Principles of Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the Knowledge System 981198882X, 9789811988820

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Binggong Chen

Principles of Subjective Anthropology Concepts and the Knowledge System

Principles of Subjective Anthropology

Binggong Chen

Principles of Subjective Anthropology Concepts and the Knowledge System

Binggong Chen School of Marxism Jilin University Changchun, Jilin, China Translated by Xianming Liu Jilin University Changchun, China

A. Blair Stonechild First Nations University of Canada Regina, Canada

This work was supported by Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences (19WKSB002). ISBN 978-981-19-8882-0 ISBN 978-981-19-8883-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7 Jointly published with Social Sciences Academic Press The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: Social Sciences Academic Press. © Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Subjective Anthropology and the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2 Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . 1 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research Object of Anthropology and the Resultant Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Discipline System of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research Object of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Excursion of the Research Object and Discipline System of Anthropology and the Harm Done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Mission of Anthropology and an Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Historic Mission of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 An Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . 3.1 The Concept of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Concept of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Research Objects of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Significance of the Construction of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . 4.1 Providing Rational Frameworks and Methods for Man’s Knowledge About Himself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Furnishing Humanity with Rational Knowledge He Can Use to Be Master of His Destiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Laying the Foundation of Anthropology’s Transition from the Borderline Discipline to the Mainstream One . . . . . . . .

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4.4 Providing the Humanities and Social Sciences with Original Premises on Which to Fathom the Mysteries of Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Providing a Theoretical Basis for the Discipline in Order for Chinese Anthropology to Rank Among Its Global Peers . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Theoretical Foundation and Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Theoretical Foundation of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 World Outlooks of Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Marx’s Theory of Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Marxist Theory of Human Beings (or Marxist Human Theory) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Marx’s Thoughts on Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 How Modes of Thinking Hitherto Known to Humankind Hamper Pioneering Efforts to Unravel the Noumenon of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The “Triple Transcendence” and “Three Levels” of Human Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Essence of Human Life: Practical Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Man’s Practical Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Conception of Practice as the Essence of Human Life . . . . . 1.2 Practice Furnishes the Key to Helping Us Understand the Great Complexity of Human Life and Unravel the Essence of Human Life Shrouded in Mystery . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Marx’s Practical Theory Provides the Fundamental Principle for Our Understanding of the Noumenon of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Man’s Real Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Basic Implications of the Marxist Theory About “The Actual or Real Man” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Essence of “Real Man” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Deeper Understanding and Further Exploration of the Theory on “Real Man” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Human Subject’s Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Definition and Category of the Human Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Man’s Subjectivity and Its Manifold Manifestations . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Definite Values Appropriate to Definite Kinds of Human Subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Man’s “Dual Life” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Implications of Man’s “Dual Life” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4.2 The Multiple Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 4.3 The Unity of Man’s “Dual Life” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 5 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . 1 The Noumenon of Human Life: From “Dualism” to “Duality” . . . . . . 2 Chinese and Foreign Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Ancient Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Modern Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Several Theoretical Patterns About the Ontology of Human Life . . . . 3.1 “Man Is Created by God” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 “Man Is a Living Creature” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 “Man Is a Rational Creature—That Is, Man Is Endowed with Reason” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 “Man as a Creature of Culture” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Synchronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Static Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Dynamic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Diachronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Formative Process of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Developmental Stages of the Noumenon of Individual Human Life—An Individual Human Being’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Dualistic Unity of Man’s “Structure and Choice” in a State of Mutual Dependence—The Noumenon of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . 7 The Unique Human Characteristics and Functions of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . 7.1 The Unique Human Characteristics of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Functions of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Comments on Two Types of Ontology of Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 A Critical Commentary on Sartre’s Existentialism . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 A Critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” Preparing Certain Theoretical Prerequisites for Human Studies . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6 Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Concept of Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Origin and History of the Term “Personality” . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Concept of Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 A Description of Personality Based on the Theory of “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A Critical Commentary on Classical Theories of Personality . . . . . . . 2.1 The Ancient Chinese and Western Theories of Personality . . . . . 2.2 The Freudian Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Karen Horney’s Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Maslow’s Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Kurt Lewin’s Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Personality Structure: The Concept, Characteristics and Functions . . 3.1 The Concept of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Characteristics of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Functions of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Basic Structure of Human Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Basic Structure of Human Personality—“The Three Levels of Personality Structure” and “Eight Kinds of Powers” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Carrying Forward and Drawing Upon Various Theoretical Traditions of Personality Structure in an Integrated Fashion . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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7 Group Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Total Absence of the General (or Universal) Concept of “Group” and the Negative Effects Resulting Therefrom . . . . . . . . . 2 The Concept of “Group” and the Categorization of “Groups” . . . . . . . 2.1 The Concept of “Group” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Categories of “Group” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Several Theoretical Patterns of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Radcliffe–Brown’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Émile Durkheim’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Max Weber’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Bruno Latour’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Arnold Toynbee’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Concept, Characteristics and Functions of “Group Structure” . . . 4.1 The Concept of Group Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Basic Hierarchy of Group Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Characteristics of Group Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 The Functions of Group Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1 Subjective Anthropology and the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthropology “The questions,” as Karl Marx pointed out, “are the frank, uncompromising voices of the time embracing all individuals; they are its mottoes, they are the supremely practical utterances proclaiming the state of its soul.”1 The revolutionary thesis Marx set forth as to how man achieves historical progress and social development cannot fail to awaken us to the fact that “anthropology remains marginal as a category,” by which is meant that “anthropology is virtually absent in the minds and hearts of students, student leaders, parents, administrators, alumni, trustees, legislators, and donors,”2 and that it is abundantly clear that the discipline of anthropology has been placed in a position of considerable difficulty. With the above situation in view, we are under the imperative necessity of reflecting deeply and seriously on the longterm implications of an anthropology that is virtually marginalized, now and ever, in the academy or in society. It follows justly that within a broader sociohistorical frame of globalization the problem of how to fathom the various causes underlying the long-term marginalization of anthropology and of how to come up with more inclusive strategies to cope with the awkward situation rightly asserts itself as “the slogan of the times,” to wit, “the most practical voice reflecting the spirit of the times.” To put it more specifically, the immense and glorious task anthropology has set itself is to establish the discipline of subjective anthropology, to reconstruct the discipline system of anthropology, and to bring about a gradual but steady transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. We are fairly justified in asserting that the colossal effort on the part of anthropology is, in a certain sense, a 1

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 40. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 289–290. 2 Peacock, James L. “The Future of Anthropology.” American Anthropologist 99(1) (1997): 9–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/682128.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 B. Chen, Principles of Subjective Anthropology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_1

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dynamic reflection of “the frank, uncompromising voices of the time embracing all individuals.” Anthropology, in consonance with the etymology of its name, “study of humanity,” richly merits the still-unrivalled distinction of being the most comprehensive of the academic disciplines dealing with mankind, which can perhaps be explained in terms of its topical interest, which, on the one hand, tends to be displayed in its concern with human societies as well as with human cultures, and which, on the other, tends to embrace such diverse areas as human goals and values and humanity’s final destination, whereby it stands to reason that anthropology, in relation to other academic disciplines, rightly asserts itself as one of the mainstream disciplines that tend to dominate the sphere of academic learning. However, anthropology has been subjected to relentless marginalization over long periods of time. Peacock, president of the American Anthropological Association between 1993 and 1995, remarked that “despite the yeoman’s service that anthropology does in teaching a large number of students, anthropology is still marginal as a category” and that “the discipline is not a category within the wider culture’s plan, memory, or consciousness”—or, to put it another way, “anthropology is still the invisible discipline.”3 It can thus be seen that anthropology’s marginalization has become an indisputable fact when viewed from a global perspective. To make matters worse, anthropology seems totally undisturbed by its long-term marginalization and simply fails to exercise any initiative in solving the problem once and for all. In view of the above situation, we’ll have to note with regret that this exactly reverses what we might expect. There is no denying the fact that anthropology’s marginalization would be pregnant with grave consequences. In actual fact, the relationship between anthropology and humanity, in the proper sense, can be reduced to that of the discipline in itself to its research object. In this world no discipline other than anthropology is inextricably linked with humanity to such an extent that the relationship between any other discipline and humanity cannot be simply put on a par with that of anthropology to human beings. In general, the mysteries of anthropology lie in man, and the secrets of man consist in anthropology. People have been suffering from a serious deficiency in knowledge on man as a direct consequence of anthropology’s marginalization. Over a long period of time, people have been complaining that there has been a serious deficiency in knowledge about man and that the knowledge about man has been in the grip of poverty. “Man has become,” as philosophical anthropologist Scheler pointed out, “problematic as never before; he no longer knows what he is.”4 Another philosophical anthropologist Michael Landmann argued that the traditional image of man has been demolished, whereas modern man lacks such a valid self-image. After all, culture, art, and social order should have been built on such a self-image.5 From what has been discussed above, it would be logical for us to argue that how man exists tends to be predicated upon what he is. Man’s serious deficiency in knowledge about himself, or rather, the poverty of human knowledge about himself, must of necessity 3

Ibid. Landmann, M. (2006). Philosophical Anthropology (Yan, Jia., Trans.). Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, p. 4. 5 Ibid. 4

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lead the majority of humanities and social sciences to make arbitrary assumptions about human nature, which, consequently, would make a rational knowledge of human existence woefully incomplete,6 rest upon an insecure foundation, go from one extreme to the other, or possess an antagonistic character,7 whereby the resultant crisis would be most likely to threaten the very existence of human beings. Thus it would be logical for us to theorize that how to meet the mounting crisis of human existence necessarily requires as an antecedent in logic the perspicuous but sound reflections on the question of “what man is,” which, in its turn, must presuppose that we should carefully study and discuss the problem of anthropology’s marginalization in all its fundamental bearings. In the strict sense of the term, anthropology’s marginalization is in essence the self-marginalization, which, in its turn, constitutes the cause underlying the marginalization of anthropology. As James L. Peacock put it, “it is not society that is to blame for anthropology’s marginalization, but anthropology itself. …We have a zeal that is sometimes evangelical. Its roots often are the field experience. This is a rite of passage, and we do dwell obsessively within it, rather as the religious convert dwells within the conversion experience; we refer to it as our special source of understanding, thus disdaining the nonconvert. We think we’re special; so we preach instead of listen, or we stand aloof. …Whether it survives, flourishes, or becomes extinct depends on anthropology’s ability to contribute: to become integral and significant to our culture and society without becoming subservient.”8 The obvious discrepancy between the existing object of anthropological study widely accepted in anthropological circles and the one in the proper sense of the term poses a serious problem by which the discipline of anthropology has been confronted for long periods of time, which holds true for the discipline system of anthropology. When subjected to rigorous analysis and thorough examination, the concept of anthropology rightly asserts itself as “the science of humanity,” or more specifically, “the scientific study of human beings and of their cultures.” Following this line of thought, we cannot fail to perceive the slightest discrepancy between this way of framing the idea of anthropology and the technical conception of the discipline in the proper sense of the term,9 whereby we may seem justified in asserting that the concept of anthropology we are trying to understand in this way allows little deviation from the proper definition of the discipline and can thus be considered scientific in the truest sense of the word. However, we’ll have to note with regret that during the historical development of anthropology the research object and discipline system of anthropology failed to follow closely this line of thought that tends not to allow the slightest deviation from a proper, genuine understanding of anthropology—that is, “the scientific study of human beings and 6

Smith, Steven B., ed. (2009). The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 135. 7 James, David. (2021). Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. New York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 86. 8 Peacock, James L. “The Future of Anthropology.” American Anthropologist 99(1) (1997): 9–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/682128. 9 Miguens, Sofia., ed. (2020). The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 510.

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their cultures.”10 In the midst of a transition from theological through biological to cultural anthropology, rather than being directed towards the study of man himself, the conscious efforts on the part of anthropologists of different generations were focused on the description and analysis of various cultural phenomena and their evolutionary changes, thereby leading to a wide discrepancy between the existing research object of anthropology generally accepted within anthropological circles and the normal one that is to be understood in a proper sense, which holds true for the discipline system of anthropology. To put it more specifically, these discrepancies tend to manifest themselves in various aspects of anthropology. An example or two will suffice to make this clear. There has been a fundamental shift in what is the focus of anthropological research. Anthropology is concerned primarily with “culture” rather than with “man himself,” which is to say, it is “culture” rather than “man himself” that rightly asserts itself as the central field of anthropological study. The research object of anthropology undergoes a fundamental displacement alongside the shift of the central focus of anthropology to culture. With very few exceptions, anthropologists almost invariably inveigh most bitterly against the study of man, that is to say, they either deliberately neglect the study of man or voluntarily abstain from studying him. Rather, they dwell obsessively within the field of culture. There is an obvious discrepancy between the existing discipline system of anthropology widely accepted in anthropological circles and the one in the proper sense of the term, whereby human beings are deprived of the only academic discipline that tends to devote itself exclusively to the study of man himself. The subject has been woefully neglected even by some of the most distinguished names of the academic world that either disdain to study it or categorically reject it. French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, who was arguably a leading exponent of structuralism, attached little importance to the role of human agency, or rather the function of subjective initiative, but rather laid undue emphasis upon the function of objective structures. He was emphatic in his assertion that the subject of society as well as of history is the a priori structure rather than man and that social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even declared the position on “melting man,” asserting that “such a detestable favorite as the human subject must be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled over the philosophical territory for too long.”11 Alfred Louis Kroeber, an influential American anthropologist, who served as President of the American Anthropological Association, was awarded the Huxley Memorial Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute and was acclaimed as one of the greatest anthropologists of the twentieth century. He treated culture as a super organism and propounded the “superorganic theory of culture.” For Kroeber, culture has the inherent law of change and development to itself, anthropologists simply confine themselves to the description and explanation 10

Wulf, Christoph. (2013). Anthropology: A Continental Perspective (Winter, Deirdre., Hamilton, Elizabeth., Rouse, Margitta., & Rouse, Richard J., Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago press, p. 116. cf. Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 778. 11 Li, Qing-Yi. (1986). Althusser and Structural Marxism. Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, pp. 77–78.

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of cultural phenomena, and there is no necessity for them to study man himself. In 1925 he published the “Eighteen Statements,” asserting with emphasis that an individual, whose value is embodied in his or her being treated as proof or evidence of civilization, cannot prove of any historical value. It would strain the keenest imagination to understand why these anthropologists, whose brilliant achievements earned them the huge acclaim of the entire anthropological community, had conceived so profound a contempt for “man himself,” why they had so bitterly inveighed against the study of man, and why they so deliberately neglected the subject! By the logic of events, it is bound to follow that anthropology dismisses man’s existence as a matter of no consequence, whereas, by contrast, man manifests little interest in anthropology. Herein lies the underlying cause of anthropology’s marginalization. The transition of anthropology from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one must be predicated upon a reversion to normal on the part of the research object and discipline system of anthropology, which, in its turn, necessarily requires as an antecedent in logic the perspicuous but sound reflections on the question of “what man is.” In this seminal work, on the one hand the author introduces the concept of “subjective anthropology” and formulates the knowledge system which will enable “subjective anthropology” to qualify as an emergent academic discipline in its own right, and on the other, he endeavors to elaborate on the idea for the reconstruction of the discipline system of anthropology, so that the pioneering and laudable efforts on the part of the author may bring about a gradual but steady transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one, whereby this opus can blaze a new path along which cultured and forward-looking people will be able to acquire new knowledge of man which may provide abundant food for perspicuous but sound reflections on a long-run solution to the problem of how to meet the impending crisis of human existence. The book entitled Principles of Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the Knowledge System, which will reflect a high credit upon its author’s copious learning and historical perspective, embodies the results of a very large amount of original research by the author—or to put it the other way round, this opus rightly asserts itself as the fruit of more than twenty years of resolute pursuit and arduous exploration, whereby the latest frontiers of anthropological research are being pushed farther onwards as time goes on. His brilliant talent is manifested in this seminal work, where it is by the exercise of creative talent as well as through the expenditure of creative effort that the author filled two distinct gaps in the knowledge and understanding of modern man12 and formulated seven basic principles of “subjective anthropology.” First, the book filled two distinct gaps in the knowledge and understanding of modern man. To put it more specifically, it filled the gap in the knowledge and understanding of the concrete “whole man” and developed the general (or universal) concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained therein.

12

Mandelbaum, David G., Lasker, Gabriel W., & Albert, Ethel M., eds. (1963). The Teaching of Anthropology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 597.

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Second, the author established seven fundamental principles of “subjective anthropology.” (1) He presented the concept of “subjective anthropology” and framed the theoretical system that will enable “subjective anthropology” to qualify as a new academic discipline in its own right. (2) In the book he conceived and expanded the creative idea for the reconstruction of the discipline system of Chinese anthropology. According to him, anthropology should include three major branches, viz. subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology, and biological (or physical) anthropology, which can be further divided into smaller branches of knowledge or subfields of study respectively. To put it differently, the new discipline system of anthropology can be referred to as the one endowed with Chinese characteristics, Chinese visions and Chinese styles. (3) In advancing the theory of “structure and choice,” the author claimed that, more often than not, such explanations systematically related to the aforementioned theory are given by formulating some fundamental ontology that posits human life. (4) The author gave a graphic description of personality based on the theory of “structure and choice,” which is to say he propounded and expounded “the theory of personality structure and choice” which can be represented in the form of a diagram. (5) The author provided a graphic description of group based on the theory of “structure and choice,” that is to say, he postulated and elaborated “the theory of group structure and choice” that can be represented in the form of a diagram. (6) The book is the only adequate exposition of the two subjects, namely, the topdown construction of the value system of group and the construction of sound personality, which tend to throw new light on our rational knowledge of human existence. (7) In methodological terms, subjective analysis has been introduced into the study of subjective anthropology and thereby asserts itself as the most approved method for the study of subjective anthropology. In addition, of all the concepts and theses the author presented and developed in the crowning work of his long career, some have been widely accepted in anthropological circles, though this book has added a new light to them, while others originated with the author himself. It thus comes as no surprise that this book gives the fullest expression to his systematic creativity which tends to combine logic and reasoning with unbounded and vigorous imagination and to make him strive in a systematic way for creative solutions to problems. It therefore naturally follows that when he attempts to present her arguments in a logical way, it often happens that there are not enough concepts or categories adequate for the purpose and that since it is difficult to frame a definition that is both comprehensive and accurate, some concepts or categories generally accepted within anthropological circles are necessarily endowed with inherent flaws and their definitions are far from admirably clear and accurate. With the above situation in view, the author takes the initiative in introducing some

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basic concepts and categories that may prove of supreme importance to the discipline of subjective anthropology, and meanwhile tries to ensure that a lavish expenditure of creative effort will eventually enable these new concepts and categories to come into full play in qualifying subjective anthropology as an emergent academic discipline in its own right, whereby he will be able to carry on his anthropological research in real earnest. In the end, however, it must be pointed out that Chinese anthropological circles are now faced with the triple task of advancing and developing the theoretical system of subjective anthropology, reconstructing the discipline system of anthropology, and establishing the discipline system of Chinese anthropology with Chinese characteristics, Chinese visions and Chinese styles and that the triple task rightly asserts itself as a theoretical project of tremendous magnitude that has far-reaching implications for the way we think about the future of anthropology. Just as the research project can be likened to a huge iceberg, so a wealth of theoretical knowledge the book places at our disposal may be compared to the tip of the iceberg above the ocean surface. Like the portion of the iceberg below the water surface,13 the remaining part of the research project represents a vast reservoir of theoretical knowledge, more abundant, more mysterious, and more significant. The author suggests that at least the theories about the following three main subdisciplines of anthropology as well as the rational knowledge of human existence deserve serious and enthusiastic study so that the research project could be brought to completion. (1) Anthropologists should devote themselves most conscientiously to the study of philosophical anthropology. Of the various sub-branches of philosophical anthropology, cultural philosophical anthropology becomes immensely popular with whoever is trying to open up a new frontier for anthropological exploration. According to cultural philosophical anthropology, the essence of man lies in the fact that he is a creature of culture. If the fundamental conception of the essence of man is far from ideal, it follows justly that philosophical anthropology may provide a fascinating new perspective on the nature of man—or to put it the other way round, the light thrown upon the essence or nature of man by philosophical anthropology tends to reveal “what man is” in a new light. Hence anthropologists should reconstruct the discipline system of philosophical anthropology and form new theories about it. (2) According to the academic views widely accepted among Chinese anthropologists, the discipline system of anthropology can be roughly divided into two representative schools: the American school and the Continental school. In general, the discipline of anthropology in the United States can be seen as comprised of the two branches of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology, while, by contrast, the discipline of anthropology in Continental Europe is traditionally divided into four subfields, namely, anthropology, archaeology,

13

Raab, Jennifer. (2015). Frederic Church: The Art and Science of Detail. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 110.

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ethnology and linguistics.14 The discipline system of modern anthropology is actually founded on the aforementioned division of the branches of anthropology in the United States and Continental Europe. Based on a brief sumup of the existing discipline system of anthropology, the author conceived the idea for the reconstruction of the discipline system of anthropology—that is, anthropology should encompass the three major branches, to wit subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and biological (or physical) anthropology. If anthropology is referred to as general anthropology, “the study of humankind at the most comprehensive and holistic level,”15 then, by the logic of events, a holistic anthropological theory should be accepted as the framework through which to make sense of general anthropology. If so, in holistic terms, what is it that general anthropology requires as an antecedent in logic? According to this conception, in constructing the knowledge system of general anthropology, how ill anthropologists address themselves to epistemological, methodological, and ontological questions hitherto much-debated within the anthropological discourse? (3) In terms of primary objects of anthropological study, cultural anthropology remains today the discipline that primarily studies the emergence and divergence of languages over time, the survivals of ancient cultures, and some traditional peoples (or primitive tribal groups),16 as well as modern cities and mediums of film, radio and television, in particular, ethnographic films. Moreover, the academic discipline is mainly devoted to the study of the origin and development of the material and spiritual cultures created by human beings as well as of the laws of human cultural evolution. From what has been discussed above, the questions naturally arise as to what field of study may rightly assert itself as the central focus of cultural anthropology as well as about how to develop the discipline’s theoretical system. (4) If anthropology can place the question of “what man is” in the clearest light, then, as often as not, a scientific exposition of “what man is” will be able to serve as a logical prerequisite for a rational knowledge of human existence and to provide a sound basis for an objective understanding of human life, whereby anthropology can supply us with a theoretical foothold for thinking about a long-run solution to the problem of how to meet the impending crisis of human existence and will enable us to approach the problem in a scientific and objective spirit. In vying with other academic disciplines for the only adequate exposition of “what man is,” more often than not, anthropology will enable us to elicit rational faculties latent within us, to look back upon the long history of five thousand years in a scientific spirit, and to turn our thoughts with more earnestness towards the 14

Hu, Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, pp. 2–3. 15 Valsiner, Jaan., ed. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 96. 16 Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 1833.

References

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future. Given the clash of civilizations and resultant confusion and turmoil, it will come as no surprise that anthropology would be in a position to stimulate us to cast our minds back on the past and review the historical development in a scientific spirit, or rather, to bring to light the laws governing human cultural construction and evolution and to view the clash and merging of civilizations in their proper historical perspective. Moreover, in throwing considerable further light upon the rational knowledge of human existence, anthropology will be able to provide a scientific explanation of certain fundamental values such as love, justice, democracy, education, and so forth, whereby it would be in a position to make a lasting contribution toward a long-run solution to the problem of how human beings are able to achieve some fundamental goals such as existence, development, well-being, and sustainability. The author has never entertained the least doubt that anthropology must undergo an inevitable transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. It is Chinese scholars that start to think about embarking upon the immense and glorious task and it is incumbent upon them to push the task through to completion!

References 1. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 40. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 289–290. 2. Peacock, James L. “The Future of Anthropology.” American Anthropologist 99(1) (1997): 9–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/682128. 3. Landmann, M. (2006). Philosophical Anthropology (Yan, Jia., Trans.). Guiyang, China: Guizhou People‘s Publishing House, p. 4. 4. Smith, Steven B., ed. (2009). The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 135. 5. James, David. (2021). Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. New York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 86. 6. Miguens, Sofia., ed. (2020). The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 510. 7. Wulf, Christoph. (2013). Anthropology: A Continental Perspective (Winter, Deirdre., Hamilton, Elizabeth., Rouse, Margitta., & Rouse, Richard J., Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago press, p. 116. cf. Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 778. 8. Li, Qing-Yi. (1986). Althusser and Structural Marxism. Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, pp. 77–78. 9. Mandelbaum, David G., Lasker, Gabriel W., & Albert, Ethel M., eds. (1963). The Teaching of Anthropology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 597. 10. Raab, Jennifer. (2015). Frederic Church: The Art and Science of Detail. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 110. 11. Hu Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, pp. 2–3. 12. Valsiner, Jaan., ed. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 96. 13. Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 1833.

Chapter 2

Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology

With the evolution of human civilization spanning over five thousand years, modern science and technology has attained an advanced stage, in which mankind can reach the deepest earth and the highest heaven, control the forces of nature, and gain insight into minute particles. Although he has made tremendous progress and development in the prolonged process of human civilization, mankind has been neglectful of the study of himself. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau ever argued two centuries ago, “Of all human sciences the most useful and most imperfect appears to me to be that of mankind.”1 To date, the problem has not been really resolved. As a general rule, the manner in which man knows himself determines how he acts. The very fact that mankind has been neglecting to know himself eventually leads to a grave crisis which may endanger his own existence. In essence, it may well be admitted that the grave crisis which affects human beings’ own existence can be more or less equivalent to the great difficulty with which man endeavors to know himself. There is a close identity between “anthropology” and “knowing thyself’: in general, “the mysteries of anthropology lie in man, while the secrets of man consist in anthropology.” However, it is regrettable that a long course of time has witnessed the study of anthropology not focused upon “man himself” but concentrated on the human “physique,” “culture” and “society,” which results in the excursion of the research objects and discipline systems of anthropology. In this sense, anthropology cannot evade responsibility for the grave crisis of “knowing thyself.” This work in which the author advanced the knowledge system and concepts of subjective anthropology is intended to orient the discipline system and research objects of anthropology towards a rational and scientific realm so that anthropology may be really charged with the arduous task of unlocking the mysteries of man himself and thus man when confronted with the grave crisis of “knowing thyself” can overcome the overwhelming odds of survival.

1

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1982). Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men. Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 62.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 B. Chen, Principles of Subjective Anthropology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_2

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1 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research Object of Anthropology and the Resultant Impacts 1.1 The Discipline System of Anthropology According to the academic views widely accepted among Chinese anthropologists, the discipline system of anthropology can be roughly divided into two representative schools: the American school and the Continental school. In general, the discipline of anthropology in the United States can be seen as composed of the two subfields of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology which can be further divided into several branches respectively. As a subfield of anthropology, physical anthropology, also known as biological anthropology, includes such academic disciplines as paleoanthropology, anthropometry, and ethnology, while cultural anthropology encompasses such scientific subfields as ethnography, linguistic anthropology, and archaeology.2 By contrast, the scientific discipline of anthropology in Continental Europe can be divided into such four independent subfields as anthropology, archaeology, ethnology, and linguistics. Whether in the United States or in Continental Europe, each subfield of anthropology can be further divided into smaller branches of knowledge or fields of study.3 Admittedly, the discipline system of modern anthropology is actually founded on the above-mentioned division of the subfields (or branches) of anthropology in the United States and Continental Europe.

1.2 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research Object of Anthropology In general, the concepts of anthropology endowed with interdisciplinary characteristics are wide in range and hence abundant in connotations, while the definition of anthropology as the science that treats of man, in broad terms, determines how the concepts at the service of anthropology are developed and elucidated. The conception of anthropology subjected to rigorous analysis and thorough examination requires that anthropology should lay claim to “man himself as well as his culture” as its object of study and the learning concerned with “man himself as well as his culture” as its main body of knowledge. When we endeavor to apprehend the nature of anthropology, this line of thought is subjected to no excursion, to wit, the conception of

2

Hu, Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, pp. 2–3; Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2006). An Introduction to Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, p. 11. 3 Hu Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, pp. 2–3.

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anthropology is scientific and correct and subjected to no excursion.4 However, in the history of anthropology, its “object of study” and “discipline system” failed to follow closely this line of thought. During the development of anthropology, there occurred a shift in focus of study from the biological perspective to the cultural one. As a subfield of anthropology, biological anthropology (also known as physical anthropology) is a scientific discipline concerned with the biological aspects of human beings and hence provides a biological perspective to the systematic study of human beings, while cultural anthropology is a branch of anthropology focused on the study of cultural variation among humans. Scholars engaged in anthropological research neglected and even chose not to make an exhaustive study of “man himself”. Moreover, they attempted to substitute “cultural anthropology” for “anthropology” in the hope of making “anthropology” hidden from view, as a result of which the “research object” and “discipline system” of the scientific discipline of “anthropology” were subjected to universal deviation (or excursion) from their scientific and correct paths. This sort of deviation (or excursion) marked by tendency and universality can be seen everywhere and is primarily incarnated in the following aspects. (1) The Excursion (or Deviation) of the Principal Focus of Anthropology The term “anthropology” made its appearance roughly in the sixteenth century. Otto Casmann (1562–1607) was a German humanist who converted from Catholicism to Protestantism as a young man. He is important to the history of anthropology and psychology, because in 1596 he produced a work entitled Psychologia Anthropologica as one of the first scholars to make a study of anthropology. Thenceforward, the term “anthropology” came to be widely used in German universities. Roughly speaking, anthropology went through the following shifts in focus of study: “theological anthropology”—“biological anthropology”—“cultural anthropology.” During the development of anthropology, theological anthropology made an earlier appearance. In the nineteenth century, “scientific anthropology” made its debut with the advent of Darwin’s theory of evolution and its central focus of study was oriented towards the biological aspects of human beings. From the perspective of “scientific anthropology,” man is treated as a kind of living organism evolving from nature, and human traits can be defined by making a comparison between human beings and

4

“In terms of its etymology, anthropology is the science that treats of man. In actual fact, among multitudes of sciences at the service of mankind, anthropology asserts itself as merely one of them.” (Encyclopaedia Britannica). “As a science for the good of human learning, anthropology is the study of human nature and culture.” (Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2002). ‘Preface.’ In A General Survey of Anthropology. Taiyuan, China: Shanxi Education Press, pp. 268–269.) “The discipline of anthropology is concerned with ‘the learning on humans’.” (Wang, MingMing. (2002). What is Anthropology? Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 2.) “As two combining forms of the term “anthropology”, ‘anthropos (human being)’ and ‘logos (theory or science)’ may owe their origins to Greek beginnings in terms of their respective etymologies. The two component parts are combined to mean ‘the science (or study) of man (or human beings)’.” (See also Song, Yuan-Fang., ed. A Concise Dictionary of Social Sciences. Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 1982.)

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animals and a study of human beings’ physiological phenomena as well as their evolutionary changes. In terms of the range of study, there is a considerable overlap between “biological (or physical) anthropology” and “scientific anthropology.” However, the foregoing discipline encountered various criticisms on the grounds that this academic approach cannot be used to explain what a “rational person” is. Hence, with the shift of the central focus of anthropology to culture, “cultural anthropology” marked by numerous schools and various viewpoints came to assert itself as the main discipline of anthropology, which was even put on a par with anthropology itself. Cultural anthropology, which treats humans as a kind of cultural beings, is a branch of anthropology focused on the description and analysis of a variety of cultural (or social) phenomena as well as their evolutionary changes, by means of which man can be explained and represented. By submitting the study on human beings to greater dimensions, cultural anthropology attained a vigorous development during which multitudes of illustrious masters fruitful in their academic achievements took center stage in the field of study. However, with the development of cultural anthropology, a grievous outgrowth attracted widespread attention. Scholars engaged in the research of cultural anthropology attempted to equate “culture” with “man himself”, holding that the study of “culture” was more or less equivalent to that of “man himself”, to such an extent that they attempted to make “man” lie under the shadow of “culture”, substitute “culture” for “man”, and even turn the study of “culture” against the study “man”, as a result of which the discipline system and research objects of “anthropology” were submitted to grievous excursions. Moreover, this sort of “excursion (or deviation)” arising from the increasingly widened gap between “cultural anthropology” and “anthropology” in terms of their respective research objects and discipline systems made either “culturology” or “sociology” almost become the version of “anthropology.” Anthropology was neglectful of the study of “man himself” and this led to the deficiency in or even emptiness of knowledge on human beings. A grave consequence followed. “Anthropology” was disinterested in “man himself,” and vice versa. The science of anthropology was subjected to relentless marginalization (or peripherization). Until now, this situation has been continuing. As a scientific discipline concerned with the study of human beings and their cultures, anthropology should have asserted itself as the hot topic of concern and the main focus of attention. The marginalization (or peripherization) of anthropology is considered to be an abnormal phenomenon, whose fundamental cause lies in the excursion (or deviation) of the research object and discipline system of anthropology. (2) The Excursion of the Research Objects of Anthropology It is “culture” rather than “man himself” that has long since been the basic object of study for anthropology. A vast body of anthropological literature treats “culture” as the object of study and takes it as the key concept of anthropology, on the basis of which all of the knowledge systems of anthropology are to be formulated and developed. Not only are the foregoing viewpoints anchored in some works or textbooks, but also the fundamental viewpoints are shared in different versions of encyclopedia and famous anthropological literature or course books of the modern world. About the excursion of the objective of anthropology, German philosophical anthropologist Dr.

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M. Landmann argued: “…in England and France, and to some extent in America, anthropology is equated with ethnology, of which prehistory is also considered a part. …Even in Germany this use of the term is not completely unknown. Wilhelm Mühlmann’s Geschichte der Anthropologie (1948) is mainly, if not exclusively, a history of ethnology.” So far the viewpoint that anthropology takes “culture” rather than “man himself” as the object of study has been ensconced and even enshrined in the minds of Chinese scholars and foreign ones alike, and it is regrettable that such an abnormal phenomenon has been going on up till now. There is no necessity at all for us to furnish any example in justification of the argument, but pointing out the following universal fact will suffice to prove the argument. Invariably, the theory that anthropology takes “culture” as the fundamental object of study neglecting and even rejecting the study of “man himself” has been widely accepted in various versions of anthropological works and textbooks. Anthropology was neglectful of or even abstained from the study of “man himself” and merely focused on the study of “culture”, and hence in the field of anthropological study this led to not only the deficiency in knowledge on human beings but also the distortion of the nature and image of man. Some scholars even hold that the nature of man is equivalent to the combination of “animals and cultures”! All of the foregoing statements have shown that at present there exists a prevailing tendency in anthropological circles that the fundamental object of study for anthropology is treated as the study of “culture” created by mankind rather than the study of “man himself”, and that anthropology has long since been staying away from the study of “man himself” that should have been ensconced as its fundamental object of study and thus how many misapprehensions and excursions have been caused when scholars engaged in the study of anthropology attempted to gain knowledge on human beings! (3) The Excursion of the Discipline System of Anthropology In terms of the discipline system of anthropology, modern anthropology is neglectful of and even abstains from the study of “man himself.” How the discipline system of anthropology is treated in the United States is as follows. In general, the discipline of anthropology in the United States can be seen as composed of the two subfields of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology, which can be further divided into several branches respectively. As a subfield of anthropology, physical anthropology, also known as biological anthropology, includes such academic disciplines as paleoanthropology, anthropometry, and ethnology, while cultural anthropology encompasses such scientific subfields as ethnography, linguistic anthropology, and archaeology. Each foregoing subfield of anthropology can be further divided into smaller branches of knowledge or fields of study. How American anthropologists divide the discipline system of anthropology and put their own interpretation on various branches of anthropology also demonstrates clearly that the discipline system and research objects of anthropology have been subjected to grievous excursions. “Physical anthropology, also known as biological anthropology, is concerned with not only the biological bases of human survival in the past and present but also the nature of the transformation to human anatomy and behavior in the course of evolution from early hominines to modern people. Of particular concern to physical

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anthropologists are the course that human evolution has taken and the processes that have brought about human biological variation. Much light has been thrown upon human physical traits as well as relations between human biological physique and culture.” “Cultural anthropology is a scientific discipline focused on the study of human society and culture, as distinguished from human biological characteristics. Cultural phenomena of concern to cultural anthropologists are oriented to the description, analysis, and explanation of modes of human thought and behavior as well as similarities and diversities among societies or cultures, which are embodied in such manifold spheres of human life as customs and habits, matrimony, kinship and family structure, economic and political system, religion, and primitive art.” “Archaeology (also spelled archeology) takes as its object of study all past human societies. Archaeologists examine specifically all aspects of tangible and intangible cultural heritage of past human life and activities, and as other anthropologists do in their respective fields of study, so they endeavor to gain a deep understanding of the truth about man himself across time and space.” “Linguistic anthropologists argue that language is a social instrument through which people engage themselves in cultural practice. As a subdiscipline of anthropology, linguistic anthropology is focused on the exploration of how cultural diversity is related to linguistic usages around the world.” Cai Yuanpei, China’s democratic revolutionary, educator, and thinker, published an article entitled On Ethnography in the journal of Yiban in December 1926, which gave a full exposition of the implications of ethnography. He stated briefly, “As a branch of learning, ethnography, whose methods involve recording or comparing collected materials, is intended to explore the cultures of various peoples.” To date, this concept still plays an important role in anthropology. Two conclusions can be drawn from the implications of the discipline system of anthropology which by now the anthropological circles have gained a common understanding of. First, as a major division of anthropology, cultural anthropology as well as its subdivisions such as archaeology, linguistic anthropology, and ethnography deals with the study of culture or society, which has been inextricably bound up with human activities since it was created by man, rather than man himself. Second, biological anthropology, also known as physical anthropology, has man himself as the object of study, and yet it never deals with a living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness, but is basically concerned with the biological bases of human beings, which provides a biological perspective to the systematic study of human beings. A living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness, who is not only bursting with vim and vigor but also endowed with distinctive characteristics, is able to establish himself among his or her peers in social interaction and engage himself or herself in social practice. Thus, it may well be admitted that the discipline system of anthropology fails to treat a living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness as the object of study, a system of theoretical knowledge with regard to a living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness has been hitherto unavailable, and even such a wish, pursuit or intention has not manifested itself. What a regrettable thing! Admittedly, in the garden of human knowledge, as well as philosophy concerned with the essence of man as a whole, anthropology can be recognized as the only science of humanity which studies human beings as a whole. If anthropology evades the study of man

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as a whole, which subject would like the study of man as a whole consigned to its rightful realm? (4) Classic Authors in Anthropology Neglecting the Study of Man Himself The basic theories advanced by some prominent anthropologists have shown that they were not only neglectful of the study of man himself, but also showed contempt for the study of man himself, and even categorically rejected the study of man himself. As one of the central figures in the structural school of thought, French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss was arguably a leading exponent of structuralism who laid emphasis on the function of objective structures, but warranted little attention to the role of human agency. He believed that the nature and change of a social phenomenon is determined by the a priori preexisting structures, human beings’ statements and actions which are governed by the universal structures can only be treated as their manifestations, and they never change the structures. Hence, the subject of society as well as of history is the a priori structure rather than man. Social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even declared the position on “melting man”, asserting that “such a detestable favorite as the human subject must be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled over the philosophical territory for too long.”5 Alfred Louis Kroeber was an influential American anthropologist, served as President of the American Anthropological Association, was awarded the Huxley Memorial Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, and was acclaimed as one of the greatest anthropologists of the twentieth century. He treated culture as a super organism and propounded the “superorganic theory of culture”, according to which the whole world is made of such four phenomena as mass or force, life, consciousness, and social life or culture, culture treated as a super organism is scarcely subject to the influence of a lower organism, and nor is it influenced by human psychology or inheritance. He held that culture is endowed with its rightful law of development and change, that anthropologists confine their attention only to culture, and that there is no necessity for them to study man himself. In 1925 he published the “Eighteen Statements”, under this title of which are mainly included the following contents. “Second, in terms of its research materials, what history studies is not man but his creations, that is, the results of human action. Third, civilization, which finds expression in human creations and whose existence is dependent upon human beings, is in essence an entity, a sort of order deriving its origins from life. …History is not concerned with man who created civilization but merely with civilization itself. Sixth, an individual, whose value is embodied in his or her being treated as proof or evidence of civilization, lays no claim to his or her historical value.” He believed that an individual is of so little consequence that culture endowed with the characteristics of a super organism can exist independently of human beings and take its course without any individual’s influence. Kroeber despised and even denied man’s subjective initiative and historical value, treated man merely as a supplement to and a proof of culture viewed as a super organism, and thus there did not seem to be any necessity for anthropologists 5

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149.

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to study man himself. What a ridiculous argument it is. Man is the product of culture and vice versa. In the final analysis, culture is the product of man. Without man, how can there exist the super organism conception of culture? The theories expounded by the two foregoing anthropologists have shown that the “research objects” and “discipline systems” of the scientific discipline of “anthropology” were subjected to universal deviation (or excursion) from their scientific and correct paths. More specifically, anthropology treated culture as well as society as the object of study, and neglected or even rejected the study of man himself. Admittedly, there existed a necessity for the “research object” and “discipline system” of anthropology to be subjected to universal excursion (or deviation) from their scientific and correct paths. When we seek to anatomize the universal excursion (or deviation)of the “research object” and “discipline system” of anthropology from an epistemological angle, it is not hard to see that the world outlook and methodology derived from dialectical materialism and historical materialism respectively will play a significant role in our analysis. If we fail to grasp the advanced world outlook and methodology in an effort to acquire a deep and complete understanding of man himself, we will not unravel the mysteries of man, and nor will we comprehend the dialectical relations between man and culture, which is inevitable to land the discipline of anthropology in a predicament where anthropologists may encounter enormous troubles in knowing man himself. Ultimately, they cannot but abandon the study of man himself and turn their attention to culture, which leads to the universal excursion (or deviation) of the “research objects” and “discipline systems” of anthropology.

1.3 The Excursion of the Research Object and Discipline System of Anthropology and the Harm Done (1) The Imposition of Cultural Repressiveness upon Man’s Subjectivity There exist deep causes for the excursion of the discipline system and research object of anthropology, which is attributable to nothing more than scorn or even contempt for man himself as well as the neglect of the study of man himself. The fundamental causes reside in its disregarding the relationship of the dialectical unity between man and culture, having man and culture stand in contradiction to each other, using culture to screen man, repress man, and supersede man, and negating man’s subjective status as well as his subjective role. Grave consequences followed from the foregoing causes. In the territory of anthropology, while culture came out into the open and expanded far and wide, man’s endowments such as his subjectivity, independence, initiative, and creativity were obviously treated with disregard. The realm of anthropology also bore witness to the emergence of such opposite tendencies as cultural nuclealization versus man’s marginalization, and the constant presence of culture versus the constant absence of man. Man possesses no historical value and thus the human subject should be expelled from the territory of anthropology. Culture is not created by man, but it is treated as an organism, which runs its course.

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Culture becomes inextricably bound up with human activities, only because it was born with no feet and has been dependent on man for its transport. Considering man is regarded as subservient to culture, there is no necessity for man to be master of his fate, as a matter of fact man is unable to grasp his destiny in his hands, and thus man should be at the mercy of culture. Some areas of anthropological study seemed to bear witness to the resurrection of the God-oriented Middle Ages, though this deity was culture rather than God. Admittedly, such foregoing tendencies are abnormal. Anthropology must recognize the subjective status of man as well as the relationship of the dialectical unity between man and culture, have the subjective status of man returned to normal, and treat man himself as well as his culture as the object of study. The reasons are as follows. First, the human subject exists as a fundamental part of the world, in the sense that there can be no world without a subject, nor the subject without world. In contrast with culture, man, who promotes the cultural introspection and transcendence, who puts them into practice, and who furthers the cultural development far and wide attributable to human praxis in the final analysis, is widely acknowledged as the goal of culture, the standard of culture, the dynamics of culture, the source of culture, and the principle of culture. Without man, there will exist no culture, nor will the renewal and development of culture. Second, the relationship between man and culture is not unidirectional but bidirectional and dialectal. Culture creates man, and man is also the maker of culture. In the final analysis, culture is the product of human practice for survival. Third, it is only through the human subject that the functions of culture can be brought into play, and without human agency, any function of culture cannot be fulfilled. However, whenever a culture claims superiority over the others, whether or not it can give play to its functions as well as what functions it can fulfill is not completely dependent on the culture itself, but is still contingent upon the human subject’s attitude, quality and situation. Fourth, the being of man is characterized not only by his cultural existence, but also by his historical existence. In the macroscopic perspective of human civilization, the path of cultural and social progress is closely linked with the process of human development, which is characterized by mutual penetration, mutual support, mutual restriction, and mutual causality, and they work together to manifest themselves in a course of evolution marked by simultaneity and complexity. Fifth, man is able to grasp his destiny in his hands. While culture can fulfill a restrictive function of considerable importance, man is endowed with the creative capacity for choice. Their respective functions are roughly as follows. While culture determines the possibility of choice, man decides the reality of choice. Through continual introspection, transcendence, and choice, man can determine his success or failure, and thus become master of his fate. Sixth, the manner in which man knows himself is the way that he behaves and lives. Man as well as his life is always in an unfinished state. As man himself is endowed with multifarious potentialities, so human life is full of a multitude of possibilities. To ensure a bright future for mankind, we must study culture and, particularly, man himself. More specifically, we must have our study start with such problems as “what

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is the human being?” and “what should the human being be?” so as to unravel the mysteries of man. (2) Leading to a Serious Deficiency in Knowledge on Man The object of anthropological study should have been man himself as well as his culture, and anthropologists should have elucidated the knowledge and theories about man himself as well as his culture, which should have been the mission of the discipline. However, the excursions of the discipline system and research objects of anthropology have shown that anthropologists did not treat man himself as the object of study, but had culture and society as the object of study. Two grave problems arose from the foregoing abnormal situation. First, anthropology laid exclusive claim to the specialized knowledge about culture and society, which made anthropology almost become another version of culturology or sociology. Second, the foregoing abnormal situation made the discipline of anthropology deficient in and even empty of knowledge on man. In the knowledge system of anthropology, apart from the knowledge about the biological and behavioral aspects of human beings—that is, the biological bases of human behavior, there rarely exists the knowledge on man himself. At the present time, in contrast with the anthropological knowledge on man, philosophy encompasses a more genuine and extensive body of knowledge about man, and in the pursuit of knowledge about man people would rather turn to philosophy (the science of man) and psychology for knowledge about man than go to anthropology for it, although the two subjects are merely devoted to the study of some aspects of man: one is concerned with the human essence and the other deals with the human psychology. Over a long period of time, people have been complaining that there has been a serious deficiency in knowledge about man and that the knowledge about man has been in the grip of poverty. As the Chinese saying goes, his own land lies waste while he tills others’ fields. Likewise, when they seek to pursue knowledge about man, people will always find themselves in an awkward predicament. Won’t anthropology, which treats man himself as well as his culture as the object of study, be to blame for the foregoing regrettable situation?! As a branch of learning, anthropology studies human beings as well as human cultures, and there exists an inherent identity between the science of humanity and the knowledge about man. The mysteries of humanity consist in anthropology, and vice versa. The hope of anthropology resides in the fact that anthropologists should devote deep study to human beings as well as human cultures so as to unravel and elucidate the mysteries of man. Nowadays the tasks to be shouldered by the discipline of anthropology are fairly arduous, and the problems to be addressed are quite grave and complex. The following problems are likely to pose a variety of formidable challenges to the science of anthropology. How will anthropologists carry forward and develop the methodology of anthropology so that they can make a deep study of human beings as well as human cultures, gain an insight into some intricate problems, and find proper ways of unraveling the mysteries of man? How will anthropologists reveal the essence and ontology of “structure and choice” of man’s unique life? How will anthropologists expound the unique life ontology of “structure and choice” of a living individual characterized by concreteness and wholeness as well as its rich

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theories and regularities? How will anthropologists elucidate the unique life ontology of “structure and choice” of a group as well as its rich theories and regularities? How will anthropologists develop the value system of human existence and reveal the logic of human existence based on the essence and ontology of man’s unique life so that they can help people face up to the paradoxes inherent in themselves, overcome a variety of survival crises, inspire confidence in themselves and live a better life in the future? Generally speaking, anthropology today will have to shoulder theoretical tasks of tremendous magnitude. More specifically, how will anthropologists address the following two theoretical problems of considerable magnitude? First, what is the human being? In other words, anthropologists will have to elucidate the essence and ontology of man’s unique life, and expound the concrete mode of human existence. Second, how does the human being exist? That is to say, anthropologists will have to explore and establish the value system of human existence, and elaborate the concrete mode of human existence. Knowledge about the former problem is the indispensible prerequisite to the scientific consideration of the latter one, and only if we have gained sufficient knowledge about the latter problem, can we achieve a better understanding of the former one. Knowledge about both of the two problems can provide a solid foundation of knowledge for human beings’ pursuit of such lofty ideals as sustainable development and eternal happiness. Such anthropological knowledge is essential and indispensible for both the survival of personality and the existence of a group as well as that of a species. (3) Anthropology’s Marginalization The excursion or deviation of the discipline system and research object of anthropology lands itself in a trying situation where the science of anthropology is disinterested in man, and vice versa. In more than a century, the discipline of anthropology has been subjected to relentless marginalization. In the twenty-first century, if the discipline fails to solve such a problem as the excursion or deviation of the discipline systems and research objects, anthropology still cannot escape being marginalized, and cannot even provide core theories for the society. This kind of view is not at all exceptional. To elaborate the problem, we may as well make reference to the article entitled The Future of Anthropology which James L. Peacock, president of the American Anthropological Association between 1993 and 1995, published in the March issue of American Anthropologist for 1997 and which was translated in Chinese in the second issue of Study of Nationalities in Guangxi for 2001. The article showed that American anthropology today has been subjected to marginalization and standing in a serious predicament while he sought to analyze the inner causes and come up with strategies to cope with the awkward situation. James L. Peacock remarked, “…despite the yeoman’s service that anthropology does in teaching a large number of students, anthropology is still marginal as a category. Anthropology is virtually absent in the minds and hearts of students, student leaders, parents, administrators, alumni, trustees, legislators, and donors. …anthropology remains marginal as a category. We are ‘outside the envelope,’ as they say.” For this, he further noted that anthropology in the twenty-first century would be faced with such three possible scenarios as extinction, standing aloof, and developing

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and applying the core ideas that are part of our great tradition. “So what is the future of anthropology? Let’s look at three scenarios: The first is extinction. Götterdämmerung; we go up in flames. In this period of downsizing, universities and institutions see small, vulnerable programs such as anthropology as likely candidates for hit lists. Unfortunately, this is more than a distant; it is a viable possibility. A second scenario, perhaps likely, is that we do not die but seek refuge in our enclave, hanging on as living dead. Anthropology in the twenty-first century, in this vision, consists of disorganized, quaintly intriguing, and slightly amusing naysaying eccentrics who relish vaguely recalled avant-garde ideas from the fin de siècle 20th-century but who are merely a curiosity in the 21st. The third alternative, as viable as extinction, is a flourishing redirection of our field into a prominent position in society. Anthropology would remain intriguing and creatively diverse, iconoclastic and breathtaking in its sweep and perception, profound in its scholarship, but would become integral and even leading in addressing the complex challenges of a transnational, yet grounded, humanity.” Moreover, he pointed out, “What are liabilities of the discipline and its practitioners? One argument is that it is not society that is to blame for anthropology’s marginalization, but anthropology itself. …Whether it survives, flourishes, or becomes extinct depends on anthropology’s ability to contribute: to become integral and significant to our culture and society without becoming subservient.” Obviously, James L. Peacock is an honest scholar. His article hit the nail on the head, laying bare the vulnerable points of anthropology, and was keen enough to awaken the muddle-headed. In essence, anthropology’s marginalization is the selfmarginalization. Anthropology has its own object of study—the human being himself subjected to deviation, fails to formulate the knowledge system about the human being himself, and thus people tend to show little concern about the discipline and even devote scant attention to it. It is not that people do not need anthropology, but that anthropology fails to meet human needs, and does not even show much concern about them. It is certain to follow that anthropology cold-shoulders man, and vice versa. To be more specific, anthropology’s marginalization is attributable to the following two flaws inherent in the discipline of anthropology. First, anthropology treats culture or society rather than man himself as the object of study, showing contempt or scorn for the human being, and even neglecting the study of man himself. Second, anthropology attaches importance to ancient times while it places little value upon modern times. Nowadays the anthropological study of “the country and the past” takes priority over that of “the city and the present”, which was true of the anthropological study in the past, and even divorces itself from the modern development of human beings. Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown, a prominent English anthropologist, revealed the second flaw in the discipline of anthropology long ago and proposed the strategy for making a synchronic study of anthropological problems, which showed remarkable insight at that time. It is regrettable that hitherto the two problems mentioned-above have not been completely solved. Anthropology abandoned human beings, modern people in particular, and it is small wonder that anthropology has been subjected to marginalization. To ensure a transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one, anthropology must take resolute measures to solve the two foregoing problems so

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that it may have its discipline system and research objects returned to normal, treating man himself as well as his culture as the objects of study and reconstructing the discipline system of anthropology. Fundamentally speaking, anthropology, “the science of humanity,” studies human beings as well as human cultures, and in this world no discipline other than anthropology is so inextricably linked with the fate of mankind. Considering anthropology’s marginalization is abnormal, it is bound to follow that anthropology should contribute core theories to society. Given that nowadays the crisis of human existence has become more acute, mankind is faced with the urgent task of knowing himself and being master of his own fate. Hence it is incumbent upon anthropology to help humanity with the task. People earnestly hope that anthropology will treat human beings as well as human cultures as the objects of study and contribute knowledge about concrete modes of human existence or survival so that it can help humanity extricate himself from the awkward predicament and see a bright future before him. (4) The Arbitrariness of Assumptions about Human Nature Inherent in the Humanities and Social Sciences In general, the manner in which man knows himself is the way that he lives. As far as some humanities and social sciences are concerned, they seek to formulate knowledge systems concerning their respective disciplines based on the way in which man knows himself. Some humanities and social sciences invariably rest their respective logical premises upon the assumptions about human nature, and the well-knit knowledge systems of the disciplines tend to start off on a variety of logical premises to what man is. Whether complete or partial, more often than not the assumptions about human nature will determine a priori whether or not the knowledge systems of the disciplines are correct. Regretfully, anthropology fails to contribute its rightful assumptions about human nature of man in his wholeness and concreteness to the humanities and social sciences. Scientism, which has been sweeping through the world for hundreds of years, has shattered the image of man in his wholeness and concreteness and cut him into broken pieces. Moreover, scientism merely illuminated some portions of man at most while it abandoned his other parts, which led man in his incompleteness into the world. Based upon such assumed premises of human nature, how can the humanities and social sciences formulate complete knowledge systems for their respective disciplines? A multitude of long-standing mistaken theories have been advanced based upon the incomplete knowledge on man. The following two examples will suffice to illustrate the above situation. Human psychology is rashly equated with man himself, and the assumptions about man himself can be substituted by those about human psychology, which has been habitually accepted as self-evident truths in the realm of management. However, this is not scientific, because human psychology can only be treated as a part of man in his wholeness and concreteness, and on no account can the former be identified with the latter. Instead of those assumptions about a living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness, such branches of learning as psychology, economics, politics, and ethics vie with one another in postulating their respective theories on human nature so that they will be capable of establishing a firm foothold for the theoretical systems within their

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respective territories of study. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the truthfulness of their theoretical postulations on human nature may be derived from those logical premises which fall far short of scientificalness. In terms of research objects of the humanities and social sciences, only the discipline of anthropology devotes itself truly and exclusively to the study of man in his wholeness and concreteness. Hence it is incumbent upon anthropology to propound the logical premises to man in his wholeness and concreteness for the humanities and social sciences. Considering the survival crisis of human existence has become more acute in the twenty-first century, the study and development of anthropology will have implications for those of some disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, and also affect the fate and future of mankind. (5) The Contorted Discipline System of Anthropology Any well-knit discipline must make its concepts, objects of study and discipline system agree with one another, which is true of the discipline of anthropology. In other words, anthropology’s concepts, objects of study and discipline system must also agree with one another. However, if anthropology’s concepts, objects of study and discipline system disagree with one another, many problems will be bound to arise. Generally speaking, a vast majority of anthropologists may define the term anthropology as “the science of humanity,” “the science of humans,” or “the scientific study of human beings as well as human cultures.” Despite this fact abovementioned, the majority of anthropologists tend to treat culture or society as the research object of anthropology while the minority may take culture and man as the object of study. In terms of anthropology’s research objects as well as its main body of knowledge, the vast majority of anthropologists pursue their studies which mainly revolve around culture or society, and basically contribute knowledge about culture or society to human civilization. As for the discipline systems of anthropology, they can be roughly divided into two representative schools: the American school and the Continental school. In general, the discipline of anthropology in the United States can be seen as composed of the two subfields of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology while the discipline of anthropology in the Continental Europe can be divided into such four independent subfields as anthropology, archaeology, ethnology, and linguistics. Fundamentally, the great majority of anthropologists pursue their studies in accordance with the foregoing discipline systems of anthropology. The basic contents contained in the foregoing discipline systems fail to cover knowledge about man himself and they are obviously incomplete. The above-mentioned theoretical expositions have shown that the discipline of anthropology itself brought about the disagreements and contortions between the concepts, the research objects and the discipline systems as well as the incomplete knowledge about man himself. Anthropology is the scientific discipline concerned with human beings as well as human cultures. However, culture or society is ensconced in the realm of anthropology and treated as the research object and discipline system while man himself is expelled from the territory of anthropology, which leads to the excursion and incompleteness of the research objects and discipline systems, but also the logical contradiction and confusion of the discipline systems. The following

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example will suffice to illustrate this regrettable situation. In general, the discipline of anthropology in the United States can be seen as composed of the two subfields of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology which can be further divided into several branches respectively. However, on no account will the two branches of anthropology cover all of the disciplines of anthropology, from which are excluded such branches of anthropology as personality or psychological anthropology, the anthropology of the family, anthropology of organizations, national anthropology (ethnography or ethnology) and the anthropology of the state. The foregoing disciplines of anthropology neither fall under the category of biological or physical anthropology nor come into the category of cultural anthropology. As scientific disciplines of anthropology, they deal with man himself, and ought to come under the category of subjective anthropology formulated in this very work. Whether they fall under the category of biological anthropology or come into the category of cultural anthropology, such categorization may sound not only illogical but ridiculous. Professor Jiang Bingzhao at Xianmeng University devoted a thought-provoking discussion to the foregoing problem in its fundamental bearings. In 1983, Professor Jiang Bingzhao published an article entitled Cultural Anthropology is not Equated with Ethnology at the Second (1983) Annual Meeting of Chinese Anthropological Society. He argued that cultural anthropology is a branch of anthropology in which sociality is the central concept and which focuses on the study of social statuses and roles, groups, institutions, and the relations among them while ethnology is the branch of anthropology that compares and analyzes the characteristics of different peoples and the relationships between them. He added that the concepts of the peoples came into existence only after humans made their appearance on the earth, and that the research contents of cultural anthropology failed to overlap with those of ethnology, and vice versa. As the chief compiler of Ethnology in the Broad Sense of the Term, Professor Shi Zhengyi at Minzu University of China holds that ethnology and anthropology cannot be subsumed under one and the same discipline, and that they cannot substitute for each other. Moreover, some Chinese scholars maintain that the subject who was constructed and confined in the past should revert to his selfhood and autonomy. It is thus clear or evident that the excursion or even deviation of the research objects and discipline systems of anthropology causes the discipline systems to be faced with how many serious problems and confusions. If the research object of anthropology is confined merely to the study of culture or society, and the discipline system of anthropology is kept within the limits of culture or society, then, whether it is man as the subject, personality as the subject, or group as the subject, any branch of anthropology which treats any or all of the foregoing three sorts of subjects as the object of study will come outside the category of anthropology! There is an only way to solve this serious logical problem, that is to say, anthropology ought to have the research object and discipline system revert to man himself as well as his culture, and seek to reconstruct or reestablish the discipline system based on the object of study–man himself as well as his culture. Hence, it is incumbent upon Chinese anthropologists to accomplish this historical task.

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2 The Mission of Anthropology and an Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthropology 2.1 The Historic Mission of Anthropology Anthropology is faced with two tasks of historical importance in the twenty-first century, that is to say, it must accomplish two fundamental changes. First, Anthropology must have the research object and the discipline system respectively revert from excursion to normal. This transformation entails a double change. First, anthropology must have the object of study revert from excursion to normal. Considering anthropology gave up the study of man himself and treated purely culture or society as the research object in the past, on the one hand the tendency must be corrected, but on the other, anthropology must be given enormous impetus so that it may treat man himself as well as his culture as the object of study and make the research object return to normal. Second, anthropology must accomplish the task of making the discipline system return from excursion to normal. That anthropology failed to make a direct study of man himself in the past caused few branches of anthropology to devote direct study to man himself and thus led to the excursion of the discipline system. To be more specific, while some disciplines were absorbed in the exploration of culture or society and others were buried in the study of human physique, few branches were devoted to the study of man himself. Culture or society cannot be equated with man himself, and human physique which is merely concerned with the biological bases of human beings cannot be identified with man himself either. In view of the abnormal situation mentioned-above, anthropology in the twenty-first century will have to shoulder another task of historical importance. Specifically speaking, anthropology ought to establish the subdivisions devoted to the study of man himself, reconstruct the discipline system of anthropology, and fulfill the task of making the discipline system revert from excursion to normal. When it has accomplished the foregoing double change, anthropology will be able to make itself directly devoted to the study of man himself as well as his culture, make a deep study of human beings as well as human cultures, and concerned about the survival and development of humanity so that it can make due contributions to the better fate of humanity—that is, personality, group or species. Second, anthropology must ensure a transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. As it is concerned about the survival and development of humanity (personality, group or species) and devoted to the task of improving the destiny of humanity (personality, group or species), anthropology will certainly arouse people’s enthusiasm and win their support as well as respect for itself, bring about a radical change in the passive situation where anthropology shows little concern for man himself and man himself cold-shoulders anthropology, make anthropology, which

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is concerned with man himself, and man himself, who is also solicitous for anthropology, produce a good influence on each other, and ultimately expedite its transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. Anthropology will have to accomplish the task of making the research object and the discipline system respectively revert from excursion to normal. Meanwhile, it will also lend an impetus to the transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. Between the foregoing two fundamental changes there exists an inherent identity. The reversion from excursion to normal on the part of anthropology’s research object and discipline system provides the presupposition and basis for the foregoing two fundamental changes while anthropology’s transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one constitutes the inevitable outcome of the foregoing two fundamental changes. Only if it has accomplished the task of making the research object and the discipline system respectively revert from excursion to normal, can anthropology give an impetus to the transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. Only if it strives for the success in transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one, can anthropology lend more powerful impetus to the reversion from excursion to normal on the part of anthropology’s research object and discipline system. Only if the foregoing two fundamental changes have been accomplished, can the prospects of anthropology and the destiny of humanity be inextricably linked with each other and improved mutually. A long time ago Chinese anthropologists came to realize the urgent necessity of bringing about a change in the research objects and discipline systems of anthropology. Fei Xiaotong or Fei Hsiao-tung (November 2, 1910-April 24, 2005), one of the foremost Chinese social anthropologists, was a pioneering researcher and professor of sociology and anthropology, and was also noted for his studies of China’s ethnic groups as well as of village life in China. One of China’s finest sociologists and anthropologists, his works on these subjects were instrumental in laying a solid foundation for the development of sociological and anthropological studies in China, as well as in introducing social and cultural phenomena of China to the international community.6 He pointed out, “The history of science as well as the development of science inspires humanity to make a study of himself, and anthropology, ‘the science of humanity’, which is the scientific study of human beings as well as their cultures and societies, is viewed as a pioneering work of the nineteenth century. After they devoted a long period of time to the exploration of anthropology, by the early nineteenth century anthropologists had established a set of methods which marked a new development and a new breakthrough in the humanities’ world. However, anthropologists may have encountered far more difficulties in developing the discipline of anthropology than they have done in establishing other sciences, not only because the humanities’ world encompasses a wide range of problems, but because how we make a study of humans is distinguished from the way that we conduct research on animals. Researchers must have a new point of view and a new realm of thought. That is to say, not only must researchers treat objects of study as external things, but 6

Boorman, Howard L. (1968). “Fei Hsiao-tung.” In Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. II. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 17–19.

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they must make use of the human traits with which they are endowed to understand objects of study by placing themselves in the shoes of research objects.”7 The foregoing ideas spurred Mr. Fei Xiaotong to turn out a multitude of famous works such as Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley in which he advanced such well-known thoughts as cross-cultural dialogue and cultural selfconsciousness. By making the authoritative statements mentioned-above, Mr. Fei Xiaotong held that anthropology, which by the early twentieth century had already developed a set of scientific methods, ought to conduct a study of man himself. However, researchers must have a new point of view and a new realm of thought in order to establish the science of anthropology. Mr. Fei Xiaotong had already realized the necessity of making a new breakthrough and change in the discipline of anthropology. Regretfully, when he came to realize the serious problem by which anthropology was confronted, Mr. Fei Xiaotong had reached an advanced age. He passed away in 2005. His long cherished hope that anthropology ought to have a new breakthrough, a new point of view and a new realm of thought has been clearly shown in his thoughts and works. The foregoing two historic missions, to wit the above-mentioned two fundamental changes, ought to be accomplished in the twenty-first century, and thus the Chinese anthropological circles are confronted with opportunities and challenges. As far as opportunities are concerned, Chinese anthropologists including scholars or researchers first become aware of the two tasks of historical importance, first take them upon themselves, and first advance and formulate a set of original theories —Principles of Subjective Anthropology, and thus they are faced with excellent opportunities and broad prospects. As far as challenges are concerned, the two tasks of historical importance are quite arduous, and they surely involve many complex problems ranging from theory to practice. The two arduous tasks will require anthropology to incorporate and transcend anthropological theories of the past, which may take several generations of Chinese scholars to persevere in their concerted efforts.

2.2 An Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthropology (1) A Basic Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthropology Based on the foregoing analyses, an idea for the reconstruction of the discipline system of anthropology is as follows. Anthropology should include three major branches, to wit subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and biological (or physical) anthropology, which can be further divided into smaller branches of knowledge or subfields of study respectively. Anthropology, also referred to as general 7

Fei, Xiao-Tong. (1996). Personal Ideas and Reflections on Scholarship. Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing, p. 328.

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anthropology, is the comprehensive study of human beings as well as of human cultures. The discipline encompasses three major branches, to wit subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and biological (or physical) anthropology. Subjective anthropology is mainly concerned with the study of man himself which includes the concrete mode of human existence—that is, the essence and ontology of man’s unique life, as well as the concrete mode of human survival. As a primary branch of anthropology, the science or discipline can be further divided into personality (or psychological) anthropology, the anthropology of the family, anthropology of organizations, national anthropology (ethnography or ethnology) and the anthropology of the state. As a major division of anthropology, cultural anthropology is focused on the study of culture in its many aspects which encompasses knowledge, belief, science and technology, education, art and institution as well as their respective regularities of production, development and change. As a subfield of anthropology, biological anthropology, also referred to as physical anthropology, is primarily concerned with the biological aspects of human beings and provides a biological perspective to the systematic study of human beings, which includes the synchronic and diachronic study of the biological bases of human beings. Physical anthropology includes such academic disciplines as paleoanthropology, anthropometry and ethnology, while cultural anthropology encompasses such scientific subfields as knowledge anthropology, linguistic anthropology and archaeology. The foregoing three major branches or divisions of anthropology can be further divided into smaller branches of knowledge or fields of study. (2) The Place of Subjective Anthropology in the Discipline System of Anthropology First, the relationship between anthropology and subjective anthropology constitutes that between discipline and branch. Subjective anthropology ensconced in the discipline system of anthropology is treated as one of the three primary branches of anthropology. Subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and physical anthropology together constitute the three major branches of anthropology, which can be further divided into smaller branches respectively. The three major branches characterized by mutual connection, mutual support, mutual penetration and mutual permeation together form the tree of anthropology. As one major branch of the tree of anthropology, subjective anthropology is mainly concerned with the study and explanation of the knowledge on man himself within the knowledge system of anthropology. Second, we seem to feel the necessity of some slight explanation on the idea for the branches of anthropology. The following branches of anthropology such as personality (or psychological) anthropology, the anthropology of the family, anthropology of organizations, national anthropology (ethnography or ethnology) and the anthropology of the state can be put under the designation of subjective anthropology. In order to attempt the reversion from excursion to normal on the part of the research objects and discipline systems of anthropology as well as the reconstruction of discipline systems of anthropology, we must muster courage and make painstaking efforts

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to achieve a breakthrough in the formulation of relevant theories as well as the reconstruction of discipline systems of anthropology. Here we might as well elucidate the vital life-force of humanity—“the intellectual power.” “The intellectual power” constitutes the vital life force indispensible for the survival and development of humanity. Although it is incapable of being seen or touched, yet we cannot negate its existence, nor even can we weaken its enormous power! “The intellectual power” is the influence exercised upon the course of social development in which in order to hold his destiny in his hands, humanity will have to grasp how things stand and what the future holds, make a judicious choice of the way ahead, and take the initiative in utilizing his theoretical and rational thinking abilities.8 From ancient times to the present, the Chinese nation has been in the habit of reflection and exploration, and endowed with the power of deep thinking and the power of indomitable will. The author himself set about the task of discovering and exploring the problem, to wit the excursion of the research objects and discipline systems of anthropology until he advanced and developed the tentative but pioneering theoretical system intended to solve the foregoing problem—“the principles of subjective anthropology,” which has taken him 25 years of resolute pursuit and arduous exploration from 1985 through 2010. As the Chinese saying goes, it takes twenty five years to sharpen a sword. The author cherishes an ardent hope that Chinese anthropologists will make collective efforts to study or explore the problems by which anthropology is confronted in the twenty-first century. We cherish the fervent conviction that Chinese scholars not only must but also can create the new discipline system of Chinese anthropology with Chinese characteristics, Chinese visions and Chinese styles in the twenty-first century!

3 The Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology 3.1 The Concept of Anthropology The term “anthropology” made its appearance roughly in the sixteenth century, and thenceforth came into existence various definitions of the term anthropology which were characterized by relative concentration and stability of meanings. In general, different versions of encyclopedia and famous anthropological literature or course books of the modern world share the view that anthropology is concerned with the study of man, that is to say the science that treats of man. Although anthropology encounters such a grave problem as the excursion of the research objects and discipline systems of anthropology, the understandings of the term anthropology are nevertheless characterized by relative concentration and stability of meanings, and 8

Gao, Qing-Hai., Hu, Hai-Bo., & He, Lai. (1998). Humans’ Gattungswesen Life and Their Gattungswesen Philosophy. Changchun: Jilin Publishing Group, p. 453.

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they are roughly scientific. The following examples will suffice to illustrate the foregoing argument. Anthropology is a scientific discipline which studies not only the origin and development of humanity himself but also those of material culture and spiritual culture created by humanity as well as their respective laws of development.9 In terms of its etymology, anthropology is the science that treats of man. In actual fact, among multitudes of sciences at the service of mankind, anthropology asserts itself as merely one of them.10 Anthropology studies human beings from biological and cultural perspectives. That part of anthropology which treats man as an animal is termed physical anthropology while that part which deals with modes of life created by people living in societies is referred to as cultural anthropology.11 Anthropology is a branch of learning concerned with the study of man as well as related non-human primates. As two combining forms of the term anthropology, “anthropos (human being, humankind or humanity)” and “logos (study, theory or science)” may owe their origins to Greek beginnings in terms of their respective etymologies. The two component parts are combined to mean “the science (or study) of man (or human beings).”12 As a science for the good of human learning, anthropology is the study of human nature and culture.13 The discipline of anthropology is concerned with the learning on humans.14 After a summation of the foregoing definitions of the term anthropology, we may admit that anthropology is a branch of learning concerned with the study of man as well as man himself and his cultures. The basic contents contained in the concept of anthropology may be viewed from two aspects. On the one hand it may be perceived as one branch of learning concerned with the study of man himself, but on the other it may be treated as the scientific study dealing with human cultures or societies. The study of man himself and that of human cultures or societies exist in organic unity with each other within the discipline of anthropology. “Man himself” and “culture (or society)” constitute the two principal elements of the concept of anthropology. The connection and unity and development of the two principal elements form anthropology’s system of core concepts and holistic knowledge system.

9

Yuan, Shi-Quan., & Feng, Tao., eds. (1990). Encylopaedia of China. Beijing: China Press, p. 971. “Anthropology.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 28 Feb. 2022 < https://www.encyclopedia.com > . 11 Ibid. 12 Zhou, Da-Ming. (2007). An Introduction to Anthropology. Kunming, China: Yunnan University Press, pp. 1–2. 13 Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2002). A General Survey of Anthropology. Taiyuan, China: Shanxi Education Press, pp. 268–269. 14 Wang, Ming-Ming. (2002). What is Anthropology? Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 2. 10

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3.2 The Concept of Subjective Anthropology Subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man as the subject, to wit his basic mode of existence and that of survival as well as their respective laws of change and development. That is to say, subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man’s basic mode of existence, to wit the essence and ontology of man’s unique life as well as their respective laws of change and development, and his basic mode of survival, to wit the construction of human values and that of holistic personality as well as their respective laws of change and development. The concept of subjective anthropology is endowed with the following properties. First, as a branch of learning, subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man himself, to wit man as the subject. Second, subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man’s basic mode of existence, to wit the essence and ontology of man’s unique life as well as their respective laws of change and development. Third, subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man’s basic mode of survival, to wit the construction of human values and that of holistic personality as well as their respective laws of change and development. Fourth, what subjective anthropology studies and reveals is the totality of man as the subject, including “personality” (individual) in his concreteness and wholeness, “group” (community) in their concreteness and wholeness, and “species” (kind or Gattungswesen) in his or its concreteness and wholeness.

3.3 The Research Objects of Subjective Anthropology The discipline of anthropology made its appearance over 200 years ago, and thenceforth the research objects and discipline systems of the scientific discipline of anthropology were subjected to universal deviation from their scientific and correct paths, namely, the excursion from the study of man himself as well as his culture to that of culture or society. Anthropology was neglectful of and even abstained from the study of “man himself,” which made the discipline deficient in and even empty of knowledge on man—anthropology’s main body of knowledge. Subjective anthropology is advanced and developed to study and address the following grave problems treated as the historic tasks which subjective anthropology will have to accomplish in the twenty-first century, that is to say anthropology’s excursion of the research objects and discipline systems and failure to illuminate man himself in his concreteness and totality. Therefore, it is incumbent upon subjective anthropology to accomplish such fundamental tasks as the concrete study of man himself as a whole and the concrete illumination of man himself as a whole. As a major branch of anthropology, subjective anthropology treats man himself in his concreteness and wholeness as the object of study. More specifically, the research object of subjective anthropology is man himself, to wit the basic mode of human existence and that of human survival as well as their respective laws of change

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and development. Subjective anthropology is the concrete study and illumination of the basic mode of human existence—the unique life ontology of man—“structure and choice”. Meanwhile, it also studies the basic mode of human survival, to wit the construction of human values and that of holistic personality as well as their respective laws of change and development. The illuminating explanations on the research object of anthropology are as follows: (1) Subjective Anthropology is the Concrete Study of Man Himself as a Whole, Which Can Be Demonstrated in the Following Three Aspects First, “man himself” refers to the total number of people as subjects, rather than a certain kind of man as the subject. Three kinds of subject are embodied in man as the subject. More specifically, in this very work, the individual is called “personality,” the community is referred to as “group,” including all the organizations marked by inherent self-integration and communities of human survival characterized by subjective independence and practice which are created by man, such as family, organization, nationality, state and international organization, and “species” is also known as kind (Gattungswesen). The contents of this work are mainly concerned with personality (individual) and group (community) as well as species (kind or Gattungswesen). Second, “man himself” denotes every kind of subject in his totality, rather than a part of every kind of subject. Whether it is concerned with personality, group or species, this work is invariably concerned with personality as a whole, group as a whole or species as a whole, rather than a certain part of the respective kinds of personality, group or species. As the part constitutes a formative element of the whole, this work is bound to deal with a certain part of the respective kinds of personality, group or species, but this is merely intended to meet the purpose of elucidating personality as a whole, group as a whole or species as a whole. Third, much heed ought to be paid to the distinction between the research objects of subjective anthropology and those of the philosophical “study of man.” In terms of their respective branches of learning, subjective anthropology and the philosophical “study of man” may fall under two different categories which lay claim to clearly different ways of dealing with their respective objects of study. Although they both take “man as a whole (or in his totality)” as their respective objects of study, subjective anthropology and the philosophical “study of man” may adopt vastly different ways of dealing with “man as a whole (or in his totality).” While the philosophical study of “man as a whole (or in his totality)” is aimed specifically at revealing the essence of “man as a whole (or in his totality),” subjective anthropology seeks to expound theoretical presuppositions concerning “man as a whole (or in his totality)” by bringing to light the essence or nature of “man as a whole (or in his totality).” To wit, the fundamental task of subjective anthropology is to reveal and elaborate “man as a whole (or in his totality)” as well as his essence or nature. What subjective anthropology treats as the object of study is “man in his concreteness and wholeness”, to be more specific, the concrete mode of human survival—that is, “structure and choice”, in which “man in his concreteness and wholeness” exists, such as the

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diagrammatical theory on “the structure of personality and choice”. Meanwhile, it also studies the basic mode of human survival in which “man in his concreteness and wholeness” survives—the construction of human values and that of holistic personality as well as the laws of human survival and development and change which “man in his concreteness and wholeness” has to obey in life. That subjective anthropology studies “man in his concreteness and wholeness” does not mean that it merely reveals the essence of “man as a whole (or in his totality).” (2) Subjective Anthropology Studies and Reveals the Essence or Nature of “Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness.” As the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness” constitutes the logical premise on which we can bring to light and gain a deeper insight into the mode of human existence (the noumenon of human life) and that of human survival which man himself is endowed with, priority must be given to the study and revelation of the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness.” In general, the way that we apprehend the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness” will determine how we understand and reveal the mode of human existence (the noumenon of human life) and that of human survival as well as their inherent laws of change and development. In the history of anthropology, such branches of learning as religious anthropology, rational anthropology, biological anthropology and cultural anthropology took the anthropological stage successively and vied with one another in advancing their respective theories so as to gain a solid foothold in the territory of anthropology, and it was bound to follow that there came into existence a considerable variety of theories on anthropology which stemmed from their respective logical premises marked by substantial differences among themselves. If we perceive the essence or nature of man as the creation of god, we will be bound to grasp and interpret the mode of human existence and that of human survival by making use of the will of god, and religious anthropology was sure to be established based on the foregoing theories of anthropology. If we attribute the essence or nature of man to human reason, we will be most likely to elucidate the mode of human existence and that of human survival by turning to rational principles, and such an anthropological perspective was certain to contribute immensely to the construction of rational anthropology. If the essence or nature of man is ascribed to the biological bases of human beings, the mode of human existence and that of human survival are certain to be explicated based upon the natural or biological phenomena, and the above theory was essential to spurring the appearance of biological anthropology. If we owe the essence or nature of man to culture, we will strive to understand and explain the mode of human existence and that of human survival from a cultural perspective, and the above-mentioned theory of anthropology brought about the construction of cultural anthropology. If we perceive the essence or nature of man as “subject of practice,” it is bound to follow that we will seek to expound the mode of human existence and that of human survival from the perspective of “subject of practice,” and the foregoing theory of anthropology will lend an enormous impetus to the construction of subjective anthropology. In summary, the logical premise of subjective anthropology consists in the study and

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revelation of the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness”, and therefore it constitutes an important object of study for subjective anthropology. (3) Subjective Anthropology Studies and Reveals the Concrete Mode of Human Existence Which Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness is Endowed with, to wit the Study and Revelation of the Noumenon of Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness The study of the concrete mode of human existence (the noumenon of human life) which man in his concreteness and wholeness is endowed with constitutes the answer to the question of “what man is”. In this work the author holds that man’s concrete mode of existence (the noumenon of human life) can be equated with man’s “structure and choice”. Man exists in the concrete mode of “structure and choice”, personality exists in the mode of “structure of personality and choice”, and group exists in the mode of “structure of group and choice”. Only if the life ontology of “structure and choice” of man or group is expounded, can “man himself” be really and truly elucidated. Moreover, it should be noted that the study and revelation of what man himself is implies deeper implications. What “man himself” is constitutes the basis and premise of “what man should be or should not be and “what man should do or should not do”. Only if “man himself”, to wit the mode of human existence, is formulated, can the mode of human survival—the construction of human values and that of sound personality be elucidated. Meanwhile, there exists another necessity for us to notice that the study and revelation of what “man himself” in his concreteness and wholeness is will produce an influence on various schools of thought as well as their theories in terms of their respective premises. More often than not, different answers to the question of what “man himself” is constitute the indispensible prerequisites to the emergence of different schools of anthropology. The following two examples will suffice to illustrate the above argument. French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss was arguably a leading exponent of structuralism who laid emphasis on the function of objective structures, but warranted little attention to the role of human agency (or man’s subjective initiative). In his view man’s subjectivity as well as choice does not mean anything. He believed that man’s existence is endowed with a set of a priori preexisting structures inherent in the depth of human subconsciousness, human beings cannot but obey these structures, and they can never change them. He also held that the nature and change of a social phenomenon is determined by the a priori preexisting structures, and human beings’ statements and actions governed by the universal structures can only be treated as their manifestations. Hence, the subject of society as well as of history is the a priori structure rather than man. Based on Claude LéviStrauss’ foregoing theories, structural anthropology came into existence. Subjective anthropology maintains that structural theories are one-sided. Man’s existence can be identified with “structure and choice.” Man’s existence is endowed with both structure and choice, to wit the unity of structure and choice. Subjective anthropology strives to explain “man himself” as well as his behavior by shedding light on the “structure and choice” of man characterized by complexity and mutability, hopes

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to ameliorate the prospects and destiny of humanity by improving the “structure and choice” of man, and then constructs the theoretical systems of subjective anthropology. In short, subjective anthropology shoulders the task of studying and revealing the concrete mode of human existence—“structure and choice,” in which man in his concreteness and wholeness exists, as well as its laws of change and development, which constitutes one of the fundamental contents of subjective anthropology. (4) As Well as the Laws of Destiny which He Strives to Grasp, Subjective Anthropology Studies and Reveals “Man Himself”—the Concrete Mode of Human Existence in which Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness Exists The mode of human survival which “man himself” is endowed with is different from that of human existence in which “man himself” exists. While the mode of human existence in which “man himself” exists is a kind of objective existence and falls within the scope of “what man is”, the mode of human survival which “man himself” is endowed with is the combination of subjectivity and objectivity, comes not only within the scope of “what man is” but within the realm of “what man should be” or “what man should become of”, and in essence, it is most likely to fall within the realm of “what man should be” or “what man should become of”. It should be pointed out that man in his concreteness and wholeness cherishes the good hopes and enthusiastic aspirations for the future which are embodied in the mode of human existence inherent in “man himself”. To be more specific, by studying and revealing the mode of human existence in which “man himself” exists, subjective anthropology ought to sum up the basic experience of human survival and draw the valuable lessons therefrom which man as the subject (personality, group and species) has learned since the dawn of civilization, particularly in the long history of 5000 years. It ought to explore the laws of human survival which man as the subject (personality, group and species) cannot but obey, reveal and address the fundamental Angst which man as the subject (personality, group and species) is confronted with in his actual existence. It ought to help man as the subject (personality, group and species) extricate himself from the survival predicament, constantly engage in self-reflection and transcend himself. Subjective anthropology must realize the foregoing ideals and aspirations so that it would find a reasonable road which man as the subject (personality, group and species) can take to march ahead. The mode of human existence inherent in “man himself” which subjective anthropology seeks to elucidate is characterized by open-endedness, to wit the unity of opposites of result and process, and never reaches a finished stated once and for all. Let’s make an apt analogy to illustrate the above point. Even though doctors can succeed in curing a multitude of diseases, they can never eradiate all diseases from the earth once and for all. Likewise, even if antivirus softwares can be successful in killing a myriad of viruses, they can never wipe out all viruses from networks of the world once and for all. Subjective anthropology cannot but follow in the wake of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species) and keep close track of the progress or development of his survival practice, cannot afford to relax in its assiduous efforts for a moment, and devote itself to the arduous study and exploration so that it would keep pace with him and keep abreast of all the most recent developments of his survival practice, reveal the inherent laws which he

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cannot but obey in his survival practice, and help humanity attain the goal of survival, development and eternal happiness—in the service of mankind forever. Since it boasts unique research objects and perspectives, subjective anthropology maintains that it occupies an unsubstitutable place among different groups of sciences or disciplines and possesses incalculable value to the study and exploration of the survival practice in which “man himself”—“man as the subject” (personality, group and species) cannot but engage himself. People will come to like and even cherish a deep affection for subjective anthropology in same way as they show an interest in and even have a passion for human anatomy and medical science as well as doctors. People cannot imagine how humans would survive if there were no human anatomy, medical science or doctors in the world. Likewise, in the twenty-first century people will not be able to imagine how humans would survive if there were no subjective anthropology or subjective anthropologists in the world!

4 Significance of the Construction of Subjective Anthropology 4.1 Providing Rational Frameworks and Methods for Man’s Knowledge About Himself In general, the way that man knows himself will determine how he creates himself and chooses to act. Self-knowledge constitutes the premise on which man creates himself and chooses to act. Over a long period of time, on the one hand scientism has resulted in the fragmentariness of man’s image, but on the other anthropology had its perspectives transferred to culture and society, which caused anthropology to be divorced from its rightful object of study—“man himself.” Humanity is plunged into confusion and crisis in which he meets with tremendous difficulties in knowing himself. Philosophical anthropologist Michael Landmann thought, “Even though people have made tremendous efforts to solve the question of what man is to which they furnished innumerable solutions, the question is nonetheless far from being really settled. In our age, all of the past images of man as a form of self-understanding have been broken”. He heartily subscribed to the following ideas entertained by Max Scheler who stated in the essay, “On the Idea of Man”: “In a certain sense all central problems of philosophy can be traced back to the question of what man is. If there is a philosophical task whose solution our age needs with singular desperation it is that of a philosophical anthropology.” Man has become, as Scheler says, problematic as never before; he no longer knows what he is, and he knows that he does not know it. Unsure of his way, questionable to himself, he therefore studies with unparalleled concern his own significance and reality, where he came from and what his destination is. But when he struggles for a new self-understanding, he is also struggling for his future form. The quest for an anthropology determines our reality. Everyone realizes

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vaguely that the question of man is the question of that decides our fate.15 While anthropology is the scientific study of “man himself as well as his cultures”, subjective anthropology is a branch of anthropology focused on the study of “man himself”, to wit the concrete mode of existence and that of survival of “man as the subject” as well as their respective laws of development. Hence, it is incumbent on subjective anthropology to explain and expound man and remove man’s confusion about selfknowledge. The relationship between “man himself” and subjective anthropology can be described this way: the mysteries of subjective anthropology consist in “man himself” while those of “man himself” lie in subjective anthropology. The four ideas about man which subjective anthropology seeks to advance and expound are as follows: (1) the idea on the premise of human nature (practical subject); (2) the idea. on the mode of human existence (the life ontology of “structure and choice”—the diagrammatical theory on “the structure of personality and choice” and the diagrammatical theory on “the structure of group and choice”); (3) the idea on the mode of human existence (“construction of the value system of group” and “construction of holistic personality”); (4) the idea on the reconstruction of the discipline system of anthropology. This includes two reforms. The first is to advance the original concept of “subjective anthropology” and construct the theoretical system of “subjective anthropology.” The second is to advance and expound the original idea on the reconstruction of the discipline system of anthropology. Anthropology ought not to cling to the present discipline system which encompasses such two major branches of learning as “biological anthropology” and “cultural anthropology,” but rather construct such three primary branches of learning as “subjective anthropology,” “cultural anthropology” and “biological anthropology,” which can be further divided into several smaller branches respectively. Subjective anthropology not only reveals and expounds the two main questions of ontology (epistemology) and axiology (ethics), “What is man?” “What should man do? (How should man live?),” but brings to light and elucidates the ways of knowing and explaining man, so that it can furnish theoretical frameworks and scientific methods which man may avail himself of to gain a deeper insight into himself.

4.2 Furnishing Humanity with Rational Knowledge He Can Use to Be Master of His Destiny What determines the destiny of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species)? How is the destiny determined? What is the relationship between “man as the subject” and his destiny? Fundamentally speaking, these problems are vitally concerned with the survival of human beings. Subjective anthropology has made a scientific answer 15

Landmann, M. (1988). Philosophical Anthropology. Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, pp. 3–4.

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to the foregoing question by offering original theories and methods that humanity can avail himself of to be master of his own fate. The above-mentioned theories and methods can be mostly summed up in the following three fundamental principles which are closely linked with the existence of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species). (1) Theory of “Structure and Choice” Subjective anthropology advances and expounds the proposition of “structure and choice”, holding that the theory of “structure and choice” constitutes not only the life ontology of man, but the methodology of man’s knowledge of human life, and the existentialism guiding man into the future. It furnishes a profound exposition of the significance and implications that “structure and choice” will hold for the human destiny. The above significance and implications are mainly embodied in the following two points. First, subjective anthropology argues that the destiny of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species) is mainly determined by “structure and choice”, to wit by the choice he has made based on the structure. “Structure” furnishes him with the basis and possibility of “choice” while “choice” determines his reality. Man’s connected curves in real life constitute his destiny. Second, subjective anthropology also maintains that “structure” of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species) is not only inheritable, preexistent and fixed, but also creative, selective and open-ended, and choice can affect “structure” and even reconstruct “structure”. Therefore, the destiny of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species) will be determined by the choice he has made based on the particular premise of “structure”. The life ontology of “structure and choice” of man is marked by the following definitive properties. Structure is the basis of life, choice is the creativity of life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of life basis and life creativity. Structure is what has been in life, choice is what is to be in life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of what has been in life and what is to be in life. Structure is the regulation of life, choice is the freedom of life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of life regulation and life freedom. Structure is the tradition of life, choice is the transcendence of life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of life tradition and life transcendence. Structure is the finitude of life, choice is the infinity of life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of life finitude and life infinity. Structure determines choice, and vice versa. Between structure and choice there exists the unity of opposites on the basis of mutual penetration and regulation, mutual support and limitation, and mutual connection and transformation. “Structure and choice” is the basic way in which under the pressure of the external environment man as the subject responds to environmental challenges as well as pressures and takes control of his destiny, to wit, the basic way in which man as the subject remolds the subjective world while changing the objective world, and gains mastery of the present and the future while stepping towards freedom. Whether for personality or for group as well as for all humanity, the significance and implications that “structure and choice” will hold for the human destiny will be universal.

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(2) Top-down Construction of the Value System of Group Subjective anthropology, which advances and expounds the top-down construction of the value system of group, holds that, whether in the past or at present, the topdown construction of the value system of group is of vital importance. Especially in the era of economic and information globalization, whether the construction of the value system of group is top-down or not will play a decisive role in the destiny of group as well as in its ups and downs, and the same is true of family, organization, nationality, state or international organization. Whichever group has succeeded in constructing the top-down value system is bound to travel the path of prosperity and progress and make people live a happy life while whichever group fails to construct the top-down value system is sure to follow the road of poverty and backwardness and make people live a miserable life. This has been proved not only by what happened in the long history of 5000 years, but by the grim realities of the contemporary era. (3) Construction of “Sound Personality” Subjective anthropology, which advances and expounds the construction of “sound personality,” maintains that the human evolution of 1.7 million years constituted a witness to the perfection of the potentialities of the structure of personality, to wit “the tertiary structure and eight drives (or powers)” which can be genetically transmitted through generations. People throughout the world are endowed with pretty much the same potentialities, regardless of race (white, yellow or black, to name but a few), gender or age. The differences in their respective potentialities among people can be mostly attributed to their distinct results of nurture. Therefore, subjective anthropology maintains that we ought to allow full play to human potentialities and construct holistic personality, which is of fundamental importance to the destiny and future of all people throughout the world, regardless of personality, group or all humanity.

4.3 Laying the Foundation of Anthropology’s Transition from the Borderline Discipline to the Mainstream One Anthropology’s marginalization has become an indisputable fact when viewed from a global perspective. At the present time anthropology’s marginalization from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one constitutes a historic task in anthropological circles. In order to accomplish a substantial change in the discipline of anthropology, anthropological circles must strive to discover the fundamental causes of humanity’s marginalization. After a careful analysis of the development of anthropology in the past 200 years, it is not difficult to find that anthropology’s marginalization can be attributed to the result of anthropology’s self- marginalization. The excursion (or deviation) of anthropology’s research objects and discipline systems leads to anthropology’s marginalization. As a branch of learning, anthropology is the scientific study of human beings as well as human cultures. However, after culture

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anthropology came on the anthropological stage, anthropology changed from the study of man himself as well as his cultures to that of culture and society. Anthropology had its rightful object of study—“man himself” subjected to excursion (or deviation), and thus sowed the seeds of self-marginalization. The seeds bore flowers and fruits—anthropology’s marginalization, which can be embodied in the vivid description of how anthropology that cold-shoulders man himself is treated coolly by man himself. The foregoing facts may warrant the only conclusion that anthropology which seeks to inaugurate the historic change from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one cannot but start off having anthropology’s research objects and discipline systems return to normal. The construction of subjective anthropology may serve as a decisive step towards anthropology’s transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. However, if anthropology seeks to initiate the genuine transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one, anthropologists cannot but carry out overall reforms in the discipline system of anthropology, which will lay the solid foundation of anthropology’s transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. To this end, this work maintains that anthropology will be faced with the following three important tasks of constructing discipline systems in order to bring about the transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. First, anthropology ought to make the object of study revert to normal. To wit, it ought to strive for the reversion from the basic study of culture or society to that of man himself as well as his cultures. Second, subjective anthropology ought to be constructed so that it can be exclusively devoted to the study of man himself, to wit the study of the essence or nature of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species), his basic mode of existence and that of survival as well as their respective laws of development. Third, anthropology ought to carry out overall reforms in the present discipline system of anthropology and institute the original discipline system of anthropology which encompasses such three primary branches as subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and biological anthropology. Only in this way can anthropology lay the solid foundation of the transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one and enter into a virtuous circle in which anthropology is interested in man himself and man himself is also concerned with anthropology so that it can succeed in bringing about the historic transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. The author is deeply convinced that this historical change of anthropology is sure to be inaugurated by Chinese anthropologists and accomplished by them.

4.4 Providing the Humanities and Social Sciences with Original Premises on Which to Fathom the Mysteries of Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness In general, the majority of humanities and social sciences can be viewed as the science of humanity respectively, and “what is man?” may constitute one premise of these

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sciences. Whether or not it is profound or whether or not it is wrong, knowledge on “what man is” will be directly concerned with the scientificity and valuableness of humanities and social sciences. However, the question of “what man is” has been far from being really solved up to now. The assumptions on human nature which the humanities and social sciences seek to provide are more often than not incomplete and fragmentary. A couple of examples will suffice to illustrate the above point. “Philosophy traces “the assumption on human nature” back to the essence or nature of man; ethics, to man’s morality; psychology, to the human psychology; jurisprudence, to citizens’ (or civic) rights and obligations before the law. However, their respective assumptions on human nature cannot be equated with the concrete and whole man, but can only represent different parts of man in his concreteness and wholeness. After all, man exists and acts the way that man in his concreteness and wholeness does, and whatever part of him is subjected to external stimuli, he is bound to respond the way that man in his concreteness and wholeness is sure to do so. It is also necessary to point out that numerous disciplines advance the assumptions on human nature only universal to their respective fields, which they would more often than not use as the premises to construct the theories and knowledge systems of their respective disciplines. The following examples will suffice to justify the point. The science of economics will more often than not construct economic theories and knowledge systems purely on the assumptions of “economic man”. Likewise, the discipline of management will also build up management theories and knowledge systems completely on the assumptions of “psychological man”. However, the foregoing assumptions on human nature are impossible, nonexistent, and thus unscientific. It is hard to imagine whether or not there does exist any universal truthfulness in their respective theories and knowledge systems. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the paradox of human existence has been increasingly manifest, and against this backdrop the incomplete and faulty “assumptions on human nature” will surely make various sciences fall into their respective areas of mistaken theories. Just as German philosophical anthropologist M. Landmann stated, “Even though modern people possess multifaceted knowledge on the human world, such cognition nevertheless blurs the image of man, and thus our age lacks exactly the clear and welldefined image of man.” Subjective anthropology seeks to furnish various sciences with the assumptions and premises on man in his concreteness and wholeness by trying to reveal and explain him, which will surely help humanities and social sciences conform to the realities of man in his concreteness and wholeness in a more scientific, more perfect and more efficient way.

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4.5 Providing a Theoretical Basis for the Discipline in Order for Chinese Anthropology to Rank Among Its Global Peers Marx held that the problem is the slogan of the times and the most practical voice reflecting the spirit of the times. Making anthropology’s research objects and discipline systems return to normal, establishing subjective anthropology and reconstructing the discipline system of anthropology may be thought of as being in some way analogous to the slogan of the times and the most practical voice reflecting the spirit of the times. The slogan of the times as well as the most practical voice reflecting the spirit of the times is not only what is expected of anthropology itself but of the Chinese nation. The twenty-first century will surely bear witness to the rapid rise of the Chinese nation, and with the rise of the Chinese nation, the spirit of the Chinese nation is certain to be flourishing and leading the world. China may be the starting place for these historic tasks of anthropology such as making anthropology’s research objects and discipline systems revert to normal, establishing subjective anthropology and reconstructing the discipline system of anthropology which will surely provide the theoretical basis for China’s anthropology with the Chinese characteristics, the Chinese spirit and the Chinese style, inaugurate Chinese anthropology’s transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one, and rank among its global peers in the end. Chinese anthropology will not only contribute the theoretical knowledge on “man himself as well as his cultures” to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as well as to the existence and development of all mankind, but contribute wisdom to the survival, development and happiness of China and all humanity.

References 1. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1982). Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men. Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 62. 2. Hu, Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, pp. 2–3; Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2006). An Introduction to Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, p.11. 3. Hu Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, pp. 2–3. 4. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149. 5. Boorman, Howard L. (1968). “Fei Hsiao-tung.” In Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. II. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 17–19. 6. Fei, Xiao-Tong. (1996). Personal Ideas and Reflections on Scholarship. Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing, p. 328. 7. Gao, Qing-Hai., Hu, Hai-Bo., & He, Lai. (1998). Humans’ Gattungswesen Life and Their Gattungswesen Philosophy. Changchun: Jilin Publishing Group, p. 453. 8. Yuan, Shi-Quan., & Feng, Tao., eds. (1990). Encylopaedia of China. Beijing: China Press, p. 971. 9. “Anthropology.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 28 Feb. 2022 .

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10. Zhou, Da-Ming. (2007). An Introduction to Anthropolgy. Kunming, China: Yunnan University Press, pp. 1–2. 11. Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2002). A General Survey of Anthropology. Taiyuan, China: Shanxi Education Press, pp. 268-269. 12. Wang, Ming-Ming. (2002). What is Anthropology? Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 2. 13. Landmann, M. (1988). Philosophical Anthropology. Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, pp. 3–4.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Foundation and Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology

Advancing “the theory of structure and choice” cannot be divorced from the road to human civilization. Marxist theory constitutes the theoretical basis of “structure and choice,” and anthropology as well as other related humanities and social sciences affords the knowlsedge base for “the theory of structure and choice.” It is worth noting that theories of Marxist dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Marxist theory on humanity in particular, provides theoretical basis, guiding ideology and scientific methods for the construction of “structure and choice.”

1 Theoretical Foundation of Subjective Anthropology 1.1 World Outlooks of Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism As a well-knit and well organized theoretical system, Marxist dialectical and historical materialism is a theory on the universal laws of natural, social and thought development, which provides the scientific world outlook and methodology for the proletariat as well as for all mankind. Marxist theories, such as “the world is by its very nature material,” the unity of matter and consciousness, the relationship between practice and the world where human beings exist, the basic laws of universal connection and development of the world, the basic contradictions of society as well as their laws of development, the driving force for social development, human beings’ cognitive activities as well as their laws, truth and value, and mankind’s emancipation and human beings’ free and all-round development, provide the scientific and specific guide for the construction of “the theory of structure and choice” and lay the solid foundation of “the theory of structure and choice.”

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 B. Chen, Principles of Subjective Anthropology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_3

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As a core category of “the theory of structure and choice,” Marxist historical materialism constitutes the soul of “the theory of structure and choice.” Engels held that historical materialism is the new world outlook founded by Marx. In the Foreword to Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy written in 1888, Frederick Engels rendered an authoritative judgment on Theses on Feuerbach by Karl Marx in the spring of 1845, holding that the brilliant germ of Marx’s new world outlook was deposited in the first invaluable document.1 In 1859 Marx offered an authoritative exposition of his new outlook on the world in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. “The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies, can be summarized as follows. In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the tasks itself arises only when the material conditions of its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, 1 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 213.

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and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonisms, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of society to a close.”2 The foregoing lucid and in-depth exposition by Marx not only expounds the structure of human society, the formative elements of society, the fundamental driving force of social development, the mechanism and mode of social development, but also reveals the course, phase and prospects of social development, and sheds lights on the basic laws governing the development of human society. Marxist thoughts mentioned above constitute not only the core of all historical materialism but also the basis and soul of the whole theory of “structure and choice.” In the meantime, Marx and Engels incisively expounded man’s subjective initiative, subjectivity and creativity. From the viewpoint of Marx, in actual production the subject is man while the object is nature,3 and man as the subject must be the point of departure,4 which illustrates that in this world only man can act as subject and claim to be the rightful purpose and point of departure of all activities while the other natural objects can only be treated as objects. Engels sought to make the above point more explicit by holding that in the socialist society man becomes master of his social combinations at last, thereby becoming lord of the natural world. “Then, for the first time, man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face-to-face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man’s own social organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have, hitherto, governed history, pass under the control of man himself. Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history—only from that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.”5 In the thoughts 2

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 82–83. 3 Ibid., p. 88. 4 Marx, K.,& Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 121. 5 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Marx & Engels: Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 760.

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of Marx and Engels, man as the concrete and historical subject whose fundamental mode of existence can be identified with human practice is able to enter into free and conscious activities in specific social relations and, in Engels’ view, claim to be master of three types, to wit lord of nature, society and himself respectively. Marx offered an authoritative exposition of the above point. “Man is a species-being,6 not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but—and this is only another way of expressing it—also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being. The whole character of a species, its species— character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Life itself appears only as a means to life. The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity.”7 Marx and Engels’ brilliant exposition of man’s subjectivity, initiative (subjective activity or dynamic role) and free and conscious life activity not only lays the foundation of “the theory of structure and choice, but enables man to determine his fate by making a creative choice based on “structure”.

1.2 Marx’s Theory of Practice Historical materialism (also materialist conception of history) constructed by Marx and Engels is articulated as their new world outlook which is mainly concerned with the scientific theory of practice. Practice is man’s unique mode of existence as well as of survival in which man can actively know and reform the world so as to respond to the pressure of the external environment by solving survival problems. Practice perceived as the essence of human life is the fundamental mode in which human beings exist and survive, and constitutes the basis of differentiation and unity of man’s natural life and supernatural life, objective world and subjective world, and world-in-itself and human world. As the basic mode of human existence and that of human survival, practice aroused considerable concern and discussion of philosophers long ago. However, neither eastern scholars nor western ones failed to furnish a scientific exposition of the essence and meaning of practice before Marx and Engels addressed themselves to the conception of practice. For the first time 6

The term “species-being” (Gattungswesen) is derived from Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy where it is applied to man and mankind as a whole. 7 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p.95.

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in the history of human thought Marx and Engels furnished a scientific exposition of practice, holding that practice can be defined as the human activities that human beings are actively engaged in to know and reform the world so that they would be able to arouse strong hopes of survival, address themselves to the pressure of the external environment, and travel the path of development. In the struggle against old materialism, Marx incisively elaborated on the theory of practice characterized by man’s initiative (man’s active or dynamic role, man’s subjective activity). At the very beginning of Theses on Feuerbach, Marx offered trenchant criticism of the old materialism. “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.”8 Marx’s theory of practice sought to have the active side of man as the subject developed abstractly by idealism reestablished on the base of materialism. For the first time in the history of learning, Marx treated material production as the foremost form of practice, and raised practice up to the level of man’s unique mode of existence as well as of survival. Marx’s conception of practice constitutes the theoretical foothold and cornerstone of the theory of “structure and choice.” An in-depth exposition of “the foremost form of practice” offered by Marx is as follows. “Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite form of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. This production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its turn this presupposes the intercourse [Verkehr] of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production.”9 As man’s unique mode of existence as well as of survival, practice which treats material production as its foremost manifestation constitutes not only the fundamental distinction between human beings and animals but also one of the basic causes of interpersonal difference. This is because practice 8

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Theses on Feuerbach. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 54. 9 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 67 – 68.

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is the basis of man’s existence, the basis of man’s social relations and the basis of man’s conscious activities. The essence of practice consists in the social activities which human beings are actively engaged in to know and reform the world. Practice is the objective, sensuous activity characterized by the immediate reality. Practice is man’s active, conscious activity. Animals adjust themselves to the environment by following their respective patterns of gene expression and submitting to a wide variety of environmental restraints. In contradistinction to animals’ instinctive adaptability of their surroundings, human practical activity is endowed with human consciousness and purpose. At the very beginning, the purpose in the form of concepts or ideas exists in the mind of the practitioner, who is aware that the purpose in the role of a law determines the means and ways of his activity.10 Practice abundantly demonstrates man’s initiative and conscious activity. As Mao Zedong pointed out, “ideas, etc. are subjective, while deeds or actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both represent the dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of dynamic role ‘man’s conscious dynamic role,’ and it is a characteristic that distinguishes man from all other beings.”11 It goes without saying that practice is certain to be man’s social practice and human beings’ practical activities cannot but be conditioned by certain social and historical circumstances. Different social conditions will lead to distinct practical activities. In The German Ideology written from the fall of 1845 to mid-1846, Marx offered an incisive exposition of the relationship between practice and history. Moreover, in 1852 Marx furnished a trenchant exposition of the above point in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”12 Particular emphasis should also be given to the following point. Practice forms not only the basis of man’s “dual life” such as “natural life and supernatural life,” “objective world and subjective world,” “world-in-itself and human world,” and “humanized nature and human society,” but also the basis of the unity of man’s “dual life” such as “objective world and subjective world,” “world-in-itself and human world,” and “humanized nature and human society,” as well as the basis of man’s change from alienation to humanization and freedom. Marx’s theory of practice constitutes an important theoretical basis of the theory of “structure and choice.”

10

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 23: Marx & Engels: Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 202. 11 Mao, Ze-Dong. (1991). Mao Zedong Selected Works, Volume 2: On Protracted War. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 477. 12 Shapiro, Fred R., ed. (2021). The New Yale Book of Quotations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 530.

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1.3 Marxist Theory of Human Beings (or Marxist Human Theory) Marxist theory of human beings boasts abundant and profound thoughts, and hence constitutes an important theoretical basis of the theory of “structure and choice.” It mainly includes the following contents. “Real man” is conceived as the foothold of Marxist theory of human beings. The course that human self-knowledge has taken can be roughly divided into three historical stages, to wit the stage of intuitive understanding, that of reflective abstraction and that of dialectical all-dimensional understanding. In the first stage, people can acquire a grasp of man mainly by virtue of intuitive understanding. In the second stage, people may put an abstract definition on man by reflecting on human reason. In the third stage, people can achieve a realistic, historical and concrete understanding of man. These are Marx’s important thoughts upon “real man,” and they constitute the cornerstone of Marx’s theory of human beings. The materialist conception of history (or the historical materialism) founded by Marx uncovers not only the historical mystery of the evolution of human society but also “Sphinx’s riddle” of man’s development. Marx believes that human change and development can be attributed to the fact that humans are social beings and subjects of social practical activities, which affords the key to an understanding of the mystery of man as well as his evolution, treats man as a process of dialectical development and views the essence of man as well as his mode of existence as a process, that is to say, a river rolling on incessantly. This demonstrates that man is endowed with boundless development and infinite richness, and constitutes the fundamental reason that before Marx addressed himself to the question of man, a multitude of theorists failed to achieve an understanding of man. While conducting a systematic and profound examination of Marx’s thoughts upon “real man,” we can also find out that Marxist theory of human beings (or Marxist human theory) boasts abundant and profound thoughts, and Marxism is never devoid of the “empty field” of human study. Marx profoundly revealed the essence or nature of man, which is reflected in the following principal points. First, Marx holds that humans are social beings and endowed with sociability. Humans are endowed by nature with the following four characteristics, to wit interdependence, sociability, morality and corporation in labor.13 Marx believes that man is the most veritable social animal, that is to say, he is not only a sociable (or gregarious) animal, but an independent animal merely in society. Engels also thinks that man is the most social of all animals.14 Society constitutes the living conditions under which people depend on one another. The essence of man is not immutable, but evolves with the change of social practice, social relations and historical conditions. Second, Marx once elaborated on the nature of man. The species-essence of man is the free, conscious activity, to wit the active, practical activity or labor. In Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx once 13

Yuan, Gui-Ren. (1988). Man’s Philosophy. Beijing: Workers’ Publishing House, pp. 44–53. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 512.

14

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pointed out, “For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species—character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Life itself appears only as a means to life.” “The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. Estranged labor reverses the relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes life activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence.” “In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. …An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.” “It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his specieslife, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature is taken from him. Similarly, in degrading spontaneous, free activity to a means, estranged labor makes man’s species-life a means to his physical existence. The consciousness which man has of his species is thus transformed by estrangement in such a way that species-life becomes for him a means.” “Estranged labor turns thus: Man’s species-being, both nature and his spiritual species-property, into a being alien to him, into a means of his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect. An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity, form his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man. When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labor and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to the man’s labor and object of labor. In fact, the proposition that man’s species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature. The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man stands to himself, is realized and expressed only in

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the relationship in which a man stands to other men. Hence within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker.”15 Engels wrote in Dialectics of Nature, “And what do we find once more as the characteristic difference between the troupe of monkeys and human society? Labor. …Labor begins with the making of tools.” Then he added, “In short, the animal merely uses its environment, and brings about changes in it simply by its presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals, and once again it is labor that brings about this distinction.”16 Marx also pointed out, “But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.”17 What Marx meant by “the ensemble of the social relations” can be interpreted as a multilevel and multifaceted structure. The nature of man is not unchangeable but evolves. As far as an individual is concerned, the essence of man also evolves, that is to say, the nature or essence of man also changes or evolves, which is true of or universal to any individual case. Even though living conditions are roughly the same, the difference in human nature may also arise. How does this difference come about? It ought to be admitted that the main reason lies in the influence of social relations, that is to say, his social experiences and concrete relations will determine his nature. Failure to accept the foregoing proposition will constitute a departure from materialism. However, we cannot but admit that an individual’s subjective effort and choice will play an important, sometimes even a decisive, role in the formation of his nature. Failure to recognize the above point will be conceived as a departure from dialectics. Marx profoundly expounded on the theory of the whole man. In The German Ideology Marx formally produced the scientific conception of separate individuals’ all-round development and thenceforward furnished a systematic exposition of the concept in many important works. Marx emphasized that intellectual and physical strength of all members of society should achieve their full and free and harmonious development in many ways in the course of production. In Principles of Communism Engels also pointed out, “Industry controlled by society as a whole, and operated according to a plan, presupposes well-rounded human beings, their faculties developed in balanced fashion, able to see the system of production in its entirety.”18 Marx gave special emphasis to the proposition that men should be “whole individuals,” to wit well-rounded human beings. As a whole individual, man should be possessed of all his nature or essence in an all-round manner. Marxist theory profoundly unveiled the cause of man’s one-sided development—the division of labor. Private ownership and class exploitation, meanwhile, aggravated this one-sidedness. Marx held 15

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 96. 16 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 513, 517. 17 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Complete Works, Volume 3: Marx: Theses on Feuerbach. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 5. 18 Marx, K., Engels, F. (1958). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Principles of Communism. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 370.

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that the true division of labor begins with the separation between material labor and mental labor. The division of labor which occurs in the production of a commodity under capitalism completely destroys the independence of workers and makes them become the parts of social institutions under the command of capital.19 Engels made several similar points in Anti-Dühring, “As labor is divided into several parts, so man himself is divided into several parts. To secure training in a single activity makes it highly necessary that all other physical and mental faculties should be sacrificed. This deformity of human development and the division of labor go hand in hand.”20 Therefore, to change the abnormal development of human beings must of necessity presuppose the transformation of this old social division of labor based on capitalist exploitation. Marx thinks that human development is a dialectical process of development. Man is a historical being and human life is a process of constant introspection and transcendence. Marx pointed out that the process of human growth must of necessity go through three basic stages and three historical forms in chronological order. First, the form of human dependency came into existence when man was at the mercy of his environment. At that time, although they were already out of the animal kingdom, human beings were still unable to rid themselves of the dependence on nature, and so they could not but form a community, which severely impeded or hindered the development of individual autonomy and creativity. Second, human independence is based on the dependence on money existing in the form of a special commodity and generally accepted as a medium of exchange. In the further development of human beings, their social connections gradually replaced those with nature, which not only promoted the germination and development of individual autonomy, but helped the individual come into existence, who entertained the individual-oriented conception and attached much value to independent personality. Human success in ascending this step of development lies in the development of commodity market economy and the material exchange between people. This development boasts a dual character. On the one hand, individual independence promotes human liberation and development, but on the other, while he is liberated from the bondage of his relations with nature, man is again bound up in fetters of money existing in the form of a special commodity and generally accepted as a medium of exchange. Third, free individuality is based upon the all-round development of separate individuals and their common powers of social production which constitute their social wealth. This is the free and conscious form of human development. These three basic stages and three historical forms constitute the process which human growth must of necessity go through one after another, to wit the course of spiral escalation which must of necessity follow the law of negation of negation. Marx profoundly elaborated on the theory of human value. First, in order for us to acquire a good grasp of the conception of human value, it will become a 19

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 47: Marx: Economic Manuscripts of 1861–63. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 309. 20 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: AntiDühring. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 316.

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foremost necessity to elucidate Marx’s thoughts on the two standards of human labor, to wit “the standard of the species” and “the inherent standard of man.” In Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx wrote, “An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.”21 What Marx meant here by “the inherent standard” refers to “the standard of human beings,” that is to say “the standard of human value.” Second, it is imperative to achieve an objective and correct understanding of the concept of value as well as that of human value. Marx believed that the universal concept of value emerges from human beings’ relationships with objects that satisfy their needs. The subject is the human being and the human society while the object is the objective reality. Value represents the function and significance of objective things for the existence and development of human beings and human society. To put it simply, value is the objective attribute of things to meet people’s certain needs. In general, human value is different from objective things. Human value boasts its uniqueness. In addition to the social value that people acquire possession of while meeting the needs of society, the satisfaction of human existence and needs also constitutes a kind of value. The following examples will suffice to illustrate this point. Either a person who is terminally ill and hence deprived of all ability to work or a person who is physically handicapped and has never been able to do any work really cannot do any more for society. However, he is the subject, and the satisfaction of his own existence and needs is the value. He is also entitled to survive, to attain material and spiritual satisfaction, and to have his personality respected. Man is the unity of subject and object. Man as the object must contribute to society in order to gain possession of value while man as the subject is entitled to the respect and satisfaction which also constitute a kind of value. The so-called human value is the unity of the respect and satisfaction which the individual receives from the society and the individual’s duty and contribution to the society. Under socialism, human value devoid of either of these two aspects will be incomplete. Marxist theory on the two standards of human labor (“the standard of the species” and “the inherent standard of man”) as well as the theory on human value provides a theoretical basis for examining the principle of reasonable existence of man as the subject.

1.4 Marx’s Thoughts on Anthropology Although he failed to produce any anthropological work in his whole life, Marx did have abundant thoughts on anthropology in a multitude of works. Marx was much concerned over anthropology. Marx never stopped studying anthropological materials and theories since he set out to establish historical materialism and the theory 21

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 97.

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of surplus value. After the first volume of Das Kapital came out, Marx devoted much of his energy and time to the study of anthropology till the end of his life. During the period of his life, he made voluminous notes on anthropology such as The Conspectus (Précis) of Lewis H. Morgan’s “Ancient History,” Notes to (on) Maksim M. Kovalevsky’s Books—“Communal Landownership” and “Historic-Comparative Method,” Notes to (on) Mayne’s Work, Notes on John Lubbock’s Works in The Natural History Review and Notes on Phil’s Work. Moreover, he read and studied many anthropological notes made by such scholars as Moni, Mauler and Huxter Hausenin their works. Marx had a lot of research pieces and letters that also contained brilliant ideas on anthropology. Marx wrote a lot of research pieces on the Asiatic mode of production. Letters to the editorial board of the Chronicle of the Motherland as well as those to Zasulich all contained important thoughts on anthropology. Engels carried on Marx’s unfinished work, developed his anthropological theories and fulfilled his will by completing and publishing the anthropological monograph entitled The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. The anthropological thoughts of Marx and Engels were primarily concerned with philosophical anthropology and cultural anthropology (or social anthropology). Admittedly, anthropology has always been a theme of Marx’s theoretical activities. Besides the consistent themes of philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism, there is also a constant theme of anthropology in Marx’s theoretical activities. Marx’s anthropological thoughts were not only engraved in the minds of his day, but also are treasured up in the memory of modern people. The influence of Marx’s anthropological thoughts is mainly shown as follows. Marx paid much attention to the study of human history and interpreted the abundant fruits of many years’ study on social history as the research results of human history. In The German Ideology he wrote, “History can be examined in two ways or from two aspects, that is to say, history can be divided into natural history and human history. But these two aspects are indivisible, and as long as there exist men, natural history and human history will be mutually conditioned. Natural history, the so-called natural science, we shall not discuss here; what we should make an in-depth study of is human history, because the entire ideology either distorts human history or ignores it altogether.”22 In fact, Marx’s theory of human or social history not only constitutes one of the core contents of all Marxist theories, but also produces a tremendous influence on the socialist movement throughout the world and the modernization of the contemporary Third World. In the Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy published in 1859, Marx held that “in broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society.” The five modes of production or forms of society progress in chronological order like characters come on the stage one after another. This clearly has the implications of the unilineal evolution (also referred to as “classical social evolution”) of human

22

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 66.

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society. After studying anthropology in his later years, Marx achieved great theoretical transcendence. He believed that history progresses in regular succession and the course of history is the unity of continuity and discontinuity. In the history of social development, the factors leading to stability and those bringing about change are contradictory to one another, so that some societies may have followed unique courses of history. In particular, the fundamental differences between eastern societies and western ones may make it possible for some eastern societies to develop in a non-European way. Under certain historical conditions, it is possible for some eastern societies to march through the Caudine Forks of capitalism. Marx thought that internal conflicts differ essentially in different societies, which makes separate societies gradually possess unique characteristics in their respective courses of history. This has included the idea of the multilinear evolution of human history. When he found out that some people attempted to mechanically generalize his theory of the historical evolution of human society (that is the five-stage theory of human development), Marx pointed out indignantly that if one attempted to turn his historical theory of the origins of capitalism in Western Europe into the theory of historical philosophy on the path of general development, holding that all nations, whatever their historical circumstances, are destined to follow the same path, in doing so, he would bestow too much honor on me, but in the meantime he would heap too many insults upon me. Marx’s anthropological thought not only provides a theoretical basis for the establishment and development of socialism in China as well as in other Asian countries, but also blazes new paths to modernization for the Third World countries different from those followed by the European countries, and moreover, it provides theoretical guidance for the countries with the Asiatic mode of production as the dominant economic system so that they may abandon the closed-door policy (that is the policy of closing the country to international communication), formulate and execute the reform and opening up policy. Nowadays Marx’s anthropological thought still can furnish a scientific and authoritative explanation of a multitude of intricacies arising in real life and render immense service to the development of every nation by offering workable solutions to intricate problems arising threrefrom. There are many other outstanding anthropological thoughts in the works of Marx and Engels. Engels maintained that anthropology is the bridge from morphology and physiology of man as well as of race to history.23 This very definition of anthropology is also quite profound and thought-provoking even today. By entering upon an incisive criticism of Feuerbach’s worship of “the abstract individual,” Marx demonstrates convincingly that the study of social history must treat the sensuous, practical and realistic individual as the object of study. In their works Marx and Engels also provided most comprehensive accounts of social structure as well as its law of change and development in an effort to formulate historical materialism. Moreover, they set forth abundant and profound thoughts on human development (that is three stages of human development) and human liberation. They maintained that practice is the basic mode of human existence. They elaborated on man’s subjective initiative 23

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 524.

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and individuality. Marxists tend to accord Marx’s theory of Gattungswesen which is generally translated as “species-being,” “species-existence,” “species-essence” or “species-nature” an important place in his critique of capitalism, his conception of communism, and his materialist conception of history. According to a note from the young Marx in the The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, the term “species-being” (Gattungswesen) is derived from Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy in which it refers both to the nature of each man and of humanity as a whole. In the sixth Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx argues that the species-being is always determined in a specific social and historical formation, with some aspects being biological. Marx believes that humans can make their species and their lives their object. That is to say, to make one’s life ones’ object is therefore to treat one’s life as something that is under one’s control. What is involved in making one’s species one’s object is more complicated. In one sense, it emphasizes the essentially social character of humans, and their need to live in a community of the species. In others, it seems to emphasize that we attempt to make our lives expressions of our species-essence; further that we have goals concerning what becomes of the species in general. The idea covers much of the same territory as “making one’s life one’s object”; it concerns self-consciousness, purposive activity, and so forth. All these thoughts mentioned above in the works of Marx and Engels constitute the precious theoretical treasure of anthropology and afford the sound theoretical basis and guidance for the establishment of the theory of “structure and choice.”

2 Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology Mode of thinking can be viewed as one of the most powerful instruments for understanding and unraveling the mysteries of research objects, one and only way to solve complicated problems and theoretical difficulties confronting objects of study, and affords a fundamental basis for methodological creativity. Strictly speaking, the level of theoretical construction depends upon the level that the mode of thinking for theoretical construction has attained, and tends to change with it. Therefore, mode of thinking plays a key role in the theoretical construction of “structure and choice.”

2.1 How Modes of Thinking Hitherto Known to Humankind Hamper Pioneering Efforts to Unravel the Noumenon of Human Life Mode of thinking constitutes the indispensible prerequisite for the study of the life ontology of man. The research on the ontology of human life, which is stamped with the brand of human modes of thinking, tends to be regulated and restricted by human modes of thinking. To put it another way, unraveling the ontology of human

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life synchronizes with the progress of human modes of thinking. Scientific modes of thinking may act as the fundamental prerequisites for the intensive research on the ontology of human life and the scientific interpretation of man. However, the long evolution of man saw a myriad of rapid changes in the external world, while it witnessed little change in human mode of thinking as well as its discouragingly slow development. The transition from primitive mode of thinking to modern one may have taken approximately thousands of years or even tens of thousands of years. Thusfar, there has been a long-drawn-out and irreconcilable conflict between human modes of thinking, particularly between existential (ontological) thinking and practical thinking, between the mode of thinking oriented towards species and the one oriented towards species-beings, and between formal thinking and dialectical thinking, which retards the progress (development) of general scientific knowledge, aggravates the difficulty of knowing man himself, and constitutes a serious obstacle to unraveling the mysteries inherent in the ontology of human life. Since the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates took the lead in concerning himself with the problem of humanity’s self-understanding, or rather, the question of knowing thyself, there has been no wise solution to the problem of how to know himself by which humankind has been confronted for thousands of years, and one of the fundamental reasons why that happened lies in the fact that humankind has been deficient in effective modes of thinking powerful enough to help himself unravel his own impenetrable mysteries. If today witnessed neither the removal of limitations and barriers imposed by old modes of thinking upon human mind nor the establishment of new ways of thinking, then constructing the life ontology of man—“the theory of structure and choice” would be only a good intention and “knowing thyself” would remain an unattainable ideal. As far as the research on the life ontology of man is concerned, the limitations placed by old ways of thinking upon human mind are mainly reflected in those of existential (ontological) thinking, those of the mode of thinking oriented towards species and those of formal thinking, among which the limitations of dualistic thinking included in those of formal thinking are most noticeable. So far human thought is still on a level with binary (dualistic) thinking. Although dualistic (binary) thinking, which is so far of immense value to human beings, contributed immensely to a vast multitude of enduring successes in human scientific knowledge, especially the remarkable progress in science and technology, yet its disadvantages have manifested themselves in huge numbers, i.e., binary (dualistic) thinking endowed with its own inherent weaknesses not only has led the whole “human subject,” who makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, who is not only bursting with vim and vigor but also endowed with species-beings’ (conscious beings’) distinctive characteristics and who is able to establish himself among his or her peers in social interaction and engage himself or herself in social practice, into a fragmented state, but also has landed humanity in contradiction, division, conflict and confrontation, which has brought humankind to the verge of ruin. However, thus far humankind has been unable to remove, once and for all, the fetters of binary thinking’s intrinsic drawbacks (or weaknesses) from human mind. It can even be admitted that today the limitations upon the understanding of man himself may boil

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down to nothing more than the limitations of the subject himself or herself, or rather the limitations of dualistic (or binary) thinking as a basic mode of human thought, to wit the limitations of human discontinuous (or fractured) thinking, or more specifically, the dichotomist and mechanistic Western modernist scientific paradigm initiated by René Descartes, whose influence has dominated and fractured thinking in the Western world for close to four centuries (Ramsay, 1999), and has been imposed on the rest of the world with equally deleterious effects.24 The limitations imposed by binary (dualistic) thinking on human mind not only hinder humankind from selfknowledge but, more seriously, affect man’s view of himself as well as his worldview (his comprehensive conception or apprehension of the world especially from a specific standpoint—called also weltanschauung). Claude Lévi-Strauss, French social anthropologist and leading exponent of structuralism, could not help sighing with deep emotions at the limitations imposed by binary (dualistic) thinking on human mind. He dedicated his own life time to the study of human modes of thinking—“a binary (dualistic or dichotomist) mental structure” that the nervous system of the human brain is endowed with. Considering that after the Renaissance social sciences tended to put more value on analysis than on synthesis, Lévi-Strauss attempted to bring about an effectual cure for the deep-rooted ills which social sciences have been suffering from since the Renaissance by making a life-long study of binary (dualistic or dichotomist) mental structures” that the nervous system of the human brain is endowed with. That is to say, Lévi-Strauss tried using the structural method endowed with a broad vision, which postulates that an unconscious “metastructure” emerges through the human mental process of pairing opposites and according to which the human mind is viewed as a repository of a great variety of natural material, from which it selects pairs of elements that can be combined to form diverse structures, to bring about an effectual cure for the deep-rooted ills which social sciences have been suffering from since the Renaissance. However, this goal has not been attained. He argued that the basis of the world is neither mode of production nor absolute spirit, but “a binary mental structure” that the nervous system of the human brain is endowed with. His following view is quite profound: the universe is a continuum, but human beings look at it, think about it, or study it only by dividing it into discontinuous parts due to the limitations of human thinking. Furthermore, human beings divide the aforementioned parts into categories so as to bring order to the universe. Since the fundamental essence of human thinking is the mental structure of binary opposition, the way that human beings seek to describe separate things is often endowed with discontinuity as well as characteristics of opposition. Considering that the mental structure of binary opposition is inherent in human mind, man is unable to extricate himself from the mental structure of binary opposition, i.e., there is no way of avoiding the impact of the mental structure of binary opposition upon human thought. This eventually landed him in a difficult position. On the one hand he affirmed that classification (or categorization) and binary (or dualistic) thinking are 24

Haug, Erika. “Critical Reflections on the Emerging Discourse of International Social Work.” International Social Work 48(2) (March 2005): 128–129. Erika Haug is a former professor in the School of Indian Social Work at the First Nations University of Canada in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

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of great significance to human rational thinking, self-knowledge and understanding of the world, but on the other, he also awakened to the fact that classification (or categorization) and binary (or dualistic) thinking are endowed with their respective inherent serious limitation and harm, which constituted a constant source of worry to him. In his view, it is mankind’s binary (or dualistic) thinking, one of our most basic and primitive conceptual tendencies, that divides human beings into “ourselves” and “people of a different kind (people not belonging to the same category)” as well as “Western people” and “aboriginal (or indigenous) people” and that segments ethnic groups into “superior” and “inferior” ones, which not only resulted in hostile relations among people, but also led to innumerable conflicts, persecutions, disasters and wars in the history of mankind. He earnestly hoped that human beings ought to break free from the categorization (or classification) consciousness, especially the consciousness of binary opposition. He very much admired the teachings or practice of Chan sect of Buddhism in China (Zen Buddhism in Japan) and yearned to reach the state of no difference which may be identified with the Buddhist truth revealed in the following Chinese poem: “There is no Buddhist tree at all, and there is bright mirror nor. Now there is nothing at all, how could be dust any more?” For him, looked at from that point of view, Islam (the Muslim religion) is inferior to Christianity, while Christianity is inferior to Buddhism. Evidently, as one of the twentieth century’s greatest intellectuals, Lévi-Strauss became acutely aware of the limitations of human thinking, i.e. fractured thinking or binary (or dualistic) thinking, and felt the urgent necessity of breaking free from the limitations. However, he failed to solve the long-drawn-out, perplexing problem, nor did he break free from the limitations of formal logical thinking. Regrettably, he surrendered to the sway of binary (or dualistic) thinking. Binary or dualistic thinking constitutes a bottleneck in understanding the ontology of human life. If he fails to break free from the limitations of dual or binary thinking, humankind cannot view the understanding of himself or self-knowledge in its right perspective, nor can he achieve the contradictory unity of dual life, i.e. the life of species and the life of kind, which will eventually make impenetrable darkness settle over the path of development mankind has to travel in the future. In order to obtain an objective and complete understanding of the inscrutable and paradoxical ontology of human life, Karl Marx and his followers took the lead in attempting to unravel the problem of human fractured thinking as well as in originating the theory of dialectics that reveals the universal law of human thought characterized by the evolution from fractured thinking into continuous thinking. Looking to the future, human beings ought to pin their highest hopes on the Marxist theory of dialectics as well as its development so that they will eventually achieve an objective and complete understanding of the inscrutable ontology of human life.

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2.2 The “Triple Transcendence” and “Three Levels” of Human Thinking In order to understand and unravel the inscrutable noumenon of human life, we must achieve the “triple transcendence” of old modes of thinking and attain the three higher levels of human thinking in ascending order under the guidance of Marxist materialist dialectics, i.e., we must triumph over the negative or restrictive aspects of ontological thinking and strive to reach the level of practical thinking, we must transcend the way of thinking oriented towards the life of species and adopt the mode of thinking oriented towards the life of kind, and we must overcome the limitations of formal logical thinking and attempt to raise the mode of human thinking to the level of dialectical thinking. (1) The Transcendence from Ontological to Practical Thinking—Attaining the Level of Practical Thinking Invariably the ancient Greek philosophers treated “knowing thyself or selfknowledge” as the supreme goal of philosophical thinking. However, the philosophical history of thousands of years bore ample witness to the regrettable fact that generation after generation of thinkers and philosophers rose to unravel the mysteries of “knowing thyself or self-knowledge,” but they tried in vain to attain the supreme goal of philosophical thinking. The key to the settlement of the above-mentioned question lies in nothing but the choice of right modes of thinking to understand man himself, that is to say, it is the ontological way of thinking that inevitably led to philosophers’ failure to attain the supreme goal of philosophical thinking—knowing thyself or self-knowledge, or rather unraveling the mysteries of man himself. While a vast multitude of philosophers appeared, one after another, on the stage of human thought from ancient times right through to the present, Western intellectual history of several thousands of years, in which German philosopher Hegel was the last of the great philosophical system builders of modern times and his work marks the pinnacle of classical German philosophy, witnessed the domination of ontological thinking over the Western mind. Fundamentally speaking, the most serious problem confronting the ontological way of thinking lies in the fact that in the long history of human thought generation after generation of philosophers or thinkers invariably tried in vain to discover the true and real world of noumena or things in themselves behind the phenomenal world, in which an object or aspect is known through the senses rather than by thought or intuition, made a futile attempt to find the ultimate being whose sublime mission is designed to determine and govern the way that all other things exist, and vainly sought to overcome the multiple contradictions inherent in human life, which not only landed man in a one-dimensional state but also reduced him to abstraction so that they failed to gain knowledge of real human beings themselves, nor did they offer an elaborate and convincing explanation of human nature and human worlds characterized by more complex contradictions arising from the contradictions inherent in human life, those between people and those between man and nature. To put it briefly, the philosophers or thinkers who were given to the ontological way of

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thinking would reject the contradictory unity of dual life, i.e. the life of species and the life of kind, as well as the existence of contradictory relationships inherent in human life, of those between people and of those between man and nature. While pondering human nature in the strict ontological sense, the philosophers or thinkers who gave themselves up to the ontological way of thinking would understand human beings as divinities overcoming worldly desires and attaining sainthood, or rather, transcending worldliness and attaining holiness, or as atomized individuals, or as natural beings that do not differ essentially from animals, or as purely rational beings who devote themselves heart and soul to intellectual activities, or as cultural beings. In particular, human beings are reduced to “structural beings” in structuralism, the school of thought developed by the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss that seeks to analyze social relationships in terms of highly abstract relational structures often expressed in a logical symbolism, in which cultures, viewed as systems, are analyzed in terms of the structural relations among their elements, universal patterns in cultural systems are products of the invariant structure of the human mind, and the human mind is viewed as a repository of a great variety of natural material, from which it selects pairs of elements that can be combined to form diverse structures. While the philosophers or thinkers, who indulged in the ontological way of thinking to their hearts’ content, ventured an impressive array of hypotheses about human nature in the strict ontological sense, the real, whole “human subject,” who makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, who is not only bursting with vim and vigor but also endowed with species-beings’ (or conscious beings’) distinctive characteristics and who is able to establish himself among his or her peers in social interaction and engage himself or herself in social practice, fell into almost total neglect and was eventually plunged into the abyss of despair. The aforementioned theoretical view can be further expressed as follows: through abstraction or theoretical work on the part of the abovementioned philosophers or thinkers who steeped themselves in ontological thinking, “real, whole humans” as well as their worlds characterized by the unity of multiple contradictions landed up in a one-dimensional state, or sank into division, opposition and fragmentation, or were reduced to sentient or living beings or conscious existence devoid of history so that the above philosophers failed to achieve a correct, objective and deeper understanding of human beings and their worlds and, to make matters even worse, had human beings and their worlds subjected to serious deviation from their respective true states, which eventually lead human beings and their worlds into a state of loss and disintegration. In the final analysis, the philosophers who steeped themselves in ontological thinking failed to gain true knowledge of human nature and human worlds, nor did they provide a rational and illuminating explanation of human nature and human worlds, nor did they make any convincing predictions about human nature and human worlds. Karl Marx made an epoch-making contribution to the fundamental change in human thinking by substituting a practical way of thinking for the old ontological way of thinking and tried to provide new theoretical insights into the way we understand human beings as well as human worlds. Karl Marx took the lead in establishing practice as the fundamental principle of philosophy by substituting the practical way

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of thinking for the ontological way of thinking and seeking to raise the mode of human thinking to the level of practical thinking as well as by providing remarkably keen insights into human nature, provided the real foundation not only for a profound grasp of what human beings as well as human worlds are, but also for a correct, objective and deeper understanding of human beings, who are bursting with vim and vigor in social interaction and practice and, more importantly, who endeavor to throw themselves with passion into endless reconciliation between the grim realities of life and the life-long pursuit of dreams either within the bounds of possibility or beyond the range of possibility, as well as human worlds, and, whether in theory or in practice, provided a wider theoretical perspective on the problem of how to understand human beings as well as human worlds and struck out new paths in epistemology for generation after generation of Marxist followers. According to Marx, practice is man’s unique, conscious activity whose primary purpose lies in the creation of value. “Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being. For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. Admittedly animals also produce. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.”25 In human practice, while changing the objective world, man also undergoes a complete transformation of his subjective world as well as his world outlook, which proves that 25

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 96–97.

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man can make his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness and that man can act as subject of his practical activity characterized by freedom, spontaneity, purpose and consciousness. In this sense, Marx emphasized that men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like and that they themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence. In view of the fact that practice lays the real basis for delving into vast dimensions of human nature and provides the practical way of thinking about how to achieve true knowledge of man himself, a thorough grasp of the real foundation as well as the practical way of thinking will contribute immensely to humankind’s eventual success in unraveling his own baffling and impenetrable mysteries. The chief reasons for the foregoing categorical statement may be adduced as follows. First, the practical way of thinking provides the real foundation for understanding man from the perspective of his personal activity. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, man also creates himself by making his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness and, as a conscious being, he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence. As a living, real being, man possesses exuberant creative vitality. Although he comes from nature, man, far from being the ready-made product of nature, creates himself. The essence of man, i.e. human nature, is not determined by nature, but is brought into existence in human beings’ creative activities. Second, the practical way of thinking provides the foundation for understanding the dialectical unity between man and the outside world. Only from a practical point of view can we gain a remarkably keen insight into the essential relationship between human beings and the outside world characterized by mutual unity and reciprocal negation, i.e., there exists a curious causal relationship between man and nature characterized by mutual dependence and reciprocal negation, to put it another way, man, as a living, real being, comes from nature, but transcends nature. Practical activity is a process of reciprocal interaction between man and nature, between the subject and the object and between subjectivism and objectivism. In this process, man not only tries to construct the relationship of negative unity with the objective world in accordance with the standard of every species, but also knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object, as a result of which the world of objects is transformed into a world where on the one hand man follows the course of nature, but on the other, he also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty, and thus before man appeared on the earth, the mere relations between a myriad of species dominated the natural world, whereas after man existed on the earth, the original world was miraculously transformed into a humanized world, or rather a contradictory world, where human beings and the natural world have since been on a collision course. The aforementioned difficulties confronting humankind today can only be understood and explained by recourse to the practical way of thinking. Third, the practical way of thinking provides the real foundation for understanding the dialectical unity of various binary relations inherent in human life. Human beings not only come to understand the unity of dualistic contradictions and oppositions inherent in human practical activity, such as affirmation versus negation, initiative versus passivity, subjectivity versus objectivity, collectivity versus individuality, division versus unity

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and necessity versus freedom, but also they can make their practical activities attain higher levels by overcoming contradictions and removing oppositions inherent in human practice. It was just on the basis of human practical activity characterized by the unity of complex contradictions that man evolved from the ape and that human nature developed ceaselessly, and it was only on the basis of human practice that the evolution of humankind as well as the development of human nature could be possible of attainment. In short, the main theoretical objective that human beings strive to achieve by recourse to the practical way of thinking is to provide remarkably keen insights into human nature, to delve into vast dimensions of human nature, to elucidate what human nature is from the perspective of man himself, and to acquire a thorough grasp of man as well as his world from the viewpoint of negative unity. Only by recourse to the practical way of thinking can we achieve a correct, objective and deeper understanding of man himself and raise the level of human understanding from fantasy to reality, from abstraction to concreteness, from fragmentation to wholeness and from paradox to science, and only by use of practical thinking can we provide a scientific explanation of the unique ontology of human life, or rather human nature, which thus in methodological terms provides the scientific foundation for the theory of “structure and choice”. (2) Transcending the Way of Thinking Oriented Towards the Life of Species and Adopting the Mode of Thinking Oriented Towards the Life of Kind To put it succinctly, by the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings we mean that this way of thinking can only be used to gain knowledge of non-human species and that it can only be applied to the nature of non-human species rather than to the essence of human beings. Whichever way of thinking may render immense service to human understanding of objects hinges upon the nature of objects rather than depend on passing whims or arbitrary decisions. With the above situation in view, it can be safely asserted that the way of thinking oriented towards speciesbeings or human beings ought to be used to grasp the living, real species-being in his wholeness. Thus, the idea that the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species may be entitled to help with man’s understanding of himself clearly runs counter to universal laws of cognition. During a considerable period of time, growth retardation in human thinking as well as lower levels of cognitive development made mankind fall into the deeply ingrained habit of understanding himself by recourse to the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species, whose lasting, seductive influence upon human mind can still be strongly felt today. Generally speaking, the mode of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings are endowed with the following characteristics. First, this way of thinking may be treated as a kind of predetermined or closed thinking. Thus, when people endeavor to apprehend the nature or essence of non-human species or beings in this way of thinking, it will naturally follow that the nature or essence of non-human species or beings tends to be conceived of as predetermined, closed and fixed. The following example will suffice to illustrate humankind’s deep-seated tendency to understand non-human species or beings in the way of predetermined or closed thinking. Even the nature of a higher mammal tends to be conceived of as predetermined, i.e., people tend to endow the

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higher animal with all of the nature of its kind they presume it to possess at birth, and the remainder of its life will only witness the constant unfolding of what has been contained in its genes. Rather than transcend itself, the higher mammal can be only what it is for the rest of its life, to put it another way, it cannot become what it is not. Second, people just take it for granted that this kind of thinking can be perceived as the one characterized by sameness of essential (or generic) character in different instances, or rather, devoid of any contradictions. Judging by the aforementioned character unique to the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings, we can see how firmly entrenched the notion is that the way that a thing exists, that is to say the objective reality of a thing, is identical with the nature of its kind. The following example will suffice to illustrate this specious argument. The nature of an individual animal as well as its mode of existence almost invariably manifests itself in its close identity with that of its species, and thus there cannot be any dichotomy between natural and supernatural phenomena or between the soul and the body in the nature of an individual animal as well as in its mode of existence. According to Karl Marx, “the animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity.”26 Third, this way of thinking may be conceived of as a kind of isolated thinking characterized by one-sidedness in understanding. People endowed with this way of thinking tend to entertain the obsessive idea that the innate character of one species, once formed, will remain immutable ever after. According to this notion, they would be disposed to hazard the conclusion that one species is separated from other species, individuals of one species are isolated from each other, and the evolution of one species is independent of its environment. More specifically, there are no dynamic relationships other than the incessant exchange of matter and energy between species and environment, which species tend to carry on in accordance with their respective inherent standards and needs. Such inexorable laws of nature as the sequence of transfers of matter and energy in the form of food from organism to organism, or rather, food chains, and the law of the jungle, that is to say, the weak fall prey to the strong, tend to dominate the great variability and complexity of interdependent relationships between one species and other different ones, which may permit of no other dynamic relationships marked by usually continuous and productive activity or change between a single species and other different ones. Among individuals of one species, that the nature of the species is immediately one (or identical) with that of the individual would make it clear that the union of elements constituting the individuality and identity of the individual may be concealed from view and that individuals of the species are almost indistinguishable from each other. It is the way of thinking that seeks to distinguish one species from another, i.e., it is the mode of thinking that aims to demarcate different species. Only if we have succeeded in pinpointing the differences between one thing and other different things can our efforts to understand things be crowned with success. Whenever we attempt to understand one thing, we will have to pinpoint the nature of the species to which it belongs. Only in this way can we describe the thing in 26

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 96.

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outline and acquire a scientific grasp of it. In terms of how we view the nature of thinking, this kind of thinking may come under the category of formal-logical thinking. This mode of thinking can be applied only to things, that is, non-human species or beings, rather than to human beings. When people readily call up this way of thinking to render its substantial help with the task of understanding human beings, this mode of thinking will inevitably result in manifold manifestations of human alienation. Following this line of thought, it will naturally follow that human beings are liable to digitization, objectification, atomization and simplification, to put it another way, human beings tend to be conceived of as digitized, objectified, atomized and simplified by those people endowed with this way of thinking. Human image or nature tends to be stereotyped by them, that is to say, they tend to form a fixed idea about human nature or image. This mode of thinking will be most likely to bring about the abstract human nature as well as the loss of humanity, namely inhumanity or dehumanization. Moreover, when people fuse with this way of thinking and attempt to understand human beings in all his fundamental bearings, their thoughts tend to be hedged around with psychological inflexibility, or rather, the rigid dominance of psychological reactions over chose values and contingencies in guiding action. Man is a special being fundamentally different from things, or rather, non-human beings, not only because free, conscious life activity is man’s species-character, but because man can make his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. It is his free, conscious life activity that distinguishes man immediately from nonhuman beings. In the long process of human evolution, man transcended the inherent limitations of things or species, in particular the essence of things or species, and evolved into a unique, negative unity of multiple contradictions, that is to say, man changed into the only being of consciousness (or being-for-itself) that is capable of creative practical activity in the world and whose nature presents a baffling mystery and is capable of indefinite, open-ended development. To put it another way, human nature is what its potentiality-for-being is capable of, is existentially surrendered to thrownness, and in every case is delivered over to the possibility of finding itself in its possibilities. With the above situation in view, when we devote ourselves to the study of man, we must discard all thought of trying to understand human beings by turning to the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings, but rather explore the special ways of thinking as well as scientific methods of analysis that will be of universal application to our understanding of human beings. How on earth should we grasp the nature of human beings? People at different periods of history already woke up to numerous weaknesses inherent in the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings and sought to remedy them. However, the aforementioned problems were far from settled on a realistic basis because people at various historical periods invariably failed to afford a practical basis on which to distinguish humans from species. Karl Marx founded the theory of practice, introduced us to the way of thinking oriented towards man’s specieslife, treated the above-mentioned problems from an entirely new angle and solved them once and for all. Marx formed the way of thinking oriented towards man’s species-life based on man’s practical activity. According to Marx, man’s practical activity can be summarized as follows. It is just in his work upon the objective world,

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therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Men existing in the real practical world and hence standing in the real practical relationship to other men not only form the basis for Marx’s understanding of man’s species-nature, or rather, man’s essential nature, but also serve as the basic premise on which he founded the theory of practice. Marx brought about a fundamental change in the traditional way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings by introducing man’s practical activity into our understanding of species-life. From Marx’s point of view, man’s species-character is his free, conscious activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that man goes beyond the limitations of non-human species or beings and becomes a species-being. With the situation in view, Marx introduced us to the way of thinking oriented towards the life of kind, that is to say the human species or human beings, as well as man’s species-being, species-nature, species-life and species-consciousness, which beat new paths for our understanding and grasp of human beings. For the sake of illustration, we may as well cite the following short passage from Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, which has been well-known to students of Marxism. “In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. Admittedly animals also produce. …An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.”27 Roughly speaking, Marx’s way of thinking oriented towards the life of kind, or rather, the human species or human beings, can be understood from the following three key aspects, despite the fact that it boasts a profusion of meanings. (1) From a synchronic perspective, it is aimed at revealing the special nature of man. The nature of man can be summarized as follows. First, “man is a speciesbeing, because he makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, that is to say, man is the only being of consciousness (or being-foritself) that is capable of creative practical activity in the world.” As master of his 27

Ibid., pp. 96–97.

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life activity, man is capable of creative practical activity. What’s more, man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. Man cannot bear to be the slave of his life as well as of his instincts, but tries to fight his instincts and gain mastery over his life. Second, “man transcends himself by integrating his natural life into his species-life.” Man transcends the limitations of his natural life, in particular the essence of his natural life, and forms his species-life as well as his species-nature. As far as man’s natural life is concerned, it becomes almost secondary to man’s specieslife and asserts itself as the basic premise of man’s species-life, on which man can explore and capture the essence of his species-life, which can be conceived of as the true nature of man. This affords a sound basis for the statement that man is what his potentiality-for-being is capable of, is existentially surrendered to thrownness, and in every case is delivered over to the possibility of finding himself in his possibilities, which will be inextricably bound up with man’s multifarious pursuits through all ages. (2) From a diachronic perspective, the main task before this very way of thinking is to elucidate the process of human development. According to Marx, the course of human development must of necessity pass through roughly three basic stages and hence three historical forms in chronological order. The first stage in the historical process of human development is characterized by dependent personality traits resulting from social relations based on human dependence. During that period of history, although they were already out of the animal kingdom, human beings were still unable to break free from the dependence on nature, and so they could not but form a community, which severely impeded the development of individual autonomy and creativity. With the above situation in view, the form of human dependence came into existence either in a quite natural manner or when man was at the mercy of his environment. In the second stage of human development, human independence is based on the dependence on money existing in the form of a special commodity and generally accepted as a medium of exchange. In the further development of human beings, their social connections gradually replaced those relations with nature, which not only promoted the germination and development of individual autonomy, but helped with the emergence of the individual, who entertains the individual-oriented conception and attaches much value to independent personality. Human success in ascending this step of development lies in the development of commodity market economy as well as in the material exchange between people. This development boasts a dual character. On the one hand, individual independence promotes human liberation and development, but on the other, while he is liberated from the bondage of his relations with nature, man is again held in bondage to money existing in the form of a special commodity and generally accepted as a medium of exchange. In the third stage of human development, free individuality is based upon the all-round development of separate individuals and their common powers of social production which constitute their social wealth. This is the free and conscious form of human development. These three basic stages as well as three historical forms constitute the process which human development must of necessity go through one after another, to wit the course of spiral escalation which must of necessity follow the law of negation

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of negation. In the historical process of human development, human beings neither span over these three stages nor break free from them. Rather, the three stages of human development follow the logic of historical necessity. (3) In axiological terms, this way of thinking seeks to demonstrate that the emergence of human beings is bound to hold manifold implications not only for man himself but also for the earth itself. First, it is intended to reveal that the nature of life took a great leap forward—or, to put it another way, the emergence of man brought about a fundamental change in the way that life exists. Specifically, non-human beings survive by adjusting themselves to the environment, whereas human beings live by engaging in practical activity as well as by adapting themselves to their surroundings, which amply demonstrates that man’s species-life characterized by dual dependence on man’s practical activity as well as on his environment endows man’s species-being with new nature and traits totally different from those of non-human beings. Second, this way of thinking may render substantial help to us when we try to establish the truth that after the emergence of the human species, man developed over time into a special or unique form of life that is not only better adapted to survive changes in his environment, but that makes nature itself as well as his work upon inorganic nature the object of his will and of his consciousness by transcending the limitations of natural life, which clearly and conclusively shows that eternal value is inherent in man’s specieslife. Third, it may assert itself in its own right when we endeavor to apprehend the truth that man rid himself of nature’s absolute mastery over life and made himself master of his life activity. That is to say, man, who is a species-being, is capable of creative practical activity, knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species as well as how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object, and therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. Fourth, it is aimed at revealing the truth that man’s species-nature is endowed with the highest level of activity, initiative and creativity that life has ever attained on earth. In short, in the transition from the way of thinking oriented towards non-human beings to that directed towards human beings, the latter transcended the inherent limitations of the former, which not only enabled us to eliminate the detrimental effects of the way of thinking oriented towards non-human beings once and for all which will be inevitably produced when we attempt to understand the nature of man, or rather, the noumenon of human life, in this very way of thinking, but which provided the theoretical basis as well as the fundamental methodology which would be of tremendous help to us when we try to acquire a more profound grasp of man. What is more, this will also afford a sound line of thought which can be invariably and conscientiously followed when we try to build up the theory concerning the life ontology of man, to wit “the theory of structure and choice.” (3) Transcending the Limitations of Formal Logical Thinking and Raising the Mode of Human Thinking to the Level of Dialectical Thinking It is the dialectical-logical thinking that seems to be most necessary for us to probe and unravel the mystery of the nature of human life. The unity of opposites inherent in the nature of human life manifests itself in a myriad of complex relationships as well as in a multitude of antagonistic contradictions, which makes it most necessary for us to

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apply the dialectical-logical thinking to our understanding of the life ontology of man. It is even arguable that the reason why people create the dialectical-logical thinking lies in the fact that they intend it to help them solve the problem of understanding man in all its fundamental bearings. However, before people attempt to acquire a good grasp of dialectical logic, they will have to wake up to the enormity of the task. With the above situation in view, people would be expected to devote themselves assiduously to the study of dialectical logic with a view to gaining thorough mastery of it and hence making the way of thinking undergo a substantial change from the formal-logical thinking to the dialectical-logical thinking. Generally speaking, people tend to apply, to a greater or lesser degree, the formal-logical thinking to the understanding of things, in particular to the consideration and analysis of problems by giving full scope to the unique strengths inherent in it, which can be attributable to the evolution of man. However, the formal-logical thinking applies only to the natural sciences without the expenditure of mental effort on the part of the average learner, rather than to the ones with abstruse principles, complex formulae and recondite ideas featuring prominently in them, which are thus beyond the grasp of most people, nor does it offer any scope for a scientific explanation as well as an extensive exploration of human beings, human society and the human mind. Therefore, it can be safely asserted that it is in the aforementioned manifold spheres of human activity that the dialectical-logical thinking may assert itself as the dominant way of thinking in its own right. If the dialectical-logical thinking fails to render active help to the process of cognition, or rather, the process by which knowledge and understanding is developed in the mind, the human mind is probably hedged by the metaphysical thinking and even gets itself into a very difficult situation, so that it renders itself up to the metaphysical thinking without the knowledge of the subject, which can be probably attributable to the way that the properties of objects or things, or more specifically, those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them, are to be construed. When people apply their minds to understanding things, they tend to regard the things that develop and change as dead or fossilized objects and thus take a static, isolated and one-sided approach to things of the world, which is true of a multitude of problems before them. As a logical outcome of this tendency, the formal-logical thinking would dominate the human mind in the process of cognition. Moreover, people are liable to distinguish things only by turning to their respective concepts and adopt stereotyped or fixed ways of describing or considering them. This is somewhat similar to picture-taking as well as filmmaking (or, in a academic context, film production), that is to say, only after the film is chemically developed, can the long strip of emulsion-coated and perforated plastic show an unbroken series of small negative images of people and things one after the other, among which may be included the ones recording the continuous movements of human subjects. It is thus evident that in order to produce a photographic record of the continuous movements of human subjects in the real world, a photographer has to record the very movements of human subjects in a strip of photographic film, and then cuts it into a series of individual negatives, which can be chemically developed into photographs. When the photographs are combined and displayed in order, the illusion of motion can be achieved. If people are only concerned with individual negatives, but not

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with the unbroken continuity of objective reality captured in individual negatives, their mind will be hedged around with the metaphysical thinking in the process of cognition. The aforementioned difficulty we have encountered in understanding things lies not in the objective reality or world, which, in its true nature, is continuous rather than broken, but in the human mind and cognitive ability, which tend to make people break the continuous world down into separate parts that fall into different categories with their respective fixed or stereotyped concepts featuring prominently in them. It is thus clear that when people set about understanding the world, they are liable to form the broken and fragmented world picture in their mind. How on earth can human brains reflect the continuous world? How on earth can people consciously establish a correct relationship with the objective world in their minds? Evidently, the limitations inherent in the formal-logical thinking render itself incapable of helping people address this difficult problem. In contrast, only the dialectical-logical thinking can help people consciously form the continuous and unbroken world picture in their minds and acquire a complete understanding of the complexity of human life as well as man’s practical activity, and therefore herein lies the truth that it is the dialectical-logical thinking rather than the formal-logical thinking that helps people acquire a general grasp of man himself as well as his practical activity. The objects of study such as the unique ontology of human life as well as the structure and choice of man that the theory of “structure and choice” is intended to explain in its own right have been verified as fully entitled to rank among the most complex and the most unfathomable in the world, and as such make it absolutely necessary for the dialectical-logical thinking to play a dominant role in our correct understanding and grasp of the aforementioned objects of study for the theory of “structure and choice.” It took so many millennia for humans to undergo a slow and difficult change from the formal-logical thinking to the dialectical-logical one, whose completion or perfection was attributable to Hegel and Marx’s respective lifetime of thought and work devoted to the transcendence of the dialectical-logical thinking over the formal-logical one. Generally speaking, it is the unity of opposites between concepts or categories that entitles the dialectical-logical thinking to assert itself as a dominant way of thinking in its own right when people attempt to solve the myriad problems confronting their minds. The dialectical-logical thinking differs essentially from the formal-logical one in that the concepts and categories characterized by the unity of opposites when rendering their service to man’s dialectical-logical thinking are viewed not as static, isolated, dead or fossilized, but rather as interrelated and interdependent, so that they may help people form a genuine picture of the objective world in their minds, that is to say, they may help people form the world picture that can be understood as a dynamic and genuine reflection of the objective world in the brain. When the key concepts and categories render their service to the dialectical-logical thinking, we must recognize the necessity of viewing the concepts and categories in terms of interconnectedness, development, and transformation, and achieve a dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites between the key concepts (or key categories) that consists in the grasping of oppositions in their unity, or of the positive in the negative. With the above situation in view, a couple of questions as to the concepts and categories commonly used in the dialectical-logical thinking may arise right here

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that can be pressing for serious consideration and practical solution. How can we achieve a dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites between being and nonbeing? In view of the fact that the law of contradictions is a fundamental basis for dialectical materialist thought, how can we acquire a dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites between the contradictions present in matter itself and those in the ideas of the brain? Considering that dialectics is the “logic of change” and can explain the concepts of evolution and transformation, that all existence is the result of constant transformation and contradiction, and that transformation is motivated by the unity between contradictions, how can we obtain a dialectical understanding of things’ transformation from the state of having being to the state characterized by the negation of being, i.e. absence of existence or vice versa? How can we gain a dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites between particularity and totality, or rather, the relationship between the particularity in its totality and the totality in its particularity? In actual fact, in view of the fact that people are endowed with the formal-logical thinking and that this very way of thinking is deeply entrenched in the human mind, they tend to use the formal-logical thinking rather than the dialecticallogical thinking to help them understand things. Just as a valiant warrior needs to overcome one difficulty after another when he tries to cross the passes in war, so too a large body of brilliant minds need to make unremitting efforts to solve the above theoretical problems. For the sake of illustration, let’s cite the following instance. The problem of how to acquire a dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites between the contradictions present in matter itself and those in the ideas of the brain may be viewed as the one pressing for serious consideration and practical solution. Concepts are the most important tools that human brains use to reflect reality—or, to put it another way, human brains can reflect reality only through concepts. However, the ways that human brains reflect reality are unique, that is to say, when human brains reflect reality through concepts, they tend to break the continuity of things, treat the things that develop and change as dead or fossilized objects, and view them as static and isolated. When human brains reflect reality through concepts, the relationship between concepts and reality is either “to be” or “not to be,” but cannot be both simultaneously, otherwise it would be ridiculous. Only in this way can people think reasonably. When human thinking is directed towards objective reality, the very nature of human thinking ordains that the process of cognition should be free of any contradictions, that is to say, human thinking, by its very nature, tends to free itself of any contradictions in the process of cognition. From the perspective of mental logic, contradictions that represent absurdities occur only when human thinking goes wrong. However, if human thinking rids itself of any contradictions in the process of cognition, then a vast multitude of complex relationships between human thinking and objective reality will therefore cease to exist. On the one hand one can directly perceive such phenomena as contradiction, change and motion, but on the other, once human thinking is directed towards such phenomena as contradiction, change and motion, it will tend to treat them as one-sided, fossilized and inflexible. In human thinking, the concept of “motion” is no longer in motion, the concept of “change” stays the same and does not change, and the concept of “contradiction” is devoid of any inconsistency or incongruity. Otherwise, human thinking would be thrown

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into logical confusion, which will consequently render human brains incapable of reflecting reality at all, and herein lies the fundamental problem confronting human thinking. The only solution to this difficult problem lies in the creation of dialectical thinking and logic in human thought. However, people did not wake up to the difficult problem confronting human thinking until Hegel first awakened them to the task of great difficulty. He found that formal logic does not apply to our understanding of the nature of mind, that is to say human nature. Accordingly, he sought to create a new kind of logic, which not only represents abstract universals, but which embodies the richness of particularity, individuality, and individual things in abstract universality, i.e. a mode of thinking that not only renders substantial service to the study of man, but that helps us give shape to the unique nature of man as well as its manifold manifestations. This mode of thinking can be termed “dialectical-logical thinking.” Hegel and Marx made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the development of dialectical-logical thinking. The German philosopher Hegel (1770–1831) was an important figure of German idealism, whose principal achievement was his development of a distinctive articulation of idealism, sometimes termed absolute idealism, as well as his concept of spirit (Geist, sometimes also translated as “mind”) as the historical manifestation of the logical concept and the “sublation” (Aufhebung, integration without elimination or reduction) of seemingly contradictory or opposing factors. Absolute idealism is Hegel’s account of how existence or being is ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole (das Absolute). Hegel called his philosophy “absolute idealism” in contrast to the “subjective idealism” of Berkeley and the “transcendental idealism” of Kant and Fichte, which were not based on a critique of the finite and a dialectical philosophy of history as Hegel’s idealism was. Hegel asserted that in order for the thinking subject (human reason or consciousness) to be able to know its object (the world) at all, there must be in some sense an identity of thought and being. Otherwise, the subject would never have access to the object and we would have no certainty about any of our knowledge of the world. To account for the differences between thought and being, however, as well as the richness and diversity of each, the unity of thought and being cannot be expressed as the abstract identity “A = A.” Absolute idealism is the attempt to demonstrate this unity using a new “speculative” philosophical method, which requires new concepts and rules of logic. According to Hegel, the absolute ground of being is essentially a dynamic, historical process of necessity that unfolds by itself in the form of increasingly complex forms of being and of consciousness, ultimately giving rise to all the diversity in the world and in the concepts with which we think and make sense of the world. Robert Tucker puts it this way: “Hegelianism…is a religion of self-worship whose fundamental theme is given in Hegel’s image of the man who aspires to be God himself, who demands something more, namely infinity.” The picture Hegel presents is “a picture of a self-glorifying humanity striving compulsively, and at the end successfully, rise to divinity.”28 Hegelian dialectic, usually presented in a threefold manner, was stated as comprising three dialectical stages of development: 28

Tucker, Robert C. (2017). Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 43– 44.

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a thesis, giving rise to reaction; an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis; and the tension between the two being resolved by means of a synthesis. In more simplistic terms, one can consider it thus: problem → reaction → solution. Although this model is often named after Hegel, he himself never used that specific formulation. Hegel ascribed that terminology to Kant. Carrying on Kant’s work, Fichte greatly elaborated on the synthesis model and popularized it. On the other hand, Hegel did use a three-valued logical model that is very similar to the antithesis model, but Hegel’s most usual terms were: abstract-negative-concrete. Hegel used this writing model as a backbone to accompany his points in many of his works. The formula, thesisantithesis-synthesis, does not explain why the thesis requires an antithesis. However, the formula, abstract-negative-concrete, suggests a flaw, or perhaps an incompleteness, in any initial thesis. For Hegel, the concrete, the synthesis, the absolute, must always pass through the phase of the negation, in the journey to completion, that is, mediation. This is the essence of what is popularly called Hegelian dialectics. According to the German philosopher Walter Kaufmann: “Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology. Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books. And they do not help us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic, or his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension of what he does by forcing it into a scheme which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned […] The mechanical formalism […] Hegel derides expressly and at some length in the preface to the Phenomenology.”29 To describe the activity of overcoming the negative, Hegel also often used the term Aufhebung, variously translated into English as “sublation” or “overcoming”, to conceive of the working of the dialectic. Roughly, the term indicates preserving the useful portion of an idea, thing, society, etc., while moving beyond its limitations. In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being (Sein); but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing (Nichts). When it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same time, also returning to nothing (in life, for example, one’s living is also a dying), both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming. As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to proceed by making implicit contradictions explicit: each stage of the process is the product of contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage. For Hegel, the whole of history is one tremendous dialect, major stages of which chart a progression from self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rational constitutional state of free and equal citizens. The Hegelian dialect cannot be mechanically applied for any chosen thesis. Critics argue that the selection of any antithesis, other than the logical negation of the thesis, is subjective. Then, if the logical negation is used as the antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis. In practice, when an antithesis is selected to suit the user’s subjective purpose, the resulting “contradictions” are rhetorical, not logical, and the resulting synthesis is not rigorously 29

Solomon, Robert C. (1985). In the Spirit of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 215–216.

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defensible against a multitude of other possible syntheses. The problem with the Fichtean “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” model is that it implies that contradictions or negations come from outside of things. Hegel’s point is that they are inherent in and internal to things. Hegel stated that the purpose of dialectics is “to study things in their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories of understanding.”30 One important dialectical principle for Hegel is the transitionfrom quantity to quality, which he terms the Measure. The measure is the qualitative quantum, the quantum is the existence of quantity. Another important principle for Hegel is the negation of the negation, which he also terms Aufhebung (sublation): Something is only what it is in its relation to another, but by the negation of the negation this something incorporates the other into itself. The dialectical movement involves two moments that negate each other, something and its other. As a result of the negation of the negation, “something becomes its other; this other is itself something; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum.”31 Something in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related. In becoming there are two moments: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; by sublation, i.e., negation of the negation being passes over into nothing, it ceases to be, but something new shows up, is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained. In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related, then self-forgetful, relieving the original tension. Marxist dialectic is a form of Hegelian dialectic which applies to the study of historical materialism. It purports to be a reflection of the real world created by man. Dialectic would thus be a robust method under which one could examine personal, social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core foundation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas behind historical materialism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels proposed that Hegel’s dialectic is too abstract. “The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”32 In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented his own dialect method, which he claims to be “direct opposite” of Hegel’s method. “My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world

30

Stern, Robert. (2002). Routledge Philosophy Guide to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 16. 31 Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, p. 116. 32 Althusser, Louis. (2005). For Marx (Ben Brewster, Trans.). New York, NY: Verso, pp. 89–94.

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reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.”33 Marxist dialectics is exemplified in Das Kapital (Capital: A Crititique of Political Economy), which outlines two central theories: (i) surplus values and (ii) the materialist conception of history. Marx explains dialectical materialism as follows: “In its rational form, it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”34 Hence, philosophic contradiction is central to the development of dialectics—the progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social change; the negation of the initial development of the status quo; the negation of that negation; and the high-level recurrence of features of the original status quo. “As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy…” “The great basic thought,” Engels writes, “that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But, to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words, and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation, are two different things… For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy, itself, is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain.”35 Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is “the science of the general laws of motion both of the external world and of human thought.”36 Thus it can be seen or it is therefore clear that Hegelian dialectics is Hegel’s idealistic account of how existence or being is ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole (das Absolute) and that Marx transformed Hegelian dialectics into materialistic dialectics. According to Marx, “the unity of opposites” as well as “the unity of contradictions” is fully entitled to the primary concern for the dialectical-logical thinking, because the way that they are interrelated and interact on each other not only sets matter into 33

Rockmore, Tom. (2018). Marx’s Dream: From Capitalism to Communism. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 131. 34 Mclellan, David. (2000). Karl Marx: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 458. 35 Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 6–7. 36 Lenin, V.I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 7–9.

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motion but also gives shape to it, that is to say, we may never view the opposite from this aspect, nor may we consider the unity from that aspect, nor may we think that either this stands in opposition or that does in unity, but rather take it for granted that just as the opposite must be the very opposite of unity, so too the unity must be the very unity of opposites. This illustrates very clearly how human thinking moves, changes and develops. It has now become evident to us that formal-logical thinking tends to make people break the continuous world down into separate parts that come into different categories with their respective fixed or stereotyped concepts featuring prominently in them, and consequently, that when people set about understanding the world, they are liable to form the broken and fragmented world picture in their mind, whereas the concepts and categories characterized by the unity of opposites when rendering their service to man’s dialectical-logical thinking are viewed not as static, isolated, dead or fossilized, but rather as interrelated and interdependent, so that they may help people form a genuine picture of the objective world in their minds, that is to say, they may help people to form the world picture that can be understood as a dynamic and genuine reflection of the objective world in the brain. Structural anthropologists have been trying to rediscover the unity of binary opposites or oppositions inherent in the dual structure of human thinking and thus reach a wise solution to those seemingly inscrutable problems that the dual structure of human thinking has been continuing to cause for structural anthropology over a long period of time. The aforementioned solution can be summarized as follows. As the “duality” of human thinking starts to exist as “the duality of unity,” so too does the “unity” of human thought begin to exist as “the unity of opposites.” Moreover, only through action and motion of thought can either “binary oppositions” or the “the unity of duality” be within the range of possibility. The rediscovery and resurrection of the unity of binary opposites or oppositions inherent in the dual structure of human thinking, to a greater or lesser extent, may help people form a genuine picture of the objective world in their minds, that is to say, the aforementioned solution may help people to form the world picture that can be understood as a dynamic and genuine reflection of the objective world in the brain, in particular a true picture of man as well as of human worlds. Hegel and Marx transcended the limitations of formal-logical thinking and raised the mode of human thinking to the level of dialectical-logical thinking, hence endowing human concepts and thinking with the nature of contradiction and motion, which marks an epoch-making development in the mode of human thinking. In view of the fact that “the theory of structure and choice” takes the noumenon of human life, to wit the real man himself, as the prime object of study, people would be expected to acquire a scientific and correct understanding of the noumenon of human life only if they devote themselves assiduously to the study of dialectical logic with a view to gaining thorough mastery of it and hence making the way of thinking undergo a substantial change from the formal-logical thinking to the dialectical-logical thinking, overcome the limitations of formal logical thinking and attempt to raise the mode of human thinking to the level of dialectical thinking. Otherwise, people would be unable to move even a single step when trying to gain an insight into the life ontology of man, that is to say the real man himself. In the field of anthropological study this led to not only the deficiency in knowledge on human

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beings but also the distortion of human nature and image. Some scholars even hold that human nature is equivalent to the combination of “animals and cultures!” How many misapprehensions and deviations have been caused when scholars engaged in the study of anthropology attempted to gain knowledge on human beings! As one of the central figures in the structural school of thought, French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss was arguably a leading exponent of structuralism who laid emphasis on the function of objective “structures,” but who warranted little attention to the role of “human” agency, or rather, “man’s” subjective initiative. He believed that the nature and change of a social phenomenon is determined by the a priori preexisting “structures” and that human beings’ statements and actions, which are governed by the universal “structures,” can only be treated as their manifestations and never change the “structures.” Hence, the “subject” of society and of history is the a priori “structure” rather than “man.” Social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in such an unconscious “structure” characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even coined the famous phrase “melting man” and declared his position on it, asserting that “such a detestable favorite as the human subjectmust be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled over philosophy for too long.”37

References 1. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 213. 2. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 82–83. 3. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 121. 4. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Marx & Engels: Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 760. 5. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 95. 6. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Theses on Feuerbach. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 54. 7. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 67 – 68. 8. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 23: Marx & Engels: Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 202. 9. Mao, Ze-Dong. (1991). Mao Zedong Selected Works, Volume 2: On Protracted War Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 477. 10. Shapiro, Fred R., ed. (2021). The New Yale Book of Quotations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 530. 11. Yuan, Gui-Ren. (1988). Man’s Philosophy. Beijing: Workers’ Publishing House, pp. 44-53. 12. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 512. 13. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 96. 37

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149.

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14. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 513, 517. 15. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Complete Works, Volume 3:Marx: Theses on Feuerbach. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 5. 16. Marx, K., Engels, F. (1958). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Principles of Communism. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 370. 17. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 47: Marx: Economic Manuscripts of 1861–63. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 309. 18. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: AntiDühring. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 316. 19. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 97. 20. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 66. 21. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 524. 22. Haug, Erika. “Critical Reflections on the Emerging Discourse of International Social Work.” International Social Work 48(2) (March 2005): 128-129. 23. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 96–97. 24. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 96. 25. Tucker, Robert C. (2017). Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 43-44. 26. Solomon, Robert C. (1985). In the Spirit of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 215-216. 27. Stern, Robert. (2002). Routledge Philosophy Guide to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 16. 28. Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, p. 116. 29. Althusser, Louis. (2005). For Marx (Ben Brewster, Trans.). New York, NY: Verso, pp. 89–94. 30. Rockmore, Tom. (2018). Marx’s Dream: From Capitalism to Communism.. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 131. 31. Mclellan, David. (2000). Karl Marx: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 458. 32. Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 6-7. 33. Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 7-9. 34. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149.

Chapter 4

The Essence of Human Life: Practical Subject

When trying to probe into the mystery of man, we will have to take the scientific and correct understanding of the essence of human life as the point of departure. In other words, only by making a reasonable explanation of the essence of human life can we succeed in unraveling the mysteries of the human subject. The theory of “structure and choice” concerning the essence of human life constitutes a large repertory of theoretical knowledge, and how to define the essence of man’s unique life, or rather, how to determine or identify the essential qualities of man’s unique life, forms the repertory’s theoretical cornerstone and basic foothold. When we attempt to formulate the theory of “structure and choice,” including its knowledge system, we must, first and foremost, realize the necessity of determining or identifying the essential qualities of man’s unique life. “The practical species” (or “the practical subject”) constitutes the essence of man’s unique life. In view of the fact that man is a practical species, man’s life must of necessity be endowed with unique and essential qualities, i.e., man’s life is “the practical life,” “the real life,” “the human subject’s life” and “the dual life.” On the one hand, the aforementioned fact not only supplies the fundamental reason for the complexity and uncertainty of human life, but also reveals the underlying causes of innumerable uncertainties confronting human destiny. On the other hand, it affords a sound basis for the encouraging fact that despite many setbacks in his life, he still has brilliant prospects before him.

1 Man’s Practical Life In view of the fact that the noumenon of human life or the essence of human life has been veiled in mystery over a long period of time, the Marxian theory of practice not only affords a theoretical basis for our general grasp of the life ontology of man or the essence of human life, but also furnishes the key to unraveling the mystery. According to Marx’s theory of practice, practice constitutes the life ontology of man as well as the essence of human life. To put it another way, in essence “man is a practical species,” © Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 B. Chen, Principles of Subjective Anthropology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_4

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and “man’s life is the practical life.” Practice not only makes human beings differ fundamentally from animals, but also leads to essential differences among people. In other words, fundamentally speaking, practice not only distinguishes man from the animal, but also makes humans differ essentially among themselves. This shows that practice will render its substantial service to our understanding and explanation of the life ontology of man as well as the essence of human life. In epistemological terms, the practical way of thinking constitutes a qualitative leap as well as a complete revolution in human understanding.

1.1 The Conception of Practice as the Essence of Human Life In philosophy, essence is the attribute (or property) or set of attributes (or properties) that makes a thing, i.e. an entity or substance, be what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. It is often called the “nature” of a thing such that it possesses certain necessary, metaphysical characteristics or properties in contrast with merely accidental or contingent ones. It is often considered a specific power, function, or internal relation (or set of relations) which again makes the thing be the kind of thing that it is. Particular contradictions inherent in a thing are interrelated and act on each other, hence forming the essence of a thing. The notion of essence has acquired many slightly but importantly different shades of meaning throughout the history of philosophy, though most of them derive in some manner from its initial use by Aristotle. In the history of western thought, essence has often served as a vehicle for doctrines that “tend to individuate different forms of existence as well as different identity conditions for objects and properties.”1 Karl Marx was a follower of Hegel’s thought, and he, too, developed a philosophy in reaction to his master. In his early work, Marx used Aristotelian style teleology and derived a concept of humanity’s essential nature. Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 describes a theory of alienation based on human existence being completely different from human essence. Marx said human nature was social, and that humanity had the distinct essence of free activity and conscious thought. Some scholars have argued that Marx abandoned the idea of a human essence, but many other scholars point to Marx’s continued discussion of these ideas despite the decline of terms such as essence and alienation in his later work. For Marx, practice reveals exactly the fundamental nature of human life, whose formation can be fundamentally attributable to the interrelationship as well as the interaction between particular contradictions inherent in human life. According to Marx’s theory of practice, the Marxian conception of practice may be briefly summarized in the following outline. Practice is man’s unique mode of existence as well as of survival in which man can actively know and reform the world so as to respond to the pressure of the external environment by solving survival problems. “The human subject” is actively engaged in changing the objective world as well as remolding the subjective 1

Coffey, Cody J. (2010). As I See It. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, p. 238.

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world in order to overcome the contradictions between his own needs and the outside world. Thus, practice constitutes the essence of man’s unique existence as well as the essence of man’s unique life. According to Marx’s conception of practice, practice is a fundamental form of human activity whereby men produce their means of subsistence to meet their personal needs and thus prove themselves to be conscious speciesbeings. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, especially various kinds of value, man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, hence proving himself a conscious species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world that man changes the external world as well as himself and becomes the subject that in a real sense makes his personal activity the object of his will and of his consciousness. In this very sense Marx incisively pointed out, “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men. Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. This production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its turn this presupposes the intercourse of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production.”2 Marx uses the term “praxis” to refer to the free, universal, creative and self-creative activity through which man creates and changes his historical world and himself. Praxis is an activity unique to man, which distinguishes him from all other beings.3 The concept appears in two of Marx’s early works: “The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844” and “The Theses on Feuerbach (1845).” In the former work, Marx contrasts the free, conscious productive activity of human beings with the unconscious compulsive production of animals. He also affirms the primacy of praxis over theory, claiming 2

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: The German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 67. 3 Petrovic, Gajo. “Praxis.” In The Dictionary of Marxist Thought (second ed.), eds. Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan, & Ralph Miliband, 435. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

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that theoretical contradictions can only be resolved through practical activity.4 In the latter work, revolutionary practice is a central theme. “The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice (3rd thesis).” “All social life is essentially practical. All the mysteries which lead theory towards mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and in the comprehension of this praxis (8th thesis).” “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it (11th thesis).”5 Human practice has the following implications: (1) Practice is man’s (the subject’s) conscious, dynamic activity, which serves as the fundamental characteristic that distinguishes human existence from animal existence. The animals are forced to adapt themselves to the external environment, whereas man makes his practical activity the object of his will and of his consciousness, and conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. In his work upon the objective world, man actively remolds his subjective world while changing the objective world. (2) Practice is “the subject’s” or “man’s” immediate, real activity. Man’s real, sentient or sensuous activity, which includes material activity as well as spiritual activity, is based on material activity, in particular material production and the distribution of material benefits. (3) Practice is the human subject’s social and historical activity. Human beings’ practical activities characterized by change and development take place in human society. What is contained in the constitutive elements of practice such as the object, the nature, the scope and the method hinges on changing social circumstances as well as different levels of historical development. The unchangeable human practical activity is almost out of the range of possibility. (4) Practice encompasses a wide range of human activities such as the productive activities, the social and political activities, the scientific and cultural activities, the practical activities carried out in one’s life and the practical activities concerned with man’s self-reflection as well as his self-remolding, in which the human subject attempts to know himself and remold his subjective world while trying to understand and change the objective world.

1.2 Practice Furnishes the Key to Helping Us Understand the Great Complexity of Human Life and Unravel the Essence of Human Life Shrouded in Mystery While practice is the essence of human life, “structure and choice” constitutes the ontology (the study of what there is as well as of the most general features of what there is and of how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways) of human life. Only by examining and analyzing man’s unique life from a practical perspective or in the practical mode of thinking can one truly 4

Ibid., p. 437. Brudney, Daniel. (1998). Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 236–242.

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acquire a profound grasp of the ontology of human life as well as the phenomena of human life and further gain a keen insight into them. If practice is torn away from human beings, that is to say without practice, the ontology of human life as well as all phenomena of life cannot be fully explained, nor can human beings guide themselves through the practical activities through which they seek to change the world. There are several reasons that account for why practice is of paramount importance to human beings. (1) Practice can be taken as the basis on which “the human subject” adapts himself to his environment and tries to create the relationship between man and nature which is in essence characterized by negative unity of opposites. In order to survive, mankind must first of all be provided with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter and transport, which makes it imperatively necessary for human beings to create the relationship between man and nature that is resourceconserving and environment-friendly, which is to say human beings will have to keep nature in a dynamic state of equilibrium and sustainability while developing natural resources and wresting wealth from nature. This can only be achieved by resting on a rational and scientific basis. (2) Practice can be perceived as the basis on which people tend to establish sound relations among themselves. While conquering and harnessing nature, people must of necessity establish interpersonal relationships between them, in particular the profound but inscrutable relations characterized by great complexity as well as rapid or unexpected change. There exists a wide variety of social or interpersonal relationships including individual-to-individual, individualto-group, group-to-group, and group-to-society relationships as well as economic, political, cultural and legal relationships. Today it would seem that whether people can take a correct approach to their social relations among themselves or not depends fundamentally upon man’s social practice. (3) Just as man’s social being determines his social consciousness, so practice forms the basis on which one can judge his or her consciousness between right and wrong. The initiative, consciousness and purpose which man has of his species makes him become an amazingly creative species-being. More specifically, man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a speciesbeing that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore

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he sees himself in a world that he has created. Admittedly animals also produce. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. Human beings are anatomically similar and related to the great apes but are distinguished by a more highly developed brain and a resultant capacity for articulate speech and abstract reasoning. In addition, human beings possess a variety of advanced cognitive abilities believed to be restricted to them, or rather, entirely unique to them. It is therefore clear that man’s cognitive, linguistic, and technological capabilities offer a very promising prospect for him. However, these same capabilities unique to humans may make them far more dangerous than animals. Correct consciousness brings benefit, while false consciousness spells loss. In this sense, the crisis mankind is facing today, in the final analysis, boils down to nothing more than the crisis of human consciousness. Judging human consciousness between right and wrong can only be based on practice, because human beings can only depend on practice to promote the development of human consciousness, raise the level of consciousness, establish the true facts of human consciousness and put false consciousness to rights. (4) Practice can be treated as the basis on which “the human subject” tries to solve all his survival problems. Myriads of complex and unintelligible contradictions inherent in human existence as well as in human survival are always awaiting solution and at the same time putting one individual’s ability and proficiency to the severe test. The contradictions perceived as inherent manifestations of human existence encompass the contradictory relationships of man to nature, man to man and man to himself that are intertwined and superimposed and that even undergo a myriad of changes in an instant. With the above situation in view, though he has too many contradictions to cope with at the same time, “the human subject” could hardly attend to all sorts of complex and unintelligible contradictions flooding in at once and it must follow that he would be overwhelmed by fatigue eventually. The myriad contradictions inherent in human existence encompasses man’s “dual life” (man’s “natural life versus his supernatural life”) and man’s life endowed with multi-duality as well as other manifold manifestations characterized by the unity of opposites such as man’s finiteness versus his infiniteness, man’s ideal versus his reality, man’s perceptual knowledge versus his rational knowledge including man’s emotion versus his reason—or, to put it another way, man’s sensibility versus his sense, man’s soul versus his body, the phenomenon of man versus the essence or nature of man, the particularity existing in human life versus the universality or generality residing in human life, the experience of contingency versus necessity, or vice versa, in human life, the myriad possibilities versus the various realities in human life and vice versa,

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citizens’ or civic rights versus their civic obligations, the purpose of human life versus the regularity of human life, the instrumentality embedded within human existence versus the inherent value of human life, the fairness of a society, especially the fairness associated with a given social system, versus its production efficiency, in particular its social members’ labor efficiency, the humanistic ideals inherent in human life versus the general patterns of market activities, and truth, good and beauty embedded within human existence versus falsehood, evil and ugliness inherent in human life. The aforementioned complex contradictions confronting people in their life originate from their practical activities of daily living, manifest themselves in their practical activities of daily living, and can only be resolved through their practical activities of daily living. Resolving the myriad contradictions inherent in human existence through human beings’ practical activities carried out in their life constitutes the fundamental mode of human existence as well as the basic way that the ontology of man’s unique life exists.

1.3 Marx’s Practical Theory Provides the Fundamental Principle for Our Understanding of the Noumenon of Human Life Marx’s practical theory provides the fundamental principle as well as the basic viewpoint that can be used to cast illumination upon the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The theory about “man’s practical life” introduces us to the main points that are to be brought out in the following discussion. (1) “The human subject” treats itself as “the actual, living species”, that is man in his wholeness, as an individual and social being, deeply covering the basic aspects of life. People, male or female, who carry out practical activities in their life, are not the imaginary or abstract ones, but the actual, living species-beings or social beings with their diverse motives and their diverse intensions, who not only can create and maintain a myriad of social relations with other people, but who can make and transform the world in which they live. The theory of “structure and choice” takes “the human subject” as the main object of study and, at the same time, tries to cast illumination upon the very research object. “The human subject,” who treats itself as the actual, living species-being or social being, that is as a man in his totality, on the one hand, is only flesh and blood, that is the physical being, but on the other, he is endowed with reason and thought, which provides the rational reason why myriad desires lie hidden in his mind and which makes it possible for “the human subject” to cope with external challenges and pressures. It is in man himself rather than outside of man himself that we try to unravel the mystery of man, which is to say we can only depend upon the practical activities carried out by the actual, living man in his totality to probe, elucidate and solve the mystery of man.

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(2) “The human subject” treats itself as the subject who makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness and who proves himself a conscious species-being in creating a world of objects by his personal activity. Man, who is master of his destiny, can prove clearly and indisputably his life of great value to himself as well as to others by allowing full play to his initiative and creativity in his practical activities rather than by depending upon the forces outside himself. Man can grasp his destiny in his own hands and map out his own future. (3) It is common knowledge that each lock has its own individual key and that only the appropriate measure taken under given circumstances can serve to cope with the actual situation at a given time and place. In view of the fact that the problems which “the human subject” encounters in his life as well as in his practical activities invariably arise under specific conditions, the basic principle that concrete conditions require concrete analysis can be applied to the aforementioned problems. Only by depending upon the specific circumstances or concrete conditions under which problems may arise as well as upon the objective realities or actual conditions which “personality structure” as well as “group structure” proceeds from can we come up with reasonable ways and means of highlighting the myriad choices and challenges by which “personality behavior” as well as “group behavior” is always confronted. (4) “The human subject” can only make a judicious choice of personality behavior on rational principles. More specifically, in making a judicious choice of personality behavior in accordance with rational principles, “the human subject” can neither seek purely the truth of personality behavior nor emphasize unduly the value of personality behavior, but rather tries to achieve the internal unity of truth and value, purpose and regularity as well as fairness and efficiency, and by conforming to the rational principles attempts to address all the complex problems by which he is confronted in his practical activities of daily living. (5) “The human subject’s” practice can be perceived as the basis on which human beings try to achieve the pluralistic unity of man’s “three worlds,” that is, the physical world consisting of physical bodies, the world of mental or psychological states or processes, or of subjective experiences, and the world of the products of the human mind. Man’s “three worlds” are interrelated, interdependent and interact on each other. The natural world is characterized by diverse species and rich resources, whereas the human world boasts a galaxy of great minds, whose names will go down in the annals of history, as well as the richness and variety of cultures across societies. Considering what can be expected from the human world, the richness and variety of human cultures can be attributable to the richness and diversity of man’s practical activities. In carrying out their practical activities, human beings try to make the richness and variety of human cultures and the richness and diversity of man’s practical activities exist in unity with each other, which is to say they are interdependent on each other, interrelate and interact with each other in the human world. “The abstract holism” and “the abstract identity,” which fall within the scope of metaphysical theories, do not conform to the reality of nature, let alone the reality of “the human

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world.” Only Marxist dialectic derived from human practice, which is embodied in the Marxist theories of “the real holism (or the concrete totality)” and “the pluralistic unity,” can be fully entitled to explain the richness and complexity of human cultures that one can hardly imagine in his mind. Marxist dialectic purports to be a reflection of the real world created by man. Dialectic would thus be a robust method under which one could examine personal, social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core foundation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas behind historical materialism. In Marxism, the dialectical method of historical study became intertwined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx, Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels proposed that Hegel’s dialect is too abstract. “The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”6 In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented his own dialectic method, which he claims to be “direct opposite” of Hegel’s method. “My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.”7 Marxist dialectics is exemplified in Das Kapital (Capital), in which Marx outlines the two central theories of surplus value and the materialist conception of history and explains dialectical materialism as follows. “In its rational form, it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”8 Friedrich Engels proposed that nature is dialectical, thus, in Anti-Dühring he said that the negation of negation is “a very simple process, which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped

6

Rockmore, Tom. (2018). Marx’s Dream: from Capitalism to Communism. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 140. 7 McLellan, David. (2000). Karl Marx: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 457. 8 Moyar, Dean., ed. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 667.

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of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy.”9 In Dialectics of Nature, Engels said that “Probably the same gentlemen who up to now have decried the transformation of quantity into quality as mysticism and incomprehensible transcendentalism will now declare that it is indeed something quite self-evident, trivial, and commonplace, which they have long employed, and so they have been taught nothing new. But to have formulated for the first time in its universally valid form a general law of development of Nature, society, and thought, will always remain an act of historic importance.”10 Class struggle is the primary contradiction to be resolved by Marxist dialectics, because of its central role in the social and political lives of a society. Nonetheless, Marx and Marxists developed the concept of class struggle to comprehend the dialectical contradictions between mental and manual labor, and between town and country. Hence, philosophic contradiction is central to the development of dialectics—the progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social change; the negation of the initial development of status quo; the negation of the negation; and the high-level recurrence of features of the original status quo. For Lenin, the primary feature of Marx’s “dialectical materialism” (Lenin’s term) was its application of materialist philosophy to history and social sciences. Lenin’s main input in the philosophy of dialectical materialism was his theory of reflection, which presented human consciousness as a dynamic reflection of the objective material world that fully shapes its contents and structure. In the USSR, Progress Publishers issued anthologies of dialectical materialism by Lenin, wherein he also quotes Marx and Engels. “As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy…. ‘The great basic thought,’ Engels writes, ‘that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But, to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words, and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation, are two different things… For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy, itself, is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain.’ Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is ‘the science of the general

9

Wood, John Cunningham., ed. (1998). Karl Marx’s Economics: Critical Assessments, Volume I. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 403. 10 Seldam, Howard., & Martel, Harry., eds. (2002). Reader in Marxist Philosophy: From the Writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. New York, NY: International Publishers, p. 126.

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laws of motion both of the external world and of human thought.’”11 In addition, Lenin’s dialectical understanding of the concept of development can be described as follows. “A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; ‘breaks in continuity;’ the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between all aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional one.”12 Dialectics has become central to continental philosophy, but it plays no part in Anglo-American philosophy. In other words, on the Continent of Europe, dialectics has entered intellectual culture as what might be called a legitimate part of thought and philosophy, whereas in America and Britain, the dialectic plays no discernible part in the intellectual culture, which instead tends toward positivism, a philosophical theory stating that theology and metaphysics are earlier modes of knowledge and that positive knowledge is based on natural phenomena and their properties and relations as verified by the empirical sciences. Positivism is based on empiricism, a theory that all knowledge originates in experience, and verified data (positive facts) received from the senses are known as empirical evidence. Thus, information derived from sensory experience, interpreted through reason and logic, forms the exclusive source of all certain knowledge.13 Positivism holds that valid knowledge (certitude or truth) is found only in this a posteriori knowledge. Those who accept this theory also maintain that society, like the physical world, operates according to general laws. Introspective and intuitive knowledge is rejected, as are metaphysics and theology because metaphysical and theological claims cannot be verified by sense experience. Although the positive approach has been a recurrent theme in the history of western thought,14 the modern approach was formulated by the philosopher Auguste Comte in the early nineteenth century.15 Comte argued that, much as the physical world operates according to gravity and other absolute laws, so does society.16

11

Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection. Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, pp. 7–9. 12 Ibid. 13 Macionis, John J., & Gerber, Linda M. Sociology. London, UK: Pearson Education, 2010. 14 Cohen, Louis., Manion, Lawrence., & Morrison, Keith. “Research Methods in Education (Six Edition).” British Journal of Educational Studies. 55 (4): 9. London and New York: Routledge. 2007. 15 “Auguste Comte.” Sociology Guide. sociologyguide.com. Retrieved 31 January 2020. 16 Macionis, John J. (2012). Sociology (14th Edition). Boston, MA: Pearson, p. 11.

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A prime example of the European tradition is Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, which is very different from the works of Popper, whose philosophy was for a time highly influential in the UK where he lived. Sartre states that “Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in order to discover these concrete syntheses. It can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving, dialectical totalisation, which is nothing else but history or—from the strictly cultural point of view adopted here—‘philosophy—becoming – the world.’”17 Karl Popper has attacked the dialectic repeatedly. In 1937, he wrote and delivered a paper entitled “What Is Dialectic?” in which he attacked the dialectical method for its willingness to “put up with contradictions.”18 Popper concluded the essay with these words: “The whole development of dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in philosophical system-building. It should remind us that philosophy should not be made a basis for any sort of scientific system and that philosophers should be much more modest in their claims. One task which they can fulfill quite usefully is the study of the critical methods of science.”19 In chapter 12 of volume 2 of The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper unleashed a famous attack on Hegelian dialectics in which he held that Hegel’s thought (unjustly in the view of some philosophers, such as Walter Kaufmann)20 was to some degree responsible for facilitating the rise of fascism in Europe by encouraging and justifying irrationalism, a system emphasizing intuition, instinct, feeling, or faith rather than reason or holding that the universe is governed by irrational forces. In Sect. 17 of his 1961 “addenda” to The Open Society, entitled “Facts, Standards and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism,” Popper refused to moderate his criticism of the Hegelian dialect, arguing that it “played a major role in the downfall of the liberal movement in Germany […] by contributing to historicism and to an identification of might and right, encouraged totalitarian modes of thought. […] [And] undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and honesty.”21 The philosopher of science and physicist Mario Bunge repeatedly criticized Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, calling them “fuzzy and remote from science”22 and a “disastrous legacy.”23 He concluded: “The so-called laws of dialectics, such as formulated by Engels (1940, 1954) and Lenin (1947, 1981), are false insofar as they are intelligible.”24 17

Sartre, Jean-Paul. “The Search for Method (1st part).” In Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre (Hazel Barnes, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1960. 18 Popper, Karl. (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 316. 19 Ibid., p. 335. 20 Walter Kaufmann. “Kaufmann.” Marxists.org. Retrieved 2020–01-31. 21 Popper, Karl. (1966). The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol.2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.395. 22 Bunge, Mario Augusto. “A Critique of Dialectics.” In Scientific Materialism, 41–63. Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1981. 23 Bunge, Mario Augusto. (2012). Evaluating philosophies. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, pp. 84– 85. 24 Ibid., pp. 84–85.

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Irrationalism is a philosophical movement emerging in the 19th and early twentieth century,25 emphasizing the non-rational dimension of human life and claiming to enrich the apprehension of human life by extending it beyond the rational to its fuller dimensions. “Rooted either in metaphysics or in an awareness of the uniqueness of human experience, irrationalism stressed the dimensions of instinct, feeling, and will as over and against reason.”26 As they reject logic, irrationalists argue that instinct and feelings are superior to reason in the research of knowledge.27 The main tide of irrationalism, like that of literary romanticism—itself a form of irrationalism— followed the Age of Reason and was a reaction to it. Irrationalism found much in the life of the spirit and in human history that could not be dealt with by the rational methods of science. Under the influence of Charles Darwin and later Sigmund Freud, irrationalism began to explore the biological and subconscious roots of experience. Pragmatism, existentialism, and vitalism (or “life philosophy”) all arose as expressions of this expanded view of human life and thought. “In general, irrationalism implies either (in ontology) that the world is devoid of rational structure, meaning, and purpose; or (in epistemology) that reason is inherently defective and incapable of knowing the universe without the universe without distortion; or (in ethics) that recourse to objective standards is futile; or (in anthropology) that in human nature itself the dominant dimensions are irrational.”28 Historicism is the idea of attributing meaningful significance to space and time, such as historical period, geographical place, and local culture. Historicism tends to be hermeneutic because it values cautious, rigorous, and contextualized interpretation of information; or relativist, because it rejects notions of universal, fundamental and immutable interpretations.29 The term “historicism” (Historismus) was coined by German philosopher Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel.30 Over time it has developed different and somewhat divergent meanings. Elements of historicism appear in the writings of French essayist Michael de Montaigne (1533–1592) and Italian philosopher G. B. Vico (1668–1744), and became more fully developed with the dialectic of Georg Hegel (1770–1831), influential in 19th-century Europe. The writings of Karl Marx, influenced by Hegel, also include historicism. The term is also associated with the empirical social sciences and with the work of Franz Boas. The approach varies from individualist theories of knowledge such as empiricism and rationalism, 25

Rockmore, Tom. (2012). Lukacs Today: Essays in Marxist Philosophy.New York, NY: Springer Science & Business Media, p.5. 26 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “irrationalism.”Encyclopedia Britannica, February 8, 2012. https://www.britannica.com/topic/irrationalism. 27 Kukla, Andre. (2013). Social Constructivism and the Philosphy of Science. New York, NY: Routledge,p. 149. 28 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “irrationalism.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 8, 2012. https://www.britannica.com/topic/irrationalism. 29 Kahan, Jeffrey. “Historicism.” Renaissance Quarterly 50:4 (December 22, 1997): 1202. 30 Leiter, Brian., & Rosen, Michael., eds. (2007). The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p.175.cf. Harloe, Katherine., & Morley, Neville., eds. (2012). Thucydides and the Modern World: Reception, Reinterpretation and Influence from the Renaissance to the Present. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 81.

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which neglect the role of traditions. Historicism may be contrasted with reductionist theories—which assumes that all developments can be explained by fundamental principles (such as in economic determinism)—or with theories that posit that historical changes occur as a result of random chance. The Austrian-English philosopher Karl Popper condemned historicism along with the determinism and holism which he argued formed its basis. In his Poverty of Historicism, he identified historicism with the opinion that there are “inexorable laws of historical destiny,” which opinion he warned against. If this seems to contrast with what proponents of historicism argue for, in terms of contextually relative interpretation, this happens, according to Popper, only because such proponents are unaware of the type of causality they ascribe to history. Talcott Parsons criticized historicism as a case of idealistic fallacy in The Structure of Social Action (1937). The social theory of Karl Marx, with respect to modern scholarship, has an ambiguous relation to historicism. Critics of Marx have charged his theory with historicism since its very genesis. Marx himself expresses critical concerns with this historical tendency in his Theses on Feuerbach: “The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who changed circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.”31 Karl Popper used the term historicism in his influential books The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies, to mean: “an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their primary aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns,’ the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the evolution of history.”32 Karl Popper wrote with reference to Hegel’s theory of history, which he criticized extensively. However, there is wide dispute whether Popper’s description of “historicism” is an accurate description of Hegel, or more his characterization of his own philosophical antagonists, including Marxist-Lenin thought, then widely held as posing a challenge to the philosophical basis of the West, as well as theories such as Spengler’s which drew predictions about the future course of events from the past. A NeoMarxist critic, Karel Kosik, in Dialectics of the Concrete (1976) criticizes Popper’s statement that “All knowledge, whether intuitive or discursive must be of abstract aspects, and we can never grasp the ‘concrete structure of reality itself.’”33 Kosik refers to him as “a leading contemporary opponent of the philosophy of concrete

31 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1969). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Theses on Feuerbach (V. Lough, Trans.). Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 13–15. 32 Popper, Karl. (1957). The Poverty of Historicism.London: Routledge, p. 3. 33 Kosik, Karel. “Dialectics of the Conrete Totality.” Telos 2 (Fall 1968). New York: Telos Press, p. 18.

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totality,”34 and clarifies that, “Totality indeed does not signify all facts. Totality signifies reality as structured dialectical whole, within which any particular fact (or any group or set of facts) can be rationally comprehended”35 as “the cognition of a fact or of a set of facts is the cognition of their place in the totality of reality.”36 He considers Popper’s work to be a part of atomist-rationalist theories of reality.37 Kosik declares: “Opinions as to whether cognition of all facts is knowable or not are based on the rationalist-empiricist idea that cognition proceeds by the analytic-summative method. This idea is in turn based on the atomist idea of reality as a sum of things, processes and facts.”38 Kosik also suggests that Popper and like-minded thinkers lack an understanding of dialectical processes and how they form a totality.39 One of the most important books of the twentieth century, Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies is an uncompromising defense of liberal democracy and a powerful attack on the intellectual origins of totalitarianism. From 1938 until the end of the Second World War he focused his energies on political philosophy, seeking to diagnose the intellectual origins of German and Soviet totalitarianism. The Open Society and Its Enemies was the result. An immediate sensation when it was first published in two volumes in 1945, Popper’s monumental achievement has attained legendary status on both the Left and Right and is credited with inspiring anticommunist dissidents during the Cold War. Arguing that the spirit of free, critical inquiry that governs scientific investigation should also apply to politics, Popper traces the roots of an opposite, authoritarian tendency to a tradition represented by Plato, Marx, and Hegel.40 Popper’s book remains one of the most popular defenses of Western liberal values in the post World War Two era.41 Gilbert Ryle, reviewing Popper’s book just two years after its publication42 and agreeing with him, wrote that Plato “was Socrates’ Judas.”43 The Open Society and Its Enemies was praised by the philosopher Bertrand Russell, who called it “a work of first-class importance” and “a vigorous and profound defense of democracy,”44 and Sidney Hook who called it a “subtly argued and passionately written” critique of the “historical ideas that threaten the love of freedom [and] the existence of an open society.” Hook calls 34

Ibid., p.23. Ibid., pp. 18–19. 36 Ibid., p.23. 37 Ibid., p.24. 38 Ibid., p.23. 39 Ibid., pp.23–24. 40 Popper, Karl R. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton, US-NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020. 41 McCrum, Robert. (2016). “The 100 best nonfiction books: No 35 – The Open Society and Its Enemies by Karl Popper (1945)”. In The Guardian. 42 Ryle, Gilbert. “Popper, K.R. – The Open Society and Its Enemies.” Mind 222(56) (April 1947): 167–172. 43 Ibid., p.169. See also Burke, T. E. (1983). The Philosophy of Popper. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. p. 141. 44 Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Abingdon-on-Thames, GB-OXF: Routledge, 2012. 35

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Popper’s critique of the cardinal beliefs of historicism “undoubtedly sound,” noting that historicism “overlooks the presence of genuine alternatives in history, the operation of plural causal processes in the historical pattern, and the role of human ideals in redetermining the future.” Nevertheless, Hook argues that Popper “reads Plato too literally when it serves his purposes and is too cocksure about what Plato’s ‘real’ meaning is when the texts are ambiguous,” and calls Popper’s treatment of Hegel “downright abusive” and “demonstrably false,” noting that “there is not a single reference to Hegel in Hitler’s Mein Kampf (My Struggle or My Fight).”45 The philosopher Joseph Agassi credits Popper with showing that historicism is a factor common to both fascism and Bolshevism.46 Some other philosophers were critical. Walter Kaufmann believed that Popper’s work has many virtues, including its attack against totalitarianism, and many suggestive ideas. However, he also found it to have serious flaws, writing that Popper’s interpretations of Plato were flawed and that Popper had provided a “comprehensive statement” of older myths about Hegel. Kaufmann commented that despite Popper’s hatred of totalitarianism, Popper’s method was “unfortunately similar to that of totalitarian ‘scholars.’”47 In his The Open Philosophy and the Open Society: A Reply to Dr. Karl Popper’s Refutations of Marxism (1968), the Marxist author Maurice Cornforth defended Marxism against Popper’s criticisms. Though disagreeing with Popper, Cornforth nevertheless called him “perhaps the most eminent” critic of Marxism.48 The philosopher Robert C. Solomon writes that Popper directs an “almost wholly unjustified polemic” against Hegel, one which has helped to give Hegel a reputation as a “moral and political reactionary.”49 The Marxist economist Ernest Mandel identifies The Open Society and Its Enemies as part of a literature, beginning with German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, that criticizes the dialectical method Marx borrowed from Hegel as “useless,” “metaphysical,” or “mystifying.”He faults Popper and the other critics for their “positivist narrowness.”50 The political theorist Rajeev Bhargava argues that Popper “notoriously misreads Hegel and Marx,” and that the formulation Popper deployed to defend liberal political values is “motivated by partisan ideological considerations grounded curiously in the most abstract metaphysical premises.”51 In Jon Stewart’s anthology The Hegel Myths and Legends (1996), The Open Society and Its Enemies is listed as a work that has propagated 45

Hook, Sidney. “From Plato to Hegel to Marx.” New York Times (July 22, 1951). Agassi, Joseph. (2014). Popper and His Popular Critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos. Heidelberg, DE: Springer, p. 48. 47 Kaufmann, Walter A. “The Hegel Myth and Its Method.” In The Hegel Myths and Legends, ed. Jon Stewart, 82–83. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996. 48 Cornforth, Maurice. (1968). The Open Philosophy and the Open Society: A Reply to Dr. Karl popper’s Refutations of Marxism. New York, NY: International Publishers, p. 5. 49 Solomon, Robert C. (1995). In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 480. 50 Marx, Karl. (1990). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1. London: Penguin. p.22. 51 Bhargava, Rajeeve. “Karl Popper: Reason without Revolution.” Economic and Political Weekly (December 31, 1994). 46

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“myths” about Hegel.52 Stephen Houlgate writes that while Hegel sought to deceive others by use of dialectic is famous, it is also ignorant, as is Popper’s charge that Hegel’s account of sound and heat in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences is “gibberish.”53 (6) “The human subject’s” practice can be conceived as a process of development and change. In view of the fact that man’s immediate practice is historical, which is to say when men engage themselves in practical activities, they cannot carry out them as they please, that is, their activities cannot occur under selfselected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past, it must of necessity be inextricably linked with man’s past practice as well as his future practice, which is to say, on the one hand, man’s immediate practice can be attributable to the continued progress and cumulative development of past practice, but on the other, it provides the sound basis and necessary prerequisite for future practice. Considering what can be expected from an individual, practice constitutes his life-long course of struggle. When confronted with a myriad of external pressures and challenges, one has to engage himself in a life-long course of struggle in order to deal with myriad pressures and challenges closely intertwined with his life activity in the external world. Only in this way can one grasp his destiny in his own hands and be master of his fate. Therefore, only when one tries to identify the truth about the essence of human life with the unalterable belief that “man is a practical species-being,” can one gain a deeper insight into the ontology of human life—“structure and choice,” enlighten other people about it, and further give valuable guidance to them on how to understand and treat it.

2 Man’s Real Life In view of the fact that “the essence of human life” as well as “the noumenon of human life” is predicated upon the Marxist belief that “man is a practical speciesbeing,” the term of “the real man” borrowed from Marxist classics may render its substantial help to us when we attempt to delve into “the essence of human life” as well as “the ontology of human life.” The theory of “structure and choice” takes “the actual or real man” rather than “the imaginary man” or “the abstract man” as the primary object of study and, at the same time, tries to illuminate “the actual or real man” in all his fundamental bearings. The theory of “structure and choice” is based upon “the actual or real man,” starting off on the very premise to shed light on the ontology of human life. Marx’s theory about “the actual or real man”, which possesses unparalleled intellectual richness and profundity, not only can be 52

Stewart, Jon, ed. (1996). The Hegel Myths and Legends. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. p. 383. 53 Houlgate, Stephen. (1998). The Hegel Reader. Oxford, GB-OXF: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 2, 253, 256.

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conceived as a significant theoretical breakthrough in human studies, but also can be perceived as a complete revolution in man’s self-knowledge in the history of human thought. Marx refutes the long-established cardinal belief widely accepted among idealists that, in contradiction to materialism, the active side of human thinking was developed abstractly by idealism to the extent that the mere exercise of pure reason or intellect would enable the idealists to gain a marvelous insight into the truth of what it is to be a human being. In addition, Marx still contradicts the dogmatic doctrine of the old materialism that understanding man can only proceed from the mere natural standpoint, which must of necessity treat man as mere natural beings. In direct contradiction to idealism as well as the old materialism, Marx, who differs essentially from idealists as well as from the old materialists in knowing man, positively asserts that man is an active, practical subject, which brought about epoch-making changes in man’s self-knowledge, which made human science break through the shackles of abstract humanity and take “the actual or real man” as the main object of study, and which opened up the fair way for the development of human science.

2.1 The Basic Implications of the Marxist Theory About “The Actual or Real Man” Viewed from the perspective, man is a species-being,54 not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but—and this is only another way of expressing it—also because he treats himself as “the actual, living species;” because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being. The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature; and the more universal man (or the animal) is, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body. Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature. For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is lifeengendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s speciescharacter. Life itself appears only as a means to life. The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man 54

The term “species-being” (Gattungswesen) is derived from Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy where it is applied to man and mankind as a whole.

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makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. It is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s specie-life; for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. Admittedly animals also produce. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. It has now become evident to us that the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual, but that in its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. From a Marxist perspective, man is an actual or real species-being. Marx and Engels made cooperative efforts to set forth more fully developed ideas on “the actual or real man” mainly in several of the classical works such as The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism, Theses on Feuerbach, and The German Ideology (written from fall 1845 to mid-1846). Marx once developed a clear definition of “real man” in The Holy Family: “Real man is the one living in a real, objective world anddetermined by that world.”He added a few illuminating remarks on “real man”: “The object as being for man, as the objective being of man, is at the same time the existence of man for other men, his human relation to other men, the social behavior of man to man.”55 Marx’s suggestive ideas on “real man” show clearly and conclusively that Marx sought to create internal interrelationships between man himself, the objective world and social relations and that he came to treat man’s objective world and social relations as principal constituents of the definition of man 55 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: The Holy Family. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 52, 245.

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as well as of the essence of man. It is thus evident that “real man” is the actual, living man who lives in the objective or real world and at the same time establishes complex social relations with other members and who actively engages in social practice. The main object that “the theory of structure and choice” tries to throw light on has always been “the human subject,” that is “the subject—man,” who, in turn, has been identified with “real man” all along. Marx’s illuminating ideas on “real man” can be summarized in the following aspects. (1) “Real man” is first of all the flesh-and-blood individual who is standing before us, empirically or sensuously perceptible and conceptually describable. In his private letter addressed to Marx on 19th November, 1844, Engels said that “We must take our departure from the Ego, the empirical, flesh-and-blood individual, if we are not, like Stirner, to remain stuck at this point but rather proceed to raise ourselves to ‘man’. ‘Man’ will always remain a wraith so long as his basis is not empirical man. In short we must take our departure from empiricism and materialism if our concepts, and notably our ‘man,’ are to be something real; we must deduce the general from the particular, not from itself or, à la Hegel, from thin air.”56 “The real man,” who lives in the real world and actively engages in social practice, is not an imaginary, incorporeal, or unreal image, but a fleshand-blood, empirically or sensuously perceptible concrete species-being. Man is endowed with reason. Aristotle famously describes reason as a part of human nature. People are different from animals, because they possess the quality of reason. For Baruch Spinoza, desire is the very essence of man. According to Webster’s Dictionary, desire is the conscious impulse toward something that promises enjoyment or satisfaction in its attainment. Aristotle acknowledges that desire cannot account for all purposive movement towards a goal. He posits that perhaps reason, in conjunction with desire and by way of the imagination, makes it possible for one to apprehend an object of desire, to see it as desirable. In this way reason and desire work together to determine what is a good object of desire. Desire is not considered to be a bad thing in and of and of itself; rather, it is a powerful force within the human that, once submitted to morality and reason, can become a tool for good, for advancement, and for abundant living. Human reason endows man with the power of thinking in orderly rational ways, making a wise choice or a sound judgment, and then acting judiciously according to circumstances. “Real man” is a complex species-being in its totality, who is living in the real world and endowed with exuberant vitality. “Real man” is a unique species-being that is sensuously perceptible and empirically describable. “Real man” is the actual, living species-being who has been persistently and energetically striving for the unity of body and mind through life. “Real man” can be grouped into three categories, including individual— “personality;” collective—“group” (family, organization or institution, state and international organization); mankind—“species.” 56

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 27: Engels: “Letter from Engels to Marx.” Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p.13.

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(2) “Real man” is a species-being in its totality, to wit the real, whole man. “Real man” endowed with exuberant vitality is a whole or concrete species-being, whose existence depends upon its complex constituents and aspects possessing their respective unique implications, positions and functions invariably indispensible for its whole existence and whose complex constituents and aspects fundamental to its existence are not isolated or separated from each other, but jointly form the organic parts of “real man”, whose interconnection and interaction with each other is indispensible for their respective existence and which perform their respective functions while conditioning each other. “Real man’s” complex constituents and aspects fundamental to its whole existence manifest themselves in all its fundamental bearings. “Real man” is a unique species-being who exists in and for himself, which supplies the basic reason for the fact that his existence is characterized by the unity of body and mind as well as by the unity of the perceptual and the rational. “Real man” is a practical species-being, whose practical activity manifests itself mainly in his knowledge and reformation of nature, society, the objective world and the subjective world. “Real man” is a species-being who can develop a myriad of complex relationships with the external world, whose myriad forms manifest themselves mainly in the relations of man to nature, of man to society and of man to real life as well as of man to virtual reality. “Real man” is a conscious species-being who can awake to the paramount importance of time and space to his existence, which is characterized by the tension between synchrony and diachrony as well as by the unity between them. Despite the fact that they are liable to conflict with each other, manifold manifestations of relationships inherent in “real man’s” existence are not separated or even isolated from each other, but tend to coexist side by side with each other, which is to say myriad forms of relationships included in “real man’s” whole existence should be viewed from a holistic perspective or in a holistic way, especially when they interrelate and interact with each other through “real man’s” social practice. Therefore, “real man” when viewed as a whole or in its totality is a man in his totality or a whole man, that is “a real, actual, whole man”. (3) In the capacity of a subject, “real man” develops myriad social connections with other members of society and actively engages in a multitude of practical activities. As the subject of the world, “real man” is endowed with the power of carrying out practical activities and has been engaged in social practice since he came into the world, which is to say that “real man” would spend his whole life remolding his subjective world and improving his mind in myriad ways while changing the objective world and working for the betterment of society as a whole. This is the very essence of man. Human practice, that is, human practical activity or man’s conscious life activity, not only makes human beings fundamentally different from animals, but also constitutes an essential difference between each individual and every other individual. Likewise, different states, different peoples, different organizations, or different humans also base their respective fundamental differences upon human practice. In the final analysis, the essential differences between them can be invariably attributable to the

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different practical activities they engage in separately. Marx argued that “The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can be verified in a purely empirical way. The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. Men are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these. The existence of men is their actual lifeprocess.”57 Man’s actual practical activity not only determines what constitutes what could be called the essence of man as well as the nature of man, but also defines the concreteness and uniqueness of what it is to exist as a human being, an individual, or a group. (4) “Real man” is embodied in the unity of “actual self” and “ideal self” as well as of “what it is to exist as an actual self” and “what it will be to exist as an ideal self”. It has been argued that the evolutionary emergence of higher-order consciousness such as self-consciousness and self-awareness in humans is a result of human evolution, the evolutionary process that dates back 1.7 million years. One of the basic functions inherent in self-consciousness (or self-awareness) consisting of essential elements manifests itself in the fact that, on the one hand, it can differentiate between one element from the other and view constituent elements in isolation from others, but on the other, it can coordinate component elements, make them coexist side by side with each other and act as a unity, which is to say that self-consciousness (or self-awareness) not only can make self existing as a unity differentiate between “actual self” and “ideal self” as well as between “what it is to be an actual self” and “what it will be to act as an ideal self,” but also can make self achieve the unity of “actual self” and “ideal self” as well as of “what it is to be an actual self” and “what it will be to exist as an ideal self”, whereby self can triumph over its negative or restrictive aspects and strive to strive for great progress. The characteristics and abilities that all human beings are endowed with, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, age, culture or creed, may act as a driving force for human progress and social advance. “Actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”) is man’s immediate existence, to wit the 57

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 24, 29.

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actual state in which man exists as well as the moral, intellectual and cultural levels he has attained accordingly, whereas “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”) is about how man looks forward to the future, maps out his future and carves out his future, that is about what man’s ideal state is like as well as about the moral, intellectual and cultural levels he has reached accordingly. Generally speaking, “actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”) tends to lay the basis for “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”), while “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”) is the continuation and development of “actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”). “Actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”) and “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”) exist in unity with each other as well as in contradiction to each other, and “real man” exists and develops in conformity with the very law of the unity of opposites. The unity of “actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”) and “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”) as well as the contradiction between them not only defines “real man’s” immediate existence, but also enables “real man” to view the future optimistically, map out his future and carve out his future, and thus “real man” is the unity of reality and history. The Marxist theory on “real man”, which is devoted to the study of both “actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”) and “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”), serves to guide people along the right direction and point up the surest road for the emancipation of all mankind as well as for the free development of all.

2.2 The Essence of “Real Man” Marx’s theory on the essence of man is consistent with his theory about “real man”. In contradistinction to Marx’s idea of man, the philosophers before him deduced man’s species-being from human thinking, it was from human thinking that they arrived at man’s species-being, and hence man’s species-being is crowned with a halo of abstraction. Likewise, the idealistic understanding of abstract man demonstrates yet again how deeply idealistic abstraction is rooted in the idealistic mind. For Marx, the first premise of all human history is the existence of living human individuals and the existence of men is their actual life-process. Free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, man proves himself a conscious speciesbeing, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active specieslife. The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into definite social and political relations. These social and political relations are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they

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work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.58 In direct contrast to all hitherto existing idealism which descends from heaven to earth, here Marx ascends from earth to heaven. That is to say, Marx set out from living individuals’ actual life-process and practical activity conditioned by definite material conditions and material intercourse, whereby he could obtain a more profound understanding of real, active men and gain a deeper insight into the essence of man. In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx proposed that man’s practical activity and social relations may prove of cardinal importance to our understanding of man as well as human nature. “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary,’ of ‘practical-critical,’ activity. The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth—i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” Likewise, in The German Ideology Marx maintained that the paramount importance of real, active men’s actual life-process, material production and social intercourse cannot be overemphasized to our understanding of man as well as human essence. “Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into ‘relations’ with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. We must state the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is a historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Therefore in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implication and to accord it its due importance. The production of life, both of one’s own in labor and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a 58

Ibid., pp. 23, 29.

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social relationship. By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a ‘productive force.’ Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society, hence, that the ‘history of humanity’ must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange.” In The Holy Family, Marx insisted that given the important role of the “interest” in our understanding of human activity and human essence, one cannot attach too much importance to the “interest.” He held that “Man is recognized as the essence, the basis of all human activity and situations or relations. History is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.” Further, he added that “It must further be precisely distinguished to what extent the mass was ‘interested’ in aims and to what extent it was ‘enthusiastic’ over them. The ‘idea’ always disgraced itself insofar as it differed from the ‘interest’. The ‘interest’ that is correctly accessible to ordinary minds constitutes the general foundation of morals.”59 Proceeding on this line of thought, Marx further pointed out that the fundamental difference between humans and animals lies in man’s labor, especially man’s production, arguing that “Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.”60 Hence Marx’s theory on “real man” lays the theoretical basis for a deeper understanding as to the truth of human essence and further points up the wide road for legions of theorists stepping into the shoes of Marx and vying with one another in producing their respective theories on human beings as well as on human nature. Proceeding from man’s social practice and material production, Marx gave us penetrating insights into the essence of man (human nature or human essence). Active, real men engage not only in the production of material life but also in the production of intellectual life. In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into the social division of labor, which determines the definite intercourse (material or mental) and relations (production or social) of different individuals to one another, of different organizations to one another as well as of different social classes or strata among themselves, which must of necessity require definite rules and systems, especially the private ownership, and which illustrates the necessity of establishing social institutions and management styles appropriate to various divisions among the individuals, organizations, nations, or classes (strata) co-operating in definite kinds of labor, whereby each individual must of necessity be a concrete one as well as a unique one, rather than an abstract one. As Marx argued, 59 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: The Holy Family. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp.103, 118–119, 167. 60 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 67.

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“For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape.”61 In view of the fact that active, real men or the actual, living individuals engage in social practice and material production and assert their vested rights to particular, exclusive spheres of activity, after considerable discussion on the essence of man, Marx formulated the rational conclusion that “But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.”62 The very way that Marx tried to reveal the essence of man can help us recognize the fundamental difference between humans and animals as well as between each individual and every other individual, find out exactly the truth about human essence and enlighten us as to how to adopt a scientific approach to human essence. The way that Marx tried to reveal the essence of man endows the concept of human nature with multiple implications. First, human nature and human existence are endowed with such inherent characteristics as multiplicity and richness. As far as an individual is concerned, his nature as well as his existence is not marked by unitariness or one-dimensionality, but characterized by multiplicity and multidimensionality. As Marx argued in The German Ideology, “In the case of an individual, for example, whose life embraces a wide circle of varied activities and practical relations to the world, and who, therefore, lives a many-sided life, thought has the same character of universality as every other manifestation of his life. …The extent to which these qualities develop on the universal or local scale, the extent to which they transcend local narrow-mindedness or remain within its confines, depend not on Stirner, but on the development of world intercourse and on the part which he and the locality where he lives.”63 Second, human nature as well as human existence is a complex system. On no account should one cram his mind with various plausible theories proposed by the past philosophers in regard to human nature and human existence, who insisted that man should be conceived as “an entity,” “a separate, physical being (or living thing) in itself,” or “the existent endowed with self-consciousness.” Rather man can only be perceived as a unique system. The system of human nature is endowed with numerous constituent elements of crucial importance to human existence, such as the ideological power, the moral power, the intellectual power, the will power and the power of motivation, which can come under the category of man’s inherent powers and which possess such prominent characteristics as many-sidedness and complexity as well as system and structure. Third, human nature is historical, which is to say that human nature is in a continuous process of development. The progressive development of social practice as well as the steady expansion of material production (productive activity or labor) must of necessity result in more universal 61

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 37. 62 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: Marx: Theses on Feuerbach. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p.5. 63 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp.296–297.

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or much wider spheres of human intercourse and activity, whose most prominent manifestations can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, “humanized nature,” which signifies a nature that is the by-product of human conceptualizations, activities, and regulations, is undergoing an inevitable process of expansion. Accordingly, the sphere of humanized nature on which man lives is becoming more universal than ever. As Marx argued in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, “The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature; and the more universal (or the animal) is, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc., constitute theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art—his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and digestible— so also in the realm of practice they constitute a part of human life and human activity. Physically man lives only these products of nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, a dwelling, etc. The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body— both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body. Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.” On the other hand, when active, real men enter into relation with one another as individuals, the intercourse and association of these actual, living individuals, which was formerly a restricted one and characterized by the narrowness of the individuals themselves, is getting increasingly complex and their manifold spheres of intercourse and activity are becoming much wider than ever. Hence these individuals will inevitably undergo a gradual transition from local, narrow-minded beings to world-historical beings. “The further the separate spheres, which interact on one another, extend in the course of this development, the more the original isolation of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the developed mode of production and intercourse and the division of labor between various nations naturally brought forth by these, the more history becomes world history.”64 The universal development of productive forces, that is, a great increase in productive power or a high degree of this development, itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being. Furthermore, only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which can finally put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones.65

64 65

Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 39.

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2.3 Deeper Understanding and Further Exploration of the Theory on “Real Man” Marx’s theory on “real man” is devoted to the study of man’s universal existence as well as the essence of man in practice. In this regard, Marx conceptualized four separate pairs of opposite categories forming an organic relationship with each other to elaborate his argument. First, the local, narrow-minded individual versus the universal individual. By “the local, narrow-minded individual,” Marx means the one who is conditioned by the development of productive forces and thus who shuts himself up within narrow confines and exists in isolation. In sharp contrast to “the local, narrow-minded individual,” the universal individual is “the real, universal one” who secures all-round possession of human essence on condition that the more the mode of production is developed, the more history becomes world history. That is to say, only the universal development of productive forces, coupled with a universal intercourse between men established with this full development of productive power, can finally put worldhistorical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones and witness the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being. “The real, universal individual” can thus only exist world-historically, and its activity can only have a “world-historical” existence. World-historical existence of “real, universal individuals” means existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history. Second, the individual in his one-sided existence versus the individual in his allround development. By “the individual in his one-sided existence”, Marx means the one whose inherent powers have been rendered one-sided by external forces beyond human control, that is the definite individuals emerging as the immediate consequence of the division of labor coming about naturally in society. As Marx argued in The German Ideology, “For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape.”66 In stark contrast to “the individual in his one-sided existence,” “the individual in his all-round development” is in a position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity and hence a free and all-round development in all his fundamental bearings, and his essence consists in the thus postulated development of a totality of capacities.67 Only in communist society can a concrete (or free and all-round) individual be found in existence. “…in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening,

66 67

Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 76.

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criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.”68 Third, the individual who is in a position to engage in self-activity versus the individual whose existence is oriented towards what is accidental to him and who thus leads an alienated life in an alien world inimically opposed to him. By the latter one, Marx means the individual who can only engage in an alien activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. When the forms of intercourse come into conflict with the productive forces—or, to put it another way, when the contradiction enters on the scene between the forms of intercourse and the productive forces, the earlier forms of intercourse, which are deprived of inherent existence imputed to them and hence assert themselves as accidental things, tend to appear as accidental fetters upon the more developed productive forces and hence upon the advanced mode of the self-activity of individuals, are liable to deprive the individuals engaged in practical activities of their initiative, which means “energy or aptitude displayed in initiation of action and acting independently of outside influence or control,” or spontaneity, which indicates “the quality or state proceeding from natural feeling or native tendency without external constraint,” and necessarily result in the loss of the intrinsic basis for practical human activity. The aforementioned practical human activity is most likely to be rendered accidental by the earlier forms of intercourse and hence change into an alien activity. Therefore, it can be safely asserted that the individual who engages in an alien activity, which is not his spontaneous activity, can be equated with the one whose existence is oriented towards what is accidental to him. In stark contrast to the latter individual, the former individual is the individual as a person, who is in a position to engage in self-activity. As Marx argued in The German Ideology, “What appears accidental to the latter age as opposed to the earlier—and this applies also to the elements handed down by an earlier age—is a form of intercourse which corresponded to a definite stage of development of the productive forces. The relation of the productive forces to the form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to the occupation or activity of the individuals…The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other, are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under which these definite individuals, living under definite relationships, can alone produce their material life and what is connected with it, are thus the conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity. The definite condition under which they produce, thus corresponds to the reality of their conditioned nature, their one-sided existence of which only becomes evident when the contradiction enters on the scene and thus exists for the later individuals. Then this condition appears as an accidental fetter, and the consciousness that it is a fetter is imputed to the earlier age as well.”69 It is thus clear that the individual engaged in practical activity is endowed with initiative and that he is in a position to engage in self-activity. However, it must be admitted that there exists a relative difference between the individual as a person who is in a position to engage in self-activity 68 69

Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 80.

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and the individual whose existence is oriented towards what is accidental to him, who thus leads an alienated life in an alien world inimically opposed to him, and who can only engage in an alien activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. That is to say, the difference between the former individual and the latter one is “not a conceptual difference but a historical fact. This distinction has a different significance at different times. It is not a distinction that we have to make for each age, but one which each age makes itself from among the different elements which it finds in existence, and indeed not according to any theory, but compelled by material collisions in life.”70 Only in communist society, in which man can conquer nature and control human intercourse, will man be able to prove himself a real species-being endowed with man’s species-character, that is man’s free, conscious activity, and hence an individual who is in a position to engage in self-activity. Fourth, the individual who is a member of the real community versus the individual who is a member of the illusory community. For Marx, the community can be grouped into two categories, to wit the real community and the illusory community, which are utterly different from each other. Marx argued that it is of their own accord that the separate individuals form the real community to truly represent the interests of the individual and that it is just this voluntary combination of the separate individuals which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control. In sharp contrast to the real community, Marx maintained that the illusory community represents only the interests of some groups rather than those of the separate individual and that considering what can be expected from most groups, it represents an external force alien to them. Marx held that “Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the real community, therefore, is personal freedom possible.”71 And only in the community should the collectivist principles be followed. Let’s provide a clear and concise summary of what we have been discussing up till now. The great strength inherent in the theory of “real man,” which affords a basis for “the theory of structure and choice” in terms of how it is devoted to the wider and deeper study of human nature, lies in the richness and profundity of what is contained in the theory as well as in the fact that the theory on “real man” can enrich and deepen our understanding of the essence of man’s unique life, which consists in the fact that man is a practical species. To put it another way, the knowledge system that “the theory of structure and choice” tries to construct and develop can be conceived as the crystallization of wisdom based upon a deeper understanding and further exploration of “practical man” as well as “real man.”

70 71

Ibid. Ibid., p. 84.

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3 The Human Subject’s Life 3.1 Definition and Category of the Human Subject (1) Conception of the Human Subject We mean by the category of a subject that it can be readily comprehensible to ordinary minds only in relation to the category of an object. A subject is a being or an entity that has a relationship with another entity that exists outside itself (called an “object”), whereas an object is something typically understood in contrast to a subject. According to Marx, the subject is man, whilst the object is nature.72 A subject means an individual, while an object is something mental or physical that exists as the object toward which human thought, feeling, or action is directed. On no account is a subject divorced from its object and vice versa. Therefore any discussion regarding the nature of a subject can only be made in light of the context and hence in relation to its object. I should like to avail myself of this very opportunity to adduce the following quotations from Marx’s “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General” in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in which he gave a marvelous insight into the relationship of subject to object. “Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers, vitalpowers—he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are objects that he needs—essential objects, indispensible to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and sense for a third party, is one and the same thing…A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, and plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has no being for its object; i.e., it is not objectively related. Its being is not objective. A non-objective being is a non-being. Suppose a being which is neither an object itself, nor has an object. Such a being, in the first place, would be the unique being: there would exist no being outside it—it would exist solitary and alone. For as soon as there are objects outside me, as soon as I am not alone, I am another–another reality than the object outside me. For this third object I am thus a different reality than itself; that is, I am its object. Thus, to suppose a being which is not the object of another being is to presuppose that no objective being exists. As soon as I have an object, this object has me for 72

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 88.

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an object. But a non-objective being is an unreal, non-sensuous thing—a product of mere thought (i.e., of mere imagination)—an abstraction. To be sensuous, that is, to be really existing, means to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, to have sensuous objects outside oneself—objects of one’s sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer. Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being—and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent its object. But man is not merely a natural being: he is a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for himself. Therefore he is a species-being, and has to confirm and manifest himself as such both in his being and in his knowing. Therefore, human objects are not natural objects as they immediately present themselves, and neither is human sense as it immediately is—as it is objectively—human sensibility, human objectivity. Neither nature objectively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a form adequate to the human being.”73 Moreover, in “Private Property and Communism” of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx gave a more powerful and clarifying analysis of the dialectical unity of subject and object to further enlighten us as to the relationship of subject to object. “We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is possible only when the object becomes for him a social object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object. On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man’s essential powers—human reality, and for that reason the reality of his own essential powers—that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realizehis individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself becomes the object. The manner in which they become his depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it; for it is precisely the determinate nature of this relationship which shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation. To the eye an object comes to be other than it is to the ear, and the object of the eye is another object than the object of the ear. The specific character of each essential power is precisely its specific essence, and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, of its objectively actual, living being. Thus man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of thinking, but with all his senses. On the other hand, let us look at this in its subjective aspect. Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music, and just as the most beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear—is [no] object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers—it can therefore only exist for me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective capacity; because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far as my sense goes (has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to that object)—for this reason the senses of the social man differ from those of the nonsocial man. Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of 73

Morris, Brian. (2003). Anthropological Studies of Religion: An Introductory Text. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 29.

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form—in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being. For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanized nature. The forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire history of the world down to the present….Thus, the objectification of the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make man’s sense human, as well as to create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural substance.”74 Taken in the narrow sense of the word, a subject is the mind, ego, or agent of whatever sort that sustains or assumes the form of thought or consciousness—or, to put it simply, a subject is a being or an individual that possesses unique conscious experiences, while, viewed in the broad sense of the word, a subject means an entity that has agency and hence that acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an object). However, we should not rest contented with a mere dualistic apprehension of the subject. Subjectivity is an inherently social mode that comes about through innumerable interactions within society. As much as subjectivity is a process of individuation, it is equally a process of socialization, the individual never being isolated in a self-contained environment, but endlessly engaging in interaction with the surrounding world. The subject tends to become involved in an activity by playing different roles in it such as the initiator, the organizer, the leader and the decisionmaker. To be truly an individual, to be true to himself, his actions should in some way be expressed so that they describe who and what he is to himself and to others. The important point is that to exist, the individual must make choices—the individual must decide what to do the next moment and on into the future. What the individual chooses and how he chooses will define who and what he is—to himself and to others. Hence it can be safely asserted that a subject is the actual, real, and living individual who engages in practical activities under certain social conditions and whose essential nature lies in the fact that he is a social species-being as well as a practical species-being.75 In other words the subject does not exist before society. Rather the subject owes its existence entirely to the social order. Further, the subject can be seen as the contingent effect of society. Thus, the view that the subject is socially limited is unquestionably true. A subject generally refers to the social subject or the practical subject. In view of the fact that human practice invariably manifests itself in a wide range of activities and that the subject is always established in a particular sphere of human activity, a subject may come into the category of the cognitive subject, of the subject of value, of the aesthetic subject, of the moral subject and of the historical subject. In addition, subjects can also be categorized from other different perspectives. “He [Marx] drove the philosophical categories of the Subject… etc. from all the domains 74

Bertell, Ollman. (1976). Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–96. 75 Liu, Pei-Xian., & Chang, Guan-Wu. (1988). Marxism and the Contemporaty Dictionary. Beijing, China: China Renmin University Press, pp. 164–165.

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in which they had reigned supreme. Not only from political economy (rejection of the myth of homo economicus, that is of the individual with definite faculties and needs as the Subject of the classical economy); not just from history (rejection of social atomism and ethico-political idealism); not just from ethics (rejection of the Kantian ethical idea); but also from philosophy itself: for Marx’s materialism excludes the empiricism of the Subject (and its inverse: the transcendental Subject).”76 A rejection of the ‘bourgeois’ Subject of economics, and liberal ethics can also be found in Marx who criticized the bourgeois Subject for its limitations. Marx did not aim to abolish the historical Subject altogether. His theoretical terminology was not intended to blot out the human agency, but to highlight the barriers to its full realization. (2) The Fundamental Characteristics of a Subject Man as subject is endowed with three fundamental characteristics. First, man has an exalted position in the universe and he seeks to deeply reflect upon his elevated position in the universe. Whilst “noumenon” is defined as a posited object or event that appears in itself independently of perception by the senses, man’s noumenon exists in himself and for himself. From the point of view of Marx, in actual production the subject is man while the object is nature, and man as subject must be the point of departure, which is to say that in this world only man can act as subject and claim to be the rightful purpose and point of departure of all activities while the other natural objects can only be treated as objects. Whilst only social practice can be the criterion of truth, man is the measure of all things. The ultimate goal of human practical activities is to render man’s existence, development and perfection within the bounds of possibility. In human practice, man always remains the subject – or, to put it another way, man is the subject at all times and in all places.77 In the course of the history of man, the laws which govern the development of society and the progress of civilization bear ample testimony to the universal truth that, on the one hand, man exists as the result of the movement of history, but on the other, he constitutes the point of departure of the movement of history.78 Therefore, the historical development manifests itself in the dialectical unity of man’s existence as the historical premise and his existence as the historical result. As Marx argued in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”In “Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner”, that is The German Ideology (Volume I), Marx maintained that “History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances, and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a 76

Althusser, Louis. (2005). For Marx.New York, NY: Verso, pp. 228–229. Marx, K., & Engels, F.(1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 130. 78 Ibid., p.121. 77

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completely changed activity… It shows that history does not end by being resolved into ‘self-consciousness as spirit of the spirit,’ but that in it at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions, which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances.” Man constitutes the point of departure of his own activities, and virtually all his activities are geared to meeting man’s physical needs as well as his spiritual needs.79 In view of the fact that man exists as the result of his own activities and at the same time constitutes the criterion of his own activities, he can see himself in a world that he has created and hence approach a state of perfection and consummation.80 Second, man is master of nature, because man is a species-being, which is to say that man is a conscious being and that free, conscious activity is man’s speciescharacter. Man can humanize nature through practice, which must of necessity lead to the humanization of nature. The German poet and philosopher Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) wrote the verse—“Full of merit, yet poetically, dwells man on the earth” in praise of nature as well as in eulogy of man. On the one hand, as a natural being, man is rooted in nature and lives on nature, which is to say that nature is his body as well as his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is his direct means of life and the material, the object, and the instrument of his life, that he must remain or live in continuous interchange with the natural world, and that his physical and spiritual life is linked to nature if he is not to die. On the other hand, as a conscious species-being, man can make the intellect do its utmost to know the natural objects or the objective world and create a world of objects by his personal activity, thereby changing natural objects into human or social objects and making them undergo the change from “being—in—itself” or “being—for—itself” to “being—for—man himself” that constitutes a two-way, complementary process in which the object undergoes a process of subjectification while the subject undergoes a process of objectification. In understanding and changing the objective world, man can allow full play to his essential powers and change natural objects into human or social objects endowed with man’s essential powers and hence geared towards man’s physical and spiritual needs. In his monumental works On the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871) the great British naturalist Charles Darwin claimed that man was descended from apes. But it is infinitely more than this. In view of the fact that labor is the primary basic condition for all human existence, in a sense, we have to say that labor created man himself. In Dialectics of Nature “Labor created man” is 79

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1956). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume1: Marx: “Critical Notes on the Article: ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian’.” Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 487. 80 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 97.

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a formulation of Marx’s thought by Engels, who usually rendered Marx’s thought adequately and succinctly. The aforementioned statement cannot be understood in and by itself. Rather it acquires its meaning by contradicting some traditionally accepted truth whose plausibility up to the beginning of the modern age had been beyond doubt. “Labor created man” means first that it is labor rather than God that created man; second, it means that man, insofar as he is human, creates himself, that his humanity is the result of his own activity; it means, third, that what distinguishes man from animal, his differentia specifica, is not reason, but labor, that he is not an animal rationale, but an animal laborans; fourth, it means that it is not reason, until then the highest attribute of man, but labor, the traditionally most despised human activity, which contains the humanity of man. Thus Marx challenges the traditional God, the traditional estimate of labor, and the traditional glorification of reason.81 For Engels, the further that man in the making became removed from the animal kingdom, the higher he rose also over animals. With each generation, labor itself became different, more perfect, more diversified. New spheres for labor and hence new forms of activity further and further separated man from the animal. By the co-operation of hands, organs of speech, and brain, not only in each individual, but also in society, human beings became capable of executing more and more complicated operations, and of setting themselves, and achieving, higher and higher aims. The further men become removed from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of a premeditated, planned action directed towards definite ends known in advance. The animal merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it simply by its presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals, and once again it is labor that brings bout this distinction and that makes man vanquish nature and reign supreme over all the other creatures in the natural world. In The Tragedy of Hamlet the English playwright William Shakespeare cannot refrain from expressing unbounded admiration for man—“What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form, in moving, how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the world! The paragon of animals!”82 Thus it can be safely asserted that it is labor that creates man himself as well as separate individuals and that endows individuals with the faculties of engaging in self-activities. However, let us not flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature. For each such conquest takes its revenge on us. Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws and that we should exist in unity or harmony with nature.

81

Arendt, Hannah. (2006). Between Past and Future. London: Penguin Books, pp. 21–22. Zamir, Tzachi., ed. (2018). Shakespeare’s Hamlet: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 67.

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Third, man can become master of society only if all social members shall take the initiative in having an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. In the course of historical evolution, men tend to act as social subjects and historical subjects to build on themselves within their given historical conditions and social relationships. Thus it is quite obvious from the start that there exists a materialistic connection of men with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of production, and which is as old as men themselves. This connection is ever taking new forms, and thus presents a “history” independently of the existence of any political or religious nonsense which in addition may hold men together. This shows that men can bring their brilliant intellect to bear upon the task of knowing those historically created relations of individuals to nature and to one another and that in carrying out practical activities, men can give full play to their initiative in transforming the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. Thus it follows that the intercourse of individuals to one another must of necessity undergo the transformation from a state of “being-in-itself” to a state of “being-for-itself,” which constitutes a two-way, complementary process in which men create new forms of intercourse and hence act as the social subjects appropriate to those historically created relations of individuals to nature and to one another. Admittedly, that men take the more initiative in creating more extensive and profound social relationships would make it possible for human society and civilization to attain a more advanced stage with greater promise of perfection for each social subject. It is commonly asserted that man tends to play a decisive part in developing the relations of man to man as well as of man to nature. In The German Ideology Marx famously noted that “Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into ‘relations’ with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation.” However, the identity of nature and man appears in such a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted relation to one another determines their restricted relation to one another. According to Marx, social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal enjoyment—i.e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in actual direct association with other men—will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of the enjoyment. But also when I am active scientifically, etc.—an activity which I can seldom perform in direct with others—then my activity is social, because I perform it as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being. My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that of which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The activity of my general

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consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being. Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life—even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association with others—are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. man’s individual and species-life are not different, however much—and this is inevitable—the mode of existence of the individual is a more particular or more general mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular or more general individual life. In his consciousness of species man confirms his real social life and simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in species consciousness and exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being. Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real individual social being), is just as much the totality—the ideal totality—the subjective existence of imagined and experienced society for itself; just as he exists also in the real world both as awareness and real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality of human manifestations of life. (3) Categorization of Subjects The first category refers to the personal subject, to wit “the subject as a personality or individual”. In this work, “individual” is called “personality.” The concept of “personality” that is specific to this very work comes into the category of subjective anthropology and differs essentially from the conception of “personality” used respectively in such disciplines as philosophy, ethics, psychology and jurisprudence. To put it simply, in subjective anthropology the term “personality” is coined to describe “the actual, real, and concrete individual endowed with essential powers and unique characteristics” as well as the total number of such individuals. In this work the personal subject is referred to as “the subject as a personality or individual.” “The subject as a personality or individual” means “the subject as an actual, real, and concrete individual endowed with essential powers and unique characteristics,” which is used either in the singular or in the plural. “The subject as a personality or individual” is endowed with universal characteristics and essential powers abstracted from the total number of such individuals as well as unique characteristics and essential powers inherent in a separate individual. The second category means the collective subject, that is “the subject as a group.” In this work “collective” is referred to as “group.” The term “group,” which was coined specifically for this very work, falls into the category of subjective anthropology and can be conceived as the mature result of many years’ hard work. Specifically, the author consumed more than twenty years in working upon the discipline of subjective anthropology, immersed himself deeply in the study of a vast amount of relevant literature, and eventually ventured upon the production of the concept of “group” after many years of extensive reading, subtle analysis and deep deliberation. The author holds that in contrast with the concept of “collective,” the concept of “group” can be geared to meet the specific needs of subjective anthropology more

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scientifically and accurately, help smooth away a multitude of academic difficulties or address a myriad of academic problems confronting the discipline of subjective anthropology, and hence bring the author’s abstruse ideas within the comprehension of academic circles more effectively. To put it in a nutshell, the concept of “group” created specifically for the discipline of subjective anthropology refers to “the community oriented towards human existence” which can only be built through human beings’ concerted and conscious efforts. “Group” can be arranged in a hierarchy—or, to put it another way, it can be organized into different levels of importance from lowest to highest such as the family, the organization, the state and the international organization that may come under the same category of “the community oriented towards human existence” which can only be built through human beings’ common and conscious efforts. In this work the collective subject is referred to as “the subject as a group.” By “the subject as a group”, we mean “the subject as a community oriented towards human existence that can only be built through human beings’ joint efforts.” This shows that “the subject as a group” can be understood at different levels. “The subject as a group,” including the family, the organization, the state and the international organization, is endowed with the whole array of general qualities and universal characteristics generalized from the subjects as the communities oriented towards human existence at different levels, as well as a myriad of unique characteristics and qualities respectively inherent in the subjects as the communities oriented towards human existence at different levels. The third category is the human subject, namely “the subject as a species.” In this work the totality of human beings is referred to as “species,” which has been a generally accepted usage among philosophical circles. Likewise, the discipline of subjective anthropology still follows the long-established usage and treats the totality of human beings as “species” accordingly. The subject as the totality of human beings is called “the subject as a species.” “The subject as a species” is endowed with universal characteristics and qualities inherent in the human subject as well as unique characteristics and qualities to itself. The concept of “the subject as a species” can be used to symbolize the totality of human beings’ essential characteristics and intrinsic qualities as well as the totality of human interests.

3.2 Man’s Subjectivity and Its Manifold Manifestations Man’s subjectivity or human subjectivity refers to the human subject’s consciousness, activity and initiative, to wit, such essential characteristics as purpose, activity, initiative, choice and creativity displayed by the human subject in subject-object relations and common to man as subject. Man’s subjectivity or human subjectivity manifests itself mainly in the relationship between the subject and the object or in the relation(s) of subject to object, in which the subject tries to bring the object within its comprehension, under control and into use. Human subjectivity or man’s subjectivity manifests itself in the following ways.

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(1) Purpose We mean by “purpose” that man as subject (the human subject) always remains an end in subject-object relations. According to the author, man has an exalted position in the universe. In human practice or human practical activities, man always remains an end—or, to put it another way, man is an end at all times and in all places. On the one hand, man exists as the result of his own activities, but on the other, he constitutes the point of departure of his own activities. Whilst only social practice can be the criterion of truth, man is the measure of all things as well as the criterion of his own activities. As Marx argued, in human practice or human practical activities, man always remains the subject—or, to put it another way, man is the subject at all times and in all places.83 In this world, only man constitutes the rightful purpose of his own activities, and virtually all his activities are geared to meeting man’s physical needs as well as his spiritual needs. In view of the fact that man exists as the result of his own activities and at the same time constitutes the criterion of his own activities, he can see himself in a world that he has created and hence approach a state of perfection and consummation.84 In the course of the history of man, the laws which govern the development of society and the progress of civilization bear ample testimony to the universal truth that, on the one hand, man exists as the result of the movement of history, but on the other, he constitutes the point of departure of the movement of history, in which the ultimate goal of human practical activities is to render possible man’s existence, development, well-being and eternity as well as avoid any human activity to jeopardize human survival and development. (2) Consciousness By “consciousness,” we mean the human subject’s (man as subject) selfconsciousness and corresponding behavior when it stands in a definite relationship to the object. This demonstrates that man endowed with essential powers, as it were, could command sufficient courage to become master of the world as well as of himself, because he is a conscious being and makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. Consciousness is the manifestation of man’s essential powers, the externalization of man’s self-consciousness or self-awareness and the natural need for the actualization of man’s essential nature. No other animal can compare with man in this world. Man endowed with self-consciousness or self-awareness is the most intelligent, the most competent, the most indomitable and the most promising animal and hence entitled to reign over the world. As the spheres of human activity are increasingly widened, man’s subjective status and ability will be increasingly improved and his free, conscious subjectivity will be enhanced accordingly, which will make a free, conscious subject of man himself yet. 83

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 130. 84 Ibid., p. 97.

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(3) Initiative By “initiative,” we mean a degree of initiative or activity on the part of the human subject (man as subject). Man’s initiative or activity constitutes a definite form of human consciousness in the process of conscious development. Human initiative endows man as subject (the human subject) with conscious wishes or desires, brings man as subject (the human subject) within the partial comprehension of man’s conscious purposes and patterns, and enables man as subject (the human subject) to be partially rid of subjective arbitrariness and randomness, thereby leading man as subject (the human subject) into a state in which he can behave consciously, or rather, thereby causing the human subject to be in a position to behave consciously. The function of human initiative tends to manifest itself in two ways. On the one hand human initiative enables man as subject (the human subject), to a certain extent, to be consciously awake to his inherent purpose and vocation, and on the other hand it can bring man as subject (the human subject), to a certain degree, within the conscious comprehension and grasp of the laws of development and change of objective things. As far as mankind is concerned, the human subject’s initiative comes about as the result of a long process of conscious evolution, while, as far as the individual is concerned, the human subject’s initiative is formed as the result of a long process of training and practice. (4) Choice By “choice,” we mean the human subject’s ability to consciously judge and choose behaviors under the pressure of circumstances. That is to say, in responding to environmental pressures, the human subject must demonstrate his ability to consciously judge and choose behaviors. Human choice is the manifestation of man’s essential powers such as free will and free judgment. It suggests that the human subject can obtain a clear grasp of his myriad purposes as well as objects’ properties or attributes and that he can also judge and choose behaviors by taking stock of his immediate conditions as well as the external environment confronting him. The human subject’s essential characteristics such as consciousness, initiative and freedom can be fully manifested through human choice—or, to put it another way, human choice can be a full manifestation of the human subject’s essential characteristics such as consciousness, initiative and freedom. The concept of “choice” is multifaceted and carries multiple implications. First, whilst the human subject is hedged around with all sorts of probabilities, the human subject (man as subject) is entitled to retain the freedom of choice. If a mere choice were left to the human subject or, even worse, if he were deprived of the freedom of choice, there would never be any choice on the human subject’s part. Second, human choice is also a manifestation of man’s subjective will, without which there would never exist any choice on the part of the human subject. Third, human choice means the human subject’s ability for choice as well as his standard of choice. If the human subject is equipped with the definite ability for choice as well as the definite standard of choice, he could make correct choices, which would ensure him success and happiness. By contrast, if he is devoid of the definite ability for choice as well as the definite standard of choice, the human subject

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could make wrong choices, which would land him in failure and misfortune. Choices are practically of most frequent occurrence in the human subject’s life so that he is hedged around with innumerable choices, whose interrelation with each other as well as their interaction on each other will eventually shape his course in life and decide the destiny of a lifetime. (5) Creativity Human creativity is the supreme form of human choice as well as the highest manifestation of human subjectivity. Human choice encompasses all kinds of acts of choosing—or, to put it another way, human choice is concerned with any kind of act of choosing, ranging from “a regular act of choosing” to “an irregular act of choosing” as well as from “a valuable act of choosing” to “a valueless act of choosing,” to name but a few. In short, human choices are virtually of most frequent occurrence in human society. Moreover, they occur at all times and in all places. By contrast, human creativity, as distinct from other kinds of acts of choosing in all its fundamental bearings, could be regarded as the supreme form of human choice. Fundamentally speaking, creation is development, progress, qualitative change, transcendence and a process in which something new is made or brought into existence. Considering that the human world is undergoing massive changes in all spheres of human activity, that tremendous advances have been made in material and spiritual civilization and that human society is undergoing new and startling developments in social systems and human relations, in retrospect, we are able to admire all human achievements in every field of human endeavor throughout history, which, with few exceptions, fall into the category of human creations and which, to a greater or lesser degree, are connected with human creativity. As Engels pointed out, “The more that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the world, the more they make their own history consciously, the less becomes the influence of unforeseen effects and uncontrolled forces of this history, and the more accurately does the historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance.”85 Admittedly, human history bears ample witness to the self-evident truth that the progress of civilization as well as the development of society, both past and present alike, can be directly or indirectly attributed to human creativity, which is true of the shape of things to come. Human creativity is the supreme manifestation of man’s vital power. Just as allowing full play to human subjectivity depends fundamentally upon human creativity, so fostering man’s essential powers—a power for man’s creation and development of himself—hinges primarily upon cultivating man’s creative powers. A progressive society must of necessity be one overflowing with creativity, exuberant in creativity, and full of creativity. Human subjectivity manifests itself in manifold spheres of human activity. Hence human subjectivity tends to assume definite forms appropriate to definite fields of social practice. A few examples will suffice to serve as an illustration, such as “cognitive subjectivity” in the field of cognition, “aesthetic subjectivity” in the realm of 85

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 457.

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aesthetics, “the subjectivity of the decision-maker” in the field of management and “axiological subjectivity” in the domain of axiology, to name but a few. In view of the fact that human subjectivity constitutes the fundamental foundation of collective, anthropological life and that it is the necessity to be in our consciousness what we are in and to the world at large—to others, and toward nature, we must wake up to the imperative necessity of enhancing human subjectivity and subjective initiative as well as bringing them into full play in manifold spheres of social practice.

3.3 Definite Values Appropriate to Definite Kinds of Human Subjectivity Human subjectivities can be categorized according to what category human subjects come into. Generally speaking, human subjects fall into three categories, that is “the subject as a personality,” “the subject as a group” and “the subject as a species.” Human subjectivities can be categorized into the three categories of “the subjectivity of personality,” “the subjectivity of group” and “the subjectivity of species” accordingly. In addition, there exists a fourth category of human subjectivity, namely “intersubjectivity.” (1) The Value Inherent in “The Subjectivity of Personality” The unique, indispensable and irreplaceable value inherent in “the subjectivity of personality” (the individual’s subjectivity) lies in the fact that “the subjectivity of personality” (the individual’s subjectivity) provides the basis for human existence. As Marx argued, “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.”86 The basis for any human subject’s activity can only be the separate individual, that is the personality. Given that the free and all-round development of each as well as of all never appears to be something distinct, separate or independent of social development, the way that definite individuals exist is appropriate to the way that the definite society exists. As Marx noted, “From this it can only be concluded that the social history of man is never anything else than the history of his individual development, whether he is conscious of this or not.”87 Only if human and social values are married with the mentalities of living individuals can they appear real, immediate to living individuals. Hence it is only through the practical activities of living individuals that human and social values can be put into practice eventually. If human subjectivity were divorced from separate individuals, we should be at a loss what to do with it. The main purpose of marrying human subjectivity with the separate individual is to endow the separate individual with 86

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 3: The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 23. 87 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 4: Marx: “Letter from Marx to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov (December 28, 1846).” Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 532.

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individual characteristics, which will eventually mould him into a man of individual personality, whose inexhaustible creativity deserves to be fostered. As Marx pointed out, “All emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself. Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his ‘own powers’ as social powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.”88 The fundamental thing, however, is that we should attach importance to everyone’s initiative and creativity and give full scope to everyone’s creative powers. In general, human personality is conceived to have genetic as well as environmental origins. Personality is defined as the characteristic sets of behaviors, cognitions, and emotional patterns that evolve from biological and environmental factors.89 Personality embraces “behavioral characteristics, both inherent and acquired, that are most clearly expressed in interactions with other people, that can distinguish one person from another and that can be observed in people’s relations to the environment and to the social group.”90 Therefore, it can be safely asserted that it is on the biological basis that human personality evolves from such factors as environmental influences, social interactions and life experiences and that it forms as a result of human beings’ active cultivation and creation. Perfection of personality presupposes an individual’s constant self-reflection, constant selftranscendence, and constant self-elevation—or, to put it another way, the individual is expected to be constantly striving after a lofty realm of thought. In The Analects of Confucius, Confucius, who was China’s first teacher as well as the founder of the Confucian school, enlightened us about how to cultivate and perfect human personality by setting forth sensible views on the question. As he taught, “At fifteen I set my heart on learning. At thirty I could take my stance. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the Decree of Heaven. At sixty I was already obedient to this Decree. At seventy I could follow the desires of my mind without overstepping the boundaries of what is right.”91 It is thus clear that it would take one more than a lifetime to cultivate his subjectivity and elevate his mind. (2) The Value Inherent in the Subjectivity of a Group As was stated above, “the subject as a group” can be understood at different levels. “The subject as a group,” including the family, the organization, the state and the international organization, is endowed with the whole array of general qualities and universal characteristics generalized from the subjects as the communities oriented 88

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1956). Marx & Engels Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 1: Marx: “On the Jewish Question.”Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 443. 89 Corr, Philip J., & Matthews, Gerald. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 90 Holzman, P. S. “personality.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 24, 2020. https://www.britan nica.com/topic/personality. 91 Feng, You-Lan. (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: The Publishing House of Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences, pp. 74, 76.

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towards human existence at different levels as well as a myriad of unique characteristics and qualities respectively inherent in the subjects as the communities oriented towards human existence at different levels. By contrast, the values inherent in the subjectivity of a group are most self-evident. How the subjectivity of a group develops will have a great deal to do with the standard of a group’s (the family, the organization, the state and the international organization) material and spiritual life, have a direct bearing on the extent to which each individual’s subjectivity, in contrast with every other individual’s subjectivity, is cultivated and harnessed within a group, and, more importantly, affect the destiny and future of a group. In contrasting the English national character with the German and the French character, Engels set forth well grounded views on the subject at great length. As Engels pointed out, between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, “The Germans, the nation of Christian spiritualism, experienced a philosophical revolution; the French, the nation of classical materialism and hence of politics, had to go through a political revolution; the English, a nation that is a mixture of German and French elements, who therefore embody both sides of the antithesis and are for that reason more universal than either of the two factors taken separately, were for that reason drawn into a more universal, a social revolution.” Nonetheless, he continued regretfully, “This will need to be elaborated in greater detail, for the position of nations, at least with regard to recent times, has in our philosophy of history so far been dealt with very inadequately, or rather not all.”92 The above discussion with regard to the subject urges that we should attach great importance to the study, cultivation and harnessing of “the subjectivity of a group.” In general, “the subjectivity of personality” tends to act in unison with “the subjectivity of group”, and this is manifested in two ways. First, on the one hand “the subjectivity of personality” can only be formed in “the subjectivity of group,” and on the other hand the cultivation and development of “the subjectivity of group” can only depend upon the development of “the subjectivity of personality.” Second, “the subjectivity of group” must dispense appropriate education and guidance to “the subjectivity of personality” and make it identify with the existing order of things and conform to definite standards of behavior. Meanwhile, it cannot be emphasized enough that “the subjectivity of group” must also provide “the subjectivity of personality” with appropriate education and guidance to emancipate its mind and hence harness the substantive powers inherent in “the subjectivity of personality”—consciousness, independence, creativity and initiative. (3) The Value Inherent in “the Subjectivity of Species” Before elaborating on the value inherent in “the subjectivity of species,” we feel the necessity of furnishing some slight explanation of the concept of “species.” Looked at from a Marxist perspective, the concept of “species” is aimed at providing a scientific description of and casting illumination on the totality and universality inherent in human existence. Admittedly, it is on his own initiative that man, as a species-being, endows his existence with unity and universality. The true basis of this pluralistic 92

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1956). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 1: Engels: “The Condition of England: the Eighteenth Century.” Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 658.

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unity, which can only be manifested through man’s free, conscious activity, or rather, man’s species-character, lies in the fact that individual characteristics must undergo an all-round or overall development and can be brought into full play, yet this unity in man’s species-life awakens us to the paradoxical nature of human existence, that is to say, man is condemned to self-transcendence and he is condemned to transcend himself at all times and in all places. This is unique to man, the advanced life form in which the nervous system attains its fullest development and in which nature attains consciousness of itself. It is commonly asserted that man was descended from the apes—or, to put it another way, man developed from now-extinct primates. Nonetheless, the more human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the word, the more man’s nature and form become advanced in relation to the animal’s. The essence of man, that is “the subjectivity of species,” manifests itself in the multitude of essential differences existing between humans and animals. Fundamentally speaking, humans differ essentially from animals in the following respects. First, animal nature forms as a result of natural selection, while man forms his speciesnature and species-character through his practical activities. Second, animal traits are genetically determined and transmitted, whereas it is on his own initiative that man acquires his species-nature and species-character. Third, animal traits are relatively fixed and thus immutable. By contrast, man’s species-nature and species-character are constantly changing and developing, thereby opening up infinite possibilities for man. Fourth, the unity manifested in animal traits is universally applicable to cognate species, while man’s species-nature and species-character differs from individual to individual, depending on concrete differences among actual, real, and living individuals. This is Marx’s viewpoint on the fundamental differences between humans and animals, which has been repeatedly emphasized in his works. As Marx put it in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, “The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. It is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence….The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity, and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character.”93 “The subjectivity of species” manifests itself not only in man’s species-nature and species-character, which is contained in the character of man’s free, conscious activity, but also in a whole new perspective on human relations, or rather, the most recently developed ideas on the relation of man to nature, to society, and to himself. What has been discussed above may be briefly summarized as follows. On the one hand, “the subjectivity of species” opens up a myriad of possibilities for new angles of vision to relevant questions, new 93 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2009). Mar& Engels Collected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 162.

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theoretical principles, new value systems, new ways of considering problems and new realms of thought. On the other hand, only if all “personalities” (individuals) and “groups” (families, organizations, states and international organizations) when confronted with severe challenges in the 21 century form and perfect “the subjectivity of species” as well as “the consciousness of species” can they free themselves of the pernicious influences of the polarized way of thinking, the scholastic or metaphysical thesis that there exists such predetermined essence to be found in human beings and the absolute idea of truth, extricate themselves from the awkward predicament in which mankind has to face and endure the tragic consequences of mass suicide, give themselves a new outlook upon life and a new orientation in life which must of necessity exert a beneficial influence on man’s standards of behavior, help the subject as a personality, the subject as a group, and the subject as a species get rid of the long-standing mistaken ideas, and hence help mankind march towards a bright future. (4) The Value Inherent in “Intersubjectivity” By “intersubjectivity” we mean the human subjectivity manifesting itself in a variety of interactions between human subjects of various kinds. More specifically, “intersubjectivity” refers to man’s essential nature and subjective activity shared by all human beings and manifesting themselves in a variety of interactions between human subjects of all kinds—purpose, consciousness, initiative, choice and creativity. “Intersubjectivity” possesses two fundamental characteristics: first, “intersubjectivity” constitutes a necessity to human interactions—or, to put it another way, “intersubjectivity” exists in human interactions as a necessity. It is commonly asserted that none of human subjects exists in isolation. Hence human subjectivity manifests itself in the relation of subject to object and of subject to subject as well as in the intercourse between human beings. It is therefore clear that “intersubjectivity” manifested through human interactions exists in mutual intercourse of human subjects as a necessity and that it constitutes a necessity to the intercourse among human subjects. Second, the formation, development and perfection of “intersubjectivity” is attributable to man’s own initiative and subjective activity. Just as other three kinds of human subjectivity exist as a result of man’s own initiative and subjective activity, so the development and perfection of “intersubjectivity” depend fundamentally upon human cultivation and social development. In cultivating and developing all kinds of human subjectivity, human beings ought to cultivate and develop “intersubjectivity” between human subjects in particular. Hence it can be safely asserted that how it fares with “intersubjectivity” will have a huge bearing on the fate of human subjectivity in general. The concept of “intersubjectivity” as well as the theory of “intersubjectivity” originated with Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre, who attempted to wrestle with the complicated issues of intersubjectivity in their respective writings. Edmund Husserl recognized the importance of intersubjectivity, and wrote extensively on the topic. He considered intersubjectivity crucial not only at the relational level but also at the epistemological and even metaphysical levels. In Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, or rather, the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl attempts

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to grapple with the problem of intersubjectivity and puts forward his theory of transcendental, monadological intersubjectivity. According to Husserl, each particular man as his private synthetic formation in his transcendentally reduced pure conscious life, or rather, each particular monad in his peculiar ownness, represents a particular cognitive subject, and has a universe of what is peculiarly his own, that is the world constituted transcendentally in him—the domain of his peculiarly own essentiality, of what he is in himself, in his full concreteness or what he is in himself as a monad, or, to put it another way, he has a universe of what is specifically peculiar to his concrete being as a monad, purely in himself and for himself with an exclusive ownness. For Husserl, the general consensus among men of the world is that an intersubjective world should be established and that each particular man’s peculiar ownnes should be connected with the intersubjective world. In his own words, “To this community there naturally corresponds, in transcendental concreteness, a similarly open community of monads, which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity.”94 Similarly, the term “intersubjectivity” has also been used in Sartre’s studies on man to refer to the intersubjective relationship between people. Marx’s writings also touch upon the intersubjectivity between people. For Marx, man always remains the subject – that is, man can be reduced not merely to a conscious subject but, more importantly, to a historical, practical subject. The relation of individuals to one another, which differs essentially from that of individuals to things, can be reduced to the practical intercourse of individuals. Man’s estranged, alienated relation to the other manifests itself precisely in the fact that the subjective relation of individuals to one another resolves itself into “a social relation between things”. It is precisely this estranged, alienated relation of individuals to one another that the communist movement will eventually do away with or abolish. It is thus clear that Marxist theory provides the theoretical framework and basis for the practical construction of intersubjective relations. Generally speaking, we will distinguish between three types of intersubjectivity which are endowed with their own special constitutive function and performance. What we mean by the first intersubjectivity is that the interests of subjects harmonize, that subjects treat each other as ends and that subjects are on very intimate terms with each other. This type of intersubjectivity exists in primitive society as well as in modern society as exemplified by the domestic relations based upon true love including parental (paternal or maternal), conjugal, or filial love. As for the second type of intersubjectivity, it refers to the intersubjective relation in which subjects treat each other as means and which exists in those forms of society founded on private ownership in the history of all hitherto existing society, especially in the market economy society. By the third type of intersubjectivity, we mean that this type of inersubjectivity can only be manifested through the voluntary association of free men and that it can only be possible of realization in the Communist society—that is, a final stage of society in Marxist theory in which the state has withered away and economic goods are distributed equitably. In the Communist society, subjects treat each other as ends, and the all-round and free development of each subject is the 94

Husserl, Edmund.(1977). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 166.

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condition for the all-round and free development of all. In pointing out the fact that man’s rational nature exists as an end in itself, Kant gives the practical imperative in this form: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.”95 In the work of Kant, the principle that each person constitutes an end in itself is seen as the basis for developing a perfect society in which each man would act, and be treated, as an end. This “kingdom of ends” bears a striking resemblance to the social structure envisioned by Rousseau as the voluntary cooperation of free men in the ideal state. Surely we cannot fail to see reflected here the thoughts of Mme de Wolmar in sections of La Nouvelle Héloïse: “It is never right to harm a human soul for the advantage of others.”96 And Later: “Man is too noble a being to serve simply as the instrument for others, and he must not be used for what suits them without consulting also what suits himself….”97 On the whole, the second type or state of “intersubjectivity” asserts itself in its own right as the dominant form of social interaction in modern society. It has become an imperative necessity that human social interaction should undergo a transformation from the state of “intersubjectivity’ in which subjects treat each other as means to the state of “intersubjectivity” in which subjects treat each other as ends as well as to the state of “intersubjectivity” in which “the voluntary association of free men” ultimately prevails. The development of “intersubjectivity” has to meet, among other things, the following two requisite conditions: first, economic and social progress lays the foundation for the development of “intersubjectivity.” Second, the cultural and moral progress may serve as necessary conditions for actuating the development of “intersubjectivity.” In acting in concert with each other, the aforementioned conditions are mutually conditioned, mutually complementary, and are indispensible for the development of “intersubjectivity.” With the above situation in view, we must make concerted and consistent efforts to fulfill the above-mentioned conditions so that we can develop and promote “intersubjective” relations.

4 Man’s “Dual Life” 4.1 The Implications of Man’s “Dual Life” It is generally accepted that man is the only creature in the world that is endowed with its own distinctively characteristic species-character surpassing those of other species and thereby distinguishing it from other species in all its fundamental bearings. To put it another way, man is possessed of “dual life”—that is, “natural life and supernatural life.” Thus it can be seen that man lives a natural life as well as a supernatural life, 95

Kant, Immanuel.(1949). Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Thomas Kingsmill Abbot, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, p. 53. 96 Cassirer, Ernst. (1970). Rousseau-Kant-Goethe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 33. 97 Ibid.

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that man’s natural life differs from his supernatural life and that man’s natural life is thoroughly impregnated with a supernatural life. (1) The Basis of Man’s “Dual Life” What is essential in the existence of man is the fact that he is a part of nature, yet he somehow and in some ways transcends nature, which lays the basis for man’s “dual life.” For the sake of further clarification on the evolutionary history of life on earth, in particular the two substantial advances in the evolutionary process of nature— that is, the emergence of living organisms and the appearance of human beings on earth, we feel the necessity of having recourse to Frederick Engels’ Dialectics of Nature so that we could gain a good deal of enlightenment from it. “If, finally, the temperature becomes so far equalized that over a considerable portion of the surface at least it does not exceed the limits within which protein iscapable of life, then, if other chemical conditions are favorable, living protoplasm is formed. What these conditions are, we do not yet know, which is not to be wondered at since so far even the chemical formula of protein has been established—we do not even know how many chemically different protein bodies there are—and since it is only about ten years ago that the fact became known that completely structureless protein exercises all the essential functions of life, digestion, excretion, movement, contraction, reaction to stimuli, and reproduction. Thousands of years may have passed before the conditions arose in which the next advance could take place and this formless protein produce the first cell by formation of nucleus and cell membrane. But this first cell also provided the foundation for the morphological development of the whole organic world; the first to develop, as it is permissible to assume from the whole analogy of the paleontological record, were innumerable species of non-cellular and cellular protista, of which Eozoon canadense alone has come down to us, and of which some were gradually differentiated into the first plants and others into the first animals. And from the first animals were developed, essentially by further differentiation, the numerous classes, orders, families, genera, and species of animals; and finally mammals, the form in which the nervous system attains its fullest development; and among these again finally that mammal in which nature attains consciousness of itself—man.” According to the above copious quotations adduced from Frederick Engels’Dialectics of Nature, it can be safely asserted that the advent of human life on this planet marks a most important advance in the evolutionary process of nature. This world was from thenceforth impregnated with “man’s supernatural life” and gradually changed into “the human world” characterized by the predominance of “man’s supernatural life.” Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature. For each such conquest takes its revenge on us. Each of them, it is true, has in the first place the consequences on which we counted, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the first. Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws. In terms

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of how nature relates to organic life, the life of a human being differs essentially from the life of an animal in two respects: first, in the evolutionary process of nature there arose the essential difference between natural life and supernatural life among living organisms. Animals do not transcend nature, but still belong to nature, thereby existing merely as a part of nature. Animals solely depend upon the bounty of nature and follow simply the natural instincts in the struggle for existence. For animals, only natural selection can render possible the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life. Thus it can be seen that rather than existing as “a being for itself” possessed of consciousness or initiative, the life of an animal exists as “a self-acting being,” thereby falling under the designation of “a self-acting being in itself,” that it follows merely the instincts of nature in the struggle for existence and that its “self-acting being” is left completely at the mercy of the fundamental instincts upon which the life of an animal is built. This shows clearly and conclusively that the life of a human being differs essentially from the life of an animal. Man is able to seize the initiative in grasping his destiny in his own hands and hence transcends nature. Rather than depending upon the bounty of nature, man can produce the necessary means of subsistence which comes ultimately from human labor and practice whereby man brought about a fundamental change in his own manner of existence as well as the animal’s mode of life. It is therefore clear that the life of a human being exists as “a self-acting being for itself”. Second, the process of natural development has also witnessed a fundamental change in the relationship between the life of an animal and the environment as well as the relationship between the life of a human being and the environment—that is to say, the animal is at the mercy of its environment, it has to adjust itself to its environment by instinct in the struggle for life, and thus it is the product of its environment, whereas man, far from being the product of his environment, can grasp objective laws independent of his will and have recourse to natural laws to remake nature in the struggle for existence. The animal belongs to its environment, the life of an animal merely exists as a part of its environment—that is to say, its environment includes the animal, and the animal is in essence one with its environment. The life of an animal is determined, governed and dominated by its environment. Whether or not an animal can survive in its environment fundamentally hinges upon how the animal adjusts itself to its environment. The relationship between the life of an animal and its environment constitutes a sharp contrast to the relationship between the life of a human being and its environment. Not only can man make his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, but through his creative activity man can make the environment the object he has been trying to transform in the struggle for existence—that is, man can make the environment a part of human life, thereby making the environment an extension of his body and organs. If the environment undergoes few changes by itself, man will bring about corresponding changes in the environment through his practical activity. It is thus evident that it is not that the environment governs the life of a human being, but rather that the life of a human being dominates its environment. The way that the life of a human being relates to its environment shows clearly and conclusively that man endowed with such distinctively characteristic attributes as consciousness, initiative and self-discipline can govern, dominate and conquer his environment.

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(2) The Mode of Existence of Man’s “Dual Life” The fact that man transcends nature marks a fundamental change in the nature of living things existent in the universe—that is to say, with the advent of human life on this planet, man’s natural life as well as his supernatural life is bound to leave its mark upon the evolutionary history of nature. The fact that man is no longer at the mercy of his environment demonstrates indisputably that nature has lost absolute control and domination over human life and that man becomes “a self-defined being.” The life of an animal, which exists merely as a part of nature, belongs to its environment and is at the mercy of its environment, because nature dominates its existence and governs its life. The way that the animal relates to its environment manifests itself in two ways. First, in terms of how the animal relates to its environment, the animal is at the mercy of its environment, which dominates its existence and governs its life. Only if an individual animal adjusts itself to its environment can it survive, otherwise it must perish. As A. G. Brown argues, “The success of an animal species in its relationships with the external environment is dependent on how well it can adapt to changes in that environment. Part of this adaptation is, of course, evolutionary and, by the process of natural selection, leads to the emergence of new species over time. Within the lifetime of an individual animal success is strongly dependent on that animal’s ability to adapt to the environment, and, in particular, to alter its behavior in appropriate ways.”98 Second, in terms of how an animal alters its behavior to adapt to its environment, animal behavior is completely controlled or totally governed by nature—that is to say, animal behavior is guided by the animal’s natural instincts. An animal is devoid of self-consciousness, nor is it possessed of “the sense of self.” The life of an animal, which differs essentially from human life, follows simply the instincts of nature and is completely at one with nature. When human life underwent the change from natural life to “supernatural life,” man’s “supernatural life” endowed with such distinctively characteristic attributes as “self” and “self-consciousness” started to be master of human life. Likewise, the fundamental change in human life also manifests itself in two ways. First, the fact that human life is endowed with such distinctively characteristic attributes as consciousness and self-discipline will ensure that human life is no longer guided by instinct and that man can dominate his environment. Second, human behavior is no longer guided by instinct, but rather is dominated by man’s consciousness as well as by his sense of self. The fact that human life is characterized by the predominance of man’s “supernatural life” marks a substantial advance in the evolutionary process of natural life, demonstrating clearly and conclusively that the evolution of life on earth witnessed a fundamental change from animal life to human life and that natural life managed to free itself from the domination of nature eventually. Marx gave a brilliant exposition of the aforementioned subject in his writings, which made a deep impression on us. We may gain a good deal of enlightenment from the following quotations adduced from Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. “The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself 98

Brown, A. G. (2001). Nerve Cells and Nervous Systems: An Introduction to Neuroscience. London: Springer-Verlag, p. 231.

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from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity.”99 In addition, Frederick Engels’ illuminating remarks in his Dialectics of Nature can also enlighten us on this subject. “In short, the animal merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it simply by his presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals, and once again it is labor that brings about this distinction.”100 Fundamentally speaking, the distinction between human life and animal life lies in the fact that an animal lives merely a “natural life,” while man finds himself possessed of a “dual life”—that is, man lives “a natural life as well as a supernatural life” or, to put it another way, man is endowed with “instinctive life and super-instinctive life.” Herein lies the uniqueness of human life as well as the essence of human life. Based on the single instinctual life bestowed upon humankind by nature, man gradually found himself possessed of a second life by his labor, that is, a “supernatural life”— or, to put it another way, man has “conscious life activity” and makes himself master of his life activity. All the distinctively characteristic attributes such as initiative, value, consciousness, complexity and infinity inherent in human life may trace their origin to the advent of man’s “supernatural life” on earth. Admittedly, the fact that human life represents the supreme form of life in the universe demonstrates clearly and conclusively that the evolution of life in the universe has attained a new stage of development. Man’s “dual life” shows us that the essence of man is dependent upon man’s “dual life”—that is to say, man’s “natural life and supernatural life.” To put it another way, the human essence not merely depends upon man’s natural life, but more importantly hinges upon his “supernatural life.” It is therefore clear that the being of a man differs essentially from the being of an animal in all respects. In particular, the manner and value and manifestations and characteristics of human existence are fundamentally different from those inherent in the being of an animal. It can be safely asserted that, in contrast to animal life, human life is absolutely new and unique. With the above situation in view, when we attempt to acquire a deeper understanding as to the truth of what it is to be a human being and throw clear impartial light upon man, we must start out from the premise that man finds himself possessed of a “dual life”—that is, man lives “a natural life as well as a supernatural life” or, to put it another way, man is endowed with “instinctive life and super-instinctive life,” otherwise we will have a fragmentary knowledge of man. For “the theory of structure and choice,” the theory about “man’s dual life” may serve as a fundamental principle that can be used to throw considerable further light upon man.

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Elster, Jon., ed. (1986). Karl Marx: A Reader. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 41. McCormack, Teresa., Hoerl, Christoph., & Butterfill, Stephen., eds. (2011). Tool Use and Causal Cognition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 111.

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4.2 The Multiple Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life The hard and fast distinction between human life and animal life lies in the fact that an animal lives merely “a natural life,” while man finds himself possessed of “a dual life”—that is, man is endowed with “natural life and supernatural life” or, to put it another way, man is born to lead a natural life and a supernatural life. The constant contradiction, opposition and struggle between man’s natural life and his supernatural life that manifest themselves in human practical activity as well as in man’s struggle for existence assuredly make it possible for human life to evolve into a dual life, which manifests itself in multiple or manifold forms, and to be characterized by multiple or manifold manifestations of a dual life, which tend to display myriad, vivid and complex characteristics that defy description. To put it in a nutshell, the life of a human being in the strict sense of the word is nothing but a negative unity manifested through its inherent multiplicity of contradictory relationships. This negative unity manifests itself mainly in the relation of man to himself as well as in the relation of man to the world including the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society. (1) The Multiple or Manifold Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life in the Relation of Man to Himself When we concentrate our attention upon the relation of man to himself, we tend to find that our self is a dialectical unity of multiple or manifold contradictions inherent in man’s dual life wherein the multiple or manifold contradictions inherent in man’s dual life, which intermingle with each other and interact on each other, on the one hand follow the law of the unity of opposites, but on the other, act together to form a pluralistic, open, dynamic and changing system. The multiple or manifold oppositions inherent in the self such as man’s historicity versus his super-historicity, man’s finitude versus his infinity, man’s reality versus his ideality, man’s sensibility versus his sense and man’s soul versus his body tend to make man live a full and varied life. First, the duality of man’s historicity versus his super-historicity. In the customary sense, man’s historical being manifests itself mainly in the fact that man lives in the past, in the present and in the future. As fate would have it, the life of a human being is bound up with his life, past, present and future. With the above situation in view, man always strives after a fuller, brighter and nobler life in the future. Man’s future cannot exist without his past or history. Hence, man’s past and history constitute determining factors in shaping his future. It is commonly asserted that a lofty ideal possible of realization in the future is usually the best guidance in difficult situations and that it will impel people to advance courageously. Without an ideal he deems worth cherishing, defending and pursuing, man cannot live in the present, let alone live a fuller, brighter and nobler life in the future. It is therefore clear that the contradiction or opposition between man’s “history” and his “future,” or rather man’s historicity and his super-historicity, is indispensably necessary to human life. Second, the “duality” of man’s finitude and infinity. Given that human existence is in a way reducible to the problem of time, it can be safely asserted that man is a

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finite being as well as an infinite being, which is to say that when we recognize man’s finitude, we must at the same time recognize his infinity. With the above situation in view, the formidable rift, the discrepancy between the finite and the infinite must of necessity open in man’s search for temporal fulfillment and the fusion of his past, present and future. Man who comes into the world finds no escape from the finality of death, but rather has to accept death with fatalistic resignation. Not only does death come to all men, but also death may come at any hour. Despite this, in fighting against death, man who is capable of creative achievements tries to transcend his finitude and overcome the finality of death, thereby striving after immortality of mortal nature as well as infinity absorbed in the finite. In the face of death, man’s life vanishes like the dew, yet man can make his life endure for ages by his productive labor. Confronted with his finitude, man can strive after the infinite goal of moral perfection and cultural creation. It is therefore clear that man recognizes the aspiration to immortality as the base on which all of human cultural creativity is built and that infinity is the mighty foundation of all cultural life in every aspect. The way that man strives after eternity and infinity manifests itself in the fact that man sees no limits to his natural life, but rather that he strives after his “supernatural life” oriented towards value, mind and reason, which will, in turn, make it possible for human life to be endowed with the attributes of eternity and infinity, or rather possessed of an eternal and infinite essence. Third, the “duality” of man’s reality and his ideality. It is commonly asserted that man who lives a real life possesses an ideal he deems worth cherishing, defending and pursuing, that man can reconcile the realities of life with the dreams of life and that man can exert all the endeavors in his power to convert his dream into reality. “Reality” is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within a system, as opposed to that which is only imaginary. The term is also used to refer to the ontological status of things, indicating their existence. Hence, “reality” can be defined in a way that links it to man’s immediate existence. By “ideal” we mean that man who cherishes high hopes for the future is always building hope into the future. It is commonly argued that man’s reality lays the foundation for the attainment of his ideal, while man’s ideal constitutes the extension of his reality, which is to say that man’s ideal can bridge the gap between the realities of life and the dreams of life. Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature, finds himself divorced from reality, he will be devoid of any basis or foundation on which men shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. Whoever voluntarily forsakes ideals must of necessity have a dim future before him. Man with his feet firmly on the solid ground always looks forward to the future and strives after a lofty ideal. For an individual, not merely does the “duality” of man’s reality and his ideality aid him materially in choosing the basic orientation towards life, but also it serves as a source of motive power underlying all his life activity. Man never rests content with things as they are, or rather the existing state of affairs, nor does he feel content with his immediate existence, but rather cherishes high hopes for all that brightens and beautifies existence. It is common knowledge that both man and animal are mortal in their physical lives. But whereas an animal’s existence

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ceases with its physical death, man’s essence lives on in a spiritual existence. When an animal experiences physical death, its body is still in existence, but its life-force— its soul—ceases to exist. But when a person dies, his soul passes to a higher realm where it lives on. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. With the above situation in view, it can be safely asserted that an animal’s existence can be described as what it is to be an animal, whereas human existence can be characterized as both what it is to be a human being and what it is not to be a human being. To summarize, the “duality” of man’s reality and his ideality may act as a source of motive power that serves to aid man materially in actuating the development of man’s “dual life” as well as achieving the unity of man’s “dual life.” Thus it is clear that man’s historicity versus his super-historicity, man’s finitude versus his infinity and man’s reality versus his ideality that can be attributed to the “duality” of man’s natural life and his supernatural life may justify their concurrent existence in human life wherein the inherent attributes in contradiction to each other meet each other, interact on each other, transform themselves into each other, and act together to form the system of human life. Human life can be characterized, so to speak, as a gigantic nexus of huge significance consisting of multiple or manifold contradictions inherent in man’s dual life. The essence of human life manifests itself not in either of two opposing extremes, but in the dialectical unity of the multiple or manifold contradictions inherent in man’s dual life. (2) The Multiple or Manifold Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life in the Relation of Man to the World Man and the world merge into an organic whole, and the complex relationship between them, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society, not merely constitutes a necessary prerequisite to man’s dual life characterized by multiple or manifold inherent contradictions, but also forms the basis of it. Man’s dual life characterized by multiple or manifold inherent oppositions never forms in isolation, nor does it exist or develop separately from other things that are connected with it. Man and the world merge into an organic whole, and it is in the complex relationship between them, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society, that man’s dual life characterized by multiple inherent contradictions forms, exists and develops. Without the merging of man and the world into an organic whole or the complex relationship between man and the world, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society, man’s dual life characterized by multiple inherent oppositions will not form, nor will it exist or develop. Human life is not an isolated, closed system, but rather an open one, in which the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society are inextricably interwoven with each other in the merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as in the dynamic, complex relationship between man and the world. It is in the very merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as in the complex relationship between man and the world that man’s dual life characterized by manifold inherent

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oppositions unfolds itself to the outer world and meanwhile imparts an interesting and colorful aspect to the outside world. Man’s dual life characterized by multiple inherent contradictions, the merging of man and the world into an organic whole, and the dynamic, complex relationship between man and the world, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society, coexist with each other, undergo a concurrent development, and are hardly ever divorced from each other. The merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as the dynamic, complex relation of man to the world is determined by the distinctively characteristic attributes which are peculiar to human beings—or, to put it another way, what is distinctively and uniquely characteristic of a human being necessarily determines the merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as man’s dynamic, complex relationship to the world. In contrast with man’s relation to the world, animals’ relations with nature as well as with each other, which are simple and rigid, tend to be determined by the natural instincts upon which animal life is fundamentally built. The genes of one species tend to determine the relationship of the species to its environment. Fundamentally speaking, how the genes of a species are structured and organized will shape the species-specific behavioral patterns, which hardly ever transcend what has been identified in the genetic structure of a species. It is therefore clear that, for a species, freedom or initiative almost never manifests itself in the relationship of a species to its environment. On the contrary, the relationship between man and the world is characterized by man’s freedom, initiative (subjective activity), change and development—that is to say, man’s freedom and initiative are embodied in the change and development of man’s relation to the world, which is to say that man’s freedom and initiative are inextricably interwoven with the change and development of man’s relationship with the world. On the one hand, man and the world merge into an organic whole, and on the other hand, the development of man’s relation to the world and the development of man himself are interrelated with each other and interact on each other, or rather condition each other. Specifically, man’s dual life characterized by manifold inherent oppositions actuates the development of multiple forms of duality manifesting themselves in the relationship between man and the world, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society, and vice versa. It is in the very merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as in the complex relationship of man to the world that man’s dual life characterized by multiple inherent oppositions attains its richness and variety as well as its full development. As Marx put it, “As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.”101 That is to say, the “multiple duality” aspect of what they are coincides with the “multiple duality” aspect of “what they produce,” i.e. the relation of man to nature, and of “how they produce,” i.e. the relation of man to society as well as the relation of man to nature.

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Marx, K., Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol.3: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 229.

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Man’s relation to the world, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society, which is characterized by “multiple duality,” manifests itself in the following three aspects: First, the relationship between man and nature. In man’s practical activity as well as in his struggle for existence, man’s relationship to nature becomes an object of human practice. The nature of man’s “multiple duality” makes it possible for man’s relationship with nature to be characterized by “duality,” or rather by “multiple duality” such as the contrasting poles of phenomenon and essence, particularity and generality, fortuity and necessity as well as possibility and reality. In the relation of man to nature characterized by “multiple duality,” man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature. Man takes the initiative in remaking nature—that is, leaving man’s mark upon nature and transforming nature into the humanized or human world whereby while man is engaged in a constant struggle with nature, humanized nature meets man’s survival needs as well as his development needs. In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx gave a brilliant exposition of man’s relationship to nature. “The life of the species, both in man and animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature; and the more universal man (or the animal) is, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc., constitute theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art—his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and digestible—so also in the realm of practice they constitute a part of human life and human activity. Physically man lives only on these products of nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, a dwelling, etc. The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body. Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.” Just as Frederick Engels put it in his Dialectics of Nature, “whilst the animal merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it simply by his presence, man by his changes makes it serve his needs, masters it …Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature. For each such conquest takes its revenge on us. Each of them, it is true, has in the first place the consequences on which we counted, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the first….Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws.” Second, the relationship between man and society. In man’s practical activity as well as in his struggle for existence, man’s relationship to society, i.e. man’s

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relation to man, becomes an object of human practice. The nature of man’s “multiple duality” makes it possible for man’s relationship with society to be characterized by “duality,” or rather by “multiple duality” such as the contrasting poles of individual and group, reality and ideality, rights and obligations as well as truth, good and beauty versus falsehood, evil and ugliness. In man’s relationship to society characterized by “multiple duality,” i.e. man’s relation to man, the reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one another forms their social connection. Given that there are likely to be tensions and personality clashes in any group, individuals (personalities), collectives (groups) and human beings (species-beings) will have to mediate differences that may arise between them, act in harmony with each other, and work together with one accord in time of difficulties so that they can coexist with each other and undergo simultaneous development in pursuit of eternal happiness. Third, man’s relation to nature and his relation to society are interrelated with each other, interact on each other and merge into an organic whole. In man’s practical activity as well as in his struggle for life, man’s relation to nature is characterized by simultaneous coexistence with his relation to society, and vice versus. Neither the relationship between man and nature nor the relationship between man and society can exist in isolation, that is to say, man’s relation to nature cannot exist in isolation from his relation to society. Given that man’s relation to nature asserts itself as an object of human practice in its own right, which is true of man’s relation to society, the relationship between man’s relation to nature and his relation to society is fully entitled to become an object of human practice. The nature of man’s “multiple duality” makes “the relationship between man’s relation to nature and his relation to society” certain to be endowed with “duality” and “multiple duality,” such as purpose and regularity, instrumental rationality and value rationality, “What can I know?” and “What ought I to do?”, equity and efficiency as well as humanistic ideals and patterns of market economy. By making recourse to the aforementioned relationships characterized by “multiple duality,” human beings attempt to make man’s relation to nature and his relation to society act in harmony with each other, interact on each other and merge into an organic whole, thereby actuating the harmonious and sustainable development of nature, humans and society, that is to say, making “Heaven, Earth and man,” i.e. all things in the world, coexist with each other and undergo harmonious and sustainable development. In addition, we feel the necessity of pointing out that the aforementioned complex relationship between man and the world merging in unity with each other, i.e. man’s relation to nature and his relation to society, which may prove of profound importance to human life and development, not merely makes man’s dual life endowed with multiple inherent contradictions and man’s relation to the world characterized by multiple duality, i.e. man’s relation to nature and his relation to society, act in harmony with each other, but also renders possible the integration of the potent forces in the world, that is, natural and social forces, by making man open to the world, whereby man can become, in the true sense of the word, a giant that is brave enough to enter into rivalry with heaven and earth, as well as the wisest of all creatures on earth in the real sense of the term. As Marx puts it in his Grundrisse—Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), in the beginning of human existence on the earth,

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“relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at isolated points.” The essential powers of a single individual, that is, man’s natural powers or vital powers, were greatly conditioned and limited. The following well-known quotations adduced from French philosopher Blaise Pascal show us the greatness of humanity as well as its fragility or weakness. Pascal first stresses the transient nature of man: “Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in the realm of nature.…There is no need for the entire universe to arm itself in order to crush him: a vapor, a drop of water is sufficient to kill him.” Yet this painful consciousness of the fragility of man is juxtaposed with the capacity to think which asserts human dignity and greatness. Then Pascal adds: “But man is a thinking reed. Should the universe crush him, man would still be nobler than that which kills him, for he knows that he is dying and recognizes the advantage which the universe has over him.” Thus the loneliness of man in the universe is juxtaposed with his awareness, with the capacity to think, which lends him dignity. “All our dignity, therefore, is in thought.” Or Pascal simply extols reason in man in a categorical statement: “Thought forms the greatness of man.”102 In man’s open relation to nature as well as to society, man not merely can make the forces outside himself undergo a complete transformation, but also can have them at his command and turn them to good account whereby man can confirm and manifest himself both in his species-life and in his essential power that can respectively transcend itself. In man’s relation to nature characterized by the unity of opposites, man tries to awaken nature from a deep slumber by making recourse to his practical activity, has natural forces integrated with his essential powers and makes them change into more massive and more colossal material forces. The fact that man and nature are interrelated with each other and interact on each other also demonstrates clearly and conclusively that “man’s spiritual life is linked to nature”, which is to say that “…the more universal man is, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc., constitutes theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art—his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and digestible—so also in the realm of practice they constitute a part of human life and human activity.”103 In man’s relation to society characterized by the unity of opposites, i.e. man’s relation to man, on the one hand, the contrasting poles of human practical activity such as competition and cooperation, conflict and alliance as well as difference and consensus may aid man materially in transcending individual and group narrowness, and on the other hand, human beings when faced with a myriad of pressures and challenges care for each other, lend support to each other and march together towards a bright future. In the relationship between man and nature characterized by man’s oneness with nature as well as the relationship between man and society characterized by man’s oneness 102

Roshwald, Mordecal. (1999). The Transient and the Absolute: An Interpretation of the Human Condition and of Human Endeavor. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 16. 103 Elster, Jon., ed. (1986). Karl Marx: A Reader. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 40–41.

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with society, human beings make recourse to neither the powers of a single individual nor those of a particular group, but rather utilize the myriad powers of mankind in general as well as the human powers unleashed in the human world. These are the “combined powers” created by “human subjects” who open to the outside world— that is, the unprecedented life forces in history, from which originate man’s real essential powers and in which reside man’s hopes for the future.

4.3 The Unity of Man’s “Dual Life” (1) The Essence of the Unity of Man’s “Dual Life” The essence of the unity of man’s “dual life” resides in the “negative” development and transcendence of man’s “dual life.” The unity of man’s “dual life” does not consist in the fact that “one kind of human life” overpowers “the other kind of human life,” nor in the fact that “one kind of life” cancels out or substitutes for “the other kind of life”, but rather in the fact that by “the negation of the negation” “one kind of life” incorporates “the other” into itself and that “man’s dual life” undergoes a negative development and transcendence, that is to say, the unity of man’s “dual life” lies in the “negative” development and transcendence of man’s “dual life.” Here it is necessary that we have a clear idea what exactly is meant by “negation.” In Marx’s materialist dialectic, “negation” refers to a process of internal “selftranscendence”. We mean by “negation” that in the unity of opposites, which Lenin described as the most important of the dialectical principles,104 a thing is determined by its internal oppositions. Dialecticians claim that unity or identity of opposites can exist in reality or in thought. According to Kant, thought has a natural tendency to issue in contradictions or antinomies, whenever it seeks to apprehend the infinite. By referring to the philosophical importance of the antinomies of reason, we have shown that how the recognition of their existence helped largely to get rid of the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysic of understanding, and to direct attention to the dialectical movement of thought. But Kant never got beyond the negative result that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and never penetrated to the discovery of what the antinomies really and positively mean. For Hegel, that true and positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual thing involves a coexistence of opposed elements. Consequently to know, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is equivalent to being conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations. The old metaphysic, as we have already seen, when it studied the objects of which it sought a metaphysical knowledge, went to work by applying categories abstractly and to the exclusion of their opposites.105 Marx and Engels hold that everything in existence is a combination or unity of opposites, that everything contains two mutually incompatible and exclusive but nevertheless equally essential and indispensable 104

Lenin, V.I. (1927). Collected Works, XIII. New York: International Publishers, p. 321. Sorensen, Roy. (2003). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 305.

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parts or aspects, and that this unity of opposites in nature is the thing that makes each entity auto-dynamic and provides this constant motivation for movement and change.106 This idea was borrowed from Hegel who said: “Contradiction in nature is the root of all motion and of all life.”107 In Das Kapital (Capital), Marx gave a brilliant exposition of the essence of “dialectics”—“negation”: “In its rational form, it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of affairs, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negation of the state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”108 Lenin quotes Marx and Engels to demonstrate convincingly that philosophic contradiction is central to the development of dialectics—the progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social change, the negation of the initial development of the status quo, the negation of the negation, and the high-level recurrence of features of the original status quo. “As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy…. ‘The great basic thought,’ Engels writes, ‘that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away… this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But, to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words, and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation, are two different things. …For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy, itself, is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain.’ Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is ‘the science of the general laws of motion both of the external world and of human thought.’”109 According to Lenin, “the identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference between the terms ‘identity’ and ‘unity’ is not particularly important here. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of 106

Skousen, W. Cleon. (1962). The Naked Communist. Orem, UT: Verity Publishing, p. 33. Giovanni, George Di. (2010). George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 382. 108 Moyar, Dean., ed. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 667. 109 Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 7–9. 107

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opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites. The two basic conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation). In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external—God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of ‘self-movement.’ The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the ‘self-movement’ of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the ‘leaps,’ to the ‘break in continuity,’ to the ‘transformation into the opposite,’ to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new. The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”110 Lenin describes his dialectical understanding of the concept of development: “A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; ‘breaks in continuity;’ the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between all aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional one.”111 By “negation” we also mean that the preservation of our nation’s historical and cultural heritage is based on the principle that we should discard the dross, select the essence, and critically assimilate whatever is beneficial to us. The following copious quotations adduced from Mao Tse-tung’s “On New Democracy” may render substantial help to us when we attempt to develop an objective understanding of how we can draw upon our nation’s splendid historical and cultural heritage and of how we can absorb foreign civilization to enrich our own. “New-democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to our own nation and bears our own national characteristics. it links up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of all other nations and they are related in such a way that they can absorb something from each other and help each other to develop, together forming a new world culture; but as a revolutionary national culture it can never link up with any reactionary imperialist culture of whatever nation. To nourish her own culture China needs to assimilate a good deal of foreign progressive culture, not enough of which was done in the past. We should 110

Knight, Nick. (2018). Li Da and Marxist Philosophy in China. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 43. Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 7–9.

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assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the earlier cultures of other nations, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment. However, we should not gulp any of this foreign material down uncritically, but must treat it as we do our food—first chewing it, then submitting it to the working of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions, and separating it into nutriment to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded—before it can nourish us. To advocate ‘wholesale westernization’ is wrong. China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign material. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content— such is our new culture today. …A splendid old culture was created during the long period of Chinese feudal society. To study the development of this old culture, to reject its feudal dross and assimilate its democratic essence is a necessary condition for developing our new national culture and increasing our national self-confidence, but we should never swallow anything and everything uncritically. It is imperative to separate the fine old culture of the people which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character from all the decadence of the old ruling class. China’s present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, and her present new culture, too, has developed out of her old culture; therefore, we must respect our own history and must not lop it off. However, respect for history means giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical development, and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising every drop of feudal poison.”112 Hence the dialectical negation is not a simple logical negation that behaves like A and not-A, nor is it a sharp opposition wherein this something substitutes for or prevails over the other. For Hegel, the negation of the negation is one important dialectical principle, which he also terms “sublation” (Aufhebung), that is to say, something is only what it is in its relation to another, but by the negation of the negation this something incorporates the other into itself. The dialectical movement involves two moments that negate each other, something and its other. As a result of the negation of the negation, “something becomes its other; this other is itself something; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum.”113 Something

112 Mao, Tse-Tung. (1965). Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume II. Oxford, GB-OXF: Pergamon Press, pp. 380–381. 113 McTaggart, John., & McTaggart, Ellis. (1910). A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 32.

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in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related.114 In becoming there are two moments115 : coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, that is to say, by sublation, i.e., negation of the negation, being passes over into nothing and ceases to be, but something new shows up and is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained.116 In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related, then self-forgetful, relieving the original tension. Thus it can be seen that the essence of negation resides not in the fact that contradictions or negations come from outside of things, but rather in the fact that they are inherent in and internal to things. In this sense, we mean by “negation” that the unity of opposites inheres in the multiple or manifold contradictions immanent in human life. It is only fitting that the law of “the negation of negation” which serves as an important dialectical principle for Hegel should provide a most appropriate description of the aforementioned unity of opposites. For Hegel, the dialectical unity of opposites can be achieved by “the negation of negation”, that is to say, “the concrete,” “the synthesis,” and “the absolute” must always pass through the phase of the negative in the journey to completion, that is, mediation, whereby the tension between a “thesis,” which gives rise to its reaction, and an “antithesis,” which contradicts or negates the “thesis,” can be resolved or relieved by means of a “synthesis.” This is the essence of what is popularly called Hegelian dialectics. By “synthesis” we do not mean that it rejects a “thesis” or an “antithesis,” but that, as a determinate negation, it preserves the useful portion of a “thesis” and of an “antithesis,” or rather the valuable elements inherent in a “thesis” as well as in an “antithesis,” and that it incorporates the “thesis” and the “antithesis” into itself, thereby forming a totality characterized by self-relatedness and self-forgetfulness. With “the human subject”, namely “the subject-man”, the aforementioned dialectical unity of opposites, which can conceived as a process of determinate negation, is nothing more or less than a clear and unequivocal manifestation of the essence of human life characterized by man’s constant introspection, unceasing transcendence and unlimited potential of human creativity. The following example I am now going to adduce will assuredly serve to afford a telling illustration of this. The unity of man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” is a process of negation of negation, or rather, a process of self-transcendence wherein man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” must of necessity merge into an organic whole. In man’s “dual life,” the “natural life” and the “supernatural life” are by no means diametrically opposite to each other, nor do they form a polar relationship with each other in the sense of “either/or,” which forces us permanently to take decisions: to take up one alternative, and simultaneously exclude the other. In The German Ideology, Marx averred that “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.” It is therefore evident that as the first premise of all human existence, man’s “natural life” lays the basis for human existence—or, to put 114

Ibid. Dorrien, Gary. (2015). Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 204. 116 Ibid. 115

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it another way, human existence, as is clear from what has been said above, has as its premises and basis the “natural life” of man. Only if a single individual is possessed of the “natural life” can he be regarded as a corporeal, living, real, sensuous being full of natural vigor and endowed with essential powers, that is to say, a man with his feet firmly on the ground, or a man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature. Otherwise, he can only be an ethereal soul. However, a single individual must of necessity be possessed of the “supernatural life” as well as the “natural life” or he will be assuredly devoid of the true essence of man and thereby does not differ essentially from the animal. Thus it can be seen that man is still bound to a supernatural life. Despite the fact that man’s “supernatural life” is the negation of his “natural life,” yet the very negation does not mean that the “supernatural life” simply discards or merely rejects the “natural life,” but that the “supernatural life” incorporates the “natural life” into itself whereby they merge into an organic whole. It follows from what has been said above that the dialectical principle of negation of negation as well as the dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis may contribute greatly to a fundamental understanding of man’s relationship to his “supernatural life.” That is to say, man neither simply discards nor merely rejects his “supernatural life,” but rather incorporates the “supernatural life” into himself whereby they merge into an organic whole. It is therefore clear that by the “negation of negation,” which constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression, man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” merge into a new single whole after passing through a dialectical process of determinate negation in which the dialectical process leads to concepts or forms that are increasingly comprehensive and universal, the result of which “is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite” (Hegel’s Science of Logic 33; cf. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind 54), and through which new determinations thereby grow out of the process itself and integrate with the essence of man. This shows clearly and conclusively that the unity of man’s “dual life” is in essence the dialectical merging of man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” as well as the dialectical transcendence of man’s “supernatural life” over his “natural life.” Moreover, the dialectical principle of “negation of negation” and the dialectical model of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” may aid materially in understanding the mechanisms of the personality (the individual), the group (the family, the organization, the state and the international organization) and the species (the human species). Finally, the negative unity of man’s “dual life” asserts itself as a complicated, progressive and unfettered development in its own right. (2) How to Achieve the Unity of Man’s “Dual Life” “Structure and choice,” or rather, “practical man’s structure and choice,” constitutes the scientific method to bring about the unity of man’s “dual life.” It is only through practical human activity as well as by the instrumentality of “practical man’s structure and choice” that the unity of man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” can be possible of realization. To put it another way, “practical man” has no alternative but to resort to his “structure and choice” as the only method to secure the unity of man’s “dual life.”

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By man’s “structure and choice” we mean “personality structure” as well as the “behavioral choices” that “personality structure” tends to attribute to definite circumstances. “Personality structure” refers to man’s “dynamic structural system” with constituent elements not only consistent with each other but also working in unity with each other, whose gradual development from a simple to a more complicated form can be attributed to hereditary factors as well as to man’s long term education, learning and social practice. We mean by “behavioral choice” that “personality structure” responds appropriately to a diverse range of external stimuli or acts appropriately in response to various outside pressures. The unity of man’s “dual life,” which is founded on practical human activity, can only be possible of realization through the instrumentality of “personality structure” and its “behavioral choice.” Man’s “structure and choice” constitutes the noumenon of man’s unique life, the basic mode of existence peculiar to man’s unique life, and the basic mode of survival in which man’s unique life exists. To put it another way, the essence of man’s unique life, the basic mode of existence in which man’s unique life exists, and the basic mode of survival peculiar to man’s unique life can all be reduced to man’s “structure and choice.” Man’s “structure and choice,” which asserts itself as an all-embracing concept in its own right, must of necessity be nothing more or less than the totality of man’s material and spiritual power, all of man’s behavior including the totality of man’s behavior patterns, all of man’s history, the sum total of all that is related to man’s immediate existence in the real world as well as all human possibilities including man’s unfathomable potential for the future. Arguably, it can be safely asserted that man can be identified with man’s “structure and choice,” that man’s “structure and choice” can be equated with man, and that man can not by any manner of means be divorced from man’s “structure and choice” and vice versa. The fundamental reason for these assertions lies in the fact that man’s “structure and choice” constitutes the essence of man’s unique life. Not merely does man’s “dual life” as well as the unity of man’s “dual life” assert themselves as a predominant characteristic of man’s “structure and choice” in its own right, but also they perform a primary and indispensable function in man’s “structure and choice.” The unity of man’s “dual life” can only be realized or achieved through the instrumentality of man’s “structure and choice.” The general course of human development has been in line with the way that the unity of man’s “dual life” evolves. In making whatever behavioral choices man wishes, man invariably tries to have his existence closely aligned with the unity of man’s “dual life” and thereby seek a wise solution to the fundamental problem of how the unity of man’s “dual life” can be achieved. Whenever man chooses to bring about the unity of man’s “dual life,” man’s life will tend towards the unity of man’s “dual life.” On the contrary, whenever man chooses to divorce the natural life from the supernatural life, man’s “dual life” will of necessity be divorced from each other. In view of the fact that the development of modern man is not yet complete, but in its still unfinished state, whether or not man’s “dual life” tends towards the unity of man’s “natural life” and his “supernatural life” will hinge fundamentally upon man’s “structure and choice”—or, to put it another way, whether or not the unity of man’s “dual life” can be possible of realization will depend entirely upon man’s structure as well as his choice. In the final analysis, how

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the unity of man’s “dual life” can be brought about will be completely dependent upon what behavioral choices “real man” will make as well as how he will make behavioral choices. (3) The Manifestations of the Unity of Man’s “Dual Life” The unity of man’s “dual life” manifests itself mainly in three forms. The first form, namely the real unity of man’s “dual life.” We mean by the real unity of man’s “dual life” that it is only through practical human activity as well as by the instrumentality of “real man’s structure and choice” that the unity of man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” can be possible of realization. To put it another way, “real man” has no alternative but to resort to his “structure and choice” as the only method to secure the unity of man’s “dual life.” The unity of man’s “dual life” manifesting itself in the very form may be conceived of as the most basic as well as the most universal. It is therefore evident that the unity of man’s “dual life” is possible of realization basically through the instrumentality of every concrete behavioral choice “real man” makes. The way that the unity of man’s “dual life” is brought about can be described as follows: external pressures set in motion “real man’s personality structure” and force it to make behavioral choices according to circumstances and respond appropriately to myriad environmental stresses or challenges. On the one hand, the unity of man’s “dual life” inheres in every behavioral choice man makes, and on the other hand, every behavioral choice man makes is a vivid manifestation of how the unity of man’s “dual life” is possible of realization, which is true of such groups as the family, the organization, the state and the international organization. It can be safely asserted that the unity of man’s “dual life” happens to mankind as a whole at all times and in all places and that it is possible of realization only through the instrumentality of innumerable behavior choices made by the personality (the individual), the group (the family, the organization, the state) and the species (human beings). The second form, or rather, the theoretical unity of man’s “dual life.” Man is not just an entity but a living creature endowed with self-awareness. Self-awareness, as distinct from other kinds of consciousness, has personal identity (the self), particularly one’s own personality or individuality, for its object. Specifically, self-awareness is how an individual consciously knows, understands, analyses and evaluates his own character, feelings, motives and desires. Moreover, by self-awareness we mean how an individual’s character, feelings, motives and desires should be directed by moral laws or “categorical imperatives.” It is arguable that self-awareness aids man materially in producing a myriad of theories about the world as well as about “man himself.” Fundamentally speaking, the myriad theories about “man himself” were originated by man so that they would be designed to guide man in bringing about the unity of man’s “dual life.” From ancient times through the present, man has been trying to achieve the unity of man’s “dual life” by having his Herculean efforts oriented in two directions: on the one hand, in real life, man tends to lend every effort within his power toward the realization of the unity of man’s “dual life;” on the other hand, in theory, man essays various methods of bringing about the unity of man’s “dual

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life.” The latter solution to the problem of how the unity of man’s “dual life” is possible of realization can be designated as the theoretical unity of man’s “dual life.” The real unity of man’s “dual life” and the theoretical unity of man’s “dual life” are interdependent on each other, interrelated with each other and inseparable from each other whereby they are indispensable for the unity of man’s “dual life.” “The theory of structure and choice,” as is clear from what we have said above, must of necessity have as its premises basis man’s real life as well as his practical activity when it is aimed at providing a theoretical exposition of man’s mode of existence as well as his mode of survival. Only if it incorporates all the theories of different ages, different styles and different schools into itself, discarding the dross and selecting the essence, can “the theory of structure and choice” when confronted with the task of bringing about the real unity of man’s “dual life” explore and open up the myriad possibilities of the real unity of man’s “dual life” and thereby allow full scope to enormous potentialities inherent in the real unity of man’s “dual life.” The third form, to wit the free unity of man’s “dual life.” The unity of man’s “dual life” has passed through a long and arduous process of evolution. Marx’s theory about the three stages of personality development shows clearly and conclusively that the unity of man’s “dual life” must of necessity progressively pass through three successive stages of development and that only when human society attains the stage of development in which the association of free men becomes the predominant form of social organization and in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all can the free unity of man’s “dual life” be possible of realization. According to Marx, the first stage of personality development is based on relations of personal dependence and a group-oriented personality features most prominently in the phase of personality development. We will assuredly gain a good deal of enlightenment from the following quotations adduced from Britt Leslie and Philip Esler respectively when we attempt to obtain a deeper understanding of what a group-oriented personality is like. As opposed to an individualistic personality type, “a group-oriented personality type” or “a collectivist personality type” considers people to be inextricably bound or embedded in a collective or a group. A grouporiented personality derives his or her self-image and understanding from the group in which they are embedded. This group is usually the family, and by extension it can also be the tribe, village, nation, ethnic group. The collectivist personality type will conceive of herself or himself as always being in inter-relationship with those who are on an equal social stratum as well as with those who are on higher and lower social strata. This horizontal and vertical interrelatedness is essential for being human. Those who are of this communal orientation will understand other individuals not as individuals, but rather as part of the group in which they are embedded. Individuals are judged based on the family, tribe, village, or nation in which they are embedded. Likewise, a group is judged based on the actions of an individual member of that group.117 In group-oriented cultures, individuals tend to align their activities and attitudes with those of the groups to which they belong. Typical virtues 117

Leslie, Britt. (2015). One Thing I Know: How the Blind Man of John 9 Leads an Audience toward Belief . Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, p. 130.

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in such contexts are obedience to elders, respect for tradition, a willingness to share goods with other group members and a pronounced tendency to represent the group in its relations to other groups, which is often associated with inter-group competitiveness.118 In the first stage of personality development, human productive capacity developed only to a slight extent and at isolated points, and the substantive powers latent within man himself were severely restricted. In the early phase of personality development, man’s “dual life,” to wit the natural life and the supernatural life, was still in its primeval state and devoid of any differentiation or unity. The second stage of personality development can be designated as the phase of independent personality development characterized by personal independence founded on objective [sachlicher] dependence. The second stage of independent personality development is appropriate to the second social form, according to Marx, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations, of all-round needs and universal capacities is formed for the first time. In the second phase of personality development, man’s substantive powers underwent an alarming development and an individual began to lead a full and varied life whereby he was able to free himself from the control and domination by a single group and started to develop an independent personality. Despite what has just been said above, two big troubling problems hamper the free and all-round development of independent personality, thereby awaiting solution. (1) An individual tends to misconstrue independent personality as “isolated personality” and identify independent personality with “isolated personality.” Hence he is most likely to be dominated by me-first mentality and follow the principles of egoistic individualism. (2) An individual tends to value material gains more than spiritual development, and it becomes more and more prevalent for an individual to employ all possible means of seeking after material gains and comforts. In the second stage of personality development, man’s “dual life” undergoes a rapid and progressive differentiation, which, on the one hand, guides man’s “dual life” out of its primeval state, but which, on the other hand, makes man’s “dual life” sink into a one-sided state, which tends to manifest itself in the antagonism or separation between man’s natural life and his supernatural life as well as in the blind, headlong advocacy of the one-sided unity of man’s “dual life.” The third stage of personality development can be described as the phase of free individualistic personality development, which corresponds to the third stage of social development wherein, according to Marx, free individuality is based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth. It is only in the third phase of personality development that man’s essential powers can attain their fullest development and that man’s relationship to man, his relationship to nature and his relationship to himself can tend towards the true and essential unity. It is only in this period that man can shake himself free from the yoke of the relations of personal dependence and break away from the yoke of the relations of objective dependency and that eventually man can pass beyond his narrow confines whereby the differentiation and unity of man’s “dual life” may attain the highest possible level. 118

Esler, Philip Francis., ed. (2000). The Early Christian World, Volume I-II. London: Routledge, p. 16.

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Nonetheless, the differentiation and unity of man’s “dual life” still occur in the stage of free individualistic personality development, in which the unity of man’s “dual life” attains the highest possible level and reaches a free state, in which, according to Marx, free individuality is based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, in which, for Marx, the free and all-round development of each is the condition for the free and all-round development of all, and in which, according to the Taoists represented by Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu of ancient China, things different in their nature and their natural ability are all equally happy when they have a full and free exercise of their natural ability whereby the identification of man with the universe can be achieved.

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73. Cassirer, Ernst. (1970). Rousseau-Kant-Goethe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 33. 74. Brown, A. G. (2001). Nerve Cells and Nervous Systems: An Introduction to Neuroscience. London: Springer-Verlag, p. 231. 75. Elster, Jon., ed. (1986). Karl Marx: A Reader. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 41. 76. McCormack, Teresa., Hoerl, Christoph., & Butterfill, Stephen., eds. (2011). Tool Use and Causal Cognition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 111. 77. Marx, K., Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol.3: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 229. 78. Roshwald, Mordecal. (1999). The Transient and the Absolute: An Interpretation of the Human Condition and of Human Endeavor. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 16. 79. Elster, Jon., ed. (1986). Karl Marx: A Reader. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 40-41. 80. Lenin, V.I. (1927). Collected Works, XIII. New York: International Publishers, p. 321. 81. Sorensen, Roy. (2003). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 305. 82. Skousen, W. Cleon. (1962). The Naked Communist. Orem, UT: Verity Publishing, p. 33. 83. Giovanni, George Di. (2010). George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 382. 84. Moyar, Dean., ed. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 667. 85. Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 7-9. 86. Knight, Nick. (2018). Li Da and Marxist Philosophy in China. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 43. 87. Mao, Tse-Tung. (1965). Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume II. Oxford, GB-OXF: Pergamon Press, pp. 380-381. 88. McTaggart, John., & McTaggart, Ellis. (1910). A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 32. 89. Dorrien, Gary. (2015). Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 204. 90. Leslie, Britt. (2015). One Thing I Know: How the Blind Man of John 9 Leads an Audience toward Belief. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, p. 130. 91. Esler, Philip Francis., ed. (2000). The Early Christian World, Volume I-II. London: Routledge, p. 16.

Chapter 5

The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice”

The purpose of the book is to explore and explicate the noumenon of human life, to decipher the philosophical question—that is, “what is man?”, which mankind has been confronting for thousands of years, to advance and develop the noumenon of human life—“structure and choice,” and to construct the ontology of human life— “the theory of structure and choice.” Marx’s philosophical anthropology as well as his dialectical thought demonstrates that the mechanism of “structure and choice” not only exists between society and man, but also inheres in the noumenon of human life. Moreover, the mechanism of “structure and choice” inherent in the noumenon of human life is more typical and more fundamental, thereby possessing more explanatory power. When it comes to the noumenon of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is), it is a regrettably long-standing fact that structuralism and existentialism tend to make man’s “structure and choice” separate from each other and contradictory to each other—that is to say, either man’s “structure” is antithetical to his “choice” or man’s “choice” goes beyond its proper bounds and acts to negate the existence of any structure upon which human life depends. Hence it must of necessity follow that the above two types of theory cannot but sink into the quagmire of dualism. Therefore, it has become an urgent demand of the times that the ontology of human life should undergo a transformation from “dualism” to “duality.” Marxist dialectical thinking constitutes the scientific method to bring about this transformation. An integrated duality—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” is inherent in the noumenon of human life. The noumenon of human life as an integrated being is at once man’s “structure” and his “choice,” the unity of which lies primarily in the fact that they are connected with each other and transformed into each other and that they condition and determine each other. Multiple modes of existence such as diachronic existence, synchronic existence and interactive existence inhere in the noumenon of human life, which also possesses numerous characteristics and functions specific only to human beings. It can be safely asserted that the noumenon of human life can be summarized

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 B. Chen, Principles of Subjective Anthropology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_5

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as man’s “structure and choice.” In passing criticism upon structuralism and existentialism, the author tries to reconstruct the ontology of human life, whereby his theory provides an ontological foundation for the humanities and social sciences, a theoretical framework for an idealistic anthropological commitment to self-transcendence, a scientific philosophy of life for us, and a good deal of enlightenment about many theoretical prerequisites.

1 The Noumenon of Human Life: From “Dualism” to “Duality” This book attempts to apply the theories and methods of philosophical anthropology to the interpretation of the noumenon of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is). The difference between philosophical anthropology and other philosophies lies not in the fact that philosophical anthropology devotes a general discussion to ontological questions but rather that it tends to lay undue emphasis upon the ontology of human life. According to Liu Fangtong, the Chinese philosopher, “arguably, one of the most distinguishing characteristics of philosophical anthropology is the fact that philosophical anthropology seeks a philosophical explanation of the vast stores of human knowledge—knowledge about humans, which have been amassed in empirical sciences over centuries.” “Philosophical anthropology seeks abstraction of man’s ontological structure in the anthropological sense from human knowledge in all its variety, or rather by taking into account the physical, spiritual, biological, psychological, religious, and cultural dimensions of humans.”1 Michael Landmann, the prominent German philosophical anthropologist, argues that while physical anthropology and ethnology explore the external characteristics—biological and cultural— of human beings, philosophical anthropology critiques the supposed knowledge and suggests that man himself or herself is a problem that raises fundamental questions about being and what if anything distinguishes the human race from other forms of existence inhabiting the universe.2 Generally speaking, as well as being one of the most distinguishing characteristics of philosophical anthropology, exploring man’s ontological structure from an anthropological perspective has also become an important field of inquiry for philosophical anthropology. Philosophical anthropology had been under the long-term impact and domination of technology in the twentieth century, which in turn made philosophical anthropologists look back at human existence in a technocratic culture in retrospective reflection in the late twentieth century. As American scholar Calvin O. Schrag points out in his “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought”: “A new inquiry and new categories of self-understanding have been developed. This inquiry standpoint and these categories are primarily the 1

Liu, Fang-Tong. (2000). Contemporary Western Philosophy (revised ed.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 384–385. 2 Landmann, Michael. (1988). Philosophical Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 4.

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result of the historicizing of human existence and the crisis of consciousness which such historicizing uncovers when it confronts the threats and negativities of a technocratic culture. It is thus that a new rostrum of interpretive categories has been delineated. Included in this rostrum are such categories as estrangement, objectification, depersonalization, dehumanization, loneliness, conformism, anonymity, guilt, and absurdity …. Traditional metaphysics would reduce this question to a question about an anima naturaliter humana, but as we has already suggested, contemporary thought has reopened and reasked the question more specifically from the standpoint of historical considerations.”3 It is against the larger historical background characterized by critical reflections upon Western culture as well as by intellectual transitions in Western society that the author addresses himself to the arduous task of reconstructing the ontology of human life—“the theory of structure and choice” under the guidance of Marxism by devoting more than twenty years to exploring the noumenon of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) and studying an impressive array of philosophical anthropological theories and methods. When it comes to the ontology of human life, there exists the long-standing antithesis between existentialism and structuralism. While denying the existence of any choice in human life, structuralism tends to exaggerate the structure of the human mind (or the structure of human consciousness) and to enshrine it as an absolute. Claude Lévi-Strauss, the French social anthropologist and leading exponent of structuralism, maintains that the structure of human consciousness as well as the cultural and social structures, which are products of the invariant structure of the human mind, tends to remain unchanged—or, to put it another way, it tends to stay the same and not changed. It would be ludicrous (or ridiculous) nonsense to say that human choice, or more specifically, the behavioral choice on the part of a subject, could make any difference to the social structure or the cultural structure. On the contrary, while negating any structure inherent in human life, existentialism tends to exaggerate the existence of any choice in human life and to enshrine it as an absolute. The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the leading figures in the philosophy of existentialism, holds that neither objective structures nor objective laws inhere in human life or in the empirical world and that everything depends on human choice, or rather the free choice of individuals. The aforementioned two kinds of theories tend to make man’s “structure and choice”—that is, the unified noumenon of human life, separate from each other, depreciate each other and negate each other. Hence, when it comes to the ontology of human life, it must of necessity follow that there exists the binary opposition between “structure” and “choice.” It is therefore clear that either of them, whether existentialism or structuralism, tends to go from one extreme to the other and to lapse into some kind of one-sidedness.4 Marxist dialectical thinking has proven to be an important tool as well as an essential prerequisite for our understanding and interpretation of the noumenon of human 3

Schrag, Calvin O. “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought.” Philosophy East and West 20:1(1970): 83–89. 4 Chen, Bing-Gong. “Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the Knowledge System.” Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition 3 (2011).

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life (the reality of human life in itself as it is). In order to make the ontology of human life undergo a transformation from “dualism” to “duality,” we must achieve the “triple transcendence” of old modes of thinking and attain the three higher levels of human thought in ascending order under the guidance of Marxist materialist dialectics, i.e., we must triumph over the negative or restrictive aspects of “ontological thinking” and strive to reach the level of “practical thinking,” we must break free from the limitations of “metaphysical thinking” and seek to raise the mode of human thought to the level of “dialectical thinking,” and we must transcend ‘the way of thinking oriented towards the life of species” and adopt “the mode of thinking oriented towards the life of kind.” Marxist dialectical thinking reveals the essence of human life—practice. Marx’s “practical thinking” helps us to analyze and understand the noumenon of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is), and affords a scientific foundation on which can be understood the dialectical unity of manifold dualistic relationships whereby we can overcome an array of binary oppositions (or opposites) such as subjectivity versus objectivity, subject versus object, activity versus passivity, materialism versus idealism, natural versus supernatural, and structure versus choice, and whereby we can turn multiple binary oppositions, which bear no relationship to each other, into “integrated dualities.” While metaphysical thinking tends to make us view the people and things that develop and change in the objective world as static, isolated, and fossilized, Marxist dialectical thinking tends to overcome the limitations inherent to metaphysical thinking and to endow the images of people and things in the human mind with continuity, movement and systematization, thereby making the images of people and things in the human mind conform to objective reality. During a considerable period of time, growth retardation in human thinking as well as lower levels of cognitive development made mankind fall into the deeply ingrained habit of understanding himself by recourse to the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings, including animal life, whose absurdity is manifest for reasons which can be summarized as follows. First, this way of thinking may be treated as a kind of predetermined or closed thinking. Second, people just take it for granted that this kind of thinking can be perceived as the one characterized by sameness of essential (or generic) character in different instances, or rather, devoid of any contradictions. Third, this way of thinking may be conceived of as a sort of isolated thinking characterized by one-sidedness in understanding. In exposing the manifest absurdities which seem inherent in the mode of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings, Marxist dialectical thinking proves clearly and indisputably that man is possessed of “a dual life”—that is, man is born to lead a natural life and a supernatural life or, to put it another way, man is endowed with “the integrated duality of natural life and supernatural life.” Marxism provides a new perspective, develops a new methodology and thereby opens up many lines of theoretical research by bringing about a revolution in human thinking whereby Marxist theory can provide a powerful analytical tool in the critique of the dualistic fallacies of structuralism and existentialism as well as in the scientific interpretation of the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice”. The ontology of human life, or rather, the theory of “structure and choice”, which originated with Chen Binggong, represents a revolution in human understanding

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of the essence of life. Human practical activity, human language and the human brain serve to provide foundations as well as conditions for the evolution of the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice.” During the long course of human evolution, the brain of the anthropoid ape gradually changed into the human brain, which is to say the cognitive structure of non-human primates gradually evolved into that of human beings. The aforementioned statement seems to be rather trite, but a more detailed analysis might conceivably make us adduce evidence of evolutionary changes attributable to human practical activity, social interaction and human language. Fundamentally speaking, man’s cognitive structure triumphs over the negative or restrictive aspects inherent in the cognitive structure of nonhuman primates—or, to put it another way, the cognitive structure of human beings transcends that of non-human primates in all its fundamental bearings. The transcendence of man’s cognitive structure over that of non-human primates manifests itself mainly in the following ways. First, the simple cognitive structure of non-human primates is devoid of consciousness and self-awareness, but consists of an almost undifferentiated chaotic mass of desires, which is true of the cognitive structures of other animals. In contrast, the transcendence of man’s cognitive structure over that of the animal manifests itself in the fact that there is a differentiation between consciousness, subconsciousness and self-awareness in the cognitive structure of human beings. Second, the anthropoid ape is endowed with the cognitive structure, but it cannot make a conscious choice. Its response to the environment depends essentially on instinct. By contrast, man’s “structure and choice” are inherent in his cognitive structure. Man’s response to the environment depends primarily upon his consciousness and initiative—or, to put it another way, in responding to the environment, man can make complex behavioral choices on his own initiative. The transcendence of man’s cognitive structure over that of the animal marks a qualitative leap in the evolution of life on our planet, by which we mean that the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” came into existence. When the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” first came into existence, it may have proven of far-reaching importance to humanity, for the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” represents the second qualitative leap in the evolution of life on our planet. There occurred two major qualitative leaps in the evolution of life on our planet. The evolutionary history of life has seen transformations from inorganic to organic matter, and then to proteins and primitive living organisms. It is generally accepted that the transformation from inorganic matter to primitive living organisms constitutes the first major qualitative leap in the evolution of life and that the transformation from the oldest forms of life to the earliest hominines represents the second major qualitative leap in the evolution of life. The appearance of human life on the earth represents a decisive qualitative leap in the evolutionary history of life. With the above situation in view, it may be safely asserted that the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” came into existence when man made his advent upon the earth, along with the world of human subjects. The noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” may prove of great significance to humankind when viewed in the perspective of the relationship between life and nature. The reasons for

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this can be summarized as follows. First, the transcendence of being-for-itself over being-in-itself manifests itself in the fact that being-for-itself is the man’s consciousness, which is fluid and changeable, while being-in-itself is the object, which is fixed and deterministic.5 In Being and Nothingness Sartre gives an account of two fundamental types of being: being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-in-itself refers to non-conscious entities or brute matter. Unlike consciousness, being-in-itself cannot transcend itself. In contrast, being-for-itself refers to consciousness. Unlike beingin-itself, being-for-itself is defined in terms of possibility and transcendence. In other words, being-for-itself must transcend itself towards a particular possibility, becoming something that has not yet been realized.6 Just as man belongs to nature and is an essential part of it, so animals are an integral part of the natural world. Animals are determined by their instincts, which is to say animals simply follow their propensities and obey the laws of their being, from which they have no power to depart. Animals, as a rule, do no more than follow their natural instincts.7 Far from being the for-itself endowed with conscious initiative, the animal should be conceived as the in-itself in the sense that it displays a not-having of initiative—that is to say, the being of the animal in itself is constituted by poverty in initiative. The noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” endows man with the capacity to transcend nature as well as the initiative in assuming control over his own life, thereby bringing about the unity of being-for-itself and being-for-others. Second, on the one hand, nature governs all life on the earth, but on the other, man can change the natural environment, adjust himself to it, and live in harmony with it. That is to say, the evolutionary history of life saw the transformation from life’s submission to nature to man’s domination of nature. Animals exist as an integral part of the environment. Moreover, the environment relates to animals as dominator between animals and their environment. On the contrary, man’s relationship with the environment is entirely different from that between animals and their environment. The noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice”, enables man to change the natural environment by making creative choices on his own initiative and to coexist in harmony with the natural environment. To put it another way, the relationship between man and the environment manifests itself mainly in the fact that man can take the initiative in changing the natural environment, adjusting himself to the natural environment, and harmonizing with the natural environment. The very existence of man’s “structure and choice”—that is, the noumenon of human life, enables man to become the conscious subject, which is to say, as such man can master his own life and the world. An integrated duality—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” is inherent in the noumenon of human life. The noumenon of human life as an integrated being is at 5

Robert, K. Wen. (2014). Philosophy—One Man’s Overview. Bloomington, IL: iUniverse LLC, p. 80. 6 Joseph, Felicity., Reynolds, Jack., & Woodward, Ashley., eds. (2014). The Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 366. 7 William Crookes, F. R. S., & C., eds. “Animal Depravity.” Journal of Science: Natural sciences 6 (October 1875): 416.

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once man’s “structure” and his “choice.” The “structure” of human life refers to all forms of vital power or life force inherent in the noumenon of human life as well as the ways in which they are interrelated and interact on each other. The structure of human life, which asserts itself as the basis of human life in its own right, not only marks the degree and level of development that human life attains, but also determines the nature and level of human behavioral choices. By “human behavioral choice(s)” we mean that man can make decisions regarding his myriad behaviors and choose the most effective ones accordingly in a certain environment, which is to say, humans can make decisions based on an appraisal of the utility of available behavioral options or choices and choose that which affords maximum utility,8 that man can remold his subjective world while changing the objective world, and that man’s practical behavior represents a concrete manifestation of his conscious initiative. Man’s behavior choice changes the objective world as well as his subjective world, which is to say, the behavioral choice on the part of a human subject changes the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” thereby exerting a determining influence on the structure of human life. Hence, the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” asserts itself as an integrated duality in its own right. The integrated duality inherent in the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” came into existence when man made his advent upon the earth, and will exist for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. According to the findings of archaeological anthropology, mankind went through an evolutionary change from ape to human, and in the process, the unified noumenon of human life has been integrated with the two aspects of “structure” and “choice” from its inception, which tend to find frequent expression in human productive activities as well as in social and intellectual activities, such as making tools, engaging in production, building up social relationships, etc. To put it another way, in the evolutionary process from ape to man, the two aspects of “structure” and “choice” which tend to find frequent expression in human productive activities as well as in social and intellectual activities, such as making tools, engaging in production, building up social relationships, etc., have been inherent in the unified noumenon of human life since the beginning of human existence on the earth. In the long process of human spiritual evolution, the noumenon of non-human primate life, or rather, the anthropoid ape’s “structure and choice,” was still in an early stage of spiritual development which was characterized by a vague awakening of spiritual consciousness. However, the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,” which started into existence in the spiritual consciousness of anthropoid apes, endowed non-human primate life with the “integrated duality” unique to human life, thereby making anthropoid apes differ essentially from other animals. Practical human activity is inextricably linked with the noumenon of human life and provides the motive force for its evolutionary development. On a practical basis, the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and force,” passed through a long process of evolution, 8

Bernasco, Wim, Gelder, Jean-Louis Van., & Effers, Henk., eds. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Offender Decision Making. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 71.

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and took nearly two million years to go through different stages of development. In the long process of evolution, the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,” first appeared in an embryonic form, then gradually took shape, and eventually evolved into the modern form, which is to say, the noumenon of modern human life came to maturity and attained relative perfection. It can be safely asserted that man’s “structure and choice,” or rather, the noumenon of human life, do not stand in a dualistic relationship to each other, which is to say, man’s “structure and choice” do not exist in absolute isolation from each other, but rather that an integrated duality is inherent in the unified noumenon of human life, or rather, in the relationship of man’s “structure” to his “choice.” In the unified noumenon of human life inhere the two constituent parts of “structure” and “choice,” which are different from each other, inseparable from each other, and closely connected with each other, and which are integrated into one whole. By the essence of the integration achieved in man’s “structure and choice,” or rather, in the noumenon of human life, we mean not that man’s “structure” overwhelms or replaces his “choice” (structuralist thought, for example), or that man’s “choice” overpowers or takes the place of his “structure” (existentialist ideas, for example), but that dialectical integration, development and transcendence, the unity of opposites, and the inner mediation can be achieved in man’s “structure and choice,” that is, in the noumenon of human life, and that man’s “structure and choice” tend to reveal themselves in an ongoing process of dialectical unity and self-transcendence. Through the instrumentality of man’s behavioral choice, the structure of human life lays the organizational basis for human practical activity, whereas the behavioral choice on the part of a humansubject tends to manifest itself in a variety of practical behaviors. Man’s “structure” and “choice” are connected with each other, dependent upon each other, and changed into each other. Man’s “structure” determines his “choice”, and vice versa, whereby the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” has turned out to be one of the most unfathomable mysteries in the world. Just as a human subject, who is endowed with the structure of human life, but who is rendered incapable of making choices, cannot exist in the world, so one who is endowed with the power of making choices cannot prove beyond a possibility of doubt he is devoid of any structure whatsoever inherent in the noumenon of human life. Hence, it can be safely asserted that an integrated duality is inherent in the noumenon of human life and that man’s “structure and choice” are inherently integrated into one whole. The noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,” asserts itself as an open-ended being in its own right, and is endowed with infinite possibilities of the future only awaiting development. The noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” which is endowed with a spatial dimension, is integrated with the world and exists synchronically with it, thereby endowing the human world with a most copious and unfailing source of intellectual development. Moreover, the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,” also possesses a temporal dimension, which manifests itself in the fact that the noumenon of human life is integrated with the world and exists diachronically with it, whereby the noumenon of human life that is integrated with the human world can reveal itself in an ongoing process of development and transcendence, and will exist for all periods infinitely extending far into the future.

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The noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” tends to assert itself as the mode of human existence and as the mode of human survival in its own right. When the external environment imposes pressure on the human subject to which he has to respond, the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,” will respond accordingly on its own initiative by directing the human subject’s behavioral choices towards the external environment as well as towards his own “metastructure,” whereby the human subject not only changes the external environment, but also makes readjustments to a greater or lesser extent to his own “metastructure.” When faced with new pressures from the external environment, the human subject tends to bring the noumenon of human life into operation again, and to make new behavioral choices, whereby the new behavioral choices can bring about changes in the external environment as well as in the subject’s “metastructure.” That is to say, when faced with mounting pressures from the external environment, man’s “structure and choice,” or rather, the noumenon of human life, tend to be transformed into each other, to change each other, and to determine each other. The interaction of man’s “structure” with his “choice” tends to repeat itself in endless cycles, or even to infinity. “The integrated duality” inherent in the noumenon of human life, that is, the essence of man’s species-life, finds expression in the interactive process of man’s “structure and choice,” which gives material form to the unique mode of existence of the species-being, and which is a dynamic and genuine reflection of the human life course unfolding itself on a magnificent scale from ancient times to the present, in which human beings will be able to attain infinite transcendence while marching into the future.

2 Chinese and Foreign Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of Human Life Looking back on the course of the history of civilization, we will find that Chinese and foreign scholars from ancient times to the present have never ceased their serious and assiduous efforts to gain a fresh and deeper insight into the noumenon of human life, and that there have been dozens of such competing theories put forward, which make an extensive literature of speculation on this intriguing subject and which embody the admirable results of their own original researches. Regrettably, their conscientious and unremitting endeavors failed to provide the key to a true and complete understanding of the noumenon of human life, but paved the way for worthy successors’ continuous and indefatigable researches on this question. Though their ingenuous but hazardous attempts at working out this absorbing but perplexing question failed, every failure constitutes a stepping stone to reaching a wiser solution of this question. In so doing they have made substantial contributions of permanent value to the sum of human knowledge as well as to our knowledge of the essence of human life.

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2.1 Ancient Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of Human Life The noumenon of human life has always proved so tempting both to Chinese and to Western scholars since ancient times that they made genuine and painstaking efforts to pry into the mysteries of human life and that they advanced a multitude of ingenious and laudable theories on this question. There are a few impressive historical examples in illustration of this argument. Confucius was a ju and the founder of the Ju school, which has been known in the West as the Confucian school. The Ju school is the Ju chia or School of Literati. This school is known in Western literature as the Confucianist school, but the word ju literally means “literatus” or scholar. Thus the Western title is somewhat misleading, because it misses the implication that the followers of this school were scholars as well as thinkers; they, above all others, were the teachers of the ancient classics and thus the inheritors of the ancient cultural legacy. Confucius, to be sure, is the leading figure of this school and may rightly be considered as its founder. Nevertheless the term ju not only denotes “Confucian” or “Confucianist,” but has a wider implication as well.9 In the Analects, Confucius enlightened us about the threefold Way of an exemplary person (or a superior man). Here the Way or Truth means Tao. The Master said: “Set your heart on the Tao.” (Analects, VII, 6). And again: “To hear the Tao in the morning and then die at night, that would be all right.” (Analects, IV, 9) It was this Tao which Confucius at fifteen set his heart upon learning. What we now call “learning” means the increase of our knowledge, but the Tao is that whereby we can elevate our mind. Confucius said, “The Way of an exemplary person (or a superior man) is threefold, but I am unable to accomplish them: the wise are free from doubts; the virtuous are free from anxiety; the brave are free from fear.” (Analects, XIV)10 It is thus clear that, according to Confucianism, the noumenon of human life can be reduced to his “humanity,” “wisdom,” and “valor.” Mencius developed orthodox Confucianism, especially the Confucian theory about the noumenon of human life, and thus he was venerated by later generations as the “Second Sage” of Confucianism after the “Supreme Sage,” Confucius. Mencius represents the idealistic wing of Confucianism. The Mencius in seven books records the conversations between Mencius and the feudal lords of his time as well as between him and his disciples, and in later time it was honored by being made one of the famous “Four Books,” which for the past one thousand years have formed the basis of Confucian education.11 Mencius said: “The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that of right and wrong. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence (or human-heartedness); that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that 9

Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, pp. 48, 50, 64. 10 Ibid., p. 74. 11 Ibid., p. 110.

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of right and wrong, the principle of wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them.”12 To support his theory, Mencius presents numerous arguments, among them the following: “All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others … If now men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress … From this case we may perceive that he who lacks the feeling of commiseration is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of modesty and yielding is not a man; and that he who lacks a sense of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of human-heartedness. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and yielding is the beginning of propriety. The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Man has these four beginnings, just as he has four limbs … Since all men have these four beginnings in themselves, let them know how to give them full development and completion. The result will be like fire that begins to burn, or a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to protect all within the four seas. If they are denied that development, they will not suffice even to serve one’s parents.” (Mencius, IIa, 6).13 All men in their original nature possess these “four beginnings,” which, if fully developed, become the four “constant virtues,” so greatly emphasized in Confucianism. These virtues, if not hindered by external conditions, develop naturally from within, just as a tree grows by itself from the seed, or a flower from the bud. There remains another question, which is: Why should man allow free development to his “four beginnings,” instead of to what we may call his lower instincts? Mencius answers that it is these four beginnings that differentiate man from the beasts. They should be developed, therefore, because it is only through their development that man is truly a “man.” (Mencius, IVb, 19).14 For Mencius, on the one hand human nature is a social tendency which is inborn, but on the other, it consists of natural qualities, which is to say, Mencius maintained that man has two essences: One is man’s natural essence; the other is man’s social essence. By man’s natural essence, Mencius means that human desires for food and sex are directly associated with physical form, which is to say, ordinary human desires for food and sex are our natural physical or psychological instincts, and that our mouths have a common taste for flavor.15 Mencius means by man’s social essence that all men in their original nature possess these four “constant virtues” such as human-heartedness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom.16 Herein, in fact, lies the essential difference between man and the 12

Legge, James. (1861). The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius, Vol. II. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 278. 13 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 112. 14 Ibid., p. 114. 15 Chˇ ong Chedu. (2020). The Great Synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea: The Chonˇon (Testament) (Edward Y. J. Chung, Trans.). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 257. 16 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, pp. 112, 114.

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animals in the Mencius sense of the term. Animals may be said to possess the pure essence of nature, which Mencius calls the material senses xiao ti (the small, 小体), whilst man is a social being as well as a natural being—or to put it another way, man possesses the natural essence as well as the social nature, which is rightly described as the reflecting and thinking mind/heart da ti (the great, 大体) in the Mencius. If man allows free development to his lower instincts, that is, his natural essence (the small, 小体), instead of to what we may call his “four virtues,” or rather, his social nature (the great, 大体), he will be called a “little man” who does not differ essentially from birds or beasts. Mencius says: “A man who only eats and drinks is counted mean by others;—because he nourishes what is little to the neglect of what is great. If a man, fond of his eating and drinking, were not to neglect what is of more importance, how should his mouth and belly be considered as no more than an inch of skin? Some parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great, and some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes the great is a great man. Those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; those who follow that part which is little are little men. The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man.” (Mencius, XIV, 2, 5, 6; XV, 2).17 For Mencius, the function of the mind / heart is to reflect or think. It is this mind / heart, Mencius says, that enables man to think or reflect. It is only by thinking or reflecting that man is truly a man. Specifically, it is only by thinking or reflecting that the “four beginnings”—the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and respect, and the sense of right and wrong, which, he says, are inherent in man’s nature, when elevated or developed, may result in the “four constant virtues,” that is, “goodness,” “righteousness,” “propriety,” and “wisdom,” whereby man can become a “superior man.” It is therefore clear that Mencius tries to build up a new theory about the noumenon of human life whose origin, formation, and development rightly deserve deep and extensive discussion. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato also advanced a theory about the noumenon of human life. In his treatise the Republic, Plato established the tripartite soul, which is to say, the Platonic soul consists of three parts which are located in different regions of the body. Animals and plants possess only lower souls. What distinguishes man from the lower orders of creation is thus that man alone has a higher soul, that is, the rational soul, whereby man is a species-being most similar to God and therefore dear to him. According to Plato, the soul has three distinguishable layers, or levels: The lowest layer of the soul is described as man’s appetites (temperance), the second layer 17

Legge, James. (1861). The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius, Vol. II. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, pp. 293–294.

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is called the spirit (courage), and the third layer is what Plato described as reason (wisdom). For Plato, just as men are made out of three metals, gold, silver, and bronze (or iron), so there are three kinds of people in any society: The philosopher-king, whose soul is made of gold, is the embodiment of wisdom and virtue. He knows the statesmanship and statecraft while governing the state. The guardians, whose souls are made of silver, whose virtue is to be courageous, and whose purpose is to direct the state with the virtue of wisdom, are suited to protect the state. Those lesser people such as farmers, craftsmen, and traders, whose souls are composed of bronze and iron and whose virtue is to practice temperance in appetites and passions, should be engaged in productive and economic activities, and thus provide all necessary goods and services for their fellow countrymen.18 Thus it can be seen that Plato divides the community into three classes or professions, i.e., the wise rulers, the auxiliary protectors and the working class of producers.19 According to him, if the three classes can perform their own functions faithfully and resign themselves to their own destinies, unity and harmony will prevail in the State in that justice, or the public virtue, tends to grow with the specialization of functions.20 It is thus clear that in the early days of human civilization a multitude of eminent scholars in Chinese and Western countries made serious and indefatigable researches on the noumenon of human life, which gave them fascinating insights into this absorbing but perplexing question and which stimulated them to advance numerous ingenious and enlightening theories.

2.2 Modern Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of Human Life In modern times, a number of notable scholars put forward many ingenious theories about the noumenon of human life, which, regrettably, were far from reaching a genuine solution of this question, but which in great leaps have carried forward our understanding of this question. Several representative theories may be adduced to support this argument. Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was an Austrian neurologist and the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud may justly be called the most influential intellectual legislator of his age. His creation of psychoanalysis was at once a theory of the human psyche, a therapy for the relief of its ills, and an optic for the interpretation of culture and society. Despite repeated criticisms, attempted refutations, and qualifications of

18

Gao, Qing-Hai. (1990). Essentials of European Philosophical History (new edition). Changchun, China: Jilin People’s Publishing House, pp. 91–93. 19 Reeves, M. Francis. (2004). Platonic Engagements: A Comtemporary Dialogue on Morality, Justice and the Business World. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 284. 20 Jayapalan, N. (2002). Comprehensive Study of Plato. New Delhi, IN: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, p. 30.

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Freud’s work, its spell remained powerful well after his death.21 Freud advanced his own ingenious theory about the noumenon of human life by dividing the human psyche into three portions, that is, the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” and further developing a model of psychic structure comprising the three provinces of the psychic apparatus, viz. the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” which he discussed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and expounded in The Ego and the Id (1923), to capture the dynamics of the mind, which is to say, the three agents are theoretical constructs that describe the activities and interactions of the mental life of a person. He proposed that the noumenon of human life could be divided into three parts, or rather, the “id,” “ego,” and “superego.” The id is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that is completely unconscious and is the source of psychic energy derived from instinctual needs and drives. The “id,” whose basic biological needs are primarily sexual, or rather, libidinal drives, is the most primitive component of the human personality that comes into being at birth, and is the source of basic biological needs and drives, emotional impulses and desires, including sexual and aggressive motives. The “id,” which is unconscious, operates on the pleasure principle, according to which it tries to seek pleasure, avoid pain, and gain immediate gratification of instinctive drives and impulses. It’s filled with basic biological energy reaching it from the instincts, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle.22 Freud called the “Id” the “true psychic reality” because it represents the inner world of subjective experience, with no knowledge of objective reality. The “Id” seeks immediate gratification without regard to personal or social consequences or to external reality in general, that is, it mediates between its biological and psychological needs on the one hand and external reality on the other. The “Ego” is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that serves as the organized conscious mediator between the person and reality especially by functioning both in the perception of and adaptation to reality. Conscious awareness resides in the ego, although not all of the operations of the ego are conscious.23 The ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions and impulses.24 Hence the ego helps us to organize our thoughts and to make sense of them and the world around us. For Freud, the ego acts according to the reality principle, which is a regulating mechanism that enables the individual to delay gratifying immediate needs and function effectively in the real world.25 Accordingly, it seeks to please the

21

Jay, Martin Evan. “Sigmund Freud.” From https://www.britannica.com/biography/SigmundFreud. 22 Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 105–106. 23 Snowden, Ruth. (2006). Freud: Teach Yourself. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 105–107. 24 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology (James Strachey, Trans.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 363–364. 25 Schacter, Daniel L., Wegner, Daniel M., & Gilbert, Daniel T. Psychology. New York, NY: Macmillan Higher Education, 2008.

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id’s drive in realistic ways that, in the long term, bring benefit, rather than grief.26 As the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world,27 it attempts to mediate between id and reality, find a balance between primitive drives and reality while satisfying the id and super-ego, and bring about harmony among the forces and influences working in and upon it.28 Freud concedes that the ego serves three severe masters, that is, the external world, the super-ego, and the id, that the ego, driven by the id, confined by the super-ego, and repulsed by reality, has to do its best to suit all three, thus is constantly feeling hemmed by the danger of causing discontent on two other sides, and that the ego seems to be more loyal to the id, preferring to gloss over the finer details of reality to minimize conflicts while pretending to have a regard for reality.29 In Freudian theory the ego is the psychic system that mediates between the id and the superego to get our needs met. The ego meets the needs of the id in a reasonable, moral manner approved by the superego, which is what Freud called the moral guardian, and which as such observes and guides the ego. Superego is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that is only partly conscious, represents internalization of parental conscience and the rules of society, and functions to reward and punish through a system of moral attitudes, conscience, and a sense of guilt. The superego, the mental system that reflects the internalization of cultural rules, mainly learned as parents exercise their authority, consists of a set of guidelines, internal standards, and other codes of conduct that regulate and control our behaviors, thoughts, and fantasies. It acts as a kind of conscience, punishing us when it finds we are doing or thinking something wrong (by producing guilt or other painful feelings) and rewarding us (with feelings of pride or self-congratulation) for living up to ideal standards.30 The superego, which acts as the conscience, maintains our sense of morality, and controls our sense of right and wrong and guilt,31 whereby it helps us fit into society by getting us to act in socially acceptable ways.32 According to Freud, the installation of the superego can be described as a successful instance of identification with the parental agency, while as development proceeds the superego also takes on the influence of those who have stepped into the place of parents—educators, teachers, and people chosen as ideal models. Thus a child’s superego is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of its parents’ superego. It becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgments of value which have propagated themselves in 26

Noam, Gil G., Hauser, Stuart T., Santostefano, Sebastiano., Garrison, William., Jacobson, Alan M., Powers, Sally I., & Mead, Merril. “Ego Development and Psychopathology: A Study of Hospitalized Adolescents”. Child Development. Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development. 55:1 (February 1984): 189–194. 27 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology (James Strachey, Trans.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 363–364. 28 Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 110–111. 29 Ibid. 30 Schacter, Daniel L. (2011). Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, p. 481. 31 Sédat, Jacques. (2000). “Freud.” Collection Synthese. Armand Colin, p.109. 32 Snowden, Ruth. (2006). Freud: Teach Yourself. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 105–107.

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this manner from generation to generation.33 Hence the superego functions as the guardian of morality as well as the guardian of civilization. The superego, on the one hand, aims for perfection,34 but on the other, it has to work in contradiction to the id. The super-ego strives to act in a socially appropriate manner, whereas the id just wants instant self-gratification.35 Psychoanalysis is a therapeutic method, originated by Sigmund Freud, for treating mental disorders by investigating the interaction of conscious and unconscious elements in the patient’s mind and bringing repressed fears and conflicts into the conscious mind, using techniques such as dream interpretation and free association. Freud’s psychoanalysis is based on his conception of a person which can be represented by his three schemes for describing the mind, that is, the human psyche consists of id, ego, and superego, the mind could be divided into conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and the driving force of our action is the pleasure principle, as well as its derivatives, which is the instinctive seeking of pleasure and avoiding of pain to satisfy biological and psychological needs.36 It can be safely asserted that in developing a theoretical framework of the noumenon of human life, Freud made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the ontological study of human existence by blazing a new and different path towards true knowledge of the human essence. However, Freudian ideas received scathing criticisms after his death, because in the Freudian theory a universal sexual motive was found to have been inherent in the customs and dreams of primitive societies as well as in the early civilizations. In addition, some severe criticisms were also leveled at Freud’s exclusively sexualistic stand, including his definition of energy and libido in a purely sexual sense. The Freudian theory reveals that Freud confines himself almost exclusively to sexuality and its manifold ramifications in the psyche. Nonetheless, his theory concerning the psychological basis of sexuality, especially the purely sexually defined concept of libido and the exclusively sexual interpretation of energy, is purely hypothetical and actually pure conjecture. This limitation compelled Freud to explain man’s psychic energy in exclusively sexual terms, and to reduce all psychological motives to one single unit, that is, libido. There is today a growing consensus that Freud’s psychoanalytical theory provides an inadequate explanation of how the three elements of personality, i.e. the id, ego, and superego, may exist in dynamic equilibrium or in conflict with one another. It is thus evident that the deficiencies inherent in the Freudian theory are apparently obvious.

33

Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 95–96. 34 Meyers, David G. “Module 44: The Psychoanalytic Perspective.” In Psychology Eighth Edition in Modules. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2007. 35 Calian, Florian. (2012). Plato’s Psychology of Action and the Origin of Agency. Paris, FR: L’Harmattan, pp. 17–19. 36 Sigmund, Freud. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Jue-FuGao, Trans.). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, 1984; Sigmund, Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Chinese edition) (Chen Lin, Huan-Min Zhang, & Wei-Qi Chen, Trans., Rev. Ze-chuan Chen). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986.

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Karen Horney (1885–1952), German-born American psychoanalyst whose work exerted a decisive influence upon the course of psychoanalysis,37 was among the most influential of 20th-centuray psychologists through her critiques and revisions of Freudian theory.38 Departing from some of the basic principles of Sigmund Freud,39 her theories questioned some traditional Freudian views, which was particularly true of the theories of sexuality and of the instinct orientation of psychoanalysis. She disagreed with Freud about inherent differences in the psychology of men and women, and traced such differences to society and culture rather than biology.40 She suggested an environmental and social basis for the personality and its disorders. In her major theoretical works, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937) and New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), she argued that environmental and social conditions, rather than the instinctual or biological drives described by Freud, determine much of individual personality and are the chief causes of neuroses and personality disorders.41 Horney formulated a theory of psychopathology that was at once more comprehensive in its scope and more penetrating in its insights. Her ideas, grounded in clinical experience, are almost totally devoid of the dramatic speculation that frequently marked the writings of the man she always acknowledged to be her indispensable forerunner, Sigmund Freud.42 Despite these variances with the prevalent Freudian view, Horney strove to reformulate Freudian thought, presenting a holistic, humanistic view of the individual psyche which placed much emphasis on cultural and social differences worldwide. As such, she is often classified as neo-Freudian.43 Horney put forward her own original theory about the noumenon of human life, in which there are three manifestations of the self, that is, the “actual self,” the “real self,” and the “ideal self.” Following a psychodynamic tradition, Horney defined the “real self” as an “intrinsic potentiality” or “central inner force, common to all human beings,”44 or rather, the “original force toward individual growth and fulfillment.”45 She maintained that the “real self” constitutes “the reservoir of spontaneous energies,”46 which includes the basic physiological and psychological needs, and that 37

“Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 38 “Horney, Karen (1885–1952).”Women in World History: A Biographical Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 39 Britannica, The Editor of Encyclopedia. “Karen Horney”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2020, . Accessed 3 February 2021. 40 Schacter, Daniel L., Gilbert, Daniel Todd., & Wegner, Daniel M. Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2011. 41 Britannica, The Editor of Encyclopedia. “Karen Horney”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karen-Horney. Accessed 3 February 2021. 42 “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 43 “Karen Horney.” en.wikipedia.org. 31 Jan. 2021 . 44 Horney, Karen. (1950). Neurosis and Human Growth. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 17. 45 Ibid., p. 158. 46 Ibid., p. 159.

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it represents an innate developmental tendency. Hence, the “real self,” according to Horney, is the potential self who tends to strive for its unfettered growth. For Horney, the “actual self,” as distinguished from the “real self,” is derived from the sum total of our actual experiences, and it is the empirical self—that part of the actual self which is immediately apprehendable and observable at any given moment. She also defines an “actual self” as “everything a person is at a given time: body and soul, healthy and neurotic.” The “actual self,” says Horney, is that fluid combination of the neurotic and the real that we are in daily existence. According to Horney, the “ideal self,” as opposed to the “actual self,” may be viewed as neurotic and the source of the grandiose aspects of the self, and psychologically healthy people, with very few exceptions, strive to reach an ideal self that is reasonably attainable, which means that man, by his very nature and of his own accord, strives toward self-realization, which Horney views as both a “prime moral obligation” and a “prime moral privilege,” and that his set of values evolves from such striving. The consistent struggle between the “actual self” and the “ideal self” constitutes what Horney refers to as “the central inner conflict,” which results in excessive compulsions and “shoulds” that the individual develops to rule his life and hereby finds meaning in life. For a person who is striving for his ideal self, the natural striving constitutes the central inner force of his actual self as well as the most serious obstacle to healthy growth, that is, the neurotic solution which Horney called self-realization, the attempt to see and to mold oneself into a glorified, idealized, illusory image with strivings for superiority, power, perfection, and vindictive triumph over others.47 It must be admitted that Horney’s theory about the noumenon of human life rejected the pansexual Freudian view and corrected this serious weakness inherent to the Freudian theory, and that she tried to gain a deeper and fresh insight into the structure of human life by delving into the central inner conflict between the “actual self” and the “ideal self.” Thus it can be safely asserted that Horney’s theory embodies substantial improvements over Freud’s. However, there are still weaknesses in her theory. Clearly, human behaviors and neuroses cannot be given a full explanation when viewed from the perspective of the “actual self” or the “ideal self,” which is far from explaining human behaviors that are complex and unpredictable. Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970), often referred to as the “father of humanistic psychology,”48 was a prominent personality theorist and one of the best-known American psychologists of the twentieth century. Skeptical of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, Maslow worked to develop a more expansive theory of human motivation,

47

Horney, Karen. The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Chuan Feng, Trans.) Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 1988; Horney, Karen. Our Inner Conflicts (Zuo-Hong Wang, Trans.) Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 2004; “Karen Danielsen Horney.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 https://www.encyclopedia. com. 48 “Maslow, Abraham.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 .

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one that could accommodate the powerful influence of biology and the environment while honoring the human capacity for free will.49 He postulated a hierarchical theory of human motivation, wherein needs arrange themselves in a hierarchy from basic biological needs to those of self-esteem and self-actualization.50 Influenced by existentialist philosophers and literary figures, Maslow was an important contributor in the United States to humanistic psychology, which was sometimes called the “third force,” in opposition to behaviorism and psychoanalysis.51 Maslow remains a figure of considerable renown in psychology. For all of his influence on academic psychology, Maslow’s most enduring legacy is cultural.52 Maslow proposed his own theory about the noumenon of human life—that is, the theory of Maslow’s needs, also known as the “hierarchy of human needs.” In his 1943 paper “A Theory of Human Motivation” as well as in his major works, Motivation and Personality (1954) and Toward a Psychology of Being (1962), Maslow argued that humans possess five sets of basic needs, ranging from basic “physiological” needs to “safety,” “love” or “belongingness,” “esteem,” and “self-actualization,” that these innate needs are arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency—or, to put it another way, human needs can be described as ordered in a pre-potent hierarchy, and that individuals are motivated to fulfill lower-level needs before they are motivated to fulfill higher-level needs. He postulated that these motivational needs underlie all human behavior, which is to say, they constitute the primary sources of behavioral motivation. These needs, according to Maslow, are critical in our survival and ongoing existence, for without having these needs met, an individual will fail to develop into a healthy person, both physically and psychologically. He asserted that an individual tends to be dominated by these hierarchically arranged needs all through life, and that at any given time he is struggling to meet these needs until he reaches the apex of the hierarchy, self-actualization. He believed that humans aspire to have all of these needs met and experience a sense of genuine fulfillment when this is achieved. According to Maslow’s theory of motivation, known as the “hierarchy of needs,” all human behaviors are deemed to be motivated by five sets of hierarchically arranged needs.53 Maslow argued that his theory of motivation integrated existing formulations from psychoanalysis and behavioral psychology with insights derived from the study of the “psychologically healthy,” while psychoanalytically inspired theory, which was based largely on the study of people experiencing personal difficulties, resulted in a distorted and unduly 49

“Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 50 Sternlicht, Manny “Maslow, Abraham H.” Encyclopedia Judaica. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 51 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. “Abraham Maslow”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 14 Jan. 2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abraham-H-Maslow. Accessed 5 February 2021. 52 “Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 53 Maslow, Abraham H. Self-Actualizing Man (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu & Feng Liu, Trans.) Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987; Hoffman, Edward. The Right to Be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu, Trans.) Beijing, China: Reform Publishing House (1988–2000), 1998.

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narrow conception of human motivation.54 Maslow’s theory of motivation is reasonable in the sense that he contended human needs constitute the primary driving force behind human behavior, and that they rightly serve to explain the entire spectrum of human behavior. It may be safely asserted that Maslow’s theory represents a substantial improvement on its forerunners, such as Freud’s and Horney’s theories. Freud saw the libido as the sole driving force behind all human behavior, and Maslow’s theory overcame the weakness inherent in the Freudian theory. According to Horney, human behaviors and neuroses can be given a full explanation only when viewed from the perspective of the “actual self” or the “ideal self,” and in his theory Maslow corrected the inherent weakness of Horney’s theory. Nonetheless, Maslow’s theory is far from comprehensive. When it comes to the noumenon of human life, Maslow’s theory cannot offer an all-embracing and full explanation. Maslow’s theory attempts to describe and explain human behavior in terms of human needs and desires, which is neither scientific nor practical. While human needs tend to provide the basic energy for human behavior, and to influence the basic behavioral tendencies, they cannot directly determine whether humans behave or how they behave. Man is a rational animal—or, to put it another way, man is endowed with reason. Human reason is the ultimate determining force in human behavior. Generally speaking, human needs and rational judgment jointly determine human behavior. Under certain external environmental pressures, human behavior tends to be initiated through needs. Then an individual tends to make behavioral choices whenever he (or she) exercises his (or her) power of rational judgment. Thus it can be seen that rational judgment is the ultimate determining force in human behavior. To sum up, the obvious weakness of Maslow’s theory lies in the fact that he rejected and even ignored the determining influence of consciousness and reason upon human behavior. Thus it must of necessity follow that his theory cannot offer a scientific explanation of man’s unpredictable and unfathomable behavior. There are still many learned and intelligent men who have made important contributions to the study of human ontology. Some eminent scholars devoted themselves assiduously and faithfully to the study of human ontology, while there are still more prominent figures who provided valuable knowledge and methods for the study of human ontology. A constellation of illustrious names include Ferdinand de Saussure, Jean Piaget, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Max Weber, Bruno Latour, Arnold Toynbee, and Kurt Lewin. Of these two notable names, that is, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Jean-Paul Sartre, which appeared at the beginning of the book, claim particular mention. They proposed many profound and stimulating theories as well as relevant methods. It is regrettable that their conscientious and unremitting endeavors failed to provide the key to a true and complete understanding of the noumenon of human life. However, their mental efforts paved the way for worthy successors’ continuous and indefatigable researches on this question. Although their ingenuous but hazardous attempts at working out this absorbing but perplexing question failed, every failure constitutes a stepping stone to reaching a wiser solution of this question. In so doing 54

“Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 .

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they have made substantial contributions of permanent value to the sum of human knowledge as well as to our knowledge of the essence of human life. With the above situation in view, we must inherit and develop Marxist dialectical thinking, and follow in the footsteps of our forerunners who have achieved valuable results of scholarly research in the field of human ontology. Only in this way can we unravel the mystery of human existence. In 1986 and 1987, the author Chen Binggong got 42 colleagues and students organized several times to undertake investigations on “personality and values” in Chinese metropolises such as Changchun, Beijing, Xi’an, Wuhan, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. From 1995 to 2005, he carried out a series of experiments in “personality structure and holistic personality development” in Chinese regions and cities like Jilin Province, Henan Province, and Shenzhen. Based upon these investigations and experiments, the author published relevant articles and works, such as “The 21st Century and Chinese Traditional Ideal Personality Models: From a Modern Perspective” and General Tendencies in Chinese Personality. While following in the footsteps of his predecessors who have achieved the latest results of scholarly research in the field of human ontology, the author devoted more than 30 years of his life to the study of human ontology by drawing upon previous results in the field. Eventually, the author, in conjunction with his colleagues and students, made preliminary findings from long-term investigations and experiments, and proposed tentative ideas about the noumenon of human life. The author asserts that “the integrated duality” is inherent in the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” and that “the integrated duality” manifests itself in the organic unity of “structure and choice.” The author’s view may be briefly summarized in the following statement, that is, the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” is basically composed of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” (1) By the “triple structure,” that is, the “three levels of personality structure,” we mean the basic structure of the noumenon of human life, or rather, the basic make-up of man’s “structure and choice,” which consists of three organic levels of personality structure. By the first level of personality structure, or rather, “the power of personality demand (or need),” which constitutes the basic level of the noumenon of human life that the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” we mean that man’s basic needs and driving forces as well as their manifold manifestations are inherent in the subconscious (or unconscious) mind, which, according to the author, can be regarded as “the great reservoir” of man’s basic needs and driving forces, and that “the power of personality demand (or need)” can provide primitive energies and basic tendencies for human behavioral choices. By the second level of personality structure, that is, “the power of personality judgment,” which is the crucial level of the noumenon of human life, and which is of paramount importance to man’s “structure and choice,” we mean that the conscious mind is endowed with man’s rational powers that tend to manifest themselves in manifold forms, and that “the power of personality judgment” tends to be inextricably linked with “the power of personality demand (or need),” thereby determining man’s behavioral choices. By the third level of personality structure, that is, “personality behavior choice,” we mean that man can determine his own behavior and make appropriate behavioral choices in a certain environment, that “personality behavior

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choice” manifests itself in a person’s practical activities throughout his whole life, and that “personality behavior choice” is man’s conscious practical activity whereby he can remold his subjective world while changing the objective world. (2) By “eight kinds of powers” we mean that eight kinds of essential (or substantive) powers are inherent in the noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice.” “Eight kinds of powers” can be grouped into three separate levels of “the triple structure.” “The power of personality demand (or need),” which belongs to the first level of personality structure, includes three kinds of power inherent in human life: (1) “the power of survival demand (or need),” for instance desire for food, sexual desire, and desire for safety. (2) “the power of belonging demand (or need),” for example desire for love, desire for group, and desire for self-esteem. (3) “The power of development demand (or need)” such as desire for knowledge, desire for achievement, and desire for perfection. Basically, “the power of personality demand (or need)” is inherent in the subconscious (or unconscious) mind. “The power of personality judgment,” which comes into the second level of personality structure, contains four kinds of power inherent in human life: (1) “ideological and moral power;” (2) “wisdom power;” (3) “will power;” (4) “power of introspection.” The first three kinds of power inherent in human life, which are three principal manifestations of “the power of personality judgment,” exist in the conscious mind, while the fourth kind of power, which is a major form of “the power of personality judgment,” is present in man’s self-awareness. “Personality behavior choice,” which can be grouped into the third level of personality structure, consists of one type of power inherent in human life, that is, “personality behavior choice.” The author spent over 30 years of his life following in the footsteps of his forerunners and contemporaries, who have achieved the latest results of scholarly research in philosophy, anthropology, philosophical anthropology, and other related disciplines, in order to unravel the mystery of human existence, or rather, to gain a fresh and deeper insight into the noumenon of human life which the author terms man’s “structure and choice.” His untiring and unremitting efforts were eventually crowned with success. He drew preliminary conclusions from long-term investigations and experiments. His monograph entitled Principles of Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the Knowledge System, which was published trough China Social Sciences Press in 2012, was chosen as one of “National Achievements Library of Philosophy and Social Sciences” in 2011. In this scholarly work the author proposed and expounded the theory of “personality structure and choice,” which was illustrated by charts and diagrams, and which took pages 177–311 of this book to go into details, holding that the noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” is basically composed of “three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” Based on an intelligent and clarifying analysis of the noumenon of human life, it can be safely asserted that man’s “structure and choice” do not exist in a binary relationship where one half of the binary represents the opposite of the other, and that nor the relationship of man’s “structure” to his “choice” exists outside the noumenon of human life. Rather, “the integrated duality” is inherent within the noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” the relationship of which is essentially a negative unity of those opposites or contradictions inherent within the noumenon of

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human life. The noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” includes the complex structure of human life and the more complex choices that have to be made in man’s life, whereby it can assert itself as a very complex life system in its own right. Or to be more precise, the noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” is a concrete historical unity of the complex structure of human life and the more complex choices that have to be made in man’s life. Herein lies the fundamental reason that human life differs essentially from animal life. It is the very noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” that makes humans qualitatively different from all other life forms, including animals, and that makes human life so rich, so colorful, so picturesque, so deep, so complex, and so mysterious. The noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” exists not only as a natural being but also as a social being. It is endowed with superior reason and conscious of having in itself infinite desires. On the one hand, it can possess brilliant intelligence and boast of noble lineage, but on the other, it may be kept in ignorance and humbled in the dust. It can be as firm as a rock, but it can be the most feeble thing in nature. A vapor, a drop of water suffices to kill it. It has a natural tendency towards introspection whereby it can achieve transcendence, but it is liable to error when it falls into an ossified way of thinking. It can look forward to a bright future with unbounded confidence, but it can bring destruction upon itself. The tragedy repeats itself an infinite number of times in history. It may find itself in a woeful predicament and be driven to the brink of desperation, but it has boundless hope in itself. It is thus far regarded as the highest stage of evolutionary development, but it will exist in an unfinished state for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. People can attain knowledge of it, but they can never offer an intellectually ultimate explanation of it. Indeed, in passing judgment on a man, we tend to make regrettable mistakes. Sometimes we seem to offer an intellectually ultimate explanation of what man is, but in fact our explanations are far from satisfactory. Sometimes it seems to us that human society is undergoing a remarkable development in manifold spheres of human activity, but it is regrettable that these stunning developments should lead to the crisis of civilization as well as the alienation of man from nature, from society, and from himself. “What a piece of work is a man!”55 It defies all comparison. What an unfathomable life system man is! Man has become a prime object of study, for which scientists cannot refrain from expressing their boundless admiration, but which makes them puzzle their brains over it! Admittedly, knowing what man in the world is would be no more a perfectly simple and easy thing to do than knowing the world. Such eminent figures as William Shakespeare, Blaise Pascal, Max Scheler, Ernst Cassirer, and Michael Landmann, who went down in the history of human thought, sang the praises of man, and devoted themselves assiduously and faithfully to the study of man. Their scholarly researches on what man is throw light on a mere portion or a mere aspect of man at the most, rather than man’s totality! Man must of 55

Shakespeare, William. (2001). The Complete Works of William Shakespeare: The Tragedy of Hamlet (in the English and Chinese languages), Vol. 32. (Shi-Qiu Liang, Trans.) Beijing, China: China Radio and TV Press, &Taipei, China: The Far East Book Company, p. 110.

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necessity be a prime object of study for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. The noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” and which exist in many modes, is endowed with superior properties (or qualities) and functions that are unique to man. It tends to manifest itself concretely in its synchronic existence, in its diachronic existence, and in the unified duality of man’s “structure and choice” that depend on each other.

3 Several Theoretical Patterns About the Ontology of Human Life It is arguable at any rate that man’s recorded history of nearly five thousand years can be seen as a process moving towards man’s self-knowledge, which is in effect nothing but man’s developing knowledge of nature, of himself and of history. As will be seen in due course, human history can be represented as a movement towards the fuller realization of man’s freedom in knowing himself. Differing theories, which originated with myriad schools of thought in the course of human history, vied with one another in helping man to gain deep insights into himself. In broad terms, other theoretical patterns about the noumenon of human life, as opposed to the Marxist theory about the noumenon of human life, can be classified into four categories—that is, we still can distinguish between other four types of theoretical patterns concerning the noumenon of human life as contrasted with the Marxist theory about the noumenon of human life.

3.1 “Man Is Created by God” One of these basic types is religious anthropology. In the Bible, God creates man— or, to put it another way, man is God’s unique creation. God creates man on the last day of creation as the last living creature: man is the goal or at least the “crown of creation.” That is to say, man constitutes the conclusion, the pinnacle and crown of God’s creation. The Biblical creation account shows clearly and conclusively how religious anthropology treats of the ontology of human life. At this point we seem to feel the necessity of providing a brief explanation of how the long tradition of Western Christian anthropology shaped the theory about the nature or essence of human life. Many Christian teachings, such as “the doctrine of Genesis,” “the doctrine of original sin,” “two groups of men according to the anthropology of the Apostle Paul,” “the Calvinist doctrine of the double predestination of all people—that is, humanity consists of two kinds of people, those who are predestined to eternal bliss and those who will not reach salvation,” “the doctrine of grace” and “the faith or belief in immortality,” provide valuable insights into the truth of human existence. On the one hand, these theses of religious anthropology as well as those theories

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of secular anthropology cast illumination on the basic questions such as the origin, nature, mode of existence, ways of salvation and eternal pursuits of human beings, but on the other, religious anthropology differs from secular anthropology in shedding light on the basic questions in religious ways rather than in secular ways. “Already in antiquity the attempt was made to define man as the only being with religion. It was an idea that Berdyaev always repeated, ‘that the ontological question of man and the question of religion lie in the same stratum of existence.’”56 Hence we have good reason to believe that these Christian teachings can be properly treated as valuable anthropological documents for permanent reference. It is common knowledge that the Bible is the Word of God and Genesis is the foundation stone of that great literary edifice. Still, it can be safely asserted that the first chapters of Genesis amalgamate old anthropological myths. In the Biblical creation accounts, God creates man by creating a first primeval couple from whom all men are then descended and at the same time endows man with his exclusive or unique properties. “Man communicates his creation by God to all the rest of ‘creation.’ But in the Bible the creation of the world is only a preparation for the creation of man. God does not create him together with the animals, but on his own day of creation: man originates from a new act of creation, he is—something shocked later natural science—not a part of the animal kingdom, but a separate kingdom all by himself. And indeed God creates man on the last day of creation as the last living creature (according to modern biology, too, man appears as one of the last species on earth): man is the goal or at least the ‘crown of creation.’ This is confirmed by the most important anthropological thesis of the creation account: ‘God made man in his image; in the image of God he made him.’ The other beings are only God’s creatures; man, however, is his likeness, imago dei. Words full of implications, full of destiny, repeated thousands of times and later used as postulates: man gains his highest dimension by virtue of his likeness to God: ‘You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy’ (Lev. 19:2; cf. Matt. 5:48).”57 In the Old Testament, Adam and Eve sinned, and therefore men no longer live in Paradise, which means that everyone born thereafter share this guilt. To this day the pious Christian still lives in the feeling of being burdened with an original sin. The fall of the first man did corrupt all human nature. Christian theology understands man as homo peccator (man the sinner). He is imperfect and worthless, not only as compared to God; he is also fundamentally sinful and guilty as such.58 Each individual finds himself sinful as a member of the human race; he is sinful only because of original sin, which Adam as the first man brought down upon all men and which is communicated from generation to generation. By the very fact that we exist after the Fall we all share in original sin. Sinfulness is therefore for us post-Adamites an original inheritance of human nature. Adam’s fall has vitiated our

56

Landman, Michael. (1974). Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, p. 74. 57 Ibid., p. 75. 58 Ibid., p. 79.

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nature.59 According to the Bible, God created the first primeval couple called Adam and Eve in a special act of creation—that is, God made man in his image; in the image of God he made him. Despite man’s likeness to God, however, the Bible never leaves any doubt as to the tremendous distance between God and man; indeed the Bible regards as the basic situation of man the fact that he is situated at this distance, and that the awareness of this can therefore never be sufficiently kept alive and intensified. Perhaps the verse on man’s likeness to God should even be translated: God created man as his shadow image and only as a dark outline of himself. The transcendent God takes on a human destiny in his Son. But this neither drags him down to the level of man nor lifts humanity to the divine.60 How little the likeness to God draws man to God’s level is shown in the prohibition against eating of the tree of knowledge. God has reserved knowledge of good and evil for himself. That knowledge of good and evil is a divine property and make him like to God is what the serpent says in its words of seduction. Giving in to its temptation, Adam and Eve eat of the tree of knowledge. In this way they arrogate to themselves a divine quality that God did not intend for them: man is an ethical being, knowing good and evil, and precisely this is a divine trait in him. He has seized it from God against God’s intention. He wins his highest quality through guilt. And as he is punished for his guilt, so are Adam and Eve are expelled from Paradise. And that does not mean merely that they have to exchange the beautiful garden for the rough field. Beside the tree of knowledge there grew in Paradise the tree of eternal life. Originally Adam and Eve had been permitted to eat of it: it was not all prohibited. But after they have committed sacrilege, God takes back the godlike immortality he had originally intended for them. He had announced this punishment from the first in case of their violation. “From the day on which you eat of it you will be mortal.” He casts them out of Paradise and places an angel before it “to guard the path to the tree of life,” from which they thus remain forever separated. This means: man must die; and he is himself to blame for this fate. Man will consume his whole life in making atonement for his sins and thereby strives to seek God’s forgiveness. In connection with this later so-called “fall into (original) sin” the Biblical author brings together a whole series of further human properties he has observed. He has already noted that man, as distinguished from the beasts, has a sense of shame and wears clothes, that he is the only creature that must work to earn a living, and that the human female suffers more strongly from pregnancy ailments and birth pains. Now all this must be mythically explained and a cause for it be given. Originally, so it says, Adam and Eve went naked “and were not ashamed”; only by eating of the tree of knowledge were “their eyes opened” to this. Originally man did not have to work; in Paradise he got his food without effort. That he now must work, and also woman’s pains at childbirth, both these things—as well as mortality—are now interpreted as a divine penalty for violating God’s prohibition, as a curse to an existence that is so hard only for that reason.61 In the Old Testament, Adam and Eve sinned, and therefore men no longer live in Paradise, but this does not at all mean 59

Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., pp. 76–77. 61 Ibid., pp. 77–78. 60

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that everyone born thereafter shares this guilt. To this day the pious Jew does not live in the feeling of being burdened with an original sin. The fall of the first man did not corrupt all human nature. “The soul that you have laid in me, it is pure.” In contrast, extreme forms of Christian theology understand man as homo peccator (man the sinner). He is imperfect and worthless, not only as compared to God; he is also fundamentally sinful and guilty as such. He lives constitutionally in a state of deficiency.62 Theological anthropology further reveals man’s “duality,” thereby bringing new hope to men. The Apostle Paul distinguishes between two groups of men: those who live according to the flesh and those who live according to the spirit. There are natural and spiritual men, the unconverted and the converted, the lost and the saved, children of the world and children of God. The first group is derived from Adam, the second from Christ,”63 The “natural man” is not, however, as one might perhaps believe at first sight, a coarse primitive! Paul is not concerned with secular differences such as culture and good breeding. The opposite of natural man is not the cultured man, but the one who has received grace and forgiveness.64 Here the Christian doctrine of grace may merit a brief explanation. The theory of progress opposes the Christian doctrine of sin by its faith in the original goodness of man, but it also is against the Christian doctrine of grace. For in Christianity, fallen man, powerless of himself, can be saved only by the gift of divine grace. The theory of progress, however, holds that man, whom it regards as not fallen very deep, can lift himself up by his own powers and “work his way up the paths to Olympus.” Both know a “self-redemption.” But Christianity itself has variously strict formulations of the doctrine of grace. It admits of no self-redemption, but still various Christian teachings allow for some participation on man’s part in his salvation. The point at issue between Augustine and Pelagius was whether every human effort, however pure, is inadequate and vain and we can be saved only by grace –sola gratia– or whether man can move at least a bit towards grace and, as it were, prepare the ground for it. Pelagius too held that man’s salvation does not depend totally on himself but needs a supernatural completion. But for him an innate nobility dwells in us. Because of this innate natural nobility we are not completely dependent on an outpouring of salvation from above, but can strive toward it on our own. God’s efficacy and his activity in man are joined by human cooperation. Augustine, on the contrary, regards sinfulness as a basic property of man, which has been imposed on man by God, and which we cannot change by our own power, for only God by his grace can remove it. Whether we perform good works or not, they do not contribute to the obtaining of grace. And so Augustine formulates statements almost weird in their religious radicalism: e.g., “Ama deum et fac quod vis” (“Love God and do what you will!”). This sentence is often interpreted as though it meant: whoever truly loves God can do no evil; he needs no further guideline than to do the right thing on his own. Augustine means something quite different: the believer is still capable 62

Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 82. 64 Ibid., pp. 82–83. 63

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of committing evil; but for grace, so he believes, that is not important, it does not direct itself by good behavior or evil deed. Augustine is thinking religiously while Pelagius, though not denying the religious significance of sin and that grace is a free gift, does not want to remove moral responsibility from our own shoulders. In Pelagius, as his opponents have correctly seen, there still lives a portion of “pagan” antiquity. Man is, for him, not exclusively dependent on divine mercy, but himself achieves something through his mind and will. Although Pelagianism was bitterly persecuted in its time, a modified form of it, called semi-Pelagianism, survived in Catholicism. Original sin has weakened the divine spark in man but not extinguished and destroyed it completely. By his actions man can earn merit through his “good works,” and he can climb a few stages of knowledge of God in a “natural theology” prior to any revelation, relying on his own reason. Just as grace does not do away with morality, revelation does not devalue the truth of philosophy.65 In Christianity as in many other religions and philosophies, a personal existence beyond the grave awaits each one of us. In life itself, after all, Christianity expects an individual relationship to God from each person and discovers, in Harnack’s words, “the infinite value of the individual soul.” In this respect Christianity can rightly claim to be a precursor of the modern breakthrough, by Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz, Schleiermacher, and others, to the appreciation of the individual, whether human or nonhuman. In contrast to Platonism, the highest value is seen as residing not in the general but in the unique singular object that is never repeated. As we have seen, in Christianity the body also participates in life beyond the grave. Under the impression of the corruption of the body the idea soon emerged that not the whole man but only his soul becomes immortal. Originally that is what “soul” meant, namely, the quintessence of the numinous in us as contrasted with the numinous outside us. Thus it was natural to ascribe the divine attribute of immortality to it.66 The Christian teachings about the immortality of the soul can be used as evidence or proof of the relationship between man’s finitude and infinity. Thus it can be seen that religious anthropology covers nearly all aspects of man’s essence and hence that it can rightly claim to be a branch of anthropology. However, there are many deficiencies in religious anthropology, and the fundamental one resides in the fact that the very branch of anthropology always asserts itself as a theological system shrouded in mystery in its own right, that it maintains the Christian principle that God is the center of the earth, of all the spheres, and of all things that are in the world, that God is creator and master of the world, and that man who is willing to make himself a humble servant of God is nothing more or less than a derivative creature intended to derive his nature, life, identity, behavior and immortality from God in order to function as designed by God and to experience the destiny God intended.

65 66

Ibid., pp. 97–99. Ibid., pp. 100–101.

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3.2 “Man Is a Living Creature” Biological anthropology’s interpretative approach to the essence of human life may be briefly summarized in one statement as follows: “Man is a living creature.” According to the theory, man is primarily an animal, his reason depends on the somatic physiology—that is to say, reason depends genetically or functionally on the vital side investigated by biology or physiology, and man is but one link in the continuous chain of organisms. Despite the fact that man and animals each rightly claim their respective places at the top of the biological chain, however, man never leaves any doubt as to the enormous distance between animals as contrasted with the appreciable distinction between man and animals. “But the distance between man and animal is not uniform. Not all animals are at the same distance from man. Some are closer to him, some farther away. And perhaps the distance between man and the animals closest to him is less than that between these animals in turn and the ones farthest from him. Let us juxtapose the infusorium as the lowest and most dissimilar to man, the chimpanzee as the animal most similar to man, and man himself: obviously in this series, the infusorium and the chimpanzee do not contrast with man, but man and chimpanzee are closer to one another compared with the infusorium. The differences within the animal kingdom are thus greater than the difference between the highest animals and man.”67 “At a very early date philosophy sought to lessen the emotionally drastic evaluative contrast between man and animal. Plato in his The Statesman dealt ironically with the naive arrogance of contrasting the totality of other creatures with ourselves under one concept ‘animal,’ when he said that this is just as if one day the cranes got together and declared: we are the cranes, the other living creatures, however, are only animals (Gulliver has the same experience on the island of horses). Thus Plato, like Aesop, has man sees his own errors in the mirror of the animal world. As in the Theaetetus (dialogue) he unmasks the class mentality of the nobility as full of prejudices and vanity, so here he reveals hoministic arrogance. Of course Plato is thinking more logically than objectively. What does not apply to the crane might apply to man.”68 “In his late period Plato is said to have once defined man as ‘a two-legged creature without feathers.’ (Frederick the Great appropriated this definition which seemed to confirm his misanthropy: he speaks of the two-legged unfeathered race.) In an anecdote, Plato’s adversary Diogenes is said to have plucked a chicken and said: this is Plato’s man. Therefore Plato added to his definition: ‘with flat nails.’ Thus in Plato two different types of anthropology collide and are left standing, without interlinking or complementing each other: a zoological definition of man, which places him completely in the animal kingdom, and man’s definition as a rational being, in which absolutely no mention is made of his animal side. This incoherent and unbalanced juxtaposition of two anthropologies is, however, a consequence of both a purely spiritualistic and a purely naturalistic conception, which mutually condition 67

Ibid., p. 152. Landman. Michael. Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Westminster Press, 1974, pp. 152–153.

68

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one another in their one-sidedness. Therefore the juxtaposition has survived down to the threshold of our time. Even as bearer of the mental equipment that contemplates ideas, man remains for Plato closely related with the animals: like the Hindus he allows for gradation from human to animal souls (and vice versa). Man is superior to the animals, as it were, only potentially: most men make but little use of their reason. As a penalty, after death they do not attain pure incorporeal immortality, but they must begin a new life. Yet the reincarnation of the soul in an animal destiny is no greater punishment than that in a human destiny, for according to The Statesman many souls voluntarily choose animal destinies.”69 “Aristotle is the teacher of a unified world structure in which matter and idea are much less separate than in Plato. In his theory the realms of nature fit together, as later for Leibniz, like rising stairs, and the soul is even the entelechy of the body. Man is the pinnacle in the hierarchy of beings; that makes them tower above them but at the same time remain linked with them. Thus his decision remains in the balance. The ethically accentuated faith in the divine-spiritual special destiny of man, which has survived in Christianity, and the more metaphysical belief in the indivisible unity of the universe, which also includes man, both are retained.”70 It is therefore clear that biological anthropology reduces man’s ontology and nature to his natural properties, thereby reducing man to a natural being that exists as an integral part of nature. Darwin’s theory of evolution asserts itself as a new basis for biological anthropology as well as for human knowledge in its own right, thereby rightly claiming to be a new sort of biological anthropology. Darwinism provided a unified picture of the evolution of the universe, the evolution of life on the earth, and the evolution of human knowledge. According to Darwin’s theory of evolution, man came into existence only in the last two-thousandth part of total geological history. Humans are related to animals in many respects, and it is with the evolution of species that man emerged as a distinct species on the earth. Anthropologists and biologists alike generally accept it for a scientific fact that we and the extinct hominins are somehow related and that we and the apes, both living and extinct, are also somehow related. “But that man’s kinship with the animals goes back to a common descent, that they develop one from the other and that finally man too developed from them as the last creature, this transition of thought from merely morphological similarity to genetic development, from the post hoc to the propter hoc, is an achievement only of the nineteenth century, of Lamarck and above all Darwin.”71 However, the idea of evolution had been repressed by the dogma of creation and Platonism. The idea that there is an “origin of species” (Darwin)—that is, one species can eventually evolve into another species over long periods of time, shook people’s deep-seated faith in the Biblical dogma of creation, according to which God created all species of animals right at the beginning, as well as in the Platonic realism of universals, according to which the species preexist unchangeably as eternal ideas, prior to all process, and thus according to which the species can be defined as primary and eternal realities, as what 69

Ibid., p. 153. Ibid., p. 154. 71 Ibid., p. 161. 70

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“always remain the same,” thereby raising a storm of rationalistic skepticism and criticism against the Christian doctrine of creation. Darwin argued that the animal and vegetable kingdoms are governed by the same general biological laws such as “the brute struggle for existence” and “the survival of the fittest” and that only a relatively small number of descendants of any animal couple can survive in the end. Moreover, Darwin discovered and proved the law of biological evolution stating that the heredity of a species tends to undergo an infinite deviation from the prototype—that is to say, the filial generation is far from the simple copy or exact replica of the parental generation, but there always occurs slight deviations in the evolutionary process. Darwin further argued that these constant changes would be inherited by the next generation and produce slow adaptation to the environment. It was this secondary mechanism of adaptation to the environment through the inheritance of acquired characteristics that would influence the evolution of species. Hence, only those offspring that adapt themselves to their environment can survive. The slight deviations occurring in the evolutionary process may lead to the transmutation of species as well as the genetic mutations in populations, and eventually one species can evolve into another species over long periods of time. Darwin believed that species, advancing up a linear ladder of complexity that was related to the great chain of being, evolve from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher, and from the natural to the spiritual. “Already in The Origin of Species (1859) Darwin had left no doubt that the laws by which new species develop can also be applied to the origin of man. But as a pious Anglican he formulated, in all caution, only: ‘Light will be thrown on the origin of man and it history.’ That, was popularly said, man comes from the animal, specifically from the ape, first appears only in The Descent of Man (1871).”72 “In the ’70s many others, such as Huxley, Vogt, and Haeckel, began to draw the consequences of the theory of evolution, also concerning man. ‘Anthropology is a part of zoology’ (Haeckel). This, then, is the real ‘Darwinism.’ Man too, is now known, shares with all other animals the fact of originating from another species. The exciting similarity between man and, especially, the ape rests on blood relationship. ‘In tremendous distances which the mind can never fathom’—and it doesn’t matter whether it was hundreds of thousands or millions of years—man must have originated from animal ancestors and prior forms. In view of this, however, the assumption (now disproved) seemed inevitable that the separation between man and animal had previously been exaggerated, that what they have in common far outweighed and that man basically was ‘only an animal.’”.73 Biological anthropologists attempted to examine and explain many biological characteristics of human life, such as its unspecialization, from a evolutionary perspective. Just as a key is adapted to a lock, so the animal’s specialization in its organs and behaviors enables it to adapt to the particular living conditions, which is true of each species’ specialized patterns. On the contrary, man is “unspecialized” in his general constitution, which makes such a creature find it harder to maintain itself in the world than animals especially adapted to their environment and better equipped 72 73

Ibid., p. 165. Ibid., pp. 165–166.

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for the struggle for existence. Therefore man is poor in instincts, and this seems at first to be a disadvantage for the progress of human life. But, though unspecialization may have negative effects at the start, in the long run it means an invaluable advantage. Because man’s organs are archaically unspecialized, man can adapt himself to more complex and more unpredictable environments. Because he is not controlled by instincts, man can himself reflect and invent, thereby possessing inexhaustible potentialities. Man’s unspecialization endows him with infinite power, enables him to meet nearly all challenges and thus makes him far outpace the animals though they seem to be better equipped for the struggle for existence. Moreover, biological anthropologists also gave a clear and lucid explanation of man’s “rhythm of growth” and “openness to the world,” and their pioneering efforts have been crowned with success. It is thus clear that biological anthropology is concerned with many aspects of man’s ontology (man’s existence) and that it forms a substantial contribution of permanent value to our knowledge of the ontology of human life. However, there are many deficiencies inherent in biological anthropology, and the fundamental one lies in the fact that man is reduced to the animal, that man’s natural life replaces “social man’s” or “whole man’s” life and that biological laws substitute for human laws, which makes biological anthropology far from offering a scientific and convincing explanation of man and which thus lands this very discipline in an absurd situation.

3.3 “Man Is a Rational Creature—That Is, Man Is Endowed with Reason” Rational anthropology’s interpretative approach to the essence of human life may be briefly summarized in one statement as follows: “Man is a rational creature— that is, man is endowed with reason.” Rational anthropologists attempt to reduce man’s ontology to his reason—that is, man is a rational creature, and devote vast scientific efforts to the exploration of various aspects of man starting off on the premise of reason alone. According to this theory, human reason is the essential characteristic that distinguishes man from the animal, and the absolutely unique quality of man enables him to engage in sublime thought and reflection, thereby making him become wise and noble in character. Only man has reason in this world. Man’s reason establishes his superiority compared with earthly things, places him above everything else that exists, and hence gives him a special dignity. In the famous metaphor of the thinking reed, Pascal compares humanity to the entire universe, stating that man, though the universe is gigantic enough to be crushing him, can point out to it something that he is which is greater than it: he is the weakest reed of nature, “but a thinking reed.” “Pascal admires humanity’s essential frailty but also its unalienable nobility. While the human being is set in the universe as nature’s weakest creature like a delicate reed, he is nonetheless nobler than the entire universe for he is endowed with the faculty of thought; the human person is a thinking reed

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who is conscious of his state, whereas the universe knows absolutely nothing of its own existence. Therefore, the use of reason displays our ultimate dignity; human reason is a wonderful and unparalleled source of humanity’s delicate greatness.”74 Rational anthropology originated with the classical Greeks. “They understand man, not by starting with God, nor by starting with man’s corporeality or sensuousness, but by starting with himself and his own intellectual gifts. For them he is the being or creature that has reason. Thus the Anacreonic poems say: ‘Nature gave the ox horns, the horse hooves, the hare speed, but man thoughts.’ For Plato the power of logic is the highest part of man’s soul, and the same is true of Aristotle and the Stoics.”75 Thus, “man assumes a unique and incomparable rank among all other creatures.”76 According to rational anthropology, the unique functions that reason performs can be roughly summarized as follows. First, reason has the function of knowing the world. Reason can grasp the universality, generality and essence of things through categorization, reasoning and abstraction, thereby knowing the world. Second, reason performs the creative function. Reason endows man with abstraction and reasoning as well as with imagination, which enables man to engage in remarkable creative activities and which makes man become the most creative creature in the world. “Knowledge seeks to apprehend the factual; imagination rises above the factual and explores the nonfactual. But precisely for that reason it develops a fertility for knowledge too, for it leads toward new facts! That man is the creature most capable of knowledge is based not only on his much-praised ability for abstraction and his logic but just as much on the fact that he is the most imaginative creature. ‘For God linked it with us alone with a heavenly bond’ and ‘Only he finds content who has something to add to it’ (Goethe). Receptivity also gains from that quality which is seen today as the primary human quality: creativity. Our reasoning power not only knows; it is also formative and inventive. We are unique not only because we have a comprehensive and objective picture of the world. We can construct a world ourselves and produce religion, law, art, in short the entire cultural sphere. Homo sapiens is just as much homo inveniens (man the inventor). And as knowledge, on the one hand, is the foundation of all cultural inventions, so vice versa the inventive mind is the basis for progress in knowledge.”77 Third, reason enables man to devote himself to good works. Reason can be directed towards the mind, purify the mind, impose constraints on human behaviors, free man of the confusion characteristic of a primitive man or a child “who lives more in individual, mutually incommensurable percepts than in comprehensively higher conceptualizations,”78 and thereby enable him to lead a rational and moral life. Let us take a concrete example to serve as an illustration. Buddha, who as a king’s son was kept from all negative impressions 74

Toth, Beata. (2016). The Heart Has Its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the Heart. Cambridge, England: ISD LLC, p. 6. 75 Landman, Michael. (1974). Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, p. 109. 76 Ibid., p. 113. 77 Ibid., p. 143. 78 Ibid., p. 141.

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during his childhood, takes his first independent walk into the city and meets a poor man, a sick man, and a dead man carried on a bier: at a stroke the true fate of men and his own task of helping them are revealed to him. On the one hand, rational anthropology proves the enormous value of reason to human beings, and leaves no doubt at all reason asserts itself as man’s ontology and essence in its own right, but on the other, rational ontology tends to exaggerate man’s reason, negate man’s “wholeness,” reject and even suppress man’s nature. “As reason conflicts with tradition on the outside, it also has opposition within man himself, namely the other powers of the soul, the drives and passions (Max Weber distinguishes between three main motives of action: traditional, rational, and emotional).”79 This is what we would expect as well as what is certain to happen. As opposed to this, rational anthropology tends to make reason conflict with tradition on the outside and have opposition within man himself, namely the other powers of the soul, the drives and passions, maintaining that reason is supposed to rule over the desires and that reason is supposed to completely suppress the emotions as well as the nonrational layers of the soul, which pushes rational anthropology to an absurd extreme. Many Western scholars hold that mind and life are essentially opposite forces and that there seems to be no room for mutual compromise between them. The opposition between mind and life appears to hold true for the Chinese traditional Confucianists who believe that people should eradicate human desires and maintain the heavenly principles— ethics as propounded by the Song Confucianists of ancient China. Many scholars’ attack on the anthropology of spirit, or mind, namely rational anthropology, is thus not at all directed against their great tradition and real meaning. They are taking a stand against the later debasement of their theory. Klages expressly states that “All the intellectual accomplishments of which mankind has been proud, the change from the symbol to the concept, from magic to technology, from the chthonic matriarchal law and faith to the father principle, all these things were really stations on the path of decline.”80

3.4 “Man as a Creature of Culture” We have studied man as a creature of God, as a rational being, as a living being. Now we must get to know him as a cultural being. Cultural anthropology’s interpretative approach to the essence of human life may be briefly summarized in one statement as follows: “Man is a cultural being.” Cultural anthropologists attempt to reduce man’s ontology to his culture—that is, man is a cultural creature, and devote vast scientific efforts to the explanation of various aspects of man from the point of view of culture. It is an undeniable fact that cultural anthropology rightly claims to be the mainstream of contemporary anthropology. According to this theory, man is a cultural creature, and this is mainly manifested in two important aspects: on the one hand, man is 79 80

Ibid., p. 110. Ibid., p. 138.

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the creator of culture, and on the other hand, man is the product of culture. Man creates culture, but in creating culture man also creates himself. Man creates his cultural patterns and transmits them from generation to generation. Man’s inherited cultural patterns tend to evolve new cultural patterns and determine the patterns of human existence. Thereby man will of necessity become “a creature of culture.” Some cultural anthropologists even identify man with culture, asserting that man is his culture and vice versa, that studying culture is synonymous with studying man, that what seems like cultural hatred can be equated with misanthropy, or rather selfhatred, and that giving up cultures will mean giving up cultural identities. Therefore, as was seen above, each culture, after man has formed it, forms man in turn, so that indirectly he forms himself by forming it. “Instead of having the permanent nature typical of other beings, man is in the situation of always creating himself. Since he is based on no plan, he designs himself. ‘Man invents man.’ In an incessant surpassing of himself, he never exists statically: he is cast again and again into a virginal future, becoming what he wants to be.”81 Philosophical anthropologist Michael Landmann’s intelligent and clarifying analysis of man as creator and creature of culture may be briefly summarized in “four beings.” First, man is a cultural being. Man is the creator of culture as well as the product of culture. The inseparable unity between “man as the creator of culture” and “man as the product of culture” constitutes man’s mode of existence—that is, “man is a creature of culture.” “Culture would not exist without man to fulfill it. But he would also be nothing without culture. Each has an inseparable function for the other. Any attempt to separate these intermeshing parts from this unity must necessarily be artificial.”82 Second, man is a social being. Culture tends to manifest itself in particular social forms. Man must live in society. “Whoever stands outside the community is not a man but ‘either an animal or God.’” “But man becomes a complete man only by growing up in a tradition-bearing group of his own kind. His cultural side can develop only in that way.” “Thus if man is seen as a social being, he is also seen as a cultural being.”83 Third, man is a historical being. “Precisely speaking, man does not produce culture, he produces cultures.” “As was stated above in general, we are not only builders of but also built by culture; the individual can never be understood by himself alone, but only from the cultural preconditions that support and permeate him. This is also true concretely. As we can never produce culture in general, but rather a historically particular culture, so the retroactive influence of that culture always makes historically particular men of us. Our freedom to create history is counterbalanced by our being bound within it, by productivity on the one hand, by plasticity on the other, and so man is changed along with his changing milleu. We not only imitate what has previously been lived in the culture that surrounds us, but even the things we produce are impregnated with its overall style. We are far more strongly 81

Ibid., p. 212. Ibid., p. 219. 83 Ibid., pp. 221–222. 82

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determined by cultural factors than by hereditary factors –which race theoreticians consider the only decisive ones.”84 Therefore, “as a cultural being he is a historical being too. And this also in a double sense: he both has power over and is dependent on history, he determines history and is determined by it.”85 Fourth, man is a traditional being. “The instincts that control the behavior of animals are a natural property of his species. They are transmitted in the same way as physical traits, purely biologically by heredity. Therefore, as was seen above, an animal brought up among creatures of another species behaves just as if it had been brought up by its own parents. Human behavior, however, is controlled by the culture which men have once acquired. How man feeds and procreates, how he dresses and dwells, how he behaves practically and ethically, how he speaks and looks at the world, all the cultural forms he makes use of, are based on historical creation. Since they have been historically created they cannot be transmitted by heredity. Yet they must be preserved: what the ancestors have discovered must benefit later generations. Instead of heredity then, another, purely spiritual form of preservation is called tradition. Through it, knowledge and skills are passed from generation to generation like buckets on a fire line and transmitted to posterity by example and instruction from their predecessors.”86 “Although tradition is the principle of conservation, it is alterable, and, because created once itself, it is accessible to enrichment and modification by new creation. It did not arise earlier all at once either. It sums up a multiplicity of individual achievements. And this process of accretion still continues today and into the unforeseeable future, so much so that finally, as Simmel has shown, the individual can no longer assimilate everything that objective culture offers him and can no longer acculturate himself subjectively by doing so. And as successively new elements are added to it and likewise transmitted by it, other elements undergo a transformation while yet others die out. Man’s body, in which the law of heredity prevails, is relatively unchanged from that of his remotest ancestors, but each subsequent generation finds itself spiritually in a different world.”87 “Not every change of tradition, of course, results from a conscious intention. Language, mores, styles, etc., often develop by immanent laws without anyone intending it, in fact, as Simmel has shown, even contrary to man’s will: these changes follow the particular logic of their products. Even where such a will is prevalent and at work, its bearers need not be aware of it, and therefore they need not stand out as individuals. The real subject of the development can be an anonymous collectivity. As it can take place unwilled or not consciously willed, so also can it go unnoticed. Each individual and generation may subjectively believe that they are merely passing down their age-old traditions faithfully to their offspring. But in fact they change them. When two generations do the same thing, it is no longer the same, and in the course of long periods of time something new in principle arises through an 84

Ibid., p. 224. Ibid., p. 221. 86 Ibid., pp. 226–227. 87 Ibid., pp. 229–230. 85

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accumulation of slight modifications. But the change becomes visible only where earlier documents have been preserved.”88 Tradition tends to exercise rigid constraints on the individual. There seems to be a contradiction between the rigidity of tradition and the creativity of the individual, which tends to bring forth new ideas in culture and actuate cultural development. “For the deeper we go back into history the more piously we find men clinging to their inviolable traditions. The traditions were considered sacred as ancestral heritage and community property, and they were preserved from generation to generation down to the present. Every deviation from them could call forth the anger of higher powers, could cast the community into misfortune. Therefore every violation was punished as sacrilege. So in early times, only such changes could take place as either did not cross the threshold of consciousness or could appeal to a higher sanction and necessity. Only late, only in higher cultures and after repeated loosening from the Greeks on, did tradition gradually lose its rigidity. The ‘constraint’ (Durkheim) which it exercised on the individual decreased. He has gained greater leeway against it and can disregard it to develop his own creativity. In great individuals, whose works everyone admires and who invent new directions for the life of later-comers to follow, mankind thus honors, as it were, crystallization points of its own creative power. They are representatives of humanity (Emerson).”89 “Purely from logic one might think that in the beginning the least was created and therefore the creative gift could develop most unrestrictedly; conversely, one might think: the more there has already been created, the less the field of application creativity finds, and so it must recede. In reality it is most restricted at the start by traditionalistic coercion, and finds insufficient groundwork and possibilities of combination. Of course an excess of already created material can cause it to recede again. Thus the creativity of the individual can apparently advance most unrestrictedly in the middle stage of a culture. Here it has its greatest blossoming. Universal necessary tasks still exist and save productivity from declining into mere play and whimsicality. The most favorable times are the transition periods when an old world-structure is collapsing but individualism has not yet reached its peak.”90 Many cultural anthropologists attach great importance to man’s creative powers, holding that man creates his culture—that is, man is the creator of culture, and that man also creates his own essence by making his own decisions. Human creativity is a fundamental manifestation of man’s inner, subjective spirit as well as a basic characteristic of man as “a creature of culture,” which makes man differ essentially form animals and which makes man rightly claim an exalted place in the universe. “As was said above, no one ever starts ‘right from the beginning.’ Not every situation challenges our creative originality. Generally we need only adopt the results of earlier creativity. We can sail on an extensive canal system that was excavated by others long before our time. We are born not only with our own gifts as individuals but simultaneously into the ‘external apparatus’ of a culture that has been accumulated 88

Ibid., p. 230. Ibid., pp. 230–231. 90 Ibid., p. 231. 89

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by our ancestors and handed down to us. In addition to our subjective spirit that we bring with us we receive from them the gift of objective spirit. Our life need only, as it were, be poured into the tracks of this objective spirit which are available to us. For long stretches it needs absolutely no spontaneity, but merely reactualizes preexistent patterns of life. As with ethical norms, we are led by the hand by preexistent norms in all fields.”91 “That is the only way for us to maintain ourselves in a strange and hostile world and at the same time reach a much higher stage than we could attain by ourselves. What the individual can invent his short lifetime is relatively little. In culture, however, our basis is the collected wealth of experiences and inventions that an entire people, indeed all nations, have undergone during many generations. We are beneficiaries of this wealth and our work is made easier and more differentiated by this preparatory work which others have done.”92 “The psychosomatic constitution that man gets from birth is still not everything. It is only a part of his total reality. As long as one asks only about man’s psychosomatic qualities, one will fail to understand him. Man can be completely understood only by studying his roots in objective spirit in addition to these qualities, and cultural conditioning in addition to the natural qualities he gets from birth; by studying, in other words, not only the eternal and constant heritage of his species but also that which, though likewise inevitably belonging to the species, varies in content from people to people, from age to age. Each human individual becomes such only as a particular in the supra individual medium of culture, which surpasses the individual and is common to an entire group. Only its support holds the individual upright; only in its enveloping atmosphere can he breathe. Its directives interweave in him like a system of blood vessels that constitutes an integral part of him. This system must, it is true, be filled with the blood of his subjectivity; he must, so to speak, fill the ideal with the reality of life. Culture would not exist without man to fulfill it. But he would also be nothing without culture. Each has an inseparable function for the other. Any attempt to separate these two intermeshing parts from this unity must necessarily be artificial.”93 Objectively speaking, cultural anthropologists, as contrasted with religious anthropologists, biological anthropologists and rational anthropologists, made a more extensive and profound exploration of various aspects of man and culture and produced more abundant fruits, which have had wider implications for the development of anthropology. However, there is still one of the most fundamental problems awaiting solution—that is, “what is man?” The fact that man creates culture and that culture also creates man, far from solving the problem of “what man is”, merely throws light on the interrelationship between man and culture. Strictly speaking, the interpretative approach to culture can only make us obtain a superficial understanding of what man is, rather than truly unraveling the mystery of “man himself.” Despite the fact that there exists a close and intimate relationship between man and culture, 91

Ibid., pp. 217–218. Ibid., p. 218. 93 Ibid., pp. 218–219. 92

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we still cannot draw an equal sign between them—that is, culture cannot be equated with man and vice versa. To summarize, in order to truly solve the problem of “what man is,” we maintain that the problem of how to understand “man himself” may assert itself as a matter of primary consideration in its own right.

4 The Synchronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” By the synchronic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” we mean the mode by which the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice exists in the same space. The “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his life constitute the organic parts of the unified noumenon of human life when viewed in the synchronic perspective—or, to put it another way, “the integrated duality” is inherent in man’s “structure and choice.” Man’s “structure and choice” are indispensable for the unified noumenon of human life. With man’s “structure” or his “choice,” it has its own particular status and function, whereby man’s “structure and choice” act jointly to meet external pressures and challenges, achieve the unity of opposites, and can be transformed into each other. The noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself, first of all, in its static existence as well as in its dynamic existence.

4.1 The Static Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” The static existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can be described as follows. The “structure” of human life constitutes the organizational basis of human life, while man’s “choice” is man’s behavioral practice in his life. Hence, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is the dualistic unity of the organizational basis of human life and man’s behavioral choice in his life. The “structure” of human life, which is a life system organically composed of several powers of life, constitutes the organizational basis of human life as well as the essential prerequisite to human life. While providing a solid basis for man’s “choice,” the “structure” of human life controls and even determines man’s “choice” in his life. The “structure” of human life, which asserts itself as a complex, unpredictable, and unfathomable being in its own right, is one of the great products of human evolution as well as the proper object of study that defies any attempt to offer an intellectually ultimate explanation for itself. Marx pointed out: “man is man’s world.” Man has never ceased his efforts to offer an intellectually ultimate explanation of himself and to make a thorough inquiry into himself. To this end man

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has proposed myriad theories and hypotheses. The life-long pursuit of his chosen subject—the noumenon of human life has made the author of this work fully awake to the fact that the “structure” of human life, which asserts itself as an elaborate, complex, and unfathomable life system in its own right, tends to perform a primary and indispensable function by laying the organizational basis of human life. Man’s life as well as his all-embracing forms of choice is founded largely on the structure of human life. It is the “structure” of human life that renders possible man’s “choice” in a certain environment (e.g., nature and society). Without the “structure” of human life, there is no possibility of man’s life, not to mention his all-embracing forms of choice. In addition, the “structure” of human life also constitutes the basis on which to explain man’s choice in his life. It is in the “structure” of human life that we may find some explanation for man’s choice in his life, which is to say, the “structure” of human life serves to explain, to a greater or lesser degree, all of man’s choices in his life. Moreover, in the “structure” of human life we may find some internal explanation for the complexity of human nature, which, in turn, tends to be determined by the complex structure of human life. In the final analysis, it is the unpredictable and unfathomable structure of human life that makes man’s life as well as his “choice” unpredictable and unfathomable. The “structure” of human life can be viewed as both synchronic and diachronic in nature. On the one hand, just as the present is an extension of the past, so the “structure” of human life is one of the great products of human evolution. On the other hand, it will exist for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. On the one hand, the “structure” of human life provides a solid basis for the unfettered development of man’s essential powers such as “creativity” and “freedom,” but on the other, it tends to place restrictions on man’s “creativity” and “freedom.” The “structure” of human life tends to exert a determining influence on the survival, development and destiny of man. It can determine man’s choice in a certain environment (e.g., nature and society), thereby indirectly affecting and even deciding the destiny of man. Hence, we would rather say that personality structure determines fate, than that character determines destiny. The personality structure, i.e. “the triple structure and eight kinds of powers,” is the organizational basis of one’s character. Thus it can be asserted that personality structure tends to determine character, and that character tends to determine destiny. The “structure” of human life constitutes the organizational basis of human life, and man’s “choice” in his life will never for a moment be divorced from the “structure” of human life. By man’s “choice” in his life we mean that man’s behavioral choices that have to be made in a certain environment tend to result from the workings of the “structure” of human life, that man has to make appropriate behavioral choices to resolve the contradictions between him and the external environment (e.g. nature and society), and that man can consciously remold his subjective world while giving full play to his subjective initiative in an effort to change the objective world. Man’s “choice” in his life is distinctively characteristic of man, which is to say, man can exercise the subjective initiative in his conscious practical activity as well as in making appropriate behavioral choices. The rich meanings derived from man’s “choice” in his life may be summarized as follows. First, man tends to make appropriate behavioral choices to meet external environmental pressures, and man’s choice in his life tends to result

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from the workings of the “structure” of human life. Man’s choice in his life, which is characterized by universality, constancy and abundance, is a response to external environmental pressures, a basic way in which man can change the objective world as well as his own subjective world and in which man can grasp his destiny in his own hands and march towards freedom, and, at the same time, a manifestation of man’s active, tenacious and unstoppable life-force. Second, the essence of man’s “choice” in his life is man’s life-practice. Innumerable eminent scholars from ancient days to the present cherished unbounded admiration for man’s “choice” in his life, but they invariably failed to offer an intellectually ultimate explanation of the essence of man’s “choice.” Marx made a scientific interpretation of man’s “choice” in his life—man’s life-practice. Man’s “choice” is a basic way of man’s life-practice as well as a concrete expression of the essence of man’s unique life—practice. Man tends to carry out all his practical activities through the instrumentality of man’s “choice” in his life, which is to say, on the one hand, all human practical activity tends to find expression in man’s “choice”, and on the other hand, it is only through the instrumentality of man’s “choice” that all human practical activity can be within the bounds of possibility. Man’s life-practice is impossible without man’s “choice” in his life. There is no practical activity whatsoever lying outside man’s “choice,” that is to say, man’s practical activity in his life will never for a moment be divorced from man’s “choice” in his life. Therefore, in this sense, it may be asserted that man’s “choice” in his life is man’s practical activity in his life, and that the former’s process amounts to the latter’s. Third, man’s “choice” in his life could prove of decisive importance to man’s survival, development and destiny. Generally speaking, man’s destiny depends primarily not upon the environment and manpower, nor upon any gods whatsoever, but upon his own choices that have to be made in a certain environment. Under certain environmental conditions, if you make correct choices in your life, you will attain success. On the contrary, if you make wrong choices in your life, you will invite failure. Hence it must be admitted that a series of important choices which may be correct or wrong will largely determine one’s success or failure. In the final analysis, man’s “choice” in his life will determine his destiny under certain environmental conditions. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is the dualistic unity of the organizational basis of human life and man’s behavioral choice in his life. The “structure” of human life is the organizational basis (physical and nonphysical), while man’s “choice” in his life is man’s life-practice that tends to find expression in man’s behavioral choices. The “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his life jointly constitute the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his life depend on each other for existence, determine each other’s essential qualities or characteristics, lend support to each other, and transform into each other. Between the “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his life exist manifold complex relationships that are characterized by “integrated duality.” These manifold complex relationships that are characterized by “integrated duality” are a clear manifestation of the “dualistic unity” of the organizational basis (physical and nonphysical) of human life and man’s

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life-practice that tends to find expression in man’s behavioral choices. They work together to influence and even determine man’s survival, development and destiny.

4.2 The Dynamic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” The dynamic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can be defined as follows. Under certain environmental pressures man must of necessity respond to the environment. Specifically, the constituent elements inherent in the “structure” of human life tend to start working into operation, and the overarching one in relation to other constituent parts thereof is capable of integrating itself with other constituent elements by unifying its vital functions with those of other constituent parts, thereby exercising a decisive influence upon man’s behavioral “choice.” By man’s “choice” in his life we mean that man can respond to the environment by making decisions and putting them into practice. It is therefore clear that the dynamic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is the “dualistic unity” of two mechanisms for responding to the environment by man’s “structure” as well as by his “choice.” Under external environmental pressures the component elements inherent in the “structure” of human life tend to secure close coordination of mental processes from each other, and to work successfully together to respond accordingly by making appropriate behavioral choices. Hence it can be safely asserted that the process which the integrated workings of the “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his life tend to follow can be briefly described as follows: “the environmental stimulus” + the “structure” of human life → “man’s behavioral choices that have to be made in his life.” All the essential (or substantive) powers inherent in the “structure” of human life will be integrated into the working process. Man tends to follow a certain process in making appropriate behavioral choices. In responding to the environment, man tends to devise available means as well as workable strategies first, then to make well-considered decisions, and finally to put them into practice by making appropriate behavioral choices. In so doing, man who tends to act on his own initiative can demonstrate his subjective initiative in addressing environmental concerns and pressures, can play an active role in the struggle for remolding his subjective world while changing the objective world, and can create himself, develop himself with practice, and transcend himself. Thus it can be seen that the “dualistic unity” of man’s “structure and choice,” or rather, the noumenon of human life, as well as the dynamic existence of the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,” invariably finds expression in this very working process. Whether it be an individual’s survival and development under certain environmental pressures, or whether it be the evolutionary progress of human civilization under certain environmental pressures, it can be possible of realization only through the “dualistic unity” of man’s “structure

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and choice” as well as through the dynamic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The “dualistic unity” of man’s “structure and choice” as well as the dynamic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself mainly in the fact that while undergoing a complicated process of planning, decisionmaking and implementation under certain environmental pressures, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to render possible man’s coordinated or unified behavior that can be roughly categorized into four types. (1) “Procedural” behavior. Under external environmental pressures man must of necessity struggle for survival and development. With the above situation in view, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” deems it indispensably necessary to create a general mechanism for man’s behavioral choice. Specifically, under external environmental pressures “the power of personality demand (or need)” is set in motion first, then “the power of personality judgment” takes part in decision-making, and ultimately, it is still “the power of personality judgment” that determines man’s behavioral choice. “Procedural behavior” is of a general and universal character. Basically, man’s general behavioral choices come into the category of “procedural” behavior. (2) “Performative” behavior. Under certain external environmental pressures only “the power of personality demand (or need)” performs the primary and indispensable function of determining man’s behavioral choice. Under certain external environmental pressures, for some reason or other either “the power of personality judgment” fails to take part in decision-making or it is incapable of making any decisions whatsoever. Only “the power of personality demand (or need)” is the single most important factor in determining man’s behavioral choice. “Performative” behavior belongs to a special type of behavior, thereby possessing particularity. Under normal circumstances, “the power of personality judgment” is master of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” constitutes the ultimate determining factor in determining man’s behavioral choice, and acts as a loyal guardian for man’s behavioral choice. Hence “the power of personality judgment” tends not to produce “performative” behavior. However, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is the most complicated as well as the most miraculous of all the manifestations of the Deity. There are almost invariably a multitude of phenomena associated with man’s behavioral choice that simply defy explanation. Of all the special phenomena connected with man’s behavioral choice, a fairly large number of them fall into the category of “performative” behavior. A few ready-at-hand instances from life will suffice to illustrate this argument. In childhood most children are capable of performing certain behaviors. For example, they fear big animals, frighten small animals, and like climbing trees. Sometimes even you yourself may be unable to explain what your rare gestures or facial expressions are communicating! Two more examples such as “having a dream” and “being drunk with wine” may prove relevant to the subject under discussion. The aforementioned behaviors tend to be determined not by “the power of personality judgment” (consciousness) that is symbolic of reason, but rather by “the power of personality demand (or need)” (the subconscious or the unconscious) that represents the irrational desires in humans. While man’s “performative” behavioral choice is either possessed of particularity or is of

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rare occurrence, it may prove of great importance to the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice.” Some “truth” about the noumenon of human life that stands as it is tends to manifest itself in man’s “performative” behavior, and to reveal itself before our eyes. Hence man’s “performative” behavior is fully entitled to the claim of being the prime object of study that will assuredly enable us to gain a fresh and deeper insight into the truth about man. (3) “Truth-oriented” behavior. Under certain external environmental pressures, “the power of personality judgment” alone serves to determine man’s behavioral choice, which is to say “the power of personality judgment” is the sole factor in determining man’s behavioral choice. Under certain external environmental pressures, either “the power of personality demand (or need)” fails to get working or “the power of personality judgment” firmly discourages it from taking part in decision-making, even though it has been brought into operation. Rather, “the power of personality” alone determines man’s behavioral choice. This type of behavioral choice is very few and only applicable to individual or exceptional cases, but it never fails to justify its existence. Man is a rational animal—or, to put it another way, only human beings are endowed with reason and capable of reason. Human reason that is the sole criterion of man’s behavioral choice tends to act as the ultimate decision-maker that serves to determine man’s behavioral choice. By this type of behavioral choice is meant that man will sacrifice himself for truth. Exalted human nature tends to find expression in this type of behavior that we term “truth-oriented behavior.” For example, revolutionary martyrs and people with high aspirations looked death calmly in the face, and were ready to suffer death for the sake of their country. It is in the interests of the people that innumerable officers and soldiers do not flinch (or shrink) even if they are threatened with destruction. The best exposition of this type of behavior that gives expression to exalted human nature is to be found in the inscription Mao Zedong wrote on the Monument to the People’s Heroes on September 30, 1949: “Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the people’s war of liberation and the people’s revolution in the past three years! Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the people’s war of liberation and the people’s revolution in the past thirty years! Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who from 1840 laid down their lives in the many struggles against domestic and foreign enemies and for national independence and the freedom and well-being of the people!”94 Hence it can be safely asserted that the only power that determines their behavioral choice is truth and justice. (4) “Inaction (or nonaction).” Under certain external environmental pressures, after much consideration “the power of personality judgment” decides not to make behavioral choices. Specifically, under certain external environmental pressures, after profound consideration and careful planning “the power of personality judgment” has refrained from exhibiting all possible behavioral manifestations, deciding not to make any behavioral choice at all. “Inaction (or nonaction)” that is devoid of all possible behavioral manifestations is also a type of behavioral choice, and in most cases it is only after 94

Mao, Ze-Dong. “Eternal Glory to the Heroes of the People!” (Epitaph on the Monument to the Heroes of the People drafted by Comrade Mao, Tse-Tung) in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Retrieved from “Marxists.org”. Access Time: February 21, 2021.

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deep deliberation and elaborate planning that “the power of personality judgment” can refrain from exhibiting all possible behavioral manifestations. In fact, “inaction (nonaction)” tends to pass through the actual behavioral process, and hence can be termed another type of “procedural” behavior. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” must of necessity endow man’s behavioral choice with unique dimensions. By the behavioral dimension we mean the direction of human behavior. In general, in making behavioral choices, man tends to choose behavior in two directions, that is, “the internal behavioral choice” and “the external behavioral choice.” By “the external behavioral choice” we mean that under certain external environmental pressures man’s behavioral choice tends to be directed towards the external environment whereby man can adjust to or transform the external environment. This kind of behavioral choice is what is normally meant by “changing the objective world.” We mean by “the internal behavioral choice” that under certain external environmental pressures man’s behavioral choice tends to be directed towards the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice.” “The internal behavioral choice” tends to manifest itself mainly in the fact that man can reflect upon, transform, and transcend the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” This is what people usually mean by “remolding one’s subjective world.” Generally speaking, by man’s behavioral choice we mean that “the external behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral choice” interact with each other and transform into each other. In man’s life-practice, if, as commonly happens, “the external behavioral choice” turns out to be so frustrating, man will turn to “the internal behavioral choice” instead, transforming and transcending the original noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” through learning and introspection, and then again he will turn to “the external behavioral choice.” Whoever he (or she) is, frequent alternations between “the external behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral choice” are characteristic of his (or her) entire life.

5 The Diachronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself in the synchronic existence as well as in the diachronic existence. By the diachronic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” we mean that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” exists in time—or, to put it another way, it has a temporal mode of existence, and that it develops over time from a primitive to a more advanced form. According to the German philosopher Heinrich Rombach, “all things are living and so is the universe.” “It is in the

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structure itself that structure comes into being.” That is to say, structure is “the structure of the process itself” at all times and in all circumstances.95 The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” which is immediately real, asserts itself as a process of development in its own right, which is to say it exists as an ongoing process. Ancient and modern scholars did considerable research on the evolutionary process of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” and achieved some valuable and admirable results. In modern times,96 many eminent scholars in China, such as Lin Yaohua, Lin Huixiang, and Liu Wenying, as well as a number of renowned scholars in Western countries, including Thomas Hunt Morgan, Charles Robert Darwin, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Erik Homburger Erikson, conducted a profound study of the subject and made important contributions to the study of human ontology. Liu Wenying, a distinguished Chinese scholar, once advanced a theory about the human spirit that can be embodied in “the diagram of cosmological scheme” and find expression in “the Taiji symbol” consisting of a circle with S-shaped dividing line between white or light, or Yang and black or dark, or Yin halves. He believes that the spiritual world is composed of two parts, that is, consciousness and subconsciousness, and that the Yin and Yang, which are regarded as two opposite cosmic principles or forces and which are connected with each other and complementary to each other, take up their abode in the spiritual world, whereby “the diagram of cosmological scheme” constitutes a vivid graphic representation of the interaction of these two primary principles—Yin and Yang, through which all phenomena of the universe are produced. For him, only after “the diagram of cosmological scheme,” which constitutes a vivid graphic representation of the relationship between the human spirit and “the Taiji symbol,” has passed through “three historical stages of development” can it gradually come into existence. “The three historical stages of development” can be briefly described as follows. “The diagram of cosmological scheme” in its embryonic stage of development serves as a manifestation of the primitive mind that is dominated by simple-minded ignorance. “The diagram of cosmological scheme” in its formative stage of development constitutes a graphic representation of the mind of early Homo sapiens. “The diagram of cosmological scheme” in its finished stage of development is a dynamic reflection of the mind of modern Homo sapiens.97 This is quite original and thought-provoking, in so far as the scholar with an inquiring mind divides the process of human spiritual development into three historical stages, and depicts the characteristics of primitive thought through the agency of the diagrams of cosmological scheme that are a vivid representation of human spiritual development. Nonetheless, the scholar seemed to put a strained interpretation upon the assertion that the principles of Yin and 95

Rombach, Heinrich. (2009). Die Welt als lebendige Struktur: Probleme und Lösungen der Strukturontologie (Chinese version) (Jun Wang, Trans.). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, pp. 10–12. 96 In Chinese historiography, “the modern times” specifically refer to the period from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1919 as well as the period from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the present. 97 Liu, Wen-Ying. (1996). Ancient Historical Origins: A New Study of Primitive Thought and Cultures. Beijing, China: China Social Sciences Press, pp. 403–433.

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Yang, which find expression in “the diagram of cosmological scheme,” constitute the noumenon of human life, that “the diagram of cosmological scheme” depicts the interaction of these two primary principles—Yin and Yang, whereby it forms a vivid graphic representation of human spiritual development, and that the noumenon of human life can be interpreted in terms of the principles of Yin and Yang. This view deviates from the truth about the noumenon of human life, and thus it is far from scientific. It is therefore clear that the scholar’s view on the noumenon of human life still remains a mystery to us. The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget has theorized that there are four distinct and universal stages of cognitive development which roughly correlate with chronological age, and that each stage is characterized by a unique form of cognitive structure which affects all of the child’s thinking. Piaget views man as a complex, active, and dynamic organism whose cognitive ability tends to manifest itself in the greater adaptability of an organism to the world through the dual processes of assimilation and accommodation, modifying one’s mental schemes to allow room for new information. Piaget notes that the cognitive development of children without exception follows a temporal sequence, and that this qualitative development of cognitive structures can be divided into four main stages: “sensorimotor stage” (from birth to age two), “preoperational stage” (roughly from age two to age six or seven), “concrete operational stage” (from age seven to age eleven or twelve), and “formal operational stage” (from age eleven to sixteen and onwards).98 Piaget maintained that the stages appear in an invariable order, but recognized that they do so at somewhat different ages, in different individuals, cultures, and settings.99 Piaget saw the child as constantly creating and re-creating his own model of reality, achieving mental growth by integrating simpler concepts into higher-level concepts at each stage. The first, or sensorimotor, stage is chiefly concerned with mastering his own innate physical reflexes and extending them into pleasurable or interesting actions. During the same period, the child first becomes aware of himself as a separate physical entity and then realizes that the objects around him also have a separate and permanent existence. In the second, or preoperational, stage, the child learns to manipulate his environment symbolically through inner representations, or thoughts, about the external world. During this stage he learns to represent objects by words and to manipulate the words mentally, just as he earlier manipulated the physical objects themselves. In the third, or concrete operational, stage, occur the beginning of logic in the child’s thought processes and the beginning of the classification of objects by their similarities and differences. During this period the child also begins to grasp concepts of time and number. The fourth stage, or the period of formal operations, is characterized by an orderliness of thinking and a mastery of logical thought, allowing a more flexible kind of mental experimentation. The child learns in this final stage to manipulate abstract ideas, make hypotheses, and see the implications of his own 98

Huang Xi-Ting. (2002). Personality Psychology. Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang Education Publishing House, pp. 477–483. 99 “Piaget, Jean.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encylopedia.com. 23 Feb. 2021 https://www.encyclopedia.com.

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thinking and that of others.100 Also, Piaget acknowledged that there is a close correspondence in development between intellectual and affective structure. Moreover, he held that cognition and affect reflect a functional parallelism, and that we shall be able to parallel, stage by stage, the intellectual structures and the levels of emotional development.101 According to him, the development of mental structures is closely tied to the development of cognitive structures such as the capacity for abstraction and logical thinking. Thus in a certain sense it may be said that cognitive development accelerates or retards mental development. Before he was 30 years of age, Piaget was world renowned for his explorations of the cognitive development of children. Throughout a brilliant research career that spanned more than 60 years, Piaget refined his structural and holistic methodology for observing, describing, and evaluating the stages of human cognitive development from the point of view of the child. Piaget is credited with foundational contributions to the emerging disciplines of child psychology, educational psychology, and cognitive developmental theory. The ingenuity of his approach to the study of children’s ways of thinking continues to inform and influence the fields of epistemology, education, and developmental and child psychology. His pioneering research and prolific publications on the nature of thought and the development of intelligence assured Piaget’s place as a major influence in the scientific thinking of the twentieth century. His genuine respect for and appreciation of the mind of the child and his prodigious research accomplishments continue to inspire and challenge scholars and researchers worldwide.102 The American psychologist and educator Lawrence Kohlberg is best known for his stage theory, which postulated that human moral development progresses through a series of cognitive stages defined as total ways of thinking about moral issues rather than as attitudes toward specific situations.103 He was a follower of Jean Piaget and held him in high regard. His doctoral dissertation was prompted by his consuming interest in Piaget’s work on the moral development of children. Based on Piaget’s four-stage theory of cognitive development, Kohlberg put forward his ingenious theory of moral cognitive development (or moral judgment). Kohlberg’s theory consists of six stages of moral development, which are arranged such that each stage is the logical prerequisite of the next, and which he organized into three general levels of moral development, with two stages at each level. His theory of moral development can be briefly described as follows. (1) “The preconventional level” consists of the first and second stages of moral development, that is “the punishment-and-obedience orientation” (or “heteronomous morality”) and “the instrumental-relativist orientation” (or “individualism and instrumental purpose”) respectively; (2) “The conventional level” encompasses the third and fourth stages of moral development, that is 100

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. “Jean Piaget”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 16 September, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Piaget. Accessed 24 February 2021. 101 Piaget, Jean. Science of Education and the Psychology of the Child (Chinese version) (Tong-Xian Fu, Trans.). Beijing, China: Culture and Education Publishing House, 1981. 102 “Piaget, Jean.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 23 Feb. 2021https://www.encyclopedia.com. 103 “Kohlberg, Lawrence.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 24 Feb. 2021 .

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“‘the good boy, good girl’ orientation” (or “interpersonal expectations and conformity”) and “the ‘law-and-order’ orientation” (or “social system and conscience”) respectively; (3) “The postconventional level,” also known as “the principled level,” includes the fifth and sixth stages of moral development, that is “social contract or legalistic orientation” and “universal ethical principle orientation” respectively.104 Kohlberg’s theory consisting of “three levels and six stages of moral development” was highly influential, especially in psychology and education. There is profound truth in both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories. Mental development tends to be influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by various factors such as social practice, cultural variables, and information transmission. Additionally, it has to be taken into consideration that there are also internal factors, such as the development of cognitive structures, which must of necessity accelerate or retard mental development. It may even be said that we can parallel, stage by stage, the levels of cognitive development and those of mental development, which is to say cognitive development, stage by stage, tends either to promote or to arrest mental development, thereby assuring the mental world of a higher or lower level of development. It is therefore clear that in normal development both the mental world and cognitive structure are so highly parallel as to ensure synchronized development. The diachronic existence of the noumenon of human Life—man’s “structure and choice” can be roughly described as follows.

5.1 The Formative Process of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” one of the rarest and most valuable gifts with which man can be endowed, asserts itself as a mental system in its own right, the formation of which depends fundamentally on human practice, social life, and the human body (especially the cerebrum, that is, the physical seat of man’s mental faculties). It is after millions of years of evolution that the cerebral structure of the anthropoid apes, especially the unconscious part of the brain, evolved into the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” In other words, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” gradually came into being only after it had passed through a long process of evolution, which may be explained by analogy, though it is merely a superficial and forced analogy; and moreover, it is not always reliable to argue by analogy. Let us take two analogical examples to serve as an illustration. Daybreak tends to be preceded by a long, dark night. If he gets drunk with wine, he will consume much time in making himself sober-minded. This long process of evolution can be roughly divided into three stages: The first stage, namely the ape-man period, which can be termed “the embryonic stage” or “the dawning stage.” At the incipient stage of development, the ape-man 104

Wei, Xian-Chao. (1995). Moral Psychology and Moral Education. Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang University Press, pp. 122–125.

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evolved from the anthropoid ape, and his noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” operated primarily at a subconscious level. At the early stage of development, the ape-man’s subconsciousness predominated in its cerebral structure, while its consciousness was just beginning to come into being, manifesting itself merely as a small bright spot. Although the tiny bright spot only dimly illuminated an infinitesimally small part of the ape-man’s mental world, it may have proven of tremendous importance to the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” because it heralded the great dawn of man’s mental world, which can best be illustrated by the following diagram of “the first glimmers of dawn in man’s mental world.” Basically, the ape-man’s behaviors remained dependent upon subconscious instincts for guidance and control in this stage. The second stage, or rather, “the formative stage,” in which human development occurred in early Homo sapiens. In this stage early Homo sapiens’ consciousness and subconscious continued to develop their respective differential or distinguishing characteristics. While early Homo sapiens’ “conscious awareness” gradually grew and illuminated some parts of the mental world, on the whole, it remained at a lower level of consciousness, and was hemmed in on all sides by the subconscious. This shows that it was the subconscious that predominated in early Homo sapiens’ noumenon, that is, their “structure and choice,” which is to say, the subconscious tended to exert the supreme determining or guiding influence on the mental activities that occurred in the cerebral structure of early Homo sapiens. Hence it was a frequent phenomenon that early Homo sapiens’ consciousness and subconscious would alternate in dominating the mental world, which is to say, sometimes it was the consciousness that controlled their behaviors, and sometimes it was the subconscious that governed their behaviors, thus making it possible for such mental phenomena as clear-headedness and muddle-headedness to alternate with each other. This demonstrates that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” has passed through a long process of evolution that consists of three stages of development, and that the noumenon of early Homo sapiens is rightly considered to be intermediate between the noumenon of the ape-man and that of modern Homo sapiens. The third stage may be briefly described as a process of development, in which the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern humans)—that is, their “structure and choice,” evolved into a “Gestalt” system, a structure so integrated that the properties of the whole are not reducible to the sum of the properties of its parts. At this stage the differentiation between consciousness and subconsciousness was nearly complete in the cerebral structure of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern humans). Basically, the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern humans)—that is, their “structure and choice,” evolved into a “Gestalt” system. In this stage the distinctive characteristics such as richness, exactitude, and profundity inherent to the human mental processes began to manifest themselves in modern Homo sapiens’ conscious awareness, which progressively acquired functional specialization. The conscious awareness at the forefront of human mental activity began to take center stage in the mental world. By contrast, the subconscious was forced to relinquish control of the mental world and to recede into the background, thenceforth sinking into obscurity. Under normal circumstances, modern

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Homo sapiens’ behaviors were directly determined by their consciousness (including self-awareness), rather than by their subconscious. However, under peculiar circumstances, there are always a few exceptions, such as hypnosis, dream, and certain behaviors typical of children, which tend to be controlled by the human subconscious. The differentiation between consciousness and subconsciousness represents a fundamental leap forward in the process of human development; thereafter, the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens gradually evolved into a “Gestalt” system, whereby mankind became removed from animals and eventually rose above the animal kingdom. After having passed through a series of evolutionary stages leading from an anthropoid to the modern human type, modern Homo sapiens eventually evolved into modern humans, that is “real men,” in a strictly taxonomic sense. Nonetheless, there is one thing that needs to be pointed out. The fact that modern Homo sapiens’ subconscious receded into the background and sank into obscurity does not mean that the subconscious must of necessity lose the enormous energies inherent in itself, or that it fails to exercise an important influence upon human life and destiny. In actual fact, except for the tiny bright spot symbolizing the emergence of human consciousness in the ape-man’s cerebral structure, modern Homo sapiens’ subconscious contains almost all the substantive powers inherent in the noumenon of the ape-man. The essential powers that had already evolved into a mass of needs, desires (or drives), and passions must not be trifled with in view of the fact that they vainly attempted to control human behavior. As Hippolyte Taine pointed out in The Logic of the Humanities: “Our so-called nature is actually a mass of hidden passions. … We tend to flatter ourselves for guiding them, but in fact it is them that guide us; we tend to attribute our behaviors to ourselves, but in fact it is their actions, beyond all our reasoning and control, that may justify our behaviors.”105 Heedless of the above-mentioned fact, we’ll be unable to attain true knowledge of the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice.” Moreover, it should also be noted that in view of the fact that the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens took shape in an earlier stage of the evolutionary process, it was relatively simple, far from mature, and even less perfect. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” which is based on social life and human practice, manifests itself as an immediately real being, and at the same time presents itself as an ongoing process of development, which is to say it exists as a continuous process of evolution. In other words, the noumenon of human life can reveal itself in an ongoing process of introspection and transcendence, and will exist for all periods infinitely extending far into the future. In the human life course unfolding itself on a magnificent scale from ancient times to the present, human beings will be able to attain infinite transcendence while marching into the future.

105

Cassirer, Ernst. (2004). The Logic of the Humanities (Zi-Yin Guan, Trans.). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 30.

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5.2 The Developmental Stages of the Noumenon of Individual Human Life—An Individual Human Being’s “Structure and Choice” The German evolutionary biologist (or evolutionist) propounded “Recapitulation Theory,” also called “the fundamental biogenetic law,” postulating that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny—i.e., the stages of an individual organism’s evolutionary development repeats, recapitulates or reflects in compressed, miniaturized form the evolutionary history of the species. Otherwise put, each successive stage in the development of an individual represents one of the adult forms that appeared in its evolutionary history. The same is true of the evolutionary history of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”—that is, the developmental stages of the noumneon of individual human life—an individual human being’s “structure and choice” roughly replays the formative process of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The development process of the noumenon of individual human life—an individual human being’s “structure and choice” roughly underwent the following three stages of evolution: The first stage: the infancy period (from birth to age three), also called “the dawning stage of the noumenon of individual human life—an individual human being’s ‘structure and choice.’” At this early stage the noumenon of individual human life—the infant’s “structure and choice,” which is far from perfect, is almost exclusively occupied by the infant’s subconscious presenting a great contrast to its consciousness, which is merely a small bright spot in the infant’s cerebral structure. It is in this very first stage of development that the infant’s behaviors are basically dependent upon subconscious (or instinctive) guidance and control. The noumenon of individual human life—the infant’s “structure and choice,” which bears some resemblance to that of the ape-man, can be best illustrated by the diagram of “the first glimmers of dawn in the ape-man’s mental world,” or rather, in the noumenon of the ape-man—his “structure and choice.” As the Swiss psychologist Carl Jung once pointed out: “The individual mind has its origins in a chaotic, undifferentiated unity.”106 The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget described the child during the first two years of life as being in a sensorimotor stage, in which the infant does not become aware of himself as the one that is able to start and control his actions.107 At this early stage these common and interesting phenomena such as thumb-sucking and/or toe-sucking can often be observed in infants. It is the earliest noumenon of individual human life—the infant’s “structure and choice” that renders these “chaotic phenomena” possible and actual—that is, infants are not in a position to distinguish between subject and object, nor can they recognize the difference between self and the outside world. Basically, it is the subconscious that dominates the infant’s mental world as well as the noumenon of infant life (from birth to age two)—that is, its “structure 106

Hall, Calvin Springer., & Nordby, Vernon J. (1987). A Primer of Jungian Psychology (Chuan Feng, Trans.). Beijing, China: SDX Joint Publishing Company, p. 112. 107 Piaget, Jean. (1987). The Principles of Genetic Epistemology (Xian-Dian Wang, Trans.). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, p. 23.

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and choice.” Nonetheless, the infant’s conscious awareness that bears some resemblance to the noumenon of the ape-man, by which is meant that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and chocie” attained “the dawning stage,” has started to manifest itself as a small bright spot, which will hold out unlimited prospects, although it is hemmed in on all sides by the subconscious. The second stage: the period spanning early and middle childhood (from three to ten years), also referred to as “the formative stage.” In this stage the child’s consciousness and subconscious tend to undergo continuous differentiation. While his “conscious awareness” gradually grows and illuminates some parts of the mental world, on the whole, it is hemmed in on all sides by the subconscious, and remains at a lower level of consciousness. The noumenon of individual human life at the period of early to middle childhood resembles that of early Homo sapiens, and thus can be illustrated by the diagram of the noumenon of early Homo sapiens—their “structure and choice,” which corresponds roughly to the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” in the formative stage of development. This demonstrates that it is the subconscious that predominates in the child’s noumenon—his “structure and choice,” which is to say, the subconscious tends to exert the supreme determining or guiding influence on the mental activities that occur in the child’s cerebral structure. Hence it is a frequent phenomenon that the child’s consciousness and subconscious tend to alternate in dominating his mental world, which is to say, sometimes it is the consciousness that controls his behaviors, and sometimes it is the subconscious that governs their behaviors. Thus the chaotic phenomena observed in children’s contrasting behaviors such as cleverness versus muddle-headedness and obedience versus disobedience are almost incapable of explanation. Generally, for children over two years of age, not only does their consciousness begin to develop, but also their self-awareness starts into existence and undergoes rapid development. With the egocentric thinking typical at this stage, they tend to understand the world and to form their ideas of the world in egocentric ways. For example, they tend to use “I,” “my” or “mine” to express what they intend to communicate. This indicates that they begin to discover themselves as individual beings, similar to others, yet unique in their own way, and that they gradually disengage their mind from certain “chaotic” behavioral patterns, for example, they are not in a position to distinguish between subject and object, nor can they recognize the difference between self and the outside world. Rather, they begin to distinguish between subject and object, and try to develop subjective consciousness (self-awareness), whereby they, acting as independent subjects, will be able to fulfill the rights and duties of a citizen in the future. It may be safely assumed that the subjective consciousness acquired by children at this stage is of tremendous importance to their future development. As Kant once pointed out, when the child begins his talk by using “I,” for him, it looks as if a ray of light streamed into his mind.108 It is thus evident that the period of early to middle childhood at between about the ages of three and ten is a crucial stage

108

Kant, Immanuel. (1987). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Xiao-Mang Deng, Trans.). Chongqing, China: Chongqing Publishing House, p. 2.

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in which “consciousness and subconsciousness” as well as “consciousness and selfawareness” undergo rapid differentiation. In this stage the important task before us is to guide them towards a correct understanding of the relationship between oneself and others, by which is meant that on the one hand we should make them take the initiative in developing subjective consciousness, and prepare themselves to grasp their destiny in their own hands, and that on the other hand we should make them grasp the relationship between oneself and others or society, and prepare themselves to render service to others and the community at large. Otherwise, they may encounter enormous difficulties in adapting themselves to the social life of their time. The third stage: the period from middle childhood to late adolescence (at between about the ages of ten and eighteen), also termed “the stage of Gestalt formation.” During this period children pass through the transition from childhood to youth. The noumenon of individual human life spanning middle childhood through late adolescence bears some resemblance to that of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern humans), and thus can be illustrated by the diagram of the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern humans)—their “structure and choice,” or rather, the diagram of the noumeno of human life—man’s “structure and choice” at the stage of Gestalt formation. During this stage the differentiation between consciousness and subconsciousness in their cerebral structure is nearly complete, which is true of the differentiation between consciousness and self-awareness working together to form conscious awareness. During this period conscious awareness undergoing rapid development tends to take center stage in the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” while the subconscious recedes into the background. Under normal circumstances, their behaviors are directly determined by self-awareness, rather than by the subconscious. Nonetheless, under peculiar circumstances, there are always a few exceptions. In early youth the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” gradually takes shape and eventually evolves into a gestalt system, which, in turn, enables individual human beings at between about the ages of ten and eighteen to meet environmental pressures, particularly natural and social ones, and which enables them to engage in the struggle of life while acting as individual beings or independent subjects. However, in early youth, although the noumenon of human life has already taken shape and evolved into a gestalt system, yet it’s still relatively simple, far from mature, and even less perfect. Hence the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” will be faced with the arduous task of developing and perfecting itself. To sum up, the noumenon of individual human life—an individual human being’s “structure and choice,” which invariably unfolds itself through a process of self-development, self-transcendence, and self-perfection, must of necessity cease with his death. The reason why the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” underwent these three evolutionary stages lies in the fact that social practice forms the basis of its evolution, that the brain attains practically its full size and weight and reaches its full maturity of growth and vigor, and that human beings possess mastery of the language as an instrument of communication. Specifically, social practice forms the basis of social life for the evolution of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The brain provides the biological (or physical)

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basis for the evolution of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” Language as an instrument of communication serves as a necessary condition for the evolution of the nomenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” It is these three essential evolutionary factors that made it possible for the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” to pass through the following three evolutionary stages by a gradual process of development, that is, “the dawning stage,” “the formative stage,” and “the gestalt stage.” Despite this, the noumenon of human life is still in a process of evolution, development and perfection, and thus opens up before itself an infinite future. In view of this, Marx formulated the theory about the three stages of human development—that is, the three major historical forms of human existence. In delving into the “negative” essence of human life, Marx proposed the “threestage” theory about human development. According to him, the first stage, or rather, the primitive form of human existence, is based on relations of “personal dependence.” At this stage of human development are primitive people such as ape men, early Homo sapiens, modern Homo sapiens, etc., early modern humans in a strictly taxonomic sense, and people who lived in slave and feudal societies. The second stage—that is, the second great form of human existence, is “personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things.” The third stage, namely the third major form of human existence, is “free individuality based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth.”109 Whether they are the three great stages of human development—that is, the ape-man period (or “the dawning stage” of human development), “the formative stage” in which human development, particularly the differentiation between consciousness and subconsciousness, occurred in early Homo sapiens, and the third stage in which the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern humans)—their “structure and choice” evolved into a “Gestalt” system, or they are the three major historical forms of human existence—that is, the first forms of society based on “personal dependency relations,” the second great form that is “personal independence based on dependence mediated by things,” and the third stage based on “free individuality,” their developments are invariably attributed to social practice, the growth and development of the brain, and the existence of language as an instrument of communication and thought. The development of the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” is a dynamic and ongoing process of self-reflection and self-transcendence. Man can justly lay claim to being an independent subject that is endowed with the power of planning his life, of creating his life, and of gaining mastery over his life, whereby the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” as well as its attendant cultures that are the products of human creativity, can of itself pass through a continuous process of evolution, sometimes progressing in spurts, sometimes in leaps and bounds, but always continuously developing, and can render possible the slow and gradual unfolding of man’s species-life, his real

109

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Collected Works, Volume 46: Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 104.

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objectivity as a species-being that not only can look towards future, but also can open up before himself an infinite future.

6 The Dualistic Unity of Man’s “Structure and Choice” in a State of Mutual Dependence—The Noumenon of Human Life The dualistic unity of man’s “structure and choice” in a state of mutual dependence— that is, the noumenon of human life, can be described as follows. “The structure of human life” determines “man’s life choice,” which, in turn, determines “the structure of human life.” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to manifest itself in the dualistic unity of “the structure of human life” and “man’s life choice” in a state of mutual dependence. “The structure of human life” determines “man’s life choice.” It may be safely asserted that the totality of man’s choices in life is determined by “the structure of human life,” which will bring into operation the constituent elements inherent in itself when faced with environmental pressures, particularly natural and social ones. That is to say, not only can the totality of man’s choices in life be conceived as the result of the workings of the constituent elements inherent in “the structure of human life,” but also it can be attributed to the planning and decision-making by “the structure of human life.” The dependency of “man’s life-choice” in relation to “the structure of human life” manifests itself mainly in the following aspects. First, “the structure of human life” lays the basis for “man’s choice in life,” which is to say “the structure of human life” furnishes the underlying reason for “man’s choice in life.” “The structure of human life” provides the organizational basis for “man’s choice in life”—that is, “the structure of human life” is the necessary prerequisite to “man’s choice in life.” When faced with certain environmental pressures, particularly natural and social ones, “the structure of human life” tends to bring into operation the various constituent elements inherent in itself—that is, the various life forces, and thereby to build up an integrated life system in which the component elements are well integrated with each other in an organic way. It is only through careful planning that “the structure of human life” can find ways and means to cope with environmental pressures, which is to say it is only by making appropriate behavioral choices that “the structure of human life” can respond to certain environmental pressures, especially natural and social ones. Generally speaking, under certain environmental pressures, natural and social ones in particular, what kind of structure an individual human being is endowed with will determine what kinds of behavioral choices he tends to make. Hence it must of necessity follow that a difference in “the structure of human life” will assuredly cause a difference in “human behavioral choice.” Even a difference in “human behavioral choice” under the same environmental pressures is mainly attributable to a difference in “the structure of human life.” Second, “the structure of human life” asserts itself as the unfailing source

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of motive power for human behavioral choices in its own right. “The structure of human life,” which can justly lay claim to being a dynamic structural system kept in constantly good working order, tends to be brought into operation whenever it is subject to external environmental influence, whereby it can react or respond to the external environment by making appropriate behavioral choices. “The whole structure of human life” contains motive forces, by which is meant that the various vital powers inherent in “the whole structure of human life,” the mutual relationship of the different kinds of life force, and the relationship between “the structure of human life” and the external environment (nature and society), with very few exceptions, contain motive (or driving) forces, and form an unfailing source of motive power for a variety of behavioral choices in a broad band of life situations. Under certain environmental pressures, natural and social ones in particular, the motive (or driving) forces inherent in “the structure of human life” not only motivate human beings to make a variety of behavioral choices, but also aid them materially in determining various behavioral choices. It is thus evident that “the structure of human life” can justly lay claim to being an unfailing source of motive power for human behavioral choices, and that it can rightly assert itself as an ultimate source of motivation for man’s choice in life. Under certain environmental pressures, natural and social ones in particular, an array of behavioral choices, e.g. “whether or not man will make behavioral choices,” “what kinds of behavioral choices he will make,” “when he will start making behavioral choices,” “when he will stop making behavioral choices,” etc., in the final analysis, depends on the various motive (or driving) forces inherent in “the structure of human life” as well as the workings of the dynamic structural system—that is, the structure of human life. The dependency of “man’s life-choice” in relation to “the structure of human life” may be briefly summed up as follows: under certain environmental pressures, e.g. natural and social ones, “the structure of human life” invariably serves as an unfailing source of motivation and motive power for human behavioral choices. Third, when it comes to the question of how their respective development and changes affect each other, it may be safely asserted that “the structure of human life” tends to exert a determining influence upon “man’s lifechoice”—that is, “the structure of human life” tends to decisively influence “man’s life-choice” in its development and change, or the development and change of “the structure of human life” tends to determine how “man’s life-choice” develops and changes accordingly. “The structure of human life” lays the organizational basis for “man’s life-choice,” and hence its development and change must of necessity make “man’s life-choice” undergo a definite development and change. Generally speaking, as long as the external environmental conditions are much the same, any development (or change) that occurs in “the structure of human life” invariably leads to a corresponding development (or change) in “man’s life-choice,” and thus some reason or another that is to be found in “the structure of human life” may be used to offer a possible explanation for any development or change that occurs in “man’s life-choice.” Moreover, on further reflection, the course of development followed by the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” may awaken us to the fact that the qualitative difference in behavioral choice between ape-men, early Homo sapiens and Modern Homo sapiens as well as the substantive changes their

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respective behavioral choices underwent in the long process of evolution, in the final analysis, can be attributed to their respective cerebral structures—that is, ape-men’s, early Homo sapiens’ and modern Homo sapiens’ cerebral structures, which differ essentially from each other, and which underwent fundamental changes in the long evolutionary process of the noumenon of human life that can be divided into three stages, that is, “the dawning stage,” “the formative stage,” and “the gestalt stage.” In summary, how “the structure of human life” develops tends to determine how “man’s choice in life” develops, and the course of development followed by “the structure of human life” tends to exert a determining influence upon the process of development “man’s choice in life” undergoes. “The structure of human life” determines “man’s choice in life,” which, in turn, tends to exert a determining influence upon “the structure of human life.” “The structure of human life,” far from being the product of pure imagination, can be invariably understood as the product of subjective construction through the agency of the mechanism for behavioral choice in its long process of evolution. The development of “man’s life-choice” provides the basis and motivation for the development of “the structure of human life.” This is mainly manifested in the following aspects. First, “man’s choice in life” lays the basis for the formation of “the structure of human life.” When viewed from the perspective of mankind as a whole, “man’s choice in life” is believed to lay the basis for the formation of “the structure of human life”—or, to put it another way, “man’s choice in life” constitutes the indispensable prerequisite to the formation of “the structure of human life.” There is a fundamental difference between the structure of human life and that of animals—that is, the structure of animals is naturally formed, whereas “the structure of human life” can be conceived as the product of subjective construction through the agency of the mechanism for behavioral choice in its long process of evolution. In making each great leap forward in its long evolutionary process, “the structure of human life” invariably takes the development of “man’s choice in life” as a fundamental basis or a basic prerequisite. Liu Wenying, a distinguished Chinese scholar, once fathomed and formulated the causes of the evolutionary process the structure of primitive thought underwent. He postulated that primitive thought roughly passed through three developmental stages in its long process of evolution, that is, the operational stage of “image-action,” the operational stage of “image-image,” and the operational stage of “image-concept.” At a later period of the operational stage of “image-concept” the structure of human thought began to reach the basic level of conceptual operation. For him, such basic factors as “making tools,” “social interaction,” “the use of language as an instrument of communication and thought” contribute immensely to the development of primitive thought and its transformation into the modern consciousness. He pointed out that hand in hand with the emergence and development of primitive thought went the development of the instrumental behavior patterns of primitive peoples and of practical human activity such as making tools—that is, primitive thinking emerged and developed side by side with the development of the instrumental behavior patterns of primitive peoples and of practical human activity such as making tools, or the emergence and development of primitive thought is accompanied by the development of the instrumental behavior patterns of primitive peoples and of practical human

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activity such as making tools. Making tools, which in Marxism is the fundamental form of productive practice, establishes a profound objective basis for primitive thinking.110 “Making tools,” “social interaction,” and “the use of language as an instrument of communication and thought” without exception come into the category of “man’s life-choice.” “Man’s choice in life” lays the fundamental basis for the formation and development of “the structure of human life,” and meanwhile constitutes the basic prerequisite to them. When viewed from the perspective of an individual, “man’s choice in life” rightly asserts itself as a basic way in which “the structure of human life” will be brought into existence. It is invariably on the basis of its genetic inheritance that “the structure of individual human life” is gradually established through “man’s choice in life” and that it can rightly assert itself as the product of subjective construction through the agency of the mechanism for behavioral choice in its long process of evolution. Without “man’s choice in life,” “the structure of human life” wouldn’t be able to exist, nor would its development and leap forward. In actual fact, it is since his infancy that an individual human being has been engaged in developing and perfecting his structure of human life through the agency of a wide variety of choices that have to be made in a broad band of life situations. Just as highly sensitive magnetic heads, which are of extremely high fidelity, can scan a wide range of magnetic fields and perform a full range of recording operations, so the infant in his infancy can take the initiative in making a wide variety of behavioral choices through the media of his ears, eyes, mouth, tongue and body. In other words, senses can be understood as transducers from the physical world to the realm of the mind where the infant can interpret the information, creating his perception of the world around him. In receiving all kinds of information from the external environment and storing them in the brain, he can gradually construct his sensory structure, perceptual structure and knowledge structure. He will take the initiative in making behavioral choices like “jumping or dancing for joy,” thereby gradually training the sense of rhythm and developing the sense of time and space, so that he is able to develop his thinking in images. He can develop his logical thinking by making behavioral choices like “babbling (the production of meaningless strings of speech sounds by infants)” as well as by gradually mastering the vocabulary and grammar of his mother tongue. In making behavioral choices such as “learning to read and write” and “choosing behaviors towards other people in daily life,” he can gradually fathom the mysteries of the world and conform to social norms, whereby he can start developing his ideological and moral power, wisdom power, will power and power of introspection. In making behavioral choices such as summing up experience and learning lessons from it, he begins to answer the call of reason, curbing his own needs, desires, and feelings, and attempting to harmonize them with social demands and expectations, whereby “his own structure of human life” will be tending and growing up, though by slow and imperceptible degrees, to a state of maturity and perfection. When he grows a little older, he will enter school and receive academic training that tends to instill in him the sentiment that whatever the characteristic may 110

Liu, Wen-Ying. (1996). Ancient Historical Origins: A New Study of Primitive Thought and Cultures. Beijing, China: China Social Sciences Press, pp. 78–83.

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be, e.g. system, purpose, planning, method, etc., it has become an almost indispensable concomitant to his behavioral choice, and that dimensions of regular schooling reach into and define nearly every facet of human life whereby “his own structure of human life” must of necessity undergo systematic and effective development. Obviously, it is on the basis of genetic inheritance that “man’s choice in life” constructs, develops, and perfects “the structure of human life.” In a certain sense, just as the difference in “man’s choice in life” tends to determine the differentiation in “the structure of human life,” so the level that “man reaches in his life-choice” tends to exert a determining influence upon the level that “the structure of human life” attains. Second, “man’s choice in life” may assert itself as a basic way in which “the structure of human life” achieves self-transcendence. Generally speaking, it is through the agency of “the internal behavioral choice” that “the structure of human life” achieves self-transcendence. Under external environmental pressures, natural and social ones in particular, man tends to make two kinds of behavioral choice in his life—that is, “the external behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral choice.” Specifically, by “the external behavioral choice” we mean that under the influence of environmental stimuli the various component elements inherent in “the structure of human life” that are well integrated with each other in an organic manner tend to be brought into operation and to respond accordingly by directing man’s behavioral choice towards the objective environment, particularly natural and social ones. This kind of behavioral choice is what is normally meant by “transforming the external environment” or by “changing the objective world.” We mean by “the internal behavioral choice” that under the influence of environmental stimuli the various component elements inherent in “the structure of human life” that are well integrated with each other in an organic manner tend to be brought into operation and to respond accordingly by directing man’s behavioral choice towards “the structure of human life” itself. This is what people usually mean by “transforming one’s metastructure of human life” or by “remolding one’s subjective world.” In most cases, these two kinds of behavioral choice either alternate with each other or change to each other. He whose “external behavioral choices” lead to successful outcomes will be likely to make “internal behavioral choices,” whereby he can sum up experience and make his “original structure of human life” tend towards a more perfect state. He whose “external behavioral choices” have all met with failure will be more likely to make “internal behavioral choices,” and to give serious reflection to failures and learn lessons from them, whereby he can transform and transcend “his own original structure of human life.” Generally speaking, he who has a good prospect opened before him is in a position to make “external behavioral choices” as well as “internal behavioral choices,” and to make them alternate with each other and work together harmoniously, so that “his own original structure of human life” will be constantly transcending itself. Hence it may be safely asserted that “man’s choice in life” rightly asserts itself as a basic way in which “the structure of human life” achieves development and self-transcendence. Otherwise put, without “man’s choice in life,” it is well-nigh impossible for “the structure of human life” to achieve development and self-transcendence. Third, “man’s choice in life” may rightly assert itself as a basic

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way in which “the structure of human life” achieves freedom. Freedom is inextricably bound up with man’s species-life that longs for freedom, on the one hand, and that seeks freedom, on the other. “Man’s conscious choice in life” may justly assert itself as the basic way in which “the structure of human life” achieves freedom. Marx postulates that only in the final stage of human society, i.e. that further advanced stage of communist society, in which “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all,”111 can the freedom of “man’s species-life” be possible of realization in a real sense. Engels argues that “the more that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the word, the more they make their own history consciously, the less becomes the influence of unforeseen effects and uncontrolled forces of this history, and the more accurately does the historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance.”112 There is not the least doubt that in order to make the historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance, and to make the freedom of “man’s species-life” possible of realization, invariably human beings must depend upon “man’s choice in life,” and cannot but depend upon “man’s choice in life.” Hence we assert that “man’s choice in life” can justly lay claim to being the basic way in which the lofty ideals of life mentioned above can be attained. Marx further points out that “free, conscious activity is man’s speciescharacter.”113 Man’s “free, conscious activity” is expressed as “man’s free, conscious choice in life”—or, to put it another way, it is only through the agency of “man’s free, conscious choice in life” that man’s “species-life” can achieve freedom. The aforementioned fact tends to manifest itself in the following two aspects. On the one hand, man can know and change the objective world through “free, conscious external behavioral choice,” and on the other, he can remold and perfect his subjective world through “free, conscious internal behavioral choice.” Only in this way can “the structure of human life” tend towards freedom and infinity. It is mere empty talk, when we are assured that “the structure of human life” that is divorced from “man’s choice in life” can attain freedom and infinity. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to manifest itself in the dualistic unity of “the structure of human life” and “man’s life choice” in a state of mutual dependence. Such mutual dependence is invariably in a normal state—that is, such mutual dependence exists at all times and in all circumstances, or such mutual dependence will exist for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. The dualistic unity of “the structure of human life” and “man’s life choice” in a state of mutual dependence is also termed “the dualistic unity achieved through a two-way process” which tends to manifest itself in manifold manifestations such 111

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 294. 112 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2009). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 9: Engels: Dialectics of Nature (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 421–422. 113 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 96.

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as permeating each other, defining each other, supporting each other, conditioning each other, mutual connection, and mutual transformation. It should be further pointed out here that not only does “the two-way determining relationship” inhere in the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” but also it exists outside the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”—that is, between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and “social structure” also exists “the two-way determining relationship.” For the sake of survival and development the nomenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” must of necessity take the initiative in accommodating, creating or transforming “social structures,” whereby it can create a “social structural space” to better meet its survival and development needs. At the same time, it must of necessity follow that, on the one hand, for the sake of its own existence and development “the social structure” tends to be actively engaged in constructing, guiding, developing, and reforming the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” thus making it achieve progress, development, and self-transcendence, and that, on the other, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can develop an adequate understanding of social structures, integrate individual behavioral dispositions with the changing needs of social structure, and give impetus to necessary changes in social structure. This is what is meant by “the two-way determining relationship” outside the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” which can be briefly described as follows. On the one hand, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and chocie” determines—namely, accommodates, creates or transforms— “social structures.” On the other hand, “social structures” also determine—that is, construct, guide or reform—the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The relationship between the noumenon of human life (man’s “structure and choice”) and “the structure of society” is most commonly manifested in the fact that they lend impetus to each other, on the one hand, and that they are well integrated with each other, on the other. Such relationship will exist for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. Whether it is “the two-way determining relationship” within the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” namely, between “the structure of human life” and “man’s choice in life,” or the one outside the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” that is, between the noumenon of human life (man’s “structure and choice”) and “the social structure,” it is invariably through human behavioral choice as well as on the basis of social life and human practice that “the two-way determining relationship” can be possible of realization. In summary, human behavioral choice may justly assert itself as the basic way in which the aforementioned “two-way determining relationships” can be brought about. Without human behavioral choice, it is well-nigh impossible for the abovementioned “two-way determining relationships” to exist, let alone achieve development.

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7 The Unique Human Characteristics and Functions of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” may justly lay claim to being a closely knit, finely structured, and infinitely changeable system, which tends to exist as an unique being endowed with vitality and power, as well as endued with numerous uniquely human characteristics and functions that make man far surpass animals and capable of making his own choices, planning his own destiny, and controlling his own fate, whereby man becomes a species-being full of boundless vitality, thus opening up before mankind unlimited prospects of progress and development.

7.1 The Unique Human Characteristics of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” exists as an unique being endowed with vitality and power, as well as endued with numerous uniquely human characteristics that distinguish human beings from animals. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and its uniquely human characteristics merge into an integrated whole, by which is meant that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” lays the physical basis of life for its uniquely human characteristics, which, in turn, necessarily assert themselves as the mode of existence and form of expression of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The uniquely human characteristics of the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” are mainly as follows. (1) Practicality Practice is a fundamental human characteristic inherent in the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” as well as an essential distinction between man and other animals. As Marx points out in The German Ideology, “men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.”114 Fundamentally speaking, practice is a uniquely human characteristic. Just as the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and its inherent practicality merge into an integrated whole, so do the noumenon of human life and the essence of human life, which is to say, on the one hand the 114

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology (excerpts) (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 67.

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noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” forms the organizational basis as well as the physical basis for the essence of human life—human practice, but on the other, human practice is the essence of the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” as well as the concentrated expression of other unique human characteristics inherent in the noumenon of human life. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is not only a unique organizational system in the world, which is highly developed, extremely complex, and full of vitality, but also the only living being that is capable of engaging in practical activities. Hence the essence of human life—human practice must of necessity be at once incorporated and manifested in the noumeon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” Higher animals other than humans are not endowed with the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” nor are they endued with the essence of human life—human practice. “The integrating relationship” between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and the essence of human life—human practice tends to manifest itself in the fact that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” and the essence of human life—human practice, merge to form an integrated whole, and that they tend to undergo integrated development. The development of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” parallels that of the essence of human life—human practice, which is to say, just as the development of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can definitely be changed into that of the essence of human life—human practice, so the development of the essence of human life—human practice can certainly be transformed into that of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” Whether it is for the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” or for the essence of human life—human practice, one party’s progress and development will promote the other party’s progress and development. Likewise, one party’s regression or retardation will cause the other party’s regression or retardation. The relationship between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and the essence of human life—human practice can be reduced to the relationship of “the noumenon of life” to “the essence of life,” which must necessarily manifest itself in the fact that they merge to form an integrated whole, that they undergo integrated development, and that they cannot be separated from one another even for an instant. (2) Reality Reality, which is one of the uniquely human characteristics of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” asserts itself as an essential prerequisite for the existence and development of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” As Marx points out in The Holy Family, “real man is the man living in a real, objective world and determined by that world.”115 In one of his letters to Marx,

115

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: Marx & Engels: The Holy Family (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 245.

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Engels said that “‘man’ will always remain a wraith so long as his basis is not empirical man.”116 Man is never abstract but always actual (or real) man. The being of men is their actual life process, so the collective, generic character of human life is real life. It is thus evident that reality asserts itself as an essential prerequisite for the existence and development of human life. Marx’s theory about “real man,” which treats “reality” as a prerequisite for man’s self-knowledge, not only offers us a more scientific definition of man himself but, more importantly, represents a profound revolution in human self-understanding. Between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and man’s reality exists “the integrating relationship.” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to exist in the real mode of man’s existence, that is, the noumenon of human life that is composed of “the triple structure of human life” and “the eight kinds of substantive (or essential) powers” is a kind of real being full of life and power as well as composed of flesh and blood. It is not something ethereal or intangible, but rather something sensuously perceptible and empirically describable—or to put it another way, it exists in both nature and society. It is to be conceived as a real living thing existent as a whole, as well as endowed with the capacity to engage in practical activity, definitely human motives, desires, and reason. It is a concrete, historical existence in which the unity of body and spirit, of synchronicity and diachronicity, and the unity between changing the objective world and remolding one’s subjective world, as well as the unity between desire and reason, are invariably achieved. “The integrating relationship” exists between the noumenon of human life—namely, man’s “structure and choice,” and man’s reality—that is, one of the uniquely human characteristics. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can rightly assert itself as the real life, and thus must necessarily be endowed with one of the uniquely human characteristics—man’s reality, which, in turn, can justly lay claim to being the necessary manifestation of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” as well as the mode of existence in which the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” exists. (3) Subjectivity Subjectivity, which is one of the uniquely human characteristics of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” is of fundamental importance to the existence and development of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” For Marx, man is the subject, whilst nature is treated as object.117 In human practice man always remains the subject.118 According to Marx, man as subject must be the point of departure, which is to say, in this world only man can act as subject and 116

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 27: Engels: A Letter from Engels to Marx (19 November 1844) (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 13. 117 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 88. 118 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 130.

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can claim to be the rightful purpose and point of departure of all activities while the other natural objects can only be treated as objects. In the course of the history of man, the laws that govern the development of society and the progress of civilization bear ample testimony to the universal truth that, on the one hand, man exists as the result of the movement of history, but on the other, he constitutes the point of departure of the movement of history.119 Therefore, the historical development manifests itself in the dialectical unity of man’s existence as the historical premise and his existence as the historical result. Subjectivity, which comes into the category of the uniquely human characteristics, is of fundamental importance to man’s existence and development. Specifically, man’s subjectivity or human subjectivity refers to the human subject’s consciousness, activity and initiative, to wit, such essential characteristics as purpose, activity, initiative, choice and creativity displayed by the human subject in subjectobject relations, as well as common to man as subject. Man’s subjectivity or human subjectivity manifests itself mainly in the relationship between the subject and the object, in which the subject tries to bring the object within its comprehension, under control and into use. Between the noumenon of human life (man’s “structure and choice”) and human subjectivity exists “the integrating relationship,” by which is meant that the nomenon of human life (man’s “structure and choice”) lays the physical basis of life for human subjectivity, and that it asserts itself as an essential prerequisite for the existence and development of man’s subjectivity, which, in turn, necessarily asserts itself as the mode of existence and form of expression of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” It is the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” that can make man far surpass other higher animals in intelligence and adaptability, and that can accomplish man’s rise from the animal kingdom and lift mankind above the rest of the animal world, whereby man can become a subject in the proper sense of the word. The more that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the word, the more that they are likely to achieve free consciousness. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” may aid materially in making man become the conscious subject of the world, in making man, nature and society undergo progressive and harmonious development, and in making man occupy an exalted place in the universe. It is on the basis of social life and human practice that the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” and human subjectivity must necessarily merge to form an integrated whole and undergo integrated development, thereby coordinating with each other to reach higher levels of development. (3) Duality Duality is a typical human characteristic inherent in the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice.” Man is the only creature in the world that can justly lay claim to being the possessor of two kinds of life which can be brought into contrast. The one is a natural life, which man has in common with the lower animals, which he receives in the first birth from his human progenitors, and which is corruptible, frail and transitory. The other is a supernatural life, which he has in common with God 119

Ibid., p. 121.

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Himself, which must be received from a Divine Progenitor, and which is incorruptible, abiding and eternal.120 Hence it can be safely asserted that man is the unity of “natural life” and “supernatural life.” As Marx maintained: “The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being.”121 The animal has only a “natural life,” while men are the possessors of a “dual life”—or to put it another way, the human life possesses the dual nature, namely, the “natural life” and the “supernatural life.” Animals that have no conscious awareness whatsoever are wholly dependent upon inherited abilities and natural instincts for the direction of their life activities, whilst man endowed with his conscious awareness gains a proper rational control over his life activities, whereby man becomes the highest being (or the supreme form of life) in the universe—the conscious “species-being.” Between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and man’s “dual life” exists “the integrating relationship,” by which is meant that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” forms the basis for man’s “dual life,” which, in turn, necessarily asserts itself as the mode of existence and form of expression of the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice.” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” endows man with “a natural life and a supernatural life,” and the dual character of human life further forms the basis for multiple or manifold manifestations of man’s “dual life,” such as man’s ideality versus his reality, man’s finitude versus his infinity, man’s historicity versus his super-historicity, man’s necessity versus his freedom, man’s soul versus his body etc., which can be reduced to the multiple duality of human life. These two opposites of duality stand in the relation of contradiction to each other, intermingle with each other, act upon each other, and change into each other, thus achieving the unity of opposites, whereby man can make his life rich and colorful beyond compare, behaving as if he owned the universe. In summary, on the one hand, the multiple duality of human life can make man become a giant in the true sense of the term who is brave enough to enter into rivalry with heaven and earth, but on the other, it can also make heaven, earth and man coexist with one another and undergo harmonious development. The complexity of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” the high level of development attained by it, and the way that the system is finely structured tend to find profound expression in the “duality” of human life as well as in its “multiple duality.” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and the duality of human life must necessarily merge to form an integrated whole and undergo integrated development, thereby 120

Pettingell, John Hancock. (1887). Views and Reviews in Eschatology: A Collection of Letters, and Other Papers Concerning the Life and Death to Come. Yarmouth, ME.: Scriptural Publication Society, p. 273. 121 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2009). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 162.

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coordinating with each other to attain higher stages of development or higher levels of development. Moreover, between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and its uniquely human characteristics such as choice, transcendence and infinity exists “the integrating relationship,” by which is meant that the nomenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” lays the physical basis of life for its manifold human characteristics, and that it asserts itself as an essential prerequisite for the existence and development of its manifold human characteristics, which, in turn, must necessarily lay claim to being the mode of existence and form of expression of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.”

7.2 The Functions of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” rightly asserts itself as an unfailing source of power indispensable for human life, and at the same time it is held accountable for making behavioral choices through careful planning, decision making and execution, and regulation and control of behavior that are of habitual occurrence in human life. By the function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” we mean that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is endowed with the capacity for responding and adapting to external environmental pressures, transforming the objective world as well as the subjective world, and gaining mastery and control over one’s own destiny, and that, accordingly, it must of necessity perform its manifold functions to accomplish the foregoing objectives. Generally speaking, the functions performed by the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tend to manifest themselves mainly in the following two aspects. (1) The Overall Function of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” By the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” we mean that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to perform an important function in human life as a whole, particularly in its overall situation as well as in its whole destiny. This function tends to manifest itself mainly in the following three aspects. First, the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” may assert itself as a basic way in which the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” meets environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, and in which man and the world coexist with each other and undergo harmonious development. The primary overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself in the fact that in responding to external environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”

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will be motivated to make appropriate behavioral choices, and to capitalize upon its opportunities for survival and development, thereby making man and the world coexist with each other and undergo harmonious development. Man who lives in a certain environment, especially in a particular natural and social environment, has to meet external environmental pressures and challenges at all times and in all circumstances. On the one hand, if he successfully responds to external environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, man will be able to adapt himself to the environment, particularly nature and society, and thereby to seize the initiative in grasping his destiny in his own hands. On the other hand, if he fails to meet external environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, man will assuredly find himself in the midst of insuperable difficulties in making adjustment to the environment, particularly nature and society, and thereby lose the initiative in gaining mastery over his own fate. It is therefore evident that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is endowed with substantive powers, that it is in a position to engage in higher forms of self-reflection and selftranscendence, and that in meeting external environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, it can take the initiative in making man and the world coexist with each other and undergo harmonious development. Second, the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” may assert itself as a basic way in which man can improve and transcend himself, thereby achieving self-development. The key to the harmonious development of mankind and nature lies in the development of human beings, whereby man can justly lay claim to being the subject of the world. Man is hedged around with various environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, which are too changeable to be predictable, which will constantly exist in myriad forms, and which invariably involve, to a greater or lesser extent, some kind of risk. With the above situation in view, only if the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is able to engage in constant self-reflection and self-transcendence can it meet environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, and exercise initiative in grasping its own destiny. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” endowed with the capacity to engage in profound self-reflection and constant self-transcendence is in a position to engage in conscious self-reflection and self-transcendence through the differentiation inherent to selfconsciousness as well as through the identification of self-consciousness with objectconsciousness, whereby the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can constantly decrease the discrepancy between the real self and the ideal self and bring the real self into alignment with the ideal self, thus continually tending towards improvement and perfection. Third, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” asserts itself as a basic way in which man can gain mastery over his own destiny and embark on the long march towards freedom. Not only can the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” transform these two worlds by itself—the objective world and the subjective world, but it can bring about unity of these two worlds and build up an integrated objective and subjective world—the human world, whereby it can achieve the integrated development of man and the world and make man embark on a

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long march towards freedom. In pursuing his lofty ideals, engaging in constant selfdevelopment and self-transcendence, and embarking upon a long march towards the final state of human freedom or salvation through unity, man no longer depends solely upon his personal powers, but rather on the combined powers of “the human world” as a whole, including his personal powers, which the world has never witnessed before. In the famous metaphor of “the thinking reed,” the French scientist and philosopher Blaise Pascal compares humanity to the entire universe, stating that man, though the universe is gigantic enough to be crushing him, can point out to it something that he is which is greater than it: he is the weakest reed of nature, but “a thinking reed.” “Pascal admires humanity’s essential frailty but also its unalienable nobility. While the human being is set in the universe as nature’s weakest creature like a delicate reed, he is nonetheless nobler than the entire universe for he is endowed with the faculty of thought; the human person is a thinking reed who is conscious of his state, whereas the universe knows absolutely nothing of its own existence. Therefore, the use of reason displays our ultimate dignity; human reason is a wonderful and unparalleled source of humanity’s delicate greatness.”122 Because man is “a thinking reed,” it can be safely asserted that he is powerful beyond compare, that he is able to gain mastery over his own destiny, and to enter into rivalry with heaven and earth, and that he has unlimited prospects before him. (2) The Concrete Function of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” By the concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” we mean that the concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” or more specifically, its whole and any component elements contained therein, as well as the grouping of component elements, tends to exercise concrete influence on human behavioral choices as well as on a wide variety of life situations in which human behavioral choices will have to be made—or, to put it another way, by the concrete function of the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice” we mean how the whole and any component elements contained therein, the various component parts contained in the whole, or rather, the structure of human life and the external world, exercise concrete influence on one another. The concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” rightly asserts itself as the internal basis and concrete manifestation of the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” The concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to manifest itself in the following aspects. First, the choice function. It is the basic function of the noumenon of human life— man’s “structure and choice.” When faced with certain environmental pressures, particularly natural and social ones, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to make human behavioral choices by bringing into operation the various constituent elements inherent in itself so that it can respond to the external 122

Toth, Beata. (2016). The Heart Has Its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the Heart. Cambridge, England: ISD LLC, p. 6.

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environment, particularly nature and society. As long as an individual human being’s life endures, his behavioral choice will remain with him throughout his life. Second, the dynamic function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to assert itself as a complex dynamic structural system consisting of “three levels of structure and eight kinds of powers.” Under external environmental pressures, particularly natural and social ones, the system will come into operation automatically and respond to the external environment, particularly nature and society, by making appropriate behavioral choices that can be almost invariably traceable to definite motives of action, whereby the system must necessarily undergo constant self-improvement and self-transcendence. Third, the directional function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” includes the intellectual and moral system composed of many component elements, such as ideology, value, morality, and emotion, which are a genuine reflection of—or rather truly representative of—the demands and interests that are of crucial importance to the survival and development of individuals, society and mankind in general. Moreover, the intellectual and moral system can also regulate and determine the direction of human behavioral choice in such a way that “Heaven, Earth and man” can coexist in harmony with one another. Fourth, the methodological function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” encompasses the wisdom system consisting of knowledge structure, modes of thought, and inherited and acquired abilities, which contribute substantially to the formation and development of man’s creative powers that tend to find expression in manifold spheres of human activity. The wisdom system may serve as a living repository of various methods and styles that can be used to solve innumerable difficulties and problems by which man is most assuredly confronted in practice. Fifth, the regulative function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” embraces the volition system that can consciously regulate and control human behaviors whereby they can be directed towards premeditated or preconceived ends. The volition system is in a position to maintain, regulate, and control human behaviors, or more specifically, to control the start or end of a behavior, and to regulate the input or diversion of mental and physical energy. Sixth, the reflective function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” includes the self-reflective system that is capable of self-reflection and selftranscendence. The self-reflective system is in a position to examine the relationship between “the ideal self and the real self” through the differentiation inherent to self-consciousness as well as through the identification of self-consciousness with object-consciousness, thereby making man undergo constant self-development and self-transcendence and embark upon a long march towards freedom.

8 Comments on Two Types of Ontology of Life While addressing ourselves to the question of how to gain a deeper insight into the ontology of human life, we tend to find ourselves in the midst of enormous

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difficulties in instituting a comparison between two types of theory—structural and existentialist—each being characterized by classicality and one-sidedness. We feel the necessity of giving the two kinds of theory as to the ontology of human life a profound understanding as well as a thorough analysis when we attempt to have a better understanding of the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is)—that is, man’s “structure and choice.” The structure of human life has been widely accepted as a general truth in the structural theory about the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) which, on the other hand, tends to deny the existence of any choice in human life. According to the structuralist theory about the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is), under given cultural conditions, whether it is the structure of collective consciousness or the social structure that is rooted in the cultural pattern and in the collective consciousness, it tends to remain unchanged—or, to put it another way, it tends to stay the same and not changed. Individuals can only submit themselves to the structure of society or the structure of collective consciousness and follow old traditions as well as established conventions. It would be ludicrous (or ridiculous) nonsense to say that human choice, or more specifically, the behavioral choice on the part of a subject, could make any difference to the social structure or the structure of collective consciousness. On the contrary, human choice, or more specifically, the behavioral choice on the part of a subject, has been universally recognized as an undeniable truth in the existentialist theory about the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) which, on the other hand, tends to negate the existence of any structure upon which human life depends. The existentialist theory about the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) holds that man’s real being or existence lies in his freedom, that the nature (or essence) of man is nothing but the product of man’s self-creation and that everything is possible and free. According to the existentialist theory as to the ontology of human life, neither objective necessity nor objective value inheres in human life or in the empirical world—or, to put it another way, what you choose tends to define who you are. The one-sidedness characteristic of the aforementioned two kinds of theories manifests itself in the fact that man’s “structure and choice,” to wit the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) characterized by the unity of “structure and choice,” tends to be separated from each other and contradictory to each other—that is to say, either man’s “structure” is antithetical to his “choice” or man’s “choice” goes beyond its proper bounds and acts to negate the existence of any structure upon which human life depends. Hence it must of necessity follow that the above two types of theory cannot but sink into absurdity. On the one hand, man’s “structure and choice” combine to form the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) wherein its component elements tend to be brought into operation and kept in good working order, and on the other hand, they constitute the two organic constituent parts of the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) wherein each of the two occupies a specific place and performs unique functions. Man’s “structure and choice,” which are characterized by the unity of opposites, permeate each other and support each other, but they cannot replace each other.

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While they stick to their own arguments, the structural theorists and their existentialist counterparts, whose writings have had a wide-spread influence upon people’s conception of the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is), write in great quantity and present clear-cut viewpoints. The writings published by the structural theorists as well as by their existentialist counterparts will be of immense value to us in our research work. It can even be asserted that only if we subject the aforementioned two types of theory to a profound analysis and a critical evaluation can we obtain a deeper understanding of the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is), that is to say man’s “structure and choice.” The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre may rank as the leading exponent of the existentialist kind of theory, while the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss has been unquestionably the foremost proponent of the structural type of theory.

8.1 A Critical Commentary on Sartre’s Existentialism Generally speaking, existentialism may be defined as the philosophical theory which deals with “the fundamental condition of human existence,” which is to say existentialism is a form of philosophical enquiry that explores the nature of existence by emphasizing experience of the human subject—not merely the thinking subject, but the acting, feeling, living human individual.123 Throughout their writings the major philosophers identified as existentialists tend to describe and analyze our most basic existential experiences, which reveal the fundamental human condition in our relation to the world and others. Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), who was a nineteenth century Danish philosopher, has long been known as “the father of existentialism”— or, to put it another way, Søren Kierkegaard is widely considered to be the first existentialist philosopher, though he did not use the term existentialism, and his ideas are recognized as the groundwork of existential thought. Much of his philosophical work deals with the issues of how one lives as a “single individual,” giving priority to concrete human reality over abstract thinking and highlighting the importance of personal choice and commitment.124 Kierkegaard’s thought is a corrective to the rationalism of much of philosophy, reminding us of the inward dimension of existence, the experience of subjectivity. His overall existential philosophy had a tremendous influence on twentieth century thought, particularly in the areas of philosophy, theology, psychology, literature, and art.125 Existentialism became popular early in the twentieth century, flourished in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, and by the 1970s the cultural image of existentialism had become a cliché. As a cultural movement, existentialism belongs to the past. As a philosophical inquiry that introduced a new norm, authenticity, for understanding what it means to be human existentialism has 123

Macquarrie, John. (1972). Existentialism. New York: Penguin, pp. 14–15. Gardiner, Patrick. (1969). Nineteenth Century Philosophy. New York, NY: The Free Press, pp. 289–320. 125 “Søren Kierkegaard”, “New World Encyclopedia”, . 124

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continued to play an important role in contemporary thought in both the continental and analytic traditions.126 Among the major philosophers identified as existentialists were Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger, whose classical writings “gave philosophical shape to the basic existential insight that thinking about human existence requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought,” that “human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor as subjects interacting with a world of objects,” and that “all the themes popularly associated with existentialism find their philosophical significance in the context of the search for a new categorical framework, together with its governing norm.”127 While existentialism is generally considered to have originated with Kierkegaard, the first prominent existentialist philosopher to adopt the term as a self-description was Jean-Paul Sartre, who is arguably one of the leading figures in the 20th-century French philosophy of existentialism and whose philosophical ideas have been widely disseminated in Europe and North America and have had a widespread influence throughout the world. (1) Sartre’s Primary Existential Ideas First, one of Sartre’s primary existential ideas is the notion that existence precedes essence. The Sartrean claim is best understood in contrast to the traditional philosophical view that there is a predetermined essence to be found in humans. This view is in contradistinction to what the major existential philosophers hold; they teach that “existence precedes essence”—that is, man first of all exists and defines himself afterwards by his own free choice. Sartre’s early masterwork, Being and Nothingness (1943), in which he developed a philosophical account of his existentialist ideas, tends to be regarded as both the most important non-fiction expression of Sartre’s existentialism and his most influential philosophical work. Sartre accords an ontological primacy to human existence or human reality while developing a philosophical system of his own. (1) Like most twentieth century existential thinkers Sartre was greatly influenced by the phenomenological movements of Edmund Husserl. This teaching held that all human knowledge can be reduced to an original “lived experience.” This gave concrete descriptive analyses for our basic experiences priority over purely logical, abstract reasoning. Like Heidegger, Sartre appropriated the phenomenological method and applied it to the subject of “existence.” For Sartre this meant dividing all reality into two basic modes of being: the in-itself (en-soi), which is the state of all material beings as they exist apart from our consciousness of them; and the for-itself (pour-soi), which is all things as they are experienced by or for human consciousness.128 For Sartre ontology is primarily descriptive and classificatory, and his phenomenological ontology presupposes that there exist two distinct and irreducible categories or kinds of being: the in-itself (en-soi) and the for-itself (poursoi), roughly the nonconscious and consciousness respectively. Being-in-itself and 126

Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 127 Ibid. 128 “Jean-Paul Sartre”, “New World Encyclopedia”, https://newworldencyclopedia.org.

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being-for-itself have mutually exclusive characteristics and yet we (human reality) are entities that combine both, which is the ontological root of our ambiguity. The in-itself, by which we mean the reality of the objective world, is solid, self-identical, passive and inert.129 Sartre contends that human existence is a conundrum whereby each of us exists, for as long as we live, within an overall condition of nothingness characterized by fortuity, absurdity and chaos, devoid of purpose, causality, rationality, regularity, order, time, development or change. In the view of the existentialist, human existence is characterized by what has been called “the existential angst,” or a sense of disorientation, confusion or isolation in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world. In all probability people tend to regard this very world with disgust and hatred. In contrast to the in-itself, the for-itself, by which we mean human existence or human reality, is fluid, nonself-identical, and dynamic. It is the internal negation or “nihilation” of the in-itself, on which it depends.130 Sartre argues that one’s existence and one’s formal projection of a self are distinctly separate and within the means of human control and that the for-itself is always something that is what it is not and something that is what it is. Hence Sartre concludes that we are always “more” than our situation and that this is the ontological foundation of our freedom. We are “condemned” to be free, in his hyperbolic phrase.131 Given that being-initself is an immanence which cannot realize or transcend itself, an affirmation which cannot affirm itself, an activity which cannot act, because it is glued to itself, the world of the in-itself, which is superfluous because it has no meaning independent of consciousness,132 tends to work in unity with the world of the for-itself, which asserts itself as the foundation of the world in its own right and which gives meaning to things by virtue of the projects that it pursues,133 which is to say the objective world, the human world and man’s existence tend to exist as an organic unity. On the one hand, we are bound to the physical world, but on the other, we are constrained to make continuous, conscious choices. We are free to create ourselves by giving some flexibility in choosing our actions for ourselves, and it is through our freedom that we accept responsibility for our actions, which in turn determines who we are.134 It is therefore clear that people are defined only insofar as they act and that they are responsible for their actions. (2) The proposition that “existence precedes essence” is a central claim of existentialism, which reverses the traditional philosophical view that “essence precedes existence”—that is, the essence (the nature) of a thing is more fundamental and immutable than its existence (the mere fact of its being).135 129

Flynn, Thomas, “Jean-Paul Sartre”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Joseph, Felicity., Reynolds, Jack., & Woodward, Ashley., eds. (2014). The Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 366. 133 Ibid. 134 “Jean-Paul Sartre”, “New World Encyclopedia”, https://newworldencyclopedia.org. 135 Plato, Timaeus; Aristotle, Metaphysics; St Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Pars 3:1, Summa Theologiae, Pars 1:1, etc. Analysis of “existence before essence” in Etienne Gilson, The

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To claim that existence precedes essence is to assert that there is no such predetermined essence to be found in humans, and that an individual’s essence is defined by the individual through how that individual creates and lives his or her life. As Sartre puts it in his lecture given in 1945—namely, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,”136 “What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing—as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.”137 According to Sartre, if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. For we mean to say that man primarily exists—that man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be.138 Second, while they are opposed to all forms of determinism, existentialists tend to espouse the theory of radical freedom. To put it another way, for the existentialist the concept of freedom tends to be established on the basis of arguments against determinism.139 Sartre’s views on freedom can be briefly summarized as follows. (1) Man is entitled to complete freedom forever. Human beings are born to be free even when they do not want to. They cannot but be free. They are unavoidably free. For Sartre, freedom is the fundamental, necessary and inalienable possession of every conscious human being, every being-for-itself.140 Human beings are in Sartre’s phrase “thrown” into freedom, they spend much of lives devising strategies for denying or evading the anguish of freedom, but this flight from freedom is shown to fail, according to Sartre, Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Introduction. See “Existence precedes essence” in “en.m.wikipedia.org”. 136 The lecture was delivered on Monday, October 29, 1945, although not published until 1946. An English translation by Carol Macomber, with an introduction by the sociologist Annie Cohen-Solal and notes and preface by Arlette EIkaïm-Sartre, was published under the title Existentialism Is a Humanism in 2007. 137 Kaufmann, Walter., ed. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York: New American Library, 1975. 138 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism Is a Humanism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. 139 Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 140 Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, p. 85.

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in the experience of anguish.141 Freedom is an ontological necessity for every man or woman and any attempt to escape from freedom is impossible.142 Man is freedom, which is to say, human existence is at one with human freedom and there is little or no difference between them. Existentialists tend to take man’s existence as well as his freedom as the thing-in-itself of human life or the essence of man; in other words, when it comes to what is essential to a human being, there are no other essential properties except man’s free existence. Man is condemned to be free—or, to put it another way, man is completely free forever. Otherwise, man cannot exist. Furthermore, freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made to be at the heart of man, and which forces human reality to make itself. This is so because freedom is identical with man’s existence. This means that no limit to man’s freedom can be found except freedom itself. Man therefore originates and develops himself in freedom such that nothing determines his action and nothing causes or sustains him except his freedom. He automatically becomes the author and architect of himself. Thus, man radically becomes free from determinism, and hence free from any antecedently fixed standard. He is not controlled by any force outside of himself. As Sartre puts it that man is condemned to freedom, a situation he cannot run away from. We are all condemned to be free, which means that there is no limit to our freedom, in fact, we are not free, not to be free, we are not free to cease to be free.143 For Sartre, man is condemned to be free, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does.144 Here what Sartre means by “freedom” is the freedom of human choice as well as the freedom of human will, rather than the freedom we can become. In discussing freedom, Sartre argues that the formula “to be free” does not mean “to obtain what one has wished,” but rather the ability to determine what one wishes, that is, in making a choice. Hence, freedom is tied to choice, and choice is the concrete actualization of freedom. To be free is to be compelled to make a choice. We cannot avoid choosing because a refusal to choose is itself a choice. Freedom is therefore the freedom of choosing and not the freedom of not choosing because not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose. For Sartre therefore, our freedom consists in the fact that we must choose what it means to exist and how we will continue to exist at every moment.145 (2) The proposition that existence precedes essence is a central claim of existentialism, which presupposes human freedom. For Sartre, it is 141

Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 142 Rev Fr. Francis lyke Agada MSP, ed. “Chapter Three—The Autonomy of Human Reason” in God and Human Freedom: A Philosophico-Theological Enquiry into the Nature of Human Free Will and the Problem of Evil in the World. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2015. 143 Ibid. 144 Kaufmann, Walter., ed. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York, NY: New American Library, 1975. 145 Rev Fr. Francis lyke Agada MSP, ed. “Chapter Three—The Autonomy of Human Reason” in God and Human Freedom: A Philosophico-Theological Enquiry into the Nature of Human Free Will and the Problem of Evil in the World. Bloomington, US-IN: AuthorHouse, 2015.

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true that existence precedes essence precisely because man is born free, free without preordination or predetermination. There are no objective laws, or objective values, or objective standards in the world as well as in man’s life. Rather, everything is free and possible, and everything depends on personal choices made by individuals. Moreover, only the theory of existentialism can make man possess and maintain human dignity. (3) Man must assume responsibility for his behavioral choice. Sartre holds that human beings are not only given the ability to make free choices, which can be understood as manifestation of their free will, but they must take responsibility for what they are and do. In discussing freedom, Sartre argues that freedom is tied to choice and that choice is the concrete actualization of freedom. For Sartre therefore, our freedom consists in the fact that we must choose what it means to exist and how we will continue to exist at every moment.146 Man must bear responsibility for his free choices—or, to put it another way, people can affirm that they are free by continually striving to take responsibility for their choices.147 The reason why man tries to escape from freedom is because he wants to evade responsibility. For Sartre, human freedom is accompanied by a heavy and inescapable responsibility and a disturbing anguish, for “to be free” is the same thing as “to be responsible” because they are intertwined. This implies that responsibility of our action and facticity of our freedom is the essence of our being. In his existential psychoanalysis theory, Sartre asserts the inescapable responsibility of all individuals for their own decisions.148 (4) Sartre’s claim in No Exit that “Hell is other people” is a conditional claim, not a categorical one.149 Sartre believes that the absolute freedom of the individual inevitably brings about diametrically opposite relationships between people. According to Sartre, from the moment that we exist we establish a factual limit—in terms of our desires—to the other’s freedom. And the Other’s freedom does, likewise, set an actual limit to our own freedom. Therefore, the Other’s freedom forms the object, that is, limit of our desires or projects.150 Sartre argues that from the moment that I exist I establish a factual limit to the Other’s freedom. I am this limit, and each of my projects traces the outline of this limit around the Other.151 We always perform our actions in a world of others where one’s existence in relation to the Other’s may appear so redundant, superfluous and unnecessary. Thus, says Sartre, to claim “respect for the Other’s freedom is an empty word; even if we would assume the project of respecting this 146

Ibid. Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London, UK: Continuum International Publishing Group, p. 85. 148 Rev Fr. Francis lyke Agada MSP, ed. “Chapter Three—The Autonomy of Human Reason” in God and Human Freedom: A Philosophico-Theological Enquiry into the Nature of Human Free Will and the Problem of Evil in the World. Bloomington, US-IN: AuthorHouse, 2015. 149 Benko, Steven A., & Pavelich, Andrew., eds. “Is Hell Other People?” In The Good Place and Philosophy. Chicago, US-IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 2020. 150 Kariuki, Joseph., & Utz, Arthur Fridolin. (1981). The Possibility of Universal Moral Judgement in Existential Ethics: A Critical Analysis of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience According to Jean-Paul Sartre. Lang, p. 311. 151 Merkel, Bernard. The Concept of Freedom and the Development of Sartre’s Early Political Thought. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019. 147

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freedom, each attitude which we adopted to the Other would be a violation of that freedom which we claimed to respect.” Once I exist, I must affect other people and, by the same reasoning, if I choose to terminate my existence I will still inevitably be affecting other people. In this way, Sartre argues that finally I must “force” the Other to be free.152 Sartre also believed that each person is only absolutely free when he is opposing other people. For Sartre, the unending struggle between lovers for recognition or within loving relationships turns love into perpetual conflict. Conflict is thus the inevitable basis of the love relationship. It is primarily for this reason that Sartre concludes that love is always doomed to failure. Apart from being commonly considered the father of Existentialist philosophy, whose indefatigable pursuit of philosophical reflection gained him worldwide renown and whose writings set the tone for intellectual life in the decade immediately following the Second World War,153 Paul Sartre also ranks as the most versatile writer who turned to playwriting and eventually produced a series of theatrical successes which are essentially dramatizations of his existentialist ideas.154 Sartre’s own ideas were and are better known through his fictional works (such as Nausea and No Exit) than through his more purely philosophical ones (such as Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason).155 He who had a deeper knowledge of Marxism put forward many enlightening theories and thought-provoking viewpoints concerning Marxist theory. Sartre seemed to think that existentialism and Marxism were not contradictory philosophies. The incompatibility, or apparent incompatibility, concerns freedom. Existentialism is a theory that above all maintains that human is inalienable, whereas, according to many Marxists of Sartre’s time, Marxism is a deterministic theory of human history at the centre of which is the notion of dialectical materialism. What Sartre does not agree with is what some Marxists have seen as the main implication of Marx’s theory, namely, that it is deterministic and that there is no place in it for human freedom. Sartre’s reading of Marx is that his theory of dialectical materialism gives an all-important role to human consciousness and, by implication, human freedom because freedom is an essential characteristic of consciousness. Sartre argues that it is a misreading of Marx to suppose that his materialism is a reductionist theory that proposes the development of matter by matter with human being nothing more than a material product of the process. Sartre treats “dialectical materialism,” with its reductionist connotations, as a corrupted term, preferring instead the term “historical materialism” which reflects more accurately the materialism Marx actually proposed. So, Sartre begins to synthesize existentialism and Marxism by arguing that it is a misunderstanding of Marxism to view it as utterly materialistic and deterministic, as fundamentally opposed to 152

Ibid. Flynn, Thomas, “Jean-Paul Sartre”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 154 “Jean Paul Sartre.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Aug. 2020 . 155 Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 153

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any theory of human freedom, individuality or even consciousness. Sartre goes on to argue that Marxism can accommodate the existentialist view of human freedom and indeed must do so if it is to make sense. Sartre argues that Marxism is not only a theory of history that requires a notion of human consciousness and therefore freedom, Marxism is “history itself become conscious of itself.” In the Critique of Dialectical Reason Sartre recognizes far more than he does in Being and Nothingness that a person, a whole social class of people, can be without freedom in any real practical sense as a result of political and economic oppression. A person’s existential freedom remains inalienable, he cannot not choose, but his freedom does not amount to much if his only choice is, for example, to endure drudgery and exploitation in a factory for a subsistence wage or to die. This view is, in a sense, a development rather than a departure from views expressed in Being and Nothingness in so far as Sartre recognizes in that work that the most serious threat to a person’s freedom is the freedom of the Other. Just as one person can transcend another and reduce him to an object, to a transcendence-transcended, so one social class can, through economic and social exploitation, transcend another social class and reduce its members to objects. In this way the Sartre of the Critique develops his theory of being-for-others, a central plank of existentialism, into a Marxist theory of man’s alienation by man. Sartre is fully prepared to place existentialism at the service of Marxism in this way. He identifies Marxism as the dominant philosophy of the age and existentialism as a subordinate theory the purpose of which is to function within Marxism positively influencing its future development towards the realization of a classless, harmonious society. Such a society, according to Sartre, is possible but not inevitable.156 Sartre remained committed to the value of freedom as self-making throughout his life. This commitment led Sartre to hold that existentialism itself was only an “ideological” moment within Marxism, which he termed “the one philosophy of our time which we cannot go beyond”. As this statement suggests, Sartre’s embrace of Marxism was a function of his sense of history as the factic situation in which the project of self-making takes place. Because existing is self-making (action), philosophy—including existential philosophy—cannot be understood as a disinterested theorizing about timeless essences but is always a form of engagement, a diagnosis of the past and a projection of norms appropriate to a different future in light of which the present takes on significance. It therefore always arises from the historical-political situation and is a way of intervening in it. Marxism, like existentialism, makes this necessarily practical orientation of philosophy explicit. Sartre holds that a philosophy of self-making could not content itself with highlighting the situation of individual choice; an authentic political identity could only emerge from a theory that situated such choice in a practically oriented analysis of its concrete situation. Thus it appeared to him that the “ideology of existence” was itself merely an alienated form of the deeper analysis of social and historical reality provided by Marx’s dialectical approach. Marxism is unsurpassable, therefore, because it is the

156

Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, pp. 53–56.

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most lucid theory of our alienated situation of concrete unfreedom, oriented toward the practical-political overcoming of that unfreedom.157 (2) A Critical Analysis of Sartre’s Existentialism First, Sartre made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the development of existential thought as well as of existential theory. (1) Sartre’s existentialism filled the value vacuum created by “purely technical philosophy” in Europe and America. Logical empiricism, which flourished in Europe and America in the twentieth century, gradually evolved into “purely technical philosophies” such as analytic philosophy, philosophy of language and logical positivism. More specifically, logical empiricism is a philosophic movement rather than a set of doctrines, and it flourished in the 1920s and 30s in several centers in Europe and in the 40s and 50s in the United States. Logical empiricism probably never commanded the assent of the majority of philosophers in either Europe or America, and by 1970 the movement was pretty clearly over—though with lasting influence whether recognized or not. According to logical empiricism, or logical positivism, the question about man’s outlook on life has traditionally been dismissed as unimportant in philosophy. Logical empiricists (or logical positivists) also refused to explore the origin of the world as well as the ultimate value and meaning of human life, and this created a “value vacuum” in the realm of ideas, beliefs and values as well as the realm of theory. It is Sartre’s existentialism that filled the value vacuum created by “purely technical philosophy” in either Europe or America. (2) In his existential philosophy Sartre affirms and advocates man’s subjective initiative. “Man is free,” he wrote. “The coward makes himself cowardly. The hero makes himself heroic.” For Sartre, man’s subjective spirit as well as his subjective initiative, which is entitled to high praise, cannot fail to produce a positive and material effect upon man’s practical activities as well as his mental activities. While stimulating them to embrace their careers and strive for further progress, Sartre’s existentialism impels people to throw off spiritual shackles and emancipate the mind. Second, there are unquestionably deficiencies or problems in Sartre’s existential philosophy. (1) Sartre’s existential theory is of an illusory nature. Sartre is an advocate of absolute freedom, but the idea of absolute freedom he advocates is impossible to put into practice. An absolute freedom exists nowhere. It is truly astonishing to find a man like Sartre, who seeks to give us in his phenomenological approach a strictly objective view of what appears in reality, managing nevertheless to build up a conception of freedom which is so thoroughly unrealistic.158 We can only declare this unlimited “absolute freedom” to be a mere illusion, because Sartre fails to justify his interpretation of “absolute freedom” as something which would be compatible with the existence of restrictions and limitations. Human existence cannot be divorced from restrictions or limitations, but rather it could be hedged around with all kinds of 157

Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 158 Detmer, David.(2013). Freedom as a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing, pp. 84–85.

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constraints or all sorts of conditions. Hence human freedom can only depend on how man understands or grasps the conditions which surround him. The more he knows of the conditions which surround him, the freer he becomes, and vice versa. Whoever fails to know of the conditions which surround him will find himself in the midst of insurmountable difficulties in enjoying freedom. As Sartre puts it, “being situated” is an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom. Man cannot retain absolute freedom because freedom can exist only as restricted—or, to put it another way, freedom always operates within a context in which some things are possible, others are impossible, and still others are merely more or less difficult.159 It is therefore clear that advocating absolute freedom can only be reduced to a mere slogan. Sartre’s existentialism flourished in Europe and America in the 1950s and 60s and then was on the wane in the 70s and 80s. In theory, its decline may be related to the illusory nature of Sartre’s existentialism. (2) Immorality. There are internal contradictions inherent in Sartre’s existential philosophy. First, if man retains absolute freedom, it must of necessity follow that he has the freedom to choose “the good” or “the evil” and that morality will not exist. Second, if a person has absolute freedom, it must of necessity follow that more people will be denied freedom. If all have absolute freedom, it must of necessity follow that all will be denied freedom. Such a world cannot exist. Anyone endowed with reason and conscience cannot advocate the socalled absolute freedom. Third, in terms of the specific relationship between one individual and every other individual, if each one insists upon enjoying absolute freedom, it must of necessity follow that immorality will exist among them, that is, “Hell is—other people.” As Sartre describes it in his play No Exit, three damned souls are locked up together for eternity in one hideous room in hell. Ironically, the torture is not of rack and fire, but of the burning humiliation of each soul as if it is stripped of its pretenses by the curious souls of the damned. As one of the characters, Garcin, says, “So this is hell. I’d never have believed it. You remember all we were told about the torture chambers, the fire and brimstone, the ‘burning marl.’ Old wives’ tales! There’s no need for red-hot pokers. Hell is other people!”160 Thus it can be seen that while Sartre insists, with all the emphasis at his command, that the individual should enjoy absolute freedom, his emphasis upon human freedom of choice and moral responsibility for it has become nothing but empty talk.

8.2 A Critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism As an intellectual movement, structuralism refers to one of the dominant trends in modern philosophy that gives primacy to the structuralist methodology applicable to a wide range of disciplines. Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist, is universally recognized as one of the founders of twentieth century structuralism.

159 160

Ibid., p. 84. Bernasconi, Robert. ‘Hell Is Other People.’ In How To Read Sartre. Granta Books.

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Although not its originator, the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss is generally considered the most notable exponent of the movement and he is arguably the first such scholar sparking a widespread interest in structuralism. Along with Lévi-Strauss, other prominent structuralists associated with structuralism include the linguist Roman Jakobson, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. Probably the most distinctive feature of the structuralist method is the emphasis it gives to wholes or totalities and the logical priority of the whole over its parts. Structuralists maintain that it is the relationship of parts to each other and to the whole that is important. They insist that the whole and the parts can be properly explained only in terms of the relations that exist between the parts. Thus a structuralist approach focuses on the relationship of individual parts to the larger whole—the structure, which means what an internal analysis of a given whole reveals, viz, elements, relationships among elements, and the arrangement or system of these relations. Hence, structuralism might be defined as follows: The whole is more than the parts, and cannot be reduced to the parts. What is important is the relationship between the parts. It is also worth noting that structuralists claim that to understand the surface structure, one has to understand the deep structure and the ways in which it influences the surface structure. According to structuralists, there is a deep underlying structure to most surface phenomena, and this structure can be conceptualized as a series of generative rules that can create a wide variety of empirical phenomena.161 Lévi-Strauss’ work struck a chord in French left-wing culture in the early 1960s as the expression of a philosophy that shared much of the inspiration of the then dominant philosophies of phenomenology and existentialism, while avoiding what had come to be seen as the insoluble problems of the latter. Many of the pioneers of the structuralist movement, such as Lacan, Foucault, and Poulantzas, came to structuralism from phenomenology or existentialism and created new variants of structuralism that sought to integrate structuralism with phenomenology. Many followers of the structuralist movement brought to structuralism the fervor and missionary zeal with which the previous generation had embraced phenomenology and existentialism. The ease and speed with which so many intellectuals made the transition from phenomenology to structuralism should warn us against the common belief, held by the proponents of one or the other doctrine, that the two movements are absolutely opposed to one another, a belief that is apparently validated by the antithetical terms in which the debate between the two is conducted. There is no doubt that between structuralism and existentialism, in particular, there is an unbridgeable gulf, expressed in the bynow standard oppositions of structure to history, object to subject, unconscious to conscious, determinacy to free will, immanence to transcendence. However, this unbridgeable gulf is not a gulf between two absolutely antithetical philosophies, but is one between philosophies that offer complementary, but divergent, solutions to a common set of problems. Although the structuralist movement emerged in reaction to existentialism, and came to prominence two decades after the heyday of existentialism, the two philosophies have a common origin in the inter-war intellectual 161

Turner, Jonathan H. (2012). Theoretical Sociology: 1830 to the Present. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 736.

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crisis in France. It is these common problems, to which Sartre and Lévi-Strauss offered antithetical solutions, that provide the common foundation of structuralism and existentialism, and it is the shared origin that explains the ease with which a new generation of intellectuals could move from one to the other, or could propose a synthesis of the two.162 (1) The Substance of Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralist Theory Claude Lévi-Strauss, one of the leading figures in structuralism, was an eminent French anthropologist whose work was key in the development of the theory of structuralism and structural anthropology. In 1959 he was appointed to the chair of social anthropology at the College de France. In 1967 he was awarded the Gold Medal of the French National Centre for Scientific Research (French: Centre national de la recherché scientifique, CNRS).163 In 1973 he was elected to the French Academy of Sciences in recognition of his distinguished achievements in anthropological research. In 1974 he received the accolade of election to the Académie Française. The widespread impact of Lévi-Strauss’ thought can be felt in academic circles around the world. His influence has been significant not only throughout the social sciences, but also in philosophy, religion, and literature. Three main sources for Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism can be identified. One must recognize the structuralist ideas developed in modern linguistics, cultural anthropology and modern anthropology reaching a synthesis in structuralism. De Saussure’s structural linguistics, Franz Boas’ structural anthropology and Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious exerted an important influence upon the development of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism. It was Lévi-Strauss who stated that “ethnology is first of all psychology.” The basic ideas of Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology can be summarized as follows. First, structuralism is above all a method, that is to say a structural method. (1) Lévi-Strauss tried to use the structural method to prove the scientificness of anthropology. In the days when Lévi-Strauss engaged in anthropological research, the social sciences encountered considerable criticism from natural scientists on their “scientificness.” Lévi-Strauss believed that we must begin with an in-depth analysis of the structure of internal relationships in the society in order to prove the scientificness of anthropology. For him, the concept of “structure” characterized by abstraction and universality has the function of making anthropology scientific on the model of a natural science. (2) By “structure” Lévi-Strauss means a structural method or a structuralist approach applicable to a wide range of disciplines. For LéviStrauss, the term “structure” indicates a method in the methodological sense, namely certain patterns of structuralist methodology. Lévi-Strauss argues that structure has nothing to do with empirical entities. According to Lévi-Strauss, structure does not 162

Clarke, Simon.(1981). The Foundations of Structuralism: A Critique of Lévi-Strauss and the Structuralist Movement. Brighton, GB-ESX: The Harvester Press, pp. 7–9. 163 The CNRS was ranked No. 3 in 2015 and No. 4 in 2017 by the Nature Index, which measures the largest contributors to papers published in 82 leading journals. “Ten institutions that dominated science in 2015”. Retrieved 12 October 2020. “10 institutions that dominated science in 2017”. Retrieved 12 October 2020. “Introduction to the Nature Index”. Retrieved 12 October 2020.

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refer to an empirical reality but to a structural method—or, to put it another way, the term “structure” indicates modes of thought or methodological patterns constructed on the foundation of that reality. For him, “the term ‘social structure’ has nothing to do with empirical reality but with models which are built after it.”164 One may agree with Lévi-Strauss’ categorical distinction between the concepts of social structure and social relation. In his view, social relations consist of the raw materials out of which the models making up the social structure are built, while social structure can be conceived of as the models built out of social relations. Therefore, “social structure cannot claim a field of its own among others in social studies. It is rather a method to be applied to any kind of social studies, similar to the structural analysis current in other disciplines.”165 In addition, according to him, structure, which can be viewed as a kind of methodological pattern, must also meet the following standards. In other words, he believed that structure is endowed with three characteristics. First, structure should be treated as a complete whole, in which various elements condition (restrain) each other closely, with none of them subjected to change independent of others. Second, if certain elements of the structure are subjected to changes, the structure will no longer exist. Third, the implication in the term “structure” indicates that all the observable facts can be understood directly. Lévi-Strauss asserts that only a structuralist approach to anthropology can make it a scientific discipline. (3) Structuralism could be described as a systematic approach universally applicable to a wide range of disciplines. Lévi-Strauss’ major work has been devoted to the development of a systematic, universal method, and this same systematic method could be applied to anthropology as well as to other disciplines. For him, this method can be treated as a structural method. According to Lévi-Strauss’ structural method, any set of phenomena empirically observable in human society should be treated not as a mechanical agglomeration but as a systematic or structural whole. In addition, this structural method can also be used to explain the relations among the elements of a system and the relationships among various systems, as well as among different fields of research. Academic research should break down the absolute boundaries between phenomena and reduce every phenomenon whatsoever to its systematic whole. (4) Structuralism firmly rejects the idea of the human subject as well as of the subjective choices of individuals. Structuralism replaces the ontologically privileged human subject with a decentred conception of the self. At the height of the popularity of structuralism, it was common to talk of the death of the subject—the demise of the idea of individuals acting and choosing voluntarily.166 Lévi-Strauss laid emphasis on the function of objective structures, but he bestowed little attention on the role of human agency, that is to say man’s subjective initiative. For him, all human social phenomena as well as human beings’ statements and actions, which are governed by the universal structures, can only be treated as their manifestations, and they 164 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 299. 165 Ibid., p. 300. 166 Gordon Marshall. “structuralism.” A Dictionary of Sociology. Encyclopedia.com. 16 Oct. 2020 .

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never change the structures. Hence, the subject of society as well as of history is the a priori structure rather than man. Social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even declared the position on “melting man,” asserting that “such a detestable favorite as the subject (man) must be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled over the philosophical territory for too long.” Second, structuralism views the binary opposition as the key to understanding structural relationships among elements—or, to put it another way, the idea of binary oppositions is central to structuralist thought. For Lévi-Strauss all relations can be ultimately reducible to binary oppositions. The structuralist method, then, is a means whereby social reality may be expressed as binary oppositions. The main contents contained in this method can be summarized as follows: (1) Structures are characterized by relations, which for Lévi-Strauss can be all ultimately reducible to binary oppositions. According to Lévi-Strauss, all structural relations can be reduced to binary oppositions, which will be a basis for the attribution of social value to each element—or, to put it another way, this may serve to fix the social value of each element. This method tends to lay emphasis upon their wholes or totalities when it is used to describe and understand social phenomena. Hence the great advantage of the structuralist method lies in the fact that it allows us to apprehend a social phenomenon as a whole embracing the totality of its parts, since each of its components has its value in terms of its relation to the totality. Indeed, the relations that are most important in structural analysis are binary oppositions. Whatever else the structuralist method may have done, it has undoubtedly encouraged structuralists to think in binary terms, to look for binary oppositions in whatever phenomenon they are studying whereby they can discern underlying structures behind the often fluctuating and changing appearances of social reality. The principle of this method lies in the fact that the structuralist method is used primarily to study the network of relations connecting interdependent elements, rather than the elements within a given whole. For Lévi-Strauss, a preliminary understanding of structural relationships among elements of a structure can help us to explain the relation between the whole and its parts. (2) Lévi-Strauss held binary oppositions to operate based on the structures of the human brain—or, to put it another way, binary oppositions were part of the structures of the human brain. He argued that the basis of the world is neither the mode of production nor the absolute spirit, but rather the human subconscious, that is, the subconscious layer of the human mind. The subconscious can be regarded as the ultimate source of all human action—or, to put it another way, the realm of the subconscious lies behind all human behavior. Since the nervous system of the human brain (the subconscious) is endowed with a binary mental structure, which is to say the essence of human thinking is the structure of binary oppositions, the way that human beings attempt to describe separate or discontinuous things tends to be characterized by a binary opposition. The universe is a continuum, but human beings study (look at or think about) it only by dividing it into discontinuous parts (segments) due to the limitations of human thinking. In knowing the universe, human beings tend to divide the discontinuous parts (segments) into categories so as to bring order to the universe. In view of the fact that the mental structures (the subconscious) which

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underlie human behavior usually take the form of binary oppositions, human beings tend to describe, interpret and make sense of the world in terms of binary oppositions. (3) There are limitations inherent in binary thinking. For Lévi-Strauss, this kind of binary thinking is far from the best possible one. Rather, it asserts itself as intermediate between primitive and modern thought as it actually exists. He tried to make us recognize the limitations inherent in binary thinking by pointing out that human beings are endowed with mental structures, the constitution of which is simple and incomplete compared with the structure of the objective world. A “binary opposition” is intrinsic to the primitive or ancient mind, and this kind of binary thinking continues to this day. On the one hand, this kind of mental structure can be used to know the world-parts and explain survival phenomena, but on the other, there are many limitations inherent in it. Although he affirmed that classification (categorization) is of great significance to human rational thinking and understanding of the world, LéviStrauss also sensed a deep concern over potential outcomes of this innate tendency to categorize (classify) natural objects that human thinking is endowed with. It is mankind’s classification (categorization) consciousness that divides human beings into “ourselves” and “people of a different kind (people not belonging to the same category),” that segments ethnic groups into “superior” and “inferior” ones, and that may cause contradictions between people of different nationalities, ethnic discriminations, and divisions in society, as well as national conflicts and wars, which had been repeatedly inflicted upon human societies in the history of mankind. In addition, classification consciousness may constitute a barrier to human knowledge in such a way that human beings may find themselves amidst insurmountable difficulties in viewing things in their totality as well as in obtaining a deeper understanding of the physical world and human behavior. Third, Lévi-Strauss’ application of structural methods can be perceived most clearly in his Structural Anthropology (1958). He applied structural analysis to the study of kinship, myth and primitive thought, which has proved of great value to the development of anthropology. (1) The elementary structures of kinship. For LéviStrauss, there are two serious limitations to traditional kinship studies. First, the traditional analysis of kinship systems merely involves a treatment of the units of kinship as independent entities, whereas a structural analysis of kinship systems involves a treatment of the units of kinship not as independent entities but as related entities, and an overall focus on the concept of a system which bears structure. For him, kinship systems constitute coherent and patterned wholes, and are subject to structural analysis. Lévi-Strauss argues that kinship must be treated as one relationship within a system, while the system itself must be considered as a whole in order to grasp its structure.167 Second, perhaps the weakest point in traditional kinship studies has been the failure to treat kinship as a system which bears structure. One area that particularly needs emphasis in traditional kinship studies is the historical development of the kinship system. Lévi-Strauss’ application of structural methods can be perceived most clearly in his brilliant analysis of kinship systems. According to him, 167

Witherspoon, Gary. (1975). Navajo Kinship and Marriage. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 12.

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“the recurrence of kinship patterns, marriage rules, similarly prescribed attitudes between certain types of relations, and so forth, in scattered regions of the globe and in fundamentally different societies, leads us to believe, that in the case of kinship as well as language, the observable phenomena result from the action of laws which are general but implicit.”168 In his seminal work The Elementary Structures of Kinship Claude Lévi-Strauss identified the kinship structure as the underlying principle of social life. He holds that societies exist with binary distinctions like patrilinealmatrilineal, kin non-kin etc. and that binary oppositions or opposites are cardinal to his analysis and explanation of kinship structures. In applying binary opposition to the study of kinship structures in human societies, Lévi-Strauss tried to show that kinship systems could be summarized in terms of five binary oppositions. He argues that kinship relations may ultimately be divided into two groups, which each represents two generations. One group describes blood relations—brother, sister, father, and son; the other describes ties established by marriage—maternal uncle, nephew, husband, and wife.169 (2) The structural study of myth. For the first half of the twentieth century anthropologists and mythologists mainly went their separate ways, the anthropologists adhering to some version of myth-ritualism and functionalism and the mythologists proceeding on the assumption that myths could be studied as literature, narrative, or historical text. Dissatisfied with any interpretation of myth mentioned above, Claude Lévi-Strauss changed all of that. Lévi-Strauss’s principal innovation in the analysis and explanation of myth is referred to as structuralism. His inspiration derived from linguistics, specifically from the so-called Prague school and the work of Roman Jacobson in particular. The point of his analysis was to reveal the structure of myth.170 Shortly after his monumental work –The Elementary Structures of Kinship appeared in 1949, Lévi-Strauss shifted the focus of his research away from kinship studies to the structural study of myth. He asserted that just as the human mind is dominated by structure in the realm of myth, which is in some sense separate from everyday life, so it will necessarily be dominated by structure in the manifold spheres of human activity. He pointed out that there are a myriad of myths around the world, with plots and themes similar to each other. He emphasized the presence of the same logical patterns in myths throughout the world. Myth is the initial or ancient form which the structure of human mind takes to manifest itself, as well as the primitive form which primitive human beings assume to express their primitive mentalities—or, to put it another way, myth tends to be viewed as a direct and undisguised expression of man’s inner thoughts as well as their connections to each other, that is, the structure of human mind. For Lévi-Strauss, myth represents the collective dream of humanity (mankind) in the earliest days of civilization (in his infancy), or rather, the dream manifestations of the collective unconscious. He even believed that 168

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 36. 169 Wheater, Kitty. (2017). An Analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Structural Anthropology. London, UK: Macat International Ltd, p. 30. 170 Winzeler, Robert L. (2008). Anthropology and Religion: What We Know, Think, and Question. Plymouth, UK: Altamira Press, p. 126.

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the creation of myths by primitive people was aimed at transmitting information, that just as the powerful and resounding notes of a symphony strike the sensitive, responsive and sympathetic chord in the heart of the listener, so repeated transmission of information will produce almost the same impression upon the mind of the receiver, and that just as an orchestra has to read the music score repeatedly before it sets about playing a symphony, so a reader will have to ponder over the myth before he can succeed in grasping its implications. According to Lévi-Strauss, meaning resides in the combination of elements—or “mythemes”—and in the relations that can be drawn, by the structuralist reader, between them. Lévi-Strauss, then, fabricates an analogy between language, myth and music as a means of re-imagining Saussure’s distinction between the syntagmatic-diachronic and paradigmatic-synchronic dimensions of language: “By getting at what we call harmony, we would then see that an orchestra score, to be meaningful, must be read diachronically along one axis— that is, page after page, from left to right—and synchronically along the other axis, all the notes written vertically making up one gross constituent unit, that is, one bundle of relations.” We find the juxtaposition of myth and music repeated in the essay “The Story of Asdiwal”, where Lévi-Strauss distinguishes between the narrative or syntagmatic-diachronic sequence of events, or “the chronological order in which things happen”, and various paradigmatic-synchronic levels arranged vertically across which the happenings that the myth recounts, take place. Whereas the former is compared to melody, which proceeds along the syntagmatic-diachronic axis, the latter is compared to “contrapuntal schemata which are vertical,” again insinuating that the practice of reading (Western) music provides a model for reading myths, in that it is a process that must proceed both horizontally from page to page and vertically from stave to stave at the same time. Lévi-Strauss clarifies the analogy between language, myth and music further in Myth and Meaning: “Therefore, we have to read the myth more or less as we would read an orchestral score, not stave after stave, but understanding that we should apprehend the whole page and understanding that something which was written on the first stave at the top of the page acquires meaning only if one considers that it is part and parcel of what is written below on the second stave, the third stave, and so on. That is, we have to read not only from left to right, but at the same time vertically, from top to bottom. We have to understand that each page is a totality. And it is only by treating the myth as if it were an orchestral score, written stave after stave, that we can understand it as a totality, that we can extract the meaning out of the myth.”171 (3) The structure of primitive thought. Lévi-Strauss insists on fundamental similarities between primitive and modern thinking—or, to put it another way, he argues that there is no essential difference between primitive and modern thinking. Lévi-Strauss believed that primitive people’s nature taxonomy, that is, classification of natural objects, which belongs in a scientific category, is as practical as modern science. According to Lévi-Strauss, the thought we call primitive, that is the primitive thought, is founded on a demand for order—or, to put it another way, this “demand for order” underlies much primitive 171

Tremlett, Paul-François. (2014). Lévi-Strauss on Religion: The Structuring Mind. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 58–59.

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thought. This “demand for order” forms the basis for both primitive and scientific thought. All human thought shares this fundamental “demand for order.” This is equally true of all thought but it is through the properties common to all thought that we can most easily begin to understand forms of thought which seem very strange to us.172 Lévi-Strauss postulates two distinct modes of scientific thought and writes, “These are certainly not a function of different stages of development of the human mind, but rather of two strategic levels at which nature is accessible to scientific enquiry: one roughly adapted to that of perception and imagination; the other at a remove from it.”173 “It is therefore better, instead of contrasting magic and science, to compare them as two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge, which, on the one hand, require the same sort of mental operations, and on the other, differ not so much in kind as in the different types of phenomena to which they are applied.”174 Lévi-Strauss attacked the traditional dichotomy of primitive and modern thought. It must be admitted that his binary analysis reveals no evidence that primary thought differs from modern thought. In essence there is hardly any difference between primitive and modern thought. Moreover, Lévi-Strauss’ structural analysis of totemism is enlightening. His work, Totemism, offers a unique insight into the worship of a deified object and helps in the understanding of tribal rites. (2) A Critical Analysis of Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism First, Lévi-Strauss’ contribution to structuralism. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, structuralism was the dominant Western intellectual movement, whose popularity led to its spread across the globe. There can be no doubt that Lévi-Strauss is the central figure in the movement and that his writings have sparked a widespread interest in structuralism. He has been acclaimed as “the father of structuralism.” The cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz remarks, “Lévi-Strauss made anthropology undergo a rational training. He endowed anthropology with theoretical, rational and philosophical dimensions. He tried to integrate the main global trends in rational thought into anthropology. He made anthropology break away from handicraft models. ...It is thanks to Lévi-Strauss that anthropologists are just beginning to wake up to the importance of thinking, which is indeed unprecedented in anthropological studies.”175 His substantial contributions to structuralism can be summarized as follows. (1) There is a renewed emphasis on wholes or totalities in academic circles. Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism holds that the structure of a thing is a complete whole. His writings, on the one hand, give emphasis to the closely interdependent relations among the constituent elements that make up a given whole as well as between the whole and its parts, and on the other hand demonstrate how the whole and its parts as well 172

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, p. 14. 173 Morris, Brian. (1987). Anthropological Studies of Religion: An Introductory Text. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 280. 174 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, p. 18. 175 Bourdieu, Pierre. (1997). Cultural Capital and Social Alchemy. Shanghai, China: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p. 5.

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as the constituent elements that make up a whole condition or restrain each other. The basic principle followed by the structuralist approach emphasizing the whole or the totality is as follows. The whole ought to be analyzed in terms of the structural relations among its elements rather than the internal elements as entities in themselves. To wit, Lévi-Strauss’s structural method focuses on the relationship between elements of the whole, rather than on elements as entities in themselves. Considering that after the Renaissance social sciences tended to put more value on analysis than on synthesis and give primacy to the whole over its parts, to a certain extent, the structuralist approach, or rather the structural method, which boasts a broad vision, has brought about an effectual cure for the deep-rooted ills which social sciences have been suffering from, especially since the wave of scientism launched before and after World War I prevailed. Structuralist thought, especially in the writings of Lévi-Strauss, has changed the way scholars in a wide range of disciplines think about their work, thereby steering their scholastic studies in the right direction. (2) Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism made anthropologists wake up to the fact that structure may prove of great importance to anthropological theories—or, to put it another way, Lévi-Strauss made anthropologists attach more importance to the place occupied by structure as well as the value possessed by it in anthropological theories. He argued that we should embrace structure as man’s mode of existence and way of thinking and that structure can be treated as a universal method applicable to a wide range of disciplines. In his writings, which demonstrate how structure affects and determines human life, Lévi-Strauss gave a thought-provoking and enlightening analysis of the binary structure of human thought. He devoted his life to the study of man’s mode of thinking—that is, “a binary mental structure” that the nervous system of the human brain is endowed with. For Lévi-Strauss, on the one hand, innumerable achievements in the history of mankind should be credited or attributed to the binary structure of human thought, but on the other, he tried to demonstrate in his writings that the binary structure of human thought led to oppositions, conflicts, disasters and wars threatening the survival and development of mankind, whereby he made anthropological circles and social scientists wake up to the importance of structure and entertain a lively concern for structure. (3) Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism has awakened anthropological circles to conscious rational thought. It has been known since a long time ago that anthropology gives primacy to field work over theoretical thought and that anthropologists show contempt for theoretical thought or even declare themselves dead against it. It must of necessity follow that anthropology has been deficient in theory over a long period of time. Lévi-Strauss tried to develop a systematic theory as well as a universal method while applying himself to the study of internal social relationships with the structural method that he is credited with. He was far from the attainment of his goal, but the rational spirit in which he pursued his researches impressed anthropological circles tremendously. Second, the limitations and problems inherent in Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism. There are manifold limitations and problems inherent in Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism. (1) Lévi-Strauss maintains a negative attitude towards man’s subjectivity. On the one hand, his structuralist theory lays undue emphasis upon the place of structure as well as its function, but on the other, man’s subjectivity tends to be dismissed as

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unimportant in his writings. For Lévi-Strauss, the subject of society as well as of history is the a priori structure rather than man. Social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even declared the position on “melting man”, asserting that “such a detestable favorite as the subject (man) must be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled over the philosophical territory for too long.”176 According to Lévi-Strauss’s method of anthropological research, anthropology should neglect and even reject the study of “man himself”—or, to put it another way, the author’s beliefs and assumptions as well as the subject’s own personal experience (knowledge) should be removed from anthropological research. It is therefore clear that Lévi-Strauss’s method of anthropological research is far from applicable to the study of human beings as well as human cultures, which asserts itself as the object of anthropological inquiry in its own right. Culture creates man who in turn is fully entitled to be the maker of culture. If we disregard the relationship of the dialectical unity between man and culture—or, to put it another way, if we have man and culture stand in contradiction to each other, use culture to screen man, repress man or supersede man, and even negate man’s subjective status as well as his subjective role, there will exist no culture, not to mention cultural reform and innovation. Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is essentially an ahistorical method. Hence it must of necessity follow that when he uses his structuralist method to explain cultural phenomena, the explanation is completely ahistorical. Lévi-Strauss contends that history is the product of the unconscious working of the mind. To put it another way, history can only be described or understood in terms of the inherent and unconscious structure of the human mind. Lévi-Strauss reveals an unconscious structure of binary oppositions which can be applied to the interpretation of all cultural phenomena. However, the invariant structure of the human mind tends to treat human beings as well as human cultures as fossilized. In other words, in applying the invariant structure of the human mind to the interpretation of human beings as well as cultural phenomena, Lévi-Strauss tends to treat them as ahistorical beings, which is to say they tend to remain the same over or through time. Sartre objected to Lévi-Strauss’ approach to the study of man on existential grounds. In his view, structuralism is remote from human existence and even denies its fundamental condition—that is, freedom.177 Sartre considers the structuralist approach to be guilty of transforming men into static, timeless objects, related to things in the world and to other men in purely formal, objective and timeless ways.178 This makes the structuralist interpretation of man and culture far from complete. Generally speaking, structuralism as well as the theories denying man’s subjective initiative fails to offer a scientific interpretation of man and culture. (2) Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism denies man’s subjective choice. Structuralism, on the one hand, lays undue 176

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (2007). Mythologiques: L’Homme nu (The Naked Man) (Chinese translation). Beijing, China: China Renmin University Press, p. 149. 177 Kurzweil, Edith. (1996). The Age of Structuralism: from Lévi-Strauss to Foucault. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. 24. 178 Lévi-Strauss. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 11.

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emphasis on objective structures, but on the other, it tends to treat man’s subjective initiative and choice as unimportant. For Lévi-Strauss, all social phenomena as well as human beings’ words and actions, which tend to be determined or governed by the a priori preexisting structures, can only be treated as their manifestations, but they never change the universal structures. This runs counter to the very law of human existence. The human subject that is inherently endowed with structure and choice is the unity of structure and choice. In the sphere of the human world, as there is no choice that has nothing to do with structure, so there is no structure that has no connection with choice. Structure and choice are connected with each other and can transform to each other—that is, as structure can transform to choice, so choice can change to structure. As structure determines choice, so choice determines structure. Lévi-Strauss insists upon the structure that has nothing to do with choice, but in fact the Lévi-Straussian structure does not exist at all in the human world. (3) Lévi-Strauss attempts to apply scientific method to the interpretation of man and culture. LéviStrauss nurses a perennial desire to break down barriers between disparate fields of knowledge, such as natural sciences, social sciences and humanities, which claim superiority for their respective methodologies, and to apply the methods of structural linguistics to anthropology. As early as 1964 Claude Lévi-Strauss criticized the dualism humanities versus sciences arguing that methodological aspects of the so called “hard sciences” could occur in different disciplines of the humanities as well as in the social sciences. Only by borrowing from the empirical sciences and transforming themselves into theoretical equivalents could the humanities achieve any sort of objective and systematic parity.179 Given that the Lévi-Straussian style of research has evoked much controversy, we must pronounce a fair judgment on its merits and demerits. The Lévi-Straussian style of research runs counter to an important principle of scientific inquiry—that is, research methods must be appropriate to specific movements of objects, especially their respective forms of movement. Specifically, we must not apply the lower forms of movement to the study of the higher forms of movement. If we apply the lower forms of movement to the study of the higher forms of movement, it must of necessity follow that we will reach wrong conclusions. The German philosopher and sociologist Theodor W. Adorno once put forward an influential argument—that is, the paradigms of natural sciences cannot be transplanted to the social sciences. Structures, as we have seen, are characterized by relations, which for Lévi-Strauss are all ultimately reducible to binary oppositions. The structuralist method, then, is a means whereby social reality may be expressed as binary oppositions. However, when Lévi-Strauss applies his structuralist method to the interpretation of anthropological phenomena, some explanations are impressive, while others are somewhat far-fetched and unconvincing. Perhaps the main problem lies in the fact that the methods for the study of the lower forms of movement have been applied to the study of the higher forms of movement. The methods for the study of the higher forms of movement are a new set of methods represented by Marx’s materialist dialectics. 179

Vlacos, Sophie. (2014). Ricoeur, Literature and Imagination. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, Inc., p. 25.

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9 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” Preparing Certain Theoretical Prerequisites for Human Studies The theory about the noumenon of human life—or rather about man’s “structure and choice”—can only be established under the guidance of Marxism, or more specifically, in integrating man’s existential experience with theoretical knowledge from different disciplines such as Chinese and foreign philosophies, philosophical anthropology, anthropology, psychology, and history, particularly in analyzing and criticizing the principle of binary opposition as well as its manifold manifestations that both structuralists and existentialists loyally maintained in their academic studies. Hence it can be safely asserted that the theory about the noumenon of human life— or rather man’s “structure and choice”—is in a better position to make us acquire a deeper understanding of “the principles of subjective anthropology,” and to make “the discipline of subjective anthropology” undergo further development. Moreover, it is also of much importance in preparing certain theoretical prerequisites for human studies. First, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” attempts a new interpretation of “the actual whole man.” Over longer periods of time, mankind has been in the midst of a grave crisis, that is, “knowing thyself.” As American scholar Calvin O. Schrag points out in his “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought”: “The representatives of the different disciplines display a common concernful disquietude about the objectivizing tendencies in the modern world which threaten humanism and humanity alike. These objectivizing tendencies are seen as being the result of the conspiring of many factors, but always generally positioned against the background of an encroaching technocracy and scientism. Pitirim Sorokin, the American sociologist, finds the greatest threat of ‘sensate culture,’ which in his view is dominant in the contemporary Western world, to reside in the sacrifice of the humanness of man by reducing him to a scientific object. The threat of depersonalization through objectivization is discernable in virtually every aspect of man’s contemporary cultural and technological existence.”180 As anyone acquainted with the literature can testify, we are not alone in this assessment. Already in 1928 Max Scheler, the founder of philosophical anthropology, who had conceived of it as a fundamental discipline of philosophy and the human sciences, called our attention to the troubled condition affecting the scientific and philosophical study of man. “We have a scientific, a philosophical, and a theological anthropology in complete separation from each other. We do not have a unified idea of man. The increasing multiplicity of the special sciences, valuable as they are, tends to hide man’s nature more than reveal it. Man is more a problem to himself at the present time than ever

180

Schrag, Calvin O. “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought.” Philosophy East and West 20: 1 (January 1970): 83–89.

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before in all recorded history.”181 Technologism has long since obscured the image of but any man, and “knowing thyself” has become a 21st-century problem. According to Marxist theory, the scholarly monograph advances and develops the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” and in so doing seeks to elaborate the categorical system as well as the theoretical and methodological frames. Second, the theory about the noumenon of human life—or rather about man’s “structure and choice”—is set to embark upon a new study of human ontology from a Marxist perspective. The fundamental task before philosophical anthropology is to provide the ontological basis for the humanities and social sciences connected with human studies. Max Scheler, who was a pioneering German philosopher known for his original and substantial contribution to the advancement of philosophical anthropology, rightly contended that philosophical anthropology is a meta-philosophy as well as a metascience. The Chinese philosopher Liu Fangtong maintained that “only such an anthropological discipline can reestablish the basis for those sciences that take man as the object of study.”182 The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer, admittedly approaching the issue from a somewhat different perspective, nonetheless came to a remarkably similar general conclusion: “Psychology, ethnology, anthropology, and history have amassed an astoundingly rich and constantly increasing body of facts. …But our wealth of facts is not necessarily a wealth of thoughts. Unless we succeed in finding a clue of Ariadne to lead us out of this labyrinth, we can have no real insight into the general character of human culture; we shall remain lost in a mass of disconnected and disintegrated data which seem to lack all conceptual unity.”183 No significant progress, however, has been made so far in solving this problem. Let us take a few examples to serve as an illustration. Philosophy traces “the assumption on human nature” back to the essence (or nature) of man; ethics, to man’s morality; psychology, to the human psychology; jurisprudence, to citizens’ (or civic) rights and obligations before the law. However, their respective assumptions on human nature cannot be equated with the concrete and whole man, but rather can only represent different parts of the concrete and whole man. After all, man exists and acts the way that the concrete and whole man does. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the paradox of human existence has been increasingly manifest, and against this backdrop the incomplete and faulty “assumptions on human nature” will surely make the humanities and social sciences fall into their respective areas of mistaken theories. In this very book the author advances and develops the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” and attempts to make certain assumptions about “the concrete and whole man,” and to provide the ontological basis for the humanities and social sciences closely connected with 181

Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. (1983). The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition: Individualization of Nature and the Human Being. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, p. 77. 182 Liu, Fang-Tong. (2000). Contemporary Western Philosophy (revised ed.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 387. 183 Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 22.

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human studies, whereby the humanities and social sciences will be able to conform to the realities of “the concrete and whole man” in a more scientific, more perfect and more efficient way. Third, the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” rightly asserts itself as a scientific philosophy of life. Generally speaking, there is a close identity between the theory about the noumenon of human life and the scientific philosophy of life. How a man thinks reflectively on life tends to determine what his philosophy of life is. The structure of human life has been widely accepted as a general truth in the structural theory about the noumenon—or rather the thing-in-itself—of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) which, on the other hand, tends to deny the existence of any choice in human life. Hence it must of necessity follow that the structuralist theory takes a negative attitude towards “any choice in human life.” On the contrary, “any choice in human life” has been universally recognized as an undeniable truth in the existentialist theory about the noumenon—or rather the thing-in-itself—of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) which, on the other hand, tends to negate the existence of any structure upon which human life depends. There can be little doubt that existentialists will adopt a nihilistic attitude towards the structure of human life. The theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” holds that man’s “structure and choice” can justly lay claim to being “the integrated duality” of the noumenon of human life, that is to say, the noumenon of human life consisting of both “structure” and “choice” tends to assert itself as the unity of man’s “structure and choice.” Moreover, the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” maintains that man’s “structure” determines his “choice,” which, in turn, tends to exercise a determining influence upon man’s “structure.” It’s therefore evident that this very theory is at once a form of human ontology and a sort of philosophy of life. He who advocates the theory about the noumenon of human life—or rather about man’s “structure and choice”—tends to insist on paying due recognition to the social structure, the structure of human life, and “man’s choice in life.” He who is endowed with the structure of human life is in a position not only to consciously cultivate an active rational attitude towards life, but to make conscious and active choices. In brief, the theory about the noumenon of human life—or rather about man’s “structure and choice”—is of much importance in preparing certain theoretical prerequisites or frames for the scientific philosophy of life an individual human being may adopt in his life, whereby he can take a correct approach towards the relationship among the various component elements inherent in the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” as well as towards man’s relationship to other people, to society, to nature, and to himself, and criticize or reject the one-sided theories such as structuralism, existentialism, and anthropocentrism, thus gaining mastery over his own destiny. Fourth, the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” serves to prepare certain theoretical frames of reference for an idealistic anthropological commitment to self-transcendence. The marginalization of anthropology has long since become an indisputable fact when viewed from a global perspective. To make people wake to the gravity of the situation, we may

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as well make reference to the article entitled The Future of Anthropology, which James L. Peacock, president of the American Anthropological Association between 1993 and 1995, published in the March issue of American Anthropologist for 1997, and which was translated in Chinese in the second issue of Study of Nationalities in Guangxi for 2001. The article showed that in view of the fact that American anthropology today has been in the midst of marginalization and standing in a serious predicament, he sought to analyze the inner causes, and to come up with strategies to cope with the awkward situation. James L. Peacock remarked, “…despite the yeoman’s service that anthropology does in teaching a large number of students, anthropology is still marginal as a category. Anthropology is virtually absent in the minds and hearts of students, student leaders, parents, administrators, alumni, trustees, legislators, and donors. …anthropology remains marginal as a category. We are ‘outside the envelope,’ as they say.” For this, he further noted that anthropology in the twenty-first century would be faced with such three possible scenarios as extinction, standing aloof, and developing and applying the core ideas that are part of our great tradition. “So what is the future of anthropology? Let’s look at three scenarios: The first is extinction. Götterdämmerung; we go up in flames. In this period of downsizing, universities and institutions see small, vulnerable programs such as anthropology as likely candidates for hit lists. Unfortunately, this is more than a distant; it is a viable possibility. A second scenario, perhaps likely, is that we do not die but seek refuge in our enclave, hanging on as living dead. Anthropology in the twenty-first century, in this vision, consists of disorganized, quaintly intriguing, and slightly amusing naysaying eccentrics who relish vaguely recalled avant-garde ideas from the fin de siècle 20th-century but who are merely a curiosity in the 21st. The third alternative, as viable as extinction, is a flourishing redirection of our field into a prominent position in society. Anthropology would remain intriguing and creatively diverse, iconoclastic and breathtaking in its sweep and perception, profound in its scholarship, but would become integral and even leading in addressing the complex challenges of a transnational, yet grounded, humanity.” Moreover, he pointed out, “What are liabilities of the discipline and its practitioners? One argument is that it is not society that is to blame for anthropology’s marginalization, but anthropology itself. …Whether it survives, flourishes, or becomes extinct depends on anthropology’s ability to contribute: to become integral and significant to our culture and society without becoming subservient.” An in-depth analysis of the awkward situation facing anthropology may awaken us to the fact that, essentially, it is anthropology itself that is to blame for its own marginalization. It has long since become a regrettable fact that “culture,” “society” and “human physique” asserted themselves as the research objects of anthropology, while “the study of man himself” has fallen into almost total neglect in anthropological circles. Academic anthropology’s regrettable separation from its proper object of study must of necessity cause “man himself” to cold shoulder anthropology. A workable solution to the problem of “anthropology’s marginalization” should be based on the premise that anthropology must take “man himself” as the prime object of study. Hence the author advances and develops the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” and makes a thorough inquiry into the noumenon of

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human life, holding that only in this way can anthropology lay a solid foundation for the transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one and enter into a virtuous circle, in which anthropology is interested in man himself and man himself is also concerned with anthropology, whereby it can succeed in bringing about the historical transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one.

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22. Schacter, Daniel L., Wegner, Daniel M., & Gilbert, Daniel T. Psychology. New York, NY: Macmillan Higher Education, 2008. 23. Noam, Gil G., Hauser, Stuart T., Santostefano, Sebastiano., Garrison, William., Jacobson, Alan M., Powers, Sally I., & Mead, Merril. “Ego Development and Psychopathology: A Study of Hospitalized Adolescents”. Child Development. Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development. 55:1 (February 1984): 189–194. 24. Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology (James Strachey, Trans.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 363–364. 25. Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 110–111. 26. Schacter, Daniel L. (2011). Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, p. 481. 27. Sédat, Jacques. (2000). “Freud.” Collection Synthese. Armand Colin, p. 109. 28. Snowden, Ruth. (2006). Freud: Teach Yourself . New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 105–107. 29. Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 95–6. 30. Meyers, David G. “Module 44: The Psychoanalytic Perspective.” In Psychology Eighth Edition in Modules. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2007. 31. Calian, Florian. (2012). Plato’s Psychology of Action and the Origin of Agency. Paris, FR: L’Harmattan, pp. 17–19. 32. Sigmund, Freud. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Jue-Fu Gao, Trans.). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, 1984; Sigmund, Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Chinese edition) (Chen Lin, Huan-Min Zhang, & Wei-Qi Chen, Trans., Rev. Zechuan Chen). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986. 33. “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. . Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 34. Horney, Karen (1885–1952). Women in World History: A Biographical Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 35. Britannica, The Editor of Encyclopedia. “Karen Horney”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2020, . Accessed 3 February 2021. 36. Schacter, Daniel L., Gilbert, Daniel Todd., & Wegner, Daniel M. Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2011. 37. Britannica, The Editor of Encyclopedia. “Karen Horney”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karen-Horney. Accessed 3 February 2021. 38. “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 39. “Karen Horney.” en.wikipedia.org. 31 Jan. 2021 . 40. Horney, Karen. (1950). Neurosis and Human Growth. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 17. 41. Horney, Karen. The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Chuan Feng, Trans.) Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 1988; Horney, Karen. Our Inner Conflicts (Zuo-Hong Wang, Trans.) Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 2004; “Karen Danielsen Horney.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 https://www. encyclopedia.com. 42. “Maslow, Abraham.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 43. “Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. . Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 44. Sternlicht, Manny “Maslow, Abraham H.” Encyclopedia Judaica. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 45. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. “Abraham Maslow”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 14 Jan. 2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abraham-H-Maslow. Accessed 5 February 2021.

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46. “Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. . Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 47. Maslow, Abraham H. Self-Actualizing Man (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu & Feng Liu, Trans.) Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987; Hoffman, Edward. The Right to Be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu, Trans.) Beijing, China: Reform Publishing House (1988–2000), 1998. 48. “Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 . 49. Shakespeare, William. (2001). The Complete Works of William Shakespeare: The Tragedy of Hamlet (in the English and Chinese languages), Vol. 32. (Shi-Qiu Liang, Trans.) Beijing, China: China Radio and TV Press, & Taipei, China: The Far East Book Company, p. 110. 50. Landman, Michael. (1974). Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, p. 74. 51. Landman. Michael. Philosophical Anthropology (translated by David J. Parent). Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Westminster Press, 1974, pp. 152–153. 52. Toth, Beata. (2016). The Heart Has Its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the Heart. Cambridge, England: ISD LLC, p. 6. 53. Landman, Michael. (1974). Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, p. 109. 54. Mao, Ze-Dong. “Eternal Glory to the Heroes of the People!” (Epitaph on the Monument to the Heroes of the People drafted by Comrade Mao, Tse-Tung) in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Retrieved from “Marxists.org”. Access Time: February 21, 2021. 55. Rombach, Heinrich. (2009). Die Welt als lebendige Struktur: Probleme und Lösungen der Strukturontologie (Chinese version) (Jun Wang, Trans.). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, pp. 10–12. 56. Liu, Wen-Ying. (1996). Ancient Historical Origins: A New Study of Primitive Thought and Cultures. Beijing, China: China Social Sciences Press, pp. 403–433. 57. Huang Xi-Ting. (2002). Personality Psychology. Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang Education Publishing House, pp. 477–483. 58. “Piaget, Jean.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. . Encylopedia.com. 23 Feb. 2021 https://www.encyclopedia.com. 59. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. “Jean Piaget”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 16 September, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Piaget. Accessed 24 February 2021. 60. Piaget, Jean. Science of Education and the Psychology of the Child (Chinese version) (Tongxian Fu, Trans.). Beijing, China: Culture and Education Publishing House, 1981. 61. “Piaget, Jean.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 23 Feb. 2021. https://www.encyclopedia.com. 62. “Kohlberg, Lawrence.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 24 Feb. 2021 . 63. Wei, Xian-Chao. (1995). Moral Psychology and Moral Education. Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang University Press, pp. 122–125. 64. Cassirer, Ernst. (2004). The Logic of the Humanities (Zi-Yin Guan, Trans.). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 30. 65. Hall, Calvin Springer., & Nordby, Vernon J. (1987). A Primer of Jungian Psychology (Chuan Feng, Trans.). Beijing, China: SDX Joint Publishing Company, p. 112. 66. Piaget, Jean. (1987). The Principles of Genetic Epistemology (Xian-Dian Wang, Trans.). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, p. 23. 67. Kant, Immanuel. (1987). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Xiao-Mang Deng, Trans.). Chongqing, China: Chongqing Publishing House, p. 2. 68. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Collected Works, Volume 46: Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 104.

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69. Liu, Wen-Ying. (1996). Ancient Historical Origins: A New Study of Primitive Thought and Cultures. Beijing, China: China Social Sciences Press, pp. 78–83. 70. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 294. 71. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2009). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 9: Engels: Dialectics of Nature (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 421–22. 72. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 96. 73. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The German Ideology (excerpts) (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 67. 74. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: Marx & Engels: The Holy Family (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 245. 75. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 27: Engels: A Letter from Engels to Marx (19 November 1844) (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 13. 76. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: “Preface” in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 88. 77. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 130. 78. Pettingell, John Hancock. (1887). Views and Reviews in Eschatology: A Collection of Letters, and Other Papers Concerning the Life and Death to Come. Yarmouth, ME.: Scriptural Publication Society, p. 273. 79. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2009). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 162. 80. Toth, Beata. (2016). The Heart Has Its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the Heart. Cambridge, England: ISD LLC, p. 6. 81. Macquarrie, John. (1972). Existentialism. New York: Penguin, pp. 14–15. 82. Gardiner, Patrick. (1969). Nineteenth Century Philosophy. New York, NY: The Free Press, pp. 289–320. 83. “Søren Kierkegaard”, “New World Encyclopedia”, . 84. Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 85. “Jean-Paul Sartre”, “New World Encyclopedia”, https://newworldencyclopedia.org. 86. Flynn, Thomas, “Jean-Paul Sartre”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 87. Joseph, Felicity., Reynolds, Jack., & Woodward, Ashley., eds. (2014). The Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 366. 88. “Jean-Paul Sartre”, “New World Encyclopedia”, https://newworldencyclopedia.org. 89. Plato, Timaeus; Aristotle, Metaphysics; St Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Pars 3:1, Summa Theologiae, Pars 1:1, etc. Analysis of “existence before essence” in Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Introduction. See “Existence precedes essence” in “en.m.wikipedia.org”. 90. Kaufmann, Walter., ed. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York: New American Library, 1975.

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91. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism Is a Humanism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. 92. Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 93. Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, p. 85. 94. Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 95. Rev Fr. Francis lyke Agada MSP, ed. “Chapter Three—The Autonomy of Human Reason” in God and Human Freedom: A Philosophico-Theological Enquiry into the Nature of Human Free Will and the Problem of Evil in the World. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2015. 96. Kaufmann, Walter., ed. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York, NY: New American Library, 1975. 97. Benko, Steven A., & Pavelich, Andrew., eds. “Is Hell Other People?” In The Good Place and Philosophy. Chicago, US-IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 2020. 98. Kariuki, Joseph., & Utz, Arthur Fridolin. (1981). The Possibility of Universal Moral Judgement in Existential Ethics: A Critical Analysis of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience According to Jean-Paul Sartre. Lang, p. 311. 99. Merkel, Bernard. The Concept of Freedom and the Development of Sartre’s Early Political Thought. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019. 100. Flynn, Thomas, “Jean-Paul Sartre”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 101. “Jean Paul Sartre.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. . Encyclopedia.com. 13 Aug. 2020 . 102. Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 103. Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, pp. 53–56. 104. Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 105. Detmer, David. (2013). Freedom as a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing, pp. 84–85. 106. Bernasconi, Robert. ‘Hell Is Other People.’ In How To Read Sartre. Granta Books. 107. Turner, Jonathan H. (2012). Theoretical Sociology: 1830 to the Present. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 736. 108. Clarke, Simon. (1981). The Foundations of Structuralism: A Critique of Lévi-Strauss and the Structuralist Movement. Brighton, GB-ESX: The Harvester Press, pp. 7–9. 109. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 299. 110. Gordon Marshall. “structuralism.” A Dictionary of Sociology. Encyclopedia.com. 16 Oct. 2020 . 111. Witherspoon, Gary. (1975). Navajo Kinship and Marriage. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 12. 112. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 36. 113. Wheater, Kitty. (2017). An Analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Structural Anthropology. London, UK: Macat International Ltd, p. 30. 114. Winzeler, Robert L. (2008). Anthropology and Religion: What We Know, Think, and Question. Plymouth, UK: Altamira Press, p. 126.

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115. Tremlett, Paul-François. (2014). Lévi-Strauss on Religion: The Structuring Mind. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 58–59. 116. Lévi-Strauss. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, p. 14. 117. Morris, Brian. (1987). Anthropological Studies of Religion: An Introductory Text. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 280. 118. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China: The Commercial Press, p. 18. 119. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1997). Cultural Capital and Social Alchemy. Shanghai, China: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p. 5. 120. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (2007). Mythologiques: L’Homme nu (The Naked Man) (Chinese translation). Beijing, China: China Renmin University Press, p. 149. 121. Kurzweil, Edith. (1996). The Age of Structuralism: from Lévi-Strauss to Foucault. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. 24. 122. Lévi-Strauss. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 11. 123. Vlacos, Sophie. (2014). Ricoeur, Literature and Imagination. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, Inc., p. 25. 124. Schrag, Calvin O. “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought.” Philosophy East and West 20: 1 (January 1970): 83–89. 125. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. (1983). The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition: Individualization of Nature and the Human Being. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, p. 77. 126. Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 22.

Chapter 6

Personality Structure

Man is a conscious automaton, by which is meant that man asserts himself as a social being through conscious control and regulation of his own behavior. Fundamentally, it is man himself who determines whether he is active or inactive as well as how he is active or inactive in a given external environment. Whatever external environment man is confronted with, for his part, can be described, to a larger or lesser extent, as some kinds of external stimuli. Any external environment tends not to exert an immediate or determining influence on human behavior, but rather it is man himself who determines whether he is active or inactive as well as how he is active or inactive in a given external environment. Moreover, human actions (or behaviors)—or rather whether he is active or inactive as well as how he is active or inactive—are among the most complex and inscrutable phenomena that have ever appeared in this world. This may awaken us to the truth that one of the most complicated and advanced dynamic structural mechanisms, which have ever appeared in the long evolutionary history of living things, must of necessity be inherent in each single individual. It is the dynamic structural mechanism that determines man’s complex motives and behaviors. However, the dynamic structural mechanism is supposed to be essentially invisible, impalpable, inexplicable, and even undetectable by any accessible means of investigation, and hence it may be not inaptly termed the “black box,” by which is meant that the personality structure, or more specifically, the dynamic structural mechanism, would surely remain an unfathomable mystery. In view of this, only if we appeal to both the input and output ends of the “black box” for help can we gain a more profound insight into the workings of the dynamic structural mechanism. The structure and workings of the “black box” are extremely complicated, and, as yet, we know very little indeed about the “black box.” With the above situation in view, the theory about man’s “structure and choice” is essentially aimed at expanding and deepening our insight into the fundamental workings of the dynamic structural mechanism in that a real grasp of the operation of psychological processes within the unknowable “black box” may aid materially in coming to grips with a conceptualization of the personality structure, or rather, the dynamic structural mechanism.

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1 The Concept of Personality At first glance, the concept of personality may seem quite simple, but in reality it is far too complicated and difficult to pin down precisely. In actual life, not only may the concept of personality be susceptible of various interpretations in different disciplines, but even each single individual may form a divergent conception of personality. Researchers from many different fields of study have long since developed different versions of the concept of personality. Nevertheless, of the myriad versions that had been offered, not a single one has, so far, been generally accepted. Let us take a concrete example to serve as an illustration. In his monograph Personality—a Psychological Interpretation the American psychologist G. W. Allport ferreted out fifty definitions for the word “personality” and gave a critical summary and analysis of them whilst sketching out the history of how definitions of personality have changed and developed. In view of this, in order to make an in-depth study of an independent individual, we feel the necessity of giving the concept of personality a clear and lucid explanation.

1.1 The Origin and History of the Term “Personality” It is generally believed that the term “personality” derives its origin from the classical Latin word “persona,” which originally referred to the masks worn by ancient Greek and Roman actors in theatrical performances. By the first century B.C., these ancient theatrical masks began to appear on ancient Roman stages—or, to put it another way, ancient Roman performers began to use these masks when performing their roles in tragedies or comedies. According to Diomedes, Quintus Roscius (ca.126 B.C.–62 B.C.), the most celebrated comic actor of ancient Rome, who is spoken of in terms of the highest commendation by Cicero, supposedly introduced masks, which had been unknown before on the Roman stage, because he wanted to conceal his natural squint of the eye with the mask. Thenceforth the practice of wearing masks, which was rather an advantage than an inconvenience in the ancient Greek and Roman theatres, was widely followed in theatrical performances. However, sometimes the real differences between drama and social life, particularly between theatrical and real social roles, seem to have blurred. Hence, in the history of Western civilization the word “personality” underwent changes in connotation and eventually came to be used as an abstract noun, which basically refers to “the state of being a person.” While perusing the admirably written treatises of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), we may definitely discern that the word “personality” in his extensive writings underwent further changes, acquiring ever more complex layers of meaning and connotation. Cicero was a Roman statesman as well as the greatest Roman orator, and his “unique and imperishable glory,” according to John William Mackail, “is that he created the language of the civilized world, and used that language to create

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a style which nineteen centuries have not replaced, and in some respects have hardly altered.”1 In his extensive writings the word “personality” acquired at least four types of meanings. First, how one behaves himself towards others, or how one’s behavior appears to others, or what impression he makes on others. To put it another way, how others judge his behavior, or what others think of him, or how others view him. It is generally admitted that there are obvious discrepancies between what others think of him and what he is really like. Second, “just as in the theatre actors play multiple roles by wearing different masks, so in ordinary life human beings play various roles, too, to be distinguished as it were by the various masks they wear.”2 “The role based on life choices human beings make in relation to their careers tends to proceed from their own deliberations; as a consequence, some people apply themselves to philosophy, others to civil law, and others again to rhetoric.”3 It has now become evident to us that in the case of the second persona we have to take account of the social position we find ourselves in as well as the role that we adopt by choice, such as philosophy, law, or oratory. Third, in this sense “personality” may be conceived as the sum total of an individual’s qualities, innate and acquired, which reveal themselves in the performance of one’s work, and which make one competent to take up his work. Fourth, Cicero’s use of the concept of “personality” in his writings is accompanied by a reinterpretation of the traditional Roma value of dignity (dignitas) as well as by the introduction of the notion of human superiority.4 Hence in the case of the fourth persona the concept “personality” is to be associated with the superiority and dignity of our nature (for instance, the style of writing). From Cicero’s time until fairly recently, or rather, at later stages of Western social development, the concept of “personality” underwent constant changes in connotation and gradually acquired more extended meanings, whereby it came to acquire certain connotations inherent in the modern notion of “personality.” For the sake of illustration, let us cite the following instances. First, the concept of “personality” means the outward appearance of a person. Originally it meant “the mask worn by an actor on the stage;” by extension it has come to mean “the outward appearance of a person.” The word “personality” in this sense, however, does not refer to “the true self” or “the real self,” but rather means “the false (imaginary or fictitious) self,” “the feigned self” or “the pretended self.” Second, the word “personality”—or rather the Latin “persona”—designates a person endowed with excellent qualities. Originally the term “personality” referred directly to the theatrical masks that the ancient Greek and Roman actors wore in the theaters of antiquity. Later it came to be applied to the actors themselves, then to the 1

Gunnison, Walter Balfour., & Harley, Walter Scott., eds. (1912). Marcus Tullius Cicero Seven Orations, with Selections from the Letters, De Senectute, ans Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae. Boston, US-MA: Silver Burdett, xxiv. 2 Lolordo, Antonia., ed. (2019). Persons: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 31. 3 Ibid., p. 32. 4 Ibid., p. 33.

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character acted, portrayed or created by an actor on the stage. In much later times, by extension it came to acquire the meaning of unique individuality, that is, the totality of an individual’s distinctive characteristics and essential qualities peculiar to and distinguishing him from others. In view of the fact that unique individuality tends to find its fullest expression in the true (or real) self rather than in the feigned (or pretended) self, there is an antithesis between the true (or real) self and the feigned (or pretended) self. The very extended meaning imparted to the word “personality” was to have important implications for the later development of the concept of “personality.” Third, the term “personality” refers to qualities of distinction and dignity, and in this sense it becomes almost identical with reputation. Before long the concept of “persona” carrying connotations of reputation and dignity was incorporated into the Roman social class system as well as the Roman legal system, and the word “personality,” when used in this extended sense, may awaken us to the fact that the different Roman classes allowed for different rights and duties—that is, the members of one class might fulfill certain rights and obligations, while the members of another class would not. However, the concept of “persona” in this sense applied only to Roman citizens—that is, all freeborn inhabitants of the Roman Empire who were granted citizenship status, rather than to slaves. Only free Roman citizens were endowed with a legal personality, while slaves in ancient Rome were deprived of personality in the legal sense (servus non habet personam). Fourth, the term “personality” refers to a representative of a particular group or organization (institution). In this sense the word “personality” indicates the rights and duties imposed on the personal representative. For example, the word “personality” is also used to designate the priest or minister in the Christian church. The Latin “persona” was used in Christian contexts for “a parish priest,” probably from his being the most important person in the parish. Only after we have examined how the concept of “persona” evolved and changed in the early period of Greco-Roman civilization will the realization sink in that originally the term “persona” designated both the actor and the masks worn in ancient theaters, that later it came to denote a fictional character exhibiting no truth of human nature, and that at a much later period it began to mean a real individual endowed with an original essence, or specific nature, by which he or she is distinguished from every other individual.5 Hence it could be argued that the evolution of the concept of “persona” in the Greco-Roman period provided the fundamental basis for its semantic extension and enrichment in later periods. Generally speaking, the word “personality” derived from the Latin “persona” refers roughly to “a distinct individual” or “an individual person”—more specifically some aspect of who an individual is, or rather, some aspect of a person who retains one’s individuality (or at least a substantial portion of it).6

5 Zavatta, Benedetta. (2019). Individuality and Beyond: Nietzsche Reads Emerson (Alexander Reynolds, Trans.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 34. 6 Martin, Michael., & Augustine, Keith., eds. (2015). The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life after Death. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 1.

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In modern times,7 Chinese and Western scholars’ persistent attempts at a generally acceptable definition for such a broad abstract word as personality made it clear that the Western interpretation of “personality” is mainly oriented towards the psychological aspects of an individual person, whilst the Chinese version of it is primarily concerned with individual ethics or morality. Philip S. Holzman, who was the Esther and Sidney R. Rabb Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Harvard University, put his own interpretation on personality in Encyclopedia Britannica. “Personality, a characteristic way of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Personality embraces moods, attitudes, and opinions and is most clearly expressed in interactions with other people. It includes behavioral characteristics, both inherent and acquired, that distinguish one person from another and that can be observed in people’s relations to the environment and to the social group.”8 Looking at the definition of “personality,” we will find that three main meanings of this word are listed in Modern Chinese Dictionary (the seventh edition). First, personality is the sum total of an individual’s characteristics—that is, personality is the integration of character, temperament (or disposition) and ability (or intellect) of a person. Second, by personality we may mean an individual’s moral qualities. Third, a person may enjoy legal personality—the status of being a subject (or bearer) of rights and duties under law. The second meaning of the word “personality” as compared with the other two meanings has been widely used in Chinese society. Admittedly, the concept of personality virtually synonymous with the second meaning of the word has won general acceptance in Chinese community.

1.2 An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Concept of Personality Once the concept of “personality” is used to describe “man himself,” it quickly comes into common use in many of the humanities and social sciences. Two main reasons may be adduced to account for this. First, “personality” is a concept for which we tend to frame a concise and clear definition, and hence conciseness and clearness constitute the essential characteristics of the concept of personality. The concept of personality can be used to describe “man himself” in an admirably concise manner and to give a clear definition of “man himself” so that we can avoid the unnecessary confusion in distinguishing the concept of personality and other concepts or categories in a certain discipline. Second, “man himself,” or rather, “what man is,” constitutes the theoretical prerequisite as well as the logical premise for many disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, whereby the concept of personality comes into common use in the 7

In Chinese history the term “modern times” refers specifically to the period from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1919 as well as the period from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the present. Wu, Jing-Rong., & Cheng, Zhen-Qiu., et al., eds. (2001). New Age Chinese-English Dictionary. Beijing: The Commercial Press, pp. 805, 1675. 8 Holzman, Philip S. “Personality”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 24 Feb. 2020, https://www.britannica. com/topic/personality. Accessed 7 April 2021.

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humanities and social sciences, for which “man himself,” or more specifically, “what man is,” is postulated (or posited) to be a logical premise. For reasons stated above, the concept of personality, which asserts itself as a very unique one in its own right, comes into common use in the course of time. “Personality,” which is one of the most abstract words in English, carries a wide range of connotations, but at the same time it falls short of denotative meanings, whereby the word has great elasticity of meaning. Not only can it be used in almost any discipline of the humanities and social sciences, but it can be used without ambiguity in various contexts, though any ambiguity as to the meaning is not entirely precluded by the context. Thus it stands to reason that the concept of “personality” is highly susceptible of most diverse interpretations in different disciplines of the Western humanities and social sciences, and that the scholars thereof as such, as the case may be, either emphasize a certain aspect of the concept, or choose to ignore other aspects of it, which is true of the Chinese situation. In view of this, in order to achieve a more profound understanding of the concept of “personality,” we feel that the concept of “personality” is deserving of closer examination and further investigation, particularly when it is being used in certain disciplines of the humanities and social sciences. (1) A Philosophical Perspective on the Concept of “Personality” In philosophical terms, the concept of “personality” refers basically to the nature of man and the inherent (fundamental or essential) characteristics (qualities or attributes) thereof as well as human values. We may adduce a few examples to support this argument. Boethius, who “was the last of the Roman philosophers, and the first of the scholastic theologians,”9 is one of the main sources for the transmission of ancient Greek philosophy to the Latin West during the first half of the Middle Ages,10 and became the main intermediary between Classical antiquity and following centuries. He had conceived a plan to translate into Latin the entire body of writings by Aristotle and Plato so that they would remain available to a Western Europe that was rapidly losing its intellectual ties with the Greek-speaking east.11 He did not realize this plan in its entirety, but he did translate a number of the logical works of Aristotle and wrote several commentaries on these writings. In doing so, he rendered a very important service to the early medieval West by providing the only Latin translations of Aristotle available until the gradual introduction of the “new 9

Rubenstein, Richard E. (2004). Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages. Orlando, US-FL: Harcourt, Inc., p. 63. 10 Spade, Paul Vincent, “Medieval Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL . 11 Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian., ed. (2005). Holy Teaching: Introducing the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Ada, US-MN: Brazos Press, p. 14.

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learning” in the late Middle Ages.12 As a result, when learning revived in the Latin world half a millennium later, virtually every thinker’s starting point was the logic of Aristotle as translated, interpreted, and applied by Boethius.13 In his theological treatises Boethius draws on Aristotelian metaphysics to define “person” as “an individual substance of a rational nature.”14 This classical definition for the concept of “personality” reflects the truth about human personhood as well as the rationality of an individual. In other words, all of the connotations that the concept carries with it are invariably related to the essential (basic or fundamental) nature of man—that is, the concept contains nothing other than what human nature is intended to be. This definition of “personality” by Boethius in the sixth century was accepted by almost all medieval philosophers, and hence it stands to reason that this Boethian tradition informs later philosophical definitions of “personality” and thus influences man’s understanding and explanation of the concept from the Middle Ages to our own century. In A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester, which was published in 1698, John Locke set down his definition of the word person, viz. “that person stands for a thinking intelligent being that hath reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being in different times and places.” In this definition, Locke specifies some of the elements that comprise our concept of self-consciousness. In particular, he holds these features, viz. thinking, intelligence, reason, reflection and the ability to engage in tensed first-person judgments, to be constitutive of our concept of a person.15 Locke concludes that consciousness is personality because it “always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things: in this alone consists personality identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational being;” and remains constant in different places and at different times.16 According to Leibniz, a representative of the seventeenth-century tradition of rationalism, a person is a rational entity who “is supposed to be thinkable as a monadic entity whose features are intelligible without a nexus of relations, including a nexus of relations to other monadic entities.”17 In his notion of a person, “although Leibniz

12

Sutherland, A. “Boethius.” Encyclopedia of Religion. Encyclopedia.com. 10 Apr. 2021 . 13 Rubenstein, Richard E. (2004). Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages. Orlando, US-FL: Harcourt, Inc., p. 63. 14 Adams, Marilyn McCord. (2006). Christ and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 80. 15 Craig, Edward., ed. (1998). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nihilism to Quantum Mechanics. London: Routledge, p. 319. 16 Locke, John. (1854). The Works of John Locke: Philosophical Works, with a Preliminary Essay and Notes by J. A. St. John. London: Henry G. Bohn, p. 466. 17 Lolordo, Antonia., ed. (2019). Persons: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 246.

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rejects Locke’s identification of the person with consciousness, he nevertheless shares his conception of the cogito as the decisive characteristic of rationality.”18 (2) An Ethical Perspective on the Concept of “Personality” From the ethical perspective the concept of “personality” refers primarily to an individual’s moral character, the respect he deserves for his good moral qualities, and the esteem that rests only on his morality. For example, one of the main tenets of the Kantian moral philosophy, in which Kant uses the concept of “personality” in its ethical or moral sense, is its supreme emphasis on the moral value of personality. According to Kant, “this respect-inspiring idea of personality, which sets before our eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it shows the want of accord of our conduct with it, and thereby strikes down self-conceit, is even natural to the commonest reason, and easily observed.”19 For him, “personality is that quality in every man which makes him worthwhile, aside from the uses to which he may be put by his fellows.”20 In addition, just as Kant points out in his Critique of Practical Reason, “A man also may be an object to me of love, fear, or admiration, even to astonishment, and yet not be an object of respect. His jocose humor, his courage and strength, his power from the rank he has amongst others, may inspire me with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him is wanting. Fontenelle says, ‘I bow before a great man, but my mind does not bow.’ I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose it or not, and though I bear my head never so high that he may not forget my superior rank.”21 Thus it can be seen that in his moral philosophy Kant elaborated in minute detail and at inordinate length the ethical conception of personality as well as the moral value of personality. (3) The Concept of Personality in Jurisprudence In general, by the concept of personality in jurisprudence we mean that the subject enjoys the basic rights of persons guaranteed by the constitution and law and at the same time fulfills the fundamental obligations of persons as stipulated in the constitution and law. It may be said as a general rule that the legal personality of a natural person begins with his birth and ends with his death, though for certain purposes the law recognizes capacity for rights and duties beyond the limits of a human being’s life. It is to be noted that the concept of legal personality, which is 18

Tipton, I.C., ed. (1977). Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 121. 19 Kant, Immanuel. (1889). Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., Paternoster-Row, p. 181. 20 Allport, Gordon Willard. (1957). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 33. 21 Kant, Immanuel. (1898). Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, B.D., Trans.). London: Longmans, Green, and Co., P. 169 [193].

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sometimes used to express our notion of the legal status of a person,22 has its origins in Roman law. Under Roman law a person is any individual enjoying legal status.23 In Roman law a person’s capacity to exercise civil rights depended primarily upon whether he was free or a slave.24 Only freeborn citizens were recognized as possessing legal personality by Roman law—or to put it another way, only freeborn men could be bearers of legal rights and were invested with the dignity of persons, claiming the privileges and protection of law.25 In ancient Rome slaves were considered property under Roman law and had no legal personhood. “The American jurist Roscoe Pound wrote that in ancient Rome a slave ‘was a thing, and as such, like animals could be the object of rights of property,’ and the British historian of Roman law Barry Nicholas has pointed out that in Rome ‘the slave was a thing … he himself had no rights: he was merely an object of rights, like an animal.’”26 “What was the working of slavery on the legal rights of the person enslaved? It was, as we have already seen, to destroy them altogether. Practically it reduced him to a chattel, the property of his owner, subject like a horse or a dog to his master’s absolute will and disposal. … But when we are speaking of legal personality, personality invested with legal rights, which can be asserted and maintained by process of law, no such personality was allowed to the slave by Roman law.”27 Christian moralists who were against such social discrimination insisted that each man is a person,28 and that each one has a personality and character of his own.29 In modern states the law treats personality as “a human living organism possessed of all its things.” Hence all human beings that “are looked upon as capable of being invested with rights, or made liable to the performance of duties,” are endowed with legal personality.30 In the further development of law, “just as law unproblematically recognizes the legal personality of individual human beings, so it must acknowledge the legal personality of groups. … Groups of any kind, possessing a unified and living will” as well as meeting the necessary legal requirements, “ought to be recognized as independent 22

Howe, William Wirt. (1896). Studies in Civil Law and Its Relations to the Law of England and America. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, p. 63. 23 Allport, Gordon Willard. (1957). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 35. 24 Sherman, Charles Phines. (1917). Roman Law in the Modern World: Manual of Roman Law Illustrated by Anglo-American Law and the Modern Codes. Boston, MA: Boston Book Company, p. 26. 25 Allport, Gordon Willard. (1957). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 35. 26 Wise, S.M. (2016, August 18). Animal rights. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica. com/topic/animal-rights. 27 Hadley, James (LL.D., late professor of Greek literature in Yale College). (1881). Introduction to Roman Law: In Twelve Academic Lectures. New York City, NY: D. Appleton & Co., pp. 113–114. 28 Allport, Gordon Willard. (1957). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York City, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 35. 29 Weaver, George Sumner, D.D. (1891). Heaven. Boston, MA: Universalist Publishing House, p. 27. 30 The Law Magazine and Review: For Both Branches of the Legal Profession at Home and Abroad, Volume 1(1872). London: Butterworths, p. 1091.

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agents capable of legal personality.”31 Such groups are also called legal persons, the classical examples of which are corporations, institutions, funds, and agencies, and any species of which is endowed by virtue of its legal personality with various rights and all the duties attached thereto, which shall be also conferred upon a single person by law. To summarize, “legal person” can be defined as “a body of men or of property,” that is, a group of individuals organized for some purpose, “which the law, in imitation of the personality of human beings, treats artificially as subject of rights and duties independent of its component parts.”32 In order to seek more clarification of the concept of “legal person,” we feel the necessity of bringing out several essential points involved in our deeper understanding of the conception of “legal person.” “The term institution is intended as a broad category embracing most organized and relatively enduring social bodies, corporations, communities, or associations—such as marriages, families, religious organizations, business corporations, trade unions, and voluntary associations. … A full account of institutional rights would require attention to these wider social contexts that substantially shape the definition and exercise of such rights.”33 “Institutions so defined possess ‘agency’ and are thereby capable of ‘legal subjectivity,’ by which is meant that they can exercise legal rights, discharge legal duties, and wield legal powers (this term is intended to be taken more widely than legal personality, which refers essentially to the capacity of an entity to be recognized by the state as a bearer of legal rights and duties).”34 “An association is formed by the transfer of a part of the essence and will of each individual member to the social whole. It is not simply an aggregate of externally related individual wills, but a real, organic unity constituting an independent communal whole. Such a whole possesses a reality distinct from and transcending the separate wills of its individual members and capable of willing and acting on its own account. It possesses personality; it is a ‘group-person.’”35 “The reality, unity, and agency of the group are prior to any positive legal ordering. … Law arranges and penetrates this inner unity and hence the inner structure of the group, but it does not serve as its source. Rather, law must accept the existence of a force, an urge, a stream of consciousness that has to be place in a legal context. … Group-persons should, like individuals, be recognized as capable of possessing rights, and this legal capacity does not depend on recognition by the state, even though the state supplies the legal form for group-rights.”36 “In Germanic legal theory, groups are accorded legal recognition as real personalities. … A sphere of individual will is always recognized, but seen as being balanced by the requirements of communal life. In the Germanic conception, personality is not 31

Frohnen, Bruce P., & Grasso, Kenneth L., eds. (2008). Rethinking Rights: Historical, Political, and Philosophical Perspectives. Columbia, US-MO: University of Missouri Press, p. 219. 32 “Legal Person.” Encyclopaedia Judaica. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Apr. 2021 . 33 Frohnen, Bruce P., & Kenneth L. Grasso, eds. (2008). Rethinking Rights: Historical, Political, and Philosophical Perspectives. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, p. 214. 34 Ibid., p. 215. 35 Ibid., p. 218. 36 Ibid., p. 219.

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seen as indivisible. The possibility exists of transferring part of one’s will to a groupperson and thereby establishing an entirely new and distinct personality endowed with rights and duties of its own. Once a group is organized as a collective person with a unified will, there exists a presumption that it will be recognized in law as possessing legal personality.”37 (4) The Sociological Conception of Personality The sociological conception refers basically to a human being’s distinctive personal character characterized by the unity and fixity of individual behavioral characteristics which “are intrinsically social, in that they describe how an individual relates to others,”38 and which must be blended in a harmonious and coordinated manner to form a balanced personality.39 Generally speaking, sociologists are more inclined to define personality from a social perspective, by which is meant that they don’t attach much weight to the internal structure of personality, the dynamics of personality structure or the human behavioral choices, and that they don’t seem to attach any importance to the self-sufficiency of human choice or the internal structure of personality. Some sociologists intend the concept of personality as a sociological category embracing the ultimate particles to which human groups can be reducible. In the eyes of some sociologists, in one way or another personality is always considered a reflection of the social background as well as the subjective reflection of culture.40 According to one succinct and fairly typical statement made by Ellsworth Faris, personality is but “the subjective aspect of culture.”41 He maintains that the formation and development of human personality tend to be concurrent with the individual human being’s subjectivization of social mores (or customs) and conventions (or traditions) in his or her life, particularly at an early period of life. Admittedly, Faris had a partial, one-sided conception of personality in that he did not attach any importance to the role and position of biological factors in the development of personality and nor did he attach much weight to the complex internal structures, the diverse structural functions or the ability to make appropriate choices, with which the human subject is endowed. Still other sociologists define personality from the perspective of social effectiveness, contending that personality is the integration of the traits that determine personal effectiveness. Ernest W. Burgess held that “personality, from the standpoint of group life, is the integration of all the traits which determine the role and status of the person in society. Personality might, therefore, be defined as social effectiveness.”42 Careful reading of this definition may lead one 37

Ibid., p. 220. Deaux, Kay., & Snyder, Mark., eds. (2019). The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 294. 39 Li, Jian-Hua., &Fan, Ding-Jiu. (1984). A Concise Dictionary of Sociology. Lanzhou, China: Gansu People’s Publishing House, pp. 12–22. 40 Pandora, Katherine Ann. (1993). Dissenting Science: Psychologists’ Democratic Critique During the Depression Era. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 279. 41 Chen, Zhong-Geng., & Zhang, Yu-Xin. (1986). Personality Psychology. Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, p. 38. 42 Ibid., pp. 37–38. 38

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to assume it is a simplistic approach to the personality of every human being that tends to be complex, unpredictable and sometimes unfathomable. (5) Personality: A Psychological Interpretation In psychology, “personality” rightly asserts itself as a vexing and intractable topic that is fraught with and steeped in controversy.43 In the psychological sense of the word, “personality,” which can roughly be seen as the total constellation of an individual’s various psychological characteristics, or more specifically, the totality of an individual’s behavioral and emotional characteristics, is generally believed to be a synonym of “individuality,” which is synonymous with “personality” when it is used to mean the attributes that make up the character and nature of an individual, or that distinguish an individual from others. In this sense it may be safely asserted that an individual’s personality is in many ways a reflection of his or her mental outlook.44 Nonetheless, we feel the necessity of distinguishing between individuality and personality. “Personality is that which makes us such as we are, which constitutes our character and determines the greater or lesser worth and dignity of our individuality. Personality and individuality are not two separate entities, but two abstractions of the same reality. Each term emphasizes a different aspect. The former comprises those features which change an individual into a person of a definite character, while the latter denotes their bodily actualization in material concreteness. Both terms are synonymous, being at times interchangeable, but forming a contrast when we distinguish between the essential and accidental of man’s life, between that which is permanent and that which is transient.”45 Psychology, as compared with other disciplines devoted to the study of personality, has probed more deeply and extensively into the field personality research. To date, psychologists have formed many divergent conceptions of what “personality” means, in which they managed to embody their original ideas. Although different psychologists emphasize different aspects of personality, most agree that personality is the totality of an individual’s characteristics—or put it another way, personality can be viewed as the integrated total of the distinctive traits or qualities possessed by an individual. John T. MacCurdy, while defining personality, has emphasized its integrative features. According to him, personality is “an integration of patterns (interests) which gives a peculiar individual trend to the behavior of the organism.”46 Kempf’s definition of personality lay emphasis on the organization and integration of certain qualities by an individual in the process of effecting adjustment to his environment. In terms of biological adaptation, Kempf stated that “personality is the integration of those systems of habits that 43

Raeff, Catherine. (2020). Exploring the Complexities of Human Action. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 271. 44 Yang, Qing. (1985). A Concise Dictionary of Psychology. Changchun, China: Jilin People’s Publishing House, p. 16. 45 Carus, Paul. (1903). Whence and Whither: An Inquiry into the Nature of the Soul, Its Origin and Its Destiny. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, pp. 106–107. 46 MacCurdy, John T. (2013). Common Principles in Psychology and Physiology. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 263.

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represent an individual’s characteristic adjustments to his environment.”47 To put it another way, “personality is the habitual mode of adjustment which the organism effects between its own egocentric drives and the exigencies of environment.”48 J. P. Guilford began the tradition of studying the structure of personality variables using factor analysis.49 For him, the definition of personality adopted for use starts logically from an axiom to which everyone seems agreed: each and every personality is unique.50 Hence, in order to obtain a clear understanding of “personality,” we must first of all be clear as to the differences between personality as a general phenomenon. According to J. P. Guilford, “An individual’s personality then, is his unique pattern of traits—a trait is any distinguishable, relatively enduring way in which one individual differs from another.”51 Kurt Lewin considered personality as “a dynamic totality of systems.”52 In framing a definition of personality, Gordon Willard Allport accentuated the importance of the dynamics of personality and defined personality as “the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment.”53 The American psychologist Gordon Willard Allport (1897–1967) is generally acclaimed as one of the founding figures of personality psychology, moving away from psychoanalytic and behavioral theories toward humanistic theories of psychology.54 He was one of the first psychologists to focus on the study of personality and developed his own original, eclectic theory of personality based on traits.55 His important introductory work on the theory of personality was Personality: A Psychological Interpretation,56 which is widely viewed as an important landmark in the establishment of “personality” as a legitimate subdiscipline in psychology.57 He consistently related his approach to the study of personality to his social interests and sought to introduce the leavening influence of humanism into psychology by honoring human potential and individual uniqueness 47

Allport, Gordon Willard. (1937). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York City, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 45. 48 C., Aggarwal J. (2014). Essentials of Educational Psychology. New Delhi, IN: Vikas Publishing House, P. 344. 49 Derlega, Valerian J., Winstead, Barbara A., & Jones, Warren H. (2005). Personality: Contemporary Theory and Research. Boston, MA: Thomson/Wadsworth, p. 196. 50 Mischel, Harriet N., & Mischel, Walter., eds. (1973). Readings in Personality. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 22. 51 C., Aggarwal J. (2014). Essentials of Educational Psychology. New Delhi, IN: Vikas Publishing House, P. 344. 52 Ibid. 53 Henry, Nelson Bollinger., ed. (1946). Changing Conceptions in Educational Administration, Volume 45, Part 2. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 79. 54 Sperry, Len. (2015). Mental Health and Mental Disorders: An Encyclopedia of Conditions, Treatments, and Well-Being. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, pp. 47–48. 55 Ibid., 47. 56 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Gordon Allport.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November 7, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gordon-W-Allport. 57 “Allport, Gordon Willard.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 .

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as well as by emphasizing the importance of the present context, as opposed to past history.58 He had a profound impact in shaping humanistic theory as a whole.59 As is evident from the above description and discussion of personality research, although psychology has probed deeply and extensively into the field of personality research, these psychological conceptions of personality without exception revolve around “human psychology.”

1.3 A Description of Personality Based on the Theory of “Structure and Choice” It is only in the realm of subjective anthropology that the theory of “structure and choice,” which has for its prime object of study “the real, concrete, unique and whole man,” is in a position to describe, define and even employ the concept of “personality.” (1) A Description of Personality Based on the Theory of “Structure and Choice,” as Contrasted With other Traditional Disciplines’ Conceptions of Personality As previously stated, each of the traditional disciplines mentioned above has formed its own distinct conception of personality, which is certainly entitled to provide justifiable reasons for its superiority over other versions of personality, and which assuredly constitutes a valuable contribution to the study of the problem of how to know man himself as well as to the study of the problem of how to obtain a deeper understanding of personality. Among the total conceptions of personality as described above, some conception of personality tends to mark a significant academic milestone. Moreover, they possess one characteristic in common, that is, each of the traditional disciplines mentioned above attempts to put its own interpretation on personality largely based upon the admirable results of scholarly research achieved in its own field of research, and each conception of personality is, as it were, a conscientious attempt to provide a concise and illuminating explanation of the qualities and characteristics inherent in what one sees as some portion or aspect of one’s own unique personality. Looked at from “the concrete whole man’s” point of view, this very characteristic shared by the conceptions of personality as described above tends to turn into one of the weaknesses that these concepts of personality possess in common. Specifically, there is a prevailing tendency among the traditional disciplines mentioned above to neglect the study of all that is relevant to “the concrete whole man.” Rather, each of the traditional disciplines that have been described above is only devoted to the study of some portion or aspect of “the concrete whole man.” In other words, rather than view “the concrete whole man” in all his bearings, each of the traditional disciplines 58

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Gordon Allport.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November 7, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gordon-W-Allport. 59 Sperry, Len. (2015). Mental Health and Mental Disorders: An Encyclopedia of Conditions, Treatments, and Well-Being. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 48.

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mentioned above only casts illumination on a certain part of “the concrete whole man.” The above situation can be thought of as being in some way analogous to what happened in the familiar story about the six blind men exploring different parts of an elephant. As the famous traditional Indian tale goes, a group of blind men were asked to describe an elephant, but each given the chance to feel only one part of the animal’s body. Each man came in contact with a different part of the beast and attempted to describe the animal based on the part he felt. The first blind man who grabbed hold of the elephant’s trunk said that it is long and rubbery like a snake, but with two sticky holes in the end. The second man who stretched out his arms and took hold of a tusk insisted that it is hard and cold and round and curved with a sharp point like a needle. The third man who touched a leg concluded that it looks like a tree, solid and strong and growing out of the ground. The fourth man who bumped into the elephant’s belly asserted that it is rough and flat, like a high wall. The fifth man who took hold of an ear declared that it is like a big leaf of leather, smooth and thin. The last man who reached out and grabbed the elephant’s tail claimed that it is thin and long, and all tattered at the end like an old rope.60 How can you view or judge the blind men reporting on their several appraisals of the elephant? By what possible course of reasoning can you justify yourself in thinking that their hasty judgments about what the elephant is really like are right and wrong at the same time? On the one hand, when the blind men put their hands on the different parts of the elephant and each tried to describe the whole animal from the part he felt, none of the blind men was incorrect, which was to say his assertive description of what the part of the elephant he felt is like was indisputably correct, but on the other, when they made judgments of the whole elephant based only on the parts they felt, they were actually making inferences that must of necessity be proved one-sided and wrong. This parable illustrates that human knowledge or understanding can be reduced to the dialectical interaction between the whole and the part and that one must grasp the parts of things and their relations to each other and to the whole.61 A profound analysis of the parable suggests that all the blind men were right in regard to the particular part of the elephant they had described, but that they were completely wrong in describing the whole elephant. Each man’s conclusion is valid within its own context but does little to explain what an elephant is really like. Each man’s account is a most accurate description of the part he felt, but none comes remotely close to an accurate picture of the whole elephant. Each of these blind men got a wrong idea of the elephant because he mentally saw only a small portion of the animal. Based on an intelligent and subtle analysis of this terribly overused yet still helpful Indian parable, we may seek further enlightenment from it. Firstly, one is really not qualified to make a judgment on matters until all sides of the question have been considered. Secondly, every judgment is true only in relation to a particular 60

Fisman, Ray., & Sullivan, Tim. (2015). The Org: The Underlying Logic of the Office. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 167. cf. Kadodwala, Dilip. (1996). Hinduism Teacher’s Resource Book. Cheltenham, UK: Nelson Thornes, pp. 10–11. 61 Palmer, Richard E. (1969). Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, p. 87.

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aspect of the thing seen from a particular point of view. Thirdly, all judgments are therefore necessarily relative, conditional and limited. Lastly, one should perceive the same phenomenon from a different perspective and then generalizes about the whole. Put succinctly, among the basic concepts of personality developed by the various traditional disciplines mentioned above, the philosophical conception of personality serves to shed light on the nature (or essence) of man, the ethical conception of personality may cast light on human morality, the legal conception of personality is expected to throw light on citizens’ rights and obligations as stipulated in the constitution and other laws, the sociological conception of personality may give us an illuminating insight into the social nature of personality as well as into the influence of cultural diversity upon personality formation, and the psychological conception of personality may aid significantly in gaining a deeper insight into human psychology. Each of the theoretical concepts of personality as described above sheds light upon only one portion or region of the whole personality rather than the totality of personality, to wit “the concrete whole man.” With the above situation in view, the arduous but glorious task before the theory of “structure and choice” is exactly to offer a most illuminating explanation of what is meant by “the concrete whole man” rather than to cast light upon only one part, portion or region of “the concrete whole man,” whereby we will be enabled to attain to a more complete and profound understanding of “the concrete whole man.” The conception of personality formulated by the theory of “structure and choice” will be enabled to embrace all that is meant by “the concrete whole man” and to offer a more comprehensive explanation of “the concrete whole man,” thereby providing supreme enlightenment about the total essence of man, the whole noumenon of human life, and an ensemble of denotative and connotative meanings inherent in the conception of human life. As evident from the above discussion, none of the theoretical concepts of personality developed by the various traditional disciplines mentioned above is in a position to give a full explanation of what is meant by “the concrete whole man,” whereby we may gain a complete and profound understanding of “the concrete whole man.” With the above situation in view, we feel the necessity of introducing a new concept of personality whereby this new concept of personality will be enabled to offer a most illuminating explanation of “the concrete whole man” and to throw considerable further light upon “the concrete whole man.” Looked at from “the concrete whole man’s” point of view, “personality” refers to “the real, concrete, unique and whole man.” “Personality,” as the term is used here, simply means a single individual who has his own peculiar structure of personal characteristics and his own unique dynamic structure of personality, each of which has an internal unity of its own and is characterized by relative stability. Personality is acquired through socialization. Personality is the totality of personality structure as well as the ensemble of behavioral choices. Personality is the unity of man’s natural life and his spiritual life. Personality is the mode of human existence, as considered in relation to all its manifold forms of existence, and it therefore stands to reason that personality is a certain state or level of human development.

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(2) The Denotative and Connotative Meanings Inherent in the Concept of Personality Specifically, the concept of personality described above may be formulated as follows. A. Personality can be regarded as synonymous with the real, concrete, individual man. Hence personality is intimately bound up with the fact of man’s real corporeal living existence. Personality is a manifestation of man’s essence, but it contains more than it. More specifically, personality refers to a concrete social being that actually exists in the real world and engages in everyday practical activity. B. Personality deals with the whole individual and not with particular aspects which make up a person or group of persons, which is to say personality is the sum total of individual characteristics that make one person distinct from another. In this sense “personality” does not cast emphasis upon any particular aspect of an individual person, nor does it assert itself as an abstract conception of human essence. Rather, it is designed to provide an overall description of man, or rather, to give expression to man’s whole existence. Generally speaking, there are two primary aspects to the aforementioned concept of personality that can be explored in more detail. (a) There is a natural tendency on the part of the human personality toward consistency or integration. In other words, the integrative nature of personality tends to give some consistency to the behavior of the individual, for whom to be effective in a social context,62 the personality must be integrated, that is, the tendencies when organized must be consistent with one another, and the whole must be consistent with the norms of society.63 “… there is a basic tendency within people to move toward greater coherence and integrity in the organization of their inner world. Inherent in the nature of human development is the intrinsic tendency toward greater consistency and harmony within; that is, people are intrinsically motivated to integration and harmony.”64 “Even other psychologists have hinted at human organismic integration. Freud spoke of the synthetic function of the ego that suggested that throughout life people work to bring coherence to their experience and thus to the development of their own personality. Child psychologist Jean Piaget hypothesized a similar organizational principle in children, whereby they imbued everything with life. Carl Rogers and fellow humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow spoke of the self-actualization principle within people leading them toward greater internal harmony and integrity. In a similar way, argue Deci and Ryan, people’s perceived sense of competence and perceived sense of autonomy enhance intrinsic motivation that empowers organismic integration. The development of integration in personality reveals who you truly are and indicates becoming all you are capable 62

Barnouw, Victor. (1963). Culture and Personality. Belmont, CA: Dorsey Press, p. 6. Pacific Perspective 3–4 (1974): 8. 64 Mascarenhas, Oswald. (2019). Corporate Ethics for Turbulent Markets: Executive Response to Market Challenges. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, pp. 14–15. 63

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of—these ground and empower the concept of human authenticity. … Deci rightfully asserts that intrinsic motivation and the inherent integrative tendency are natural whereby we discover, develop, and enjoy ourselves as a human integrated personality that is truly individual an social, immanent and transcendent at the same time.”65 (b) “Jung believed that psychic energy could be channeled externally, toward the outside world, or internally, toward the self.”66 Hence, on the one hand we mean by the aforementioned concept of personality the integration of various component elements of personality structure that are relatively fixed and interdependent, but on the other, we intend the term “personality” used in this sense as a broad category embracing the multiplicity of human behavioral choices that tends to assume myriad forms of human practical activity. Allport saw personality as striving toward unity of internal and external psychic energy.67 C. The noumenon of personality is the personality’s “structure and choice.” The personality structure tends to determine the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality, which, in turn, tends to affect and determine the personality structure. The behavioral choice on the part of a human personality represents a dynamic manifestation of the personality structure. In actual fact, not only can the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality affect the personality structure, it can build and change the personality structure as well. The personality structure is far from being accepted as a natural formation, but rather is conceived as a subjective construct whose formation depends fundamentally on the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality. The relationship between the personality structure and the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality is a unity of opposites, which is to say they are opposite to each other, yet dependent on each other and presupposing each other in their relationships with each other. The unity of the personality structure and the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality lies primarily in the fact that they are connected with each other and transformed into each other, that they support and condition each other, and that they corporate with each other in enabling the human personality to achieve infinite transcendence. Whether we treat personality as purely equivalent to the personality structure or regard it as simply synonymous with the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality, in either of two cases it must be admitted that we may hold a partial and one-sided view of personality. Rather, personality should be viewed as the unity of the personality structure and the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality. D. Personality refers to what is distinctive about an individual. According to Merriam-Webster, personality is the complex or totality of an individual’s distinctive characteristics and traits that distinguishes an individual or a nation 65

Ibid., pp. 15–16. Schultz, Duane P., & Schultz, Sydney Ellen. (2000). Theories of Personality. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, p. 97. 67 Ryckman, Richard M. (2004). Theories of Personality. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, p. 265. 66

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or group. For J. P. Guilford, an individual’s personality can be regarded as a unique structure of traits that characterize the individual, that is, “an individual’s personality is his unique pattern of traits—a trait is any distinguishable, relatively enduring way in which one individual differs from another.” To Muir, “personality is the individual considered as a whole. It may be defined as the most characteristic integration of an individual’s structure, modes of interests, attitudes, behaviors and capacities or abilities.” Mark Sherman stated that “personality is the characteristic patterns of behaviors, cognitions and emotions which may be expressed by the individual and manifest to others.” To put it another way, personality may be defined as “the distinct and unique organization of traits in an individual as reflected in how he reacts to himself and others” and in how he speaks and behaves differently from others.68 Just as no two individuals share exactly the same personality structure in the world, so no two persons have identical personalities. E. Kurt Lewin considered personality as “a dynamic totality of systems.” According to G. W. Allport, “personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psycho-physical systems that determine his unique adjustment to the environment.” Kempf stated that “personality is the habitual mode of adjustment which the organism effects between its own egocentric drives and the exigencies of environment.”69 “The personality is a dynamic structure which feeds on experiences in the same say that the body feeds on animal or vegetable matter.”70 “Personality refers to the composite behavior-pattern of an empiric individual in all of his interpersonal and group relations. Personality is thus indicated to be a dynamic quality.”71 “Personality structure is the individual’s structural and dynamic traits reflected in his typical mode of reaction, thought and behavior in various situations.”72 The dynamic-psychic energy, which Freud described as an inherent force within the individual and which is susceptible to the influence of environmental stimuli and provoked into manifestation in the context of environmental stimuli, tends to determine the particular pathway the individual will take to fulfilling a need, motive, or incentive, to wit the process of personalizing motivation, and to shape the particular behaviors the individual enacts.73 The internal interactions among component elements inherent in the dynamic structure of personality not only provide driving forces for human behavioral choices, 68

Klausmeier, Herbert John., & Ripple, Richard E. (1971). Learning and Human Abilities: Educational Psychology. New York, NY: Harper & Row, p. 554. 69 C., Aggarwal J. (2014). Essentials of Educational Psychology. New Delhi, IN: Vikas Publishing House, pp. 343–344. 70 West, Roger. (1986). Philosophy and Evolution: The Evolution of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Evolution. Columbia, SC: Summerhouse Press, p. 298. 71 Wilcox, Lloyd. (1942). Group Structure and Personality Types Among the Sioux Indians of North Dakota. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 69. 72 Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics 42, 37 (1985). 73 Hogan, Robert., & Jones, Warren H., eds. (1991). Perspectives in Personality (Part 1). Shoals, IN: Kingsley, p. 45.

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but also constitute internal factors that account for the fact that an individual is likely to suffer frustrations and illnesses when making behavioral choices. F. “Psychoanalytic theory emphasizes that the human organism is constantly, though slowly, changing through perpetual interactions, and that, therefore, the human personality can be conceived of as a locus of change with fragile and indefinite boundaries. It suggests that research should focus not only on studies of traits, attitudes, and motives but also on studies that reflect the psychoanalytic view that personality never ceases to develop and that even the rate of personality modification changes during the course of a life. Although the theory holds that conflict and such basic drives as sex and aggression figure prominently in personality development and functioning, their presence may be neither recognizable nor comprehensible to persons untrained to look for those motives. However, personality characteristics are relatively stable over time and across situations.”74 “It was widely believed that personality patterns are established during childhood and adolescence and then remain relatively stable over the rest of the life span.”75 “We have just pointed out that the personality of an individual is not absolutely fixed or unchanging. We have noted that personality goes through a process of growth, development and change during a lifetime.”76 “In other words, personality is characterized by change and stability, by consistency and transformation. … the basic personality structure of the individual remains relatively stable or is not significantly affected by the passage of time.”77 Hence we may safely assert that the internal structure of personality as well as the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality is characterized by change and transformation as well as by stability and consistency. G. “Personality includes behavioral characteristics, both inherent and acquired, that distinguish one person from another and that can be observed in people’s relations to the environment and to the social group.”78 To put it another way, by personality we mean “the totality of inherited and acquired psychic qualities which are characteristic of one individual and which make the individual unique.”79 According to Prince Morton, personality can be seen as “the sum total of biological innate dispositions, impulses, tendencies, aptitudes and instincts of the individual and the dispositions and tendencies acquired by experience.”80 W. Brown was of the view that “personality is the total differentiation which the 74

Holzman, P.S. (2020, February 24). Personality. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britan nica.com/topic/personality. 75 Zanden, James Wilfrid Vander. (1985). Human Development. New York, NY: A. A. Knopf, p. 480. 76 Skaggs, Ernest Burton. (1935). A Textbook of Experimental and Theoretical Psychology. Boston, MA: Christopher Publishing House, p. 413. 77 McKenzie, Sheila C. (1980). Aging and Old Age. Northbrook, IL: Scott Foresman, p. 134. 78 Holzman, P. S. (2020, February 24). Personality. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britan nica.com/topic/personality. 79 Maddi, Salvatore R., ed. (1971). Perspectives on Personality: A Comparative Approach. London, UK: Little, Brown, p. 330. 80 C., Aggarwal J. (2014). Essentials of Educational Psychology. New Delhi, IN: Vikas Publishing House, p. 344.

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individual makes by incorporating the inherited and acquired powers to stimulate and to activate the imagination of others in art, science and public affairs and also to live in and partake of a super-individual and super temporal world of values.”81 It is therefore evident that personality is the combination of innate inherited qualities (traits or characteristics) and acquired learning experiences. The innate inherited traits (qualities or characteristics) form the biological basis of personality, while the acquired learning itself, which is “the process of change in behavior resulting from experience or practice,”82 serves as the key to the formation of personality. H. Personality is a product of the socialization process. “Sociologists almost universally view personality as the product of socialization, although the role of biology, particularly as a transmitter of potentialities, is not ignored.”83 “Sociologists refer to the overall process through which an individual develops personality as socialization.”84 “Human personality is a product of experience in a socialization process and the resulting structure varies with the nature and conditions of such experience.”85 “Socialization is the broad learning process by which we acquire the attitudes and values of our culture.”86 “From the perspective the individual, socialization is the complex learning process through which individuals develop selfhood and acquire the knowledge, skills, and motivations required for participation in social life.”87 “Socialization is the process by which an individual’s personality is developed.”88 “Nevertheless, the socialization process never ends with adolescence, but rather continues throughout a person’s entire life … an individual’s personality is largely a product of his social environment, as acquired through social interaction.”89 “The basic personality type is a product of socialization in a particular society.”90 “Each individual, as a personality, is a product not only of existing relations, but also of all previous history.”91 “Social learning theorists believe that learning is the key to understanding personality” and that “your interactions with your environment determine much of what 81

Ibid., pp. 343–345. Craig, Grace J. (1989). Human Development. Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 23. 83 Perry, John Ambrose, & Seidler, Murray Benjamin. (1973). Patterns of Contemporary Society: An Introduction to Social Science. San Francisco, CA; Canfield Press, p. 66. 84 Ibid., p. 110. 85 The Journal of Asian Studies 747: 31 (1972). 86 Craig, Grace J. (1989). Human Development. Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 23. 87 Hagedorn, Robert. (1983). Essentials of Sociology. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, p. 60. 88 Rogers, Everett M., & Burdge, Rabel J. (1972). Social Change in Rural Societies. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts, p. 64. 89 Olsen, Marvin Elliott. (1968). The Process of Social Organization. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 121. 90 Merrill, Francis Ellsworth. (1965). Society and Culture: An Introduction to Sociology. Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 197. 91 Heiliger, Wilhelm. (1980). Soviet and Chinese Personalities. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 27. 82

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you become.”92 “A behavioral approach suggests that learning is the process that shapes personality and that learning takes place through experience.”93 “An individual’s basic personality and behavioral tendencies are seen as results of previous learning experience.”94 “In a broad sense, then, common values shape and control all social life as they are expressed through norms, which are institutionalized in collectivities and internalized within personalities.”95 Thus it can be seen that an individual’s learning experiences, social values and behavioral trainings contribute significantly (or substantially) to the formation and development of personality. The process of socialization of the personality can be understood as referring to the process of personality formation and development, which could be formulated as follows: “Personality as a product of socialization comes about as a result of the interplay of various factors, including our biological inheritance or heredity, the cultural environment, social groups and social structures, and past experiences. … For almost a century, there has been a continuing debate among social scientists on how much of what we are and who we are result from heredity (nature) and how much is determined by our socio-cultural environment (nurture). Those who view nature as the determining factor of personality maintain that an individual’s traits and social behavior are the product of heredity or ‘nature.’ The kind of individual one becomes is genetically preordained and the human social drama is a predetermined genetic script. The other view holds that individual traits and social behavior are the product of experience and learning (nurture), and one’s personality depends on the environment and the way one is raised, and the social scripts are a result of one’s own making.”96 Likewise, culture can be defined as the sum total of human creation. On the one hand culture and personality influence each other, condition each other, and shape each other, but on the other, the two entities are inseparable from each other and undergo simultaneous development. I. Personality is the unity of two lives within us: the one, the natural life, tending surely to decay; the other, the spiritual life, tending to perfection. Man differs essentially from the animal, not only because he possesses both the natural and supernatural life in himself, but also because “an animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object.”97 To put it 92

McConnell, James V., & Philipchalk, Ronald P. (1992). Understanding Human Behavior. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, p. 445. 93 Lefton, Lester A., & Valvatne, Laura. (1986). Mastering Psychology. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, p. 456. 94 Proceedings—Academy of Management (Issue 3 of Michigan business papers), 1973, p. 283. 95 Olsen, Marvin Elliott. (1968). The Process of Social Organization. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 256. 96 Panopio, Isabel S., &Rolda, Realidad Santico. (2007). Society and Culture: An Introduction to Sociology and Anthropology. Quezon City, PH: Katha Publishing Co., Inc., p. 102. 97 Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (Martin Milligan, Trans.). Moscow: Progressive Publishers, 1959.

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another way, “man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being. The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature; … For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character.”98 “Of all organized beings with which we are acquainted, there are none in which are so wonderfully united the three different kinds of life.”99

2 A Critical Commentary on Classical Theories of Personality Personality structure refers to the way in which constituent elements of personality structure interconnect and interact with each other in an organic manner at all times and in all places, whereby personality structure can be conceived as the organic organization of constituent elements inherent in the personality. Not only does personality structure afford the intrinsic basis for the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality, but it also asserts itself as the source of motive power for the personality’s behavioral choice in its own right. Personality structure, which is a real entity, has been well likened to a mysterious “black box” whose contents cannot be examined objectively. The basic personality traits as well as the component elements inherent in the personality structure characterized by great complexity integrate various functions and hence form a powerful source of stability of the person. In view of the fact that the structure of human personality is neither visible nor tangible, we can only form a judgment by inference from both ends of the structure of human personality, by which we mean, respectively, the input end of the structure of human personality, that is, the environmental stimulus that a human personality receives, and the output end of the structure of human personality, or rather, the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality. Suppose we cultivate a knowledge of both ends of the structure of human personality in our mind—that is, the environmental stimulus that a human personality receives and the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality, we can assuredly infer the structure of human personality from these known facts. Supposing that we have learned about the structure of human personality as well as either end of the structure of human personality, i.e. 98

Ibid. Paine, Martyn. (1872). Physiology of the Soul and Instinct, as Distinguished from Materialism: With Supplementary Demonstrations of the Divine Communication of the Narratives of Creation and the Flood. New York, NY: Harper, p. 24.

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either the environmental stimulus that a human personality receives or the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality, then we can definitely infer the other end of the structure of human personality from these known facts. The above method for the scholarly investigation and scientific examination of the structure of human personality tends to be characterized by complexity and indirectness, thus causing uncertainty in the interpretation of the structure of human personality. This method for the study of personality structure constitutes the major reason for the existence of the fact that human knowledge on the structure of human personality has been scanty, inaccurate, and incomplete (one-sided or partial) for thousands of years. If we look at the structure of human personality from such an angle we’ll see that man has been faced with the difficult task of understanding and revealing personality structure and what an arduous task man has set for himself! Looking back on the course of the history of civilization—or, to put it another way, in taking a retrospective glance over the recorded history of mankind, covering nearly 5000 years, we will assuredly find that Chinese and foreign scholars (including some theorists) from ancient times to the present have never ceased their serious and assiduous efforts to gain a fresh and deeper insight into the structure of human personality, and that there have been dozens of such competing theories put forward, which make an extensive literature of speculation on this intriguing subject, on the one hand, and embody the admirable results of their own original researches on the other. It is regrettable that their conscientious and unremitting endeavors failed to provide the key to a true and complete understanding of the structure of human personality, but we’ll be relieved to find that their efforts paved the way for worthy successors’ continuous and indefatigable researches on this question upon which just at the present time there is much controversy. Though their ingenuous but hazardous attempts at attaining a complete and exhaustive or comprehensive knowledge of personality structure failed, every failure constitutes a stepping stone to reaching a wiser solution of this question. In so doing they have made substantial contributions of permanent value to the sum of human knowledge as well as to our knowledge of the structure of human personality. In view of this, we should make a painstaking and conscientious study of the basic tenets underlying some of the classical theories of personality, as well as making an intelligent and subtle analysis of them, in order appropriately to absorb the essence and discard the dross, whereby we can establish the theory of “structure and choice” that can be used as the basis for a theoretical conception of personality structure.

2.1 The Ancient Chinese and Western Theories of Personality In the early days of human civilization a multitude of eminent scholars in Chinese and Western countries made serious and indefatigable researches on the structure of human personality, which gave them fascinating insights into this absorbing but perplexing question and which stimulated them to advance numerous ingenious and enlightening theories. The light thrown upon the structure of human personality by some ancient Chinese and Western philosophers has revealed it in a rational

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perspective. The various postulated versions of personality structure tend to give prominence to the rational qualities inherent in individual human beings—or, to put it another way, their respective theories of personality structure are fundamentally marked by the rational qualities with which an individual human being is endowed. “Confucius was a ju and the founder of the Ju school, which has been known in the West as the Confucian school.”100 The Ju school is the Ju chia or School of Literati. This school is known in Western literature as the Confucianist school, but the word ju literally means “literatus” or scholar. Thus the Western title is somewhat misleading, because it misses the implication that the followers of this school were scholars as well as thinkers; they, above all others, were the teachers of the ancient classics and thus the inheritors of the ancient cultural legacy. Confucius, to be sure, is the leading figure of this school and may rightly be considered as its founder. Nevertheless the term ju not only denotes “Confucian” or “Confucianist,” but has a wider implication as well.101 “Confucius, however, was more than a ju in the common sense of the word. It is true that in the Analects we find him, from one point of view, being portrayed merely as an educator. He wanted his disciples to be ‘rounded men’ who would be useful to state and society, and therefore he taught them various branches of knowledge based upon the different classics. His primary function as a teacher, he felt, was to interpret to his disciples the ancient cultural heritage. That is why, in his own words as recorded in the Analects, he was ‘a transmitter and not an originator.’ But this is only an aspect of Confucius, and there is another one as well. This is that, while transmitting the traditional institutions and ideas, Confucius gave them interpretations derived from his own moral concepts. ... In this way Confucius was more than a mere transmitter, for in transmitting, he originated something new. This spirit of originating through transmitting was perpetuated by the followers of Confucius, by whom, as the classical texts were handed down from generation to generation, countless commentaries and interpretations were written. ... This is what set Confucius apart from the ordinary literati of his time, and made him the founder of a new school. Because the followers of this school were at the same time scholars and specialists on the Six Classics, the school became known as the School of the Literati.”102 Confucius entertains a deep-seated respect for the personality of a superior man, the very essence of which tends to manifest itself in the fact that the superior man, or more specifically, a man of great benevolence of character, should be filled with benevolence toward his fellow-men—or, to put it another way, his benevolence must of necessity cause him to love all men, (Analects, XII, 22).103 and that the superior man, or rather, the man of perfect virtue, “seeks to perfect the admirable qualities of men, and doesn’t seek to perfect their bad qualities.” (Analects, XII, 16).104 “With regard to the virtue 100

Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 64. 101 Ibid., pp. 48, 50, 64. 102 Ibid., p. 66. 103 Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 198. 104 Ibid., p. 196.

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of the individual, Confucius emphasized human-heartedness and righteousness (yi), especially the former. ... The idea of yi is rather formal, but that of jen (humanheartedness) is much more concrete. The formal essence of the duties of man in society is their ‘oughtness,’ because all these duties are what he ought to do. But the material essence of these duties is ‘loving others,’ i.e., jen or human-heartedness. ... Confucius says: ‘Human-heartedness consists in loving others.’ (Analects, XII, 22). The man who really loves others is one able to perform his duties in society. Hence in the Analects we see that Confucius sometimes uses the word jen not only to denote a special kind of virtue, but also to denote all the virtues combined, so that the term ‘man of jen’ becomes synonymous with the man of all-round virtue. In such contexts, jen can be translated as ‘perfect virtue.’”105 In the Analects we find the passage: “When Chung Kung asked about perfect virtue (jen), the master said: ‘.... Do not do to others as you would not wish done to yourself ....’” (Analects, XII, 2).106 Again, Confucius is reported in the Analects as saying: “The man of jen is one who, desiring to sustain himself, sustains others, and desiring to develop himself, develop others. To be able from one’s own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others; that may be called the way to practice jen.” (Analects, VI, 28).107 To put it another way, “Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves;—this may be called the art of virtue.” (Analects, VI, 28).108 “Thus the practice of jen consists in consideration for others. ‘Desiring to sustain oneself, one sustains others; desiring to develop oneself, one develops others.’ In other words: ‘Do to others what you wish yourself.’ This is the positive aspect of the practice, which was called by Confucius chung or ‘conscientiousness to others.’ And the negative aspect, which was called by Confucius shu or ‘altruism,’ is: ‘Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself.’ The practice as a whole is called the principle of chung and shu, which is ‘the way to practice jen.’”109 “The principle of chung and shu is at the same time the principle of jen, so that the practice of chung and shu means the practice of jen. And this practice leads to the carrying out of one’s responsibilities and duties in society, in which is comprised the quality of yi or righteousness. Hence the principle of chung and shu beomes the alpha and omega of one’s moral life. ... Everyone has within himself the ‘measuring square’ for conduct, and can use it at any time. So simple as this is the method of practicingjen, so that Confucius said: ‘Is virtue a thing remote? 105

Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, pp. 68, 70. 106 Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 192. 107 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 70. 108 Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 152. 109 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 70.

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I wish to be virtuous, and lo! virtue is at hand.’” (Analects, VII, 29).110 To put it another way, “Is jen indeed far off? I crave for jen, and lo! jen is at hand!” (Analects, VII, 29).111 In the Analects, Confucius enlightened us about the threefold Way of an exemplary person (or a superior man). Here the Way or Truth means Tao. The Master said: “Set your heart on the Tao.” (Analects, VII, 6). And again: “To hear the Tao in the morning and then die at night, that would be all right.” (Analects, IV, 9). It was this Tao which Confucius at fifteen set his heart upon learning. What we now call “learning” means the increase of our knowledge, but the Tao is that whereby we can elevate our mind.112 This is why Confucius said, “The Way of an exemplary person (or a superior man) is threefold, but I am unable to accomplish them: the wise are free from perplexities (or doubts); the virtuous from anxiety; and the bold (or the brave) from fear.” (Analects, IX, 28).113 It is thus clear that, according to Confucianism, the various aspects of a superior man’s character can be reduced to his “humanity,” “wisdom,” and “valor.” “In the Taoist work, the Chuang-tzu, we see that the Taoists often ridiculed Confucius as one who confined himself to the morality of human-heartedness and righteousness, thus being conscious only of moral values, and not super-moral values. Superficially they were right, but actually they were wrong.”114 In actual fact, Confucius, who is equipped with a higher ambition than that of worldly honors, is a man of vast worldly experience as well as a man of extensive learning, whose genuine knowledge was invariably acquired through diligent study, serious reflection and widened (or enlarged) experience. Thus speaking about his own spiritual development, Confucius said: “At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of heaven. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right.” (Analects, II, 4)115 To put it another way, “At fifteen I set my heart on learning. At thirty I could stand. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the Decrees of Heaven. At sixty I was already obedient [to this Decree]. At seventy I could follow the desires of my mind without overstepping the boundaries [of what is right].” (Analects, II, 4)116 “His statement that at forty he had no doubts means that he had then become a wise man. For, as quoted before, ‘The wise are free from doubts.’ Up to this time of his life Confucius was perhaps conscious only of moral values. But at the age of fifty 110

Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 159. 111 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 72. 112 Ibid., p. 74. 113 Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 173. 114 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 74. 115 Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 122. 116 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 74.

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and sixty, he knew the Decree of Heaven and was obedient to it. In other words, he was then also conscious of super-moral values. Confucius in this respect was like Socrates. Socrates thought that he had been appointed by a divine order to awaken the Greeks, and Confucius had a similar consciousness of a divine mission.”117 For example, when he was threatened with physical violence at a place called K’uang, he said: “If Heaven had wished to let this cause of truth perish, then I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K’uang do to me?” (Analects, IX, 5).118 To put it another way, “If Heaven had wished to let civilization perish, later generations (like myself) would not have been permitted to participate in it. But since Heaven had not wished to let civilization perish, what can the people of K’uang do to me?” (Analects, IX, 5).119 One of his contemporaries also said: “The empire has long been without the principles of truth and right; Heaven is going to use your master as a bell with its wooden tongue.” (Analects, III, 24).120 To put it another way, “The world for long has been without order. But now Heaven is going to use the Master as an arousing tocsin.” (Analects, III, 24).121 “Thus Confucius in doing what he did, was convinced that he was following the Decree of Heaven and was supported by Heaven; he was conscious of values higher than moral ones.”122 According to Confucianism, the superior man should manifest illustrious virtue throughout the world, order well his own state, bring peace to the world, love the people, and rest in the highest good. “The Great Learning was attributed by the Neo-Confucianists, though with no real proof, to Tseng Tzu, one of the chief disciples of Confucius.” As the opening section of the Great Learning reads, “Things being investigated, only then did their knowledge become extended. Their knowledge being extended, only then did their thought become sincere. Their thought being sincere, only did their mind become rectified. Their mind being rectified, only then did their selves become cultivated. Their selves being cultivated, only then did their families become regulated. Their families being regulated, only then did their states become rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, only then could the world be at peace. ... In the above quotation, the steps preceding the cultivation of one’s own self, such as the investigation of things, extension of knowledge, etc., are the ways and means for cultivating the self. And the steps following the cultivation of the self, such as the regulation of the family, etc., are the ways and means for cultivating the self to its highest perfection, or as the text says, for ‘resting in the highest good.’ Man cannot develop his nature to perfection unless he tries his best to do his duties in society. 117

Ibid., p. 76. Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 168. 119 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 76. 120 Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 133. 121 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 76. 122 Ibid. 118

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He cannot perfect himself without at the same time perfecting others. ‘To manifest one’s illustrious virtue’ is the same as ‘to cultivate one’s self.’ The former is merely the content of the latter. Thus several ideas are reduced to a single idea, which is central in Confucianism. It is unnecessary that one should be head of a state or of some world organization, before one can do something to bring good order to the state and peace to the world. One should merely do one’s best to do good for the state as a member of the state, and do good for the world as a member of the world. One is then doing one’s full share of bringing good order to the state and peace to the world. By thus sincerely trying to do one’s best, one is resting in the highest good.”123 By throwing considerable further light upon the rational qualities inherent in individual human beings, Mencius developed orthodox Confucianism, especially the classical Confucian personality theory, and thus he was venerated by later generations as the “Second Sage” of Confucianism after the “Supreme Sage,” Confucius. Mencius represents the idealistic wing of Confucianism. The Mencius in seven books records the conversations between Mencius and the feudal lords of his time as well as between him and his disciples, and in later time it was honored by being made one of the famous “Four Books,” which for the past one thousand years have formed the basis of Confucian education.124 Mencius said: “The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that of right and wrong. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence (or human-heartedness); that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of right and wrong, the principle of wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them.”125 To support his theory, Mencius presents numerous arguments, among them the following: “All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others… If now men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress… From this case we may perceive that he who lacks the feeling of commiseration is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of modesty and yielding is not a man; and that he who lacks a sense of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of human-heartedness. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and yielding is the beginning of propriety. The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Man has these four beginnings, just as he has four limbs… Since all men have these four beginnings in themselves, let them know how to give them full development and completion. The result will be like fire that begins to burn, or a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to protect all within the four seas. If they are denied that development, they will not suffice even to serve one’s

123

Ibid., pp. 298, 300. Ibid., p. 110. 125 Legge, James. (1861). The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius, Vol. II. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 278. 124

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parents.” (Mencius, IIa, 6).126 All men in their original nature possess these “four beginnings,” which, if fully developed, become the four “constant virtues,” so greatly emphasized in Confucianism. These virtues, if not hindered by external conditions, develop naturally from within, just as a tree grows by itself from the seed, or a flower from the bud. There remains another question, which is: Why should man allow free development to his “four beginnings,” instead of to what we may call his lower instincts? Mencius answers that it is these four beginnings that differentiate man from the beasts. They should be developed, therefore, because it is only through their development that man is truly a “man.”(Mencius, IVb, 19).127 For Mencius, on the one hand human nature is a social tendency which is inborn, but on the other, it consists of natural qualities, which is to say, Mencius maintained that man has two essences: One is man’s natural essence; the other is man’s social essence. By man’s natural essence, Mencius means that human desires for food and sex are directly associated with physical form, which is to say, ordinary human desires for food and sex are our natural physical or psychological instincts, and that our mouths have a common taste for flavor.128 Mencius means by man’s social essence that all men in their original nature possess these four “constant virtues” such as human-heartedness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom.129 Herein, in fact, lies the essential difference between man and the animals in the Mencius sense of the term. Animals may be said to possess the pure essence of nature, which Mencius calls the material senses xiao ti (the small, 小体), whilst man is a social being as well as a natural being—or to put it another way, man possesses the natural essence as well as the social nature, which is rightly described as the reflecting and thinking mind/heart da ti (the great, 大体) in the Mencius. If man allows free development to his lower instincts, that is, his natural essence (the small, 小体), instead of to what we may call his “four virtues,” or rather, his social nature (the great, 大体), he will be called a “little man” who does not differ essentially from birds or beasts. Mencius says: “A man who only eats and drinks is counted mean by others;—because he nourishes what is little to the neglect of what is great. If a man, fond of his eating and drinking, were not to neglect what is of more importance, how should his mouth and belly be considered as no more than an inch of skin? Some parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great, and some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes the great is a great man. Those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; those who follow that part which is little are little men. The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To 126

Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 112. 127 Ibid., p. 114. 128 Chedu, Chˇ ong. (2020). The Great Synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea: The Chonˇon (Testament). (Edward Y. J. Chung, Trans.). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 257. 129 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, pp. 112, 114.

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the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man.” (Mencius, XIV, 2, 5, 6; XV, 2).130 For Mencius, the function of the mind/heart is to reflect or think. It is this mind/heart, Mencius says, that enables man to think or reflect. It is only by thinking or reflecting that man is truly a man. Specifically, it is only by thinking or reflecting that the “four beginnings”—the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and respect, and the sense of right and wrong, which, he says, are inherent in man’s nature, when elevated or developed, may result in the “four constant virtues,” that is, “goodness,” “righteousness,” “propriety,” and “wisdom,” whereby man can become a “superior man.” It is therefore clear that Mencius tries to build up a new personality theory whose origin, formation, and development rightly deserve deep and extensive discussion. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato, whose voluminous writings on almost every conceivable subject constitute a veritable encyclopedia of ancient Greek thought, and who “is, by any reckoning, one of the most penetrating, wide-ranging, and influential authors in the history of philosophy,”131 also advanced his own personality theory by throwing considerable further light upon the rational qualities inherent in individual human beings. The widely known tribute paid to him by the philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead may attest to Plato’s relation to the Western philosophical tradition: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.”132 As the distinguished Cambridge professor Simon Blackburn points out, Plato’s best-known work The Republic, which “is commonly regarded as the culminating achievement of Plato as a philosopher and writer,”133 has proven to be one of the world’s most influential works of philosophy and political theory, both intellectually and historically, and has been the cornerstone of Western philosophy for over two thousand years.134 Norbert Blössner argues that the Republic is best understood as an analysis of the workings and moral improvement of the individual soul with remarkable

130

Legge, James. (1861). The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius, Vol. II. London, UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, pp. 293–294. 131 Kraut, Richard, “Plato”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/plato/. 132 Griffin, D. R., & Sherburne, D. W., eds. (1978). Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. New York, NY: Free Press, p. 39. cf. Blackburn, Simon. (2007). “Introduction.” In Plato’s Republic: A Biography. London, UK: Atlantic Books. 133 Blackburn, Simon. (2007). “Introduction.” In Plato’s Republic: A Biography. London, UK: Atlantic Books. 134 National Public Radio (8 August, 2007). “Plato’s ‘Republic’ Still Influential, Author Says.” Talk of the Nation.

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thoroughness and clarity.135 In the dialogue of the Republic, Socrates, who “is the first and greatest liberal hero and martyr to freedom in thought and speech,”136 made very wise reflections and observations upon the possibility of an ideal personality. In his treatise the Republic, Plato established the personality theory about the tripartite soul, which is to say, the Platonic soul consists of three parts which are located in different regions of the body. Animals and plants possess only lower souls. What distinguishes man from the lower orders of creation is thus that man alone has a higher soul, that is, the rational soul, whereby man is a species-being most similar to God and therefore dear to him. According to Plato, the soul has three distinguishable layers, or levels: The lowest layer of the soul is described as man’s appetites (temperance), the second layer is called the spirit (courage), and the third layer is what Plato described as reason (wisdom). For Plato, just as men are made out of three metals, gold, silver, and bronze (or iron), so there are three kinds of people in any society: The philosopher-king, whose soul is made of gold, is the embodiment of wisdom and virtue. He knows the statesmanship and statecraft while governing the state. The guardians, whose souls are made of silver, whose virtue is to be courageous, and whose purpose is to direct the state with the virtue of wisdom, are suited to protect the state. Those lesser people such as farmers, craftsmen, and traders, whose souls are composed of bronze and iron and whose virtue is to practice temperance in appetites and passions, should be engaged in productive and economic activities, and thus provide all necessary goods and services for their fellow countrymen.137 Thus it can be seen that Plato divides the community into three classes or professions, i.e., the wise rulers, the auxiliary protectors and the working class of producers.138 According to him, if the three classes can perform their own functions faithfully and resign themselves to their own destinies, unity and harmony will prevail in the State in that justice, or the public virtue, tends to grow with the specialization of functions.139 For Plato, slaves in ancient Greece were deprived of personality in the legal sense (servus non habet personam). It is thus clear that the light thrown upon the structure of human personality by Plato in the Republic has revealed it in a rational perspective, and that, in a similar way, in the early days of human civilization a multitude of eminent scholars in Chinese and Western countries invariably provided a rational insight into the structure of human personality. Their respective theories of personality structure tend to throw considerable further light upon the rational qualities inherent in individual human beings. 135

Blössner, Norbert. “The City-Soul Analogy.” (G. R. F. Ferrari, Trans.). In The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, eds. G. R. F. Ferrari & Giovanni R. F. Ferrari, 345–385. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 136 Blackburn, Simon. (2007). “Introduction.” In Plato’s Republic: A Biography. London, UK: Atlantic Books. 137 Gao, Qing-Hai. (1990). Essentials of European Philosophical History(new edition). Changchun, China: Jilin People’s Publishing House, pp. 91–93. 138 Reeves, M. Francis. (2004). Platonic Engagements: A Contemporary Dialogue on Morality, Justice and the Business World. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 284. 139 Jayapalan, N. (2002). Comprehensive Study of Plato. New Delhi, IN: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, p. 30.

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2.2 The Freudian Theory of Personality Structure In modern times, a number of notable scholars put forward many ingenious theories about the structure of human personality, which, regrettably, were far from providing a comprehensive knowledge of personality structure, but which in great leaps have carried forward our understanding of personality structure. Several representative theories may be adduced to support this argument. Sigmund Freud, who was an Austrian neuropsychologist, psychoanalyst, the founder of psychoanalysis, and one of the major intellectual figures of the 20th century,140 aimed to “throw light upon the unusual, abnormal, or pathological manifestations of the mind” by tracing them to the psychological forces that produced them,141 and formulated the original psychoanalytic theory of personality structure. “Freud may justly be called the most influential intellectual legislator of his age. His creation of psychoanalysis was at once a theory of the human psyche, a therapy for the relief of its ills, and an optic for the interpretation of culture and society. Despite repeated criticisms, attempted refutations, and qualifications of Freud’s work, its spell remained powerful well after his death. If, as the American sociologist Philip Rieff once contended, ‘psychological man’ replaced such earlier notions as political, religious, or economic man as the twentieth century’s dominant self-image, it is in no measure due to the power of Freud’s vision and the seeming inexhaustibility of the intellectual legacy he left behind.”142 “Sigmund Freud’s contribution to psychological knowledge and treatment is remarkably comprehensive in that he developed not only the psychoanalytic theory of personality development and functioning, but the treatment model that follows from the theory as well.”143 Freud advanced his own ingenious theory about the structure of human personality by dividing the human psyche into three portions, that is, the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” and further developing a model of psychic structure comprising the three provinces of the psychic apparatus, viz. the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” which he discussed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and expounded in The Ego and the Id (1923), to capture the dynamics of the mind, which is to say, the three agents are theoretical constructs that describe the activities and interactions of the mental life of a person. He proposed that the structure of human personality could be divided into three parts, or rather, the “id,” “ego,” and “superego.” “In the tripartite structural theory, Freud placed sexual and aggressive instincts in a special part of the mind called the id, which he believed to be a completely unorganized, primordial reservoir of instinctual energies under domination of primary process. The id, therefore, belonged to the unconscious, though was 140

Jay, M. Evan. “Sigmund Freud.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 2, 2021. https://www.britan nica.com/biography/Sigmund-Freud. 141 “Freud, Sigmund.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 . 142 Jay, M. Evan. “Sigmund Freud.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 2, 2021. https://www.britan nica.com/biography/Sigmund-Freud. 143 Hersen, Michel, & Van Hasselt, Vincent B. eds. (1994). Advanced Abnormal Psychology. New York, NY: Plenum Press, p. 404.

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not coextensive with it. The instinctual drives were biologically given, hereditary, and concerned only with seeking immediate discharge.”144 The id is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that is completely unconscious and that is the source of psychic energy derived from instinctual needs and drives. The “id,” whose basic biological needs are primarily sexual, or rather, libidinal drives, is the most primitive component of the human personality that comes into being at birth, and is the source of basic biological needs and drives, emotional impulses and desires, including sexual and aggressive motives. The “Id,” which is unconscious, operates on the pleasure principle, according to which it tries to seek pleasure, avoid pain, and gain immediate gratification of instinctive drives and impulses. It’s filled with basic biological energy reaching it from the instincts, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle.145 Freud called the “id” the “true psychic reality” because it represents the inner world of subjective experience, with no knowledge of objective reality. The “id” seeks immediate gratification without regard to personal or social consequences or to external reality in general, that is, it mediates between its biological and psychological needs on the one hand and external reality on the other. Freud even believed that libido was the ultimate driving energy in human affairs and considered libido to be the ultimate driving force behind every human action. He maintained that, in the final analysis, it is the sexual drive or instinct (libido) that determines whether people are happy or sad, whether they desire wealth, status, or fame, or whether they launch a war or conclude a peace. Developmentally, the id precedes the ego; the psychic apparatus begins, at birth, as an undifferentiated id, part of which then develops into a structured ego.146 The “ego” is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that serves as the organized conscious mediator between the person and reality especially by functioning both in the perception of/and adaptation to reality. Conscious awareness resides in the ego, although not all of the operations of the ego are conscious.147 The ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions and impulses.148 Hence the ego helps us to organize our thoughts and make sense of them and the world around us. For Freud, the ego acts according to the reality principle, which is a regulating mechanism that enables the individual to delay gratifying immediate needs and function effectively in the real world.149 Accordingly, it seeks to please the id’s drive in realistic ways that, in the long term, bring benefit, rather 144

Nicholi, Armand M. (1999). The Harvard Guide to Psychiatry. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 177. 145 Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 105–6. 146 Ramachandran, Vilayanur S., ed. (2012). Encyclopedia of Human Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, pp. 393–399. 147 Snowden, Ruth. (2006). Freud: Teach Yourself. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 105–107. 148 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology (James Strachey, Trans.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 363–4. 149 Schacter, Daniel L., Wegner, Daniel M., & Gilbert, Daniel T. (2008). Psychology. New York, NY: Macmillan Higher Education.

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than grief.150 As the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world,151 it attempts to mediate between id and reality, find a balance between primitive drives and reality while satisfying the id and super-ego, and bring about harmony among the forces and influences working in and upon it.152 Freud concedes that the ego serves three severe masters, that is, the external world, the super-ego, and the id, that the ego, driven by the id, confined by the super-ego, and repulsed by reality, has to do its best to suit all three, thus is constantly feeling hemmed by the danger of causing discontent on two other sides, and that the ego seems to be more loyal to the id, preferring to gloss over the finer details of reality to minimize conflicts while pretending to have a regard for reality.153 In Freudian theory the ego is the psychic system that mediates between the id and the superego to get our needs met. The ego meets the needs of the id in a reasonable, moral manner approved by the superego, which is what Freud called the moral guardian, and which as such observes and guides the ego. Superego is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that is only partly conscious, that represents internalization of parental conscience and the rules of society, and that functions to reward and punish through a system of moral attitudes, conscience, and a sense of guilt. The superego, the mental system that reflects the internalization of cultural rules, mainly learned as parents exercise their authority, consists of a set of guidelines, internal standards, and other codes of conduct that regulate and control our behaviors, thoughts, and fantasies. It acts as a kind of conscience, punishing us when it finds we are doing or thinking something wrong (by producing guilt or other painful feelings) and rewarding us (with feelings of pride or self-congratulation) for living up to ideal standards.154 The superego, which acts as the conscience, maintains our sense of morality, and controls our sense of right and wrong and guilt,155 whereby it helps us fit into society by getting us to act in socially acceptable ways.156 According to Freud, the installation of the superego can be described as a successful instance of identification with the parental agency, while as development proceeds the superego also takes on the influence of those who have stepped into the place of parents—educators, teachers, and people chosen as ideal models. Thus a child’s superego is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of its parents’ superego. It becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgments 150

Noam, Gil G., Hauser, Stuart T., Santostefano, Sebastiano., Garrison, William., Jacobson, Alan M., Powers, Sally I., & Mead, Merril. “Ego Development and Psychopathology: A Study of Hospitalized Adolescents”. Child Development. Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development. 55(1) (Feb., 1984): 189–194. 151 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology. (James Strachey, Trans.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 363–4. 152 Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 110–11. 153 Ibid. 154 Schacter, Daniel L. (2011). Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, p. 481. 155 Sédat, Jacques. (2000). “Freud” in Collection Synthese. Paris; Armand Colin, p. 109. 156 Snowden, Ruth. (2006). Freud: Teach Yourself. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 105–107.

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of value which have propagated themselves in this manner from generation to generation.157 Hence the superego functions as the guardian of morality as well as the guardian of civilization. Freud believed that the three portions of the mind—the id, ego, and superego—are often in conflict, but that the three parts of the psyche interact with each other within the structure of human personality. The id that is a mass of instinctive drives and impulses needs immediate satisfaction and wants instant selfgratification. Hence, whenever the id is striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle158 —the psychic force oriented to immediate gratification of impulse and desire,159 the ego, which represents what may be called reason and common sense and which acts according to the reality principle, either has to hold in check the id’s impulses and passions and represses them again into the unconscious or allows some of the id’s desires and wants to be expressed while trying to find a balance between the id, superego, and reality. The superego, on the one hand, aims for perfection,160 but on the other, it has to work in contradiction to the id. The super-ego strives to act in a socially appropriate manner, controls our sense of right and wrong and guilt,161 and helps us fit into society by getting us to act in socially acceptable ways.162 Thus it can be seen that “the ego, driven by the id, confined by the superego, repulsed by reality, struggles to bring about harmony among the forces and influences working in and upon it.”163 If the ego tries to satisfy the needs of the id as well as the demands of the superego in ways that are reasonable and rational, or rather, in ways acceptable to the superego, that is, if the ego attempts to meet the id’s demands within the limits imposed by the superego, or when the ego often tries to channel the id’s impulsive demands into more socially acceptable channels, the development of a normal, healthy personality is to be achieved. On the contrary, if the ego constantly represses the primitive needs and instinctual demands of the id, forcing them back into the unconscious, the individual will have problems in living or behave deviantly, and even suffer from an illness, particularly a neurosis. Psychoanalysis is a therapeutic method, originated by Sigmund Freud, for treating mental disorders by investigating the interaction of conscious and unconscious elements in the patient’s mind and bringing repressed fears and conflicts into the conscious mind, using techniques such as dream interpretation and free association.164 Freud’s psychoanalysis is based on his conception of 157

Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 95–6. 158 Ibid., pp. 105–106. 159 Schacter, Daniel L. (2011). Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, p. 481. 160 Meyers, David G. “Module 44: The Psychoanalytic Perspective”. Psychology Eighth Edition in Modules. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2007. 161 Calian, Florian. (2012). Plato’s Psychology of Action and the Origin of Agency. Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 17–19. 162 Snowden, Ruth. (2006). Freud: Teach Yourself. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 105–107. 163 Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 110–111. 164 Langwith, Jacqueline., ed. (2008). Perspectives on Diseases and Disorders: Depression. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, p. 150.

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a person which can be represented by his three schemes for describing the mind, that is, the human psyche consists of id, ego, and superego, the mind could be divided into conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and the driving force of our action is the pleasure principle, as well as its derivatives, which is the instinctive seeking of pleasure and avoiding of pain to satisfy biological and psychological needs.165 It can be safely asserted that in developing a theoretical framework of the structure of human personality, Freud made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the study of personality structure by blazing a new and different path towards true knowledge of personality structure. However, Freudian ideas received scathing criticisms after his death, because in the Freudian theory a universal sexual motive was found to have been inherent in the customs and dreams of primitive societies as well as in the early civilizations. In addition, some severe criticisms were also leveled at Freud’s exclusively sexualistic stand, including his definition of energy and libido in a purely sexual sense. The Freudian theory reveals that Freud confines himself almost exclusively to sexuality and its manifold ramifications in the psyche. Nonetheless, his theory concerning the psychological basis of sexuality, especially the purely sexually defined concept of libido and the exclusively sexual interpretation of energy, is purely hypothetical and actually pure conjecture. This limitation compelled Freud to explain man’s psychic energy in exclusively sexual terms, and to reduce all psychological motives to one single unit, that is, libido. There is today a growing consensus that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory provides an inadequate explanation of how the three elements of personality, i.e. the id, ego, and superego, may exist in dynamic equilibrium or in conflict with one another. It is thus evident that the deficiencies inherent in the Freudian theory are apparently obvious.

2.3 Karen Horney’s Theory of Personality Structure Karen Horney (1885–1952), German-born American psychoanalyst whose work exerted a decisive influence upon the course of psychoanalysis,166 was among the most influential of 20th-centuray psychologists through her critiques and revisions of Freudian theory.167 “Horney is sometimes described as a neo-Freudian member of ‘the cultural school,’ a group that also included Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan,

165

Sigmund, Freud. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Chinese edition) (Jue-FuGao, Trans.). Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984; Sigmund, Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Chinese edition) (Chen Lin, Huan-MinZhang, & Wei-Qi Chen, Trans., Rev. Ze-Chuan Chen). Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986. 166 “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia. com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 167 “Horney, Karen (1885–1952).” Women in World History: A Biographical Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia. com. 13 Jan. 2021 .

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Clara Thompson, and Abraham Kardiner.”168 As Thompson says: “The contributions of Sullivan and Fromm have come to be called the ‘cultural school,’ because of the great emphasis of both on the interpersonal factors in personality formation and personal difficulties.”169 “Karen Horney was perhaps the first psychoanalyst to emphasize the importance of culture.”170 What interests Horney is “the problem of normal and neurotic structures in a given culture.” She insists that “we cannot understand these structures without a detailed knowledge of the influences the particular culture exerts over the individual.”171 “Horney criticizes Freud for emphasizing biological factors to the exclusion of cultural factors.”172 “Freud’s disregard of cultural factors not only leads to false generalizations,” she says, “but to a large extent blocks an understanding of the real forces which motivate our attitudes and actions.”173 “Karen Horney also used culture as a facilitator of the individual’s developmental patterns. … she developed this argument into a theoretical position that culture determined the observed frequency of developmental patterns. Thus, individual factors caused an individual’s development, but cultural factors determined the frequency with which the pattern was seen in society.”174 “After Karen Horney immigrated to the United Sates in 1932, her emphasis on cultural determinism became increasingly dominant in her work. By 1939, when she published New Ways in Psychoanalysis, she had completely rejected Freud’s instinct theory and adopted a thorough-going cultural determinism.”175 “Her move from Germany to the United States facilitates this shift in two ways. First, her experience with a different culture illustrated how powerful culture was in shaping psychological development. Second, her professional association and close personal relationship with Erich Fromm and other members of the cultural school served to reinforce and develop her earlier ideas about the importance of culture.”176 Departing from some of the basic principles of Sigmund Freud,177 her theories questioned some traditional 168

Adams, Bridget. (2009). The Psychology Companion. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 241. 169 Adams, Michael Vannoy. (2004). The Fantasy Principle: Psychoanalysis of the Imagination. New York, NY: Brunner-Routledge, p. 133. 170 Ibid. 171 Horney, Karen. (1937). The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, p. 20. 172 Adams, Michael Vannoy. (2004). The Fantasy Principle: Psychoanalysis of the Imagination. New York, NY: Brunner-Routledge, p. 133. 173 Horney, Karen. (1937). The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, pp. 20–1. 174 Kimball, Meredith M., Cole, Ellen., & Rothblum, Esther D. (1995). Feminist Visions of Gender Similarities and Differences. Binghampton, NY: Haworth Press, pp. 72–73. 175 Ibid., p. 73. See also Westkott, Marcia. (1986). The Feminist Legacy of Karen Horney. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 57–65. 176 Ibid. See also Holland, Dorothy., & Quinn, Naomi., eds. (1987). Cultural Models in Language and Thought. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 245–274, 277–294. 177 Britannica, The Editor of Encyclopedia. “Karen Horney”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karen-Horney. Accessed 3 February 2021.

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Freudian views, which was particularly true of the theories of sexuality and of the instinct orientation of psychoanalysis. She disagreed with Freud about inherent differences in the psychology of men and women, and traced such differences to society and culture rather than biology.178 She suggested an environmental and social basis for the personality and its disorders. In her major theoretical works, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937) and New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), “Horney stressed that cultural and social conditions, rather than sexual instincts, contribute to neurosis and sexual disturbances.”179 She argued that environmental and social conditions, rather than the instinctual or biological drives described by Freud, determine much of individual personality and are the chief causes of neuroses and personality disorders.180 Horney formulated a theory of psychopathology that was at once more comprehensive in its scope and more penetrating in its insights. Her ideas, grounded in clinical experience, are almost totally devoid of the dramatic speculation that frequently marked the writings of the man she always acknowledged to be her indispensable forerunner, Sigmund Freud.181 Despite these variances with the prevalent Freudian view, Horney strove to reformulate Freudian thought, presenting a holistic, humanistic view of the individual psyche which placed much emphasis on cultural and social differences worldwide. As such, she is often classified as neo-Freudian.182 Horney put forward her own original theory about the structure of human personality, in which there are three manifestations of the self, that is, the “actual self,” the “real self,” and the “ideal self.” Following a psychodynamic tradition, Horney defined the “real self” as an “intrinsic potentiality” or “central inner force, common to all human beings,”183 or rather, the “original force toward individual growth and fulfillment.”184 She maintained that the “real self” constitutes “the reservoir of spontaneous energies,”185 which includes the basic physiological and psychological needs, and that it represents an innate developmental tendency. Hence, the “real self,” according to Horney, is the potential self who tends to strive for its unfettered growth. For Horney, the “actual self,” as distinguished from the “real self,” is derived from the sum total of our actual experiences, and it is the empirical self—that part of the actual self which is immediately apprehendable and observable at any given moment. She also defines an “actual self” as “everything a person is at a given time: body and soul, healthy and neurotic.” The “actual self,” says Horney, is that fluid combination of the 178

Schacter, Daniel L., Gilbert, Daniel Todd., & Wegner, Daniel M. Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2011. 179 Adams, Bridget. (2009). The Psychology Companion. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 241. 180 Britannica, The Editor of Encyclopedia. “Karen Horney”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karen-Horney. Accessed 3 February 2021. 181 “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia. com. 13 Jan. 2021 . 182 “Karen Horney.” en.wikipedia.org. 31 Jan. 2021 . 183 Horney, Karen. Neurosis and Human Growth. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1950, p. 17. 184 Ibid., p. 158. 185 Ibid., p. 159.

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neurotic and the real that we are in daily existence. According to Horney, the “ideal self,” as opposed to the “actual self,” may be viewed as neurotic and the source of the grandiose aspects of the self, and psychologically healthy people, with very few exceptions, strive to reach an ideal self that is reasonably attainable, which means that man, by his very nature and of his own accord, strives toward self-realization, which Horney views as both a “prime moral obligation” and a “prime moral privilege,” and that his set of values evolves from such striving. The consistent struggle between the “actual self” and the “ideal self” constitutes what Horney refers to as “the central inner conflict,” which results in excessive compulsions and “shoulds” that the individual develops to rule his life and hereby finds meaning in life. For a person who is striving for his ideal self, the natural striving constitutes the central inner force of his actual self as well as the most serious obstacle to healthy growth, that is, the neurotic solution which Horney called self-realization, the attempt to see and to mold oneself into a glorified, idealized, illusory image with strivings for superiority, power, perfection, and vindictive triumph over others.186 In the case of a normal person, the actual self is not far removed from the ideal self, but rather they are tied up with each other. The normal person can adjust the ideal self to the changes wrought on him, which is to say the normal person can adapt (or accommodate) the ideal self to the changed or altering conditions of the actual self. When the normal person has reached his ideals implanted in his or her breast, he or she will pursue new ideals he or she deems worth cherishing and defending. Hence, where the normal person is concerned, he or she tends to be motivated by his or her ideals which he or she can reconcile with the realities of life. By contrast, the neurotic person’s self is split between an idealized self and a real self. On the one hand, the real self, in the eyes of a neurotic person, tends to degenerate into a despised self and thus should be held in contempt because of its coarse and philistine tastes, but on the other, neurotic individuals tend to feel that the ideal self is imbued with a sense of mystery and wonder and that they somehow cannot live up to the ideal self. Thus, looked at from the perspective of a neurotic person, the ideal self is not a natural extension of the real self, but rather it is divorced from real life and becomes a mere illusion of reality. In this case, the more persistently a neurotic person pursues his or her ideals, the more miserable failures he or she may experience, and the more serious illnesses he or she may suffer accordingly. It must be admitted that Horney’s theory about the structure of human personality rejected the pansexual Freudian view and corrected this serious weakness inherent to the Freudian theory, and that she tried to gain a deeper and fresh insight into the structure of human personality by delving into the central inner conflict between the “actual self” and the “ideal self.” According to Freud’s pansexual theory, the neurotic suffers from mental disorder merely because he or she is unable to achieve sexual satisfaction. In delving into the structure of human personality, Horney tried to throw considerable further light upon the discrepancy 186 Horney, Karen. The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Chuan Feng, Trans.). Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 1988; Horney, Karen. Our Inner Conflicts (Zuo-Hong Wang, Trans.). Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 2004; “Karen Danielsen Horney.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 .

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between the ideal self and the real self, thereby giving us a different perspective on deviant behaviors and mental illnesses. It can be safely asserted that in developing a theoretical framework of the structure of human personality, Horney made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the study of personality structure by blazing a different path towards true knowledge of personality structure as well as by providing a new perspective on human behavior. Thus it can be seen that Horney’s theory embodies substantial improvements over Freud’s. However, there are still inherent weaknesses in her theory. Clearly, human behaviors and motives that are complex and unpredictable cannot be given a full explanation when viewed from the perspective of the “actual self” or the “ideal self,” which may keep us from seeing human behaviors and motives in their various aspects. As a general rule human behavior has no connection with what it is to be the ideal self, though in some cases human behavior has something to do with it. Rather, in numerous cases human behavior is mainly associated with personality judgment. When, for example, a teacher decides about how to perform an experiment or how to work out a difficult math problem, or when a student calculates how much two divided by two equals, which is to say, when people make purely cognitive judgments or engage in logical reasoning, their behavioral choices either have nothing to do with the ideal self or have something to do with it. Rather, their behavioral choices depend primarily upon their logical judgments. As stated above, “a key concept of Horney’s personality theory is the concept of self, which she subdivides into real, actual, and ideal.”187 In some cases Horney’s personality theory can offer a most illuminating explanation of deviant behaviors and neurotic disorders. Although Horney’s personality theory provides a new and different perspective on the structure of human personality, it is far from sufficient to account for all the diverse facets of human behavioral phenomena. To put it in a nutshell, Horney’s personality theory cannot be placed on a par with a scientific law that should be accepted as absolute valid within the scope of application.

2.4 Maslow’s Theory of Personality Structure Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970), one of the founding fathers of humanistic psychology and a former president of the American Psychological Association,188 was a prominent personality theorist and one of the best-known American psychologists of the twentieth century. Maslow contributed significantly to the development of the humanistic school of psychology with its roots running from Socrates through the Renaissance. Humanistic psychology rose to prominence in the midtwentieth century in answer to the limitations of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic

187

Forgus, Ronald H., & Shulman, Bernald H. (1979). Personality: A Cognitive View. Hoboken, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 61. 188 “Maslow, Abraham H.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 .

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theory and B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism.189 Maslow, founder of the humanistic school of psychology, believed that “humans are inherently good by nature,” that “their behavior is driven by a necessity to satisfy their basic needs,”190 and that humanistic psychology is designed to “encourage subjects to change their state of mind from having negative thoughts and reactions to one focused on self-awareness and thoughtfulness.”191 Humanistic psychology stands in stark contrast with Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and John Watson and Ivan Pavlov’s behaviorism.192 Maslow set his views in contrast to classical Freudian psychoanalysis, disagreeing with “the dark, pessimistic, and largely negative picture of personality presented by Freudian psychoanalysis,”193 and turning away from the psychoanalytic idea that normal behavior could be inferred from studies of abnormal behavior.194 He refuses to recognize the role of society and culture in personality formation and development—or, to put it another way, he places too little emphasis on the social and cultural determinants of personality. By pointing out the fundamental flaws of the two leading schools of psychology, Maslow established humanism as a third force in the field of psychology, with a large company of followers.195 In his distinguished and influential work entitled “A Theory of Human Motivation (1943),” which is now considered to be one of the classic works in psychology, Maslow proposed his holistic-dynamic theory of personality, which is largely a theory of human motivation. “What Maslow has done is try to explain human motivation in a way that takes account of individual differences in personality and that is an advance on the purely biological or reductionist approaches of some personality theorists.”196 Maslow argued that humans possess five sets of basic needs, ranging from basic “physiological” needs to “safety,” “love” or “belongingness,” “esteem,” and “self-actualization,” that these innate needs are arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency—or, to put it another way, human needs can be described as ordered in a pre-potent hierarchy, and that individuals are motivated to fulfill lower-level needs before they are motivated to fulfill higher-level needs. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is often represented as a pyramid with the more basic needs at the bottom and self-fulfillment needs at the top. These needs are related to each other in a hierarchy of prepotency, from physiological needs at the bottom up to self-actualization at the apex. Maslow asserts that the physiological needs that occupy the bottom level in the hierarchy are the most prepotent of all 189 Benjafield, John G. (2010). A Macat History of Psychology. Third Edition. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, pp. 357–362. 190 Stoyanov, Stoyan. (2017). A Macat Analysis of Abraham H. Maslow’s “A Theory of Human Motivation.” London, UK: Macat International Ltd, p. 31. 191 Ibid., p. 62. 192 Ibid., p. 61–62. 193 Engler, Barbara. (1985). Personality Theories: An Introduction. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, p. 275. 194 “Maslow, Abraham H.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 . 195 Stoyanov, Stoyan. (2017). A Macat Analysis of Abraham H. Maslow’s “A Theory of Human Motivation.” London, UK: Macat International Ltd, p. 62. 196 Gorman, Phil. (2004). Motivation and Emotion. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 61.

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needs and that lower order needs are inherently more important to people than higher order needs. He argues that all the lower level needs show a linear inverse relationship between satisfaction and importance, that lower order needs in the hierarchy are prepotent, more urgently demanding than higher order needs, and that higher-order needs only become prepotent as lower-order needs are reasonably met. Maslow’s theory proposes that lower order needs must be satisfied before individuals are motivated to pursue higher order needs—or, to put it another way, Maslow’s hierarchy states that a lower level must be completely satisfied and fulfilled before moving onto a higher pursuit. Maslow makes the point that until one level of needs is fulfilled, behavior is not motivated by the next higher level of needs. That is to say, individuals first need to satisfy needs at lower levels of the hierarchy before they seek satisfaction of higher level needs. “Research has supported the position that lower-order needs do take precedence over higher-order needs, but critics have suggested that Maslow’s hierarchy is too simplistic and too rigid to explain the motivation of those who cannot meet the lower-order needs but still strive for the higher-order needs.”197 Self-actualization or self-fulfillment is the highest order need in Maslow’s hierarchy, or more specifically, “the instinctual need to fulfill one’s creative, moral, and intellectual potential.”198 The hierarchical ordering of needs differs greatly from individual to individual, and this further contributes to individual differences in personality. Maslow maintains that needs are biological or instinctive and that individuals tend to behave in ways that satisfy them. Maslow refers to lower needs as “deficiency needs” and to higher order needs as “growth needs.” “Maslow distinguishes between deficiency motivation characteristic of the lower needs and growth motivation, or ‘metamotivation,’ characteristic of self-actualization.”199 Maslow advocated viewing human behavior from a perspective of needs. According to Maslow, the basic human needs are responsible for generating all motivation, and all behavior is deemed to be directly or indirectly motivated by such basic human needs. Human behavior is largely motivated or determined by the different levels of human needs. “Man’s lower needs are the biologically-rooted animal instincts that our species has inherited as part of our mammalian evolution. … In stark contrast with mankind’s lower biological needs, our higher needs only motivate us consciously; we ordinarily must be aware of these higher needs and choose to meet them.”200 Only if we have fulfilled our higher order needs can we remain fulfilled in our uniquely human dimension; that is, we can remain ultimately happy and complete.201 “The hierarchical relationship within this spectrum of needs means that any one motivator from this enormous range of motivators may become the operant factor in shaping the behavior of the organism 197

Sullivan, Larry E., ed. (2009). The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 234. 198 Ibid. 199 Kventensky, Erma Dell. (1972). On Relationships Between the Creative Personality and Some Dimensions of Cognitive Style. Davis, CA: University of California Press, p. 13. 200 McNamara, Thomas Edward. (2004). Evolution, Culture, and Consciousness: The Discovery of the Preconscious Mind. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 157. 201 Ibid.

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at a particular time simply by virtue of its being the lowest level, unfulfilled need within the hierarchy at that time. In other words, if all needs were equally unsatisfied, then the lowest, most instinctual need would be the primary motivator until it was satisfied. Then, the next higher, unmet need would dominate behavior until it was satisfied, and this process would continue until all needs were satisfied.”202 “Man’s lower needs are the biologically-rooted animal instincts that our species has inherited as part of our mammalian evolution. We do not have the freedom to remove them from our nature. Indeed, if we try to ignore our primate instincts, they will still motivate us—even unconsciously, if necessary—to satisfy them. The unconscious power of these needs to control human consciousness, and thereby, behavior, was one of Freud’s greatest discoveries. Maslow greatly expanded the definition of human needs beyond Freud’s, but he also pointed out that these higher needs, unlike our primate instincts, do not normally have the power to create unconscious motivation. In other words, if we are not aware of these higher needs or if we choose not to act upon them, they will not motivate us on the unconscious level as much as the more instinctual needs do. In stark contrast with mankind’s lower biological needs, our higher needs only motivate us consciously; we ordinarily must be aware of these higher needs and choose to meet them, if they are to be satisfied at all. Of course, if we choose not to meet them for whatever reason, we will inevitably suffer the consequences of not growing on that higher level of our personality, which fits well with Jung’s theory of self-actualization.”203 “The problem with not fulfilling our higher needs is simply that we remain unfulfilled in our uniquely human dimension; that is, we remain ultimately unhappy and incomplete, as Jung first pointed out and Maslow reaffirmed. Whereas we must fulfill our instinctual primate needs because they are hard wired into our CNS, we are not so neurologically compelled to fulfill our higher needs. Therein lies the essence of the human predicament. We must satisfy our primate needs, but having done so, on any particular occasion, presents us with a new problem. On those occasions, which usually occur on a daily basis in the modern world, we can either go on to fulfill higher needs, or we can attempt to control our environment so as to always be able to fulfill those lower needs, and then some, in the future. Western culture has programmed us to think of this critical juncture as a decision point, but I am suggesting that the concept of decision making is a theological one that is a misunderstanding of the human CNS. All decisions are predetermined by the neurological activities in the brain that are themselves the product of the following influences: acculturation, individual past experiences, current homeostatic needs, and the current environment. Every decision is simply a preconscious summation of the interactions between all these forces acting on the CNS at the moment the decision is made.”204 “If all cultures have evolved in order to ensure the fulfillment of our primate needs, as I have proposed, then we can conclude that all past and present forms of acculturation program their members to be more aware of those primate needs than our higher needs. Indeed, I believe that even awareness of the 202

Ibid. Ibid. 204 Ibid., pp. 157–158. 203

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higher needs of human needs of human nature is a very recent development in the evolution of the human mind. For most of our history as a species we were driven by instinctual necessity and the rise of civilization did little to change that, since all cultures inculcate the scarcity mentality of our EEA. So human beings have always been programmed to focus awareness on primate needs and not the higher needs that only came into existence with the evolution of self-consciousness. The problem is that if we do not fulfill those higher needs we will never be complete human beings. This emphasis on basic instincts is at the core of modern Western egocentric selfconsciousness simply because it is, like all previous stages of consciousness, a form of instinct.”205 “When Maslow’s theory is examined in light of the structure of egocentric consciousness, it becomes evident that the contents of awareness must be selected by a kind of preconscious scanning process, driven by the lower instinctual needs and intended for their satisfaction. We know from experimental psychology that the human nervous system is constantly bombarded by enormous numbers of stimuli, originating from different levels and sources of sensory stimulation. For example, there is continual organic stimulation, such as the somatic sensations generated over the surface of the skin by such constants as contact with clothing and exposure to air and light. Besides somatic sensations, auditory and visual stimuli impinge upon us from our physical and social environment. Then, there is the whole arena of mental stimulation within the cortex, such as associations between thoughts present in awareness and the contents of memory. The CNS must have evolved a hierarchy to deal with all of these constant, concurrent stimulation on an instinctual priority basis. So, the human CNS must preconsciously filter every stimulus through a hierarchy of classes of stimulation that automatically prioritizes them on the basis of a neurological architecture that manifests a combination of universal primate instincts and of local values acquired in the process of acculturation, as well as learning from experience.”206 He postulates that these motivational needs underlie all human behavior, which is to say, they constitute the primary sources of behavioral motivation. These needs, according to Maslow, are critical in our survival and ongoing existence, for without having these needs met, an individual will fail to develop into a healthy person, both physically and psychologically. He asserted that an individual tends to be dominated by these hierarchically arranged needs all through life, and that at any given time he is struggling to meet these needs until he reaches the apex of the hierarchy, self-actualization. He believed that humans aspire to have all of these needs met and experience a sense of genuine fulfillment when this is achieved. The higher order needs an individual person is trying to fulfill, the more of the best of humanity the individual is endowed with, and the more likely the individual is to be relieved from the condition of inferior animality—or, to put it another way, the individual is less driven by primitive, self-serving, and animalistic instinctual forces. According to

205 206

Ibid., p. 158. Ibid., pp. 158–159.

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Maslow’s theory of motivation, known as the “hierarchy of needs,” all human behaviors are deemed to be motivated by five sets of hierarchically arranged needs.207 Maslow argued that his theory of motivation integrated existing formulations from psychoanalysis and behavioral psychology with insights derived from the study of the “psychologically healthy,” while psychoanalytically inspired theory, which was based largely on the study of people experiencing personal difficulties, resulted in a distorted and unduly narrow conception of human motivation.208 Maslow’s theory of motivation is reasonable in the sense that he contended human needs constitute the primary driving force behind human behavior, and that they rightly serve to explain the entire spectrum of human behavior. It may be safely asserted that Maslow’s theory represents a substantial improvement on its forerunners, such as Freud’s and Horney’s theories. Freud saw the libido as the sole driving force behind all human behavior, and Maslow’s theory overcame the weakness inherent in the Freudian theory. According to Horney, human behaviors and neuroses can be given a full explanation only when viewed from the perspective of the “actual self” or the “ideal self,” and in his theory Maslow corrected the inherent weakness of Horney’s theory. Nonetheless, Maslow’s theory is far from comprehensive. When it comes to the structure of human personality, Maslow’s theory cannot offer an all-embracing and full explanation. Maslow’s theory attempts to describe and explain human behavior in terms of human needs and desires, which is neither scientific nor practical. While human needs tend to provide the basic energy for human behavior, and to influence the basic behavioral tendencies, they cannot directly determine whether humans behave or how they behave. Man is a rational animal—or, to put it another way, man is endowed with reason. Human reason is the ultimate determining force in human behavior. Generally speaking, human needs and rational judgment jointly determine human behavior. Under certain external environmental pressures, human behavior tends to be initiated through needs. Then an individual tends to make behavioral choices whenever he (or she) exercises his (or her) power of rational judgment. Thus it can be seen that rational judgment is the ultimate determining force in human behavior. To sum up, the obvious weakness of Maslow’s theory lies in the fact that he rejected and even ignored the determining influence of consciousness and reason upon human behavior. Thus it must of necessity follow that his theory cannot offer a scientific explanation of man’s unpredictable and unfathomable behavior.

207 Maslow, Abraham H. Self-Actualizing Man (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu& Feng Liu, Trans.). Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987; Hoffman, Edward. The Right to Be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu, Trans.) Beijing: Reform Publishing House (1988–2000), 1998. 208 “Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan. 2021 .

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2.5 Kurt Lewin’s Theory of Personality Structure Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), German-born American social psychologist, is often recognized as the founder of modern experimental social psychology. At the time of Kurt Lewin’s death in February 1947, he was widely regarded as one of the outstanding psychologists of his generation. Edward Tolman, the colleague who delivered a tribute to Lewin at a meeting of the American Psychological Association later that year, thought that Lewin could be compared to Freud himself. “Freud the clinician and Lewin the experimentalist—these are the two men whose names will stand before all others in the history of our psychological era. For it is their contrasting but complementary insights which first made psychology a science applicable to real human beings and to real human society.”209 Lewin originated the concept of field theory to explain how human behavior interacts with the environment, and developed his psychological field theory that was applicable to a wide variety of psychological and sociological phenomena. “Lewin’s dynamic view on psychological structure and human action was a significant contributor to psychological ideas. It was a general methodological orientation that radically transcended the associationist worldview of most of psychology. Thus, he stated that ‘field theory is probably best characterized as a method: namely, a method of analyzing causal relations and of building scientific constructs. This method of analyzing causal relations can be expressed in the form of certain statements about the conditions of change.’”210 “Force” is the core concept at the heart of the eminent social psychologist Kurt Lewin’s topological psychology. “Lewin distinguished three types of forces: driving forces, which arise from needs and cause locomotion toward a goal; restraining forces, which are associated with barriers; and induced forces, which are related to the wishes of other people in the person’s life space. Lewin regarded forces as having both direction and strength, and represented them in his drawings as vectors (arrows), with the direction of the vector representing the direction of the force, and its length representing its intensity or strength.”211 Lewin believes that force is the latent internal energy that serves to motivate human behavior. He devised the concept of dynamic field that describes social and psychological phenomena and serves as foundations for his psychological theory. “Central to Lewin’s theorizing was the idea of dynamic field, which refers to the complex constellation of forces that determine a person’s movement toward or away from a particular state or course of action. Any factor having an effect on a person in a given context could be included in the person’s dynamic field. In incorporating a wide range of potential influences on thought and behavior, the concept of dynamic field allows for the integration of different disciplines and

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“Lewin, Kurt.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 . 210 Damon, William., & Lerner, Richard M. (2006). Handbook of Child Psychology, Theoretical Models of Human Development. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 194. 211 “Lewin, Kurt.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 .

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levels of analysis.”212 Dynamical social psychology owes its biggest debt to Kurt Lewin, and he is widely regarded as the father of “dynamic psychology.”213 He also proposed the concept of tension system, contending that the system of psychological tension, which would be discharged when “need” in a person is met, forms the determining cause of human behavior. Tension and need are Lewin’s two major dynamic concepts. Tension, according to Lewin, is the outcome of the state of disequilibrium, and need refers to physiological or psychological condition that causes either decrease or increase in tension of a system.214 Whenever a psychological need is felt, there is a state of tension, and the individual tends to act in order to achieve relief.215 The release of tension tends to provide dynamic energy for human behavior and psychological activity, thereby constituting a hidden factor in determining man’s psychological activities and behavioral manifestations. “Lewin’s field theory utilizes the concept of tension systems in order to explain human personality in action. In essence, a tension system is an energy system created by a need and released when the person achieves the goal related to that need. Lewin does not use the word ‘tension’ in the sense of an undesirable stress or emotional strain; rather, he regarded tension as a desirable condition of readiness for action toward attaining a goal. He saw tension as increased by any barrier between the need and the goal. In addition to barriers, Lewin also related tensions to forces. … Lewin maintained that tension tends to equalize itself by spreading from one region throughout a person’s psychic system; he called the means of this equalization a process. Processes include such activities as thinking, remembering, perceiving, performing an action, and many others. Several different tension systems and processes may coexist simultaneously within a person and remain for various lengths of time. … Lewin developed his concept of tension systems in part because he disagreed with the associationist explanation of human behavior. Associationist psychologists explained behavior as the end result of simple ideas derived from sense experience that became associated in the mind through repetition and conditioning. An associationist psychologist would regard doing any purposeful action as setting up a tendency to repeat the action. Lewin observed that there are many purposeful actions that people do not ordinarily repeat once they have achieved their goal. … Another important feature of Lewin’s concept of tension systems is his emphasis on the here-and-now. He parted company with Freudian psychoanalysis in looking for long-term historical explanations of human behavior. Lewin argued instead for what he called the principle of contemporaneity in a person’s

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Vallacher, Robin R., Coleman, Peter T., Nowak, Andrzej., Bui-Wrzosinska, Lan., Liebovitch, Larry., Kugler, Katharina G., & Bartoli, Andrea. (2014). Attracted to Conflict: Dynamic Foundations of Destructive Social Relations. New York, NY: Springer Science & Business Media, p. 57. 213 Ibid. 214 Mishra, B. K. (2008). Psychology: The Study of Human Behavior. New Delhi, IN: PHI Learning Private Limited, p. 441. 215 Wolman, Benjamin B. (2012). Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology. New York, NY: Springer Science & Business Media, p. 479.

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life space, meaning that only present facts can influence present behavior.”216 It is therefore evident that “Tension,” for Lewin, invariably exists in a system. In view of this, in order to arrive at a true understanding of “tension,” we feel the necessity of giving such concepts as “force field” and “life space” a clear and lucid explanation. By “life space” Lewin means “the sum of all facts that determine the person’s behavior at a given point in time.”217 That is to say, the life space includes all the possible facts that may influence human behavior and psychological activity at a given time—or, to put it another way, an individual’s behavior, at any time, is manifested only within the coexisting factors of the current “life space” or “psychological field.”218 In other words, “the sum total of all environmental and personal factors in interaction is called the life space or the psychological space.”219 In what follows, we will inquire about the exact relationship between the person and the environment and how their entanglement might influence behavior, and lay out the fundamentals of Kurt Lewin’s field theory, which represents the earliest framework for predicting behavior based on the interaction of the person and the environment. “Lewin represented ‘the person in the life space’ (that is, the behaving self) with topological diagrams that depicted relevant dispositional and environmental factors, using boundaries to differentiate them and arrows to symbolize facilitating or inhibiting forces. With these map-like diagrams, which he hoped would eventually lead to formal mathematical solutions, Lewin sought to express the dynamic interchange among the diverse factors that constitute the psychological ‘field’ and that causally influence behavior. In field theory, all behavior is the product of two sources, the person and the environment, hence the well-known equation B = f (P, E). … Lewin believed that P and E were fully interdependent and inseparable. … Lewin theorized about how each factor affected the other: ‘The person and his environment have to be considered as one constellation of interdependent factors’. That person factors are always in a state of dynamic interrelation with environmental factors, and that all psychological events are the result of these interacting forces is the major conceptual contribution of field theory.”220 “Lewin’s central assumption is that human behavior is dependent on the psychological field at a given time. A psychological field encompasses the combination of all possible factors that (can) affect an individual’s behavior. Human behavior can thus be perceived as a function of the prevailing forces within the psychological field that an individual perceives at a given time. A psychological field, however, includes more than just external factors of the environment. It rather originates from 216

Gale, an imprint of Cengage Learning. (2015). A Study Guide for Psychologists and Their Theories for Students: Kurt Lewin. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale. See also “Lewin, Kurt.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 . 217 Nicholi, Armand M. (1978). The Harvard Guide to Modern Psychiatry, Volume 2. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 136. 218 Deutsch, Morton. “Field Theory in Social Psychology.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol.1, eds. Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968. 219 Rice, F. Philip. (1992). The Adolescent: Development, Relationships, and Culture. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, p. 85. 220 Deaux, Kay., & Snyder, Mark., eds. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 74.

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the interaction of the individual and the individual’s psychological representation of the environment. In other words, the person and the environment must be understood as a constellation of interdependent factors. Lewin calls the entirety of these factors the ‘life space’. It is this life space that an individual experiences at any given moment and that determines the individual’s behavior in that moment. This famous theoretical assumption is well represented in the following formula: B = F (P, E) = F (LS). Accordingly, behavior (B) is a function (F) of the person (P) and the environment (E). Lewin assumed that this formula is valid for affects, goal-directed behavior, dreams, wishes, and also thinking. Both the person and the environment have to be understood as intertwined factors. The potentially complex interaction between the two—represented by the function (F) in the formula—is what determines people’s behavior. Human behavior is thus even-handedly dependent on what type of person an individual is, how his or her personality plays out in a given situation, and on the subjectively perceived environment in a given situation.”221 Hence the life space may be briefly summarized as follows. The interaction of the person (P) and the environment (E) produces the life space, and the life space that is the combination of all the factors may influence a person’s behavior at any time. An individual’s behavior, at any time, can be expressed as a function of the life space B = f (LS).222 The environment as demonstrated in the life space refers to the objective situation in which the personperceives and acts. The life space environment (E) is completely subjective within each context as it depends not only on the objective situation, but also on the characteristics of the person.223 It is necessary to consider all aspects of a person’s conscious and unconscious environment in order to map out the person’s life space.224 “The behaving self may be seen as the individual’s perception of his relations to the environment he perceives.”225 Field theory holds that behavior must be derived from a totality of coexisting facts. These coexisting facts make up a “dynamic field,”226 which means that the state of any part of the field depends on every other part of it. Behavior depends on the present field rather than on the past or the future. Human behaviors can make large or small influences on the totality of the life space.227 The development of the person inevitably affects the life space. Development also plays a major role in life space behavior. From the beginning of one’s life

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Masur, Philipp K. (2018). Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure: Communication Processes in Online Environments. New York, NY: Springer, p. 132. 222 Deutsch, Morton. “Field Theory in Social Psychology.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol.1, eds. GardnerLindzey & ElliotAronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968. 223 Ibid. 224 Burnes, Bernard., & Cooke, Bill. (2013). “Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory: A Review and Revaluation.” International Journal of Management Reviews15(4): 408–425. 225 Deutsch, Morton. “Field Theory in Social Psychology.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol.1, eds. GardnerLindzey & ElliotAronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968. 226 Martin, John Levi. (2003). “What Is Field Theory?” American Journal of Sociology 109(1): 1–49. 227 Ibid.

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behavior is molded in all respects to his or her social situation.228 “Like other Gestalt psychologists, Lewin focused on the person’s subjective perceptions, not on ‘objective’ analysis. He emphasized the influence of the social environment, as perceived by the individual, which he called the psychological field. A full understanding of a person’s psychological field cannot result from an ‘objective’ description by others of what surrounds the person because what matters is the person’s own interpretation. This is not to say that the person can necessarily verbalize his or her perceived environment, but the person’s own reports typically provide better clues than do the researcher’s intuitions. … Just as in Gestalt psychology generally, Lewin emphasized the individual’s phenomenology, the individual’s construction of the situation. Another theme imported from Gestalt psychology to social psychology was Lewin’s insistence on describing the total situation, not its isolated elements. One must understand all the psychological forces operating on the person in any given situation in order to predict anything. … No one force predicts action, but the dynamic equilibrium among them, the ever-changing balance of forces, does predict action. The total psychological field (and hence behavior) is determined by two pairs of factors. The first pair consists of the person in the situation. Neither alone is sufficient to predict behavior. The person contributes needs, beliefs, and perceptual abilities. These act on the environment to constitute the psychological field. … Ever since Lewin, social psychologists have seen both person and situation as essential to predicting behavior. … The second pair of psychological field factors that determine behavior is cognition and motivation. Both are functions of person and situation, and jointly they predict behavior. … To summarize, Lewin focuses his analysis on psychological reality as perceived by the individual; on a whole configuration of forces, not single elements; on the person and the situation; and on cognition and motivation. These major themes, which date back through Gestalt to Kant, are theoretical points that still survive in modern approaches to social cognition as well as in psychology as a whole.”229 “Lewin’s field theory integrates biological and environmental factors into behavior without trying to judge which has the greater influence.”230 “Lewin did not offer propositions about which dimensions of situations were more or less relevant to field theory.”231 “Field theory provides a classificatory framework for the investigation of person-environment interactions. However, it remains unclear how the situation itself fits into this theoretical framework. Is the psychological field a synonym for the term situation? Or is a situation something different? These questions are only implicitly and often times ambiguously addressed in field theory.”232 Kurt Lewin, 228

Lewin, Kurt. (1939). “Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology.” American Journal of Sociology 44(6): 868–896. 229 Fiske, Susan T., & Taylor, Shelley E. Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 2016. 230 Rice, F. Philip. (1992). The Adolescent: Development, Relationships, and Culture. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, p. 85. 231 Deaux, Kay., & Snyder, Mark., eds. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 74. 232 Masur, Philipp K. (2018). Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure: Communication Processes in Online Environments. New York, NY: Springer, p. 134.

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who “regards the human mind as a dynamic tension system and all behavior as an attempt to relieve tension and to establish equilibrium,”233 and who “views activity or behavior as a dynamic balance of forces working in opposite directions,”234 proposed “the quasi-stable equilibrium theory” by developing most comprehensively the forcefield concept in his psychological field theory. The keystone of the homeostatic equilibrium is the idea that the organism is endowed with a mechanism of self-defense, which serves to protect the organism itself from perceived danger by automatically and unconsciously modifying the organism’s perception of and/or reaction to danger, and is endued with a tendency toward the maintenance of a relatively stable equilibrium, that the capacity for self-control inherent in the organism enables the functional system of the organism to interact dynamically with the larger environment, a need that supports the survival of the system, and to form a cause-and-effect relationship between the system and the environment, both of which are constantly changing in consequence of this interaction, and that an upset in the equilibrium of forces, on the one hand, tends to create a state of tension in the organism, but on the other, to prompt the organism itself to achieve a new form of dynamic equilibrium with the environment through adaptive behavior, or rather, through a process of ordering and growth. To put it slightly differently, “the ability of the system to adapt to its environment through changes in its structure leads to states of equilibrium and homeostasis, both of which relate to different types of balance. Equilibrium is the sense of being in balance. When something is in balance, there is little variability in movement before the state of balance is disrupted. On the other hand, homeostasis is a state of variable balance where the limits to maintaining balance are more flexible.”235 As Lewin points out, whenever the original psychological equilibrium is disrupted (at least temporarily), the major cause of disruption can invariably be attributed to the arousal of a need that serves to prompt action because the organism tends to maintain a constant internal equilibrium, or rather, “a steady state of homeostasis that is not to be construed as a stationary balance but rather as quasi-stationary equilibrium comparable to a river which flows at a given velocity in a given direction during a certain interval of time,”236 and the resultant internal tension that may occur as a result of an upset in the mental equilibrium tends to incite the organism to restore the equilibrium, or rather, to establish a new permanent internal equilibrium, a dynamic balance of the driving (promoting change) and restraining (inhibiting change) forces, even though some aspects of the original equilibrium may persist. Lewin’s studies demonstrated that “psychological processes—no less than biological, physical, and economic—may often be deduced from their tendency towards equilibrium. The transition from a state of rest to a dynamic state, or the modification of a stationary 233

Broudy, Harry S., & Freel, Eugene Lawrence. (1956). Psychology for General Education. London, UK: Longmans, Green and Co., p. 214. 234 Milton, Charles R. (1981). Human Behavior in Organizations: Three Levels of Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 374. 235 Brandell, Jerrold R. (2010). Theory & Practice in Clinical Social Work. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 9. 236 Gius, John Armes. (1966). Fundamentals of General Surgery. Chicago, IL: Year Book Medical Publishers, p. 72.

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process occurs when systematic equilibrium has been upset. There results a process in the direction of a new equilibrium.”237 Based on the ancient philosophical idea that human behavior is motivated by the desire to seek pleasure and to avoid pain, human behavior can be perceived through such a type of explanatory theory as the pleasure principle or the doctrine of hedonism, which is to say, people tend to explain human behavior in terms of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Likewise, “Bentham held that man is constructed in such a manner that he is incapable of doing anything other than to seek pleasure and avoid pain. The mainspring of human action is the desire to secure pleasure and to avoid pain.”238 By contrast, Lewin advanced a newer view of human behavior, postulating that human behavior can best be explained according to the homeostatic theory based on the assumption that “human behavior is a function of an individual’s psychological environment and should be seen as part of a continuum, with individual variations from the norm being a function of tensions between perceptions of the self and of the environment.”239 The homeostatic equilibrium theory may well form a substantial contribution of permanent value to our deeper knowledge of human behavior. Either the field theory or the theory of homeostasis or equilibrium, which originated with Kurt Lewin, requires an interdisciplinary approach to psychological and social phenomena, thus opening up new perspectives on modern social psychology. For centuries the prevailing psychological entity was a philosophically postulated one. During that same period and, in particular, before one of social psychology’s towering figures emerged: Kurt Lewin, with very few exceptions earlier psychologists postulated the existence of specific psychological entities and, in particular, of some specific motivational forces affecting behavior and mood. By contrast, “Lewin’s theory attempts to account for the many forces that are interacting at any given time to influence motivation or behavior and how a given motivation or behavior is the result of these multiple influences. Lewin (1935) postulates that a person’s motivation or behavior is the result of interactions of the person and the perceived environment, or life space which refers to one’s psychological reality.”240 Lewin’s psychological differentiations, which show the changes from substantialism to relationalism (or relativism), not only open up new perspectives on psychology and human sciences, but also provide a revolutionary approach to psychological and social reality, thus helping to make psychology a modern pragmatic discipline in its own right. “Lewin’s revolutionary approach to psychology was based on the idea that all psychological and social phenomena need to be understood in terms of ‘social space’ that represents a relational view of the world. … Social space and field theory were central to the social psychology of Kurt Lewin and provided one of the foundations of organization development and action research. … Social space is 237

Ellis, Willis D. (1999). A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology. New York, NY: Psychology Press, p. 290. 238 Andres, Tomas Quintin D. (1980). Understanding Values. New Day Publishers, Quezon City, PH: New Day Publishers, p. 147. 239 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “Kurt Lewin.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 8, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kurt-Lewin. 240 Keller, John M. (2009). Motivational Design for Learning and Performance: The ARCS Model Approach. New York, NY: Springer Science & Business Media, pp. 103–104.

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distinct from physical space, though the two constantly influence each other. Social space forms out of links created when people’s thinking and feeling are put into action and elicit responses from others, which then shape their thinking, feeling and action. If the interaction is temporary or fleeting, a social space is unlikely to form. However, when interactions are sustained over time and become patterned, they take on a particular configuration that differentiates them from other patterned interactions. Differentiation is a mental act that leads to the creation of a space outside, but not wholly independent, of the individuals who constitute it. All relationships, from the simplest to the most complex, are differentiated social spaces. Couples, groups, organizations, cultures and whole societies are all configurations of social space. They differ in the level of complexity and their specific characteristics, but they all are based on the same fundamental construct. Lewin’s use of social space was strongly influenced by the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer and his concept of ‘relationalism’. Cassirer made a distinction between the logic of things, or substantialism, and a logic of relations, or relationalism. Substantialism is rooted in the intuitive sense that the world is constructed from independent, material objects and can be best grasped by understanding these things. It is also reflected in the widely accepted notion of causality as change, or variance, induced in one distinct thing as the result of the impact of another distinct thing. A ‘relational logic,’ on the other hand, accords primacy to the relations among entities. In other words, reality is best grasped as an ordering of the elements of perception through a process of construction that gives them intelligibility and meaning. Cassirer (1923/1953) argued that modern science was moving steadily from a substantive to a relational logic, using the concept of geometric space as a totally abstract way of representing physical relations. Space is not a physical concept but rather a mental creation that can be used to think relationally about making order from any given set of elements. Lewin adopted this idea of space as an essential construct for theorizing about the social world. He was one of the first social scientists to realize that psychology, and the social sciences in general, was limited by a substantialist logic that viewed reality in terms of separate entities (i.e. variables) that directly influence each other. He introduced the idea of a social space in order to shift the focus to a relational logic, which is essentially the basis for holism and ‘synergy’—that is, the whole (i.e. the relations) is greater than the sum of its parts (i.e. substantive entities). This whole, however, is totally abstract and invisible. What makes social space such a useful construct is that it focuses neither on the individual nor on the collective as the unit of analysis but rather on the processes through which individuals, in interaction with others, construct their shared worlds. It became the basis for the idea of group dynamics and concepts such as norms and cohesion.”241 “The concept of field was borrowed by Lewin from physics as a way of accounting for causality in social space. By the twentieth century, physics increasingly faced problems that could not be solved through Newtonian mechanics, which attributed causality to the behavior of physical bodies when subjected to forces or displacement from each other. The main difficulty was explaining how certain bodies seemed to 241

Coghlan, David., & Brydon-Miller, Mary., eds. (2014). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research. London, UK: SAGE Publications, p. 347.

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influence other bodies without direct contact (e.g. electromagnetism). The turning point was the Faraday-Maxwell concept of the electromagnetic ‘field,’ in which causality is attributed to the influence of this field on the elements that constitute it. Thus, fields can be understood as spaces that not only link different elements into a kind of network but also exert force on and shape the behavior of their constituents. The basic components of a social field are (a) the individual and collective actors or agents who constitute the field; (b) the relationship among these actors, with a particular focus on relative power (e.g. hierarchical or equalitarian); the shared meanings that signify what is going in the field and make it intelligible—meaning holds the social field together and exerts a truly human force that differentiates social fields from fields in the world of nature—and (4) the ‘rules of the game’ that govern action within it. In the social world, fields cause people to think, feel and act in certain ways. The meanings and rules of the game become internalized into the constituents of the field and shape their behavior. Lewin introduced the construct of the ‘life space,’ which he defined as the ‘totality of facts’ which determine the behavior of an individual at a certain moment. When Lewin referred to ‘facts,’ he was not referring to ‘objective’ facts but to the internalized field—all those perceived elements that have an influence on a person at any given moment. This construct was expressed symbolically in the well-known formula B = f (P, E) (behavior is a function of person and environment) and pointed to the link between the internal and external worlds. Thus, human psychology was conceived as a ‘field’, and the life space represented the state of the field at any given moment. Each change of a person’s life space means either expanding or contracting that person’s ‘space of free movement’—that is, the range of what is possible for that person to do or achieve. A generation after Lewin, Bourdieu, who was also influenced by Cassirer, used the concepts of social space and field theory in building his ‘reflexive sociology.’ In this framework, social space is a set of points differentiated into fields (e.g. a professional field, artistic field, academic field, religious field), each of which has its particular ‘structure of difference’—that is, a unique logic and hierarchy that shapes the behavior of different position holders. The social world consists of individuals who occupy ‘points’ in particular fields that determine their positions vis-à-vis each other. Bourdieu used the term habitus to designate the logic that governs a particular field. The habitus is a cognitive structure that regulates the behavior level of an entire field and is internalized by people as a kind of psychological schema that determines how to perceive reality and how to act. The mutual shaping of social structures and individual consciousness accounts for the relative stability of social fields. Field theory provided Lewin and Bourdieu with a construct for understanding the seemingly invisible influence of social structures on individuals and one another. What makes social space and field such useful constructs is that they focus neither on the individual nor on the collective as the unit of analysis but rather on the circular, reflexive processes through which individuals, in interaction with others, continually construct and reconstruct their shared worlds (Friedman, 2011). Fields are both phenomenal (i.e. in people’s minds) and structural (‘out there’), linking the internal world of people with the external social world through an ongoing shaping process. Field theory obviates the distinction between agency and structure, seeing them as integrated and analyzable by the

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same set of constructs. For this reason, both Lewin and Bourdieu believed that field theory provided a general theory that could dissolve the strict disciplinary distinctions among the social sciences.”242 “Although many of Lewin’s ideas and concepts had a major, lasting effect on the social sciences, his followers mostly abandoned the field theory itself. One reason for this was the fact that field theory presented a fundamental challenge to social science in terms of the knowledge it produced, its division into separate disciplines and its research methods. Rather than carrying on the revolution, most of Lewin’s disciples tool many of the ideas and concepts out of the context of fieldtheory and researched them using the methods of mainstream social science. Another reason for the stagnation of field theory was that Lewin failed to clearly and systematically conceptualize field theory and its conceptual tools in ways that others could learn and use. For example, after Lewin’s death, almost no one continued to use the visual representations of social space and field that are so prevalent in his writings. Bourdieu’s version of field theory had a somewhat greater impact on sociology, but it too was relegated to the margins and was rarely applied systematically. Field theory, however, maintains its potential because the fundamental problems in the social sciences which led both Lewin and Bourdieu to field theory have not gone away. Thinkers and researchers in a number of fields have recognized the usefulness of field theory for unifying dualities (agent and structure) and capturing the tension between stability and change.”243 In Chen Binggong’s view the weaknesses inherent in Lewin’s theory mainly manifest themselves in the following two aspects. First, on the one hand, to some extent Lewin’s theory lays undue emphasis upon the dynamic relationship between the person and the environment, but on the other, the dynamic value inherent in psychological elements as well as in their relationships to each other is given but scant attention. Second, as is well known, Kurt Lewin originated the classical formula B = f (P, E) as a basis for explaining and predicting behavior, and tried to utilize this famous psychological equation of behavior to illustrate the functional dependency of human behavior. However, this celebrated formula for behavior can only be used to describe simple patterns of behavior rather than to explain complex ones, especially the inscrutable and unpredictable behavior of people. Despite the shortcomings that we have pointed out in Lewin’s theory, we have rarely disputed the considerable contributions of his theory to our comprehensive and profound understanding of psychological and social phenomena, or his role as one of the most influential social psychologists of the twentieth century. This trying situation discussed above may result from certain limitations inherent in the discipline of psychology as a whole. Most psychologists opt to maintain value neutrality rather than take a stand on the debatable issue of values in their researches— that is, they advocate steering clear of or taking a neutral stand on the issue of values that is often observed as a trigger for a variety of debates in contemporary society, whereby they may be spared from the ordeal of dealing with the vast complexity of human beings as well as of human behavior that surely and ultimately rests upon a vast array of human values. If that is the case, especially when psychologists give up 242 243

Ibid., pp. 347–348. Ibid., p. 348.

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the study of inscrutable and unpredictable behavior of people, how can they come to a full appreciation of human complexity, depth and mystery? To put it another way, if the situation described above is true, how can they gain a more profound insight into the complexity, depths and mystery of human behavior? If we cannot offer a convincing and elaborate explanation of human complexity, depth and mystery, particularly the complexity, depths and mystery of human behavior, how can we unravel the mystery of man that has been haunting the human mind for at least five thousand years?

3 Personality Structure: The Concept, Characteristics and Functions 3.1 The Concept of Personality Structure In general, “structure” refers to the way in which constituent elements of a particular system interconnect and interact with each other. By “the structure of human personality” we mean the organic organization of internal elements inherent in a definite personality as well as the appropriate forms or modes of organization. In other words, “personality structure” refers to the formation of a definite personality system as well as the appropriate modes of formation, or more specifically, the way in which constituent elements of a particular personality system interconnect and interrelate with each other. “Personality structure” as the organic organization of constituent elements inherent in a definite personality system refers to the way in which constituent elements of a particular personality system interconnect and interact with each other in an organic manner at all times and in all places. The kindred meaning of the term can be formulated as follows so that we could form a clear and comprehensive conception of personality structure. (1) Personality structure should be viewed as “an organized whole and more than a mere aggregate of discrete parts.”244 The central conception of personality structure is “that of a whole; it is the most holistic entity in the universe; hence no other category will do justice to it, and certainly not mechanism. … The Personality is thus a more or less balanced whole or structure of various tendencies and activities maintained in progressive harmony by the holistic unity of the Personality itself.”245 Personality structure is at all times an integrated (or integral) whole functioning holistically—that is, a holistic conception of personality insists that personality structure functions as a whole. “The personality arises out of social and physical experiences, and these experiences are molded into a unified structure, an integrated whole.”246 In this regard, 244

Frick, Willard B. (1989). Humanistic Psychology: Conversations with Abraham Maslow, Gardner Murphy, Carl Rogers. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, p. 137. 245 Smuts, Jan C. (1926).Holism and Evolution. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, p. 290. 246 Lazarus, Richard S. (1961). Adjustment and Personality. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, p. 123.

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we can say with perfect safety that personality structure is “a holistically functioning entity.”247 From the foregoing it will be seen that each personality structure is an integral personality system which functions as an integrated whole. Personality structure that exists as a unique and highly integrated or holistic system tends to respond to the external environment in a holistic manner, whereby it will be able to make behavioral choices. (2) “Personality structure” as the organic organization of constituent elements inherent in a definite personality system refers to the way in which constituent elements of a particular personality system interconnect and interact with each other in an organic manner at all times and in all places. When we attempt an intelligent and clarifying analysis of personality structure, we tend to envision the different constituent elements which enter into the constitution of personality structure. Moreover, in order to obtain a deeper understanding of personality structure, we feel compelled to take into consideration the correlation between the various constituent elements as well as the internal relationships between the various component elements and the personality as a whole. Let us adduce a concrete example to serve as an illustration. We may conceive a total personality structure consisting of three major systems—the personality demand (or need) system, the personality judgment system, and the system of personality behavior choice—and the various constituent elements contained therein, which form a unified and harmonious whole while interacting with each other and interrelating with each other. Hence, the structure of human personality that is conceived of as a complex network of interacting systems may be described in terms of the three major systems and the constituent elements contained therein. Probably few psychologists would disagree with the proposition that the structure of personality is a whole embracing the three major systems as well as the different constituent elements contained therein, which relate to one another and to the whole in various ways. (3) The structure of human personality is real, concrete, and unique. On the one hand, each personality structure is broadly similar in form to every other personality structure, which is to say that whatever form every personality structure may take, with very few exceptions, they are of similar form or structure, and that careful contrast of the two forms of personality structure will show clearly that they have something in common with each other. On the other hand, each personality structure is vastly different in content from every other personality structure; that is to say, each concrete personality structure has its own distinct or unique content. It is therefore clear that there are assuredly similarities in form among myriad forms of personality structure and that identical structures would never exist between them. With the above situation in view, when it comes to a scientific analysis of the structure of a definite personality, it is not that we view the structure of a particular personality superficially and thereby take a static, isolated and one-sided approach to it, but that we should apply the materialistic conception of history as well as the methodology of historical materialism to the dialectical analysis of the real life of a definite personality, or rather, its actual

247

Brinich, Paul., & Shelley, Christopher. (2002). The Self and Personality Structure. Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, p. 94.

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situation at a given time and place, which plays a crucial role in shaping the structure of personality. (4) Personality structure rightly asserts itself as one of the most fundamental characteristics of personality. Fundamentally speaking, the difference among people lies not so much in gender, age, or skin color, but rather in personality structure. Basically speaking, the level or degree of personality development may find its fullest expression in personality structure that, in turn, rightly asserts itself as one of the most fundamental characteristics of personality. To put it another way, people differ essentially from each other in having their own different personality structures—that is, the essential difference between people resides in the fact that each personality structure is different from every other personality structure. Let us adduce a few examples to serve as an illustration. Humans can be divided into the yellow race (the Mongolian race), the white race (the Caucasian race), and the black race (the Negroid race) according to the color of their skin. People can be divided into the male sex and the female sex according to their function of producing young. People can be divided into the old and the young according to their age. In spite of their physical differences, the essential difference between people lies in the fact that they are endowed with different personality structures. (5) Personality structure may be conceived as a determining factor that tends to influence and even determine the fate of personality. Generally speaking, of all the factors that can influence the fate of personality, personality structure may assert itself as one of the most important deciding factors in determining the fate of personality. Personality structure not only marks the degree and level of development that a particular personality attains, but also determines whether the behavioral choice on the part of a particular personality meets with success or results in failure, as well as the nature and level of behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality, thereby deciding the fate of personality marked by vicissitudes. (6) Personality structure may be regarded as a result of the interaction between environmental influences and the behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality. In terms of how personality structures interact with the environment to generate behavior, especially in terms of how a definite personality meets environmental pressures and challenges, the structure of human personality may be conceived as the product or result of practical human activity. In terms of how personality structures interact with the behavioral choice on the part of a particular personality, under certain environmental conditions the structure of human personality tends to determine the behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality– that is, in most cases the structure of human personality susceptible to the influence of external environmental stimuli tends to determine the behavioral choice on the part of a particular personality. Generally speaking, what kind of structure a personality is endowed with will determine what kinds of appropriate choices it tends to make, which will, in turn, affect and even shape the destiny of a particular personality. It is only through the agency of the behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality that the personality can mold itself into a particular structure of personality. Hence, personality structure may be conceived as a result of the interaction between environmental influences and the behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality. (7) The structure of personality that holds an exceptional place in the knowledge system based on the theory of “structure and choice” forms an essential part of the theory of

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“structure and choice,” or rather, constitutes the nucleus of the theory of “structure and choice.” Only if we take up the thorough study of personality structure can we give the theory of “structure and choice” a clear and lucid explanation, whereby we can render considerable service to man’s survival and development.

3.2 The Characteristics of Personality Structure By the logic of events, in elaborating upon personality structure, we feel the necessity of giving a brief critical summary of the fundamental characteristics inherent in personality structure. (1) Wholeness The structure of human personality must invariably be considered with reference to all its inherent constituent elements. Personality structure exists as a whole—that is, all its inherent constituent parts work together to constitute an organic unity. We can build up a system of hypotheses as to the structure of personality by taking into consideration the constituent elements of personality structure that are meticulously arranged and highly organized and that interrelate and interact with each other in an orderly manner. On the one hand, these inherent constituent parts that are arranged and organized in an orderly manner tend toward an organic unity. On the other hand, these constituent elements of personality structure that are characterized as complex and changeable can be integrated into an organic whole. Moreover, personality structure tends to respond holistically to environmental pressures and challenges, which is to say, under certain external environmental conditions the constituent elements inherent in personality structure tend to work in unity with each other to make the behavioral choices, which a particular personality susceptible to the influence of external environmental stimuli has to make, in agreement with each other rather than in contradiction with each other. The contradictory behavioral choice on the part of a particular personality suggests serious defects in personality structure and may cause personality disorders. (2) Hierarchy There are different levels or differentiations in levels within the structure of human personality. That is to say, the constituent elements of personality structure can be organized into different levels, or rather, into higher and lower levels. Looked at from the angle of a certain level in the hierarchy of personality structure, the structure of personality is endowed with duality. At the three levels of personality structure—that is, the power of personality demand (or need), the power of personality judgment, and the behavioral choice on the part of a personality, each level is endowed with duality—or, to put it another way, while asserting itself as one of the constituent

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elements of personality structure, each level in the “triple structure of personality”— “the three levels of personality structure” constitutes a self-sufficient personality subsystem consisting of the constituent elements contained therein.248 (3) The Unity of Stability and Changeability On the one hand, the structure of personality can be seen as having an open-ended and changeable tendency, but on the other, it develops a natural tendency to maintain internal order and stability, whereby personality structure brings about the unity of stability and changeability. The structure of personality possesses relative stability and rightly asserts itself as a system with an orderly structure, which is to say, the constituent elements of personality structure and the relationships contained therein are interrelated with each other and interact on each other. The stable interconnection and orderly interaction between constituent elements of personality structure enables the structure of personality to lie in a state of relatively stable equilibrium. Once this kind of stability is overturned, the structure of personality tends to be in a state of disorder. Personality structure may be viewed across the life cycle both as an open-ended and as a changeable entity. On the one hand, the structure of personality that is probably continuously susceptible to the influences of environmental stimuli can exchange energy and information with the outside environment, but on the other, it can maintain close relationships with the environment and keep a dynamic balance between itself and the environment by making adjustment to the environment. In so doing, the structure of personality will be enabled to undergo a constant transformation while bringing about changes in the external environment. (4) The Unity of Isomorphism and Uniqueness Personality structures that are of similar form, or rather that are expressed in similar forms, have their own unique contents. These forms and contents cannot be separated from each other, but rather bring about the unity of isomorphism and uniqueness. Personality structures are of identical or similar form, that is, in terms of the “form” of the personality structure every individual on earth is endowed with roughly the same structure of personality. Hence the author champions the proposition that each individual’s personality structure consists of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” First, by the “triple structure,” that is, the “three levels of personality structure,” we mean the basic structure of human personality, or rather, the basic make-up of human personality, which consists of three organic levels of personality structure. By the first level of personality structure, or rather, “the power of personality demand (or need),” we mean that man’s basic needs and driving forces as well as their manifold manifestations are inherent in the subconscious (or unconscious) mind, which, according to the author, can be regarded as “the great reservoir” of man’s basic needs and driving forces, and that “the power of personality demand (or need)” can provide primitive energies and basic tendencies for human behavioral choices. By the second level of personality structure, that 248

Liao, Gai-Long., Sun, Lian-Cheng., & Chen, You-Jin. (1993). An Encyclopedic Outline of Marxism. Beijing: People’s Daily Press, pp. 219–220.

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is, “the power of personality judgment,” which is the crucial level of personality structure, and which is of paramount importance to man’s “structure and choice,” we mean that the conscious mind is endowed with man’s rational powers that tend to manifest themselves in manifold forms, and that “the power of personality judgment” tends to be inextricably linked with “the power of personality demand (or need),” thereby determining man’s behavioral choices. By the third level of personality structure, that is, “personality behavior choice,” we mean that man can determine his own behavior and make appropriate behavioral choices in a certain environment, that “personality behavior choice” manifests itself in a person’s practical activities throughout his whole life, and that “personality behavior choice” is man’s conscious practical activity whereby he can remold his subjective world while changing the objective world. Second, by “eight kinds of powers” we mean that eight essential (or substantive) powers are inherent in the structure of human personality. “Eight kinds of powers” can be grouped into three separate levels of “the triple structure.” “The power of personality demand (or need)” that belongs to the first level of personality structure includes three kinds of power inherent in human personality: (1) “the power of survival demand (or need),” for instance desire for food, sexual desire, and desire for safety; (2) “the power of belonging demand (or need),” for example desire for love, desire for group, and desire for self-esteem; (3) “the power of development demand (or need)” such as desire for knowledge, desire for achievement, and desire for perfection. Basically, “the power of personality demand (or need)” is inherent in the subconscious (or unconscious) mind. “The power of personality judgment” that comes into the second level of personality structure contains four kinds of power inherent in human personality: (1) “ideological and moral power;” (2) “wisdom power;” (3) “will power;” (4) “power of introspection.” The first three kinds of power inherent in human personality, which are three principal manifestations of “the power of personality judgment,” exist in the conscious mind, while the fourth kind of power, which is a major form of “the power of personality judgment,” is present in man’s self-awareness. “Personality behavior choice,” which can be grouped into the third level of personality structure, consists of one type of power inherent in human personality, that is, “personality behavior choice.” With very few exceptions, every individual on earth develops a personality structure that is basically composed of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers,” regardless of their age, gender, race or ethnicity. However, each individual’s personality structure possesses its own unique content, and from this it follows that, just as no two personality structures in the world are identical in content, so it should not be surprising that no two personalities are exactly alike—that is, no two human personalities are ever precisely the same, although there exist innumerable combinations of personality content. As Rousseau pointed out, “I mean to present my fellow mortals with a man in all the integrity of nature; and this man shall be myself! I know my heart, and have studied mankind: I am not made like any one I have been acquainted with, perhaps like no one in existence; if not better, I at least claim originality, and

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whether nature did wisely in breaking the mould with which she formed me, can only be determined after having read this work.”249 (5) The Unity of Synchronicity and Diachronicity The structure of personality that can be conceived both as a synchronic and as a diachronic entity rightly asserts itself as the unity of synchronicity and diachronicity.250 Thus, we should devote ourselves to the synchronic study of personality structure as a state as well as the diachronic study of it as change through time or evolution over time. By the synchronicity of the structure of personality in its immediate concrete existence in itself we are justified in holding that the structure of personality rightly asserts itself as an immediate concrete entity—or to put it the other way round, under certain conditions the structure of personality in its immediate concrete existence consists of certain constituent elements, is endowed with its own properties (or characteristics) as distinct from those of others, evolves a variety of possible neural mechanisms for behavioral choice, and develops its own unique behavior patterns. By the diachronicity of the structure of personality that is subject to change over time we mean that the structure of personality that tends to undergo change through time is not simply a product of individual personality development, but rather a miniature replication of the process of human evolution. The individual’s personality structure tends to be a miniature manifestation of the life-long process of growth and development in which the lapse of days and years is marked chiefly by the vestiges of personal events—by the ordinary vicissitudes of individual prosperity or misfortune, some of which may prove of far-reaching importance to the formation and development of personality structure as well as to the whole period of one’s life.251 At this point in time we find it highly necessary to lay special emphasis upon that fact that the structure of personality can be conceived of not simply as a diachronic structure of the conscious being—or to put it the other way round, the author insists, with all the emphasis at his command, that too strong emphasis cannot be put on the diachronic aspect of personality structure, but rather as a diachronic structure species-beings (human beings) share in common—that is, the structure of personality is not simply a product of individual personality development, but rather a miniature replication of the process of human evolution.252 Generally speaking, the initial stages in the historical development of personality structure are invariably marked (or characterized) by a replication of the process of human development and, in particular, the stages of human development extending from infancy through late childhood can be seen as an approximate replication in miniature of the earlier stages of human evolution. Furthermore, we can safely assert 249

Gao, Qing-Hai., Hu, Hai-Bo., & He, Lai. (1998). Man’s Species-life (Gattungsleben) and Species-consciousness (Gattungsbewusstsein). Changchun, China: Jilin People’s Press, p. 398. 250 Jin, Bing-Hua. (2003). A Voluminous Dictionary of Marxist Philosophy. Shanghai, China: Shanghai Lexicographical Press, pp. 178–179. 251 Hubbard, L. Ron. (1989). Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health (Xiao Yu, Trans.). Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company, p. 3. 252 Xia, Jian-Zhong. (1997). The Theoretical Schools of Cultural Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, p. 167.

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that the unity of synchronicity and diachronicity inherent in the structure of personality will ensure that infinite potentialities awaiting development must of necessity exist in the structure of personality, which is to say, the structure of personality is endowed with enormous potentialities and energies, but in practice we can only develop and utilize them to a very limited extent. This also suggests that the potential possibilities inherent in each individual’s personality structure are roughly same or similar—or to put it the other way round, in terms of those genetically determined and transmitted potentialities, there is no essential difference in them between each healthy personality and every other one—that is, those genetically determined and transmitted potentialities inherent in each healthy personality is not essentially or qualitatively different from those inherent in every other one. In real life, however, the difference, especially the vast difference, in personality structure between one individual and another, can be attributed primarily more to nurture than to nature. While delving into the unity of synchronicity and diachronicity that may prove of great importance to a deeper understanding of personality structure, we should adopt a rational attitude toward the object of knowledge so that it may ensure us of a sure way of working out our potentialities and arriving at the true understanding of man as a species-being.

3.3 The Functions of Personality Structure The functions of personality structure mainly manifest themselves in the following aspects. (1) The Cognitive Function The structure of personality is endowed with the most wondrous creation in the world, that is to say the cognitive structure that may exceed all hitherto known bounds of human knowledge. Hence, not only can the structure of personality have direct knowledge of the immediate world, but also it can have indirect knowledge of a much wider world and a more remote world. The structure of personality is endowed with a unique function, which is to say, it can create and recognize symbolic forms as carriers of cultural meanings, “with which to comprehend the forms of man’s cultural life in all their richness and variety” and to “understand the new way open to man—the way to civilization.”253 This fact may supply the basic reason why man is so developed both intellectually and spiritually. According to Ernst Cassirer, man who lives in a symbolic universe is endowed with the symbolic capacity for knowing and thinking, thereby rightly asserting himself as an animal symbolicum. In his work entitled An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture Cassirer advanced elaborate and ingenious arguments in a sane, sober, and convincing manner to show that “Yet in the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the 253

Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 26.

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distinctive mark of human life. The functional circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged; it has also undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.”254 “Yet there is no remedy against this reversal of the natural order. Man cannot escape from his own achievement. He cannot but adopt the conditions of his own life. No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience. All human progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net. No longer can man confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium.”255 “Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum.”256 “The human being for Cassirer is not merely an animale rationale, it is an animale symbolicum. In all the major precincts of human expression we can see how we construct our worlds through acts of symbolization. Everywhere we turn we see the evidence of our own symbolic activity, whether we look at mythical representations, at language, at art, or even at science itself. Without symbolism, human beings would be locked within the confines of a brute biological existence. It is only in virtue of our own symbolic capacity that we gain access to higher realms of meaning. In The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Cassirer develops this argument in stepwise fashion, moving from a stage of ‘primitive’ symbolization in mythical thought-systems to the intermediary stage of monotheistic religion; he then addresses the symbolic role of human language, before turning to natural science, which he regards as the highest and most objective domain of symbolic expression. He does not see these stages as superseding one another historically, as if the symbolic worlds of myth were shrugged off as mere fiction when humanity progressed toward greater rationality and enlightenment. Instead he sees the stages as incorporating one another in the manner of a dialect, so that each stage could be said to build upon and surpass the one that precedes it. But he nonetheless believes that the capacity to structure our symbolic worlds has genuinely expanded and has permitted humanity a heightened degree of self-knowledge. In myth we live at the mercy of the beings we have endowed with an illusory independence; in science, however, we recognize that our symbolic worlds are our own creation. In this sense the entire history of human expression is also a record of our efforts to gain a greater knowledge of ourselves. It fulfills the 254

Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 25. 256 Ibid., p. 26. 255

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ancient injunction of Western philosophy: ‘Know thyself.’”257 Cognitive symbols open up an infinity of possibilities for human cognitive ability. The functions of cognitive symbols mainly manifest themselves in the following aspects. First, cognitive symbols endow language with objective characteristics—that is, the instrument of objectification or the depository of objectivity. As Cassirer points out in the aforementioned work, which “is not destined for scholars or philosophers alone,” the subject matter of which, that is, the fundamental problems of human culture, “should be made accessible to the general public,” and in which he tried to “avoid all technicalities and to express his thoughts as clearly and simply as possible,”258 “Yet the decisive feature is not its (word) physical but its logical character. Physically the word may be declared to be impotent, but logically it is elevated to a higher, indeed to the highest rank. The Logos becomes the principle of the universe and the first principle of human knowledge. … Heraclitus does not admit that above the phenomenal world, the world of ‘becoming,’ there exists a higher sphere, an ideal or eternal order of pure ‘being.’ Yet he is not content with the mere fact of change; he seeks the principle of change. According to Heraclitus this principle is not to be found in a material thing. Not the material but the human world is the clue to a correct interpretation of the cosmic order. In this human world the faculty of speech occupies a central place. We must, therefore, understand what speech means in order to understand the ‘meaning’ of the universe. If we fail to find this approach—the approach through the medium of language rather than through physical phenomena—we miss the gateway to philosophy. Even in Heraclitus’ thought the word, the Logos, is not a merely anthropological phenomenon. It is not confined within the narrow limits of our human world, for it possesses universal cosmic truth. But instead of being a magic power the word is understood in its semantic and symbolic function.”259 “Not all language, though, can perform this function. Cassirer distinguishes between language on the merely expressive or emotional level (1), representative or semantic language (2), and symbolic language, i.e., language on the level of pure meaning (3). Only gradually does man seem to be able to raise himself form lower to higher forms of language, that is to say, language that brings with it higher forms of objectivity in signification or meaning giving. One of the most important ways of giving or expressing meaning is, of course, through language. Through language we learn to direct our actions, find a way of controlling our emotions, and convey our intentions and thoughts. This cannot be though merely through language on the emotional level, for example through sorrow or yelling in anger, despite the possibilities of emotional discharge. First when man has distanced himself from these immediate emotions, and has tried to represent them or mediate them through some modus of meaning giving, he can achieve some form of objectivity or determinacy. Still later, man may 257

Gordon, Peter E. “Introduction.” In An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, Ernst Cassirer. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021. 258 Cassirer, Ernst. “Preface.” In An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, Ernst Cassirer. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021. 259 Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 111.

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be in the position to take a more objective view of an event. In that instance, he finds himself in the sphere of the symbolic or pure meaning, whereby meaning exists separated from all original sense impressions that accompanied an event.”260 “Cassirer mentions as symbolic forms or forms of objectivity: Myth, Language, Religion, Science, Art, Technology, Economy, State, Ethics, and Law, but they are not limited to the forms enumerated here. Every symbolic form is a closed world of images and signs, that operates through symbols, but one must not ask about the role the symbol plays therein, but rather investigate in what way this world (be it in language, myth, or science) in its totality bears the character of symbolic formation. Every type of symbolic form stands for a different kind of objectification and cannot be understood save ‘in terms of its own canon of intelligibility.’ In other words, each symbolic form is autonomous, has its own ‘inner form,’ and is not reducible to any other symbolic form completely.”261 “In the philosophy of symbolic forms, each particular form takes its meaning solely from the systematic place in which it stands. The content and significance of each form is characterized by ‘the richness and specific quality of the relations and concatenations in which it stands with other spiritual energies and ultimately with totality.’ For this, according to Cassirer, we have to discover a factor, which recurs in each basic cultural form but in no two of them takes exactly the same shape, i.e., without losing the incomparable particularity of any of them. The question is whether there exists a medium, through which all the configurations effected in the separate branches of cultural life must pass, ‘but which nevertheless retains its particular nature, its specific character.’”262 “Cassirer finds this medium in the concept of the ‘symbol’ taken in its broadest meaning, i.e., as the expression of something intellectual through sensory signs and images. Through the concept of the symbol, Cassirer finds ‘anall-embracing medium in which the most diverse cultural forms meet,’ and for which the idealistic opposition between the mundus sensibilis and the mundus intelligibilis is no longer irreconcilable and exclusive. The symbol is characterized by a new form of reciprocity and correlation, i.e., a new cooperation between the senses and the spirit. The cooperation consists in the fact that ‘The concept of the spirit is disclosed only in its manifestations; the ideal form is known only by and in the aggregate of the sensible signs which it uses for its expression.’ As a result, for Cassirer, ‘[t]he conceptual definition of a content (…) goes hand in hand with its stabilization in some characteristic sign.’ Accordingly, Cassirer describes the meaning of experience as a progressive process of determination. In the symbolic sphere, what we call the intellectual or the spiritual ultimately has to find its fulfillment in something sensory; it appears only by and in a sensory sign.”263 “For Cassirer the opposition between the objective and the subjective is not so much the solution, as it is the perfect expression of the problem of cognition. According to Cassirer, sensibility consists not merely of passivity and receptivity, but also has an active 260

Coskun, Deniz. (2007). Law as Symbolic Form: Ernst Cassirer and the Anthropocentric View of Law. Dordrecht, NL: Springer, p. 167. 261 Ibid., p. 188. 262 Ibid., pp. 188–189. 263 Ibid., pp. 189–190.

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element of formation. Out of the chaos of immediate sense impressions man creates order or some kind of permanence, paradigmatically by using linguistic signs, such as names. Through language, the content of what was first perceived to be chaos receives a certain intellectual mark. As a result, the content of sense impressions rises above the mere sensual level: because it has acquired an intellectual articulation the sensory qualities no longer regulate it absolutely. Symbolic forms create systems of sensuous symbols, which display a function or mode of objectification. It is characteristic of symbols that they transgress individual consciousness and claim universal validity by confronting the subjective with the universal. In the sciences, the symbol embodies the ‘fundamental principle of cognition that the universal can be perceived only in the particular, while the particular can be thought only in reference to the universal.’ For Cassirer, this function is not limited to the sciences but runs through all the other cultural forms as well. Therefore, all symbolic forms contain and display a specific kind of symbolic formation, whereby the symbol represents the relationship between the idea and the sign, the universal and the particular. However, Cassirer is not interested in a substantial definition of the ‘symbol’ or what the symbol signifies in this or that specific discipline. He rather asks in what respect a certain discipline, such as language, myth, or science carries with it the general function of symbolic formation: ‘all truly strict and exact thought is sustained by the symbolic and semiotics on which it is based.’ Symbolic forms are, therefore, functional systems.”264 “‘The fundamental concepts of each science, the instruments with which it propounds its questions and formulates its solutions, are regarded no longer as passive images of something given but as symbols created by the intellect itself.’ In this regard, Cassirer is importantly inspired by the mathematical physicist Heinrich Hertz, who was among the first to formulate this new ideal of knowledge. He observed that in the attempts of the natural sciences to foresee future experience, the scientists make use of ‘inner fictions or symbols’ of outward objects, ‘and these symbols are so constituted that the necessary logical consequences of the images are always images of the necessary natural consequences of the imaged objects. (…) The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of things; they have with things the one essential agreement which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement, but further agreement with things is not necessary to their purpose.’ In place of the requirement of a similarity of content between the image of the object and the object itself, the natural sciences now introduce a highly complex logical relation. The natural sciences now describe an object only within the essential categories of natural science, and therewith have come to renounce the claim of an ‘immediate’ grasp and communication of reality. Accordingly, scientific concepts are never mere designations for the given and present, rather they point the way to new, hitherto unexplored fields. Therewith, they prepare the way for “a process of interpolation and extrapolation.’ In fine, concepts must no longer be taken in their substantial, but in their functional sense, i.e., ‘not primarily as an expression of a simple existence or occurrence, but as an expression of a determinate order, a specific mode of

264

Ibid., p. 190.

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contemplation.’ They are not responsive to reality, but confront reality with a particular question and direction of thought.”265 “Cassirer maintains that the concept can be understood only by investigating the structure of conceptualization itself and the possibility of such a structure. This structure cannot be derived back to a single material principle, which holds good for all concepts. Rather, what comprises the ultimate foundation of a concept and accounts for its fundamental character is its meaning. With his account of the functional theory of knowledge, Cassirer makes clear, that an object of knowledge can be described only when mediated by a particular logical and conceptual structure, i.e., by symbols articulated through symbolic forms. Accordingly, Cassirer concludes, ‘a variety of media will correspond to various structures of the object, to various meanings for ‘objective relations.’ To put it otherwise, the form (or ‘meaning machine’) with which an object is articulated determines its fundamental meaning.”266 “As referred to above, for Cassirer, next to cognition, the life of the human spirit as a whole also knows a variety of other modes or forms of ‘objectification,’ by means of which it raises a particular to the level of the universally valid. Although these forms of objectification achieve universal validity by methods entirely different from the logical concepts and the laws of logic, nevertheless, each one of them has in common with cognition, that ‘it does not merely copy but rather embodies an original formative power. It does not express passively the mere fact that something is present but contains an independent energy of the human spirit through which the simple presence of the phenomenon assumes a definite meaning, a particular ideational content.’ Furthermore, the answer to the question of how a certain phenomenon assumes a certain ‘meaning’ or how it is possible that something assumes ‘meaning,’ Cassirer finds in the concept of ‘symbolic pregnance.’ By symbolic pregnance, Cassirer understands, ‘the way in which a perception as a sensory experience contains at the same time a certain non-intuitive meaning which it immediately and concretely represents.’ ‘The simplest and in a sense the most original and primitive type of this relation [i.e., symbolic pregnance] is found,’ says Cassirer, ‘wherever a sensory experience of some sort confronts us possessing a certain content of meaning such that a kind of expressive value adheres to it with which it seems to be saturated.’ In this regard, the sensory content does not stand before us like a ‘mute picture on a tablet,’ ‘but rather immediately manifests an inner life as something that appears through its objective nature.’ Symbolic pregnance is the condition for the possibility of all of giving meaning (through signs). Through the concept of symbolic pregnance, it becomes understandable what Cassirer means by symbolic form. A symbolic form is a certain way to interpret signs and images, an intermediate process through which we first gain access to reality, and through which we relate ourselves to the outer world. Cassirer gives the following definition of a symbolic form, which can be dissected in four components: it comprises of ‘every energy of the mind [Energie des Geistes]’ [1], through which ‘a mental content of meaning [geistiger Bedeutungsgehalt] [2] is connected to a concrete, sensory

265 266

Ibid., pp. 191–192. Ibid., pp. 192–193.

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sign [konkretes sinnliches Zeichen] [3] and made to adhere internally to it [4].’”267 “Whereas the sign fades away when the physiognomic characteristics that make up a sign lose their force to appeal to the senses, symbols maintain their force in the sphere of meaning, irrespective of the diminishing quality of the sensory material that accompanied them. However, the sign for the philosophy of symbolic forms is never a mere cloak, an accidental and outward garment for thought, because when thought uses a sign it represents a basic tendency and form of thought. The sign ‘serves not merely to communicate a complete and given thought-content, but is an instrument, by means of which this content develops and fully defines itself.’ This becomes more obvious when we discuss the fourth component of the symbolic form, to which we turn now. The sensory material, the material of perception, i.e., the sign, is not a real being that can be isolated and put to the fore in this isolation as a pure given, as a psychological datum. We apprehend the symbolic sign as an inward energy, which assumes objective form in the outward world. In other words, when we strive to (intersubjectively) objectify our subjective intentions through symbolic formations of various kinds, we do not merely make meaning, but also give it a place in our own perception and consciousness. Once conferred, we ourselves as the originators of meaning eventually cannot circumvent them. The meanings we have produced (in conjunction with other members of an interpretative or symbolic community) become part of that (particular) objective world, and we subsequently have to deal with them as any other outward reality; in other words, we are ‘made to adhere internally to it’—or rather bring ourselves to adhere to them when acting accordingly (as we are also free to negate them).”268 “It is characteristic of the symbol—as the expression of a universal in some concrete, sensory sign—that in it expression, representation, and signification converge with one another. However, not all symbolic forms are equally well equipped to grapple with pure meaning or even display representational features. Cassirer distinguishes three various dimensions in symbolic formation, i.e., the expressive or mythic, the mimetic or representational, and the significative dimension or the sphere of pure meaning. When Cassirer takes up Kant’s insight that objects are not ‘given’ to consciousness in a rigid and finished state, but are first constituted by a synthetic unity of the consciousness, and broadens its range of applicability to any (cultural) cosmos that was formed out of a chaos of impressions; he does not contend that every phase of human consciousness is on a par as to its level of symbolization or objectification. Mythic mentality has objective claims of validity, and comprises of an independent cosmos or a characteristic and typical worldview, but its claims only apply in the mythic realm. For Cassirer myth also involves a process of objectification, that is to say, of transforming mere impressions into formed representations. However, as is explicated below, the transformation myth achieves in our perceptual or sensual world does not reach a representative or significative dimension, because that is reserved for the symbolic forms of language, religion, science, and so forth. If we want to understand myth, though, we cannot do that by contrasting it with the claims of science. To understand myth, we have to consider it only in 267 268

Ibid., pp. 193–194. Ibid., p. 196.

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its own terms, and for that we have to reach back to strata preceding theoretical object-consciousness. As Cassirer writes, ‘(…) before man thinks in terms of logical concepts, he holds his experiences by means of clear, separate mythical images.’ However, not only does Cassirer explore the typical formation of objectifications in the depths of mythical thought, he also contends that myth in this respect is the matrix of all cultural life.”269 “In a way, every act of the human intellect is symbolic insofar as it makes representations of certain processes or laws, or when it puts a certain occurrence in a certain perspective or functionality. That is important, but not definitive of a symbolic form. A symbolic form encapsulates and fully contextualizes a certain experience and as a result gives it a characteristic meaning that is contestable on its own terms. It is a process that involves the phenomenon of symbolic pregnance, because through every symbolic form we give shape to our perceptions by already directing them into a certain direction. Progressively, according to Cassirer, we reach higher forms of objectivity, i.e., pure forms of meaning, that is, only when the human being can freely develop and realize his symbolic functions. In this regard, the allcomprehensive characteristic of the various symbolic forms can also obstruct the development toward increasingly higher of objectivity. Whereas each symbolic form is a self-sufficient medium for understanding and making understandable the world, it can also assume a dominant or hegemonic position with respect to the complete intellectual horizon of the individual. In pejorative terms, these are aberrations or reductions of the multi-dimensionality of human life. When myth holds the life of man in its grip, in an absolute and domiant way, we may call it archaism, primitivism, or barbarism. In the case of religion, we encounter the same totalizing effect upon human life in the form of fundamentalism (as distinct from Puritanism). Law, too can degenerate in a mere formalism or a total juridification of human life. It is up to philosophy to explicate their interconnectedness, and the delicate balance between them that stands at the core of human freedom.”270 Second, symbolic forms endow man with the unique gift of symbolic imagination, whereby he can conceive something he has never seen before, and imagine things he has never experienced directly. To put it otherwise, man who possesses an unbounded and vigorous imagination can conceive of something that has never existed before, and imagine what has never happened yet. “In defining man as an animal rationale, as a technological animal, or a social or political animal, we do not capture the differentia specifica of the human mode of being. Wherein lies the difference? For Cassirer the essential difference is that the structure in which the animal finds itself is a merely formal and biological structure, whereas the structure in which man finds himself is a symbolic structure of his own creation.”271 “In short, we may say that

269

Ibid., p. 197. Ibid., p. 199. 271 Lofts, S. G. (2000). Ernst Cassirer: A “Repetition” of Modernity. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, p. 65. 270

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the animal possesses a practical imagination and intelligence whereas man alone has developed a new form: a symbolic imagination and intelligence.”272 Third, the ability to create symbols puts man in full possession of extraordinary intellectual endowments such as symbolic intelligence. “The symbol is tied to the development of intelligence that characterizes the human individual. Cassirer brings forth the example of Hellen Keller as a means to portray the interconnection between symbolism and the development of human mentality.”273 Cassirer says: “The principle of symbolism, with its universality, validity, and general applicability, is the magic word, the Open Sesame (something that unfailingly brings about a desired end)! giving access to the specifically human world, to the world of human culture. Once man is in possession of this magic key further progress is assured.”274 “For Cassirer, it is this ability to create symbols which serves as the defining characteristic to separate humans from mere animals. … For the animal, the phenomenon can never manifest itself as a symbol, either of itself or of anything else, either concrete or abstract. This assertion does not deny that animals are intelligent—in fact, Carrier claims that many species of animals do indeed exhibit intelligence in the way that they relate objects to each other, not as symbols, but as signs or signals.”275 “Signals and symbols belong to two different universes of discourse: a signal is a part of the physical world of being; a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning.”276 Signs are always given; symbols are always created. Cassirer is emphatic on this point: “All the phenomena which are commonly described as conditioned reflexes are not merely very far from but even opposed to the essential character of human symbolic though… In short, we may say that the animal possesses a practical imagination and intelligence whereas man alone has developed a new form: a symbolic imagination and intelligence.”277 Fourth, symbolic forms enable man to develop the variety of cultural perceptions of symbolic space and time. “(…) it is the idea of abstract or symbolic space which clears the way for man not only to a new field of knowledge but to an entirely new direction of his cultural life.”278 “The fact of the existence of such a thing as abstract space was one of the first and most important discoveries of Greek thought. … We must admit that abstract space has no counterpart and no foundation in any physical or psychological reality.”279 “Geometrical space, or rather, the space of 272

Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 33. 273 Verene, Donald Phillip. (2011). The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, p. 94. 274 Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 35. 275 Luft, Eric von der. (2019). Ruminations: Selected Philosophical, Historical, and Ideological Papers: Volume 1, Part 1, The Infinite. North Syracuse, NY: Gegensatz Press, pp. 309–310. 276 Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 32. 277 Ibid., pp. 32–33. 278 Ibid., p. 43. 279 Ibid., p. 44.

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geometry (a theoretical or scientific concept of space), abstracts from all the variety and heterogeneity imposed upon us by the disparate nature of our senses. Here we have a homogeneous, a universal space. And it was only by the medium of this new and characteristic form of space that man could arrive at the concept of a unique, systematic cosmic order. The idea of such an order, of the unity and the lawfulness of the universe, never could have been reached without the idea of a uniform space.”280 “Astronomy supersedes astrology; geometrical space takes the place of mythical and magical space. It was a false and erroneous form of symbolic thought that first paved the way to a new and true symbolism, the symbolism of modern science. One of the first and most difficult tasks of modern philosophy was to understand this symbolism in its true sense and in its full significance.”281 “Memory implies a process of recognition and identification, an ideational process of a very complex sort. The former impressions must not only be repeated; they must also be ordered and located, and referred to different points in time. Such a location is not possible without conceiving time as a general scheme—as a serial order which comprises all the individual events. The awareness of time necessarily implies the concept of such a serial order corresponding to that other scheme which we call space.”282 “In man we cannot describe recollection as a simple return of an event, as a faint image or copy of former impressions. It is not simply a repetition but rather a rebirth of the past; it implies a creative and constructive process. It is not enough to pick up isolated data of our past experience; we must really re-collect them, we must organize and synthesize them, and assemble them into a focus of thought. It is this kind of recollection which gives us the characteristic shape of memory, and distinguishes it from all the other phenomena in animal or organic life.”283 “According to Bergson’s view, memory is a much deeper and more complex phenomenon. It means ‘internalization’ and intensification; it means the interpretation of all the elements of our past life. … Symbolic memory is the process by which man not only repeats his past experience but also reconstructs this experience.”284 “So far we have taken under consideration only one aspect of time—the relation of the present to the past. But there is yet another aspect which seems to be even more important to, and more characteristic of, the structure of human life. This is what might be called the third dimension of time, the dimension of the future. In our consciousness of time the future is an indispensable element. Even in the earliest stages of life this element begins to play a dominant role. ‘It is characteristic of the whole early development of the life of ideas,’ writes William Stern, ‘that they do not appear so much as memories pointing to something in the past, but as expectations directed to the future—even though only to a future immediately at hand. We meet here for the first time a general law of development. Reference to the future is grasped by the consciousness sooner than that to the past.’ In our later life this tendency becomes even more pronounced. … To think of the 280

Ibid., p. 45. Ibid., pp. 48–49. 282 Ibid., pp. 50–51. 283 Ibid., p. 51. 284 Ibid., p. 52. 281

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future and to live in the future is a necessary part of his nature.”285 “On the basis of this evidence it seems to follow that the anticipation of future events and even the planning of future actions are not entirely beyond the reach of animal life. But in human beings the awareness of the future undergoes the same characteristic change of meaning which we have noted with regard to the idea of the past. The future is not only an image; it becomes an ‘ideal.’ The meaning of this transformation manifests itself in all the phases of man’s cultural life. So long as he remains entirely absorbed in his practical activities the difference is not clearly observable. It appears to be a difference of degree, not a specific difference. To be sure the future envisaged by man extends over a much wider area, and his planning is much more conscious and careful. But all this still belongs to the realm of prudence, not to that of wisdom. The term ‘prudence’ (prudentia) is etymologically connected with ‘providence’ (providentia). It means the ability to foresee future events and to prepare for future needs. But the theoretical idea of the future—that idea which is a prerequisite of all man’s higher cultural activities—is of a quite different sort. It is more than mere expectation; it becomes an imperative of human life. And this imperative reaches far beyond man’s immediate practical needs—in its highest form it reaches beyond the limits of his empirical life. This is man’s symbolic future, which corresponds to and is in strict analogy with his symbolic past.”286 Fifth, the dependence relationship of relational thought to symbolic thought is made explicit by Ernst Cassirer: “It is symbolic thought which overcomes the natural inertia of man and endows him with a new ability, the ability to constantly reshape his human universe.”287 Man’s symbolic thought ensures him of the unique possession of relational thought. “Without a complex system of symbols relational thought cannot arise at all, much less reach its full development. It would not be correct to say that the mere awareness of relations presupposes an intellectual act, an act of logical or abstract thought. Such an awareness is necessary even in elementary acts of perception. The sensationalist theories used to describe perception as a mosaic of simple sense data. Thinkers of this persuasion constantly overlooked the fact that sensation itself is by no means a mere aggregate or bundle of isolated impressions. Modern Gestalt psychology has corrected this view. It has shown that the very simplest perceptual processes imply fundamental structural elements, certain patterns or configurations. This principle holds both for the human and the animal world. Even in comparatively low stages of animal life the presence of these structural elements—especially of spatial and optical structures—has been experimentally proved. The awareness of relations cannot, therefore, be regarded as a specific feature of human consciousness. We do find, however, in man a special type of relational thought which has no parallel in the animal world. In man an ability to isolate relations—to consider them in their abstract meaning—has developed. In order to grasp this meaning man is no longer dependent upon concrete sense data, upon visual, auditory, tactile, kinesthetic data. He considers these relations ‘in themselves’ as Plato 285

Ibid., p. 53. Ibid., pp. 55–56. 287 Ibid., p. 62. 286

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said. Geometry is the classic example of this turning point in man’s intellectual life. Even in elementary geometry we are not bound to the apprehension of concrete individual figures. We are not concerned with physical things or perceptual objects, for we are studying universal spatial relations for whose expression we have an adequate symbolism. Without the preliminary step of human language such an achievement would not be possible. In all the tests which have been made of the processes of abstraction or generalization in animals, this point has become evident. … They, or more specifically, the processes of abstraction or generalization in animals, cannot develop because they do not possess that invaluable and indeed indispensable aid of human speech, of a system of symbols.”288 Sixth, symbolic forms are condemned to sustain humanity in a meaningful cultural world. “No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe.”289 “In language, in religion, in art, in science, man can do no more than to build up his own universe– a symbolic universe that enables him to understand and interpret, to articulate and organize, to synthesize and universalize his human experience.”290 “There is a profound difference between philosophical and sociological perspectives of social symbols and symbolic communication. The philosophical perspectives emphasize what might be called ‘a new dimension of reality’ or ‘a fifth dimension’ (Elias 1991:47) of human existence which reshapes the four dimensions of space– time into a shared universe of symbols communicating the meaningful existence to both individuals and societies. Its primary purpose is to examine social symbols as an expression of human nature and/or the media communicating and searching for the meaning of human existence. The fifth dimension of social symbols constitutes the cultural life of human beings which, since early mythologies, has incorporated both anthropological explanations of the origins of human existence and cosmological explanations of the origins of the world. If there still remains ‘a clue to the nature of man’ in the modern world of science and functionally differentiated society, it is to be found in a symbolic universe of humankind responding to the physical world by the active and complicated process of thinking. In this respect, Ernst Cassirer, for instance, states that ‘instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his specific difference, and we can understand the new way open to man—the way to civilization’. According to this anthropological philosophy, symbols do not have actual existence in the physical world, yet they have a ‘meaning’ and thus make a clear distinction between actual reality and possibility. The difference between things and symbols constitutes human culture as a realm of the difference between facts and ideals. The general function of symbolic thought is thus the establishment of ideals, which, by definition, are impossible to materialize. They are in the state of potentiality which is both a necessary and indispensible part of our social reality.”291 288

Ibid., pp. 38–39. Ibid., p. 25. 290 Ibid., p. 221. 291 Klink, Bart van., Beers, Britta van., & Poort, Lonneke., eds. (2016). Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw. New York, NY: Springer Nature, pp. 108–109. 289

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Seventh, symbolic forms ensure for man free access to an “ideal world,” parts of which are language, myth, art, and religion. “Even here man does not live in a world of hard facts, or according to his immediate needs and desires. He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusions, in his fantasies and dreams.”292 “But Cassirer’s philosophy does contain a rational principle of organization, albeit one that cannot be separated from its empirical unfolding. This principle is embedded in the central notion of the symbol itself, in what Jürgen Habermas has aptly called its ‘liberating power.’ If animals are captive to their environment, reacting to it in purely instinctual fashion, man, the ‘symbolic animal,’ is able to grasp it as a world, as the object of aspirations, projects, and theories. Symbolism thus opens the way ‘from animal reactions to human responses.’”293 “Without symbolism the life of man would be like that of the prisoners in the cave of Plato’s famous simile. Man’s life would be confined within the limits of his biological needs and his practical interests; it could find no access to the ‘ideal world’ which is opened to him from different sides by religion, art, philosophy, science.”294 Eighth, “Every organism, even the lowest, is not only in a vague sense adapted to (angepasst) but entirely fitted into (eingepasst) its environment. According to its anatomical structure it possesses a certain Merknetz and a certain Wirknetz—a receptor system and an effector system. Without the cooperation and equilibrium of these two systems the organism could not survive. The receptor system by which a biological species receives outward stimuli and the effector system by which it reacts to them are in all cases closely interwoven. They are links in one and the same chain which is described by Uexküll as the functional circle (Funktionskreis) of the animal. … Obviously the human world forms no exception to those biological rules which govern the life of all the other organisms. Yet in the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of human life. The functional circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged; it has also undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system. … There is an unmistakable difference between organic reactions and human responses. In the first case a direct and immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus,”295 that is, “animals can easily be trained to react not merely to direct stimuli but to all sorts of mediate or representative stimuli,”296 and “almost all animal actions are governed by the presence of an immediate stimulus.”297 “In 292

Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 25. 293 Skidelsky, Edward. (2012). Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 103–104. 294 Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 41. 295 Ibid., p. 24. 296 Ibid., pp. 31–32. 297 Ibid., p. 33.

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the second case it is interrupted and retarded by a slow and complicated process of thought,”298 whereby man can make behavioral choices. “The transition from a merely practical attitude to a symbolic attitude is the final result of a slow and continuous process.”299 To put it in a nutshell, the structure of human personality opens up infinite possibilities for man’s cognitive ability to develop in an all-round way, whereby man can obtain a quicker, keener, and deeper insight into what Karl Popper called the three worlds of physical process, psychological states, and the abstract products of the intellect. (2) The Function of Choice The chief function of personality structure is to make behavioral choices, which is to say, the component elements inherent in the structure of human personality susceptible to external environmental stimuli tend to act jointly by securing close coordination of mental processes from each other and to respond accordingly by making appropriate behavioral choices. In view of the fact that the structure of personality responsive to external environmental stimuli tends to struggle for survival and development, the structure of personality deems it indispensably necessary to create a general mechanism for making behavioral choices. Specifically, under external environmental pressures “the power of personality demand (or need)” is set in motion first, then “the power of personality judgment” takes part in decision-making, and ultimately, it is still “the power of personality judgment” that ensures to the structure of personality appropriate responses to external environmental stimuli and that prompts it to make behavioral choices accordingly. When examining the behavioral choices that the structure of personality has to make to address external environmental challenges, we must bestow some consideration on the multifaceted nature of behavioral choices. The structure of personality makes behavioral choices either to meet the challenges of the external environment or to bring about a change in itself—or to put it the other way round, the behavioral choice on the part of the structure of personality can be purely directed toward the external environment or simply aimed at bringing about a change in the structure of personality itself. Here we feel the necessity of distinguishing the difference between “one-way choice” and “twoway choice.” We mean by “one-way choice” that the behavioral choice on the part of the structure of personality under the influence of many and varied environmental stimuli can be purely directed toward either the external environment or the structure of personality itself. The one-way behavioral choice on the part of the structure of personality tends to be made in a small way and in a relatively simple manner and to exist extensively and universally in human life. By “two-way choice” (also termed “two-way composite choice”) we mean that the structure of personality responsive to external environmental stimuli can be faced with “internal choice” and “external choice” simultaneously that interrelate with each other, interact with each other, and

298 299

Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 33.

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condition each other. Let us adduce a few concrete examples to serve as an illustration. In some cases, under the influence of environmental stimuli the personality first tends to make internal behavioral choices by adjusting and improving its own personality structure and putting itself in readiness, and then proceeds to make external behavioral choices by responding or reacting to the external environment. In other cases, the personality first tends to make external behavioral choices by responding or reacting to the external environment, and then, depending on the responses it receives from the external environment, the personality proceeds to make internal behavioral choices by adjusting and improving its own personality structure. Moreover, when faced with “internal choice” and “external choice” at the same time, the structure of personality under the influence of many and varied environmental stimuli can make “internal behavioral choices” and “external behavioral choices” simultaneously that either alternate with each other or overlap with each other. Generally speaking, those relatively complex behavior choices that exert a really wide-spread and tremendous influence over the external environment will invariably come into the category of “two-way choice” (also termed “two-way composite choice”) which tends to manifest itself in the fact that “internal choice” and “external choice” either alternate with each other or overlap with each other when the structure of personality is faced with “internal choice” and “external choice” simultaneously. The basic way in which man strives for the realization of his goal in life lies in his behavioral choice. The behavioral choice on the part of any individual human being invariably manifests itself in every deed, at all times and in all places. Admittedly, the basic mode of human existence tends to manifest itself in the fact that an individual human being under certain more or less specific external environmental conditions may enlist the aid of his personality structure in making behavioral choices whereby he can determine his own survival, development and destiny. (3) The Structure and Dynamics of Human Personality The structure of personality can be likened to a power set that may serve as an unfailing source of power readily available to man’s behavioral choice as well as to its manifold behavioral manifestations. The source of power for the structure of personality manifests itself mainly in the following three aspects. First, the component elements inherent in the structure of personality and personality dynamics. The various component elements inherent in the structure of personality (“the three levels of personality structure” and “their respective corresponding eight kinds of powers”) possess their respective potentialities and constitute sources of power on which human personality depends for its existence, development and change.300 Second, the internal structure of personality and personality dynamics. The relationships among the various component elements inherent in the structure of personality as well as those between the structure of personality as a whole and the various component elements contained therein possess motive powers and thereby constitute sources of power on which human personality depends for its existence, development and 300

Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004). A Dictionary of Classic Propositions of Western Marxism. Beijing: Oriental Publishing House, pp. 234–235.

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change. Third, the external environment and personality dynamics. The relationships between the external environment and the structure of personality are also closely related to personality dynamics. The contradictions that invariably exist between the structure of personality and the external environment regardless of whether the structure of personality adapts to the external environment or not and that exist throughout life undergoing development and change tend to produce different levels of tension in the personality and to prompt the human personality to make behavioral choices, thereby achieving personality balance. It’s just the aforementioned three kinds of motive power that promote the human personality to make behavioral choices and maintain the existence and development of human personality as long as life endures. (4) The Creative Function of Personality Structure In terms of their respective functions, the structure of human personality differs essentially from that of the animal body in being endowed with innate creative powers that lift man from the purely animalistic level of living for living’s sake onto the human level of making living worthwhile and purposeful. It’s through the exercise of its creative powers that not only can the structure of personality remold and transcend its subjective world, but also it can change and transcend the objective world, whereby the structure of personality can grasp its destiny in its own hands. Of all the creative functions of personality structure that manifest themselves in all the manifold spheres of human activity, the most basic one is nothing other than productive practice. As Marx points out in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, “Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.”301 The creative function of personality structure that enables one to gain firm control of his destiny not only makes man’s life vibrant with pride for its past and present glories, but also must of necessity make man’s life pride itself upon its future glories. (5) The Integrative Function of Personality Structure

301

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 96–97.

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Moreover, personality structure also has the function of holistic self-integration. The component elements of personality structure that are characterized by complexity and changeability tend to present themselves holistically and to make behavioral choices in a more holistic manner, whereby the structure of personality can meet external environmental pressures and challenges. The basic reason why the structure of personality is able to respond to environmental pressures and challenges is that personality structure serves a powerful integrative function. No matter how the human personality is required to adapt to a complex environment or no matter what changes the human personality may seem to have undergone, the integrative function of personality structure will invariably ensure that the human personality presents itself as “a whole man” at all times and in all places. This function manifests itself mainly in the following three aspects. First, the structure of personality is enabled to integrate the totality of all those elements to itself into a unified living whole capable of adapting to an ever-changing internal and external environment. Second, under the influence of external environmental stimuli and pressures the totality of all those substantive powers inherent in the human personality tends to be integrated with each other in an organic way and to be brought into operation and kept in good working order, working together to secure close coordination of mental processes from each other, whereby the ensemble of all those essential powers to itself will act jointly to react or respond to the external environment by making appropriate behavioral choices that can be almost invariably traceable to definite motives of action. Third, the constituent elements inherent in the structure of personality are just as well integrated on a synchronic level as well as on a diachronic level, whereby the structure of personality can be justifiably proud of being the unity of synchronicity and diachrony in its own right. Hence we are fully entitled to say that it’s the integrative function of personality that enables the personality structure itself to rank with the world’s most unified (or holistic) living structures man’s mind has ever conceived. (6) The Self-construction of Personality Structure By the self-construction of personality structure we mean that the structure of personality is able to perform such important functions as setting itself fitting goals in life, integrating various constituent elements into an organic unity, achieving its goals in life, and engaging in a constant, unending struggle for self-transcendence. The structure of personality depends chiefly on human self-awareness (or self-consciousness) to carry out the foregoing functions. The differentiation and unity of human selfconsciousness will naturally follow after human self-consciousness has reached its full development, which is to say, in human self-consciousness, the self that experiences itself as divided or split may be characterized as a division between the ideal and the real self. In human self-consciousness the structure of personality tends to carry out comprehensive analysis of the various aspects of the real self and to render judicious judgment upon the real self by appealing to the ideal self for help, whereby human self-consciousness may bring about the unity between the ideal and the real self and the structure of personality may achieve self-transcendence. This process tends to move in cycles as long as life endures. It’s just the differentiation and unity of human self-consciousness that bring about the unity of man’s

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dual life (man’s natural and supernatural life) as well as of multiple binary opposites (or oppositions) inherent in man’s dual life and that enable man’s dual life characterized by multiple binary oppositions (or opposites) to engage in a constant, unending struggle for self-transcendence. Whether or not the human personality can open itself up to the outside world or whether or not the human personality can carry out a free and open exchange of information with the external world depends on whether or not the differentiation and unity of human self-consciousness can be possible of realization. The differentiation and unity of human self-consciousness, or rather, the self-construction of personality structure, provide a sound foundation for the human personality’s unique project of self-transcendence and thereby open up infinite possibilities for the development and perfection of personality structure.

4 The Basic Structure of Human Personality 4.1 The Basic Structure of Human Personality—“The Three Levels of Personality Structure” and “Eight Kinds of Powers” The structure of personality is basically composed of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” By “the three levels of personality structure” we mean “the power of personality demand (or need),” “the power of personality judgment,” and “the behavioral choice on the part of the human personality.” We mean by “eight kinds of powers” that “the three levels of personality structure” consist of “eight kinds of personality powers.” Specifically, “the power of personality demand (or need)” includes three kinds of power inherent in human personality—that is, “the power of survival demand (or need),” “the power of belonging demand (or need),” and “the power of value (or development) demand (or need).” “The power of personality judgment” contains four kinds of power inherent in human personality, viz. “ideological and moral power,” “wisdom power,” “will power” and “power of introspection.” “The behavioral choice on the part of human personality” consists of one type of power inherent in human personality, that is, “personality behavior choice.” At this point in time we feel the necessity of giving the basic structure of human personality a clear and lucid explanation. First, the basic structure of human personality consists of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” “The power of personality demand (or need)” can be seen as tantamount to human needs and desires inherent in the subconscious mind. By “the power of personality judgment” we mean man’s rational powers, or rather, man’s powers of reason and will, with which the conscious mind is endowed. By “the behavioral choice on the part of human personality” we mean the latent powers of behavioral choice that the human personality tends to draw forth from within itself when it seeks to meet a myriad of environmental pressures

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and challenges. “The behavioral choice on the part of human personality” includes the behavioral goals as well as the personality powers that the human personality tends to call forth from within itself in striving for the realization of the foregoing behavioral goals. To put it the other way round, under the influence of external environmental stimuli the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of personality judgment tend to work together and secure close coordination of mental processes from each other, thereby ensuring that the human personality can respond to the external environment by making appropriate behavioral choices. Generally speaking, the workings of the basic structure of human personality can be described briefly as follows. Under the influence of external environmental stimuli the power of personality demand (or need) will be first brought into operation, and then the power of personality judgment will exercise judgment in helping the human personality to make appropriate behavioral choices, or more specifically, to direct the behavioral choices either towards the external environment or towards the personality structure itself. Second, the isomorphic structure of human personality. Whoever is born into this world and enters into ordinary human life is invariably endowed with roughly the same personality structure, that is, “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” Put otherwise, with very few exceptions the personality structure of each individual human being is composed of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers,” regardless of gender, age, ethnic origin, state of residency or skin color. The difference in personality structure between each individual and every other individual can invariably be reducible to the difference in their respective contents of personality structure. Each personality structure differs from every other personality structure as to the concrete content of personality structure—or to put it another way, no two individual human beings share exactly the same contents of personality structure. Hence we may safely assert that there is no or little difference in personality structure between each individual and every other individual—that is, every personality structure consists of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers,” and that the isomorphism inherent in the structure of personality results from human evolution and genetic inheritance. If the structure of personality is found woefully lacking in any level of personality whatsoever or any kind of power contained therein, then either case will result in what we call, for want of a better term, “serious defects of personality (or defective personalities)” or “personality disturbances (or disorders).” Third, “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers” are indispensable for ensuring the smooth workings of the basic structure of human personality wherein each kind of personality power is quite on a par with every other kind of personality power in importance or value, which holds true for the relationship of each level of personality structure to every other level of personality structure. Among “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers,” while there is a difference in level, power, status or function between each kind of personality power and every other kind of personality, which holds good for the relationship between each level of personality structure and every other level of personality structure, there is practically no difference in importance or

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value between each level of personality structure and every other level of personality structure, which holds true for the relationship of each kind of personality power to every other kind of personality power. “The three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” inherent in the basic structure of human personality may prove of fundamental importance as well as indispensably necessary to the survival and development of human personality. Hence “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” should undergo their full and balanced development, whereby the whole personality can be constructed and attain its full development. Either showing a deliberate disregard for any level of personality structure or any kind of personality power or rejecting them with contempt (or scorn) will invariably be detrimental to the human personality. Such attitudes towards to the structure of personality seem to be highly unreasonable and unscientific. Fourth, manifold complex relationships are inherent in the basic structure of human personality that consists of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.” Taken as a whole, it’s the relationships between structure and function that predominate among the manifold and complex relationships inherent in the basic structure of human personality. The relationship between structure and function tends to find concrete expression in the relationships among the various constituent elements of the personality structure as well as in those ones between the whole structure of personality and the various elements contained therein. The personality structure as a whole and the various elements contained therein are connected with each other, condition each other, permeate each other, determine each other, support each other, restrain each other, cooperate with each other and work in unity with each other, which holds true for the various constituent elements inherent in the basic structure of human personality. Meanwhile, it should be noted that among “the three levels of personality structure” as well as among “eight kinds of personality powers” also exist other types of relationships. First, let us take a concrete example in illustration of the relation between cause and effect. Under certain external environmental conditions the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of personality judgment conspire to ensure the behavioral choice on the part of human personality. It is common knowledge that everything that happens has a cause and an effect. This cause-and-effect relationship demonstrates that the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of personality judgment conspire to form the determining cause, whilst the behavioral choice on the part of human personality constitutes the effect. Second, we’ll have the task of explaining the relation between essence and phenomenon. We may safely assert that the behavioral choice on the part of human personality must of necessity manifest itself as an inevitable phenomenon resulting from the coordinated workings of the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of personality judgment acting in harmony towards a common end when viewed in the perspective of the relation between essence and phenomenon. The very relation between essence and phenomenon mentioned above may awaken us to the fact that the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of personality judgment rightly assert themselves as the essence that manifests itself through phenomena and unfolds itself

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in phenomena, while the behavioral choice on the part of human personality presents itself as a manifestation (or a phenomenon) of the essence. It may, therefore, be safely asserted that a multitude of complex relationships are inherent in the structure of personality that is composed of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” and that it is the basic relation between structure and function that predominates in the multiplicity of complex relationships present as natural parts of the personality structure. Fifth, it is universally agreed that the basic structure of human personality must be understood as a unified whole. The constituent elements of personality structure that are characterized by complexity and changeability ensure that the human personality presents itself as “a whole man” at all times and in all places. On the one hand the structure of personality is in a position to open itself up to the external environment, behaving as a free and open system that is involved in a continuous exchange of both information and energy with the external environment, but on the other, it is in a position to preserve its own holistic unity that is in its essence nothing other than simple existence which has unfolded as a whole person who is primarily responsible for making appropriate behavioral choices at all times and in all places. To put it the other way round, if the structure of personality fails to exist as a whole person or to make behavioral choices in a more holistic manner, then either case will result in what we call, for want of a better term, “defective personalities (or serious defects of personality)” or “personality disorders (or disturbances).”

4.2 Carrying Forward and Drawing Upon Various Theoretical Traditions of Personality Structure in an Integrated Fashion As stated above, man’s recorded history spanning nearly 5000 years saw the increasing availability of an extensive literature on the subject of personality structure, or rather concerning the knowledge of personality structure as well as dealing with the theory of personality structure. The theory of personality structure, or more specifically, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers,” which the author advances in this very monograph and tries to explain in the accompanying diagram, rightly asserts itself as an original theoretical system endowed with such characteristics as completeness, independence, and systematicity, which critically assimilates whatever is beneficial while incorporating previous knowledge of personality structure belonging to different ages, different styles and different schools, and which differs greatly from all previous theories of personality structure that can be grouped into their respective schools of thought. The theory of personality structure, or rather, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers,” is by no means seen as the creation of anything out of nothing—or, to put it the other way round, the foregoing theory of personality structure is not like water without a source, or a tree without

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roots. The theory of personality structure, that is, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers,” which originated with Cen Binggong and rests upon a solid practical foundation, rightly asserts itself as the result of his thirty years of continuous research and exploration in its own right, which is to say, the foregoing theory of personality structure can be viewed either as an organic integration or a theoretical distillation of both the extensive knowledge the author acquired through interdisciplinary exploration and the wide experience he gained from long and exhaustive experiments in multidisciplinary research. Moreover, the foregoing theory of personality structure also achieves a comprehensive integration of all previous theories of personality structure that can be grouped into their respective schools of thought as well as of all relevant knowledge derived from other disciplines bearing on the subject of personality structure, thereby achieving self-transcendence. The theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” has as its prime object of study the basic structure of human personality and takes in all the valuable theories and viewpoints that belong to different ages, different styles and different schools and that the author tries his utmost to integrate into his theory of personality structure. The author’s integration or incorporation of different ideas into his theory of personality structure manifests itself mainly in the following aspects. First, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself the rationalistic assumptions about personality structure that vied with one another in trying to give us a good insight into the structure of personality in the history of human thought. Previous personality theories based on rationalism tended to reduce the structure of personality to the rational powers inherent in personality structure. An example or two will suffice to make this clear. From the rationalist perspective, the structure of personality can be understood as a combination of “the true, the good and the beautiful,” a fusion of “humanity, wisdom and valor,” or a blending of “truth, good, beauty and sacredness.” In the examples listed below, whether they be the theories about personality structure advanced by Confucius, the founder of the Confucian school, and then developed more fully by Mencius, the “Second Sage” of Confucianism after the “Supreme Sage,” Confucius, or the theories about personality structure advocated by the ancient Greek philosophers, of whom Plato is the most prominent representative, or the theories about personality structure widely accepted among academic circles in Hong Kong and Taiwan, with very few exceptions, they may come into the category of personality structure based on rationalism. The theories listed above invariably verify the validity of the rational powers inherent in personality structure and lay emphasis upon their respective positions and functions in relation to those of other constituent elements contained in the structure of personality. Admittedly, the theories mentioned above took correct approaches to the subject of personality structure, thereby providing the basis for reflection on human reality. If the structure of personality is devoid of any rational power whatsoever, then serious defects in the personality structure will result therefrom—or to put it the other way round, the personality structure as described above, far from reaching the state of being a person, reduces itself merely to the status of an inanimate being. Hence, from a

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rationalist perspective the rational powers are inherent in the structure of personality and herein lies the important contribution by the rationalists who tended to adopt rationalist approaches to the study of personality structure. However, the significant drawback to the rationalistic theories about personality structure is that the structure of personality deserves an epitomized description and merits an elaborate explanation merely on the conscious and rational level, that the depths of the subconscious and the irrational regions of the personality structure fall into almost total neglect, and that the rationalists who took rationalist approaches to the study of personality structure tended to retain a totally negative attitude towards the existence of the subconscious and irrational aspects of personality structure as well as towards their respective functions. Hence it is patently absurd to believe such things as the rationalistic assumptions about personality structure that do not conform to human reality on the one hand and that run contrary to human nature on the other. A probing and subtle analysis of the rationalistic theories about personality structure in relation to the theory about “the three levels of personality structure and eight kinds of personality powers” may help awaken us to the fact that the first level of personality structure—that is, the power of personality demand (or need), according to the rationalistic theories about personality structure, should be dismissed as unimportant and, therefore, must be discarded as unnecessary, whereby the rationalistic theories about personality structure must of necessity fall into incompleteness and absurdity. Second, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself the irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure that vied with one another in trying to give us a good insight into the structure of personality in the history of human thought. Previous personality theories emphasizing human irrationality tended to reduce the structure of personality to the irrational powers inherent in personality structure. We may adduce a few classic examples in illustration of this argument. From the point of view of irrationalists, some hold that the structure of personality can be understood as composed of human needs and desires—or to put it the other way round, the personality structure can be conceived as consisting of the natural instincts of social animals with which man’s species being is endowed. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs may be regarded as representative of the foregoing irrationalist ideas on personality structure. Others maintain that while the structure of personality includes both rational and irrational elements as its natural constituent parts, the irrational powers inherent in personality structure, such as human needs and desires, as well as irrational drives and impulses, tend to run afoul of the rational ones contained therein and to overwhelm them in our decision making, whereby they seek to dominate the whole structure of personality, which is to say, not only will the irrational powers inherent in the structure of personality determine the way a person behaves, or more specifically, the way he or she perceives, values, and interacts with others and the environment, but also they will lay the basis for a sound mind and a sound body—or to put it the other way round, how a person develops the irrational powers latent within his or her structure of personality will influence, to a larger or lesser extent, whether or not he or she is sound in mind and body. Freud’s theory of personality structure may represent the above irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure. With

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very few exceptions, the theories mentioned above recognize the validity of the irrational powers inherent in personality structure and cast emphasis upon human needs and desires as well as the natural instincts of social animals with which man’s species being is endowed. Moreover, the foregoing theories also give prominence to the positions and functions respectively belonging to human needs and desires as well as to man’s natural instincts. It may be safely asserted that the aforementioned theories took correct approaches to the study of personality structure and expanded and deepened our insight into certain important aspects of human nature, thereby providing the basis for reflection on human reality. If the structure of personality is devoid of any irrational power whatsoever, then deficiency of these irrational powers can lead to serious defects in personality structure—or to put it the other way round, the personality structure as described above, far from reaching the state of being “the whole man,”302 reduces itself to nothing more than a mere inanimate thing. Hence, from an irrationalist viewpoint, the structure of personality must of necessity include irrational powers as its natural constituent parts, such as human needs and desires, as well as the natural instincts of social animals with which man’s species being is endowed. There are, however, also significant flaws in a variety of irrationalist theories of personality structure, or rather, in the various theories of personality structure that are perceived as exclusively based on irrationalism. The weaknesses and limitations inherent in the irrationalist theories of personality structure may be briefly summarized as follows. In the case of each significant theoretical drawback as listed below, in its main outlines, though not in the details, it’s the same. It’s merely on the subconscious or irrational level that the structure of personality deserves a detailed description and merits an elaborate explanation, the conscious and rational aspects of personality structure—or the cultural determinants of personality structure fall into almost total neglect, and the irrationalists who took irrationalist approaches to the study of personality structure tended to maintain a totally negative attitude towards the existence of the conscious and rational aspects of personality structure as well as towards their respective values. Hence it is palpably absurd to believe such things as the irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure that do not by any means correspond with human reality. One of the fundamental differences between humans and other animals lies in the fact that the human being is endowed with the power of reason and consciousness that can lift mankind above the rest of the animal world. Herein lies the fundamental reason why humans can be raised from bestiality to humanity, why from the very dawn of history man has arrogated to himself all the honor and power due to his supreme elevation above the rest of the animal world, and why man can rightly assert himself as a conscious species-being. If the structure of personality is woefully lacking in any rational power whatsoever, then deficiency of these rational powers may result in serious defects in personality structure—or to put it the other way round, the personality structure as mentioned above fails to elevate itself to the status of “the whole man,”303 but rather reduces 302

Cohen, Marshall., Nagel, Thomas., & Scanlon, Thomas. (2014). Marx, Justice and History: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 60. 303 Ibid.

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itself to a mere inanimate being. In other words, just like animal behaviors are totally guided by instinct, human behavior fails to transcend the instincts of nature, but rather undergoes a retrograde reversion to the primitive human instinct. More specifically, the less that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the word, the less they make their own history consciously, the more becomes the influence of unforeseen effects and uncontrolled forces of this history, and the less accurately does the historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance. Whether the conscious and rational aspects of personality structure—or the cultural determinants of personality structure fall into almost total neglect or whether the rationalists who took rationalist approaches to the study of personality structure tended to retain a totally negative attitude towards the depths of the subconscious and the irrational regions of personality structure as well as towards their respective values or functions, it is invariably patently or palpably absurd to believe such things as the rationalistic or irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure that do not conform to human reality on the one hand and that run contrary to human nature on the other. An intelligent and clarifying analysis of the various irrationalist theories of personality structure in relation to the theory about “the three levels of personality structure and eight kinds of personality powers” may help awaken us to the fact that the second level of personality structure—that is, the power of personality judgment, according to the irrationalists who tended to adopt irrationalist approaches to the study of personality structure, should be dismissed as unimportant and, therefore, must be discarded as unnecessary, whereby the various irrationalist theories of personality structure must of necessity fall into incompleteness and absurdity. Third, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself the behaviorist theories of personality structure that vied with one another in trying to give us a good insight into the structure of personality in the history of human thought. Generally speaking, behaviorists devote little attention to the structure of personality, show little interest in internal personality structures, and put little value upon the study of internal personality structures which, according behavioral theories of personality structure, can never aspire to objectivity in any accurate scientific sense. Whereupon it must of necessity follow that behaviorists tend to reject internal personality structures as a scientific subject deserving of serious and enthusiastic study. To put it the other way round, behaviorists contend that only the study of behavioral responses to particular environmental stimuli can be accepted as objective and reliable in the true sense of the word. Hence they devote themselves exclusively to the study of various environmental stimuli to which individual organisms are subjected, appropriate behavioral reactions of individual organisms that respond to environmental stimuli, and acquired behavior patterns or habits that are regularly followed until they have become almost involuntary. “Behaviorism is a term coined by J. B. Watson in 1913 to indicate that all habits may be explained in terms of conditioned glandular and motor reaction. ‘Behaviorism holds that the subject matter of human psychology is the behavior or activities of the human being. Behaviorism claims that ‘consciousness’ is neither a definable nor a usable concept; that it is merely another word for the ‘soul’ of more ancient times (Behaviorism, 1924). Classical behaviorism asserted

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that the proper subject for psychology was not the operation of the mind but rather the examination of objective, observable behavior. Behavior was to be understood in terms of the stimulus–response formula; the organism thus is essentially passive and can only react to stimulation. The leading psychologists of the next generation were trained in Watson’s orbit—Clark Hull, B. F. Skinner, Kenneth Spence, and E. L. Thorndike. Modern behaviorism, as exemplified by Skinner’s operant behaviorism, eschews a mechanistic view of human nature. The core theme of operant behaviorism is that activities of the organism bring consequences that shape and influence further action. It is the environment that produces the consequences, so it is the environment that shapes, influences, and determines a person’s behavior.”304 “Behaviorism was founded by John Watson, in reaction to the structuralist school of psychological thought, which took the quality of conscious experience as its subject and deployed self-examination of mental events (introspection) as its method. In criticizing this approach, Watson’s aim was to turn psychology into a natural science, arguing that the impossibility of an objective examination of an internal, hidden mind necessarily required a focus on behavior. This redirection of attention carried with it the requirement that mind and consciousness be removed from psychological consideration.”305 Some behaviorists such as American psychologists Edward L. Thorndike, John B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner (1904–1990), who are among the most prominent representatives of the behaviorist traditions, hold that all modes of behavior can be understood and explained in terms of the classical behaviorist formula of “stimulus and response” that one can represent by letters and signs as “S → R.” Among other behaviorists who belong to the American school of behaviorism rejecting the study of mind and consciousness as unscientific and focusing on objective and observable behavior, Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), German-born American social psychologist, who is often recognized as the founder of modern experimental social psychology, and who deservedly ranks as the 18th-most eminent psychologist of the twentieth century,306 rightly ranks as one of the leading exponents of the behaviorist school which has developed almost wholly in America. Kurt Lewin originated the classical formula B = f (P, E) as a basis for explaining and predicting behavior, and tried to utilize this famous psychological equation of behavior to illustrate the functional dependency of human behavior. This famous theoretical assumption is well represented in the following formula: B = F (P, E) = F (LS). Accordingly, behavior (B) is a function (F) of the person (P) and the environment (E). Both the person and the environment have to be understood as intertwined factors. The potentially complex interaction between the two—represented by the function (F) in the formula—is what determines people’s behavior. Hence the life space may be briefly summarized 304

Campbell, Robert Jean. (2009). Campbell’s Psychiatric Dictionary. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 123. 305 Vonk, Jennifer., & Shackelford, Todd K. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 19. 306 Haggbloom, S. J. et al. (2002). The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century. Review of General Psychology 6(2):139–152.

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as follows. The interaction of the person (P) and the environment (E) produces the life space, and the life space that is the combination of all the factors may influence a person’s behavior at any time. An individual’s behavior, at any time, can be expressed as a function of the life space B = f (LS).307 “E. L. Thorndike (1874–1949), a pioneer in the experimental investigation of animal behavior, advanced an influential learning theory known as connectionism. His practical work focused on behavior, and he can be considered a forerunner of behaviorism.”308 A Review of General Psychology survey, published in 2002, ranked Thorndike as the ninth-most cited psychologist of the twentieth century.309 In 1912, Thorndike was elected president for the American Psychological Association.310 In 1917, he was one of the first psychologists to be admitted to the National Academy of Sciences. “In 1925, for his contributions to psychological measurement and its applications to education, Columbia University awarded Thorndike the Butler medal in gold, granted once every five years for the most distinguished contribution made anywhere in the world to philosophy or to educational theory, practice, or administration.”311 In 1934, Thorndike was elected president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.312 “In Animal Intelligence Thorndike set down what proved to be a lasting framework for his theory of mind and the laws of learning. He brought into the twentieth century the British tradition of ‘associationism,’ and his own learning theory came to be called ‘connectionism,’ or sometimes ‘stimulus– response theory.’ … Mind, said Thorndike, is man’s ‘connection system,’ forming a bond between some stimulus—Thorndike preferred the word ‘situation,’ recognizing the complexity of many stimuli—and some response made to it by the learner. All that a man knows, feels, ‘wants,’ or does is dependent upon his having formed a connection between some situation and some response. … Thorndike’s ‘laws of learning’ explain the connection processes. His ‘laws of exercise’ recalls the principle of ‘frequency,’ or ‘use,’ found in nineteenth-century association theory: a response made is likely to be made again, merely as a result of having been made before. The ‘law of effect’ states that the consequences (satisfying or not satisfying) of a response will increase or decrease the probability that the connection was formed and that the response will be repeated.”313 “A thoroughgoing Darwinist, Thorndike was convinced that, because of evolutionary continuity, the study of animal behavior 307

Deutsch, Morton. “Field Theory in Social Psychology.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, eds. GardnerLindzey & ElliotAronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968. 308 Weiner, Irving B., & Craighead, W. Edward., eds. (2010). The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology, Volume 3. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p. 1340. 309 Haggbloom, S. J. et al. (2002). The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century. Review of General Psychology 6(2):139–152. 310 Zimmerman, Barry J., & Schunk, Dale H., eds. (2003). Educational Psychology: A Century of Contributions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., p. 113. 311 “Thorndike, Edward L.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia. com. 7 Aug. 2021 . 312 Thomson, Godfrey., & Thorndike, Edward L. Nature 164, 474 (1949). 313 “Thorndike, Edward L.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 .

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is instructive to human psychology. … His painstaking study of animal behavior convinced Thorndike that the process of animal learning rested not on some form of reasoning and not even on imitation. Learning depends, instead, upon the presence of some situation or stimulus (S) requiring the animal to make various, more or less random responses (R); as a result of such trial and error, the correct, or most adaptive, response is eventually made. The effect produced by the appropriate response is a sort of reward. … The effect acts physiologically, creating or reinforcing a neural connection between that response and the situation which provoked it; repetition of that or a similar stimulus becomes more readily able to produce the previously successful response, and inappropriate responses are forgone. … The basic principle which Thorndike formulated to account for the S-R connection is the law of effect; in the language of such later psychologists as Clark Hull and B. F. Skinner, this is a reinforcement theory of learning.”314 Reviewing in retrospect Thorndike’s academic career and theoretical work, we may safely assert that Thorndike made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the advancement of psychology. Thorndike introduced the concept of reinforcement and was the first to apply psychological principles to the area of learning. His theory of learning, especially the law of effect, is most often considered to be his greatest achievement. Thorndike influenced many schools of psychology as Gestalt psychologists, reflexologists, and behavioral psychologists all studied his research as a starting point. Thorndike had a powerful impact on reinforcement theory and behavior analysis, providing the basic framework for empirical laws in behavior psychology with his law of effect.315 His work on comparative psychology and the learning process led to the theory of connectionism and helped lay the scientific foundation for educational psychology.316 Thorndike’s work would eventually be a major influence to B. F. Skinner and Clark Hull. John B. Watson (1878–1958) was an American psychologist who both pioneered and publicized the scientific theory of behaviorism, establishing it as a psychological school.317 “He was honored as the initiator of a ‘revolution in psychological thought’ and a person whose work was a vital determinant of ‘the form and substance of modern psychology.’”318 A Review of General Psychology survey ranked Watson as the 17th most cited psychologist of the twentieth century.319 “As the founder of American behaviorism, Watson placed an extreme emphasis on the environment 314 CLIFFORD, GERALDINE JON çICH “Thorndike, Edward L. (1874–1949).” Encyclopedia of Education. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 . 315 Adams, M. A. (2000). Reinforcement Theory and Behavior Analysis. Behavioral Development Bulletin 9(1): 3–6. 316 Zimmerman, Barry J., & Schunk, Dale H., eds. (2003). Educational Psychology: A Century of Contributions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., pp. 113–154. 317 Cohn, Aaron S. (2014). “Watson, John B.” In The Social History of the American Family: An Encyclopedia, eds. Marilyn J. Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, 1429–1430. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 318 “Watson, John B. (1878–1958).” Learning and Memory. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 . 319 Haggbloom, S. J. et al. (2002). The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century. Review of General Psychology 6(2): 139–152.

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in shaping behavior. With an unswerving belief in determinism and materialism, Watson argued that complete prediction and control of behavior could be achieved only by a psychology that found identity with the natural sciences.”320 Watson cherished the belief that “psychology could become an objective and practical science only if it rid itself of unverifiable, unreliable introspective methods and focused on the study of observable behavior—events that could be recorded by an outsider— rather than on inferred, private states of consciousness or experience.”321 He articulated his first statements on behaviorist psychology in the epoch-making article “Psychology as a Behaviorist Views It” (1913), claiming that “psychology is the science of human behavior, which, like animal behavior, should be studied under exacting laboratory conditions,”322 and that “the goal of psychology was to predict and control behavior, not to analyze consciousness into its elements or to study vague ‘functions’ or processes like perception, imagery, and volition.”323 In his first major work, Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology, which was published in 1914, “he argued forcefully for the use of animal subjects in psychological study and described instinct as a series of reflexes activated by heredity,”324 maintaining that “animal learning and behavior, which had generally been relegated to a minor position in psychology or had not been viewed as part of psychology at all, was the one truly objective, scientific area of psychology,” and that “the techniques used in the animal laboratory could be profitably, objectively, and practically applied to human beings.”325 “The definitive statement of Watson’s position appears in another major work, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (1919), in which he sought to extend the principles and methods of comparative psychology to the study of human beings and staunchly advocated the use of conditioning in research.”326 “In any event, his approach was original because of how it combined a variety of emphases, dissatisfactions, and opinions in a unique, revolutionary way. … The new method was essentially the conditioned-reflex procedure of Ivan Pavlov and Vladimir Bekhterev, which he appreciated and examined. (Previously he had stressed the associationist laws of frequency and recency; he frowned on Edward L. Thorndike’s law of effect because the notion of strengthening or weakening S-R bonds by means of subsequent satisfaction or discomfort seemed subjective to him, although it is the 320

Weiner, Irving B., & Craighead, W. Edward., eds. (2010). The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology, Volume 3. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p. 1340. 321 “Watson, John B. (1878–1958).” Learning and Memory. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 . 322 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “John B. Watson.” Encyclopedia Britannica, January 13, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-B-Watson. 323 “Watson, John B. (1878–1958).” Learning and Memory. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 . 324 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “John B. Watson.” Encyclopedia Britannica, January 13, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-B-Watson. 325 “Watson, John B. (1878–1958).” Learning and Memory. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 . 326 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “John B. Watson.” Encyclopedia Britannica, January 13, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-B-Watson.

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forerunner of Skinner’s law of operant reinforcement). From his own studies with human beings Watson illustrated a variety of Pavlovian conditioning phenomena that seemed relevant for everyday human behavior. … Watson denied any significant initiating or mediating role for the brain, and he would not consider possible cognitive processes intervening between the external S and the subject’s R. His approach was thus peripheralistic in its focus on movements and secretions, and not on changes in the central nervous system. He worried that serious consideration of the existence of such intervening, unobservable processes would be subjective and unscientific; in any case it was unnecessary for behavioral prediction and control.”327 “Arguably, B. F. Skinner (1904–1990), an American psychologist, was the foremost behaviorist of the twentieth century. Drawing inspiration from Thorndike more than Watson, Skinner argued that scientific psychology must concern itself with the analysis of behavior rather than the study of cognition. In his seminal book, The Behavior of Organisms, Skinner established an experimental analysis of behavior that featured operant conditioning as the centerpiece.”328 “B. F. Skinner provided the experimental foundations of contemporary behavior analysis and its applications. He introduced the terminology of operant behavior and elaborated on the concept of reinforcement. He interpreted verbal behavior in terms of those foundations and was outspoken about the differences between the methods of behavior analysis and those of cognitive psychology. His contributions provided the foundations for extensions to a variety of applications both in and outside of psychology.”329 A Review of General Psychology survey listed Skinner as the most influential psychologist of the twentieth century.330 When behaviorist theories of personality structure introduced environmental factors into the study of personality structure, the shift in the focus of research interest suggested that the study of personality structure underwent a transition from the mere study of internal personality structures to the study of the interactive relationships between humans and the environment—or to put it the other way round, the study of personality structure underwent a change from the mere study of “entities” to the study of “relationships,” which demonstrated that the study of personality structure has made a great advance both theoretically and methodologically. The reason why the structure of personality cannot for one moment be divorced from the environment lies in the fact that the structure of personality tends to be molded by the external environment on the one hand, and that only the environment can afford the structure of personality every chance of survival and development on the other. Hence, we may safely assert that, in delving into the mysteries of personality structure, if we fail to take into account environmental factors, we will have great difficulty in 327

“Watson, John B. (1878–1958).” Learning and Memory. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 . 328 Weiner, Irving B., & Craighead, W. Edward, eds. (2010). The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology, Volume 3. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p. 1340. 329 “Skinner, B. F.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 6 Aug. 2021 . 330 Haggbloom, S. J. et al. (2002). The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century. Review of General Psychology 6(2): 139–152.

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forming a clear conception of personality structure, not to mention the complexity of human behavior. In view of the foregoing facts, we must fully recognize that behaviorists have made substantial contributions to the scientific study of personality structure. However, we must point out several significant weaknesses and limitations inherent in behavioral theories of personality structure, which can be summarized in the following two aspects. First, it is generally recognized that no convincing or scientific explanation for the complexity of human behavior has yet been found in behavioral theories of personality structure. They tend to lay undue emphasis upon “the stimulus–response formula,” discouraging instead any deeper study of values and possibilities inherent in internal personality structures. Hence they are generally applicable to the study of a wide range of simple repetitive behaviors, rather than the complexity of behavioral choices, to say nothing of those human behaviors that are liable to be much more changeable and unpredictable. Second, behavioral theories of personality structure fail to place the structure of personality in the clearest light. Far from giving us a good insight into the structure of personality, they generally hold an oversimplified view of personality structure, and even discourage any deeper study of personality structure. According to Chen Bing-Gong’s theory of personality structure, or rather, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure and eight kinds of personality powers,” behavioral theories of personality structure tend to either dismiss the structure of personality as unimportant or discourage any deeper study of personality structure, whereby in all human probability behaviorists will be placed in a position of considerable difficulty, which is to say, behavioral theories of personality structure neither give us a good insight into the structure of personality nor place far more complex behavioral patterns, which man is capable of learning than are other creatures,331 in the clearest light, either theoretically or methodologically. Fourth, The theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself other relevant theories of personality structure that have been vying with one another in trying to give us a good insight into the structure of personality in the history of human thought, as well as theoretical knowledge derived from other related disciplines. In the history of human thought, the rationalistic assumptions about personality structure, the irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure, and the behavioral theories of personality structure have been vying with one another to make substantial contributions to the scientific study of personality structure. Many other theories of personality structure also constitute a valuable contribution to the scientific study of personality structure. Moreover, one feature that distinguishes Chen Bing-Gong’s theory of personality structure from many other theories of personality is the inclusion of original ideas derived from other related disciplines as one of the most fundamental aspects of the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.” Hence we feel the necessity of integrating or incorporating the foregoing theories and ideas into the very theory about 331

Mueller, Dennis C. (2003). Public Choice III. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 325.

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“the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.” Let us adduce several relevant examples in illustration of the aforementioned argument. In the history of philosophy, a multitude of theories and conceptions of “the subject’s self-consciousness” were brought forth, and all types of ideas and beliefs were postulated regarding “the subject’s self-consciousness,” whereby our knowledge of “the subject’s self-consciousness” has been greatly broadened, enriched, and deepened. In particular, Hegel’s philosophy reduced the evolution of philosophy itself as well as the course of human history, that is the progress of the human world, to a product of the self-development of the Idea that might be construed as tantamount to “the subject’s self-consciousness,” or more specifically, the product of the immanent dialect of the Absolute Idea.332 German-born American psychoanalyst Karen Horney (1885–1952), who is often included in the group of neo-Freudian psychoanalysts who focused their attention on man’s functioning in his social and cultural environments, and who is usually listed among the first major theorists of the cultural school of psychoanalytic psychiatry,333 was emphatic in her assertion that the self tends to be at the core of human personality and to occupy a dominant place in the structure of personality, and that all persons possess a dual perception of the self: the real self, who we are, and the ideal self, who we wish to be. Horney’s particular emphasis upon the discrepancy and conflict between the real self and the ideal self led her to believe that the tension between the real self and the ideal self as well as the unity of the real and ideal selves furnishes an unfailing and reliable source of motive power that may facilitate free and full development of personality on the one hand, while on the other constituting the basic reason why people suffer from some neurosis or other, why the neurotic person, whose self is split between the ideal self, who struggles with the tyranny of the should (striving for perfection), and the real self, who degenerates into the despised real self (self based on false evaluations of others), is like a clock’s pendulum, oscillating between a fallacious perfection and a manifestation of self-hate, and why Horney referred to this phenomenon as the tyranny of the should and the neurotic’s hopeless search for glory.334 Moreover, it is important to note that deep insights into the structure of personality as well as original ideas on the very subject can also be found in both other relevant theories of personality structure and theoretical knowledge derived from other related disciplines. Hence we should attain full comprehension of these insights and ideas so that we are able to make good use of them when we seek to expand and deepen our understanding of personality structure. Despite this, it by no means follows that these deep insights and original ideas would enable us to make a comprehensive exposition of “the whole man’s” personality structure in that the potential weaknesses and limitations inherent in the foregoing theories and theoretical explanations contained therein assuredly 332

Wood, John Cunningham. (1998). Karl Marx’s Economics: Critical Assessments. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 96. 333 Balis, George U., Wurmser, Leon., & McDaniel, Ellen. (2013). The Behavioral and Social Sciences and the Practice of Medicine: The Psychiatric Foundations of Medicine. Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, p. 216. 334 Ge, Lu-Jia., & Chen, Ruo-Li. (1999). Cultural Dilemmas and Inner Conflicts: Cultural Psychopathology. Wuhan, China: Hubei Educational Publishing House, pp. 130–181.

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discourage us against seeing and understanding the truth about personality structure. One or two examples will suffice to make this clear. Philosophy, the rational, abstract, and methodical consideration of reality as a whole or of fundamental dimensions of human existence and experience,335 can be defined as “the human attempt to systematically study the most fundamental structures of our entire experience in order to arrive at beliefs that are as conceptually clear, experientially confirmed, and rationally coherent as possible.”336 However, because of the limitations inherent in the very discipline, philosophy, far from giving a comprehensive explanation of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure, is concerned primarily with the study of human nature as well as any fundamental distinguishing characteristics contained therein. Likewise, owing to the limitations inherent in the discipline proper, psychology is devoted solely to the study of human psychology, rather than giving a comprehensive exposition of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure. As a matter of fact, the ideal of value freedom or value neutrality psychologists deem worth cherishing and defending is rooted in psychology to such an extent that the very science holds out the promise of predisposing psychologists to study personality structure without invoking the aid of any given ideologies, values or theoretical knowledge.337 By contrast, anthropology, the future of which can best be assured if its development is built on its own inherent strengths rather than on the basic characteristics that are common to such traditional disciplines as philosophy, anthropology and psychology, deservedly ranks high among humanities and social sciences, and as such would be in a better position to give a comprehensive exposition of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure. “As a science of man, the Humanities, which focus first and foremost on facts concerning archaeology, anthropology, psychology, cultural studies, history, language, art, and literature, are a cognitive activity that attempts to procure knowledge about the conditions of human beings as acting, thinking, and willing creatures; it is a systematic activity that attempts to explain and understand facts from the theoretical possibilities each discipline leaves open.”338 “Different social sciences study the different aspects of man and society in different ways. Anthropology is the science of man. It studies all aspects of man. It studies human behavior in every time and place and in different cultures. It studies man everywhere on earth. It studies man in both the periods, historic and prehistoric. It studies man on all levels, civilized and uncivilized. In the words of Herskovites, anthropology is a science of man and his actions. It studies the origin and evolution of man from material, cultural and social points of view. In this way, different fields of anthropology study man in different aspects. … Redfield says that holiest tendencies are on the increase in anthropology, which is to say, man is being studied on different 335

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Philosophy.” Encyclopedia Britannica, August 20, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy. 336 Lawhead, William. (2007). The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth / Thomson Learning, p. 5. 337 Osbeck, Lisa M. (2019). Values in Psychological Science: Re-Imagining Epistemic Priorities at a New Frontier. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 12–15. 338 Jensen, Julio Hans Casado., & Gensen, Julio. (2004). The Object of Study in the Humanities. Copenhagen, DK: Museum Tusculanum Press, p. 53.

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levels of culture and interest in the study of values and personality is increasing. All these tendencies show that in future anthropology will come closer to social science in comparison with natural sciences.”339 However, the long-term development of anthropology saw the gradual but irreversible estrangement of the discipline proper from its object of study—“man himself,” which, for want of a better term, we may as well call “object of knowledge” (the field or subject matter that a discipline is investigating).340 That is to say, anthropology has long been concerned primarily with the study of human physique and human culture. Anthropologists failed to focus attention on “man himself,” or rather, to give a comprehensive explanation of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure. To make matters worse, they either set themselves against the study of “man himself” or resigned themselves to the study of human physique and human culture which in time predisposed anthropologists to divorce anthropology from the study of “man himself.” Clark Wissler (1870–1947), American anthropologist who was curator of the American Museum of Natural History in New York City for nearly 40 years and also taught at Yale University (1924–40),341 maintained that “Anthropology is the science that studies man. It includes the study of all questions that relate to human beings as social animals.”342 Polish-born British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), one of the most important anthropologists of the twentieth century who played a decisive part in the formation of the contemporary British school of social anthropology, is widely recognized as a founder of social anthropology.343 Through his scientific activities, especially his methodological innovations, he was a major contributor to the transformation of nineteenth-century speculative anthropology into a modern science of man.344 His professional training and career, beginning in 1910, were based in England. In 1927 he was appointed to the first chair in anthropology at the University of London. In 1936 he was awarded an honorary doctor of science degree at the Harvard University tercentenary celebrations. From 1940 to 1942 he taught as Bishop Museum Visiting Professor of Anthropology at Yale University.345 Malinowski held that “Anthropology is a science that studies the human race and its culture in all degrees and levels of development. It includes the study of the physical nature of human beings, the racial differences among them, civilization, and societal formation

339

Sharma, Ram Nath., & Sharma, Rajendra K. (1997). Anthropology. New Delhi, IN: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, p. 22. 340 Powell, Jason L., & Owen, Tim., eds. (2007). Reconstructing Postmodernism: Critical Debates. New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., p. 24. 341 Britannica, T. Editors of Encylopaedia. “Clark Wissler.” Encyclopedia Britannica, September 14, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Clark-Wissler. 342 Cheng, Guo-Qiang. “The Chinese People Need Anthropology.” In Anthropology in China: Defining the Discipline, ed. Gregory EliyuGuldin. New York, NY: Routledge, 2015. 343 Firth, R. William. “Bronislaw Malinowski.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, May 12, 2021. https:// www.britannica.com/biography/Bronislaw-Malinowski. 344 “Malinowski, Bronislaw.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 16 Aug. 2021 . 345 Ibid.

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as well as questions related to Man’s mental and spiritual responses to the environment.”346 Dr. Gonzales, who was once vice-president of the University of Maryland, noted that “today in America anthropology is deemed a science that studies Man in general.”347 Lin Huixiang, Chinese anthropologist and professor at Xiamen University, proposed that “anthropology should be the study of both the physical properties and the cultural conditions of the human race, but with emphasis placed on the primitive age.” He contended that “Anthropology is a science that employs a historical perspective in studying humanity and its culture.”348 “The theory of structure and choice” takes “man” in general as the object of study and integrates or incorporates into itself various classical theories about man, whereby we may safely assert that “the theory of structure and choice” is quite equal to the task of giving a comprehensive explanation of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure. The author spent over 30 years of his life following in the footsteps of his forerunners and contemporaries, who have achieved the latest results of scholarly research in philosophy, anthropology, philosophical anthropology, and other related disciplines, in order to unravel the mystery of human existence, or rather, to gain a fresh and deeper insight into the noumenon of human life which the author terms man’s “structure and choice.” His untiring and unremitting efforts were eventually crowned with success. He drew preliminary conclusions from long-term investigations and experiments. His monograph entitled Principles of Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the Knowledge System was chosen as one of “National Achievements Library of Philosophy and Social Sciences” in 2011. Subsequently, this work was published through China Social Sciences Press in 2012. In this scholarly work the author proposed and expounded the theory of “personality structure and choice,” which was illustrated by charts and diagrams, and which took pages 177–311 of this book to go into details, holding that the noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” is basically composed of “three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.” In 1986 and 1987, the author got 42 colleagues and students organized several times to undertake investigations on “personality and values” in Chinese metropolises such as Changchun, Beijing, Xi’an, Wuhan, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. From 1995 to 2005, he carried out a series of experiments in “personality structure and holistic personality development” in Chinese regions and cities like Jilin Province, Henan Province, and Shenzhen. Based upon these investigations and experiments, the author published relevant articles and works, such as “The 21st Century and Chinese Traditional Ideal Personality Models: From a Modern Perspective” and General Tendencies in Chinese Personality. While following in the footsteps of his predecessors who have achieved the latest results of scholarly research in the field of human ontology, the author devoted more than 30 years of his life to the study of human ontology by drawing upon previous results in the field. Eventually, the author, in conjunction with his 346

Cheng, Guo-Qiang. “The Chinese People Need Anthropology.” In Anthropology in China: Defining the Discipline, ed. Gregory EliyuGuldin. New York, NY: Routledge, 2015. 347 Ibid. 348 Ibid.

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colleagues and students, made preliminary findings from long-term investigations and experiments, and proposed his theory of personality structure, or rather, the theory about “three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.” To sum up, the author adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the study of personality structure that encourages a neutral approach free of any disciplinary bias, which is to say, the author acknowledges the necessity of studying personality structure from multiple disciplines, but he has no decided preference among diverse disciplines and refrains elevating any particular discipline’s importance in the study of personality structure so as to minimize or neglect the importance of others—or put it the other way round, he holds a neutral attitude towards the scientific knowledge from diverse disciplines despite the fact that individual interdisciplinarians who tend to be characterized by a host of ideological, ethical, epistemological, theoretical, methodological, and other biases may like some disciplines more than others.349 The author attaches great importance to all previous theories about personality structure and gives adequate consideration to creative and original ideas about personality structure he tries to seize and assimilate from the stock of knowledge produced by each of related disciplines. In time the author succeeded in incorporating and integrating the abundant material and sufficient data he gathered for the study of personality structure into his system theory of personality structure, or rather the theory about “three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.”

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211. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 9. 212. McGee, Kyle. (2014). Bruno Latour: The Normativity of Networks. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 49. 213. Navaro, Yael., Biner, Zerrin Özlem., Bieberstein, Alice von., & Altuˇg, Seda., eds. (2021). Reverberations: Violence Across Time and Space. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 164. 214. Vries, Gerard de. (2016). Bruno Latour. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 90. 215. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 68. 216. Dahlgaard-Park, Su Mi., ed. (2015). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Quality and the Service Economy. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 11–12. 217. Blok, Anders., & Jensen, Torben Elgaard. (2011). Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid World. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 167. 218. George-Graves, Nadine., ed. (2015). The Oxford Handbook of Dance and Theater. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 500. 219. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 46. 220. Latour, Bruno. (2013). An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence (Catherine Porter, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 158. 221. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 75. 222. Eming, Jutta., & Starkey, Kathryn., eds. (2021). Things and Thingness in European Literature and Visual Art, 700–1600. Berlin, DE: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, p. 131. 223. Tischleder, Babette Bärbel. (2014). The Literary Life of Things: Case Studies in American Fiction. Frankfurt, DE: Campus Verlag GmbH, p. 28. 224. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 70–71. 225. McAtackney, Laura. (2014). An Archaeology of the Troubles: The Dark Heritage of Long Kesh /Maze Prison. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 103. 226. Whybray, Adam. (2020). The Art of Czech Animation: A History of Political Dissent and Allegory. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 95. 227. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 107. 228. Fraiberg, Steven., Wang, Xi-Qiao., & You, Xiao-Ye. (2017). Inventing the World Grant University: Chinese International Students’ Mobilities, Literacies, and Identities. Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, p. 15. 229. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 172. 230. Fraiberg, Steven., Wang, Xi-Qiao., & You, Xiao-Ye. (2017). Inventing the World Grant University: Chinese International Students’ Mobilities, Literacies, and Identities. Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, p. 17. 231. Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 259. 232. Sorokin, Pitirim A. (1956). “Toynbee’s Philosophy of History.” In Toynbee and History: Critical Essays and Reviews, ed. M. F. Ashley Montagu. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, pp. 179– 180. 233. Toynbee, Arnold J. (1956). A Study of History, Volume 3. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p. 380. 234. Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 123. 235. Toynbee, Arnold J. (1986). A Study of History (Wei-Feng Cao et al., Trans.). Shanghai, China: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, pp. 248, 455–457.

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236. Wolin, Sheldon S. (2016). Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 730. 237. Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 357–358. 238. Fraser, J. T. (2021). Of Time, Passion, and Knowledge: Reflections on the Strategy of Existence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 165. 239. Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 189. 240. Toynbee, Arnold J. (1986). A Study of History (Wei-Feng Cao et al., Trans.). Shanghai, CN: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p. 453.

Chapter 7

Group Structure

Not only does “personality” rightly assert itself as a mode of human existence, but also “group” reveals itself as a mode of human existence. Hence we may safely assert that both “personality” and “group” reveal themselves as basic modes of human existence. In the case of mankind’s remote, primate ancestors such as anthropoid apes, their modes of existence could invariably be reduced to both “personality” and “group.” These two modes of existence were continued in the course of the history of man, passing through a long process of evolution, and in time evolved into man’s two basic modes of existence. Not only does “personality” rightly assert itself as a mode of human existence, but also “group” reveals itself as a mode of human existence. Hence we may safely assert that both “personality” and “group” reveal themselves as basic modes of human existence. In the case of mankind’s remote, primate ancestors such as anthropoid apes, their modes of existence could invariably be reduced to both “personality” and “group.” These two modes of existence were continued in the course of the history of man, passing through a long process of evolution, and in time evolved into man’s two basic modes of existence. The study of man’s modes of existence thus requires that we should make a systematic and exhaustive investigation of both “personality” and “group,” which is to say, the study of man’s modes of existence necessitates making a serious and enthusiastic study of both “personality” and “group.” In other words, only if we have made an elaborate and scholarly investigation of both “personality” and “group” can we help forward the study of man’s modes of existence. It is regrettable, however, that it was neglect of the study of “group” that left us in the dark of the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained therein, thereby causing a great blank in the history of human thought. In the past only the specific concepts of “group” such as those of family, institution, state and international organization, as well as the concrete knowledge contained therein, were created and developed, while the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant ideas derived from it was almost never consciously articulated let alone explained or embraced. International

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academic or theoretical circles are now faced with the arduous and urgent task of creating the universal concept of “group” and evolving new knowledge from it, which has become an issue of great and lasting importance facing them at present. Creating and developing the general concept of “group” as well as the systematic knowledge contained therein may prove of great value, or rather, of supreme importance, in understanding and addressing the great theoretical and practical issues of today. For example, the universal concept of “group” as well as the concrete knowledge derived from it can make man know himself in a new light, endow humanities and social sciences with their respective allegedly scientific assumptions (or presuppositions) about human nature, make up for the deficiencies inherent in the concrete knowledge about “group,” prompt people to cultivate or develop a rational knowledge of their existence and to hold or grasp their destinies in their own hands.

1 The Total Absence of the General (or Universal) Concept of “Group” and the Negative Effects Resulting Therefrom The five thousand years of man’s recorded history saw the total absence of the general concept of “group,” and it was neglect of the study of “group” that left us in the dark of the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained therein, thereby causing a great blank in the history of human thought. In the past only the specific concepts of “group” such as those of family, institution, state and international organization, as well as the concrete knowledge contained therein, were created and developed, while the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant ideas derived from it was almost never consciously articulated let alone explained or embraced. The total absence of the general concept of “group” as well as any body of theoretical knowledge contained therein can be perceived as tantamount to a most serious deficiency inherent in man’s basic concepts and knowledge systems, which tended to exercise its restraints upon human thought and thus to impede (or hinder) the development of human thinking, and which tended to reduce the previous generations of scholars to a passive position when they sought to gain a deeper insight into the multiple modes of human existence as well as the myriad ways in which human beings secure their survival in both nature and society, or rather, the various forms of human adaptation to the environment, and to build up their own theories about them. With the above situation in view, we must awake to the fact that the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained therein has been absent in man’s repository of basic concepts and knowledge systems, and realize the urgent necessity for addressing this serious problem. In view of the fact that human beings have had no such general notion of “group” as yet and that none of the existing concepts or categories can serve as a linguistic expression of the notion of “group” in a general sense, only if we have created and developed the general concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained

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therein can we in a very real sense make up for the serious deficiency inherent in man’s basic concepts and knowledge systems. It is obvious, at once, that there can be no such specific notion of “group” as shall, at the same time, embrace all that is contained in the general concept of “group”—or to put it the other way round, there is no such notion as a specific concept of “group” that can rightly assert itself as a substitute for the universal concept of “group.” Such concepts as those of family, institution, state and international organization, when compared with the universal concept of “group,” fall into the specific categories of “group.” Only the specific concepts of “group” can place their multifarious services at the disposal of those people who are trying to gain a comprehensive knowledge of particular “groups” and give a full explanation of the relevant theories about them. One or two examples will suffice to make this clear. The concept of “family” may aid people in gaining a comprehensive knowledge of families and giving a full explanation of the relevant theories about them. The same is true of such concepts as those of “organization” and “state.” However, the specific concepts of “group” cannot by any means place their services at the disposal of those people who attempt to gain a comprehensive knowledge of the general “group” and to give a full explanation of the relevant theories about it. As a general rule, linguistic concepts or categories can be organized or grouped into complex conceptual hierarchies in which a single concept may be a superordinate or a subordinate concept in relation to others. “The lowest species-concept has the smallest extension. The genus-concept always has a greater extension than all the species-concepts subordinate to it. The highest genus-concept within a series of concepts has relatively the greatest extension, for it includes all the lower species that belong to that series; while each of the subordinate speciesconcepts includes only a part of these lower species and has, therefore, a smaller extension.”1 “Since species concepts cover proper parts of the generic extension, we can see the content of a species as composed out of, and therefore defined by, the genus itself, plus some differentia marking off its particular way of having the genus concept.”2 “The genus is the ‘single idea’ spread through many separate things and existing in each of them; for the genus is not an assemblage of species, like a whole of parts, but is present in each of the species as existing before them and participated in both by each of the separate species and by the genus itself. The species are the many ideas different from one another but comprehended by one single embracing idea, which is the genus; though it is outside them, as transcending the species, yet it contains the causes of the species; for to all those who posit Ideas, real genera are thought to be both older and more essential that the species ranged under them; the realities existing prior to species are not identical with the characters that exist in the species by participation.”3 Thus one seems fairly justified in concluding that the genus concept (“the superordinate-level concept”) is normally entitled to embrace 1

Pfänder, Alexander. (2013). Logic. Berlin, DE: Walter de Gruyter, p. 166. Guyer, Paul., ed. (2010). The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 87. 3 Proclus. (1987). Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (Glenn R. Morrow & John M. Dillon, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 41. 2

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all that is contained in the species concept (“the subordinate-level concept”), while the species concept neither includes or encompasses what is contained in the genus concept nor substitutes for the genus concept itself. In the conceptual system of “group,” the notion of “group” used in a general sense rightly asserts itself as a genus concept, while such conceptions as those of family, institution, state and international organization rank indisputably among the species concepts. Hence it can be safely asserted that such conceptions as those of family, institution, state and international organization cannot by any means embrace or encompass the content contained in the general concept of “group” respectively, nor can they each substitute for the universal concept of “group” itself. The general concept of “group” cannot be replaced by any other existing concepts that are in a position to place their services at the disposal of those people who attempt to give a clear and lucid explanation of “human groups.” Several examples might be adduced in explication of this argument. Some words in English, such as “colony” and “population,” are used to refer to “a group (or body) of people”—or to put it the other way round, the English words like “colony” and “population” can be used to give clear, concrete and intelligible to what we mean by the concept of “group.” Generally speaking, “we mean by ‘group’ that two or more figures (individuals or people) that are connected with each other directly or indirectly are assembled together to form a complete unit in a composition.”4 Or to put it more pertinently for the present purpose, “a group can be defined as two or more people between whom there is an established pattern of psychological and social interaction, which is recognized as an entity by its members and usually by others because of its particular type of collective behavior.”5 There are many similar definitions for the term “group” in Baidu Encyclopedia, the world’s largest user-generated encyclopedia in Chinese language. For example, “the term ‘group’ as opposed to the word ‘individual’ refers to a unified body of individuals. A group can be seen as formed by a number of individuals ‘having in common certain characteristics such as gender, age, living in the same area, working in the same sector, having a similar professional qualification, belonging to the same ethnic group, or even belonging to the same bracket or fraction (decile, quintile, etc.) in the distribution of income.’6 The term ‘group’ can also be defined as any combination of two or more individuals acting jointly or entering into direct or indirect intercourse with one another.” In Baidu Encyclopedia, in addition, groups can be divided into distinct categories according to different criteria, such as real versus hypothetical groups, actual versus reference groups, formal versus informal groups, and large versus small groups. It is thus obvious that the specific concept of “group” differs essentially from the general concept of “group.” The universal concept of “group” refers to any 4

Li, Jian-Hua., & Fan, Ding-Jiu. (1984). The Concise Dictionary of Sociology. Lanzhou, China: Gansu People’s Publishing House, pp. 459–460. 5 Goetschius, George W. (2013). Working with Community Groups: Using Community Development as a Method of Social Work. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 219. 6 Badie, Bertrand., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., & Morlino, Leonardo., eds. (2011). International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, p. 1179.

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community oriented towards human existence, which can be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions, and which should be seen as autonomous subjects of social practice, whereby practice must of necessity constitute the essence of community life. By contrast, the specific concept of “group” is devoid of any such distinguishing characteristics or essential qualities as are inherent in the general concept of “group.” Thus it can be seen that some particular groups come under the universal category of “group,” while other specific groups cannot by any means fall into the general category of “group.” The informal groups at various levels, for instance, do not belong to the universal category of “group.” Likewise, certain specific groups by which what we mean in a general sense cannot simply fall under the particular or specific category of “group” by which what we mean in the ordinary sense. It is therefore evident that the concept of “group” used in the ordinary sense, or rather in a particular or specific sense, is not by any means tantamount to the general concept of “group,” nor can it substitute for the universal concept of “group” itself. For the sake of illustration, let’s adduce another example and discern the subtle difference between the concept of “collective” and the general concept of “group.” The word “collective” in English denotes “an organized group of people considered as a whole, who ‘live together linked not by family ties but by shared ideology,’7 who ‘are united by joint socially useful activity’—or, to put it another way, ‘a collective is possible only under the condition that it combines people in an activity which is clearly beneficial for society,’8 and who ‘together bring about a certain event through the aggregation of their individual efforts’ or ‘work concertedly in the pursuit of a common goal.’9 ” Baidu Encyclopedia, which deservedly ranks as the world’s largest user-generated encyclopedia in Chinese language, provides many similar definitions of the term “collective.” In Baidu Encyclopedia, for example, the term “collective” is defined to read as follows: “The term ‘collective’ means any organized group of any kind, which has been circumscribed and assigned to one particular sphere of human activity, and whose members have the autonomy of decision-making in their own particular spheres of activity. A collective rests upon a sound socio-economic foundation for establishing collective identity as well as upon an ideological foundation—a shared set of values and ideas, which is to say, a collective also shares a common ideological underpinning. A collective can establish or identify common political goals and unite in pursuit of them. A collective can be expected to act on behalf of common social interests and promote collective values and common social interests—to put it the other way round, its members are committed to common social interests.” In addition, according to Baidu Encyclopedia, “A collective may rightly assert itself as a form of group organization, which tends to reach a higher level of performance, 7

Harriss, John. (1991). The Family: A Social History of the Twentieth Century. Oxford, GB-ENG: Oxford University Press, p. 248. 8 Shelyag, V. V., Glotochkin, A. D., & Platonov, K. K., eds. (1976). Military Psychology: A Soviet View. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 280. 9 Kolb, Robert W., ed. (2008). Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 341–342.

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and which, in most cases, tends to find expression in group values, group attitudes and group orientations, such as collectivist values and morals.” It is thus obvious that the specific concept of “group” used in the ordinary sense differs essentially from the general concept of “group.” As stated above, the universal concept of “group” refers to any community oriented towards human existence, which can be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions, and which should be seen as autonomous subjects of social practice, whereby practice must of necessity constitute the essence of community life. By comparison, the specific concept of “group” used in the ordinary sense is devoid of any such distinguishing characteristics or essential qualities as are unique to the general concept of “group.” Hence we may safely assert that the term “group” used in a general sense is by no means tantamount to the term “collective,” nor can it be replaced by the term “group.” Let us take a concrete example to serve as an illustration. A collection of people assembled temporarily in any manner or for whatever purpose can only fall into the category of “collective” rather than under the category of “group” used in a general sense. Similarly, certain specific “groups” by which what we mean in a general sense cannot simply fall under the category of “collective.” Thus it can be seen that the concept of “collective” is not by any means tantamount to the general concept of “group,” nor can it substitute for the universal concept of “group” itself. In the past only the specific concepts of “group” such as those of family, institution, state and international organization, as well as the concrete knowledge contained therein, were created and developed, while the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant ideas derived from it was almost never consciously articulated let alone explained or embraced. The total absence of the general concept of “group” as well as any body of theoretical knowledge contained therein can be perceived as tantamount to a most serious deficiency inherent in man’s basic concepts and knowledge systems and as such must of necessity bring about the existence of more lacunae in human knowledge. More lacunae in human knowledge will, in turn, deprive man of an accurate knowledge of concrete “groups” as well as a rational knowledge of human existence, and bring about the existence of a broken chain of human knowledge that tends to exercise its restraints upon man’s two distinct kinds of cognition: perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge. The complete absence of the general concept of “group” as well as any body of theoretical knowledge contained therein must of necessity lead people to face some difficulty in acquiring an accurate and scientific knowledge of concrete “groups.” As a general rule, linguistic concepts or categories can be organized or grouped into complex conceptual hierarchies in which a single concept may be a superordinate or a subordinate concept in relation to others. Hence we may safely assert that the genus concept (“the superordinate-level concept”) tends to embody and express the intrinsic qualities and essential characteristics inherent in the species concept (“the subordinate-level concept”), and that the former is normally entitled to embrace all that is contained in the latter, which neither includes or encompasses what is contained in the genus concept nor substitutes for the genus concept itself. Moreover, one seems fairly justified in concluding that only if we have acquired a thorough grasp of the genus concept can we obtain an accurate understanding of the intrinsic

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qualities and essential characteristics inherent in the species concept, which is to say, if one fails to achieve a good grasp of the genus concept, it must of necessity follow that he will find himself in the midst of insurmountable difficulties in having a correct and scientific understanding of the intrinsic qualities and essential characteristics inherent in the species concept. The above situation may even lead people to form some mistaken ideas about the species concept either blindly or randomly so that these misconceived ideas may prevail on their minds over long stretches of time. In other words, the total absence of the genus concept as well as relevant knowledge contained therein must of necessity lead people to face some difficulty in acquiring an accurate and scientific understanding of the species concept and concrete knowledge derived from it. Researchers’ personal idiosyncrasies widespread in contemporary academic circles awake us to the fact that they tend to lay undue emphasis upon the understanding and explanation of the various specific concepts of “group” (the species concepts of “group”) almost to the total neglect of the creation and formulation of the general concept of “group” (the genus concept of “group”), thereby inevitably leading to a significant lacuna in certain specific concepts of “group” as well as in certain concrete theories about specific “groups.” Let us cite an apt example in illustration of this argument. Some scholars argue that the cultural and structural perspectives dominate in explaining the specific concept of “group.” Some scholars incline to the view that we should explain the specific concept of “group” in terms of the stratification of human subjects. Other scholars are more likely to elaborate the specific concept of “group” in developing both the theory of “group choice” and the actor-network theory. “The theory of structure and choice” holds that the general concept of “group” is organically constituted out of the three elements of “subjective group behavior,” “group culture” and “group choice,” each of which cannot by any means exist in isolation from others or work separately from others, nor can each of the three elements substitute for the whole system. Thus one seems fairly justified in asserting that any group by which what we mean in a general sense can only exist and work in a holistic manner. Let us take another example to serve as an illustration. The total absence of the general concept of “group” as well as any body of theoretical knowledge contained therein must of necessity lead man to suffer a deficiency in rational knowledge of human existence and render incomplete the system that comprises the human self as well as the human subject,10 incomplete in itself by definition.11 It is only within the whole system comprising the human self as well as the human subject that we can theorize the conception of the human subject as a personality, a group that is understandable in a general sense, and a historical species-being, which is to say, the whole system that comprises the human self as well as the human subject can be classified into three separate categories of the human subject in its triple capacity of personality, group and species-being. However, it is neglect of the creation 10

Allan, George., & Allshouse, Merle F., eds. (2005). Nature, Truth, and Value: Exploring the Thinking of Frederick Ferré. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 75. 11 Corse, Sandra. (2000). Operatic Subjects: The Evolution of Self in Modern Opera. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, p. 53.

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and formulation of the general concept of “group” that necessarily brings about the existence of missing links in the series of concepts and categories connected with the system that comprises the human self as well as the human subject, from which, for example, would be found missing the concept of the human subject in the capacity of a “group” that is understandable in a general sense, thus inevitably constituting a serious and regrettable lacuna in the foregoing series of concepts and categories. Woefully neglecting the creation and formulation of the concept of the human subject in the capacity of a “group” by which what we mean in a general sense, in turn, must of necessity lead man to suffer a deficiency in rational knowledge of human existence or to have a one-sided account of the rational logic that governs human existence. As a result, it must of necessity follow that a rational knowledge of human existence is not predicated upon the idea of the whole system that comprises the human self as well as the human subject and that can be classified into three separate categories of the human subject in its triple capacity of personality, group and species-being, which is to say, the foregoing notion of the whole system fails to furnish a theoretical footing for the rational knowledge of human existence. Rather, a rational knowledge of human existence tends to be presupposed by the mere conception of only one category of human subject in the capacity of personality, group or species-being, which in turn serves as a footing for the rational knowledge of human existence. If we attempt to establish a rational system of existence by having as the theoretical basis or footing the mere conception of the human subject in the capacity of personality, or rather, by rejecting the notion of the human subject in its dual capacity of group and species-being, it is impossible for us, indeed any human being, to avoid one-sidedness in formulating the rational system of existence. This is what we mean by mainstream theories or ideologies in modern western societies to the effect that modern western societies tend to establish a rational system of existence by having as the theoretical basis or footing the mere conception of the isolated human subject in the capacity of personality, or rather, by rejecting the notion of the human subject in its dual capacity of group and species-being. The Western rational system of existence that was in the ascendant a few hundred years is now facing a serious crisis whereby western societies as well as the rest of the world may be placed in a very difficult position.

2 The Concept of “Group” and the Categorization of “Groups” 2.1 The Concept of “Group” By the concept of “group” we mean that any community when confronted with the struggle for life must of necessity respond to external environmental pressures in diverse ways, that any community condemned to be in the bitter struggle for survival can be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their

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respective integrative functions, and that any community which is engaged in the ceaseless struggle for existence should be seen as autonomous subjects of social practice, whereby practice must of necessity constitute the essence of community life. To put it in a nutshell, any “group” that is understandable in either a general or specific sense may rightly assert itself as a universal mode of existence in which man as subject exists. Man in a particular environment is engaged in the ceaseless struggle with his environment and, as such, is ultimately the product of interactions with his environment. On the one hand the environment provides suitable conditions for human life, but on the other, it exerts pressure upon human beings, thereby posing a serious challenge to the survival of humanity. As it is commonly believed, man must of necessity respond to the environmental pressures and challenges for the sake of survival. Forming a group or groups, to wit gathering into a group or groups, as a basic means of survival for mankind, enables human beings to meet environmental pressures and challenges. In a famous passage of his Zoology Aristotle distinguishes gregarious animals from the dispersed and solitary. The anthropoid apes or primates were from the beginning social or gregarious animals. “As a consequence of selection to cope with ecological pressures, most primates live in social groups (Wrangham 1980),”12 which is to say, “the living primates have evolved as gregarious animals, and much of their behavior is specifically adapted to life in groups.”13 Various kinds of “groups” endowed with their respective structures and functions took center stage one after the other in the course of the long history of human social development and we can trace such “groups” back through successive stages of development. We can trace the specific forms of the human family across the great transformations of human history.14 “In evolutionary anthropology, following the classification devised by E. R. Service (1971), societies may be categorized according to complexity as bands or nomads, tribes, chiefdoms and states.”15 With the progress of civilization, socio-political organizations, especially international organizations, began to hold dominating sway among various kinds of “groups,” which, for want of a better term, we may as well call “human communities that have to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.”16 As it is commonly believed, human beings surely will, in years to come, create many more “groups” with more complex structures and more comprehensive functions. It is generally believed that human beings are especially expert in forming “groups” and that any other animals cannot be placed on a par with humans in this respect. Chinese Confucian philosopher Hsün-tzu gave an exposition of his views on man’s 12

Russon, Anne E., & Begun, David R., eds. (2004). The Evolution of Thought: Evolutionary Origins of Great Ape Intelligence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 339. 13 Mason, William A. Sociability and Social Organization in Monkeys and Apes. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, L.Berkowitz, 319. New York, NY: Academic Press, 1964. 14 Harrell, Stevan. (2018). Human Families. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 551–552. 15 Curchin, Leonard A. (2004). The Romanization of Central Spain: Complexity, Diversity, and Change in a Provincial Hinterland. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 30–32. cf. Hall, John A, ed. (1994). The State: Critical Concepts in Sociology. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 461–467. 16 Reich, Jennifer A., ed. (2021). The State of Families: Law, Policy, and the Meanings of Relationships. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 23.

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natural gift for forming groups. Xunzi (c.300–c. 230 BCE), also spelled Hsün-tzu or Hsün-tze, original name Xun Kuang, honorary name Xun Qing,17 lived during the Warring States period of ancient China, one of the most fertile and influential in Chinese history, which not only saw the rise of many of the great philosophers, but also witnessed the establishment of many of the governmental structures and cultural patterns that were to characterize China for the next 2000 years.18 He contributed to the Hundred Schools of thought, i.e. philosophies and schools that flourished from the sixth to the third century BCE, an era of great cultural and intellectual expansion in ancient China, which is also known as the Golden Age of Chinese philosophy because during this period a great variety of philosophies and schools vied with one another to expound their views and proposals for attaining a happy social and political order and freely developed, discussed and refined a broad range of thoughts and ideas that have profoundly influenced lifestyles and social consciousness up to the present day in East Asian countries and the East Asian diaspora around the world. “Hsün-tzu was one of the three great Confucian philosophers of the classical period in China. He elaborated and systematized the work undertaken by Confucius and Mencius, giving a cohesiveness, comprehensiveness, and direction to Confucian thought that was all the more compelling for the rigor with which he set it forth; and the strength he thereby gave to that philosophy has been largely responsible for its continuance for over 2000 years.”19 Hsün-tzu maintains that “men cannot live without some kind of a social organization. The reason for this is that, in order to enjoy better living, men have need of co-operation and mutual support. Hsün-tzu says: ‘A single individual needs the support of the accomplishments of hundreds of workmen. Yet an able man cannot be skilled in more than one line, and one man cannot hold two offices simultaneously. If people all live alone and do not serve one another, there will be poverty.’ Likewise, men need to be united in order to conquer other creatures: ‘Man’s strength is not equal to that of the ox; his running is not equal to that of the horse; and yet ox and horses are used by him. How is this? I say that it is because men are able to form social organizations, whereas the others are unable…. When united, men have greater strength; having greater strength, they become powerful; being powerful, they can overcome other creatures.’ For these two reasons, men must have a social organization.”20 If they fail to form groups of any kind, men cannot possibly by any means successfully respond to environmental pressures and challenges, nor can they maintain their existence, development or well-being, to say nothing of harmonious coexistence with nature. When external environmental 17

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Xunzi.” Encyclopedia Britannica, June 9, 2017. https:// www.britannica.com/biography/Xunzi. 18 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Warring States.” Encyclopedia Britannica, September 25, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/event/Warring-States. 19 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Xunzi.” Encyclopedia Britannica, June 9, 2017. https:// www.britannica.com/biography/Xunzi. 20 Feng, You-Lan (also spelled Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy: English-Chinese Bilingual Version (ZhaoFu-San, Trans.). Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 234. cf. Needham, Joseph. (1956). Science and Civilization in China (Vol. 2): History of Scientific Thought. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 23.

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pressures mount, men who are condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence tend to take the initiative in forming or establishing various kinds of communities that can be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions. These communities condemned to be in the struggle for life can be collectively referred to as “groups.” The struggle for existence acts like a sieve separating the more fit from the less fit, or rather, sifting those whom it wants to survive from those who are doomed to perish.21 Charles Darwin advocated the theory of the survival of the fittest and, in setting out his theory of evolution by natural selection as an explanation for adaptation and speciation, he called “this principle, by which each slight variation [a trait], if useful, is preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man’s power of selection,”22 arguing that “if variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterized will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterized,”23 and that “man by selection can certainly produce great results, and can adapt organic beings to his own uses, through the accumulation of slight but useful variations, given to him by the hand of Nature. But Natural Selection, as we shall hereafter see, is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art.”24 The concept of natural selection may enlighten us about the truth that individuals best adapted to their environments are more likely to survive and reproduce and that as long as there is some variation between them and that variation is heritable, there will be an inevitable selection of individuals with the most advantageous variations. According to Prof. Paulsen, natural selection occurs as follows: “Life is for the living being a constant strife for vital conditions. The number of creatures that live and desire to preserve themselves is always greater than the number of seats at the table of nature—a consequence of her lavish production of living germs. The fertility of species differs very much; but there is no species a single pair of which would not, under favorable circumstances, be able to fill the earth with their offspring in the course of a few centuries. That this does not happen is due to the parsimony of life-conditions. In the battle ensuing for the possession of these, the great majority prematurely perish. It is, however, a further fact that the individuals of a species do not enter the struggle with exactly equal powers; many minute deviations occur. The result is that the individuals whose variations are advantageous have the greatest prospect of surviving the struggle; superiority means preservation of life. The qualities which constitute superiority may be very different in kind: excessive strength, swiftness, sagacity, and intelligence, or advantages in the 21

Vyas, R. N. Peace is Certainly Possible. In A New Vision of History, R. N. Vyas. New Delhi, IN: Diamond Pocket Books (P) Ltd., 2020. 22 Darwin, Charles. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (First Edition). London: John Murray, p. 61. 23 Ibid., p. 127. 24 Ibid., p. 61.

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possession of weapons of defense or attack; the power to avoid detection, or a greater ability to resist injuries of all kinds. Each of these advantages may make its possessor superior in a struggle, successful in flight, able to endure frost and famine, while other less-favored animals will perish. Accordingly, also, the same individuals will have the best prospects of leaving numerous offspring; and by transmitting to them their endowments, it happens that advantages which were at first individual gradually become properties of the species. The individuals best adapted to the conditions of life determine the type of the species. A one-sided excess in the evolution of certain qualities, for example in that of size or defensive organs or swiftness, could not be the result, because such qualities would disturb the general equilibrium and thus diminish the capability of life. An animal economy must, like an economic or political system, distribute its tasks among the different functions according to the measure of their importance: among the functions of defense, locomotion, nervous activity, etc.”25 “In such a way, then, development or progressive evolution, in the sense of immanent teleology, can take place without the need of an intelligence, interfering from without, as a principle of explanation. And with the enhancement of the species, a differentiation of types also occurs. The maximum of life possible at any given moment is increased by a division into different types having different needs and different organizations. More individuals of different species can exist together than individuals of one species because they fit into the vacant places and fill out all possible space.”26 “Alongside of and together with the principle of natural selection which Darwin places in the foreground, he furthermore recognizes other principles as co-operative; thus the principle which Lamarck regarded as the essential cause of variation: changes in the conditions of the earth’s surface. By producing alterations in vital conditions, they necessitate modifications in function, and changes in the use of organs finally lead to alterations in structure. Migrations, which are occasioned by the struggle for existence, since it forces animals to wander, produce the same effect. And as a second co-operative principle Darwin mentions the principle of correlative changes.”27 “The presupposition of all development, without which the above-mentioned principles would have no support for their activity, is, of course, the will to live, the will to struggle for existence, common to all beings taking part in the evolution. They do not suffer the development passively, they are not, like the pebbles in the brook, pushed into a new form by mechanical causes acting from without. Their own inner activity is the absolute condition of the efficacy of natural selection. The struggle for existence is not imposed upon individuals from without; it is their own will to fight the battle; and without this will, the will to preserve and exercise individual life and produce and preserve offspring, there could be no such struggle for existence at all. And moreover, the will to live is the absolute original precondition; it cannot in turn be derived from natural selection.”28 If we just care 25

Paulsen, Friedrich. (1895). Introduction to Philosophy (Frank Thilly, Trans.). New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, pp. 183–184. 26 Ibid., p. 184. 27 Ibid., p. 185. 28 Ibid., pp. 185–186.

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to go into the details of human psychology, we find that cooperation and cordiality is quite natural for the human animal. Even in the low species of the beings like ants and bees we find simple testimony about the fact of the mutual aid pervading the human psychology.29 In emphasizing the role of the gregarious instinct, Dr. Trotter is of the opinion that the gregarious instinct is the basis of all social life. “When we come to consider man we find ourselves faced at once by some of the most interesting problems in the biology of the social habit.” States Trotter, “It is probably not necessary now to labor the proof of the fact that man is a gregarious animal in literal fact, that he is as essentially gregarious as the bee and the ant, the sheep, the ox, and the horse. The tissue of characteristically gregarious reactions which his conduct presents furnishes incontestable proof of this thesis, which is thus an indispensable clue to an inquiry into the intricate problems of human society.”30 “Vestiges of these instinctive activities may often be seen in man’s behavior,” state Edwin Boring, Herbert Langfeld and World, “but learning, habit, intelligence and culture have so overridden them that is seldom proper to speak of instinctive behavior in man” (Foundations of Psychology. 46).31 “The foregoing theories concerning instincts do establish this fact that it is the basic nature of man to remain in some social system. We cannot imagine at present that in some distant past the man was a solitary figure. His constitution is so that he cannot remain all alone. When he is born, he needs the support of his parent, when he is grown up he needs the hand of a woman, when he is married (legally or otherwise) he needs progeny. And to support this large paraphernalia he needs the society in its multifarious form.”32 In view of the fact that no satisfactory explanation for the concept of “group” has yet been offered, we feel the necessity of giving it a more comprehensive explanation. (1) Human beings can take the initiative in forming or establishing various kinds of communities that may aid materially in making men engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. There can be little doubt that whenever a single individual is facing intense challenges and pressures to adapt to the changing environment and new social needs, he or she will be really in no position to address them, thus feeling how weak, powerless and vulnerable he or she may be. Man is the weakest animal. He has neither the huge build of an elephant nor the sharp teeth and claws of a crocodile. Despite these deficiencies, the bountiful nature has endowed him with one crowning virtue viz. intelligence coupled with an instinct for association, or rather, forming groups. In truth, it does not take much stretch of imagination to realize that sole dependence upon human intelligence as well as upon his instinct for association, or rather, his gift for forming groups, has been rendered absolutely necessary by man’s immediate survival and long-term existence. Human intelligence as 29

Vyas, R. N. Peace is Certainly Possible. In A New Vision of History, R. N. Vyas. New Delhi, IN: Diamond Pocket Books (P) Ltd., 2020. 30 Trotter, W. (2019). Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. Glasgow, GB-SCT: Good Press, p. 112. 31 Vyas, R. N. Peace is Certainly Possible. In A New Vision of History, R. N. Vyas. New Delhi, IN: Diamond Pocket Books (P) Ltd., 2020. 32 Ibid.

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well as his gift for forming groups, namely his instinct for association, enables man to stand on a par with nature in power. The fundamental difference between man’s gift for forming groups and the animal’s gregarious instinct lies in the fact that, like the human animal, many other animals tend to live in social groups, or rather, to live in their natural social structure, whereas man’s gregarious behavior tends to be influenced, to a larger or lesser degree, by his consciousness— or to put it the other way round, man can take the initiative in forming or establishing various kinds of groups. In the earliest societies primitive people formulated various taboos and prohibitions, a considerable number of which were rules and sanctions that were significant for the social order, that, as such, belonged to the general system of social control,33 and that proved effective in forming or establishing groups as well as in drawing clear lines of demarcation between them. For example, the customs and practices of primitive people were very much shaped by reservations about the most universal of all taboos, the incest taboo, which prohibits sexual relations between close relatives.34 Human beings are condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for existence at different levels of economic, political, and social development which tend to find expression in manifold spheres of human activity. With the progress of civilization, man will be in a better position to exercise more and more initiative in forming or establishing various kinds of groups. At this point in time we feel it necessary to point out that almost any kind of group can rightly assert itself as an open community that will open up infinite possibilities of the prospect of future development on the one hand and that will be engaged in a constant struggle for existence on the other. Human beings will never cease their conscious and consistent efforts in order to form or establish various kinds of groups, which is to say, such constant efforts on the part of social members will be continued not only for periods in the immediate future but for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. Moreover, various kinds of groups will assuredly undergo ceaseless change and development in the far-off future. (2) Any community that is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for existence must of necessity meet its members’ basic or essential needs for the sake of their immediate survival and long-term existence. To become human ad remain human necessitates man’s multifarious needs, such as the material needs, the spiritual needs, the need for social interaction, etc. At the same time, we must also awake to the fact that while there are innumerable deficiencies inherent in the structure of the human animal, “there is no limit to the needs he can create, or to the means of satisfying them.”35 Man can take the initiative in forming or establishing various kinds of groups in order to satisfy his multifarious changing 33

Merriam-Webster staff. (1999). Merriam-Webster’s Encyclopedia of World Religions. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., p. 1051. 34 Fellmann, Ferdinand. (2016). The Couple: Intimate Relations in a New Key (Walsh, Rebecca, Trans.). Münster, DE: LIT Verlag, p. 134. cf. Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Taboo.” Encyclopdedia Britannica, February 28, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/taboo-sociology. 35 Horosz, William. (1987). Search without Idols. Dordrecht, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 200.

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needs of life. Only if man makes conscious and consistent efforts to establish and perfect various kinds of groups can he meet his various needs of life arising from the innumerable deficiencies inherent in the structure of the human animal. As Marx argued, “The human being is in the most literal sense a political animal, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.”36 Holbach believed that “of all beings the most necessary to man is man.”37 In other words, the separate individual cannot by any means satisfy man’s various needs of life. Rather, only different types or forms of “groups” that members of a community organize or establish by working in close association and cooperation with each other can meet man’s multifarious needs of life. To put it in a nutshell, any type or form of “group” can rightly assert itself as a community that is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence and that man tends to build through conscious and consistent efforts in order to meet his multifarious needs of life. (3) Man’s species-character, i.e., man’s conscious life activity, is inherent in any community that is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. One seems fairly justified in postulating that the concept of “group” may rightly assert itself as the unity of the two meanings that inhere in itself, namely man’s species-character and the community-character of human existence. Groups of any kind possess a fundamental characteristic in common, to wit man’s species-character, which, in turn, determines the essential nature of a community. It is of such a nature so to render it possible that human “groups” differ essentially animal “populations.” Any type or kind of “group” can be considered tantamount to a community of “species-beings” and possesses all the characteristics with which “speciesbeings” are endowed. For example, by its practicality (or practicalness) we mean that any group may conceive of itself as a particular practical subject38 capable of “engaging in various cognitive and perhaps practical activities”39 as well as in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.40 Its subjectivity suggests that the human subject in the capacity of a “group” that is understandable in either a general or specific sense rightly ranks among the three separate categories of the human subject in its triple capacity of personality, 36

Marx, Karl. (1979). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 46(Part I): Marx: Grundrisse: Introduction (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 21. 37 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: Marx & Engels: The Holy Family (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 169–170. 38 Engstrom, Stephen. (2009). The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 238. 39 Elder, Crawford L. (2011). Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 5. 40 Reich, Jennifer A., ed. (2021). The State of Families: Law, Policy, and the Meanings of Relationships. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 23.

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group and species-being. The duality of human life inherent in a “group” understandable in a general or specific sense indicates that whether it be the human subject in the capacity of personality or the human subject in the capacity of group, either of them possesses both the natural life and the supernatural life and asserts itself as the unity between the natural life and the supernatural life. As with any particular personality, groups of any kind are fully entitled to claim man’s “structure and choice” to be the common noumenon which, in turn, must of necessity possess all the defining characteristics with which the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice” is endowed. Hence one seems fairly justified in concluding that any type or kind of “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense invariably possesses the unique species character of man and, as such, is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. (4) By the concept of “group” we mean that any community when confronted with the struggle for life must of necessity respond to external environmental pressures in diverse ways and that any community condemned to be in the ceaseless struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence can be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions. Any type or kind of “group” contains its internal organizations and structures that may be officially termed “group structures.” There are particular necessary connections or relationships among the constituent elements inherent in the structure of a particular group as well as between the whole structure of a particular group and the constituent elements contained therein. More specifically, it is special mechanisms in good working order rather than disorderly or unsystematic relationships that exist among the constituent elements inherent in the structure of a particular group as well as between the whole structure of a particular group and the constituent elements contained therein. It is worth noting that the structure of a particular group is entitled to assert itself as a selfintegrated organization which not only makes the constituent elements contained therein “exhibit a particular internal order,”41 but also enables them to secure close cooperation and coordination from each other, whereby the very group will be in a better position to take concerted and unified action to meet external environmental pressures and challenges. Hence we may safely assert that any type or kind of group can rightly assert itself as a self-integrated community that is condemned to be in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence and that can be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions. Self-integration is one of the distinctive features that distinguish the foregoing conception of “groups” from our usual understandings of other human groups. We should not identify any notion of human groups with the foregoing conception of “group” in that any

41

Westle, Bettina., & Segatti, Paolo., eds. (2016). European Identity in the Context of National Identity: Questions of Identity in Sixteen European Countries in the Wake of the Financial Crisis. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 88.

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human group that cannot be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions—or to put it the other way round, any human group whose structures or organizations contained therein cannot engage in self-integration, cannot be called a “group” in the proper sense of the term. The defining characteristic with which the foregoing concept of “group” is endowed may lead us to the conclusion that families, institutions, states and certain international organizations can be termed “groups” in the foregoing sense of the term. Some groups, such as a group of people temporarily assembled for a specific purpose, a group of employees engaged in some line of trade and loosely organized in society, etc., cannot be called “groups” in the foregoing sense of the word in that their structures or organizations contained therein cannot engage in self-integration. (5) Any type or kind of “group” that is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence must necessarily be endowed with one of the distinguishing characteristics of the human subject, to wit man’s “structure and choice.” The concept of “group” that serves as a linguistic expression of the notion of “the human subject in the capacity of group” must bear within itself the fundamental characteristic of the human subject, that is man’s “structure and choice.” Any type or kind of “group” that may be conceived as composed of autonomous subjects of social practice can rightly assert itself as an organic living whole that tends to take man’s “structure and choice,” i.e. the noumenon of human life, as the most fundamental characteristic of the human subject. Such “groups” when confronted with external environmental pressures and challenges can engage in independent decision making and choose responding behaviors to address the external environmental pressures and challenges. This kind of responding behavior may be directed outwardly in direct response to external environmental challenges, or it may be directed inwardly to readjust the structure of “group.” However, whether they be outwardly-directed behaviors or inwardly-directed behaviors, they are invariably predicated upon independent choice-making and decision-making by the group itself, which is to say, they tend to result from the workings of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” For the “group” understandable in the foregoing sense, all the instructions or hints from other human groups can only be regarded as certain external environmental pressures and stimuli. It is only the “group” itself that can determine exactly what decisions it will make as well as what behaviors it will choose. In the light of the foregoing understanding of the notion of “group,” any type of community that is endowed with the most fundamental characteristic of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can be perceived as a “group,” while on the contrary any kind of community that is devoid of the most fundamental characteristic of human life—man’s “structure and choice” cannot be defined as a “group.” (6) The concept of “group” understandable in the foregoing sense represents a holistic expression of the notion of the human subject in the capacity of “group” and can adequately provide a holistic explanation of it as one of the three forms

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of the human subject in its triple capacity of personality, group, and speciesbeing. The concept of “group” that serves as a linguistic expression of the notion of the human subject in the capacity of “group” is sufficient to enlighten us on the aforementioned human subject. More specifically, the category of “subject” serves to describe and explain the structure, function, characteristics and workings of the human subject in the capacity of “group.” On the whole, the concept of “group” covers or includes all kinds of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group.” The concept of “group” used in either a general or specific sense is a genus concept, while the concept of a concrete human subject in the capacity of “group” is a species concept. Generally speaking, between the concept of “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense and the concept of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group” exists the relationship between the general and the individual, between the universal and the particular, and between the abstract and the concrete. Each concrete human subject in the capacity of “group” must of necessity contain the structure, function, characteristics and workings of a “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense, which, in turn, must necessarily find expression in their respective counterparts of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group.” We must make a deep study of the structure, function, characteristics and workings of a “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense and place them in the clearest light. Only in this way can our conscious and unremitting efforts provide theoretical basis and guidance for a still more profound, more adequate and more complete elucidation of the structure, function, characteristics and workings of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group” as well as for a deeper insight into them. It can thus be seen that a profound elucidation of the structure, function, characteristics and workings of a “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense is the necessary prerequisite to the systematic study and profound exposition of the corresponding counterparts of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group.” What’s been discussed above may be briefly summed up as follows. Only if we make serious and patient efforts to make an in-depth study of the “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense can our conscious and consistent efforts provide correct guidance and prerequisites for a more profound understanding and explanation of all kinds of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group.”

2.2 The Categories of “Group” After various considerations such as consanguinity, locality, occupation, belief and power have been taken into account, multifarious “groups” can be roughly grouped into the following four major categories: (1) The Family

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The family is the oldest and most enduring social unit (institution or group) of human society42 and historically most common form of social organization.43 It may be safely asserted that the family, which rightly asserts itself as one of the oldest and the most common forms of communities in the world, is a group of people who are closely related to one another by consanguinity (by blood ties or through birth), by affinity (through marriage), or through adoption, and who tend to engage in economic cooperation based upon a division of labor by sex to secure a better livelihood.44 “Marriage exists only when the economic and the sexual are united into one relationship, and this combination occurs only in marriage. Marriage, thus defined, is found in every known society.”45 The term “family” is used either in the broad or narrow sense. The “family” in the narrower sense of the word can refer to “the classic nuclear family, defined in terms of a couple (male and female) and their biological offspring.” “But the family in its narrower or more specific sense is itself regulated in various ways by state laws that define the family as a legal structure. In this sense, the family is founded on a state-recognized form of licensed sexual union between people. In a monogamous union, this bond is notionally exclusive. Transgressing this exclusivity may lead to civil or criminal sanctions and may also be grounds for divorce.”46 In his influential work Social Structure (1949), George Peter Murdock defined the family as “a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults.”47 “The two-generation family composed of mother, mother’s husband, and their offspring was defined by Murdock as the nuclear family. This form is mostly found in hunting-and-gathering and industrial societies. On the one hand, in times of hardship and catastrophes, little help is shown from outside, which means that in the case of the mother’s or the father’s death, the children’s lives become insecure. On the other hand, this form of family is well-adapted to a high-mobility life, be it the society of the Inuits or contemporary industrialized societies. This form of family is also common where there is a sexual division of labor. Murdock took this form of family as a universal human social grouping.”48 “The nuclear family is a universal human social grouping. Either as the sole prevailing form of the family or as the basic unit from which more complex familiar forms are compounded, it 42

Sokalski, Henryk J. (2001). xii Foreword. In Family-Centered Policies and Practices: International Implications, Katharine Briar-Lawson, Hal A. Lawson, & Charles B. Hennon. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 43 Perry, John A., & Perry, Erna K. (2016). Contemporary Society: An Introduction to Social Science. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 296. 44 Sumner, William Graham., & Keller, Albert Galloway. (1927). The Science of Society, Volume III. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 1505–1518. 45 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, p. 8. 46 Strathern, Andrew., & Stewart, Pamela J. (2016). Kinship in Action: Self and Group. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 9. 47 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, p. 1. 48 Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume I. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., p. 945.

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exists as a distinct and strongly functional group in every known society. No exception, at least, has come to light in the 250 representative cultures surveyed for the present study, which thus corroborates the conclusion of Lowie: ‘It does not matter whether marital relations are permanent or temporary; whether there is polygyny or polyandry or sexual license; whether conditions are complicated by the addition of members not included in our family circle: the one fact stands out beyond all others that everywhere the husband, wife, and immature children constitute a unit apart from the remainder of the community.’”49 “The reasons for its universality do not become fully apparent when the nuclear family is viewed merely as a social group. Only when it is analyzed into its constituent relationships, and these are examined individually as well as collectively, does one gain an adequate conception of the family’s many-sided utility and thus of its inevitability. A social group arises when a series of interpersonal relationships, which may be defined as sets of reciprocally adjusted habitual responses, binds a number of participant individuals collectively to one another. In the nuclear family, for example, the clustered relationships are eight in number: husband-wife, father-son, father-daughter, mother-son, mother-daughter, brother-brother, sister-sister, and brother-sister. The members of each interacting pair are linked to one another both directly through reciprocally reinforcing behavior and indirectly through the relationships of each to every other member of the family. Any factor which strengthens the tie between one member and a second, also operates indirectly to bind the former to a third member with whom the second maintains a close relationship. An explanation of the social utility of the nuclear family, and thus of its universality, must consequently be sought not alone in its functions as a collectivity but also in the services and satisfactions of the relationships between its constituent members.”50 Only when group marriage (a marital union embracing at once several men and several women) came into existence as an institution of marriage can we safely assert that the family in the broadest sense of the word reaches beyond the nuclear family to a whole array of family forms. For example, Lewis H. Morgan, an American ethnologist of eminence, who is generally acknowledged as a representative of the American school of classical evolution, who is known especially for establishing the study of kinship systems,51 and whose later research in social evolution and kinship organization resulted in a number of monographs and the book Ancient History (1877), long considered a hallmark in social anthropology, as well as in Marxist social theory, undertook to demonstrate that “Five different and successive forms of the family may now be distinguished, each having an institution of marriage peculiar to itself. They are the following: I. The Consanguine Family. It was founded upon the intermarriage of brothers and sisters, own and collateral, in a group. II. The Punaluan Family. It was founded upon the intermarriage of several sisters, own and collateral, with each other’s husbands, in a group; the joint husbands 49 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, pp. 2–3. 50 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 51 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Lewis Henry Morgan.” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 13, 2020. https://.Britannica.com/biography/Lewis-Henry-Morganwww.

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not being necessarily kinsmen of each other. Also, on the intermarriage of several brothers, own and collateral, with each others’ wives, in a group; these wives not being necessarily of kin to each other, although often the case in both instances. In each case the group of men were conjointly married to the group of women. III. The Syndyasmian or Pairing Family. It was founded upon marriage between single pairs, but without an exclusive cohabitation. The marriage continued during the pleasure of the parties. IV. The Patriarchal Family. It was founded upon the marriage of one man with several wives; followed, in general, by the seclusion of the wives. V. The Monogamian Family. It was founded upon marriage between single pairs, with an exclusive cohabitation.”52 These forms, Mr. Morgan claimed, “sprang successively one from the other, and collectively represent the growth of the idea of the family.”53 Generally speaking, marriage forms the basis for the founding of a family—or, to put it another way, marriage rightly asserts itself as the foundation of every family.54 Whenever a man and a woman enter into wedlock, it naturally follows that the newly wedded couple will found a family. Thus it can be seen that the traditional family as a social unit tends to be founded on heterosexual marriage.55 The husband-wife relationship established by marriage may rightly assert itself as the primary one, or rather, the most basic and fundamental one, in the mesh of family relationship, next to which rank the various relationships between parents and children as well as those between other constituent members of the family, which thus tend to evolve into a more complex and institutionalized system of kinship relationships. “Incest taboos, however, create an overlapping of families and arrange their members into different degrees of nearness or remoteness of relationship. A person has his primary relatives—his parents and siblings in his family of orientation and his spouse and children in his family of procreation. Each of these persons has his own primary relatives, who, if they are not similarly related to Ego, rank as the latter’s secondary relatives, e.g., his father’s father, his mother’s sister, his wife’s mother, his brother’s son, and his daughter’s husband. The primary relatives of secondary kinsmen are Ego’s tertiary relatives, such as his father’s sister’s husband, his wife’s sister’s daughter, and any of his first cousins. This stepwise gradation of kinsmen extends indefinitely, creating innumerable distinct categories of genealogical connection.”56 “Some of the intimacy characteristic of relationships within the nuclear family tends to flow outward along the ramifying channels of kinship ties. …Owing to the ramification of kinship ties which results from incest taboos, a person may have 33 different types of secondary relatives and 151 different types of tertiary relatives, and a single type, such as father’s brother, may include a number of individuals. All societies are faced 52

Morgan, Lewis Henry. (1985). Ancient Society. Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, pp. 383–384. 53 Ibid., p. 385. 54 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, p. 8. 55 Katrougalos, George., & Lazaridis, Gabriella. (2003). Southern European Welfare States: Problems, Challenges and Prospects. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 70. 56 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, p. 14.

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with the problem of establishing priorities, as it were, i.e., of defining for individuals the particular group of kinsmen to whom they are privileged to turn first for material aid, support, or ceremonial support. All cultures meet this problem by adopting a rule of descent. A rule of descent affiliates an individual at birth with a particular group of relatives with whom he is especially intimate and from whom he can expect certain kinds of services that he cannot demand of non-relatives, or even of other kinsmen. The fundamental rules of descent are only three in number: patrilineal descent, which affiliates a person with a group of kinsmen who are related to him through males only; matrilineal descent, which assigns him to a group consisting exclusively of relatives through females; and bilateral descent, which associates him with a group of very close relatives irrespective of their particular genealogical connection to him. A fourth rule, called double descent, combines patrilineal and matrilineal descent by assigning the individual to a group of each type.”57 “Descent, in fine, does not necessarily involve any belief that certain genealogical ties are closer than others, much less a recognition of kinship with one parent to the exclusion of the other, although such notions have been reported in exceptional cases. It merely refers to a cultural rule which affiliates an individual with a particular selected group of kinsmen for certain social purposes such as mutual assistance or the regulation of marriage.”58 The family as an independent social unit tends to perform certain important functions that are essential to human social life—the reproductive, the economic, the educational, the cultural, and the political. “In the nuclear family or its constituent relationships we thus see assembled four functions fundamental to human social life—the sexual, the economic, the reproductive, and the educational. Without provision for the first and third, society would become extinct; for the second, life itself would cease; for the fourth, culture would come to an end. The immense social utility of the nuclear family and the basic reason for its universality thus began to emerge in strong relief.”59 In its capacity as a relatively independent social unit, the family is normally entitled to make decisions for family members in almost all spheres of life. Generally speaking, the primary responsibility for bearing and rearing children ever remains with the family. The family must see to it that old parents are properly provided for, provide its members with the basic necessities of life—food, clothing, shelter and transport, render appropriate assistance to its members on important occasions such as marriages, funerals, and medical treatment, and, in particular, give meticulous care to those confined to bed by sickness. It is therefore evident that the family plays a crucial role in almost all areas of life. For any living person, concluding a marriage, bearing and rearing children, earning a livelihood, and departing this life may be conceived as the most basic activities of life. Moreover, an individual’s basic emotions, the values formed early in life, and the basic behavior patterns are most likely shaped first and foremost by the family. To sum up, no matter how advanced a modern industrialized state or society has become today, no such state or society can rightly assert itself as a substitute for the 57

Ibid., pp. 14–15. Ibid., p. 16. 59 Ibid., p. 10. 58

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family in its status or function as a social service, and the constituent members of a family will not give up their respective roles in the family. (2) The Organization By the organization we mean a formal social organization that rightly asserts itself as one of the basic categories of “group.” Those informal organizations devoid of any particular structures cannot by any means fall under the basic category of “group.” By the so-called “formal organization” we mean a community that is engaged in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence and in which its constituent members tend to work in association with each other by coordinating mutual behaviors and activities in order to achieve a common goal. “Any activity involving the conscious cooperation of two or more persons can be called organized activity. However, in modern society cooperative activity is carried on within a much more formal structure than the one just described. Participants have tasks assigned to them; the relationships between participants are ordered in such ways as to achieve the final product with a minimum expenditure of human effort and material resources. Thus, by formal organization we mean a planned system of cooperative effort in which each participant has a recognized role to play and duties or tasks to perform. These duties are assigned in order to achieve the organization purpose rather than to satisfy individual preferences, although the two often coincide.”60 “It should not be thought, however, that all the influences operating upon the employees of an organization further cooperation. There may be, for example, conflicting interpretations of the organization goals, or various units of the organization may have inconsistent goals. Incompatibility among members of the organization may lead to friction and may increase, rather than reduce, resistance to organizational influence. Certain methods of supervision may curb rather than stimulate initiative. Nevertheless, the first set of influences—those encouraging cooperation, viz. value premises, acceptance of influence, expectations and organizational morale—predominate most of the time in most organizations. If they did not, organized behavior would not be an effective way of carrying out tasks, members would receive no inducement toward continued participation, and the organization itself would disappear. Hence only those organizations survive for any length of time whose net influence upon their members is to preserve and develop habits of cooperation. …The ability of organizations to develop in their members habits of cooperation is greatly increased by the attitudes and habits that these members bring to organizations. …the patterns of cooperation will generally reflect to a very considerable degree the patterns of cooperation that are incorporated in the mores and training procedures of the larger society.”61 For any organization endowed with particular structures as well as with vital powers, its constituent members tend to engage in a complex series of holistically structured activities based on norms. To put it in a nutshell, the organization tends to refer to a community that is formally organized by following formal procedures and legally 60

Simon, Herbert A., Thompson, Victor A., & Smithburg, Donald W. (2017). Public Administration. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 10. 61 Ibid.

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recognized as an independent entity and that is engaged in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. Judith R. Blau spells out this argument in more neutral terms: any organization is endowed with legitimacy.62 “By formal organization is meant the pattern of behaviors and relationships that is deliberately and legitimately planned for the members of an organization. …Now of course anyone in an organization (or outside it, for that matter) may make such a plan. Several plans may be made, and these may conflict. Formal organization comes into existence when there is an agreed-upon and accepted procedure for giving ‘legitimacy’ to one of these plans. …We cannot pursue further at this point the subject of legitimacy and the acceptance of authority except to warn against certain misconceptions. First, legitimacy is at root not a legal but a psychological matter. A legal or any other system of authority is legitimate only to the extent that those persons to whom it is directed feel that they ought or must accept it. Second, the legitimacy of an organizational plan is seldom accepted as absolute by those whom it seeks to govern. There are always limits—often fairly narrow limits—which, if exceeded, will cause refusal to accept the plan or even to admit its legitimacy. Third, legitimacy need not be hierarchical in its structure, resulting from successive acts of delegation.”63 The more advanced human societies become, the greater number of discrete organizational units there will be, the more comprehensive functions organizations tend to perform. Today’s society has become more highly organized on the one hand, and organizations of various kinds have proved to be of crucial importance to societies and individuals alike on the other. As James Burnham points out, “What is occurring … is a drive for social dominance, for power and privilege, for the position of ruling class by the social group or class of the manager.”64 “Burnham’s thesis is that a declining capitalist form of society is giving way to a managerial one. The managerial revolution by which this is being accomplished is not a violent upheaval, but rather a transition over a period of time, in much the same way as feudal society gave way to capitalism. …But there was no reason to think of socialism as the alternative. …In this society it will be the managers who are dominant, who have power and privilege, who have control over the means of production and have preference in the distribution of rewards. In short, the managers will be the ruling class. This does not necessarily mean that political offices will be occupied by managers, any more than under capitalism all politicians were capitalists, but that the real power over what is done will be in the hands of managers.”65 Generally speaking, such organizations are endowed with the following characteristics. First, organizational objectives and personal goals, or rather, the objectives set for the organization by those who control it, as well as the goals established by its constituent members. “As already noted, much human behavior is neither conscious nor rational. In many cases the actor cannot explain 62

Blau, Judith R. (1992). The Shape of Culture: A Study of Contemporary Patterns in the United States. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 79. 63 Ibid. 64 Pugh, Derek S., & Hickson, David J. (2016). Great Writers on Organizations: The Third Omnibus Edition. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 283. 65 Ibid., p. 288.

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why he behaves in a particular way—or if he does explain, the explanation is simply a rationalization of the real unconscious motivations. Since organizations are set up to accomplish purposes, the study of administration must necessarily be concerned with the rational aspects of human behavior. …for the present, the emphasis will be upon those behaviors that can be analyzed as deliberate and purposive choices. …It will suffice for our purposes if the reader understands that the justification of any choice depends, first, on the ends to be achieved and, second, on the appropriateness of the particular course of action chosen for the realization of these ends. …Before an individual can rationally choose between several courses of action, he must ask himself: (1) ‘What is my objective—my goal?’ and ‘Which of these courses of action is best suited to that goal?’ …A basic test of any proposed course of action is whether it will contribute to the organization objective. Determining the objective of an organization usually involves not only questions of what values the activity is to be directed toward, but also what groups of people it is to serve and what levels or quality of service it is to provide. …The value premises (goals, objectives) upon which the employee bases his decisions tend to be the objectives of the organization or organizational unit in which he works. …To be more accurate, the value premises that the individual employee incorporates into his behavior are not usually the goals of the organization as a whole, but intermediate goals—means to the larger organization ends—that define his particular job in the organization. …Here we feel the necessity of pointing out the intimate connection between the organization objective and the process by which a new organization comes into existence. …At the same time it will become equally clear that the organization objective is of vital significance in the survival and continued existence of the organization.”66 Second, any given organization endowed with particular structures may be realized through many different structures. Hence we should be concerned with identifying different forms of organizational structures and exploring their implications. The fact that organizational activities can be arranged in various ways means that organizations can have differing structures, such as the ideological structure, the psychological structure, the technical structure, the systematic (or institutional) structure, the structure of personnel organizations and the structure of personnel systems. Third, a structured and holistic approach to organizational activities should be adopted to ensure that the organization as a whole may engage in holistically structured activities and that consistency and integration are achieved within all organizational activities. Fourth, any particular organization that denotes a group of people with a common purpose may rightly assert itself as an independent social subject that enjoys corresponding rights according to their obligations on the one hand and that fulfills corresponding obligations according to their rights on the other. Any given organization is endowed with the following functions. First, organizations are in a unique position to meet

66

Simon, Herbert A., Thompson, Victor A., & Smithburg, Donald W. (2017). Characteristics of Behavior in Organizations in “Chapter Three Human Behavior and Organization.” In Public Administration, New York, NY: Routledge.

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external environmental pressures and challenges. “According to U. S. officials, international organizations are often in the best position to respond quickly to crisis situations. For example, WHO is often in the best position to recognize the early stages of infectious disease outbreaks through its interactions with the various networks of its member countries and collaborating centers. Also, WHO is often best suited to coordinate international health activities that often draw on experts’ knowledge from multiple countries, including the United States.”67 Second, the organization tends to make its constituent members reach consensus of opinion, have a clear understanding of their respective roles, and act in unison to achieve the organization’s objectives effectively and efficiently. “The employee tends to assume not just a passive but an active attitude toward the furtherance of the organization’s objectives. He does not merely accept the organization goals in deciding those questions that come to him, or accept the instructions he receives, but he exercises more or less initiative in finding ways of furthering those goals.”68 Third, the organization can best meet the deep-felt human needs of its constituent members. “The primary functions of any organization, whether religious, political, or industrial, should be to implement the needs of man to enjoy a meaningful existence.”69 “For many years Frederick Herzberg conducted, with colleagues and students, a program of research and application on human motivations in the work situation and its effects on the individual’s job satisfaction and mental health. …The major finding of the study was that the events that led to satisfaction were of quite a different kind from those that led to dissatisfaction. Five factors stood out as strong determinants of job satisfaction: achievement, recognition, the attraction of the work itself, responsibility, and advancement. Lack of these five factors, though, was mentioned very infrequently in regard to job dissatisfaction. When the reasons for the dissatisfaction were analyzed, they were found to be concerned with different factors: company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations, and working conditions. Because such distinctly separate factors were found to be associated with job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction, Herzberg concludes that these two feelings are not the opposites of one another; rather, they are concerned with two different ranges of human needs. The set of factors associated with job dissatisfaction are those stemming from the individual’s overriding need to avoid physical and social deprivation. Using a biblical analogy, Herzberg relates these to the Adam conception of the nature of humanity. When Adam was expelled from the Garden of Eden, he was immediately faced with the task of satisfying the needs that stemmed from his animal nature: food, warmth, avoidance of pain, safety, security, belongingness, and so on. Ever since then, people have had to concern themselves with the satisfaction of these needs, together with 67

United States General Accounting Office. (1997). United Nations U. S. Participation in Five Affiliated International Organizations: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate. Washington, D. C.: Diane Publishing, pp. 9–10. 68 Simon, Herbert A., Thompson, Victor A., & Smithburg, Donald W. (2017). Influence of the Formal and Informal Organization in “Chapter Three Human Behavior and Organization.” In Public Administration, New York, NY: Routledge. 69 Pugh, Derek S., & Hickson, David J., eds. (2007). Writers on Organizations (6th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 130.

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those that, as a result of social conditioning, have been added to them.”70 “In contrast, the factors associated with job satisfaction are those stemming from people’s need to realize their human potential for perfection. In biblical terms, this is the Abraham conception of human nature. Abraham was created in the image of God. He was capable of great accomplishments, development, growth, transcending his environmental limitations, and self-realization. People have these aspects to their natures, too; they are, indeed, the characteristically human ones. They have needs to understand, to achieve, and, through achievement, to experience psychological growth; these needs are very powerful motivating drives.”71 Fourth, the organization can improve its constituent members’ work efficiency and make them work with great efficiency whereby the organization as a whole can achieve maximum efficiency and benefit. The formation of an organization tends to follow formally established procedures that are always associated with the comprehensive and accurate definition of objectives and characteristics of the organization as well as with the clear and lucid explanation of interpersonal relationships and behavioral norms that are generally accepted among its constituent members. Formal organizations include schools, institutions of higher education like colleges and universities, companies, enterprises, business unions, hospitals, research institutes and farmers’ organizations, to name but a few. Informal organizations encompass social groups, such as friendship groups, charitable (philanthropic) groups, a group of people temporarily assembled for a specific purpose, and a group of employees engaged in some line of trade and loosely organized in society, etc., which cannot be called “formal organizations” in the general sense of the term “group” in that such organizations and any structures contained therein cannot engage in self-integration. (3) The State Let us begin with the most popular of Engels’ works, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, the sixth edition of which was published in Stuttgart as far back as 1894. Summing up his historical analysis, Engels says: “The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it ‘the reality of the ethical idea’, ‘the image and reality of reason’, as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arisen our of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.”72 “This expresses with perfect clarity the basic idea of Marxism with regard to the historical 70

Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., p. 146. 72 Lenin, V. I. (1990). Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 5. 71

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role and the meaning of the state. The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonism objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable. …the state only exists where there are class antagonisms and a class struggle. …According to Marx, the state could neither have arisen nor maintained itself had it been possible to reconcile classes. …According to Marx, the state is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of ‘order’, which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between classes.”73 Marx and his followers reinforced this belief by treating the state merely as an instrument of oppression in the hands of the dominant class that was defined primarily in economic terms,74 as well as by conceiving the state as representing the interests of the economically dominant class.75 “Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class….”76 “The state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it). …it is not denied that the state is an organ of class rule, or that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. …if the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if it is a power standing above society and ‘alienating itself more and more from it’, it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this ‘alienation.’”77 As distinct from any other groups (organizations) understandable in either the general or particular sense of the word, states have been vested with supreme power since the earliest forms of states emerged in human history. It has traditionally been argued that states possess a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence, whereby we cling to a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence as the defining characteristic of the states—or to put it the other way round, we just take it for granted that a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence should be accepted as a central feature of any definition of the state. More specifically, modern states tend to use violence as a means of governing, or rather, to rely on the threat (let alone actual use) of violence as a tool.78 “According to Gandhi, the basic distinguishing characteristic of a state compared to 73

Ibid., pp. 5–6. Fukui, Haruhiro., Merkl, Peter H., Muller-Groeling, Hubertus., & Watanabe, Akio., eds. (1993). The Politics of Economic Change in Postwar Japan and West Germany, Volume 1: Macroeconomic Conditions and Policy Responses. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., p. 2. 75 Prior, Mike. (2010). The Popular and the Political: Essays on Socialism in the 1980s. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 30. 76 Lenin, V. I. (1990). Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 11. 77 Ibid., 6–7. 78 Richardson, Jeremy, & Mazey, Sonia., eds. (2015). European Union: Power and Policymaking.New York, NY: Routledge, p. 7. 74

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other organizations, lies in its power of coercion. A society possesses plurality of organizations and institutions, but only the state is endowed with this unique power of physical coercion. From his experience of the British government and politics in India, when Gandhi was writing, he became convinced that a state is an engine of coercion and oppression. To Gandhi, modern states represent centralization of power, but centralization cannot be sustained and defended without the application of adequate force. Thus, modern states are essentially violent in nature. In this connection, he writes: ‘The State represents violence in a concentrated and organized form. The individual has a soul, but as the State is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned from violence to which it owes its very existence.’ Gandhi observes that it is impossible for a modern state based on force to be non-violent because violence is in-built in the system.”79 “ The state is a ‘special coercive force’. Engels gives this splendid and extremely profound definition here with the utmost lucidity. And from it follows that the ‘special coercive force’ for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, of millions of working people by handfuls of the rich, must be replaced by a ‘special coercive force’ for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat). This is precisely what is meant by ‘abolition of the state as state’. This is precisely the ‘act’ of taking possession of the means of production in the name of society.”80 Hence we may safely assert that the ruling class tends to exercise its power in its own interest by the use of the state as an instrument of class domination.81 While the legislative, executive, judicial and procuratorial hierarchies are central to the authoritarian aspects of states, the military, police and prison hierarchies are central to their coercive apparatuses.82 Thus one seems fairly justified in concluding that the state is a polity, or rather, a specific form of political organization, organized around the foregoing central aspects of political power. At the same time, in view of the fact that states are primary subjects of international law, regardless of their internal constitutions, whether unitary or federal, republican or monarchic, national or multinational,83 all states that enjoy sovereign equality should have equal rights and duties and rightly assert themselves as equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature, which is to say, each state has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and to live in peace with other States. “The identity of the State as subject of international law and as subject of national law means that, finally, the international legal order obligating and authorizing the State and the national legal order determining the individuals 79

Ghosh, B. N. (2012). Beyond Gandhi Economics: Towards a Creative Deconstruction. New Delhi, IN: SAGE Publications India, p. 153. 80 Lenin, V. I. (1990). Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 16. 81 Harvey, David. (2012). Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 270. 82 Scott, John. (2006). Power. Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 37. 83 Rommen, H. A. “State, The.” New Catholic Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia.com. 23 Sep. 2021 .

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who, as organ of the State, execute its international duties and exercise its international rights, form one and the same universal order.”84 As an existential community the state, which is always subject to the universal “rule of reason and conscience” and which is endowed “only with the most inclusive human authority in the area of its jurisdiction,”85 must ensure that individual members can successfully engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. “In relation to the many other societies creatively produced by man in the course of his intellectual, moral, socioeconomic, and cultural growth and differentiation, the state is the ordering and unifying authority, the unitas ordinis of the common good in which all individual persons and their many free associations participate and through which they enjoy legal security and self-fulfillment in the stability and tranquility, i.e., the peace, of the public order. More than any other temporal community, the state, as the name implies, tends toward perpetuity and survival into an indefinite future. …But in its mode of being the state does not exist independent of, outside, or above the persons who are organized within it, but wholly in them. …Nor is the end of the state so much its own and so independent of the ends of the persons forming it that their lives, rights, and fortunes can be unlimitedly sacrificed for its end or good. Instead, the rights of individual persons are themselves essential parts of the end of the state, which, like all societies, must ultimately serve the ends of its individual members.”86 The traditional theory asserts that “the state is composed of three elements—the people, the territory and the power of the state exercised by an independent government,” and that “these elements can be conceived of only as the validity and the spheres of validity of a legal order,”87 which is to say, “the state can be conceptualized as an entity of the three basic elements of the German legal philosopher Georg Jellinek—territory, people, sovereign power (Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk, Staatsgewalt).”88 “From this perspective, the state is seen as a normative order, and it is intersubjectively constructed normative values that provide the unifying standards and symbols of legitimate authority and allow us to perceive the state as a unitary and sovereign actor. Thus, sovereignty ‘is negotiated out of interaction within intersubjectively identifiable communities’ and it is this institution which legitimates ‘the state’ as an agent in international social life. As Michael Walzer notes, unity can only ever be symbolized, but it is through the claim to sovereignty made on the state’s behalf, and how this is articulated and put into practice, both domestically and internationally, that a sense of unity

84 Leben, Charles. (2010). The Advancement of International Law. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, p. 118. 85 Long, Michael G. (2002). Against Us, But for Us: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the State. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, p. 82. 86 Rommen, H. A. “State, The.” New Catholic Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia.com. 23 Sep. 2021 . 87 Leben, Charles. (2010). The Advancement of International Law. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, p. 117. 88 Merkel, Wolfgang., Kollmorgen, Raj., & Wagener, Hans-Jürgen., eds. (2019). The Handbook of Political, Social, and Economic Transformation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 657.

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is created.”89 While the world’s economy is undergoing rapid integration into the global economy, up to the present time the state has remained the most fundamental and authoritarian of all the existential communities man creatively organized in the course of human history. “State and society overlapped and interacted across broad historical time spans” whereby between state and society emerged the third realm, that is “public sphere” or “civil society,” which is to say, state and society formed an either/or binary in Jurgen Habermas’s very widely discussed concept of “public sphere,” as well as in the later concept “civil society.”90 After the emergence of the modern nation-state, in many areas state and society are superimposed upon each other and they overlap each other to such a degree that it is never possible properly to draw a clear distinction between them. On the one hand, the state tends to lay the basis for various “group activities,” to provide the general conditions in which various “group activities” take place, and to set the stage for various “group activities,” but one the other, by virtue of the supreme authority invested in the state by its people, the state has full authority to govern and direct various groups by laying down and enforcing rules and regulations as well as by making sure that various “group activities” shall be regulated by law. As a result, the various groups mentioned above may be deprived of their autonomy and thus fail to assert their independence. As a general rule, the existence and activities of various groups tend to be subject to the existing social system as well as to state rules and regulations whereby only relative independence and autonomy shall be guaranteed or granted to the various groups mentioned above. States endowed with hierarchical structures as well as with the multitude of functions “are faced with a number of options in framing strategic responses” which “are tailored to the specific circumstances of the state in question— both to optimize the best possible response from the state as a whole and to create a strategy that accurately reflects the challenges and threats that the state actually faces.”91 Thereby, the state tends to make strategic decisions and choices as to how best to meet domestic and international challenges or, more specifically, to promote economic development and social welfare through a coherent use of internal and external policies, whereby the state should retain freedom “to follow its own path, to control its own life and existence, to determine its own course of development and to pursue its own happiness and evolutionary destiny.”92 Therefore, “the state is expected to anticipate critical developments and avoid detriment by an effective crisis management, supply the economy with an appropriate infrastructure, initiate technological progress, and provide favorable conditions for economic growth. In addition, the welfare state philosophy requires social compensation for all sorts of 89

Rae, Heather. (2002). State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 16–17. 90 Huang, Philip C. (2010). Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 15. 91 Taddeo, Mariarosaria., & Glorioso, Ludovica., eds. (2016). Ethics and Policies for Cyber Operations: A NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Initiative. London, UK: Springer Nature, p. 209. 92 Teitelbaum, Benjamin R. (2017). Lions of the North: Sounds of the New Nordic Radical Nationalism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 38.

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individual disadvantages so that today the state can be said to bear again an allembracing responsibility for the social and cultural welfare of society.”93 There are three fundamental and traditional functions of the state. First, for Marx the state can be viewed as an instrument of class rule whereby the state can maintain the unity of the ruling class and ensure its position as the politically dominant class. The state that acts as an apparatus of class domination tends to exercise dictatorship over a handful of hostile elements, or rather, a small number of antisocial elements doing harm to society in general and, more specifically, bent only on promoting general disorder. Second, the state is faced with the immense task of promoting economic, social and cultural development whereby its primary objectives, to wit rapid economic growth and sustainable social development, can be achieved. Third, the state is under an obligation to safeguard national independence, to defend state sovereignty, and to preserve territorial integrity. To trace the historical origins and development of the state, one must go back to the time when human social organization took the form of distinct societies. According to the Marxist-Leninist theory of social development, “The development of society proceeds through the consecutive replacement, according to definite laws, of one socioeconomic formation by another. …Mankind as a whole has passed through four formations—primitive communal, slave, feudal, and capitalist—and is now living in the epoch of transition to the next formation, the first phase of which is called socialism.”94 “Although Marx does not mention socialism as a mode of production, Marxists generally agree that between capitalism and communism, there exists a transition phase called socialism, which Lenin called ‘the first phase of communist society.’ During this stage, the state is controlled by the working class, or what Marx calls ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat,’ through its political organ the communist party.”95 Marx and Engels’ conception of history as straight-line progress through a series of universal social forms and world-wide class systems is essential to the historical category of the state in that their ideas on history demonstrate irrefutably that the state has not existed from all eternity and that the earliest form of the state emerged out of the primitive commune—or to put it the other way round, “until about 10,000 years ago, all human societies were at the stage of primitive communism.”96 Hence we may safely assert that “The emergence of the state coincided with the emergence of social classes and class struggles resulting from the transition from a primitive communal to more advanced modes of production when an economic surplus was first generated.”97 Summing up his historical analysis, Engels points out that “The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as 93

Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver., ed. (1991). The Public Sector: Challenge for Coordination and Learning. Berlin, DE: Walter de Gruyter & Co., p. 133. 94 Gandy, D. Ross. (1979). Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, p. 4. 95 Berberoglu, Berch. (2016). Political Sociology in a Global Era: An Introduction to the State and Society. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 60–61. 96 Ibid., p. 58. 97 Ibid., p. 57.

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class antagonism objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.”98 “In orthodox Marxist vein, Mao Zedong believed the existence of classes and class struggle to be a fundamental and omnipresent feature of all human societies except the most primitive,” insisting that “prior to the elimination of the class system, there is no way that class contradictions can be abolished”—or to put it another way, “class struggle cannot be eliminated.”99 In the remote future, when the social productive forces have reached a higher stage of development, on the one hand class distinctions will disappear and the class system will be eliminated, while on the other hand the state will pass away and the whole state machinery will become a thing of the past, consigned to the museum of antiquities along with the spinning wheel and the bronze axe.100 (4) The International Organization The term international organization generally refers to an organization that is composed mainly of member states (or nations) and usually established by a formal agreement. International organizations have traditionally been conceived as formal institutions that tend to be established formally through treaties, or rather, according to formal legal agreements entered into by member states with one another. International organizations created on the basis of legal agreements tend to represent and protect their members’ interests and to achieve economic, political, and cultural goals in accordance with their statutes. “As a formal organization structured for a continuous purpose, an international organization has a permanent administrative capacity, ‘a hierarchically organized group of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures’ (Biermann et al. 2009: 37). …We conceive an international organization as having an institutionalized capacity for collective decision making. Most units that are classified as international organizations have a standing assembly or executive and a permanent secretariat that is separate from its member state administrations.”101 It therefore stands to reason that the majority of international organizations have set up specialized standing subcommittees to seek the solution of economic, political, and juridical problems that may arise among them and to promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development. “What then are the irreducible essential characteristics of international organizations and what are the other elements which often typify such organizations? The outstanding features have three headings: membership, aim and structure. An international organization should draw its membership form two or more sovereign states. The organization is established with 98

Lenin, V. I. (1990). Lenin Collected Works, Volume 31 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 6. 99 Knight, Nick. (2007). Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong’s Thought. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 176. 100 Lenin, V. I. (1990). Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 13–14. 101 Hooghe, Liesbet., Marks, Gary., Lenz, Tobias., Bezuijen, Jeanine., Ceka, Besir., & Derderyan, Svet. (2017). Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–16.

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the aim of pursuing the common interests of the members. The organization should have its own formal structure of a continuous nature established by an agreement such as a treaty or constituent document. …So an international organization can be defined as a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership.”102 International organizations possess international legal personality that derives from the will of the members as expressed in the constitutive documents such as treaties or formal legal agreements,103 and that tends to confer on international organizations the capacity to have legal rights and obligations under public international law.104 Generally speaking, the various types of international organizations are determined by aims, activities and functions, membership and structure. “According to the UN Economic and Social Council, ‘Every international organization which is not created by means of inter-governmental agreements shall be considered as a non-governmental international organization (Economic and Social Council, Resolution 288 (x) of 27 February 1950).’ This suggests a distinction between intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs, sometimes shortened to NGOs).”105 Hence one seems fairly justified in concluding that the most pertinent classification of international organizations should be based on the nature of their respective members,106 and that the first and foremost distinction between the kinds of international organizations should be those which are interstate or intergovernmental and those whose membership is non-governmental.107 Nonetheless, “the most common way of classifying international organizations is to look at what they are supposed to do and what they actually do. These two interrelated aspects of the behavior of the organizations get to the heart of their existence, and it is by these that they are best classified.”108 Thus international organizations can be classified into political organizations, economic organizations, cultural organizations, etc., according to their area of activity or the nature of their activity. “However, any clear-cut classification of organizations according to main objects of activity— preservation of peace and security, economic development, financial aid, technical, scientific and cultural exchange, humanitarian or military assistance—would prove to be less than accurate and lead to glaring inconsistencies in a number of cases,

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Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, p. 33. Thirlway, Hugh. (2014). The Sources of International Law. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 4. 104 Frid, Rachel. (1995). The Relations Between the EC and International Organizations: Legal Theory and Practice. The Hague, NL: Kluwer Law International, p. 10. 105 Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, pp. 34–36. 106 Mulvaney, Dustin. (2011). Green Politics: An A-to-Z Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 301. 107 Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, pp. 35. 108 Ibid., p. 50. 103

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because of the overlap of functions and responsibilities.”109 International organizations can be classified by their reach and scope of competency,110 which is to say, in view of the fact that a broad distinction may be made between organizations endowed with comprehensive competence and organizations with limited competence, a further possible distinction may be based on the global, regional or subregional scope of an organization.111 To put it in a nutshell, international organizations may be classified on a regional or global basis.112 According to the foregoing criterion for the classification of organizations, it would be fair to conclude that the UN is the most important global institutional structure.113 Regional intergovernmental organizations, by contrast, include such organizations as the European Union (EU), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (short for Comecon), Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It should be noted, however, that the term “international organization” is a broad and disputed category, which is to say there exists controversy around the boundaries of the category of organization most clearly classified as “international organizations.” Hence we may safely assert that not all international organizations can come into the category of “groups.” Generally speaking, intergovernmental organizations, which refer to entities created by treaty, involving two or more nations, to work in good faith, on issues of common interest, may fall into the category of “groups,” but there is debate as to whether or not other types of international organizations can qualify as “groups.” With the above situation in view, the categorization of international organizations must be based on the principle that concrete conditions require concrete analysis. On analysis, one seems fairly justified in concluding that some international organizations may come within the category of “groups,” while other cannot. The international organizations that fall into the category of “groups” may assert themselves as an important form of “group” and serve as a kind of human community whose members tend to engage in the constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. In general, the international organizations that fall into the category of “groups” tend to possess the following characteristics, albeit in varying degrees. First, the international organizations that come into the category of “groups” are, for the most

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Schiavone, Giuseppe. (2005). International Organizations: A Dictionary and Directory. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 3. 110 Nordquist, Myron H., Wolfrum, Rüdiger., Moore, John Norton., & Long, Ronán., eds. (2008). Legal Challenges in Maritime Security. Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 197. 111 Schiavone, Giuseppe. (2005). International Organizations: A Dictionary and Directory. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 3. 112 Araim, Amer Salih. (1991). Intergovernmental Commodity Organizations and the New International Economic Order. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, p. 14. 113 Jovanovi´ c, Miodrag A. (2019). The Nature of International Law. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 162.

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part, interstate or intergovernmental organizations.114 To put it the other way round, international organizations tend to be established by their member states in order to perform certain tasks that those member states are unable or unwilling to perform on their own.115 Hence we may safely assert that “an international organization should draw its membership from two or more sovereign states, though members need not be limited to states or official state representatives such as government ministers.”116 “The traditional notion of international organizations being established between governments is based on the sovereign state view of international relations, which contains three important elements: that, with few exceptions, only sovereign states are the subjects of international law; that sovereign states are equal in their standing in international law; that sovereign states are institutionally selfcontained and international law cannot interfere with the domestic jurisdiction of their governments.”117 Thus, “it is claimed that the term ‘interstate’ or ‘intergovernmental’ should be used when describing an activity—war, diplomacy, relations of any kind— conducted between two sovereign states and their governmental representatives.”118 However, “with all these relationships—intergovernmental, transnational and transgovernmental—being included under the heading ‘international,’” “this state and government-oriented view of the word ‘international’ has been increasingly challenged over the past four decades.”119 Second, the international organizations that fall into the category of “groups” tend to be established by way of a bilateral treaty, an agreement between two states or governments that governs some aspects of the relationship between those two states or governments, as well as by way of a multilateral treaty, an agreement among more than two states or governments.120 According to Wallace and Singer, “The intergovernmental organization ‘must consist of at least two qualified members of the international system’ and should have been ‘created by a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of national states’. Bilateral international organizations are included on the grounds that they are still international organizations and because otherwise certain multilateral organizations would have to be excluded for the periods when their membership was reduced to two.”121 So an international organization can be defined as “a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of 114

Butler, William E., & Butler, William Elliot. (2002). The Law of Treaties in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Text and Commentary. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 309. 115 Cogan, Jacob Katz., Hurd, Ian., & Johnstone, Ian., eds. (2016). The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 139. 116 Archer, Clive. (2015). International Organizations (4th ed.) New York, NY: Routledge, p. 30. 117 Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, pp. 36–37. 118 Ibid., p. 1. 119 Ibid. 120 O’Keefe, Roger. (2015). International Criminal Law. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 89. 121 Archer, Clive. (2015). International Organizations (4th ed.) New York, NY: Routledge, p. 29.

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the membership.”122 Third, an international organization is capable of developing a certain degree of autonomy from its membership, which is to say the international organization is endowed with the ability to act independently, to make free choices, and to integrate itself. In other words, formal IOs can be seen as “entities created with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to provide formal, ongoing, multilateral processes of decision-making between states, along with the capacity to execute the collective will of their members (states).”123 Fourth, Wallace and Singer maintained that the international organization “should have a permanent secretariat with a permanent headquarters arrangement and which performs ongoing tasks.”124 Fifth, “An intergovernmental organization is supposed to be at the service of the international community to perform its mission in full independence and without any kind of interference or the impression of influence from any particular state. It is for this reason that sovereign States have made intergovernmental organizations subjects of international law.”125 It thus seems justified in concluding that “all intergovernmental organizations are general subjects of international law in the sense that they have the capacity to perform any ‘sovereign’ and international acts which they are in a practical position to perform.”126 As stated above, international organizations endowed with the capacity to act independently tend to develop a certain level of autonomy, coupled with a high degree of organization. With all these relationships— intergovernmental, transnational and transgovernmental—being included under the heading “international,” we may safely assert that “the international organization that is established with the aim of pursuing the common interests of the members should draw its members from two or more sovereign states.”127 With the globalization of the world economy, the various international organizations that are undergoing phenomenal development will prove of increasing value to human beings in their constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.

3 Several Theoretical Patterns of “Group Structure” In modern times there has been a tendency to develop a reasonable explanation of the multiple aspects of “group structure” and a host of ingenious theories have thus far been proposed as a tentative explanation for the different aspects of “group structure.” All such explanations provide the epistemic basis for the study of “group 122

Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 29. 124 Ibid. 125 Ziadé, Nassib G., ed. (2008). Problems of International Administrative Law: On the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 163. 126 Seyersted, Finn. “Is the International Personality of Intergovernmental Organization Valid visà-vis Non-Members?” Indian Journal of International Law 4 (1964):233–265. 127 Archer, Clive. (2015). International Organizations (4th ed.) New York, NY: Routledge, p. 30. 123

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structure,” which is to say, only if we have made a serious and enthusiastic study of the various theoretical patterns of “group structure,” as well as conducting a probing and subtle analysis of them, can we establish the scientific theoretical patterns of “group structure” whereby any particular “group” can be properly guided in its behavioral choice, as well as being master of its own destiny. With the above situation in view, we fully recognize the need to make an intelligent and clarifying analysis of the following five representative theoretical patterns of “group structure” as well as give them a clear and lucid explanation.

3.1 Radcliffe–Brown’s Theory of “Group Structure” Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), one of the most eminent anthropologists of the first half of the twentieth century, was a British anthropologist closely associated with the development of structural-functionalism and is universally recognized as the founder and leading proponent of the British functionalist school. By example and teaching he helped to develop and establish modern “social” anthropology as a generalizing, theoretical discipline. The most notable of his many important contributions was his application to primitive societies of some of the ideas of systems theory, which led to a revolution in the analysis and interpretation of social relations. In brief, he may be said to have turned social anthropology from its preoccupation with historical development and psychological extrapolation to the comparative study of persistent and changing social structures. Among his many professional distinctions were membership in the Amsterdam Royal Academy of Sciences, honorary membership in the New York Academy of Sciences, fellowship in the British Academy, first presidency of the British Association of Social Anthropologists, and the presidency of the Royal Anthropology Institute, which awarded him the Rivers Medal in 1938 and the Huxley Memorial Medal in 1951.128 In late 1935 Radcliffe-Brown left for a four-month’s visit to China at the invitation of Professor Wu Wenzao, who invited him to lecture at Yenching University and other places in China.129 As soon as Professor Radcliffe-Brown arrived at Yenching University, he was invited to lead a workshop on the application of anthropological methods in studying modern society. He gave two lectures, volunteering to speak on “The plan of investigating sociologically rural life in China.” From then on, the vast country of China has become an experimental area of his comparative sociology.130 There

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“Radcliffe-Brown, A. R.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 25 Oct. 2021 . 129 Shils, Edward., ed. (1991). Remembering the University of Chicago: Teachers, Scientists, and Scholars. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 406. 130 Wang, Ming-Ming. (2014). The West As the Other: A Genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism. Hong Kong, China: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, p. 224.

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he had a major influence on a number of younger scholars and his lectures were translated and published in a special volume of the Chinese Sociological Circle.131 The basic tenets of Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism can be summarized in the following assumptions. (1) Radcliffe-Brown laid particular stress upon the synchronic study of anthropology. He pointed out that cultural anthropology boasts two kinds of study, namely the synchronic study and the diachronic study. A diachronic study, which is intended to trace the historical origin of culture, is a longitudinal study, while a synchronic study, which is oriented towards the essence, structure and function of culture, is a horizontal (or lateral) study. There exists a grave defect in the method of diachronic study, or rather, it is difficult to draw scientific conclusions by introducing the method of diachronic study and impossible to test and verify the drawn conclusions. Hence it is essential to make a synchronic study of cultural anthropology. The synchronic study described by him can be summarized as follows: culture can be treated as an integrated system regardless of the history or origin of culture. In this integrated system, each cultural element plays a specific role and performs a specific function. The essence of cultural study consists in the study of the overall structure of a culture, the interrelationship between various elements of a culture, and the function of external adaptation and internal integration performed by each element of the overall system, as well as the comparative study of similarities and differences between different systems of cultural integration. However, he was not altogether opposed to the diachronic study, merely thinking that the synchronic study ought to take precedence over the diachronic study. (2) Radcliffe-Brown addressed the question of social structure as a part of his larger interest in the interconnectedness of individuals and societies and led the way in developing his theory of social structure.132 He had put forth the notion of “social structure” as early as 1914. In the 1920s his use of the notion became more explicit, and in the 1930s quite precise. In his final formulation, structure refers to an arrangement of persons and organization to an arrangement of activities. Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism is best articulated in the idea that the life of a society can be conceived and studied as a system of relations of association and that a particular social structure is an arrangement of relations in which the interests or values of different individuals and groups are coapted within fiduciary “social values” expressed as institutional norms. He phrased the determinants of social relations of all kinds in terms of the coaptation or fitting together or harmonization of individual interests or values that makes possible “relations of association” and “social values.”133 131

Shils, Edward., ed. (1991). Remembering the University of Chicago: Teachers, Scientists, and Scholars. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 406. 132 Birx, H. James., ed. (2005). Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 2096. 133 “Radcliffe-Brown, A. R.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 25 Oct. 2021 .

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He attempted to explain social phenomena as enduring systems of adaptation, fusion, and integration of elements. He held that social structures are arrangements of persons and that organizations are the arrangements of activities; thus, the life of a society may be viewed as an active system of functionally consistent, interdependent elements.134 His notion of social structure can be summarized in the following four aspects. First, Radcliffe-Brown delineated an ahistorical focus on social structure as the main determinant of social function.135 The most notable of Radcliffe-Brown’s many theoretical contributions lies in the establishment of functionalist anthropology. In The Andaman Islanders, Radcliffe-Brown made a number of illuminating remarks upon cultural functionalism. Every custom and belief of a primitive society plays some determinate part in the social life of the community, just as every organ of a living body plays some part in the general life of the organism. The mass of institutions, customs and beliefs forms a single whole or system that determines the life of a society, and the life of a society is not less real, or less subject to natural laws, than the life of an organism.136 He believed that every cultural phenomenon performs particular functions and that either the whole society or a community therein constitutes a functional entity. The constituent parts of a unified whole coordinate with one another, condition one another and act in harmony with one another. Only if we succeed in revealing the functions of the whole as well as its constituent parts can we understand their respective meanings. Malinowski had argued that cultural institutions had to be understood in relation to the basic human psychological and biological needs they satisfied. Radcliffe-Brown, however, stressed a “structural–functional” approach to social analysis which viewed social systems as integrated mechanisms in which all parts function to promote the harmony of the whole. Radcliffe-Brown thought that social institutions should be studied like any scientific object. The job of the social anthropologist was to describe the anatomy of interdependent social institutions— what he called “social structure”—and to define the functioning of all parts in relation to the whole. The aim of such analysis is to account for what holds a functioning society together. He further elaborated on the value of social structure to anthropological research. He argued that society presents problems to anthropologists in the same way as nature presents problems to physicists and biologists alike, that is to say, the foregoing problems are all presented in a structural form to their respective objects. For an anthropologist, only if he has gained a perfect understanding of social structure can he acquire true knowledge of the structure itself as well as the functions performed by the constituent parts thereof. With the above situation in view, it is not difficult to understand that Radcliffe-Brown gave priority to what he termed “social

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Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “A. R. Radcliffe-Brown.” Encyclopedia Britannica, October 20, 2021. https://www.Britannica.com/biography/A-R-Radcliffe-Brown. 135 Bell, Catherine. (2009). Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 27. 136 Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1922). The Andaman Islanders: A Study in Social Anthropology. London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 229–230.

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structure” in his structural functionalism that “focuses on the structure of social relationships” and that “attributes functions to institutions in terms of the contribution they make to maintaining that structure.”137 Second, the social anthropology of function, structure, and relational networks deals with the relations of real interconnectedness, with “…the continuing arrangement of persons in relationships defined or controlled by institutions, i.e., socially established norms or patterns of behavior”. The substance of this study is the “real and concrete” social structure resulting from “role-activities” of persons acting from “positions” in that structure.138 Social structure mainly refers to the relations between people (or personal relations) in a cultural entity. This includes various groups comprised of individuals as well as the positions of individuals in their respective groups. Such two predictors as social stratification and classification may render great service to our deeper understanding of social groups. In terms of social stratification, considering that society is divided into upper, middle and lower classes, hence there exist social strata (that is, all classes of the community) such as the nobility (or the aristocracy), the populace (or the masses), the laboring (or working) class and the farming (or peasant) classes. As far as the social classification is concerned, there exists the systematic arrangement in groups or categories according to established criteria such as woman, man, family and clan. Third, the social relations between people are regulated by institutions. Interrelational concepts apply only to what he called “the internal nature” of particular social systems, a system being a set or assemblage of interdependent parts forming “a naturally occurring unity,” a complex, ordered, and unified whole in a particular region over a period of time. Institutions generally refer to some socially recognized principles, normative systems or behavioral patterns related to social life. Socially accepted principles can be conceived of as the basis of group formation. In primitive society, the core of social relations is kinship, and different principles of heirship in kinship are of crucial importance, because they exert a decisive influence on other family relations, especially the relationship between father and son as well as between uncle and nephew. Behavioral patterns and social norms are normal behaviors recognized or accepted in a specific relationship between people. There are universally recognized or widely accepted norms and patterns of behavior binding upon not only parents when they treat children but also children when they deal with parents as well as other family relationships. He believed that shedding light on social institutions could be available to help us describe and illustrate social structures. He was of the opinion that the study of social institutions is an important aspect of social structure. Thus, according to him, social structure has to be described by the institutions, which define the proper or expected conduct of persons in their various relationships.139 137

Layton, Robert. (1997). An Introduction to Theory in Anthropology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 37. 138 “Radcliffe-Brown, A. R.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 25 Oct. 2021 . 139 Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1988). Method in Social Anthropology (Jian-Zhong Xia, Trans.). Jinan, China: Shandong People’s Publishing House, p. 146.

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Fourth, while the actual content of social structure tends to undergo a constant change, the general structural form may remain relatively constant over a longer period of time.140 Essentially, Radcliffe-Brown saw social structure as a network of real people in a real society, albeit one in which social processes had left changes to be understood and analyzed in terms of an evolving structural form.141 The current use of social structure in British social anthropology in terms of a body of principles underlying social relations, rather than their actual content, stems from RadcliffeBrown’s concept of structural form rather than from his own use of the term social structure as defined above. To Radcliffe-Brown the social structure was an empirical reality existing at a single moment of time, while the structural form was an abstraction from reality by the investigator and implied a period rather than a moment of time.142 To put it the other way round, social structure is also a dynamic social process, albeit one in which relationships between people are subject to change, whereas the form of social structure is relatively stable. The contents of social structure represent the individuals that make up society, and social forms constitute social institutions. Based upon the aforementioned points, his definition of social structure is as follows: “social structure is the continuing arrangement of persons in relationships defined or controlled by institutions, i.e., socially established norms or patterns of behavior.” It is often useful to make the comparison of social phenomena with physiological phenomena. The analogy between individual organisms and the social organism is one that has in all ages forced itself on the attention of the observant.143 The validity of the analogy is further strengthened by the fact that every single day old cells die away and new ones are formed to take their place and that practically all the cells in the body are replaced completely within seven years. In other words, as an individual, every human being in society is a biological organism, a collection of a vast number of molecules organized in a complex structure, within which, as long as it persists, there occur physiological and psychological actions and reactions, processes and changes.144 Despite this fact, one seems fairly justified in concluding that while the cells of the human body undergo a complete change every seven years, the form of the human body as a living organism remains unchangeable. (3) Radcliffe-Brown drew his theory of process from Herbert Spencer who conceived evolution as at one and the same time a process toward higher

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Kuper, Adam., ed. (2004). The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 29. 141 Barnard, Alan., & Spencer, Jonathan., eds. (1996). Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 511. 142 Mitchell, G. Duncan., ed. (2017). A New Dictionary of the Social Sciences. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 199. 143 Spencer, Herbert. (1878). Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Volume 3. London, UK: Williams and Norgate, p. 414. 144 Kuper, Adam., ed. (2004). The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 30.

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integration and differentiation.145 His thoughts upon evolution can be summarized as follows. First, on the one hand Radcliffe-Brown advocated the idea of social evolution, declaring himself a lifelong proponent of the theory of social evolution, but on the other, he passed trenchant criticism upon the arguments brought forward by anti-evolutionists, who had been characterized as ideologically confused and ignorant, that is, who possessed such characteristics in common as ideological or mental confusion or muddled thinking and ignorance.146 Second, both organic evolution and social evolution are natural processes subject to the laws of nature. Third, either organic evolution or social evolution is an anisotropic process of development, or rather, a process of evolution from a simple form to a complex one, which holds true for animals and plants as well as for social structure. Fourth, either organic evolution or social evolution exhibits a general tendency, namely the progress of organic or social organization and diversified forms of life, which tend to involve the complication of structure and function as well as the intimacy and expansion of social intercourse. Radcliffe-Brown accepted Emilé Durkheim’s classic argument that two factors interact to bring about social change and can likewise lay the groundwork for social evolution: “material density” by which he means density of population in a given area, or more specifically, the number of inhabitants per unit of area as well as the development of the means of communication and transmission, and “moral density” which refers to the increased density of interaction and social relationships within a population, or rather, the frequency of social exchange and rate of social interaction,147 which is to say, by moral density Durkheim means, roughly, the number of social relationships per person.148 “The degree and mode of concentration of the social mass—demographic fluctuations, urbanization, improved communications and transport, and so on— bring about heightened rates of social interaction.”149 “Moral density cannot grow unless material density grows at the same time, and the latter can be used to measure the former. It is useless, moreover, to try to find out which has determined the other; it is enough to state that they are inseparable.”150 To put it the other way round, “Moral density cannot therefore increase without physical density increasing at the same time, and the latter can serve to measure the extent of the former. Moreover, it is useless to investigate which of the 145

“Radcliffe-Brown, A. R.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 25 Oct. 2021 . 146 Radcliffe-Brown. (2002). Method in Social Anthropology (Jian-Zhong Xia, Trans.). Beijng, China: Huaxia Publishing House, p. 158. 147 Saunders, Peter. (2007). Social Theory and the Urban Question. London, UK: Routledge, p. 43. 148 Waters, Malcolm. (1994). Modern Sociological Theory. London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd, p. 297. 149 Traugott, Mark., ed. Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis (Mark Traugott, Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 29. 150 Giddens, Anthony., ed. (1972). Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings (Anthony Giddens, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 151.

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two has influenced the other; it suffices to realize that they are inseparable.”151 Fifth, Radcliffe-Brown also believed that evolution does not necessarily mean progress. For him, evolution refers to the gradual change in structure and function as well as the complexity of social interactions, while progress simply means the progress of knowledge, science and technology as well as the development of morality. Progress should be judged by other standards. As a result of evolution society tends to grow more complex in its social structure and social development—both internal and external—tends to maintain a proper balance. However, social development, be it for better or for worse, can be judged by other scientific standards. Radcliffe-Brown deservedly ranks as one of the masters of structural functionalism, who advanced a multitude of original ideas and theories, some of which were so scientific and enlightening that they led to a revolution in the analysis and interpretation of social structures and functions. We may gain a good deal of enlightenment from his seminal ideas and theories, among which we most assuredly can find the nearest parallel to “the theory of structure and choice.”

3.2 Émile Durkheim’s Theory of “Group Structure” Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), a prominent French social scientist and zealous champion of cultural anthropology, is widely regarded as the founder of the French school of sociologist,152 is retrospectively acclaimed as one of the founding figures of sociology as an academic discipline and,153 and, with Max Weber and Karl Marx, is commonly cited as a principal architect of modern social science.154 Durkheim, whose ideas remain influential in the theory and practice of sociology to this day,155 is rightly credited with originating the theory of social structure and is hailed as developing this insight into what would become the functionalist theory of change in his first major work, The Division of Labor in Society (1947).156 The basic tenets of Durkheim’s theories of structural functionalism and social structure can be roughly summarized in the following fundamental assumptions. (1) Durkheim’s sociological position rests upon two theoretical premises: the theory of social evolution and the holistic view of society. First, according to his theory of social evolution, Durkheim held evolutionary views on the transition from 151 Lukes, Steven., ed. (2014). The Division of Labor in Society (W. D.Halls, Trans.). New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, Inc., p. 202. 152 Peyre, H. M. “Émile Durkheim.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November 11, 2021. https://www. britannica.com/biography/Emile-Durkheim. 153 Lynch, Michael. “Sociology.” In The Social Science Encyclopedia, eds. Adam Kuper & Jessica Kuper. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. 154 Calhoun, Craig., et al., eds. (2002). Classical Sociological Theory. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, p. 107. 155 Livesey, Chris. (2014). Cambridge International AS and A Level Sociology Coursebook. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 4. 156 O’Byrne, Darren. (2013). Introducing Sociological Theory. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 39.

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traditional to modern society. He agreed with Spencer that increased specialization among the individuals of a group led to the cooperative interdependence that has characterized the evolution from primitive to civilized society.157 For Spencer, evolution was progress from the primitive and simple to the modern and complex; differentiation and mutual cooperation would inevitably continue to increase. He combined a market and utilitarian theory of society with a theory of progress: the history of social evolution is a process of increasing size, division of labor, differentiation, and mutual cooperation (specifically in the form of contractual relationships).158 But where Spencer, a leading exponent of utilitarian individualist theory in economics, attributed social cooperation to contractual relations between individuals for their mutual advantage, Durkheim, on the other hand, insisted that such regulations are created by society rather than by individuals, who are in the course of pursuing their own immediate interests. Thus, the happiness or self-interest principle, which, according to the classical utilitarian view, was supposed to lead men to social cooperation, was entirely discounted by Durkheim.159 Durkheim also tried to demolish Spencer’s view that mutual cooperation was the basis of social activity and to replace that view with the conception of interdependence. For him, cooperation in a complex contract society cannot explain how society holds together; it cannot explain the existence of order. In primitive societies, order is maintained by a collective conscience or collective sentiments. By contrast, it is the division of labor characteristic of modern society that generates the various forms of interdependence which are much more profound than either the primitive collective conscience or the Spencerian idea of mutual cooperation in the market. Hence it is this interdependence existing in a modern society that forms the true basis for social order as well as for social cooperation.160 In other words, it is modern men’s interdependence, or rather, their need for each other’s specialties, that creates social bonds and social order based on interdependence and cooperation among people performing a wide range of diverse and specialized tasks.161 Second, according to Durkheim’s holistic view of society, in spite of the fact that society is merely the sum of its individual members—or to put it the other way round, even though the sole elements of which society is composed are individuals, society is more than the sum of the individuals who comprise it,162 which is to 157

Upadhyay, Vijay S., & Pandey, Gaya. (1993). History of Anthropological Thought. New Delhi, IN: Concept Publishing Company, p. 275. 158 La Porte, Todd R., ed. (1975). Organized Social Company: Challenge to Politics and Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 312. 159 Upadhyay, Vijay S., & Pandey, Gaya. (1993). History of Anthropological Thought. New Delhi, IN: Concept Publishing Company, p. 275. 160 La Porte, Todd R., ed. (1975). Organized Social Company: Challenge to Politics and Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 312. 161 Lamanna, Mary Ann. (2002). Emile Durkheim on the Family. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, p. 66. 162 Teubert, Wolfgang. (2010). Meaning, Discourse and Society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 127.

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say, “Society is not a mere sum of individuals. Rather, the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics.”163 For Durkheim, the social or collective has emergent properties that transcend the combination of individuals,164 that is to say, the combination of individuals to form a society produces a new type of existence with properties not found in the individuals but deriving from their association.165 In Durkheim’s view, society is an entity that exists in its own right, beyond the ideas, hopes and desires of its individual members,166 which is to say, a social entity’s putative existence is scarcely ever subject to the will of its individual members. For Durkheim, each society may be conceived as a discrete, self-contained entity with its own individuality, which could be defined in terms of a specific combination of constituent elements.167 Durkheim held that “society is not a mere sum of individuals; rather the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics” and that it was “in the nature of this individuality, not in that of its component units, that one must seek the immediate and determining causes of the facts appearing there.”168 According to Durkheim, the individual tends to be controlled externally by “social facts,” which Durkheim defined as “facts with very distinctive characteristics: they consist of ways of acting, thinking and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him.” Social facts tend to be recognized by their coercive function, which includes the sanctions, either deliberate or non-intended, imposed on those who try to resist their influence.169 Durkheim argued that in well regulated societies individuals tend to follow a framework of normative controls and social regulations and that laws as a form of social control should set limits on individual propensities. He tried to emphasize that interdependence (“dynamic density”) in a modern society binds men to each other and that this dependence can be characterized as compulsory and normative because it gives us a sense of limits. Moreover, he contended that our social dependences make us what we are and that we should

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Mearsheimer, John J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 35. 164 Bammer, Gabriele., ed. (2015). Change ! Combining Analytic Approaches with Street Wisdom. Canberra, AU: ANU Press, p. 61. 165 Benton, Ted. (1977). Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 85. 166 Livesey, Chris. (2014). Cambridge International AS and A Level Sociology Coursebook. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 4. 167 Ingold, Tim. (2011). Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 235. 168 Lukes, Steven. (1985). Emile Durkheim – His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 19. 169 Brown, Stuart., Collinson, Diané., & Wilkinson, Robert., eds. (1997). Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Philosophers. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 207.

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be obligated to that society which formed us.170 Durkheim believed that social inequalities are largely determined by what he called “macro-social structures” and that a change in the nature of “macro-social structures” tends to bring about a change in social inequalities, or rather, to overcome social inequalities. Thus, when we come to describe the social stratification in a particular society, we need to give adequate consideration to any macro-social structures contained therein, that is, to give the social stratification an adequate explanation at the macro-structural level. (2) The basic assumptions of Durkheim’s sociological theory can be summarized as follows. First, we feel the necessity of making a searching examination of Durkheim’s two central concepts in his sociology, to wit “social facts” and “the conscience collective,” which he considered to be of utmost importance to sociological studies. For Durkheim, the object of study for sociologists should be “social facts” rather than individual behaviors. Only “social facts” can be used to explain society itself, which is not true of individual behaviors. In other words, society itself that can be treated as an organic entity must be explained in terms of “social facts,” not in terms of individual behaviors. In The Rules of Sociological Method Durkheim defined a social fact as “every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising over the individual an external constraint” and further as “[every way of acting] which is general throughout a given society, while existing in its own right, independent of its individual manifestations.”171 It thus can be seen that Durkheim’s definition embodies three distinguishing criteria: externality, constraint and generality plus independence.172 In his magnum opus, The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim defines “the conscience or commune” as “the set of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a single society [which] forms a determinate system that has its own life.” The French word “conscience” is ambiguous, embracing the meanings of the two English words “conscience” and “consciousness.” Thus the “beliefs and sentiments” comprising the conscience collective are, on the one hand, moral and religious, and, on the other, cognitive. He also defined the term as meaning “social facts.”173 Durkheim believed that society exerts a coercive force on individuals, whose norms, beliefs and values make up the collective consciousness, which is crucial in explaining the existence of society: it produces society and holds it together. According to the thesis of The Division of Labor, the simpler societies are founded upon a strongly defined moral consensus, an enveloping conscience collective. There are four principal dimensions along which we can analyze the properties of the conscience collective in such societies, and each of these 170

La Porte, Todd R., ed. (1975). Organized Social Company: Challenge to Politics and Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 313. 171 Lukes, Steven. (1985). Emile Durkheim – His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 10–11. 172 Ibid., pp. 11–15. 173 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

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characteristics undergoes change in the course of social development, as the division of labor expands, and society becomes more complex. These concern the volume, intensity, rigidity and the content of the beliefs and values which compose the conscience collective. The degree of “intensity” of the constituent elements of the conscience collective concerns the extent of the emotional and intellectual hold which these beliefs and values exert over the perspectives of the individual.174 In the pre-modern world the collective consciousness is an all-embracing social force. It is high in volume, enveloping the entirety of the consciousness of individuals, impressing itself on nearly every facet of their lives. It is high in intensity, exerting a powerful effect on people’s thinking and behavior, forcefully steering them in a “collective direction.” It is high in rigidity, consisting of well-defined rules of conduct, leaving little room for individual interpretation or discretion. And it is high in religious content, investing shared values and ideas with divine authority. In pre-modern society, where the group is preeminent, the “individual consciousness is almost indistinct from the collective consciousness.”175 Thus, when we come to describe the social stratification or social structure in a particular society, we must focus our attention on the “social facts” or “collective consciousness” contained therein. Second, Durkheim believed that the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity would be the basic way in which modern societies would enable social cooperation and equality. In The Division of Labor in Society Durkheim provided sociology with a pair of its most revered and enduring concepts: mechanical and organic solidarity. It may be safely asserted that Durkheim’s most famous typology is that of mechanical and organic solidarity which he used to talk about how societies have changed and evolved. For Durkheim, social relationships that dominated traditional societies tend to be characterized by “mechanical solidarity” based on social homogeneity, and individuals in such repressive societies tend to be integrated into a social whole by their common values and beliefs as well as by punitive laws and sanctions. In modern industrial societies, by contrast, the relationships among members tend to be marked by “organic solidarity” based on a complex division of labor—or to put it the other way round, social interactions in modern society tend to be based around a division of labor that created increasing social heterogeneity and interdependency. According to Durkheim, despite the fact that the conscience collective, the fund of common beliefs and sentiments which makes possible mechanical integration on the basis of resemblances, is contracting and destined finally to disappear, it continues to exist under organic solidarity by undergoing a transformation in its content and a redefinition of the scope of its jurisdiction to the smaller subunits where

174 Giddens, Anthony., ed. (1972). Emile Durkheim: Selected Readings. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 5. 175 Royce, Edward. (2015). Classical Social Theory and Modern Society: Marx, Durkheim, Weber. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 72.

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primary relations retain their vigor,176 which is to say, the collective consciousness of societies based on mechanical solidarity gives way to a more problematical collective consciousness grounded in individualism and emerging out of modern complex societies based on organic solidarity,177 which has greatly encouraged the development of individuality. In the stage of mechanical solidarity, the community resorts to punitive law and repressive sanctions to reassert the common conscience. With the development of organic society, restitutive law becomes predominant and most assuredly promotes the development of individualism.178 According to Durkheim, pari passu with the decrease of the power of the collective consciousness is the change from “repressive” to “restitutive” law. A study of the codes of peoples in different stages of social development reveals a progressive decrease in the importance of the repressive, and a corresponding increase of this restitutive law. Durkheim considers this strong proof of the decrease of the strength of the social consciousness as a whole.179 In Durkheim’s opinion, restitutory law, in contrast to penal law, is the hallmark of a complex society.180 Hence one seems fairly justified in concluding that the greater the degree of the division of labor within a society, the higher the degree of social differentiation and interdependence in it, the more likely its members will be to achieve social equality. It thus can be seen that Durkheim analyzed social stratification as related to equality as much as inequality and that he tried to apply the new concept of division of labor to the age-old problem of social class and inequality, attempting to put to rest the specter of a deficit of social equality in the world of today. In Durkheim’s vision, the division of labor into finer and finer parts tends to ensure that social members are more likely to attain mutual equality under the law. As Durkheim argued, the higher the level of social development, the more likely a society will be in the midst of a transition from the segmentary type of society based on the territorial principle to the “organized” type of society based on the functional principle, the more easily social inequalities will be leveled off.181 By the “organized” society Durkheim meant that it is composed of occupational groups which are interdependent functional units and that this type of social organization increases pari passu with the increase of the segmentary type of society, though it is never completely realized. Some elements of segmentary organization persist, and the functional 176

Traugott, Mark., ed. Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis (Mark Traugott, Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 13. 177 Hvattum, Mari., & Hermansen, Christian., eds. (2004). Tracing Modernity: Manifestations of the Modern in Architecture and the City. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 9. 178 Selznick, Philip. (1994). The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 143. 179 The Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, ed. (1915). Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Volume 63. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, pp. 165–166. 180 Bell, Duncan., ed. (2006). Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 90. 181 Durkheim, Emile. (2000). The Division of Labor in Society (Jing-Dong Qu, Trans.). Shanghai, China: SDX Joint Publishing Company, p. 337.

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unit never becomes the sole basis of the structural arrangement of societies; we continue to have national groups and other, smaller, territorial units. But “it is permitted to look forward to the continuation of this double movement, and to foresee that a day will come when our whole political and social organization will have a basis, exclusively, or exclusively, professional.”182 However, he concluded, the division of labor “develops regularly” to the extent to which he called the “segmentary” type of society disappears, and the vanishing of the older segmentary type of society is primarily the cause and not the effect of specialization.183 As stated above, Durkheim was one of the leading proponents of structural functionalism, a sociological theory which interprets each part of society in terms of how it contributes to the whole society, which is to say, this approach sees the society as a whole unit, with all its constituent parts interrelated into a functioning whole, and analyses events and institutions in terms of the functions they serve for the society and the individuals.184 From the 1930s to the 1960s structural functionalism, which was developed from the writings of Emile Durkheim, was the dominant sociological theory. The term “structure” is generally used to refer to the fabric of society—that is, the social institutions and systems that combine to make it up—whereas “function” refers to the role played by each social institution in the maintenance of society as a whole. Structural functionalism involves a macroscopic approach to the study of social phenomena, a focus on the social system as a whole and interest in the subsystems that comprise it. Structural functionalists regard the subsystems as interdependent, and all make a contribution to the wellbeing of society as a whole. According to structural functionalists, we need to understand how the various aspects of the social system contribute to society as a whole. Of particular interest is the role that those aspects play in promoting social order and cohesion.185 (3) Emile Durkheim was essentially a positivist as far as his methodology is concerned. Durkheim adopted a positivist approach to sociological research. His approach to social phenomena stressed that social facts are things and must be treated as such and that they could be approached via a scientific method stressing objectivity and rationality. Through his positivist approach Durkheim attempted to develop a unique understanding of social phenomena and to ground his sociological theory on differing assumptions about social facts. The central assumptions of Durkheim’s sociological theory can be summarized as follows. Firstly, Durkheim held the view that an interpretation of social stratification necessarily depends upon a holistic understanding of the functioning of a society 182

The Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, ed. (1915). Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Volume 63. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, pp. 163. 183 Schmaus, Warren., & Schmaus, Warren S. (1994). Durkheim’s Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge: Creating an Intellectual Niche. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 138. 184 O’Reilly, Karen. (2012). Ethnographic Methods. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 19. 185 Churton, Mel., & Brown, Anne. (2010). Theory and Method. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 38.

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and that social stratification is determined largely by the forms of social structure and social organization—or to put it the other way round, structural differentiation tends to affect social stratification.186 Secondly, the foregoing discussion is sufficient to indicate that Durkheim not only introduced a series of stimulating hypotheses about the role of social differentiation, but also added certain important positive corollaries to the theory of structural differentiation. He argued that some degree of inequality contributes to functional integration. As Durkheim pointed out, “the process of social differentiation generates inevitably its logical opposite, social integration—that is, the establishment of superordinate values and patterns of behavior that override occupational, regional, confessional, and other differences, or at least limit their potential for conflict.”187 According to Durkheim, social development or, as it used to be known, tends to manifest itself as a continuous process of social differentiation as a result of which societies become structurally more complex.188 For him, the increasing differentiation of social functions tends to elevate living standards and to reduce social conflicts. In social differentiation, Durkheim saw the ultimate basis of social solidarity. In his view, social solidarity is primarily a function of the degree of social differentiation and normative regulation.189 The particular form of social solidarity tends to be shaped by the degree of social differentiation, which, in turn, necessarily corresponds with the overall level of solidarity of a society. Social order and stability tend to be maintained through organic solidarity based on social differentiation, which is to say, functional differentiation in industrialized societies played an essential function for society as a whole, Durkheim suggested, by sustaining solidarity and cohesion, maintaining order and stability,190 or rather, maintaining a stable social whole.191 It has been argued that “an important aspect of Durkheim’s theorizing on social change that particularly resonates today is his distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity in society.”192 In its mechanical form, typically found in traditional communities, society tends to be organized on the basis of differences between the scared and the secular, which tends to play a crucial role in maintaining social stability and cohesion. 186

Smith, Brian Clive. (1996). Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development. London, UK: Macmillan Press, p. 66. 187 Ambrosius, Gerold., & Hubbard, William H. (1989). A Social and Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe (Keith Tribe & William H. Hubbard, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 48. 188 Randall, Vicky., & Theobald, Robin. (1998). Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics. London, UK: Macmillan Press, p. 20. 189 Meulen, Ruud ter., Arts, Wil., & Muffels, Ruud., eds. (2001). Solidarity in Health and Social Care in Europe. Dordrecht, NL: Springer Science & Business Media, p. 374. 190 Norris, Pippa., & Inglehart, Ronald. (2004). Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 9. 191 Scott, John. (2014). A Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p. 264. 192 Madge, Nicola., Hemming, Peter J., & Stenson, Kevin. (2014). Youth On Religion: The Development, Negotiation and Impact of Faith and Non-faith Identity. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 7.

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Thirdly, Durkheim theorized occupational differentiation as the basis of social stratification. According to him, occupations tend to be considered as the basic units of modern social hierarchy and occupational groups that become central elements of the new stratification system tend to confer identity, status, and material rewards.193 In The Division of Labor (1933), Durkheim attempts to show how the process of occupational differentiation leads to the emergence of distinct social classes and hence gives rise to new structures of social stratification. For Durkheim, the distinction between the sacred and the profane is one crucial dichotomy that is characteristic of occupational differentiation in a society based on mechanical solidarity and that also provides us with a basis on which to analyze the mechanical society’s implication in social inequalities. Durkheim contended that when a society is organized on the basis of organic solidarity that “consists in the ties of co-operation between individuals or groups of individuals which derive from their occupational interdependence within the differentiated division of labor,”194 the multiplicity of occupational life which is subject to the fair contracts that tend to be framed and honored by some kind of collective morality necessarily calls forth the development of social justice and equality opportunity within occupational groups. The social stratificationist theory owes its origins to the French sociology of Emile Durkheim, which treats the occupational structure as a continuous hierarchy of occupations that runs from high to low on some attribute.195 “In analyzing the data of social stratification, Durkheim mainly focused on occupational differentiation by emphasizing the effect of occupational functions on social stratification.”196 Hence, the foregoing analogy leads to a perspective on social stratification far different from that of Marx and Webster. In Durkheim’s view, occupational differentiation can be considered as the major factor contributing to social stratification. Indeed Durkheim could be said to have developed his own distinctive theory of social stratification, that is to say, one of the distinctive features of Durkheim’s theory of social stratification is the preoccupation with the organic specialization of cooperative occupational divisions, or rather, the moral sanctioning of specialization in the division of labor.197 In Durkheim’s theory modern society is organized in the sense that “it is composed of occupational groups which are interdependent functional units. This is indeed the real essence of modern social organization.”198 In the type of society of organic solidarity, “the solidarity 193

Wright, Erik Olin., ed. (2005). Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 159. 194 Giddens, Anthony., ed. (1972). Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 8. 195 McAllister, Ian., Dowrick, Steve., & Hassan, Riaz., eds. (2003). The Cambridge Handbook of Social Sciences in Australia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 436. 196 Chen, Yu-Ting. (2021). The Gender Wage Gap. Ottawa, CA-On: Dandybooks Canada, p. 10. 197 Giddens, Anthony. (2003). Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 240. 198 The Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, ed. (1915). Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Volume 63. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, p. 163.

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of the members of society is produced not by the functional interdependence based on the development of the division of labor but by the generally binding and authoritative convictions operative in moral individualism, contract law, and mores.”199 Thus Durkheim’s The Division of Labor in Society can be interpreted as a theory on the moral basis of cooperation for the communal production of collective goods.200 Admittedly, Durkheim’s sociology of social interdependence through division of labor is enormously consequential for modern societies. Other classic sociological theorists, such as Kinsley Davis, Wilbert Moore, and Talcott Parsons, who have been universally recognized as leading proponents of the functionalist school of thought, followed closely in the footsteps of Durkheim and helped lay the groundwork of modern sociology of social stratification by proposing a functionalist perspective on social stratification, which was first advanced by Emile Durkheim. Hence it may be safely asserted that aside from Karl Marx and Max Weber whose works have bequeathed a rich legacy of social stratification theories to posterity, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim rightly asserts himself as the founding father of the third perspective on social differentiation, or rather, the functional theory of social stratification. However, the aforementioned theory contains some serious weaknesses inherent in itself. Few specific criteria for social stratification have ever been suggested. The foregoing theory can never come into the category of critical theories. In particular, the role of human subjective initiative is never brought into full play in Durkheim’s theory of social stratification—or to put it the other way round, human subjective initiative has fallen into almost total neglect in his theory of social hierarchy. Hence it follows justly that the functionalist theory of social stratification fails to give a scientific explanation of the origin of social inequality. Despite this, Durkheim’s theory of social stratification remains to be a most practical and sensible method of viewing the problems of social stratification in their true perspective, thereby enabling us to approach a wider range of theoretical and substantive issues such as social structure and occupational differentiation from an entirely new angle.

3.3 Max Weber’s Theory of “Group Structure” Max Weber (1864–1920) is widely considered the greatest of German sociologists and has become a leading influence in European and American thought.201 He deservedly ranks as the most influential and in many respects the most profound

199

Beckert, Jens. (2002). Beyond the Market: The Social Foundations of Economic Efficiency (Barbara Harshav, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 95. 200 Ibid. 201 Gerth, Hans Heinrich., & Mills, Charles Wright., eds. (2009). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 1.

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of twentieth-century social scientists.202 He is now recognized as one of the great minds of the twentieth century.203 He is a scholarly, conscientious and prolific author. His scholarly output was extremely impressive in both range and quality.204 In the last several decades his reputation as a scholar and thinker of the first order has continuously increased.205 Weber’s theory of social stratification forms a substantial contribution of permanent value to our knowledge of modern society. For Weber, social stratification can be succinctly defined as the unequal distribution of resources in society, such as wealth, income, occupation, education, prestige, and power. More specifically, by social stratification Weber means that valued resources are unequally distributed among the various status or social groups that make up a society—or to put it the other way round, according to Weber, social stratification refers to the unequal distribution of valued goods and services based on social statuses among different social groups in a hierarchical system of social classes or strata whereby durable and marked differences among different social or status groups tend to manifest themselves in differing access to and unequal distribution of social resources and opportunities. Weber developed a multidimensional approach to social stratification that reflects the interplay between class (the economic dimension), status (or prestige, the cultural and social dimension) and party (or power, the political dimension).206 Weber’s approach to stratification was built on the analysis developed by Marx, but he modified and elaborated it.207 Weber took issue with Marx’s unidimensional view of social stratification in writings often referred to as a debate with Marx’s ghost.208 “Like Marx, Weber regarded society as characterized by conflicts over power and resources. Yet where Marx saw polarized class relations and economic issues at the heart of all social conflict, Weber developed a more complex, multidimensional view of society. Social stratification is not simply a matter of class, according to Weber, but is shaped by two further aspects: status and party. These three overlapping elements of stratification produce an enormous number of possible positions within society, rather than the more rigid bipolar model which Marx proposed.”209 Max Weber’s multidimensional view of social stratification became the most accepted perspective among twentieth-century

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“Weber, Max.” Encyclopedia of Religion. Encyclopedia.com. 28 Nov. 2021 . 203 Lachmann, L. M. (2007). The Legacy of Max Weber. Berkeley, CA: The Glendessary Press, p. 144. 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid. 206 Hurst, Charles E. (2007). Social Inequality: Forms, Causes, and Consequences. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, p. 202. 207 Giddens, Anthony., & Griffiths, Simon. (2006). Sociology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 302. 208 Bryant, Clifton D., & Peck, Dennis L., eds. (2007). 21st Century Sociology: A Reference Handbook, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 229. 209 Giddens, Anthony., & Griffiths, Simon. (2006). Sociology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 302.

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sociologists.210 The main thrust of Weber’s multidimensional theory of stratification may be roughly summed up as follows. (1) Two basic hypothetical prerequisites. First, when it comes to the causal analysis of social stratification, “causality was not for Weber something that could be reduced in sociological explanation to any one set of phenomena, such as the economic variables, but rather involved a multiplicity of causal factors.”211 Weber recognized that the control or possession of property is a crucial determinant of stratification, and he acknowledged that income and wealth are important factors in determining class situation.212 However, through his analysis of a number of historical societies, Weber sought to demonstrate that various factors other than the ownership of the means of production were influential in shaping social stratification. Another predominating factor which Weber identifies as influential in determining social stratification is the social action of individuals.213 Weber argues that class situations emerge only on the basis of social action.214 According to Weber, under conditions of a market economy, or rather, in the modern capitalist market-economy, or more specifically, within the area in which pure market conditions prevail, the mere ownership of property is only a first step towards the formation of social classes, that is, the control of property is by no means the final factor in determining social stratification. In other words, Weber also identifies other factors contributing to the formation of classes in a real sense. For Weber, social stratification may be shaped, to a lesser or greater degree, by many possible relationships of an individual or group to markets. Thus it can be seen that “it is the nature of chances in the market which is the common factor determining the fate of a number of individuals.”215 In this sense, the “class situation” is ultimately a “market situation.”216 Second, Max Weber viewed social structure as constituted by the social actions of individuals and groups, which is to say, the social actions of individuals and groups that make up the social structure constitute the basic elements of social structure.217 Weber’s sociological thought is quite the opposite of Durkheim’s. Weber and Durkheim that are often seen as being “at opposite poles as social 210

Bryant, Clifton D., & Peck, Dennis L., eds. (2007). 21st Century Sociology: A Reference Handbook, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 229. 211 Hamilton, Peter. (2015). Knowledge and Social Structure: An Introduction to the Classical Argument in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 92. 212 Keister, Lisa A., & Southgate, Darby E. (2012). Inequality: A Contemporary Approach to Race, Class, and Gender. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 47. 213 Gamble, Andrew., Marsh, David., & Tant, Tony., eds. (1999). Marxism and Social Science. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, p. 140. 214 Abrutyn, Seth., & Lizardo, Omar., eds. (2021). Handbook of Classical Sociological Theory. Berlin, DE: Springer Nature, p. 249. 215 Whimster, Sam., ed. (2004). The Essential Weber: A Reader. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 184. 216 Ibid. 217 Swedberg, Richard., & Agevall, Ola. (2005).The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 209.

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theorists” represent “diametrically opposed” approaches to sociological analysis. In his essay “Two sociological traditions,” Reinhard Bendix argues that Durkheim, who “modeled his sociology after the natural sciences,” is representative of the Baconian or Saint-Simonian tradition, in which the major goal is “the discovery of general laws.” In contrast, Weber was heir to a tradition dating back to Burckhardt and Tocqueville, in which the major goal is “to discover the genesis of historical configurations.”218 Durkheim viewed society as an independent entity existing in its own right and apart from the sum of individuals that happen to comprise it, while Weber conceived society as a system made up of social actors linked to one another by ties of different social actions between them, that is to say, society cannot be said to exist apart from individuals and their actions. Rather, society and the collection of individuals that make it up must be understood as integrally tied to one another. It thus can be seen that Weber’s orientation towards sociological solutions as a whole diverges significantly from Durkheim’s social theory. Weber contends that social action should be the object of sociological research and that the social actions of individuals and groups characterized by their subjective orientations constitute the basic building blocks of social structures. In “Basic Concepts of Sociology,” which was written as an introduction to Economy and Society, Weber defined social action as follows: “Action is ‘social’ insofar as its subjective meaning takes into account the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.”219 For Weber, action can be defined as “all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it,”220 and “social action is related in its intended meaning and oriented in its progression to the behavior of others.”221 It is on the basis of the foregoing discussion about the two hypothetical prerequisites that Weber developed a multidimensional approach to social stratification that reflects the interplay between wealth, prestige and power. (2) Weber’s three-component theory of social stratification. Weber formulated a three-component theory of stratification that describes social class as emerging from the interplay between variables of class, status and party and that examines how wealth, prestige and power work together in determining the social stratification of an individual. In his magnum opus Economy and Society, which remains today perhaps the only systematic sociology in world historical and comparative depth, Weber discussed exhaustively the three-component theory of stratification, with class, status and party as conceptually distinct elements. This distinction is most clearly described in Weber’s essay “Class, Status, and Party” which is a far-reaching contribution to social-stratification theory. In this 218

Thompson, Michael., Ellis, Richard., & Wildavsky, Aaron. (2018). Cultural Theory. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 170. 219 Greenwood, John D. (2004). The Disappearance of the Social in American Social Psychology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 81. 220 Campbell, Colin. (1998). The Myth of Social Action. New York, NY: Cambridge University press, p. 30. 221 Ringer, Fritz. (2004). Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 97.

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classic work on social stratification, Weber conceptualized the three-component theory for understanding social hierarchies as the interplay between class, status, and power and “discussed the conceptualization of power in relation to issues of social stratification through ‘class’ (Klasse) and ‘status’ (Stand), seeing these social phenomena as being closely associated with each other.”222 For Weber, class is a fundamentally economic phenomenon,223 which is to say, class based on economic factors is the economic measure of stratification and can thus be defined as the grouping of people according to economic position—or to put it the other way round, social class can be defined as a broad category of people sharing the same economic position. According to Weber, “status refers to a form of social stratification in which social positions are ranked and organized by legal, political, and cultural criteria into status groups.”224 In Weber’s theory of social stratification party forms an additional source of stratification characterized by differential access to political or social power. As Weber pointed out, “in modern times party formation is an important aspect of power and can influence stratification independently of class and status.”225 More specifically, party refers to the ability of political groups and associations to exercise power and influence the social and political system, and parties tend to engage in action “oriented toward the acquisition of social power, that is to say, toward influencing social action no matter what is content may be.”226 First, class and the market situation. In view of the fact that the concept of class plays an important role in Weber’s theory of social stratification, we feel the necessity of examining how Weber formulates the concept of class in Economy and Society. He supplies the following definition of class: “We may speak of a class when a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar as this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor market. This is class situation.”227 It is therefore clear that class situation, for Weber, is identified with market situation. Weber believed that under given market conditions class situation that is founded on objectively given economic conditions tends to be determined by the life chances of the market situation that can be understood as, in Gidden’s terms, “the chances an individual has for sharing in the socially created economic or cultural ‘goods’ that typically exist in any given 222

Hanke, Edith., Scaff, Lawrence A., & Whimster, Sam., eds. (2019). The Oxford Handbook of Max Weber. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 134. 223 Wright, Erik Olin., ed. (2005). Approaches to Class Analysis. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 152. 224 Mennen, Inge. (2011). Power and Status in the Roman Empire, AD 193–284. Leiden, NL: Brill, p. 6. 225 Giddens, Anthony., & Griffiths, Simon. (2006). Sociology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 303. 226 Dillon, Michele. (2020). Introduction to Sociological Theory: Theorists, Concepts, and their Application to the Twenty-First Century. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 141. 227 Swedberg, Richard., & Agevall, Ola. (2005). The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and central Concepts. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 37.

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society” or, more simply, as “the chances that individuals have of gaining access to scarce and valued outcomes.”228 In the modern capitalist market economy people are engaged in economically oriented action. An aggregate of people who share common economic interests in a similar market situation tend to act collectively, or rather, to develop communal social relationships, thereby grouping themselves into different social classes—or to put it the other way round, “for Weber, an individual’s class position is determined by their ‘market situation’. Individuals are grouped together on the basis of a similar position in a market economy.”229 Similar to Marx’s concept, Weber saw a class as made up of people sharing similar or the same economic interests and life chances in a similar economic situation. In Weber’s theory of stratification we can get three significant terms in relation to class, viz. “life chances,” “economic interests” and “market conditions,” which rightly assert themselves as the essential ideas of Weber’s concept of class. Central to Weber’s conceptualization of class is the notion of “life chances,” by which he means “the kind of control or lack of it which the individual has over goods and services and existing possibilities of their exploitation for the attainment of receipts within a given economic order.”230 It is the mutual interaction of these three factors that leads to the formation of social classes. Weber, on the other hand, pointed out that “ownership or non-ownership of material goods or of definite skills constitutes the class situation” and that “it would appear, therefore, that property and the lack of property comprise the basic categories of all class situations.”231 For Weber, the unequal exchange occurs through the intermediary of the market between the propertied classes, among whom are the owners of the means of production, and the non-propertied classes, whose labor the property-owning classes purchase by way of waged employment. Compared with the labor force of the non-propertied class, the capital or land of the propertied class whose livelihood rests principally on the utilization of it is in an essentially advantageous market position. “According to the law of marginal utility, it then follows that using the market as the mode of distribution excludes the ‘propertyless’ from effectively competing with the ‘propertied’ for highly valued goods. In fact, the law of marginal utility produces an effective monopoly for the acquisition of highly valued goods. This monopoly belongs to the propertied. Thus, other things being equal, this mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable deals to those who already have goods, and therefore quite simply are not dependent on trading for their livelihood. Generally then, using the market as the mode of distribution also increases the propertied people’s power in price wars with propertyless people over highly valued goods. Propertyless people have nothing to offer but their labor itself or the products created through their own labor. Unlike the propertied owner, such 228

Wright, Erik Olin., ed. (2005). Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 32. 229 Gamble, Andrew., Marsh, David., & Tant, Tony., eds. (1999). Marxism and Social Science. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, p. 139. 230 Berberoglu, Berch. (2017). Social Theory: Classical and Contemporary – A Critical Perspective. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 37. 231 Hamilton, Peter. (1991). Max Weber: Critical Assessments 2. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 56.

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laborers are forced to use their products and labor in a timely fashion in order to simply eke out the most basic existence.”232 To put it another way, “it is the most elemental economic fact that the way in which the disposition over material property is distributed among a plurality of people, meeting competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange, in itself creates specific life chances. The mode of distribution, in accord with the law of marginal utility, excludes the non-wealthy from competing for highly valued goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives to them a monopoly to acquire such goods. Other things being equal, the mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable deals for all those who, provided with goods, do not necessarily have to exchange them. It increases, at least generally, their power in the price struggle with those who, being propertyless, have nothing to offer but their labor or the resulting products, and who are compelled to get rid of these products in order to subsist at all. The mode of distribution gives to the propertied a monopoly on the possibility of transferring property from the sphere of use as ‘wealth’ to the sphere of ‘capital,’ that is, it gives them the entrepreneurial functions and all chances to share directly or indirectly in returns on capital. All this holds true within the area in which pure market conditions prevail.”233 From what has been discussed above, Weber seems fairly justified in concluding that social class rightly asserts itself as a strictly objective dimension of stratification and that under given market conditions class situation that is founded on objectively given economic conditions tends to be determined by the life chances of the market situation. Second, status and the social honor. To begin with, we will examine how Weber formulated the definition of social status or social honor. As noted earlier, Weber offered a multidimensional view of social stratification in his theoretical scheme. As a general rule, social status refers primarily to the cultural dimension or aspect of stratification based upon such variables as social honor and prestige accorded to people, groups, and organizations in a society. Social status in Weber’s terminology, on the other hand, relates to the common status situations, lifestyles and values shared by a status (or identity) group which, in turn, tends to be bound and distinguished by their shared status situations, values and lifestyles. Hence it may be safely asserted that “all persons who are accorded the same estimations of social honor or prestige and who live the same style-of-life generally fall within the same status group of ‘status situation’.”234 Weber distinguishes “class situation” from “status situation” by contending that status cannot be solely determined by economic factors. Rather, the latter has to be defined according to the distribution of social honor. “In contrast with the ‘class situation’, which is determined by purely economic factors, we shall use the term ‘status situation’ to refer to all those typical components of people’s destinies which are determined by a specific social evaluation of ‘status’, whether positive or 232

Waters, Tony., & Waters, Dagmar., eds. (2015). Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society: New Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification (Tony Waters & Dagmar Waters, Trans.). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 43. 233 Giddens, Anthony., & Held, David., eds. (1982). Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 61. 234 Pandey, Rajendra. (1989). Mainstream Traditions of Social Stratification Theory. New Delhi, IN: Mittal Publications, p. 68.

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negative, when that evaluation is based on some common characteristic shared by many people.”235 Weber argues that the factors determining an individual’s social prestige are multidimensional and that the various factors, such as birth, family background (or family status), etiquette, deportment (or manners), education, breeding (or upbringing), and lifestyles, may all contribute to an individual’s social status. For Weber, members of the same status (or identity) group tend to share a collective identity or strong sense of group affiliation (group identity or “belonging together”). In particular, the privileged status groups or prestige classes who enjoy a higher level of prestige by virtue of their social status (social standing or social position) are more likely to possess a strong sense of superiority in relation to those groups with a feeling of inferiority, thereby consciously marking themselves off from those groups. In what follows, we will concern ourselves with the complex interplay between social class and cultural stratification. Weber asserts that there is no necessary causal relationship between economic resources and cultural resources, insofar as economic resources are convertible to cultural resources. To put it simply, economic resources cannot be identified with cultural resources. Weber admits that in reality separation of class from status is a fairly common phenomenon, that is, a disjuncture between class position and status position is liable to occur in the real world. In actual fact, at any given moment there is often likely to be some discrepancy between the economic power of a social group and the social esteem, respect, or admiration that a society confers on the social group. Moreover, even where wealth and social honor are roughly on a par, social esteem or respect tends not to go hand in hand with private wealth.236 Wealth cannot ensure the new rich any chances of securing for themselves a position in a privileged status group. Both propertied and propertyless people can belong to the same status group. Weber suggests that it is a complex combination o factors including their family background, history, lifestyles, education, and breeding that leads to the above paradoxical situation. “Precisely because of the rigorous reactions against the claims of property per se, privileged status groups have for that reason never accepted the ‘parvenu’ personally, and genuinely without reservations, however completely he has adopted their way of life; it is his descendents who are first accepted, since they have been brought up within the status conventions of their social stratum and have never defiled their standing as members of the status group by their own employment for gain.”237 Third, party and the power. In Weber’s multidimensional theory of stratification political power constitutes the basis of a third dimension of stratification. Weber defined power as “the probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” and as “the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others 235

Runciman, W. G., ed. (1978). Max Weber: Selections in Translation (Eric Matthews, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 48. 236 Parkin, Frank. (2002). Max Weber. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 96. 237 Runciman, W. G., ed. (1978). Max Weber: Selections in Translation (Eric Matthews, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 53.

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who are participating in the action.”238 Weber has defined a political party “as a voluntary society of propaganda and agitations, seeking to acquire power in order to procure chances for its active adherents to realize objective aims or personal advantages or both,” which is to say, according to Weber, “The end to which [a party’s] activity is devoted is to secure power within a corporate group for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members.”239 In other words, political parties can be defined as groups organized for the purpose of seeking and seizing political power, of pursuing and safeguarding their economic interests, and of seeking and maintaining their social statuses. Inequalities in the political sphere tend to manifest themselves in the hierarchical distribution of political power and authority, which Weber also highlights as the key aspect of social inequalities in modern societies.240 Weber sees bureaucracy as central to comprehending modern society,241 and his theory of bureaucracy constitutes an important contribution to the study of the question as well as to the sociology of knowledge.242 First, Weber defined authority as legitimate power, maintaining that power and authority tend to provide the basis of social stability and thereby to rightly assert themselves as the underlying factors conducive to social order and stability. Second, Weber distinguished three types of legitimate authority: rational-legal authority derived from the legality of normative rules, traditional authority as in the sanctity of traditions and status, and charismatic authority, or authority ordained by one’s character or heroic nature.243 In contrasting the rational-legal type of authority system as manifested in bureaucratic organizations with traditional and charismatic authority systems, Weber seemed fairly justified in concluding that bureaucracy would be the most rational and efficient form of organization for modern societies. Weber also contrasted different forms of social organization, asserting with emphasis that bureaucratic organization represents the triumph of instrumental rationality as applied to various forms of social organization,244 such as churches, states, armies, political parties, economic enterprises, private associations, clubs, and many others. In modern industrial societies characterized by the growth and ubiquity of large-scale bureaucratic organizations, a majority of resources tend to be controlled largely by bureaucratic organizations, 238 Lukes, Steven. (1986). Power. New York, NY: New York University Press, pp. 1–17. cf. Rubin, Edward L. (2005). Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 76–84. See also, Pandey, Rajendra. (1989). Mainstream Traditions of Social Stratification Theory. New Delhi, IN: Mittal Publications, p. 80. 239 Rustow, Dankwart A. (2015). Politics of Compromise. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 228. 240 Wright, Erik Olin. (2005).Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 161. 241 Michie, Jonathan., ed. (2013). Reader’s Guide to the Social Sciences. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 139. 242 Burke, Peter. (2000). A Social History of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Polity Press, pp. 4–5. 243 Calhoun, Craig. (2002). Dictionary of the Social Sciences. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 26. 244 Johnson, Doyle Paul. (2008). Contemporary Sociological Theory: An Integrated Multi-Level Approach. New York, NY: Springer Science & Business Media, p. 37.

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rather than by individual members. Taking the above into account, it can be concluded that formal or legal authority is always a matter of position—it belongs to the position, not to the person in an organization, that is, formal or legal authority tends to be vested in organizational positions—it is not personal characteristics or resources but rather the positions he or she holds in an organization that decides about authority of a person.245 Precisely, “the organizational authority is the right inherent in managerial position to make decisions, give direction, give orders and expect them to be obeyed, reward or punish those lower in hierarchy and to select actions affecting part or the whole of an organization.”246 More generally, “authority may result from an explicit or implicit contract allocating the right to decide on specified matters to a member or group of members of the organization.”247 From what has been discussed above, we may safely assert that various types of resources with which bureaucratic organizations are endowed are in fact placed in the hands of such controllers as officials and managers, who must, of necessity, occupy higher positions in a bureaucratic structure as well as in a social hierarchy, compared with individuals in lower positions. To sum up, as noted above, Weber’s three dimensions of stratification—the economic, the cultural and the political, which tend to be closely interrelated and mutually dependent, led him to develop a multidimensional approach to social stratification. In his three-component theory of stratification, Weber attached more importance to cultural stratification, asserting with emphasis that cultural stratification can be the basis for economic and political stratification. There is, however, no necessary causal relationship between these three dimensions of stratification. Under certain social conditions each of these three dimensions of stratification can rightly assert itself as the central axis of stratification. As such, Weber’s multidimensional theory of stratification appeared perfectly suited to capturing the reality of social stratification in a society characterized by a market economy, or rather, in modern capitalist societies. In formulating his multidimensional theory of stratification, Weber delved into the origins of social stratification, explored the complex mechanisms for social change, and pursued the rational solutions to the problem of social stratification. It may be safely asserted that we can gain a good deal of enlightenment from Weber’s original ideas on social stratification.

3.4 Bruno Latour’s Theory of “Group Structure” Bruno Latour, French philosopher, sociologist and anthropologist, who rightly asserts himself as one of the leading figures in social sciences today and deservedly ranks among the top foundational figures in science and technology studies, has been 245

Bezzina, Frank., & Cassar, Vincent., eds. (2021). Proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Management Leadership and Governance. Reading, UK: Academic Conference International Limited, p. 307. 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid.

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widely recognized as a leader of the Paris school of sociology, or more specifically, as a pioneer in the field of actor-network theory, whose innovative and iconoclastic work in the study of science and technology in society forms a substantial contribution of permanent value to the sociology of scientific knowledge as well as to the development of actor-network theory. In his seminal work Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, co-authored with Steve Woolgar, Latour “began to explore the laboratory as a kind of anthropological field,”248 claiming to use an anthropological approach to the study of life and science in the laboratory,249 where “scientists constitute a tribe whose daily manipulation and production of objects is in danger of being misunderstood, if accorded the high status with which its outputs are sometimes greeted by the outside world,”250 which is to say, “Latour pioneered what he thought of as an ‘ethnographic’ or ‘anthropological’ study of scientists and engineers at work,”251 seeking to capture in detail “the everyday laboratory practices of science” and technology that “may give very interesting new perspectives on the construction of scientific beliefs or knowledge in the scientific community.”252 Admittedly, whether it be Latour’s “micro-sociological or laboratory studies approach,” which “features ethnographic study of particular research groups, tracing the myriad activities and interactions that eventuate in the production and acceptance of a scientific fact or datum,”253 whether it be his actor-network theory (usually abbreviated to ANT), which provides us with a unique socio-technical perspective and rightly asserts itself as a system of its own, and which “attempts to disengage constructivism from what he considers an overemphasis on human intention in order to bring the material layers of the network into focus,”254 or whether it be his seminal work Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-NetworkTheory, in which Latour endeavors “to show why the social cannot be construed as a kind of material or domain and to dispute the project of providing a ‘social explanation’ of some other state of affairs, and in which “after having done extensive work

248

Lampland, Martha., & Star, Susan Leigh., eds. (2009). Standards and Their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying, and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 19. 249 Greenhouse, Carol J., Mertz, Elizabeth., & Warren, Kay B., eds. (2002). Ethnography in Unstable Places: Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dramatic Political Change. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, p. 122. 250 Latour, Bruno., & Woolgar, Steve. (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 29. 251 Benton, Ted., & Craib, Ian. (2011). Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of Social Thought. London, UK: Macmillan International Higher Education, p. 69. 252 Niiniluoto, IIkka. (1999). Critical Scientific Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 269. 253 Longino, Helen, “The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 254 Feenberg, Andrew. (2017). Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 47.

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on the ‘assemblages’ of nature,” he believes “it’s necessary to scrutinize more thoroughly the exact content of what is ‘assembled’ under the umbrella of a society,”255 Latour’s innovative and iconoclastic studies in the areas mentioned above have left a deep and enduring mark upon social scientific academic circles. For Latour, “to be faithful to the experience of the social, we have to take up three different duties in succession: deployment, stabilization, and composition.”256 First, by “deployment” Latour means that in the real life-world any uncertainty as to what counts in a given situation has to be rendered traceable whereby ANT at our disposal can “render the social world as flat as possible in order to ensure that the establishment of any new link is clearly visible,”257 that is, “we first have to learn how to deploy controversies so as to gauge the number of new participants in any future assemblage.”258 Thus, according to Latour, “we should not limit in advance the sort of beings populating the social world. Social sciences have become much too timid in deploying the sheer complexity of the associations they have encountered. …it’s possible to feed, so to speak, off controversies and learn how to become good relativists—surely an indispensable preparation before venturing into new territory.”259 Second, Latour means by “stabilization” that “we have to be able to follow how the actors themselves stabilize those controversies arising from uncertainty by building formats, standards, and metrologies.”260 As Latour suggests, the aforementioned means allowing actors to stabilize those controversies can be used as effective methods and be readily available to actors, thus deserving to be kept. Third, by “composition” Latour means that the involvement of a multiplicity of actors in myriad processes and procedures would make it possible to “reassemble the social not in a society but in a collective.”261 In Latour’s words, “we want to see how the assemblages thus gathered can renew our sense of being in the same collective.”262 From what has been discussed above, we may safely assert that actor network theory provides us with a unique socio-technical perspective and rightly asserts itself as a system of its own. Broadly speaking, actor network theory, along with other constructivist approaches to the study of science and technology, is commonly described as a constructivist approach in that “Latour seems to take emergence as an important feature of reality and argues for a particular ontology of the world as inhabited by agents with their own ‘irreducible powers, capabilities, propensities, etc., interacting and remaking the world in a continuous process of interaction’.”263 Moreover, actor network theory offers 255

Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–2. 256 Ibid., p. 249. 257 Ibid., p. 16. 258 Ibid., p. 249. 259 Ibid., p. 16. 260 Ibid., p. 249. 261 Ibid., p. 16. 262 Ibid., p. 249. 263 Lawson, Clive. (2017). Technology and Isolation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 45.

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a theoretical framework for understanding social structure and has been influential in constructivist discussions of social structure. Considering actor network theory embraces the actual contents as they are, we feel the necessity of providing it with a fuller description. (1) As discussed above, actor-network theory is a theoretical and methodological approach to social theory as well as a constructivist approach to the study of science and technology. However, “it is important to see actor-network theory not as complete in itself and well developed theory,” but as a theoretical prerequisite (or position) within the broader debate of the studies of the sociology of associations as well as of the sociology of technology.264 In his seminal work Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Bruno Latour inaugurates a new sociological paradigm named “sociology of associations” or “associology” which is opposite to the standard sociology of the social.265 “This is what distinguishes Latour’s sociology from the prevailing disciplinary models that trace back to Durkheim. While traditional sociology (which Latour calls the ‘sociology of the social’) takes social aggregates as already given, Latour’s ‘sociology of associations’ focuses on how social aggregates are connected together.”266 In Bruno Latour’s words, “Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists, socio-linguists, social psychologists, etc.) take social aggregates as the given that could shed some light on residual aspects of economics, linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other scholars, on the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained by the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology, law, management, etc.”267 In Latour’s view, traditional sociology tends to “posit the existence of a specific sort of phenomenon variously called ‘society,’ ‘social order,’ ‘social practice,’ ‘social dimension,’ or ‘social structure.’ For the last century during which social theories have been elaborated, it has been important for traditional sociology to distinguish its own special domain of reality from other domains such as economics, geography, biology, psychology, law, science, and politics.”268 “A given trait was said to be ‘social’ or to ‘pertain to society’ when traditional sociology could be defined as possessing specific properties.”269 Generally speaking, traditional sociology tends to make recourse to “social factors” as starting points for describing and explaining society. Despite this fact, this sort of explanation characterized by needless repetition can be 264

Avgerou, Chrisanthi. (2002). Information Systems and Global Diversity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 59. 265 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–17. 266 Concannon, Cavan W. (2017). Assembling Early Christianity: Trade, Networks, and the Letters of Dionysios of Corinth. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 51. 267 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 5. 268 Ibid., p. 3. 269 Ibid.

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of little avail, or rather, nothing more than a tautology, if traditional sociologists still cling to the belief that “the social could explain the social.”270 Bruno Latour claims that “there is nothing specific to social order; that there is no social dimension of any sort, no ‘social context,’ no distinct domain of reality to which the label ‘social’ or ‘society’ could be attributed; that “there is no such a thing as a society;” and that ‘society,’ far from being the context ‘in which’ everything is framed, should rather be construed as one of the many connecting elements circulating inside tiny conduits.”271 Specifically, “even though most social scientists would prefer to call ‘social’ a homogeneous thing, it’s perfectly acceptable to designate by the same word a trail of associations between heterogeneous elements.”272 Bruno Latour avows his sympathy with the second sociological paradigm or the second version of sociology, or more specifically, “sociology of associations”, which has become known as “actor-network-theory”. Latour’s use of the concept “network” in actor-network theory, which tends to form a source of misunderstanding,273 should not be confused with the conception of a network either in the everyday sense of the word or in the sociological usage of the term,274 nor with the conventional notion of a social network.275 Rather, Latour asserts that “Network is a concept, not a thing out there. It is a tool to help describe something, not what is being described.”276 By traditional network we mean the “net” drawn with a pen, while by actor-network Latour means the pen used as a tool of expression. As stated above, actor-network theory (generally shortened to ANT) rightly asserts itself as a theoretical and methodological approach to social theory. To be more precise, ANT is not a theory pertaining to what is described, but rather “a theory about how to learn or study what makes up collective life—by letting the actors have some room to express themselves and by being attentive to their enunciations.”277 Latour’s innovative and iconoclastic method for reassembling the social can then be extended under the rubric of “actor-network theory,” alternatively, and more appropriately, called “sociology of translation” or “actant-rhyzome ontology.”278 (2) Bruno Latour introduced and developed three key concepts, viz. “actor,” “mediator” and “network,” to illuminate ANT, and utilized them as starting points for research. First, in developing his original conception of “actor,” Latour tried to 270

Ibid. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 272 Ibid., p. 5. 273 Vries, Gerard de. (2016). Bruno Latour. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 92. 274 MacKenzie, Donald A. (1998). Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, p. 281. 275 Vries, Gerard de. (2016). Bruno Latour. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 92. 276 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 131. 277 Vries, Gerard de. (2016). Bruno Latour. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 88. 278 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 9. 271

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endow the sociological concept with two defining characteristics, that is “freedom” and “ubiquity,” for the sake of conceptual clarification. By the “freedom” inherent in the concept of “actor” Latour means that actors enable freedom of action. He rejects the functionalist approach to understanding actors as free agents performing predetermined functions at particular loci. For Bruno Latour, any such agent, far from rightly asserting itself as an actor in the proper sense of the term, can itself be treated either as a semiotic sign or as a “black box.” As Latour has argued, actors are not treated as intermediaries, but rather as mediators. In the words of Bruno Latour, the acts of a mediator tend to be involved in the transformation of the contingent circumstances as well as in the translation of the available information. By the second distinguishing characteristic—“ubiquity,” with which the concept of “actor” is endowed, Latour means that ANT is a heterogeneous amalgamation of human and non-human actors, that an actant, which is consistently synonymous or virtually interchangeable with an actor,279 is “neither an object nor a subject but an ‘intervener’… an operator which by virtue of its particular location in an assemblage and the fortuity of being in the right place in the right time, makes the difference, makes things happen, becomes the decisive force catalyzing an event,”280 and that actors in ANT, known as actants, which are sources of action that can be either human or nonhuman, include both human beings and non-human actors such as ideas, technologies, institutions, and biological organisms. Second, while the sociology of the social, as Latour has polemically argued, “limits itself to describing and explaining human social actions and the social structures that constrain their action,”281 ANT “follows the actors in their weaving through things they have added to social skills so as to render more durable the constantly shifting interactions.”282 To be more precise, we feel the necessity of introducing two technical terms. “An intermediary,” Latour insists, “is what transports meaning or force without transformation: defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs. For all practical purposes, an intermediary can be taken not only as a black box, but also as a black box counting for one, even if it is internally made of many parts.”283 In contrast, “mediators cannot be counted as just one; they might count for one, for nothing, for several, or for infinity. Their input is never a good predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time. Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.”284 Furthermore, Latour is emphatic 279

McGee, Kyle. (2014). Bruno Latour: The Normativity of Networks. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 49. 280 Navaro, Yael., Biner, Zerrin Özlem., Bieberstein, Alice von., & Altuˇ g, Seda., eds. (2021). Reverberations: Violence Across Time and Space. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 164. 281 Vries, Gerard de. (2016). Bruno Latour. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 90. 282 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 68. 283 Ibid., p. 39. 284 Ibid.

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in his assertion that “no matter how complicated an intermediary is, it may, for all practical purposes, count for just one—or even for nothing at all because it can be easily forgotten,” whereas “no matter how apparently simple a mediator may look, it may become complex; it may lead in multiple directions which will modify all the contradictory accounts attributed to its role.”285 Essentially, a mediator can be understood either as an attitude towards the actor or as a view on it. Third, “ANT has a different conceptualization of the network,” which is to say, “the network in ANT gains a different meaning from the common understanding of networks such as the Internet and social networks.”286 The network in ANT is far from assuming or elucidating networks as stable structures that can be mapped or pictured, but rather “explains networks as cumulative and dynamic collections of interactions, which change continually.”287 Networks, for Latour, are the emergent properties of movements and relations, a series of actions and mediations, and a collection of interactions. “A network in ANT,” as Latour holds, “is a collection of heterogeneous actors that align their interest to perform an action.”288 In other words, “the network makes actants act in a certain way. Hence, action in ANT is a characteristic of the network because there are many actants that are involved in enacting a specific action.”289 As such, actor-networks tend to exist in a constant process of making and becoming. Furthermore, as Latour has stated, the network in ANT may refer to “any connection established between human and non-human actors in a social sequence of events,” and the concept of “network” can be used to “highlight the dynamic process whereby new connections are created and changed.”290 Thus, Latour is emphatic in asserting that “network is an expression to check how much energy, movement, and specificity our own reports are able to capture. Network is a concept, not a thing out there. It is a tool to help describe something, not what is being described.”291 (3) Five uncertainties or controversies. Latour identifies and discusses five “sources of uncertainty” or controversies regarding the “social world” in actor network theory (ANT). First, groups tend to exist in an ongoing process of formation and thus to undergo constant change. For Latour, groups are not stable but rather in a constant process of becoming, classification, regrouping and collapse. If people are no longer concerned about the on-going process of formation and change relating to one group or another, they will be most likely to form an empty 285

Ibid. Dahlgaard-Park, Su Mi., ed. (2015). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Quality and the Service Economy. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 11–12. 287 Ibid. 288 Ibid., p. 11. 289 Ibid., p. 12. 290 Blok, Anders., & Jensen, Torben Elgaard. (2011). Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid World. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 167. 291 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 131. 286

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conception of group barren of all thought. As Latour has argued, “there are no groups, only group formation,”292 that is, groups are constantly in a state of flux: “there is no relevant group that can be said to make up social aggregates, no established component that can be used as an incontrovertible point.”293 Second, on the one hand actions occur, but on the other, actions are overtaken. According to Latour, “action is overtaken or action is other-taken! So it is taken up by others and shared with the masses. It is mysteriously carried out and at the same time distributed to others.”294 “For the social sciences to regain their initial energy, it’s crucial not to conflate all the agencies overtaking the action into some kind of agency—‘society,’ ‘culture,’ ‘structure,’ ‘fields,’ ‘individuals,’ or whatever name they are given—that would itself be social. Action should remain a surprise, a mediation, an event.”295 Latour defines an actor or actant as “something that acts or to which activity is granted by others.”296 That is to say, “an actor is what is made to act by many others”—or to put it the other way round, “an ‘actor’ in the hyphenated expression actor-network is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming toward it.”297 Hence it may be safely asserted that any course of course is not initiated by the actor or actant itself, but rather is caused by others. Furthermore, “the direction of the action is uncertain,”298 and “any course of action will thread a trajectory through completely foreign modes of existence that have been brought together by heterogeneous actors.”299 Actions are not controlled, continuous, fixed, or predetermined. In Latour’s words, action “is not a coherent, controlled, wellrounded, and clean-edged affair.”300 Rather, many forces combine to produce an action or to make actions occur, which is to say, actions can be attributed to the influence of many forces. For Latour, “by definition, action is dislocated. Action is borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, and translated.”301 In other words, actions that are continually subjected to influences of many kinds tend to undergo constant change or transformation. As Latour suggests, to grasp the various forces that combine to produce actions and have them overtaken by others, or rather, to understand the contours, detours and sedimentations of power in an assemblage of actions, “you have ‘to follow the actors 292

Ibid., p. 27. Ibid., p. 29. 294 Ibid., p. 45. 295 Ibid. 296 George-Graves, Nadine., ed. (2015). The Oxford Handbook of Dance and Theater. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 500. 297 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 46. 298 Latour, Bruno. (2013). An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence (Catherine Porter, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 158. 299 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 75. 300 Ibid., p. 46. 301 Ibid. 293

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themselves’, that is try to catch up with their often wild innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish.”302 Third, Latour’s innovative and iconoclastic work in the study of social phenomena is to extend the sociological concept of an actor to include a potentially infinite range of social, natural and/or technological phenomena, that is include objects and non-human entities. Latour’s definition of what it means to “act” can be either human or non-human. For him, “action” is always composite, and agency is embodied in humans as well as in non-humans, which is to say, agency is therefore perceived as a “distributed phenomenon,” residing not only in humans but also in objects as well as in their “intra-actions.”303 Admittedly, “Latour’s critical contribution to a social theory of objects is his claim that not only humans but also nonhuman things have agency.”304 Thus, the ANT theory of “action” should be extended to include both human and non-human actions and be reserved for humans as well as for non-human entities. As Latour has argued, “Social action is not only taken over by aliens, it is also shifted or delegated to different types of actors which are able to transport the action further through other modes of action, other types of forces altogether. …If action is limited a priori to what ‘intentional,’ ‘meaningful’ humans do, it is hard to see how a hammer, a basket, a door closer, a cat, a rug, a list, or a tag could act. They might exist in the domain of ‘material’ ‘causal’ relations, but not in the ‘reflexive’ ‘symbolic’ domain of social relations. By contrast, if we stick to our decision to start form the controversies about actors and agencies, then anything that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor—or, if it has no figuration yet, an actant. Thus, the questions to ask about any agent are simply the following: Does it make a difference in the course of some other agent’s action or not? Is there some trial that allows someone to detect this difference?”305 In Latour’s words, objects are also mediators that have the capacity to “transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.”306 Latour contends that objects or non-human actors “are mutable entities that are both complex and essential to understanding the social world and that “are significant in explaining human and non-human actions in that they are actors that have power and influence.”307 As such, the ANT conception of objects or non-human actors “decentralizes humans as the sole 302

Ibid., p. 12. Eming, Jutta., & Starkey, Kathryn., eds. (2021). Things and Thingness in European Literature and Visual Art, 700–1600. Berlin, DE: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, p. 131. 304 Tischleder, Babette Bärbel. (2014). The Literary Life of Things: Case Studies in American Fiction. Frankfurt, DE: Campus Verlag GmbH, p. 28. 305 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 70–71. 306 Ibid., p. 39. 307 McAtackney, Laura. (2014). An Archaeology of the Troubles: The Dark Heritage of Long Kesh /Maze Prison. New York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 103. 303

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site of influence in the world. …For Latour, each and every thing, unique at each given moment, is inextricably intertwined through mediators with other things and can act upon them without there being any necessity for intent or cognition on behalf of that thing.”308 Therefore, when we devote ourselves to the study of the complexity and multiplicity of objects’ or non-human actors’ actions, we should follow Alfred Gell’s contention that “a thing can appear as an agent, temporarily becoming a locus of agency either of its owners or its own, in particular social situations” and that “agency is relational and contextdependent.”309 Fourth, Latour addressed the distinction between matters of fact and matters of concern in order to propose a new way to look at “things.” The real connection between things, as Latour holds, is the social itself that is constructed from these associations and their movements. For Latour, “Social is nowhere in particular as a thing among other things but may circulate everywhere as a movement connecting non-social things.”310 We have to unravel the connection between things before we understand what the social is. To make this possible, we have to “shift the world of matters of fact to the worlds of matters of concern,”311 that is, “we have to shift from an impoverished repertoire of intermediaries to a highly complex and highly controversial set of mediators.”312 Moreover, “when we list the qualities of an ANT account, we will make sure that when agencies are introduced they are never presented simply as matters of fact but always as matters of concern, with their mode of fabrication and their stabilizing mechanisms clearly visible.”313 Latour asserts with emphasis that “Once the artificial boundary between social and natural was removed, nonhuman entities were able to appear under an unexpected guise. …Empiricism no longer appears as the solid bedrock on which to build everything else, but as a very poor rendering of experience. This poverty, however, is not overcome by moving away from material experience, for instance to the ‘rich human subjectivity,’ but closer to the much variegated lives materials have to offer.”314 Fifth, the fifth source of uncertainty is about how to write down risky accounts that tend to realize all of the above uncertainties. The purpose of a risky account is, in Latour’s words, to “extend the exploration of the social connections a

308

Whybray, Adam. (2020). The Art of Czech Animation: A History of Political Dissent and Allegory. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 95. 309 McAtackney, Laura. (2014). An Archaeology of the Troubles: The Dark Heritage of Long Kesh /Maze Prison. New York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 103. 310 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 107. 311 IbiD., p. 116. 312 Ibid., p. 118. 313 Ibid., p. 120. 314 Ibid., pp. 111–112.

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little bit further.”315 According to Latour, “textual accounts are the social scientist’s laboratory” and they “can fail like experiments often do.”316 However, “it seems that too often sociologists of the social are simply trying to ‘fix a world on paper’ as if this activity was never in risk of failing. If that is the case, there is no way they can succeed, since the world they wish to capture remains invisible because the mediating constraints of writing are either ignored or denied. No matter what pains they have taken to be accurate during the course of their inquiries, their textual account has been missed.”317 Moreover, “the dissemination of rather simple-minded visual representations” (or graphs), which is endowed with “the drawback of not capturing movements and of being visually poor,” will inevitably lead to “the very poverty of graphical representation.”318 “Masses of social agents might have been invoked in the text, but since the principle of their assembly remains unknown and the cost of their expansion has not been paid, it’s as if nothing was happening. No matter what their figuration is, they don’t do very much. Since the reassembling of new aggregates has not been rendered traceable through the text, it’s as if the social world had not been made to exist.”319 With the above situation in view, Latour maintains that “a text, in our definition of social science” should be thus deserving of “a test on how many actors the writer is able to treat as mediators and how far he or she is able to achieve the social.”320 For Latour, “a good text elicits networks of actors when it allows the writer to trace a set of relations defined as so many translations,” while “in a bad text only a handful of actors will be designated as the causes of all the others, which will have no other function than to serve as a backdrop or relay for the flows of causal efficacy.”321 “In keeping with the logic of our interest in textual reports and accounting,” as Latour suggests, “it might be useful to list the different notebooks one should keep—manual or digital, it no longer matters much. The first notebook should be reserved as a log of the enquiry itself. …A second notebook should be kept for gathering information in such a way that it is possible simultaneously to keep all the items in a chronological order and to dispatch them into categories which will evolve later into more and more refined files and subfiles. …A third notebook should be always at hand for ad libitum writing trials. …A fourth type of notebook should be carefully kept to register the effects of the written account on the actors whose world has been either deployed or unified.”322

315

Ibid., p. 128. Ibid., p. 127. 317 Ibid., pp. 127–128. 318 Ibid., pp. 132–133. 319 Ibid., p. 131. 320 Ibid., pp. 128–129. 321 Ibid., pp. 129–130. 322 Ibid., pp. 134–135. 316

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(4) As has been discussed above, Latour’s original conceptualization of “stabilization” and “composition” is geared toward expanding upon his actor-networktheory. Latour means by “stabilization” that “we have to be able to follow how the actors themselves stabilize those controversies arising from uncertainty by building formats, standards, and metrologies.”323 By “composition” Latour means that the involvement of a multiplicity of actors in myriad processes and procedures would make it possible to “reassemble the social not in a society but in a collective.”324 In Latour’s words, “we want to see how the assemblages thus gathered can renew our sense of being in the same collective.”325 After having had an adequate discussion on the five major uncertainties mentioned above, Latour began to focus his chief attention upon the problem of how to “reassemble the social.” Latour argues for an “anctant –rhizome ontology,”326 insisting that “starting almost anyplace will provide traces, vestiges, and linkages to other nodes or actors in the network” and that “the establishment of every link in complex interlocking sets of associations is visible.”327 Latour suggests three analytically separate but deeply related moves by which an actornetwork analysis proceeds: localizing the global, redistributing the local, and connecting the sites. As Latour has argued, “we will first relocate the global so as to break down the automatism that leads from interaction to ‘Context’; we will then redistribute the local so as to understand why interaction is such an abstraction; and finally, we will connect the sites revealed by the two former moves, highlighting the various vehicles that make up the definition of the social understood as association.”328 In the chapter entitled “First Move: Localizing the Global” of his seminal work Reassembling the Social, Latour emphasizes the importance of examining connectivity itself: “We have to lay continuous connections leading from one local interaction to the other places, times, and agencies through which a local site is made to do something. This means that we have to follow the path indicated by the process of delegation or translation.”329 In the chapter entitled “Second Move: Redistributing the Local” of the same book, Latour notes that “what has been designated by the term ‘local interaction’ is the assemblage of all the other local interactions distributed elsewhere in time and space, which have been brought to bear on the scene through the relays of various non-human actors.”330 In the chapter entitled “Third Move: 323

Ibid., p. 249. Ibid., p. 16. 325 Ibid., p. 249. 326 Ibid., p. 9. 327 Fraiberg, Steven., Wang, Xi-Qiao., & You, Xiao-Ye. (2017). Inventing the World Grant University: Chinese International Students’ Mobilities, Literacies, and Identities. Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, p. 15. 328 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 172. 329 Ibid., p. 173. 330 Ibid., p. 194. 324

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Connecting Sites” of the aforementioned work, Latour contends that “through tracing chains of activity across multiple sites we were able to identify complex connections between them.”331 In taking up three different duties in succession, viz. deployment, stabilization, and composition, Latour does care to fulfill the last duty, namely composition. He concludes his book by tackling the question of what he has called political epistemology, or more specifically, “the ontological question of the unity of this common world.”332 As Latour has argued, “two other sets of procedures should be brought into the foreground: a first set that makes the deployment of actors visible” and that renders possible the analysis of the five sources of uncertainty; “and a second that makes the unification of the collective into a common world” which is “acceptable to those who will be unified” and, more importantly, which is “to render the cohabitation possible.”333 “It’s because of the first set that ANT looks more like a disinterested science combating the urge of sociology to legislate in the actor’s stead. It’s because of the second set that ANT should most resemble a political engagement as it criticizes the production of a science of society supposed to be invisible to the eyes of the ‘informants’ and claims by some avant-garde to know better.”334 To this, Latour adds philosophically that “something like disinterestedness is offered by the deployment of the four sources of uncertainty reviewed earlier, while engagement comes from the possibility offered by the fifth uncertainty of helping assemble in part the collective, that is, to give it an arena, a forum, a space, a representation through the very modest medium of some risky account that is most of the time a fragile intervention consisting only of text.”335 To sum up, Latour’s actor-network theory (usually abbreviated to ANT) provides us with a unique socio-technical perspective and rightly asserts itself as a system of its own. His innovative and iconoclastic studies in the domains of human society, science and technology have left a deep and enduring mark upon social scientific academic circles. In particular, we are deeply impressed that Latour accentuates the importance of human and non-human agencies and does care to elaborate more fully upon this point. Nonetheless, it should be noted that his theory has obvious limitations. Let us take a concrete example to serve as an illustration. In mapping those metaphysical innovations, his theory involves a strong dedication to relativism. It therefore follows that Latour tends to have his theoretical models and frameworks predicated upon metaphysical assumptions in the hope of producing a closer approximation to reality. Thus far his theory,

331

Fraiberg, Steven., Wang, Xi-Qiao., & You, Xiao-Ye. (2017). Inventing the World Grant University: Chinese International Students’ Mobilities, Literacies, and Identities. Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, p. 17. 332 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 259. 333 Ibid., pp. 256, 259. 334 Ibid., p. 256. 335 Ibid.

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far from being universally accepted within the academic community, has been the subject of animated controversy.

3.5 Arnold Toynbee’s Theory of “Group Structure” Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975), one of the most remarkable thinkers of this century as well as the most famous historian of his time, won world-wide recognition as the author of the massive and monumental work of historical science A Study of History in twelve volumes. Toynbee did not bring out any scholarly work devoted exclusively to the study of social or civilizational structures. Despite this fact, some of Toynbee’s basic assumptions about civilizational structures, which stand out conspicuously in his treasure-house of ideas on history and civilization, rightly assert themselves as the necessary prerequisites for analyzing and explaining civilizational phenomena. In what follows, we will set out to summarize his theories and assumptions about civilizational structures and to provide a judicious evaluation of his intellectual legacy for the study of history. (1) Toynbee’s assumptions about civilizational structures and frameworks. “By ‘civilization’ Toynbee means not a mere ‘field of historical study’ but a united system, or the whole, whose parts are connected with one another by causal ties.”336 In Toynbee’s own words, “Civilizations are wholes whose parts all cohere with one another and all affect one another reciprocally… It is one of the characteristics of civilizations in process of growth that all aspects and activities of their social life are co-ordinated into a single whole, in which the economic, political, and cultural elements are kept in a nice adjustment with one another by an inner harmony of the growing body social.”337 For Toynbee, these three elements—the economic, the political, and the cultural—are not only inherent in civilizational structures but also are in harmony with one another.338 Meantime, Toynbee holds that the human elements of civilization, or rather, creative minorities (or dominant minorities), internal proletariats, and external proletariats,339 are almost on a par with the above three elements in importance. Moreover, Toynbee attaches great importance to “creative minorities,” believing that the possession or failure of creative power in the creative minority tends to constitute one of the fundamental reasons for the rise and fall of civilizations as well as for the growth and decline of historical societies.340 336

Sorokin, Pitirim A. (1956). “Toynbee’s Philosophy of History.” In Toynbee and History: Critical Essays and Reviews, ed. M. F. Ashley Montagu. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, pp. 179–180. 337 Toynbee, Arnold J. (1956). A Study of History, Volume 3. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p. 380. 338 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 123. 339 Ibid., pp. 370–372. 340 Toynbee, Arnold J. (1986). A Study of History (Wei-Feng Caoet al., Trans.). Shanghai, China: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, pp. 248, 455–457.

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(2) Toynbee’s formula of challenge and response. In Toynbee’s view civilizations’ survival can be explained by the formula of challenge and response that has been widely read and pondered,341 or rather, in terms of responses to challenges emanating from the external environment.342 To put it the other way round, the growth and decline of historical societies can be understood as a challenge and response interaction between societies and their environments,343 which is to say, the rise and fall of civilizations can be viewed in terms of the inexorable dynamics of challenge and response. As Toynbee has argued, “man achieves civilization, not as a result of superior biological endowment or geographical environment, but as a response to a challenge in a situation of special difficulty which rouses him to make a hitherto unprecedented effort.”344 According to Toynbee, the external environment can be subdivided into “the human environment, which for any society consists of the other human societies with which it finds itself in contact, and the physical environment constituted by non-human nature.”345 For him, any society or civilization is almost invariably confronted with myriad pressures and challenges emanating from the external environment, either human or physical, that is, formidable pressures and challenges originating either from the human environment or from the physical environment are always presented to societies or civilizations. Each society or civilization when faced with a multitude of external pressures and challenges has to respond by addressing them in myriad ways, for example by taking the form of removing external pressures, of surmounting external obstacles or of overcoming external adversaries. It therefore follows that the origin and growth of civilization can be viewed as a result of successful responses to a succession of challenges and that, by contrast, failure to respond successfully to successive challenges either can arrest the development of civilization or can result in an inevitable demise of civilization. (3) The genesis, growth, decline and breakdown of civilizations depend fundamentally upon civilizational structures. In setting forth this argument, we shall find it convenient to subdivide it into the following three points. First, the genesis of civilizations. Toynbee asserts that “if the geneses of civilizations are not the result of biological factors or of geographical environment acting separately, they must be the result of some kind of interaction between them. In other words, the factor which we are seeking to identify is something not simple but multiple, 341

Wolin, Sheldon S. (2016). Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 730. 342 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 357–358. 343 Fraser, J. T. (2021). Of Time, Passion, and Knowledge: Reflections on the Strategy of Existence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 165. 344 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 357–358. 345 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p.189.

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not an entity but a relation.”346 To put it another way, “the genesis of civilization is due neither to the race factor nor to geographic environment as such but to a specific combination of two conditions: the presence of a creative minority in a given society and of an environment which is neither too unfavorable nor too favorable. The groups which had these conditions emerged as civilizations; the groups which did not have them remained on the sub-civilization level.”347 Second, the growth of civilizations. As Toynbee has argued, “geographical expansion, or ‘painting the map red’, is no criterion whatever of the real growth of a civilization.”348 Rather, “the growth of civilization tends to manifest itself in a progressive and cumulative inward self-determination or self-articulation.”349 In other words, “the criterion of growth is progress towards self-determination or self-articulation.”350 Moreover, “real progress is found to consist in a process defined as ‘etherialization’, an overcoming of material obstacles which releases the energies of the society to make responses to challenges which henceforth are internal rather than external, spiritual rather than material.”351 In Toynbee’s opinion, a growing society is a unity consisting of creative minorities (or dominant minorities) freely imitated and followed by the uncreative majority—the internal proletariat of the society and the external proletariat of its barbarian neighbors.352 “The growths of civilizations are the work of creative individuals or creative minorities,”353 and “the uncreative majority shall follow the creative minority’s lead,”354 “either by the mass undergoing the actual experience which has transformed the creative individuals, or by their imitation of its externals— in other words, by mimesis,”355 that is by “enlisting the faculty of mimesis (or imitation) in the souls of the uncreative rank and file,”356 who had not originated such social “assets”—aptitudes or emotions or ideas, and who “would never have possessed them if they had not encountered and imitated those who possessed them.”357 Third, the breakdown or disintegration of civilizations. In Toynbee’s 346

Ibid., p. 60. Toynbee, Arnold J. (1986). A Study of History (Wei-Feng Cao et al., Trans.). Shanghai, CN: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p.453. 348 Toynbee, Arnold J., and Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 189. 349 Ibid., p. 199. 350 Ibid., p. 208. 351 Toynbee, Arnold J., and Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 364. 352 Ibid., pp. 370–372. 353 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p.214. 354 Ibid., p. 215. 355 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 364. 356 Toynbee, Arnold J., and Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p.533. 357 Ibid., p. 216. 347

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formulation, “the nature of the breakdowns of civilizations can be summed up in three points: a failure of creative power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of mimesis on the part of the majority and a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole.”358 In an expanded form this formula runs as follows: “when, in the history of any society, a creative minority degenerates into a dominant minority which attempts to retain by force a position that it has ceased to merit, this change in the character of the ruling element provokes, on the other side, the secession of a proletariat which no longer admires and imitates its rulers and revolts against it servitude…this proletariat, when it asserts itself, is divided from the outset into two distinct parts. There is an internal proletariat, prostrate and recalcitrant, and an external proletariat beyond the frontiers who now violently resist incorporation. And thus the breakdown of a civilization gives rise to a class-war within the body social of a society which was neither divided against itself by hard-and-fast divisions nor sundered from its neighbors by unbridgeable gulfs so long as it was in growth.”359 From what has been discussed above, it naturally follows that Toynbee is inclined to favor the view that the cause underlying the breakdown or collapse of civilizations resides in the disintegration of civilizational structures. (4) The development of civilizational structures runs parallel with the course of civilization. Given that the course of the history of man and the process of the development of civilization are manifestly bound up with each other, it is not surprising that there should be a close affinity between the rhythms of these two processes. The notion of either the history of man or the progress of civilization as a process of gradual unfolding from lower to higher stages seems to be a generally established idea in people’s mind. The process of gradual unfolding from lower to higher stages, which is true of the history of man as well as of the evolution of civilization, may be briefly summarized as follows. Just as “subman succeeded in turning himself into man in the course of human history,” so “man, in all the time that has elapsed since sub-man’s achievement made man human,” will succeed in attaining a super-human level.360 Thus Toynbee envisions either the whole human history or the total civilizational process as a progression (or evolution) unfolding its richness and leading through separate civilizations and their uniform but concretely different rhythms from “underMan” and “under-Civilization,” through Man and Civilization, and finally to Superman and Transfigured Ethereal Super-Civilization of the Kingdom of God.361 According to Toynbee, the process of gradual unfolding from lower to higher stages involves the progress of civilization, the development of civilizational structures, and the evolution of man. As the above discussion has suggested, Arnold Toynbee deserves to rank with the foremost thinkers of this 358

Ibid., p. 246. Ibid. 360 Ibid., p. 197. 361 Sorokin, P. A. (1950). Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, p. 120. 359

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century as well as among the most eminent historians of his time. Admittedly, Toynbee did not bring out any scholarly work devoted exclusively to the study of social or civilizational structures. Nonetheless, his original and impressive ideas on civilizational structures and the workings thereof would entitle Toynbee to richly merit the distinction of being one of the most remarkable thinkers that have devoted themselves ardently and assiduously to the study of civilizational structures. Toynbee’s philosophy of history based on the basic assumptions about the framework of civilizational structures and the formula for civilizations’ survival—the formula of challenge-and-response constantly asserts itself in providing him with a basis for explaining the rise and fall of civilizations as well as for generalizing about the history of civilizations in the way philosophy of history required. It goes without saying that some deficiencies and limitations inherent in Toynbee’s theory of civilizations would be far from helping him to clear up certain uncertainties he would surely face when he devoted himself ardently and assiduously to the study of civilizational phenomena, and that they would be far from being of any help to him when he attempted to work out wise solutions for the myriad problems confronting humanity and civilization. With the above situation in view, Toynbee has no choice but to prostrate himself and invoke God and the Kingdom of God whereby he could arouse in himself an intuitive sense of history. Nevertheless, it can be safely asserted that Toynbee’s life-long study of human societies and civilizations not merely makes a stunning addition to the vast treasure house of civilizational theories, but, more importantly, forms a substantial contribution of permanent value to our knowledge of the history of human societies and civilizations and of the past achievements of mankind in the manifold spheres of human activity.

4 The Concept, Characteristics and Functions of “Group Structure” As shown in the preceding chapter, the author formed an original conception of personality. Following the same train of thought as in the foregoing chapter, the author argues that any given group can be conceptualized as a self-contained conscious entity that asserts itself as an independent self-sufficient being through conscious control and regulation of its own behavior and that any given group can be defined as a particular human community that has to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. The behavioral choice on the part of any given group that tends to be susceptible to the influence of external stimulus can be viewed as self-driven and self-determined. For any given group, whatever forces of nature can only count as mere external stimuli, that is, they tend not to exercise any determining influence on the behavior of a particular group. Rather, the behavioral choice on the part of any given group that is subject to the influence of external stimulus tends to be determined by the group’s internal structure, which is to say, the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group tends to occur as a result

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of the mutual interaction of its constituent elements making up the group’s internal structure. The internal structure of a group can become the motivating force behind the behavioral choice on the part of a group and thereby can form the determining cause underlying the growth and decline of a group. It may be safely affirmed that the key to a profound grasp of any given group and the structure thereof as well as to a deep understanding of the existence, development and destiny of a particular group lies in the fact that we must give the concept of group structure a clear and lucid explanation.

4.1 The Concept of Group Structure By “group structure” we mean the interactive relationships between the various constituent elements of a given institutionalized group and the behavioral norms thereof that govern the dynamic interactions among the various constituent elements of a given institutionalized group that “has been instituted by its members or by others in order to fulfill a specific purpose.”362 Moreover, we mean by “group structure” the organic system consisting of such subjects as individuals and cultural elements making up a given institutionalized group as well as of their complex relationships, such as those among individuals, those among cultural elements, and those between individuals and cultural elements. The structure of any institutionalized group is a living and dynamic system, is differently endowed with regard to the integrative capacity, and is in a position to make appropriate behavior choices so as to cope with external environmental pressures. In making appropriate responses to external stimuli the structure of any institutionalized group is capable of constant adjustment to both internal and external environmental changes so as to make itself undergo development and change. The rich connotations inherent in the concept of “group structure” can be summarized as follows. (1) The creation of “group structure” tends to stem from the institutionalization of an organic system, thereby asserting itself as an institutionalized system in its own right. In a general way “group structure” is an organic system that the separate sets of institutions work together to establish, to support, and to maintain while the various institutions interact with each other and operate as an organic system. Whatever type of “group structure” constitutes no exception to the universal creation of “group structure” stemming from the institutionalization of an organic system. The separate sets of institutions, which tend to be established by various “groups,” include the established rules, patterns of life, and behavioral norms that are designed to handle or deal with the complex relationships manifesting themselves in the manifold spheres of human existence. As the famous British functionalist anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown pointed out, 362

Taylor, Claire., & Vlassopoulos, Kostas., eds. (2015). Communities and Networks in the Ancient Greek World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 179.

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the study of social institutions is an important aspect of social structure, and social structure has to be described by the institutions, which define the proper or expected conduct of persons in their various relationships.363 Institutions that are the most distinguishing characteristics of group structures tend to provide a sound basis for the existence and development of group structures. (2) “Group structure” is an organic whole made up of many complex elements. “Group structure” includes subjective structures and cultural structures. The former is composed of the relationships among people, the hierarchical structure of groups, and the group categorization system, while the latter consists of a particular group’s ideologies and institutions as well as of its productive forces mainly associated with the power of science and the power of technology. In addition, “group structure” also includes the functions of subjective structures and of cultural structures as well as the relationships between subjective and cultural structures. Despite the fact that “group structure” consists of numerous and diverse constituent elements and the various complex relationships thereof, it can integrate itself into an organic whole through its internal mechanisms and as such can render possible the unity of the whole system. (3) “Group structure” is a dynamic system. In a general way “group structure” can be likened to a complicated organism that can be brought into existence through the efforts of human subjects. In itself, “group structure” rightly asserts itself as a dynamic system endowed with abounding vitality and enormous energy. When we concern ourselves with the problem of how driving (or motive) forces exist within a particular group, we may safely assert that motive (or driving) forces are inherent in the internal relationships among the constituent elements composed of a particular group’s ideologies, institutions, and productive forces closely connected with the power of science and the power of technology, as well as in the correlations between the several different subsystems making up the structure of a particular group. Likewise, driving (or) motive forces also manifest themselves in the relationships between subjective and cultural structures. In the proper sense of the term, “group structure” constitutes a living and dynamic system, which can be described as a power set in a metaphorical sense, and which may be represented as a self-contained conscious entity in a philosophical sense. (4) “Group structure” is marked by continuous and productive activity and thus is subject to change. “Group structure” tends to undergo constant evolutionary change and development. “Group structure” when faced with external environmental pressures tends to undergo constant transformation and adjustment so as to adapt itself to an ever-changing external environment. Hence it may be safely asserted that “group structure” existing as a living and dynamic system can be regarded as the most sophisticated system in existence that in itself can be viewed as undergoing constant self-transcendence. Moreover, it is worth noting that “group structure” tends to present itself as the immediate system that in 363

Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1988). Method in Social Anthropology (Jian-Zhong Xia, Trans.). Jinan, China: Shandong People’s Publishing House, p. 146.

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its turn is liable to undergo a continuous process of change and development. More often than not, “group structure” tends to find itself in a delicate situation, having to adjust to changes in environment while at the same time expected to change itself. It seems quite likely that once “group structure” is tardy in responding to environmental changes and ceases transcending itself, it tends to find itself facing enormous pressures and formidable challenges coming from the external environment, whereby it can incur the risk of being eliminated. (5) “Group structure,” which exists as an organic system with a purpose in view, tends to display a great adroitness in making behavioral choices. Just as man, who exists as a complicated organism, that is as a conscious being or as a speciesbeing, makes his own life and his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness and has the unique gift of being able to make behavioral choices, so any given group that is brought into existence through the efforts of human subjects tends to exist as a living system with a purpose in view and to show considerable adroitness in making behavioral choices. Any group structure that is innately endowed with unique operating mechanisms is immediately one with its life activity it adopts as an object for itself. The structure of any given group when confronted with a myriad of external environmental pressures can make various decisions and behavioral choices that tend to exercise a determining influence on its survival and development, whereby it will be able to determine its own destiny by properly exercising its own free will. The reasons for the above argument are twofold. The reason lies not only in the fact that groups structures tend to be brought into existence through the efforts of human subjects, but also in that fact that any group structure is innately endowed with the unique mechanisms for making appropriate decisions and behavioral choices, that is the inherent mechanisms of subjective decision-making, by which we mean that any group structure when faced with enormous pressures and formidable challenges from the external environment is able to make appropriate decisions by properly exercising its own free will as well as by working properly its highly complex and efficient mechanisms of decision-making, whereby any given group can make appropriate behavioral choices so as to influence and determine its own destiny. From what has been discussed above, we may, therefore, reasonably conclude that man rightly asserts himself as the only organism in the world that can make conscious choices and thereby grasp his destiny in his own hands.

4.2 The Basic Hierarchy of Group Structures The main ideas about the basic structure of groups underlying the theory of “structure and choice” may be summarized as follows. (1) The basic component parts making up the whole structure of any particular group. “Group structure” is an organic system consisting of “a three-tier structure and seven kinds of powers.” The “three-tier structure or system” is composed of three

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constituent (or component) subsystems—that is, the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group, the culture of a particular group, and the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group, which in their turn organize themselves into an organic system in the way any particular system or structure requires. In the threetier system, each tier comprises several constituent subsystems, or rather, several lower-level component structures. Thus, “group structure” can be succinctly summarized in the general statement— “the three-tier structure and seven kinds of powers.” The first tier in the three-tier system is the human subject acting in the capacity of a particular group. The first tier in the three-tier structure is mainly composed of three constituent elements—that is, subjective leadership, subjective qualities, and subjective stratification or identification. The several constituent elements comprising the human subjects of a particular group, when contrasted with other component parts of a particular group, can be characterized as the most fundamental, the most lively, and the most energetic. The subject acting in the capacity of a particular group tends to possess all of the characteristics of the human subject, such as the social character, practicality (or practicalness), initiative, creativity, transcendence, the unique ability to make rational choices, etc. The three constituent elements inherent in the human subject of a particular group correlate with each other, interact with each, and depend on each other in the way any particular system or structure is required. What applies to the correlations among the three constituent elements making up the human subject of a particular group also holds of the relationships between the above three component parts and the other two constituent subsystems of the three-tier structure. The second tier in the three-tier system is the culture of a particular group primarily composed of three constituent elements, or rather, a particular group’s productive forces mainly associated with the power of science and the power of technology as well as its ideologies and institutions. By the culture of a particular group, that is the most basic constituent part of a particular group, we mean the aggregate of material and intellectual wealth created by the human subjects of a particular group. The three constituent elements inherent in the culture of a particular group correlate with each other, interact with each, and depend on each other in the way any particular system or structure is required. What applies to the correlations among the three constituent elements making up the culture of a particular group also holds of the relationships between the above three component parts and the other two constituent subsystems of the three-tier structure. The third tier in the three-tier system is the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group. The third tier consists of a mere constituent element, that is the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group. In view of the fact that a particular group is susceptible to the influence of external stimuli, the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group tends to be the outcome of an interaction among the various constituent elements of the whole structure of a particular group. Specifically, by the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group we mean that the structure of a particular group acting in the capacity of a living subject, when confronted with enormous pressures and formidable challenges coming from the external environment, tends to make appropriate responses and behavioral choices

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to address them, and that the human subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof correlate with each other and interact with each other so as to make it possible for the whole structure of a particular group to cope with external environmental stress. The mechanism for rendering possible the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group can be briefly described as follows. When faced with external environmental pressures, the human subject acting in the capacity of a particular group first makes an extensive exploration of its culture and seeks workable solutions for the problems by which it is confronted and then makes wellconsidered decisions and appropriate behavioral choices, thereby rendering possible the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group. The behavioral choice on the part of a particular group is constantly going through the same process again and will never cease repeating this process so long as the group exists as a living organism. (2) The internal relationships and their defining characteristics within the structure of a particular group. In a general way, what applies to the relationships between the whole structure of a particular group and its constituent elements as well as to the relationships among the various constituent elements inherent in the structure of a particular group does not hold true for the relationships between the whole and its component parts in the usual sense or for the relationships among the component parts of the whole in the ordinary sense. Rather, the relationships between the whole structure of a particular group and its constituent elements as well as the relationships among the various constituent elements making up the whole structure of a particular group are inherent in a particular system or structure. The basic tenets of systems theory may help to enlighten us about the theoretical assumptions underlying the internal relationships within the structure of a particular group as well as about the defining characteristic with which these internal relationships are endowed. Systems theory is the interdisciplinary study of the general patterns, structures, and regularities manifested in a system. Specifically, systems theory helps to throw considerable light upon the relationships among the various constituent elements both within and outside a particular system, upon the interrelationships between the various constituent elements within a particular system and their counterparts outside the particular system, and upon the functions of the various constituent elements both within and outside a particular system, whereby on the one hand systems theory can provide further enlightenment about the nature of the structure of a particular group and of its internal relationships as well as about the inherent regularities manifested in the internal relationships among the various constituent elements of the structure of a particular group; and, on the other, it can provide us with the proper methods for the study of the nature and regularities with which the structure of a particular group is endowed. The defining characteristics, with which are endowed the interrelationships between the whole structure of a particular group and its constituent elements as well as the relationships among the various constituent elements of the structure of a particular group, can be summarized as follows. First, in a specific external environment the three constituent subsystems of the three-tier structure—that is, the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group,

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the culture of a particular group, and the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group, are correlated with one another in a particular way or in particular ways and ultimately are closely integrated into an organic whole, namely the structure of a particular group. The structure of a particular group when confronted with external environmental pressures tend to ensure integration of the human subject of a particular group with the culture of a particular group and to render possible the holistic workings of the three-tier system, whereby the structure of a particular group can make it possible for a particular group to make appropriate behavioral choices and respond to external environmental pressures. Second, the holistic mode of thinking, with which the structure of a particular group is endowed, may prove of great importance to the existence and development of a particular group and thus merits special emphasis. The structure of a particular group rightly asserts itself as an organic whole, and its constituent elements, which are endowed with their respective specific functions and which deserve their respective unique places in the whole structure of a particular group, are linked or correlated with one another in a particular way or in particular ways. From a holistic point of view, the structure of a particular group tends to require that the function of the whole should be greater than the sum of the functions of its component parts. However, it does not naturally follow that its constituent elements in good working order will ensure that the whole structure of a particular group is functioning perfectly. From what has been discussed above, we may safely assert that only if the various constituent elements making up the structure of a particular group observe the principles and regularities that may prove of fundamental importance to the existence and development of a particular group can they give full play to their respective functions, thereby allowing full scope for the function of the whole structure of a particular group. Third, the “systematic or structural relationship” unique to the structure of a particular group is fundamentally different from the relationship between the whole and its parts as well as from the relation of essence to phenomenon. We feel that it is our first task to distinguish the “structural (or systematic) relationship” from that of “the whole to its parts.” By the “systematic or structural relationship” we mean the relationship between the whole and its parts belonging by nature to the human world, while the relationship of the whole to its parts in the usual sense is unique to the natural world. It is therefore clear that the essential difference between these two relationships lies in that fact that the former is characterized by subjective participation and domination, while the latter belongs to a purely natural category. In addition, either of these two relationships undergoes different developmental or evolutionary pathways and thus follows its own law. In what follows, we’ll concern ourselves about the difference between the “structural (or systematic) relationship” and the relation of essence to phenomenon. In the relation between essence and existence (phenomenon or appearance) the constituent elements or component parts tend to be viewed as the phenomena or appearances of the whole whereas the whole tends to be conceived of as the essence of the constituent elements or component parts. Thus it can be seen that what applies to the relation of essence to phenomenon does not hold of the relationship of the whole to its parts unique to the structure of a particular group that belongs by nature to the human world. Therefore, we seem reasonably

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justified in concluding that the relationship between the whole structure of a particular group and its constituent elements as well as the relationships among its component parts is neither the simple relationship of the whole to its parts nor the relation of essence to phenomenon, but rather the “systematic or structural” relationship belonging by nature to the human world. As already discussed above, the “systematic or structural” relationship refers to the particular structural relationship belonging by nature to the human world, or more specifically, the relationship between the whole and its component parts as well as the relationships among the constituent elements. It is commonly asserted that man is “capable of more comprehensive consciousness than the powers of brutes are susceptible of.”364 Thus, in the “systematic or structural” relationship characterized by subjective participation and domination as well as by the human subject’s more comprehensive consciousness, the whole that is made up of its constituent elements cannot be reduced to the sum of its component parts which in their turn cannot substitute for the whole. Admittedly, on the one hand the “systematic or structural” relationship, in its true nature, is more complicated and changeable, but on the other, for the structure of a particular group, this relationship does constitute a realistic one.365 Fourth, what applies to the special complex relationships among the constituent elements of a particular system also holds of the relationships between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof, which tend to manifest themselves in myriad ways across manifold aspects of the structure of a particular group. To begin with, let’s set forth the relation between end and means. In a general way what applies to the relation between end and means also holds good for the relationship between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof, which is to say, the former is the end of the latter, while, on the contrary, the latter is a means to its end. The culture of a particular group, in its original and strict sense, tends to be created and developed by the human subjects of a particular group, who have to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term development, and to be a means of serving the human subjects of a particular group. Some keen students of “group culture” even liken the culture of a particular group to the organs based outside the living human body. The comparison of “group culture” to extracorporeal organs in no way better reveals that what applies to the relation between end and means also holds true for the relationship between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof. In addressing ourselves to the relationship between the human subjects of a particular group and their culture, we come to a keen realization of the fact that our second task is to demonstrate that what applies to the relation between subject and object also holds of the relationship between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof. By way of comparison we can safely affirm that the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group enjoys the unique distinction of being 364

Bebeke, Eduard Friedrich. (2001). Elements of Psychology on the Principles of Beneke. Carlisle, MA: Applewood Books, p. 23. 365 Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004). A Dictionary of Western Marxist Theses. Beijing, China: Oriental Publishing House, pp. 16–18.

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subject and that the culture of a particular group rightly asserts itself as object. From what has been said above, we may, therefore, reasonably conclude that the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group is the initiator of the behavior, whereas the culture of a particular group is the recipient of the behavior, and that the human subject of a particular group is, of necessity, endowed with certain distinguishing characteristics such as initiative, independence, creativity, transcendence, and the unique gift of making behavioral choices. It must, however, be pointed out that despite acting in the capacity of object, as compared with the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group, the culture of a particular group acting in the capacity of the recipient of the behavior is far from passive. The culture of a particular group, which is, of necessity, endowed with objectivity and initiative independent of human will following its creation, could not fail to exercise a permeating and determining influence on the human subject of a particular group, to lend unfailing moral support to it or to put a restraint on its activity, whereby the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group can only enjoy relative independence and freedom. In a general way the culture of a particular group tends to open up infinite possibilities for the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group which, in turn, cannot by any means occur outside the range of possibilities allowed by the culture of a particular group. In what follows, we’ll try to give a concise description of the third relationship between the human subjects of a particular group and their culture, which is to say, the culture of a particular group tends to lay the basis for the existence and development of the human subjects of a particular group and to provide the necessary conditions under which the human subjects of a particular group give full play to their functions as an integral whole. By contrast, the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group is essential to giving full play to the functions with which the culture of a particular group is endowed. In other words, the human subjects of a particular group can render possible their behavioral choices only if the culture of a particular group provides a sound basis for their behavioral choices and opens up infinite possibilities for them or provided that cultural tendencies are comprehensible to the human subjects of a particular group. However, it is worth noting that when compared with the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group, there is little scope left for group cultures’. It thus stands to reason that only the behavioral choice on the part of the human subject of a particular group can ensure that all of the cultural tendencies of a particular group manifest themselves in myriad ways across diverse aspects of a particular group and that infinite possibilities for a particular group become possible of realization. It is therefore evident that for the culture of a particular group, the key to giving full play to its functions lies in the absolute dependence of the culture of a particular group upon the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group. The fourth relationship between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and its culture is characterized by mutual support as well as by mutual conditioning, or mutual causation. Whereas the levels of culture and of development achieved by the human subjects of a particular group tend to provide enough of what the culture of a particular group needs in order to exist and develop, they may make the culture of a particular group undergo arrested development. Likewise, the level of development the culture of a particular group has attained, on the one hand, may rightly assert

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itself as the motive force behind the existence and development of the human subjects of a particular group, but on the other, it may stunt the growth of a particular group in all its bearings. As regards the fifth relationship, it is abundantly attested that the culture of a particular group creates the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group, and vice versa. That is to say, they create each other and build up each other. To recapitulate briefly, the relationship is perhaps best summarized in the following statement: the human subjects of a particular group tend to be created and built up by their cultures, and vice versa.

4.3 The Characteristics of Group Structure In a general way the structure of a particular group is endowed with the following characteristics. (1) In what follows, then, our discussion is primarily concerned with the holistic character of the structure of a particular group. Rather than asserting itself as a mechanical combination of its constituent elements or as a simple aggregate of its component parts, the structure of a particular group can only be regarded as an organic whole. The various constituent elements inherent in the structure of a particular group tend to exist the way a particular system or structure does, and each separate constituent element fails to perform the holistic function of the structure of a particular group, that is, the whole is greater (or more) than the sum of its parts. However, it is worth noting that it is within the structure of a particular group that each component part is, of necessity, endowed with its own functions and characteristics, whereas each constituent element cannot by any means possess such functions and characteristics when it is divorced from the whole structure of a particular group. Since the holistic character of the structure of a particular group tends to manifest itself in two especially salient dimensions—the spatial and the temporal—it is necessary to distinguish these two distinct but mutually interactive aspects of the structure of a particular group. To put it in a nutshell, we can acquire a good grasp of the holistic characteristic inherent in the structure of a particular group both spatially and temporally. In spatial terms, the structure of a particular group tends to exist as a separate entity, or rather as an organic whole, which is to say, notwithstanding the complicated relationships among its separate constituent elements, with very few exceptions, the various constituent elements making up the structure of a particular group are almost invariably integrated into a unity that tends to be kept in good working order, whereby the separate constituent elements could at least be brought to act in unison so as to make sure that the structure of a particular group and any subsystem thereof can engage in the constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. Moreover, when confronted with external environmental pressures and challenges, the structure

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of a particular group can depend upon its own mechanisms to secure close coordination among its constituent elements and make them come into operation in a holistic way, whereby the structure of a particular group can bring about the unity of its constituent elements which, in their turn, may take a holistic approach to their behavioral choices. In temporal terms, in primitive society primitive men began to concern themselves with the alternation of seasons and observations of such natural phenomena generated curiosity in their minds as to how the seasons revolve in the course of nature. Let us take a concrete example to serve as an illustration. In earlier civilizations, a calendar is any system for dividing time over extended periods, such as years, months, days, or hours, and arranging such divisions in a definite order—or to put it the other way round, a calendar is an orderly arrangement of the divisions of time as years, months, weeks and days adapted to the purpose of civil life. Among primitive peoples, such a calendar system suggests that the holistic conception of the universe shared by primitive peoples was wedded to “the orderly arrangement of a primitive group effort to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose,”366 and that primitive peoples sought to synchronize their life with the rhythm of the seasons and thus to preserve their life in its proper unity. In The Classic of Poetry (or The Book of Songs), which is the oldest existing collection of Chinese poetry in world literature and the finest treasure of Chinese traditional songs that Chinese antiquity has left us, there are many popular poems such as lyrics, folksongs, eulogies, and hymns describing how the holistic conception of time and particularly of the course of seasons held by the people of the Chinese Zhou dynasty is closely connected with the orderly organization of their social activities, whereby the Zhou people could preserve their life in its proper unity. As Martin Kern has argued, the Book of Songs creates “normative cultural memory” for Chinese people of different generations, by which he means “a social construction that comprises those parts of the Chinese past that are fundamentally meaningful to present-day Chinese society.”367 According to him, “the most comprehensive and lasting representation of archaic Chinese poetry is the corpus preserved in the Poetry, an anthology of songs that encompasses the voices of rulers as well as those of the common people, verses of mythological remembrance and celebration, as well as lyrics of love and hope, solitude and despair. It is this all-embracing view of human existence, expressed in the solemn and straightforward diction of pre-classical Chinese, that has established the Poetry as the foundational text of Chinese literature.”368 For example, the oft quoted poem “The Seventh Moon” (七月 Qi Yue) in the subsection of Airs of Bin “specifies at what time a certain action 366

Bedworth, David A., & Bedworth, Albert E., eds. (2010). The Dictionary of Health Education. New York, NY; Oxford University Press, p. 123. 367 Daniel, Ding. (2020). The Historical Roots of Technical Communication in the Chinese Tradition. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 62. 368 Owen, Stephen., ed. (2010). The Cambridge History of Chinese Literature, Volume I. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 18.

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is performed” and it “does this by juxtaposing natural phenomena with human actions” so that “we could understand the natural phenomena as descriptions of the chronological context in which human actions are performed.”369 As Martin Kern puts it, the “Airs of Bin” are mostly shorter lyrics composed in simple formulaic language, that is, they are generally ancient folk songs that record the voice of the common people.370 “So often the poem presents a situation where human actions are performed when a specific natural phenomenon occurs, such as in ‘七月流火’ (In the seventh moon/Scorpio sets down) and in ‘九月授衣’ (In the ninth moon/it is time to give clothes to peasants).”371 The poem under discussion, which comprises eight stanzas, each of which has a marked lyric quality, describes how the Zhou people managed to synchronize their sacrificial ceremonies and daily life such as food, clothing, shelter and transport with the regular succession of months. Moreover, it is safe to assume that “this poem, in its juxtaposing of certain natural phenomena that occur in a moon, with human activities in that moon, represents the Chinese philosophical thought of ‘oneness of nature and humans’ that the oracle-bone-inscription texts championed.”372 From what has been discussed above we seem fairly justified in concluding that the people of the Zhou dynasty began to attach great importance to the marriage of the holistic conception of the course of seasons and the orderly organization of social activities so that they could preserve their social life in its proper unity.373 (2) The structure of a particular group rightly asserts itself as an organic system and as such stands to reason that it is endowed with the distinguishing characteristics of a particular system or structure. The constituent elements inherent in the structure of a particular group, far from existing as discrete entities to such an extent that there is little correlation between them, are related to each other by causal laws and connected with each other in an orderly and relatively predictable manner. The separate constituent elements, which are endowed with their respective specific functions and which deserve their respective unique places in the whole structure of a particular group, are linked or correlated with one another in a particular way or in particular ways. Only if the various constituent elements making up the structure of a particular group observe the principles and regularities that may prove of fundamental importance to the existence and development of a particular group can they give full play to their respective functions with which the separate constituent elements are inherently endowed, thereby allowing full scope for the overall function of the structure of 369

Daniel, Ding. (2020). The Historical Roots of Technical Communication in the Chinese Tradition. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 65. 370 Owen, Stephen., ed. (2010). The Cambridge History of Chinese Literature, Volume I. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 20. 371 Daniel, Ding. (2020). The Historical Roots of Technical Communication in the Chinese Tradition. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 65. 372 Ibid., p. 66. 373 Wang, Ming-Ming. (2005). What is Anthropology ? Beijing, China: Peking University Press, pp. 103–106.

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a particular group. As regards the structural character of group structures, there is, in addition, one further point to make, that is, the structural character of group structures tends to manifest itself in the fact that group structures, with very few exceptions, invariably assume an isomorphic form. Despite the fact that group structures each have rich and varied contents to themselves, they are of identical or similar form—or, to put it another way, the structural forms of different groups are almost identical to each other. To recapitulate briefly, the structural form of any given group can be reduced to “the three-tier structure and seven kinds of powers.” In order to make us abundantly clear about the fact that group structures, with very few exceptions, invariably assume an isomorphic form, Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, both professors of social anthropology at the University of St Andrews, developed a critical comparison between, and assessment of, modern Western societies and existing primitive communities. “McGrane argues that the idea of the superiority of Western culture, particularly its spectacular scientific success, became the potent and decidedly unliberal yardstick through which anthropologists assessed the accomplishments of other cultures. There is the superior Western culture, and then there are all the rest as contrast. A sharp divide is created, with epistemological privilege always on the side of the West. In general, the process of exoticizing other cultures has been intensified through this tendency of characterizing their salient features in contrastive frames to our own. The content varies somewhat in accordance to context, but in each contrastive frame, we find lurking the underlying idea that ‘unsophisticated’ technology is understood to entail weak religion, weak thought, weak ritual, weak politics, weak economics. Thus, we have science, they have magic; or we have history, they have myth; we have high-tech agriculture, they have subsistence practices; we have priests, they have shamans; or we have scientists, they have shamans; we have philosophy, they have beliefs; we are literate, they are illiterate; or we have writing, they have oral literature; we have theater, they have ritual; we have government, they have elders; we have rationality, they are pre-logical; we have individualism, they have community— and so on through a myriad of cultural traits that are suggestive of a thesis long popular in the history of Western thought that equates ‘simple’ technology with simple minds.”374 From what has been discussed above it is therefore clear that group structures are endowed with roughly the same structural form, which is to say, group structures, with very few exceptions, invariably assume an isomorphic form. The very fact that group structures invariably assume an isomorphic form, for Claude Lévi-Strauss, can be analyzed in terms of the invariant structure of the human mind, or rather an unconscious “metastructure” emerging through the human mental process of pairing opposites.375 Just as the invariant structure of the human mind, that is an unconscious “metastructure” emerging through the 374

Rapport, Nigel., & Overing, Joanna. Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 99. 375 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “structuralism.” Encyclopedia Britannica. March 18, 2014. https://www.britannica.com/science/structuralism-anthropology.

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human mental process of pairing opposites, is to a considerable extent common to all human beings, so group structures that are brought into existence largely through the conscious efforts of human beings are, of necessity, endowed with roughly the same structural form.376 (3) Group structure is in a constant process of change or development and is thereby endowed with an intrinsically dynamic character. The structure of a particular group is far from static, inflexible, rigid or ossified. Rather, the structure of any given group rightly asserts itself as a dynamic system involving constant change and development. Any particular group can be conceived of as being at once a structure and a process. By way of illustration, let us examine how Marx and Engels viewed social structures in their proper historical perspective so that their powerful and subtle analyses of how social structures function and change threw considerable further light upon the nature of social structures as well as upon the dynamic character of group structures. Marx and Engels believed that “society is a social structure, or system,” that is, society can be seen as composed of organically interrelated parts,377 such as the productive forces, the relations of production, the economic base, the superstructure, and so forth. Furthermore, Marx and Engels argue that the structure of society must of necessity show itself as the class structure and social stratification in a given kind of class society. For Marx and Engels, the contradictions and struggles inherent in the social structures in question tend to constitute the main driving forces for the development of human society from the lower to the higher, or rather to provide the dynamic for the internally motivated transformation from lower to higher stages of society. Accordingly, “it is often asserted that Marxism holds a teleological, evolutionist notion of history, which posits a number of distinct stages through which societies pass,”378 namely primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism.379 It can thus be seen that the structure of society is a structure as well as being a process. In his pointed critique of structuralist Marxism, History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History, German philosopher Alfred Schmidt, who has established distinction as a noted scholar of critical theory, leveled penetrating and shrewd criticisms at two one-sided views on Marx and Engels’ theory of social structure—that is to say, some scholars are inclined to favor the view that the Marxian theory of social structure can be reduced to mere conceptualizations of “structure without history,” while others tend to endorse the view that Marx’s theory of social structure can be simply defined as the materialistic 376

Xia, Jian-Zhong. (1997). The Major Theoretical Schools of Cultural Anthropology. Beijing, China: China Renmin University Press, pp. 280–281. 377 Turner, Jonathan H. (2013). Theoretical Sociology: 1830 to the Present. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 78. 378 Jones, Branwen Gruffydd.(2006). Explaining Global Poverty: A Critical Realist Approach. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 74. 379 Vidal, Matt., Smith, Tony., Rotta, Tomás., & Prew, Paul., eds. (2019). The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 157.

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conception of “history without structure.” “Against a mere standpoint philosophy, which believes it can reach truth through the unwavering absolutisation of isolated ideological certainties, Schmidt always claimed that knowledge can only be attained in the critical passage through conflicting positions—that is to say, neither as a middle position between extremes nor through the simple affirmation of one side.”380 Schmidt returns instead to Hegel’s and Marx’s historical texts and presents an original and suggestive account of Marx’s appropriation of Hegel, and, most importantly, of the concept of “dialectical mediation” of logic and history. Whilst expounding on the perennial opposition of “logic,” “theory,” “system,” and “structure,” on the one hand, and “history-as-narrative” on the other, Schmidt argues that holding with only one side of this opposition—either structure without history or history without structure—is unfaithful to Marx and also makes for inadequate history. He went on to propose a new thesis about Marx’s theory of social structure, which is to say, Marx’s social theory is inherently endowed with the dual-character—history and structure. In other words, Marx takes a historical view of human society, holding that human society can be viewed not only as a structure but also as a process of historical development.381 Hence it may be safely asserted that the structure of society rightly asserts itself as the unity of structure and history, which holds true for any kind of group structure. Whether it be the family structure, the organizational structure or the state structure, with very few exceptions, it will invariably assert itself both as a structure and the course of history, which tend to undergo a process of constant change and development. (4) In what follows our primary concern is to gain a clearer conception of the core of a particular group structure. It is often asserted that the structure of a particular group rightly asserts itself as an organic system that tends to be brought into existence through the conscious efforts of human subjects, whereby its most important constituent element must of necessity bring into existence the central character of a particular group structure. Among the various constituent elements inherent in the structure of a particular group exists the central element that has its own enormous dominating power in relation to other elements of a particular group structure, whereby the fundamental constituent element can get other elements to cohere, exercise control over them, acquire great influence over them, submit them to restraint, and provide for the rational and scientific management of their affairs. The central element tends to ensure that every other element has its own vested interest that is due to itself and that the various constituent elements act in concert to meet environmental pressures and challenges, whereby any particular group with all its varied elements integrated into an organic whole can engage in the constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term development. Conducting a systematic examination of the habits 380

Best, Beverley., Bonefeld, Werner., & O’kane, Chris., eds. (2018). The SAGE Handbook of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. London, UK: SAGE Publications, p. 305. 381 Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004). A Dictionary of Western Marxist Theses. Beijing, China: Oriental Publishing House, pp. 43–44.

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and characteristics of many higher primate groups and, in particular, of the evolutionary roots of dominance and hierarchy among higher primates may be sufficient to enlighten us as to how the key distinguishing characteristic of the fundamental constituent element inherent in the structure of a particular group started into existence. As a general rule dominance hierarchy forms the basis of many, if not most, primate social structures—that is, hierarchical structure characterizes group organization in many primate species.382 For most primate groups, leadership is expressed through a male-based dominance hierarchy,383 in which an alpha male, to use the scientific term, tends to dominate as the group leader.384 Among many primates, dominance hierarchies tend to result in leadership functions and in social regulation of individual behavior,385 which is to say, the dominant group leader is responsible for controlling, governing, or directing the behavior of the whole group, or rather, “deciding where to move next, initiating travel, and leading a group between food, water resources, and rest sites.”386 Once the order of dominance is established in a primate group, this hierarchical structure serves to maintain order among the members of the primate group, or, more specifically, to head off conflict and socially disruptive activities or to reduce chaotic behaviors and promote orderly, adaptive conduct. Most species of nonhuman primates are social and have evolved to live in complex societies. They form intricate social relationships, engage in species-specific social behaviors, and develop many social skills necessary for group living. In general, the study of social development and affiliation in primates tends to be organized around the study of interactions, relationships, and social structure.387 In the complex hierarchical structure of a nonhuman primate society, the relative social position of a primate tends to be determined by “the social status of individuals relative to other group members (e.g., dominance rank).”388 For most nonhuman primate groups, maintaining social order through dominance hierarchy tends to depend primarily upon whether or not more dominant individuals, who, more often than not, can compete successfully with their peers for more food and mating opportunities, are able to control access to resources at 382

Haviland, William A., Prins, Harald E. L., Walrath, Dana., & McBride, Bunny. (2016). The Essence of Anthropology. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, p. 65. 383 Andrea, Alfred J., Neel, Carolyn., & Aldenderfer, Mark., eds. (2011). World History Encyclopedia, Volume 2. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 222. 384 Mayseless, Ofra. (2016). The Caring Motivation: An Integrated Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 195. 385 Boehm, Christopher. (1987). Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies. Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 231. 386 Spotte, Stephen. (2012). Societies of Wolves and Free-ranging Dogs. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 230. 387 Maestripieri, Dario., ed. (2005). Primate Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 173. 388 Vonk, Jennifer., & Shackleford, Todd K., eds. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 88.

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the expense of more subordinate members.389 The hierarchical structure, which rightly asserts itself as one of the most fundamental characteristics of higher nonhuman primates, has been undergoing constant evolution and development in the human world, whereby group structures, which tend to be brought into existence through the conscious efforts of human beings, are becoming more complex and more sophisticated. On the one hand human beings are especially expert at creating group structures of various kinds, such as the family structure, the organizational structure, the state structure, the international organizations, and so forth, but on the other, each individual is inseparably bound up with the existence and development of a particular group structure. Any particular group has a unique structure to itself, which tends to comprise the fundamental constituent element and other less important component parts. In general, within the traditional family structure the parents are the core of the family and perform the roles that modern society associates with the parents. In the ordinary sense of the word the term “management” refers to the collective body of those who manage or direct an organization and who tend to be classified in a hierarchy of authority and to perform different tasks, such as the manager, the chairman of the board of directors, president (or chancellor), dean (the head of a division, faculty, college, or school of a university), the head of an institute, office, etc., director (or chief), and other persons assuming managerial roles at various levels of the managerial hierarchy of an organization. The core of an organizational structure is the top manager or senior management group who perform management functions and oversee both the organization’s internal and external structures.390 “From a managerial perspective, structure enables management to define lines of responsibility and authority, control work activities, and accomplish organizational goals. From a worker’s perspective, different structural configurations affect not only productivity and economic results, defined by the marketplace, but also the job satisfaction, commitment, motivation, and perceptions about expectations and obligations.”391 As often as not, “it is the top management who establish norms that filter down through the organization and thereby sustain the organization’s culture.”392 State leaders or the core leadership of the state are the core of the state structures. The core of international organizations tends to consist of the various types of management groups well as of the persons in charge such as chairperson, president of a society or association, chief executive officer, and so forth. The core of a particular group structure is the center of supreme power and authority in the group, which is vested with adequate powers of execution and supervision 389

Li, Fa-Jun. (2007). Biological Anthropology. Guangzhou, China: Zhongshan University Press, pp. 111–112. 390 Lauffer, Armand. (2011). Understanding Your Social Agency. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 331. 391 Mills, Albert J., Mills, Jean C. Helms., Bratton, John., & Forshaw, Carolyn. (2007). Organizational Behavior in a Global Context. Peterborough, CA-ON: Broad view Press, p. 459. 392 Aquinas, P. G. (2008). Organization Structure and Design – Applications & Challenges. New Delhi, IN: Excel Books, p. 435.

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clearly defined by law and which is required to undertake important responsibilities involving a variety of tasks such as collecting and analyzing information and making decisions. Hence we may safely assert that the core of a particular group structure tends to play a key (or fundamental) role in rendering possible the existence and development of a particular group and that in some cases it constitutes a decisive factor in the existence and development of a particular group.

4.4 The Functions of Group Structures Just as the structure of the human body has its normal functions, so any given group structure has unique functions to itself. By the functions of group structures we mean that any given group structure tends to affect the way people conduct their lives, to influence how a particular group can engage in the constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term development, and to determine, to a greater or lesser extent, the nature of a particular group. In general, any given group structure tends to accomplish the following four functions. (1) The basic function of a particular group structure is to make behavioral choices. When confronted with external environmental pressures, any given group structure tends to invoke the aid of the inner workings of these two subsystems, namely the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof, to make appropriate behavioral choices whereby it will be in a positon to respond to environmental pressures and challenges. The behavioral choices made by any given group structure fall into two categories. “The external behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure tends to be made in direct response to external environmental pressures and challenges, while “the internal behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure has to be made when any given group structure indirectly responds to external environmental pressures and challenges. In other words, it seems indispensably necessary for a particular group structure to be constantly adjusting itself, transforming itself, and improving itself when it indirectly responds to external environmental pressures and challenges. The subjectivity and initiative inherent in the structure of a particular group tend to find full expression in the two categories of behavior choice that encompass all the behaviors of a particular group structure. The ensemble of the subjective characteristics inherent in group structures, such as initiative, independence, autonomy, creativity, transcendence, and so forth, almost invariably manifest themselves through the basic function of making behavioral choices—or to put it the other way round, it is only through the basic function of making behavioral choices that the totality of the subjective characteristics common to group structures can reveal themselves and come into play. A host of other functions with which group structures are endowed, such as the dynamic function, the function of creating and maintaining order, and the self-construction function, can only become possible of realization

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and be brought into operation through the basic function of making behavioral choices—or, to put it another way, it is only through the basic function of making behavioral choices that a multitude of other functions inherent in group structures can be brought into full play. The basic function of making behavioral choices is common to various types of group structures, such as the family structure, the organizational structure, the state structure, international organizations, and so forth. Only if the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group exercises initiative in making behavioral choices can the myriad goals of existence and development group structures set themselves can become possible of realization. The theory of practical materialism, which originated with Marx and Engels, places historical materialism and historical dialectics in the clearest light and thus greatly enlightens us as to the truth that the human subject can exercise initiative in making behavioral choices and that we can explore the laws, principles, and methods that are generally applicable to the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group structure. (2) The dynamic function is common to group structures. The structure of a particular group that rightly asserts itself as a dynamic structure tends to afford an unfailing source of power for the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group as well as for the existence and development of a particular group. In itself, the structure of a particular group can be likened to a power set, in which the various constituent elements as well as the complex relationships among them are inherently endowed with enormous potentialities. The subject acting in the capacity of a particular group, which is mainly composed of three constituent elements—that is, subjective leadership, subjective qualities, and subjective stratification or identification, possesses great potentialities in conjunction with the culture of a particular group primarily composed of three constituent elements, or rather, a particular group’s productive forces mainly associated with the power of science and the power of technology as well as its ideologies and institutions. Likewise, enormous potentialities are inherent in the contradictory unity of the human subjects of a particular group and the culture thereof. On the one hand, the great potentialities latent within the group enable the group itself to engage in the constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term development. On the other hand, the enormous potentialities, especially when external environmental pressures mount, can stir up latent forces and spur the group itself on to make behavioral choices, including the internal and external behavioral choices, whereby the group can address external environmental challenges. As long as group structures exist, driving forces will inhere in the structure of a particular group, which, in its turn, may provide an unfailing source of power for its own existence and development. The theory of historical materialism that originated with Marx and Engels may greatly enlighten us about the driving forces behind social structures. “When Marx and Engels applied the law of the unity of contradictions to the study of the socio-historical process they discovered the basic causes of social development to be the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of

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production, the contradiction of class struggle, and also the resultant contradiction between the economic base and its superstructure (politics, ideology),”393 which is to say, the dialectical interplay between the productive forces and the relations of production as well as between the economic base and its superstructure, which tend to be in their contradictory unity and historical movement, affords an unfailing source of power for the existence and development of human society, thereby providing the dynamic for the internally motivated transformation from lower to higher stages of society. In class society Marxism tends to place prime emphasis on class contradictions and class struggles as the motive forces of social development. It can thus be seen that the antagonism between the forces and relations of production, the contradiction between the economic base and its superstructure, and the struggle between classes not only together constitute the driving forces of social development, but also jointly determine the basic direction of social development.394 To recapitulate briefly, not only can historical materialism greatly enlighten us about the motive forces of social development as well as about the dynamic functions of social structures, but it can provide theories and methods for scientific researches on group structures of various kinds, such as the family structure, the organizational structure, the state structure, international organizations, and so forth, so that we may invoke the aid of these theories and methods to gain a deeper insight into the driving forces and dynamic functions of group structures and to throw considerable further light upon them. (3) The structure of a particular group tends to perform the function of creating and maintaining order, by which we mean that the structure of a particular group tends to make the human subjects of a particular group identify themselves with human institutions and conform to a code of conduct whilst it is in the course of bringing order to individuals’ lives of the group, whereby the human subjects of a particular group will be able to adjust themselves to the existing order of the group and to use the standards of behavior generally accepted by the group to regulate their conduct. Any particular group, for example “small groups like the members of a family, community organizations including schools and churches, large-scale organizations such as state and national governments, and global societies such as the United Nations,”395 which is in a position to assert its power in all its multifarious forms and, meanwhile, to promote various essential interests that are conducive to the well-being of the group, rightly asserts itself as a community that has to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. As a general rule any particular group is expected to bring order to individuals’ lives rather than throw social life into 393

Knight, Nick., ed. (1990). Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy, 1937. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., p. 177. 394 Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004).A Dictionary of Western Marxist Theses. Beijing, China: Oriental Publishing House, pp. 50–51. 395 Ballantine, Jeanne H., Roberts, Keith A., & Korgen, Kathleen Odell. (2018). Our Social World: Introduction to Sociology. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 14.

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disorder. The universal law of survival holds true for any particular group that has to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. Disorder tends to cause contradictions, to breed turbulence, and to create conflicts within a particular group itself. In some cases disorder can lead to the disintegration of the group as a whole. With the above situation in view, any particular group structure almost invariably takes the initiative in creating and maintaining order. In his justly famous monograph Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure, Edmund R. Leach, an iconoclastic British social anthropologist, is trenchantly committed to the view that real societies are in fact open and not bounded, and never in equilibrium, which is to say, societies cannot be viewed in terms of a static equilibrium, but rather of a dynamic one.396 As Leach has already pointed out, in view of the fact that social structures do not remain in a state of equilibrium, one must be ready to reckon with the ensuing contradictions and potential conflicts within and among social members. For Leach, it is the opposition inherent in individual and group interests that renders possible “a continuous back and forth oscillating pull of personal and collective interests.”397 Furthermore, Leach sees transience as inherent “in the mechanistic sort of oscillating equilibrium that he famously described for Highland Burma.”398 It can thus be seen that the functions of social structures tend to manifest themselves in the maintenance of dynamic equilibrium as well as in the creation of institutionalized relationships (links or connections) between individuals and interest groups.399 In his monumental magnum opus The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion, which illuminated “the forgotten milestones of the road which man has travelled,”400 the prominent British anthropologist James G. Frazer, who is “a major molder of the modern mind,”401 narrated a myth that may be briefly summed up as follows: only if a runaway slave first had to break off the magic golden bough and then slew the incumbent priest of Lake Nemi, who had gained his place by murdering his predecessor and who stood guard at all times, awaiting a challenger to his supremacy, can he qualify himself for the office of priest and reign with the title of King of the Wood.402 A moral we draw from the myth 396

Tambiah, Stanley J. (2002). Edmund Leach: An Anthropological Life. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 259. 397 Horsman, John Henry. (2018). Servant-Leaders in Training: Foundations of the Philosophy of Servant-Leadership. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 105. 398 Comaroff, John L., & Comaroff, Jean., eds. (2018). The Politics of Custom: Chiefship, Capital, and the State in Contemporary Africa. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 11. 399 Xia, Jian-Zhong. (1997). The Major Theoretical Schools of Cultural Anthropology. Beijing, China: China Remin University Press, pp. 289–292. 400 “Frazer, James George.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 1 Mar. 2022 . 401 Stade, George., & Karbiener, Karen., eds. (2009). Encyclopedia of British Writers, 1800 to the Present. New York, NY: Infobase Publishing, p. 189. 402 Smith, Jonathan Z. (1993). Map is not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 208–239.

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is that imperial power must be kept in equilibrium with social power and interests. As already stated above, the structure of a particular group is in a position to perform the basic function of creating and maintaining order. In addressing itself to the problem of how to establish and maintain order, the structure of a particular group must commit itself to accomplishing the following stupendous tasks which may prove of crucial importance to the existence and development of a particular group. Rational institutions must be brought into existence through the conscious efforts of the human subjects of a particular group. The standards or rules of behavior for the individual members of a particular group must be established. The rationality of social institutions and norms must be expounded adequately. Those members who contravene the social code or fail to conform to social institutions must be punished. Social institutions and norms must undergo continuous change and improvement. The individual members of a particular group must identify themselves with their social institutions and code that tend to represent the consensus of thoughtful opinion throughout the whole group. The structure of a particular group must mitigate the contradictions and reduce (or resolve) the conflicts among the individual members of a particular group, who, in their turn, must learn to relieve (or allay) antagonistic feelings and to express hostile emotions. The human subjects of a particular group must adjust themselves to the existing order of the group and use the standards of behavior generally accepted by the group to regulate their conduct. Keeping the individual members of a particular group in pursuit of the above tasks and working towards the successful completion of them will ensure that the structure of a particular group can engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term development. In actual fact, any particular group structure tends to address itself to the myriad problems confronting the individual members of a particular group. Only a concerted effort on the part of all members can render individual and collective efforts more likely to be crowned with success. Otherwise, if the human subjects of a particular group relax their efforts and even abandon them, the structure of a particular group will assuredly be confronted with the problem of how to maintain the existing order of a particular group as well as of how to bring about the unity of a particular group. To make matters even worse, lacking united effort would be greatly to the detriment of the existence and development of a particular group structure. (4) Apart from the above-mentioned functions, the structure of a particular group also has a self-construction function, by which we mean that any particular group structure is endowed with the capacity for self-examination, self-regulation, self-improvement and self-transcendence. When confronted with external environmental pressures and challenges, the structure of a particular group tends to invoke the aid of a self-construction function to take the initiative in improving the comprehensive performance of the various constituent elements making up a particular group, to commit itself to raising the moral, cultural and intellectual level of the individual members of a particular group, to make the relationships among these inherent constituent elements, to a greater or lesser extent, undergo necessary changes, and to ensure for itself the highest attainable level

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of performance, whereby the structure of a particular group will be able to adjust itself to external environmental changes. This function of cooperative self-construction is in fact an internal mechanism of a particular group structure, that is the workings of a particular group structure. Given that the structure of a particular group tends to exist as a self-conscious entity, in general, a particular group structure when faced with external environmental pressures and challenges must be ready to reckon with two different types of behavioral choices, namely “the external behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral choice.” “The external behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure tends to be made in direct response to external environmental pressures and challenges, while “the internal behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure has to be made when the structure of a particular group indirectly responds to external environmental pressures and challenges. In other words, it seems indispensably necessary for a particular group structure to be constantly examining itself, adjusting itself, improving itself and transcending itself when it indirectly responds to external environmental pressures and challenges. “The internal behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure suggests that the structure of a particular group is “a self-constructing adaptive control system,” thus undergoing a constant process of behavioral self-construction.403 The structure of a particular group tends to invoke the aid of behavioral self-construction to improve and heighten the powers latent within the human subjects of a particular group, to enhance and increase the cultural power of a particular group, to bring about appropriate changes in the relationships among the various constituent elements of a particular group, and to make itself engage in self-examination, self-improvement and self-transcendence, whereby the structure of a particular group can successfully respond to external environmental pressures and challenges. History attests the fact that the “behavioral self-constructing capabilities” with which the structure of a particular group is endowed,404 whether weak or strong, not only have a great deal to do with the rise and fall of a particular group structure, but also have bearing on the destiny of a particular group structure. The more conscious efforts the structure of a particular group is putting forth in order to enhance the capabilities for behavioral self-construction and to get the behavioral self-construction function undergoing continual improvement, the more defects it will most probably find within itself, and the more likely it is that the expenditure of conscious effort on the part of the particular group structure will enable the structure itself to atone for its numerous shortcomings, whereby the structure of a particular group will be able to engage in self-transcendence, to bring about a most salutary improvement, and to stand up to any test in hard times. In a certain sense, the much greater the capabilities for behavioral self-construction seem to us, the more likely will it be that the

403

Ford, Martin E. (1992). Motivating Humans: Goals, Emotions, and Personal Agency Beliefs. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., p. 21. 404 Ibid.

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structure of a particular group is able to smooth away the innumerable difficulties that beset its path, and vice versa. Only if the structure of a particular group takes the initiative in enhancing the capabilities for behavioral self-construction can it bring all its potentialities into full play and approach perfection in the course of time. In general, the behavioral self-construction function tends to have important implications for the existence and development of a particular group structure. In support of this argument, the fact is to be aptly cited that “China has created an economic miracle in world development history” and “has sustained a high and continuing growth for more than half a century,” whereby “the reform period from 1978 onwards has been heralded as a time when China’s economic miracle was created.”405 After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China came to a victorious close, the second generation of leaders began to gain ascendency in China’s political arena. Under the collective leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Deng Xiaoping at the core, the Chinese government, which took the initiative in reflecting upon what had happened during the pre-reform period (1949–78) and learning lessons from their past mistakes, led Chinese people to carry out “reform and opening up,” to advance the transition of the basic economic system from a planned economy to a market economy, and to achieve an economic miracle by sustaining high-speed economic growth, whereby China has become the world’s second largest economy. The amazing success story of China’s reform and opening up stands as a living testimony that the behavioral self-construction function is of immense value to the structure of a particular group that has to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.406 In actual fact, from primitive society onwards, group structures of different kinds hitherto known to us began to exercise initiative in performing their respective selfconstruction functions, which, in their turn, enabled the various group structures to undergo continual development and improvement. In the era of globalization, especially against the backdrop of a sluggish global economy, with very few exceptions, any particular group structure is now almost invariably faced with the urgent necessity of bring into full play the behavioral self-construction function.

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