Presidential Elections in the South: Putting 2008 in Context 9781626374775

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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN THE SOUTH

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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN THE SOUTH Putting 2008 in Political Context

EDITED BY

Branwell DuBose Kapeluck Robert P. Steed Laurence W. Moreland

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

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Published in the United States of America in 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Presidential elections in the South : putting 2008 in political context / Branwell DuBose Kapeluck, Robert P. Steed, and Laurence W. Moreland, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-58826-738-2 (hc : alk. paper) 1. Presidents—United States—Election—History—20th century. 2. Presidents—United States—Election—History—21st century. 3. Presidents—United States—Election—2008. 4. Southern States— Politics and government—1951– I. Kapeluck, Branwell DuBose, 1969– II. Steed, Robert P. III. Moreland, Laurence W. JK524.P6786 2010 324.973’0931—dc22 2010006905

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

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Contents

vii

List of Tables and Figures

1 The Importance of the South in Presidential Politics Robert P. Steed and Laurence W. Moreland

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Part 1 The Structural Context of Southern Presidential Politics

2 The Republican South John M. Bruce

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3 The Transformation of Southern Presidential Primaries Seth C. McKee and Danny Hayes

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4 Changing Party Fortunes in the South: A Federal Perspective Robert D. Brown and John M. Bruce

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Part 2 Demographics and the Partisan Landscape

5 The Emerging Battleground South:

Population Change and Changing Politics Susan A. MacManus with Andrew F. Quecan, David J. Bonanza, Christopher J. Leddy Jr., and Brian D. McPhee v

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CONTENTS

6 The Latino Vote in 2008 Harold W. Stanley

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7 Generational Changes Jonathan Knuckey

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Part 3 Issues, Beliefs, and Race

8 Issues and Party Coalitions Branwell DuBose Kapeluck

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9 The Faith Factor John C. Green

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10 The Legacy of Race in 2008 Joseph A. Aistrup, Emizet F. Kisangani, and Roxanne L. Piri

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Part 4 Conclusion

11 The Future of Southern Politics John A. Clark

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Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

261 281 285 291

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Tables and Figures

Tables 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.A1 3.A2 3.A3 3.A4 3.A5 3.A6 3.A7 3.A8 5.1

The Republican Vote in Southern States, 1948–2008 The Growth of Southern Democratic Presidential Primaries, 1972–2008 The Growth of Southern Republican Presidential Primaries, 1972–2008 Differences Between Southern Presidential Primary Voters in the 2008 Democratic and Republican Contests Characteristics of the Georgia Republican Primary Electorate, 1988–2008 Characteristics of the Georgia Democratic Primary Electorate, 1984–2008 Characteristics of the Tennessee Republican Primary Electorate, 1988–2008 Characteristics of the Tennessee Democratic Primary Electorate, 1984–2008 Characteristics of the Texas Republican Primary Electorate, 1988–2000 Characteristics of the Texas Democratic Primary Electorate, 1984–2004 Characteristics of the Southern Super Tuesday Republican Primary Electorate, 1988–2000 Characteristics of the Southern Super Tuesday Democratic Primary Electorate, 1988 and 2000 Shifts in the South’s Battleground States, 2000–2008 vii

18 42 43 59 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 100

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viii 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 6.1 6.2 6.3

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6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 8.1

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Population Density by State, 2000–2006 Voter Profile by Geographical Location, 2004 and 2008 Racial/Ethnic Composition of Voters, 2004 and 2008 Voter Composition by Age, 2004 and 2008 Gender Composition of Voters, 2004 and 2008 Income of Voters, 2004 and 2008 Education Level of Voters, 2004 and 2008 Evangelicals vs. Seculars, 2007 Evangelical vs. Nonevangelical White Voters, 2004 and 2008 Rankings by State: Demographic Shifts Rankings by State: Socioeconomic Shifts, 2000–2007 Party Identification of Voters, 2004 and 2008 “The Solid South Is Now More Liquid” Total and Voting-Age Population, Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, United States and South, 2004 Total and Citizen Voting-Age Population, Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, United States and South, 2004 Citizen Voting-Age Population, Registration and Turnout, Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, United States and South, 2004 Effect of Voting Age, Citizenship, Registration, and Turnout Differentials Among Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, United States and South, 2004 The Hispanic Vote Needed to Bring Texas to Political Parity Summary of Political Generations of Native Southern Whites Size of Political Generations of Native Southern Whites, by Period Party Identifications of Native Southern Whites, by Generation, 1972–2000 Regression of Party Identification of Native Southern Whites, 1984–2000 State-by-State Percentage of White Vote Cast by Each Age Group in the 2008 Presidential Election State-by-State White Vote for Barack Obama in the 2008 Presidential Election, by Age Group The Effects of the Youth Vote on Obama’s State-by-State Vote State-by-State White Vote for Democratic Candidates in the 2008 US Senate Elections, by Age Group Correlations Between Respondents’ Vote for GOP Presidential Candidate and Various Indicators of Racial Predispositions, 1980–1988

106 107 115 119 122 126 127 129 129 130 131 132 134 143 144

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145 148 156 158 159 163 168 169 170 171

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Correlations Between Respondents’ Vote for GOP Presidential Candidate and Various Indicators of Racial Predispositions, 1992–2004 8.3 Top Four Issues in the 2008 Election 8.4 Levels of Economic Voting in the Deep South and Rim South, 2008 Election 9.1 Religion and the 2008 Presidential Vote in Southern States 9.2 Religious Groups and the Presidential Vote in the South, 2008 and 2004 9.3 Religious Groups and Presidential Coalitions in the South, 2008 and 2004 9.4 Religious Groups, Republican and Net Party Alignment, 2008 and 2004 9.5 Religious Groups and Republican Party Alignment in the South, 2008, 1976, and 1944 9.6 Religious Groups and Net Republican Alignment in the South, 2008, 1976, and 1944 10.1 Evaluations of Obama’s Inexperience and Racial Resentment 10.2 McCain’s Support and Racial Resentment 10.A1 Operationalizations and Summary Statistics of Unweighted Variables 11.1 OLS Regression Model of White Obama Vote by Black Electorate, 2008 11.2 OLS Regression Model of Obama Vote in 2008 by Kerry Vote in 2004

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198 207 208 218 220 221 221 223 224 242 244 249 258 259

Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2

Republican Popular Vote by Deep and Rim South Republican Electoral Votes over Time Share of Winning Electoral Vote Drawn from the South Congressional Partisanship in the South Partisanship and Ideology in the South Electorate Characteristics of the South and Nation Net Democratic Vote by Race McCain Advantage Among Evangelical Voters Net Democratic Vote by Percentage Evangelical Percentage of Southern Voters Participating in Republican Presidential Primaries, Selected Years Ideology in Southern Democratic Primaries, 1984–2008

20 21 22 24 25 27 31 32 33 40 50

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3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1

Race in Southern Democratic Primaries, 1984–2008 Gender in Southern Democratic Primaries, 1984–2008 Ideology in Southern Republican Primaries, 1988–2008 Party Identification in Southern Republican Primaries, 1988–2008 Age Distribution Among Southern Republican Primary Voters, 1988–2000 State and National Democratic Advantage, Southern States, 1968–2003 National and State Democratic Electoral Advantage, 1968–2003 Democratic Party Advantage, by Region State Partisanship, Ideology, and Partisan-Ideological Divergence Democratic Advantage Differential and Partisan-Ideological Divergence Democratic Advantage at the National Level Democratic Advantage at the State Level Population Size, 1950–2030 Growth Rate by State, 1950–2030 Urban by State, 1950–2000 Foreign-Born by State, 1950–2005 In-Migration from Region Outside the South by State, 2002–2006 State Natives, 1950–2000 Hispanic Population by State, 1980–2012 Asian Population by State, 1990–2012 Black Population by State, 1950–2012 25–34 Years of Age by State, 1990–2012 65 and Older by State, 1950–2012 Female Population by State, 1980–2011 Male Population by State, 1980–2011 Median Family Income by State, 1950–2012 Income Per Capita by State, 1950–2012 College Graduates by State, 1950–2012 Change in the Evangelical Vote Percentage, 2000–2004 Hispanic Voters, Hispanic Population: The Gap Hispanic Voters, Hispanic Population: The Gap in the South Hispanic Turnout of the Citizen Voting-Age Population, United States, 1980–2004 Hispanic Population and Voters, Texas, 2000–2040 Party Identification of Southern Whites, 1952–2004

52 53 55 56 57 77 80 81 85 87 90 92 103 104 105 109 110 110 111 111 112 117 118 120 121 123 124 124 128 141 142 146 148 154

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8.1

8.2 8.3

8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14 9.1 10.1 10.2 10.3 11.1

Average Per Capita Southern Income as a Percentage of Non-Southern Average Per Capita Income, by Region and Year Southern Presidential Voting Trends, by Income Class, 1952–2004 Percentage Mention of Racial Problems by Whites as Most Important National Problem, by Region and Year Top Four Issues in 1980 Presidential Election Southern Christian Fundamentalist Support for GOP Presidential Candidates, 1980–2004 Top Four Issues in 1984 Presidential Election Top Four Issues in 1988 Presidential Election Top Four Issues in 1992 Presidential Election Top Four Issues in 1996 Presidential Election Top Four Issues in 2000 Presidential Election Top Four Issues in 2004 Presidential Election Comparison of 2004 White Support for Kerry and 2008 White Support for Obama McCain White Vote and Racial Context Influence of Religious Right on White Support for McCain, 2008 Religious Groups and GOP Alignment in the South, 1972–2008 Probability of “Obama Inexperienced,” by Racial Resentment and Ideology Probability of Supporting McCain, by Racial Resentment and Ideology Probability of Supporting McCain, by Racial Resentment and Party Identification White Vote for Obama as a Function of the African American Share of the Electorate, 2008

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184 186 187 190 192 196 199 202 205 210 211 212 227 243 246 247 257

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1 The Importance of the South in Presidential Politics Robert P. Steed and Laurence W. Moreland

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAS turned not only on its size as a major region in the United States but also on its frequent unanimity or near unanimity in casting its electoral votes. The eleven states of the old Confederacy have disproportionately supported one party almost to the exclusion of the other often enough to elevate the region’s influence and leverage on presidential elections. The South has a long history of one-partyism. For roughly three-quarters of a century, from the end of Reconstruction into the 1950s, the region was overwhelmingly Democratic. In the disputed presidential election of 1876, three states of the former Confederacy—Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana—cast their electoral votes for Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. In 1880, all eleven southern states voted Democratic, and it was not until 1920, when Tennessee cast its electoral votes for Warren G. Harding, that this regional solidarity was broken, an impressive run of ten consecutive elections. Southern support for the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate held firm even in years of Republican landslides as, for example, in 1904 when the eleven southern states were joined only by Kentucky and Maryland in casting electoral votes for the Democratic ticket. In 1920, when Tennessee broke ranks, only one other state, Kentucky, joined the remaining ten southern states in voting Democratic. In 1924, southern Democratic solidarity was restored in the face of another Republican landslide (the only other state voting Democratic was Oklahoma). The election in 1928 caused the most serious crack in regional Democratic support since Reconstruction when five of the eleven southern states cast their electoral votes for Herbert Hoover over the Catholic, antiProhibition Democrat, Al Smith.1 This breech was quickly mended, howev1

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er, as the region returned to Democratic solidarity by supporting Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, a pattern that would continue unbroken through the next three elections. In summary, the South unanimously voted Democratic in fifteen of the seventeen presidential elections from 1880 through 1944, with 1920, and especially 1928, being the only exceptions. If we disaggregate these regional voting patterns to consider the electoral votes of the individual states in each of the seventeen elections during this sixty-four-year period, the Democrats carried the southern electoral vote in the individual states a remarkable 96.7 percent of the time. The 1948 election marked the beginning of a two-decade transition in patterns of presidential voting in the South. A floor fight over the inclusion of a civil rights statement in the Democratic platform that year prompted a number of southern delegates to walk out of the national convention and form the States’ Rights Party. That party, with South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond as its standard-bearer, won the electoral votes of four Deep South states (Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina) and one electoral vote in Tennessee.2 Even though the Democrats took measures to mend their southern fences—for example, the southern senators John Sparkman (Alabama), Estes Kefauver (Tennessee), and Lyndon B. Johnson (Texas) were selected as the party’s vice-presidential candidates in 1952, 1956, and 1960, respectively— the party never again restored regional solidarity to its pre-1948 level. In both 1952 and 1956, Dwight Eisenhower won electoral votes in the South, and in a real test of the Republicans’ staying power in the region in 1960, Richard Nixon carried three states (see Bartley and Graham 1975; Lamis 1990). In 1964, an election that was complicated by the emotions and conflict associated with the civil rights movement, Barry Goldwater carried the five Deep South states where white voters looked with favor on his general states’ rights conservatism and his perceived support for segregation generated by his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the US Senate. Even though Goldwater’s support came from groups very different from those who supported Eisenhower and Nixon, this election marked a continuing erosion of Democratic strength in the South. The 1968 election continued the pattern of Democratic decline in southern presidential politics. The former Democratic governor of Alabama, George C. Wallace, running as the American Independent Party candidate, carried the same Deep South states carried by Goldwater in 1964; additionally, he received one electoral vote (out of thirteen cast) in North Carolina. Republican candidate Richard Nixon carried five southern states, and Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey carried only Texas. Thus, over the twenty-year period from 1948 through 1968, the South’s electoral votes were consistently divided among the Democrats, the Republicans, and, at both ends of the period, strong regional third parties.

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From 1972 through 2004, the South once again tended strongly toward one-partyism in its presidential voting, this time in favor of the Republicans. Republicans carried a majority of the southern states in eight of the nine elections in this period and carried all of the southern states in five of the nine elections (1972, 1984, 1988, 2000, and 2004). Only when the Democrats nominated a southerner to head their ticket did their fortunes in the region improve appreciably. In 1976, Jimmy Carter, buoyed by his status as a native southerner and by the anti-Republican and antiestablishment sentiments generated by the Watergate scandal and the subsequent resignation of President Richard Nixon, was able to win the electoral votes of ten of the eleven southern states. Carter’s regional support eroded quickly, however, and in his 1980 reelection bid he won only his home state of Georgia in the South. In 1992 and 1996, the southern team of Bill Clinton and Al Gore succeeded in winning four southern states (with two of those being their home states of Arkansas and Tennessee both years). It is of special significance that in three of the four elections with southern Democratic presidential candidates between 1972 and 2004, the Democrats were still unable to win a majority of the states in the region. Clearly, Republican presidential strength in the South from 1972 through 2004 did not rise to the level of Democratic presidential strength in the region from 1880 through 1944. Still, Republican dominance of presidential politics in the region was impressive. Again, if we disaggregate presidential elections in this period to consider state-level electoral results, Republicans won these elections in the southern states 87.7 percent of the time. Although this is lower than the comparable Democratic winning percentage for the period 1880–1944, it is still remarkable. In short, if we consider southern presidential electoral patterns from 1880 through 2004, a period of 124 years and thirty-two presidential elections, the South has demonstrated strong one-partyism for all but roughly two decades (and six elections). That translates into 104 years and twentysix elections with almost solid support for one party or the other. In twenty of these elections, the southern vote was unanimous, and in three other elections it fell one state short of being unanimous (although one of those was in 1976, when the vote deviated from the dominant pattern of the period). Historically, the South’s one-party solidarity has leveraged the region’s influence in presidential elections beyond what it otherwise would have been. First the Democrats and then the Republicans (after 1968) came to see the South as a reliable stronghold upon which to base a national electoral strategy. With the certainty of the South’s block of electoral votes, the favored party’s candidate had a solid start toward winning the electoral votes necessary for victory and had, therefore, the luxury of targeting and concentrating on selected states in other parts of the country, knowing that the candidate had to win far fewer of those states than the opponent. The

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other party’s candidate was, conversely, forced to campaign in, and win, the bulk of the remaining states to win the election. From the late 1800s into the 1950s, for example, the solidarity of the South in presidential elections led the Republicans to pursue the so-called Lincoln electoral strategy—that is, conceding all or most of the South to the Democrats while carrying most or all of the Midwest, East, and West Coast. Following 1968, as the parties’ respective fortunes changed in the South, the Democrats were, ironically, forced to pursue their own version of the Lincoln strategy. Inasmuch as Republicans could usually count on winning the South’s electoral votes plus a few other reliably Republican states in the Midwest and the Mountain West, they had only to pick up a handful of the battleground states for victory. In recent elections, the South’s 153 electoral votes accounted for approximately 57 percent of the 270 votes needed to win, so Republicans tended to be highly advantaged at the outset. Of course, Democrats during the post-1968 period had their own areas of strength, but even so, they had a consistently more difficult task than Republicans, as Democrats had to come close to winning nearly every battleground state. Being a regional base upon which national election strategy was organized often elevated the South to a level of influence disproportionate to its size in national party councils and among national party leaders. Prior to World War II national Democratic leaders were reluctant to challenge the Jim Crow system of racial discrimination in the South in part because they did not want to alienate southern Democrats and risk losing the region’s support. Indeed, this remained a concern to the Democrats well into the post–World War II period, as evidenced by that party’s ongoing efforts during the 1950s to bring the South back into the coalition after the 1948 States’ Rights Party revolt and by John F. Kennedy’s avoidance of full-scale support of the civil rights movement, at least until shortly before his assassination in 1963. Kennedy’s reluctance to endorse the civil rights agenda was prompted by a number of factors (including his concerns with Cold War foreign policy and his recognition of the power of southerners in Congress), but the fresh memories of his extremely close 1960 election and his concern with losing southern voter support in an expected hard reelection battle in 1964 were important. As the southern party system changed in the 1960s, the region assumed central importance to Republican campaign strategy and, consequently, to that party’s political agenda. Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign saw the potential of developing a southern base for the party by appealing to conservative social and political orientations of many white voters in the region. The earlier inroads made by Eisenhower and Nixon had shown that traditional Republican positions regarding business interests and fiscal conservatism resonated with at least some middle-class southerners in the

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region’s growing urban and suburban areas, and Goldwater’s message of limited government, coupled with his vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act, added a more overtly racial dimension to the mix. For Goldwater, the South became his theoretical campaign base, as indicated by this prescription of the Republican National Committee for winning the 1964 presidential election (quoted in Cosman 1966, 41): Barry Goldwater will take all 128 electoral votes of the eleven Southern States! In 1964 Goldwater will give “the solid South” dramatic new meaning! This is the key to Republican success! In addition to sweeping the South, Goldwater will lead our party to a tremendous victory by carrying the dependable Republican states of the Midwest, Rocky Mountains, and Northern New England. The secret to Republican victory lies in the fact that Senator Goldwater can convert a past weakness of the Republican Party into great strength. He alone can tap this new reservoir of votes, not only for President, but also for control of Congress.

Seeing the opportunity to build on increasing southern disaffection with the national Democratic Party, Republicans in 1968 focused on developing a strategy designed to wrench the region away from the Democrats with a view toward creating a southern base of its own. From 1968 forward this new “Southern Strategy” became Republican gospel. Aided by Kevin Phillips, his shrewd and perceptive chief elections and campaigns analyst, Richard Nixon in his 1968 campaign courted the (white, Protestant) South in almost every way possible. He promised to appoint a southerner to the Supreme Court (not that the South was unrepresented, as Alabama’s Hugo Black famously sat on the Court in 1968), and he used code-phrases such as a return to “law and order” and getting “welfare cheats” off the rolls, phrases that in the South during the 1960s were taken as unsympathetic references to race and the civil rights movement. The success of Nixon’s effort in 1968 was limited by the presence of George Wallace in the race, but it continued to be the centerpiece of Republican campaign politics. Nixon’s 1968 Southern Strategy was subsequently published by Kevin Phillips in his remarkably prescient The Emerging Republican Majority (1969), arguing that support from southern whites (together with other factors) would soon result in a new electoral alignment, one in which Republicans would be highly competitive if not dominant. Phillips was eventually proved correct, of course, but not as soon as he expected; Watergate certainly slowed, but did not stop, the shift of southern whites to the Republican Party. The task of completing the development of the Southern Strategy fell to Ronald Reagan, whose efforts at wooing the white South were without peer. (For an excellent account and interpretation of these events, see Black and Black 2002; a useful companion and update for Phillips’s work is Aistrup 1996.) The result was an

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increasingly close programmatic alignment between the South and the Republican Party and, consequently, increased influence for the region in the party nationally. The influence of the South that is rooted in the region’s historical record of solidarity has had three additional consequences for presidential electoral politics. The first is that it has traditionally served as a protective wall against national political tides that run against the favored party. For example, from 1880 through 1928, when the Republican Party was dominant in national politics and often won true landslide victories in presidential elections, the South’s solid support of the Democratic Party gave that party an ongoing base upon which it could rebuild national strength. In this sense, one-partyism serves to maintain and perpetuate the national twoparty system. Although scholars and others might debate the merits of such an outcome, those in the weaker party would usually see this as a significant benefit. Second, population shifts to the Sunbelt have resulted in a growing proportion of votes for the South in the Electoral College, so much so that the South today has the largest regional total of electoral votes. Consequently, regional solidarity tends to be an even more important element in national campaign strategy. In the 1944 presidential election, the eleven states of the Old South had 127 electoral votes (about 24 percent of the total and about 48 percent of the total needed to win). By 2004, the South’s electoral votes had swollen to 153 (more than 28 percent of the total and almost 57 percent of the total needed to win). In 2012 (the first presidential election after the 2010 census), the South is widely expected to gain five electoral votes (and possibly six), raising the total to 158 (more than 29 percent of the total and nearly 59 percent of the total needed to win). To be sure, most of the growth has come in just two states (Florida and Texas), but other southern states (Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia) have also increased their electoral votes or will likely do so as a consequence of the 2010 census. Third, the importance of the South in presidential elections has carried over into the presidential nomination process. Since the 1980s, the South has played a disproportionate role in the primary process that ultimately selects the presidential nominees. The idea of a southern regional primary dates to at least 1975, an idea spearheaded by the Southern Legislative Conference (one of four regional legislative groups, operating under the Council of State Governments, which encourages intergovernmental cooperation at the state level). (For a history of the southern regional primary, subsequently known as Super Tuesday, see especially Stanley and Hadley 1987; see also Bullock 1991; Clark and Haynes 2002. For an extended and detailed discussion of the South in the nomination process, see Chapter 3 in this volume.) Beginning to push the idea seriously in 1985, the Southern Legislative Conference succeeded in

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getting the regional primary concept implemented in 1988. Mostly promoted by Democrats who thought it would help shift attention to the South as well as smooth the way for a moderate candidate from the South to obtain the Democratic presidential nomination, ten of the eleven southern states (plus Kentucky and five non-southern states) participated in the first of the Super Tuesday events, held early in the primary season (early March 1988). South Carolina, however, chose not to participate in the first Super Tuesday and instead eventually succeeded in scheduling a primary on the Saturday before Super Tuesday. Although the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary, both held in January of presidential years, continued to attract enormous media and candidate attention, the South Carolina primary was considered the gateway to success in the South. Unlike Iowa and New Hampshire, South Carolina, back then and today, has a large minority population (important for Democratic candidates); in addition, the state was often seen as a precursor for what might happen a few days later on Super Tuesday. For candidates who did not do well in either Iowa or New Hampshire, South Carolina became a crucial firewall state, almost essential to maintaining a candidacy. For example, in 1988 then–Vice President George H. W. Bush virtually assured his nomination (over Senator Robert Dole) by winning South Carolina’s gateway primary, then sweeping the remaining ten states of the old Confederacy. Similarly, in 2000, after a surprise loss to Senator John McCain in the New Hampshire primary (McCain had skipped Iowa to concentrate on New Hampshire), Governor George W. Bush of Texas stopped the bleeding in South Carolina’s bitterly fought primary, going on to win the other southern primaries, the nomination, and the general election (see Clark and Haynes 2002). Today, the influence of southern primaries has waned due to each party’s tweaking of its primary season, rescheduling both southern and nonsouthern primaries so that the primary season is now frontloaded, which generally works to the advantage of preprimary frontrunners. Even so, the South Carolina primary remains the first in the region and one of the first in the nation, and thus it retains great potential for candidates as they try to move successfully through the gateway to the South. In short, the South has a long and important place in presidential politics in the nation. The region’s role has evolved in significant ways for more than a century, and it continues to be a focus of scholars interested in understanding southern as well as national politics (especially presidential politics). The large body of literature examining the South and presidential politics is evidence of this ongoing interest and is recognition of the topic’s importance (see Stanley 2006). This volume continues this rich tradition of scholarship by presenting a series of original works that provide context and analysis for the 2008 presidential election in the South. The three chapters in Part 1 combine with this

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brief introductory chapter to provide a foundation for the chapters that follow. Chapters 2 and 4 detail the South’s role in national presidential politics since roughly World War II: Chapter 2 broadens the historical regional perspective summarized here in Chapter 1, and Chapter 4 analyzes the key connections between political developments at the state level and presidential politics in the South. Chapter 3 extends Chapter 1’s brief overview of the South’s increasingly important role in the presidential nomination process. The remaining chapters present detailed discussions of a number of topics central to an understanding of southern electoral politics and examine how they help illuminate the 2008 presidential election in the South. The three chapters in Part 2 examine in more detail the interplay between key demographic patterns and the evolving partisan and electoral politics of the South. Susan MacManus and her colleagues (Chapter 5) provide an overview of recent demographic developments in the region, and Harold Stanley (Chapter 6) and Jonathan Knuckey (Chapter 7) build on this foundation by offering detailed analyses of how the emergence of a growing Hispanic population (and vote) and generational change have impacted southern politics, especially in 2008. The three chapters in Part 3 provide a broader historical context and analyses of variables such as race, religion, and policy issues related to southern voting patterns in 2008. Each chapter addresses relevant aspects of the recent (i.e., post–World War II) political history of the South in greater depth and with more focus than this introductory historical sketch; collectively they develop a more complete picture of the evolution and current importance of the region in presidential politics. Finally, in his concluding chapter (Part 4, Chapter 11), John Clark synthesizes key points made in the preceding chapters and identifies some major conclusions regarding their implications for the future shape of southern politics (and the role of the South in national politics). The 2008 presidential election in the South deviated from recent electoral patterns in the region in important ways. A well-funded, charismatic, nonsouthern, African American Democrat ran an unusually energetic campaign throughout the region and managed to break the Republican grip on the South’s electoral votes evident in both 2000 and 2004 (and the majority of elections since 1968). The 2008 election is, therefore, an especially interesting election to analyze in larger historical context. Whatever its longterm implications for southern and national politics—whether it ultimately proves to be the beginning of longer transformation of southern presidential electoral patterns or a short-term deviation based on a set of idiosyncratic variables—the election can be considered a watershed in US politics. In the early 1990s, Earl and Merle Black argued in The Vital South (1992, p. 366) that the South is “at the center of struggles to define winners and losers in American politics.” It is in that broad context that we approach the analyses that follow.

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Notes 1. For more details on the defection of Democrats in the South in the 1928 presidential election, see Key (1949). 2. For a more complete discussion of the 1948 election, see Key (1949), Lamis (1988), and Kirkendall (1971).

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2 The Republican South John M. Bruce

MAKING THE OBSERVATION THAT REGIONS MATTER IN US POLITICS IS no more profound than noting that water is wet. Regional differences have played a significant role in shaping the nature of politics since the founding of the country. Early differences between seaboard and inland states created political problems under the Articles of Confederation. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the dominant geographic difference was between free and slave states, which spawned massive political and military conflict, as well as dramatic social change. It is also this division that created the politically distinct South, the modern partisan consequences of which will be discussed here. As a political force, the South’s political effects are different from other regional political effects observed throughout US history. Specifically, the South’s historical political features of note include (1) the level of political cohesiveness, (2) the longevity of the regional effect, (3) the intensity of the partisanship, and (4) ironically, perhaps, the speed and totality of the reversal of the direction of the regional effect. Perhaps more so than any other region (certainly any other large region), the South acted politically with striking cohesiveness (particularly during the period from the mid-1860s to the mid-1900s). The region was not without political dissent during the post–Civil War Democratic dominance, but political control by Democrats was overwhelmingly consistent throughout the eleven states. This cohesiveness is made more noteworthy when the longevity of the regional effect is fully appreciated. The South emerged as a distinct political entity with the end of Reconstruction, and it did not begin to show any meaningful fraying until the middle of the twentieth century. It would be fair to describe the South as the most important regional effect in US politics during the second 13

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century of the nation’s history. This importance was based on the cohesiveness and longevity of the region’s political behavior, as well as on the intensity of its partisanship. The South was not different merely because of the Democratic dominance of the region. After all, there were other areas of the country where one party dominated. The difference in the South was the nearly total absence of Republicans. The failure of the Republican Party in the region was based less on ideology than on history. The effect was the same, however, with the Yellow Dog Democrats being unflinching supporters of the Democratic ticket. The final part of the regional story is, in some ways, a surprise ending: The region’s Democratic dominance collapsed in relatively short order, only to be replaced by a slightly weaker version of Republican dominance. 1 And even though the Democratic Party is not absent in the South today, there is no denying that the region has overwhelmingly shifted toward the Republican Party. Historical precedent for such a large-scale political reversal is difficult to find in the nation’s history. In this chapter, the recent electoral history of the South is reviewed. In order to understand how the Republican Party came to dominate contemporary politics in the South, it is important to understand the foundations (and associated weaknesses) of the Democratic dominance. The second part of the chapter examines how the South factored into the 2008 election.

The Solid South The end of Reconstruction in 1876 marked a fundamental change in the politics of the South. The withdrawal of federal troops from the region allowed political forces opposed to racial equality to return to power. Politically, the withdrawal of the federal presence helped cause the collapse of the emerging Republican Party in the region. The resulting environment was one in which the Democratic Party reigned supreme, and African Americans were virtually excluded from the political process. Society was built around separation of the races. Such segregation received an official stamp of approval from the federal government when, in 1896, the US Supreme Court issued its ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson.2 In that landmark case, the Court embraced the philosophy that led to the separate-but-equal doctrine (a judicial doctrine that allowed states to require separation of the races in public facilities such as schools, parks, and public transportation so long as the facilities were substantially equal; in practice, the facilities were seldom actually equal). The result in the South was a more pronounced division by race. This general division made the continued exclusion of blacks from the political process that much easier. Race played the prominent role in the cultural and political life of the South in the period from the end of Reconstruction through the middle of

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the twentieth century. Indeed, V. O. Key Jr. (1949) argued that race was the single most critical factor in understanding the politics of the South during this era. In Southern Politics in State and Nation, he showed that the greatest hostility to any emerging sense of racial equality was found in the “black belt” of the region (1949, 5). The presence of large (sometimes majority) black populations in these counties led the white political leadership to exert more substantial measures to maintain a whites-only ballot box. These measures included residence requirements (and related demands for presenting records of that residency), literacy tests, and poll taxes.3 However, it is important to note that blacks were often kept from the ballot box through much more simple means: discouragement and intimidation. As we review this history in light of the 2008 election, it is worth considering the motives of southern political leaders. Although there can be little doubt that the dominant view of whites in the South was broadly racist (certainly by modern standards), the incentive for trying to bypass the Fifteenth Amendment was not purely racial animosity (the 1870 amendment that guaranteed blacks the right to vote). The existing power structure of the South was built upon a calculus that used only white voters. Given that the South had the largest density of blacks in the country,4 altering the definition of the electorate would fundamentally alter the balance of power. Richard Scher (1997) argues that the one-party South was built, in large part, on a social and political structure that kept blacks and poor whites from seeking change. As one example, he cites the lack of innovation in agriculture in the South. And though lack of resources contributed to the failure to modernize, so, too, did the extensive use of the tenant-sharecropper system of agriculture (Scher 1997, 39). This method helped assure a lack of advancement by black farmers by denying the accumulation of capital.

A Time of Transition in the South Such was the nature of politics in the South through World War II. In terms of political power, the Democratic Party had it, and only whites could participate in the process of governing. However, events outside the region would soon begin to alter the status quo and the associated political environment. One of the early events flowed from the nation’s experience of World War II. In 1945, the military began to study a more efficient way to use black soldiers in the postwar military. This process continued through 1947, with President Harry Truman deciding in early 1948 that he would integrate the military by executive order.5 Work on this goal continued into the summer of that year, during which the Democratic National Convention adopted a revision to the platform put forward by Hubert H. Humphrey, mayor of Minneapolis at the time.6 The revised plank was a more vigorous

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endorsement of civil rights than had been in the draft platform. This new stance was a direct challenge to the politics of the South that were built on racial discrimination. Not surprisingly, delegates from the overwhelmingly Democratic South were not pleased. A mere twelve days after the Democratic platform was revised, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which declared a new policy of “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”7 The new interest of the national Democratic Party in race relations was not universally accepted. Portions of the military fought for years to avoid integration. Likewise, southern states saw a conflict between their historical partisan attachment to the party that ended the hated Reconstruction and the preservation of a social order that was integral to their society. It should not be a surprise that preserving social order trumped partisan consistency. Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina abandoned the Democrats in 1948, casting their votes for Strom Thurmond’s Dixiecrat candidacy. This represented the first time Deep South states had voted for anyone other than a Democrat since the end of Reconstruction. Indeed, these four Deep South states had been so alienated by the national Democratic Party that their state executive Democratic committees had designated Thurmond and not Truman as the “official” Democratic presidential nominee on their ballots (Maisel 1991, 1075). The 1948 election showed that the loyalty of the South to the Democratic Party did, in fact, have limits. However, the region generally returned to the Democratic fold in the 1952, 1956, and 1960 elections. The Republican ticket did win some southern states, and the GOP share of the vote increased across the board. And despite continued Democratic dominance in the region, these shifts in electoral share were just one sign of an underlying movement. This change was driven, yet again, by events beyond the borders of the South. In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that the notion of separate-but-equal as a legal concept was unconstitutional.8 Lest there be doubt about the intent of the government to support the Supreme Court’s decision, Republican President Dwight Eisenhower sent federal troops into Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce a school integration decision in 1957. Southern Democrats now found themselves at odds not only with their own party but also increasingly with the federal government.9 The pace of political change between 1948 and the early 1960s was relatively slow, at least in terms of partisan control of elected office. The increasing emphasis of the Democratic Party on civil rights identified fissures in the party’s coalition. In the end, these years brought only moderate increases in the strength of the Republican Party. The rate of change picked up dramatically in 1964. The crucial event was the passage of the Civil

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Rights Act of 1964, which integrated much of public life. More important, the Civil Rights Act had substantial political implications for that year’s presidential election. President Lyndon Johnson strongly advocated the act, despite the certain political costs.10 The next year saw the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which interjected federal control into the states’ administration of voter registration. The Voting Rights Act represented a much more targeted attack on discrimination. Although the Civil Rights Act had addressed public accommodation and employment, it did little for political equality. In contrast, the Voting Rights Act removed the literacy test, one of the primary means by which blacks had been discouraged from voting in the South. As such, it represented a far more significant threat to the status quo.11 Both pieces of legislation had the effect of pushing the South away from the Democratic Party. The increased salience of civil rights as an issue within the Democratic Party created an opportunity for the Republican Party. Dissatisfaction with the Democrats had caused southern Democrats to vote for third-party candidates in 1948 (Thurmond) and 1968 (Wallace), but during that period there had also been a steady increase in the percent of the vote cast for Republican presidential candidates. During this period, Kevin Phillips (1969) argued that the future of the “emerging Republican majority” was located, in part, in the South. The southern success of the Goldwater candidacy in 1964, as well as the heavily divided southern vote in 1968, made clear that the Democrats had lost their grip on the region. The weak candidacy of George McGovern in 1972 allowed Republicans to do unusually well in the region. Jimmy Carter’s Georgia roots helped bring the South back toward the Democrats in 1976, but that was the last time a Democratic candidate won the region until another southern candidate ran in 1992. Table 2.1 shows the development of Republican presidential strength in the region over this time. In the four elections between 1948 and 1960, there were twelve instances (out of a possible forty-four) of a southern state casting a plurality of Republican votes. In contrast, between 1988 and 2008 Republicans carried southern states fifty-five of sixty-six times.12 Republicans prevailed roughly 25 percent of the time during the early period, but they dominated the latter period, winning almost 85 percent of the races. The patterns seen in Table 2.1 are not accidental. They reflect not only the results of the Democratic Party embracing a civil rights agenda but also the Republican Party’s move away from that agenda. Some evidence of this strategy may be seen in how Richard Nixon approached race as a presidential candidate in 1960, 1968, and 1972. In the 1960 race (which he lost to John Kennedy), his campaign sought the votes of blacks and embraced an agenda of racial equality. By 1968, however, Nixon had largely abandoned his interest in obtaining black votes and focused more on southern white votes. Edward Carmines and James Stimson (1989) reviewed this period,

Arkansas

Florida

Georgia

1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

19.04 35.02 39.39 41.73 69.45 13.99 72.43 42.61 48.75 60.54 59.17 47.65 50.12 56.48 62.49 60.45

9.86 43.76 45.81 43.06 43.41 30.77 68.87 34.90 48.13 60.47 56.37 35.48 36.80 51.31 54.31 58.91

33.63 54.99 57.16 51.51 48.85 40.53 54.18 46.64 55.52 65.32 60.86 40.89 42.32 48.95 52.10 48.37

18.31 30.34 33.27 37.43 54.12 30.37 75.04 32.96 40.97 60.17 59.75 42.88 47.01 54.67 57.97 52.24

Louisiana Mississippi 17.45 47.08 53.28 28.59 56.81 23.48 65.32 45.95 51.20 60.77 54.27 40.97 39.94 52.55 56.72 58.61

2.62 39.56 24.46 24.67 87.14 13.52 78.20 47.68 49.46 61.88 59.89 49.68 51.94 57.62 59.01 56.41

North Carolina

South Carolina

Tennessee

Texas

Virginia

5.25 46.09 49.34 47.89 43.85 39.51 69.46 44.19 49.30 61.90 57.97 43.44 49.00 56.03 56.02 49.54

3.78 49.28 25.18 48.76 58.89 38.09 70.78 44.26 49.42 63.55 61.50 48.02 49.79 56.84 57.98 53.88

36.87 49.99 49.21 52.92 44.49 37.85 67.70 42.94 48.70 57.84 57.89 42.43 45.59 51.15 56.80 56.91

24.60 53.13 55.27 48.52 36.49 39.87 66.23 47.97 55.28 63.61 55.95 40.56 47.99 56.43 61.09 55.53

41.04 56.32 55.37 52.44 46.18 43.58 67.84 49.29 53.03 62.29 59.74 44.97 47.10 52.47 53.92 46.44

Source: US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years. Notes: Cell entries are percentage of total presidential vote each year cast for the Republican candidate. Bold entries represent when the Republican won a plurality.

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Alabama

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Table 2.1

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noting that the candidate met with southern delegates to the Republican convention. At that meeting, Nixon sought to reassure them that his administration would not press the notion of racial equality; Nixon won the White House that year. Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign featured additional efforts to woo southern voters, including an announcement of the administration’s efforts to reduce federal action to enforce desegregation. In later years, other Republican candidates took steps to keep southern white voters in their column. For example, in 1980 Ronald Reagan announced his presidential campaign with an appearance at the county fair in Neshoba County, Mississippi, where three civil rights workers were murdered in 1964. At that appearance, Reagan told the crowd that “I believe in states’ rights” (Jackson 2000). Little more would need to be said to make clear he would not support a federal government that pushed racial matters. Two decades later in 2000, George W. Bush would again raise the notion of states’ rights, albeit in other contexts (such as South Carolina’s Confederate flag issue). The conclusion of the twentieth century marked the end of this transition period in the South. The Republican Party had overwhelmingly reversed almost a century of Democratic dominance at the presidential level, and they had done so in the course of twenty to thirty years. The resurgence of the Republican Party in national politics during this same period suggests that the South truly had emerged, yet again, as a crucial region in US politics.

Regional Trends Through 2008 Having reviewed the more significant elements of the region’s political history, the remainder of the chapter offers a more in-depth assessment of how changes in that political environment were manifested in election-related outcomes. Turning first to presidential-level voting, Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of the total vote cast for the Republican candidate in each election. In the graph, the Deep South states are shown separately from the Rim South states. Looking at the overall pattern, the growth in support for the GOP is clear. Across the entire region, Republicans averaged slightly more than 19 percent of the vote in 1948; by 2008 it exceeded 51 percent. When considering the two subregions of the South, the greatest change is seen in the Deep South. Those states were slower to vote Republican, and they did so at lower levels compared to the Rim South states. However, in the more recent elections, Deep South states are slightly more supportive of the Republicans than the perimeter states. Throughout the more than five decades considered here, there is remarkable growth in popular support for the Republican Party’s presiden-

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Figure 2.1

Republican Popular Vote by Deep and Rim South (percentage)

80.00

70.00

60.00

Percent

50.00

40.00

30.00

20.00

10.00

0.00 1948

1952

1956

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Year Deep South

Rim South

Note: Lines show percent of total vote cast for Republican presidential candidates, divided by Deep South and Rim South states. Deep South states include Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Rim South states include Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

tial candidates. However, one of the peculiarities of the US system is the role of the Electoral College in transforming the popular vote to actual election outcome. It is possible that the growth in popular support may be hindered by the need to win a plurality in a state, the so-called all-or-nothing principle, in order to obtain any electors. This possibility can be examined by considering the dashed line shown in Figure 2.2. This line shows the percent of southern electoral votes cast for Republicans over time. Two patterns are worthy of comment. First, a quick comparison shows that the general shape of the line closely mirrors the lines shown in Figure 2.1, that is, popular support is reasonably reflected in electoral vote totals. Second, comparison of the two lines in Figure 2.2 suggests that, during the early years, Republican voters were not successful in obtaining electoral votes (the 19 percent in 1948 netted zero electoral votes) but that they were remarkably successful in later years. The solid line indicates the percentage of electoral votes from southern states that went for the GOP. The key to this dramatic growth in electoral vote was a less dramatic increase in popular vote. The mean GOP vote in 1948–1976 was 43.8 percent, and in 1980–

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THE REPUBLICAN SOUTH Figure 2.2

Republican Electoral Votes over Time

100

Percent

75

50

25

0 1948

1952

1956

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Year % GOP Electoral Vote in South

% GOP Vote in South

Note: The dashed line shows the percent of electoral votes from the region cast for the Republican candidate in a given election. The solid line shows the percent of the southern popular vote cast for the Republican in a given year.

2008 it was 52.8 percent. In six of the last ten elections (1972–2008), the Republican candidate has received at least 90 percent of the region’s electoral vote. The GOP received at least 65 percent of the regional electoral vote in all but two elections since 1972 (the exceptions being 1976 and 2008).13 Solid electoral strength in the region produced dramatic Electoral College support. The inescapable conclusion is that the South has been trending toward the Republican Party for some time and that the strength of the GOP in terms of electoral votes is approaching the level of the Democratic Party’s regional power in the early years of the twentieth century. A related question, however, has to do with the role of the South in national politics. One would expect the South to gain significance in the GOP if Republican growth there exceeded the party’s growth in other parts of the nation. Likewise, if Democratic victories rely less on the South, then it would be safe to assume that southern voices may matter less in that party’s strategy. One way to consider this is to look at the percentage of the winning presidential candidate’s Electoral College vote that came from the South. These

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percentages are shown in Figure 2.3. Victories by Democratic presidential candidates are marked with a square; Republican victories are marked with a circle. The vertical axis is the percentage of the winner’s total Electoral College vote drawn from southern states. It is important to note that this value has a maximum value that is well below 100 percent. For example, in 2004 the South held a total of 153 electoral votes. Given that any candidate needs 270 to carry the Electoral College, the maximum score in 2004 would be 56.7 percent.14 This maximum score is shown with the solid line across the top portion of the figure. Examining Figure 2.3 makes several trends crystal-clear. First, the two parties are moving in different directions. Democrats are less dependent on southern votes to win the Electoral College (consider the long-dash line, trending downward in the figure). The Democratic Party’s victory in 1948

Figure 2.3

Share of Winning Electoral Vote Drawn from the South

60

50

Percent

40

30

20

10

0 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Year Maximum

Democratic

Republican

Linear (Democratic)

Linear (Republican)

Note: The data points show the percent of the winner’s Electoral College vote that came from southern states (squares for Democrats, circles for Republicans). The two dashed lines overlaying the data are simple linear representations of the data for each party to show trends. The solid line across the top represents the maximum score for any given year.

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23

was built on about one-third of the electoral vote coming from the South. By the time of Bill Clinton’s victories (1992 and 1996), that proportion had been cut by more than half. In fact, the only exception to this trend is Jimmy Carter’s performance in 1976, when approximately 40 percent of his electoral vote came from southern states. In contrast, the Republican Party is increasingly reliant on the South for presidential victories. The trend line for Republicans (marked with a short-dash line) is strikingly upward. Indeed, looking at the two victories of George W. Bush (2000 and 2004), it is clear that the Republicans are essentially at the point at which the South has maximized its contribution to winning a national contest.15 Given the success of the Republican Party at the presidential level, one of the natural questions is how this fits in with contests for Congress. Other scholars have covered the historical aspects of this issue (see, e.g., Bullock and Rozell 1998; Black and Black 2002; Rhodes 2000), but a passing note is important. The election of 2008 did not reverse the long-running trend of increased Republican southern strength in the US Congress. However, the GOP did see some seats flip to the Democratic Party in both 2006 and 2008. After decades of steady declines in the number of Democratic seats from southern states, the last two elections have seen an increase. The Republicans gained a majority of southern seats in 1994, and they expanded on the margin of dominance through 2004. The Republican advantage in 2004 was forty-eight seats, almost a 2:1 regional split. After 2008, the Republican advantage was down to twenty-one seats. 16 The long-term trends of partisan balance can be seen in Figure 2.4. The two lines without data markers show the decline of the Democrats (the solid line) and the rise of the Republicans (the dashed line) in terms of the number of southern seats held by each party. These two lines should be measured against the left side of the figure, which shows the number of seats held. The significance of the South to the legislative fate of each party in a national context is also worth considering. A preliminary answer can be seen in the additional lines overlaid on Figure 2.4. Each line shows the proportion of overall party membership in Congress that is drawn from the South (Democrats are marked by the solid line with circles on the data points; Republicans are the dashed line with squares on the data points). The two lines are scaled to the percentages listed on the right side of the figure. Not surprisingly, the lines generally track together. This should be the case as long as the fate of a party in the South is consistent with the fate of that party nationally. As the Democrats lost seats in the South, the region grew increasingly marginal within the party. The Democratic delegation that comes from the South, roughly 20 percent of the whole, represents a reduction by about half from the regional high the party enjoyed during the 1950s. By contrast, the presence of southern members of Congress in the Republican Party increased from nearly zero to about 40 percent by 2008.

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THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS Figure 2.4

Congressional Partisanship in the South

140.00

50

45 120.00 40

35

30

25

Percent

80.00

60.00 20

15

40.00

10 20.00 5

2008

2004

2006

2000

2002

1996

1998

1992

1994

1988

1990

1984

1986

1980

1982

1976

1978

1972

1974

1968

1970

1964

1966

1960

1962

1956

1958

1952

1954

0 1948

0.00 1950

Seats (House and Senate)

100.00

Year Dem. Seats in South

Rep. Seats in South

Percentage Dem. Seats Southern

Percentage Rep. Seats Southern

Note: The two lines (solid and dashed) without data markers represent the number of seats in the US House and Senate held by Democrats (solid) and Republicans (dashed) from the South, respectively. This is measured on the left side of the figure. The two lines with data markers represent the proportion of Democratic (solid) and Republican (dashed) seats in Congress that are drawn from the South. This percentage is measured on the right side of the figure.

The reduction of any national party to a regional faction is sure to be a fatal political situation. In the aftermath of the 2008 election, there was a fair amount of discussion on the Republican Party becoming a party of southern white men (Nossiter 2008; Schone 2008). Looking at the last few data points in Figure 2.4, some evidence of such a trend may be seen as emerging. The 2006 and 2008 elections show the seats-held line diverging from the line showing the proportion of the party seats that are southern seats. Looking at the GOP lines, the actual number of GOP seats in the South declined in those two elections. However, the proportion of the GOP seats in Congress that were drawn from the South increased in those years. The GOP, at least in Congress, is increasingly a southern party. Given the conservative nature of the South, this means the national party is likely to be pulled to the right, which will have consequences for their ability to contest future elections. Given such dramatic change in the electoral fate of the major parties in

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THE REPUBLICAN SOUTH

the South, several questions arise. What motivated the change? Why did voters alter their behavior? Was there an underlying shift in the ideology of the region? Was there a move in partisan attitudes in response to party activities and candidates? Although an in-depth analysis of individual-level attitudes is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is possible to examine the stability of partisanship and ideology in the region to identify a rough approximation. Using CBS News polling data (collected and aggregated by Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993), it is possible to track aggregate responses in the region. Figure 2.5 shows the percent of southerners who identify themselves as conservative (the solid line on the figure) and the percent that identify themselves as Republican (the dashed line).17 What the figure makes clear is that an ideologically conservative South is nothing new. Indeed, the average percentage of self-described conservatives shows

Figure 2.5

Partisanship and Ideology in the South

45

40

35

25

20

15

10

5

0 19 7 19 7 7 19 8 7 19 9 8 19 0 8 19 1 8 19 2 8 19 3 8 19 4 8 19 5 8 19 6 8 19 7 8 19 8 8 19 9 9 19 0 9 19 1 92 19 9 19 3 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 08

Percent

30

Year Republican

Conservative

Source: Wright, Erickson, and McIver (collection of CBS polls, 1976–2003). See Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985) for more. Data for 2004 and 2008 were added by the author and are approximated with state exit polls. Note: The lines show the percent of southern-state residents who identify themselves as conservative (solid) and Republican (dotted).

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THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

stability over time. By contrast, the percentage who identify themselves as Republicans more than doubles, from about 15 percent in 1977 to more than 35 percent in 2003. Although these polling results end in 2003, I have used exit-poll data to approximate points for 2004 and 2008.18 The line for conservatives continues at approximately the same level. However, 2004 marked a spike in Republican identification, which would be consistent with the electoral environment that year. In 2008, the percentage of southerners who identified themselves as Republicans declined to the level seen in 2003. The conservative nature of the region has long represented a potential pickup for the Republican Party. It was not until the early 1980s during the Reagan administration that the party could solidify that potential into real change in voters’ partisanship, however (see Black and Black 2002).

The South in the 2008 Election Although Barack Obama won three southern states in the 2008 presidential election, the region as a whole was never in serious contention. Obama’s ability to contest the region more effectively was based on his support among African American voters in the South and on the striking unpopularity of the incumbent party. In the end, Republican candidate John McCain received an average of 54 percent of the vote across the southern states. Despite losing three of the eleven states, McCain’s vote was the fifth-highest for the GOP in the South since 1948. McCain’s performance in the region was strong when compared to his support in the rest of the nation. His average state vote in the South was 9 points higher than in the rest of the nation. This is 2 percent more than the same number for George W. Bush in 2004. It is also part of a longer trend of the GOP doing better in the South compared to the rest of the country. This may be more evidence of the Republican Party becoming a regionalized version of a national party. Before considering how the 2008 election played out in the minds of southern voters, it is worth looking at how the South compares to the nation. To do so, the differences between the region and nation along several key political variables should be examined. The first item is also, perhaps, the most obvious: candidate choice. How did candidate preference among southern voters compare to that of the nation? For this assessment (as well as much that follows), I rely on exit polls from the 2008 election.19 Figure 2.6a shows vote choice (in the form of percent Democratic minus percent Republican) for the nation and each of the southern states. Nationally, the average state vote was almost 7 points in the Democratic direction. Among southern states, only Virginia is even close (at +7 Democratic). The region averaged more than 9 points in the Republican direction. McCain generally did worse in states that have seen significant in-migration (that is, the movement of people into a state from outside the state). The commonality

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27

THE REPUBLICAN SOUTH Figure 2.6

Electorate Characteristics of the South and Nation a. Net Democratic Vote

10

5

0 !"#$%"&

+)(,)%)"

'&$()*"

!$(-. /"($&)%"

Difference

-5 81$(,)"

5$6-. /"($&)%"

-10

017"2

:)22)22);;)

-15 01%%12211

-20

9$6)2)"%" 3(4"%2"2 3&"|z|

Logged Odds

Percentage Change

0.120 0.334 0.311 –2.190 0.184 –0.009 0.352 –0.037

0.024 0.048 0.087 0.470 0.331 0.056 0.238 0.482

5.080 6.900 3.580 –4.670 0.560 –0.160 1.480 –0.080

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.577 0.871 0.139 0.938

1.128 1.396 1.365 0.112 1.203 0.991 1.422 0.963

12.752 39.640 36.515 –88.813 20.253 –0.901 42.196 –3.665

0.391 –4.050

0.181 0.461

2.160 –8.780

0.031 0.000

1.478

47.829

Notes: Number of obs = 908; Wald chi2(9) = 220.47; Pr > Chi2 = 0.0000; McFadden’s Adj R2 = 0.2909.

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ment and evaluations of Obama’s experience. Thus, higher levels of racial resentment will have a positive effect on the probability of a negative evaluation of Obama’s experience. Once again, responses to the question about Obama’s experience are recoded into a dichotomy between those who opined that Obama did not have enough political experience to be president (coded 1), versus those who thought he did or were unsure (coded 0). Even after controlling for other independent variables, higher levels of racial resentment increase the logged odds of viewing Obama as inexperienced. Each change in racial resentment increases these odds by almost 13 percent. Not surprisingly, both party identification and ideology have strong effects. The percentage change in odds for party identification was 39.6 percent, and for ideology it was 36.5 percent. Thus, Republicans and conservatives were both more likely to judge Obama to be inexperienced. Race also has significant effects. African Americans are much less likely to view Obama as inexperienced (percentage change in odds is -88 percent). Finally, those likely voters over 65 years old have greater odds of viewing Obama as inexperienced. Compared to the same for those between 30 years and 64 years, the increase in odds for older voters is 47.8 percent. The effects of the other control variables are statistically insignificant. Figure 10.1 examines the effects of racial resentment and ideology on evaluations of Obama’s experience, holding the other explanatory variables constant at their medians. Liberals with very low levels of racial resentment

Figure 10.1 Probability of “Obama Inexperienced,” by Racial Resentment and Ideology 0.900

0.800

Prob. Obama Inexperienced

0.700

0.600

0.500

0.400

0.300

0.200

0.100

0.000 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Racial Resentment

Liberals

Moderates

Conservatives

16

17

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have less than a 20 percent probability of viewing Obama as inexperienced. Even liberals with the highest level of racial resentment (a very rare species of voter) have less than a 50 percent probability of evaluating Obama as politically inexperienced. By contrast, 77 percent is the probability for conservatives with the highest level of racial resentment and 33 percent for conservatives with low levels of racial resentment. Finally, moderates do not cross the 50 percent threshold until the racial resentment index climbs above 13 (out of 17). These findings suggest that racial resentment indirectly influences voting by working through voters’ opinions about Obama’s level of experience. Before discussing the significance of these results, we turn our attention to assess the direct effects of racial resentment on voters’ choice. Racial Resentment and Support for McCain

Table 10.2 shows support for the second hypothesis that higher levels of racial resentment would increase the probability that likely voters would cast their ballot for McCain. Each increase in racial resentment increases the odds of supporting McCain by more than 17 percent. This effect occurs despite controlling for the influences of party identification, ideology, George Bush’s approval ratings, and a host of other sociodemographic variables. Closely related to racial resentment is the variable measuring likely voters’ opinions about Obama’s experience. For this analysis, 1 is “enough experience,” 0 is “unsure,” and -1 is “not enough experience.” Given this

Table 10.2

McCain’s Support and Racial Resentment Robust Coef.

Racial resentment Obama experienced Party identification Ideology Bush approval African American Other minority Education Christians Age 18 to 30 years Age 65 years and older Constant

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

Logged Odds

Percentage Change

0.158 –1.467 0.442 0.473 2.465 –2.605 –1.312 –0.080 1.114 –1.556

0.044 0.214 0.094 0.143 0.454 1.008 1.275 0.119 0.431 0.579

3.590 –6.850 4.690 3.300 5.430 –2.580 –1.030 –0.670 2.580 –2.690

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.303 0.505 0.010 0.007

1.171 0.231 1.557 1.604 11.761 0.074 0.269 0.924 3.046 0.211

17.119 –76.933 55.658 60.427 1076.070 –92.611 –73.077 –7.645 204.581 –78.898

–1.000 –5.232

0.372 1.027

–2.690 –5.090

0.007 0.000

0.368

–63.200

Notes: Number of obs = 731; Wald chi2(11) = 150.34; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; McFadden’s Adj R2 = 0.704.

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coding, evaluations of Obama’s experience should have a negative relationship with support for McCain. Table 10.2 shows that this is indeed the case. Going from unsure to enough experience decreases the odds of supporting McCain by almost 77 percent. Together, both of these findings suggest that racial resentment has both a direct influence on voting intentions and an indirect influence via evaluations of Obama’s level of experience. The other two variables associated with questions about race are the African American dummy variable and the dummy variable for other minorities. Even though the effect of the African American dummy variable is significant, decreasing the odds of supporting McCain (compared to whites) by almost 93 percent, the effect of the other minority variable is statistically insignificant. A closer examination of this latter relationship shows that there is a negative bivariate relationship with supporting McCain, but the effect becomes insignificant after controlling for the other independent variables. We suspect that this null finding is largely a function of a very small sample of other minorities. Table 10.2 also shows the results for a number of other variables that political scientists traditionally associate with presidential voting patterns. Partisanship, ideology, and presidential approval all have large effects in the expected direction. Religion is also significant. Being Christian, compared to non-Christian, increases the odds of supporting McCain by almost 205 percent. Finally, although we expected younger voters to be less supportive of McCain when compared to middle aged voters, older voters in the South were also less supportive of McCain compared to middle-age voters. Most exit polls show that older voters were the most supportive of McCain. Additional analyses of these findings suggest they may be a function of the large vote for Obama in some Florida retirement counties. One dog, of considerable note, did not hunt in the 2008 presidential election in the South. Neither of the two operationalizations of economic class—income, which was not included in the analysis, and education, which was included in the analysis—have significant effects on supporting McCain. (See Chapter 5 in this volume for similar findings.) One would think that with all of the recent scholarship on southern politics showing the relationship between partisan changes and economic class variables (Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Shafer and Johnston 2006) one of these indicators would prove to have a significant relationship with voting intentions. But this is not the case. Perhaps when racial politics emerges in the South, as it did in 2008 with the presidential candidacy of an African American, the old South’s classless politics rises from the ashes of history to temporarily recast the politics for just one election.5 However, other scholars and polemicists have been theorizing about the rise of religion (Franks 2004) and ideology (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998) for years. Despite the onset of racial poli-

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tics, both of these variables survived to influence presidential voting intentions, whereas class did not. With an Obama candidacy in 2012 all but assured, it will be interesting to observe if economic class variables reemerge as significant indicators of presidential voting preferences. Or alternatively, whether they continue to remain insignificant and in true topdown fashion this pattern is replicated down the electoral hierarchy in the South. Figure 10.2 analyzes support for McCain by different levels of racial resentment and ideology. We focus on these two independent variables because of the close connection between ideology and racial resentment (Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). Figure 10.2 illustrates that even conservatives with very low levels of racial resentment have a better than 50 percent probability of supporting McCain over Obama. Conservatives with the highest levels of racial resentment have more than a 90 percent probability of supporting McCain. Of course, these findings are not surprising. Rather, what is noteworthy are the support patterns for moderates. Once racial resentment climbs past the midpoint of its index (8) the probability of supporting McCain increases to above 50 percent. At the highest levels of racial resentment, moderates have an 81 percent probability of supporting McCain. These findings suggest that moderates in the South may have made their voting decision based on their level of racial resentment. If it is high, they are more likely to support McCain. If it is low, they are more likely to support Obama.

Figure 10.2 Probability of Supporting McCain, by Racial Resentment and Ideology 1.000 0.900

Prob. of Supporting McCain

0.800 0.700 0.600 0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Racial Resentment

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

16

17

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Figure 10.3 examines the probability of supporting McCain based on racial resentment and partisanship. Based on the patterns of support associated with moderates, we focus our narrative on independents to assess if racial resentment may have been the deciding factor in determining their patterns of presidential support. The middle line with square symbols shows the changes in probability of supporting McCain for each level of racial resentment for independents. For independents, the probability of supporting McCain crosses the 50 percent threshold at a lower level of racial resentment (5) when compared to moderates. At the highest levels of racial resentment, independents have more than an 87 percent probability of supporting McCain. All of this suggests that racial resentment may have been a key variable for understanding the patterns of support for those groups that are typically in the middle of the political struggle between the two major parties, moderates and independents.

Conclusion Both evaluations of Obama’s experience and voting intentions of likely southern voters are tied to racial resentment. Those with the highest levels of racial resentment are more likely to view Obama as inexperienced and are more likely to support McCain for president. These patterns are signifi-

Figure 10.3 Probability of Supporting McCain, by Racial Resentment and Party Identification 1.200

Prob. of Supporting McCain

1.000

0.800

0.600

0.400

0.200

0.000 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Racial Resentment

Democrat

Independent

Republican

16

17

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cant after controlling for partisanship, ideology, presidential approval, religion, and sociodemographic variables. Moreover, these patterns emerge even though racial issues were not injected into the campaign. As such, these findings correspond with the literature analyzing voting behavior in statewide contests when an African American is on the ballot (Citrin et al. 1990; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears and Kinder 1970, 1971). How do these patterns of candidate support compare to other presidential elections in the South in the modern era? We do not see evidence that race was the predominant factor in the South in 2008 as it was in 1948, 1964, and 1968. Other factors like partisanship, presidential approval, and religion all played important roles in defining voting behavior in ways that are consistent with normal presidential election years. This is the good news. However, our evaluations need to be tempered. Even though the only major racially based stimulus was the race of Obama, the evidence suggests that race mattered especially with independents and moderates, the voters in the middle of the political spectrum who often determine which candidates win. Did Obama’s candidacy stimulate patterns of politics that are unique to the South? Although these data do not extend to other parts of the United States, the American National Election Study data for the 2008 elections (unavailable at this writing) will allow this type of comparison. Given the decline of economic class variables and the rise of racial resentment in explaining patterns of presidential support in the South in 2008, it seems apparent that Obama’s candidacy stimulated a political nerve in the South, a nerve that other voters in other US regions may not share. If the South is unique, racial resentment will play more of a role in defining the region’s patterns of voting compared to other regions. Finally, these findings, when coupled with other recent research on the impact of racial resentment (Knuckey 2005; Valentino and Sears 2005), raise another important topic for future research. Will Obama’s performance in office regarding the economy or the war on terrorism influence southerners’ views of African American candidates? Although the reward-punishment model of economic voting has been challenged on several grounds (see esp. Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Rudolph 2006), it will be interesting to assess the effect of racial resentment on voting preferences in 2010 and 2012 in the South when placed within the context of actual presidential performance. We are hopeful that with the progress in race relations since the end of World War II the evaluations of presidential performance and voting behavior will be independent of racial resentment.

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Appendix Appendix 10.A1

Operationalizations and Summary Statistics of Unweighted Variables

Barack Obama’s Inexperience I’d like to ask you what you think about Barack Obama’s level of experience. Do you think he has enough experience to be president, does not have enough experience to be president, or are not sure whether he has enough experience to be president? Frequency % Cumulative No 530 48.62 48.62 Unsure 198 18.17 66.79 Yes 332 30.46 97.25 Don’t know 30 2.75 100.00 Total 1,090 100.00 Support for McCain Suppose the election were being held today. If Barack Obama were the Democratic Party’s candidate and John McCain were the Republican Party’s candidate, who would you be more likely to vote for? Frequency % Cumulative Obama 398 36.51 36.51 McCain 577 52.94 89.45 Don’t know/other 115 10.55 100.00 Total 1,090 100.00 Racial Resentment Racial Resentment (Four variables summarized in text) ranging from 1 (low) to 17 (high). Mean = 10.5 Median = 10 Std. Dev. = 4.13 Party Identification Standard 7-point party identification scale ranging from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7 (strong Republican) Mean = 4.05 Median = 4 Std. Dev. = 2.26 Ideology Five point ideology scale ranging from 1 (strong liberal) to 5 (strong conservative) Mean = 3.45 Median = 4 Std. Dev. = 1.23 Bush Approval Do you Approve or Disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? Frequency % Cumulative Disapprove 563 51.65 51.65 Approve 382 35.05 86.70 Don’t know 145 13.30 100.00 Total 1,090 100.00 Education Education ranging from 1 (less than high school) to 6 (postgraduate) Mean = 3.86 Median = 4 Std. Dev. = 1.62 Race What is your race or ethnicity? Frequency Caucasian 825 African American 139 Other Minority 57 Don’t know/other 69 Total 1,090

% 75.69 12.75 5.33 6.33 100.00

Cumulative 75.69 88.44 93.67 100.00

(continues)

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ISSUES, BELIEFS, AND RACE continued

Age What is your age as of your last birthday? Frequency 18 to 30 36 31 to 64 573 65+ 411 Don’t know/ra 67 Total 1,090

% 3.60 52.60 37.70 6.10 100.00

Cumulative 3.6 56.2 93.9 100.0

Religious Preference What, if any, is your religious preference: Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness, Muslim, or an Orthodox religion such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church? Frequency % Cumulative Others 195 17.89 17.89 Christian 895 82.11 100.00 Total 1,090 100.00

Notes 1. The authors wish to thank Scott Huffmon at Winthrop University for conducting this survey and making these data available. The authors are solely responsible for the analysis of these data and interpretations of the findings. 2. These statewide candidates include Tom Bradley, who in 1982 and 1986 lost the governor race in California; Harvey Gantt, who in 1990 and 1996 lost the race for the US Senate seat in North Carolina against Jesse Helms; H. Carl McCall, who lost the 2002 New York race for governor; and Ron Kirk, who lost the 2002 US Senate contest in Texas. Although not yet assessed in this literature, the loss of Democrat Harold Ford Jr. for the US Senate seat in Tennessee in 2006 will be added. These losses are contrasted against the electoral successes of US Senator Edmond Brooke of Massachusetts in 1966 and 1972, Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia in 1989, US Senator Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois in 1992, US Senator Barack Obama of Illinois in 2004, and Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts in 2006. 3. To reduce missing values, we replaced missing values for each item with the rounded score from the other three items. In so doing, we reduced our missing values by 108 respondents and we increased the Cronbach’s Alpha from .579 to .602 for the index. 4. We did conduct all analyses for only whites. It had no appreciable impact on the findings for either model. 5. See Shafer and Johnston (2006) for an analysis of the temporary effects of third-party candidates in the South.

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11 The Future of Southern Politics John A. Clark

THE CHAPTERS IN THIS VOLUME START WITH TWO RELATED ASSUMPtions: The South is a distinctive region, and the politics of the region are worth studying on their own merits. Like all assumptions, they should not be made lightly. They are clearly supported by historical precedent. In the early days of the republic, the South’s distinctiveness stemmed from its slave-based agrarian economy. Following the Civil War, its overwhelming support for the Democratic Party made it unique. In more recent years, dramatic shifts in the region’s demographics and politics have made it an obvious choice for study. Today, however, some scholars question whether southern distinctiveness continues (e.g., Shafer and Johnston 2006). The question of southern distinctiveness was not lost on V. O. Key Jr., who included the words “in state and nation” in the title of his landmark study of southern politics (Key 1949). For Key, the region was distinctive. Absent two-party competition, democracy suffered. The centrality of race and the continued subjugation of former slaves shaped the political institutions of the region and the relationship of the southern states to the rest of the nation. Yet, Key also recognized the changes that were beginning to alter the southern landscape: population migration, the growth of cities, and the diversification of the economy were under way (Key 1949, 671–675), and these trends have increased exponentially in the intervening years. How should the 2008 presidential election be interpreted in light of the aforementioned assumptions? Was the South distinctive in the most recent election? Or does it fit with patterns present in the rest of the country? If the latter, does the region deserve the attention of volumes like this one? Leaving aside the first question for the moment, my conclusion is that the remaining three should be answered in the affirmative. Yes, the South 253

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remained distinctive in 2008. Yes, it fits with patterns found elsewhere. Yes, it deserves attention for both the continuity of its distinctiveness and the changes that have occurred there. This chapter begins with a brief examination of the movement from a solidly Democratic South to a region dominated by Republicans at the presidential level. The 2008 election fits within this framework fairly well. I next take up the question of southern exceptionalism in light of the 2008 results. In some ways—and in some places—the South has been transformed from a unique region into one in which its variation fits with the rest of the country. In other ways, it continues to be a world unto itself when one considers its place in the US political landscape.

From “Solid South” to “Solid South?” The earlier summaries of southern political history (see esp. Chapters 1, 2, and 4 in this volume) detailed the central elements of the development of the one-party and Jim Crow systems in the South in the post-Reconstruction era and of the dramatic transformation of those traditional patterns in the post–World War II era. This transformation saw the gradual destruction of the Jim Crow system and the end of the Democratic Solid South, first at the level of presidential politics and then, by the 1980s and 1990s, at the level of subnational politics as well. Indeed, the change in partisanship was so significant as to suggest to many that the region had come to be dominated by the Republican Party by the last quarter of the twentieth century. Recent observers have found additional support for a new era of Republican dominance of the South, although Democratic support among African Americans provides a ceiling of sorts (Black and Black 1992; Lublin 2004). For example, one study (Hayes and McKee 2008) identifies three trends that seem to favor Republicans well into the future: the increasing ideological congruity between southerners and the Republican Party, Republican support among younger voters, and the power of incumbency for those Republicans currently in office. Another study (Schaller 2006) goes so far as to argue that Democrats should write off the South as unwinnable—or at least unnecessary—in the pursuit of the White House. Bill Clinton would have won his election and reelection bids without the southern states he carried. Despite the attention focused on Florida in 2000, Al Gore could have won the presidency had he garnered a plurality in any of the states won by George W. Bush.1 The 2008 presidential election seems to fit into the pattern laid out here. The Republican nominee, John McCain, won eight of the eleven southern states. Meanwhile, Barack Obama won Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina on his way to an Electoral College landslide. Like Clinton before

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him, Obama’s Electoral College victory was not predicated on his success in the South. Both candidates benefited from economic woes that made the incumbent’s party vulnerable. Unlike previous candidates, Obama had a remarkable advantage in terms of campaign spending. His campaign was able to run advertisements and operate campaign offices in a variety of places, including parts of the South, which had been ignored in recent elections by candidates from both parties. Part of Obama’s success was manufactured with a strong campaign that future Democratic candidates may have difficulty replicating, including Obama in 2012 should he run for reelection. Is Obama’s success in the South, limited as it was, likely to be repeated? Or will the region’s Republican strength be restored in future elections? Any attempt to answer these questions is purely speculative, and one can only hope such speculation will be taken with the appropriate caveats and a grain of salt (except in the event one turns out to be correct). There is little reason to think that Democratic candidates in 2012 and 2016 will substantially alter the electoral landscape. Nevertheless, the analysis of Susan MacManus in Chapter 5 of this volume makes clear that the changing demographics of the region may play a continuing role in Democratic success. Should Hispanic turnout catch up to the dramatic population growth of this group in several states, Democratic prospects will brighten considerably, as Harold Stanley demonstrates in Chapter 6. Another area of promise for Democrats is the support Obama received from young voters. The generational difference between candidates was clear, and the Obama campaign effectively employed new technologies to organize and mobilize young supporters. New voters are notoriously volatile, yet cohort effects in party support tend to persist over time (Jennings and Markus 1984; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Sears and Funk 1999).2 In Chapter 7, Jonathan Knuckey examines cohort differences in partisanship (1972–2004) and vote choice (2008). He finds younger voters to be more supportive of Obama among southern whites, but the effects are relatively small. Taking all voters into account, however, the age effects appear stronger. A larger proportion of nonwhite voters were younger, and they preferred Obama by large margins. The difference between 18–29-year-old voters and older voters reached double figures in every state but one (Georgia) and reached an astonishing 30 percentage points in North Carolina.3 If the young cohort stays involved in politics, and if young voters retain their Democratic allegiances, and if white voters become a smaller segment of the electorate, and if subsequent cohorts exhibit the same behavior, the future for Democrats might be rosier than past history suggests. It probably goes without saying that such a Democratic Party would bear little resemblance to the one that dominated the South prior to the 1960s.

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The End of Southern Exceptionalism? In the second volume of their trilogy on southern politics, Earl Black and Merle Black (1992) coined the phrase “vital South” to describe the importance of the region for determining winners in presidential elections while allowing Democrats to retain control of the US House of Representatives and often the US Senate. The term signified the importance of the region as a bellwether for national politics as well: The contemporary South reveals—sometimes in exaggerated form—political outcomes characteristic of the entire country. . . . Today, one looks at the South and sees America. There is abundant reason to pay close attention to future political developments in the South, for it now shapes the trends and sets the pace of national political outcomes and procedures (Black and Black 1992, 366).

The decline of southern exceptionalism is echoed by others (Shafer and Johnston 2006) who argue that economic development rather than “legal desegregation” was the driving force behind the growth of two-party competition and a new political system based on class differences. The case for continued southern exceptionalism can be made in at least two ways. First, the history of the region, particularly with regard to conflicts centered on race, may continue to distinguish the South from the rest of the country. As V. O. Key (1949, 5) famously put it, “In the last analysis the major peculiarities of southern politics go back to the Negro. Whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.” Although regional differences on racial issues have diminished, there is ample evidence that southerners hold attitudes about race that are distinctive (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Valentino and Sears 2005). Joseph A. Aistrup, Emizet Kisangani, and Roxanne L. Piri (Chapter 10 in this volume) demonstrate that racial resentment diminished the belief that Obama was experienced enough to become president and consequently led to increased support for John McCain. A second argument for continued southern exceptionalism is based on the unique demographic tendencies of southerners. In other words, the South is different from the rest of the country because the people who live there are different in politically relevant ways. For example, southern states have higher concentrations of African American citizens than the rest of the country, particularly the Deep South states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Another key difference stems from what John Green calls the “faith factor” (see Chapter 9 in this volume). White southerners are more likely to belong to evangelical Protestant churches, and many mainline Protestant congregations are more conservative than their denominational brethren in other parts of the country.

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Religious variables may have the same effects on southern voters as they do on voters elsewhere, but regional differences in the distribution of those variables may make the South exceptional. The first point to make about southern exceptionalism is that the South is not now, nor likely has it ever been, monolithic. Despite regional similarities, there are vast differences within and across states. For Key (1949), these differences corresponded to the size of the African American population so that the Rim South differed from the Deep South. More recently, David Woodard (2006) classified some states as “national” (Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Virginia), others as “emergent” (North Carolina and Tennessee), and the rest as “traditional” (Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina). As this classification scheme suggests, some southern states fit more neatly with the nation as a whole than do others. In order to more fully examine the degree of southern exceptionalism in the 2008 election, Figure 11.1 displays the percentage of the vote received by Barack Obama from white voters in each state (Y-axis) as a function of the proportion of voters in that state who were African American. Two aspects of the figure leap off the page. First, there is considerable variation

Figure 11.1 White Vote for Obama as a Function of the African American Share of the Electorate, 2008

Source: Exit polls obtained atwww.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/.

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in white voting patterns in states with very low levels of black voters. The range extends from a cluster of western states (Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho) at around 30 percent support for Obama among whites to 68 percent in Vermont and 70 percent in Obama’s home state of Hawaii. Second, the southern states (represented by black dots) make up the lower-right portion of the figure due to their relatively high African American populations and their relatively low levels of white support for Obama. Some of them seem to fit with the rest of the country (most notably Florida), but most appear to be outliers. A more systematic examination of these data is presented in the regression model in Table 11.1. The dependent variable in the analysis is the percentage of white vote for Obama in each state (the Y-axis in Figure 11.1). It is regressed on the percentage of the votes cast by African Americans (the X-axis) and an interaction variable used to capture differences between the South and the rest of the country. The results show that, for states outside the South, there is no relationship between the racial composition of the electorate and the decisions made by white voters. Southern states are different. In the South, each percentage point increase in the African American share of the electorate produces a corresponding decline in white voter support for Obama. To put it another way, southern states are distinctive not only because of their racial demographics but also in the way white voters behave in the presence of black voters. The southern party system is racially polarized in a way that is different from the rest of the country. If the southern party system is racially polarized, it stands to reason that the presence of an African American candidate at the top of the Democratic ticket might adversely affect the party’s success in the South. This proposition is tested in Table 11.2. Here the overall vote share won by Obama in 2008 is regressed on the vote share won by the 2004 Democratic nominee, John Kerry. An interaction term again is used to capture southern exceptionalism. The model shows that, all things being equal, Obama ran about 5.5 points ahead of Kerry. Outside the South, a change of 1 percent in support for Kerry yields an identical 1 percent change in support for Obama. The South is different once again. In southern states, the effect of a one-unit

Table 11.1 OLS Regression Model of White Obama Vote by Black Electorate, 2008

African American percentage of the electorate South African American percentage of the electorate Constant Notes: Adj. R2 = .51; N = 50.

b

s.e.

p (sig.)

.14 -1.07 46.45

.24 .22 2.11

.58 .00 .00

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THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN POLITICS Table 11.2

OLS Regression Model of Obama Vote in 2008 by Kerry Vote in 2004

Kerry vote in state, 2004 South Kerry vote in state, 2004 Constant

b

s.e.

p (sig.)

1.00 -.07 5.45

.06 .03 2.94

.00 .03 .07

Notes: Adj. R2 = .86; N = 50.

change in support for Kerry drops to a corresponding .93 change in support for Obama. In other words, Obama’s vote totals in the South are slightly lower than one would expect given the support Kerry received four years earlier. Though the difference is statistically significant (p=0.03), it does not amount to much in substantive terms. One can conclude that there was considerable consistency between 2004 and 2008 in all parts of the country, even if the regression equation reveals some slippage in support for Obama in the South relative to the rest of the states. Indeed, Obama lost support in only three southern states and gained support in the others compared to Kerry. Taken together, these results suggest that southern exceptionalism may have declined, but it has not disappeared completely. A more complete mapping of regional differences over time seems to be in order.

A Regional Republican Party? In April 2009, the longtime US senator from Pennsylvania Arlen Specter shocked the political world by announcing that he was leaving the Republican Party to become a Democrat. Specter’s switch contributed to a more ideologically cohesive—and considerably smaller—Republican Party in the Senate. Republicans held fifty-five Senate seats going into the 2006 elections. Their numbers dwindled to forty in 2009. The election of Scott Brown in Massachusetts to fill the vacancy created by the death of Edward Kennedy inceased the number of Republican seats to forty-one by early 2010, still far below the number of US Senate seats the party held prior to the 2006 midterm elections. Republicans controlled fifteen of the twentytwo Senate seats from southern states, greater than a 2-to-1 margin. Unfortunately for the party, Democrats held a similar majority of the more numerous Senate seats outside the South. The ratios were much closer on the House side, where the most noticeable trend has been the turnover of seats formerly held by Republican moderates, especially in the Northeast. These changes have led some observers to question whether the Republican Party has become a regional party based in the South or a

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minority party unwilling to sacrifice ideological purity to expand in order to challenge for control of government. A careful examination of the historical record, both within the South and for the nation as a whole, suggests that we ought not put too much stock into short-term trends. Political circumstances can change rapidly, and both political parties have shown themselves to be resilient and adaptable. Talk of a permanent Republican majority was commonplace during the administration of George W. Bush, and even earlier, and less than a generation has passed since the thought of Democrats losing control of the US House seemed preposterous. Just as they have since the end of Reconstruction, the southern states and the various political actors therein—candidates, activists, voters—will continue to shape the contours of national politics. The chapters in this volume provide an important baseline by which past changes can be gauged and from which future changes can be measured.

Notes 1. A weakness in Schaller’s argument, it seems to me, is that Democratic candidates who are moderately successful in the South are the same ones able to broaden the party’s electoral coalition outside the region. In other words, Clinton and Obama (more than Gore or Kerry) garnered support from nonaligned voters both inside and outside the South. Winning in the South may not be necessary for Democratic success, but candidates who cannot compete there are unlikely to compete in all the other places that Democrats need to win to build an Electoral College majority. 2. Vote choice tends to be less stable than partisanship, which, once formed, tends to resist change. The implications for different conceptualizations of party support are evident in the exchange between Donald Strong (1963), who examined vote choice, and Philip Converse (1963), who looked at party identification. Neither of them anticipated the Republican sweep of southern Electoral College votes a mere decade later. 3. Like Knuckey, I rely on exit poll data made available at the CNN website: www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/.

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Stimson, James A. 2004. Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stoker, Laura. 1998. “Understanding Whites’ Resistance to Affirmative Action: The Role of Principled Commitments and Racial Prejudice.” In Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, eds. Perception and Prejudice: Race and Politics in the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press. Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani. 2003. Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization. Boulder: Westview. Strong, Donald S. 1963. “Durable Republicanism in the South.” In Allan P. Sindler, ed. Change in the Contemporary South. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Suro, Robert. 2005. “A Growing Minority.” The World Almanac, 2005. www.facts.com/wfea70050.htm (accessed July 30, 2008). Suro, Robert, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 2003. “The Rise of the Second Generation: Changing Patterns in Hispanic Population Growth.” Pew Hispanic Center, October 14. Suro, Robert, and Audrey Singer. 2002. “Latino Growth in Metropolitan America: Changing Patterns, New Locations.” Census 2000 Survey Series. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and Pew Hispanic Center, July. Tarman, Christopher, and David O. Sears. 2005. “The Conceptualization and Measurement of Symbolic Racism.” Journal of Politics 67: 731–761. Taylor, Melissa, and James Carroll. 2002. “The Changing Population in the U.S.: Baby Boomers, Immigrants, and Their Effects on State Government.” Trends Alert. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, December. Taylor, Paul, and Richard Fry. 2007. “Hispanics in the 2008 Election: A Swing Vote?” Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. Teixeira, Ruy. 2008. “The Future of Red, Blue, and Purple America.” Paper presented at a conference on sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, February 28. www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/01 _demographics_teixeira (accessed March 3, 2008). Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. “When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and SelfMonitoring.” American Journal of Political Science 37: 1032–1053. Thernstrom, Abigail, and Stephan Thernstrom. 2008. “Is Race Out of the Race?” Los Angeles Times, March 20. Torres, Cruz C. 2000. “Emerging Latino Communities: A New Challenge for the Rural South.” The Rural South: Preparing for the 21st Century, no. 12, August. Towery, Matt. 2008. “Matt Towery’s Inside The Numbers: Will Obama Play in Georgia?” Southern Political Report, November 20. Traub, James. 2008. “The Emerging Minority.” New York Times, March 2. Tuch, Steven A. 1987. “Urbanism, Region, and Tolerance Revisited: The Case of Racial Prejudice.” American Sociological Review 52: 504–510. Urbina, Ian. 2008. “In Virginia, Large Voting Blocs for McCain and for Obama.” The New York Times, September 18. US Census Bureau. 2006. Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004, Current Population Report P20–556, Washington, DC, March. ———. 2007. Table 2: Annual Estimates of the Population by Selected Age Groups and Sex for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006 (NC-EST2006–02)

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Joseph A. Aistrup is professor of political science and interim associate dean of arts and sciences at Kansas State University. He has published in numerous scholarly journals, including Political Research Quarterly, Legislative Studies Quarterly, American Review of Politics, and Economic Development Review. Additionally, his book, Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South (1996) is one of the most widely cited works on the development of southern Republican Party strength in recent years. David J. Bonanza is a student in the University of South Florida’s Honors College and a participant in USF’s undergraduate research program. Robert D. Brown is professor of political science at the University of Mississippi and departmental director of graduate studies. His research has been published in a wide variety of political science journals, including American Politics Research, Social Science Quarterly, and American Review of Politics. He has recently completed a manuscript (coauthored with John Bruce) entitled U.S. Political Parties: Competition in the Context of Federalism. John M. Bruce is associate professor of political science at the University of Mississippi. His research interests include southern politics, voting behavior, public opinion, political parties, research methodology, and, generally, American government and politics. His three most recent journal articles/book chapters have addressed political party competition, congressional voting, partisanship in the South, and the Christian Coalition in the 1996 281

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elections in Texas. His publications include his book entitled The Changing Politics of Gun Control (1998). John A. Clark is professor of political science at Western Michigan University. His research has resulted in publications in various professional journals, the presentation of numerous conference papers, and book chapters. He has published in such journals as The American Political Science Review, Polity, and The American Review of Politics. He is coeditor (with Robert P. Steed, Lewis Bowman, and Charles D. Hadley) of Party Organization and Activism in the American South (1998), which won the Southern Political Science Association’s V.O. Key Award for the Best Book on Southern Politics in 1998; and he coedited (with Charles Prysby) Southern Political Party Activists: Patterns of Conflict and Change, 1991– 2001 (2004). John C. Green is director of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron. He is also distinguished professor of political science at the University of Akron and senior fellow with the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. He is best known for his work on religion and politics. He has written numerous journal articles and is the coauthor of The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy, Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches From the Front, and The Diminishing Divide: Religion’s Changing Role in American Politics. He is coeditor of The State of the Parties, now in its 5th edition, Multiparty Politics in America, and Financing the 1996 Election. Danny Hayes is assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University. He also serves as a senior research associate at the Maxwell School’s Campbell Public Affairs Institute. His work has been published in a variety of journals, including the American Journal of Political Science, American Politics Research, and Politics and Policy. He is a regular presenter as well as discussant at national political science conferences. Branwell DuBose Kapeluck is associate professor of political science at The Citadel. He has served as a director for the biennial Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics since 2002. Most recently, he coedited (with Laurence W. Moreland and Robert P. Steed) A Paler Shade of Red: The 2008 Presidential Election in the South (2009). Emizet F. Kisangani is professor of political science at Kansas State University. His research has appeared in African Studies Review, British Journal of Political Science, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of

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Modern African Studies, and Journal of Peace Research. He is the author of “Zaire After Mobutu: A Case of a Humanitarian Emergency.” He is coauthor of The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace and The Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Jonathan Knuckey is associate professor of political science at the University of Central Florida. His research interests focus on southern politics, political behavior, scope and methods in political science, and, generally, American government and politics. His recent journal publications have addressed religious conservatism and the Republican Party, classification of presidential elections, symbolic racism in Louisiana elections, and presidential elections in Louisiana politics. He recently published a chapter analyzing Florida’s role in the 2008 presidential election in A Paler Shade of Red: The 2008 Presidential Election in the South, DuBose Kapeluck, Laurence W. Moreland, and Robert P. Steed, eds. (2009). Christopher J. Leddy Jr. is a student in the University of South Florida’s Honors College and a participant in USF’s undergraduate research program. Susan A. MacManus is distinguished university professor of public administration and political science in the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida. She has written extensively on Florida politics and elections and on generational change in the South. She has made frequent appearances in the Florida and national media as an elections analyst. A past president of the Southern Political Science Association, she received that association’s Diane Blair Award for outstanding contributions to the profession. Her recent publications include Florida Politics: Ten Media Markets, One Powerful State (2004), Politics in States and Communities (2003), Mapping Florida’s Political Landscape: The Changing Art and Politics of Reapportionment and Redistricting (2002), Targeting Senior Citizens (2000), and Young vs. Old: Generational Combat in the 21st Century (1996). Seth C. McKee is assistant professor of political science at the University of South Florida. He has been a regular participant, both as presenter and discussant, at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. He is the author of numerous journal articles, book chapters, and professional papers. His work has appeared in a number of peer-reviewed journals, including Social Science Quarterly, Presidential Studies Quarterly, and the American Review of Politics. His research interests include the effects of redistricting and voter turnout. He has a forthcoming book entitled Republican Ascendancy in Southern Elections U.S. House: Causes and Consequences.

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Brian D. McPhee is a student in the University of South Florida’s Honors College and a participant in USF’s undergraduate research program. Laurence W. Moreland is professor of political science at The Citadel. He has long-served as codirector of the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics and is the author and editor of a number of publications, including (with Robert P. Steed) Writing Southern Politics: Contemporary Interpretations and Future Directions (2006), and (with DuBose Kapeluck and Robert P. Steed) A Paler Shade of Red: The 2008 Presidential Election in the South (2009). Roxanne L. Piri earned her MA in political science at Kansas State University, and is currently enrolled in the Ph.D. program at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Andrew F. Quecan is a student in the University of South Florida’s Honors College and a participant in USF’s undergraduate research program. Harold W. Stanley is Geurin-Pettus Distinguished Professor of American Politics and Political Economy at Southern Methodist University. A Rhodes Scholar and past president of the Southern Political Science Association, he has written numerous professional papers, journal articles, and book chapters. His recent publications include articles in the American Journal of Political Science, American Politics Research, and Presidential Studies Quarterly; numerous book chapters; and a number of books, including six editions of Vital Statistics in American Politics, Voter Mobilization and the Politics of Race: The South and Universal Suffrage, 1952–1984 (1987), and Senate vs. Governor, 1971: Referents for Opposition in a One-Party Legislature (1975). Robert P. Steed is professor of political science at The Citadel. He has long-served as codirector of the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics and is the author of numerous journal articles. He has coedited seventeen books, including (with Laurence W. Moreland) Writing Southern Politics: Contemporary Interpretations and Future Directions (2006), and (with DuBose Kapeluck and Laurence W. Moreland) A Paler Shade of Red: The 2008 Presidential Election in the South (2009).

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Index

abortion, 35, 59, 161, 164–165, 191, 194, 197, 201, 203–204, 207, 229 age, 115–120; and partisanship, 153– 174; and realignment, 153–174; and 2008 voting, 118–120, 166–171 aid to minorities, 161 Alabama: election of 1948, 2, 16; population change, 104–136, 140; post1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 168–171 all-or-nothing principle, 20 American Independent Party, 2 Anderson, John, 228 Arkansas: election of 1992, 3; election of 1996, 3; population change, 104– 136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 168–171 Articles of Confederation, 13 Atwater, Lee, 193 Ayer, William, 235 Bendixen, Sergio, 138 Black, Earl, 8 Black, Hugo, 5 Black, Merle, 8 Bradley, Thomas J., 234 Brown, Scott, 259 Brown, Thad, 101 Brownstein, Ronald, 128

Brown v. Board of Education, 16 Bush, George H. W., 7, 43, 44, 45, 48, 191, 193, 195–197, 229, 231, 234; Christian right, 229 Bush, George W., 7, 19, 23, 34, 35, 45, 48, 138, 166, 195, 201–206, 213, 215, 220–222, 254, 260; effect on 2008 election, 28, 240; white evangelicals, 230–231 Byrd, Harry, 226 Carmines, Edward, 17 Carter, Jimmy, 3, 17, 23, 37(n13), 43– 44, 181, 185, 186–187, 189, 206, 223, 228 Christian Coalition, 35, 230 Christian right, 200–201, 203, 207, 212, 229 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2, 5, 16–17, 37(n10), 47 civil rights movement, 2, 4, 5, 227 Clinton, Bill, 3, 23, 37(n12), 42, 44, 45, 49, 89, 139, 157, 166, 195–198, 200– 201, 213, 229, 254, 260(n1) Clinton, Hillary, 39, 46, 51, 58, 69(n10), 137–140, 207, 209, 214(n6), 235 Cochran, Thad, 96(n19) Converse, Philip, 101, 260(n2) Cooper, Chris, 214(n7) Council of State Governments, 6 critical realignment, 160

285

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dealignment, 153 defense expenditures, 161, 162 de la Garza, Rodolfo O., 147 Dixiecrats, 16, 41, 157. See also States’ Rights Party Dole, Elizabeth, 171 Dole, Robert, 7, 199–200, 202 Dukakis, Michael, 44, 193 Duke, David, 238 economy: policy voting, 179–182 education, 125–127, 165 Edwards, John, 45, 46 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2, 4, 16, 37(n9), 60, 157, 226 election of 1876, 1 election of 1880, 1 election of 1924, 1 election of 1928, 1 election of 1932, 2 election of 1944, 6; role of religion, 222–227 election of 1948, 2, 4, 15–16, 17, 23, 41, 157 election of 1952, 2, 16, 157 election of 1956, 2, 16 election of 1960, 2, 16, 17 election of 1964, 2, 4–5, 17, 47, 170 election of 1968, 2, 5, 17, 41 election of 1972, 3, 17, 19; role of religion, 227–228 election of 1976, 3, 17, 23, 170; role of religion, 222–224, 228 election of 1980, 3; issues in, 185–189; role of religion, 228–229 election of 1984, 3; issues in, 189–191 election of 1988, 3; issues in, 191–194; role of religion, 229 election of 1992, 3, 17, 23; issues in, 194–198; role of religion, 229–230 election of 1994, 23 election of 1996, 3, 23, 89; issues in, 198–201; role of religion, 229–230 election of 2000, 3, 19, 23, 126; issues in, 201–204; role of religion, 230 election of 2002, 89 election of 2004, 3, 6, 23, 126, 138; issues in, 204–206; role of religion, 230 election of 2006, 23 election of 2008, 23, 26–34, 89; age,

166–171, 255; candidate choice effect, 26–27; and the economy, 34, 36, 89; and education, 123–125; evaluation of Bush effect, 29, 240; and gender gap, 29–30, 121–122; Hispanic vote in, 137–140; ideology effect, 28–29, 34; income, 123–125; in-migration effect, 26–27; issues in, 206–214; partisanship effect, 27–28, 33–34, 240; and party change, 88– 93; and race, 30–31, 35, 89, 114– 115, 233–249; and religion, 31–33, 35, 125–128, 215, 232, 240; and war in Afghanistan, 35, 89; and war in Iraq, 35, 36, 89 electorate: compared with Democratic primary electorate, 57–60; Republican primary, 54, 56–57 Executive Order 9981, 16, 37(n7) faith factor, 256 Fifteenth Amendment, 15 Florida: election of 1976, 1; Hispanic vote, 130; population change, 104– 136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69, 138; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 130, 168–171 Ford, Gerald, 43, 234 frontloading, 7, 42 gay marriage, 59 gender, 161 gender gap, 29–30, 51, 53, 58, 121–122 generational replacement, 154–155 Georgia: election of 1980, 3; population change, 104–136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 Republican primary voting patterns, 54–55; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 133, 168–171 Gephardt, Dick, 48 Gilmore, Jim, 171 Goldwater, Barry, 2, 4–5, 17, 47, 178, 226–227, 234 Gore, Al, 3, 37(n12), 44, 48, 201–203, 229, 254, 260(n1) government spending/services, 161, 162 Hagen, Kay, 171, 173 Harding, Warren G., 1 Hart, Gary, 44

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INDEX Hayes, Rutherford B., 1 Hertzberg, Hendrick, 209 Hispanics, 58, 61–68, 100, 113; in electorate, 141–147; population change, 99–136, 140, 150(n6); registration, 143–145; turnout, 143–145, 255; and 2008 primaries, 51, 69(n10); 2008 vote, 114–115, 137–151 Holbrook and Van Dunk (HVD) measure, 74–75, 94(n4) Hoover, Herbert, 1 Horton, Willie, 193, 197, 234 Huckabee, Mike, 41, 45, 69(nn5,6), 139, 140 Humphrey, Hubert H., 2, 15, 37(n6), 234 ideology, 28–29, 34, 58, 95(n14), 161; and southern party change, 82–88, 162, 164–165 income, 125–126, 165 Iowa caucus, 7 Jackson, Jesse, 44, 229, 235 Jim Crow system, 4, 254 job guarantees, 161, 162 Johnson, Lyndon B., 2, 17, 37(n10), 227, 234 Jones, Paula, 200 Kefauver, Estes, 2 Kennedy, Edward, 44, 259 Kennedy, John F., 4, 17, 226 Kentucky: election of 1904, 1; election of 1920, 1 Kerry, John, 45, 138, 205, 210–211, 220–221, 258–259, 260(n1) Key, V. O., Jr., 15, 34–35, 71, 100, 153, 158, 178, 253, 256–257 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 234 Knuckey, Jonathan, 260(n3) Kondracke, Mort, 133, 135 Latino. See Hispanics legislative elections, 91–93 Lewinsky, Monica, 200 Lincoln, Abraham, 34; electoral strategy, 4 literacy test, 15, 17 Little Rock, Arkansas: desegregation crisis, 16

287

Lott, Trent, 96(n19) Louisiana: election of 1876, 1; election of 1948, 2, 16; population change, 104–136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 168– 171 MacManus, Susan, 213 McCain, John, 7, 35, 45, 69(n6), 206– 209, 211–213, 217–222, 231, 233– 236, 238–242, 244–247, 249; and Hispanic primary support, 137, 139– 140; support characteristics in 2008, 26–34, 166–171; 2008 primaries, 39, 137, 139–140 McGovern-Fraser Commission, 42 McGovern, George, 17, 43, 139, 226 Maryland: election of 1904, 1 Mississippi: election of 1948, 2, 16; population change, 104–136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 168–171 Moakley, Joseph, 201 Mondale, Walter, 44, 189–190 Moral Majority, 35, 228 Moyers, Bill, 37(n10) Nader, Ralph, 228 New Hampshire primary, 7 Nixon, Richard M., 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19, 43, 181, 184, 226–228, 234 North Carolina: election of 1968, 2; population change, 104–136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 132, 168–171 Obama, Barack, 38(n20), 207, 209–211, 213, 215, 218–222, 233–236, 238– 249; and Hispanic primary support, 137–139; role of religion in 2008 election, 231; support characteristics in 2008, 26–34, 166–171; 2008 primaries, 39, 137–139 Oklahoma: election of 1924, 1 one-partyism, 1–6, 14–15, 41, 71, 157 Palin, Sarah, 209 parties-in-the-electorate, 46, 49

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party change, southern, 71–96; and inmigration, 102–136; and the 2008 election, 88–93. See also realignment Paul, Ron, 139 Pentacostalism, 216 Perot, Ross, 195–196, 200, 214(n6), 228–229 Phillips, Kevin, 5, 17, 34–35 Plessy v. Ferguson, 14 poll tax, 15 population change, 99–136, 140 primaries, 39–69; historical overview, 41–46 race and southern politics, 5, 14–15, 35, 38(n24), 163–164, 178–179, 183, 234, 245; in 2008 election, 30–31, 89, 114–115, 166– 171, 233–250; in 2008 primaries, 51–52, 58 racial resentment, 233, 237–238, 240, 242–243, 246–248; and partisanship, 247. See also symbolic racism Reagan, Ronald, 5, 19, 35, 43, 48, 155, 157, 166, 180, 184, 187, 189–193, 213, 234; evangelical vote, 187, 19, 228–229; mobilization, 160; realignment, 54, 159–160, 172 realignment, 40, 49, 71–96, 94(n1); and age, 153–174; and race, 163–164; and social-class polarization, 165, 172 Reconstruction, 1, 13, 14, 16, 41 religion and southern politics, 35–36, 51, 125–128, 161, 174(n4), 215–232; and party transformation, 164, 183; in 2008 election, 31–33, 35, 59, 126– 127 Republican Party and the South, 254 residence requirements, 15 residency, 161, 165 Robertson, Pat, 229 Romney, Mitt, 48, 139, 140 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 2, 223 Russell, Richard B., 69(n2) same-sex marriage, 230 Schaller, Thomas F., 260(n2) Scher, Richard, 15 school prayer, 34, 59 secular realignment, 153, 158, 160 segmented partisanship, 73–74

separate-but-equal doctrine, 14, 16 Sharpton, Al, 235 Smathers, George, 69(n2) Smith, Al, 1 Solid South, 14–15, 99, 153, 157, 217, 226, 228. See also one-partyism South Carolina: Confederate flag issue, 19; election of 1876, 1; election of 1948, 2, 16; population change, 104–136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 7, 42–69; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 168– 171 southern distinctiveness, 177, 253 southern exceptionalism, 254, 256 Southern Legislative Conference, 6, 44 southern party system, 258 southern regional primary. See Super Tuesday Southern Strategy, 5, 31, 157, 167, 226, 234–235, 238 Sparkman, John, 2 Specter, Arlen, 259 States’ Rights Party, 2, 4 Stimson, James, 17 Strong, Donald, 260(n2) Super Tuesday, 6–7, 44–45, 49 supply-side economics, 191 symbolic racism, 179, 200, 237 tenant-sharecropper system, 15 Tennessee: election of 1920, 1; election of 1948, 2; population change, 104– 136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 Republican primary voting patterns, 54–55; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 168–171 Texas: election of 1968, 2; future Hispanic vote, 147–149; population change, 104–136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42– 69, 138–139; 2008 Republican primary voting patterns, 54–55; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 168–171 Thompson, Fred, 45, 69(nn4,5) Thurmond, Strom, 2, 16, 17, 41, 226 Truman, Harry, 15 union membership, 161 urbanization, 105–107

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INDEX Virginia: population change, 104– 136, 140; post-1968 party change, 76–96; primaries, 42–69; 2008 voting patterns, 26–34, 133, 168– 171 voting patterns: 1948–2008, 19–26; in 2008, 26–34, 114–115, 118–120, 122–123, 125–127, 166–171 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 17, 37(n11), 234–235

289

Wallace, George C., 2, 5, 17, 43, 178, 226, 234 Warner, Mark, 171 Watergate scandal, 3, 5, 228 Weather Underground, 235 Whitewater, 200 Woodard, David, 257 Wright, Jeremiah, 235 Yellow Dog Democrats, 14

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About the Book

YOU CAN’T WIN THE PRESIDENCY WITHOUT WINNING THE SOUTH, or so the saying goes—but what does “winning the South” actually entail? How is the southern electoral landscape distinct? Presidential Elections in the South offers a comprehensive examination of the trends driving election outcomes in the region since 1948. The authors assess the electoral significance of everything from religious conservatism, racial bias, and demographic change to party identification, challenger quality, and nomination rules at the primary level. Each chapter traces the importance of a particular issue over time, then investigates how that issue played out in the 2008 presidential election. Incorporating a thoughtful analysis of overarching themes, the book highlights unique regional dynamics within a broad national context. Branwell DuBose Kapeluck is associate professor of political science at The Citadel and editor of A Paler Shade of Red: The 2008 Presidential Election in the South (with Laurence W. Moreland and Robert P. Steed). Robert P. Steed and Laurence W. Moreland are professors of political science at The Citadel and coeditors of numerous books, including The 2000 Presidential Election in the South: Partisanship and Southern Party Systems in the 21st Century.

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