Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policies 1527539512, 9781527539518

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Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe

Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policies Edited by

Maria Luisa Maniscalco and Valeria Rosato

Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policies Edited by Maria Luisa Maniscalco and Valeria Rosato This book first published 2019 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2019 by Maria Luisa Maniscalco, Valeria Rosato and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-3951-2 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-3951-8

CONTENTS

Notes on Contributors................................................................................ vii Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Luigi Moccia Introduction .............................................................................................. xiii Maria Luisa Maniscalco and Valeria Rosato Part I: Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policies Chapter One ................................................................................................. 2 The European Union and the Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy Santina Musolino Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 25 Belgium and the Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy Cind Du Bois and Willy Bruggeman Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 37 France and the Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy Valeria Rosato Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 63 Italy and the Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy Maria Luisa Maniscalco Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 92 Spain and the Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy Valeria Rosato Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 112 The United Kingdom and the Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy Maria Luisa Maniscalco

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Contents

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 145 Recommendations for New Policies Maria Luisa Maniscalco and Valeria Rosato Part II: Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism: The Civil Society Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 164 The Role of Civil Society in Policies to Prevent Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe Alessandro Zanasi Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 190 Recommendations for New Policies Giovanni Vassallo and Angelo Rollo Conclusions ............................................................................................. 203 Maria Luisa Maniscalco and Valeria Rosato

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Maria Luisa Maniscalco, former Full Professor of Sociology at the University Roma Tre, is currently the Deputy Director of the Master in International Security/Safety, Global Strategies and Medical MaxiEmergency in the Unconventional Events (Faculty of Medicine and Surgery, University Tor Vergata, Rome) and Research Director at Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence Altiero Spinelli (Roma Tre). Valeria Rosato, PhD in Sociology and Adjunct Professor at Political Sciences Department at the Roma Tre University. A Visiting Fellow at various Latin American Universities, she has been working for years on the analysis of contemporary conflicts and has participated in national and international research on issues related to security, peacekeeping and peacekeeping processes. Willy Bruggeman, President of the Belgian Federal Police Board, Board Member – International Advisors to the Pearls in Policing program, Professor of Police Science at the Benelux University, former deputy Director EUROPOL. Cind du Bois is Professor at the Royal Military Academy where she presides the chair of Economics since 2009. Her research domain covers different aspects of defence economics such as the backlash effect of military action, the economics of terrorism and economic security. Santina Musolino is PhD in Political Sciences and currently a member of the TRIVALENT project research team. Her main research interests are terrorism and political violence analysed from a gender perspective. Angelo Rollo holds an M.A. in Security and Diplomacy from the University of Tel Aviv (Israel). He has worked as research assistant at the Institute for National Security Studies of Tel Aviv and at the International Institute of Counter Terrorism of Herzliya (Israel). Angelo currently holds the position of Security Researcher at Zanasi & Partners, with a specific focus on extremism, terrorism and radicalisation issues.

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Notes on Contributors

Giovanni Vassallo holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Bologna (Italy). A professional journalist prior to joining Zanasi & Partners – where he works as Project Manager of several ECfunded projects on terrorism-related issues and border control – Giovanni carried out research on security threats and crisis management at Sciences Po (France) and Rights and Humanity (United Kingdom). Alessandro Zanasi holds an M.Eng. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Bologna (Italy) and an M.Sc. in Economics from the University of Modena (Italy). Founder and President of Zanasi & Partners, Alessandro has been appointed member of ESRAB and ESRIF within the European Commission, defining guiding principles in the field of security and defence at the European level, subjects on which he has been author of many relevant reports, papers and books.

FOREWORD LUIGI MOCCIA

1

This book is an output of the TRIVALENT project . TRIVALENT (Terrorism prevention via radicalisation counter-narrative) is a three-year European project. Officially started in May 2017, its activities will end in April 2020. TRIVALENT is a large ‘family’ of 21 members, with a rather mixed composition. There are professional, academic and expert partners. The majority of members are law enforcement agencies: eleven police bodies (Italian, Albanian, Polish and Latvian police; Italian and Portuguese penitentiary police; Italian, Polish, Spanish and Belgian local police forces). This is an important and qualifying feature. In addition, there are six academic partners: five from four EU countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain, the UK) and one from a non-EU country (IDC/ ICT, Herzliya, Israel) plus four more expert partners with multidisciplinary expertise in the field of security and ICT from three EU countries (France, Italy, Spain). To give an overall idea of TRIVALENT’s rationale in terms of its main goals and vision, it is possible here to touch upon some general points. There is no single way in which people are attracted by violent extremism; there is not even one way to contrast and prevent this phenomenon from happening and spreading in our complex, connected and increasingly conflictual societies. In the context of EU countries facing the challenge of home-grown terrorism, TRIVALENT aims to offer an in-depth analysis of radicalisation leading to violent extremism in view of its prevention. Essentially, TRIVALENT’s focus on prevention can be summarised in a trilogy, where: a) the first goal is to test the feasibility of IT early detection tools (predict to prevent); b) the second one is to develop communication strategies focused on narrative formats, targeted for specific contexts and publics (communicate to prevent);

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c) the third one is to design community-oriented policing based on partnership, trust building and problem solving, to be implemented through new skills guidelines and training-the-trainers programmes for law enforcement agencies and other front-line operators, as well as civil society and communities actors (good policing and community engagement). Looking a bit closer at these goals, one may observe that each one carries some caveats. Indeed, when considering early detection IT tools, one should also be aware of the methodological and conceptual difficulty of distinguishing between radicalisation and violent radicalisation, and moreover of identifying the so-called “markers” of extremism due to potential encroachments on free speech and the fact that there is no consensus on how to predict a person’s path to violent extremism. Again, when considering communication strategies and (social) media formats in which to frame and manage potentially highly conflictual polarisation issues, which frequently characterise the radicalisation process, one should be aware of the risk that so-called counter-alternative narratives may be conducive to overemphasizing the danger of Islamic extremism in particular. Lastly, when considering community-oriented policing based on community partnership, trust building and problem solving, one should also be aware of clarifying the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement agencies (and public authorities in general), civil society, and private sector organisations in order to achieve improved cross-sector coordination and implementation. All in all, however, and in a most synthetic way, the TRIVALENT rationale focuses on the idea of prevention based on balancing a securitarian with a communitarian approach. Of course, this brings about the question of how to understand a community-oriented approach to prevention. Briefly, it suffices to recall three main assumptions. a) Basically, the reasoning underlying the communitarian approach to prevention makes it a turning point in prevention policies, strategies and tools. b) From the viewpoint of the responses to the issues posed by violent extremism, regardless of its definition, what matters is the way in which such issues are and should be looked at.

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c) As regards prevention, violent extremism is to be understood as a social as well as a security issue. To sum up, in other words, given the slippery nature and uncertain meaning of expressions such as “radicalisation”, “violent extremism” and even “terrorism”, not by chance evidenced by the lack of consensus on an official international definition, the securitarian approach closely connected with law enforcement, which works for detecting and sanctioning committed or attempted crimes, becomes more problematic when applied to prevent crimes or the possibility of them occurring, if only because the law enforcement mechanisms need, to get in motion, crimes already committed or attempted. Moreover, an authentic approach to prevention should take into account a variety of factors and conditions, including the social nature of the issues related to the spreading of the radicalisation phenomenon, especially in certain environs and in relation to the so-called vulnerable. Furthermore, the importance of detecting and countering the early signals of violent extremism, though serving to prevent at least the worst manifestations for a while, are not enough to prevent other possible occurrences. To this end, a deeper and more durable bottom-up action is needed that engages communities, i.e. through a community partnership built on mutual respect, trust-building and problem-solving attitudes and skills. Therefore, greater attention to the fact that radicalisation and extremism, beyond posing security issues, also reflect social issues is at the basis of what could be called the paradigm shift from a more conventional securitarian approach towards a more suitable communitarian approach to prevention involving communities and civil society actors/stakeholders. I would like to make here a prospective conclusion by recalling that the need for an innovative policy approach in the field of preventing/ countering violent extremism, understood to mean preventive measures that seek to address the drivers and the root causes of radicalisation, posits the question of whether, in today’s world, a counter-terrorism approach entrusted only or predominantly to officials and professionals in security (and intelligence alike) needs to be supported and completed with policies, strategies and measures empowering the role of civil society and communities also. In other words, security, strictly understood as the sole prerogative of professionals in law enforcement, needs to be supported and completed with many more skilled people committed to working in the ‘art’ of

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prevention based on early detection/predictive tools, suitable narratives and community partnership, aimed at trust building and problem solving at the grass-root level. Indeed, radicalisation leading to violent extremism, however complex the phenomenon in its multifarious and somewhat intertwined causes and drivers at micro, meso and macro levels, presents behavioural signals and symptoms (languages, postures, views) of socially recognisable relevance, with respect to which if (and to the extent to which) it is possible to resort to detection (predictive) tools and risk-reduction measures finalised to counter this phenomenon by way of suitable narrative formats of communication and dialogue with and between law enforcement agencies and communities, it should also be possible, nay, necessary, to provide support for problem solving, through civil society engagement, on the side of all the actors involved. Luigi Moccia TRIVALENT Project Coordinator European Centre of Excellence Altiero Spinelli University Roma Tre

Notes 1

This publication is the result of a research effort executed in the frame of the TRIVALENT Research Project. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 740934.

INTRODUCTION MARIA LUISA MANISCALCO AND VALERIA ROSATO

Terrorism is not a novelty in the recent history of Europe. Starting at the latest in the second half of last century, various types of terrorist attacks have been linked with nationalist and separatist movements (e.g. the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom and the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain) or related to political extremism, including anarchism, the far left (e.g. Italian Red Brigades, the Greek 17th November Revolutionary Organisation, the French Action Directe, the German Rote Armee Fraktion, etc.) and the far right (e.g. Ordine Nuovo in Italy, National- sozialistischer Untergrund – NSU in Germany and New Force in Spain) movements and groups. While some forms of violent political extremism do still exist, starting from the new millennium, the EU member states – the Western countries, in particular – have become more concerned about the threat deriving from the so-called jihadist terrorism. Its international, transnational and local nature, along with its purpose to prepare or establish a global Islamic State (the Caliphate) and to deeply transform worldwide societies, make it stand out from other national or regional (local) terrorist movements. The perpetrators’ determination and the emotional coverage of the attacks by the mass media have nurtured a feeling of fear and anxiety in Western public opinion. Since 2014 the growing series of jihadist attacks, together with various foiled and failed terrorist plots, have reinforced the widespread awareness of the vulnerabilities in open European democracies. The anxiety is aggravated by the fear that terrorists can take advantage of supportive Muslim communities in the European territories. Jihadist terrorism has been the main focus of counter-terrorism policies, not only for security reasons but also more generally for its impact on the peaceful coexistence and social stability in the context of multicultural communities at local, national, European, and international levels. It not only threatens people’s lives but also polarises societies, spreads hatred and suspicion and creates tension between ethnic groups

Introduction

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and religions. According to a 2017 study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee), the increasing focus on jihadist terrorism by Member States is illustrated by statistics on a high number of suspects, criminal proceedings and arrests in regard to jihadist terrorism as compared to a relatively small number from other forms of terrorism such as left-wing, right- wing and separatist terrorism1.

Jihadist terrorism has a chameleonic nature, equipped with considerable capabilities to associate actions carried out by lone individuals and more complex coordinated attacks. The elimination of terrorist leaders, law enforcement measures (as in the prosecution and incarceration of suspects) and the use of countermeasures of intelligence, law enforcement agencies and military forces, may be not sufficient and cause unintended consequences. The decline of a particular organisation will not be sufficient if new organisations spring up or if the old group can regenerate. What we might see as a victory may not be the end of terrorism if its narrative endures, fueling violence and fostering feelings of exclusion; so, the collapse of the Islamic State (IS) will not end the jihadist problem. Coping with contemporary jihadist terrorism requires multidimensional strategies and combinations of coercive and conciliatory measures. We also need a community-oriented approach to prevention and a cultural struggle in order to demolish the jihadist narrative and portray terrorists as unsuccessful political fighters and “losers” rather than religious heroes. Within the general framework of the European TRIVALENT project, the comparative analysis presented in this book focuses, alongside policy measures taken at the EU level, on the counter terrorism and counterradicalisation policies implemented by five countries – Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as particularly significant European case studies – in order to assess their strengths and weaknesses and identify possible areas of improvement. Below is the rationale behind the selection of these five countries: •

Belgium is a relatively small EU Member State which, however, has recently witnessed multiple terrorist plots and attacks on its national territory and recorded the highest number of terrorismrelated convictions in Europe. Moreover, the country’s legal and law-enforcement systems have come under growing scrutiny, with

Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe

•

•

•

•

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concerns being raised regarding their ability to effectively tackle the jihadist threat without undermining fundamental rights. The “high” threat level experienced by Belgium, combined with questions surrounding the effectiveness of its response capacity, make the country particularly worthy of consideration. France is a large EU Member State that has suffered some of the deadliest terrorist attacks perpetrated in Europe over the last decade. Since November 2015, the country has been struck by more than 20 attacks, many of which targeted members of the police and the military. In addition to the multitude of attacks, events such as the mass exodus of French foreign fighters to Syria have marked a critical transition in French counter-terrorism policy. Emergency measures were introduced in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris attacks. Although officially repealed in November 2017, the law promulgated to replace them incorporates some elements of the previous state of emergency, triggering claims that the provision may be harmful to citizens’ civil liberties. Italy is also a large EU Member State. While the country has not been struck by any major terrorist attacks of jihadist matrix, and Italian figures concerning radicalisation are lower compared to those of other EU countries, Italy remains a highly symbolic target and has been subject to numerous calls for attacks by the IS. In response to the threat, the country recently modified its legislative framework in order to implement several EU counter-terrorism measures. Among Italian best practices in counter terrorism, there is also a well-established cooperation between the different intelligence agencies and between them and police forces, including penitentiary police. Spain is another large EU Member State which, in addition to its history of domestic terrorism, has suffered two serious Islamist terrorist attacks: the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the Barcelona van attack in 2017. Spain has also updated its legal framework in recent years in response to UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on “foreign terrorist fighters”. The latest legislative reform of 2019 amends some articles of the Penal Code through the transposition of an EU Directive concerning the crime of terrorist groups and organisations and terrorist offences. The United Kingdom is currently the European country with the lengthiest record of domestic counter-terrorism laws. The UK has suffered many serious terrorist attacks in recent years and is arguably the forerunner in initiating “soft” preventive counter-

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radicalisation measures involving actors from civil society. Although it has an opt- out from the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (and will not take part in the EU Directive), and although the Brexit will alter its relationship with the EU further, the UK remains nevertheless a key regional partner for the EU and for member states in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. These case studies, with their peculiarities and differences, allow a delineation of the role of long-term and structural factors in defining counter terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies, as well as the impacts that specific occurrences can have. Different types of public policies, including repressive, preventive, legal, and administrative measures, have been analysed together with the role of civil society in preventing and mitigating radicalisation processes. The book offers an updated and critical description of the main antiterrorism and anti-radicalisation policies and measures of the five countries and their strengths and weaknesses, identifying the possible evolutionary lines and proposing a series of recommendations.

Notes 1

Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, “EU and Member States’ policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes,” PE 596.832 (December 2017), 10.

PART I PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM POLICIES

CHAPTER ONE THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM POLICY SANTINA MUSOLINO

1. Background In the years preceding the 9/11 attacks, the European Commission already had concrete ideas for measures that would be potentially useful to combat terrorism, but there was no common sense of urgency or political determination at the EU level to introduce or ratify these measures. The year 2001 was a watershed in the history of European anti-terrorism policy: terrorism and violent radicalisation became the major concerns of the EU and its member states. After this dramatic event, the EU member states realised that they all faced one collective terrorist threat. This was a crucial moment that prepared the ground for the development of a common EU counter-terrorism policy. The subsequent institutionalisation of this cooperation – especially through the establishment of the European Arrest Warrant, the Counter Terrorism Coordinator and the European Counter Terrorism Centre within Europol – has contributed to a “routinization”1 of counter-terrorism practices in the European Union. In an extraordinary meeting ten days after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon, the European Council (EC) declared the fight against terrorism to be an EU priority objective2. In particular, two gatherings – an extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels and a second informal Council meeting in Ghent on 19 October 2001 – marked the beginning of a long list of meetings and the start of the so-called “Anti-terrorism Roadmap”, a plan of concrete counter-terrorism actions for the EU. The EU’s counter-terrorism agenda has been “to a large extent ‘crisisdriven’”3 and was heavily influenced by several major shocking events: 9/11; the Madrid and London bombings; the rise of the Islamic State in

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Iraq and Syria (ISIS); the terrorist attacks in France of 2015 and 2016; the attacks in Brussels and Berlin in 2016; and the recent attack in Strasburg on December 2018. Even though the perception of terrorist threat has become ever more shared within the EU post-9/11, a more coherent EU counter-terrorism policy took shape only between 2004 and 2005. The Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005, in fact, prompted the EU to develop initiatives to better understand the root causes of terrorism and led to identifying radicalisation as the main focal point in combating terrorism. The attacks did not show a clear link with al-Qaeda or any other global Salafi network. In the London case, the jihadi terrorists were home-grown and to a large extent operated independently. This self-organisation of jihadist terrorist groups, functioning without financial and operational support from a central terrorist organisation, has led to an important transformation in the perception of the terrorist threat in Europe: from the almost exclusive focus on al-Qaeda, prevalent immediately after the 9/11 attacks, to home-grown terrorism as a result of “intra-EU radicalisation processes and terrorist recruitment”4. The amendment of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA5 in 2008 added several more activities to the list of criminalised ones and shifted the focus on criminalising preparatory acts and incitement to terrorism. Moreover, it stressed the importance of reconsidering the potentialities of a preventive action. The adoption of the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action6 in 2010 and the creation, in 2011, of the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) outlined the importance of creating a network connecting first-line experts from various EU member states. The following years and the events that marked them – the Syrian civil war, the rise of the ISIS and a series of new terrorist attacks – forced the European Union to reconsider its counter-terrorism policies due to another change in the terrorist threat perception and the emergence of new challenges. The first of these challenges was the management of the phenomenon of so-called “foreign fighters”7. The civil war in Syria and the rise of ISIS, in fact, attracted a large number of individuals travelling from all over the world, including Europe, to take part in this conflict. In June 2014 about 2500 European fighters had travelled to Syria, but this number had risen to more than 5000 in November 2015. The majority of these fighters joined extremist groups and “about 30% of them have returned to Europe”8. Moreover, although not all returnees have become terrorists, many of them have gone through a radicalisation process that has made them more likely to resort to violence. There is also evidence that the so-called “Islamic State” has instructed some of its combatants to

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return to Europe to perpetrate terror ist attacks, spread propaganda, and radicalise and recruit other potential militants9. The new threat represented by foreign fighters dramatically materialised in a series of terrorist attacks in the EU between 2015 and 2017, prompting all member states to think about new measures in the fight against terrorism. In particular, the attack on the offices of the French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo, on 7 January 2015, led the EU Justice and Home Affair Council (JHA) to publish the Riga Statement10, which identified terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist financing to be among the main threats to EU internal security. It appeared immediately clear that the threat was no longer just an internal threat but also an external one. Furthermore, the investigations about these attacks showed “the transnational aspects of the operative cells that prepared the attacks and the international support networks related to that”11. In order to respond to the changes of terrorist threat, the Commission in December 201512 proposed the adoption of a new directive on combating terrorism, which was supposed to strengthen framework decisions and add new criminal offences that address the foreign fighter phenomenon. Another Paris attack – the massacre at the Bataclan Theatre on 13 November 2015 – was the deadliest in the EU since the 2004 Madrid attack. Then, in 22 March 2016, suicide bombings took place at the Brussels airport and Maalbeek metro station in the EU quarter of Brussels. In response to the November 2015 and March 2016 attacks, the European External Action Service (EEAS) proposed new policies13. The purpose and justifications of these new policies were clearly focused on strengthening European boundaries in external relations, despite the rising wave of extreme nationalist sentiment within some member states. In particular, EEAS improved the internal-external nexus of security, EU-US intelligence sharing and formal/informal diplomacy to promote cooperation with third countries. With the aim of improving the cooperation between police and judicial agencies within the EU and data exchange between member states, the European Counter Terrorism Centre was launched in January 2016 and in June of the same year, the Council produced a “roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management, including interoperability solution in the Justice and Home Affairs area”14. Finally, the dramatic episodes mentioned above and those which occurred subsequently – the attack in Nice in July 2016 and the attack on the Christmas Market in Berlin in December 2016 – seemed to demonstrate a further transformation in the threat to the citizens of the EU:

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the emergence of the phenomenon of the lone wolf and the “weaponisation of ordinary life”15.

2. State of the existing policy Although in 2005 the EU adopted a specific counter-terrorism strategy, counter-terrorism remains part of a broader “EU security architecture”16. Policy making in this area has therefore also been influenced by other general strategies. One of them – the 2015 European Agenda on Security identifies terrorism as one of the three priority areas for EU security, together with organised crime and cybercrime. In the context of the Agenda’s implementation, the idea according to which “the EU and its member states need to move beyond the concept of cooperating to protect national internal security to the idea of protecting the collective security of the Union as a whole”17 emerged. Some components of the European Union’s “multifaceted fight against terrorism”18 include the exchange of information between police and intelligence agencies; the development of external action; the managing of complex threats and natural disasters; the control of European borders; the fight against terrorist recruitment and financing; and the production of counter-terrorism legislation19. The most relevant counter-terrorism policy initiatives and measures put in place by the EU mainly concerned these “policy themes”20: a) Measures and tools for operational cooperation and intelligence/law enforcement and judicial information exchange; b) Data collection and database access; c) Measures to enhance external border security; d) Measures to combat terrorist financing (including the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, TFTP); e) Measures to reduce terrorists’ access to weapons and explosives (including the proposed revision of the Firearms Directive); f) Criminal justice measures (including the new directive on combating terrorism); g) Measures to combat radicalisation and recruitment (the work of the RAN)21. Each of the above-mentioned initiatives and measures will be further developed and described in the following pages using the analytic dimensions of preventive measures and repression measures.

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Chapter One

Since one of the four pillars of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is prevention, prevention of radicalisation is considered an important aspect of the general approach of the EU to combat terrorism and counter radicalisation and violent extremism. Several strategies and programmes have been developed, which include “a special EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, a Media Communication Strategy, a Check-the-Web project, and an EU-wide Empowering Civil Society-programme”22. However, in terms of mandates, prevention of radicalisation is considered “an area that falls under the sovereign authority of the Member States”23 At the EU level, various tools, strategies, programmes, networks, and platforms were created to inspire and encourage Member States to develop policies and instruments on local and national local levels. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) can be considered to be “the main actor in place to give follow-up to the objectives of the EU and functions as a network to exchange experiences, collect good practices and offer training to first-line responders”24. An important area within the dimension of preventive measures is that which concerns the measures and tools for data collection, database access and information exchange. The EU has created several structures with the aim of allowing data collection, operational cooperation and information exchange concerning intelligence, law enforcement and justice. One of the first structures was the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), an intergovernmental organisation designed to provide its member countries with direct access to “a wide range of criminal databases, containing millions of records on fingerprints, DNA, stolen motor vehicles, firearms, stolen and lost travel documents and more”25. With the aim of facilitating the exchange of information between EU member states’ criminal records databases, the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) was also created in April 201226. A Council Decision of 200227 introduced an important agency in the field of operational cooperation and law enforcement – the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) – which aims to stimulate and improve the coordination of judicial investigations and prosecutions for cases with links between two or more member states. In 2004, Council Decision 2004/512/EC28 established the Visa Information System (VIS) to allow the processing of data concerning third-country nationals applying for short-stay visits or travelling through the Schengen member states. VIS involves the exchange of visa data between the member states to conduct a common visa policy. Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA29 – also known as the “Swedish Decision” because of the initiative by Sweden – established the rules for

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member states’ law enforcement authorities to simplify the exchange of information more effectively and in order to detect, prevent and investigate criminal offences and conduct criminal intelligence operations. In 2009 the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) was created to help member states deal with a specific set of criminal offences, including terrorism. Europol collects, stores, processes, analyses, and exchanges information and also facilitates operational cooperation via Joint Investigation Teams (JITs). Moreover, the Agency provides law enforcement expertise to the member states and produces threat assessments, strategic and operational analyses, and general situation reports such as the annual and public TE-SAT (Terrorism Situation & Trend Report). For the functions of operational cooperation and information exchange, Europol maintains the following tools: •

•

• •

•

Europol Information System (EIS): Europol’s central reference system to verify the availability beyond national jurisdictions of data relating to suspected and convicted persons, criminal structures, offences and the means to commit them. Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA): allows for the exchange of operational and strategic information and intelligence relating to crime between Europol, the member states and third parties that have a cooperation agreement with Europol30. Europol Analysis System (EAS): the operational information system through which information can be managed and analysed through tools offered by the system. European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC): a centre for expertise focused on foreign fighters, terrorist financing, online terrorist propaganda, illegal arms trafficking, and international cooperation since January 2016. 24/7 operational centre: the central Europol hub for processing incoming data.

Europol has become an important “player” in EU counter terrorism and, as already noted, its role was reinforced in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Europol’s counter-terrorist efforts have been mainly directed towards tackling Islamist-inspired terrorism. Activities carried out by Europol include:

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a) Analysing gathered information from strategic, tactical and operational perspectives; b) Undertaking threat and risk assessments; c) Supporting operational investigations in the member states, when requested; d) Monitoring, tracking and preventing all forms of illicit trafficking of nuclear material, arms, explosives, and weapons of mass destruction; e) Maintaining regular contact with terrorist experts. In order to strengthen Europol’s counter-terrorist efforts, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was created in January 2016. The official website of Europol presents the ECTC as an “operations centre and hub of expertise that reflects the growing need for the EU to enforce and implement its response to terrorism”31. Specifically, the ECTC focuses on: a) Tackling foreign fighters; b) Sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing amongst member states (through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the Financial Intelligence Unit); c) Monitoring and suggesting preventive measures against online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU Internet Referral Unit); d) Countering illegal arms trafficking; e) Fostering the international cooperation among counter-terrorism authorities32. Part of Europol’s ECTC is the EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU), which started its activities in July 2015 and whose mission is “to link the virtual face of terrorism to its physical aspect by connecting prevention and investigation capabilities”33. The EU IRU’s role is to identify the disseminators of terrorist propaganda and reduce accessibility to terrorist content online by providing a resilient referral capability for the member states. Moreover, this unit provides internet-based investigation support to respond to the member states operational needs34. In recent years, there have been some interesting improvements on the EU level. In addition to the evolution of Europol’s ECTC, the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) was improved in 2016 with the creation of a common platform for the exchange of information between member states’ security services.

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In general, the foundation of CTG and ECTC within Europol can be seen as concrete testimony of the fact that counter-terrorism cooperation has become increasingly institutionalised in the EU. This institutionalisation – as recently highlighted by Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard – has contributed to the “routinisation of EU counterterrorism practices”35. In order to address the complex landscape of differently governed information systems, the Commission set up – under Commission Decision C/2016/3780 of 17 June 201636 – the High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability (HLEG), whose aim is to “contribute to an overall strategic vision on how to make the management and use of data for border management and security more effective and efficient, and to identify solutions to implement improvements”37. In order to guarantee control of the external border and support the management of migration, the EU – always with a preventive perspective – has built up tools and established specific measures. In 2003 the European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), the European Union (EU) fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers and irregular border-crossers, was created. Since its appearance it “has proved to be a very important tool providing fingerprint comparison evidence to assist with determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum application made in the EU”38. On October 2013, the EU adopted a regulation establishing the European border surveillance system Eurosur, an information-exchange framework for generating EU-wide situation awareness and for detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and saving migrant lives at the external borders of the member states. The Schengen Information System II (SIS II) was activated in 201339. SIS II is the successor of SIS I, in operation until May 2013. Both the SIS I and the SIS II include the national systems which are established in the member states of the Schengen Area and with the help of network they are connected to the central system. The SIS II ensures the information management infrastructure that is helping to ensure the border control and the security control, as well as it helps for the court cooperation40.

Another important step to ensure the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime is the adoption – 27 April 2016 – of Directive (EU) 2016/681 on the use of the Passenger Name Record (PNR). The Directive notably “provides for the obligation of air carriers to transfer to member states the PNR data they

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have collected in the normal course of their business”41. After a few months, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) replaced the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), which had been in operation since May 2005. The EBCG has the task of implementing European-integrated border management at the national and EU levels to ensure freedom of movement within the EU as well as contribute to maintaining an area of freedom, security and justice42. In this regard, in March 2017, member states produced the Rome Declaration, which invited the EU to take measures (the so-called “Rome Agenda”) on migration, terrorism, socio-economic development, security and defence, and the environment43. The declaration’s main requests were that the Union remained “the best instrument” to address policy challenges and that the Member States and EU institutions would continue to work “in a spirit of trust and loyal cooperation”44. Alongside the preventive measures described above, European counterterrorism and security policies have also been articulated through a series of measures and tools that fall within the second dimension cited – the repressive one. The first group of repressive measures includes the tools designed to combat terrorist financing. In general, the EU policy regarding combating terrorist financing and sanctions aims at disrupting the flow of financial resources to and from terrorist organisations and individual terrorists. The two main components of action are measures by which private entities that handle funds for clients are tracked to ensure that suspicious transactions are reported to the authorities on the one hand, and the assets of persons involved in supporting terrorism (sanctions) are frozen, on the other5. The main repressive tool in counter-terrorism policies consists of criminal justice measures used to punish and prevent the commission of terrorist acts. The key legal instrument is the directive on combating terrorism, replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. An important piece of legislation among the acts recently adopted by the Union legislature is Directive (EU) 2017/541, adopted on the basis of Article 83 (Ex-Article 31 TEU)46 and considered necessary to align the EU legal framework with the changing international legal context, taking into account, in particular, United Nation Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Prevention of Terrorism. Interventions, measures and instruments designed and created to combat terrorism and radicalisation can be placed in a sort of “intersection” between preventive and repressive measures.

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In recent years, awareness about online radicalisation has increased. In 2015, the European Commission launched the EU Internet Forum with the aim of stopping the misuse of the internet by international terrorist groups, as well as providing a framework for efficient and voluntary cooperation with the internet industry to control terrorist online content. Building on the ongoing work within the EU Internet Forum, on 1 March 2018, the Commission recommended a set of urgent operational measures that online platforms and member states should take, including the swift detection and removal of terrorist content online and increased cooperation with law enforcement authorities (LEAs). As we have already seen in the pages dedicated to the role of Europol, the EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) works to anticipate and pre-empt terrorist abuse of online platforms. The IRU identifies terrorist content and provides operational support and analysis to EU member states. Within the fight against online radicalisation, an important issue has become the creation of the online counter-narrative. In order to spread alternative narratives, the European Commission decided to support civil society partners through the Civil Society Empowerment Programme. Under this programme, the Commission finances campaigns that provide alternative narratives to terrorist propaganda and that promote fundamental rights and values. About this last point, in January 2018, the Commission proposed a Council Recommendation on “promoting common values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of teaching”47 aiming at ensuring that young people understand the importance of common values, strengthening social cohesion and contributing to fighting the rise of extremism, populism, xenophobia, and the spread of fake news, especially on the web. Recent EU action has followed a double approach – on one hand denying terrorists and criminals the means with which to act while on the other, building resilience against terrorist attacks. In the first approach, the recently adopted Fifth Anti-Money-Laundering Directive completes the existing EU framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The Directive aims to facilitate the work of financial intelligence units and address the risks linked to virtual currencies and anonymous prepaid cards. Moreover, in order to prevent terrorists from easily acquiring firearms a directive on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, a law that started to apply in 2018, has been adopted. Regarding external border protection, the EU has recently improved the use of existing databases and has tried to fill the information gaps by creating new ones. In 2017, a specific amendment to the Schengen Borders Code introduced an obligation to carry out systematic checks against

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relevant databases at external land, sea, and air borders on all persons, including EU nationals. More recently, two new information systems were adopted: an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data for non-EU nationals crossing EU borders, and a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) to support security checks on visa-exempt non-EU nationals. These systems should be operational starting from 2020 and 2021, respectively.

3. Loopholes and gaps in existing policies In the last decade, the EU has developed a counter-radicalisation policy that goes hand in hand with the counter-terrorism policy. The analysis of the current state of the EU’s counter-radicalisation strategy reveals new trends also found in contemporary international security. Among these identified trends of particular importance are the predominance of preventive strategies, the “crime-terror nexus”48 and the “overrepresentation of Islamist-inspired terrorism in EU policy documents and strategies”49 while other forms of terrorism are mostly absent. This last aspect was also highlighted by a study for the LIBE Committee about the coherence, relevance and effectiveness of European Union’s policies on counter terrorism. In this report, in fact, we read the counter-terrorism agenda primarily reflects the security concerns of Western and Northern European Member States around jihadism. Threat perceptions and counter-terrorist “legacies” in Central and Eastern Europe and Member States might be different. Moreover, the potential for political violence does not solely rest with jihadists as the attack by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011 showed50.

The reconstruction of the state of European Union policies on counter terrorism and prevention of radicalisation – above all taking into account their coherence and effectiveness – has made clear the presence of some limits and gaps. The first gap identified is the lack of evidence for programmes addressing radicalisation. Radicalisation research has received a lot of attention and funding – and many of these funds have been guaranteed by EU programmes; nevertheless, despite its exponential growth in recent years, we still know very little about the actual causes, processes and mechanisms of radicalisation. Another critical aspect regarding EU counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies is the lack of operational cooperation between LEAs, which is also linked to some gaps in the use of information systems at both the national and EU agency levels51. The amount of information exchanged by national

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authorities has increased in recent years; however, it seems that the EU databases are not being used to their full potential because, for example, investigations of major terrorist attacks in the EU have revealed situations where information was not shared between national authorities52. Another relevant gap is in the effective fight against terrorism. The implementation and enforcement of EU tools and measures in the fight against terrorism have not yet been fully evaluated, especially as regards their coherence and compliance with fundamental rights. The European Commission has conducted a comprehensive assessment of EU security policy and this effort could be seen as a positive first step. However, the invalidation by the Court of Justice of several EU legal instruments53 in this field suggests that the EU institutions have failed many times to take fundamental rights into account in the process of counter-terrorism law and policy-making. The issue of the coherence and compliance of EU counter-terrorism policies with fundamental rights is closely related to some implications deriving from the growing counter-terrorist power given to Europol and highlighted by recent research and studies. As a result of Europol becoming “highly bureaucratized”54, the police are now technical actors in the fight against terrorism and this has “depoliticised”55 counterterrorist efforts. The depoliticisation of terrorism has turned out to be a strategy to “normalise” counter-terrorist procedures and facilitate cooperation because it removes the need to analyse the motivations behind terrorist acts and transform anti-terrorist cooperation into a “technical matter”56. In this way, counter terrorism has become part of the ‘normal’ criminal policies and, as such, it has become “smoother and quicker”57. This strategy, anyway, raises serious questions concerning the accountability of Europol and the legitimacy of its work. In this regard, according to Julia Jansson, despite the apparently “technical” and depoliticised nature of police cooperation, Europol has transformed itself into a policy maker instead of retaining its role as a merely executive organ. Furthermore, the close collaboration with third states and organisations seems to make police collaboration “even more autonomous and less accountable”58. Particularly problematic is the collaboration between Europol and the United States for at least two reasons. First of all because of the continuous use of the death penalty in the United States, while the actions of Europol should follow the principles set by the European Convention on Human Rights, which bans the death penalty “in all circumstances”59. A second reason is related to the problem arising from the Europol-United States agreement that grants the United States

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authorities more rights to access Europol data than the national authorities of EU member states. Sharing data with United States officials is problematic because the United States does not have a structured data protection legislation, and because the agreement does not explicitly deny the possibility of United States officials sharing Europol information with third parties or states60. A final important consideration – deriving from a recent comprehensive assessment of EU Security Policy by European Commission61 – is the need for “a more long-term, societal approach in counter-radicalisation policies”62. Current security, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies, in fact, do not take sufficient account of long-term and socio-economic factors at the national andEuropean level. In reality, however, the response to radicalisation should be global, which would mean that a fundamental step towards effective counter radicalisation is represented by regional, national and international cooperation. This cooperation is “relatively well developed in the sphere of counter-terrorism (for example, at the level of intelligence sharing) but less so when it comes to the prevention of radicalisation”63.

4. Conclusions An analysis about the impact of EU counter-terrorism strategies on domestic arenas led to finding – according with Monika Den Boer and Irina Wiegand (201564) – a convergence between the national counterterrorism systems in the EU member states. The convergence becomes visible at four different levels: “political-strategic, organizational, procedural, and legal”65. 1) Political-strategic level: In the different political arenas, counterterrorism strategies have been adopted with the promotion of multidisciplinary, cross-sector or integrated security approaches, which “forces police and justice organizations to take account of different organizational perceptions, images and cultures”66. Several counter-terrorism strategies developed at the national and European levels “have adopted similar strategic vocabularies, which may be interpreted as a form of political-strategic convergence”67; 2) Organisational level: At an organisational level, the convergence between national counter-terrorism organisations in member states may also be characterised by “an organic sensitivity to internal and external impulses. As organisations seek to create responses to old problems, new problems arise”68;

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3) Procedural level: The counter-terrorism experts in the member states gradually begin to work according to standard protocols and working procedures; 4) Legal level: The fast internationalisation of regulatory tools establishes binding and non-binding principles for all national legal systems, and this “may contribute to an incremental legal convergence”69. According to the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation, the focus on anti-radicalisation in the post-2015 period had a further impact on terrorism prevention strategies and this focus was placed on two main areas of intervention: prisons and the internet. In this regard, recognising that prisons might be “incubators”70 for radicalisation and considering the increased number of terrorist prisoners and in view of their eventual release, the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HL- CEG-R) stresses the need to increase member states’ capacity to “develop, implement and evaluate risk assessment tools and disengagement programmes to allow for targeted and effective rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorist offenders”71. With regard to the second area, dissemination of terrorist propaganda on the internet remains a primary concern and efforts to reduce the impact of such content through its removal, the development of counter and alternative narratives and the development of strategic communications remain a priority. In addition to the work carried out in the context of the EU Internet Forum and the recent “Commission recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online”72, the HLCEG-R calls for action by the traditional media and satellite television and underlines the importance for each member state to make use of the support and consultancy provided by the European Strategic Communications Network73. The reconstruction of the EU’s policies on counter terrorism as well as the analysis of the limits and gaps in the measures and tools adopted over the years has shown that the terrorist threat has evolved and changed, putting the European Union in front of new challenges in terms of preventing as well as countering the radicalisation process: the return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) and their families, including children, home-grown terrorists and the so-called “lone wolves”. In particular, foreign fighters and their return and relocation remain a significant longterm challenge, requiring member states to balance repressive and “soft” responses because their imprisonment may only delay the threat they pose. Finally, recent threat assessments indicate a worrying increase in rightwing extremism promoting anti-democratic and intolerant messages that

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risk feeding violent extremism. This means that it is essential for the European Union to monitor not only the spread of Islamic ideology but also the rise in right-wing and left-wing extremisms in order to develop prevention and intervention measures that are in line with fundamental rights standards and avoid triggering stigmatisation processes.

Notes 1

Christian Kaunert, Sarah Léonard, “The collective securitisation of terrorism in the European Union,” West European Politics 42, no. 2 (2019): 261–277; James Sperling, Mark Webber, “The European Union: Security governance and collective securitisation,” West European Politics, 42, no. 2 (2019): 228–260. 2 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the extraordinary Europe A Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ 20972/140en.pdf. 3 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “Counter-terrorism in the EU’s external relations,” Journal of European Integration, 39 (2017): 609–624; Sarah Backman, Mark Rhinard, “The European Union’s capacities for managing crisis,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 26, no. 4 (2018): 261–271. 4 Oldrich Bures, EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (London: Routledge 2011). 5 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F0475. 6 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (COM (2010) 673), http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/ regdoc/rep/1/2010/EN/1-2010-673-EN-F1-1.Pdf. 7 Oldrich Bures, “EU’s response to foreign fighters: New threat, old challenges?” Terrorism and Political Violence (2018): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546 553.2017.1404456. 8 Directorate general for internal policies, civil liberties, justice and home affairs, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness (European Union 2017), 34. 9 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: The European Agenda on Security (April 28, 2015), http:// ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf; Europol, Changes in Modus Operandi Islamic State Terror- ist Attacks (2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/changes-modusoperan- di-islamic-state-terrorist-attacks. 10 European Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Riga Joint Statement (2015), http:// data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5855-2015-INIT/en/pdf. 11 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 35.

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European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (2 December 2015), COM (2015) 625 final, 2015/0281 (COD). 13 Conclusion of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on Counter Terrorism, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-re-leases/2015/11/20/jhaconclusions-counter-terrorism/. 14 Council of the European Union, Roadmap to enhance information exchange and in- formation management including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area, 9368/1/16 Rev 1 (6 June 2016), https://statewatch.org/news/2016/jun/ eu-council-info-exchange-interoperabilityroadmap-9368-rev1-6-6-16.pdf. 15 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 36. 16 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), The Fight Against Terrorism (May 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621817/ EPRS_STU(2018)621817_EN.pdf. 17 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social. Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The European Agenda on Security, Strasbourg (28.4.2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/125863/EU%20agenda%20on%20security .pdf. 18 Argomaniz, Bures and Kaunert, “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence,” 192. 19 Argomaniz, Bures and Kaunert, “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelli- gence,” 191–206. 20 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 63. 21 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001 (2001). 22 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 63. 23 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 63. 24 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 63. 25 https://www.interpol.int/How-we-work/Databases. 26 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/toolsjudicial- cooperation/european-criminal-records-information-system-ecris_en. 27 Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, 2002/187/JHA, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con- tent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32002D0187.

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Council Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS) (2004/512/EC), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A 32004D0512. 29 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA (18 December 2006), https://eurlex. europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2006/960/oj. 30 More specifically, Europol has concluded operational agreements with non-EU countries allowing for the exchange of information (including personal data). Since 2015, new agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Georgia, and Ukraine have been concluded. New Europol strategic agreements, limited to the exchange of general intelligence, have been concluded with Brazil, China and United Arab Emirates. In 2018, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations for operational agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. 31 https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorismcentre-ectc. 32 In the field of international cooperation, the EU-US cooperation plays a fundamental role. The US is, in fact, the EU’s main partner in the field of counterterrorism. Europol and US Customs and Border Protection signed two agreements on foreign fighters and illegal immigration in 2015: the Focal Point Travellers Agreement and the Focal Point Check Point Agreement. Focal Point (FP) Travellers is a specialist team of analysts and experts within Europol that coordinates EU member states’ investigations into, and data analysis on, foreign terrorist fighters. A further agreement from 2016 allowed for active FBI involvement in FP Travellers. The EU-US data protection “umbrella agreement,” signed in 2016, put in place a comprehensive high-level data protection framework for EU-US law enforcement cooperation. 33 EU Internet Referral Unit, Transparency Report, https://www.europol.europa.eu/ publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-transparency-report-2017, 3. 34 EU Internet Referral Unit, Transparency Report. 35 Kaunert, Léonard, “The Collective Securitisation,” 273. 36 Commission Decision of 17 June 2016 setting up the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability, https://publications.europa.eu/en/pub- lication-detail/-/publication/b76fead8-4a4611e6-9c64-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 37 High-level expert group on information systems and interoperability, Final Report (May 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail. groupDetailDoc&id=32600&no=1. 38 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-ofapplicants_en. 39 Schengen Information System, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/justice_ freedom_security/230102.html?root=230102. 40 Personal Data in Schengen Information System II (SIS II), https://www.dvi.gov. lv/en/personal-data-protection-2/international-cooperation/personal-data-in-schengen-information-system-sis-ii/.

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Passenger Name Record (PNR), European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/policecooperation/information-exchange/pnr_en. 42 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness. 43 The Rome Declaration, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/rome-declaration/. 44 Sperling, Webber, “The European Union,” 230. 45 Evaluation of EU Measures to combat terrorist financing, In-depth analysis for the LIBE Committee (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/ join/2014/509978/IPOL-LIBE_NT%282014%29509978_EN.pdf. 46 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – part three: Union policies and internal actions – Title V: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – Chapter 4: Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Article 83 (exArticle 31 TEU), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E083. 47 European Commission, A Europe That Protects: Preventing Radicalisation, EU Mayor’s Conference: “Building Urban Defences Against Terrorism” (March 8, 2018). 48 Bruno Oliveira Martins, Monika Ziegler, “Counter-radicalization as Counterterrorism: The European Union Case,” in Expressions of Radicalization: Global Politics, Processes and Practices, eds Kristian Steiner, Andreas Önnerfors (London: Palgrave, 2017), 7. 49 Oliveira Martins, Ziegler, “Counter-radicalization as Counter-terrorism,” 7. 50 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 70. 51 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 76–78. 52 Directorate general for internal policies, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 76–78. 53 In its jurisprudence, the European Court of Justice has identified numerous violations of fundamental rights by counter-terrorism measures. Examples include the Kadi case law, Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige rulings, which declared indiscriminate retention of communications data to be incompatible with EU law. Recently, in July 2017, the Court declared the EU-Canada Agreement on the transfer and processing of PNR incompatible with the Treaties. 54 Julia Jansson, “Building Resilience, Demolishing Accountability? The Role of Europol in Counter-terrorism,” Policing and Society, 28, no. 4 (2018): 432–447, 442. 55 Jansson, “Building Resilience,” 442. 56 Jansson, “Building Resilience,” 432–447. 57 Jansson, “Building Resilience,” 443. 58 Jansson, “Building Resilience,” 443. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council and the Council, Thirteenth progress report towards an effective and genuine security union, Brussels (24/1/2018), 9, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-

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do/policies/european-agenda-security/20180124-progress-report-13-towardseffective-and-genu- ine-security-union.pdf. 59 Protocol no. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, Vilnius, CETS no. 187 (3.5.2002). 60 Jansson, “Building Resilience,” 442. 61 Commission Staff Working Document, Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy, Brussels (27/7/2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/125861/ comprehensive%20security%20assessment%20part%201.pdf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Seventeenth Progress Report towards an effective and genuine Security Union, Strasbourg (11/12/2018), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20181211_com2018-845-security-union-up- date-17_en.pdf. 62 Dialogue About Radicalisation and Equality (DARE) – EU H2020 funded project, Effectiveness of Counter-radicalisation Policies: Preliminary Research Findings and Recommendations from European Experts in Deradicalisation and Counter-Terrorism, http://www.dareh2020.org/uploads/1/2/1/7/12176018/18_04_25_dare_policy_brief _ 1_ct_experts_perspectives.pdf. 63 Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality (DARE). 64 Monica Den Boer, Irina Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration: Evaluating the Impact of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies on Domestic Arenas,” Intelligence and National Security, 30, no. 2–3 (2015): 377–401. 65 Den Boer, Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration,” 380. 66 Den Boer, Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration,” 380. 67 Den Boer, Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration,” 380. 68 Den Boer, Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration,” 381. 69 Den Boer, Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration,” 383. 70 European Commission, High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), Final Report (18 May 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20180613_fi- nalreport-radicalisation.pdf. 71 European Commission, High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), Final Report. 72 Commission Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (C (2018) 1177 final), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/ commission-recommendation-measures-effectively-tackle-illegalcontent-online. 73 European Commission, High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), Final Report.

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List of References Argomaniz, Javier, Bures Oldrich, and Kaunert Christian. “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment.” Intelligence and National Security 30, no. 2–3 (2015): 191–206. Backman, Sarah, Rhinard Mark. “The European Union’s Capacities for Managing Crisis.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 26, no. 4 (2018): 261–271. Bakker, Edwin. “EU Counter-radicalization Policies: A Comprehensive and Consistent Approach?” Intelligence and National Security 30, no. 2–3 (2015): 281–305. Bures, Oldrich. “EU’s Response to Foreign Fighters: New Threat, Old Challenges?” Terrorism and Political Violence, (2018): 1–18. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1404456. —. EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? London: Routledge, 2011. Commission Decision of 17 June 2016 setting up the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability. https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b76fead8-4a4611e6-9c64-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. Commission Staff Working Document. Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy. Brussels, (27/7/2017). http://www.europarl.europa. eu/cmsdata/125861/comprehensive%20security%20assessment%20 part%201.pdf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Seventeenth Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union, Strasbourg 11/12/2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ what-we-do/poli-cies/european-agenda-security/20181211_com-2018845-security-un- ion-update-17_en.pdf. Conclusion of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting with- in the Council on Counter Terrorism. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2015/11/20/jha-conclusions-counter-terrorism/. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – part three: Union policies and internal actions – Title V: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – Chapter 4: Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Article 83 (ex-Article 31 TEU), https://eurlex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E083.

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Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime. 2002/187/JHA. https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32002D0187. Council Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS) (2004/512/EC). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32004D0512. Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, (18 December 2006). https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2006/960/oj. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F0475. Council of the European Union. Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area: – State of play of the implementation of its Actions 1 to 16 (Chapter 2), 13283/16, (14 October 2016), 15. —. Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area, 9368/1/16 Rev 1, (6 June 2016). Davis Cross, Mai’a K. “Counter-terrorism in the EU’s External Relations.” Journal of European Integration, 39 (2017): 609–624. —. The Politics of Crisis in Europe. Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2017a. Den Boer, Monica, Wiegand Irina. “From Convergence to Deep Integration: Evaluating the Impact of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies on Domestic Arenas.” Intelligence and National Security 30, no. 2–3 (2015): 377–401. Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality (DARE) – EU H2020 funded project, Effectiveness of Counter-radicalisation Policies: Preliminary Research Findings and Recommendations from European Experts in Deradicalisation and Counter-Terrorism. Directorate general for internal policies, Civil liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, European Union (2017). Directorate-general for Internal Policies. Evaluation of EU Measures to Combat Terrorist Financing. In-depth analysis for the LIBE Committee (2014). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/509978/ IPOL-LIBE_NT%282014%29509978_EN.pdf. EU Internet Referral Unit. Transparency Report. https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-transparency-report2017.

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European Commission. A Europe that Protects: Preventing Radicalisation. EU Mayor’s Conference: “Building Urban Defences against Terrorism.” (March 8, 2018). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/ 20180308_a-europe-that-protects-preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf. —. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: The European Agenda on Security, (April 28, 2015). http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/ documents/basicdocuments/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf. —. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps towards a More Secure Europe (COM (2010) 673). http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2010/EN/1-2010-673EN-F1-1.Pdf. —. High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), Final Report, (18 May 2018). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/europe-an-agendasecurity/20180613_final-report-radicalisation.pdf. —. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX% 3A52015PC0625. European Council. Conclusions and Plan of Action of the extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20972/140en.pdf. European Justice and Home Affairs Ministers. Riga Joint Statement, (2015). http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5855-2015INIT/en/pdf. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). The Fight against Terrorism, (May 2018). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/2018/621817/EPRS_STU(2018)621817_EN.pdf. Europol. Changes in Modus Operandi Islamic State Terrorist Attacks, (2016). https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/changes-modusoperan-diislamic-state-terrorist-attacks. High-level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability. Final Report, (May 2017).

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http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index. cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=32600&no=1. Jansson, Julia. “Building Resilience, Demolishing Accountability? The Role of Europol in Counter-terrorism.” Policing and Society 28, no. 4 (2018): 432–447. Kaunert, Christian, Léonard Sarah. “The Collective Securitisation of Terrorism in the European Union.” West European Politics 42, no. 2 (2019): 261–277. Oliveira Martins, Bruno, Ziegler Monika. “Counter-radicalization as Counter-terrorism: The European Union Case.” In Expressions of Radicalization: Global Politics, Processes and Practices, eds Kristian Steiner, Andreas Önnerfors. London: Palgrave, 2017. Protocol no. 13, to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, Vilnius, CETS no. 187, 3.5.2002. Sperling, James, Webber Mark. “The European Union: Security Governance and Collective Securitisation.” West European Politics 42, no. 2 (2019): 228–260.

Websites https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. http://europa.eu/. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html. http://www.dare-h2020.org/. https://www.europol.europa.eu/. http://eurojust.europa.eu/Pages/home.aspx. https://www.interpol.int/How-we-work/Databases. https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/ tools-judicial-cooperation/european-criminal-records-information-system-ecris_en. https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/asylum/identification-of-applicants_en.

CHAPTER TWO BELGIUM AND THE PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM POLICY CIND DU BOIS AND WILLY BRUGGEMAN

1. Background While the attacks of March 22, 2016 were the worst terror attacks on Belgian soil, the country has a long history of experience with terrorism. The 70s and 80s were predominantly characterised by the attacks by leftwing groups such as the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) and also of some right-wing groups. During this period, however, the country was also confronted with the bombing of the Jewish community in Belgium by Palestinian groups. Left-wing terrorism decreased after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 while the Oslo Accords tempered Palestinian terrorism. The Soviet-Afghan war (1979–1989) and, later, the Algerian civil war (1990–1998), however, also attracted mujahideen from Belgium. After the Imam of the Grand Mosque of Brussels was murdered in 1985 due to his defence of Salma Rushdie, who defended a multi-religion society, the Belgian Police created a special unit within the existing anti-terrorist unit1 that focused on radical Islamism. In March 1995 this unit dismantled a radical Islamist network organised around the pivotal figure of Ahmed Zaoui, who was a former leader of the Algerian FIS (Algerian Islamic Salvation Front). This group had won the elections in 1992 but the elections were cancelled, which resulted in a form of nationalist protest by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). This Algerian network had a few cells in Belgium, which, while they had a predominantly logistical task, were nevertheless also linked to the bombing campaigns in France in 1995. The Belgian police also found one of the first manuals of jihadism, with more than 8000 pages covering all aspects of violent jihad and dedicated to Osama bin Laden.

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In 1998 the unit dismantled a second jihadi network. This network, around Farid Mellouk, was a real operational group since the unit found a lot of explosives and modus operandi. Moreover, the group also appeared to have links with the top tier of al-Qaeda, indicating the more global character of the network. The police also found a document belonging to the GICM (Groupe Islamique Combatant Marocain). 1998 was also the starting year of two other important cases, i.e. Trabelsi and Massoud. Ahmad Shah Massoud was the leader of the anti-Taliban rebellion in Afghanistan and was killed on the 9th of September, 2001. His murderers were two Tunisians living illegally in Belgian. One of them, Abdessatar Dahmane, was married to Malika El Aroud, a Belgian Moroccan-born Muslim activist who became famous because of her Islamist writings on the internet. The Massoud network was dismantled in 2001 (there was insufficient evidence to convict Malika) and on the 13th of September, the police also arrested Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian former professional football player. Trabelsi was radicalised in prison after being sentenced for minor criminal acts. After he was released, he travelled to Afghanistan, where he came into contact with Osama bin Laden. After his return he prepared terrorist acts against a NATO Airforce base in Belgium and the American embassy in Paris. Trabelsi was also connected to “the shoe bomber” Richard Reid, who attempted to bomb an American Airlines flight on the 22nd of December, 2001. As described by Coolsaet2, during the period 1998–2001, Belgium was confronted with cells from international al-Qaeda-dominated jihadism. After the international counter-terrorist efforts and the military campaign, this centralised hierarchical jihadism transformed into a decentralised network of local cells, some supervised by the overarching al-Qaeda ideology but others independent and only inspired by al-Qaeda. In 2004 the Belgian police forces dismantled such a movement, the “Maaseik network”. This network appeared to have links with the Madrid bombers as well as with the group Hofstad (which killed Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands). The first converted European suicide bomber was also Belgian. Muriel Degauque killed herself during an attack against an American military patrol in Iraq in 2005. After the Iraq War, the world became more and more confronted with this new type of terrorism, i.e. home-grown, self-radicalised individuals inspired by the al-Qaeda idea. In 2010 Fouad Belkacem founded the radical group Sharia4Belgium and called for the creation of an Islamic State in Belgium. The group was dismantled and Fouad Belkacem was convicted in 2015. In this period a number of incidents already foreshadowed the deadly attacks of 2016. In 2011 a man opened fire in Luik and killed six people, after which he

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committed suicide. In 2012 an Imam in Anderlecht was murdered. The murderer was Sunnite and wanted to frighten the Shiite population. In 2014 Mehdi Nemmouche, an Algerian-born Frenchman, started a fire in the Jewish Museum in Brussels, which killed four people. The killer, radicalised in prison, was known and was being followed by the intelligence services. After his release in 2012, he stayed in Syria for more than a year, where he was involved in the hostage-taking of four French journalists (June 2013). On his return from Syria, Nemmouche was interrogated by the German police but released afterwards. After his return he settled in Molenbeek. Nemmouche was the first European returnee to commit a terror attack in Europe and was sentenced to life in prison in March 20193. In 2015 the police killed two returnees during a raid in Verviers. Abdelhamid Abaaoud was able to escape and organise the Paris attacks in November 2015. One of the other authors of the Paris attacks was the Frenchman Salah Abdeslam, who lived in Belgium. He was arrested in Belgium on the 18th of March, 2016, a few days before the attacks. On the 22nd of March, 2016, Belgium experienced its own 9/11 with the attacks on Zaventem Airport and the Maalbeeck metro station, resulting in 35 persons killed and more than 300 injured. The attackers belonged to the same cell that was responsible for the attacks in Paris in 2015. This very brief overview indicates that jihadist groups were already present in Belgium before 9/11. The incidents in Belgium as well as the attacks in other Western countries shaped Belgian’s counter-terrorism policy.

2. General organisational structure of security agencies against terrorism After the attacks on 9/11, Belgium created task forces to develop a plan of action against radicalisation. The first draft of this plan ‘Plan M (Mosques)’ saw light at the end of 2002 and focused exclusively on jihadist radicalisation. In 2004 the scope of the plan was enlarged to cover other forms of radicalisation and extremism. The plan was renamed ‘Plan R (Radicalisation)’. After the thwarted attacks in Verviers in 2015, Plan R was reformed and updated. The final goal of this plan is to coordinate the activities of the different services involved in the fight against radicalisation and terrorism. The coordination of the plan is the responsibility of the National Task Force (NTF), which consists of members representing all partners involved in the fight against terrorism (see supra). The guidance of the NTF is the responsibility of the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA). This unit has been

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operational since 2006 and evaluates terrorist and extremist threats in Belgium. While CUTA operates under the authority of the Ministers of the Interior Affairs and Justice, it does not take action. This is the responsibility of the National Security Council, chaired by the Belgian prime minister together with the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Justice. This overarching governing body coordinates all Belgian counter-terrorism activities and has replaced the Ministerial Commission for Intelligence and Security since 20154. Two supporting institutions were created to execute the Council’s decisions, i.e. a Strategic Committee for Information and Security and a Coordinating Committee for Information and Security, which is composed of members of all the institutions involved in the policy, such as the federal judicial police and the intelligence services. In order to ensure an adequate translation of national policy into local actions, Plan R also installed local task forces (LTFs). These forces combine local police and intelligence services and put into practice the guidelines of the NTF. In addition, some Belgian municipalities also opted to create a local integral security cell, which unites all relevant partners (police, schools, community workers, etc.) in order to detect and respond to cases of radicalisation. The installation of this consultation body is not mandatory but was a request from the Minister of Interior Affairs after the Paris attacks in 2015. In June 2016 a framework was drawn up for all partners involved in the prevention and repression of terrorism by means of the ‘Kadernota Integrale Veiligheid’ (KIV). This text provides the framework of reference for the current Belgian security policy and sketches the integration of the different partners involved. These partners come from different policy levels. The earlier described National Security Council is a security body at the federal level that coordinates the security policy in Belgium. Also at the federal level, Belgium has a National Coordination and Crisis Centre which coordinates the activities of the different police forces and intelligence services in times of crisis. Belgium has in fact two different intelligence services – the Military Intelligence Services and State Security. With respect to financial information on terrorist organisations, an important role is also played by the Cell for Financial Information Processing, which collects and exploits data on suspicious financial transactions.

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3. Repression and prosecution measures After the attacks on 9/11, the European Union decided to create a European framework for the legislation on terrorism for all EU countries. This framework decision of 13 June 2002 requires all EU countries to align their legislation and introduce minimum penalties regarding terrorist offences. The decision defines terrorist offences as well as offences related to terrorist groups or linked to terrorist activities, and sets down the rules for transposition in EU countries. In Belgium, this European decision resulted in the law of 19 December 2003, which not only criminalised terrorist acts but also criminalises participation in activities organised by terrorist groups. Since then, the Belgian lawmaker has constantly adopted the law following the evolution of the problem of terrorism. The law was modified in 2013 (Law of 28 February 2013) to also include public provocation to terrorism as an infraction as well as recruitment and training of members for terrorism. After the Paris attacks in January 2015, the Belgian government announced a new list of 12 actions in their war against terrorism. After the Paris attacks of November 2015, another 18 new measures were announced. Since some of these new measures required a modification of the Belgian legal framework, this resulted in some amendments of the law against terrorism5. Table 1 gives an overview of these most recent measures and indicates whether they have been adopted and implemented. Table 1: 30 Measures against Terrorism 1 2 3 4

5

6

18 measures announced in November 2015 € 400 million for security and the fight against Yes terrorism Reinforcement of police controls at the borders Yes Deployment of 520 military to reinforce security Yes Since January 2015 Particular research methods & new technologies Yes for the intelligence services Law of 25 December 2016 & Law of 30 March 2017 72 hours of administrative detention for acts of Partly terrorism instead of 24 hours Since 2017 the time period has been extended to 48 hours House searches 24 hours a day for terrorist Yes offences. End of the exception forbidding house Law of 27 April 2016 searches between 9PM and 5AM

30 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16

17 18

1 2 3 4 5

Chapter Two Foreign fighters: Deprivation of liberty and jailed Yes upon return to Belgium Law of 3 August 2016 Extension of wiretapping Yes Law of 27 April 2016 Belgian passenger name record Yes Law of 25 December 2016 Screening of all hate preachers Yes Circular note of 18 July 2016 Dismantling of unrecognised places of worship Yes that propagate jihadism Closing of several places in the framework of the Plan Canal6 End of anonymity for prepaid cards Yes Law of 1 September 2016 Plan Canal: Prevention and repression7 Yes Reinforcement of the screening before access to Yes sensitive jobs Extension of the network of cameras recognising Yes license plates 250 additional cameras Closing down websites preaching hate Yes Task of the Internet Referral Unit of the Federal Police Evaluation in order to adapt legislations linked to Yes the state of emergency. Possibility for temporary Royal Resolution of 1 and exceptional measures to ensure public safety May, 2016 Participation in the international fight against IS Yes Deployment in Iraq and F16s in international mission 12 measures announced in January 2015 Insertion in the penal code of a new terrorist Yes offence relating to travel abroad for terrorist Law of 20 July 2015 purposes Extension of the list of offences leading to the use Yes of specific research methods Law of 20 July 2015 More options for withdrawal of Belgian Yes citizenship Law of 20 July 2015 Temporary withdrawal of the identity card, Yes refusal to issue and withdrawal of passports Law of 10 August 2015 Structural reform of the intelligence and security Yes structures. Establishment of a National Security Royal Resolution of Council 28 January 2015 & of 2 June 2015

Belgium and the Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy 6

7

8 9 10

11 12

31

Activation of the legally established mechanism Yes to identify persons involved in the financing of Circular note of Minister terrorism and whose assets will be frozen of Justice and Minister of Interior Affairs of 7 September 2015 Revision of the Foreign Fighter circular note of Yes 24 September 2014 Circular note of Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior Affairs of 21 August 2015 Optimisation of the exchanges of information Yes between the authorities and the administrative and Creation of a dynamic judicial services database on FTFs Revision of the 2005 plan against radicalisation Yes Fight against radicalism in prisons Yes Action Plan of the Minister of Justice of 11 March 2015 Calling in the Belgian Army for specific Yes monitoring services Operation Vigilant Guardian Strengthening of the capacity of the State Security Yes Service and transfer of the VIP protection to the Since June 2016 police

All the counter-terrorist financing efforts are coordinated by the National Security Council. In the Coordination Committee of this Council, a special counter-terrorist financing platform for all relevant partners was established in 2015. This platform falls under the direction of the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF/CFI)8. The agency has seen a large increase in the number of files related to terrorist financing. While there were fewer than 40 cases in 2014 and 75 files in 2015, 2016 saw a sharp increase with 112 files responsible for about €6.7 million. In 2017 the number of files increased to 164 but the total amount of money decreased to €5.97 million9. With respect to the regulation on terrorist financing, the relevant international framework is that of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF is an intergovernmental body, endorsed by more than 180 countries, which sets the standards for the legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hence, together with the 1999 Convention and dedicated UN Security Council resolutions, the recommendations published by the Action Force hence form the

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international basis for a response against these threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The most recent version of these recommendations dates back to 2012. The European vision on counterterrorist financing is stipulated in the European Commission’s 2015 Action Plan against terrorist financing and the Fourth Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. With this directive, Europe underlines the importance of a risk-based approach to counter-terrorist financing. This risk-based approach is also the first recommendation of the FATF, which states that this is to “ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing are commensurate with the risks identified” (FATF, 2017, 9)10. The FATF not only provides the framework for the necessary measures but also evaluates its members. The most recent evaluation of Belgium dates from July 2014. While this evaluation was already positive, Belgium has in the meantime implemented some recommendations during the important changes of 2015–2016. As mentioned earlier, among the most important progress made in the counter-terrorist financing methodology is the mechanism to freeze terrorist assets. Next to this decision the government increasingly uses the tool of financial intelligence to retrieve information on terrorist suspects while also targeting organisations suspected of providing financial, administrative or logistical help to radicalised individuals11.

4. Best practices, failures and loopholes Immediately after the attacks in March 2016, the level of threat increased to the highest level and a parliamentary investigation committee (PIC) was installed to investigate what had gone wrong on that tragic day. This committee presented its final report in October 2017. The major findings and guidelines of the recommendations are diverse as the PIC investigated all aspects of the 22nd of March attacks. The research and report covers four different themes, i.e. crisis management on March 22nd, the role of the victims, counter radicalisation in Belgium, and the security policy12. The PIC notes that the causes of (violent) radicalisation cannot be found exclusively in religions and ideologies. As far as religious radicalisation is concerned, certain trends such as Salafism and Wahhabism have been present in Belgium for decades. Moreover, the committee emphasises the fact that counterterrorism should not only entail prosecution and repression but also needs to focus on prevention. Promoting social and cultural diversity is therefore essential and the local

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authorities should strive for a more inclusive approach. They also argue that a basic training of religious teachers in general, and of Islamic teachers in particular, must be geared to current social issues, including human rights. Apparently, some foreign countries have used their diplomatic and financial power to promote in Belgium radicalising movements through mosques, education and study channels. Hearings during the committee’s research showed that the Great Mosque of Brussels (a mosque without official recognition) and the Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium are important symbols for a segment of the Muslim community of Belgium. Because of the preaching of hate and dubious financing, the PIC recommended that the Belgian State put an end to the concession agreement of 13 June 1969. The centre of gravity of the management of this mosque should lie in Belgium. With the same line of reasoning, the committee promotes a more effective use of the different legal possibilities, including those related to criminal law, to dissolve associations and the dissemination of ideas that are contrary to Belgian law. The committee has noted that ideas inspired by radical Islam are being increasingly expressed openly in Belgian prisons. Most of the perpetrators of the 22nd of March terrorist attacks had already spent time in prison. Hence, three specific objectives were set for the Deradex departments and the satellite teams in Belgian prisons, i.e. standardisation, isolation and disengagement. These systems should be used complementarily in order to combat radicalisation in prisons. The committee also points out the use of new technologies in (violent) radicalisation. Hence, they call for self-regulation and formal agreements with internet providers to be concluded at a European level. While the efforts of the emergency services following the 22nd of March attacks have been praised, the PIC also claims that emergency planning in response to terrorist attacks must be adapted with a special focus on the unity of command and a better cooperation between emergency centres and customised medical intervention plans in line with the general so-called maximum medical intervention plan that was already in development on the 22nd of March. They also argue for an expansion of the ASTRID network as it is the sole operator for the communication system for all Belgian emergency services. With respect to the victims, the PIC acknowledges the usefulness of the federal prosecutor’s office and the Disaster Victim Identification Team in order to identify them. While special efforts have been realised to apply basic principles of victim support, the PIC also points out the insufficient

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financial assistance available. Hence, new initiatives for the future have been introduced (one-stop-shop, one reference person for each victim, financial compensation mechanisms). One of the major remarks of the report reflects the lack of an information-sharing culture within and between the security services as they are too compartmentalised. The activities of the National Task Force, the local task forces (at the provincial level) and the local integral security units need to be further developed and professionalised. The intelligence services need more scope as their information position proved too weak to detect terrorist plans. A national strategic plan for intelligence must be completed within the National Security Council. The PIC proposes a more hierarchical organisation at the top tiers of the federal police and that the staff must give due attention to specific profiles while respecting an active diversity policy. They also require more unity of command in investigations related to terrorism. On the level of prosecution, the PIC claims that a number of aspects involving the execution of sentences should be tightened up, with particular attention to conditional releases and possible travel bans. The monitoring of individuals on parole must be more effective, and convicted terrorists who are ultimately released must be subject to appropriate control and supervision measures. In order to realise all of this, the information position of the administrative authorities in the municipalities should improve and the administrative policing capabilities must be strengthened. Of course, Belgium is not an isolated country. Hence, international cooperation is essential, and under which conditions classified information from foreign intelligence services may be passed on to police, judicial and other government services must be clarified. Foreign signaling (Schengen, Interpol …) must be better monitored and the position of Belgian liaison officers improved.

5. Conclusions After the March 2016 attacks, Belgian’s security services were heavily criticised in the international press. A journalist on the Politico.eu website even called Belgium a ‘failed state’, referring to the facts that Molenbeek was known to be a breeding spot for jihadis and that the March attackers had already been involved in the Paris attacks of November 2015. While it is clear that some criticism was deserved, not all criticism was grounded in fact. Moreover, the March 2016 attacks indicated a significant change in Belgium’s counter-terrorism policy. Since these tragic events, significant

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improvements have been made in several domains (law enforcement, prevention, intelligence services …). The importance of the events and the effect on policy are highlighted by the fact that for the first time in Belgian history, a parliamentary investigation committee was transformed into a follow-up commission13 to check whether the recommendations issued have indeed led to appropriate decisions and to what extent they have initiated concrete actions. These follow-up responsibilities are not limited to the activities of the Parliament itself as the law maker but are also focusing on the ministers and the respective organisations active in combating terrorism in Belgium.

Notes 1

Alain Grignard, “30 ans de présence de l’islam radical en Belgique,” Lecture at Uliège on 9/5/2017. 2 Rik Coolsaet and Tanguy Struye, Belgium and Counterterrorism Policy in the Jihadi Era (1986-2007). Brussel: Egmont Institute, 2017, Egmont Paper 15. 3 Paul Ponsaers, Jihadi’s in België: De route naar Zaventem en Maalbeek. Antwerpen: Maklu, 2017. 4 Royal Resolution, 28 January 2015 retrieved on http://www.ejustice.just.fgov. be/cgi/article_body.pl?numac=2015200479. 5 Vincent Seron and Sophie Andre, “30 measures against terrorism: Penal populism between expected efficiency and potential collateral damage,” in Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options, ed. Thomas Renard, Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2016, Paper 89. Council of Ministers, “Thematische Ministerraad veiligheid-justitie-defensie: Bilan & evaluatie,” 14-052017. 6 The Canal Plan or Plan against terrorism and radicalisation in the Canal zone was initiated in April 2016 to coordinate the actions of different communities in their fight against terrorism. Five different police zones and eight communities participate in this plan. 7 See infra. 8 France Lemeunier, “Counterterrorism financing in Belgium: A new perspective,” in Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options, ed. Thomas Renard (Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2016) Paper 89. 9 Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières, “Rapport d’activités 2017”, 77, available at http://www.ctif-cfi.be/website/images/FR/annual_report/ra2017fr.pdf. 10 Financial Action Task Force, “International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation” (2017, 129), available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatfrecom- mendations.html.

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11

France Lemeunier, “Counterterrorism financing in Belgium: A new perspective,” in Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options, ed. Thomas Renard. Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2016, Paper 89. 12 Willy Bruggeman, Parlementaire onderzoekscommissie terroristische aanslagen 2016. Oud-Turnhout: Gompel&Svacina, 2018: 749. 13 Willy Bruggeman, “Van een parlementair onderzoek naar een opvolgingscommis- sie terroristische aanslagen 22 maart 2016,” Panopticon, 10 (2018): 962–964.

List of References Bruggeman, Willy. “Van een parlementair onderzoek naar een opvolgingscommissie terroristische aanslagen 22 maart 2016.” Panopticon 10, (2018): 962–964. —. Parlementaire onderzoekscommissie terroristische aanslagen 2016. Oud-Turnhout: Gompel&Svacina, 2018, 749. Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières. “Rapport d’activités 2017”, (2017): 77, available at http://www.ctif-cfi.be/website/images/ FR/annual_report/ra2017fr.pdf. Coolsaet Rik and Struye Tanguy. Belgium and Counterterrorism Policy in the Jihadi Era (1986-2007). Brussel: Egmont Institute, 2017, Egmont Paper 15. Council of Ministers. “Thematische Ministerraad veiligheid-justitie-defensie: Bilan & evaluatie.” May 14, 2017. Financial Action Task Force. “International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation” (2017): https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/ documents/fatf-recommendations.html. Grignard, Alain. “30 ans de présence de l’islam radical en Belgique.” Lecture at Uliège on May 9, 2017. Lemeunier, France. “Counterterrorism financing in Belgium: A new perspective.” In Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options, ed. Thomas Renard. Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2016. Ponsaers, Paul. Jihadi’s in België: De route naar Zaventem en Maalbeek. Antwerpen: Maklu, 2017. Royal Resolution. 28 January 2015. http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/article_body.pl?numac=20152004 79. Seron, Vincent, Andre Sophie. “30 measures against terrorism: Penal populism between expected efficiency and potential collateral damage.” In Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options, ed. Thomas Renard. Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2016.

CHAPTER THREE FRANCE AND THE PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM POLICY VALERIA ROSATO

1. Background 1.1 Number of Jihadist attacks and trends According to the report by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in 20151, there was a 10% decrease in deaths caused by terrorism for the first time since 2010. However, it has risen dramatically, by 650%, compared to 2014 for OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) member countries. As many as 21 of the 34 OECD member countries from 2015 to mid-2016 have suffered at least one terrorist attack, and the worst records are registered by Turkey and France. In the latest GTI Report in 2018, France occupies the 30th position, making it one of the leading European countries most affected by the terrorist phenomenon, together with the United Kingdom2. The deterioration of the French situation in 2015 was mainly due to two events: 1) the attacks on the Ilede-France, which caused 20 casualties, and 2) the November attacks in Paris, which killed 136 people. Both attacks were planned and carried out by ISIL members. As can be seen from the GTI data, France has not been affected by high levels of terrorism in its recent history: from 2000 to 2014, it recorded an average of one death per year, an average which rose to 161 in 2015 alone. France is also one of the main European countries affected by the phenomenon of the so-called foreign fighters (FF), individuals who left their country of residence to fight in Syria against the Bashar al Assad regime. According to a report drawn up by ICCT3, in 2015 some 4000 FF come from the countries of the European Union, and for the most part

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from four countries: Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. While Belgium has the highest per-capita FF contingent (420–516) in 2015, France is the main European FF basin, with more than 900 individuals leaving the country to reach conflict zones. According to this report, the FFs come from all regions and environments in France, about 200 of them are female and 23% are converts. Since 2014 the military pressure exercised in Iraq and Syria by international coalition forces has led to serious military setbacks for ISIL4. The jihadist group has lost territory but continues to pose significant and diversified threats. In particular, the recent weakening of ISIL in conflict zones has led to an increase in the number of externally directed attacks and in the number of foreign terrorist fighter returnees, especially to Europe and Maghreb. The attacks in Paris in November 2015 show clearly how terrorists have been trained in active-shooter scenarios, acquiring the ability to maximise confusion and casualties. The 2015 attack on the French magazine Charlie Hebdo was also carried out by individuals who had reportedly received terrorist training in Yemen. The Inherent Resolve operation carried out by a coalition of Western and Arab countries has so far regained almost all of Daech’s controlled territories in Syria and Iraq5. This is an important victory but it has not eliminated the terrorist threat since these jihadist movements remain operative through alternative strategies of clandestine action. France, in particular, remains one of the principal targets of these movements because it is perceived as an enemy of Islam for its domestic and foreign policies6. The following reconstruction of the recent jihadist terrorist attacks that have taken place on national soil shows how France today faces a serious “menace terroriste de nature essentiellement endogène”7. Latest terrorist attacks in France (2014 – to date): 1. Joue-les-Tours Police Station Stabbing, Tours, 20 December 2014 2. Charlie Hebdo Newspaper Shooting, Paris, 7-9 January 2015 3. Shooting of Montrouge Police Officer, Fontenay-aux-Roses Jogger

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Shooting, and Porte de Vincennes Supermarket Siege, Paris, 7-9 January 2015 Jewish Community Centre Stabbing, Nice, 3 February 2015 Woman Shot and Killed in Connection with Suspected Church Terrorist Attack, Villejuif, 19 April 2015 Herve Cornara Decapitation, Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, 26 June 2015 Thalys Train Stabbing Just after Border with Belgium; Train Stopped in Arras, 21 August 2015 Paris Attacks: Stade de France, Restaurants and Bataclan, Paris, 13-14 November 2015

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9. Mosque and Soldier Vehicle Ramming, Valence, 1 January 2016 10. Jewish Teacher Machete Attack, Marseille, 11 January 2016 11. Police Stabbing and Livestream Hostage Taking, Magnanville, 13 June 2016 12. Bastille Day Vehicle Ramming, Nice, 14 July 2016 13. Normandy Catholic Church Attack, Saint Etienne du Rouvray, 26 July 2016 14. Prison Melee Attack, Osny, 4 September 2016 15. Louvre Knife Attack, Paris, 3 February 2017 16. Orly Airport Attack, Orly, 18 March 2017 17. Shooting of Champs Élysées Police Officer, Paris, 20 April 2017 18. Murders at Marseille Saint-Charles Station, 1 October 2017 19. Carcassonne and Trèbes Attack, 23 March 2018 20. Paris Knife Attack, 12 May 2018 21. Strasbourg Attack, 11 December 2018 22. Condé-sur-Sarthe Penitentiary, 5 March 2019

Brief description of recent terrorist attacks by year: 2015 •

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Between January 7-9, three French attackers killed a total of 17 people in three attacks in and around Paris. On January 7, brothers Saïd and Cherif Kouachi killed 12 people at the offices of the Charlie Hebdo satirical newspaper. On January 8, Amedy Coulibaly killed a traffic policewoman in the Parisian suburb of Montrouge. On January 9, Coulibaly took hostages at Hyper Cacher, a kosher supermarket on the eastern edge of Paris, killing four before being killed by French police. After a nationwide manhunt, French police killed the Kouachi brothers in a standoff in a factory in Dammartin-en-Goële, north of Paris, on January 9. On April 19, Algerian student Sid Ahmed Glam, known to French security services for his radical views, was plotting to attack a church in Villejuif, a Paris suburb. He shot and wounded himself before executing his plan. Glam is accused of having killed another person around this time. On June 26, Frenchman Yassin Salhi beheaded his supervisor in what French prosecutors said was an ISIL-inspired attack at an industrial site in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, near Lyon. Salhi committed suicide in his prison cell on December 22 according to a French deputy prosecutor. On August 21, heavily armed Moroccan national Ayoub el-Khazzani opened fire in a carriage of a Thalys train travelling from Amsterdam to Paris. Passengers on board the train foiled his attack. Two American citizens (one a dual French-American citizen) were seriously injured during the incident. On November 13, French and Belgian nationals launched a series of attacks that killed 130 victims in and around Paris. Terrorists working in three coordinated teams attacked the Bataclan concert hall, the Stade de

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France, and restaurant terraces in four locations in the 10th and 11th arrondissements of Paris. Seven of the attackers died in clashes with police or by detonating suicide vests during the attacks. On November 18, police stormed a safe house in Saint-Denis, killing three, including the alleged attack planner Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian citizen. Salah Abdeslam, a French citizen and brother of November 13 suicide bomber Brahim Abdeslam, remained at large at the end of 2015; he was apprehended in March 2016. 2016 •

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On January 7, the anniversary of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, a man wearing a fake explosive vest and wielding a butcher knife attempted to attack a police station in Paris. Police officers shot and killed the assailant – Tarek Belkacem, a 20-year-old born in Morocco – before he could injure anyone. Investigators later found on the attacker a handwritten note pledging allegiance to ISIS and justifying the act as a response to the attacks in Syria. On June 13, 25-year-old French citizen Larossi Abballa killed a police officer and his civil servant wife with a knife at their home in the Paris suburb of Magnanville. In a 12-minute video streamed live on Facebook during a standoff with police, Abballa pledged allegiance to ISIS and called for more attacks on police, journalists, and other public figures. Police forces raided the house, killed Abballa, and rescued the couple’s three-year-old son, who was unharmed. On July 14, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a 31-year-old Tunisian national with French residency, drove a 19-ton truck through a crowd celebrating Bastille Day on Nice’s promenade, killing 86 and wounding more than 400 during the mile-long rampage. After several attempts by bystanders and police to stop the truck, two police officers shot and killed the driver approximately five minutes after the attack began. Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was armed with a 7.65mm handgun; several replica weapons and an unarmed grenade were reportedly found in the otherwise almost entirely empty rental truck. ISIS’s propaganda outlet, Amaq, issued a statement on July 16 describing the attacker as “a soldier of the Islamic State”. On July 26, two teenagers wielding knives and a non-functioning pistol killed an 86-year-old priest and wounded a parishioner attending mass at a Catholic church in Normandy. Police shot and killed the two perpetrators – 19-year-old French citizen Abdelmalik Petitjean and 19-year-old Algerian-born French citizen Adel Kermiche – as they tried to flee the church using the remaining hostages as shields. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, describing Kermiche and Petitjean as “Islamic State soldiers”, and later released videos of the two attackers pledging allegiance to the terrorist organisation. In early September, French authorities arrested three women suspected of planning an attack on a Paris train station after an earlier failed effort to detonate a car bomb near the Notre Dame cathedral. One of the women

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arrested reportedly had ties to both the Normandy and Magnanville attackers, and two men arrested in connection with the plot were reportedly linked to ISIS operative Rachid Kassim. x On October 1 Ahmed Hanachi, a Tunisian national, stabbed and killed two girls at the Saint-Charles Station in Marseille. ISIS has claimed the attack. 2017 x x x x

2018 x

x x

On February 3 a soldier near the Louvre museum opened fire on a man who was attempting to enter the museum with a machete. The man shouted “Allahu Akbar” and injured the soldier’s scalp. On March 18 a policeman was shot and injured in the Paris suburb of Gargesles-Gonesse by an attacker who was later shot dead at Orly Airport near Paris after trying to grab a soldier’s rifle. On April 20 an Islamist opened fire on police officers on the ChampsÉlysées. ISIS claimed responsibility. On 1st October a man stabbed to death a 20-year-old woman and a 17year-old girl at Marseille-Saint-Charles Station. The attacker was shot dead. He was heard shouting “Allahu Akbar”. ISIS claimed responsibility. On March 23 a gunman affiliated with ISIS attacked and stole a car in Carcassonne, killing the passenger and wounding the driver. He arrived in Trèbes and shot at some police officers, who were jogging. Then he killed three people and injured several others in a super- market. On May 12 a Chechnya-born French Muslim, armed with a knife, killed one pedestrian and injured several more near the Garnier Opera in Paris before being fatally shot by police. On December 11 a gunman opened fire just outside the Strasbourg Christmas Market, killing five and injuring 11. He was killed in a gunfight with security forces two days later.

2019

x On March 5 an inmate at the high-security Condé-sur-Sarthe penitentiary stabbed two prison guards.

2. The counter-terrorism system in France 2.1 General organisational structure of security agencies France has two national security forces: the General Directorate of National Police (DGPN) and the Directorate General of the National Gendarmerie (DGGN), both subordinate to the Interior Ministry.

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The DGPN has three priority tasks8: 1. Public security and peace (which consists of ensuring the enforcement of laws, the protection of persons and property, the prevention of disturbances to public order and tranquillity, and the prevention of delinquency); 2. Judicial police (the purpose of the judicial police, under the direction and supervision of the judicial authority, is to investigate and establish criminal offences, gather evidence, search for perpetrators and accomplices, arrest them, and refer them to the competent judicial authorities); 3. Intelligence and information (tensure that government authorities are kept informed, detect and prevent any threat likely to harm public order, institutions, the fundamental interests of the nation or national sovereignty). The DGGN is part of the Defence Ministry but the Interior Ministry manages its policing functions. The DGPN is responsible for civil law enforcement and criminal investigations in cities and large towns and is staffed with approximately 98.000 personnel. The National Gendarmerie is a military institution that guarantees the security and peace of our citizens and the protection of their property. It provides judicial police, personal assistance and law enforcement services and participates in the defence of the nation, including in theatres of external operations9. The General Directorate of Internal Security (DGSI – Direction Générale de la Securité Intérieure) combines law enforcement capabilities with domestic intelligence gathering. The DGSI was created by the Decree of 30 April 201410. It takes over the missions of the Central Internal Intelligence Directorate (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur) created on 1 July 2008, itself the result of the merger of the Central Intelligence Directorate (Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux), founded in 1907, and the Territorial Surveillance Directorate (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire), created in 1944. The DGSI’s main tasks are: 1. Counterintelligence; 2. Countering terrorism and violent extremism; 3. Protection of the economic patrimony; 4. Specialised judicial police mission. Following the attacks in January 2015, the President of the Republic decided to place the Vigipirate plan11 on the highest level of vigilance and mobilise a large number of troops within the armed forces. This decision led to the creation of Operation Sentinel. Since 14 January 2015, it has enabled more than 10,000 soldiers to be deployed in France: 6,000 in the

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Île-de-France region and 4,000 in the provinces. These soldiers come from the various garrisons spread over the territory. The armed forces, engaged to complement police and gendarmerie units, focus on protecting sensitive areas of interest.

2.2 The main steps in French policy in the fight against terrorism and radicalisation In recent decades France has suffered several terrorist attacks on its territory by a multitude of groups that can be divided into three categories: 1) radical leftist groups; 2) regional separatist groups; 3) international terrorist groups (mainly Middle Eastern origin). The latter were introduced in 1980 with the Rue Copernic incident, a Paris synagogue bombing12. The counter-terrorism regime in France originated in 1986, which was a critical year for the country due to the numerous terrorist attacks13. Since then, the French government has decided to move from an ‘accommodation policy’ to a ‘policy of suppression’ by strengthening the police and the judicial apparatus in the field of counter-terrorism. The legislation of September 198614 created a variety of new specialised organs within the French government in order to coordinate and centralise counter-terrorism actions. In 1984 the Anti-terrorist Coordination Unit UCLAT (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste) was created within the Interior Ministry. UCLAT was designed to strengthen the cooperation and connections between law enforcement and intelligence services. The law of 9 September 1986 reform also centralised all judicial proceedings relating to terrorism. The specialist investigating magistrates combine prosecutorial and judicial powers. In the 1990s, France was faced with the threat of Islamist terrorism, particularly of Algerian origin, and in 1995 and 1996 some new legislative initiatives enabled magistrates to strengthen their powers. There were no substantial changes to the counter-terrorism system but the notion of conspiracy to commit terrorism was codified as terrorism itself, which allows the authorities to act preventively against terrorist suspects15. The laws of 1986, 1995 and 1996 allow the magistrates to hold suspects in terrorist cases for four days rather than two before charging them, to get search warrants during the night and to request trials without a jury in specific cases. Direct cooperation between magistrates and the domestic intelligence agency DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire) was also strengthened without the mediation of judicial police. The combination of

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expertise between intelligence services and the judicial powers created a very effective body for combating terrorism. France has had a solid counter-terrorism apparatus centred on repression and prosecution since the end of the 90s but after 9/11 it put in place further measures to strengthen and refine its repressive approach to counter Jihadi terrorism. Investigative and preventive powers were strengthened, with particular attention on potential terrorism-crime nexuses. The post-9/11 reforms broadened data collection and enhanced the power of security services. These measures could be grouped into the four categories of16: 1. Prevention and investigation (expanding and strengthening data collection, camera surveillance, searches and pre-charge detention); 2. Disruption (intervention in travel, internet, finances, and citizenship); 3. Prosecution (about finances, lone wolves, incitement of terrorism, and terrorist training camp); 4. Coordination and information sharing (regional representation, inter-agency and intra-executive coordination). Between 2014 and 2015, some important events marked a critical transition in the French counter-terrorism policy: the mass exodus of French foreign fighters to Syria and the 2015 attacks. From then, the French government began to consider the need to change its approach, based only on repression, by including ‘soft’ anti-radicalisation measures. Until then, the counter-terrorism arsenal had proved to be a success by allowing the prosecution and arrest of a large number of Jihadi terrorist. The growing phenomenon of foreign fighters first and then the attacks on French soil have, however, revealed the weaknesses of this approach and its devastating unexpected effects. In particular, the vast phenomenon of proselytism in prisons has been one of the most critical side effects produced by the lack of attention shown in previous years to the prevention of radicalisation and the reintegration of individuals at risk of radicalisation. Next we will reconstruct the main steps of the repressive measures and then analyse the most recent anti-radicalisation policy.

2.3 Recent repression and prosecution measures The counter-terrorism regime in France originated in 1986 when the French government decided to move from an ‘accommodation policy’ to a

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‘policy of suppression’ by strengthening the police and the judicial apparatus in the field of counter-terrorism. The legislation of September 198617 is a cornerstone of French anti-terrorism legislation, and it has been amended and updated at regular intervals since its introduction. It created a variety of new specialised organs within the French government to coordinate and centralise counter-terrorism actions. France had a solid counter-terrorism apparatus centred on repression and prosecution since the end of the 90s but after 9/11, it put in place further measures to strengthen and refine its repressive approach to counter jihadi terrorism. Investigative and preventive powers were strengthened, with particular attention on potential terrorism-crime nexuses. The post-9/11 reforms broadened data collection and enhanced the power of security services. France has a system of non-jury courts for terrorism trials and a broad definition of what is considered a terrorist offence – the so-called “association of wrongdoers” offence – which allows it to cast a wide net and imprison a broad range of suspects. Under French law, foreigners can be deported if they are believed to pose a serious threat to public order. France remains under the state of emergency enacted shortly after the November 2015 attacks in and around Paris. The state of emergency is decreed by the President of the Republic by two decisions taken in the Council of Ministers on Friday night from Friday 13 to Saturday 14 November 2015. This exceptional provision, provided for by the law of 3 April 195518 in the event of serious disturbances to public order, allows the prefects to take reinforced measures to preserve public order and prevent further terrorist attacks: – restrict freedom of movement by establishing special protection or security zones, or by prohibiting movement in certain places (curfew); – prohibit the stay in certain parts of the territory of any person liable to create a disturbance of public order; – requisition private persons or means; – prohibit certain public meetings or provisionally close certain meeting places; – authorise administrative searches in the presence of a judicial police officer; – in addition, the Ministry of the Interior may place under house arrest any person whose activities prove to be dangerous for security and public order.

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The state of emergency was renewed for the fifth time in midDecember, and then in July 15, 2017 until November 1, 2017. On October 30, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the end of the state of emergency and the promulgation of the Law of October 30, 2017 to Strengthen Internal Security and the Fight against Terrorism19. The text incorporates some elements of the state of emergency and gives prefects, police and security forces extensive powers to search places, seize documents, objects and electronic data, place people under police surveillance, and close places of worship. The measure also authorises police to carry out identity checks at French borders. Beyond the exceptional measure of the state of emergency, the French government has in recent years begun to strengthen its legal arsenal against terrorism. Below are the key steps in this process20. From December 2012, the French legal arsenal has been strengthened by a law that allows French nationals who have participated in terrorist offences committed abroad to be tried. Combined with the action of the police and intelligence services, the law has already led to the opening of nearly 300 legal proceedings against 1200 nationals involved in jihadist activities. In 2014, the government put in place a comprehensive plan to combat terrorist networks and violent radicalisation. It comprises five complementary axes: preventing the departure of adults and minors; dismantling recruitment channels operating in France; supporting and directing families; communicating, raising awareness and training, and strengthening international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Act of 13 November 2014 strengthens the provisions on combating terrorism. It helps to prevent and counteract the departure of French nationals planning to participate in terrorist activities abroad. The passports and identity cards of French citizens applying for jihad may be confiscated for a period of six months, and are renewable for two years. The aim of the measure is to prevent French citizens from acquiring competence in an armed struggle abroad and becoming a danger to national security upon their return. The law also takes into account the new operating methods and the increasing action of isolated terrorists. It penalises acts of preparation for terrorist crimes. Article 5 thus extends to the individual terrorist enterprise the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to the crime of association of criminals in connection with a terrorist enterprise, which is the cornerstone of terrorism proceedings. Police services also have appropriate investigative tools, even in the context of a sole proprietorship.

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The repression of the apology of terrorism is reinforced by the possibility of imposing a penalty of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 euros if the acts were committed using an online communication service. On 12 January 2015, judges pronounced for the first time sentences of imprisonment for terrorism with immediate imprisonment. The Intelligence Act of 24 July 2015 provides a legal, coherent and comprehensive framework for the activities of intelligence services. It authorises them to use technical means of access to information while guaranteeing respect for public freedoms and privacy. The text is the result of in-depth reflection and is balanced, anxious to contribute to strengthening the security, individual liberties and privacy of the French people. Finally, the law of 13 November 2014 opens up the possibility for the administrative authority to ask internet service providers to block access to websites promoting or provoking terrorism. A further law to strengthen the fight against terrorism was enacted on 3 June 2016. This law provides judges and prosecutors with a new set of resources. For example, they may use technical investigative tools previously reserved for intelligence services. In some specific cases, night searches are possible. Witnesses at risk are better protected. Other measures include making identity checks and those of persons returning from terrorist areas more effective. Weapons trafficking and cybercrime are more severely combatted and punished. Ultimately, the text provides a long-term strengthened legal framework and an appropriate response to the evolving terrorist threat. By Law 2016-731 of 3 June 2016, the French Criminal Code was amended and supplemented by criminalising the trafficking of cultural goods coming from areas in which terrorist groups are operating and the regular consultation of online content with messages, pictures or other material that can lead to or provoke someone to commit a terrorist act or that promotes or glorifies those acts. This last incrimination has been censored by the French Constitutional Court in Decision 2016611 of 10 February 2017, and as a consequence has been redrafted by the new Law 2017-258 of 28 February 2017. Law 2016-731 of 3 June 2016 also extended the powers of magistrates and investigators, making it possible to conduct night-time house searches and use new investigation techniques for data collection. Furthermore, the law reinforced arms and ammunition control, created provisions aimed at protecting witnesses, and strengthened the efficiency of administrative controls to avert terrorist acts and allow for the surveillance of those coming back to France after travelling abroad to participate in terrorist activities.

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As part of the fight against terrorism, France participated in the setting up of a European system for exchanging data on certain air passengers: the Passenger Name Record (PNR). Following the attacks in January 2015, France called for the rapid establishment of this system to identify people travelling by air as part of organised crime and terrorism-related activities. This demand was met in April 2016 when the European Parliament adopted a text allowing passenger name record data to be used to prevent or detect terrorist offences and serious forms of crime. Debuted in France in the summer of 2016, it is gradually being rolled out from the end of 2016. Special efforts have also been made to combat the financing of terrorism. An anti-terrorist financing plan was presented in March 2015. The programme has three objectives: to improve the traceability of financial operations by reducing the anonymity of transactions, mobilising financial players, and strengthening the freezing capacities of financiers and terrorist actors. Among the regulatory measures taken in this context we can note the reduction from 3,000 to 1,000 euros of the cash payment ceiling or the systematic reporting by banks of any cash deposits or withdrawals exceeding 10,000 euros cumulated over one month21. The Organized Crime Act of 3 June 2016 directly targets the clandestine movement of large sums of money. The amount stored on prepaid cards is now limited and the traceability of transactions carried out with these cards has been reinforced. For its part, Tracfin (the French unit in charge of combating money laundering and terrorist financing) can designate suspicious persons or banking operations to banks so they can implement vigilance measures. Tracfin can also obtain information from the structures responsible for managing payment systems. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, France has taken an active part in the adoption of several resolutions relating to the financing of terrorism: reassessment of sanctions, strengthening of the international control mechanism, encouragement of states to take strong measures to combat trafficking in oil or raw materials, etc. In this regard, France has taken an active part in the fight against terrorism. France also plays a leading role in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Within the bank, France co-led a report on emerging risks in terrorist financing with the United States. French initiatives are also relayed within the G20, such as strengthening cooperation between intelligence units. The same is true of the G7, with France wishing to become the driving force in the fight against terrorist financing. The French government announced nine new measures in 2015 to counter terrorist financing, several of which went into effect in 2016. The

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measures aim to limit the size and availability of anonymous and cash transactions, improve tracking of suspicious transactions, enhance due diligence checks, and bolster the capacity to freeze assets (e.g. by extending covered assets to include vehicles). Now France is making proposals to revise the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. This text improves the European Union’s tools for combating the financing of terrorism. The draft revision takes up most of the French authorities’ requests. The new text will thus make it possible to strengthen the rules governing electronic money and to increase and harmonise the powers of financial intelligence units. As regards the freezing of terrorist assets, the purpose of the French initiative within the framework of the European Union (the RELEX network) is to adopt a text enabling the Union to freeze the assets of terrorists whose assets have not been frozen within the framework of the United Nations.

2.4 Preventive measures As we have seen in the section on recent counter-terrorism measures, a plan to combat violent radicalisation and terrorist networks was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2014, with the aim of constituting a global strategy to respond to the development of the phenomenon of radicalisation and the ever-increasing number of French nationals leaving for Syrian-Iraqi combat zones. The plan was structured around two components. The first aimed to strengthen the legislative framework for combating terrorism and the jihadist networks and resulted in the adoption of the Act of 13 November 2014, which strengthens the provisions relating to the fight against terrorism. The second, of a regulatory and administrative nature, provided for the establishment of a dedicated mechanism to facilitate the detection, as early as possible, of individuals showing signs of radicalisation and ensure their reintegration into society. On 29 April 2014, the Ministry of the Interior created a National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalisation – Centre national d’assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation (CNAPR) – which was entrusted with the management of a toll-free number. It is attached to the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit – UCLAT – and collects, in a centralised manner, reports from individuals showing signs of radicalisation and provides families with counselling and psychological support. In addition to the establishment of this national reporting platform, the government has developed a territorial mechanism to ensure that individuals identified as at risk of radicalisation are taken care of in each department. Through a circular from the Minister of the Interior dated

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29 April 2014, the prefectures were invited to create two new structures, Departmental Security Staff and the Listening and Support Units for families. The whole system is under the responsibility of the General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee on Crime Prevention (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance) – now the Inter-ministerial Committee on Crime Prevention and Radicalisation (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation SGCIPDR), attached to the Ministry of the Interior. On 21 January 2015, a new Anti-Terrorism Plan (PLAT) was adopted. In addition to the allocation of substantial additional material and human resources, to both the security and intelligence forces and the judicial authorities, this included new measures designed to strengthen the system for dealing with radicalisation. In order to ensure the close monitoring of radicalised prisoners and prevent any proselytising in prisons, the plan included the creation of a specific system for the care of these individuals in prisons within dedicated units. Provision was also made for the strengthening of prison intelligence services to improve the early detection of signs of radicalisation. The plan also reaffirmed the importance of the preventive aspect of the strategy to combat radicalisation and terrorism. A total of 60 million euros over three years has been allotted for the development of radicalisation-prevention activities financed by the Inter-ministerial Crime Prevention Fund (Fonds interministériel de prévention de la délinquance – FIPD). In order to improve knowledge of the phenomenon of radicalisation, the plan also provided for the creation of a national monitoring and information mission within the administration of judicial protection for young people and the establishment of a national register of persons accused or convicted of terrorist acts. Following the attacks of 13 November 2015 and the president’s announcement to congress on 16 November, additional resources were made available to strengthen the national strategy to combat terrorism and violent radicalisation as part of a new plan commonly known as the Security Pact (SPA). These additional resources were mobilised to increase the number of security forces, judicial authorities, the prison administration and prefectures, particularly in the context of their mission to prevent radicalisation, as well as to secure the penitentiary park22. Two government initiatives in particular have been implemented with regard to the prison reforms23. The first concerned the isolation of radicalised inmates from common criminals; the second initiative provided for the recruitment of prison “made in France” imams, namely, imams

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compliant with French values. But these initiatives encountered a series of difficulties, mainly due to the overcrowding of prisons, the unpreparedness of prison guards in counter terrorism, and the objective difficulties in identifying radical prisoners, etc. The policy of “grouping” prisoners in dedicated units to follow specific programmes was also abandoned due to the scarce results obtained24. In May 2016, the national counter-terrorism and violent radicalisation framework was further consolidated with the adoption of a new Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism (Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme – PART)25. In addition to the measures already implemented under PLAT, the plan included 50 new measures to “strengthen society’s capacity to prevent, detect and deal with cases of violent radicalisation”. As in previous plans, particular attention has been paid to structuring the arrangements for dealing with radicalised or radicalising individuals. In addition to the measures already implemented, provision has been made for the setting up of interregional mobile teams to provide support to local actors in the care of radicalised people as well as for the creation of “centres for reintegration and citizenship”, structures designed to support their families in a situation of unease and their social and professional environments. The plan also included the reinforcement of resources allocated to radicalisation-prevention schemes, with an additional 40 million euros over two years. PART is divided into seven priorities: 1. Detect radicalisation trajectories and terrorist networks as early as possible; 2. Monitor, obstruct and neutralise terrorist networks; 3. Fight terrorism in its international networks and sanctuaries; 4. Densify radicalisation-prevention mechanisms to ensure individualised care of the public; 5. Develop applied research on counter-discourse and mobilise Islam in France; 6. Better protect vulnerable sites and networks; 7. Respond to any terrorist attack and demonstrate the resilience of the nation. The Prime Minister’s office launched a counter-messaging campaign through the internet platform stopdjihadisme in an effort to prevent the online recruitment of foreign fighters26. The campaign deploys survivors’ stories, interactive videos, and information on a toll-free hotline so those who believe a friend or relative is at risk of radicalisation to violence can

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call for guidance and support. Five thousand individuals have been flagged for support services or judicial attention since the hotline opened in 2014. On Wednesday 16 March 2016, the Senate Committee decided to set up a pluralist information mission entitled “Desendoctrination, disengage and reintegration of jihadists in France and Europe”. The aim of this mission was to carry out an evaluation of the radicalisation management arrangements and of all measures aimed at preventing or reversing the radicalisation process, in particular by encouraging the reintegration of the individuals concerned into a social, family and professional environment27.

On 12 July 2017, the final report of the committee was published, and it stressed the need for a paradigm shift in the policy of combating terrorism and radicalisation. In particular, the report alerted the public authorities to the difficulties in defining and implementing certain mechanisms for dealing with radicalisation. In view of the obvious failure of the experiment carried out in Pontourny28, the impasse constituted by the creation of “centres of de-radicalization” had then been noted. They also pointed out the abuses observed in the selection, at the territorial level, of the actors, particularly associative actors, who had to intervene in the management of individuals reported to be in the process of radicalisation. On July 28 2017, a statement by the Ministry of Interior announced the closure of the first prevention, integration and citizenship centre in Pontourny, noting that “the experimentation of an open reception centre, operating on a voluntary basis, has shown its limitations”29 and admitted the need for further reflection on the anti-radicalisation policy.

2.5 Loopholes and gaps in existing policies After the attacks on its territory in 2015, the French government’s response was rapid and harsh: A state of emergency was declared and aerial military engagement and training against ISIL in Iraq and Syria intensified. The country’s repressive approach to the imprisonment and the prosecution of a large number of suspects, however, had begun to show signs of failure. The delay in considering the implementation of an antiradicalisation policy led to the emergence of a series of unintended effects. Among the most important are the increase in proselytism in prisons and the stigmatisation of the Muslim population. The use of state-of-emergency powers, as denounced by various organisations such as Amnesty International30 and Human Rights Watch31, erodes civil liberties and contributes to polarising society. These

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discriminatory practices affect mainly Muslims and North Africans and contribute to undermining the cooperation between Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies. The state of emergency was renewed for the fifth time in midDecember and recently extended after the expiry date of July 15, 2017 to November 1, 2017. On October 30, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the end of the state of emergency and the promulgation of the Law of October 30, 2017 to Strengthen Internal Security and the Fight against Terrorism32. The text incorporates some elements of the state of emergency and gives prefects, police and security forces extensive powers to search places, seize documents, objects and electronic data, place people under police surveillance, and close places of worship. The measure also authorises police to carry out identity checks at French borders. The problem, according to human rights defenders, is that these increased powers conferred to police and prefects “now are treated as the ‘new normal’, while at the same time weakening judicial scrutiny over how some of those powers are used”33. In addition, France has until now applied a very centralised and security-oriented counter-radicalisation approach based on four main aspects: 1. Deradicalisation wings in prisons; 2. Deradicalisation centres; 3. Intelligence surveillance of Jihadist webpages; and 4. Family support hotline34. In October 2016, the policy of “grouping” prisoners in dedicated units to follow specific programmes was abandoned due to the poor results obtained, as well as the programme concerning the “centres of deradicalisation” managed by local associations. The immaturity of this anti-radicalisation policy is becoming so evident that it was defined as a “total fiasco” by the Senate Committee at the end of July 2017. The Committee started its work in June 2017 with the aim to carry out an evaluation of the radicalisation management arrangements and of all measures aimed at preventing or reversing the radicalisation process, in particular by encouraging the reintegration of the individuals concerned into a social, family and professional environment35.

On 12 July 2017, the final Senate Committee Report entitled “Desendoctrination, Disengage and Reintegration of Jihadists in France and Europe” was published, which stresses the need for a paradigm shift in the policy of combating terrorism and radicalisation. In particular, the report alerts the public authorities to the difficulties observed in defining and implementing certain mechanisms for dealing with radicalisation. In view of the obvious failure of the experiment carried out in Pontourny36, the impasse constituted by the creation of “centres of deradicalisation” had

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been noted. They also pointed out the abuses observed in the selection, at the territorial level, of actors, particularly associative actors, who had to intervene in the management of individuals reported to be in the process of radicalisation. On July 28, 2017 a statement by the Ministry of Interior announced the closure of the first prevention, integration and citizenship centre in Pontourny noting that “the experimentation of an open reception centre, operating on a voluntary basis, has shown its limitations”37 and admitting the need to further reflect on the anti-radicalisation policy to be pursued. The failures of this French counter-terrorism system are detailed below. In the first section, the findings of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry Report on the State’s efforts to combat terrorism after 7 January 2015 are merged38. The second section is dedicated to the deficiencies of the counter-radicalisation policy revealed by the above-mentioned Senate Committee Report.

2.6 Security Architecture •

•

•

•

Intelligence action. Incomplete reorganisation of Intelligence services. Failures in the gathering and analysis of information to prevent attacks; absence of a national counter-terrorism agency; absence of a shared database; excessive separation between intelligence divisions of the three police units; insufficient human and financial resources; and poorly diversified recruitment National strategy and coordination. Lack of concerted anti-terrorist action within the State; poor centralisation and accountability of information on the terrorist threat; insufficient coordination at interministerial level; weak prerogatives of the national intelligence coordinator Criminal response to the threat. Too weak legislation on convictions for terrorism; insufficient monitoring of radicalised prisoners; poor awareness and training of prison staff; failures in units dedicated to radicalised prisoners Protection and security of the territory. Insufficient plans and investments; lack of reflection on the effectiveness of the state of emergency to mobilise the security forces in a long-term perspective; poor screening systems at French international airports and insufficient number of security agents; insufficient reflection on the use of the Armed Forces and their progressive reduction in territorial surveillance and deterrence services

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International cooperation. Lack of communication and coordination at the European level; insufficient tools given by member states to the two agencies Europol (bloc’s law enforcement agency) and Frontex (bloc’s border control agency); lack of a shared database at the European level; insufficient contribution from Eurojust agency to facilitate increasingly international judicial investigations; insufficient international cooperation with sharing of intelligence information on bilateral or informal agreements.

2.7 Radicalism I. Role of institutional actors • National guideline. Insufficient reflection and clarity on the perimeters and the respective missions of the actors involved; lack of evaluation methods in the recruitment of expertise in associations dedicated to deradicalisation and in the training of state agents • Coordination of actors at a territorial level. Slowness in the territorial structure planning; lack of data in the assessment of the expertise in the field of radicalisation assistance, activities and budgets of all units active on the territory (decentralised state services, territorial authorities, networks of professionals and associations, religious leaders); absence of accurate statistics on radicalised people • Selection of associative actors. Deficient analysis in the selection of associations, both with regard to skills and the excessive number of those involved; excessive public funds allocated to these organisations (‘radicalisation business’) • Training for public actors. Weaknesses in the training approach regarding radicalisation and inadequate capacity to verify and evaluate the skills of the structures proposed for counselling activities on this topic (‘terrorism business’) II. Assistance programmes for radicalised people in the process of radicalisation • Prevention policies. Lack of policy adjustment in favour of proximity approaches; lack of an individualised and multidisciplinary approach in the care process. • Care proceedings. Scarce achievements in grouping experience for prisoners radicalised or those involved in a radicalisation process;

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•

lack of legal basis for ‘dedicated units’ in prisons; absence of a strategy for preparing and monitoring prisoners after release. Care proceedings of minors. Deficits in the criminal response and in the care procedures of minors involved in a radicalisation process; lack of alternatives to imprisonment to avoid exacerbating the process of indoctrination and to avoid social stigmatisation; insufficient projects for the assistance of women and children from conflict zones (Iraq and Syria).

On 23 February 2018, the French prime minister presented a new national plan for the prevention of radicalisation, which provided for 60 measures to redirect the prevention policy. The government continues to place emphasis on the need for “prévenir pour protéger” through mobilisation and coordination between state actors, local communities and civil society. Despite these efforts, the results of a senate committee of inquiry published in July 2018 highlighted the limits of government plans to combat radicalisation39. According to the report, the persistence of the terrorist threat has led to the undisputed improvement and strengthening of intelligence, justice and police services, while positive results from prevention measures to radicalisation are difficult to achieve. Such measures would remain too generalist and long-term and awareness is raised of the limitations in the exchange of good practices at national and international level since the positive results obtained in some territories are not always transferable to other contexts.

3. Conclusion For decades, French counter-terrorism policies have been primarily based on repression and prosecution, and after 9/11, France put in place further measures to strengthen and refine its repressive approach to counter jihadi terrorism. Between 2014 and 2015, some important events marked a critical transition in the French counter-terrorism policy: the mass exodus of French foreign fighters to Syria and the 2015 attacks. From that point, the French government considered the need to change its approach based only on repression by including ‘soft’ anti-radicalisation measures. Until then, the counter-terrorism arsenal had proved to be a success by allowing the prosecution and arrest of a large number of Jihadi terrorists. The growing phenomenon of foreign fighters first and then the attacks on French soil have, however, revealed the weaknesses of this approach and its devastating unexpected effects. Aware of these failures,

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French political decision-makers have only recently begun a more serious and in-depth analysis of counter-terrorism policies, with a particular focus on preventing and combating radicalisation.

Notes 1

Global Terrorism Index 2016, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf. 2 The United Kingdom occupies the 28th position on the 2018 GTI after the suicide bombing on May 22, 2017 during the Ariana Grande concert in Manchester that killed 23 people and injured an additional 119. 3 ICCT Research Paper, Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU (April 2016). 4 UN, “Third Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat,” No S/2016/830 (30 September, 2016), https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/ 830&referer=/english/&Lang=E. 5 More information on the operation is available on the official website: https://www. inherentresolve.mil/. 6 Bindner Laurence, “Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France,” ICCT Policy Brief (February 2018). 7 Sénat de la République Française, Rapport n. 639 “COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE sur l’organisation et les moyens des services de l’État pour faire face à l’évolution de la menace terroriste après la chute de l’État islamique,” (4 July 2018). 8 Ministry of Interior of the French Republic, available on the website https://www. interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministere/Police-nationale. 9 Ministry of Interior of the French Republic, available on the website https://www. interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministere/Gendarmerie-nationale. 10 The 30 April 2014 decree specifies the perimeter of DGSI’s missions in Article 1 according to the following terms: “The Directorate General of Internal Security is an active service of the national police. It is responsible, throughout the territory of the Republic, for seeking, centralising and exploiting intelligence concerning national security or the fundamental interests of the Nation”. Available on the website https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministere/DGSI. 11 The Vigipirate plan is a system of vigilance, prevention and protection, which makes it possible to better defend France and its population against the terrorist threat. In 1978 the French government launched a warning system in response to the first major waves of terrorist attacks carried out in France and Europe by extremist or separatist organisations. In 1991 the first Vigipirate plan was created to facilitate the prime minister’s fight against terrorist acts. See http:// www.stopdjihadisme.gouv.fr/node/361. 12 The bombing on 3 October 1980 was directed against a synagogue of the French Israeli Union (Libérale Israélite de France), Copernic Street, Paris, which was full of worshippers for Sabbath services. There were four dead and 46 injured.

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That year alone, 12 attacks claimed by the Committee for Solidarity with Near Eastern Political Prisoners (CSPPA) caused a total of 11 deaths and 220 injuries. 14 Law n. 86-1020, 9 September 1986 about counter-terrorism and attacks against state security. 15 According to Article 421-2-1 of the French Penal Code, inserted on 22 July 1996, “The participation in any group formed or association established with a view to the preparation, marked by one or more material actions, of any of the acts of terrorism provided for under the previous articles shall in addition be an act of terrorism.” See http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/french_penal_code_33.pdf. 16 Dorle Hellmuth, “Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 12 (2015): 979–997. 17 Law n. 86-1020, 9 September 1986 about counter-terrorism and attacks against state security. 18 Article 5 of Act no. 55–385 of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency is amended as follows: For the purpose of preventing disturbances to public security and public order, the prefect has the following powers: 1. To prohibit the movement of persons or vehicles in places and at times fixed by stops; 2. To establish, by order, protection or security zones where the residence of persons is regulated; 3. To prohibit the stay in all or part of the department of any person in respect of whom there are serious reasons to believe that his conduct constitutes a threat to public security and order. The order shall set out the duration, limited in time, of the measure, the precise circumstances of fact and place on which it is based, and the territory in which it applies, which may not include the domicile of the person concerned. A paragraph is added as follows: “These measures shall take account of the family and professional life of the persons likely to be affected”. See https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00000069535 0. 19 Loi n. 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte con- tre le terrorisme, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/10/30/INTX1716370L/ jo/texte. 20 Ministry of Interior of the French Republic, http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/ lutte-contre-terrorisme-radicalisation/mesures-lutter-contre-terrorisme/quel-estlarse- nal-juridique. 21 Ministere des Finances et des Comptes Publics, Dossier “Countering Terrorist financing,” (18 March 2015), https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/PDF/presskit-countering_terrorist financing.pdf. 22 According to the latest statistics by the Ministry of Justice, as of 29 May 2017, 450 persons were incarcerated (prevented or convicted) for terrorism-related offences. The number of Islamist convicted (compared to 390 at the beginning of 2017) was only 90 in 2014. 23 The intelligence office of the prison administration was created in 2003 (Bureau du Renseignement Penitentiaire) to detect and supervise the radical inmates but until 2012 communication between this office and the other intelligence services was absent. Only in 2012 was an official information-sharing protocol signed by

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the prison administration and the Directorat-General of Domestic Security, and since 2015 the prison administration has been detailed to the UCLAT. 24 Hellmuth, “Countering Jihadi Terrorists,” 979–997. 25 Ministry of Interior of the French Republic, see file:///C:/Users/valer/Downloads/Plan-d-action-contre-la-radicalisation-et-leterrorisme.pdf. 26 Ministry of Interior of the French Republic, http://www.stopdjihadisme.gouv.fr/. 27 See the Senate of the French Republic website http://www.senat.fr/rap/r16-633/ r16-633.html. 28 In September 2016, the government decided, on an experimental basis, to open, in Beaumont-en-Veron (Indre-et-Loire), the first centre for prevention, integration and citizenship with the aim of preparing, proposing and providing a useful educational offer and programme for the reintegration of marginalised radicalised young people. 29 Ministry of Interior of the French Republic, https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/ Actualites/Communiques/Fermeture-du-premier-centre-de-prevention-d-insertion-et-de-citoyennete. 30 Amnesty International, “France: Renewal of State of Emergency Risks Normalizing Exceptional Measures,” (December 15, 2016). 31 Human Right Watch, “Preempting Justice. Counterterrorism laws and procedures in France,” (July 1, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/01/preempting-justice/counterterrorism-lawsand-procedures-franc and Human Right Watch, “France is addicted to the state of emergency. Put an end to it, Mr. President,” (July 11, 2017), https://www.hrw. org/news/2017/07/11/france-addicted-state-emergency-put-end-it-mr-president. 32 Loi n. 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte con- tre le terrorisme, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/10/30/INTX1716370L/ jo/texte. 33 Human Rights Watch, “Welcome, France, to the ‘New Normal’,” (November 1, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/01/welcome-france-new-normal. 34 Witold Mucha, “Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany,” Journal for Deradicalisation, no. 10 (Spring 2017): 230–254. 35 See the Senate of the French Republic website http://www.senat.fr/rap/r16-633/ r16-633.html. 36 In September 2016, the government decided, on an experimental basis, to open, in Beaumont-en-Veron (Indre-et-Loire), a first centre for prevention, integration and citizenship with the aim of preparing, proposing and providing a useful educational offer and programme for the reintegration of marginalised radicalised young people. 37 Ministry of Interior of the French Republic, see https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/ fr/Actualites/Communiques/Fermeture-du-premier-centre-de-prevention-d-insertion-et-de-citoyennete. 38 Assemblèe Nationale, Rapport n. 3922 “COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7

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janvier 2015,” (July 5, 2016), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapenq/r3922-t1. asp#P2787_726430. 39 Sénat de la République française, Rapport n. 639 “COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE sur l’organisation et les moyens des services de l’État pour faire face à l’évolution de la menace terroriste après la chute de l’État islamique,” (4 July 2018).

List of References Amnesty International. “France: Renewal of State of Emergency risks normalizing exceptional measures”, December 15, 2016. https://www.am-nesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/france-renewal-ofstate-of-emergen- cy-risks-normalizing-exceptional-measures/. Assemblèe Nationale. Rapport n. 3922 “COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015”, July 5, 2016. http://www.assemblee-nation-ale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922t1.asp#P2787_726430. Bindner, Laurence. “Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France”. ICCT Policy Brief (February 2018). French Penal Code. Inserted on 22 July 1996, Article 421-2-1. http://www. equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/french_penal_code_33.pdf. Global Terrorism Index 2016. http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf. Hellmuth, Dorle. “Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 12, (2015): 979–997. Human Right Watch. “France is addicted to the state of emergency. Put an end to it, Mr. President” July 11, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/11/france-addicted-stateemergency-put-end-it-mr-president. —. “Preempting Justice. Counterterrorism laws and procedures in France” July 1, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/01/preemptingjustice/counterterrorism-laws-and-procedures-franc. —. “Welcome, France, to the ‘New Normal’”, November 1, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/01/welcome-france-new- normal. ICCT Research Paper. Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU, (April 2016). https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_ Foreign-Fight-ers-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_includingAnnexesLinks.pdf. Legifrance. Article 5 of Act no. 55–385 of 3 April 1955. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.

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Legifrance. Law n. 86-1020, 9 September 1986. https://www.legifrance. gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000693912. Legifrance. Loi n. 2017-1510 du 30 Octobre 2017. https://www.legifrance. gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/10/30/INTX1716370L/jo/text.e. Ministere des Finances et des Comptes Publics. Dossier “Countering Terrorist Financing”, 18 March 2015. https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/PDF/press-kitcountering_terrorist_financing.pdf. Ministry of Interior of the French Republic. http://www.stop-djihadisme. gouv.fr/lutte-contre-terrorisme-radicalisation/mesures-lutter-contreterrorisme/quel-est-larsenal-juridique. —. https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Actualites/Communiques/Fermeturedu-premier-centre-de-prevention-d-insertion-et-de-citoyennete. —. https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Actualites/Communiques/Fermeturedu-premier-centre-de-preven- tion-d-insertion-et-de-citoyennete. —. https://www.gouvernement.fr/risques/plan-d-action-contre-leterrorisme. —. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/ Le-ministere/DGSI. —. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/ Le-ministere/Police-nationale. —. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/ Le-ministere/Gendarmerie-nationale. Mucha, Witold. “Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalisation. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany”. Journal for Deradicalisation, no. 10 (Spring 2017): 230–254. Sénat de la République française, Rapport n. 639. “COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE sur l’organisation et les moyens des services de l’État pour faire face à l’évolution de la menace terroriste après la chute de l’État islamique”, 4 July 2018. UN. “Third report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat”, No. S/2016/830, 30 September, 2016. https://www.un.org/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/830&referer=/english/&Lang=E.

Websites http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr. http://www.senat.fr. https://www.inherentresolve.mil/. https://www.amnesty.org. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/. https://www.economie.gouv.fr/.

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https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/. https://icct.nl/. https://www.hrw.org. http://economicsandpeace.org/. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/. https://www.un.org

CHAPTER FOUR ITALY AND THE PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM POLICY MARIA LUISA MANISCALCO

1. Background and framework of violent radicalisation 1.1 The experience of the “Years of Lead” and the permanence of the domestic subversive groups In its recent past, Italy confronted a long period of social and political turmoil that lasted from the 1960s until the early 1980s, causing widespread domestic political violence: right-wing, left-wing, anarchist and ethno-nationalist terrorism. Before the eruption of right-wing and left-wing terrorism in the 1970s, Italy experienced a season of ethno-nationalist violence in the area of Alto Adige/ South Tyrol. The most well-known terrorist organisation was the South Tyrolean Liberation Committee that in its first phase focused on symbolic targets but after an escalation of violence committed several assassinations and ambushes on Italian security forces. The solution to the South Tyrolean question was political and did not lead to any counterterrorism strategy. Starting from the so-called Years of Lead, the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse, BR) was the largest, longest-lasting, and most broadly diffused leftwing terrorist group. At its peak the organisation had thousands of active members and supporters, with its strongest presence in the industrial cities of Northern Italy. Members of the Red Brigades attacked property rather than people until 1972; arson against factory managers’ cars was particularly common as were raids against the offices of right-wing organisations. On April 18, 1974, Mario Sossi, a Genoa magistrate, was kidnapped by the Red Brigades. It was the first time that the left-wing terrorist group had directly struck the Italian government, marking the beginning of tensions that

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lasted for 10 years. The primary targets of the Red Brigades were symbols of capitalism and the Italian state: these included politicians, especially those of the Christian Democratic party, law enforcement and factories. Its best-known attack of the period was the kidnapping and killing of Christian Democratic leader and former prime minister Aldo Moro in 1978. The Red Brigades’ activities began to decline in 1980. Members were being arrested at higher rates, and they increasingly cooperated with authorities, leading to the capture of more members. During the Years of Lead, from 1977 to November 1981, a far-right organisation, the Armed Revolutionary Groups (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari, NAR) was also active. It committed 33 murders in four years, and had planned to assassinate some personalities from the political world. The 70s were a time of political violence; between 1969 and 1981; nearly 2,000 murders were attributed to political violence in the form of bombing, assassination and urban guerrilla warfare between rival militant factions. In addition, Italy has always had to deal with the burden of strong criminal violence, including the murder of two prominent anti-mafia judges (Giovanni Falcone, murdered with his wife and three escort officers and Paolo Borsellino, murdered with five escort officers) in the 1990s. This wave of domestic social conflicts and unprecedented acts of terror- ism – carried out by both left-wing and right-wing paramilitary groups – led to the introduction of special laws. Thanks to an efficient synergy between police and intelligence agencies, the domestic subversive groups have been dismantled, but potentially subversive risks, although much more limited than the previous ones, are still present. Over the years, though strongly reduced by anti-terrorist operations, domestic subversive groups have engaged in efforts to reorganise clandestine groups styled after the Red Brigades; they have also been trying to re-group by penetrating milieus of social unrest where extremist ideologies are rooted. The New Red Brigades returned to the forefront in1999 after a period of inactivity. Massimo D’Antona, a labour law expert working on plans for greater flexibility in Italy’s labour market, was murdered in Rome by the Red Brigades for the Construction of the Combatant Communist Party (“Brigate Rosse per la costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente” – BR-PCC). Three years later, on 19 March 2002, Marco Biagi, a labour law and industrial relations expert and government consultant, was murdered by the same group. On March 2 2003, a BR-PCC member killed policeman Emanuele Petri after a bloody gun- fight on the Rome-Florence train.

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Since the mid-1980s, insurrectionary anarchist groups and individuals have been responsible for dozens of attacks in Italy and abroad, and since the late 1990s, the Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI), the insurrectionary anarchist militant movement, has increasingly used more dangerous and violent methods such as bombings and assaults. After the substantial dismantling of the left-wing terrorist group BR-PCC in the 2000s, anarchist insurrectionism has been the most dangerous form of domestic subversive violence. Over the years anarchist insurrectionism, has continued to exhibit aggressive intentions; according to the Europol TE-SAT Report 2018, in Greece and Italy the anarchist extremist milieu is considered to be “an antechamber to terrorism, in the sense that it provides fertile ground for radicalisation and recruitment”1. Some extremist right-wing groups are considered equally dangerous because they have shown an ability to gain followers for their xenophobic and racist ideas. They have contacts with similar groups at the European level and are active in the international arena. Some of them fight in Donbass (Ukraine) for opposing sides: the Ukrainian nationalist formations and the pro-Russian separatists. The growth of violent radical actions, motivated by the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory that inspired the terrorist massacre in two mosques in Christchurch (New Zealand) on March 2019, is a fear shared by European countries.

1.2 The Jihadist arena before and after the millennium Unlike France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany, Italy has not suffered any major jihadist attacks and has not seen the same degree of radicalisation and extremist activity. Moreover, even according to the leading indicator of the number of foreign terrorist fighters who have travelled to Syria and Iraq (138 people, not only citizens and residents but referring to the national territory2), there are fewer dangerous Islamist extremists on Italian soil in absolute terms as well as fewer Islamist extremists as a proportion of the Muslim population than those countries. Italian cities have never experienced the presence of sharia patrols by Muslims, and rather than having “ghetto communities” located in specific urban areas, the Muslim population – which is mainly concentrated in Northern Italy – is dispersed throughout the territory. This different spatial distribution has prevented the formation of so-called “hotbeds” of radicalisation3, which elsewhere – e.g., within some specific regional or

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urban spaces such as the French banlieue Saint-Denis, the Molenbeek district of Brussels, and the Sparkhill district of Birmingham4 – acted as the incubators and triggers of radicalisation processes. Since Italy’s limited colonial experience didn’t bring large multi-ethnic concentrations of citizens from the former colonies into the country, and large-scale Muslim immigration began only in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Italy has not yet known third- and fourth-generation descendants of immigrants, who are most susceptible to jihadist propaganda. This lack of Italian generations means that authorities could focus on non-citizens, who could be deported at the first signs of concern. Therefore, in general, Italian police and counter-terrorism forces have not had to deal with a huge number of people who were potentially at risk of radicalisation, unlike France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom. While Italy has escaped acts of terrorism, there has been a longstanding jihadist presence in Italy. Jihadist networks have been active in Italy since the late 1980s and hubs can be traced since the early 1990s, a period in which there were significant arrivals of migrants. There has been a significant jihadist presence in Italy since then: The country has served as a harbour for members of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Jamat-Islamiyya, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA, from French), Ansar al-Islam, and al-Qaeda. The main jihadist network was originally located in the city of Milan, where the Egyptian Ibrahim Saad Abu Zeid founded the Islamic Cultural Centre (1988), better known as the Jenner Avenue Mosque. The Salafi-centred site was embodied by the Jamaa Islamiya group, whose branch in Milan was represented by Ibrahim Saad, who was appointed as the director of the new centre. The Jenner Avenue Mosque has always been the undisputed hub of jihadist activity in Italy, with the US Department of Treasury describing the Jenner Avenue network as “the most important base of Osama bin Laden’s network in Europe”5. Ramzi Youssef, tied to Jamaa Islamiya, spent a period in Milan under the protection of the Jenner Mosque. He was one of those responsible for the truck bomb attack on the World Trade Center in New York (February 26, 1993) that killed six people and injured over a thousand, and he is also believed to have been involved in the attempted attack on Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila (Philippines) in 1995. Sentenced to life imprisonment by the District Court in Manhattan, he professed, “I am a terrorist and I’m proud”6. The Islamic Cultural Centre gained importance for the global jihadist movement when the conflict in Bosnia erupted in 1992. Not only was the Jenner Avenue Mosque’s imam, Anwar Shabaan, the commander of foreign mujahidin in Bosnia but the network in Milan was also an important node supplying

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documents, money and other forms of logistical support for volunteers worldwide seeking to reach the battlefield in the Balkans7. During the years of the Bosnian War, the Jenner Avenue Mosque expressed most of its organisational potential, with constant logistic support (fund-raising, propaganda, falsification of documents, etc.) for the battalion of foreign fighters involved in the war. Many of the mujahidin who left for Bosnia were radicalised under the aegis of the Jenner Avenue Mosque’s imam, Anwar Shabaan. In 1995 the Jenner Avenue network claimed the radicalisation of the first recorded suicide bomber in Europe; of Egyptian descent, he blew himself up in a car bombing (a Fiat Mirafiori 130) attempt against a police station in Fiume/Rijeka to avenge the killing of Anwar Shabaan. At least four of the major protagonists of suicide bombings in Iraq left from Milan. One example is Fahdal Nassim, an Algerian who, in August 2003, caused 22 casualties (including Sergio Vieira De Mello) at the Baghdad UN headquarters. After serving as a strategic base where many charismatic preachers and ideologues of international jihadism transited, the Milanbased network has survived the death of its vertices in 1995. Deriving from Milan’s ideological base and logistics platform, since the late 90s jihadist radicalisation has spread into the Central and Northern regions of Italy. Cities such as Gallarate, Como, Varese, Bologna, and Cremona have become important hubs propagating the Salafi ideology. Special emphasis was placed on the jihadist network in the city of Cremona, where several radical cells, headed by the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, found their historical genesis. The group’s leader, Ahmed el-Bouhali, took part in the Afghan war (2001), and probably died during the conflict. Despite being resized by a massive police counter-terror campaign that led to the detection and arrest of the Italian jihadist leaders, the hub survived. This was possible through several connections between the Italian and Balkans jihadists, who, following the end of the Balkan conflicts, found a safe haven in Italy. The Italian jihadist network also tried to directly act within the national territory. However, this has not been the first goal of the group in order to avoid being targeted by the security services and to maintain its logistic central role in the spread of jihadist violence across the European borders. By the mid-2000s, several aggressive security investigations led to the dismantling of dozens of cells and the voluntary departure from Italy of many hardened jihadists, which caused a significant decrease in jihadist activity. Some of the long-established networks and some new actors (Pakistanis, for example) continued their activities, even though at a

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markedly lower intensity. It is noteworthy that other than a few improbable plots, no attacks against Italy were planned by established networks in this period, despite a number of plots targeting other European countries. The Italian jihadist network has gradually shifted from representing a safe haven for foreigner combatants to being the incubator of home-grown jihadists. As stressed by Lorenzo Vidino, the turning point of this transition could be delineated in the failed terrorist attack against the Army barracks on the periphery of Milan (October 12, 2009), carried out by the Libyan citizen Mohammed Game who had lived in Italy since 20038. Despite the failure of the attack, carried out with an improvised explosive device similar to the type used by terrorists in the London Underground attacks of July 7, 2005, it represents a turning point because it became clear that Italy would be at risk of home-grown terrorism. The jihadist scene in Italy has progressively changed with the formation of a new generation of home-grown terrorists and the presence of lone wolves; during the last few years, Italian authorities have increasingly noticed a shift toward forms of radicalisation similar to that experienced in other Western European countries. Several recent events highlighted the following trend: The jihadist cell of four Kosovars that threatened Pope Bergoglio dismantled in Brescia in 2015 – Dibrani Gafurr, the twenty-four-year-old Kosovar who, from Brescia, formed an online network of jihadist enthusiasts and the Italian converts to Islam who had recently reached Syria and Iraq. Over the years the jihadist threat has remained current and concrete in Italy; one example was the 2015 arrest of Abdul Rahman Nauroz, a Kurd-Iraqi citizen residing in Merano, close to Bolzano, on charges of being an Islamic State recruiter; another example was Berlin truck attacker Anis Amri (radicalised in Italian prisons), who was shot dead on 23 December 2016 in Sesto San Giovanni close to Milan. In April 2017, Italian police announced they had helped German authorities break up a terrorist cell in Berlin linked to Anis Amri. In November 2017, Abderrahim Moutaharrik – a Moroccan kickboxing champion imprisoned in April 2016 on charges of international terrorism for alleged links to ISIS – was sentenced to six years in prison. In December 2017, Mouner El Aloual was sentenced to six years of imprisonment; the Moroccan had been arrested in April 2017 in Turin for propaganda and proselytism in favour of the Islamic State on the online platform Zello and because he planned attacks in Italy. During 2018 there were many arrests of people accused of association for the purpose of international terrorism, such as the Somali citizen Mohsin Ibrahim Omar, who was engaged in intense proselytising activities

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on the web and openly intending to act and the Lebanese of Palestinian origin Alhaj Ahmad Amin, resident in Macomer (Sardinia). Another relevant question is the challenge posed by the 138 foreign fighters, with ties in Italy by virtue of citizenship or residence permits, who left to join jihadist groups in Syria and in Iraq such as the so-called Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and other groups. The biggest concern is the blow- back effect, namely the possibility that, once back in Italy, they may decide to carry out terrorist attacks. According to the Italian intelligence report of February 2019, the jihadist threat, very articulate and deep-rooted, remains one of the main threats in Italy9 not only because Italy has always had a special role in the jihadist imagination and narrative but also because of the persistent presence in the territory of radicalised subjects and those exposed to radicalisation processes.

2. The structure of the Italian security system: Legal and institutional framework 2.1 General features The counter-terrorism experiences, along with a prolonged struggle over the years against organised crime (Mafia, Camorra, Ndrangheta), have contributed to the development of legal and policing tools and ad hoc organisational structures that have improved the performance and strengthened the resilience of the Italian counter-terrorism system. Italy was able to quickly modify its legislation, adjusting the counteractive measures to the growing threat from international terrorism and transferring pieces of legislation against organised crime into legislation on terrorism. Furthermore, since terrorism has taken on a transnational dimension, Italy has tried to implement the most appropriate legislation to guarantee the highest level of cooperation and coordination at national and international levels. This legislative review on anti-terrorism was also needed in the light of indications from supranational organisations, such as the UN Security Council and the European Union, which called upon member states to comply with their own rules on the prevention and repression of the terrorist phenomenon. Lately, as a Member State of the European Union, Italy has implemented the European directives and regulations against terrorism. For example, in May 2018, Italy adopted in its legislation two relevant European directives, namely, the Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European

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Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime10, and the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security for network and information systems across the Union11. The Italian intelligence and law enforcement agencies are fully aware that organised crime and terrorist groups often operate in similar ways and that this growing convergence of organised crime and terror groups is a global security threat. In terms of the threat response, the Italian system has proved itself to be effective thanks to an extensive counter-terrorism legislation, the appropriate policing tools and methods, and an organisation with a high level of coordination and experienced personnel.

2.2 The legal framework The Italian legal framework on prevention, prosecution and repression of terrorism and violent radicalisation is contained in the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and specific laws. The legislation, which particularly since 2001 has developed in the form of an emergency decree and immediate response to serious terrorist attacks committed abroad, is also based on the need to provide an adequate response to emerging issues such as home-grown terrorists, foreign fighters and lone terrorists. Innovative criminal cases have been progressively introduced for the purpose of defining new offences (identifying, for instance, so-called “spy crimes”) and new aggravating circumstances with special effect along with a set of repressive and preventive measures. Four laws (Law n. 438 of December 15 2001, Law n. 155 of July 31 2005, Law n. 43 of April 17 2015, Law n. 153 of 28 July 2016) have profoundly renewed anti-terrorism legislation, which, until 2001, was structured in order to counter both left-wing and right-wing domestic terrorism. With law n. 438/2001, Italian anti-terrorism legislation started to place emphasis on the international scenario, adding to the aim of reducing eversion of the democratic order that of fighting international terrorism12. The law punishes not only whoever promotes, constitutes, organises, and directs terrorist associations but also whoever finances them. Punishment (with the exclusion of close relatives) of anyone who provides shelter,

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food, hospitality, means of transport, and communication tools to affiliates to such terrorist associations was also introduced. In just over a decade (from 2005 to 2016), following these three reforms, the Italian legislator introduced four new offences concerning enrolment in terrorist organisations, consequent training, organisation of transfers abroad for the purposes of enrolment in such formations, and the financing of terrorist activities. The legislation on terrorism was further developed due to the issuance of law n. 155/2005 (“Urgent measures to fight international terrorism”), which clarified the matter, first defining what conduct can be considered for purposes of terrorism, that is, those that can cause serious damage to the country or to an international organization and are carried out in order to intimidate the population or force the public authorities or an international organization to take or refrain from doing any act or destabilize or destroy the fundamental, constitutional, economic and social political structures of a country or of an international organization

or the conducts “defined as terrorist or committed for terrorism by conventions or other rules of inter- national law binding on Italy”13. The law enhanced instruments to fight the threat of terrorist organisations and criminalised new misconduct that might lead to terrorist acts, such as active recruiting and training for terrorism purposes. In this respect, Italy focused most of its efforts on complying with the international instruments aimed at strengthening police and judicial cooperation on a multilateral basis. Anyone who enrols for terrorism training or otherwise provides instructions on the preparation or use of explosive materials is punished. The enrolled and trained subject is also punished. The possession and manufacture of false documents valid for expatriation – which is considered a “crime-spy” for which law n. 43/2015 has tightened the penalty, including the mandatory arrest in flagrante – are also punished. Among the anti-terrorism innovations introduced, it is also possible to conduct investigative hearings with detainees and inmates in order to gain useful information for the prevention and repression of crimes committed for terrorism purposes. The law has also given the Minister of the Interior or the competent Prefect Delegate the right to order the immediate expulsion of a foreigner when there are well-founded grounds for considering that their stay in the state can in any way facilitate international terrorist organisations or activities. Finally, a new

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aggravating circumstance has been envisaged if the instigation or apology concerns crimes of terrorism or crimes against humanity. The development of legislation over the years has led to: a) the criminalisation of new types of offences; b) the strengthening of sanctions for specific offences; c) the provision of procedural and non-procedural protection measures with subsequent reductions of sentences or, for some offences, exemption from punishment for those offenders who decided to cooperate with justice; d) the provision of special investigation techniques such as undercover operations, financial investigations, interceptions, cyber investigations and several supplemental rules on public order and security, prison systems, the competence and prerogatives of law enforcement officers, control of suspicious financial transactions The legislation was further developed in 2015 and 2016. On April 21, 2015, new legislation amending the Criminal Code with respect to fighting terrorism entered into effect in Italy. Law n. 43/2015 (which converts into, with modifications, the Decree-law n. 7 of February 18, 2015, “Urgent Measures for the Fight against Terrorism, Including International Terrorism, as well as Extension of the International Missions of the Armed Forces and Police, Cooperation Initiatives for the Development and Support of Reconstruction Processes, and Participation in Initiatives of International Organisations for the Consolidation of Peace and Stabilization Processes”) has introduced significant changes and additions in terms of both substantive criminal law (with the profiling of new criminal cases) and procedural law as regards prevention and investigation co-ordination14. The overall aim of this reform is the tendency to harmonise legislation in a way that takes into account not only the different forms that jihadist terrorism can take but also the various institutional realities that are called upon to deal with it. Therefore, it is from this perspective that the passages of the reform on the role of the internet for the activities of the jihadist groups and on the new functions assigned to the Postal and Communication Police as well as the functional guarantees granted to the intelligence agencies operators must be interpreted. The law is characterised by the development of a “two-track” strategy of preventive and sanctioning measures against terrorism in accordance with the model already applied for the fight against the Mafia. The experience of the fight against organised crime also inspired the establishment of the new National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Prosecution Office, a centralised judicial authority with coordination powers and investigative impetus on organised crime and terrorism. The

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mandate of the former National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor was extended to include terrorism cases. By analysing the contents of the law, it must be emphasised first of all that the law has modified the previous definition of “cases of dangerousness”, which now also includes those who are involved “in a conflict abroad in support of an organization pursuing terrorist purposes” (in italics in the text). The law focuses on new figures of terrorists, paying attention to the training and transfer activities of subjects to be involved in terrorist or combat activities abroad, with an emphasis on global connection tools. In relation to the phenomenon of foreign fighters, the law provides for the imprisonment of a person enlisted for purposes of international terrorism for five to eight years; the same article already provided for the imprisonment of the recruiter for seven to 15 years. The law also provides for the punishment for trainees, sanctioning – in line with the French model, which includes the case of individual terrorist enterprises – also the person who, having self-acquired instruction, selftrains without having contact with any trainer. The rule seeks to counteract the phenomenon of the “lone wolf”. From the procedural point of view, Law n. 43/2015 has introduced new tools to counter the phenomenon of proselytism and terrorist propaganda through the internet by providing for the gradual intervention by the judicial authority with inhibition orders or removal of sites used for incriminated activities and conduct. In July 2016 the Italian Parliament again legislated to strengthen protection against terrorism with law n. 153 of 28 July 201615. It did so with a ratification law of five different international acts aimed at preventing and combating terrorism, namely: a) the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism signed in Warsaw on 16 May 2005; b) the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism signed in New York on 14 September 2005; c) the Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism signed in Strasbourg on 15 May 2003; d) the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism signed in Warsaw on 16 May 2005; e) the Additional Protocol to the Convention of the Council of Europe on the Prevention of Terrorism signed in Riga on 22 October 2015. Furthermore, law n. 153 of 28 July 2016 introduces three new crimes into the Criminal Code: a) financing of misconduct having terrorism purposes (art. 270 quinquies 1); b) theft of assets or money subject to

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seizure in order to prevent financing of misconduct having terrorism purposes (art. 270 quinquies 2); c) providing nuclear material, fabricating or possessing a nuclear weapon, making use of radioactive materials and nuclear weapons, making use or damaging a nuclear plant so that radioactive material is released for the purpose of terrorism (art. 280 ter). These new cases are added to those already foreseen, which tend to repress the association (Article 270-bis), recruitment (Article 270-quater), organisation of transfers (Article 270-quater.1), and training (Article 270quinquies) for terrorism purposes. As already mentioned, Directive 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of PNR data for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (Decree-Law n. 53 of May 201816) was recently transposed into Italian legislation. Finally, law n. 132 of December 1, 201817 provides for the loss of ius soli-acquired citizenship for naturalized citizens who receive a final conviction for terrorism. The revocation was adopted, within three years of the final judgment, by decree of the President of the Republic, on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior.

2.3 Institutional framework: The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies The Italian counter-terrorism system has been reorganised since the September 11 events. Policies in this regard include the domestic counterterrorism action in which the Ministry of the Internal Affairs is involved in collaboration with the intelligence agencies, the common strategies at the EU level and international cooperation. Italy relies on a comprehensive network of bilateral and multilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance and extradition. As a partner of Defeat-ISIS Coalition, Italy carries out air-to-air refuelling activities in favour of the Coalition’s air assets and tasks of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance with remote-piloted aircraft and planes and maintains personnel training for Kurdish and Iraqi security forces. Until March 2019 approximately 500 Italian troops provided site security for workers engaged in critical repair work on the Mosul Dam. Italy cochairs the Coalition’s Counter ISIS Finance Group with the United States and Saudi Arabia to enhance financial information-sharing and global efforts to counter ISIS financing. Law n. 124 of August 200718 reformed the Italian intelligence community and established a comprehensive system. The reform was

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designed to guide the intelligence system towards integration and closer exchanges with institutional actors to power and steady a virtuous relationship between the decision makers and the Security Intelligence System. The Italian intelligence community is composed of the Prime Minister, the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic (CISR), the delegated authority (if appointed), the Security Intelligence Department (DIS), the External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE), and the Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI). The DIS mainly coordinates the entire activity of the Italian intelligence organisation. Moreover, it also verifies the results of intelligence activities through promoting and ensuring the exchange of information between intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. It also collects information, analyses and reports from the AISE and AISI and from other state administrations to provide government authorities with exhaustive information. The main task of AISE is to carry out the information activities that take place outside the national territory in order to protect Italian political, military, economic, scientific and industrial interests; AISI has basically the same duties as AISE but at an internal national level. So, AISE and the AISI are entrusted to safeguard national interests and security, mainly on a territorial basis. Law n. 124 /2007 establishes, however, the AISE shall carry out operations in the national territory only in close cooperation with AISI and in association with operations abroad. Likewise, AISI may conduct operations abroad only in close cooperation with AISE and in association with operations conducted within the national boundaries. In these cases DIS ensures the operational coordination required to enhance synergy without the overlapping of efforts. The oversight of and overall responsibility for the intelligence policy are vested in the prime minister, who may delegate those powers to the delegated authority. The Italian intelligence system, named Information System for the Security of the Republic, is headed by the prime minister, who is assisted by the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic (CISR). The so-called delegated authority acts as an intermediary figure between the prime minister and the Information System for the Security of the Republic. Since 2001, the Minister of the Economy and Finance has been supported by the Committee for Financial Security (CFS), which aims at preventing terroristic infiltration in the Italian financial system.

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Finally, there is the Department of Information and Safety of the General Staff of the Minister of the Defence (RIS), which exchanges information with AISE concerning external terroristic threats to national interests. Law and order in Italy is the responsibility of four national police forces and two local police forces. The four national forces are the Italian National Police, Carabinieri Corps, Finance Corps, and Penitentiary Police Corps. The two local forces are the Provincial Police and Municipal Police. The Italian National Police is a civil police force primarily responsible for the maintenance of public order and security. It is placed directly under the authority of the Public Security Department within the Ministry of the Interior. At the helm of the department is a Prefect of the Republic, who is appointed to the position of Chief of Police – Director General of Public Security under the control of the Department of Public Security. National Police offices are spread all over the national territory, and in its capacity as the national public security authority, the National Police deal with the protection of the state, the safeguarding of citizens’ rights and liberties, the maintenance of law and order and public security and the provision of assistance to public and private persons or entities in the event of accidents and disasters as well as in the peaceful settlement of disputes between private parties. The numerous areas of action performed by the National Police make their organisation complex and diversified, consisting of specialist units that include the Traffic Police, Railway Police, Postal and Communications Police, Anti-Riot Police and Forensic Science Police. The Postal and Communications Police is the unit primarily responsible for the control of web communications. It is their job to keep a list of websites that are being used for activities of terroristic association and conduct for terrorism purposes in which the different reports of the judicial police are gathered. The fight against terrorism is entrusted to the Central Directorate of Prevention Police (DCPP) at a central level, and to DIGOS units (General Investigations and Special Operations Division) operating in every provincial police headquarters (Questura). DCPP activities focus on political extremism, terrorism and group violence. The DCPP also controls the NOCS (Central Security Operations Unit), an elite team trained for high-risk operations such as the rescue of hostages and raids on criminals and terrorists in any type of environment. The Carabinieri Corps is a military police force, dependent on the Ministry of Defence, on permanent active duty in the field of public

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security and safety. It is entrusted with military and police tasks. Military tasks include contributing to national defence, participating in military operations in Italy and abroad, executing military police functions and ensuring the security of Italian diplomatic and consular representations. As for police tasks, the Carabinieri Corps carries out public order and security policing as well as investigative activities on its own initiative or at the request of the judicial authorities. The Carabinieri Corps is spread over the national territory, with stations and lieutenancies. It ensures control of the territory, and provides a prompt 24-hour response to emergency calls. This work is integrated and complemented by specialised Carabinieri Commands responsible for safeguarding the fundamental interests of the community: from protecting the environment, health, work, and the nation’s cultural heritage to the observance of EU agricultural and food regulations. Within the Carabinieri Corps the Special Investigative Department (ROS) specialises in complex high-level investigations on organised crime and terrorism. It has specific competences in counter terrorism against internal and international extremist organisations. The GIS (Special Intervention Group) is one of three police tactical units that can operate throughout the country, the other two being NOCS of the National Police and ATPI (Anti-terrorism and Rapid Response Service) of the Finance Corps. GIS is employed in high-risk special actions against terrorism and specialises in hostage rescue, prioritising their physical safety, the reconquest of vital targets and facilities held by terrorists, intervention against hijacking, and intervention in environments featuring NBCR dangers. The Finance Corps is a special police force falling under the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. It is a military corps and an integral part of the Italian armed forces and law enforcement agencies. The institutional tasks of the Finance Corps comprise preventing, detecting and reporting evasions and any other violations of financial laws and regulations, monitoring compliance with political and economic regulations and carrying out maritime patrol activities for financial police purposes. In other words, the Finance Corps is a police force with general competence in all economic and financial matters. In addition, the Corps participates in maintaining public security and order and in military defence activities along the country’s borders. The ATPI (Anti-terrorism and Rapid Response Service) of the Finance Corps is specialised in counter-terrorism activity, in charge of the supervision of airports, ports and targets considered sensitive. It also operates in the fight against illicit trafficking, with specific regard to the

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area of organised crime, smuggling, drugs, weapons, and illegal immigration. The ATPI specialises in the liberation of hostages and is also engaged in missions abroad. The Penitentiary Police Corps operates under civil law and falls under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Penitentiary Administration. The penitentiary police ensures order and security inside prisons and outside, conducting armed surveillance along the outer walls and at the entrance to prison buildings, preventing unauthorised entries and exits. In addition, they manage work and education programs for inmates and provide transport, escort and guard services for prisoners, including the surveillance of hospitalised offenders. The Corps has its own marine service and dog and horse units. Finally, the penitentiary police can be deployed to carry out public order and security functions, including public rescue, in cases where they are required to help provide specific civil protection. Within the penitentiary police, the Central Unit for Investigations (NIC), a special unit based in Rome, intervenes in case of signs of radicalisation in order to carry out preventive measures such as surveillance in case of an inmate’s imminent release from prison. The law enforcement agencies use the same investigation techniques to deal with organised crime and terrorism cases. Investigation techniques such as wire taps, website navigation, telephone, email, and face-to-face communication intercepts can be used in terrorism cases, pursuant to a reasoned order issued by the Court following a request filed by the public prosecutor. Other investigation techniques such as financial and cyber investigations, undercover operations and the controlled delivery of weapons, drugs and money are contemplated by the legislation. Cases on terrorism and organised crime are investigated and prosecuted by specialised units within District Public Prosecution Offices.

2.4 Inter-institutional cooperation, leadership and coordination The whole Italian system is based on the presence of a series of actors working at different levels but with strong forms of exchange and institutional collaboration among intelligence agencies, armed and police forces, public administrations, and organisations providing public utility and related foreign services. Law n. 124/2007 significantly strengthened institutional cooperation relationships, with particular emphasis on the following points:

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a) The armed forces, the police forces, the administrations of the State and the research organisations, including private ones, are called on to supply information, analyses and reports to DIS, which to this effect provides and ensures the exchange of information, also through regular meetings. b) The armed forces, the police forces and the criminal investigation and public security officers and authorities are called on to ensure wide cooperation with AISE and AISI personnel. c) The Police forces, upon request by DIS, are called on to provide – following authorisation from the judicial authority in case of confidentiality of investigation – information concerning criminal police investigations. The judicial authority may send, on its own initiative, documents and information of interest for the activities of the Information System for the Security of the Republic. In general, all public administrations and organisations supplying public utility services must cooperate with DIS, AISE and AISI to ensure – if required at institutional level – access to their digital archives. As already mentioned, terrorist threats as well as dynamics related to money laundering and financing of terrorist acts and terrorist organisations are constantly monitored by inter-agency bodies such as the Financial Security Committee (FSC) and the Anti-terrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (CASA). The FSC, established by Law n. 431 of December 14, 2001, coordinates policies and activities aimed at preventing the use of the country’s financial and economic systems for money laundering and terrorism financing purposes and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is chaired by the Director General of the Treasury and includes representatives of 13 government entities competent in the field of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, including the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Bank of Italy, the National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange (CONSOB), the Institute for Insurance Supervision (IVASS), the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), police forces and the National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Attorney-General. The Minister of the Interior has specific organisations that carry out counter-terrorism activities coordination. The first one is the Crisis Unit (established by Law n. 133/2002), which verifies the veracity of information about a potential security threat and coordinates the activation

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of the appropriate emergency measures. The second one is the Antiterrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (CASA), established by the Decree of the Ministry of the Interior, May 6, 2004. Members of the Committee are the Director of the Prevention Police (presiding); highranking officers of the main law enforcement agencies; high-ranking officers of the Intelligence Agencies (AISI and AISE) and DIS. The Committee is a permanent body that is tasked to assess the international and internal terrorist threats and any relevant information regarding those threats; coordinate the law enforcement and the intelligence agencies; share the information provided by the law enforcement and intelligence agencies; and support and enforce the decisions taken by the government and parliament. CASA analyses the information available, ensures the coordination between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies and provides the necessary information to the relevant agencies. The Committee disseminates the information collected to the relevant law enforcement agencies and plans the action of the main law enforcement agencies so that it is finalised to detect and monitor terrorist threats. It has dealt so far with the assessment of threats against Italy19. The success of the activity of the Committee relies on a permanent coordination and consultation among its relevant members. Lastly, inside the Ministry of Justice, the National Anti-Mafia and Anti- Terrorism Directorate, established under the 2015 counter-terrorism law, has the attribution of coordination powers and investigative impetus also on terrorism.

3. The preventive measures According to Italian legislation, preventive measures are remedies aimed not at investigating or prosecuting a crime but at preventing persons considered a danger to state and public security from committing crimes. The prerequisite for these proceedings is not the perpetration of a crime but the suspected current dangerousness of individuals. The Italian legal system provides for a number of administrative preventive measures. In particular, the use of expulsion from national territory as a preventive instrument has been intensified in recent times. As a precautionary measure, expulsion doesn’t put an end to the informative and investigative activities on the subjects expelled from the country. On the contrary, it involves an in-depth analysis of the reactions triggered in their family and relational contexts by the measure itself, with the possible

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identification of other dangerous subjects connected or related to the ones expelled, and potentially subject to a similar sanction. There are different ways of expulsion: administrative expulsion by the Minister of the Interior is expulsion for reasons of state security, conceived as a highly discretionary political act and therefore remains under the sole competence of the Interior Minister, whose only obligation is to give prior communication to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This measure must be adequately motivated so as to specify the threat represented by the expelled person in terms of “State security”; “public security” reasons are not sufficient to justify such a measure. This is the case, for example, of a person involved in espionage or terrorism. The expulsion involves a ban on returning to the country for a period of 10 years and arrest in case of non-compliance with this prohibition. Under no circumstances may the expulsion of a foreigner be ordered to a country of destination where they may be prosecuted for reasons of race, sex, language, nationality, religion, political opinion, personal or social conditions, or where there is a risk of being deported to another state in which they are not protected from persecution. Moreover, the Minister of the Interior or the Prefect may order the expulsion of a foreigner if they have, individually or in a group, carried out acts objectively directed at the commission of terrorist offences, including international ones, and there are well-founded reasons to believe that their stay in Italy can in any way facilitate organisations or terrorist activities. The administrative expulsion by the Prefect is a type of expulsion adopted in the case of illegal immigration or the irregular residence of a foreigner in the national territory, or for reasons of social danger, belonging to one of target individuals of prevention measures. This latter hypothesis was expanded in 2011 by envisaging the applicability of prevention measures to those who, acting in groups or in isolation, present substantively relevant preparatory acts aimed at subverting the state order by committing certain specific offences or generally crimes with the aim of (even international) terrorism. A final amendment introduced by Law n. 43/2015, in line with criminal and administrative sanctions against foreign terrorist fighters, is the possibility of expulsion of foreign people by the Prefect for “preparatory acts to take part in a conflict in a foreign territory in support of an organisation pursuing terrorist purposes”. Even European citizens may be expelled from the national territory by a decree of the Minister of the Interior for reasons of state security or for imperative reasons of public order if the stability of institutions is endangered (as in the case of espionage or terrorist activity hypotheses).

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Other administrative (non-criminal) measures are the personal prevention measures that affect personal freedom and freedom of movement and are applied on the basis of concerns of dangerousness covered by specific legal provisions. The reference legislative text remains Legislative Decree n. 159, September 2011 (the so-called anti-Mafia Code20). With Law n. 43/2015 on urgent measures for countering terrorism, significant changes have been introduced in the area of preventive measures for both personal and property aspects. The main preventive measures applied by the administrative authority (police commissioner) are the compulsory removal from the municipality of residence; the ban on access to certain public places; a warning for persecutory conduct; the ban from the municipality of residence; the obligation to appear at least twice a week at the local police office or at the command of the Carabinieri Corps of the territorial jurisdiction; and the obligation to return to their home or to another place of private residence within a specified time and not to leave before a certain fixed hour. The preventive measures applied by the judicial authority are special public security surveillance; special public security surveillance with ban on residence; and special public security surveillance with an obligation to stay. Personal preventive measures are now also applicable to foreign fighters. The competent police authority has the right to urgently order the withdrawal of their passport and the suspension of the validity of other equivalent documents for the purpose of expatriation. However, a subsequent intervention by the judicial authority (District public prosecutor and president of the provincial capital court) is expected in order to validate this measure within 96 hours. Another applicable measure is the special public security surveillance, accompanied, if necessary, by the obligation to stay or the ban against staying. This measure, which is linked to the purpose of “preventing the transfer of potential terrorists abroad” entails a set of behavioural constraints restricting free movement. Departure from the country by an individual under surveillance is a violation of the previously mentioned restrictions on freedom of movement and therefore a punishable offence. For this purpose the Italian legislation envisages a similar tool to that recently adopted by the legislations of other European countries, such as France, which allows the punishment of individuals who, their dangerousness as potential terrorists confirmed, try to leave the country in order to join groups and organisations operating in other countries.

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4. Preventing radicalisation in prison Prison radicalisation is an increasing concern in many countries in Western Europe. The process by which detainees are increasingly adopting violent ideas and goals represents one of the main terrorist threats as evidenced by the numerous attacks on European soil conducted by previously detained individuals who have been radicalised in prison. For this reason, the counter-radicalisation programs in prison are now major parts of many European countries’ overall counter-extremism strategies. These strategies aim to prevent the spread of violent extremism in jails and decrease the recidivism of detainees for terrorism-related crimes. The prevention of radicalisation in Italian jails is carried out through monitoring activities aimed at revealing every single aspect of the personal and relational life of the prisoner in order to put into place support strategies and, at the same time, identify potential elements of risk. The monitoring procedure operates at three different levels and aims at making a distinction between legitimate religious practice and extremism. The first level of action, defined Monitoraggio (monitoring), focuses on individuals who were detained for crimes related to international terrorism as well as on those who – showing themselves prone to forms of proselytism, radicalisation or recruitment – are considered to be of particular interest. The second level, the so-called Attenzionamento (from the Italian word for “attention”) includes individuals who, during their detention, engaged in behaviours that seem to entail a certain level of closeness to jihadist ideologies and, therefore, their potential involvement in proselytism and recruiting activities. The third level, called Segnalazione (reporting), includes prisoners that, because of the vagueness of the information provided by the correctional facility, require a later assessment in order to be potentially included in the first or second level or to be maintained in or excluded from the third level. From an organisational point of view, in any of the more than 200 Italian prisons there is a contact person – a member of the prison guards – responsible for the monitoring of Islamic radicalism. In case of signs of radicalisation, the NIC intervenes. The NIC’s task is to analyse, on a monthly and bi-monthly basis, data concerning prisoners’ everyday life; that is, mail and package correspondence, phone calls, visits, disciplinary infractions, and behaviour reports. The monitoring level consists of a focused and deeper observation of the prisoner’s behaviour, aimed at both verifying their potential adhesion to extremist ideas and implementing deradicalisation procedures as well as supplying reports to police forces on

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the territory in order to carry out preventive measures, such as surveillance, in case of imminent release from prison. Prisoners detained for international terrorism crimes are separated from the rest of the prisoners in order to prevent them from carrying out proselytism activities or ideological indoctrination towards more vulnerable subjects and dangerous forms of cooperation with members of other criminal groups such as the Mafia, Camorra, etc. from arising. In case of facts of investigative and judicial interest, the results of monitoring activities at the three levels are shared with the judicial authority, all the forces of law and order, and the internal and external intelligence and security agencies (AISI and AISE) within the Anti-Terrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (CASA). Indeed, the numerous reports about Muslim ex-prisoners allow investigators to gather crucial and extensive information about their personalities, connections (for example, there are registers of visits and conversations between prisoners and their relatives and acquaintances), and other habits which are considered extremely useful for investigative and preventive purposes21. Italian prisons regularly use the so-called “Terrorist screening centre”, an IT programme managed by the FBI involving 80 countries worldwide that ensures constant sharing of data and information and giving access to the names of subjects considered dangerous. It is therefore possible to know if a subject in an Italian prison for common offences had been reported as dangerous from a terrorist point of view by another country. The Italian police forces joined the programme a few years ago and the Minister of Justice recently followed in order to cover the Italian prison situation. A group of strategic analysists was also established within the office of the Minister of Justice in order to facilitate information sharing between the National Counter-terrorism Office, Eurojust, liaison magistrates (already present in France and Albania and soon in Morocco as well), the major district attorneys’ offices and prison authorities. As far as preventive activities are concerned, there has been an extensive effort to reduce the sense of isolation and (social) exclusion that feeds terrorism. To this purpose, an important contribution has been made by the intensification of interviews between inmates and educators, as well as social workers and other professional figures such as psychology and criminology experts and cultural mediators. There has also been an effort to both foster the cultural development of foreigner prisoners through school and professional courses and to involve external social figures, such voluntary assistants, public organisations, consular authorities, priests and imams, in the attempt to control insidious leadership phenomena. In this

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respect, the administration has considered it appropriate to create a Memorandum of Understanding with the Union of Islamic Communities in Italy (UCOII), aimed at providing spiritual and moral assistance to Muslim prisoners through access to adequately prepared operators within the prisons. Following the same approach towards prevention, prison agents and supervisors receive training concerning Islamic culture issues, religious practice and cultural mediation, to which the topics of violent radicalisation and propaganda within prisons and juvenile detention centres have also been added. The latter were developed in the light of strategies outlined by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, which highlighted the importance of accurate monitoring activities on the phenomenon of radicalisation in prisons.

5. Preventing radicalisation on the web It is a well-established belief that the web and the various social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, You Tube, Telegram, Paltalk, Ask.FM, Tumblr, etc.) play a critical role in the recruitment and mobilisation of individuals to the jihadist cause and in the dissemination of extremist ideologies. The web is often the main means of getting in touch with jihadist ideology, deepening it, interacting with other radicalised people or individuals in the process of being radicalised and, once the decision to mobilise has been made, to look for operational support. The decline of ISIS on the online space has been overstated. Jihadist contents continue to be disseminated online at a consistent rate. While Telegram exists as a “safe haven” for jihadists, they have not abandoned other platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, You Tube, etc. It is also known that the so-called foreign terrorist fighters, having reached the theatres of war, engaged in intense communicative activity with the communities of origin whose contents continue to circulate. Controlling the whole set of telematic resources thus plays a key role in developing prevention and counter-terrorism strategies. In Italy, the case of Anas el Abboubi (who was born in Marrakech in 1992 and moved to Vobarno – a little town in the province of Brescia – at the age of seven) founder of the Sharia4Italy group, was a first significant sign of the presence of an extreme radicalisation path that finds in the web its dynamism and its expression, in a similar manner to those spread throughout Europe. Monitored since September 2012 and arrested in June 2013 on accusations of training for the purpose of international terrorism and incitement to discrimination and violence for racial, ethnic and

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religious reasons, Anas el Abboubi was released by the review court and he immediately left for Syria, where he continued to feed an online debate on jihadist issues22. Starting from the first cases in recent years, we have witnessed the growth of an embryonic Italian jihadist community on the web and on some social networks in particular. Today great attention is being paid to jihadism on the net; the same procedural rules, established under the counter-terrorism legislation in order to facilitate the work of the Information Services and the Judicial Police, have specifically the aim of accessing to telematic traces of the activity of individuals and groups as well as coordination tools. Pursuant to Law 43/2015, the Ministry of the Interior is entitled to set up a list of the websites used for terrorist conduct, such as incitement, recruitment and training to carry out attacks. The authorities may order internet service providers to immediately block access to such websites and remove their content or ban access to the internet domain. In the presence of concrete elements of specific terrorismrelated crimes perpetrated by telematic means, the public prosecutor orders by reasoned decree, preferably through the Postal and Communications Police (the main body responsible for the control of web communications), internet providers to remove the illegal content accessible to the public. In the case of content generated by users and hosted on platforms that can be attributed to third parties, the removal of specific illegal content is ordered. Service providers are required to act promptly and in any case not later than forty-eight hours after receipt of the notification. Failure to fulfil these obligations by the provider is sanctioned with a ban on access to the internet domain by means of preventive seizure. It is possible to submit reports on the Postal and Communications Police portal to contribute to public security; police operators act as attentive receptors and analysers of information provided by users, carrying out prevention activities aimed at protecting public safety. In 2015 a series of dangerous activities in Brescia and its surroundings were identified through careful monitoring of the web. The police dismantled, in what was called the van Demme operation, a jihadist group consisting of four armed Kosovars who, in front of a webcam, sang the praises of a jihad threatening Pope Bergoglio (“This will be the last Pope”). The investigations started in 2014 after the identification on Facebook of a group entitled “With or Without You the Caliphate Returned”, which, presumably from Syria, directed its propaganda towards internet users coming from the Balkans and resident in Italy. The four men had contacts with the group and a documented connection with jihadist chains active in the Balkans23.

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A year later, the analysis of a flow of chat and online conversations led to the identification of another aspiring terrorist in the town of Fiesse, near Bergamo, who had also inducted his young son in the cult of the “holy war”24. Similarly, starting from some posts on Facebook and after some investigation, in 2016 Sara Pilè, a 25-year-old women from Brescia living in Monticelli Brusati, who had converted after getting married to a Tunisian expelled in June 2016, was identified as a socially dangerous aspiring “martyr”. The court in Brescia set the measure of special surveillance, prohibiting the use of the internet and attendance in mosques25.

6. Conclusions Italy, only marginally affected by the jihadist phenomenon, has not, so far, faced the same level of terrorist threat as European countries like Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. The country has not experienced massive recruiting chains or attacks on the same scale as elsewhere or mass mobilisations towards areas of conflict (Iraq, Syria …) and a relevant number of returnees. As outlined, this reality is likely due to a variety of factors, including even a lower degree of radicalisation inside the Italian Muslim communities and less resentment among Muslims over the country’s colonial past and foreign policy. Moreover, Italian law enforcement has remained advanced in its capacity to detect and deter terrorist activity, links and associations within the country. With an established tradition of factual contrast against violent extremism and organised crime, Italy has until now applied a centralised and security-oriented counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation approach based on the following main aspects: a) intelligence and police investigations and surveillance; b) monitoring webpages and social media; c) countering the financing of terrorism; d) administrative expulsions; e) personal preventing measure; f) judicial measures; g) monitoring and counter-radicalisation programs within prisons. Among the Italian strategy’s best practices there is a well-established cooperation between the different intelligence agencies and between them and law enforcement agencies, coordinating their counter-terrorism efforts and meeting regularly to review terrorist threats and share information26. Italy aggressively investigates and prosecutes terrorist suspects and dismantles suspected terrorist-related networks; it also continues to make use of expedited administrative procedures to expel non-citizens suspected of endangering national security.

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Nevertheless, national legislator and law enforcement agencies believe that a successful counter terrorism, such as an effective fight against organised crime, cannot be achieved without respect for individual guarantees. These guarantees are fully ensured by procedural rules and protection of human rights, which are both crucial in every type of action. Nonetheless, since it is possible to observe dynamics that mimic those seen in other European countries, non-coercive actions to counter violent radicalisation are now deemed necessary by many Italian policy makers27. The prevention of violent radicalisation is different from the counterterrorism strategy: its purpose is to intervene before crimes occur. Measures aimed at schools, prisons, communities and families consider every single person susceptible to radicalisation as someone to be protected, and the aim is to intervene before they take up arms. Albeit with an exclusive focus on jihadist radicalisation, two crucial landmarks in the prevention of violent radicalisation are the abovementioned program targeting detainees of Muslim faith, developed in partnership with UCOII, and the National Pact for an Italian Islam28. The National Pact for an Italian Islam was signed on 1 February 2017 at the Interior Ministry with representatives of the major Islamic associations and communities that include about 70% of Muslims in Italy. It is not really an agreement as it foresees Article n. 8 of the Italian Constitution, but it is a beginning and one step further in the direction of mutual recognition. One of the essential points is that all the signatories have committed to reject all forms of violence and terrorism. The document contains a declaration of commitment by the Islamic organisations to strengthen dialogue and collaboration with the Ministry of Interior administration, continuing efforts to work against expressions of religious extremism and promoting a process in harmony with the principles of the Italian legislation on religious freedoms. Italy’s long history of countering organised crime and radical ideological movements has given it a strong legacy in fighting internal threats to security. Authorities are now leveraging those capabilities to counter-terrorist recruitment, radicalisation to violence and networking. However, until now, the prevention strategy adopted by Italy lacked a multi-stakeholder approach, both in theory and in practice. This extremely complex strategy and not necessarily winning, as the experience of other European countries shows, is not developed in Italy. There aren’t measures targeting schools, communities and families or projects aimed at increasing the resilience of young people to violent radicalising thought and ideological propaganda.

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The terrorist threat is nonetheless long-standing, serious and growing, and there are significant shortcomings that need to be addressed by future policies not only against an ever-present jihadist threat but also in light of increasing episodes of violence carried out by radical right-wing and leftwing groups and individuals. Italy is dealing with considerable societal challenges that could lead to greater security challenges in the future.

Notes 1

European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE-SAT 2018). Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica, Relazione sulla politica dell’informazione per la sicurezza 2018, febbraio 2019, https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/category/relazioneannuale.html. 3 Arturo Varvelli A, Jihadist Hotbeds. Understanding Local Radicalisation Processes (ISPI, 2016). 4 Maria Luisa Maniscalco, “I musulmani in Europa: tra integrazione e radicalizzazione,” La cittadinanza europea 1 (2017): 5–37. 5 Fabrizio Gatti, “Viale Jenner, la moschea più indagata d’Italia,” Corriere della Sera, October 18, 2001, https://goo.gl/g4Wczk. 6 Benjamin Weiser, “Mastermind gets Life for Bombing of Trade Center,” New York Times, January 09, 1998, https://goo.gl/tZYK0g. 7 Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network. Oxford: Berg, 2004. 8 Lorenzo Vidino, Il jihadismo autoctono in Italia: nascita, sviluppo e dinamiche di radicalizzazione (Milano: ISPI, 2014), http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/Il_jihadis- mo_autoctono_in_Italia.pdf. 9 https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/category/relazione-annuale.html. 10 https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2ba036c211bd- 11e6-ba9a-01aa75ed71a1. 11 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1148/oj. 12 http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/01438l.htm. 13 http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05155l.htm. 14 http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2015/04/20/15G00060/sg. 15 http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/08/09/16G00165/sg%20. 16 https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2018/05/25/18G00081/sg. 17 https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2018/12/03/281/sg/pdf. 18 https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2007/08/13/187/sg/pdf. 19 In Italy the threat level of terrorist attacks is measured on a scale of five levels, from the less worrying to the worst, according to a sequence of phonetic alphabet letters adopted by NATO: Charlie, Bravo, Alpha 3, Alpha 2 and Alpha 1. The threat is at the moment deemed Alpha 2, http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-08-18/ scala-5-livelli-modello-nato211917.shtml?uuid=AEaFnoEC&nmll=2707. 2

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https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/ originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=20110928&atto.codiceRedazionale=011G0201. 21 An investigation (called “Black Flag Operation”) of the penitentiary police in collaboration with the State Police (Digos) led in January 2017 to the indictment of the Tunisian Hmidi Saber, a leader of the Ansar al-sharia group and a landmark that many Tunisians and Syrians. 22 In Anas el Abboubi’s parable, Arnaboldi Marco, Vidino Lorenzo, “Califfato, social e sciami in Europa: l’appeal della propaganda dello Stato Islamico tra i nostri aspiranti jihadisti,” in Twitter e Jihad: la comunicazione dell’Isis, ed. Monica Maggioni (Novi ligure: edizioni Epoké, 2015), 135–155. 23 http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/12/01/news/terrorismo_arresti_e_ perquisizio- ni_in_italia_e_in_kosovo-128530461/. 24 The operation was called by the police “Tut Elimi” from the Turkish “Take my hand” (the name of one of the videos posted of the detained), http://milan.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/11/03/news/brescia_terrorismo-151202861./ 25 http://www.giornaledibrescia.it/sebino-e-franciacorta/sorveglianza-speciale-per3-an- ni-post-su-fb-inchiodano-sara-pil%C3%A8-1.3108129. 26 The recent cases of Mouner El Aloual (sentenced to six years in December 2017) and Nabil Benhamir (sentenced to 5 years and 10 months in November 2018) testify to the persistent capacity of the Italian counter-terrorism system. 27 The Dambruoso-Manciulli draft law (Preventive measures against radicalisation and jihadist violent extremism), presented on 26 January 2016, sought to address various shortcomings in the country’s strategy to prevent radicalisation and terrorism, providing for a wide range of new measures. However, the draft law has not been approved by Parliament. 28 http://www.intern.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/pubblicazioni/patto-nazionale-islamitaliano.

List of References Arnaboldi, Marco, Vidino Lorenzo. “Califfato, social e sciami in Europa: l’appeal della propaganda dello Stato Islamico tra i nostri aspiranti jihadisti.” In Twitter e Jihad: la comunicazione dell’Isis, edited by Maggio- ni Monica, 135–155. Novi ligure: edizioni Epoké, 2015. Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 18 ottobre 2001, 374, recante disposizioni urgent per contrastare il terrorismo interna- zionale. http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/01438l.h. European Parliament. Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/2ba036c2-11bd-11e6-ba9a-01aa75e- d71a1.

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European Parliament. Directive (eu) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1148/oj. Europol. European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE-SAT 2018). https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/mainreports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018. Gatti, Fabrizio. “Viale Jenner, la moschea più indagata d’Italia”. Corriere della Sera, (October 18, 2001). https://goo.gl/g4Wczk. Kohlmann, Evan F. Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network. Oxford: Berg, 2004. Maniscalco, Maria Luisa. “I musulmani in Europa: tra integrazione e radicalizzazione”. La cittadinanza europea 1, (2017): 5–37. Ministero dell’Interno. Patto nazionale per un Islam italiano. http://www. intern.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/pubblicazioni/patto-nazionale-islamitaliano. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica. Relazione sulla politica dell’informazione per la sicurezza 2018. https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/ category/relazione-annuale.html. Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della repubblica. Relazione Annuale. https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/category/ relazione-annuale.html. Varvelli, Arturo. Jihadist Hotbeds. Understanding Local Radicalisation Processes. ISPI, 2016. Vidino, Lorenzo. Il jihadismo autoctono in Italia: nascita, sviluppo e dinamiche di radicalizzazione. Milano: ISPI, 2014. http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/Il_jihadismo_autoctono_in_Italia.pdf. Weiser, Benjamin. “Mastermind gets life for bombing of trade center.” New York Times, (January 09, 1998). https://goo.gl/tZYK0g.

CHAPTER FIVE SPAIN AND THE PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM POLICY VALERIA ROSATO

1. Background 1.1 A brief history of jihadist networks The current Spanish democracy has been shaken from its very beginning by activities carried out by different domestic terrorist organisations, although “none has been as persistent over time or has produced as many victims and social consequences as Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA)”1. The Spanish security forces – Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado (FCSE) – have faced ETA for more than three decades, improving their capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, but it is also true that the country’s internal security structures were not as well adapted to dealing with the much more recent challenges of terrorism. Until the attacks perpetrated in Madrid by radical Islamists in 2004, the real threat for Spain was that of ETA, a terrorist organisation formed during the 1960s and responsible for “80 per cent of the more than 1,000 people killed in the country as a result of terrorist actions between 1968 and 2001”2. This terrorist organisation has remained a major source of fear for the citizens of Spain and, in particular, for the residents of the Basque Country, even though its violence has “progressively declined in frequency throughout the 1980s and more so during the 1990s and the first years of the new century”3. The number of fatalities caused by ETA was 81 between 1978 and 1980, 34 between 1981 and 1990, and 16 between 1991 and 2000. In 2001 the group killed 13 people. The following year ETA caused five fatalities followed by three killings in 20034. In addition to these forms of violence, the most lethal groups in Spain have been

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a Left-Wing terrorist group named GRAPO, responsible for the killing of 85 people, Right-Wing terrorism during the transition from dictatorship to democracy, responsible for 34 killings and GAL, a group of mercenaries led by senior members of the Spanish Ministry of Interior who killed 27 people between 1983 and 1987 in an attempt to spread terror among ETA sympathizers5.

The history of terrorism in Spain inspired by Islamism can be traced back over two decades. The Algerian Jihadist network was probably the first to embed itself in Spain, after civil violence broke out in Algeria in 1992. In the beginning, the network was composed of members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), maintained links to bin Laden and received aid and training from al-Qaeda camps in Sudan until 1996. Then the GIA transferred its strategy to Western Europe, where a considerable Algerian community in France favoured the implantation of support networks and recruitment. Similar networks sprang up in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Spain. In contrast, the presence of Jihadist networks of Syrian origin in Spain (also known as the Abu Dahdah network or al-Qaeda in Spain) dates back to 1994: “Many members came from Syria, but most have acquired Spanish nationality. This network was less homogenized than the Algerian one as other nationalities, like Moroccans, were part of the group” (Jordan, Horsburgh, 2005)6. After 9/11, Spain’s main jihadist terrorist attacks were in Madrid in 2004 by the terrorist group al-Qaeda and Barcelona in 2017 by the Islamic State. On 11 March 2004 in Madrid, a bomb exploded on a train in the vicinity of Atocha Station. Just a minute later, two more explosions occurred on the same train. Chaos and confusion ensued on the platforms and escalators of the terminal. At 7.38 two more bombs exploded in two train carriages at the El Pozo station and another in Santa Eugenia. At 7:39, four more explosions destroyed another train 500 meters from Atocha. In just three minutes, ten bombs rewrote history: Madrid had suffered the biggest terrorist attack ever perpetrated in Spain, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,500. After 13 years, on August 13, 2017, Spain was shocked by another attack. The Islamic State (IS) struck the heart of Barcelona in the most serious attack in Spain since 11-M. A van hit the hundreds of people in La Rambla, leaving at least 13 dead and more than 100 injured. Spain has not been immune from the jihadist mobilisation worldwide driven by the IS organisation, though it “is not among the Western European countries most affected, neither in absolute terms nor relative to the size of its population”7. Between June 2013 – the date of the first anti-

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IS counter-terrorism operation launched inside Spain – and August 2016, “the total number of detainees for IS-related terrorist activities was 130”8. In the case of Spain, the vast majority of the 130 individuals arrested between June 2013 and August 2016 for IS-related terrorist offences took part in jihadist activities with others and not as lone actors.

1.2 From radicalised Muslims in Spain to ‘foreign fighters’ in Syria and ‘returnees’ Of all the individuals arrested in Spain for IS-related terrorist activities between June 2013 and August 2016, 63.2% had travelled to Syria and Iraq, had tried to travel or had the intention of doing so. Most of those individuals underwent detention while already decided to make the journey, while they were preparing for it, at the point of embarking upon it, or even in transit. About one out of every 10 (9%) were arrested on their return. Interestingly, the percentage of women arrested while in transit (42.9%) is particularly salient and nearly multiplies by four the figure observed for men (11.3%)9.

Reinares and Calvo also reconstructed the profiles of 20 Spanish residents that had travelled to fight with jihadist groups in Syria before 2014. Eleven of the 20 are Spanish citizens while the remaining 9 are Moroccan nationals living in Spain; most lived in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in North Africa, but also in Girona and Malaga. Most individuals arrested in Spain for IS-related terrorist activities were men (83.8%) aged between 20 and 44 at the time of detention (80.3%) – 56.7% of individuals were married at the time of the arrest; 43% are nationals of Spain and 41.4% are Moroccan nationals. Moreover, “five out of every ten are immigrants and four out of ten are second generation descendants of (mainly) Moroccan immigrants”10. Some 13.3% are converts. Six out of ten were enrolled in secondary education, twice the number of those who only attended primary school. Three times as many as those detainees with only working class jobs, have been in middle class or lower middle class jobs. 16.7% had no known occupation at the time of detention, and one-third had a previous criminal record as ordinary delinquents11.

Between 2004 and 2012, 95% of the individuals detained were involved as members of cells and small groups, sometimes connected with jihadist organisations abroad (mostly in South Asia, the Middle East and

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North Africa) though, on other occasions, they operated independently from such entities. The remaining 5% of individuals detained became involved on their own, as lone actors. Finally, 64% of all those detained in Spain for IS-related activities over the threeyear period beginning in June 2013 were active as members of newly formed groups or networks. That is to say, cells, groups or networks established from 2011 onwards – after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria gathering individuals with no previous involvement in jihadist activities12.

As a consequence of the territorial defeat inflicted on the Islamic State through the Inherent Resolve operation carried out by a coalition of Western and Arabian countries13, one of the main problems facing many European countries today concerns the so-called returnees phenomenon. As regards Spain, these are former ISIS and al-Qaeda fighters who left their homes in Madrid, Catalonia and Spain’s North African enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla to fight in conflict zones like Syria and Iraq. According to recent estimates, more than 230 Spanish citizens have left to join terrorist groups, of which a quarter have died in combat and 20% have returned to Spain14.

2. Counter-terrorism system in Spain 2.1 General organisational structure of security agencies The Body of Agencies dedicated to Information and Intelligence in Spain can be grouped into three large blocks15: 1. Foreign Intelligence: The National Intelligence Centre (El Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) is the main service of the country, with a national and international scope of action, within which also operate the National Security Office, the National Intelligence and Counter- intelligence Office and the National Cryptology Centre, its director acting as the National Intelligence and Counterintelligence Authority while the deployment of the Department of Interior at the Embassies accentuates the external capacity of the information services. 2. Internal Intelligence: Within the Ministry of the Interior, the Commissioner General for Information and the Civil Guard Information Service; and in the field of criminal intelligence, the Central Operational Unit and the Central Criminal Intelligence

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Unit, the Ministry also hosts the Centre for Intelligence against Terrorism and Organised Crime (CITCO). The Ministry of Economy and Finance incorporates the Financial Intelligence Unit (SEPBLAC) and the Customs Surveillance Service (SVA). Within the field of internal intelligence, we should also mention the Information Units of the Autonomous Police (Mossos D’Esquadra, Ertzaintza and Navarre Regional Police). 3. Military Intelligence: Headed by the Armed Forces Intelligence Centre (strategic intelligence), Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence Sections and Divisions (Strategic intelligence, security and counterintelligence), and Intelligence Units in charge of obtaining information on the ground (tactical intelligence).

2.2 The main steps in Spanish policy in the fight against terrorism and radicalisation In the aftermath of 9/11, Spain took an active role in international counter-terrorism efforts; for example, it has been a key participant of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) instituted by the UN Security Council to monitor states’ agreement with counter-terrorism standards. Moreover, Spain helped to establish the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF) with the long-term aim of reducing vulnerability to terrorism through the creation of a comprehensive approach to preventing and prosecuting terrorist acts and countering radicalisation and recruitment16. Spain has also become a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an intergovernmental organisation that works to promote polices that combat money laundering and terrorist financing – and of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. Since 2004, Spain has been a member of an informal working group on jihadism known as the “5 + 5” that involves defence ministers from Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya and exchanges information on threats posed by Islamic extremism and foreign fighters. Spain has also been an active partner in American and African efforts to track and interrupt transnational terrorism17. Early in the morning on 11 March 2004, several explosions on four trains in Madrid killed 191 people and injured over 1,400 others. The attack was the work of a radical Islamic network linked to Al Qaeda18and made it clear that the fight against global terrorism had not been treated with the right importance from the government before the event. As a consequence, the police information and intelligence services failed to meet the needs that emerged from that specific situation and it became

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clear that “there were serious problems of coordination, both among police forces and within each of them”19. With the aim of correcting these weaknesses, the Executive Committee for the Unified Command of the National Security Forces (Comité Ejecutivo para el Mando Unificado or CEMU) – an important innovation introduced to the structure of the Interior Ministry in May 2004 – approved in that same year an extensive counter-terrorism plan (called Plan Operativo de Lucha Contra el Terrorismo) aimed at preventing and responding to the different forms of terrorism that represented a threat to Spain, with a specific focus on alQaeda-related terrorism20. Moreover, the “11M” attacks – and the numerous police operations against jihadist terrorism carried out in Spain in the period following – brought to light a new feature of the global terrorism threat: the growing importance of individuals and cells not linked to any organisation. In order to develop Spain’s internal security structures to the point at which they are able to deal with the risks and threats of international terrorism, it has been necessary to improve intelligence capacities; more specifically, police intelligence. The decision by the National Police and the Guardia Civil to strengthen their counter-terrorism services in order to make them ready to face the risks and threats of global terrorism has led to an increase in the number of jobs in the prevention of, and fight against, terrorism. During the legislature that began a few weeks after the 11 March attacks, “about 1,000 Police and Guardia Civil agents were added. More specifically, in 2004, 300 new positions were created for these agents; in 2005, another 300 were added; more were added later”21. Another step towards reinforcing the central police information and intelligence services in order to prepare the security forces to deal effectively with the challenges inherent to global terrorism has been the establishment of new departments specialised in the study of procedures and operational methods used by international terrorists. In this regard, for example, the Comisaría General de Informacíon – the counter-terrorism branch of the National Police force – created new units in areas such as strategic analysis, information systems, technologies, and so-called cyberterrorism22. However, despite the several changes introduced to adapt internal security structures to deal with the risks and threats of global terrorism after the 11 March attacks, no significant changes have been made in counterterrorism legislation, except for some that involve the storage and use of explosives, and the transfer to Spanish legislation of binding decisions made at the European Union level23.

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Another fundamental development accomplished by the legislature introduced following the Madrid bombings in order to more effectively prevent and fight global terrorism has been that of strengthening coordination among national security forces in light of the weaknesses in this area that became clear with the examination of events leading up to the attacks of 11 March 2004 as well as the problems in the relationships among the various security forces. For this purpose, the National AntiTerrorism Coordination Centre (Centro Nacional de Coordinacíon Antiterrorista, CNCA) was created on 28 May 2004. The CNCA, through a regular assessment of terrorist risks and threats to Spain, provides highquality strategic intelligence that includes intervention and operational recommendations for dealing with such risks and threats. The Centre, moreover, has regular contacts with similar institutions in other European and Western countries, including important agencies as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre or JTAC (United Kingdom), Unité de coordination de la lutte antiterreoriste or UCLAT (France) and the National Counter Terrorism Center or NCTC (United States). It also works with agencies operative in the Arab world and the Asian region, and with the African Union’s Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme or CAERT. On December 2006, inside the CNCA the Integrated System for the Coordination of Antiterrorist Operations (SICOA) was established. This innovation is basically a database in which the National Police’s General Commissariat of Intelligence and the Guardia Civil’s information service enter data corresponding to terrorism investigations24. The prevention of and the fight against global terrorism require a much broader agenda of cooperation with authorities in other nations. In order to accomplish this, the Spanish security forces have continued to take part in different tools for intergovernmental dialogue on this issue in the context of the EU’s Third Pillar, such as the Working Group on Terrorism and the Task Force of Police Chiefs. Moreover, the international cooperation against global terrorism developed by Spanish authorities has led to improving cooperation with the United States and increasing cooperation 25 with police forces in Muslim countries .

2.3 Recent repression and prosecution measures Terrorism offences are defined in the Criminal Code. The 2/2015 Organic Law of March 2015 modified the 10/1995 Organic Law of the Criminal Code with regard to terrorism-related offences. Spanish legislation criminalises the financing of, participation in, incitement of,

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and recruitment and training for a terrorist organisation. Art. 575 of the 2015 law in particular addresses the phenomenon of foreign fighters as it criminalises the travelling to a foreign country for the purpose of joining a terrorist group or committing a terrorist act. The main novelties are as follows: – The catalogue of terrorist “purposes” is expanded to include not only subverting the constitutional order but also suppressing or destabilising the functioning of political institutions and economic or social structures of the State; forcing public authorities to perform an act or to abstain from doing so; destabilising the functioning of an international organisation or provoking a state of terror among the population. – The configuration of computer-related offences as terrorist offences is expressly introduced when they are committed for the terrorist purposes described above. – Public disorder, sedition and rebellion are criminalised as terrorist offences if committed by a terrorist organisation or group or by a person or persons committing them individually but covered by a terrorist organisation or group. – Indoctrination or training in military techniques, combat techniques, preparation or development of weapons, explosives, chemical or biological weapons, flammable, incendiary, explosive substances, etc., is considered a terrorist offence. This conduct is punished whether training is received from third parties or one “trained” oneself, i.e. self-taught. – It is a criminal offence for any person who, for the purpose of training, has in their possession documents or files or habitually accesses communication services via the internet or electronic media whose contents incite the incorporation of terrorist organisations or groups or collaboration with any of them. – The criminal offence of terrorism is defined as the movement or establishment to a foreign territory controlled by a terrorist group or organisation to receive training or to collaborate with them. – With regard to the crime of collaboration, the catalogue of punishable conduct is expanded. In addition, assistance will be provided to a terrorist organisation or group as well as to groups or individuals whose actions have a terrorist purpose. – In relation to criminal offences of extortion or acts of humiliation, discrediting or disparaging the victims of terrorism, precautionary measures may be taken in the case of such offences being

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committed by means of services or content accessible via the internet or electronic communications services. The removal of content, the removal of links and the prohibition of access to such illegal content may be ordered. – The reform is a great step forward, therefore, in relation to the prevention of the promotion of jihadist terrorism through social networks, electronic communications or the creation of web pages or forums, penalising both the dissemination of inciting ideas and training in techniques for the commission of any terrorist crime. There is also significant legislative support for the criminalisation of movements to territories controlled by terrorist organisations or groups for training or indoctrination, making them criminal offences. The latest legislative reform addressing issues related to the fight against terrorism is incorporated into Organic Law 1/2019 of 20 February, amending Organic Law 10/1995 of 23 November of the Criminal Code, which transposes European Union Directives in the financial and terrorist fields and addresses international issues26. In particular, it transposes Directive 2017/541 / EU concerning the crime of terrorist groups and organisations and terrorist offences. Some articles of the penal code have been modified to increase the prison sentence for the leaders of a terrorist organisation or group and make definitive the penalty of disqualification. In addition, it extends the criminal responsibility of legal persons in the commission of any type of terrorist offence: crimes of terrorism, collaboration with terrorists, indoctrination, exaltation, ennobling or incitement to terrorism. This list of crimes, moreover, is increased by the reform with the new crimes of falsification of documents for terrorist purposes and travel for terrorist purposes.

2.4 Measures for prevention In addition to improving police coordination and intelligence capacities, the Executive Committee for the Unified Command (CEMU) approved a Terrorism Prevention and Protection Plan (Plan de Prevención y Protección Antiterrorista)27 in March 2005. In May 2007, CEMU also approved a National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure which implied a wide inter-ministerial collaboration as well as an effective partnership between the public and private sectors, with connections to European programmes and networks facing this issue. Also, concerning attacks with nuclear, radioactive, bacteriological or chemical (NRBC) components, authorities at the Interior Ministry decided in 2005 to

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establish a Prevention and Reaction Plan to deal with possible incidents “involving non-conventional components and to prepare an appropriate response to threats of this nature”28. In the field of adaptation to the third European directive on banking systems and the prevention of the financing of terrorism, between 2004 and 2007, the Commission for the Monitoring of Activities related to the Financing of Terrorism (Comisíon de Vigilancia de Actividades de Financiacíon del Terrorismo or CVAFT) “closed a total of 730 files, of which about half (exactly 369) involved the financing of Islamist terrorism”29. Although in the past years the focus had mainly been on law enforcement and protection-based measures, 2015 marked a significant shift in Spain’s counter-terrorism approach with the country announcing the formation of a new prevention programme. In January 2015, the ministry presented its National Strategic Plan to Fight Violent Radicalization (Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta – PEN-LCRV), including all forms of extremist thought. The project was based on coordination between local groups that would answer to municipal authorities, sharing information about individuals at risk of being targeted by, among others, jihadist recruiters30. The plan establishes a unique national structure, coordinated by the National Group to Combat Violent Radicalisation, under the Ministry of Home Affairs that will comprise various ministerial departments, the National Intelligence Centre, and the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces as well as other institutions, bodies and associations. This group will coordinate with those located in each municipality. Moreover, the plan contains a specific section to combat radicalisation in correctional facilities. Within the framework of the National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalization (PEN-LCRV) approved in 2015, the Ministry of Interior has chosen the city of Malaga as a pilot city for the implementation of the PEN-LCRV in collaboration with the Intelligence Centre for Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO). According to the First Transversal Plan for Coexistence and the Prevention of Violent Radicalization in the City of Malaga 2017 - 2010, the City Council of Malaga focuses its efforts on one of the four pillars (prevent, protect, pursue and respond) of this strategy: prevention in response to a national need to address the phenomenon of violent radicalisation. The main lines of action of the Malaga Prevention Plan are31: prevention and planned intervention; institutional actions and cooperation; awareness raising and training; gender equality and promotion among Muslim women in the social, cultural, health and productive spheres; social and intercultural mediation; management of coexistence, religious and multicultural

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diversity; education and development of attitudes and skills in children and young people; strategic communication on the internet and social networks; research and analysis. Another important line of action of the plan concerns social networks, a fundamental channel in the recruitment of jihadists. The plan developed by the Municipality of Malaga also aims to combat the messages through which recruiters convince young people to join the cause: the involvement of young Muslims who are opinion leaders in social networks among their peers is considered indispensable in order to send messages of tolerance and cohabitation to their followers to counteract those who demand radicalisation. According to the PEN-LCRV, the municipality (local level) is the main scene of this phenomenon of violent radicalisation. To this end, the Plan proposes the creation of Local Groups to Combat Violent Radicalization coordinated by the security forces at the local level and which, under the supervision of the national group, will integrate the other local social sectors in order to know, prevent and treat the detected outbreaks. According to the PEN-LCRV, the national group coordinates the Local Groups for Combating Violent Radicalization, which are located in each municipal district of the State. For the specific case of Malaga, the Local Group is made up of representatives of the city council (Social services, local police, schools, social entities, risk groups and the University of Malaga). Another initiative launched by the Ministry of the Interior in 2015 was the Stop Radicalismos Campaign32 with the aim of facilitating the exchange of information between citizens and security forces to intercept any signs of radicalisation and report suspicious individuals. The tools available for the project are the website ‘Stop-radicalismos.es’, a dedicated telephone number, an email address ([email protected]) and a mobile application (Alertcops). According to the Ministry of Interior, thanks to this campaign and to the collaboration of citizens, the security forces were able to arrest three people for the exaltation of terrorism in 2016 and early 2017. According with the Ministry of the Interior the Radicalization Information Coordination Centre (CCIR), which depends on the Intelligence Centre for Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO) and operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year since its launch almost two years ago, has received a total of 4,761 communications. The Ministry explained that, once evaluated, around 34% of the information it has received contained information considered of police interest. The majority of such information came from the communities of Madrid, Catalonia and Andalusia33.

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In November 2016, the Ministry of the Interior launched a State Plan for Social Defence of Spain against radicalisation in prisons. The plan includes a directive by the General Secretariat of Penitentiary Institutions signed on October 25, 2016 and entitled “Programa Marco de Intervenciòn en radicalizaciòn violenta con internos islamistas” (Framework Program of Intervention in Violent Radicalisation with Islamist Inmates)34. The plan includes the support of moderate imams thanks to the agreement signed between the penitentiary institutions and the Islamic Federation. The aim is to promote a moderate reading of Islam among radicalised prisoners or prisoners at risk of radicalisation and not to criminalise legitimate religious practices. The programme provides for the division of these inmates into three different groups and an appropriate reintegration and rehabilitation programme for each group. After the last attack in Barcelona on 17 August 2017, the Ministry of the Interior decided to maintain the anti-terrorist alert at level 4 in the absence of an “imminent attack situation”, which is what the only higher level is intended for. A reinforcement of security measures has been announced as well as prevention by increasing collaboration with local police. In addition, the government has announced its intention to start a process for police reform with the objective of update the Law of the Security Forces in order to integrate the competences acquired over the last 30 years by both the Ertzaintza and the Mossos d’ Esquadra35, and to improve the coordination between all police forces36. On 27 December 2017, the Spanish Minister of the Interior announced a package of initiatives to improve and strengthen the fight against Jihadist terrorism. This package includes three main sections: 1. Legal initiatives concerning the adaptation of Spanish legislation to European regulations (on flight passenger data transmission, on the return of foreigners), on explosives regulation, on the financing of terrorism from drug trafficking; 2. Initiatives to adapt to the new realities (on the Ministers of Religions, on registers of accommodation and rental activities for vehicles, on liquid gas distribution, reform of the General Penitentiary Law); 3. General support in order to eliminate disparities and improve the collaboration and working conditions of the security forces37. Such initiatives are also considered in the new strategy of countering Jihadist terrorism presented in February 2019 by the Ministry of the Interior38. The document reflects the most recent European directives on the basis of the important transformations observed in recent years in terrorist strategies. The plan focuses, in fact, on some key aspects: the returnees phenomenon, radicalisation in prisons and factors of marginalisation that nourish the rise of identity-based extremism. The

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main threat that Spain must face in the coming years is, therefore, the increase in extremism and, in particular, the home-grown terrorist cells.

3. Loopholes and gaps in existing policies The reforms announced by the Spanish Minister of the Interior in the aftermath of the last terrorist attacks in 2017 confirm the numerous deficiencies in the Spanish counter-terrorism system. The measures taken to date have not been carefully and scrupulously assessed by the institutions. It is only now that a debate is being proposed precisely in order to set up a parliamentary committee of inquiry on the terrorist attacks of August 2017 in Barcelona and Cambrils39. The objective of an eventual investigation would be to better understand some of the gaps that have emerged, in particular: a) in managing the terrorist alert; b) in investigations following the attack; c) in coordinating and information sharing at both the national and international level (in the specific case of the Barcelona attack between United States intelligence services, government services and those of the Generalitat40); d) in coordinating between security forces, in particular between the State Security Corps and the Mossos d’Esquadra; e) in the functioning of the National Intelligence Centre (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) in the control of religious extremists, their activities and prison permits (e.g. the case of the Ripoll Imam Abdelbaki Es Satty, responsible for radicalising a terrorist cell). The latest report by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament on “EU and Member States’ policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes” also made some comments about the Spanish case41. The first relates to the investigation of terrorism-related crimes and the second to information sharing between EU member states. In the first case, the exceptional detention measure, the ‘Incommunicado’ detention, is taken into account, which involves greater restrictions on the rights of suspects than in other EU member states; however, the effectiveness of the detention is still to be assessed. The second point concerns the informal information-sharing mechanisms between EU member states and concerns data protection as information is not properly recorded. According to the report, there is a

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lack of adequate control mechanisms at the EU level to monitor excessive violations of the rights of suspects. As regards the anti-radicalisation programme (Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta) approved by the Council of Ministers on 30 January 2015 to implement EU directives in the fight against radicalisation and violent extremism, numerous criticisms have been made42. The main ones are: 1. Failure to implement the plan. Two-and-a-half years after the launch of the Radicalisation Plan, only 13 out of a total of 8,000 municipalities have implemented measures to prevent and combat extremism. Only a few pioneering programmes have been implemented, such as in the case of the city of Malaga43 and in some institutes such as the Fundación al-Fanar44; 2. Lack of information sharing and coordination. The Basque Country and Catalonia have set up separate anti-radicalisation programmes. There is a deficit of cooperation and coordination between the national and autonomous levels and a lack of complete confidence between the leadership of national and autonomous security forces; 3. Lack of political will. According to the heads of counter-terrorism, there are resources and instruments to start the plan but there is still a lack of real political will to coordinate the various administrations of the country. Moreover, there has also not been a serious assessment of the effectiveness of other radicalisation-prevention measures45. For instance, transparency on the teaching of the Muslim religion in schools46 and the initiative of the “Stop Radicalismos” web page47 which risks becoming a mere instrument of complaint rather than prevention. Some scholars are starting to highlight the gaps in counter-terrorism strategies in Western societies, in prevention policies in particular, and question the policy paradigm that founded them48. The dominant paradigm in the counter-terrorism policy is based on the psychosocial nature of the phenomenon and centred on individuals and their motivations, i.e. radicalisation would be the explicative fulcrum of terrorism while social, political and cultural factors are ignored or underestimated49. The various prevention programmes, including the Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta – PEN-LCRV, are therefore based on an ambiguous conceptualisation of radicalisation, which implies the control and prevention of extremism as it is considered a precondition for violence50. Any violent ideology would threaten the normal stability and

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coexistence of citizens so the legitimacy of these policies from an ideological and cultural point of view is based on the idea of a society that is aware of and co-responsible for maintaining security. The PEN-LCRV proposes an integral strategy based on three pillars: prevention (prevenir), vigilance (vigilar) and implementation (actuar). Prevention is based on integration and social coexistence, and is pursued through the detection of conflicting elements and gaps in integration. Vigilance requires observation and attention at the community level in order to detect signs of radicalisation. Finally, in the third and last phase, the plan presupposes the development of a system of monitoring and investigation of the individuals or groups that legitimise violence. All these steps imply the total active participation of society, which must vigilate, cooperate and anticipate violence. It is no coincidence that the most recent national strategy plan against terrorism has been deliberately made public by the Spanish government – rompiendo una tradición enraizada en la singular historia de la lucha contra el terrorismo…contribuyendo así a la implicación de todos aquellos sectores sociales e institucionales que de una u otra forma participan en la puesta en práctica de las líneas de acción que abarca la Estrategia51.

The strong limits of such a policy, first of all, the stigmatisation of some communities and the negative effects on young people of Muslim origin, have already emerged in other studies on European countries where these policies have been implemented for some years and require urgent academic and political reflection.

4. Conclusion Spain’s counter-terrorism policy in recent years has been characterised by a particular focus on the repressive approach. Compared to other countries, Spain did not need to undertake urgent legal reforms with exceptional measures as it already had a solid legislative apparatus in the field of terrorism. Since the attack of 11 March 2004, the State has exclusively opted to strengthen some counter-terrorism means (e.g. increased resources for security forces). Only from 2010 onwards, and in particular from 2015, were some legislative reforms made to tighten prison sentences and include new types of crimes such as travelling to areas controlled by terrorist groups and self-training through the internet to engage in violent acts. 2015 was also a crucial year because of the greater attention given by policy makers to the fight against extremism and violent radicalisation. To date, the ambitious national prevention plan has not yet

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been fully implemented, except for rare exceptions such as the case of the Municipality of Malaga. The latter was launched in June 2017 but no data and information are yet available for a possible evaluation52. Undoubtedly, Spain’s delay in formulating and launching a strategy to combat radicalisation could turn into an important opportunity to learn from the mistakes made in recent years in other European countries.

Notes 1 Fernando Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 5 (2009): 367–388. 2 Rogelio Alonso, Fernando Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1–2 (2005): 265– 278. 3 Alonso, Reinares, “Terrorism,” 265–278. 4 Alonso, Reinares, “Terrorism,” 265–278. 5 Rogelio Alonso, “Victims of ETA’s terrorism as an interest group: Evolution, influence, and impact on the political agenda of Spain,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 6 (2017): 985–1005. 6 Javier Jordan, Nicola Horsburgh, “Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 169–191. 7 Carola García-Calvo, Fernando Reinares, “Patterns of Involvement among Individuals Arrested for Islamic State-related Terrorist Activities in Spain, 20132016,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016): 109–20. 8 García-Calvo, Reinares, “Patterns of Involvement,” 109–20. 9 García-Calvo, Reinares, “Patterns of Involvement,” 109–20. 10 García-Calvo, Reinares, “Patterns of Involvement,” 109–20. 11 García-Calvo, Reinares, “Patterns of Involvement,” 109–20. 12 García-Calvo, Reinares, “Patterns of Involvement,” 109–20. 13 More information on the operation is available on the official website: https://www.inherentresolve.mil/. 14 Estrategia Nacional contra el Terrorismo 2019, “BOE”, no. 49 (26 February 2019): 17942–17966. 15 La pagina de ASR, see https://www.intelpage.info/la-inteligencia-espanola.html. 16 https://www.counterextremism.com/. 17 https://www.counterextremism.com/. 18 Jordan, Horsburgh, “Mapping Jihadist,” 169–191; Javier Jordan, “The Evolution of the Structure of jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe: The Case of Spain,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 8 (2014), 654–673. 19 Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings,” 367–388. 20 Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings,” 367–388. 21 Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings,” 367–388. 22 Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings,” 367–388. 23 Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings,” 367–388.

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Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings,” 367–388. Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings,” 367–388. 26 Ley Orgánica 1/2019, de 20 de febrero, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal, para transponer Directivas de la Unión Europea en los ámbitos financiero y de terrorismo, y abordar cuestiones de índole internacional, «BOE» núm. 45, de 21 de febrero de 2019, páginas 16698 a 16712, https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2019/02/20/1. 27 Published in Diario de Sesiones del Senado, Comisiòn de Interior, VIII Legislatura, Comisiones, no. 168, 2–18. 28 Fernando Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 5 (2009): 367–388. 29 Fernando Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 5 (2009): 367–388. 30 Ministry of Interior, http://www.interior.gob.es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/planes- trategico-nacional-de-lucha-contra-la-radicalizacion-violenta/plan-estrategiconacional. 31 Ministry of Interior, “I Plan Transversal por la Convivencia y la Prevención de la Radicalización Violenta en la Ciudad de Málaga 2017-2020,” available ihttp:// www.interior.gob.es/documents/642012/5179146/I+Plan+Transversal+por+la+Convivencia.pdf/b62bc722-c8f6-4677-9c3f-5841aa51ea40. 32 Ministry of Interior, https://stop-radicalismos.ses.mir.es/. 33 Lavanguardia, see http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20170916/431328311582/ la-web-de-interior-stop-radicalismos-ha-recibido-4761-comunicaciones-des- de-supuesta-en-marcha-en-2015.html. 34 Ministry of Interior, “Programa Marco de Intervenciòn en radicalización violenta con internos islamistas,” http://www.institucionpenitenciaria.es/web/export/sites/ default/datos/descargables/instruccionesCirculares/Circular_I-2-2016.-_Programa_ Marco_de_intervencixn_en_radicalizacixn_con_internos_islamistas.pdf. 35 The Ertzaintza and the Mossos d’ Esquadra are the autonomous police forces of the respective autonomous regions of the Basque Country and Catalonia. 36 El Mundo, http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2017/08/30/59a5d44e468aeb0a1c8b45f5. html. 37 Ministry of Interior, http://www.interior.gob.es. 38 Estrategia Nacional contra el Terrorismo 2019, “BOE”, no. 49 (26 February 2019): 17942–17966. 39 El Diario, https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Cs-Congreso-propuestainvestigacion-Bar- celona_0_737726476.html. 40 The Generalitat de Catalunya is the administrative-institutional system for the government of Catalonia. 41 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament, “EU and Member States’ policies and laws on persons suspected of terror- ism-related crimes,” December 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/ document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2017)596832. 25

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El Pais, https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/28/actualidad/1503946491_ 613708.html, 29 August, 2017. 43 Ievenn, https://ievenn.com/malaga-contra-radicalismo-un-plan-pionero/8884/, 27/08/ 2017. 44 Fundacion Al fanar, http://www.fundacionalfanar.org/. 45 Dialogo Atlantico, http://dialogoatlantico.com/2018/01/la-importancia-de-la-eficacia-de-las-medidas-de-prevencion-de-la-radicalizacion-violenta-y-la-deradicalizacion/. 46 BOE, Boletìn Oficial del Estado, https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE- A-2016-2715. 47 Ministry of Interior, https://stop-radicalismos.ses.mir.es/. 48 Arun Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror. London: Verso, 2015. 49 Christopher Baker-Beall, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, Lee Jarvis, eds, CounterRadicalization: Critical perspectives (First ed.). New York: Routledge, 2015. 50 Laura Maria Fernández De Mosteyrín and Pedro Limón López, “Paradigmas y prevención del terrorismo: Una aproximación al Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta (PEN-LCRV 2015),” Política y Sociedad 54, no. 3 (2017): 805–827. 51 Estrategia Nacional contra el Terrorismo 2019, “BOE”, no. 49 (26 February 2019): 17945–17946. 52 The programme includes an agreement with the University of Malaga to measure results.

List of References Alonso, Rogelio and Fernando Reinares. “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain.” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1–2 (2005): 265–278. Alonso, Rogelio. “Victims of ETA’s terrorism as an interest group: Evolution, influence, and impact on the political agenda of Spain”. Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 6 (2017): 985–1005. Baker-Beall, Christopher, Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Lee Jarvis, eds. Counter-Radicalization: Critical Perspectives (First ed.). New York: Routledge, 2015. BOE, Boletìn Oficial del Estado. https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php? id=BOE-A-2016-2715. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament. “EU and Member States’ policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes”, December 2017. http://www. europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_ STU(2017)596832.

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Dialogo Atlantico. http://dialogoatlantico.com/2018/01/la-importancia-dela-eficacia-de-las-medidas-de-prevencion-de-la-radicalizacion-violenta-y-la-deradicalizacion/. Diario de Sesiones del Senado. Comisiòn de Interior, VIII Legislatura, Comisiones, no. 168, 2–18. Estrategia Nacional contra el Terrorismo 2019. “BOE”, no. 49 (26 February 2019): 17942–17966. Fernández, Laura Maria, De Mosteyrín and Pedro Limón López. “Paradigmas y prevención del terrorismo: una aproximación al Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta (PEN-LCRV 2015).” Política y Sociedad 54, no. 3 (2017): 805–827. García-Calvo, Carola and Fernando Reinares. “Patterns of Involvement among Individuals Arrested for Islamic State-related Terrorist Activities in Spain, 2013-2016.” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016): 109–20. Jordan, Javier and Nicola Horsburgh. “Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 169–191. Jordan, Javier. “The Evolution of the Structure of Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe: The Case of Spain”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 8 (2014): 654–673. Kundnani, Arun. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror. London: Verso, 2015. Ley Orgánica 1/2019, de 20 de febrero, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal, para transponer Directivas de la Unión Europea en los ámbitos financiero y de terrorismo, y abordar cuestiones de índole internacional. “BOE”, no. 45, (21 Feb- ruary 2019): 16698–16712. https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2019/02/20/1. Ministry of Interior. “Programa Marco de Intervenciòn en radicalización violenta con internos islamista”. http://www.institucionpenitenciaria. es/web/export/sites/default/datos/descargables/instruccionesCirculares/ Circular_I-2-2016.-_Programa_Marco_de_intervencixn_en_radicalizacixn_con_internos_islamistas.pdf. —. “I Plan Transversal por la Convivencia y la Prevención de la Radicalización Violenta en la Ciudad de Málaga 2017-2020.” http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/642012/5179146/I+Plan+Transv ersal+por+la+-Convivencia.pdf/b62bc722-c8f6-4677-9c3f5841aa51ea40. Reinares, Fernando. “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 5 (2009): 367–388.

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Websites https://www.counterextremism.com/. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Cs-Congreso-propuesta-investigacionBar- celona_0_737726476.html. http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2017/08/30/59a5d44e468aeb0a1c8b45f5. html. https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/28/actualidad/1503946 491_613708.html. http://www.fundacionalfanar.org/. https://ievenn.com/malaga-contra-radicalismo-un-plan-pionero/8884/. https://www.inherentresolve.mil/. https://www.intelpage.info/la-inteligencia-espanola.html. http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20170916/431328311582/la-webde-interior-stop-radicalismos-ha-recibido-4761-comunicaciones-desdesu-puesta-en-marcha-en-2015.html. http://www.interior.gob.es. http://www.interior.gob.es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/plan-estrategiconacional-de-lucha-contra-la-radicalizacion-violenta/plan-estrategiconacional. https://stop-radicalismos.ses.mir.es/.

CHAPTER SIX THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM POLICY MARIA LUISA MANISCALCO

1. Background and framework of violent radicalisation 1.1 The experience of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the special legislation The UK has had a long history of counter-terrorism policy and legislation, at first relating to the separatist conflict in Northern Ireland in the last century. The origins of the problems in the region extend back centuries to the Anglo-Norman intervention in Ireland in 1167; despite some mixing of the English and Irish population, the two were never completely united. Indeed, in the following centuries, the conflicts and tensions flared up periodically. The seed of the modern conflict was planted in 1921 when the AngloIrish Treaty – marking the end of the Irish War of Independence that had started in 1919 – granted most of the island of Ireland autonomy from Britain, but maintained British rule over six northern counties (Northern Ireland) with a large Protestant population. The Northern Ireland government introduced the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland)1 in April 1922 to stem the tide of nationalist violence by splinter groups of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a militia that fought for Irish independence, who did not accept the terms of the partition. This act gave the Minister for Home Affairs the right to create regulations and instruct the police to arrest without a warrant and intern without trial those suspected of breaking the regulations. The Special Powers Act, renewed annually until 1928, although most of the secessionist violence had ceased by 1927, was eventually made permanent in 1933 and remained in operation until it was repealed by the

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Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act in 1973 by the British government2 well after the beginning of the so-called “Troubles”. Indeed in the late 1960s, tensions between Catholic Republicans and members of the pro-British Unionist majority spilled over into riots. British troops were deployed on the streets. The IRA re-emerged and from 1972 onwards a secessionist group, the Provisional IRA, took the lead in the fight against British rule. The recent terrorist conflict in Northern Ireland – which began in the late 1960s and is usually deemed to have ended with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 – lasted for three decades, during which a special legislation was developed. This was achieved mainly through the adoption of Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts (PTA), a series of Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom from 1974 to 1989 that conferred emergency powers upon police forces where they suspected terrorism. The first Act was enacted in 19743 following the IRA bombing campaigns of the early 1970s; it was rewritten in 1976, 1984 and again in 19894 but continued to be emergency temporary powers that had to be renewed each year. While the first three Acts all contained final date clauses beyond the annual renewal, this provision was not included in the 1989 Act. Others Acts of the United Kingdom related to the Troubles in Northern Ireland were the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 (the EPA), amended by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 19985, and the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 19986. With this last legal text a slow metamorphosis of the approach to the terrorist phenomenon has begun to take shape: a) from the use of emergency provisions with the characteristics of such legislation, such as their limited validity in time and space, to the general anti-terrorism legislative provisions permanently included in the legal system; b) from the exclusive attention to internal separatist terrorism to focus on international terrorism as well. The policy adopted to deal with this kind of terrorism was as far as possible based on a criminal justice – although somewhat modified – process in order to make it better respond to challenges posed by the nature of terrorist secret groups and their ability to intimidate the community, witnesses and jurors. The Terrorism Act 2000 (TA)7 received royal assent on 20 July 2000 and came into force on 19 February 2001. It was the first piece of legislation to fully recognise the changing landscape of terrorism, particularly the rise of Islamist terrorism in the UK and globally. Indeed, the presence of influent jihadist ideologues in the United Kingdom predates the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Throughout

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the 1990s, al-Qaeda – under the direction of Osama bin Laden – ran numerous front organisations in Europe to assist both financing and recruitment efforts for terrorist groups. The Terrorism Act 2000 completely reforms the law concerning the prevention of terrorism in the United Kingdom, albeit with some exceptions; furthermore, it applies to any terrorist activity in the United Kingdom and abroad. The Act was intended as a permanent and comprehensive piece of legislation, created with the aim of breaking away from the use of emergency legislation. The Northern Ireland-specific part of the Act (Part VII) was time-limited to five years. Subject to annual renewal, these temporary provisions were due to lapse in February 2006. The Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Act 2006 came into force on 18th February 2006, the main purpose of which was to extend those provisions of Part VII still in effect until 31st July 2007. The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 increased police powers for the purpose of countering terrorism and received royal assent on 26 November 2008. The problem of armed dissent in Northern Ireland has remained unsolved over the years; according to the “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland” assessment report (20 October 2015)8, the threat level in Northern Ireland from Northern Ireland-related terrorism remains serious. The most serious terrorist threat is represented by dissident republican groups that still oppose the peace process. Dissident republicans have continued to primarily target police officers, but prison officers and members of the armed forces have also been targeted. Until now dissident paramilitaries from both sides of the conflict, both Irish republicans and pro-British loyalists, are active and still recruiting. Between 2011 and 2017, there were 127 national security attacks in Northern Ireland, mainly targeting the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), prison officers and the armed forces. Dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of one police officer and two prison officers between 2011 and 2017. The reckless nature of these attacks also put civilians at serious risk. Brexit could further destabilise peace in Northern Ireland; the car bomb attack in the city of Derry (January 2019), even without victims or major damage, and the death of Lyra McKee during the clashes in Derry on April 18th, could be serious warnings.

1.2 The rise of Islamist threat in UK Between the 2005 coordinated attack on the London transport system (resulting in the death of 56 people, with an additional 700 injured) and

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2016, the UK had experienced relatively few “successful” attacks relating to Islamist terrorism. Since then, there have been four attacks that have been attributed to Islamist extremism: the Glasgow International Airport attack (2007, 30 June) (5 people were injured and the only death was of one of the perpetrators); an attempted bombing in a café toilet in Exeter (2008, 22 May), injuring only the perpetrator; the attack on off-duty soldier Lee Rigby, decapitated in Woolwich, London (2013, 22 May); a man with a knife attacked 3 people at Leytonstone Tube Station in East London (2015, 5 December). Besides these four attacks, numerous Islamist-inspired or motivated plots have taken place in the UK but, given the nature of counter terrorism, successful prevention of terrorist attacks does not always come to light. However, authorities often state, without going into details, the number of attacks prevented, e.g. 12 attacks were reported in March 2017 to have been thwarted in the previous year, some only hours before they were planned to be set in motion9. In 2017 the UK witnessed four jihadist attacks: the Westminster Bridge attack on 22 March (6 people, including the perpetrator, were killed in the incident, and 49 people were injured), the Manchester Arena bombing on 22 May (22 people killed and 250 injured), the London Bridge attack on 3 June (8 people were killed and 48 injured), and the London tube train attack on 15 September (30 people were injured). On August 14, 2018, Salih Khater, the 29-year-old British citizen, originally from Sudan, injured 3 people by hitting cyclists and pedestrians with a car. These attacks shook public opinion and put unprecedented pressure on the country’s security services to better respond to terrorism and prevent other similar attacks. The threatening situation has drawn attention to the numerous Muslim communities in Great Britain and to the problem of their radicalisation.

1.3 Muslims in the UK and extremist networks Great Britain has the third-largest Muslim population in the European Union, after France and Germany, and, according to new figures, is home to more than 3 million Muslims for the first time ever, with more than half born outside the UK. The number has doubled in just over a decade as a result of soaring immigration and high birth rates. The United Kingdom has a long history of relationships and mutual influence with Muslim populations linked to its colonial past. Muslim mass immigration to Britain began after World War II as a result of the destruction and labour shortages caused by the war. Muslim migrants from

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former British colonies, predominantly India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, were recruited in large numbers by the government and businesses to rebuild the country. Large numbers of doctors recruited from India and Pakistan, encouraged by the Ministry of Health in the early 1960s, also played a key role in the establishment of the National Health Service. The UK has a tradition of receiving people from different ethnic or religious groups and taking a multicultural approach, allowing people to live in the UK whilst continuing to practice their own traditions rather than expecting them to adapt to the so-called “British way”. However, the segregation into ethnic enclaves, some integration problems of the Muslim population and the threat from home-grown terrorism have thrown the multicultural policies into crisis. The recent terrorist attacks have generated massive media attention to the unprecedented jihad threat currently facing European countries, although the presence of influential jihadist ideologues in Europe predates the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. The migration of radicalised Islamic preachers into the UK dates back to the mid-1980s when individuals like Abu Hamza al Masri, Abu Qatada, Omar Bakri Mohammed, and Abdullah el Faisel began preaching their interpretation of strict Islamic orthopraxy in London. Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Omar Bakri Mohammed were active around the Finsbury Park Mosque in North London while Abdullah El-Faisal focused his efforts in South London. Although their ultra-conservative view of Islam was able to find some traction with some of Britain’s disaffected young people and convert them into religiously motivated activists, their numbers initially remained generally small. As a consequence, the police paid little attention to them. In 1997, Abu Hamza became the de facto imam of the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque in London – a well-known hub of jihadist support. Under Abu Hamza’s direction, the Finsbury Park Mosque served as a critical link between al-Qaeda operatives and prospective local recruits in Europe. Omar Bakri Mohammed founded al Muhajiroun, an initially small organisation with a limited number of followers that later spread throughout the UK, while small spinoffs of the movement were present in Europe and in the United States at the end of the 90s. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, numerous arrests and other forms of pressure led to the disbandment of the group in 2004. However, al Muhajiroun activists, led by Bakri’s right arm, Anjem Choudary, began to found numerous new organisations. In spite of a series of bans by British authorities, groups such as Saved Sect, al-Ghura- baa, Muslims against Crusades, Need4Khilafah, Muslim Prisoners, the Islamic

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Emergency Defence and many more continued political activism. Around 2010, Choudary began to systematically export a new brand: Sharia4. One of the biggest and most renowned was Sharia4Belgium. Anjem Choudary gained more recent notoriety as one of the most outspoken supporters of the Islamic State in Europe. Choudary, arrested in August 2015 on charges of inciting support for the Islamic State, is a highly charismatic Salafist preacher who directly motivated or influenced many foreign fighters. Although there are many more Islamist organisations10, the al Muhajiroun network remains at the heart of UK Islamist extremism11.

2. The structure of the UK security system: Legal and institutional framework 2.1 The legal framework In the UK, long-standing laws and measures similar to an emergency regime, albeit adopted outside of a formally declared state of emergency, are operational12. In this legislation terrorism is just one form of emergency where special powers may be invoked in order to provide the government with “enhanced” emergency powers. However, this legislation has not passed without criticism as it raised competing claims between security and human rights. Just before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11th, the awareness of having to deal with a changed landscape of terrorism and particularly with the rise of Islamist terrorism led, as previously mentioned, to the adoption of the Terrorism Act 2000 that, unlike the previous laws on the fight against terrorism, appears as permanent legislation and is applicable throughout the territory of the United Kingdom and not only a part of it. The law redefined the notion of terrorism as the the use or threat of action …designated to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause.

While the previous definition was limited to “… the use of violence for political ends…”, the Terrorism Act 2000 offers a detailed explanation of terrorism as an action that involves serious violence against a person …. involves serious damage to property …. endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action … creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the

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Furthermore, a wide variety of hypotheses of crimes related to terrorism can be found in the law. In spite of this, the UK government considered that the events of September 11th had shown a new level of threat that required new legislative actions. In the aftermath of September 11th and the first Islamist suicide attacks in the country (London, July 7, 2005), the UK has adopted three major anti-terror laws, thus amending considerably the legislation further on this matter. Although some sporadic modifications were proposed over the years, the legislation as a whole has adopted and implemented increasingly tight counter-terrorism measures.

2.2 The legislation between 2001 and 2010 Following a succession of disrupted or actual terror attacks in Britain and other locations across Europe, the UK government began drafting additional legislative action to meet the threat. Between 2001 and 2010, many additional pieces of “counter-terrorism” legislation were adopted with tight control measures expanding the Terrorism Act 2000 definition of terrorism through the so-called “terrorism-related” activities. According to the Introductory Text, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA)13 is an Act to amend the Terrorism Act 2000; to make further provision about terrorism and security; to provide for the freezing of assets; to make provision about immigration and asylum; to amend or extend the criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law; to make provision about the control of pathogens and toxins; to provide for the retention of communications data.

The key element of the law was the government’s determination to find a way to deal with foreigners the security services suspected of committing, organising or supporting terrorism. The anti-terrorism measures adopted introduced restrictions on immigration and the treatment of foreigners who raised considerable doubts. Faced with suspected terrorists they could neither prosecute nor deport (because they came from countries with poor human rights protection and could face torture or the death penalty), the government created provisions to detain them indefinitely. To implement the 2001 ATCSA, the Blair Government adopted the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order

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200114 to depart from the international obligations imposed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Prevention of Terrorism Act 200515 introduced new provisions aimed at involving the judiciary more closely in the procedures relating to the anti-terrorist emergency. This Act intended to deal with the Law Lords’ ruling of 16 December 2004 that the detention without trial of nine foreigners at Her Majesty’s Prison Belmarsh under Part 4 of the 2001 ATCSA was unlawful, being incompatible with European (and, thus, domestic) human rights laws. In particular, the Act established the “control orders”, applicable to all regardless of nationality, with which, among other things, the possibility of preventive house arrest for individuals suspected of terrorism was foreseen. The “control orders” furthermore allowed investigative bodies to put in place the global control of all utilities and accounts of a suspected subject through the issuance of a single authorisation measure, taken out of control of the judiciary and delivered to the executive only. Following the 7/7 bombing in London, British authorities passed more security legislation while simultaneously coming to the realisation that securitisation was not enough16. The Terrorism Act 2006 created new offences related to terrorism and amended existing ones17; some of its terms have proven to be highly controversial. The following are some of the new criminal offences: a) encouragement of terrorism (prohibits the publishing of “a statement that is likely to be understood … as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement … to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”)18; b) disseminating terrorist publications (prohibits the dissemination of a publication which is likely to be understood as either directly or indirectly encouraging terrorism, or includes information which is likely to be understood as being useful in the commission or preparation of an act of terrorism)19; c) preparation of terrorist acts (prohibits anyone from engaging in any conduct in preparation for an intended act of terrorism)20; d) training for terrorism (prohibits anyone from training others in terrorist activities, or from receiving training)21; e) attendance at a place used for terrorist training (prohibits anyone from being at a place where training is going on whether in the United Kingdom or abroad, provided the person knew or reasonably believed that it was happening)22. The government considered the act a necessary response to an unprecedented terrorist threat; it met with opposition from those who believed it was an undue imposition on civil liberties. The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 further increased police powers for the purpose of countering terrorism as an Act

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Chapter Six to confer further powers to gather and share information for counterterrorism and other purposes; to make further provision about the detention and questioning of terrorist suspects and the prosecution and punishment of terrorist offences; to impose notification requirements on persons convicted of such offences; to confer further powers to act against terrorist financing, money laundering and certain other activities; to provide for review of certain Treasury decisions and about evidence in, and other matters connected with, review proceedings; to amend the law relating to inquiries; to amend the enactments relating to terrorist offences, “control orders” and the forfeiture of terrorist cash2.

In more detail, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 enables post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects and the drawing of adverse inferences from a refusal to say something that is later relied on in court; allows for extended sentences for offenders convicted of offences with a “terrorist connection”; enables the police to request monitoring information from convicted terrorists and prevent them from travel abroad. The Act also removes the general ban on the use of intercept material in certain specified proceedings; and enables the Treasury to direct the financial sector to take action on suspected money laundering or terrorist financing transactions in countries outside of the European Economic Area. Finally, the 2008 anti-terrorism law amended the definition of terrorism by inserting a reference to a racial cause alongside the religious, ideological and political ones, allows a constable to take fingerprints and DNA samples from individuals subject to “control orders” and ensures full use can be made of them in terrorism investigations. The United Kingdom Parliament has also envisaged financial contrast measures against terrorism; the Terrorist Asset Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010 makes provision for the temporary validity of certain “Orders in Council”, imposing financial restrictions on, and in relation to, persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activity and for connected purposes. The Terrorist Asset Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010 was repealed in the same year by the Terrorist Asset Freezing etc Act 201024.

2.3 The legislation since 2011 On December 14, 2011, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIM)25 came into force and repealed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The law provides the statutory framework for administrative restrictions on people suspected of posing a threat to national security and replaces the “control orders” with the “terrorism prevention and investigation measures” that have characteristics very

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similar to the previous measures. On the basis of these new measures, the Home Secretary may assign such a person to a particular residence, restrict with whom they may live, impose geographic and curfew restrictions, and limit association and communication with others. The “terrorism prevention and investigation measures” can be applied to UK nationals and foreigners, are limited to two years and allow, among other things: a) assigned overnight residence; b) a ban on travel outside the country or outside a specified area within the UK; c) exclusion orders prohibiting a person from entering an area or specific types of places (such as internet cafes); d) restrictions on access to financial services and the use of mobile phones; e) restrictions on association with other people. The Justice and Security Act 2013 (JSA)26 was passed into law in April and July 2013. Its main purposes were to provide for oversight of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Headquarters and other activities relating to intelligence or security matters; to make provisions about “closed material procedure” in relation to certain civil proceedings; and to prevent the making of certain court orders for the disclosure of sensitive information and for connected purposes. The Justice and Security Act of 2013 provides for closed hearings in civil cases involving security sensitive information. In this regard, the term “closed material procedure” (CMP) is used. Generally, in ordinary civil proceedings, all significant information is communicated to the parties in question and their defence lawyers and the case takes place in public hearings. In this way everyone is guaranteed the opportunity to defend themselves adequately. It happens differently in the CMP proceedings. With the formation of the so-called Islamic State and the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 201527 was issued. The Act contains powers deemed necessary to help the UK respond to the threat of new forms of terrorism and intends to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity and then return to the country. It enhances the ability of operational agencies to monitor and control the actions of those who pose a threat by reintroducing several of the more stringent administrative restrictions found under the previous “control order regime”, including the forced relocation of individuals subject to a TPIM. In addition, the threshold for imposing a TPIM was lowered from “a reasonable belief” to a “balance of probabilities” that a person has been involved in terrorism-related activities. The Act also creates a Temporary Exclusion Order that can temporarily disrupt a British citizen suspected of involvement in terrorist activity

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abroad from returning to the UK, places strong restrictions on where individuals can go, and requires them to attend meetings as part of their ongoing management. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 improves law enforcement agencies’ ability to find out who is responsible for sending communications accessing an internet communications service, provides a general duty on a range of organisations to prevent people being drawn into terrorism and puts Channel (the government’s voluntary programme for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) on a statutory basis. In November 2016, Parliament passed the Investigatory Powers Act 201628 (nicknamed the Snoopers’ Charter), the most significant update of British surveillance laws in 15 years. The Act comprehensively sets out and, in limited respects, expands the electronic surveillance powers of the UK Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, mandating broad powers for bulk interception, bulk acquisition and access to bulk personal datasets. It also aims to improve the safeguards on the exercise of those powers. The Act also creates a new criminal offence for unlawfully accessing internet data. The Snoopers’ Charter allows intelligence services to hack phones and computers and even use a suspect’s camera or microphone in their smartphones to eavesdrop remotely on conversations. These warranted powers allow the security services and the law enforcement agencies to monitor the content of emails, texts, phone calls and real-time conversations. It also contains wide-ranging powers to require web and phone companies to retain records of everyone’s web browsing histories and communications data records for phone calls and texts for two years for access by the intelligence and law enforcement services. On 12 February 2019, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 201929 became law after passing UK parliament with less debate than many had hoped while Brexit dominated the political agenda. It received royal assent on 12 February 2019 and came into force on 12 April 2019. The law updates existing counter-terrorism legislation to reflect the digital age, including the way in which people view content online. It also reflects the speed at which terrorism plots develop. The law also intends to address hostile activities that threaten the national security committed by individuals or that may be carried out for, or on behalf of, a state other than the UK, or otherwise in the interests of a state other than the UK. In addition, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019: a) amends certain terrorism offences for the digital age; b) reflects contemporary patterns of radicalisation, ensuring laws reflect modern use

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of the internet; c) intends to help meet the operational needs of intelligence services and police forces, strengthening their powers to prevent and investigate terrorist offences; d) increases the maximum penalty for certain offences, ensuring the punishment better reflects the crime and better prevents reoffending; e) manages offenders following their release from custody; f) intends to prevent and investigate terrorist offences; and g) creates extensive new border security powers, which include accessing information on electronic devices. The new law has been criticised in several respects, including how it limits freedom of expression and access to information online and creates extensive new border security powers, which include access to information on electronic devices.

3. Institutional framework: The security system 3.1 General features Although the UK as a whole has dealt with international terrorism with the tools proper to criminal law, as the government itself claims, the UK is playing a leading role in the Global Coalition committed to degrading and defeating ISIS through military action; tackling ISIS finances; preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; supporting stabilisation efforts; and degrading ISIS’ poisonous and false narrative30. As a partner in the Global Coalition, UK efforts have included strike and surveillance operations in Syria and Iraq as well as a full range of participation in the counter-terrorism-related working groups of the Coalition. The UK has also expanded counter ISIS efforts to Libya. The UK’s counter-terrorism apparatus consists of intelligence and lawenforcement activities, the latter also using intelligence tools such as data collection and analysis. It is a complex structure, made up of different organisational levels (cooperation, coordination and monitoring) and supported by a reinforced counter-terrorism legislation, permitting the government to surveil, interdict and control the movements of suspected terrorists31. In March 2007, various elements of the government’s counterterrorism apparatus were consolidated in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT). OSCT is an executive directorate of the UK Home Office responsible for leading the work on counter terrorism in the UK, and working closely with the police and security services. It also enables oversight of MI5 and counter-terrorism policing; and supports the Home Secretary develop, coordinate and implement CONTEST strategy and its four work strands.

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The Cabinet Office supports the work of the National Security Council through the National Security Secretariat, which also has oversight of the Single Intelligence Account. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) – a cross-departmental crisis committee created to respond to national emergencies – is the government’s crisis response mechanism for terrorist attacks. It meets to discuss high-priority issues that cross-departmental borders within government. This committee does not meet regularly but is active only in special critical circumstances.

3.2 The UK intelligence community Intelligence activities are carried out by three main agencies, the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the Security Service (MI5), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which operate in three different functional and intervention areas and are supported by several other agencies and organisations. The United Kingdom government maintains intelligence agencies within several different government departments. The agencies are responsible for collecting and producing foreign and domestic intelligence, providing military intelligence, and performing espionage and counterespionage. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), commonly known as MI6, is the foreign intelligence service of the government. It deals with threats from outside the United Kingdom and is tasked mainly with the covert overseas collection and analysis of human intelligence (HUMINT) in support of the UK’s national security32. Another agency of foreign intelligence is the Defence Intelligence (DI), an integral part of the Ministry of Defence and the main provider of strategic defence intelligence to the department and the armed forces. It provides timely intelligence products, assessments and advice to guide policy decisions and the commitment and employment of the armed forces, informs defence research and equipment programmes and supports military operations. The organisation employs a mixture of civilian and military staff and is funded within the UK’s defence budget. The organisation was formerly known as the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) but changed its name in 2009. The main agency of domestic intelligence is the Security Service (generally referred to as MI5)33. MI5’s mission is to keep the country safe. Currently around 80% of MI5’s resources are used to support counterterrorism work. Indeed, the end of the Cold War resulted in a change in emphasis for the operations of the service, assuming responsibility for the

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responsibility for the investigation of all Northern Ireland-related subversive activities within Britain and increasing the effort of countering other forms of terrorism. MI5 investigates threats to national security through the gathering of secret intelligence and by working closely with other UK and overseas partners. UK law enforcement agencies, including all regional police forces, maintain a close working relationship with MI5 on counterterrorism issues, particularly, in more recent years, the more widespread threat of Islamic extremism. After the September 11th attacks in the US, MI5 started collecting bulk telephone communications data under a littleunderstood general power of the Telecommunications Act 198434. This activity was kept secret until announced in 2015. Other agencies of domestic intelligence are the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit35 (formerly, the National Domestic Extremism Unit) and the National Ballistics Intelligence Service, or NABIS36. The first one is a national police unit of the National Police Chiefs’ Council within the Metropolitan Police Service Specialist Operations group. The unit was created in 2004 with the purpose to directly combat domestic extremism in society and to provide and report intelligence about domestic extremists and public disorder issues. The NABIS, officially launched on 1 April 2008, is a service dedicated to managing and providing detailed information regarding firearm-related criminality. The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB)37 is a police unit in the United Kingdom responsible for gathering and analysing intelligence relating to fraud and financially-motivated cybercrime. Other key elements of the UK’s intelligence machinery are the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). GCHQ is a transversal organisation dealing with domestic and international threats. GCHQ is responsible for providing signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance to the government and armed forces, defending government systems from cyber threat, providing support to the armed forces and striving to keep the public safe in real life and online. It works closely with MI5 and the MI638. Currently there are two main components of the GCHQ – the Composite Signals Organisation (CSO), which is responsible for gathering information, and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which is responsible for securing the UK’s own communications. Co-located with GCHQ for administrative purposes, there is the Joint Technical Language Service (JTLS), a small department and cross-government resource responsible for mainly technical language

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support and translation and interpreting services across government departments. JTAC, established in June 2003, is based in MI5’s headquarters. JTAC is a self-standing organisation comprised of representatives from 16 government departments and agencies. The head of JTAC is accountable to the director general of MI5, who in turn reports to the government’s Joint Intelligence Committee39 on JTAC’s activities. JTAC analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range of government departments and agencies, as well as produces more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities. JTAC brings together counter-terrorist expertise from the police and government departments and agencies so information is analysed and processed on a shared basis. JTAC works especially closely with MI5’s International Counter-Terrorism branch, which manages investigations into terrorist activity in the UK. This enables it to assess the nature and extent of the threat in the country40.

3.3 Law enforcement agencies Law enforcement activities are carried out at central (Metropolitan Police) and local levels because of the traditional organisational structure of the UK’s police forces, which comprises a variety of local and territorial police units for the four constituent nations: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. On the whole, there are several coordination (between the different police units) and cooperation (with the intelligence and security agencies) bodies in order to prevent and counter violent extremism. The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) is the peak national coordination body for law enforcement in the United Kingdom and the representative body for British police chief officers. Established on 1 April 2015, it replaces the former Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). The NPCC comprises several units41. Its key functions are: a) the command of counter-terrorism operations and delivery of counter-terrorist policing through the national network, as set out in the Counter Terrorism Collaboration Agreement; b) the coordination of national operations including defining, monitoring and testing force contributions to the Strategic Policing Requirement, working with the National Crime Agency where appropriate; c) the coordination of the national police response to national emergencies and the coordination

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of the mobilisation of resources across force borders and internationally; d) the national operational implementation of standards and policy as set by the College of Policing and Government; e) to work with the College of Policing, developing joint national approaches on criminal justice, value for money, service transformation, information management, performance management and technology; f) where appropriate, to work with the College of Policing in order to develop joint national approaches to staff and human resource issues, including misconduct and discipline, in line with the Chief Officers’ responsibilities as employers. Police prevention and counter-terrorism activities are mainly carried out by the Counter Terrorism Coordination Committee (CTCC) of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, which is a national coordination body made of chief officers of the nine regional leading counter-terrorism police forces. The CTCC is the focal point for counter-terrorism policing and related issues, and is responsible for developing national counter-terrorism and domestic extremism strategic policy through the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ). CTCC activities are also supported and strengthened by a network of local police units that reports to the CTCC to aid in prevention. The National Counter Terrorism Policing Network (NCTPN), also known as the Police Counter-Terrorism Network, is the national collaboration of police forces in the United Kingdom and works to prevent, deter and investigate terrorism in the United Kingdom. The NCTPN is made up of 11 Regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) and Regional Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs), which bring together intelligence, operations and investigation functions around the United Kingdom to help prevent, disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities. Units are regionally based and resourced by regional police forces, and are composed of detectives, financial and cyber investigators, community contact teams, intelligence analysts, and forensic specialists. Each CTU provides coordination and specialist support for their respective regions. The NCTPN works closely with security and intelligence agencies. The National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ) is responsible for developing policy and strategy and providing a single national counter-terrorism policing voice on behalf of the NCTPN. With regard to counter-terrorism, day-to-day operations are the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Service (Mets) in conjunction with OSCT and the MI5. The Mets is responsible for counter-terrorist operations within Greater London but also has a coordination and leadership role in these matters nationally.

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4. Countering terrorism: The CONTEST strategy 4.1 General features CONTEST is the name of the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy. It was first developed by the Home Office in early 2003. The aim of the strategy is “to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence”. This strategy is based on the conviction that terrorism policies need to address not only the immediate threat of attacks but the longer term factors that enable terrorist groups to grow and flourish. As already mentioned, the Home Secretary is responsible for CONTEST and is supported by OSCT. Updates on the strategy were published in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2018. The last one focuses on all types of terrorism and reflects the findings of a fundamental review of all aspects of counter terrorism, updating and strengthening this approach within the tried-and-tested strategic framework of the four work strands: a) Prevent: safeguard people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; b) Pursue: stop terrorist attacks happening in the UK and overseas; c) Protect: strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK and overseas; d) Prepare: mitigate the impact of terrorist incidents if they occur. The primary outcome is to reduce: a) intent; b) capability; c) vulnerability; and d) impact. The approach of 2018 Strategy is similar to the previous one of 2011, but it implements new changes that increase and optimise capabilities in domestic investigations. It includes more prevention by disrupting terrorist threats earlier and faster by allowing authorities to intervene in the early stages (prosecution for terrorist offences, longer sentences and better supervision of individuals after prison). Information sharing is the key of the new strategy: Better communication channels on the local and national levels; integrated relationships with the private sector to ensure certain venues, detect faster alerts and detect suspicious purchases.

4.2 The Prevent strategy The government introduced Prevent in 2003 but it wasn’t made public for some years. In practice, it is delivered differently in the different devolved nations of the UK as many of the organisations involved, for example, the police and councils, are under the control of devolved governments. The Prevent strategy is not applied in Northern Ireland.

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The current Prevent strategy addresses all forms of terrorism and radicalisation as the “process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism”. Prevent has distinct objectives: a) Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it. The Prevent strategy recognises that people who are engaged in terrorist activities are often initially drawn into extremist narratives and beliefs, and these narratives (violent and non-violent) should be challenged to stop people moving from extremism into terrorism. So a fundamental part of Prevent lies in challenging ideologies that lead to extremism and violence and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote them. To avoid the dissemination of terrorist material, Prevent focuses on building strong counter-terrorist narratives and on online activity in order to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online. b) Protecting and supporting vulnerable people. Radicalisation is usually a process, not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorist-related activity. A wide range of sectors work to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; priority areas include education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. The public sector organisations are subject to a duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The duty requires local authorities, schools, colleges, higher education institutions, health institutions, prisons and probation, and the police to consider the need to protect people from being attracted to terrorism. The duty is designed to help ensure that vulnerable people at risk of radicalisation are as supported as they would be if subjected to other processes protecting people from exploitation by a series of other damages such as drugs, gangs, and physical and sexual exploitation. Prevent and its Channel programme were placed on a statutory footing by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. If an individual is assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation, they may be offered support through the Channel programme in England and Wales, or the Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC) programme in Scotland. These are multi-agency programmes designed to safeguard and support vulnerable individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism. Channel is run in every local authority in England and Wales and addresses all types of extremism, including extreme right-wing and Islamist-related. Support includes assistance with education and employment, health support and ideological mentoring to provide vulnerable individuals with the skills to protect themselves from being drawn into terrorism-related activity or supporting terrorism.

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Participation in Channel is entirely voluntary. According to government statistics, 7,318 individuals were referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme in England and Wales from April 2017 to March 2018. The sectors accounting for the highest number of referrals in 2017/18 were the education sector (2,462; 33%) and the police (2,364; 32%)42. Of these, 3,096 (42%) left the process requiring no further action, 2,902 (40%) left the process and were signposted to alternative services prior to Channel discussions taking place, and 1,314 (18%) were deemed suitable, through preliminary assessment, to be discussed by a Channel panel. Of the 1,314 individuals discussed by a Channel panel, 920 (70%) did not receive Channel support and 564 (61%) were referred to other services. The remaining 394 individuals received Channel support. Of these, 298 (76%) individuals have subsequently left the process, and 96 (24%) are currently still receiving Channel support. Of those who have left the Channel process, 251 (84%) did so with no further terrorism-related concerns. The remaining 47 (16%) individuals withdrew from the Channel process, although in some cases support from other services may still be in place, and any terrorism risk that might be present is managed by the police. The new element of the 2018 Prevent strategy is the inclusion of Desistance and Disengagement Programmes (DDP) under its purview. DDP has been running in pilot through 2017, focusing on people subject to court-approved conditions, including all terrorism and terrorism-related offenders on probation licence, as well as those on TPIMs and those who have returned from conflict zones in Syria or Iraq (the so-called foreign terrorist fighters) and are subject to Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs). The DDP reflects increasing collaboration across different elements of the counter-terrorism system, notably Prevent and Pursue. The offered support could include mentoring, psychological support, and theological and ideological advice. Furthermore, MI5, Counter-Terrorism Policing and the Home Office are establishing a series of multi-agency centre (MAC) pilots to trial a new domestic operational model that combines improved intelligence sharing with a more effective local approach. The MAC pilots will test multiagency approaches at both national and local levels, trialing different ways of sharing information with a broader range of partners, including government departments and local authorities, to enrich the UK’s overall understanding of the potential risk. Looking beyond the threat posed by individuals, the pilots also provide an opportunity to enhance the activities locally within the Prepare and Protect work strands, using an improved

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understanding of the local threat picture, to allow improvements in public protection and local emergency response. Prevent has been the subject of criticism, and the decision to impose a statutory duty on public sector organisations has been particularly controversial. In August 2016, the Home Affairs Select Committee published a report, “Radicalisation: The counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point” following an inquiry into the government’s counterextremism strategy43. The Committee sought views on the effectiveness of Prevent and the key problems with it. The report concluded that failure to address concerns about Prevent among the communities most affected by it would mean that it would continue to be viewed with suspicion. The new version of Prevent also sparked the same reactions from various sections of British society.

4.3 The Pursue strategy The purpose of Pursue is to stop terrorist attacks happening in the country and against UK interests overseas. To disrupt terrorist activity in addition to the capabilities of counter-terrorism policing and the security and intelligence agencies, including covert human intelligence sources, surveillance assets and the lawful intercept of communications, Pursue uses a wide range of tools; for example, working to proscribe organisations, freeze and seize their financial assets, and break up networks and associations in prison. Conviction in court and imprisonment are considered the most effective way to stop and deter terrorists and deliver justice to their victims. The objectives of Pursue are to: a) detect and understand terrorist activity; b) investigate terrorist activity; and c) disrupt terrorist activity, including through prosecutions. Some of the main actions planned for the next three years are: a) a step- change in the domestic investigative capabilities through implementing the recommendations of MI5 and CT Policing’s Operational Improvement Review; b) as set out in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, the recruiting and training of over 1,900 additional staff across the security and intelligence agencies; c) the development of a series of multi-agency pilots to improve information sharing and enrich understanding of the threat at the local level, and d) the use of enhanced legislative tools to target and disrupt terrorist finance.

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4.4 The Protect strategy The purpose of Protect is to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against its interests overseas and so reduce its vulnerability. The work focuses on border security, transport systems, national infrastructure, and crowded places. Protective security is principally achieved by identifying risks, assessing vulnerabilities and encouraging infrastructure owners and operators to implement proportionate mitigation measures. The objectives of Protect are to a) detect and deal with suspected terrorists and harmful materials at the border; b) reduce the risk to and improve the resilience of global aviation, other transport sectors and critical national infrastructure most at risk of terror attack; c) reduce the vulnerability of crowded places, specific vulnerable groups, and profile individuals; d) detect and prevent terrorist access to and use of materials of concern, knowledge and information that could be used to conduct attacks. The main actions planned for the next three years are: a) collate and analyse greater volumes of high-quality data to enhance the ability to target known and previously unknown persons; b) maintain the UK at the fore- front of leading screening and detection technologies at the border, including behavioural detection, new detection techniques, data analytics, and machine learning; c) further strengthen security and resilience across the UK’s transport network and other parts of critical national infrastructure, and target the insider threat by strengthening information sharing about those working in sensitive environments in airports, to ensure that persons of concern do not have access to restricted environments; d) work in partnership with the aviation industry and international partners to deliver robust and sustainable aviation security in the UK and overseas; e) improve security at crowded places through closer, more effective cooperation with a wider range of responsible local authority and private sector partners; f) enhance capabilities to detect terrorist activity involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) material and their precursors, and to control and safeguard these materials.

4.5 The Prepare strategy Prepare aims to mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident when it cannot be stopped. The UK approach to preparing for civil emergencies (including terrorist attacks) is to build and maintain generic capabilities applicable for use in any eventuality. For a terrorist attack, additional

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specialist capabilities are envisaged. The Home Office works with intelligence agencies and emergency services to stop a terrorist attack and recover from its consequences. The emergency services have trained specialists to deal with terrorist incidents – including armed officers supported by specialist fire and ambulance teams. They also have skills and equipment to deal with an attack using a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) device. The objectives of Prepare are to: a) deliver a coordinated multi-agency response to all types of terrorist attacks; b) ensure that the UK has a full range of capabilities to respond to current and future threats; c) minimise the impact of terrorist attacks on people, services and communities. The main actions are to: a) maintain the investment in the capabilities of the emergency services in order to deliver a coordinated and effective response to terrorist attacks; b) ensure the UK is resilient and ready to respond in a proportionate and effective manner to a wide range of CBRNE threats; c) fully embed the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles across the emergency services by 2020; d) regularly test and exercise the multi-agency capabilities required to respond to, and recover from, a wide range of terrorist attacks; and e) improve support arrangements for victims of terrorism to ensure a comprehensive and coordinated response.

5. Preventing radicalisation in prison The UK Justice Ministry figures show there are 12,847 Muslim prisoners in England and Wales (15% of prison population), in Scotland Muslim prisoners account for 4.4%44. According to the statistics of police operations as at 30 September 2018, in Great Britain there were 224 persons in custody for terrorism-related offences, a 5% increase since the previous year. This was the highest number since the data collection began in April 2009. Of those in custody, the majority (80%) were categorised as holding Islamist extremist views. A further 13% were categorised as holding far-right-wing ideologies, with the remaining prisoners holding beliefs related to other ideologies (which includes Northern Ireland-related groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, and those individuals whose ideology is not clear). The proportion of prisoners holding far-right ideologies has increased steadily over the past three years45. Terrorism investigators recently confirmed that the Manchester Arena bomber, Salman Abedi, twice visited an imprisoned extremist in the months leading up to the attack. Also, the Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood – who killed 5 people and injured 50 – was indoctrinated with

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extremism ideology during his time in jail. Prisons as fruitful places for radicalisation and recruitment for Islamist extremists – or indeed any other kind of political extremism – is not a novel concept. Prisons can provide an atmosphere in which individuals are particularly vulnerable to the full spectrum of extremist ideological messages, whether Islamist or not. In the United Kingdom, new measures were introduced to tackle this growing problem. The government’s Counter Extremism Strategy, published in October 201546, emphasised that peer-to-peer radicalisation could be a particular problem. The prisoners, it remarked, could be susceptible to extremist ideologies, and so the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) launched a full review of how prisons deal with Islamist extremism. In September 2015, the-then Secretary of State for Justice commissioned a review to: a) assess the growing threat Islamist extremism – and the radicalisation which sustains it – poses to prisons and probation services; and b) assess the capability of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to meet that threat. The review team, led by Ian Acheson, submitted a detailed report of their findings and recommendations on 17 March 2016. Given the nature of its content – and the implications for public safety and security – the review constitutes a classified report47. Actions in response to review findings were: a) creation of a new Security, Order and Counter Terrorism Directorate, which analyses incidents and includes an Islamist extremism review implementation team; b) creation of specialist units to allow a greater separation and specialised management of the highest risk individuals; c) improvement of capacity for responding swiftly to serious violent incidents; d) recording of disruptive or violent behaviour; e) improvement of staff training; f) tightened vetting; g) removal of extremist literature; h) a greater focus on the safe management of corporate worship; i) reviewing procedures under “Rule 39” to ensure confidential privilege in legal correspondence is not being abused48. During 2017, important news appeared in the press: A 100 strong specialist team of counter-terrorism experts was launched to examine intelligence from around the country, assess the danger posed by radicalisation behind bars, train personnel to deter offenders from being lured into extremism and advice management of dangerous and high profile extremists. Other meas-ures taken include an instruction to governors to ban extremist literature and remove anyone from communal worship who is promoting anti-British beliefs or other dangerous views49. The British Ministry of Justice has announced that plans will go ahead to

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separate extremist prisoners from mainstream inmates and isolate them in “jihadi jails” to deter radicalisation50. Indeed, for those offenders that pose the most significant risk of radicalising other prisoners, Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) has introduced two specialist separation centres at HMP Frankland and HMP Full Sutton. In addition, the National Prisons Intelligence Coordination Centre (NPICC), launched in November 2015, continues to improve the understanding of the risks terrorist offenders pose while in prison and upon release. Terrorist offenders on probation are managed according to both the risk they pose to the public and their rehabilitative needs. All are managed through the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), led by the National Probation Service (NPS) and the police, with input from prisons, regional police-led Counter-Terrorism Units and other public service partners. In April 2017, the Home Office and Ministry of Justice established a joint unit to strengthen the response to the threat of extremism and terrorism in prisons and among those on probation. In England and Wales (separate arrangements are in place in Scotland), approximately 700 prisoners who have been identified as engaged in terrorism or extremism, or about whom there are extremism concerns, are managed at any one time. Every offender who is in prison or on probation can take advantage of a series of interventions from psychological support and mentoring to education.

6. The Counter Extremism Strategy The government’s Counter Extremism Strategy, published in October 201551, aims to protect communities from the extensive social harms caused by extremism. It sets out the work to: a) counter extremist ideology, continue to confront and challenge extremist propaganda, ensure no space goes uncontested, including online, and support those at risk of radicalisation; b) build and support a partnership with all those opposed to extremism, going further to stand with and build the capacity of mainstream individuals, community organisations and others who work every day to challenge extremists and protect vulnerable individuals; and b) create new targeted powers to disrupt the most dangerous and active extremist activities; build cohesive communities; review, understand and address the reasons why some people living in the UK do not identify with the country and its values.

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To varying degrees, the responsibility for counter extremism is devolved in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and each devolved administration has its own approach. For a number of years, the government has been trying to present and pass laws to counter extremism and, in both 2015 and 2016, counterextremism bills were announced in the Queen’s Speech52. However, the proposals proved controversial, not least because of the challenges around a workable definition of extremism itself. In 2018, the government established an Independent Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE), which was tasked with defining “extremism”. On November 22, 2018, the Commission called on the public to share views, experiences and evidence on extremism and its impact in order to carry out a unique study. In this online consultation, the Commission asked crucial questions, including how the government can strengthen its response to extremism, what the scale of the problem is and how social media plays a role in spreading extremism53. On April 9, 2019, the Commission named the academics it commissioned to redact studies on far-right, Islamic, far left and online extremism54. Meanwhile, on April 6 2019, the press announced the government had stopped making laws to counter extremism because this is “too difficult” to define55. At the international level, the UK actively supports the UN’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE)56, a comprehensive framework to establish a whole government, whole society approach working with partners, including governments, the United Nations Development Programme, the Commonwealth, the Global CounterTerrorism Forum and the Hedayah Centre, which, through UK-UAE support, launched a task force to support the development and implementation of national action plans to prevent and counter violent extremism. Since a successful social integration strategy is important to counter the extremism that leads to violence, a new Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper was published for consultation in March 201857. The Green Paper set out the government’s vision for building socially stronger and more confident communities “where people – whatever their background – live, work, learn and socialise together, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities”. The responses to the consultation showed broad support for the integration objectives expressed in the Green Paper and highlighted the need for both national and local integration plans to be delivered in a way which inspires, engages and involves local communities58. The new Integrated Communities Action Plan (February,

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2019) com-plements the engagement of the government to address barriers that can undermine integration. It supplements the paper on “Civil Society Strategy: Building a future that works for everyone” (August, 2018)59 that sets out the government’s vision to work with and support civil society. The Action Plan is for England because the majority of the policy proposals are in areas where responsibility is devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

7. Conclusion The UK faces several different terrorist threats. Jihadist terrorism, still the main and most significant threat, has given rise over the years to laws and measures similar to an emergency regime although implemented outside of a formally declared state of emergency. Despite a considerable commitment, the problems of integration of the Muslim population remain, together with the threat from home-grown terrorism and the proliferation of “low-tech” attacks. Approximately 850 British citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the Islamic State and other jihadist groups since the beginning of the conflict60. Therefore, possible negative consequences and challenges posed by returnee foreign terrorist fighters from the Middle East are feared. In addition, there are concerns about the growth of extreme right- wing violence (for the first time, in 2016, the UK proscribed an extreme rightwing terrorist group: National Action) and, moreover, the fear of a new escalation of terrorism linked to Northern Ireland dissent. Indeed, according to the MI5 Security Service, in the UK the threat level for international terrorism is still “severe”. As for Northern Irelandrelated terrorism, the threat level is also considered “severe” in Northern Ireland, and “moderate” in Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland)61. Another factor of uncertainty is represented by Brexit consequences on the operational effectiveness of the security system, although the recourse to the use of bilateral and non-EU intelligence-sharing mechanisms, as well as the likelihood of some form of observer status for the UK at the European policing agency Europol, could compensate for any negative effects. Under the concern of recent attacks and the threat from other different forms of political violence, the Westminster government has more recently developed a “refresh” of its counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST). This includes a major expansion of the Prevent anti-radicalisation programme, with much clearer guidelines aiming for better implementation, mostly security-oriented focused on the perspective of a new legislation “ensuring

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the police and Crown Prosecution Service have the powers they need” to prosecute, imprison and rehabilitate offenders. It also beefs up information sharing between MI5 and local authorities on suspects and working with the private sector to flag suspicious trafficking. These measures have aroused criticism in the press and by some civil society organisations. As shown by all previous analyses, the peculiarity of the country’s state organisation, and the permanence of special aspects relating to Northern Ireland experience, affect the UK counter-radicalisation policy and in its operational working. In such a context, the UK policy for combating terrorism and countering violent radicalisation has become over the years a complex and articulated set of levels, regulations and measures that permeate and involve the whole society, its actors and stakeholders, in different roles and environs. These characteristics confer on the UK model of radicalisation prevention its own specificity.

Notes 1

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisro/1949/147/contents/made. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/53/pdfs/ukpga_19730053_en.pdf. 3 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/56/contents/enacted. 4 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/4/contents. 5 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=Northern%20Ireland%20(Emergency% 20Pro- visions)%20Acts%20. 6 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/40/pdfs/ukpga_19980040_en.pdf. 7 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents. 8 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/469548/Paramilitary_Groups_in_Northern_Ireland_– _20_Oct_2015. pdf. 9 Adam Lusher, “Security services foiled more than 12 UK terror attacks last year, Defence Secretary reveals,” Independent, March 23, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-westminster-attack-michael-fallon-terrorthreat-islamist-lone-wolf-low-tech-car-truck-vehicle-a7645221.html. 10 See Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, May 3, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/612 076/20170503_ Proscription.pdf. 11 Tom Burgis, “The network that remains at the heart of UK Islamist extremism,” Financial Times, June 6, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/54eb9e5e-4ab7-11e7a3f4-c742b9791d43. 12 Counter terrorism is a reserved matter, but many of the local implementation mechanisms, such as policing and justice in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and health, education and local government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are devolved. It should also be noted that Scotland and Northern Ireland are separate legal jurisdictions from England and Wales, and Scotland operates a different system of law. 2

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https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/3644/made. 15 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/contents. 16 So the Prevent work-stream was added to the 2006 version of CONTEST, the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy first developed by the Home Office in early 2003. 17 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/pdfs/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf. 18 Indirect encouragement statements include every statement which glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; and is a statement from which those members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances. In England and Wales, a person guilty of this offence is liable, on conviction or indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, or to a fine, or to both, or, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, a person guilty of this offence is liable, on conviction or indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, or to a fine, or to both, or, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both. 19 The maximum penalty is seven years’ imprisonment. 20 The maximum penalty is life imprisonment. 21 The maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment. 22 The maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment. 23 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28/pdfs/ukpga_20080028_en.pdf. 24 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/38/contents. The Terrorist AssetFreezing Act, etc. 2010 is regularly up to date. 25 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/contents/enacted. 26 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents. 27 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted. 28 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/contents/enacted. 29 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/3/contents/enacted. 30 https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/daesh/about. 31 In November 2016, the Parliament passed the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, the most significant update of British surveillance laws in 15 years. 32 https://www.sis.gov.uk/. 33 https://www.mi5.gov.uk/. 34 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/12/contents. 35 http://www.npcc.police.uk/NationalPolicing/NDEDIU/AboutNDEDIU.aspx. 36 http://www.nabis.police.uk/. 37 https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economiccrime/ nfib/Pages/default.aspx. 38 https://www.gchq.gov.uk/. 39 The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is an inter-agency deliberative body responsible for intelligence assessment, coordination and oversight of the SIS/MI6, MI5, GCHQ and DI and to maintain liaison with Commonwealth and foreign 14

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intelligence organisations as appropriate, and to consider the extent to which its product can be made available to them; https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-intelligence-committee. 40 https://www.mi5.gov.uk/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre. 41 They are the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit; the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service. 42 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supportedthrough-the-prevent-programme-april-2017-to-march-2018. 43 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf. 44 UK Prison Population Statistics, Briefing Paper, Number CBP-04334, 23 July 2018, by Georgina Sturge, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/ SN04334/SN04334.pdf. 45 Home Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and sub- sequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, quarter- ly update to September 2018 Statistical Bulletin 29/18, 6 December 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_ data/file/762046/police-powers-terrorism-sep2018-hosb2918.pdf. 46 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf. 47 A summary of its main findings and its principal recommendations, however, has been published: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice/summary-of-the-main-findings-of-thereview-of-islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice. 48 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice/government-response-to-the-review-of-islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice. 49 Smith H., “Prison Extremism: 100-strong team launched to tackle Islamist radicalisation behind bars,” Independent, 2 April 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ uk/crime/prison-extremism-task-force-tackleislamism-radicalisation-a7661886.html. 50 Swinford S. “Dangerous extremists locked up in Britain’s first ‘Jihadi jial’ to stop them radicalizing other inmates,” The Telegraph, 5, July, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/05/dangerous-extremists-lockedbritains-first-jihadi-jail-stop/. 51 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy. The Coun- ter Extremism Strategy defines extremism as; “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of our Armed Forces as extremist”. 52 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7238. 53 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commission-for-countering-extremismlaunch- es-call-for-evidence-on-extremism-in-england-and-wales. 54 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commission-for-countering-extremismse- lects-leading-academics-for-research-papers. 55 The Telegraph, April, 6, 2019,

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https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/06/gov- ernment-abandoned-creatingextremism-laws-difficult-former/. 56 https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism. ctitf/ files/plan_action.pdf 57 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/696993/Integrated_Communities_Strategy.pdf. 58 See Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper Summary of consultation responses and Government response February 2019, https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/777160/Integrated_Communities_Strategy_Government_Response.pdf. 59 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/732765/Civil_Society_Strategy_building_a_future_that_work s_for_ everyone.pdf. 60 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985. 61 The UK uses a five-point scale to measure the terrorist threat levels: low, moderate, substantial, severe and critical, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels.

List of References Burgis, Tom. “The network that remains at the heart of UK Islamist extremism.” Financial Times, June 6, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/54e-b9e5e-4ab7-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43. Commission for Countering Extremism. Commission for Countering Extrem- ism launches call for evidence on extremism in England and Wales. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commission-for-counteringextrem-ism-launches-call-for-evidence-on-extremism-in-england-andwales. —. Commission for Countering Ex- tremism selects leading academics for research papers. https://www. gov.uk/government/news/commissionfor-countering-extremism-selects-leading-academics-for-researchpapers. The Telegraph, April, 6, 2019. Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/40/pdfs/ukpga_19980040_e n.pdf. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Office for Civil Society, Tracey Crouch MP, and the Rt Hon Jeremy Wright MP. Civil Society Strategy: Building a Future that Works for Everyone. Dixon Hayley. “Extremism definition fails Clarkson test: Government gave up on laws to fight ideology because it’s ‘too difficult’.” The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/06/governmentabandoned-creating-extremism-laws-difficult-former/.

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HM Government. Civil Society Strategy: Building a Future that Works for Everyone. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/732765/Civil_Society_Strategy_-_building_a_future_that_works_for_everyone.pdf. Home Office. Counter-Extremism Strategy. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy. —. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/ individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-preventprogramme-april-2017-to-march-2018. —. Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search. Statistical Bulletin 29/18, 6 December 2018. https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/762046/police-powers-terrorism-sep2018-hosb2918.pdf. —. Proscribed Terrorist Organisations. 3 May, 2017. https:// www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/612076/20170503_Proscription.pdf. House of Commons Library. Counter-extremism Policy: An Overview. https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/ CBP-7238. House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee. Radicalisation: The counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/1 35.pdf. Lusher, Adam. “Security services foiled more than 12 UK terror attacks last year, Defence Secretary reveals.” Independent, March 23, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-westminster-attack-michael-fallon-terror-threat-islamist-lone-wolf-low-techcar-truck-vehicle-a7645221.html. Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Governments. Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/696993/In te- grated_Communities_Strategy.pdf. Ministry of Justice, National Offender Management Service. Summary of the main findings of the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/islamist-extremism-inprisons-probation-and-youth-justice/summary-of-the-main-findings-

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of-the-review-of-islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-andyouth-justice. Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.countert errorism.ctitf/files/plan_action.pd. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. http://www.leg- islation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/56/contents/enacted. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (repealed). http:// www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/4/contents. Smith, Hayden. “Prison extremism: 100-strong team launched to tackle Islamist radicalisation behind bars.” Independent, April 2, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/prison-extremismtask-force-tack- le-islamism-radicalisation-a7661886.html. Sturge, Georgina. UK Prison Population Statistics. Briefing Paper, Number CBP-04334, 23 July 2018. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/ documents/SN04334/SN04334.pdf. Swinford, Steven. “Dangerous extremists locked up in Britain’s first ‘Jihadi jial’ to stop them radicalizing.” The Telegraph, July 5, 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/05/dangerous-extremistslocked-brit- ains-first-jihadi-jail-stop/. Telecommunications Act 1984. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/12/ contents. Terrorism Act 2000. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents. Terrorism Act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/pdfs/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf Counter Terrorism Act 2008. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28/pdfs/ukpga_20080028_en .pdf. The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922 to (Northern Ireland) 1949. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisro/1949/147/ contents/made. The Terrorist Asset Freezing Act etc 2010. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2010/38/contents. UK Action to Combact Daesh. https://www.gov.uk/government/topicalevents/ daesh/about.

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Websites http://www.nabis.police.uk/. http://www.npcc.police.uk/NationalPolicing/NDEDIU/AboutNDEDIU.asp x. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploa ds/attachment_data/file/469548/Paramilitary_Groups_in_Northern_ Ireland_-_20_Oct_2015.pdf. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985. https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-andeconomic-crime/nfib/Pages/default.aspx. https://www.gchq.gov.uk/. https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-intelligence-committee. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels. https://www.sis.gov.uk/.

CHAPTER SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEW POLICIES MARIA LUISA MANISCALCO AND VALERIA ROSATO

The recent terrorist attacks in Europe again pointed out the urgent need to tackle the terrorism and radicalisation leading to violent extremism. The majority of the terrorist suspects of those attacks were European citizens, born and raised in Europe, who were radicalised and committed atrocities against their fellow citizens. According to the analysis carried out in the previous chapters of this book within European Western societies, counter terrorism is mainly about crime prevention. EU member states and regional bodies have responded to terrorist attacks by proposing, adopting and implementing wave after wave of counter-terrorism measures that have enhanced executive powers, restricted judicial controls and exposed everyone to government surveillance. But counter-terrorist policies based on a narrow range of repressive mechanisms and military measures tend to become overly heavy-handed, producing serious negative side effects which serve to enhance the problem rather than reduce it. The prevention of radicalisation is a key part of the fight against terrorism, as was highlighted in the European Agenda on Security1. A broad approach to preventing terrorism can be based on preventive mechanisms – such as normative counter-terrorism, anti-radicalisation and anti-recruitment measures, deterrence, disruption, incapacitation, facilitating disengagement from terrorism – and through a combination of actions across several policy areas, bringing together competent authorities, and societal and community actors at all levels – local, regional, national, and European.

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1. General caveat to policy makers on anti-radicalisation policies Re-think the process and stages of radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism in order to create a shared understanding of the phenomenon and its indicators. Support analysis and research in order to assess changing radicalisation processes and trends and avoid emergency legislation and measures.

The European Commission defines radicalisation as a complex phenomenon of individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity, as well as a rising propensity to use means of force to reach political goals that negate or undermine democracy2. Terrorist radicalisation is in turn understood as the complex phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to committing terrorist acts. As stressed by the European Commission, terrorist radicalisation is not confined to one faith or political ideology. The notion of ‘radicalisation’ as a precursor to violent activities gained prominence after the 9/11 attacks3. There is no universally accepted definition of radicalisation in academia, government or practitioners; radicalisation is a term whose use, let alone definition, is contested by many. About the only thing experts agree on is that radicalisation is a process of a gradual adoption of extremist ideas which would end in the practice of violent extremism or terrorism. The radicalisation process was frequently illustrated as a staircase or pyramid4 where all persons with grievances about injustices are at the bottom, and some of them subsequently move upwards, via a series of cumulative steps, to the top, where they become terrorists. Researchers identified various push-and-pull factors that explain the attraction of extremist groups and involvement in ideologically inspired violence. They are not caused by a single “trigger” and do not have a single cause or an inevitable path but are usually the result of a combination of different factors. These factors are situated at different levels: from individual motivations through group dynamics to wide contextual elements that form a breeding ground for violence and terrorism and give individuals a motivation to take action. The life histories of jihadist ter rorists, as well as those of the separatist, far-right and far-left movements, appeared to vary greatly. The drivers conducive to radicalisation may include a strong sense of personal or cultural alienation, personal trauma and other psychological problems, perceived injustice or humiliation reinforced by social marginalisation, xenophobia and

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discrimination, limited education or employment possibilities, criminality, and political factors as well as an ideological and religious utopia. These factors can be exploited by recruiters who prey on vulnerabilities and grievances through manipu lation or reinforced, in contrast, by selfisolation. Recently, social media provides connectivity and a sense of belonging to and virtual participation in radicalised groups. Radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism is a fastevolving phenomenon such as its manifestations, its root causes, catalysing factors, and trigger events. For example, the drivers of the recent violent jihadist radicalisation process in Europe are different from, and more complex than, previous terrorist phenomena such as far-left and far-right terrorism. Recently (December 2017), members of the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation identified Islamist extremist ideology as a priority area for further action while also highlighting the need to pay particular attention to right-wing extremism5. As shown previously, EU member states and regional bodies have responded to Jihadist terrorist attacks by proposing, adopting and implementing wave after wave of counter-terrorism measures that have enhanced executive powers, restricted judicial controls and exposed everyone to government surveillance. But counter-terrorist policies only based on a narrow range of repressive mechanisms and military measures tend to become overly heavy-handed, producing serious negative side effects that enhance the problem rather than reduce it. In some cases, such as in France, the use of state-of-emergency powers, by various organisations such as Amnesty International6 and Human Rights Watch7, has eroded civil liberties and contributed to polarising society. The responsibility for countering and preventing radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism primarily lies with the member states. However, the recent terrorist attacks in Europe have once more demonstrated the importance of addressing radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism also at the European level. The prevention of radicalisation is a key part of the fight against terrorism, as was highlighted in the European Agenda on Security8. However, there are differences in terminology concerning the radicalisation process and radicalised persons across European countries as well as in the risk assessment criteria used to monitor the signs of radicalisation and identify risk categories. Therefore, a common understanding of radicalisation and the categories of radicalised persons as well as of indicators of radicalisation should be reached at the EU level in order to facilitate information exchange across Europe as well

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as reviewing legislation, policy framework and strategies of prevention, investigation, prosecution and conviction, rehabilitation and reintegration.

2. Prevention Promote social inclusion and active adhesion to European values of freedom, tolerance, mutual understanding and non-discrimination through policies in support of appropriate educational programs and projects. Avoid the creation of the socalled hotbeds of terrorism and the no-go areas.

Intolerant “Us vs. Them” ideologies – exaggerating perceived differences in simplistic narratives about others, neglecting that which the two groups have in common – need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive approach to preventing and countering the radicalisation that leads to violent extremism and terrorism while preventing marginalisation and avoiding the stigmatisation of specific communities in European societies. To achieve these objectives, the role of education and youth policies is fundamental. 1) Teachers, educators and youth workers can play a crucial role in fostering active citizenship by promoting common democratic values, enhancing critical thinking, digital awareness and media literacy and also managing controversial issues with open discussions in safe classrooms. 2) Public policies can significantly support the development of these transversal skills by reinforcing other actions to tackle radicalisation, including discussions on controversial issues, addressing conspiracy theories or developing counter or alternative narratives. 3) Adequate school and youth policies must be supported at the European level, in the member states and at the local level, where many factors and drivers of the conflict and radicalisation processes leading to active violent militancy are rooted. Since these threats are rooted locally, any response needs to be tailored to context. Indeed, many metropolitan areas in various European countries – as, for example, in Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden – constitute no-go zones characterised by self-segregation, refusal of integration, violence, criminality, and challenging public authorities. These areas are at great risk of violent radicalisation and consequent stigmatisation that undermine social cohesion and peace. In these areas it

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is opportune to intervene with adequate social policies and a regeneration of the urban fabric with interventions to combat crime. Radicalisation prevention and social inclusion should be developed both at the individual/community and territorial levels, avoiding the creation of the so-called hotbeds of terrorism and no-go areas. Education, diversity and urban regeneration and renewal could help create a new sense of belonging both within targeted community spaces and between them and the rest of the society, thus avoiding further isolation and criminalisation. Consider the crime-terror nexus in the design of prevention policies inter- vening at all levels (macro, meso and micro).

The evolving relationship between terrorism and crime poses significant challenges. In Europe there is evidence that there is a link between petty crime and terrorism, where individuals on the margins of society and the formal economy or in prison are most vulnerable to radicalisation. In Europe even recently numerous terrorists were involved in various forms of criminality before becoming jihadists. In other areas of the world, the relationship between organised crime and terrorism has transformed to one of symbiosis and convergence, in which it has become increasingly difficult to draw a meaningful distinction. In designing an appropriate policy response at macro level, state actors and policy makers may work to address large-scale basic factors at the crime terrorism nexus by implementing interventions aimed at issues such as improving rule of law, enhancing transparency and boosting economic opportunities. At the meso level, raising awareness of key policy makers of the kinds of prevailing factors that increase the risk of radicalisation and criminalisation would be useful so that measures to ameliorate the resilience can be employed. At the micro level, carefully monitoring vulnerable communities and those individuals already on watchlists for these triggers may allow early and supportive action. Community-led (along with law enforcement cooperation) responses that allow individuals the opportunity to voice and address their grievances may be effective in reducing their vulnerability. Listed below are recommendations for specific policies, taking into account the connection between crime and terrorism: •

improve and increase analyses on radicalisation and criminalisation risks with the collaboration of experts, especially researchers and law enforcement;

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• • •

develop social policies focusing on improving the rule of law and increasing economic opportunities; promote monitoring of vulnerable communities and individuals; support community-led initiatives aimed at the creation of early and tailored support services and structures.

Pursue a multi-agency approach at the local level by strengthening cooperation among local governments and law enforcement agencies as well as NGOs, researchers and social workers operating in the public and private sector.

A local approach is crucial to the successful prevention of radicalisation. To achieve this goal, there is now a unanimous consensus that it is necessary to improve and strengthen collaboration between all the stake- holders involved: civil society, law enforcement, local government and nongovernmental institutions, researchers, social workers from the public and private sector, etc. Pursuing a multi-agency approach should first and foremost involve an effort of dialogue and transparency between the different actors, followed by a common commitment to refining the modalities of cooperation. From the analysis of the case studies presented above, some critical issues have clearly emerged that prevent the implementation or the real effectiveness of the anti-radicalisation plans launched by the various governments. The main weakness that characterises the English and French cases in particular is the scarce or non-existent trust that the Muslim communities have in the institutions. As we have seen, the Prevent strategy is unbalanced by the strong role of the police. Also, in the French case it was highlighted how the prolonged use of state-of-emergency powers contributed to polarising society and undermining the cooperation between Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies. In the Spanish and Belgian cases, given the specific conformation of the state structure and the presence of autonomous and regional local police forces, one of the aspects that emerged was the need for a greater effort on the part of policy makers to coordinate and collaborate at both national and local levels. An effective local multi-agency approach could contribute significantly to overcoming these numerous impasses. The specific policy recommandations identified are listed below: •

improve and increase analyses and statistics on radicalisation risks with the collaboration of experts (especially researchers and law enforcement), both at member state and EU levels (through

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• • • • • • •

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channels such as the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues – EENeT); sharing of knowledge and best practices of existing multi-agency approaches (through EU level channels such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network – RAN); identification and formulation of practical guidelines and sharing protocols (through EU-level channels such as RAN); improve and ensure the coherence and coordination of all structures involved at the national level; improve the analysis of legal frameworks to facilitate the exchange of information between different agencies; identify the perimeters of action of the various actors involved; improve analysis and evaluation of the selection of actors involved and the subsequent funding; enhance support of local and regional structures to ensure rapid and tailored interventions and strengthen long-term expertise (through channels at EU level such as RAN and European Strategic Communications Network-ESCN).

Undermine the appeal of terrorist propaganda through communication and the spread of alternative narratives.

One of the crucial aspects of the phenomenon of radicalisation concerns the channels of communication through which the dissemination of terrorist propaganda takes place. In order to tackle the phenomenon, counter measures must be carried out focusing on three levels: 1. monitoring and setting up all the measures to counter the spread of violent messages through the internet; 2. developing counter and alternative narratives; 3. finding the right balance between media freedom and responsible media reporting that avoids amplifying the spread of extremist messages and contributing to polarisation dynamics and that contrasts the dissemination of fake news and disinformation campaigns. Counter-messaging campaigns through the internet platform have already been launched in countries such as France and Spain: the French “stop djihadisme” and the Spanish “Stop radicalismos”. The aim of these initiatives is twofold: on the one hand, to inform about the risks and effects of radicalisation and, on the other hand, to facilitate citizens’ requests for help and support through toll-free hotlines. These initiatives, however, risk becoming a mere instrument of complaint rather than prevention if they are not accompanied by a complete and effective plan to combat extremist

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propaganda. Below are the main specific recommendations for policy makers: •

•

• • • • • •

to exchange experiences and good practices to identify difficulties on effectiveness and impact in the dissemination of alternative counter- narrative (through EU-level channels as RAN and European Strate- gic Communications Network – ESCN); to develop sustainable strategic communications responses and projects for the dissemination of counter-narratives both on the web and through other communication channels (through the ESCN expertise and consultancy services); to promote and support analysis of the development of communication strategies of extremist groups and disinformation campaigns and their effects (also through the ESCN network); to enhance communication and collaboration in the field of new technologies (in particular in the web) between public actors and private actors; to make formal agreements at national and international levels in the management of information in order to also facilitate intelligence services; to develop and improve channels and tools for the anonymous reporting of at-risk content by citizens; to improve the flexibility and adaptation of the police and intelligence authorities to the rapid changes in the virtual world; to facilitate and raise awareness in the communication industry in the development of ethical and deontological guidance to prevent polarisation dynamics and the spread of extremist narratives.

Adopt gender-sensitive policies in recruitment, retention and promotion of women in prison administrations. Recruit and train women staff to work with violent female extremist prisoners as well as design and deliver genderappropriate interventions.

The basic function of prisons holding alleged, accused or convicted violent extremist prisoners is to contribute to public safety. An effective system for incarcerating convicted terrorists is a central part of an effective criminal justice response to terrorism. Such a system should prevent the further radicalisation of prisoners, prevent terrorist activities from being directed or supported from within the prison system, and provide for the deradicalisation and reintegration of prisoners into society where possible and thereby reduce recidivism.

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Prisons are often described as “breeding grounds” for the radicalisation to violence of prisoners sentenced for offences unrelated to violent extremism. Prisons have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period. No matter how different their causes or backgrounds, European Marxists, Irish Republicans and Egyptian Islamists have all regarded their comrades’ imprisonment as traumatic turning points in the histories of their movements. In light of the risk that prisons constitute potential locations for radicalisation, prisons should further strive to prevent other prisoners from being radicalised to violence. At the same time, prisons also must provide an opportunity for prisoners to disengage from violence, preparing many for their social reintegration into the community. Time in prison may bring about a transformation away from violent extremism – and could even prove a catalyst for positive change. Prisons, as extremely unsettling environments, are “places of vulnerability” which offer nearly optimum conditions for the prospering of radical and often religiously oriented ideologies because individuals are more likely than elsewhere to search for new beliefs and associations. Confronted with existential questions and deprived of their existing social networks, prisoners with no previous involvement in politically motivated violence are vulnerable to being radicalised and recruited into terrorism. Poor conditions, including overcrowding as well as long periods of time in pre-trial detention, can create a situation where not only can radicalisation diffuse but implementation of prevention/rehabilitation programmes may be very difficult to accomplish. Religious conversion is a rather frequent response to the harsh state of detention, but religious conversion is not the same as radicalisation. Good counter-radicalisation policies – whether in or outside prison – never fail to distinguish between the legitimate expression of faith and extremist ideologies. It must equally be taken into account that, in the case of Islamist militant radicalisation, prison imams have an important role to play, but they are not a remedy for every problem. Their credibility and independence must be protected. It is neither reasonable nor realistic to think that they can be spiritual counsellors and at the same time social workers and terrorism experts. European prisons are increasingly focusing on security – as, for example, through the monitoring of people at risk and the deradicalisation wings in prisons – and resorting to solitary confinement to counteract the threat of proselytism of radicalisation and terrorism. These measures can have a dangerous impact and can produce unintended consequences.

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Prisons are not just a threat but can make a positive contribution to tackling problems of radicalisation and terrorism in society as a whole. Prison and probation interventions must aim to ensure the security and safety (for the offender (s) in question, staff, other offenders and society at large), and to support offender rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Prison services should be more ambitious in promoting positive influences inside prison and develop more innovative approaches to facilitate prisoners’ transition back into society. Any approach must be grounded in international human rights law and standards, the rule of law, democracy and justice and based on fundamental principles as: 1) individuals sentenced for terrorist acts do not all pose the same risk to society; 2) offenders are capable of positive change, and need support to disengage from extremism; 3) offenders’ well-being and rehabilitation must be promoted to ensure safety; 4) positive staff-prisoner relationships and healthy prison settings are essential. An adequate risk assessment process on admission is essential and can be the foundation for important decisions about security classification, allocation to different facilities and separating individual prisoners from the general prison population in order to prevent radicalisation. The type of activities supporting to reduce vulnerability to violent extremism will depend on risk, vulnerability and local resources. A diversionary activity may be sufficient for a prisoner who is in the early stages of radicalisation to violence, whereas a more focused and structured one-on-one mentoring programme may be required for those prisoners who are already radicalised to violence. It is also vital as a means to gather information about suitable rehabilitation interventions. Prison intelligence, consistent with national legislation and international standards, is a key aspect of a dynamic security and requires staff to actively engage, and maintain professional relationships, with prisoners if they are to obtain good quality information. The selection and training of staff working with violent extremist prisoners is one particularly important element. Ensuring that prisons holding violent extremist prisoners have a sufficient number of good quality and well-trained staff should be a priority for all prison systems. In some jurisdictions violent extremist prisoners are held in separate

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facilities; in others violent extremists are integrated in all prisons, or dispersed among a few high-security prisons. In both scenarios, the way in which prison personnel deal with violent extremist prisoners can be one of the greatest challenges to the professionalism of prison staff. Prison and probation services must select and recruit staff with relevant linguistic abilities and cultural sensitivity. Intercultural and multi-faith awareness training for staff must form an integral part of education and training in order to promote an understanding and tolerance of diversity of beliefs and traditions. Adequate numbers of specialist staff, such as psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, should be employed in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners. It should not be assumed that people with professional training will automatically be suitable to work in a prison environment and there also needs to be clarity about the role they are expected to carry out. Where prisons are delivering disengagement interventions, personnel involved in the disengagement process (including scholars, faith leaders …) require training to sensitise them to the intervention, its goals and objectives, the kind of violent extremist prisoners they are dealing with, how to manage crises, and how to distinguish between signs of radicalisation to violence and legitimate expressions of faith.

3. Investigation and prosecution/conviction Improve information sharing and coordination among EU Member States by enhancing police cooperation and interoperability of information systems, supporting good practice exchange between counter-radicalisation experts and practitioners, and addressing forms of violent extremism other than jihadism.

While member states have the primary responsibility in the field of security and counter-terrorism (retaining also sole responsibility for national security pursuant to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union), the EU has supported member states’ efforts to collectively combat radicalisation and terrorism. Jihadist terrorism in particular, with its international and transnational nature, together with the goal of preparing or establishing a global Islamic State (the Caliphate) and of profoundly transforming world societies, make it stand out from other national or regional (local) terrorist movements and in need of coordinated and collective responses. This support has taken various forms, from harmonisation of counter-terrorism legislation to the development of specific IT systems or tools facilitating information exchange and law

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enforcement and judicial cooperation, to more operational activities to advance the sharing of best practices and cooperation with civil society and the private sector. Policymakers in the member states must: • • •

•

Increase police cooperation and judicial cooperation and exchange of information between law enforcement authorities while respecting fundamental rights; Move towards the interoperability of information systems in order to address current shortcomings in the exchange; Organise, among prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers, prison wards and parole officers, conferences, workshops and expert meetings on topical counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation issues and share experiences and the good (and bad) context of the gathering and use of (digital/cyber) evidence, or the assessment of rehabilitation needs; Since the potential for political violence and terrorist attacks does not rest exclusively with jihadists, keep an open attitude to other forms of political violence and the differentiated manner in which this manifests.

Support community policing initiatives by promoting knowledge exchange at the EU level, enhancing protection of fundamental rights for the communities involved, conducting regular programme evaluations, delivering improved and upto-date personnel training as well as establishing effective and transparent communication channels between institutions and communities.

The community policing philosophy is based on the promotion of organisational strategies focused on collaboration and the strong bond between law enforcement agencies and communities. It is a preventive and proactive approach aimed at involving and supporting communities in solving local issues. In particular, within the anti-radicalisation policies, the main objective is to raise awareness and inform the population about the risks to their own security and the threat posed by violent extremism. The main pillar of the policing community is trust building, closely linked to capacity building and information sharing. One of the fundamental elements in the fight against terrorism at the local police level is the collection and processing of intelligence on radicalisation. Important and effective synergies can be created between law enforcement agencies and community members who contribute to the local intelligence system. However, to achieve this goal, it is crucial, as

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mentioned above, to support the process of community empowerment and create strong trust-based bonds between citizens and institutions through measures dedicated to: • • • • • • •

strengthening and improving knowledge sharing and best practices on community policing (through EU-level channels); prioritising and enhancing the protection of civil rights and liberties of the communities involved; improving transparency in communicating the role and function of the institutions and their representatives; conducting regular programme evaluations in order to support constant improvements of activities; supporting community-led initiatives; improving and updating personnel training; creating and maintaining rapid and effective communication channels between institutions and communities (for example, through the use of social media).

4. Rehabilitation and reintegration Include the “do no harm” principle in the design of anti-radicalisation, deradicalisation/disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration policies and measures.

Counter-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration policies pursue profound changes. It is in the nature of change that one can never be sure that all aspects of it will be positive. As shown by some lessons learned, laws and measures to prevent radicalisation – addressed to specific categories of vulnerable people and groups and communities – can have unintended consequences that contribute to developing the dynamics and processes of the radicalisation they intended to counteract. As we have seen in the English case of Prevent, strategies aimed at communities broadly identified as being at risk of radicalisation can make groups and individuals feel stigmatised. Programmes aimed at Muslim communities – particularly programmes inspired by the fight against terrorism – have made entire communities feel viewed by the state as potential terrorists because of the actions of a minority9 or have increased prejudice against these communities and thus contributing to the polarisation of society. The “do no harm” principle suggests that, during programme designing and planning, all the possible effects of a programme – long, mid-term,

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short, intended, unintended, positive or negative – have to be considered. “Do no harm” seems an obvious principle to sustain and yet it is difficult to implement because several factors contribute to its difficult realisation. The main ones are: 1) The impossibility of foreseeing long-term consequences. 2) The difficulty of splitting the negative and positive effects of a programme. 3) Many measures have been introduced as emergency measures. 4) Considering the possible consequences is a costly and complex operation and may take some time. These difficulties must not, however, be an obstacle to the insertion in the drafting of all anti-radicalisation deradicalisation/disengagement and rehabilitation policies and measures of the “do no harm” principle. To enhance the capacity to develop and implement the “do no harm” principle it is useful to exchange lessons learned, and map and evaluate the different interventions, best practices and failures. Table 1 summarises the main counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism measures at the macro, meso and micro level.

REHABILITATION REINTAGRATION

INVESTIGATION PROSECUTION TO CONVICTION

PREVENTION Community cohesion programmes, support to families, schools, religious leaders, addressing radicalisation in prison, training on radicalisation for front-line personnel Community policing, law enforcement, judicial systems, intelligence, investigations, disrupt financial support Prison programmes

Cooperation between Member States and EU institutions, agencies and specialised forums in sharing experiences, best practices, informations and analysis

Cooperation between Member States and EU institutions, agencies and specialised forums in sharing experiences, best practices, informations and analysis

Cooperation between Member States and EU institutions, agencies and specialised forums in sharing experiences, best practices, informations and analysis Dealing with returnees, policies on foreign terrorist fighters

Legal infrastructure, law enforcement, judicial systems, intelligence, investigations, disrupt financial support

Dealing with families of returnees

Enhance the local multiagency approach

Promoting inclusive education and EU values, countering terrorist propaganda and hate messages, alternative narrative project, encouraging civil society engagement, crime – terrorism nexus

MESO LEVEL

MACRO LEVEL

Supporting analysis and research to assess radicalisation risk and on radicalisation factors and trends;

Table 1. Policy measures proposed at macro, meso and micro level

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MICRO LEVEL

Deradicalisation and disengagement programmes

Monitoring, arresting and punishing individual offenders, intelligence, investigations, probation infrastructures

Workshop with the former extremists in schools

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Notes 1

European Commission, The European Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185 (28 April 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security_en. 2 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs Glossary, https://ec.europa. eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/r_en. 3 Baker-Beall Cristopher, Heath-Kelly Charlotte and Jarvis Lee, “Introduction,” in Counter-radicalisation: Critical Perspectives, eds. Charlotte Baker-Beall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 1–12. 4 For the staircase model see Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist, no. 60 (2005): 161–169, and for pyramid model, see McCauley Clark, Moskalenko Sophia., “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathway toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 20 (2008): 415–433. 5 High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation, “Interim Report,” (Preliminary Findings and Recommendations) (December 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=36235&no=1. 6 Amnesty International, “France: Renewal of State of Emergency risks normalizing exceptional measures,” (December 15, 2016). 7 Human Right Watch, “Preempting Justice. Counter-terrorism laws and procedures in France,” (July, 1, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/01/preempting-justice/ counterterrorism-lawsand-procedures-franc and Human Right Watch, “France is ad- dicted to the state of emergency. Put an end to it, Mr. President,” (July 11, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/11/france-addicted-state-emergency-put-endit- mr-president. 8 European Commission, The European Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185 (28 April 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security_en. 9 Awan Imran, “I am a Muslim not an extremist”: How the Prevent Strategy has constructed a “suspect” community,” Politics & Policy 40, no. 6 (2012): 1158– 1185; Clutterbuck Lindsay, Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2015; Thomas Paul, “Prevent and community cohesion in Britain: The worst of all possible worlds?” in Counterradicalisation: Critical Perspectives, eds. Cristopher Baker-Beall. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, 36–52.

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List of References Amnesty International. “France: Renewal of State of Emergency risks normalizing exceptional measures.” December 15, 2016. Awan, Imran. “I am a Muslim, not an extremist”: How the Prevent Strategy has constructed a “suspect” community.” Politics & Policy 40, no. 6, (2012): 1158–1185. Baker-Beall, Cristopher, Heath-Kelly Charlotte, and Jarvis Lee. ‘Introduction’, in Counter-radicalisation: Critical Perspectives, edited by Cristo- pher Baker-Beall, 1–12. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. Clutterbuck, Linsay. Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism. Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 2015. European Commission. Migration and Home Affairs Glossary. https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e- library/glossary/r en. European Commission. The European Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185, (28 April 2015). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/european-agenda-security_en. Fathali, M. Moghaddam. “The Staircase to Terrorism”. American Psychologist, no. 60, (2005): 161–169. High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation. “Interim Report” (Preliminary Findings and Recommendations), (December 2017). http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail. groupDetailDoc&id=36235&no=1. Human Right Watch. “France is addicted to the state of emergency. Put an end to it, Mr. President.” July 11, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/11/france-addicted-stateemergency-put-end-it-mr-president. Human Right Watch. “Preempting Justice. Counterterrorism laws and procedures in France.” July 1, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/01/preemptingjustice/counterterrorism-laws-and-procedures-franc. Moskalenko, Sophia and Clark McCauley. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation: Pathway toward Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 20 (2008): 415–433. Thomas, Paul. “Prevent and community cohesion in Britain: The worst of all possible worlds?” In Counter-radicalisation: Critical Perspectives, edited by Cristopher Baker-Beall, 36–52. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015.

PART II PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM: THE CIVIL SOCIETY

CHAPTER EIGHT THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLICIES TO PREVENT RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM IN EUROPE ALESSANDRO ZANASI

1. Civil society actors Within the broad framework of policies of counter-radicalisation, civil society is more and more perceived as a central partner in both developing and enacting counter radicalisation strategies. According to the European Commission1 (EC), the closest possible approach to vulnerable subjects is demanded to successfully tackle violent extremism, and this requires close cooperation with local entities, with particular regard to actors from civil society. In this context, civil society encompasses “all forms of social actions carried out by individuals or groups who are neither connected to, nor managed by, the State”2, whereas a civil society organisation (CSO) is defined as “an organisational structure whose members serve the general interest through a democratic process, and which plays the role of mediator between public authorities and citizens3”. The significance of civil society’s contribution to EU governance is highlighted by Art. 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU4, which calls for an “open, transparent and regular dialogue” to be upheld with specific CSOs, such as community-based and faith-based associations. The involvement of civil society is in fact deemed fundamental, given the power that CSOs have to effectively support any effort aimed at countering radicalisation at all stages, from its prevention (e.g. within families), to re-education and reintegration in the social fabric (e.g. thanks to the support of teachers and social workers). Furthermore, civil society actors can monitor vulnerable individuals and exchange information with other relevant stakeholders (from both the private and public sphere).

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When it comes to countering violent radicalisation, the EC admits that legislative and security measures alone are inadequate, emphasising the need to complement such efforts with policies to engage and seek support from actors belonging to civil society5, which can range from schools and families to non-for-profit research, advocacy and media groups. The advantages of involving civil society stem from the ability of CSOs to address aspects that are conducive to violent extremism, from psychological behaviours and personal experiences and social and group dynamics to political, economic, cultural, and religious beliefs. In other words, grass-root communities are deemed better suited to intervene at the local level to give voice to such grievances and offer dependable answers6. The importance of local communities was also stressed in a recent publication by RAN7, which further highlights their ability to provide a deeper understanding of target audiences, stating that the counternarratives they propose are able to “understand the specific, and often local, vulnerabilities, attitudes, behaviours, interests and media consumption habits of a particular target audience”. According to a study conducted by the Change Institute8 and to research carried out by OSCE9, in fact, CSOs can rely on a broad range of specific features that make them precious allies in the fight against violent extremism. Examples of such characteristics include: • • • • •

Capacity to deliver a same-level structure dialogue to those subjects (e.g. political zealots, isolated individuals, etc.) undergoing, or most at risk to undergo, the process of violent radicalisation; Ability to fill gaps left by public authorities in terms of services provided (e.g. social workers, teachers and doctors who operate in close proximity to vulnerable individuals); Deep awareness of local needs and of the necessary knowledge, skills and experience to address them; Faculty to recognise measures likely to be successful and tailored to local contexts; Potential to provide participatory responses with a more immediate and tangible impact.

In addition, it is important to point out that actors from civil society have another crucial prerogative as they may act upon various different stages of the radicalisation process. CSOs could in fact intervene before and during a person’s path towards violent extremism through activities directed at preventing violent extremism (e.g. awareness raising, training, community policing, etc.), but also after, by means of efforts targeting

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individuals who have already been radicalised (e.g. rehabilitation and reintregration of former radicals, etc.). At the same time, it is worth noting that CSOs may either directly contribute to counter radicalisation, through initiatives conducted autonomously and without any ties with public authorities, or play a complementary role to them, through activities developed or implemented in partnership with government players10. Taking into account all these preliminary considerations, the following sections will outline the foremost policies recently implemented with the aim to prevent and contrast the phenomenon of violent radicalisation. Such comprehensive analysis will be articulated in two main levels: initially, the investigation will focus on the measures – directed at and supported by civil society actors – implemented by the European Union, to subsequently move to those deployed at the EU Member State level by examining five selected case studies: Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

1.1 European Union The strategy pursued by the European Union for countering the phenomena of radicalisation and the recruitment of terrorists considers enhancing the resilience of civil society as the highest priority. Another urgency set out by the EU and its institutions is to properly train, build capacity and engage with first-line practitioners operating across various domains. One of the initiatives undertaken by the European Commission in the broad framework of this strategic approach is the establishment of the Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP)11, coordinated by the RAN Centre of Excellence12 – which involves over 2400 front-line practitioners from different areas of civil society in the prevention of radicalisation and funded within the Internal Security Fund13. The programme, established in 2015, aims to exploit the potential provided by the internet to support civil society stakeholders in the advancement of positive narratives challenging those embedded in violent extremist propaganda. In this respect, the CSEP organises capacity-building and training activities, encourages partnerships between civil society organisations and internet companies and supports civil society in communication efforts targeted at individuals at risk of radicalisation. In 2017, for instance, a training programme was designed to address the skills required by CSOs in order to reach vulnerable groups through counternarrative campaigns14. In addition, the CSEP has lately created a solid network15 comprised of those EC-funded projects (e.g. TRIVALENT16, etc.) that seek to counter and prevent the spread of extremism and

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radicalisation all over Europe, thus strengthening the capabilities of all the stakeholders involved in such efforts. The CSEP falls in turn under the umbrella of a broader initiative, known as the EU Internet Forum17, established by the EC Directorate General for Home Affairs18 (DG HOME) in 2015 and aimed at addressing the mounting usage of the internet made – for criminal purposes – by terrorist and extremist groups. This strategic perspective stems from the acknowledgement that terrorists and extremists are increasingly exploiting the internet in the spreading of their propaganda, and that corrective steps must be undertaken to counter this trend. More specifically, the EU Internet Forum serves as a platform to endorse spontaneous cooperation amongst industry, government, law enforcement agencies, and civil society with a twofold objective: on the one hand, to make violent extremist contents more difficult to access on the web; on the other hand, to empower local actors in the spread of alternative narratives. In doing so, the internet industry represents a key partner and the public-private partnership has the objective of detecting and addressing harmful material on the web by pulling down the extremist content that is detected and by giving a voice to those that challenge extremist narratives. Furthermore, measures taken at the EU level to strengthen the resilience of civil society against violent extremism have been accompanied by efforts to support first-line practitioners in their radicalisation-prevention activities. In this regard, the EU has funded several projects related to community engagement and empowerment, which have been carried out by civil society organisations. One of the most relevant is the TERRA project19 (2012-2016), aimed at supporting information exchange within networks of practitioners from both government and civil society. The TERRA toolkit included training manuals for teachers, police, prison officers, religious leaders and journalists, recommendations for local and national policy makers as well as interviews with victims of terrorism and former radicalised individuals. In other words, these training materials are intended to support those firstline workers that deal with radicalised individuals so they can undertake deradicalisation activities and increase the disengagement from terrorist and extremist groups. As for the case of TERRA, other projects have recently been funded by the European Commission in the framework of countering radicalisation. The PERICLES project20, for instance, was launched in 2017 with the aim of devising a holistic approach in the prevention and countering of violent radicalisation and extremism. In addition, the EC has financed the TRIVALENT project21, which aims at understanding the root causes of

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left-wing, right-wing and religious radicalisation at the EU level in order to develop appropriate countermeasures, ranging from early detection methodologies to counter-narrative techniques, and the CICERO project22, which will develop and implement a counter-narrative communication campaign aimed at preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism, accompanied by a methodology for evaluating the campaign’s effectiveness. Besides funding initiatives of prevention of radicalisation led by civil society actors, the EU has also sought to empower civil society by developing a collection of dedicated training materials. For instance, a variety of resources have been produced specifically targeting youth workers, such as “The Contribution of Youth Work to Preventing Marginalisation and Violent Radicalisation”23, released by the EC Directorate General for Education and Culture24 (DG EAC), and the “Young People and Extremism Resource Packs”25, jointly written by the British Council26 and SALTO27. Yet, another initiative recently introduced at the European level is the creation of a fact sheet “Tackling Radicalisation through Education and Youth Action28”, which explains how European education, as well as youth initiatives and policies, should face the threat of radicalisation. Amongst the suggested approaches and prevention strategies, the document highlights the importance of supporting cross-national partnerships as well as stresses the significance of European values through education models comprising sportspersons, artists and entrepreneurs from disadvantaged backgrounds. At the same time, the EU has complemented these prevention policies with measures aimed at intervening at the opposite end of the radicalisation process in order to rehabilitate individuals that have already become radicalised. In this respect, a European Network of Deradicalisation29 (ENoD) was established in 2013 within the framework of an international project co-funded by DG HOME. More specifically, ENoD was set up as an EU network composed of local practitioners from NGOs dealing with deradicalisation and the prevention of hate crimes through direct engagement with individuals at risk. Further deradicalisation actions undertaken at the EU level have come from RAN’s Exit and Prison & Probation Working Group30, which aims at providing assistance to those practitioners (prison staff, policymakers, doctors, religious figures, etc.) involved in the prevention of radicalisation in jails. Such efforts have focused on facilitating the reintegration of previously radicalised individuals (e.g. former prisoners) into society as well as on disheartening extremists from engaging in violent behaviours. To this end, a series of activities have been carried out, from the

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organisation of joint meetings with NGOs working with offenders and people seeking to leave extremist groups to the production of manuals for former radicals involved in exit works31.

1.2 Belgium Although a variety of dedicated strategies, programmes and networks have been established at the European level, it is also true that counterradicalisation policies are mostly considered a prerogative of Member States. In this regard, the national strategy of Belgium to fight and prevent radicalisation has been defined by federal authorities within a document entitled “Action Plan against Radicalisation”, also referred to as Plan R32. Published in 2005 and updated in 2015 in the aftermath of the terror attacks carried out in France and Belgium, Plan R aims at defining a global line of action against radicalisation, creating a structure tasked with the coordination of all local and federal activities related to this issue. This document sets up one National Task Force, which provides overall coordination on a national level for the Action Plan, plus many different local task forces, which are operational consultation platforms for police forces and intelligence agencies, and limited to a specific area of competence. In addition, the Belgian Coordination Committee for Intelligence and Security33 – in coordination with the Belgian Federal Public Service Home Affairs34 – established “Unit Radicalism” (Unit R) in 2014, a task force that oversees the preparation, elaboration and evaluation of security and prevention policies. More specifically, examples of tasks executed through Unit R range from knowledge acquisition and dissemination and awareness-raising activities to keep society informed about solutions against violent radicalisation, to training and coaching professionals active in the fight against such phenomena. In 2015, a memorandum was circulated by the government demanding the mayors of all Belgian cities to set up “local integrated security cells” (LIVC) in a multidisciplinary platform that allows public authorities to work with religious institutions, schools, associations, and social workers with the purpose of establishing new procedures to combat radicalisation at a local level. The objective of this integrated approach is to guarantee a continuous exchange of information between civil society, preventive services such as the local task forces and the authorities, so as to ensure the early detection of signs of radicalisation and that radicalized individuals35 are dealt with in a timely manner.

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While a general framework is also in place at the federal level, since 2014 a new state reform has further identified local communities as crucial actors in preventing radicalisation. As a result, various policies have been developed by the different Belgian communities and regions. The most widely documented are those implemented by the government of the Flanders region36. Such measures include subsidising and organising a series of training programmes, each tailored to specific sectors of civil society such as civil society actors in touch with individuals at risk of radicalisation or involved in the rehabilitation of foreign fighters and their family members. Training programmes are therefore not only directed at first-line workers (e.g. teachers), but also at imams, with the aim of providing them with a better knowledge of the social context and the Dutch language. This training, developed by the government of the Flanders region, covers both theoretical training (e.g. aimed at detecting symptoms of radicalisation) and pragmatic training (e.g. conversation techniques to be used when dealing with vulnerable individuals). Another initiative launched in the Flemish region in 2018 and funded by the district’s government is the so-called “Network Islam experts”, in which Islam experts give young people and first-line practitioners explanations and interpretations about Islam and the Islamic standards and values. In addition, the initiative provides support to local sport clubs and neighbourhood sport initiatives in order to encourage the interfaith dialogue and help young people feel more connected to the society they live in. Furthermore, a special employment path is accessible to radicalised individuals and vulnerable young people through collaboration with the public employment service of Flanders (VDAB), whose mediators have been trained to detect symptoms of radicalisation. Beyond local and federal initiatives, other projects have been implemented through the synergy between EU and Belgian national institutions. An instance of such is the BOUNCE project37 (2015–2018), funded by the EU and coordinated by the Belgian Federal Public Service Home Affairs38, consisting of a package of three training and awarenessraising tools aimed at young people, with the goal of improving the capabilities of early detection and prevention of radicalisation. More specifically, these tools are BOUNCE Young, BOUNCE Along and BOUNCE Up. BOUNCE Young aims at strengthening the youngsters’ resilience to violent radicalisation as a preventive factor. BOUNCE Along, instead, is focused on parents and first-line workers in their daily efforts to prevent radicalisation among young people. Lastly, BOUNCE Up is a “train-the-trainer” tool that combines BOUNCE Young and BOUNCE Along39.

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1.3 France In the aftermath of the Paris attacks on November 13th, 2015, the former French president, François Hollande, pushed for the adoption of the so-called Security Pact40 (SPA). Amongst the different measures implemented, the pact established the recruitment of imams that embraced French values to engage in education activities in prisons and directed at preventing those detainees deemed vulnerable to radicalisation. In May 2016, a new Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism41 (PART), enacted by the French government, introduced 80 strategies aimed at increasing civil society’s capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to violent radicalisation. The initiative encompassed the development of education projects in partnership with municipalities and associations, consisting of a range of extracurricular activities (foreseeing, for instance, the creation and the dissemination of best practice guides among school principals) to improve students’ critical thinking skills, and encouraging the establishment of regional hubs of entities dealing with radicalised people, with the involvement of networks of major associations from which the French government can benefit in its counter radicalisation efforts. France, in fact, can rely on a wide body of networks both within and outside of its borders; this is comprised of its diplomatic and consular network (which is the world’s third-largest, counting around 500 sites), its cultural network, the largest worldwide, with 500 French institutes, around 40 research institutes and more than 400 Alliances Françaises; and by its school network. Finally, university scholarships were created and made accessible by temporary teachers, research assistants and PhD candidates working in the field of the fight against violent extremism. The PART plan is not the only strategy the French government has put in place in order to enhance its cooperation with civilians. In November 2016, the former French prime minister, Manuel Valls, initiated a comprehensive and multifaceted campaign against terrorism and radicalisation known as “Stop Djihadisme42” (Stop Jihadism), tailored towards the tackling of terrorism of all shapes, from the online recruitment of foreign fighters to the improvement of the French legal corpus to fight this phenomenon (one of the achievements of this initiative, for instance, is a law approved on October 30, 201743 that strengthens the fight against terrorism by allowing every local district in France to conduct surveillance on any person for whom there are serious reasons to believe that their behaviour constitutes a threat). This initiative, based on the assumption that every citizen can play an important role in the fight against violent extremism, revolves around the idea of providing its users with the possibility to easily and rapidly get in touch with the government. The

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creation of a toll-free hotline is primarily directed at people suspecting that friends or relatives might be at risk of radicalisation but it is also usable by survivors of terrorist attacks who want to share their experiences. Stop Djihadisme also has a Facebook44 and a Twitter45 account that pursue the same idea of approachability and the involvement of the public. This very concept – which envisages a prominent role for civil society actors in preventing the phenomenon of radicalisation – underpins another initiative called “Vigipirate”46, active since 1978 and revised in 2006. More specifically, Vigipirate is a terrorism-alert system active nationwide in France that, amongst other things, encourages individuals to raise the alert about suspicious situations and contact the nearest police precinct using a free telephone hotline and a dedicated internet platform47. Whereas Vigipirate is intended to function as an alert system, the counter-radicalisation strategies of the French government are complemented by initiatives focused on prevention. One of these is the “Prevent to Protect” National Plan to Counter Radicalisation48. Using the enriched legislation described above, in October 2017 the government enacted a new plan that included 60 measures aimed at refocusing the French strategy of prevention around five main themes: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

Shielding minds from radicalisation; Widening the detection/prevention network; Understanding and preparing for developments in radicalisation; Training local stakeholders and assessing practices; Tailoring disengagement schemes.

Another counter-radicalisation initiative involving French civil society actors is the “Community Counteracting Radicalisation” project49 (CoCoRa), which aimed at tackling radicalisation amongst youth by empowering local communities as equal partners in the efforts of prevention50. Co-funded by the EC and carried out between 2015 and 2017, the project saw the active involvement of the Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Citoyennes et Européennes51 (Association for the Development of Citizen and European Initiatives), which organised workshops and meetings with representatives of local communities with the aim of gathering ideas for future prevention efforts targeted at young people. CoCoRa has had five major outcomes: the collaborative programme, the prevention programme, the ambassador programme, the prevention strategy and the handbook collection52. The CoCoRa collaborative programme, based on collaboration with local groups, held workshops aimed at enhancing the involvement of young people in its

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future activities. The project’s prevention programme was in fact focused on youth in its definition of preventive strategies reliant on values of democracy and antidiscrimination. The young targets of the project were also crucial players in the ambassador programme, which aimed at the empowerment of the youngsters and allowed them to present their needs and desires to the public authorities and the practitioners involved in the field of prevention of radicalisation. Lastly, CoCoRa’s prevention strategy and handbook collection gathered the project’s findings in terms of tools, approaches and methods of prevention. In addition to national policies and EU initiatives, it is worth mentioning that a significant contribution to the French efforts directed at the prevention of violent extremism delivered by NGOs, several of which are at the forefront of dealing with the prevention of radicalisation at a national level. The Association Française des Victimes du terrorisme53 (Association of French Victims of Terrorism), for instance, aimed to bring together social workers and victims of terrorism through the implementation of two major programmes: the first one, called “Terrorism: How about listening to what victims have to say?”, was created in 2010 to encourage the involvement of young people through the organisation of conferences in schools and prisons located in suburban areas (e.g. the French city of Sevran) or endangered neighbourhoods54; the second initiative, called “Victim’s Counter-Terrorism Gathering”, was put in place in 2014 and consisted of reuniting 21 victims of terrorism, coming from different continents as well as belonging to different socio-cultural backgrounds, in order to produce an awareness-raising documentary to be distributed to the general public55. Other NGOs are instead more focused on the prevention of radicalisation through the promotion of inter-faith and intercultural dialogue, which is not a mere theological matter but a rather complex issue that, if addressed correctly, can strengthen resilience and prevention capabilities. In this respect, for instance, the Scouts Musulmans de France56 (Muslim Scouts of France) organises educational activities – such as trips, camping and outdoor games – for the purpose of breaking down barriers with local youth57. Another organisation involved in such efforts is the Fraternité d’Abraham58 (Brotherhood of Abraham), which seeks to improve the relationship between the three religions that have evolved from Abraham (i.e. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism). To this end, the NGO not only organises monthly conferences on theological and political topics59 but also offers support to the Ligue de l’Enseignement60 (League of Teaching) in order to shape partnerships with schools and promote the

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integration of young people belonging to difficult family backgrounds. In a similar way, the Paris-based Institut des cultures d’Islam61 (Institute of Islamic Culture) undertakes a wide range of initiatives, including conferences and seminars on the historical, cultural and sociological aspects of the Muslim culture, with the aim of spreading a deeper understanding of Islam in the French capital.

1.4 Italy One of the major strategies pursued by the Italian government in order to include civil society in its counter-radicalisation efforts is the funding, through the Ministero della Giustizia62 (Ministry of Justice), of a pilot project targeting detainees of Muslim faith. Developed in partnership with the NGO Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d’Italia63 (Union of Islamic Communities of Italy), the project’s objective is to prevent radicalisation in prisons by giving imams and spiritual leaders – some of whom are women – access to eight detention facilities (the prisons of Turin, Cremona, Modena, Sollicciano, San Vittore, Bollate, Canton Mombello, and Verona) that host large numbers of Muslim detainees. The involvement of religious leaders is envisaged to allow inmates to exercise their full civil rights as well as at provide individuals with targeted spiritual support64. The project aims at granting detainees of Muslim faith full access to all their civil rights (e.g. collective prayers on Fridays, their freedom of, the right to speak with an imam, the right to have halal food served to them, etc.). Providing these fundamental rights to the detainees prevents them from developing sentiments of victimisation, and fights any resentment, that could lead them to follow the path of radicalisation. Besides this initiative, the Italian Ministry of Justice has been working to improve the training of the first-line practitioners (e.g. educators, probation services, etc.) dealing with detainees. To this end, dedicated training courses were delivered, starting from 2010, with the aim to increase the practitioners’ understanding of the Islamic culture through lectures by professors and cultural mediators in order to improve the capability to detect early signs of violent extremism and proselytism by using specific indicators and tools. In addition, such training courses were addressed at improving and supporting the information exchange amongst different actors (e.g. penitentiary police, educators, social workers, etc.) through working group activities. In parallel to domestic policies, Italian civil society actors have played an increasingly prominent role in the implementation of counterradicalisation projects that are stand-alone with regard to governmental

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support. CESIE65, a Palermo-based NGO, has been a key player in the above-mentioned CoCoRa, which foresaw the execution of collaborative activities (e.g. dedicated workshops, joint visits to churches and mosques, etc.) in the Sicilian city, with the participation of local youngsters from different religious and cultural backgrounds. These activities were based on the assumption that engaging young people, empowering them and raising their awareness are fundamental preventive steps in that they are aimed at enhancing their resilience against extremism, and attracting them to the values of democracy and inter-faith coexistence. Another example includes the work carried out by organisations such as EXIT66 and Associazione Italiana Vittime del Terrorismo67 (AIVITER), which deem education of youth a pivotal strategy for combating violent radicalisation and improving individual resilience. More specifically, EXIT offers psychological consultations and support to victims of discrimination and violence in religious groups by means of a wide spectrum of approaches, from conflict resolution and conflict transformation methods to one-onone interventions whereas, in the framework of the “Counternarration4Counterterrorism – C4C” Project68, AIVITER has produced a set of multimedia training modules, such as a multilanguage open source web platform, which leverage the testimonials and stories of terrorism victims in order to raise awareness about extremist violence and spur young people to play a more active role as community members. The web platform “The Terrorism Survivors Storytelling – Global Platform for Resilience Stories and Radicalisation Awareness” comprises a global database of stories of terrorism survivors, either as texts, videos or photos.

1.5 Spain The Spanish strategy for the fight against terrorism and radicalisation revolves around the so-called Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalizacion Violenta (Strategic Plan to Fight Against Violent Radicalisation), a document defining the framework for strategic actions that the Spanish government undertakes to detect and neutralise early outbreaks of violent radicalisation, which is considered one of the biggest threats to Spain’s national security69. Even though the plan is built to contrast every kind of violent radicalisation, the main emphasis – even more after the terrorist attacks that occurred recently on European soil – is currently given to jihadist terrorism70. More specifically, the plan sets up a unique national structure coordinated by the National Group to Combat Violent Radicalisation under the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is comprised of various

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ministerial departments, the National Intelligence Centre and the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces as well as other institutions, bodies and associations71. The national group is responsible for supervising the local groups – involving representatives of the local community and coordinated by law enforcement agencies – located in each municipal district of the state. Each case is assessed in both national and local groups and, depending on its characteristics and criticality, it is addressed to the level most appropriate to solve it72. Besides the above measure, the Spanish government has created several other instruments to enhance the efficiency of the fight against terrorism through the involvement of civil society actors. Examples in this respect include the creation – by the Ministry of Justice – of the “Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence”, which aims to promote dialogue and fund selected integration projects, including the publication of the first Spanish book on Islam for first-grade students73. In addition, the Minister of the Interior has implemented the “Stop Radicalismos” (Stop Radicalism) platform which provides users with the possibility to report radicalised behaviour through various channels such as a website74, a hotline number (900822066) and the “AlertCops75” app. Furthermore, the Spanish administration has funded to the so-called Mapa del Terror76 (Map of Terror), an educational project conceived by the Colectivo de Víctimas del Terrorismo en el País Vasco77 (Collective of Victims of Terrorism in the Basque Country) and aimed at delivering alternative narratives to violent radicalisation to teachers and pupils. The Spanish government has also made sure to tighten and increase its cooperation with religious organisations, especially those representing the Muslim population, whose presence on national soil has steadily grown in the last 10 years78. An increasingly significant role has therefore been assumed by the Comisión Islámica de España79 (Spanish Islamic Commission), which has emphasised the need – in accordance with the formal cooperation agreement signed in 1992 that envisaged the availability of Islamic education in Spanish public schools80 – to intervene at the educational level as a measure to reinforce counter-radicalisation efforts. As a result, during the academic year 2016-2017, Muslim secondary school students had Muslim religion classes in which they were given educational tools (e.g. comics) to facilitate their understanding of how to reject radicalisation. In addition, it is important to remark on the crucial role played by the Spanish Islamic Commission in cooperating with national authorities and condemning the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists81.

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1.6 United Kingdom The United Kingdom’s national counter-terrorism strategy, called CONTEST, was adopted in 2003 and consists of four key components: • • • •

Pursue, which aims at the detection and prosecution of individuals planning terrorist attacks against the UK and its interests; Prepare, which revolves around the mitigation of impacts derived from terrorist attacks as well as those subsequent actions necessary to undertake a national recovery; Protect, which consists of strengthening measures to enhance national safeguards against terrorist attacks (e.g. stricter checks at the border, etc.); Prevent, which seeks to pre-emptively prevent individuals at risk from undertaking a radicalisation process82.

The latter strategy in particular assumes a pivotal role with regard to building a society resilient to violent extremism through the involvement of civil society actors. In this respect, after consultations with Muslim communities in the aftermath of the 2005 London suicide bombings, the UK government detected seven key areas in the fight against radicalisation: Engaging with young people, education, engaging with Muslim women, supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions, imams’ training, community security, and tackling extremism and radicalisation83. More specifically, the “Prevent” programme foresees government cooperation with 82 civil society organisations84 located in over 40 priority areas (e.g. education, faith, health, criminal justice, etc.) spread across the country85. Notably, police officers and members of religious and ethnic communities have collaborated in collecting information to identify individuals deemed potentially problematic or at risk of radicalisation86. Put in this context, the “Channel” programme87, which is part of “Prevent”, assumes crucial relevance in providing early-stage support to vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background lest they become involved in criminal activities. In particular, the programme foresees the partnership between representatives of the National Health Service (NHS), social services, schools, and other civil society actors with the objective to report and assist vulnerable subjects. For instance, during the participating panels – organised locally to provide support for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism – if the individual at stake is a child already known to social services, the social worker operating at that local level will be involved in all the decisions concerning that child88.

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As in the other EU member states previously analysed, several UK NGOs have stood out over the years for their efforts in the attempt to prevent radicalisation. The Active Change Foundation89, which copes with cases of serious violence associated with gangs, violent extremism and hate crimes, periodically organises different sport and educational events, offers support to young individuals looking for a job, provides tailored training activities (e.g. One-Day Prevent Extremism Training90), and provides a tailored development plan for young people91. Another organisation contributing to the prevention of the radicalisation of youngsters is the Institute for Strategic Dialogue92 through its “One to One” programme, which over the years has engaged 723 radicalised individuals93, and the “Against Violent Extremism94” global network, reuniting former extremists and survivors of violent extremism now fighting radical narratives and preventing the recruitment of vulnerable youth. Other civil society-driven projects implemented in the UK include the Youth Civil Activism Network95, which connect almost 1300 young activists, creatives and technology entrepreneurs to support the creation of counter-narrative contents, and Radical Dialogue96, consisting of 30-hour courses in which members of local communities are encouraged to actively engage in the counter-radicalisation efforts97. No less importantly, women are playing an increasingly relevant role in the prevention of the radicalisation phenomenon. This is evidenced by their growing participation in several community engagement initiatives such as the “Muslimah Matters98”, promoted by the Liverpool University, a project consisting of several workshops involving women associated with mosques and other faith institutions in order to increase their knowledge of vulnerability issues and to identify “matriarch” figures capable of fostering female networks99. Another project that goes in this direction is “Women and Extremism”100, committed to the creation of an active network of female policy makers, academics and activists dealing with the role of women in violent extremism101.

Notes 1

Accessed April 29, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en. “Civil Society Organisation,” EUR-Lex, Accessed April 23, 2019, https://eurlex. europa.eu/summary/glossary/civil_society_organisation.html. 3 Stijn Smismans, “‘Civil society’ in European institutional discourses,” Centre Européen Institut d’Etudes Politiques Paris, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d72a8633-1fd1-47bb-91246f6df4c21e89.pdf. 2

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“The European Parliament’s Implementation of Article 17 TFEU,” EU Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/ religious-and-non-con-fessional-dialogue/home/en-article17-the-epimplementation.pdf. 5 Change Institute, “Study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation,” July 2008, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ecvr_best_practice_core_report_en.pdf. 6 Bibi van Ginkel, Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (ICCT – The Hague Research Paper, 2012). 7 “Developing counter- and alternative narratives together with local communities,” RAN Issue Paper, October 15, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/aboutran/ran-c-and-n/docs/developing_counter_and_alternative_narratives_together_ with_local_communities_en.pdf. 8 Change Institute, “Study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation,” July 2008, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ecvr_best_practice_core_report_en.pdf. 9 “The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Focus on South-Eastern Europe,” OSCE, August 2018, https://wb-iisg.com/wp-content/uploads/bp-attachments/5978/ OSCE_ Role-of-Civil-Society-in-PCVERLT-SEE.pdf. 10 Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices,” Accessed April 15, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/ networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran _collection-approach- es_and_practices_en.pdf. 11 “EU Internet Forum: Civil Society Empowerment Programme” European Commission for Migration and Home Affairs, Accessed April 15, 2019 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/civil-society-empowermentprogramme_en. 12 “Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN),” European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/radicali- sation_awareness_network_en. 13 “Internal Security Fund – Police,” European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-andsafeguard- ing-liberties/internal-security-fund-police_en. 14 “Joint Activity Plan (JAP) for the Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP),” RAN Centre of Excellence, January 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/mar/ eu-com-radicalisation-civil-societyempowerment-programme-work-plan-2017-19.pdf.

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“CSEP Network,” European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs, https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme/csep_db_en. 16 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://trivalent-project.eu/. 17 “EU Internet Forum: Bringing together governments, Europol and technology companies to counter-terrorist content and hate speech online,” European Commission, Press release December 3, 2015, Accessed April 15, 2019 http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-15-6243_en.htm. 18 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/index_en. 19 Accessed April 15, 2019, https://terratoolkit.eu/. 20 Accessed April 29, 2019, http://project-pericles.eu/. 21 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://trivalent-project.eu/. 22 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.cicero-project.eu/. 23 Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, European Commission, “The Contribution of Youth Work to Preventing Marginalisation and Violent Radicalisation,” March 10, 2017, Accessed April 15, 2019 https://publications.europa. eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0ad09926-a8b111e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1. 24 “Education, Youth, Sport and Culture,” European Commission, DirectorateGeneral https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/education-youth-sport-and-culture_en. 25 Accessed April 18, 2019 https://www.salto-youth.net/downloads/4-17-3550/ 26 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://www.britishcouncil.org/. 27 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://www.salto-youth.net/. 28 European Commission, “Tackling Radicalisation through Education and Youth Action,” Accessed April 18, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmusplus/sites/ erasmusplus/files/library/fact-sheet-post-paris_en.pdf. 29 Accessed April 18, 2019, https://violence-prevention-network.de/?lang=en. 30 “Prison and Probation Working Group (RAN P&P),” European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/ radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p_en. 31 Accessed April 18, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/ networks/ radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit_en. 32 Accessed April 19, 2019, http://besafe.jdbi.eu/sites/besafe.localhost/files/u3051/ planr_en.pdf. 33 Accessed April 29, 2019, http://www.ennir.be/belgium/belgian-intelligence-andse- curity-landscape. 34 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://ibz.be/. 35 Isabelle Vincke, Philippe Devaux and Julyette Lenders “Dossier: Organen en Maatregelen in de Strijd tegen Radicalisme,” Nieuwsbrief Stad en Gemeenten van Brussel-Hoofdstad, no. 1 (2016): 13–14. 36 Government of Flanders, “Action Plan for the Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation processes that can lead to extremism and terrorism,” Accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.fdfa.be/sites/default/files/atoms/files/actieplan_radicalisering_eng.pdf. 37 Accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/the-project.

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Accessed April 29, 2019, https://www.ibz.be/. Accessed April 29, 2019, https://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/bounce-tools. 40 “Discours du président de la République devant le Congrès,” François Hollande, November 16, 2015, https://onu.delegfrance.org/François-Hollande-s-Speech-Before-a-Joint-Session-of-Parliament. 41 Accessed April 19, 2019, http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2018/10/20181004plan-d-action-contre-le-terrorisme-anglais.pdf. 42 Accessed April 19, 2019, http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/. 43 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000035932811&categorieLien=id. 44 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/Stopdjihadisme.FR/. 45 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://twitter.com/stopdjihadisme?lang=en. 46 “Tackling Terrorism Together,” Accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/locale/piecejointe/2017/08/vigipirate-anglais-v2017.pdf. 47 TERRA, “Inventory of the best-practices on deradicalisation from the different Member-States of the EU,” Accessed April 19, 2019, http://www.terra-net.eu/files/ nice_to_know/20140722134422CVERLTdef.pdf. 48 “Prevent to Protect” National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation, Interministerial Com- mittee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR), February 23, 2018, https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PNPR_ English_final_sans- mediakit.pdf. 49 Accessed April 19, 2019, http://cocoraproject.eu/. 50 CoCoRa, “The CoCoRa Prevention Strategy Handbook Collection,” Accessed April 19, 2019, http://cocoraproject.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/cocora-handbook-collection-en.pdf. 51 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://adice.asso.fr/en/. 52 Accessed April 30, 2019, http://cocoraproject.eu/outputs/. 53 Accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.afvt.org. 54 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7481_en. 55 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.afvt.org/7-mars-2014-action-de-lafvt-orga-madrid0-14-mars-2014/. 56 Accessed April 30, 2019, http://scoutsmusulmans.fr/. 57 Vladimir de Gmeline, “Scouts musulmans: Islam, B.A. et feux de camp,” Marianne, February 20, 2016, Accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.marianne.net/so- ciete/scouts-musulmans-islam-ba-et-feux-de-camp. 58 Accessed April 30, 2019, http://www.fraternite-dabraham.com/. 59 In April 2019, for instance, the NGO held in Paris a conference titled “Naissance et expansion de l’Islam de Mohamed aux Abbassides – Relations avec les juif et les chrétiens” (“The birth and expansion of Islam from Mohamed to the Abbasids – Relations with the Jews and the Christians”), http://www.fraternite-dabraham.com/ mercredi-10-avril-conference-naissance-et-expansion-de-lislam-de-mohamed-auxabbassides/. 60 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://laligue.org/. 61 Accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.institut-cultures-islam.org/english-presentation/. 39

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Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.giustizia.it/. Accessed April 19, 2019, http://www.ucoii.org/. 64 Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d’Italia (UCOII) “Prevenire la radicalizzazione nelle carceri,” 2017, Accessed April 19, 2019. https://www.ucoii.org/3499/ news-eventi/ucoii-agisce-prevenire-la-radicalizzazione-nelle-carceri/. 65 Accessed April 30, 2019, www.cesie.org. 66 Accessed April 19, 2019, http://www.exitonlus.it. 67 Accessed April 19, 2019, http://www.vittimeterrorismo.it. 68 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7444_en. 69 “The role of local authorities in European national strategies against radicalisation,” European Forum for Urban Security, 2016. Accessed April 23, 2019, https:// efus.eu/files/2016/08/The-role-of-local-authorities-in-national-strategies_Efus_ EN.pdf. 70 Dominic Kudlacek et al. “Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries. A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation,” Hannover: Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen (2017). 71 “Government approves comprehensive strategic plan to combat violent radicalisation,” La Moncloa, 2015. Accessed April 23, 2019, http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/councilministers/Paginas/2015/201 50130-council-minister.aspx. 72 Dominic Kudlacek et al., “Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries. A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation,” Hannover: Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen, (2017): 85–90. 73 Stephen White and Kieran McEvoy, “Countering violent extremism: Community engagement programs in Europe” (2012). Accessed April 23, 2019, http://qiass.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/QIASS-CVE_CommunityEngagement-Pro- grammes-in-Europe-final-101514.pdf. 74 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://stop-radicalismos.ses.mir.es/. 75 “The role of local authorities in European national strategies against radicalisation,” European Forum for Urban Security, 2016. Accessed April 23, 2019, https://efus.eu/files/2016/08/The-role-of-local-authorities-in-nationalstrategies_Efus_ EN.pdf. 76 Accessed April 29, 2019, https://mapadelterror.com/. 77 Accessed April 29, 2019, http://www.covite.org. 78 Accessed April 29, 2019, http://ucide.org/sites/default/files/revistas/27_estademo- graf17.pdf. 79 Accessed April 29, 2019, http://comisionislamicadeespana.org/. 80 Accessed April 29, 2019, http://home.lu.lv/~rbalodis/Baznicu%20tiesibas/Akti/ Arvalstis_ligumi/Spanija_evang.pdf. 81 Alejandra Gomez Cespedes, “NCTB Counterterrorism Strategies in Spain” (2006), Accessed April 23, 2019, https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/werkdocument-4spain_tcm28- 68936.pdf. 82 Cameron Sumpter, “Community policing to counter violent extremism: Evident potential and challenging realities” (2016). Accessed April 23, 2019, https:// www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PR160922_Community-Polic-ingfor-CVE.pdf. 63

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“Study on the best practises in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation,” The Change Institute, 2008, accessed April 23, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ecvr_best_practice_core_report_ en.pdf. 84 “Civil Society is a key actor in preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017, accessed April 23, 2019, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ngos/civil-society-iskey-to-pre- venting-and-countering-violent-extremism.html. 85 “Prevent strategy,” UK government, 2011. Accessed April 30, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/ file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf. 86 Ibid. 87 “The Channel programme,” UK Home Office, 2017. Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/the-channel-programme. 88 “Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism,” HM Government, 2015, accessed April 23, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/425189/ Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf. 89 Active Change Foundation website, https://www.activechangefoundation.org/. 90 Active Change Foundation website, accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.activechangefoundation.org/Event/preventing-extremism. 91 Active Change Foundation, accessed April 23, 2019, https://www.activechangefoundation.org/Pages/Category/how-we-help. 92 ISD website, accessed April 23, 2019, https://www.isdglobal.org/. 93 ISD website, accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.isdglobal.org/programmes/ communications-technology/one-to-one/. 94 Against Violent Extremism website, accessed April 30, 2019, http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/. 95 https://www.isdglobal.org/programmes/grassroots-networks/youth-civilactivism-net- work-youthcan-2/. 96 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/radical-dialogue_en. 97 “Annual Report 2016,” Foundation for Peace, 2016, accessed April 23, 2019, https://www.foundationforpeace.org/wp-contentuploads201811ffp-annual-re- port2016-pdf/. 98 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7427_en. 99 “Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism,” RAN, 2017, accessed April 23, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ ran_collectionapproaches_and_practices_en.pdf. 100 ISD website, accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.isdglobal.org/programmes/ grassroots-networks/women-and-extremism-wae/. 101 Ibid.

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List of References Change Institute. Study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation, July 2008. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ecvr_best_practice_ core_report_en.pdf. Civil Society Organisation. EUR-Lex, Accessed April 23, 2019. https://eurlex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/civil_society_organisation.html. CoCoRa. “The CoCoRa Prevention Strategy Handbook Collection.” Accessed April 19, 2019. http://cocoraproject.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/coco-ra-handbookcollection-en.pdf. de Gmeline, Vladimir. “Scouts musulmans: Islam, B.A. et feux de camp.” Marianne, February 20, 2016, Accessed April 19, 2019. https://www. marianne.net/societe/scouts-musulmans-islam-ba-et-feux-de-camp. Developing counter- and alternative narratives together with local communities. RAN Issue Paper, October 15, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-cand-n/docs/developing_counter_and_alternative_ narratives_together_with_local_communities_en.pdf. Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, European Commission. The Contribution of Youth Work to Preventing Marginalisation and Violent Radicalisation, March 10, 2017, Accessed April 15, 2019. https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/0ad09926-a8b1-11e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1. European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs. CSEP Network. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_aware-ness_network/civil-societyempowerment-programme/csep_db_en. European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs. Internal Security Fund – Police. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/internal-security-fund-police_en. European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs. Prison and Probation Working Group (RAN P&P). https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/aboutran/ ran-p-and-p_en. European Commission for Migration and Home Affairs. EU Internet Forum: Civil Society Empowerment Programme, Accessed April 15, 2019

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https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_ awareness_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme_en. European Commission, Directorate-General. Education, Youth, Sport and Culture. https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/education-youth-sport-and-culture_en. European Commission. EU Internet Forum: Bringing together governments, Europol and technology companies to counter-terrorist content and hate speech online, Press release December 3, 2015, Accessed April 15, 2019. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-156243_en.htm. European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs. Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en. European Commission. Tackling Radicalisation through Education and Youth Action, Accessed April 18, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmusplus/sites/erasmusplus/files/li brary/fact-sheet-post-paris_en.pdf. European Forum for Urban Security. The Role of Local Authorities in European National Strategies against Radicalisation. 2016. Accessed April 23, 2019. https://efus.eu/files/2016/08/The-role-of-localauthorities-in-na- tional-strategies_Efus_EN.pdf. Foundation for Peace. Annual Report 2016. 2016, accessed April 23, 2019. https://www.foundationforpeace.org/wp-contentuploads201811ffp-annual-report-2016-pdf/. Gomez Cespedes, Alejandra. NCTB Counterterrorism Strategies in Spain. 2006, Accessed April 23, 2019. https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/werkdocument-4-spain_tcm2868936.pdf. Government of Flanders. Action Plan for the Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation Processes that can Lead to Extremism and Terrorism. Accessed April 19, 2019. https://www.fdfa.be/sites/default/files/atoms/files/actieplan_radicaliseri ng_eng.pdf. HM Government. Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. 2015, Accessed April 23, 2019. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up loads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_20 15. pdf.

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Hollande, François. “Discours du président de la République devant le Congrès.” November 16, 2015. https://onu.delegfrance.org/FrançoisHol- lande-s-Speech-Before-a-Joint-Session-of-Parliament. Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR). “Prevent to Protect” National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation, I, February 23, 2018. https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/wpcontent/up- loads/2018/08/PNPR_English_final_sansmediakit.pdf. Kudlacek, Dominic et al. “Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries. A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation.” Hannover: Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Nieder- sachsen (2017). La Moncloa. “Government approves comprehensive strategic plan to combat violent radicalisation.” 2015. Accessed April 23, 2019. http:// www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/councilministers/Paginas/2015/20150130-council-minister.aspx. OSCE. The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Focus on South-Eastern Europe, August 2018. https://wb-iisg.com/wp-content/ uploads/bp-attachments/5978/OSCE_Role-of-Civil-Society-inPCVERLT-SEE.pdf. Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices, Accessed April 15, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/whatwedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf. RAN Centre of Excellence, Joint Activity Plan (JAP) for the Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP), January 2017. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/mar/eu-com-radicalisation-civilsociety-empowerment-programme-work-plan-2017-19.pdf. RAN. “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism.” 2017, accessed April 23, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collectionapproaches_and_practices_en.pdf. Smismans, Stijn. Civil Society in European Institutional Discourses. Centre Européen Institut d’Etudes Politiques Paris. https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d72a8633-1fd1-47bb-91246f6df4c21e89.pdf.

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Sumpter, Cameron. Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: Evident Potential and Challenging Realities. (2016). Accessed April 23, 2019. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PR160922_ Community-Policing-for-CVE.pdf. Tackling Terrorism Together, Accessed April 19, 2019. https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/locale/piece-jointe/2017/08/vigipi-rateanglais-v2017.pdf. TERRA. Inventory of the Best Practices on Deradicalisation from the Different Member-States of the EU, Accessed April 19, 2019. http://www.terranet.eu/files/nice_to_know/20140722134422CVERLTd ef.pdf. Terrorism Strategy. (ICCT – The Hague Research Paper, 2012). The Change Institute. Study on the best practises in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation. 2008, Accessed April 23, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ ecvr_best_practice_core_report_en.pdf. The European Parliament’s Implementation of Article 17 TFEU. EU Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/beheard/religious-and-non-confessional-dialogue/home/en-article17-theep-im- plementation.pdf. UK government. Prevent Strategy. 2011. Accessed April 30, 2019. https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf. UK Home Office. “The Channel programme.” 2017. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/the-channel-programme. Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d’Italia (UCOII). “Prevenire la radicalizzazione nelle carceri.” 2017, Accessed April 19, 2019. https://www.ucoii.org/3499/news-eventi/ucoii-agisce-prevenire-laradicalizzazione-nelle-carceri/. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Civil Society is a key actor in preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism.” 2017, accessed April 23, 2019. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ngos/ civil-society-is-key-to-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism. html. Van Ginkel, Bibi. Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism Experiences with the UN Global Counter. ICCT, The Hague: 2012.

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Vincke, Isabelle, Devaux Philippe, and Lenders Julyette. “Dossier: Organen en Maatregelen in de Strijd tegen Radicalisme.” Nieuwsbrief Stad en Gemeenten van Brussel-Hoofdstad, no. 1 (2016): 13–14. White, Stephen and McEvoy Kieran. Countering Violent Extremism: Community engagement programs in Europe. 2012. Accessed April 23, 2019. http://qiass.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/QIASS-CVE_CommunityEngagement-Programmes-in-Europe-final-101514.pdf.

Websites http://cocoraproject.eu/. http://comisionislamicadeespana.org/. http://project-pericles.eu/. http://scoutsmusulmans.fr/. http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/. http://www.covite.org. http://www.ennir.be/belgium/belgian-intelligence-and-security-landscape. http://www.exitonlus.it. http://www.fraternite-dabraham.com/. http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/. http://www.ucoii.org/. http://www.vittimeterrorismo.it. https://adice.asso.fr/en/. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/radical-dialogue_en. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/index_en. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_ awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit_en. https://laligue.org/. https://mapadelterror.com/. https://terratoolkit.eu/. https://trivalent-project.eu/. https://twitter.com/stopdjihadisme?lang=en. https://violence-prevention-network.de/?lang=en. https://www.activechangefoundation.org/. https://www.afvt.org. https://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/the-project. https://www.britishcouncil.org/. https://www.cicero-project.eu/. https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/227/…/528/. https://www.facebook.com/Stopdjihadisme.FR/. https://www.giustizia.it/.

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CHAPTER NINE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEW POLICIES GIOVANNI VASSALLO AND ANGELO ROLLO

The previous chapters have provided an exhaustive overview of counter-radicalisation projects and initiatives in which civil society actors play a prominent role. In this respect, they also highlighted how grass-root communities already represent a key player at the local level, as they usually have a better knowledge of the individual and group dynamics leading to radicalisation, which allows them to tackle such issues at their roots and provide a more immediate response. Teachers, for instance, are more likely to be in direct contact with vulnerable subjects coming from different social and economic backgrounds as well as divergent political and religious beliefs. In turn, this deep understanding of the attitudes and psychological aspects (e.g. loneliness, willingness to act, etc.) that may trigger a radicalisation process could place them in a more favourable position to design and implement prompt and participatory solutions, which could range from simple dialogue to dedicated activities (e.g. raising-awareness workshops) that aim to tackle the causes of such a phenomenon through the direct involvement of the subjects most at risk. Furthermore, the involvement of civil society actors in counterradicalisation efforts might benefit from one of their most prominent prerogatives, consisting of their ability to act upon multiple stages of the radicalisation process. In other words, civil society actors can not only design activities aimed at preventing the undertaking of radicalising activities but they can also intervene in a latter stage of the process (e.g. investigation and prosecution/conviction, or through the rehabilitation and the reintegration of former radical individuals or groups). In the light of such capacities, it is therefore necessary to identify – for each of the above stages – specific recommendations directed at policy makers with the aim to further enhance the involvement of civil society actors and organisations in the counter-radicalisation field as well as to better exploit their peculiarities and responsiveness at the local level.

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1. Prevention 1) Allocate the resources necessary to empower civil society as key actors in radicalisation-prevention efforts The role of civil society is pivotal to addressing issues that could be instrumental in violent radicalisation. Actors such as NGOs, religious communities, former extremists and even the victims of terrorism, as previously mentioned, can provide a valuable contribution to efforts directed at preventing radicalisation by strengthening social cohesion and developing a feeling of inclusion within the communities and individuals they work with1. However, in order to be able to make a difference, civil society needs support from public authorities: From a practical point of view, the political will to develop specific policies and, in particular, allocate the required resources will be a major factor in determining the success or failure of such policies. This is particularly relevant within the context of policies to prevent radicalisation directed at civil society. In fact, the lack of political will is one of the factors behind some of the policy failures that have occurred over the years in the analysed EU member states: The Spanish government, for instance, was reluctant to pay for imams to teach Islamic education in public schools at least until 2009, even though this measure was comprised in the 1992 agreement signed in partnership with the CIE. In this way it missed the opportunity to exert some sort of influence on the type of Islamic education taught to students by selecting adequate personnel and verifying the narratives thus conveyed. Another example of this lack of determination in pursuing civil society-focused prevention policies comes from Belgium: As noted in section 2.2, the country’s prevention framework, while comprising measures to involve actors belonging to civil society, is considered as having remained a mostly theoretical initiative, a weakness that became evident after the public disclosure of the Belgian ties of the 2015 Paris attackers, whose base of operations was not far from Brussels. 2) Improve the cooperation between global internet companies and civil society actors As the process of radicalisation and recruitment is increasingly migrating to the internet, social networking and civil society actors should work in coordination to effectively counter the use of the internet by terrorist organisations. More specifically, training could be addressed to

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civil society groups engaged in countering the spread of violent contents online. Furthermore, internet companies should support civil society partners in the development of alternative narratives as well as awarenessraising communication campaigns targeting individuals who may be exposed to violent materials on the internet, such as students and, more generally, young people. These empowering actions should be implemented by taking into consideration the distinctive nature of civil society actors – which are generally very responsive at the local level – in order not to distort their approach to counter terrorism. Initiatives such as “Tech against Terrorism2” and the “Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism3” (GIFCT), recently taken by internet companies (Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube) to prevent the diffusion of online terrorist contents, are examples of such cooperation. Tech against Terrorism operates on behalf of the UN CTED (United Nations CounterTerrorism Committee Executive Directorate) in order to aid the technology industries in their fight against terrorist abuse of their tools. It operates in synergy with GIFCT4, which aims at the prevention of terrorists’ use of social platforms by employing technology for sharing knowledge and best practices and by conducting and funding research in this field. Since the creation of these initiatives, relevant results have been achieved in the fight against extremism. According to GIFCT, 98% of the videos removed by YouTube are detected by machine-learning algorithms for violent extremism, thus helping human analysts remove about five times as many videos as they did before; 99% of the contents related to ISIS and al-Qaeda were removed from Facebook before anyone reported it, and similar results in terms of percentages have been achieved on Twitter. 3) Implement targeted prevention programs aimed at detecting and supporting individuals at an early stage of the radicalisation process through a multi-agency approach based on cooperation amongst multiple actors Over the last few years, high costs and difficult quantifications of the results have caused a shift from large preventive programmes to more targeted interventions, which are viewed as more useful complements to traditional counter-terrorism measures5. This kind of intervention aims at addressing individuals at risk at the early stage of the radicalisation process and are most effectively provided through a multi-agency approach, based therefore on a coordinated support action involving multiple entities. Two examples of countries in which multi-agency approaches to radicalisation prevention have been deficient are Belgium

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and Italy, although for different reasons. As mentioned above, in Belgium such an approach, despite being embedded in policies enacted by the federal government, suffered from a lack of participation by the civil society actors expected to contribute. On the other hand, in Italy the prevention strategy lacked this kind of multi-stakeholder approach in both theory and practice. On the contrary, in order to ensure the success of a multi-agency approach to radicalisation prevention, it is necessary not only to focus on the early detection of individuals at risk but also to develop an appropriate support package and ensure that relevant information is shared amongst the entities involved6. There is a wide array of civil society actors who could play a role in such efforts, depending on the different administrative layouts of the EU member states. In this respect, however, specific actors with different expertise should be involved within the context of radicalisation prevention policies: • • •

•

Youth services, because teenagers are considered to be highly susceptible to extremist ideologies; Social workers, who address social issues that may contribute to an individual’s shift towards violent extremism ideas; Educators and teachers, due to their ability to convey societal values and inform students about the dangers connected with extremism and radicalisation as well as to their privileged position for timely identifying, assessing and reporting signs of radicalisation; Labour services, since they intervene in the economic status of an individual, a factor which may influence his or her vulnerability to extremist ideology7.

4) Preserve the independence of civil society actors involved in radicalisation-prevention from public authorities in order to help them gain the trust of target communities and, therefore, maximise the effectiveness of their interventions One of the key obstacles preventing fruitful collaboration between public authorities and civil society in building community resilience to violent extremism relies on the perception that particular communities (e.g. the Muslim community) are stigmatised or discriminated against8. In addition, such feelings can be exacerbated by authority-related incidents, such as frequent police raids in the same neighbourhood or hostile public statements9.

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As a consequence, it is pivotal that civil society actors working in radicalisation prevention establish a relationship with communities that feel discriminated against. This can be extremely difficult and timeconsuming, but nonetheless it constitutes a fundamental step in advancing community engagement, resilience and willingness to deal with polarisation and radicalisation10. However, in order to build trust with those communities more exposed to the risk of being a hotbed for violent extremism, it is crucial that the latter perceive civil society actors as independent from the influence of public authorities. Individuals and groups targeted by the action of these organisations need to feel an explicit separation between them and the government or municipality otherwise there is a risk of credibility loss. This closely regards both the policy makers and LEAs who have to keep some distance from CSOs and the CSOs themselves, who should demand it as a non-negotiable requirement for their work.

2. Investigation and prosecution/conviction 1) Improve information sharing and coordination among EU member states by enhancing police cooperation and the interoperability of information systems, supporting good practice exchange between counter-radicalisation experts and practitioners, and addressing all forms of violent extremism While member states retain the major responsibility in regard to security and counterterrorism, the EU has reinforced member states’ efforts to cooperatively tackle radicalisation and terrorism. The “jihadi” kind of terrorism, in particular, with its international and transnational charateristics, together with its failed ambition of preparing and establishing a global Islamic State (the Caliphate) and profoundly transforming world societies, stands out from other national and regional terrorist organisations given the need for combating it with coordinated and collective responses. This coordination has been conducted in various ways, from harmonisation of different counterterrorism legislations to the development of specific IT systems and tools to smooth the exchange of information, law enforcement and judicial cooperation to more operational activities to advance the sharing of best practices, cooperation with civil society and the private sector. Policymakers in the member states must:

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• • •

•

195

Intensify police and judicial cooperation, as well as the information sharing between law enforcement agencies while adhering to the fundamental rights; Move towards the interoperability of information systems in order to address the current inadequacies in such an exchange; Organise, among prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers, prison wards and parole officers, conferences, workshops and expert meetings on topical counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation issues, and share experiences and good (and bad) gathering and use of (digital / cyber) evidence and assessments of rehabilitation needs; Since the latent risk for political violence and terrorist attacks does not rest exclusively with jihadists, do not neglect or underestimate other forms of political violence and the differentiated manners in which they are manifested.

2) Support community policing initiatives by promoting knowledge exchange at the EU level, enhancing the protection of fundamental rights for the communities involved, conducting regular programme evaluations, delivering improved and up-to-date personnel training as well as establishing effective and transparent communication channels between institutions and communities In the broad framework of counter radicalisation, those approaches that follow a philosophy of community policing rely on the implementation of organisational strategies that are addressed at enhancing collaboration between law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and civil communities, and at creating a strong bond among these two different sectors. This method is characterised by its preventive and proactive approach, which aims at engaging local communities and aiding them in the resolution of local challenges. More precisely, within the context of countering extremism and radicalisation, the foremost objective of such strategies is to deepen civilians’ understanding of the threats posed to their own security, and of the risks constituted by violent extremism, so as to empower them in the first steps of prevention. Given the high relevance that civil society has in this kind of strategy, the main pillar upon which community policing rests is trust building, whereas capacity building and information sharing are two further fundamental aspects to be pursued. Among the major factors within the counter-terrorism struggle at the local police level are the intelligence collection and intelligence processing steps. Such steps, however, must not rely exclusively on the competent bodies (i.e. LEAs and intelligence agencies), whose detection capabilities

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can be considerably enhanced by an active and effective synergy with the members of local communities. Nevertheless, these synergies cannot take place if preliminary measures have not been previously undertaken in order to empower local communities and build a strong bond based on mutual trust between citizens and institutions. These measures should be devoted to: • • • • • • •

Enhancing the sharing of knowledge and best practices on community policing (e.g. through channels at a European level); Ensuring and strengthening the protection of the civil rights and freedoms of the local communities involved; Guaranteeing transparent and clear communication about the role that the institutions and their representatives play in the efforts of counter radicalisation; Conducting systematic evaluations of the programmes in place in order to implement continuous improvements; Encouraging initiatives led by the community; Refining the training of the personnel and keeping it constantly updated; Putting in place and maintaining real-time and effective channels of communication between public institutions and local communities (e.g. through the creation of apposite social media accounts).

3. Rehabilitation and reintegration 1) Improve the transparency of CSOs involved in the rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalised individuals by creating an EU Code of Conduct that defines common transparency principles and rules Credibility and trust are fundamental ingredients of any successful civil society’s effort to counter violent extremism. In order to reach their intended goals, grassroots initiatives must be perceived as genuine by their target communities, as must be the actors delivering them. Mechanisms of trust play a focal role in successfully pushing individuals with violent extremist beliefs to abandon their ideologies and reintegrate into society. Some of the analysed EU member states have in fact witnessed multiple cases of civil society organisations whose behaviour has eroded their perceived credibility and trustworthiness as legitimate sources of support in the eyes of communities affected by radicalisation.

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In this respect, the analysis of existing policies presented in the previous chapters points to a lack of transparency as one of the core weaknesses undermining the work of some of these organisations. Poor transparency has been reported to be an issue for several NGOs active, for example, in France and the UK, where it has emerged in relation to their financial and operational conduct. This gap in transparency has limited their ability to deliver credible and effective responses to violent extremism while also having negative consequences – reputational and, in some cases, even legal – for the entities involved. Such examples evidently show that, in order to gain and maintain the necessary level of trust, civil society actors dealing with radicalisation must be held accountable to high transparency standards. The adoption of self-binding measures by the very organisations delivering deradicalisation interventions could help not only to provide an adequate legal framework at national and European levels but also to improve the transparency and, in turn, the effectiveness of their actions. To this end, a recommended measure - consists of the creation of an EU Code of Conduct defining common transparency principles and rules for NGOs and other civil society actors involved in counter-radicalisation initiatives. This code of conduct should dictate the transparency standards related to key aspects of these organisations’ work, from sources of funding and possible ties with public authorities to internal management (including staff experience and ratio of volunteer vis-à-vis paid workers), activities performed as well as methodologies used. Such code of conduct should be drafted by representatives of civil society organisations as well as by those of their target communities in order to meet the necessities of both groups, with other relevant stakeholders, such as EU policy makers, national authorities and LEAs, also being consulted. A suitable framework for elaborating the proposed set of standards could be that of RAN Working Groups11. Once approved, the code of conduct should be presented for adoption to a wide basin of entities from civil society, starting from members of the CSEP network. An invitation to sign up to the code should eventually be extended to all civil society organisations working on counter radicalisation across Europe, including actors focusing on prevention efforts. Adherence should be on a voluntary basis but incentives should be put in place for organisations to join in, such as eligibility to additional EU funding for future projects. 2) Make radicalisation-specific training available to community leaders (e.g. religious figures), covering cultural, social and psychological mechanisms that are conducive to violent

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radicalisation as well as the language and communication skills needed to engage with vulnerable subjects One of the aspects calling for greater transparency on the part of civil society organisations is their level of experience in the field of counter radicalisation, which might engage in deradicalisation activities without possessing the necessary competencies and skills. At the same time, while a lack of transparency is to blame for some of the resulting intervention failures, others are also explained in terms of a training gap on the side of civil society actors. Therefore, radicalisation-specific training should be provided to religious and other community leaders before they reach out to radicalised people for rehabilitation and reintegration purposes. Such training is necessary for them to be able to grasp the social, cultural and psychological context inhabited by those individuals and provide them with the type of guidance and support they need12. In addition to constitutional, theological and ideological knowledge specific to their own community, awareness of the psychological and emotional drivers of the radicalisation process should also be enhanced. Relevant mechanisms include individual and group dynamics that may trigger or accelerate a person’s path towards violent extremism, especially during transitional periods of their lives such as when entering or exiting prison. The proposed training should also equip community leaders with the language and communication skills required to effectively engage, both face-to-face and online, with radicalised individuals. Targeting cultural, social, psychological, and communication skills, the proposed training could be articulated into a common EU module complemented by community or country-specific modules developed in collaboration with local stakeholders. It is worth stressing that the programmme is likely to be more effective if delivered by practitioners also coming from civil society (e.g. religious associations, cultural centres, universities) rather than by state-managed entities such as EU agencies and national/local governments. The fundamental role that civil society actors must play in any effort of counter radicalisation is commonly agreed upon by most stakeholders. According to a document released by OSCE in 2018, understanding the valuable role of civil society in preventing and countering radicalisation is an important first step towards developing holistic and comprehensive strategies to address the security threat posed by violent extremism13.

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3) Provide families of individuals who are or have been detained in relation to terrorism offences with dedicated support (e.g. a social and psychological counselling service), while also promoting the rise of informal support networks amongst families of detainees Another actor that should be empowered within the context of deradicalisation initiatives is represented by families of radicalised persons. As stated by the European Commission, violent radicalisation is most effectively contained “at a level closest to the most vulnerable individuals”14. In this context, family members are well positioned to convince vulnerable subjects to turn away from violence and reintegrate into society. Nevertheless, insufficient efforts have been devoted so far to this policy area within the countries analysed in this document: no family support policies have been put in place by Italy whereas the UK’s community engagement strategy has drawn criticisms from families belonging to the communities being targeted. Building on known cases of successful exit programmes implemented by other European countries, such as the Aarhus model developed by Denmark15, a two-pronged approach to family empowerment is recommended to foster the rehabilitation and reintegration of former prisoners. On the one hand, relatives of inmates and newly released prisoners should benefit from social, psychological and other types of support, such as counselling services delivered by qualified civil society practitioners (e.g. psychologists and social workers). These forms of support should increase families’ awareness and ability to address the key challenges raised by the rehabilitation and reintegration process, such as finding a job despite being registered as an offender. In parallel, such efforts should be complemented by initiatives aimed at strengthening ties between different families affected by radicalization; for instance, by encouraging the creation of both online and offline networks devoted to this task. Such networks could be implemented, for example, by promoting the creation of informal groups comprised by the families of former prisoners through the organisation of social or recreational activities, thus enabling families to discuss their problems and offer support to one another.

Notes 1

“Prevention of radicalisation and manifestations of hate at grassroot levels,” Council of Europe, 2015, Accessed April 23, 2019 https://rm.coe.int/168071b265. 2 Tech against Terrorism, accessed April 23, 2019, https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/.

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Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.gifct.org/. Accessed April 30, 2019, https://www.gifct.org/about/. 5 Ibid. 6 “Cooperation with Civil Society to Prevent the Radicalisation of Young People,” European Economic and Social Committee, 2017, accessed April 23, 2019 http://we- bapi.eesc.europa.eu/documentsanonymous/eesc-2017-02650-00-00-actra-en.docx. 7 Diego Muro “Resilient Cities: Countering violent extremism at local level,” 2017. Accessed April 23, 2019, https://www.cidob.org/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/monografias/monografi - as/resilient_cities_countering_violent_extremism_at_local_level/(language)/eslES. 8 Michael Privot, “Evidence of discrimination against Muslims in Europe highlights need for action against Islamophobia,” European Network against Racism, November 21, 2017, https://www.enar-eu.org/Evidence-of-discriminationagainst-Muslims-in-Eu- rope-highlights-need-for-action. 9 Ethnic Profiling by Police in Europe, Open Society Justice Initiative, June 2005, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/justiceinit_200506.pdf. 10 Strengthening Community Resilience to Polarisation and Radicalisation, Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017. Accessed April 23, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-yf-andc/docs/ran_yf_c_strengthening_community_ resilience_29-30_06_2017_en.pdf. 11 Accessed April 30, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/ radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran_en. 12 Dilwar Hussain and Henry Tuck, “The Education and Training of Islamic Faith Leaders in Europe: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in France and Germany,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. Accessed April 23, 2019. https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/227/…/528/. 13 “The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Focus on South-Eastern Europe,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, August 2018, https://www. osce.org/secretariat/400241?download=true. 14 “Radicalisation,” European Commission, 2018. Accessed April 23, 2019, https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisisandterrorism/radicalisation_en. 15 Prebel Bertelsen, Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model. Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2015 Accessed April 23, 2019, http://psy.au.dk/fileadmin/Psykologi/ Forskning/…/Panorama.pdf. 4

List of References Bertelsen, Prebel. Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model. Panorama: Insights. “Asian and European Affairs.”

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Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2015 Accessed April 23, 2019. http://psy. au.dk/fileadmin/Psykologi/Forskning/…/Panorama.pdf. Council of Europe. “Prevention of Radicalisation and Manifestations of Hate at Grassroot Levels.” 2015, Accessed April 23, 2019. https://rm.coe.int/ 168071b265. Dilwar, Hussain and Tuck Henry. “The Education and Training of Islamic Faith Leaders in Europe: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in France and Germany.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. Accessed April 23, 2019. European Commission. “Radicalisation.” 2018. Accessed April 23, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisisand-terrorism/radicalisation_en. European Economic and Social Committee. “Cooperation with Civil Society to Prevent the Radicalisation of Young People.” 2017. Accessed April 23, 2019. http://webapi.eesc.europa.eu/documentsanonymous/eesc-2017-0265000-00-ac-tra-en.docx. Muro, Diego. “Resilient Cities: Countering violent extremism at local level.” 2017. Accessed April 23, 2019. Open Society Justice Initiative. Ethnic Profiling by Police in Europe. June 2005. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/justiceinit_200506.pdf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. “The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicaliza- tion that Lead to Terrorism: A Focus on South-Eastern Europe.” Vienna, August 2018. https://www.osce.org/secretariat/400241?download=true. Privot, Michael. “Evidence of Discrimination against Muslims in Europe High- lights Need for Action against Islamophobia.” European Network against Racism, November 21, 2017. https://www.enareu.org/Evidence-of-discrimination-against-Muslims-in-Europehighlights-need-for-action. Radicalisation Awareness Network. Strengthening Community Resilience to Polarisation and Radicalisation. 2017. Accessed April 23, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-yf-andc/docs/ran_yf_c_strengthening_community_resilience_2930_06_2017_en.pdf.

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Websites https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_ awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit_en. https://www.gifct.org/. https://www.gifct.org/about/. https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/.

CONCLUSIONS MARIA LUISA MANISCALCO AND VALERIA ROSATO

While in the recent years the EU member states have been standardising their counter-terrorism policies and a certain convergence between national counter-terrorism systems has been achieved, the analysis of the anti-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies of the five countries examined shows above all that every national policy is influenced by previous experiences with terrorism, constitutional norms, security architecture, bureaucratic cultures, working procedures on the ground, and specific priorities. Thus, the comparison between the counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation policies of Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom reveals some important similarities and, at the same time, some significant differences. The first similarity concerns the presence and activity of terrorist groups in the past. All countries have had significant experience of domestic terrorism (except Belgium, where this activity was at a lower level) in the 1970s and 1980s. In the cases of the UK and Spain, the terrorist threat from nationalist groups even persisted until the 1990s and 2000s. The high intensity of this threat had therefore already promoted in all countries the development of a sophisticated counter-terrorism apparatus and special legislation on terrorism. The second similarity concerns the tendency for all the countries examined to “follow” the phenomenon of jihadist terrorism in its evolution. While it is true that the epochal event of September 11 gave impetus to the revision and strengthening of the various counter-terrorism measures in most European countries, it is also clear that four of the countries examined have started to review or implement their antiterrorism policies following traumatic events in their territories. Italy, in turn, although not affected by jihadist attacks, has followed the trend of other European countries by developing a significant policy in this regard. The analogy concerns the priorities of the implemented measures. After the attacks and bombings in Madrid (2014) and London (2005), all

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five countries have increased and refined repression and prosecution measures through several legislative reforms. They have strengthened intelligence and policing activities through improved cooperation and the increase of personnel. Also, with regard to homeland security measures, they all increased surveillance and increased the terror threat level. In particular, since 2004, the UK has set up a sort of “emergency regime” while France activated a “state of emergency” from 2015 to October 2017. Over the years, as it has been possible to observe from the detailed analysis of the various case studies proposed, the anti-terrorism policies of each country have been constantly subjected to continuous changes and transformations towards a greater tightening of the measures. In most cases, national law enforcement agencies place stronger emphasis on repression and prosecution than on prevention and rehabilitation. So, the promising counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation measures, conceived exclusively in terms of security, have sometimes proved problematic due to their impact on important values of European society such as human rights and freedom. Our cross-referencing analysis also reveals important differences, especially with respect to counter-radicalisation policies. The typology and timing of the implementation of these policies vary significantly from country to country and also depend directly on some structural background factors such as the presence of a large historical Muslim population, the number and intensity of the jihadist terrorist attacks suffered and the number of so-called foreign terrorist fighters. Italy can be considered a special case precisely because of its different structural characteristics: fewer Muslims in the country, a lower degree of radicalisation inside the Italian Muslim communities and less resentment among Muslims over the country’s colonial past and foreign policy. To date Italy has not suffered jihadist terrorist attacks in its territory and has a low number of foreign terrorist fighters. These Italian peculiarities, added to a developed counter-terrorism apparatus, obscured the reflection on preventive counter-radicalisation measures. Recently, non-coercive preventive actions to counter violent radicalisation are deemed necessary by many Italian policy makers. The other four countries (Belgium, France, Spain and the UK) have been developing counter violent radicalisation plans for some years but, in this case too, the methods and results achieved so far differ depending on the national context. The UK and Belgium, which both have a Muslim population of 5-6%, launched their first projects in the early 2000s in the form of community-based deradicalisation programmes. After these first attempts, both countries, following the recent attacks of 2015 and 2017, have decided to review and “refresh” their programmes.

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In the Belgian case, the main criticality in the implementation of these policies derives directly from its complexity state organisation: repression is a federal responsibility while prevention is the responsibility of the three different communities (French, German and Flemish). France, on the other hand, despite its large Muslim population (estimated at around 10%) started very late (only from 2015) to develop a true policy to combat violent radicalisation through the implementation of a series of measures regarding the establishment of deradicalisation centres, a direct line of support for families, surveillance of the web and reserved wings in prison for extremists. In the French case, this is a security-oriented counter-radicalisation approach that has shown its ineffectiveness Even Spain’s recently (2015) launched anti-radicalisation plan has so far failed to take off mainly due to the lack of political will and lack of information sharing. In the Spanish case, in fact, the main criticality in the implementation of this plan depends directly on the peculiar structure of law enforcement agencies and, consequently, on the difficulties of collaboration between national and local levels. In the UK case, the main criticality found in the implementation of its “Prevent” strategy derives from the continuing mistrust that reigns among the Muslim communities most at risk of violent radicalisation. Over the last few years, the enthusiasm for large preventive programmes has declined among EU member states in favour of more targeted interventions. This is due to the high cost of such programmes and the difficult quantification of their results. Targeted interventions are currently viewed as a more useful complement to traditional counterterrorism measures. This kind of intervention aims to address individuals at risk at an early stage of the radicalisation process and is most effectively provided through a multi-agency approach based on a coordinated support action involving multiple entities. Belgium and Italy are two examples of countries in which multi-agency approaches to radicalisation prevention have been deficient, although for different reasons. In Belgium, such an approach, despite being embedded in policies enacted by the federal government, suffered from a lack of participation by the civil society actors expected to contribute. On the other hand, the prevention strategy adopted by Italy lacked this kind of multi-stake- holder approach, both in theory and in practice. Policy makers of the five countries have made considerable investments on policies and programmes designed to tackle terrorism and violent radicalisation. However, it is unclear whether these investments are effective, as the evidence base in this field remains thin and there is an absence of sufficient evidence to measure impact due to the

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unavailability of sensitive data. There is also a limited understanding of what actually works in order to disengage those that are radicalised or radicalising, and to de-radicalise and rehabilitate those who have engaged in violent activities. The number of arrests, expulsions, judicial cases, and suspects and amount of frozen terrorist money do not shed much light on the actual effects of policies on specific cultures, communities and individuals at risk of violent radicalisation. Important actions have been taken at the EU level in order to strengthen law enforcement agencies’ cooperation and information sharing. Nevertheless, a so-called “denial of information” prevails at the European level. Often the information of the various national intelligence agencies is not so easily shared and even denied. Ultimately, a collaboration between the various European states on the subject of intelligence appears to be still too far away. Furthermore, there are still significant differences between law enforcement policies implemented at the national level. Not only are law enforcement agencies organised differently but the focus of their commitment is also variable. Civil society is widely recognised as an important player in tackling violent radicalisation. In particular, actors such as NGOs, religious communities, former extremists and even victims of terrorism can make a valuable contribution to prevent radicalisation by strengthening social cohesion and a feeling of inclusion within the communities and individuals they work with. The UK’s program to prevent radicalisation through the systematic engagement of other services and agencies, including entities from civil society, stands as a notable exception, although the extent of the controversy raised by the programme suggests there are still wide margins for improvements when it comes to involving local communities in the efforts to counter violent extremism. One of the main factors found to be conducive to effective cooperation between public authorities and local communities is a bond of mutual trust. A relationship based on trust is a sine-qua condition for the success of community engagement programs pursued by law enforcement agencies to support terrorism prevention and investigations. Perceived legitimacy has also emerged as a prerequisite for effective grassroots initiatives in this area, which are undertaken independently of public authorities’ support. The importance of credibility and trustworthiness even for civil society stakeholders is demonstrated by the failures experienced by some NGOs involved in rehabilitation and reintegration projects due to their questionable behaviour. So, for example, education is key to countering radicalisation, and the role of educators is very delicate because their main task is to ensure an

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educational process that promotes the development of skills and abilities and especially the ability to think critically. On the contrary, the request to “‘monitor”’, “detect” and report to the competent authorities any signs of radicalisation in students would lead to a contradiction of this key principle at the basis of the activity of the educator and could violate the children’s human rights. The posture of “controllers”, solicited and in some cases imposed within some counter-radicalisation strategies (such as the Prevent strategy in the UK), can in fact deeply undermine the bond of trust between teachers and students, leading the latter to censor themselves, to be afraid to freely express their opinions. The risks inherent in these strategies are therefore those of achieving the opposite effect: to foster feelings of exclusion and drive young people towards other outlets to explore their ideas, at the risk of falling more easily into extremism. The comparative analysis of the successes and failures of existing counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism policies reveals some important policy recommendations for all five case studies. The most important is the need to improve measures that address the causes of terrorism. To achieve this, action is needed on two levels: a) structural level through macro-policies; b) operating level through micro-policies. Structural reforms must be formulated on the basis of the needs and critical issues identified for each country. The increase in law enforcement training resources, structural reforms of law enforcement agencies and consequent improvement in coordination and information sharing are therefore crucial. These reforms are fundamental to address the evolution of the terrorist phenomenon in general, thus escaping from the constant phase of emergency that characterises the approach of some countries (see the cases of France and the UK) and, above all, to adequately prepare countries that may face terrorist attacks on their soil for the first time. With regard to the operational measures, it is important to plan and activate the deradicalisation initiatives on local ground, taking into account two fundamental aspects: a purely material one and the other of a politicalcultural nature. The first concerns the need for an increase in personnel, budget and training; the second concerns the need to depolarise the public debate, avoiding the stigmatisation of specific communities. Finally, the notion of ethics as antithetical to security is misleading and may be detrimental when applied to counter-radicalisation policies. Measures viewed as unfair or discriminatory by the individuals targeted by them may exacerbate existing trust deficits, limiting the extent of cooperation possible while also contributing to feelings of alienation that may fuel radicalisation processes. Ethical questions surrounding the formulation and implementation of counter-radicalisation and counter-

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terrorism policies should not be treated as a secondary concern but, rather, as a necessary component of counter-radicalisation policies, especially policies relying on multi-agency approaches. Some proposals for recommendations for future policies against radicalisation are summarised in the table below: Summary of proposed recommendations for future counter-radicalisation policies Recommendation description

Step of Main counterstakeholder radicalisation (s) targeted process

Ethical/legal issues

Promote social inclusion and Prevention active adhesion to European values of freedom, tolerance, mutual understanding and nondiscrimination through policies in support of appropriate educational programmes and projects. Avoid the creation of so-called hotbeds of terrorism and no-go areas.

EU policy-makers

Consider the crime-terror nexus Prevention during the design of prevention policies intervening at all levels (macro, meso and micro).

EU policy-makers

Pursue a multi-agency Prevention approach at local level by strengthening cooperation among local governments and law enforcement agencies as well as NGOs, researchers and social workers operating in the public and private sectors.

EU policy-makers, Ambiguities of law-enforcement stakeholders’ agencies, civil responsibilities and duties society Erosion of confidentiality and privacy

Undermine the appeal of terrorist propaganda through communication and the spread of alternative narratives.

EU policy-makers, Erosion of freedom of law-enforcement expression, privacy and agencies, civil presumtion of innocence society

Prevention

Stigmatisation of target communities/individuals Polarisation of society

Stigmatisation of target communities/individuals

Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe Fight radicalisation in prisons with prevention and rehabilitation policies and measures. Provide specific training or coaching programmes for personnel dealing with terrorism and radicalisation.

Prevention

Adopt gender-sensitive policies Prevention in recruitment, retention and promotion of women in prison administrations. Recruit and train female staff to work with violent female extremist prisoners as well as design and deliver gender-appropriate interventions.

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EU policy-makers, Erosion of confidentiality law-enforcement and privacy agencies

EU policy-makers, Gender-based law-enforcement discrimination agencies

Prevention

Law-enforcement agencies

Stigmatisation of target communities/ individuals

Favour transparent and Prevention participatory law enforcement practices over coercive and repressive measures as a means to establish more fruitful and successful partnerships with society. Provide LEAs officers with specific training on how to effectively implement those practices.

Law-enforcement agencies

Transparency and accountability of LEAs

Allocate adequate resources Prevention to empower civil society as key actors in radicalisation prevention.

Civil society, EU policy-makers

Transparency and accountability of CSOs

Implement targeted prevention Prevention programmess aimed at supporting individuals at an stage of the radicalisation by relying on a multi-agency approach based on cooperation among multiple actors, youth services, social workers, the education system, and services.

EU policy-makers, Stigmatisation of target law-enforcement communities/individuals agencies, civil society Polarisation of society

Avoid biased policing approaches which could lead to actual or perceived discrimination against target communities.

Ambiguities of stakeholders’ responsibilities and duties

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Improve information sharing Investigation, and coordination among EU prosecution and conviction Member States by enhancing police cooperation and interoperability of information systems, supporting good practice exchange between counter-radicalisation experts and practitioners and addressing forms of violent extremism other than jihadism.

EU policy-makers, Privacy and data law-enforcement protection law violations agencies, civil society Ambiguities of LEAs’ responsibilities and duties

Support terrorism investigation Investigation, and prosecution by developing prosecution proactive and bottom-up and conviction community policing programs, be implemented both online offline. Such programmes involve local actors in shaping and evaluating law enforcement policies targeting their communities, in order to build trust and encourage voluntary sharing of information.

Law-enforcement agencies, civil society

Support community policing Investigation, initiatives by promoting prosecution and knowledge exchange at the EU conviction level, enhancing the protection of fundamental rights for the communities involved, conducting regular programme evaluations, delivering improved and up-to- date personnel training as well as establishing effective and transparent communication channels between institutions and communities.

EU policy-makers, Transparency of law-enforcement LEA-civil society agencies cooperation

Avoid publicly framing community engagement programmes in counterterrorism terms, as this may discourage citizens from collaborating with LEAs. Pursue intelligence gathering as an outcome of, rather than as the motivation for, effective collaboration with civil society.

Law-enforcement agencies, EU policy-makers

Prevention, Investigation, prosecution and conviction

Stigmatisation of target communities/ individuals Polarisation of society

Stigmatisation of target communities/ individuals

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Improve the transparency of CSOs involved in the rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalised individuals by creating an EU Code of Conduct defining common transparency principles and rules.

Prevention, rehabilitation and reintregration

Civil society, EU policy- makers

Transparency and

Include the “do no harm” principle in the design of antiradicalisation, deradicalisation/disengageme nt, rehabilitation and reintegration policies and measures.

Rehabilitation and reintregration

EU policy-makers

Stigmatisation of target communities/ individuals

Make radicalisation-specific training available to community leaders (e.g. religious figures), covering cultural, social and psychological drivers of violent radicalisation as well as communication skills needed to engage with vulnerable subjects.

Rehabilitation and reintregration

Civil society

Stigmatisation of target communities/ individuals

Provide families of individuals who are/have been detained in relation to terrorism offences with dedicated support (e.g. a social and psychological counselling service) while also promoting the rise of informal support networks among families of detainees.

Rehabilitation and reintregration

Civil society

Erosion of confidentiality and privacy

accountability of CSOs