Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century: The Dynamics of Recognition 9781107047, 1107047358, 1013044581

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It funhers the Universiry's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www .cambridge.org Information on this tide: www.cambridge.org/9781107047)S8 0 Bridget Coggins 1014

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Library of Congress Cataloging in P11blicatio11 Data Coggins, Bridget. Power politics and state fonn:uion in the twentieth cenrury: the dynamics of recognition I Bridget Coggins. pages cm ISBN 978·1-107-04735-8 (hardback) 1. Secession - History - 10th century. 1. Separatist movements - His1ory - 10th century. 3. Nation-state - History- 10th century. 4. l..q;itim:tcy of governments History - 10th century. S· Nationalism - History - 10th century. 6. Yugoslavia History-Autonomy and independence movements. 7. Soviet Union - History -Autonomy and independence movements. 8. World politics - 10th century. I. Tide. JC)Jl .C61.fS 1014 310.109'04-osc.'11 ( 199}).

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States of Uncertainty

5

PATTERNS OF STATE EMERGENCE (1816-2.002.)

In 1816, the international system had only 2. s members.' 3 One hundred years later, there were still fewer than so states. State emergences were few and far between during the nineteenth century, and state death or violent conquest was more likely.',. Colonial expansion did not eliminate states because conquered regimes were rarely acknowledged as legitimate sovereigns to begin with. Precolonial peoples and territories were commonly considered terra n11/li11s, literally "no man's lands," and therefore deemed free for the taking. In the mid-18oos, the system reached a peak of 46 members with decolonization in the Americas, and then lost many in the following years as a result of state consolidation in Europe. In dramatic contrast, during the twentieth century, t so new states entered the international system, quadrupling its membership.'' With no remaining terras m11/i11s, henceforth any new state had to be born by cleaving off territory from a recognized sovereign entity. These new states were born in various ways over four periods of independence. The first two occurred after the world wars, as victors punished the vanquished and rewarded or reinstated their friends. The third occurred more gradually as empires shed their colonial holdings from the end of World War II through the 1970s. Finally, the Yugoslav and Soviet collapses created more than 2.0 new states from just two as the century concluded. (See Figure 1.1.) The pattern of newly independent states should not be attributed to superficial temporal periods alone, however. Not all discontented minorities received states as President Woodrow Wilson's "Founeen Points" speech might have implied following World War I. ' 6 Nor did all of the systematically oppressed achieve the independence they demanded, colonial or otherwise, when the founding members of the UN dedicated themselves to the "self-determination of peoples."'' Several groups often vied to control the same population and territory or disputed the contours of their inherited boundaries. This meant that many more aspired to independence than actually achieved it. These patterns remain consistent today. The number of ongoing independence projects has not dipped below so since World War II. Among them, only a minority become states, but even unsuccessful demands typically impose high costs in lives lost, wealth destroyed or deferred, and political instability.

Although 1816 is nor rhe beginning of rhe Wesrphali:in, sr:1re-ccn1ered order (1648), schol:irs generally agree rhat conremporary notions of sovereii;nty and sr:itehood were pervasive by rhc , nineteenth century. Krasner (1999) provides an expansive: discussion. 4 1 Fazal (10041, Atzili (100617). ,: Correlares of War Project (1005).

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Wilson (1918). United Nations (ioo 3).

Power Politics a11d State Formation

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STATE EMER°-~-~-..~~--·-~-~.'.1931-2002) . .·

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State Emergence Dynamics (1931-1001)

Mosr srares born in rhe twenrierh cenrury became independenr following inrernal conresrs over sovereignty as in anricolonial separarism or sccession. 18 Ir is an oh-repeated claim that successful secession is exceedingly rare, yet during this time period, more than one of every three demands for independence was realized. 111 Only a particular subtype, a successful war of independence such as Eritrea's separarion from Erhiopia, was uncommon. That secession's success rare is underestimated should not, however, be taken as evidence that new statehood was quickly or easily achieved. Successful demands lasted nearly 10 years (9.89) on average and were responsible for millions of deaths. "0 The French-Indochinese War alone killed 600,000 in just 9 years. Sudan's most recent civil war is reported to have killed more than :z. million people. Secessionist conRicts also frequently drew in kin countries or ideological supponers, internationalizing the violence. Moreover, the conflicts were especially fraught because they blurred the lines between civilians and combatants, wreak· ing havoc on civil society and stymieing post-conflict reconstruction."' •• For the purposes of this project, :inti-coloni:ilism :ind sccessionism :ire considered cquiv:ilcnr. funher cxpl:in:ition is provided m Ch:iprer 2.. '¥ According to the d:ir:iscr for rhis projL-cr, 9S of z.s9 mdepcndcncc muvL'fllcnts bc:twcm 1931 :ind z.ooz. bc:c:imc indL-pcndL"llf sr:ircs (:ippmxim:itdy Jc pl'fCcnt). • 0 Ibid. 11 Walter (1991), W:ilrc:r :ind Snyder (1999).

States of Uucertainty

7 STATE EMERGENCE (1931-2002)

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State Emergence ( 1931-1001)

All cases of new independence are of interest to a study on state emergence. Nevertheless, this project limits its focus to the causes of state emergence for groups who demand independence from their legitimate governors or home states. Theoretical and empirical reasons inform this choice. First, some states do enter the system without prior nationalist demands, but these states-to-be could not be idenrified a priori. In most cases, they emerged vi::i unil::iteral decoloniz::ition by ::in imperi::il power or reflected changes in territory negotiated by treaties following the world w::irs. Occ::isionally, this me::int that the state preceded national identity entirely. As d' Azeglio famously exclaimed, "We h::ive made Italy, now we must make ltalians!".u Or inste::id, a st::ite with strong national identity was occupied, destroyed in a w::ir, and resurrected by the victorious coalition. 11 Second, ::is Figure 1 .1 shows, the number of states born following independence dem::inds far exceeds those born in other ways. The other, far less common forms are unilateral decolonization, when a foreign authority unilater::illy devolves authority to :l loc::il one; dissolution, when ::a ~dcration lawfully dissolves into its constituent parts; 14 postw::ir settlement,

.. a:.--' . ncu m Emerson (1960, p. 95) . 11

.. For c~mpk.'S, sec f:iz.al (~007, pp. 30--33). The line bctw,-cn st:irc d1ssolurion :ind SCCl.'SSIOll 15 somcrimc:s fozzy. for cx:implc, it is clc:ir th:it Slovenia :ind Cro:iti:i settdcd from Yugosl:ivi:i, but it is less de:ir th:it M:iccdonia did. Simil:irly, l!sioni:a, larvi:i, :ind Lithu:ini:i clc:irly seceded from chc USSR prior to its coll:ipsc, whcrc:is st:itcs such as K:iz:ilchst:in pc:rh:ips did not and emerged :is :1 function of rhc SoviL't Union's dissolution.

8

Power Politics a11d State Formatio11

when the victors of war determine political jurisdiction by external fiat; and union, when two or more states join to become one new state. Not every new state enters the system because of secessionism, but most in the conremporary world do. They form the subject maner for this book.

THE INTERNATIONAL POLIT.ICS OF STATE BIRTH

I make three primary and interrelated arguments explaining when, why, and how new states emerge. First, I demonstrate that the intematiqnal system's nature has been misunderstood. Statehood does not inhere in governmental control on the ground alone. Without exremal legitimacy, an actor is not a state. Instead, the intemation::il states system is better ch::iracterized as an international community wherein influenri::il members determine which ::ispiring stares will succeed and which will be left outside to founder. Therefore, ::in English School or soft Constructivist account provides rhe most accurate portrayal of statehood's essential features. The Westphalian order depends on mutual sovereign recognition among states. According to James, "The mere existence of a territorial entity which is also constitutionally independent is one thing ... the extent to which it participates in international life is ::inother matter.. .It depends on the number of other states which are wanting ::ind willing to enter into relations with the state concerned. " 1 ' Recognition by the system's members rather than - and sometimes in spite of - de facto control and authority is the pivotal distinction between states and non-state "others." The contemporary dynamics of secession and statehood evince one of the most dramatic instances of the second image reversed; system-level factors determine not only the form and function of institutions within states, but also who those states are to begin with. 16 Tellingly, there are very few cases in recent history where new states unambiguously met the prevailing legal standards for membership, and yet states have proliferated. Legal vagaries may be partially responsible for the gap between law and practice. But the more compelling explanation for the disparity is that existing states, rather than some disinterested or unbiased arbiter, confer external legitim3cy. Self-interest 3nd power dynamics inevit3bly creep into the process when leaders are given the opportunity to select their own new peers. Following from the first, my second major 3rgument is that existing members' p3rochial concerns meaningfully shape their preferences for or 3g3inst new states. This is an intuitively compelling, but largely untested belief. 17 International law bemoans the overtly political practice of recognition. 18 And " j3mcs (19116, p. 147). •" Gourcvirch (1978) • ., Schol3rs including Kr3sncr (1009) h3vc n:cmdy suggested just this. •• According to the most current 3nd widely held interprct3tions of intl'ft13tion31 law, n-cogninon of 3 new state prior to the 3chievcment of cenain objl'Ctive cri1eria (identifiable terrnory and population, effective government, and the capaci1y to enter into m1ern311onal rclaiions)

States of U11certainty

9

it is eminently reasonable that granting external legitimacy, like the myriad other decisions leaders make, should be politically motivated. I present three major categories of interest that influence leaders' preferences: international security concerns, domestic politics and security, and system stability. Additionally, this argument presents an alternative perspective on domestic-level theories that claim internal politics predominate when it comes to state emergence. Although it may be that internal politics or characteristics within the secessionist territory help explain whether and when state birth occurs, those facrors are important because community members believe they ought to be, not because they alone constitute statehood. In short, existing theories have identified a spurious relationship; they are right about the pattern, but their causal explanations for it are incorrect. How do powerful states• preferences figure into state birth? The dynamics of external legitimacy conform to a threshold model of sorts. 111 Many stares must recognize a newcomer before it secures full membership in the international community. Unanimous recognition is not necessary, bur a critical mass of acceptance musr be achieved before the rights and obligations of statehood rake hold.l 0 All stares are both members and progenitors of the sysrem, bur the Grear Powers• recognition decisions are the most important. Their disproportionate material capabilities give them substantial influence over other stares' recognition behavior. Often prime movers in crises of stare birth, Great Power recognition serves as a focal point for others ro follow, initiating a cascade of sysrem-wide legitimacy. Further, once past the tipping point, recognized statehood is almost never revoked.J 1 Whether the Great Powers• individual preferences ultimately lead to recognition and state birth depends on their alignmenr with one another. Leaders do constitutes premature recognition and carries no legal force; It 1s i1sclf an 1llcgal act (Von Glahn, l!ijJ., pp. 87, !11). •• lmtial anicularions of threshold models can be: found in Schelling (1!17la, 1971b) and Finnemore ;ind Sikkink (1!198). A l:1y version of a threshold model also underlies Makolm Gfadwdl's (1000) book The Tipping Poi111: Huw Liltle Things Can Make a Big Differenu. 0 ' "(U)niversal r«ugnition is not necessary either in rhrory or in practice . .. nevertheless a 'critical mass' uf recognition could said to be: necessary" (Fawn and Mayall, t !196, p. 10!1). For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a state rccogni1ed by only two other members to gain membership as a state within the: United Nations or to r1.uivc a loan from the World Bank or IMF. '' Waltz (•97!1, JI· !IS) notl'S this 11."lldcncy. The "stickiness" of rc:cugnition is also p:irt of Jackson's (1990) expl:manon fur why so-calk.J quasi·states mdure even with little domestic legitimacy. Ir is also noieworthy to point out that alchough coordinated self-interested behavior might cause state etnergmce initially, the threshold model implil'S that the same constellation of mtcreslS need not be maintained in order for statehood to endure. The: legitimacy of suspending a state's sovereignty, on lhc olhcr hand, 1s not without proponents. An example of suspended sovereignty can be seen m the U.S.-led war to overthrow the govemml.'lll of Iraq in 1003. Similarly, Jcffory Merbst argues that in extraordinary circums1anc1.'S the international community should dccenify faill-d stat1.'S and discununue 1hc:ir juridical c:xremal sovereignty l•9!16-7. p. 141). The Neiv York Times Magaunc too, in 11S third annual "The Yl'llr in Ideas" issue, d1.-clared ~suspended nationhood" one o( rhe most influential idl'3S of 100.J (Cain, 1003 ).

10

Po111er Politics and State Formation

not make their choices in a vacuum; they are strategically interdependent and must anticipate how others will act and react. My third and final argument is that the international system incentivizes leaders to coordinate their recognition to ( t) maintain system stability and peace among themselves, (1) ensure a critical mass of support for new members, and (3) diffuse responsibility for violating another member's sovereignry (by legitimizing a challenge to its territorial inregriry) and limit the potential for its violent re{l'ibution. When the Great Powers' preferences align positively, they easily collude in favor of an aspiring state and a decisive cascade of legitimacy follows. When they align negatively, the would·be state is decisively blocked. Similarly, when their preferences do not align, leaders rypically defer to the status quo and emergence does not occur. Only in extraordinary circumstances, most recently regarding Kosovo and the Georgian separatists, does the drive to coordinate lapse. In sum, the international politics of recognition are essential to understanding which actors among the scores of potential new members will be accepted into the international community of stares and to predicting when that acceptance is likely to occur. Nascent states are either elevated to state membership or excluded from it by powerful, existing members guided significantly by their own parochial interests. THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL RECOGNITION

Collectively, these arguments have important consequences for international relations and conflict resolution. The first implication is that the politics of external legitimacy work to ensure short·term stability in the international system. Self·interests drive states' preferences, but strong states' incentives to coordinate- and not act impulsively on those preferences when they do conflict ensure that most new members are mutually acceptable. When aspiring states advance the interests of the powerful, they will more readily be accepted as community members. When strong states' interests diverge, they avoid interna· tionalizing the dispute among themselves by upholding the status quo. This maintains international stability because overlapping sovereignty, or the recog· nition of two legitimate authorities over the same territory, is avoided. The next major implication is that the politics of external recognition may unintentionally create system·wide instability over the long run. Because new states' entries into the international system are contingent on political consid· erations and not necessarily on the authority and capacity of the nascent states, newcomers will generally exercise less coercive control and authoriry than existing models of state emergence imply; internally speaking, they are less sovereign. In the worst~ase scenario, the international communiry is accepting new members that are bound to fail, unintentionally destabilizing the system and potentially imperilling their own securiry as states proliferate. Today, experts caution that a number of the world's newest states - including Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, and South Sudan - are imperilled because of their

States of Uncertainty

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equivocal sovereignty. J:i. Others argue the problem is even more pervasive, so much so that external, not internal, sovereignty now sustains the majority of states in the developing world. After an initial honeymoon period, new countries may find themselves unable to or governed by regimes that are unwilling to provide even basic public goods for their people. And this may initiate a cycle of poverty, corruption, and violence that is difficult to undo. Moreover, some have linked state failure and internal weakness to international threats including terrorism, transnational crime, weapons trafficking, even the spread of disease and environmental degradation. As new states multiply, so too might weakness and international insecurity. On the other hand, if new states can use membership's significant benefits to advance effective domestic governance through opportunities for development assistance, military cooperation, trade, and investment, then their relative weak· ness at birth may not have lasting adverse effects. State weakness might simply be a marker of youth. Even though this may seem overly optimistic, it is not clear that an alternative selection mechanism for new states is feasible. Nor is it certain that less politically attractive, but more effectively sovereign new members would fare any better. Requiring a certain level of capacity would initially create stronger states and slow system growth. Still, powerful states are unlikely to opt out of the opportunity to determine their new peers, and the probability of any new state's survival in the face of hostile Great Powers could not be very high. Third, this project demonstrates that prominent models of civil war settle· mcnt and war termination significantly underestimate the influence of third parties. Although authors rightly characterize the situation between separatists and their governments as zero-sum and beset by commitment problems, they do not appreciate the extent to which conflict outcomes are dependent on powerful smtes' acceptance. This leaves an important variable unobserved. Secessionist wars sometimes end decisively on the battlefield but remain unresolved and continue to fester because powerful states cannot reach consensus among them· selves about the outcome. Ongoing debates over Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia are cases in point. Conversely, when they arc possible, clear and credible demonstrations of support for independence or against it by the Great Powers should expedite conflict resolution. In these cases, granting legitimacy would be less costly than the intervention and peacekeeping scenarios often offered as solutions. Finally, and relatedly, overreliance on comparative theories of state emer· gencc has led to erroneous beliefs about potential remedies to state emergence conflicts. Specifically, scholars place undue faith in institutional configurations' and other domestic factors' abilities to prevent demands for independence and their realization ..l 1 The evidence presented herein demonstrates that the end of colonialism will not forestall state emergence. Nor will giving minorities ,, Cho pra (1003); Anderson (10041; Mandi and Blomfidd (1011)

u

Roeder (10071.

I l.

Power Politics and State Formation

autonomous political authority necessarily foment disintegration. The true causes of state birth are contingent and depend on the motives and interpretations of powerful outsiders. Attending to both the domestic and international aspects of secessionism will yield more successful policies than strategies pro· posed by purely domestic models. OUTLINE AND ORGANIZATION

The book proceeds as follows: first, in Chapter i, I review the literarure within comparative politics, international law, and international relations regarding state emergence. I find that the predominant conception of state birth is oriented toward control and legitimacy within the aspiring state. However, objective measures of control and authority do not convincingly explain the pattern of state birth. Many more states emerge than domestic factors suggest should do so. I argue that international political factors best explain the gap between theory and practice when it comes to statehood. External legitimacy is the ultimate arbiter of state emergence. Therefore, understanding why states accept new members is essential to understanding the dynamics of state birth. Next, Chapter 3 lays out the project's research design and methodology. Chapter 4 evaluates the current state of the art regarding state emergence and then adapts it for testing within the proposed new, internationally oriented framework. Among other things, it asks: are federal subunits or ethnic substates more likely to secure states than groups organized differently? Or do only the strongest separatist movements survive to become independent states? Many of the domestic-level explanations find convincing empirical support, but they are ultimately inconclusive. Most are structural and do not vary within the same case, thereby limiting their ability to explain when new states will emerge. The chapter then introduces new hypotheses on external acceptance and tests them using an original, annual cross-sectional, time-series dataset more appropriate to international explanations. The new dependent variable is formal recognition, an executive-level decree of sovereignty, unambiguous evidence that an existing system member accepts a new peer. I then explore whether or not external politics help explain Great Power recognition decisions between 19 3 1 and 1000. I present three major categories of political interests that should influence state preferences: external security concerns, domestic political con· cerns, and system stability. The new explanations improve significandy on the domestic-only theories. The quantitative evidence convincingly demonstrates that leaders accept new states with an eye toward their own interests. Furthennore, the Great Powers are each motivated by different concerns at different points in time. How those preferences align will ultimately determine patterns of state birth. Chapters 5 and 6 use clustered case studies from the Former Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet Union to investigate support for the causal motives underlying recognition and the dynamics of recognition among the Great Powers.

States of Uncertainty

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Specifically, they analyze whether and how the Great Powers confront disagreements among themselves about which would-be states ought to be recognized the alignment hypotheses regarding the causal mechanism. The cases in the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo) demonstrate that the poli. rics among the Great Powers themselves loom larger than most developments on the ground in secessionist conflicts. The analyses reveal that leaders consistently worked to maimain a unified front and coordinated their recognitions accordingly. Indeed, the Kosovo conflict remained unresolved for a decade, due in substantial part to the absence of an external consensus. Regarding Croatia, previous work implying that Germany unilaterally broke from the European consensus is found to overstate its case. The post-Soviet case cluster, including the secession attempts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, NagomoKarabakh in Azerbaijan, and Chechnya in Russia, traces the politics of nonrecognition where Great Power interests diverged. In all of the stalemated Caucasian conflicts, despite their demonstrating significant variation in sovereign authority on the ground, no recognition was granted to the de facto independent governments. It was not until the United States and much of Europe recognized Kosovo in z.008 that Russia unilaterally recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in ;:m act of retribution for its peers' violation of the recognition armistice that had so for prevailed among them over the three conflicts. Chapter 7, the final chapter, explores the consequences of the book's main findings. The first portion synthesizes the empirical results. The latter portion explores how the dynamics of state birth will influence international politics and security in years to come, potentially - though not inevitably - creating instability long term. It also advocates a reconsideration of current policies regarding secessionist conflicts and civil war. Too many strategies for conflict prevention and resolution exclude external political factors and, therefore, underestimate the international community's potential role as a force for either good or ill.

2

Statehood in Theory and Practice

The scholarly srudy of international relations fixates on states. Experts study their actions and interactions; how they influence and are influenced by the system and by supra- and sub-state actors; their manners of diplomacy, trade, and war; and how they organize their internal and external affairs. Its range is exhaustive. Yet it seldom contemplates how new states enter the international community to begin with. The discipline's focus on the relations among states has unintentionally caused myopia of a sort, leading scholars to neglect foundational system dynamics like the birth and death of states. The Wesrphalian origin myth and the state's rise ro institutional dominance within the system are well known. 1 The selection mechanism for new stares is decidedly not. As a result, supposition and anecdote derived from the early European experience often substitute for theory and evidence when it comes to changes in membership. Perhaps it is difficult to understand scholars' relative disregard for state emergence given the state's prominent place in theory, bur it is easy to understand why most others might take states for granted. On any given day, distinguishing between states and non-states is straightforward. ~rates have gcofessional militar.ies, their own currencies and institutiom1lized bureaucracies. They are members of intergovernmental organizations, make treaties, regulate trade, and confer national citizenship. The People's Republic of China is clearly a state, w ereas the Republic of lchkeria - which most have never even heard ofis clearly not. It seems the distinction berween states and non-states is obvious and tangible, requiring no further investigation. Yet the contemporary politics of nationalism and sovereignry belie the seem· ingly stark contrast between the two rypes of actors. Ongoing controversies over the statuses of Kosovo, Somaliland, and Taiwan provide but a few examples of the many ambiguous statelike actors in existence. Statehood is also increasingly ' for 1wo cxcmrlary works, sec Spruy1 I1994 t and Tilly S1-Soviet sccessmnisu. • Many sratc:s 54-ccdcd with linle conri'St from rhe Soviet Union :md Slovakia's separation from the Czech Republic was also peaceful. • The domananr opcrationalil.3tion of war comes from the Correlates of War ProjL'Ct (10051, which dcfinL'S ii as a Connally d,-clared war with at least 1,000 combatant battle deaths during c:ich calendar year. Some alternative mcasurL'S have lx.'Cn created more specific to civil war (Glcd11sch ct al., 1001; Licklider 1995; Sambanis 1003). The 1,000-dcath threshold is generally consistent across studies; they differ over which deaths (only combatants or noncombatants as well) should be i:ountcd, over the appropriate time period ( 1,000 deaths each yL-ar or 1,000 as a cumula1ivc count), and over absolute or rdarive measurL'S (e.g., per capita deaths) (Sambanis 100 3). • Nine Slovenian soldiers and approximately 36 JNA soldJCrs were killed during the civil war. ·• Again, Gellncr ( 1993, p. 74) c:srimatcs there :ire 11,ooo distinct langu:igcs in the modern world. llannum ( 1990, pp. 454-osl :irgucs there might be 5,000 states in the: system if ethno-nation:il sclf·dctcrmin;nion was fully exercised.

Q11antitative Analyses

61

not even make an initial demand for independence.' ° Conversely, the set of ethnic groups would also exclude too many manifest secessionist movements that span multiple ethnicities or occur within a subset of members of a single · ethnic group. As a result, this project considers secession a unique demand and observes the factors associated with the successful achievement of that end for the group making the demand.'' This alternative perspective on sub-state conflict may yield insights inro the civil war and ethnic conflict literatures. But more likely and more consistent with this project's purposes - the results will help shed light on the system dynamics at work in secessionist conflicts. If widespread external acceptance is definitional of membership in international society, and, therefore, a necessary componenr of successful secession, then the determinanrs of recog· nition promise meaningful leverage on modern state emergence. The approach should uncover a preliminary set of conditions under which prospective states are likely to be accepted into international society by its most influential members. Second, the small number of existing studies on state emergence tends to select on the dependent variable (realized independence), rather than looking at a wider range of potential states. Selection on the dependent variable like this may generate misleading conclusions. For example, a number of studies conrend that as colonial rule became discredited, leaders were more likely to accept claims of self-determination as a basis for statehood. Typically, scholars infer that there was an increased probability of independence based on the observation that a large number of post-colonial states entered the international system after 1945. Yet we also know that many post-colonial claims to statehood were rejected. The Baganda preferred restoration of the Bugandan Kingdom to incorporation within the new Ugandan state, which they saw as an arbitrary colonial relic. And pan-African movements such as Katanga attempted to establish large multicthnic states but similarly failed to secure support. Finally, multiple anti· colonial regimes often vied for control over the same territory. In Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast colony), leadership was secured, to some extent, because the British did not anticipate that Nkrumah's Convention People's Parry (CPP) would prevail in elections regarding independence. For many colonial peoples demanding independence, the eventual form and fate of their efforts were not assured. Moreover, a greater number of movements demanded recognition during the period of decolonization. Ceteris parib11s, we might expect a larger ~umber of new state members when there are simply more groups demanding independence. So even if one accepts the conclusion that the international community more readily accepted post-colonial states, significant variation remains unexplained by selecting on successful bids for statehood. In order to •• Goe

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nz (1oos); Moihoncy ;ind Goertz (10041.

As opposn110 urhcr "'=m:mds or ends such ;is ;iutonomy, civil rii;hts, r\-gimc choingc, revolution, and soon.

Porvcr Politics a11d State Formatio11 avoid the problems anendant to selection on the dependent variable, I sample all of the actors demanding independent statehood between 1931 01nd 1000. Finally, the tests I utilize pennit greater insight into the determin01nts of the timing of state emergence than previous studies have allowed. Duration analysis permits the use of time-varying covariates, permitting us to trace individual secessionist movements and Great Powers over time and ;iggregate all of the relevant observations for them.

EMPIRICAL BEGINNINGS

By any account, the twentieth century witnessed an explosion in state binh. In the less than a century since World War I, the international community's ranks have ballooned to nearly z.oo. The entries were primarily anributable to secession, but a number were also the result of dissolution and unilateral decolonization. Among the states entering purely as a result of decolonization, it is well established that control and authority standards were not adhered to; replacing the colonial systems with more representative, local government was given priority."~ Some efforts were made to ensure that colonies' transitions to statehood were successful, but most colonies lacked some aspect of functional, independent governance at the point of recognized membership. 13 Yet colonial independences are widely considered exceptions to the normal course of state emergence. In most other cases, we expect that state emergence should follow a bonom-up causal path. Patterns of secession and statehood do not conform to that expectation. To the contrary, the only newcomers entering the system between 1931 and z.001 that convincingly met the legal standards for recognition prior to receiving at least one outsider's recognition were Bangladesh, Eritrea, Slovenia, and Somaliland. Notably, Somaliland, though it meets the legal criteria, has not yet been recognized by any other state and, consequently, is not a system member. Lowering the bar just a bit, we could also add many of the so-called frozen conflicts in post-Soviet states such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, NagornoKarabakh, Transniesrria, and even Chechnya to the list of unrecognized and domestically sovereign actors along with Somaliland. At some point during their secession anempts, each one of these groups had dose to effective sovereignty on the ground, with most falling short because of dependence on an external patron. Figure 4 . 1 shows the mismatch between de facto independence (domes· tic sovereignty) and de ittre recognition (external sovereignty) among some contemporary secessionist movements. Those groups falling within the upper· left and lower-right quadrants are consisrenr with the bottom-up model's

" UnncJ N:uions Chancr (1945); Unitt.-d Nations Declaration on Granting Colonial Countries and Peoples (196o). ' ' The: Mandate and Trust systems were: designed with this inr1.11t in mind.

o(

lnJt."JICnJence to

Q11a11titative Analyses

No de jure Recognlllon

Widespread de jure

Aecognlllon

FIGURE

LllUe de facto Authority

Widespread de facto Authority

Kashmir, Kurdistan (Turkey). Southam Cameroon, Tibet

Somallland, Abkhazla, AnfoUan,

Bosnia-Herz, East Tlmor, Soulh Sudan

Bangladesh, Slovenia, Erilrea

Chactvlya (1996)

4. 1 Internal and External Sovereigncy

expectations, whereas the lower-left and upper-right quadrants are contrary; de facto control and de ;ure recognition should be perfectly correlated.

DATA COLLECTION AND RESOURCES

Various sources were referenced in creating the dataset. ' 4 Great Power recognition dates come directly from the foreign ministries of the countries when available. 15 Because recognition is bilateral, there is no international repository of recognition data. The Correlates of War (COW) dataset purports to use recognition as an indicator preceding the League of Nations and United Nations, but in fact it reports only the diplomatic missions established by France and Britain from 1816 to 19z.o. 16 During later years, including the period under study here, the COW uses League or UN membership as an indicator of statehood. 17 Although membership in these international organizations is a useful proxy for statehood in most cases, this project concerns how external

'' Additional details ;ire: available: in the codebook. 11 Whm rc:cognilion J;ues wc:rc: not avail;ible dirc:cdy from the: minisiries, secondary sources were: consulted. •• Slll:lll and Singer ( 198J.). In 3dJition, the: popul3tion must be: 3t least 500,000. 7 ' ~ initial impetus behind the: system entry vari3ble explains this choice:. Singer 3nd Small's pnmary invcstig;ition sought to understand 3nd systematize various levels of st3tus within the: international system. Thc:y were: not in1cn.'Stcd in the: consc:cr3tion of st3tchood, but in delineating the strong, influential nu.'1tlbc:rs from the wc:ak :ind insignificant ones. This :ilso c:xpl:iins their choice: to exclude states with populations kss than 500,000 (ibid.).

Po1Uer Politics and State Fonnation sovereignty comes to be granted in the first place. •H Once embassies are built, a protcrstate's progress toward statehood is usually complete.' 11 For our purposes, a more fine-grained recognition measure indicating progress toward full external statehood is required. Information regarding secessionist movements comes from a variety of sources. Unfortunately, the sensitive nature of the subject means that the data are almost certainly incomplete as a result of governments' ~pacity. Home states often attempt to hide their domestic challenges away. Secrecy is desirable for at least two reasons. First, states do not want to appear weak or embattled, so keeping word of their discontents quiet helps stave off additional challenges and maintain legitimacy with the rest of the population. Second, secrecy allows governments to crack down on secessionists withoutattracting negative publicity. Scrutiny regarding the government's methods of quelling separatism amounts to free publicity for the secessionists. No home state wants to be complicit in the success of its challengers. Fortunately, global news services and Internet resources make maintaining secrecy increasingly difficult. Still, this potential limirarion should be kept in mind, especially with reference to less transparent, authoritarian home states. The following resources contributed the bulk of information regarding secessionist movements: Minahan's Nations Without States; Gurr's Minorities at Risk; Halperin, Scheffer, and Small's Self-DetemiirJation in the New World Order; Emerson's From Empire to Nation; and Ayres's Violent lntra-Natio11al ConPict data. For ongoing cases, the movements' own websites or press releases were often consulted. Websites were particularly useful for discerning a movement's demands, confirming the existence of a national flag, and finding information regarding the proposed borders and population of the new stare. Data on civil and international war come from the Correlates of War datasets and the Peace Research Institute Oslo's Uppsala Conflict Data Program (PRIO/UCDP). This includes onset, end, duration, and violence level. Data on militarized international conflict short of war comes from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID Ill) project and the PRIO/ UCDP data. Data on governmental regime type come from the Polity IV data.

SECESSIONISM AND THE GREAT POWERS

A secessionist movement is a nationalist group dedicated to formal separation from its home state in order to form a newly independent state. ~ 0 Groups that '. India W3S 3 member of the wguc :ind UN before its independence from Brit;iin. The Philippines w:is ;ilso :i member of the le3gue before independence. Finally, Bcl;irus ;ind the Ukraine were ;icccptcd ;is full members of the UN prior to indi:pcndcnce ;is well. A number of st;itcs were :ilso excluded from UN membership bcc;iusc of Cold W;ir politics between the United St;itcs :ind Soviet Union; neither le3guc nor UN membership is perfectly corrcl;itcd with st;itehood. ''' In m;iny c;isc:s, emb:issic:s ;ire cst;iblished ye;irs ;iftcr d1plom;itic recognition h;is lx.-cn ;iscribcd. '" A note on ;iltem;itive d;iu sources: m:iny of the secessionist movements begun since 1931 do not fall within the coding scheme of the Minorities ;it Risk d;it;i. In m:iny c;ises, groups were colon131 did nOf surpass the cst:iblishcd popubtion threshold or the n;ition:il communirics were not

Q11antitati11e Analyses seek to separate from their home srates in order to join another preexisting state are classified as irredentist and excluded from the category. & ' Groups that do not seek statehood, but instead seek forms of autonomy shon of complete independence, including civil rights or regional self-governance, are also excluded from the set of secessionist movements, although this docs not mean that groups cannot transition from seeking autonomy to seeking full independence and vice versa during different periods. Finally, groups that seek to ovenhrow the government of an established state, as in the case of revolution or coup d'etat, are also not considered to be secessionist. Secession is also distinct from decolonization, which is characterized by the devolution of authoriry from an imperial government to a local one. In some cases, as in the British West Indies, the transfer of authority is driven by the imperial power rather than by nationalist demands on behalf of the colonized peoples themselves. u In these cases, the colonies were not secessionist because they did not demand self-rule; they were unilaterally granted or forced into it. Other cases of decolonization were, however, preceded by demands of independence and self-government on behalf of colonial peoples. Often characterized as conflicts of national liberation or extra-systemic wars, conflicts involving movements like these fit well within the conceptual definition of secession outlined earlier. It is on this basis that anticolonial secessions were included in the dataset. Operationally, four factors dictate whether or not a group is coded as a secessionist movement. First, a group must formally declare independence from its home state at some point during its operation. In most cases, a declaration of independence is a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) according to international law. The word "unilateral" indicates that the home state does not recognize the group's independence, in opposition to consensual or bilateral independence. Second, the group must have a flag. This requirement indicates the movemenr has national consciousness. Third, the group must make a d:lim to both a population and territory over which it presides. This qualification is meant to exclude two types of movements that do not constitute secession attempts: (1) pirate states, where a population claim is made without a territorial claim and (1) platform islands, a popular means of attempting to evade U.S. taxes in the 196os, wherein a claim to territory is made without a permanent

considered lo have either suffered dis:idv:m1:1ges or received :idv:int:igc:S bec:iuse of their group affili:11ion. Ex:imples o( c:isc:s 1h:1t do not qualify :ire Pucno Ricans in the United S1:11~'5, E:is1 Bmg:ilis (now B:ingl:ideshis) in P:1kis1:1n., Abu S:iyy:if in the Philippines, :ind M:ict'duni:ins tn Yugosl:ivi:i. " I( the s1:11e the irredentists hopt" 10 join dOt'S not m:ikc :in equal :ind opposite cl:iim 10 control the secessionists' popul:irion :ind territory, then the group is sc:cessionist. St'e the discussion rci;:irJing Nagomo-K:ir:ib:ikh's :ind Sourh Osscti:i's inclusion in Ch:1p1cr s for a more dct:iiled discussion on irredentist versus secessionist cl:iims. .... Jamaica w:is the exception in th:it c3sc.

PoUJer Politics and State Formatio11

66 population.~ 3

Finally, the independence movement must last at least one week, must involve at least 1,000 people, and must claim at least 1oo square kilometers (km 2 ) of territory. This requirement was levied in the name of research efficiency. It is unlikely that a very small or very shon-lived movement would caprure the attention of the media or, for that matter, even its own home state. Information regarding such obscure movements would not be readily available. For each secessionist movement identified, dates ~ere recorded indicating the beginning and end dates of each secession attempt. Some groups attempt secession multiple times. In these cases, Tibet and Chechnya among them, roman numerals indicate the sequence of attempts. It was also sometimes the case that a single secessionist movement splintered into two or more groups. When at least one of the splintering groups qualified as a secessionist movement, that group was considered to have begun on the date of the split from the larger group. The Great Powers were coded according to their appearance and duration within the Correlates of War datasets. The Great Powers are the most materially capable states within the system during a given period. Because they are the strongest states, they are also widely believed to be the most influential. Further, their capabilities imply that they will have global, not merely regional or local, interests. According to the COW operationalization, the Great Powers between 1931 and 1000 were Great Britain, United States, and USSR/Russia: 1931-1000; China: 1950-1000; France: 1931-1940, 1945-1000; Germany: 1931-1945, 1991-1000; Italy: 1931-1943; and japan: 1931-1945, 1991-1000. The number of Grear Powers in a given year during the srudy period ranged from four to seven. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DOMESTIC LEVEL RESULTS

Recall the following seven primary hypotheses from Chapter 3: ln1crna1ional-Lc:vel Hypotheses

Great PoUJers UJith a conflictual relationship UJith a home state UJill be more likely to recognize its secessio11ists. Hz.: Great PoUJers UJith a friendly relatio11ship UJith a home state UJill be less likely to recog11ize its secessionists. HJ: Great PoUJers UJith secessionist challengers of their ow11 UJill be less likely to recog11ize secessionists i11 other states. H4: Great PoUJers UJill be more likely to recog11iz.e secessio11ists UJhen a11other Great PoUJer or PoUJers have already do11e so.

H 1:

Domestic-Level Hypotheses

H 5:

Mobilized minority groups are more likely to achieve statehood (are more likely to receive Great PoUJer recog11itio11).

•' The platform isl:md idea has also bc.'f.'11 auempted in the Gulf of Guinea. In these cases, groups have :mcmptrd to cl:um preexisting offshore oil fac1h111.-s.

Q11a11titative A11alyses lrtstit11tio11ally empowered grottps are more likely to achieve statehood (are more likely to receive Great Power recog11itio11). H1: Materially stro11ger groups are more likely to achieve statehood (are more likely to receive Great Power recog11ition) H6:

Domestic-Level Variables :1. 4 Beginning with the conventional wisdom, the domestic level, this section discusses the operational indicators devised ro test the state emergence hypotheses. According to existing theories, a secessionist movement's material strength, ethnic composition, and institutional organization are the primary factors determining its successful membership in the international community. Hypothesis 6 argues that institutionally empowered secessionists are more likely to achieve statehood and recognition. Anticolonial movements are thought ro have a greater chance of gaining recognition for at least three reasons. first, as colonialism came to be seen as an illegitimate form of governance, the Great Powers should have become more sympathetic to anticolonial secessionists' plights and, therefore, more predisposed to recognize. Second, home states were subjected to social pressure to allow anticolonial secessionists to secede, especially once the United Nations was founded. And finally, imperial powers might not have tried to hold on ro colonies because the cost-benefit calculus regarding for-flung territorial holdings favored their liquidation. Colony is a dummy variable coded o if the secessionist movement claims a territory and population that is not a colony of its home state. The variable is coded 1 if the secessionist movement is anricolonial. A colony is operationally defined as a jurisdiction, composed of people and territory, governed by a state or agents of a state that is neither geographically contiguous nor within 1 oo miles of the home state's shoreline. If a movement has a colonial history, but is not attempting to secede from its colonial governor, then it is not considered anticolonial. Ninety-eight of me 159 secessionist movements within the dataset were identified as colonial. Additionally, there may be a positive relationship between claims to sub-state territories (states, regions, or republics) and successful secession. Organized jurisdictional units can more easily transition to independent statehood because the rudimentary organs of government are established prior to independence; these groups need not create institutions from scratch. Internal boundaries may seem to offer the promise of a dean break between secessionists and the home State as well. Furthermore, not only significant internally, the principle of 11ti Possidetis j11ris has recently been used by outside powers to ensure the continuity of new states' former colonial borders and to maintain stability among the states of the Former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. :1.,

.. .,..,__

11 • nc

. pro1ca's codebook

provides :i sumlTl3ry of the definitions discussed in this section.

l1ie term 11111muidetis l":is you possess·) w:is used to communic:itc that st:itc ll-:idcrs could only claim the 1crn111ril"S that they physic:illy possessed. The more conremporary 1111 possidctis ;rms

68

Power Politics a11d State Formatio"

Sub-stare jurisdictions should be more likely to gain recognition, whereas movements arrempting to form new states without internal administrative boundaries will face greater difficulties. Preexisting units are already endowed with stable boundaries and populations; they often already have the trappings of governmental authority (police, emergency services, local elections, schools, ere.) and are often presumed to have relatively homogenous populations. Because states' choices of administrative units are wide 111nging, ethno-federal divisions were taken from Roeder. This definition excluded smaller intrastate organizational units such as cities, counties, and states, but ethno-federal units share the most characteristics in common with independent countries of the various types. The Roeder operationalization double counted many colonies, so colonial units were dropped from Roeder's list. The resulting dummy variable, eth11icfed, was coded o for nonedmo-federal units and 1 for ethno-federal units. Sixty-one of :z.59 secessionist movements within the dataset claimed territories organized as ethno-federal units. Hypothesis s argues that ethnic minority groups will be more likely to achieve statehood as a result of their distinct national character and popular support demonstrated by their mobilization. Two variables were created to rest this intuition. The first captured the degree to which a secessionist movement was ethnically dissimilar from its home state. The measure is an ordinal variable resulting from the summation of the linguistic and religious differences between the home state majority and the secessionists. If the groups share a language family, the linguistic indicator is coded o; if they are different, then 1. 16 Religious dissimilarity compares the majority's religion to that of rhe secessionists. 17 If the two shared a religion, the religious indicator is coded o; if they arc different, then 1. The indicators were then summed to create distiflct. Thus, a group coded :z. is linguistically and religiously dissimilar from its home stare, a group coded 1 is distinct on one dimension, and a group coded o shares both language and religion with the majority. 18 Of the 159 secessionist movements in the dataset, 78 were distinct from the majority on both dimensions and another 86 were either linguistically or religiously distinct. Perhaps independence is not about difference per se, but about the politicization of difference and the voicing of justifiable grievance by the secessionist ("as you lq;ally possess") granted legal aurhority tu former colonies wirhin rhe toralny uf rhtir former colonial borders, thereby conrravcning rhe term's original meaning. •• Llnguage families, uf which there arc 118 worldwide, were identified using rhe Ethnologue database (Gurdon 1005). If rhe majority did nut share a common language, the nariunal lllnguage or language of governmenr was used. •' Differences were 1udged among the five major world religions: Buddhism, Chrisrianity, l-lindu1sm, Islam, and Judaism. This opcratiunalizariun is dose, bur nor idenrical, ru I lunringron's measure of ' civrlizarions I 1993). An addiuunal religion variable, measuring smaller disrinctiuns such as 1hose bt.1wccn Sunni, Sh1'a, and Sufi Islam or Protestant, Cuholic, Orrhodux, and urhcr forms of Chrisri:inny w;:as also crc:ir\-d but w:as not sutistically signilic;:anr. '• By m-ccssity, :any ubjccrivisr, system· wide mc::asurc of crhnic and religious differcnc"'S only roughly :aprroximarcs luc:il understandings of me3ningful social and political difference. Ttns should be kepi in mind when interpreting these results. Unfonuruucly, no r\':ldtly av;:ailablc :ahcmarivcs cl anJ heat parents in from of their d1ildren .. .They use fisc.::11 'ontrols ro break the Alb:m1an shop owners. They surround one part of rhe town 3n 111l\o'iorn"1:11eJ 111 J11J.1h ( 1997, r· tosl . • 0 j11J.1h ( 1999, r. 11) imrlies ltugov;) W;IS tolc:r.ttl.'J h)" S4:rb1:111 .1111horni~"!> ....."\:.l\IS· months aflc:r Russia (M:iy 1, 1910} and the Allies (January 27, 1911 I had rc:cugnizc:J its indc:pc:n were 11111 :tJorll-d 1'11.'fore the •ntervl'1lti1Hl hy Russian m1li1ary force!i. • '" lite United Natitms IJC,Jmc involn-d in Abkhazia :u G:orgi.1·~ reljlll'l>t. Tbilisi initial!>· a~h·J Russia IO imervene 10 lJUdl die v1olcnl'C bu1 la1cr dl·t:ricJ Moscow's pro·Ahkhaz hi.rs. As ;1 n.-suh, 11 ask~-d 1he UN ro 1akc a more :ii:m·.: role.

188

Power Politics a11d State Formatio11

Caucasus wars. 113 Russian interests were imponantly intertwined with the fares of the secessionists and the home stares. Once Russian authorities reestablished stabiliry within Russia proper following Soviet disintegration, they began working to ensure rhat their priorities in the near-abroad were met. Russian policy toward Abkhazia oscillated between support for rhe breakaway republic and its Georgian home state, depending on rhe perceived friendliness of the Georgian regime in power at the rime. Russia's support for the South Ossetians, whom it saw as rightfully Russian, was unequivocal. Finally, Moscow's position on Karabakh was somewhat unclear. Russia wanted Azerbaij3n ro join the CIS and so courted its favor at times by supporting its effons in.Kar3bakh. At the same time, Russia was often at loggerheads with Azerbaijan as a result of Caspian oil and its perceived pro-Western orientation. Though importantly engaged in K3rabakh, Russian interests were somewhat less at stake there than in Georgia.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia At the time of its intervention in Georgia, Russia itself was not a unitary actor. At the highest levels, Yeltsin and Russia's Supreme Soviet were making their own independent policies toward the North Caucasus. 17" Likewise, in the field, remnants of Soviet forces derermined their own actions within the sep3ratist republics. Regardless, Russia w:is influenri:il from rhe start. According ro King, .. whether prompted by rhe whim of brig:ide commanders or by a policy directive of Moscow, Soviet armed forces, l:iter ro become Russian Federation troops, were the main suppliers of weaponry (and often soldiers) to (the! separatist groups."''J The flows of we:ipons and military equipment from the Former Soviet Union were essential to supplying both the secessionists and their home states during the wars. Whereas the home states could h:ive leg:illy procured the arms, the secessionists would have been much weaker without the illicit supplies. Moscow might not have been responsible for many of its initial viol:itions of Georgian sovereignry because of its own lack of central control. By early in J 993, however, when the Russian Federation dispatched peacekeeping troops to South Osseria and Abkhazia, the stare had reconsolidated its power and con· ducted a more unified foreign policy. Russian leaders made no secret of their intention to unilaterally intervene in Georgia, even without the support of the international communiry. In fact, Russian peacekeepers were dispatched before any international peacekeeping '" lk'Causc Russia's role within rhc Chc:chen conflict is that of a home Slate, its anri·rl~ugninon stan'e is left unexplored except in rhar capacity (rhough Russia s starus as a Grear rower cerrainly inOuc:nced other sr:m:s· fl'Cognirion behavior roward Chc.'Chnya). In the urher scCl'SS1on· isr conOicrs, Russia's behavior consrirurl.J an important external poliric:al influence. 11 • Ozhiganov (1997, p. 391). '" King (1001, p. s.w>. 0

fotematio11a/ Respo11ses to the \Vars of Soviet Succession missions had been established. According to one expert at the time, .. The UN (found! itself in the delicate situation of facing requests for international legitimization of decisions taken by others." 176 In fact, Russian peacekeeping forces became outright combatants in South Ossetia 's contlict after they were fired on by Georgian troops, foretelling their future conflict there. Intervention in the post-Soviet states was not uniquely under Russia's purview, as would be aptly demonstrated in Karabakh, but Russia was the most important and active power in the region. The other Great Powers allowed Russia disproportionate influence over the conflicrs because of its special interest, at first. Consequently, both the Georgian government and the rebels came to calculate their behavior with an eye toward Russia's response. Russian policies in Georgia were a mixed blessing for both sides. On one hand, Russian peacekeepers did help quell the violence between Georgia and the secessionists. On the other hand, Russia was not an impartial arbiter, and its policies often served to increase hostilities and suspicion between the parties. Yeltsin seemed to support Georgia's territorial integrity over Abkhaz independence initially. 177 He reassured Georgian leaders that Russian troops had been dispatched to Abkhazia in order to maintain the peace, nothing more. As time wore on, though, it became dear that Russia had its own interests at heart, rather than altruistic concerns for Georgian stability. Speaking of the problem in South Ossetia, Georgian President Saakashvili, "declared that there is 'no Ossetian problem in Georgia', but 'a problem in Georgian-Russian relations with respect to certain territories.'" 1'H Apparently, he had determined that Russia was the principal problem, not the secessionist Ossets. Russia had significant interests at stake in the near-abroad. Georgia, in particular, held not only two restive separatist regions with favorable views of Moscow, but in Abkhazia, warm water ports on the Black Sea. The ports were strategically and economically attractive. Indeed, Russia only agreed to send peacekeepers to intervene in Georgia conditional on Georgia giving Russia permission to establish military bases there. Moscow maintains an overtly strategic posture there to date.•::-~ Between Georgia's two separatist contlicts, Russian support was somewhat stronger for South Ossetia. The Ossets were ethnically and ideologically more similar to Russia than Georgia. Ossetians also saw Russia as their potential future home state. So, not only did Russia have strong identity relations with the Ossets, it stood to increase its territorial control, or at least its influence, if the South Ossetians won independence. In contrast, even though Russia was generally supportive of Abkhazia, its support was more opportunistic and economic ,,. M:u;farlanc: (1997, fl. SI 1). 177 In a Scp1c:mb1:r 3 aJJrcss, Yc:l1Sin callc:J for G.·orgia's unity anJ 1c:rriiorial imci;nty. ''" CitL-d in German (:.007, p. 363). I 7 • Russia :lgl"L-C:J Junng a mL·c:ting of 1hc: osca: in Istanbul, Turkey. in Ocwhc:r 1999 to close: the:

Georgian bases.

Power Politics a11d State Formatio11 rather than the result of a consistent interest in Abkhaz independence. Abkhazia and Russia had friendly relations, and Russia routinely violated Georgia's embargo of the region, but Moscow supporred Georgia, too, rarely wavering from its insistence that its territorial integrity should be maintained. Russian support for the secessionists did not arise entirely unprovoked. The Georgian government was also somewhat antagonistic toward Russia, giving Moscow additional justification for backing its challengers. Tbilisi's policies created a dual geosrrategic and domestic security concern 'for Russia. Georgia complicated Russia's conflict with Chechnya by permitting Chechen fighters to enter Georgian territory to evade Russian authorities. Russia also accused Georgian authorities of supplying Chechen fighters with weapons they had procured with the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia believed its own weapons were being used against it in Chechnya. 'M 0 The Georgian government was using the "external security logic" against Russia, attempting to weaken Russia from within by supporting its secessionists. Georgian authorities, for their part, denied aiding and abetting the Chechens, but their claims were not entirely credible. By August 1001, tensions between Russia and Georgia flared into violent conflict. Georgia accused Russia of bombing incursions within Georgian territory west of the Pankisi Gorge. Though denied by Russian authorities, OSCE observers later confirmed Russian responsibility for the bombings. '"' Ultimately, Tbilisi acquiesced to Moscow and arrested a number of Chechen separatists in the region. Russia played both sides insofar as international law was concerned. Ir consistently favored a negotiated settlement between Georgia and the secessionists but simultaneously erected some of the largest barriers to compromise. Moscow has also openly flouted traditional practices of international law to the secessionist states' advantage. In l.OOO, for example, Russia imposed harsh visa restrictions on Georgia. But the standards were not enforced at border crossings with South Ossetia or Abkhazia, affording the secessionists extensive freedom of movement and economic opportunity. •h Further, Russia eased restrictions on Georgian minorities becoming Russian citizens, not only allowing them to travel more freely, but also providing pensioners with the same benefits a Russian citizen would receive. Finally, Russia's military bases within Georgia, which it agreed to close, remained in place. '"' The September t 1, l.OO 1, terrorist auacks in the United States renewed American interest in lslamism and the unstable, potential terrorist safe havens in the Russian periphery. Since then, Russian authorities have become increas· ingly suspicious of U.S. intentions in Eurasia. In l.001, American troops arrived

Myers (ioo:z.b). '"' Myers (:z.oo:z.a). ••• Lynch (:z.oo:z.. p. 846); King (:z.001, p. Hll. '"' King (:z.004, p. 31. Two Soviet Era b35'.'Swi1hm \.corgi;i w~'l'eclc~-d in :z.007, hu1 reinforced bases in the scp;ir;i1ist enc'3v~'S were ;igm:J upon when Russi on either side to fewer 1h.111 \.500. Raum 11995). Interview with S1:oct;try o( State W.urm Chri~wrher, McNcil·l.ehrcr News llo11r air~-J Dc.'\:cml~r I l, 1994.

'" L:s Gclh, ~iu.-J m !M.hwcid ( l'J9S).

194

Power Politics a11d State Formatio11

separatism. •9 2. In either case, the United States saw its relationship with Russia as more friendly than that with the Chechens. Perceptions of Russia shifred somewhat precipitously after the fall of the Soviet Union. Secretary Christopher's statement that Russia was a .. democratic society" and this was no longer the "old Cold War" indicates the extent of the change in Washington's perceptions of Moscow. Similarly, American leaders drew parallels between the American Civil War and the Russian war in Chechnya. Again, U.S. decision makers saw a Western, democratic leader in Yeltsin; he was trying to hold on to Chechnya as Lincoln had held on to the Confederacy during the American Civil War. •11 ) Interestingly, Gorbachev had compared his own situation to Lincoln's in 1990-1991 when he opposed Baltic independence, but Gorbachev's protest fell on deaf ears. 111" Just five years later, Yeltsin was embraced as a champion for democratic leadership. It was true that Yeltsin was democratically elected, but Russian democracy was far from consolidated. If these perspectives are taken as evidence of Washington's view of Russia, they reflected future aspirations for Russia's domestic politics rather than the reality in the mid-199os. For the entire period leading up to the second Russo-Chechen war, U.S. interests in Russia's future, and the potential material benefits to be gained from that future, subdued American criticism of Russia and made Chechen recognition highly unlikely. Moreover, Chechnya did not possess the oil or other valuable commodities that might have made recognition more attractive. South Ossctia and Abkhazia The United States did not recognize Georgian independence at first because of the chaos surrounding its civil war and Washington's uncertainty about Georgia's democratic aspirations. American leaders quickly abandoned their attempt at conditional recognition for the post-Soviet states, however, in exchange for the more immediate gains in U.S. security and economic interests there. Georgia's decidedly pro-Western orientation promised access to Caspi:in oil and suppon for American military initiatives such as the exp:insion of NATO and the Iraq War. L:ner, in the early 1000s, Georgia's geography made it an imponant staging location for U.S. countenerrorism efforts in Central Asi:i. South Ossetia and Abkhazia claimed democratic aspirations, which might have drawn U.S. sympathy, but so did Georgia. Supporting the secessionists would only contribute to further Georgian instability and offered no potential rewards. The United States supponed Georgia early, beginning during its secession from the Soviet Union. U.S. officials first implied that Georgian recognition depended on Gams.1khurdia 's regime improving human rights conditions within ·~• Rumer (1001, p. 6JI. ,.,, Lipidus I 199K, pp. H-JSI. ,.,. Ibid.

l11tematio11al Rcspo11ses to the Wars of Soviet S11ccessio11

195

the republic. But their threat was not credible. '"'j At that time, Georgia was an attractive ally because of its pro-Western orientation. Since then, even when Georgia's democratic bona tides were in question, American support remained strong. Following the Georgian civil war, Washington initially supported Shevardnadze, hoping he was a genuine democratic refonner. Corruption, however, was endemic. Once it was dear Shevardnadze was not what the United States had hoped for, it and many U.S. NGOs shifted their support (and bankrolls) ro the opposition. As noted before, U.S. engagement fueled Russian suspicions. As of 1004, the United States had donated a billion dollars in aid to Georgia for the promorion of democracy and development since Georgian independence. ' 116 American troops trained the Georgian military. Additional American funds flowed to Georgia to stem the growth of Islamic militarism in the Caucasus as part of the war on rerror. Over the years, Georgian stability has become vital to U.S. interests in the region. American strategic interests in Central Asia and interests in the East-West energy corridor make them believe Georgia is the centerpiece to stability within the Caucasus. ' 117 The United States maintains only a limired military presence in Georgia. However, its role there is not without controversy. One of the U.S.-financed military training facilities is near South Ossetia and provoked suspicions of U.S. intentions within the Ossetian community. ' 1111 Supporrers of U.S. policies in Georgia see a triumph in Georgia's peaceful coup (in 1003) and genuine democratic aspirations. But according to Charles King, Georgia might also be seen as a cautionary tale. What the United States created in Georgia might be characterized as a Potemkin democracy. Underneath the veneer of democratic refonns was a deeply fractured state and society. Georgia's borders are not established, nor are its sovereign authorities. Indeed, Georgia might have most appropriately been termed a failed state.'"'"' Bur U.S. interests in Georgia were entrenched early on and were unlikely to shift toward the secessionists.

Nagomo-Karabakh Like Georgia, the U.S. relationship with Azerbaijan is reasonably amicable, making its recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh unlikely from the beginning. At independence, the Azeri government became an important political ally of the United States on a variety of important issues. Even though U.S.-Azeri relations benefited American interests in the region, their relationship is one of strange

••t

~Russi3 condemns rii;lu~ viol311ons m Gc:ori;13; C.."t1rg1;1 u~-:it~'S army" ( 1991 ). '"" More precisely, bcrw~-..·n $1.1billion311J S1.3 hilliun (Chivers, 100.J): Myd:ms (.too,). ''' Smirh (1004). ••• Ostmvsky (1oos>'•• Kmg (100-1).

Power Politics a11d State Formatio11 bedfellows. The United States and Azerbaijan share little in common beyond their policy preferences. Indeed, American leaders often seem uncomfortable with their decision to pursue economic and strategic interests while sacrificing their supposed dedication to democracy, human rights, and self-determination. U.S. decision makers voiced criticisms of the manner in which Azerbaijan waged its political battles agrgia .

August 14

Gcorgian-Ahkh:iz war begins.

Sc/1tc:111l1cr .2.

3 13 .2.0

Nagorno-Karahakh JJing rules, sec CorrclalL'S of W:ir ProjL'CI (1005 ). l:inguage familiL'S, of which rhrre :ire 1111 worlJwiJc, were iJcntificJ using rhc Ethnologuc: Ja1:1b:1sc: (GorJon 1oos ).1' the majority JiJ not share :1 common langu:igc:, the narion:il L1nguagc: or bngu:igc o( govc:mment was uscJ. • DiffcrcnCL'S were: juJgcd among the five: m:ijor world religions: Buddhism, Christianity, l-linduism, Islam, :mJ Judaism. 'lliis opcrationaliz:ition is close, hut not idcniical, 10 Uuntingron's ( 1993) mc:isurc of civiliution. An addition:il religion variable:, measuring sm:alkr Jistincrions such as those: :imong Sunni, Shi.:i, and Sufi lsl:im or ProtL-stant, Catholic, Onhudox, :inJ other forms o( Christi:inity was also crc::ttL'LI but was not st:itistic:illy s1gnific3n1. 0 ' Minorities 3t Risk ProjL'CI {1009). " For :1JJi1i1111al critcri3, SL'C the MinoritiL'S 31 Risk website: hup://www .ciJcm.umd.L-dulmar/dcli · nition.:isp. Although it is poss1hlc: for 3 MAR group 111 be: pohtK:.1lly advantagL-d by its status, this was nor the c:isc for the groups in this stuJy. 8

Appe11dix A

230

state or agents of a state that is neither geographically contiguous nor within I oo miles of its shoreline. Secondary secessions, that is, secession attempts where the home state is a former colony itself, are not coded as colonies even though they reside within units that once were. Emblematically, Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan and Biafra's attempted separation from Nigeria were not considered anti-colonial; 1 • Colony. o Not a colony. 10. ethnicfed: A dummy variable indicating whether t~e secessionists have a state within an ethno-federal union during each conflict year. 1 :L EtlmicFed follows Philip Roeder's (1007) coding but drops all colonial units. For example, Slovenia was a member of an ethnic federation, Yugoslavia, whereas Mozambique was a Portuguese colony; 1 = Ethno·federal union member, o =Not an ethno-federal union member. 1 1. vlevel: The level of violence experienced annually in a given secessionisthome state dyad. The variable comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). In a given year, the variable codes o no armed conflict 1 between 1 s and 999 battle-related deaths 1 at least 1,000 battle-related deaths'' 1 2. warwin: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement defeats its home state in a war for independence, taken from the COW intrastate war data; I = Secessionist war win, o = Conflict is ongoing, ends in a stalemate, or ends in a loss. '" 13. UN: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement becomes a full member of the United Nations (UN); 1 = UN membership, o =Not a member. 14. cowsys: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement becomes a member of the COW System Membership Data; 1 =COW membership, o =Not a member.

=

International Data 1.

case: The unique dataset l.D. number for the secessionist conflict. See Appendix 8 for case l.D.

Roeder (!007 I considers c;oloni~'S to be 3 form or ethnic sq;m.:nt St31e. Unfonun31cfy. combining the twu rypc:s o( units in this w3y r3iSl'S c;unsuua validity prubkms. Coluni3I adm1msrrations were not typkally repn:scmtauve of rhe people; therdon:, the positl-d theoretical ml-ch:mism underlying Sl"gml'rlt state emergence, n3mdy disproponionatc barg3ming leverage with the state,lannut function in the manner 11 dOl'S in ethnic fc:Jerations. Funher, ahernative cxplan:nions for the Jisproponionatc SUCCl'SS or amiculunial groups and ethno·federal groups exist, d1s11nct frum ROl-dl'l''s, making them cquilin31. Consequently, this analyS1s treats the two as distinct. '• UCOP/PIUO (iooH). '• ~'Ccssionist conOicts often n:mJin ongoing after combat cca5es. • I

Pro;ect Codebook 2..

3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

131

name: The longhand name for the conflict dyad. Where a conflict berween a secessionist-home state dyad recurs or where more than one distinct secessionist movement exists within the same ethnic or geo· graphic region, then roman numerals serve to distinguish the move· ments, for example, China-Tibet I, China·Tibet II, or place name in parentheses, for example, France-French West Africa (Guinea), France-French West Africa (Mauritania). See Appendix B for names. acrorr: The state from which the secessionist movement is attempting to secede (referred to as the home state in the domestic dataset). In some cases, a single secessionist movement attempts to secede from a number of home states as in Kurdistan. Each secessionist-home state dyad is coded as a separate instance of secession (e.g., Iraq-Kurds, Turkey· Kurds) because it is theoretically possible for one group to succeed in its goal of independence, whereas another does nor (or fails or compromises whereas the other does not). cow: The three-letter Correlates of War data abbreviation for the home state (acton ). ccode1: The three-number Correlates of War d&:na country code for the home stare (acrorr ). 1 5 year: The calendar year for which observations were coded. ccode1: The three-number Correlates of War data country code for the Grear Power state (acror1). 16 dyadid: A unique 1.0. number for each secessionist conflict-Grear Power dyad. colony: A dummy variable indicating whether the secessionist movement is a colony of the home state during each conflict year. Operationally, a co/011y is defined as a jurisdiction (people and territory) governed by a state or agents of a state that is neither geographically contiguous nor within 100 miles of its shoreline. Secondary secessions, that is, secession attempts where the home state is a former colony itself, are not coded as colonies even though they reside within unirs that once were. Emblematically, Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan and Biafra's attempted separation from Nigeria were not considered anticolonial; 1 =Colony, o =Not a colony. ethnicfed: A dummy variable indicating whether the secessionists have a state within :1n ethno-federal union during each conflict year. 1 " Eth11icFed follows Philip Roeder's (1007) coding bur drops all colonial units. For example, Slovenia was a member of an ethnic federation,

The v:ariahle ccodc cum:sponds 10 the Corrd:atL'S o( War Couniry Code for the home state where :available. l'or coding rulL-s, 51.'C CorrdatL'S uf War 1 ProJL'\:I (1003). •• Sec note 15. '' Sec no1c 11. '1

ip.

t t.

ti..

13.

14.

1 S·

16.

17.

Appc11dix A

Yugoslavia, whereas Mozambique was a Portuguese colony; 1 = Ethnofederal union member, o =Not an ethno·federal union member. vlevel: The level of violence experienced annually in a given secessionisthome state dyad. The variable comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). In a given year, the variable codes o no armed conflict 1 between l.S and 999 battle-related deaths i. at least 1 ,ooo battle-related deaths.' 8 warwin: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement defeats its home state in a war for independence, taken from the COW intrastate war data; t =Secessionist war win, o =Conflict is ongoing, ends in a stalemate, or ends in a loss. 111 challengers: A count of the number of ongoing secessionist challenges against the given Great Power (actori.) in a given year. Data collected from this dataset. challengeh: A dummy variable indicating whether a Great Power (actori.) has an unusually high number of secessionist challengers during a given year. The variable was created by taking the number of seces· sionist challenges for each Great Power home state in each year of the dataset and coding 1 for cases in the 9oth percentile and above, which included those Great Powers with between 10 and 11 challengers in a conflict year; I = Unusually high number of challenges, o = Not an unusually high number of challenges. vchallenge: A variable indicating the cumulative level of violence reached in a Great Power's (actori.) domestic secessionist challenges in a given year. The intensity of violence was measured by summing the levels of violence from the PRIO dataset for each Great Power's domestic seces· sionist challenges in a given year. l.0 The resulting variable ranges from o (none) to 6 (violence equivalent to 3 full-scale civil wars). cwmid: A dummy variable indicating whether a Great Power (actori.) and a home state (acton) initiate a militarized interstate dispute during a given year. The variable is taken from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data; t = MID initiated, o = No MID initiated. mutualdem: A dummy variable indicating that both the Great Power (actori.) and the home state (acton) were stable democracies during a given year. The variable is derived from scores provided by the Polity IV data. Consistent with accepted practice, states with Polity scores above 7

'" UCDP/PRIO (1008). Secessionist conOiclS orrt."R remain ongoing afo:r combar ccaSt.-s. 10 No armed conflict (o), Z.S-999 b:irdc-rclart.-d dc:uhs ( 1 ), 1,000 or more baulc-rcl:irL-d dearhs (z.). The: inu:nsi1y or violence mc:isurc is rarhcr crude. For example, rwo conflias causing JOO b;111lc:rcla1cd dc:a1hs would be coded idcn1ic:illy 10 one conflicr wi1h more 1h:in 1,000 banlc-rc:lared dc:a1hs. Unfonunarcly, no bc:nc:r algori1hm is rc:idily :ivailablc:. '~

Pro;ect Codebook were considered democracies; 1 =Mutual democracy, o = Not mutual democracy. u 18. mutualaut: A dummy variable indicating that both the Great Power (actou.) and the home state (actorr) were stable autocracies during a given year. The variable is derived from scores provided by the Polity IV data. Consistent with accepted practice, states with Polity scores below -7 were considered autocracies; 1 =Mutual autocracy, o =Not mutual autocracy. 11 19. prec: A dummy variable indicating that at least one Great Power had previously granted recognition to a given secessionist movement, col· leered from this dataset; 1 = Previous recognition, o = No previous recognition. 20. precs: A count variable indicating the number of Great Power recogni· rions granted to a given secessionist movement as of that conflict year. 21. gprecpro: A variable measuring the proportion of the total number of Great Powers that have granted a secessionist movement recognition as of a given conflict year. u. recyear: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a given Great Power (actori.) grants formal recognition to a given secessionist movement.

" One or boch of che s1:ucs had Policy scon.-s bc:1w~-cn -10 and 6, -66, -77, or -8K . .. One or both of the s1:11cs had Polity scores bc1wccn -6 and 1o, -66, -77, or -KS.

APPENDIX B

Unique Case 1.0.

# t 2.

3 4

s

6

7 8 9 10 11

12

13 14 1

s

16 17

18 19 2.o 2.1

u

2.3 2.4 2.5

26 2.7

NAME USA - Marshall Islands USA - Micronesia USA - Philippines USA - Hawaiians USA - Pueno Rico Canada - Quebec St.Kitts and Nevis - Nevis I Bolivia - Cambas UK-Baluch UK - Rhodesia - Northern Rhodesia - Barorseland (lozi) UK - Northern Ireland UK- Yemen (FLOSY) UK - Buganda UK -Gold Coast (Ghana) I UK - Jews (Palestine/Israel) I UK-Karen UK - Newfoundland UK - Rhodesia - Northern Rhodesia UK - Rhodesia UK - Scots II UK - Scots I UK - Iraq UK - Egypt UK - Burma (Myanmar) UK - Pakistan (West & East) UK - India UK - Ceylon (Sri Lanka)

Appc11dix 8

236

l.8

2.9 30 3I 3 2. 33 34 3S

36 37 38 39 40 41 42. 44 4S 46 47 48 49 so SI S1 S3 S4

SS s6 S7 s8 S9 60 61

62. 63 64 6s 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

UK - Jews (Palestine/Israel) Ill UK - Jews (Pillestine/lsrael) II UK-Sanusis UK-Sudan UK -Gold Coast (Ghana) JI UK - Malilyil (Straits Settlements)(Malaysia) UK-Cyprus UK - British Somaliland UK-Nigeria UK - Sierril Leone UK-Tangilnyika UK-Ugandil UK-Kuwiilt UK - Mau Mau (Kenya) UK - Zanzibar (inc. wlfanganyika) UK-Gambia UK-Guyilna UK - Basuorol:ind (Lesotho) UK - Borswan:i UK - Yemen (NLF) UK - Mauritius UK-Sw:izi UK-Fiji UK - B:ih:im:is Australia - PNG UK - Seychelles UK- Rhodesi:i-Zimbabwe UK-Brunei Netherlands - Netherlands Indies I Netherlands - Netherlands Indies II Netherlands - W. Papua (Iran Jaya) Netherlands - Dutch Guiana Belgium - Flemish Belgium - Belgian Congo Belgium - Burundi (Bezi) Belgium - Rwanda France - Alawites (Hatay) France - Basques France - Brittany France - Casamance France - Corsica France - French Somaliland II France - French Indochina (Laos) France - French Indochina I

U11iq11c Case l.D. 73 14 15

76 77 78 79 80 St 82.

83 84 85

86 87 88 89 90 91 92. 93 94 95

96 97 98 99 JOO JOI

102. 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 I I 2. 113 114 II 5

116

France - French West Africa RDA France - Syria France - French Indochina (Cambodia) France - French Indochina (Vietnam) II France - Morocco France -Tunisia France - French West Africa (Guinea) France - Mossi (Burkina Faso) France - French Eq. Africa (CAR) France - French Eq. Africa (Chad) France - French Eq. Africa (Middle Congo) France - French West Africa (Cote d'Ivoire) France - French Somaliland I France- French Eq. Africa (Gabon) France - Niger France - French West Africa (French Soudan)(Mali) France - Senegal France - French West Africa (Mauritania) France - Algeria France - Comoros France - Dahomey France - Madagascar France - Monaco France - Savoy France - French Indochina (Pathet Lio) Switzerland - Jura Spain - Basques II Spain - Catalans II Spain - Spanish Guinea Spain - Basques I Spain - Basques Ill Spain - Catalans I Portugal - Guinea Bissau Potugal-Mozambique Portugal - Sao Tome & Principe Portugal -Angola Portugal - East Timer Portugal-Cape Verde Czechoslovakia - Slovakia Italy - Giulians Italy - Sicily Italy - Italian Somaliland Italy - Padania Italy - Sardinia

2.37

Appc11dix B

:z.38

117 Italy - South Tyrol JJ8 Italy - Montenegro Jl9 Italy - Sanusis I l.O I l. I I l.l.

12.3 114 115 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 130 131 131 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 141 143 144

•so

151 I 5 l. 153 154

iss

156 161 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170

Croatia - Serbs Yugoslavia -Albanians (Kosovars) Serbia and Montenegro - Kosovo Albanians Yugoslavia - Bosnia/Herz Yugoslavia -Croatians Yugoslavia -Slovenians Yugoslavia-Macedonia Bosnia and Herz. - Serbs Bosnia -Croats (Muslims 1994-1995) Cyprus - Turkish Cypriots Moldova - Transnistria Moldova - Gagauz USSR - Adzhar USSR-Ajars Russia - Chechnya I Russia - Chechnya II Russia - Dagesranis USSR - Ta tars Russia -Tatars USSR - Estonians II USSR - Abkhaz Rep. USSR - Latvians II USSR - Lithuanians Ill USSR - Armenia USSR - Azeris USSR - Russian USSR - Tajiks USSR - Turkomen USSR - Ukrainians II USSR - Uzbeks USSR - Balkars Czechoslovakia - Carpatho-Rusyns USSR - Lithuanians II USSR - Ukrainians I Ukraine - Crimea Georgia - Abkhazia Georgia - South Ossetia Azerbaijan - Nagoro-lbakh war, 167, 184, 191 Kashmiris, s1 Khadjimba, Rilul, Prime Minister :ind Vice President of Abkhoizia, 179 Khrushchev, Nikita, Premier of the Soviet Union, lSJ, 161 King, Charles, 188, 19 s Kodori Gorge, 180 Kohl, Helmut, Choincellorof Gcrm;iny, 115, 111, 111 Kokoity, Eduard, President of South Osseti:i, 1113 Kosovo, 14, 98, 111, 11 ?, I JS application to B:tdintcr Commission, 116 effective authority in, 79, 116, 109, 111, t)), 137 external nonrecognition, 88, ta 6, 131 external recognition for, t), 135, 113 independence demand, 1, 94, 107, I.JS intcrn:irion:ilpoliticsand, 1, 13,87, 1t1, IJS, 104, 119 Kosovo Libcr:uion Army (KLA), 110, 111, t)1, 137 NATO intervention, 117, t 31, aH popular lcgitim;icy in, 109, 110 projected viability for, l 09, a u, aH recognition, effects of, 116 territorial control in, s6, '09 within Serbi:i, 1J1 within Yugusl:ivi:t, 119, 90, 91, 109, 110

llldex

z.68 Kosovo Force(KFOR), 133 Krasner, Stephen, 32, )4, 79 Kucan, Milan, President o( Slovenia, 91, 9 3, 94 League o( Communists o( Slovenia (LDC). See Slovenia League o( Nations, 54, 63 Lee, Teng-hui. President o(Taiwan, ROC, 40 Linle, Allan, 93, 100, 101 Ljubljana. Stt Slovenia London. See United Kingdom Maastricht Summit, 1u.,110, 148 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic o( (FYROM), 78, 8.h 8j, 111 external recognition for, 11 s. 118 Malayali, s1 MAR

operationalization, 6'} Maskhadov, Asian, President of Chechnya, 168, 16'}, 171, 173, 100, 101, :z.o:z. Mesic, Stjepan, President o( the Presidency o( Yugoslavia and President o( Croatia, 94, IOI MID. See Militarized lnlel'5tate Dispute data Militari:z.ed lntcrsc:ue Dispute (MID Ill) project, 64 Milosevic, Slobodan, President of Serbia and President o( the Federal Republic o( Yugoslavia, 1,83,93, 138 Croatia, policies toward, 8s, 91, 91, 94, 103, 111, 113, 119, 113 Greater Serbia, 114 Kosovo, policies toward, 90, 93, 10,, 111, 131 presidency, rise to. 90 Slovenia, policies toward, 100, 101, 101 Mindanao,3 Minorities at Risk Project (MAR), 40, so, 64, 69, l 8:z.

Moldova, 138, 143, 1so Montenegro, 54, 8j, 88, 89, 93, 13.J Montevideo Convention, 30,) 1, 98, 11 s. I :z.9, 137· 148, 171, 181,:z.23 standards, 30, 49 Moscow. See Russia n111111a/4111 operationalization, 71 n111111aldmr. Set also democracy, mutual operationalization, 71

Nagomo·Karabakh, 215 eHective authority in, 18 s, uo extemal nonn:c:ognition, 206, 216 external recognition for, l BS independence demand, 164 projc:aed viability for, l 86 Soviet rulc,-163 territorial control in, 184 national mobiliz.ation, so ' NATO. See Nonh Atlantic Treaty Org3niz.ation nego11a1cd consent, ss Ne1hcrlands, 7S noninterference. See sovereignty Norm Atlantic Treaty Organization hc.'fl Wight, Manin, 1!I World Bank, 34, Ko, 106 Xinji:ang. Sec China, sccc:ssionism in Yehsin, Boris, President o( the: Russian Feder:ation, •ss. 1s6, •s1. 170, 171, 188, 189, 19.z., •9.J. 194 Yemc:n, .z..J. 41 Yugosl:av wars. Sec also 11ndcrTen Day war, Croati.1n W.1r, Kosovo W.1r Yugoslavia dc:mogr.1phics, K!I intc:rnation:al context, 97, 113, 111 rccoenition, effects o(, t J 1 Yugoslavi.1, Federal Republic of (FRYI. Sec Sc:rbia Yugoslavia, Socialist Fc.-dcral Republic of (SFRY). Sec Yugoslavia