Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford Aristotle Studies Series) [1 ed.] 9780199588350, 019958835X

Citation preview

Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics

OXFORD ARISTOTLE STUDIES General Editors Julia Annas and Lindsay Judson PUBLISHED IN THE SERIES Doing and Being An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta Jonathan Beere Space, Time, Matter, and Form Essays on Aristotle’s Physics David Bostock Aristotle on Meaning and Essence David Charles Time for Aristotle Ursula Coope Aristotle on Teleology Monte Ransome Johnson On Location Aristotle’s Concepts of Place Benjamin Morison Order in Multiplicity Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle Christopher Shields Aristotle’s Theory of Substance The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta Michael V. Wedin Aristotle’s De Interpretatione Contradiction and Dialectic C. W. A. Whitaker

Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Michail Peramatzis

1

3

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York # Michail Peramatzis 2011 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn ISBN 978-0-19-958835-0 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To my family, in Greece and in the UK

Preface and Acknowledgements The aim of this book is not only to understand Aristotle’s view of the priority relations between fundamental and derivative parts of reality but also to assess whether his preferred prior and posterior candidates can satisfy these relations. But my project is not exclusively to interpret Aristotle. It is also to link Aristotelian problems, ideas, and arguments with philosophical issues which are central to modern discussions of substance, essentialism, modality, causation, and explanation. The success of this type of project is a thorny affair. It depends on striking the appropriate balance between carrying through rigorous exegetical work, engaging in acute philosophical criticism, and avoiding the pitfalls of anachronism. It remains to be judged by the reader whether, and if so in what measure, the present study attempts or manages to achieve this arduous sort of balancing act. The history of this monograph goes back all the way to my postgraduate studies at Christ Church and the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Oxford. One of the chapters of my D.Phil. thesis contains a first approximation to the view of ontological priority set out in Part II of this book. The greatest part of the work, however, was done after completing my D.Phil. studies, when I was awarded a Junior Research Fellowship at Christ Church. I am indebted to Lindsay Judson, who was my mentor at Christ Church but who also discussed with me significant parts of the first draft of the book. I would also like to extend my warm thanks to all the people of Christ Church who made me feel welcome and provided an idyllic environment for my work throughout the eight years of my D.Phil. and my JRF. I was extremely fortunate to work closely with David Charles not only for my doctoral thesis but also during my post-doctoral Fellowship at Oxford. A lot of the views and arguments of this book have been immensely influenced by discussions I had with him in seminars, conferences, or unofficial discussion groups. Working with him during my eight years in Oxford was highly enjoyable and exciting, intense, and rewarding. Other members of discussion groups held in Oxford at various times include Lucas Angioni, David Bronstein, Laura Castelli, Atsushi Kawatani, Scott O’Connor, Hiro Ogino, and Nathanael Stein. I am grateful to all of them for their helpful comments and criticism. Parts of this book were presented at seminars, conferences, or workshops long before they reached their present shape. A very brief paper, which contains the seeds for Part I of the book, was presented in 2007 at the Oxford Ancient Philosophy Workshop organized by Terry Irwin and David Charles. I am indebted to the convenors and all the participants for their questions and remarks. Parts of chapters 8, 10, and 12 were presented at the Conference on Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics held at the

P R E F A C E A N D A C K N OW L E D G E M E N T S

vii

University of Campinas in 2008, while parts of chapter 7 have their ancestors in a paper I gave the following year in the same place for the Conference on Aristotle’s Notions of Necessity and Causality in the Posterior Analytics. I would like to thank warmly my colleague and friend, Lucas Angioni, not only for enabling me to travel to Brazil and to participate in these interesting conferences but also for his invaluable comments and criticism. Thanks are also due to Marco Zingano and all the other participants for their incisive questions. Long sections of chapters 3, 4, and 5 were condensed into a paper which I gave in May 2010 at the Oxford Conference on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I received extremely helpful feedback and criticism from many participants, which improved significantly central theses of this book. During Trinity Term of 2010 I gave, together with David Bronstein, David Charles, and Alan Code, a series of seminars on Aristotle’s metaphysics in which I had the opportunity to test several views and arguments set out in the book. I would like to thank all those who attended and, in particular, Alan Code, with whom I co-presented a marathon-like last session on the priority of particular substances (a precursor to chapter 11). Their insightful remarks made me reformulate and improve my views immensely. Finally, I would like to thank the Classics Faculty of the University of Cambridge for their invitation to give a paper at the ‘B Club’ in November 2010 on the primacy of particular substances. The lively discussion with the participants helped me rethink and reshape parts of chapter 11. An earlier version of the view of ontological priority advanced in Part II of the book was published as an article in the Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (35, 2008, pp. 187–248). Parts of chapters 8, 10, 13, 14, and appendix 2 are taken, with slight changes, from that article. I would like to thank the editor of the Oxford Studies, Brad Inwood, not only for agreeing to publish such a lengthy article but more importantly for his acute comments and criticism. Thanks are also due to the anonymous readers of the Oxford Studies. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the Oxford University Press and the senior commissioning editor in Philosophy, Peter Momtchiloff, for their support and patience. I am also indebted to Stephen Makin, who read the first draft of the book and made invaluable remarks. M. M. P. Queen’s University, Belfast

This page intentionally left blank

Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Preliminaries 1.2 Priority in Definition: Form, Matter, and Compound 1.3 Ontological Priority in ‘Being What Something Essentially Is’ 1.4 Aristotelian Method and Methodological Neutrality

1 3 6 11 16

Part I. Definitional Priority: Form, Matter, and Compound 2. Definitional Priority and Definitionally Primary Items 2.1 Priority in Definition or in Account 2.2 Separation in Definition and the Asymmetry of Definitional Priority 2.3 Transitivity 2.4 Irreflexivity and Fundamentally Primary Items 2.5 Form as Definitionally Primary 2.6 Can Definitionally Posterior Items Be Indefinable? 2.7 Important Consequences

23 23 25 25 27 30 32 37

3. Matter within a Form’s Essence? 3.1 Preliminary Remarks 3.2 An Important Distinction 3.3 The Dominant Question of Metaphysics Z.10–11 3.4 Initial Examples of Metaphysics Z.10 and Different Types of Matter 3.5 The End of Metaphysics Z.11 and the ‘Matter of Form’ (Metaphysics .24)

39 39 40 42 45

4. Natural Form, Mathematical Form, and Platonist Errors 4.1 Hyper-Materiality and Hyper-Formality 4.2 Abstractability, Separability, and Definitional Independence (Physics B.2) 4.3 What Natural Forms Are Not Like (I): Forms Studied by Subordinate Mathematical Sciences (Posterior Analytics A.13) 4.4 What Natural Forms Are Not Like (II): Mathematical Abstractions in Thought (Physics B.2, 193b31–5) 4.5 What Natural Forms Are Not Like (III): Platonist Forms 4.6 Platonist Forms and Change (Metaphysics A.9 and Z.8) 4.7 Concluding Note on Mathematical Versus Natural Form (De Anima A.1)

50 55 56 59 64 70 74 77 84

x

CONTENTS

5. Natural Forms as Essentially Matter- and Change-Involving 5.1 Why is Hyper-Formality Mistaken? (Metaphysics Z.11) 5.2 Matter, Change, and the Case of the Soul (Metaphysics E.1 and De Anima A.1) 5.3 Formal and Material Parts of a Form’s Essence: Intra-Definiens Priority of Form over Matter? (Physics B.2) 5.4 The Inextricability of Formal and Material Parts of a Form’s Essence (Sophistici Elenchi 31) 5.5 Interim Conclusions

90 91 99 110 122 132

6. Material and Change-Related Features of a Natural Form’s Essence 6.1 The Necessary and Causal Link between Matter and Change 6.2 What Kind of Matter Accounts for Natural Change? 6.3 Material and Change-Related Parts in a Natural Form’s Essence 6.4 The Explanatory Role of Material and Change-Related Features within a Natural Form’s Essence (De Anima A.4) 6.5 Conclusion: Metaphysics and the Study of Matter and Change (Metaphysics Z.11)

138 139 143 152

7. Essentially Enmattered Form as Prior to Matter: A Modest Proposal 7.1 Biting the Bullet 7.2 Pragmatic or Interest-Relative Views 7.3 Two Objects – Two Definitions 7.4 ‘Matter’ as an Ambiguous Term 7.5 Proximate and Remote Types of Matter 7.6 Reclaiming the Form’s Priority over Matter: The Basics 7.7 Definitional Models of Priority 7.8 Determining the Prior and Posterior Relata: The Causal-Explanatory Model Introduced 7.9 Filling in the Gaps: Specifying the Posterior Relata as Explananda 7.10 Conclusion: Dissecting the Definiens

168 169 170 171 173 173 176 178

157 162

180 188 195

Part II. Ontological Priority 8. Priority in Nature or in Substance 8.1 The Neutral Formulation of the Independence Claim [IC] 8.2 More on the Distinction between Existing and Being What Something Is 8.3 Interim Conclusions

203 204

9. Platonist Ontological Priority 9.1 The Discussion of Platonist Priority in the Eudemian Ethics 9.2 Platonist and Aristotelian Ontological Priority 9.3 Appendix: Separation and Priority

212 213 216 217

208 210

CONTENTS

xi

10. Evidence for Priority in Being [PIB] in Metaphysics .11 10.1 Prior Subjects and Prior Substances 10.2 Ways of Being and Ways of Being Ontologically Prior 10.3 Priority in Potential Being or Destruction and Actual Being or Generation 10.4 Interim Conclusions

219 219 222

11. The Ontological Priority of Particular Substances 11.1 Primary Substances of the Categories and Metaphysics Z.1 11.2 How not to Understand the Priority of Particular Substances 11.3 Subjecthood, and the Ontological Priority of Particular Substances as [PIB] 11.4 Conclusion 11.5 Appendix: Metaphysics Z.1 and Priority ‘in Time’

229 230 233

12. Definitional and Ontological Priority [PIB] 12.1 Aristotle’s Distinction between ‘Priority in Account’ and ‘Priority in Substance’ (Metaphysics M.2) 12.2 Metaphysics M.2 and the Claim of Form to both Priority Conditions 12.3 What Is it for a Form to Be ‘Prior in Account’? (Metaphysics H.1 & Physics B.1) 12.4 Ontological Priority [PIB] as Grounding ‘Real’ Definitional Priority

254

223 228

238 244 249

255 260 262 265

13. Test Cases for Ontological Priority [PIB] 13.1 Right/Acute Angles (Metaphysics Z.10) 13.2 Actual Being as Ontologically Prior to Potential Being (Metaphysics .8) 13.3 Substance and Form as Actual Being – Matter as Potential Being 13.4 Generalizability of [PIB] (I): Capacity Possession and Exercise 13.5 Generalizability of [PIB] (II): Capacities and Their Exercise 13.6 Generalizability of [PIB] (III): Perishable Things and Eternal Actual Beings 13.7 Conclusion: The Unity of Metaphysics .8

270 270

14. Conclusion: Further Problems and Some Suggestions 14.1 Substancehood, and the Status of Priority 14.2 Essential Interdependence and ‘Parts’ of the Form’s Essence 14.3 The Scope of Ontological Priority and ‘Particular versus Universal Form’ 14.4 Ontological Priority and Modality

301 302 305

Appendix 1: Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b28: ÆNŁÅe or ÆNŁÅØŒe? Appendix 2: Textual and Interpretative Issues in Metaphysics .11, 1019a1–14 Bibliography Index Locorum General Index Index Nominum

312 317 320 325 327 329

278 278 286 288 291 299

308 309

This page intentionally left blank

1 Introduction It is not difficult to ascertain the centrality of the notion of priority within philosophical discourse. Understood widely, this notion is cognate with crucial concepts such as those of dependence, basicness, fundamentality, substancehood, primacy, non-derivativeness, groundedness, foundation, etc.1 In metaphysics, for instance, some theorists argue for the primacy of (e.g.) particular objects,2 while others hold that states of affairs are basic units of reality. In discussions of causation the intuitive basis is that the cause has some sort of priority over the effect. In ethics agent-centred views of morality ascribe a fundamental role to the agent’s states of character for determining the nature of moral goodness. Action-centred accounts, by contrast, favour particular (types of ) actions over agents. In all these cases, and in several others, it is a philosophically arduous task to set out the ways or senses in which the privileged items are thought to be prior to their dependants. Contemporary metaphysicians acknowledge that in recent years there has been a noticeable turn to Aristotelian discussions of priority in one form or another. This revival of interests in Aristotle-inspired themes focuses on questions of what priority consists in and how it relates existents, rendering some basic and others derivative. The metaphysical position underlying these interests is vividly characterized as ‘ordered’ in contradistinction with Quine’s ‘flat’ ontology.3 Quinean metaphysical views are indifferent to questions of priority relations obtaining between existents but deal mainly with the question of what there is, attempting to provide a metaphysical inventory, as it were, an unstructured (and hence ‘flat’) list of existing things. In Aristotelian views, by contrast, questions of existence are not considered central. Rather, the crucial questions are what types of existent are fundamental and what their grounding relation to derivative existents consists in.4 It becomes extremely important, therefore, to return 1 See Koslicki, K., ‘Varieties of Ontological Dependence’ forthcoming in F. Correia & B. Schneider (eds.), Because, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 2 Here and in what follows ‘x is primary’ will be taken as equivalent to (or as an abbreviation of ) ‘x is prior to y’. A comparable case is that of locutions in which a predicate x is said to be ‘true of y’ and those in which x is simply said to be ‘true’. 3 See Schaffer, J., ‘On What Grounds What’ [‘Grounds’] in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 354–6. 4 Schaffer goes further than my present claim allows and argues that ‘metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist. Of course they do! The question is whether

2

I N T RO D U C T I O N

to Aristotle’s own claims, arguments, and examples regarding priority and to study them not only with exegetical caution but also with an acutely critical philosophical eye. This sort of study will hopefully bear fruit not only in the form of a historically sensitive and interpretatively sound grasp of Aristotelian doctrine but also by deepening our understanding of the concepts and the related questions. Aristotle deploys the notion of priority in numerous parts and levels of his thought. In his ontology he operates with the notion of primary substance. His Categories, for instance, confer this honorific title upon particular objects such as Socrates or Bucephalus. Particular substances of this sort are taken as prior not only to non-substance attributes, such as being pale, but also to accidental compounds, such as the pale man. In the Metaphysics, however, it is essences or substantial forms, such as being human, which are privileged with priority over certain types of matter or hylomorphic compounds (either particular compound objects such as Socrates or universal compound types such as the species human). Mathematical entities, on the other hand, such as numbers or geometrical figures, are conceived as posterior to, or dependent upon, physical bodies. Even outside the abstract confines of metaphysics, however, the notion of priority serves significant functions in Aristotle’s system. In his ethics we encounter claims about the primacy of excellence (Iæ), the appropriate state of the agent’s character, in specifying morally good actions (Nicomachean Ethics [NE], II.4, 1105a26–33). At the same time, though, engaging in morally good activity seems to possess an important form of priority over states of character at least in so far as it is crucial to moral habituation, ethical education, and the acquisition of the correct type of character (NE II.1, 1103a26-b2; b6-23). To offer a different sort of example, in evaluating intellectual excellences Aristotle maintains that theoretical wisdom (çÆ) is, in some way, more fundamental than practical wisdom (çæ ÅØ ; NE VI.13, 1145a6–11). Indeed, contemplation (ŁøæÆ), the activity of theoretical wisdom, seems to enjoy some form of priority over all other types of activity that constitute the flourishing life (PÆØ Æ). In another striking case taken from the Politics, the state is conceived as prior ‘by nature’ to each individual citizen as the former ‘can be without’ the latter, while the converse is not the case (I.2, 1253a18–26). The chief aim of the present study is to understand priority claims of this sort in Aristotle’s metaphysical system. Thus, I shall seek to set out the different concepts of priority and to see whether, and if so how, Aristotle’s preferred prior and posterior

or not they are fundamental’ (see his ‘Grounds’, p. 347; his emphasis). Similarly, he thinks that ‘Aristotle seems to take a permissive disinterest in such [i.e. existence] questions’. It should be emphasized that, despite Schaffer’s own position and contrary to his view of Aristotle’s picture, Aristotle does not see his project as ‘promiscuous’ with regard to existence questions or claims. In the Posterior Analytics, for example, he places great importance on coming to have knowledge of existence or establishing the existence of certain (types of ) phenomena or objects. Analogously, in the Metaphysics the question of what there is to be grounded by fundamental existents is by no means trivial (cf., e.g., Z.17, 1041a10–28; 1041a32–b7; also see chapter 7 of the present study).

I N T RO D U C T I O N

3

items fit with these concepts. In the first instance, my project will be to offer a promising interpretation which not only accommodates Aristotle’s examples without artificial assumptions or paradoxical consequences but also renders his view philosophically attractive. Furthermore, this project aspires to present Aristotle’s arguments (or my interpretation of his arguments) as constituting a viable unified account of the different concepts of priority employed by modern metaphysicians, an account which could overcome some of the thorny difficulties encountered by alternative proposals.

1.1 Preliminaries In my view, Aristotelian priority, in its most general outline, consists in an asymmetric independence relation between prior and posterior items. Put simply, a prior item is (or can be) without the posterior item, while the latter is not (or cannot be) without the former.5 Beyond this basic intensional characterization, the concept of priority can be filled in with further qualifications and give rise to distinct types of relation. Hence, for instance, an item could be taken as prior to another in explanation in that the second is explained in terms of the first, while the converse does not hold good. Or something could be deemed prior to another thing in existence just in case the first exists without the second but not the other way about. In dealing with the extensional question of what satisfies the notion of priority relative to what, I shall be referring to entities which are central in Aristotle’s ontology: particular substances or compounds consisting of matter plus form; matter and material parts; forms and their parts. It should be emphasized at the outset that my treatment of these beings will presuppose the following distinction: (a) Objects and types of object. Aristotle’s particular substances, his individual hylomorphic compounds, can be understood as paradigmatic cases of tokenobject: e.g. Socrates or Bucephalus. These are made of their corresponding token-matters or token-material constituents. Aristotle, however, also speaks of universal compounds, such as the species human or horse, entities which consist of form plus matter ‘taken universally’ but are not themselves substances. The matter which constitutes these entities is what I shall label ‘type-matter’. I shall categorize these as types of object, entities which are parasitic upon their token-members. (b) Features, attributes, ways or modes of being. It is not a presupposition of my view that, strictly speaking, all these sorts of entity fall under the same ontological heading. Thus, for instance, the difference between pallor and being pale might not be simply grammatical. For the purposes of the present study, 5 Aristotle’s own formulations fluctuate in respect of modal content. In some cases he sets out priority using modal terms (x is prior to y iff x can be without y but not conversely), while elsewhere he avoids modal formulations (x is prior to y iff x is without y but not vice versa). I shall treat this issue only briefly. See sections 1.3, 2.1, and 14.4.

4

I N T RO D U C T I O N

however, I shall not distinguish between such entities. The idea is that entities such as being pale or walking are non-substance or accidental features, attributes, or ways of being. There are, however, essential ways of being too, what Aristotle terms ‘what-it-is-for-something-to-be-F ’ (e  q r ÆØ Ø). Indeed, the phrase ‘way’ or ‘mode of being’ is designed to correspond to this Aristotelian terminology. I shall conceive Aristotle’s essences and forms as modes or ways of being in this way, entities which are essential to the (types of ) objects possessing them. Entities of types (a) and (b) are parts of the furniture of physical reality. They should not be confused with the following sorts of item: (c) Linguistic or conceptual formulae, abstractions in thought, fictions, or constructs. Examples of these sorts of item are proper names such as ‘Socrates’ with which we refer to type (a) particular objects; accounts such as ‘being a colour of a specific kind’ which describe type (b) accidental features; mathematical entities such as numbers or figures which are produced by thought-abstraction from, and are parasitic upon, physical entities.6 In Aristotle’s view, type (a) entities have an essence or form [type (b) entity] which accounts for their being. Thus, for instance, Socrates’ essence is to be a human, while Bucephalus’ essence is to be a horse. Similarly, the essence of the type human is whatit-is-to-be human. The relation between objects or types of object and their essence is captured by definitions such as the following: [1] [2]

Socrates ¼def being human.7 Human [KIND]¼def being human.

There are two reasons why definitions of this sort should not be read as identity statements. First, entities such as Socrates or human are (respectively) token- and type-objects [category (a)], whereas being a human is a mode of being [category (b)]. It would be hard to see how such categorially diverse entities could be identified. Second, the essence, being human, is intuitively conceived as being somehow prior to the token- or type-object it is the essence of. One way in which to flesh out this idea is to think that what-it-is-to-be-human, the referent of ‘being human’, makes Socrates or the species human what they essentially are. But the converse is not true. The relation of priority just described, however, is asymmetric and, hence, incompatible with identity. For identity is symmetric and no relation can be both symmetric and asymmetric in the very same way or sense.

6 There are further, subsidiary categories of entity which could be added to this list. For example, (d) nonsubstance or accidental compounds, which consist of a token- or type-object [category (a)] plus a nonsubstance feature or mode of being [category (b)]. Instances of (d) would be the token pale Socrates or the type walking man. 7 The issue of whether or not particular objects or individual hylomorphic compounds are definable is controversial. My view is set out in sections 2.6, 5.3, and 7.7.

I N T RO D U C T I O N

5

There is a trivial way, to be sure, in which to translate [1] or [2] into identity statements by inserting what can be called an ‘objectifying operator’ into the definiens-side. [10 ] [20 ]

Socrates ¼def the [token-object whose essence is] to be human. Human [KIND] ¼def the [type-object whose essence is] to be human.

The objectifying operator ‘the’ enables us to read the definiens-phrase in a way which makes its referent obviously identical with token- or type-objects. For it seems correct to think that Socrates is identified with a token-object that has the essence of being human. Similarly, the kind human is identical with the type whose essence is to be human. Equally, though, there is a clear sense in which this ‘objectifying’ device does not deprive essence from its priority over token- or type-objects. For it is still plausible to hold firm to the claim that a part of the definiens-phrase, the term ‘being human’, refers to an entity which enjoys a sort of asymmetry over the definiendum. After all, it remains the case that being human makes token-humans or the type-human what they are. In what follows, however, I shall also examine the relation between forms [type (b) entities] and their own essential modes of being. Hence, I shall speak of essences or forms as ‘having their own essences’. Equivalently, I shall refer to essences, essential features, or essential modes of being as ‘being of forms’. By no means should this manner of speaking be taken as entailing that forms have essences in the way in which objects or types of object [category (a)] do. Rather, essences or forms are themselves essences and so are automatically identified with their essential ways of being. Suppose the following sample definition: [3] Being human [FORM] ¼def being a rational soul embodied in a certain type of organic/functional body. Here the initial intuitive plausibility of the identity reading is underpinned by the fact that not only the definiens- but also the definiendum-phrase describes a feature, attribute, or way of being [type (b) entity]. Moreover, the mode of being picked up by the definiens-phrase should not be conceived as prior to the definiendum in the manner outlined earlier for cases [1] and [2]. For being a rational soul embodied in a certain type of organic body does not make being human what it is. Rather, the former is identical with the latter. The definiendumand definiens-phrases pick up one and the same (numerically) mode of being. It may well be that the definiens-phrase sheds some explanatory light on the definiendum. But this should not be understood as anything more than a merely epistemic form of priority. The idea would be that our grasp of the human form becomes better if based on the notion of being a rational soul embodied in a certain type of organic body. Yet the two notions refer to just one single entity, the mode of being which is essential to particular humans or the kind human.

6

I N T RO D U C T I O N

An implication of this view, and a thesis which I shall argue for extensively in the course of the present study, is that despite its internal complexity, mirrored in the definiens-phrase of [3], an essence or form should not be taken as involving intrinsic parts which are mutually distinct or independent entities in any strong sense. Rather, because [3] describes just one single entity, the parts of the definiens should be understood as abstract parts or aspects of the mode of being that the essence or form is. Hence, being a rational soul and being embodied in a certain type of organic body, each taken separately, are mutually incomplete and essentially interdependent features. Taken jointly, however, they are identical with the unified feature or way of being that the form or essence being human consists in.8 With this conceptual apparatus firmly in place I now turn to an overview of my argument in Part I.

1.2 Priority in Definition: Form, Matter, and Compound Aristotle holds that an item is prior to another in account or in definition (º ªfiø) just in case (the definition of ) the first is included in the definition of the second but not conversely.9 This is captured by my initial characterization of definitional priority (in chapter 2) as follows: [PID] A is prior in definition to B just in case A is (correctly) defined without mentioning B, but B is not (correctly) defined without mentioning A. The structure of Part I of the present study could be sketched by reference to the apparent conflict between the following two claims: [A] Natural forms, the essences of natural, perceptible, and changeable compounds, are definitionally prior to (or asymmetrically independent of ) matter in the manner of [PID]. [B] Natural forms are essentially enmattered and so must be defined in terms of matter in a way which prevents them from satisfying [PID]. Clearly, these two claims are incompatible if the term ‘matter’ has the same sense in both. The general strategy of my position will be to argue that Aristotle does not subscribe to this synonymy assumption. Thus, in [A] natural forms are asymmetrically independent of certain types of matter, whereas in [B] they are essentially dependent on different sorts of material entity. The central aim of my argument in Part I will be to set out the differences between the two kinds of matter and to reconcile [A] and [B].

8

The details of this issue will be discussed in sections 5.4 and 14.2. Cf. (e.g.) Metaphysics [¼Met.] Z.1, 1028a35–6 or M.2, 1077b3–4. The problem of whether an item is defined in terms of another item’s name alone or in terms of another item’s whole definition is not pertinent to present concerns. Met. Z.1, 1028a35–6, seems to support the second option. 9

I N T RO D U C T I O N

7

The first step towards achieving this goal is to consolidate [B]. Indeed, [B] would be one of the most controversial claims favoured by my view, a claim which most commentators would readily discard or seriously qualify. Before attempting to rehabilitate [B], I shall explore (in chapter 2) Aristotle’s view that natural form is definitionally prior to matter and (particular or universal) compounds. The main idea will be that not only compounds but also matter should be legitimate types of definiendum if indeed they are definitionally posterior to form in the manner of [PID]. Moreover, it is at least conceptually possible that items such as compounds and matter could even be mentioned in the definiens-formula provided that the fundamental defining work is carried out not by them but by what is definitionally primary, the form. Chapter 3 will take up this last possibility. I shall argue for the weak thesis that material features or modes of being [type (b) entities] could be parts of a natural form’s essence. What could not be part of a form’s essence, by contrast, are the token-materials constituting particular hylomorphic compounds or the type-matters included in universal compounds. While the form of a Socrates-shaped statue seems essentially independent of particular bits of bronze or even of specific types of matter, such as bronze, wood, or marble, it could intrinsically involve material features such as being made of a bulky mass which is (e.g.) malleable, solidifiable, and wrought-able. This weak thesis opens up conceptual space for establishing [B], the claim of the form’s essential enmatterment. In chapter 4 I shall prepare the ground for supporting [B] more directly by comparing Aristotelian natural form with abstract, mathematical entities and Platonist Forms. This comparison will consolidate the negative thesis that natural forms are neither like mathematical abstractions in thought nor like Platonist Forms. Aristotle argues that in mathematics the practice of thought-abstraction or thought-separation is employed correctly and gives rise to mathematical entities. These abstract entities are ontologically parasitic as they cannot exist within the physical world without physical objects or their perceptible matter. They are, nevertheless, definitionally and essentially independent of physical objects and perceptible matter: for they are abstractions, fictions, or constructs which do not include such concrete types of entity in their essence. Aristotle holds that Platonists incorrectly adopt the same abstractionist or separationist approach in the case of natural forms, such as being human or being horse. In effect, the Platonist position identifies natural form with abstract mathematical entities. This, however, is a misguided approach. Not only is natural form radically different from the mathematical entities studied by superior theoretical branches of mathematics (e.g. number theory or geometry). It is also contrasted even with the entities examined by applied mathematical disciplines such as astronomy or mechanics. For these last types of entity, too, are mathematical abstractions borrowed from theoretical mathematics by applied sciences and fitted extrinsically onto natural beings. Natural beings just do not essentially involve these sorts of mathematical form. It is important, at this juncture, to elucidate the kind of dependence on matter which seems to characterize natural form. Aristotle’s view is not simply that natural form

8

I N T RO D U C T I O N

necessarily depends for its existence on the existence of physical objects or their matter. This dependency is shared by mathematical entities too. For, as pointed out in the previous paragraph, mathematical entities, too, cannot exist as parts of physical reality without existing in some physical object or other. The additional tie of dependency that binds natural form is that its definition must mention specific types of perceptible, robust material feature. For it essentially involves these sorts of material mode of being. The reason for this definitional and essential dependence upon matter is that natural form, in so far as it is the essence of hylomorphic compounds, must account for their material nature. Indeed, it must be able to ground even their capacities for the particular sorts of change characteristic of their kind. For this reason, Aristotle adds that natural form is essentially not only matter- but also change-involving. In chapter 5 I shall argue directly for [B], the positive thesis that a natural form is indeed essentially enmattered. The starting-point will be Aristotle’s celebrated critique of Socrates the Younger developed in Metaphysics Z.11. It will become clear that, apart from compounds, natural form too is essentially hylomorphic. Its intrinsic parts include not only material but also change-related features or ways of being. Let us formulate this result with the help of an example, building on the schematic definition of the human form provided earlier: [30 ] Being human [FORM] ¼def being a rational soul embodied in a certain type of organic/functional body capable of (e.g.) growth, alteration, and locomotion. Another important place where Aristotle argues for this thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment is Physics B.2. In that chapter, however, we also encounter a version of [A], the claim that natural form is, in some way, prior to matter. Hence, for example, form is conceived as the final cause for the sake of which matter is as it is. Matter, by contrast, is dependent on form as it is what it essentially is for the sake of the form. It becomes urgent, therefore, to see whether, and if so how, this asymmetry, inherent in [A], is reconcilable with the dependence thesis, [B]. There is a misleading way in which one might seek to mitigate the clash between [A] and [B], what I shall label the ‘Reconciliatory Approach’ or [RA] for brevity. In this approach, while natural form has both formal and material intrinsic parts, yet its formal components are definitionally and essentially prior to its material components. The claim of priority, then, is seen as applying internally to a form’s essence, in an ‘intradefiniens’ fashion. In [30 ], for instance, the formal feature of being a rational soul is somehow prior to (or asymmetrically independent of ) the material mode of being intrinsic to the human form, being embodied in a certain type of functional body. This is so despite the fact that the human form essentially includes this material mode of being. The basic difficulty with [RA] is that it is flagrantly inconsistent with [B], the claim of a natural form’s essential enmatterment. If form is indeed essentially enmattered, its formal intrinsic constituents too should be essentially matter-involving. If, by contrast,

I N T RO D U C T I O N

9

form is asymmetrically independent of matter, there is no reason for postponement. We should not push its priority within its own essence or render it intra-definiens. Rather, we should announce its priority at the outset, thereby disregarding (as not essential to form) features such as being embodied in a certain type of organic body. This last move, though, is equivalent to overthrowing [B], a thesis which possesses independent credentials in Aristotle’s metaphysical picture. Far from adopting [RA], my strategy will be to undermine this idea of intra-definiens priority by arguing that the relation between a form’s material and formal intrinsic components is essential and inextricable interdependence. Taking advantage of a neglected passage from Sophistici Elenchi 31, I shall develop Aristotle’s favourite comparison between natural form and the form of being snub, which is defined as being nasally concave. In this definiens the two features, being concave and being nasal, should not be conceived as two independent conjuncts which unite and generate the form of being snub. Aristotle’s argument suggests, by contrast, that the formal feature of being concave, in so far as it is part of the essence of being snub, is not identified with the abstract geometrical entity concavity. Rather, it is essentially and indissolubly intertwined with the material feature being nasal. Conversely, too, it seems that the material feature being nasal which is intrinsic to being snub is essentially and inextricably concavity-involving. This view gives rise to a consistent, comprehensive thesis of essential enmatterment. This thesis applies ‘all the way down’, even to a form’s own intrinsic formal and material parts. This fortified version of [B] radically undercuts any plausibility that the idea of an intra-definiens priority might preserve. If so, it effectively demolishes the foundations of [RA]. More constructively, however, the view of essential inextricability between formal and material parts encapsulates a powerful way in which to secure the essential unity of a form’s own nature. In chapter 6 I shall explore further the basis for [B]. I shall seek to explain why both material and change-related features are parts of a natural form’s essence without conferring priority upon either. Not only matter but also change should be somehow mentioned in a form’s definition to enable form to serve its grounding functions. For on the basis of its material and change-related features it can account successfully for the material character of hylomorphic compounds and their capacities to undergo the sorts of change required of their kind. Further, material and change-related features should not be conceived as reducible to or as eliminable by means of each other. In particular, the material parts of a natural form’s essence are not fully identifiable in terms of potentialities for change, successful performance of functions, or other formal or goaloriented specifications. Rather, a natural form includes robust, constituent, perceptible types of material feature. Its material, as well as formal, intrinsic parts are irreducibly hylomorphic. This seems the most plausible way in which form can achieve its grounding role over enmattered compounds that are capable of change. At the same time, this view guards against the pitfall of transforming natural form itself into a concrete, material, and changeable (type of ) object. For the presence of material and

10

I N T RO D U C T I O N

change-related features within a form’s essence serves only the grounding role of explaining the nature of hylomorphic changeable compounds. It does not render form itself a changeable material object. One might, at this stage, voice the worry that the line of argument advanced thus far seems overly to strengthen [B] at the expense of [A]. How will natural form prove definitionally and essentially prior to matter (and change) if it is so closely tied with material (and change-related) ways of being? The simplest way in which to formulate the proposed reconciliation between [A] and [B] is to point out that the term ‘matter’ employed in these two claims is ambiguous. Natural form is definitionally and essentially dependent upon matter in the sense of material features or modes of being integral to its essence, such as being embodied in a determinate type of functional body. It is also prior to matter, however, in the sense of token-materials, such as this concrete human hand of mine, or type-matters, such as strong, smooth, or wrinkled types of hand. Chapter 7 will flesh out this proto-solution to the problem of the apparent conflict between [A] and [B]. There I shall deploy what can be labelled Aristotle’s ‘causalexplanatory’ model of essence. Taking the view of the Posterior Analytics as a useful starting-point, I shall describe Aristotle’s conception of definitions of process-kinds such as thunder or eclipse. These definitions, he argues, can be reached on the basis of scientific proofs such as the following: Noise belongs to quenching of fire. Quenching of fire belongs to the clouds. Therefore, noise belongs to the clouds. By re-arranging the terms of this demonstration we can construct the definition of the type thunder which is identified with a certain sort of cloud-noise: [4] Thunder[KIND] ¼def noise in the clouds caused by fire’s being cloudily quenched. Here only a certain segment of the definiens-phrase refers to the fundamental feature which makes the kind thunder what it essentially is. This feature is the quenching of fire in the clouds, the efficient cause of thunder, what is picked out by the middle term of the proof just laid out. It is worth noting that this picture introduces a modified idea of intra-definiens priority in which the causal feature, quenching of fire, fixes the identity of, and so is prior to, the cloud-noise. Because this sort of cloud-noise is identical with the type of phenomenon that thunder is, the privileged causal part of the definiens is also definitionally prior to the kind thunder. Causal defining parts of this sort are prior in so far as they are identity-fixers for the relevant kind: for they make the kind what it essentially is. The way in which they discharge this identity-fixing role, however, does not consist simply in an abstract concept of formal causation. Rather, these identity-fixers also function (essentially and non-decomposably) in specific modes of efficient, final, or material-grounding causa-

I N T RO D U C T I O N

11

tion. Thus, in the present example, the quenching of fire in the clouds is not simply the formal cause but also, and more crucially, the efficient cause of the type of cloud-noise that thunder is identical with. In the Analytics Aristotle makes a promissory note that this causal-explanatory model of essence and definition is applicable to substance-kinds too (see, e.g., the examples of human and soul offered at Posterior Analytics [APo.] B.8, 93a23–4). This promise begins to be fulfilled in Metaphysics Z.17. The extension of the model is further carried out in Metaphysics H.2–4. Suppose the following definition of the kind human in terms of the essentially hylomorphic form, being human, as schematized earlier in [3]: [5] Human [KIND] ¼def the type of body with humanly* structure whose essence is to be a rational soul embodied in a certain sort of organic/functional body.10 The idea is that the hylomorphic form, the essential mode of being that is picked up by the definiens-phrase in bold type, is the identity-fixer of, and so is prior to, the type of matter with humanly* structure. Because this latter is identical with the kind human (what Aristotle calls ‘universal compound’), it follows that the privileged part of the definiens is also prior to the kind human. Natural, essentially hylomorphic form, then, proves definitionally prior not to its own intrinsic material parts but to (universal and particular) compounds and their (type- and token-) matters. The former makes the latter what they essentially are by being itself a type of real-world, e.g. efficient or final cause. In [5], for instance, the human form, in its hylomorphic entirety, operates as an identity-fixer of the posterior items by being essentially their final cause. The type of body with humanly* structure that is identical with the kind human, as well as its constituent type-matter, are as they are for the sake of realizing the telos that the human form is. If this line of argument is sound and plausible, there is no substantive tension between our initial claims, [A] and [B].

1.3 Ontological Priority in ‘Being What Something Essentially Is’ In several of the formulations just sketched I referred not only to definitional priority but also employed the terminology of ‘essential priority’. Part II of the present study aims at elucidating this ontological variety of priority. The starting-point for chapter 8 will be Metaphysics .11. In that context, Aristotle introduces his notion of priority in nature and substance (which for brevity’s sake I shall call ‘ontological priority’) and sets it out in terms of the following asymmetric independence claim:

10 I am using the term ‘humanly*’ to avoid the premature objection that the phrase ‘humanly structure’ renders [5] circular. In a fully worked-out, scientific definition of the type human, the structure characteristic of the kind’s matter is, presumably, specifiable without resorting to repetitions of the definiendum-term.

12

I N T RO D U C T I O N

[IC] A is ontologically prior to B just in case A can be (r ÆØ) without B but B cannot be without A (1019a1–4). Virtually all important commentators of Aristotle’s Metaphysics construe [IC] or other equivalent claims made elsewhere in the corpus in what Kit Fine calls ‘the modal-existential’ way of understanding the notion of (asymmetric) ontological independence:11 [PIE] A is ontologically prior to B if and only if A can exist without B existing but not the other way about. Or equivalently: B cannot exist unless A exists but not conversely [Priority in Existence].12 In what follows I shall question and, in large measure, undermine this line of interpretation.13 It is not my primary concern in the present study to examine in detail whether or not the modal notions of necessity or possibility are a fundamental or indispensable part of Aristotle’s account of priority. I shall, at any rate, submit that any modal aspects present in Aristotle’s view are derived from and are grounded on basic essentialist or definitional considerations. Thus, in [IC] A can be without B but not conversely in virtue of the fact that A essentially is without B but not the other way around.14 My chief aim, however, will be to criticize the alleged existential aspect of Aristotle’s view. Some of the problems arising from favouring [PIE] as an interpretation of his notion of ontological priority run as follows:

Fine, K., ‘Ontological Dependence’ [‘Dependence’], Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, 1995, p. 271. Kit Fine notes that Aristotle’s account of ontological priority too is couched in similar terms (p. 270). This remark, however, is not intended as an interpretational proposal. 12 Cf. (e.g.) Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 1, p. 318, or Kirwan, C., Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Books G, D and E, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 155–6. Similarly, Stephen Makin (Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Y, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 192) holds that ‘in Met. D.11 Aristotle explains priority in nature and substance in terms of existential independence’. Charlotte Witt (Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 81; see also, pp. 13, 77–8, and 138, n. 2) construes Metaphysics .11 in the existential manner too: ‘if A is prior in being to B, then A can exist without B, but B cannot exist without A’ (p. 79). A similar approach is followed by Christos Panayides (‘Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality in Substance’ [‘Priority’], Ancient Philosophy, 19, 1999, p. 329), who argues that Metaphysics .11 – together with Categories [¼Cat.] 12, 14a30–5, and Met. M.2, 1077b1–9 – clearly explicate priority in substance in terms of asymmetric existential independence. Lynne Spellman’s view (Substance and Separation in Aristotle, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 83–99) constitutes an exception to this interpretative rule: she takes Aristotelian forms to be satisfying the criterion of separation in being, which she understands as the ontological correlate of separation in account. My interpretation of Aristotelian ontological priority as asymmetric independence in ‘being what something is’ resembles, in some respects, her idea (see esp. pp. 86–8). She does not, however, set out this idea in the same direction or as fully as I do. I shall not discuss her views in detail as the present study does not examine the notion of separation but that of priority. 13 It is not necessary to think that in Aristotle’s view [PIE] is incoherent or should be junked out of hand. Rather, this notion seems problematic and unsuccessful as a condition for primary substancehood to be met by substantial forms or particular hylomorphic substances. 14 Most commentators understand Aristotle’s view in the modal manner. I shall make a few brief remarks about this issue in sections 2.1 and 14.4. 11

I N T RO D U C T I O N

13

(a) Aristotle himself understands Platonist ontological priority in the manner of [PIE], as asymmetric existential independence of Forms from all their perceptible instances. Indeed, he frequently criticizes and condemns the Platonist position that Forms can exist without any perceptibles existing but not conversely. Assuming that his own preferred candidates for primary substancehood, his substantial forms, satisfy the criterion of ontological priority, it would be implausible to hold that they are ontologically prior in the manner of [PIE], in the very same Platonist fashion which Aristotle finds problematic. This is so unless Aristotelian forms are privileged with some extra feature which renders them invulnerable to Aristotle’s own criticism of [PIE] as it applies to Platonist Forms. But no such feature seems available in Aristotle’s metaphysical picture (see chapter 9). (b) Under the existential construal, the examples offered in several crucial places of the Metaphysics (e.g. in .11, Z.10, and .8) turn out to be misleading or incorrect. For in some cases the putative prior items cannot actually exist without the posterior ones existing. In other cases, while ontological priority requires an asymmetric ontological independence relation, prior and posterior items can (or cannot) exist independently of each other (non-symmetrically). I shall take up this point in chapters 10, 11, and 13. (c) Assuming that substantial forms must (as primary substances) fulfil the requirement of ontological priority, they must be ontologically independent of (e.g.) the particular compounds they enform (but not conversely). Given [PIE], however, forms straightforwardly fail to satisfy this criterion: for they cannot exist without any enformed compounds existing. (d) More importantly, essences or forms are not even the kinds of entity which could exist independently of particular compounds or certain types of matter. For, quite generally, essences are not themselves independently existing objects [type (a) token-entities] but are ways or modes of being essential to certain objects [type (b) entities]. Further, forms in Aristotle’s sublunary world are entities which are essentially or necessarily (either sort of modality will suffice for present purposes) enmattered or which essentially or necessarily enform particular compounds. If so, they cannot exist without the relevant types of matter or without the corresponding enformed compounds existing. Because of these and further related problems to be discussed below, I shall argue in favour of the following alternative understanding of Aristotle’s notion of ontological priority: [PIB] A is ontologically prior to B if and only if A can be what it essentially is independently of B being what it is, while the converse is not the case [Priority in Being what something essentially is].

14

I N T RO D U C T I O N

It should be noted that the modal aspect of [PIB], expressed in the locutions ‘can/ cannot be what something essentially is’, will not be deemed basic in Aristotle’s account. Rather, these modalities are grounded on the underlying essentialist or definitional notion of making something what it essentially is. This is effectively a notion of formal causation, one which is equivalent to the concept of identity-fixing. The suggestion is that, because A fixes the identity of B (or makes B what it essentially is; or is the prominent part of B’s essence) but not conversely, A can be what it essentially is without B, whereas B cannot be what it is without including A within its essence. This non-existential notion of ontological priority is inspired by, and is similar to, Kit Fine’s own understanding of ontological dependence and independence.15 It is the ontological correlate of definitional priority, understood in the manner of [PID]. The idea behind [PIB], then, is that, just as some items are defined without others but not conversely, so too some entities are what they are without others being what they are but not conversely. The advantages of [PIB] over [PIE], but also its general conceptual merits, could be summarized as follows: (a) While it closely parallels the nominal, conceptual or linguistic, notion of asymmetric independence in account or definition, the notion of [PIB] is a distinctly ontological sense of priority. For it captures the intuition that what some items are is part of what other items are, while the converse is not the case. This is particularly important in Aristotle’s overall metaphysical picture as it supports the claim of form to primary substancehood. Armed with the notion of [PIB], Aristotle can argue that essences or forms are not merely linguistic or conceptual items in terms of which other items are defined or simply our ways of explaining certain (types of ) objects, features, or phenomena. Rather, they are fundamental parts of the fabric of the world, real-world entities which make ontologically dependent items what they are. Equivalently, essences or forms are the most important or fundamental parts of what other, derivative entities are, while the converse does not hold good (see chapter 12). (b) In this understanding of [PIB] as the ontological counterpart to definitional priority, x’s essence or form is not any old type of entity referred to in x’s definiens-formula. As I just noted, the entities which satisfy [PIB] are not any or all items mentioned in a putative definition of x but only the ones which are crucial to x’s being what it is, the ones that make x what it is. Thus, for instance, in some views of definition, the defining formulae of certain types of compound include mention of their matter or their genus. In the present understanding of [PIB], this need not entail that genera or certain types of matter are ontologically 15 Kit Fine clarifies his account of ontological dependence as follows: ‘The notion of one object depending upon another is therefore the real counterpart to the nominal notion of one term being definable in terms of another’ (‘Dependence’, p. 275). He also acknowledges the Aristotelian origins of this idea, which he traces back to the Topics Z.4 and Met. Z.1, 1028a35–6 (pp. 275–6).

I N T RO D U C T I O N

15

prior to compounds. For, arguably, these items are not the most important part of what it is to be the relevant types of compound as they do not make them what they are. Rather, it would be the corresponding essences or forms which satisfy [PIB] as they play the relevant fundamental ontological role. (c) It should not be thought, however, that [PIB] enables only substantial forms to qualify as substances. Rather, even particular substances, Aristotle’s individual hylomorphic compounds, satisfy the priority requirement for substancehood if this requirement is understood as [PIB]. In chapter 11 I shall first show that [PIE] just cannot work as a condition to be met by particular substance over the relata Aristotle takes it as prior to, non-substance attributes and accidental compounds. I shall argue, furthermore, that particular substance can be prior to these entities in the manner of [PIB]. The idea will be that as the ultimate subject of metaphysical predication particular substance (some or other) makes non-substance attributes and accidental compounds the general types of predicable entity that they are. Clearly, this variant of [PIB] is based on the notion of subjecthood, in which nonsubstance attributes belong to or are qualifications of particular substance, while the converse is not the case. (d) In Metaphysics .11 and in the wider context of Metaphysics  but also outside this context (e.g. in Metaphysics Z.10 and .8) the arguments advanced to underpin ontological priority and the examples given to clarify this notion work successfully only against the background of [PIB]. (e) The motivation behind my account is that [PIB] proves successful exactly where [PIE] clearly fails. A form, for instance, cannot be ontologically prior to the items Aristotle thinks it is (matter and compounds) if this relation is understood existentially. It must, nonetheless, be ontologically prior in some way if it is to be a genuine substance. The notion of [PIB] provides the required solution to this puzzle. This non-existential notion of priority underwrites a useful ontological independence criterion for primary substancehood. For, while forms are not the types of item which could fulfil the existential version of this criterion, they are prior to certain types of matter and to the compounds they enform in being what they are. In this fashion they can serve as primary substances. In section 8.1 I shall argue, first, that [IC], the formulation put forward at Metaphysics .11, 1019a3–4, taken by itself, is neutral or open as it can be understood either as [PIE] or as [PIB]. This open formulation, it could be claimed, supports the following weak thesis about Aristotle’s notion of ontological priority: [WT] The discussion of Metaphysics .11 suggests that Aristotle’s view of ontological priority does not require the existential construal as the only possible interpretation. It may well be that Aristotle left conceptual space for [PIB] too; or that he took [PIE] as applying only to some items, while [PIB] as applying to others; or that he did not clearly distinguish between the two, although his arguments and examples presuppose both.

16

I N T RO D U C T I O N

My own thesis, however, is bolder than [WT]. It can be formulated in terms of the following two claims: [BT]1 The discussion of Metaphysics .11, plus some related considerations from the wider context of Metaphysics , imply that Aristotle’s notion of ontological priority works successfully if understood as asymmetric independence in being what something is. By contrast, this notion raises serious, indeed insurmountable, difficulties if construed in the existential fashion. [BT]2 Outside the context of Metaphysics , many of Aristotle’s arguments and examples seem to work well if ontological priority is equivalent to [PIB], while [PIE] renders Aristotle’s views false and his examples misleading or unsuccessful. I shall defend [BT]1 in chapter 10. Further, to support [BT]2, I shall discuss (in chapter 13) several parts of Metaphysics Z.10 and .8, where [PIB] proves significant in the difficult cases and ‘recalcitrant’ examples of prior and posterior items offered in these chapters.

1.4 Aristotelian Method and Methodological Neutrality In my discussion of the notions of definitional and ontological priority my policy will be to keep distinct, as far as possible, the intensional and extensional questions. Thus, I shall seek to offer an initial characterization of the content of these two notions (as Aristotle understands them) independently of the question of what entities (if any) fall under their extension. This, however, will be only an initial characterization. Aristotle’s aim is not simply to provide a completely neutral conceptual analysis of the two notions. Rather, his considered view of the content of the concepts is heavily influenced by intuitions about what items are (in certain ways) prior to what other items. Correspondingly, my interpretation of his claims, arguments, and examples will follow a similar route. While I shall formulate some initial, perhaps rough-and-ready, specifications of definitional and ontological priority, the more refined, and more successful, accounts will be shaped in the light of the question of what items Aristotle sees as definitionally or/and ontologically primary. In both cases, the main target of my inquiry will be to finesse the concepts in a way which will allow Aristotle’s favoured candidates to qualify as definitionally or/and ontologically prior. It would be helpful to sketch a brief map of my overall project by reference to this distinction between extensional and intensional concerns. Part I, in general, will take the question of what it is to be prior in definition as answerable fairly straightforwardly in terms of the notion of [PID] outlined earlier. The focus, however, will fall on the extensional question. Thus, given Aristotle’s strong arguments for [B], the form’s essential enmatterment, it will be examined whether, and if so how, Aristotle’s preferred contender, natural form, can be definitionally prior to the corresponding derivative items, matter and compounds. As already indicated, this is an inquiry into

I N T RO D U C T I O N

17

how form could satisfy the priority claim, [A]. My answer to this question will involve an element of ‘extensional revisionism’, the distinction between different types of matter that form is or is not prior to. Part II, on the other hand, will keep relatively fixed the answer to the extensional question of what entities are ontologically primary. It will investigate more constructively, though, the content of the notion of ontological priority itself and will seek to spell out its grounds. In the course of this investigation I shall argue against the deeply entrenched existential conception of ontological priority in terms of [PIE]. Further, I shall introduce and seek to consolidate the more attractive understanding of ontological priority on the basis of [PIB]. By no means should this be taken as implying that extensional questions will be ignored in Part II. Far from this, chapters 11 and 13 will return to these questions and will examine how particular substance, form, and actual being fulfil, each in its own distinctive fashion, the criterion of ontological priority taken as [PIB]. The plausibility and success of this Aristotle-inspired method depend on two points. First, the conceptual refinement should not consist simply in stipulating unnatural or artificial senses in which certain terms are used. Nor should we develop accounts which are ad hoc or which do not any more bear strong conceptual links with the initial characterizations of the content of the relevant concepts. Rather, the well-worked-out picture should not only avoid the weaknesses of our initial, intuitive grasp of the concepts but also preserve some of its crucial elements. Second, the items which are taken as falling within the extension of the concepts and which play an important role in our formulation of the content of these concepts should be bona fide candidates for being definitionally or/and ontologically prior or posterior. Only under this condition will they be reliable ‘regulators’ of our understanding of the concepts. It is not necessary that all bona fide candidates will in the end qualify. Nor is it necessary that the successful candidates will be successful exactly in the same sense or way in which they were conceived as being definitionally or/and ontologically prior or posterior at the outset. These two points suggest that Aristotle’s method (or my interpretation of it) involves a sort of ‘fine-tuning’ between the answers to the intensional and the extensional questions. The initial intuitive understanding of the concepts is modified on the basis of paradigmatic instances. At the same time, though, some of the instances are jettisoned, while others are re-understood as proper instances, in the light of more sophisticated accounts of the content of the concepts. In my interpretation of Aristotle’s view, for example, I shall discard what is called the ‘modal-existential’ construal of ontological priority as expressed in [PIE]. One of the chief reasons for this move is the assumption that substantial forms (as primary substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics) are good candidates for being ontologically prior to the types of matter and the hylomorphic compounds they enform. This methodological approach, however, is far from being incontrovertible. In his exceptionally lucid treatment of the notion of existential dependence, for instance,

18

I N T RO D U C T I O N

Fabrice Correia adopts a completely different strategy.16 Correia’s methodological proposal in treating existential dependence is of particular interest, since Aristotle’s own notion of ontological priority is an asymmetric type of ontological independence. Thus, Correia notes that his investigation is purely conceptual in that he is ‘not interested in how the world is – not even in how the world must be or might be, if “must” and “might” are understood as expressing metaphysical necessity and possibility, respectively’.17 His account of existential dependence, then, is intended to be neutral with respect to particular metaphysical views as it does not presuppose any concrete answer to the extensional question of what depends on what. Indeed, as he claims, his account does not, in principle, rule out any metaphysical position provided that it is not absurd or (as he says) it is viable or dialectically possible.18 At this juncture, he draws an important distinction between being dialectically possible or viable and being correct or true: The [neutrality] policy does not say that the fact that an account of a given notion is incompatible with a metaphysical view which is true counts as an objection to that account; it says that the fact that an account of a given notion is incompatible with a metaphysical view which is viable counts against that account.19

Correia’s neutrality policy, then, allows him to use counterexamples to undermine certain rival accounts of dependence without committing himself to the truth of the ontological views from which he borrows these counterexamples. Clearly, the type of Aristotelian methodology sketched earlier is significantly different from Correia’s policy as it essentially involves a form of interaction between the putative content of a concept and the items intuitively held to be promising candidates for falling under this concept. Does this imply, however, that it is not useful, valuable, or reliable as a method of conceptual investigation? Moreover, is it necessary that Aristotle-inspired projects should prove insensitive to Correia’s distinction between viability and correctness? Hence, it would be worth examining whether it is possible to defend an Aristotelian (or Aristotle-inspired) account from the types of counterexample that Correia employs without claiming simply that these counterexamples presuppose metaphysical views which are not true from Aristotle’s viewpoint or that they introduce entities which are not parts of the Aristotelian fabric of the world. If the requirement for neutrality is as strong as Correia demands, it seems difficult for a method of Aristotelian orientation to meet it. For Aristotle’s enterprise is not simply a metaphysically neutral, conceptual investigation of the notion of priority. Rather, Aristotle seeks to offer an account of priority which accommodates certain intuitions as to what types of entity are prior to others in given ways. In this respect, then, the 16 Cf. Correia, F., Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions [Dependence], Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 2005, pp. 9–11. 17 See Correia, Dependence, p. 9. 18 Cf. Correia, Dependence, pp. 9–10. 19 See Correia, Dependence, p. 11 (Correia’s emphasis). Also cf. p. 41.

I N T RO D U C T I O N

19

Aristotelian approach may be diametrically opposed to Correia’s policy. But it is important to ask whether it is plausible to set the neutrality standard as high as Correia does, even if it is methodologically feasible or legitimate to do so. It is fair, I think, to answer that Correia’s neutrality standard is set too high. Let us, for example, turn to Correia’s own remarks about the notion of substance offered in the light of his account of existential dependence. He explicitly seeks to define the category of substance by presupposing that certain entities are paradigmatic substances, while others are paradigmatic non-substances.20 Yet he claims that he continues to pursue his policy of neutrality with respect to particular metaphysical views. The difference between the case of substance and that of dependence, he notes, is that in examining the notion of substance ‘we have a constraint which was absent in the case of dependence: we start with a certain view about the extension of the predicate we are dealing with, about what counts as a substance and what is not a substance.’21 Is it true, however, that this constraint does not obtain in the case of our philosophical or even pre- or proto-theoretical conception of dependence or (for that matter) of priority? Thus, for instance, the notion of ontological priority might be taken as one of the central ways in which to understand the notion of substance. For, arguably, being a substance is crucially (even if not exclusively) to be ontologically prior to (or asymmetrically independent of ) certain entities. But if so, the intuitions we have about the extension of the notion of substance may give rise to similar intuitions about the extension of the notion of ontological priority. Hence, just as in the case of substance, similarly in the case of ontological priority we would have a certain idea about what counts as an ontologically prior or posterior entity. Even if one does not subscribe to the view that being a substance essentially involves being ontologically prior to certain entities, one could challenge Correia’s claim that his treatment of the notion of substance is neutral with respect to specific metaphysical views. For it is not clear whether or why it constitutes a metaphysically neutral policy to take (as he does) tables, planets, or organisms as paradigmatic substances, and events, states, or relations as paradigmatic non-substances. These considerations suggest that a metaphysically neutral policy should place no special extensional constraints in examining the notion of substance, constraints which allegedly have no counterparts in the case of ontological priority. If, however, it seems promising to weaken the neutrality requirement and to invoke extensional constraints, there is no cogent reason to do so only for the case of substance but not for that of ontological priority. As Correia himself admits in the case of substance, ‘the neutrality policy will have its limits’.22 My present proposal is simply that similar limits should exist in the case of priority. 20 21 22

Cf. Correia, Dependence, p. 123. See Correia, Dependence, p. 124. See Correia, Dependence, p. 124.

This page intentionally left blank

PART I

Definitional Priority: Form, Matter, and Compound

This page intentionally left blank

2 Definitional Priority and Definitionally Primary Items My first aim in the present chapter is to set out the notion of definitional priority as a relation of asymmetric independence in definition. At the same time, though, it will be useful to examine Aristotle’s view of what is definitionally prior to what. In the Metaphysics he insists that form is definitionally prior to matter and compounds. His way of formulating this view involves the claim that ‘definition is of the universal form’. I shall seek to disambiguate this claim on the basis of the distinction between universal form as the only proper definiendum and universal form as the ultimate definiens. My thesis will be that, while matter and compounds can play the role of legitimate definiendum, only form is the fundamental item in terms of which everything else is ultimately defined. This way of setting up Aristotle’s position dispels a difficulty which arises from some of his claims made in Metaphysics Z.10–11. If compounds and matter are definitionally posterior to form, they must be definable in terms of form. However, Aristotle also maintains that compounds and matter are, in a certain way, indefinable. To avoid the apparent inconsistency between these last two claims, I shall make use of my distinction between legitimate definiendum and ultimate definiens. Thus, compounds and matter are indefinable in that they are not fundamental defining items in terms of which other derivative items are grasped. Only form can perform this basic defining function. On the other hand, though, compounds and matter are unproblematically definable in that they can get specified ultimately in terms of form. In this way, they can, without difficulty, be definitionally posterior to form, while form can preserve its fundamental definitional primacy over them.

2.1 Priority in Definition or in Account Aristotle seems to understand priority in definition (›æØ fiH) or in account (º ªfiø) as an asymmetric relation of independence between two items in a definitional formula: [PID] A is prior in definition to B just in case A is (correctly) defined without mentioning B, but B is not (correctly) defined without mentioning A.

24

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Sometimes this claim seems to ground a different, modal thesis of asymmetric definitional independence: because A is prior in definition to B in the manner of [PID], A can be (correctly) defined without mentioning B, whereas B cannot be (correctly) defined without mentioning A. It seems clear, in Aristotle’s view, that modal theses of this last sort are underwritten by essentialist, definitional claims such as [PID]. I shall briefly discuss this issue in section 14.4. Here are some of the passages which discuss [PID] and are relevant to present concerns: For with respect to the account the former are defined in terms of the latter, and the latter are prior in that they are without the former. (Metaphysics [Met.] Z.10, 1034b30-2; Bostock’s trans.)1 The parts of the formula, into which the formula is divided, are prior – some of them or all of them; and the formula of the right angle is not divided into the formula of the acute, but that of the acute into that of the right; for one who defines the acute uses the right angle; for the acute is less than the right. And, similarly, in the case of the circle and the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined through the circle and the finger through the whole; for finger is such-and-such a part of man. (Met. Z.10, 1035b4–11; Bostock’s trans.) [Things are prior] in definition to those things whose definitions are compounded from definitions of them. (Met. M.2, 1077b3–4; Annas’s trans.) And in definition, too, this [i.e. substance] is primary (for it is necessary that in each thing’s definition there should occur the definition of a substance). (Met. Z.1, 1028a34–6; Bostock’s trans.)

Because definitional priority ranges over items in a definitional formula or (what could be called) analysandum and analysans concepts, it is plausible to think that either linguistic terms or concepts are definitionally prior to other, posterior or dependent, linguistic terms or concepts (1034b31: º ªÆØ K KŒø; 1077b4: ƒ º ªØ KŒ ø~ º ªø). However, one could apply definitional priority to things or entities, too, in the following sense: an entity, A, is definitionally prior to another entity, B, if and only if the term for, or the concept corresponding to, A is part of the definiens of the term for, or the concept corresponding to, B but not conversely. It is crucial, at this juncture, to distinguish between the following two questions: (1) What (in Aristotle’s view) does the concept of definitional priority consist in? (2) What (in Aristotle’s view) qualifies as definitionally prior to what? The last passage quoted above seems to be primarily concerned with (2). It presupposes, though, an understanding of definitional priority which is equivalent to [PID]: for substance is a successful candidate for definitional primacy just because the account of substance is mentioned or included in the definition of any non-substance item but

1 There are several points where I disagree with a translator and choose to modify (in smaller or larger measure) his or her translation. I shall follow this practice without indicating it separately for each translated passage.

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y A N D D E F I N I T I O N A L LY P R I M A RY I T E M S

25

(presumably) the converse does not hold good. Let us first focus on (1) to clarify the notion of definitional priority on the basis of [PID].

2.2 Separation in Definition and the Asymmetry of Definitional Priority An interesting aspect of Aristotle’s notion of definitional priority is that it involves as a necessary part the concept of separation in definition. An item, A, is separate in definition (or in account) from another item, B, if and only if A is (or can be) defined without reference to B. This relation is non-symmetric: B may also be defined (or be definable) without mentioning A. Thus, definitional separation is a non-symmetric notion of definitional independence. The terms åøæØ e or åøæØe would be Aristotle’s way of expressing this idea: A is defined (or is definable) ¼ı or åøæd

F B and so A is åøæØe from B in account or in definition. The preposition åøæd is cognate with the terms åøæØ e or åøæØe and signifies ‘without-ness’, just as the preposition ¼ı does. Quite generally, then, separation seems to be a non-symmetric independence relation. This type of separation or independence, however, is only one necessary part of definitional priority. To yield this last notion, definitional separation must be strengthened by adding a ‘not conversely’ clause. For A is prior to B in definition just in case A is separate in definition from B (or A is defined åøæd F B) but B is not separate from A in the same way. This suggests that definitional priority should be set out in the asymmetric manner of [PID]. That Aristotle himself understands definitional priority in this asymmetric way is clear from the second passage quoted above (Met. Z.10, 1035b4–11). Thus, for instance, the right angle is definitionally prior to the acute because the account of the right angle does not include as a part (or is not divided into) the account of the acute but the converse holds good (1035b6–7). It follows that the proper definition of the acute is in terms of the right angle but not conversely (7–8). The idea of one thing’s definition being a part of another thing’s definition is also central in the rest of the passages just quoted from Metaphysics Z.1 and M.2. Assuming that standard part-whole relations are asymmetric, if it is correct to grasp definitional priority as a definitional part-whole relation, it would follow that definitional priority, too, is an asymmetric relation.

2.3 Transitivity Transitivity is a further feature of the relation of definitional priority. Intuitively, if A were (asymmetrically) definable in terms of B and B in terms of C, it would seem correct to define A in terms of C. It is important, however, to be cautious at this juncture. Transitivity seems to apply incontrovertibly only if one understands definitional priority in a weak, non-explanatory mode, in which a term or a term’s definitory

26

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

account is simply included in another term’s definition. Thus, if the triangle is defined as a closed three-sided plane figure, and a side (or a line) as a set of points in a certain sort of arrangement, it follows that the triangle can be defined in terms of a set of points in a certain sort of arrangement. It is not obvious, however, that this last definition of the triangle has the same explanatory force as the initial one. Explanatory concerns of this sort should not be understood in a merely epistemic fashion. A correct and explanatorily successful definition of the triangle in terms of three-sided, closed plane figure is not simply an account that makes the concept of triangle better intelligible to us or to definers like us. Rather, the notion of a threesided, closed plane figure is what the concept of triangle consists (or partly consists) in. This might constitute reason for Aristotle not to take the relation of definitional priority as unqualifiedly transitive. For, in his view, the transitivity of this relation may depend on the identity of the relata. Hence, it seems incorrect to define the triangle in terms of the defining features of a side or a line, as a set of points thus-and-so arranged. By contrast, it might be correct to define it in terms of the defining features of three-sidedness or figure or both. For, while it seems misleading to define the triangle simply as a set of points of some type, it is intuitively plausible to define it as a certain sort of figure or three-sided figure. An important issue, which is related to the transitivity of definitional priority, is whether a definitionally posterior item is defined simply in terms of the name (or term) corresponding to the definitionally prior item or by reference to the prior item’s whole defining formula. The passage quoted first (Met. Z.10, 1034b30–2) does not offer a clear answer to this question. The second passage, which re-examines the problems raised by the first, seems to favour the ‘simple name/term’ view. Aristotle maintains that the acute is defined as ‘an angle which is less than a right one’. There is no need, in this example, to include the whole definitory account of the right angle into the definiens of the acute but simply the name or term ‘right angle’. By contrast, the passages from Metaphysics Z.1 and M.2 support the view that the accounts of the posterior items are (at least partly) constituted from the accounts of the prior ones. Hence, in the º ª of each non-substance item there occurs the º ª (and not just the name) of a substance (1028a35–6; cf. 1077b3–4: ‹ø ƒ º ªØ KŒ ø~ º ªø). This is not merely an exegetical problem. It is easy to see that the requirement of including the whole definition of a prior item in a posterior item’s definiens may lead to an infinite regress especially if definitional priority is a straightforwardly transitive relation. Suppose that A is definitionally prior to B and so A’s definition occurs in the definiens of B. Assuming that definitionally prior items such as A are themselves definable, and given transitivity, it follows that the definiens of B will include not only A’s definition but also the definition of the definitory constituents of A, and so on and so forth ad infinitum. It may well be that Aristotle’s considered view is that, although it is possible, it is not required to define a posterior item by reference to the whole definition of a prior item. Alternatively, Aristotle may be using the term º ª in a deflationary fashion in passages such as Metaphysics Z.1, 1028a35–6, or M.2, 1077b3–4.

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y A N D D E F I N I T I O N A L LY P R I M A RY I T E M S

27

Thus, the claim that the º ª of the prior item is included in the definiens of the posterior item need not imply anything too demanding. It is not the whole definitory account which is part of the definiens of a posterior item. Rather, what occurs in the definiens is simply the linguistic term or the concept corresponding to the entity which is definitionally prior. If this is correct, the danger of infinite regress seems to be defused.2

2.4 Irreflexivity and Fundamentally Primary Items Another feature which we would intuitively ascribe to the relation of definitional priority is that of irreflexivity. For, if a term or concept were definitionally prior to itself, it would be defined ( per absurdum) in terms of itself and not vice versa. Rather, in our standard understanding of definitory formulae, it is required that a term or concept be grasped in terms of a term or concept distinct from itself. It might be doubted, however, whether Aristotle would agree with this conception of definition. Suppose, for example, the distinction, within his theory of demonstrative sciences, between items which ‘have causes or explanations other than themselves for their being the types of item they are (i.e. for their essences)’ and those which do not (Posterior Analytics [APo.] B.9, 93b21–6). An item that belongs to this last class seems to have as cause or explanation of its being something which is not other than the definiendum or the explanandum itself or (even more strongly) something which is the same as the definiendum or the explanandum (APo. B.9, 93b21; 26; B.8,93a5–6). This might suggest that an account or explanation of what this item is, its definition, is formulated in terms of this item itself. If this definition is non-circular and correct, an item of this sort seems to be definitionally prior to itself, a result which conflicts with our conception of definitional priority as irreflexive. Aristotle himself argues that the definitions of such items are posited or, at any rate, are made clear in some other fashion (93b23–4). He then offers the unit as an example of such self-defining or self-explanatory items (93b24–5). The 2 There is no need, for present purposes, to discuss this issue in further detail. A further, important question is whether including the whole definition of a prior item into the definiens of a posterior one makes the latter more dependent upon the former than is strictly necessary. Suppose that the line is definitionally prior to the triangle, since the latter is defined as a closed three-sided plane figure (where having a side presupposes being constituted from a line). If one were to include the whole definition of line in the definition of a triangle, one might be led into a conception of the triangle as a type of line. This conception, however, seems intuitively mistaken: for the triangle just is not a type of line. On the other hand, it would not be misleading to include the whole definition of a figure, as being a triangle is just what it is to be a figure of a certain sort. Perhaps Aristotle did not think that there is a single answer to this question, one which covers all cases: for whether the posterior item’s account includes the name alone or the whole definition of the prior item may depend precisely on the identity of the relata. Alternatively, it may be important to finesse the notion of definitional priority in such a way that one could distinguish between more and less important items which are definitionally prior or constitute parts of the accounts of other, posterior, items. In the example of the triangle, the reason why it is misleading to include the whole definition of line may be that the line is not the most prominent item in terms of which the triangle is defined. Similarly, the reason why it is not misleading to include the whole definition of a figure may be that ‘figure’ is a crucial definitionally prior term (even if not the only or the most important one).

28

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

explanation of what the unit is, its definition, is posited by the number theorist as (e.g.) something which is indivisible in quantity. This looks like a correct and non-circular definition of the unit. In Aristotle’s view, however, it should also be understood as an account of essence which crucially involves nothing other than the definiendum itself. One way of tackling this problem would be to challenge the above understanding of what is ‘not other than’ or is ‘the same as’ the definiendum. Perhaps Aristotle’s claim is that primary items in a demonstrative science (such as unit in number theory) are definitionally perspicuous in that there is no other item, prior to them, which can account for their essence. This, however, would be a claim about the natural order of priority within a demonstrative science. Given how things are in reality, primary items explain the essences of derivative ones but not conversely. By contrast, there is no realworld entity which could explain the essence of these primaries. This claim would not rule out the possibility of there being explications or clarifications of primaries by reference to concepts epistemically more familiar or accessible to definers or knowers. These concepts would be definitionally prior not in the natural order of things but only ‘with respect to us’. If this is correct, the terms or concepts found in the definiens of a primary item are not even the kinds of item that could qualify for definitional priority. For the corresponding accounts are not even proper definitions as they do not properly define anything but only make something clearer to prospective definers or learners of a science. This might be a way in which to bring out the importance of Aristotle’s remark that we must posit or, at any rate, make clear in some other way what a primary item is, just as the number theorist posits that the unit is what is indivisible in quantity (93b23–5). There is no reason, then, to think that accounts of ‘things which have no cause of their essence other than themselves’ undermine the usual conception of definitional priority as irreflexive. This issue has an important application to the case of substance. In the passage quoted last (Met. Z.1, 1028a34–6), Aristotle holds that substance is primary in definition. The idea behind this claim is that everything else, every non-substance item, is defined in terms of (some) substance (or other), while substance itself is not defined in terms of any non-substance item. Hence, substance seems to be a fundamental definitional ground in a given domain in that there is nothing definitionally prior to it, while everything else in that domain is ultimately (even if indirectly or implicitly) definable in terms of it. The notion of a domain involved in this formulation could be understood in two ways. First, it can be the subject-matter of a particular scientific discipline. In this case, a specific type of substance would be definitionally primary in that everything else studied by that science would be ultimately understood on the basis of this type of substance. Thus, for instance, the science of human living beings grasps (directly or indirectly) all the items within its subject-matter in terms of the human soul, a paradigmatic case of primary substance. Second, a domain could be understood as the subject-matter of a highly general, philosophical branch, such as ontology or metaphysics. In this case, the ontological category of substance, together with the essential and necessary features ascribed to it by the relevant philosophical theory, would be the

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y A N D D E F I N I T I O N A L LY P R I M A RY I T E M S

29

concept in terms of which all other, non-substance categories would (more or less directly) be conceived. Does it follow from this primacy thesis, however, that there is nothing in terms of which substance itself could be grasped? And, if so, should it be inferred that there is no definition of substance? If we return an affirmative answer to this last question, we seem to be driven into odd consequences. How is substance to make anything else definitionally clear if it cannot itself be grasped through any definition? Does it make sense to conceive substance as definitionally primary when it itself is not even the proper object of definition as it cannot be specified by anything? One way in which to address this series of questions would be to think that substance can be a proper object of definition because it could be specified in terms of itself. This, however, is not a promising route. For it would yield the counterintuitive result that definitional priority is reflexive. No item, however, can be definitionally prior to itself. This view of definitional priority is not plausible because it accepts circular accounts as proper definitions. Moreover, it seems flagrantly incoherent: if an item is definitionally prior to itself, it is defined in terms of itself but not conversely. But if so, it is defined in terms of itself and it is not defined in terms of itself. To avoid these absurdities, one could use the distinction drawn earlier between what is definitionally prior in nature and what is definitionally prior with respect to us (definers, knowers, or learners). This is a distinction that Aristotle himself draws in Topics Z.4, 141b3ff. Thus, in the order of nature – as things stand in reality – there are no non-substance items which could explain the nature of a substance, A. Perhaps, it might be claimed, there is another substance or another type of substance which could define A. In that case, though, A would not be ultimately primary in definition in the given domain. Suppose, then, for the sake of the argument that A is the fundamentally primary item in the relevant domain. Even so, there may be a successful way in which to elucidate A with respect to knowing subjects such as ourselves in general, or with respect to future students of a specific scientific discipline. For instance, one could specify A as that which accounts for or causally explains the features of all other, nonsubstance items studied by this discipline. Aristotle’s example in the Topics is taken from geometry. In the order of nature, the point is definitionally primary, the ultimate specifying ground within the domain of geometry: for every other geometrical item is understood (even if indirectly or implicitly) on the basis of the point but the point itself is not understood in terms of any other geometrical item. However, if one sought to elucidate what a point is for teaching and learning purposes, one could state that a point is the limit of a line. Alternatively, if one required an explicit definition as a starting-point for demonstration, one could explicate the point as an indivisible quantity with some position. These would be accounts of what the point is in which the terms or concepts which do the specifying are not the same as the definiendum. These types of account, then, are not circular. Nor do they require that the relation of definitional priority should be reflexive. They do not, therefore, render Aristotle’s view of definitional priority incoherent. At the same time, though, this approach does not leave primaries ‘defini-

30

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

tionally orphan’. For these primaries are not only the fundamental items in terms of which everything else is defined but are also themselves specifiable in some terms or other. Hence, they are proper objects of some sort of definitional account and so are graspable in definitional fashion, just as the dependent or derivative items which are understood in terms of them are.

2.5 Form as Definitionally Primary Let us now turn to the extensional question, (2): what types of item, in Aristotle’s metaphysical picture, are definitionally prior to what types of derivative or dependent item? Some of the passages already quoted make clear what Aristotle’s answer to this question should look like. Metaphysics Z.1, 1028a34–6, argues that substance is definitionally primary as every non-substance item is defined in terms of (some) substance (or other), whereas substance is not defined in terms of any non-substance item. However, because the notion of substancehood in that passage is not perspicuous, the answer to (2) is not entirely clear. Virtually all commentators on Aristotle’s Metaphysics argue that form is the primary substance. It is plausible to think that one way in which form is primary is by being definitionally prior to certain dependent items. It is a central aim of Part I of the present study to examine whether and in what way this idea is correct. Before taking up this last issue, however, it is crucial to set out further Aristotle’s understanding of what the definitionally prior and posterior items are. Thus those parts that are material, and into which a thing is divided as into its matter, are posterior; but those that are parts of the formula and of the substance which accords with the formula, are prior – some or all of them. [ . . . ] It follows that the parts of this substance [the soul of animals, the substance which accords with their formula] are prior – some or all of them – to the whole animal, and similarly in the particular cases, while the body and its parts are posterior to this substance, and it is not this substance [the one according to the account: e.g. the soul of animals; 1035b14–16] but the whole that is divided into these bodily parts as into its matter. (Met. Z.10, 1035b11–22; Bostock’s trans.) But man and horse and things thus said of particulars, which however are universal, are not substances but compound wholes of a certain kind from this formula and this matter taken universally. (Met. Z.10, 1035b27–30; Bostock’s trans.) But Socrates is the particular from the ultimate matter, and similarly in the other cases too. (1035b30–1; Bostock’s trans.) One way in which to formulate the claim that some items are fundamentally primary in definition would run as follows:

[1] If there is an x in terms of which all items (in a given domain) are defined but x itself is not defined in terms of them, x is the definitionally primary item (in that domain). That x defines everything else (but not conversely) need not be viewed as entailing that x is directly or explicitly mentioned in the definitions of everything else. Definitional

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y A N D D E F I N I T I O N A L LY P R I M A RY I T E M S

31

dependence upon x might be indirect or implicit. Hence, the specification of each item in a given domain could break down into accounts that ultimately refer back to x through their definitory constituents. The passages just quoted suggest that form is fundamentally primary in definition: [2] Universal hylomorphic compounds (e.g. man or horse), particular hylomorphic compounds (e.g. Socrates or Callias), matter and material parts are defined in terms of all/some parts of the form but not conversely. From [1] and [2] Aristotle can conclude at Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b33–4, that: [3]

Definition is of the form in that form is fundamentally primary in definition.

That is to say, matter, material parts, particular and universal compounds are grasped ultimately in terms of form (or some/all parts of the form). By contrast, form itself (or some/all parts of the form) is not specified in terms of these dependent or posterior items. A first question invited by this argument is about [2]: Why is Aristotle adding the qualification that only some parts of the form might be definitionally prior to certain items, while the whole form or all of its parts might not be prior in this manner? My answer to this question will become clear only after I set out my view of the form’s definitional primacy in chapter 7. However, an interim reply could be sketched along the following lines. Let us assume as an example the following schematic definition of a type of universal hylomorphic compound: Human-kind

¼def rational soul enmattered in a certain sort of organic body.

One reason why it would be incorrect to claim that the whole definiens – or all of its parts collectively – is definitionally prior to the definiendum may be that the definiendum just is what it is to be the definiens.3 If the relation between the two is identity, a symmetric relation, there cannot be any priority of the whole definiens over the definiendum. For priority is asymmetric and no relation can be both symmetric and asymmetric in the same sense. Thus, it cannot be the whole definiens (or all of its parts taken together) which asymmetrically specifies the definiendum. This implies that some parts of the definiens may, while others may not, be prior. Hence, if taken in its entirety, the definiens may not be prior to, but may be identical with, the definiendum. Some privileged part(s) of the definiens, however, could still be prior to the definiendum.

3 I am not here claiming that there is, or must be, an identity relation between the definiendum and the whole definiens. My claim is only that one possible reason why the whole definiens might not be prior to the definiendum would be their identity, if one were prepared to claim that they are identical. Aristotle’s claim is cautious: he writes ‘the form or some or all of its parts’ without committing himself to any definite disjunct amongst the available options. With similar caution I use the symbol ‘¼def’ to denote the relation of being defined as. I do not, at this point, wish to make further claims as to whether or not such definitional statements imply that there is an identity relation between the definiendum and the definiens.

32

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

The question then arises: which parts are not prior and why? A simple reply would involve the idea that some terms of the definiens, perhaps the ones referring to material features of the definiendum, are themselves material components of the defining formula. If so, the entities corresponding to these terms are definitionally posterior to the formal features of the thing defined, those described by the formal terms of the definiens. Thus, even if ‘enmattered in a certain sort of organic body’ is included in the definiens of the kind human, the feature described by this phrase is not prior to the human-kind as it constitutes a material feature of the definiendum. This material feature, being enmattered in an organic body of a certain sort, is itself understood in terms of the formal feature of the human-kind referred to by the corresponding formal term of the definiens, ‘rational soul’. This line of thought is consistent with [2]. The reason why material features mentioned in the definiens are definitionally posterior to formal ones is that they are understood in terms of them. Moreover, this approach accommodates Aristotle’s important conclusion, [3]. The formal features referred to in the definiens prove definitionally primary: for not only the definiendum but also its material attributes are grasped on the basis of these formal entities. It should be noted, though, that this idea has several gaps that need to be filled in. Thus, for example, one could object that no reason is given for the claim that the formal features mentioned in the definiens are fundamentally primary in definition. Why are they the items on the basis of which both the definiendum and its material features are grasped? On a rival view, it would be matter, or some of its parts, which would define not only the definiendum but also its formal features. Alternatively, one could challenge the grounds for asymmetry: just as material attributes are understood on the basis of formal ones, the latter, too, can be grasped only by reference to the former. For, the objector would argue, the material terms of the definiens are incomplete descriptions of the definiendum without the relevant formal terms, and conversely. I shall return to these crucial questions in later chapters.

2.6 Can Definitionally Posterior Items Be Indefinable? Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b11–14, clearly argues that matter and material parts are definitionally posterior to form. Similarly, at 1035b19–20, universal and particular compounds are also conceived as definitionally posterior to form.4 If this is correct, the argument from [1] and [2] to [3] entails that universal compounds or species such as man or horse are definitionally posterior to form. Indeed, this claim seems to capture our intuitions about definition and its objects (the items which get specified). For in

4 At 1035b27–30 and 30–1, Aristotle seems to be clarifying what he means by the phrases F ı ºı Çfiı and ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ used at 1035b19–20. The first phrase signifies universal compounds or species such as human or horse, while the second picks up particular compounds such as Socrates or Callias.

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y A N D D E F I N I T I O N A L LY P R I M A RY I T E M S

33

our standard conception of definition what primarily gets specified are universal compounds or species: CU

¼def F (perhaps) plus M,

where ‘CU’ stands for the universal compound, ‘F ’ for the formal features of this compound and ‘M ’ for its material characteristics. In this formula, CU could be seen as being ultimately defined in terms of F, even if M is part of its definiens. For (the idea would be) although M is included in CU’s definiens, M is itself further defined in terms of F. If so, F is the definitional bedrock. Moreover, since Aristotle claims that particular compounds, too, are definitionally posterior to form, we could apply the same idea to the definition of particular compounds. Even if their matter were to be mentioned in their definiens, their form would still be definitionally primary as it would define not only them but also their matter. It would follow, then, that particular compounds, too, are legitimate objects of definition and could get specified by reference to form. There is a difficulty at this point. My understanding of [3] implies that definition is primarily of form in that definitions of all things are ultimately cast in terms of form. It is plausible, however, to construe the locution ‘definition is of x’ in the following different way: definition has form as its primary object. Thus, form is not the ultimate item in terms of which definitions are shaped but that which alone or strictly speaking gets specified, the only legitimate type of definiendum. This alternative understanding of [3] would appear to conflict with Aristotle’s view that not only (particular and universal) compounds but also matter and material parts are definitionally posterior to form. For none of these items is purely formal: compounds involve matter, while matter and its parts are, unsurprisingly, predominantly (if not crudely or exclusively) ‘material’. But if so, none of these items could be a legitimate definiendum, as definition would be of or about form alone. However, if compounds or matter cannot even be defined, how could they be definitionally posterior to anything? There is an additional complication. Aristotle develops his view of what is definitionally primary beyond his thesis [3]. He adds a further claim in Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b34-1036a1: [4]

Definitional accounts are of the universal.

Similarly, in Metaphysics Z.11, 1036a28–9, [3] and [4] are combined: ‘definition is of the universal and of the form’. Presumably, the idea is that definition is not of any old type of universal but of form alone taken universally. This seems to make the case for particular compounds as definitionally posterior items even more difficult to sustain. For, if [4] entails that only universals are legitimate objects of definition, particular compounds could not get defined by anything and so could not be definitionally posterior to form. Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that there are problems with the definability of particular compounds. He does not, however, render them unqualifiedly indefinable. Indeed, it would be a mistake to think, on the basis of [4], that only

34

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

particular compounds are beset by definability problems. For, if [3] implies that only form can be a legitimate definiendum, universal compounds, matter and material parts also turn out to be indefinable. To reinstate the claim of compounds and matter to being definable and so to being definitionally posterior to form, it is important to examine Aristotle’s own remarks on the definability of particular compounds: But there is no definition of what already is a compound whole, for instance of this circle, or of any other perceptible or intelligible particular [ . . . ]; but these are always said [or have an account: º ªÆØ] and are known on the basis of the universal account. And matter is in itself unknowable. (Z.10, 1036a2–9; Bostock’s trans.) But of this [i.e. of the composite substance] in a way there is an account and in another there is not; when taken together with its matter there is no account (for matter is indeterminate [or indefinable]), but there is an account in accordance with its primary substance, as, for instance, the account of man is that of the soul. (Z.11, 1037a26–9; Bostock’s trans.)

These two passages can be seen as undermining the alternative understanding of claims [3] and [4], in which particular compounds are unqualifiedly indefinable. For if Aristotle held that only universal form can be a legitimate definiendum, he would not argue that particular compounds are, in a way, definable. I shall use these two passages to attack the rival construal of [3] and [4] in which universal form is the only legitimate definiendum. Rather, I shall argue that ‘definition is of universal form’ implies only that universal form is the ultimate item in terms of which defining formulae are basically structured. The main idea of the two passages is that: [5]

Particular compounds are (a) definable in a way and (b) indefinable in another way.

One way in which to understand [4] consistently with [5] is to take [4] as ambiguous between the following two claims: [4.1]

8x (x is definable ! x is universal)

and [4.2]

8x [(x is definable) ! ∃y (y is universal & x is defined in terms of y)],

where y may be complex. Clearly, [4.1] summarizes the restrictive construal of ‘definition is of . . . ’ as ‘definition has as its only object . . . ’. Thus, it represents the view that only universals can be objects of definition and so conflicts with [5(a)] which allows particular compounds to be definable. By contrast, [4.2] is more liberal as it implies that a definiendum may be either universal or particular (inclusively) provided that it is always defined in terms of some universal(s) or other. It should be emphasized that, contrary to [4.1], [4.2] is sensitive to my distinction between objects of definition – what gets specified by definition – and that in terms of which definition is formulated – what does the specifying. In this respect, it is consistent with, and

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y A N D D E F I N I T I O N A L LY P R I M A RY I T E M S

35

indeed offers a plausible way in which to understand, [5]: particular compounds are definable in so far as they can be objects of definition but indefinable in so far as their account is necessarily shaped only in non-particular, universal format. For, even if specifiable, they are necessarily specified only in terms of some universal(s) or other. This understanding suggests that particular compounds may be definable (in a way) even in the face of claim [4], that definition is of the universal. The crucial question, then, is whether, and in what way, this approach can also be applied to universal compounds and matter. As I noted, the combination of [3] and [4] suggests that these items, too, should be indefinable if ‘definition is of the form and of the universal’ implies that only universal form can be a legitimate definiendum. For neither matter nor universal compounds are purely universal or formal. Aristotle, however, could adopt an enriched version of [5]: universal compounds and matter are definable in a way but indefinable in another, just as particular compounds are. If this is correct, it would be misleading to construe the conjunction of [3] and [4] as: [6]

8x [x is definable ! (x is form & x is universal)]

With [6] Aristotle’s claim that definition is of the universal form is transformed into the view that only universal form is a legitimate definiendum. Hence, [6] is equivalent to the restrictive view which rules out the possibility that compounds or material entities should be definable. By contrast, if we adopt my liberal understanding of what could get specified by a definition, it seems preferable to understand [3] and [4] as follows: [7]

8x [(x is definable) ! ∃y (y is universal form & x is defined in terms of y)],

where y may be complex. Similarly to [4.2], [7] presupposes my distinction between what does the defining and what gets defined. Thus, the range of definable objects is left entirely open by [7] as particular or universal compounds, matter and material parts seem unproblematically definable. By contrast, there are restrictions as to what does the defining work: only universal form can discharge this last role, even if the definiendum need not be universal form alone. It is implausible, then, to take [3] and [4] as restricting the legitimate object of definition to universal form alone. Rather, it seems fair to think that definition can, in a way, be about (particular or universal) compounds and matter. The way in which this is possible is clarified by [7]: provided that universal form is the basic defining item, compounds or matter can be legitimate objects of definition. If this is correct, there is no tension between Aristotle’s position that these items are definitionally posterior to form and his claim that, in a way, they are indefinable or definition ‘is not of them’. For they are definitionally posterior to form in so far as they are defined in terms of form, while they are indefinable in so far as they cannot be defined strictly in their own terms, as it were, but only in terms of universal form. Compounds are not defined ultimately in terms of prior compounds but in terms of form. Matter and material parts are, at bottom, grasped not simply as material items but on the basis of form.

36

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

It might be objected that [5] entails only that particular compounds are definable in one way but indefinable in another. Aristotle does not explicitly argue, however, that universal compounds or matter are definable in one way but indefinable in another. Nor does he clearly maintain, with [7], that they are definable in that they are specifiable in terms of universal form, but indefinable in that they are not themselves basic defining items. This objection seems to presuppose that the sole target of [3] and [4] is to make particularity alone incompatible (in a way) with definability. If this were correct, universal compounds or matter – in so far as they are non-particular – would be unproblematically definable. However, in explaining why particular compounds are indefinable in a way [5(b)], Aristotle holds that this is because matter by itself is unknowable or indefinable. Hence, his basic explanation of why compounds are (in a way) indefinable does not invoke the notion of particularity at all (Met. Z.10, 1036a8–9; Z.11, 1037a27). Rather, his idea seems to be that being constituted (at least partly) from matter makes certain entities indefinable (in a way). But if having matter as a component entails indefinability of some sort, universal compounds should be indefinable in a way: for they too are partly constituted from matter (taken universally), just as particular compounds are.5 Matter and material parts are even worse off: for in so far as they are material they could not be proper objects of definition. This holds true if the claim that matter is unknowable and indefinable entails that it cannot be specified at all by any definition. On the view, then, that matter is unknowable and indefinable, while being material or having material components makes an item indefinable (in a certain way), it follows that there are common definability problems besetting (particular or universal) compounds and matter alike. The reason for these problems is the same in all cases: in Aristotle’s view, neither compounds nor matter are purely ‘formal or universal’. This clashes with the requirements introduced by [3] and [4]. Rather, compounds and matter further involve material constituents. If so, they should fall within the scope of [5] together with particular compounds. For all these items are definable in one way

5 Using this idea we could tentatively answer Bostock’s question about the role of universal composites in the argument of Metaphysics Z.10–11. Bostock (Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 146–7) thinks that the reference to universal composites at Z.10, 1035b27–30, ‘upsets’ the line of argument of these two chapters. For, as he remarks (p. 155), ‘the argument of this paragraph [1035b31– 1036a3] depends upon ignoring the possibility of universal compounds. For it claims that the parts of the form are the parts of the essence, i.e. those mentioned in the defining formula. Then, in order to prove that the parts of the combined whole are not mentioned in the definition, it claims that definition is always of what is universal, and there is no definition of a combined whole because it is particular and not universal. Evidently, this is flatly inconsistent with the admission just above [1035b27–30] that there are wholes which combine a form and matter taken universally.’ Again, in his comments on Z.11, 1036a26–31, he argues (p. 159) that ‘the introductory paragraph [of Z.11] still appears to presuppose that a material component can never be universal, for it claims that “definition is of the form and the universal” (a28–9), strongly suggesting that only the form is universal’. The answer to Bostock’s worry might be that Aristotle takes definability to be problematic (in a way) in the case of compounds quite generally, precisely because they have material constituents. This definability problem of compounds arises regardless of whether they or their material parts are universal or particular.

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y A N D D E F I N I T I O N A L LY P R I M A RY I T E M S

37

but indefinable in another in so far as they include matter. Further, because all of them are conceived as definitionally posterior to form, they had better be legitimate objects of definition. For if they cannot be defined at all, how could they be defined in terms of anything whatever, let alone form? My view, set out on the basis of [7], seems to offer a plausible solution to these problems. Compounds and matter are definable in a way, in that they can be grasped in terms of universal form. If so, they can be definitionally posterior to universal form. This is the way in which definition is of the form and of the universal. Compounds and matter are indefinable in another way, though, in that they are not fundamentally primary items in terms of which any other definiendum is characterized.

2.7 Important Consequences The significance of understanding [3] and [4] on the basis of the distinction between fundamentally defining items and items defined in terms of them can become clearer as follows. In this view, the claim that definition is of the form and of the universal is a thesis about what does the basic defining. Thus, it consolidates the claim of form (or of certain formal parts of the definiens) to definitional primacy over the relevant derivative items. For it is in terms of form that the rest are specified but the converse does not hold good. Second, this approach is liberal as it does not rule out important candidates for definability. For it allows for all major contenders to be susceptible to definitional specification without counterintuitively restricting the range of definable items. Third, by being liberal as to what the definiendum could be, it coheres with Aristotle’s view of what is definitionally posterior to form. Because they are definable in terms of form, compounds and matter are indeed definitionally posterior to form. This interpretation has a further, extremely significant advantage. In invoking the notion of a fundamentally primary defining item, it extends the logical space for interesting alternative views of definitional primacy. Thus, there is no reason, in my view, to think that a definiens must be constituted from (universal) form alone or that form must be the sole item in terms of which anything whatever gets specified. Not only does matter become a legitimate definiendum which can be specified (ultimately) in terms of form. In my view, matter could also be referred to by certain parts of the definiens, provided that it does not play the role of a fundamentally primary defining item. In the light of this, we need not deny that material features could be mentioned in a definition and so could be parts of what it is to be a (universal or particular) compound or a certain type of matter. More importantly, there would be no difficulty even if one held that forms themselves are essentially enmattered and are defined by reference to material features. For the notion of being ultimate implies only that form is the fundamental definitional ground in terms of which other, dependent, items are grasped. This notion does not require that formal terms are the only constituents of a definiens or that they cannot be intertwined with material (or non-purely-formal) constituents in a defining formula.

38

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Proper defining formulae, then, may make reference to material features of the definiendum. This is permissible under the proviso that the formal features (but not the material ones) are the basic items in terms of which the definiendum is characterized. This result is welcome especially if the definiendum is a material entity or a compound from form plus matter. But, even in cases in which the definiendum is form itself, this view leaves open the possibility that the definiens may be shaped in terms of both formal and material components. This possibility becomes extremely important if form is essentially enmattered. For in that case the form’s definition must make reference to material features of some sort. In chapters 4–6 I shall argue that Aristotle indeed takes his forms as essentially matter-involving. Before engaging in this task, though, it is necessary to underpin in further detail the claim that matter could be part of a form’s essence and be mentioned in its definiens. Moreover, it is crucial to examine what types of material entity could be included in a form’s essence. To answer these twin questions, we need to be sensitive to the distinction between form, matter, and compound. Thus, for instance, we should not allow into the form’s essence material features which would identify forms with particular material constituents or concrete compound objects. These issues will be addressed in the next chapter.

3 Matter within a Form’s Essence? The arguments of the previous chapter suggest that there is a sense in which matter, even if ‘indefinite’, ‘indefinable’, or ‘unknowable’, can be an object of definition, provided that it is ultimately understood in terms of form. Similarly, matter could even be included in what is doing the defining as long as it does not have the basic role in the definiens. These, however, are just theoretical possibilities within Aristotle’s overall view. Indeed, some would object that in several places Aristotle argues that matter cannot be part of a form’s essence or be mentioned in its defining account. The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, I shall explain in what way matter or material parts could be part of a form’s essence or referred to in its definiens. Second, I shall discuss some of the most important passages that appear to argue against the possibility of mentioning matter in a form’s definiens or of conceiving a form’s essence as including matter. This discussion will show that these passages do not rule out that possibility. Rather, in some cases, they even support the idea that matter is part of a form’s essence.

3.1 Preliminary Remarks It is important to note that the question is not whether form, quite generally, could involve matter in its essence. Rather, our interest lies with natural forms which are essences or substances of particular, natural hylomorphic compounds of specific types. These compounds are natural in that they involve change of several sorts. If so, their form should, in so far as it is their essence, account for the corresponding sorts of change that they are capable of undergoing. Later chapters will develop this point in detail. Another important consequence of our interest in natural forms is that claims or arguments about them need not carry over to (e.g.) mathematical forms. Thus it will become clear that Aristotle’s position about natural forms grows out of an illuminating contrast between them and mathematical forms. This contrast is also present at the core of his criticism of Platonist Forms, which are not only thought to exist independently of perceptible particulars or their matter but are also defined by Platonizing thinkers without any mention of matter. Aristotle’s view seems to be that defining forms of natural bodies as Platonists do is not to define natural forms at all. Rather, it is to

40

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

identify natural with mathematical forms. If so, however, the Platonist position is mistaken at the outset.1

3.2 An Important Distinction The main argument against the possibility of including matter in the essence of a natural form is that Aristotle draws a sharp matter–form distinction. His hylomorphic position is introduced with the distinction between compound, form, and matter. If so, why re-introduce matter in a form’s essence? Is it not prima facie absurd to posit a formal entity, the form, and then allow matter back in its essence? The initial reaction to this kind of objection should be that Aristotle’s distinction might involve an abstraction of form from matter (or vice versa) that serves legitimate theoretical purposes. It does not, though, prejudge the question of what a real formal entity, its essence, involves. For a form’s real essence might be partly constituted from matter even if it is possible to point to different segments of that essence, demarcating some as formal and others as non-formal or material. This kind of objection seems powerful in the light of Aristotle’s repeated claims that form, as essence (d q r ÆØ), is the ‘substance without matter’. Thus, in Metaphysics Z.7, which re-introduces the distinction between form, matter, and compound that was bracketed during the ‘logical’ discussion of Z.4–6,2 proponents of the ‘purity’ of form see evidence for their view in the following passage: Thus it turns out that in a way health is produced from health, and a house from a house, the one that has matter from the one that does not [B ¼ı oºÅ c åıÆ oºÅ]; for the skill of curing is the form [e r  ] of health, and the skill of building is the form of a house; and by the substance without matter I mean the what-it-is-to-be [º ªø b PÆ ¼ı oºÅ e d q rÆØ]. (Metaphysics [Met.] Z.7, 1032b11–14; Bostock’s trans.)

The view that conceives form as essentially independent of matter argues that the craft examples offered in this passage suggest that forms, the essences of natural things, are like the form of health or the form of house as grasped by the craftsman. But if so, it would be difficult to see how forms of this sort could be material. Aristotle himself states that the form of health and the form of house are substances without matter. In the same context, however, a few lines later, Aristotle couples the above remarks with the following argument:

1

Some of Aristotle’s arguments about natural forms of sublunary compounds seem to apply to superlunary eternal actual beings. Hence, for example, in so far as they undergo change in the form of eternal, uniform cyclical locomotion, some superlunary objects could be seen as involving essences similar to the natural forms of sublunary changing objects. In what follows I shall make only a few brief remarks about such cases. 2 The term ‘logical’ is a mechanical translation of Aristotle’s ºªØŒH , which occurs in the introduction to Metaphysics Z.4, in the phrase æH Yø  ØÆ æd ÆPF [sc. F  q r ÆØ] ºªØŒH (1029b13). For a discussion of this logical type of investigation carried out in Metaphysics Z.4 see my ‘Essence and Per Se Predication in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.4’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 39, 2010, pp. 121–82.

M AT T E R W I T H I N A F O R M ’ S E S S E N C E ?

41

So, as is said, a thing could not come into being if nothing were present beforehand. Indeed it is clear that some part must necessarily be present; for the matter of a thing is a part of it (for it is present in it and comes to be the thing). But is it also amongst the parts that are in the formula [Iºº’ pæÆ ŒÆd H K fiH º ª{]? Well, in fact we speak in both ways when we say what a brazen circle is, saying that the matter is bronze and the form is such-and-such a shape, and this is the kind under which it falls primarily. So the brazen circle has its matter in its formula [› c åƺŒF

ŒŒº åØ K fiH º ª{ c oºÅ]. (Met. Z.7, 1032b30–1033a5; Bostock’s trans.)

Here another artefact, a brazen circle, is used to illustrate that, just as a certain type of matter is part of the compound, similarly matter must be part of the form of this compound. If forms of natural bodies are similar to that of the brazen circle, they should involve matter in their own essence. It is clear that in these two passages Aristotle is using the term ‘matter’ in different senses. This is exactly the point that the ‘form without matter’ theorists seem to have overlooked. The first passage implies that the form of house does not (indeed cannot) essentially involve bricks, stones, or the other particular or token material parts that a particular compound house is made of. This, however, does not imply that it cannot include as parts any material entities at all, such as the attribute of being made of building blocks of a certain sort. More plausibly, the essence of the house-form may well involve generic material features such as being incorporated in non-porous matter, the one appropriate to embody the formal housefeature of being a covering for the sake of protection. The claim that the form of house is not itself an enmattered token- or type-compound house with token- or typematerial parts does not entail that its essence is purely formal. More generally, the important distinction which is implicit in the argument of Metaphysics Z.7 is threefold: (a) A particular compound object of a specific type involves particular bits of matter, token material parts. Similarly, a specific compound-type (what Aristotle labels ‘universal compound’ at Z.10, 1035b27–30) is a type of object with corresponding type-material parts. Thus, for instance, while this concrete brazen statue involves these particular bits of bronze, the type brazen statue involves the type-matter bronze. Because form is an essence but is neither an object nor a type of object, it does not essentially involve such material parts. (b) A form of a certain sort is an essence, an essential feature or a mode of being for the particular object or type of object that has this essence. As such, a form could not include in its essence sorts of matter or material components which are (token or type) objects. Material entities which could belong to a form’s essence should themselves be material features or material ways of being that are intrinsic to this form. (c) A form’s definition is a linguistic or conceptual item and so is neither a realworld natural (type of ) object nor an essential feature of any object. Rather, it is a linguistic or conceptual formula that has parts of similar linguistic or conceptual nature. If a form’s essence involves not only formal but also material parts, its

42

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

definiens account has corresponding formal and material constituent terms that refer to or describe the respective formal and material features which together make up the essence of that form. It is clear from this distinction that a form’s essence does not have material parts of type (a). For, if it did, forms would turn out themselves to be enmattered compound objects or types of object, as opposed to essential attributes of such enmattered compounds. It does not follow from this, though, that forms are identified with merely linguistic or conceptual items of level (c). Nor does it follow that they are simply abstractions in thought. Rather, forms are entities of type (b): they are parts of the fabric of the real world, although they are not material compound particulars or types. If this is correct, Aristotle’s claim in the first passage is that forms are substances without matter in that they are ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (1032b14: d q r ÆØ), essential ways of being for the (types of ) objects they are forms of. But they are not themselves such (types of ) objects. Hence, the matter they are independent of is the particular material bits that make up compound objects at some stage or other of their existence. Similarly, they are independent of specific types of matter that belong to the essence of determinate compound types. The house-builder, in grasping the house-form without the matter, is grasping the essential mode of being for the house-form without any particular bricks, stones, etc. or types thereof. If that mode of being involves material features, the house-builder grasps these too. But this is not the same as grasping particular bits of matter or specific type-matters as such.3 In the second passage, though, the material entities that are parts of the form’s essence are not token- or type-matters but are material features that constitute, together with appropriate formal attributes, the complex essence of that form. It is these last types of matter that the definiens of a form refers to or describes through corresponding terms or concepts.

3.3 The Dominant Question of Metaphysics Z.10–11 One of the most important contexts in which Aristotle discusses the question of whether, and if so what, types of matter are included in the essence of natural forms is Metaphysics Z.10–11. The initial formulation of the problem runs as follows: Now a definition is an account, and every account has parts; further, as the account stands to the object, so do the parts of the account stand to the parts of the object; so we are already involved in the problem of whether the account of the parts should or should not occur in the account of the whole. In some cases it is clear that the account of the parts is present in that of the whole, while in others it is clear that it is not. Thus the account of the circle does not contain that of its segments, whereas the account of a syllable does contain that of its letters. Yet a circle is divided into its segments just as a syllable is divided into its letters. (Met. Z.10, 1034b20–8; Bostock’s trans.)

3 It seems plausible to think that, while the real-world object grasped by the house-builder is an entity of type (b), his or her body of knowledge is in the form of a type (c), conceptual or linguistic, item.

M AT T E R W I T H I N A F O R M ’ S E S S E N C E ?

43

Aristotle’s view is that there is a correspondence between a thing’s definiens account and the thing itself, its essence. This raises the question of whether it is necessary for there to be a further correspondence between the parts of a thing’s definiens account and the parts of the thing or of its essence. While Aristotle will answer this last question affirmatively, he clearly indicates that the problem is to determine the relevant notion of being a part of a thing and so to specify what kinds of part are involved in a thing’s essence and referred to in its definiens.4 For, as is clear from the first two examples given, being a part of a thing, quite generally, is not a sufficient condition for being a part of that thing’s essence or for being mentioned in its definition. While certain letters are parts of a specific type of syllable and are mentioned in its definition, a circle’s segments are not parts of its definiens account, although they are, in some acceptable sense, ‘parts’ of the circle. If so, the parts of a circle’s essence are not parts of the circle in the way in which its circular segments are. Similarly, in the second set of examples (offered at 1034b28–32), while a finger is part of the human type of animal and an acute angle is part of a right angle, it does not follow that the former items define the latter. If so, parts of this sort are not definitionally prior to the corresponding wholes. Nor are they components of the essence of these wholes. Aristotle remarks, by contrast, that these wholes are mentioned in their respective parts’ definitions and so are prior to them. This suggests that the notion of being a thing’s part which is mentioned in that thing’s definiens account will be illuminated with the help of the notion of priority. Indeed, this sort of priority is not merely definitional but also ontological (1034b31–2: fiH º ª{ ªaæ [ . . . ] ŒÆd e r ÆØ). This crucial point will be taken up in subsequent chapters. This argument suggests that the kinds of real-world part which correspond to definitional parts are constituents of a thing’s essence. Aristotle’s way of proceeding clearly suggests this general idea: Perhaps it is that part is spoken of in many ways [ . . . ] But we need consider only the parts from which a substance is compounded. If, then, there is both matter, and form, and the compound of these, and if each of them is substance, then there is one way in which even the matter of a thing could be called a part of it, but in another way it is not part of it, but only the constituents of the account of the form are parts of the thing. (Met. Z.10, 1034b32–1035a4; Bostock’s trans.)

4

There is a difficulty here. Suppose that x is defined in terms of y and so y is one of x’s essential parts. Assume, further, that y itself is defined in terms of z. If the relation of ‘being defined in terms of’ is transitive, it follows that x is defined in terms of z. But, if what is included in x’s definiens account is the whole definiens account of y, while y’s definiens involves z’s complete defining formula, it seems that x’s definiens should involve the whole definiens of z. If z itself is definable in terms of further definable items, this view could generate an infinite regress in which x’s definiens formula contains infinitely many defining accounts of other, prior items. This infinite regress could be blocked at the first step if an account of x’s essential part, y, is as deflated as a simple (or relatively simple) linguistic term or expression that merely refers to y, as opposed to a fully fledged definitional account of y. If so, x’s definiens formula will include just a term ‘y’ or something like it but not the whole definition of y. Thus, there will be no need to mention in that formula z or z’s account too.

44

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

This passage invokes the distinction between the three types of substance (already introduced at Z.3, 1029a2–5), the matter, the form, and the particular form-matter compound. Combining this distinction with the further claim that matter is, in a way, part of some thing but, in another way, is not part of this thing yields the following result. The types of matter which are parts of a thing and the way in which they are its parts are determined by the kind of thing or the kind of substance under discussion. Clearly, if the thing is a particular compound substance, it involves token material parts. This is not yet to say that token material parts are essential to the particular compound. These material parts are not, at any rate, parts of the form of a particular or universal compound. Consistently with the distinction I drew in section 3.2, this result does not rule out the possibility that some other type of matter is part of the form’s essence. Indeed, as Aristotle remarks at 1035a3–4, the type of matter which could be part of even the form is that which would constitute, together with formal components, the essence of that form and which would be referred to by its definiens formula (K z › F Yı

º ª ). The task that Aristotle sets himself is to specify the criteria for determining those types of matter, if any, that could be essential parts of the form. This seems clear from the familiar Aristotelian phrasing ‘in a way yes, in a way no’ employed at 1035a2–3, which signals that it is necessary to disambiguate the term ‘matter’ to understand what types of matter, if any, could be parts of the form’s essence, and in what way. That the very same concerns govern the overall discussion of Metaphysics Z.10–11 is clear from the introduction to Z.11: It is natural to raise the problem of what sorts of parts are parts of the form, and what sort of parts are not, but are parts of the whole taken together [Iººa F ıغŠı]. If we are not clear on this, we shall not be able to define each thing; for definition is of the form and of the universal; so unless it is clearly seen which sort of parts are parts as matter, and which not, the account of the object will not be clearly seen either. (Met. Z.11, 1036a26–31; Bostock’s trans.)

The discussion is about what types of part are included in the form’s essence, as opposed to those which make up the (particular or universal) compound. If so, the sort of parts which are ‘as matter’ and are excluded from the form’s essence may well be material parts of the (particular or universal) compound. By contrast, some parts of the form’s essence may be material as long as they are not particular bits or types of matter included in token or type compounds (type (a) matter). Rather, they should be more general material modes of being or features which constitute the complex mode of being or feature that the relevant form is (type (b) matter). It is clear, therefore, that the general problem of Metaphysics Z.10–11 does not rule out at the outset the possibility that certain types of matter are parts of the form’s essence.

M AT T E R W I T H I N A F O R M ’ S E S S E N C E ?

45

3.4 Initial Examples of Metaphysics Z.10 and Different Types of Matter In this section I shall discuss some of the various examples Aristotle provides in the first part of Metaphysics Z.10 (up to 1035b3). I shall seek to show that these examples do not prevent appropriate types of matter from being parts of the form’s essence. It should be noted, however, that this first section of Metaphysics Z.10 is aporetic, sketchy, and provisional. This is not to say that its claims are false or its examples are misleading. Rather, they are not complete or sufficiently precise. Aristotle will take up, in a fresh start within Metaphysics Z.10, the issue of the form’s priority over matter (1035b3ff.). Further, in Metaphysics Z.11, he will argue more positively that, while form is prior to matter, yet it involves essentially certain types of matter (1036a31ff.). It is important, though, to show that even his initial examples are not intended to rule out the possibility of essentially enmattered natural forms. For instance, flesh is not a part of concavity (for it is the matter in which concavity comes to be) but it is a part of snubness; similarly, the bronze is a part of the statue as a combined whole but not of the statue spoken of as form (for we should specify the form and insofar as each thing has a form, but we should never specify the material by itself ). (Met. Z.10, 1035a4–9; Bostock’s trans.)

Aristotle begins with examples of features or forms, such as concavity (B Œغ Å ) and snubness (B Ø Å ), as opposed to the compound concave- or snub-thing.5 This suggests that the type of entity under discussion determines whether and what types of matter will be involved in its essence. Hence, for instance, the nature of mathematical entities, such as the form of concavity or the feature of being concave, is to be thought-abstractions which do not involve matter, such as (nasal) flesh. By contrast, natural entities, such as the form of snubness or the feature of being snub, are matter-involving entities that include (e.g.) nasal flesh as part of their nature. After the mathematical case of the form of concavity and the natural case of the form of snubness, Aristotle offers an artefact example, a statue. This is a more complex case as the statue can be understood either as a compound or as the statue-form. Moreover, if it is a compound, it could be either a token or a type compound. It is clear from the passage that the compound statue involves bronze as a part. Thus, for example, this token brazen statue of Socrates has bronze as its part (whether this is an essential part of the statue or not is not yet clear). Similarly, the brazen type of a Socrates-statue involves the type bronze. By contrast, the form of a Socrates-statue, the feature of being the

5 There is a deflationary reading of these examples. Aristotle may be seen as referring to features or attributes such as being F or F-ness. On a more demanding reading, he is discussing cases of form which themselves are features or modes of being. However, the structure of the argument from 1035a1–2ff. seems to favour the more demanding reading. For Aristotle introduces the distinction between different types of substance: matter, form, and compound. If so, his examples seem to be picking up these different sorts of substance. First he discusses two cases of form (and their relation to matter) and then he goes on to examine a case of compound (and its relation to matter).

46

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

relevant Socrates-like shaped statue, does not include those sorts of bronze in its nature. It is crucial that the matter which is not part of this form is this token bronze of this concrete Socrates-statue or the type bronze which is part of the type brazen Socratesstatue. This claim, however, does not entail that the relevant form, being a Socratesshaped statue, does not involve any types of material feature at all. Indeed, it seems fair to think that being a Socrates-shaped statue may well involve a feature such as being made of a certain type of malleable and solidifiable or, more generally, wrought-able mass. This possibility is far from being precluded. The subsequent passage develops further this possibility by taking up the examples of syllable versus circle from the beginning of Metaphysics Z.10 (1034b24–8): It is for this reason that the account of a circle does not contain that of its segments, while the account of a syllable does contain that of its letters. For the letters are parts of the account of the form, and are not the matter of the syllable, whereas the segments are parts only in the way that the matter on which the form comes to be is a part; but they are closer to the form than is the bronze in the case where roundness comes to be in bronze. Yet in a sense the account of the syllable will not contain all letters, as, for example, these waxen ones or those in the air; for they too are already parts of the syllable as its perceptible matter. (1035b9–17; Bostock’s trans.)

Not only does this passage support the possibility that matter can be part of a form’s essence. It also advances our understanding of what types of matter should be included in a form’s essence. The form of circle is a mathematical entity (like the previous example of concavity) which is abstract and essentially independent of parts such as segments, especially if these last are understood as token parts of a particular circle or even specific types of material part (such as brazen semicircles). A syllable-form, by contrast, such as being BA, is similar to the artefact case of the statue-form. As such it essentially involves not just an abstract or quasi-mathematical structure or arrangement but also specific letter-features thus-and-so arranged. This is so because letters of this sort are not crudely material but are parts of the syllable-form’s essence (1035a11: a b ªaæ ØåEÆ F º ªı æÅ F Yı ŒÆd På oºÅ). That they are material features of some sort is clear from the fact that they cannot be identified with the structure or the arrangement of the syllable-form, which would be its purely formal feature. Rather, letters are elements (ØåEÆ): elements, quite generally, and letter-elements, in particular, are usually lined up with matter by Aristotle. Further, these items are contrasted with specific tokens or types of perceptible material letter. The letter-features which are parts of the syllable-form’s essence are not these concrete ink signs, BA, just made on this sheet of paper. Nor are they the particular airen letters I produce in a concrete utterance of ‘BA’. Correspondingly, the essence of the form of BA does not include the types ink, wax, air, etc., either collectively or disjunctively. Just as in the artefact example of the statue-form, though, this result need not imply that the form of BA does not essentially include as parts any types of letter-feature at all. If so, Aristotle’s aim in offering these examples is to specify the appropriate types of essential material part without identifying them with the

M AT T E R W I T H I N A F O R M ’ S E S S E N C E ?

47

material constituents of token or type BA syllables. Perhaps, a tentative but promising candidate for being the essence of BA’s form would be the feature of being an articulate mark of B arranged thus-and-so in front of or before A. Even the remarks about the circle’s form, however, suggest that it is not necessary to conceive of a form’s essence as completely independent of all types of material attribute. Thus, in the case of circularity or roundness, the segments which are not parts of the essence are particular semicircles or types thereof (e.g. semicircles having a specific magnitude or extension). More obviously, token material semicircles (e.g. these brazen ones) or type material ones (e.g. brazen, wooden, etc. semicircles) are not parts of the form of circle. In Metaphysics Z.10–11 Aristotle’s favoured way of describing the relation between such mathematical forms and the material parts which are not essential to them is to state that the form comes to be in or on the relevant types of material part (KتªŁÆØ or KªªªŁÆØ: 1035a5; 12; 14; 1036a31). This way of speaking suggests that there is an independent entity, the mathematical feature that does not include the relevant type of matter, which is extrinsically linked with, or imposed ‘from the outside’ on, that matter. Even so, however, perceptible token or type material parts (such as this bronze or bronze in general) are, in Aristotle’s view, ‘more remote’ from the form’s essence than abstract token or type segments (such as this geometrical semicircle or the type semicircle of such-and-such magnitude) are. This stratification of material parts which are not essential to mathematical forms implies that there might be certain types of matter which are sufficiently ‘proximate’ to the form to be parts of its essence. To be sure, no type of matter might be close enough to be included in a mathematical form’s essence. Aristotle’s later remarks, though, that mathematical forms involve intelligible types of matter, such as being continuous magnitudes or being constituted from lines, do not rule out this possibility (1036a9–12; 1036b7–10; 1036b32–1037a5). Thus, if the intelligible type of matter which is essential to the circle’s form is being a continuous line, it is clear that having semicircles or being divisible into circular segments is closer to this form than being a brazen semicircle or being this token brazen segment is. The important point, not only in the mathematical case but also, and more importantly, in the natural case, is that certain types of matter may be part of a form’s essence provided that they are properly identified. Some of the constraints on their proper identification are implicit in the claim that definition is of the form and of the universal. First, essential material parts must be located at the correct level of generality: they cannot be token- or type-material parts of token- or type-compounds. Second, they cannot be material parts of objects or types of object but could be material features in the way in which forms, as essences, are features or modes of being. The next group of examples that Aristotle examines at 1035a17–b3 comprises concrete compound objects with corresponding token material parts. I shall discuss these examples without citing the whole passage. The opening lines of this section clearly introduce the criterion with which to expel such matter from a form’s essence.

48

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Indeed, even though a line is destroyed when it is divided into halves, or a man when he is dispersed into bones, sinews and flesh, it does not follow from this that they are composed of these parts as parts of their substance but these are rather their matter, and are parts of the combined whole, but not parts of the form or of that which definition is of. Hence they do not occur in the accounts [ . . . ] For this reason some things have as their principles the things they are made from and destroyed into, while others do not. (1035a17–25; Bostock’s trans.)

That Aristotle is focusing on particular compounds becomes clear from two points. First, he is formulating a criterion in which the complete division or dissolution of an object into all its parts signals its passing-away. Thus, if a line is cut into its halves, it perishes. Or, if a human is divided into all its constituent bones, sinews, and flesh, he or she dies. This criterion, however, applies only to particular compounds: for forms, such as being a line or being a human, just do not pass away in this manner (1035a28–30).6 Rather, it is particular compound objects that cease to exist if all their constituents are taken away from them or/and divided from each other.7 Second, the examples are clearly offered as cases of compounds (1035a20–1; 23; 25; 34). More importantly, they are not universal compound types but are concrete compound tokens. While the initial examples of line and human do not unambiguously suggest this, the subsequent examples of the snub-thing, the brazen circle, the clay statue, the brazen sphere, and, most importantly, Callias make it clear (1035a26–7; 31–3).8 Just as Callias is a particular compound, similarly the rest of the examples should describe cases of concrete hylomorphic objects. If this is correct, Aristotle’s claim that the material parts of these objects are not parts of the form’s essence (1035a19–22) does not entail that no material parts at all can be included in the form’s essence. For the material parts of particular compounds are token materials, such as these concrete ink marks of the BA syllable in the previous example (1035a15–16). This does not prevent appropriately identified material features from being in a form’s essence. Thus, for example, being a human soul does not essentially involve Callias’ particular bones, sinews, or flesh but may well include features such as 6 Aristotle makes a similar remark at Met. Z.15, 1039b23–7. It is not forms themselves but the particular compounds enformed by them which come to be and pass away. A form such as being a house could pass away only in that all particular compound houses that it enforms could pass away. 7 Notice that the claim is not that, while the complete whole passes away, the constituent bodily parts will continue to exist and function properly, as they did before they were taken away from the complete whole or/and divided from each other. Rather, the criterion implies that the parts will be just surviving remains which do not any more satisfy the conditions for being fully or properly functional bodily constituents. 8 It is worth noting the difference between the initial examples and these cases of particular compound. While 1035a5–6 discusses a natural form or feature, snubness or being snub (Ø Å ), 1035a26 introduces the snub thing (e Ø e), a concrete natural compound object. At 1035a4 and 14 we have the mathematical forms of concavity or roundness (Œغ Å ; 檪ıº Å ), while at 1035a26 and 32–3 the examples are of particular compound artefacts in which a mathematical form has been imposed on the relevant matter (åƺŒF ŒŒº ; çÆEæÆ N åƺŒe). If so, the contrast is between general forms or features and particular compound objects. Even in the mathematical example of circle given at 1035a33–b1, we have a particular compound in which a mathematical shape is given to some perceptible token material mass (1035a34–b1: n

ıغÆØ B fi oºÅ fi ). For this reason even this circle is destroyed once all its segments are separated from it or/ and taken apart from each other (1035a33–4: Ø b [sc. çŁæÆØ] › ŒŒº N a   ÆÆ).

M AT T E R W I T H I N A F O R M ’ S E S S E N C E ?

49

being embodied in specific types of bodily parts. More importantly, it may depend for its being what it is on material features such as being enmattered in an appropriate organic body. Hence, the group of examples offered in this section of Metaphysics Z.10 does not rule out the possibility of essentially enmattered forms. There is a difficulty at this juncture. Aristotle argues that token material parts are indeed constituents of particular compounds, such as Callias or this clay statue (1035a20–1; 22–3). Moreover, he suggests that material components of this sort are principles of particular compounds (1035a24–5; 30–1). Do these remarks imply that token material parts are principles in that they are essential to the corresponding particular compounds? If the answer to this question is affirmative, Aristotle’s claims would conflict with the following intuitively plausible idea: Callias can continue to be what he essentially is even if some or (more radically) all of his bodily parts are replaced either at once or gradually. Indeed, the vast majority of Callias’ bodily cells are replaced during a sufficiently long stage of his life without his ceasing to be what he essentially is. To reply to this difficulty, it is enough to point out that Aristotle’s criterion in this section of Metaphysics Z.10 is not about relations of essential dependence between particular compounds and their token material parts. Rather, his criterion is one of existential dependence. Thus, for example, Callias passes away if (e.g.) all his token bodily cells are separated from him or/and divided from each other. If so, Callias cannot exist without any token bodily parts at all. But this does not entail that the token bodily parts constituting Callias at t1 are essential to him rather than the ones constituting him at t2. Aristotle does not even argue for any significant sort of existential independence of such token bodily parts from Callias. He does not claim, for instance, that, after separation or division, any of Callias’ token bodily parts continue to exist as functional bodily parts of a human being. His criterion implies only that such token material parts survive as non-functional remains. Hence, this criterion need not be taken as rendering particular compounds essentially dependent upon token material parts that constitute them at any point or during any phase of their existence. If so, token material parts are not principles of particular compounds in that the latter essentially depend on the former. Rather, token-matter is a principle merely in that it outlives particular compounds after their passing-away. But it does so only as remaining non-functional relic.9 Aristotle’s point, then, may well be that, just as token material parts are not essential to forms (although other sorts of material feature might be parts of their essence), so too they are not essential to particular compounds (although they materially constitute them at some point or period of their existence). Neither of these claims, though, requires that no material parts of any sort can have any place in the essence of forms or particular compounds. 9 I shall come back to the type of principle-hood or priority that token material parts enjoy over compounds in sections 10.3 and 13.1, in my discussion of ontological priority in respect of potential being or passing-away.

50

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

3.5 The End of Metaphysics Z.11 and the ‘Matter of Form’ (Metaphysics .24) It seems fair to conclude that the arguments and the examples studied so far do not presuppose that no type of matter could be included in the essence of natural forms. If so, they do not block the possibility of essentially enmattered natural forms. It should be emphasized, though, that this is not the same as positively supporting this possibility. Nor is this result equivalent to arguing that natural forms are, or must be, essentially enmattered. It is, however, a helpful first step towards establishing the thesis that matter of an appropriate sort is an integral part of a form’s essence. The following chapters will argue more directly for this thesis. It could be objected that my conclusion is supported only by the initial section of Metaphysics Z.10, which (as I observed earlier) is aporetic, sketchy, and provisional. Furthermore, the objector would argue, the rest of Metaphysics Z.10–11 will straightforwardly deny that matter is part of a form’s essence. In later chapters I shall examine several important arguments of Metaphysics Z.10–11 and shall show that this objection is not decisive. Indeed, as will become clear, these arguments underpin the thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment. At present, though, it is useful to discuss some of the concluding remarks of Metaphysics Z.11. While it may seem premature to move on to those remarks before examining the premisses that support them, it is important to show that even Aristotle’s later claims in Metaphysics Z.11 agree with my interpretation of the first part of Metaphysics Z.10. We have now said, universally and for all cases, what a what-it-is-to-be is, and in what way it is itself in its own right. And we have said why it is that the account of what-it-is-to-be a thing sometimes contains the parts of the thing being defined, and sometimes does not. For we have said that the formula of the substance will not contain those parts that are parts as matter – which indeed are not parts of that substance at all, but of the substance which is the combined whole, and this latter in a way does not have an account, though in another way it does; when taken together with its matter it does not have an account (for matter is indeterminate [I æØ]), but it does have an account in accordance with its primary substance [ŒÆa c æÅ PÆ], as, for instance, a man has the account of the soul; for the substance is the form that is in the thing, and the whole combined from this and the matter is called a substance from this. Thus concavity is the substance (for from this and the nose there is formed a snub nose and its snubness, for in these the nose will occur twice) – but the substance which is the combined whole, e.g. a snub nose or Callias, has matter in it as well. (Met. Z.11, 1037a21–33; Bostock’s trans.)

Several commentators construe this passage as denying that matter has any place in a form’s essence. Thus, Michael Frede argues that this summary rules out ‘definitions in terms of both form and matter’ and that, in Aristotle’s considered view, the definition of a form ‘will contain no reference to the matter’.10 10 See Frede, M., ‘The Definition of Sensible Substances in Met. Z’ in D. Devereux & P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique chez Aristote, Paris, 1990, pp. 116–17.

M AT T E R W I T H I N A F O R M ’ S E S S E N C E ?

51

It seems clear, however, that Aristotle’s concluding remarks are consistent with the arguments and examples of the first section of Metaphysics Z.10, in which the possibility is left open for certain types of matter to be included in a form’s essence. Thus, the claim that matter is not part of the form’s essence is equivalent to the idea that token material parts of the particular compound are not involved in a form’s essence. Aristotle states that material parts are sometimes parts of the essence and sometimes they are not. Clearly, if they are token bodily parts of particular compounds, they are not included in the essence. But if they are appropriately identified types of material feature, they are parts of the essence. While concrete matter constitutes some particular compound or other, it is not allowed in the essence of a form. This is the point of Aristotle’s remark that ‘matter is part only of the substance which is the combined whole’. It does not follow from this, though, that no type of matter at all could be part of a form’s essence. Indeed, as the previous example of the syllable suggests, nothing prevents more generic material features which are properly identified from being essential to a form. There is a difficulty at this point. Aristotle may be contrasting forms and their essences not with particular compounds but with universal compound types. If so, it is not just token material parts which are not invoked in a form’s essence. Not even generic types of matter are parts of this essence. It is clear, however, from the overall context and the examples that Aristotle offers at 1037a30–3 that he is referring to particular compounds with token bodily parts. First, he calls these items ‘compound substances’ as opposed to ‘primary substances’, an honorific term reserved for forms (1037a28–30). In Aristotle’s view, however, universal compound types clearly are not substances (1035b27–30). Nor are they even secondary substances or substances ‘in accordance with’, or posterior to, the form, the primary substance. More importantly, the example of Callias at 1037a33 fixes the reference of ‘compound substance’ to particular compound objects. Similarly to this clear-cut case, the rest of the examples are particular compounds. A particular human such as Callias is defined in terms of his form, the soul, which is the primary substance that determines what he essentially is (1037a28–9).11 This particular snub-nose is a case in which the form of being (nasal) concavity enforms this particular bit of nasal matter (a concrete nose) and makes it a snub-nose.12 If this is correct, the matter which has no place in a form’s essence is only token-matter of particular compound substances.

In this sense the particular compound substance is ‘in accordance with’ the primary substance, its form: for the form makes the particular compound what it essentially is. If so, it determines its essence. 12 There are several exegetical problems with the example of the snub-nose given at 1037a30–3, some of which may pose difficulties for my view that it too is intended as an example of a particular compound. First, Aristotle states that the primary substance or form of the snub-nose is concavity (1037a30: Œغ Å ). This might be taken as a mathematical form along the lines of the earlier example offered at Z.10, 1035a4–5. If so, one might think that a natural compound, such as the snub-nose, involves a particular material part on which a mathematical form is imposed, and to which this purely formal, abstract, or mathematical form bears only an extrinsic relation. Hence, it may be concluded, forms of natural compounds do not seem to differ from mathematical forms which are essentially immaterial. This sort of objection will be dealt with in detail in later chapters. At present, it is sufficient to point out that its conclusion need not follow. For the concavity which is 11

52

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Moreover, even if the contrast were between forms and universal compound types, still it would not follow that no type of matter can be an essential component of form. For, as I argued in section 3.2, if there are types of matter which can be part of a form’s essence, these would be neither token bodily parts of particular compounds nor general types of matter which belong to compound types (type (a) matter). The sorts of matter which could belong to a form’s essence are not only universal or generic. More significantly, they are not objects or types of object but are features or ways of being, just as the form is an essential feature or way of being, a what-it-is-to-be. If this requirement were violated, it would be possible for a form to involve essentially material token- or type-objects. But if so, it would be difficult to see how a form could continue to be the type of entity it is. For, if it had token- or type-objects as its essential parts, it would not be an essential feature or mode of being. Rather, it would turn out itself to be a compound token- or type-object, one that is constituted from an attribute plus some material token- or type-object. In Aristotle’s view, however, this result seems unattractive as it eliminates the distinction between form (or what-it-is-to-be) and compound (type of ) object.

the formal part of the snub-nose’s essence is not necessarily identical with the mathematical sort of concavity. This is why I used the term ‘nasal’ within brackets to characterize the concavity that is essential to the snubnose. Aristotle himself, in Sophistici Elenchi 31, argues that the concavity which is involved in the snub-thing is distinct both from the generic mathematical feature of being concave and from the type of concavity involved in the bandy-thing (181b37–182a3). If so, the concavity which enforms a particular nose should not be identified with mathematical concavity but with a distinctive type of nasal concavity, an essentially enmattered natural form. I shall take up this issue and the argument of Sophistici Elenchi 31 in section 5.4. A second problem is that the (nasal) concavity, the form or primary substance, is thought to be a formal constituent not only of a particular snub-nose but also of snubness, which itself is a natural form (1037a30–2: x   Œغ Å (KŒ ªaæ ÆÅ ŒÆd B ÞØe Ø c Þd ŒÆd  Ø Å K, d ªaæ K Ø æØ  Þ ). But if so, the contrast that Aristotle has in mind is not simply between form and particular compound but also between different sorts of form, such as the forms of concavity and of snubness. If this is correct, a form’s essence involves neither token material parts of particular compounds nor generic material features which are parts of forms such as snubness. Therefore, (at least some) forms turn out to involve no matter at all. My reply to this objection places some importance on the phrase d ªaæ K Ø æØ  Þ , which Ross finds irrelevant and deletes, although it is well attested in the manuscripts (Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. II, p. 205). This phrase takes up a point made at Z.5, 1030b28–35: the definition of compounds, such as snub-nose, will repeat ‘nose’ twice: for ‘snub-nose ¼def nose with the concavity of nose’. In the context of Z.11, this point seems to hold good of the compound Ø c Þd , which is mentioned at 1037a31. It does not, however, fit well with the case of  Ø Å , if indeed this last example is understood as the form of snubness. For the definiens of this form is not ‘nose with a concavity of nose’ but ‘nasal concavity’ or ‘concavity in/of a nose’, which does not contain a second occurrence of ‘nose’. Aristotle, however, clearly thinks that a second ‘nose’ will occur in the definition of both Ø c Þd and  Ø Å : d

ªaæ K Ø æØ  Þ . To avoid this problem, it is plausible to think that  Ø Å is not a form. Rather, Aristotle is using this abstract noun to describe a compound, this particular nose’s snubness. Thus, the second ŒÆd of 1037a31 should be read epexegetically: ‘from this [sc. concavity] and [this particular] nose there is formed [this particular] snub-nose, i.e. its snubness/its being snub’. Clearly, a putative defining account of ‘this nose’s snubness’ involves a double occurrence of ‘nose’: ‘this nose that has the concavity of nose’. In this way, the ‘snub-nose and its snubness’ is brought in line with the case of Callias. Both are examples of particular compounds. If so, Aristotle’s claim in the summary of Metaphysics Z.11 is only that form does not essentially involve token material parts of particular compounds.

M AT T E R W I T H I N A F O R M ’ S E S S E N C E ?

53

The conclusion reached in this chapter may appear to be a far-fetched theoretical possibility that has no real basis in Aristotle’s own picture. To dispel this appearance, it is important to close by discussing a passage from Metaphysics .24.13 This chapter explicates the ‘from/out of which’ terminology (Œ Ø ). This terminology is crucial to the argument of Metaphysics Z.10–11: for this argument sets out criteria with which to determine what is and what is not in a form’s essence partly by reference to what the essence of a form (or its definition) is ‘constituted from’ (1034b34; 1035a3–4; 19–21; 24–5; 1036a14–6; 1037a29–33). Thus, items that are ‘from/out of which as matter’ have no place in a form’s essence. By contrast, items which are ‘from/out of which not as matter’ are parts of its essence. This contrast seems to be the topic of the following passage from the philosophical lexicon: [We call being from/out of which] others as the form is out of the part, as for instance a man is out of the two-footed and a syllable out of an element; for this is different from the way in which the statue is out of the bronze; for a composite substance is out of perceptible matter, but a form is also out of the matter of the form [KŒ B ÆNŁÅB ªaæ oºÅ  ıŁc PÆ, Iººa ŒÆd e r 

KŒ B F Yı oºÅ ; Met. .24, 1023a35–b2; Kirwan’s trans.].

This passage, and especially its closing phrase ŒÆd e r  KŒ B F Yı oºÅ , clearly suggests that Aristotle himself envisaged the possibility of including certain sorts of matter in a form’s essence. Let me spell this out. At 1023a26–9, Aristotle introduces the notion of being ‘from which’ that captures the relation between particular material components and concrete compound objects. Thus, for instance, the bronze is that from which the particular compound statue is materially made up. If so, the bronze Aristotle is referring to is this token lump of bronze that constitutes this particular brazen statue. This seems to correspond to similar examples provided in Metaphysics Z.10–11, most prominently the case of the compound brazen statue discussed at 1035a6–7. In the passage just quoted, however, Aristotle is setting out the ‘out of which’ notion that picks up precisely the types of item which are parts of a form’s essence. Hence, for example, being biped is one of the items from which the form of man is made, while being a certain type of letter is amongst those items from which a syllable’s form is constituted. This sort of formconstituents is contrasted with the token bronze out of which the particular statue is made (thus, 1023a36–b2 seems to take up the example of 1023a29). This contrast is a crucial part of the distinction I am relying on in the present chapter between types of matter which are not included in a form’s essence and those that are. Aristotle points out that the token bronze of the compound statue, of the particular composite substance ( ıŁc PÆ), is simply perceptible matter which does not have any place in a form’s essence. For a form does not depend, for its being what it is, on particular perceptible bits of matter. It does depend, though, on appropriate types of 13 I am indebted to Lucas Angioni for drawing my attention to this important passage from Metaphysics .24.

54

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

material feature, the matter from which a form is made up (1023b2: KŒ B F Yı

oºÅ ). It may be objected, at this juncture, that the phrase ‘matter of the form’ need not signify anything stronger than parts or constituents of the form’s essence or entities which are referred to by its definiens account. Thus, being biped is ‘matter of the form’ of man or being a specific letter is ‘matter of the form’ of syllable simply in that they are amongst the items that make up the essence of human-form or syllable-form. More importantly, it would be a mistake to conceive being biped, a differentia-feature, as a quasi-material component of the form’s essence. Aristotle’s argument, advanced in Metaphysics Z.12, 1038a5–9 and 18–20, implies that genera-features are like underlying matter if indeed they are anything over and above the type of thing that has those features. By contrast, differentia-features would correspond more closely to (although perhaps they would not be identified with) the essence or the form of a type of thing. In the syllable example, however, being a specific letter clearly is neither a differentiafeature nor a purely formal attribute. As I observed in section 3.4, letters, just as elements in general, are normally lined up with matter. Further, the purely formal components of a syllable-form would be its structure or arrangement, while its letters would be parallel to material building-blocks. Finally, while the formal feature of arrangement or structure is abstract and so imperceptible, letters can be either perceptible tokens or types or general features of a syllable-form. While it is not plausible to include token perceptible letters or type-letters in a form’s essence, it seems obvious that features such as (e.g.) being B or being A have a place in the essence of the BA-syllable-form. If so, however, the parts of a form’s essence are not purely formal but also material, provided that they are appropriately characterized. The phrase ŒÆd e r  KŒ B F Yı oºÅ by itself is, at any rate, sufficient evidence for the view that amongst the essential constituents of a form some are formal and some material. Moreover, those that are material are the ones appropriate to the form, the ‘matter of the form’. These are not perceptible token material parts of particular compound substances. Nor are they type-materials such as those which are parts of a type-compound. There is, however, a further option: a form’s essence can involve entities which are placed at the correct level of generality and are properly identified as essential material features or ways of being, just as forms themselves are essential ways of being for the (types of ) objects they are forms of. A definition which makes reference to material entities of this sort is still ‘of the universal and of the form’ (1035b33–1036a1; 1036a28–9): for these material entities are not token- or typeobjects but are universal modes of being, just as forms are. If so, the possibility of essentially enmattered natural forms does not clash with the general constraints on the essence and definition of form as set out in Metaphysics Z.10-11.

4 Natural Form, Mathematical Form, and Platonist Errors The aim of the present chapter is to address the negative issue of what, in Aristotle’s view, natural forms should not be understood as. My claim will be that their essence is not like that of mathematical forms. I shall begin by discussing Metaphysics Z.11, which compares mathematical with natural forms and raises the questions of how to differentiate between them, and how to determine the types of matter (if any) which are essential to natural forms but not essential to mathematical entities. In section 4.2 I shall show how Physics B.2 contrasts the objects studied by mathematical sciences with those examined by physics. The idea seems to be that, while mathematical form is essentially independent of all perceptible types of matter (collectively), natural form should not be conceived in this fashion. To explore further this claim, section 4.3 will take up Aristotle’s view of applied mathematical sciences as set out in Posterior Analytics A.13. This discussion suggests that not only higher-level mathematical branches but also subordinate mathematical sciences deal with abstract mathematical forms which are essentially independent of matter. While applied mathematical disciplines fit mathematical forms and theorems onto natural objects or their matter, yet these forms remain essentially immaterial and so non-natural. Indeed, Aristotle argues that, while natural objects (or their matter) involve, in some non-essential manner, mathematical forms, they differ in essence from them. This underpins the position that the essence of natural forms just is not like that of mathematical entities. In section 4.4 I shall return to Physics B.2, where we can detect a criterion with which to demarcate mathematical from natural form. This criterion is useful in specifying whether the essence of a form should include perceptible types of matter or not. If so, it can correctly categorize some forms as mathematical, and others as natural. The thrust of this criterion is that defining a form without any reference to perceptible types of matter should not lead to any errors in our reasoning about this form within the relevant scientific domain. Aristotle’s thesis is that defining mathematical form without mentioning matter is a successful strategy: for definitions of this sort do not yield any errors within mathematics. By contrast, the attempt to define natural forms independently of perceptible matter is doomed to failure as definitions of this sort will give rise to false inferences in the domain of physics. For this reason natural forms

56

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

are essentially matter-involving and so their correct definition must mention the appropriate types of matter. In sections 4.5 and 4.6 I shall argue that, if one were to define natural forms as immaterial entities, one would employ the process of thought-abstraction incorrectly. If so, one would effectively provide Platonizing accounts of natural beings, accounts which would identify them with Platonist Forms, which are on a par with mathematical entities. Aristotle criticizes this abstractionist approach by claiming that Platonizing definitions could not properly ground the essentially material character of natural compounds or their capacities to undergo change of certain types. This criticism makes clearer his claim (made in Physics B.2) that the essence of natural forms is not simply matter-involving but also includes change-related features. While definitions of natural forms that make reference to both matter and change can explain the necessary features and capacities of natural compounds, it would be implausible to hold that Platonizing or quasi-mathematical accounts could carry out this explanatory work. The conclusion is that natural forms do not simply depend for their existence within the physical world on the existence of some material body or other (this is a type of dependence relation they share with mathematical forms). More importantly, their essence contains material attributes of perceptible types and further change-related features which enable them to function successfully as essences of enmattered, changeable compounds. This is their fundamental difference not only from mathematical forms but also from entities that Platonists unnecessarily invoke in their ontology.

4.1 Hyper-Materiality and Hyper-Formality After reformulating the question that occupied most of Metaphysics Z.10 as to what items are parts of a form’s essence (1036a27–31), Metaphysics Z.11 takes up the comparison between mathematical and natural form.1 This comparison is crucial for Aristotle’s purposes but its implications can be assessed only if discussed in parallel with other important passages (most notably Physics B.2, which will be examined in the following section). [i] Now where a thing seems to come to be realised in others which are different in kind, as for instance a circle in bronze or in stone or in wood, in such cases it seems clear that the bronze and the stone are in no way part of the substance of the circle, since it is separated from them; [ii] and where a thing is not seen to be separated, nothing prevents it from being similar to these [previous cases], just like the case where all circles were to be seen as bronze; for even in this case the bronze would still be no part of the form; but it would be difficult to abstract this [bronze] in thought. [iii] For instance, the form of a man always seems to be in flesh and bones and parts of this sort; are these, then, also parts of the form and the account? Or rather not, but they are matter, but because it [the form of a man] does not come to be realised in anything else we cannot separate it from them? [iv] Since this seems to be possible but it is unclear in which 1

This comparison is implicit in Metaphysics Z.10 too: 1035a4–6; 9–10; b1–3; 1036a3–5.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

57

cases it occurs, some already raise the difficulty even in the case of the circle and the triangle, namely that it is not appropriate for them to be defined by lines and continuity, but all these, too, should be said in the same way as flesh and bones of man, or bronze and stone of statue; and they reduce everything to numbers, and they say that the account of line is that of two. (Metaphysics [Met.] Z.11, 1036a31–b13; Bostock’s trans.)

Aristotle is comparing different sorts of form: mathematical and natural forms. That his argument is about forms too but not only about (particular or universal) compounds becomes clear from three of his claims. First, he presents the circle case by using the relation of coming to be in or on some specific types of matter (1036a31: Kتت Æ Kç’  æø; cf. 1036b6–7). In Metaphysics Z.10, though, this relation characterizes the link between mathematical form and certain types of matter (1035a5; 12; 13–14). Second, at Z.11, 1036b1–2, it is argued that, even if all circles were in fact enmattered only in bronze, bronze would still not belong to the form of circle (1036b2: › åƺŒe

Pb < æ > F Yı ). Third, in introducing the human case, Aristotle is clearly referring to the form of human (1036b3–5: x  e F IŁæı r  ). The comparison between the form of the circle and that of human raises an important point: being separate or separable from certain types of matter (or not being so) as a matter of fact does not, by itself, entail necessarily being definable (or being indefinable) without mentioning these types of matter. This point is exemplified by three distinct cases: (S1) Forms which can be enmattered in different types of matter can, it appears, be defined without (and hence their essence need not include as parts) some (or even all?) of these types of matter (section [i]). Thus, for instance, the form of circle can be enmattered in wood, stone, bronze, etc. Because of this, it is easy (for us or other definers like us) to abstract away or separate in thought these types of matter from the form of circle and define this form without them. (S2) Forms which are in fact always enmattered in the same types of matter may or may not be definable without (and hence their essence may or may not include as parts) some (or even all?) of these types of matter (section [iii]). For example, the form of human being is always seen in fact to be enmattered only in flesh, bones, etc: it is difficult for us to abstract away or separate in thought these types of materials from the form of human being and define it without them. (S3) Just as forms which can be enmattered in different types of matter, similarly, forms which are indeed always enmattered in the same types of matter may be defined without mentioning these types of matter or need not include them as parts of their essence. From the fact that some forms are in fact always enmattered in the same types of matter and, hence, from our difficulty to abstract away or separate in thought these types of matter from such forms, it does not follow that the former necessarily are parts of the essence of the latter. Nor does it follow that such forms must be defined in terms of these types of matter (section [ii]). For example, the form of human being may be on a par

58

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

with the form of circle, in the case where the latter would always be seen in fact to be enmattered only in bronze. In this case, just as the form of circle would be defined without mentioning bronze, so too the form of human being would be defined without mentioning flesh, bones, etc. Hence, if one defined the form of human being in terms of flesh, bones, etc., one would face the problem of what could be labelled ‘hyper-materiality’: one’s definition would include redundant material parts which are not essential to the form of human being. Even so, argues Aristotle, the possibility left open by (S3) that both mathematical and natural forms [those referred to in (S1) and (S2)] may be defined independently of matter, supports views which are potentially misleading.2 This last point, I think, is a major part of Aristotle’s complaints about Platonizing or Pythagorean definitions (section [iv]) and of his criticism of Socrates the Younger (1036b21–8 to be discussed in the next chapter). In both cases Aristotle discerns the danger of what I shall call ‘hyper-formality’. To avoid hyper-materiality, the mistake of including in a form’s definition material parts which are not essential to it, some theorists endorse the opposite extreme: they claim that definitions of such forms should be structured in purely formal terms, without any reference whatever to material features of the definiendum. Hence, for example, thinkers with obvious Platonizing or Pythagorean influences conceive both mathematical and natural forms as essentially independent of the types of matter they are embodied in. Not only do they define natural forms (such as being human) or artefact forms (such as being a statue) without any reference to types of matter (1036b10–11). They do not allow even more abstract or generic types of matter, such as being a continuous magnitude or being constituted from lines, in the definition of mathematical forms such as being a circle or being a

2 It is useful, in this connection, to mention Frede and Patzig’s comment on this issue (Frede, M. & Patzig, G., Aristoteles ‘Metaphysik Z’, vol. 2, Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich, 1988, ad loc. 1036a31–b7 and ff.). In their view, there are three cases in which a form is always seen to be enmattered in certain types of matter. (a) When (e.g.) all circles are bronze, it is difficult but not impossible to separate in thought the form of the circle from bronze, as the two are only externally related: the bronze is no part of the circle’s form. (b) When matter is internally related to a form (but is not part of its essence), it is impossible to separate in thought this form from that matter. (c) When the alleged material part is part (of the essence) of a form, it is again impossible (in a stronger sense than (b) above?) to separate in thought this form from that part. Frede and Patzig argue that there is no criterion by which to distinguish case (b) from (c) and, for this reason, definers make two kinds of mistake. That is to say, they either take ‘internal’ matter to be part (of the essence) of a form [case (b) mistaken for (c)] or they take formal components to be merely ‘internal’ material parts [case (c) mistaken for (b)]. In this way, Frede and Patzig conclude, Aristotle’s criticism can be understood as accusing Platonists and Pythagoreans of making the second sort of mistake: for they take parts of the essence of mathematical forms as simply ‘internal’, but non-essential matter. Socrates the Younger, on the other hand, is charged with the first kind of confusion. If so, Socrates the Younger mistook types of matter ‘internal’ to the form of human as matter which is possible to be abstracted away from that form, in the manner of abstracting bronze, wood, etc. from the form of circle. This, however, is a mistake as it is impossible that ‘internal’ matter be separate from the form it is internally related to. For an excellent discussion of Frede’s and Patzig’s view, see Whiting, J., ‘Metasubstance: Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth’, The Philosophical Review, 100(4), 1991, pp. 628–9. I shall come back to their view later.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

59

triangle (1036b8–10). One of the main consequences of this ‘hyper-formal’ approach is that all types of form are reduced to numbers or number-forms (1036b12–13). Aristotle points out, however, that definitions which are shaped in purely formal terms may fail successfully to specify a certain definiendum, perhaps because this definiendum just is (essentially) a certain kind of form enmattered in certain kinds of corporeal component or matter thus-and-so enformed (1036b23–4). Before examining (in chapter 5) his positive arguments for the essentially enmattered character of natural forms, though, it is important to understand two points. First, he thinks that ‘hyperformal’ strategies, such as the one described in the previous paragraph, are incorrect not only in the case of natural but also in that of mathematical form. Even mathematical forms essentially involve certain types of matter, such as being a continuous magnitude or being made of lines. This is the type of matter that he labels ‘intelligible’, as opposed to ‘perceptible’ (1036b32–1037a5). His main disagreement, however, is that natural forms just are not like mathematical forms. Even if (contrary to ‘hyper-formal’ views) mathematical forms include abstract or mathematical types of matter, yet the essence of natural forms does not have material parts simply of this sort. It is not the case that natural forms are essentially enmattered but their material parts are abstract or generic in the way in which quasi-material mathematical entities are. Rather, if natural forms are essentially enmattered, their matter is not the same as mathematical or ‘intelligible’ matter. For, while mathematical forms are forms of imperceptible, non-natural, and unchangeable objects (mathematical objects), natural forms are essences of perceptible, natural, and changeable compounds. Because of this, a natural form’s essence must be appropriate for explaining the capacity for change of the perceptible natural compounds that have the relevant form. Aristotle argues that natural forms which are defined without any reference to proper material entities cannot perform this explanatory task. The basis of this argument is developed in Physics B.2, to which I now turn.

4.2 Abstractability, Separability, and Definitional Independence (Physics B.2) The main problem arising from Metaphysics Z.11 is that it is unclear whether certain formal items are definitionally independent of material constituents. It is not helpful, in this connection, to invoke the fact that we find it easy or difficult to abstract away or separate in thought these material entities from them. For this fact is not a reliable guide as to their definitional independence from certain types of matter. Thus, for instance, let us suppose the following (schematic) definitions: Form of triangle ¼def being a three-sided closed plane figure. Form of human being ¼def being a rational soul. Just as the definiens of the triangle’s form makes no reference to any types of perceptible matter in which this form may be realized, so too ‘being a rational soul’ stands by itself

60

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

as a putative definiens-term of the form of human being. It may be difficult or artificial but it is not impossible to abstract away certain types of matter and to produce a definition in purely formal terms. Even in the case of the human form, the fact that we can never observe human souls being realized in different types of bodily part does not necessarily imply that they essentially involve these types of material. Hence, there is no compelling reason to include these materials in the definition of the human form or to think that a proposed definition shaped in purely formal terms (along the lines of the one just offered) is incorrect. It should be noted, at this juncture, that the notions of abstraction in thought and separation employed in the present discussion (1036a31–b7) need not be equivalent. Thus, the notion of abstraction might be taken as implying that one is treating F as not involving M: while one is aware of a compound, F plus M, one is taking away (abstracting) M from this compound. By contrast, separation might be seen as equivalent to not treating F as involving M: while F is part of the compound F plus M, one simply does not see F as involving anything other than itself. In this understanding, the difference between abstraction and separation in thought is reflected by the position and the scope of the negation in the phrases ‘treating FþM as not M-involving’ and ‘not treating FþM as M-involving’.3 For present concerns, however, this distinction is not crucial: for the point is that it is possible to have an account of a form which does not mention any types of matter, independently of how one may have arrived at such an account or of whether the account is correct. Given that accounts of this type are possible, the problem is to find a criterion by which to discern between correct and incorrect cases. Aristotle comes to grips with this issue and proposes a criterion in Physics B.2. In that context he draws a sharp contrast between mathematical and natural form and shows why it would be a mistake to define natural form in the same manner as mathematical form. Moreover, he specifies that the identification of natural with mathematical form leads to mistaken views like those put forward by Platonists (views which are similar to the Platonizing or Pythagorean practices alluded to in Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b7–20). [i] Having distinguished in how many ways nature is spoken of, we must go to consider how the student of mathematics differs from the student of nature (for natural bodies have planes, solids, lengths and points, which the mathematician studies); and again, is astronomy a branch of the study of nature, or a different subject?4 For it would be absurd if the student of nature were 3 For a discussion of this distinction between the notions of abstraction and separation in thought, see Charles, D., ‘Aristotle’s Psychological Theory’ [‘Psychological’], Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 24, 2008, pp. 1–30 (at p. 5, n. 11). 4 At 193b25 I follow the manuscript reading Ø  IæºªÆ  æÆ j æ B çıØŒB with a question mark at the end, against Ross’s emendation Ø N  IæºªÆ  æÆ j æ B çıØŒB . Aristotle poses two questions. (1) What is the difference between the physicist and the mathematician? (2) Is astronomy different from physics or a part of it? Mueller (‘Physics and Astronomy: Aristotle’s Physics II.2 193b22–194a12’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 16, 2006, pp. 175–206) argues against Ross’s emendation and interpretation on the grounds that Ross makes the text involve two separate questions which appear to draw a distinction between mathematics and intermediate or subordinate mathematical sciences such as

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

61

expected to know what the sun or the moon is, but not to know any of their per se accidents, especially as it is plain that those who discuss nature do also discuss the shape of the sun and moon, and whether the earth and the cosmos are spherical or not. [ii] The mathematician, too, deals with these things, but he does not consider each of them as boundary of natural bodies; nor does he consider their accidents insofar as they happen to belong to them; that is why he separates them; for they are separate [or: separable] in thought from change, and it makes no difference, nor does any error result in separating them. [iii] Those who talk about ideas do not notice that they too are doing this; for they separate natural things though they are less separate [or: separable] than mathematical things. This would become clear if one tried to give the definitions, both of them and of their accidents. For the odd and the even and the straight and the curved, and, further, number and line and shape are [said?] without change, but flesh and bone and human are not, but these last are said like snub nose but not like the curved. [iv] The point is clear also from those branches of mathematics which come nearest to the study of nature, like optics, harmonics, and astronomy; for they are in a way the reverse of geometry. For geometry considers natural lines, but not as natural, while optics treats of mathematical lines, but considers them not as mathematical but as natural. (Physics [Phys.] B.2, 193b31–194a7; Charlton’s trans.)

Sections [i] and [iv] of this passage raise and address two main problems: (1) What is the difference between natural and mathematical sciences? In Aristotle’s view, the difference consists in the way in which mathematics studies its objects: while mathematicians examine natural bodies and their attributes (193b23–5; 31), they see them as separable from the relevant types of perceptible natural matter by correctly applying a thought-process that Aristotle calls ‘separation in thought’ (193b33–5). Although mathematicians are aware that natural bodies are compounds that involve mathematical shapes plus matter, they abstract away matter and examine only mathematical form. It is important to see how the practice of the student of nature differs from this mathematical approach. (2) Is astronomy (or sciences like it) part of natural science or not? The answer to this question is neither completely clear nor sufficiently supported by Aristotle in this passage. It is obvious for present purposes, though, that he takes sciences astronomy. Aristotle, however, would not wish to render astronomy non-mathematical or a part of physics (pp. 177–8). While I do not find Ross’s emendation necessary, I think that even the manuscript reading implies my two separate questions, (1) and (2). This, however, does not render astronomy a non-mathematical science. Thus, my distinction between (1) and (2) does not inherit Ross’s view of astronomy as part of physics. Mueller argues that with Ross’s emendation and interpretation ‘appreciation of the mathematical content of the intermediate sciences is greatly diminished, if not abandoned’ (p. 192). But this is rather independent of the distinction between (1) and (2). Mueller seems to think that separating questions (1) and (2) is sufficient for making mathematics and astronomy (or other subordinate sciences like it) different, and for yielding a conception of astronomy as non-mathematical. But the mathematical nature of astronomy can be preserved despite the distinction between (1) and (2). For astronomy can continue to be abstract, proofinvolving and so mathematical, even if it is not identified with theoretical, superordinate mathematical disciplines. Hence, it can still differ from physics. At the same time, though, astronomy seems also to differ from theoretical, superordinate mathematical branches, such as geometry. While both are mathematical in the sense just specified, astronomy fits mathematical abstractions, principles, and theorems onto perceptible material objects. This does not make it a part of physics but simply a ‘more naturalized’ branch of mathematics (see below the discussion of 194a7ff.).

62

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

like astronomy, optics or harmonics as mathematical disciplines, although they are ‘closer to’ natural sciences than (e.g.) number theory or geometry are (194a7–8: a çıØŒæÆ H ÆŁÅ ø, x  OØŒc ŒÆd ±æ ØŒc ŒÆØ I溪Æ). James Lennox helpfully compares this claim with Posterior Analytics A.13, where sciences of this mathematical sort are definitely not natural but subordinate to abstract mathematical sciences:5 for, as subordinate, they take theorems from number theory or geometry and apply them to natural objects (or some of their aspects/features) which admit of such mathematical treatment. If so, subordinate mathematical sciences see mathematical objects and the theorems that are about them as natural. This would be one way in which to explicate 194a9–12 ( ’ OØŒc ÆŁÅ ÆØŒc b ªæÆ c [sc. ŒE], Iºº’ På fi w ÆŁÅ ÆØŒc Iºº’ fi w çıØŒ). In the case of subordinate mathematical disciplines like optics (but not in natural science) the form studied is still mathematical but is viewed as being involved in natural objects and is applied to them directly from mathematical sciences.6 Problem (1) arises as a result of the fact that natural bodies, the objects of physics, include as parts of some sort solids, planes, lengths, points, etc., which are paradigmatically objects of mathematical sciences like geometry (193b23–5). Aristotle, however, Lennox, J. G., ‘ “As if We Were Investigating Snubness”: Aristotle on the Prospects for a Single Science of Nature’ [‘Snubness’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 35, 2008, pp. 149–6. Lennox’s main aim is to show that natural science as described in Physics B.2 is not like these mathematical subordinate sciences but has a unified object of its own. For it does not study compound or non-unified cases in which mathematical form is applied to material or natural objects. Rather, the object of natural science is a unity of a distinctive kind of natural form plus matter. Lennox sees Physics B.2 as ruling out a possible misconstrual of natural science that identifies it with subordinate mathematical sciences. He argues that Aristotle aimed to differentiate his view from this possible misconception as both Platonists (or thinkers concerned with Platonist themes) and Aristotelians are liable to fall prey to such an error. While Platonists positively define natural forms as essentially independent of natural bodies or their matter, Aristotelians might mistakenly apply the teachings of Posterior Analytics A.13 to the case of natural science and conclude that its object is like that of subordinate mathematical sciences. While I agree with Lennox’s points about the contrast between Platonism or mathematical subordinate sciences and natural science, my goal is not epistemological. Rather, my argument is about the essence of natural form itself, the real-world object of physics. Further, as I shall argue in the next chapter, Lennox’s view on this issue is not entirely clear. Does he think that the object of natural science is a sort of compound, a nonmathematical form which is necessarily linked with perceptible types of matter? Or does he take my view, in which natural form is itself essentially enmattered and is studied as such by natural science? 6 For a contrasting view see McKirahan, R. D., Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science [Principles], Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 65. McKirahan argues that ‘visual lines are susceptible to geometrical treatment because they are geometrical lines – not all geometrical lines, but certain ones . . . ’ (his emphases). In his earlier study of Aristotelian sciences he seems to have adopted a different view, closer to mine: ‘The subject matters [of superior and subordinate sciences] remain distinct: visual lines are not identical with geometrical lines. In particular, they are not a species of geometrical lines’ (‘Aristotle’s Subordinate Sciences’ [‘Subordinate’], British Journal for the History of Science, 11(3), 1978, p. 202). In my view, optics (for instance) takes up geometrical lines from geometry and applies them to visual lines, which are physical entities. In so doing, it adds to geometrical lines physical properties, such as matter or motion, in order to offer mathematical explanations of certain geometrical, quantitative, or magnitude-related features that belong to visual lines. This view fits better with Aristotle’s claim that ‘optics studies mathematical lines but not qua mathematical but qua physical’ (194a11–12). For a similar interpretation, see Burnyeat, M. F., ‘Archytas and Optics’, Science in Context, 18(1), 2005, pp. 36–7. 5

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

63

explains the difference at 193b31–3. Natural science studies such shapes strictly as limits of natural bodies. But limits are not themselves independent objects but are affections or attributes of natural objects. If so, they are not independent of natural objects or their matter. Further, these attributes are not essential to natural objects. For they do not make these objects the types of natural being they are. Nor are they referred to in the definitions of those beings. It is clear that, in Aristotle’s view, no serious natural philosopher would define any natural body as a geometrical shape of some sort. Moreover, physics studies the attributes of such shapes as features of (the limits of ) natural bodies but not as features of entities which are independent of natural bodies or their matter. Mathematics, by contrast, examines these shapes not as limits of natural bodies but, presumably, as entities by themselves, independently of natural bodies or their matter. Furthermore, the attributes of these shapes are studied not as features of natural bodies but as features of entities which are independent of natural bodies or their matter. Thus, for instance, the attribute of having a sum of internal angles equal to two right angles is not viewed as a feature of brazen triangles but of the abstract mathematical entity triangle or triangularity. This implies that mathematical disciplines are about mathematical forms and their features without any reference to types of perceptible matter. Later on, at 194a9–12, this point is codified and compared with other subordinate and ‘more natural’ mathematical sciences (a çıØŒæÆ H ÆŁÅ ø). Hence, for example, geometry is about natural lines but not as natural. It studies natural lines not as bounds of natural objects but as independent of them and their material parts. Optics takes up these mathematical lines from geometry and studies them, but not as mathematical or completely independent of natural objects and their matter. Rather, subordinate mathematical sciences seek to fit their mathematical objects onto natural material bodies and explain certain features of those bodies on the basis of principles and theorems which are originally about immaterial mathematical forms. To flesh out this last conjecture, it is fair to observe that, in so far as they assume without proof theorems demonstrated by geometry or number theory as their own principles, optics, astronomy, harmonics, etc. have mathematical objects as their subject-matter. For these theorems are about, and are demonstrated of, mathematical entities. Indeed, if they were not about such entities, they would not, strictly speaking, be true. Moreover, the principles from which these theorems are proved by geometry or number theory are not about physical objects but are about mathematical entities. Subordinate mathematical sciences, however, use these theorems to explain natural phenomena which involve physical material objects and some of their features. For this reason, they see the mathematical entities that the theorems they use are about as natural entities conjoined with natural material bodies. Hence, for instance, astronomy adopts from stereometry theorems about the geometrical, unchangeable and immaterial, sphere-form and explains by reference to them geometrical features of spheroid planets, which are perceptible objects that revolve around the Earth and so involve ‘topical’ matter. Harmonics, on the other hand, inherits from number theory theorems

64

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

about matter-less and unchangeable arithmetical ratios and views them as applying to musical notes, which are embodied in material stuffs such as air or water. A crucial question arises at this juncture. Are the real-world objects of subordinate sciences such as astronomy or harmonics simply mathematical forms (independent of perceptible matter), which are extrinsically related to or implemented on perceptible natural bodies and their matter? Or are they essentially enmattered forms, entities which involve in their own nature the types of matter that belong to perceptible natural objects? While Physics B.2 does not address this issue in detail, Aristotle’s claim that subordinate sciences are mathematical, even if they are ‘closer to’ physics in that they treat their mathematical objects as natural, suggests a rough-and-ready answer. Because astronomy and other sciences like it borrow their objects from mathematical sciences, the forms that they study are mathematical entities that are essentially independent of natural objects and their perceptible types of matter. The idea is that subordinate mathematical sciences impose on natural objects and their matter abstracted mathematical forms. They do not, however, examine natural objects or their matter in terms of the natural forms which are their essences and make them the kinds of natural body that they are. To describe more fully the difference of natural forms (those essential to natural material objects) from abstracted forms studied by mathematical sciences, it is important to discuss briefly the status of subordinate sciences as described in Posterior Analytics A.13.

4.3 What Natural Forms Are Not Like (I): Forms Studied by Subordinate Mathematical Sciences (Posterior Analytics A.13) James Lennox has argued convincingly in favour of an interpretation of Physics B.2 in which Aristotle’s argument aims to guard his audience against a possible misconception of the object of natural science. Because Physics B.1 has distinguished nature into form and matter and has privileged form with a sort of priority over matter (193b3–8), there is a danger that natural science might be identified with an abstract discipline in which mathematical forms are viewed as explanatorily prior to natural objects and their matter.7 Indeed, as Lennox remarks, this danger is even more imminent for a reader or an audience who are familiar with Aristotle’s position about subordinate mathematical sciences as treated in Posterior Analytics A.13. For they might understand the natural scientist as someone who ‘studies the matter and the underlying subject and (perhaps) also makes use of the results of the mathematician in a study of the forms of natural things’.8 But if so, natural scientists would effectively be practitioners of subordinate mathematical sciences such as those discussed in the Analytics. As Lennox points out,

7 8

Lennox, ‘Snubness’, pp. 158–9. Lennox, ‘Snubness’, pp. 162–3.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

65

however, Aristotle wishes to ‘disabuse his readers of this misunderstanding of the study of nature’.9 While Lennox’s interpretation is extremely attractive and his comments on parts of Physics B.2 and Posterior Analytics A.13 are invaluable, the scope of my present discussion is narrower than his. Further, my aim is not to identify the epistemological differences between natural science and subordinate mathematical disciplines. Rather, it is to show that the objects of physics, natural forms, are not like the objects of subordinate mathematical sciences. For the objects of the latter are mathematical forms, which are essentially independent of natural bodies and their matter. As such they cannot be forms or essences of natural bodies. Nor can they explain the necessary features and capacities of natural bodies. Posterior Analytics A.13 sets out the difference between knowledge of the reason why (Ø Ø) and knowledge of fact (‹Ø). One of the central cases of this difference is that in which knowledge of the former type belongs to one scientific discipline, while knowledge of the latter type belongs to a different discipline (78b34–5). Examples of such cases are sciences which are related so that one is under the other in a hierarchy of superordinate and subordinate disciplines. Thus, for instance, geometry is the superordinate, abstract mathematical science, optics is placed under it, and what could be called ‘rainbow studies’ is at the lowest level under both of these mathematical sciences. To offer another example, geometry (or even stereometry) would be above mathematical astronomy, while the latter would be above nautical astronomy. Similarly, stereometry is the superordinate mathematical science under which mechanics is subordinated, whereas number theory is above harmonics, and mathematical harmonics above ‘acoustical’ harmonics (78b35–79a2; 10–13).10 Lennox, ‘Snubness’, p. 163. There are two ways in which to understand the relation between the separate sciences at each level, both of which (in my view) yield unattractive results. First, one might think that the relation is simply one of higher or lower generality. Thus, McKirahan (Principles, p. 66) argues that ‘the superior science is more general than the subordinate one, which means that its subject-matter extends more widely’. He offers the example of branches within abstract algebra, such as set theory, group theory, ring theory, and field theory: ‘Proofs in one branch of algebra may make use of principles and conclusions of more general branches, but not vice-versa.’ But this does not seem correct; for a similar structure could be traced (e.g.) within geometry: while proofs about isosceles triangles may make use of principles or proofs about triangles quite generally, the converse does not hold good. But the study of isosceles triangles is not a separate, subordinate science falling under the study of triangle quite generally. Alternatively, it might be argued that there are two distinct types of subalternation, one applying between higher superordinate sciences and intermediate subordinate ones (e.g. geometry and astronomy) and another obtaining between intermediate and lowest ones (e.g. astronomy and nautical astronomy). This view is adopted by McKirahan’s earlier treatment of Aristotelian subordinate sciences (see his ‘Subordinate’, pp. 205 and 210–15). Hence, he holds that both superordinate and intermediate sciences are mathematical in that they are abstract and proof-involving. By contrast, intermediate sciences are mathematical, while lowest subordinate ones are physical and observational. Further, some parts of the latter are explained on the basis of the former (p. 211). Aristotle, however, clearly maintains that intermediate as well as lowest subordinate sciences are ‘observational’ (79a2–6). Further, the distinct sciences at each of the three levels do not seem to be physical but are mathematical in some way or other. If so, it would be a mistake to take (e.g.) astronomy as merely mathematical or devoid of any observational content. Similarly, it would be misleading to think of nautical astronomy as part of physical science. It seems more promising to argue that there is one unified relation of subalternation holding not only between higher and intermediate but also between intermediate and lowest subordinate sciences. This would be the relation of 9

10

66

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

In all these examples, the superordinate sciences possess knowledge of the reason why, presumably in that they prove their theorems from first principles which are causal and explanatory.11 Subordinate sciences, by contrast, assume those very theorems without proving them and so do not possess demonstrative knowledge of them. They do, however, deduce further consequences from them by applying them to their own subject-matter.12 Hence, for example, mechanics derives quantitative theorems about material spheres which are capable of moving on inclined planes from observations about such perceptible objects plus stereometrical theorems about spherical solids. Observation in this case might involve (e.g.) the measure in which different materials might influence the temporal duration of downward motion or the degree of friction between spheres and planes. What superordinate sciences like stereometry do not know are precisely such observations or the theorems stemming from them plus stereometrical propositions.13 By contrast, subordinate sciences possess knowledge of borrowing abstract mathematical forms and principles or theorems about them from the higher science and fitting them onto (more or less) concrete physical phenomena or material bodies involved in these phenomena described in terms of observational statements possessed by the relevant subordinate science. Thus, for example, astronomy takes up the abstract, geometrical sphere-form studied by geometrical principles and theorems and applies it to celestial bodies and their movements. Similarly, nautical astronomy borrows results from the intermediate mathematical science of astronomy and applies them to even more concrete areas, such as finding a ship’s position or drawing routes on a map. Clearly, though, even these results of nautical astronomy are reached via geometrical methods and employ mathematical abstraction: for they fit geometrical concepts such as positions or lines onto physical subject-matters. I shall return to this relation of ‘fitting onto’ later. 11 This general statement agrees with 79a3–4: yØ ªaæ åıØ H ÆNø a IØ . But there is a subsidiary difficulty here. One would expect that mathematicians have proofs of theorems or know the causes of what is the case, of the ‹Ø. It is difficult to see, though, how they could have proofs of the causes themselves. For causes, at least primary or ultimate causes (those described by definitions or axioms of a demonstrative science), are not themselves provable but prove other derivative items. One solution would be to think that the proofs possessed by (e.g.) stereometry, proofs of stereometrical theorems, are proofs of propositions that are used as causes by mechanics. For the latter explains its derived propositions on the basis of stereometrical theorems: mechanics uses stereometrical theorems as causes of its own derived propositions, while stereometry has the proofs of these theorems, which are used as primary causes and explanations by mechanics. Alternatively, we could understand the phrase H ÆNø a IØ as meaning ‘causal/ explanatory proofs’ (not ‘proofs of causes’). This rendering would yield the plausible thesis that superordinate sciences possess causal demonstrations, the explanatory proofs of their theorems. 12 It is plausible to take this idea as the import of 79a2–6: KÆFŁÆ ªaæ e b ‹Ø H ÆNŁÅØŒH N ÆØ, e b Ø Ø H ÆŁÅ ÆØŒH. ‘Perceptual’ are those disciplines that rely on our perceptual capacities and know observational matters of fact. To explain these facts, they use theorems of mathematics without proving them. ‘Mathematical’ are those sciences that know the reason why: they possess the proper principles and prove from them their theorems. To be sure, superordinate mathematical sciences, too, know their respective ‹Ø in that they know demonstratively the theorems they derive from their peculiar principles. They do not, however, know the ‹Ø that their subordinate sciences know, what these subordinate sciences deduce about perceptible phenomena from observations plus the application of mathematical theorems to these observations. 13 This seems to be the thrust of 79a4–6: ŒÆd ººŒØ PŒ YÆØ e ‹Ø, ŒÆŁæ ƒ e ŒÆŁ ºı ŁøæF ººŒØ ØÆ H ŒÆŁ’ŒÆ PŒ YÆØ Ø’IØŒłÆ. While superordinate sciences know their own theorems, their own ‹Ø, they lack knowledge of the theorems of subordinate sciences, the ‹Ø of the sciences under them. Hence, for example, stereometry does not comprise any statements about friction between material spheroids and inclined planes, whereas mechanics knows such things on the basis of observations plus the very theorems that stereometry demonstrates and knows. If so, the lack of study

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

67

these matters of fact. If so, the ‹Ø-type of knowledge that belongs to subordinate sciences is twofold: (a) Theorems of higher mathematical sciences which are not proven within the lower ones. Hence, subordinate sciences do not know this sort of ‹Ø demonstratively (or strictly speaking) but merely assume it. (b) Propositions deduced from (a)-type items in conjunction with observations about natural, perceptible phenomena. These propositions are about natural perceptible phenomena or the objects involved in them. Subordinate sciences can explain propositions of this sort on the basis of mathematical theorems of superordinate sciences. They do not, however, possess complete explanations which would invoke the proofs of the mathematical theorems they use from proper mathematical principles.14 With these background assumptions in place, we can understand better the following crucial passage: The items in question are things which, being different in essence [from forms] involve forms [Ø b ÆFÆ [sc. ØÆ H ŒÆŁ’ŒÆ] ‹Æ æ  Ø ZÆ c PÆ [sc. H NH] Œ åæÅÆØ E

YØ]. For mathematics is concerned with forms: for its objects are not said of any underlying subject – for even if geometrical objects are said of some underlying subject, still it is not as being said of an underlying subject that they are studied. (Posterior Analytics [APo.] A.13, 79a6–10; Barnes’s trans.)

Here Aristotle describes the relation between natural objects or their features and the kind of form which is studied by subordinate sciences and is applied to them. As Aristotle remarks in Physics B.2 about astronomy, harmonics, and optics, subordinate sciences are mathematical disciplines as they are placed under number theory or geometry (194a7–9). They are ‘more physical’, though, than number theory or

(IØŒłÆ) that characterizes more general or theoretical superordinate disciplines concerns specific types of phenomena or objects examined by subordinate sciences (cf. 79a10–13). Here I agree with McKirahan (‘Subordinate’, p. 203) that ‘the optician discovers facts (‹Ø) and then, like any other scientist, seeks to prove them, and attain full scientific knowledge. But because of the way he treats the objects of his study, his proofs are geometrical; without knowledge of geometry, he could have factual knowledge, but would be unable to upgrade this to Ø Ø knowledge.’ I do not agree, however, that, in so far as the optician seeks to prove his or her optical conclusions, he or she is operating qua geometer but not qua optician. It is true that optical proofs are geometrical in that they use geometrical principles and theorems about geometrical objects. But does this require that optics knows geometrical principles in the way in which geometry does? Or is it necessary that optics should know the proofs of geometrical theorems in the way in which geometry does? It should be noted that this is not a point about whether the same person could be both a geometer and an optician. This is certainly possible. It does not follow from this, though, that proofs in optics are just geometrical proofs. For, even if optics includes geometrical principles or theorems, this normally holds only implicitly or indirectly. Hence, the optician normally uses theorems about geometrical objects without proving them. Similarly, because these theorems are proved by geometry from geometrical principles, optics involves geometrical principles too. But again this is an indirect sort of involvement: for optics does not know these principles as explanatory starting-points, nor does it prove from them any geometrical theorems. Rather, optics assumes geometrical theorems (proved by geometry from geometrical principles). From these theorems, plus optical observations, it demonstrates its own optical conclusions. 14

68

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

geometry are in that they invoke mathematical theorems ‘from above’ to provide quantitative explanations of natural objects, phenomena, or some of their aspects. The passage just quoted adds that these natural bodies (or the phenomena involving them) are essentially different from mathematical forms studied by number theory or geometry.15 For they are not simply types of unit, number, or ratio; nor are they points, lines, planes, or solids of some sort. They involve, nevertheless, in some non-essential fashion, mathematical forms (79a7: Œ åæÅÆØ E YØ). Thus, for instance, certain parts, features, or aspects of them can be analysed in terms of mathematical objects.16 Or certain phenomena involving them can be explained mathematically on the basis of theorems which are about mathematical forms. It may be objected, at this juncture, that Aristotle’s view of subordinate sciences allows physics itself to be a type of applied mathematical science like mechanics, optics, or astronomy. For, it will be claimed, subordinate sciences of this sort fit mathematical forms onto natural bodies and their matter and, on this basis, explain why natural enmattered objects are as they are, why they possess their necessary attributes, and, most significantly, why they are capable of undergoing certain types of change. Thus, for instance, mechanics explains (amongst other things) the downward motion of material spheroids on inclined planes by reference to stereometrical theorems. Optics derives explanations of the reflection (a change in direction) of light-rays on mirrors (or other similar surfaces) from geometrical theorems. Astronomy shows why celestial bodies revolve around the Earth in uniform cyclical motion on the basis of geometrical propositions. If so, however, there is no need to think that there are extra entities, natural forms, which are different from mathematical forms in that they alone possess

It is worth noting that I agree with Ross (Aristotle’s ‘Prior’ and ‘Posterior Analytics’, Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 551–2) against Barnes (Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 159 and 161–2; see his (k)) that the ÆFÆ at 79a6 does not refer to subordinate sciences. If so, Aristotle’s present claim is not that subordinate sciences differ in essence from superordinate mathematical sciences but use the mathematical forms that these latter study. For Aristotle, at 79a3, uses the personal yØ to refer to mathematical scientists who lack knowledge of the ‹Ø and of the particulars. If so, to refer to these scientists or their disciplines, he would use NØ ªaæ yØ/ÆhØ ‹Ø . . . at 79a6. Rather, by using Ø b ÆFÆ ‹Æ . . . , Aristotle refers back to the ØÆ H ŒÆŁ’ŒÆ just mentioned at 79a5–6. For he is discussing particular types of natural perceptible object (those ignored by mathematical scientists), which are essentially different from mathematical forms but, nevertheless, involve, in some way or other, mathematical forms. Ross’s rendering of Œ åæÅÆØ E YØ as ‘things which manifest forms but have a distinctive nature of their own’ expresses exactly this contrast. This interpretation makes better sense of 79a6–7 in general: it is natural perceptible objects which Œ åæÅÆØ E YØ, although they are æ  Ø c PÆ from these very mathematical forms. If one worries about the irregular construal of Œ åæÅÆØ, there is an alternative interpretation which takes the subjects of Ø and Œ åæÅÆØ to be different: ÆFÆ as the subject of Ø refers to objects, which are essentially different from mathematical forms, while an understood Ø is the subject of Œ åæÅÆØ. If so, the meaning would be that, while the objects are essentially different from mathematical forms, one uses such mathematical forms for these objects. Although this is not an impossible construction, I find more natural and plausible the interpretation that takes ÆFÆ as the single subject of the whole clause and as referring to objects. 16 From Physics B.2, 193b31–3, we have already seen that mathematical entities, such as points, lines, etc., are simply bounds of natural bodies but are not their essential features. 15

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

69

the distinctive features which could account for the essence of material bodies and their capacities for change. There is a core presupposition made by this type of objection which is grossly mistaken. Subordinate mathematical sciences do not explain the being of material bodies, their necessary properties, or their capacities for change by applying merely abstract mathematical forms to them (or their matter), or by reference to mathematical theorems that are about such abstractions. Nor is it possible for mathematical disciplines to achieve such explanatory goals from their own, limited resources. Rather, subordinate mathematical sciences assume that material bodies are as they are (e.g. essentially form- and matter-involving), and that they are capable of undergoing the types of change they actually engage in. What these sciences explain are quantitative, magnitude-related, or, quite generally, mathematical features of (or relations between) natural objects, their attributes, or phenomena involving these, on the assumption that they are matter-involving and capable of certain sorts of change.17 Thus, for instance, astronomy, optics, mechanics, etc. fit mathematical forms onto natural bodies (or their matter) and deduce from mathematical theorems propositions that account for (e.g.) measures of material lines, surfaces, or solids, for degrees of angles formed by limits of natural bodies, for equalities or inequalities between physical magnitudes, for the temporal duration of observed spatial motions, etc. If so, subordinate mathematical sciences assume that natural bodies are essentially matter- and change-involving and explain only mathematical aspects, properties, or relations manifested by these bodies or their changes. Mathematical forms and theorems about them provide only mathematical models for the change of natural material objects. They do not, indeed cannot, ground their capacities for change. It is only on the basis of natural forms, with distinctively non-mathematical or non-abstract essences, that the physicist can explain why natural hylomorphic compounds are material in the way they are and possess their capacities for certain kinds of change. In the next section I shall argue that Aristotle’s aim in Physics B.2 is to specify further the difference between mathematical and natural form, and to show why the latter can account for material objects and their change. Subordinate sciences, then, constitute cases in which merely mathematical abstractions (forms which are separable from matter in thought) are applied to natural perceptible objects.18 Indeed, at 79a7–10 Aristotle notes that superordinate mathematical sciences

17

McKirahan seems to make this point in his treatment of Aristotelian subordinate sciences. See his ‘Subordinate’, p. 202; see also his Principles, p. 65. 18 It is interesting to compare this claim with Aristotle’s statement at Phys. B.2, 194a9–12, that subordinate sciences involve an inversion of the process of mathematical abstraction (194a9: IƺØ ªaæ æ  Ø’ åıØ B fi ªø æÆ fi ) and that they study mathematical form not as mathematical but as natural (194a11–12:  ’ OØŒc ÆŁÅ ÆØŒc b ªæÆ c [sc. ŒE], Iºº’ Påfi w ÆŁÅ ÆØŒc Iºº’fi w çıØŒ). Posterior Analytics A.13 suggests that, in so far as they are mathematical, subordinate sciences use abstract mathematical forms and apply them to natural bodies or phenomena. But this is a sort of addition, the reverse of abstraction: for, while they start with form which is abstracted from matter, they re-introduce some type of matter or natural body that can be thought of as exemplifying the relevant form (even if approximately). In another way, though, there is reverse abstraction in the sense of additional abstraction from objects which are

70

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

(the ones that know the reason why) are about mathematical forms (æd YÅ; a ªø æØŒa [sc. YÅ]). These forms do not essentially belong to any subject in particular. That is to say, no specific type of natural body or its matter is part of their essence. Even if it is necessary that mathematical forms exist in some type of natural body or other (or: even if they must belong to some type of subject or other) if they are to exist at all, yet they are not studied by any mathematical discipline as essentially involving any type of natural body, matter, or subject. Forms of natural bodies, by contrast, cannot be identified with immaterial mathematical forms. For natural objects are themselves essentially different from mathematical forms (79a6–7: æ Ø ZÆ c PÆ [sc. H NH]) as they are not separable in thought from certain types of perceptible matter. In the terminology used by Posterior Analytics A.13, 79a8–10, natural objects or their essences, their forms, cannot be essentially independent of all types of subject in which they inhere. It follows, then, that the objects of natural science, the forms of natural hylomorphic compounds, are not like mathematical forms, the objects of (superordinate or subordinate) mathematical sciences. Let us explain further the differences between the two.

4.4 What Natural Forms Are Not Like (II): Mathematical Abstractions in Thought (Physics B.2, 193b31–5) Section [ii] of the passage from Physics B.2 quoted in section 4.2 traces the difference between natural and mathematical form in the distinctive way in which mathematics already abstract: e.g. mechanics takes a mathematical line and focuses only on those of its geometrical features that can be implemented on perceptible, material spheroids and planes, disregarding any geometrical features that do not apply to its specific subject-matter. This relation of implementation or application of mathematical forms to non-mathematical objects is captured by Aristotle’s notion of KçÆæ Ø which is employed in other parts of Posterior Analytics A. Aristotle argues that the proper principles of a science and the theorems it proves from them cannot apply to other sciences: for what these principles and theorems are about, the subject-matter of a science, is different from that of other sciences. If so, the proofs of a science do not fit onto the subjectmatter of another (APo. A. 7, 75b4: PŒ Ø [ . . . ] KçÆæ ÆØ). Hence, principles and theorems from number theory do not apply to points, lines, etc., the subject-matter of geometry (75b3–6). The only exception is superordinate and subordinate sciences, where the theorems of the higher sciences do apply to the subjectmatter of the lower ones (75b12–17; cf. A.9, 76a4–13; A.12, 77b1–2; A.27, 87a33–4). The implication, then, is that the proper principles and theorems of a superordinate science do fit onto the subject-matter of the relevant subordinate one(s) (A.9, 76a22–5:  ’ I ØØ PŒ KçÆæ Ø K’ ¼ºº ª  , Iºº’ j ‰ YæÅÆØ Æƒ ªø æØŒÆd Kd a ÅåÆØŒa j OØŒa ŒÆd ƃ IæØŁ ÅØŒÆd Kd a ±æ ØŒ ). The relation of fitting onto between proofs of a superordinate science and subject-matter of a subordinate science could be seen as the epistemic counterpart to the ontological relation of ‘coming to be on/in’ that holds between mathematical forms and specific types of matter (KªªªŁÆØ; KتªŁÆØ; cf. Met. Z.10, 1035a5; 12; 13–14; Z.11, 1036a31; b6–7). If a mathematical form, F, can come to be on/in a particular (perceptible, natural) type of subject, body, or matter, M, the mathematical principles and theorems that are about F fit onto (or can be correctly applied to) M, the object that involves or exemplifies F. Conversely, if the mathematical F-related principles or theorems correctly apply to M, F can come to be in/on M. I am indebted to Edward Hussey for reminding me of the passages from Posterior Analytics A which discuss the relation of KçÆæ Ø and for suggesting a way in which to understand the inversion of abstraction in subordinate sciences.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

71

studies its objects. While mathematicians study the very same natural points, lines, etc. which are the limits of natural bodies, yet they do not study them as the limits of natural bodies. Nor do they examine their attributes as attributes that belong to the limits of natural bodies (193b31–3). Rather, as I suggested, mathematical forms and their features are seen as essentially independent of natural bodies or their matter. They are examined in their own right, as mathematical objects and as mathematical features, respectively. On the assumption, then, that mathematical forms are essentially independent of perceptible types of matter and so are different from natural forms, it is important to formulate a criterion with which to demarcate which forms fall under each category. Without a criterion of this sort, it would be merely a matter of arbitrary regulation to take some cases as mathematical and others as natural and to define them accordingly with or without mentioning matter. It has been argued by David Charles that Physics B.2, 193b33–5, offers just such a criterion:19 ‘the mathematician separates mathematical forms and their features [from natural bodies and their matter]; for they are separate/separable in thought from change, and it makes no difference, nor does any error arise from this separation.’ The point which is crucial for present purposes concerns the separability of certain items in comparison with others. Mathematicians take as their starting-points natural material objects and correctly employ a process of thought-separation or abstraction. By disregarding all material features of the relevant objects this process of thoughtabstraction results in mathematical forms, which are essentially independent of matter and change (193b34: åøæØa ªaæ B fi Ø ŒØ KØ). It should be noted that, in Aristotle’s view, ‘essentially involving some type(s) of matter’ and ‘essentially being capable of change of some corresponding type(s)’ seem necessarily co-extensive.20 The type of independence that mathematical forms enjoy from matter is clearly one in thought or in definition (193b34: B fi Ø; 194a2: º ªØ f ‹æı ). The idea is

Charles, ‘Psychological’, p. 5; also see his ‘Aristotle on Desire and Action’, in D. Frede & B. Reis (eds.), Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2009, pp. 291–308 (at pp. 293–4). 20 There is a problem here: why is Aristotle claiming that mathematical objects are (truly) separate in thought or definition from change (193b34; 194a5)? We would expect him to be saying that they are separate from perceptible matter. Indeed, in my formulations I took perceptible matter as the item which mathematical objects are separate from. One reason for favouring this view is that in the case of natural objects (flesh, blood, human, etc.) Aristotle argues that they are like snubness but not like mathematical entities (194a6–7). A few lines later, however, (a12–15) he will claim that, just as snubness (194a13: Ø Å ) or the form of snub, natural forms are neither without matter nor in accordance with matter (194a14–15: h’ ¼ı oºÅ a ØÆFÆ h ŒÆa c oºÅ). This clearly implies that natural forms are not definitionally separate from matter as their account cannot be without matter, whereas mathematical objects are definitionally separate from matter. A second, more general, consideration in favour of taking matter as the thing which mathematical or natural objects are or are not (respectively) separate from is that change can be understood as something which requires matter as a substratum that supports change or makes it possible. If so, the fact that mathematical objects are separate from change implies that they are separate from matter too. By contrast, if natural bodies are inseparable from change, they are inseparable from matter too. Cf. Charlton, W., Aristotle’s ‘Physics’ I, II, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 96. In chapter 6 I shall return to these questions of what the relation between matter and change is, and how this relation is relevant to the claim that natural form is essentially enmattered. 19

72

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

that, in the case of mathematical objects or their forms, mathematicians are correct in separating away perceptible matter from them and defining them without mentioning any such matter. For these defined items indeed are separable in account: no error arises in mathematical reasoning if one defines being a triangle (or the form of triangle) as being a three-sided closed plane figure, without invoking possible types of perceptible material in which triangularity might be realized. It is important to emphasize that, in Aristotle’s view, the reason why no error arises in mathematics is not that our reasoning proceeds in a certain way or that we have certain definitional strategies in particular scientific disciplines. Rather, it is because mathematical objects themselves, within the domain of mathematics, do not essentially involve any perceptible type of matter at all that we are capable of truly or correctly defining them in the way we do and of engaging in correct mathematical reasoning on the basis of these successful definitions.21 While this view might not seem to constitute a perspicuous or fully worked out ontology of mathematical objects, it is important for the comparison between mathematical and natural forms. For its implication is that in defining natural forms differently from mathematical forms, the correctness of our definitions and the truth of our relevant reasoning do not consist simply in making conventions or stipulating meanings of terms. Rather, Aristotle thinks that, because natural forms are themselves as they are, and differ in certain ways from mathematical forms, we define them correctly and draw true inferences about them in the way we do. The criterion, then, with which to decide whether to mention matter in the definition of a form or not (and so the way in which to demarcate natural from mathematical form) is to see whether any errors arise in our reasoning about the definiendum if matter is taken away from its definiens. If there is no resulting error, the definiendum is separable in thought or in definition from matter. If errors arise, the definiendum is not independent of matter. This test can be formulated in the following brief way: A is separable in thought from B if no error arises in one’s relevant A-related reasoning if one considers A to exist without B existing. In discussing this test, David Charles notes that, although (e.g.) mathematical objects are separate in thought or account in this manner, they in fact cannot exist if they are not enmattered in any perceptual matter at all.22 This last claim, however, is about the ontological status of mathematical entities as existing physical items, not about their nature or their properties within the context of mathematical sciences.23 Thus, the fact that mathematical 21 This seems to be the point made at Phys. B.2, 193b33–4: the claim that mathematicians (correctly) abstract and define without matter or change is grounded on the claim that mathematical objects truly are separate in thought from matter or change (193b34: åøæØa ªaæ . . . ). 22 Charles, ‘Psychological’, p. 5. 23 Charles draws attention to the fact that the notion of relevant A-related reasoning needs spelling out. A promising starting-point for this task is his distinction between ‘what is essential to mathematical reasoning’ and ‘what are external claims about mathematical reasoning’. Thus, for instance, claims within the philosophy of mathematics about (e.g.) the metaphysical status of numbers would be examples of the second type of claim. Claims within arithmetic about the properties of natural numbers or about addition would fall under the first type. As Charles remarks, ‘[t]his distinction allows the mathematician to make a true mathematical

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

73

objects do not exist separately from all types of perceptible matter (taken collectively) does not corrode our mathematical reasoning about them in any important way. Suppose, for example, the definition of the form of triangle as being a three-sided closed plane figure: it follows from this definition plus further propositions that (amongst other things) triangles have a sum of internal angles equal to two right angles. This consequence of the definition, just as all other triangle-related theorems of (e.g.) Euclidean geometry, is true or correct (in the relevant geometrical domain). No error ensues from defining the triangle without any reference to perceptible matter, because (Euclidean) geometrical triangles do not essentially involve any type of perceptible matter at all. The case of natural form, by contrast, is not similar to that of mathematical entities.24 Defining (e.g.) human soul, the form of being human, as being a rational soul may, perhaps if taken in conjunction with certain further claims, lead our reasoning to the conclusion that (e.g.) all humans necessarily do nothing else but theoretical thinking. Similarly, it would be a mistake to apply the geometrical definition of concavity or the concavity-related geometrical theorems to the form of snub. For the geometrical definition or the theorems flowing from it would yield results which do not hold good of the nasal type of concavity, the sort of thing that the form of snub is. For example, geometrical theorems about concavity would hold only by approximation, and with the help of idealizations, in the case of snubness. Further, and more importantly, definitions or theorems of this sort might lead our snubness-related reasoning to the error that snub-objects are not capable of change. For instance, if snubness is understood simply in terms of mathematical concavity, as essentially non-enmattered, a snub-nose might be conceived as an object whose shape could not be altered or restored depending on whether pressure is exerted on it. It is clear, then, that definitions of this type – definitions of natural forms which make no mention of any appropriate type of matter – may give rise to errors such as the ones just noted. The reason why these errors arise is because natural forms essentially involve not only formal but also material features of certain types (cf. Met. Z.11, 1036b23–4). For this reason, the definitions of these forms must be shaped in terms of not only formal but also material items. Thus, if one were to imagine away or ignore the relevant material items, one would be driven into incorrect definitions which ‘miss the target’ definiendum. Moreover, on the basis of these incorrect definitions, one would derive further features which are not true of the relevant objects. If so, one would make errors in one’s reasoning about the objects allegedly defined.

claim, e.g., 2þ2¼4, even when he (or she) holds a false, e.g., Platonist view about the ontological status of numbers’ (‘Psychological’, p. 5, n. 12). 24 This is precisely the focus of Aristotle’s own criticism of Socrates the Younger as set out in Met. Z.11, 1036b25; 26; 28: the analogy that Socrates the Younger used to draw between human and circle is not successful. I shall come back to this important point in the next chapter.

74

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

These errors, then, would be rooted in the initial mistake of hyper-formality, by which the definition of a form is formulated in purely formal terms without any reference whatever to any appropriate type of matter. Conversely, however, this sort of failure should not lead one into the opposite mistake of hyper-materiality: as I noted, it is not any and every type of matter which must be mentioned in the definition of an essentially enmattered form but only the types of material feature appropriate to constitute the relevant form or integral to its being the kind of form it is.25 At any rate, the test by which to avoid hyper-materiality seems to be the same as in the case of overcoming hyper-formality. In both cases, the proposed definition must not give rise to any errors in our relevant reasoning about the form defined. Thus, for instance, it would be a mistake to define the form of snub by reference to my nasal matter; for this would lead to the error that any nasal concavity which is not enmattered in my nasal matter is not snubness.

4.5 What Natural Forms Are Not Like (III): Platonist Forms So far the conclusion is that natural form is not like mathematical form, the object studied by (superordinate or subordinate) mathematical sciences. Mathematical form passes the test introduced in the previous section and so is correctly defined as essentially independent of matter. If so, natural form should not pass this test: abstracting matter away from natural form and defining it as essentially independent of material features would yield mistakes in our reasoning within natural sciences. In section [iii] of the passage from Physics B.2 cited in section 4.2 (193b35–194a7), Aristotle draws precisely this contrast between natural and mathematical forms by noting that quasimathematical accounts of natural forms (that make no reference to matter or change) would be unsuccessful. Unsurprisingly, his study-cases are taken from Platonizing practices of defining natural forms. Aristotle’s criticism is that, while mathematicians correctly employ separation in thought and successfully define mathematical form as essentially independent of natural bodies and their matter (or change), Platonists incorrectly apply the same thoughtprocess to natural forms and seek to define them separately from natural bodies and their matter (or change). Their attempts at defining natural forms in this fashion fail as their use of thought-abstraction or separation on these forms is mistaken: for natural forms just are not separate in thought or in definition from matter or change (193b36–194a1: a ªaæ çıØŒa åøæÇıØ w ZÆ åøæØa H ÆŁÅ ÆØŒH). It is important to emphasize that Aristotle’s present claim is not simply that natural forms necessarily depend for their existence upon matter. He argues for the stronger

25 I shall discuss the issue of how to specify the scope and nature of these types of matter in sections 5.5 and 7.9.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

75

claim that they cannot even be defined or successfully grasped as essentially independent of matter. Hence, as Ross correctly notes, this passage does not reproduce Aristotle’s usual critique of Platonists, that they render their Forms existentially independent of perceptible particulars and their matter.26 Rather, the charge against Platonizing definitions is stronger than this: not only are their Forms incapable of existing separately from natural bodies or their matter; they cannot even be defined (correctly) without mentioning matter. But this latter stronger claim seems a fortiori to entail the former. That Aristotle is here interested in (successful) definitions becomes clear from 194a1–3. While accounts of mathematical forms as essentially separate from matter are correct, accounts of natural forms along similar lines are mistaken. To show this, it is sufficient to attempt to provide a correct definition of a natural form (194a2: º ªØ f ‹æı ). It is certainly possible to offer an account of a natural form without mentioning any matter at all. This is exactly how Platonizing definers proceed. Even in an Aristotelian definition in terms of form plus matter, it is possible to ignore away the material terms and construct an account which contains only formal terms. But this would not constitute a successful or correct definition (‹æ ). In contradistinction with mathematical practice, this sort of account would give rise to errors in our reasoning about the relevant natural form defined. Aristotle compares between mathematical entities and their attributes, on the one hand, and natural forms, on the other (194a2–3: ‹æı ŒÆd ÆPH ŒÆd H ı ÅŒ ø). While being odd, even, straight, curved (features) or number, line, figure (entities that have such features), etc. are correctly defined without matter or change, flesh, bone, man, etc. are not (194a3–6: e b ªaæ æØe ÆØ . . . ¼ı ŒØø , aæ b ŒÆd OF ŒÆd ¼Łæø PŒ Ø). How natural forms should be correctly defined is more positively alluded to on the basis of Aristotle’s favoured example, the snub-nose (194a6–7: Iººa ÆFÆ [sc. a çıØŒa] uæ Þd Ø c Iºº’ På ‰ e ŒÆ º º ªÆØ).27 A natural form is not like the mathematical form of being curved in which there is no essential involvement of any perceptible types of matter. The idea, then, is that the essence of natural forms encompasses both formal and material parts, just as the coupled object snub-nose does. This positive view of natural form as essentially enmattered will be the focus of the next chapter. What is important for present purposes is to defuse a possible objection to my interpretation of Aristotle’s examples and of his general aim. In my view, the examples of mathematical and natural entities offered in Physics B.2 are cases of form or, at least, are intended to cover such cases too, over and above compound objects. Thus, I have been speaking of the mathematical form of being a triangle (or triangularity), the formal feature of being curved, and the natural forms of being flesh, bone, or human being. It might be objected, however, that in the example given at 194a6 the contrast between 26 27

Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s ‘Physics’, Oxford University Press, 1936, pp. 506–7. This example is taken up and developed later at 194a12ff. I shall discuss this passage in the next chapter.

76

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

mathematical entities and a compound or coupled object (the snub-nose), together with the parallelism between this last case and natural entities (193b36: a çıØŒa), suggest that it is only natural compounds, but not natural forms, which are inseparable from matter (or change). If Aristotle intended his position to range over natural forms too, he would contrast mathematical entities with the form of snubness or being snub. Further, he would argue that natural ‘entities’ are similar to this form of snubness or being snub. If this objection were correct, however, natural forms would turn out to be on a par with mathematical entities, the essence of which does not comprise any types of perceptible matter. But if so, the overall argument of Physics B.2, 193b22–194a12, would seem odd. What would be the point of contrasting mathematical entities, immaterial forms, with natural entities, which are inseparable from matter, if Aristotle retreated back to the view that the forms of the latter are just like mathematical forms? And how would he explain the consequence of this position that, while natural forms are essentially non-enmattered, the objects they are essences of, the corresponding natural compounds, are essentially enmattered? My discussion (in section 4.3) of subordinate mathematical sciences suggests that natural form is not like the mathematical form taken up by these sciences and applied to natural material objects. Hence, it would constitute a better strategy for Aristotle to argue that just as, and because, natural forms are essentially matter-involving, natural compounds (which are enformed by them) are essentially enmattered. I shall return to this important point in the following chapter. Even independently of these issues, however, there is textual evidence which suggests that Aristotle aims to cover the case of natural form too as essentially matterinvolving. First, in introducing his criticism of Platonists, his point is that they attempt to define their own Forms (193b36: ƒ a N Æ º ª ) as independent of matter. If so, his interest is in entities such as the natural forms of being flesh, being bone, being man, etc. His criticism of Platonism, then, should be that these entities, natural forms, are not essentially independent of matter: being flesh, being bone, being man, etc. are not essentially immaterial Platonist Forms but are natural forms whose essence includes matter. Aristotle’s goal is to block the identification of natural forms with Platonist Forms: for this would be effectively equivalent to identifying natural forms with quasimathematical, purely formal entities, a mistake which is the main target of the criticism developed in Physics B.2. Further, at 194a6–7, it is not necessary to take the snub-nose as a coupled or compound object, as opposed to a formal entity or attribute, such as being snubnose. Indeed, the snub-nose (Ø c Þd ) is contrasted with the curved (e ŒÆ º), which is clearly taken as an attribute, being curved or curvedness, but not as the curved thing (at 194a3–5 e æØe, e ¼æØ,  PŁf and e ŒÆ º are all examples of ı ÅŒ Æ, while IæØŁ e , ªæÆ c and åB Æ are examples of mathematical entities to which these ı ÅŒ Æ belong). If so, Aristotle’s point seems to be that, while being curved, a mathematical form or feature, is essentially non-enmattered,

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

77

being snub-nosed (a natural form or feature) and all other natural forms like it, are not essentially independent of matter. For, just as the essence of being snub-nosed includes being a nose or being embodied in nasal matter, similarly the essence of all natural forms contains material features. Lastly, and most importantly, even if this passage at 193b22–194a12 is not decisive as to whether Aristotle intends both natural forms and compounds or just compounds as essentially matter- and change-involving, his later discussion more straightforwardly covers natural form too. For a few lines below, at 194a13–15, he states that natural entities studied by physics are like snubness (194a13: uæ æd Ø Å ), the form of being snub, not simply the compound snub-thing or snub-nose. Similarly, in the closing lines of the chapter, at 194b9–10, he emphasizes that his arguments are about the form (194b10: e r  ). In both cases, though, he adds that this natural sort of form is not without, or is in, matter (194a14–15; b12–13). While these claims will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, it is obvious for present purposes that natural forms themselves (and not just compound objects) are sharply contrasted with mathematical forms and are deemed to be essentially matter- and change-involving.

4.6 Platonist Forms and Change (Metaphysics A.9 and Z.8) As I noted, Aristotle’s examples and arguments given in Physics B.2, 193b22–194a12, do not directly state that natural forms, unlike mathematical forms, are essentially dependent on perceptible types of matter. Rather, the claim is that their essence is change-involving, as opposed to mathematical entities which are (correctly) defined without mentioning any type(s) of change at all (193b34–5; 194a3–6). It is only after 194a12 that natural forms are clearly thought to be essentially dependent on perceptible types of matter (194a13–15; b12–13). I remarked earlier that this shift from changeto matter-involvement suggests that Aristotle conceives of being essentially changeinvolving and being essentially matter-involving as necessarily equivalent (or he takes the corresponding terms as necessarily co-extensive).28 In chapter 6 I shall discuss in some detail this connection between change and matter, and its underlying ground. At present, though, it would be useful to see how Aristotle deploys the link between natural form and change in his criticism of Platonist Forms advanced in several parts of the Metaphysics. This discussion will shed more light on the contrast between mathematical and natural forms drawn in Physics B.2 by illustrating how Platonizing definitions of natural forms in purely formal terms would mistakenly identify natural with mathematical forms.

28 It is not an implication of this view that the features of being essentially change-involving and being essentially matter-involving are identical. Nor does this view entail that the corresponding terms have the same meaning.

78

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

A good starting-point for this discussion is Metaphysics A.9. This chapter attacks the general Platonist thesis that Forms exist independently of, or over and above (Ææa), all perceptible particulars and their matter (cf. A.6, 987b4–10; M.4, 1078b12–17; 30–4; M.9, 1086a31–b13). There are three arguments, however, which make the further, distinctive claim that Platonist Forms cannot even serve as causes of any locomotion, coming-to-be or, quite generally, change in the perceptible world, although they are posited as such causes. Indeed, Aristotle’s deeper reason for this charge is not simply that Platonist Forms are taken as existentially independent of perceptible particulars. Rather, he seems to be arguing that Platonists conceive their Forms in a ‘more mathematical’ fashion than is appropriate. Combining this point with the claim of Physics B.2 (193b35–194a7) that Platonists mistakenly define their Forms quasimathematically, as essentially independent of change (and matter), yields the result that Platonist Forms cannot explain change in the perceptible world as they do not themselves essentially involve change (or matter) in some appropriate mode. This implies that Aristotle’s own natural forms are different from Platonist Forms (as well as mathematical entities) in that they encompass change (and matter) in their essence. Further, this essential involvement of change (and matter), however it may be spelt out, secures the fundamental causal role of Aristotelian natural forms as essences of natural, changeable material objects. These consequences will be explored further in the next two chapters. Aristotle’s criticism in Metaphysics A.9 assumes that Platonists hold that their Forms do not exist in the perceptible objects which participate in them but are existentially independent of them (991a12–14: c Kıæå ª E  åıØ). One of the major difficulties arising from this view is described in the following passage: Most of all one would raise the difficulty as to what, in the end, Forms contribute either to those perceptibles that are imperishable or to those [perceptibles] which come to be and pass away; for they are not causes for perceptibles of any of their motion or change [ø b ºØÆ ØÆæØ ¼ Ø   ı ººÆØ a YÅ E IœØ H ÆNŁÅH j E ªØª Ø

ŒÆd çŁØæ Ø · h ªaæ ŒØø h ƺB P ØA Kd ÆYØÆ ÆPE ]. (Met. A.9, 991a8–11; my trans.)

It is clear that Forms are posited as principles or causes of some sort to account for the nature of changing perceptible beings. Indeed, Aristotle implies that, while both perishable and imperishable perceptible objects are capable of undergoing change, Platonist Forms cannot account for change in either region.29 It is tempting to suppose

29 At 991a11 the ÆPE seems to be picking up both IœØ and ªØª Ø /çŁØæ Ø collectively. This might be the reason why Aristotle includes both ŒØø and ƺB in his remark. The term ŒÅØ is linguistically closer to locomotion (although it can normally signify any type of change) and so applies better to imperishable perceptibles (such as celestial bodies) as they can undergo only locomotion (and perhaps, in some cases, alteration: cf. the phases of the moon) but not growth or coming-to-be/passing-away. By contrast, ƺc is a more general term which signifies more inclusively all four types of change. If so, it characterizes better perishable perceptibles, which can undergo any of these four types of change.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

79

that the reason for the Forms’ causal inadequacy is simply their assumed existential independence from perceptible objects. Aristotle’s criticism advanced in Physics B.2, however, suggests that Platonists do not only make this assumption of existential independence but also define their Forms as essentially separable from change (and matter). If so, the idea behind Aristotle’s complaint in Metaphysics A.9 is that because Forms are (incorrectly) grasped as essentially non-change-involving, they cannot ground the capacity for change of the perceptible objects they are supposed to be the essences and principles of. At this point, though, it is far from clear why Aristotle thinks that the notion of being a cause of change in the perceptible world requires that the cause itself essentially involve change (or matter). A second argument, deployed a few lines later, seems to come to grips with this pressing question. Further, it would seem impossible for the substance and that whose substance it is to be separately [from each other]; so how would Forms be separately [from things], although they are substances of [these] things? But this is what is said in the Phaedo, that Forms are causes both of being and of coming-to-be; but, even if Forms exist, yet those that participate in them do not come-to-be if what initiates the change does not exist [ŒÆØ H NH Zø ‹ ø P ªªÆØ a  åÆ i cfi q e ŒØB], and many other things come-to-be, like, e.g., a house or a ring, which we say there are no Forms of; so it is clear that it is possible that the others too both are and come-tobe because of similar causes such as the ones because of which the things just mentioned [are and come-to-be]. (Met. A.9, 991b1–9; my trans.)

While this passage begins with the usual criticism that Platonist Forms are mistakenly thought to be existentially separate or separable from (or independent of) the objects they are essences of, it goes on to invoke the idea that they cannot function as causes of being or coming-to-be for the objects that partake of them.30 Especially in the case of coming-to-be and, quite generally, change, which is our main interest at present, Aristotle develops an ingenious concessive argument in two parts. The first is intended to cover cases of natural coming-to-be. Thus, he points out that, even if Platonist Forms exist, they do not seem to cause the coming-to-be of any of their participants. For, without a particular material object that acts as the moving or efficient cause of a natural process of coming-to-be, a Form by itself could never give rise to the resulting complete object (991b5: P ªªÆØ a  åÆ i cfi q e ŒØB). Conversely, even if the Form exists, it seems to be explanatorily and causally redundant as the particular ‘mover’ is sufficient to account for the coming-to-be of a natural object. Hence, for instance, in the coming-to-be of a human being the father is a sufficient moving cause, whereas the Form of human being does not seem to play any relevant or indispensable causal role.

30 Ross (Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 1, p. 199) suggests that Aristotle’s reference to Plato’s Phaedo is intended to cover the discussion of 100d. I shall not go into this issue at all.

80

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Second, in the case of craft-production, Aristotle denies that there are any artefact Forms.31 Even so, however, many particular artefacts come-to-be (or are produced) without any need to posit Forms over and above the craftsman or the artist, the particular moving cause that initiates the process of production and (if all goes well) produces the finished artefact. From this Aristotle concludes that it is possible that in natural cases, too, the causes of coming-to-be of natural objects are similar to those that operate in craft-production, where no Forms exist. But if so, it is possible to explain the coming-to-be of natural objects without invoking any Platonist Forms. Indeed, as the previous argument implies, it would be unclear how such Forms could be causes of change or coming-to-be without any particular natural objects themselves carrying through that role. In both parts of this argument, however, Aristotle’s line of reasoning could easily give rise to misconstruals. It may be thought that his view entails that there are no forms at all, whether Platonist or non-Platonist. For, it will be argued, just as no forms exist or cause the production of artefacts, no forms are causally relevant or necessary as ‘movers’ in natural processes of coming-to-be. Rather, it is always particular material objects which function as efficient causes and explain the coming-to-be of natural objects and artefacts alike. But this is not Aristotle’s position. For he clearly thinks that there are natural forms which explain natural coming-to-be. But they are not like Platonist Forms. Not only do Aristotle’s forms exist inseparably from the material perceptible objects they enform. More importantly, as Physics B.2 argues, they are not essentially independent of change (or matter; cf. 193b35–194a7; 13–15; 194b12–13). If this is correct, Aristotle’s criticism is intended to block only a particular conception of forms as comprising no change-involving features. His own position is that to explain coming-to-be or, in general, change, forms cannot have the mathematical character that Platonists seem to ascribe to their Forms. Rather, they must be entities that enform and are essences of particular material objects which function as efficient causes of change, or which arise from such processes as complete end-results. Particular material ‘movers’ are compounds from matter and form. If so, their causal efficacy and their role in explaining change must be grounded (at least partly) on the distinctive features of the form that is their essence. Thus, for instance, the form of human being is the kind of entity that is the essence of the father, of the particular compound object that initiates generation and causes the coming-to-be of the offspring. Moreover, it is the essence of the offspring itself, of the complete end-result of the relevant generation process. Aristotle’s point is not, to be sure, that these considerations demonstratively require natural forms which essentially involve change (or matter). Rather, the weight of his criticism is that it is difficult to see how immaterial and

31 Interestingly, there are many places in Plato’s dialogues in which the existence of artefact Forms seems to be affirmed (cf. Ross’s references, Metaphysics, p. 199). Aristotle’s claim at 991b6–7, then, might be either a reflection of his own denial of the existence of artefact Forms or an implication of Platonist theses set out independently of, or later than, the dialogues which accept the existence of such Forms.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

81

unchangeable quasi-mathematical Platonist Forms could be the essences of material changing objects. If so, his own view should conceive forms non-mathematically, as essentially involving change (and matter). The third argument from Metaphysics A.9, although extremely obscure in its details, brings out Aristotle’s deeper complaint about the inappropriately ‘mathematical’ understanding of Platonist Forms: Further, one could take the underlying material substance as rather mathematical [ ÆŁÅ ÆØŒø æÆ], and as being predicated and being a difference of the material substance32 rather than matter, such as, for instance, the large and the small, just like the physiologists speak of the rare and the dense, saying that these are the primary differences of the subject; for these are excesses and deficiencies of some sort.33 And about change, if these are changes, it is clear that Forms will change;34 but if not, where did change come from?35 For all study of nature is eliminated. (Met. A.9, 992b1–9; my trans.)

The ‘more mathematical’ conception of matter that Aristotle criticizes in this passage is one in which material entities are identified with attributes or ‘differences’ rather than material objects that possess these attributes or are marked out by these differences. In the Platonist picture, instead of material bodies or corporeal constituents, there are quasi-mathematical features such as the large and the small. It should be noted that the ‘large’ and the ‘small’ are presumably understood by Aristotle as the features or attributes of being large or largeness and being small or smallness. This gives good 32 I take the second ŒÆd at 992b3 as epexegetic: ‘of the substance, i.e. the matter/material substance’. There are two reasons for preferring this rendering. First, in the previous sentence (992b1–2) the substance under discussion is specified as underlying (c ŒØ Å PÆ) and as matter (‰ oºÅ). Further, the second term of the comparison at 992b4 is j oºÅ: while this sort of substance should be understood as matter, Platonists think of it as an attribute or difference. 33 The first anaphoric comparative clause (992b4: x  . . . ) gives examples of how Platonists understand material substance more mathematically: instead of material items they speak of the large and the small or largeness and smallness. The second anaphoric comparative clause (992b4–5: uæ . . . ) draws the parallel between this Platonist mathematical ‘matter’ and the physiologists’ rare and the dense, or rareness and denseness. Similarly to physiological explanations, Platonist largeness and smallness are held to be primary differentiations or differentiating factors of the underlying substance. If so, the clause æÆ F ŒØ ı çŒ r ÆØ ØÆçæa ÆÆ at 992b5–6 could be ranging over both sets of examples, Platonist and physiological alike. Similarly, at b6, ÆFÆ seems to refer both to largeness/smallness and to rareness/ denseness: for it is fair to think that each member of these pairs can be characterized as excess or deficiency, as the case may be. 34 Similarly to the ÆFÆ of 992b6, the ÆFÆ of b7 seems to refer back not only to the physiologists’ rareness and denseness but also to the Platonist entities, largeness and smallness. At b4–6 Aristotle draws the parallel between the Platonist large/small and the rare/dense of the physiologists: for both can be understood as primary ‘differences’ of the underlying subject. Then, at b6ff., he describes both pairs as excesses and deficiencies and explores whether they are identified with changes or not. If Forms such as largeness and smallness are like rareness and denseness, they can be characterized as excesses or deficiencies. But if so, these Forms (just as the excesses/deficiencies that rareness and denseness are) may involve change. 35 The odd introductory prepositional phrase æd ŒØø at 992b7 seems to provide the subject-matter of the whole argument. It functions like the phrase ‘these assumptions have consequences for the topic of change’. If this is correct, it makes sense to take ŒÅØ as the subject of  Ł qºŁ at b8: either Forms explain the source of change (but if so, they are themselves changeable); or they do not, in which case the question remains as to whence change originates.

82

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

sense to his claim that Platonists construe material entities as attributes (ŒÆŪæEŁÆØ) or as primary differences of underlying subjects (992b5–6: æÆ F ŒØ ı . . . r ÆØ ØÆçæa ÆÆ ). The second complication introduced by this argument is that it is unclear whether these ‘attributes’ or ‘differences’ are intended as static features of objects or as dynamic differentiating agents that function as causes. This ambiguity is particularly conspicuous in the term ‘difference’, which can signify either a feature (something like a differentia) or a cause that produces differentiation (e.g. an efficient cause of the coming-to-be of different types of objects). It is plausible that this last difficulty does not grow out of Aristotle’s own careless formulations. Rather, it might be reflecting a basic ambiguity in the Platonist position. Aristotle has already pointed out, in the course of Metaphysics A, that Platonists take the One (or oneness) as the essence of all other Forms, while Forms themselves are thought to be the essence of perceptible particulars (A.6, 988a10–11; A.7, 988b4–6; cf. A.5, 987b18–20). These claims give rise to the following twin questions. First, what makes each different Form the different entity it is if the essence of all of them is to be one or oneness? Second, what makes each different perceptible object that is F a different F if the essence of all perceptible Fs is the Form F ? Aristotle’s interpretation of Platonism answers questions of this sort by reference to quasi-material Platonist entities such as the large and the small. For it is on the basis of these entities, as ‘differences’ of (e.g.) the One, that each different Form is the different entity it is. Here, however, we encounter the ambiguity just noted. Are the large and the small static features that constitute the essence of each Form together with the basic underlying subject, the One? Or are they agents that act upon the One and by differentiating it produce each different Form? Similarly, in the case of different perceptible particulars, are the large and the small features that together with the Form F render each perceptible F the different F it is? Or are they agents that act upon the Form F and cause the coming-to-be of each different perceptible F? Indeed, Aristotle’s criticism developed in the passage just quoted from Metaphysics A.9 is formulated as a dilemma that mirrors the bifurcation into either ‘feature’ or ‘agent’. The large and the small are described as excesses and deficiencies of some sort. Again these characterizations are not helpful in deciding whether Platonist quasimaterial entities are quantitative features of underlying objects or causes of ‘magnifying’ or ‘diminuting’ processes that result in objects that are ‘excessively’ or ‘deficiently’ thus-and-so. Aristotle lays out two possibilities. First, it may be thought that these quasi-material entities, the large and the small, initiate processes and cause the comingto-be of ‘excessive’ or ‘deficient’ objects. But if so, Aristotle remarks, Platonist Forms will be involved in change. For not only will the large and the small, these quasimaterial Platonist Forms, themselves be efficient causes of change. Even the rest of the Forms will be acted upon by the large and the small and will be changed into (e.g.) each different perceptible particular that partakes of each Form. Alternatively, the large and the small might not play any dynamic causal role in change or in the coming-to-be of perceptible particulars. That is to say, they might be simply features or attributes that

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

83

constitute, in conjunction with Forms, the essence of different perceptible particulars. Aristotle’s complaint about this option is that it ignores the way in which nature actually works. For perceptible particulars come to be, are capable of several types of change, and eventually pass away.They are not immutable objects with permanent features, such as (e.g.) the Form F they participate in plus the corresponding attribute of being large or being small. If so, it is difficult to see how this Platonist conception can explain the source of change in the natural world. It should be noted that the interpretation just offered is only a tentative proposal for overcoming some of the exegetical hurdles of this difficult passage. It is not my aim to provide an account that solves all the relevant problems. It is clear, though, from my discussion that Aristotle criticizes Platonists for conceiving their Forms in a mathematical fashion. Further, his diagnosis is that this conception posits entities that have no clear or indispensable role as causes of change in the perceptible world. It should be emphasized that these are not idiosyncratic parts of his critique of Platonism as set out in Metaphysics A.9. Rather, they are claims that shape his own position about natural form in contradistinction with Platonist or quasi-mathematical entities. Indeed, in Metaphysics Z.8 he returns to some of these themes and invites us to grasp natural forms as essences and principles of particular material objects which cause natural processes of change, or which are complete end-results of such processes: It is clear, then, that the causality of the forms – if there are such forms apart from the particulars as some maintain – is of no use so far as concerns coming into being and substances; nor is it the case that because of these [forms] there would be substances in their own right. In some cases, indeed, it is perfectly clear that the creator is such as the created, not however the same or one in number but in kind, as, for instance, in natural things – for man begets man [ . . . ]; consequently, we evidently do not need to set up forms as paradigms (for this is the area where we should most have looked for paradigms; for these are substances most of all) but here it is sufficient that the begetter is the producer, and is the cause of the form being in the matter. (Met. Z.8, 1033b26–1034a5; Bostock’s trans.)

Here Aristotle clearly favours natural compound particulars and their forms as central cases of substance (1033b32; 1034a3–4). In these cases, he maintains, Platonist Forms existing independently of perceptible particulars (1033b27–8: Ææa a ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆÆ) have no causal relevance (1033b26–8:  H NH ÆNÆ . . . PŁb åæØ Æ). Indeed, they are completely dispensable since perceptible compound particulars are sufficient as causes of the coming-to-be of other particulars (1034a4–5: ƒŒÆe e ªH ØBÆØ ŒÆd F Yı ÆYØ r ÆØ K B fi oºÅ fi ). Moreover, even if there are Platonist Forms, they could not function as causes that give rise to perceptible particular substances (1033b28: P’ i r  Øa ÆFÆ [sc. YÅ] PÆØ ŒÆŁ’ Æ ). If so, they have no place in explaining the essence or the coming-into-being of perceptible natural objects (1033b28: æ ª a ª Ø ŒÆd a PÆ PŁb åæØ Æ). Once more, the example of the father, the particular moving cause that produces the offspring as the end-result of a generation process, does not imply that Aristotle thinks

84

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

that there are no forms at all or that they play no causal role whatever in the changes of perceptible particulars. For the father and the offspring alike are compounds from matter and form. If so, their form, in so far as it is their essence, should be (at least in part) crucial in underwriting their causal role (as either efficient or final causes) in natural processes of change. Furthermore, as Aristotle remarks, the particular compound is a cause of there being form in matter (1034a5: F Yı ÆYØ r ÆØ K B fi oºÅ fi ). This indicates that, in his view, natural forms do exist and are involved in natural processes of change, but are not like quasi-mathematical Platonist entities. While this argument does not precisely describe the distinctive features of Aristotelian natural forms, it does suggest that they should be seen as playing a fundamental causal role not only as essences of natural compounds but also as underlying their coming-to-be (they should be useful as causes æ ª a ª Ø ŒÆd a PÆ ; cf.1033b26–8). Because they are forms and essences of natural compounds, they should explain why these compounds are efficient or/and final causes of natural processes. These are constraints which are not met by Platonist Forms exactly because they are mistakenly defined as independent of change (and matter). It will be a task for subsequent chapters to explain how Aristotle’s natural forms fulfil these constraints by being essentially changeand matter-involving. A further important task will be to examine the necessary connection between change and matter.

4.7 Concluding Note on Mathematical Versus Natural Form (De Anima A.1) In sections 4.3 and 4.4 I remarked that, while mathematical forms are essentially independent of change and matter (and are correctly defined as such), yet they must exist in some perceptible material body or other if they are to exist at all. Despite this last claim of necessary existential dependence of mathematical forms on perceptible bodies or their matter, mathematical practice is not beset by any errors in the relevant reasoning about mathematical forms. Thus, for instance, while the definition of the mathematical form of being a triangle ignores the triangle’s existential dependence on material bodies, there is no mistake arising from this definition. Conversely, Aristotle’s criticism of Platonists as set out in Physics B.2 does not consist simply in the claim that natural forms must exist in some material body or other if they are to exist at all. This would be insufficient to demarcate mathematical from natural form: for mathematical forms, too, are existentially dependent on material bodies. Rather, Aristotle’s charge is that Platonists define (incorrectly) natural forms as essentially independent of matter and change. If so, his own view of natural forms does not simply affirm their existential dependence on material bodies but also, and more strongly, favours their being essentially matter- and change-involving. A difficulty arises at this juncture. How are we to understand Aristotle’s claim that mathematical forms are essentially immaterial and unchangeable, although they cannot

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

85

exist without any material bodies at all? In one possible view, this claim might seem unacceptable: for it cannot reconcile the essence with the existence conditions of mathematical forms. If mathematical forms are essentially immaterial and unchangeable, they are existents in their own right, independently of material bodies. If, by contrast, they are not independently existing objects, their essence must include material or change-related features. On the assumption that their existential dependence on material bodies carries more weight, then, mathematical forms might be taken as being on a par with natural forms. In both cases, this view will maintain, forms are not only existentially dependent upon material bodies; their essence too includes as parts perceptible types of matter or natural bodies. But if so, there remains no substantive difference between mathematical and natural form. Alternatively, it could be argued that it is unproblematic to distinguish between the existence conditions and the essence of mathematical forms. If so, while mathematical forms cannot exist without material bodies, yet their essence does not comprise matter or change. Rather, they are abstractions in thought which are essentially immaterial and unchangeable. This is so despite the fact that for these abstractions to exist it is necessary that they exist in some material body or other. This view places more importance on the nature of mathematical forms as abstractions in thought, thereby undermining their necessary existential dependence on material bodies. Once more, however, it would be possible, on the basis of this view, to equate mathematical with natural forms. Thus, it could be argued that natural forms, too, are essentially independent of matter and change, even if they cannot exist without any material bodies at all. Just as mathematical forms, natural forms, too, are abstractions in thought which can be (correctly) defined without any mention of matter or change. If so, they are not realworld physical entities. Only physical objects, perceptible particular compounds, are parts of the fabric of reality, while forms (whether natural or mathematical) are merely abstracted from such material bodies. It is important to show that both of these views make unwarranted assumptions which misrepresent Aristotle’s view: for, clearly, Aristotle draws a sharp distinction between mathematical and natural form. Any construal which obliterates this distinction, or is not sensitive to it, cannot be a successful interpretation of Aristotle’s position. Moreover, both of these views are not only exegetically inadequate but also adopt implausible claims about the nature of, and the relation between, mathematical and natural form. To shed some more light on Aristotle’s position, it is useful to examine the following two passages from De Anima A.1: If then there is any of the functions or affections of the soul which is peculiar to it, it would be possible for it [the soul] to be separated [from the body]; but if there is nothing peculiar to it [the soul], it would not be separable, but it would be like the straight, to which, qua straight, many attributes belong, as, e.g., touching the brazen sphere at a point, although the straight if separated will not so touch; for it is inseparable, if indeed it is always found with some body. (De Anima [DAn.] A.1, 403a10–16; Hamlyn’s trans.)

86

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

The attributes which are not separable, but which are not treated as attributes of such and such a body but in abstraction, are the concern of the mathematician [ . . . ]. We were saying that the affections of the soul are inseparable from the natural matter of animals in this way, [i.e.] insofar as anger and fear are such, and not in the way in which line and plane [are inseparable]. (DAn. A.1, 403b14–15; 17–19; Hamlyn’s trans.)

This section of De Anima A.1 examines two interconnected questions. The first is whether there are any functions or affections of the soul which are peculiar to it alone (but are not common to body too), in which case the soul might be separable from the body. The second is what type of science examines the soul and its features, given that all of its functions or affections seem also to involve the body and so the soul turns out to be inseparable from the body. I shall return to both of these questions in the next chapter, in the discussion of the positive claim that natural forms are essentially matter-involving. At present, though, it should be emphasized that the passages just quoted develop the comparison, and underline the differences between, natural and mathematical form. First, as is clear from 403b14–19, mathematical entities are inseparable from natural material objects but in a distinctive way in comparison with natural forms, such as psychic functions, affections or even the soul itself (403b17–19: a ŁÅ B łıåB oø

IåæØÆ B çıØŒB oºÅ H ÇHø,fi w ª ØÆFŁ’ æåØ Łı e ŒÆd ç  ,36 ŒÆd På uæ ªæÆ c ŒÆd K [sc. IåæØÆ æåØ/KØ]).37 While mathematical 36 At 403b18 Ross unnecessarily emendsfi w ª ØÆFŁ’ æåØ Łı e ŒÆd ç  by adding x Æ before Łı e . I prefer to keep the manuscript reading as it gives a better sense to Aristotle’s argument. The idea is that psychic affections are inseparable from matter in the way in which anger and fear are inseparable. If so, æåØ is a copula which connects the subjects Łı e ŒÆd ç  with ØÆFÆ. The pronoun ØÆFÆ picks up IåæØÆ B çıØŒB oºÅ from 403b17–18. The way in which anger, fear, and other psychic affections are inseparable from matter has been explained at 403a16ff. Thus, for instance, 403a24–5 states that psychic affections are enmattered formulae (º ªØ ıºØ), while at 403b11–12 the natural scientist, who studies the soul and its affections, examines all those entities that are functions or affections of a certain sort of body or matter. The point of these concluding remarks at 403b16–19 would be to generalize the cases of anger or fear discussed previously in some detail, and to conclude that all psychic functions or affections are inseparable from natural matter in the way in which, or in so far as (fi w), these cases are. Hicks (Aristotle: De Anima, Cambridge University Press, 1907, pp. 208-9) keeps the manuscript reading but adds a comma after æåØ. His construal runs as follows: ‘attributes of the soul are as such, – I mean, as anger and fear, inseparable from the physical matter of the animals to which they belong’ (p. 9). If so, anger and fear are taken simply as repeated examples of inseparable psychic affections. This reading involves an unusually periphrastic (even if not impossible or completely unparalleled) construction of thefi w . . . locution. Aristotle would normally write fi w ØÆFÆ without feeling the need to add æåØ. My interpretation seems preferable as it gives good grammatical structure, preserves the elliptic Aristotelian style and links the concluding remarks more closely with the specific mode of inseparability of the cases of anger and fear discussed at 403a16–27. 37 There is a textual issue as to what complement we should understand in the anaphoric comparative clause ŒÆd På uæ ªæÆ c ŒÆd K: is it that psychic affections are inseparable not in the way in which line or plane are IåæØÆ or not in the way in which they are åøæØ? The two options might be equivalent: for psychic affections are inseparable from matter, while mathematical forms are either inseparable from matter in a different way or they are separate from matter but only in the way in which they are studied by mathematics (403b14–15:fi w b c Øı  Æ ŁÅ ŒÆd K IçÆØæ ø ). In another way, though, mathematical forms, too, are inseparable (403b14: c åøæØH). I take it, however, that understanding IåæØÆ at the end of the clause ŒÆd På uæ ªæÆ c ŒÆd K answers better to the characterization given at 403b14 of mathematical objects as c åøæØH: while mathematical objects are studied as separable and through abstraction, they are inseparable from natural matter, albeit differently from the way in which natural forms are inseparable from such matter.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

87

forms are studied, with the help of thought abstraction, as not belonging to natural material bodies, yet they are not separable from such bodies (403b14–15: H b c åøæØH b,fi w b c Øı  Æ ŁÅ ŒÆd K IçÆØæ ø ). The first part of this claim is virtually equivalent to the position set out in Physics B.2, 193b31–5. Mathematicians, on the basis of correct application of thought abstraction, define (successfully) mathematical entities as essentially independent of matter and change. This is the mode in which mathematical objects are (correctly) treated ‘not as features of natural material bodies’ (403b14–15). At the same time, though, mathematical forms are inseparable from natural bodies. The way in which this holds true is illustrated in the first passage just quoted. At 403a15–16 the straight (e PŁ) is held to be inseparable from natural bodies as it is ‘always found together with some body or other’ (IåæØ ªaæ [sc. e PŁ], Yæ Id a  Æ Ø KØ). Aristotle’s idea becomes clearer once we consider the example of ‘the straight’. This is a case of a particular, perceptible straight line (or straight-lined object) as it is supposed to have the attribute of contacting a material, perceptible brazen sphere at some point. Again, the point at which the perceptible straight line and the brazen sphere are in contact cannot be a dimensionless, geometrical point but should be a physical point. Aristotle maintains that the feature of being in contact with this brazen sphere belongs to this straight line just because of its being straight (403a12–13: fiH PŁE,fi w PŁ, ººa ı ÆØ, x  . . . ). Thus, for instance, this straight-lined object, because of its straightness (and, presumably, also because of the direction of its straightness) touches this brazen sphere at one of the physical points on its surface. If this object were not straight (or if it were not straight in the particular direction of its straightness), it would not touch the sphere. However, Aristotle remarks, the feature of being in contact with this brazen sphere at some physical point would not belong to the straight if it were separated from all material bodies. Hence, if what is under consideration is the purely immaterial, geometrical form of being a straight line, no physical feature could be truly ascribed to ‘the straight’. For, as Aristotle points out, the abstract, geometrical form of being a straight line just does not touch any material object (such as this brazen sphere) at any physical point (403a14–15: P Ø ª’ –łÆØ oø åøæØŁb e PŁ). Indeed, a geometrical form does not have any physical or material functions, affections, or features at all. For it is essentially independent of such items and is (correctly) treated as such by the geometer.38 In what way, then, are ‘the straight’ and other entities like it always found together with some natural body or other (403a15–16)? It is not in so far as they are mathematical forms but in so far as they are physical bodies that such entities always exist in matter. For it is precisely in so far as they are physical bodies that they have features such as being in contact with, being parallel to, intersecting, etc. physical enmattered 38 To be sure, a geometrical form does possess features but these are appropriate geometrical, not physical, features. Hence, for example, a geometrical straight line with a certain direction can be in contact with a geometrical spherical solid at some dimensionless, indivisible geometrical point.

88

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

objects. If so, Aristotle claims that mathematical entities are inseparable from some body or other in that they necessarily exist in some body or other if they are to exist at all. This, however, does not affect their essence as mathematical forms studied by mathematical disciplines. Consistently with Physics B.2, 193b31–5, mathematical forms, as objects of mathematics, are essentially independent of matter and change. By contrast, if we consider the conditions for their existing in the physical world, mathematical entities necessarily depend for their existence on some natural, material body or other. For they cannot exist as physical, perceptible, or enmattered objects at all (with corresponding physical properties, like being in contact with this brazen sphere) if they do not exist in some material object or other. It might be objected that this view has two main unattractive implications. First, it inflates the ontology by introducing two kinds of mathematical entity: physical, enmattered mathematical objects and purely immaterial, mathematical forms. Second, it ascribes to mathematical forms a ‘shady’ ontological status as abstractions in thought. The first difficulty, however, is only a pseudo-problem. For enmattered mathematical objects are simply physical objects that have mathematical features. Thus, for instance, ‘the straight’ referred to in Aristotle’s example is a perceptible particular object (e.g. a wooden stick) that has a straight-lined shape with a certain direction. Because it is such a physical object, the straight-lined object can (truly) have attributes such as touching this brazen sphere. To offer a different sort of case from Physics B.2: geometrical entities, such as points, lengths, planes, solids, etc., belong to natural bodies as (nonessential) features (193b23–5). For they are (e.g.) limits of natural bodies (193b31–3). As for the second difficulty, it seems unproblematic for Aristotle’s view that purely immaterial mathematical forms are essentially independent of matter only as abstractions in thought. They are not physical particulars, over and above material bodies. Perhaps they are fictions or constructs. These extra kinds of item in the ontology may well be parasitic upon physical objects in some fashion or other. But this does not affect their essence as mathematical forms. It simply reflects their existence conditions as parts of physical reality: for they cannot exist as parts of the physical world unless they exist in some material object or other. With this key move of distinguishing between existence conditions and essence of mathematical forms, Aristotle develops further the contrast with natural forms. The only point of similarity between the two seems to be their necessary existential dependence upon material bodies. Hence, at 403a11–13 and 15–16, the soul is compared with the physical straight-lined object which is inseparable from material bodies in that it always exists in some body or other. This, however, entails only that natural forms, such as the soul, necessarily exist in some body or other if they are to exist at all. This is the only, minimal way in which natural forms resemble mathematical entities. By contrast, there is a more crucial way in which the two differ from each other. As is pointed out at 403b17–19, natural forms (such as the soul and its functions or affections), are inseparable from natural matter in a further way, different from and over and above, the way in which mathematical entities are inseparable from matter.

N AT U R A L F O R M , M AT H E M AT I C A L F O R M , A N D P L AT O N I S T E R RO R S

89

Not only do natural forms necessarily depend upon natural bodies for their existence in the way in which mathematical entities do. They are also inseparable from matter in an additional way in which mathematical forms are not (403b19: ŒÆd På uæ ªæÆ c ŒÆd K [sc. IåæØÆ æåØ/KØ]). For mathematical entities, as abstractions, are ‘separable’ in that they are essentially independent of material bodies and are (correctly) defined as such. By contrast, natural forms are, in this respect, ‘inseparable’ as they essentially involve natural matter. Indeed, at 403a11–12, the soul (a natural form) is conceived as inseparable from the body, on the assumption that none of its functions or affections is peculiar to it alone. Rather, all of these functions and affections seem essentially to involve bodily features. This claim will be supported by the argument of 403a16–27 which will conclude that psychic functions or affections are enmattered formulae in that they essentially involve natural or perceptible types of matter (403a25: º ªØ ıºØ). If this is correct, the upshot is that, while both natural and mathematical forms necessarily depend for their existence upon some material object or other, only mathematical forms truly are essentially independent of matter. They are, to be sure, ‘always found in some body or other’, and so are necessarily parts of physical compounds. Despite this, however, they are correctly treated as essentially just mathematical forms without any type of perceptible matter at all. This is the result reached at Physics B.2, 193b31–5, where it is emphasized that mathematicians correctly abstract away and successfully define mathematical forms without matter (or change). Nothing misleading or false stems from this practice as mathematical forms just are (essentially) the way mathematicians define them. By contrast, natural forms are not only necessarily dependent for their existence on some natural body or other. Apart from being necessarily parts of physical compounds, they encompass natural or perceptible types of material feature in their own essence. In examining the physical compounds they are necessarily parts of, natural scientists have to study natural forms as comprising both formal and material features in their essence. For natural forms just are (essentially) both form- and matter-involving. More significantly, if they were incorrectly defined without matter (or change), there would arise errors in the relevant reasoning about them. In general, inferences within natural science would yield results which could not explain the essentially matter-involving character or the capacity for change of physical compounds, the objects natural forms are the essences of. But if so, physics would incorrectly identify natural forms or physical compounds with quasi-mathematical entities similar to Platonist Forms. Aristotle, however, finds this unacceptable as it would eliminate natural study altogether (Metaphysics A.9, 992b8–9). There is a deep difference, in his view, between essentially enmattered natural forms and immaterial mathematical abstractions, even if both necessarily depend for their existence within the physical world upon the existence of some relevant material object or other.

5 Natural Forms as Essentially Matter- and Change-Involving The present chapter will argue directly for the positive claim that natural form, the essence of compound (types of ) physical objects, includes material and change-related characteristics in its own essence. First, I shall discuss a central argument advanced in Metaphysics Z.11, in which Aristotle criticizes Socrates the Younger and counterproposes the positive thesis that natural forms are essentially both formal and material. It will become clear, or so I shall argue, that this thesis applies not only to particular or universal compounds but also to forms themselves. This result might be challenged, however, on the grounds that Metaphysics Z.10–11 is embedded in an aporetic and tentative context and so should not be used as basis for deriving Aristotle’s considered positions. To rebut this challenge, I shall discuss, in section 5.2, the comparison Aristotle draws in Metaphysics E.1 between the feature of being snub and natural forms. I shall argue that the thesis that natural form is essentially enmattered is clearly formulated and supported in that part of the Metaphysics too, in a context which is definitely more positive and constructive than Metaphysics Z.10–11 is. Further, Metaphysics E.1 elucidates this positive thesis by discussing the case of the soul as an instance of an essentially enmattered entity. The soul, however, clearly is the form or essence of certain natural compounds but is not itself a compound object. If so, the positive thesis of essential enmatterment seems to range not only over compounds but also (and more importantly) over forms. I shall explore further the example of the soul by examining De Anima A.1. There, Aristotle argues that none of the features that could constitute the soul’s essence – no capacity or faculty for psychic functions or affections – is essentially matter-less or change-free. I shall show how this result entails that the soul, a paradigmatic case of natural form, must itself be grasped as containing material and change-related parts in its own nature, features which must be mentioned in its definition even if they are not purely formal. This will further strengthen the positive thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment. In section 5.3 I shall return to Physics B.2 to investigate how this thesis is employed in that context. There, Aristotle seems to be aiming at showing not simply that natural form is essentially enmattered but also that it is somehow prior to matter in essence and definition. I shall discuss and criticize at length a possible misunderstanding of this last priority claim, an approach which I shall label ‘reconciliatory’. This approach maintains

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

91

that, while natural form has both formal and material (or change-related) parts in its essence, its formal components are essentially and definitionally prior to its material parts. I shall argue that this idea of priority of formal over material constituents within a form’s essence – what could be called ‘intra-definiens’ priority – is chimerical. If form is essentially enmattered, its formal essential parts too should comprise material features in their essence. My diagnosis of the reconciliatory approach will be that it is either incoherent or it does not properly adopt the thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment. I shall offer an alternative proposal which seeks to accommodate the priority claim without compromising this thesis. In my view, because natural forms, as well as their formal essential parts, are essentially enmattered, there is no intra-definiens priority of form over matter. However, form in its entirety – encompassing both its formal and its material essential components – is essentially and definitionally prior to (particular and universal) compounds and their corresponding material parts. If so, it proves primary over tokenand type-material items. Even on the plausible assumption that there cannot be any intra-definiens priority of form over matter, however, it is important to understand in more depth the relation between formal and material parts of essentially enmattered natural forms. The resources with which to address this question can be derived from an important passage of Sophistici Elenchi 31, in which Aristotle deploys the example of snubness, already used in Physics B.2 and Metaphysics E.1. Taking seriously his insistence on modelling the essence of natural form on that of snubness, I shall argue that his view is that formal and material parts of the form’s essence are essentially interdependent in an inextricable fashion. Not only, then, is form itself essentially enmattered. Even its formal essential parts are indissolubly linked with matter in essence and definition (and conversely). This will render the idea of an intra-definiens priority even less attractive. I shall close the present chapter first by assessing the snubness analogy in comparison with the teleological conception of form and matter. My suggestion will be that we should take neither of these two models as dispensable or as inferior to the other. For each serves different clarificatory purposes and illuminates distinct aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysical view of the form–matter relation. Finally, I shall draw some more general conclusions stemming from the positive thesis that form is essentially matter-involving, and from Aristotle’s additional claim that it is prior to certain types of material item.

5.1 Why is Hyper-Formality Mistaken? (Metaphysics Z.11) In section 4.1 I discussed Aristotle’s comparison drawn in Metaphysics Z.11 between mathematical and natural forms and his allusion to ‘hyper-formal’ definitions offered by Platonizing or Pythagorean thinkers. In a fresh start within the same chapter Aristotle sets out more positively the reasons why, and the respects in which, the

92

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

definition of natural form differs from that of mathematical form. In so doing, he discards hyper-formal approaches to defining natural form. It is therefore a vain attempt to try to reduce everything in this way, and to eliminate the matter. For some things presumably are one thing in another, or certain things in a certain state [ØÆ ªaæ Yø  ’ K fiH’ Kd j ‰d Æd åÆ]. And the comparison which Socrates the Younger used to draw between an animal and a circle is not sound; for it leads away from the truth, and misleads one into supposing that there might be a man without parts, as there can be a circle without bronze. But the cases are not the same. For an animal is a sort of perceptible object [ÆNŁÅ  . . . Ø],1 and cannot be defined without change [¼ı ŒØø ], nor therefore without parts in a certain state [h’ ¼ı H æH Kå ø  ]. For it is not a hand in any and every state that is a part of man [P ªaæ ø F IŁæı æ  åæ], but only that which can fulfil its function [ ıÆ Å e æª IºE], so the one which is living [or: ensouled;  łıå ]; a hand which is not living is not a part of man [ c  łıå b P æ ]. (Metaphysics [Met.] Z.11, 1036b22–32; Bostock’s trans.)

With the help of Aristotle’s complaint about the analogy that Socrates the Younger used to draw, we can see that the intended contrast is between natural and mathematical entities. Socrates the Younger equated the mathematical case of circle with that of a certain type of animal, a natural entity.2 Aristotle points out, however, that the two cases are not sufficiently similar for the analogy to be successful. Apart from the negative points discussed in the previous chapter, an important addition is made about the distinctive character of some items in comparison with mathematical entities. First, it is noted that the attempted reduction of all defined objects to form (or even to number) by omitting all types of material feature is futile.3 Second, and more significantly, it is claimed that the reason for this is that some items just are (essentially, I take it) a certain type of thing in a certain type of matter or certain types of material in a certain state (1036b23–4: ØÆ ªaæ Yø  ’ K fiH’ Kd j ‰d Æd åÆ).4 This claim of essential enmatterment is unclear in two ways. First, it is necessary to understand what the scope of ØÆ (used at 1036b23) is. Is Aristotle making only the relatively incontrovertible point that natural (particular or universal) compounds are essentially both matter- and form-involving? If so, his argument does not support the

1 In Appendix 1 I shall explain why I prefer the manuscript reading ÆNŁÅ  at 1036b28 contrary to the emendation ÆNŁÅØŒe favoured by several commentators. 2 While at 1036b24 we find Çfiı, it is reasonable to suppose that Aristotle does not intend to contrast generic features, such as being an animal, with particular sorts of mathematical entity, such as being a circle. Rather, at 1036b27ff. Aristotle shifts from the generic Çfiı to the specific ¼Łæø. Further, the overall context of 1036a31–b7 suggests that the contrast is between specific types of natural and mathematical entity. 3 The phrase e Æ IªØ oø at 1036b22 clearly picks up the IªıØ Æ N f IæØŁ f at b12 and the occurrences of r  at b15–20. Hence, Aristotle is criticizing the reduction of everything to form or number, and the indiscriminate subtraction of all material terms from any putative definition. 4 It might be objected that the Yø at 1036b23 is watering down the claim that some things are essentially matter-involving. However, Yø need not mean ‘perhaps’; it may well be equivalent to ‘presumably’ or even ‘surely’. At any rate, this mere occurrence of Yø cannot counterbalance the overall line of argument of this passage, which clearly supports the view of essential enmatterment of certain items.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

93

view that natural forms themselves essentially include material features. Indeed, if his claim at 1036b23–4 is that compounds alone have both matter and form in their essence, this view seems to be undermined significantly. By contrast, if the claim is that natural forms too (or primarily) are essentially matter-involving ( just as compounds are), the view is firmly in place. Further, the use of examples such as ‘animal’ (of a certain type) and ‘human’ may be seen as fixing the scope of ØÆ in favour of universal compounds (1036b24; 27; 29; 30–1): it is not natural forms but universal compounds, such as animal of a certain type or human, which are essentially both formal and material. There are several considerations against this line of interpretation. The overall context of Metaphysics Z.10–11 clearly explores the question of what the parts of a form’s essence are, or what is mentioned in a form’s definition (1034b22–4; 1036a26–31). It is fair to assume that the claim put forward at 1036b23–4 is also addressing this question. If this is correct, it offers an answer to this question, the first positive one in Metaphysics Z.10–11: natural forms themselves (but not only compounds) encompass both formal and material components in their essence. If Aristotle intended to restrict his claim to universal compounds alone, thereby excluding forms, he would have signalled this shift. Even the immediate context, however, suggests that Aristotle takes forms too as essentially matter-involving. Hence, at 1036a31–3, he introduces his discussion with the example of the form of the circle and other mathematical forms like it: for it is only such forms that can come to be in or on specific types of matter (‹Æ Kتت Æ Kç’  æø; ŒŒº K åƺŒfiH . . . ). It makes no good sense, though, to claim that the universal compound circle, which already includes matter of a specific sort, comes to be in or on matter. Similarly, 1036b2 and 5 clearly show that the question is whether certain types of matter belong in, or are parts of, the form’s essence (Pb ªaæ i w › åƺŒe Pb < æ > F Yı ; pæ’ s ŒÆd Kd ÆFÆ æÅ F Yı ŒÆd F º ªı). More clearly, however, the example of ‘human’ or ‘animal’ of a particular kind given at 1036b24ff. has already been adduced a few lines earlier, at 1036b3ff. In the earlier passage it is obvious that Aristotle is interested in the form of human and is tackling the question of what is included in the essence of forms like it (1036b3: x  e F IŁæı r  ). It is plausible to conclude that this same example is taken up by the later passage, at 1036b23–8. If so, Aristotle is positively arguing that, apart from compounds, natural forms themselves are essentially ‘both material and formal’. There is also a weaker rebuttal to interpreters who wish to restrict the scope of the claim made at 1036b23–4 to compounds alone. Let us suppose that the arguments advanced in the previous paragraph carry no weight. For, it will be claimed, at 1036b21 Aristotle makes a radically fresh start and maintains that only universal compounds, such as man, are defined in terms of both form and matter. By contrast, the essence of forms has no material components and so their definition does not include material terms. The deeper assumption behind this contention is, presumably, that definition is only of the form and of the universal in that what does the defining is, strictly speaking,

94

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

universal form alone (1035b33–1036a1; 1036a28–9). On this assumption, our opponent concedes that universal compounds are legitimate objects of definition in that they can get defined. Their definiens, though, just as the definiens of any other item, is cast in terms of universal form alone. For, in this view, matter has no place in the essence, nor is it mentioned in the definition of anything. If this describes the rival view accurately, however, how are we to understand Aristotle’s claim as formulated at 1036b23–4? The claim that universal compounds (but not forms) are ‘certain types of thing in certain types of matter’ or ‘certain types of material in certain types of state’ obviously clashes with the view that their definiens is universal form alone. If, on the other hand, our opponent seeks to preserve this last view consistently with Aristotle’s claim, it seems necessary to take the references to material features as intrinsic to the definition of form too. For, if the definiens of compounds is based on universal form alone and, at the same time, compounds are defined as ‘form in matter’ or ‘matter thus-and-so enformed’, these material terms should be parts of the form’s definiens too. But if so, the essence of form itself is also matter-involving. There is a clear dilemma for interpreters who take the ØÆ of 1036b23 as ranging over universal compounds alone: their view of definition as ‘of the form and of the universal alone’ should be either discarded or drastically re-adjusted so that the definiens of form too contains material terms. In this last case, though, form itself is essentially ‘both formal and material’. Therefore, even if Aristotle’s claim made at 1036b23–4 and his example offered at b24–32 are primarily about the essence and definition of universal compounds, still their form, what makes them what they are, turns out to include material features in its own essence. There is a second point which remains unclear in the claim that some items are  ’ K fiH’ or ‰d Æd åÆ. It is important to ascertain what types of entity are isolated as essentially matter-involving. My previous observation, arising from the critique of Socrates the Younger, about the contrast between being man and being circle, indicates that it is natural forms that are held to be essentially matter-involving. By contrast, mathematical forms, such as being a circle, are thought to be essentially independent of all types of perceptible matter, such as bronze, iron, etc. (collectively). There is, however, a complication at this juncture. Metaphysics Z.11 seems to imply that even mathematical forms should essentially involve intelligible types of matter such as being made of lines or being continuous magnitudes (1036b7–20). Indeed, Aristotle envisages the possibility that all entities which are not pure essences or forms by themselves but are ‘thises’ include certain types of matter (1036b35–1037a2: ŒÆd Æe ªaæ oºÅ Ø Ø n c Ø  q r ÆØ ŒÆd r  ÆPe ŒÆŁ’ Æe Iººa   Ø). Thus, for instance, particular, material mathematical objects, such as this brazen circle, have token material parts, such as these concrete brazen semicircles. By contrast, universal mathematical forms, such as being a circle, do not have parts of this sort but nevertheless include intelligible material components, such as being made of continuous lines (1036b32–4; 1037a2–5). Why suppose, then, that the case of natural forms is different from that of mathematical forms? Why not think that both mathematical and

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

95

natural forms are matter-involving simply in that they include abstract features along the lines of mathematical, intelligible matter, features which are not parts of the real, physical world? My reply to this difficulty will be based on two points. The first has its basis in the context of Metaphysics Z.10–11, in Aristotle’s further remarks about mathematical, intelligible types of matter. In Metaphysics Z.10, 1036a9–12, Aristotle has already invoked the notion of intelligible matter and has contrasted it with that of perceptible matter. His idea seems to be that, while intelligible matter exists only in perceptible objects, yet it exists in them in the same way in which mathematical entities exist in perceptible objects (1036a11–12: Åc b  K E ÆNŁÅE æåıÆ c fi w ÆNŁÅ, x  a ÆŁÅ ÆØŒ). That is to say, for intelligible matter to exist in the physical world, it must exist in some physical object or other. However, just as all other mathematical entities, intelligible matter is essentially independent of all physical objects, their perceptible types of matter and their capacity for causing or undergoing change. This is consistent with the view outlined in Physics B.2 as understood in chapter 4. Indeed, at 1036a9–11, Aristotle draws the distinction between perceptible and intelligible types of matter with the help of the notion of change. Perceptible types of matter, those that are found in perceptible, natural entities, are capable of change (1036a10–11: ÆNŁÅc b x  åƺŒe ŒÆd º ŒÆd ‹Å ŒØÅc oºÅ). By contrast, intelligible types of matter are constituents of mathematical entities and are incapable of change, just as mathematical entities themselves are. This point brings me to the second part of my reply, which will refer back to my general arguments in section 4.7 about the difference between mathematical and natural form. There is a striking similarity between mathematical form and intelligible matter. Both are necessarily dependent upon the existence of some physical object or other for their existence within the perceptible, physical world. However, just as mathematical form, intelligible matter too does not essentially involve any perceptible types of matter. Nor does it include any essential parts that explain or support the changeability of any objects. For mathematical objects completely lack any capacities for causing or undergoing change. If so, their essence, which is made up from mathematical form plus intelligible matter, should not contain any features that explain any capacity for change. This is precisely the difference between the perceptible, ‘change-related’ material features, which are parts of the essence of natural forms, and intelligible matter, which essentially belongs to mathematical form. Perceptible types of material feature are integral parts of the essence of natural form as they, together with the relevant formal parts, ground the capacity of physical compounds for various types of change. By contrast, intelligible types of material feature are distinctive sorts of matter which are parts of mathematical forms but do not play any causal or explanatory role in any object’s capacity for change. For the objects whose essence is made up from mathematical form plus intelligible matter are completely unchangeable, mathematical objects. I shall treat more fully the present difficulty in the next chapter, in which I shall discuss the connection between being material and being

96

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

changeable. For present purposes, though, it is clear that the types of material feature that are included in the essence of natural form are significantly different from mathematical, intelligible matter. If these considerations are correct, the emerging thesis is that natural forms themselves have both formal and material essential parts. For this reason it is misleading and incorrect to try to define them in purely formal terms or to exclude all types of material feature from their essence (1036b23: IçÆØæE c oºÅ ææª). Let us schematize this thesis as follows: [D]

FC ¼def F1, F2, . . . , Fm enmattered in M1, M2, . . . , Mn.

In this formula FC is a natural form of hylomorphic compounds, while F1, F2, . . . , Fm are the formal and M1, M2, . . . , Mn the material parts of its essence.5 It is worth emphasizing the following two points. First, Aristotle’s thesis is not only consistent with the argument developed in Physics B.2 (193b31–194a7) but also corroborates my interpretation of that argument as set out in section 4.2. Metaphysics Z.11 implies that constructing putative definitions of natural forms which contain only formal parts (1036b22: e Æ IªØ oø; cf. 1036b12: IªıØ Æ N f IæØŁ  ) or which completely disregard material items (1036b23: IçÆØæE c oºÅ) is incorrect (1036b25: P ŒÆºH åØ): for it misleads us into deriving mistaken beliefs about the relevant objects (1036b26: IªØ ªaæ Æe  IºÅŁF , ŒÆd ØE ºÆ Ø . . . ). This is precisely the result reached in Physics B.2: incorrect definitions are thought to yield errors in our reasoning about the objects so defined. Thus, defining the human form without reference to having bodily parts of a certain sort might lead us to further mistakes: for we might infer from this unsuccessful definition that embodied human beings are objects that involve simply magnitude or extension in the manner of merely geometrical objects. Second, Aristotle’s argument is not simply about the necessary existential dependence of a natural form (or a compound) upon certain material parts. Rather, it is about the essential features of natural forms, those mentioned in their (correct) definition. One might misconstrue the argument because of the way in which Aristotle introduces his criticism of Socrates the Younger. Thus, Aristotle complains that the position adopted by Socrates the Younger might give rise to the mistaken view that ‘human can be without bodily parts’ in the way in which ‘circle can be without bronze’ (1036b27–8). This claim, though, does not imply simply that form necessarily depends for its existence on material parts existing. The immediately subsequent statement shows that Aristotle is interested in essential dependencies represented by definitional connections (1036b29–30: ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ, Øe P’ ¼ı . . . ).

5 A notational variant of [D] would run as follows: [D´] FC ¼ def M1, M2, . . . , Mn enformed by F1, F2, . . . , Fm. While [D] and [D´] are equivalent, I shall use only [D] in my formulations for the sake of simplicity and brevity.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

97

Hence, his view is that natural forms are defined in material terms too, and so have material as well as formal essential parts. We should exercise caution, however, in seeking to understand the import of the essential dependencies and definitional connections Aristotle is describing at 1036b28–30. It does not automatically follow from his use of PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ ¼ı that what is included in the definition of the human form are terms such as ‘being perceptible’, ‘involving change’, or ‘having parts in a certain state’. There are two considerations which are crucial in this connection. First, some of the items mentioned in this example might simply constitute evidential grounds which help us, or definers like us, to trace the essential parts of the human form and to construct its correct definition. Thus, the claim that ‘a certain type of animal is perceptible’ need not entail that ‘being perceptible’ is part of the definiens of being human. The implication might be only that because being human is the sort of thing that can be perceived through the senses we should define it in a manner that is sensitive to its being perceptible. Second, while the locution ‘. . . cannot be defined without’ indicates stronger definitional and essential connections, it does not require that the concrete terms filling in the gaps of this particular case are parts of the relevant definition. For these terms may well be schematic or imprecise examples. Indeed, involving change or having bodily parts in certain states are highly generic features which are common to many forms of animal over and above being human. But if so, they could not be peculiar or essential to the human form alone. It is plausible to conclude, then, that, while the definition of the human form makes reference to determinate types of material and change-related features, it does not include the generic terms provided in this example. Let us, then, try to understand how Aristotle circumscribes the general constraints on the nature of material and change-related components of a form’s essence. Clearly, he maintains that the essence of natural forms comprises features which are not simply material but can also account for the capacity of natural compounds for several types of change (1036b29–30: ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ, Øe P’ ¼ı H æH Kå ø  ). One way in which to take the claim that ‘human cannot be defined without change, and for this reason it cannot be defined without bodily parts’ is to think that it traces the evidential chain that leads us to the bedrock defining feature of having bodily parts of a certain sort or/and in a certain state. If this is plausible, the idea is that, because it contains these types of material feature, the essence of natural form can explain the capacity for change of the objects which are enformed by it. Alternatively, it may be thought that the basic defining feature of a natural form is its involving change in some appropriate fashion. This feature would be basic in that it can ground the material features which belong essentially to a natural form. There is yet another, more neutral, ‘no priority’ thesis in which both material and change-related features are parts of a natural form’s essence without either of them having a more important role in explaining the presence of the other. Because this passage from Metaphysics Z.11 does not address unambiguously this issue, I shall refrain from committing myself to any one of the three different readings just sketched.

98

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

It seems clearer, though, that Aristotle is underlining the idea that, while material features are essential parts of natural forms, they are not crudely material entities. Hence, for example, the human form does not involve the material feature of having hands unqualifiedly or even in any and every state (1036b30–1: P ªaæ ø F IŁæı æ  åæ). For features such as having dead, wooden, or detached hands just are not essential parts of being human. By contrast, having living and fully functional hands which can perform successfully their relevant function could well be essential to the human form (1036b30–2: H æH Kå ø  ;  ıÆ Å e æª IºE;  łıå ).6 This idea might give rise to a construal of Aristotle’s argument in which the material features included in a form’s essence are only nominally material. For their proper characterization, it will be claimed, is cast strictly in formal, functional, or goal-oriented terms. One might even treat similarly the issue raised in the previous paragraph about the possible priority relations between material and change-related features within a form’s essence. Thus, one might think that because change-related attributes are cognate with formal or functional ones, they are prior to material features. By contrast, material features of a form’s essence are dependent upon not only functional but also change-related attributes. There are two ways in which this sort of construal might be developed. In its strong version, it claims that the essence of a natural form does not involve robustly material features at all. Thus, for instance, a correct definition would not mention items such as having hands, being made of flesh, or having mass and bulk. Rather, the ‘material’ features constituting a form’s essence would be completely specifiable in functional terms such as ‘performing successfully the human-chiro-functions’, ‘providing resistance’, or ‘exerting impenetrability’. This reductive position is too monolithic to be plausible within the argument of Metaphysics Z.11, in which Aristotle insists that ‘reducing everything to form alone and omitting matter altogether’ is a mistaken definitional practice (1036b22–3). Further, in the immediate context of 1036b30–2, Aristotle clearly implies that straightforwardly material attributes, such as having specific types of corporeal parts like hands, should be mentioned in a natural form’s definition. The weaker version of this ‘formalist’ or ‘functionalist’ construal of Aristotle’s position would hold that, while material features are essential parts of a form, yet they are posterior to formal or functional parts. That is to say, in order to characterize them properly one would have to refer to the formal or functional parts of the relevant form’s essence. For these latter parts make the corresponding material features what they are, whereas the converse is not the case. It should be observed, however, that Aristotle’s argument does not support this view of priority of the formal or functional 6 Ross’s contention (Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 2, p. 203) that Kå ø  is ‘really irrelevant’ is mistaken. In my view, Aristotle’s point is precisely that the type(s) of matter mentioned in a form’s definiens are not simply or crudely material, like (e.g.) flesh, bones, etc. or eyes, ears, etc., but material parts in certain states, capable of performing the relevant functions successfully. While Ross takes Aristotle’s emphasis to be only on H æH or  åæ, I take it as also falling on Kå ø  , P . . . ø ,  ıÆ Å e æª IºE and  łıå .

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

99

parts over material ones. Nor does his previous claim (made at 1036b28–30) about the indispensability of material and change-related features favour either of these as more basic than the other. Similarly, it would be premature to suppose that material features are themselves prior to change-related attributes or to formal and functional essential parts of a form. Aristotle’s position as set out so far entails only that both material (and/or change-related) and formal (or functional) features constitute the essence of natural forms. Indeed, any view which would ascribe priority to a single segment of a form’s essence would struggle to avoid Aristotle’s own criticism of ‘hyperformality’ or ‘hyper-materiality’ as I understood them within the context of Metaphysics Z.11. It is more promising, at this stage, to adopt the less ambitious interpretation in which natural form is essentially both matter- and form-involving. Further, and consistently with this view, it seems that the material parts of its essence similarly comprise not only material but also formal or functional features. Aristotle’s additional contention that form is in some way prior to matter should be derived from different texts and supported on the basis of stronger arguments.

5.2 Matter, Change, and the Case of the Soul (Metaphysics E.1 and De Anima A.1) There is an obvious objection to my interpretation of the important passage taken from Metaphysics Z.11 which criticizes the view of Socrates the Younger. It might be doubted whether the overall aporetic tone and line of argument of Metaphysics Z.10–11 could support the strongly positive conclusion that natural form encompasses both material and formal essential parts. Further, even if the passage from Metaphysics Z.11 does argue for this bold thesis, it could be seen as an exception or even an aberration. For, the objector would argue, Aristotle’s general or official view does not seem congenial to this thesis. Rather, his preferred position is one which takes natural forms as essentially immaterial. The first aim of the present section is to undermine this type of objection. To do so, it is helpful to examine the following passage from Metaphysics E.1: It follows that if all thinking is either practical or productive or theoretical, that concerned with nature must be of a theoretical kind, but a kind which studies such of the things-that-are as are capable of being changed, and substance in accordance with the account for the most part, yet not separable. We must pay attention to the manner of a thing’s account and what-it-is-to-be that thing, since the inquiry will get nowhere otherwise. Among things defined, i.e. those which are what something is, some are like the snub, others like the concave. And the difference between these is that the snub is coupled together with matter (for the snub is a concave nose), whereas concavity is without perceptible matter. So if every natural thing is said in the same way as the snub, as for instance nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and animal as a whole, and leaf, root, bark, and plant as a whole (for the accounts of none of them are without change, but always include matter), it is clear how, in the case of natural things, we need to investigate the what-it-is and define, and why it falls to the student of nature to study a certain kind of soul, that which is not without matter. (Metaphysics [Met.] E.1, 1025b25–1026a6; Kirwan’s trans.)

100

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Aristotle uses again his favourite example of the snub. He compares all natural entities with the snub (1025b34–1026a1: N c Æ a çıØŒa › ø fiH Ø fiH º ªÆØ), which essentially involves perceptible types of matter (1025b32–3: e b Ø e ıغŠ Kd a B oºÅ ). As such, natural entities include in their essence perceptible types of material feature and change-related attributes, those that can account for the capacity of natural objects to cause or undergo change (1026a2–3: PŁe ªaæ ¼ı ŒØø › º ª ÆPH [sc. H çıØŒH], Iºº’ Id åØ oºÅ). Further, he contrasts the case of the snub and of natural entities with geometrical features, such as being concave, which do not essentially depend on perceptible types of material characteristic (1025b33–4:  b Œغ Å ¼ı oºÅ ÆNŁÅB ). It is crucial, for present purposes, to show that Aristotle’s claims in this important passage entail that, apart from (universal or particular) compounds, natural forms, too, fall within the scope of the phrase Æ a çıØŒa used at 1025b34. This task is especially pressing as not only Aristotle’s formulation of the comparison with the snub but also his examples might suggest that natural compounds alone are essentially matter- and change-involving. Thus, strictly speaking, natural entities are lined up not with the feature of being snub or snubness, a formal entity, but with the snub (e Ø e: 1025b31, 32, 33, 1026a1), an item that is normally identified with the compound snub-thing or snub-type. Further, the morphology of the examples of natural entities offered at 1026a1–2 might be taken as pointing only to universal compounds (nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, animal of certain sort; leaf, root, bark, plant of a certain sort). If these considerations are correct, it would follow that Aristotle does not actually argue that natural forms are also matter-involving. Even worse, if his intended claim is that only natural compounds contain matter in their essence, this passage is against the view of essentially enmattered forms. There is no need, however, to accept this narrow construal. Quite generally, abstract neuter terms, such as e Ø e, may well denote the corresponding feature of being snub or snubness, instead of the snub-object or snub-type. Moreover, the wider context of this passage indicates that the scope of the discussion encompasses not only compounds but also forms and essences. At 1025b26–7 the objects of natural theoretical study are not only natural compound objects, those which are capable of undergoing change (Z ‹ KØ ıÆe ŒØEŁÆØ). Apart from these, physics also inquires into form, the substance which is in accordance with the account (1025b27–8: æd PÆ c ŒÆa e º ª; cf. Z.10, 1035b13–16:  ŒÆa e º ª PÆ ŒÆd e r  ŒÆd e  q r ÆØ).7 7 Natural form is also held to be inseparable (1025b28: P åøæØc). Aristotle, however, does not specify the items it is inseparable from, or the way in which it is inseparable. The subsequent discussion, though, clearly implies that natural forms are inseparable from perceptible types of material feature and change-related attributes in that their essence includes these items (1026a2–3: PŁe ªaæ ¼ı ŒØø › º ª ÆPH [sc. H çıØŒH], Iºº’ Id åØ oºÅ; cf. 1025b34: oºÅ ÆNŁÅB ). I shall not deal with the textual issues of 1025b28, where the Greek seems awkward (see Ross, Metaphysics, vol. 1, p. 354). The question of how to understand the phrase ‰ Kd e º used at 1025b28 falls outside the scope of the present study. Let me just

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

101

Further, the discussion about the snub and its comparison with natural entities is introduced to illuminate the way in which to conceive and to examine the essence and the account (1025b28–9: e  q r ÆØ ŒÆd e º ª H Kd). Indeed, the snub is itself a case of an entity which reveals what something essentially is (1025b31: H  KØ a b ‰ e Ø e). Hence, the natural entities which are likened to the snub are not only compounds but also forms. More importantly, the phraseology of Metaphysics E.1 is clearly more liberal and inclusive than what the rival construal allows. For even in the case of being concave or concavity Aristotle feels free to shift between the terms ‘the F ’ (1025b31–2: e ŒEº) and ‘F-ness’ or ‘being F’ (1025b33–4:  Œغ Å ). Indeed, at 1025b32–4 his choice to contrast the snub with concavity suggests that, just as ‘concavity’, ‘the snub’ too covers not only compound objects or types but also features or formal entities. Most importantly, though, what shows that his discussion ranges over natural forms too is his concluding example. In it the type of soul which is examined by natural science is (essentially, I take it) not without the perceptible types of material feature or the change-related characteristics already referred to at 1025b32–4 and 1026a2–3: æd łıåB KÆ . . . ‹Å c ¼ı B oºÅ K. This type of soul is not a compound but is a natural form, one which is unambiguously thought essentially to include material and change-related features.8 It is safe, therefore, to infer that Metaphysics E.1 favours the thesis of essential enmatterment not only for compounds but also for natural forms. Moreover, consistently with Metaphysics Z.11, it is not only natural forms but also the material parts of their essence which include material components, over and above their formal features. The examples provided at 1026a1–2 suggest that whole or complete natural forms, such as being a plant or an animal of determinate types, essentially involve material features. However, it is also clear that their essential material parts, such as being constituted from face, flesh, bone, etc. or having leaves, roots,

note that the chief problem, in this connection, is what the range of this phrase is. Does it qualify the prepositional phrase ŒÆa e º ª or the adjective P åøæØc? It is difficult to see how natural form could be essentially dependent on matter and change only for the most part but sometimes become separable or separated from them. It makes more sense to opt for the first interpretation. Natural forms are substances in accordance with the definition but may be thought to conform with the definition only for the most part. For they are forms and essences of particular compound substances, objects which for the most part comply with the features characteristic of their kind and its definition but which sometimes deviate from these norms. Because natural forms are substances in that they enform, and are essences of, objects of this, ‘for the most part’ sort, they too conform with the definition for the most part. 8 Kirwan (Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Books G, D and E, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 187) argues that forms are changeless. If so, he would presumably doubt whether they essentially involve change-related features. In claiming that forms are changeless, however, Aristotle cautiously remarks that they do not perish in the same way as particular compounds do (Z.10, 1035a28–30). Indeed, he specifies that they differ from particular compounds in that they exist and cease to exist without coming-to-be or passing-away (Z.15, 1039b20–7). This entails only that natural forms involve change in a way different from that in which particular compounds do. Thus, for instance, while natural forms do not themselves undergo change (in the way in which compounds do), yet they may involve features which explain and ground the capacity of compounds (the objects enformed by them) to initiate or suffer change. I shall return to this point in the next chapter.

102

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

barks, etc., are themselves entities that possess essential material characteristics together with formal ones. This agrees with the example offered at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b30–2, in which essential bodily features of the human form seem to have both material components (such as being corporeal members of certain sorts) and formal or functional features (such as performing the relevant functions successfully). Thus, the argument of Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b21–32, is not merely an anomaly.9 9

There is another source of doubt about my interpretation of Metaphysics E.1. Several commentators emend the manuscript reading IåæØÆ found in the phrase  b çıØŒc æd IåæØÆ b Iºº’ PŒ IŒÅÆ at 1026a13–14. Instead, they take the objects of physics Aristotle is referring to as åøæØ. This implies that Aristotle is now interested in (particular or universal) compounds as objects of physics, items which are separable or separated, as opposed to forms (discussed at 1025b27ff.) which are inseparable (cf. Ross, Metaphysics, vol. 1, p. 355; this would correspond to the contrast drawn in Metaphysics H.1, 1042a28–31, and Physics B.1, 193b3–5, where particular compounds are separable but forms are not separable but only in account). Presumably, the idea is that compounds are separable from each other as they are identifiable independently of each other. This construal can be set out in two ways. The first possibility is to think that Aristotle is shifting his interest from natural forms (dealt with at 1025a27–1026a6) to compounds. Alternatively, it might be thought that he has been speaking about compounds all along, to the exclusion of forms. The first approach does not threaten my interpretation as it does not require that only compounds are essentially matter-involving. However, it undermines the unity of Aristotle’s argument as it imposes on it a change of topic within a few lines. It is more plausible to suppose that, while Aristotle takes both compounds and forms as essentially matter-involving, his argument, from 1025b27ff., centres around natural form. The second construal, by contrast, raises an objection to my view as it implies that only compounds contain matter in their essence. I do not, however, find the emendation plausible as none of the reasons offered in its favour is compelling. First, it is not true that the ‘balance of the sentence’ is lost or the antithesis is ‘false’ in the phrase æd IåæØÆ b Iºº’ PŒ IŒÅÆ (see Ross, Metaphysics, vol. 1, p. 355). The balance is present in that the first privative adjective is affirmed, while the second is denied. Further, there is no reason to suppose that there should be a strong antithesis between åøæØa b and Iºº’ PŒ IŒÅÆ, an antithesis which is obliterated if the pair is IåæØÆ b and Iºº’ PŒ IŒÅÆ (for being inseparable from matter necessarily entails involving changeability). Notice that in the case of mathematical sciences the pair æd IŒÅÆ b P åøæØa b Yø Iºº’ ‰ K oºÅ fi does not really involve an antithesis in the way required by Ross. For mathematical entities are only tentatively (Yø ) held to be inseparable from matter (the Yø of 1026a15 seems parallel to the term ¼ź in the phrase Iºº’ N IŒØø ŒÆd åøæØH K, F ¼ź used at 1026a8–9). If it turns out that they are separable from matter in some way, it is not surprising that they are unchangeable. If so, the antithesis between IŒÅÆ b and P åøæØa b Yø is also eliminated. Indeed, as I argued in the previous chapter, mathematical entities are essentially independent of, or separable from, matter and change even if they cannot exist in the physical world without some material, changeable object or other. This view is obviously in place at Metaphysics E.1, 1026a7–10, where Aristotle introduces mathematical entities with the claim that it is unclear whether they are separable from matter and so unchangeable. The way in which they indeed are inseparable from matter and so changeable is encapsulated in their necessary existential dependence on the existence of some material, changeable object or other. However, they are also essentially separable from matter and change in that, as mathematical entities, they are defined (within the realm of mathematics) independently of matter and change. This claim is implied by the statement made at Metaphysics E.1, 1026a9–10, that mathematical entities are studied as separable from matter and as unchangeable by certain branches of mathematical science: ØÆ ÆŁ ÆÆfi w IŒÅÆ ŒÆdfi w åøæØa ŁøæE. (The ØÆ of 1026a9 and a14 seems to refer to purely theoretical, superordinate mathematical sciences, which study mathematical abstractions. By contrast, applied, subordinate mathematical disciplines take up mathematical abstractions from superordinate sciences but re-add material bodies and change to them; see my discussion of these issues in sections 4.2 and 4.3.) There is an obvious way, then, in which æd IŒÅÆ b P åøæØa b Yø Iºº’ ‰ K oºÅ fi contains no substantive antithesis: for mathematical entities are essentially separable from matter and change as they are defined without them. If so, it automatically follows that they are unchangeable too. The real antithesis implied by 1026a13–15 is not internal to each of the phrases æd IåæØÆ b Iºº’ PŒ IŒÅÆ and æd IŒÅÆ b P åøæØa b Yø Iºº’ ‰ K oºÅ fi . Rather, the striking contrast is between these two phrases themselves: while both natural and mathematical

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

103

This leads us to the second aim of the present section. It is important to explore how the example of the soul (given at Metaphysics E.1, 1026a5–6) can be filled in to give a more concrete model of the Aristotelian view of form as essentially matter-involving. The following passage from De Anima A.1 is central in this connection: If then there is any of the functions or affections of the soul which is peculiar to it, it would be possible for it [the soul] to be separated [from the body]; but if there is nothing peculiar to it [the soul], it would not be separable, but it would be like the straight, to which, qua straight, many attributes belong, as, e.g., touching the brazen sphere at a point, although the straight if separated will not so touch; for it is inseparable, if indeed it is always found with some body. It seems that all the affections of the soul, too, involve the body, anger, gentleness, fear, pity, confidence, and, further, joy and both loving and hating; for at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way. This is suggested by the fact that sometimes when severe and manifest sufferings befall us we are not provoked to exasperation or fear, while at other times we are moved by small and imperceptible sufferings when the body is aroused and is as it is when we are in anger. And this is even more evident: for men may come to have the affections of the frightened although nothing frightening is taking place. If this is so, it is clear that the affections [of the soul] are enmattered formulae. Hence their definitions are such as ‘being angry is a particular sort of movement of a body of such and such a kind, or a part or potentiality of it, as a result of this thing and for the sake of that’. And for these reasons it at once falls to the student of nature to inquire into the soul, either every soul or soul of such and such kind. (De Anima [DAn.] A.1, 403a10–28; Hamlyn’s trans.)

The closing statement of this passage virtually coincides with the claim made at Metaphysics E.1, 1026a5–6, that natural philosophy examines that type of soul which is essentially matter- and change-involving. In the previous chapter I discussed the way in which this type of soul, a paradigm of natural form, is similar to mathematical entities. Both seem to be necessarily dependent for their existence within the physical world on the existence of some material body or other. In the conclusion of De Anima A.1, though, Aristotle clarifies that, despite this similarity, there is a key difference (403b17–19). Mathematical entities are dependent on matter and change only in the existential way just specified, whereas their essence as abstractions does not contain material or change-related features. By contrast, natural forms are dependent on matter entities are inseparable from matter (and so from change) – for both necessarily depend for their existence on the existence of some material, changeable object or other – yet mathematical entities are studied as immaterial and as unchangeable. For they are correctly defined independently of matter and change as they are essentially independent of them. By contrast, natural forms are essentially matter- and changeinvolving and so are studied as such by natural philosophy. The weight of Aristotle’s intended antithesis falls on the difference between natural and mathematical sciences (cf. 1026a13 and a14:  b ªaæ çıØŒc . . . B

b ÆŁÅ ÆØŒB ØÆ) which reflects the essentially different characters of the objects they study. Hence, while natural entities (including forms) are essentially inseparable from matter and so changeable (IåæØÆ b Iºº’ PŒ IŒÅÆ), and are studied as such, mathematical entities are studied as separable from matter and as unchangeable (æd IŒÅÆ b; cf. 1026a9–10:fi w IŒÅÆ ŒÆdfi w åøæØa ŁøæE), even if they are, in some non-essential way, inseparable from matter (P åøæØa b Yø Iºº’ ‰ K oºÅ fi ). For they are dependent on matter not for their essence as mathematical entities but for their existence within the physical world. There is no cogent reason, then, to emend the IåæØÆ of 1026a14 into åøæØ.

104

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

and change not only in the existential way. Rather, they also comprise material and change-related characteristics in their own essence. With this distinction firmly in place, we can understand better Aristotle’s project in the passage just cited. His line of argument presupposes that if the natural form that the soul is possesses any features which are peculiar to it alone but do not essentially involve the body too, the soul may be essentially independent of bodily attributes. If, by contrast, all of the soul’s features contain bodily attributes in their nature, the soul too would comprise material features in its own essence. The idea is that any features which are possible candidates for constituting a matter-free essence of the soul must belong to it alone without carrying any bodily contamination in their nature. For, if any of them essentially involves bodily attributes too, it could not be successful as a putative matter-less essence of the soul. Rather, it would bring along with it bodily features which would necessarily render the soul’s essence matter-involving. Clearly, if all psychic features are ‘bodily-laden’ in their very nature, the soul could not have any matter-free candidate essence. In this case, though, the soul would be essentially dependent upon matter. On the basis of these plausible assumptions, Aristotle remarks that all functions or affections of the soul (æªø j ÆŁÅ ø; ŁÅ: 403a3; 10–11; 16; 25; 403b10–12; 17) seem essentially to involve the body or corporeal characteristics (403a16–17: ØŒ b ŒÆd a B łıåB ŁÅ Æ r ÆØ a  Æ ; cf. 403a5–10 and 403b17–19). In a slightly different formulation, he maintains that all psychic functions or affections are essentially ‘together with’, or include within their nature, bodily functions or affections (403a18–19: – Æ ªaæ Ø [sc. E B łıåB ŁØ] åØ Ø e H Æ).10 To underpin these abstract claims, he adduces the following considerations. (a) There are cases in which, while we are affected by occurrences which are intensely and clearly such as to cause (e.g.) anger or fear, we experience no psychic affection of the relevant sort. For, Aristotle seems to be arguing, our body does not possess the features which are intrinsically present in genuine cases of anger- or fear-affections. (b) On other occasions, while (e.g.) the anger-inducing factors are minor and barely perceptible, the psychic affection of anger occurs as the body possesses the proper material features which are essential to this sort of psychic affection and are present when one is angry.11

10 The phrases r ÆØ a  Æ (403a16–17) and – Æ Ø (403a18) do not require that bodily functions/affections are essential parts of psychic functions/affections. They could well be understood as implying merely necessary connections between psychic and bodily functions/affections. However, the schematic definition provided at 403a26–7 clearly indicates that the link between them is not simply necessary. Rather, it seems that psychic affections contain bodily features in their own essence. I shall come back to this point later. 11 It is worth laying out the possible interpretations of 403a21–2. The clause ‹Æ OæªA fi e H Æ ŒÆd oø åÅ fi uæ [sc. åØ] obviously describes the condition the body is in and/or the features it possesses in cases in which even a minor occurrence induces the relevant psychic affection. It seems plausible to take the

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

105

(c) Finally, there are cases in which there is no real (e.g.) fear-inducing factor at all but the psychic affection of fear occurs: for, similarly to case (b), the body is characterized by the material features which essentially belong to the psychic affection of fear.12 From these three cases it becomes clear that without the appropriate bodily features the corresponding psychic functions or affections are not as they should essentially be. Conversely, psychic functions or affections are what they essentially are if they involve the relevant bodily features. Aristotle’s conclusion is that all psychic functions and affections are enmattered formulae (403a25: a ŁÅ º ªØ ıºØ NØ).13 There are two possible ways in which to spell out the crucial phrase º ªØ ıºØ. The weaker position would hold that psychic functions or affections are essentially just formal entities without any bodily attributes within their own nature. However, if they are to exist as psychic features of any ensouled being, they must exist in some (ensouled) material object or other. In this view, there is only necessary existential dependence of psychic functions and affections upon the existence of matter. By contrast, there is no essential involvement of bodily features within the nature of psychic functions or affections themselves. Two considerations, however, suggest that this construal is not promising. First, merely necessary existential dependence would not be sufficient to mark out mathematical entities from psychic affections, functions, the soul itself, or other natural forms verb OæªA fi as specifying not the psychic affection of anger itself but a material feature such as (e.g.) having the blood around the heart in boiling or hot condition (cf. 403a31–b1: Ç Ø F æd ŒÆæÆ Æ¥ Æ ŒÆd Łæ F). By contrast, the verb OæªÇÅÆØ in the clause ‹Æ OæªÇÅÆØ at 403a22 seems to be describing the psychic affection of anger itself which belongs to a being that is angry (e.g. a human). Thus, the subject of OæªÇÅÆØ could be an understood Ø , similarly to the understood subject Øa of the infinitive construction e b b . . . Åb ÆæŁÆØ j çEŁÆØ . . . K b . . . ŒØEŁÆØ at 403a19–21. Alternatively, e H Æ could be the subject of the entire clause ‹Æ OæªA fi e H Æ ŒÆd oø åÅ fi uæ [sc. åØ] ‹Æ OæªÇÅÆØ. In that case, e H Æ could be designating the whole composite being, a soul-plus-body compound, which possesses both the material feature of (e.g.) having the blood around the heart boiling and the psychic affection of being angry. 12 In cases (a) and (c) the text does not explicitly include any ‹Æ clauses which would describe the relevant bodily features in the way in which 403a21–2 does: K ’ e ØŒæH ŒÆd I ÆıæH ŒØEŁÆØ, ‹Æ OæªA fi e H Æ ŒÆd oø åØ uæ ‹Æ OæªÇÅÆØ. Thus, in (a), at 403a19–21, we have e b b NåıæH ŒÆd KÆæªH ÆŁÅ ø ı ÆØ ø Åb ÆæŁÆØ j çEŁÆØ. Correspondingly, in (c), at 403a23–4, we find ÅŁe ªaæ çæF ı Æ K E ŁØ ªÆØ E F çı ı. Neither of these last two cases specifies the relevant bodily conditions under which an ensouled being suffers or does not suffer a psychic affection. It seems fair, though, to suppose that in (a) we should supply a condition contrary to that described in (b): ‘when the body is not in the relevant material state and does not possess the features it has when one is in exasperation or fear.’ Further, in (c), it makes sense to understand a condition similar to that specified in (b): ‘when the body is in the relevant material state and possesses the features it has when one feels fear.’ This interpretation can be supported by the connectives used at 403a19–24. Case (a) is introduced by e b b at 403a19 and contrasts with the K b of case (b) at 403a21. Hence, (a) presupposes a ‹Æ clause contrary to that of (b). By contrast, (c) carries over a ‹Æ clause similar to that found in (b) as it is introduced by Ø b at 403a22–3. 13 I add the universal quantifier to this conclusion as the whole discussion was introduced with the claim that all psychic functions/affections are essentially ‘with body’ or are ‘together with bodily functions/ affections’ (a B łıåB ŁÅ Æ: 403a16; 18).

106

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

like it. Aristotle concludes his argument, at 403b17–19, by noting that psychic functions and affections are inseparable from natural matter in a further, distinctive way compared with mathematical entities. If so, it would be a mistake to understand º ªØ ıºØ as implying that psychic functions and affections are simply necessarily dependent for their existence on the existence of some material object or other, just as mathematical entities are. Second, at 403a25–6, Aristotle offers a schematic definition of a psychic affection such as anger. This definition encompasses terms which clearly describe material and change-related features such as involving change in the body or a bodily part (ŒÅ Ø F Øıd  Æ j æı ). Because definitions (ƒ ‹æØ) are linguistic items that describe the essence of the entity defined, it follows that psychic functions or affections contain material characteristics, bodily functions or affections, as parts of their very nature. Therefore, they are not simply necessarily dependent for their existence on the existence of some material object or other. If this line of argument is sound, it is plausible to understand º ªØ ıºØ in a stronger, ‘essentialist’ fashion. Apart from being linked to matter in the manner of necessary existential dependence, psychic functions and affections are also essentially inseparable from material functions or affections: for bodily attributes are integral parts of their nature. Hence, Aristotle’s conclusion is that all psychic functions and affections essentially carry with them material and change-related characteristics. Against the background of the presuppositions invoked at 403a10–12, this conclusion suggests that none of the features of the soul constitutes a successful candidate for being a matter-less or change-free essence of the soul. If so, however, the soul, a central case of natural form, proves to be essentially matter- and change-involving. On the assumption that all natural forms are like the soul, the overall result would be that natural forms include material and change-related attributes as essential constituents. There are four main lines of objection to this substantive thesis of the essential enmatterment of natural forms such as the soul. First, one might doubt whether the conclusion that psychic functions and affections are essentially enmattered formulae carries over to significantly different cases such as the soul or natural forms like it. For, it will be claimed, the soul or natural forms are types of substance: they enform, and are essences of, (particular and universal) compounds. By contrast, functions or affections of the soul are not types of substance as they do not play any similar enforming role as essences of anything.14 This objection, though, does not appreciate the background of Aristotle’s argument as set out in De Anima A.1, 403a10–12. For Aristotle discusses psychic functions and affections as being essentially tied to the soul’s capacities or faculties. Capacities or faculties of this sort, however, are putative candidates for constituting a matter-less essence of the soul. Aristotle sees such psychic capacities (e.g. being capable of getting 14 Psychic functions or affections could not be types of particular, composite substance either: for they are not particular objects but are features. Hence, the objector would conclude, they fall completely outside the category of substance.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

107

angry) as the only possible essential parts of the soul itself. If so, the capacities for psychic functions and affections are considered as making up the being of a substance-case, the soul, which is the form and essence of natural living things. For this reason, Aristotle’s conclusion straightforwardly entails that substance-cases, such as the soul and natural forms like it, are essentially matter-involving. For what the soul is could consist only of capacities for performing psychic functions or suffering psychic affections: if the latter are essentially dependent on matter or bodily features, so is the former. The second difficulty that could be raised is cognate with the objection just discussed. It might be conceded that the examples of psychic functions and affections explored in De Anima A.1 do have important implications for substance-cases. Yet one could insist that these examples fall short of the substance-case of natural forms such as the soul. The reason for this, it would be argued, is that psychic functions and affections are analogous only with (particular or universal) compounds. If so, Aristotle’s argument could have consequences only for particular compound substances and the (non-substance) universal compound types they are members of. At most, then, this argument could imply that only compounds are essentially matter-involving. This, however, is a relatively unexciting position. Not only is this sort of objection insensitive to Aristotle’s strategy of examining capacities for psychic functions and affections as the only items that could be parts of the soul’s essence. It does not even take seriously the underlying ontology of psychic functions and affections. Aristotle insists on using the terms æªÆ and ÆŁ ÆÆ/ŁÅ (403a3; 10–11; 16; 25; 403b10–12; 17). Further, he consistently offers examples in the form of infinitives (403a7–10: OæªÇŁÆØ, ŁÆææE, KØŁı E, ‹ºø ÆNŁŁÆØ, . . . E . . . ; 18: çغE  ŒÆd ØE). More importantly, in his schematic definition given at 403a26–7 he clearly takes anger as a suffering or affection (OæªÇŁÆØ) and defines it as a change of a certain sort (ŒÅ Ø ). All these formulations strongly suggest that his examples are not cases of compound objects or types of object. Rather, they are precisely functions and affections, doings and sufferings, certain types of feature belonging to objects or types of object: being in anger, showing courage, desiring, perceiving through the senses, thinking, feeling fear, loving, or hating. Clusters of features such as these stem from essentially unified psychic capacities or faculties such as nutrition, perception, or the intellect. In turn, these last are essential constituents of certain types of soul which are the forms and essences of the corresponding kinds of living being. It is safe to conclude, then, that Aristotle’s examples are not analogous to compounds. Rather, psychic functions and affections are types of feature, entities which are cognate with formal items. These functions and affections are rooted in the soul’s capacities or faculties, which constitute the natural form that the soul is. Hence, because its constituents essentially involve not only formal but also bodily characteristics – for they are capacities for performing functions or suffering affections that are intrinsically hylomorphic – the soul itself essentially depends on matter. The same conclusion would apply to all natural forms like the soul.

108

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

A third possible objection would accept that psychic æªÆ and ŁÅ, as well as the soul itself and other natural forms, contain material characteristics in their own essence. It would deny, however, that Aristotle’s argument as developed in De Anima A.1 requires that change or change-related attributes are essential parts of the soul. To support this change-free construal, the objector would point out that the essential dependencies Aristotle is describing in this chapter invoke only matter but omit change altogether. Thus, at 403a6, 9–10, 15–16, 16–17, 18–19, and b17–19, he specifies that psychic functions, affections, and the soul itself are not without, are together with, or are inseparable from body. Even his main conclusion, reached at 403a25, is that psychic functions and affections are formulae which are (essentially) just enmattered. Because there is no reference to change or change-related features, it is implausible to infer that the soul or its functions and affections essentially depend on such features. The first weakness of this line of reasoning is that it ignores other Aristotelian arguments, outside the context of De Anima A.1, which obviously take change-related features as essential parts of natural forms. Earlier in the present section, I discussed how Metaphysics E.1 argues that, as objects of natural science, forms are essentially both matter- and change-involving (1025b32–4; 1026a2–3; a12; 13–14). Similarly, the previous chapter examined Physics B.2, which supports the presence of not only material but also of change-related features in the essence of natural forms (193b34–194a7; 14–15; 194b12–13). Even within De Anima A.1, however, there are signposts with which Aristotle signals the presence of change-related features in the essence of the soul and its functions or affections. Thus, at 403a21, the psychic affection of anger (in the absence of any strong or obvious anger-inducing agent) is characterized as undergoing change of a certain sort (the ŒØEŁÆØ at 403a21 is evidently parallel to ÆæŁÆØ at a20 or OæªÇÅÆØ at a22). More to the point, the schematic definition proposed at 403a26–7 specifies the affection of being angry as (essentially) a change of a specific type (e OæªÇŁÆØ ŒÅ Ø . . . ). It would be difficult, then, to avoid the necessary implication that change-related attributes are essential parts of psychic functions or affections, the soul itself, and other natural forms like it.15 There is a final, more serious difficulty, which would target Aristotle’s own claim that all functions and affections linked with psychic capacities or faculties are essentially matter- and change-involving (403a16–17: a B łıåB ŁÅ Æ r ÆØ a  Æ ). For without a universal claim of this sort Aristotle could not argue that all psychic capacities or faculties which constitute possible essential features of the soul are

15

There is a more urgent question that could be raised regarding change. This is a question not about whether change-related features enter the essence of natural forms such as the soul but about the way in which they do so: how is it that natural forms, (e.g.) the soul or its features, are essentially change-involving? It seems incorrect to suppose that the soul itself can essentially be (e.g.) in motion or undergo change. However, essentially involving change-related features should not be confused with essentially being in motion or undergoing change. Rather, a natural form’s essence would contain features which ground and explain the capacities of compound objects for initiating or suffering several types of change. This point will be taken up in the next chapter.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

109

dependent upon bodily functions or affections. Hence, he could not sustain the conclusion that the soul itself must comprise material or change-related parts in its essence. For there might be some psychic feature(s) which would be completely separable in essence from bodily attributes. If so, there could be a matter-less essence of the soul. A sophisticated version of this sort of objection does not simply exercise a sceptical stance towards the possibility that all psychic features are essentially enmattered formulae. Nor does it depend on the merely theoretical possibility that some of these features might prove independent of bodily characteristics. Rather, it challenges the generalizability of the cases of fear or anger. It may well be true that anger and fear, or even further psychic functions and affections like them, are essentially ‘together with’ bodily features. This hardly suffices, however, for drawing the conclusion that all capacities for psychic functions or affections have essential material parts. To ground this universal claim, Aristotle could need to inquire into several different sorts of psychic function or affection and show that these too resemble the cases of anger and fear. It is unclear whether such a project could be successful. Moreover, there are cases of psychic capacities such as thought or, perhaps more promisingly, theoretical thought that could well be essentially separable from bodily functions or affections. If so, they could constitute a matter-less essence of the soul, an essence which would be peculiar to the soul alone as it would not bring along with it any material features. I shall tackle this sort of objection only briefly as its full treatment would require a separate, long discussion. Let me first deal with the example of thought as a possible matter-less essential capacity of the soul. In De Anima A.1, 403a8–10, Aristotle considers the function of thinking and notes that, if anything, thinking seems to be peculiar to the soul alone to the exclusion of bodily functions or affections. Immediately, though, he goes on to argue that, if thinking is or involves essentially a specific type of imagination, it too is an enmattered formula ( ºØÆ ’ ØŒ N{ [sc. B łıåB ] e E· N ’ Kd ŒÆd F çÆÆÆ Ø j c ¼ı çÆÆÆ , PŒ K åØ’ i Pb F’ ¼ı  Æ r ÆØ). This strongly suggests that a case could be made for thinking too, perhaps even theoretical thinking, as essentially matter-involving. To be sure, this does not require that all types of theoretical thinking would fall under this heading. Thus, for instance, we could continue to conceive divine theoretical contemplation as essentially immaterial. This divine type of thinking, however, is not a psychic function or affection of a natural, perceptible, and changeable ensouled being with the corresponding type of natural form. By contrast, theoretical thinking of the non-divine, human type constitutes a case of psychic function which belongs to perceptible natural living beings with the corresponding type of soul. If so, the human capacity for thinking may well be essentially matter-involving. For, as Aristotle implies, it could essentially be or involve a certain type of imagination, a capacity that includes bodily characteristics in its own nature. It is extremely difficult, on the other hand, to undercut the other part of this objection. How could one prove the complete generalizability of the cases of anger

110

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y: F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

or fear? For present purposes it is perhaps better to assume that the demanding task of showing that several diverse types of psychic function or affection are essentially dependent on matter can, in principle, be carried through. It would be fair, then, to conclude that all psychic functions and affections, as well as the soul itself, comprise bodily and change-related essential components.

5.3 Formal and Material Parts of a Form’s Essence: Intra-Definiens Priority of Form over Matter? (Physics B.2) The thesis that natural forms are essentially matter- and change-involving as codified by [D] in section 5.1 faces an urgent question. According to this thesis, the correct definition of a natural form, FC, which is the essence of the relevant compounds, runs as follows: [D]

FC ¼def F1, F2, . . . , Fm enmattered in M1, M2, . . . , Mn.

The difficulty is how this view of essence and definition could accommodate Aristotle’s repeated claim that form, or some or all of its parts, is definitionally prior to matter and its parts (Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b4–6; 11–22). For, clearly, this claim entails that form is, in some way, independent of matter but not conversely. Thus, the essence of form should not involve material features, nor should its definition mention such features. The converse, however, does not hold good as material attributes should be defined in terms of form: for they are made what they essentially are by such formal entities. A possible view which attempts to reconcile this priority claim with [D] would accept that forms of natural compounds are defined in the manner of [D]: for they contain material and change-related essential parts. It would add, however, that the priority of form is re-gained at another front, within the definiens of [D]. Hence, while the defined form itself, FC, is not definitionally or essentially prior to matter, yet its defining formal features, F1, F2, . . . , Fm, are thus prior to its material ones, M1, M2, . . . , Mn. This intra-definiens or intra-essential sort of priority of formal entities over material attributes, it would be argued, is sufficient to sustain Aristotle’s priority claim without overthrowing the thesis of the essential enmatterment of form. The central aim of the present section is to undermine this kind of reconciliatory approach (henceforth [RA]) by uncovering its gaps. There is a general consideration which would readily challenge the coherence of [RA]. If we are serious about the correctness of [D] and the underlying position of the essential enmatterment of natural form, we should conceive a form’s defining formal features (F1, F2, . . . , Fm) as themselves essentially containing not only further formal but also material constituents. The same holds of the material features (M1, M2, . . . , Mn) making up the essence of a natural form. For they, too, should essentially be both matter- and form-involving. It is useful, at this juncture, to invoke the example given

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

111

at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b30–2: the material feature of (e.g.) having hands, which is included in the essence of the human-form, is itself grasped as an essential compound of formal characteristics (such as performing well the relevant humanly-chiro-function) plus material attributes (such as being a flesh-bone-tissue bodily organ of the corresponding sort). It seems, therefore, exceedingly difficult for [RA] to break free from the requirement that even a form’s formal and material defining features should themselves have not only formal but also material components. If this approach genuinely adopts the thesis of a form’s essential enmatterment, the same thesis should also apply to the formal entities found in a form’s essence. To put it more vividly, against the schematic background of [D]: why should F1, F2, . . . , Fm be any different from FC and enjoy essential and definitional priority over M1, M2, . . . , Mn? There is a possible response that is available to the resolute proponent of [RA]. It would be claimed that Physics B.2 favours the position of the essential enmatterment of natural form but also underpins the intra-definiens priority of form over matter. [RA] would hold that in that context Aristotle has the resources with which to show that there are specific types of causal relation between formal and material components of a form’s essence. Thus, formal entities are final causes, while material features are caused by them: the former constitute that for the sake of which the latter are as they essentially are but the converse is not the case. It would be concluded, then, that this sort of causal asymmetry can ground the intra-definiens priority of the formal over the material parts of a natural form’s essence. Let me begin with two central passages taken from Physics B.2 that could be used in support of [RA]. After laying out my interpretation, I shall sketch how [RA] would construe some of the claims made in these passages. I shall then show that this line of construal does not constitute a compelling interpretation. Nor does it give Aristotle a plausible argument. Since there are two sorts of things called nature, form and matter, we should proceed as if we were inquiring into what snubness is; so things of this sort are neither without matter nor in accordance with matter. (Physics [Phys.] B.2, 194a12–15; Charlton’s trans.) Up to what point, then, should the student of nature know the form and the what-it-is? Or should he know the form and the what-it-is just as the doctor knows the sinew and the smith knows bronze? For they know each of these things up to what they are for, and about these things which are separable in kind, but are in matter.16 (Phys. B.2, 194b9–13; Charlton’s trans.)

16 I agree with Ross (Aristotle’s ‘Physics’, Oxford University Press, 1936, p. 510) that the vulgate åæØ ı is ‘feeble as an answer to the question åæØ  ı’ posed at 194b9–10. For this reason I adopt his emendation åæØ F which becomes part of the prepositional phrase åæØ F  ŒÆ. At the same time, though, I keep the ªaæ found in the manuscripts and punctuate as follows: j uæ NÆæe [sc. E N ÆØ] Fæ j åƺŒ Æ [sc. E N ÆØ] åƺŒe; åæØ F  ªaæ ŒÆ [sc. E N ÆØ] ŒÆ, ŒÆd æd ÆFÆ – KØ åøæØa b YØ, K oºÅ fi  . ¼Łæø ªaæ [ . . . ]. Thus, Aristotle begins the passage with a question about the extent to which the natural scientist ought to know the form. He then goes on to ask a further question which tentatively addresses the first: ‘or should the physicist know the form just as some craftsmen know their subject-matter?’ Finally, he answers more affirmatively by explaining ( åæØ F  ªaæ ŒÆ ŒÆ)

112

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y: F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

In the first passage, it is argued that the student of nature should seek the definition (194a13:  KØ) of the objects belonging to his or her subject-matter as if they were like snubness. It is plausible to take the term Ø Å as signifying the essence or form of snub things – snubness or being snub – as opposed to the compound ‘snub thing’. This does not require that only natural forms resemble snubness. Nor does it rule out (particular or universal) compounds as items that are also like snubness in some respects. Rather, it suggests that the objects of study Aristotle is interested in (194a14: a ØÆFÆ) are natural forms of hylomorphic compounds rather than compounds. The important claim, however, is that, just as snubness, natural forms are essentially ‘neither without matter nor in accordance with matter’ (194a14–15). I take my qualification ‘essentially’ as ranging over the whole phrase h’ ¼ı oºÅ h ŒÆa c oºÅ. The crucial question, at this juncture, is what the implications of these prepositional locutions are. Despite the inherent difficulties of seeking to understand thinkers who philosophize by prepositions, it seems clear that natural forms must be defined as being not without (PŒ ¼ı) certain types of material feature, or as being together with them (cf. Metaphysics E.1, 1025b32–3: a B oºÅ ). Thus, their defining formulae must include material terms along the lines of [D]. Hence, the present context of Physics B.2 clearly invokes the thesis of the essential enmatterment of natural form. It is more difficult, however, to ascertain the import of h ŒÆa c oºÅ used at 194a14–15. This qualification might be construed as offering support to [RA]. Thus, it would be claimed that, while material features are essential parts of a natural form, they are not the fundamental or determinant constituents of its essence. In this sense, a natural form is not ‘in accordance with matter’ in that the types of material attribute mentioned in its definition are not the ultimate features in terms of which it is characterized. Rather, there are more important or crucial entities mentioned in the definiens, the formal components, in terms of which the relevant definiendum is basically or ultimately defined. Similarly, because the formal components are more basic, they are essentially and definitionally prior to the material parts of the essence. While a natural form is essentially matter-involving, it is its formal features that ultimately determine not only its own essence but also that of its material constituents. This defence of [RA] is beset by a dilemma. Suppose that the formal parts of the essence are fundamental, ultimate, or basic in that they make the form itself but also its material essential components what they are but not conversely. If so, they are essentially and definitionally prior to form and its material parts. In this case, however, [RA] seems to have discarded the position of the essential enmatterment of form. For, if there are some basic formal features which define matter or determine its essence, whereas the converse does not hold good, form turns out to be essentially immaterial. Why, then, place any importance on [D] and the underlying thesis that matter is an essential part of natural form? It would be preferable to define form solely in formal that a craftsman knows what the materials are for, and inquires into things which are separable in kind but are in matter. This rendering seems to yield not only a good syntactical structure but also a good argument.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

113

terms from the outset and to argue that material features, too, are ultimately defined in a similar fashion. The second horn of the dilemma holds that the formal features included in a natural form’s essence are determinant or more basic than the material ones, without ultimately reducing or eliminating the latter in favour of the former. Hence, while material components are ‘less important’ than formal ones, they cannot be completely omitted from the definition of any formal entity at any level of investigating natural form. This point can be brought out by using the resources of [D]. It is not only FC that is defined in material terms such as M1, M2, . . . , Mn. Its formal defining features, too, F1, F2, . . . , Fm, must be grasped as comprising similar material items. These last could be M1, M2, . . . , Mn themselves. If so, the idea is that formal and material parts of the definiens are essentially interdependent. Alternatively, the material items found in the essence of the formal constituents, F1, F2, . . . , Fm, might be distinct from M1, M2, . . . , Mn. In either case, though, natural form and its formal essential parts are essentially and definitionally dependent not only on further formal entities but also on material features. If this version of [RA] pursues consistently the thesis of the essential enmatterment of natural form, it just cannot reconcile this thesis with the claim that form is prior to matter. Neither of the horns of this dilemma would be satisfactory as a way of fleshing out [RA]. Yet the pressing question of how to understand ‘nor in accordance with matter’ remains. While it would be incorrect to interpret this phrase in the way proposed by [RA], it seems clear that Aristotle seeks to minimize the significance of material attributes as parts of a natural form’s essence. My view is that his intended meaning is clarified by the claims of the second passage quoted above. There, once again, Aristotle clearly deals not just with compounds but mainly with natural forms and their definition (194b10: e r  ŒÆd e  KØ) as falling under the subject-matter of natural philosophy. The phrasing suggests that these forms, which natural philosophy is about (194b12: æd ÆFÆ), are essentially separate or separable YØ but are in matter (194b12–13: åøæØa b YØ, K oºÅ fi  ).17 This formulation repeats the position that natural form is essentially matter-involving as form is thought to be ‘in matter’. This prepositional phrase corresponds to the qualification ‘not without matter’ used in the previous passage (194a14: h’ ¼ı oºÅ ). It is more difficult, though, to understand the notion of separateness or separability YØ. It is fair to suppose that natural form is taken as somehow essentially separate or separable from matter: for the idea seems to be that form is in matter but is also somehow separate or separable from it. But how are we to understand the way in which it is separate or separable from matter given the added claim that it is also essentially in matter? My proposal will be that the phrase åøæØa YØ is correlative to, and can be used to specify, the prepositional qualification h ŒÆa c oºÅ Similarly to my interpretation of 194a14–5, I take my characterization ‘essentially’ as governing the whole phrase åøæØa b YØ, K oºÅ fi  . 17

114

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y: F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

used at 194a14–15.18 It seems paradoxical to construe YØ in the way Ross does, as implying that form is separate from matter in form. Equally, it would be misleading to use Ross’s alternative rendering ‘separable/separate from matter in thought’, which seems to be endorsed by Charlton’s and Lennox’s ‘separate/separable in account’.19 For, a few lines earlier in Physics B.2, at 194a1–7, natural forms, unlike mathematical entities, are thought not to be (successfully) separable in thought from matter or change. Nor, as a result, can they be correctly defined without mentioning material or change-related characteristics. To be sure, one could misleadingly subtract matter and construct incorrect definitions, merely abstract conceptions of natural form without any reference to matter or change. But if so, one would mistakenly use thoughtabstraction in inappropriate cases and would provide unsuccessful accounts of natural form. These accounts would give rise to errors in our reasoning within natural science. Thus, for example, we would be unable, on the basis of such accounts, to explain the necessary features of the objects enformed by natural forms. To avoid these difficulties, I translated åøæØa YØ as ‘separable/separate in kind’. Natural form is essentially separable from (or can be independent of ) matter in kind in that the same type of natural form can be enmattered in several different types of matter without including in its essence any one in particular amongst these types of material feature. Similarly, a natural form would not involve in its essence a conjunction or a disjunction of all these different types of matter in which it might be embodied. Rather, these types of matter would be different in kind from those material features which are integral to its essence. Hence, natural forms are essentially separable in kind from (e.g.) particular bits of matter or token material parts. For example, the humanform is specifically (YØ) independent of a token sensory organ such as this eye or a particular parcel of eye-jelly in which the capacity of human eye-sight is embodied in a concrete case.20 Similarly, the human form seems separable in kind from some determinate types of material feature or bodily part: for it would be incorrect to think that (e.g.) having a strong type of arm or a pale sort of complexion are essential parts of being a human soul. It is helpful, at this juncture, to recall some of the artefact examples offered in Metaphysics Z.10, which I discussed in section 3.4 Lennox (‘ “As if We Were Investigating Snubness”: Aristotle on the Prospects for a Single Science of Nature’ [‘Snubness’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 35, 2008, p. 182) also seems to be relying on the correspondence between h’ ¼ı oºÅ and K oºÅ fi , on the one hand, and h ŒÆa c oºÅ and åøæØa YØ, on the other: ‘ “[s]eparable in form but in matter”, in other words, is the positive way of saying “not without matter, but not in accordance with matter”.’ His view, however, takes separability YØ as separability ‘in form’ or ‘in account’. My interpretation does not accept this point. 19 See Ross, Physics, p. 510; Charlton, Aristotle’s ‘Physics’ I, II [Physics], Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 98; Lennox, ‘Snubness’, p. 182. It is worth noting that Lennox argues that ‘[t]he nature of this “separability in form” or “in account” [ . . . ] and how it differs from the “separability in thought from change” that Aristotle grants to mathematical attributes, is not explored here’. 20 In De Anima A.4, 408b20–22, for instance, Aristotle claims that if an old man were to receive an eye of a certain type, he might be able to see as efficiently as the young man. This suggests that the capacity for sense perception (more precisely: human eyesight), a formal part of human soul, is essentially and definitionally independent of particular sensory organs or token bodily parts. 18

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

115

(1035a14–17). The form of the BA syllable, for instance, does not essentially include token materials such as these concrete ink marks just made on this sheet of paper. Nor does it include A- or B-letters of specific material types, such as airen, waxen, chalky, etc. In this interpretation, Aristotle’s notion of separability in kind as employed in Physics B.2 can be illuminated on the basis of a claim made in Metaphysics Z.11 (already discussed in section 4.1): [ . . . ] where a thing seems to come to be realised in others which are different in kind [Kç’  æø fiH YØ], as for instance a circle in bronze or in stone or in wood, in such cases it seems clear that the bronze and the stone are in no way part of the substance of the circle, since it is separated from them [Øa e åøæÇŁÆØ ÆPH]. (Met. Z.11, 1036a31–4; Bostock’s trans. modified)

Similarly to the syllable example, the form of circle is different in kind not only from particular bits of matter but, more significantly, from certain specific types of matter such as bronze, wood, stone, etc. Aristotle, then, argues that because this form is separate or separable from these types of matter they are not part of its essence. Nor are they mentioned in its definiens. It is plausible to think that the form of circle is separable from certain specific types of matter in kind (YØ), a qualification which may easily be supplied from the immediate context (1036a31–2:  æø fiH YØ). This seems to be precisely the sense in which Physics B.2, 194b12–13, claims that forms of natural objects are separable from matter YØ. At the same time, however, natural forms are not essentially separable in kind from all perceptible types of material feature collectively. For, if they were, they would prove identical with mathematical entities such as the circle-form used as an example in the passage just quoted from Metaphysics Z.11. Natural forms, though, have a distinctive nature compared with mathematical entities. For, as Physics B.2 argues, they are not essentially or definitionally independent of all perceptible types of material feature or change-related characteristics in the manner in which mathematical forms are (193b33–194a7). Thus, to use the example given at Metaphysics Z.11, 13036b28–32, the human-form includes in its essence material features such as (e.g.) having boneflesh-tissue hands that can perform well the relevant humanly-chiro-functions. In an artefact case, for instance, the Socrates-shaped statue-form is essentially dependent on material features such as (e.g.) being constituted from bulk or mass that is solidifiable and wrought-able (cf. Z.10, 1035a6–9). If this interpretation is correct, Aristotle’s characterization of form as ‘separable in kind from matter but in matter’ implies, in effect, that natural form is essentially independent of matter in one way but not in another. More precisely, perhaps, the claim is that natural form is essentially separable from certain types of material entity but dependent upon certain others. In general, the distinction between åøæØa YØ and K oºÅ fi (or between h’ ¼ı oºÅ and h ŒÆa c oºÅ) constitutes Aristotle’s way of marking out the scope issue concerning the types of material feature which are or

116

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y: F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

are not included in a natural form’s essence.21 There are two central questions on this issue. (1) What is the determining criterion on the basis of which to demarcate the types of material feature which are essential parts of natural form from those which are not? (2) Is it possible to salvage Aristotle’s view of the form’s priority over matter by arguing that natural form is not only essentially independent of certain types of matter but also prior to them in that it makes them what they essentially are but not conversely? [RA] could, at this point, attempt to answer both of these questions in a way that would favour the view of intra-definiens priority of formal over material constituents of a form’s essence. To do so, it would first place emphasis on the example that introduces the second passage taken from Physics B.2. In this example, Aristotle suggests that the natural scientist should know the essence of natural form in a way similar (or in roughly equal measure) to that in which the medical doctor knows sinew or the smith knows bronze (194b9–11). It is initially surprising that Aristotle lines up knowledge of essence and form with knowing material constituents such as sinews or bronze. It immediately becomes evident, though, that the link between the two is grasped in teleological terms. In this teleological conception, the form is the final goal, that for the sake of which each material item is as it is, while matter is for the sake of the form, which is identified with the final cause (194b11–12:  ŒÆ ŒÆ [sc. Fæ j åƺŒ ]).

21 At 194b13 Aristotle adds a puzzling ªaæ clause to the claim that natural forms are in matter: ‘for a man owes his/her birth to another man and to the sun’ (¼Łæø ªaæ ¼Łæø ªA fi ŒÆd lºØ ). Does this imply that, alongside certain types of material characteristic, the essence of (e.g.) the human form includes the features of having been begotten by a human father and being sustained by the sun’s heat and light? Aristotle makes a similar claim in Metaphysics .5, 1071a13–16, but formulates it more cautiously: uæ IŁæı ÆYØ   ØåEÆ, Fæ ŒÆd ªB ‰ oºÅ ŒÆd e YØ r  , ŒÆd Ø Ø ¼ºº ø x  › Ææ, ŒÆd Ææa ÆFÆ › lºØ ŒÆd › ºe ŒŒº . Here it is clear that causes such as the father or the sun and its annual movement in the ecliptic are causes external to the essence of the human form (1071a14–15: they are Ø Ø ¼ºº ø, apart from e YØ r  ). They are efficient or assisting causes in the coming-to-be and growth of compound human beings. Two points are worth noting. First, the example at Physics B.2, 194a13, comes after the claim that form is in matter to suggest that causes of (generation of ) natural compound objects, such as this human offspring, are not disembodied entities (e.g. Platonist Forms) but particular compound objects of the same type, in our case a human father (cf. Met. Z.9, 1033b26–32, 1034a2–5, and my discussion of this passage in section 4.6; see also Ross Physics, p. 511). Second, Aristotle has already introduced natural processes of coming-to-be earlier in Physics B.2 (194a29ff.: z ªaæ ıåF B ŒØø hÅ Ø Ø  º . . . ) and is clearly discussing such processes in this example. At 194a13 the father begets the offspring and so is the efficient cause of its coming-to-be: ¼Łæø ªaæ ¼Łæø ªA fi . The point, then, seems to be that the causes Aristotle is referring to in this example are efficient or assisting causes of natural processes which yield, as end-results, complete compound objects (in coming-to-be) or certain states or features that come-tobelong to compound objects (in growth or alteration). The human father is the efficient cause in the process which ends with the coming-into-being of a human offspring. The sun, its heat, light, and annual movement in the ecliptic, is an assisting cause in the processes of nourishment and development of a human being. Even if these causes are enabling or necessary conditions for the being of a human (or the existence of its form in particular bodily parts), they are not essential parts of its essence (or its form’s essence).

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

117

The idea, then, is that the natural philosopher knows not only the form as that for the sake of which matter is as it is, but also matter as being what it is for the sake of the form. [RA] would seek to answer (1) by holding that the types of matter which are not mentioned in a form’s definiens and from which form is separable in kind are those which are not linked with form in any obvious teleological manner. Conversely, the types of matter which are integral to a natural form’s essence are those which are related to it in the teleological mode just outlined. Thus, for instance, because the material features of (e.g.) having strong arms or delicate hands are not as they are for the sake of the human form, they are not parts of its nature. By contrast, having bodily extremities which properly fulfil the relevant functions obviously serves certain aspects of being human, and so is for the sake of the human form. As such, this material feature is essentially involved in that form. With this move, therefore, [RA] not only accepts that natural form is essentially enmattered but can also begin to specify the types of material feature that are parts of its essence. To tackle question (2), [RA] would argue that within the essence of a natural form, as represented by the definiens-side of [D], the formal features, F1, F2, . . . , Fm, are final causes, entities for the sake of which the material attributes, M1, M2, . . . , Mn, are what they are. Conversely, the latter are caused by the former in that the material components are as they are for the sake of the formal ones. This teleological sort of causal asymmetry, it would be claimed, can ground the form’s intra-definiens essential and definitional priority over matter. For, by being final causes, the formal components determine the nature of the material ones, while the converse just is not the case. [RA] would conclude, then, that it is possible to sustain the claim that form is prior to matter consistently with the thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment. Before criticizing this argument, let me examine two further passages from Physics B.2 which seem to set out Aristotle’s teleological conceptual apparatus. As such, these passages could be seen by [RA] as further support for the form’s intra-definiens priority over matter. It is important, then, to disabuse ourselves of this line of construal by undermining its philosophical soundness and counter-proposing a more promising interpretation. Further, it belongs to the same study to know the end or what something is for, and to know whatever is for that end. Now nature is an end and what something is for (for of those things that there is a definite end to a continuous change, that last thing is also what it is for [ . . . ]; for the end should not be just any last thing, but the best). (Phys. B.2, 194a27–33; Charlton’s trans.) Further, matter is amongst those things which are relative to something; for there is a different sort of matter for a different sort of form [Ø H æ Ø  oºÅ· ¼ºº{ ªaæ YØ ¼ººÅ oºÅ]. (Phys. B.2, 194b8–9; my trans.)

It is worth noting at the outset that the first passage presupposes that both sorts of nature, form and matter, are studied by natural philosophy. This claim is supported by the argument advanced at 194a22–7. In addition to form and matter, though, our passage takes natural philosophy as also inquiring into the final cause (194a27: e y

118

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y: F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

ŒÆ ŒÆd e  º ) and the items which are for the sake of the final cause (194a28: ‹Æ ø [sc. F y ŒÆ ŒÆd F  ºı ] ŒÆ). Just as in the case of form and matter, the contrasted items e y ŒÆ and ‹Æ ø ŒÆ are held to be objects of study for natural philosophy. It seems fair to conclude that there is a correspondence between the two pairs that runs as follows: Form þ matter : Final cause þ what is for the sake of the final cause. Indeed, Aristotle goes on to line up a certain type of nature with the final cause (194a28–9:  çØ  º ŒÆd y ŒÆ). The type of nature which is identified with the final cause should be the form, the essence of a complete natural compound (type of ) object (cf. Physics B.7, 198a24–6). This is precisely what is called the best ultimate thing at 194a32–3 (e  ºØ [sc. åÆ r ÆØ  º ]). If this is correct, the material type of nature must be identified with the items which are for the sake of the final cause and the form.22 [RA], however, would use these incontrovertible aspects of Aristotle’s statements to ground the asymmetric independence of formal from material characteristics within a form’s essence. Thus, while both formal and material components are included in a natural form’s essence, there is a causal asymmetry internal to this essence. For formal parts are final causes of material ones, while the latter are caused by the former. It is exactly in this way, it would be argued, that the formal parts make the material ones what they essentially are but not conversely. Moreover, [RA] would employ this intradefiniens sort of priority to understand the second passage just quoted. In that passage, Aristotle seems to be arguing for a sort of asymmetry between matter and form: matter is relative to form as there is a different type of matter corresponding to a different type of form. The idea would be, presumably, that (e.g.) the material feature of being embodied in an organic type of human eye-jelly is relative to the form of human sight. By contrast, for the form of (e.g.) canine sight there would be a different, canine type of material feature varying in accordance with the form. Aristotle, however, does not state the converse claim that form, too, varies with, and so is relative to, matter. This might

22

There is an important complication introduced by the argument developed at 194a27–33. Aristotle is now interested not only in form and matter as synchronic constituents of a completed natural compound (e.g. the token or type of bronze that fully embodies the Socrates-shaped statue-form which is the essence of this token compound Socrates-statue). Alongside this, he is discussing continuous processes of natural coming-tobe (comparing them with processes of artefact production) in which the unwrought matter does not constitute the finished end-result but is the material that can develop (or be worked) into the entity that is enformed by the relevant form and fully serves the corresponding final cause (194a29–30: z ªaæ ıåF

B ŒØø hÅ Ø Ø  º ). An instance of this sort of matter would be the human seed which can develop into a complete human being (having the human essence or form, i.e. the relevant type of soul) at the final stage(s) of a normal process of human generation (one that is not interrupted or interfered with). For present purposes, though, I need not discuss in detail the differences between the two sorts of case. The human seed is a type of matter that is for the sake of the human form being realized at the completion stage of a successful generation process. Similarly, the token matter constituting an actual human being can be taken as being for the sake of the human form which is the essence of this actual human being.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

119

be a reason for supposing that he does not endorse this claim. Rather, he would argue that matter is relative to form but not the other way about. Clearly, however, if this indeed is Aristotle’s view, there is an obvious objection to it. For form, too, seems relative to matter as different types of formal feature vary in accordance with different types of material entity in which they are realized. Especially in the case of natural compounds, in which there is no human craftsman who constructs the matter exclusively for the sake of the relevant form (the function or goal of the finished artefact), the matter is already present (194b7–8). But if so, just as the form, the matter too is already in place as it should essentially be. Hence, matter and form seem to be relative to each other. For example, the form of human sight is relative to the material feature of being embodied in an organic type of human eye-jelly, just as the latter is relative to the former. To defuse this sort of objection and support the asymmetry of form over matter, [RA] would argue that only matter is relative to form (but not conversely) as matter is what it is for the sake of the form (the final cause), whereas the converse is not the case. Because form is essentially and definitionally prior to matter in this teleological fashion, we can underpin the asymmetric version of the claim that matter is relative to form. The overall conclusion of [RA] would be that, although form is essentially both matter- and form-involving, its essence is internally stratified hierarchically. The material parts of its essence are relative and posterior to the formal ones as the former are caused to be what they are by the latter, which are the final causes. Let me take up the last point about the asymmetric construal of the claim put forward at 194b8–9 that matter is relative to form. There is no textual basis for favouring this sort of asymmetry. Aristotle does not himself maintain (explicitly or implicitly) that form is not relative to matter. Furthermore, there is no good philosophical reason to saddle Aristotle with this negated converse claim. For, as he goes on to remark at 194b9–12, knowledge of form and essence is analogous to knowing the matter as being for the sake of the form. This indicates that knowledge of form is knowledge of it as being that for the sake of which matter is as it is. Because knowing is a factive mental state,23 we can infer from this that, just as matter is for the sake of the form, similarly form is that for the sake of which matter is. If this is correct, what follows from the Aristotelian teleological framework is that form and matter are (symmetrically) relative to each other as each constitutes a member of an appropriate teleological pair. There is a more important reason for rejecting the sort of asymmetry that [RA] requires. For this is an intra-definiens asymmetry, one that obtains within the form’s own essence: formal essential components are thought as prior to (qua final causes of ) material ones. The implication, then, is that in this link of final causation the formal parts are causes, whereas the material parts are their effects but not conversely. It is of

23

That is to say, knowing that p entails that p is true.

120

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

utmost significance, though, to emphasize that, given the thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment, the what-it-is of the form and of its formal parts cannot but involve material characteristics. Equally, the material features included in a form’s essence comprise not only material but also formal essential parts. If this is correct, in claiming that the formal parts are final causes of the material ones, one necessarily implies that some material features (those essential to the formal parts) are also final causes of either themselves or of further material attributes. In the first case, it would be paradoxical to maintain that part of the final cause of the material constituents is these material items themselves. In the second case, no asymmetry of form over matter could be sustained as the final cause would itself essentially involve further material features. If so, both form and matter would be final causes of, and prior to, some other material entities. There arises, then, an impasse which besets those who adhere to [RA]. First, they cannot independently identify the final cause that the form is, for parts of its identityfixer are material features too. If so, they cannot legitimately maintain that form alone is the final cause but matter is not. Further, if formal plus material features constitute the final cause, material features might turn out to be their own partial causes. Alternatively, even if there are further, distinct material features that are caused collaboratively by the form’s formal-plus-material essential parts, still this last kind of final cause is indissolubly hylomorphic. If so, no asymmetry or priority can be conferred on form or its formal essential parts by themselves. This is not surprising if one appreciates the deeper consequences of the position that form is essentially matter-involving. For if this position is accepted, one cannot consistently claim that any formal essential parts of the form are asymmetrically independent of, or prior to, its material parts in essence or definition. If natural form and its formal essential constituents alike are matterinvolving, they cannot be prior to their very own material essential parts. Nor, quite generally, can they be asymmetrically independent of all perceptible types of material feature collectively. The only viable alternative would be to give up the thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment. This move, however, is neither reconciliatory nor plausible given the arguments discussed in the present and the previous chapters. It should be emphasized that my interpretation too endorses the teleological conception deployed in Physics B.2, in which form and matter are understood, respectively, as final cause and what is for the sake of the final cause. It is important, then, to argue that there is a telic sort of causal asymmetry between the two by which form proves to be essentially and definitionally prior to matter. It would be mistaken, though, to construe this relation as being intra-definiens for the reasons I pointed out in my criticism of [RA]. There are several constraints which should shape our understanding of the telic causal asymmetry and of the corresponding priority of form over matter. First, form or its essential parts cannot be the final cause of, or prior to, essential features belonging to their own nature. For if this were so, form would effectively be asymmetrically independent of itself (or of parts of itself ) in essence and definition. In that case, however, form would be what it is because of itself and, at the same time, not because of itself. This result would be absurd. The second constraint should guide us in

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

121

specifying the types of item that form and its essential parts can be, and indeed are, final causes of and prior to. An important consideration, in this connection, is that Aristotle conceives natural form as the essence of particular compound objects. Further, he thinks that universal compounds, the types particulars are members of, are made what they are by form (Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b14–20; 27–31; Z.11, 1037a24–33). From these assumptions it is plausible to infer that form and its essential parts should be final causes of, and essentially prior to, (universal and particular) compounds. Moreover, because particular compounds involve token-material parts, while universal compounds have type-material constituents, it would follow that form and its essential parts should be final causes of, and essentially prior to, these token- and type-materials. Two clarificatory points are in order. First, it is not only form and its formal essential components that function as final causes of, and so are prior to, particular or universal compounds. Rather, the form in its entirety, encompassing both formal and material parts of its essence, is privileged over compounds in this teleological and ontological fashion. If so, the whole hylomorphic form is the final cause of and is essentially prior to the token- and type-materials of particular and universal compounds (respectively). Suppose that a particular compound, CP, can be understood as follows: CP: being FC þ Token-with-Token-Matter. A universal compound, CU, on the other hand, would be represented as follows: CU: being FC þ Type-with-Type-Matter. In both formulae FC is the form of natural compounds. From the definiens of FC, as given by [D], it follows that FC as a whole (a complex hylomorphic essence made up of formal and material features, F1, F2, . . . , Fm plus M1, M2, . . . , Mn) enforms and is the essence of universal and particular compounds. Thus, both formal and material features determine the nature of token- and type-materials found in particular and universal compounds respectively. It is in this sense, then, that token- and type-materials are for the sake of form: for they are as they are for the sake of realizing or embodying this sort of complex hylomorphic form that is their essence. The converse, of course, is not the case. Second, there is no need to suppose that the token- and type-materials found (respectively) in particular and universal compounds are dramatically different from the material attributes essential to a natural form. Indeed, the only or main difference might consist merely in their being tokens or types that have these essential features, as opposed to being themselves these essential features or modes of being. Thus, for example, an essential material part of the human-hearing-form is to be embodied in a flesh-bonetissue ear that can perform successfully the humanly-aural-functions. A particular ear of a concrete human being that has the relevant capacity of hearing, then, might be simply a token bodily organ that has the feature of being a flesh-bone-tissue ear that can perform successfully the humanly-aural-functions. Similarly, the type-matter found in

122

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

the universal compound Socrates-shaped type of statue need not be anything more complex than a type of material body that has the feature of being a solidifiable and wrought-able bulky mass. The corresponding essential material part of the Socratesshaped statue-form would be simply the feature of being constituted from solidifiable and wrought-able bulky mass. My proposal, then, is to preserve the asymmetry and priority of form over matter which is understood in terms of teleological causal relations. It is not part of this proposal, though, to smuggle the telic causal asymmetry and priority back into the essence of form. For, if natural form is essentially made up of not only formal but also material features, its defining formal characteristics cannot themselves be asymmetrically independent of material attributes. Hence, the claim of the form’s priority over matter should not be understood in the intra-definiens manner, as applying within the form’s own essence. Rather, an essentially enmattered natural form is that for the sake of which token- and type-materials are as they are: for it determines their nature and so is essentially and definitionally prior to them. These relatively sketchy aspects of my view will be taken up and developed more fully in chapter 7. For present purposes, however, it is sufficiently clear that my proposal too aims to achieve a viable and coherent reconciliation between the form’s essential enmatterment and its priority over matter. Unlike [RA], though, this sort of reconciliation does not compromise the integrity of either of these two central parts of Aristotle’s metaphysical picture.24

5.4 The Inextricability of Formal and Material Parts of a Form’s Essence (Sophistici Elenchi 31) The interpretation set out in the present chapter could be challenged in a rather straightforward way. It could be argued that the thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment should not be overrated. It seems true, given the arguments of Metaphysics E.1 and Physics B.2, that Aristotle takes natural form as essentially involving material and change-related features. However, it would be claimed, there is no textual reason to understand the formal parts of its own essence as themselves being essentially 24

Lennox (‘Snubness’) does not specify whether he takes natural form (the object of natural philosophy) as itself essentially enmattered or only as necessarily dependent for its existence on matter and change. Sometimes he gives the impression that he follows the essential enmatterment route. Thus, in assessing the example of the snub, he notes that it ‘is used as a model for how natural objects, in contradistinction from the objects of mathematics, are to be defined’ (p. 171). Similarly, he points out that ‘the object of investigation is not “snub nose”, which suggests a property predicated of a subject, but the abstract property “snubness”, and we are aiming to understand its essence” (p. 172). He goes on to take the objects of natural science as universals which refer to natural beings as material and formal unities. However, he also claims that snubness is a feature that ‘is necessarily concave flesh and bone’ (p. 173), a statement that might imply that snubness is not essentially concavity in nasal flesh. If so, his idea might be that only (particular or universal) compounds are essentially form- and matter-involving. Indeed, he maintains that ‘the objects investigated by natural science are essentially material bodies with their own capacities for change’ (p. 169). Again, this seems to entail that what essentially involves form and matter (together with capacities for change) are not natural forms but are natural compound objects.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

123

enmattered. For Aristotle does not discuss the nature of such formal parts but only that of form. Moreover, even if we accept the conceptual implications of the thesis that form is essentially enmattered, it is unclear how a form’s formal parts are themselves essentially dependent on matter. Let us use the schema of [D] once more: [D]

FC ¼def F1, F2, . . . , Fm enmattered in M1, M2, . . . , Mn.

Are we to suppose that the material features which are essential to F1, F2, . . . , Fm are the very same material parts (M1, M2, . . . , Mn) of FC’s own essence? If so, the view would be that formal and material essential components of form are not separately identifiable but are essentially linked interdependently, in a non-decomposable way. Alternatively, it might be thought that the material items which are essential to F1, F2, . . . , Fm are distinct from M1, M2, . . . , Mn. In this case, though, it seems that the formal essential components of form are indeed essentially and definitionally prior to its material features, even if they are not completely independent of matter. But if so, one might entertain the idea of an intra-definiens priority of form over matter along the lines of [RA] discussed in the previous section. As I have already pointed out, though, this result would not be promising in the light of the difficulties inherent in [RA]. Aristotle comes to grips with this problem in an important passage from Sophistici Elenchi 31. There, in the context of discussing sophisms that involve multiple repetitions of the same term (181b25–6), he uses once more the celebrated example of the snub.25 I shall argue that Aristotle’s understanding of this example suggests that he takes the formal and material features intrinsic to natural form as themselves interdependently and inextricably related to each other in essence. In the case of the predicates through which something is revealed we should say the following, i.e. that what is revealed is not the same [when the predicate is used] separately by itself and [when it is used] as part of an account [expression: K fiH º ª{]. For the concave reveals the same thing commonly when used of the snub and of the bandy, whereas nothing prevents it from signifying different things when added to the nose and when added to the legs; for in the former case it signifies the snub, while in the latter it signifies the bandy, and it makes no difference to say snub-nose or concave-nose. Further, we should not allow the phrase to be in direct cases; for it is false. For the snub is not a concave nose but something of a nose, i.e. an affection of nose, so that there is nothing absurd if the snub nose is a nose that has the concavity of nose. (Sophistici Elenchi [Soph. El.] 31, 181b35–182a6; my trans.)

The grammatical point with which Aristotle closes this passage (182a3–6) is not important for present purposes. It has one aspect, however, which is helpful. For it clarifies beyond doubt that, in this context, Aristotle does not take the ‘snub’ as a compound (particular or universal) snub-thing, such as this snub-nose or the snub type of nose. Rather, he specifies that the ‘snub’ is a feature or affection (182a4: P ªæ KØ 25 The example of the snub is used in this context because at Sophistici Elenchi 13, 173b9–11, it has already been offered as a case which generates ‘babbling’. If the snub is ‘concavity of nose’ or ‘concave nose’, a snubnose will be ‘concave nose nose’. A similar problem is discussed in Metaphysics Z.5, 1030b30–1031a1.

124

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

e Ø e Þd ŒºÅ Iººa ÞØe , x  Ł ) but is not an object or type of object. Hence, his discussion primarily ranges over attributes or ways of being. Against the background of Metaphysics E.1 and Physics B.2, if the ‘snub’, understood as snubness or being snub, is analogous to form, Aristotle’s present argument should apply to natural forms too, the essential features of, or modes of being for, natural compounds. The starting-point of this argument seems linguistic. A signifying predicate-term does not or, more cautiously, need not, when used separately (or by itself ), signify the same thing as when used as part of a complex phrase/account. That Aristotle begins from observations about linguistic terms or predicates is clear from several points made in Sophistici Elenchi 31. The chapter is introduced with the claim that we should not allow that relative predicates signify some definite thing if used separately by themselves (181b26–7: P   H æ Ø ºª ø Å ÆØ Ø åøæØÇ Æ ŒÆŁ’ Æa a ŒÆŪæÆ ). Thus, for instance, ‘double’ or ‘half ’ by themselves may not signify anything or, even if they do, they need not signify the same as when they are combined with other terms (181b32–4: e b “غؔ Pb Å ÆØ Pb Yø . . . P ÆPe ŒÆd ıÅ fi æÅ ).26 Similarly, in our passage, the subject-matter of the argument clearly comprises predicate-terms through which something is revealed or signified (181b36: K b E Ø’ z źFÆØ ŒÆŪæı Ø ).27 The crucial example is that of the ‘concave’. In the light of Aristotle’s remark made at 182b4, I shall take such terms as signifying features or modes of being and shall formulate them as predicate-expressions. Thus, ‘being concave’ or ‘concavity’ reveals the same thing when used separately or by itself of Ø e and of ÞØŒ  alike (181b38–9: ŒØB b e ÆPe źE Kd F Ø F ŒÆd F ÞØŒF). By contrast, it may signify something different when it is added to ‘nose’ and forms part of the expression ‘concavity þ nose’. Similarly, it may signify some further, different thing in the case in which it constitutes the expression ‘concavity þ legs’ (181b39–182a1: æØŁ  b Pb ŒøºØ ¼ººÆ, e b B fi ÞØd e b fiH Œ ºØ, Å ÆØ). Indeed, Aristotle claims that ‘concavity þ nose’ signifies the snub, the feature of snubness, or being snub, while ‘concavity þ legs’ signifies the feature of being bandy

26

Here I need not assume the quotation marks that Ross prints. The context clearly indicates that Aristotle is discussing relative terms which signify relatives. 27 Ross emends the phrase at 181b36 into K b E Ø’ z źFÆØ ŒÆŪıæı Ø F ºŒ . His idea might be that in this way the structure is parallel to that used at 181b25–6: H æ Ø ºª ø . . . a ŒÆŪæÆ . There, we have a genitive qualifying a ŒÆŪæÆ , and so something similar should be expected at 181b36, where Ross’s added ø qualifies E ŒÆŪıæı Ø . I do not see any serious reason to accept this emendation as the phrase makes sense as it stands in the manuscripts. There is another textual point here. I have translated the F at 181b36 as an object of ºŒ , which preannounces the clause ‰ P e ÆPe åøæd [ . . . ]. It could be taken, however, as an object of Ø’ z źFÆØ: ‘in the case of predicates through which this (kind of case) is signified.’ My interpretation would not be affected even if we adopted this alternative rendering. It seems more natural, though, to understand the text in the way I have translated it: ‘in the case of predicates through which something is signified [those that have signification as opposed to relative predicates which may have no signification at all by themselves: 181b26–7; 32–3] we should say this, i.e. that. . . .’

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

125

(182a1–2). The significations of these complex expressions are not only mutually different but also differ from the signification of ‘concavity’ or ‘being concave’. A difficulty arising from the contrast Aristotle is relying on is how to understand the claim made at 181b37–9 that ‘concavity’ has the same signification in common to both Ø e and ÞØŒ . It would be mistaken to think that Aristotle is describing cases of complex locutions, such as ‘concavity þ snubness’ or ‘concavity þ bandy-ness’. For, if this were so, there would be no obvious contrast with the other cases, those of ‘concavity þ nose’ and ‘concavity þ legs’ (181b39–182a2). Hence, it is preferable to suppose that ‘concavity’ signifies the same if assigned as a predicate to snubness or to bandy-ness. The idea, then, would be that in the predications ‘concavity belongs to snubness’ and ‘concavity belongs to bandy-ness’ the predicate ‘concavity’ signifies the same thing, presumably the feature of being concave or concavity.28 The main problem, however, is to assess the philosophical implications of this linguistic point. Let us assume that ‘concavity’ by itself signifies the same in ‘concavity belongs to snubness’ and ‘concavity belongs to bandy-ness’. In both cases, the signified feature is being concave. Suppose, further, that ‘concavity’ in ‘concavity þ nose’ or ‘concavity þ legs’ reveals a feature different from merely being concave, the signification of the isolated term ‘concavity’. Similarly, the two composite expressions differ from each other in signification. For the first signifies being snub, whereas the second signifies being bandy. Do these remarks carry any more weight than simply bringing out certain observations about combinations of linguistic terms or, even more narrowly, about Greek linguistic practice? Even if the answer to this question is affirmative, there is a further issue of generalizability. Can we use the examples of ‘snubness’ or ‘bandy-ness’ as a basis for drawing general conclusions about combined terms and corresponding compound features? Or do these terms constitute merely idiosyncratic instances, perhaps internal to Greek usage alone? Let me address these questions first by pointing out that the examples provided in this passage are linguistic counterparts to an important ontological point about

28 This point need not be formulated in a way that requires Ø e and ÞØŒ  to be merely subject-terms or linguistic items. An equivalent claim would be that the predicate ‘is concave’ signifies the same feature, being concave, when said of the Ø e- or the ÞØŒ -entities referred to by the corresponding subject-terms. A further difficulty is about Aristotle’s usage of the terms Ø e and ÞØŒ . Do these represent predicateexpressions signifying features, such as snubness or bandy-ness, or subject-terms referring to objects, such as the snub- or the bandy-thing? Reasons of consistency and uniformity with the rest of the examples offered in this passage would suggest that Ø e and ÞØŒ  are predicate-expressions, such as ‘snubness’, picking up features, such as being snub (182a4). But if so, it might be thought that it is difficult to preserve the predicational interpretation I just proposed, in which ‘concavity’ is a predicate-term signifying the same in both predications ‘the Ø e is concave’ and ‘the ÞØŒ  is concave’. For one might hold that this interpretation requires that Ø e and ÞØŒ  be subject-terms referring to objects. This, however, is not a cogent argument. The predicational point can be formulated equally well even without using strict subject-terms or referring to objects. Thus, we can say that the predicate ‘is concave’ is said of snubness (or ‘being concave belongs to snubness’) and signifies the same as when said of bandy-ness (or when used in ‘concavity belongs to bandy-ness’). The two terms, then, Ø e and ÞØŒ , can be understood consistently with the ‘snub’ of 182a4, as predicate-phrases signifying features.

126

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

real-world entities, such as being snub or being bandy, but also about natural forms which are analogous to such features. Throughout Sophistici Elenchi 31, Aristotle emphasizes what seems to be a term-to-world relation between predicates or linguistic terms and modes of being or features being signified: the former reveal or signify the latter (181b26: Å ÆØ Ø; 32: Å ÆØ Pb Yø ; 36: E Ø’ z źFÆØ ŒÆŪæı Ø ; 37: P e ÆPe . . . e ź ; 38: e ÆPe źE; 181b39–182a2: ¼ººÆ . . . Å ÆØ· ŁÆ b ªaæ e Ø , ŁÆ b e ÞØŒe Å ÆØ). Moreover, the case of combined or complex accounts (181b33–4: ıÅ fi æÅ ; 37: K fiH º ª{) indicates that we can understand formulae such as ‘concavity þ nose’ and ‘concavity þ legs’ as putative defining accounts of being snub and being bandy respectively. This becomes plausible against the background of Metaphysics E.1 and Physics B.2. There, the definiens of natural form is understood analogously to the definiens of being snub, which is ‘concavity of nose’. This last formula, though, is virtually the same as the complex expression ‘being concave þ nose’ used in Sophistici Elenchi 31. In accounts of this sort ‘being concave’ is lined up with formal terms, while ‘nose’ or ‘being of nose’ corresponds to material terms. In the light of these two considerations, we can conceive complex expressions such as ‘concavity þ nose’ as accurately revealing or signifying the essence of attributes such as being snub or, analogously, of natural forms quite generally. If so, these expressions signify real-world essential features or modes of being, those that make the corresponding definiendum what it essentially is. Further, because they involve both material and formal terms, they describe the essence as involving both material and formal characteristics. Aristotle’s underlying point is that formal entities which are signified by terms such as ‘being concave’ cannot be grasped independently of material attributes signified by terms such as ‘being nasal’. His view is not that ‘being concave’ by itself signifies something different from the compound formula ‘being concave þ nose’ simply because of an external or artificial linkage of ‘being concave’ with ‘nose’. Rather, ‘being concave’ by itself has a different signification from a linguistically identical term, ‘being concave’, as a component of the complex expression ‘being concave þ nose’. Thus, there is no independent signification of ‘being concave’ by itself which is linked, as a separate conjunct, with the signification of ‘nose’ and yields by addition the new signification of ‘being concave þ nose’. For the independent signification of ‘being concave’ when the term is used separately from others just is not the same as that of ‘being concave’ when the term is part of ‘being concave þ nose’ (181b37–182a2). By contrast, while ‘being concave’ by itself presumably signifies the feature of concavity, yet a linguistically indistinguishable term, ‘being concave’, signifies the feature of being snub in the phrase ‘being concave þ nose’. This point is formulated even more emphatically in Aristotle’s further claim that ‘snub-nose’ and ‘concave nose’ do not differ in signification (182a2–3). For the signification of ‘being concave’ in ‘concave nose’ is just snubness, a feature that is essentially nasal. This line of thought suggests that being concave, in so far as it is an essential formal part of being snub, is already permeated, in its very nature, by the material attributes

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

127

which are integral to the essence of being snub, such as being of nose or being nasal. Compare the definition of being snub, [Dsnub]

Being snub ¼def being concavity of nose,

with [D]: [D]

FC ¼def F1, F2, . . . , Fm enmattered in M1, M2, . . . , Mn.

In Aristotle’s own view, [Dsnub] can be used as a model for understanding [D], the definition of natural form. It would follow, then, that the formal parts of a natural form’s essence (F1, F2, . . . , Fm) are inextricably dependent on the material ones (M1, M2, . . . , Mn). Not only are there material features which are essential to natural forms. Even their formal essential parts involve, in their own essence, those material features in an indissoluble fashion. The converse claim should also hold good: the material features, M1, M2, . . . , Mn, found in a natural form’s essence are essentially characterized in terms of the formal ones, F1, F2, . . . , Fm. For, as the example of Metaphysics Z.11 implies, a material essential part of the human form, such as having a hand, is specified not only in material terms, such as being a flesh-bone-tissue bodily extremity, but also in formal terms, such as being in certain states or, more specifically, being capable of performing well the relevant humanly-chiro-functions (1036b30–2). The overall conclusion seems to be that formal and material parts of a natural form’s essence are inextricably dependent on each other (symmetrically). If correct, this result undercuts further any plausibility that the idea of an intra-definiens priority might still be carrying. Form may be essentially and definitionally prior to matter but cannot be so relative to its own essential material features. There is a further question arising from Aristotle’s argument advanced in Sophistici Elenchi 31. While the feature of being concave (the signification of ‘being concave’) is not the same as the concavity essential to being snub (signified by ‘being concave’ in ‘concavity þ nose’), yet it is a feature of some type. Unlike the case of relative terms, Aristotle does not maintain that ‘being concave’ by itself may have no signification at all (181a26–7; 32–3). Rather, he holds that it does signify some feature. More strikingly, it signifies the very same feature when predicated of snubness or bandy-ness (181a36–9). It is important, then, to explore the nature of this sort of feature. First, it seems clear that it is not an essentially matter-involving feature in the manner in which being snub or being bandy essentially comprise being nasal or being of legs respectively. For if it were, the difference between it and being snub or being bandy would evaporate. It seems fair to suppose, then, that ‘being concave’ signifies an abstract, essentially immaterial feature. This is corroborated by Aristotle’s remark that it signifies the same in both predications ‘concavity belongs to snubness’ and ‘concavity belongs to bandyness’. For it seems correct that the abstract, geometrical feature of being concave can be truly ascribed to snubness or bandy-ness alike. Aristotle formulates this point in a different way too. He states that universal terms such as ‘being concave’ or ‘being knowledge’ signify something common or in common when predicationally related to

128

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

different specific kinds of entity (181b35: e ŒØ ; 181b38: ŒØB fi ). Thus, for instance, while each particular scientific discipline is truly characterized as knowledge, the generic feature of being knowledge is not to be specific knowledge of anything in particular but knowledge of some knowable thing or other (181b35). Similarly, concavity is a general, abstract shape-feature that belongs in common to snub- or bandy-things (181b37–9). But it is not essentially nasal or pedal concavity. In the light of Physics B.2, 193b31–194a7, it is reasonable to conclude that being concave is a mathematical entity, an abstraction that involves no perceptual matter in its essence, something that the mathematician produces by thought-abstraction from matter (such as legs, noses, etc.) and change. This is so even if this entity cannot exist as a shape of physical bodies without any material objects existing at all. The claim, therefore, is not that the abstract feature of concavity does not exist at all: for it does exist as an essentially immaterial entity, a mathematical construct or fiction. It does not, however, exist as a specific kind of physical entity as it does not contain any physical or material features at all in its essence. The feature of being snub, by contrast, or its essential formal part, being (nasally) concave, are specific types of natural feature that essentially contain perceptible types of material characteristic. They do not, to be sure, exist as independent natural or physical material objects: for they are necessarily dependent for their existence on the existence of some such object or other. They are, however, specific natural or physical features in that their essence partly consists of material attributes. In Sophistici Elenchi 31 Aristotle’s allusion to this point is implicit in his example of determinate branches of scientific knowledge in contradistinction with knowledge quite generally. The term ‘medical knowledge’ signifies a specific branch of knowledge with a corresponding determinate real-world object (e.g. the state of being healthy). The generic term ‘knowledge’, however, does not signify any particular discipline with any specific real-world subjectmatter. Rather, it reveals the abstract feature of being knowledge of some knowable object or other (181b34–5: P’  KØ Å K fiH YØ (x  N Ø  NÆæØŒc KØ Å) [sc. Å ÆØ F], ‹æ e ŒØ · KŒE ’ q KØ Å KØÅF). Hence, features such as being snub or its essential part, being (nasally) concave, are specific types of natural, essentially matter-involving feature existing in the physical world as attributes of objects or types of object. In accordance with the model of snubness (or its concavity), natural form is the determinate essence of natural objects or types of object that makes them the specific (kinds of ) things they are. Mathematical or abstract features are real entities, in so far as they are understood as abstractions, but are not determinate types of natural form that make any physical (types of ) objects what they specifically are. There is a further complication at this juncture. Aristotle cautiously maintains that nothing prevents ‘being concave’ by itself from signifying something other than what is signified by a linguistically indistinguishable term which is part of a complex formula (181b39: Pb ŒøºØ ¼ººÆ . . . Å ÆØ). This, presumably, does not rule out the possibility of complex expressions in which the ‘being concave’ segment has the same

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N V O LV I N G

129

signification as the isolated term ‘being concave’. But what is the criterion with which to differentiate the distinct sorts of case? A plausible suggestion might be that the feature signified by the isolated term is different from that signified by the same term when it is part of a composite account just in case the two (or more) terms of the composite account signify features that are essentially dependent on each other in a non-decomposable manner. Thus, in the example of snubness, its essential formal part, being (nasally) concave, intrinsically involves the material characteristic of being nasal, and conversely. In this way, snubness can be grasped as a naturally unified feature in which formal and material components constitute a parallel complex, naturally unified mode of being. The natural unity of all these entities is underwritten by the essential inextricability between formal and material components. If so, it follows that the unified feature of being nasal concavity is essentially distinct from the abstract feature of concavity. There are, however, cases in which abstract features such as concavity are extrinsically or non-essentially combined with other features or (types of ) objects. Suppose, for instance, that a lump of clay is worked up first into a spherical and then into a cylindrical shape. It is true to say of a spherical lump of clay that it has the feature of being spherical or simply to state that ‘this piece of clay is spherical’. Similarly, it seems correct to ascribe to a cylindrical lump of clay the attribute of being cylindrical or just to say that ‘this parcel of clay is cylindrical’. It does not follow from this, though, that in the complex expressions corresponding to these predications, ‘being spherical þ clay’ and ‘being cylindrical þ clay’, each component-term signifies a feature that is inextricably dependent on the feature signified by the other (or vice versa). For neither of the two geometrical features is essentially dependent on the feature of being made of clay. Conversely, a lump of clay does not essentially change whether it is moulded into spherical or cylindrical shape. This is why the features of being spherical or being cylindrical just are not naturally unified with the material feature of being made of clay. In this case, then, we have an instance of the possibility in which an abstract feature remains the same even if combined with another feature or (type of) object. If so, the corresponding isolated term signifies that very same feature as its counterpart-term does when it constitutes a complex formula. A serious objection might be raised, however, about this last distinction between natural, essentially matter-involving and mathematical or abstract, essentially immaterial attributes. It might be argued that the feature of being snub or its essential formal component, being (nasally) concave, is a deficient model for understanding natural form. The reason for this, it will be claimed, is that being concave and being nasal do not unite in the natural way just described, in which the essential, formal and material, parts of natural form are inextricable from each other in essence. After all, there are many instances in which concavity, a geometrical feature, does not involve nasality. Conversely too, there are many features of being nasal that do not contain in their nature the attribute of being concave. Thus, James Lennox criticizes the snubness model for failing to tackle ‘the problem of the nature of the unity of [natural]

130

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

composites’.29 Lennox’s criticism is developed within his comments on Physics B.2, 193b35–194a15. At that stage, Aristotle’s argument has not yet invoked the teleological conception of form and matter. In that context, Lennox remarks that the example of being snub ‘fails to capture the most important fact about natural unity for Aristotle, its dynamic character’. [W]hen Aristotle stresses the differences between mathematical and natural abstractions, it is typically by stressing that the mathematician studies his objects in separation from change, while the natural scientist cannot, in the nature of his investigation, do that. Snubness is a good model for concepts that refer to unities of shape in material; but if the unity one aims to capture is that of capacity and activity, or of body and soul, it leaves much to be desired.30

Lennox goes on to argue that the teleological framework laid out in the rest of Physics B.2 (194a27ff.) avoids the shortcomings of the snubness model and fills in its gaps. In his view, it is the alignment of form with final cause and of matter with what is for the sake of the final cause that grounds the unity of form and matter in natural substances. The snubness model, by contrast, cannot explain this sort of unity.31 To address this challenge, it is important first to emphasize that I agree with Lennox that the snubness model cannot be the whole story. It does not follow from this, however, that it is inferior to the teleological model or that it is inherently unsuccessful. To compare the two models, it is necessary to ascertain what they are supposed to be models for. With this question in mind, it should be stressed that the snubness model is clearly introduced as analogous to natural form (Physics B.2, 194a13–14: ‰ i N æd Ø Å ŒE   KØ, oø ŁøæÅ ). The respect, however, in which the two sorts of case are analogous is that natural form is essentially matter-involving just as being snub essentially includes the material feature of being nasal. Furthermore, in our passage from Sophistici Elenchi 31, the analogy is enriched with an additional point. It is not simply the essence of being snub that includes the material characteristic of being nasal. It is also its formal part, being (nasally) concave, which is indissolubly dependent on the same material attribute. Therefore, the overall aim of the analogy – what the snubness model is a model for – is the thesis that natural form is essentially both formal and material, and that not even the formal components included within its essence can be disentangled from matter. The teleological conception, on the other hand, seems to be a model that serves distinct purposes. For it aims to specify further the relation between form and matter: the former is that for the sake of which the latter is as it is. Further, teleology plays an important role in making intelligible natural change. Thus, for instance, not only does the final cause that the form is determine the initial, intermediate, and completion stages that a process of coming-to-be has. It also is the fundamental mode of being on

29 30 31

See Lennox, ‘Snubness’, p. 173. See Lennox, ‘Snubness’, pp. 173–4 (his emphasis). Cf. Lennox, ‘Snubness’, pp. 178–9.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

131

the basis of which the nature of several entities existing at each stage of the process is regulated. Finally, teleology and final causation can ground the asymmetry and priority of form over certain types of material item. The fact that the case of snubness is not a model, or is not a complete model, for any of these points does not render it altogether defective or unsuccessful. Moreover, there are three ways in which the teleological conception and the model based on it might be overrated or misunderstood if the snubness analogy is disregarded. First, teleology cannot by itself fully explain change. For without introducing material features in the essence of natural form, we could not show why or how it could explain the capacity of compounds, the objects it is the essence of, for several types of change. I shall come back to this point in the next chapter. At present, though, it is clear that, in so far as the explanation of change is concerned, the models of snubness and of teleology seem to be mutually complementary. This is a far cry from the view that the snubness model just cannot accommodate the dynamic, change-related character of the form–matter unity in natural substances. Second, a significant aspect of this sort of unity can be elucidated on the basis of the snubness model as extended in Sophistici Elenchi 31. If natural form, as well as its essential formal parts, are essentially enmattered in the non-decomposable way described in the present section, there begins to emerge a distinctive picture of the kind of unity possessed by natural form and the objects enformed by it. In this picture, formal and material features are not independent conjuncts which interlock and miraculously give rise to a unified natural form or compound. Rather, because their very essences are inter-laden indissolubly, they constitute a naturally unified essential mode of being which enforms particular compounds. If so, it is not surprising that these compounds too can be natural unities in the way they are. Without this contribution to unity by the snubness model, teleology would be incomplete and potentially misleading. This leads to my third point. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we should place no great emphasis on the snubness model and its implications about the essentially enmattered character of natural form and the inextricability between formal and material features. By contrast, we should take the teleological framework as playing the basic explanatory role in Aristotle’s metaphysical view. This approach might imply that, even if there are material features in the essence of natural form, they are posterior to form as they are simply for the form’s sake. For the teleological model renders matter a mere teleological effect of the final cause that the form is. It is easy to see how this result may give rise to the idea of an intra-definiens priority of form over matter countenanced by [RA]. I have already criticized extensively the drawbacks of this line. Alternatively, the construal which favours (exclusively or predominantly) the teleological model over the snubness analogy might encourage a view in which form is not essentially enmattered at all. Rather, all the parts of its essence would be fully identifiable in formal, functional, or telic terms. For, it would be argued, because matter is causally dependent on the final cause that the form is, it is essentially and definitionally

132

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

dependent on form, whereas the converse is not the case. If so, what is included in a natural form’s essence are not robustly material features but functions, capacities, or goals that can be successfully fulfilled. Thus, for instance, the human form does not essentially involve at all material features such as having hands or having flesh-bonetissue bodily extremities. By contrast, only formal modes of being, such as being in a certain hand-function-fulfilling state or being capable of performing well humanlychiro-functions, are essential components of form.32 Not only are there discrepancies between this outcome and the details of the relevant example provided in Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b30–2. More importantly, this view ignores the strong arguments developed in the present chapter for the thesis that form, and its intrinsic formal parts, are essentially matter-involving. To avoid misconstruals of this type, it is important to supplement the teleological conception with the snubness analogy in a way that does not underestimate either of the two models.

5.5 Interim Conclusions The arguments set out in the present chapter strongly suggest that the essence of natural form involves material and change-related features. If so, it is necessary to mention these non-formal entities in the form’s definiens. It should be emphasized, though, that these twin claims are not equivalent to the weaker position that, necessarily, a natural form exists in some type of matter or other if it is to exist at all. This weaker position also holds of mathematical entities, which are definitionally and essentially independent of perceptible types of material feature.33 For, even if their essence does not include as parts perceptible types of matter, yet mathematical entities must exist in some perceptible type of matter or other if they are to exist at all. The case of natural form, however, is different and, for this reason, the conclusion reached in this chapter is stronger. A form of this type cannot even be grasped properly if its definition does not make any reference to certain types of perceptible material attribute. For its very essence contains material parts, over and above formal components.

32 While I would not argue that Lennox adopts this strongly functionalist, ‘form-only’ approach, there are several places where his focus on the teleological conception might be taken in this manner. Thus, he writes (‘Snubness’, pp. 182–3) that ‘natural form is to be thought of as the functional capacity that is the source of unity of the natural thing’s materials – to identify their proper function is to explain why certain materials are present rather than others, and why they are organised in the way they are’. Remarks of this sort – coupled with the fact that he does not clarify whether natural form is itself essentially enmattered or whether it is only necessarily dependent for its existence on matter – may be taken as supporting the view that a natural form’s essence does not comprise any material features but contains only formal, functional, or telic characteristics. 33 Cf. Balme, D. M., ‘Aristotle’s Biology Was Not Essentialist’ in A. Gotthelf & J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology [Biology], Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 291–302. Balme (p. 295) remarks that ‘Aristotle is not saying that a man can only exist in matter, which would be trivial and would equally be true of the circle [ . . . ] If his comparison with the snub is to hold, he must mean that it is logically impossible to prescind from matter when defining a man’.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

133

Disassociating the Definitional Order from the Order of Essence? One might challenge this line of reasoning, however, by arguing that the question of whether or not natural form is essentially enmattered is distinct from the question of whether or not it can be defined independently of matter. Hence, one could be neutral or agnostic on the first question, even if the definition of natural form must mention certain types of material feature. In this view, our definitional practices would not reflect the way things are in reality: for, even if we defined form (partly) in terms of matter, it would not be necessary, because of this, to accept that its essence involves material parts. Conversely, even if the essence of natural form necessarily included material parts, it would still be possible to offer accounts which would not make any reference to matter. Our definitional strategies, then, could preserve the form’s definitional priority over matter, even if in reality its essence would be matter-involving. This objection is decisive only if definitions are merely abstract accounts, linguistic or significatory formulae which do not precisely describe the essence of a form as it really is. If, by contrast, the definition of form is an account of its essence and precisely reflects what-it-is-to-be a form in reality, one cannot have a definition of a form which mentions a certain type of material attribute without accepting that the form itself is essentially enmattered. And conversely too: if a form is essentially enmattered, its (correct or successful) definition must mention the types of material feature which are integral to its essence. It is reasonable to suppose that Aristotle’s view of definition agrees with this second approach, in which there is a match between the orders of definition and of essence. Hence, if the arguments advanced in the present chapter adequately support the thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment, it follows that we can define natural forms only by including the relevant material terms in the definiens, alongside formal ones. Essential Enmatterment and Claims of Necessity The thesis of the form’s essential enmatterment, as schematized by [D], [D]

FC ¼def F1, F2, . . . , Fm enmattered in M1, M2, . . . , Mn,

straightforwardly grounds the necessity claim that for a natural form to exist, it must exist in some particular (token or type) materials. Similarly, [D] underpins the claim that (particular or universal) compounds necessarily are enmattered token- or typeobjects. For, if any token- or type-object is enformed by FC, necessarily it must instantiate the material features, M1, M2, . . . , Mn, which are parts of FC’s essence. Hence, we can see [D] as implying the following general necessity claim: [N]

8x [If x is FC then □ (x is F1, F2, . . . , Fm enmattered in M1, M2, . . . , Mn)].

This claim is neither equivalent to nor the only claim entailed by [D]. It is worth pointing out, at any rate, that the move from [D] to [N] typifies the way in which the definition of natural form generates necessary claims about the enmattered character of

134

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

whatever has the relevant form. It is obvious that [N] is similar to claims of hypothetical necessity put forward by Aristotle in Physics B.9 (200a11–13; 19–20; 24–6; 28–9). If a natural form exists or will exist, it is necessary that certain types of matter exist or will exist as material constituents of the object that has this form. This point is captured by the phrase ‘enmattered in M1, M2, . . . , Mn’ occurring in the consequent of [N]. It is extremely difficult, by contrast, to derive claims of hypothetical necessity (along the lines of [N]) from definitions of forms which do not mention material attributes. This difficulty is particularly pressing for thinkers who conceive natural form as essentially non-enmattered. For clearly they take the form’s definiens as making no reference to material features. At the same time, however, they seek to show that this definiens grounds or entails necessity claims such as [N]. This task is notoriously problematic: for how could a definiens generate the relevant necessity claim without any mention of material types of characteristic? Thus, for instance, Michael Frede, in interpreting Aristotle’s criticism of Socrates the Younger in Metaphysics Z.11, argues that the definition of (e.g.) the human form may refer only to formal parts (without mentioning any material parts), but ‘in such a way as to make it perfectly clear that a human being cannot exist without material parts’.34 Frede takes these material parts of a human being to be ‘internally’ related to the form, although they are not parts of its essence or definition.35 In defining the human soul, for example, as (amongst other things) involving the capacity for sense perception, one presupposes not only that human beings must have material parts (i.e. sensory organs) but also that they must have material parts of a certain sort, perhaps even that they must, in a way, have the material parts that they have. From this Frede concludes that ‘the whole context of Z.10–11 [ . . . ] speaks against the assumption that Aristotle here means to say that the material parts have to be mentioned in the definition’.36 He holds, then, that although the form’s definiens does not mention matter or its parts, it somehow presupposes or entails that the definiendum, the purely immaterial form, must exist in certain types of matter if it is to exist at all. The first difficulty with this type of view is that there is no criterion with which to distinguish the parts which are material but only internally related to the form from those which are not material but are formal parts of its own essence.37 A further problem is acutely brought out by Jennifer Whiting.38 Metaphysics Z.10 claims that definitions mention only parts of the form, while Metaphysics Z.11 asks what parts are included in the form. The overarching question of Metaphysics Z.10–11, therefore, is 34 See Frede, M. ‘The Definition of Sensible Substances in Met. Z’ [‘Definition’] in D. Devereux & P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique chez Aristote, Paris, 1990, p. 120. 35 Cf. Frede, M. and Patzig, G., Aristoteles ‘Metaphysik Z’, [Metaphysik] 2 vols., Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich, 1988, ad loc., 1036b21–32. 36 See Frede, ‘Definition’, p. 121; my emphasis. 37 Frede and Patzig themselves admit that their view faces this difficulty; cf. Metaphysik, ad loc., 1036b21–32; cf. Whiting, J. ‘Metasubstance: Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth’ [‘Metasubstance’], The Philosophical Review, 100(4), 1991, pp. 628–9 and 631. 38 Cf. Whiting, ‘Metasubstance’, pp. 629–30.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

135

what is mentioned in the definition, or involved in the essence, of form. Why, then, asks Whiting, doesn’t Aristotle signal the distinction between what is explicitly mentioned in a definition and what is only implied by what is mentioned in the definition? One would expect him to do so, ‘especially since it is fundamental to his argument and he has the resources with which to do so. For he claims elsewhere that having angles equal to two right angles is not part of the essence or definition of a triangle but only something which is somehow implied by its essence or definition.’39 Indeed, as Whiting notes, Aristotle seems to make this distinction at De Anima A.1, 402b16–25, and Metaphysics .30, 1025a30–4. Scope Issues It is useful to return to the argument in which I detected Aristotle’s worries about hyper-materiality and hyper-formality (section 4.1; Metaphysics Z.11, 1036a31–b13). There, he does not clarify the scope of a form’s possible definitional dependence on, or independence from, matter. Thus, he does not specify whether mathematical forms are definable independently of only one/some or even all perceptible types of material feature (1036a31–4). Similarly, he does not offer any resources with which to decide whether forms such as that of human being may (or may not) be definable independently of only one/some or even all perceptible types of bodily attribute (1036b3–7). Moreover, in either case, even if the relevant forms are definitionally separable from all types of material feature, are we to understand the term ‘all’ distributively (‘for any given one’) or collectively (‘for all taken together’)? It is plausible to think that one of the central points of Aristotle’s complaints about Platonizing or Pythagorean-style definitions and about the views of Socrates the Younger might concern the scope of their claims of definitional independence. One aspect of his objections to their positions might be that they take natural forms as definitionally independent either of all types of matter (taken together) or of any given one type of matter. The ‘collective’ view is perhaps represented by Platonizing and Pythagorean theorists: for they seem to define natural form analogously with line, circle, etc. in terms of number or similar formal or quasi-formal items alone plus nothing else (1036b12–13: IªıØ Æ N f IæØŁ  , ŒÆd ªæÆ B e º ª e H  r Æ çÆØ; compare the role of r  at b17–20). Hence, they take mathematical as well as natural forms as definable independently of all perceptible types of material characteristic taken together. The ‘distributive’ view, by contrast, perhaps fits better with the thesis of Socrates the Younger. He defines human being analogously to the mathematical circle, presumably independently of any given one type of matter, such as bronze, iron, etc. (1036b27–8: uæ ¼ı F åƺŒF e ŒŒº). He would define the form of human being, then, independently of any given type of bodily feature, even if his definition might

39

See Whiting, ‘Metasubstance’, pp. 629–30; her emphasis.

136

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

(explicitly or implicitly) specify that the nature of the human form is not independent of all types of bodily feature taken together. Worse still, Platonizing and Pythagorean thinkers or Socrates the Younger may not even draw any clear distinctions at all about the scope of their definitional independence claims. It could be argued, by contrast, that one of the main aspects of Aristotle’s putative solution to the problems discussed in Metaphysics Z.10–11 and Physics B.2 is that he clarifies (even if in an indirect or not entirely perspicuous fashion) the scope of his claims of definitional dependence or independence. Thus, in so far as they are essentially enmattered, Aristotelian natural forms may be definitionally independent of only one/some types of material feature but not all (either collectively or distributively). For natural forms cannot be defined without mentioning (at least) some perceptible types of material characteristic, the ones appropriate to embody the relevant forms. Indeed, in my view, some of Aristotle’s own formulations in the context of Metaphysics Z.10–11 underpin this interpretation. For example, his discussion of the syllable-form (at Metaphysics Z.10, 1035a9–17) suggests that natural form is not essentially dependent on token- or type-materials (see section 3.4). I suggested that this idea can be deployed to reconcile Aristotle’s claim that form is prior to matter with the thesis that form is essentially enmattered. For, while form is essentially and definitionally dependent on its own material features, it seems to be not only independent of but also prior to tokenand type-materials (see question (2) in section 5.3). There remains, however, the question of how to determine the types of material characteristic which are indeed parts of a natural form’s essence (see question (1) in section 5.3). The merely negative claim that they are not token- or type-materials will not get us far enough. I shall address this problem in some detail in chapter 7. Let me simply note, though, that the general criterion with which to specify the types of material feature intrinsic to natural form is that of identity-fixing. The idea is that a form, its being the type of essential feature it is, is partly determined by what certain types of material feature are. Those material features which do not play this role of partial identity-fixing should be excised from a natural form’s essence. To be sure, this criterion cannot be the whole story. A more substantive idea is that a natural form, including both its formal and material parts, should have causal and explanatory functions. Hence, for instance, in Physics B.2, 194a27ff., Aristotle invokes his teleological conception of the form–matter relation. This conception suggests that a form should be a type of cause of, and explain, the presence of certain materials.40 In section 5.3 I argued that this causal relation does not, indeed cannot, hold between the formal and material parts of a natural form’s own essence. Rather, a form in its hylomorphic entirety should explain why particular and universal compounds have the token- and type-materials they have (respectively). If this is correct, the material 40 Here I assume that the causal and explanatory role of natural, hylomorphic form need not be exhausted by links of final causation alone. It seems plausible that some types of form might operate as efficient or grounding causes of some sort. I shall take up this point in chapter 7.

N AT U R A L F O R M S A S E S S E N T I A L LY M AT T E R - A N D C H A N G E - I N VO LV I N G

137

features which are parts of a natural form’s essence should be seen as essential modes of being which partly explain the nature of particular and universal compounds and the presence of their corresponding token- and type-materials. It is important, at this point, not to misunderstand the claim that the material parts of a form’s essence are partial causes and explanations of the nature of (particular and universal) compounds and their matter. In the light of the teleological framework operating in Physics B.2, it might be objected that this claim completely misrepresents Aristotle’s view. For, it would be argued, Aristotle maintains that the form is the final cause for the sake of which matter is as it is but not conversely. If so, how can crudely material entities intrude into the essence of form and collaborate with it in its causal and explanatory roles? This type of challenge, however, is not sensitive to my point that neither formal nor material parts of a form’s essence cause or explain each other’s nature. Thus, the material essential components of form are not (e.g.) final causes or explanations of the formal ones (or vice versa). Rather, the whole form, its entire form- and matterinvolving essence, is a final cause of, and explains the nature of, compounds and their material constituents. Further, the material entities which enter a form’s essence and cooperate with formal features as causes and explanations of compounds and their matter are not concrete token-materials or types of matter. Rather, just as the formal parts intrinsic to form, they are perceptible types of attribute or feature, essential modes or ways of being for particular or universal compounds and their token- or type-matter (respectively). Lastly, these material features or modes of being are not crudely material. Taking seriously the example provided at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b30–2, the material feature of (e.g.) having hands, which partly makes up the essence of the human form, is not grasped simply as being a flesh-bone-tissue bodily extremity. It also includes in its essence formal, functional, or telic characteristics such as having the capacity to achieve its humanly-chiro-functions. Nor is this last claim equivalent to any type of spiritualist or functionalist view in which even a form’s material essential characteristics are fully identifiable in terms of pure form, function, or goal alone. Rather, the claim is that, just as form itself and its formal parts, the material components of its essence, too, are both matter- and form-involving. This is another way in which to formulate the result reached in Sophistici Elenchi 31 about the essential and definitional inextricability of formal and material features which constitute a natural form’s essence.

6 Material and Change-Related Features of a Natural Form’s Essence The previous two chapters have argued that natural forms include amongst their essential parts certain types of material and change-related feature. This substantive metaphysical position, however, gives rise to several further difficulties. Most conspicuously, it could be asked in what way such material and change-related items function as parts of natural form, and for what reason their presence within the essence of natural form is indispensable. In section 6.1 I shall show that both matter and change are included in a form’s essence on the basis of Aristotelian arguments for the necessary mutual entailment between these two notions. In doing so it is important to put aside Aristotle’s claim that matter is a type of substance in that it supports change. For this claim applies primarily to particular material substrata that ground the capacity of compounds for the types of change inherent to their kind. It does not carry over, though, to the relation between material and change-related attributes contained in a natural form’s essence. Indeed, as I shall argue, it would be a mistake to hold that, at this level, change is posterior or reducible to matter and so should not be mentioned in a natural form’s definition. In section 6.2 I shall address the converse type of objection, which seeks to eliminate matter from a form’s essence by grasping it solely in terms of potentiality for change or even by reference to formal, functional, or telic features alone. My main argument against this view will be that material parts which are identified in this ‘rarefied’ or ‘hyper-formalist’ fashion could not (uniquely) ground or explain the natural sorts of change that specific types of compound are capable of. Rather, I shall suggest that the material features intrinsic to natural form are robust or substantive, perceptible, and constituent types of material characteristic. Even if we accept these claims, though, it still remains to be seen how material and change-related features function within a natural form’s essence. Section 6.3 will argue that they have grounding and explanatory roles. Simply, they make compounds have the material natures they possess, and they ground their capacities for several sorts of change. To underpin this claim, I shall employ Aristotle’s remarks made in Physics B.1 about material natures as explanatorily basic entities. Further, in section 6.4, I shall address a possible objection growing out of this picture, according to which material and change-related features might render natural form itself a concrete material and changeable object. To rebut this, I shall make use of the example of the

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

139

soul as discussed in De Anima A.4. Despite the presence of (e.g.) change-related features in the essence of psychic activities and passions that the soul’s capacities involve, Aristotle firmly maintains that the soul itself neither produces change in itself nor suffers any type of change. I shall close the present chapter by making a few sketchy remarks about the study of matter and change by metaphysics. My aim is to defuse the possible challenge that the inquiry into perceptible, perishable substances and into their essentially enmattered natural form falls outside the scope of wisdom or first philosophy.

6.1 The Necessary and Causal Link between Matter and Change In sections 4.4 and 4.6 I noted that Aristotle uses two significantly distinct claims to characterize natural form. While in most cases he argues that natural form is essentially matter-involving, there are places where he maintains that it cannot be defined without change-related features. Indeed, some of his arguments shift from one claim to the other without any apparent difficulty. Thus, for instance, Physics B.2 starts with the view that natural form, unlike mathematical form, is essentially dependent upon change (193b34–194a1; a3–7). A few lines later, though, within the same argumentative context, natural form is held to be essentially in matter or not without matter (194a14–15; b12–3). Similarly, in Metaphysics E.1, while the initial claim is that natural forms are (essentially) together with matter (1025b32–3), it is added that their definition is not without change but always has matter (1026a2–3). In Metaphysics Z.11, too, change and matter are closely linked in a similar fashion. Because natural forms, such as the human-form, cannot be defined without change, it follows that they cannot be defined without material parts either (1036b29–30). To understand this connection between matter and change, I tentatively proposed that, in Aristotle’s view, the two concepts are necessarily equivalent in that, necessarily, whatever involves material characteristics also includes change-related features, and conversely. To put it differently, it seems that the terms ‘material’ and ‘change-related’ are necessarily co-extensive. There are several places in the corpus in which Aristotle seems to be countenancing a view of this sort. The argument in the present section will focus only on a few passages amongst these. My aim will be twofold. First, I shall explore whether and in what way there are priority relations between matter and change. Second, I shall examine whether the essence of natural form includes both material and change-related characteristics or just one type of feature amongst these two. To support the necessary connection between matter and change, it is useful to begin with the following passage from Metaphysics .2. This passage is embedded in a context which seeks to establish that every natural, perceptible, changeable substance has matter (cf. 1069b24–5).

140

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Perceptible substance is changeable. If change is from opposites or from what lies in between, but not from all opposites (for the voice is not white) but from what is contrary, it is necessary that there be something underlying which changes into the contrary state; for the contraries do not change [IªŒÅ EÆ Ø e ƺº N c KÆøØ· P ªaæ a KÆÆ ÆººØ]. Further, something remains, while the contrary does not remain [Ø e b  Ø, e ’ KÆ På  Ø]. Therefore, there is some third thing over and above the contraries, the matter. [Metaphysics [Met.] .2, 1069b3–9; Charles’s trans.)1

Here we encounter two distinct arguments from change to the existence of matter as a subject that underlies change. The assumption which is common to both is that natural processes of change involve states, dispositions, or attributes which are contrary. For example, while at the initial stage(s) of a natural generation process of a human being there is no actual or complete human being, the final stage(s) of this process are characterized (if all goes well) by the presence of a fully developed human being. If this is correct, there are two ways in which the presence of matter is necessary to support change. First, the contrary items themselves do not change but presumably replace one another. If so, there should be some underlying entity which undergoes the continuous process of change from one contrary to the other. Second, the contrary which is present at the initial stage(s) does not itself persist but presumably gives its place to the contrary which exists at the end stage(s). Hence, there should be some entity which remains despite the non-persistence of contraries, and is the persisting subject of the continuous process. The intuition behind both arguments is that, while in natural changes there is one single thing which both changes and persists, none of the contraries involved can play either role. There are several problematic details that beset subjecthood arguments of this sort.2 These difficulties, though, lie outside the scope of present concerns. What is important is that Aristotle underpins the necessary connection between change and matter. The observed capacity of perceptible compound substances for change seems to require the presence of matter in them as a particular substratum which supports change. Conversely too: the presence of concrete underlying materials in compounds necessarily entails their capacity for change in ways characteristic of their kind. A further question, at this juncture, is whether Aristotle takes matter or change as ontologically or/and explanatorily more basic than the other or whether he rests content with the necessary equivalence between the two without endorsing any distinct priority claim. There are two central passages which indicate that matter is 1 The translation of this passage is taken from Charles, D., ‘Metaphysics L.2: Matter and Change’ [‘L.2’], in M. Frede & D. Charles D. (eds.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 81–110. 2 For example, while a material substratum seems necessary for the coming-into-being and the passingaway of a particular substance, such as Socrates, other types of change, such as local, quantitative, and qualitative change do not seem, strictly speaking, to require a material substratum separate from the particular substance. For (e.g.) it is not Socrates’ material substratum but Socrates himself who moves from place A to place B, grows from adolescent to mature human or changes from having a pale to having a tanned complexion. For a discussion of this issue, see Charles, ‘L.2’, pp. 85–8.

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

141

more fundamental than change in that change occurs in the ways it does by virtue of there being matter of several corresponding types. Some people think that the nature and substance of beings which are by nature is the primary constituent present in them, which is unformed by itself [ŒE ’  çØ ŒÆd  PÆ H çØ Zø KØ rÆØ e æH Kıæå Œ{, IææŁ Ø ŒÆŁ’ Æı ], as, for instance, the wood would be the nature of bed, while bronze of statue. It is an indication of this, says Antipho, that if you bury a bed, and the decomposition gets the ability to send up a shoot, what comes up will not be a bed but wood, as the disposition of parts customary for beds and the artistry belong only by accident [to wood], whereas the substance is that which persists uninterruptedly while being affected in these ways [c ’ PÆ sÆ KŒÅ m ŒÆd ØÆ Ø ÆFÆ åıÆ ıåH ]. (Physics [Phys.] B.1, 193a9–17; Charlton’s trans.) It is evident that matter too is a substance; for in all changes from one opposite to the other there is something which underlies the change, as, for instance, in a change of place there is that which is now here and later there, and in a change of size there is that which is now of such a size and later larger or smaller, and in change of quality there is that which is now healthy and later sick; similarly in a change of substance there is that which is now coming into being and later perishing, and which now underlies as a this and later underlies by way of privation. And this last kind of change implies all the others, but they – one or two of them – do not imply it; for a thing which has matter for change of place [Y Ø oºÅ åØ ØŒ] need not necessarily have matter for generation and destruction. (Met. H.1, 1042a32–b6; Bostock’s trans.)

It is a shared assumption of both passages that the matter under discussion is a sort of underlying entity or a subject that persists while undergoing different types of change. Thus, for instance, a parcel of wood, a type of constituent matter, can be worked up into a bed, taken apart into planks, rebuilt as a chest of drawers, and so on and so forth. In all these changes the wood is a remaining, particular substratum which is consecutively enformed by different dispositions, such as being a bed, being a pile of planks, being a chest of drawers, etc. It seems, then, that the capacity for change of certain kinds of object requires the presence of an underlying material constituent in them. At the same time, though, a material substratum of this kind necessitates the capacity for change of the objects having this substratum. Yet, in both passages, Aristotle argues that the material substratum is a type of basic nature or substance precisely in that it persists while undergoing continuous processes of change (Phys. B.1, 193a9–10:  çØ ŒÆd  PÆ; 16–17: c PÆ; Met. H.1, 1042a32–4: Kd PÆ ŒÆd  oºÅ). This characterization of matter as substance of a certain sort implies that matter is the basic entity that grounds or explains the capacity for change possessed by natural, changing objects. The converse, however, is not the case: it is not because of the capacity for change of certain objects that their matter or their material substratum is as it is. Matter seems to enjoy this more fundamental ontological role despite the necessary mutual entailment between being material and being capable of changing. If this is correct, one might doubt whether it is necessary to include change-related features in the essence of a natural form. For, it would be argued, what is involved in the form are only the ontologically and explanatorily basic entities, the ones that make

142

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

the objects having this form what they are. While matter and change seem necessarily equivalent in the way just described, matter is the substance, the ontological and explanatory bedrock that explains change. Hence, change should not be conceived as intrinsic to form: for the presence of matter in a form’s essence suffices for explaining change. In this way, mentioning matter in a natural form’s definition renders any reference to change redundant. This result, though, seems to be at variance with Aristotle’s claims that natural forms comprise not only material but also change-related features (Phys. B.2, 193b31–194a7; Met. E.1, 1026a2–3; Z.11, 1036b29–30). To assess this difficulty, it is important to distinguish between different notions of matter which play importantly distinct explanatory roles at separate ontological levels. The matter which is described by the subjecthood arguments advanced in Physics B.1 and Metaphysics H.1 and .2 is a substance (and so ontologically and explanatorily fundamental) in so far as it is a particular material substratum underlying the changes of particular compound objects. Hence, for example, the particular lump of wood constituting this bed, the token-materials of a particular compound, might function as a concrete substratum which supports change by receiving contrary attributes at the initial and final stage(s) of the process of producing this bed. So understood, matter seems prior to change: because of there being token-materials of a certain sort that operate as particular subjects for contraries, compounds can undergo change. This explanatory task, however, is distinct from that carried out by form. A form is what makes a particular material substratum the thing it is with the corresponding potentialities for change. To play this ontological and explanatory role efficiently, the form could include both material and change-related parts in its nature. At the very least, there is nothing in the arguments from subjecthood that automatically rules out this possibility. It seems correct that matter as a particular substratum is more basic than change in that it persists while undergoing continuous change of some sort. However, there is a further, distinct question as to what makes this particular material substratum what it is and explains its subject-role in change. This last question cannot be answered simply by insisting that matter is a particular substratum. Rather, it is form that explains not only the material features essential to this substratum but also its characteristic role as a particular entity that underlies certain types of change. If this is correct, it would be at least possible that the essence of natural form encompasses not only material but also change-related features. The former would explain the material character of particular substrata for change, while the latter would account for the role of these substrata as ‘supporters’ of change. Indeed, it would be difficult (one might argue) for a natural form to discharge its ontological and explanatory function adequately without including both material and change-related features in its own essence. Aristotle himself seems to underpin this possibility and to adopt an inclusive view of this sort in the example of human form offered in Metaphysics Z.11. There it is clear that natural form must be defined not only in terms of material features but also in terms of change (1036b29–30: ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ, Øe P’ ¼ı H æH Kå ø  ). This suggests that a natural form is conceived as a complex entity with

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

143

essential parts of several different types: it comprises formal, material, and changerelated attributes. This case is importantly different from that of particular compounds. For their matter, as particular material substratum, is the principle that underlies change even if being material and being capable of change seem necessarily to imply each other. By contrast, at the level of form, material and change-related features are mutually necessitated without the one being more basic than the other. Rather, both kinds of feature are indispensable as essential parts of natural form: for each performs distinctive ontological and explanatory roles.

6.2 What Kind of Matter Accounts for Natural Change? The example of human form provided in Metaphysics Z.11, which seems to invoke both material and change-related features as parts of natural form, might give rise to a different host of difficulties. One could accept that both types of feature are present in a natural form’s essence without privileging matter as ontologically or/and explanatorily prior to change. It would be possible, however, to argue that the explanatory arrow runs in the opposite direction. In this view, while material characteristics are parts of the form, they are (either partly or fully) understood by reference to change-related features. Hence, change-related features are conceived as ontologically and explanatorily prior to material ones. Indeed, some aspects of Aristotle’s own example as developed at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b28–32, might be viewed as lending support to this sort of view. First, Aristotle contends that because natural form cannot be defined without mentioning change, it follows that it cannot be defined without mentioning the appropriate material parts (1036b29–30: ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ, Øe P’ ¼ı H æH). Hence, change-related attributes appear to be causing, in some way, the presence of material characteristics, such as being constituted from certain bodily parts. Second, after urging that a natural form, such as the human form, must be defined in terms of both material parts and change, Aristotle emphasizes that the material parts which are intrinsic to form are understood in terms of capacities for performing well certain functions. Thus, for instance, the human form involves the material feature of having hands that are not in any and every state but are living and are capable of fulfilling their humanly-chiro-function (1036b30–2: P’ ¼ı H æH Kå ø  . P ªaæ ø F IŁæı æ  åæ, Iºº’  ıÆ Å e æª IºE, u  łıå sÆ). This might suggest that the material parts of a natural form’s essence are not robustly material features, such as having hands, being constituted from flesh-bone-tendons, possessing bulk or mass, being characterized by certain degrees of heat or cold, etc. Rather, they are fully or at least partly identifiable in formal, functional, or goal-oriented terms. Because change-related attributes are cognate with this latter type of characteristic, one could conclude that change is more fundamental than matter within the essence of natural forms, even if their definition mentions both material and change-related features. In the example of Metaphysics

144

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Z.11, the capacity for successful performance of the humanly-chiro-function seems to involve potentialities for wielding tools, lifting objects, preserving bodily balance, and several other kinds of change or motion. If material features such as possessing hands are understood in functional or goal-directed terms that are motion- or change-laden in this way, it is clear that change is explanatorily and ontologically more fundamental than matter within a natural form’s essence. Third, and more generally, the way in which matter is described by several Aristotelian arguments might indicate that not only material features intrinsic to form but also matter quite generally are wholly reducible to mere potentialities for change. Hence, for example, the subjecthood arguments deployed in Metaphysics .2 and H.1 and in Physics B.1 do not seem to offer any separate resources for grasping the notion of matter, apart from its role as a ‘change-supporter’. It is no radical move to infer from this that matter is essentially simply a potentiality for change in that it makes the items that possess matter capable of undergoing the types of change characteristic of their kind. Thus, for instance, matter as a particular substratum is simply something that enables compounds (e.g.) to come-to-be and pass-away. Similarly, material features intrinsic to natural form are just formally or functionally identified capacities which ground the patterns of change characteristic of the compounds that have the relevant form. If this is correct, the material parts of a natural form are not matter-involving in any weighty sense. Rather, they are specifiable by reference to change-related, formal, functional, or even goal-directed features. The human form does not include the material feature of having hands made of bone-flesh-tendons but that of possessing extremities that can move in certain ways and function in the relevant humanly-chirofashion. The house form is essentially matter-involving not in that it comprises the feature of being made of non-porous types of building-block but in that it is made of anything that can shelter and protect humans and their belongings (functional feature) by keeping out wind, rain, heat, etc. (change- or motion-related feature). In general, the material parts essential to natural form are characterized simply as those items which can support change by carrying out the relevant functions or by realizing the corresponding form in the appropriate way. Before offering positive arguments in favour of a more robust conception of Aristotelian matter, it is important to undercut the last three points that appear to support the opposite view. First, Aristotle’s claim, made at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b29–30, that (e.g.) the human form must be defined in terms of change and so in terms of material parts need not imply anything about the natural explanatory order obtaining between change and matter. As I remarked in section 5.1, this chain of ‘not without’ claims might be simply describing evidential grounds that assist us or definers such as ourselves correctly to specify the essence of a natural form, such as being human. The idea would be, then, that our definitional practices should be sensitive to the fact that the human form is the essence of perceptible objects which are capable of changing. Because of this fact, our proposed definition should also take into account that human beings are material substances. Correspondingly, in characterizing the

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

145

human form, the essence of such perceptible, changeable, and so material objects, our definition must mention change-related features and so material features. It does not follow from this, however, that the material attributes mentioned are as they are because of the change-related features referred to in the definition. Rather, what follows is only that because the definition should be shaped in a certain changeinvolving way, it should also mention material features. Second, even if we accept the dubious claim that change-related attributes are cognate with formal, functional, or goal-directed features, Aristotle’s view that bodily parts are characterized by reference to their capacity to perform successfully certain functions does not entail that they are wholly or partly reducible to capacities of this sort. Nor does it require that matter is ontologically and explanatorily posterior to change-related, formal, functional, or telic features. Aristotle’s main point seems to be that the material features intrinsic to form should not be solely or crudely material or completely independent of change-related, formal, functional, or goal-oriented characteristics. Thus, for instance, it would be a mistake to hold that the feature of possessing hands is to be understood only in terms of being constituted from fleshbone-tendons. For this would allow that having detached hands or hands that consist of dead or paralysed flesh-bone-tendons could be essential parts of the form. Rather, Aristotle argues that the feature of having hands made of flesh-bone-tendons should be supplemented by the formal, functional, or telic features of being alive or being capable of carrying out the relevant humanly-chiro-functions. Aristotle’s claim, then, need not be understood as eliminating robustly material features altogether from a natural form’s essence in favour of change-related, functional, or telic characteristics. Indeed, if my arguments set out in chapter 5 are sound, a coherent hylomorphic view would maintain that not only formal but also material parts of a natural form’s essence are inextricably form- and matter-involving. Thus, for instance, being a rational soul of a certain type, the formal part of the human form, is essentially dependent upon material features such as being realized in a body that has (inter alia) hands made of flesh-bone-tendons. But, conversely too, material features intrinsic to the human form are essentially dependent on the formal parts. If so, they are grasped also in terms of capacities for performing well the functions which are characteristic of the human kind. It is not only formal but also material entities that are essentially hylomorphic. This, however, does not entail that formal entities are essentially just matter-involving or that the essence of material parts is exhausted by change-related, formal, functional, or telic features alone. The third challenge against a substantive conception of Aristotelian matter suggests that there are no change-independent resources with which to grasp the notion of matter. To address this worry satisfactorily, it is necessary to discuss arguments outside Metaphysics .2 and H.1 and Physics B.1, and to counter-propose an alternative, robust view of matter. Before taking up this task, though, it is worth emphasizing that the position which reduces matter to mere potentiality for change does not seem to appreciate the significance of two general points. First, the passages in which Aristotle

146

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

describes matter solely by reference to potentiality for change might be limited by the context of discussion or by particular purposes that Aristotle is interested in at certain stages of his argument. The fact that in those places he illuminates the notion of matter only by reference to potentiality for change does not imply that quite generally, and in all possible contexts, potentiality for change is the only or the most prominent part of his conception of matter. Second, the use of the notion of potentiality for change to explicate the concept of matter does not require that the former is the ontological and explanatory bedrock in terms of which to understand the latter. It might be simply an indication that the notion of change and the observed changeability of perceptible natural objects are didactically helpful as ways of making matter intelligible to Aristotle’s intended audience. Hence, for example, the subjecthood arguments developed in Metaphysics .2 and H.1 and in Physics B.1 might be aiming at showing that the datum of change requires the notion of particular material substratum to ground change and make it intelligible. It would not follow from this, however, that matter is simply potentiality for change. Indeed, it could be argued that, while change constitutes the starting-point of inquiry into, and discovery of, matter, yet, at least in some cases, it is matter that is fundamental in the natural order of explanation. It is easy to see how these two points might be interrelated. In the contexts in which Aristotle spells out matter solely in terms of potentiality for change, he might be interested only in making initial clarifications that will help his audience grasp the meaning and importance of the notion of matter. Outside these contexts, and after fixing the reference of his theoretical terms, he can go on to explicate the deeper theoretical grounds for his notion of matter. These grounds might prove independent of, or even more basic than, mere potentiality for change. The idea that Aristotle’s basic conception of matter is not exhausted by the notion of potentiality for change alone is implicit even in arguments such as the one advanced in Physics B.1. There Aristotle fills in the gaps of the ‘potentiality for change’ model by alluding to the notion of matter as a primary constituent of natural compounds (193a10–11: e æH Kıæå Œ{). In the example of the piece of wood that can be the material substratum for several different dispositions (such as being a bed, being a pile of planks, being a chest of drawers) it is clear that matter is not simply a potentiality for change but a substantive material entity that constitutes (together with form) natural compounds. Similarly, in Physics B.2, it seems that natural forms, unlike mathematical forms, are essentially dependent on matter not simply in that their essence includes the potentiality for change. Rather, following the snubness model employed at 194a12–15, natural forms encompass weightier, perceptible types of material characteristic. Thus, for instance, the concavity that is intrinsic to the form of snub seems to include as an essential part the feature of being nasal, an entity that is far from being a mere potentiality for change. Moreover, in Metaphysics E.1, Aristotle explicitly specifies the matter intrinsic to form by reference to perceptible types of material characteristic (1025b30–1026a6: a B oºÅ , Id åØ oºÅ, ‹Å c ¼ı oºÅ K, where oºÅ is clearly ÆNŁÅc oºÅ; cf. 1025b34). He adds, to be sure,

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

147

that change-related features are also mentioned in the definition of natural form (1026a2–3). This, however, is not the same as claiming that matter is wholly or partly reducible to such change-related features, or that it is grasped simply as potentiality for change. Indeed, if Aristotle’s conception of matter is based on substantive, perceptible types of material attribute, it would be difficult to see how it could be reduced to mere potentiality for change. These last claims are useful starting-points for my positive proposal about Aristotle’s conception of matter. The basic idea underlying this proposal is that the material items which are essential parts of natural forms are perceptible, constituent types of material feature. While these material features also involve change-related, formal, functional, and even goal-directed attributes, they cannot be wholly or partly reduced to such attributes. There are two main reasons for this irreducibility. First, the material features intrinsic to natural forms (together with their formal features) make compounds and their material parts what they essentially are. Compounds and their matter, however, essentially involve bulky, massy, heavy, and, quite generally, robust, constituent sorts of matter. It is, then, difficult to see how mere potentialities for change, formal, functional, or telic features alone could play the required ontological role of enforming material bodies of this substantive sort. Second, and more importantly, it is questionable whether highly rarefied material features, wholly or partly reducible to potentialities for change, formal, functional, or goal-oriented attributes, would be successful in explaining the required types of natural change. Indeed, it seems plausible that this conception of matter would identify the material parts of natural form with types of matter that belong to abstract or mathematical entities. But if this were correct, natural form and its ‘material’ parts could not, without extreme difficulty, explain the observed capacity of compounds for change. For, if the only type of matter involved in natural form is abstract or mathematical, there would be a clear danger of identifying natural with mathematical form. This last move, however, would deprive natural form of its explanatory role in grounding the capacity of compounds for change. For, as Physics B.2 and Metaphysics E.1 argue, mathematical form is unable to explain natural change as it is essentially independent of perceptible matter (193b31–5; 194a1–7; 1025b32–1026a6). It is important, at this juncture, to understand better the claim made in Physics B.2 and Metaphysics E.1 that natural form includes perceptible, constituent sorts of material feature. There is an important passage, taken from Metaphysics Z.10, which clarifies the notion of perceptible matter. In this way, it also addresses the urgent question of the types of matter that are excluded from the essence of natural form. Some matter is perceptible some intelligible, perceptible such as, for instance, bronze and wood, and all matter which is changeable, while intelligible is that which is present in perceptible things but not qua perceptible, as, for instance, mathematical entities [oºÅ b  b ÆNŁÅ KØ  b Å, ÆNŁÅc b x åƺŒe ŒÆd º ŒÆd ‹Å ŒØÅc oºÅ, Åc b  K E ÆNŁÅE

æåıÆ cfi w ÆNŁÅ, x a ÆŁÅ ÆØŒ]. (Met. Z.10, 1036a9–12; Bostock’s trans.)

148

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Clearly, perceptible matter is to be grasped by reference to constituent types of material, such as wood, bronze, stone, etc., entities that are neither mere potentialities for change nor (wholly or partly) reducible to formal, functional, or telic features. Aristotle does add that perceptible matter is that which is changeable (1036a10–11: ‹Å ŒØÅc oºÅ). This, however, does not entail that substantive types of matter, such as bronze or wood, are eliminable in favour of mere potentialities for change. It is more plausible to maintain that perceptible types of matter also have the capacity to undergo several sorts of change. Thus, for instance, in some cases perceptible matter is the concrete material substratum that underlies the changes of compounds. In the light of this, the matter which is integral to natural form should be understood in terms of perceptible, constituent types of material characteristic. While these characteristics are essentially linked with change-related features, formal, functional, or even telic attributes, they are not (wholly or partly) identifiable in terms of the latter. For how could one fully specify a material feature such as being made of flesh-bone-tendons or being composed of bulky mass simply by reference to change or function without mentioning any perceptible or constituent sorts of matter at all? The contrast drawn at Metaphysics Z.10, 1036a9–12, between perceptible and intelligible kinds of matter suggests that this project would be futile. Indeed, it would be comparable with the desperate attempt of Platonizing or Pythagorean theorists to reduce everything to mathematical form or to disregard matter altogether (Met. Z.11, 1036b22–3). As I pointed out in sections 4.1 and 5.1, this approach of ‘Hyper-Formality’ is doomed to failure. The reason for this is that hyper-formal, reductive imperialism would render natural, perceptible matter virtually indistinguishable from (e.g.) intelligible matter, the one which is intrinsic to mathematical forms. In Metaphysics Z.11 instances of intelligible matter include the features of being made of lines or being composed of continuous magnitudes. These are intelligible material attributes which are parts of mathematical forms such as being circle or being triangle (1036b7–12). The passage just quoted claims that, just as mathematical forms themselves, intelligible material features too are ‘in perceptible objects’ (1036a11): for all these abstract mathematical entities cannot exist within the physical world without existing in some perceptible material object or other. However, neither mathematical forms nor their intelligible matter are essentially dependent upon any perceptible type of material object: their essence is to be abstractions but not to be perceptible, physical entities (1036a11–12: cfi w ÆNŁÅ). Consistently with Physics B.2 and Metaphysics E.1, this essential independence from perceptible types of material feature entails that abstract or mathematical entities such as intelligible matter cannot ground any capacities of natural compounds for change. This result is obviously welcome in the realm of unchangeable mathematical objects: for their forms, comprising both formal and (intelligible) material parts, should not explain any capacity for change as no such capacity is present in their case. It should be obvious, by contrast, that there are serious pitfalls for the view that seeks to identify perceptible, constituent types of material feature with mere potentialities for

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

149

change, formal, functional, or telic characteristics. For it would be difficult to demarcate this rarefied notion of ‘perceptible’ matter from intelligible types of material feature involved in mathematical abstractions. Hence, the formalist, functionalist, or ‘mere potentiality for change’ model of matter would be under pressure to show how its preferred notion of matter could explain the relevant type(s) of natural change that compounds are capable of. Suppose that the perceptible matter intrinsic to natural form is understood solely in terms of functional features such as being impenetrable, offering resistance, exerting pressure, performing certain sorts of spatial motion such as rolling or revolving around other objects. If so, however, it is not difficult to imagine geometrical, arithmetical, or, quite generally, abstract entities satisfying these functional descriptions without successfully explaining the relevant types of perceptible, natural change. Thus, for instance, it might be thought that the matter involved in the houseform is not the feature of being constituted from non-porous types of building-block but that of being impenetrable in a way that covers and shelters. But is it not possible for a geometrical surface-covering to play this role by sheltering a cube from straight-linerain perpendicular to its top? Similarly, an arithmetical algorithm could be impenetrable by certain types of number in that its mathematical structure ‘sieves out’ certain numerical results. Further, a feature such as rolling or revolving around other objects could characterize the spatial motion of a collection of pixels on a computer screen generated by a string of machine code. To return to Aristotle’s own example offered in Metaphysics Z.11, let us assume that the feature of having hands is not (even partly) grasped by reference to being composed of flesh-bone-tendons. Rather, it is specified simply in terms of capacity for successful performance of humanly-chiro-functions. If so, the human form could turn out essentially to involve telepathic or ectoplasmic ‘hands’ that can fulfil the relevant function from distance, without any physical contact or interaction. Clearly, however, these examples do not constitute bona fide cases of material features that could account for capacities of compounds for natural types of change. It is preferable, then, to understand the material parts integral to natural form as robustly and substantively perceptible, constituent types of material feature.3

3 The examples employed in the present argument are similar to David Charles’s case of a ‘shadow’ object, the ‘Follower’, invoked in his criticism of the notion of topical matter used in Metaphysics .2 (‘L.2’, pp. 92–3). Aristotle introduces the notion of merely topical matter to describe the matter possessed exclusively by eternal, spatially moving, perceptible substances, such as the stars (Metaphysics H.1, 1042b5–6; H.4, 1044b6–8; .2, 1069b24–6; .8, 1050b20–2). David Charles argues that the conceptual apparatus of Metaphysics .2 (and Metaphysics  in general) cannot set out the notion of topical matter independently of the potentiality for spatial motion. This conception of topical matter, though, is not sufficiently restrictive to prevent dummy, non-substance objects from qualifying as possessors of topical matter and as substances. The ‘Follower’, an example of a dummy object, is defined by Charles as follows: ‘the object which follows the same route as an eternal perceptible object (the Leader), but occupies a given space two minutes after the Leader has left it [ . . . ] The leader, let us assume, has only topical matter, understood as the potentiality to follow a given path through space [ . . . ]’ (p. 93). It is clear that, just as the Leader, the Follower too seems to have the potentiality to follow a given spatial path. If so, however, the Follower too should possess topical matter and, presumably, be counted as a genuine substance alongside the Leader. This result suggests that the notion of topical matter understood solely by reference to potentiality for topical change is, as Charles

150

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

There is a way in which the formalist, functionalist, or ‘mere potentiality for change’ model of matter might seek to surmount this challenge. It could claim that, while material features are essentially identifiable in formal, functional, or telic terms, yet they are necessarily dependent on specific types of perceptible material if they are to exist at all. Thus, for instance, the human form does not involve anything weightier than (e.g.) the capacity to perform well the humanly-chiro-functions even if this capacity necessarily depends for its existence on its being realized in hands made of particular types of flesh-bone-tendons. There are three problems with this line of reply. First, it is not immediately clear how this view derives the claim that for a formally or functionally identified material feature to exist, it must exist in particular types of perceptible matter. It would be far from trivial to show how this strong necessity claim is explained by, or grounded on, the essential character of material features as (in this view) these do not involve any non-formal or non-functional aspects. How, then, could they give rise to the necessary enmatterment claim? The rival view, which grasps matter by reference to robustly perceptible, constituent material features, can straightforwardly achieve this explanatory task. For the essence of this sort of matter is to be substantively perceptible and constituent. It follows, then, that material features integral to natural form must be realized in the corresponding determinate types of perceptible matter making up the compounds that have this form. The formalist or functionalist position, by contrast, seems to be appropriating the necessary enmatterment claim in an ad hoc fashion, as an added component of its overall view. The second difficulty could be labelled ‘the problem of multiple realization’. What is the reason for holding that formally or functionally identified material characteristics are, or indeed must be, realized in certain types of perceptible matter rather than others? Let us assume, for example, that the material feature of having (human) hands is simply to have the capacity to perform well the humanly-chiro-functions. Assuming that the term ‘human’ is to be understood in a similar, merely formalist or functionalist manner, this specification seems to offer no grounds for claiming that the humanlychiro-function must be realized in (human) hands made of flesh-bone-tendons. Indeed, as my previous example suggests, this capacity may well be realizable by eerie, ghostly hands or (more prosaically) by extremities belonging to non-human species. The formalist or functionalist position might welcome this result by claiming that, while capacities for fulfilling functions such as seeing, hearing, or wielding tools

remarks, ‘too liberal’ (p. 93). Two important points are in order. First, my examples and Charles’s argument suggest that the formalist, functionalist, or ‘mere potentiality for change’ model of matter is inadequate for characterizing not only ‘mundane’, perceptible types of matter in the sublunary world but also more ‘exalted’ types of perceptible matter, such as topical matter present in superlunary, eternal, perceptible substances. Second, Charles’s claim is not that Aristotle completely lacks any conceptual framework in which to articulate a more successful notion of matter. Rather, his point is limited to Metaphysics , which (in his view) does not seem to invoke any other conception of matter beyond the model of mere potentiality for change.

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

151

are unified in this way, they can be realized multiply in different types of perceptible matter across several kinds of natural living being. But if this is correct, the task of explaining essential differences between distinct types of bodily part belonging to separate species – each with its own peculiar capacities characteristic of the species – becomes highly problematic. For example, the human capacity for smelling belonging to human noses seems essentially different from the corresponding canine capacity characteristic of canine noses. If the capacity for performing well the function of smelling is to be the same across distinct species, it would be difficult properly to individuate different bodily organs of separate species simply in formalist or functionalist terms. The robust conception of matter, however, does not encounter such difficulties. Thus, for instance, the (human) capacity for carrying out the humanlychiro-functions belonging to (human) hands cannot be realized in different kinds of bodily part. Nor does this capacity turn out to be the same for distinct sorts of material part involved in separate species of living being. For it is not even identifiable without mentioning the substantive, perceptible material feature of having (human) hands made of (human) flesh-bone-tendons. Nor does the converse hold good: for these last, robust material features are not crudely material but also involve formal and functional attributes integral to human form. As I argued in section 5.4, both formal and material parts of natural form are essentially hylomorphic in an indissoluble fashion. Lastly, the added claim of necessary (but not essential) enmatterment is not sufficiently restrictive to demarcate natural from mathematical form. The formalist or functionalist position insists that the material parts of natural form are essentially independent of perceptible types of material feature: for they are identified simply by reference to potentialities for change, formal, functional, or goal-directed attributes. At the same time, though, this view cedes that formally or functionally identified material characteristics necessarily depend for their existence on the existence of some perceptible material object or other. This result, however, renders a natural form’s material parts virtually indistinguishable from abstract mathematical entities or their intelligible material parts. As I remarked earlier, mathematical forms, as well as intelligible matter, are essentially independent of physical objects or perceptible types of matter. What they are is simply to be mathematical abstractions, fictions, or constructs. Yet, they also exist in the physical world as limits, shapes, or (quite generally) mathematical attributes of natural objects and their perceptible matter (cf. Physics B.2, 193b22–5; 31–3). However, for this sort of existence within the physical world, they necessarily depend on the existence of some perceptible material objects or other. Formally or functionally identified material features, then, seem to share too many similarities with mathematical entities and their intelligible matter. This conception of matter does not, it appears, possess any resources with which to set out a distinctive, non-abstract or non-mathematical, notion of natural form or its essential material components. As I argued earlier, the resulting identification of natural with mathematical form raises serious hurdles for the project of explaining the relevant types of natural change that compounds are capable of. My proposal, which preserves the ‘heavy-duty’,

152

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

perceptible and constituent character of a natural form’s material parts, does not encounter any difficulties of this sort.

6.3 Material and Change-Related Parts in a Natural Form’s Essence The last two sections argued that a natural form’s essence encompasses both material and change-related features, without either of them being reducible or posterior to the other. There is, however, a more fundamental question that could be raised at this juncture. Even on the assumption that natural form is essentially matter- and changeinvolving, it is still unclear what the role of material and change-related features would be as essential parts of form. The present section will argue that their role is to explain the material character of compounds that have the relevant form and to ground their capacities for the types of natural change that they undergo. The subsequent section will seek to specify in further detail how material and change-related features discharge this explanatory role using the example of the soul and some of its essential functions or affections. It is helpful, for present purposes, to approach these issues by reference to the definitional and explanatory practices deployed by natural science. It should be incontrovertible that physics examines natural form, a real-world entity that can operate as explanans for several types of explanandum falling under its subject-matter. The most prominent types of explanandum require answers to the questions of why particular compounds of specific kinds are as they are, and why they possess the necessary attributes that they have. Hence, for example, a central object of inquiry for natural philosophy is why compounds have the material features they have or why they possess the capacity for several types of change in the way they do. If this is correct, the general form of explanans should address and elucidate precisely this sort of explanandum. It is not surprising, then, that the material and change-related parts of natural form are the most promising candidates for carrying out this explanatory function. Aristotle lays out this general explanatory framework of natural science by introducing and developing the notion of nature in Physics B.1. Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, the notion of nature bifurcates into material and formal natures (193a9–12; 28–31; b3–4). Further, Aristotle privileges formal natures with a sort of priority over matter, even if he does not proceed to underpin satisfactorily this priority within the context of Physics B.1 (193b6–18). These claims do not require that natural form be essentially independent of matter quite generally. Nor do they imply that all types of matter are essentially characterizable in terms of form alone, whereas the converse is not the case. Rather, as I argued in chapters 4 and 5, form seems to be essentially dependent upon appropriate, perceptible types of material feature. Even so, it can preserve its essential and explanatory priority over the token- and type-material

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

153

parts possessed by particular and universal compounds. In the light of this, I shall understand the concept of nature invoked in Physics B.1 as being in line with the notion of essentially hylomorphic formal essences of natural compounds. Based on the argument of chapter 5, it seems unproblematic to hold that formal natures essentially involve material parts, despite the distinction drawn in Physics B.1 between form and matter and the form’s priority over matter. Second, my argument will focus on matter as an explanatory item within a natural form’s essence. Furthermore, the form’s essential material parts will be viewed as explanatorily basic features that ground the capacity of compounds for change. This is not to suggest that only material features are included in the essence of form at the expense of change-related attributes. As I argued in section 6.1, a natural form’s essence also depends on change. Similarly, the claim that material parts of the form explain capacities for change does not imply that change-related features included in the form are (wholly or partly) reducible to or eliminable by material ones. For the explanatory link under discussion is not one that relates the form’s own material and change-related parts by reducing the latter to the former. Rather, the types of explanandum grounded on the material features integral to form are the capacities of compounds themselves to undergo the relevant types of change. With these clarifications firmly in place, let us turn to Aristotle’s argument, advanced in Physics B.1, in favour of the explanatory role of natures. All these things [i.e. natural things; sc. a çØ from 192b8–12] plainly differ from things which are not constituted naturally. For each of them has in itself a source of change and staying unchanged [ø b ªaæ ŒÆ K ÆıfiH Iæåc åØ ŒØø ŒÆd ø ], whether in respect of place, or growth and decay, or alteration [ . . . ] [Things which are not constituted naturally; cf. 192b16ff.] have no innate tendency to change [P Æ ›æ c åØ ÆºB

 çı] [ . . . ] Nature, then, is what has been said; and anything which has a source of this sort has a nature [çØ b åØ ‹Æ ØÆÅ åØ Iæå]. And every such thing is a substance; for it is an underlying thing, and nature is always in an underlying thing [ŒÆd Ø Æ ÆFÆ PÆ· Œ  ªæ Ø, ŒÆd K ŒØ { Kd  çØ I]. It is in accordance with nature, and so is everything which belongs to it of itself, as moving upwards belongs to fire; for that neither is a nature nor has a nature, but is due to nature and in accordance with nature [ŒÆa çØ b ÆF  ŒÆd ‹Æ Ø æåØ ŒÆŁ’ Æ, x fiH ıæd ç æŁÆØ ¼ø· F ªaæ çØ b PŒ Ø P’ åØ çØ, çØ b ŒÆd ŒÆa çØ K]. (Phys. B.1, 192b12–15; 18–19; 32–193a1; Charlton’s trans.)

Aristotle’s explanatory targets are perceptible objects, such as compounds, their material parts and the four simple elements (192b9–11). Let us focus on particular compounds, which seem to satisfy most successfully Aristotle’s characterization as substances and subjects in which natures necessarily exist (192b33–4). Objects of this sort are natural in that they have natures (192b32–3; cf. b36–193a1: çØ åØ). More importantly, they are as they are due to, or by virtue of, these natures (192a8–9; 193a1: çØ). Equivalently, they are what they are in accordance with these natures (192b35; 193a1: ŒÆa çØ). It is clear, then, that natures are the types of explanans entity that

154

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

account for compounds, their being as they are. In addition to this explanatory task, they also ground the necessary attributes of compounds, the features that belong to them per se or as a result of these compounds’ own identity (192b35–6: ‹Æ Ø

[sc. E çØ sØ/PÆØ /ŒØ Ø ; cf. 192b32–4] æåØ ŒÆŁ’ Æ). That a nature explains the presence of such necessary features too is indicated by Aristotle’s claim that they are çØ or ŒÆa çØ (193a1). While they are neither explanatorily basic natures nor compound objects that possess such natures, yet they are attributes that necessarily belong to compounds by virtue of, or in accordance with, the nature of these compounds (192b36–193a1). Indeed, the claim that they are possessed by their bearers per se or as such (192b35–6: ŒÆŁ’ Æ) is equivalent to the thesis that they belong to compound objects because of those objects’ own essence or nature. To fill in the gaps of this picture, it is crucial to understand better the content of the types of explanandum that natures account for. The passage just quoted from Physics B.1 suggests that all natural entities – the things to be explained by natures – possess their own internal principles or sources of several types of change and rest (192b13–15: ø b ªaæ ŒÆ K ÆıfiH Iæåc åØ ŒØø ŒÆd ø ; 18–19: ›æ c åØ ÆºB  çı; 32–3: çØ b åØ ‹Æ ØÆÅ åØ Iæå). It would be overly hasty to infer from this that the natures Aristotle is referring to are identified with the sources of change inherent in natural entities. Rather, his point seems to be that there is necessary mutual entailment between having nature and having such sources of change (192b32–3: çØ b åØ ‹Æ ØÆÅ åØ Iæå). The reason for keeping natures and sources of change conceptually separate is that Aristotle goes on to argue that natures just are formal and material natures. In so doing, he identifies natures with the form and matter of compound objects. At the same time, he keeps formal and material natures distinct from those objects’ internalized sources of change or rest. That is one way in which nature is said, the primary underlying matter for each of the things which have in themselves a source of their movements and changes [ æÅ Œ{ ŒØ Å oºÅ H Kå ø K ÆE Iæåc ŒØø ŒÆd ƺB ] [ . . . ]. (Phys. B.1, 193a28–30; Charlton’s trans.) So in another way the nature of things which have in themselves a source of their changes would be their shape and their form [u ¼ºº æ   çØ i YÅ H Kå ø K ÆE ŒØø

Iæåc  æçc ŒÆd e r  ]. (Phys. B.1, 193b3–5; Charlton’s trans.)

It is clear from these later passages taken from Physics B.1 that, while form and matter of compounds are the same as their natures, their internal sources of change are added as distinct items. If Aristotle intended to identify natures with internal sources of change, he would presumably use different formulations along the following lines: ‘nature, in the first instance, is the underlying material constituent of each of the things which have in themselves this/such source (i.e. material nature) of their change’; ‘nature, in another way, is the shape and the form of things that have in themselves this/such source (i.e. formal nature) of their changes.’ His actual formulations, however, do not contain any anaphoric devices (such as ÆÅ or ØÆÅ [i.e. çØ/oºÅ/ æç] Iæåc

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

155

ŒØø ) with which to refer back to material or formal natures and render them identical with sources of change. Rather, the formal and material natures of compound objects are distinguished from their internal sources of change.4 This is not just a pedantic point of merely terminological significance. The reason why Aristotle separates formal or material natures from internal sources of change or rest is that the latter constitute the central types of explanandum which are grounded on the explanatorily basic material or formal natures. It would be difficult for Aristotle to equate material or formal natures with principles or sources of change: for a major component of his overall position is that matter and (especially) form are predominantly principles of the being and essence of natural compound objects (but not simply of their change). It is more plausible, then, to understand sources of change as powers or capacities of compounds to produce or undergo change. This conception of sources of change would align them with the initial notion of potentiality set out in Metaphysics , the one which is grasped mainly by reference to change. In that context, Aristotle explicitly holds that the notion of potentiality which is tied to the concept of change is indeed a principle or source of change (Met. .1, 1046a9–11: ‹ÆØ b [sc. ı Ø º ªÆØ] æ e ÆPe r  , AÆØ IæåÆ Ø NØ, ŒÆd æe æÅ Æ º ªÆØ, l KØ Iæåc ƺB ). Further, he specifies that this power or capacity of an object to cause or undego change is a principle that is present in the object itself (1046a12–13:  K ÆPfiH fiH åØ Iæåc ƺB ÆŁÅØŒB ; 22-8:  b ªaæ K fiH åØ (Øa ªaæ e åØ Øa Iæå [ . . . ] åØ e å [ . . . ]),  ’ K fiH ØFØ, x  e Łæ e ŒÆd  NŒ ØŒ,  b K fiH Łæ ÆØŒfiH  ’ K fiH NŒ ØŒfiH). These considerations strongly suggest that the powers or capacities of Metaphysics .1 are the internal sources of change as characterized in Physics B.1. Clearly, however, these items are not the same as the material or formal natures of natural compound objects. Rather, they are the types of explanandum which are grounded on the basis of the material and formal natures of these objects. We are now in a position to bring out the explanatory role of material and formal natures, and to specify the items which are grounded by reference to them. Let us suppose, for example, that one type of source of change to be explained by appropriate James Lennox (‘ “As if We Were Investigating Snubness”: Aristotle on the Prospects for a Single Science of Nature’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 35, 2008, pp. 150–1, n. 3) helpfully draws attention to this important issue. However, his formulations are not always unambiguous. He begins by claiming that the distinguishing mark of things with natures is that they have an internal source of change. He then goes on to argue (correctly, in my view) that ‘the two natures [i.e. matter and form] are thus kept conceptually distinct from the inherent source of change’ (p. 150). He concludes, however, that ‘it is not the matter and the form that are natures but the potentials, the sources of change, possessed in virtue of the matter and the form’ (p. 151). In my view, the distinguishing mark of there being natures, the presence of internal sources of change, is just a distinguishing mark. It is not what it is to be a nature. For this reason, I think, Aristotle separates the notion of nature from that of internal source of change. Moreover, I do not see how we could avoid the identification of natures with material and formal natures. If so, Lennox’s claim that it is not matter and form that are natures but the sources of change does not seem promising. I agree with him, though, that the internal sources of change are present by virtue of matter and form, although he would not make my further move of identifying this pair of explanatorily basic entities with natures. 4

156

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

material and formal natures is the power or capacity of a certain kind of compound stuff, say charcoal, to heat (cf. Met. .1, 1046a26–8: e Łæ e [ . . . ] K fiH Łæ ÆØŒfiH). This source of change, the heat-inducing power inherent in charcoal, is to be explained by the nature of charcoal, its essence and form. It should be emphasized that this does not imply that what does the explaining is a merely abstract, purely formal nature. There are strong, independent arguments, developed in chapter 5, that the essence or form of natural compounds essentially involves perceptible types of material feature. Therefore, the nature that explains the charcoal’s internal heating power or source of change is essentially and inextricably hylomorphic. Formal and material natures collaborate indissolubly in grounding the sources of qualitative-temperature change inherent in this kind of compound stuff. Thus, for instance, the material features intrinsic to the form of charcoal, such as (e.g.) being composed of a determinate quantity of dry and fiery stuff, together with its formal parts, (e.g.) the relevant chemical structure, make charcoal what it is and underwrite its power to heat bodies. A resolute proponent of the formalist or functionalist position could, at this point, object that the formal nature of charcoal by itself, its chemical structure alone, would be a sufficient explanans for the heating power of this kind of stuff. It would be necessary, to be sure, if this chemical structure is to exist, that it exist in the specific types of perceptible material that it does. These material features, however, are not parts of charcoal’s formal nature. In section 6.2 I have already pointed out the severe difficulties that views of this sort have to overcome. It should be added, at present, that the formalist or functionalist position would be under pressure to show why the combination of charcoal’s chemical formula with the necessary material features that it possesses is not a lucky coincidence. What is required of this position is not simply to show why the chemical structure of charcoal and its power to heat bodies based on this structure are necessarily enmattered in perceptible types of matter as opposed to abstract ‘materials’, such as mathematical intelligible matter (e.g. geometrical continuous magnitudes). More urgently, the formalist or functionalist position must explain why it is not merely a fluke that charcoal’s chemical structure is necessarily realized in the determinate types of perceptible material it is present in. Why, for instance, is it not enmattered in fire-resistant glassy spheroids containing boiling water instead of dry and fiery lumps of wood? After all, this sort of glassy spheroids could support some sort of capacity for heating things up. The view that conceives explanatory natures as essentially hylomorphic, by contrast, is not threatened by these difficulties. For it allows material features, such as being composed of certain dry and fiery stuff, to be essential parts of natural form. Hence, it is no miracle that the chemical structure of charcoal is necessarily realized in the perceptible types of material it is present in: for the corresponding material characteristics are essential components of this chemical structure. If so, they make the typematter present in the kind charcoal what it is and explain its essence. Furthermore, they ground the power of charcoal to heat things up in the specific, matter-involving way in which it normally exercises this power. It is questionable whether a formalist or

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

157

functionalist approach could carry through this explanatory task. For there is danger that an essentially immaterial chemical formula might be similar to a transcendent Platonist Form. More plausibly, perhaps, it might be identified with a purely mathematical form, an entity which is essentially independent of perceptible matter and change but involves only abstract, intelligible matter. Alternatively, this essentially immaterial chemical formula might be grasped in terms of the mathematical forms used by subordinate mathematical sciences. In this view, the branch of natural science that studies charcoal takes up an abstract mathematical ratio from (e.g.) number theory, together with the relevant theorems concerning this ratio, and artificially fits them onto natural objects and their perceptible matter without describing any intrinsic relations between form and material objects. As I argued in chapter 4, however, Aristotle criticizes all of these strategies as unduly abstract and mathematical. Natural form just is not like Platonist or mathematical form. For this reason, physics is neither a theoretical, superordinate mathematical science nor a ‘naturalized’, subordinate discipline of applied mathematics.5 Successful explanation within physics requires non-abstract natures that are essentially and non-decomposably hylomorphic. It is on the basis of such natures that the physicist can latch onto the causal order of the world and ground the necessary features of natural compounds and their capacities for several types of change.

6.4 The Explanatory Role of Material and Change-Related Features within a Natural Form’s Essence (De Anima A.4) The presence of both material and change-related parts and their explanatory function within the essence of natural forms might give rise to a serious challenge. It might be thought that, if forms involve perceptible types of material feature, they themselves prove to be concrete material objects. Similarly, the presence of change-related attributes in their essence might be taken as indicating that forms are capable of change or motion. It seems absurd, though, to ascribe such characteristics to the types of entity that forms are. To tackle this challenge, it will be useful to employ a specific model of natural form, the soul of living beings. In this model, it becomes clearer precisely how the soul’s essential parts, including material and change-related features, explain the nature of ensouled living beings without rendering the soul itself a concrete, ensouled compound. Before engaging in this task, however, it is of utmost importance to pinpoint some basic differences between natural form and the compounds that are enformed by it.

5 In this respect, physics is strongly contrasted with subordinate, applied mathematical sciences such as astronomy, mechanics, or harmonics. While these disciplines are ‘more natural’, still they are mathematical (Phys. B.2, 194a7–12: a çıØŒæÆ H ÆŁÅ ø).

158

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

First, talk of a natural form’s ‘essence’ should not be understood as implying that a form is a kind of entity that has essence in the way in which a particular compound object does. Rather, in dissecting a form’s essence we are interested in the essence that it is (or is identical with): its simple or complex structure, the nature of the parts that constitute it (if indeed it is complex), and the way in which these parts are related to each other. Second, as the essence or nature of certain objects, a form is not itself an object or a type but is a mode or way of being, the one which is essential to the objects enformed by it. As such, the ‘essential’ parts of a form are themselves features, attributes, ways, or modes of being, those that make up the complex essential feature or mode of being that this form is (or is identical with). In section 5.4 I argued that these parts of natural form should not be grasped as independent entities but as essentially linked with each other in an inextricable way. In this conception, then, the material or change-related items involved in the essence of a natural form are features that (partly) explain the material nature of the compound objects that possess this form as well as the capacities for change characteristic of their kind. They are not, however, attributes belonging to the form itself in the same way in which they are possessed by the relevant objects. Rather, they are essentially interdependent, component features that compose the complex, whole feature that the form itself is. It is obvious, therefore, that the presence of such material or change-related component features does not make the form itself a concrete, material, or changeable object. This is so despite the fact that the form, by virtue of its material and change-related components, grounds the relevant attributes of the objects it is the form of. Let us, then, deploy the model of the soul, a natural form which essentially involves psychic functions and affections, the ones that are based on the unified faculties or capacities that a specific type of soul is identified with. These psychic faculties or capacities should be taken as concrete instances of essential parts of natural forms, comprising formal, material, and change-related features. As such they are to be understood as types of explanans that ground particular ensouled beings, their being what they are, their having the material characteristics they have, and their possessing the capacities for change inherent in their kind. Hence, the types of explanandum investigated by the branch of natural science that inquires into the soul are attributes of compounds such as being angry, feeling fear, showing mercy, perceiving through the senses, or thinking. In De Anima A.4 Aristotle insists that matter- or change-involving features may be essential parts of the soul and contribute to explaining the relevant functions or affections of living beings, without making the soul itself an ensouled object that has a body, gets angry, feels fear, pities, or thinks. The soul can, as we have seen, move and set itself in motion incidentally, as, for instance, the body in which it is may move, and be set in motion by the soul; otherwise it cannot move from place to place [ŒÆa ı ÅŒe b ŒØEŁÆØ [sc. c łıå], ŒÆŁæ Y , Ø ŒÆd ŒØE Æı, x  ŒØEŁÆØ b K fiz KØ, F b ŒØEŁÆØ e B łıåB · ¼ººø ’ På x   ŒØŁÆØ ŒÆa   ÆP]. One would more naturally be puzzled as to whether the soul is

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

159

moved in view of such considerations as the following. We say that the soul feels pain and joy, confidence and fear, and again that it is angry, perceives and thinks; all these are held to be movements. From this one might think that the soul itself is moved; but this is not necessary. For even if most of all feeling pain or joy or thinking are movements, and each of them is to be in motion, and this movement is due to the soul, as, for instance, to be angry or to be afraid is for the heart to be in motion in a particular way, while to think is perhaps either this or some other kind of movement, and of these some occur while certain items move in place, some others [occur while certain items move] in alteration (of what sort and how does not concern us here) [N ªaæ ŒÆd ‹Ø ºØÆ e ºıEŁÆØ j åÆæØ j ØÆEŁÆØ ŒØBØ N, ŒÆd ŒÆ ŒØEŁÆØ ø, e b ŒØEŁÆ KØ e B łıåB , x  e OæªÇŁÆØ j çEŁÆØ e c ŒÆæÆ ‰d ŒØEŁÆØ, e b ØÆEŁÆØ j e F Yø j æ  Ø, ø b ı ÆØ a b ŒÆa çæa ØH ŒØı ø, a b ŒÆ’ IººøØ (EÆ b ŒÆd H , æ KØ º ª )]; yet, to say that the soul feels anger is as if one should say that the soul weaves or builds; for it is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does so with the soul [e c6 º ªØ OæªÇŁÆØ c łıåc ‹ Ø Œi Y Ø º ªØ c łıåc çÆØ j NŒ E·  ºØ ªaæ Yø c º ªØ c łıåc KºE j ÆŁØ j ØÆEŁÆØ, Iººa e ¼Łæø B fi łıåB fi ]; and this, too, not in that the motion is in the soul, but in that in some cases the motion reaches up to, while in others it starts from, the soul [F b c ‰ K KŒÅ fi B ŒØø hÅ , Iºº’ ›b b åæØ KŒÅ , ›b ’ I’ KŒÅ ], as, for instance, sense perception is from these things, while recollection from the soul towards the movements or retentions in the sense-organs. [De Anima [DAn.] A.4, 408a30–b18; Hicks’s trans.)

This passage contains numerous important claims that are themes of intense scholarly debates. For present purposes, though, I shall focus on Aristotle’s thesis that the soul is not the proper subject of psychic functions or affections. Aristotle cautiously remarks that functions or affections such as being angry, feeling pity, perceiving, or thinking seem (to certain thinkers) to be sorts of change (408b3–4: ŒØØ ŒFØ r ÆØ). Thus, he clearly employs a concessive tone at 408b5ff.: ‘even if we accept the endoxic view that all such functions and affections are types of change, still there is something paradoxical about the claim that the soul itself undergoes change.’ This aspect of his argument suggests that he is not committed to the identification of psychic functions and affections with types of change. Indeed, the later development of his own conceptual framework shows that he discards this view: for he maintains that (at least some) psychic functions or affections are not changes at all or, even if they bear some similarity to change, they constitute a distinctive, sui generis, type of change (De Anima B.5, 417b6–7).

6 At 408b11, most manuscripts read e b º ªØ, whereas only two have e c º ªØ. Both Ross and Hicks follow Bonitz and adopt this last reading. Bonitz’s reason for preferring this reading is that c fits better as a particle which introduces the apodosis of the long concessive clause N ªaæ ŒÆd ‹Ø ºØÆ e ºıEŁÆØ . . . ø b ı ÆØ a b ŒÆa çæa ØH ŒØı ø, a b ŒÆ’ IººøØ (EÆ b ŒÆd H , æ KØ º ª ) at 408b5–11. I need not discuss the details of this textual issue. Either reading will suffice for present purposes provided that it retains the contrast between the concessive clause and the apodosis: ‘even if all these claims hold true, nevertheless. . . . ’

160

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

Even in the theoretically more innocuous passage just quoted, though, he insinuates that it is unclear whether and in what way psychic functions or affections themselves are types of change. Hence, while at 408b5–7 he begins by identifying psychic functions and affections with changes or with undergoing changes, at 408b8–9 he shifts to the claim that (e.g.) to be angry is for the heart to suffer change of a certain sort. Being the same as a sort of change, however, is distinct from involving a cardiac change of some kind. Moreover, at 408b9–11, the link between psychic functions or affections and change becomes even looser. For Aristotle remarks that psychic functions or affections obtain while some items undergo change of some type (ø b ı ÆØ a b ŒÆa çæa ØH ŒØı ø, a b ŒÆ’ IººøØ). But is the claim that these functions or affections are themselves changes and are accompanied by separate changes, such as (e.g.) cardiac movements? Or is it the case that, strictly speaking, psychic functions or affections are not changes but just occur (perhaps even necessarily so) while certain items undergo change? Furthermore, independently of whether these functions or affections are themselves identified with changes of some kind, there is a question as to whether their relation to the accompanying changes is identity, necessary mutual entailment, co-occurrence, or some distinct sort of link yet to be specified. In my view, we need not conclude that Aristotle’s present argument is muddled. Nor does it follow that he is insensitive to these issues or that he does not have satisfactory responses to them. It seems more plausible that the ascending order in which he enriches the picture of psychic functions and affections and develops their possible relation to change is his way of signalling that the connection between them and change is less than perspicuous. Drawing the distinctions he alludes to and addressing the questions arising from these distinctions would be a good starting-point for elucidating that connection. Despite the inherent difficulties with the received view of psychic functions and affections as changes, however, Aristotle argues that it is imprecise or/and misleading to hold that the soul itself is the appropriate bearer of features such as feeling fear, showing mercy, perceiving, or thinking (408b4–5; 13–14). Indeed, assigning attributes of this sort to the soul is analogous to making the manifestly absurd claim that the soul itself weaves or builds (408b11–13). The paradoxical spirit of this form of claim is not necessarily tied to the identification of psychic functions or affections with types of change. To the contrary, there are some types of psychic functions or affections which could be unproblematically identified with certain sorts of change. Thus, for instance, how would one characterize features of ensouled living beings such as setting bodily parts in spatial motion or following routes from one place to another (e.g. walking, swimming, or flying) if not as types of change (locomotion)? Yet, as Aristotle’s own example indicates, the soul itself neither sets itself in locomotion nor undergoes spatial change of this type (408a33–4). What is important for present purposes, nevertheless, is that the soul is the entity in virtue of which or by which the ensouled living body possesses even this function or affection of setting things in motion or undergoing spatial change (408a32–3: ŒØEŁÆØ

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

161

b K fiz KØ, F b ŒØEŁÆØ e B łıåB ; cf. 408b7: e b ŒØEŁÆ KØ e B łıåB ).7 Similarly, in cases of psychic functions and affections that are not clearly identified with types of change, it is not the soul itself that (e.g.) feels pity, learns, or thinks. Rather, it is the compound, ensouled living being, (e.g.) a human, which exercises or undergoes these with the soul (408b13–15:  ºØ ªaæ Yø c º ªØ c łıåc KºE j ÆŁØ j ØÆEŁÆØ, Iººa e ¼Łæø B fi łıåB fi ). It is fair to think that the locution ‘with the soul’ carries causal and explanatory connotations, similar to those implicit in the phrase ‘by the soul’ used earlier (408a32–3; b7: e B łıåB ). As a paradigmatic instance of natural form, then, the soul is essentially matter- and change-involving in that it includes material and change-related features as its components. It follows, then, that the form that the soul is (or is identical with) makes the living compound what it is and explains the presence of its necessary material features and its capacities for change. As Aristotle insists, however, these grounding and explanatory tasks – achieved through the presence of (e.g.) change-related features – do not make the soul a moving or changing object. Nor does the presence of material characteristics in the soul’s essence render it a concrete material compound. Rather, this is how the soul, in its hylomorphic entirety, explains the material nature of living compounds. Aristotle goes on to offer some schematic examples of the way in which change-related features enter the soul’s essence without making it a changing or moving object. In all cases, while change is related to the soul as something that is initiated from or reaches up to it, the soul itself is not, properly speaking, an object which sets itself in motion or which undergoes change. For change is not in the soul but is present in the ensouled compound as a subject (408b15–16: F b c ‰ K KŒÅ fi B ŒØø hÅ , Iºº’ ›b b åæØ KŒÅ , ›b ’ I’ KŒÅ ). Thus, for example, sense perception is roughly understood in terms of psychic features that involve a certain type of change that starts from perceptible objects and reaches all the way up to the soul. Recollection is grasped by reference to essential parts of the soul that include a specific sort of change commencing from the soul and reaching up to the sensory organs. In neither case, however, is the soul setting itself in motion or suffering any type of change. Quite generally, then, the material or change-related parts of a natural form’s essence discharge their causal and explanatory roles without turning this form itself into a material object or assigning to it any capacities for change.8

7

Aristotle notes that, because the soul exists in the living body and can cause it to undergo spatial motion, there is a sense in which the soul sets itself in motion and undergoes spatial change. This, however, is for the soul to set itself in motion or to undergo change only incidentally. Properly speaking, it is the living body that is set in motion and undergoes spatial change by the soul (408a30–3). 8 The claims made at DAn. A.4, 408b18–29, that the intellect is imperishable and divine, and that (theoretical) thinking and contemplating are impassive, might give rise to the objection that some parts of the soul are essentially immaterial. If so, why not think that the soul itself is identified with these essentially non-matter- and non-change-involving entities? More radically, why not conclude that the essence of natural forms is, at bottom, independent of matter and change? There are several problematic points raised by this passage, difficulties that undermine the soundness and validity of this line of objection. First, Aristotle’s comparison with sense perception and sensory organs (drawn at 408b20–2) suggests only that

162

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

6.5 Conclusion: Metaphysics and the Study of Matter and Change (Metaphysics Z.11) There is a radical, global type of objection that could be raised at this juncture even by theorists who accept all the major claims argued for in the present chapter. Suppose that a natural form’s essence includes both material and change-related features that are not mutually reducible or eliminable. Let us also assume that natural form, as a hylomorphic (and ‘kinetic’, we might add) whole, makes compounds what they are and explains their necessary features and capacities to cause or undergo change. One could still ask why metaphysics, the primary branch of theoretical philosophy, should take up the study of such natural, matter- and change-involving entities. Does it not fall exclusively to natural philosophy – physics as opposed to metaphysics – to inquire into natural form? If the answer to this last question is affirmative, it becomes unclear

the intellect, as well as the soul quite generally, is essentially independent of token-material parts (such as this pair of old or myopic eyes) or even certain types of matter (such as old, blue, or tired eyes). It does not follow from this, though, that the soul or the intellect are essentially independent of all types of material or change-related feature. Second, the claim of imperishability of the intellect or of impassivity of activities such as theoretical thinking and contemplating (408b19; 24–5; 29) seems effectively to make the same point as the earlier claim that the soul itself does not undergo change or is not the proper subject of psychic functions/affections (408b11–16). Thus, the intellect does not itself perish; rather, it is the compound living being which has intellect that perishes. Similarly, it is not the activity of theoretical thinking or contemplating itself that suffers anything, but some bodily part or organ in which it is present (408b26–9). Indeed, Aristotle generalizes this claim to cover the soul as a whole, as well as non-intellectual psychic features, such as loving, hating, and having memory (408b22–3; 25–8): it is not the soul or these psychic functions/ affections that suffer with old age but the compound living being. If Aristotle’s argument continues to develop the point about proper subjecthood, there is no basis for inferring that the soul or natural form quite generally is essentially non-matter- and non-change-involving. Third, and more puzzlingly, Aristotle maintains that the intellect is a type of imperishable substance. He characterizes it as (completely) impassive and divine. But do these characterizations apply to the human intellect too? Or do they entail simply that some types of intellect, the divine ones in the superlunary region, are imperishable substances and so (perhaps) essentially immaterial and non-change-involving? The same question can be raised about activities such as theoretical thinking or contemplating: is it just the divine or also the human type and exercise of these activities which are eternal, imperishable, and so (perhaps) essentially independent of matter and change? The earlier claim (made at DAn. A.1, 403a8–10) that human thinking essentially depends on imagination suggests that in the human case even thinking is essentially inseparable from matter and change. Moreover, how are we to understand the relation of ‘coming to be in something’ that obtains between the imperishable substance that the intellect is and the compound human being? Surely, a perishable substance, the particular human being, cannot contain or come to contain a further imperishable substance within itself? Even if this imperishable entity is not simply a substance but is the substance of the compound human, why does it not render this living being itself imperishable? Might it be that the phrase ‘coming to be in something’ alludes to the relation of mere resemblance or likeness that holds between our own theoretical thinking and the eternal, divine contemplation of imperishable intellects (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics X.8, 1178b21–3: H IŁæøø c  ÆÅ fi [sc. B fi F ŁF KæªÆ fi ŁøæÅØŒB fi from 1178b21–2] ıªªÅ [but not  ÆP]; 25–7: Kç’ ‹ › ø  Ø B ØÆÅ KæªÆ [sc. B F ŁF KæªÆ ŁøæÅØŒB from 1178b21–2] æåØ; cf. X.7, 1177b24–31)? If so, Aristotle’s claim would be roughly that a psychic capacity or faculty comes to be developed within us humans: the exercise of this capacity or faculty is simply similar to the eternal, impassive theoretical activity of divine, imperishable substances. Because of this wide host of difficulties it is not safe (I conclude) to use this passage taken from De Anima A.4 to infer general conclusions about whether or not the soul (or natural form in general) is essentially matterand change-involving.

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

163

whether and in what way the arguments in favour of essentially enmattered natural form are relevant to the overall project of Aristotelian metaphysics. Why not jettison the investigation of perceptible natural objects and their essences, thereby limiting the scope of first philosophy to imperceptible, eternal substances such as divine intelligences and the Prime Mover? This sort of challenge can be treated only briefly as several of the considerations it grows out of lie well outside the scope of the present study. It should be emphasized, however, that Aristotle himself is aware of this line of objection and addresses it towards the end of Metaphysics Z.11, within a context in which the study of natural substances and their forms is central to his metaphysical project. We must consider later whether there is any other matter than that of such substances as these, and whether we should enquire after some other kind of substance, for instance numbers or the like. It is in fact for this purpose that we are attempting to analyse perceptible substances too, since the study of perceptible substances is in a way the task of physics or second philosophy; for a physicist must have knowledge not only of the matter of things but also, and in greater measure, of the substance in accordance with the account [ æ b Ø Ææa c oºÅ H Øø PØH Ø ¼ººÅ, ŒÆd E ÇÅE PÆ  æÆ Øa x  IæØŁ f X Ø ØF, Œ  oæ. ı ªaæ åæØ ŒÆd æd H ÆNŁÅH PØH Øæ ŁÆ ØæÇØ, Kd æ  Øa B çıØŒB ŒÆd ı æÆ çغçÆ æª  æd a ÆNŁÅa PÆ ŁøæÆ· P ªaæ  æd B oºÅ E ªøæÇØ e çıØŒe Iººa ŒÆd B ŒÆa e º ª, ŒÆd Aºº]. (Met. Z.11, 1037a10–17; Bostock’s trans.)

Here it is acknowledged that the ultimate aim of first philosophy is to inquire into the existence and nature of imperceptible types of matter and substance. Thus, at 1037a4–5, Aristotle seems to refer back to his distinction between perceptible and intelligible matter drawn at Metaphysics Z.10, 1036a9–12. In my discussion of this passage in section 6.2 I argued that intelligible, mathematical matter is abstract and essentially independent of perceptible, perishable natural bodies. It too, however, just as perceptible matter, necessarily depends for its existence within the physical world on the existence of some perceptible, perishable natural body or other. If so, it is plausible to think that the phrase Ææa c oºÅ H Øø PØH used at 1037a10–11 refers not simply to perceptible but also to intelligible matter. Aristotle, then, alludes to the question of whether there is any matter over and above these types of matter which are dependent on perceptible, perishable natural bodies for their existence. Similarly, at 1037a5–10, his distinction between form, matter, universal, and particular compound is exemplified by perceptible, perishable compounds and their formal and material principles: the human soul, the human body, Socrates, Coriscus, and the kind human. In the passage just quoted, therefore, the question posed at 1037a11–12 is whether there are substances which are different from these perceptible, perishable ones. The example of numbers provided at 1037a12 will not be Aristotle’s considered answer to this question. Together with the generalizing phrase X Ø ØF, though, this

164

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

example clarifies that the investigation will later focus on the existence and nature of imperceptible or/and imperishable substances. At the same time, however, Aristotle argues that the inquiry into perceptible, perishable natural substances and their form is conducted precisely for the sake of studying exalted cases such as the ones just alluded to (at 1037a13 the reference of ı åæØ seems to be Œ  oæ and its dependent interrogative clauses). The first idea implicit in this formulation is that Aristotle follows a didactic or pedagogical order of laying out his argument. In this order, while the study of imperceptible or/and imperishable substances is the central target, it should be preceded by the examination of perceptible perishable substances. There may be several reasons why this way of proceeding is didactically or pedagogically useful. Notwithstanding platitudinous points about what is less abstract and so easier to grasp, Aristotle’s aim may be to introduce his metaphysical argument beginning with what, in his own view, is epistemically more accessible or familiar to human learners of this science like us. In some contexts introductory material of this sort might be ‘logical’ in that it stems from considerations developed in non-specialized, non-scientific works, such as the Analytics or the Topics.9 Elsewhere, the inquiry might commence from what is closer to particular, observable phenomena and the types of concrete object involved in them.10 Alternatively, a learner might be initiated into a scientific discipline through notions which are extremely general and all-encompassing, even if not as clear or determinate as the proper, fundamental concepts of the science in question.11 It is not difficult to imagine how perceptible, perishable substances and their forms could exhibit the relevant characteristics that render them useful as starting-points for metaphysical inquiry. First, these substances are not the most narrow, specialized object of the core metaphysical branch which studies imperceptible or/and imperishable objects. Further, the primary substances in the sublunary region, natural forms or essences, are substances of perceptible perishable compounds, the particular, concrete objects accessible to our sense-perception. Moreover, if imperishable or/and imperceptible substances are, strictly speaking, the specialized, narrow subject-matter of

9 Thus, in Metaphysics Z.4–5, Aristotle seems to be introducing the inquiry into essence ( q r ÆØ) on the basis of predicational considerations about what is said of what and in what way. This, presumably, is what he labels ‘logical’ investigation (1029b13). See my article ‘Essence and Per Se Predication in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.4’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 39, 2010, pp. 121–82, for some discussion of this issue. If we accept the received position of 1029b3–12 as part of the introduction to Metaphysics Z.4, Aristotle pinpoints the idea that such ‘logical’ considerations are epistemically ‘more familiar’ to us (1029b7: KŒ H ÆPfiH ªøæØ ø æø). Hence, they should be used as starting-points for the study of more demanding notions, such as that of essence. 10 Posterior Analytics A.2, 71b33–72a5, draws the distinction between what is epistemically prior by nature and what is more knowable by and familiar to us. As examples of items that fall under the second category, Aristotle offers perceptible, particular phenomena or objects. 11 The distinction between what is more knowable by and familiar to us and what is epistemically prior by nature is famously deployed in Physics A.1, 184a16ff. There Aristotle proposes to begin from items that are highly general, confused, and indefinite but clear to us (184a21–2; 23–6) advancing towards what is clear by nature, i.e. determinate and specific (184a24; b1–5).

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

165

metaphysics, there is a sense in which our common sense conception of perceptible compounds as substances and of their forms as their primary substances is convoluted and imprecise. It may even be remotely comparable with the infantile tendency of calling all men ‘father’ and all women ‘mother’, mentioned at Physics A.1, 184b3–5, as an example of confused and indeterminate knowledge. This need not diminish the significance of perceptible, perishable natural substances and their forms as real-world entities or as objects of knowledge. It is true that the didactic or pedagogical order just sketched traces the natural order of ontological, causal, and explanatory hierarchy in a reverse mode. Thus, Aristotle’s idea at Metaphysics Z.11, 1037a13, seems to be that we study the perceptible, perishable matter of natural compounds (even in the guise of intelligible, mathematical matter abstracted from it) for the sake of proceeding to a type of matter which is not perishable, such as the merely topical matter of superlunary entities capable only of spatial change.12 Furthermore, from our grasp of objects that involve these last types of changeable matter we will be able to examine the existence and nature of entities that do not contain any types of matter at all. Similarly, on the basis of our successful understanding of natural compounds, their matter and their form, we will be able to investigate eternal substances that are essentially independent of perishable matter. From these last, in turn, we could ascend to the primary substances which are altogether independent of changeable matter and do not function as essences or forms of any specific types of object. This reverse tracking of the natural order of being and knowledge, however, does not result in discarding perceptible or perishable natural substances as not being parts of the fabric or reality. Nor does it place these substances at the lowest niche of the overall hierarchy. Hence, for example, natural form and the objects it is the essence of do not resemble non-substance attributes such as walking, accidental compounds such as white man, or processes such as eclipse or thunder. They are crucial parts of the perceptible, perishable physical world that ground the existence and nature of nonsubstance entities such as the ones just mentioned. This is so despite the fact that they are not the most central or ultimately primary segments of reality. Still they constitute a type of secondary substance, derivative only if compared with eternal entities. It should be recalled, at this juncture, that each of the central books of the Metaphysics is explicitly thought to be a discourse primarily into substance (Z.1, 1028a13–20; b2–7; H.1, 1042a4–7; 24–31; .1, 1045b27–32). All these books, though, seem to focus heavily on perceptible, perishable substances and their form, containing either brief allusions to or single sections on imperishable or/and imperceptible entities. While this suggests that Aristotle’s project involves a further aim, not carried through by the central books,

12 As I noted in 6.2, ‘merely topical matter’ need not entail a matter which is non-robust or nonconstituent in contradistinction to the perceptible matter of perishable, natural substances. Merely topical matter may still be substantive and constituent even if imperishable or, quite generally, unchangeable in the respects in which sublunary substances alone are changeable.

166

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

yet it unequivocally implies that more ‘humble’, mundane entities, too, are important types of substance, even if not primary ones. This seems to be the sense in which the examination of perceptible, perishable natural substances falls to natural, ‘second’ philosophy (1037a14–15). Just as the realworld object of this inquiry is non-primary substance (but substance nevertheless), similarly the investigation itself is secondary or derivative only if compared with the core metaphysical branch that has imperishable or/and imperceptible entities as its exclusive subject-matter. By no means does this entail that the inquiry into perceptible, perishable objects does not constitute theoretical philosophy at all (Metaphysics E.1, 1025b26–8; 1026a6–7). Nor does it require that this inquiry is the least honourable part of wisdom or metaphysics. Thus, for example, it is a study of core parts of the furniture of reality, natural entities and their principles, without being abstract or disconnected from physical reality, matter, and change in the way in which theoretical mathematical knowledge is (Metaphysics E.1, 1026a7–10; 14–15). This sort of ‘second’ metaphysics, then, is secondary because it consists in studying secondary substances, perishable, perceptible objects and their principles. In so far as it examines substance, though, it is a bona fide part of theoretical metaphysical wisdom. One could doubt, at this point, whether this theoretical discipline might be dubbed anything other than ‘glorified physics’. Aristotle does point out that there is a way in which the study of ‘non-primary’, perceptible and perishable substances belongs to physics (1037a14–15: æ  Øa B çıØŒB ). There is no need, however, because of this claim to view physical study in any derogatory light. The reason for maintaining that perceptible, perishable substances are, properly speaking, dealt with by the theoretical branch of physics is, presumably, the centrality of perceptible, perishable, and changeable matter as a principle of these substances. Because the physicist seeks to account for such substances, he or she has to invoke explanations that rely heavily on matter of the relevant type. For substances within the perishable, perceptible world, as well as their forms or essences, are essentially dependent on certain types of material and change-related feature. This is precisely the way in which inquiry into these entities is not part of the core metaphysical discipline. For the ultimate aim of this last study is to treat objects which are essentially independent of perishable matter or (at even more advanced levels) entities which are completely separate from any type of matter whatever. At the same time, however, the physicist deals not only with perceptible, perishable matter but also with form as the essence and principle of natural compounds. Indeed, as Aristotle emphasizes, the physicist knows form in even greater measure (1037a17: ŒÆd B ŒÆa e º ª, ŒÆd Aºº). For form is essentially and definitionally prior to certain types of perceptible, perishable matter even if not completely independent of all such matter. As I argued in chapter 5, natural form is essentially matter-involving. Yet it could be independent of certain types of matter, such as token- or type-materials involved in particular or universal compounds. If the converse claim is not the case, even natural form would prove prior to some (even if not all) types of matter. This is

MATERIAL AND CHANGE - RELATED FEATURES OF A NATURAL FORM ’ S ESSENCE

167

the way in which secondary theoretical philosophy qualifies as a type of metaphysical wisdom. For, by studying natural forms and the compound objects they are the essences of, it offers a model which can preserve (non-trivially) the ontological and explanatory priority of these forms over matter despite their essential enmatterment. This model will also be helpful in studying imperishable or/and imperceptible substances. For in this primary branch of metaphysics, too, the main interest is in the (complete) priority of certain entities over all sorts of perishable matter. This suggests a further, distinctive way in which our inquiry into perceptible, perishable compounds and their form is ‘for the sake of ’ the core branch of metaphysical investigation (1037a13–14). The next chapter will seek to support the priority claim of natural, essentially matter-involving, form over certain types of matter.

7 Essentially Enmattered Form as Prior to Matter: A Modest Proposal The discussion of chapters 4–6 strongly suggests that forms of enmattered composites are themselves essentially enmattered. If this is correct, the definitions of these forms must mention certain types of matter. The problem, then, is how to deal with the apparent conflict between this last claim and Aristotle’s thesis that forms are essentially and definitionally prior to matter and material parts (put forward in Metaphysics Z.10–11, Physics B.1–2, and elsewhere). I shall sketch a few alternative answers to this question and shall comment on their respective merits and weaknesses. In the constructive parts of the present chapter I shall develop certain aspects of (what I take as) the most promising line of solution. In section 5.3 I have already alluded to this solution. There I suggested that, while form is not essentially independent of its own essential material parts, yet it could be prior to the material constituents of (particular or universal) compounds. Aristotle clearly argues, in Metaphysics Z.10–11, that form is essentially and definitionally prior to universal and particular compounds. It is a small step from this to show that it is also prior to the token-matter of particular compounds and the type-matter of universal compounds. My present argument will seek to consolidate this suggestion and to set out its details. To do so, I shall introduce what can be called Aristotle’s ‘causal-explanatory’ model of essence. Aristotle lays out this model in Posterior Analytics B.8–10, in his discussion of definitions of process-kinds such as thunder or eclipse. There he argues that only some items in the definiens, the causal parts, are prior to the definiendum. For the former constitute features that fix the identity and function as efficient causes of the latter. Thunder, for example, is defined as a cloud-noise caused by fire being quenched. This last item, the quenching of fire, is prior to the type of noise belonging to the clouds (the one mentioned in the definiens-term of thunder). For it is the efficient cause that brings about the relevant cloud-noise, thereby making it the type of noise that it is. Because this type of cloud-noise is identical with thunder, it follows that the quenching of fire is also prior to thunder in the same way: it fixes the kind’s identity by being its efficient cause. In Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4 Aristotle aims to extend this causal-explanatory model to cases of substance-kinds. He holds that a substance-kind is defined in terms of its type-matter and the form which is its essence. The kind human, then, would be a certain type of organic body with specific humanly structural features whose essence

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

169

is the form being a (human) rational soul. Here the form or essence also plays a causal role (in the present, human case as a final cause) which is comparable with the function carried out by the efficient cause involved in the process-kinds discussed in the Analytics. Aristotle’s idea seems to be that the form or essence (e.g. being a rational soul) fixes the identity and is the cause of the type-with-type-matter which is identical with the substance-kind defined (e.g. the human-kind). The form or essence, therefore, seems prior not only to the kind but also to its type-matter. This causal-explanatory model of form and essence can be used to mitigate the apparent tension between the form’s essential enmatterment and its priority over matter. I shall argue that natural form, as an essentially and indissolubly hylomorphic whole, cannot, to be sure, be prior to its own essential material parts. This sort of form, however, in its hylomorphic entirety – including even its intrinsic material parts – can be prior not only to (particular or universal) compounds but also to their (token- or type-) matter. For it is a cause and an explanans of these items. By contrast, the posterior (token- or type-) matter constitutes the corresponding explanandum which has form as its identity-fixer and as the cause of its being what it is. In this way, natural form is prior to matter in essence and definition even if it itself essentially involves certain types of material feature.1

7.1 Biting the Bullet One way in which to deal with the conflict between essentially enmattered forms and the claim of their priority over matter is simply to concede that they are irremediably dependent on matter in essence and definition. In this view, the only primary substances that can be defined without mentioning matter are the Prime and the Planetary Movers. Thus, for instance, in discussing definitional separation – a notion which, as I noted in section 2.2, is a necessary part of definitional priority – Donald Morrison maintains that it ‘is a philosophical dodge that borders on being a cheat’.2 He claims that Aristotle has put himself in a situation in which separation is a basic substancehood criterion, while form is the primary substance.3 Nonetheless, forms cannot be separate from particulars, because they are always enmattered in them. If so, forms cannot satisfy the orthodox separateness criterion and, as a result, cannot be substances, let alone primary ones. For this reason, Morrison concludes, Aristotle modifies his separateness criterion and holds that forms are separate only in account or definition and can, after all, be substances. In the final analysis, however, this 1 The idea of applying the Analytics model to the Metaphysics is by no means novel. My view follows and develops some of David Charles’s suggestions made in his ‘Definition and Explanation in the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics’ in D. Charles (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 286–328. 2 See Morrison, D., ‘Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’ [‘Separation’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3, 1985, p. 154. 3 Morrison, ‘Separation’, pp. 138–9.

170

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

philosophical ‘face-saving dodge does not even save face’.4 Forms are not separate in account either, because the definitions of all enmattered forms must mention their matter. Only immaterial substances, such as the Prime and the Planetary Movers, are genuinely separate and, as a consequence, separate in account from matter. This objection to the notion of definitional separation seems to carry over to the concept of definitional priority, since definitional priority is an asymmetric type of definitional separation. But if so, Aristotle’s view faces serious difficulties. If we were to adopt this line of ‘biting the bullet’, we could not (it appears) develop any ‘mundane’ or sublunary metaphysics in which form is primary substance. Not only would forms of hylomorphic compounds have to be grasped in terms of matter. They would not even have any claim to independence from matter or any fundamental ontological role relative to it. In that case, two main options would be available. First, we could subscribe to a ‘no-priority’ thesis in which forms are essentially hylomorphic: neither the formal nor the material constituents of their essence are prior to each other in any important way. Alternatively, we could advance a materialist thesis, in which forms are essentially hylomorphic but are ultimately understood in terms of their material essential components. In either case, however, Aristotle’s ‘sublunary’ metaphysics could not sustain the form’s asymmetric independence from matter in essence and definition. Hence, only first philosophy in the sense of theology could satisfy some of his requirements for metaphysics as a science. For only theology could study genuinely immaterial substances, ontologically fundamental entities which are essentially and definitionally prior to everything else but do not themselves essentially include any material attributes.

7.2 Pragmatic or Interest-Relative Views One might attempt to salvage the form’s priority over matter by distinguishing different epistemic contexts in which forms are or are not fundamental in essence and definition. In this view, the fact that forms of hylomorphic compounds seem to be essentially and definitionally dependent upon matter would be a mere symptom of our definitional practices in certain scientific domains or of our epistemic interests within a given discipline. For, equally, a proponent of this view would argue, there are distinctive definitional approaches within different scientific enterprises which consider forms as prior to matter. If so, Aristotle’s position that forms are essentially and definitionally primary applies only to these latter, ‘matter-ignoring’, epistemic contexts but not to the former, which are interested in the matter-involving version of a form’s definition. It could be submitted, then, that Aristotelian metaphysics (or first philosophy) studies and defines forms as independent of matter, while physics examines them as dependent

4

Morrison, ‘Separation’, p. 155.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

171

upon matter. One of the main drawbacks of this proposal, however, is that Aristotle’s metaphysics does not examine or consider entities as grasped or specified relative to certain epistemic contexts or scientific interests. Rather, Aristotelian first philosophy studies fundamental real-world entities as such. This, presumably, is part of the import of Aristotle’s repeated claim that first philosophy is a type of knowledge or a scientific discipline which studies being qua being (Ø KØ Å Ø m ŁøæE e k fi w k; Metaphysics [Met.] .1, 1003a21–2; 31–2; E.1, 1025b3–4; 1026a31–2).

7.3 Two Objects – Two Definitions Another way in which to tackle our problem would be to introduce two distinct types of definable object, both of which are parts of the fabric of the world. In this proposal, there would be two distinct types of definition, each dealing with the corresponding type of object. Matter-involving definitions would describe the types of object which are essentially enmattered, whereas ‘immaterial’ definitions would characterize the other types of object, forms which are essentially ‘without matter’. Donald Morrison seems to favour a view along these lines.5 First, he takes Michael Frede to be arguing that the apparent conflict between the metaphysician’s and the physicist’s definitions is due to their asking the same question (about one and the same type of object) understood in two different ways. This would put Frede’s position roughly under the view described in section 7.2. In that view, there is one real-world object but two different scientific contexts in which this object is viewed or defined.6 By contrast, Morrison holds that the apparent conflict between metaphysical and physical definitions arises because there are two distinct questions asked, about two corresponding distinct types of object: ‘What is man?’ and ‘What is the primary substance of man?’ The former is asked by physics and aims to define the compound, while the latter is asked by metaphysics and is about the form alone. This clearly constitutes a version of the ‘two objects-two definitions’ view. In this version of the view under consideration, the two kinds of definable realworld object are the form and the compound. While metaphysics studies pure form, which can be specified independently of matter, physics examines (universal) hylomorphic compounds, which are ‘this type of form in this type of matter’ or ‘matter thus-and-so enformed’ (taken universally in both cases). On a slightly different version of the same sort of view, the types of object studied by metaphysics are pure (essentially ‘matter-less’) forms which are definable independently of matter, whereas those treated by physics are hylomorphic (essentially matter-involving) forms the definitions of which necessarily include matter. In this last version of this line of solution, then, the

5 Morrison D., ‘Some Remarks on Definition in Metaphysics Z’ in D. Devereux & P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie [Biologie], Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientific, Paris, 1990, p. 143. 6 Cf. Frede, M., ‘The Definition of Sensible Substances in Met. Z’ in D. Devereux & P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique chez Aristote, Paris, 1990, pp. 113–29.

172

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

two different objects studied are both forms. They differ, though, in that one kind of form is matter-free (and studied by metaphysics), while the other is matter-involving (and examined by physics). There are several pressing questions which need to be addressed by views of this sort. First, how could this approach deal with the possible charge of ontological inflation? Is it necessary to introduce two strictly distinct types of form, (e.g.) the ‘pure’ house-form and the one which involves ‘material accretions’? More importantly, is it true that there are two genuinely distinct types of object, as this view suggests, and, if so, what is the ground of their distinctness? There are further, serious difficulties even if one accepts that the two distinct objects are not the ‘pure’ and the ‘impure’ forms but are the hylomorphic compound and the matter-less form. For one had better avoid making compounds and their forms too distinct. Forms are the substances of enmattered compounds, while the essence of enmattered compounds is to be enformed by the relevant form. However, if (on this view) compounds and their forms are so distinct as to deserve separate treatment by independent sciences, how can forms play the role of being the substances of these compounds? Or how can these enmattered compounds be essentially enformed by such matter-free forms? On the one hand, pure forms would tend to render purely formal the compounds they are the essences of. This result, though, would clash with our intuition that hylomorphic compounds are essentially enmattered. Conversely, essentially enmattered compounds intuitively seem to require, as their essences, forms which themselves are essentially matterinvolving. Quite generally, the two views set out in the previous and the present sections are beset by one common difficulty which could be expressed in the slogan ‘just don’t mention the matter!’7 There is inherent artificiality in the claim that definitions of forms as given by metaphysics ‘just don’t mention’ matter, while definitions of forms as given by physics are structured in terms of matter. Analogously, it seems contrived to hold that, while the real-world objects treated by metaphysics are immaterial forms, the real-world objects examined by physics are either essentially enmattered compounds or matter-involving forms. For both physics and (sublunary) metaphysics study forms of enmattered compounds. Further, forms and hylomorphic compounds are closely related in a way which makes implausible the claim that forms – as opposed to compounds – may be definable without mentioning any type of matter at all. Moreover, even if we ignore the artificiality just described, it would be likely that ‘matter7 It might be of interest to point out that this slogan is inspired by the phrase ‘just don’t mention the war!’, Basil Fawlty’s persistent injunction (in one of the episodes of the BBC comedy series Fawlty Towers) when he had to welcome to his hotel German guests. However, not even once, in all his encounters or dialogues with the German visitors, did he fail to mention the Second World War. The idea behind the slogan which imitates his phrase, then, is that, just as he found it artificial to try to understand and interact with the German visitors without mentioning the Second World War, similarly it is artificial to seek to understand and define forms of hylomorphic compounds without any mention whatever of certain types of material feature. Here I am indebted to discussions I had with David Charles, who reminded me of the phrase ‘just don’t mention the war!’ and the problem associated with it.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

173

less’ definitions of forms would turn out to be accounts of mere abstractions in thought. An account of the house-form as a covering which prevents harm, without any mention of some appropriate type(s) of material feature, is not a serious definition of a metaphysically fundamental, real-world entity. Rather, it seems to be an account which misses the target definiendum and so potentially yields errors in our relevant house-related reasoning. For it might support the inference that a house is an entity which is not made up of any perceptible type of material at all.

7.4 ‘Matter’ as an Ambiguous Term It is plausible to distinguish between different types or levels of matter upon which form may or may not be definitionally dependent. Thus, a form (e.g. the form of a statue) can be defined without mentioning particular bits of matter (this particular lump of bronze) or even certain type(s) of matter (bronze, iron, marble, etc.) and, in this sense, it is definitionally prior to matter. By contrast, a form cannot be defined without mentioning a range of certain types of matter: e.g. being made of bulky, malleable, solidifiable, and wrought-able materials, the types of material feature appropriate to characterize essentially the relevant statue-form. In this different sense, then, a natural form is not definitionally prior to matter. My own proposal, which will be set out in sections 7.6–7.10, is a version of this type of solution. It may seem questionable, however, whether this view solves the problem satisfactorily. For the form is, after all, definitionally dependent upon more general types of material attribute. It seems unavoidable, though, that any serious view of form as essentially enmattered would have to concede that natural form is essentially dependent on certain types of material feature. What is of utmost importance for any such view is to offer an account of how to determine the scope and the nature of the types of matter which must be mentioned in a form’s definition, and how to demarcate them from the types of matter that form is essentially independent of. This will be one of the main tasks of the present chapter’s positive part.

7.5 Proximate and Remote Types of Matter One way in which to develop the type of approach just described in section 7.4 has been proposed by Jennifer Whiting.8 In her view, forms of enmattered compounds are ‘essentially (and not just necessarily) enmattered in the sense that these forms include functionally defined matter’.9 Whiting challenges the traditional conception of form as 8 I take Jennifer Whiting’s view as a central example of the general position held more widely by several commentators. 9 See Whiting, J. E., ‘Metasubstance: Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth’ [‘Metasubstance’], The Philosophical Review, 100(4), 1991, p. 631 (her emphasis). Notice that her claim at this point (that forms are essentially but not simply necessarily enmattered) is equivalent to my general conclusion reached in chapters 4–6.

174

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

something abstract and immaterial, or as a universal realized in a particular piece of matter, something ‘which, even if it must be realized or embodied in some matter in order to exist, does not itself contain or include matter’.10 Rather, she thinks, the form is ‘a concrete thing constituted by or identified with some matter’. Whiting does not take these two options of constitution and of identity as mutually exclusive. Rather, she allows that the constitution of form by matter may be equivalent to, or even the same as, its identity with matter. To regain the form’s priority over matter, then, she places emphasis on Aristotle’s distinction between remote and proximate matter. The portions of stuff (e.g. flesh, bones, sinews) which constitute a form (e.g. the form of human being) at different times are not identical with the constituted enmattered form. By contrast, the organic body and its functionally defined parts (e.g. the living human body and its fully functional parts) can be identified with the form. Hence, although the former types of matter are unknowable and indefinable, the latter can be known and defined in terms of their functions. If so, Aristotle can allow that the definitions of essentially enmattered forms ‘refer to matter without violating the requirement that forms and forms alone are the proper objects of definition’.11 Forms, therefore, are definitionally independent of non-proximate or remote types of matter but dependent upon proximate types of matter. In Whiting’s view, however, proximate matter is not, strictly speaking, an alien corporeal accretion to purely immaterial forms but a quasi-formal part of them, in so far as it is functionally identified. Conversely, the form is not, strictly speaking, purely immaterial or abstract but essentially enmattered in so far as the functionally defined proximate types of matter are integral to its essence. There are certain aspects of Whiting’s view which will be common to my position too. Most notably, I agree with her that forms of hylomorphic compounds are essentially (and not simply necessarily) enmattered. There are, however, crucial differences between my position and Whiting’s view, differences which will become clearer once my proposal is fully presented. Let me simply note, at present, some points of discrepancy which should be obvious given my argument so far. First, there is no need, in my view, to pronounce any types of matter unknowable or indefinable, as Whiting appears to be doing in the case of remote types of matter. As I argued in section 2.6, matter may be indefinable or unknowable only in that it is not the ultimate definiens of anything, while it itself can be grasped (ultimately) in terms of form. In this last sense, however, it is definable and knowable, since it can play the role of what gets specified, provided that this specification is shaped in terms of form. This issue should not be conflated with the separate question of whether the form in terms of which certain types of matter are ultimately defined and known is itself essentially matter-involving or matter-free. A coherent view of essentially enmattered form would, presumably, 10 See Whiting, J. E., ‘Form and Individuation in Aristotle’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3(4), 1986, p. 372. 11 See ‘Metasubstance’, p. 631.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

175

hold that even form, which is the explanatory bedrock and defines certain derivative types of matter, is essentially matter-involving. There would be a distinction, though, between the explanans types of material feature essentially included in form and those types of matter which are extrinsic to, but are explained by, it. Second, Whiting seems to take the claim that definition is of the form and of the form alone in a way which makes form both that which (primarily) gets specified (the ‘proper’, as she calls it, object of definition) and that which does the specifying. Thus, in her view, even if the definiens somehow makes reference to the material features of the form defined, it does so only via the formal route: the material features of the form are functionally identified in the definiens. In my view, by contrast, there is no compelling reason to conceive the definiens as consisting solely of formal or functional terms. Rather, the material features of the form defined may be described by corresponding material terms in the definiens, provided that even these material terms refer to essential material parts of the form defined. There is a host of difficulties which grow out of this last point and have been discussed in some detail in chapter 6. Why identify matter or material features simply or exclusively in formal or functional terms? Would it be correct or even feasible to do so successfully? Would this sort of identification imply that natural form is on a par with abstract, mathematical formulae, structures, or functions? Thus, for instance, Whiting’s view might entail that the type of form that is the essence of a human sense-organ such as the eye is specifiable in purely formal or functional terms, such as human seeing or being capable of picking up visible form without the matter. If so, this kind of form would not essentially include material features such as (e.g.) being made of a certain human type of eye-jelly. Hence, it would be questionable whether this view could differentiate Aristotle’s position from Platonizing types of functionalism. Furthermore, there are some more general points in Whiting’s view about which one could express doubts. First, it does not seem necessary to introduce the distinction between proximate and remote types of matter in order to reconcile the view of the form’s essential enmatterment with the claim that form is definitionally prior to matter. For the distinction between these types of matter could, arguably, be taken as separate from the question of whether a form can be defined without mentioning matter. Apart from this issue of theoretical parsimony, however, the distinction between proximate and remote types of matter does not seem entirely helpful. Whiting’s crucial point is that proximate types of matter (such as hands, eyes, ears, etc.) are identifiable in terms of their proper functions alone and, hence, can be mentioned in a form’s definition without violating the requirement that form alone is the proper object of definition. Similarly, though, less proximate types of matter (such as flesh, blood, sinews, etc.) could be defined in purely functional terms. Even elemental types of matter (e.g. earth, water, air, fire), which are more remote than flesh, blood, or sinews, could be fully identifiable in purely functional terms. Does this mean that they too could, in principle, be mentioned in a form’s definition? If so, the importance of the distinction between proximate and remote types of matter for the problem under

176

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

discussion seems less than decisive. If, by contrast, remote types of matter should not be mentioned in a form’s definition, it seems that the issue of whether they are fully identifiable in functional terms or not cannot, by itself, offer an adequate criterion for distinguishing what should and what should not be part of a definition. A final important point is that Whiting’s position seems to take a definite stand on the debate about whether form is universal or individual. She maintains that forms are not abstract, immaterial or universal entities which are somehow realized in particular parcels of matter. Rather, they are concrete, individual things which are constituted by or/and are identified with their proximate matter. Although this claim may not, I suspect, be indispensable for her answer to the question of whether forms can be defined without mentioning matter, it is, nevertheless, the natural position to take given her views. There is, however, some motivation to favour solutions which remain neutral on this point. Regardless of whether forms are universal or particular, they must be definitionally prior to matter and (universal or particular) compounds if (consistently with Aristotle’s view) they are to qualify as primary substances. Because it favours the view of form as individual, Whiting’s position tends to identify essentially enmattered forms with concrete material objects. As I argued, however, natural forms are neither abstract, mathematical entities nor individual enmattered objects (Aristotle’s particular hylomorphic compounds). Nor should they be identified with universal compounds such as man or horse. Rather, in so far as they are essences, forms should be conceived as modes or ways of being, features which are essential to (particular or universal) compounds. In what follows I shall propose a solution which shares some of the general starting-points of Whiting’s view but avoids the weaknesses I have just pointed out.

7.6 Reclaiming the Form’s Priority over Matter: The Basics The thesis of chapters 4–6, that natural form is essentially matter-involving, entails that there are not only formal but also material components included in a form’s essence. In section 5.3 I argued against [RA], the approach which seeks to reconcile the form’s essential enmatterment with its priority over matter by favouring an intra-definiens type of asymmetry. [RA] holds that, within a form’s own essence, its formal parts are essentially independent of its material parts but not conversely. This sort of priority, however, does not seem viable. For, as I showed in section 5.4, formal and material parts of a natural form are essentially interdependent in a non-decomposable fashion. Hence, the form’s own formal parts are not identifiable as prior to anything without already including intrinsically the corresponding material parts. Nor is it possible for a form’s material constituents to be identified without reference to the relevant formal parts of its essence. On this sort of view of essential enmatterment, then, if form is prior

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

177

to anything at all, it is so in its hylomorphic entirety, comprising both the formal and the material parts of its essence. Let us, for the sake of the argument, examine the available alternatives. First, one might insist that the formal components are indeed prior to the material components of a form’s essence. If so, the absurd implication would be that form, its formal parts, could be prior to itself, the material parts of its own essence. Because they are inextricably interdependent, however, its formal and material parts make up a unified whole that cannot be taken apart or dissolved into prior and posterior items. If the identity of formal and material parts cannot be fixed independently of each other, there is no coherent way of pronouncing either as essentially prior to the other. A different suggestion would be to accept that there can be no such intra-definiens priority, in which the form’s formal parts are prior to its own material parts. This view would, nevertheless, maintain that the formal parts are prior to other material entities, distinct from the material features intrinsic to form. This may well be the case but does not straightforwardly render form prior to matter. For form continues to be essentially dependent upon, but not prior to, the material attributes which (partly) make up its own essence. A third alternative would be to drop the thesis that natural form is essentially matterinvolving. In this way, one could maintain that the form is essentially matter-free and so prior to certain types of material entity even if it must be realized in these types of matter if it is to exist at all. Although this line is certainly possible, it comes at considerably high cost. For there are strong independent arguments (those advanced in chapters 4–6) which indicate that natural form is indeed essentially enmattered. It is preferable, then, to support the form’s priority over matter without overthrowing the thesis of its essential enmatterment. To pursue this last line, I shall argue for a version of the view that the term ‘matter’ is ambiguous (see section 7.4). In one sense ‘matter’ signifies the material features which are integral to a natural form’s essence. In this sense form just cannot be essentially prior to matter. In another sense, though, ‘matter’ picks up concrete material components of particular compounds (token-matter) or specific types of matter involved in universal compounds (type-matter). In this last sense nothing prevents form from being prior to matter. The starting-point for this sort of proposal is the modest claim made by Aristotle himself in Metaphysics Z.10 that form is essentially and definitionally prior to particular and universal compounds (1035b4–6; 11–14; 18–20; 27–31). The ground for this claim is that form is the essence and the primary substance of compounds. However, it is clear that particular compounds such as Socrates or Callias have token-matter from which they are (partly) constituted, while universal compounds such as human or horse include type-matter amongst their components. It seems plausible that the essence and primary substance of compounds, their form, should be essentially and definitionally prior not only to them but also to their material components. Thus, for example, as essence and primary substance the human-form seems responsible for fixing the

178

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

identity not only of Socrates or Callias but also of their particular bodies and concrete material parts. Similarly, the human-form determines the essence not only of the kind (or species) human but also of its ‘universally taken’ matter, the human type of organic body (1035b29–30). It is worth noting at the outset that this intuitive conception can preserve the explanatory and causal role of natural form relative to matter. This is so despite the fact that form is essentially matter-involving. A natural form’s essential enmatterment implies only that certain types of material feature are amongst its intrinsic parts and collaborate with its essential formal parts in discharging the explanatory and causal function that this form serves. Put simply, the idea is that natural form, as a hylomorphic whole made up of formal plus material features, causes token- or typematerials and particular or universal compounds to be as they are. In this way, it explains their nature. Hence, the form retains its causal and explanatory character although it essentially encompasses not only formal but also material parts.

7.7 Definitional Models of Priority The claim of form to priority over matter can be formulated perspicuously with the help of definitional statements. Because our starting-point is that form is prior to (universal and particular) compounds, it is useful to consider definitions of particular (CP) and universal (CU) compounds in terms of the natural form of such compounds (FC), their hylomorphic essence. The definitions of these items would run as follows: [D-CP]

CP ¼ def token-with-token-matter whose essence is (being FC).

[D-CU]

CU ¼ def type-with-type-matter whose essence is (being FC).

Given the arguments of chapters 4–6, the natural form, FC, involved in both of these formulae, is clearly hylomorphic and is understood in terms of our familiar definitional schema, [D]: [D]

FC ¼ def F1, F2, . . . , Fm þ M1, M2, . . . , Mn.

Clearly, [D] is a statement of strict identity, an equivalence and congruence relation. In it the feature or mode of being, being FC, is grasped in terms of the unified complex feature or mode of being, being (F1, F2, . . . , Fm þ M1, M2, . . . , Mn), that is identical with being FC. It is more difficult to assess the relations implied by the other two formulae. One suggestion would be that [D-CP] and [D-CU] can also be understood as statements of strict identity. For in [D-CP] the particular compound, CP, is characterized by reference to the token-object (having token-matter) that is presumably identical with CP. Analogously, in [D-CU] the universal compound, CU, is specified as the type (having type-matter) that is identical with CU. Both [D-CP] and [D-CU], however, share a prominent segment of their definiens-side which carries out the important explanatory

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

179

work. This is the formal part, being FC, the way of being that is the essence of CP and CU. For (the idea would be) the feature of being FC, in its hylomorphic entirety, makes the token CP, as well as its token-matter, what they are. Similarly, being FC determines the essence of the universal compound, CU, and of its type-matter. In this view, therefore, the definition of compounds involves an intra-definiens priority: the form, as essence and primary substance, is essentially and definitionally prior to the entities referred to by the terms ‘token-with-token-matter’ and ‘type-with-typematter’ occurring in the definiens. Because these entities are identical with the particular and the universal compound (respectively), it follows that the form, being FC, is essentially and definitionally prior to the compounds being defined, CP and CU. An alternative way in which to understand the form’s priority over compounds and matter as encapsulated in [D-CP] and [D-CU] is to allow that Aristotelian definitional formulae need not conform to the Procrustean conception of definition as a statement of strict identity. Rather, in this view, the definiens of such formulae is straightforwardly prior to the definiendum. If so, however, we should not introduce the terms ‘tokenwith-token-matter’ or ‘type-with-type-matter’ in the definiens-side. For these terms force us to read the definitions of compounds as identity statements: CP seems identical with the token-with-token-matter that instantiates CP’s form, while CU seems identical with the type-with-type-matter that is enformed by CU’s form. This alternative view, then, would simplify the definitions of compounds as follows: [D-CP]0 0

[D-CU]

CP ¼ def being FC. CU ¼ def being FC.

These definitional statements cannot support identity as the entity referred to by the definiendum is a particular object (CP) or a type of object (CU), while that referred to by the definiens is a feature or way/mode of being. It would be extremely difficult to argue that such categorially diverse entities are identical. In this view, by contrast, it is obvious that the feature of being FC can be immediately prior to (particular and universal) compounds in essence and definition. For it is the essential feature which makes these compounds what they are, while the converse does not hold good. The best way to read [D-CP]0 and [D-CU]0 , then, is as stating that the defining essence of (particular and universal) compounds is to be FC. What is important for present purposes, at any rate, is that in either conception of Aristotelian definition the form can prove essentially and definitionally prior to compounds and the matter involved in them. This is so despite the fact that natural form is itself essentially matter-involving. The reconciliation between the thesis of essential enmatterment and the claim of priority over matter is achieved as follows. While form is essentially dependent upon the material features intrinsic to it, yet it is prior to the token- and type-matter that belongs to particular and universal compounds (respectively). In what follows I shall seek to underpin this attractive reconciliatory approach.

180

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

7.8 Determining the Prior and Posterior Relata: The Causal-Explanatory Model Introduced So far the types of material feature intrinsic to natural form have been characterized either negatively or too abstractly. Thus, it has been argued that the form’s essential material parts are neither the token- nor the type-materials involved in particular and universal compounds. Rather, they are material features which (partly) constitute the unified complex feature or mode of being that the form is identical with. There is, however, a further, central question as to what precisely these material features consist in. It is not helpful to answer this question by claiming that the form’s material parts are those material features which are included in its essence. Similarly, the matter which is not essential to but is posterior to form has been described, in a highly general manner, as token- and type-matter which belongs to particular and universal compounds (respectively). This implies that form is essentially and definitionally independent of token- or type-matter but not conversely. The ‘not conversely’ clause used in this formulation suggests that natural form, involving both its formal and its material essential components, determines the range of appropriate token- and type-materials that this form can be realized in. Token- and type-matter are, therefore, made what they are by hylomorphic natural form and so are dependent on it in essence and definition. This explanatory framework, in which form accounts for the essence of certain types of matter, while the latter are caused to be as they are by form, can provide criteria with which to demarcate those types of matter which are essential to form from those which are posterior to it. The role of form as identity-fixer of token- and type-matter is causal and explanatory obviously in the sense of formal causation. It should be emphasized, though, that, depending on the kinds of (particular or universal) compound and matter under discussion, this function of formal causation is supplemented by further types of causal role, such as material-grounding, efficient, or final causation. Thus, in mathematical cases, the form of a mathematical entity functions not only as formal but also as ‘grounding’ cause, a type of cause which closely corresponds to the material cause (Posterior Analytics [APo.] B.11, 94a20–2; 24–36).12 More relevantly to present con-

12 There are two importantly diverse but related ways in which to understand this sort of grounding causation. First, the formal cause of (e.g.) triangle (being a three-sided-closed-plane-figure) is referred to by the middle term in a demonstrative syllogism which proves that (e.g.) all triangles have a sum of internal angles equal to two right angles. In this way, the formal cause links the premisses of the proof and so grounds the conclusion. (It goes without saying that I am simplifying this example. The proof of this geometrical theorem involves more than just two premisses. Similarly, the grounding causal work of relating the premisses and supporting the conclusion is carried out not simply by the form of triangle but also by further mathematical entities, such as (e.g.) the essence of straight line, the nature of the relation of being parallel, etc.) At the same time, though, parts of the triangle’s essence, such as (consisting of ) three-lines/sides, can be understood as constituents or material parts of the triangle which cause, via the route of material causation, the presence of the feature in question. After all, a triangle has as its basic components three sides (arranged in the closed-plane-figure way). It is these quasi-material constituents that (partly) explain the triangle’s having

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

181

cerns, in cases of natural processes such as thunder or eclipse, the formal cause which fixes the identity of the relevant process-kind does so by being the efficient cause of the process-kind. Hence, for instance, the type of cloud-noise that thunder is identical with is made what it is by fire’s being cloudily-quenched, which also is the efficient cause of this cloud-noise (APo. B.8, 93b7–14; B.10, 93b38–94a7). More importantly, in cases of natural kinds such as human or horse, the form or essence is not only the formal but also the final cause of them and of their type-matter. In section 5.3 I have already discussed how Physics B.2 aligns form with final cause in this way (194a27–33; b9–13). It is important to examine more closely this causal-explanatory model, as introduced in Posterior Analytics B.8–10 and developed in Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4. Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, a methodological note: I shall avoid discussing the exegetical issues arising from these difficult chapters of the Analytics and the Metaphysics. Rather, I shall seek to present some fairly incontrovertible parts of Aristotle’s position and to show how these ideas can contribute to our understanding of the types of matter that are essential to form in contrast with those that are posterior to and are explained by it. Second, the scope of most of the subsequent discussion will be limited to the definitions of universal compounds (or kinds) and their type-matter on the basis of their hylomorphic form or essence. One reason for this restriction is that Aristotle himself seems to be focusing on types and their definitions. It is not difficult, though, to extend his claims so that they are also applicable to particular compounds and their token-matter. I shall take up this point in the next section. In Posterior Analytics B.8–10 Aristotle investigates the requirements for defining kinds of natural process such as (e.g.) thunder or eclipse. His view is that the proper definitions of such kinds cannot be conclusions of demonstrative syllogisms (B.8, 93b15–17). He argues, though, that these definitions can be reached with the help of scientific proof by re-arranging the terms of the relevant demonstrations (B.8, 93b17–18; B.10, 93b38–94a9). Suppose the following proof regarding thunder, a process-kind which is taken as a certain type of cloud-noise: Noise belongs to all fire being quenched. Fire being quenched belongs to the clouds. Noise belongs to the clouds.

Clearly, the conclusion does not contain the complete explanatory definition of thunder. It does not even appear to include the term ‘thunder’. However, Aristotle maintains that by taking the three terms of this proof and shaping them in a causerevealing way we can reach the successful explanatory definition of thunder. Thus, the item referred to by the middle term of this syllogism, the quenching of fire, is the

its sum of internal angles equal to two right angles. In what follows I shall not discuss further this controversial issue of the role of material-grounding cause in mathematics as it lies outside the scope of present concerns.

182

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

efficient cause that explains the connection between noise and clouds. It is, then, what causes the relevant type of cloud-noise which is identical with the kind thunder. In the light of this, we can formulate the corresponding definition of thunder as follows: Thunder[KIND] ¼ def noise in the clouds caused by fire being quenched. Similarly for the case of lunar eclipse: Eclipse[KIND] ¼ def privation of light from the Moon caused by the Earth’s screening.13 It should be obvious that the schematic definitions of (particular and universal) substance-compounds, [D-CP] and [D-CU], introduced in section 7.7, could be seen as parallel to these definitions. A chief aim of Aristotle’s project in Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4 is to consolidate this parallel. In the examples provided in the Analytics, the causal part of the definiens (the quenching of fire or the Earth’s screening) clearly functions as formal cause. For (e.g.) the identity of the type of cloud-noise that thunder is gets fixed by the relevant sort of quenching of a fiery body in the clouds. In addition, however, it is clear that this sort of quenching of fire also serves as the efficient cause as it produces the kind of cloud-noise that thunder is. An analogous story can be told in the case of lunar eclipse. That Aristotle’s main aim in Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4 is to expand this causalexplanatory model so as to cover definitions of substance-kinds is clear from his explicit use of the same examples as those offered in the Analytics. The case of thunder recurs at Metaphysics Z.17, 1041a24–6, while the example of lunar eclipse is taken up at H.4, 1044b9–15. In Metaphysics Z.17 Aristotle argues that the Analytics approach is applicable to artefact- or substance-kinds too, such as house or human being, and their form or essence (1041a26–7; 1041b1–9). It is undeniably significant that this chapter is introduced as inquiring into the role of substance or essence as principle and cause: Let us now take a fresh starting-point and say what kind of thing substance should be said to be; [ . . . ] Since, then, substance is a principle and a cause of some sort, let us start from this point. [Met. Z.17, 1041a6–10; Bostock’s trans.)

There are two important questions at this juncture. First, what is the precise nature of the type of cause and principle that substance is? The answer to this question will be crucial to specifying the types of material feature which are intrinsic to natural form and explain, together with its formal parts, the nature of (universal and particular) compounds and their (token- and type-) matter. Second, what are the items which are 13

The demonstration corresponding to this causal definition would run as follows: Privation of light belongs to the Earth’s screening. The Earth’s screening belongs to the Moon. Privation of light belongs to the Moon.

This example is discussed briefly at APo. B.2, 90a15–18 and in more detail at B.8, 93a29–b7.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

183

caused to be as they are by this type of cause and principle that substance is? Tackling this question is necessary for determining what kind of matter is posterior to, and is explained by, natural, essentially hylomorphic form. There are several places in Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4 where Aristotle responds to these questions. The first issue about the type of cause and principle that substance is seems to be addressed in the following passage: It is clear, then, that what is sought is the cause – and this is the what-it-is-to-be, to speak logically14 – which in some cases is that for the sake of which the thing is [as it is] (as presumably in the case of a house or a bed), while in some cases it is that which first began the change; for the latter too is a cause. (Met. Z.17, 1041a27–30; Bostock’s trans.)

Elsewhere, too, Aristotle argues that the (primary) substance is the cause of being for each (type of ) thing (H.2, 1043a2–4; H.3, 1043b12–14). More importantly, he clarifies this point by specifying that the essence or form is this sort of primary substance which causes the being of each (type of ) thing. For, as he remarks, the definition of a (kind of ) thing, the account of its form or essence, is not clear or successful if it does not mention the cause of being for this thing (H.4, 1044b12–15). Thus, the form or essence is the primary substance which explains why kinds are as they are. It seems to be fulfilling this function of formal causation, though, by essentially involving an extra role as (e.g.) final or efficient cause. The second question, about the types of explanandum grounded on form or essence, is tackled as follows: [I]t is clear that the question must be why the matter is [thus-and-so]15; for instance, the question may be ‘Why are these things here a house?’16 Because what-it-is-to-be a house [n q NŒÆ fi 14

At 1041a28 I follow Ross in reading F ’ Kd e  q r ÆØ, ‰ NE ºªØŒH together with the manuscripts. Jaeger offers no plausible reason for excluding this crucial sentence which identifies the cause that primary substance is with essence and form. 15 Both Ross and Jaeger adopt Christ’s conjecture and add a second d at 1041b5 in the phrase c oºÅ ÇÅE Øa  K, thereby rendering it Øa  K. This emendation seeks to align the text with the idea that the cause being sought for is something that explains why some (material) entity has some attribute or other. Without the extra d, it is argued, the text would imply that the cause explains why matter simply is, i.e. why it exists. At the beginning of this sentence, though, at 1041b4–5, Aristotle maintains that existence is not to be explained but is already assumed. I agree that the cause under investigation is an entity that explains why matter possesses the features it does. I do not think, however, that the emendation is necessary. The phrase c oºÅ ÇÅE Øa  K can be understood elliptically as ‘why matter is [as it is]’: for the K can be taken not as existential but as predicative and so as completable by an understood predicate. 16 The details of the example x NŒÆ Æd Øa  are extremely controversial. If Æd is the subject and NŒÆ is the predicate, the explanandum is ‘why are these types of material a house?’. If the syntax is to be understood conversely, Aristotle is asking ‘why is the house (made up of ) these types of material?’ One could argue even that the example is formulated misleadingly. From the discussion of the Analytics it is clear that the explanandum is the conclusion of a proof. This conclusion, however, does not mention the process-kind under investigation. Thus, for example, the conclusion of the thunder-related demonstration is ‘noise belongs to the clouds’, not ‘noise belongs to thunder’. If so, the conclusion of corresponding proofs regarding substance-kinds should not contain references to the kind in question. Hence, the explanandum should not include the term ‘house’ at all. Aristotle’s question, then, should be ‘why are these types of material arranged in this manner?’ or ‘why do they have the features they have?’ There is no reason to engage in this debate.

184

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

r ÆØ] belongs to them. And ‘Why is this thing here or this body with this feature a man?’17 So what is sought is the cause of matter (and this is the form) by which the matter is thus-and-so [u e ÆYØ ÇÅEÆØ B oºÅ (F ’ Kd e r  )18 fiz d K]. And that is the substance. (Met. Z.17, 1041b5–9; Bostock’s trans.)

There are several points made in this passage which are the subject of intense scholarly debate. I shall not enter this debate as my thesis can be supported without adopting definite views on these textual and interpretative details. What emerges fairly incontrovertibly, especially from the closing sentences of this passage, is that the cause or principle that form or essence is explains the nature and features of matter (1041a7–8). Similarly, the opening statement elucidates the explanandum as being the matter and its possession of the essential and necessary features that it has (1041b5). The matter to be grounded on the form or essence is precisely the type-matter involved in substance- or artefact-kinds (or universal compounds) such as human, house, or bed (1041a26–7; 29–30; 1041b1; b5–6; 6–7). Thus, for instance, the examples offered are type-materials (such as bricks and stones at 1041a27), kinds of house-buildable matter (1041b6: NŒÆ Æd Øa ), or types of organic human body with certain structural features (1041b7:

My argument is simply that what is explained by the essence or form are the attributes of the type-matter involved in the universal compound house. 17

Again the phrase ŒÆd [sc. Øa ] ¼Łæø , j e H Æ F d å can be interpreted in different ways, even if we ignore the textual variations at 1041b7 (some manuscripts have › instead of the first ; some omit the F after H Æ; some commentators prefer ‰d instead of the second d on the basis of Alexander’s paraphrasis). The first part of the sentence (ŒÆd [sc. Øa ] ¼Łæø ) suggests that the explanandum is either ‘why is this type of body a man?’ or ‘why is man (made up of ) this type of body?’ The second part (j e H Æ F d å) could be either stating a genuine alternative or correcting and clarifying the first attempt at formulating the question. It seems more plausible to take the second part as reformulating the first in a clearer way. If so, the explanandum would be either ‘why is this type of body with this feature a man?’ or ‘why is man (made up of) this type of body with this type of feature?’ On an alternative (perhaps more attractive) reading, Aristotle uses the phrase j e H Æ F d å to structure more cautiously his considered formulation of the explanandum. In this formulation the substance-kind human is not mentioned at all in the conclusion of the demonstrative syllogism that grounds the explanandum in question. This is because the Analytics model, which guides the discussion of Metaphysics Z.17, avoids mentioning the kinds (e.g.) thunder or eclipse in the conclusions to be explained. In the light of this, the explanandum should be ‘why does this type of body possess this feature?’ Thus, the second part of 1041b6–7 should be understood as j [sc. Øa ] e H Æ F [sc. K] d å (this syntax of K plus the participle å would be extremely telling here: first, it would emphasize that this body-type indeed possesses this attribute as an established fact that stands in need of explanation by reference to form/essence; second, it would refer back to the background assumption of the argument, stated at 1041b4–5, that the causal inquiry does not seek but already possesses knowledge that this type of matter has this feature). This view could be supported by the examples offered in Metaphysics H.2–3, where the causal-explanatory model is further set out. In that context, what gets explained by the form or essence is not why a certain type of matter falls under a particular kind. Rather, the form or essence explains why a certain type of matter possesses specific structural features which are characteristic of a determinate kind. Why is this type of wood/stone positioned as it is (for the threshold-kind)? Why are these types of bricks and planks structured in this shape (for the house-kind)? Why is water solidified (for the ice-kind)? Why are high and low sounds mixed in this ratio (for the harmonykind)? (H.2, 1043a5–12; cf. H.3, 1043b4–10). I shall not examine these issues in any further detail as my general argument is relatively independent of them. 18 Jaeger has no compelling reason for excluding this parenthetical clause which brings together the notion of cause with that of essence or form.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

185

ŒÆd [sc. Øa ] ¼Łæø , j e H Æ F d å). Later on, in Metaphysics H, the matter caused to be as it is by the form or essence is exemplified by types such as wood or stone (arranged in the threshold-structure) in the case of the threshold-kind; bricks or stone (shaped in the house-mode) for the house-kind; water (in a certain solidified condition) for the ice-kind; high and low sounds (in a certain mixture) in the case of harmony (H.2, 1043a5–12; cf. H.3, 1043b4–10). One of the clearest articulations, though, of this causal-explanatory model is advanced in the following passage from Metaphysics H.3: Nor, then, is man an animal and two-footed, but there must also be something distinct from these [elements], if these are matter, which is neither an element nor composed of elements, but is the substance; and this they eliminate when they state only the matter. So if this is the cause of man’s being, and this is the substance, they will be failing to state the substance itself [Pb c › ¼Łæø KØ e ÇfiH ŒÆd ı, Iºº Ø E rÆØ n Ææa ÆF KØ, N ÆFŁ’ oºÅ, h b ØåE h’ KŒ Øåı, Iºº’  PÆ· n KÆØæF c oºÅ º ªıØ. N s F’ ÆYØ F r ÆØ, ŒÆd PÆ F, ÆPc i c PÆ P º ªØ.19 (Met. H.3, 1043b10–14; Bostock’s trans.)

Here Aristotle characterizes the types of matter which are posterior to, and are explained by, the essence or form as type-matter, such as animal or biped, involved in universal compounds, such as the human-kind (1043b10–11). It is not important, for present purposes, to ascertain whether, and if so how, genera and differentiae could be identified with matter. What is important is that the entities caused to be as they are by the form (or essence) are conceived as type-matter of some sort. The explanandum is ‘why is this type of animal or/and biped a human?’ or (perhaps more cautiously and consistently with Posterior Analytics B.8–10) ‘why is this type of animal biped?’ At the same time, though, this passage argues that form or essence – what is contrasted with matter, material constituents, or elements (1043b11: N ÆFŁ’ oºÅ; b12: ØåE; b13: c oºÅ) – is the primary substance of things. This primary substance functions as the cause of being, what makes each thing the (type of ) object it is (1043b12:  PÆ; b13–14: N s F’ ÆYØ F r ÆØ, ŒÆd PÆ F). It should be noted that the causal-explanatory model which takes the primary substance as grounding the nature of the type-matter involved in universal compounds does not clash with the conception of form as essentially and inextricably hylomorphic. The fact that essence or form is prior to, and explains the nature of, the type-matter of

19 I agree with Ross, who (against Bonitz and Jaeger) reads the manuscripts at 1043b10 where there is no article before ı. Similarly, at b12 Ross correctly (in my view) retains the manuscript reading  PÆ after Iºº’ but punctuates with a semicolon. In this way the text reads smoothly as follows: Iºº’  PÆ· n KÆØæF c oºÅ º ªıØ. Finally, at b13–14 the manuscript reading N s F’ ÆYØ F r ÆØ, ŒÆd PÆ F, ÆPc i c PÆ P º ªØ makes better sense than Jaeger’s N s F’ ÆYØ F r ÆØ ŒÆd PÆ , F ÆPc i c PÆ º ªØ, where the negation before º ªØ has been unnecessarily removed. Aristotle argues against theorists who define things by reference to matter alone, thereby eliminating the essence and the form from a definition (1043b12–13: n KÆØæF c oºÅ º ªıØ). Thus, they fail to mention the very substance of the definiendum (1043b14: ÆPc i c PÆ P º ªØ).

186

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

kinds does not render it matter-free, purely formal or solely functional. For the arguments in favour of the form’s essential enmatterment are independent of its role as cause of being for type-matter and universal compounds. In effect, the primary substance of things, their form or essence, as a unified, hylomorphic complex including its own intrinsic material parts, works as a cause which fixes the identity of universal compounds and their type-matter. This last item, the type-matter of a kind, should not be conflated with the sorts of material feature which are essentially involved in a natural form. For type-matter is not a feature or a mode of being that (partly) constitutes a natural form. Rather, it is a type of matter which is part of the universal compound or kind. If this is correct, its nature and necessary characteristics can be explained on the basis of the hylomorphic cause that an essentially enmattered, natural form is. In this way, natural form proves prior to type-matter in essence and definition even if it is itself intrinsically matter-involving. There is a central question arising from Aristotle’s causal-explanatory model. It is about the nature of the relation between the formal cause that a form or essence is and its additional role as material-grounding, efficient or final cause. It would be a highly unattractive suggestion to claim that the role of formal causation alone is basic, but an item which plays this role also functions, either necessarily or as a matter of fact, in the manner of material-grounding, efficient, or final causation. For this suggestion does not provide any substantive basis for linking the role of formal causation with the extra causal function that a formal cause necessarily or actually performs. An alternative view would be to hold that formal causation necessarily co-occurs with material-grounding, efficient or final causation. Thus, for example, if any feature (such as being a human soul) is the formal cause of the kind human, necessarily it also functions as the final cause of this kind (and, presumably, of its type-matter too) and conversely. In this case too, though, it may be objected that there seems to be no sufficient ground for this strong, necessary bi-conditional. If there is some concept which could ground the necessity of the bi-conditional, are we to understand the notion of formal or/and final causation in terms of that concept? If no such concept is available, are we to grasp the bi-conditional as describing a brute fact? If so, we could ask whether there is any explanatory relation between the two sides of the biconditional, such that one causal role is explained by the other but not conversely. If the answer to this question is negative, the necessary bi-conditional should be taken as a ‘no-priority’ thesis. The most promising line seems to be, by contrast, that formal causation partly consists in the notion of making something the (type of ) thing it is. This notion could be independent of material-grounding, efficient, or final causation only at some highly abstract, theoretical level of analysis, what Aristotle calls the ‘logical’ mode of investigation (1041a28). Beyond this level, however, there would be no way of correctly or fully grasping the concept of formal causation by itself, independently of either material-grounding or efficient or final causation. In this view, then, anything which functions as formal cause would be essentially an efficient, final, or

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

187

material-grounding cause. It would be impossible to disentangle its function as formal cause from its extra causal role. Indeed, it would be misleading to speak of an ‘extra’ causal role: for the type of formal cause that it is would essentially be either efficient or final or material-grounding cause, depending on the relevant sort of case. This view could be supported with the help of Metaphysics Z.17, 1041a27–30: This [the cause] is the what-it-is-to-be [ q rÆØ], speaking logically, which in some cases is that for the sake of which the thing is [as it is] (as presumably in the case of a house or a bed), while in some cases it is that which first began the change. (Bostock’s trans.)

This claim does not (I take it) imply that the cause – the essence or formal cause – just actually is, or simply happens to be, either final or efficient cause too. Rather, at the abstract, ‘logical’ level of metaphysical inquiry, an item can be singled out as the essence and the formal cause. However, its precise nature as formal cause crucially involves its functioning as final or efficient cause, depending on the case under discussion. It is obvious that this view does not make the extra causal role that a formal cause serves look like a fluke. Nor does it merely posit an ad hoc link between formal causation and an extra albeit necessary causal function. Rather, because the nature of formal causation is fully graspable only in terms of efficient, final, or material-grounding causation, anything that is an essence or form is intrinsically an efficient, final, or materialgrounding cause. If so, it immediately follows that it must function in one of these causal modes. If this interpretation of Aristotle’s position fully identifies the two causal functions, however, one might raise the question of what the nature of formal causation consists in. It does not seem plausible to take it disjunctively, as either material-grounding or efficient or final causation. Rather, it is more promising to conceive it by itself, in terms of the notion of x’s making y the (type of ) thing it is. If so, it could be essentially independent of the extra causal roles of material-grounding, efficient, or final causation. In response to this line of objection, it should be emphasized that the view just set out does not conceive formal causation disjunctively. For, as I pointed out, what the extra causal role is in each case is determined by the (kind of ) entity whose essence or form is under investigation. Thus, for instance, in mathematical cases, the kind of formal cause that an essence is acts as material-grounding cause. In natural kinds of process such as thunder or eclipse the essence or form is essentially an efficient cause. In cases of natural substance-kinds, their form or essence is the final cause for the sake of which the kind and its type-matter are as they are. At the same time, though, this view preserves the notion of making something the (type of ) thing it is as an abstract way of grasping formal causation ‘logically’, at a general theoretical level, fairly independently of additional causal roles. This relative conceptual independence, however, does not entail that formal causation can be set out completely or successfully without any reference to material-grounding, efficient, or final causation. Rather, the latter are the fundamental notions on the basis of which the former is essentially characterized and fully understood. For without them the bare concept of

188

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

formal causation could not be anchored in concrete real-world relations of causation but would remain an ungrounded and merely determinable, abstract idea. It is worth pointing out that this last abstract conception of formal causation should not be deemed unimportant. Its conceptual independence at the general ‘logical’ level might prove epistemically indispensable in cases in which it is not yet clear whether, and if so what, extra causal function a formal cause serves. For example, in inquiring into the nature of a type of phenomenon or object, we might have a clear (nonincidental) grasp of (part of ) its essence or formal cause (as such) without yet possessing the whole causal-explanatory account. Indeed, Aristotle’s own position, as set out in Posterior Analytics B.8–10, seems to run along these lines. Thus, in investigating the nature of thunder, we may grasp part(s) of its essence. For example, we may know that it is a certain type of cloud-noise. At this stage, though, we may not have any knowledge of the efficient cause of thunder, the quenching of fire in the clouds (93a15ff.).20 If so, formal causation could be relatively independent of efficient causation (within the ‘logical’ framework), just as our knowledge of (part of ) the former may be gained independently of our knowledge of the latter. A view of formal causation as ‘logically’ or abstractly graspable without reference to extra causal roles is congenial to epistemic positions of this sort. At the same time, though, this type of view does not render the extra causal role fulfilled by a formal cause coincidental. For, in this view, the link between the notion of formal causation and that of an additional causal function is essential and inextricable.

7.9 Filling in the Gaps: Specifying the Posterior Relata as Explananda All the examples of matter provided in Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4 seem to be specific types of body, kinds of building-block or material stuffs that are made what they are through the causal efficacy of form or essence. As I have already noted, however, it is extremely difficult to determine the precise nature of the matter to be explained by form in definitions of substance-kinds. This is because the formal details of Aristotle’s 20

David Charles has argued convincingly for an interpretation of Aristotle’s view of scientific inquiry as involving three stages. In the first stage, we have knowledge of the signification of terms: for instance, we know that ‘thunder’ signifies a certain type of cloud-noise. In the second stage, we seek knowledge of the existence of a (kind of ) phenomenon or object simply on the basis of our grasp of part(s) of its nature, without yet being required to know its complete cause or essence. Hence, on the basis of our grasp of thunder as a certain type of cloud-noise we can achieve knowledge of thunder as an existing, scientifically explicable phenomenon even if we do not yet know its complete cause or essence. In the third stage, we can acquire complete demonstrative knowledge by grasping the cause of the (type of ) phenomenon or object under investigation. Thus, once we discover that the type of cloud-noise that thunder is identical with is brought about by the quenching of fire in the clouds we can construct the relevant proof. At the same time, by rearranging the terms of this proof, we can formulate the complete, explanatory definition of thunder. My present point, about the relative independence of knowledge of formal causation from knowledge of extra causal roles, falls within the second stage of this three-stage view of scientific inquiry. See Charles, D., Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 23–56.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

189

sample definitions are hopelessly unclear and highly controversial. It is fairly straightforward, by contrast, that there are certain features which just are not explicable on the basis of the form or essence of a determinate kind of object. One example of features of this sort is given in the following passage from Metaphysics Z.17: But to inquire into why a thing is itself is to inquire into nothing at all (for that the thing is and its being must be clear – I mean, for instance, that the moon is eclipsed – but for the fact that a thing is itself, there is just one account and one cause for all cases, e.g., why a man is a man or an artistic thing is artistic, unless one says that each thing is indivisible from itself, and this is what being one thing is; but this is common to all things and too brief. (Met. Z.17, 1041a14–20: e b s Øa  ÆP KØ ÆP , P  KØ ÇÅE (E ªaæ e ‹Ø ŒÆd e r ÆØ æåØ BºÆ ZÆ–º ªø ’ x ‹Ø  ºÅ KŒºØ–, ÆPe b ‹Ø ÆP , x º ª ŒÆd Æ ÆNÆ Kd ø, Øa  › ¼Łæø

¼Łæø j › ıØŒe ıØŒ , ºc Y Ø º ªØ ‹Ø IØÆæ æe Æe ŒÆ, F ’ q e d r ÆØ· Iººa F ŒØ  ª ŒÆa ø ŒÆd  )]. (Bostock’s trans.)

There are necessary attributes such as being either F or not-F, not being F and not-F, being self-identical, being one, being a being, etc. Such attributes belong necessarily to any and every type of object. Their necessity, though, does not have its source, nor is it grounded on, the essence or form of any particular type of object. For this reason, no genuine, essence-based type of inquiry examines whether (e.g.) x is x, whether x is either F or not-F, or whether x is not F and not-F. For the answer to questions of this sort is brief and common to any and every type of object (1041a19–20: ŒØ  ª ŒÆa ø ŒÆd  ).21 Aristotle contends that asking why x is x is inquiring into nothing at all or is answered by just one single account or reason that applies to all kinds of things (1041a16–17: ÆPe b ‹Ø ÆP , x º ª ŒÆd Æ ÆNÆ Kd ø). Perhaps this answer would be that nothing is distinguishable from itself, or that everything is self-identical, as this is what it is to be one being (1041a18–19: ºc Y Ø º ªØ ‹Ø IØÆæ æe Æe ŒÆ, F ’ q e d r ÆØ). However, inquiries of this type do not proceed from genuine definitions, the accounts of essences of specific types of thing. While brevity ( ) may not strike one as a sufficient reason for disregarding a proposed account, being common to any and every type of object clearly renders suspect a putative definition. In examining a particular subject-matter, we ask about the kinds of object that make up this subject-matter and about their own essential, per se, peculiar or proper features. This implies that essence-based inquiry is subject-matter-

21 One might object that APo. A.11, 77a22–5, suggests that (e.g.) the Principle of the Excluded Middle (¼PEM) is used in demonstrations ‘to the impossible’ (reductio ad absurdum proofs). Such proofs, however, do not have as conclusions propositions like ‘x is either F or not-F ’ even if such claims may be (explicitly or implicitly) amongst their premisses. Similarly, the demonstration described at A.11, 77a10–21, which assumes an (instantiated) form of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (¼PNC) and proves a conclusion of similar PNC-form, is a contrived, far-fetched exception to standard demonstrative practices. Indeed, at 77a10–12, Aristotle himself presents this example as an anomaly: ‘no demonstration assumes that it is not possible to affirm and deny at the same time, unless the conclusion too is to be proved in this form.’ But what kind of proof aims at showing such platitudes?

190

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

sensitive: it is about, and explains attributes of, particular kinds of object on the basis of those objects’ essences or forms.22 If so, it is not concerned with explaining why certain attributes belong necessarily to objects if these objects or their essences are irrelevant to the possession of the attributes in question. Put differently: if any attributes are to be explained as belonging necessarily to any and every type of object independently of its nature, and from features or premisses which obtain for any and every kind of thing, these attributes do not hold any interest for any genuine, essence-based inquiry. Nor is this an epistemic claim or a pragmatic choice. The reason why essence-based inquiry does not deal with such attributes is that no kind of object, its being what it is, is constituted from them, even if no type of object can fail to possess them. Because this sort of metaphysical investigation seeks to get right the natures of the kinds of object it inquires into, it is unsurprising that it ignores such trivial, ‘brief and common’, even if necessary, attributes.23 It is not essence or form which explains the possession of these necessary features but highly generic logical principles, such as the principle of noncontradiction, the law of self-identity, or the principle of the excluded middle. There are further necessary features of a different sort, which should not be confused with the types of matter which are included in the definition of universal compounds and are explained by form or essence. These would be the merely necessary features of kinds which are non-essential but are explained by the essences of these kinds. Suppose that the causal-explanatory model of the Analytics is indeed applicable to substancekinds in the way suggested by Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4. If so, we can use our schematic definition of universal compounds, [D-CU], introduced in section 7.7, to construct a sample definition of the kind human: Human[KIND] ¼ soul).

def

the ‘type-with-type-matter’ whose essence is (being a human

22 Aristotle maintains that one of the basic ingredients of a demonstrative science is e ª  e Œ , the subject-matter and the kinds of things it comprises, together with their per se attributes (APo. A.7, 75a42–b2; A.10, 76b3–5; 6–10; 11–13). 23 To be sure, attributes of this trivial sort do seem to play some role in demonstrative sciences. As the term ‘common’ implies, they are assumed in common by every demonstrative science in the form of what Aristotle calls ‘axioms’ or, more to the present point, ‘common axioms’ (APo. A.7, 75a41–2; A.10, 76a38–9; b14–15; A.11, 77a26–8). These are exemplified by (e.g.) PNC or PEM. Thus, attributes which belong necessarily to any and every kind of thing simply in virtue of these basic logical laws, like being self-identical, not being F and not-F, being either F or not-F, etc. are assumed in common by all sciences. (There is a proviso added by Aristotle to this claim. General axioms, such as PNC or PEM, or even axioms which are common only to certain types of science, such as ‘if equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equals’ – a proposition that applies commonly to quantitative sciences alone – are common to all sciences which assume them only ‘by analogy’: APo. A.10, 76a37–b2; A.11, 77a22–5. This, I take it, entails that the axioms are not about the very same kinds of object across all sciences in which they are assumed. Thus, for instance, while in geometry ‘if equals . . . ’ is about quantities with some position – points, lines, etc. – in number theory it is about quantities without any position – units, numbers, etc.) However, these ‘trivial and brief’ attributes do not play the same role as the proper or peculiar, explanans or explanandum, per se attributes, which are studied, or proved to belong to things, by each particular scientific discipline (APo. A.10, 76a37–41; b3–6: YØÆ). Exactly how common axioms function and what their distinctive features are compared with the proper or peculiar principles-premisses would be topics of another, separate discussion.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

191

Here the feature of being a human soul is the essentially hylomorphic form or essence of the kind which functions as cause. Hence, it fixes the identity of the entity referred to by the term ‘type-with-type-matter’, presumably by acting as the final cause for the sake of which this entity is as it is. This intra-definiens priority of form over the ‘typewith-type-matter’ also grounds its priority over the definiendum. Because the kind human is identical with what is described as ‘type-with-type-matter’, it follows that it too is made what it is, and is caused by, the form or essence, being a human soul. The form mentioned in the definiens, then, is also essentially prior to the kind defined. Our urgent question, however, remains unanswered. How are we to identify the entity referred to as ‘type-with-type-matter’ or the type-matter involved in it? It would be a mistake to reply that necessary peculiar features (propria) of the humankind, such as being capable of learning grammar or being capable of laughing, could play the role of the relevant explanandum. For, while such features can be successfully explained (at least partly) by reference to the kind’s essence, they are not, intuitively speaking, parts of this essence. Nor, therefore, are they mentioned in the kind’s definition. Hence, they cannot be the referents of the term ‘type-with-type-matter’ as this term is clearly included in the kind’s definition. Our characterization of the matter which is posterior to form continues to be negative. There are two general views which gesture towards the beginnings of a more positive answer. (a) The first view could be labelled ‘deflationary’. In it the type-with-type-matter mentioned in the definiens of (e.g.) the kind human is nothing weightier than a general subject that simply has the essential feature of being a human soul. Analogously, the type-matter involved in it is simply the material substratum whose essence is to have the features which are intrinsic parts of the essentially matter-involving form. Hence, in Aristotle’s example, offered at Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b6–7, the human body with the relevant humanly structure is simply that type of material substrate which is enformed by the human soul. To give an essential characterization of this body-type it is sufficient to set out the formal, material, and functional intrinsic parts of being a human soul, the hylomorphic form or essence of the corresponding human-kind. It is not hard to extend this view to definitions of particular compounds too, if indeed Aristotle’s metaphysical picture envisages any niche for such definitions. Thus, for instance, a particular compound could be defined as the token-withtoken-matter whose essence is to be a human soul. If so, the shadow term ‘token-with-token-matter’ refers to a particular subject which is essentially nothing other than an instance of the relevant form, being a human soul. The corresponding token-matter is, similarly, a concrete material substratum which is essentially a bearer of the form being a human soul. (b) The second sort of view is far more demanding. It has two different versions which are not mutually exclusive.

192

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

(i) In the first version, the form – e.g. being a human soul – causes and explains the being of all the relevant specific types of matter or bodily part that the kind human might be realized in. Hence, what is explained by the form is a wide range of materials appropriate for the existence of the kind. It is useful, at this juncture, to consider the example of an artefact-kind, such as the Socratesstatue-kind, defined in terms of the Socrates-statue-form. The material feature which is included in the essence of this artefact-form would be something like being composed of bulky mass which is malleable, solidifiable, and wroughtable in the Socrates-statue-shape. This essential material feature involved in the form would regulate what the appropriate types of matter are for embodying the relevant Socrates-statue-form. Presumably, the specification of these typematters would be formulated as a disjunction: ‘either wood or marble or bronze or. . . . ’ To see how this idea is applicable to particular compounds, we can return to cases of natural living substances. Socrates, an individual human being, is definable in terms of the essentially matter-involving form, being a human soul. If so, his form determines the range of token material bits or concrete bodily parts (such as particular cells, parcels of tissue, bones, etc.) that he may possess, lose, and/or replenish throughout his career as essentially a member of the human kind. There are difficulties with this version of the demanding view. It is unclear, first, whether the item referred to disjunctively (as, for example, ‘either wood or marble or bronze or . . . ’) would be essential to the kind or not. Aristotle’s causal-explanatory model, as developed in the Analytics and the Metaphysics, takes form as grounding other essential features mentioned in the kind’s definition. If the present view holds firm to this claim, it would effectively have the problematic consequence that the essence of kinds includes disjunctive attributes.24 If one sought to avoid this consequence, however, one would most likely hold that such disjunctive attributes are necessary but non-essential. But if so, one would ignore the constraints built into Aristotle’s model. For, in this model, what is explained by the causal part of the definiens (the form) are the remaining parts of this definiens, which are essential but noncausal features of the kind in question.

24

More conspicuously, in the case of particular compounds, it would be implausible to suggest that the relation holding between (e.g.) Socrates and his token material bits at any given time in (or even throughout) his life is one of essential constitution. For several (perhaps even all?) of the bits, tokens, or even (some) types of material parts that Socrates involves at some stage(s) of his ‘career’ as a human can change or perish without any important corresponding change in his essence. To be sure, this last claim holds good on the assumption that a particular compound’s essence is what makes it essentially a specific type of particular thing (or a particular thing of a specific type). The claim would have to be qualified if we understood a particular compound’s essence as what makes it essentially this concrete, particular, or token thing.

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

193

Second, this version of the demanding view might be driven to claims which undermine the form’s essential enmatterment. For one could go too far and insert into the disjunctive specification of the type-matters to be explained by form material items which really belong amongst the form’s intrinsic parts. If so, one would completely strip off the form from robust, perceptible types of material feature by identifying it in purely formal and/or functional terms. Thus, in the example of the Socrates-statue-form, it might be argued that even the material feature of being composed of bulky mass is amongst the typematters to be explained by reference to form. In this case, though, the form does not contain any substantive material features but is characterized simply as being the Socrates-statue-shape embodied in something malleable, solidifiable, and wrought-able. It is questionable, however, whether this functionally identified form represents a viable view of the form’s essential enmatterment. I discussed some of the difficulties arising from this issue in chapter 6. (ii) The second version of the demanding view places emphasis on the argument advanced in Metaphysics H.3, 1043b10–14, a passage discussed in section 7.8. In that argument the cause that the form is explains genus- and differentia-types included in a kind’s essence. For instance, in the sample definition of the kind human, as formulated earlier, the items caused to be as they are by the form, being a human soul, are types such as animal or biped (1043b10–12). The idea, then, is that the kind has essential features which place it, as a species, in a certain slot of a genus-differentia tree. In some cases, these features may be derived from distinct genus-differentia divisions. Thus, in the case of the kind human, its definition might make reference to differentiae as diverse as terrestrial, featherless, biped, or rational. The human-form, then, would explain how these diverse types constitute a unified kind by being their identity-fixer. Hence, in our example, no differentia could be specified as an independent conjunct, without essential reference to being a human soul, the form of the species human. It is possible to combine aspects of versions (i) and (ii) of the demanding view, thereby producing interesting variants. One possibility is to hold that the range of type-matters explained by reference to form is identified with all the genera and differentiae belonging in the kind’s essence. This line would argue that the antecedent in Aristotle’s conditional ‘if animal and biped are matter, then the primary substance, form or essence, is distinct from and causes them to be as they are’ does indeed hold good (Met. H.3, 1043b10–11; cf. b13–14).25 If so, however, there is an obvious difficulty. It is notoriously difficult to show how type-matters, such as organic human body, could 25 Notice that the position of Metaphysics H.3 about the relation between matter-form and genus-differentia definitions is idiosyncratic. Aristotle’s standard hypothesis is that matter is lined up with genus, while form corresponds to the final differentia (Z.12, 1038a5–9; 18–30). By contrast, Metaphysics H.3 introduces the idea that both genus and differentia are parallel to, or are identified with, the matter, whereas the form or essence (the cause that primary substance is) has no correlate in the genus-differentia definitional framework.

194

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

be aligned, even in principle, with a genus such as animal or a differentia such as biped. This difficulty grows out of the general question of whether the hylomorphic definitional model could yield similar results to those reached by the practice of definition per-genus-et-differentiam. Some doubt whether the two models are even reconcilable.26 An alternative would be to refrain from identifying type-matters with genera or differentiae. It would still be possible, though, to admit all these items (typematters, genera, and differentiae) alongside each other within the kind’s essence. Thus, for instance, the definition of the kind human would mention not only the type-matter organic human body but also the genus animal and the differentiae biped, terrestrial, featherless, rational, etc. The human-form, then, would be the cause of being for all these diverse entities. The problem undercutting this sort of view is that it seems to pack ‘too many things’ into the kind’s essence. It is unclear whether it could place any constraints with which to block the presence of indefinitely (or even infinitely) many essential features. Worse still, it might allow in the essence several merely necessary features which may be explicable (partly) in terms of the form but are intuitively non-essential. Finally, it would be a challenge for this view to show how the form could unify this manifold of essential features into one single kind. A full discussion of the causal-explanatory model, as introduced in Posterior Analytics B.8–10 and expanded in Metaphysics Z.17 and H.2–4, would require a long, separate study. Similarly, some of the details of this model – such as the choice between views (a), (b.i), (b.ii), or their variants – lie well outside the scope of present concerns. Reasons of theoretical parsimony and coherence, however, suggest that the deflationary view (a) is more promising. First, it is not vulnerable to any charges of material over-determination of the kind. In view (b) there are (at least) two material items mentioned in the definition of any kind. In the definiens of the kind human, for example, there are material features (such as being embodied in an organic human body) which are intrinsic to the human-form (being a human soul). At the same time, though, there are type-matters referred to by the disjunctive term which describes the range of appropriate types of material in which the human-kind might be realized. If one adopts certain variants of (b), one would allow not only type-matters of this last sort but also genera and differentiae into the kind’s essence. In that case, though, there would be too many material factors taken as determining the identity of the kind. By contrast, view (a) does not yield problems of this sort. For, in this view, the only material entities mentioned in the kind’s definiens are the material features intrinsic to hylomorphic form. Apart from these, the kind’s essence includes only a universal subject or a general material substratum which is essentially nothing more than a bearer of the features intrinsic to the kind’s form. There are helpful discussions of these problems in Grene, M., ‘Is Genus to Species as Matter to Form? Aristotle and Taxonomy’, Synthese, 28, 1974, pp. 51–69, and in Rorty, R. ‘Matter as Goo: Comments on Grene’s Paper’, Synthese, 28, 1974, pp. 71–7. 26

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

195

Second, because of this economical approach to material items included in the definiens, view (a) does not import excessively many essential but non-causal features into the kind’s essence, features which are to be explained by reference to the kind’s form. In this way, it does not have to address questions about the origin of such features. Nor does it have to prescribe any criteria with which to introduce such features into the essence as explananda or with which to ostracize others. More importantly, however, it can unproblematically account for the unity of the items included in the essence, thereby securing the unity of the kind. View (b), by contrast, seems to be fragmenting the kind into a swarm of essential features. It is doubtful whether the kind’s form could explain the nature and unity of all these items. Third, and most significantly, view (a) re-emphasizes the importance of the notion of being a subject as a mark of substancehood. This is not to say that Aristotle endorses ultimate subjecthood as the sole or the most basic criterion for being a substance. Rather, he favours identity-fixing, priority, and causal-explanatory considerations as chief requirements for substancehood.27 At the same time, though, he shows how these basic notions underwrite the concept of being a subject. In view (a) the typematter included in (e.g.) the human-kind is a universal material substrate which is essentially just a possessor of the features involved in the kind’s form, being a human soul. Hence, its being the determinate type of subject it is depends on its being enformed, and caused to be as it is, by the form. Similarly, the token-matter involved in a particular compound such as Socrates is wholly identifiable as a concrete subject whose essence is simply to possess the features intrinsic to the relevant human-form. It is true that (e.g.) Socrates or Callias are particular subjects of metaphysical predication underlying merely necessary, non-substance features (such as having some complexion) and accidental attributes (such as being pale or being sun-tanned). This, however, holds good only in virtue of their being particular objects of a determinate kind. If so, their subjecthood crucially depends on their being enformed, and caused to be particular objects of a specific kind, by their primary substance, their form. In this way, the important concept of subjecthood seems to be grounded on the fundamental essentialist and causal-explanatory notions of priority, making a thing what it is and causing its nature and the presence of its necessary features.

7.10 Conclusion: Dissecting the Definiens It is worth returning to Aristotle’s claim made in Metaphysics Z.10 that ‘some or all parts of the form and of the defining formula’ are prior to matter and (particular or universal) compounds (1035b4–6; 11–14). It is clear, at the present stage of the argument, that

27 Metaphysics Z.3 presents Aristotle’s argument against views which take ultimate subjecthood as the only or the most fundamental criterion of substancehood (1028b36–1029a2; 1029a7–10). There he maintains that thisness, separateness, and priority are more important concepts in terms of which to understand the notion of substance (1029a5–7; 26–30).

196

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

this claim is vindicated by the intra-definiens priority which obtains in definitions such as the following: Human[KIND] ¼ def type-with-type-matter whose essence is (being a human soul). Here the form, being a human soul, is prior to the ‘type-with-type-matter’. Because this last item is identical with the human-kind, it follows that the form is also prior to the human-kind. In these definitions, then, there is only one part of the definiens, the form (e.g. being a human soul), which is prior to the kind and its matter. Hence, it is not the whole defining essence but only a part of it – the hylomorphic form that functions as cause – which is prior to matter and (universal) compound. This part of the kind’s essence is parallel to the efficient cause referred to by the ‘causal’ terms included in the sample definitions of Posterior Analytics B.8–10. Thus: Thunder[KIND] ¼ def cloud-noise caused by fire-being-cloudily-quenched. In this definition, too, only one part of the definiens, the quenching of fire, is prior to the kind thunder by being prior to the type of cloud-noise that thunder is identical with. If this is correct, Aristotle’s disjunctive claim ‘some or all parts of the defining formula are prior’ should be understood as alluding to his considered view that only some items in the definiens, the causal parts, are prior to the definiendum. Two important remarks are in order. First, the claim that some items (such as a certain type of cloud-noise or a particular sort of organic human body) are not basic but are caused to be as they are by the form does not entail that they are non-essential. Rather, as is obvious from the examples just offered, these items are mentioned in the definition and so are parts of the kind’s essence. Second, and more importantly, it might be objected that this stratification of the definiens cannot accommodate Aristotle’s claim that ‘some parts of the form and of the defining formula’ are prior to matter and compounds. For, it would be argued, this claim is undermined by an ambiguity implicit in the terms ‘form’, ‘essence’, or ‘defining formula’. For these terms could pick up either the whole definiens or its causal part alone. If, for instance, the form, essence, or defining formula of the humankind is what is referred to by the whole definiens-term, we cannot privilege any proper part of it as prior to another or to the definiendum. In that case, however, we cannot implement Aristotle’s causal-explanatory model in which only one, causal section of the definiens, the form, is essentially and definitionally fundamental. Rather, the form, essence, and cause should be the whole defining formula. It does not seem correct, though, to think that (e.g.) the type-with-type-matter whose essence is to be a human soul is prior to the human-kind. For the relation between these two types seems to be strict identity. If, by contrast, ‘form’, ‘essence’, or ‘defining formula’ pick up only the causal part of the definiens, it is difficult to see how only a part of that entity is prior to matter and compounds. In the example of the human-kind, the form as a whole, in its hylomorphic entirety, seems prior to the kind and its matter. Aristotle does not argue that

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

197

only a part of the causal section of the definiens is prior to the kind or its matter. Hence, for instance, he does not hold that only quenching, but not fire, is prior to the kind thunder or the type of cloud-noise that thunder is identical with. Nor does he suggest that only being a rational soul, but not the whole form being a human soul, is prior to the human-kind or the specific type of organic human body involved in this kind. If this is correct, Aristotle would not have good reason to claim that ‘some or all parts of the essence, form or defining formula’ are prior to matter and compounds. For it would be the whole causal section of the definiens, all its parts collectively, which would be prior to these items. His disjunction, then, would be either unnecessary or misleading. To reply to this line of objection, it is important to acknowledge that Aristotle’s position involves a bifurcation of the concepts of essence, form, and defining formula into ‘expansive’ and ‘restricted’ varieties. Hence, the essence, form, or definition of a kind can be either its whole ‘what-it-is’, what is described by the complete definiens, or its shorter ‘what-it-is-to-be’, that part of its definiens which, strictly speaking, is prior to the kind by fixing its identity and causing it to be as it is. The distinction between these two notions might be reflected by Aristotle’s use of the phrases  KØ x and  q r ÆØ fiH x respectively. It is not a foregone conclusion, though, that Aristotle uses this terminology consistently throughout the Analytics and the Metaphysics to mark off the relevant distinction. To rebut this objection satisfactorily, then, it is important to point out that none of these concepts – essence, form, or defining formula – is central as a criterion with which to stratify hierarchically the definiens and privilege only some of its parts as basic and others as derivative. Rather, this stratification is determined by the notions of priority, identity-fixing, and causation-explanation. The prominent part of the definiens is picked up in virtue of its being essentially independent of the rest of the definiens (but not conversely). Further, this sort of priority consists in its making or causing the definiendum to be the type of entity it is, with the type-matter it essentially involves. It is certainly true that (e.g.) the human-form, being a human soul, is prior to the human kind by being its identity-fixer and its final cause. But this human-form is thus privileged as the fundamental segment of the definiens not simply in so far as it is form but, crucially, in so far as and because it fulfils the roles of being prior to, an identity-fixer, and the cause of the human-kind’s being what it is. There is a further, serious objection which might suggest that the causal-explanatory model set out in the Analytics and the Metaphysics entails that there is intra-definiens priority within the very essence of the hylomorphic form itself. If this were so, however, the reconciliatory approach, [RA], criticized in section 5.3, would be back to haunt us. This sort of objection would first claim that the definitional examples of process-kinds discussed in Posterior Analytics B.8–10 can be reformulated so as to range over process-forms too. Instead of having just a kind-definiendum Thunder[KIND] ¼ def cloud-noise caused by fire-being-cloudily-quenched,

198

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

we can also define the form of thunder as follows: Being thunder quenched.

[FORM]

¼

def

being a cloud-noise caused by fire-being-cloudily-

It is plausible to think that this last definition preserves the intra-definiens priority of the causal feature, the quenching of fire, over the feature of being a certain type of cloudnoise. The objector, then, would seek to employ the same point in the case of substance-kinds. Nothing prevents us from defining not only the kind human, Human[KIND] ¼ def type-with-type-matter whose essence is (being a human soul), but also the form, the causal part of the kind’s definiens. Thus, for instance: Being a human soul human body.

[FORM]

¼

def

being a rational soul embodied in an organic

In my view, intra-definiens priority clearly obtains in the case of the human-kind as being a human soul is prior to the ‘type-with-type-matter’ that the human-kind is identical with. By contrast, there is no such priority in the case of the human-form: for being a human soul is essentially and inextricably hylomorphic so that neither the formal nor the material part of its essence could be prior to the other. The objector would, at this point, challenge my distinction. Why not maintain that there also is intra-definiens priority in the last formula just given? Why not take the formal part of the definiens, being a rational soul, as prior to, and as the final cause of, the material part, being composed of an organic human body? This idea of priority of formal over material features within the form’s own essence is virtually equivalent to [RA]. As I remarked in section 5.3, this approach might imply that natural form is ultimately independent of matter in essence and definition (but not conversely). The ‘ultimate’ front in which this type of priority is regained is placed within the form’s definiens. I have already discussed the absurd consequences of this view of intra-definiens priority, given the arguments in favour of the form’s essential enmatterment. What is important for present purposes is to explain why the case of natural hylomorphic form differs from that of thunder-form (or eclipse-form). It should be emphasized that the cases examined in the Analytics involve distinct kinds of object with their own features, which cause the presence of separate features in further kinds of object. Thus, the feature of being cloudily-quenched belongs to a fiery mass. Further, this quenching of fire is distinct from, and causes the presence of, making noise, another feature which is possessed by yet another type of object, the clouds. Similarly, in the case of lunar eclipse, the distinct objects involved in the relevant process are not simply kinds but unique particulars. The Earth screens the Moon and, as a result, the Moon loses its light. There is a neat criterion, then, with which to dissect the definiens in these cases, even if the definiendum is not the process-kind but the process-form, such as being thunder or being lunar eclipse. The distinctness of the (types of ) objects having causal

E S S E N T I A L LY E N M AT T E R E D F O R M A S P R I O R T O M AT T E R

199

features from those (types of ) objects that possess the features caused grounds the layering of the definiens into basic and derivative entities even within the essence of process-forms. Hence, because the causal feature, being-cloudily-quenched, belongs to a fiery mass, while the feature caused by this, making a certain type of cloud-noise, belongs to a separate kind, the clouds, the former feature is the basic entity which fixes the identity of the latter by acting as its efficient cause. The converse claim, though, is not the case. No corresponding structure obtains, by contrast, within the definiens of a natural form, such as the form of the substance-kind human. First, this definiens consists of just one single entity, a unified but complex hylomorphic feature, (e.g.) being a rational soul embodied in an organic human body. For the formal and material parts of this definiens are not mutually separate conjuncts or independent features of distinct types of object. Their inextricable unity is underwritten by their essential interdependence (as set out in section 5.4). The formal part depends for its essence on the material part and conversely. If so, there is no way of disentangling the one from the other or rendering the one prior to, or the cause of, the other. If one were to claim, per absurdum, that the formal part is prior to, and the cause of, the material part, one would effectively hold that the whole hylomorphic complex is prior to, and the cause of, itself. Given the asymmetry and irreflexivity of priority and causality, however, this would be paradoxical. For this reason, the prospects of an intra-definiens priority within a natural form’s own essence seem gloomy. Second, contrary to the case of process-forms, the forms of substance-kinds involve no distinct types of object at all in their definiens. For their definiens is a single, unified (albeit complex) essential feature of one single substance-kind. For example, being a rational soul embodied in an organic human body is the form and essence of the substance-kind human alone. Nor does the definiendum, the form defined, implicitly involve more than just one single substance-kind. Being a human soul, the form defined in our sample definition, is the essence of the human-kind alone. In the light of this, there seems to be no basis for fragmenting a natural form’s definiens into fundamental and derivative entities. While process-forms involve distinct explanans and explanandum features in virtue of the distinct (types of ) objects possessing these features, substance-kind-forms are essences of just one single kind. Lastly, not even the whole definiens could be prior to, or the cause of, the definiendum in definitions of substance-kind-forms: Being a human soul human body.

[FORM]

¼

def

being a rational soul embodied in an organic

Here the relation between the definiens and the form defined is strict, numerical identity. For a natural, substance-kind-form is not an entity that has essence in the way in which a (type of ) object possesses its essence. Kinds or particular objects are made what they are by their essence but not conversely. If so, the asymmetry between

200

D E F I N I T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y : F O R M , M AT T E R , A N D C O M P O U N D

them and their essence is straightforward. A form, by contrast, is itself an essence and so is identical with the essence described by the definiens-term of its definition. If this is correct, there can be no priority of the definiens over the form defined as the two are identical, and priority is incompatible with identity. It seems, therefore, that no plausible relation of priority can be read into definitions of substance-kind-forms, whether this priority is conceived as obtaining within the definiens or as holding of the definiens over the definiendum.

PART II

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

This page intentionally left blank

8 Priority in Nature or in Substance My argument in Part I sought to establish that, while natural form is essentially matterinvolving, it can successfully satisfy the requirement of definitional priority over certain types of matter. If this is correct, Aristotelian form is correctly defined without mentioning these types of matter. By contrast, these types of matter are correctly defined only by reference to the relevant form. In several places, however, I argued that form is not only definitionally but also ‘essentially’ prior to these types of matter (and to the compounds partly constituted from them). Although I did not fully set out the qualification ‘essentially’, it is clear from my formulations that this added notion of priority is understood in terms of identity-fixing. While form determines the essence of the corresponding posterior entities, its own essence is not determined by them. Here, even if the underlying concept of priority closely parallels priority in definition, yet it is obviously grounded on ontological considerations. For it is intuitively explicated in terms of the asymmetric, causal notion of making something what it essentially is (but not conversely). Part II of the present study will aim at elucidating this last notion by reference to Aristotle’s own view of priority in nature, in substance, or in being. My starting-point will be his comments on this notion in Metaphysics .11. I shall argue, first, that his formulation of priority in nature or in substance need not be taken in the existential way in which an item can exist independently of another but not conversely. There is a different conception which is theoretically legitimate and will prove useful. Something can be without another thing but not vice versa in that the first can be what it essentially is without the second (being what it essentially is), while the converse is not the case. This modal formulation could be directly grounded on the non-modal, essentialist, and causal notion of making something the (type of ) thing that it essentially is (but not vice versa). Because something makes another thing what it is (but not the other way about), it follows that the first can be what it is without the second (but not conversely). In later chapters I shall set out further this view and shall argue that it yields better results as an interpretation of Aristotelian ontological priority than the existential construal does. First, however, let us examine whether Aristotle’s discussion in Metaphysics .11 allows conceptual space for a non-existential notion of ontological priority.

204

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

8.1 The Neutral Formulation of the Independence Claim [IC] In Metaphysics .11, 1019a1–4, Aristotle explicates priority in nature or in substance (B fi çØ/PÆ fi ) in terms of asymmetric ontological independence. Elsewhere he provides similar formulations for what he labels ‘priority in being’ (fiH r ÆØ; cf. Metaphysics [Met.] Z.10, 1034b30–2; M.2, 1077b2–3). In what follows I shall use the term ‘ontological’ to characterize this notion of priority. Some things are called prior and posterior in this way, while others are called so in nature and in substance, those for which it is possible to be without other things, but not the latter without them; this division was used by Plato. (Met. .11, 1019a1–4; Kirwan’s trans.)

At 1019a3–4 Aristotle formulates the following independence claim: [IC] A is ontologically prior to B just in case A can be (r ÆØ) without B (¼ı ¼ººø) but B cannot be without A (¼ı KŒø ). This claim clearly represents ontological priority as an asymmetric relation. Further, it implies that ontological priority involves, as a necessary part, ontological separation. For A is ontologically prior to B just in case A is ontologically separate from (is or can be without, ¼ı or åøæd ) B but B is not ontologically separate from A. The formulation of [IC], by itself, is open as to what the exact ontological relation between A and B is. For the term ‘to be’ (r ÆØ) may be taken either existentially or as meaning ‘to be what something is’.1 If so, A can be ontologically prior to B either in existence: [PIE] A is ontologically prior to B if and only if A can exist without B existing but not the other way about. Or equivalently: B cannot exist unless A exists but not conversely [Priority in Existence]. Or A could be ontologically prior to B in being what it is: [PIB] A is ontologically prior to B if and only if A can be what it is independently of B being what it is, while the converse is not the case [Priority in Being]. [PIB] could be labelled the ‘ontological counterpart’ to definitional priority. Just as A is definitionally prior to B if and only if A is mentioned in B’s definiens-term but not vice

1 Cleary (Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority [Senses], The Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series, 1988, p. 45) does not notice this openness of the ‘being without’ formula as between existence and ‘being what it is’. Moreover, he later construes .11’s priority formula in the existential way (p. 48). However, he holds (p. 50) that ‘existence’ (or ‘being’) has many senses. As he says, ‘the trouble with using “existence” as a translation of r ÆØ is that it gives a false impression of univocity and so tends to mislead us in interpreting Aristotle’. For this reason, he claims, it is preferable to talk about ‘being’ and ‘modes of being’ rather than ‘existence’. His formulations, however, are put in terms of ‘existing without’.

P R I O R I T Y I N N AT U R E O R I N S U B S TA N C E

205

versa, A is ontologically prior to B in the manner of [PIB] just in case A is part of B’s essence, its being what it is, but not conversely. To avoid a ‘premature’ objection, the following clarification is in order. In the first instance, ‘to be’ (r ÆØ) is open between its existential and its predicative uses. In its predicative use ‘to be’ signifies ‘being thus-and-so’ but not straightforwardly ‘being what something (essentially) is’. However, the merely predicative use would yield philosophically uninteresting results if applied to the notion of ontological priority. What would the significance be in claiming that (e.g.) A can be white without B being white or, for that matter, without B sitting, being sun-tanned, etc.? Second, why would priority in ‘being thus-and-so’ constitute a type of priority in nature or in substance? Third, priority in ‘being thus-and-so’ would, presumably, be included under the type of priority that attributes of prior items possess, a case already treated at 1018b37–1019a1 (Ø æ æÆ º ªÆØ a H æ æø ŁÅ, x  PŁÅ

ºØ Å · e b ªaæ ªæÆ B ŒÆŁ’ Æc Ł e b KØçÆÆ ). Even in this case, though, the prior items are not accidental attributes of any old type but belong to the relevant subjects per se. In the light of these considerations, it is preferable not to understand [PIB] in the merely predicative manner. If ‘being thus-and-so’ is equivalent to ‘being ___’ where the gap could be occupied even by essential predicates, this predicative use of r ÆØ includes the ‘being what something (essentially) is’ formula too (see section 8.2). If so, it is more plausible to take [PIB] in the philosophically important, essentialist sense of ‘A’s being what it is without B being what it is’, rather than in the general predicative sense of ‘A’s being thus-and-so without B being thusand-so’. If these considerations are correct, Aristotelian ontological priority may be something distinct from or more liberal than existential priority.2 More importantly, there is reason to think that Aristotelian ontological priority is not existential priority. Thus, for

In his comments on Met. .8, Panayides (‘Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality in Substance’, Ancient Philosophy, 19, 1999, pp. 327–8) challenges the view that priority in substance is asymmetric ontological independence and favours Aquinas’ and Ross’s interpretations which explicate priority in substance in terms of completion or perfection and degrees of reality or substantiality of an entity (pp. 330-1). However, Panayides thinks that ontological priority is nothing other than asymmetric existential independence. In this respect, his criticism does not affect my view which does not take priority in substance to be the same as asymmetric existential independence. More importantly, my interpretation accommodates the argument put forward by Aristotle in Met. .11, where priority in substance (or in nature) clearly is asymmetric ontological (but not simply existential) independence. Thus, for instance, Panayides argues that Phys. .7, 260b15-19, sharply distinguishes ontological priority (which he equates with asymmetric existential independence) from priority in substance: e ªaæ æH [ . . . ] i º ªÆØ ºÆåH . º ªÆØ b æ æ y  c Z PŒ ÆØ pººÆ, KŒE b ¼ı H ¼ººø, ŒÆd e fiH åæ {, ŒÆd e ŒÆ’ PÆ. If so, he concludes, priority in substance cannot be asymmetric ontological (¼ existential) independence (pp. 336–7). My view is invulnerable to Panayides’s line of criticism, given that my notion of ontological priority is not one of asymmetric existential independence. Panayides, however, cannot explain why Met. .11 uses the term ‘priority in substance’ for the notion of asymmetric ontological independence (viz., A can be without B but not conversely) which – in his view of Phys. .7 – should be sharply distinct from priority in substance. By contrast, as I shall argue, my interpretation can unify Met. .11 and .8 (and Phys. .7) without equating priority in substance (or in nature) with existential independence. 2

206

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

instance, when Aristotle discusses Platonist priority, he does not use the term ‘to be’ (as he does here), which is open between [PIE] and [PIB]. He rather uses stronger terms which imply destruction, annihilation, or going out of existence (e.g. IÆØæEŁÆØ). In chapter 9 I shall discuss how in the Eudemian Ethics (1217b10-12) he claims that, if a Platonic Form F is thus destroyed, its sensible instances are destroyed too.3 Similarly, in Metaphysics .8, 1017b18-21, if mathematical objects or number are ‘eliminated’, all things are eliminated too: for the defining parts of all things are mathematical objects or number.4 As I shall argue in chapter 9, these locutions suggest that Aristotle’s account of Platonist priority is one which ascribes asymmetric existential independence to Forms. But Aristotelian priority need not be taken in this narrow way. Aristotle’s formulation of [IC] favours a more liberal ontological claim of priority, one which could be read either as [PIE] or as [PIB].5 If one understands Aristotelian priority in this manner, it is not difficult to see why in Metaphysics .11, 1019a4, Aristotle notes that Plato used this distinction (between ontologically prior and posterior things) without criticizing him. Aristotle takes this distinction to be useful when construed (as in the previous paragraph) more liberally than the strictly existential approach allows. An interesting possibility is left open at this juncture. One could agree with Aristotle that Plato used the priority relation, but still express scepticism about Aristotle’s interpretation of Platonist ontological priority strictly as [PIE]. If so, one could argue that even Platonist ontological priority may be conceived either as [PIE] or as [PIB]. A possible place where the priority criterion is used by Plato might be the following passage:6

3 The Greek phrase is IÆØæı ı ªaæ F å ı IÆØæEŁÆØ ŒÆd a  åÆ B N Æ , L º ªÆØ fiH  åØ KŒÅ . 4 With regard to mathematical objects it is said: z IÆØæı ø IÆØæEÆØ e ‹º; for number: IÆØæı ı  ªaæ P  r ÆØ, ŒÆd ›æÇØ Æ. 5 Stephen Makin (‘What does Aristotle Mean by Priority in Substance?’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 24, 2003, pp. 217–21) argues that priority in nature and substance is asymmetric existential independence. Thus, he is not sensitive to the openness of r ÆØ as between existence and ‘being what it is’. For this reason he understands ontological priority in potentiality and actuality as existential independence by invoking considerations about generation and destruction. Moreover, he applies this construal of .11 to .8: he thinks that actuality is ontologically prior to potentiality (1049b10–11; 1050a4ff.) in the sense of existential independence which he traces in .11. The difference between his account and mine will become clearer when I discuss .8 in section 13.3: in .8 existential priority cannot work, even if one introduces premisses concerning generation and destruction from .11, as Makin does. Furthermore, taking .11’s ontological priority as [PIB], instead of [PIE], gives better results (or so I shall argue) in the contexts of both .11 and .8. 6 Cleary (Senses, pp. 45–6) compares Aristotle’s reference to Plato’s priority distinction with the Platonic method of division in the Sophist and the Politicus. In that context, genera are thought to be prior to species, because a certain species implies a certain genus but not conversely (e.g. if there is a man, then there is an animal; but it is not the case that, if there is an animal, then there is a man). I prefer to compare this part of Met. .11 with the Republic, a Platonic work which clearly argues that the Form of the Good is superior in power and seniority to other Forms. This claim is directly relevant to the question of what ousia or primary reality is and so is connected with Aristotle’s own discussion in Met. .11. Cleary’s own references (p. 46) to Met. B.5 and .8 concerning the priority of number over point, of point over line, etc. are closely linked with the notion of priority discussed in the Republic.

P R I O R I T Y I N N AT U R E O R I N S U B S TA N C E

207

Thus, we should also say that the things which are known not only owe to the Good their being known, but also have their being and/or their substance [ŒÆd e rÆ  ŒÆd c PÆ] in virtue of it, although the Good is not substance, but surpasses substance to a great extent in seniority and potency. (Republic, 509b6–10; my trans.)

Plato thinks that the Form of the Good is prior to all other Forms in seniority or rank and potency (æ å æÆ fi ŒÆd ı Ø). Not only does it make all other Forms knowable; it also provides them with their being (e r ÆØ) and/or their substance (c PÆ).7 The latter claim seems to correspond to Aristotle’s notion of ontological priority. That the Form of the Good is not itself substance (PÆ) but is far beyond substance, is a further, separate claim which need not concern us at present. The important point is that Plato’s priority thesis is compatible with either [PIE] or [PIB]. Moreover, the argument offered in this passage could be understood as employing not the existential but the ‘being what it is’ notion of ‘to be’. Thus, the Form of the Good may be responsible for making the rest of the Forms what they are (but not conversely), without the rest of the Forms being dependent upon the Form of the Good for their existence. Indeed, it would be difficult to see in what way the rest of the Forms could depend on the existence of the Good for their own existence. For each Form is a necessary existent regardless of whether anything else exists or not. It might be argued that the relevant sort of dependence is one in which the existence of the Form of the Good explains the existence of the rest of the Forms: the latter exist because the former does. This notion, however, is distinct from the asymmetric capacity for independent existence as encapsulated in [PIE]. Indeed, it seems to approximate [PIB]. For, arguably, the way in which the existence of the Good explains the existence of the rest of the Forms is by causing them to exist as entities that essentially involve goodness. The idea, then, would be that the Form of the Good, its being the Good, makes the rest of the Forms essentially good, while the converse does not hold true. Clearly, though, this is not an existential notion of priority along the lines of [PIE] but is a version of [PIB]. Understood in this way, the Platonist notion of ontological priority could and should be endorsed by Aristotle. But his use of Platonist priority is determined by two factors. First, given his use of ‘to be’ at .11, 1019a3 (as opposed to that of IÆØæEŁÆØ at Metaphysics .8, 1017b18–21, or Eudemian Ethics 1217b10–12), the formulation of the priority claim should be open between [PIE] and [PIB].8 Second, since he denies that there are any Platonic Forms, the relata of this type of ontological priority cannot be the Form of the Good and all other Forms, contrary to the claims

7 I am not assuming that e r ÆØ and c PÆ necessarily designate separate notions. The present argument works even if these two terms constitute a virtual hendiadys. 8 To be sure, even the Platonist notion of priority might be taken neutrally between [PIE] and [PIB]. If so, in describing Platonist priority as [PIE], Aristotle is perhaps misreading the Platonist position in a critical, even polemical, spirit.

208

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

made in the passage just quoted from the Republic.9 As will become clearer from chapter 9, however, Aristotle does not consider Plato’s conception of ontological priority as complying with these two requirements. For Aristotle takes Platonist ontological priority as strictly existential despite the fact that the general, Platonistinspired formula [IC] is, by itself, open between [PIE] and [PIB]. Further, Aristotle understands the relata of Platonist ontological priority to be the Form of the Good and the rest of the Forms or Forms (quite generally) and perceptible particulars (cf. Met. A.6, 988a10–11; A.7, 988b4–6).

8.2 More on the Distinction between Existing and Being What Something Is Some might object that the distinction between the notions of existing and ‘being what something is’ is not an admissible move to make. This objection has a conceptual and an exegetical aspect which can be treated separately from each other. That the distinction between existence and ‘being what something is’ is conceptually plausible becomes clearer on the basis of Kit Fine’s observation about the difficulties that arise when one identifies the two notions: For it does not seem right to identify the ‘being’ of an object, its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect, existence is too weak; for there is more to what an object is than its mere existence. In another respect, existence is too strong; for what an object is, its nature, need not include existence as a part.10

This argument suggests that the notion of ‘being what something is’ can be explicated independently of the notion of existence. If so, the notion of ontological priority could be coherently distinguished into priority in existence and priority in ‘being what it is’. A consideration which suggests not only that this last distinction is conceptually legitimate but also that the notion of priority in ‘being what something is’ fares better than existential priority is that the latter has temporal implications which should not affect purely ontological types of priority. For instance, a thinker (especially someone Cleary (Senses, p. 45) thinks that ‘it is perhaps a little surprising to find Aristotle apparently accepting a Platonic criterion for what is prior with respect to substance (ŒÆa PÆ), especially in one of the books of the Met.’. But, as I shall argue, Aristotle may be accepting the formulation of the criterion without agreeing with Plato on what satisfies this criterion. Cleary himself solves this problem by claiming (p. 48) that, in introducing the subjecthood criterion at 1019a5–6, Aristotle keeps the Platonist priority criterion formula (‘being without . . . ’) but now this is not satisfied by Platonic Forms but by different things. For it is not Platonic Forms but particular objects or primary substances of the Categories which are .11’s subjects. In my interpretation I prefer to leave this point open: there is no reason, in .11’s context, to favour the primacy of particular substances in the manner of the Categories. The priority criterion plus the subjecthood requirement should make substance ontologically prior, regardless of whether it may be a particular substance or a substantial form. If so, it is better to think that Aristotle uses the same Platonist formulation of the criterion but contends that different items satisfy it. For he rejects certain other Platonist tenets but also introduces theses of his own. 10 Kit Fine, ‘Ontological Dependence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, 1995, p. 274. 9

P R I O R I T Y I N N AT U R E O R I N S U B S TA N C E

209

holding distinctly Aristotelian views) may wish to claim that a completed house is, in some relevant ontological sense, prior to (e.g.) the bricks which constitute it. However, if one adopts the existential approach, one has to explain in what way the completed house could exist without the bricks existing, while the latter could not exist without the former. This seems to be a difficult task, given that the bricks can or do exist before the completed house exists: hence, the former seem capable of existing without the latter existing but the converse does not hold good. Further, there is not even prima facie plausible reason why the bricks’ temporally prior existence should determine whether the house is ontologically prior. It seems, then, that the existential construal invokes considerations of temporal priority which are either irrelevant or yield incorrect results. The objection under discussion involves a further radical challenge. A brief but sharp way to put forward this challenge runs as follows. Assuming that the notions of existing and being what something is are distinguished and that ontological priority is accordingly understood either as [PIE] or [PIB], it still seems that items which fail to satisfy the former cannot qualify for the latter or/and conversely. If so, these two notions of priority cannot be properly demarcated independently of each other and, hence, the distinction may be groundless. Thus, for instance, my view may entail that an Aristotelian form F is what it is independently of the compounds it enforms being what they are but not conversely. This, it could be claimed, implies that, even if all compound F ’s cease to exist, F still is what it is independently of the existence of its compound instances. However, the objector would argue, if there are no compound F ’s, F itself cannot even exist, let alone continue to be what it is. My reply is that this objection is telling only if one assumes that the concept of ‘being what something is’ is essentially dependent upon the notion of existence. By contrast, my account questions and, in some measure, undermines this assumption. It may even be the case that, in order for a form F to be what it is, F must exist. And, similarly, F cannot exist independently of (perhaps) at least one compound F existing. What follows from these two claims is only that, in order for a form F to be what it is, at least one compound F must exist. Yet by no means does this entail that the concept of what it is to be F consists (or even partly consists) in the notion of at least one compound F’s existing. This is the deeper motivation for my view, which argues that the notion of ‘being what something is’ could be explicated independently of the notion of existence. If this is correct, ontological priority can be successfully understood as [PIB], without invoking the notion of existence. Indeed, the notion of being what something is, as employed by [PIB], has the additional merit of emphasizing the purely ontological aspect of the priority at issue, an aspect which should not be contaminated by considerations such as the objection just raised. Contrary to the existential approach, the notion of [PIB] is not corroded by temporal considerations such as the ones noted in the housebricks example. Nor is it dependent upon numerical, as it were, questions such as the following: how many existing compound Fs are necessary for a form F to exist?

210

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

All such concerns are ostracized from the account of [PIB] as irrelevant to the issue of how an item qualifies as an ontologically basic entity. The exegetical question of whether and in what way Aristotle himself distinguished between existing and ‘being what something is’ is extremely important. It cannot, however, be settled on the basis of Metaphysics .11 alone. There is some evidence that the distinction is drawn elsewhere in the corpus but not in Metaphysics .11. For instance, in the Posterior Analytics B.1, 89b32–5, B.2, 89b38, b39–90a1, a2–5, and a32–4, Aristotle thinks that ‘to be’ (Ø) can be used either simpliciter (without any predicates: ±ºH ŒÆd c H Ææå ø Ø) or qualifiedly (as having predicates: e ‹Ø j N Ø [ . . . ] e Kd æı ; H Ææå ø). The first use is exemplified by statements such as ‘God is’ or ‘Centaur is not’, which clearly have existential meaning. The second is found in claims such as ‘A is white’ or ‘the moon is suffering eclipse’. This second use of ‘to be’ as ‘being thus-and-so’, even if primarily predicative, includes the ‘being what something is’ formula too. For ‘being thus-and-so’ entails that ‘to be’ is used with a place-holder which can be filled in by any sort of predicates, even essential ones. If these two different uses of ‘to be’ correspond to distinct ontological notions of existing and being what something is, it is plausible to think that, at the conceptual level too, Aristotle drew the distinction between these two notions. Moreover, quite apart from the different uses of the verb ‘to be’, Aristotle argues, at Posterior Analytics B.8, 93a14–28, that one can have some grasp of ‘what X is’ before (or independently of ) establishing the existence of X (where X is a kind).11 Similarly, at Posterior Analytics A.2, 72a18–24, he argues that, in the context of demonstrative sciences, one needs to assume as principles both ‘what it is’ ( KØ) or definitions (›æØ ) and ‘that it is’ (e r ÆØ) or hypotheses ( ŁØ ). These points seem to presuppose that the notions of existing and ‘being what it is’ are distinct. For, if there were no clear distinction between them, one could not have any grasp of ‘what it is’ before (or independently of ) knowing ‘that it is’. Nor would one need to assume both but just one of them. The distinction seems to be explicitly in place at 72a23–4: ‘for what the unit is and that the unit is are not the same’ (e ªaæ  KØ  ŒÆd e r ÆØ Æ P ÆP ).

8.3 Interim Conclusions I shall not discuss in any further detail passages from the Analytics as they present several difficulties which are not relevant to present concerns. More importantly, it is not clear whether and in what measure the Analytics engage with the ontological issues discussed

11 This seems to hold good at least according to some views: see (e.g.) Charles, D., Aristotle on Meaning and Essence [Meaning], Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 23–56; see also his ‘Some Comments on Prof. Enrico Berti’s “Being and Essence in Contemporary Interpretations of Aristotle” ’ in A. Bottani, M. Carrara, & P. Giaretta (eds.), Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 2002, pp. 114–24.

P R I O R I T Y I N N AT U R E O R I N S U B S TA N C E

211

in the Metaphysics. It may well be that the Analytics are concerned with merely linguistic, predicative, or at most epistemological problems without circumscribing, or committing Aristotle to, definite metaphysical positions. It would constitute a separate project to study Aristotle’s explication of and arguments for the distinction between existing and being what it is. Nevertheless, this task lies outside the scope of the present study. It is perhaps more important not to answer the questions of whether, where, and in what way Aristotle drew this distinction but rather why he did not do so in the Metaphysics, where the notion of ontological priority plays a significant role as a criterion for primary substancehood. Again, this is not an issue which could be satisfactorily settled in terms of a few brief remarks. One way of tackling this issue might involve the idea that Aristotle’s levels of discussion vary from one treatise to another or even within a single work and are layered in ways which may rule out certain otherwise pertinent or important considerations from the treatment of a topic. In particular, the intricacies of the semantics of ‘to be’ and the corresponding distinction between the concepts of existence and being thus-and-so constitute important problems in their own right but may not be congenial to the level of discussion or the type of argument advanced in certain parts of the Metaphysics. Perhaps these are issues which fall under the subject-matter of ‘logical’ works such as the Analytics. Metaphysics .11 does not, at any rate, explicitly draw the distinction between existing and being what something is. For this reason, my argument is based on the following, non-committal claim. In Metaphysics .11, 1019a3–4, Aristotle uses the term ‘to be’ (r ÆØ) in his formulation of ontological priority in a way which is neutral or open between existence and ‘being what it is’ (regardless of whether he clearly makes this conceptual distinction anywhere or not).12 However – I shall also argue – his further distinctions and examples (both in Metaphysics .11 and elsewhere) work successfully if the term ‘to be’ employed in his formulations is understood nonexistentially. Indeed, his notion of ontological priority yields philosophically significant results only if taken as [PIB].

12 There are three possible answers to the question of whether or not Aristotle makes the relevant distinction anywhere in the corpus: (1) he did not properly draw the distinction between existence and ‘being what it is’ anywhere in the corpus; (2) he did distinguish them both elsewhere and in Metaphysics D.11; and (3) he made the distinction elsewhere but not in D.11. My argument will not be committed to any of these three alternatives.

9 Platonist Ontological Priority In Metaphysics .11 Aristotle acknowledges that the notion of ontological priority was used by Plato (1019a4). In chapter 8 I suggested that Aristotle’s own understanding of ontological priority is neutral as it is compatible either with [PIE] or with [PIB]. Moreover, I claimed that his formulation of [IC] at 1019a3–4 in terms of ‘to be’ (r ÆØ) indicates that he favours [PIB] rather than [PIE]. For, while in his own account of ontological priority he uses the weaker term ‘to be’, in his criticism of Platonist priority he deploys stronger terms (such as IÆØæEŁÆØ) which imply going out of existence. It seems plausible to infer from this that part of his disagreement with Plato’s view is due to the existential conception of ontological priority if indeed this is how he understands the Platonist position. In the present chapter I shall seek to support this last claim. I shall discuss an argument advanced in the Eudemian Ethics, 1217b10–15, which claims that Platonist Forms are thought to be ontologically prior to their perceptible instances. My aim is to show that Aristotle understands Platonist ontological priority as asymmetric existential independence. Platonist Forms are conceived as ontologically prior to their perceptible instances in that they exist (or can exist) without their perceptible instances existing but not the other way about. If this is correct, Aristotle cannot be favouring the existential construal of ontological priority. First, he frequently criticizes Platonists for holding that their Forms can exist without any perceptible instances existing (but not conversely). Second, his substantial forms must fulfil, in some appropriate way, the requirement of ontological priority if they are to be primary substances. But if so, they cannot be ontologically prior to matter or to particular compounds in the manner of [PIE], in the very same Platonist way which Aristotle criticizes as problematic. This seems to be a sound conclusion, unless Aristotle’s own forms are supposed to have some extra feature which enables them to fend off his criticism and rejection of Platonist, existentially prior Forms. Aristotelian forms, however, do not seem to possess any such feature in virtue of which they could qualify, in any straightforward way, as existentially prior to their perceptible instances. Hence, Aristotle’s own notion of ontological priority, the one which applies to his substantial forms, must be distinct from the Platonist, existential construal of this notion. This line of argument, therefore, would constitute further evidence against [PIE] and in favour of [PIB]. It is worth noting that this conclusion need not entail that the concept of [PIE] is, in Aristotle’s

P L AT O N I S T O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y

213

view, incoherent. Rather, it is a notion which is not useful as a criterion of primary substancehood to be fulfilled by forms relative to their compound instances. It should be noted at the outset that my argument will not assume that Aristotle’s claims describe faithfully or criticize fairly Platonist positions. Rather, my aim is to examine what he takes Platonist priority to be and why he rejects it, independently of whether he was a fair interpreter of Platonism and of whether there is a correct construal of Platonist priority.

9.1 The Discussion of Platonist Priority in the Eudemian Ethics The context of the passage to be examined from the Eudemian Ethics is a discussion of what is (morally) best and of the different conceptions of this supreme good. In this context Aristotle seems to turn to Platonists, describing their view of the supreme good or (as they call it) the Good-Itself. [1] For they say that the Good-itself is the best thing of all, and the Good-itself is that to which it belongs to be both first among goods [æ{ r ÆØ H IªÆŁH], and the cause by its presence, for other things, of their being goods. [2] And both of these belong to the form of the Good. By ‘both of these’ I mean the fact that it is first among goods [æH H IªÆŁH], and that it is the cause by its presence, for the other good things, of their being good. [3] For, they say that it is of that object [the form of the Good], above all, that the good is truly said (other things being goods through sharing in it, and similarity to it), and [4] it is first among goods; for, if the object in which things share were taken away, with it would go all the things that share in the Form, and are called what they are called through sharing in it; and that is the way that the first stands in relation to the posterior [ŒÆd æH H IªÆŁH· IÆØæı ı ªaæ F å ı IÆØæEŁÆØ ŒÆd a  åÆ B N Æ , L º ªÆØ fiH  åØ KŒÅ , e b æH F åØ e æ  æe e oæ]. [5] So, the Good-itself is the Form of the Good; [6] and indeed, like the other Forms, it is separate from the things that share in it [ŒÆd ªaæ åøæØc r ÆØ H å ø, uæ ŒÆd a ¼ººÆ N Æ ]. (Eudemian Ethics [EE] 1217b2–15; Woods’s trans.) The inferential structure of this passage seems to run as follows: [1] Aristotle attributes to Platonists three claims concerning three corresponding features of the Good-Itself: (a) The Good-Itself is what is best amongst all other good things (b3). (b) It is primary or first amongst other good things (b4). (c) It is the cause, by its presence in other good things, of their being good (b5). [2] Features (b) and (c) are also ascribed to the Form of the Good.

214

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[3] Aristotle explicates in some detail feature (c). [4] Feature (b) is spelt out. [5] From [1] and [2] it becomes clear that the Good-Itself is identified with the Form of the Good. For this reason both the former and the latter are essentially characterized (inter alia) by features (b) and (c). [6] Aristotle adds that, just as all other Forms, the Form of the Good (or, given [5], the Good-Itself ) is separate from the perceptible particulars which participate in it. The present section will focus on part [4] of this passage, Aristotle’s characterization of Platonist primacy or priority. It is important to emphasize that (b), the feature of primacy, could be seen as applying not just to the Form of the Good but to all Platonist Forms in the following fashion: (b)

A Form F is prior to all its perceptible instances (b4).

This is so despite the fact that the Form of the Good might itself be conceived as possessing a further type of priority over the rest of the Forms. Yet the point of the present passage is the relation of primacy or priority between Forms, such as the Form of the Good, and their perceptible particular instances. If so, there is no reason to restrict Aristotle’s discussion to the priority of the Form of the Good over particular good items. Aristotle’s explanation of Platonist priority is given at 1217b11–12 (æH H IªÆŁH· IÆØæı ı ªaæ . . . ). This explanation involves the terminology of participation, which is used at 1217b9–10. However, there is no reason, for present purposes, to examine in detail the notion of participation. It is sufficient to note that Aristotle’s explanation of Platonist priority presupposes that perceptible particular Fs participate in the Form F (a  åÆ B N Æ ) and are truly called ‘F’ in so far as they participate in F (L º ªÆØ fiH  åØ KŒÅ ). Similarly, a form F is ‘participated in’ (F å ı) by perceptible particular Fs. Given this conceptual apparatus, feature (b), the notion of priority of a Form F over its perceptible particular instances, is set out as follows: (b) F is prior to all perceptible particular Fs in that, if F is eliminated (IÆØæı ı ªaæ F å ı), all perceptible particular Fs are eliminated too (IÆØæEŁÆØ ŒÆd a  åÆ B N Æ ). The converse, however, does not (it appears) hold good. The first important question raised by my formulation of (b) is what the implications of the term IÆØæı ı or IÆØæEŁÆØ are. As the renderings ‘taken away’, ‘eliminated’, or ‘annihilated’ clearly indicate, this term suggests that Aristotle understands Platonist priority in the existential manner of [PIE]. His idea seems to be that, if a Form ceases to exist, its perceptible instances cease to exist too. As I noted in section 8.1, similar terms

P L AT O N I S T O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y

215

are used in Metaphysics .8, in a context where Aristotle reports Platonist (or Platonizing) views which take mathematical objects or numbers as substances. There it seems that part of the reason why entities of this sort are favoured as substances is that, if these entities were taken away or eliminated, all other things would be eliminated too (1017b18–21: z IÆØæı ø IÆØæEÆØ e ‹º . . . ). By contrast, in the formulation of his own notion of ontological priority Aristotle uses the weaker, less committal term ‘to be’ (r ÆØ), which may imply either the existential construal or the conception in terms of being what something essentially is (see my discussion in section 8.1). The contrast between the two terms, as well as the existential connotations of ‘being eliminated’ itself (IÆØæEŁÆØ), suggest that Aristotle’s interpretation of Platonist priority ascribes to Platonist Forms asymmetric existential independence from their perceptible instances. If so, his understanding of Platonist ontological priority seems equivalent to [PIE]. Second, my formulation of (b) clearly takes Platonist priority as an asymmetric relation between Forms and their perceptible instances. While perceptible particular Fs would cease to exist if F ceased to exist, F would continue to exist even if all perceptible particular Fs went out of existence. Aristotle’s claim, made at 1217b11–12, however, does not add (as I do) that, if all perceptible Fs went out of existence, the Form F would continue to exist. Thus, one might object that the Platonist notion of priority is non-symmetric: a Form’s ontological priority over its perceptible instances does not imply (or rule out) that, if all perceptible particulars went out of existence, the relevant Form would continue to exist. Worse still, one might think that Platonist priority is symmetric: just as all perceptible Fs cease to exist if the Form F ceases to exist, so too the Form F ceases to exist if all perceptible Fs cease to exist. Asymmetry, however, seems to be required by Aristotle’s choice of labelling the Platonist relation as ‘primacy’ or ‘priority’. For it would be (at least) misleading to call Forms ‘primary’ or ‘prior’ in relation to their perceptible instances and, at the same time, allow that their perceptible instances, too, bear the same relation to them. Why or how would Forms be primary or first relative to their perceptible instances if their perceptible instances were also primary or first relative to Forms in the very same way or sense? The opponent of asymmetry would find it difficult to answer this last question, given that there is no evidence that Aristotle uses distinct senses of primacy or priority in different parts of this passage. Indeed, his claim that (b) is the way in which the ‘primary’ stands in relation to the ‘posterior’ seems to be fixing the asymmetry of the Platonist notion of priority. For perceptible particulars are understood as posterior to the primary items, Forms, while Forms are not themselves said to be posterior to perceptible particulars (1217b13: e b æH F åØ e æ  æe e oæ). Moreover, this asymmetric understanding of Platonist priority agrees with Aristotle’s own asymmetric conception of ontological priority in Metaphysics .11, a notion which (as Aristotle remarks) was used by Plato himself (1019a3–4). If part of Plato’s

216

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

use of this notion was the asymmetry clearly introduced in Metaphysics .11, it is not surprising that the Eudemian Ethics, too, takes Platonist priority to be asymmetric. Third, my formulation of (b) takes the scope of existential priority of a Form F as ranging over all perceptible Fs. For Aristotle seems to be speaking of all other things which are F, excluding the Form F itself. At 1217b2–3 he claims that Platonists hold that the Good-Itself is the best amongst all good items (çÆd ªaæ ¼æØ b r ÆØ ø ÆPe e IªÆŁ ). In the immediately subsequent clause, then, where he argues that the Good-Itself is first amongst good items (b3–4), it is plausible to think that he takes this Form’s priority as ranging over all these good items just referred to at b2–3. Similarly, at b10–11, the term H IªÆŁH is better understood in the light of b2–3 as referring to all perceptible particular good items. Therefore, Aristotle does not (it seems) intend his claims to mean that a Platonist Form F is existentially prior only to one or some perceptible Fs. Platonists are presented as endorsing the stronger claim that their Forms are existentially prior to all their perceptible instances. Even so, however, there remains a scope ambiguity as ‘all’ may be either distributive (‘for any one perceptible F . . . ’) or collective (‘for all perceptible Fs taken together . . . ’). This ambiguity could be resolved if it is legitimate to invoke elements from Aristotle’s explication of feature (c), the claim that the Good-Itself is the cause, by its presence in other good things, of their being good. At 1217b5, 7, and 10, Aristotle specifies that the Platonist Form of the Good is a cause of this sort relative to ‘the rest of good things’ (ÆN{ B fi ÆæıÆ fi E ¼ººØ F IªÆŁa r ÆØ; e E ¼ººØ ÆYØ IªÆŁE B fi ÆæıÆ fi F IªÆŁE r ÆØ; ŒÆa åc ªaæ ŒÆd › Ø ÅÆ pººÆ IªÆŁa KŒÅ

[sc. B N Æ F IªÆŁF] r ÆØ). But, in this case, the rest of good things are all perceptible particular good items collectively, excluding the Form of the Good itself. If the scope of feature (c) is a reliable guide as to the intended scope of Platonist priority, Platonist Forms would seem to be existentially prior to all their perceptible instances taken together.

9.2 Platonist and Aristotelian Ontological Priority The above considerations suggest that Aristotle’s interpretation of Platonist ontological priority is cast in terms of asymmetric existential independence of Forms from all their perceptible instances. This conception, however, is equivalent to [PIE]: an item is ontologically prior to another just in case the first can (or does) exist without the second existing, but not conversely. In condemning Platonist priority, then, part of Aristotle’s aim is to discard this existential construal. But he does not completely reject the notion of ontological priority: for his own substantial forms must (qua primary substances) satisfy an appropriate criterion of ontological priority. They cannot, though, satisfy the existential version of this criterion: for, if they did, how would they differ from Platonist Forms, the entities which are held to be existentially prior to perceptible particulars?

P L AT O N I S T O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y

217

In the light of this, it seems plausible to conclude that Aristotle leaves conceptual space for understanding the notion of ontological priority in the manner of [PIB]. With the help of this last concept, his forms could be ontologically prior to matter or to particular compounds. If so, they could be primary substances in a way significantly different from that in which Platonists conceive their Forms to be so. If this is correct, the discussion of the Eudemian Ethics seems indirectly to favour [PIB] as opposed to [PIE].

9.3 Appendix: Separation and Priority In sections 2.2 and 8.1 I argued that definitional as well as ontological priority seems to require, as a necessary part, the notion of separation (or separability). The main reason offered for this claim was that definitional separation looks like a non-symmetric definitional independence relation, while ontological separation resembles a nonsymmetric ontological independence relation. In both cases, then, separation seems conceptually cognate with a notion of ‘without-ness’, one which is equivalent to nonsymmetric independence of some sort. If so, to generate the notion of (definitional or ontological) priority – the asymmetric relation of (definitional or ontological) independence – it is necessary to have (definitional or ontological) separation but also add asymmetry. Thus, for instance, for A to be definitionally prior to B is for A to be defined (or be definable) without (or separately from) B and not conversely. Or, for A to be ontologically prior to B is for A to be (or to be capable of being) without (or separately from) B and not conversely. If so, priority is essentially characterized on the basis of separation plus asymmetry. Apart from these conceptual considerations, however, we have not yet traced any direct evidence in support of this interpretation in Aristotle’s own claims. In Metaphysics D.11, for example, the explication of ontological priority is shaped in terms of ‘being capable of being without (¼ı)’ but there is no mention of separation (1019a3–4).1 It seems plausible, though, to think that being ‘without’ (¼ı) is equivalent to being ‘separately’ (åøæ ), even if this last term does not occur in the text. The ‘being separately (åøæ )’ formulation may be seen as implying separation: for A to be without or separately from (åøæ F) B is just for A to be separate (åøæØe) from 1

The connection between priority and separation which is put forward in the passage from the Eudemian Ethics is absent from Met. .11. I agree with Gail Fine (‘Separation’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 1984, pp. 35–6 and 38), who maintains that separation and ontological priority are closely related as follows: A is ontologically prior to B iff A is ontologically separate from B but not conversely. However, Fine’s view differs from mine in so far as she understands Aristotelian ontological priority in the Platonist, existential manner, along the lines of the passage from the Eudemian Ethics. Donald Morrison’s interpretation of this passage differs from Fine’s view; see his ‘Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3, 1985, pp. 130–6. Lynne Spellman (Substance and Separation in Aristotle, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 93) argues convincingly (against Morrison) that Aristotelian separation is clearly connected with priority, although she disassociates ontological priority from Platonist separation, which she takes to be the Forms’ numerical distinctness from perceptibles.

218

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

B. Thus, A is ontologically prior to B if and only if A is (or can be) separately from (¼ı or åøæd F) B but B is not (or cannot be) separately from A. The passage from the Eudemian Ethics discussed in the present chapter, however, seems to underpin this sort of connection between priority and separation. At 1217b14-15 (part [6] of the passage quoted in section 9.1) Aristotle makes a final remark about the way in which Platonists articulate their view of the Form of the Good: just as the rest of the Forms, he states, the Form of the Good is held to be separate from the perceptible particulars which participate in it (ŒÆd ªaæ åøæØc r ÆØ H å ø, uæ ŒÆd a ¼ººÆ N Æ ). This remark immediately follows the explication of Platonist priority as it applies to the Form of the Good. To be sure, the connective ŒÆd ªaæ does not introduce a straightforwardly explanatory clause, one which would be intended to offer the grounds for the priority of the Form of the Good over perceptible good items. Rather, ŒÆd ªaæ is better understood as ‘and indeed’, a connective which adds a further important point. This is just as well: for separation by itself is not sufficient to explain priority fully as the former is non-symmetric, while the latter is asymmetric. However, separation, as an independence relation, is an indispensable part of the concept of priority: for priority is an independence or separation relation, even if it essentially involves asymmetry too. Aristotle’s final remark, then, seems to support the idea that separation is a necessary part of the concept of priority, whether in definition or in being.2

2 Further evidence in favour of this idea may be detected at Met. M.2, 1077b2–3. In that context Aristotle specifies that an item is ontologically prior to another just in case the first is separate from and surpasses the second ‘in being’ (B fi b ªaæ PÆ fi æ æÆ ‹Æ åøæØÇ Æ fiH r ÆØ æººØ). It is clear from this formulation that separation is a necessary constituent of priority. Further, it seems that what is required for priority, in addition to separation, is some type of asymmetry: if a prior item, A, surpasses in being a posterior item, B (whatever this means), A cannot (at the same time, in the same way, in the same sense, etc.) itself be surpassed in being by B. In section 12.1 I shall come back to this definition of ontological priority offered in Met. M.2.

10 Evidence for Priority in Being [PIB] in Metaphysics .11 My view of Metaphysics .11 suggests that the notion of [PIB] successfully accommodates the discussion developed in this chapter, while [PIE] faces serious problems, if it does not completely fail (see [BT]1 in section 1.3). My argument for this thesis is twofold: (i) While the notions of subjecthood, potential being, and actual being, as introduced in Metaphysics .11 and set out in the wider context of Metaphysics , render [PIE] problematic, they work well in the framework of [PIB]. (ii) The distinctions drawn in Metaphysics .11 between priority in respect of potential being or destruction and priority in respect of actual being or generation, and the examples offered to clarify these distinctions clearly favour [PIB] as an understanding of the relevant types of ontological priority. By contrast, [PIE] does not seem to work satisfactorily.

10.1 Prior Subjects and Prior Substances A question that is fundamental to understanding ontological priority as [PIB] is what types of item are prior in ‘being what they are’ and what types of item are posterior to, or dependent upon, the former in this ontological but non-existential mode. A first, albeit general and somewhat vague, answer to this extensional question would be that Aristotelian substances are ontologically prior in ‘being what they are’ to certain dependent items. A similar answer is given in the following passage from Metaphysics .11: But since there are many ways of being, firstly, the subject is prior and for that reason substance is prior; but, secondly, in a different way potential and actual beings [are prior]; for some things are prior in potentiality, while others in actuality. (Metaphysics [Met.] .11, 1019a4–8; Kirwan’s trans.)

First, Aristotle emphasizes that there are many ways of being. The two ways of being mentioned in this passage have already been introduced in the wider context of Metaphysics  (subjecthood is treated at .7, 1017a19–30, and .8, 1017b13–14,

220

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

23–4, while potential being and actual being are discussed at .7, 1017a35–b9).1 In Metaphysics .7, 1017a19–22, Aristotle distinguishes between accidental and per se being and seems to suggest that only genuine subjects can be per se beings: Those things which are said to be per accidens are said so either because both belong to the same being [e.g. both just and musician belong to a man; cf. 1017a15–16]; or because that [accident] belongs to a being [e.g. musician belongs to a man; cf. 1017a13–15]; or because this being is [or exists], to which the accident belongs, and of which this [the accident] is predicated [e.g. notwhite, something which might be taken to be a non-being, is nevertheless said to be, because it belongs to something which is or exists; cf. 1017a18–19]. (my trans.)

In all three cases, accidents are called ‘beings’, because they belong to a subject which, presumably, is a genuine, per se, being. Moreover, at 1017a22–7, the different categories are introduced as ways of per se being, while substance – the category signifying ‘what it is’ ( KØ) – is distinguished from non-substance categories. These two points, together with the prominence given to the subjecthood criterion in Metaphysics .8 (1017b13–14; 23–4), could explain why subjects and substances are held to be ontologically prior in Metaphysics .11, 1019a4–6. Further, in the light of this, we could specify the items which are posterior to subjects and substances. Substances are ontologically prior because they are per se beings and ultimate subjects that other items belong to or depend on. By contrast, non-substance items which belong to or depend on substances are accidental beings and so are ontologically posterior to substance. It should be emphasized at the outset that, in this general model, Aristotelian essences or substantial forms seem to fulfil the criterion of ontological priority rather straightforwardly in comparison with particular compound substances, such as Socrates or Callias. For, if essences or forms were ‘stripped away’ from particular subjects, the subjects themselves would also vanish. For example, Socrates (a putative subject and a particular substance) cannot continue to be what he is if his essence or form is ‘taken away’ from him.2 Thus, after dying, Socrates is no more a human being (or the human being he is prior to his death) but, perhaps, just a corpse (or Socrates’ dead body). Hence, although particular substances are genuine substances of a certain type, they are not asymmetrically independent of their essences or forms in being what they are. This is part of the reason why the Categories notion of subjecthood as applied to particular substances may not be prominent or successful as a requirement for primary substancehood in the Metaphysics. In the next chapter I shall examine the chief claims and arguments for the ontological primacy of particular substances as developed in the

1 Cleary (Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority [Senses], The Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series, 1988, pp. 45–8) makes no reference to Met. .7 in connection with the ‘many different ways of being’ discussed in Met. .11. 2 This holds true independently of what the essence of Socrates consists in (e.g. being a human being or having a certain type of soul, or whatever) and of whether his essence is universal or particular.

EVIDENCE FOR PRIORITY IN BEING

[PIB]

I N M E TA P H Y S I C S

.11

221

Categories. I shall argue that particular substances can qualify as ontologically primary only in an attenuated, ‘predicational’ sense of priority. For they seem to be primary only in that they are ultimate subjects of metaphysical predication for non-substance attributes, while non-substance attributes are entities which belong to them as ultimate subjects. An essence or form, by contrast, can qualify more straightforwardly as a certain type of subject, per se being and primary substance in that it is what it is independently of all particular compound substances it enforms being what they are (but not conversely). That is to say, for any particular substance to be a specific (type of ) subject, it is crucial that it should be made what it is by its essence or form. The converse, though, does not hold good: for no particular subject or substance of any type makes its essence or form what it essentially is. Without this dependence on essence or form for being what it essentially is, no particular substance can be a (specific type of ) subject of metaphysical predication. Indeed, the locution ‘what it is’ ( KØ) employed at Metaphysics .7, 1017a25, as applied to the category of substance seems to refer not to particular compound substances but to essences. The suggestion would be, therefore, that essences are not accidental but are per se beings which are ontologically prior in the manner of Metaphysics .11. Thus, Metaphysics  seems not merely to remain open between [PIE] and [PIB] but strongly to undermine [PIE] in favour of [PIB]. Let me spell this out. First, an essence or form F is not even the kind of entity which could exist independently of the objects whose essence or form it is. In so far as F is an essence, it is not itself a (type of ) object but an essential way of being for the objects whose essence it is. This, presumably, is part of the reason why Aristotle uses the technical term ‘what-it-is-for-something-to-be-F’ or similar locutions for essence (e.g. Met Z.4, 1029b20:  q r ÆØ Œ{). Thus, F is not the type of entity that could exist independently of other items or in its own right, let alone in the asymmetric fashion of [PIE]. Moreover, in the Aristotelian sublunary world a substantial form is necessarily or even essentially an entity which enforms certain types of matter or certain types of compound. If so, an entity of this sort could not exist independently of certain types of matter or, more to the present point, without the compounds it enforms existing, especially if this independence relation is understood asymmetrically as [PIE] requires. Thus, consistently with my view of Metaphysics .11, an essence or form F cannot exist if there exist no particular compound substances enformed by F. Second, as primary substance, an essence or form F must cover the requirement of ontological priority, even if not in its existential version. Indeed, F can satisfy this requirement if it is understood in terms of [PIB]. For F is what it is independently of all compound Fs being what they are but not conversely. In other words, F makes particular substances (the entities in which F exists) what they essentially are (but not conversely) and so F is ontologically prior to them. For what a particular substance is depends on what its essence or form is but the converse is not the case. This, to be sure,

222

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

does not entail that particular substances are non-substance or accidental entities in the manner of the examples given in Metaphysics .7 (e.g. being musical or being white). Rather, the implication is only that, despite their being substances of a certain sort, yet they are posterior to or dependent upon their essences or forms for their being the specific types of object that they are.

10.2 Ways of Being and Ways of Being Ontologically Prior In addition to the way of being which is peculiar to subjects and substances, Metaphysics .11 introduces a second way of being, that of potential and actual being (1019a6–7). In Metaphysics .7, 1017a35–b9, Aristotle had already drawn this distinction with the help of some examples. Something is said to be ing (e.g. to be seeing, to be knowing, or to be resting) both when it actually s and when it can . Accordingly, the distinction is between being potentially and being actually  or between what is potentially and what is actually . This point is significant for present purposes. For it clearly suggests that Aristotle considers potential and actual beings not as items which exist potentially or actually but which potentially or actually are what they are. This is further evidence in favour of my bolder position, [BT]1, formulated in section 1.3. The wider context of Metaphysics  is not simply congenial to the distinction between existing and ‘being what something is’. Rather, it positively introduces and works with the notion of ‘being what something is’. In effect, this last point, if applied to the concept of priority discussed in Metaphysics .11, favours the notion of [PIB]. One can, on the basis of these considerations, explain Aristotle’s distinction between the following two types of ontological priority: (a) One of the central ways of being (r ÆØ) is being a subject and so subjects are ontologically prior in the manner of [IC]. However, since substances must, in a way, fulfil a criterion of subjecthood, it follows that substances are ontologically prior to certain items in the manner of [IC].3 But what are these posterior items supposed to be? This question remains unanswered in the present context. As I suggested in section 10.1, the allusion to the subjecthood requirement and the wider context of Metaphysics .7–8 seem to favour the claim of essence or form to being ontologically prior (in the manner of [PIB]) to particular compound substances. However, this is not unproblematic. For instance, the scope of [IC] as applied to essences or forms is not clearly

3 That substances must satisfy the subjecthood requirement is clear from Metaphysics H.1 (1042a26ff.), D.8 (1017b13–14; 23–4), and Z.3 (1028b36–1029a2). Metaphysics Z.3 also suggests that substances must satisfy this criterion under the constraints of thisness, separateness, and priority (1029a2–10; 27–30).

EVIDENCE FOR PRIORITY IN BEING

[PIB]

I N M E TA P H Y S I C S

.11

223

determined: are they ontologically prior in ‘being what they are’ to all compounds they enform or only to some?4 (b) The second type of ontological priority follows from another way in which being is said. Since ontological priority is asymmetric independence with respect to being and there are potential and actual ways of being (just as Metaphysics .7, 1017a35–b9, argues), it follows that things are also ontologically prior or posterior to one another in respect of potential and actual being.

10.3 Priority in Potential Being or Destruction and Actual Being or Generation An initial difference between type (a) and type (b) ontological priority is that type (a) is an asymmetric ontological independence requirement for substancehood, whereas type (b) is distinguished into two asymmetric independence relations: (b1) Priority in respect of potential being, and (b2) Priority in respect of actual being. [ . . . ] for some things are prior in potentiality, while others in actuality, as, for instance, half of a line [is prior] in potentiality to the whole line, and the part to the whole, and matter to substance, but posterior in actuality; for when the whole is dissolved, they will be in actuality. In a certain way, then, all things called prior and posterior are said to be so in respect of these last; for it is possible for some to be without the others in respect of coming to be, as, for instance, the whole in relation to its parts, while for others in respect of destruction, as, for instance, the part in relation to the whole. Similarly in the other cases too. (Met. .11, 1019a7–14; Kirwan’s trans.)5

I shall structure my discussion of the distinctions and examples of this passage by categorizing the different types of priority into the following two groups: (i) Priority of type (a), type (b2), and in respect of generation or coming-to-be. (ii) Priority of type (b1) and in respect of destruction or passing-away. My assumption is that each of these two groups can be treated uniformly as the examples offered to clarify the different priority relations in each group are the same. The basic idea, then, is that using the same examples of prior and posterior items implies that the distinct priority relations yield equivalent results and, hence, can be treated together. It should be noted, however, that this approach does not identify the relevant types of priority. Although equivalent in that they are exemplified by the same 4 Even if one successfully argued in favour of the wide scope, still the term ‘all’ would be ambiguous as between its collective and distributive senses. Because these pressing questions are not addressed in Metaphysics .11, I shall leave them aside for further study. However, I shall make a few brief comments upon the scope issue in section 14.3. 5 In appendix 2 I shall discuss in some detail the textual and interpretative issues arising from this passage in particular but also from Met. .11, 1019a1–14, as a whole.

224

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

relata, the types of priority in each of the above two groups are not necessarily the same. One could, perhaps, put forward a related claim at the semantic level: while the corresponding relational terms (e.g. ‘prior in potential being’ and ‘prior in passingaway’) have the same reference, they need not have the same meaning.6 First, type (a) and type (b2) priority seem to yield the same results and, hence, to be equivalent in the sense just specified. Given the priority of substance [type (a)] and that in respect of actual being [type (b2)], certain substance- or substance-like-items (such as whole lines, wholes in general, and substances) are ontologically prior to non-substance items (such as segments of lines, parts of wholes, and matter). In effect, both criteria – type (a) and type (b2) priority – seem to be satisfied by substance. If so, these two types of ontological priority could function equivalently as substancehood requirements. Ontological priority of type (b1), by contrast, reverses the relation between substance and non-substance items. Given this criterion of ontological priority in respect of potential being, segments, parts, and matter are held to be ontologically prior to whole lines, wholes in general, and substance respectively. This implies that – whatever its other merits – type (b1) ontological priority is not a successful substancehood requirement as it renders substance posterior to non-substance. Second, at 1019a12–14 Aristotle’s examples for ontological priority in respect of generation and destruction agree with those offered for priority in respect of actual being (b2) and potential being (b1) respectively. In respect of generation ( just as in respect of actual being) the whole is prior to the part, while in respect of destruction ( just as in respect of potential being) the part is prior to the whole. This entails that type (b1) ontological priority is equivalent to priority in respect of destruction, while type (b2) is equivalent to priority in respect of generation. Further, since type (a) ontological priority (that of subjects-substances) seems equivalent to (b2) (in respect of actual being), while the latter yields the same results as priority in generation, it would follow that type (a) priority is equivalent to that in respect of generation. The main problem, however, is to shed some light on Aristotle’s specific examples, rather than merely bringing in line his abstract distinctions. In particular, the question is whether and in what way each of the items used as examples qualifies for the specified sorts of priority relative to the other items mentioned in these examples. At this juncture, my account of [PIB], understood as the ontological correlate of definitional priority, seems helpful. Given the argument advanced in Part I of the present study, it is plausible to assume that the human type of body (a type of matter enformed by the form of human being) is definitionally dependent upon the form of human being. In addition to this substance example, mathematical, non-substance items

6 Compare this case with the following example. Although both ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’s teacher’ have the same reference, they are not identical expressions as the former is a proper name, whereas the latter is a definite description. Similarly, although both ‘prior in respect of potential being’ and ‘prior in respect of passing-away’ refer to (e.g.) parts relative to wholes or segments relative to lines, yet they do not have the same meaning.

EVIDENCE FOR PRIORITY IN BEING

[PIB]

I N M E TA P H Y S I C S

.11

225

such as half-a-line (a segment which is half a whole line) are definitionally dependent upon items such as a whole line. On the further assumption that type (a) ontological priority of substance over non-substance items is the ontological counterpart to definitional priority, it is reasonable to think that: (1) What it is to be half-a-line depends on what it is to be a whole line but not conversely. And: (2) What it is to be a human body depends on what it is to be (the form of ) a human being but not conversely. Clearly, the existential construal cannot straightforwardly accommodate these examples of asymmetric independence. For, just as no (enformed) human body can exist without the form of human being existing in and enforming it, so too the form of human being cannot exist without any (enformed) human body existing. The mathematical example seems even more problematic. While half-a-line can exist without a whole line existing, a whole line cannot exist without one of its halves existing. For without it, a whole line ceases to exist as such and gives its place to a remaining halfsegment. Moreover, as suggested above, type (a) ontological priority seems equivalent to priority in respect of actual being (b2) and in respect of generation. The characterizations ‘actual being’ and ‘generation’ can plausibly be conceived as qualifying the way in which the prior and posterior items are what they are. In particular, as fully functional (actual) beings or as beings at the later or final stages of coming-to-be (hence, nearer to completion or ‘perfection’), the whole line and the form of human being (fully realized in an appropriate type of body) are ontologically prior to half-a-line and a human body respectively, precisely in respect of actual being or generation: (1´) What it is to be a complete or ‘proper’ half-a-line depends on what it is to be a complete, ‘proper’ or ‘perfect’, whole line but not conversely. And: (2´) What it is to be a fully functional human body depends on what it is to be a fully functional human being, one in which the relevant form is fully realized, but not conversely. It should be emphasized that the characterizations ‘complete’, ‘proper’, ‘perfect’, etc. in (1´) and ‘dissolved’, ‘truncated’, etc. in (3) below are not intended to identify the mathematical cases with the biological ones. There is a sharp difference between the two types of case. At the same time, though, there is an analogy between them. Just as there are some complete or fully functional instances of biological kinds, similarly there are some paradigmatic or fully-fledged tokens of mathematical types of entity. For example, a breadth- and depth-less line of determinate measure (a specific length)

226

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

could be such an instance of the mathematical type of line. Further, just as there are some non-complete or not fully functional instances of biological kinds, so too there are some ‘lesser’ examples of mathematical types of entity. For example, a bronze circle would be a less than paradigmatic instance of the mathematical type of circle. If these considerations are correct, the important substancehood criterion of type (a) ontological priority can be aligned not only with type (b2) priority (in respect of actual being) but also with priority in respect of generation. More importantly, all three relations can be successfully set out on the basis of the notion of [PIB], without invoking any problematic claims of independent existence. The existential construal is problematic for reasons similar to those mentioned above. First, it does not yield the desirable asymmetric independence relations. A fully functional human body cannot exist without the form of a human existing in and fully enforming it and conversely. Second, the existential approach gets some of the examples in incorrect priority order. While a whole line cannot exist without one of its halves existing, half-a-line can exist without a whole line existing. More importantly, the existential construal can accommodate the characterizations ‘in respect of actual being’ or ‘coming-to-be’ only in an artificial and ad hoc fashion. How is one to understand the claim that (e.g.) a whole line can exist actually without half-a-line existing actually but not conversely, without turning it into an instance of empty scholastic jargon? If, by contrast, this claim were to be explicated in the plausible manner of (1´) and (2´), it would be misleading or incorrect also to invoke the notion of existence. Ontological priority in respect of potential being, (b1), and priority in respect of destruction, however, seem to require that some items should be prior or posterior to others only as incomplete (potential) beings or as products of some type of passingaway. Candidate types of passing-away could be (e.g.) the complete dissolution of a thing into its parts or the detachment of a part from a whole. Thus: (3) What it is to be a dissolved or truncated line (of a certain type) depends on what it is to be a remaining or detached half-segment (of the relevant type) but not conversely. And: (4) What it is to be a human being which has passed away or has been maimed depends on what it is to be a remaining body or cut-off bodily part (of the relevant type) but not conversely. Just as a dead human being is defined in terms of a remaining body of a certain type (e.g. a corpse), so too at the ontological level what it is to be this type of human being which has passed away depends on what it is to be this type of remnant matter. As Aristotle remarks at 1019a10–11, when a whole or a complete and fully enformed thing (a line, a whole, or a substance) dissolves into its parts or passes away, the relevant remaining potential being (a segment, a part, matter) actually is the potential being or nonfunctional remnant it is said to be (ØƺıŁ  ªaæ ŒÆ’ Kº åØÆ ÆØ). If so, it is ontologically prior to the whole (which is not any more what it is to be a complete,

EVIDENCE FOR PRIORITY IN BEING

[PIB]

I N M E TA P H Y S I C S

.11

227

fully functional whole) in respect of incomplete, potential, being or, more relevantly, in respect of passing-away.7 The existential approach, by contrast, once more seems unsuccessful. First, similarly to the previous cases, it cannot yield the requisite asymmetry. If one held firm to the existential construal of priority in respect of potential being or passing-away, one would have to claim that a remnant body (e.g. Socrates’ corpse) can exist without the corresponding dead human (dead Socrates) existing or ever having existed (but not conversely). The first option does not look promising: for Socrates’ corpse and dead Socrates reciprocally imply each other’s existence. The second option is obviously false: Socrates’ corpse cannot exist without dead Socrates ever having existed. To give a further example: just as a detached bodily part can exist (as non-functional or detached) independently of the mutilated human, so too a mutilated human can exist (as maimed or not fully functional) independently of the detached part. Second, the claim that halfa-line can exist potentially without the whole line existing potentially but not conversely does not seem to convey any satisfactory meaning, unless it is understood in the fashion of (3) and (4). But if so, it is preferable to employ the notion of [PIB] rather than [PIE]. What, however, is the precise ontological status of certain types of matter or material part which are prior to the whole in respect of passing-away or potential being? For instance, after the death of a complete and functional human (a substance), his or her body is an actual, independent but non-functional body or corpse (mere matter), not an actual and functional human body. Hence, it is ontologically prior in that what it is to be a dead or ‘destroyed’ human being (one which has passed away) depends on what it is to be a corpse but not conversely. To be more precise: non-enformed matter of substances which have passed away and, quite generally, parts of wholes which have perished are ontologically prior (in respect of passing-away or potential being) only as material stuffs which sustain the corresponding fully enformed material parts of the complete and functional wholes before the latter’s passing-away.8 Strictly speaking, 7 An alternative (but equivalent) formulation would run as follows: after the dissolution of the whole into its parts or the detachment of a part, the relevant remnant or detached part is prior in actual being to the whole in that the former actually or completely is a remnant or non-functional part, while the latter depends for its being what it is upon the actual remnant or cut-off part being what it is. In this last formulation, however, we are dealing with an extremely attenuated notion of actual being in respect of which certain items are ontologically prior to others: for it is products of mutilation or of other types of passing-away which are taken as ontologically prior to other items in respect of actual being. For this reason, I prefer the first formulation: after mutilation, dissolution, or passing-away, detached parts, remnants, etc. are actualized as detached parts or remnants, etc. and so are prior to other items in respect of potential being or, more to the point, in respect of passing-away. 8 Cleary’s position (Senses, p. 50) on the ØƺıŁ  at 1019a10 is similar to mine: ‘material parts of a living whole cannot “be” (in the sense of having substantial form) without the whole and, hence, they are posterior in this sense of actuality. But when the whole is dissolved they are actualized as material parts (which is a different sense of “being”). [ . . . ] The point is that, after the dissolution of the whole, the material parts will no longer be the matter of that substance; just as the severed finger is no longer informed by the life principle that is called łıå’ (Cleary’s emphasis). In my view, after the dissolution of the living whole, what remains is the matter which sustains the bodily part or the whole body of that substance prior to its dissolution. This

228

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

after a human being has passed away, it is not his or her fully enformed and functional human body which is ontologically prior to him or her in respect of passing-away but the material stuffs which constitute the human body of the fully functional living human being (prior to his or her death).9

10.4 Interim Conclusions The moral to be drawn from the discussion of Metaphysics .11, 1019a1–14, as a whole is that, while Aristotle’s notion of ontological priority works successfully as [PIB], it raises serious or even insurmountable difficulties if construed as [PIE]. Second, given that [PIB] is the ontological correlate of definitional priority, Aristotle’s remarks about priority in respect of potential being or passing-away and in respect of actual being or coming-to-be become more plausible. Just as Metaphysics .7, 1017a35ff., suggests, potential or actual beings are not items which potentially or actually exist but which potentially or actually are what they are. If so, ontological priority in respect of potential or actual being is best formulated in terms of [PIB], a notion which entails that the qualifications ‘potential’ and ‘actual being’ modify the ways in which the prior or posterior items are what they are. Thus, there is no need to introduce any unnatural assumptions about degrees or modes of existence (or perfection). Third, the notion of [PIB], as opposed to that of [PIE], could serve as a criterion which respects the claim of essence or substantial form to primary substancehood. A substantial form F cannot exist if there are no particular compounds which are enformed by F. If so, ontological priority, understood as [PIE], cannot be satisfied by forms and, hence, cannot render them the primary substances of the Metaphysics. This is so, unless one holds (perhaps somewhat desperately) that forms can exist as abstract items or thoughts, independently of all their particular compound instances existing. Alternatively, a resolute proponent of [PIE] might think that, while a form cannot exist independently of all the particular compounds it enforms taken together, it can exist without any given one of them existing. In either way, however, the plausibility of [PIE] as a criterion for primary substancehood is significantly diminished. By contrast, [PIB] seems capable of functioning as a successful requirement for the primary substancehood of forms, without rendering them mind-dependent items or seriously restricting the scope of their independence. Just as a form is defined independently of all the particular compounds it enforms (but not conversely), so too what it is to be this type of form is independent of all those particular compounds being what they are (but not conversely).

remnant is actual as non-functional remaining matter of that substance but not actual as enformed and functional bodily part or body (proximate matter) of that substance. 9

I shall return to this point in section 13.1, in my discussion of some of the examples offered in Met. Z.10.

11 The Ontological Priority of Particular Substances In chapter 7 I argued that natural form is definitionally and essentially prior to compounds and their matter. The ontological type of priority described by the term ‘essentially’ has been characterized (in chapters 8 and 10) by reference to [PIB] which can be set out in terms of the notion of making something what it is. An important question arises at this juncture, however, about the claim of particular compound substances to being ontologically prior. I have already noted (in section 10.1) that essences or substantial forms fare better than particular substances do in satisfying the criterion of ontological priority understood as [PIB]. For, while essences or forms make particular substances what they are, the converse does not hold true. If this is correct, essences or forms can be what they are independently of all particular substances but not conversely. This result, however, undermines (it appears) the intuitive Aristotelian view that particular compound objects are substances of some sort. For if particular objects, such as Socrates or Callias, are not ontologically prior to anything, how could they qualify as substances at all? In the present chapter I shall seek to overcome this difficulty by arguing that particular substances are ontologically prior to derivative entities such as non-substance attributes and accidental compounds. I shall specify their ontological priority as a qualified form of [PIB] grounded on the notion of ultimate subjecthood. As ultimate subjects that other things are said of or are present in, particular substances make non-substance attributes the types of predicable entity that they are but not conversely. This sort of asymmetry, however, is importantly different from their alleged capacity for existing independently of non-substance attributes (but not conversely). Similarly, this type of predicational priority over non-substance attributes cannot support the claim that particular substances make non-substance attributes the determinate types of entity that they essentially are. As I shall argue, the primacy of particular substance consists in an attenuated notion of [PIB] in which it makes non-substance entities the generic types of being that they are, i.e. predicable attributes. By contrast, nonsubstance attributes do not make particular substance a kind of predicable entity. For they do not function as metaphysical subjects of particular substance but are said of or belong to it as ultimate subject. This predicational version of [PIB], then, could offer an attractive, unified picture of Aristotelian ontological priority.

230

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

11.1 Primary Substances of the Categories and Metaphysics Z.1 In his Categories Aristotle argues not simply that particular objects, such as Socrates or Bucephalus, are substances but more boldly that they are primary substances. In the Metaphysics the honorific title of primary substancehood is reserved for essences or substantial forms (Z.11, 1037a27–30). Aristotle continues to hold, however, that particular objects are substances of some sort (H.1, 1042a24–6 and 29–31). If so, they should possess some type of primacy over ontologically posterior or derivative entities. The central argument offered in the Categories for the primacy of particular substances is helpfully summarized in the following passage: Thus all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects. So if the primary substances were not, it would be impossible for any of the other things to be. [Categories [Cat.] 5, 2b3–6; Ackrill’s trans.)

There are several other places in the Categories which make similar claims or develop further the thesis put forward in this passage (cf. 1b3–6; 2a12–14; 2a34–b3; b15–17). In what follows I shall not engage in the debate about the precise import of the ties of being said of or being present in a subject. For these two types of relation do not seem to play any significant ontological role outside the context of the Categories. There are two different points, though, which clearly are of crucial importance. Let us examine them more closely. First, Aristotle seems to understand the primacy of his particular substances in terms of an independence claim which is virtually equivalent to [IC] as formulated in Metaphysics .11, 1019a3–4: if particular substances were not, none of the other entities could be. While the passage just quoted does not explicitly add any ‘not conversely’ clause, it seems plausible to think that Aristotle understands the independence claim in this asymmetric fashion. For in what sense would particular substances be primary if they too could not be without the other, derivative or posterior entities? Moreover, asymmetry seems to be entailed by the notion of subjecthood: while particular substances are ultimate subjects (that other entities are said of or are present in), no other entities are ultimate subjects of this sort. If the priority of particular substances is underwritten by their subjecthood, it would follow that they are independent of other things in the relevant, subject-based way, whereas other things are not independent of them in this way. This last remark brings us to the second important point emerging from the picture of the Categories. The claim of asymmetric independence made in our passage is underpinned by the notion of ultimate subjecthood. Because they are ultimate subjects that other entities are predicated of or are present in, particular substances are asymmetrically independent of other things. In the light of this, Aristotle seems to infer the independence claim from the thesis of ultimate subjecthood (2b5: c PH s . . . ).

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

231

It is worth emphasizing that the notion of subjecthood is also deployed in Metaphysics Δ.11 in setting out ontological priority on the basis of [IC]. As discussed in section 10.1, Aristotle argues that substances are ontologically prior and so satisfy [IC] because they are subjects (1019a5–6). The notion of subjecthood, then, should play a crucial role in underwriting the type of priority that particular substances enjoy over non-substance entities. One of the central aims of the present chapter is to show how subjecthood supports the ontological priority of particular substances as expressed in [IC]. The idea will be that, in so far as they are subjects of a certain type, particular substances can be without derivative entities, while the converse is not the case. Furthermore, I shall argue that particular substances satisfy [IC] and are ontologically prior only under the non-existential notion of [PIB]. By contrast, the existential construal of ontological priority, [PIE], once more yields problematic results. To advance this line of argument, it is helpful to discuss parts of Metaphysics Z.1. One of the chief reasons for this move is that both of Aristotle’s key points made in Categories 5 are also used in Metaphysics Z.1. First, Aristotle claims that substance is primary in all important ways. Further, this claim seems to be the culmination of an argument which is based on the notion of subjecthood as applied to particular substances. Here is the main passage about priority taken from Metaphysics Z.1: The primary is said in many ways; but substance is primary in all ways, both in account and in knowledge and in time. For none amongst the rest of the categories is separate but it alone is. (Metaphysics [Met.] Z.1, 1028a31–4; Bostock’s trans.)

It is not important for present purposes to examine the notions of priority in account or in knowledge, especially since they seem fairly unproblematic. Nor is it useful to discuss the exegetical crux of whether and, if so, why the label ‘priority in time’ is ascribed to the type of priority described by the claim that substance alone is separate, while none of the other categories is.1 What is of utmost significance, though, is this last claim. First, it clearly encapsulates a sort of ontological priority in the form of asymmetric separation: while substance is (or can be) separately from (or without) non-substance entities, the converse does not hold good. That Aristotle himself understands this relation of ontological separation in the asymmetric manner in which I just formulated it becomes clear from his use of the operator ‘alone’ (1028a33–4: H b ªaæ ¼ººø ŒÆŪæÅ ø PŁb åøæØ , ÆoÅ b Å). The idea is that only substance is without other, non-substance entities. None other amongst non-substance categories, by contrast, is without substance. This sort of formulation, then, can successfully characterize the asymmetric independence relation that ontological priority consists in. On the assumption that asymmetric separation (åøæØ- ) is expressible in terms of asymmetric without-ness or independence (¼ı), this claim is equivalent to [IC] as introduced in Metaphysics 1 I shall bracket this question in the main body of my argument. In section 11.5, however, which functions as an appendix, I shall take it up and shall make a few tentative suggestions.

232

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

.11, 1019a3–4. It is important to investigate, then, the notion of ontological priority underlying Aristotle’s argument and its links with the view set out in Metaphysics .11. To anticipate an obvious objection, it should be clarified that my present claim is not that the statement ‘no other category is separate, but substance alone is’ is intended exclusively as a formulation of ontological priority alone. Thus, it may well be that this statement can be used to elucidate all other sorts of asymmetric independence relation that obtain between substance and non-substance entities. For instance, priority in account could be characterized as asymmetric separation in definition: while no other of the categories is defined separately from substance, substance alone is defined separately from them. Priority in knowledge too could fit into the same formula: while no other amongst the categories is known separately from substance, substance alone is known separately from them. It is obvious, though, that this sort of flexibility of the asymmetric separation claim should be reflected in the case of ontological priority too. Hence, this claim also codifies a central way in which substance is ontologically prior to certain posterior entities in that it is separately from them, while they are not separately from it. The second important point arising from Metaphysics Z.1 is that this notion of ontological priority, formulated in terms of asymmetric separation (or separability), seems to apply to particular substances too. For earlier in the chapter Aristotle clearly holds that particular substances are amongst the types of substance he is focusing on in his arguments (1028a27: F ’ Kd  PÆ ŒÆd e ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ). If this is correct, particular substances too should be ontologically prior in that they alone are separately from other things but not conversely. Furthermore, not only this passage but also the wider context of Metaphysics Z.1 imply that the items that particular substances are ontologically prior to are nonsubstance attributes, such as being white or walking. The passage just quoted states that ‘no other amongst non-substance categories’ is separately from substance. Earlier in the chapter Aristotle argues that non-substance attributes of this sort are not beings in their own right or separately from substance (1028a20–4). He also claims that particular substances are ontologically prior in this way not only to non-substance attributes but also to accidental compounds, such as what is walking or the walking thing (1028a24–9). Hence, Metaphysics Z.1 offers the resources with which to address the central issue of the posterior relata, the entities that are ontologically dependent upon particular substances. More importantly, however, Metaphysics Z.1 seems to follow the same line of reasoning as that employed in Categories 5 and alluded to in Metaphysics .11. The ontological priority of particular substances is underwritten by their role as ultimate subjects that non-substance entities are predicated of or belong to. Thus, the reason why non-substance attributes, such as walking or being white, are not beings in their own right or separately from substance is that there is some particular substance or other that underlies them as their subject. Similarly, non-substance compounds, such as what is walking or the walking thing, are beings only in so far as some particular substance or

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

233

other is their underlying subject [1028a25–7: Ø Ø e Œ  ÆPE ‰æØ  (F ’ Kd  PÆ ŒÆd e ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ)]. Clearly, then, all these claims adduced in Metaphysics Z.1 are indispensable for understanding ontological priority and its relation to the central notion of ultimate subjecthood. The constructive part of the present chapter will seek to disentangle these claims and to use them as basis for a promising view of the ontological priority of particular substances over non-substance entities. Before engaging in this task, though, it is worth bringing out some further, more general, reasons why the context of Metaphysics Z.1 is invaluable as a starting-point for examining the distinctive sort of ontological primacy possessed by particular substances. First, it is incontrovertible that this chapter is the introduction to Metaphysics Z, the account of substance in which Aristotle will argue for the primary substancehood of essence or form. As has been pointed out, however, the examples offered in Metaphysics Z.1 imply that particular substances, too, are primary in so far as they are subjects (1028a25–7). By no means, to be sure, does this entail that they are primary relative to essence or form. Yet, as subjects, they could be prior to non-substance attributes and accidental compounds. Second, Metaphysics Z.1 has strong links to the doctrine of the Categories and so could provide a way in which to reconcile (what is usually taken as conflicting) earlier and later Aristotelian views. The presence of and the interest in the views set out in the Categories are obvious from the opening lines of Metaphysics Z.1. At 1028a11–20 Aristotle introduces the framework of the distinct categories and claims that the category of substance is the primary type of being. From 1028a20–31 he argues that particular substances are subjects that support non-substance entities and confer upon them the status of being. Most importantly, though, Metaphysics Z.1 is central in that its claims – however introductory, provisional, imprecise, or unclear – should apply not only to the range of examples offered within this chapter, which is limited to particular substances as subjects. Rather, these claims should also cover essences or forms, the substance cases which will prove primary in the course of the arguments developed later on in the Metaphysics. Ideally, and to avoid charges of equivocation, the notion of priority that substances qualify for should be fairly unified even if the posterior items might be different depending on the distinct types of substance which are deemed prior. It will become clear, or so I shall argue, that [PIB] can discharge this unifying role as an interpretation of Aristotelian ontological priority.

11.2 How not to Understand the Priority of Particular Substances It is notoriously difficult to see whether, and if so in what way, particular substances could qualify as ontologically independent of non-substance entities in the asymmetric way required by the claim that they alone ‘are separately from’ other, non-substance

234

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

categories (1028a33–4). This conception of ontological priority as asymmetric separation (or separability) from non-substance entities can be compared with the following remark made earlier in Metaphysics Z.1: entities such as walking are not beings per se or in their own right as it is not possible for them to be separated from substance (1028a22–4: Pb ªaæ ÆPH Kd h ŒÆŁ’ Æe [çıŒ ] h åøæÇŁÆØ ıÆe B PÆ ). Presumably, then, substance is primary in that it is a being in its own right as it can be separated from non-substance entities, while the converse does not hold good. Once more, this seems equivalent to [IC] introduced in Metaphysics Δ.11, 1019a3–4, or the formulation used in Categories 5, 2b5–6: if particular substances are not, non-substance entities cannot be, while particular substances can be if nonsubstance items are not. There is a misleading way in which to set out claims of this sort, one that encounters severe difficulties. Unfortunately, nearly all of Aristotle’s commentators seem to adopt this line, which can be labelled (using Kit Fine’s terminology) ‘modal–existential’.2 In this view, a particular substance is prior to non-substance attributes in that, if a nonsubstance exists, necessarily a particular substance exists, but not the other way about. The first host of difficulties with this view flows from the insistence on the modal aspect. For, assuming that numbers are necessary existents, a particular substance such as Socrates turns out to be posterior to any number whatever: if Socrates exists, necessarily the number two exists. The converse, though, does not seem true. Alternatively, to avoid using numbers as necessary existents, we could take Socrates and his distinctness from the Eiffel Tower: if Socrates exists, necessarily his distinctness from the Eiffel Tower exists. Intuitively, though, we would not wish to concede that Socrates ontologically depends upon his being distinct from the Eiffel Tower. The results would be similarly counterintuitive even if we focus on less exotic cases or more familiar Aristotelian examples, such as merely necessary (but non-essential) attributes or propria. On the assumption that Socrates is a man, it seems true that, if he exists, necessarily his being capable of laughing exists. In the present view, though, this would entail that particular substances, such as Socrates or Callias, are ontologically dependent upon their propria or their merely necessary attributes. In general, the modal understanding of priority seems to drive us to the absurd result that anything whatever is dependent upon any necessary existent (or even all of them taken together). Aristotle himself describes a type of priority in Categories 12 which seems to be rather similar to this modal conception. It is plausible to think that many commentators took his remarks as implying that the way in which particular substances are primary involves this modal notion of priority.

2 Kit Fine’s criticism of the ‘modal-existential’ view is developed in his ‘Ontological Dependence’ [‘Dependence’], Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, 1995, pp. 271–2. The examples provided here are mainly taken from this article; see also his ‘Essence and Modality’ in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Logic and Language (Philosophical Perspectives, 8, Atascadero, CA, 1994), pp. 1–16 (at 4–6).

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

235

The second way of being prior is that in which something does not reciprocate as to implication of being, as for instance the unit is prior to two; for if there are two it follows immediately that the unit is, whereas if the unit is it is not necessary that there are two, so that the implication of the other item’s being does not reciprocate from the unit, and that from which the implication of being does not reciprocate seems to be prior. (Categories 12, 14a29–35; Ackrill’s trans.)

Aristotle’s example of priority as ‘non-reciprocation in implication of being’ is fairly straightforward. He holds that the unit is prior in this way to the number two in that, if two is, necessarily the unit is. But if the unit is, it is not necessary that two is.3 Clearly, though, if this is the way in which particular substances are intended to be primary, it is extremely difficult to derive the correct results. For, if Socrates is, necessarily the species man and the genus animal are. However, if either the species man or the genus animal is, it is not necessary that Socrates is. Moreover, because the species necessarily implies the genus, it turns out that genera are prior to species in this sense. But this gets the priority relations introduced in the Categories completely the wrong way around. Not only do species and genera, the secondary substances of the Categories, prove prior to Aristotle’s primary, particular substances. Even within the class of secondary substances it is not the species but the genus that seems to be primary. Aristotle’s considered view, however, is that species are (secondary) substances ‘more’ or ‘rather than’, and so are prior to, genera (2b7–14; 17–22; 29–34). More importantly, particular substances cannot satisfy the asymmetry condition of this notion of priority.4 This seems to be true regardless of whether we understand ontological priority as [PIE] or as [PIB]. For instance, Socrates can exist without walking and have another attribute instead of walking but, similarly, walking can exist without Socrates existing and be an attribute of another substance (e.g. Callias). Further, just as Socrates existing is necessary for the existence of some determinate accidental attributes or other, so too the existence of the latter is necessary for Socrates existing. For he cannot exist independently of all his determinate accidental attributes. Similarly, although he can exist without some or other determinate accidental attributes (e.g. he can exist as weighing 71 kg instead of weighing 70 kg or as being suntanned instead of being pale), he cannot exist without any determinable ones, such as

3 There is a question, at this point, as to whether the necessity at issue is de re or simply necessity of logical consequence. Aristotle’s use of ‘inference’ locutions, such as IŒºŁÅØ or IŒºıŁE PŁ , might suggest that he is interested in necessity of logical consequence. It is possible, though, that this necessity of logical consequence is based on a type of de re necessity. Hence, for example, because within a certain mathematical universe the number two necessarily involves the unit (but not conversely), the logical implication from there being two to there being a unit is necessary (but not vice versa). I shall not discuss this issue in any detail as it falls outside the scope of present concerns. 4 The arguments which show that particular substances cannot fulfill the asymmetry condition of ontological priority were developed in my ‘Aristotle’s Notion of Priority in Nature and Substance’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35, 2008, pp. 202–4. Independently, and in the same year, Phil Corkum argued for a very similar view in his ‘Aristotle on Ontological Dependence’ [‘Dependence’], Phronesis 53, 2008, pp. 65–92 (at 71–3).

236

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

having weight or having complexion.5 It seems, then, that particular substances cannot satisfy the asymmetry constraint inherent in the concept of [PIE] relative to their nonsubstance attributes. Even if we shift to the weaker notion of [PIB], however, particular substances do not seem to fare any better. For, once more, they cannot be asymmetrically independent of their non-substance attributes in ‘being what they are’. If one thought that a particular substance is ontologically prior to its non-substance attributes in that it is what it is independently of any given one or even all of them collectively, one would be unable to preserve the requisite asymmetry. Hence, for example, just as Socrates is what he is (a man) independently of being white, so too being white is what it is (a certain type of colour) independently of Socrates being what he is. Moreover, if it is correct to think that [PIB] is grounded on the causal relation of making something the specific type of entity that it (essentially) is, it is implausible to hold that a particular substance is thus related to any of its non-substance attributes. It seems plainly incorrect to claim that (e.g.) Socrates makes the attribute being white the determinate type of colour that it is. For Socrates is not part of the specific essence of being white. There is a simple way, however, in which one could attempt to render a particular substance ontologically prior to its non-substance attributes either existentially or in ‘being what it is’. Thus, one could invoke non-substance, particularized properties or tropes, understood as non-recurrent individual attributes. Clearly, a particular substance can exist without them, while the converse is not the case. For the notion of a trope implies that it cannot exist separately from its concrete bearer. Its bearer, though, a particular substance, could exist without this specific trope, perhaps having another trope in its place. For instance, the existence of Socrates is necessarily written into the existence conditions of his own, individual whiteness. It does not seem true, though, that he could not exist without his whiteness. For, after getting a sun-tan, he could exist with a different complexion trope, his particular attribute of being sun-tanned. Analogously, because a particularized non-substance attribute is individuated by reference to the particular object to which it belongs, it follows that it is ontologically

5 For these problems, see Burnyeat, M. et al., Notes on Z, unpublished ms., Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 1979, pp. 4–5 and Bostock, Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 58–60. The last two points suggest that Aristotle’s particular substances are not bare particulars from which all attributes can be removed. According to some commentators, Metaphysics Z.3 seems to argue for the claim that one cannot ‘strip away’ all attributes from a subject (Charlton, Aristotle’s ‘Physics’ I, II, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 136–8; Gill, M. L., Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity [Substance], Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 26–31; Maudlin, T., ‘Substances and Space-Time: What Aristotle Would Have Said to Einstein’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 21, 1990, pp. 532 and 534–6). Aristotle’s ontological independence requirement cannot violate Z.3’s provisos, for otherwise the absurdity of prime matter would follow. This absurdity is not unrelated to the impossibility of bare particulars. Maudlin (pp. 538–9) claims that Aristotle’s reductio argument in Z.3 shows that both prime matter and bare particulars are ‘the twin monstrosities of metaphysics’. In Z.3, Aristotle’s argument is primarily directed against prime matter but it can equally well apply to bare particulars. The basic claim of his argument, which makes both prime matter and bare particulars impossible, is that there are some attributes which are integral to the existence and being of a subject: not all attributes can be removed from it.

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

237

dependent on its bearer (a particular substance) in being what it is. The identity of this particular substance, by contrast, is not fixed by any of its non-substance tropes. For example, Socrates’ own walking seems essentially to involve Socrates (or his essence), while Socrates’ essence does not include his walking or any other of his non-substance tropes. If so, a particular substance proves ontologically prior to its particularized nonsubstance attributes in the manner of [PIB] too. Let us accept, for the sake of the argument, the controversial assumption that Aristotle himself did endorse (whether within the context of the Categories or even outside it) non-substance tropes in the sense just sketched. Let us also agree that the fact that (e.g.) Socrates’ particular walking cannot be specified or referred to without mentioning the proper name or a definite description of Socrates is not due simply to linguistic or epistemic limitations of our own descriptive or referential devices. Rather, it reflects accurately the existence conditions or the nature of non-substance tropes themselves. Even so, however, the introduction of such tropes does not seem to address satisfactorily the issue of the ontological priority of particular substances over non-substance entities. For, in so far as this issue is concerned, the concept of tropes whose existence conditions or identity are fixed on the basis of a specific particular substance seems to beg the question. Hence, Socrates turns out ontologically prior to his peculiar walking in the manner of [PIE] just because his existence is built into the existence conditions of his walking. Further, Socrates is the identity-fixer of, and so can be ontologically prior in ‘being what he is’ to, his own walking simply because he, or his essence, is inserted into his walking, its being what it essentially is. It should be noted that my present claim is not that there is anything inherently wrong with this line of thought as a proposed account of non-substance tropes. As an explanation of ontological priority, however, it seems strikingly inadequate. For it does not offer any substantive grounds for the thesis that a concrete particular substance is ontologically prior to its non-substance tropes. Rather, it presupposes the required asymmetric dependence of a trope upon its specific particular possessor. In this way, though, the constraint of ontological priority is covered far too easily as it is already inherent in the notion of a non-substance entity itself. It is possible, at this juncture, to propose alternative views of non-substance tropes, which are not vulnerable to the charge just outlined. Thus, it might be denied that the existence conditions or the identity of a trope involve any specific particular substance, even if this trope cannot belong to more than just one particular substance. In this conception, tropes are types of non-recurrent universal. For instance, a highly finegrained shade of colour, even if fully identifiable (in purely universal terms) independently of any specific particular substance, could be incapable of ever existing in more than one particular substance alone. If so, this trope would necessarily cease to exist if its particular bearer passed away (but not conversely). Once again, however, this view fails to generate the required type of asymmetric dependence. For this shade of colour does not have any specific particular substance written into its existence conditions or its identity. If so, it does not depend specifically on one particular substance rather than

238

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

another. Because it is essentially a universal (even if non-recurrent) entity, there is nothing which would prevent it from belonging to (e.g.) Callias instead of Socrates. This sort of trope, then, is not ontologically posterior exclusively to (e.g.) Socrates but to some one particular substance or other. A different conception of tropes would hold that they are recurrent individual properties that cannot belong to more than just one particular substance at any one given time. Yet they can be present in different particular substances at different times or consecutively. In this ‘relay’ picture of tropes, a particular whiteness may belong to Socrates alone on Tuesday and then to Callias alone on Thursday or successively first only to Socrates at t, then only to Plato at tþ1 and then only to Aristotle at tþ2. It could not, however, belong to more than just one specific particular substance at any one time. Does it follow from this conception that a particular substance is in any plausible way ontologically prior to its tropes? It is obviously true that (e.g.) Socrates is ontologically independent of an individual whiteness even if the latter ceases to be present in him and starts to belong to Callias. But the converse claim seems equally true: an individual whiteness is ontologically independent of Socrates as it can belong to particular substances other than Socrates at different times. This is so despite the fact that it cannot be possessed by more than just one particular substance at any one given time. If this is correct, this proposal too proves unsuccessful as a way of rendering tropes ontologically posterior to specific particular substances.

11.3 Subjecthood, and the Ontological Priority of Particular Substances as [PIB] In the light of these considerations one might feel forced to conclude that particular substances just cannot qualify as ontologically prior to non-substance attributes, no matter whether ontological priority is understood as [PIE] or as [PIB]. To avoid this impasse, it is necessary to resort to the notion of subjecthood as a way in which to explicate and ground the primacy of particular substances. It will be useful, at this juncture, to make a fresh start in assessing the argument advanced in Metaphysics Z.1. This argument adduces several clarificatory points about the primacy of particular substances over non-substance attributes or accidental compounds on the basis of subjecthood. Here is an overview of these points: (a) Non-substance types of being are said to be beings in virtue of being qualifications of the primary type of being, substance (1028a18–20: a ’ ¼ººÆ º ªÆØ ZÆ fiH F oø Z [sc. F æı Z , i.e. B PÆ ; cf. 1028a14–15: æH k e  KØ, ‹æ Å ÆØ c PÆ] a b  Å r ÆØ, a b . . . ). It is not necessary to take this claim as elucidating only the ontological type of priority of substance over non-substance entities. Even priority in account or priority in knowledge could be set out on the basis of this formulation. Thus, it may be thought that non-substance entities are defined in virtue of, and by

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

6

239

reference to, their being qualifications of substance (but not vice versa). Analogously, knowing a non-substance entity may be based on knowing the way in which it qualifies substance (but not conversely). At any rate, this remark should also apply to ontological priority: substance is ontologically prior to nonsubstance entities as the latter are beings in so far as they are qualifications of substance. The converse, by contrast, does not hold good. For, presumably, substance is a subject underlying these qualifying, non-substance entities but is not a qualification of them. No non-substance attribute is a being in its own right as it cannot be separated from substance (1028a22–4: Pb ªaæ ÆPH [sc. H Øø, i.e. F ÆÇØ ŒÆd F ªØÆØ ŒÆd . . . from 1028a20–2] Kd h ŒÆŁ’ Æe [çıŒ ] h åøæÇŁÆØ ıÆe B PÆ ).6 There is some determinate subject, a particular substance, which underlies nonsubstance attributes and accidental compounds. It is in virtue of (1028a26: Ø Ø) belonging to particular substances as underlying subjects that entities such as what is walking or the walking thing are beings [1028a25–7: ÆFÆ b [sc. e ÆÇ ŒÆØ e ŒÆŁ  ŒÆØ . . . from 1028a24–5] Aºº çÆÆØ ZÆ, Ø Ø Ø Ø e Œ  ÆPE ‰æØ  (F ’ Kd  PÆ ŒÆd e ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ)]. What is good or the good thing, as well as what is sitting or the sitting thing, are not (said to be) beings without a particular substance as their underlying subject (1028a28–9: e IªÆŁe ªaæ j e ŒÆŁ  PŒ ¼ı ı [sc. F ŒØ ı, i.e. B PÆ ŒÆd F ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ from 1028a26-7] º ªÆØ).7 Because particular substances operate as underlying subjects, each non-substance attribute or accidental compound is a being (1028a29–30: Øa ÆÅ [sc. c PÆ ŒÆd e ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ] ŒIŒø ŒÆ Ø). From this it straightforwardly follows that substance is being in a primary or unqualified manner (1028a30–1: u e æø k ŒÆd P d k Iºº’ k ±ºH  PÆ i YÅ). For, presumably, it does not belong to anything but is a subject that possesses other, non-substance items.

I do not take the phrase h åøæÇŁÆØ ıÆe B PÆ as denying an additional feature of nonsubstance attributes, over and above the claim that they are not per se beings. Rather, this phrase seems to stand in an epexegetic relation to the expression h ŒÆŁ’ Æe. If this is correct, it explains the following two points: (a) the way in which non-substances are not beings in their own right (i.e. they are not capable of ontological independence or separation); and (b) the items relative to which they are not per se (i.e. they cannot be separated from substance). 7 I have understood the phrase PŒ ¼ı ı º ªÆØ as being completed by an understood ZÆ: these non-substance items are not said to be beings without substance. The term ZÆ is easily supplied with the help of the context. The preceding sentence at 1028a25–6 states that what is walking or what is sitting Aºº çÆÆØ ZÆ. The subsequent sentence at 1028a29–31 clearly entails that non-substance entities Ø because of substance and so are d k but not k ±ºH .

240

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

(f ) From this last point about the unqualified or primary way in which substance is being Aristotle moves on to the familiar claim that substance is primary in all ways. Most importantly, it is ontologically prior as it is separate (or separable) from non-substance categories but not conversely (1028a33–4: H b ªaæ ¼ººø ŒÆŪæÅ ø PŁb åøæØ , ÆoÅ b [sc.  PÆ from 1028a32] Å). As I have already pointed out, points (b) and (f ) might be seen as leading to the unattractive, modal–existential construal of ontological priority. In addition, point (d) might enforce this hasty impression. Thus, it might be thought that what is good or the good thing, just as what is sitting or the sitting thing, cannot exist without a specific particular substance but not conversely. The previous section argued that it is highly questionable whether the asymmetry condition of this claim could be satisfied. A more cautious assessment of (d), however, guards against this pitfall. Aristotle does not put forward any modal–existential claim of ontological priority at 1028a28–9. Rather, his thesis is that non-substance entities are not (correctly held to be) beings independently of particular substances. The implicit converse claim is that particular substances are (correctly held to be) beings independently of standing in any similar relation to non-substance attributes or accidental compounds. There is no allusion, then, to any modal aspect. For non-substance entities simply are not (said to be) beings without substance. There is no implication that they are incapable of being (said to be) beings without it. Nor is Aristotle putting forward any claim of existential dependence. For he does not maintain that non-substance entities do not exist without substance, but that they do not have the status of being without it. A plausible implication from this would be that particular substances are ontologically prior in that they determine the nature of non-substance attributes and accidental compounds as beings quite generally. For particular substances are subjects that other entities are qualifications of, while they themselves are not qualifications of anything. This consideration about subjecthood, which seems the most promising way in which to achieve the required asymmetry, is emphasized by (c). Because (c) clearly constitutes the basis for the claim made in (d), it is safe to understand the examples offered in (d) in the manner just sketched, as presupposing the notion of subjecthood. In effect, the central point (c) implies that the ontological priority of particular substances consists in their being subjects, whereas non-substance entities are not subjects but are qualifiers possessed by subjects. More significantly, points (a) and (e) add a causal–explanatory aspect to the relation of asymmetric dependence of non-substance entities upon substance. In (a) it becomes clear that non-substances earn the status of ‘being-ness’ by virtue of their being qualifications of substance. The converse causal claim, though, is not true. In similar fashion, (e) entails that non-substance attributes or accidental compounds are beings because of substance. As a result substance is being in the primary or unqualified way (æø k; k ±ºH ), while non-substance entities are beings derivatively (d k).

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

241

The idea, then, is that substance does not causally depend for its being-ness on nonsubstance entities: for it is a being without belonging to, or being possessed by, anything else. By contrast, non-substance entities are beings only in so far as, and because, they are linked to substance as its qualifications. This causal–explanatory asymmetry can be successfully applied to particular substances if set out by reference to the notion of subjecthood invoked in (c). Thus, particular substances, for example, are ultimate subjects which underlie non-substance attributes and accidental compounds. The former serve as items which are qualified by the latter. The converse claim is blocked by the fact that particular substances are themselves ultimate subjects and so do not qualify anything else. This sort of asymmetry could ground the ontological primacy of particular substances: because they are ultimate subjects of this sort, particular substances make non-substance entities the general types of being that they are. What it is to be a non-substance entity is to be a qualifier of a subject, some particular substance or other. By contrast, the nature of a particular substance does not consist in its being a qualifier of anything. Rather, it is a subject that other, non-substance entities qualify. The first obvious question about the present suggestion is how to conceptualize this sort of ontological priority of particular substances. I submit that it is a version of [PIB] which can be clarified in terms of the causal–explanatory notion of making something what it is. It might be objected that this sort of account is alien to Aristotle’s view of particular substances and his justification of their ontological primacy. Even outside the context of Metaphysics Z.1, however, Aristotle deploys a notion of ontological priority which involves the idea that what is prior causes or explains the being of derivative items. Hence, in the Categories, the main work which favours the primacy of particular substances, Aristotle introduces the following type of priority which he helpfully calls ‘priority by nature’ (14b12–13: æ æ NŒ ø çØ º ªØ’ ¼).8 There would seem, however, to be another manner of priority besides those mentioned.9 For of things which reciprocate as to implication of being, that which is in some way the cause of the other’s being might reasonably be called prior by nature. And that there are some such cases is clear. For there being a man reciprocates as to implication of being with the true statement about it: if there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, and reciprocally – since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing’s being, the actual thing does seem in

8

Following Ackrill’s translation (Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione [Categories], Oxford University Press, 1963) and Corkum’s remarks (‘Dependence’, p. 75), I take çØ as modifying the adjective æ æ. The adverb NŒ ø , on the other hand, seems to be qualifying the optative º ªØ’ ¼. 9 It is worth noting that Categories 12 begins with the announcement that there are four types of priority (14a26). At the end of the discussion of these four types, however, Aristotle concludes that, while ‘the ways in which the prior is said are this many (FØ)’, i.e. those four just described, yet there is a further, fifth type of priority (14b9–11). Indeed, the whole chapter closes with the remark that there are five ways in which priority is said (14b22–3), a claim which directly clashes with its opening statement.

242

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

some way the cause of the statement’s being true; it is because the actual thing is or is not that the statement is called true or false. (Categories 12, 14b10–22; Ackrill’s trans.)

Clearly this sort of priority by nature should correspond to priority in nature or in substance as specified in Metaphysics Δ.11, what I labelled ‘ontological priority’. It should be noted, first, that prior and posterior items are here linked by a symmetric dependence relation. This is what Aristotle terms ‘reciprocation as to implication of being’: if a man is, the statement ‘a man is’ is true and conversely. This feature could be seen as consolidating the argument I offered in section 11.2. If specific particular substances and their non-substance attributes are connected by a similar symmetric relation, it is unsurprising that the modal–existential construal cannot accommodate the asymmetry condition in the way it attempts to do so. It seems correct, as has been argued, that a non-substance attribute (such as being white) requires for its existence some particular substance or other existing. It is also the case, however, that, if a specific particular substance (such as Socrates) exists, necessarily some non-substance attribute or other belongs to it. The required asymmetry should, therefore, be sought elsewhere. Aristotle’s suggestion in Categories 12 is that this asymmetry is causal–explanatory or grounding. Because a man is, the statement ‘a man is’ is true but not the other way about. This is so despite the fact that there is mutual (perhaps even necessary) implication between a man’s being and the corresponding statement’s being true. If we apply this conception of ontological priority to particular substances, the intuitive result is that, because they are (as they are), non-substance entities are (as they are) but not the other way about. This obviously fits well with the two causal–explanatory or grounding points (a) and (e) brought out in Metaphysics Z.1 (1028a18–20; 29–31). Non-substances are beings because of substance or in virtue of their being qualifications of substance. It should be emphasized, though, that this causal relation of ontological priority should not be understood as obtaining between specific particular substances and non-substance attributes. It does not seem correct to think that being white is as it is because Socrates is as he is. For being white would be what it is even if Socrates underwent radical sorts of change or even if he passed away. Indeed, being white would presumably be as it is even if Socrates never existed. This is so unless we adopt a view of non-substance attributes as non-recurrent individual properties whose existence conditions and identity are determined by a specific particular bearer. In section 11.2, however, I have already doubted the plausibility and success of this approach as a way of setting out the notion of ontological priority. It is more promising, then, to view this causal–explanatory relation of priority as holding of particular substance and non-substance entities as such or quite generally. Because of some particular substance or other, its being the general type of being that it is, non-substance attributes and accidental compounds are the general kinds of being that they are (but not vice versa). An extremely important question arises, at this point, about the abstract phrase ‘general type of being that something is’ employed in these formulations. What is it precisely that does the causing or the explaining of being-ness? And what is the nature

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

243

of this being-ness that gets caused or explained by particular substances (or by their being what they are)? To answer these twin questions, we should refer back to the notion of ultimate subjecthood as characterized in Metaphysics Z.1. There Aristotle clarifies that, while particular substances are subjects to which other things are ascribed, they themselves do not qualify anything else. Non-substance entities, by contrast, are not subjects but are qualifications of, and belong to, particular substances as subjects. This idea can be imported into the causal–explanatory type of ontological priority to fill in the gaps in the locution ‘general type of being that something is’. Thus, because particular substances are subjects of metaphysical predication, non-substance entities are beings which belong to, or are predicated of, such subjects (but not conversely). What it is to be a non-substance entity, then, is to be a qualifier or predicate of particular substances, the types of being which operate as metaphysical subjects underlying non-substances. If this is correct, particular substances are prior in that they, or their being ultimate subjects, makes non-substances what they are, attributes which belong to subjects. The explanandum, then, in this causal–explanatory type of ontological priority is the general status of being-ness for non-substances, their being qualifiers or predicates. The explanans, by contrast, is the primary way in which particular substances possess being-ness, their being subjects of metaphysical predication.10 This view seems to be vindicated by the argument rehearsed in Metaphysics Z.1, which concludes that substance is being unqualifiedly or primarily, whereas non-substance is being derivatively. For this conclusion stems from the causal–explanatory thesis that non-substances are beings because substance functions as their subject or by virtue of their being qualifications of this sort of subject (1028a29–31; cf. a26–7; a18–20).11

10 The notion of metaphysical predication used in the present argument serves simply as a way of ruling out suspect predications such as those described by the statements ‘this white is musical’ or ‘this walking (thing) is a man’. In these last cases, while ‘this white’ and ‘this walking’ are grammatical subjects, yet the entities referred to by them (being white and walking) are not metaphysical subjects. For they are not the real-world possessors of the features described by the predicate-terms. By contrast, these features belong to specific types of particular substance. Thus, this white or this walking are truly said to be musical or a man (partly) because (e.g.) a particular man happens to be white or happens to be walking. Aristotle advances this view in APo. A.19, 81b24–9 and A.22, 83a1–32; see my article ‘Essence and Per Se Predication in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.4’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 39, 2010, pp. 162–5. 11 My account of the sort of ontological priority applying to particular substances is congenial to Corkum’s view (‘Dependence’, p. 77–81). He holds that particular substances have ‘their status as beings independently of standing in any predicational tie to any other entity whatsoever’. By contrast, other, non-substance entities are not beings independently of being said of, or being in, some particular substance or other as a subject. Indeed, they are beings precisely because of standing in these predicational ties to particular substances. My proposal can be used to flesh out Corkum’s brief formulations. After all, he himself admits that his argument is not intended as an account but as a formulation of ontological priority (p. 81). Corkum’s formulation, then, could be filled in by the following, central points of my view: (a) my conception of the ontological priority of particular substances as non-existential, in the manner of [PIB]; (b) the elucidation of this concept on the basis of the asymmetric causal notion of a particular substance’s making non-substance attributes what they are; and (c) the explication of the ‘status of being-ness’ not only for particular substances but also for non-substance entities: the former are subject-beings, whereas the latter are qualifying- or predicate-beings.

244

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

11.4 Conclusion The view just proposed has several striking advantages. First, it constitutes a unified approach to Aristotelian ontological priority that accommodates univocally not only particular substances but also their essences or substantial forms. For in both cases the underlying concept of ontological priority is [PIB], a notion which is based on the asymmetric, causal–explanatory relation of making something what it essentially is. Just as essences or forms make compounds and their matter what they are (but not conversely), particular substances make non-substance entities what they are (but not vice versa). In both cases, then, what is prior is (or can be) what it is without the posterior items being what they are, while the converse is not true. This, in effect, is equivalent to my formulation of [PIB] as introduced in section 8.1. In this way, my view is not beset by the difficulties inherent in the modal–existential construal of ontological priority. For, obviously, it differs radically from the competing claim of existential independence codified in [PIE]. Further, it is not fundamentally a modal conception even if modal claims stem from it. Hence, the modal claim that what is prior is capable of being what it is without the posterior items but not conversely is not the explanatory bedrock of my view. For it follows from, and is grounded on, the non-modal, essentialist thesis that the nature of posterior items involves what is prior but not the other way about. The asymmetric causal notion of a prior item’s making the rest what they are does not consist in the corresponding modal claim of asymmetric necessary dependence, even if the former not only entails but also explains the latter. Furthermore, my proposal regains the asymmetry with which particular substances are held to be privileged over non-substance entities. For it is plainly true that nonsubstance attributes or accidental compounds depend, for their nature as qualifyingbeings, on particular substances having them as qualifications. Particular substances, by contrast, do not depend, for their nature as beings, on being qualifications of nonsubstance entities. For they just are not qualifications of anything else but are subjects which receive qualifications. As I argued in section 11.2, there seems to be no available, alternative strategy with which to secure the asymmetry condition in any equally plausible manner. Lastly, my view has the merit of incorporating into the type of ontological priority characteristic of particular substances a useful causal or explanatory aspect. Not only is this grounding parameter central in Metaphysics Z.1 [in points (a) and (e) made at 1028a18–20 and 29–31]. It is also an intrinsic component of the important, ontological notion of priority set out in Categories 12 (14b10–22). Aristotle’s idea seems to be that the nature of particular substances as subject-beings grounds the being-ness of nonsubstance attributes as qualifications of some subject or other. Analogously, particular substances, their being subjects of this sort, explain the nature of accidental compounds as beings which consist of a non-substance attribute plus a subject qualified by it. This causal–explanatory feature of ontological priority is captured by the notion of making something what it essentially is, which is fundamental to my view of [PIB].

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

245

It might be objected that my suggestion is too ‘logical’ or predicational to represent a substantive, ontological notion of Aristotelian priority. For the cornerstone of this suggestion is effectively the asymmetric dependence of predicates upon subjects or of attributes upon objects. The exegetical undertone of this objection can be easily tackled by reference to Aristotle’s own considerations within Metaphysics Z.1. Immediately after arguing for the primacy of substantial being over non-substances by reference to subjecthood, he emphasizes that his position becomes clear on the basis of corresponding predications (1028a27–8: ‹æ K çÆÆØ K B fi ŒÆŪæÆ fi B fi ØÆÅ fi ). It is predications such as ‘Socrates is pale’ or ‘Callias is walking’ which describe the asymmetric dependence of qualifying-beings on a subject that they qualify, some particular substance or other. It should be noted, though, that this dependence is not merely grammatical or linguistic. This is why in section 11.3 I used the expression ‘subject of metaphysical predication’ to characterize the types of primary subject that particular substances are. Aristotle’s view is not that any old type of subject-term refers to a genuine subject, a real-world bearer of non-substance attributes. Rather, it is determinate kinds of particular substance that are the proper bearers of non-substance attributes or the substrates underlying accidental compounds. In predications such as ‘this white (thing) is a man’ or ‘this musical (thing) is walking’, for example, the subject-terms do not refer to basic subjects that are qualified by the features described by the predicate-terms. It is because a particular man (for example) is accidentally white or happens to be musical that this white or this musical are truly said to be a man or to be walking. An entity such as being white or being musical just does not function as a realworld object which is qualified by non-substance attributes in its own right, independently of belonging to some particular substance or other.12 12 Alan Code’s view of the primacy of particular substances seems to agree, in large measure, with my proposal. The distinctive feature of his argument is (as becomes clear from both seminar and private discussions) that particular substances are subjects of predication which persist through change despite their coming to possess a plethora of different or even contrary accidental attributes. Non-substance attributes, by contrast, are predicated of, and qualify, such continuants as subjects. Code places emphasis on passages taken from the Categories and the Posterior Analytics in which Aristotle holds that particular substances are the only kinds of being which remain numerically one and the same, although they are receptive of contraries (Cat. 5, 4a10ff.). The idea is that particular substances are persisting subjects of predication that acquire, lose or replace their non-substance attributes, while the converse does not hold good (APo. A.19, 81b24–9; A.22, 83a4–14). For instance, Socrates is first pale and later is not pale but gets a sun-tan. Even so, throughout his career as a particular substance, he remains what he essentially is, a human. By contrast, being pale does not remain numerically one and the same entity if it ceases to be pale or if it alters into being sun-tanned. Code’s view seems cognate with Alexander’s simile about the asymmetric independence claim made at Met. Z.1, 1028a33–4 (which Alexander takes as explaining priority in time): particular substances are ontologically prior in the way in which a wine jar is prior to the wines that it successively contains. Similarly, a particular substance continues to exist and be what it is while taking on contrary non-substance attributes (In Metaph. 460.36–461.11). Although not fully developed, even Alexander’s proposed asymmetry, illustrated in the fashion of container versus content, could be set out with the help of my [PIB]. Substance is ontologically prior as a subject which remains numerically the same despite being qualified by all kinds of different, even contrary, non-substance entities throughout its career. Non-substance entities, by contrast, qualify subjects in this way but are not themselves qualified as persisting subjects by anything.

246

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

There are two important ways, however, in which the proposed concept of the ontological priority of particular substances proves weak. First, our intuitive expectation is that the entities that satisfy [PIB] make dependent items the determinate types of being that they (essentially) are. Thus, an essence or substantial form fixes the specific identity of compounds and their matter. For instance, being human or being a human soul, the essence or form of the kind human, of particular humans and of the corresponding type- and token-matters, makes these derivative entities the determinate kinds of being that they essentially are. In my view, by contrast, particular substances operate in a ‘generic’ causal or grounding mode of identity-fixing. For their ontological priority over non-substances does not consist in the claim that a specific particular substance makes a given nonsubstance the determinate kind of being that it is. It is not true that (e.g.) Socrates is prior to being red in that he (or his essence) makes red the specific type of colour that it is. Not even determinable non-substance attributes, such as being coloured or being a quality, seem to have their nature in virtue of what a concrete particular substance, such as Socrates, is.13 Rather, the view is that particular substance, in general, or any particular substance whatsoever makes non-substance attributes the general kinds of being that they are. The generic nature of particular substance (some or other), its being in the primary, subject-mode, grounds the generic nature of non-substance entities as derivative, qualifying-beings belonging to some subject or other of this sort. This notion of ontological primacy is undeniably attenuated. Does it follow from this, however, that my account is incoherent or that it is not sensitive to Aristotle’s own view of ontological priority? The answer to this question should, I think, be negative. To consolidate this line of reply, it is helpful to discuss the second challenge that might be levelled against my approach. It might be objected that the generic causal character of the priority relation just described entails that particular substances are not the ultimate foundation of Aristotle’s metaphysical picture. For, after all, they do not cause anything to be what it specifically is. Worse still, they themselves do not have their nature in their own right or primitively. No particular substance, to be sure, has its specific or generic identity fixed by any non-substance entity. Yet what particular substances are is determined by their essence or form. Hence, for instance, a compound particular substance, such as Socrates, is made the specific kind of particular object or the determinate type of subject that it is (an individual human) in virtue of its essence or form, being human or being a human soul.14 13 It might be objected that the essence of a determinable attribute such as being coloured includes its belonging to a surface, which in turn is part of a particular substance. If so, it might be thought that a particular substance, its surface, makes being coloured what it is. It is not true, though, that some specific particular substance (or its surface) is involved in what being coloured is. Rather, it is some particular substance or other (or some corresponding surface or other) which is part of the essence of being coloured. 14 The present argument can work even if we do not invoke substantial forms, actualities, or any other metaphysically ‘weighty’ kinds of entity. The minimum requirement is that a particular substance’s essence, its what-it-is-to-be, makes it the determinate type of particular object or subject that it is. (Obviously, if forms and actualities satisfy this constraint as particular types of essence, the present argument will also go through

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

247

This result, though, is neither conceptually implausible nor exegetically inadequate. For in the Metaphysics Aristotle himself does not take particular substances as ontologically prior to their essences or forms. Rather, he maintains that their essences or forms are prior to compound particular substances. For this reason, he argues, essences or forms are primary substances (Z.11, 1037a25–30). Yet he continues to conceive particular compounds as substances, even if they are not primary (Z.11, 1037a25–6; 30; 32; cf. H.1, 1042a24–6; 29–31). This need not be seen as clashing with the doctrine of the Categories which favours the primacy of particular substances. For particular substances can be taken as primary in that they are ontologically prior to non-substance entities in the manner described in my view. This seems to be common ground between the Categories and the Metaphysics.15 Further, this picture is extremely helpful in interpreting Metaphysics Z.1, as well as Metaphysics ZH quite generally. As I remarked earlier, the introductory chapter of Metaphysics Z provides several claims and examples which seem to focus on particular substances and their primacy over non-substance entities. It would be a mistake, though, to suggest that the argument for the primacy of substance ‘in all available ways’ ranges exclusively over particular substances alone. For it is not only particular substances but all types of substance which are primary in all ways (1028a30–b2). If so, the thesis which renders particular substances ontologically prior to non-substance entities, while taking essences or forms as ontologically prior to particular substances themselves, accommodates neatly Aristotle’s overall project. Nor is this picture conceptually problematic. First, it introduces the idea of a hierarchy of ontological fundamentality within the concept of substance. Thus, while particular substances are ontologically prior to non-substance attributes and accidental compounds, they are not the metaphysical bedrock in Aristotle’s considered unproblematically.) The essence-requirement could be covered even within the conceptual framework of the Categories. An attractive view might hold that infimae species, the central type of secondary substance introduced in the Categories, could play that role. For all particular substances are made what they are in virtue of their species. Alternatively, and perhaps more cautiously and congenially to the Metaphysics, it is not the species itself but the what-it-is of the species that makes particular substances what they are. For not even the species itself has its essence in its own right. Rather, it is the what-it-is ( KØ) of the species that makes it and all particular substances falling under it what they are. Traces of this suggestion might be present in Cat. 5, 2b7–14; 29–37; 3a37–9; 3b2–4; 13–23. These considerations seem cognate with the claim made in the Metaphysics that, while particular compounds are substances, universal compounds or species are not (Z.10, 1035b27–31; cf. H.1, 1042a29–31). Further, although the Metaphysics accepts particular substances in this fashion, it denies that they are primary. Primary substancehood is, by contrast, ascribed to their essences or forms (Z.11, 1037a25–30). 15 This point might give rise to complaints about Corkum’s view. One might wonder whether his argument is relatively incomplete and artificially restricted to the context of the Categories alone. It is true that in the Categories particular substances are primary in that they enjoy a certain type of asymmetric ontological independence from non-substance entities. But they are not thus independent of their own essences, their what-it-is (as is termed at Cat. 5, 2b7–14; 29–37; 3a37–9; 3b2–4; 13–23). It is certainly methodologically legitimate for Corkum’s purposes to leave the Metaphysics to the side. The passages from the Categories just mentioned, however, seem to argue for an ontological sort of dependence of particular substances on their species or, perhaps more correctly, on the what-it-is of their species. It would be interesting to explore whether and, if so, how Corkum’s view could accommodate these passages.

248

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

position. Rather, they are ontologically posterior to their essences or forms as they are made what they essentially are by virtue of them. In the light of this, essences or forms prove primary substances relative to particular compounds.16 Moreover, this sort of conceptual stratification also obtains in the case of ontological priority itself. For, while this notion is unified in the manner of [PIB] and is further consolidated with the help of the causal–explanatory notion of making something what it is, yet it is diversified in at least two ways. First, there are different modes of satisfying ontological priority in accordance with the relata at issue. In one case it is particular substances that stand in this relation to non-substance attributes or accidental compounds. In another it is essences or forms that are thus privileged over particular substances. Second, the causal relation of making something what it is gets bifurcated on the basis of the relevant types of explanans and explanandum. For in the case of particular substances it is their generic status as subject-beings which causes or explains the generic being-ness of non-substance entities as qualifiers of subjects. Essences or forms, by contrast, are responsible for the specific nature of particular compound substances (as well as universal compounds and token- or type-matter). It should not be supposed that these ramifications of the notion of ontological priority are arbitrary. For there is an important criterion with which to distinguish between the modes in which this notion manifests itself. Using the concept of subjecthood as a starting-point, we could ask why non-substance attributes or accidental compounds are (generically) qualifying-beings. The reply to this question in terms of the subjecthood of particular substances yields one type of ontological priority. The notion of subjecthood involved in this claim, however, is not basic. For we can go on to ask what it is (specifically) in virtue of which particular substances are the determinate types of subject that they are. The answer to this question invokes the notion of an essence’s or a form’s making particular substances the specific kinds of being that they are. The subjecthood-oriented concept of ontological priority, then, is not fundamental but is based on the notion of ontological priority which accounts for subjecthood.17

16

It is noteworthy that this view does not rule out but rather encourages the claim that there may be even further types of substance (such as superlunary eternal actual beings) which are hierarchically placed not only above particular compounds but also above their essences or forms. My argument in the present study, though, focuses on sublunary, perishable objects and their essences or forms. For a brief treatment of eternal actual beings see section 13.6. 17 This way of layering the notion of ontological priority is not alien to Aristotle’s own views. In the Metaphysics he himself seems to refine or even to undermine the centrality of the Categories notion of subjecthood as a criterion for primary substancehood or as ground for the ontological primacy of substance. For he qualifies the notion of subjecthood in terms of thisness, separateness, and priority. Indeed, he seems even to favour these last three criteria over subjecthood; see (e.g.) Met. Z.3, 1029a5–10; 26–30. Also cf. Gill, Substance, p. 31.

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

249

11.5 Appendix: Metaphysics Z.1 and Priority ‘in Time’ In section 11.1 I left to the side the baffling exegetical question of whether, and if so why, Aristotle labels as ‘priority in time’ the claim that substance alone is separate from non-substance attributes but not the other way about. Let us look once more at the relevant passage: The primary is said in many ways; but substance is primary in all ways, both in account and in knowledge and in time. For none amongst the rest of the categories is separate but it alone is. (Met. Z.1, 1028a31–4; Bostock’s trans.)

Immediately Aristotle goes on to elucidate priority in account and priority in knowledge (1028a34–6; 36–b2). Several commentators have been tempted to link the claim that ‘none amongst the rest of the categories is separate but substance alone is’ with temporal priority of some sort.18 It is obvious, though, that the type of priority encapsulated in this claim does not seem to involve any temporal considerations. More importantly, as I argued, to get the correct form of asymmetry between particular substances and non-substance entities, we should understand this claim in the ontological manner of [PIB] as set out in section 11.3. For, even if we attempted to smuggle temporal considerations into the argument, still we would be unable to secure the asymmetry condition. Thus, for instance, just as Socrates can exist before acquiring (at the end of a process of sun-tanning) the attribute of being sun-tanned, being suntanned, too, can exist before Socrates existing, as an attribute of another particular substance that is sun-tanned. There are two main ways in which to tackle the exegetical crux of the term ‘priority in time’. The first, economical approach is, arguably, the most attractive. It denies that there is any strong link between this term and the subsequent claim of asymmetric independence of substance. The idea, then, would be that the qualification ‘in time’ is mentioned but then dropped or left unexplained. At any rate, the claim of asymmetric independence would not be intended as an explication peculiar to any sort of temporal priority. For, in one view, this claim describes the asymmetric independence relation that ontological priority alone consists in. Alternatively, and more inclusively, this claim could be thought as clarifying all relevant types of priority mentioned or alluded to at 1028a31–b2. As asymmetric independence in being it describes ontological

18 Alternatively, others insert a çØ into the sentence of 1028a32–3, thereby rendering it ø  PÆ æH, ŒÆd çØ ŒÆd º ªø fi ŒÆd åæ ø fi ŒÆd ªØ (Asclepius) or ø  PÆ æH, ŒÆd º ªø fi ŒÆd ªØ ŒÆd åæ ø fi ŒÆd çØ (Bessarion and the Aldine edition). In this way, they take H b ªaæ ¼ººø ŒÆŪæÅ ø PŁb åøæØ , ÆoÅ b Å as clarifying the label æH çØ, while they think that æH åæ ø fi is left unexplained. Emendations of this sort, however, are not sufficiently supported by the manuscripts. See Ross, Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 2, p. 160.

250

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

priority; as asymmetric independence in definition it captures priority in account; and as asymmetric independence in knowledge it specifies priority in knowledge.19 It will be immediately asked, though, why priority in time is listed alongside ontological, definitional, and epistemic priorities without receiving any decent explanation. There are two different but not mutually exclusive ways in which to address this question. First, we could argue that the notion of temporal priority is fairly clear and unproblematic: it consists in an asymmetric relation of occurring before or after something. If so, Aristotle need not, at this point, digress into any details about it. Indeed, earlier in the Metaphysics, in the philosophical lexicon, he has given just such an explanation of priority in time which confirms that this notion is relatively perspicuous (.11, 1018b14–19). The Trojan Wars are prior in time to the Persian Wars in that the former are more remote from the present time than the latter. Or, if the criterion is proximity to the present, it is the other way around. It might be difficult, at the present stage of the argument of Metaphysics Z, to see how it is that substance satisfies this constraint relative to non-substances. It does not follow from this, however, that Aristotle should feel compelled to set out the notion of temporal priority itself. The second suggestion as to why temporal priority is not further elucidated has as its starting-point precisely this last claim. While the notion of priority in time is clear enough to be left unexplained, how substance fulfills it over non-substance entities is too difficult to be clarified in passing at this juncture of Metaphysics Z. For this reason, Aristotle makes a merely promissory or/and forward-looking remark without setting it out at all. He announces that substance is primary in time too but will argue for this claim in detail only after carrying through a long and complex metaphysical investigation. In the course of this investigation he will introduce and canvass notions such as essence, form, and matter, substance as principle and cause, and finally actual and potential being. It is only in the culmination of this discussion, in Metaphysics .8, that he will be able to show how substance (as form and actual being) is – in a certain sense – prior even in time to non-substance (as matter and potential being). Hence, it is true that, in the process of a substance’s coming-to-be, a seed or an egg (a material, potential being) temporally precedes the complete organism (a fully enformed, substantial or actual being). However, potential beings of this sort are themselves preceded in time by other substantial, actual beings of the same species. For the latter function as efficient causes which produce the former (.8, 1049a17ff.). This explanation, though, is too demanding as it involves substantive and dense theoretical commitments. If so, it is out of place in the introductory context of Metaphysics Z.1, which argues mainly from straightforwardly intelligible, predicational considerations. The alternative strategy would be to accept that there is an explanatory link between temporal priority and the claim that substance is ontologically independent 19 With some stretching, the claim of asymmetric separation could be seen as covering even priority in time, in the manner of asymmetric independence in temporal occurrence: what is temporally prior or posterior obtains before or after some other item but not the other way about.

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

251

of non-substances but not conversely. This view is (I think) less promising than the previous, ‘separationist’ approach. For it is inflationary as it has to enrich our understanding of temporal priority to fine-tune it with the asymmetric independence claim. This adjustment is required because (as noted earlier) that claim cannot be satisfactorily formulated in terms of purely temporal or even change-related construals of priority in time. If this is correct, it is natural to ask why Aristotle did not altogether abandon the characterization ‘in time’ in favour of qualifications such as ‘in substance’ or ‘in nature’. Perhaps, we might reply, the context of Metaphysics Z.1 is too ‘logical’ or predicational to sustain terminology of this last sort. Its orientation towards considerations and arguments advanced in treatises such as the Categories would make it odd to invoke talk of ‘nature’. For this introductory chapter does not include any claims about teleology, processes of coming-to-be or completion-states of an entity. A similar line of reasoning might apply in the case of the term ‘priority in substance’. It would not constitute an immediately accessible, introductory claim to hold that ‘substance is primary in substance’. Later on in the Metaphysics, in theoretically more charged contexts, Aristotle would have the conceptual apparatus in place to support such claims satisfactorily.20 There are, arguably, many imaginative or ingenious ways in which to enrich the notion of temporal priority in order to align it with the desirable sort of ontological priority, [PIB].21 In what follows my argument will constitute a merely tentative (even if attractive) suggestion. The claim of asymmetric ontological independence could be characterized as ‘priority in time’ in the sense of precedence in rank or in seniority. This would be a metaphorical but vivid characterization of the notion of ontological priority which is grasped as [PIB]. Aristotle himself comes close to providing a description of temporal priority in similar terms in the following passage taken from Categories 12: First and most strictly, [something is called prior] in respect of time, as when one thing is called senior [ææ] or more ancient [ƺÆØ æ] than another; for it is because the time is longer that it is called either senior or more ancient. (Categories 12, 14a26–9; Ackrill’s trans.) 20 For instance, in Metaphysics M.2 Aristotle argues that ‘body is prior in substance’ to geometrical entities (such as lines or surfaces). He also maintains, though, that body is a substance and so his conclusion is that a type of substance is prior in substance to mathematical entities. In that context, however, he deploys a rich teleological argument which involves premisses about fully enformed beings (ensouled living organisms) and their completion at later or final stages of natural processes of coming-to-be (1077a24–36). In Metaphysics Z.1, by contrast, these considerations are entirely absent. 21 For example, while Alexander takes the priority in time invoked in Metaphysics Z.1 as being explained by the claim of asymmetric separation, he realizes that asymmetric existential independence does not work (In Metaph. 460.36–461.3). For this reason, he proposes that substance is prior in the manner in which a jar is prior to the quantities of wine that fill it at each given successive time (461.7–9). The idea seems to be that a particular substance is ontologically prior to its successive, non-substance attributes in that it persists as a numerically identical individual while receiving, replacing, or losing them throughout its temporally extended existence (461.3–7; 9–11). It is obvious, though, that even this ingenious way of bringing together priority in time and asymmetric ontological independence does not agree with Aristotle’s standard conception of temporal priority (described in Met. .11, 1018b14–9 and employed in .8, 1049b17ff.).

252

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

This first type of priority discussed in Categories 12 does, to be sure, invoke literal temporal considerations about longer or shorter periods of time. On the other hand, though, it is significant that priority in time is linked closely with the notions of seniority or rank (14a27; 29: ææ). These notions do not require that the item which is ‘senior’ or ‘higher in rank’ be older than what is ‘lower in rank’. Thus, for example, a highest-rank military officer, such as a general, could be of the same age as, or even younger than, (some of ) the soldiers, the lower- or even the higher-rank officers that he commands. Yet he is senior to them in the chain of command. As is well known, military metaphors of this sort are not unfamiliar to Aristotle himself. In Metaphysics .10, where he discusses whether goodness belongs to something separate from the whole of nature or whether it consists in the order of the whole, he employs the example of an army. Its goodness consists not only in the way it is put together and positioned on the battlefield but also in the general who is in charge of it. Indeed, the general – the highest in rank or seniority – is primarily or mostly the bearer of an army’s goodness: for he is responsible for the order and position of his troops but not the other way about (1075a11–15). There is nothing which prevents a general from being younger than, or at least of the same age as, some or even all of his troops. Analogously, a particular substance may not be prior in time to some or even all of its non-substance qualifications. For the latter could exist as qualifications of other particular substances before this particular substance came into existence. Yet a particular substance (some or other) is ontologically senior or higher in rank as it is the subject which makes non-substance attributes qualifying-beings. Non-substance entities, by contrast, are below particular substance in the ontological hierarchy as they do not make it the kind of subject-being that it is. It is worth comparing this idea with a passage taken from Plato’s Republic which I have already quoted in section 8.1. As I argued, this passage is a possible place where Plato deploys the notion of ontological priority in the way alluded to by Aristotle in Metaphysics .11, 1019a4. Thus, we should also say that the things which are known not only owe to the Good their being known, but also have both their being and their substance in virtue of it [e r Æ  ŒÆd c PÆ ’ KŒı ÆPE æEÆØ], although the Good is not substance, but surpasses substance to a great extent in seniority and potency [Ø K ŒØÆ B PÆ æÆ fi ŒÆd ı Ø æ å ]. (Republic, 509b6–10; my trans.)

Let us suppose that this argument may be introducing the notion of ontological priority as the way in which the Good surpasses the rest of the Forms by giving them their being or/and substance (but not vice versa). This is not an implausible assumption. Aristotle himself uses the jargon of ‘surpassing in being’ in some of his own clarificatory remarks about ontological priority:

T H E O N T O L O G I C A L P R I O R I T Y O F PA RT I C U L A R S U B S TA N C E S

253

Those things are prior in substance to some others which if separated they surpass the others in being [B fi b ªaæ PÆ fi æ æÆ ‹Æ åøæØÇ Æ fiH r ÆØ æººØ]. (Met. M.2, 1077b2–3; my trans.)

If this is correct, even Plato’s grasp of ontological priority clearly involves considerations about seniority or higher rank (509b8: æÆ fi ). His Form of the Good is prior in the chain of command to all other Forms in that it provides them with their substance, while the converse is not the case. Indeed, the negated converse claim that nothing is responsible for the substance of the Good might be a promising way in which to spell out Plato’s cryptic statement that the Good is not substance but is beyond substance. For, while it makes other Forms what they are, nothing fixes its own substance. Rather, it is what it is in its own right. This is so despite the fact that the Form of the Good need not be ‘older’ than the rest of the Forms in any literal sense of temporal priority. Hence, for instance, there is no pressure to think that any of the posterior Forms came to be after the Good. It may well be that all Forms are necessary existents that do not come to be at all. What is important, at any rate, is that there is evidence even in Plato for understanding ontological priority in terms of seniority or rank. Although metaphorical, so understood the qualification ‘in time’ has several merits as a characterization of ontological priority. First, it is deflationary as it is not a philosopher’s esoteric or idiosyncratic terminological construct (unlike the modern term ‘ontological’). Rather, it is taken directly from descriptions of familiar relations of authority, chain of command, or military hierarchy. Second, it is not a partisan term (unlike the clearly Aristotelian labels ‘priority in substance’ and ‘in nature’). While Aristotle was the first to theorize specifically about the notion of priority in nature or in substance, his use of the seniority idea emphasizes the link and continuity with Platonic theses, such as the ones put forward in the Republic. Aristotle’s use of the term ‘in time’ to describe ontological priority, then, could be his implicit way of referring back to this widely studied work and establishing the importance of this notion independently of any specific philosophical school. This would be unsurprising as in other parts of the corpus he explicitly mentions Plato or the Platonists in connection with ontological priority (Met. .11, 1019a4; Eudemian Ethics [EE] 1217b1–16). Finally, his attempt at connecting ontological priority with earlier Platonist discussions would not be out of place in the context of Metaphysics Z.1, 1028b2ff. For in closing this chapter he clearly seeks to link his own questions about substance to those raised by his predecessors and contemporaries about being. If so, the characterization of ontological priority as temporal priority, in the sense of seniority employed even by Platonists, would be part of the wider attempt to show that his claims, even those about ontological priority, are related to concerns of other, earlier or contemporary theorists. Hence, if we take the bold step of bringing together temporal and ontological priorities in this manner, we might reap some more general exegetical benefits too.

12 Definitional and Ontological Priority [PIB] In the present chapter I shall seek to formulate and address two important, interrelated objections to my view of Aristotelian ontological priority. (1) I argued that ontological priority, understood as [PIB], is based on the idea that some fundamental entity makes a dependent entity what it is (or the type of thing it is). A different formulation of the same point is that [PIB] is the asymmetric relational notion of an entity’s being a part of another thing’s essence. In this sense, I claimed, [PIB] is the ontological counterpart to definitional priority, the asymmetric relation in which an entity’s name or definition is part of the linguistic or conceptual formula that defines a posterior thing. One could object, however, that there is no genuine distinction between Aristotle’s notion of definitional priority and my understanding of ontological priority as [PIB]. For, the objector would argue, Aristotelian definitional priority just is [PIB]: Aristotle conceives definitional priority as priority in ‘real’ definition, in which one entity defines another (but not conversely) precisely in that the first makes the second what it is, or is part of the second’s essence. If this objection is correct, my view does not yield a type of ontological priority which is distinct from definitional priority. Rather, it simply reiterates definitional priority and provides no genuine alternative to the existential type of ontological priority. (2) Let us assume that the objection just raised can be rebutted so as to vindicate the distinction between definitional and ontological priority (independently of whether the latter is understood in the manner of [PIB] or otherwise). Still one might object that, while Aristotle’s substantial forms are definitionally prior to the types of matter and the (universal or particular) compounds they enform, they fail to be ontologically prior to these items in any way whatever. The reason for this failure, it will be claimed, is that Aristotelian forms are abstractions in thought, just as mathematical objects are. Thus, for instance, mathematical objects can be defined without mentioning any perceptible types of matter or compounds. This, however, does not imply that they are ontologically prior to those items. Indeed, it could be argued that mathematical objects are, in some way or other, ontologically parasitic upon perceptible types of matter or compounds. Analogously, the objector would hold, forms are not real-world

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

255

entities but are end-products of abstraction, linguistic or conceptual items which are grasped by ‘ignoring away’ certain types of matter or compounds. Hence, while they are definitionally prior to certain items, they are ontologically dependent upon perceptible types of matter or compounds (but not the other way about). In my attempt to tackle these twin challenges, I shall first discuss some passages from the Metaphysics which are directly relevant to the issues raised by the two objections. Second, I shall seek to show that the arguments developed in these passages not only undermine the strength of the two objections but also support certain aspects of my interpretation. Third, I shall offer some further reasons why Aristotle’s position introduces the distinction between definitional and ontological priority taken as [PIB]. In his view, definitional priority as such is far from being identical with [PIB]: for by itself it does not even entail [PIB]. The reason for this is that definitional priority is a generic notion which is distinguished into two separate types, one of which just fails to imply ontological priority. This type of definitional priority is merely ‘nominal’, linguistic or conceptual: A satisfies this nominal notion relative to B just in case a term or formula corresponding to A simply is part of the linguistic or conceptual account of a term or formula corresponding to B (but not vice versa). There is, however, a second type of definitional priority, one which could be labelled ‘priority in real definition’: A is definitionally prior to B in this fashion if and only if A correctly defines B (but not conversely). In this case definitional priority does indeed entail ontological priority understood as [PIB]. In section 12.4 I shall argue that [PIB] supports this distinction between real and nominal definitional priority. My thesis, however, is not simply that there is a genuine distinction between nominal definitional priority and [PIB]. More importantly, I shall suggest that [PIB] is distinct from, and more fundamental than, real definitional priority. For, I shall argue, [PIB] underwrites priority in real definition as it sets the chief constraints on what it is for an item to be the ‘correct definition’ of another. As part of this discussion, I shall also explain why substantial forms should be conceived as real-world entities which make certain derivative objects what they are.

12.1 Aristotle’s Distinction between ‘Priority in Account’ and ‘Priority in Substance’ (Metaphysics M.2) Aristotle comes to grips with the problem raised by objection (1) in Metaphysics M.2, 1077a36–b11. In the wider context of this passage Aristotle criticizes metaphysical positions which favour mathematical objects as primary substances relative to perceptible natural bodies (1077a14–20; 24–36). He attacks this view by drawing the distinction between priority in account and priority in substance:

256

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

Let [mathematical objects] be prior in account, but still not everything which is prior in account is also prior in substance [P Æ ‹Æ fiH º ª{ æ æÆ ŒÆd B fi PÆ fi æ æÆ]. For these things are prior in substance [to some other items] which, if separated, surpass in being [the other items: B fi b ªaæ PÆ fi æ æÆ ‹Æ åøæØÇ Æ fiH rÆØ æººØ], while things are prior in account to some items whose accounts are constituted from the accounts of the former; and these do not apply at the same time [ÆFÆ b På – Æ æåØ]. For if the attributes are not over and above the substances [N ªaæ c Ø a ŁÅ Ææa a PÆ ], like, e.g., that which is moving or is white, white is prior to white man in account but not in substance [e ºıŒe æ æ ŒÆa e º ª Iºº’ P ŒÆa c PÆ]; for it is not possible to be separated but is always together with the compound (and I call ‘compound’ the white man), so that it is clear that neither what comes from abstraction is prior, nor what comes from addition is posterior [P ªaæ K åÆØ r ÆØ ŒåøæØ  Iºº’ Id – Æ fiH ı º{ K . . . , u çÆæe ‹Ø h e K IçÆØæ ø

æ æ h e KŒ æŁ ø oæ]; for white man is said from addition to white. (1077a36–b11; Annas’s trans. with minor changes)

Not only does this passage draw the distinction between definitional priority (fiH º ª{) and ontological priority (B fi PÆ fi ). More importantly, it clearly states that definitional priority does not – quite generally or by itself – entail ontological priority automatically or unqualifiedly. Thus, if my understanding of ontological priority is correct, [PIB] could be distinct from definitional priority. It is clear that the formulation of ontological priority offered in this passage is (at least) consistent with my understanding of [PIB]. Aristotle claims that A is ontologically prior to B just in case (i) A is separate or separable from B and (ii) A surpasses B in being. As I have argued in previous chapters, separation or separability can be understood as a non-symmetric independence relation which is a necessary component of priority. Hence, condition (i) states simply that A is, or can be, without (or åøæd F) B and so A is separate or separable (åøæØÇ  or åøæØe) from B. Condition (ii), on the other hand, adds the required asymmetry which, together with separation, yields ontological priority: while A surpasses B in being (as A is or can be åøæd F B), B is surpassed by A in being, because it is not or cannot be separately from (åøæd F) A. This formulation is virtually equivalent to [IC], put forward in Metaphysics .11, where a prior item, A, is thought to be without (¼ı) the posterior one, B, but not conversely (1019a3–4). More importantly, the qualification ‘in being’ (1077b3: fiH r ÆØ) agrees with Aristotle’s formulation of ontological priority in Metaphysics .11 (1019a3: r ÆØ). Hence, just as in the chapter from the philosophical lexicon, in Metaphysics M.2, too, the notion of ontological priority is neutral between [PIE] and [PIB]. However, from my previous arguments, it should be clear that [PIB] fares better than [PIE] does as an understanding of Aristotelian ontological priority. If these arguments are plausible, the notion of ontological priority deployed in Metaphysics M.2 should be interpreted in terms of [PIB]. For present purposes, however, it is not necessary to show that the formulation of Metaphysics M.2 fully supports [PIB]. Objection (1) can be blocked if, as I just argued,

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

257

this formulation is simply consistent with [PIB]. Aristotle himself goes on to claim that definitional priority does not imply ontological priority (as specified in Metaphysics M.2). But if so, nor should it imply [PIB], given that this last notion is consistent with the concept of ontological priority as set out in Metaphysics M.2. If this is correct, the decisiveness of objection (1) is significantly reduced. The notion of [PIB] is not the same as definitional priority, because the latter does not even entail the former. Aristotle’s claim runs as follows: (a)

Not everything which is definitionally is also ontologically prior (b1–2).

This important claim blocks the entailment from definitional to ontological priority and secures the distinction between the two notions. Yet it is compatible with the following thesis: (b)

There are some things which are both definitionally and ontologically prior.

The obvious Aristotelian candidates for covering both types of priority are substancecases, such as essences or substantial forms. Not only are their names or definitions parts of the linguistic or conceptual formulae that define matter and compounds. They are also the real-world entities that make these derivative (types of ) objects what they are, thereby fulfilling the condition of [PIB]. A complication arises at this point. Aristotle claims that these two notions do not obtain at the same time (1077b4: ÆFÆ b På – Æ æåØ). This statement might be construed as rendering definitional and ontological priority mutually exclusive. If this construal is correct, (b) cannot hold good: for there could be nothing which possesses both definitional and ontological priority if these two notions are incompatible. But if this were so, Aristotle’s ontological picture would not be feasible. For, contrary to his considered position, his preferred candidates for primary substancehood could not at the same time serve as definitionally and ontologically fundamental items. Moreover, his conception (or my interpretation of his conception) of [PIB] as the ontological correlate of definitional priority would be untenable. For this conception presupposes that anything which satisfies [PIB] is definitionally prior too. If [PIB] and definitional priority were mutually exclusive, however, this presupposition could not hold true and so the idea that [PIB] is the ontological counterpart to definitional priority would be overthrown. To show that Aristotle’s argument does not rule out (b) in the way just outlined, we should examine the phrase ÆFÆ b På – Æ æåØ used at 1077b4. Julia Annas adds, with Bywater, an Id after æåØ, to make the phrase equivalent to (b).1 Ross thinks that this is unnecessary: for (as he argues) the phrase ÆFÆ b På – Æ æåØ does not require that the two kinds of priority should never belong to the same thing but (at least)

1

Annas J., Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books M and N, Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 94 and 133.

258

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

implies that they do not always apply to the same thing.2 I agree with Ross for the following reasons. First, his construal makes 1077b4 consistent with b1–2 without involving any textual emendation. Second, there are passages outside Metaphysics M.2 where Aristotle does argue that certain types of item are prior both in definition and in being. If so, the phrase used in Metaphysics M.2, 1077b4, should be understood as Ross suggests and along the lines of (b) so as to accommodate these cases.3 And, third, the – Æ used at 1077b4 need not have a strictly temporal sense in which the two types of priority do not belong to the same thing at the same time. This claim may entail that, when a thing is prior in one way, it cannot be prior in the other. Aristotle’s adverbial phrase På – Æ, however, often has a logical use of non-universality, one which is conceptually cognate with the P Æ used at b1–2, or of non-entailment between two notions.4 The claim that ‘these two notions do not apply – Æ’, then, may suggest simply that there is no automatic or necessary entailment from definitional to ontological priority. In the light of this, none of Aristotle’s claims seems to run contrary to (b). Furthermore, the combination of (b) with (a), the claim which is explicitly made at Metaphysics M.2, 1077b1–2, has significant implications. While definitional and ontological priorities are genuinely distinct (as there is no automatic entailment from the former to the latter), they are not incompatible. Hence, Aristotelian substances, such as essences or forms, could unproblematically satisfy both conditions. Moreover, there is no prima facie difficulty with the view that ontological priority understood as [PIB] is the ontological correlate of definitional priority. For, while the two notions are not identical, nothing prevents [PIB] from corresponding to a specific type of definitional priority, such that, if anything is ontologically prior in the manner of [PIB], it is also definitionally prior to certain items. Indeed, in this particular type of definitional priority, the entailment should run the other way about too. The idea would be that Aristotle conceives definitional priority as a generic concept that encompasses two diverse modes in which an item might be prior to another ‘in definition’. One type of definitional priority just does not entail ontological priority as it is equivalent to a merely ‘nominal’ notion of definitional priority. Another type of definitional priority,

2 Ross, Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 2, p. 415. Cleary, Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority, The Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series, 1988, p. 89, also thinks that the phrase ÆFÆ b På – Æ æåØ must be taken ‘to mean that the two types of priority do not usually belong together to the same things’ (Cleary’s emphasis). 3 For instance, Met. Z.10, 1034b28–32, provides examples of items which are prior both fiH º ª{ and fiH r ÆØ. More importantly, Met. Z.1, 1028a32–6, argues that substance-cases are prior in all ways, most notably in definition (as explicated at 1028a35–6) and in being (for they are asymmetrically separate from nonsubstance cases: 1028a33–4). 4 For a parallel use of – Æ, see the formulations of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in Metaphysics . For instance, at .3, 1005b19–20 and 26–27, one can trace a sense of – Æ which implies that it is impossible for two contradictory attributes to belong to the same thing consistently (‘at the same time’ in a quasi-logical use).

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

259

by contrast, the one satisfied by forms or other substance-cases, does indeed imply [PIB]. This would constitute priority in ‘real’ (as opposed to nominal) definition. It seems plausible to think that Aristotle’s example, provided at Metaphysics M.2, 1077b4–7, describes a case of priority in nominal definition, which is not followed by ontological priority. Thus, non-substance attributes such as being in motion or being white are prior ‘in account’ to the accidental compounds they co-constitute together with some particular substance or other. It is true that the term ‘being white’ or simply ‘white’ is part of the linguistic or conceptual account of the accidental compound white man (but not vice versa). For white man would be explicated as ‘a man who is white’. Aristotle notes, however, that this accidental attribute is not prior ‘in substance’. For it is clear that being white does not fix the identity of any of the particular substances with which it constitutes accidental compounds. An essence or substantial form, by contrast, not only has its name or account within the definiens-term of matter or compounds but also makes these types of object what they essentially are. The way in which substance-cases of this sort are prior in real definition, then, entails that they are also ontologically prior in the manner of [PIB]. Further, as noted earlier, the view of [PIB] as the ontological counterpart to definitional priority (understood as priority in real definition) suggests that the entailment runs in the opposite direction too. Hence, an entity which fulfils [PIB] by fixing the identity of another (type of ) thing is a fortiori prior to it in the ‘real’ definitional mode. If these considerations are correct, Aristotle’s conception of ontological and real definitional priority supports the following equivalence claim: [E] x is prior in real definition to y if and only if x is ontologically prior to y in the manner of [PIB]. At this juncture, objection (1) could be reformulated in the light of the bi-conditional claim [E]. It could be conceded that there is a clear distinction between nominal definitional priority and ontological priority understood as [PIB]. Yet the fresh challenge to my view would be that there is no substantive distinction between real definitional priority and [PIB]. Indeed, [E] seems precisely to obliterate this distinction. For it describes the two concepts as co-extensive, perhaps even necessarily co-extensive. There are two lines of reply to this renewed challenge. The first, weaker point is that co-extension or necessary co-extension requires only that the two concepts are (extensionally) equivalent. It does not render them identical. If so, there is still logical space for the distinction between real definitional priority and [PIB]. Second, and more importantly, the distinctness of the two concepts may consist in a grounding relation obtaining between them. For, in my view, it is because of being ontologically prior in the manner of [PIB] that an item is prior in real definition to some other item. The converse, though, is not the case. Hence, the ontological notion of [PIB] is the ground for priority in real definition. Even if there is extensional equivalence between the two sides of [E], yet the left-hand side is true in virtue of the right-hand side (but not

260

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

conversely). I shall support further this grounding role of [PIB] over real definitional priority in section 12.4.

12.2 Metaphysics M.2 and the Claim of Form to both Priority Conditions While objection (1) may not any more seem so decisive, a further question could be raised about what (if anything) lies within the scope of (b). Is it true that Aristotelian substantial forms are amongst those entities which possess both types of priority? Indeed, one could argue that the passage just quoted from Metaphysics M.2 indicates that forms are only definitionally but not ontologically prior, whereas particular substances alone are ontologically prior to certain items. Thus, for instance, forms may be seen as belonging together with the examples of mathematical objects or accidental attributes offered in Metaphysics M.2 (1077b5: ŁÅ). These examples suggest that accidental attributes, such as being white or being in motion, are definitionally but not ontologically prior to the compounds they belong to (1077b7: P ŒÆa c PÆ). In the present context, Aristotle seems to be focusing on accidental compounds, entities which consist of a substance – most plausibly, some particular substance or other – plus a non-substance attribute. In this sense, a compound is an accidental complex resulting from a sort of addition (1077b10–11: e KŒ æŁ ø [ . . . ]· KŒ æŁ ø ªaæ fiH ºıŒfiH › ºıŒe ¼Łæø º ªÆØ). To use Aristotle’s own example: the specification of ‘white’ does not include ‘white man’, the term which corresponds to the compound consisting of some particular man or other who is white. By contrast, the characterization of ‘white man’ must involve ‘white’ or the account of ‘white’: for ‘white’ is part of the formula ‘white man’. The attribute of being white, however, is not ontologically prior to some particular man or other who is white if (as Aristotle remarks) it is not over and above particular substances of this sort (1077b4–5: N ªaæ c Ø a ŁÅ Ææa a PÆ ). As is clear from 1077b7–8, not being over and above x is equivalent to not being separate or separable from x (P ªaæ K åÆØ r ÆØ ŒåøæØ  Iºº’ Id – Æ fiH ı º{ K). Hence, being white is not, or cannot be, separated from, but is always a component of, some compound or other – for instance, some particular man or other who is white. That is to say, accidental attributes such as being white cannot even satisfy (i), the separation or separability condition for ontological priority as elucidated at Metaphysics M.2, 1077b2–3. But if so, they cannot qualify as ontologically prior entities. A possible objection, then, would be that, because forms resemble (in some important respects) mathematical objects or accidental attributes, they are only definitionally but not ontologically prior to (e.g.) particular substances or compounds consisting of matter plus form. Analogously to Aristotle’s conclusion about accidental attributes, this objection conceives forms as abstractions in thought (1077b9–10: e K IçÆØæ ø )

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

261

which are not ontologically prior to particular substances or hylomorphic compounds. Equally, in this view, particular substances or compounds are not ontologically posterior to forms (1077b9–10: u çÆæe ‹Ø h e K IçÆØæ ø æ æ h e KŒ æŁ ø oæ). Hence, the objection would run, particular substances or compounds are ontologically prior to forms, whereas forms are merely abstractions in thought, just as mathematical objects or accidental attributes are. Clearly, this form of objection already trespasses on the territory of objection (2) regarding the extensional question of what is ontologically prior to what. Even so, it is important to address it as it grows out of the context of Metaphysics M.2, which is presently under discussion. The main weakness inherent in this line of argument is that the objector assumes without justification that forms are like accidental attributes. There is no compelling reason, however, to accept this assumption. Indeed, it seems more plausible to think that substantial forms are not like entities of this sort. For they are not accidental beings (ŁÅ) but are substance-entities, integral to the essence of the objects they enform. The objector might attempt to counter-reply that, even if they are not accidents of this sort, yet they are abstractions in thought, just as mathematical objects are. I shall postpone addressing this ramification of the present objection. In sections 12.3 and 12.4 I shall offer further reasons why substantial forms should not be conceived as prior solely in (nominal) definition or as mere abstractions in thought. It is important, however, to show that the claims made and the examples offered in Metaphysics M.2 do not require the interpretation proposed by this type of objection. Aristotle does indeed maintain that accidental attributes are ‘not over and above substances’ or that they cannot be ‘separated from, but are always together with’ compounds (such as some particular man or other who is white). This should correspond to the way in which non-substance attributes are dependent upon some particular substance or other for their being the general types of predicable entity that they are. By contrast, particular substance quite generally (some or other) serves as the metaphysical subject which makes non-substance attributes what they are. This, as I argued in chapter 11, is the specific mode of [PIB] in which particular substances are ontologically prior to non-substance entities. It does not follow from this, however, that particular substances or hylomorphic compounds are not ontologically dependent on their substantial forms or indeed that they are ontologically prior to forms. Nor does it follow that their forms or essences fall under the same ontological heading as mathematical objects or non-substance attributes, such as being white or being in motion. As I suggested in section 11.4, the fundamental, substance-status of essences or forms consists in their making particular substances the determinate types of underlying object or metaphysical subject that they are. But the converse does not hold good. It is true that (e.g.) some particular man or other functions as the metaphysical subject which renders non-substance attributes the

262

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

general types of predicable being they are.5 This, however, is not the bedrock of metaphysical explanation. For one may still ask what accounts for the being of a particular man as an object of a specific type. To this question we should clearly return the answer that the form, being human, makes all human beings the types of particular substance or hylomorphic compound that they are. There is no clash, therefore, between Metaphysics M.2 and the claim of essence or substantial form to ontological priority in the manner of [PIB].

12.3 What Is it for a Form to Be ‘Prior in Account’? (Metaphysics H.1 & Physics B.1) Objection (2) could be formulated and supported in a way which is invulnerable to the remarks just made about Metaphysics M.2. The objector would insist that Aristotelian substantial forms are not real-world entities but are abstractions, just as mathematical objects are. For this reason, they are not in any way ontologically prior to certain types of matter or compounds. Rather, they are only definitionally prior to items of this sort. To underpin this conception, the objector would point to passages outside Metaphysics M.2, where Aristotle apparently claims not only that forms are prior merely in definition but also that particular compounds alone are ontologically prior.

5 In chapter 11, I argued that particular substances satisfy [PIB] relative to non-substance attributes and accidental compounds alike. It might be objected, however, that Metaphysics M.2 indicates that nonsubstance ŁÅ, such as being white, are posterior to accidental compounds, such as white man, but not to particular substances. For at 1077b9–10 we read: ‘neither accidental attributes [that come from abstraction] are ontologically prior nor compounds [that come from addition] are ontologically posterior’ (h e K IçÆØæ ø æ æ h e KŒ æŁ ø oæ). This claim may suggest that it is not particular substances by themselves but accidental compounds as wholes – what Aristotle calls e KŒ æŁ ø – which are ontologically prior to non-substance attributes. But this would clash with my suggestion that particular substances are ontologically prior in the manner of [PIB] not only to non-substance attributes but also to accidental compounds. Two points seem to undermine this objection. First, Aristotle’s literal claim is that non-substance attributes are not ontologically prior, while accidental compounds are not ontologically posterior (h e K IçÆØæ ø æ æ h e KŒ æŁ ø oæ). This is not the same as the view that accidental compounds are indeed prior, whereas accidental attributes are posterior to them. More plausibly, Aristotle’s conclusion seems to be that non-substance attributes and accidental compounds are not even the kinds of thing that could be ontologically prior to each other. The reason for this would be that both of these types of non-substance entity are equally dependent on particular substances or subjects for their being the predicable beings they are. If so, my view is in line with the argument of Metaphysics M.2. Second, Aristotle does hold that a non-substance attribute cannot be separated from, but is always together with, some accidental compound or other (1077b7–8: P ªaæ K åÆØ r ÆØ ŒåøæØ  Iºº’ Id – Æ fiH ı º{ K). He also argues, however, that a non-substance attribute is not over and above particular substances (1077b4–5: N ªaæ c Ø a ŁÅ Ææa a PÆ ). His view, then, may be simply that a non-substance attribute ontologically depends on some particular substance or other which constitutes the prominent part of the relevant accidental compound. Thus, for instance, being white ‘cannot be separated from but is always together with’ the compound (e.g.) white man simply in that it is the type of predicable entity that it is by virtue of some particular man or other who happens to be white. Hence, Aristotle ascribes ontological preeminence not to the whole accidental compound as such but to some particular substance or other which is the ultimate subject underlying this compound.

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

263

But now we must proceed to the agreed substances. These are the perceptible ones. And all perceptible substances have matter. Substance is what underlies [e Œ ], and in one way this is the matter (by which I mean that which is not a this in actuality, but is a this in potentiality), and in another way it is the account and the form, which, being a this, is separate in account [¼ººø b › º ª ŒÆd  æç, n   Ø k fiH º ª{ åøæØ  KØ], and in a third way it is what comes from both of these, which alone can come-to-be and pass-away, and is separate simpliciter [æ b e KŒ ø, y ª Ø ı ŒÆd çŁæ KØ, ŒÆd åøæØe ±ºH ]. For of those things that are substances according to the account some are separate simpliciter and some are not. (Metaphysics [Met.] H.1, 1042a24–31; Bostock’s trans.) Hence, in another way nature would be the shape and the form of those things which have in themselves a principle of change, something which is not separate except in respect of account [u ¼ºº æ   çØ i YÅ H Kå ø K ÆE ŒØø Iæåc  æçc ŒÆd e r  , P åøæØe k Iºº’ j ŒÆa e º ª]. (Physics [Phys.] B.1, 193b3–5; my trans.)

In the first passage, taken from Metaphysics H.1, forms of perceptible, compound substances are said to be separate in account (1042a29: fiH º ª{ åøæØ ).6 Similarly, in the second passage, from Physics B.1, forms are conceived as separate only in account (193b4–5: P åøæØe k Iºº’ j ŒÆa e º ª). These twin claims suggest (it appears) that forms could be prior to certain items only definitionally but not ontologically. For, if they satisfy the condition of separation (a non-symmetric type of independence) only in definition, they could be asymmetrically independent of, and so prior to, certain items only in definition too. Obviously, this last consequent holds good only on the assumption that, in addition to definitional separation, forms could also fulfil the asymmetry condition. More importantly, Metaphysics H.1 clearly states only that particular compound substances are ‘separate simpliciter’ or ‘unqualifiedly’ (åøæØe ±ºH ), a phrase which may be understood – in contradistinction with the locution ‘separate in account’ (fiH º ª{ åøæØ ) – as implying ontological independence (and perhaps ontological priority too). In favouring the ontological priority of particular compounds alone, then, these considerations constitute serious blows against the claim of forms to ontological priority. Let me first deal with the ontological type of priority which allegedly applies to particular compounds alone. It is far from clear what the notion of ‘unqualified’ (±ºH ) separation employed in Metaphysics H.1 is equivalent to. Apart from the apparent stylistic contrast with the term ‘in account’ (fiH º ª{), there is no cogent argument which suggests that only unqualified separation could be ontological

6 There is no need, for present purposes, to discuss in detail the claim made at Met. H.1, 1042a31, that some ‘substances according to the account’ are not separate simpliciter, whereas others are. It is clear from 1042a28–9 that those which are not separate simpliciter are the forms of perceptible, compound substances. By contrast, those which are separate simpliciter are, presumably, the eternal actual beings in the superlunary region, the Prime and the Planetary Movers. The study of this last type of substance, however, lies outside the scope of present concerns.

264

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

separation, the necessary condition for ontological priority.7 Further, the argument advanced in Metaphysics H.1 does not specify the types of entity that particular compounds are supposed to be unqualifiedly separate from. Nor does it clarify whether particular compounds are unqualifiedly separate from all or some of the relevant relata. Let us grant, then, for the sake of the argument, that unqualified separation is an ontological type of separation or non-symmetric independence, a relation which obtains between particular compounds and all their non-substance attributes. Suppose, further, that this sort of separation is a necessary part of the asymmetric notion of ontological priority, understood in terms of [PIB], as it applies to particular compounds. This would be the type of [PIB] set out in chapter 11, the one which is grounded on the notion of ultimate subjecthood. Thus, some particular substance or other is the subject of metaphysical predication that makes non-substance attributes the types of predicable entity that they are (but not conversely). None of these assumptions, however, offers compelling reasons for concluding that particular compounds alone are ontologically prior, whereas substantial forms or essences are not ontologically but only definitionally prior. More importantly, as noted in section 12.2, even if particular substances are basic subjects of predication, ontologically prior to nonsubstance entities, still their essences or forms should be ontologically prior to them. For the latter make the former the determinate kinds of particular object or underlying subject that they are, but not the other way around. More to the present point: is it necessary to understand the claim that forms are separate only ‘in account’ (fiH º ª{) as ruling out the view that forms are ontologically prior to certain entities in the manner of [PIB]? The objector seems to take the claim that forms are separate only in account as implying a merely nominal notion of definitional independence, as though forms were abstractions in thought, merely linguistic or conceptual items. If so, their definitional separation (or independence) from certain types of matter or compounds does not entail any real-world relation between them and these types of matter or compounds. Thus, for instance, the form of human being is definitionally independent of all particular human beings simply in that the definition of (e.g.) ‘human soul’ refers to no particular human beings. Conversely, though, the term ‘human soul’ (or its essential characterization) is included in the defining formulae of each and every particular human being. There is, however, a different way in which to understand Aristotle’s remarks made in Metaphysics H.1 and Physics B.1. It is true that his claim that forms are separate only in definition implies that they could be prior to certain items only in definition. This last claim, though, is compatible with the view that forms could also be ontologically prior in the manner of [PIB] if ‘priority only in account’ means asymmetric independence in real (but not merely nominal) definition. Indeed, the objector provides no argument 7 Indeed, Spellman (Substance and Separation in Aristotle [Separation], Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 97) holds that the passage taken from Metaphysics H.1 is the only place where ±ºH separation is mentioned and, in this respect, this passage is anomalous.

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

265

for thinking that the qualification ‘only in account’ employed in Metaphysics H.1 or Physics B.1 requires the understanding ‘only in nominal, conceptual or linguistic, definition’. It is far more plausible to hold that forms are prior in real definition to certain other items precisely in so far as or because they are ontologically prior to these items in the manner of [PIB].8 In this view, forms are not deemed abstractions in thought but prove real-world entities which are parts of the essence of the posterior objects and so make them the kinds of thing they are. These notions of being a part of another thing’s essence and of making another thing what it is are the fundamental ideas underlying my understanding of Aristotelian ontological priority in terms of [PIB]. Because forms are real-world entities which satisfy [PIB] in the way just described, they are also prior to certain derivative items in real definition in that they are the referents of the defining, linguistic, or conceptual formulae of these items. Hence, my conception of [PIB] may be seen as a way of consolidating priority in real definition. This last suggestion will be the topic of the following section.

12.4 Ontological Priority [PIB] as Grounding ‘Real’ Definitional Priority The two objections discussed in the present chapter seem to flow from a metaphysical position which takes forms as abstract, linguistic or conceptual, items which are not ‘out there in the real world’. Because forms are likened to mathematical objects in this respect, it is inferred that they are prior only in definition but not in any ontological way. This conclusion can give rise to a further, global challenge against my view: what, if any, are the reasons for thinking that [PIB] is a substantive type of ontological priority rather than a disguised or inflated version of merely definitional priority? To answer this last, global objection and show that [PIB] is not identified with priority in definition, it is important to explain why the case of Aristotelian substantial forms is neither similar to nor the same as that of mathematical objects. The reason is that mathematical entities are not ontologically fundamental, real-world items but are abstractions in thought. Thus, they do not make any real-world objects what they are. Nor are they basic constituents of what these objects are. It is true that mathematical entities are defined independently of natural bodies (and conversely). They are not,

8 It is important to note that this idea does not cancel out the distinction between the concepts of real definitional priority and ontological priority. While the two concepts entail each other, yet they are distinct: for ontological priority is the foundation of priority in real definition. For a similar suggestion about the claim made in Met. H.1, 1042a28–9, that forms are separate only fiH º ª{, see Spellman, Separation, pp. 95–7. Spellman argues that separation fiH º ª{ can be interpreted as presupposing (what she calls) the ontological correlate of separation fiH º ª{: ‘[ . . . ] there may be another way to interpret separation in definition – that is to say, as the ontological correlate to it’ (p. 96); ‘[ . . . ] “separation in definition” does not exclude its ontological correlate; indeed, insofar as Aristotle is serious about an ontology of specimens of kinds that includes even accidental unities, it may actually be implied’ (p. 97; my emphasis).

266

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

however, basic parts of what it is to be any natural body. Indeed, it could be claimed, they are, in some way or other, ontologically posterior to physical objects as they are abstracted from such objects in the first place. Hence, they cannot be ontologically primary or substances in the way in which substantial forms are. By contrast, substantial forms, as primary substances, are not abstractions in thought but are fundamental parts of the furniture of reality. For they make certain types of matter and compounds what they are by constituting basic parts of their essence. For this reason, they must satisfy the ontological criterion of priority – in addition to the definitional one – over the types of matter and the compounds they enform. The notion of [PIB], then, has significant conceptual strength. Not only is this notion clearly distinct from the criterion of definitional priority. More importantly, it underwrites the definitional criterion by supporting a real, as opposed to merely nominal, notion of definitional priority. It is on the basis of [PIB] that ‘priority in account’ as employed in Metaphysics M.2 is bifurcated into real and nominal definitional priority. This last, nominal notion of definitional priority is what prevents Aristotle, in Metaphysics M.2, from allowing any automatic or unqualified entailment from ‘priority in account’, quite generally, to ‘priority in substance’ [see claim (a) in section 12.1; 1077b1–2: P Æ ‹Æ fiH º ª{ æ æÆ ŒÆd B fi PÆ fi æ æÆ]. However, as I argued in section 12.1, even if merely nominal definitional priority does not imply ontological priority, yet real definitional priority does. Moreover, because ontological priority, set out on the basis of [PIB], is the ontological counterpart to real definitional priority, the former also entails the latter. The overall picture, then, is captured by the following bi-conditional claim formulated earlier: [E] x is prior in real definition to y if and only if x is ontologically prior to y in the manner of [PIB]. I submitted that, despite the (perhaps even necessary) extensional equivalence between real definitional priority and ontological priority, the two concepts are not identical. For, I claimed, ontological priority in the sense of [PIB] grounds real definitional priority. What, however, is the foundation of this asymmetry? Why not think that [E] is a ‘no-priority’ thesis in which no grounding relation obtains between real definitional priority and [PIB]? Or why not maintain that real definitional priority, as opposed to [PIB], is explanatorily basic? To answer these questions, and to consolidate the asymmetry of the right-hand side over the left-hand side of [E], it is necessary to invoke the concept of identity-fixing or making something what it essentially is, which constitutes the fundamental characterization of [PIB]. This is effectively a notion of formal causation. As a causal relation of this sort, this notion essentially involves the required asymmetry: x is the formal cause of y in that x causes y to be as it is or x fixes y’s identity, while the converse is not the case. It might still be doubted, though, whether the notion of formal causation by itself could vindicate the claim of [PIB] to asymmetry over real definitional priority. Indeed,

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

267

it might be argued that formal causation is too abstract a concept to serve this role. After all, there are cases in which x can be taken as the formal cause of y or conversely. One might offer the following mathematical example. The line (or its essence) might be seen as what makes the figure what it is: for being a figure is to be a set of lines arranged in a certain fashion. Equally, though, this case can also be treated in the opposite direction of formal causation: for being a line is, arguably, to be the limit of some figure or other. If the notion of formal causation which underlies [PIB] is liberal in such excessive measure, it cannot consolidate the explanatory asymmetry of [PIB] over real definitional priority. For it is, in effect, a ‘thin’ logical concept in which the formal cause of an item could be any old feature that is (e.g.) extensionally equivalent to this item. Indeed, this view of formal causation would be indifferent even to possible rolereversals between a thing and its formal cause or essence. But, if so, formal causation, far from grounding real definitional priority, would be virtually indistinguishable from a merely nominal notion of definitional priority. In chapter 7, in my argument for the primacy of form over matter and compounds, I alluded to Aristotle’s reply to this line of objection. There (in section 7.8) I pointed out that Aristotle accepts that the isolated concept of formal causation, understood simply as the essence or the ‘what-it-is-to-be-something’, is an abstract causal notion deployed at the so-called ‘logical’ level of metaphysical investigation. He adds, however, that the essence or form is the efficient or the final cause, depending on the type of case under consideration (Met. Z.17, 1041a27–30). Thus, for instance, in the case of process-types, the essence or form of (e.g.) thunder is the efficient cause, fire being quenched in the clouds. This suggests that formal causation is by itself incomplete without weightier causal notions such as efficient, final, or material-grounding causation. Indeed, as I argued, the cause that formal causation consists in involves essentially and indissolubly realworld relations of efficient, final, or material-grounding causation. If this is correct, though, the notions of formal causation, making something what it is or identity-fixing are rooted in these types of real-world causation, which unequivocally secure the required asymmetry. If the formal cause of (e.g.) the process-type thunder just is its efficient cause, fire being cloudily-quenched, it would be difficult to see how thunder too could be taken as the formal cause of fire being cloudily-quenched. For it is not clear at all whether, and if so how, thunder could produce, by way of efficient causation, the quenching of fire in the clouds. The converse causal claim, however, seems incontrovertible. Aristotle’s notion of formal causation, therefore, understood in terms of identity-fixing or making something what it is, inherently carries with it the asymmetry of efficient, final, or material-grounding causation. By presupposing this notion of formal causation, [PIB] encapsulates the requirements for correct definition and so accounts for real definitional priority. In the light of this it becomes clear that, while [PIB] and real definitional priority are equivalent in the manner of the bi-conditional claim [E], they fall short of identity. For

268

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

the notion of ontological priority is the ground for ‘real’ definitional priority. It is not any and every defining formula or part thereof which successfully refers to a basic, realworld essence or form. Nor is it any and every type of definitionally prior item which satisfies [PIB] and turns out to be primary substance. This is precisely the moral of the argument advanced in Metaphysics M.2, 1077a36–b11, which I discussed in section 12.1. Thus, for instance, some putative definiens may be referring to ontologically non-fundamental entities. Or some definitionally prior items may not be integral to what the posterior items fundamentally are. Some definers or definitional practices may favour formulae which mention certain types of matter, wider genera, merely necessary features, extra- or non-essential items which belong to the things defined. It does not follow from this, however, that these items are real-world substantial forms or ontologically prior to the things defined. Indeed, it is the other way about. Because they make derivative objects what they are – by constituting fundamental parts of what these dependent objects are – certain real-world entities are substantial forms of, and ontologically prior to, these objects. A fortiori they are mentioned in those things’ definitions and are prior to them in real definition. To examine a crucial case: the arguments developed in Part I of the present study suggest that, despite being essentially enmattered, natural form is definitionally prior to compounds and their matter. Thus, in section 7.9, I offered as an example the following, schematic definition of the universal compound (or type) human: Human [KIND] ¼def the ‘type-with-type-matter’ whose essence is (being a human soul). In my view, ‘being a human soul’, the part of the definiens-term which refers to the form, is definitionally prior not only to the definiendum but also to the segment of the definiens that picks up the type-matter involved in the human-kind. This raises the fair question of what determines which sections of the definiens are to be privileged as definitionally prior to the rest. At this juncture, the notion of [PIB] can be seen as consolidating the view of definitional priority developed in Part I. Because they make the material parts of the kind’s essence (referred to by ‘type-with-type-matter’) what they are, the formal parts of the kind’s essence (referred to by ‘being a human soul’) are ontologically prior to these material parts but not conversely. Presumably, the specific mode in which the human form discharges this role of formal causation is by being essentially the final cause of the types of matter involved in the kind human. Hence, for example, the type-matter organic body of a certain (human) sort is as it is for the sake of realizing the telos that being a human soul is. Because of this ontological type of priority, then, the formal segment of the definiens-term is prior to the material terms in real definition. If these considerations are correct, the notion of ontological priority, understood as [PIB], is the foundation on the basis of which certain parts of the definiens prove to be ‘pre-eminent’ in comparison with the rest and so are selected as definitionally prior to them. The thrust of my account is that definitional priority cannot, by itself, demarcate ‘real’ from ‘nominal’ definitions (e.g. definitions of non-existents). A human being is

DEFINITIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

269

defined as (e.g.) an animal with a certain type of soul, while a goat-stag is defined as the offspring of goat and stag. On the criterion of definitional priority alone, just as the notion of a soul of a certain type is prior to that of a human, the notion of a goat-andstag-offspring is prior to that of a goat-stag. It should not follow from this, however, that a goat-stag is the type of entity that has a real definition or is enformed by any realworld substantial form. The notion of [PIB] serves as a way of blocking this type of inference. For what guarantees the ‘reality’ of definitions of certain kinds of object is that the items referred to in the definiens are real-world entities which make the defined objects what they are. Equivalently: the defining features referred to in real definitions, their being what they are, are ontologically basic parts of what it is to be the types of object defined. This does not hold good in the case of merely nominal definitions as the defining formulae need not correspond to any real-world entities which make any objects what they are. The bedrock underlying the notion of [PIB], then, is that form is the primary substance, an ontologically fundamental real-world entity. For this reason, form is the referent of a real definiens, that is to say, a (non-propositional) linguistic or conceptual item included in a defining formula. Similarly, form – its being the way it is, as opposed to its mere existence – constitutes the truth-maker, as it were, of a (propositional) real definition. These last two claims underwrite the facts that a real definiens is a successfully referring linguistic or conceptual item, while a real definition is ‘true’ or correct. Correspondingly, as primary substance, form should fulfil a substantive criterion of asymmetric ontological independence from the relevant dependent objects. This criterion, [PIB], underpins the notion of definitional priority as priority in real definition.

13 Test Cases for Ontological Priority [PIB] The aim of the present chapter is to show that [PIB] is a notion which is employed, even if not directly explicated, by Aristotle even outside the context of Metaphysics .11 (see [BT]2 in section 1.3). To support this thesis, I shall examine some relevant parts of Metaphysics Z.10 and .8. My argument is restricted to understanding the priority relations that Aristotle posits in these contexts on the basis of the notion of [PIB], which seems to work better than [PIE].

13.1 Right/Acute Angles (Metaphysics Z.10) In Metaphysics Z.10 Aristotle explores the priority relations between form (and its parts), matter (and its parts), and compound: Further, if the parts are prior to the whole, then since an acute angle is part of a right angle, and since a finger is part of a [certain type of] animal, the acute angle will be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the man. But the reverse appears to be the case; for with respect to the account the former are defined in terms of the latter, and the latter are prior in that they are [fiH r ÆØ] without the former. (1034b28–32; Bostock’s trans.) The parts of the formula, into which the formula is divided, are prior – some of them or all of them; and the formula of the right angle is not divided into the formula of the acute, but that of the acute into that of the right; for one who defines the acute uses the right angle; for the acute is less than the right. And, similarly, in the case of the circle and the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined through the circle and the finger through the whole; for finger is such-and-such a part of man. Thus those parts that are material, and into which a thing is divided as into its matter, are posterior; but those that are parts of the formula and of the substance which accords with the formula, are prior – some or all of them. Now, since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of the animate) is the substance which accords with the formula, i.e. the form and what-it-is-tobe such a body (at least, if each part is properly defined, it cannot be defined without its function, which it cannot have without sense perception), it follows that the parts of the soul are prior – some or all of them – to the whole compound animal, and similarly in the particular cases, while the body and its parts are posterior to this substance, and it is not this substance [the substance according to the account: e.g., the soul of animals; 1035b14–16] but the compound whole that is divided into these bodily parts as into its matter. (1035b4–22; Bostock’s trans.)

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

271

The argument advanced in the first passage seeks to refute the view that parts, quite generally, are prior to the whole. The type of priority is not initially specified as either definitional or ontological but lines 1034b31–2 seem to require both. The central claim which denies that parts are prior to the whole is formulated at 1034b30–2. While an acute angle is part of a right angle and a finger is part of a human, a right angle and a human are prior to an acute angle and a finger respectively, both in account and in ‘being without them’. This claim indicates the correct priority relations and clearly shows that both definitional (fiH º ª{) and ontological (ŒÆd H r ÆØ) types of priority are intended. Aristotle, however, does not specify the kinds of whole or the kinds of part he is dealing with. The second passage just quoted suggests that his argument applies to whole forms (and their parts), for they (and some or all of their parts) are prior to material parts of compounds (1035b4–6; 11–14). Thus, forms must be prior to material parts of this sort both definitionally and ontologically. It is clear from 1034b31 that forms are definitionally prior to material parts in that the latter are defined in terms of the former. Thus, for instance, an acute is defined as an angle which is less than a right angle, while a finger is defined as such-and-such a part of a human (1035b6–11). However, it is not clear in what way forms are ontologically prior to material parts of compounds. The claim that a right angle is ontologically prior to an acute has caused many problems to commentators. The difficulty arises because they construe this type of ontological priority in the existential fashion. Hence, they see Aristotle as making an obvious mistake: while a right angle may be defined independently of an acute (but not conversely), yet it cannot exist as such without an acute angle existing as one of its parts. For, if one of its parts were detached, a right angle would not exist but would, presumably, be replaced by a remaining acute angle. Conversely, there is no reason to deny that an acute angle could exist without a right angle existing.1 There is no need, however, to understand Aristotle’s explication of ontological priority at 1034b31–2 in this existential way.2 He holds that A is ontologically prior to B just in case A is without B (H r ÆØ ¼ı Iºººø). Just as [IC] in Metaphysics .11, 1 Cf. Ross, Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ [Metaphysics], Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 2, p. 196; Bostock, Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 146. My interpretation resembles a suggestion made by Burnyeat et al. [Notes on Z, unpublished ms., Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 1979, p. 80, under (i)]: ‘the acute could exist without the right but would not be acute, as goalposts can exist without footballs but are not yet goalposts; this seems to assimilate the acute case to the finger case’ (Burnyeat’s emphasis). My interpretation differs from this view in that I understand ontological priority with the help of – and as the ontological counterpart to – the notion of definitional priority, which is employed by Aristotle at 1034b30–1 and 1035b6–11. 2 Wedin, M. V., Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: The ‘Categories’ and ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 301–2, takes the acute/right-angle case as an instance of existential independence and so faces the difficulties just outlined. His formulation runs as follows:

x is defined in terms of y & x cannot exist without y $ y is prior to x. In the second conjunct of the left-hand side of the bi-conditional, the existential condition cannot be satisfied by forms asymmetrically. Hence, I propose to modify this conjunct into ‘x cannot be what it is without y being what it is (but not vice versa)’.

272

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

this claim is neutral as between [PIE] and [PIB]. Indeed, [PIB] liberates Aristotle from the mistake that commentators ascribe to him. A right angle makes an acute what it essentially is, whereas the converse is not the case. This becomes clearer on the basis of the connection between definitional and ontological considerations. Just as an acute angle is defined in terms of a right angle but not conversely, similarly the former’s essence is determined by the latter, its being what it is, but not conversely. One objection to my view might be that the existential construal proves successful (it appears) in the finger–human case. A human can exist independently of his or her finger existing but a finger cannot exist (as a fully functional finger) without a human existing. Why should Aristotle here introduce the notion of [PIB], instead of [PIE], as I took him to be doing? A brief response would be that [PIB] works successfully in the acute/right-angle case, whereas [PIE] fails. More importantly, [PIE] seems unsuccessful even in the finger–human example as it does not secure the asymmetry condition underlying the ontological priority relation. It is true that a fully functional finger cannot exist (as such) if detached from a whole human. Conversely, too, however, a fully functional, complete human cannot exist (as such) without his or her finger existing. For without his or her finger, he or she would not be complete but mutilated. Further, just as a mutilated human can exist (as such) without his or her detached finger, so too his or her detached, non-functional finger can exist (as such) without the corresponding maimed human. Hence, the notion of [PIE] is problematic independently of our example of choice. In both variants of the finger–human case just discussed I added the qualifications ‘fully functional’ or ‘complete’ and ‘detached’, ‘mutilated’ or ‘non-functional’. This serves as a way in which to link the discussion of Metaphysics Z.10 with the distinction drawn in Metaphysics .11 between priority in respect of actual being or coming-to-be and in respect of potential being or passing-away. Consistently with Metaphysics .11, the example offered at Metaphysics Z.10, 1034b30 and 1035b11, entails that a whole, complete, and fully functional human is prior to a fully functional finger in respect of actual being or coming-to-be. For, in the light of my account of [PIB], what it is to be a complete, fully functional finger depends on what it is to be a complete, fully functional human – one which is at later or completion stages of the process of coming-to-be a human – but not the other way about. The further example given at Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b22–5, by contrast, suggests that a detached, non-functional finger is, in a certain way, prior to a maimed human being: And it is not this substance [the form, the substance according to the account: e.g., the soul of animals; 1035b14–16] but the whole that is divided into these bodily parts as into its matter –and these bodily parts are prior to the whole in a way, but not in another (for they cannot even be, if separated [from the whole]; for it is not a finger in any and every state that is the finger of the animal, but a dead finger is so only homonymously). (1035b21–5; Bostock’s trans.)

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

273

My suggestion is that the way in which material parts are ontologically prior to a whole compound substance is in respect of potential being or passing-away, as specified in my discussion of Metaphysics .11 (section 10.3). For what it is to be a mutilated human of a certain type depends on what it is to be a detached bodily part of the relevant type (e.g. a cut-off finger), one which is the end-product of the corresponding process of truncation or passing-away. The converse, though, is not the case. Thus, it is plausible to define a maimed human in terms of the relevant end-product of the corresponding process of mutilation – as (e.g.) one who lacks his or her detached finger – but not conversely. Similarly, then, his or her being a mutilated human depends on the kind of detached bodily part, its being the type of cut-off part that it is, but not conversely. Apart from establishing conceptual affinity with Metaphysics .11, 1019a6–14, my qualifications ‘detached’, ‘cut-off ’, etc. emphasize the idea that a detached bodily part, such as a cut-off finger, is not complete or properly functional. Further, because it is non-functional or dead, calling it ‘finger’ is only a homonymous characterization. Indeed, this is Aristotle’s point at 1035b21–5: when a bodily part of a whole compound substance is detached, it ceases to be an enformed and functional part of the compound. It becomes a product of mutilation and is called (e.g.) ‘finger’ only homonymously (1035b25). In the examples provided in Metaphysics Z.10, after a circle’s or a human’s passingaway or after maiming a circle or a human, the remaining or the detached items are called ‘semicircle’ or ‘finger’ only homonymously. They have the same names as a proper semicircle or a fully functional finger respectively but do not satisfy the same definitions as the latter. For not only do they lack the salient features of proper or functional parts of the complete or functional wholes. More importantly, not even their essence could be what it is to be a proper or functional part of the complete or functional wholes (Z.10, 1035b23: Pb ªaæ r ÆØ ÆÆØ). The detached ‘semicircle’ is only homonymously a semicircle: for in reality it is merely (e.g.) a remaining arc.3 Similarly, the severed ‘finger’ is so called only homonymously as it is effectively only a lump of flesh, bones, etc.4 3 As I noted in section 10.3, the characterizations ‘proper’, ‘functional’, ‘complete’, etc. or their opposites do not presuppose that mathematical and biological cases are equivalent. They suggest only that there is an analogy between the two types of case. Aristotle himself argues that certain instances of mathematical entities are not proper and so are called whatever they are called in name alone. For example, a particular perceptible triangle or a bronze circle are not proper or perfect instances of the mathematical types of triangle or circle. For this reason, presumably, he claims, in the very context of Metaphysics Z.10, at 1035b1–3, that a particular circle is called ‘circle’ only homonymously to a circle which unqualifiedly satisfies the definition of a mathematical circle (› ø ø ªaæ º ªÆØ ŒŒº ‹  ±ºH ºª  ŒÆd › ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆÆ): for there are no names peculiar to such ‘imperfect’ or ‘lesser’ mathematical particulars (Øa e c r ÆØ YØ Z Æ E

ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ). This last claim does not, I think, imply that there are no proper names, demonstratives, or similar linguistic devices with which to refer to mathematical particulars of this sort. Rather, the idea is that, apart from items such as ‘circle’ or the definiens-term of ‘circle’, there are no general or common names – descriptions or characterizations – peculiar to these particulars. 4 Some might object that the term Œıº need not be defined in terms of the human form. Analogously, it is not necessary that what it is to be a finger depends on what it is to be (the form of)

274

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

Let us suppose for the sake of the argument, however, that these remnants were called ‘semicircle’ or ‘finger’ non-homonymously or properly. If this were so, they would satisfy the corresponding definitions. In that case, because these definitions are formulated in terms of the whole circle and the whole human respectively, the semicircle and the finger, their being what they are, would be ontologically dependent on what it is to be circle and human respectively. This ontological dependency would be mirrored by their definitional dependence upon the latter. In the present, postmortem or post-mutilationem cases, however, a dissolved or truncated circle or a maimed human are defined in terms of the relevant types of detached semicircle or severed finger respectively – as (e.g.) a circle which lacks one of its halves or as a human who has lost his or her finger – but not conversely. In terms of real-world dependence, then, what it is to be a dissolved or truncated circle or a maimed human depends on what it is to be the relevant type of detached semicircle or severed finger respectively – the endproducts of the corresponding processes of mutilation or passing-away – but not conversely. For this reason, the material remnants or remaining corporeal parts (beings in potentiality) are ontologically prior to the wholes (which have passed away) in respect of potential being or passing-away.5 human. The reason, it could be argued, is that (e.g.) in Historia Animalium, 498a31–b4, Aristotle uses the term Œıº for the toes or fingers of beasts such as seals. If so, a Œıº could be defined independently of being human. Moreover, at the parallel ontological level, what it is to be a finger need not depend on what it is to be human. This is not a decisive objection. First, it does not envisage the possibility that Aristotle may be using certain terms analogically or by similarity, perhaps because he lacks more precise terms or terms peculiar to certain bodily parts of beasts. Indeed, at 498a32 (uæ Åæø  æı), a33 (f  Æ › ı

åæ), and b3–4 (ÆæƺØØ ÆE H NåŁø PæÆE ), he clearly uses certain terms (such as æı, åæ, and PæÆE ) on the basis of analogy with or similarity to (uæ, › ı , ÆæƺØØ) the cases of quadrupeds, bipeds, and fish. All these non-standard, similarity- or analogy-based uses may suggest that Aristotle intends simply to draw the analogy or emphasize the similarity at issue. Or they may imply that he lacks precise terms or appropriate descriptions for some bodily parts of certain types of animal. They do not, however, entail that just because (e.g.) the extremities of seals are called åıºØ, they are of the same type as human fingers. More importantly, at the ontological level, this objection is not sensitive to the idea that the type of finger under discussion at Historia Animalium 498a34 just is not a human finger. This is the reason why its being what it is does not, presumably, depend on what it is to be human. It does not follow from this, though, that there is no type of finger which depends, for its being the sort of finger it is, upon what it is to be human. The examples offered by Aristotle in Metaphysics Z.10 are consistent with this idea. At some places he claims that a finger is definitionally and ontologically posterior to an animal or a whole animal (1034b29; 1035b10–11; 22; 24). The terms ‘animal’ or ‘whole animal’ are, arguably, intended to mean ‘a certain type of animal or whole animal’. For he goes on to add that (e.g.) a human being is prior to his or her finger (1034b30; 1035b11). This also suggests that in these parts of Metaphysics Z.10 he is offering as an example the human type of finger which is definitionally and ontologically dependent upon the human form. 5 The problem of reconciling Metaphysics .11 and Z.10 is treated in some detail by Kirwan, Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Books G, D and E, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 155–6. In .11, 1019a10–11, Aristotle holds that a part is in actuality and is prior to the whole after the latter’s dissolution. However, in Z.10, 1035b23–5, he claims that, if a man’s finger is detached, the severed finger ‘cannot even be’ what a finger essentially is and is called ‘finger’ only homonymously. If so, after a man passes away, his or her finger is not a finger in actuality or an independent functional part. How, then, does Aristotle intend his claim made at .11, 1019a10–14, that after passing-away a part (such as a finger) ‘will be in actuality’ or ‘is prior to the whole (such as a human) in respect of passing-away’? In my view of Metaphysics .11, Aristotle’s position is not that after (or in respect of ) passing-away a segment of a line, a part of a whole, or the matter of a compound substance are independent, actual, and functional (or quasi-functional, in the geometrical case of a line and its

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

275

A further possible objection to my interpretation is that at Metaphysics Z.10, 1034b31–2, Aristotle uses the phrase ‘without each other’ (¼ı Iºººø), which suggests that prior and posterior items may be mutually or non-symmetrically independent. In my view, however, this independence relation should be asymmetric: it should include the rider ‘but not conversely’. Obviously, this objection threatens not only my interpretation but also the existential construal. For the relation of ontological priority must be asymmetric regardless of whether it is [PIE] or [PIB]. Following a suggestion in the literature, an initial response to this objection would be that the locution ¼ı Iºººø reflects the first question which one usually raises about independence relations between two items: ‘can two given items be without each other?’ The answer to questions of this sort need not be affirmative in a way which renders the priority relation non-symmetric. One may answer that the one can be without the other but not conversely.6 More importantly, though, an argument advanced in the Eudemian Ethics, 1240b38–1241a14, suggests that the phrase ¼ı Iºººø need not be construed non-symmetrically. In that context, Aristotle discusses how friendship is related to concord (› ØÆ) and goodwill (hØÆ; 1241a1–3). He contends that some theorists identify friendship, concord, and goodwill (r ÆØ ÆP), whereas others hold that they are ‘not without each other’ (PŒ ¼ı Iºººø). In examining goodwill, Aristotle seems to favour the second view, as he maintains that it is not the same as friendship but is not altogether different from it (a3–4). Hence, if the only alternative to identity is dependence of some sort, Aristotle’s view should be that friendship and goodwill are not ¼ı Iºººø. But at a12–13, where he draws his conclusion about the relation between these two notions, he maintains that, while every friend is good-willed, not every good-willed person is a friend. This entails that friendship depends on goodwill, whereas the latter is independent of the former, despite the previous claim that the two notions are not ¼ı Iºººø. While this is not an absolutely watertight argument, it seems to indicate that the phrase ¼ı Iºººø does not necessarily make an independence relation non-symmetric. It is more plausible, therefore, to take the priority claim made at Metaphysics Z.10, 1034b31–2, as asymmetric, although Aristotle uses this controversial phrase. Another, more serious objection to my view would be that the phrase ‘in that they are without each other’ used at 1034b31–2 (H r ÆØ ¼ı Iºººø) supports a strong

segment) parts of a line, a whole, or a compound substance respectively but only actual non-functional material remnants. These are just the material (or quasi-material, in the geometrical case) stuffs which (prior to passingaway) constitute or sustain the corresponding functional material parts of a complete and functional whole, such as a line, a whole, or a substance. For example, a segment is what is left of a line, a remnant of the original line. A part of a whole – e.g., a branch of a tree – is not a functional part of a tree after the latter’s perishing but only a cut-off twig or a lump of timber. The matter of a compound substance, after the latter’s passing-away, is not the proximate functional matter of this compound but a piece of non-functional matter (which is not any more enformed by the relevant form). 6

See Burnyeat et al., Z, p. 80.

276

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

ontological type of priority only in the finger–human case but not in abstract or mathematical cases. In this last sort of case, such as that of the acute/right-angle, only definitional priority is applicable. One could conclude, then, that because the case of forms resembles these abstract examples, forms are prior only in definition but not in any ontological manner. Indeed, the objector could even doubt whether Aristotle deploys any (non-existential) ontological notion of priority over and above definitional priority. In chapter 12 I have already addressed this form of objection, which does not recognize [PIB] as an ontological type of priority alongside definitional priority. This type of challenge usually presupposes a conception of forms as abstractions which cannot meet any requirement stronger than that of definitional priority. It would be useful, at this juncture, to explore how my line of reply applies to the context of Metaphysics Z.10, which is presently under discussion. A simple reply to this objection involves accepting its first premiss but denying its second. It seems fair to think that certain mathematical objects are definitionally and ontologically prior to derivative mathematical abstractions. Hence, for instance, a right angle is prior to an acute or a point is prior to a line. It does not follow from this, though, that such basic mathematical items are ontologically prior to physical bodies. Nor should it be inferred that they are substances in the manner of Aristotelian substantial forms. Even so, the fact that Aristotle uses the phrase H r ÆØ ¼ı Iºººø strongly suggests that he seeks to introduce ontological considerations in addition to definitional theses. Further, in the overall context of Metaphysics Z.10, and especially on the basis of 1035b4–21 cited earlier, it seems that Aristotle’s present discussion deals with the priority of substantial forms over certain items. His aim, then, is to show that forms are both definitionally and ontologically primary. Even if mathematical objects cannot qualify for strict ontological primacy or substancehood, the target of these abstract examples is to elucidate a point about substantial forms. Forms should be prior both definitionally and ontologically if they are to qualify as genuine primary substances. The second passage cited above from Metaphysics Z.10 (1035b4–22) indicates that Aristotle conceives substantial forms not merely as abstract or linguistic items but as fundamental, real-world entities. In the case of forms, then, he should be seeking to establish ontological priority over and above definitional priority. That forms enjoy definitional priority over matter and material parts is clear from 1035b4–12. The argument developed at 1035b13ff., though, seems also to underpin the ontological priority of forms over matter and compounds.7 First, Aristotle contends that there is a type of substance, the form, which corresponds to the account or formula and which is prior to the compounds it is the form of (1035b13–15; 18–21). This clearly favours the idea of correspondence between the definitional and the ontological levels. The

7 Aristotle clearly argues that forms are definitionally and ontologically prior not only to universal compounds but also to particular compound substances. The phrase F ı ºı Çfiı at 1035b19 seems to refer to universal compounds (cf. b27–30), while ŒÆd ŒÆŁ’ ŒÆ c › ø at b19–20 picks up particular compounds (cf. b30–31).

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

277

phrase ‘substance in accordance with the account/formula’ suggests that what occurs at the linguistic or definitional level is the counterpart to what there is at the level of reality (b13; 15:  ŒÆa e º ª PÆ). Second, this type of substance which corresponds to the account is, in the case of living beings, their soul (1035b14–16). Souls, however, are not merely linguistic or conceptual items but are real-world organizing principles which make living beings what they are (1035b16: e r  ŒÆd e  q r ÆØ fiH ØfiH  ÆØ). In addition to definitional priority, then, forms are privileged with an ontological type of priority, [PIB], over animate beings. If this is correct, ontological priority should be amongst the types of asymmetric dependence and independence relation under discussion within the context of Metaphysics Z.10 (1035b18–19; 20–1). For Aristotle should be interested not only in definitional relations (1035b16–18) but also in relations between living compounds and their souls (b18–21). The bracketed claims made at 1035b16–18 need not imply that Aristotle is concerned solely with definitional considerations. Indeed, linguistic or conceptual considerations could not, by themselves, account for the relevant ontological relations between living beings and their souls. Rather, these parenthetical remarks suggest that ontological theses can be elucidated on the basis of parallel definitional claims. In the light of this, it becomes plausible to invoke an ontological correlate of definitional priority. This real-world type of priority, understood as [PIB], enables forms to qualify as genuine primary substances and not merely as linguistic or conceptual items. The ontological character of a form’s priority over the types of matter and the compounds it enforms consists in its making these derivative entities what they are (b16). Without their form, matter and material parts are only incomplete, potential beings but not fully functional, actual compound substances or functional parts thereof.8 Further, a compound, its being what it is, is determined by what the relevant type of form is, while the converse is not the case.9 8 In section 10.1 I have already argued that Aristotle’s sublunary forms could not be ontologically prior to matter in existence. Only if understood in terms of [PIB] could the ontological priority condition be met by these forms. 9 There are subsidiary problems which make the overall argument of Metaphysics Z.10 particularly difficult in its details. (1) Why does Aristotle claim that ‘some or all of the parts of the form’ are prior to matter and material parts and to compounds and their bodily parts (1035b6; 14; 19)? Burnyeat et al. (Z, pp. 82–5) note that this issue may be connected with concerns about the priority relations between form, its formal constituents, and the compounds having the relevant form. Some parts of the form may not be definitionally or ontologically prior to the compound, while others may be so. For example, at Met. Z.12, 1038a18–21, only the last differentia is thought to be the essence and the definition of a thing. If so, only the last differentia is definitionally and ontologically prior to the compound. By contrast, at 1038a5–9, Aristotle holds that the genus does not exist over and above the species or exists only as a type of underlying matter which supports the species. If so, the genus, a putative part of the account and the form, either is not prior to the compound (for it does not exist alongside the species) or, strictly speaking, is not even a formal but only a quasi-material part. I outlined how my view deals with question (1) in section 7.10. (2) How should one read the bracketed text at 1035b16–18? Is each part of the animal ultimately dependent upon the function of or capacity for sense perception or only each animal as a whole? At 1035b16–17 Ross reads with the manuscripts ŒÆ ªF e æ Ka ›æÇÅÆØ ŒÆºH , while Jaeger reads ŒÆ ªF [e æ ] Ka ›æÇÅÆØ ŒÆºH . On the first

278

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

13.2 Actual Being as Ontologically Prior to Potential Being (Metaphysics .8) The importance of [PIB] is also clear in the context of Metaphysics .8. My aim is not to explore all the claims made in this long and difficult chapter. Nor shall I seek to understand all cases in which actual beings are taken as ontologically prior to potential beings (1049b10–11: æ æÆ Kd  K æªØÆ . . . ŒÆd B fi PÆ fi ). Rather, my chief aim is to understand the relation between form in complete or fully functional compounds and the corresponding incomplete, potential beings (e.g. adult–child, human–seed). In general, the focus of the present argument will be on the ontological priority of form as actual being over matter as potential being. One could express doubt, at this juncture, about whether [PIB] is a comprehensively successful notion which could accommodate all the cases of ontological priority discussed in Metaphysics .8. To address this difficulty and to underpin the weak claim that [PIB] could embrace all the relevant examples, I shall briefly discuss cases outside the realm of sublunary form, matter, and compounds. These cases include capacity possession and its exercise, capacities and their exercise quite generally, and perishable things versus eternal actual beings. It should be emphasized at the outset, though, that this sketchy discussion will not aim to set out in detail how the relevant actual beings are ontologically prior to the corresponding potential beings in the manner of [PIB]. Rather, my goal will be to defuse the twin objections that [PIB] cannot plausibly be extended to these cases or that [PIE] fares better than [PIB] does in dealing with them.

13.3 Substance and Form as Actual Being – Matter as Potential Being The opening sentence of Metaphysics .8 suggests that the distinctions drawn in the philosophical lexicon are, in some measure, present in this chapter too (1049b4–5). Aristotle holds that priority is said in many different ways, the ways which ‘we have distinguished earlier’, presumably in the context of Metaphysics .11.10 At any rate, reading, to define each part of the whole compound substance, one must mention its function and ultimately its capacity for sense perception. But it is not clear that all bodily parts are defined in terms of sense perception. On the second reading, each animate being, presumably each animal, is defined in terms of its functions and ultimately in terms of sense perception. For, in Aristotle’s view, what distinguishes animals from lower living organisms (such as plants) is their capacity for sense perception. But, again, why should the phrase H Çfiø at 1035b14 pick up only animals and not living organisms in general, including plants? After all, the only distinctive feature of ÇfiHÆ emphasized in this passage is that they possess a soul (b14–16). But all living organisms are ensouled: even plants have a nutritive soul. I shall offer a further brief discussion of question (2) in appendix 1, footnote 3. My argument in favour of [PIB] is, at any rate, relatively distinct from questions (1) and (2) and remains roughly intact, regardless of how one may answer them. 10 Makin (Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Y [Y], Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 182) also takes the reference to Metaphysics .11 to be obvious.

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

279

Metaphysics .8 takes actual being as prior to potential being in account, in substance and, in a certain way, in time too (b10–12). For brevity’s sake, I shall leave to the side definitional and temporal types of priority as they are relatively unproblematic (b12–17; b17–1050a3).11 My aim is to argue that [PIB] can successfully underwrite the claim that actual being is ontologically prior to potential being (æ æÆ B fi PÆ fi ), a claim which is the focus of the following passage: Further, [actual being is prior to potential being] in substance too, first because things which are posterior in generation are prior in form and in substance (e.g. adult to child, and human to seed; for the former already have the form, while the latter do not), and because everything which is in the process of becoming moves towards the principle and the end [ º ] (for ‘that for the sake of which’ [e y ŒÆ] is the principle, and becoming is for the sake of the end), and actuality is the end, and potentiality is acquired for the sake of this. [ . . . ] Further, matter is in potentiality, because it may go to the form; but when it is in actuality, then it is in the form [ . . . ] For the function [æª] is the end, while the actuality is the function – and for this reason the name ‘actuality’ [K æªØÆ] is used in accordance with the function [æª]– and it [actuality] strives towards the complete reality [Kº åØÆ]. (1050a4–10; 15–16; 21–3; my trans.)12

This argument rests on two basic assumptions which are closely interconnected: (1) What is temporally posterior in the process of coming-to-be is prior in form and in substance (Premiss; 1050a4–5: a B fi ª Ø oæÆ fiH YØ ŒÆd B fi PÆ fi æ æÆ).13 (2) Everything which is in the process of coming-to-be moves towards its principle and final end (Premiss; 1050a7–8: –Æ K’ Iæåc ÆÇØ e ªØª  ŒÆd  º ). The cases of an adult and a human versus a child and a seed respectively are offered as examples of (1). The former are cases of actual being and as such are ontologically prior to the latter, which are cases of potential being (1050a5–7). Similarly, a form as actual being is ontologically prior to matter, a type of potential being (a15–16). Aristotle’s explanation of and examples for (1) rest on the fact that beings in earlier phases of generation are incomplete and do not possess the form (1050a6–7). This view, taken together with (2), introduces a rich conceptual framework of teleology:14

11 I agree with Witt (Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics [Ways], Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 79) and Makin (Y, p. 192) that, while the notions of definitional and temporal priority are straightforward or fairly clear, ontological priority stands in need of clarification. 12 I omit the examples offered at 1050a10–14 as they are not directly relevant to my present concerns, for they deal with capacity possession and exercise. Similarly, I have not translated 1050a16–21, which is a generalization to the cases in which the end is a type of change (teaching and learning), because my argument is primarily about substances. In sections 13.4 and 13.5 I shall briefly take up the case of capacity possession and exercise, as well as that of capacities and their exercise in general. 13 This assumption is also present in Met. M.2, 1077a26–7, where it is argued that bodies more clearly are substances rather than mathematical objects (1077a24–31). In M.2, the basis for this assumption is the claim that bodies are complete and structured wholes as they come to have a soul or form (1077a28–9). 14 Cleary (Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority [Senses], The Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series, 1988, p. 59), Witt (Ways, p. 78), and Makin (Y, p. 194) also notice the teleological perspective of the

280

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

(a) What is temporally prior in a process of coming-to-be has not yet accomplished its final cause, that for the sake of which it is as it is: for it does not yet possess the form in completeness. (b) What is temporally posterior or last in a process of coming-to-be is complete and possesses the relevant form: it has accomplished its final end. Since, in such cases, the form and the final cause are the principles, it follows that the items falling under the scope of (b) are ontologically prior to those under (a). Yet Aristotle introduces several further premisses to support the conclusion that actuality is ontologically prior to potentiality: The functional being is the final cause (Premiss; 1050a21). Actuality is the functional being (Premiss; a22). Actuality is the final cause [From (3) and (4); a9]. The principle is that for the sake of which things are in the process of comingto-be (Premiss; a8). (7) In a process of coming-to-be that for the sake of which things are is the final cause (Premiss; a8–9). (8) The principle is the final cause [From (6) and (7)]. (9) Actuality is the principle, that for the sake of which there is potentiality [From (5) and (8); a9–10]. (10) Therefore, as principle, actuality is ontologically prior to potentiality [From (9)]. (3) (4) (5) (6)

This argument, it can be claimed, rests on unduly abstract and unsupported premisses.15 To understand Aristotle’s view, one should account for the particular examples of ontological priority: adult over child, human over seed, and form over matter. Most commentators have understood these examples on the basis of the existential construal of ontological priority. In their view, an adult can somehow exist independently of the relevant type of child having existed, while a human can exist without the relevant type of seed having existed. However, because these claims seem straightforwardly false, other interpreters have put forward different proposals to make the examples intelligible. Stephen Makin, for instance, argues that teleological considerations about generation and its privileged stages make the examples perspicuous. Generation has a privileged stage, that of completeness (e.g. adult, human, possession of form), while all earlier stages are ontologically dependent upon that stage. If so, beings at earlier stages cannot exist without beings at the completeness stage existing in that the former are for the sake of the latter. The fact that something might go wrong – in which case a

argument deployed in Metaphysics .8. However, they do not realize that their existential construal of the priority relation creates problems if applied to Aristotle’s examples. 15 It could even be objected that this argument is nothing more than ‘School Metaphysics’; see Dancy, R. M., ‘Aristotle and the Priority of Actuality’ [‘Priority’], in S. Knuuttila (ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1980, p. 92.

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

281

being at the completeness stage will never exist, even though a being at an earlier stage has existed – does not imply existential dependence of the former upon the latter. It just entails that the generation process has been interrupted or interfered with. But interruptions of or interferences with the generation process are cases of destruction and destruction cannot yield a being at the completeness stage. For this reason, in cases of destruction the privileged stage of generation never obtains. Yet, if all goes well, generation will yield a being at the completeness stage which is existentially independent of beings at earlier stages.16 It is not clear, however, why we should take destruction processes in this idiosyncratic way. Is it not more plausible to think that the destruction process at issue is one that affects beings which already are in complete existence? For instance, the case of infanticide, which interrupts the generation process and prevents an adult from existing, is not, strictly speaking, the passing-away of an adult but the passing-away of a child. One would expect that the relevant type of destruction, an adult’s passing-away, should take place after an adult has come into full, complete being. Only if one takes destruction in a non-standard way can the existential construal make some sense. Charlotte Witt argues that (e.g.) young Sally is not existentially dependent upon a particular  º (her future self, Sally the adult) but upon ‘the type or species which she will realize’.17 In her view, the end or actuality in question is not the individual or (as she calls it) the token that Sally will become but the species. However, young Sally and Sally the adult are cases of potentiality and actuality respectively and as such Sally the adult should be ontologically prior to young Sally. The ontological priority of actuality over potentiality holds both at the token and at the type levels for the same reason. Witt could argue, to be sure, that Sally the adult is ontologically prior to young Sally, while insisting that this priority relation obtains on account of the fact that the type or species will exist in Sally the adult. However, combining the token and type levels in this manner still does not yield the desired results. How can the species exist in Sally the adult without Sally the adult ever existing? In this case, it appears that the species’ existing in Sally the adult is dependent upon young Sally’s having existed. For if young

16 See Makin, ‘What does Aristotle Mean by Priority in Substance?’ [‘Priority’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 24, 2003, pp. 226–7 and 230; cf. also his Y, pp. 193–5, where his view is formulated as follows: ‘[RE] Fs are prior in substance to Gs so long as there is some process which in normal conditions results in Fs rather than Gs; whereas the way to get Gs rather than Fs is to interfere with, interrupt or hinder that process’ (Y, p. 195; Makin’s emphasis). In my view, the main weaknesses of [RE] are the existential construal of the independence relation between Fs and Gs and the anomalous way of understanding destruction. 17 See Witt, Ch., ‘The Priority of Actuality’ [‘Priority’], in T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, & M. L. Gill (eds.), Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ [Unity], Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 224 and, in general, pp. 222ff. Cf. her Ways, p. 85: ‘although the boy exists for the sake of the man, the boy is ontologically dependent on the type or species he will realize, rather than the token or individual he might become. [ . . . ] [T]he end or actuality in question is the species – in our example, the human species. Aristotelian species, in turn, are ontologically dependent on the existence of their individual members. Ultimately, then, the boy in our example is ontologically dependent on the existence of human beings.’ Notably, in all her formulations Witt takes ontological priority and dependence in the existential manner; see Ways, pp. 13, 77–8, 79, 81, 138 (n. 2).

282

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

Sally goes out of existence, the species will never exist in Sally the adult. The fact that the species has existed in Sally’s own parents or will exist in other adults seems irrelevant, as in this particular case the actuality (Sally the adult) is existentially dependent upon the potentiality (young Sally).18 It is clear that the accounts just mentioned share a common weakness. They cannot explain how a being at a later or completion stage of a generation process can exist independently of a being existing or having existed at an earlier stage. It should be noted, however, that this difficulty does not consist merely in the following claim: (1) It is necessary that there should exist or have existed some immature entity or other of type A, if there is going to exist or there exists a complete entity of type B. This claim would allow that (e.g.) an adult man’s existence depends on the existence of a werewolf boy who would transform into an adult man when drinking his first alcoholic beverage at the age of twenty-one. Rather, the difficulty in question encapsulates more serious worries about the existence of certain types of entity as results of generation processes: (2) As a mature or complete result of a certain type of generation process, G, an entity of type A cannot exist without the corresponding immature or incomplete entity of the appropriate type B having already existed at an earlier stage of G. This seems to be one of Aristotle’s points in introducing natural, end-directed processes of coming-to-be. As I remarked in section 8.2, the deeper reason for the difficulty stemming from (2) is that the existential construal inevitably carries with it temporal

18 Witt would reply that young Sally’s existence as an immature human being depends on the existence of the species, which, in turn, depends on the actual existence of any one presently existing human being as a complete human being. If so, young Sally’s existing as an immature human being ultimately depends upon the existence of any one actually existing human being as a complete human being (this seems to be the point of her claim that type-actualities are prior to token-potentialities). However, the jargon of ‘existing as . . . ’ employed in this version of Witt’s view seems to make good sense only if understood in terms of the notion of being what something is. For it is not the ‘existing as . . . ’ but the ‘being what it is’ of an immature human being that depends on the ‘being what it is’ (and not the ‘existing as . . . ’) of a complete human being. But if so, it is preferable completely to avoid talk of existence and to develop an interpretation in terms of [PIB]. Indeed, Witt herself (Ways, p. 84) notes the problematic character of the existential construal as applied to the examples of Met. .8: ‘it is hard to see how the boy is ontologically dependent on the man, since the man – and the man’s form – does not now exist’ (my emphasis). It is noteworthy that, at several points, Witt’s argument seems to approximate my view of [PIB]: ‘if being human did not actually exist, then the boy could not be potentially human, or, in other words, he would not exist, where “exist” means exist as what he is. But the reverse ontological dependency does not hold’ (Ways, p. 85; Witt’s emphasis). Similarly, she thinks that the relation between a potential being A and an actual being B is one of ontological dependence, in so far as what it is to be A is being potentially B (Ways, p. 83). However, her main thesis is formulated in terms of the problematic existential construal. She argues that potential beings, such as the child in our example, are existentially dependent on the existence of actual beings, such as being human (Ways, p. 85). Panayides (‘Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality in Substance’, Ancient Philosophy, 19, 1999, p. 334) criticizes Witt’s existential construal on similar grounds. He argues that it is implausible to think that young Sally is ontologically dependent on Sally the adult, since young Sally ‘exists now, whereas the adult Sally is not now in existence. In fact, she may never exist.’

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

283

connotations which prevent it from accommodating the examples given in Metaphysics .8. But temporal considerations either yield incorrect results or are irrelevant to the ontological type of priority of actuality over potentiality. Priority in time is a distinct type of priority which is treated in its own right by Aristotle (1049b17–1050a3). It does not, indeed should not, have any significant consequences on ontological priority. Further, the existential construal seems to be undermined by Aristotle’s teleological argument and his remarks about processes of coming-to-be. Teleology and processes of coming-to-be allow us to invoke the notion of hypothetical necessity from Physics B.9. Regardless of problematic details, it is clear that, in processes of coming-to-be, matter is hypothetically necessary for a form to exist in a complete, fully functional compound. Hence, for example, if a saw and its function (e.g. cutting) are going to exist, it is necessary that there should exist some type of matter appropriate for incorporating the function of cutting (e.g. a proper type of metal such as iron). This item would discharge the role of the material nature of a saw. This holds good, despite the fact that a saw is not for the sake of (e.g.) the iron but the iron is for the sake of a saw (200a12–13; 24–9). There is a relation of existential dependence of form upon matter, then, although the teleological dependence runs the other way around (200a7–10; 19–22).19 Aristotle’s examples in Metaphysics .8 are, admittedly, different from those offered in Physics B.9. While a type of metal appropriate for sustaining the function of cutting is the proximate matter of a saw (the matter constituting a fully functional saw), a child or a seed of the relevant types do not materially constitute an adult or a human respectively. Rather, they are immature entities at earlier phases of the process of coming-to-be. It would be sufficient for present purposes, however, if the two types of case shared the relevant salient features which would render them hypothetically necessary for the corresponding forms to exist. Indeed, just as a type of metal appropriate for cutting must exist if a saw is to exist, similarly an immature entity of the proper type must exist

19

The mathematical cases (Phys. B.9, 200a15–30) resemble natural generation and craft production cases in the following two respects. (1) The existential interdependence between form and compounds in natural generation and craft production cases corresponds to the logical or syllogistic interdependence between principles or premisses of mathematical proofs and their conclusions. Thus, the form or  º of a house cannot exist if no enmattered houses exist, while an enmattered house cannot exist without the house-form existing in and enforming it. Similarly, if the straight line is thus-and-so (principle or premiss of a proof ), the triangle must have a sum of internal angles equal to two right angles (¼ 2R; theorem or conclusion of a proof ). Conversely, too, if the triangle has 2R, the straight line must be thus-and-so (200a18–19). In mathematics, however, the interdependence relation seems equivalent to the following claim: given inferential validity, the conclusion of a proof cannot be true if the premisses are not true and conversely. This is what I labelled ‘syllogistic’ or ‘logical interdependence’ (a21–4: c Z F ı æ Æ  Iæåc PŒ ÆØ; Iæåc [ . . . ] F ºªØ F). (2) In cases of natural generation and craft production, the ontological-teleological priority of a form- º over matter corresponds to the explanatory priority of the demonstrative premisses-principles over the conclusion of mathematical proofs. It is because of the fact that the straight line is thus-and-so that the triangle has 2R but not conversely (a16–18). I omit the mathematical cases from the main body of my argument, for in such cases the considerations from teleology and generation processes (which are central in Metaphysics .8) cannot, strictly speaking, apply. However, the argument I just offered suggests that there are correspondences between the two types of case as described in Physics B.9, 200a15–30. Further, [PIB] can, without difficulty, accommodate the correspondences between these two distinct types of case.

284

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

at an earlier stage of the generation process if a mature entity of the relevant type is to exist at a later or completion stage of this process. Aristotle himself seems to conceive the two types of case as sufficiently similar in all relevant respects as he offers the example of matter as potential being and form as actual being at Metaphysics .8, 1050a15–16. In this example, the potential being that matter is will, if all goes well, constitute or embody the relevant type of actual being, the form. Since this is provided as a further example of the ontological primacy of actuality over potentiality (1050a15: Ø), it follows that the previous examples, too, describe similar cases of actual being which are ontologically prior to corresponding potential beings. Conversely, Physics B.9 provides no reason to rule out the possibility that (e.g.) a type of metal appropriate for cutting is hypothetically necessary for a saw to exist in so far as it is the corresponding type of not-fully-processed material at earlier stages of the relevant production process, a material which does not yet constitute a fully functional saw. On the assumption, then, that one can apply the claims made in Physics B.9 to the examples offered in Metaphysics .8, one can derive the following results: (1) If an adult, a human or a form exist or are going to exist at later or completion stages of certain types of generation process, the relevant types of child, seed or matter must exist or will have to exist (respectively) at earlier stages of these processes. This claim is based on the formulations set out at Physics B.9, 200a19–20, where Aristotle clearly applies hypothetical necessity to cases of generation process, similar to those discussed in Metaphysics .8. The existential construal of the notion of ontological priority subscribes to the following two claims: (2) The relevant types of child, seed, or matter do not exist or will not exist at earlier stages of these processes. But: (3) An adult, a human, or a form can exist or will be able to exist at later or completion stages of these processes, independently of the existence of the items referred to in (2) respectively. But the conjunction of (1) with (2) yields (by modus tollens) the following result: (4) An adult, a human, or a form cannot exist or will not be able to exist at later or completion stages of these processes. Claim (4) contradicts (3), which encapsulates the existential construal of ontological priority. It turns out that an adult, a human, and a form are existentially dependent upon the existence of the relevant types of child, seed, and matter respectively.20 On the existential approach, therefore, actuality does not prove ontologically prior to 20 A possible objection might run as follows. How could the appropriate types of child or seed (potential beings) be identified without the relevant types of adult- or human-form (actual beings)? If these potential beings could not be identified without the corresponding actual beings, how could the latter be existentially dependent on the former? In that case, it appears, potential beings would effectively depend upon actual beings for their identity. However, I am not here denying that a child or a seed of the relevant types are

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

285

potentiality. For this reason, I conclude, [PIE] does not work successfully within the context of Metaphysics .8. The notion of [PIB], once again, seems helpful at this juncture. An adult, a human, and a form are existentially dependent upon the existence of the relevant types of child, seed, and matter respectively. Yet they are what they are independently of the relevant types of child, seed, or matter being what they are. Indeed, the dependence runs the other way about. The relevant types of child, seed, or matter, their being what they are, are ontologically dependent on what it is to be an adult, a human, or a form respectively. This point should be understood on the basis of considerations about processes of coming-to-be, teleology, and hypothetical necessity. The fact that in processes of coming-to-be the realization of a form in complete compounds and so the existence of a form in them depend (by hypothetical necessity) upon the existence of an appropriate type of matter does not entail that a form is because or for the sake of this type of matter (Physics [Phys] B.9, 200a9–10; cf. 26–7: P Øa ÆF KØ e  º Iºº’ j ‰ oºÅ, P’ ÆØ Øa ÆFÆ). What it is to be an appropriate type of matter, by contrast, depends on what it is to be the relevant telos, the form to be realized. For a type of matter is as it is for the sake of what the relevant type of form is. Therefore, a child, a seed, or an appropriate type of matter, their being what they are, respectively depend upon what it is to be an adult, a human, or a form of the relevant types. For the former ‘move towards’ the realization of the latter (1050a7–8). By contrast, what an adult, a human, or a form is does not, in the corresponding way, depend upon what a child, a seed, or an appropriate type of matter is.21 For the former are the final causes ( ºÅ) which make the latter what they are but not conversely. This need not entail that any kinds of child, seed, or matter will suffice for an adult, a human, or a form of the relevant types to be what they are. But the range of appropriate types of child, seed, or matter is

identifiable in terms of some form or other. My claim would be, however, that they are enformed as a child or as a seed (respectively). If so, they are identifiable in terms of the corresponding ‘lower-level’ forms. The fact that these lower-level forms depend upon the forms of an adult or a human (respectively) for their being what they are is a further, separate issue. This issue is congenial to my wider thesis about the [PIB]-type ontological priority of forms over matter at earlier stages of a generation process. This wider thesis, though, does not entail that matter at earlier stages is an entirely form-less or unidentifiable lump of material stuffs. 21 There is an interesting but misleading way in which this dependency of matter or potential being upon form or actual being might be challenged. One might argue that in some cases an adult is thus-and-so as a result of a precursor being thus-and-so. Thus, for instance, this adult human’s being a woman depends on the embryo’s having undergone (e.g.) certain heating or cooling processes within the mother’s womb. By contrast, the embryo’s having been heated or cooled in these ways does not depend on the adult human’s being a woman. It might be inferred from this, then, that the adult female human is not ontologically prior, but is posterior, to the embryo from which she developed. This form of objection grows out of a basic misunderstanding. Being heated or cooled is an accidental, non-essential feature that comes to belong to the embryo within a mother’s womb during the process of reproduction. It is not part of the essence of the embryo or the adult human. Nor, more importantly, is it for the sake of anything or, in particular, for the sake of the adult human’s turning out female. For this reason it does not depend for its essence on the actual being or telos that the human-form is. Equally, however, it does not itself determine what the adult human essentially is as it constitutes a merely accidental feature. I am indebted to Stephen Makin for raising this point.

286

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

ontologically dependent upon what it is to be an adult, a human, or a form of the corresponding types respectively.22 An objection might be raised at this juncture. It could be conceded that my view establishes the correct kind of ontological priority of actuality, form, and substance over potentiality and matter. It might still be doubted, though, whether my argument supports the claim of form to ontological priority over the compound substances it enforms. Given the priority relations between the different types of substance as described in Metaphysics Z.10, however, it is clear that this objection cannot be decisive (1035b4–6; 11–14; 18–22). A form is ontologically prior not only to matter (and its parts) but also to compounds (and their bodily parts). In Metaphysics .8 these priority claims are implicitly present. Because compounds cannot be complete or realize their relevant telos if they do not possess their form, they are ontologically posterior to form. For, if they do not possess their form, they are merely material, non-enformed entities and so are substances only in potentiality. This type of ontological priority of form over compounds, however, cannot be identified with [PIE]. A form cannot exist if no enmattered compounds exist, while enmattered compounds cannot exist (as complete or fully functional) independently of their form. A form, by contrast, satisfies [PIB] as it makes compounds what they are but not conversely.

13.4 Generalizability of [PIB] (I): Capacity Possession and Exercise The first challenge against the possibility that [PIB] is extendable to all cases of ontological priority of actual over potential beings is posed by Aristotle’s remarks about possession of capacities and their exercise: For it is not that animals see in order that they may have sight but they have sight so that they may see, and likewise too they possess the building craft in order that they may build and the contemplative ability in order that they may contemplate; but it is not that they contemplate

22

Jonathan Beere does not adopt the existential construal in setting out Aristotle’s thesis, formulated in the first part of Metaphysics .8, that actual beings are ontologically prior to potential beings. In the same year as my ‘Aristotle’s Notion of Priority in Nature and Substance’ [‘Priority’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35, 2008, pp. 187–247, but independently of it, he argues that in sublunary, perishable cases, actual beings are prior to potential beings ‘in being what they are’. In his example, ‘what it is to be an oak tree sprout depends on what it is to be an oak tree, but not vice versa’ (‘The Priority in Being of Energeia’ in M. Crubellier, A. Jaulin, D. Lefebvre, & P.-M. Morel (eds.), Dynamis: Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, Editions Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve-Paris-Dudley, MA, 2008, p. 437). More notably, he refers to Kit Fine’s work on essence, modality, and ontological dependence as I did in my article, even though, as he notes, ‘this idea was not originally suggested’ to him by Kit Fine’s work (p. 437, n. 11; cf. my ‘Priority’ pp. 187–9; 196; 240–3). Beere, however, does not apply this non-existential notion of ontological priority to the relation obtaining between eternal actual beings and perishable beings discussed in the second part of Metaphysics .8. Indeed, to understand this relation he seems to be employing a fully fledged modal–existential construal. I shall return to this point in section 13.6.

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

287

in order that they may have the contemplative ability, except those who are practising.23 (Metaphysics [Met.] .8, 1050a10–13; Makin’s trans.)

Here Aristotle applies his distinction between potential and actual being to having a capacity and exercising it respectively. His position is that exercising a capacity is an actuality and as such is ontologically prior to possessing a capacity, which is a potentiality. Even non-substance cases of this sort should be understood by reference to the teleological considerations put forward at 1050a9–10. The potentiality that possessing a capacity consists in is for the sake of the end, the actuality that exercising this capacity is. Thus, having sight, a specific capacity for sense-perception, is for the sake of actively seeing, the actuality which is the final cause of possessing this capacity. For this reason, Aristotle concludes, seeing is ontologically prior to having sight. My account of [PIB] could unproblematically cover cases of this sort too. First, it should be pointed out that, consistently with my view, there is existential dependence of a capacity’s exercise upon its possession. Hence, for example, a human’s exercising his or her sight cannot exist without his or her having the capacity for human sight.24 This dependency mirrors the relation of existential dependence of form on certain types of matter and hylomorphic compounds, a relation which obtains in substancecases. If this is correct, capacity exercise cannot be ontologically prior to capacity possession in the existential manner of [PIE]. The exercise of human seeing, by contrast, its being what it is, makes a human’s possessing his or her sight what it is but not conversely. For having the capacity of sight is as it is for the sake of actively seeing. The converse, though, does not hold true (1050a10–13). The idea, then, is that what it is to be seeing is the final cause in virtue of which having sight is the type of capacity possession that it is. Employing the model of

23 I have not translated the problematic part of the text at 1050a13–14, which deals with the specific ways in which people who lack (e.g.) the contemplative ability may nevertheless be taken as actively contemplating in so far as they practise or study to acquire this ability. Important though it may be, this issue is not directly relevant to present concerns. 24 Indeed, this relation of existential dependence could be conceived as running in the opposite direction too in either (or both) of the following two ways. (1) The acquisition and so the possession of certain types of capacity depend for their existence on there being or having been instances of actively practising the relevant capacity (prior to its proper possession). Thus, for instance, to come to have the guitar-playing ability, one practises actual guitar-playing. Aristotle himself refers to this case of capacity acquisition using the example of the contemplative ability and the practice in actively contemplating which precedes the possession of this ability. There is a question, however, as to whether and, if so, in what way one who lacks (e.g.) the guitarplaying capacity can engage in practice of proper guitar-playing or in guitar-playing of the same type as that exercised by one who possesses the guitar-playing craft. Aristotle briefly addresses this question at 1050a13–14. The brevity of his reply and the textual problems of these lines, though, obscure his position. (2) The continued existence or preservation of certain types of capacity possession seems to depend on the existence of instances of capacity exercise. For example, to continue to have the guitar-playing ability, one exercises by actually playing the guitar. If these two points are sound, capacity possession existentially depends on its exercise, just as the latter depends on the former for its existence. This sort of existential interdependence is in line with my view of the relation which holds of form and matter or compounds in substancecases. A form cannot exist without being enmattered or without having compound instances, just as matter or compounds cannot exist (as complete or fully functional beings) without being enformed.

288

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB] in this fashion, it seems straightforward to conclude that capacity exercise, a nonsubstance case of being in actuality, meets the ontological priority condition over capacity possession, the corresponding case of being in potentiality.

13.5 Generalizability of [PIB] (II): Capacities and Their Exercise Aristotle moves on to a general discussion of capacities versus their exercise, a further case of being in potentiality and being in actuality respectively. And since in some cases it is the exercise that is final (for example, seeing in the case of sight, and nothing different [or: no different result] over and above this comes to be from sight), but from others there does come to be something (for example, from the house-building craft a house over and above the act of house-building), it is nevertheless no less true that the one is the end, while the other is more the end rather than the potentiality. For the act of house-building is in what is being built and comes to be and is at the same time as the house. So in all the cases where what comes to be is something different over and above the exercise, in these cases the actuality is in what is being made (for example, the act of house-building is in what is being built, and the act of weaving is in what is being woven, and likewise too in other cases, and generally the change is in what is being changed); while in all the other cases where there is no other product over and above the actuality, the actuality is in them (for example, seeing in the one seeing and contemplation in the one contemplating and living in the soul, which is why flourishing is also [in the soul]; for it is a certain kind of living). (Met. .8, 1050a23–b2; Makin’s trans.)

It would be useful to examine whether, and if so in what way, my view of [PIB] could accommodate these cases of ontological priority of actual over potential beings. Aristotle distinguishes the potential beings that capacities are into two separate types using the criterion of whether or not there is some end-product or result stemming from a capacity which exists over and above its exercise (1050a30: Ææa c åæØ). First, there are capacities such as sight or contemplation which could be called ‘nontransitive’. Their exercise does not yield any result which outlives the relevant activity of (e.g.) seeing or contemplating. There is no end-product which exists over and above the exercise of these capacities. Rather, their result or final end is immanent in their employment (1050a23–5; 34–5). Moreover, in these cases the employment of a capacity exists in the (type of ) object or entity that exercises the relevant capacity (1050a34–b2). Hence, for instance, seeing is in the animal that is seeing, while contemplating is in the thinker who is contemplating. Aristotle’s overall position implies, then, that the actual being or telos that a capacity exercise is cannot meet the ontological priority condition in its existential version. There are two points which support this conclusion. First, the employment of a capacity cannot exist without the relevant capacity existing or being possessed by the capacity-exerciser. I have already discussed this claim in the previous section in setting

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

289

out the existential dependency of capacity exercise upon capacity possession. Further, as Aristotle adds at Metaphysics .8, 1050a34–b2, the exercise of a non-transitive capacity cannot exist without the capacity-exerciser existing. If we adopt [PIE], therefore, we seem unable to explain how the employment of this type of capacity could be ontologically prior to the capacity itself. This problem can be resolved if we deploy the notion of [PIB]. Despite its existential dependency on capacity possession and capacity-exerciser, the employment of a nontransitive capacity constitutes the activity and the final cause for the sake of which the capacity is as it is. Thus, for instance, the act of seeing, its being what it is, determines the nature of the capacity of sight, its being what it is, whereas the converse is not the case. This asymmetric relation of priority is based on the causal asymmetry obtaining between the final cause that an activity is and the capacity which is for the sake of this final cause. With the help of [PIB], then, the exercise of non-transitive capacities can prove ontologically prior to these capacities. In the case of transitive capacities, such as those of craft-production, by contrast, there is a product or end-result which is distinct from and exists independently of the capacity exercise. Hence, for example, the final end of the craft of house-building, the completed house, is over and above the act of house-building (1050a25–7; 30–1). For a house exists even if/when there is no activity of house-building. Moreover, Aristotle maintains that the employment of transitive capacities exists in the items which are being made into the completed end-result (1050a31: ø b  K æªØÆ K fiH Øı { K). For instance, house-building is in what is being house-built, just as weaving is in what is being woven (1050a28–9; 30–4). If this is correct, however, the exercise of transitive capacities cannot fulfil ontological priority in the manner of [PIE] for two separate reasons. First, as pointed out in the previous section, it cannot exist without the relevant capacity existing or being possessed by the appropriate capacity-exerciser. Second, it turns out to be existentially dependent upon the items which are ‘under construction’, just as the latter depend on it for their existence. What is being constructed into a house depends for its existence as such on there being house-building activity employed on it. Similarly, however, the act of house-building exists only if applied to an entity which is being house-built. If existential priority is what is at stake, then, the employment of transitive capacities flatly fails to qualify. Aristotle faces a serious objection, at this juncture, one which threatens the claim of capacity exercise to ontological priority over transitive capacities even if this relation is understood in the manner of [PIB]. In the case of non-transitive capacities [PIB] proved successful because it was grounded on a prominent relation of final causation. Because the ultimate telos (the åÆ of 1050a24) of a non-transitive capacity is its own exercise, the nature of the capacity is fixed by its exercise: for it is as it is for the sake of its exercise but not conversely. Thus, for instance, the contemplative ability is as it is for the sake of the contemplating activity, its final cause, but not the other way about.

290

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

In the case of transitive capacities, by contrast, Aristotle contends that their ultimate end-product or final cause is distinct from, and exists independently of, their employment. Not only does this entail that (e.g.) a completed house exists even if/when there is no house-building activity. More importantly, it suggests that the act of housebuilding ontologically depends, in the very manner of [PIB], on the telos or form of being a house, the entity which enforms the completed house, which is the end-result of house-building. For what it is to be house-building activity depends on what it is to be the relevant house-telos or house-form. If the act of house-building is not itself a telos but is as it is for the sake of the house-telos, how can it play the role of final cause for the capacity of house-building? The exercise of transitive capacities fails to satisfy (it appears) ontological or teleological priority over these capacities even in the nonexistential manner of [PIB]. It is precisely this line of objection that Aristotle aims to rebut with his contrast between non-transitive and transitive capacities. While he accepts that in transitive capacities the ultimate final end is to realize the telos or form of the completed product, he denies the view that the corresponding activity is not a telos at all. As he remarks at Metaphysics .8, 1050a27–8, the teleological structure in which non-transitive capacities are for the sake of their exercise carries over to transitive capacities too (1050a27: ‹ ø PŁb w), albeit modified. For in transitive capacities, too, while their distinct end-product, such as a completed house, is the telos, yet their employment, (e.g.) the house-building activity, is a telos rather than the capacity, the craft of house-building (1050a27–8: ŁÆ b  º , ŁÆ b Aºº  º B ı  KØ).25 25

The sentence used at 1050a27–8 is the object of intense scholarly debate. My interpretation is as follows. I take the statement ‹ ø PŁb w ŁÆ b  º , ŁÆ b Aºº  º B ı  KØ as ranging only over transitive capacities such as the house-building craft. The phrase ‹ ø PŁb w compares non-transitive with transitive capacities and suggests that the teleological structure obtaining in the former (discussed at 1050a23–5) is ‘no less’ applicable to the latter too. The phrase ŁÆ b  º , ŁÆ b Aºº  º B ı  KØ, then, explains how this teleological structure works in transitive capacities. The ŁÆ b picks up the Ø from 1050a26, the distinct end-product, and states that this is the ultimate  º . The ŁÆ b refers to an understood åæBØ implied by I’ Kø b ªªÆ Ø [sc. Ææa c åæBØ] at 1050a25–6. The claim is that this åæBØ of transitive capacities is Aºº  º rather than the capacity. An alternative interpretation would be to take the sentence ‹ ø PŁb w ŁÆ b  º , ŁÆ b Aºº  º B ı  KØ as ranging over both non-transitive and transitive capacities. In that case, Aristotle would contrast the ultimate telos that the exercise of non-transitive capacities is with the reduced telic status of exercise in transitive capacities. In this view, the ŁÆ b  º picks up non-transitive capacity exercise and says that it is the ultimate  º . The ŁÆ b Aºº  º B ı  KØ, by contrast, refers to transitive capacity exercise, rendering it Aºº  º than the capacity, even if not the ultimate  º . There are two reasons for preferring my interpretation. First, the ªaæ clause of 1050a28–9, which expresses Aristotle’s elucidation of the claim made at 1050a27–8, focuses exclusively on transitive capacities and explains the relation between their employment and the ultimate end-product, their distinct telos ( ªaæ NŒ ÅØ . . . B fi NŒÆ fi ). This is precisely the contrast that my view takes ŁÆ b and ŁÆ b to be drawing at 1050a27–8. Indeed, there is no mention of non-transitive capacities after 1050a25 and up to a34. Aristotle seems, at this point, to be interested solely in the intricacies of transitive capacities. Second, in the alternative interpretation, no discernible purpose seems to be served by the contrast between ŁÆ b  º and ŁÆ b Aºº  º . Why would Aristotle claim that (e.g.) seeing is the telos, while house-building is the telos rather than the craft of house-building? The first part of this claim looks like a repetition of his thesis that there is no separate end-result in non-transitive capacities over and above their exercise (1050a23–5). The second part,

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

291

The idea is that the distinct end-product which exists over and above the exercise of a transitive capacity is the ultimate principle or final cause, the teleological bedrock underlying the capacity exercise. For what it is to be this sort of exercise depends on the nature of the telos that the distinct end-product is. At the same time, though, the exercise is the final cause of, and determines the nature of, the transitive capacity. Thus, for example, what it is to be the craft of house-building is to be the ability actively to engage in house-building. For the craft of house-building is for the sake of this activity. In the case of transitive capacities, then, Aristotle operates with a stratified type of teleological structure. While the distinct result, the completed end-product, is the ultimate principle or final cause which fixes the nature of the capacity exercise, the latter is the intermediate final cause of the capacity. If so, with the help of [PIB], the end-product proves ontologically prior to the activity, whereas the activity is ontologically prior to the capacity. Ultimately, if ontological priority is a transitive relation, the end-product turns out to be ontologically prior to the capacity too. For, after all, a transitive capacity is ultimately directed towards the teleological bedrock that the distinct end-product is. However, this ontological dependency, as well as the underlying teleological relation, are mediated by, and are based on, the capacity exercise. For the exercise is directly dependent upon the end-product, whereas the capacity only indirectly, via the exercise itself. While the telos or form of a complete house fixes the identity of the house-building activity, the latter makes the craft of house-building what it is. It is this activity, therefore, which links the nature of the transitive capacity with the fundamental ontological and teleological principle that the house-telos is.

13.6 Generalizability of [PIB] (III): Perishable Things and Eternal Actual Beings The possibility of understanding [PIB] as having universal scope faces its greatest challenge in the case of eternal or imperishable actual beings such as the Prime and the Planetary Movers. My treatment of these cases of ontologically primary actual being will be even more brief and sketchy than the non-substance cases of capacity possession and exercise or capacities and their exercise. A substantive discussion of primary eternal actualities, one that would take into account Metaphysics  and Physics then, would draw an odd comparison between the ‘higher’ telic status of exercise versus transitive capacity. We would expect, however, that the contrast should be made between the telic status of non-transitive and transitive capacity exercises, not between the telic status of transitive capacity and its exercise. In my interpretation, however, the contrast is drawn within transitive capacities themselves between the ultimate telic status of their distinct end-product and the reduced telic status of their exercise. This contrast serves as a way of tackling the objection that in the case of transitive capacities, because the exercise is not the ultimate telos, it cannot be ontologically prior to the capacity. Aristotle’s reply concedes that the distinct end-product of transitive capacities is the teleological bedrock (ŁÆ b  º ). It contends, however, that their exercise continues to be an intermediate telos, posterior to the end-product but prior to the capacity (ŁÆ b Aºº  º B ı  KØ). I am indebted to Brian Battiste for severe but constructive criticism which helped me clarify my view. I have also benefited greatly from discussions with David Charles on this point.

292

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

, would be the topic of another, separate study. My first aim, at present, is to show that [PIE] is overrated as a way of understanding the ontological priority of eternal actual beings over perishable things. Second, I shall suggest several tentative ways in which [PIB] might be viewed as faring better than [PIE] does even in these superlunary cases. This second part will inevitably be more allusive and promissory rather than fully argued for. The first source of doubt for [PIB] grows out of the way in which Aristotle introduces his inquiry into ontologically primary, eternal actual beings: But indeed actuality is prior in a more proper way too. For eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and nothing eternal is potentially [or: there is no potentially eternal being]. (Met. .8, 1050b6–8; Makin’s trans.)

There are two distinct ways in which to object to my view on the basis of this passage. First, one might concede that up to this point, in the first part of Metaphysics .8 (1050a4–b6), Aristotle has been deploying [PIB] to set out the ontological priority of sublunary actual beings over potential beings. Yet, it could be argued that the ‘more proper’ way of priority introduced in the second part of this chapter (1050b6ff.) is equivalent to the stronger, existential criterion of [PIE]. It is in this existential manner, then, that eternal actualities are ontologically prior to perishable beings. Alternatively, to support the argumentative unity of Metaphysics .8, one might think that in both parts of the chapter Aristotle operates with the same existential notion of ontological priority, [PIE]. His point, then, is that, while sublunary cases satisfy [PIE] in reduced or weak ways, eternal actual beings meet this condition unqualifiedly or more straightforwardly. There is no compelling reason, however, to adopt either of these two construals. Indeed, the immediate context of the passage just quoted suggests a different, more economical interpretation. Just before this passage Aristotle writes: In accordance with this argument it is evident that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality, and, as we said, one actuality always precedes another in time until that which is primarily bringing about change in each case. (Met. .8, 1050b3–6; Makin’s trans.)

The deficient character of the priority with which perishable actual beings are privileged over potential things consists precisely in the fact that there are further claimants in the sublunary world over and above actual beings. It is true that in the case of temporal priority, for instance, an immature organism, a potential being, is always preceded by a different mature individual of the same species, an actual being. Yet this sort of potential being is temporally prior to its future mature self, the actual complete organism that, if all goes well, it will develop into. Similarly, in the case of ontological priority it is the case that perishable actual beings constitute the final causes of, and so are ontologically prior to, the corresponding potential beings. These potential beings, however, are parts of the sublunary, perishable real-world and compete with actual beings for the title of ontological priority. More importantly, perishable actual beings

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

293

existentially depend on the corresponding potential beings, just as the latter depend for their existence on the former. In the superlunary region, by contrast, there are no contenders for the honorific title of ontological priority over perishable beings: for there are no potential eternal entities. It is only eternal actual beings, then, which can, and indeed are, ontologically prior to perishable things. Aristotle’s use of the term ‘more proper’ to characterize the type of ontological priority possessed by eternal actualities may be bringing out simply this point. Because there are no other candidates, such as potential eternal beings, eternal actualities are more straightforwardly ontologically prior to perishable entities, arguably in the manner of [PIB], the very same notion which applies to perishable actual beings. At any rate, the characterization ‘more proper’ by itself is not sufficient to undermine the plausibility of [PIB] in the second part of Metaphysics .8. Nor does it require that [PIE] is the single notion of ontological priority which is at work in this chapter as a whole. A different line of objection to [PIB], and an argument allegedly in favour of [PIE], might be derived from Aristotle’s insistence on setting out the ontological dependence of perishable beings upon eternal actualities in terms of contingency. Because they are necessary existents, it will be argued, eternal actualities are ontologically prior to the contingent existents that perishable beings are. Indeed, Aristotle explicates (it appears) ontological priority by reference to necessary existential dependence: Nor are any of the things which are of necessity [potentially] (and yet these are primary; for if these were not, nothing would be [or: nothing could be: Pb H K IªŒÅ Zø [sc. PŁb ı Ø Ø from 1050b16–17] (ŒÆØ ÆFÆ æHÆ· N ªaæ ÆFÆ c q, PŁb i q)]. (Met. .8, 1050b18–19; Makin’s trans.)

The proponent of [PIE] would conceive the eternal, imperishable actual beings examined at 1050b16–17 as being amongst the types of necessary being discussed in this passage. The conclusion would be, then, that eternal actualities are ontologically prior in the modal–existential fashion implied by the formula ‘if these were not, nothing could be’ introduced at 1050b19. If this is correct, the notion of [PIB] seems out of place in the second part of Metaphysics .8.26 It is not clear, however, whether [PIE] would be a charitable way in which to interpret Aristotle’s position. Suppose that the existential view is equivalent to the claim that, if perishable beings exist, necessarily eternal actualities exist (but not vice versa). Put differently, no perishable entities can exist unless eternal actualities exist (but not conversely). In section 11.2 I discussed the weaknesses of this modal–existential view by reference to Kit Fine’s criticism.27 This form of criticism, though, applies in

26

Charlotte Witt has raised this form of objection to my view of [PIB] in private communication. See Fine, K., ‘Ontological Dependence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, 1995, pp. 271–2, and ‘Essence and Modality’ in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Logic and Language (Philosophical Perspectives, 8), Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, 1994, pp. 4–6. 27

294

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

the present context too. There is no reason to prevent necessary existents such as numbers from playing the role of ‘imperishable eternal actualities’ which are ontologically prior to perishable beings. Let us assume the existence of any or even of all perishable beings taken together. It is then true that, if any/all perishable objects exist, necessarily numbers exist (but not conversely). The same holds in the case of necessary features: if any/all perishable beings exist, necessarily being F and not not-F or being self-identical exists (in them). Why favour eternal actual beings such as the Prime or the Planetary Movers as ontologically prior to perishable things, as opposed to these types of necessary existent, if [PIE] is Aristotle’s preferred view of ontological priority? More worryingly, it is doubtful whether [PIE] could secure the asymmetry condition implicit in the type of ontological priority that eternal actual beings enjoy over perishable objects. Hence, for instance, Aristotle holds that there is constant and eternal replenishment of members of sublunary species. He also maintains that the sublunary basic elements eternally transform into each other in a cyclical fashion. These are not just matters of fact but constitute necessities in the Aristotelian sublunary, perishable world. Using [PIE], then, we may conclude that, just as they depend for their existence on the necessary existence of eternal actualities, similarly eternal actualities, too, are existentially dependent on them. For, if any/all eternal actual beings exist, necessarily sublunary species exist (eternally) or necessarily sublunary elements exist (in eternal cyclical transformation). An even more acute case in which [PIE] renders asymmetry virtually unattainable could be derived from within the superlunary, imperishable region. It seems incontrovertible that, in Aristotle’s view, the Prime Mover is ontologically prior to all other eternal actual beings, such as Planetary Movers, celestial bodies, etc. Assuming [PIE], this implies that, if any/all of these ‘lesser’ eternal actual beings exist, necessarily the Prime Mover exists but not the other way about. It is also obvious, however, that Aristotle conceives these ‘lesser’ eternal actualities as necessary existents: for they just cannot cease to exist. Clearly, then, if the Prime Mover exists, necessarily any/all of the ‘lesser’ eternal actual beings exist. It follows that [PIE] cannot sustain the required asymmetry of the Prime Mover’s ontological priority over other eternal actualities. The thrust of these considerations is that the existential construal does not provide any grounds for privileging as ontologically primary the eternal actual beings that Aristotle takes as fundamental. It is no foregone conclusion, then, that [PIE] yields more successful results than [PIB] does in the second part of Metaphysics .8. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made against the plausibility of the modal–existential view. This, however, is not a positive argument in favour of [PIB]. The objection to this non-existential notion, at this juncture, would be that it is at variance with Aristotle’s obviously modal–existential formula ‘if these primaries were not, nothing could be’ (1050b19). What is the argument offered by the [PIE]-theorist, however, for the claim that Aristotle obviously endorses the modal–existential version of ontological priority? It is worth noticing that his present formulation is, once again, open as between [PIE] and

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

295

[PIB], just as his claim [IC] is at Metaphysics .11, 1019a3–4. He does not employ any strong terms, such as IÆØæEŁÆØ, which may entail elimination or going out of existence (cf. Met. .8, 1017b18–19; 21; Eudemian Ethics [EE] 1217b11–12). Rather, he uses forms of the weaker, neutral verb ‘to be’ (1050b19: q; i q), consistently with the term ‘being’ at Metaphysics .11, 1019a13 (r ÆØ). The formulation provided at Metaphysics .8, 1050b19, therefore, does not by itself rule out [PIB]. It is still open to us, if it is conceptually more plausible, to understand this formulation as equivalent to the claim that, if eternal actual beings were not as they essentially are, nothing could be what it is. Moreover, it is possible to conceive this modal claim as being based on the notion of identity-fixing or making something what it essentially is. Because eternal actual beings somehow determine the nature of perishable beings (but not conversely), they can be what they are without them but not the other way around. This would be in line with my view of [PIB] as being grounded on the notion of making something what it is. To flesh out this point, it is useful to examine the following passage taken from Metaphysics .8, which is usually offered as ‘proof ’ of the existential construal: What can fail to be is perishable, either without qualification or in that way in which it is said that it can fail to be, either in respect of place or in respect of quantity or quality; and without qualification is in respect of substance. So nothing that is imperishable without qualification is potentially without qualification (but nothing prevents its being so in a certain respect, for example, in respect of quality or location); so all [eternal things] are in actuality. (Met. .8, 1050b13–18; Makin’s trans.)

It is usually thought that being unqualifiedly (±ºH ) or being in respect of substance (e ŒÆ’ PÆ) presupposes the existential use of ‘to be’ as opposed to its predicative uses. Hence, a perishable entity without qualification or in respect of substance is one that can fail to exist, while an entity which is perishable in respect of (e.g.) quality is one which can fail to possess some quality or other. By contrast, an imperishable entity unqualifiedly or in respect of substance is one that cannot ever fail to exist, even if it might fail to have a certain quality or be at a particular location. This, however, need not be the sort of contrast that Aristotle intends. His claim is that the qualified cases of perishable being are non-substance cases such as (e.g.) location, quantity, or quality. Thus, for example, an object that is ‘perishable in respect of heating’ is one which is capable of heating but may fail to heat: for it may fail to initiate the relevant change in respect of temperature. A perishable being in respect of substance-type F, by contrast, is one which is capable of being F but may fail to be F. It is true that one of the several ways in which it may fail to be F is by ceasing to exist after passing-away. But this is not the only way in which this entity is perishable in respect of substance-type F. For this object might fail to be F without completely ceasing to exist as it may be an incomplete, abnormal, or defective case of F. Failure to exist, then, is too weak to capture the conceptual depth of failing to be in respect of substance. If this

296

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

is correct, it is more plausible to understand this last notion in terms of failing to be what something essentially is. This idea is also applicable to beings which are imperishable unqualifiedly or in respect of substance. These are entities which eternally are what they essentially are. In their case there is no room for failing to be the substance-type F that they are. It follows from this, to be sure, that they cannot fail to exist as F as they cannot cease to be F. This implication, however, does not require us to identify the inability to fail to exist with the inability to cease to be what something essentially is. The fundamental point is that imperishable beings eternally are F in actuality as they can never fail to be successfully or completely F. This is so even if an imperishable being, such as (e.g.) a celestial body, might be at one location but not another. To give a different example, the moon eternally is in actuality what it is to be the moon, even if one of its specific qualities can be replaced by another (e.g. it can be eclipsed but not full). It should be noted that Aristotle’s claim is not that, if perishable things are F, necessarily imperishable things are F (or G or whatever), while the converse is not the case. Rather, his position is that, while imperishable beings can never fail to be essentially what they are, perishable things can do so. This position does not directly describe the relation of ontological priority. Rather, it aims to elucidate the nature of imperishable beings as eternally actual entities. What it is to be an imperishable, eternal actual thing is for an entity eternally to possess successfully or completely its own essence. Aristotle’s remarks about ‘being unqualifiedly’ or ‘being in respect of substance’, then, do not require the notion of existing but can be equally well understood in terms of being what something essentially is. If so, [PIB] is a possible and coherent way in which to set out the type of priority possessed by imperishable entities, those which eternally are in actuality ‘without qualification’ or ‘in respect of substance’. We reach, at this point, the chief challenge directed against the possibility of generalizing [PIB] to cover eternal actual beings. This challenge cannot be dealt with simply by arguing that [PIB] is not incoherent or that Aristotle’s formulations leave conceptual space for this notion. Rather, the resolute opponent of [PIB] would find utterly implausible the claim that eternal actual being, its being what it is, is part of the nature of perishable beings but not conversely. It would be argued that the idea that eternal actualities determine the essence of perishable entities (but not vice versa) is nonsensical. Thus, for instance, there are many different types of essence belonging to sublunary, perishable substances, since there are many species of perishable substance. But what it is to be an eternal actual being does not make any of these essences the specific type of entity that it is. For, if this were so, sublunary, perishable beings would turn out to be, per absurdum, imperishable or eternal actual beings.28

28 Charlotte Witt and Brian Battiste have raised this type of objection and developed its ramifications in private communication. My view has been significantly clarified and improved with the help of their criticism.

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

297

There is no reason, however, to apply [PIB] to eternal actual beings in this monolithic fashion. A cautious supporter of this notion would not claim that any eternal actuality is part of the essence of any specific sublunary, perishable type of substance. Thus, for instance, it is not the case that being eternal, imperishable, or unfailingly actual determines the nature of (e.g.) being human. For no member of the human species is eternal or imperishable. Rather, the idea would be that eternal actual being, its being eternal or imperishable, fixes the generic identity of all sublunary species as species. There is no need to understand this universally quantified claim in a way which might suggest that eternal actualities enform a separate ‘global’ entity in its own right – the cosmos, the universe, or what have you – something that exists over and above all sublunary species and is rendered eternal or imperishable by (e.g.) the Prime or the Planetary Movers. A more parsimonious version of the universally quantified claim is that each and every sublunary species is, in so far as it is a species, eternal or imperishable as it cannot fail to be constantly replenished with new members. This is not equivalent to the view that each or every species has eternity written into each particular nature. Hence, it is not the case that the essence of (e.g.) the human species is to be a rational biped animal which is immortal or to be a certain type of organic body enformed by a specific sort of rational soul which is eternal. Rather, the human species itself, as well as each and every other sublunary species, is eternal or imperishable. Aristotle’s example given in Metaphysics .8 does not consider the case of sublunary species but that of sublunary, basic material elements: Things which are in change, too, such as earth and fire, imitate the things which are imperishable. For these too are always acting; for they have change both as such and in themselves. (Met. .8, 1050b28–30; my trans.)

The case of sublunary elements is similar to that of species in that eternity or constant actuality is part of their nature, too, in so far as they perpetually transform into each other in cyclical manner. This seems to be the import of Aristotle’s claim that they too are ‘always acting’ (1050b29: ŒÆd ªaæ ÆFÆ Id KæªE). Again, this does not imply that a particular pocket of (e.g.) fire or even fire in its entirety at a given cosmic stage is eternal or imperishable. Rather, the view seems to be that all elements as such and in their entirety – the total mass of fire, air, water, and earth – are imperishable and eternal. For, presumably, no quantitative loss results from the ceaseless elemental transformation. Nor is any of the different elements threatened with utter annihilation at some stage of this perpetual process. For each of them is replaced by another but eventually reappears in the eternal cycle of transformation. It seems plausible to think that this idea underlies Aristotle’s remark that the elements are engaged in this eternal cyclical transformation ‘in so far as they are elements’ and by ‘having this feature embedded in their nature’ (1050b30: ŒÆŁ’ Æa ªaæ ŒÆd K ÆE åØ c ŒÅØ). If this is correct, eternal actual beings could be ontologically prior to sublunary material elements in the manner of [PIB]. For part of what it is to be an element, the general

298

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

feature of being involved in eternal cyclical transformation, depends on the imperishability and eternal actual being of superlunary entities. The converse, though, does not hold good. There is a further way in which to deploy [PIB] in the superlunary, eternal region. Aristotle clearly maintains that the Prime Mover is ontologically prior to the Planetary Movers, the Heavenly Intelligences. As already pointed out, the modal–existential construal faces severe difficulties with this priority claim. The notion of [PIB], however, could overcome these difficulties rather neatly. The eternal and imperishable essence of the Prime Mover, its perpetual theoretical activity, determines the general nature of the Planetary Movers as such by making them engage in eternal circular locomotion. For, presumably, these Celestial Intelligences grasp the goodness of the Prime Mover’s nature and activity and desire to imitate it. Hence, they pursue this kind of life as their own telos, achieving it in a way peculiar to their nature, that of eternal circular motion. The goodness of the Prime Mover’s essence, then, can be conceived as the moving and final cause which determines the nature of the Heavenly Intelligences as eternal actual beings. It is in these particular causal roles that the Prime Mover discharges its identity-fixing function and qualifies as ontologically prior to the Planetary Movers in the manner of [PIB]. There is a serious gap in the present proposal. Perhaps the superlunary scenario just envisaged could support the claim that there is a causal relation between the Prime and the Planetary Movers, one that grounds the identity-fixing role and the ontological priority of the former over the latter. For, after all, the Planetary Movers are Intelligences that can somehow grasp the goodness of the Prime Mover’s nature and develop the intellectual desire to pursue it in their own way. But is there any corresponding causal relation between eternal actual beings and perishable things? If we return a negative answer to this question, the ontological priority of eternal actualities over perishable things would prove ungrounded. For without some underlying real-world relation of efficient, final, or material-grounding causation, eternal actual beings could not play the identity-fixing role inherent in the notion of [PIB]. Indeed, without any causal relation of this sort, it would be a matter of artificial stipulation to claim that eternal actual beings make perishable things what they are. There would be no basis for ruling out the view that the relation runs in the opposite direction. If the basis for [PIB] does not consist merely in arbitrarily regulating the relevant asymmetry, eternal actual beings should be ontologically primary by operating as specific types of cause of perishable beings. The starting-point for exploring how this might work is, presumably, Aristotle’s claim (made in the passage quoted last) that (e.g.) sublunary basic material elements imitate imperishable beings (Met. .8, 1050b28–9). It is crucial, then, to understand how the notion of imitation could be set out in concrete causal terms of efficient or final causation. It does not seem plausible, for instance, to suppose that (e.g.) sublunary elements or species as such somehow perceive or grasp the eternal nature, activity, or goodness of eternal actual beings and are moved to pursue

TEST CASES FOR ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

[PIB]

299

them as objects of desire.29 Inquiring into this issue, however, falls well outside the scope of the present study. It is sufficient, for our purposes, simply to underpin the possibility of employing [PIB] in the superlunary, imperishable region and to suggest ways in which this type of priority of eternal actual beings over perishable things could be understood. The notion of [PIB] proves, at any rate, more promising even in this area than what [PIE] is usually taken to be.

13.7 Conclusion: The Unity of Metaphysics .8 The wide variety of examples that Aristotle offers in Metaphysics .8 to clarify his view that actual being is ontologically prior to potential being gives rise to several difficulties. To overcome these difficulties, some commentators adopt what Stephen Makin calls a ‘splitting’ strategy. They argue that the notion of [PIE] is present only in the second part of the chapter, the one dealing with eternal actual beings (1050b6ff.), but not in the first teleological section (1050a4–b6). So understood, though, the chapter’s overall argument loses its uniformity.30 Others adopt a ‘non-splitting’ strategy and think that the same type of ontological priority is present throughout Metaphysics .8. However, they employ the existential construal. Hence, in order to understand Aristotle’s examples on the basis of [PIE], they either develop complex theories with several unnatural assumptions about coming-to-be and passing-away or restrict the existential priority claim to one holding between type-actualities and token-potentialities.31 My interpretation of Metaphysics .8 has the following advantages. First, it adopts a ‘non-splitting’ strategy and applies the same, ontological, type of priority in both parts of the chapter. The difference between my approach and that of other ‘non-splitting’ It is worth pointing out that Beere’s view of the second part of Metaphysics .8 would benefit immensely if he employed the same, non-existential notion of ontological priority as the one he operates with in understanding the first part of this chapter. Instead, he follows the modal–existential approach in which perishable beings could not exist unless imperishable, eternal actual beings existed (see Beere, ‘Priority’, p. 445ff.). Under the influence of this construal Beere reaches a conclusion which is less than perspicuous: ‘it is the eternal things that are responsible for there being any perishable things at all’ (p. 447). My present suggestion to use [PIB] in the case of eternal actualities could be used to clarify this claim in at least two ways. First, my emphasis on concrete causal relations which consolidate ontological priority could flesh out Beere’s metaphorical remark about the ‘responsibility’ of eternal beings. In my view, they would be responsible as formal causes, by making perishable beings what they are in specific modes of (e.g.) efficient or final causation. Second, their causal responsibility would not result in the mere existence of perishable beings (see Beere’s phrase ‘responsible for there being any perishable things at all’). Rather, they would determine general features within the nature of perishable beings, such as the species’ eternity or the elements’ eternal cyclical transformation. 30 Makin (‘Priority’, pp. 235–7) points out that the ‘splitting’ approach is followed by Ross, Metaphysics, vol. 2, pp. 262–5; Dancy, ‘Priority’, pp. 88–9; Burnyeat et al., Notes on Eta and Theta, unpublished ms., Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 1984, pp. 133–4 and 144. He also argues that this approach undermines the argumentative uniformity of Metaphysics .8. Beere’s view, published after Makin’s article, could also be characterized in terms of the ‘splitting’ strategy (see Beere, ‘Priority’, pp. 430–1 and 445). 31 A ‘non-splitting’ strategy is followed by Makin (‘Priority’, p. 237). Makin himself (p. 237) thinks that Witt (see her ‘Priority’) endorses a ‘non-splitting’ strategy too. As I noted, however, both develop their ‘nonsplitting’ strategies in terms of the problematic existential construal. 29

300

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

theorists is that, in my view, ontological priority is best interpreted as [PIB]. Second, my account is conceptually simple and straightforward as it does not involve giving a convoluted account of either Aristotle’s claims or his examples. It renders all different types of actual being ontologically prior to the corresponding potential beings in the manner of [PIB], without invoking problematic claims about existence. Third, it links the considerations invoked in Metaphysics .8 about teleology and coming-to-be with teleology and hypothetical necessity in processes of coming-to-be as described in Physics B.9 (199b34–200a30). In this way, one can make sense of not only the existential dependence of form, substance, and actual being upon matter, compounds, and potential being but also of the ontological priority, understood as [PIB], of the former over the latter. One can, then, see a uniform account at work in these different parts of Aristotle’s doctrine. In the light of this, it seems that the notion of [PIB] is not only significant and clear but also consistent with and true to Aristotle’s claims and examples.

14 Conclusion: Further Problems and Some Suggestions My account of ontological priority in terms of [PIB] seems to offer a unified approach to Metaphysics .11, Z.10, and .8. The motivation behind this account is the fact that one should be sensitive to the different ways in which different entities may qualify for ontological priority. In particular, a form cannot be ontologically prior to the beings Aristotle thinks it is (matter and compounds) if this relation is understood as [PIE]. It must be ontologically prior in some way, however, if it is to be a genuine substance. The notion of [PIB] provides the required solution to this puzzle. It seems impossible, by contrast, straightforwardly to accommodate the examples given in Metaphysics .11, Z.10, and .8 on the basis of the existential construal of Aristotle’s claim [IC] as formulated in Metaphysics .11, 1019a3–4. A further important feature of the present suggestion is that it posits a ‘match’ between the levels of definition and reality. Just as the definition of an essence or form, F, is the account of what it is to be F, correspondingly, ontological priority in the sense of [PIB] is the real counterpart to definitional priority. The crucial notion behind definitional priority is that of being defined or being understood in terms of some more basic concept, a notion formally represented by the relation of being a part of a dependent item’s definition. Analogously, the idea underlying [PIB] is that an ontologically basic entity is the fundamental part of what it is to be a posterior entity: for it makes an entity of this type what it is. Schematically speaking, my interpretation introduces the idea of an ontological hierarchy every level of which corresponds to a parallel level of a coordinate definitional or conceptual hierarchy. The items which are ‘higher up in rank’ are prior to those ‘lower down’ both in definition and in ‘being what they are’ but the converse is not the case. It is no necessary part of this sort of view to place more importance on either of the two orders. One could argue for the parallel between definitional and ontological priority without also favouring the one or the other as more basic.1 I argued, however,

1 Similarly, Kit Fine (‘Ontological Dependence’ [‘Dependence’], Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, 1995, p. 275) remarks that one can accept the connection between the definitional and ontological levels ‘without assuming that the account of dependence in terms of understanding [i.e. definition] is somehow more basic than the account in terms of essence’.

302

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

that Aristotle would presumably hold that the ontological order is more fundamental than the definitional one (see section 12.4). A definition is only an account, a linguistic or conceptual item that gains its importance because of its corresponding or referring to an ontologically primary entity, a form. A form is what makes things what they are and so it determines what the correct account is, the account which specifies what the thing in question is. The notion of ontological priority, then, has (at least in Aristotle’s view) a better claim to being basic than definitional priority does.

14.1 Substancehood, and the Status of Priority In modern discussions of Aristotelian definitional and ontological priority, these notions are set out as though they are ‘criteria’ or ‘requirements’ for being a substance.2 In most cases, interpreters employ this terminology without clarifying whether it is intended to capture Aristotle’s own view or whether it represents a philosophical assessment of these concepts, regardless of what Aristotle himself might have thought. It seems extremely hard, at any rate, to judge what his view would be as this issue is not (to put it mildly) in the forefront of his inquiry into substance. This question has not been addressed in the present study thus far, mainly because it is fairly separate from the project of understanding the notion of priority itself. In what follows my suggestion should not be viewed as a putative interpretation of any of Aristotle’s actual claims. Rather, I shall tentatively sketch (what I take as) a philosophically plausible, ‘Aristotelian’ or ‘Aristotle-inspired’ answer. There are at least three ways in which to understand talk of ‘criteria’ or ‘requirements’ as it applies to priority. First, priority might be conceived as a necessary condition which enables items to qualify as substances but is not itself an intrinsic part of substancehood. In this view, while priority is a significant concept – one which must be satisfied by any successful candidate for substancehood – yet it is not an essential component of what it is to be a substance. Hence, important though it may be, the task of setting out the notion of priority is only a prerequisite for understanding the more crucial concept of substance. Second, priority might be taken as a mark of, or test for, substancehood, a successful heuristic device used by us or metaphysical investigators such as ourselves to discover genuine substance-cases. The conceptual relation between this notion of priority and substancehood is even weaker than it was in the previous view. For, regardless of its epistemic value, this test of priority need not have any essential or even necessary involvement in the concept of substance itself. Rather, once we single out successful substance-cases on the basis of this test, we should engage in a further, separate study of substancehood in order to flesh out its own content. While the extensional results reached on the basis of our priority test may be helpful or even illuminating in this last 2 An extremely influential example would be Owen, G. E. L., ‘Particular and Universal’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79, 1978–1979, pp. 1–21 (at p. 3).

C O N C L U S I O N : F U RT H E R P RO B L E M S A N D S O M E S U G G E S T I O N S

303

endeavour, our proper grasp of substancehood is distinct from, and independent of, the priority test itself. Third, and more promisingly in my view, priority might be seen as an essential part of the notion of substance. In one version of this approach, definitional and ontological priorities, perhaps together with further concepts, such as unity and thisness (  Ø), exhaust the content of substancehood. This point could be cast in related semantic terms as follows: the term ‘substance’ just means the same as ‘a this, a prior, a unified, etc. item’. A more cautious version of this view would not subscribe to this last, strong claim, in which substancehood is taken as exhaustible by or reducible to priority, unity, thisness, etc. Rather, at the semantic level, the term ‘substance’ would be conceived as meaningful in its own right, independently of these theoretically charged notions. Perhaps, in this view, ‘substance’ means something like ‘primary reality’, ‘fundamental real-world entity’, ‘real ground for other beings’, etc. At the same time, though, the cautious approach would contend that an adequate theoretical understanding and a philosophically sound grounding of substancehood require a fuller grasp of notions such as priority, unity, or thisness. It should be pointed out that this last, cautious view resembles Aristotle’s own approach to scientific inquiry as set out in Posterior Analytics B.8–10. Assuming that it is legitimate to conceive Aristotle’s metaphysical inquiry into substance on the basis of the Analytics model, this result has several significant advantages. To examine the phenomenon of (e.g.) thunder, an inquirer uses his or her prior grasp of the signification of the term ‘thunder’ as ‘a certain type of noise’. Correspondingly, Aristotle’s starting-point is an intuitive, pre- or proto-theoretical understanding of what the term ‘substance’ signifies. Perhaps this understanding involves the notion of primary being as discussed by some of his predecessors or contemporaries. Thus, in the closing lines of the first chapter of Metaphysics Z, Aristotle insists that his question of what substance is coincides with the earlier problem of what being is (Z.1, 1028b2–7:  e Z and   PÆ). In subsequent stages of his inquiry, Aristotle seeks to discover successful or even promising candidates for substancehood, types of entity which are correctly or just usually taken as substances. The catalogue and discussion of promising substance-cases developed in Metaphysics Z.2 would be included amongst these stages. Towards the end of this chapter Aristotle draws the important distinction between putative cases of substance (1028b28:  Nd PÆØ) and the intensional question of what substancehood consists in (1028b32:  KØ). Not only will Aristotle be able to establish the existence of genuine substance-cases on the basis of extensional discussions such as that advanced in Metaphysics Z.2. More importantly, from these extensional results he can derive several important characteristics which are thought to belong to substance and might help in tackling the ‘what is substance?’ question, even if the initial reply to this question is only a brief and provisional outline (1028b31–2: ıøÆ Ø c PÆ æH  KØ).

304

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

Hence, some of the proposed characteristics may be crucial, intrinsic parts of substancehood. Others may be salient features of, or necessary prerequisites for, this notion. Equally, some may prove extraneous to it. Thus, for example, the list of the four important ways in which substance is said, adduced in the beginning of Metaphysics Z.3 (1028a33–6), might be seen as enumerating features of this type. Indeed, these four ways of substancehood – essence, universal, genus, and subject – structure the overall subsequent discussion in the rest of Metaphysics Z.3 In Posterior Analytics B.8 Aristotle argues that in the intermediate stages of investigation, in which the scientific inquirer seeks to establish the existence of a (type of ) phenomenon or thing, it is important to pursue grasp of ‘parts of the phenomenon or the thing itself ’. For without this sort of grasp, one could not establish (non-incidentally) the existence of anything. More importantly, one would be unable to proceed to the final stages of the inquiry, in which a (type of ) thing or phenomenon is understood in terms of its essence, the entity that causes it to be as it is (93a21–9). Thus, for instance, to prove the existence of thunder, one should grasp this phenomenon as a certain type of noise in the clouds. By establishing that this type of noise indeed belongs to the clouds, one acquires scientific knowledge of the thunder’s existence. Moreover, in this way one is in a position to achieve the ultimate goal of inquiry, to grasp what makes thunder the phenomenon it is by causing its being. In the present example, this would be the efficient cause of thunder, the quenching of fire in the clouds. Analogously, it could be argued, in his study of substance Aristotle seeks to ascertain whether any of the ‘four central ways of substancehood’, laid out in Metaphysics Z.3, constitutes a ‘part of the thing itself ’, an intrinsic component of substancehood. The discussion carried out in Metaphysics Z offers, arguably, hints of a positive answer to this question. Hence, one of the central conclusions is that primary substance is the essence or the form, the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ of each (type of ) thing or, more clearly, what makes each (type of ) thing what it is (Z.11, 1037a25–30; a33–b4: æÅ PÆ). Aristotle can build on these notions as they seem to be parts of substancehood itself. In this way, his search will advance into a fuller, satisfactory conception of the nature of substancehood as a whole. Ideally, at these final stages, the concepts of priority, unity, or thisness should prove indispensable in setting out the content of substancehood. They should correspond to what Aristotle calls the ‘cause’ or ‘middle term’ involved in scientific proofs (in the case of, for example, thunder this role is played by the quenching of fire in the clouds).

3

In outline: Metaphysics Z.3 treats subjecthood, Z.4–6 deal with essence, while Z.13–16 take up the universal. It has been argued that, while the genus is listed in Z.3, it does not receive any treatment later on or it is lumped together with the universal in the discussion of Z.13–16. It is not implausible, however, to think that Z.12 involves a substantive inquiry into genus as it raises the question of the unity of per genus et differentiam definition. On the other hand, Z.7–9 seem to digress from the list of Z.3 as they deal with form, matter, and compound in generation and production processes. Z.10–11, though, which immediately follow this alleged digression, re-introduce essence from Z.4–6 and re-examine it in the light of the discussion of form, matter, and compound carried out in Z.7–9.

C O N C L U S I O N : F U RT H E R P RO B L E M S A N D S O M E S U G G E S T I O N S

305

Thus, these concepts should function as substantive philosophical explanations which provide an adequate account of, and ground for, the notion of substance. It should be emphasized, at this juncture, that the present, tentative proposal is extremely schematic and highly speculative. It does, however, possess important merits. Not only is it consistent with Aristotle’s account of scientific investigation as described in the Analytics. More importantly, it offers an attractive way in which to preserve the conceptual distinctness and importance of separate Aristotelian notions such as those of priority and substancehood without reducing or eliminating the one in favour of the other. Thus, in this view, substancehood possesses its own basic content independently of more complex or demanding notions such as that of priority. At the same time, though, the cautious model posits a plausible explanatory link in which substancehood is set out and grounded on the basis of priority, presumably by additional reference to further, crucial notions such as those of unity and thisness.

14.2 Essential Interdependence and ‘Parts’ of the Form’s Essence In Part I of the present study I argued that natural form includes not only formal but also material features as parts of its essence. I also showed that Aristotle’s conception of the relation between formal and material parts within a form’s own essence is intrinsic ‘inextricability’ or ‘non-decomposability’. Within the form itself, its formal parts are essentially dependent on its material parts and conversely. As I remarked, this conception provides a powerful way in which to secure the internal unity of form. The relation of essential interdependence, however, undermines (it appears) the use of the term ‘part’ to label the formal and material items within a natural form’s essence. For these formal and material items are not specifiable without each other. Nor can they be what they are independently of each other. If so, it will be argued, they are not independent entities in any strong sense. They do not constitute separate real-world (types of ) objects or even distinct essential features or modes of being, what could be labelled ‘objective’ or ‘strong parts’. Hence, their characterization as ‘parts’, it will be concluded, is unjustified and potentially misleading. This is an important point. It does not, however, pose any insurmountable difficulties for my view. In earlier chapters I claimed that the form is a complex but unified feature or mode of being, one which accounts for the essence of the (types of ) objects it is the form of. As pointed out, its unity is mirrored in the link of essential inextricability which obtains between its formal and material constituents. This mirroring relation is based on the fact that the form is identical with the whole consisting of its formal and material components. None of these claims, however, requires any strong notion of ‘part’, ‘constituent’, or ‘component’. By contrast, these terms are used in reduced, weak, or loose senses. Let us employ these senses using the locution ‘aspectual’ or ‘weak parts’. A form’s essential formal and material weak parts are merely its

306

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

aspects, i.e. separately incomplete features or mutually interdependent modes of being included in it. They are not distinct or mutually independent objects or types of object. Nor are they even separate essential features or ways of being. For neither of them by itself can stand as a real-world entity in its own right. By no means, though, should we take this thesis as leading to the opposite extreme. Taken together, formal and material aspectual parts do not add up to a mere abstraction in thought. For as a whole they are numerically one and the same as the form, which is a real-world entity. The complex of formal-plus-material aspectual parts, then, as well as the form which is identical with this complex, is a feature or a mode of being that is part of the fabric of the world. It should not be confused with the types of item that abstract or mathematical forms are. To put it differently: while separately formal and material weak parts are mutually indissoluble aspects of a form, yet jointly they are identical with the unified real-world entity that this form is. This type of position, however, invites two serious questions. The first is about the type of composition that underlies this view of the form’s internal structure. It could be doubted whether two separately weak parts could ever give rise to the fundamental, real-world entity that the whole form is. Thus, one might object that regardless of the type or number of aspectual parts that may be put together, no objectively real entity could ever be generated. Rather, the outcome would always be a further item of ‘aspectual’ or abstract nature which could not serve the function of Aristotelian natural form. It is not a presupposition of my view, however, that natural form is to be constructed out of its formal and material weak parts through some type of ‘bottom-up’ mereological composition. Nor does my thesis imply that form is to be reduced to its formal or material aspectual parts. Form, by contrast, is conceived as a fundamental real-world entity in its own right. While it is identical with the relevant hylomorphic whole, its reality is not to be grounded on any of its aspectual parts or their manner of composition. Rather, its formal and material parts, taken separately, are our ways of grasping the essence of natural form. This sort of grasp presumably involves thought-abstraction and produces items which themselves are abstract. This precisely is the reason why a form’s formal and material ‘parts’ are weak or aspectual. Abstract items of this type are crucial in our understanding of the internal nature of form in scientific or metaphysical contexts. Thus, for instance, the natural scientist can study (e.g.) the human-form by conceiving it in a ‘split-up’ fashion, in terms of the contrast between being a rational soul and being embodied in the relevant kind of organic body. Similarly, the metaphysician can make theoretical claims about form by notionally distinguishing different segments within its essence and describing putative features of these segments. It does not follow from this, though, that these items are anything more than scientific or metaphysical abstract concepts with no counterparts in reality. This point brings us to the second question. If the form’s weak parts are conceived as mutually non-distinct and intrinsically interdependent aspects, what is the criterion with which to determine that some of them are ‘formal’, while others are ‘material’?

C O N C L U S I O N : F U RT H E R P RO B L E M S A N D S O M E S U G G E S T I O N S

307

Conversely, if the division between formal and material items is clear-cut and properly grounded, would it not be more plausible to understand them as distinct and independent entities or objective (as opposed to aspectual) parts within the form’s essence? In my view, by contrast, because formal and material aspectual parts are intrinsically interdependent, it is impossible to point to some of them as formal without also essentially involving the rest, those which are supposed to be material. If this is correct, it will be objected, the dissection of a form’s essence into formal and material aspectual parts proves arbitrary. In reply it should be recalled that, within a form’s own essence, the form-matter distinction involves our grasping the relevant items with the help of some sort of thought-abstraction. This does not entail that the whole form, consisting of formalplus-material aspectual parts, is itself an abstract item. Rather, the idea is that our picking up just one item within the form’s essence as formal and another as material is the result of our employing thought-abstraction. It is true that we can use the term ‘being a covering which prevents harm’ to point to the formal item included in the essence of the house-form. It does not follow from this, though, that this term by itself is a successfully referring expression, one that picks up a genuine real-world entity, a feature which is independent of the relevant material aspectual part, being made of bricks and stones arranged in a certain (house) mode. Rather, within a form’s definiens formula, formal as well as material terms are separately incomplete and fail to refer to any real-world entity without each other. One might ask, at this juncture, what the basis is for this abstract matter-form distinction within a form’s own essence. A tentative answer might model this distinction on the relation of (types of ) objects existing at initial phases of generation or production versus those obtaining at later or completion stages. Equally, the distinction between formal and material aspectual parts might be seen as grounded on the contrast between (types of ) objects occurring at later or completion stages of generation or production and those obtaining at later or final phases of corresponding processes of passing-away. An example of the relevant contrast would be that between bricks, stones, or wood at early stages of house-building or even before any house-building takes place and the complete house being constituted from bricks, stones, and wood arranged in the house-mode. Similarly, the complete house which obtains at later or completion stages of house-building can be contrasted with the ruins which exist at the end of this house’s demolition. The idea would be, then, that we abstract into formal aspectual parts using the criterion of analogy with or similarity to (kinds of ) objects such as the complete house being made of bricks, stones, and wood structured in the house-mode. By contrast, the type of thought-abstraction which yields material aspectual parts is conducted on the basis of analogy with or resemblance to (types of ) objects such as the house-ruins. To fill in the gaps inherent in this proposal, it would be necessary to specify more accurately the respects of analogy or resemblance between aspectual parts and the corresponding objects occurring at initial or final stages of the relevant processes. It is

308

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

sufficient for present purposes, however, to show simply that it is possible to grasp formal or material weak parts without requiring any corresponding objective parts within a form’s own essence. At the same time, though, this conception allows formal and material aspectual parts taken collectively to be identical with the form, the primary substance which is fundamentally real in Aristotle’s metaphysical picture.

14.3 The Scope of Ontological Priority and ‘Particular Versus Universal Form’ One might object to my formulation of [PIB] as it applies to form ‘on suspicion of scope vagueness’. I argued that a form F is ontologically prior to the compound Fs it enforms. This formulation, however, does not specify whether F is prior to all or some compound Fs. One could reply that it is implausible to take some compound Fs as posterior, others as prior. Thus, the claim would be that F is prior to all compound Fs. Even so, however, the wide scope is ambiguous between the collective (‘for all taken together . . . ’) and the distributive (‘for any given one . . . ’) senses. I avoided tackling this scope issue as it is directly dependent upon one’s approach to the debate of ‘universal versus particular form’. Hence, if one argues in favour of particular forms, one faces no scope problems: for a particular form is ontologically prior only to one compound substance, the one it exclusively enforms. If, by contrast, each form is universal, it could be ontologically prior either to all or some of its compound instances, in which case the discussion of the scope issue is urgent. To circumvent the ‘universal versus particular form’ controversy, I opted for the following neutral formulation: a form F is ontologically prior to the compound Fs it enforms. If F is particular, the class of compound Fs it enforms cannot have more than one member and so F is ontologically prior only to that one compound F. If, by contrast, F is universal, the class of compound Fs it enforms may have more than one member and the scope issue remains open. The deeper reason for avoiding the question of whether forms are universal or particular and for adopting a neutral stance on the scope issue is simple. The question of a form’s ontological priority over compound substances should not be sensitive to one’s approach to the problem of whether forms are particular or universal. Ontological priority is a criterion of asymmetric ontological independence of some type, one which must be fulfilled by forms, if indeed they are to qualify as primary substances. But forms should qualify for primary substancehood regardless of whether they are universal or particular. Consequently, the notion of ontological priority is to be understood independently of a form’s universality or particularity. This is so, despite the fact that the latter notions may, in some measure, influence some subsidiary aspect of the concept of ontological priority, such as the precise formulation of its scope.

C O N C L U S I O N : F U RT H E R P RO B L E M S A N D S O M E S U G G E S T I O N S

309

14.4 Ontological Priority and Modality A more important form of objection might stem from my comparison between Aristotle’s account of ontological priority and Kit Fine’s view of ontological dependence. My interpretation of Aristotelian priority complies with what Fine calls ‘the definitional approach to dependence’.4 Priority in ‘being what something is’ is the ontological parallel of priority in account or definition. In this way, one can avoid the difficulties arising from the existential construal of ontological priority claims. Fine’s account, however, has a further important component. He understands ontological dependence without invoking any modal notions of necessity or possibility. Indeed, he argues that these modal notions render the account of ontological dependence vulnerable to knock-down counterexamples.5 Aristotle’s formulation of [IC] in Metaphysics .11, 1019a3–4, though, brings in such modal notions: A is ontologically prior to B if and only if A can be without B but not conversely. Equivalently: B is ontologically posterior to A just in case, necessarily, A is if B is (while it is possible that B is not, if A is). Hence, even if Aristotle’s view could avoid the difficulties which undermine the existential construal, it would still face the problems that any modal account of ontological priority has to overcome. My interpretation of Aristotle’s view in terms of [PIB] followed his modal formulation of [IC]. Thus, A is ontologically prior to B in the manner of [PIB] in so far as A can be what it is without B being what it is, while B cannot be what it is without A being what it is. Although, in Metaphysics .11, Aristotle seems to adopt this modal approach, by no means is this his uniform practice in the Metaphysics. Indeed, his claims appear divided in this respect. In some passages he holds that ontologically prior items simply are (what they are) without others being (what they are) but not conversely. At other places, though, he remarks that the former can be without the latter but the latter cannot be without the former. Even in formulating definitional priority, Aristotle sometimes claims that the prior items can be defined or understood without the posterior ones (but not conversely) and sometimes that the former are defined or grasped without the latter (but not conversely). It is not vital, in my view, to determine whether the relevant passages favour modal or non-modal accounts.6 Rather, it is preferable to specify what, if any, aspects of See Kit Fine, ‘Dependence’, p. 275. Fine, ‘Dependence’, pp. 271–2. For example, in modal–existential accounts of ontological dependence, an item, A, turns out to be ontologically dependent upon its singleton set, {A}: for, necessarily, {A} exists if A exists. Our intuition, however, is that the relation of ontological dependence holds the other way about: it is the singleton, {A}, which ontologically depends on its member, A. Worse still, the modal–existential model seems to entail that the existence of any kind of entity depends on the existence of necessary existents such as numbers. Kit Fine’s example (‘Dependence’, p. 271) runs as follows: ‘given that [the number] 2 necessarily exists, it is necessarily the case that 2 exists if Socrates does.’ 6 The following passages seem to describe ontological or definitional priority in non-modal terms. Met. Z.10, 1034b30–2: fiH º ª{ ªaæ º ªÆØ K KŒø, ŒÆd fiH r ÆØ b ¼ı Iºººø æ æÆ; M.2, 1077b2–4: B fi b ªaæ PÆ fi æ æÆ ‹Æ åøæØÇ Æ fiH r ÆØ æººØ, fiH º ª{ b ‹ø ƒ º ªØ KŒ H º ªø; .8, 1017b17–21: Ø ‹Æ æØÆ Kıæå KØ K E ØØ ›æÇ  ŒÆd   Ø Å ÆÆ, z 4

5

310

ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY

Aristotle’s view – or of my interpretation of his view – could underpin the claim that the Aristotelian account is not open to the objections raised by Fine against the modal construal. Indeed, it seems that the modal component of the Aristotelian view can be taken as clearly derivative or secondary, even if not entirely dispensable. Thus, it is not an important part of this view to claim that some items can or cannot be (or be defined) without others. As I emphasized in the beginning of the present chapter, the basic idea behind ontological priority is that a fundamental entity makes some dependent entities what they are. The bedrock underlying priority in definition, on the other hand, is that a basic concept defines some derivative concepts. If so, no modal notions of possibility or necessity are required to enter Aristotle’s account of ontological or definitional priority. This is so, even if in some passages these modal notions do in fact play some explicatory role in unpacking ontological or definitional priority.7 What is important, however, is to determine what is conceptually basic in Aristotle’s theory. Judging by this standard, it seems that, in my interpretation, ontological and definitional priorities are fundamentally determined by considerations about what is a part of a thing’s essence, its being what it is, and its defining account respectively. It is in virtue of these considerations that certain modal claims are put forward. Thus, it is because Y’s essence or definition includes as a part X (where X is either a basic entity or a basic concept respectively) but not conversely that X can be or can be defined without Y but Y cannot be or cannot be defined without X. If so, such modal claims are secondary or derivative: for they depend on the basic notions of making something what it is (identity-fixing) and of being a part of a concept’s definition respectively. This result seems consistent not only with Fine’s approach to ontological independence but also with his more fundamental account of essence. As he argues, the concept of necessity is ‘inappropriate for understanding the concept of essence’, although any essentialist claim (of the form ‘x essentially is F’) will entail some necessary

IÆØæı ø IÆØæEÆØ e ‹º, x  KØ ı H Æ, u çÆ Ø , ŒÆd K ªæÆ B · ŒÆd ‹ºø › IæØŁ e ŒE r Æ ØØ ØF (IÆØæı ı  ªaæ Pb r ÆØ, ŒÆd ›æÇØ Æ); .11, 1018b34–6: ŒÆd ŒÆa e º ª b e ı ÅŒe F ‹ºı æ æ, x  e ıØŒe F ıØŒF IŁæı· P ªaæ ÆØ › º ª ‹º ¼ı F æı ; contrast, however, the immediately subsequent claim at 1018b36–7 which involves modal notions: ŒÆ Ø PŒ K åÆØ ıØŒe r ÆØ c Z ıØŒF Ø . By contrast, ontological and definitional priorities are spelt out in modal terms in the following passages. Met. Z.10, 1035b22–5: F b s ı ºı æ æÆ ÆF’ Ø u , Ø ’ ‰ h (Pb ªaæ r ÆØ ÆÆØ åøæØÇ Æ· P ªaæ › ø åø åıº Çfiı, Iºº’ › ı  › Ł (contrast the non-modal claim made in the same chapter at 1034b30–2, quoted above); .11, 1019a3–4: ‹Æ K åÆØ r ÆØ ¼ı ¼ººø, KŒEÆ b ¼ı KŒø ; Z.1, 1028a35–6: IªŒÅ ªaæ K fiH Œı º ª{ e B PÆ KıæåØ. In Met. Z.5, 1030b23–6, we encounter both modal and non-modal ways of clarifying definitional priority: ÆFÆ ’ Kd K ‹Ø æåØ j › º ª j h Æ y Kd F e Ł , ŒÆd c K åÆØ źHÆØ åøæ , uæ e ºıŒe ¼ı F IŁæı K åÆØ Iºº’ P e ŁBºı ¼ı F Çfiı. 7 In this respect my interpretation is different from and preferable to Makin’s approach which – alongside the problematic existential construal – takes the modal element to be basic in Aristotle’s account of ontological priority and crucial for understanding this account as applied to (e.g.) Metaphysics .8. Makin argues that ‘in order to establish a conclusion about priority in substance we have to think about possibilities – whether it is possible for there to be Fs without Gs or not’ (Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Y, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 193; Makin’s emphasis).

C O N C L U S I O N : F U RT H E R P RO B L E M S A N D S O M E S U G G E S T I O N S

311

truth. For the latter type of truth is not primary or basic, since it is true in virtue of an object’s identity, its being what it is, but not the other way about.8 Indeed, some of Aristotle’s own formulations seem to favour this view of essence by taking the notions of making something what it is or of being a part of a concept’s definition as basic and as the source of any relevant modal claims. Thus, for instance, in the context of clarifying a certain type of per se attribute, Aristotle writes: These are those [attributes] in which there occurs either the account or the name of that of which they are attributes, and it is not possible to explicate such things without this, as, e.g., the white may be explicated without the man, but the female cannot be explicated without the animal. (Metaphysics [Met] Z.5, 1030b23–6; Bostock’s trans.)

This passage, arguably, grounds the modal claim that the definition of (e.g.) being female cannot be formulated without mentioning the type animal or without including the definition of animal (but not conversely) on the definitional-essentialist claim that the defining formula of the former includes as a component the name or the account of the latter. If this is correct, Aristotle has the resources with which to demarcate his own position from rival accounts that set out the concept of (definitional or ontological) priority in fundamentally modal terms.

See Kit Fine, ‘Essence and Modality’ in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Logic and Language (Philosophical Perspectives, 8), Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, 1994, pp. 8–9. 8

Appendix 1

Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b28: ÆNŁÅe or ÆNŁÅØŒe? In section 5.1 I discussed Aristotle’s diagnosis of the misleading analogy that Socrates the Younger used to draw between mathematical entities and natural forms such as being human: But the two cases are not similar [or: are not the same]; for the animal is a certain type of perceptible entity, and it is not possible to be defined without reference to change, nor, therefore, without reference to its [material or bodily] parts being in a certain state. For it is not a hand in any and every state which is part of the human, but the one which can fulfill its function, so the one which is ensouled [or: living]; if it is not ensouled, it is not a part of the human [e ’ På ‹ Ø· ÆNŁÅe ªæ Ø e ÇfiH, ŒÆd ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ, Øe P’ ¼ı H æH Kå ø  . P ªaæ ø F IŁæı æ  åæ, Iºº’  ıÆ Å e æª IºE, u  łıå sÆ· c  łıå b P æ ] (Metaphysics [Met.] Z.11, 1036b28–32; Bostock’s trans.)

Several commentators wish to emend the manuscript reading ÆNŁÅe (‘perceptible’) at 1036b28 into ÆNŁÅØŒ  (‘capable of perception’). The considerations adduced as reasons for this emendation could be summarized as follows: (a) In their commentary on Metaphysics Z, Frede and Patzig argue that the essence of (e.g.) the human form does not include as parts a certain type of body or the relevant bodily organs. Rather, they think, these types of matter are ‘internally’ (but not essentially) related to this form: for it is impossible to separate in thought these types of matter from that form. This last, internal (as they call it) relation between form and certain types of matter, however, does not imply that the definition of the human form must mention these types of matter. Rather, this definition should only imply that this form must be embodied in these types of matter. In their view, then, the term ÆNŁÅØŒ , as part of the definiens-formula of the human form, would simply imply that this form must be enmattered, without bringing straightforwardly material terms into the definiens-formula.1 I pointed out some of the weaknesses of this line of argument in sections 5.5 and 7.3. (b) While ÆNŁÅ  could not, without considerable difficulty, give rise to the claims made at 1036b29–32, ÆNŁÅØŒe could easily yield all these claims.

1 See Frede & Patzig, Aristoteles ‘Metaphysik Z’, Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich, 1988, ad loc. 1036b28ff.; also cf. Frede, M., ‘The Definition of Sensible Substances in Met. Z’ in D. Devereux & P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique chez Aristote, Paris, 1990, p. 117.

APPENDIX

1

313

(c) If ÆNŁÅe implies simply being material, Aristotle’s qualifications Kå ø  (1036b30), P . . . ø (b30) and  ıÆ Å e æª IºE (b31) become irrelevant as characterizations of bodily parts (b30: H æH).2 For, if being perceptible is equivalent to being material, it would be sufficient to define forms of perceptible natural objects, such as the human form, simply in terms of bodily parts, without specifying the state or function of these parts. By contrast, ÆNŁÅØŒe makes all these characterizations crucially relevant. For the bodily parts mentioned in the definition of the human form are ‘in a certain state’ or are ‘capable of successfully performing their function’ precisely in that they are capable of sense perception: these æÅ are (essentially) ÆNŁÅØŒ. Indeed, the supporters of the emendation might add, this point has already been made at Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b16–18: [ . . . ] at least, if each [bodily] part [of such living bodies] is properly defined, it cannot be defined without its function, which it cannot have without sense perception [ŒÆ ªF e æ Ka ›æÇÅÆØ ŒÆºH , PŒ ¼ı F æªı ›æØEÆØ, n På æØ ¼ı ÆNŁø ]. (my trans.)3

This passage clearly suggests that the bodily parts of living or animate beings (1035b14: H Çfiø; 15: F K łåı; 16: fiH ØfiH  ÆØ) are defined in terms of the successful performance of their relevant sense-perception functions. A similar point (it will be argued) is made in Metaphysics Z.11, in Aristotle’s remark about the human form. This form is ÆNŁÅØŒe and so the bodily parts mentioned in its definition are also identified on the basis of their state or function as ÆNŁÅØŒ.4 2 This seems to be the source of the remark made by Ross (Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 2, p. 203) that Aristotle’s claim that the human form is a type of perceptible (i.e. material) entity renders Kå ø  ‘really irrelevant’. 3 As I noted in section 13.1, Jaeger brackets e æ at 1035b16–17. One of his reasons is, presumably, that not every bodily part of a ÇfiH or an  łıå H Æ is defined in terms of sense perception. Thus, for instance, it would be (at least) odd to define in this way bones, viscera, hair, the heart, or the brain (the last two are mentioned at 1035b25–7). Jaeger, then, takes each living body (ÇfiH or  łıå H Æ) to be definable in terms of sense perception as this function would be the essential feature which differentiates ÇfiHÆ from other ensouled beings such as plants. I agree with Ross that the manuscript reading is preferable. To reply to Jaeger’s challenge that not every bodily part of living beings is capable of sense perception, it is important to exercise caution in determining the reference of the phrase ŒÆ e æ at 1035b16–17. The only example of bodily parts of living beings that Aristotle offers in the immediate context (1035b3ff.) is that of the finger (b10–11; 24). If so, we could take ŒÆ e æ as referring to the finger and each (or every) bodily part like the finger. It is plausible, however, to think that bodily parts of this sort indeed are ultimately definable in terms of sense perception, just as 1035b16–18 argues. For, presumably, the finger and every part like it are capable of performing the function of (at least) the sense of touch. This way of fixing the reference of ŒÆ e æ makes good sense of 1035b25–7 too. For, when Aristotle wishes to refer to types of æÅ different from the finger, or different from bodily parts like the finger, æÅ which (presumably) are not ultimately definable in terms of sense perception, he has the resources with which to signal that he is dealing with special cases. The heart and the brain are such special cases (1035b25: ØÆ b), bodily parts which are ŒæØÆ (b25) or K fiz æH{ › º ª ŒÆd  PÆ (b25–6). Hence, the parenthetical statement made at 1035b16–18 need not be completely unbounded. The claim would be not that every bodily part of animals (including organs like the heart or the brain) is definable in terms of sense perception but, rather, that every bodily part like the finger is definable in such terms. Keeping the manuscript reading ŒÆ e æ is, therefore, more plausible than Jaeger’s proposal to delete e æ . 4 Consideration (c) provides the grounds for the general claim (b). Both points seem to be Irwin’s reasons for favouring the reading ÆNŁÅØŒe; see Irwin, T. H., Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 245 and 569, n. 39.

314

APPENDIX

1

As I noted in section 5.1, this emendation does not seem necessary. Nor is it as plausible as it is usually taken to be. The main reasons for favouring the reading ÆNŁÅe against the proposed ÆNŁÅØŒe (apart from the obvious point that it is not an emendation but is the manuscript reading) are as follows: (i) The reading ÆNŁÅe, together with the rest of the claims made at 1036b28–32, parallels important passages in Metaphysics E.1 and Physics B.2. First, at Metaphysics E.1, 1025b30–1026a6, Aristotle argues that natural forms are like snubness and so essentially involve perceptible types of matter.5 I have already examined this passage extensively in section 5.2. Here is a brief outline of the points which are relevant to present concerns:  1025b32–4: e b Ø e ıغŠ Kd a B oºÅ [ . . . ]  b Œغ Å

¼ı oºÅ ÆNŁÅB . This passage indicates that snubness and things like it essentially include perceptible types of matter, a claim which seems to correspond to the occurrence of ÆNŁÅe at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b28.  1026a2–3: PŁe ªaæ ¼ı ŒØø › º ª ÆPH [sc. H çıØŒH; cf. 1025b34– 1026a1: N c Æ a çıØŒa › ø fiH Ø fiH º ªÆØ], Iºº’ Id åØ oºÅ. This remark shows that Aristotle is addressing the question of what is included in the essence of natural form or/and what is mentioned in its definition (1026a3: › º ª ). Further, the phrase PŁe ¼ı ŒØø at 1026a2–3 parallels the phrase ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ used at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b29, which is introduced immediately after the manuscript reading ÆNŁÅe at 1036b28. The idea would be that, just as in Metaphysics E.1 a B [sc. ÆNŁÅB ] oºÅ at 1025b33–4 implies PŁe ¼ı ŒØø at 1026a2–3, similarly in Metaphysics Z.11 ÆNŁÅe at 1036b28 implies ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ at 1036b29.  1026a5–6: ŒÆd æd łıåB KÆ ŁøæBÆØ F çıØŒF, ‹Å c ¼ı oºÅ K. This important statement suggests that the natural entities Aristotle is discussing in Metaphysics E.1 are not only compounds but also forms, such as being a certain type of soul. These types of natural form, as well as the compounds enformed by them, are essentially ‘not without perceptible sorts of matter’. Second, at Physics B.2, 193b35–194a7, a passage treated in detail in chapter 4, Aristotle holds that natural entities, unlike mathematical objects, cannot be defined without reference to change.  194a4–7: [ . . . ] Ø b IæØŁ e ŒÆd ªæÆ c ŒÆd åB Æ, ¼ı ŒØø , aæ b ŒÆd OF ŒÆd ¼Łæø [i.e. a çıØŒ; cf. 193b36] PŒ Ø, Iººa ÆFÆ uæ Þd Ø c Iºº’ På ‰ e ŒÆ º º ªÆØ.

5 This parallel with Metaphysics E.1 is supported by Jennifer Whiting (correctly, in my view) in her criticism of Frede’s & Patzig’s interpretation of Met. Z.11, 1036b28–32. See her ‘Metasubstance: Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth’, The Philosophical Review, 100(4), 1991, p. 630. Whiting’s aim, however, is not to argue in favour of ÆNŁÅe or against ÆNŁÅØŒe (see p. 627, n. 38).

APPENDIX

1

315

After drawing the distinction between mathematical and natural entities (193b36–194a1: a ªaæ çıØŒa åøæÇıØ w ZÆ åøæØa H ÆŁÅ ÆØŒH), this passage argues that in defining natural beings (194a2: Y Ø ŒÆ æø [sc. H çıØŒH and H ÆŁÅ ÆØŒH] ØæfiH º ªØ f ‹æı ) one must mention change (194a5–6: ¼ı ŒØø [ . . . ] PŒ Ø). Again, this agrees with Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b28–9, where natural forms, qua ÆNŁÅ, must be defined in terms of change (1036b29: ¼ı ŒØø PŒ Ø ›æÆŁÆØ). (ii) These parallel passages outside Metaphysics Z.10–11, however, might not carry sufficient weight against the supporters of the emendation. To make the case for ÆNŁÅe stronger, it is important to examine the context of Metaphysics Z.10–11. Even in this contextualist methodological spirit, however, there is no compelling reason to agree with considerations (b) or (c) just outlined that ÆNŁÅe entails simply being material. Thus, ÆNŁÅe need not imply that the definition of (e.g.) the human form mentions certain types of bodily or material item without any further, formal, functional, or telic characterization. By contrast, ÆNŁÅe may indicate that the bodily or material features involved in the essence of entities such as the human form are identifiable by additional reference to successful performance of the relevant functions: for these features are essentially form-plus-matter involving. If so, they are not solely material but are also åÆ 

or ı Æ e æª IºE (1036b30–1). More generally, as I argued in section 5.1, the material items included in the essence of an ÆNŁÅe form are not purely material, formless features, such as having hands, legs, eyes, etc. Rather, these features also involve intrinsically and inextricably formal, functional, or telic characteristics, such as being sensory organs capable of sight, being extremities capable of locomotion, etc. Just as a natural form’s formal parts, its material parts, too, are essentially and non-decomposably hylomorphic. If so, the manuscript reading of 1036b28 would suggest that the human form is defined as ÆNŁÅe and as PŒ ¼ı ŒØø in that it essentially involves features such as having bodily parts in certain states, material parts which are thus-and-so enformed or capable of performing their relevant functions. (iii) Taking into account the wider context of Metaphysics Z.10–11, it seems that the argument advanced at Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b16–18, makes a different point from that brought out at Z.11, 1036b28. For the earlier passage deals with the definition of bodily parts such as fingers, hands, etc. (1035b10–11: Œıº ). Thus, the definitional ‘chain’ under discussion in that passage runs as follows: (1) (i) finger and the like æÅ: (ii) PŒ ¼ı F æªı (1035b17); (iii) PŒ ¼ı ÆNŁø

(1035b18). Clearly, feature (iii) is equivalent to being ÆNŁÅØŒe. The passage at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b28–32, by contrast, takes up the definitional chain from a slightly prior stage: (2) (i) human form: (ii) ÆNŁÅe (1036b28); (iii) PŒ ¼ı ŒØø (1036b29); (iv) h’ ¼ı H æH (1036b30); (v) æÅ which are åÆ  or ı Æ e æª IºE (1036b30–1). It is worth noting, at this point, that these definitional chains should be treated with caution. As I pointed out in section 5.1, it is not clear whether Aristotle maintains that items such as (1ii) or

316

APPENDIX

1

(1iii) are parts of the finger’s essence. Nor is it obvious that features such as (2ii)–(2v) are themselves mentioned in the definiens-term of the human form. Aristotle might be simply evoking evidential grounds which help us structure correctly the corresponding definitions, requirements which are epistemically useful for us or definers like us. Even if (1) and (2) are intended as definitional statements, however, it is implausible to think that terms such as ‘capable of functioning properly’ or ‘capable of sense perception’ are parts of the successful defining formula of (e.g.) the finger. For such terms are just too generic to decribe the essence which is peculiar to any particular type of finger. Let us, then, adopt the weakest possible interpretation, in which the definitional chains just codified describe requirements which a definer must fulfil in order to discover the correct definitions. Hence, for instance, to define successfully a certain type of finger, a definer must consider the feature of being capable of functioning properly (1ii) and, ultimately, being capable of sense perception (1iii). To shape the correct definition of human form, on the other hand, it is necessary to inquire into features such as perceptibility (2ii), changeability (2iii), having bodily parts (2iv), and, in particular, bodily parts which are in certain states or are capable of fulfilling certain functions (2v). It is clear from these formulations that, while (1) focuses on certain types of bodily part, (2) deals with the human form, which essentially involves these types of bodily part. If so, the first chain, (1), starts at stage (2iv) of the second. This does not imply that there is any inconsistency between the two chains. For, in both cases, the definition of bodily parts (such as the finger) should be sought by reference to their æª and, more specifically, their having ÆYŁÅØ or their being ÆNŁÅØŒ. There is, however, a difference of focus between the two chains. While (1) views bodily parts as capable of performing the function of sense perception, (2) categorizes the human form as ÆNŁÅe. Being ÆNŁÅe, in turn, implies that a specific link, (2iv), further down the chain, is occupied by bodily parts described – consistently with (1ii) and (1iii) – as åÆ  or ı Æ e æª IºE. This last feature, if fleshed out, would presumably be equivalent to their being ÆNŁÅØŒ. In the light of this, the passage at Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b16–18, does not offer any cogent support for the reading ÆNŁÅØŒe at Z.11, 1036b28, even if it suggests that certain types of bodily part are themselves ÆNŁÅØŒ. For the subject-matter of the passage at Metaphysics Z.11, 1036b28–32, is not these types of bodily part but the human form itself. As ÆNŁÅe, this form essentially involves certain ÆNŁÅØŒ types of bodily part but is not itself considered as ÆNŁÅØŒe. The two passages, then, become more clearly consistent and mutually complementary if we preserve the manuscript reading ÆNŁÅ  at 1036b28.

Appendix 2

Textual and Interpretative Issues in Metaphysics .11, 1019a1–14 [i] 1019a1–4 a b c oø º ªÆØ æ æÆ ŒÆd oæÆ, a b ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ, ‹Æ K åÆØ r ÆØ ¼ı ¼ººø, KŒEÆ b ¼ı KŒø ·fi w ØÆØæ Ø KåæB —ºø. I take the notion of ontological priority to be introduced by the phrase a b ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ [º ªÆØ æ æÆ ŒÆd oæÆ] at 1019a2–3. This notion is explicated by the claim ‹Æ K åÆØ r ÆØ ¼ı ¼ººø, KŒEÆ b ¼ı KŒø  made at a3–4, which I labelled as [IC]. [ii] 1019a4–7 Kd b e rÆØ ººÆåH , æH b e Œ  æ æ, Øe  PÆ æ æ, ØÆ ¼ººø a ŒÆa Æ Ø ŒÆd ŒÆ’ Kº åØÆ· In [i] the notion of ontological priority is understood in terms of [IC], while [IC] includes rÆØ as a crucial constituent. Thus, since a4–5 introduces the familiar Aristotelian claim that e rÆØ ººÆåH [sc. º ªÆØ similarly to the º ªÆØ at a2?], it follows that ontological priority and [IC] are distinguished according to the relevant ways of rÆØ: r ÆØ as subject and r ÆØ as potential and actual being. If so, Aristotle can introduce the three corresponding types of priority: type (a) of subjects; (b1) in respect of potential being; and (b2) in respect of actual being. John Cleary (Senses, p. 47) argues (contra Ross who thinks that a4–6 just introduces the distinction between subject/substance and non-substance categories) that the Øe at 1019a5 shows that Aristotle argues from the priority criterion to the priority of subjects and from this to the priority of substance. I rather think that Aristotle’s fundamental assumption is the multiplicity of the ways of r ÆØ. On this assumption, plus the notion of ontological priority and [IC], Aristotle derives the type of ontological priority that belongs to subjects. However, since substances must be subjects of some type, he then infers the notion of the ontological priority of substances. [iii] 1019a7–11 a b ªaæ ŒÆa Æ Ø æ æ KØ a b ŒÆa Kº åØÆ, x  ŒÆa Æ Ø b   ØÆ B ‹ºÅ ŒÆd e æØ F ‹ºı ŒÆd  oºÅ B PÆ , ŒÆ’ Kº åØÆ ’ oæ· ØƺıŁ  ªaæ ŒÆ’ Kº åØÆ ÆØ. The participle ØƺıŁ  at a10 is in the singular genitive and refers back to the examples in the same grammatical case at a9–10: B ‹ºÅ , F ‹ºı, and B PÆ . Accordingly, the subject of ŒÆ’ Kº åØÆ ÆØ at a10–11 must be an understood ÆFÆ which refers back to the nominatives   ØÆ, e æØ, and  oºÅ.

318

APPENDIX

2

There is no need to understand or supply æ æÆ after ŒÆ’ Kº åØÆ ÆØ at a10–11. However, even if one did so, my interpretation would not face any difficulties. Without æ æÆ, my interpretation implies that ‘they’, the remnants or cut-off parts, are actualized as remnants or cut-off parts, after the passing-away of a complete whole; if so, they are ontologically prior to a whole in respect of potential or incomplete being. With an understood æ æÆ, my view entails that ‘they’ are prior in respect of actual being to a whole as actual remnants or cut-off parts. As I noted in section 10.3, however, the second option, even if possible, seems far-fetched: it is effectively equivalent to the first option but unorthodox in expression. [iv] 1019a11–14 æ   ØÆ Æ a æ æ ŒÆd oæ ºª Æ ŒÆa ÆFÆ º ªÆØ· a b ªaæ ŒÆa ª Ø K åÆØ ¼ı H  æø r ÆØ, x  e ‹º H æø, a b ŒÆa çŁæ, x e æØ F ‹ºı. › ø b ŒÆd pººÆ. I agree with Cleary (Senses, p. 47) that, in order to understand this section, one should first remove the brackets which Ross and Jaeger add at a4 before Kd and at a11 after ÆØ. A first reason for this suggestion is that the example given at a13–14, e ‹º H æø and e æØ F ‹ºı, is identical with one of the examples mentioned in the bracketed text (a9). Second, Aristotle maintains that things are prior or posterior to one another ŒÆa ª Ø and ŒÆa çŁæ (a12; a13–14). But passing-away is also mentioned in Ross’s and Jaeger’s bracketed text (a10: ØƺıŁ  ). These two points suggest that .11’s conclusion in [iv] is closely connected (at least) with [iii], the last section of their bracketed text. If so, one should delete the brackets and seek to understand [iv] in the light of [iii]. I take Æ a æ æ ŒÆd oæ ºª Æ at a11–12 as referring back only to a ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ [æ æÆ ŒÆd oæÆ] at a2–3. The main reason for this is that the type of priority mentioned at a11–12 is set out at a12–14 in terms of the claim K åÆØ ¼ı [ . . . ] r ÆØ which is clearly equivalent to [IC] at a3–4. Hence, just as at a3–4 [IC] clarifies the ontological type of priority (ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ), so too at a12–14 it explicates Æ a æ æ ŒÆd oæ ºª Æ as an ontological type of priority. If so, Æ a æ æ ŒÆd oæ ºª Æ refers back only to priority ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ at a2–3 but not to all types of .11’s priority. If the reference were to Metaphysics .11 as a whole, the claim would be that all types of .11’s priority can be reduced to or expressed in terms of ontological priority. This, however, would be an overambitious claim in need of some clarification, something which Aristotle does not offer in this context. Ross (Metaphysics, vol. 1, p. 318), by contrast, takes Æ a æ æ ŒÆd oæ ºª Æ as implying that ‘all senses of ‘prior’ can be reduced to that named in l. 3, ‹Æ K åÆØ r ÆØ ¼ı ¼ººø, KŒEÆ b ¼ı KŒø ’. Similarly, Kirwan (G, D & ¯, p. 156) holds that the aim of [iv] is to reduce all types of .11’s priority to priority in respect of ‘these last’ (in naturesubstance or in potentiality and actuality?), even though Aristotle does not specify how this can be achieved. Cleary (Senses, p. 51) also argues that all types of .11’s priority can be reduced to or expressed in terms of priority in nature or substance, sometimes with the help of the distinction ‘in respect of potentiality’–‘in respect of actuality’. In my interpretation, the phrase ŒÆa ÆFÆ (a12), after the removal of the parentheses, does not refer back to ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ in [i] but to ŒÆa Æ Ø and ŒÆa Kº åØÆ in [iii]. To paraphrase: ‘in a way, all ontologically prior or posterior things, which do or do not (respectively) satisfy [IC], are so according to these last notions (ŒÆa ÆFÆ, i.e. ŒÆa Æ Ø and ŒÆa Kº åØÆ just analysed in [iii]); for some can be without others in respect of generation,

APPENDIX

2

319

while the latter can be without the former in respect of destruction’ (a12–14). The underlying connection between actual being and generation and between potential being and destruction has already been introduced implicitly through ØƺıŁ  at a10. So understood, the argument advanced in [iii]–[iv] implies that there is a systematic connection between ontological priority in respect of potential and actual being and priority in respect of destruction and generation respectively, a connection which I set out in section 10.3. A schematic way in which to represent textually this systematic connection would run as follows: a b ªaæ [ŒÆ’ Kº åØÆ] ŒÆa ª Ø K åÆØ [ . . . ], a b [ŒÆa Æ Ø] ŒÆa çŁæ [K åÆØ . . . ] (a12–14). Just as Æ a æ æ ŒÆd oæ ºª Æ at a11, so too the phrase › ø b ŒÆd pººÆ at a14 does not, in my interpretation, refer back to all types of .11’s priority. I think it is more plausible to take › ø b ŒÆd pººÆ as ranging only over the types of a ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ [æ æÆ] discussed at 1019a1ff. If so, this phrase should, in the first instance, be conceived as generalizing over the rest of the examples at a8–10: ‘what obtains in the whole–part example also holds good in the other examples (› ø b ŒÆd pººÆ), those of the line–segment and the substance–matter’. At the same time, however, › ø b ŒÆd pººÆ should be seen as also generalizing over the type of ontological priority which belongs to subjects and substances (a5–6: what I called ‘type (a)’ ontological priority). For, in my view of the claim made at 1019a11–12, all ontologically prior and posterior items discussed at a1–11 (Æ a [ŒÆa çØ ŒÆd PÆ] æ æ ŒÆd oæ ºª Æ), which do or do not (respectively) satisfy [IC], can be understood ŒÆa ÆFÆ, in terms of this last distinction between ŒÆa Æ Ø and ŒÆa Kº åØÆ. In particular, the ontological priority of subjects (discussed at a5–6) can be set out on the basis of priority ŒÆa Kº åØÆ. Further, since this last notion is parallel to priority ŒÆa ª Ø, it follows that priority of subjects–substances can also be understood in terms of priority ŒÆa ª Ø.

Bibliography Ackrill, J. L., Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione [Categories], Oxford University Press, 1963. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, Vol. 1 of Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Reimer, Berlin, 1891. Annas, J., Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books M and N [M & N ], Oxford University Press, 1976. Balme D. M., ‘Aristotle’s Biology Was Not Essentialist’ and ‘The Snub’ in Gotthelf & Lennox (eds.), Biology, 1987, pp. 291–302, 303–12. Barnes, J., Aristotle: Posterior Analytics [Analytics], Oxford University Press, 1994. Barnes, J., Schofield, M., & Sorabji, R. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle, 1: Science, Duckworth, London, 1975. ——Articles on Aristotle, 3: Metaphysics, Duckworth, London, 1979. Beere, J., ‘The Priority in Being of Energeia’ [‘Priority’] in Crubellier et al. (eds.), Dynamis, 2008, pp. 429–56. Berti, E. (ed.), Aristotle on Science: The ‘Posterior Analytics’, Antenore, Padua, 1981. Bolton, R., ‘Essentialism and Semantic Theory in Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, II, 7–10’, The Philosophical Review, 85, 1976, pp. 514–44. Bostock, D. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H [Z & H ], Oxford University Press, 1994. Bottani, A., Carrara, M., & Giaretta, P. (eds.), Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics [Individuals], Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 2002. Burnyeat, M. F., ‘Archytas and Optics’, Science in Context, 18(1), 2005, pp. 35–53. ——A Map of ‘Metaphysics’ Z, Mathesis Publ., Pittsburgh, 2001. Burnyeat, M. F., et al., Notes on Eta and Theta, unpublished ms, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 1984. ——Notes on Z [Z ], unpublished ms, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 1979. Chalmers, D., Manley, D., & Wasserman, R. (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology [Metametaphysics], Oxford University Press, 2009. Charles, D. (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy [Definition], Oxford University Press, 2010. ——‘Definition and Explanation in the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics’, in Charles (ed.), Definition, 2010, pp. 286–328. ——‘Aristotle on Desire and Action’ in D. Frede & B. Reis (eds.), Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2009, pp. 291–308. ——‘Aristotle’s Psychological Theory’ [‘Psychological’], Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 24, 2008, pp. 1–30. ——‘Some Comments on Prof. Enrico Berti’s “Being and Essence in Contemporary Interpretations of Aristotle” ’, in Bottani et al. (eds.), Individuals, 2002, pp. 109–26. ——Aristotle on Meaning and Essence [Meaning], Oxford University Press, 2000. ——‘Metaphysics L.2: Matter and Change’ [‘L.2’], in Frede & Charles (eds.), Lambda, 2000, pp. 81–110. ——‘Aristotle: Ontology and Moral Reasoning’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, IV, 1986, pp. 145–67. Charlton, W., Aristotle’s ‘Physics’ I, II [Physics], Oxford University Press, 1970.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

321

Cleary, J., Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority [Senses], The Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series, 1988. Code, A., ‘The Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Metaphysics Z’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol., 10, 1984, pp. 1–20. Corkum, P., ‘Aristotle on Ontological Dependence’ [‘Dependence’], Phronesis 53, 2008, pp. 65–92. Correia, F., Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions [Dependence], Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 2005. Correia, F. & Schneider, B. (eds.), Because, Cambridge University Press, 2011. Crubellier, M., Jaulin, A., Lefebvre, D., & Morel, P.-M. (eds.), Dynamis: Autour de la puissance chez Aristote [Dynamis], Editions Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve-Paris-Dudley, MA, 2008. Dancy, R. M., ‘Aristotle and the Priority of Actuality’ [‘Priority’], in Knuuttila (ed.), Chain, 1980, pp. 73–115. Demoss, D. & Devereux, D., ‘Essence, Existence, and Nominal Definition in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II 8–10’, Phronesis, 33, 1988, pp. 133–54. Devereux, D. & Pellegrin, P. (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique chez Aristote [Biologie], Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1990. Ferejohn, M., ‘The Definition of Generated Composites in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’ in Scaltsas et al. (eds.), Unity, 1994, pp. 291–318. Fine, G., ‘Separation: A Reply to Morrison’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3, 1985, pp. 159–65. ——‘Separation’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 1984, pp. 31–87. Fine, K., ‘Ontological Dependence’ [‘Dependence’], Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, 1995, pp. 269–90. ——‘Essence and Modality’ [‘Essence’] in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Logic and Language (Philosophical Perspectives, 8), Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, 1994, pp. 1–16. Frede, M., ‘The Definition of Sensible Substances in Met. Z’ [‘Definition’] in Devereux & Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, 1990, pp. 113–29. ——Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1987. Frede, M. & Charles, D. (eds.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum [Lambda], Oxford University Press, 2000. Frede, M. & Patzig, G., Aristoteles ‘Metaphysik Z’ [Metaphysik], 2 vols., Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich, 1988. Gill, M. L., Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity [Substance], Princeton University Press, 1989. Gotthelf, A. & Lennox, J. G. (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology [Biology], Cambridge University Press, 1987. Grene, M., ‘Is Genus to Species as Matter to Form? Aristotle and Taxonomy’, Synthese, 28, 1974, pp. 51–69. Hamlyn, D. W., Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’, Books II, III, Oxford University Press, 1968. Hare, J. E., ‘Aristotle and the Definition of Natural Things’, Phronesis, 24, 1979, pp. 168–79. Hicks, R. D., Aristotle: De Anima, Cambridge University Press, 1907. Hintikka, J., ‘On Aristotle’s Notion of Existence’, The Review of Metaphysics, 52, 1999, pp. 767–805. ——‘The Varieties of Being in Aristotle’, in Knuutila & Hintikka (eds.), Logic, 1986, pp. 81–114.

322

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hintikka, J., Remarks on Praxis, Poiesis and Ergon in Plato and Aristotle’, Annales Universitatis Turkuensis Sarja, Series B, Osa-Tom, 1973, pp. 53–62. Irwin, T. H., Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford University Press, 1988. Kirwan, C., Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Books G, D and E [G, D & E ], Oxford University Press, 1971. Koslicki, K., ‘Varieties of Ontological Dependence’ in Correia & Schneider (eds.), Because, 2011. Knuuttila, S. (ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being [Chain], D. Reidel, Dordrecht/Boston/ London, 1980. Knuuttila, S. & Hintikka, J. (eds.), The Logic of Being [Logic], D. Reidel, Dordrecht/Boston/ London, 1986. Lennox, J. G., ‘ “As if We Were Investigating Snubness”: Aristotle on the Prospects for a Single Science of Nature’ [‘Snubness’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 35, 2008, pp. 149–86. Loux, M. J., Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ Z and H, Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, 1991. Lowe, E. J., The Possibility of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 1998. ——‘Ontological Dependency’, Philosophical Papers, 23(1), 1994, pp. 31–48. Mabbott, J., D., ‘Aristotle and the OPISOS of Plato’, Classical Quarterly, 20, 1926, pp. 72–9. Madigan, A., Aristotle: ‘Metaphysics’, Books B and K 1–2, Oxford University Press, 1999. Makin, St., Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Y [Y], Oxford University Press, 2006. ——‘What does Aristotle Mean by Priority in Substance?’ [‘Priority’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 24, 2003, pp. 209–38. Matthews, G. B., ‘Aristotelian Essentialism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50, Supplement, 1990, pp. 251–62. Maudlin, T., ‘Substances and Space–Time: What Aristotle Would Have Said to Einstein’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 1990, 21, pp. 531–61. Mckirahan, R. D., Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science [Principles], Princeton University Press, 1992. ——‘Aristotle’s Subordinate Sciences’ [‘Subordinate’], British Journal for the History of Science, 11(3), 1978, pp. 197–220. Moravcsik, J. M. E., ‘Strawson and Ontological Priority’ in R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy: Second Series, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 106–19. Morrison, D., ‘Some Remarks on Definition in Metaphysics Z’ [‘Definition’] in Devereux & Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, 1990, pp. 131–44. ——‘Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’ [‘Separation’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3, 1985, pp. 125–57. ——‘Separation: A Reply to Fine’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3, 1985, pp. 167–73. Mueller, I., ‘Physics and Astronomy: Aristotle’s Physics II.2 193b22–194a12’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 16, 2006, pp. 175–206. Owen, G. E. L., ‘Particular and Universal’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79, 1978–1979, pp. 1–21. Panayides, Ch., ‘Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality in Substance’ [‘Priority’], Ancient Philosophy, 19, 1999, pp. 327–44. Peramatzis, M. M., ‘Essence and Per Se Predication in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.4’ [‘Essence’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 39, 2010, pp. 121–82.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

323

——‘Aristotle’s Notion of Priority in Nature and Substance’ [‘Priority’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35, 2008, pp. 187–247. Rorty, R., ‘Matter as Goo: Comments on Grene’s Paper’, Synthese, 28, 1974, pp. 71–7. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s ‘Prior’ and ‘Posterior Analytics’ [Analytics], Oxford University Press, 1949. ——Aristotle’s ‘Physics’ [Physics], Oxford University Press, 1936. ——Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ [Metaphysics], 2 vols., Oxford University Press, 1924. Scaltsas, Th., Substances and Universals in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1994. ——‘Substratum, Subject, and Substance’, Ancient Philosophy, 5, 1985, pp. 215–40. Scaltsas, Th., Charles, D., & Gill, M. L. (eds.), Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ [Unity], Oxford University Press, 1994. Schaffer, J., ‘On What Grounds What’ in Chalmers et al. (eds.), Metametaphysics, 2009, pp. 347–83. Spellman, L., Substance and Separation in Aristotle [Separation], Cambridge University Press, 1995. Strawson, P. F., Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Routledge, London, 1959. Tlumak, J., ‘Cross-Categorial Priority Arguments’, Metaphilosophy, 14, 1983, pp. 32–9. Wedin, M. V., Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: The ‘Categories’ and ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta, Oxford University Press, 2000. Whiting, J. E., ‘Metasubstance: Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth’ [‘Metasubstance’], The Philosophical Review, 100(4), 1991, pp. 607–39. ——‘Form and Individuation in Aristotle’ [‘Form’], History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3(4), 1986, pp. 359–77. Witt, Ch., Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics [Ways], Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, 2003. ——‘The Priority of Actuality’ [‘Priority’], in Scaltsas et al. (eds.), Unity, 1994, pp. 215–28. Woods, M., ‘The Essence of Human Being and the Individual Soul in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z and H’ in Scaltsas et al. (eds.), Unity, 1994, pp. 279–90.

This page intentionally left blank

Index Locorum Alexander of Aphrodisias In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria 460.36–461.11: 245n12, 251n21 Aristotle Categories 2b3–6: 230, 234 2b7–14: 247n14, 247n15 2b29–37: 247n14, 247n15 3a37–9: 247n14, 247n15 3b2–4: 247n14, 247n15 3b13–23: 247n14, 247n15 4a10ff.: 245n12 14a26–9: 251–2 14a29–35: 12n12, 235, 14b10–22: 241–2, 244 Posterior Analytics 71b33–72a5: 164n10 72a18–24: 210 75a41–2: 190n23 75a42–b2: 190n22 75b4: 70n18 75b12–17: 70n18 76a4–13 70n18 76a37–b2: 190n23 76a38–9: 190n23 76b14–15: 190n23 76b3–13: 190n22 77a10–12: 189n21 77a22–5: 189n21, 190n23 77b1–2: 70n18 79a6–10: 67 81b24–9: 245n12, 243n10 83a1–32: 243n10 83a4–14: 245n12 87a33–4: 70n18 89b32–5: 210 89b38: 210 89b39–90a1: 210 90a2–5: 210 90a15–18: 182n13 90a32–4: 210 93a14–28: 210 93a23–4: 11 93a29–b7: 182n13 93b7–14: 181 93b21–6: 27 93b38–94a7: 181 94a20–2: 180 94a24–36: 180

Topics 141b3ff.: 29 Sophistici Elenchi 181b25–6: 123 181b26–7: 124 181b34–5: 128 181b35–182a6: 123 181b37–182a3: 52n12 Physics 192b12–193a1: 153 193a9–17: 141 193a28–30: 154 193b3–5: 102n9, 154, 263 193b22–194a12: 76, 77, 96 193b31–5: 70–4 193b31–194a7: 61 193b33–5: 71 193b35–194a7: 74 194a4–7: 314 194a12–15: 111 194a27–33: 117 194a29ff: 117n21 194b8–9: 117 194b9–13: 111, 115 198a24–6: 118 199b34–200a30: 300 200a7–29: 133–4, 283–5 200a15–30: 283n19 260b15–19: 205n2 De Anima 402b16–25: 135 403a8–10: 109 403a10–16: 85, 106 403a10–28: 103 403b14–19: 86 403b17–19: 103 408a30–b18: 159 408b18–29: 161n8 408b20–22: 114n20 417b6–7: 159 Historia Animalium 498a31–b4: 273–4n4 Metaphysics 988a10–11: 208 988b4–6: 208 991a8–11: 78 991b1–9: 79 992b1–9: 81

326

I N D E X L O C O RU M

Aristotle (cont. ) 1003a21–2: 171 1003a31–2: 171 1017a18–19: 220 1017a19–30: 219 1017a35–b9: 220, 222 1017b13–14 & 23–4: 219–20 1017b17–21: 206, 207, 309n6 1018b14–9: 250, 251n21 1018b34–7: 310n6 1019a1–4: 204, 230, 231–2, 234, 310n6, 317 1019a4–8: 219, 317 1019a7–14: 223, 317–9 1023a35–b2: 53 1025a30–4: 135 1025b3–4: 171 1025b25–1026a6: 99, 314 1026a31–2: 171 1028a18–20: 238–9 1028a22–4: 239 1028a25–7: 239 1028a28–9: 239 1028a29–30: 239 1028a31–4: 231, 240, 245n12, 249 1028a34–6: 24, 28, 310n6 1028b36–1029a2: 195n27 1029a5–10: 195n27, 248n17 1029a26–30: 248n17 1029b13: 40n2 1030b23–6: 310n6, 311 1030b30–1031a1: 123n25 1032b11–14: 40 1032b30–1033a5: 41 1033b26–1034a5: 83, 116n21 1034b20–8: 42 1034b28–32: 270 1034b30–2: 24, 26, 309n6 1034b32–1035a4: 43 1035a4–9: 45 1035b4–22: 270 1035b4–11: 24, 25 1035b9–17: 46 1035b11–22: 30 1035b16–18: 313, 315 1035b21–5: 272, 310n6 1035b27–30: 30 1035b30–1: 30 1036a2–9: 34 1036a8–9: 36 1036a9–12: 95, 147 1036a26–31: 44 1036a31–b13: 57, 115 1036b22–32: 92, 312

1037a10–17: 163 1037a21–33: 50 1037a26–9: 34 1037a27: 36 1038a5–9: 54, 193n25, 277n9 1038a18–30: 54, 193n25, 277n9 1039b23–7: 48n6 1041a6–10: 182 1041a14–20: 189 1041a27–30: 183, 187 1041b5–9: 184 1042a24–31: 102n9, 263 1042a32–b6: 141, 149n3 1043b10–14: 185, 193 1044b6–8: 149n3 1046a9–28: 155–6 1050a4–23: 279 1050a10–13: 286–7 1050a23–b2: 288 1050b3–6: 292 1050b6–8: 292 1050b13–18: 295 1050b18–19: 293 1050b20–2: 149n3 1050b28–30: 297 1069b3–9: 140 1069b24–6: 149n3 1071a13–16: 116n21 1075a11–15: 252 1077a24–31: 251n20, 279n13 1077a36–b11: 256 1077b2–4: 24, 218n2, 253, 309n6 Nicomachean Ethics 1103a26-b23: 2 1105a26–33: 2 1145a6–11: 2 1177b24–31: 162n8 1178b21–3: 162n8 Eudemian Ethics 1217b1–16: 253 1217b2–15: 213 1217b10–12: 206, 207, 212, 295 1240b38–1241a14: 275 Politics 1253a18–26: 2 Plato Phaedo 100d: 79n30 Republic 509b6–10: 207, 252–3

General Index abstractability 59–64, 70–4 abstraction 64–70, 70–4, 260–2, 262–5 actual being as form and substance 278–86 as prior 278–99 employment/exercise of capacity 286–8, 288–91 imperishable 291–9 priority in 223–6 asymmetry 176–8, 215–16, 225–7, 235–8, 240–3, 294 and separation/separateness or separability 25, 204, 217–18, 256 and ‘without each other’ (¼ı Iºººø) or non-symmetry 275 intra-definiens 110–22, 176–82, 190–1, 195–200 capacity exercise/employment of 286–91 non-transitive/intransitive 288–9 possession of 286–8 transitive 289–91 change and explanation 152–62 and Platonist Forms 77–84 in a form’s essence 152–7 compounds definition of 178–9 indefinable 34–7 particular and universal 30–2 definition causal-explanatory model of 180–8, 188–95 interest-relative views of 170–2 pragmatic views of 170–2 errors in reasoning 70–4, 75, 84, 89, 96, 114, 173 essence and existence 208–10 and final, efficient, material-grounding causation 186–8, 265–9 and modality 309–11 and necessity 133–5 as formal causation 183, 266–7 existence and essence 208–10 dependence in 49, 84–9, 105–6, 281–5 interdependence in 283n19, 287n24

first philosophy versus second philosophy/physics 162–7 form natural versus mathematical 64–70, 70–4, 260–5, 275–7 particular versus universal 176, 220n2, 308 hyper-formality and hyper-materiality 56–9, 74, 91–9, 135, 138, 148 identity 4–6, 31, 178–9, 199–200 imitation and causation 297–9 indissolubility 120, 127, 130–1, 151 inextricability 122–32, 185–6, 198–200, 305–8 irreflexivity 27–30, 199 matter accounting for natural change 143–52 ambiguity of the term ‘matter’ 10, 173 and change 139–43, 143–52, 152–7 and explanation 157–62 as particular/universal subject 142–3, 190–1, 194–5 as prior in potential being/destruction/ passing-away 49, 227–8, 272–4, 274n5 definable or indefinable 32–7 of form 53–4 proximate–remote 173–6, 227n8, 274n5, 283 token-/type- 45–9, 120–2, 135–7, 178–9, 190–5 method Aristotelian 16–17 Neutrality of 17–19 modal-existential view/model of dependence/ independence/priority 12, 17, 233–6, 240–2, 244, 286n22, 293–9, 309–11 modality 12, 14, 24, 203, 309–11 modes/ways of being 3–6, 40–2, 178–9, 195–200, 222–3, 305–8 multiple realisation 150–1 nature 152–7 necessity 18, 150, 186, 235n3 and priority 12, 309–11 grounded on essence 133–4, 188–91 hypothetical 134, 283–6, 300 neutrality/openness of ‘being’ (~NÆØ) formulations 204–6, 211, 256, 271–2, 294–5 non-decomposability 10–11, 123, 129–31, 176, 305–8

328

GENERAL INDEX

parts aspectual/weak 305–8 objective/strong 305 Platonism/Platonists 39–40 and change 77–84 and mathematical form 74–7 and priority 206–8, 213–16, 252–3 and separation/separateness/separability 74–7, 78–81, 217–18 potential being as matter 278–86 capacity 288–91 capacity possession 286–8 priority in 49n9, 222–4, 226–7, 272–4, 274n5 prior in actual being/generation/coming-to-be 223–4, 225–6 in definition and in being/ontologically 255–60, 265–9 in potential being/destruction/passing-away 223–4, 226–8, 272–4, 274n5 in seniority/rank 206–8, 206n6, 251–3, in time 208–9, 231, 231n1, 249–53, 278–9, 282–3

psychic functions and affections 103–10, 158–61 Pythagoreans/Pythagoreanism 58, 60, 91–2, 135–6, 148 separability 59–60, 70–4, 84–9 separation 12n2, 49, 57–9, 60–4 and asymmetry 25, 217–18, 218n2, 256 in definition 25, 70–4, 263–4, 265n8 unqualifiedly (±ºø ~ ) 262–5, 264n7 snub/snubness 46–7, 75–7, 99–102, 111–15, 122–32 soul and mathematical items 84–9, 99–102 as natural form 103–10, 157–62 subject/subjecthood 219–22, 238–41, 244–8 arguments 139–40 subordinate sciences 60n4, 62n5, 62n6, 64–70 substrate 191, 195, 245 substratum 71n20, 140–8, 191–5 teleology 116–22, 130–2, 136–7, 251, 251n20, 279–80, 282–6, 287, 290–1, 299–300 transitivity 25–7, 43n4 tropes 236–8

Index Nominum Ackrill J. 241n8 Alexander of Aphrodisias 184n17, 245n12, 251n21 Annas, J. 257 Antipho 141 Balme D. 132n33 Barnes J. 68n15 Beere J. 286n22 Bostock D. 36n5, 236n5, 271n1 Burnyeat M. F. 62n6, 236n5, 271n1, 275n6, 277n9, 299n30 Charles D. 60n3, 71–2, 140n1, 140n2, 149n3, 169n1, 172n7, 188n20, 210n11, 291n25 Charlton W. 71n20, 114, 236n5 Cleary J. 204n1, 205n6, 208n9, 220n1, 227n8, 258n2, 279n14, 317, 318 Code A. 245n12 Corkum P. 235n4, 241n8, 243n11, 247n15 Correia F. 17–19 Dancy R. M. 280n15, 299n30 Fine G. 217n1 Fine K. 12, 14, 208, 234, 286n22, 293, 301n1, 309–311 Frede M. 50, 58n2, 134, 171, 312, 314n5 Gill M. L. 236n5, 248n17 Grene M. 194n26 Hicks R. D. 86n36, 159n6 Irwin T. H. 313n4 Kirwan C. 12n12, 101n8, 274n5, 318 Koslicki K. 1n1

Lennox J. G. 62, 64–5, 114, 122n24, 129–32, 155n4 Makin St. 12n12, 206n5, 278n10, 279n11, 279n14, 280–1, 285n21, 299, 310n7 Maudlin T. 236n5 Mckirahan R. D. 62n6, 65n10, 67n14, 69n17 Morrison D. 169–71, 217n1 Mueller I. 60n4 Owen G. E. L. 302n2 Panayides Ch. 12n12, 205n2, 282n18 Patzig G. 58n2, 134n35, 134n37, 312, 314 Peramatzis M. M. 40n2, 164n9, 235n4, 243n10, 286n22 Plato 204, 206–208, 212, 215, 252–3 Rorty R. 194n26 Ross W. D. 12n12, 52n12, 60n4, 68n15, 75, 79n30, 86n36, 98n6, 100n7, 102n9, 111n16, 114, 114n19, 116n21, 124n26, 124n27, 159n6, 183n14, 183n15, 185n19, 249n18, 257–8, 271n1, 277n9, 299n30, 313n2, 313n3, 317, 318 Schaffer J. 1n3, 1n4 Socrates the Younger 8, 58, 73n24, 90, 92–6, 99, 134–6, 312 Spellman L. 12n12, 217n1, 264n7, 265n8 Wedin M. V. 271n2 Whiting J. E. 58n2, 134–5, 173–6, 314n5 Witt Ch. 12n12, 279n11, 279n14, 281–2, 293n26, 296n28, 299n31