Priscian: Answers to King Khosroes of Persia 9781472584137, 9781474220194, 9781472584151

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Priscian Answers to King Khosroes of Persia

Ancient Commentators on Aristotle GENERAL EDITORS: Richard Sorabji, Honorary Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Oxford, and Emeritus Professor, King’s College London, UK; and Michael Griffin, Assistant Professor, Departments of Philosophy and Classics, University of British Columbia, Canada. This prestigious series translates the extant ancient Greek philosophical commentaries on Aristotle. Written mostly between 200 and 600 AD, the works represent the classroom teaching of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic schools in a crucial period during which pagan and Christian thought were reacting to each other. The translation in each volume is accompanied by an introduction, comprehensive commentary notes, bibliography, glossary of translated terms and a subject index. Making these key philosophical works accessible to the modern scholar, this series fills an important gap in the history of European thought. A webpage for the Ancient Commentators Project is maintained at ancientcommentators.org.uk and readers are encouraged to consult the site for details about the series as well as for addenda and corrigenda to published volumes.

Priscian Answers to King Khosroes of Persia Translated by Pamela Huby, Sten Ebbesen, David Langslow, Donald Russell, Carlos Steel and Malcolm Wilson Introduction by Richard Sorabji

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

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www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2016 Paperback edition first published 2018 © Pamela Huby, Sten Ebbesen, David Langslow, Donald Russell, Richard Sorabji, Carlos Steel and Malcolm Wilson, 2016 Pamela Huby, Sten Ebbesen, David Langslow, Donald Russell, Richard Sorabji, Carlos Steel and Malcolm Wilson have asserted their rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the authors. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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978-1-47258-413-7 978-1-35006-058-6 978-1-47258-414-4 978-1-47258-415-1

Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data Names: Priscian, active approximately 500-530, author. | Huby, Pamela M., translator. Title: Answers to King Khosroes of Persia / Priscian ; translated by Pamela Huby and [5 others] ; introduction by Richard Sorabji. Description: London ; New York : Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2016. | Series: Ancient commentators on Aristotle | Includes bibliographical references and indexes in English, Latin, and Greek. | Includes bibliographical references and indexes in English, Latin, and Greek. Identifiers: LCCN 2016013011 (print) | LCCN 2016031322 (ebook) | ISBN 9781472584137 (hardback) | ISBN 9781472584144 (ePub) | ISBN 9781472584151 (ePDF) | ISBN 9781472584151 (epdf) | ISBN 9781472584144 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Islamic philosophy–Greek influences. | Philosophy, Arab. | Philosophy, Ancient–Early works to 1800. | Philosophy and science–Miscellanea– Early works to 1800. | Khosrow I, King of Persia, -579. | BISAC: PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Ancient & Classical. | PHILOSOPHY / General. | PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body. Classification: LCC B744.3 .P7513 2016 (print) | LCC B744.3 (ebook) | DDC 186/.4–dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016013011 Series: Ancient Commentators on Aristotle Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk

Contents Abbreviations Conventions Introduction Richard Sorabji Translation Preface Chapter 1: About the Soul, and Especially the Human Chapter 2: On Sleep Chapter 3: On Dreams as a Source of Prophecy Chapter 4: Astronomy and Climate Chapter 5: On the Efficacy of Contrary Medical Prescriptions Chapter 6: The Tides Chapter 7: How Elemental Bodies get Displaced Chapter 8: How Location Affects the Character of Living Things Chapter 9: Why do Things in a Good Universe Harm Each Other? Chapter 10: Of What is the Wind Made and Where Does its Motion Come From? Notes Bibliography English–Latin Glossary Latin–English Index Latin–Greek Index Subject and Name Index

vi vii

1 11 13 15 27 34 40 47 50 59 70 76 82

87 131 135 143 151 157

Abbreviations Bywater Bywater, I., Prisciani Lydi quae extant Metaphrasis in Theophrastum et Solutionum ad Chosroem liber, Supplementum Aristotelicum 1.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1886) Dübner Dübner, F., Plotini Enneades cum S Porphyrii et Procli Institutiones et Prisciani Philosophi Solutiones (Paris: Didot, 1855), cited from Bywater’s apparatus Edelstein-Kidd Edelstein, L., and Kidd, I. G., Posidonius I: The Fragments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), with translations in I. G. Kidd, Posidonius III: The Translation of the Fragments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) FHSG Fortenbaugh, W. W., Huby, P. M., Sharples, R. W., and Gutas, D., Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1992) Long-Sedley Long, A. A., and Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) SAW-Pos Stephen White, ‘Posidonius and Stoic Physics’, in R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples, eds, Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC–200AD, 2 vols (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007), vol. 1, pp 35–76 SVF Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–24)

Conventions [. . .] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation for purposes of clarity. Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Latin (and underlying Greek) text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details. (. . .) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words.

Acknowledgements The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/GW); The Ashdown Trust; the Lorne Thyssen Research Fund for Ancient World Topics at Wolfson College, Oxford; Dr Victoria Solomonides, the Cultural Attaché of the Greek Embassy in London; and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The editors wish to thank Alan C. Bowen, Nathan Gilbert, Péter Lautner, Vivian Nutton, Fritz Pedersen, David Robertson, Mossman Roueché, Lauren Tee, and Stephen White for their comments and contributions of drafts; David Robertson for preparing the indexes; John Sellars for preparing the volume for press; and Alice Wright, Commissioning Editor at Bloomsbury Academic, for her diligence in seeing each volume of the series to press.

Introduction Richard Sorabji

The sixth century diffusion of Greek Neoplatonism The Answers to King Khosroes written by Priscian of the Athenian Neoplatonist school and delivered in 531 CE in Persia represent almost the first Greek Philosophy written for another culture. King Khosroes I of Persia lost no time in inviting the Athenians, since 531 was the first year of his reign. But it must have been around the same time that Sergius of Resh’aina (died 536), bilingual in Greek and Syriac, introduced into Syriac the teaching of the other great Greek Neoplatonist school of Alexandria, where he is thought to have studied. He wrote in Syriac two commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, each with introductory material. This was only the start of a continuing diffusion.1

Priscian and the Athenian philosophers’ refuge with King Khosroes in Persia The main controversy about Simplicius’ fellow-Athenian, Priscian, has been about whether he is the author of the commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul which is ascribed to Simplicius. I have given my own affirmative opinion in the introduction to the new edition of Aristotle Transformed.2 The commentary on On the Soul and Priscian’s Paraphrase of Theophrastus on Sense Perception were discussed as part of that controversy. The present book is the third extant work of Priscian’s to be translated in the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series: his Answers to King Khosroes. Priscian was a member of the Athenian Neoplatonist school, when the Christian emperor Justinian put an end to its pagan teaching in 529.3 This would have been seen as devastating for a body that saw itself as preserving for

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the elect a unified Greek pagan philosophical position; it would not have been seen as a welcome opportunity for research leave. Priscian was one of the seven Athenians, including three known philosophers, who accepted the refuge offered at Ctesiphon by King Khosroes I (c. 501–578 CE), the king of Persia, in 531, the first year of his reign. Priscian recorded his replies given to Khosroes’ questions about philosophy and science. The façade of Khosroes’ palace at Ctesiphon, a little south of the later city of Baghdad, was still standing at the end of the 2003–2010 invasion of Iraq, although surrounded by military operations.

Khosroes’ interest in Greek philosophy and freedom of discussion The Greek historian Agathias, who records in his Histories the Athenians’ visit to Persia, was unsympathetic to the Athenian philosophers and contemptuous of Khosroes, including his intellectual ambitions, although Michel Tardieu has collected references in languages other than Greek to a large number of other intellectuals who were welcomed by Khosroes.4 The religion of the empire, says Agathias, was not pleasing to the Athenians and they were forbidden by law to act in public because they did not conform to the established religion (Histories 2.30.3–4). If Khosroes were praised for wanting to get a taste of arguments and to take pleasure in the associated doctrine, he could be regarded as superior to the rest of the barbarians (2.28.5). But how could it be supposed that he had understood Aristotle and Plato’s Phaedo, Gorgias, Timaeus, and Parmenides translated into an uncultivated (agrios) and totally uncivilised (amousotatos) language, especially when he had been brought up in the most barbarous way of life which paid attention to battles (2.28.2–4)? Agathias admits Khosroes’ brilliant generalship and indomitable spirit in battle (2.32.5), but sets no value whatever on the contrast between Justinian’s intolerance of the Athenian philosophers and Khosroes’ tolerance of different religions and beliefs. Michel Tardieu has pointed out that in his autobiography, Khosroes said that he had never turned away anyone for being of a different religion or people, and conjectures that his wife may have been Christian. Moreover, Khosroes’ own writing shows him keen to learn the laws of other peoples.5 His

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dedication to the Athenian philosophers is shown by his remarkably making it a condition of the peace treaty of 532 with Justinian that Justinian allow the Athenian philosophers back to his territory to live the rest of their lives in peace, without fear, and without having to change their traditional religious beliefs (2.31.3). Khosroes, soon after the peace treaty of 532, received another philosopher, Uranius, who got himself into the train of Justinian’s ambassador to Persia (2.29.9). The man, declared a charlatan by Agathias, was admittedly a Pyrrhonian sceptic (2.29.7) of the kind that the Athenian Neoplatonists would themselves have considered no philosopher at all, because sceptics of this kind avoided believing in anything, even the existence of philosophy, and therefore had the reputation of mere controversialists. But Khosroes for his part arranged inter-­religious debates between him and Zoroastrian priests on such substantial subjects as the eternity or otherwise of the universe, the analysis of coming into existence, nature and whether one should posit a single first principle (arkhê, 2.29.11), and humbly regarded himself as a pupil (2.32.2). He held other debates too, one between a Nestorian and a monophysite Christian about their disagreements (Agathias 2.29.11).6 Khosroes’ cosmopolitanism is shown also by the dedications of another philosopher, Paul of Persia. Paul continued the Greek tradition, culminating in Ammonius in Alexandria, of writing introductions to Philosophy and to Aristotelian logic and he addressed two such writings in Middle Persian to Khosroes. His work had enduring influence being translated quickly into Syriac in the sixth century and via Syriac 400 years later in the tenth century into Arabic, where it influenced Muslim and Christian philosophers alike writing in Arabic. Paul was a Christian at the time he instructed Khosroes in philosophy, but a thirteenth century Christian Syrian source, Barhebraeus, says that, on failing to become Metropolitan Bishop of Persia, Paul converted to Zoroastrianism.7 If that is so, it is a further mark of cosmopolitanism that a Christian in Khosroes’ circle could explain pagan Greek philosophy to the Persian king in Persian, and then convert to Zoroastrianism. According to Agathias’ Histories 2.30.3, the Athenians had thought they were going to the land of Plato’s philosopher-­king, where justice would reign, and they became restive through finding that Khosroes was not the ideal ruler of the ideal country they had imagined. There were in fact different criteria for being a philosopher-­king, as witnessed for example in the earlier controversy

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after 355 CE between the Greek commentator Themistius and his former pupil who was to become emperor, Julian the Apostate, in Constantinople.8 But the record of Priscian’s ten answers suggests a different reason for Athenian restiveness. Khosroes’ questions start in the first chapter with the human soul, a very good starting topic for the Athenian philosophers, and one on which Priscian was an expert, if he wrote the commentary on Aristotle On the Soul. But from there they would like to go upwards to the divine human intellect, to the Platonic Ideas which the intellect contemplates, and eventually to the supreme divinity not describable in words. But as a practical ruler, Khosroes wanted to move downwards to such topics of practical interest as the physiology of sleep, prophecy through dreams, astronomy and climate, medicines, the tides, meteorology, the biological effects of different locations, the reasons for harmful animals, and the origin of winds. This was the very opposite direction from that in which the Athenians believed one ought to go. Priscian found a little home ground with the soul as prophetic because divine and separable and with an account anticipating Leibniz of the arrangements of Providence concerning dangerous animals. But on the whole, despite the many scientific books he consulted, he was less well informed.

The Athenians’ move from Khosroes in Ctesiphon Part of the Athenians’ desire to move on from Ctesiphon will have been due to the focus on questions about the physical world, which may suggest that they had not had forewarning of the questions. If the questions were not sent to Athens by Khosroes in advance and the answers prepared before they left, either they will have brought their library with them, or just possibly they will have written up the answers after they left and sent them back to Khosroes for translation into Persian, since we know that Simplicius at least (whether or not Priscian) wrote after they left, drawing on some extensive library. Agathias’ reasons for their ’all going home and saying goodbye to the barbarian’s hospitality’ (2.31.2), included Khosroes not understanding any of the higher (aiputera) things because he did not even share their beliefs (doxa), presumably about theological matters (3.31.1). But here Agathias is again going too far, because although Khosroes was soon afterwards to regard himself as a humble

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pupil of Uranius, he did get that visiting sceptic to debate higher matters, about the eternity of the world and a supreme principle, as well as about nature and coming into being, so he was not uninterested. It is not impossible that he had learnt about the higher matters from earlier talks with the Athenians, not included in what Priscian was commissioned to answer. As to where the Athenians went after they left Khosroes in Ctesiphon, it is hard to speak for all of them. But Ilsetraut Hadot has supported the hypothesis of Michel Tardieu that Simplicius at least, whose commentaries on Aristotle were written after Ctesiphon, did his writing in Carrhae, later called Harrān, which is just north of modern Syria into the territory of modern Turkey. Certainly that would be a safe place from which to retreat back into Persia from Justinian’s distant capital. But her best argument, I believe, for endorsing Harrān in particular is that Simplicius speaks in his commentary on Aristotle On the Heavens 525,101–13 of having experienced (epeirathên) boats that float on inflated animal bladders. He would have seen these in Ctesiphon, but actually trying one out would have most easily been done about forty kilometers away from Harrān on the River Aboras. Although evidence has not been found for a continuous school in Harrān right up to the ninth century when the mathematician Thābit Ibn Qurra moved from there to Baghdad, and the tenth century when there is an Arabic report of a Platonist school there and al-Fārābī is said to have moved to Harrān,9 continuity is not, I think, necessary. Even in Athens the Platonist and Aristotelian schools had disappeared and been re-­founded from time to time. But the earlier tradition in a site can recommend it as a site for refounding. So if Simplicius did set up a school, or use an existing library, his memory could have helped to encourage re-­establishment even after discontinuities.

The need for retrotranslation back to the original Greek from the surviving Latin translation Priscian’s record of his answers to Khosroes’ questions is fascinating, revealing, but tantalising. The sixth century Greek, from which a Persian translation was presumably made for Khosroes, is lost. What survives is a Latin translation,10 perhaps of the ninth century, whose translator understood properly neither the Greek nor the philosophy and science. A literal translation into English

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Introduction

could only preserve intact the unintelligibility of the Latin. What turned out often to be needed was a retrotranslation, conjecturing what the original Greek could have been, and a translation into English based at least partly on that. I am indebted to the outstanding scholars who brought their knowledge of Greek, handwritten manuscripts, philosophy, and science to bear. Handwriting is important because the introduction of cursive script between the time of Priscian and his Latin translator would induce new types of miscopying. To offer some examples of the Latin failing to provide a satisfactory translation of the Greek, sometimes it may have taken the wrong sense of an ambiguous Greek expression. For instance, in Chapter 7, it may have been the conjectured Greek euporos which is translated as opulens (rich), instead of in terms of its other meaning: easy to pass through, 79,26. Chapter  6 alone exemplifies a great variety of problem cases. It may have been the conjectured Greek akhanês which has been translated as silentium (silence), instead of gaping, 74,15. It may have been the conjectured Greek logos which was taken as verbum (word) instead of ratio (system), 73,3. Sometimes a Greek expression may have been divided up wrongly into horous (limits), instead of ho rhous (the flow), 72,3. In other cases, the Latin text contains a gap which needs to be filled by some conjectured Greek words, 74,2; 76,12. Decisions on whether the Latin needs to be emended by conjecture about the original Greek often turn on the Latin not making the best available sense, or any sense at all. But alternatively, if the Latin presents Priscian as citing a known earlier work of Greek philosophy or science, we may have access to the Greek terminology of that earlier Greek work, to serve as a control. The most extreme case of the Latin making no sense at all may come in Chapter 6, 74,1–6, where the editor of the Latin text in 1886, the outstanding Ingram Bywater, followed by another major scholar Ian Kidd,11 gave up as hopeless the attempt to get sense out of the text even by emendation, although our contributors, Stephen White and Donald Russell, both made an attempt. Bywater, the first editor after Duebnen’s transcription from a single codex, offered a large number of retrotranslations at the foot of the page, coupled with an index of conjectured Greek terms, and with the provision of conjectured Greek terms also against his index of Latin terms. Our translators have often found his proposals useful, although also offering their own alternatives. Further retroversions were suggested by Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, in her

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article of 1977, ‘ “Les solutions ad Chosroem” de Priscianus Lydus et Jean Scot’, a title she used to endorse the suggestion of J. Quicherat in 1853, but rejected by some other scholars, that the Latin translator was John Scotus Eriugena.12 The scholars cited found the barbarous Latin with its neologisms unworthy of Eriugena. But she explained this by saying that Eriugena would have been constrained by the attempt to translate the Greek literally word for word, and therefore to coin neologisms when Latin had no exact equivalent. I do not think that that accounts for the types of mistake in the Latin to be illustrated below, because this regularly involves not merely poor style but actual unintelligibility, and I would hope that Eriugena was not responsible for this. One consideration in choosing a retroversion is philosophical: which retroversion would supply a doctrine that Priscian would have been at all likely to endorse or ascribe to another philosopher? The editor also checked whether he understood the revised translation by composing an introductory note giving an account of the doctrine of each chapter, except for Chapter  1, for which Carlos Steel provided the introductory note.

Who was responsible for the unintelligibilities in the Latin? Often it has become clear that unintelligibilities were due to the Latin translator. This is perhaps clearest in cases where the original Greek word was ambiguous, and the Latin translator took the wrong sense. Examples are offered in the notes on Chapter  7, at 79,26 concerning the Latin opulentissima, on Chapter 1, at 48,31–2,  figurativa and on Chapter 6, at 69,20, expectare. Sometimes the Latin is itself meaningless because it has followed a grammatical construction which exists in Greek, but not in Latin, although Latin had a perfectly good alternative construction for expressing the point, so that following the Greek did not constitute a necessary coinage. Examples are given in the notes on Chapter 1 at 48,7 and Chapter 4, at 67,30. Altogether, the notes supply many examples. But is Priscian himself never the source of unintelligibility? This is easiest to test in cases where Priscian is following closely extensive passages from Aristotle, his most extensive source in some chapters, but suddenly appears to diverge in a way that produces very little sense. One example is offered in the note on Chapter 10, at 100,10: the explanation that Aristotle gives of why the north and south winds

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are dominant is offered in this chapter as an explanation of something entirely different, that winds are constituted by a dry exhalation, but it is obscure how it could possibly explain that. In general, the subject of winds and meteorology seems a little unfamiliar to him. At 100,14–15, he seems to misunderstand Aristotle Meteor. 361a24–5 by suggesting that the entire air follows the path of the winds, instead of the entire air and the winds below it following the path of the heavens. There is a third possibility illustrated at Chapter 7, 80,24–5, but I think it less likely. Priscian is following Aristotle’s definitions of fluid and dry which contrast the fluid as lacking a boundary of its own, but easily receiving a boundary from non-­fluid, with the dry which easily supplies its own boundary, but is otherwise hard to bound (dushoriston, On Coming-­to-Be and PassingAway 329b30–2). The Latin substitutes infinitum (unbounded) for hard to bound. Why? – cannot the dry be bounded by a river? It is just possible that Aristotle’s Greek had been miscopied either by Priscian or by a predecessor. But it is like the inaccuracy of the Latin translator not to distinguish hard to bound from unbounded, and I think the great majority of the unintelligibilities have been introduced by him.

The contributors to overcoming the unintelligibilities of the Latin Dealing with the unintelligibilities has been a matter of team work. Pamela Huby began by writing a literal translation of the entire Latin text and supplying footnotes for the whole. She is the only scholar in the team, apart from the general editor, who has looked at every part. Her version received from the fellow scholars named below comments designed in the normal way for this series to suggest improvements for the final revision.13 No progress would have been made without her first version. But the very literalness revealed that the Latin was not in itself sufficiently intelligible. At least two more things were needed. One was specialist knowledge of the ancient science increasingly central to chapters after the first. On astronomy and climate, specialist knowledge was provided by Alan Bowen, with further comments by Fritz Pedersen, and by Donald Russell who checked the original sources used by

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Priscian. Knowledge of ancient medicine was supplied by Vivian Nutton for the chapters on medicines and on such harmful animals as poisonous snakes. Stephen White supplied comments on theories of the tides and his article on that subject, cited in the notes, was of the greatest value. Malcolm Wilson provided his expertise on the winds. Concerning the opening chapter on the human soul, as seen by Priscian, Carlos Steel lent his most particular expertise. The input from history of science left a good proportion of the literal translation standing, but more was still required. It was Carlos Steel who first rightly emphasised that besides scholarship in the history of science something more was needed: retrotranslation, or retroversion to the original Greek. This calls for a rare kind of skill, but Pamela Huby had already taken account of a good number of retroversions suggested by Ingram Bywater. Steel, who was highly experienced in retroversion, worked on Priscian’s preface and his Chapter 1. Sten Ebbesen worked on Chapters 5, 8, and 9, and provided a list of suggested retroversions for these and for parts of other chapters. David Langslow had already provided an independent version of Chapter  9, but, reassuringly, it usually agreed with Ebbesen’s, and the two versions were collated, retaining Langslow’s choice of words to a considerable extent, with a third decision called for only on some of the occasions when the versions diverged. Langslow and on Chapter 10 Malcolm Wilson were well aware of the need for some retroversion. Donald Russell re-­translated the best part of five chapters (2, 3, 4, 6, and 7), and added many retroversions, even where Bywater had given up, as well as other emendations, leaving to the general editor only the second half of Chapter  7, where Priscian’s use of Aristotle supplied a sufficient guide to the original Greek. By working in person with Russell, the editor had the privilege of learning a great deal. The resulting retroversions and emendations could in the future help with a new edition, and that was the original reason for drawing attention to the contributions of the translator of each chapter, and, with the help of initials, to some contributions by others.

Notes 1 I have sketched a little more of it in the Introduction to Richard Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Re-Interpreted (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).

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2 See Richard Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed, 2nd edn (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. xxxii–xxxiii. 3 For overviews of Priscian, including discussion of the Answers to King Khosroes, see F. A. J. De Haas, ‘Priscian of Lydia and Pseudo-Simplicius on the Soul’, in L. P. Gerson, ed., The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. 2, pp. 756–63, and Matthias Perkams, ‘Priscien de Lydie’, in R. Goulet, ed., Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (Paris: CNRS, 1989–), vol. 5b, pp. 1514–21. 4 Michel Tardieu, ‘Chosroes’, in R. Goulet, ed., Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (Paris: CNRS, 1989–), vol. 2, pp. 309–18. See also Joel. T. Walker, ‘The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran’, The Ancient World 33 (2002), 45–69. 5 Michel Tardieu, ‘Chosroes’, pp. 311, 312, 317. Freedom of religious belief and freedom of speech are two further subjects, the latter with concessions about moral limits to personal abuse, discussed by the earlier commentator Themistius, as cited in the Introduction to Aristotle Re-Interpreted. 6 Michel Tardieu, ‘Chosroes’, p. 312. 7 Ibid., p. 315. 8 Simon Swain, Themistius, Julian and Greek Political Theory under Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Cf. Riccardo Chiaradonna, ‘La Lettera a Temistio di Giuliano Imperatore e il dibattiyo filosofico nel IV secolo’, in A. Marcone, ed., L’imperatore Giuliano: Realtà storica e rappresentazione (Florence: Le Monnier, 2015), pp. 149–71, and the Introduction to Aristotle Re-Interpreted. 9 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-­aʿyān, ed. I. Abbas, 8 vols (Beirut: Dār S.ādir, 1977), vol. 5, § 706, pp. 153–7. I owe this reference to Michael Chase. 10 Edited by I. Bywater in Prisciani Lydi quae extant Metaphrasis in Theophrastum et Solutionum ad Chosroem liber, Supplementum Aristotelicum 1.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1886). 11 I. G. Kidd, Posidonius III: The Translation of the Fragments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 292 (fr. 219 Edelstein-Kidd). 12 In Jean Scot Èrigène et l’Histoire de la Philosophie, Colloques internationaux du CNRS, no. 561 (Paris: CNRS, 1977), pp. 145–60. 13 The editor thanks for comments on chs 1–3, pp. 42–63, Péter Lautner; for the same on chs 4–6, pp. 63–76, David Robertson; for chs 4–5, pp. 63–9, Nathan Gilbert; for chs 7–9, pp. 77–98, Mossman Roueché; and for ch. 10, pp. 98–104, Lauren Tee. Postscript on Khosroes. For his acquiring from India the Pancatantra or Five Tales, in a style like Aesop’s, and getting them translated from Sanskrit, see Audrey Truschke, Culture of Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court, Columbia University Press and Penguin India, 2016, p. 10, n. 28.

Priscian Answers to King Khosroes of Persia Translation

Priscian the Philosopher’s Answers to Problems Raised by Khosroes, King of the Persians [Preface]

Translated by Carlos Steel with notes by Carlos Steel, unless otherwise specified1

Since there are many and different problems raised in the question, and each chapter offers different occasions2 for inquiry, it is necessary, having distinguished [the problems], one by one, to connect in a similar way suitable answers to the questions, and to apply to them as far as possible precise3 and valid proofs extracted from books of the ancients. We will use brief and concise language, in such a way that neither should a lengthy flow trouble the [reader], nor should it leave out4 any of the issues needing to be discussed insofar as they are in our power and relevant to the present occasion.5 Therefore, for those who want to correct what has been written, or to acquire an understanding of what is right and good in it,6 it may become easy to gather from which books these arguments have been composed, by summing up7 where we have read8 the ancients.9 Arguments have been taken and developed from Plato’s Timaeus and Phaedo and Phaedrus and Republic and other appropriate dialogues, and from the works10 of Aristotle On Physics and On Heaven11 and On Coming-­to-Be and Passing-Away and from the Meteorology; likewise also from the works On Sleep and Dreams, and from those that are written as it were in the form of dialogues On Philosophy and On the Worlds.12 Again Theophrastus has offered for the questions raised numerous remarkable resources13 from his Natural History and his Physics and from what he says On Sleep and Dreams and likely On Harmful Bites and On Winds and On Ways and Customs and Habitats.14

41,5

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42,1

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Hippocrates too contributes to it 15 with his On Air, Places and Waters. We have also taken useful material from Strabo’s Geography;16 and from Albinus’17 Outline of the Platonic Doctrines from Gaius’ Lecture Notes; further too from Geminus’ commentary on Posidonius’ work on Meteorology; and from Ptolemy’s Geography on the [terrestrial] latitudes,18 and from his Astronomical works, if we found something useful in it; and from Marcianus’ Periêgêsis19 and from Arrianus’ Meteora;20 from Didymus, the writer on Aristotle and his doctrines,21 and from Dorotheus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.22 And Theodotus is appreciated for offering us from his collection of notes of Ammonius’23 lectures many useful resources,24 and Porphyry from his Various Questions,25 and Iamblichus in his writing On the Soul,26 and Alexander and Themistius in their commentaries on Aristotle; the great Plotinus also, and Proclus who composed on all [subjects] different monographs and above all On the Three Arguments, by which Plato Demonstrates the Immortality of the Soul.27 This is the first question, made up of many parts, where [the king] says the following:

Chapter 1

[About the Soul, and Especially the Human] Translated by Carlos Steel

Introductory note Khosroes raises three different questions about the soul: (1) what is the nature of the soul (answer on 43,18–49,36); (2) is it one and the same in all bodies, or is it different? and if it is different, how to explain the differences in the soul? (answer on 50,1–24); (3) how are body and soul connected with one another (answer on 50,25–52,12). The first question receives the most articulated answer. Priscian distinguishes in his argumentation four sections, as announced on 43,19–21: ‘For those who gratefully follow the views of the ancient authorities no way of argumentation would be needed that the rational soul is (1) a substance that is (2) incorporeal and (3) incorruptible and (4) separable from the body, with which it is naturally conjoined.’ The first section is found on 43,21–44,14; the second on 44,15–28; the fourth on 44,29– 46,29; the third on 47,1–49,36. As Priscian announces, he will follow in this chapter ‘the views of ancient authorities’. As a matter of fact, almost nothing is original in this chapter, which is a summarizing compilation of three Neoplatonic authorities mentioned in his preface: (1) Porphyry’s Miscellaneous Questions, (2) Iamblichus’ treatise On the Soul, (3) Proclus’ monograph On the Three Arguments by which Plato Demonstrates the Immortality of the Soul. In 47,1–49,36 Priscian closely follows Proclus, as can be demonstrated through parallels in the Arabic transmission of this lost treatise. In 50,25–52,22 on the union of soul and body without confusion, he follows Porphyry’s Miscellaneous Questions, as is clear from parallels with Nemesius’ treatise On Human Nature. Section 44,15–28 may come from the same source, as parallels with Calcidius show; moreover it presupposes the same distinctions of mixture as made in

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50,25–51,9. It is more difficult to delineate the extracts adopted from Iamblichus’ treatise On the Soul, as we have no parallels here. If, however, we remove the sections that must be attributed to Porphyry and Proclus, there remain two possible sections that may come from Iamblichus: (1) the argumentation that the soul is separable from the body (44,29–46,29) and (2) the discussion on how differences among human souls can be explained (50,1–23). The first section contains a long argument to demonstrate that the soul’s substance is separated from the body starting from an analysis of the activity of philosophy, which makes us separate the soul from the body, as described in the Phaedo.28 This is a kind of argument related to the praise of philosophy in Iamblichus’ Protrepticus. Moreover, one finds a reference to such an argument in Priscian’s Commentary On the Soul, which has Iamblichus’ treatise as its mean inspiration. Some additional arguments for the separate nature of the soul, such as dreams and visions, also point to Iamblichus, who was strongly interested in these phenomena (see parallels in De Mysteriis). All this indicates that Priscian may depend on Iamblichus in this section. Regarding the second problem (on the differences between souls), it is difficult to attribute it to a particular author. The question whether every soul is of the same species or not is raised by Aristotle at the beginning of On the Soul (402b1). In his commentary on this passage Priscian writes: ‘He judges the issue worthy of enquiry because of those who introduce the differentia in composites from matter and not from the form’ (12,5–6 trans. Urmson). According to Priscian the divergence in species must come from ‘different forms or from the different principles (logoi) within one single form’ (14–15). However, the question discussed in this treatise is not about differences between souls of different kinds of animals (lions, horses), but about differences between individuals sharing the same nature. Interestingly, this question is discussed at length in Chapter 8, which starts from a summary of the conclusion we reach in Chapter 1 (see 88,23–9 to be compared with 50,1–23). The close connection between both chapters may indicate that the author had himself a particular interest in this question, and that this section is his own contribution. All in all, the reader of this chapter remains frustrated seeing how little original the author has to say himself about the soul (which is surprising given the fact that he is most probably the author of the De Anima commentary attributed to Simplicius). However, he has preserved important texts on the soul of post-Plotinian Platonists. CS

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First, what is the nature of the soul, and is it one and the same in all bodies, or is it different? And does the difference in shape of bodies of each living being come from a difference of the soul,29 or does a difference in the soul come from a difference in the body? For if, as it seems, the soul,30 and especially the human soul, is homogenously shaped by one character,31 nevertheless each [person] is different from another, and they are not similar to one another.32 But then we ought also to know from what cause a difference in the soul comes. For if the body alters the soul, and for this reason every soul differs from every other, the body clearly rules the soul. But if the soul alters the body, and a difference of shape comes from that same cause, it is obvious that the soul is the ruler of the body. But if each is altered on account of their mixture, it is evident that the mixture is better than each, and it remains to be seen what the mixture is, and how body and soul are mixed. These questions having been posed, we must first enquire about the soul, whether it is a substance, and self-­subsistent, and not allotted to be in something else; and, if that has been demonstrated, whether it is incorporeal and simple and without composition and indissoluble and33 uniform; it is necessarily connected with these attributes that the soul is immortal and incorruptible and that it cannot perish and is separated from bodies; or one should attribute to the soul the opposite properties.

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Whether the soul is a substance or an accident? For those who gratefully follow the views of the ancient authorities no way of argumentation would be needed [to show] that the rational soul is a substance that is incorporeal and incorruptible and separate from the body, with which it is naturally conjoined. However, as questions keep exciting those who believe the argument about it, as they have heard it many times in like manner, we ought nevertheless to demonstrate that the soul is a self-­subsistent substance as follows.34 It is characteristic of a substance that is self-­subsistent, I mean an individual and singular substance, that, while it remains the same and numerically one,35 it is capable of receiving contraries in accordance with its change in quality.36 Thus bodies are receptive of white and black, health and sickness, and receive contraries in turns; and the soul too is receptive of

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contraries in turns, justice I mean and intemperance, prudence and imprudence, in short, virtue and vice. Hence it is evident that the soul, which is capable of change through contraries, and is receptive of them by subsisting, is a substance that subsists by itself. As it is receptive of these things by subsisting, it is a self-­ subsisting substance and not a quality: for it would neither subsist by itself, if it were a quality, but [it would] exist in substances; nor would it become quality, if it were receptive of contrary qualities, without subsisting first by itself. The fact of being receptive of contraries indicates that the soul is a substance. And it is the property of an individual substance, not to admit within itself [degrees of] more and less.37 Through this [argument] in short and through many other [arguments] the rational soul has been shown clearly to be a substance subsisting by itself. That it is incorporeal, must be shown from the following.

That the soul is incorporeal38 [If] the soul [is corporeal], it is either juxtaposed (1) to the animal being animated by it, or it is mixed (2) with it, or fused together (3) with it.39 (1) If it is juxtaposed as it were touching, the animal may not be animated as a whole; for it is impossible for a body as a whole to be juxtaposed to a body as a whole; but the whole animal is animated; the soul is therefore not juxtaposed to it, and for this reason it is not a body. (2) If it is mixed, the soul will not longer be one thing, but something divided and made of parts; however, the soul must be one thing; it is therefore not mixed.40 (3) If it is fused together with it, the whole body will pass through the whole body; but this is impossible; for there will be two bodies in the same thing. And so it is neither juxtaposed nor mixed nor fused together: and necessarily it is also not a body, but it passes through [the body it animates] as an incorporeal substance. It is indeed a property of what is incorporeal to pass through the whole body.

That the soul is separate from the body and turned to itself These are our answers to show that the soul is incorporeal. But if someone41 were to bring in objections taken from [a consideration of] the irrational soul

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and the animation of other [i.e. non rational] animals, that is their endelekheia, as they [i.e. the Peripatetics] are accustomed to call it, and argue that even in [these animals] life pervades the whole body and makes it moving, he should understand the difference between a separate soul and one that is not separate. The irrational soul does not subsist without a body, nor does it act by itself, but it brings into the body some sort of thing: a connatural spirit42 ministering to take care of the body, or a natural heat,43 as some people call it, that is subordinated to it to make the body move and nourish and change. But of the rational soul we say that it is separate, and if this has been demonstrated, we can show from there that the soul is an incorporeal substance,44 having assumed before that, if a soul has an activity without body, it certainly will have its substance separate.45 If 46 then virtue is a property of the rational soul, through which it rules over the irrational soul and governs life; and if it is proper to [virtue] to be an accurate47 knowledge of things that are, that is to say, of divine and intelligible beings48 – for through both [i.e. virtue and knowledge] philosophers are worthy both in contemplation and in action – and if to philosophize is nothing other than to have a life pure and uncontaminated with matter and an unerring knowledge of things that truly are; and if to know the things that are without first knowing oneself is impossible; and if it is necessary that those who know themselves have an incorporeal nature that is appropriately related to that which is to be known – for there is no body that is capable of knowing itself or of being turned at all to itself 49 – and if it belongs to everything that knows to be turned to what is known, and if it belongs for that reason to what knows itself to have an activity of knowledge turned to itself: thus it is clear that the soul has necessarily a separate being.50 51 from the fact that it purifies itself from the things we desire: for how would the soul ever have a virtue that purifies it of bodily passions, if it had its being located in a body? For no purification would want a corruption to come upon what has been purified, while it is a removal of alien things, which are against nature.52 If therefore the soul in doing philosophy is released from bodily chains,53 it is clear thus also that it is by nature different from the body. For it is impossible for what is inseparable from matter to become unaffected by matter, since no being has an activity superior to its own substance.

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From both arguments54 it is clear that doing philosophy shows that we are both incorporeal and separated from matter: incorporeal through our capacity of knowing, separated from matter through our way of life according to virtue, and through both the soul is shown to live a life bodiless and separated from bodies. Let us sum up in the following way: a soul that engages in philosophy both knows itself and the things that are before itself and are separate from bodies; everything that knows itself and things that are separate from bodies, through knowing itself is [shown to be] incorporeal, but through knowing what is separate from bodies is [shown to be] separate: therefore the soul that engages in philosophy is both incorporeal and separate from bodies, and consequently it is neither dissolved nor does it perish with bodies. And so since everything that knows separate things and itself, is identical [with what it knows]55 and turned to itself, it is absolutely separate.56 For it cannot have the same activity with the body, since the latter is not at all turned to itself. Thus it is obvious: the rational soul is separate as being turned to itself. And through many other arguments it is shown that the soul has activities separate from the body, as when some [visions] appear in sleep57 about the future and what is absolutely uncertain,58 and also the fact that, [even] when the body is awake, there come to the soul illuminations of divine actions as if it were familiar with them, and prophecies of future events needing nothing of sense or of bodily phantasms, but the soul projects from within itself 59 an activity which is its own and entirely separate from the body.60 If then the soul is separate from the body both in its substance and in its intellectual activities, it follows necessarily from this that it is without composition and simple and uniform, for the composition of bodies is from matter and form, that is a mixture resulting from the combination of elements, whereas an incorporeal substance is situated beyond these and, while it is in itself uniform and by essence not mixed with other things, it is rightly61 [considered] incorruptible. For if everything that is composite is dissoluble, and what is dissoluble is also corruptible, it remains that the soul, which is not composite, is neither dissoluble nor corruptible, but incorruptible as simple; and from the necessity of this [argument] [it follows] that it is also immortal. And some who were engaged in these matters came to the same conclusion with different arguments.62

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[Three closely connected arguments about the soul]63 There are three closely connected arguments for the soul’s immortality and incorruptibility. The first64 is taken from the activity of the soul and runs as follows: the soul always imparts life to any body in which it is present; all that always imparts life is incapable of receiving the contrary of life; for if it always imparts it, it always has it by essence and by nature; none, however, of the things that truly are,65 can receive that which is capable of destroying a property inherent in it66 by essence and connatural to it; but a contrary is necessarily corruptive of its contrary; the soul therefore will never receive the contrary of that which it always imparts, life. But the contrary of life is death: the soul therefore does not receive death; and for this reason it is immortal. One of the wise men of the past, I mean the great Plotinus,67 adds even an a fortiori argument: if the soul cannot even receive back the very life it imparts, a fortiori it can not receive the contrary of life, namely death. For since it has the cause of this life connaturally, it does not need the life it gives to the body, as this is only a shadow of the life it has by its essence. No cause, indeed, needs its effect, because it always possesses powers superior to those which it bestows upon the effect. Fire, too, cannot receive back the heat it bestows upon the objects heated by it (for it has heat as connatural property) and for this reason still much less can it receive the cold, which is, also by its heaviness, contrary to its connatural heat. And in general, everything which always gives whatsoever form will receive neither what it gives nor its contrary. As for the second argument,68 let us first accept the following premise: whatever is not destroyed by its own evil, cannot possibly be destroyed by the evil of something else. For when its own good is present, it cannot destroy it (because what comes from what holds it together, is what preserves it69), nor can the intermediate, which is neither good nor bad [destroy it].70 What remains to say is this: the only cause that can destroy a thing is its own evil. We must also agree to the following: a vice of the soul is worse than the death of the body; now the vices of the soul are ignorance,71 intemperance, injustice, cowardice, and the like; but a soul that suffers from these vices is not destroyed by them, nor do they exhaust its life, as is the case with corruptible bodies, but the irrational part is even more alive and sustained by these vices, whereas the rational part remains likewise alive in itself, though, owing to its ignorance,

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it has a diminished knowledge of the things that are. Thus, those who have every kind of vice, far from being weakened by it, rather seem to be excited72 by themselves and more easily stirred to actions than those contrary to them.73 Thus, the vices of the soul do not destroy it; but whatever is not destroyed by its own evil is indestructible. It follows that the soul is indestructible. The third [argument] derives its illuminating74 demonstrative force from causality.75 Self-­movement is shown to be the cause of immortality for souls, as it exists in them by virtue of their essence and is as it were the efficient cause of immortality. That the soul is moved by itself must be proved as follows: the soul is both life, in that it gives life to others, and alive throughout itself, in that it acts upon itself and turns to itself. For what bestows life on others, lives first through itself. Insofar as it is life, it imparts movement (for this is proper to all life, to impart movement in any way), and insofar as it is alive, it is in movement. For everything that participates in life, is in movement in virtue of its being alive. On these two accounts, then, the soul has been proved to be moving as well as moved, and both as a whole, so that throughout itself it is living as well as life. For because its activity is identical with its essence, it is entirely76 activity, acting first upon itself and permeating as a whole itself as a whole, because it is itself that which is moved by itself and acting [upon itself]. And thus one activity is at the same time both: it acts upon itself and it is a cause of movement for others. First it moves itself; for separate causes77 are first causes of themselves, and only thus of the things that are caused. The soul, therefore, having vital movement, at the same time imparts movement by being life and is in movement by being alive. Now what moves itself and is moved by itself, is the purely self-­moved, and this is only found in incorporeal and separate essences, such as the soul; the soul, indeed, is truly self-­moved, but it imparts to the participating body an appearance of self-­moved life.78 Thus, the specific character79 and as it were the definition of the soul is self-­movement, inasmuch as it exists by itself and knows by itself. We can sum up as follows: whatever participates in soul is alive; whatever is alive participates in a movement of its own; therefore whatever participates in soul participates in a movement of its own. But since it belongs to the definition of the soul to impart its own movement to those things to which it is present, and since everything that brings about a certain form is itself primarily what it

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imparts to the things that participate in it, it follows that the soul is primarily moved by itself. We say this of the rational soul only, for the irrational [soul], which has as it were the appearance of self-­movement, is moved by itself together with something else [namely the body] and not through itself. For if it were moved by itself through itself, without needing the body for moving itself, it would have a substance separate from body, just as it would have a separate activity. For whatever acts without a body is also separate from the body, lest the not separate would have an activity superior to its substance. So the irrational soul is not moved by itself through itself, but together with the body. The rational soul, then, has been proved to be moved by itself both on the ground that it moves itself and on the ground that it is moved in itself.80 And let its specific character and as it were its definition be: a self-­moving hypostasis.81 Now the soul is moved and moves by thinking and considering and believing.82 In fact, a movement moved by itself is none of the passive movements, since they are proper of things moved by something else, whereas self-­movement is of an incorporeal being. To be sure, the rational soul too moves with corporeal movements, but not in the manner of a body, but these too in the manner of self-­movement, such as coming to be and passing away, increase and decrease, change and locomotion.83 Thus, the soul seems to ‘come to be’ when it proceeds from that which is not, i.e. from sensible things, toward that which [truly] is, through knowledge and reception of better and intelligible things. It seems also to partake in ‘passing away’ when it is transferred from that which is to that which is not: for being weakened it loses the knowledge of the better and by surrendering to the pollution of the body84 it seems on this account to partake in passing away. Further we say that ‘the eye of the soul’,85 when ‘nourished’86 by the good and the beautiful and the wise, is ‘increased’, while it ‘is diminished’87 by the evil, the ugly and contraries like these. And it also subject to ‘change’, when it is qualitatively altered through vice and virtue. It has also ‘locomotion’: for at some time, when on earth, it is bound to the body, because it is connatural to it; then again, when it is estranged from the body, it returns to its ordained abode. Thus it performs also the movements of the body while being moved by itself. It follows then that self-­movement88 is both complete and self-­sufficient, because it needs only itself, not anything else, to move.

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[Differences among the souls] With these reasons showing that the soul is incorporeal and simple, who could admit a difference among the souls that exist in bodies? For what kind of otherness would come about in a being that is simple and lacks quality with respect to its essence? Therefore, of souls that are, as being moved through themselves, undifferentiated in essence with respect to each other, there rightly is a difference in qualities:89 the one is known from virtue, the other from vice, and for that reason some souls will receive greater honour from God, and other souls evil by holding back [from them] what is better.90 The shapes of bodies get their difference not from the rational soul, but from their parents and from the inequalities of places and atmospheres.91 This is shown clearly to be the case in other animals and in general in those things that are subject to generation and corruption, as the constitution of bodies is different according to external or even connatural causes.92 Neither therefore does the soul alter the body into different shapes, nor is it itself altered by the body, as it is superior to all change because of its own simplicity. For in all animals the shape of each is the same by nature, like the shape of man or horse or lion or others, and it will never depart from its uniformity or its connatural character.93 The qualities however alter individually the particular differences, from which the [individuals] are recognized,94 just as men differ among themselves, and each other animate or inanimate thing. In this way the mixture of composites is somehow the cause of a different quality in bodies.

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same time be joined to [constitute] the substance of one single thing. For [only] if things are destroyed when being united, do they produce one substance. But if they can be preserved, even if that may escape our notice, they are apparently not connaturally united into one substance, as is the case with a mixture of wine and water. For an oily sponge may drive out pure water from the mixture, and papyrus likewise.96 For this reason one should believe that they97 are connected with each other, but are not united connaturally. This then is wonderful in the case of the soul, how the same thing is both mixed with something else, like those things [which are united by] being conjointly destroyed, and remains preserving its own essence, like those things which are posited side by side.98 For this is the nature of incorporeal things: the mixture of those things which are immaterial is not achieved with their destruction, but they fill throughout without hindrance everything that is suitable to receive them, and they pass through the whole without being corrupted by one another, and they remain unmixed and are not conjointly destroyed. For an incorporeal being is capable of unifying itself into indivisibility and of unifying whatever body it is present to into a temperate mixture, as a result of which the parts of that body too are united with one another. It remains therefore united without confusion.99 And for this reason it has an indivisible nature, but it is divided through its connatural relation to the body. In the case of things which give light, as a lantern set in position, it is only the light that affects in some way the air,100 but the fire itself is kept inside the candleholder. Different is the case of life that is by essence life and incorporeal: the animated body is illuminated by it, yet [life] is not mingled to one thing, like fire [inside the candleholder], but it is everywhere in the body,101 not as one thing in another fitted together through juxtaposition, but it is united without confusion, and is diffused throughout the whole, remaining indeed most perfectly incorruptible as incorporeal. But if some people102 do not accept that such a unity of mixed things can come about in the case of bodies, yet show that the thing itself, mixture, exists, it is not impossible [that such a mixture comes about in incorporeal beings]. However, because the soul is incorporeal, it cannot be affected by the ills which enter by being subservient to bodies in mixtures. For incorporeal beings are united with bodies and yet remain without confusion, and are made one with another being and yet preserve their unity through themselves. And yet they direct those things in which they are to an activity

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corresponding to them: just as the sun turns air into light and fire warms the things nearest to it; light, however, is united with air, like those things which are destroyed together, and yet remains not confused with it. For this reason the activity of incorporeal things too has its being and its strength in itself, easily filling completely those things which are suited to receive it. For it is not the case that, as a flame is ignited on a wick,103 so the soul is in a body, but it is united [to the body] as a flame attached to it, though it remains separate as a number side by side with a number, and is not added like things touching, for it lacks size. Nor is it enclosed as in a bag; for it is more than a measure. But the soul is a unity ineffable to reason and imagination, [which operate] on the level of sense perception; only intelligence can perceive it. For the creator of this universe, who made also the intellectual beings – that is, the nature of the things that received from him the occasions [of their existence]104 – created also the soul for each body and united it to that [body] to give it light and life. That the soul is united [to the body] is made clear by their being affected together; but that they are not destroyed together [in this unity] is shown by the separation that occurs through sleep. For at the moment of sleep] the soul returns rightly into itself and the body and the vital function in the body is diminished to the level of a vapour, like a flame hidden in ashes.105 Therefore incorporeal things, being united both to bodies and, according to the same ratio, to other incorporeal things, can both be mixed with them and separated. For that reason the mixture, which does not occur in a corporeal manner, but by way of shared affection and similitude, is an inclination106 [towards the body]. In fact, one may consider inclination as a mixture107 (as in the case of things that are not joined together because of distance [there may be an inclination to one another]), but it is not a corruption of the substance. Therefore the soul is mixed with the body, while preserving its substance and activity incorruptible.

Chapter 2

[On Sleep]

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Translated by Donald Russell with notes by Donald Russell, Richard Sorabji, and Pamela Huby

Introductory note On Sleep. Preliminary questions for later: (i) Is soul both active in some respects and inactive in others during sleep, or are there two souls, one active, one inactive? (ii) Is sleep connected with hot or cold? Ancient philosophical views (Aristotle’s). (1) The sensory: sleep and waking belong to sense, and hence to both soul and body. They belong to the common sense organ, the heart, not to the separate organs of the special senses. But sleep is not a privation (pace Aristotle?), because it is provided by nature to preserve animals, by giving rest from motion and from troubles, and its pleasurability confirms its naturalness. (2) The nutritive: sleep is a loss of sensibility, but not of nutritive activity, which Aristotle shows to be a distinct activity of body and soul, which is needed by other powers of the soul, but does not need sense in order to operate. Causes of sleep include: ingested food, and the fluidity and warmth which arise from food and from other causes. Warm vapour rising via veins from food to the head is there cooled by the brain and crowded, and so descends, making head and eyelids droop, and cools the heat around the heart, creating pressure on that organ enough to suppress sense-­perception. But as regards nutrition, fluidity and warmth take the place of (antiperistasis in Aristotle) their opposites, and digestion during sleep relieves the weight of the meal, sending purified blood upwards and turbid blood downwards. Digestion is aided by blood and heat being concentrated at the centre during sleep, while the outer parts become cooler.

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Another cause of sleep is fatigue from exertion, or certain illnesses, producing an undigested residue (suntêgma) which similarly rises up, cools and descends. Return to preliminary question (ii) We can now see that both heat and cold play a role, heat in causing the rise of fluid, cold in causing the cooling descent, with the result of a concentration of heat at the centre. There are other effects. Bodies are heavier, blood sluggish, breathing heavier, which are all a matter of pneuma. Psychological differences include images replacing sense perception, but without understanding of them, though truths may be more easily recognized. It is the loss of heat in the extremities which reduces the amount of pneuma there, resulting in heaviness and inertness. The coldness there also makes the extremities stiffer and the blood there thicker. In the interior, by contrast, digestion is aided by sleep through heat and pneuma being concentrated. Side effects are external pallor from loss of heat in the blood, and sweat from concentration of interior heat causing evaporation. The concentration of heat and pneuma also dissolves fluids there and encourages relaxing as a result of dreams. Again, not only is digestion during sleep connected with a hot interior and cold extremities, but we become more intelligent after sleep and intelligence is connected with cooling, as is the body after sleep. In sum, sleep partakes of both hot and cold. Preliminary question (i): our answers have not required sleep to involve either two souls, one active, the other inactive, or a corresponding division of one soul. Priscian had been on his home ground in discussing the soul in Chapter 1, but his extant works do not elsewhere examine sleep or dreams in detail, and he may have had to get up this subject for King Khosroes from scratch, making considerable use of Aristotle. The chapter’s organisation looks a bit hurried. RRKS 52,25 53,1

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and quiescent and inactive in others, and since also it is a feature of inactivity not to feel or know anything or be aware of the actions of feet or hands, whereas the role of activity is breathing in and out, seeing visions, dreams and phantasms, digesting and making the body at ease, [the person] seems at the same time to have, as it were, a double soul, because in some respects he seems very close to one dead, and in other respects to a living person. And how, if this were so, is it possible for one half of the soul to be alive and awake and active, and the other half to be mortal, comatose, and inactive? But if in the human body there are not single souls but double souls, how is it possible for there to be two souls in one body? For if there can be two souls in one body, then so [equally] (tam)109 it is obvious that one of them is separate from the other and that they differ in activity: one will be comatose, slack, and inactive, the other always awake and acting, breathing in and out, digesting, and making the body at ease; if this is so,110 it is clear that the one differs from the other both in nature and in activity. And if the activity of one soul proves its presence in the body, so [equally] (tam)111 one should ask whether [this other soul] will be present in the body during the time of its activity or outside it, seeing that the time of activity is proof of its dwelling in the body, and its time of idleness proves the opposite. Together with this, we also have to consider whether sleep is hot or cold. If it is hot, why does it slake thirst and increase fluidity? If it is cold, why does it digest food and warm the body and permit sweating? And if sleep is of one single nature, why does it have two mutually opposite effects? If it is of double nature – hot and cold – we must ask what parts are of heat, and what of cold. We must also explain why, when sleep naturally relaxes the body, it performs some action more strongly (ualidius)112 – as, for example, the stomach being strengthened, it digests food more abundantly. We have thus to discuss whether, if the sleep relaxes the whole body, it therefore at the same time relaxes and softens the stomach, or not; and if it does relax it, why does it digest food more abundantly? And if it does not relax it, how is it that it relaxes the whole body, but not the stomach? We must113 also put together what has been often said, and in many places, by philosophers of old114 and discuss whether sleep is something undergone by the soul or by the body, or by both in common. This last is true,115 because [sleep] is produced in relation to sense, and sense in something common to a body which has a soul. Sleep, in a way, is an immobility and bondage of sense,

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whereas waking is its relaxation and release. So if sleep is something undergone by the sensitive part [of the soul] and [if] there is in this both a special sense-­ organ and a common kind which, covering all the senses, offers the sense-­ organs themselves appropriate powers; and [if] also we say that the primary (and dominant)116 sense-­organ, which provides a kind of material (pneuma)117 is in the heart,118 from which comes the origin of motion and the [five] special senses,119 [then] it is manifest that our undergoing of sleeping and waking is naturally brought about in this. We should not say that sleep is a privation of waking,120 as illness is of health or blindness of vision, and the like – because things which are brought about by privation are contrary to nature, damaging, and diminishing the essence and activity of things which are in accordance with nature, and sleep, being invented by nature for the preservation121 of the living being, is no less according to nature, and [no less] a causal factor in acting because of nature, than is waking. And if rest is beneficial for any being accustomed to be in motion but not strong enough to bear motion continuously and for ever (because it would be destroyed if it did not forget its troubles), sleep is therefore useful and necessary for its preservation; it is therefore also natural. For if it is necessary for an animal to exist and be preserved according to its own nature, waking and sleep will both cooperate naturally with one another for its preservation. Sleep is also shown to be natural in another way, by being accompanied by pleasure and causing neither hurt nor dismay, as privation of normal states do. Nothing which is contrary to nature is causative of preservation for nature, or [causative] pleasurably and usefully as are things which are in accordance with nature. Sleep therefore is a sort of natural insensibility and something undergone by soul and body in common, because the motions of the dominant sense are also common to soul and body. It is also manifest that the nutritive122 can be separated from the aforesaid [perceptual] parts of the soul, as agreed, in bodies which have a soul; and that this [i.e. the nutritive part] can be outside the others, as in plants; and [also that] none of the senses and the other powers connected with the soul which came to be123 in the body can function without the nutritive part. Hence it is pretty124 clear that when the senses are quiescent in sleep, sleep operates with the nutritive part of the soul, not needing for this any motion of the sense-­organs.

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The cause of sleep in animals is food coming in from outside,125 and an excess of the fluid and the hot inside arising from certain causes. For from such food [i.e. food from outside] present in the receptive areas, a vapour126 develops, which passes into the veins and is thence carried to the head. For it is necessary that what is pushed up is pushed up [only] so far, and then returns and changes course. Moreover, what is hot in any animal tends to rise to the upper parts and there it befalls that matter which has become heavy in accumulating turns back of its own accord, is carried downwards and chills the heat which is around the heart. Sleep is induced when such chilling takes place. For the vapours from fluid, spreading to fill the upper parts around the brain, into which they gather – and which is the coldest thing of all in the body127 – weigh down the head and the eyelids and make [the individual] sleep. But when they have flowed back and, in returning, have driven that heat into the heart itself, then the abundance of fluid food cools the heat which surrounds the heart (just as a quantity of logs piled on a fire cools the fire) and so prepares for sleep. For sleep is produced when bodily matter is raised by heat through the veins to the head; but when it is overcome [i.e. cannot rise more] and weighed down by its own abundance, it is driven back again and flowing downwards in a mass causes the natural heat of the heart to become weaker. When digestion has taken place, sleep too has a rest. For sleep happens as long as the blood remains unseparated after a meal, but when the blood is separated128 and the purer part is located in the higher regions, while the more turbid part affects the lower, the animal gets up, freed of the weight of the meal. What causes going to sleep is therefore the massed pressure129 from corporeal matter, raised upwards by the natural heat, upon the primary (and dominant) sense-­organ.130 For sleep is a failure of the primary sense-­organ to have strength to operate according to its proper heat – a feature necessarily coming to131 belong to the animal for its preservation because rest preserves it. But just as taking in food produces sleep by the abundance of fluid, so also does a residue132 formed inside as a result of fatigue or illness; for something like undigested food is drawn off after [heavy] labour, unless there is an abundance of cold, such as those illnesses produce which [themselves] arise from excess of hot and fluid. So if some such undigested food swells up with

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heat and is [then] driven down in a mass and cools its heat, sleep is the result; for in that case too there is the same rise and subsequent reflux of fluids. Going to sleep is therefore a cooling, yet the causal factors of sleeping are hot, because sleep is a kind of concentration and natural pressure133 of inner heat.134 Some bodily things135 happen to people asleep because of this: bodies become heavier, more full of fluid and colder, and then are nothing but the likeness of bodies; there is no flow of blood, other than a slighter and more sluggish one; breathing in and out also are heavier than when awake – which are assuredly matters of pneuma;136 dreaming and remembering without any sense137 or understanding of the images: sleepers also are more contemplative and more able to discover truth than the wakeful.138 The bodies of sleepers become heavier because of rest. There is a sort of failure of pneuma in the limbs because the heat is concentrated in the inner parts; for pneuma and heat make the body tense, whereas fluid and heaviness go with its inertness, so long as there is nothing to make it lighter. For it is pneuma and heat inflating the whole body that make it lighter. For the same reason, people become colder when asleep, for, as heat leaves them and is collected in the internal parts, the external parts are necessarily cooled, and so become stiffer, and the blood therefore becomes thicker. The consequence is that food is more easily digested and that people given to sleeping come to have a thicker body, because heat, when compressed and accumulating wholly in the lower parts, digests [food] easily and quickly, so that their bodies are better able to be nourished and are fatter; for this is not counteracted by any sensation in waking hours. Pneuma produces a motion of the food if it works with its natural force. So [unnaturally] disturbed sleep is not sufficient to ensure digestion.139 People are paler when asleep, because the blood collects in the inner parts [of the body]; for it is heat in the blood that produces an increase of good complexion (formositas).140 For this reason, people also sweat more when asleep, because there has been a cooling of their external parts, while the heat, concentrated inside in one place, quickly dissolves the flesh and makes more evaporation; when the evaporation of the fluid is released, and sweat comes out,141 not all over the body, but around the chest and neck and head. The feet are hot in sleepers; for the inner heat also attacks what is down below.

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There is also a relaxation coming from dreams, when the fluid is similarly dissolved by the inner heat; for the pneuma, in sleeping persons, is not extended over the whole body but relaxes what is left over [i.e. the parts it does not now reach]. These dreams occur differently according to age, nature, times, and seasons, and indeed also from reasons of locality, and in many other ways which it is not necessary to enumerate now, since the point at issue has been proved, namely that, for sleep, hot fluid has to be present and be accumulated in the body, from which the food is easily digested. Whether sleep is to be taken as hot or cold may be understood from the following [consideration]. It is hot in virtue of its nourishing and digesting; but if it makes [the bodily extremities] become cold, it would have to be regarded as very cold – [as it would also] from the consideration that we become more intelligent when we rise from sleep, but less so as time proceeds: for understanding comes from cooling and slackening from heat. Sleep is also seen to be cold in view of the fact that the body is even more chilled in the time after sleep. However, one should say equally that, just as sleep itself is divided into some parts derived from the hot (the inner parts) and others derived from the cold (the outer parts), such too is the nature which should be attributed to it. All these many things said about the nature of sleep demonstrate that there is neither a double soul (an inactive and an active) bound up with sleeping animals, nor yet a single soul divided down the middle into these two [i.e. active and inactive]. On this basis, the third heading will be discussed. It goes as follows.

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Chapter 3

[On Dreams as a Source of Prophecy]

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Translated by Donald Russell with notes by Donald Russell, Pamela Huby, and Richard Sorabji

Introductory note This chapter is about dreams as a source of prophecy and it draws heavily on Aristotle’s treatment, although it emerges increasingly that, as a Neoplatonist, Priscian in 531 CE has a very different view from Aristotle’s eight and a half centuries earlier. Priscian starts by agreeing with Aristotle’s On Dreams that a dream is a phantasma, which I believe to be a mental image, and that it is derived from earlier wakeful perceptions. There is a tendency in Priscian to think of a phantasma as only a visual image, and he goes on to suggest that dreams can involve more than this: a sense of taste, touch, or hearing and of activity such as eating. This is a useful correction to the more static account of dreams. Priscian also turns to Aristotle’s very rationalistic account in On Divination through Sleep of whether dreams enable one to prophesy, and if so, whether this is through communication from God. He approves Aristotle’s view that a dream can be a sign and consequence of something that has already happened, like a medical symptom which was crowded out from direct attention during wakefulness, but is recognized during the quiet of sleep and thus enables one to foresee possible future illness. He also agrees with Aristotle that a dream can suggest and inspire future courses of action, and thus foreshadow the future in a second way. He agrees finally with Aristotle that dreams may be merely coincidentally followed by what was dreamt. But whereas Aristotle stops here, Priscian goes on and wants to say, contrary to Aristotle, that in sleep the soul is divine and

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is separated from the body, even though it is naturally constituted for union with the body. Priscian adapts an idea found in the Stoic Hierocles around 100 CE, that even in sleep we retain self-­perception of our bodies (sunaisthêsis in Greek – a word literally rendered in our Latin as consensus). We pull blankets over limbs exposed to the cold, the miser clutches tight his purse, the drunkard his bottle, and the hero Heracles his club. Priscian agrees about the blankets and replaces the purse, bottle, and club by saying that, while still asleep, we can withdraw our finger from a thief trying to remove a finger ring. But whereas Hierocles was trying to illustrate how animals more generally have self-­perception of their bodies even in sleep, Priscian infers the opposite: the soul is absent from the body during sleep, but darts back in, if some blow or clamour befalls us, and addresses the damaged part. He holds that perception (sensus) of one’s finger or limbs is normally absent in sleep (63,7– 8), and so are ordinary seeing, hearing, tasting and perceptions in general (59,10–17; 60,3; 62,12). He could be exploiting Aristotle’s admission in On Dreams 462,19–25, that people who dimly perceive a real cockcrow or lamp light are not dreaming or asleep. But agreement with Aristotle goes no further than dreamers being aware only of images. What Priscian infers next goes much further. If the soul in dreams, he claims, is so far separated from one’s finger, limbs and body, perhaps in dreamless sleep it can be further separated, so as to receive messages for the intellect from the gods. He adds that perhaps Aristotle and some of his school believe this, but it is the very antithesis of Aristotle. RRKS. And then this: what is a vision (visio, Greek horama)143 and how does it come about? And, if it is awareness on the part of the soul, do gods or daimones manifest it to the soul? For if it is the soul’s awareness, why, when the soul itself is in a period of a kind of ignorance and insensibility, it is stronger and more potent concerning things which are in the future (some say some prophecies come about in this way) whereas in the waking state, the soul’s awareness has no such assuredness about the future and does not prophesy? And if a vision comes from the soul’s awareness, why [on the one hand] is there awareness in a dream as if of hearing, and seeing and the sense of taste – for it does happen

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that we eat in dreams and as if sense the taste of visible food – whereas [on the other hand] the awareness of a person who is awake amounts only to opinion and brings in no sense other than sight?144 We should speak the same way about hearing and seeing [in dreams as about taste]. Considering therefore what a vision is, and whence and how dreams arise, we affirm as follows: dreaming is not a matter of sense being affected, for it is impossible to see, or, in general, to sense anything while asleep and with the eyes closed.145 But neither is it a matter of the part of the soul being affected which understands and forms opinions because in dreams nothing can be understood or conjectured by opinion without a sense of sense-­objects appearing in the dream.146 It is plain therefore that dream is [a function] of the sensitive part [of the soul] as indeed is sleep itself.147 Sleeping and dreaming are not done by different parts of the soul, but by the same. Since imaging comes from the sensitive part – for imaging is a motion arising from a sense in activity,148 and we call a mental image in sleep a dream149 – it is clear that dreaming belongs to the sensitive part [of the soul]: it is therefore a matter of imaging. It is clear also that sense-­objects produce sense in each several sense organs150 and that the effect they produce is present not only when the senses are active but when they are passing away and become inactive. Just as a thing which has been moved by another thing, which however is not longer imparting movement to what it touched, still itself continues moved as it was by that other, and another [third] thing is moved by the second, in the same way, so it is with sense. While there is a given imparting of movement in actual operation, sense too ensures that its effect is present, to a large degree and deeply, not only in sense organs still sensing, but also when they cease to sense. For example, when there is a colour, fixing our gaze on it for a long time and then shifting our gaze to something else,151 we see the second object to which we have turned our eyes as having the same colour as that we saw before. We have the same experience also when we look at the sun or some other bright object: when we close our eyes, we first see the same colour, then what appears to us changes to red, and next turns purple to our vision, until it reaches black and so vanishes. This happens also with hearing and each of the other sense-­organs.152 It is clear therefore that, as the external sense-­objects go away, some of the

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sensations remain in the sense-­organs; some of these are confused, others more distinct. In this way, it is not only when we are awake that the movements created by sense-­objects either from outside or present in our body remain behind even when the sensing passes away, but also when we are asleep. In fact, they are more evident then, because in the daytime they are driven out and fade away through the activity of the mind and the sense – just as a small fire vanishes in the light of a bigger one, and a small feeling in the presence of a stronger one. At night, on the other hand, owing to the quiescence of the senses and the weakness of their functioning, even small things grow great153 and it can happen that the same movements occur over and over again. Often similar, but often also broken up into different shapes by their interaction with one another. For this reason, dreams do not occur immediately after a meal, nor to infants.154 Just as no reflections appear in disturbed water – or only a disturbed reflection – but a clear one when the water is at rest, so it is in sleep that mental images (phantasmata) and other motions derived from sense-­objects occur. Thus also confused visions appear to the over-­excitable,155 the feverish and the drunk,156 but when the inflammation subsides and the blood clears, a healthy157 movement of sensations from every simple sense-­object produces coherent and orderly dreams.158 It should be understood from this159 that [dreams] may be a cause, a sign [and] a consequence,160 or [a] coincidental accompaniment of what takes place in daytime.161 Any [dreams] are causes which, [though] present naturally, aid the course to be acted on, and appear in a way which is useful for understanding how to move into action. But [a dream] is a sign of what has [already] happened in conformity with (secundum) motion of the nocturnal mental images. It is a coincidence when by some chance the events which happen in the day follow it. Movements in the daytime, provided they are small, are suppressed by the greater movements of the waking hours, as we said. In sleep however the opposite happens: small [movements] seem great, obviously so in the case of what happens in our dreams:162 for people think163 that there is lightning or thunder when small sounds occur within the body. Similarly, they think they are enjoying honey or sweet juices164 when a little phlegm flows down; or that they are walking through fire and getting hot (or even plunged into water) by reason of a little excessive heat or humidity in some parts [of the body].

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It also seems surprising that we remember the mental images which were in our dream when we get up, but we have no imagination or memory during our dreams of what we did when we were awake. The reason for this is that memories are formed from things which are grasped by sense or appear through imagination (phantasia), and neither of these things happens in dreams, for (1) in sleep we do not sense anything, (2) what is [currently] going on in reality is not a matter of imaging, and so is not a dream either. However, some of the things which occur in dreams are produced not only through imagination (phantasia) but by some other effect: for example, people dream that they are eating, whether hungry or thirsty or even sated with food.165 (If however those who are asleep sometimes have a memory of their mental images,166 they are none the less ignorant of what they [themselves] have done; for they are neither moved by nor remember in their dreams what other waking movements they make, for example changes of mind, derangement, afflictions, and other disturbances). For, when many parts [of the soul] are active, they seem to have a sense of taste, touch, and hearing, and think that they are running to the fountain because they are thirsty, and correspondingly confronting other troubles. Again, dreams become either more disturbed or clearer appropriately according to the time or how the body is positioned or lies. They are confused and false around spring and autumn,167 as they are immediately after a meal. Morning dreams, as the disturbance ceases, are clear. Again, those who lie on their backs dream;168 those who sleep on their fronts are in a good position, that is to say they dream less. These and many other facts one can explain by attributing the power of imagining a sense-­object, and dreaming in general, to the union of soul and body, since these need to be understood by physical principles relating to the soul as incorporeal and somewhat divine.169 Indeed, some of those who study170 natural philosophy concentrated on the one point that the causes of dreams come not only from the reception of sensible objects, but also from the soul itself; because it is accustomed to foresee the future and signify in advance what it has to do or what will come in other ways. For, being separated from the body and endowed with superior activities and powers, it is clear that, being on its own and not troubled by any corporeal things, it contemplates clearly and makes the future visible. Hence the soul has foresight in dreams;

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but this would not be so if it was not also, together with the body, a single living creature, and if the soul without the body were not a single unity. It preserves indeed its own essence171 in union to be sure with the body, and consequently (consequenter) is separate [from the body] its essence having to be brought into its natural unity [with the body]. Now if in our sleep we cover our stiff limbs172 and withdraw a finger, because somebody wants to pull a ring off it, we must think that the self-­perception (consensus) of the soul moves rapidly to that part. For if a blow or a cry impinges upon it, it173 leaps into the body with its whole being and clothes it well and truly with its own power, leaving any [damage] that is small, and moves through that part, acting naturally and with its whole being, as though it were not divided in the body,174 and [at the same time] uses some distinct parts of its whole power. It is therefore asleep for the body as a whole, but awake for the finger to counter the person touching it and making haste to pull it toward him, and when he cautiously touches it, it is awake to that part. So, if the soul is separated from the body in sleep, it may be made worthy of visions sent by god175 – and perhaps176 Aristotle and some of his school believe this – and receives activities and powers sent by god – which it well and easily holds because it is linked with the intelligibles. Hence even without dreams, the soul, purged of the bodily things, receives intelligible things, and foresees the future by means of some divine activity.

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Chapter 4

[Astronomy and Climate] Translated by Donald Russell with notes and emendations by him (except where otherwise indicated)

Introductory note177 Priscian, like most Greeks, takes it that sun, moon, and stars rotate in a finite spherical universe around a stationary earth at the centre. Earth and the celestial sphere are both spheres with poles, equators, and hemispheres, so that it is often necessary to consider whether the terrestrial or the celestial one is being discussed. The terrestrial observer has a terrestrial horizon reaching the division between earth and air, but also a celestial horizon reaching further to the lowest visible points of the heavens which carry sun, moon, and stars. The celestial horizon of an observer in the northern terrestrial hemisphere cuts off an overarching celestial hemisphere which is different from that of an observer in the southern. Some of the most complex discussion concerns the zodiac, which is a band of twelve constellations called signs. The sun passes in a circle, the zodiacal circle, in front of the twelve celestial constellations or signs of the zodiac roughly every twenty four hours, but it also spends roughly one month each year rising in front of one sign, so that the twelve zodiacal signs, or more strictly the twelve equal parts of the zodiacal circle, are associated with twelve different parts of the year. The sun’s annual progress round the signs of the zodiac is represented by a celestial circle (the ecliptic) oblique both to the tropic circles, which mark the sun’s furthest annual passage during the year to north or south and oblique equally to the equinoctial circle intermediate between them. Twice a year, at the spring and autumnal equinox, the sun rises above the terrestrial horizon due east and sets due west, and day and night are of equal length. But after the autumnal equinox of observers in the northern hemisphere, the sun sets below their horizon only to the south of due west and it spends more of the

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24 hours below their horizon visible to southerners before it rises to the south of due east, so that for the next six months the northerners’ nights are longer than their days. Southerners by contrast see the sun during those months for longer. But after the first three of these months, the sun turns at the tropics – literally turning points – and heads back towards the north, until the vernal equinox, when day and night become equal again. That is the moment at which the sun makes its annual crossing back over the equinoctial circle, which is intermediate between the two tropics and is the celestial equator. The sun’s rising and setting for northerners in winter to the south of due east and west led some people to say that the celestial sphere itself was tilted from the northern constellations towards the south. But in fact the path of the stars merely takes on different angles in relation to our horizon. It would be better to say that the celestial sphere merely appears to be inclined in relation to us away from the constellations of the Greater and Lesser Bear, which for northerners are visible all year to their north. There are also terrestrial latitudes and zones. Terrestrial latitude (Latin clima, Greek klima) is equal to the elevation of the celestial pole above the observer’s horizon. At the terrestrial pole, its elevation will be higher and the six signs of the zodiac in the opposite direction will remain invisible all year. Priscian recognizes the seven terrestrial latitudes of Posidonius and Ptolemy, not the five of Aristotle. Besides the seven terrestrial latitudes, Priscian recognizes five terrestrial zones, distinguished by climate: freezing cold near the earth’s poles, torrid round its centre and habitable only to either side of the torrid zone. As there are five terrestrial zones, so there are five celestial circles: at north and south, the arctic and antarctic circles; next to them, the summer and winter tropic circles, and in the middle the equinoctial circle or celestial equator. The zodiacal circle runs obliquely from one tropic to the other, passing through the celestial equator. RRKS

[Why in every latitude there are four turning points in the solar year?]178 And this too must be considered,179 why throughout each of the latitudes180 there are four turning points of the solar year, of spring and summer and autumn and winter: why while these come about at the same distinct times ,181

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the length and shortness of day and night, disturbances of the air, rain clouds, and heat and cold differ and vary in each individual place and latitude. For in the winter more rain occurs in the northern parts, but in the summer in southern parts. But it must also be understood (quare), in a single region or place, where it has no difference in altitude or depth or south wind or north wind, yet the disturbances of the air and the rains differ182 in the degree of heat or cold. First we must refute those who write less accurately about this question, for neither should anyone refer to the four movements of the year by calling them turning-­points.183 The wise men of old preferred to seasons, although some, misusing the word, call them ‘turning points’ incorrectly: and throughout every one of the seven latitudes184 no one will find four changes185 and continuations of seasons through times. But to prove these things we must first make some preliminary theoretical steps. For a turning-­point is properly the time at which the sun begins to pass from the northern parts to the southern parts or from the southern parts to the northern; and through this it produces circles which are called tropics. For tropics are the circles coming into which and beginning to rise the sun makes its turning-­points: the summer tropic is that on arriving186 in which, rising at its summer rising, the sun makes summer; the winter tropic is that in which, rising at its winter rising, its makes winter; in between these circles is the equinoctial, in which the sun, when placed in it, produces each equinox. For the spring equinox is what the sun brings about when it is coming from the winter tropic step by step to the equinoctial circle; and the autumnal what when passing from the summer tropic to the equinoctial circle. Since therefore there are, as I said, two turning points and two tropical circles, there is one single equinoctial circle, but through it there come about two equinoxes. On this hypothesis, that is, a special question,187 we say that there are two tropical circles named from the turning-­points,188 [which are] parallels, that is similar or following, and the equinoctial circle is in between them.

[On the five zones that are said by the wise of this time to occupy the earth189] 25

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uninhabitable as par excellence frozen and cold; for they are under the poles themselves which hold the extremities of the sphere on each side, they are naturally far removed from the route on which the sun makes its journey: but the middle one of these five is burning hot, not habitable as being under a blazing burning, reaching from one tropic to the other; but two alone are habitable, of which each is located parallel between one of the cold ones and the middle fiery one, as if, by receiving at their extremities the frozen and the hot air, tempering the air in their own region; the northern one is inhabited by us, but the southern one by others opposite to us. And so according to the position of the zone, the same tropic191 can be for some wintery, and for the other summery. Therefore since ‘tropic’ has the strict sense of marking the movement according to the seasons, one might say that four seasons are distinguished and the year is [thereby] completed. There are only four seasons of the year, as most people say, even if some have said there are only two or three, and others also more than four: but those who define them as four say there are two different qualities192 in each season; and indeed that part of spring which extends from the zephyr193 to the equinox,194 the wintry spring, is cold and wet at the same time, whereas the rest bright, having fluid or warm qualities; whereas the part of summer which is springlike up to the summer solstice turning-­point is hot and moist, while the autumnal part is hot and dry; of autumn, the more summery part is dry and hot, the wintery dry and cold: of winter also, the first is cold and dry, but the final cold and moist. So much anyone can observe usefully about the seasons. Having defined the seasons therefore, we will consider also the question of the difference of days, making clear first what a day195 is. For a day is spoken of in three senses, either according to the bodily substance (corpus) as air illuminated by the sun; or according to the time stretching from the rising to the setting in which the centre of the sun proceeds from its rising to its setting, that is,196 the time from when the sun begins to come above the horizon until it has wholly set: the period of day and night is also called a day. And in this sense we say that one year thus is of 365 days and a certain part,197 including time from both198 [day and night]. The [celestial] horizon199 is said to be the circle dividing the visible part of the celestial sphere from the hidden, and [also] the extreme circular limit of the visible hemisphere which is above us, when nothing whatever obstructs

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[our view] over the flat expanse of the open sea, so that it goes round in a circular plane and cuts off the visible section of the [celestial] sphere, which is in reality200 less201 than a hemisphere, though it appears a hemisphere to us. With regard to the sun202 also, its rising and setting are spoken of in four ways. The horizon being divided by the tropic circles into risings (east) and settings (west), north and south, the rising points of the sun [extend] through the eastern hemisphere, taking in its passage203 from summer rising to winter rising, and divided by the equinoctial rising through the eastern semicircle from its summer rising to its winter rising, with its equinoctial rising in the middle. The setting is the opposite,204 having setting points extending from the summer setting to the winter setting, with the equinoctial setting half way between. The northern parts [of the horizon] are under the [celestial] pole which is visible to us; the southern parts on the other hand are under the pole which is hidden. They205 understand that there are two extremes to every sphere, which are called poles, one placed at the northern part, the other at the southern. Then, taking, as it were206 a line beginning at the centre of the northern pole, extending it obliquely to the centre of the southern pole, they call this the axis, around which they say the whole sphere revolves, both poles remaining as a sort of sign and centre which does not move. They make the line of the axis inclined because they say that the northern pole is above and always visible to us, whereas the southern is below and always hidden; the [celestial] axis, being drawn from the upper parts to the lower, is sloping and does not extend in a straight207 line. And so [although]208 the northern [signs] are up above, [nonetheless] since209 the zodiacal circle,210 passing at an oblique angle through the tropic circles, is touched by both of these [circles] at the tropic signs,211 but intersects the equinoctial circle at rising and setting twice [a year] at the equinoctial signs in both parts of the horizon, namely the eastern and the western, and [since] from this point212 onwards213 the zodiacal circle214 is far away from the northern [parts of the sky]:–215 for these reasons the inequality of the sectors [of the sun’s autumn and winter rising and setting points on our horizon] is also reversed.216 For they say217 that the celestial sphere is tilted from the northern constellations towards the south, though it is not in essence tilted or

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upright, but takes on different angles218 at different times219 according to the path of the stars, as a result of its being intersected by our horizon.220 Or should we rather say that the [celestial] sphere is not inclined in reality, but according to its appearance to us? For the [celestial] hemisphere which is separated from our view has an oblique limiting line [the celestial horizon] inclined away from the [northerly constellations of] the Bears and towards the south, and inclined in accordance with (iuxta) the course of the aether.221 For then (tunc: by that way of putting it), the whole heaven is upright and not inclined. The position of the two poles being thus made clear and explained, since the sun also, passing through the zodiac, necessarily traces an oblique path corresponding to the obliquity of the zodiac, with the consequence that [the sun] is also made distant from the northern parts, for this reason also it produces a difference in the days,222 since it produces a total223 measure of day and night of twenty four hours, although this is differently made up according to the position of different places. Among those whose longest day is twenty three equinoctial hours, [and] in its most northerly path the sun is carried above the earth around the pole for five or six days in the summer tropic circle. In places where the summer tropic circle coincides with the arctic circle,224 the night is said to be no more than one hour long. So also they record that at the island of Thule the sun moves above the earth throughout the day and night. I leave to other discussions the refutation of those who say that there is a sixth-­ month day and an equal six-­month night, or even that some parts of the northern region are never lit by the sun’s rays. We must return our subject.225 The extreme [terrestrial] zones being, as has been shown, frozen, and the middle zone being torrid and necessarily remaining uninhabitable, it cannot be held that the four seasons of the year are preserved in every latitude, even if it is understood that our zone is habitable:226 for the first and second [terrestrial] latitudes227 through Meroe and Zoene228 being closest to the torrid zone, just as the seventh is closest to the cold and frozen zone, these are deprived of the moderation and change between four seasons [such as the others enjoy]. But if one were to say that there is a brief variation even in these places, because the sun effects it in virtue of its being, according to the theory, the causal agent of all the movements and changes which take place around the created earth,229 [this means that] it is the actual

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heat coming from [the sun] that tempers what is its own230 and separates off what does not belong to it and changes all things around by moving the whole.231 Since therefore it has been shown that the sun is distant from the [terrestrial] pole in the north, it follows anyway that what is contained in these very places is very cold, so that232 the air is frozen, no rain can fall and no wind arise. For as the cold attacks the air very strongly, the air is windless and calm and the frozen mass of rain comes down silently as snow. This can be seen in Pontus and other places in which there are cold areas. Because of the excess of freezing233 there are no winds in winter, nor much rain, but perpetual snow falls especially in places234 in the interior. In the now scanty air, it thunders and lightens, because all the winds are stilled, as it were, and at rest, and fluid is lacking because of the warmth235 of the sun. For the power of cold needs, in order to make rain fall and winds blow, a certain admixture of heat for their production. Extreme cold, like extreme heat, is unsuitable for the production of wind or rain. One should not therefore associate rain with winter in the northern parts, nor with summer in the southern and very fiery regions. One may say that these differences occur in connexion with the distance or nearness of the sun. Thus it is natural to find in one and the same region, at small distance, a state of cold and heat.

Chapter 5

[On the Efficacy of Contrary Medical Prescriptions] 236

Translated with Notes by Sten Ebbesen, with further notes and variants by Vivian Nutton and others as marked

Introductory note Khosroes’ basic question is how contrary medical prescriptions can be efficacious. Further, when medicines are compounds, how does that affect the heat or cold of the ingredients taken singly? Priscian replies, as I construe him, by emphasising that patients have individual (propriis) needs, so that the good doctor does not try the same uniform prescription for all. His knowledge is based on familiarity with differences of location, climate, and water, and on learning from nature (naturaliter) the powers and effect on heating and cooling of the drugs taken singly or combined. The stress on particularism may be sound, although it treats Khosroes’ question as entertaining the wrong presuppositions about general rules, and that too in the space of by far the shortest chapter. So we may wonder how quickly he was able to appreciate the dismissal of speculation on the ‘differences between medicines’. Galen wrote On the Mixtures and Powers of Simple Drugs, much of which survives in Greek, although a copy translated into Syriac has just been found, which is earlier, and therefore possibly truer to Galen, than the surviving Greek.237 Nonetheless, Vivian Nutton comments that he finds no direct knowledge of Galen here in Chapter 5, even though Galenism was the medical theory of the time. RRKS The fifth chapter is like this: and this: why, when a weakness or affection is brought about from cold or heat, the doctors who visit the patient agree

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in declaring that it comes from cold or heat, but in curing and in the chosen strength of medicaments238 they are at odds; and one believes that the giving of one medicament is harmful and counter-­productive (contrariam), but another, bringing what in his opinion is helpful,239 cures the patient? And if indeed medicaments are contrary to one another and do not shorten240 a weakness, why does a sick man with their help become healthy? But if the medicaments are not the cause of the patient’s health, except by chance,241 what is the use of medicine? If, on the other hand, the medicaments are not the cause of his health, we must ask whether242 the medicaments and treatment were contrary to one another, or not. For if they were contrary, why when contrary treatment is applied, are contrary outcomes not produced? And further: when a certain medicament that is very cold is mixed with another less cold, does it then, when mixed with what is less cold, do more of what it ought to do by virtue of its coldness? For if, when on one occasion it . . . with the same weight or amount of a medicament, with equal cold [and weight].243 It is reasonable244 to raise the same query also about hot medicaments. But the query seems to us not particularly worthy of a precept.245 For if we admit that all the rules of this art of medicine are valid, and the agreement of arguments in it is unchangeable, we accept also that a man trained in medicine and with a good grasp of his art all round unites in himself all the principles of his art and carefully distinguishes between them. And from this246 you should learn against [the argument from] disagreement between doctors, that there is indeed a multitude of them [doctors], but you should understand that there is just one real craftsman, and similarly just one discipline of medicine. No more will you dispute with the sick about differences between remedies or the application of suitable medicaments and their consequences, [as] these [matters] have been completely done away with,247 it seems to me. But the skilled doctor with diligent knowledge, by himself using the discipline and [his] experience, will know the differences between medicaments, just as also each of their powers (intelligentiae).248 Whenever he knows atmospheres and localities 249 the variation in waters, and is helpful [in] weaknesses by knowing from nature (naturaliter)250 the quality of the things that heat and make things cold and have a moderate blend and by weighing the amount of each thing and what is the efficacy of simples251 when

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mixed with others and when given by themselves, [then] too at no time and in no way will he stand in the way of individual252 [needs] either253 by fitting uniform cures to the continuously flowing and mobile matter of our bodies, or by applying to [different] types of patient cures mixed according to [one] fixed measure and standard weight.

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Chapter 6

[The Tides]

254

Translated by Donald Russell. Emendations, retroversions, and notes by Donald Russell, except where indicated by other initials

Introductory note The text has recorded some of the phenomena of the tides recognized today, but without the central part of the modern explanations in terms of gravity. To take first the monthly cycle, the tides are highest at, or just after, new moon, when the sun and moon are ‘conjoined’, (70,20–21 and 73,4–7 below), i.e. approximately aligned in the order sun, moon, earth. At ‘conjunction’ the moon is illuminated from behind by the sun, so that its back side is chiefly what is illuminated. The other monthly high tide is at or just after full moon when sun and moon are to either side of the earth and the sun shines directly on the side of the moon facing us. In both of these cases, there tend to be high tides. On modern theory, this is because the sun, as well as the moon, exerts a little gravitational attraction on the water, and both can exert it when they are so aligned. By contrast at quarter moons, sun and moon exert gravitational attraction at right angles to each other, creating lower tides, because they cancel out to some extent each other’s effects. Instead of any theory of gravity, 72,12–19 cites the theory of the Stoic Posidonius (c. 135–51 BCE), according to which the moon’s pull is due to its warmth. Posidonius in fr. 122 Edelstein-Kidd, is recorded by Stobaeus as believing that the sun is made of air, as well as fire, which is no doubt why it is called fluid (umida, Greek hugra). Indeed, air is more fluid than water, Chapter 7 below, 82,12. Its fluidity tempers the moon’s heating power, though no doubt the dryness of fire tempers its fluidity. Because the warmth of this mixture is weak and tempered by fluidity (72,19), it raises the water, rather

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than burning it up, as would the sun. Thus (73,22) it raises water by the power gained from having warmth tempered by fluidity. High tides are raised on a daily, monthly, and an annual basis, and here I follow the account of Stephen White (reference in n. 252 below). It is because the lifting depends on warmth that it raises higher tides on a monthly basis at full moon, lower at the quarters (73,6–9), since at full moon it is heated over its whole facing surface. One would expect that at new moon, i.e. conjunction, when the moon is directly heated by the sun over its back surface, some of this direct heating would penetrate the mixture of air and fire of which the moon is composed, and one would expect this solar heat, therefore, to pass on to the earth which is directly aligned with sun and moon. In fact, the case of the new moon is not so simple, as Stephen White has pointed out (SAW-Pos, pp. 72–3), because it is reported (by Cleomedes in fr. 123 Edelstein-Kidd) that Posidonius thinks the moon too large and the sun too distant for sunlight to penetrate the moon completely. But White extracts from Cleomedes other statements, not directly ascribed to Posidonius or Priscian, which suggest that at new moon the direct alignment of sun, moon, and earth, coupled with the greater closeness of the sun at new moon than at full moon (when sun and moon face each other at a greater distance), the sun’s heat does stimulate the moon to emit somewhat enhanced, though still modified, heat of the weaker lunar kind, so that tides are higher around new moon as well as full moon. At full moon, when we see the full frontal illuminated face of the moon, the heat is still tempered by the greater distance away of the sun at that time. The moon also raises higher tides on a daily basis when it is at its zenith, according to Priscian, 73,27, presumably because its moderated warmth reaches the sea less obliquely. The tide then follows the moon until it sets, but subsides as the moon approaches its setting (72,24–73,1). Even under the earth the moon raises tides, but this is held to be by a different mechanism: the circulating nature of water, whose wave continues underneath the earth after the moon has set (73,9–12). When Priscian speaks of the daily influence on high tides of the moon’s position (statio), 73,27, he seems to be thinking of its being in the middle of the sky (medium caeli, 70,4; 6–7; 12–13; 71,18–20; 73,26–7, that is, at its meridian (i.e. its zenith, 73,26), not of its being closer to earth, a position from which, modern theory points out, it exercises greater gravitational attraction on the water.

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On an annual basis, Priscian says, the moon raises higher tides at the spring or autumnal equinox, and all the higher when new or full at that season. Priscian hereby corrects Strabo’s inaccurate reference to solstices instead of equinoxes in his account of Posidonius at fr. 217. Priscian starts by saying, 73,13–27, that [only] when the sun is in (rises in front of) one of the equinoctial constellations (Aries or Libra), so is (or does) the moon, and moreover twice over, once in the same equinoctial constellation at new moon and once in the opposite equinoctial constellation at full moon. So far, no explanation has been given of the higher tides. But at 73,21–5, Priscian adds that the equinoctial seasons of spring and autumn get power from the moon’s nature (White, p. 74, suggests its warmth), because, like the moon, they then possess both warmth and fluidity, and so enhance, instead of counteracting, the moon’s ability to raise tides. Priscian reports that maximal tidal pull is found just after the moon’s positioning at the zenith, 73,25–7, and also a day after new moon or full moon, 74,1–74,6. This is not explained, I think, but is presented as an observation, and, on Donald Russell’s reconstruction of the day after new or full moon, as a recent one, which may help to account for its not being explained. From 74,6 to 76,20, Priscian draws on Aristotle to discuss evaporation controlling river outflow or overflow, and the saltiness of sea. A further feature of the chapter that may strike readers is the extensive reporting on tidal flooding, including in England’s River Thames, where it is said that the tide can flow upstream, (perhaps) up to a quarter of its length, but the Latin translator says for four days continuously, 72,8–9. RRKS 69,19

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And this too:255 why does the Red Sea [Persian Gulf],256 in the course of every single night and day,257 flood258 at some times and [endure]259 the ebb260 at others? Why does the flood tide vary in degree to some extent261according to the moon? And why does the Red Sea [Persian Gulf] neither increase at the flood, nor (as is said) undergo any loss of water at ebb tide? Again, the flood is not produced by the force of the winds, nor the ebb by their silence.262 It is also evident that, although great rivers are always flowing into it, and there is no reverse flow,263 no addition to the waters is to be seen. Of the rise and fall264 of the tide in the Red Sea [Persian Gulf] and of similar effects265 in the outer Ocean,266 or in other parts of our sea,267 many different

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accounts have been given by the ancients. But those who, [best]268 of all, seem to have put together explanations for this kind of effect are the Stoic Posidonius of Syria269 and those who share his view,270 whose opinion Arrian271 also approves. They say that the outer Ocean is moved in accordance with the course of the moon and that the inner sea is affected in sympathy.272 For being connected with it only in the area of the Pillars of Hercules, as a harbour is connected with the open sea, it is affected in sympathy and also receives other distinctive movements. The ocean effect is displayed also by the fact that the strait273 near Sicily is moved four times [a day] in accordance with the moon. For when the moon rises to the middle limit274 of the sky, it [the strait] moves from west to east, and is said to be ‘going down’, for it flows out of the Tyrrhenian Sea into the Sicilian as far as the Dungheap275 at Taormina. But when the moon descends from the middle of the sky, the strait too turns back, flowing from its eastern limit towards the west,276 and it is then said to be ‘going out’.277 It is, however, weaker than the initial [current],278 for it is carried279 with a powerful flow280 which drives281 it with great speed on account of the constricted path in a straight line282 from the Pillars of Hercules on the outer Ocean. Again, however, as the moon progresses from its setting to the opposite [nadir] under the earth, the rise of the [stream] that is going down is increased, whereas when the [moon] moves away from its opposite [nadir] towards its rising, the stream283 goes back again and becomes ‘outgoing’. This also happens in the case of the outer [Atlantic] Ocean, which is moved four times during the complete course of the moon: high tide occurs around the moon’s vertical points [zenith or nadir] and risings, low tide at its sinkings and declinings from the vertical points towards the horizon. The same effect has been found in gulfs both throughout the Red Sea [Persian Gulf] in the South and in the [Caspian]284 sea in the North, and also with285 the people of Cadiz (Gadeira). But286 not only has the generation of high tides been observed around the times when the moon is at the midpoint of the sky, but it has been observed also that the tides are strongest during the monthly cycle around full moons and [lunar] conjunctions,287 and least strong around the quarters.288 Other bodies also produce a current,289 but not from the same cause nor from sympathy290 with the stars. The Euripus beside Chalcis, that is the

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channel,291 makes a current seven times a day. The Hellespont also, because of the many rivers flowing into the Black Sea, is moved in different directions at different times. At Syracuse in Sicily the spring Arethusa292 is moved every four293 years, as some say, to coincide with the holding of the Olympic Games. There294 is also an effect in the great outer Ocean such that the high tide extends over much of the mainland,295 and islands to a distance of seven hundred stades,296 as the writer Strabo says, on the authority of Posidonius himself, to the extent that the plains by the sea are covered by the flood to a depth for up to thirty stades inland and islands are actually formed there; whereas (he says) as the tide recedes, it leaves places dry which had been covered by water for a time and visited only by boat.297 As we said, two ebbs and two flood tides occur every day in regular sequence. But the tides which occur on a monthly cycle are much greater than those of single days: less water comes in and less goes out at the quarters,298 whereas at the conjunction of the moon with the sun [at new moon] and at full moon, the sea rises greatly and is seen to flow in with great speed and spreads far into the land. It is also said299 that it shows the same signs over the course of each year; less water comes in and the flow is slower around both solstices,300 whereas around the equinoxes it displays the same effect as is seen to occur around full moons and [lunar] conjunctions. The beginning of the rise does not occur immediately at the rising of the moon, but as the moon ascends a little way, nor again does the peak301 of the tide coincide with the actually exact302 moment when the moon is at the midpoint of the sky, but as the moon declines a little in the opposite direction. A little later the tide recedes until the moon is one sign (30°) above its setting. Next, it remains in the same position for as long as it takes for the moon to reach its setting and continues so for as long as it takes for the moon, moving under the earth, to pass one sign (30°) below the horizon. The same relationship between the moon’s passage below the earth and the rise and fall of the tide is observed close to when the moon is elevated one sign (30°) above the horizon.303 Tides are great at new moon and full moon, but after the new moon or full moon. The annual principle in them is to the same effect. Thus the stages of the tide304 proceed in order, so that the flow305 of the returning water advances and begins to flow back on itself and consequently to

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come back to the land. The water comes out [of the sea] so much that it even reverses the flow of great rivers. They say that the Rhine (a river that flows from the country of the Celts) and other rivers in Iberia and Britain suffer this. They say that in Britain the river called Thames, when filled by the sea after a high tide, is reversed for four days.306 So that it seems to flow away from the sea in the opposite direction. 307 The Stoic Posidonius, inquiring into the causes of these things, as one who had personally308 become a student of this kind of ebb and flow,309 discriminates, saying that the cause of it is the moon and not the sun. The sun’s fire, he says, is pure and of great power; so however great the vapours it raises from land and sea it also subsequently destroys them by its fire. The moon’s fire, on the other hand, (he says) is not pure, but weaker and feeble and therefore more productive for things on earth. However, it cannot consume what it produces, but only raise up, and make waves in, bodies of water, disturbing them by its heat, but not diminishing them because of the weakness of its heat and its greater fluidity.310 Hence also [waters] heated by the moon stagnate311 more readily. For water heated in a pot to a moderate degree first swells and boils over, but when heat is applied continuously, is used up and subsides. Now the great Ocean also (he says) is equally312 affected by the sun in the same way as water in a pot by too much fire, whereas by the moon it is affected like things affected by a weak313 initial heat. 314 So also the water315 of the sea goes round with the moon. As if raised and thus weakened [made more malleable]316 by the moon, it rises to a flood317 and then when the moon declines towards its setting, it declines with it. It does this (he says) even when the moon goes beneath the earth and on a daily318 basis.319 As regards the monthly system,320 the cause of the great increase in the incoming tide321 is that it too322 responds323 to the powers of the moon. Hence the water rises most at full moon and [lunar] conjunction, because the power of the moon is great at these times, since at full moon the whole of what faces the earth is illuminated by the sun,324 whereas at conjunction, it is illuminated by the sun from above,325 and exerts on things on earth a power equal to that which it has when full. Quarter moons, on the other hand, are dim for affecting the sea.326 Similarly, even when each individual moon327 goes away under the earth, the tide328 still continues in order and indeed is pushed by the moon on the

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same principle. He says also that [one] reason why the flow takes place is also the circulating nature of water. So the wave rises in the form of a semicircle to follow the moon.329 Similarly the cause of the annual high tide coming on an annual basis at the equinoxes is the moon. For at both equinoxes, the sun is in one of [the equinoctial signs of]330 Aries or Libra,331 and at that season the moon also has great power, [both] when it is in conjunction (coeuntis) with the sun,332 and on the same principle [its relation to the sun],333 when there is a full moon in one of the two equinoctial signs, because [the sun] is [then] ahead in that [sign]334 which is diametrically opposite.335 He claims that the great Ocean also is at its greatest extent at the equinoctial circle.336 For, the moon being then either in conjunction with the sun or full, and right overhead over the Ocean, the water is raised to the maximum, whereas when the sun is in other signs, the moon, on coming into [the signs] Aries or Libra, is not full or in conjunction with the sun. He says, however, that the season also can produce this effect as a result of the nature337 of the moon. The moon is warm and fluid338 and it is by this power that the water is made to rise. Furthermore,339 winter is associated with fluidity, and summer with the opposite of fluidity, whereas spring and autumn are associated with fluidity and warmth to a moderate degree. The moon therefore most resembles these seasons [spring and autumn].340 Now341 the tide is full when the moon is at its zenith,342 and something more will be added to it when the moon has passed343 this limit at the middle of the sky;344 for in both cases345 [at the zenith and later] [the moons] are stronger in their link [with the sea] because of their position [near their zenith]. 346 Hence,347 with the second348 moon coming in349 after the conjunction and at the same interval after the full moon, the water is raised higher than [the moon] brought it350 before351 she moved towards new [zodiacal signs],352 in both cases353 [before she moved beyond conjunction or full moon]. This is because she is indeed not changed354 [i.e. weakened] by her power being moved far away.355 But her position356 at this particular point has [only] recently357 been decided358 to be stronger in its causality359 with regard to the size360 of its effect [than her position at the actual conjunction or full moon]. The ancients361 therefore omitted362 this reason for the amount that accrues to both flow and ebb in the spring.363

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Why,364 when every day countless mighty rivers flow into it, the sea in no way becomes greater, is a question which it is not unreasonable for some people to have failed to answer, but which is not difficult to understand, if you look closely. For if the same quantity of water is spread out over a wide area, or gathered together, it does not dry out in the same time-­scale. There is a difference: the former takes a whole lunar day365 to evaporate, while water poured into the sea366 disappears just as much as if you were to pour a cup of water over a big table: it disappears as soon as you notice it. This also happens with rivers. Since they flow continuously and accumulate, whatever reaches some vast and flat367 area is quickly and unobtrusively dried. For since many vapours have been drawn up from the sea by celestial bodies, especially the sun,368 the water that comes from the river is no more than what has evaporated. The inflowing water dries all the more because of the amount and heating power of its saltiness. Many different causes have been proposed for the saltiness of the sea,369 but most authorities say that the finest and freshest part of it rises because of its lightness day by day, and is borne upwards, separated and vaporized into a higher region. There it liquefies because of the cold and is carried down to earth. The salty part, however (they say)370 remains because of its weight, as in the bodies of living creatures. For in these when the food coming in is sweet, the stuff371 of the moist nourishment and the residue is seen to be bitter and salty, so that sweat also has this quality, because what was fresh and drinkable has been drawn off by the innate heat and enters into the flesh and the structure of the parts of the body, according to the nature of each. That there is saltiness in a mixture involving sweetness can be seen also from the following consideration:372 if one makes a container of wax and plunges it into the sea, first tying up its mouth so that the sea water does not fill it, the water that penetrates the wax container is drinkable, and what was coarse and earthy and productive of saltiness in the mixture is separated, as by a filter. Again, if one digs a trench on the beach by the sea,373 all the water that percolates into it from the sea through the hidden veins of the earth is made drinkable. It is better to say that it has been created by God like this,374 just as every other element has its own special nature, and that saltiness belongs to the nature of the sea for the benefit of all living things on earth, to prevent the sea becoming stagnant, as we see in certain lakes and other standing fresh waters.

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For standing water is easily corrupted by a moister vapour, corruption being carried on the wind. The sea, if a part of it is kept separate, quickly stagnates,375 though the whole sea does not. So this too is a providential arrangement376 for the sea. The nature of water is like this not only in [the] great Ocean, but in many other places. He377 makes this clear by telling of a lake in which, if one ties up a man or a beast of burden378 and plunges it in, it floats, does not sink and actually cuts through the water. The lake, he tells us, is bitter and salty so that it breeds no fish. But it does wash clothes, if you wet them and shake them out. It is clear, then, that saltiness creates a coarse bodily substance and that what is in it is earthy. There is another lake in Palestine called by many Asphaltitis, which they also call the Dead Sea, as having no life-­giving properties in it. Bitumen is found there. In other places too all over the earth there are outflows of rivers or springs which are naturally salty, and some which are warm and fast-­flowing. One might say379 that the cause of all this is a congenital nature united to them or an inborn nature of fire. For it is when it burns that earth takes on various forms of blends to a greater or less degree, according 380 filled with some powers of this kind, through which are set in motion the filtered waters, whether fresh, or even produced naturally from some such blendings. Some become vinegary, some bitter, others again boiling with heat and rapid movement. Research is full of these things, testified from various places: for example, the well said to be in the region of Cissia in Persia is like this. What comes out of it has a varied appearance. It is the bituminous oil they call naphtha,381 but there is also water, so that draughts taken from it are of these different kinds.

Chapter 7

[How Elemental Bodies get Displaced Up and Down from their Natural Places] 382

77,1–82,27 Translated by Donald Russell, with variants by Richard Sorabji. 82,27–88,7 Translated by Pamela Huby with variants by Donald Russell and Richard Sorabji, and with notes by all three and Sten Ebbesen

Introductory note In the first of three parts, from 77,3, Priscian records doubts about Aristotle’s scheme according to which the natural arrangement of the universe below the heavens is of the elements earth, water, air, and fire superimposed in that order according to weight in four layers. Why then do we find things out of order? How can a bird, a hurled stone, a heavy thunderbolt, or rain be aloft in the air, or, even more surprisingly, materialize out of nowhere in the air? How can fire be held down in cloud or rain, or materialize there, or fall down from there rather than rising up? How can clear air be at the same height as cloud? From 78,23, Priscian paraphrases Aristotle’s On the Heavens (Cael.), Meteorology, and On Coming-­to-Be and Passing-Away (GC). Not only are the four elements light or heavy, but they have active powers of hot or cold and passive powers of fluid or dry, which produce some of the unexpected effects, even allowing for more or less possibility of one element turning into another. Falling or floating also depend on shape or penetrability. At 82,32, Priscian explains the remaining phenomena by reference to Aristotle’s theory in his Meteorology of two exhalations drawn up from the earth by the oblique passage of the sun through the zodiacal circle. One exhalation is

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wet and accounts for some effects of cloud and rain; the other is dry or smoky and accounts for some of the fiery effects and in Chapter 10 winds. At 78,2–3 (see note), might the effect of animal breath on rainfall be connected with recent research on bacterial cells? RRKS 77, 3 5

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And this too: Why does the heavy exist and find a place in air, and fire in moisture? For fire is seen together with moisture in the air, and a heavy body may fall from the air, and that although383 there is solid density around it in the air; for a living creature with solid density can exist in pure and empty air, breathing in and out and moving from place to place. Moreover, whatever is thrown up from the earth into the air is returned again to the earth. Again, nothing is seen in the air which can hold up anything heavy or any density, and yet a cloud384 is often seen suddenly in clear air, from which much rain comes down. Again, fires from the sky or thunderbolts or some heavy object often fall to the earth. Fire also flares up in the air inside the clouds and the rain, and a light is seen, and great and terrible sounds are heard coming from the air, as though some heavy and firm objects, with much very great power, here collided with each other. Around the clouds also, at no great distance, there is sun, clear air and no clouding over, nor even a wind stirring. It can be seen from this that it is not the force of winds that brought the clouds and rain from another place, but they appeared out of the air itself, violently disturbed, and the fall of the heavy body and the noise were produced out of the air. It is also abundantly clear that the clouds do not have the solidity and power or density sufficient to resist or catch even a slight heavy object. There is also an argument from the fact that there are places in mountainous areas such that often, when the sun is shining on the tops of the mountains and the air is clear and there are no clouds there, lower down in the plains there is cloud cover and rain at the same time. But when a vapour (that is, moisture) appears away from the top of the mountain, in the place where the cloud cover begins, the storm-­cloud is found; and the further one goes into the middle of the cloud cover, the darker one will find the cloud. Sometimes even drops fall from it. But if one passes right through the cloud cover and moves down the mountain out of the darkness and vapour, the vapour (i.e. the moisture you have passed through) appears in the air as a dense cloud. Sometimes also heavy rain is produced in the air and in clouds by the

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movement, i.e. by the breathing, of men and other animals.385 This shows that the clouds do not possess such power or density that they can hold up in the air or draw up from the ground even the most minute heavy object. Winds which have great power and blow very strongly cannot seize a little pebble in the air. We have thus demonstrated that clouds and winds have no such power: so how does that nature386 form a heavy thing in the air which falls from the air, or fire, or things like that? Who raises these things from the earth? What nature? And holds them in the air? And if they were not carried up from the earth, who made them in the air? For if the fire which falls down has no heaviness, but yet is carried downwards, it is clear that it is different in nature from the fire which is on the earth. For the flame of an earthly fire, when raised up in the air, turns in an opposite direction from the air [upwards]. But if the fire in the air has a heavy [thing] in it, and falls downwards because of this, we need to ask the following question: where does the heavy come from, who holds it up in the air, why does it shine and flash amid moisture, and by what is it sent to the earth without wind or rain putting it out? By this chapter doubtful points are furnished with many explanations; but it contains a single brief question about the heavy and the light and the dense bodies which are formed in the air, or are simply drawn up from the earth: namely how do they come to be, and by what are they held up or carried along? To solve these questions, therefore, we need first387 to understand and explain that things being ‘heavy’ or ‘light’,388 one may be said to be so ‘simply’ [i.e. absolutely] in and in relation only to itself, and another by comparison with others, through which we speak of its being ‘heavier’ or ‘lighter’ than another: the light and the heavy in itself 389 is (respectively) that which habitually is carried upward from the centre and that is carried down toward to the centre. Thus fire which is properly and absolutely and always light by nature390 travels upwards, whereas earth and all earthy things are located downwards towards the middle, as being by nature heavy. This matter should perhaps be defined, according to the common opinion, as follows: the simply/absolutely391 heavy is what is beneath everything, the light is what is above everything. We speak of [heavy and light] simply, defining these according to genus and saying that one of these exclusively is the basis of 392 each: ‘light’ is the basis of fire, ‘heavy’ is the basis of earth. For fire has nothing

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heavy, and earth no lightness of any kind.393 Things in which both are present394 are heavy or light in the other sense. For this reason, they are above some things and underneath others: for example, air and water. For neither of these is ‘simply’ light or heavy, inasmuch as both are lighter than earth (for any395 part of them is consequently carried above earth) but heavier than fire (for any part of them, however small, lies below fire), and conversely, since the smallest particle of air is carried above water, and the smallest quantity of water is below air. But since, among other things, some possess heaviness and some lightness, it is clear that the cause of all these lies in a difference in the extremes which are not compounds: for it is by participating in these more or less, that some of the bodies will be light and others heavy. And,396 as those which have heaviness are taken down to the centre, which is as it were something limited,397 so that which is carried upwards is not carried up without limit but [only] to its proper extreme and limit (the proper end of every single thing is as it were its completive form398 because nothing at all is moved to infinity). One should also understand399 how some connected bodies are in the same way easily divided,400 for easily divided is easily delimited:401 air, for example, more than water and water more than earth: for air is more easily divided than water because it is more fluid402 and thin, and therefore does not freeze, while water is more easily divided than earth, because it is more humid and thin, and therefore does not freeze, while water is more easily divided than earth as being humid and very easy to pass through.403 Each of these also is said to be ‘easily delimited’ as capable of being affected by being shaped both by that which contains it and by that which it contains. Earth on the other hand is not ‘easily limited’, because it is solid and dry. A small quantity of air is more liable to be affected than a large amount, – so also with a smaller amount of water as against a larger. Thus a wide body404 – such as a container made of wood or some other material holding a large amount of water – does not move down easily, whereas a pointed container with a small content of water moves down quickly. So, since heavy things have a certain strength for separating that which is beneath them and of moving downwards, whereas things that are joined together have a power (because of which they are joined together) of not being separated, those powers must join battle with each other and the victor must be dominant. If the strength of a heavy thing, by which it does violence to405 and separates that which is beneath it, defeats the power of that which is joined

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together, it will split it and go down through it; if on the other hand the power of the ‘joined-­together’ overcomes the separate power of the ‘heavy’, the ‘joined-­ together’ will not be overcome and the ‘heavy’ will not be carried downwards. Hence crusts of ice float on water, and a straw or some similar object is carried on the air. Note, as a consequence of these assumptions, that, as these are four simple bodies, which we also call elements, there are four most general differences in them:406 hot and cold, wet and dry. Of these some are active, some passive; the elements change in themselves because of these differences. For the hot is what puts together things similar in kind, since to separate [dissimilars] is to put together things similar in kind, which is what some say fire does, whereas cold is what gathers and puts together both things of similar kinds and things which are dissimilar in kind. Fluid, again, is that which is unlimited indeed by any limit of its own, but is easily limited [by something other than fluid]. Dry again is well limited by its own limit, but hard to limit [otherwise].407 Fine and coarse, heavy and light and all other pairs of differences are reduced to these four primary differences.408 Moreover,409 of these four there are six combinations: but as it is not possible in nature for contraries to be combined, we rightly reject two or three, it is impossible for the same thing to be both hot and cold or fluid and dry. There are therefore four combinations of the four existing elements: hot and dry make fire, hot and fluid make air (though some say air is cold and fluid, in view of the frozen object up above); again, cold and fluid constitute water, and dry and cold constitute earth. The pairs of ‘differences’ are easily distributed among the elements, and the number of them in them is consonant with the theorem. Some [of the paired differences] are active, as was said, namely two, the hot and the cold, while the fluid and the dry are passive for in them [the hot and the cold] the power of the active [elements] is productive of compounds. By ‘active’ we should understand not things which are extremes by excess,410 but things which are, as it were, mixed. For it is not the excess of heat or boiling, like fire, nor the excess of cold, like ice in the case of fluid, that contributes to generation. For, just as ice is already a condensation of fluid and cold, so it is clear that nothing is born out of ice, nor out of pure and extreme fire.

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It is clear therefore that heat and cold limit, connect, and draw into themselves both things of the same kind and things of different kinds, and that they moisten, dry, harden, and soften things. The dry and the fluid on the other hand are more limited and susceptible of being affected in every case, for the easily limited is spoken of in connexion with their nature being affected by something. Of the four bodies which exist ‘simply’,411 earth and fire are the extremes412 and the purest; water and air live between them and are more mixed. Water is the contrary of fire and earth of air, for these are made up of contrary affections. Fire being hot and dry, water has nothing in common with fire, since it is fluid and cold. So also earth, being cold and dry has nothing in common with air, which is (according to many thinkers) hot and fluid. In each of the several elements there are two ‘differences’, but one of the two is dominant over the element. Fire is more hot than dry,413 air more fluid than hot, water more cold than fluid, and earth more dry than cold. They are easily changed from one into another with which they share one quality and are opposed in another, but only with difficulty when they are opposed in both. Fire is easily changed into air and air into fire, because they have heat in common, and though they are contraries in respect of dry and wet, similarly with air and water: fluid is common to both, but cold and heat are contraries. Water and earth because cold is common to both, although dry and wet are contraries. In them, therefore,414 when one contrary is overcome by the other, the change of one into the other is easy: but when fire is changed to water, or water to fire, or air to earth or earth to air, the change is difficult. For there is nothing in common, in fire in relation to water or in air in relation to earth, but two qualities are opposed to two others. So if there is nothing in common, they can be changed into each other, but with difficulty. With these matters settled therefore we must say how they are separated in the middle and around the middle. The earth415 indeed stands still, but water is placed around the earth: then the cloak of air surrounds these going round the earth and the water placed upon it, and round the sphere of air goes what is called of fire. For that is the outermost of the four, just as in the earth is the centre. Of other exhalations416 of wet and dry things from the earth and round the earth; there are two kinds;417 one is wet, and the other is dry; the wet is called

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vapour, but the other does not have a name in general, but using a universal name for a part, we call it a sort of smoke. For the nature of vapour is wet and hot, and dry: and vapour is potentially water, but an exhalation potentially fire.418 But neither the wet nor the dry exists without the other, but all of these are named according to what is predominant419 and abundant in each. And often420 indeed the vaporous exhalation is more abundant and drier than the smoky one and thus the season tends to be one of rain and much water. Contrary to this, dryness prevails and dustiness from an abundance of the smoky exhalation. This is seen to happen either over a large and contiguous area or in parts of it. For often the area round about receives seasonal rains; but in a certain part of the same there is on the contrary dustiness. The cause of these two exhalations is the sun. For421 making its passage in a circle and obliquely through the zodiac, it then pulls the wet that has been carried upwards from the earth up to a higher path; but drying the earth itself with heat it makes a draft of smoky exhalation come about. And so the vapour itself, having an abundance of wet is led back to a higher place that is above the reflection of the sun’s rays, and there because of the cold it is turned again into water, the sun having come to be further away because of the distance of its oblique circle. And so it is clear that cloud and rain and snow and ice and every one of the other wet things in the air and around the earth are from the same thing; but the dry422 exhalation, when copious, becomes the origin and nature of winds, and of other things, whatever fiery essences there are. And so since the motion of each is twofold, both of those things which are carried upwards and of those carried downwards, one indeed in accordance with nature, but the other against nature and violent, it was necessary to accept both exhalations, the wet, that is, and the smoky, and to go through what is connected with them in summary. For423 the actual humidity, raised up through the heat of the sun, and with the hot partly leaving it because of its greater distance from the sun, becomes dense through the colder place in the air and is changed through its coldness424 into cloud: and there, produced out of vapour, it becomes cold and settles sometimes indeed into fine drizzle, but sometimes into storm and rain on account of the more powerful density of the cloud. The water of the storm clouds contains also mud through the fact that much earthy stuff is lifted up by the wetter vapours. Not every movement (meatus), however, from the mud-­containing water is rain, but only that which

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is turned into cloud through the mutation of vapour. For often a violent storm of wind or whirlwind, seizing the fluid from rivers, pulls on the sea, lifts it up high, and then stops. Because of this also frogs and fishes have at times also appeared to descend along with rain as if they had been brought to birth somewhere above, just as at Aegospotami425 near the Hellespont a stone fell from the air, seized by a rather violent gust, but coming down to its proper place. Often also drops of blood resembling pitch come from fiery mixed with clouds and at the same time with rubbish from the earth, that is dung, gathered from the winds. And so all these things forced violently and against nature upwards come back downwards in a natural passage. If the quality of a vapour, is wet and weak and not lifted much above the earth, when it is not carried away by the winds or by heat, first it constitutes a mist, that is a weak cloud; but when it has slightly solidified and has been driven out it is said to be dew, having a great deal of what is airy, and little humidity. Again the solidification of vapour in higher places becomes snow, [if] snatched on high out of a wet exhalation but not yet turned into water; but rather than being moved upwards, surrounded by ice, it is actually drawn downwards, in such a way that it is snow and ice, either in the winter season, or in a cold place when the chill is so dominant426 that even on the ground it overcomes the heat which it had from a fiery exhalation. So great is the power of solidification on account of the density of the air, as in northern places and the cold zone on account of the excess of the frost that there are neither rains nor winds, but clear weather dominates (universally, and the precipitation is only of snow and there is a solidification of ice. Also from the freezing of such causes hailstones and every form of frozen moisture is formed and carried down to its proper region, the wet vapour being raised up violently and against nature, but naturally tending to its proper region. But the fact that the wet, when raised up as far as the upper region and as the cold air, is changed into water and other solidified forms, by its rising above the reflection of the rays of the sun, [thus] abandoning the sun’s heat, [and the fact that it does not], however, appear to be driven as far as the uppermost region of the air approaching the passage (meatus) of fire – these facts show clearly that the tops of the mountains are above the clouds and undisturbed. [This is shown] by the fact that the assembly (concursus) of clouds – and origin of the

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winds – produced from these two exhalations is not carried far into the air. These things terminate around the cold area and are turned427 into winds and into fire-­producing assemblies and into water variously flowing or freezing. For the area of the air itself, as we have said, is cold, through the fact that it is not near to the passage of the fire nor to the rays reflected from the earth, which stop the clouds forming near the earth, and by heat disperse their assembly.428 Let this suffice about the wet exhalations in the upper regions and naturally descending again after assembling. But we must discuss briefly the things that come from a smoky exhalation and are turned into fire-­producing assemblies, and these into the things that are expelled violently downwards and appear to be squeezed contrary to nature. For with the hot and dry429 meeting and reaching with no gap right under the circular passage [of the heavens], and encircling the air, it happens430 that the air often burns like smoke with a small movement made and following it a greater. If therefore a blaze431 has both breadth and length, there appears a burning flame, as in a field of burning stubble. But if it only has length,432 and some sparks fall out from the very burning, then there come about what they call torches and lamps,433 and again what look like shooting stars from certain burnings like these: for the exhalation burning from [the celestial] movement, seems to create these; but when the hot is compressed and expelled from air solidified through iciness, the passage (meatus) of these is produced more by squeezing (proiectio), not by burning. For just as an exhalation placed under [two superimposed]434 lamps ignites the lamp which is below by means of a flame which acts from above, and a fire is quickly drawn by the smoke from the kindled top of the candlestick, being drawn up violently,435 so also we must judge that blazes created in an upward direction, when compressed, are squeezed downwards with violence, just as436 the stones of olives compressed by the fingers are squeezed violently: for these, [though] heavy, are often seen to be driven violently upwards, out of the fingers: but437 things burned up in the air are squeezed downwards, through the fact that they are forced by density and are squeezed downwards more violently. For this reason438 also thunder and what are called winds from the clouds and all such things are borne downwards.439 For everything hot is naturally borne upwards: and so it is against nature that the fiery burning is repelled downwards. But440 according to

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the direction of the exhalation, how it comes to be lying along its width or its depth, so [what is fiery] is borne sometimes upwards, but sometimes downward or even sideways; but most of all [these things] are pushed sideways. Because of this the things that are borne are borne along two routes, by force indeed downward, but by nature upwards. For this reason also the commonest route of passage for stars that are running in different directions [shooting stars] is oblique. By the fact that in truth [shooting stars] are near the earth,441 their speed is also similar to things that are thrown by us in such a way that then they appear with great speed to move past the sun and the rest of the stars. This very thing happens also with those things that are called whirlwinds.442 For a whirlwind comes about when a wind separated from some cloud is dashed [against it] and revolves around the cloud making a circle and being strengthened round it in such a way that it seizes hold of some part of the cloud, so that they cannot be separated from one another. Through this collision therefore it is borne off sideways to earth, and it moves the things that are moved by it whirling them in a circle. Because of that also it often whirls around some of the things that are on the earth or in the sea and raises them up high, bending them backwards again into itself, not finding a way out. Hence it often draws up water from the sea; indeed, when ships arrive there it lifts them up receiving them on high with the drawing force of the water; from the ground too it lifts up stones and other things, often even animals. And these snatched up a little way are borne down again, having become dryer because of the dryness of the wind holding them up. But that fire from the sky and comets and every single one of things ignited come about from a dry exhalation around our air, is demonstrated by the appearance of what can be seen443 and above all by the thunderbolts that have differences in both their collisions and their force, as in their names too; for some of them have so little speed that444 they [have time to] burn things that are solid and resist them, but they preserve unharmed other things that are rarer and finer by passing through them. For sometimes indeed bronze penetrating a shield has set it alight because of the shield’s resistance, but it has preserved the wood unharmed: for a thunderbolt is burning wind. And it is possible also to see the basis (substantias) of other effects existing in the air from a windy exhalation, as we perhaps ought to say about thunder and lightning. When445 clouds are thickly accumulated, the exhalation that hits them is violently repelled and

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strikes a violent blow on them, whose sound is called thunder; and when the collision has come about it shoots out a fiery product of the friction which is lightning. But446 thunder comes about before the lightning; but447 the lightning is seen first, because of the fact that the sight precedes hearing, in the matter of their receiving their proper sensibles. So when sounds are made unevenly because of curvatures in the clouds, thunder is composed of these, but a fiery wind, using a certain gentle heat and then falling makes lightning.448 So on the basis of all the data collected, each of the things existing on earth or in air has its own natural tendency towards upwards, and if it undergoes a force downwards against nature it is pressed down, and again, if it holds out, it is returned to its own .

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Chapter 8

[How Location Affects the Character of Living Things] 449

Translated by Sten Ebbesen with his notes and retroversions (except as otherwise indicated)

Introductory note King Khosroes has asked why immigrant humans, animals, and plants become like locals, even if not at first. Priscian’s reply cites as natural influences: food, air, water drunk, mountain versus plain; among cultural influences: education, customs, upbringing by individuals, hard work. Any of these can explain assimilation (or difference). Chapter 5 also appealed to climate, water, and places, in explaining the differing effects of medicines. Again there are in the present chapter traces of the particularism applied in Chapter  5, at 69,13 to the medical needs of different individuals. But here the particularism is usually applied to the different needs of particular groups of living beings. A further explanation offered is that extreme change of climate may be self-­ cancelling, as extremes sometimes are, and permit healthy assimilation to the local occupants. In describing the different effect of different places, Priscian observes that places can be selectively accommodating, and a single island can accommodate some species in one part and only different species in another, while other places are totally unaccommodating and remain uninhabitable. The subject of local differences had been discussed by Aristotle, On the History of Animals 8.28–9, and by other sources cited by Bywater below. RRKS 88, 10

And this too: why is every animal or ensouled being or whatever, just like450 plants and seeds that have been carried from one region to another or to certain places, or that grow there, after some time and successive generations

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usually changed into the nature or shape proper to the land to which they have been moved?451 And supposing that the air or the earth of that land has come to be452 the cause of their change, why do permanent inhabitants and plants that grow there differ [at first from the immigrant ones] as regards shape and similarity,453 etc. even when they are similar in type, though generally, it is clear what colour and shape humans have according to which latitude (clima)454 and region they live in? [They do differ], for one may find people living in the East who are both in soul and body more similar to people living in the West than to those living in the East. The same consideration applies to those who live in the other parts [of the world]. With a view to the enquiry of this chapter, we must start455 with the things we have already stated456 about the immortality, simplicity, and incorporeality457 of the soul and its unchangeability as far as its essence is concerned, for while it changes its operations and powers due to the qualities of [the accompanying] irrational life and its bodily matters and passions, adapting itself, so to speak,458 to the material and the external environment, it remains unaltered as far as its own nature is concerned. Now, all this being presupposed, we must consider what are the causes of the difference in behaviour as well as in shapes between men, and in their shape in each particular place, whether one chooses a division459 into the main parts of Earth (i.e. Europe, Asia, and Africa), or a division based460 on places being to the north, the south, the east, or the west, or one by peoples and single regions, and, to finish the list: by cities and villages (villas) and likewise by the houses in them. For, roughly speaking,461 all of these involve differences in looks and behaviour and body size, as is also the case with other animals and with things born from the earth. As reasons for these facts we must posit food, the ambient air, and, finally, education, just as we do in the case of similarities. That food and the ambient confer shape is clear from the consequences of migrations: for immigrant beings, whether animals or plants, are modified462 so as to accord with the local shapes, but some take longer and others shorter stretches of time [to be assimilated] depending on the strength of the forming factor.463 However, some animals and some plants simply do not occur in certain places because of some trouble464 in the earth or the ambient, as is particularly the case in the places that are uninhabitable465 because of burning heat or overwhelming cold

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and ice, which are incapable of nourishing or making fecund anything of the sorts mentioned, because they have no food. Moreover, the constitution of the ambient is adverse [to fecundity], and these are two requirements of animals and of all that is germinated from the earth. As each plant and animal has its own466 matter, so it has its own food and [germinative] origin,467 for those things are connatural to it, as it were.468 Thus, provided they are not similar, [different] regions will definitely produce different manners469 and shapes, even in470 beings that arrive from abroad, although some save traces of their earlier appearance and size. A sign that food, educational tradition, behaviour, and the nature of the air are all important factors in the genesis of virtue, self-­ confidence,471 and shapes of bodies, and likewise of intellect and practical talents, is, I submit, that there is a natural difference between people according to regions, so that some are wise and clever, while others are inventors of various tools. Constitutions472 and laws also contribute to the education473 for life, as behaviour with which one grows up determines the custom of individual cities and villages. Some [traits] are also the effect of the individual natures of one’s elders, for imitation and being brought up together with them makes the new generation similar to their predecessors. This is likely to happen in a home that is not in close contact with others, for there someone will only have what he possesses by nature and what he has received from his ancestors, and if some of those ancestors happen to be ancient and there being many descended from them, they name the whole474 region or the way of life475 [after those ancestors] to indicate476 that they were the source of the starting points and seeds that planted in them their natural motions and shapes. Thus the causes of changes are [both] natural and cultural, each of them separately sufficient, but so much more when combined together.477 One may also take the following [to be conducive] to differentiation: food is dryer, less earthy, and healthier for breath478 in mountain regions, and it makes the bodies compact and each limb straight and neither crooked nor impeded479 by any external power. For there is an individual480 measure suitable to different persons. For [even]481 at seasons that are diagonally opposite482 each other, the pure air that blows483 through [the mountains] is highly conducive to this [i.e. to a healthy constitution], considering both how much we use [air]

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and that we use it for the most important [processes] of life. Moreover, it is also the case that in mountainous regions animals are more powerful and nimble and excel in body and soul: for due to the composition of the ambient air they become stronger and also get self-­confidence;484 hard work adds to this, and the fact that they do not need much food. In the plains, on the other hand †people485 have these things the contrary way, contrary to each such causal effect†. So by moving men and other animals to new places we immediately have a difference: some become rustic and stupid in certain places, and due to heavier food it is difficult for them to become perfect, while [others, in other places, become] sensible and civilized and better suited for the food. Such [circumstances] contribute to bravery or, alternatively, to dread or fear, to nimbleness or to laziness, for natural causes combined with education produce uneven results.486 People who do not have to work and have not been trained to profit by business look like gentlemen, and they have a firm state of soul. [Others] who possess both the ability487 to size up a situation and swiftness in action [look] truculent and hard and suited for travelling. For this reason also older people are more stable and reasonable with good sense, whereas the behaviour of younger people is unstable and swift. [Education] also plays a role for †migration†,488 for the speed or movement of [people’s] bodies and for the want of poverty or riches. Natural causes are responsible for colour and external traits,489 and some actually change from being white to being black, whereas others turn reddish or †black†. And some [acquire] straight hair, others curly hair, and so on with other variations of bodily traits. Strabo, the geographer,490 tells that near the city of Sybaris in Italy there are two rivers, Sybaris and Crathis. One of them, the Sybaris, makes horses that drink from it go mad491 (whence people move their herds away from it), whereas the Crathis makes people who take a bath in it have red hair and white hair and furthermore cures a variety of conditions. It is also said that in the island of Euboea in Greece there are two rivers, one of which is called Cerces, while the other is called Neileus.492 Sheep that drink from one of them become white, while those that drink from the other become black. Any historiographer will provide [similar cases of] differences occurring among many other peoples, but it is hardly worth-­while to report them all in detail, and how this the upper parts of the body are disposed493 to provide strength,

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while the lower parts are rather reduced in size.494 So, such place-­dependent difference is for all peoples a sign of their origin. For these495 are, together with the ambient, i.e. the air, the proper causes of both natures and otherness.496 Hence, one will rather find a disparity of animals and plants in Europe, whereas [one will find] that in Africa they are generally497 somehow similar to one another. The reason is that the air is similar [all over Africa], for summer and winter do not have much effect there. In Asia, on the other hand, and even more in Europe, there are great distances incorporating dissimilarities [of climate], the reason being the position each [place] has relative to the sun’s circle. For the same reason [living beings] in Europe are not the same way498 as their ancestors, not even inside the same city, whereas in Africa and Egypt they are generally so and far removed. Conditions499 of places and airs are the reasons why not all animals and plants occur at all places one after another, but each of them [occurs] in those places in which it is naturally and peculiarly500 contained, for one will find neither elephants nor griffins501 nor any other type of exotic animal with a rare nature outside their usual places. Moreover, in certain places there is not502 even a trace of some that occur in great numbers and are common [in other places], lions, e.g., and wolves and suchlike; indeed, many regions do not know what these animals are like. We also see that for some season of the year certain birds and aquatic beings altogether move away from their region, while others stay hidden in their dens because they cannot stand the climate;503 some of them do so during the winter, others during the summer. Now, every animal is naturally directed towards its own survival, and when the504 normal means to that end are lacking, there are also some hidden, special innate causes through which animals can [achieve their survival]. Thus one type of animal often will not live in some particular place, as is the case with the hare in the Greek island of Ithaca505 and in another island in the same sea; if one lets loose a hare there, it is found to move towards the edges until it stops by the sea – its last refuge, as it were; next, it is said, it will run around towns and other places without being able to stop and stay in any way, running around the whole island as if in pain and being pushed, taking no pasture or food whatsoever. A similar phenomenon occurs in Crete,506 where in the area between Cydonia507 and Eleuthernae there live only deer, wild boars,508 vipers, and francolins. But lo and behold! None of these enters the remaining509 part of the island

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that borders on [this district]; instead [the remaining part] fosters other animals – though not at all wolves, foxes, or other big and harmful510 [animals], nor any biting and noxious reptiles except for phalangia,511 i.e. spiders with a noxious bite. Some animals, however, stay without changing and thrive when transported into new regions – perhaps they accomplish512 [this] through an excess of change not taking charge,513 for superabundance will bring just anything to naught. If, however, they manage at all to endure being moved, they no longer sustain the same process of growth of all their limbs nor the whole make-­up514 of their shape. Therefore this is also the situation confronted by people who have moved to live in places at the extremes, whether it be 515 the north, south, east, or west. Each group of them become similar to the ones to whom they have been moved. There516 is a great distance between a Negro and a Scythian, a Celt and an African, an Indian and an Arab, but time changes and alters even517 the natures of Greeks, who live everywhere. In their case, however, the change is not allowed to affect the manners previously [adopted].518 From all of this it is then clear how nature is well shaped both as regards bodies and the operations of the soul and the virtues. Yet whereas migrations to the various regions, require not only a time that suits the places but also an adjustment519 to the peculiarities of those places, for this reason also some live in those places and keep their shapes from520 their former places. Hippocrates,521 the greatest authority of all in matters of medicine, does, indeed, treat of such matters in his work On Air, Places, and Waters, telling the reason for the difference in behaviour and manners, size and looks and bodily volume, as well as in the occurrence of [living] beings, according to each [type of] air, mixture of seasons, places, and quality of waters, both as regards humans and other animals and plants and seeds and generally every living thing, for the constitution of air, places, and waters is the source of small as well as great changes.

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Chapter 9

[Why do Things in a Good Universe Harm Each Other?] 522

Translated by David Langslow and Sten Ebbesen (coordinated with Vivian Nutton and Pamela Huby) with notes by the translators and various hands as indicated

Introductory note Khosroes has asked why only reptiles are poisonous to us and, more generally, what benefit there is in some animals, plants, and even stones being dangerous to living things, although others are compatible with each other. Priscian assumes a provident creator, and expects King Khosroes to agree, but not unlike Leibniz more than a millennium later, considers not merely what the best possible creatures would have been, but what would be the best compossible combination of creatures, which already helps to answer Khosroes’ question, why such dangerous animals as poisonous snakes are included. Priscian puts his answer in terms of there being a Creator of the totality (universitas, 94,9; 95,4), who is good (95,4) and whose plan (95,11), although we cannot know its details (94,18–24; 95,18–20), produces utility both for the totality (94,15; 95,7) and for each member of it (95,7). There are methods for living things to check each other out through hostility or friendship (94,26), there are differences in protective strength or speed (94,24 ff.), and they can flee from each other (98,8). Thus living things finish up compatible with each other (94,13), with their different natures kindred or at least coordinated (94,13; 94,23; 98,8), and possessing a way of co-­habiting with each other (habitudo ad se invicem, 94,22–3; 94,27; 98,7–8). Mankind is protected as royal ruler of the rest as subjects through combining sense with intelligence. At 95,18, Priscian moves from his first answer to Khosroes (to be recapitulated at 90,5–11), and gives his second answer, correcting Khosroes’

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singling out of ordinary snakes by illustrating the amazing variety of other lethal animals. After describing this widespread savagery, at 97,13, he offers explanations for certain variations in it: lassitude after hibernation, added strength from mountainous or hot and dry habitations, or from other localities, the effect of the mating season, the vigour supplied by certain foods, or variation in the attractiveness of different prey. Some animals are eaten by snakes, while others eat them. Inanimate things and properties also have variable effects. Priscian’s insistence, in his second answer, on the many sources of lethal danger might seem to conflict with his first answer by suggesting that after all there is no preservation of the totality and its members, nor a coordinated, let alone a kindred, nature among living things. But this is mitigated by his reminding us that the first answer has been trying to describe something ineffable, which cannot be known in full. And 98,5–11 recapitulates both of Priscian’s two answers, saying that those who look at details will find many healthy or harmful ways in which things cohabit either with kindred natures or by fleeing (cf. 97,13), so that it is superfluous to enumerate them all. RRKS And then this: why, when every animate body is made up of four elements, is it only in reptiles that certain deadly poisons are found, and also [why], while they are in them, do others similar in genus to them not have them? This question is about the differences among the genera of reptiles. And this: for whose benefit have these been created for the death and disabling of others? Perhaps nothing else is to be looked at except the causes from which the one who deliberately established this universe willed to adorn every sensible place with its varied animals on the ground, on the wing and in the water, and also plants and crops and stones of different make-­up and having [different] powers; for they are the causes of individual things coming to birth. And how has it come about523 that some of these are compatible with one another and have coordinated natural524 powers, and again others are in opposition and destructive [of each other] and otherwise hostile; and in general what usefulness do they have to the totality?525 To some extent,526 they make us ask a similar question to that which has to be asked in that other context,527 viz. why does fire,528 [given that it] is hot and dry, 529 burn certain kinds of other elements it has accompanied (consecutus) in a given

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type of mixture? For the reasons why each individual thing is born in its own distinctive way (varie) and has such an existence530 are ineffable, and known only to the one who produced them and made the nature of such beings according to a certain order and creative harmony. It is impossible for a divisible mind and sense to grasp the variety that is to be perceived of combinations and shapes and uses or even of the coordinated nature and way of being among themselves (ad se invicem) of animals and plants and inanimate things, from the greatest to the smallest. And why do not all flying things have the same strength and speed, or food, just as there is also not [the same] method of checking each other out through hostility or friendship or some intermediate attitude? Perhaps this would also apply to other living things. And so the same thing must be discussed also about plants and seeds and stones. For some of these things are in conflict among themselves and are destroyed by opposing force and blending and mixtures; but some grow up together and exist together. And in general what is of many forms and differing in matter is causeless to us,531 but the reasons for the production of each thing are in it naturally, putting together and forming the genera according to the order of appropriateness attributed to each. Someone might say that the connective cause of all and the power of all is manifest to us [as] this and [this] alone, how the creator of the totality is good, and adds existing things to non-­existing things, and adorns the things that are simple and intelligible with various natures, and some that are composite and visible, forming one utility532 and coordinated nature for them with one another and for the whole totality, like the creation of a concatenation from a single conjunction. But what is going to produce the best is overall the same even if opposites of parts are brought into certain things and a conflict from the mixture and the difference of qualities (for even this is constituted not without a skilful plan;533 but thus a form that is rational and composite, which indeed as a single thing is separated from everything (else), has this [being a mix], so achieving a way of existing from two opposites (sensible, I mean, and intelligible), achieving indeed a portrait of royalty.534 And if indeed it preserves this and its own principle and dignity, by being superior to sensible things and not succumbing to ambushes from any of the things that are harmful, ordained to master them. But if it is destroyed, having fallen out of its order because of lack of knowledge,535 it would somehow536 bring itself and subject itself to its subjects.

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And we will have said this speculating in common ideas about ineffable things.537 But we ought not to suppose these things about reptiles only, since it is possible to find deadly and harmful ones also among other sorts animals of the air and on the earth and in the water, just as also in plants and grasses and seeds and roots and stones there are certain destructive powers and qualities, and again some useful and healthy. And so about these matters the old writers538 also enquire whether reptiles in their bites project venom and a kind of sanies539 or inject some pneuma540 and a power. For the bites of vipers and certain other reptiles show that they give out a certain rather more terrible sanies from which they quickly make partly (partim)541 putrefied those who have been bitten. But also those who suck out the venom do not die, if the rest of the body is not injured, as if the putrefaction had not spread all over (cumulatim).542 And so the Scythian venom543 with which they anoint arrows to make them deadly composed of the sanies of a viper and a man has a composition able to kill. For there is taken from a man some sanies from his blood and adding to that what comes from a viper they smear their arrows to speed up the lethality of a hit, and so the addition of that [human sanies] putrefies the flesh; and so [the Scythians] neither touch their flesh nor that of any other creature that eats their flesh, but even avoid its very smell. But some of the biting and harming creatures fill [their victims] with some power and pneuma, like scorpions and bees and wasps and the phalangium (a venomous spider).544 And so also wasps, when they are seen upon a dead ,545 for they are fond of its flesh, are even deadlier than the vipers themselves, when they sting. Again the pricks of certain thorns and trees are deadly, like that of the wild pear in the island546 of Ceos: for that extends a prick, like the sea turtle. This is also shown by the bites of dogs and wolves, when they have rabies: for they are harmful from a malady and excess from something else. Moreover they say that in the region of the Persians those bitten by rabid dogs can be cured in the first or second application of treatment; but if a third follows,547 they are now overcome by their malady: for they never ask for water nor take in a taste of it at all. And melancholic maladies result in different specific conditions. For they weep and cry out and are saddened and laugh indiscriminately at people who address them548 and in other cases they get up in their cell (domuncula),549 look out through the window and otherwise distress550 passers-­by whom they address by showing them maladies of that sort.551 But in any case, on the fortieth day

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they die at once. For that powers without bodily mass can do many things is clear especially from stags: for they draw vipers out of hedges. Some of the reptiles also do harm not only by biting but also by using puff (sufflatio) and they kill through the medium of552 certain sticks or stones, so that from there they slaughter those who are infected.553 For they have so great a power that even if someone through sticks and metal implements – whatever one tries – a reptile will weaken its power. On the one hand (quidem) they putrify some things, on the other (vero) they cause great pain to others. But this must be similar to those emitting from themselves a power through the medium of sticks and ropes,554 and they produce numbness in those that hold them. For there are also certain places and hollows in the earth from which certain birds flying around and animals approaching are each violently seized and caused to vanish through gases that are given off. Moreover such is the power of things that bite that if they555 have bitten even the root of a tree, the whole of the tree will drop its leaves; And if any man were found to take shelter there, it causes him to lose his hair all over from the top over the whole body; and likewise it harms those who touch it through its power. They also say that a snake556 that is called holy – it appears rarely around Thessaly – not only if it were to bite but also if it touches but lightly,557 kills as if it were only using its voice.558 And in size it is not great but moderate: but when it appears, the vipers and snakes and all the others flee. It must also be known559 that560 places and times and foods all produce a variation in bites whether severe or temperate. For in the winter when they go into holes or immediately after the hole, the bites are weakened and they are almost harmless. But561 in the mountains and rugged places, such as in dry and hotter ones, all are more likely to bite because they are stronger; but elsewhere they are full of fluid and weak. Because of this [variability] also, they are most savage about [the time of] mating and in relation to the difference of foods: for from any given food someone can infer their vigour and strength. Again they say that also around Sicily and Italy562 the bite of a gecko lizard is deadly, but in other [places] entirely harmless. But reptiles are not harmful to all animals. For deer and swine563 eat snakes, and different ones are devoured harmlessly by different ones. But the cause is that bodies differ in their mixtures and just like foods of multiple forms, they are in the same way harmful and deadly; for tastes and smells are in accordance with the habits of each one of them towards

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foods: and in general many of the things which are inanimate can do this very thing; just as some of the animals that eat such-­and-such flesh or grasses die at once, and all insects are killed/destroyed by olive-­oil,564 and vultures565 by the smell of perfumes, and scarab beetles566 from roses, and snakes and almost all567 these things from the smell of the horns568 of stags: for that reason they avoid things that are fragrant. And in general if anyone approaches these things in detail,569 he will find many which are healthy for some, but harmful for others, and which incorporate some such way of cohabiting with each other, either by way of kindred nature570 or by fleeing.571 Since some mortal things and plants and crops and stones are harmful to some animals, but useful to others, and many bites suffered by men are harmful, therefore to record each one of these is a superfluous corroboration.572 And some indeed insert their poison quickly through a bite, but some through a prick or just through spitting it out, or even through a kind of hidden relation and power, whether breath or voice and look, just as happens in some other animals and men who have the evil eye.573 And to say that some indeed are by nature venomous, but some changeably so and some bring on immediate decline, or illness, or danger, and some, whatever they are accustomed to do they bring on quickly, but some after a time and to a degree is a superfluous delay. So setting it on one side, and as we are now stating the causes [only] of the being and material basis of what produces damage and brings [such trouble] on, let us move on to the tenth chapter like this.

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Chapter 10

[Of What is the Wind Made and Where Does its Motion Come From?] 574

Translated by Malcolm Wilson, with his notes, except as indicated

Introductory note Priscian’s treatment of winds is largely, though not entirely, based on Aristotle, Meteorology 2.4–6. He explains them in terms of one of Aristotle’s two exhalations, the dry, not the wet exhalation, that the sun draws up from the earth, or allows to drop down as precipitation, according to whether the sun’s heat is closer or further from us. These two exhalations were invoked in Chapter 7 above, to explain why some natural bodies get displaced up or down from their natural places, and in Chapter 6, 72,12–14, to explain the effect of excessive solar heat in burning up exhalation and so making the sun less able than the moon to raise the tides. There is really only one exhalation, but it is differently named, according to its wetness or dryness, and the two kinds get separated from each other. A number of strands of dry exhalation need to combine, to create matter sufficient to constitute a wind. Exhalation depends on warmth in the earth and from the sun, but also on the sun’s heat not being so great as to burn the exhalation up, and on there being water on the earth, but not so cold as to counteract the sun’s drawing power, and on a downpour of rain not being so heavy as to extinguish the dry exhalation. The exhalation is drawn vertically up by the sun, but, as wind, the dry exhalation bends to move obliquely round the earth. Aristotle’s explanation has been charged with implying that the wind always follows the direction of the sun (see note on 100,17).

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From 101,11, Priscian takes up the subject of Aristotle’s Meteorology 2.6: the directions of all the winds, though he may be following other authors too. Priscian’s account diverges from Aristotle’s (see notes on. 102,6; 102,9). There are several cases in which Priscian suddenly diverges from Aristotle, in such a way as to produce something very hard to understand, or something erroneous (see notes on 100,10, 100,14–15). These divergences without an intelligible motive again raise the question, mentioned in the Introduction, whether some of the unintelligibilities are due not to the undoubted errors of the Latin translator, but to Priscian himself. RRKS And this too: from what does the wind come and what is the source of its motion, and why is it that, although its body and origin and end are not apparent, the magnitude of its power is manifest? For since by the magnitude of its power it moves bodily things and drives them away,575 it also extends its motions quickly and its cessations too, sometimes over a small area indeed, but sometimes over a large one, sometimes too in some part of the earth for so many months in the year. Likewise, sometimes it quickly turns; and sometimes it is excessive; and again in the same place it is sometimes less, and sometimes silent. About the meeting of winds and other breezes,576 using the same assumptions we declare the following577 – there being two kinds of exhalation, the wet578 and hot is called [in Greek] atmis i.e., vapour, and the dry and hot is called kapnôdes, i.e. smoky. But neither of these exists without the other; they exist at the same time; and the whole is called by either name according to which predominates.579 Furthermore the sun, producing this twofold exhalation as it approaches places and passes over them, produces vapour, but when it withdraws, it becomes a cause of coldness and in turn [the vapour] condenses and falls to the earth. For this reason in the winter there is a greater abundance of water and more so at night than during the day; for nights are colder than days.580 Again it often happens that there is a dry exhalation above and a wet one below; and again conversely it happens that they are driven by certain winds to exchange their proper places and be transferred to other parts, the dry being transported to where there was wet, and the wet driven to the place of the dry.581 In fact, there is a similar effect in the bodies of animals. For in ourselves when the upper gut is dry it happens that the lower gut becomes wet, and conversely.582 And an indication that the wind and the water come from one exhalation each, and not

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both from the same, is that each is restrained by the other.583 For often winds are restrained by rains, and winds arise after rains. This happens when the exhalation which is constituted by the heat in the earth is not extinguished by being burnt up by the heat of the sun.584 It is this exhalation, the one which is the body and matter of the winds, that we say is from above.585 But when water is dominant and extinguishes the smoky exhalation, then the winds are still. And so since there is such an alternation and exchange of each, it is clearly shown that the winds come from a dry exhalation; and an argument586 for this is that the northern winds come from the arctic, and the southern winds come from the south. For these areas alone the sun does not enter; it merely approaches and recedes from them: for from its rising to its setting it is fixed within the ecliptic.587 The path of such winds is oblique:588 for, though the exhalation is produced vertically (in rectum), the winds blow around the earth, and so even the entire air follows this path in a circle.589 And so since the wind is a kind of quantity of a dry exhalation from the earth that is moved around the earth, it is clear that the principle of its motion is from above, but [the principle] of its matter and its generation arises from below.590 But it is clear that the origins of winds come about from many exhalations joining together591 a little after592 [they have risen]. For each one individually, when it starts to blow, is very small; but as they proceed, they become noticeable, though it seems to some that the Libs [the SW wind] breaks out more violently right from the beginning.593 The sun also moves [things], and at the same time the winds produce an effect; for as long as the exhalations are weak and small, they die out when a lot of heat [is applied to them]; and [the sun] disperses what is lesser (minus)594 in the exhalation; and it first dries out the earth before [the exhalation] can be produced in a gathered mass, just as if something burning were to fall on to a large fire, it often first [burns out]595 before it can produce smoke. It generally happens that calms occur either when cold is dominant596 and the heat that is in the exhalation is extinguished, as occurs in intense freezing, or597 because of the exhalation’s cold, when it is too little, being weakened by stifling and more powerful heat.598 And in the intermediate seasons between powerful winter and extreme heat, periods of calm occur, either because there is not yet any such exhalation arising, or because [the exhalation] has already been consumed by breezes, and more [exhalation] has not yet come in. Now (enim) there are two sections599 of that region that can be inhabited, the one towards the upper pole, that of the north wind, which is near us, and the

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other towards the other, southern [pole]. Accordingly we must assume also the circle of the horizon both in our section and in the section of the other part [of the earth]. And attending to this division the following things are to be said about the position600 of the winds.601 For the Zephyr [W], which is at the equinoctial sunset, is diametrically opposed to the equinoctial sunrise, which is the location of the Apeliotes [E], i.e., the Subsolanum [‘under the sun’].602 And when the north wind is blowing from the arctic, diametrically opposed to it is the Notus [S] blowing up from the south, and the wind called Argestes [NW] blowing from the summer sunset is opposed to the Kaecias [NE], which is located at the summer sunrise.603 So those winds are from diametrically opposed positions.604 But there are others to which there are no contrary winds but which must be understood in this way by force of necessity.605 For the Threscias, since it is between the Argestes [NE] and the Boreas [N], by a similar diameter has as its opposite the Euronotus [SSE].606 Again the Meses [NNE] is placed between the Kaecias [NE] and the Boreas [N], diametrically opposed to the Libonotus [SSW],607 which is in between the Notus [S] and the Libs [SW], just as the Euronotus [SSE] is between the Eurus [SE] and the Notus [S]. So therefore, all the winds are divided into six pairs or conjunctions, even if some of the old [writers] provide other divisions and names of the basic winds. But there are some winds and breezes that are peculiar to places, this [one arising] from lakes and rivers, another from bays of the sea or even different places on land – though gathering together because of the same causes, viz. the heat of the sun and the exhalation drawn upwards – each one named in a manner befitting its location. But of the fact that there are more winds from the arctic than from the places towards the south the cause is this, that the terrestrial globe is subject to this area [i.e. the north], and that much more water and snow is deposited in that place because of the path of the sun. Of winds in general some are called boreal [i.e. northern], and some austral [i.e. southern]: and some west winds are classed together with the north wind – for they are colder because they blow from the west;608 and some east winds are classed together with the south – for they are hotter in that they are blowing from the east, [and they are hotter because] those that come from the east are under the sun for the longest time, while [the sun] departs from those from the west more quickly and approaches that place later. And in this way too it is clear that [winds] cannot blow thus in opposite directions at the same time; for the one, driven

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back diametrically, becomes still; but nothing prevents those not so oriented from moving through the same area: and for this reason both blow at the same time. Again in opposite seasons opposite [winds] are most prone to blow, as for example, the Kaecias [NE] and in general the winds [arising] beyond the summer solstice blow at the spring equinox; but at the autumn equinox, the Libs [SW] [blows], and also at the summer solstice the Zephyr [W] [blows], and at the winter solstice the Eurus [E]. But the Aparctias [N] and the Threskias [NNW] and the Argestes [NW] bring pressure on the others and in general check them, for because their force comes from nearby, these blow in great numbers and strongly. Again609 it is often possible, because of the lie of the land, for winds to be in opposition to themselves. For when the Boreas [N] blows strongly in the summer and meets some very high mountain full of snow lying on it from the winter season, it happens that the resulting repercussion, blowing from it, appears to be the Notus [S], as one would expect, to those, that is, who live in the area, or it is a favourable wind and, being rather appropriate for the summer season, is considered to be a Notus [S], because it itself arises from southern areas by repercussion.610 Also high places, which are opposed to certain winds, make those [winds] unable to pass over the height of their peak either to quiet down their blowing or by blowing around in a circuit of the places receiving them to appear to make their impact from the other position, and not to come blowing in a straight line from their own places. And there are also other properties of winds, with some being drier, some wet, and with some producing snows that come down fine, and hailstones or even heavier snows, and some producing the opposite. And in general it seems to me not useful to talk about the movements and turning-­points of every one [of the winds]. It is also superfluous to say how the Etesians and the Ornithians come about, and from where.611 For these are the facts that have been received with our careful approval from many writers about the generation of winds and how much they are moved and how they move the air with their own motion. [This612 is the end of the book of Priscian the philosopher about the questions which were asked by Khosroes the King of the Persians]



Notes 1 Throughout the notes the following abbreviations have been used: ACB, Alan C. Bowen; CS, Carlos Steel; DAR, Donald Russell; DL, David Langslow; PH, Pamela Huby; RRKS, Richard Sorabji; SAW, Stephen White; SE, Sten Ebbesen; VN, Vivian Nutton. 2 occasiones, Greek: aphormai. DAR 3 Diligens is a translation of Greek akribês. 4 Praetermittat: Bywater suggests reading the passive, praetermittatur, Greek: paraleipêtai. 5 Decorum praesenti usui: cf. Plato, Timaeus 38B: prepôn en tôi paronti diakribologeisthai. 6 Either Latin quasi in line 13 needs deleting, or, as Bywater suggests, it represents Greek hôsper but then habentem in line 14 needs changing to habentium, yielding the sense: ‘or to acquire an understanding of it as being right and good’. DAR 7 Taking with Bywater recordari in line 15 as a translation of tôi mnêmoneusai. 8 Cognoscere, a misunderstanding of Greek anagignôskein = to read. DAR 9 The following list of sources (many no longer extant!) is impressive. One may doubt whether Priscian used them all to compose his Solutiones. Some may have been listed to give more authority to his answers. The fact, however, that Priscian lists also works of minor and obscure authors such as Dorotheus, Didymus, Marcianus, may indicate that he really used them. The use of some will be made explicit by Priscian in the chapters below, or in the notes. 10 actionibus, Greek: pragmateiôn. 11 Understanding with Bywater De Caeli generatione as a translation for peri ouranou, geneseôs. 12 Substantial fragments of Aristotle’s dialogue On Philosophy survive, but On the World (singular) is not a dialogue and not considered an authentic work of Aristotle. 13 occasiones, Greek: aphormai. 14 On the works of Theophrastus mentioned here, see Part 2 of W. W. Fortenbaugh, P. M. Huby, R. W. Sharples, and D. Gutas, Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1992). For On Harmful Bites and Ways and Customs and Habitats see Theophrastus of Eresus . . . Commentary Volume 5: Sources on Biology, by R.W. Sharples (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 69–71. He

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collects at pp. 360–1 under the heading of Mirabilia 139–151 items on harmful bites which may derive from Theophrastus’ On Harmful Bites. For differences according to place, see his pp. 355–8, for fish found in dry places, pp. 363–4, and for swarms of creatures, creatures that are said to be grudging, creatures that change colour, and creatures that hide, see pp. 359, 365–370. RRKS 15 Bywater suggests that Latin perveniens corresponds to the Greek anêkon, in the sense of ‘pertains’ and that it omits ‘has provided in’: Hippocrates [has provided] what pertains [in] his On Air, Water, Places. DAR Is is also possible to take perveniens for prosêhkôn (nom. masc.). 16 42,8–11 = Test. 72 in L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, Posidonius I: The Fragments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). According to Kidd, Strabo, Geminus, and Arrianus all used Posidonius. 17 Bywater (following Diels and Freudenthal) takes Lavini as an error for Albini, Albinus, mid-­second-century Platonist philosopher, pupil of the Platonist Gaius, and teacher of doctor-­philosopher Galen. Albinus wrote an Introduction to the Works of Plato, which is still extant. The work quoted here ‘Ex Gaii scholis exemplaria Platonicorum dogmatum’ (Greek: ek tou Gaiou skholiôn hupotupôseis tôn Platônikôn dogmatôn) is no longer extant. 18 Greek: klimata. 19 Marcianus, geographer from Heraclea, possibly around 400 CE. He is the author of a ‘Periplous of (voyage round) the outer sea’ and ‘Periplous of the inner sea’ (i.e. Mediterranean sea), extant in excerpts. 20 Arrian, c. 86–160 CE, pupil of the Stoic Epictetus and recorder of his lectures. His Meteorology is only preserved in fragments. See G. Roos, Flavii Arriani Scripta minora et fragmenta (Leipzig: Teubner, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 186–95. 21 Understanding Didymoque de Aristotele et ipsius scriptore dogmatum as a wrong translation of (ek) Didymou te tou peri Aristelous kai tôn autou grapsantos dogmatôn (cf. Bywater). This may be a reference to the doxographer Arius Didymus, author of an Epitome of which extracts have been preserved by Stobaeus and Eusebius. The author is generally identified with the Alexandrian philosopher Arius who was friend and counselor of Augustus. See D. E. Hahm, ‘The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus’, in W. Haase, ed., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 2.36.4 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990), pp. 2935–3055, and J. Mansfeld and D. Runia, Aetiana, The Method and Intellectual Context for a Doxographer I: The Sources (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 238–65. 22 This commentary is not known. There was a Dorotheus of Sidon (first century CE) who wrote on astrology. A less plausible candidate is Dorotheus of Ascalon, a Greek grammarian and lexicographer from the same period.

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23 Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria in the third century CE, Plotinus’ teacher, wrote nothing and swore his pupils to secrecy about his views, but, according to Porphyry, only Plotinus kept the agreement. On the ‘collectio Ammonii scholarum’, see H.-R. Schwyzer, Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins, Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften 260 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983), pp. 45–51. 24 occasiones, Greek: aphormai. DAR 25 Surviving fragments of Porphyry’s Summikta Zêtêmata have been collected by H. Dörrie, Porphyrios’ Symmikta Zetemata (München: Beck, 1959). Chapter 1 of the Solutiones is an important text for reconstructing this lost work. 26 Fragments of this treatise On the Soul are preserved by Stobaeus. Priscian (i.e. Pseudo-Simplicius) took this treatise as the main inspiration for his Commentary on the Soul. See for a French annotated translation A. J. Festugière, La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, 4 vols (Paris: Gabalda, 1944–54), vol. 3, Appendix 1, pp. 177–264. For a collection of fragments and English translation see J. Finamore and J. Dillon, Iamblichus de Anima: Text, Translation, and Commentary, Philosophia Antiqua 92 (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 27 On Proclus’ monograph on the subject see chapter 1 below, footnote 63. 28 See Carlos Steel, The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism (Brussels: Paleis der Academien, 1978), pp. 14–16. 29 For an answer to this question, see 50,9 ff. 30 Writing for una (43,1) anima, which may have been the original reading in G before the correction of G2. 31 43,2: ab una persona informata. I take persona (prosôpon) as indicating the character constituting a human person with its essential capacities and properties. I could find no parallel for this phrase. 32 I take the masculine forms (unusquisque eorum and ipsorum) as referring to the individuals characterized by the human persona. 33 43,15 ut: write et. 34 For the following argument (which may come from Porphyry) see Calcidius, in Tim. 226, p. 241,12–242,5 Waszink (other parallels are mentioned in Waszink’s apparatus). 35 carens numero (43,26) litteraly ‘deprived of number’. 36 See Aristotle, Cat. 4a10–11; 33–4; 4b2–4. 37 See Aristotle, Cat. 3b33–4. 38 For the following argument see Calcidius, in Tim. 221, p. 234,5–235,7 and 227, p. 242,15–243,12 with the excellent notes of Waszink. Waszink rightly attributes this doctrine to Porphyry. See also Alexander, De Anima 115,32 ff. (SVF 2.797). See also below 50,25 ff. The argument uses the Stoic doctrine of mixture against the Stoic claim that the soul is corporeal. See Long-Sedley, ch. 48 ‘Mixture’.

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Notes to pages 18–19

39 The Stoics distinguished three species of mixture, (1) ‘juxtaposition’ (parathesis): ‘The constituents of a juxtaposition are related to one another purely by surface contact. They undergo no essential change’ (Long-Sedley, p. 292); (2) ‘fusion’ (sunkhusis); (3) ‘blending’ (krasis): ‘[Stoic] blending resembles fusion in that the constituents are related through and through and not merely at their surfaces [as in juxtaposition], but it differs from fusion in that its constituents retain all their original properties in the mixture and can be separated out again’ (Long-Sedley, p. 293). 40 In a mixture as of water and wine, particles of wine are separated from one another by particles of water. If the soul were mixed with the body in that way, it would be divided into parts. 41 See for the following criticism of the Peripatetic (Aristotelian school’s) doctrine of the soul as entelechy: Calcidius, in Tim. 225, p. 239,16–241,2 Waszink. Here again the obvious source is Porphyry. 42 spiritum naturalem, Greek: sumphuton pneuma. The expression is already used by Aristotle (De Somno 456a12), and plays an important role in Stoic physics. 43 calorem naturalem, Greek: phusikon thermon. See Aristotle, De longitudine 466b32. See also below 56,20. 44 incorporalis essentiae, write: incorporalis essentia. 45 See Aristotle, De Anima 1.1, 403a10–16, and Proclus, El. Theol. § 16, English tr. by E.R. Dodds. 46 Here starts a long period with a concatenation of premises leading to the final conclusion at 45,25, clarum sic. 47 diligens, Greek: akribês. 48 That virtue is knowledge is not only a Socratic-Platonic doctrine, but also a Stoic view. Maximus of Tyre defines philosophy as the ‘accurate knowledge of things divine and human’ (Diss. 26.1.27). A similar definition of philosophy is found in Philo, Clement, Sextus Empiricus, and other authors of the early imperial period. However, Priscian’s source replaces ‘human’ (anthrôpinôn) by ‘intelligible’ (noêtôn). 49 The Neoplatonist argument for this is that body cannot penetrate body (epistrephesthai eis heauton), see Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 3 vols (London: Duckworth, 2004), vol. 1, ch. 4(c) v and vi. 50 This is like the argument in Porphyry, Sentences 41, 52,7–53,5 Lamberz, which distinguishes intellect from the senses as not owing its essence (ousiôsthai) to body, because in penetrating itself, it can both know itself and remain intact in separation from body. Perception, by contrast cannot withdraw from body and still know itself, or even remain intact, for it has to perceive bodies and their spatial relation to its own bodily organ. Sorabji, Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 226–9, relates this passage to the later arguments of Augustine and Avicenna that body is

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no part of the essence of soul. Nemesius and Priscian have overlapping passages which were used by Heinrich Dörrie to reconstruct Porphyry’s Miscellaneous Questions (Summikta Zêtêmata). Priscian claims to have drawn on this work at pp. 41–2 above and Nemesius also cites the work at p. 43 ff. Morani and it may be their source throughout Dörrie’s selected passages (though John Rist contests this view of Dörrie – see note on 51,25–6), even if Porphyry is wrong to suppose that the material comes from the oral teaching of the earlier Ammonius Saccas. RRKS 51 purgando (45,26) does not belong to the conclusion of the long argument based on knowledge, but introduces a new argument based on purifying virtue. Therefore, I suppose that some words were omitted after habere (45,25). 52 See Porphyry, Sent. 32,37–8: ‘to purify and be purified is the removal of everything alien’ (to kathairein kai kekatharthai aphairesis ên pantos tou allotriou). 53 vinculus (45,30), write vinculis. Reference to Phaedo 67D1–2: ‘being freed from the body as from chains’ (ekluomenên hôsper ek desmôn ek tou sômatos). 54 What are these arguments? (1) philosophy as a pursuit of science; (2) philosophy as an activity of purification. The whole argument until 46,28 may come from Iamblichus’ De Anima, as is suggested by the references to divine visions and prophecies in 46,13 ff. 55 The identity of knowledge with its object is already taught by Aristotle, De Anima 3.8, 431b20–432a1; cf. 3.6, 430b 24–26, before being adopted by the Neoplatonists. 56 46,9 conversum: igitur in se ipsum. I propose to construe conversum in se ipsum: igitur. 57 On visions in sleep see chs 2 and 3 below. 58 46,14–15: aliisque per somnum apparentibus et super futuro et omnino aliis, et quia . . . The Latin aliisque . . . et quia translates the Greek rhetorical construction allôn te . . ., kai hoti (see for example the first sentence of Lysias’ Olympiacus). There is clearly a twofold supplementary argument for the separate character of the soul: (1) visions during sleep; (2) even when awake, the soul may have visions of the future thanks to divine inspirations. Difficult to explain is the second aliis (46,15). I follow a conjecture of Bywater, who believed that allôn translated by aliis may be an error in the Greek original for adêlôn. One should notice that the term adêlos is often connected with ‘future’ events (mellonta). 59 46,18–19. The Latin talk of the soul proceeding (animae inde procedentis) is an erroneous translation of its projecting something from within itself (Greek: endothen proballomenês). Cf. Bywater in apparatus. 60 The whole argument may come from Iamblichus: see De Mysteriis 3.3 where Iamblichus is discussing divination during sleep. As he explains, the soul has a twofold life, one together with the body, the other separate from the body on its own. During sleep the soul may recover its separate life and have access to visions

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about the future. But even when awake, it can have activities that show its separate nature. On the double life of the soul see also his De Anima, preserved in Stobaeus 1,368,1–12. On the role of the divine light in divination see De Mysteriis 3.14. 61 ‘rightly’: pulchre is generally used as translation of eikotôs. 62 Reference to Proclus, whose arguments are given in the next section. 63 This section is taken entirely from Proclus’ monograph on Plato’s three proofs of immortality. The Greek text is lost, but an Arabic translation was available in the tenth century. Priscian’s summary can be compared with the summary of the argument made by the Persian scholar Miskawayh at the end of the tenth century. See on this text L. G. Westerink, ‘Proclus on Plato’s Three Proofs of Immortality’, in Zetesis: Album amicorum (Antwerp/Utrecht: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1973), pp. 296–306. A. Hasnawi discovered other quotations from the lost Arabic: ‘Deux textes en arabe sur les preuves platoniciennes de l’immortalité da l’âme’, Medioevo 23 (1997), 395–408. See also G. Chemi, ‘Monobiblon di Proclo sull’immortalità dell’anima: Atene, Ctesifonte, Corbie, Bagdad: secoli V-X’, Studia graeco-­arabica 4 (2014), 126–43. I am much indebted to Westerink’s excellent translation of Priscian’s text. My translation of this section is only a modified version of his translation. 64 This first argument is based on Plato Phaedo 105B5–107A1. See also Damascius (who relies on Proclus) in his commentary of the final argument of the Phaedo, ed. and trans. in L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo II: Damascius (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977). 65 47,7–8: nullum autem eorum quae sunt quidem ab eo quod vere est. The retroversion into Greek by Bywater is not plausible. Westerink supposes (’without much conviction’) that the translator wrongly understood the Greek preposition pros + genitive (in the sense of ‘on the side of ’, ‘belonging to’) in the phrase pros tou ontôs ontos (’from the things that truly are’) as ab eo quod vere est. However, even with that correction, the formulation is redundant. One expects ouden de tôn ontôs ontôn (‘none of the things that truly are’): cf. Syrianus, in Metaph. 106,30. 66 47,9: unum existentis, wrong translation of enuparkhontos (Bywater). 67 The same a fortiori argument is attributed to Iamblichus in Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 10 § 7. There is no passage in the Enneads where such an argument is given. However, Plotinus distinguishes between heat as an inherent (sumphuton: see ‘connaturalem’ in 47,16 and 22) quality of a cause (fire for instance) and heat as an effect proceeding from it. It is obvious that a cause cannot receive again what it has given as an effect. See Enn. 1.2.1.36 f.; 2.6.3.15 f.; 6.1.21.23 ff. It may have been Iamblichus who referred to Plotinus in his argument. As L. G. Westerink suggests (The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo I: Olympiodorus (Amsterdam: North

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Holland Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 144–5, nn. 8–9), Proclus may have taken the reference to Plotinus from Iamblichus. 68 The second argument is based upon Republic 608C9–611A3. 69 salutare, Greek: sôstikon. Proclus often connects sunekhein (hold together) and sôzein (preserve): see, for instance, El. Theol. § 13, p. 14,26–31; § 41, p. 44,2; § 46, p. 46,24; § 139, p. 122,27. 70 See Plato, Rep. 609B1–2: ‘For the good never destroys anything, nor does the neither bad nor good’. 71 indisciplinatio, intemperantia, iniustitia, timor. See Rep. 609B11-C1: ‘injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance’ (adikia te kai akolasia kai deilia kai amathia). indisciplinatio does not stand for akolasia as Bywater supposes (see his index), but for amathia, as disciplina is often used for learning (mathêsis). 72 infirmati, erased in G; firmati coni. Dübner; instimulati coni. Westerink. It may be a translation of erethizontai (to be excited). 73 i.e. the virtuous. I take with Bywater the genitive contrariorum as an erroneous translation of the Greek genitive of comparison. It should be in the ablative case in Latin. 74 circumfulsam approbationem, Greek: lampran apodeixin. For the phrase see Libanius, Oratio 3, 10,3: kai toutou lampran epoiêsanto tên apodeixin. 75 The third argument depends on Plato, Phaedrus 245C5–246A2 (with some elements from Plato, Laws 10, 893B1–898C5). See Westerink, ‘Proclus on Plato’s Three Proofs of Immortality’, p. 302. 76 48,21: taking totum as a translation of the adverbial to holon. In lines 21–6 I follow Westerink’s punctuation. 77 separato enim causalia: write separata enim causalia. 78 See Proclus, Theol. Plat. 1,66,18–20: ‘For the corporeal, being moved by something else (heterokinêton), acquires a reflection of self-­moving power from the soul and is alive through it’. 79 48,31–2: nota figurativa. The term figurativus is mostly used for ‘figurative’ or metaphorical language. But, as Westerink supposes, the term translates here probably eidikos (specific). 80 49,14–15 in se ipsam: write in se ipsa. 81 subsistentia renders hupostasis. 82 intelligens et tractans et aestimans renders dianooumenê te kai skopousa kai doxazousa (Westerink). Cf. Plato Laws 10, 897A1–2: boulesthai, skopeisthai, epimeleisthai, bouleuesthai, doxazein. The following argument is mainly based on Laws 10, 897–898. 83 49,19–34 is translated by Mossman Roueché in Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, ch. 7(2), pp. 217–18. For this metaphorical interpretation of

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Notes to pages 23–24

the corporeal movements (based on Plato, Laws 10, 893B6–894C9) see Proclus, in Parm. 7, 1156,29 ff. ed. Steel. 84 corporalibus crimibus: I take crimen to be a translation of miasma (pollution). 85 See Plato, Rep. 7, 533D2. 86 conversum, Greek: strephomenon. I adopt a suggestion of Westerink that strephomenon should be corrected into trephomenon (nourished). See Plato, Phaedr. 246E2 and cf. Proclus, De mal. subst. 48,15–16: tôn agathôn, hois trephetai to tês psukhês omma (the goods by which the eye of the soul is nourished). Proclus combines two different metaphors of Plato. See also in Parm. 617,7: to tês psukhês omma trephetai te kai ardetai, kathaper phêsi ho en tôi Phaidrôi Sôkratê (the eye of the soul is nourished . . . as Socrates says in the Phaedrus). 87 49,30 corrumpi. One expects here a translation of meiousthai (cf. 49,22 minorationem) corresponding to auxanesthai (augeri). 88 49,34–5: Westerink proposes to correct rationis motionem to motionis rationem, and translates: ‘the result of the character of self-­motion is perfection and self-­sufficient’. One must, however keep motionem as subject of the predicates perfectum and sufficiens (complete and self-­sufficient). I take the periphrastic phrase propriae rationis motionem (motion on its own account) as a translation of the Greek autokinêsian (self-­motion). 89 This is not in contradiction with what is first said (50,4–5), that there is no quality with respect to the essence of the rational soul. The different qualities are found in the powers and activities of the soul (some are vicious, some virtuous) and are due to the connection of the soul to the irrational life and the body. See n. 91. 90 eas vero malitiam quae meliora sunt prohibendi. Obscure! Bywater supposes a lacuna before malitiam. I take the genitive prohibendi as explaining wherein the evil consists of the souls that are punished: they are kept back from what is good. 91 This subject is developed at length in ch. 8 below. Priscian first summarizes what one may learn from the argument in ch. 1: ‘With a view to the enquiry of this chapter, we must start with the things we have already stated about the immortality, simplicity, and incorporeality of the soul and its unchangeability as far as its essence is concerned, for while it changes its operations and powers due to the qualities of [the accompanying] irrational life and its bodily matters and passions, adapting itself, so to speak, to the material and the external environment, it remains unaltered as far as its own nature is concerned.’ (88,23–9) 92 connaturales causas: probably corporeal causes corresponding to the bodies. 93 Understanding with Bywater the ablatives uniformitate et connaturalitate (50,19) as erroneous translations of Greek genitives construed with ekstaiê (excesserit). 94 ex quibus recipiuntur. I take with Dübner recipiuntur as a translation of the Greek katalambanontai, in the sense of ‘seized with the mind’, ‘comprehended’.

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95 The arguments in this section probably come from Porphyry’s Miscellaneous Questions, on which also Nemesius’ arguments are based in De natura hominis 3 (On the Union of Soul and Body). There are many parallels (and differences) between Nemesius and Priscian. See Dörrie, Porphyrios’ Symmikta Zetemata, pp. 12–103 and R. W. Sharples and P. J. van der Eijk, Nemesius, On the Nature of Man (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), pp. 18–19, 78–86 (with translations from Priscian in footnotes). Nemesius first distinguishes three types of connection (following a Stoic distinction: see SVF 2.473): (1) two things (for instance the elements) are changed and destroyed together to form one new being; (2) two things remain separate and unaffected in constituting a unity such as things juxtaposed to one another; (3) two things are in a mixture like wine and water, but still keep their own character. He then shows that the connection of the soul to the body does not fit any of these three modes. (On these three species of mixture see also above 44,15–28 and n. 39). Priscian has another approach: soul and body are naturally joined to one another and yet the soul keeps its identity unconfused, asunkhutos, a concept found earlier in Porphyry’s Summikta Zêtêmata. This is a ‘wonder’, as this kind of mixture is impossible between corporeal things. [There has been controversy between Jean Pépin (Revue des études anciennes 66 (1964), 53–107) and John Rist (American Journal of Philology 109 (1988), 402–15), on whether unconfused union goes back to Porphyry’s Summikta Zêtêmata and on whether Augustine, On the Trinity Book 9, borrowed the concept of the ‘unconfused’ union of body and soul. RRKS] 96 The example of an oily sponge separating water from wine by releasing the water on being squeezed is also in Nemesius, De nat. hom. pp. 39,9–10, Morani. See also Philo, De confusione ling. 186 (SVF 2.472); Arius Didymus, Physica 28,23–7 (SVF 2.471); Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.17 (1,155,5–11); Alexander, De mixtione 15, 232,2. [It was experimentally confirmed in front of witnesses for Richard Sorabji by Connie Meinwald and Wolfgang Mann in 1985. RRKS] 97 i.e. beings that are connected while preserved their being. 98 This explanation is attributed by Nemesius to Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus (De nat. hom. p. 39,16 ff.). 99 51,18. ‘Without confusion’ (asunkhutos) is the expression used three times in Nemesius, De nat. hom. pp. 40–1, Morani, and by Priscian at 51,18; 51,25; 51,30; 52,2–3 and ascribed by H. Dörrie to Porphyry’s Summikta Zêtêmata, although John Rist has contested the ascription in American Journal of Philology 109 (1988), 402–11. On the expression see Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, ch. 6(b), pp. 204–5. RRKS [See n. 50 above.] 100 It is explained by Syrianus, in Metaph. 85,21 that lights, being immaterial bodies, can pass through each other without being fused (asunkhutôs), as can the

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Notes to pages 25–26

non-­fleshly vehicles that house our souls. Proclus agrees, in Tim. 2,254,13–14, that such ‘unconfused’ mutual passage is possible for lights. RRKS 101 See again Nemesius, De nat. hom. p. 40,23–41,8 Morani: ‘just as light is united with air without confusion (asunkhutôs) and yet at the same time fused with it, in the same manner the soul too is united with the body and remains entirely without confusion. There is only this difference: as the sun is a body and circumscribed in place, it cannot be everywhere, for its light is somewhere, neither can fire be everywhere: for it remains in the wood or is attached to a wick (thruallidi) as in a place, whereas the soul, which is incorporeal and not circumscribed in place, goes as a whole through the whole, both its light and the body, and there is not a part illuminated by it where it is not present as a whole.’ This and the following parallels show again that both Nemesius and Priscian depend on Porphyry. 102 This may be a reference to a position like that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who rejected the Stoic doctrine of a throughout blending whereby the constituent particles are interpenetrating one another, though they kept their different qualities. See R. B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1976). Alexander’s critique may be right when limiting the argument to the mixture of bodies. However, as Priscian argues, in the case of incorporeals this blending throughout is perfectly possible. 103 A flame on a wick depends on the matter (oil) provided; when all oil is used the flame too will disappear. That is why the soul should not be compared to the flame on a wick but to an attached flame, not depending on the material to which it is attached. See Nemesius, De nat. hom. 41,4–5 quoted in n. 101. 104 Occasio probably corresponds to aphormê. In what sense is creation understood as ‘offering occasions’? Certainly not in a temporal sense, for Priscian is not discussing the creation of contingent beings, but of eternal incorporeal substances. The ‘occasions’ should be understood as the divine ideas or paradigms of the nature of things created. 105 See Nemesius, De nat. hom. p. 40,12–14 Morani: ‘that the soul remains itself without confusion, is clear from the fact that when the soul is somehow separated from the body in sleep, the latter is left behind like a corpse, whereby the soul only gives it some vapour through life’. 106 inclinatio: neusis. That the soul is bound to the body by its inclination and relation (skhesis) to it, is a view characteristic of Porphyry. See Sentences 3, p. 2,4; 29, p. 18,9–12 (with parallel in Nemesius, De nat. hom. p. 41,16): oukh hôs en topôi tôi sômati legetai einai, all’ hôs en skhesei kai tôi pareinai. 107 Interesting parallel in Priscian (Ps.-Simplicius), in DA 73,14–15: ‘For the mixture shows the inclination towards the body’ (tên gar pros sôma neusin hê mixis dêloi).

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108 The manuscripts provide no title; this one is ours. RRKS 109 53,15: tam = Greek houtôs, so Bywater suggests. DAR For the sense see note on 53,21. RRKS 110 Omitting ‘not’. Codex G has a correction partially erased si vero non: ‘if this is not so’, a correction perhaps motivated by Priscian’s subsequently denying the two-soul hypothesis. RRKS 111 53,21: reading tam instead of quam, DAR. Might tam (‘so’) have the force, both here and at 53,15, of ‘so equally’? That would give us here: ‘so equally (tam) one should ask’, which fits the direction of the argument from the clear case of a single soul to the unclear hypothesis of a double soul. RRKS 112 53,32: reading validius for validus. DAR 113 Only one manuscript offers a sub-­title: Whether sleep is something undergone by soul, by body, or by the combination. 114 54,6: ‘philosophers of old’. Aristotle discusses this at 453b11 ff. References to Aristotle are supplied by Bywater unless otherwise indicated. RRKS 115 ‘is true’. So Aristotle, On Sleep 454b23ff. RRKS 116 54,14: ‘primary and dominant’. See note on 56,21–2. RRKS 117 54,15; 57,14–58,10. Pneuma in the Aristotelian (and Stoic and medical) tradition was a component of the body and material, as still in the talk of certain alcohols as spirits, but closer to air, sometimes compounded with fire, and in Aristotle analogous to his fifth element which composed the heavens. It was Christianity that made spirit immaterial, on which see Gerard Verbeke, L’évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoïcisme à S. Augustin (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1945), and, for Aristotle, A. L. Peck, Aristotle, Generation of Animals, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1953), pp. 578–93. RRKS 118 The heart, so Aristotle, On Sleep 456a4. RRKS 119 Besides the five special senses, Aristotle distinguished a common sense to perform functions common to more than one sense. Here in On Sleep from 455a12, he speaks of a common power (dunamis, 455a16). This power is here and elsewhere concerned with perceiving simultaneously sweet and white, perceiving that they differ, that they belong to one thing, losing or regaining the various perceptual activities on going to sleep or re-­awakening, perceiving that we see, hear, etc., cognising time and remembering. In other contexts he speaks of a power of perceiving the qualities perceptible to more than one sense: extension, shape, number, unity, motion and rest. On its organ see note on 56,21–2 and Richard Sorabji, Aristotle On Memory (London: Duckworth 1972; 2nd edn 2004), note to Aristotle, On Memory 450a10–11. RRKS 120 Here Priscian diverges from Aristotle, who says that sleep appears to be a privation, On Sleep 453b26. RRKS

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121 54,21; 56,13: ‘preservation’, Aristotle, On Sleep 455b22, 458a31–2. RRKS 122 ‘nutritive . . . as agreed’. It is Aristotle who says at 454a11–14 that he has previously distinguished what are called different parts of the soul, and that the nutritive soul is separate from the other parts. So Priscian’s ‘agreed’ is based on Aristotle’s assurance. Aristotle held that there was a nutritive part of the soul responsible for building and maintaining our bodily structure and passing it to our offspring. He thus agreed with Empedocles, fr. 117 DK, and Plato, Timaeus 77A–C that plants have a soul, but not on their basis that plants are sensitive. Descartes claimed to be revising the concept of a non-­conscious nutritive soul, but ascribed it to all the earliest men, unaware that it was Aristotle’s innovation, and rejected by many after Aristotle, Reply to Objections Brought Against the Second Meditation § 4, in the fifth objections, translated E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), vol. 2, p. 210. RRKS 123 factarum = Greek genomenôn. DAR 124 Latin sit = Greek an eiê. DAR 125 ‘food . . . from outside’. What follows is based on Aristotle, On Sleep 456b2–5 and 21–8, 32, recapitulated at 457b20–23. RRKS 126 55,25: ‘vapour’, anathumiasis; Aristotle, On Sleep 456b3–4. Anathumiasis in the atmosphere features prominently in ch. 7 below. RRKS 127 56,6. Brain the coldest, Aristotle, On Sleep 457b29–30. RRKS 128 56,16 ff. Blood re-­purified by digestion, Aristotle, On Sleep 458a21–25. RRKS 129 56,20; 57,9. The pressure is ascribed by Aristotle to antiperistasis, 457b2; 458a27, the mutual replacement of each other by different bits of matter. Pressure is merely one incidental effect. But in the case which elsewhere interests Aristotle most, pressure is relevant when he answers the question why a projectile continues to move after it has left the thrower’s hand or bowstring. The air displaced from the front of the projectile, on Aristotle’s theory, Physics 8.10, 267a16–18, takes the place of the air displaced in its wake, and this creates the onward pressure which keeps the projectile moving. This theory was ridiculed and replaced by Priscian’s contemporary Philoponus, in what has been called a scientific revolution, Philoponus, in Phys. 641,13–642,20. Again, as with anathumiasis, Aristotle’s concepts are applied equally to physiology and to dynamics. 130 56,21–2, with 54,14. The translation proprium is often used by translators for the Greek term kurion, dominant, controlling. See Boethius and Moerbeke. Our translator of Priscian has just translated prôton kai kurion, and this makes perfect sense. The heart is the first and the dominant sense organ of common sense, as Aristotle himself says in 455a21. CS 131 Factus, as at 55,18 and elsewhere in the work. RRKS

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132 57,2–5. Residue (conceptio, Greek suntêgma) resulting from fatigue and certain illnesses, Aristotle, On Sleep 456b34–457a3. Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus also connects fatigue with a residue (suntêxis) of heavy fluid creating pressure (piesis), On Fatigue, 1–5 and 16, ed and trans. Michael Sollenberger, in William Fortenbaugh, Robert W. Sharples, Michael G. Sollenberger, eds, Theophrastus of Eresus, On Sweat, On Dizziness and On Fatigue (Leiden: Brill, 2003). RRKS 133 compressura = Greek antiperistasis in Aristotle, On Sleep 457b2 and On Dreams 458b27. cf. note on 56,20. RRKS 134 Sleep is a concentration and pressure of heat, Aristotle, On Sleep 457b1–2. RRKS 135 57,10. Bywater attributes the following to Theophrastus, but nothing like this has survived. Priscian does refer to Theophrastus’ On Sleep and Dreams, as does Diogenes Laertius 5.45. PH 136 57,14. Repunctuating ‘spiritualia vero:’ to go with the immediately preceding reference to breathing in and out, as ‘– spiritualia vero’, meaning ‘– which are assuredly matters of pneuma’. DAR Here the type of pneuma in question is breath, the most familiar example of all. The references to pneuma increase in what follows, in the sense of other gaseous spirits postulated in the body, but pneuma is not invoked in the immediately following examples and we have to wait until 57,19, so that the immediately foregoing reference to the most familiar example is the obvious one. RRKS 137 57,15. ‘Dreaming without any sensus of the images (phantasmata)’. Thus (Chapter 3) although the images and dreaming are from the sensory (sensiva) part of the soul (59,19–24), and we have awareness (notitia) in a dream as if of seeing (visus) or of the sensus of tasting, nonetheless, there is no seeing (ridere) nor sensing (sentive) in a dream, and dreaming is not a matter of sensus being affected (59,10–17; cf. 60,3; 62,12). RRKS 138 An example is given in Aristotle, On Divination Through Sleep 462b26–463b11. Dreams enable one to notice medical symptoms crowded out in the wakeful day. RRKS 139 cf. Theophrastus, On Fatigue 4, op. cit.: sleeplessness prevents digestion. RRKS 140 Good complexion, literally beauty, but the relevance of beauty (formositas) to paleness is presumably the skin’s complexion. RRKS 141 This is a particular version of the explanation of sweat in Theophrastus, On Sweat, ed. and trans. Fortenbaugh, §§ 23, 25, 40, op. cit., as due to fluid and warm replacing their opposites. RRKS 142 This chapter is on dreams as a source of prophecy, but the title is missing. RRKS 143 Priscian is especially interested in awareness of the future. RRKS 144 The waking awareness of a meal that is not present allegedly involves only a visual picture of it. Cf. 62,15–16 below, with the note on it, where phantasia

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(imagination) is connected with visual imagery, not with imagining the process of eating, whereas by earlier thinkers the term phantasia was used for various different kinds of appearance. RRKS 145 cf Aristotle, On Dreams 458b7. References to Aristotle supplied by Bywater unless otherwise indicated. 146 cf Aristotle, On Dreams 458b10–15. 147 cf Aristotle, On Dreams 459a12. 148 Most fully in Aristotle, On Memory 450a25–b14, on which cf. notes in Sorabji, Aristotle On Memory. RRKS 149 So Aristotle, On Dreams 459a17 ff. For the case for and against phantasma being a mental image, see Sorabji, Aristotle On Memory, 2nd edn, pp. xi–xix. This explains also the translation of phantasia sometimes as ‘imaging’, 59,21; 59,22; cf. for phantasticum, 59,24, 62,13, but at 62,9, 62,11, 62,15, 62,28, by the more familiar ‘imagination’. RRKS 150 60,1 ff. So Aristotle, On Dreams 459a24 ff. 151 60,9 ff. So Aristotle, On Dreams 459b11 ff. 152 So Aristotle, On Dreams 459a28–b23. 153 cf. Aristotle, On Dreams 460b28–461a8. 154 cf. Aristotle, On Dreams 461a8–14. 155 melankholikoi for Aristotle (On Dreams 461a22–3) are not sad, but over-­excitable, because of some defective state of one of the four humours: black bile. More details in the note to Aristotle On Memory 453a19, in Sorabji, Aristotle On Memory. RRKS 156 cf. Aristotle, On Dreams 461a14–25. 157 The insertion of Latin tantus (so great) is a corruption. DAR 158 cf Aristotle, On Dreams 461a25–30. 159 Latin ex his, on this interpretation, is misplaced. DAR 160 Latin aut (or) and et (and) should be switched. For Priscian takes a sign to be a consequence of a past happening, requiring to be joined together by ‘and’, as does Aristotle when he argues that one can in dreams attend to medical symptoms that were present but crowded out from attention during the wakeful day, Aristotle, On Divination Through Sleep 463a4–11; 17–21. RRKS 161 cf. Aristotle, On Divination Through Sleep 462b26–463b11. Aristotle rationalises the significance of dreams. They are not a supernatural source of prophecy, but usefully enable one to notice medical symptoms crowded out in the wakeful day, or inspire future plans and actions, or are merely coincidentally followed by what was dreamt. RRKS 162 This is very close to Aristotle, On Divination Through Sleep 463a11–17. RRKS 163 62,3. Thinking, aestimare. None of this is presumably for Priscian part of the dream, if one dreams images, but not real sounds or phlegm (cf. 63,7–8). RRKS

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164 Latin undae (waters) translates khumoi in Aristotle’s Greek, which can mean juices or flavours. RRKS 165 Dreaming of eating is not treated as a function of phantasia (imagination), because that tends to be thought of in terms of visual imaging, even though in Aristotle, and the Stoics and Sceptics of earlier times, it often meant an appearance that something is the case, whether true or false, and ranging from what is currently being seen to what is not in principle visible. Cf. Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals (London: Duckworth, 1993), ch. 2, and Malcolm Schofield, ‘Aristotle on the Imagination’, in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen, eds, Aristotle on Mind and the Senses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), ch. 4, repr. in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji, eds, Articles on Aristotle, 4 vols (London: Duckworth, 1979), vol. 4, ch. 7. RRKS 166 phantasmata. 167 62,25: compare with Pliny, Natural History 28.14. Plutarch, Quaestiones convivales 734D–F ascribes to Aristotle’s Problems the question why in autumn we have less faith in our dreams. PH 168 Lying on your back encourages sexual dreams, according to Aristotle’s successor Theophratus, in On Fatigue 16, in W. Fortenbaugh, R. Sharples, M. Sollenberger, Theophrastus of Eresus, On Sweat, On Dizziness and On Fatigue (Leiden: Brill, 2003). RRKS 169 In 62,31, with his description of the soul as ‘divine’, Priscian goes beyond the communion of soul and body referred to in 62,30, which would be accepted by Aristotle, and in 62,32 introduces the view of ‘some’, thus bringing in a position more suited to his Neoplatonism, according to which in 62,34, the soul is accustomed to foresee the future, and, 62,35, is separated (separata) from the body, not troubled, 63,2, by any corporeal things, the very antithesis of Aristotle’s view, and contrary to the spirit of his rationalistic explanation of foreseeing future illness by noticing symptoms in dreams. In 63,4–7, he acknowledges that the soul is a single animal with the body, but he still insists that it is, without the body, a single soul. When united to the body, it still preserves its essence, and therefore is separate, although its essence is constituted for forming a natural unity with the body. Priscian already treated the soul’s visions in sleep, its reception of divine activities, and its making prophecies as important evidence for its separability in ch. 1, 46,14–19. RRKS 170 ‘study’, vacare = Greek skholazein. DAR 171 ‘It [the soul] preserves indeed its own essence’. This was a point of controversy among Neoplatonists. Proclus insisted that only the activities of the soul are disturbed, not its substance or essence. Plotinus seems to have anticipated this view in 3.6.3.27–34, but allowed in 1.8.13.18–26 that a bad human soul changes

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to another nature. Damascius, on the other hand, disagreed with his predecessor Proclus and argues that the soul does undergo substantial change. The passages are translated and discussed in Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, ch. 13(d). RRKS 172 The ability of humans to recognize their bodily state during sleep was cited by the Stoic Hierocles around 100 CE, in the extensive papyrus fragment, Elements of Ethics, 4,53–5,30, which focuses on bodily self-­perception (sunaisthêsis) in animals more generally. The word used at 63,9 in our Latin translation of Priscian, consensus, is a literal Latin rendering of this Greek word. It is edited and translated (into Italian) with commentary by G. Bastianini and A. A. Long, in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, Parte I, vol. 1** (Florence: Olschki, 1992), pp. 268–451, and discussed by Brad Inwood, ‘Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century A.D.’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), 151–83, with reference to this passage at p. 164. In Hierocles, while asleep, we rearrange the blankets over cold limbs, and avoid lying on sore spots, while the miser clutches his purse, the drunkard his bottle, and the hero Heracles his club. Purse, bottle, and club can be compared to the finger ring clutched in our text. I take it from Hierocles’ example that Priscian’s stiff limbs over four hundred years later, are re-­blanketed because stiff with cold. RRKS 173 63,10 Does the soul or the self-­perception leap into the body as if it had been outside? Aristotle would have thought that the sensory soul, and Hierocles that the self-­perception, was there all along, but Priscian is invoking his Neoplatonist belief in the separation of the soul from the body, 62,35; 63,6; 63,15–16 and 63,19–20. Even Priscian admits that the sensory (sensiva) soul is present when it provides dream images (59,19–20). But he may be able to exploit Aristotle’s admission in On Dreams 462,19–25, that people who perceive (aisthanesthai) a real cockcrow, or the light of a lamp, are not dreaming or asleep. Thus Priscian holds that the sensus of one’s own finger or limbs is normally absent in sleep (63,7–8), and so are ordinary seeing, hearing, tasting and in general sensus (59,10–17; 60,3; 62,12). What we have in dreams is meraly awareness (notitia) as if of these (59,9–11). But agreement with Aristotle goes no further than dreamers being aware only of images. What he infers goes far beyond Aristotle (63,15–21): if the soul in dreams is in this way separated from one’s finger, limbs and body, perhaps in dreamless sleep it can be further separated, so as to receive messages for the intellect from the gods and foresee the future. RRKS 174 63,12. The Neoplatonists held that the soul is not in itself a divisible thing, like bodies, but it does get divided into different parts of the body by its union with it. Here, however, by leaving aside parts of the body that have only small damage,

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it acts as a single whole, but nonetheless uses distinct parts of its whole power in the damaged place. DAR 175 Aristotle certainly does not believe, as suggested in 63,15–20, that the soul is separated from the body in sleep and purged of bodily things, nor that it receives then activities sent by God. But Priscian is determined to finish with his own Neoplatonist view, despite its being at variance with Aristotle’s view on which he has been drawing so heavily. RRKS Bywater refers to the earlier Platonist view of Cicero in On Divination 1.63, that in sleep the body is as if dead and so can better foresee the future. 176 Latin nunquid may represent Greek mêpote. DAR 177 I am most grateful to Alan Bowen for checking and correcting my comments on astronomy. 178 Only one manuscript provides sub-­titles for the first two sections; neither is a chapter title. ACB 179 Bywater attributes much of this to Geminus, but the similarities are not very close. Since Priscian refers to Ptolemy on latitudes in his preface, that is a possible source. PH 180 Of the latitudes, climatum = Latin genitive plural of clima (= Greek klima). DAR [Terrestrial latitude is measured by the elevation of the celestial pole above the observer’s horizon. ACB] 181 The grammar of this sentence is unsatisfactory: it seems best to treat what precedes as a single unit, then treat what follows as a contrast. PH 182 Bywater’s text has misprinted: differunt. ACB 183 Priscian corrects the assimilation of the sun’s two turning points to the four seasons. There are four seasons, but only two tropics, where the sun changes course in its annual passage over the earth from north to south and south to north. ACB 184 Aristotle, Meteor. suggested that there were five terrestrial latitudes, but Posidonius suggested seven, and was followed by Ptolemy and here by Priscian, although Priscian accepts five terrestrial zones: freezing cold to north and south, next to that two habitable zones, and in the middle a torrid zone. PH On latitudes, see the Introductory Note to this chapter and note to 63,24. 185 alienatio = Greek alloiôsis. RRKS 186 factus, 64,12, on arriving, comes from Latin fieri, to come to be, and represents Greek genomenos, having come to be. DAR 187 He takes hupothesis in the sense in which rhetoricians use it, in contrast to thesis, as a specific, not generalised, question, but this is wrong; the Greek meant hupothesis as ‘theory’, ‘hypothesis’. DAR

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188 Priscian is alluding to the fact that ‘tropic’ (Greek tropikos) derives from Greek trepein, to turn. PH 189 Reading terram (earth). Cf. Geminus, Elementa Astronomiae 15.1. DAR [The only manuscript that gives a title is mistaken in saying caelum (the heavens), because zones are only on the earth. ACB] 190 On zones see Geminus. The five zones, unlike the seven latitudes are distinguished by climate. DAR 191 This sentence closely resembles Geminus 58.2–3. PH 192 virtutes, more literally ‘powers’. DAR 193 The sense requires a reference to the date of the end of winter. ‘The Zephyr’ does form a date. Pliny says that the West Wind begins to blow on 8 February! See Nisbet-Hubbard on Horace Odes 1.4.1. DAR 194 65.12–13: the text has veris quidem quod a zephyro ad aequinoctium hiemale. If this means ‘that part of spring which [goes] from the zephyr to the winter equinox’, it is problematic since there is no equinox in winter. ACB [I suggest, therefore taking hiemale with ver as a description of this early part of spring: ‘the wintry spring’ as above. This will be parallel to the following phrase, ‘the part of the summer which is spring-­like’. Thus the spring has a wintry and a summery part; the summer a spring-­like and an autumnal part. RRKS] 195 Bywater refers to Geminus here, but the similarity is not very close. PH 196 ‘That is’ reverts to something easier to observe: when the sun (as opposed to its centre) begins to appear, or wholly disappears. ACB 197 This refers to the fact that the solar year is a fraction of a day longer than 365 days. DAR 198 ex ambobus refers to taking day to mean day + night, a whole nukhthēmeron. Geminus, Elementa Astronomiae 70.8 uses the Greek sunamphoteron, meaning: both. DAR 199 The following definition at 65,28, of the horizon is almost identical with Geminus, Elementa Astronomiae 5.54, but a standard definition may come from many sources. PH [Celestial and terrestrial horizons are distinguished in Geminus, Elementa Astronomiae 5.57. DAR] 200 ‘in reality’, appears: ad veritatem, ad visum. Throughout 65,20–67,17, and not only when he makes it more explicit at 66,29, ‘or should we rather say?’, Priscian was conscious that some astronomical features are constructions by us, or due to how things appear to us, only some independent of us. This is clear from his use of veluti (as if, 66,16; 19); quasi (as if, 66,13); quodam (a sort of, 66,16); ab aspectu nostro (from our point of view, 67,1); non secundum essentiam sed a nobis (not in essence, but . . . our horizon, 66,28–9); non secundum veritatem sed secundum phantasiam nobis (66,30–67,1, not in truth, but in its appearance to us);

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differenter vero secundum positionem locorum accipitur, apud enim quos (67,9–10, is taken in different ways depending on position, for among people for whom . . .). There are also many references to what people say (dicuntur, dicitur, aiunt 65,22–6; 27; 28; 66,3; 12; 17; 27; 67,12); produce (ducentes, 66,14); name (nominant, 66,15); make (faciunt, 66,17); understand (intelligent, 66.11), or take (accipientes, 66,13). RRKS 201 Reading minorem. DAR 202 ad solem = Greek peri ton hêlion, as regards the sun. DAR 203 receptus transitus appears to be the nominative absolute construction, equivalent to Latin ablative absolute and to Greek genitive absolute: perhaps analêphtheisês tou parhodou. DAR 204 On the observer’s horizon. ACB 205 At 64,25 this was those who say the earth is spherical. DAR 206 quasi. The pole is treated in 66,13 as having a centre from which a line is as it were taken and produced, while in 66,16 it turns out itself to be like a sort of centre. The fluidity is considered appropriate for entities constructed by us. DAR 207 i.e. vertical. RRKS 208 See the Introductory Note to this chapter. Although some northerly constellations of the zodiac remain visible in winter, nonetheless fewer of the zodiacal constellations are then visible to northerners and more of them to southerners. This is one way in which the zodiacal circle or sun’s path as a whole has sloped to the south. RRKS 209 quoniam. DAR 210 Zodiacal circle: see the Introductory Note to this chapter. The zodiacal circle is the path which the sun takes in front of the twelve celestial constellations or signs of the zodiac roughly every twenty four hours, but it also spends roughly one month each year rising in front of one sign, so that the twelve zodiacal signs, or more strictly the twelve equal parts of the zodiacal circle, are associated with twelve different parts of the year.   The sun and stars were thought of as rotating round the earth, which remained stationary at the centre of a finite spherical universe. The sun’s annual progress round the signs of the zodiac is represented by a celestial circle (the ecliptic) oblique both to the tropic circles, which mark the sun’s furthest annual passage during the year to north or south and oblique equally to the equinoctial circle intermediate between them. Twice a year, at the spring and autumnal equinox, the sun rises above the terrestrial horizon due east and sets due west, and day and night are of equal length. But after the autumnal equinox of observers in the northern hemisphere, the sun sets below their horizon only to the south of due west and it spends more of the 24 hours below their horizon visible to southerners before it

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rises to the south of due east, so that for the next six months the northerners’ nights are longer than their days. Southerners by contrast see the sun during those months for longer. But after the first three of these months, the sun turns at the tropics – literally turning points – and heads back towards the north, until the vernal equinox, when day and night become equal again. That is the moment at which the sun makes its annual crossing back over the equinoctial circle, which is intermediate between the two tropics and is the celestial equator. RRKS 211 The tropical signs of the zodiac are Cancer and Capricorn: the equinoctial signs Aries and Libra. ACB 212 hinc. DAR 213 i.e. from where it cuts the equinoctial circle at the autumnal equinox. DAR 214 i.e. the sun’s daily passage. 215 ‘is far away’, i.e. the sun, in its daily passage through the signs of the zodiac, for the next three months, rises above the horizon of northerners increasingly further to the south of due east, spending longer each day visible to southerners below their horizon. RRKS 216 i.e. after the autumnal equinox, the sector which was formerly the bigger now becomes the smaller and vice versa. DAR 217 The sun’s rising and setting for northerners in winter to the south of due east and west led some people to say that the celestial sphere itself was tilted from the northern constellations towards the south. But, says Priscian, the path of the stars merely takes on different angles in relation to our horizon. It would be better to say that the celestial sphere merely appears to be inclined in relation to us away from the constellations of the Greater and Lesser Bear, which for northerners are visible all year to their north. 218 habitus. DAR 219 Bywater rightly takes Latin aliter to stand for Greek allote. DAR 220 The celestial sphere (with its tropic and equinoctial circles) is at an oblique angle to the zodiacal circle. And this means that the sun rises and sets due east or west only at the equinoxes. Before the autumnal equinox it rises somewhat to the north-­east, but after the autumnal equinox it rises increasingly towards the south-­east. DAR 221 The material of which Aristotle took the heavens to be composed. RRKS 222 Geminus, Elementa Astronomiae 6.24–5. DAR 223 Reading totum for totas. DAR 224 That is, near the Great Bear. PH 225 Priscian now reverts to the terrestrial zones introduced at 64,25. RRKS 226 Bywater suggests that habitabilem here stands for the Greek oikoumenên meaning the world which is in fact inhabited. PH

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227 The seven latitudes, measured by the elevation of the celestial pole above the observer’s horizon, are distinct from the five zones defined by climate. See the Introductory Note to this chapter. RRKS 228 The more usual name is Syene, now Aswan. PH 229 ‘created earth’: ornatum would seem to render Greek kosmos. ACB 230 i.e. the hot season. 231 The tempering is further described below for cold as well as heat: as the heat of the sun stills winds by removing cold moisture, so cold inhibits rain, mist, and wind. 232 The Latin ut followed by infinitive, instead of subjunctive, follows the Greek construction, which follows hôste (so that) with an infinitive. DAR 233 Reading frigiditas in place of rigiditas, as also at ch. 7, 84,4. DAR 234 Reading Dübner’s emendation terra, in place of aera (air). DAR 235 i.e. reduced warmth. ACB 236 There is no title in any manuscript either with the chapter head or within the text as here. But what comes next gives the problem in a series of questions. The central topic is the uncertainty in the use of medicines, and then the suggestion that a well-­educated doctor would know what to do. PH 237 Mark Schrope, ‘Medicine’s Hidden Roots in a Medieval Manuscript’, The New York Times [online] 1 June 2015, . 238 At 69,10 temperantia is clearly the mixture/temperament of the drug itself, i.e. krasis, and this is probably what is meant here rather than, as the translation might imply, the actual process of preparing the remedies. To distinguish medicine the drug from medicine as an art, the translation will call the former ‘medicaments’. SE 239 ‘bringing the help of his own opinion’ may be a misunderstanding by the Latin translator of the Greek ‘bringing what is in his opinion helpful’. VN 240 resecare = Greek suntemnein. SE 241 Ebbesen compares 86,15 for Latin eventus as chance. 242 quia seems invariably to render hoti, but that makes little sense. Ebbesen proposes that Priscian’s source MS had a hoti that was a corruption of ei – actually an easy error in late ancient script. A similar quia in 53,25. SE 243 68,28–30. Dübner and Bywater despair of this passage. The end of the sentence is corrupt, but the original may have meant something like: for if it is replaced by the same weight or amount of the drug, and with equal coldness [omitting the second occurrence of ‘the same weight’], it produces the same effect. VN 244 Rationem habet deliberandi must render the impersonal construction: ‘It is reasonable’. SE

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245 i.e. not worthy of being written out as a uniform precept, although that is what Khosroes is asking for, because the doctor relies on varied particular knowledge. RRKS 246 Starting a new sentence at et (and) and reading et ex eo for et ex ea. SE 247 This wording seeks to make sense of Latin extincta, but the Greek text or Latin translation may be wrong. SE [’matters’ is a tentative addition to SE’s rendering.] 248 Latin intelligentiae looks like a translation of Greek dianoiai, which may represent a misreading of Greek dunameis, properties. SE 249 Dübner has added et before aquarum, which I accept. PH 250 ‘From nature’ (naturaliter) may be wrong, but it cannot be meant that he is naturally endowed with chemical knowledge. RRKS 251 Dübner rejects the MS reading armorum and suggests a confusion in the Greek original between hoplôn, ‘implements’, and hopôn, but Bywater thinks the original had haplôn, ‘simple’. PH [Bywater is closer to the mark, unless this is the remains of an already corrupt farmacorum (drugs) – for the translator seems to be able to translate that Greek word when he comes across it. SE] 252 I take the use of propriis to mean that the doctor who has observed nature and differences of locality will not follow fixed rules for all, but will adapt his medicinal compounds to the needs of individual patients. RRKS 253 Latin et, standing for aut (or). SE 254 No title is given in any MS. 255 69,19–76,20 = Posidonius fr. 219 Edelstein-Kidd, which omits 70,19–71,2; 74,6–75,22, as not from Posidonius, with Kidd’s translation in Posidonius III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 287–94. Posidonius of Apamea, citizen of Rhodes, c. 135–51 BCE, was a Stoic pioneer in observational physics. Priscian does not give Posidonius in the bibliography in his preface to this work, so may have read only excerpts in others, including Posidonius’ pupil Strabo. So Kidd, Posidonius II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 783. But Kidd complains the Latin garbles Strabo too.   Valuable on Posidonius on the tides is Stephen White, ‘Posidonius and Stoic Physics’ [SAW-Pos], in Richard Sorabji and Robert W. Sharples, eds, Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC–200AD, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Suppl. 94, 2 vols (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007), vol. 1, pp. 35–76, at pp. 67–75. RRKS 256 Major rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, flow into the Persian Gulf, not into what we call the Red Sea. PH 257 This is the diurnal cycle of tides, but Posidonius has also a monthly cycle and an annual cycle. SAW-Pos

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258 69,20 Flood: redundare, redundatio, redundantia = Greek epibainein, epibasis? DAR; plêmmurein, plêmmuris, Bywater, who reserves epibasis for accessus. But it makes little difference because both the Greek and the latin words mean tide, See index for other renderings: rise to a flood, flood tide. high tide. The Latin word for tide is not used, because the Greeks had no word for tide in the absence of tides in the Mediterranean, except for the phenomena to be mentioned below, especially in narrow straits. DAR 259 If the Greek was menei or hupomenei, the Latin, expectare, has taken it in the less appropriate sense of ‘await’, rather than in the sense of ‘endure’. DAR 260 69,20 Ebb: recessus = Greek anakhôrêsis? DAR. See index for other renderings: fall, low tide. 261 quantum; Latin may have mistaken Greek [epi] posón (to a certain extent) for póson (how great?). DAR 262 silentium = sigê. Winds are here ruled out as the cause of tides. Sigê, silence, is a commoner metaphor for calm winds in Greek than in Latin. DAR 263 refluxus = Greek palirrhoia? DAR 264 69,26–7 accessus, recessus rise and fall (of the tide). For accessus Bywater suggest Greek epibasis. See index for other renderings of accessus: tide, high tide. DAR 265 passiones = Greek pathê? DAR 266 The Atlantic. RRKS 267 The Mediterranean. RRKS 268 Does Latin omit Greek malista? DAR 269 Of Apamea in Syria. Assyrius is misleading Latin for Suriakos. DAR [Lines 69,29–31 are Test. 71 Edelstein-Kidd. RRKS] 270 Kidd, Posidonius II, p. 782 suggests these include Strabo and Geminus. PH 271 Arrian second century CE narrator of Alexander’s campaigns and of Epictetus’ seminars, approves in his Meteorologica at Physica fr. 2 Roos. RRKS 272 Sympathy: compassio = Greek sumpatheia. DAR. A Stoic term, but it is not used in this context as an explanation, and SAW below suggests that in this text it means no more than influence. RRKS 273 The second hand of MS G has fretum for strait, cognate with fertur ‘is carried’ in 70,9. Dübner suggested that the original reading was porthmus, a transliteration of the Greek word for strait, porthmos, which in both languages unlike fretum, has a masculine ending. Dübner’s suggestion would explain why the Latin supplies a masculine ending when it uses the Greek word katiôn to describe the strait as ‘going down’. DAR 274 ‘limit’, lines 4 and 7. In 66,4 the Latin is terminum = Greek horon and in 66,7, termino. Bywater’s good correction of ‘terminos’ in its subsequent appearance at 72,3 as mistaking the Greek ho rhous (the flow) for horous (limits) is not needed

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here nor at 73,26, where the talk is of the middle limit or zenith in the sky. Here it would, moreover, necessitate an emendation in 66,7, of termino orientis (from its eastern limit) to oriente (from the east). DAR 275 Greek: kopriai, a name given to this coast because of the frequency of wrecks, according to Strabo 6.2.3. PH 276 Kidd, Posidonius II, p. 784, says the flow from the Tyrrenian sea is wrongly described as west to east. PH 277 Latin again kept the Greek exiôn. PH 278 ‘current’, possibly impetus, as at 70,22 is the West–East flow. There is no need to postulate a lacuna here. DAR 279 70,9. It is carried: fertur. DAR 280 70,9. Flow: fluxus = Greek rhoê? DAR 281 70,10. Drives: imprimente = Greek eisôthounti? DAR 282 70,10. In a straight line: regione = Greek kat’ eutheian, reading e before regione. DAR 283 70,13. The stream. Greek: ho rous, again, Bywater, not horous, which the Latin renders by termino. 284 The Hyrcanian Sea is the Caspian. PH 285 apud = Greek para? SAW 286 Edelstein and Kidd, Posidonius I, p. 197, treat from here to 71 as not from Posidonius. PH 287 70,20. Conjunction: coitus = Greek sunhodos. DAR   Around new moon, earth, moon and sun, in that order, are ‘conjoined’, i.e. approximately aligned, so that the sun shines on the back side of the moon, whereas around full moon, sun and moon are to either side of the earth and the sun shines on the side of the moon facing us. Although at conjunction only the back side of the moon is directly lit, the sun’s heat can presumably penetrate to some extent towards us through the mixture of air and fire that, according to Stobaeus in Posidonius fr. 122 (Edelstein-Kidd), composes the moon. But see the Introductory Note to this chapter for White’s explanation that that the sun’s heat merely triggers the moon’s milder heat. RRKS 288 quarters of the moon: dimidietates, 70,21; 71,10; 73,8. DAR 289 70,22, and 24, Current: impetus. DAR 290 compassio = Greek sumpatheia. DAR Sympathy with the stars need mean no more than influence, and is anyhow here denied as an explanation. There is of course an influence of sun and moon on the tides, cf. Strabo 3.5.8, sumpatheia with the moon, but that influence is explained by Priscian through warmth modified by fluidity, and is in any case not directly referred to here. SAW

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291 aqueductus = Greek aulôn? The narrow channel here between Euboea and the mainland was notorious for tidal movements. Cf. Pliny, Natural History 2.219, 225; Antigonus, Historiarum Mirabilium Collectio fr. 126b, in A. Giannini, Paradoxographorum Graecorum Reliquiae (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Italiano, 1966), p. 87. DAR 292 cf. Antigonus, Historiarum Mirabilium Collectio fr. 140, in Giannini, Paradoxographorum Graecorum Reliquiae, p. 93. DAR 293 Latin ‘five’, but four by our system of counting. PH 294 Edelstein and Kidd in Posidonius I, p. 197, assign what follows to Posidonius. According to Kidd, Posidonius III, p. 289, what immediately follows is a garbled version of his pupil Strabo, Geographica 3.5.9, fr. 218 Edelstein-Kidd. PH 295 Greek êpeiron means mainland. This is not a place called Epirus. DAR 296 To a distance of seven hundred stades. There is no need to invoke Ilipa (Alcala del Rio) cited by Strabo as 700 stades from the sea. DAR 297 The hilltops had for a while become islands. SAW 298 Quarter [moon], dimidiata luna, 71,10. DAR 299 habet ratio = Greek logos ekhei? DAR 300 A correct observation, not recognized by Strabo, but possibly from Posidonius’ later work, Meteorology, whereas Strabo was using his On the Ocean. So Kidd, Posidonius II, p. 786. DAR 301 ‘peak’, acumen: Greek akmê. DAR 302 diligens = akribês DAR, or atrekês, according to Bywater. 303 Kidd thinks this again a garbled report of Strabo 3.5.7–8, in fr. 517 EdelsteinKidd. DAR 304 ‘stages of the tide’, quae sunt accessus. DAR 305 Bywater plausibly suggests that the Latin terminos (limits) in 72,3 has misread Greek ho rhous (the flow) as if it were horous (limits). DAR 306 Bywater suggests possibly a misunderstanding of the Greek for ‘up to a quarter of its length’, epi to tetartêmorion. DAR 307 In 72,10–74,6, the author gives explanations (some of which he says were not in his ancient authorities, 74,6) of the fact that (1) specially high tides occur when a full moon or a conjunction (new moon) occurs, or (2) still more just after full moon or conjunction, or (3) occurs at an equinox, or (4) at daily zenith, or (5) still more just after zenith. (1) is explained by the moon’s warmth, stimulated by the sun’s alignment or full frontal facing, but moderated by the moon’s fluidity. (4) is explicable by the moon’s moderated warmth being directed at the sea less obliquely. White’s interpretation of (3) as due to the earth’s atmosphere cooperating at that season with the moon’s warmth modified by fluidity, is given in the introduction to the chapter. But (2) and (5) are not explained, I believe, but

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presented as mere observation, and as a recent one, which may account for the lack of explanation. RRKS 308 For Posidonius’ personal research on tides, see Strabo 3.5.9 (fr. 218 EdelsteinKidd). DAR 309 ‘ebb and flow’, reciprocatio. Posidonius observed the tides at Gadeira – Cadiz. DAR 310 umiditas 72,19, again 73,22. The greater fluidity lessens its power to evaporate vapours. For the difficulty of translating (h)umiditas, see note on ch. 7, 81,6–7. RRKS 311 ‘stagnate’, putrescere, 72,19, cf. 75,18 and 20–21, putreficere, 96,28, there translated ‘putrefy’. DAR 312 Or might the Greek have meant ‘perhaps’ (isôs: with equal probability)? DAR 313 The moon’s heat will be weak, because the air in its composition moderates the component fire. PH 314 72,24–74,6. Much of what is here said is hard to understand and seems garbled in places. Whether this is the fault of our text, the Latin translator’s poor Greek, or Priscian’s own confusions is often unclear. An interpretation is offered which has much that is doubtful and previous editors (Dübner, Bywater, and Kidd) have frequently despaired. DAR 315 ‘water’, 72,25; 73,5: unda. DAR 316 Reading exaltatam . . . infirmatam. DAR [Weakened as in made more malleable. RRKS] 317 ‘rises to a flood’, redundare. DAR 318 The text moves at 73,2 from the moon’s daily passage to its monthly passage in the next sentence and then, at 73,13, to the annual. DAR 319 72,24–73,2. So far Posidonius has mentioned a daily rise and fall of tide while the moon is sufficiently well above us and a further daily rise and fall while it is sufficiently far under the earth. Priscian does not mention Posidonius’ two slack periods of tide when the moon is not sufficiently below or above. SAW-Pos 320 73,2–12. Posidonius now turns to the monthly cycle of tides. SAW-Pos. menstrualis verbi gratia = mêniainou logou kharin – Bywater suggests the Latin wrongly takes Greek logou as ‘word’ rather than ‘principle’, ‘system’ (Latin: ratio). DAR   In the monthly cycle, the tide is greatest at full moon and at new moon, with slack tides at the quarter moons in between. 321 ‘incoming tide’, influxio. DAR 322 Like the daily tide. DAR 323 Reading singular: respondet. DAR 324 They rightly did not think the moon spun. RRKS

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325 Because the moon is made of fire and air, according to Posidonius, the sun illuminating it at new moon from above can penetrate with its heat some of the way towards the earth below. But see the Introductory Note to this chapter for White’s explanation (SAW-Pos) of why this only stimulates the moon to produce more of its own moderated heat in the direction of the earth below. RRKS 326 Why are not new moons dimmer still than quarter moons? One might reply that at new moon, the sun’s warmth penetrates through the mixture of air and fire that makes up the moon, so as to reach the earth more directly, because the new moon is conjoined with the sun behind it. But again White’s explanation, recorded in the Introductory Note to this chapter, is that at new moon, the effect of the sun’s direct alignment is rather to enable it to stimulate the moon’s own milder form of heat. RRKS 327 i.e. each time the moon . . . DAR 328 73,10. Tide: fluctus, DAR. Bywater suggests Greek plêmê. 329 Even under the earth. DAR 330 At the spring and autumn equinox, the sun rises for about a month in front of the constellations Aries (the Ram) or Libra (the Scales), which are opposite each other in the zodiac circle. RRKS 331 Priscian actually names the claws of Scorpio, the Crab, claws which were also seen as weighing scales. RRKS 332 i.e. at new moon. RRKS 333 Latin per hoc (on the same principle) mistaking Greek t’auto for touto? DAR [White (SAW-Pos, p. 73) renders per hoc differently as ‘because of the sun’, but the import is the same, because the principle is the moon’s relation to the sun, whether of direct alignment or directly facing. RRKS] 334 ‘ahead in that sign’, ducere in ea. SAW-Pos, pp. 73–4. 335 For the sun to be in a sign is for it to rise in front of it, before passing in front of all the others in the course of 24 hours. RRKS On White’s reconstruction (SAW-Pos, p. 74), only when the sun is in (rises in front of) one of the equinoctial constellations (Aries or Libra), so is (or does) the moon, and moreover twice over, once in the same equinoctial constellation at new moon and once in the opposite equinoctial constellation at full moon. Aries and Libra are diametrically opposite constellations in the zodiac circle, in that the sun is in them six months apart, in antiquity at the equinoxes. At full moon, the sun will be ahead of the moon in the diametrically opposite sign of the zodiac. So far, no explanation has been given of the higher tides. 336 That is, at the celestial equator, i.e. during the equinoctial periods when the sun rises for a month in front of the equinoctial signs. DAR 337 SAW-Pos, p. 74, suggests the reference is to its warmth. RRKS

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338 Posidonius (fr. 122 Edelstein-Kidd), is recorded by Stobaeus as believing that the sun is made of air as well as fire, which is no doubt why it is called fluid (umida, Greek hugra). RRKS 339 ‘Furthermore’, iuxta hoc = Greek para touto? DAR 340 On White’s analysis (SAW-Pos, p. 74), 73,21–5, Priscian’s explanation of annual higher tides at the two equinoxes is that the equinoctial seasons of spring and autumn acquire (partly from the moon?) both warmth and fluidity, and so enhance, instead of counteracting, the moon’s ability to raise tides. 341 Atqui, ‘Now’, marks the transition from the effect of warmth and fluidity to that of position. RRKS 342 meridiante, at the highest point of passage or zenith, which differs in different days of the month, months of the year and years in an 18-year cycle. RRKS 343 ‘has passed’, supergressa. DAR 344 The reported increase in power immediately after zenith is not explained. RRKS 345 utrinque: at the zenith and later. DAR 346 Bywater marks the Latin of 74,1–6 as a ‘hopeless’ passage and can only conjecture the text, while Kidd, Posidonius III, p. 292, says ‘the translator has finally crossed the bounds of intelligibility, and it would serve no purpose to attempt to translate the gibberish that survives’. The following translation is an attempt at reconstruction. DAR   The moon spends two days in each sign. And, according to Geminus, enters 13 and a half signs per month. At the equinox, the moon moves away from conjunction before the highest tide occurs and one and a half signs towards its eventual position at the solstice. DAR 347 74,1, Unde, hence. The greater power of the moon just after zenith is seen as parallel to its greater power just after being new or full, but neither explains the other, as ‘hence’ (unde) might suggest, and the greater power just afterwards is not in either case explained. Since the claim about the day following new or full moon was a recent observation, there may not have been time to find an explanation. RRKS 348 Reading secunda for secundum. DAR 349 74,1, Ducens would represent the rare nominative absolute construction. The normal ablative absolute would be ducente. At 73,16 ducentis was taken as being ahead, whereas here it may mean proceeding. DAR 350 intulit. DAR 351 Codex Parisinus has an erasure of 15 letters at 73,2 before priusquam (before). DAR 352 Supply formam = zodiacal sign = Greek skhêma. DAR 353 Reading utrimque instead of utrisque. DAR 354 alienatur, Greek: alloioutai. DAR

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355 As would happen if it went too far along its monthly zodiacal journey in the direction of the solstice? DAR 356 Here the position (statio) is thought of as one day clear of the alignment at conjunction (new moon) or of the sun’s facing the side of the moon that faces us (full moon). Five lines earlier at 73,27, the position that gave the moon added power was being just beyond the zenith. Here it is being just beyond new moon or full moon. In neither case is the increment from being just beyond explained. RRKS 357 novae would have been written nove, which could represent Greek neôste, recently. DAR 358 nove constituta est could represent Greek neôste edoxen. DAR 359 Latin causali is an adjective, not a noun like causality, but the Latin may have been trying to reproduce the Greek formation of a noun phrase out of an adjective and (what Latin lacks) the definite article: tôi aitiôdei (where ‘in the causal’ means ‘in causality’). DAR 360 in magnitudinem = Greek pros to megethos? DAR 361 At 69,29 these are probably Posidonius and older authorities. DAR 362 Omit pertransire. DAR 363 veris = Greek earos. DAR 364 What follows addresses a different set of questions on tides, not involving the moon, and is based on Aristotle, Meteorology 355a-­b and 358b-359a. Aristotle calls the first question, why outflowing rivers do not enlarge the sea, already an old question, Meteorology 355b20 ff. Priscian follows Aristotle’s wording in appealing to evaporation. RRKS 365 74,12: ‘lunar’ is not in the corresponding passage of Aristotle, Meteorology 2.2, 355b27. DAR [This writer’s interest is in the moon, but he does not deny that the sun’s warmth also plays a part. RRKS] 366 The sea is also not mentioned here by Aristotle, but again it connects up with this writer’s interests. DAR 367 Greek in Aristotle, 355b31: akhanê, gaping (mistranslated into Latin as silentium, as if the Greek were sigên) and flat (Greek platun, translated into Latin as latum, broad). DAR 368 Latin has kept the Greek idiom for ‘especially’: both by other celestial bodies and by the sun. DAR 369 What follows on why the sea is salty borrows to a large extent from Aristotle, Meteorology 2.2–3, 354b1 ff. RRKS 370 Aristotle, Meteorology 355b4. PH 371 substantia = Greek hupostasis, in Aristotle 355b8; 357b8–9. DAR 372 This addresses the next question, why the sea and some lakes are salty, using Aristotle, Meteorology 2.3, 358b34 ff. PH

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373 cf. Ps.-Aristotle, Problems 953b3. PH 374 Aristotle and his school do not invoke divine Providence in relation to earthly affairs, but that view seems better to the Neoplatonist, Priscian. RRKS 375 Aristotle, Meteorology 379b4. PH 376 Again not Aristotle. RRKS 377 Aristotle, Meteorology 2.3, 359a15 ff. PH 378 iumentum: beast of burden. PH 379 Aristotle says only that the power of fire is in, or comes to be in, them, Meteorology 3.2, 359b9–10. RRKS 380 This is my proposal for filling the lacuna marked by Bywater. DAR 381 Kidd suggests this garbles Posidonius’ distinction between white and black naptha, reported by Strabo 16.1.15 (fr. 236, lines 5–9 Edelstein-Kidd). RRKS 382 Only one manuscript has added any chapter title. The one here is supplied by us. DAR 383 What is surprising in the following arguments (argumentum 77,23) is not the fall of a bird, or hurled stone or heavy thunderbolt or rain, but their ever having been aloft in the air, or materialising out of nowhere in the air, or fire’s ever having been held down in cloud and rain, or materialising there, or falling down rather than rising up, or clear air being at the same height as cloud. These are questions intended for Aristotle’s scheme according to which the natural arrangement is of earth, water, air and fire superimposed in that order in four layers. RRKS 384 Nubis is spelt in 77, 11; 77, 28; 78,2 as nubs. RRKS 385 Recent research on bacteria cells in clouds may be relevant if the breath of birds and mountaineers emits bacteria. Bacteria cells are found in clouds and can form nuclei for the condensation of cloud and for ice-­formation. These are not only as effective as dust or soot particles, but, in the case of a certain bacterium which grows on plants, Pseudomonas syringae, are even more effective as nuclei for ice-­formation. The bacterium is enabled to kill and nourish itself from plants by causing them to freeze at temperatures above the normal freezing point, and the bacterial cells sprayed in high winds into the clouds retain their freezing properties. The editor is indebted to Yogi Hale Hedlin for the references to Natasha DeLeon Rodriguez et al., ‘Microbiome of the Upper Troposphere: Species Composition and Prevalence, Effects of Tropical Storms, and Atmospheric Implications’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 7 (2013), 2575–2580; U. Pöschl et al., ‘Rainforest Aerosols as Biogenic Nuclei of Clouds and Precipitation in the Amazon’, Science 329, no. 5998 (2010), 1513–16; Heidi Bauer et al., ‘Airborne Bacteria as Cloud Condensation Nuclei’, Journal of Geophysical Research, 108, no. D21 (2003), 4658; J. Robbins, ‘From Trees

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and Grass, Bacteria That Cause Snow and Rain’, The New York Times [online] (24 May 2010), . RRKS 386 Since it has been shown to be powerless. RRKS 387 The questions are answered only at 82,32. First, from 78,23, Aristotle’s scheme of earth, air, fire, and water are to be explained, with much paraphrase of him. RRKS 388 Bywater supplies the parallel passages in Aristotle, here De Caelo [Cael.] 308a7. 389 Cael. 308a29. 390 Cael. 308b13. 391 Cael. 311a16, haplôs. 392 Aristotle says lightness (moving up) is the nature of five ( pephuke), 311b15. Priscian’s wording that light is under fire (subesse), must be taken in the sense of forming a basis, not in the sense he has just given to subsistere of being beneath. RRKS 393 Cael. 311b27. 394 Cael. 311a22. 395 ‘any’. Aristotle’s Greek has to tukhon. The Latin consequenter, ‘consequently’, does not represent Aristotle. RRKS 396 Cael. 311b20; 312a4. 397 diffinitum, limited. Aristotle has hôristai, is limited, cognate with horos, a limit. RRKS 398 The idea of completive sumplêrôtikai properties was made prominent by the earlier third century Neoplatonist, Porphyry, although the term is in his teacher Plotinus. Aristotle thought that earth, air, fire and water, achieved their proper form only when in their natural places. RRKS 399 Cael. 313b6. 400 ‘easily divided’, bene discretum. DAR 401 ‘easily delimited’, bene diffinitum, in Aristotle’s Greek euhoristos, well delimited, from GC 1.10, 328a35; b2–3; 2.2, 329b31, 35; 3.8, 334b35; Meteorology 4.1, 378,24, a word connected again with horos, a definite limit. RRKS 402 81,6–7. Fluid, humidum, sometimes umidum = Greek hugron. The qualities of Aristotle’s four elements are standardly rendered as hot, cold, wet, and dry, and the translations ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ fit well with the theory, cited at 81,1–11, that these qualities form two pairs of contraries. Moreover, though fire, as a drying agent, can be considered dry, it is not clear that it altogether lacks the fluidity of air and water. On the other hand air is here (81,6–7) said to be humidus, and air is only sometimes wet, but always fluid, indeed more fluid than water, 79,24–5, and more definitely fluid than hot, 82,10–11. In ch. 6, the moon too is called fluid (umida), 72,19; 73,22, no doubt because it is considered by Posidonius, cited

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there from Stobaeus (fr. 122 Edelstein-Kidd), to be made of air, as well as fire. In some chapters it has proved possible, if sometimes artificial, to stick to a single translation, ‘fluid’. But in this chapter and Chapter 10 it is not possible, especially when two exhalations are contrasted as smoky and as possessing humiditas, since both exhalations are presumably fluid, so that ‘fluidity’ does not bring out the difference between them. Consequently other translations such as ‘wet’ and ‘moisture’ have been admitted at various points. RRKS 403 Bywater suggests that the Latin opulentissima, 79,26, has translated the wrong sense of euporôtaton, as if it here meant very well provided, instead of very easy to pass through. 404 Cael. 313b11. 405 vim facere, do violence to = Aristotle’s Greek diaspasthai, tear apart Cael 311b13. 406 Aristotle, GC 329b24; Meteorology 4, 378b10 ff. 407 The Latin would mean that ‘the dry is unlimited [by anything other than dry]’. Not even by a river? – this makes little sense. Aristotle, GC 329b30–2, which Priscian is following, says the dry is dushoriston (hard to limit), which makes much better sense. I would mark this as probably a mistranslation in Latin. A miscopying of Aristotle’s Greek by Priscian or a predecessor is possible, but less likely. RRKS 408 Aristotle, GC 329b32 ff.; 330a24. 409 GC 330a30. 410 GC 2.3, 330b25, fire is an excess (huperbolê) of heat, ice of cold. PH 411 GC 330b30. RRKS 412 summa = Greek akra, extremes, at Aristotle, GC 2.3, 330b33. 413 GC 331a3. 414 GC 331a24. 415 Aristotle, Meteorology 354b23 ff. gives this account of the concentric spheres of earth, water, air, and fire. RRKS 416 82,32 ff. For the two exhalations in the explanation of winds (called in both chapters indifferently venti and spiritus), see ch. 10, 99,6 ff. RRKS 417 Aristotle, Meteorology 359b28 ff. 418 Meteorology 340b27. 419 Meteorology 359b32. 420 Meteorology 360b2 ff. 421 Meteorology 346b20. I take fumeal inflationis, 83,17–18, with respirationem. RRKS 422 360a12: Dry exhalation. For it making winds, see also Chapter. 10. 423 Bywater attributes what follows to Theophrastus of whose Meteorology an extensive amount has been found and translated from Syriac and Arabic versions

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by Hans Daiber, ‘The Meteorology of Theophratus in Syriac and Arabic translation’, in William Fortenbaugh and Dimitri Gutas, eds, Theophrastus, His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 5 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), pp. 261–71 (see for this subject pp. 266–7), while Greek fragments have been edited by Roos. RRKS 424 The Latin has rigidatem (rigidity) but frigiditatem seems better. PH [Cf. frigor, 84,28, frigiditas, ch. 10, 101,8; frigidior 103,2. RRKS] 425 in Aegos fluminibus; see Meteorology 344b32. 426 84,28–33. For similar but divergent vocabulary concerning see 101,5–11. RRKS 427 moventur instead of mutantur as an interpretation of Greek kineitai? 428 Following Bywater’s retrotranslation of the Latin into Greek. PH 429 I thank Malcolm Wilson for pointing out why Priscian connects Aristotle’s distant belt of fire so closely with the dry exhalation down nearer us. At Meteor. 341b13–18 Aristotle speaks of the smoky and windy exhalation as going above the wet one and of the hot and dry which we call fire as being above the belt of air. Although these are distinct (because 340b36, wind does not rise above the mountain tops), fire and dry exhalation nonetheless belong to the smoky segment (diakrisis), although there is no common name. So both can easily burst into flames as the revolution of the heavens makes the belts of fire and air revolve. Priscian agrees, 85,19–20, in applying the term ‘hot and dry’ to the belt which, as he says, reaches right up to the heavens and encircles the air, and he also agrees, 85, 6–14, that dry exhalation is much lower down than that below the mountain tops. He finally agrees (85,20–86,2) in taking both the proximity of the outermost firebelt to the heavens and movement (motus, 85,2, 86,2) as helping to explain why the smoky exhalation makes the air (85,21) down in our region burst into flames. RRKS 430 In view of Aristotle’s tukhon, should Latin occidit be accidit, it happens? PH 431 Meteorology 341b25. 432 Meteorology 341b32. 433 Aristotle speaks here of sparking lights as ‘goats’. PH 434 The Latin omits the essential explanation at Aristotle 432a5 that one lamp is below the other. As Malcolm Wilson explains it to me, you light both lamps, but when the lower one is extinguished, its exhalation allows the upper lamp to reignite it in a downwards direction. This must have been what Priscian intended; his only mistake, pointed out by Wilson, is that forcible squeezing is not the explanation. RRKS 435 Bywater has a semicolon here, but I prefer a comma. PH 436 369a21. PH

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437 Meteorology 342a12. 438 Meteorology 369a19. 439 Meteorology 342a14–15. 440 Meteorology 342a21. 441 Aristotle has ‘under the moon’. PH 442 Meteorology 371a9. Bywater compares Nikephoros Blemmydes (1197–c. 1269), who drew on Aristotle and his commentators, Epitome Physica, ed. J. Wegelin (Augustae Vindelicorum [Ausburg]: Dauid Francus, 1605), pp. 148–50. RRKS 443 87,12. The Latin has visibium, instead of visibilium. 444 Meteorology 371a24. 445 Meteorology 369a27. 446 Meteorology 369b1. 447 Meteorology 369b7. 448 The Latin fails to note the transition in Aristotle’ text to the following final comment, which requires a full stop and preferably a new paragraph. RRKS 449 There is no title in any MS. 450 Taking sicuti to represent Greek dikên in order to account for the following genitives. 451 Bywater refers to Plato, Rep. 497B and Theophrastus, History of Plants 8.8 for earlier awareness of this matter. But earlier still is the discussion cited by Priscian of On Airs, Waters, and Places in the Hippocratic corpus, even if the interest there is not in migration in particular. Also concerned with location is Aristotle, History of Animals 8.28–9 and Theophrastus fr. 355A–358 FHSG. 452 facta est represents Greek gegone (has become/come to be). 453 Similarity to what? 454 clima, 88,18, is also a Greek word, rendered in Latin in ch. 4 above as climatum and translated into English as latitude, with more precise information in the note at 63,24. Here, where the context is not technical about astronomy and the earth’s curvature, at least until 91,24–5, ‘clime’ would be a satisfactory translation, but to emphasise the interconnexion of Khosroes’ interests, the same translation has been kept. RRKS 455 ‘we must start with’, praeponenda. This ought to render Greek prokeisthô, but Greek hupokeisthô (hypothesise) would make better sense. 456 In Chapter 1 above. PH 457 Correcting the in. corporalitate in Bywater. 458 veluti verbi gratia renders Greek hôs eipein. This hypothesis will also work at 73,3. 459 rationem may, perhaps, represent Greek logon in the sense of ‘proportion’.

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460 Taking locis to be an instrumental and construed with dividat. 461 sicut est sic dicendum renders Greek hôs eipein. 462 ‘are modified’, moventur. The translation may not be quite right, but this must be the general sense. 463 ‘the strength of the forming factor’, figurantis consequentiam. The translation is highly speculative. 464 ‘trouble’, affectus Greek pathos. RRKS 465 ‘uninhabitable because of burning heat’, inhabitibilibus sub ardenti ustione. The Greek must have had aoikêtois hupo kaumatos, but the translator has taken hupo in the wrong meaning as ‘below’ instead of ‘because of ’. 466 89,33: ‘own’, propria = Greek idia. Here we again have the particularism found also in ch. 5, at 69,13. There the good doctor will give different medicines according to individual (propriis) needs. 467 Literally, Latin principium is origin, but here it connects with the references to fecundity and to the choice of the word germina and germinari to describe plants, RRKS. 468 utpote renders the Greek hôsanei. 469 ‘manners’: conversationes. The translation is less than certain. 470 Translation presupposes the conjecture et quae. 471 ‘self-­confidence’: furor. See note below. 472 urbanitates translates the Greek politeiai. 473 ‘education for life’: disciplina vitae, Greek didaskalia biou (which is attested in some late ancient authors). 474 ‘the whole’ is a conjecture. The text has solam regionem. Perhaps Greek (tên) holên khôran. 475 ‘the way of life’: disciplina. 476 ‘to indicate . . . shapes’: quasi hinc occasionum et seminum naturales eis insitorum motus et formas. I think insitorum is wrong, we need a verb to have naturales motus et formas for its object. The Greek text is here reconstructed as hôs ekeithen aphormôn kai spermatôn phusikas autois emphutôn kinêseis kai eidê (that they were the source of the starting points and seeds that planted in them their natural motions and shapes). 477 Taking una to be the adverbial unā (together), but it could also be an ablative governed by magis, the meaning then being ‘but even more sufficient than one of them alone, when they are combined’. 478 bene spirantia probably renders Greek eupnoa, as already seen by Bywater. 479 ‘impeded . . . power’. Translation uncertain. 480 propria: particularism again. Presumably compact and straight bodies are particularly needed by mountain-­dwellers.

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481 Moving enim (‘For’) to precede the reference to opposite seasons, and taking the point to be concessive: even at opposite seasons, mountain air is pure. RRKS 482 The seasons were treated in Chapter 4 as being opposite each other in the zodiac circle, in the sense that the sun rises, for example, at the summer solstice in front of one zodiacal constellation while at the winter solstice it rises in front of the zodiacal constellation that is diagonally opposite in the zodiacal circle. This feature applies everywhere of course, not just in the mountains, but the equal purity of the air at these opposite times is a feature of the mountains. RRKS [Angularis is used by Boethius in Syll. Cat. and Int.2 about diagonally opposed propositions in the square of oppositions. SE] 483 ‘blows through’ assumes the Greek was diapnei instead of the anapnei which would be the obvious match for respirans if only it made sense; ‘considering how much’, etc. is tentative. 484 I take Latin furoris magnitudo to represent the Greek thumou megethos, ‘greatness of spirit’, which in Julian, De regno 31.18 is contrasted with the Greek malakia tês psukhês (softness of soul) as two extremes, both of which can make one miss what is just. 485 The words between daggers seem hopelessly corrupt. The general sense is likely to have been that the conditions in the plains produce exactly the opposite results. 486 ‘natural causes . . . results’: translation very uncertain. The singular anomalum is strange. 487 Presupposing that ingeniosum et velox ad motum renders something like the Greek to ankhinoun kai to takhukinêton. 488 ‘migration’: transmutatio. The alternative translation alteration does not make sense either. 489 speciositas must render the Greek idiotês. 490 Strabo (c. 64 BCE–after 21 CE) in his Geography, seems to have drawn this from Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus (c. 372–287 BCE): see Theophrastus fr. 218 FHSG on the different effects of local water drunk. Bywater also cites Ps.-Aristotle, On Marvels Heard [846b33]. PH 491 Taking raviosos to be a spelling error for rabiosos. 492 Bywater cites Strabo and Ps.-Aristotle, On Marvels Heard 846b36. 493 Reading disponuntur (are disposed). 494 ‘are reduced in size’: assuming, tentatively, that subvehitur means ‘something is taken away from’. The Greek huphaireitai has the meaning that seems required, but, admittedly, it is not obvious that it should be translated subvehitur, unless the translator confused Greek haireitai with airetai. 495 ‘these’ renders ipsae, which may the result of misreading Greek tauta (these) as t’autá (the same).

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496 ‘otherness’: alteritas. The translation assumes that the underlying Greek is heterotês, ‘otherness’, but it could also be alloiôsis, ‘alteration’. 497 ut omnino: Greek hôs to holon. 498 Literally, ‘in the same way’: similiter. The choice of the adverbial instead of the adjectival form is a bit strange. 499 ‘Conditions’ is a mere stopgap. We might have expected that or ‘Differences’. But what we have, speculationis (of exploration, of speculation) is not sound. It can hardly represent the remnants of ‘obstacles to exploration of ’. 500 Particularity again: elephants have their particular places. 501 Correcting grifae into grifas. 502 ‘not even a trace’: neque principium, Greek oud’ arkhên. 503 temperantia = Greek krasis. 504 ‘the normal means to that end’: quae sunt communi causa. The singular causa is a nuisance, but communi is worse; The best emendation may be communi = Greek koinôs. 505 Aristotle, History of Animals 606a2. 506 Pliny, Natural History 8.227. 507 The Latin has Cylonia, which is clearly a misreading of Cydonia (ΚΥΔΩΝΊΑ), the Δ being read as a Λ. 508 ‘wild boars’: singulares – the ancestor of French sangliers (think Asterix!). 509 Taking the corrupt aliam omorynyson as having been in the Greek tên allên homoron nêson (the bordering remainder of the island). 510 ‘harmful’: the text has malefactorum, but this must be a mistranslation, probably of the Greek kakopoiôn. 511 Referred to also in Chapter 9, 96,7. 512 Reading efficiunt for deficiunt (fail). 513 Reading administrante for administrantia. 514 ‘make-­up of their looks’: the text has formae affectum, which would correspond to to pathos tou eidous, which is not impossible, but rather awkward. I suspect affectum is an error for effectum (effect [of their shape]). There are problems with aff- and eff-­ects elsewhere in the text. 515 ‘’: , Greek pros. Other emendations are possible, but this is the minimum needed. 516 The syntax of the following is unclear, but hardly the sense. 517 The syntax is unclear, but this takes naturas to be a Greek accusative and Graecos to be the object of mutat and transfert. 518 Etenim . . . fieri. Taking the sense to be: even Greeks undergo bodily changes, but their culture is not affected. Indeed, the many Greek colonies around the Mediterranean, and even away from shore in the Middle East, tended to keep

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their distinctly Greek culture for centuries even though they were like islands in a sea of other peoples. 519 ‘adjustment’: resessionis ed. with the oldest MS, G, but the apparatus criticus ascribes recessionis (reversion) to manuscripts CHM and the reading of these three more recent manuscripts is tempting. 520 ‘from their former places’: priorum. The interpretation is highly uncertain. 521 The collection of medical treatises started by Hippocrates in the fifth century BCE is the earliest source cited. Bywater picks out ch. 12 ff. of On Airs, Waters, and Places. 522 The manuscripts provide no title. 523 Taking unde with factum est. SE 524 The ‘con’ in connaturaliter often implies something innate, born with the living being. But in ch. 9, 94,13; 94,23; 98,7–8, it refers to the natures of living beings as kindred (98,8), where they are supportive of each other, or at least coordinated (94,13; 94,23) where the protective measures allow hostile species both to survive. RRKS 525 Priscian assumes a provident creator, but not unlike Leibniz more than a millennium later, considers not merely what the best possible creatures would have been, but what would be the best compossible combination of creatures, which already helps to answer Khosroes’ question, why such dangerous animals as poisonous snakes are included. Priscian puts his answer in terms of there being a Creator of the totality (universitas, 94,9; 95,4), who is good (95,4) and whose plan (95,11) produces utility both for the totality (94,15; 95,7) and for each member of it (95,7). There are methods for living things to check each other out through hostility or friendship (94,26), there are differences in protective strength or speed (94,24 ff.), and they can flee from each other (98,8). Thus living things finish up compatible with each other (94,13), with their different natures kindred or at least coordinated (94,13; 94,23; 98,8), and possessing a way of co-­habiting with each other (habitudo ad se invicem, 94,22–3; 94,27; 98,7–8). Maximum variety as an ornament, 94,9–11, is not cited as a solution, as it would be later (A. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being). RRKS 526 Taking quid as adverbial. An alternative would be to take it as parallel to Latin hoc. In neither case need the text be despaired of. DL 527 A context other than that of damage among living things. RRKS 528 Since all fire is dry and hot, according to Aristotle at least, Latin iste may stand for the definite article in the Greek, which Latin lacks, rather than for ‘that particular sort of [fire]’. DL 529 Langslow rightly suggests supplying ‘not’. 530 substantia in Priscian renders hupostasis. I am not quite happy with ‘existence’, but ‘substance’ will not do. SE

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531 Presumably because there are potentially multiple causes. DL 532 cf. Galen, De usu partium. VN 533 95,11: ratio, plan. SE [artificialis ratio = Greek: tekhnikos logos] 534 Royal portrait because mankind rules animals and plants through its mix of sense and intelligence. RRKS hoc refers to the mix. SE 535 Nosse deficientia: because of lack of knowledge. SE 536 95,18: quomodo in Latin is a misunderstanding of Greek pôs, as if it had its interrogative sense: how. SE 537 At 95,18, Priscian moves from his first answer to Khosroes, to be recapitulated at 98,5–11, and gives his second answer, correcting Khosroes’ singling out of ordinary snakes by illustrating the amazing variety of other lethal animals. RRKS 538 Bywater cites a title in Book 3 of Theophrastus’ On Living Things: ‘On animals that bite or sting’ (FHSG fr. 360–1 and 369), referred to again in 97,2. 539 A discharge from wounds made up of serum blood and pus. PH 540 spiritus = Greek pneuma, literally breath, but used for various gaseous spirits. RRKS 541 partim must mean partly and is contrasted with cumulatim in 95,30. SE 542 cumulatim, 95,30. At 66,3 and 66,20 the corresponding Greek of Aristotle is athroôs. SE 543 Bywater cites Ps.-Aristotle, De mirabilibus auditis 845a1. 544 phalangium, referred to also at 93,2, a transliteration of the Greek. 545 Bywater thinks serpentem has fallen out here. 546 Latin speaks of a place called Coete, but Bywater takes the Greek to have referred to the island of Ceos: en Keôi tê nesôi. 547 Latin: tertia accipiente. Rose read: occipiente. Bywater takes the original Greek, to have been [tritês] diadekhomenês: ‘if a third follows’, the verb being misunderstood in Latin as meaning accipiente ‘receiving’. Langslow suggests that the Latin words can be kept, if their endings are changed to tertiam accipientes: if they receive a third application of treatment. 548 Bywater takes Latin interpellantibus to represent Greek entunkhanousin. 549 Cell (domuncula): Ebbesen points out that the deranged tended to be locked up. 550 Bywater suggests that the Latin maeste habent, which refers to their own distress may represent Greek aniarôs ekhousin, which can refer to distress caused. 551 Nutton points out that there is a story of a madman in Galen’s commentary on Epidemics 6 who went upstairs and engaged passers by in his mad ravings, throwing a slave down and killing him in the fall. 552 Langslow points out that a key is given by 97,2, where per must mean: through (the medium of) wood and stone. 553 Ebbesen suggests infectos (infected), in place of interemptos (killed).

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554 Nutton points out that ‘ropes’ (Latin: funes) is doubtful. Theophrastus talks of numbness produced by the electric eel when it is touched by pieces of wood, or a trident for spearing fish (fr. 369 FHSG, ‘On animals that bite or sting’, cited by Athenaeus, The Sophists at Dinner 7.95, 314B–C). 555 Ebbesen points out that the singular momorderit is probably a mistranslation of Greek which takes a singular verb after a neuter plural subject. 556 Bywater cites Ps.-Aristotle, De mirabilibus auditis 845b16. 557 Ps.-Aristotle, De mirabilibus auditis has ‘but even if it touches’. Bywater rightly suggests the Latin translator is confused between Greek ean thigê (if it touches) and en têi gêi (in the earth). Ebbesen adds that the Latin exiliter (lightly) makes sense only if the original Greek is followed. 558 Ps.-Aristotle merely says: ‘when they hear its voice’. 559 At 97,13, Priscian offers explanations for certain variations in the savagery he has been describing: lassitude after hibernation, added strength from mountainous or hot and dry habitations, or from other localities, the effect of the mating season, the vigour supplied by certain foods, or variation in the attractiveness of different prey. Some animals are eaten by snakes, while others eat them. Inanimate things and properties also have variable effects. RRKS 560 Ebbesen suggests that Latin quomodo (in what way) translates Greek hôs, and that the Greek need only have meant: that. 561 Bywater compares Aristotle, HA 607a9. 562 Bywater compares Ps.-Aristotle, De mirabilibus auditis 845b4. 563 Bywater compares Aristotle HA 609b30, where Ps.-Aristotle, however, adds that snakes are consequently at war with swine. 564 Bywater compares Aristotle HA 605b19. 565 Bywater compares Ps.-Aristotle 845a35 on vultures and beetles. 566 Bywater cites scarabei as Rose’s correction for scabies. 567 98,4: ‘almost all’. Ebbesen suggests it is almost as if the Latin has got corrupted from paene omnia to per omnia. 568 Bywater cites Aristotle, HA 534b23, which specifies insects dying from burnt horn. 569 98,5–11 recapitulates both of Priscian’s two answers, saying that those who look at details will find many healthy or harmful ways in which things cohabit either with kindred nature or by fleeing (cf. 97,13), so that it is superfluous to enumerate them all. RRKS 570 Here connaturalitas implies a kindred, rather than a merely coordinated nature, because it is presented as an alternative to fleeing. RRKS 571 Fleeing has been re-­invoked in the description of lethal dangers at 97,13. RRKS 572 Reading superflua for superfluae, with Langslow. 573 fascinantes, as translated by Nutton.

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574 The title is added only in MS H. 575 I change Bywater’s punctuation. 576 As in ch. 7, the two terms for wind are used interchangeably. RRKS 577 99,6 ff. For the two exhalations in the explanation of winds, see ch. 7, 82,32 ff. RRKS 578 99,7, humida. See note on ch. 7, 81,6–7. When contrasted with the dry exhalation, humida must refer to a wet exhalation, not to a fluid one, since both exhalations are to some extent fluid. But in some contexts, ‘fluid’ would be the better translation. RRKS 579 Aristotle, Meteorology 359b28–34. References to Aristotle’s Meteorology Book 2, Chapters 4–6, are supplied by Bywater, who refers also to Nikephoros Blemmydes, Epit. Phys. p. 131. 580 359b34–360a3. These exhalations are the fundamental material principles of Aristotle’s Meteorology 1–3. Wind is primarily formed from the dry exhalation, but cannot be created without the presence of fluidity. 581 99,15–19 refers, I think, to Aristotle Meteor. 341b10–12. Priscian (99,17) agrees with Aristotle that the proper place of the dry exhalation is above the wet one, even though he says that they sometimes change places. RRKS 582 360b23. 583 I follow Bywater’s suggested Greek reconstruction here. 584 100,4–6. Although the Latin is hard to follow, and keeps diverging from the parallel passages in Aristotle, here Meteorology 360b30–32, I think the reference is to the danger, already described in ch. 6, 72,12–14, that the heat of the sun is so great as to demolish the vapours (vapores demoliri). The theme is repeated below at 101,1–2: the winds drop when the exhalations die out through too much heat (marcescunt plurimo calore). In the present passage the heat in the earth is able, after rain, to turn the rainfall back into exhalation, but only if exhalation is not extinguished (extinguere) and burnt up (incensa) by the heat of the sun. So far, the appeal to the heat of the earth illustrates the second of two points in 100,3–4, that winds arise after rains – provided, we learn, that excessive sun does not dry up the exhalation. In 100,7–8, Priscian returns to explaining the first point in 100,3–4, that winds are restrained by rains: too much rainfall will extinguish (extinguere) the smoky exhalation that forms the body of winds, since it depends on some heat as well as some wetness. Aristotle’s explanation is at 360b26–361a4. I take Priscian to intend ‘by the heat’ to go with his ‘of the earth’, thus agreeing with Aristotle, 360b30–2, quoted in the next note (cf. 360a6; 362a6; 365b25–7; 367a9–11).   So far I have tried to interpret Bywater’s Latin text. Malcolm Wilson has suggested to me the alternative that with three emendations, we could get: ‘this happens when the exhalation constituted by the heat of the sun is no extinguished by the water (reading aqua quae, in place of ea quae) that is in the

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earth (deleting the first occurrence of caliditate – by the heat – and incensa – burnt up)’. RRKS 585 100,6–7. This … exhalation from above. I have taken the stress to be on hanc (this), to make a contrast with the wet exhalation, which is no longer an exhalation when it comes down as rain, so is never an exhalation from above. But the point may be instead Priscian’s agreement (99,17) with Aristotle that the proper place of the dry exhalation is above the wet one. Malcolm Wilson has suggested to me a third alternative, that ‘from above’ might be a mistake by Prisician based on Aristotle’s using the phrase ‘from above’ immediately next, though meaning from the sun, when he says, 360b30–2, ‘after rain the earth is dried both by the heat within it and by the heat from above and gives off exhalations, which (we saw) are the body of wind’. RRKS 586 100,10. Is the ‘argument’ that the dry exhalation depends on the sun’s heat not being too direct, as he is now telling us it is not in the extreme north and south? However, what Aristotle says at 361a4–10 is entirely different and only a small part is belatedly recognized by Priscian at 103,16–19. He says that it is the prevalence and power of north and south winds that is due to the sun’s annual movement in the path of the ecliptic. The sun moves some of the way to our south in summer and some of the way to our north in winter (because the ecliptic path is oblique to us), whereas it fully reaches our east and west every day (even if not our full east or west in winter months). So in seasons when the sun is closer to our north or south and warmer there, it draws up a lot of cloud and exhalation there, and in seasons when it is more distant and cooler there, it sheds a lot of the exhalation as rain. Just as the seasonal rain is greater to north and south, so must be the corresponding seasonal exhalation, and dry exhalation constitutes wind. Priscian has substituted a much more obscure explanation of a different phenomenon, and this raises the question again whether some of the unintelligibility is due to Priscian and not invariably due, as it clearly often is, to the translator’s very poor understanding of Greek. Priscian’s responsibility is probably easiest to assess when he suddenly diverges from close adherence to a passage in Aristotle, in a way which produces something difficult to understand. RRKS 587 The point is that through the year the sun’s path along the ecliptic does not shift all that far to north or south, although it does every day cross between east and west. RRKS 588 100,13–15 is based on Aristotle Meteorology 361a22. obliquus = Greek loxê in Aristotle. 589 100,14–15, ‘the winds blow around the earth and so (per hoc) even the entire air follows this path in a circle’ seems to be a misunderstanding of Aristotle, Meteor. 361a 24–5, more fully cited in the next note, ‘the whole of the air encircling earth

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follows the motion [of the heavens]’. Priscian’s ‘and so’ suggests that the entire air follows the path of the winds, instead of the entire air and the winds below it following the path of the heavens. RRKS 590 100,17, the principle of the wind’s motion is from above. Aristotle seems to be in a difficulty when he says, Meteor. 361a22–34, ‘The motion of [winds] is sideways, for they blow around the earth, even though the exhalation’s rise is vertical, because the whole of the air encircling earth follows the motion [of the heavens]. And that is why one might ask whether the origin of winds is from above or below. The motion is from above. … It is clear that the origin of movement is from above. … For how what rises will flow gets its cause from there, since the movement of things further off controls the earth.’ In Aristotle’s passage, the phrase ‘how what rises will flow (hêi rheusetai to anion) was taken to suggest not that the sun (somehow) shifts the exhalation’s movement from vertical to horizontal, but that the sun controls even the direction of the winds. Malcolm Wilson points out (Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, Cambridge University Press 2014, pp. 200–7), that Alexander in Meteor. 93,26–35 objects that then all winds would be from the east. Wilson argues that instead Aristotle has in mind the annual motion of the sun both north and south within the ecliptic, which he has just been discussing. The sun produces similar seasonal (not daily) wind movements both north and south. RRKS 591 100,18–19: so a wind contains strands of dry exhalation, as at Aristotle 361b1–5. See note on 101,2 for a possible relevance. RRKS 592 paulo post; Aristotle: kata mikron. 593 The violence of Libs is Priscian’s addition to Aristotle. 594 101,2: Aristotle, Meteorology 361b14–20, also says ‘what is lesser in the exhalation’ (to en têi anathumiasei elatton on). In Priscian, ‘lesser’ could refer to the strands he refers to at 100,18–19, some of which will be lesser. In Aristotle, the reference could be to lesser strands or lesser heat. RRKS 595 361b14–20; 101,5: we are missing the participial supplement to praeoccupat (Greek: phthanei), which requires something like combustum esse. I have made this change in the translation. 596 101,6: cold is dominant; same word for dominance (superare) at ch. 7, 84,28, ‘when chill (frigor) is dominant’. Cf. ch. 7, 84,31, eminentia pagi (excess of frost), where the Greek word for frost, pagos, is transliterated as pagus, instead of being translated into Latin. 101,7. Congelatio (freezing); same word, congelatio, at ch. 7, 84,33. RRKS 597 The first explanation for windlessness, excessive cold counteracting the necessary heat, is somewhat different from the two so far given: excessive solar heat, or excessive rainwater counteracting it, although water is one possible

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source of cold. But the second explanation in terms of excessive heat does not seem to have an obvious source different from the solar heat already mentioned. Suffocato will here have an active sense of stifling, rather than the commoner passive sense of stifled. RRKS 598 101,8–9 corresponds to Aristotle, Meteorology 361b24, quoted by Bywater. I am inclined to take macerata with frigiditate in parallel with the preceding clause. 599 362a32–4. 600 This corresponds to a new chapter in Aristotle’s Meteorology 2.6, starting at 363a21. RRKS 601 There is a dangling participle in the Latin as well. 602 363b7. The ‘Subsolanum’ is certainly an addition by the Latin translator. 603 This sentence in Latin is not grammatical. 604 This is neither true nor Aristotelian. 605 This remark is not in Aristotle. 606 Aristotle denies that the Thraskias (Latin threscias) has an opposite wind, except perhaps the local Phoenikias (364a1–4). However, he mentions the Euronotus near this location. 607 Aristotle claims that there is no opposite wind here (363b33). Priscian is working with a slightly different windrose from Aristotle’s, one that has closer affinities to that of Timosthenes (see A. Rehm, Griechische Windrosen, Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: philosophisch-­ philologische und historische Klasse 1916/3 (Munich: Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1916), pp. 47 ff.). 608 364a19. 609 Cf. Theophrastus, De Ventis 27–8. The linguistic similarity with Theophrastus is not as close as with Aristotle. Considering how closely Priscian follows Aristotle, it is possible that Priscian is following the lost Arrian here, from whom Stobaeus et al. preserve a few fragments. 610 The contrast here is obscure, but it seems to be that between a deflected wind that fools the local inhabitants into thinking it is southern and a deflected wind that is recognized as such by the inhabitants but is nevertheless called southern because it is appropriate to the season. The contrast is not present in Theophrastus. 611 The Etesian winds play an important structural role in Aristotle’s account (see M. Wilson, Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 203–4). The ‘bird winds’ (Ornithians) are mentioned at 362a23. 612 Found only in MS C.

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English–Latin Glossary Compiled by David Robertson a little after: paulo post ability to size up a situation: ingeniosus accompany: consequi accumulating: cumulatim accurate: diligens action: actus active: actualis activity: actio, operatio address: interpellare aether: aether affected, being (n.): passio affected, capable of being (adj.): affectabilis affected in sympathy, is (v.): compati ahead, is: ducere air: aer all over (adv.): cumulatim ambient, the: circumstantia, continens and: quidem et angle: habitus animation: animatio annual principle: ratio annualis appearance: phantasia, similitudo area: regio argument: argumentum as: sicut as it were: utpote as regards the system: verbi gratia English translates the conjectured Greek rather than the Latin assembly: concursus

awareness: notitia axis: axis basis: occasio, substantia beast of burden: iumentum being (n.): essentia believe: aestimare below, is: subici blend (n.): fusio, temperantia blow through: respirare bondage: vinculum born, be (v.): nasci, enasci bravery: fortitudo breeze: aura, spiritus burning (n.): exarsura by chance: per eventum came to be: factus care (n.): providentia carried, is: ferri, vehi is carried above: supervehi is carried on: superferri carry up: subvehi causal factors: causalia cause: causa, (in pl.) causalia connatural cause: connaturalis causa efficient cause: factivum causale natural cause: naturalis causa celestial sphere: mundus chain: vinculum chance: eventus

136

English–Latin Glossary

change (n.): alienatio, conversio, mutatio change course (v.): transmitti channel (n.): aqueductus character: persona chill (n.): frigor chosen strength: temperantia circle: circulus, cyclus clear, is: manifestum climate: temperantia cloud: nubes coarse: crassus cohabiting: habitudo coincidence: conveniens coincidental accompaniment: conveniens cold, coldness (n.): frigiditas, frigor cold (adj.): frigidus, gelidus combination: concursus, conformatio, copulatio combined (n.): mixtura come about, has; has come to be: factum est come in: ducere coming to belong: factus compact, makes: densare compatible: compassibilis completive form: species consummativa composition: compositio, mixtura compressed, is: compelli concentration: synodus concise: connexus confer shape: formare confused, not: inconfusus congenital, connatural (adj.): connaturalis conjecture by opinion (v): coniicere opinione conjunction (n.): coitus conjunction, is in (v.): coire connatural character: connaturalitas

connatural spirit: spiritus connaturalis connaturally, coordinated natural (adv.): connaturaliter connected: connexus consequence: consequentia consider: tractare constitution: urbanitas constitution of the ambient: continens temperies contemplation: contemplatio continuously: continuatim contribute: perveniens cooling: refrigeratio coordinated nature, joint nature: connaturalitas created earth: ornatum terrae creative harmony: armonia genitiva cultural: politicus current: impetus curvature: sinuositas decided, has recently been: constitutus est nove decline with: coinclinare declining: descensio defeat: superare definitely: omnino definition: diffinitio delimited, easily; easily limited: diffinitum bene den: fovea dense (adj.): crassus dense, becomes (v.): densari density (n.): densitas diagonally opposed: angularis differentiation: differentia diminished, is: corrumpi disposed, is: disponeri distress: maeste habere

English–Latin Glossary disturb: submovere divided, easily: discretum bene divisible: partibilis dominant: proprius dominate, is dominant: dominari, superare draft: respiratio dream (v.): somniari dreams, in: somniatim drive (v.): imprimere easy to pass through: opulens English translates the conjectured Greek rather than the Latin ebb: recessus ebb and flow: reciprocatio education: disciplina education for life: disciplina vitae educational tradition: mos disciplinae effect (n.): passio endure: expectare ensouled being: animatum entirely: totum equinoctial: aequinoctialis equinox: aequinoctium essence: essentia evil: malitia exact: diligens excess: eminentia, excellentia exhalation: inflatio existence: substantia experience: experimentum extreme (adj.): summus extreme (n.): summum fall (n.): recessus fecund, make: fecundare feeling: passio fill: infundi

first, is: praeoccupare flat: latus float: supervehi flood (n.): redundantia flood, rise to a flood (v.): redundare flow: accessus, confluxus, fluxus fluid, fluidity (n.): humiditas, umiditas fluid (adj.): humidus, umidus food: aesca, esca force (n.): impetus form (n.): forma freezing: congelatio, frigiditas friendship: amicitia frost: pagus frozen: gelascens frozen, is (v.): congelari furthermore: iuxta hoc gas: spiritus generally: ut omnino gentle: infirmus germinated, is: germinari go round: circuire good: bonus good complexion: formositas good sense: prudentia grow: nasci habitable: habitabilis happen: accidere harmful [animal]: malefactor healthier for breath: spirantia bene heat: caliditas, calor, ustio natural heat: calor naturalis holds together, what: continens hole: fovea homogeneously: per simile genus horizon: orizon

137

138

English–Latin Glossary

hostility: inimicitia hot: calidus hypostasis: subsistentia ice: gelu, glacies ignorance: indisciplinatio illuminating demonstrative force: circumfulsa approbatio image, mental image (Latin uses Greek word): phantasma imagination (Latin uses Greek word), power of imagining: phantasia imaging (Latin uses Greek word): phantasia, phantasticum immobility: immobilitas immortality: immortalitas in a straight line: regione in accordance with: iuxta in any case: omnino in causality: causalis in conformity with: secundum in general: omnino in order: in ordine in regular sequence: in ordine in that way: propter hoc inactive: inactualis inclination: inclinatio inclined: inclinatus inclined, not: indevexus increased, is: augeri indication: signum individual (adj.): proprius inflammation: inflatio inhabit: habitare inherent in it: unum existens innate: insitus insensibility: insensibilitas intelligible: intelligibilis it is said: habet ratio

join battle: committere joint nature: connaturalitas juice: (in pl.) undae just like: sicut juxtaposition: appositio kind: species kindred nature: connaturalitas knowledge: scientia land: regio language: sermo latitude: klima leave out: praetermittere lie below: subici life: vita like: veluti likeness: similitudo limit (v.): terminare limit (n.): terminus limit, hard to (adj.): infinitum English translates the conjectured Greek rather than the Latin limited, easily: diffinitum bene, finitum bene limited, something: diffinitum limited, well: diffinitum bene link: copula live in: habitare loss, privation: privatio malady: affectus manifest, is: manifestum manners: conversatio massed: cumulatus material pneuma: spiritus materialis matter: materia meal: aesca, esca measure: commoderatio meeting: concursus

English–Latin Glossary memory: memoria middle [of the sky]: medium migration: transmutatio mind, activity of the: intelligentia mixture: contemperantia, mixtura modified, is: moveri moisten (v.): humefacere moisture (n.): humiditas, umiditas moist (adj.): humidus monthly: menstrualis motion: motus moved, is: moveri movement: meatus, motus natural: naturalis nature: natura inborn nature: natura ingenita normal state: habitudo now (resumptive): atqui number: numerus nutritive, the: nutritivum oblique (adj.): obliquus obliquely (adv.): oblique occasion: occasio omit: pertransire open sea, the: campus pelagi operation: operatio opinion (n.): opinio opinion, form (v.): opinare opportunity: occasio order: ordo origin: principium otherness: alteritas outflow: fluxus overcome: superare over-­excitable: melancholicus overwhelm: superare own (adj.): proprius

139

parallel: parallêlos (Latin uses Greek word) part, nutritive: pars nutritiva part, sensitive: pars sensiva pass (v.): supergredi passage: meatus, motus, transitus passion: passio path: ambitus, meatus peak: acumen peculiarly (adv.): proprie perhaps: nunquid permeating itself: intrans se ipsam plant: germen pneuma: spiritus material pneuma: spiritus materialis pollution: crimen portrait of royalty: imago regalis position: positio, statio power: intelligentia, virtus precept: praeceptum precipitation: descensio precise: diligens predominant: eminentia presence: inhabitatio preservation (n.): salus preserve (v.): salutare pressure (n.): compressura, pressura problem: propositio proper (adj.): proprius prophecy: prophetia proportion: ratio proposition: propositio puff: sufflatio purification: purgatio purify: purgare pushed, is pushed up: compelli putrefy: putreficere quality: qualitas, virtus quarter moon: dimidiata luna

140

English–Latin Glossary

quarter of the moon: dimidietas question: speculatio special question: quaestio finita ratio: analogia (Latin uses Greek word); also the correct translation of Greek logos, when Latin takes the wrong sense (verbum = word) read: cognoscere English translates the conjectured Greek rather than the Latin reason: causa, ratio receiving (n.): assumptio recognized, are: recipi reduced, is: subvehi reflection: repercussio reflux: refluxio region: regio relationship: habitus relaxation: remissio release (n.): solutio repercussion: repercussio residue: conceptio resistance: repercussio resource: occasio respectively: omnino return: reverti reverse flow: refluxus rightly: pulchre rise (n.): accessus, ascensio, fluxus rising eastern: orientalis route: meatus rule: regula season: hora seed: semen self-­confidence: magnitudo furoris self-­perception: consensus self-­movement: motio per se, motio propriae rationis

sense (n.): sensus sense, have a (v.): sentire sense organ: aistheterium (Latin form of Greek word) sensibles: sensibilia sensitive: sensivus sequence: ordo shape (n.): forma shape (v.): informare shaped, being: configuratus shorten: resecare sick man: laborans sign (n.): forma, signum equinoctial sign: signum aequinoctiale tropic sign: signum tropicum sign, is a; show signs (v.): significare signify in advance: praesignificare silence: silentium similarity: similitudo since: quoniam situation: occasio skilful plan: ratio artificalis sleep (n.): somnus sleep, going to sleep (v.): dormire sloping: flexus smoke: fumus smoky: fumeus so: tam so to speak: veluti verbi gratia solidification, solidified form (n.): concretio solidified (adj.): concretus solstice: conversio something undergone: passio soul: anima specific character: nota figurativa speculate: speculari spread out: disponeri

English–Latin Glossary spring: ver squeeze (v.): proicere squeezing (n.): proiectio stagnate: putrescere start: praeponere starting point: occasio state: status strength (n.): fortitudo, virtus strength of the forming factor: consequentia figurantis strength, have (v.): valere strong (adj.): fortis strong enough, is (v.): valere study: vacare stuff: substantia substance: essentia, substantia sufficient: sufficiens sun, under the: subsolanum surround by ice: circumgelare swift in action: velox ad motum sympathy: compassio that (introducing that-­clause): quia thin: exilis think: intellegere, intelligere thunder: tonitru tide: accessus, fluctus, redundantia flood tide: redundantia high tide: accessus, redundantia incoming tide: influxio tilted (adj.): inclinatus tilted, is (v.): inclinari time of activity: tempus actuale tool: vas totality: universitas traits: speciositas transfer: transferre tropic circle: tropicus cyclus trouble: affectus, passio

141

turn: transmutare turned, is: moveri turned to itself: conversum ad se turning-­point: conversio undergoing: passio understand (v.): intellegere, intelligere understanding (n.): conceptio, intelligentia uneven results (n.): anomalus uniformity: uniformitas uninhabitable: inhabitabilis union: adunatio unity: unitas universe: universitas unlimited, that which is: infinitum usefulness, uses, utility: utilitas usually: veluti in plurimum vapour: vapor, vaporatio variation: alienatio vice: malitia vigour: impetus village: villa violence to, do: vim facere virtue: virtus vision: visio warm: calidus water: unda wave (n.): unda waves, make (v.): fluctificare way of being: habitudo way of existing: substantia way of life: disciplina weaken: infirmare wet (adj.): umidus, humidus wet, become (v.): humefieri what sort of: qualis while (adversative): autem wide: latus

142

English–Latin Glossary

wide area: latitudo wild boar: singularis wind: spiritus, ventus northern wind: spiritus borealis with regard to the size: in magnitudinem with regard to the sun: ad solem without confusion (adj.): inconfusus

without confusion (adv.): inconfuse without limit: in infinitum work (n.): actio zenith, at its: meridiante zodiacal circle: zodiacus cyclus zone: zona

Latin–English Index Compiled by David Robertson accessus, flow, 74,6 Latin text is very corrupt 74,1–6; high tide, 70,15.19; 73,13; rise, 69,26; 70,12; tide, 71,9.19 72,3 accidere, happen, 85,20 English translator emends occidit to accidit here in accordance with Aristotle’s tukhon actio, work, 41,18; activity, 53,7.23 actualis, active, 53,4.20; 58,27 actus, action, 45,16; 53,32; activity, 53,20 acumen, peak, 71,19 ad solem, with regard to the sun, 66,3 adunatio, union, 50,26 aequinoctialis, equinoctial, 73,16 aequinoctium, equinox, 65,13; 71,16; 103,9 aer, air, 67,30; 78,1; 80,2.3; 88,15; 89,26; 90,13.18; 91,22 aesca, esca, food, 55,22.24; 57,29; 89,10.21.26; 92,24; 94,25; meal, 56,16; 62,25 aestimare, believe, 49,17; think that, 62,3 aether, aether, 67,3 affectabilis, capable of being affected, 79,27; 80,2 affectus, malady, 96,12.17; trouble, 89,16 aistheterium (Latin form of Greek word), sense-­organ, 55,20 Latin form of Greek word alienare, change, 74,3 alienatio, change, 64,6; variation, 67,24 alteritas, otherness, 50,4; 69,9; 91,20 ambitus, path, 66,29 amicitia, friendship, 94,26 analogia (Latin uses Greek letters), ratio, 52,17 angularis, diagonally opposed, 90,13 anima, soul, 43,1 reading anima instead of una; 44,16; 45,3.30; 46,1.26; 47,2; 48,9.26; 49,14; 50,2.14; 55,13.20; 59,3.17; 90,28

animal 51,1; 88,10; 94,9; 94,23; 95,21; living things, 94,28 animatio, animation, 45,1 Poor Latin equivalent offered for the Greek animatum, ensouled being, 88,10 anomalus, uneven results, 90,26 appositio, juxtaposition, 51,24 aquaeductus, channel, 70,23 argumentum, argument, 77,23 armonia genitiva, creative harmony, 94,21 arsura, burning, 86,14 ascensio, rise, 57,7 assumptio, receiving, 88,1 atqui, now (resumptive), 73,25 augeri, is increased, 49,29 aura, breeze, 102,13 autem, while (adversative), 56,17 and frequently axis, axis, 66,15.17 bonus, good, 95,4 caliditas, heat, 56,22; 72,18.24; 75,5; 100,5 calidus, hot, 56,2; 80,17; 103,3; warm, 76,10 calor, heat, 57,6.22; 68,5.11; 72,19; 101,1 calor naturalis, natural heat, 45,6 campus pelagi, the open sea, 65,30 causa, cause, 61,16; 72,10.12; 73,3; 76,10; 88,15; 89,1; 90,6; 91,20.24; 94,12; reason, 73,11; 92,3 See also factivum causale connaturalis causa, connatural cause, 50,14 naturalis causa, natural cause, 90,6.26 causalia, causes, 48,25; causal factors, 57,8 causalis, in causality, 74,4 Latin causali may have been trying to reproduce the Greek formation of a noun

144

Latin–English Index

phrase out of an adjective and the definite article: tôi aitiôdei, but Latin text is very corrupt 74,1–6 circuire, go round, 72,24 circulus, circle, 86,25; 91,25 circumfulsa approbatio, illuminating demonstrative force, 48,10 circumgelare, surround by ice, 84,26 circumstantia, the ambient, 90,18 clima, latitude, 67,20.22; 88,18; genitive plural climatum (of the latitudes), 63,24 cognoscere, read, 41,16 Perhaps poor Latin translation of the Greek coinclinare, decline with, 73,1 coire, is in conjunction, 73,15.21 coitus, conjunction, 70,20; 71,16; 73,4.7; 74,1 committere, join battle, 80,9 commoderatio, measure, 90,12 compassibilis, compatible, 94,13 compassio, sympathy, 70,2.23 compati, is affected in sympathy, 69,32 compelli, is compressed, 86,11; is pushed, 92,23; is pushed up, 56,1 compositio, composition, 50,27 compressura, pressure, 57,9 conceptio, understanding, 41,14; residue, 57,1 concretio, solidification, 84,24.32; solidified form, 85,5 concretus, solidified, 84,22 concursus, assembly, 85,8.14.17; combination, 94,22; meeting, 99,6 configuratus, being shaped, 79,27 confluxus, flow, 73,11 conformatio, combination, 46,22 congelari, be frozen, 67,30 congelatio, freezing, 84,33; 101,7 coniicere opinione, conjecture by opinion, 59,18 connaturalis, congenital, 76,11; connatural, 47,20.22; 49,32; 50,14; 89,22; connaturally, 47,16 connaturalitas, connatural, 51,19; connatural character, 50,19; coordinated nature, 94,23; 95,7; joint nature, 50,27; kindred nature, 98,8

connaturaliter, connatural, 47,9; connaturally, 51,6; coordinated natural, 94,13 connexus, concise, 41,10; connected, 79,21 consensus, self-­perception, 63,9 consequentia, consequence, 61,17 consequentia figurantis, strength of the forming factor, 89,14 consequi, accompany, 94,18 constitutus est nove, has recently been decided, 74,5 English translator emends novae to nove, but Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 contemperantia, mixture, 46,22 contemplatio, contemplation, 45,16 continens, the ambient, 89,10.16; what holds together, 47,28 continens temperies, constitution of the ambient, 89,19 continuatim, continuously, 55,3 conveniens, coincidence, 61,20; coincidental accompaniment, 61,17 conversatio, manners, 89,23; 93,14 conversio, change, 62,19; 88,15; solstice, 71,15; 103,10; turning-­point, 64,3.22 conversum (converti) ad se, turned to itself, 45,22; 45,24; 46,9.12; 48,15 copula, link, 73,27 Bywater despairs of the Latin here copulatio, combination, 81,2.6 cor, heart, 54,15 corrumpi, is diminished, 49,30 Very poor Latin translation of the Greek crassus, coarse, 80,26; dense, 78,1 crimen, pollution, 49,27 Very poor Latin translation of the Greek cumulatim, all over, 95,30; in accumulating, 56,3 cumulatus, massed, 56,20 densare, becomes dense (pass.), 84,4; makes compact, 90,10 densitas, density, 84,7.30; 86,11 descensio, declining, 70,16; precipitation, 84,32 differentia, differentiation, 80,26; 90,9 diffinitio, definition, 48,32

Latin–English Index diffinitum, something limited, 79,18 diffinitum bene, easily delimited, 79,23.27; easily limited, 80,1; 81,22; well limited, 80,25 diffundi maxime, be at its greatest extent, 73,17 diligens, accurate, 45,14; exact, 71,19; precise, 41,8 dimidiata luna, quarter moon, 71,10; 73,8 Latin text at 73,8 does not include lunae dimidietas, quarter of the moon, 70,21 disciplina, way of life, 90,4; education, 90,27 disciplina vitae, education for life, 89,31 discretum bene, easily divided, 79,22 disponeri, is disposed, 91,16; spread out, 74,10 dominari, dominate, 84,31; is dominant, 80,9; 100,7 dormire, going to sleep, 57,8; sleep, 56,8; 57,22 ducere, is ahead, 73,16; come in, 74,1 regione, in a straight line, 70,10 eminentia, excess, 84,30; predominant, 83,7 enasci, is born, 94,19 endelekhia (Latin uses Greek letters), endelekheia, 45,1 essentia, being, 50,28; essence, 47,7.9; 48,12.21.29; 50,5.6; 54,21; 63,5; 66,28; substance, 43,13.20; 44,27; 45,10.11.33; 46,19; 49,10.12 essentia incorporalis, incorporeal substance, 45,10 eventus, chance, 68,22; 86,15 exarsura, burning, 86,4 excellentia, excess, 81,14.16 exilis, thin, 79,25 expectare, endure, 69,20 Latin here has taken the wrong sense of the conjectured Greek (menein, hupomenein) experimentum, experience, 69,7 factarum, which came to be, 55,18 genitive plural

145

factivum causale, efficient cause, 48,12 factum est, has come about, 94,14; has come to be, 88,15 factus, coming to belong, 56,23; is, 64,12 fecundare, making fecund, 89,18 ferri, is carried, 70,9 finitum bene, easily limited, 80,24 flexus, sloping, 66,20 fluctificare, make waves, 72,17 fluctus, tide, 73,10 fluxus, flow, 57,12; 70,9; 71,15; outflow, 76,9; rise, 71,24 forma, form, 46,22; 50,28; 76,12; shape, 88,17; 89,2.27; 90,6; 93,8.19; 94,22; sign, 73,16 formare, confer shape, 89,11 formositas, good complexion, 58,2 fortis, strong, 90,17; 97,18 fortitudo, bravery, 90,25; strength, 80,6.10; 97,21 fovea, den, 92,12; hole, 97,15 frigiditas, cold, 89,17; 101,8; coldness, 84,4; freezing, 67,35 English translator reads frigiditatem instead of rigiditatem at 67,35 and 84,4 frigidus, cold, 80,17; 103,2 frigor, chill, 84,28; cold, 68,4.11 fumeus, smoky, 99,9 fumus, smoke, 83,3; 85,21 furor, self-­confidence, 89,27; 90,17 fusio, blend, 76,12 gelascens, frozen, 84,34 gelidus, cold, 99,14 gelu, ice, 84,27 germen, plant, 88,11; 89,13.21; 91,21; 92,4; 94,10.28 germinari, is germinated, 89,20 glacies, ice, 80,13; 84,32; 89,17 habet ratio, it is said, 71,13 habitabilis, habitable, 67,21 habitare, inhabit, 88,16; live in, 88,22 habitudo, cohabiting, 98,7; normal state, 55,10; way of being, 94,23 habitus, angle, 66,29; attitude, 94,27; relationship, 71,24 hora, season, 73,15.21; 90,13; 92,11

146

Latin–English Index

humefacere, moisten, 81,20 humefieri, become wet, 99,20 humiditas/umiditas, fluid, 56,5; 68,3; fluidity, 53,26; 72,19; moisture, 77,3; 78,1.17 humidus/umidus, fluid, 65,14; 73,22; 79,25; 81,7; 82,18; 84,11; wet, 82,17.20; 85,4; 99,7.18; moist, 65,14; 65,19 hupothesis (Latin uses Greek letters), hypothesis, 64,20 imago regalis, portrait of royalty, 95,14 immobilitas, immobility, 54,10 immortalitas, immortality, 48,12 impetus, current, 70,22.24; force, 57,29; vigour, 97,21 imprimere, drive, 70,10 in infinitum, without limit, 79,18 in magnitudinem, with regard to the size, 74,4 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 in ordine, in order, 72,3; 73,10; in regular sequence, 71,8 inactualis, inactive, 58,27 inclinari, is tilted, 66,27 inclinatio, inclination, 52,20 inclinatus, inclined, 66,17; tilted, 66,27 inconfuse, without confusion, 51,18.25 inconfusus, not confused, 52,1; without confusion, 51,30 indevexus, not inclined, 67,4 indisciplinatio, ignorance, 47,33 infinitum, that which is unlimited, 80,23; hard to limit, 80,25 English translation follows the conjectured Greek dushoriston rather than Latin infinitum at 80,25 infirmare, weaken, 48,6 infirmus, gentle, 88,3 inflatio, exhalation, 82,32; 83,24; 84,25.29; 86,1; 87,20; 99,7.15; 100,5.18; 101,1.10; inflammation, 61,14 influxio, incoming tide, 73,3 informare, shape, 43,2 infundi, fill, 75,9 ingeniosus, ability to size up a situation, 90,30 inhabitabilis, uninhabitable, 89,16 inhabitatio, presence, 53,20 inimicitia, hostility, 94,26

insensibilitas, insensibility, 55,12 insitus, innate, 75,5 intellegere/intelligere, think, 49,17; understand, 59,17 intelligentia, activity of the mind, 61,3; power, 69,8; understanding, 57,15 At 69,8 intelligentiarum may be a misreading of the Greek intelligibilis, intelligible, 45,15 interpellare, address, 96,18.20 intrans se ipsam, permeating itself, 48,22 iumentum, beast of burden, 76,1 iuxta, in accordance with, 67,3 iuxta hoc, furthermore, 73,23 klima, latitude, 42,11 Latin transliterated from the Greek laborans, sick man, 68,21 latitudo, wide area, 74,10 latus, flat, 74,16; wide, 80,3 maeste habere, distress, 96,19 Latin mistranslates the Greek magnitudo furoris, self-­confidence, 90,17 malefactor, harmful [animal], 93,1 malitia, evil, 50,9 Latin is obscure, perhaps a lacuna here before malitia; vice, 49,31; 50,8 manifestum, is clear, 60,16; 89,11; is manifest, 54,16; 55,14 materia, matter, 45,17; 46,21; 88,26 meatus, movement, 84,9; passage, 83,16; 84,19; 85,6; 86,3; path, 100,14; route, 86,18 medium, middle [of the sky], 73,26 melancholicus, over-­excitable, 61,12 memoria, memory, 62,9.17 menstrualis, monthly, 73,2 meridiante luna, moon at its zenith, 73,26 mixtura, combined, 90,8; composition, 90,18; mixture, 50,26; 52,18; 75,7; 90,18; 93,26; 94,18; 95,10 mos disciplinae, educational tradition, 89,26 motio per se, self-­movement, 48,32 motio propriae rationis, self-­movement, 49,34

Latin–English Index motus, motion, 54,15; 55,14.20; 59,22; 90,6; 98,26; movement, 48,27; 86,1; passage, 71,24 moveri, is modified, 89,12; is moved, 48,13.27; is turned, 85,10 mundus, celestial sphere, 65,29; 66,1.30 mutatio, change, 90,6; 93,27 nasci, be born, 89,8; grow, 88,12.16 natura, nature, 54,20; 73,12.22; 88,29; 89,26.33; 90,2; 91,19; 93,13.15; 94,20 natura ingenita, inborn nature, 76,11 naturalis, natural, 90,5 nota figurativa, specific character, 48,31 Latin inaccurate translation of the Greek notitia, awareness, 59,3.13 nubes, cloud, 77,11.28; 78,2; 86,24.25 Nubes spelled nubs in most of these occurrences numerus, number, 43,26; 52,6 nunquid, perhaps, 63,17 nutritivum, the nutritive, 55,15 oblique, obliquely, 66,14 obliquus, oblique, 66,22; 100,14 occasio, basis, 58,28; occasion, 52,11; opportunity, 41,6; resource, 42,4.15; situation, 93,9; starting point, 90,5 omnino, definitely, 89,23; in any case, 96,21; in general, 83,2; respectively, 78,27 operatio, activity, 45,11; 49,10.12; 54,21; 59,23; operation, 60,6; 88,27 opinare, form opinions, 59,17 opinio, opinion, 59,12 opulens, easy to pass through, 79,26 Latin opulentissima mistranslates Greek euporôtaton, as if it here meant ‘very well provided’ instead of ‘very easy to pass through’ ordo, order, 72,8; 73,10; 94,20; 95,2.17; sequence, 71,8 orientalis, rising eastern, 66,5 orizon, horizon, 65,28; 66,9.28; 70,16; 71,23.25 ornatum terrae, created earth, 67,26

147

pagus, frost, 84,31 parallêlos (Latin uses Greek letters), parallel, 64,22; 65,2 pars nutritiva, nutritive part, 55,19 pars sensiva, sensitive part, 59,19.24 partibilis, divisible, 94,21 passio, being affected, 59,15; effect, 60,2; 62,15; 69,27; 71,2; 87,19; 99,19; feeling, 61,5; passion, 88,26; something undergone, 54,7; 55,13; troubles, 62,22; undergoing, 54,17 paulo post, a little after, 100,18 per eventum, by chance, 68,22 per simile genus, homogenously, 43,1 persona, character, 43,2 pertransire, omit, 74,6 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 perveniens, contribute, 42,8 There may be a short lacuna here phantasia (Latin uses Greek word), appearance, 48,31; 49,7; 67,1; imagination, 62,9.15; imaging, 59,21.22; power of imagining, 62,29 phantasma (Latin uses Greek letters), image, 57,15; mental image, 59,23; 61,11.20; 62,16 phantasticum (Latin form of Greek word), imaging, 59,24; 62,13 politicus, cultural, 90,6 positio, position, 91,24 praeceptum, precept, 68,32 praeoccupare, is first, 101,2 praeponere, start, 88,23 praesignificare, signify in advance, 62,35 praetermittere, leave out, 41,11 pressura, pressure, 56,20 principium, origin, 54,15; 89,22; 92,8 privatio, loss, 69,22; privation, 54,17.19; 55,10 procedere, project, 46,18 Latin inaccurate translation of the Greek proiectio, squeezing, 86,3 proiicere, squeeze, 85,18; 86,8.11 prophetia, prophecy, 46,16 59,6 propositio, problem, or proposition, 41,5 propriae rationis motio, self-­movement, 49,34

148

Latin–English Index

proprie, peculiarly, 92,5 proprius, dominant, 54,14; 55,14 56,20; individual, 69,13; 89,33; 90,12; own, 88,29; proper, 56,22 propter hoc, in that way, 41,12 providentia, care, 45,6 prudentia, good sense, 90,31 pulchre, rightly, 46,24 purgare, purify, 45,26.28 purgatio, purification, 45,28 putreficere, putrefy, 96,28 putrescere, stagnate, 72,19; 75,17.21 quaestio finita, special question, 64,21 Latin phrase reflects misunderstanding of Greek term hupothesis at 64,20 qualis, what sort of, 41,15 qualitas, quality, 50,5.23; 88,25 quia, that (introducing a that-­clause), 46,15; 54,16 and frequently quidem et, and, 41,10 quoniam, since, 66,21 ratio, proportion, 89,3; reason, 94,18 ratio annualis, annual principle, 72,2 ratio artificalis, skilful plan, 95,11 habet ratio, it is said, 71,14 recessus, ebb, 69,20.24; 74,6 Latin text is very corrupt 74,1–6; fall, 69,27; 71,24; low tide, 70,16 recipi, are recognized, 50,20 reciprocatio, ebb and flow, 72,11 redundantia, flood, 69,22.23; flood tide, 69,21; 71,5; high tide, 72,8; tide, 71,24; 73,25 redundare, flood, 69,20; rise to a flood, 72,25 refluxio, reflux, 57,7 refluxus, reverse flow, 69,25 refrigeratio, cooling, 57,8 regalis imago, portrait of royalty, 95,14 regio, area, 103,18; land, 88,15; region, 68,10; 88,18; 89,5.23.29; 90,4; 92,10; 93,4 regula, rule, 68,32 remissio, relaxation, 54,11 repercussio, reflection, 83,20; repercussion, 103,17.20; resistance, 87,17

resecare, shorten, 68,20 respirare, blow through, 90,13 respiratio, draft, 83,18 reverti, return, 56,1.4 salus, preservation, 54,21; 56,23 salutare, preserve, 47,29 scientia, knowledge, 45,14.17 secundum, in conformity with, 61,20 semen, seed, 90,5 sensibilia, sensibles, 88,1 sensivus, sensitive, 59,19 sensus, sense, 54,10.16; 57,15; 59,13.22; 94,21 sensus proprius, dominant sense, 55,14 sentire, have a sense, 62,21; sense, 59,16 sermo, language, 41,10 sicut, as, 54,18 sicuti, just like, 88,11 significare, is a sign, 91,18; show signs, 71,14 signum, indication, 100,1; sign, 61,17; 71,23.25 signum aequinoctiale, equinoctial sign, 66,23 signum tropicum, tropic sign, 66,24 silentium, silence, 69,24; gaping, 74,15 Very poor Latin translation of the Greek similitudo, appearance, 89,25; the case of similarities, 89,9; likeness, 57,12; similarity, 88,17 singularis, wild boar, 92,26 sinuositas, curvature, 88,2 solutio, release, 54,11 somniari, dream, 59,21.24 somnus, sleep, 54,10.21; 55,8.22; 56,5.21; 57,1.29 species, kind, 50,26 species consummativa, completive form, 79,20 speciositas, traits, 91,3.6 speculari, speculate, 95,19 speculatio, question, 78,21; 92,3 Note that speculatio is not translated at 92,3 where English translator uses ‘conditions’ as a stopgap option spirantia bene, healthier for breath, 90,10

Latin–English Index spiritus, breeze, 99,6; 101,11; pneuma, 57,19.28; 58,10; 95,26; wind, 78,18; 83,24; 84,21; 87,18; 88,2; 98,26; 99,6.16; 102,19; gas, 97,6 spiritus borealis, northern wind, 100,10 spiritus connaturalis, connatural spirit, 45,5 spiritus materialis, material pneuma, 54,14 statio, position, 73,27; 74,4 Latin text very corrupt 73,27–74,6 status, state, 68,11; 90,28 subici, is below, 79,12; lie below, 79,10 submovere, disturb, 72,18 subsistentia, hypostasis, 49,16 subsolanum, under the sun, 101,18 substantia, basis, 87,20; existence, 94,19; stuff, 75,3; substance, 46,23; 51,1; way of existing, 95,13 subvehi, carry up, 78,11; is reduced, 91,17 sufficiens, sufficient, 90,7 sufflatio, puff, 96,24 summum, extreme, 79,19; 81,14; 82,2 summus, extreme, 81,18 superare, defeat, 80,11; is dominant, 84,28; 101,6; overcome, 80,12; overwhelm, 89,17 superferri, is carried on, 80,14 supergredi, pass, 73,26 supervehi, float, 80,14; is carried above, 79,9.11 synodus, concentration, 57,9 tam, so, 53,15 English translator suggests that here and at 53,21 tam ‘so’ has the force of ‘so equally’, reading tam instead of quam at 53,21 temperantia, chosen strength, 68,17; blend, 69,10; climate, 92,13 tempus actuale, time of activity, 53,22 terminare, limit (v.), 81,19.21 terminus, limit (n.), 70,4.7; 79,19; 80,24.25 tonitru, thunder, 88,2 totum, entirely, 48,21 tractare, consider, 49,17 transferre, transfer, 49,26 transitus, passage, 66,6 transmitti, change course, 56,2

149

transmutare, turn, 91,5 transmutatio, migration, 89,11; 91,1 English translator notes unintelligible use of transmutatio at 91,1 tropicus cyclus, tropical circle, 64,21 turbo, whirlwind 84,11, def. 86,24 unda, juice, 62,4; water, 72,25; 73,5.23; 74,2 Latin text is very corrupt 74,1–6; wave, 73,12 uniformitas, uniformity, 50,19 unitas, unity, 51,27 universitas, totality, 94,15; 95,4; universe, 94,9 unum existens, inherent in it, 47,9 urbanitas, constitution, 89,31 ustio, heat, 89,17 ut omnino, generally, 91,21 utilitas, uses, 94,22; usefulness, 94,15; utility, 95,7 utpote, as it were, 89,22 vacare, study, 62,32 valere, have strength, 56,21; is strong enough, 55,3 vapor, vapour, 52,15; 56,6; 72,13; 74,16; 77,28; 83,2.5; 84,5.20; 85,1; 99,8.12 vaporatio, vapour, 55,25 vas, tool, 89,30 vehi, is carried, 78,28 velox ad motum, swift in action, 90,30 veluti, like, 57,3 veluti in plurimum, usually, 88,13 veluti verbi gratia, so to speak, 88,27 ventus, wind, 84,18; 99,6; 100,8.19; 101,16; 102,17; 103,21 ver, spring, 74,5 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 verbi gratia, as regards the system, 73,2 English translates the conjectured Greek rather than the Latin, which wrongly translates Greek logos in the sense of verbum (word) instead of ratio (system) villa, village, 89,6 vim facere, do violence to, 80,10

150

Latin–English Index

vinculum, bondage, 54,11; chain, 45,30 virtus, power, 41,11; 72,13; 73,4.22; 74,4; 76,13; 84,29; 88,27; 90,12; 94,11; 95,26; quality, 65,11.14; strength, 94,25; virtue, 45,12.26; 49,31; 89,27

visio, vision, 59,3.14; 63,16 vita, life, 48,14.31 zodiacus cyclus, zodiacal circle, 66,21 zona, zone, 64,26

Latin–Greek Index Compiled by David Robertson

accessus, epibasis (Bywater), 69,26; 70,12.15.19; 71,9.19; 72,3; 73,13; 74,6 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 accidere, tunkhanein, 85,20 actio, pragmateia, 41,18; 53,7.23 actualis, energêtikos, 53,4.20; 58,27 actus, praxis, 45,16; 53,20.32 acumen, akmê, 71,19 ad solem, peri ton hêlion, 66,3 adunatio, henôsis, 50,26 aequinoctialis, isêmerios, or isêmerinos, 73,16 aequinoctium, isêmeria, 65,13; 71,16; 103,9 aer, aêr, 67,30; 78,1; 80,2.3; 88,15; 89,26; 90,13.18; 91,22 aesca, esca, trophê, 55,22.24; 56,16; 57,29; 62,25; 89,10.21.26; 92,24; 94,25 aestimare, doxazein, 49,17 aether, aithêr, 67,3 affectabilis, pathêtikos, 79,27; 80,2 affectus, pathos, 89,16; 96,12.17 aisthêtêrion (Greek letters), aisthêtêrion, 54,12.14; 56,21; 60,1 Note the Greek letters here in Bywater’s text (cf. analogia, endelekheia, hupothesis, parallêlos, phantasia, phantasma) aistheterium, aisthêtêrion, 55,20 alienare, alloioun, 74,3 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 alienatio, alloiôsis, 64,6; 67,24 alteritas, alloiôsis, 50,4; 69,9; 91,20 ambitus, periodos, 66,29 amicitia, philia, 94,26 analogia (Greek letters), analogia, 52,17 angularis, diagônios, 90,13 anima, psukhê, 43,1; 44,16; 45,3.30; 46,1.26; 47,2; 48,9.26; 49,14; 50,2.14; 55,13.20; 59,3.17; 90,28 animatio, psukhôsis, 45,1

animatum, to empsukhon, 88,10 anomalus, anômalos, 90,26 appositio, parathesis, 51,24 aquaeductus, aulôn, 70,23 argumentum, logos, 77,23 armonia genitiva, harmonia gennêtikê, 94,21 arsura, purôsis, or ekpurôsis, 86,14 ascensio, anabasis, 57,7 assumptio, dokhê, 88,1 atqui, kaitoi, 73,25 augeri, auxanesthai, 49,29 aura, aura, 102,13 autem, de, 56,17 and frequently axis, axôn, 66,15.17 bonus, agathos, 95,4 caliditas, thermotês, 56,22; 72,18.24; 75,5; 100,5 calidus, thermos, 56,2; 76,10; 80,17; 103,3 calor, to thermon, 57,6.22; 68,5.11; 72,19; 101,1 calor naturalis, to phusikon thermon, 45,6 campus pelagi, pontou plax, 65,30 causa, aitia, or aition, 61,16; 72,10.12; 73,3.11; 76,10; 88,15; 89,1; 90,6; 91,20.24; 92,3; 94,12 connaturalis causa, sumphuton aition, 50,14 naturalis causa, phusikê aitia, 90,6.26 causalia, ta aitiôdê, 48,25; 57,8 causalis, aitiôdês, 74,4 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 circuire, sumperiodeuein, 72,24 circulus, helix, or kuklos, 86,25; 91,25 circumfulsa approbatio, lampra apodeixis, 48,10

152

Latin–Greek Index

circumgelare, amphipsukhein, 84,26 circumstantia, periokhê, 90,18 clima, klima, 63,24; 67,20.22; 88,18 cognoscere, anagignôskein, 41,16 Poor translation of the conjectured Greek coire, sunienai, 73,15.21 coitus, sunodos, 70,20; 71,16; 73,4.7; 74,1 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 committere, sumballein, 80,9 commoderatio, to summetron, 90,12 compassibilis, sumpathês, 94,13 compassio, sumpatheia, 70,2.23 compati, sumpathein, 69,32 compelli, ôtheisthai, 56,1; apôtheisthai, 86,11; 92,23 compositio, sunthesis, 50,27 conceptio, katalêpsis, 41,14; suntêgma, 57,1 concretio, pagos, or pêgma, 84,24.32; 85,5 concretus, pêgos, 84,22 concursus, sundromê, 85,8.14.17; 94,22; 99,6 configuratus, skhêmatizomenos, 79,27 confluxus, to surrhoun, 73,11 conformatio, summorphê, 46,22 congelari, sumpêgnusthai, 67,30 congelatio, pagos, 84,33; 101,7 coniicere opinione, doxazein, 59,18 connaturalis, sumphutos, 47,16.20.22; 49,32; 50,14; 76,11; 89,22 connaturalitas, sumphuia, 50,19.27; 51,19; 94,23; 95,7; 98,8 connaturaliter, sumphuôs, 47,9; 51,6; 94,13 connexus, sunekhês, 41,10; 79,21 consensus, sunaisthêsis, 63,9 consequentia, sumptôma, 61,17 consequentia figurantis, sumptôma skhêmatizontos, 89,14 consequi, sunakolouthein, 94,18 constitutus est nove, neôste edoxen, 74,5 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 contemperantia, sunkrasis, 46,22 contemplatio, theôria, 45,16 continens, to periekhon, 47,28; 89,10.16 continens temperies, periekhousa krasis, 89,19 continuatim, sunekhôs, 55,3 conveniens, to sumbebêkos, 61,17.20 conversatio, sunêtheia, 89,23; 93,14 conversio, tropê, 62,19; 64,3.22; 71,15; 88,15; 103,10

conversum (converti) ad se, epistrephesthai, 45,22; 45,24; 46,9.12; 48,15 copula, suzugia, 73,27 copulatio, suzeuxis, 81,2.6 cor, kardia, 54,15 corrumpi, meiousthai, 49,30 crassus, pakhus, 78,1; 80,26 crimen, miasma, 49,27 Very poor Latin translation of the Greek cumulatim, athroôs, 56,3; 95,30 cumulatus, athroos, or athroôs, 56,20 densare, puknoun, 84,4; 90,10 densitas, puknotês, 84,7.30; 86,11 descensio, katabasis, 70,16; 84,32 differentia, diaphora, 80,26; 90,9 diffinitio, horos, 48,32 diffinitum, to horiston, 79,18 diffinitum bene, to euhoriston, 79,23.27; 80,1.25; 81,22 diligens, akribês, or atrekês, 41,8; 45,14; 71,19 dimidiata luna, dikhotomos selênê, 71,10; 73,8 dimidietas, dikhotomê, 70,21 disciplina, paideia, 90,4.27 disciplina vitae, didaskalia biou, 89,31 discretum bene, to eudiaireton, 79,22 disponere, diatithesthai, 74,10; 91,16 dominari, epikratein, 80,9; 84,31; 100,7 dormire, hupnousthai, 56,8; 57,8.22 ducere, hêgeisthai, 73,16; 74,1 regione, kat’ eutheian, 70,10 eminentia, huperokhê, 83,7; 84,30 enasci, ekginesthai, 94,19 endelekhia (Greek letters), endelekheia, 45,1 essentia, ousia, 43,13.20; 44,27; 45,10.11.33; 46,19; 47,7.9; 48,12.21.29; 49,10.12; 50,5.6.28; 54,21; 63,5; 66,28 essentia incorporalis, ousia asômata, 45,10 eventus, tukhê, 68,22; 86,15 exarsura, purôsis, or ekpurôsis, 86,4 excellentia, huperbolê, 81,14.16 exilis, leptos, 79,25 expectare, menein, or hupomenein, 69,20 experimentum, empeiria, 69,7

Latin–Greek Index factarum, genomenôn, 55,18 genitive plural factivum causale, to poiêtikon aition, 48,12 factum est, gegone, 88,15; 94,14 factus, gignomenos, or genêtos, 56,23; genomenos, 64,12 fecundare, karpousthai, 89,18 ferri, pheresthai, 70,9 finitum bene, euhoriston, 80,24 flexus, klima, 66,20 fluctificare, kumainein, or kumatoun, 72,17 fluctus, plêmê, 73,10 fluxus, rhoê, or epirrhoê, 57,12; 70,9; 71,15.24; 76,9 forma, eidos, or morphê, or skhêma, 46,22; 50,28; 73,16; 76,12; 88,17; 89,2.27; 90,6; 93,8.19; 94,22 formare, plassein, or eikonizein, 89,11 formositas, kalia, or kallos, 58,2 fortis, iskhuros, 90,17; 97,18 fortitudo, andreia, 90,25; iskhus, 80,6.10; 97,21 fovea, phôleos, 92,12; 97,15 frigiditas, psukhrotês, 67,35; 84,4; 89,17; 101,8 frigidus, psukhros, 80,17; 103,2 frigor, psukhos, 68,4.11; 84,28 fumeus, kapnôdês, 99,9 fumus, kapnos, 83,3; 85,21 furor, thumos, 89,27; 90,17 fusio, khumos, 76,12 gelascens, psukhros, or psukhrôn, 84,34 gelidus, psukhros, 99,14 gelu, krustallos, 84,27 germen, blastos, or phuton, 88,11; 89,13.21; 91,21; 92,4; 94,10.28 germinari, blastanesthai, 89,20 glacies, kruos, or psukhrotês, 80,13; 84,32; 89,17 habet ratio, logos ekhei, 71,13 habitabilis, oikoumenos, 67,21 habitare, oikein, 88,16.22 habitudo, hexis, or skhesis, 55,10; 94,23; 98,7 habitus, skhesis, 66,29; 71,24; 94,27 hora, hôra, 73,15.21; 90,13; 92,11 humefacere, hugrainein, 81,20 humefieri, hugrainein, 99,20

153

humiditas/umiditas, hugrasia, 53,26; 56,5; 68,3; 72,19; 77,3; 78,1.17 humidus/umidus, hugros, 65,14; 65,19 73,22; 79,25; 81,7; 82,17.18.20; 84,11; 99,7.18 hupothesis (Greek letters), hupothesis, 64,20 imago regalis, eikôn basilikê, 95,14 immobilitas, akinêsia, 54,10 impetus, hormê, 57,29; 70,22.24; 97,21 imprimere, eisôthein, 70,10 in infinitum, pros to apeiron, 79,18 in magnitudinem, pros to megethos, 74,4 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 in ordine, kata taxin, 71,8; 72,3; 73,10 inactualis, aenergêtikos, 58,27 inclinari, enklinesthai, 66,27 inclinatio, enklima, 52,20 inclinatus, enklinomenos, 66,17.27 inconfuse, asunkhutôs, 51,18.25 inconfusus, asunkhutos, 51,30; 52,1 indisciplinatio, amathia, 47,33 infinitum, aoriston, 80,23; dushoriston, 80,25 infirmare, asthenein, 48,6 infirmus, asthenês, 88,3 inflatio, anathumiasis, 61,14; 82,32; 83,24; 84,25.29; 86,1; 87,20; 99,7.15; 100,5.18; 101,1.10 influxio, epirrhoê, or epirrhoia, 73,3 informare, eikonizein, or skhêmatizein, 43,2 infundi, parenkheisthai, 75,9 ingeniosus, ankhinous, 90,30 inhabitabilis, aoikêtos, 89,16 inhabitatio, enoikêsis, 53,20 inimicitia, ekhthra, 94,26 insensibilitas, anaisthêsia, 55,12 insitus, emphutos, 75,5 intellegere/intelligere, dianoiesthai, 49,17; 59,17 intelligentia, dianoia, 57,15; 61,3; 69,8 intelligibilis, noêtos, 45,15 interpellare, entunkhanein, 96,18.20 iumentum, hupozugion, 76,1 iuxta, para, 67,3 iuxta hoc, para touto, 73,23 klima (Latin using Greek spelling), klima, 42,11

154

Latin–Greek Index

laborans, kamnôn, 68,21 latitudo, platos, 74,10 latus, platus, 74,16; 80,3 maeste habere, aniarôs ekhein, 96,19 magnitudo furoris, tou thumou megethos, 90,17 malefactor, kakopoiôn, 93,1 malitia, kakia, 49,31; 50,8.9 manifestum, phaneron, 54,16; 55,14; 60,16; 89,11 materia, hulê, 45,17; 46,21; 88,26 meatus, phora, 83,16; 84,9.19; 85,6; 86,3.18; 100,14 medium, to meson, 73,26 melancholicus, melankholikos, 61,12 memoria, mnêmê, 62,9.17 menstrualis, mêniainos, 73,2 meridiante luna, mesouranousês tês selênês, 73,26 mixtura, krasis, 50,26; 52,18; 75,7; 90,8.18; 93,26; 94,18; 95,10 mos disciplinae, didaskalias ethos, 89,26 motio per se, autokinêsia, 48,32 motio propriae rationis, autokinêsia, 49,34 motus, kinêsis, 48,27; 54,15; 55,14.20; 59,22; 71,24; 86,1; 90,6; 98,26 moveri, kineisthai, 48,13.27; 85,10; 89,12 mundus, kosmos, 65,29; 66,1.30 mutatio, metabolê, 90,6; 93,27 nasci, gignesthai, or phuesthai, 88,12.16; 89,8 natura, phusis, 54,20; 73,12.22; 88,29; 89,26.33; 90,2; 91,19; 93,13.15; 94,20 natura ingenita, enginomenê phusis, or enginomenê dunamis, 76,11 naturalis, phusikos, 90,5 nota figurativa, kharaktêr eidikos, 48,31 notitia, ennoia, 59,3.13 nubes, nephelê, or nephos, 77,11.28; 78,2; 86,24.25 numerus, arithmos, 43,26; 52,6 nunquid, mêpote, 63,17 nutritivum, to threptikon, 55,15 oblique, kata loxon, 66,14 obliquus, loxos, 66,22; 100,14 occasio, aphormê, 41,6; 42,4.15; 52,11; 58,28; 90,5; 93,9

omnino, haplôs, 78,27; 89,23; to holon, 83,2; pantôs, 96,21 operatio, energeia, 45,11; 49,10.12; 54,21; 59,23; 60,6; 88,27 opinare, doxazein, 59,17 opinio, doxa, 59,12 opulens, Latin opulens mistranslates conjectured Greek euporos which here means easy to pass through, 79,26 ordo, taxis, 71,8; 72,8; 73,10; 94,20; 95,2.17 orientalis, anatolikos, 66,5 orizon, horizon, 65,28; 66,9.28; 70,16; 71,23.25 ornatum terrae, kosmos, 67,26 pagus, pagos, 84,31 parallêlos (Greek letters), parallêlos, 64,22; 65,2 pars nutritiva, to threptikon, 55,19 pars sensiva, to aisthêtikon, 59,19.24 partibilis, meristos, 94,21 passio, pathos, 54,7.17; 55,13; 59,15; 60,2; 61,5; 62,15.22; 69,27; 71,2; 87,19; 88,26; 99,19 paulo, kata mikron, 100,18 per eventum, kata tukhên, 68,22 per simile genus, homoeidôs, 43,1 persona, prosôpon, 43,2 pertransire, paraleipein, 74,6 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 perturbare, enokhlein, 41,11 perveniens, to anêkon, or prosêkhôn, 42,8 phantasia (Latin uses Greek word), phantasia, 48,31; 49,7; 59,21.22; 62,9.15.29; 67,1 phantasma (Latin uses Greek letters), phantasma, 57,15; 59,23; 61,11.20; 62,16 phantasticum (Latin form of Greek word), to phantastikon, 59,24; 62,13 politicus, politikos, 90,6 positio, thesis, 91,24 praeceptum, nouthetêma, or parainesis, 68,32 praeoccupare, phthanein, 101,2 praeponere, prokeisthai, or hupokeisthai, 88,23 praesignificare, prosêmainein, 62,35 praetermittere, paraleipein, 41,11

Latin–Greek Index principium, arkhê, 54,15; 89,22; 92,8 privatio, sterêsis, 54,17.19; 55,10; 69,22 procedere, proienai, or proballesthai, 46,18 proiectio, ekthlipsis, 86,3 proiicere, riptein, or ekthlibein, in parallel with next entry, 85,18; 86,8.11 prophetia, manteia, or to manteion, 46,16; 59,6 propositio, problêma, or thesis, or hupothesis, 41,5 propriae rationis motio, autokinêsia, 49,34 proprie, idiôs, 92,5 proprius, kurios, 54,14; 55,14; 56,20; idios, 56,22; 69,13; 88,29; 89,33; 90,12 propter hoc, dia toutou, 41,12 providentia, pronoia, 45,6 prudentia, phronêsis, 90,31 pulchre, eikotôs, 46,24 purgare, kathairesthai, 45,26.28 purgatio, katharsis, 45,28 putreficere, sêpesthai, 96,28 putrescere, sêpesthai, 72,19; 75,17.21 quaestio finita, hupothesis, 64,21 qualis, poios, 41,15 qualitas, poiotês, 50,5.23; 88,25 quia, hoti, 46,15; 54,16 and frequently quidem . . . et, men . . . de, 41,10 quoniam, epei, 66,21 ratio, logos, 89,3; 94,18 ratio annualis, eniausios logos, 72,2 ratio artificalis, tekhnikos logos, 95,11 habet ratio, logos ekhei, 71,14 recessus, anakhôrêsis, 69,20.24.27; 70,16; 71,24; 74,6 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 recipi, katalambanesthai, 50,20 reciprocatio, diaulos, or palirrhoia, 72,11 redundantia, epibasis, 69,21.22.23; 71,5.24; 72,8; 73,25 redundare, epibainein, 69,20; 72,25 refluxio, anarrhoia, or palirrhoia, 57,7 refluxus, anarrhoia, or palirrhoia, 69,25 refrigeratio, psukhrotês, 57,8 regalis imago, basilikê eikôn, 95,14 regio, khôra, 68,10; 88,15.18; 89,5.23.29; 90,4; 92,10; 93,4; 103,18

155

regula, kanôn, 68,32 remissio, anesis, 54,11 repercussio, antitupôsis, 83,20; 87,17; 103,17.20 resecare, suntemnein, 68,20 respirare, diapnein, 90,13 respiratio, anapnoê, 83,18 reverti, antistrephein, 56,1.4 salus, sôtêria, 54,21; 56,23 salutare, sôstikon, 47,29 scientia, epistêmê, 45,14.17 secundum, kata, 61,20 semen, sperma, 90,5 sensibilia, aisthêta, 88,1 sensivus, aisthêtikos, 59,19 sensus, aisthêsis, 54,10.16; 57,15; 59,13.22; 94,21 sensus proprius, kurios aisthêsis, 55,14 sentire, aisthanesthai, 59,16; 62,21 sermo, logos, 41,10 sicut, hoion, 54,18 sicuti, dikên, 88,11 significare, sêmainein, 71,14; 91,18 signum, sêmeion, 61,17; 71,23.25; 100,1 signum aequinoctiale, sêmeion isonuktion, 66,23 signum tropicum, sêmeion tropikon, 66,22 silentium, sigê, 69,24; akhanês, 74,15 Latin silentium mistranslates conjectured Greek akhanês, which here means ‘gaping’ similitudo, homoiotês, 57,12; 88,17; 89,9.25 singularis, kapros, 92,26 sinuositas, koilia, or kurtôsis, 88,2 solutio, lusis, 54,11 somniari, enupniazein, 59,21.24 somnus, hupnos, 54,10.21; 55,8.22; 56,5.21; 57,1.29 species, eidos, 50,26 species consummativa, eidos sumplêrôtikon, 79,20 speciositas, idiotês, 91,3.6 speculari, theôrein, 95,19 speculatio, theôria, 78,21; 92,3 possibly corrupt spirantia bene, ta eupnoa, 90,10

156

Latin–Greek Index

spiritus, pneuma, 57,19.28; 58,10; 78,18; 83,24; 84,21; 87,18; 88,2; 95,26; 97,6; 98,26; 99,6.16; 101,11; 102,19 spiritus borealis, boreion pneuma, 100,10 spiritus connaturalis, sumphuton pneuma, 45,5 spiritus materialis, hulikon pneuma, 54,14 statio, stasis, 73,27; 74,4 Latin text very corrupt 73,27-74,6 status, katastasis, 68,11; 90,28 subici, huphistasthai, 79,10.12 submovere, hupotarassein, or kinein, 72,18 subsistentia, hupostasis, 49,16 subsolanum, apêliôtês (Latin supplies Greek equivalent in Greek letters), 101,18 substantia, hupostasis, or ousia, 46,23; 51,1; 75,3; 87,20; 94,19; 95,13 subvehi, huphaireisthai, 78,11; 91,17 Latin subvehi mistranslates the conjectured Greek huphaireisthai sufficiens, arketos, 90,7 summum, to akron, 79,19; 81,14; 82,2 summus, akros, 81,18 superare, huperballein, or huperekhein, 80,11.12; 84,28; 89,17; 101,6 superferri, huperpheresthai, 80,14 supergredi, huperbainein, 73,26 supervehi, epipolazein, 79,9.11; 80,14 synodus, sunodos, 57,9 tam, houtôs, 53,15 temperantia, krasis, 68,17; 69,10; 92,13 tempus actuale, khronos energêtikos, 53,22 terminare, horizein, 81,19.21 terminus, horos, 70,4.7; 79,19; 80,24.25 tonitru, brontê, 88,2 totum, to holon, 48,21 tractare, skopein, 49,17 transferre, metapherein, 49,26 transitus, parodos, 66,6 transmitti, metaballein, 56,2 transmutare, metakinein, 91,5 transmutatio, metabolê, or metakinêsis, 89,11; 91,1 tropicus cyclus, tropikos kuklos, 64,21 turbo, tuphon 84,15; def. 86,24

unda, kuma, 62,4; 72,25; 73,5.12.23; 74,2 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 uniformitas, monoeideia, 50,19 unitas, henôsis, 51,27 universitas, to holon, 94,9.15; 95,4 unum existens, enuparkhôn, 47,9 Latin mistranslates the Greek urbanitas, politeia, 89,31 ustio, kauma, 89,17 ut omnino, hôs to holon, 91,21 utilitas, to khrêsimon, 94,15; 95,7 utpote, hôsanei, 89,22 vacare, skholazein, 62,32 valere, dunasthai, 55,3; 56,21 vapor, atmis, 52,15; 56,6; 72,13; 74,16; 77,28; 83,2.5; 84,5.20; 85,1; 99,8.12 vaporatio, anathumiasis, 55,25 vas, skeuos, 89,30 vehi, pheresthai, 78,28 velox ad motum, takhukinêtos, 90,30 veluti, hôsper, 57,3 veluti in plurimum, hôs epi to pleiston, 88,13 veluti verbi gratia, hôs eipein, 88,27 ventus, anemos, 84,18; 99,6; 100,8.19; 101,16; 102,17; 103,21 ver, ear, 74,5 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6 verbum, logos, 73,3 (Latin verbum mistranslates conjectured Greek logos which here means ratio, 73,3) verbi gratia, logou kharin, 73,2 villa, kômê, or dêmos, 89,6 vim facere, diaspasthai, 80,10 Latin provides very loose translation: literally ’tear apart’ vinculum, desmos, 45,30; 54,11 virtus, aretê, 45,12.26; 49,31; 89,27; dunamis, 41,11; 65,11.14; 72,13; 73,4.22; 74,4 Latin text very corrupt 74,1–6; 76,13; 84,29; 88,27; 90,12; 94,11.25; 95,26 visio, horâma, 59,3.14; 63,16 vita, zôê, 48,14.31 zodiacus cyclus, zôdiakos kuklos, 66,21 zona, zônê, 64,26

Subject and Name Index Compiled by Richard Sorabji

References in bold type are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text (indicated in the margins of the translation). Other references are to page numbers in the introductions to this volume and to each chapter Adaptation of groups to new environments 70, 88,10–93,27 Agathias, 2–3 Albinus, 42,9, note 17 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 42,17, note 590 d’Alverny, M.-T., 6–7 Ammonius Saccas, 42,16, notes 23, 98 Anthropocentric vs real astronomical distinctions, 66,25–67,4, notes 200, 217 Antigonus, note 291, 292 Antiperistasis, exchanging place, 27, note 129 Arabic, 3 Aristotle, 41,18–42,3, 16, 34–5, 70, 82, notes 55, 114, 165, 169, 173, 184, 363–448, 451, 505, 561, 563, 568, 579–607 ps-Aristotle On Marvellous Things Heard, notes 490, 492, 543, 556–8, 562–3, 565 Arius Didymus, 42,13, note 21 Arrian, 42,13, 69,31, notes 20, 265 Axis, celestial 66,9–21 Bowen, Alan, 8 Bywater, I., 6, 9, notes 237, 252, 259 Christians, 1–3 Cicero, note 169 Circles, tropic, equinoctial, zodiacal, ecliptic, 40–1, 64,3–23; 66,21–25, note 204 Comet, 87,11. See Exhalation (dry)

Compossible: a provident God creates not the best animals and plants (few would survive), but the best compossible animals and plants (cf. Leibniz), 4, 76 Compossible by alliance, aggression, or ability to flee, 76, 94,24–6; 98,8 Mankind is protected as royal ruler of the rest as subjects through combining sense with intelligence, 95,11–18 Cultures, diffusion to different, 1 Damascius, notes 64, 174 Day, definitions of, 65,20–8, note 198 day and night length varies with latitude and season, 67,4–17 Dew (ros), 84,23. See Exhalation (wet) Didymus, see Arius Didymus Dorotheus, 42,14, note 22 Dream, as images, after-­effects of perception, not only visual, 34, 59,12–13; 60,1–19; 62,13–16 So from sensitive part of the soul, 59,19 Images more noticeable when sense-­perception is quietened, 61,22–62,7 Not object of sense-­perception or reason, 59,14–19; 62,12 Hence when dreaming we don’t remember wakefulness, though dreams can be remembered, 62,7–20 Time and position in bed alter dreams, 62,23–8

158

Subject and Name Index

Dreams relax us, 28, 58,9–11 Such dreams due to the union of soul and body, 62,28–31; 63,4; 63,6–7 Essence of soul has natural union with body, 63,5–6 Dreams can be related to future as influence on it, as sign of causes already in place, or by coincidence, 61,16–21 But soul’s essence preserved in separation from body, 63,5–6 Soul is somewhat divine, 62,31 And some say that is how soul in dreams foresees the future, 62,31–63,3, note 166, 170 Prophecy in sleep shows soul separate from body, 46,12–17 When soul separate from body in sleep, does it receive divine visions of the future? 34, 53,9–8; 63,15–21, note 170 Ebbesen, Sten, 9 Ecliptic, 40, note 210 Elements, Aristotle’s four: earth, water, air, fire, These four elements are in four ascending natural places or layers according to their degree of lightness or weight, 78,23–79,21; 82,27–31 How, then, do they get displaced? 59–60, 77,3–78,23 Partly because they have the active powers of hot or cold and passive powers of fluid or dry, 80,15–82,27 which produce some unexpected effects, 81,18–82,1 and different possibilities of changing into each other, 82,8–27 But falling or floating also depend also on shape and penetrability, 79,21–80,15 Moreover, wet exhalation explains some displacement effects of cloud and rain, and dry exhalation explains some effects of displaced fire, 82,32–88,7

Whirlwinds can lift things up into the wrong place before letting them drop, 84,9–20 Equator, terrestrial, celestial, 40–1, note 210 Equinox, equinoctial circle, 40–1, 64,3–23; 66,21–25, note 210 equinoctial rising and setting of sun, 66,4–9 equinoctial signs (constellations) of zodiac, 73,13–17 Evil, problem of in nature: why dangerous animals and plants in good universe? 4, 76–7, 94,3–98,23. See also Compossible. Adorning every place with variety is not offered as an answer, 94,8–11, note 525, though plenitude (maximum variety) was later to be (Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being) Exhalations, wet and dry, drawn up from earth by sun, 59–60, 82,32–83,16; 99,6–11 The wet is raised first, then by heat the smoky or dry, which drives the wet higher, until cooled by distance from the sun’s reflected rays or by the sun’s moving away, the wet is liquefied, descends and becomes cloud, dew, rain, frost, snow, ice, or hail 83,16–23; 84,20–85,5; 99,6–15 The wet does not rise as high as Aristotle’s uppermost belt of fire, nor above the mountain tops 85,5–16, note 429 The rise of the dry exhalation also terminates in the cold area, 85,6–14 But the dry can be, or be driven by winds, above wet exhalation, 99,15–19 Dry exhalation can be burnt up by the sun, or extinguished by rain, water or cold, 67,28–68,11; 100,4–8; 101,1–8, note 584 A number of dry exhalations have to band together to be raised, rather than burnt up, by the sun, 100,18–101,5

Subject and Name Index Dry exhalation turns into winds and fiery phenomena 83,23–5; 100,6–7; 100,15–17; 85,10; 85,16–7 Coming from different exhalations, often rain puts an end to wind and wind to rain, 100,1–3 The dry is eventually squeezed downwards or sideways, as happens with the so-­called ‘winds from the clouds’, thunder, or shooting stars, 86,12–13; 86,19–23 The hot and dry (the uppermost belt of fire, and the dry exhalation below the mountain tops) can ignite the air below it with a flame, torches and lamps, sparks and something like shooting stars 85,19–86,1, note 429 Comets, thunderbolts (burning wind), thunder and lightning all come from dry exhalation 87,10–88,4 Whirlwinds too can whirl clouds or things on earth or in the sea in various directions, 86,23–87,10 Dry exhalation, when turned into wind, is moved from its vertical rise to sideways 100,14–15 The wind’s seasonal (?) direction follows that of the heavens between north and south extremes of the ecliptic, note 590 Alexander of Aphrodisias criticises the claim that the daily direction of winds follows that of the heavens, note 590. al-Fârâbî, 5 Freedom of religion and speech, 2–4 Frost (pagus), 84,31. See Exhalation (wet) Galen, 47, note 551 Geminus, 42,11–12, notes 189–191, 195, 198, 199, 221, 270 Gilbert, Nathan, 10 Hadot, I., 5 Hailstones (grandines) 84,34. See Exhalation (wet)

159

Harrân, 5 Hierocles, Stoic, 35, note 172, 173 Hippocrates, 42,7, note 451, 521 Horizon, terrestrial, 40–1, 66,4–9; 66,21–25, note 210 celestial, 40–1, 65,28–66,4 Huby, Pamela, 8 Iamblichus, 15–16, 42,17, notes 26, 54, 60, 67 Ice (gelu), 83,22, 84,27, (glacies), 84,32. See Exhalation (wet) Justinian, 1, 3 Khosroes, 1–5 Religious toleration, 2–3 Freedom of discussion, 2–3 Knowledge and self-­knowledge of soul, 45,22–4, 46,2–12 Langslow, David, 9 Latin translator of Greek text, 5, 7–8 Latitude, terrestrial, 40–1, note 180 Lautner, Peter, 10 Leibniz (compossibility), 4, 76 Lightning (fulgor, fulgoratio), 87,19–88,4, see exhalation, (dry) Lovejoy, Arthur, note 526. See Evil, problem of Marcianus, 14, 42,13, note 19 Medicines: doctor needs not uniform cures, but experience of variables, 47, 68,14–69,16 Misunderstandings, by Latin translator, 6–7 Misunderstanding or misuse of Aristotle by Priscian, 7–8, 83, notes 429, 434, 585, 586, 589, 606 Mixture, 18, 50,25–52,22 Juxtaposition, 18, 51,11; 51,24, note 39, 95, 96 Fusion, with destruction of original ingredients, 18, 50,8–51,9, note  95, 96 Blend with preservation and recoverability of ingredients, note 95, 96

160

Subject and Name Index

Unconfused union, 51,18; 51,25; 51,30; 52,1–2, note 95, 99, 100, 101, 103 Interpenetration of bodies in Stoics, not Alexander, note 102 Muslims, 3 Nemesius, 15, note 50, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101, 105, 106 Nutton, Vivian, 8–9 Particularism, uniform cures, not required for different individuals, 47 No one natural or cultural factor explains adaptation of groups to new environment, 70, note 46, 480, 500 Paul of Persia, 3 Pedersen, Fritz Saaby, 8 Permeating itself (of intellect and rational soul), 48,22, note 49, 50 Interpenetration of bodies in Stoics, not Alexander, 51,21–2, note 102 Persian, 3 Philosopher-­king, 3–4 Philosophy vs. science, 4 Philosopher as knowing reality, 45,12–24; 46,2–12 As purified from body, 45,25–33 Place, natural: see Elements, Plato, 16, 41,16, notes 53, 64, 68, 70–1, 75, 82, 85, note 451 Pliny, notes 167, 196, 290, 505 Plotinus, 42,28; 47,13, notes 67, 171 Plutarch, note 167 Poles, celestial, 66,9–21 Porphyry, 42,16, 15, note 25, 38, 41, 50, 52, 95, 106 Posidonius, 50, 42,12; 69,30; 71,4, 72,10 ff., note 16, 184, 255, 294, 300, 308, 309 Priscian, 1–2, 4, 7–8, 16 Prophecy by soul, without body or sense, asleep or awake, 20,35–6 Proclus, 42,19, notes 27, 62, 63, 69, 78, 86, 100, 171 Providence, 76, 94,15; 95,4–18, see also Compossible, Leibniz Ptolemy, 42,12, note 184 Purification of soul from body, 45,25–33

Rain pluvium 83,22. See Exhalation (wet) Robertson, David, 10 Roueché, Mossman, 10 Russell, Donald, 8–9 Salt in the sea because fresh part evaporates more easily, 74,19–75,7 The fresh water in sea can be found by filtering, 75,7–13 The salt keeps sea creatures alive by preventing stagnation, 75,13–22 Excessively salty lakes, rivers and springs, 75,22–76,20 Seasons 65,9–20 not every zone or latitude has every season, 67,17–68,2 Self-­perception, 35, 63,9 Sergius of Resh’aina, 1 Simplicius, 4 Sleep, Soul normally outside body in sleep, 34–5, 46,12–19, 52,13–16; 62,35–63,2, note 105, 166 Preserves its essence in separation from body, but essence is in natural unity with body, 63,5–6 Darts back in, if body needs attention, but otherwise no self-­perception, 35, 63,7–15 Not imply two souls, or a divided soul, 27–8, 53,8–24, 58,25–8 Not a privation, because natural benefit, 54,17–55,12 A function of sense, leaves nutrition intact, 27–8, 54,8–17 Heat in stomach aids digestion, 28, 53,27, 57,24–58,1 Extremities of body are colder, 32–3 Hot vapour from food rises to head, 28, 55,22–56,3, 56,12–13 Compressed and cooled, descends and suppresses sense perception in heart, 28, 56,1–15, 56,19–57,8, 29–32 Images take place of sense perception, and understanding, 28, 32, 35 But some truths better recognised in sleep, 28, 57,14–16

Subject and Name Index Cooling after sleep restores intelligence, 28, 58,18–21 Snow (nix), 67,28–68,11; 83,22, 84,20, 84,25, 84,27, 84,32. See Exhalation (wet) Solstice, 41, 64,3–23, note 210 Soul, a substance, 15, 43,20; 43,24–44,13; 17–18 Incorporeal, 15, 43,20–1; 44,13–32; 45,10; 45,11–46,29; 18–20, 62,31 Imperishable, 15, 43,20–1; 46,19–48,33; 17, 20–21 Separable from body in essence and activities, 15–16, 43,21; 45,11–46,29, 19–20 Some grounds for these attributes: Soul in philosophy knows true reality, hence knows itself, so turns to itself, 45,12–24; 46,2–12; 48,15; cf. penetrates itself, notes 49, 50; permeates itself, 48,22 Purifies itself in philosophy of bodily passions, 45,25–33 Soul has visions in sleep, or awake, about the future, 46,12–19 Soul by essence gives life, so cannot receive the contrary, death, 47,1–24 Soul is not destroyed even by its own evil: vices, 47,25–48,9 Rational soul by essence self-­moving and hence source of movement in bodies, 48,12–49,36 Self-­movement characteristic of rational, not irrational, soul, which is moved only with body 49,6–16, note 79 Irrational soul not separable, 44,32–45,8; 49,13 Soul different in different bodies, 15–16 Type of body due to species, 50,17–19 Within a species due to parents and climate, 50,9–11 Individual differences of human body due to body not soul, 50,11–16 Individual differences exist in quality of soul, 50,2–9 But no difference or alteration in soul’s essence, 50,2–9; 88,23–9, note 91

161

Dist. essence, powers, activities of soul, 45,11–12; 46,13; 46,19; 50,2–9, notes 89, 91 Body-­soul relations: Mixed somehow together, but preserve own essence, 51,9–11 Not blended, fused, or juxtaposed with body, 44,16–28, 51,6, note 95, 96 But unconfused union, note 51,18; 51,25, 51,30, 95, note 99; cf. light and air, 52,1–2 Connaturally united, 43,22; 51,19–20 Relation to body an inclination, 52,19, note 106 Spirit (pneuma), connatural instrument of soul, 45,6, note 42 Stars (shooting) 85,19–86,1 Steel, Carlos, 9 Strabo, pupil and recorder of Posidonius, 42,9; 71,4; 91,6, notes 255, 270, 490, 492 Substance, def. 43,24–44,14 Syriac, 1, 3 Syrianus, note 100 Tardieu, Michel, 2, 5 Tee, Lauren, 10 Terrestrial/celestial horizon, equator, 40–1 Thâbit Ibn Qurra, 5 Themistius, 42,18 Theophrastus, 42,3, notes 132, 139, 141, 168, 451, 490, 538, 554, 609 Thunder (tonitrus), thunderbolts (burning wind, fulmina), lightning (fulgoratio), 86,12; 87,10–88,4. See Exhalation (dry) Tides, observational knowledge of tides’ relation to moon, but not of gravity, 50 Moon, made of fire tempered by air, raises water by a warmth not so great as to burn it up (Posidonius), 50–1, 72,10–19 Daily, monthly, and annual tides, 51, the latter two more powerful, 71,9–17 Monthly high tides at or just after full moon, and new moon, 50–1, 70,19–21

162

Subject and Name Index

At full moon, sun distanced from moon, ‘opposed’ to it on the other side of earth, but heats the moon’s full face, 50–1, 73,5–9 At new moon, sun closer to moon, ‘conjoined’ with it, with earth not intervening, but exerts its heat only from behind moon, 50–1, 73,5–9 Daily high tide when moon directly overhead, 51 Tide then follows moon, reducing as moon sets, but circulation continues beneath the earth, 51, 72,24–73,2; 73,9–12 High tide also when moon at nadir under the earth, 70,2–18 Annual high tide at spring and autumn equinox, perhaps because season enhances moon’s warmth and fluidity, 52, 73,21–5 Around equinoxes, sun and moon rise conjoined in front of the same zodiacal constellations, or opposed in front of opposite ones, 73,13–21, note 335 High tide is just after the moon’s daily zenith, its monthly conjunction or opposition to the sun and the annual equinoxes, 71,17–72,2; 73,25–74,6 Tidal flooding, 71,2–7; 71,11–13; 72,2–5 Tidal flow up Rivers Rhine and Thames, 52, 72,5–10

Rivers do not by outflowing enlarge the sea, nor by overflowing enlarge themselves, because of evaporation, 74,6–19 In straits, currents can flow in different directions, four, or even seven, times a day, 70,2–13; 70,23–4 Tropics, tropical circle, 40–1, 64,3–23; 66,21–25 Turned to itself (of rational soul), 45,22–4; 46,8–12; 48,15 Uranius, 3, 4, White, Stephen, 9 Whirlwinds, see exhalation (dry) Wilson, Malcolm, 9, notes 428, 433 583, 584, 589 Wind, 98,26–99,6, see exhalation (dry) winds: directions from which blow, 101,15–104,6 Priscian’s divergence from Aristotle on this, note 606, 607 Aristotle on cause of wind’s direction, note 590 Timosthenes’ wind rose, note 607 Zodiac, signs (constellations) of the, Zodiacal circle, 40, 66,21–25, note 210, 211 Zone, terrestrial, 41, 64,25–65,7; 101,11, note 184, 190, 603 Zoroastrianism, 3