Power in Europe?: [I] Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950 [Reprint 2011 ed.] 9783110863918, 9783110106084

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Power in Europe?

Power in Europe Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950

Edited by Josef Becker and Franz Knipping

w DE

G Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 1986

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

Power in Europe? Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Europe-Politics and government-1945I. Becker, Josef, 1931. II. Knipping, Franz. D1058.P67 1986 940.554 86-16601 ISBN 0-89925-261-3

C1P-Kurztitelaufnahme

der Deutschen

Bibliothek

Power in Europe? : Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a postwar world, 1945-1950 / ed. by Josef Becker and Franz Knipping. - Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1986. ISBN 3-11-010608-6 NE: Becker, Josef [Hrsg.] © Copyright 1986 by Walter de Gruyter 8c Co., Berlin 30 - Printed in Germany - All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form - by photoprint, microfilm or any other means - nor transmitted nor translated into a machine language without written permission from the publisher. -Typesetting and Printing: Tutte GmbH, Salzweg-Passau. Binding: Lüderitz 8c Bauer, Berlin

Contents Introduction of the Editors

1

I. The Decision-Makers in Foreign Affairs

7

ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Britain and the World, 1945-1949: the View from the Foreign Office

9

GEOFFREY WARNER

Britain and Europe in 1948: the View from the Cabinet

27

R E N E GIRAULT

The French Decision-Makers and their Perception of French Power in 1948

47

BRUNELLO VIGEZZI

Italy: the End of a 'Great Power' and the Birth of a 'Democratic Power'

67

ANTONIO VARSORI

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in Post-War Italian Foreign Policy

89

MANFRED OVERESCH

Senior West German Politicians and their Perception of the German Situation in Europe 1945-1949

II. The Political Parties

117

135

MARTIN CEADEL

British Political Parties and the European Crisis of the late 1940s. .

137

SERGE BERSTEIN

French Power as seen by the Political Parties after World War I I . . .

163

SEVERINO G A L A N T E

The Genesis of Political Impotence. Italy's Mass Political Parties in the Years between the Great Alliance and the Cold War

185

VI

Contents ROMAIN H . RAINERO

The Italian Communist Party and the Italian Imperial Problem. A Forgotten 'Colonial' Position

209

DIETRICH STARITZ/ARNOLD SYWOTTEK

The International Political Situation as seen by the German Linksparteien (SPD, SED and KPD) between 1945 and 1949

III. The Economic Area

213

235

G E O R G E C . PEDEN

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power on the Eve of the Cold War

237

R O B E R T FRANK

The French Dilemma: Modernization with Dependence or Independence and Decline

263

VERA ZAMAGNI

Betting on the Future. The Reconstruction of Italian Industry, 1946-1952

283

HANS-JÜRGEN SCHRÖDER

The Economic Reconstruction of West Germany in the Context of International Relations 1945-1949

IV. The Military Problems

303

323

DONALD C . WATT

British Military Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Strategic Threat, 1945-1950

325

JEAN DELMAS

Reflections on the Notion of Military Power through the French Example (1945-1948)

339

M A N F R E D MESSERSCHMIDT/CHRISTIAN G R E I N E R / N O R B E R T WIGGERSHAUS

West Germany's Strategic Position and her Role in Defence Policy as seen by the German Military, 1945-1949

353

VII

Contents

V. Public Opinion and the Cultural Sector

371

CAROLINE ANSTEY

Foreign Office Publicity, American Aid and European Unity. Mobilising Public Opinion, 1947-1949

373

PASCAL O R Y

Introduction to an Era of Doubt. Cultural Reflections of 'French Power', around the year 1948

397

ENRICO DECLEVA

A Difficult Adaptation. The Italian Liberal-Democratic Press and the Reality of the International Situation (1945-1949)

409

HEINZ HÜRTEN

Farewell to the Power State? The Perception of the Political Environment and the Idea of the State in Public Opinion in the Western Occupation Zones of Germany between 1946 and 1948. . .

VI. Europe in the International Postwar Constellation R.A.C.

429

445

PARKER

British Perceptions of Power. Europe between the Superpowers... . P I E R R E M E L A N D R I / M A U R I C E VAISSE

France: from Powerlessness to the Search for Influence

447 461

ANDRE NOUSCHI

France, the Empire and Power (1945-1949)

475

ENNIO DI N O L F O

The Shaping of Italian Foreign Policy during the Formation of the East-West Blocs. Italy between the Superpowers

485

ELENA A G A - R O S S I

Italy at the Outbreak of the Cold War: Domestic and International Factors

503

WILFRIED LOTH

German Conceptions of Europe during the Escalation of the East-West Conflict, 1945-1949

517

VIII

Contents

Conclusion

537

BERND-JÜRGEN WENDT

Europe between Power and Powerlessness

539

Abbreviations

557

The Authors

561

Other Publications

569

Index of Names

577

Introduction of the Editors This volume assembles, in a revised and completed form, the 29 principal contributions to an international symposium held at the Haus St. Ulrich at Augsburg on 3 - 7 April 1984. More than eighty British, French, German and Italian historians as well as scholars from related fields deliberated upon "Western European Nation States and Europe within the Global System: Perceptions of Power Constellations in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy 1945-1949". The focus of interest was the fact that in 1938, in the year of Munich, the four principal Western European states were still universally recognized Great Powers, while only ten years later they found themselves, victors and vanquished of the Second World War alike, decisively reduced in importance and no longer the heart of the world, but depending upon a Superpower, the United States. What was the real extent of this decline? What were its underlying causes? And, in particular, how was the decline from Great Power status perceived by governments and peoples in Britain, France, Germany and Italy? Such questions were considered in the larger context of a long-range European research project which, beginning in 1980, at the initiative of Rene Girault of Paris I University, had brought together a number of historians and political scientists from the four countries under consideration. 1 The title of this still ongoing project is "Perceptions of Power in Western Europe between 1938 and 1958". It generally aims at intensifying research on European international questions after 1945 and encouraging personal contacts within the European scholarly community. It aims in particular at high-lighting the historical decline of Europe in the world by studying the separate but parallel paths followed by Britain, France, Germany, and Italy both before and after the Second World War. How can loss of power be measured? The collaborators decided to analyse the growth of awareness, i.e. to ask how the contemporaries perceived and judged the international decline, and to what degree the changes in the political realities were recognized. The approach, hence, is to try to elucidate "political mentalities" in the four countries, those stable or changing elements of national self-assessment

1

T h e project is organized in France by Rene Girault (Paris I) and Robert Frank (Paris X ) , in Great Britain by Anthony Adamthwaite (Loughborough) and R . A. C. Parker (Oxford), in Italy by Ennio Di N o l f o (Florence) and Brunello Vigezzi (Milan), and in the Federal Republic of Germany by the editors.

2

Introduction of the Editors

before and after the War of 1 9 3 9 - 4 5 . The methodological problems of such research into mentalities are well known. How can these passing and delicate, but at the same time most important mental phenomena, forces that reflect as well as inspire reality, be reliably discerned? One method consists in collecting and screening evidence from a great number of contemporary sources. This is the method the collaborators of the project prefer, although a more theoryoriented approach seems also possible. 2 Proceeding individually they ask, by exploring newly accessible as well as already known sources, how political personalities or groups perceived the international position of their respective countries, their autonomous strengths and weaknesses, their relative weight in the inter-state context. What degree of political and historical self-confidence can, in general, be observed? Which are the definitions of national aims and interests, how are the available means evaluated? Which were the calculations behind power politics? Did policy formulation spring from a rational assessment of quantitative and qualitative elements of power - geographical and demographic facts, economic resources, military strength, possession of colonies? Or were the determinants of a more psychological character - traditionmindedness, social cohesion, international prestige? Or was the personality of the decision-makers decisive, their different backgrounds, temperaments, education, their willingness or unwillingness to take risks, their sense of realism, their understanding of responsibilities? What were their standards in judging the intentions and possibilities of other Powers, friends or foes? Which then were, in short, the categories and criteria that shaped perceptions and consciousness of national and international power in the four countries before and after the Second World War? The Augsburg Symposium was the second within the project. A first colloquium had been organized on 1 4 - 1 7 April 1982 at the Chateau de Sevres near Paris. Its objective had been to gain a point of departure for the whole project by establishing a frame of reference from which to analyze "perceptions of power" around the year 1938, the eve of the Second World War. The contributions to this first colloquium have been published in various places. 3 A third colloquium in the series, dealing with the years 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 6 0 , will take place in 1987 in Florence. It should be emphasized, though, that these colloquia are only the major highlights of the project. The essential research work is done during the intervals by groups of scholars in the four participating countries who, in a parallel manner and in close mutual contact, approach the subject from six different perspectives:

2

A good introduction into the methods of "histoire des mentalites" is given in Jacques Le Goff et.al.,

3

La Nouvelle Histoire, Paris 1978, p. 4 0 2 - 4 2 3 .

See below, p. 569ff., 'Other publications'.

Introduction of the Editors

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

3

T h e decision-makers in foreign affairs. T h e political parties. T h e economic area. T h e military sector. Public opinion and the cultural sector. European and colonial interests.

Under these headings, which were respected in the arrangement of the present volume, the project keeps in mind the varying character of problems and questions in the four countries while also attempting to reach comparable evaluations of power consciousness, for both specific moments and longer historical perspectives. Within the framework of this general orientation, the authors endeavour to increase our knowledge of the international system of the late 1940s, a period that is only just now becoming history. As the multiple results can scarcely be adequately summarized here, some brief initial remarks, accompanied by the recommendation to read Bernd-Jürgen Wendt's conclusion at the end of the book, 4 must suffice. T h e European loss of power is omnipresent in the following studies, but so is the fact that the "decline from Great Power status" and its mental realization differed in the four countries under consideration. There can be observed, in this respect, a kind of diminuendo in the sequence from Britain to France to Italy to Germany, but also a corresponding crescendo of need for, and thus interest in, an eventual rapprochement with one's European neighbors and the United States. Only reluctantly, at any rate, did traditional powermindedness give way to a radically altered international environment. T h e vanquished as well as the victors had differing, but comparable problems in relinquishing their illusions concerning their century-old place in the political center of the world. Britain refused, for a time, to face the new situation at all, laying claim to recognition as the third if weakest World Power, side by side with the United States and the Soviet Union. For nearly a decade both Labour and Conservative leaders continued to believe in the possibility of overcoming postwar economic weakness, which was seen as provisional, and of gaining back for Britain an independent international role, even vis-a-vis the brewing Soviet military menace. Regarding this both political parties trusted in the intermediate position of the British Isles between the European continent and the Atlantic and the overseas world, in a privileged Anglo-American relationship, and in the resources - optimistically overrated - of the Empire and Commonwealth. With such assumptions British interest to find solutions in a larger Western European context became, not surprisingly, mainly a function of its continuing Great

4

See below, p.539ff.

4

Introduction of the Editors

Power ambitions. Only when the problems of decolonization became burning issues in the 1950s, in particular during the Suez Crisis, did it dawn upon the British that the gulf which separated assumptions from realities might no longer be bridged. In France, where the Second World War had jeopardized the very existence of the State, there emerged for a short time a similar illusion: that an independent Great Power status might be regained, perhaps inferior to that of the Superpowers, but superior to that of all other Powers. This illusion was fed by hopes for substantial American aid, for possibilities of more intensive exploitation of the colonies, for a permanent weakening of Germany, and for Western European cooperation with Britain and the Benelux countries. But the beginning of the Cold War and the increasing dependence upon American financial and military help forced French leaders as early as 1948 to reduce such "Third Force" ambitions, to reorient completely their policy towards Germany, and to redefine the French role in Europe and in the world. These modifications, however, were not seen as definite, as there seemed to exist another, long-range way to win back and finally maintain the status of a Great Power: the patient development and strengthening of the French power basis through the systematic modernization of the economy and in particular industry. Illusions were also to be found in Italy. Her power perceptions wavered between the crude fact of defeat and a feeling that Italy had joined the right side, that of the victors, in time. Hopes were thus nourished that there might be possibilities to link up with some independent political orientations of the prewar type. This was certainly a misperception of the situation which resulted from the collapse of fascism and East-West polarization. There were, for instance, efforts to exploit tensions and antagonisms between the victors in order to enhance the Italian position. But the results proved rather limited, even if some points could be gained before the Peace Treaty of 1947. National aims and claims, however, were not suspended by such experiences, nor by adherence to European and Atlantic groupings, as these rather seemed to offer new opportunities for national politics even in the eyes of the political Left. In Germany Hitler's war and total defeat, followed by a foreign occupation regime, brought home the absurdity of power politics. Readiness for a radical rupture with the past and a new start was correspondingly great. But even new policy orientations "in the shadow of powerlessness" were in a certain sense, even if unconsciously, based on some notion of power. In this, the adherents of "Third Force" solutions who thought that an undivided Germany might form a bridge between East and West were more optimistic with regard to future German power in international affairs than were the advocates of a strictly Western orientation. The latter, who under Adenauer's leadership were to prevail, felt that, given the historical experience, in the Bismarckian tradition, of an independent policy between East and West, and in the face of Soviet expansionism,

Introduction of the Editors

5

there was not enough German, or rather West German potential economic and military power to warrant a political course independent of the European democracies and the Atlantic World. When this fundamental decision had been taken, confirmed by national division, the notion of political power seemingly disappeared from the minds of the Germans and from public debate, to the point of becoming a kind of taboo, and this for a long time. The following studies certainly do not answer all pertinent questions. The editors and collaborators are the first to realize the limits of their joint efforts. There is much that has not been analyzed or specified. One may wish, for instance, to learn more about the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union. Here a second look at the contributions will show that the Superpowers, whose ascent was an essential factor in the European decline, appear prominently in every single study, though in the context of the general concentration of the project on Europe. There are probably other gaps. The method of inter-state comparison has still to be further refined. Altogether, the reader will find a first account, the result of an endeavour to open up new perspectives to historical research. Historians, political scientists, and economists have pooled their efforts and combined their methods in the hope of joint progress. The reader may judge the result. The editors decided to solve the thorny question of publishing papers that were presented in four different languages by attempting a publication in English. They think that the effort of a four-country comparison must not be unnecessarily complicated by linguistic divergencies. Each contribution is followed by a short abstract in German. The preparation of this English book in Germany proved nevertheless adventurous. Without the good will of our Italian, German and French collaborators, and especially the helping hands of our British colleagues Anthony Adamthwaite, Martin Ceadel, George C. Peden and Geoffrey Warner, this English publication might not have seen the light of day. The editors address their heartfelt thanks to their colleagues, adding at once that their editorial responsibility for any errors in the translations and their presentation remains, naturally, undivided. There are more thanks to render. The April 1984 Augsburg Symposium took place under the auspices of Their Excellencies the Ambassadors to Germany, Professor Luigi Vittorio Ferraris of Italy, Jacques Morizet of France, Sir Jock L. Taylor of Great Britain, and the Bavarian Staatsminister für Unterricht und Kultus, Professor Dr. Hans Maier. The Hanns-Martin-SchleyerStiftung (Cologne), the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Bonn-Bad Godesberg) and the British Council (Munich) helped to finance the Symposium. Special thanks go to the Commission of the European Communities at Brussels for subsidizing this publication. The University of Augsburg provided, with financial and material support, the institutional basis for this whole second phase of the European project. The

6

Introduction of the Editors

staff of the Lehrstuhl für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte at the University of Augsburg (Walther L. Bernecker, Herbert Müller, Klaus P. Prem, Helga Keie, Klaus Drechsel, Petra Weber, Sabine Dischinger and Eva Sturm), during the final stages supported by Rose Gatens and Wolfgang Kuhoff, formed an able and indispensable team in the various phases of the symposium and the publication process. Augsburg and Tübingen, January, 1986

Josef Becker Franz Knipping

I. The Decision-Makers in Foreign Affairs

Britain and the World, 1945-1949: the View from the Foreign Office"' by Anthony Adamthwaite

In the debates about the causes of Britain's precipitate post-1945 decline from 'Big Three' membership to regional European power, the Foreign Office was always the bete noire of press, politicians and public. In thirteen years it was the target of three major inquiries - Plowden (1964), Duncan (1969), Berrill (1977). The diplomats, it was alleged, "savagely side-tracked" Bevin's "dynamism" and "forward looking attitudes". The Foreign Office "exploited Bevin's reputation and, taking advantage of his failing powers, continued unchecked its normal routine of unplanned catastrophe". 1 According to popular stereotype, the Carlton-Brownes of the FO were obsessed by past greatness and neglected to make the necessary adjustments to second-class power status which would have spared Britain the painful retreats of the 1950s and 1960s. Recent research has produced sympathetic reassessments of the 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 Labour government's foreign policy. The reappraisals confirm Bevin as hero and conclude that "in terms of what the governments set out to do, it was a considerable achievement". 2 However, little has been said specifically about Foreign

* This article is a revised version of a paper first given at the colloquium at the University of Augsburg, West Germany, in April 1984, then at a conference at King's College, London, in September 1984. It has been published in International Affairs, 61/2, Spring 1985, pp. 223—235. I am grateful to colleagues for advice and criticism, especially to Sir Frank Roberts and Dr. Roger Bullen. I should like to thank the British Academy for a grant which enabled me to carry out the research. I acknowledge permission to quote from the following collections: Churchill College, Cambridge, for the Strang Papers; The British Library of Political and Economic Science for the Dalton, Meade and Webster Papers. Copyright material from the Public Record Office, London, appears by permission of HMSO. 1 Geoffrey McDermott, The Eden legacy and the decline of British diplomacy, London 1969, p. 87; Lord Wigg, George Wigg, London 1972, p. 139. Lord Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary 1949-53, was viciously attacked in the Sunday Express, 19Oct. 1952: "How is it that when the Government changes the blunders go on just the same? Largely because the senior officials of the Foreign Office continue to make policy whichever Government is in power", Churchill College (Cambridge), Strang Papers, 2/6.

10

Anthony Adamthwaite

Office attitudes and planning in the immediate postwar years. 3 The purpose of this article is to investigate Foreign Office perceptions of British power in the years 1945-9, and to ask how well the Office responded to the transformation of international affairs. 4

Bevin and his

advisers

Analysing Foreign Office views has its difficult points. First and most obvious is Bevin's dominance. " W h a t one clerk said to another" may seem small beer since the Foreign Secretary was the principal architect of British foreign policy. There was no Cabinet foreign affairs committee and Bevin, unlike his predecessor Anthony Eden, was his own master. Yet, as his biographer concedes, the Foreign Secretary had "as strong a team as any British Foreign Secretary ever led" including some of "the half dozen or so ablest men of their generation in British official life". 5 To suppose that the Foreign Secretary's policy was all his own work is as naive as the contemporary criticism that the minister was the prisoner of his permanent officials. 6 The existence of such a talented team ensured that between minister and officials there was a constant interplay of argument and personality. Yet fully to unravel Bevin's inspiration from that of his advisers is well-nigh impossible. Bevin left little on paper. H e found writing laborious, kept no diary, wrote few letters. His hand was practically illegible. Foreign Office files contain none "of the long and carefully drafted minutes by which Curzon and Austen 2

3

4 5 6

Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The foreign policy of the British Labour governments, 1945-51, Leicester 1984, p. 18. For recent reassessments see Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, London 1983; W. Roger Louis, The British empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951, Oxford 1984; Kenneth Morgan, Labour in power, 1945 - 51, Oxford 1984; Henry Pelling, The Labour governments, 1945—1951, London 1984; John W. Young, Britain, France and the unity of Europe, 1945-1951, Leicester 1984; Elisabeth Barker, The British between the superpowers, 1945-1950, London 1984; Alan S. Milwark, the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, London 1984. V. R. Rothwell, Britain and the cold war, 1941 — 1947, London 1982, is the only work which deals exclusively with Foreign Office views, but both D. C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britains's place, 1900-1975, Cambridge 1984, and Ovendale, op. cit., contain many helpful insights. The term 'Foreign Office' refers in this article only to the central administration in London. Bullock, op. cit., p. 98. For criticisms that Bevin had been seduced by his senior officials, see the press reports, especially The Economist, 9Feb. 1946 in Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office Papers, series 366, file 1611 (FO 366/1611). Subsequent references to the Cabinet Series (CAB) are also to documents from the PRO. T h e belief persisted: "I fear that Bevin is too much in the hands of his officials. They are not good guides on policy", Lord Cecil to Sir Charles Webster, 20Dec. 1948, Webster Papers, 1/28.

11

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

Chamberlain would convey their instructions". 7 Both the urgency of the issues and Bevin's method of working ensured that policy was made in frequent ad hoc meetings which usually went unminuted. Officials would go away and draft the necessary directives. Since the discussions were "often rambling and rather chaotic" and the conclusions "by no means always crystal clear", senior advisers enjoyed ample scope for their own ideas.8 Other changes in Foreign Office working methods make it difficult to discover the whys and wherefores of decisions. Before the Second World War, consultation within the Office and with other government departments was mostly by correspondence; during the war much more was done orally, and this became the norm. Many discussions and telephone conversations went unrecorded. There are few private diaries or papers to illuminate decision-making. Sir Alexander Cadogan, whose diary is so valuable for his eight-year stint as Permanent Under-Secretary, left the Foreign Office in February 1946 to become the first Permanent British representative to the United Nations. He kept up his diary, but it tells us little about policy-making in London. Pierson Dixon, Bevin's private secretary 1945 - 7 , kept a diary but left the Office in 1947 to become ambassador in Prague. Thus there is a long gap until 1950 when the diary of Sir Kenneth Younger, Minister of State, sheds light on the last months of Bevin's Foreign Secretaryship. That minister and mandarins were such a close-knit team compounds the difficulty of disentangling their respective contributions to policy-making. Their harmony was a remarkable achievement given their vastly different backgrounds - the rough-hewn trade union boss and a "union" predominantly of old Etonians. Bevin represented a potential threat to this elite since he helped to shape the 1943 Foreign Service Act, the Eden-Bevin reforms, aimed at "democratising" the foreign service. Yet Cadogan immediately saw advantages in Bevin's appointment: he was "the heavyweight of the Cabinet", who would "get his own way with them [...] if he can be put on the right line". The new Foreign Secretary had "sound ideas — which we must encourage". 9 The Office saw in Bevins's pivotal Cabinet position an opportunity to restore its influence as the main engine of foreign policy-making. Reassuringly, Bevin resisted calls to clean out the Augean stables and the Cabinet was told that "it was not possible to make the sweeping changes desired" in staffing. His refusal to carry out a purge has been interpreted as evidence that "Bevin became more devoted than any of his predecessors [...] to the Career Diplomat [...] so that 'now all the old nags are going back to the old stables' ". 1 0 This is misleading. In fact Bevin was privately

7

Lord Strang, Home

8

Sir Roderick Barclay, Ernest

and abroad,

London 1956, p. 294.

Bevin and the Foreign

' David Dilks (ed.), Ehe diaries of Sir Alexander 10

Office,

Cadogan,

1932—1969,

1938-1945,

London 1975, p. 3 8 .

London 1971, pp. 776, 7 8 0 .

P R O , F O 8 0 0 / 4 6 3 , 1 1 Feb. 1946; Ovendale, op. cit., p. 2, citing Dalton's diary for 26 July 1947. F o r the most recent account of the post-1945 Foreign Office see Valerie Cromwell, 'The Foreign and

12

Anthony Adamthwaite

critical of personnel and recruitment and energetically implemented the EdenBevin reforms. By the end of 1947 the foreign service had been considerably restructured. For example, of 147 members of the foreign service of senior rank in 1943, nearly half had left by the end of 1947, including seventeen forced retirements. 11 Thus Bevin was firmly in the saddle. His personality, especially his sense of humour and warm-heartedness, quickly commanded loyalty and affection. 1 2 But the main reason why minister and officials got on so well was their basic agreement on all large questions. They shared a common assumption that Britain was a world power. Naturally there were differences of approach and emphasis between minister and advisers as well as among advisers themselves, but on fundamentals they were one.

Foreign Office perceptions,

1945-1948

How did the Foreign Office view the world in 1945? Britain was seen as a world power in partnership with the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the conviction that Britain belonged by right to the ruling trinity incorporated a realistic appreciation of the war's economic legacy. At Potsdam in July 1945 Churchill described Britain as "the world's greatest debtor". The Foreign Office anticipated him by several months. In March 1945 it issued an economic balance sheet. 13 Effective postwar diplomacy, it was pointed out, would depend on economic power. Prewar diplomacy unsupported by adequate military strength had brought disaster. Postwar policy, while maintaining adequate military strength, had to be "commensurate with our economic power [ . . . ] if we enter into commitments which our economic strength will not bear we shall be exposed to another series of humiliations". Britain's enormous external debts would mean "an acute shortage of foreign exchange" and a "serious deficit on our balance of payments". The inevitable consequence would be a shift in influence from Britain to the United States. British interests, it was affirmed, had to be defended without forcing the United States to withdraw from international economic collaboration. " T h e essential task of diplomacy was to make it clear

11

12

13

Commonwealth Office', in: Zara Steiner (ed.), The Times survey of foreign ministries of the world, London 1982, pp. 5 4 2 - 7 2 . For Bevin's private criticism of staffing see the letter to Sargent of 13 May 1946 quoted in Bullock, op. cit., p. 4, note 2; for the progress of the Eden-Bevin reforms see the reports to the Parliamentary Labour Party foreign affairs group in PRO, FO 366/2743. For a sympathetic portrait of Bevin by his former private secretary, Sir Frank Roberts, see 'Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary', in: Ovendale, op. cit., pp. 2 1 - 4 2 ; also Nicholas Henderson, The private office, London 1984. 'The effect of our external financial position on our foreign policy', 30 March 1945, PRO, FO 371/45694.

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

13

that the United Kingdom can and will overcome difficulties otherwise other countries will say the lion is in his dotage and try to divide up his skin". On the credit side, Britain could boast high prestige, a high level of armaments and a manifestly dominating world position. The report concluded optimistically: "There are sound reasons for hoping that financial difficulties will be a temporary phenomenon, for this country possesses all the skill and resources required to recover a dominating place in the economic world". So much has been written about cold war origins that it is easy to forget that the Foreign Office of 1945 was a pre-cold war body. 14 Until late 1944 it was believed that the Soviet Union suffered from a traditional inferiority complex and wanted only security. Patience and goodwill were prescribed. Doubts about Soviet aims grew in 1945 but it was still assumed that wartime Big Three cooperation exercised through the United Nations would shape the postwar world. On the eve of Potsdam, in July 1945, the Foreign Office produced a comprehensive analysis of Britain's prospects. At Eden's request, Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, drew up 'Stocktaking after VE-day'. 15 Sargent did not sugar the pill. Britain, he said, was "numerically the weakest and geographically the smallest of the three Great Powers". The international situation was much less favourable than it had been in 1919. Anglo-French control of inter-war Europe had been replaced by control by the United States and the Soviet Union: "neither of them is likely to consider British interests if they interfere with their own [...] in the minds of our big partners, especially that of the United States, there is a feeling that Great Britain is now a secondary power and can be treated as such". Moreover, Britain faced two problems which had not existed in 1919 Soviet military occupation of much of eastern Europe, and the urgent need for European economic recovery. But Sargent did not suggest retreat or passivity. On the contrary, it was "essential to increase our strength". This was to be achieved in two ways: by encouraging "cooperation between the three World Powers", and by British leadership of the Dominions, France and smaller West European powers - "only so shall we be able in the long run to compel our two big partners to treat us as an equal". Sargent feared history repeating itself. Britain, he warned, might find itself in the same position as France between the wars. The United States, like Britain in the 1920s, might seek to mediate between Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain therefore must have a policy independent of the United States and the Soviet Union. Attack was the best form of defence. Britain should take the offensive in "challenging Communist penetration [...] in

14

15

See Graham Ross, 'Foreign Office attitudes to the Soviet Union, 1 9 4 1 - 4 5 ' , in: Journal of Contemporary History, 16/3,1981, pp. 5 2 1 - 4 0 ; and Graham Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British documents on Anglo-Soviet relations, 1941—45, Cambridge 1984. Rohan Butler and M . E . Pelly (eds), Documents on British policy overseas, Series 1, vol. 1, London 1984, N o . 102.

14

Anthony Adamthwaite

eastern Europe and in opposing any bid for control of Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey". In the Far East, Britain should organize "the lesser colonial powers [ . . . ] France, the Netherlands and Australia". Britain should champion "liberalism" against all forms of totalitarianism - "we must not hesitate to intervene diplomatically in the internal affairs of other countries if they are in danger of losing their liberal institutions". The Foreign Secretary, Eden, and the Permanent Under-Secretary, Cadogan, both minuted their wholehearted agreement. Realistic as these assessments were at the time, they were soon outdated by events. But the Foreign Office can hardly be blamed for failing to foresee the full extent of Britain's economic enfeeblement. After Potsdam, President Truman abruptly cut off Lend-Lease. J. M . Keynes warned the government that without substantial American aid Britain would be "virtually bankrupt". The American loan of December 1945 was soon gobbled up and Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the Prime Minister Clement Attlee "we shall be on the rocks in two years unless we can redress our balance of payments". 16 Britain floundered in a sea of troubles - the dollar drain, food and coal shortages, fears of Soviet expansion, civil war in Greece, rebellion in Palestine, withdrawal from India, the crippling cost of the British zone of occupation in Germany. Early in 1947 the Foreign Office updated Sargent's 1945 'Stocktaking' paper. Drafted in the middle of one of the worst winters on record, the document was as grim as the weather. 17 The hopes of three-power amity were now seen as illusory. There remained only the hope that "the disaster" of a new world war might be averted". Russian policy had become unambiguously isolationist [ . . . ] the balance of military strength, particularly in Europe, had altered to the advantage of the Soviet Union". In 1945, Sargent had envisaged Britain's economic recovery; by 1947, economic ills seemed incurable: "we have seldom been able to give sufficient economic backing to our policy; the present condition of the British zone in Germany is an obvious example of this, and the economic troubles of Greece are another". The main assumption of 1945, cooperation by the Big Three, had dissolved: " O n VE Day, it might have been possible, though it was already difficult to believe, that the Soviet Government intended to make a reality of three power collaboration. This is now no longer possible." The Soviet Union, though not determined on war, aimed at expansion and deployed all its efforts, especially the "fifth column", the world communist movement, " t o undermine British and American influence in all parts of the world". The atomic bomb was no deterrent. "Stalin may have some uneasy feelings about the atom

" 17

Quoted in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from power, vol.2, London 1981, p.21. PRO, FO 371/66546. Bevin's charwoman asked to be allowed to start work in the morning at 6 a. m. instead of 7 a. m., so that she could be away by 10 a. m. to get her place in the queue for food for her family, PRO, FO 800/279, Bevin to Inverchapel, 17 March 1947.

15

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

bomb, but he is probably confident that it would no be used against him as things now stand." Another 1945 principle - the necessity for an independent British foreign policy - was judged "still valid" but in the light of British weaknesses and Soviet threats " t o o great independence of the United States would be a dangerous luxury". In 1945 the chief hazard of US policy had seemed to be the risk either of a return to isolation or of mediation in Europe between Britain and the Soviet Union. By 1947 this danger was "apparently over [ . . . ] most Americans seem to feel now that the dangers of conflict between themselves and the Soviet Union are greater than between the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth". Yet American involvement had its risks - the Americans "are consciously or unconsciously tending to claim leadership". Nor could Britain afford to sit back: "the Americans are a mercurial people, unduly swayed by sentiment and prejudice". National character and domestic politics "might at any moment bring about a neutralisation of their influence in the world". In 1945 Sargent had urged British leadership of Western democratic states; in 1947 the objective held good but Britain could not play an active role in solving European economic problems because "we do not seem to have any economic resources available for political purposes". All that Britian could offer was the good example of a successful Labour government, "which should provide a useful pattern for Europe" in demonstrating a "workable alternative to Communism". Britain's only major initiative towards Western Europe between 1945 and 1947 was the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk in March 1947. 18 A variety of factors contributed to British inaction: Bevin's lingering hopes of Big Three cooperation, the desire to keep in step with the United States, inability to offer economic aid, distrust of the international communist movement in Western Europe, especially in France, preoccupation with Greece, India and the Middle East. Towards the Soviet Union Bevin in 1945 - 6 , unlike his officials, still nursed hopes of collaboration. In 1946 he turned a deaf ear to the Foreign Office Russia Committee's pleas for a counteroffensive against Soviet propaganda. 19 On Western Europe, the difficulty was to know what to do. A British-sponsored Western

18

For the Treaty of Dunkirk and Western Union see Sean Greenwood, 'Return to Dunkirk: the origins of the Anglo-French Treaty of M a r c h 1947', in: Journal

of Strategic

Studies,

4 / 6 , Dec.

1983, pp. 4 9 - 6 5 ; idem, 'Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union': August 1 9 4 5 - F e b r u a r y 1946', in: European

History

Quarterly,

1 4 / 3 , 1984, pp. 3 1 9 - 3 8 ; John Baylis, 'Britain and the Dunkirk

Treaty: the origins of N A T O ' , in: Journal

of Strategic

Studies,

5 / 2 , 1982, pp. 236 —47; idem,

'Britain, the Brussels Pact and the continental commitment', in: International

Affairs, 6 0 / 4 , 1984,

pp. 6 1 5 - 2 9 ; Geoffrey Warner, 'The Labour governments and the unity of Western Europe 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 ' , in: Ovendale (ed.), op. cit., pp. 6 1 - 8 2 . "

See Wayne Knight, 'Labourite Britain: America's sure friend?', in: Diplomatic 1983, p. 2 7 2 .

History,

7 / 4 , Fall

16

Anthony Adamthwaite

European bloc might provoke Moscow and destroy what little chance remained of working together. Yet the longer the delay in taking an initiative towards Western Europe, the less the chance of Britain becoming the great European power. In December 1946 it was decided to risk American displeasure and proceed with a French alliance. As Sargent explained: "If we make every move in the realm of high policy contingent on American prior approval, our prospects of being able to give a lead to western Europe will vanish and we shall never attain what must be our primary objective viz by close association with our neighbours to create a European group which will enable us to deal on a footing of equality with our two gigantic colleagues, the USA and the USSR". 20

From the summer of 1947 Britian abandoned caution and appeared ready to assume leadership in Western Europe. A rush of events - the Marshall Plan, the failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, the Prague coup of February 1948 and the Berlin blockade - all propelled Britain into Europe. Bevin's January 1948 call for Western Union was followed by the Brussels Treaty and the Council of Europe. Bevin even talked of a customs union and offered the vision of "Britain and France, supported by their colonies" developing "power and influence to equal that of the USA and the USSR". 2 1 The flirtation ended almost as suddenly as it began. Early in January 1949 at a meeting of senior Whitehall officials the decision was taken to give priority to the securing of " a special relationship with the USA and Canada [ . . . ] for in the last resort we cannot rely upon the European countries". 22 By the end of the year Britain had returned to the European sidelines and stayed there for the next decade.

The Permanent Under-Secretary's

Committee

How did the Foreign Office view the world in 1949? In February 1949 Bevin authorized the creation of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee, a similar body to George Kennan's State Department Policy Planning Staff, set up in 1947. Chaired by the Permanent Under-Secretary, the committee was composed of senior officials and a junior minister. Its brief was " t o consider longterm questions of foreign policy and to make recommendations". 23 In the spring 20

Quoted in Rothwel], op. cir., p. 435.

21

P R O , Cabinet Office Papers, series 129, v o l . 4 (CAB 1 2 9 / 2 4 ) , 8 J a n . 1948.

11

Sir Richard Clarke, Anglo-American

economic

collaboration

in war und peace,

1942-1949,

ed.

Sir Alec Cairncross, O x f o r d 1982, p. 208, doc. no. 27. 23

P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 7 6 3 8 4 . Kennan came to London in the summer of 1949 for discussions with British planners. For a brief reference to the Committee see Lord Strang, The diplomatic 1962, pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 ; Philip Darby, British defence p p . 1 7 , 141.

policy east of Suez, 1947-68,

career,

London

London 1973,

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

17

and summer of 1949 it produced a flurry of top secret papers, several of which quickly received Cabinet endorsement as official policy. A paper of March 1949, 'Third world power or Western consolidation', confirmed Anglo-American relations as the pivot of British policy: "in the face of implacable Soviet hostility and in view of our economic dependence on the United States [...] the immediate problem is to define the nature of our relationship with the United States."" Britain had the choice either of working for a third world power based on Europe and the Commonwealth, or of developing the union of the Atlantic area states "in a Western preponderance of power, which would of itself deter the Russians from attempting future expansion". The paper argued that a strong independent third world power could not be created. The Commonwealth was not "a geographical or strategic unity" and the United States had shown "a marked reluctance to deal with the Commonwealth either through the United Kingdom or as an appendage of Western Europe". The core of a third world power had to be Western Europe but a strong united Western Europe was judged impractical because of Soviet sympathizers and strong national traditions. Another obstacle was Germany: "to be really strong enough to maintain itself a western European third power must include a strong and probably united Germany; but in that case Germany must either attempt to dominate the union or to use its position to levy blackmail from Western Europe as the price of abstaining from co-operation with Russia." Moreover, continued the paper, "the eventual economic viability of Western Europe is still uncertain". Other arguments were marshalled against the third world power idea. As Soviet economic development went ahead it would be more difficult for a third power to stand alone. The impetus to economic cooperation had come from the United States and if assistance was withdrawn European cooperation might flag. Even if economic collaboration proved successful it was "far from clear that integration would confer any greater power of united resistance". The military prospects of a united Western Europe were even less favourable since "without disastrous interference with the recovery programme, we cannot prepare a defence programme independently of North America". The proof was NATO. The conclusion was that the two objectives of Western preponderance and a third world power "can, to some extent, be pursued concurrently. If however the two policies begin to diverge this country must [...] incline towards a western preponderance." Bevin read the paper on 27 March. "I agree with this analysis" was his comment. Anglo-American relations were assessed in a separate paper. 25 Relations rested on the assumption that the United Kingdom "is the principal partner and 24 25

PRO, FO 371/76384. 'Anglo-American relations: present and future', PRO, FO 371/76385.

18

Anthony Adamthwaite

ally on whom the United States of America can rely". Officials reasoned that if America concluded that this assumption was no longer justified then it might follow one of three courses: adopt Germany or France as the pivot of its action in Europe; retreat to isolation; seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union. " T h e United States may be dissuaded from such courses if the United Kingdom can show enough strength of national will and retain enough initiative to maintain her position as a leading world power, and, as such, influence United States policy". Sterling's difficulties might lead, it was pointed out, to the idea " o f a closer financial union between the United Kingdom and the United States". Should the United States seriously consider such a project desirable, the United Kingdom should not reject it " o u t of h a n d " . A review of "British policy towards Soviet C o m m u n i s m " confirmed that the cold war was now a fact of life. Britain's first objective should be to create a Western social, political and economic system capable of resisting the Soviet system. T h e aim should be to weaken the Soviet grip on the Eastern satellites " b e f o r e their peoples become so imbued with Soviet propaganda as to follow the lead of the Soviet government without d e m u r " . By 1949 the Foreign Office was counter-attacking vigorously. In 1946 Bevin had resisted calls for a propaganda campaign against the Soviet onslaught. In November 1947 he agreed to establish the Information Research Department to take charge of counter-propaganda. 2 6 T h e initiative came from Christopher Mayhew, Bevin's Parliamentary UnderSecretary, 1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . T h e Foreign Office Russia Committee created a cold war sub-committee which helped to organize the clandestine operation to overthrow the communist regime in Albania. Cold war strategy governed the views of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee on Germany. 2 7 Although a divided Germany was recognized as a potential threat to peace, the planners did not believe the West should take the initiative in seeking an agreement: "further progress towards a healthy and prosperous democracy under the German Federal Republic and action to weaken even more the Soviet Union are the courses most likely to result in an acceptable Russian proposal." Germany should remain disarmed but allowed an armed gendarmerie. However, the Germans were not to be trusted: "Despite their double defeat they probably still identify the German nation with Nietzsche's superman and with Hitler's master race. They are likely to examine every problem only in order to find a solution which serves the interests of Germany and [ . . . ] they are likely to regard the re-unification of Germany as a concession to be further exploited."

"

See Lyn Smith, 'Covert British propaganda: the Information Research Department, 1944—77', in: Millennium:

Journal

of International

Studies, 9 / 1 , 1980, pp. 6 7 - 8 3 ; Richard J. Fletcher, 'British

propaganda since World War II - a case study', in: Media, pp. 9 7 - 1 0 9 ; Nicholas Bethell, The great betrayal, 17

P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 7 6 3 8 6 , ' T h e future of Germany'.

Culture

London 1984.

and Society,

4 / 2 , 1982,

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

19

After Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East had the highest priority for British policy-makers. In 1946 sharp differences of opinion between the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Chiefs of Staff had arisen over the future of British interests in the Middle East. Attlee believed that parts of the Middle East were "deficit areas" which were not worth defending. Bevin, backed by his advisers, supported the Chiefs of Staff contention that Britain should maintain its presence. Sargent's advice in March 1946 was that retention of the Middle East was crucial to Britain's future as a "World Power". 2 8 In the Cabinet Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff won the battle. An April 1949 planning paper on the Middle East was not challenged when it went to the Cabinet: "In peace and war the Middle East is an area of cardinal importance [ . . . ] Strategically, the Middle East is a focal point of communications, a source of oil, a shield to Africa and the Indian Ocean, and an irreplaceable defensive base. Economically, it is, owing to oil and cotton, essential to UK recovery."

But American aid was a sine qua now. "In a major war the active partnership of the United States would be of supreme importance. In peace, economic development and refugee resettlement are impossible without large scale United States participation. Alignment of policy with the United States is accordingly essential." 2 '

The planning papers did not mean that there was a monolithic Foreign Office view about the problems. The bland prose could conceal sharp disagreements. For example, if Britain had to choose between the Unites States and Western Europe, Gladwyn Jebb, UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, believed that "quite a large body of opinion in the UK, irrespective of party, would be in favour of union with Europe rather than in favour of union with America". Hector McNeil, Minister of State, disagreed: " I have no doubt at all that the overwhelming majority would seek to combine further with the USA and Commonwealth. Anti-European feeling is a commonplace of British thought. Everyone had relatives in the USA and Canada. Most have no one in Europe, except the dead of two wars." 3 0

28

"

Quoted in Louis, op. cit., p. 31. P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 7 6 3 8 5 , 'The Middle East'. For the Committee's views on south-east Asia and the Far East see Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States and the cold war in south-east Asia, 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 5 0 ' , in: International

Affairs, 5 8 / 3 , Summer 1982, pp. 4 4 7 - 6 4 ; idem, 'Britain and the cold

war in Asia', in: Ovendale (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1 2 1 - 4 8 . 30

P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 7 6 3 8 3 , Jebb to Hoyer- Millar, 1st Oct. 1949; P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 7 6 3 8 3 , Hector MacNeil minute.

20

The evolution of Foreign Office

Anthony Adamthwaite

perceptions

What conclusions can be drawn about the evolution of Foreign Office perceptions of British power from 1945 to 1949? First and foremost, the perception of British status as a world power in 1945 was not a folie de grandeur but a statement of the obvious. Britain was manifestly a world power, possessing worldwide interests, military bases and substantial forces. As well as receiving the surrender of large German and Japanese forces Britain was one of the three peace-makers at Potsdam. William T. Fox, the originator of the term 'superpower', in 1944 had unhesitatingly described Britain as one of the three superpowers. But the diplomats were sharp-eyed. Not for a moment did they pretend that Britain was the equal of the two giants. Witness Cadogan's diary entry at Potsdam: "Big Three (or 1\) at 4." 3 1 In October 1945 Sargent likened Britain to "Lepidus in the triumvirate with Mark Antony and Augustus". 32 Uppermost, however, was a conviction that enfeeblement was temporary, not permanent. Full recovery as a great power would be a long uphill task but none the less a practical goal. By contrast, 1947-9 perceptions differed strikingly from those of 1945. Weaknesses seemingly provisional in 1945 were now judged permanent. Optimism about the long-term recovery of world power status for Britain was displaced by pessimistic appreciations of ebbing power. The postwar expansion of overseas publicity and information services reflected this awareness of diminished power and the need to convince the world that traditional prestige and skills could compensate for economic and military decline. The 1949 planners recognized that a bid for self-sufficiency, even with Commonwealth support, would mean " a sharp contraction of political influence and national prosperity". 33 Bevin's affirmations of great-power status were coupled with an acknowledgement that "the day when we, as Great Britain, can declare a policy independently of our allies, has gone". 34

31 32 33 34

Dilks (ed.), Cadogan, p. 775. Quoted in Ovendale, op. cit., p. 4. PRO, FO 371/76386, 'Anglo-American relations: present and future'. Bevin in the House of Commons, 28 March 1950, quoted in Christopher Mayhew, 'British foreign policy since 1945', in: International Affairs, 26/4, Oct. 1950, p. 478. In April 1946 Bevin told the Cabinet Defence Committee he wanted to preserve "our position as a great Power", quoted in Louis, op. cit., p. 31. He told the American ambassador in October 1949, "Great Britain could not accept integration in Western Europe on a scale which would impair its other responsibilities. She was [ . . . ] a world power [ . . . ] not merely a European power", Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. IV, Washington, DC 1975, pp. 436-7. For the Foreign Office and American opinion see Caroline Anstey, 'The projection of British socialism: Foreign Office publicity and American opinion, 1945-50', in: Journal of Contemporary History, 19/3, 1984, pp. 4 1 7 - 5 1 .

21

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

Planning machinery needed from 1945 The most significant feature of Foreign Office thinking was the absence, until 1949, of any machinery to monitor and coordinate views over the whole field of British policy. The Plowden Report concluded, "Some of the most intractable international issues in which we have been involved in the last two decades could [ . . . ] have been handled better if their implications had been explored more fully in advance". 35 The consensus of recent writing on the Attlee government's foreign policy is that against the odds the policy-makers performed well. But could they have done better? One of the most important decisions in British foreign policy was the decision not to involve Britain whole-heartedly in Europe. This decision pre-dated the creation of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee. Arguably the lack of effective planning in the crucial years 1945—8 had two momentous consequences: in the first place, the available options were not thoroughly explored, and, secondly, the Foreign Office lost an opportunity to become Whitehall ring-master, the chief centralizing and coordinating agency in foreign policy-making. Three factors help to explain why the Foreign Office failed to meet the challenge. They are, first, an ingrained resistance to the idea of planning; secondly, the pragmatism of Bevin and his advisers; thirdly, the effects of prolonged fatigue. Before the Second World War Halifax voiced the Office's deep aversion to planning: " I distrust anyone who foresees consequences and advocates remedies to avert them." 3 4 Despite a great deal of wartime planning through the Economic and Reconstruction Department, headed by Gladwyn Jebb, and the interdepartmental Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, the planning allergy reasserted itself at the end of the war. In June 1944 Sargent mooted the idea of a foreign policy statement to cover a two-year period and to be reviewed every six months. Cadogan threw cold water on the suggestion: " T h a t way lies Bedlam." 3 7 In December 1944 Sir Victor Wellesley, a former Permanent Under-Secretary, supported by Harold Nicolson, canvassed a scheme for an advisory council for planning and coordination. There was no response. Lord Mayhew recalled that when he was appointed a junior minister at the Foreign Office in 1946, "one of my first actions was to approach a certain very shrewd and experienced official to ask innocently for some document which would tell me just what the current foreign policy [ . . . ] was." He was told "not merely that no such document existed" but "that it was really rather doubtful whether we had a foreign policy

33

Report

of the committee

Plowden,

1962-63,

on representational

service overseas,

under

the chairmanship

London 1964, Cmd. 2276, p. 55.

36

Quoted in Anthony Sampson, Anatomy

37

P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 4 0 7 4 1 , 28 June 1944, minute.

of Britain, London 1962, p. 311.

of

Lord

22

Anthony Adamthwaite

in the proper sense at all". 3 8 The sole postwar innovation was the setting up in April 1946 of the Foreign Office Russia Committee to coordinate policy towards the Soviet Union. At the first meeting the chairman stressed "that it was a coordination meeting and not a policy meeting". 3 ' Planning was all the more necessary in peace time, because the sheer volume and complexity of postwar diplomacy swamped officials in paperwork. By 1949 the number of incoming papers at the Foreign Office had almost trebled since 1938. The Office had never had undivided responsibility for British foreign policy but the difficulties inherent in the process of formulating a coherent overseas policy were greatly accentuated by the interdepartmental and multilateral nature of the issues. Bevin explained to the Parliamentary Labour Party that on the economic front "every important step taken in the Foreign Office had to be co-ordinated with the Chancellor and the President of the Board of Trade". 4 0 His plan for a European customs union was defeated in November 1947 by the economics ministers. Frequent and lengthy absences abroad added to difficulties. In September 1946 Bevin admitted that "he had no minister in the F O " since his junior ministers had "arranged, independently of one another, and of him, to be in New York". 4 1 The pressures were soon felt in the Office. Sargent feared "we are in danger of being submerged by paper". Paul Gore-Booth reported "Exasperation amounting to demoralisation (and I mean it) at the obsoletism of the FO machine". 4 1 Everyone was frenetically busy. The urgent drove out the important. The UK delegation to the OEEC complained that home departments were "constantly" forgetting their existence and not sending on papers. 43 Efficiency suffered. " I have had to complain repeatedly of the dilatory practice of the Foreign Office" wrote Attlee after waiting four days for an answer to a request for information. 44 One official wistfully confided: " I long for the day when one of these importunate posts demanding instructions for a conference at 2 p.m. on the following day will get a reply: 'Your telegram 123. You will have to postpone your conference as we want to think before we send you instructions'." 45

38

Victor Wellesley, Diplomacy in fetters, London 1944; for Nicolson's support see PRO, FO 366/1497; also Mayhew, loc. cit., p. 477.

"

PRO, FO 371/56885, 2 April 1946. PRO, FO 800/492, 27 March 1946. Dalton diary, 10 Sept. 1946. PRO, FO 366/01986, Sargent minute, 14 June 1946; PRO, FO 366/1462, Gore- Booth minute, July 1945. The Economic Recovery Department replied, 24 Dec. 1948: "I am very sorry not to have answered earlier your letter of 1 November about Departments forgetting your interests. I am afraid the papers had to go round a large number of Departments and went aground in one of them", PRO, FO 371/71873. PRO, FO 800/463, Attlee to Bevin, 25 May 1947. PRO, FO 366/2901, 21 Feb. 1950.

40 41 42

43

44 45

23

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

The only consolation was that Whitehall was similarly afflicted. Professor James Meade of the Cabinet's Economic Section noted in his diary: "the coincidence of the end of the war with the beginning of the new Labour government has put a strain of work on the central Whitehall machine such as I cannot remember since I came to Whitehall in 1940." In November 1945 the situation was no better: "extreme pressure of work has made it very difficult to give them [issues] the attention which they deserve." 46 By 1949 the Cabinet was warned that "the increasing volume of international work was already in danger of imposing intolerable strains on the machinery of national government". 47 The ideas and issues were not thought out. In the autumn of 1948 Edward Bridges, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, asked senior Foreign Office officials " t o explain to him and other senior Whitehall officials the meaning and implications of the Western Union Policy, some parts of which were very obscure to them". 4 8 Alas, the Foreign Office mind was no clearer. The pragmatism of Bevin and his chief advisers ran counter to any notion of planning. When in 1946 a French official suggested a five-year plan for AngloFrench cooperation, Bevin told him: "We don't do things like that in our country." 4 9 Widespread criticism of Foreign Office elitism, especially from Labour backbenchers, 50 ensured that Bevin gave first priority to the implementation of the 1943 Foreign Service Act, liberalizing recruitment and creating for the first time a single unified foreign service. But the long-overdue reforms took several years to implement. Consequently the Office was distracted and on the defensive at a time when it might have exploited to advantage the fluidity in Whitehall as government settled down after the war. 'Moley' Sargent, Permanent UnderSecretary 1 9 4 6 - 9 , must share some responsibility for the lack of planning. In June 1944 he had tentatively talked of some postwar planning but by 1946 " h e did not believe in a Joint Planning Committee for the whole work of the Office". 51 By temperament and outlook he was deeply pessimistic, and, talking off the record, saw little future for Britain. 52 Bevin did "not think much" of him. 53

46

Meade diary, 26 Aug. and Nov. 1945, 1 / 4 .

47

P R O , CAB 1 2 8 / 1 5 , 21 Feb. 1949.

48

P R O , FO 3 7 1 / 7 1 7 6 8 , Kirkpatrick to Secretary of State, 5 O c t . 1948.

49

Hugh Dalton, High tide and after: memoirs

1945-1960,

London 1962, p. 157. F o r Foreign Office

difficulties in producing clear and coherent briefs on European economic integration see P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 7 1 7 6 8 , 'European Recovery General 1948'. 50

For Labour criticisms see Philip M . Williams (ed.), The diary of Hugh

Gaitskell,

1945—56,

Lon-

don 1983, pp. 1 1 - 1 6 . 51

P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 7 1 6 8 7 , Christopher Warner to Gladwyn Jebb, 2 2 Nov. 1 9 4 8 . 1 am grateful to M r R . Merrick for drawing may attention to this reference.

"

See Kenneth Young (ed.), The diaries of Sir Robert

Bruce Lockhart,

1980, for numerous examples of Sargent's postwar pessimism. 53

Dalton diary, 26 Aug. 1947.

vol. 2, 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 6 5 , London

24

Anthony Adamthwaite

Why, then, did Bevin set up the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee? Was it a belated conversion to planning? From the evidence available it looks as if the Committee's creation was part of Whitehall politics, a bid to ward off the defence chiefs who were demanding a reorganization of the Russia Committee and Foreign Office cold war activities. 54 The almost permanent state of overwork of ministers and officials was inimical to fresh thinking. A cumulative fatigue affected Whitehall. By the summer of 1945 Churchill and Eden were said to be so exhausted that "they could no longer look at the problems properly and read the papers about them. It had become mere improvisation." 55 The habit of continuous all-out work, developed during the war, continued after 1945. The American loan negotiations in the autumn of 1945 involved ministers and officials in London in meetings from 9 p. m. till midnight virtually every weekday evening from mid-September to mid-December. By August 1947 Dalton admitted, "We are, indeed, all very tired". 56 Sir William Strang, Sargent's successor as Permanent Under-Secretary, watched the effect of prolonged fatigue on his own performance: " t h e mind revolted against the reading of discourses and articles that had no immediate bearing on day-to-day problems. T h e next resistance erected would be against aimless discussions at large about foreign affairs [ . . . ] the mind was attempting to shed all but the inescapable task of dealing with essential interviews o r with the flow of p a p e r s " . 5 7

Conclusion To conclude: the postwar transformation of international politics and the expanded scope of government demanded new initiatives. Biennial stock-taking was not sufficient. The Foreign Office was flawed not by its perceptions but by the want of a planning staff to clarify perceptions, analyse present and future situations and produce recommendations for action. Such a staff might well have enabled the Office to hold its own against all comers, including the economic ministers who in 1947 defeated Bevin over a European customs union. The Russia Committee was no think-tank and by late 1948 there was considerable dissatisfaction with its functioning. 58 The Permanent Under-Secretary's

See PRO, FO 371/77616; also Barker, op. cit., p. 177. John Harvey (ed.), The war diaries of Oliver Harvey, London 1978, p. 385. " Dalton, op. cit., p. 260. 57 Strang, Home and abroad, p. 280. 58 PRO, FO 371/71687, Christopher Warner to Gladwyn Jebb, 22 Nov. 1948 "I have for some time wondered whether it is not a mistake for the Russia Committee to spend the bulk of its time looking through a long draft Intelligence Summary in great detail [ . . . ] . I personally - and I believe 54 55

Britain: the View from the Foreign Office

25

Committee came too late in the day to redress the balance in the Office's favour. Planning was no panacea but since Britain had so few cards in her hand it was essential to play them with the utmost skill and deliberation. Bevin's "edgerows of experience" were not enough. Equally important was the imaginative capacity to think on a long-term basis.

others too - do not feel it is worth my spending an hour and a half discussing the draft of the Intelligence Summary. Do you not think it would be much more valuable to revert to something like the original idea, making a great effort to get all the Under-Secretaries that matter to come or to send adequate substitutes if they cannot."

26

Anthony Adamthwaite

Zusammenfassung Wenn nach 1945 in der britischen Öffentlichkeit, in der Presse, in politischen Kreisen die Frage auftauchte, wie es kommen konnte, daß Großbritannien aus dem Kreis der „Großen Drei" zu einer bloßen europäischen Regionalmacht abgestiegen sei, dann wurde regelmäßig das Foreign Office zum Sündenbock erklärt. Man warf ihm vor, Vorstellungen vergangener Größe konserviert und darüber vergessen zu haben, jene notwendigen Anpassungen an die neue Rolle einer zweitrangigen Macht vorzunehmen, die schmerzliche Rückzugsmanöver in den 50er und 60er Jahren unnötig gemacht hätten. Neuere Forschungen haben zu positiveren Bewertungen der Außenpolitik der Labour-Regierung von 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 1 geführt, jedoch wurde bisher über die Haltung und die Planungen des Foreign Office wenig bekannt. Die vorstehende Studie geht der Frage nach, wie im Foreign Office in den Jahren 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9 „britische M a c h t " definiert wurde, und wie angemessen das Ministerium auf die internationalen Veränderungen reagiert hat. Es ergeben sich die Befunde, daß die Annahme einer fortdauernden britischen Weltmachtstellung damals keineswegs Größenwahn entsprang, sondern augenscheinlich der Realität entsprach; daß Großbritannien zunächst eindeutig immer noch eine Weltmacht mit globalen Interessen, Stützpunkten und Ressourcen darstellte; daß seine Diplomaten sich zwar sehr wohl im klaren darüber waren, daß ihr Land mit den beiden neuen Supermächten nicht auf derselben Stufe stand, daß jedoch die Überzeugung verbreitet war, daß das Zurückfallen Englands vorübergehender, nicht dauerhafter Natur sei. Erst zwischen 1947 und 1949 begann sich allgemein die Einsicht durchzusetzen, daß man es mit substantiellen britischen Schwächen zu tun hatte. 1949 wurde eine außenpolitische Planungsgruppe, der sogenannte Staatssekretärs-Ausschuß (Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee) gebildet, der zu der Auffassung kam, daß Großbritannien unabhängige Außenpolitik nicht mehr führen könne. Jüngere Arbeiten über die Außenpolitik der Regierung Attlee kommen übereinstimmend zu dem Ergebnis, daß trotz widriger Umstände solide Arbeit geleistet worden ist. Die vorliegende Studie gelangt zu der Ansicht, daß in den Jahren 1945 bis 1949 mehr hätte erreicht werden können, wenn schon zu dieser Zeit ein effizienter außenpolitischer Planungsapparat existiert hätte. Das Fehlen eines solchen Apparats bis 1949 bewirkte, daß die möglichen Optionen nicht gründlich genug ausgelotet wurden. Außerdem verpaßte das Foreign Office in dieser Zeit die Chance, auf lange Sicht die wirkliche Leistungs- und Koordinierungszentrale der britischen Außenpolitik zu werden.

Britain and Europe in 1948: the View from the Cabinet* by Geoffrey Warner

Anyone who seeks to analyse the perceptions of the British Cabinet with regard to Europe in 1948 faces two major problems. The first concerns the nature of the documentation. Although the Cabinet minutes are, with very few exceptions, open to inspection, they are in many respects a disappointing source. As one former Cabinet minister has written, they "give no indication of the order in which the points were made: they are always marshalled pro and con. There is no way of telling who spoke or even how many Ministers spoke. Not all the points made in argument are recorded. No indication is given of the tone or temper of the debate." 1 The position is somewhat better in respect of Cabinet committees or ad hoc meetings of ministers, for in these cases the views ot individual ministers are often spelled out in more detail. There is still, however, a marked tendency to reduce everything to the level of a bland consensus, which is perhaps not surprising in a governmental system which places considerable emphasis upon collective responsibility. For some periods the existence of private diaries kept by Cabinet ministers or civil servants permits the historian to pierce the shell of anonymous harmony built up by the minutes and to discover something of the real cut-and-thrust of debate and decision-making, but for 1948 only one such document is available - the diary of Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster - and then only for the second half of the year.2 The second problem concerns the specific power structure of the Attlee government as it affected the formulation of foreign policy. This has been well

* This paper is based largely upon Crown Copyright Records deposited at the Public Record Office, Kew, London. They are quoted by kind permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1 Patrick Gordon Walker, The Cabinet, 2nd ed., London 1972, p. 51. 2 This is deposited at the British Library of Political and Economic Science (the L. S. E.) in London. Dalton had been Chancellor of the Exchequer between July 1945 and November 1947, when he was forced to resign as a result of a Budget "leak".

28

Geoffrey Warner

described by Peter Hennessy and Andrew Arends in their excellent analysis of that government's Cabinet committee structure. "There was [ . . . ] no foreign affairs committee", they write. "Recent administrations have all had one. Foreign affairs and defence are taken together, for example, in Mrs. Thatcher's Oversea and Defence Committee. The absence of a foreign affairs group in 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 is very striking. In effect, Attlee and Bevin did the job themselves as a two-man committee who consulted the full Cabinet when they thought it necessary [ . . . ] So dominant was their partnership that they could dispense with collective arrangements for foreign policy-making beneath the level of full Cabinet without challenge from their colleagues." Moreover, the authors go on to argue, Bevin was very much the senior partner of the two. "Attlee ceded a great deal of power to Bevin on the foreign side", they maintain. " N o other Prime Minister has felt it wise to defer so fully to his Foreign Secretary." 3 If Bevin's views dominate this paper, therefore, it is not only because the archives, and in particular the bulging files of the Foreign Office itself, inevitably skew investigation in this direction, but also because the Foreign Secretary was unquestionably the principal architect of British foreign policy during this critical year.

Overshadowing and colouring every aspect of the British government's view of Europe in 1948 was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Relations between Britain and Russia had been deteriorating since the end of the war, but as the Defence Minister, Α. V. Alexander, told the House of Commons in November 1948, "Up to the period ending December, 1947, there was always a hope that we could come to a perhaps fairly speedy understanding in matters which were outstanding." 4 Such hopes were brought to an end by the failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in November-December 1947 and from then on the Soviet Union was treated, both publicly and privately, as a more or less implacable foe. "Soviet Communism", the Prime Minister told the nation in a broadcast on 3 January 1948, "pursues a policy of imperialism in a new form - ideological, economic, and strategic - which threatens the welfare and way of life of the other nations of Europe." 5 " T h e Soviet Government", wrote Bevin in a Cabinet paper of 3 March appropriately entitled 'The Threat to Western Civilisation', "is actively preparing to extend its hold over the remaining part of continental Europe and, subsequently, over the Middle East and no 3

Peter Hennessy and Andrew Arends, Mr Attlee's and the Labour

Government

1945-1951,

Engine

Room.

Cabinet

Committee

Structure

Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics, N o . 26,

Glasgow 1983, pp. 1 1 - 1 2 . 4

Parliamentary

Debates,

House

458/2011). 5

The Times,

5 Jan. 1948, p. 4.

of Commons,

5th series, v o l . 4 5 8 , c o l . 2 0 1 1 (HC Deb., 5th,

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

29

doubt the bulk of the Far East as well. In other words, physical control of the Eurasian land mass and eventual control of the whole World Island is what the Politburo is aiming at - no less a thing than that." 6 At the same time, it was not felt that the Russians wanted a war. "It seems unlikely that the Soviet Union is making plans to start a war with Great Britain or the United States", Bevin wrote in another Cabinet paper on 5 January 1948. "This is principally for two reasons. First, the Russians seem to be fairly confident of getting the fruits of war without going to war [ . . . ] Secondly, they probably realise that for the present at any rate their long-term chances in a war against the West are not good and the best result they could hope for would be mutual destruction." 7 Nevertheless, there was always the chance of a miscalculation. " I agree with you that Russia does not intend war and is not able to make it," one Cabinet Minister wrote to a Member of Parliament, "but, like all governments which rely on armed force to extend their control, they are liable to stumble into war, or into the danger of it". 8 This letter was written at a time when the Berlin blockade gave added point to the remark. In fact, less than a week earlier the Chiefs-of-Staff had pressed Attlee, Bevin and Alexander for a decision on whether the risk of war should be run over Berlin. The three Ministers felt that it was "premature" to take such a decision. In any case, the British government could not take it alone. However, they also thought that "it would be prudent to plan on the assumption that there might be a war, as it was thought that we could not withdraw from Berlin without making the most strenuous efforts to stay there. Depending on the Russian reactions, these efforts might themselves lead to war." 9 The reason why it was so important to remain in Berlin had been spelled out to senior colleagues by Bevin on 24 June, the day on which the total blockade began. "This, he believed, was an issue of will. If we now showed signs of weakness, we were in danger of being forced out of Europe. If we took a strong line, he believed that the Russians would in the end come to terms." 1 0 Open warfare was not however thought to be the principal danger. This lay in what were described as " 'cold war' methods". 1 1 One of the fullest expositions < Public Record Office (PRO), Cabinet Office Papers, series 129, vol.25, Part II (CAB 129/25 II), Cabinet Paper (CP) 48/72, 3 March 1948. 7 PRO, CAB 129/23, CP 48/7, 5 Jan. 1948. 8 Noel-Baker letter, 14July 1948, Churchill College (Cambridge), Noel-Baker Papers. Noel-Baker was Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations at this time. ' PRO, Ministry of Defence Records (DEFE) 4/14, Chiefs-of-Staff Committee (C.O.S.) (48), 96th Meeting, 9 July 1948. 10

11

PRO, CAB 130/38, GEN 240/lst Meeting, 24June 1948. Later in the year, in the House of Commons, Bevin made the inevitable reference to Munich. "I felt that when the blockade was put on", he said, "that a great choice had to be made. We made it. It was either to stand firm there or turn south and go to another Munich." (HC Deb., 5th, 456/910). PRO, CAB 129/23, CP 48/7, 5 Jan. 1948.

30

Geoffrey Warner

of these methods was given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, in the House of Commons on 1 November 1948: " T h e cold w a r is not by any means restricted to p r o p a g a n d a [ . . . ] but it is carried right into the e c o n o m i c life of all the democratic countries by the local agents and allies of the C o m i n f o r m . Encouragement is given to every kind of activity which is likely to militate against recovery o r to help break d o w n the national economy. Strikes, the a d v o c a c y o f uneconomic policies, the stirring up of every discontent produced by the unavoidable shortages and privations, and the attack upon any kind of arrangements which might protect the d e m o c r a t i c countries in case of aggression from without or within are pressed, accompanied by a completely false a c c o u n t of the Soviet Government's activities and policies. All these p o l i c i e s . . . are followed uniformly by the C o m i n f o r m agents in every country which is still free from Communist domination, in the hope that by e c o n o m i c disintegration they may be o v e r c o m e . " 1 1

These were the tactics which were employed, for example, in the great French strike waves of November 1947 and October 1948. Where the Communists could go further, of course they did so and the lessons of the Czech coup of February 1948 were taken very much to heart. " T h e Communist technique was everywhere the same", Bevin told the U.S. Ambassador on 26February. "It was based upon establishing armed cells in factories and making armies impotent to act. Therefore when armed workmen were called out the democratic forces collapsed". 13 After the collapse of Czech democracy, Bevin felt that the next Communist pressure point would be Italy, which he told the Cabinet on 5 March 1948 "was at present the weakest link in the chain of non-Communist States." 1 4 Italy was due to hold crucial elections in April and the British Foreign Secretary feared the worst. On 15 March he asked his Italian counterpart, Count Sforza, "whether if the Communists started trouble in factories as they had done in Czechoslovakia, the Italian Government were ready to meet the situation." Sforza replied that they were. Bevin then went on to urge "that it was most important in the event of an attempted coup that the legitimate Government of Italy should not in any circumstances resign. They must stand fast and so enable Great Britain, the United States and the outside world to come to their assistance." 15 The Foreign Secretary also sought to influence the outcome of the Itaian elections in other ways, for example by despatching Labour Party officials to Italy to make clear the party's support for Signore Guiseppe Saragat's breakaway Socialists as opposed to Pietro Nenni's official Socialists, who were fighting the election in

12 13

14 15

HC Deb., 5th, 4 5 7 / 5 2 5 - 5 2 6 . Bevin memo., 26Feb. 1948, PRO, Foreign Office Papers, series 800, file 465 (FO 800/465) (Bevin Papers). PRO, CAB 128/12, Cabinet Minutes (C.M.) (48), 19th Conclusions, 5March 1948. Bevin telegram, 15 March 1948, PRO, FO 800/465.

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

31

alliance with the Communists. 16 This was all the more important as the Labour M.P.s, to the fury of the government, had sent a telegram of support to Nenni. Bevin regarded the outcome of the Italian elections, which gave the Christian Democrats under Alcide de Gasperi an absolute majority in the lower house, with considerable satisfaction. 17 The government's long-term response to the Soviet threat was to set up what became known as "Western Union". " I t is not enough to reinforce the physical barriers with still guard our Western civilisation", Bevin wrote in a Cabinet paper on 4 January 1948. "We must also organise and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent in this Western civilisation of which we are the chief protagonists. This in my view can only be done by creating some form of union in Western Europe, whether of a formal or informal character, backed by the Americas and the Dominions." 1 8 This was the policy which he unveiled to the world at large in his famous speech in the House of Commons on 22 January 1948. 19 "Western Union" was to begin with France and the Benelux countries, and under the impact of the Czech coup it was not long before a five-power multilateral treaty of mutual assistance was signed in Brussels on 17March 1948. But as his Principal Private Secretary explained, Bevin's "general conception is that under the umbrella of the new 5-Power treaty [ . . . ] we should work out a much wider scheme for the general coordination and defence of the whole world outside the Soviet orbit. What we should in fact be aiming at is a U.N.O. as it should have been had the Soviets cooperated." 2 0 American support was absolutely essential if this enterprise were to succeed. On the economic side, Cripps spelled out the grim consequences for the British economy if the country were to receive no Marshall Aid: a cut in the daily calorific intake of the average Briton to ten per cent below the pre-war level and "extreme industrial dislocation, involving unemployment of perhaps as much as l j million, possibly more at first." U. S. aid was also vital to the rest of western Europe. It was, wrote Cripps on 9 October 1948, "the foundation of the possibility of European recovery and so of the survival of European democracy". 2 1 American military power was equally important. " N o Western European system can be solidly established and defended", Attlee cabled the Australian Prime

The Labour Party emissaries were the General Secretary, Mr. Morgan Phillips, and the head of the party's International Department, Mr. Denis Healey. 17 British aide-memoire, 30 April 1948, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. IV, Washington 1974, p. 843. 18 PRO, CAB 129/23, CP 48/6. " HC Deb., 5th, 4 4 6 / 3 8 3 - 4 0 9 . 20 Roberts minute, 5 March 1948, PRO, FO 800/460. 21 PRO, CAB 129/28, CP 48/161, 23 June 1948; Cripps memo., 9 Oct. 1948, PRO Treasury Papers, series 235, file 4 (T 235/4). 16

32

Geoffrey Warner

Minister on 2 February 1948, "without American military backing in the last resort, as the last two wars have demonstrated." " T h e United Kingdom", Bevin told the Cabinet's Defence Committee on 27 July 1948, "could not contemplate embarking single-handed on a war against the Soviet Union. It was therefore essential that all concerned, and particularly the United States, should realise that such a war would be primarily a United States undertaking and that the role of the United Kingdom would be bound to be subsidiary." 2 2 "What worried British Ministers on the military side was a repeat performance of World Wars I and II, when the Americans had not come in until three and two years respectively after the conflict had started. If there were a war, Bevin told the Chiefs-of-Staff on 4 February 1948, "America must be prepared to come in at once. He intended to make it clear to the Americans that we could not act as a mercenary army or defensive outpost for them." The Prime Minister made the same point just over three months later, on 8 May. "We could not proceed on the basis that, in a future war, we would hold the fort until the United States came in", he told Bevin, Alexander and Field-Marshal Montgomery, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 23 The reasoning behind this view was set out for the benefit of the full Cabinet by Bevin on 2 November 1948: " I t must be borne in mind that, although the European Powers must necessarily hold the front in case of aggression, it was not possible for Great Britain to repeat the role that she had played in 1914 and 1940. In 1914 she had, together with her allies, helped to hold the front, and in 1940 she had stood alone. But with modern air forces and weapons there was a strong possibility that Great Britain might be immobilised by air and projectile attack. For these reasons it was essential that everybody should be brought into the war at the same moment. T h e security of Western Europe required a regional pact which committed the trans-Atlantic as well as the continental Powers." 2 4

At the outset Bevin had envisaged three related but separate security systems. The first was the Brussels Treaty with U.S. backing. The second was an Atlantic security system with even closer U.S. involvement, and the third was a Mediterranean system which would particularly affect Italy. As it became clear, however, that if the Americans were going to commit themselves at all - and this was by no means certain for some time — they would prefer one all-embracing system, Bevin rallied to it. 25 So did the Cabinet, which was not informed of the progress of the negotiations until November 1948, some eight months after they had begun. Some anxiety was expressed concerning the inclusion of autho" " 24

"

Attlee telegram, 2Feb. 1948, P R O , Prime Minister's Office Papers, series 8, file 787 ( P R E M 8/787); C A B 131/5, Cabinet's Defence Committee ( D . O . ) (48), 13th Meeting, 27July 1948. P R O , D E F E 4/10, C . O . S . (48), 18th Meeting, 4 Feb. 1948. 2 N o v . 1948, P R O , C A B 129/30, CP 48/249. Bevin telegram, 1 0 M a r c h 1948, P R O , P R E M C A B 129/30, CP 48/249, 2 N o v . 1948.

8/788; Bevin minute, 6April

1948, ibid.;

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

33

ritarian Portugal in an alliance which was intended to defend democracy, but it was pointed out in reply that "there were powerful strategic grounds for including Portugal" (i. e. the control of the Azores) and, in any case, the Portuguese regime was less obnoxious than that of Spain. All, however, were united in their opposition to Italy's inclusion. As Bevin had explained in his paper to the Cabinet, the Military Committee of the Brussels Treaty Organisation had concluded that the shortage of military supplies and the limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty would make Italy a military liability rather than an asset at the moment. Its inclusion would also necessitate provision for other Mediterranean countries, especially Greece and Turkey. Finally, Bevin noted, there was a strong current of public opinion in Italy in favour of neutrality and any Italian government which acceded to the proposed alliance would undoubtedly feel obliged to try to appease it by securing special concessions." Nevertheless, in the face of American, and more particularly French insistence, Britain eventually gave way and Italy became a founder member of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. There seems to have been little trace in the Labour Cabinet of 1948 of those anxieties concerning American trigger-happiness towards the Russians which became so widespread during 1950-51 at the time of the Korean War. One exception was a curious approach from Cripps to Bevin in March 1948 concerning information he had received from an American businessman to the effect the U. S. military wanted to fight a war now while they still possessed the monopoly of the atomic bomb and that the President was prepared to go along with them in order to secure re-election on an anti-Soviet ticket in the November elections. Sending the information to Bevin, Cripps wrote in a covering letter that he felt that the underlying argument was "too good to be ignored and [...] fits in with the general rise in temperature in the international field." The British always had to remember, Cripps went on, "that the Americans - as you know only too well - cannot look at these things calmly as we do. They always get hysterical and emotional". He agreed with his informant's suggestion that the British government should indicate "that we will not be parties to any aggressive war against Russia". The Foreign Secretary was unmoved. As he wrote back to Cripps: "Of course I know that a lot of hot air is talked in America about the Soviet Union and even by people in relatively high places w h o should know better. But I simply do not believe that the President, the Secretary of State or the responsible military leaders have any intention of starting an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. Indeed, I do not see how anybody in his senses could have such a policy, having regard to the facts that the American Army is now reduced to a mere handful of effective divisions, and it would take quite a long time (a) to reintroduce conscription; and (b) to rebuild the American Armed Forces to a level adequate merely for

" PRO, CAB 128/13, C . M . (48), 68th Conclusions, 4 N o v . 1948.

34

Geoffrey Warner

defence if and when conscription has been reintroduced. The atom bomb and the American Navy are we hope effective deterrents against Russian aggression, but I hardly think that a responsible statesman with great military experience such as Mr. Marshall would rely on them exclusively to launch an aggressive war on Russia, having in mind the fate which befell Napoleon and Hitler and other invaders of Russia."

If anyone should be warned against the dangers of aggression, Bevin told the Chancellor, it should be Russia, not America. 27 And when the Foreign Secretary informed the Prime Minister - who had been apprised of the above exchange - of the outcome of the initial round of talks in Washington on the formation of an Atlantic pact, he noted, " I f there are people in America [ . . . ] who desire to have a war with the Soviet Union quickly [ . . . ] they must it seems be sought elsewhere than in the Pentagon building". 28 Although American support, both economic and military, was regarded as essential to the success of "Western Union", this does not mean that Bevin's European policy, and particularly the Brussels Treaty, should be regarded as nothing more than bait to entice the United States into a commitment to defend western Europe, as " a sprat to catch the mackerel", as he himself was once supposed to have said. 2 ' Indeed, it was explicitly stated in the Cabinet on 5 March 1948 that while "we should use United States aid to gain time [ . . . ] our ultimate aim should be to attain a position in which the countries of Western Europe could be independent both of the United States and of the Soviet Union". 3 0 Although this remark cannot be attributed specifically to Bevin, the sentiments it contained certainly seem to underlie much of his thinking. In order to appreciate this, one must first of all look at the ideological context. Both Bevin and his colleagues believed that the Labour government represented a unique "middle way" between Soviet communism and American capitalism. As Attlee put it in a broadcast on 3 January 1948, "Great Britain, like the other countries of western Europe, is placed geographically and from the point of view of economic and political theory between these two great continental States [i.e. the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union]. That is not to say that our ideas are in any sense 'watered-down capitalism' or 'watered-down communism'; nor that they constitute a temporary halting-place on a journey from one creed to the other. Ours is a philosophy in its own right." 3 1 This, in Bevin's view, put Britain in a special position. "It is for us, as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government, and not the Americans", he wrote in a Cabinet paper on 4 January, " t o give the lead in spiritual, moral and political sphere to all the 27

Cripps letter, 2 4 M a r c h 1948, P R O , F O 8 0 0 / 5 1 5 ; Bevin minute, 2 5 M a r c h 1948, ibid.

28

Bevin minute, 6 April 1948, P R O , P R E M 8 / 7 8 8 .

19

Quoted in Avi Shlaim et al., British Foreign

30

P R O , C A B 1 2 8 / 1 4 , C . M . (48), 19th Conclusions, Confidential Annex, 5 M a r c h 1948.

31

The Times,

5 J a n . 1948, p. 4.

Secretaries

since 1945, N e w t o n Abbot 1977, p. 4 8 .

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

35

democratic elements in Western Europe which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, planning and social justice - what one might call 'The Third Force'". 3 2 Western Europe by itself, of course, did not have the economic strength to rival the United States or the Soviet Union, but Bevin thought that if the European colonial powers, and particularly Britain and France, pooled their African resources, it would be a different matter. Indeed, this idea was something of an obsession with him. "With their populations of forty-seven million and forty million respectively and with their vast colonial possessions", he told the French Prime Minister, M . Ramadier, on 22 September 1947, "they could, if they acted together, be as powerful as either the Soviet Union or the United States." 33 In a conversation with the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, some three months later, Bevin "drew attention to the great resources of Western Europe both in Europe and their African Colonies. If properly developed these resources amounted to more than either the Soviet Union or the United States could muster, and should enable Western European Powers to be independent of either". 34 This notion was not simply designed for French consumption. "It would be necessary to mobilise the forces of Africa in support of any Western European Union", Bevin told the Cabinet on 8 January 1948: "and, if some such union could be created, including not only the countries of Western Europe but also their colonial possessions in Africa and the East, this would form a bloc which, both in population and productive capacity, could stand on an equality with the western hemisphere and Soviet blocs."35 He was still harping on the same theme in October. " I f we only pushed on and developed Africa," he told Hugh Dalton on the 15th, "we could have [the] U. S. dependent on us, and eating out of our hand, in four or five years." 36 If, in view of Bevin's reputation as an inveterate "Atlanticist" and "antiEuropean", these ideas come as something of a surprise, it may be even more of a shock to learn just how far the Foreign Secretary was prepared to go in the direction of European integration. In the first place, he was, at the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948, undoubtedly in favour of a European customs union. It was necessary, he told a group of his officials on 27 September 1947, " t o attempt to organise the Western States into a coherent unity. The Marshall Plan offered an opportunity of making the first step in this direction by endeavouring to form a customs union. France and Italy were already considering such a union and he was anxious to explore the possibility of an Anglo-French economic

32 33

4Jan. 1948, PRO, CAB 129/23, CP 48/8. Unsigned memo., 22Sept. 1947, PRO, FO 371/67673/Z8461/G.

Dixon memo., 29Nov. 1947, PRO, FO 800/465. PRO, CAB 128/12 II, C . M . (48), 2nd Conclusions, 8 Jan. 1948. " Dalton Diary, 15 Oct. 1948.

34 35

36

Geoffrey Warner

association as soon as possible". 37 Here, however, he ran into strong opposition from the economic departments and their Ministers. Having secured Cabinet approval for a customs union study group, he expressed disappointment at its cautious conclusions when they were presented to the Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee on 7 November 1947. "It was essential", he said, "that Western Europe should attain some measure of economic unity if it was to maintain its independence as against Russia and the United States." But Harold Wilson, the President of the Board of Trade, retorted that the British "should aim at diverting the discussions [...] away from the theoretical conception of a Customs Union (which could not in any event be achieved for many years and could make no positive contribution to the solution of existing difficulties) towards the achievement of a closer economic integration of Western Europe by more practical and immediate means". The Minister for Economic Affairs, Sir Stafford Cripps, agreed. "A Customs Union", he said, "was only one of the ways in which the economic integration of Western Europe could be attained". Hugh Dalton, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, added "that, in pursuing the aim of closer economic cooperation in Western Europe, it must not be forgotten that our first care must be to maintain close economic ties with those countries which were able to supply our needs", by which he no doubt meant the United States and the Commonwealth. 3 8 Faced with this united front, Bevin had little option but to abandon his plan for a customs union in favour of the much looser conception represented by the continuing organisation for the administration and distribution of Marshall Aid, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. 3 9 At the same time, he continued to favour the closest possible financial integration among the five Brussels Treaty powers. After a Cabinet meeting on 27 February 1948, he spoke to Cripps, who had replaced Dalton as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and urged upon him "the necessity of taking steps to prevent the various potential partners in Western Union [...] from following completely different economic policies". H e believed "that we must arrive at some basic economic conception and in his view the best machinery would be a Western Union economic bank, the backing for which would be the Fort Knox gold". 4 0 On 17 April, however, he was telling the French President, Vincent Auriol, "that he believed in the possibility of a Western Union bank and currency and of other economic arrangements designed to make the group more independent of the United States". 41 37

Hogg minute, 27Sept. 1947, PRO, FO371/67673/Z8579/G. PRO, PREM 8/1146, Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee (E.P.C.) (47), 6th Meeting, 7Nov. 1947. 3 ' PRO, CAB 129/25, CP48/75, 6 March 1948; Makins minute, 23 March 1948, FO 371/71766/ UR641/G. 40 Roberts minute, 27Feb. 1948, PRO, FO 371/71766/UR603. 41 Harvey memo., 17April 1948, PRO, FO 371/73057/Z3412/G. 38

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

37

Another area in which Bevin pressed for closer integration was that of social services. " H e thought we should aim as time went o n " , he told the other Brussels Treaty Foreign Ministers on 17 March 1948, " a t harmonising and developing our respective social services, since real social and economic security was the best antidote to communism". 4 2 A precondition of all Bevin's plans, however, was that they should be implemented pragmatically, through a careful process of inter-governmental negotiation. He had no patience with the protagonists of European federalism, whose grandiose schemes involving written constitutions and parliamentary assemblies he regarded at best as an irrelevance and at worst as a positive hindrance to the realisation of European unity. " I t is easy enough", he remarked scathingly to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, " t o draw up a blueprint for a united Western Europe and to construct neat-looking plans on paper. While I do not wish to discourage the work done by voluntary political organisations in advocating ambitious schemes of European unity, I must say that it is a much slower and harder job to carry out a practical programme which takes into account the realities which face us, and I am afraid that it will have to be done a step at a time". 4 3 " I feel that the intricacies of Western Europe are such", he told the same audience on 15 September 1948, "that we had better proceed [ . . . ] on the same principle of association of nations that we have in the Commonwealth [ . . . ] I think that adopting the principle of an unwritten constitution, and the process of constant association step by step, by treaty and agreement and by taking on certain things collectively instead of by ourselves, is the right way to approach this Western Union problem. When we have settled the matter of defence, economic co-operation and the necessary political developments which must follow, it may be possible, and I think it will be, to establish among us some kind of assembly to deal with the practical things we have accomplished as Governments, but I do not think it will work if we try to put the roof on before we have built the building." 44 When the French Foreign Minister, M . Bidault, put forward his proposal for the setting up of a European Assembly at the meeting of the Brussels Treaty Powers in July 1948, Bevin replied "that whilst I agreed in principle with M . Bidault's ultimate aims I felt that the problem required further thought in view of the danger that any such Assembly might be used by the Communists and Fellow-Travellers to defeat those very purposes for which we were working". 4 5

42

45 44 45

Unsigned memo., 17March 1948, PRO, FO 3 7 1 / 7 3 0 5 4 / Z 2 5 5 7 / G . Bevin in fact arranged for an official committee to report to the Cabinet on the question of harmonising Western Europe's social services. HC Deb., 5th, 446/395. Ibid., 456/106. Bevin telegram, 20July 1948, PRO, FO 3 7 1 / 7 3 0 6 0 / Z 5 9 9 5 / G .

38

Geoffrey Warner

"The Brussels Treaty", he told another French Minister, M. Ramacher, on 26 September 1948, "had set the course to be followed in a number of practical fields and I felt that we should concentrate on making progress in these fields, of achieving practical results before reaching for intangibles. I was not anxious in particular to set about drafting a European constitution since I thought that this would provide a fruitful source of quarrels that might well result in frustration and despair and the abandonment of the objective we had set ourselves." 46 At a subsequent meeting with M. Ramadier, when the Frenchman spoke of "the need for some illusions and dreams" such as the European Assembly to inspire the ordinary people of Europe, Bevin tartly replied "that he had dreams himself, but as Foreign Secretary he had to keep wide awake". 47 The British Foreign Secretary, however, found himself trying to swim against an extremely strong tide. 1948 was, after all, the year of the Hague Congress and Western Europe was pullulating with federalist schemes of one kind or another. Federalism was popular in some circles on the mainland of Europe. It seemed to have attracted some support within the French government, although the British were never sure whether this was the result of genuine conviction or political expediency. Inside Britain itself, the Conservative opposition toyed with federalism, although, with one or two honourable exceptions, this almost certainly was on grounds of political expediency: namely, in order to find a foreign policy issue with which to belabour the government. Last but not least, the idea was enthusiastically taken up in the United States, especially by the Republican Party, which was of course expected to win the presidential election in November 1948. As a result of all this pressure, Bevin produced in September 1948 a proposal for a "Council of Western Europe". This was to consist of an annual meeting of the key Ministers of the Brussels Treaty Powers which "would have in general a power of initiation, and should be in a position to recommend measures for acceptance by the group as a whole". The Council, Bevin suggested, "should be in the nature of a cabinet for Western Europe and would be the final storey in the structure set up under the Brussels Treaty". As he himself recognized, "the additional machinery which I have suggested, together with that already established, would of course constitute something in the nature of a Confederation", although he did not think it would be wise to employ the term. 48 Although Attlee commented that Bevin's proposal did not attract him very much, a slightly modified version was put to the meeting of the Brussels Treaty Powers at the end of October 1948 and endorsed by the Cabinet on 4 Novem-

" Bevin memo., 26Sept. 1948, PRO, FO 800/465. 47 Unsigned memo. 2 6 0 c t . 1948, PRO, F 0 371/73109/Z9292/G. 48 Bevin minute, 26Sept. 1948, PRO, FO 800/465.

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

39

ber. 49 It is clear that Bevin envisaged the widest powers for his latest brain-child. " T h e Council should deal with matters of common concern to Europe", he told Dalton, who was to head the British delegation to the Brussels Treaty committee charged with examining the proposal. " W h a t were these? Economic affairs, rationalised defence, etc.". Even the Ο. Ε. E. C. might be subordinated to it after the European Recovery Programme ended in 1952. 50 But all this was conditional upon the Council being a body purely at ministerial level. The committee of which Dalton was a member was also charged with examining the French proposal for a European parliamentary assembly and, as is known, the eventual outcome was a messy compromise between the two conceptions: a Council of Europe, consisting of a Council of Ministers and a parliamentary assembly, albeit one composed of delegates as opposed to directly elected members. Predictably it satisfied no one. When Bevin put his original scheme to Attlee, he referred to the need " t o do something to help the French Socialists as regards Western European Unity", and this illustrates the enormous importance he attached to France. One of his officials told a meeting of representatives from other government departments on 8 October 1947 "that Mr. Bevin considered that France was the most important of the Western nations". 5 1 He himself reflected, at a meeting with Attlee, Alexander and Field-Marshal Montgomery on 8 May 1948, that Stalin had said at Potsdam that "France would be no good for the next thirty years", but that it was his (Bevin's) "aim to recreate French morale in five years", a problem which he regarded as "about 7 0 % political and only 3 0 % military"/ 2 He was not at all happy with the weak and ever-changing coalitions of the Troisieme Force, nor with the resolution of the French people as a whole. Yet it was essential to steer a course between the twin extremes of Communism and Gaullism. "There is, I fear, no doubt that the present French Government and indeed the whole French nation are in a parlous state", he wrote in a paper for his Cabinet colleagues on 2 November 1948. "[Yet] we must recognise that France is essential to the Western system and that her collapse would involve the collapse of the whole." 5 3 His views were shared by other senior Ministers. At a meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet on 25 November - at which he was not present - "it was recognised that we had a strong political interest in supporting the French economy, and even in making some economic sacrifices in order to reestablish the French economy on a sound basis. For, unless the economic health

Attlee minute, 28Sept. 1948, ibid.; Bevin minute, 1 8 0 c t . 1948, ibid.; 2.Nov. 1948, PRO, CAB 129/30, C P 4 8 / 2 4 9 ; CAB 128/13, C . M . (48), 68th Conclusions, 4Nov. 1948. 50

Bevin minute, 26Sept. 1948, PRO, FO 800/465.

51

Wilson minute, 8 Oct. 1947, PRO, F 0 3 7 1 / 6 7 6 7 3 / Z 9 0 5 3 / G . Brook memo., 8May 1948, PRO, CAB 127/341. 2 Nov. 1948, PRO, CAB 129/30, CP 48/249.

" 53

40

Geoffrey Warner

of Western Europe could be restored - and this depended very largely on the recovery of France - we should not succeed in checking the spread of Communism and we should then have to recast the whole of our defensive strategy". 54 French sensibilities were also important in influencing the British government's attitude towards another key Western European country: Germany. In a major Cabinet paper of 5 January 1948 Bevin had drawn the lessons of the failure of four-power cooperation to resolve the German problem. He described "the guiding principle of British policy towards Germany" as ensuring that there should not be a Communist-controlled Germany on the pattern of Russia's other satellite Eastern European regimes. What Britain wanted was "the reconstitution of a stable, peaceful and democratic Germany", and if this could not be achieved as a result of agreement between all four occupying Powers, then it would have to be achieved as far as possible by agreement among those Powers who would cooperate. In practice, this meant the establishment "in the Western Zones in Germany [of] a political and economic system to join which the Germans in the Eastern Zone will exert all their energy, and which will in the end prevail over the standards and system established in the Soviet Zone". Although this was primarily a task for the Germans themselves, the Western Powers must ensure that it was achieved with their support and not against their opposition. 55 Although there were many problems to be overcome and much negotiation to be gone through, the line from the policy outlined in this paper to the merger of the three Western Zones into the Bundesrepublik Deutschland was a clear one. To what extent, however, was the new West German state to be accepted into the comity of Western European nations on a basis of full equality, or was it to be hedged around with controls and restrictions, the legacy of fear and bitterness engendered by World War II? This issue, it seems, caused a deep fissure within the Labour government and it was never to be bridged while they were in office. A non-Cabinet Minister, Lord Pakenham, broached the matter with brutal frankness in a note written on 7 October 1948. Leaving out any moral or economic arguments, he stated, strategic considerations pointed to the following conclusions: " ( I ) T h e r e is n o w n o p o s s i b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e S o v i e t s a i m a t t h e d o m i n a t i o n E u r o p e and the world

54

of

[...]5i

P R O , C A B 1 3 4 / 2 1 6 , E. P. C. (48), 36th Meeting, 25 Nov. 1948. T h e Ministers present were: Attlee, Cripps, Addison (Paymaster-General), Alexander, Bevan (Health), Noel-Baker, Wilson and Strachey (Food).

55

5 Jan. 1948, P R O , C A B 1 2 9 / 2 3 , CP 4 8 / 5 .

56

This was a quotation from an official British briefing paper prepared for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in October 1948.

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

41

(II) It is inconceivable that Western Europe even with American assistance will long possess the power to hold back Russia with one hand and hold down Germany with the other. (III) We should, on the contrary, look to Germany as the most powerful bulwark on the continent of Europe against the continent being overrun. Indeed, a strong Germany is likely to be the only means of averting a permanent situation under which Europe lies under the menace of being overrun by Russia at any moment, with such consolation as can be extracted from the hope of subsequent rescue. (IV) Moreover, unless the military and economic potential of Western Germany are employed to the full, the burden of re-arming Western Europe, and keeping her rearmed against the Russian threat, will hold back recovery for years. (V) On these grounds it seems to me necessary to abandon any idea that German strength, military or economic, is a threat to Britain and to regard it instead as an essential element in the system of Western defence. (VI) Our objective should therefore be to place the Western German Government, as soon as it is formed, on an equal footing with other European countries, and to enable it to supply as rapidly as possible its quota of military manpower and military and industrial potential to the Western European organisation"/ 7 Sir Stafford Cripps seems to have shared P a k e n h a m ' s views, at least in part. " A n o t h e r problem which must be s o l v e d " , he wrote in a note on ' E u r o p e a n Economic C o o p e r a t i o n ' on 9 October 1948, " i s the extent to which Western Germany is to be relied upon to help in the rearmament [i. e. of Western Europe]. M y own view is that we must take the obvious risk of using it to the utmost since I believe that otherwise we shall never be able to accomplish Western E u r o p e a n rearmament, even if only because of the shortage of steel". 5 8 M o r e o v e r , in response to further broadsides f r o m Pakenham, we find him urging upon Attlee in December the need for an Anglo-American military study to ascertain "whether (1) we are to consider G e r m a n y as an essential element in Western E u r o p e a n Defence and to seek to strengthen her economically and militarily, or, (2) regard the danger of R u s s i a overrunning G e r m a n y as such that w e should keep d o w n her strength to the minimum consistent with ultimate viability". 5 9 An even stronger supporter of Pakenham's a p p r o a c h w a s the Health Minister, Aneurin Bevan. When the issue w a s debated in the Cabinet on 22 December 1948, he said, according to D a l t o n , that " w e ought to build them [i.e. the G e r m a n s ] up as much as we could. They were a better barrier against C o m m u n i s m than the French". 6 0 57

Pakenham memo., 7 Oct. 1948, P R O , P R E M 8/1441. Pakenham was Minister of Civil Aviation at the time, but between April 1947 and M a y 1948 he had been Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, with special responsibility for occupation policy in Germany.

58

Cripps memo., 9 O c t . 1948, P R O , Τ 235/4.

59

Cripps letter, 18 Dec. 1948, P R O , P R E M 8/1441. Pakenham would not have accepted Cripps's second alternative. T h e previous month he had written to Bevin arguing that no one had suggested destroying the war potential of the other continental members of Western Union to prevent it from falling into Russian hands. See Pakenham minute, 24 N o v . 1948, ibid. Dalton Diary, " E n d of ' 4 8 ' " .

60

42

Geoffrey Warner

Dalton himself, an unregenerate Germanophobe, was on the other side of the barricades. According to his own account, he retorted at the Cabinet meeting in question that the Germans were a danger, "greater than the Russians, and greatest in combination with the Russians. We should aim [ . . . ] at a strong Atlantic Pact - with strong U . S . and Canadian contribution, a strong U . K . , a strong France, and strong Benelux and a weak G e r m a n y " . 6 1 T h e Prime Minister tended towards Dalton's position. In a personal note to Pakenham he recalled how, during the democratic interlude of the Weimar Republic, the German General Staff had built up a powerful military machine which then threw in its lot with Hitler and the Nazis. " C a n you be certain", he asked, " t h a t this will not happen again if we are too precipitate in rearming G e r m a n y ? " H e was not sure, he went on, just how far the Germans had given up their long-standing ambitions and "should like to see some more fruits of repentance". He concluded: " T h e policy of using Satan to defeat Sin is very dangerous. This was just the illusion that the Tories had over Fascism and Nazism." 6 2 According to Dalton, Bevin sought to steer a middle way between these conflicting conceptions of Germany's role. 63 In reality, as Pakenham recognised, he was much closer to the Germanophobes than to the Germanophiles. At the Cabinet meeting on 22 December 1948 he said " t h a t it would be premature at this stage to attempt to reach any firm conclusions about the ultimate attitude of Western G e r m a n y " . While his aim had been to establish a liberal and democratic state in close association with the west, " i t would be unwise to place too much reliance on Germany's ultimate willingness to pursue a pacific and co-operative policy". W h a t was necessary in the present state of uncertainty " w a s to pursue a practical policy, which, while assisting Western Germany to achieve a reasonable standard o f life in collaboration with other Western European countries, would at the same time take proper account of the French preoccupation with security". 6 4 As indicated above, French views loomed large in Bevin's mind. Indeed, in an accompanying paper on German policy, he wrote that one of its main aims was " t o carry the French Government with us; to take French fears and susceptibilities as regards security into account [ . . . ] ; to sustain the Third Force in France; and to avoid policies which are calculated to reinforce the position of General de Gaulle, bring him back to power and so destroy the whole structure of Western Union". 6 5

"

Ibid.

"

Undated Attlee note, P R O , P R E M 8 / 1 4 4 1 .

"

Dalton Diary, " E n d of ' 4 8 ' " .

64

P R O , C A B 1 2 8 / 1 3 , C . M . (48), 82nd Conclusions, 2 2 D e c . 1948; Pakenham minute, 3 0 D e c . 1948, PREM 8/1441.

"

2 0 D e c . 1948, P R O , C A B 1 2 9 / 3 1 , CP 4 8 / 3 0 6 . Pakenham likened the French attitude towards German recovery to that of the Conservative Party towards the nationalization of iron and steel: they

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

43

The British Cabinet's perception of Europe in 1948 may, therefore, be summed up as follows: an implacably hostile Soviet Union bent upon extending its sphere of influence by infiltration and subversion, which could only be countered by the formation, under British leadership, of a close but not formal union of European states with firm backing, both economic and military, from a benign United States of America. In the long term this Western European union would grow into a third force in the world, on a par with both the United States and the Soviet Union, thanks mainly to liberal injections of British Social Democracy and joint exploitation of African natural resources. Apart from Britain, France was the key element in this association, but it was weak and in need of continual succour and encouragement. West Germany, potentially the most powerful state on the continent of Europe outside the Soviet sphere, was in a state of limbo: to be turned into a shop-window for Western democracy, but at the same time to be kept at an appropriate distance on account of the skeletons rattling in its cupboard. Static portraits, however, are almost inevitably misleading. As 1948 turned into 1949 the picture was already changing. On 25 January 1949 Cripps and Bevin presented a joint paper to the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet on British policy towards the O . E . E . C . A key passage read: " W e can [ . . . ] lay down firmly the principle that, while we must be ready to make temporary sacrifices in our standard of living, and to run some degree of risk in the hope of restoring Western Europe, we must do nothing to damage irretrievably the economic structure of this country. The present attempt to restore sanity and order in the world depends upon the United States and the British Commonwealth and the countries of Western Europe working together. If, however, the attempt to restore Western Europe should fail, this country could still hope to restore its position in cooperation with the rest of the Commonwealth and with the United States. But in these circumstances we could not look for continued United States military, political and economic support if, in the endeavour to re-establish Western Europe, our economic structure had been hopelessly i m p a i r e d " . "

What this meant in practice was not spelled out until the following October, after the devaluation of sterling. "In brief", the same two authors wrote in a paper for the Cabinet, "the policy [ . . . ] set out [in January] was one under which His Majesty's Government were not to involve themselves in the economic affairs of Europe beyond the point from which they could, if they wished, withdraw". This involved a refusal to accept any loss of responsibility for budgetary and credit policy or for the management of the reserves; any hindrance to British efforts to reach and maintain equilibrium between the sterling and dollar areas;

would never regard the time as ripe for it until it had taken place and they could see that the consequences were not disastrous. See Pakenham minute, 2 4 N o v . 1948, P R E M 8 / 1 4 4 1 . 66

P R O , CAB 1 3 4 / 2 2 1 , E . P . C . (49) 6, 25 Jan. 1949.

44

Geoffrey Warner

any European share in the determination of the size of the dollar-earning and dollar-saving industries; and anything materially affecting Imperial preference. 67 This was a far cry from the ideas of a European customs union and a Western Union currency which had been mooted in early 1948 and the policy reflected, on the economic side, a clear attempt by the British government to distance itself from Europe. This policy was paralleled on the political side. In February 1949 Bevin authorised the establishment in the Foreign Office of what was known as the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee, a body somewhat akin to the Policy Planning Staff in the United States, the function of which was to consider longterm issues of foreign policy. The first paper prepared by the Committee considered the idea of Western Europe as a third force in the world and came down solidly against it and in favour of an undiluted Atlanticism. During the course of 1949 summaries and/or drafts of this paper were agreed to or acquiesced in by Bevin himself, Attlee, Cripps, Morrison, Alexander and the Commonwealth Secretary, Noel-Baker. On 18 October 1949 the final version was circulated to the Cabinet under Bevin's signature. 68 To all intents and purposes it represented government policy. One can come up with various explanations for this shift in emphasis in British policy. The signature of the Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the devaluation of sterling in September, and the frustrating experience of the Council of Europe all contributed to a reinforcement of Britain's links with the United States and a corresponding weakening of those with Western Europe. It must also be recognised that officials in various government departments, including his own, were much less enthusiastic about some aspects of Western Union than Bevin himself. Some things, however, were unchanging. The Soviet Union remained the enemy and the Cold War the central point of reference for British foreign policy in Europe and throughout the world.

67 68

25 Oct. 1949, PRO, CAB 129/37 I, CP 49/203. See the documentation in PRO, FO 371/76384 and CAB 129/37, CP 49/208, 18 Oct. 1949.

Britain: the View from the Cabinet

45

Zusammenfassung 1948 wurde in der britischen Regierung - deren Außenpolitik von Premierminister Clement Attlee, mehr noch von Außenminister Ernest Bevin bestimmt wurde - als das zentrale Problem die Bedrohung Europas durch die Sowjetunion angesehen. Diese Bedrohung erschien nicht so sehr als eine militärische - wenngleich man damit rechnete, daß aufgrund politischer Fehlkalkulation jederzeit ein Krieg ausbrechen konnte - denn als eine subversive, jenen Methoden eines Kalten Krieges entsprechend, die die Sowjetunion im März 1948 in der Tschechoslowakei vorgeführt hatte. Die britische Politik reagierte auf die sowjetische Bedrohung mit der Bildung der Westunion (Brüsseler Pakt). Diese Westunion war ursprünglich auf Großbritannien, Frankreich und die Benelux-Staaten beschränkt, Bevin suchte sie aber möglichst auf die Vereinigten Staaten und die britischen Überseegebiete auszudehnen. Insbesondere die Mitwirkung der USA wurde als wesentlich angesehen; nach längeren Verhandlungen wurde sie schließlich mit der Unterzeichnung des Nordatlantik-Paktes im April 1949 erreicht. Indessen ist die Westunion keineswegs nur als eine Institution anzusehen, über die die Unterstützung der USA bei einer Verteidigung Westeuropas erreicht werden sollte. Bevin und seine Mitarbeiter glaubten, daß die Labour-Regierung einen einzigartigen „Mittelweg" zwischen sowjetischem Kommunismus und amerikanischem Kapitalismus weisen konnte, und daß es ihr daher zukomme, die fortschrittlichen nicht-kommunistischen Bewegungen in Westeuropa zu einer starken „dritten Kraft" in der Weltpolitik zu organisieren. Diese „dritte Kraft" sollte sich auf die Ressourcen der europäischen Ubersee-Besitzungen stützen, insbesondere ihre Rohstoffe. Zunächst stellte Bevin sich diese westeuropäische Organisation in einer stark integrierten Form vor, mit einer Zollunion, mit gemeinsamem Bank- und Währungswesen und einer Harmonisierung der Sozialsysteme. Die konservative Opposition, aber auch andere Regierungsmitglieder zwangen ihn indessen, einige dieser Zielvorstellungen wieder fallenzulassen. Außerdem gingen die Pläne Bevins von einer Zusammenarbeit auf der Ebene der Regierungen aus. Er hielt nichts von gefühlsbetonten politischen Aufwallungen, und entsprechende Massenbewegungen, die 1948 in Westeuropa sichtbar wurden, desillusionierten ihn nicht wenig. Der Europarat, der Anfang 1948 als Kompromiß zwischen zwei grundsätzlich verschiedenen Sichtweisen begründet wurde, vermochte typischerweise niemanden zufriedenzustellen. Obwohl das britische Kabinett Anfang 1948 davon ausging, daß die deutschen Westzonen der Bildung eines neuen Staatswesens entgegengingen, war keineswegs klar, ob die neue politische Einheit auf der Basis voller Gleichberechtigung in die westeuropäische Staatengemeinschaft aufgenommen würde. Diese

46

Geoffrey Warner

Frage riß 1948 innerhalb der Labour-Regierung eine tiefe Kluft, die bis zum Regierungswechsel von 1951 nicht überbrückt werden konnte.

The French Decision-Makers and their Perception of French Power in 1948 by Rene Girault

" N o u s avons de bons bras, de bonnes tetes, de bons coeurs et, a notre portee, de vastes tresors a tirer de la terre. II y faut un travail acharne, un long temps, beaucoup d'initiative. M a i s la puissance est au bout, une puissance qui, celle-la, n'ecrasera personne et, au contraire, profitera a tous nos semblables. Cette puissance, ah! puisse-t-elle devenir la grande ambition n a t i o n a l e ! "

General de Gaulle at the Assemblee

Consultative

on 2March 1945. 1

Less than a month after the Conference of Yalta, to which he had not been invited, General de Gaulle expressed the hope that France would launch a massive effort to regain the rank of a great power. The very moment of this speech was significant. Not only had France been excluded from the conference that announced the end of the war and prepared the peace, but shortly thereafter the head of the French government had declined Roosevelt's invitation to meet him in Algiers, on French territory, on an American cruiser, just as kings or heads of oriental Arab states then used to be invited: " I found this exaggerated, whatever the actual distribution of forces. The sovereignty and the dignity of a great nation must be inviolable." 2 If this refusal of de Gaulle to go to Algiers was not unanimously applauded in France, there was no doubt that in 1945 the French were, generally, still sure to remain a great power, their defeat of June 1940 and the weakness of their resources at the time of the Liberation notwithstanding. Three years later, in April 1948, the General Secretary of the Quai d'Orsay, Jean Chauvel, wrote to the French Ambassador in the United States, Henri Bonnet, with regard to the future of Germany: 1

2

Cited as annex to Memoires de Guerre, vol. III. he Salut 1944-1946, Paris 1959, p. 454. - Translation: "We have strong arms, a strong mind and a courageous heart. Moreover, we have within reach the vast resources of our soil. We will need hard work, much time, a lot of initiative. The goal is power, power that will not crush anyone, but, on the contrary, will be profitable to all of us. Oh, may this power be the great ambition of our nation." Ibid., p. 88.

48

Rene Girault

" T h e French government, aware of the effect that its adherence to the Anglo-Saxon plan is bound to have on the Russians, measures the extent of her responsibilities and worries about the means she has at her disposal to meet them. At this time these means, as you know, are nearly nonexistent, or rather, they are in the hands of the Americans, and it is for the Administration in Washington to evaluate them and to dispose of them, in accordance with the policies it pursues." 3 While on the eve of the Berlin Crisis the tension between the t w o superpowers was rising, the French leaders bitterly felt their incapacity to have their German policy taken into account; their desire to remain outside the t w o antagonistic camps was more and more unrealistic. Lucidly and almost cynically Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, having resigned himself to sign the treaties of London on Germany, which the French Parliament and public opinion were certain to oppose, exclaimed in M a y 1948 to the Cabinet: "We will go before Parliament, and it will certainly reject the treaty. I will sacrifice myself if necessary, but what we refuse to do with the others they will do without us, and we will be suffocated, for we will have nothing." 4 In June 1948, the President of the French Republic, Vincent Auriol, exasperated at this "resignation", exclaimed during another cabinet session: "We are not obliged always to remain silent and passive, just because others desire it. The voice of France is often sought after, but France does not speak up. Schuman [Minister President] supports what I am saying." 5 Three years after the end of the war the French leadership perhaps still had great ambitions, but it desperately lacked the means. Was this for the French decision-makers the end of all hopes of still being a great power? H a d the illusions or dreams of 1945 been swept away? H a d they slipped away? Shortly after the crucial phase of the liberation of French national territory, in September 1944, Andre Siegfried wrote in Le

Figaro:

"We do not need a certificate confirming that we are a great power, but our nation must show its greatness through its own merits [ . . . ] leading an almost unprecedented recovery, General de Gaulle has restored our honour; thanks to him, thanks to the resistance, we can again face the world with pride. Nevertheless, the crisis has affected us, and there is a steep slope to climb up again.'"

3

Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (MAE), Henri Bonnet papers, vol. 1, p. 37, letter of 15 April

4

Noted on 26 M a y 1948 in the memoirs of Vincent Auriol, Journal du Septennat,

1948. new edition 1974, p. 242. 5

Ibid., p. 2 6 0 (9June 1948).

6

Le Figaro,

21 Sept. 1944.

vol. II, Paris 1948,

The French Decision-Makers

49

These words of the great political analyst summarize well the sentiment predominant among the French leadership in 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 : France has been terribly affected by the war, but we will be able to prove to the world that we have remained a great power, thanks to a vigorous national effort; our weakness is temporary, even if it is severe; our great power status cannot validly be contested; France is recognized as such since she is assigned a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council, and she disposes of an occupation zone in Germany. It is true that we have been excluded from the Conference of Potsdam just as we had been from the Conference of Yalta, but this was during the war when the relative distribution of forces was decisive.7 After the war, with the defeat of Germany, France has again become in Europe the power she had been for a long time; moreover, by retaining her Empire, including Indo-China where French control is being re-established, France has regained the international position of a Great Power. Probably General de Gaulle expressed widely held French convictions when he gave this definition of the French role in the world in an interview to The Times on 10 September 1945: " G r e a t Britain and F r a n c e are the t w o principal powers in the world, their task is to take the lead of the other nations t o w a r d a m o r e prosperous material development, toward greater political maturity and t o w a r d a higher level of civilization." 8

One year later, in 1946, this attitude of mind had already changed, notably when it was necessary to go to Washington and ask for substantial financial aid. Peace had been restored, but financial weakness persisted, he Canard Enchaine, a satirical journal reflecting national susceptibilities to the obligations imposed on the assisted, advanced the derisory headline, " L e President T r u m a n vient a Paris nous offrir des milliards. M a i s le Gouvernement f r a ^ a i s demande des g a r a n t i e s . " '

In the same article Mr. Andre Philip (then Ministre de l'Economie tionale) was quoted as having said:

Na-

" F r a n c e is willing to m a k e concessions to her great ally, the USA. She is willing to help her by relieving her of the overweight of capital that suffocates her. Yet the absorptive capacity of F r a n c e is not unlimited, nor can she accept the e n o r m o u s sum that is offered her, or m o r e precisely, forced upon h e r . "

In a speech delivered at Bethune on 11 August 1945, General de Gaulle declared: "We perfectly know that, as time goes on, everyone makes himself heard in conformity to his power. Nevertheless we hope that, for the world's sake, this kind of rules born under brutal war conditions will die down." Memoires de Guerre, III, p. 596. 8 Interview given to the Paris correspondent of the Times on 10 September 1945, ibid., p. 559. ' Le Canard Enchaine of 13 March 1945. - Translation: "President Truman visits Paris to offer us billions. But the French Government demands guarantees." 7

50

Rene Girault

Some weeks later, French sportsmen having achieved international successes (Y. Petra won the Wimbledon tennis championship, the boxer Marcel Cerdan became world champion, Y. Sepheriades won a world championship in rowing), the same journal headlined: "Enfin la France releve 1'athlete." 10 It is true that the respectable newspaper Le Monde wrote with respect to Petra's victory: "It is by no means childish to consider this victory as a sign of French recovery" (3 July 1946). One can well feel the doubt that was taking hold of the French, who now clung to - at the very least - questionable signs of greatness.

Disillusionment persisted in the next months when the western Allies, who were the closest nonetheless, paid little attention to the French theses concerning Germany. Let us read again Le Canard Enchatne after the famous speech of American Secretary of State Byrnes in Stuttgart, September 1946. Inventing a piece of news that was absurd, yet could seem logical to French public opinion of the time, Le Canard made Byrnes deliver a speech in Vichy, capital of the "collaboration": "Carrying on his conference tour, M r . Byrnes [ . . . ] has given a great political speech in Vichy (France). He was anxious immediately to reassure our country of the feelings the Americans hold toward it. The United States, he exclaimed, has no bias against France [ . . . ] Evidently, our German problems have priority. But your turn will come. You must be patient [ . . . ] Europe can only survive in union. And how else could it be united if not around Germany?" 1 1

The Germanophobia then dominant in France did not tolerate the idea of a German recovery. On this point agreement among the French was wide-spread. In Le Figaro, in January 1947, the author Georges Duhamel commented on Winston Churchill's speech in which the former British Prime Minister had evoked the idea of a United States of Europe and of a Franco-German reconciliation: " M r . Churchill, whose country has not been invaded, cannot imagine that we, the French, cannot at present think of the Germans without a feeling of aversion, of repugnance or, more exactly, of horror. [ . . . ] I can never forget the harm that the Germans did to other peoples and particularly to France. I will not forget it, and it never ought to be forgotten." 1 1

10

This was a pun for " l a France releve la tete", not transferable into English. Translation of the headline: " A t last France exalts the athlete"; translation of the pun: " F r a n c e raises her head". Ibid., 10 July 1946.

11

Ibid., editorial of 11 September 1946, signed by the editor-in-chief Pierre Benard. T h e same issue contains 2 slogans: " G e r m a n y won the w a r of 1914 in 1933. Germany won the war of 1939 in 1946".

12

Article of 16 January 1947 headed 'Une oeuvre de longue haieine'. G. Duhamel, member of the Academie Franfaise, was a politically independent writer.

The French Decision-Makers

51

However, in the following years, and notably in 1948/49, French policy towards Germany was gradually reduced to nothing in the face of Anglo-Saxon objectives. 13 This obvious powerlessness in a field that was fundamental to the future of French security revealed the weakness of French foreign policy. It was a painful disillusion for the victors of May 1945. But for all that, was it thought in France that the failure of this foreign policy was the expression of a loss of power or, at the very least, of influence? And particularly, had those who were in charge of the foreign relations of France that negative impression? Were they aware of a decline which gained momentum between 1945 and 1948/49?

The present paper does not pretend to answer the preceding questions exhaustively. It is based on six special studies, which, to varying degrees, look at different political circles that held discretionary powers regarding the international relations of France. 14 First, the diplomats of the Quai d'Orsay come to mind, those stationed at the centre of diplomatic administration (contribution of Mrs. Annie Lacroix-Riz), or those dealing with special aspects of diplomatic strategy (contributions of Mrs. Catherine Uhel de Cuttoli on Germany, of Mrs. Sellin on India, of Miss Claire Andrieu on Switzerland). Yet the traditional diplomats were often backed up by experts, notably when economic or financial matters were concerned. Interesting in this respect were the offices of the Ministeres des Finances, de l'Economie Nationale, of the Commissariat au Plan,15 and of specialized economic commissions (contributions of Mr. Philippe Mioche and of Mr. Michel Margueraz). At times the officials from these different departments or state agencies came together in joint groupings or committees such as the Secretariat General du Comite Interministeriel dealing with the questions of European economic cooperation (S.G. C. I.) 16 (contribution by Mr Gerard Bossuat). In theory, diplomacy was since the resignation of General de Gaulle in January 1946 the sole responsibility of the Foreign Ministry; the Foreign Minister had considerable freedom of action. He was, of course, responsible to the Cabinet, which, theoretically, directed the important decisions under the authority of the Minister President. But in reality the Cabinet intervened little, except 13

In her separate paper 'La politique allemande de la France ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 8 ) , Symbole de son impuissance?' Mrs. Uhel de Cuttoli gives a more detailed illustration of the disappointments of a French policy towards Germany that was, in the face of the exigencies of the Western Allies, impracticable.

14

The decision-makers in the military field as well as the parties and their representatives are left aside, as they are dealt with in other papers of this volume. Nevertheless, when connected with the diplomatic process, their perception of French power is logically taken into account.

15

The Commissariat

"

"General Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Committee".

au Plan was created in 1945.

52

Rene Girault

for fundamental questions or when different departments had a joint interest in negotiations with foreign countries (borrowings, loans, external finances, colonial affairs, security and supply problems). Moreover, information on foreign countries was essentially provided by the diplomatic service, which in this way was able to pre-shape the reactions of the other authorities. The President of the Republic, Vincent Auriol (elected in 1947), who constitutionally had to be kept informed on fundamental diplomatic policy decisions and correspondingly was to receive copies of the principal dispatches coming in and going out, often complained that he was at the mercy of the Quai d'Orsay; as he saw it, the Quai d'Orsay went its own way, acting as an autonomous body that was little inclined to share its responsibilities in this field; particularly he, the President of the Republic, was only partially informed on foreign questions. But was the Minister President himself any better informed by his Foreign Minister? This depended on the degree of political intimacy between the two. In the Government formed by the M . R. P. leader Robert Schuman (November 1947 to July 1948), the Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, also of the M.R.P., should in theory have been close to the Minister President, but did the views of the two men correspond? In the Andre Marie Cabinet (July 1948 to August 1948) which followed that of Robert Schuman, Robert Schuman himself was Foreign Minister; in view of the personality of the Minister President, foreign affairs were closely controlled by the experts of the Quai. Henri Queuille, succeeding Andre Marie, governed from September 1948 to October 1949. This parliament member from Correze, a skilful tactician in the chamber who was greatly interested in agricultural problems and concerned about the currency and the budget, left the initiative to Robert Schuman who was still Foreign Minister and continued in his office at the Quai when Georges Bidault succeeded Queuille in October 1949. From this point on it is possible to speak of a real continuity in the direction of this key department. The ministerial instability that was characteristic of the Fourth Republic did not really affect the conduct of French diplomacy: Robert Schuman remained Foreign Minister continuously, from 26 July 1948 to 8 January 1953, through eight different cabinets! Under such conditions of relative stability the diplomatic corps was assured a considerable freedom of action. The Quai d'Orsay did certainly not have absolute independence in the conduct of French international relations. At times temporary missions were entrusted to political personalities (the mission of Blum to the U.S.A. in 1946) or to economic experts (purchasing missions); at times functions of an international character were given to non-diplomats like the commanding generals in the occupation zones of Germany (Koenig) and Austria (Bethouard) who might exert a certain influence (in spite of their diplomatic counsellors delegated from the Quai); comparable were the roles of the "colonial" proconsuls such as the High Commissioner in Indo-China (E. Bollaert) or the General Residents in Tunisia (Jean Möns) or Morocco (General

The French Decision-Makers

53

Juin). But the important decisions were prepared and supervised by the Foreign Ministry. Thus the Ministere de la France d'Outre-mer (Overseas Territories) theoretically pursued its own policy in the Union Fra^aise; but in reality its Directors of Political Affairs (Henri Laurentie until March 1947, then Robert Delavignette) and of Economic Affairs (Georges Peter) had to reckon with the head of the African division of the Quai d'Orsay (Guy Monod). 17 Without trying to list completely all the diplomats who could influence the decisions, I may mention some significant names which occur again and again in the above-mentioned communications. The main body of the diplomatic machinery comprised the General Secretary of the Quai d'Orsay Jean Chauvel, the Director of Political Affairs Maurice Couve de Murville, the Director of Economic Affairs Herve Alphand, the Director of the Cabinet Bernard Clappier, as well as the ambassadors in a few important capitals such as Rene Massigli in London, Henri Bonnet in Washington, or Jacques Tarbe de Saint Hardouin, Political Director with the French Governor in Germany. 18 Is it possible to speak of a team to characterize this group of high civil servants? This is doubtful less so because of internal ideological or political divergencies than because of the respective positions they occupied within the diplomatic machinery. Henri Bonnet, well placed to be aware of the American reactions (notably those of Congress or of the American public opinion) was more conscious of French international dependence than some of his colleagues at the Quai who were still inclined to think in terms of a certain American "naivete". H. Alphand, more directly concerned with the economic problems of France, accepted evidently more quickly than others the political consequences of an unmistakable financial impotence. It is indeed interesting to note the extent to which, in these years of budgetary misery, of prospering black markets and of continuous commercial imbalances, material contingencies overrode other considerations. From then on, the civil servants in charge of these problems, even if they were not members of the diplomatic service, took a decisive part in the making of French diplomacy. Of the first rank among these economic experts was Jean Monnet. With his very strong character, his administrative independence (as Commissaire au Plan he was directly responsible to the Minister President), his negotiating skill and the quality of his close collaborators, he was an extraordinary person, capable of influencing effectively the decisions in the diplomatic sphere. It might be added that, thanks to his close relations with the leadership in

17

Cf. Marc Michel, 'La cooperation intercoloniale en Afrique Noire 1942/1950: un necolonialisme eclaire', in: Relations Internationales, 34, 1983.

18

The French embassy at Moscow does not seem to have been as important as the embassies at London or Washington. In March 1948 Yves Chataigneau, former General Governor of Algeria, was succeeded there by General Catroux.

54

Rene Girault

Washington, at the E. C. Α., and with the American economic "feelers" in Europe, he was perfectly well acquainted with the ideas, even the intentions of the Americans. J. Monnet's closeness to the Americans and his organizational skill seem to explain why he was charged, in February 1948, with the task of coordinating the work of the different departments concerned with the American aid. 19 This key position was not without earning him much criticism on the part of other civil servants or politicians; 20 but his influence on the President of the Republic reveals the unique importance of this personality among the real French decision-makers. Next to Jean Monnet, - and doubtless for some against Jean Monnet - the Inspecteurs des Finances have to be called to mind, those men in charge either of French financial relations with foreign countries or of the development of French reconstruction after the war. The important role of the officials of the Inspection des Finances in France in the late 1930's has already been noted.21 This influence was even more pronounced after the Liberation. Then there were several personalities who in their positions significantly influenced the direction of French foreign policy: Guillaume Guindey, Director of External Finances, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, directing the S . G . C . I., Francois Bloch-Laine, at the helm of the Treasury, Emmanuel Monick, Governor of the Bank of France. Although these persons did not form a homogeneous bloc, they reacted on the whole according to mutually shared ideas. Doubtless because of their education (the neo-liberal instruction at the Ecole libre des Sciences Politiques) and of the necessities imposed upon them by their positions, these civil servants devised a foreign economic policy based on financial restraint, the priority of an equilibrated balance of payments and a strict defence of the curreny. For several years, from 1944 to 1948, they waged a silent but tenacious struggle against the functionaries of the Plan and even more so against those of the Ministere de l'Economie Nationale, who was more inclined to accept a certain deficit and a certain rate of inflation in order to push investment aiming at the industrial reconstruction of France. In 1948, as S . G . C . I . General Secretary Gaston Cusin, who opposed the concepts of the Inspecteurs des Finances and the domineering tutelage of the Ministere des Finances ("la rue de Rivoli"), himself admitted, the case was closed; the "financiers" had won. 22

" This choice was proposed by Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. Cf. the contributions of Michel Margueraz. 10 In a cabinet session on 1st December 1948, Monnet's attitude towards the United States was harshly criticized by some ministers as too friendly, see Auriol, op. cit., p. 551. 21 See the two articles of Robert Frank and Nathalie Carre de Malberg, in: Relations Internationales, 33, 1983. 22 See the testimony of G. Cusin, 'Les services de l'Economie nationale 1944/48', in: Comite d'Histoire de la 2e guerre mondiale, Dec. 1977.

The French Decision-Makers

55

Jean Monnet himself could hardly bear their influence and their external strategy; in October 1948 he was pessimistic in the face of the Inspecteurs des Finances who ruled but were "mediocres" (sic); in December 1948 he was completely discouraged at the threat of drastic cuts in Plan investments and wanted to leave.23 However, Jean Monnet did not resign and the collaboration between the Commissariat au Plan and the rue de Rivoli went on, if not without difficulties. Obviously both felt the narrowness of their margin of action vis-ä-vis the American giant. Two approaches offered themselves as ways to solve the problem of French economic dependence: a thorough transformation of her economy (as advocated by Monnet) and fiscal and budgetary restraint (as advocated by the Treasury staff). In 1948 the tendency towards more austerity, towards a rapid return to a free market economy, towards a reduction of government planning and, overall, towards economic liberalism triumphed over the other tendency. The Quai d'Orsay then shared the convictions of the Ministere des Finances·, the Ministere de l'Economie Nationale adhering to another line, had to submit. In June 1948, Pierre Mendes-France, former Minister of the Economie Nationale, paid a visit to Vincent Auriol to suggest the creation of a Ministry of External Economic Relations. This new Ministry should integrate relevant areas of Foreign Affairs, Economie Nationale and Finances.24 A vain proposal, since the cabinet A. Marie, formed 6 weeks later, confirmed the victory of liberal othodoxy (with Paul Reynaud as Minister of Finances and Joseph Laniel as Under-Secretary of the Economie Nationale). A decisive change of direction had occurred.

It was always difficult, as has already been pointed out during the preceding symposium, to plumb the inmost thoughts of the decision-makers. Just as in 1938, they usually expressed their ideas on a current problem or else they suggested this or that immediately necessary decision. Rarely did they stand back to analyze their overall perception of the situation. They were people under stress, forced to act. In such circumstances, archival search for texts which might illustrate their perception of French power results in the admission of failure... by the historian. Nevertheless, the genesis of the actions undertaken, the direction of the choices made, even the silence on the reasons for awkward decisions and for painfully reached compromises allow us to discern the major lines of thought of the French decision-makers. If we think back to 1948, it seems that at the time the majority of the decision-makers had experienced a real crisis of consciousness, taking into account realistically the terrible French dependence in the face of a twofold pre23

Auriol, op. cit., p p . 5 5 1 and 5 6 6 (entries of 1st and 8 D e c . 1948).

24

Ibid., p. 2 6 4 (10June 1948).

56

Rene Girault

dicament: financial weakness and partition of the world into two hostile camps. The spectre of bankruptcy was doubled by the fear of a looming third world war. Pessismism alone could be the right attitude. Did this mean that any conclusion regarding the remains of French power was characterized by the same black pessimism? Was France no longer a Great Power, contrary to the hopes of the Liberation time? Before we answer this last question, let us try to reestablish some of the reference points to which the French decision-makers referred when they attempted to evaluate this Power. The majority of politicians and high civil servants had been marked by three major events of the preceding ten years: Munich, June 1940, and the Resistance. As time went by, the "capitulation" of Munich seemed to have been the first step towards French defeat; no one wanted to defend the French Munich policy any more; 25 the very word " M u n i c h " had taken on a really symbolic meaning. The defeat of June 1940 was the second negative point of reference: not only had France been defeated, but she had also been occupied. This servitude, still very recent in 1948, was at the origin of several prejudices: first, of a deep-seated hostility, even a strong hatred for the German "occupants" (it would play a role not to be overlooked in the behaviour of the French); then, of a reservedness or even uneasy sensitivity to anything that might recall a dominant foreign presence (visible in connection with American commissions under the Marshall plan); finally, there remained the haunting memory of the living conditions at the times of the occupation, with their misery, their black market, their collaboration; in this respect, the reference to Vichy still evoked shame in 1948, particularly for those who had not opted for the Resistance after the occupation of the southern zone in November 1942. 26 Hereafter the Resistance became the crucible in which the new politicians and the new administrators were formed. On 31 December 1947, Vincent Auriol summed up the first year of normal life of the young Fourth Republic. Governing, he wrote, is both an art and a science; it requires men of character, of ability, and with experience. Before 1939, the old formed the young. "There was continuity. This time, there is a formidable gap [ . . . ] The Republic had to be rebuilt with young, inexperienced men and indecisive administrators the majority of whom, often the best, had been compromised through Vichy or had been removed from office." 27 Doubtless the purification process began to lose momentum in 1948/1949, and a substantial number of persons who had only slightly been involved regained their positions. Nevertheless a certain attitude remained 25

Despite his courageous attitude during the War and his deportation, Edouard Daladier, who symbolized Munich, was marginalized by the political leaders. When he addressed the Assembly in July 1948, Auriol was surprised that "nobody reminded him of 1 9 3 8 " , Auriol, op. cit., p. 321.

16

A number of high civil servants chose at that time to join France

combattante:

Jean Chauvel,

Maurice Couve de Murville, Guillaume Guindey, Emmanuel Monick, Rene Massigli et alii. 17

Auriol, Journal,

I, p. 656.

57

T h e French Decision-Makers

predominant. From 1942/1944 France, in order to survive, had to undergo a profound transformation on all levels, political, economic, social, cultural. One desired far less a return to tradition and a glorious past than a new start to a decidedly different future. The means to realize this change could differ or even contradict each other, depending on ideological preferences, e.g. between planning and free market advocates, but it is possible to speak of a nearly general consensus regarding the need to modernize France. In 1943/1944 modernization plans had been worked out in London, Algiers and Washington by the French abroad, in the same manner as the Conseil National de la Resistance had opted for a profound transformation of the country and not just its liberation. Therefore, when Jean Monnet launched his modernization and equipment program, his projects were not hampered by hostile or indifferent "decision-makers". "As it was to become clear, the past did not resist. No force had to be applied, although much persuasion proved necessary. France was a new country, full of fresh energy that only waited for an opportunity to exert itself, a method for action and goals to focus upon." 2 8 In conclusion, Power meant renewal. We had to enter the New World, created by the war, in different shape. The past offered no reference point. In this New World everybody realized that real power was exclusively in the hands of the two super-powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. There was no question of competing with them, but France could play a part in the world within the bounds of her means. A kind of classification might thus establish itself: the two giants were unreachable, but then the old great powers, Great Britain and France, who had emerged "victorious" from the war and still owned colonial possessions, deserved the status of great powers. For the short term, neither Italy, defeated and deprived of her colonial Empire, nor Germany, occupied, divided and under foreign control, could claim that status, no more than the new remote countries that were vast but thinly populated, like the Dominions, Brazil, or Argentina, or those that were poor and overpopulated, like China and India. 29 Therefore France could play her part as a great power, especially if she modernized herself. Now, this role was understood to be that of a State which was not only itself independent, but also able to ensure, perhaps together with other European countries, the freedom of action of a third force between the two formerly-allied camps, which from 1945 onwards had been drifting apart. The rupture between Washington and Moscow was soon perceived by French leaders, even if the "cold war" began only in 1947 and up to then it had still been possible to cherish

Memoires,

28

Jean Monnet,

"

T h e lack of understanding of the French decision-makers towards the young Indian Republic is

Paris 1976, vol. I, p. 332.

shown in the paper of Christine Sellin.

58

Rene Girault

some illusions. Even at this time, in 1947 and the beginning of 1948, there was still hope to stay somewhere half-way between the Americans and Soviets. One counted on some European trump cards: Did Britain and the Benelux Countries not share French interests, since, like the French, they had to ensure their security against a German revenge, and like the French, they possessed fully-developed technical and human resources, like the French, they were in possession of colonial empires that remained pledges of power provided they were modernized and a closer partnership was established with them. A Western Europe, better organized and more closely united, would thus be a space free from the will of the two super-powers. Such an organization and such a position o f France would, however, depend on several factors: first of all, it was necessary that the countries concerned, notably the British partner, shared a common intention; moreover, they had to have sufficient economic means to resist external pressure; above all, peace had to be preserved, particularly in Europe, and the constraints of expensive rearmament had to be avoided; furthermore, the colonial possessions had to be central points o f development and not onerous impediments. In concrete terms, these necessary conditions essentially depended on the solution of two central problems: on the one hand, the German question and on the other, the financing o f industrial investments. Let us explain what is meant by this. From the French point of view, Germany was not only a potential enemy of whom France and her European allies had to beware, but she could also be the convenient source of financial and technical resources capable of relieving certain internal shortages. For the short term, Germany meant coal and thus the Ruhr, reparations and thus a beneficial occupation zone, a muzzled state and thus division and control by its neighbours. T h e economic modernization of France presupposed, by the way, that her " r i c h " American ally would prove his goodwill and consent to grant the indispensable external loans, even if this entailed in exchange conceding him advantages for his trade, his films, even a joint exploitation of colonial possessions. Was the United States not obliged to sell abroad in order to change from a war-time to a peace-time economy? W h a t one could call the "French b e t " thus presupposed a compliant American ally and a subjugated Germany. In 1948, the French decision-makers sooner or later came to understand that these two conditions did either not or no longer exist. Indeed, the climate of the cold war had played a decisive part. French policy towards Germany was a fiasco.30 From the end of 1947 the Anglo-Saxons had resolved to settle the German problem without Soviet agreement. They wanted to create a Western German State able to survive and develop. But while France had accepted the prin-

30

Papers of Mrs. Catherine Uhel de Cuttoli and Mrs. Annie Lacroix.

The French Decision-Makers

59

ciple of German economic recovery, she continued to demand reliable guarantees for her security when the London conference began on 23 February 1948. 3 1 What was particularly ill received was the idea that a Western German State should be constituted, the consequence of which would at once be the creation of an Eastern German State. The French were convinced that the desire for German re-unification would be so strong that the Germans would be pushed to turn to the East, for Berlin and Prussia would continue to have their fascination; the worst would come with a strong Germany backed up by the European East. 3 2 The first part of the London conference (until 6 March) was rather successful for the French; the Quai d'Orsay breathed a sigh of relief, but when the conference resumed in April, the French position soon became untenable. Since "the Prague coup" and above all during the month of March 1948, the Europeans and then the Americans had the feeling that Stalin was preparing for direct action in Europe. A chill wind of fear was blowing at the Quai d'Orsay as well as in the White House and the State Department; the fear of an immediate war was developping clearly before the Berlin blockade. Therefore the radical solutions of General Clay (who, according to Massigli, "lost his head to anticommunism") were accepted by his government: quickly to constitute a Western German government capable of joining in the Western camp, without giving priority treatment to the guarantees that France demanded. The risks of a Russian invasion took precedence over everything, including French security. At the end of March Henri Bonnet pointed out that "the main worry, at least for the moment, is to set up in Germany a point of support against the U.S.S.R. with the consent and active cooperation of the Germans themselves". 33

This American activism was considered by almost all the French as awkward and even provocative. Jean Chauvel, Maurice Couve de Murville, the Socialist ministers, and Vincent Auriol thought that the precipitate creation of Western Germany would provoke the Russians who would use it as a pretext for immediate action; "the creation of a Western German government [ . . . ] is the most provocative act one could possibly think of against the Soviet Union", Couve de Murville wrote on 10May 1948. 34

31

Three types of guarantees were demanded: demilitarization of Germany and permanent occupation of the Rhenish provinces, foundation of a very federal Germany, international organization of the Ruhr industry under the authority of the three occidental Powers. Instructions of Georges Bidault for Rene Massigli, 21 February 1948.

32

Curiously, neither Vincent Auriol nor the Quai d'Orsay took into account the German hostility towards the Russians. General Koenig was more subtle in his judgment. Telegram of 25 March 1948, Archives Bidault. Note of lOMay 1948, MAE, serie Y-54.

33 34

60

Rene Girault

Moreover, according to this same senior civil servant who had visited Berlin in the beginning of April: "the Russians are physically capable of driving us out of Berlin through hunger, thirst, and darkness" and "no air communication can make up for the land obstacles that the Soviets would throw in the way of communications between the Western zones". 35 Moreover, the Americans, in spite of the French appeals, had not yet provided the answer to a Russian invasion of the European continent; the American concept of stopping the Red Army at the foot of the Pyrenees (sic) could not delight the French, who were convinced that the situation would be irreversible. "Not even is there an emergency plan for the supply of arms. France is therefore strictly reduced to her own means, since the Brussels Pact unites only the powerless. In other words, she is totally exposed", commented Couve de Murville.36 Consequently, three solutions were theoretically possible for the French: they could try to disengage themselves from the threatening conflict by a "neutralist" policy between the two superpowers, they could take the initiative for a new four-power conference to at least lessen the tension, they could reluctantly close up to the American position. The first solution, defended by the "neutralist" school in the press (Claude Bourdet in Combat, Franc Tireur), was rejected by almost all "decision-makers" as it presupposed either that France would be capable of defending her integrity just by herself, or that Western Europe could pursue one common policy between the blocs. The Ministre des Armees P. E. Teitgen kept on repeating before the Cabinet that the French army was unable to resist (at the most for 6 days). There was no common understanding with the British, at least none on the German problem or on a movement away from the U.S.A. Even if Bevin showed himself rather well-disposed to a European structure, one did not feel any closeness with Great Britain, much to the regret of Ambassador Massigli, who also complained of the lack of understanding between Bidault and Bevin. In any case, the British policy would not be directed towards "neutralism". The second solution, championed by Vincent Auriol and the socialist ministers,37 was considered by Bidault and the Quai d'Orsay as completely illusory. The United States was scarcely in favour, and in any case, the Soviets had proved during the preceding conferences that they refused to enter into any concrete dialogue. One senses on this point that the recent experience of failed conferences weighed on the convictions of the decision-makers of the Quai d'Orsay, who, moreover, were hostile towards communism. In the view of the Minister

35

34 37

Cited from a personal letter of Chauvel to Bonnet, 15 April 1948, MAE, Henri Bonnet papers, vol. 1. Note of 10 May 1948, MAE, serie Y-54. See letter of the Socialist ministers to Robert Schuman, 22April 1948, Auriol, Journal, II, annex, p. 596.

The French Decision-Makers

61

Georges Bidault, who increasingly adopted American views, anti-communism gained ground in these quarters; one felt scarcely inclined to argue. Finally, could one validly talk with each other, that is to say find solutions to bridge the gap between the two giants? For the decision-makers of the Quai, for Jean Monnet, for the civil servants of the Ministere des Finances the answer did not leave any doubt, if relations with the United States were to loosen, France could no longer count on American economic aid. G. Bidault voiced it before the Cabinet: "There is not the ghost of a chance of benefitting from Marshall aid whilst also obstructing a Germany that would, moreover, be at least half compatible with our views. There are moments when one has to know where to stop. If we want to act single-handedly we lose everything. In our present miserable situation we must not follow up anything but the logic of our national interest." 38 George Bidault was right, and the other decision-makers resigned themselves to follow him: the signing of the London treaties and their passage by the French Parliament in June 1948 marked the end of a certain French policy towards Germany. The Berlin blockade which represented a new Soviet stiffening of attitude that was linked to the American stiffening did not leave France any chance of pursuing an independent policy. The feeling of powerlessness marked the French decision-makers in this summer of 1948. At the same time, with regard to the economic reconstruction of France thanks to American aid, there could nevertheless prevail in the French decisionmakers' mind the impression of protecting the essential. Therefore French powerlessness would not be total. 39 In spring 1948, the big question concerning the Marshall aid was whether the American allies would demand large concessions on the part of the recipients of this aid. In this context of international crisis the French negotiators prepared (together with the American representatives) the signing of a bilateral treaty on the conditions of the Marshall aid. Some American claims were considered as excessive by the French side: France had to accept conditions regarding the balancing of her budget, impose export credit restrictions, grant most favoured nation status to Germany and Japan, agree to a control of the exchange rate for aid dollars received, finally accept that the United States should receive strategic materials from French overseas territories.40 Difficult negotiations took place until the end of June, 1948. The American concessions were still very limited, except for the list of strategic materiels and the conditions of access to the French colonial possessions. With resignation and not without critical debates, French

38 39

Cabinet session of 2 6 M a y 1948, ibid., p. 241. For this part of my summary the papers of Georges Bossuat, Michel Margueraz and Philippe Mioche have been useful.

40

Note of G. Guindey, 4 June 1948, Archives Nationales (AN), serie F. 60.

62

Rene Girault

government and parliament therefore gave in: on 28 June 1948 the FrancoAmerican treaty was signed. 41 A new proof of powerlessness? It is actually advisable to see the stakes where they really were. To become again a great power, France had to modernize on the economic level; alone she could not succeed in this, without external credits. The United States could contribute to this renewal through aid by way of gifts. This was indeed the case of the Marshall Plan (90% gift, 10% loans). Moreover, if the French were allowed to choose where to invest, if they were free to develop this or that economic sector as they pleased, one could envisage that the momentary dependence would later on make it possible for France to become fully developed and therefore powerful. Not only was the amount of aid important, but so were the terms and conditions of its disbursement. What Jean Monnet and a certain number of French experts wanted was to retain control of the appropriation of the credits. In this case, they could really modernize France and thus keep her clear of "decadence and bondage". Several battles were indispensable to achieve this aim. First, as a necessary prerequisite, inflation had to be stopped. Since summer 1947 Jean Monnet, wellacquainted with the American wishes, had emphasized the urgency of a fight against inflation. This wish was shared by the whole Finance administration and expressed by G. Guindey who, in agreement with E. Monick, towards June/July 1947 presented his minister (Robert Schuman), with a plan intended to "change course". 4 2 It staked the need for a "realistic" exchange rate, the lifting of import restrictions so as to expose French industry to international competition, a struggle against inflation by a budget stabilization and credit restriction, untying of the gold market, encouragement of the return of private capital that had fled abroad. This plan was partially implemented by Rene Mayer at the beginning of 1948, in spite of British hostility to the French monetary measures, and taken up again in expanded form by the Queuille administration in autumn 1948. Thus a more orthodox financial policy, well understood by Washington, came into force. Was this the result of American entreaties? As a matter of fact, the French experts did not ignore American expert opinion; but, moreover, how could they proceed otherwise as soon as it had been resolved to return to a "classical" administration of public finance? There was no need for an injunction. The second battle was directly connected with Franco-American relations. The Marshall Plan had to provide France with dollars for her external purchases, but would it not be possible, as J. Monnet proposed in December 1947, to assign the equivalent of these dollars in francs to productive objectives like

41

42

In Parliament, 89 members abstained from voting or refused to agree, the communists not taken into account. The Cabinet equally showed little enthusiasm. See the testimony of G. Guindey in: Bulletin du Centre d'Histoire de la France contemporaine, 3, 1982 (Universite de Paris X Nanterre).

63

T h e French Decision-Makers

reconstruction and equipment? After discussions with the Americans and against the "theoretical" considerations of the French civil servants of the Mittistere des Finances (Guindey, Bloch-Laine), Jean Monnet's views gained acceptance. From April 1948, with the beginning of the temporary aid that preceded the Marshall Plan itself, France could employ the exchange value in francs for productive investments. 43 This was a decisive choice that afterwards allowed France to be the only European country obtaining this advantage. The subsequent frictions between the French and the E. C. A. were doubtless to demonstrate the precariousness of this settlement, but all in all France was to benefit from a decisive financial influx ("it has saved us", Fran$ois Bloch-Laine would later maintain) that was rather freely distributed. In 1948, 70 per cent of government investments and in 1949, 90 per cent of the same investments would come from this source. 44 Strictly speaking, the allocation of these exchange values was subject to American approval; and during 1948 the Americans did not fail to exploit this as a means of exerting pressure on the French authorities. But in view of the general agreement between Jean Monet and the administrators of the E . C . A . , one might even wonder whether this American "pressure" was not suggested by the Commissariat au Plan. Of course, one could, on the one hand, note constant American pressure on the French to embark on a course of fiscal and budgetary austerity, particularly in December 1948, to the extent that some French leaders were antagonized (the use of the exchange values and even the aid in general, it was intimated, would be subjected to unacceptable political terms); but on the other hand Harriman and the functionaries of the E. C. A. in France had realized the advantage for the Americans of a modernized France, capable of escaping from misery and (from their point of view) politically harmful temptations. In December 1948, Jean Monnet saved his plan, which was threatened by the draconian cuts of the Queuille Government, thanks to the support of the Americans and Vincent Auriol; the main equipment plans would be safeguarded and a real balance-of-payments equilibrium in 1952 remained the supreme objective. A third battle was fought on the same field. Had the French effort to modernize herself to be made within a European framework, in the sense of an integration into an interdependent whole where the national interests were subordinated to supernational interests, or did one have to have the national point of view alone? Jean Monnet, for the moment, opted for the second solution: "Co-operation is certainly necessary, but it will come later, deriving support from the national efforts that precede and prepare the way for it". 4 5 When the

43

Cf. G. Bossuat, 'Le poids de l'aide americaine sur la politique economique et financiere de la France', in: Relations

internationales,

37, 1984.

** These are the calculations of Michel Margueraz. 45

N o t e to the head of government, 13 July 1948, A N , F. 60.

64

Rene Girgult

plan was modified at the close of the year, changes were therefore still made on a national basis. " T h e French keep control of their own development plan" (G. Bossuat). Of course, Jean Monnet knew and felt that another stage, that of European organization, would have to extend the efforts of 1948/9, but for the moment the national outlook prevailed. It was French power that was at stake.

It is almost inappropriate to conclude, since the foregoing impressons still seem to be incomplete and uncertain. One should have the possibility of further research, especially on the dominating personalities, such as the ministers Robert Schuman, Rene Mayer, or the "mentors" of political life like Leon Blum, Edouard Herriot, or moreover on the numerous important civil servants. Nonetheless, it seems that this summary can end with some general conclusions. First, if we imagine ourselves in 1948 exactly, it seems that the "decisionmakers" were perfectly aware of French political dependence. An unsuccessful German policy, an urgent need for American financial and military resources were the two most striking aspects of this dependence. Nevertheless dependence did not at all mean, at the same time, an impression of permanent powerlessness. One can be weak or weakened for a moment; all that matters is to prepare " a jubilant dawn". The ideal of modernization is a bet on the future. The new Republic was still very young, but by a common effort of everybody, it would soon have regained the constituent elements of power. Nevertheless, the illusions of 1945 had been given up and one knew that the struggle would be hard: a world divided into two blocs did not facilitate the reascent to power; the more than unstable financial situation was a bad handicap. Of course, there still existed some trump cards: continuing cultural vitality; a Union Frangaise that should be able to ensure a French presence in the world; 46 a reliable network of alliances in Western Europe, especially with the British, while the antagonists of yesterday, Germany and Italy, were weakened. If, for the short term, peace could be maintained, the future would be more rosy. Unlike 1938, one could speak of relative optimism for the future and of greater insight into the momentary weakness. One was particularly aware that the danger of an absolute decline had been very imminent. Everybody still kept June 1940 in mind. Was the worst not behind us? Provided that there was a recovery on the economic level and modernization, there was hope. In sum, one knew perfectly well that the decisive factor for power would be the economic potential. It is by economic growth that the international rank will be assured.

46

This aspect is here left aside. See the contribution of Andre Nouschi, p p . 4 7 5 f f . below.

The French Decision-Makers

65

Zusammenfassung

Bei Kriegsende 1945 waren General de Gaulle und die anderen französischen Verantwortlichen der Meinung, daß Frankreich trotz der schweren Kriegswirkungen immer noch eine Großmacht sei. 1948, nur drei Jahre später, waren bei vielen Pariser Politikern Hoffnungen solcher Art geschwunden. Aus welchen Gründen? Offenkundig haben die finanzielle Schwäche Frankreichs und seine Isolierung in der Deutschlandfrage das Selbstbewußtsein der französischen Entscheidungsträger nachhaltig beeinträchtigt, im Quai d'Orsay ebenso wie in anderen Bereichen der Regierung. Insbesonders mußte alle jene die Last der Auslandsverschuldung bedrücken, die für die Außenhandelsbeziehungen zuständig waren; auch die Pariser Finanzbürokratie, die eine recht eigenwillige wirtschaftspolitische Orientierung befürwortete, schlug schließlich, um den Druck von außen auffangen zu können, einen strikten Kurs inneren wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts ein. Realistische Überlegungen gewannen die Oberhand. Zu diesem Realismus zwangen die Einsicht in die beherrschende internationale Stellung der beiden Supermächte und der Beginn des Kalten Krieges. Als sich 1948 mit der Berlin-Krise die Spannungen in Europa verschärften, wurde den französischen Verantwortlichen die Beschränktheit ihrer Mittel und damit ihrer Mitwirkungsmöglichkeit bei einer Lösung, namentlich der Deutschlandfrage, drastisch vor Augen geführt: Frankreich mußte auf Gedeih und Verderb auf die Linie der Amerikaner einschwenken. Weder der Neutralismus noch die Suche nach einem „Dritten Weg" waren mögliche Alternativen. Die einzige Zukunftshoffnung lag in der Perspektive, zu späterer Zeit durch eine Modernisierung der Wirtschaft mehr Unabhängigkeit zu gewinnen. Vielleicht war die Abhängigkeit nur zeitweilig, sie wurde jedoch von den meisten französischen Entscheidungsträgern als real erlebt.

Italy: the End of a 'Great Power' and the Birth of a 'Democratic Power'"" by Brunello Vigezzi

The Italy of 1 9 3 9 - 4 0 , discussed in the preceding Symposium, 1 was itself a great power of a special kind. It was "the smallest of the great powers" or - as had been said since the 19th Century - "the largest of the minor powers". But the Italy that emerged from the Second World War was the very embodiment of powerlessness. Conquered, divided, uncertain of its existence and of its survival, Italy was a reality difficult to be changed. Even after his first visit to the United States, and having expelled the Communists and Socialists from the government, De Gasperi confessed in mid-1947 to his Ambassador to Washington, Tarchiani: " O u r people believed I had in my pocket all kinds of assurances from America, and instead I had to struggle, not to achieve success, but merely to avoid disaster [ . . . ] " . 2 The true reality was that of De Gasperi's appeal to President Truman: "Mister President [ . . . ] my country is going through [ . . . ] a crisis of self-doubt [ . . . ] we will try in every way to help ourselves, but it is only too obvious that our own efforts are not enough. Until Italy will be able again to rely on the tourist industry, on emigration and on sea trade, and to begin again to export to Germany, it will be impossible to balance our trading budget. During this transitional period we need help [ . . .]". 3 As De Gasperi unceasingly pointed out, this need was urgent: " T h e government will resist as long as it can supply the daily

* In this study I expound the initial results of research I commenced on Italy's participation in the Atlantic Pact; I am very grateful to those in charge and collaborators of the Ufficio Studi and of the Archivio storico del Ministero degli esteri, of the Archivio Centrale dello Stato, of the Centro Studi 1

Tommaso Gallarati Scotti, for their courtesy and their efficiency in helping me. The Symposium of Sevres, 1982. See the Italian contributions in Rene G i r a u l t / R o b e r t Frank (eds), La Puissance

2

en Europe

1938-1940,

Paris 1984.

De Gasperi to Tarchiani, 11 July 1947, in: M . R . De Gasperi (ed.), De Gasperi Brescia 1974, pp. 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 .

3

De Gasperi to Truman, 28 April 1947, ibid., p. 93.

scrive,

vol.11,

68

Brunello Vigezzi

bread ration; if it cannot do so, it will yield to a coalition that will be Communist-dominated, although the Communists will be poorly represented". 4 T w o years later the situation was very different. Having overcome the obstacles ensuing from the Peace Treaty, Italy was concluding its " m a i n diplomatic manoeuvre", assuring its reinstatement on a par with the " o t h e r nat i o n s " with the elimination of " a n y political or moral difference", and was deciding to participate in the Atlantic Pact. But when Sforza, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced this to Parliament, he still cautioned: " R e m e m b e r that this is not 'power politics' [ . . . ] We do not possess the instruments for a power policy, nor do we wish to possess them [ . . . ] " . 5 Sforza's statements, though obviously intended as a response to accusations from the Left, stressed an important aspect of the issue. T h e history of Italy from 1943 to 1950 was largely that of the " e n d of a great p o w e r " , with all the problems involved in such an event. It was not easy to administer the heritage o f the past, nor was it easy - in such a moment as that of the postwar period - to decide on new roads to follow. In reading reports written by the chief ambassadors, we may note that Brosio, Gallarati Scotti, Quaroni and Tarchiani never ceased to stress that the age when Italy was " a great p o w e r " was over. Their language is often highly realistic, even blunt. " T h e recognition of Italy as a great power, juridically on a par with the others, was a compensation awarded her for having participated together with France and England in the first World War. We threw away this position by fighting on the other side; we should speak no more of it [ . . . ] " . Former allies had a hard time of it too, but the main point was indisputable: " I am not at all sure that England is an iron vessel, still less so that France is, but I am certain of the fact that we are only a poor earthenware vessel. We have already experienced, and quite recently, the consequences of trying to apply an iron-vessel policy when we are instead only an earthenware vessel"/ W h a t was less obvious was the role that might be assumed by Italy. T h e ambassadors seemed to do little more than redraft a curious hierarchy of European powers, for example, by making room for Benelux, " t h e new great p o w e r " , which " h a s downgraded us, in Europe, from third to fourth place"; 7 or to analyze heatedly the means by which Italy might establish itself as an intermediate power or, as one of them characteristically expressed it, a "secondary

4 5

De Gasperi to Tarchiani, 10 Sept. 1947, ibid., p. 136. Speech of 15 M a r c h 1949, resumed in C. Sforza, Cinque

attni a Palazzo Chigi. La politica

estera

italiana dal 1947 al 1951, R o m e 1952, pp. 189, 234. * Archivio Storico diplomatico del ministero degli affari esteri (ASMAE), Quaroni to Sforza, 27 Jan. 1948. 7

A S M A E , Quaroni to Sforza, 29 May 1948, with obvious reference to Western Europe and that particular period.

Italy: End of a 'Great Power'

69

major power" 8 . At times they outlined a scheme for Italian "neutrality" of the Swiss or Swedish type, noting however the many obstacles to the implementation of this project. More often, either spontaneously or in obedience to the forces of reality, they attempted to reconcile Italy's residual "independence" with the rapidly growing "interdependency" (or, as they also bluntly termed it, "dependency"), typical of the world taking shape at the conclusion of the Second World War. Among its other problems, Italy in the years between 1947 and 1949 still had to resolve (or, more precisely, to witness the resolving of) the question of its "colonies". The colonies were the most obvious reminder of Italy's past as a "great power", and resistance to the idea of relinquishing them was frequent. Moreover, it was unclear why the colonies had to be given up and who was to benefit by this. Would it be to the advantage of one of the old "great powers", of Ethiopia, of the new Arab peoples, or for the recent strategical requirements of the struggle against Communism? The difficulties were obvious and various. But another aspect was equally important in the formulation of Italy's new foreign policy. Both in regard to ratification of the Peace Treaty and to debate over the colonial issue, the government and its diplomats had to deal with public opinion, with the political parties. De Gasperi, Sforza, the government, experienced all the temptations of the past, and arduously searched for a way to build a new "democratic power" which would link more closely foreign and internal policy, and would be rooted in a broader consensus of opinion. Diplomacy too was to give unusually ample space to the political parties, increasingly so when the emergence of the Cold War made it much more difficult to define the characteristics of a "democratic power". De Gasperi, Sforza, the Secretary-Generals of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the ambassadors perceived in this way the problems of a "power policy", the uncertainty of which was reflected in the very terms used in discussing it. The history of Italian foreign policy between 1947 and 1950 in particular can be defined, to use a formula, as the history of the end of a "great power", and of its uneasy transition to the status of "democratic power". But this history has, perhaps, a broader, truer significance. Undoubtedly, Italy's situation in 1947 cannot be even remotely compared to that of France or England. Italian diplomats often stressed this. However, it becomes obvious, in reading their reports, that the Italy of that period still had some profound links, some basic affinity with the histories of all the other Western European powers (not to speak of the already impending German problem, not to speak of Eastern Europe). An analysis of the Italian government and diplomacy and their "perception of power politics" must go beyond its limits to

8

A S M A E , Tarchiani to Sforza, 6 J u n e 1948.

70

Brunello Vigezzi

become an analysis of European history, in an attempt to define the conditions of the Western European powers, or of Western Europe as a whole, with regard to the superpowers and the postwar world. As the horizon broadened, Italy became increasingly aware of the vast disproportion in strength. As the Cold War became more threatening, the "Italian factor, in itself, disappeared", as one diplomat noted 9 . This was perhaps going too far. The "Italian factor" was soon to re-emerge, and attempt to reestablish the relations that were indispensable for entering the new "system" of forces. However, the overall world situation of the period was to have a strong influence on Italian foreign policy, especially from the point of view of "power politics". The disproportionate strength of the forces in the field had another effect, that of heightening attention immeasurably. Italian diplomacy was, it seemed, forced to accentuate the traits that had marked it for centuries, as it attempted to comprehend globally the new developments and characteristics of the world around it. In this regard, Italian diplomacy could be seen as a kind of observatory from which to view the transformations of postwar "power politics" on a general scale, although it was often hard put to conceal its dismay when comparing the possibilities of the "poor earthenware vessel" of Italy with the imperious demands of emerging "world politics". In fact the prospects for Italian foreign policy between 1947 and 1950 were numerous, and were characterized by difficulties, tensions and even obvious contradictions. Historiography has very often neglected these different aspects, preferring to superimpose events from one subsequent period onto preceding ones, absurdly simplifying the situation in more than one case. It must be remembered that Italy, from 1947 to 1950, was engaged in a laborious attempt to reinstate herself on a par with other nations in the international context. It was only in this way that Italian foreign policy could reacquire its own individual character and demonstrate - beyond any trite, preconceived concept - both its weakness and its vitality.

The Peace Treaty: from revision to

"revisionism"

Italy had hoped to be reinstated at an early date on an equal footing in the international community. The Armistice, the declaration of war against Germany (and against Japan), the Resistance, the new regulation of boundary lines, the spontaneous offer of a number of sacrifices (De Gasperi's letter to Byrnes in August 1945) formed the bases for this new policy. But the Peace Treaty, with the

• A S M A E , Quaroni to Sforza, 3 F e b . 1948.

Italy: End of a 'Great Power'

71

harshness of its clauses and the issues left unsettled, ranging from Trieste to the colonies, had acted as a cold shower on these residual illusions. The treaty was anachronistic and unjust, a relic "from the XVIII Century", nothing but "clauses on boundaries, military service, economic limitations and impositions [.. .]". 1 0 Although Sforza and De Gasperi had very little doubt as to this, they were in agreement in recommending ratification of the treaty by Italy. Their singular collaboration, as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, which was to influence strongly Italian foreign policy for a number of years, had begun on just these bases, which had aroused heated criticism. The result was that Italy had signed, and then ratified, the treaty, but had immediately protested, clearly and officially, declaring her "right to rely on a radical revision of elements which could paralyze or poison the life of a nation of forty-five million human beings crowded into a land that cannot feed them". 1 1 This behavior, although contradictory, clearly expressed the faith of De Gasperi and Sforza in their cause and in the possibility of reaching a friendly agreement. Revision might be accomplished not so much by formal acts, it was hoped, as by a peace policy with its resulting concord, which would gradually demolish the Peace Treaty, clause be clause, either through spontaneous renunciations of enforcement or merely by the passage of time. Ratification of the Peace Treaty and the request for a friendly revision may be considered the first act of the "democratic power". Nor were results lacking, with renunciation, especially on the part of the United States, to implement this or that part of the treaty. All in all, however, from early 1948 throughout the year, the Italian government and diplomats found their trust sorely tested. Apart from the consequences of the Cold War (for the U N O , for Trieste, etc.) the Western powers themselves led Italy to question the choice she had made. While granting many concessions, these powers let their favors fall from above, emphasizing the difference between victors and vanquished; or even simply requested implementation of the treaty's clauses. Toward the end of 1948, after his visits to Brussels and Paris, the discouraged De Gasperi explicitly mentioned this in a meeting of the Council of Ministers. "Reports on his trip [ . . . ] Soundings, not formal discussions [ . . . ] England's coldness, motivated above all by doubts as to the solidity of the Italian political situation [...] Unfortunately, the thought of the recent war still weighs on us. Only the Americans have forgotten [ . . . ] The Europeans have not". 1 2 The Americans had forgotten. This was correct. But when Tarchiani, in mid-1948, had gone to the State Department to meet Hickerson, the Director of Political Affairs, he had there also heard repeated "the insistence that Italy maintain her 10 11 12

Speech of 24 July 1947 at the Constituent Assembly, also in the work cited by Sforza, p. 32. Circular of 11 Feb. 1947, ibid., p. 17. Archivio centrale dello Stato (ACS), Minutes of the Council of Ministers of 2 6 N o v . 1948.

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Brunello Vigezzi

commitment to destroy the two battleships returned to her by the United States and by Great Britain [ . . . ] Any too-obvious concern to rearm, or to keep weapons that are not indispensable, may be erroneously interpreted and may feed suspicions not entirely allayed." 13 The obstacle, though at times more annoying than real, was still there and its effects were significant. It cast doubt on the chosen line of action. It thrust the issue of "revision" into the foreground. Italy must obtain satisfaction before all else! If not, as pointed out by an ambassador, the request for friendly revision would swell into "revisionism"; with all the poisons that this might entail. 14

The Mogadiscio affair During these years, Italy seemed to turn inwards on herself, to lick her wounds, 15 reacting to adverse events with a kind of blunt opposition leaving little space for other considerations. The "Mogadiscio affair" was from this point of view the most shocking event of the period. The killing of 52 Italians in the former colony, in early 1948, outraged the government, public opinion, the political parties. The local British commanders were guilty of grave negligence (if not complicity); the "unchecked Somali forces" did the rest [ . . . ] " . The event, significant in itself, gave rise to opinions, judgements and reactions covering a vaster area, which cast its shadow over the entire year of 1948. The old and the new mingled. Old-style nationalists called for the return of the colonies. Left-wing elements favored another type of nationalism uniting colonial claims and the will to place Italy in opposition to the Western powers. But this tendency was even more widely diffused. To the embittered, disillusioned Italy, "nationalism" and "revisionism", the dangerous consequences of the disintegration of a "great power", still seemed to provide an answer. "Dear Tommasino, I must first of all call your attention to the spontaneous, unanimous and, I might say, significant reactions of all Italian public opinion to the Mogadiscio affair. I can assure you that the government has tried to act, as far as possible, to curb excesses." Sforza, writing to Gallarati Scotti, was certainly trying to influence Great Britain, to induce it to favor his policy of cooperation and reasonable revision, but he was also establishing, albeit in an exaggerated manner, the terms of a deepening conflict in Italian foreign policy. " T h a t England not render our efforts vain, that its African policy not favor the insurgence

13

ASMAE, Tarchiani to Sforza, 8 M a y 1948.

14

ASMAE, Quaroni to Sforza, 24 M a y 1948.

15

A S M A E , Sforza's circular of 14July 1948.

16

ACS, Minutes of the Council of Ministers of 19Feb. 1948.

Italy: End of a 'Great Power'

73

of nationalism, either rightist or leftist, nor the manoeuvres of those who are trying to separate our country from the Western world, which would be a disaster not only for us, but also for others; this is what we are asking". 1 7 From London, Gallarati Scotti was even more drastic and impatient: "Viewed from here, our propaganda in regard to the Mogadiscio affair seemed totally wrongly directed, since it tended to excite public opinion without taking into account reality [ . . . ] It rests on the presupposition that we did not lose the war—that we have not given up for a peace treaty (albeit iniquitous) our rights to the African colonies." The debate dealt with controversial issues, but Gallarati Scotti broadened the perspective still further. The propaganda disseminated in Italy wilfully ignored the fact that " a profound revolution deriving from the w a r " had "occurred in the history of the world" 1 8 . Gallarati Scotti, like other ambassadors, strove to understand the general developments that were taking place. Undoubtedly, this strengthened his criticism, which was not, however, enough to undermine conflicting opinions or to change the course of Italian foreign policy. The Mogadiscio case, within this context, was representative. The controversy was destined to repeat itself also because the ambassadors themselves were often unsure of which road to follow between "nationalism" and "revisionism".

Italy and the "Cold War" world The heads of the major Italian Embassies during this period were engaged in a sincere attempt to evaluate new developments, or at least to achieve a sense of proportion providing a basis for orientation. Basically, what they saw was the spread of the Cold War. They questioned its significance, its import, which made problematical even those great events that had before held the scene. The historical turning point in British policy was its acceptance "in full of the Continental policy" of Europe. Gallarati was sure of this, 1 ' although he was of two minds (basically more admiring than critical) about the foreign policy of the Labourite press in regard to the Commonwealth. Stirred to irritation, he commented: "Certainly it is not easy to claim the right to colonies with the people who have abandoned India, are preparing to leave Palestine and have within the last few days seen Birma withdraw from the Commonwealth [.. .]" 2 0

17

Biblioteca Ambrosiana (Milan), Documents of T o m m a s o Gallarati Scotti (CGS), Sforza to Gallarati Scotti, 23 J a n . 1948.

18

C G S , undated (and unsigned) memorandum from London.

19

C G S , undated, unsigned report (but of February 1948). C G S , Gallarati Scotti to the Director of Political Affairs Z o p p i , 23 J u n e 1948.

20

74

Brunello Vigezzi

France, by comparison, was more hesitant. Its recurrent attempts to play an independent role, even by return into to the mania for "chain p a c t s " o f the period between World Wars I and II, were giving way to a more fruitful solidarity between France and England, which was soon to split either over the Mediterranean issue, or the question of Arabs and Jews. 2 1 Quaroni noted this, as he observed the existence of an Anglo-French tendency, more or less overt, more or less consistent, to oppose American intrusion. But the Cold War was to shuffle this pattern definitively, leaving the United States in a clearly primary position. Relations between the United States and Great Britain were perhaps consolidated, but the work that must be done to set up the new "Anglo-American" political and military system" 2 2 was far from clear-cut, as shown by all the perplexity in regard to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the Arabs and the Jews. Foreign policy, at any rate, was taking on a new worldwide aspect, and this too caused Quaroni (like Gallarati Scotti) to cry out against the narrowmindedness, the isolationism of the Italian nationalists and revisionists, who sought support for their colonial requests by flirting with the Arabs and irritating the English, without the slightest idea of the forces they were reawakening. " W e do not realize what this Arab world in ferment really means. Here at Paris I am in contact with both Arab nationalistic elements and officials, managers, businessmen from the North African colonies. Thus I have heard on one side exaltation, fanaticism, on the other the enormous difficulties encountered every day, difficulties so severe as to give rise to doubt, among the more intelligent Frenchmen, in regard to the possibilities of remaining in Africa. T h a t the English are playing the Arab card, because it is to their advantage, there is not the slightest doubt. But there is even less doubt that we have no idea of the wrath of God that would fall upon our shoulders the day we took Libya back. T h e least that can be said is that we would need a new conquest, we would need ten of Graziani, and all this in an international atmosphere hardly likely to tolerate methods of this kind". 2 3 T h e central fact remained, obviously, the clash between the USSR and the United States, with all its corollary effects. Perhaps the USSR did not want war, but the anxiety-laden question was reiterated again and again in the reports, and found no soothing answer. Western Europe was practically defenseless. T h e usual image evoked was that of a new " w a r of liberation", with the Russian army advancing swiftly across Europe and the United States counterattacking from beyond the English Channel, from the Pyrenees, from North Africa. 2 4

21

A S M A E , Quaroni to Sforza, 27 Jan. 1948.

22

A S M A E , Quaroni to Sforza, 3 F e b . 1948.

"

Ibid.

24

A S M A E , Quaroni to Sforza, 6 May 1948.

Italy: End of a 'Great Power'

75

Europe, in the meantime, was divided, and the Italian diplomats were becoming resigned even to these new, ominous facts. "In any case it is increasingly clear, and I have been writing you this for two years now, that the world and Europe are more and more divided into two distinct, and opposing, groups. The Marshall Plan has served above all to define and delineate these groups even more clearly". Tarchiani's assessment of the situation finds no one to contradict it. From Washington, he is even more emphatic: "American instructions for General Clay in Germany let it be understood quite openly that the intention is to organize the industrial Reich and admit it to the Western camp; this was of course inevitable. I am afraid the 'open door' of Paris was only a figure of speech. You should keep in mind the fact that here they would have viewed with extreme apprehension, in the current situation of suspicion and mistrust, any participation of the USSR and its satellites in the economic (and therefore political, sooner or later) block of Europe. They would have wanted to keep Czechoslovakia as a hostage, as an element for penetration behind the Iron Curtain, even knowing that, of necessity, it would have been an element of penetration on this side too. Unless there is a Soviet about-face, which hardly seems likely, things will drift toward the darkest incomprehension, complicated by the fear that secret weapons are being prepared which could, at a certain moment, be a decisive means of domination over any enemy. The world situation is now at this point." 25 Hopes were dissolving, the UNO was losing its influence. The antagonists were becoming gigantic, tough, menacing. Even "traditional European diplomacy" was on the wane, and this was a fact which suddenly brought Russians and Americans, who both "reasoned and worked on a completely different level" from that of the past, closer together. 26 Although adversaries, they could recognize each other in a common atmosphere. "In the long-gone days when governments were less democratic but more civil [ . . . and] policy was made in Europe by Europeans, when one saw a country whose friendship or alliance was desired flirting with one's adversary, one tried to lure it away by offering greater advantages. The Russians and the Americans, each in their own sector, use a policy which is perhaps effective at the moment, but is certainly less pleasant — that of a blow on the head". 27 At times the ambassadors showed signs of inability to accept the reality of the situation, but even so they signaled a deeper, more widespread discontent. Europe - even France, even England - found it hard to keep pace with the rhythm of events. Perhaps Europe was really decaying. In a word, the ambassadors formed the framework within which an ade25

Tarchiani to D e Gasperi, 18 July 1947, De Gasperi, op. cit., p. 133. " ASMAE, Quaroni to Sforza, 22 Jan. 1948. 17 ASMAE, Quaroni to Sforza, 8 Aug. 1948.

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quate, intelligent foreign policy could be fitted; in following and analyzing events, they gave an indication of what criteria might be adopted. Italian foreign policy in the future would, after all, be defined on the basis of similar presuppositions. The perception of a "power policy", in this context, was equally clear. It unceasingly confirmed that the traditional European "great powers" had come to an end and that new forms of "power policy" - not always well defined - were emerging. The Italian ambassadors also provided an idea of the new dimensions of politics and of international life. Their disengagement from the Italian neorevisionists and neo-nationalists (to use the recurrent definitions) was, therefore, beyond question. And yet, in spite of this, the ideas and admonitions of individual ambassadors were sometimes ignored. There was more than one weak point. Or perhaps there was a deeper, more secret affinity which did not contradict the individual, opposing positions on "nationalism" or "revisionism", but which prevented them from being thoroughly clarified; an affinity linked to dissatisfaction over the conditions imposed on Italy and the severe obstacles to the development of a new, fruitful foreign policy. Thus Quaroni, having described, analyzed, evaluated the new situation, gave vent to one of his typical outbursts: The situation is " s a d " ; but if Italy merely takes care of her own business, as everyone else does, what can she complain about? 28 The situation even offers some previously non-existent possibilities. Prior to the withdrawal of Russia, prior to the division of Europe, Italy counted for even less... Things have changed during the past year; and if now, in early 1948, England, France and the Benelux countries are trying to reach a mutual agreement in order to have more weight, to establish a privileged relationship with America, it is unlikely that they will be able to do so without Italy. Quaroni wrote at the end of January of Bevin's much-discussed speech, of the prospects for a closer association between England and Western Europe, of the issues which were to give rise to the Brussels Pact - and his formulation of these problems is truly characteristic. "From last Spring, when the Marshall Plan was first spoken of, to today, our situation has changed very much. At that time, when it was still not known whether Russia or some of her satellites would have participated, it was, within certain limits, necessary for us to step forward and ask to be called, since a conference in which we either did not participate or participated behind the door was perfectly conceivable. Today the situation has changed. When we speak of Western Europe we are speaking of such a restricted territory that, if we leave Italy out, I don't know what is left. I am personally convinced that, in spite of all the residual reluctancy, the day when Franco's Spain will inevitably be called is not far distant; imagine us, then. So we can

28

A S M A E , Quaroni to Sforza, 22 Jan. 1948.

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Italy: End of a 'Great Power'

calmly wait for them to come looking for us. I also think this is the most advantageous policy for us. If we try hard now to enter this association, the others will set conditions on our entering it. Today the ratification of the Peace Treaty is no longer an issue, but others might crop up. If instead we have the strength to hold out, we can ourselves set conditions to our accession. This is the quickest and best way to achieve parity, as long as we realize the possible limits of parity. I am also recommending this position of accession in principle, but waiting in reality, because the Bevin plan is still so nebulous that before taking the leap we should see how it is going to develop." 29 Quaroni mentioned these prospective directions several times, while noting however that they were only partial and far too fragile to form a basis for a serious initiative. It was sufficient to view them in the context of the overall picture to understand that things would not work out. Quaroni was soon to reorganize his criteria on a sounder basis. But, understandably, others considered them fully adequate. Quaroni's temporary, partial prospects were a perfect expression of the Italy that, weary of being thrust aside, desired above all else to count for something, to reacquire its status, to achieve "parity" (and took no heed of Quaroni's reservations). Italy could and must speculate on the Cold War too. This criterion was now a factor. "Power policy" in Italy had not yet found a valid form, although many believed, or deluded themselves, that old, reliable answers were still available.

Italy and the Brussels

Pact

Certainly Sforza did not share such illusions. In spite of all, his opinion was unchanged, nor did he show the slightest regret for having formulated and applied, in agreement with De Gasperi, the moderate program calling for ratification of the Peace Treaty and friendly revision. Moreover he certainly desired success for Italy, its reinstatement on an equal footing in the international community, but was also a convinced advocate of Europeanism. But even he, in early 1948, was not entirely convinced of the Tightness of the British initiative, of the way things were going. He was undoubtedly delighted, as he declared, that England had taken the "road" toward "European cooperation", a decision "even more praiseworthy", given the "exceptional situation" of that country, halfway between the Commonwealth and the old Continent. But this time, it seems, Sforza was also intransigent. He wanted "parity", deeming it essential for cooperation. 30 " ASMAE, Quaroni to Sforza, 28 Jan. 1948. 30 Declaration to the Italian Associated Press Agency of 22 Jan. 1948, also transmitted to the embassies (ASMAE).

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Although not a revisionist, not demanding formal recognition in advance, he wanted " d e f a c t o " participation in " a n y preparatory s t a g e " of the accords, in meetings where Italy could discuss with the other nations its difficulties deriving from the Peace Treaty and possible ways to resolve them. 3 1 In the Council of Ministers, he did not commit himself, "noting that we are observers, but extraneous ones, since we are dealing with an act of the presence of Great Britain". Observers, but extraneous ones It was not much indeed, and the Council 32 fully agreed with his point of view. In regard to the actual Brussels Pact, signed by England, France and Benelux on M a r c h 17th, Sforza was, if anything, even more tepid. The pact, it must be acknowledged, was full of implicit connotations. Various meanings could be read into it. Although it was also a pact favoring economic, social and cultural cooperation, it was substantially an agreement for military defense. Formally, it was a pact made to guarantee that Germany would not again threaten other nations, but in actual fact it aimed to provide protection against Russia. The pact was also designed to coordinate Europe's "five p o w e r s " , but the chief aim was that of obtaining aid from the United States, which had, for its part, urged the Western European states to cooperate with each other. The implicit meanings of the pact were too many, and when Sforza reexamined the international situation in early March, his criticism was, though indirect, radical. While praising the economic cooperation ensuing from the Marshall Plan, Sforza insisted, on the political level, only on the "problems left open by the Peace Treaty", or worse still, he stressed "the basic European issue: that of Germany, which needs our collaboration". 3 3 A word to the wise is sufficient. The line of the " F i v e " proved to be feeble and ambiguous. Europe, the true Europe, was something else; and the Five, moreover, by themselves, on the military level, counted for something only if they had America's cooperation. If not, everything would remain the same as before. Discussion continued, ministers and diplomats were involved, and the Italian position began to assume clearer outlines, although its criteria, its means, its very aims were still uncertain in many aspects. T h e tendency, however, was there, and clearly marked; at times, indeed, excessively so. "In regard to the German issue, you are perfectly correct in saying that Germany, and Germany alone, would be the determinant element in any true European union. But this can be achieved only by America, and the more so since Germany today is in reality America. T h e French let themselves be pulled in with

31 31 33

A S M A E , Sforza to Q u a r o n i , 3 Feb. 1948. A C S , Minutes of the Council of Ministers of 28 J a n . 1948. A C S , Minutes of the Council of Ministers of 4 M a r c h 1948.

Italy: End of a 'Great Power'

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clenched teeth, but they cannot really resist [ . . . ] As for British policy [ . . . ] it is always the same [ . . . ] and exerts a paralyzing influence." 3 4 In this letter to Campilli, written in mid-February, Q u a r o n i expressed concepts which were widespread and, on the whole, quite moderate and wellbalanced. At times instead, and more often, Q u a r o n i exaggerated. Leaping from paradox to p a r a d o x , he arrived at the most extreme consequences, which were to have their influence too on the direction that was taking shape. The French, as we all know, sometimes insist too strongly on their superiority, and on such occasions Q u a r o n i did not spare his words. T h e truth was that the 5-way pact was a "simple expedient to drag in America." As for the rest " i t must be admitted that the Western Pact was a military alliance between five military nullities." It actually changed nothing. Only one point w a s , and would remain, decisive - America. Italy however, backed by America, could also reevaluate as a whole the policy to be undertaken, given the enormity of the problems involved. There was Europe, there was the Mediterranean, Africa, the Arabs. " I have specified that no one offered us anything, no one [ . . . ] made investigations, but [ . . . ] we knew [ . . . ] that, among the many ideas circulating in Washington, there was also one for a pact between Italy-Greece-Turkey and the Arab states. If this idea should ever take concrete shape we will obviously be able to take it into consideration at the time, like any other combination." 3 5 Although Sforza felt, in this case, that Q u a r o n i had exaggerated somewhat, his reservations were more for the tone of the statement than for its basic dissatisfaction. In regard to the central issue, the union of the Five, Sforza, in speaking with the Director of Political Affairs, was openly critical. " H e stated, a m o n g other things, that we are unquestionably "Westerners" and that we will inevitably take our place in the Western system, but only when it 'will be something serious', while for the moment it is merely a 'piece of paper' and a 'union of weakness' " . 3 < The Brussels Pact was still being snubbed, and clearly so, even though the issues of the Mediterranean and the Arabs, with all the problems they entailed, were left in the background, untouched by the fanciful, extemporized formulas of a fast-paced debate. Italy, moreover, had other fish to fry at the moment. All eyes were turned towards the impending April 18th elections, which were to decide the future of the nation. " T o d a y " , however, " w e do not furnish sufficiently safe guarantees. The unpredictability of the elections, of the overall political and economic situation of Italy weighs too heavily on our international position". 3 7 The am-

34 35

" 37

A S M A E , Q u a r o n i to Campilli, 12Feb. 1948. A S M A E , Q u a r o n i to Sforza, 8 April 1948. A S M A E , Zoppi to Q u a r o n i , 13 April 1948, referring Sforza's opinions. A S M A E , Q u a r o n i to Sforza, 3 Feb. 1948.

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bassadors were in agreement. " O n e question is today on all lips: what kind of Italy will emerge from the elections of April 18, 1948? The general conviction is that this is a truly historical date not only for the Italians but for all Europeans." 3 8 De Gasperi himself moreover, when the United States Ambassador had, in March, brought up with the Italian government the question of Italy's accession to the Brussels Pact, had not responded to the approach for the same reason. The impending elections made any step in that direction inadvisable. The episode is well known, and is significant. The April elections were the testing grounds for an entire policy. In the light of the issues discussed here, however, De Gasperi's attitude may assume greater consistency: Italy's "Western" choice was unquestionable; the Five, for their part, had done well to begin to provide for security even though, undoubtedly, everything depended on the United States. These were, more or less, De Gasperi's words. Although these opinions had their own weight, they certainly did not conflict with the concepts that had emerged from discussions in the Council of Ministers, or from Sforza's relations with the ambassadors. Criticism of the Brussels Pact remained unchanged. Italy, in the April elections, was wagering its future; this was the decisive point. But if De Gasperi, Sforza, the goverment, the "Western" parties won, Italian foreign policy had already taken on, in reality, a form that would be hard to change.

The April 18th elections

and Italian foreign

policy

The elections were a crucial test for the Italy of the postwar period and, as Sforza recalled, they were, perhaps for the first time in the nation's history, entirely centered around the issue of international policy. "For the first time in Italy we are called upon to vote on an international dilemma; i. e., to vote for or against the Marshall Plan", as Sforza stated at Milan in the midst of the electoral campaign. 39 The struggle was to the death. It was also highly significant in that it firmly fixed orientations, problems, foreign policy decisions in the heart of political life, among the parties, in public opinion. The foreign policy of a "democratic p o w e r " had its baptism at that time, although the violence of the opposing positions often resulted in mutual radical incomprehension. The choice, according to formula, was for the West. Its repercussions were immense. But the victory, the choices, the decisions took place on a terrain that had been prepared in advance. Foreign policy remained that which we have

38

CGS, from Gallarati Scotti's undated, unsigned report (but of February).

" Speech of 11 April 1948, also in Sforza, op. cit., pp. 5 4 - 5 5 .

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81

briefly described, laboriously worked out after the ratification of the Peace Treaty; and it is this fact that explains a somewhat paradoxical result, which has disconcerted more than one observer. The program had at times seemed straightforward. "First of all, good elections; second: an unswerving Italian policy of resistance to any Communist meddling from the outside." The rest, it was predicted by the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs of France, would follow as a consequence: 'de facto' revising of the Peace Treaty, guaranteeing of military security, finding a conciliatory solution to the colonial issue. 40 Now, however, the facts revealed a totally different, albeit not diametrically opposed, reality. Due in part to the general situation, in part to the attitude of the Western powers, in part to the previously established line of policy, the April elections guaranteed that Italy would be a permanent member of the Western camp. At the same time, the elections marked one of the moments of greatest tension in relations with neighboring powers. Soon after the elections, the Manchester Guardian published an article entitled "Italy and the Brussels Treaty" which was in reality a reminder of the Peace Treaty clauses. Italy, the article concluded, should not forget that she was a vanquished nation and that in an alliance she would be, on the whole, more of a hindrance than a help. " T h e Benelux countries consider the Brussels Pact to be exclusively regional. They would be extremely reluctant, for example, to commit themselves to supporting 'with all military and other types of aid and with all the assistance in their power' Greece, if she were attacked by Bulgaria, or Italy if she were attacked by Yugoslavia, or Turkey if she were attacked by Russia. In Italy's case, this opinion may very well be shared by French and British councillors [...] since Italy would necessarily be a significantly passive element in the military field." Italy must realize this and then, perhaps, participate in the political part, the "non-military clauses" of the Pact. On this the Manchester Guardian was insistent; and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, for his part, dispatched the text of the article to all the Italian embassies, legations and military authorities. 41 With the elections, Italy had obtained a major success - even the Manchester Guardian acknowledged this, emphasized it; she should not, however, delude herself that this could suddenly change its basic situation. The warning was clear, although it was not specified what Italy might do to collaborate with the other Western powers, as was also recommended. When, within a few days of the appearance of the article, De Gasperi in a press conference and then in an interview openly raised these same issues, commenting on Italy's "extremely

40

"

ASMAE, Quaroni to Sforza, 8 April 1948, about a conversation with Chauvel. ASMAE, Report of 14 May 1948 (from the Manchester Guardian, 24 April 1948).

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contradictory situation", 4 2 he was met with a hail of reservations, recommendations for prudence, calls for caution. Moreover, these problems were already being formulated in a different and even more explicit way on some sides, well beyond the rather summary opposition stirred up by the electoral rivalry. At Paris, Quaroni had several meetings with Caffery, who informed him of Washington's opinion. T h e United States would be extremely pleased if Italy linked itself more closely to the West, even acceding to the Western pact, subject to specifying later perhaps " t h e advantages [ . . . ] of acceding to the Brussels Union rather than to an Eastern P a c t " . But this could not belie the fact that De Gasperi had exaggerated and that the repercussions were still spirited. France left Italy free to act as she wished. But " b o t h Brussels and T h e Hague have replied that they are opposed to revision, not for Italy, but for the precedent that would be established in regard to Germany. London was even opposed to rearmament. According to the British, it was still impossible to trust Italy, not in regard to Communism but in regard to nationalism. T h e Christian Democrats had a very strong nationalistic substratum". As for Sforza, "under his internationalistic appearance lay concealed a rabid nationalist". 4 3 At London Gallarati Scotti noted that, in effect, the April elections had had the result of worsening international relations. His observation, though only partially true, cast light on the emerging problems. Some comfort was to be found, in his view, in the United States, in Marshall, who seemed to him capable of curbing the " w a r m a n i a " , the " w a r hysteria" that was invading the United States Congress. 4 4 In these same days, Tarchiani reported from Washington on his meeting with Marshall, on his satisfaction with the results of the election, his invitation to implement a program of social " r e f o r m s " in Italy, his willingness to guarantee Italy's security, even though the entire direction of foreign policy and rearmament was currently under discussion". 4 5 From another point of view, Bidault was increasingly sympathetic: " H e would in future be responsible for seeing that our entry into the Five-Way Pact was Italy's official reconsecration as a great European power." 4 6 But Bidault was, for the moment, somewhat isolated, and relations between Italy and France were very soon to become suddenly tense and bitter over the question of the application of Peace Treaty clauses dealing with the fleet. In a word, the leaders responsible for Italy's foreign policy were finding it quite difficult to obtain solid support. T h e United States too took its time,

42 43 44 45 46

Interview granted to United Press (reproduced in the Popolo, ASMAE, Quaroni to the Ministry, 6 M a y 1948. CGS, Gallarati Scotti to Sforza, lOMay 1948. ASMAE, Tarchiani to Sforza, 8 May 1948. ASMAE, Quaroni to Sforza, 6 May 1948.

27 April 1948).

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speaking of programs set up to last for "years", 4 7 while forecasts of war or of peace alternated dangerously. The United States remained the unquestioned reference point; but future prospects were still unclear, whatever attempts were made to consolidate relations and solutions. Although critical "revisionism" was not actually indulged in, something very close to it occurred at times, as when Zoppi, about to become Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs 48 repeatedly spoke of bad relations with Britain, the question of the colonies, the necessity for greater recognition of Italy. Sometimes he went too far, as when he wrote to Quaroni: " A democratic government [ . . . ] cannot disregard public opinion, and public opinion has been shaken by the treatment it has received from the West, and is already feeling the heat of what the West threatens to have in store for it." 4 9 Quaroni, for his part, often champed at the bit, undecided as to whether a pro-Arab policy should be initiated, or on the contrary, in view of the failures and mistakes of the British, a pro-Israel policy might be better. The latter might, with some risk, favor an Italian colonial policy in Libya - against the Arabs, against the British, and perhaps with significant aid from the United States, with the support of America's Jews and Italians. Quaroni discussed this sometimes with Weitzmann. His ideas, though only rough concepts, if not actual fantasies, were nonetheless the signs of a foreign policy that was being hewed out with great effort. Relations with the United States remained the deciding factor, a constant reference point for even the riskiest projects. Italy's leaders, in spite of all, were firmly in favor of security and peace. The choice of the West was never seriously questioned. It was not however by chance that little more than one month from the April elections Quaroni, in speaking of the Mediterranean, the Arabs, the Jews, the French and the English, expressed himself as follows: "In any case I believe that we should leave all roads open." 5 0

The start of the Washington instructions

conversations

and

Sforza's

Mistakes, uncertainties, a certain intimate imbalance appearing at times, did not detract from the fact that Italian foreign policy, little by little, was being established, strenghtened, consolidated. The uncertainties served to highlight the difficulties encountered by those responsible for Italy's foreign policy, difficulties met with sufficient equanimity, although at times on the basis of hastily 47

ASMAE, Tarchiani to Sforza, 8 M a y 1948.

48

See for the appointment the minutes of the Council of Ministers of 31 M a y 1948 (ACS).

50

ASMAE, Quaroni to Zoppi, 2 0 M a y 1948.

ASMAE, Zoppi to Quaroni, 5 June 1948.

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formulated and questionable criteria. The problem rather is that Italian foreign policy has often been thought of as an established program, either to be condemned or defended; while in 1947-1950 it was instead in the process of taking shape, among innumerable hesitations and obstacles, revealing all the traces of transition from a "great p o w e r " policy to that of an intermediate power, and of a "democratic power". Traces of the past were long visible and, upon close obversation, can still be detected today. When in the months between June and August of 1948 Sforza, Zoppi, Brosio, Gallarati Scotti, Quaroni, Tarchiani and the Chief Staff Officer thoroughly discussed, in a series of reports and replies to them, all the tendencies of Italian foreign policy, these traces were more than ever apparent, notwithstanding the greater awareness and results achieved. In any case, these signs are clearly apparent in the kind of summary which, as his own conclusion, Sforza drew up at the end of August and sent to his collaborators and to the General Staff. This document has up to now been unjustly neglected. 51 "This Ministry, having examined the discussions presented in previous reports from our Embassies at Washington, London, Paris, and Mogadiscio and from the General Staff, and having also taken into account the comments formulated in its own telex dated July 14th, considers that it can, at this time, express [ . . . ] its own opinion." The report, quite ample, discusses all aspects involved and marks the start, though a circumspect one, of the Washington conversations on the defence and security of the nation. "This line of conduct presumes of frank exchange of views with the North American Government, which the Washington Embassy is requested to initiate and which will be initiated here as well with Ambassador Dunn. The Paris and London embassies can explain it to the French and English governments. If we meet with a favorable, receptive overall reaction, we will have no difficulty in initiating technical conversations with Washington to examine our defense situation." In his report, Sforza describes the "line of conduct" that should be followed in the near future. This line is actually a point-by-point summary of what has been discussed up to this point, more thoroughly examined, filtered and deliberated in the wide-ranging discussions held between June and August. Thinly veiled irony in regard to the Brussels Pact is a primary feature of the report. If danger was imminent, if the Russians were to move at once, the difference between accession and non-accession would be minimal, although not disadvantageous. "In this case, our belonging or not to the Brussels Pact, as regards military defense, would offer us no greater advantages than those offered to nations acceding to the Pact, with the sole difference that, from the political 51

ASMAE, Sforza to Tarchiani, Quaroni, Gallarati Scotti, Brosio and indirectly to the Office of the Chief of Staff, 31 Aug. 1948.

Italy: End of a 'Great Power'

85

point of view, we would have, for the very fact of being free from any alliance commitment, the possibility, at least theoretical though weak, of remaining neutral, in a neutrality as defenseless as the belligerence of the Five". If the danger was not immediate, the outlook changed but, as the Americans were suggesting, the eventualities in this case were long-term. In case of war, Italy would surely be involved. Sforza was unpersuaded (or uninterested) in the hypothesis that the conflict would leave Italy untouched. The prize was too important. The question must be cooly examined, however, taking into account the degree of preparation of United States military plans. " T h e problem we are faced with is, in the obvious impossibility of assuring 'a priori' one hundred percent neutrality for Italy, to judge up to what point the confidence or rather the hope of being able to maintain such neutrality could allow us to abstain from accession to political unions which would automatically plunge us into conflict but which would at the same time offer us the effective means of defense which we alone would not possess. This possibility of defense will increase by arithmetical progression and will therefore be more and more substantial as time goes by. It is within the context of this situation that a formula might be found to resolve the complex problem, taking into consideration all the circumstances already described by the Embassies which have dealt with this subject, and by the Ministry." The information available was still uncertain and confused, but Sforza believed that a line of general strategy was taking shape; this line would on the one hand condition Italy, on the other leave it free - as long as the United States was in agreement. " A t the moment the prospects of military aid from the United States to the Five Powers of the Brussels Pact do not go beyond the terms of the Vandenberg declaration, since the Americans do not believe they can do anything concrete until their own rearmament, which Washington still considers the primary stage to be completed, has reached a certain level. The Americans have also stated that equipping Greenland and Iceland for defense is their primary objective to be achieved outside of United States territory. This complies with obvious technical and military requirements, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the defense of Europe will be taken into consideration later. This defense will stretch from far Western Europe to North Africa, gradually extending Eastward in accordance with the progress of American rearmament. In these circumstances, we may assume that Italy would be included within the area of effective Western defense only at a later time. Both the Americans and the Powers of the Western Pact should understand that it is this prospect above all which is making the nation, and therefore its government, so reluctant to expose itself immediately to automatic involvement in any conflict. There is then good reason for us to conjecture whether it is not better for the Americans too, until such time as they will be able to include our country in their strategical area, not only in theory but also in practice, and thus to defend it; whether it is not better for them

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too to attempt to avoid a possible occupation by the East, which they could not now validly oppose, by facilitating our attempt to keep ourselves, to our own and to their advantage, non-belligerent, at least for the time being." Sforza's proposal was actually a sort of compromise between the positions assumed by Brosio and by the other three ambassadors. On this basis he continues, discarding no possibility; neither that of limited defensive rearmament, nor that of a direct or indirect influence on the neutrality of the Balkan countries, nor that of a pact such as the one between Greece and Turkey. "For such a program to have any possibility of success, however, Italy must be able to defend her own borders. She must therefore be sufficiently well-armed to present a serious obstacle to any aggressor. If in these conditions we should neither be attacked nor molested — so much the better for us and for the Western powers themselves. If instead we should be attacked, we would automatically become their allies, with all the ensuing consequences. Such a solution would have the advantage of not endangering - through our immediate accession to the Western Pact - the slight possibility of facilitating a trend toward abstention in the Balkan countries; this trend, if it should develop, would be a further guarantee of peace. The possibilities offered by this solution seem to merit a thorough examination. It would not, moreover, place us, in regard to the West, in a position formally different from that of Turkey and Greece, both border countries like Italy, whose means of defense against possible aggression are reinforced by the United States, although these countries have acceded to no pact. For them, as for us, accession could take place in the future when an overall European and Mediterranean defense scheme has become an effective reality". In this report, Europe is mentioned only in the final lines, relegated to the margin as it were, emphasizing still more Italy's disengagement from the Brussels Pact. Even the Ο. Ε. E. C. seemed insufficient: " A t the same time we propose to follow and favor those initiatives which respond to an increasingly urgent need felt by the peoples of Europe by promoting the formation of a European union which will initially include at least all of the countries in the O . E . E . C . , and in which Italy can more easily be included in a wide-ranging plan of general cooperation". Here Sforza was going beyond himself. In reality, he was to insist at length on a more restricted European union, and on the Council of Europe, as an appropriate way to avoid Italy's accession to the Brussels Pact. The definitive formula was to be that of the Atlantic Pact and of the Council of Europe. In fact, this end-of-August report was a text that could easily be considered as composite, fragile and provisional. De Gasperi, Sforza and their colleagues had to investigate many other problems, to shift their positions, to undergo pressure, to work out compromises. Concentrating attention on the "Western Pact" had also served to conceal other problems that were soon to re-emerge. In spite of all this however, as can be seen in the light of the entire period elapsed

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87

since the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the text in which Sforza exerted himself to the utmost to " f i x " definitively his own "thought" and that of his colleagues clearly expresses the criteria and perspectives of Italian foreign policy, at grips with a world which made the "perception" of "power politics", either one's own or that of others, not only difficult but unrewarding.

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Brunello Vigezzi

Zusammenfassung Die Geschichte der italienischen Außenpolitik zwischen 1943 und 1950 ist die Geschichte von Niedergang und Ende einer „Großmacht" (wenngleich einer Großmacht besonderer Art); die Geschichte auch von einem sehr unruhigen und umstrittenen Abstieg auf den Status einer „Mittelmacht", die eine „demokratische Außenpolitik" führte und den Parteien, den sozialen Gruppen und der öffentlichen Meinung eine erheblich größere Rolle als früher einräumte. De Gasperi und Sforza, die herausragenden Führer dieser Politik, waren daher bereit, den harten Friedensvertrag von 1947 zu unterzeichnen. Sie hofften jedoch, nach und nach gewisse Revisionen des Vertrages de facto erreichen zu können, ohne dabei besonders revisionistische oder nationalistische Töne anschlagen zu müssen. Diese Politik kam wegen innenpolitischer Spannungen, der Haltung der anderen Mächte sowie der gesamten internationalen Lage einer Gratwanderung gleich. Der Kalte Krieg hemmte den großen, in der ganzen Welt einsetzenden Verwandlungsprozeß, vermehrte jedoch andererseits das Gewicht Italiens im internationalen Gefüge des Westens. Allerdings verminderte er auch Italiens Bewegungsfreiheit, denn die Furcht vor einem militärischen Vorrücken der UdSSR und einem sich daran knüpfenden „Befreiungskrieg" seitens der USA war weiter vorhanden. Außerdem war zu befürchten, daß der Brüsseler Vertrag die Überlegenheit des Mächteblocks England-Frankreich-Benelux und Italiens Abtrennung von ihm, sanktionieren würde. Die Außenpolitik Italiens wurde unklar, als es gleichzeitig enge Beziehungen zu den USA anstrebte, weiter das Gewicht der deutschen Frage betonte und den Abschluß von Ergänzungsverträgen etwa mit Griechenland und der Türkei (woraus sich weitere Spannungen mit Arabern und Juden ergaben) in Betracht zog. So perzipierte die italienische Diplomatie die „Machtpolitik" und ihre neuen Formen unter vielfältigen Aspekten, und es wird möglich, auch die fortschreitende Annäherung an den NATO-Vertrag zu verfolgen.

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in Post-War Italian Foreign Policy* by Antonio Varsori

On December 12, 1944, the Christian Democrat leader Alcide De Gasperi became Minister for Foreign Affairs of the second Bonomi Government. His appointment had not been the consequence of any special experience acquired in the field of international relations, but rather the result of a political compromise worked out by the Rome Committee of National Liberation, under the control of the local Allied authorities. De Gasperi took the place of Carlo Sforza, who had been "vetoed" by the British authorities. 1 During the Fascist period the Catholic leader had spent many years working as a librarian in the Vatican, and during the course of the German occupation of Rome he had spent long months in a kind of forced seclusion in the Lateran Seminary/ His name was practically unknown to international circles and even to the Anglo-American authorities in the peninsula until after the liberation of Italy's capital in 1944. It was only during the latter half of that year that British and American representatives in Italy began to appreciate De Gasperi as the outstanding leader of the new Catholic party, the Christian Democrats, whose real strength in the country could at the moment be predicted by no one. It is interesting to note that in December 1943, in a memorandum addressed to Roosevelt's personal representative to the Holy See, Myron C. Taylor, the Vatican Deputy Secretary of State Monsignor Tardini wrote: " T h e head of the

* This paper summarizes in part the results of two different research projects, conducted by Ilaria Poggiolini (on Alcide De Gasperi) and by Antonio Varsori (on Carlo Sforza), and also takes into account studies carried out by the research group dealing with the "decision-makers". 1

In regard to this episode cf. among others N. Kogan, L'ltalia pp. 1 1 1 - 1 2 0 ; G. Andreotti, De Gasperi pp. 2 4 9 - 2 5 7 ; D . W . Ellwood, L'alleato Italia, 1943-1946

e il suo tempo

nemico.

Trento

e gli Alleati, Vienna

La politica dell'occupazione

Koma,

Milan

anglo-americana

(L'alleato nemico), Milan 1977, pp. 1 1 3 - 1 2 0 ; L. W o o d w a r d , British

Policy in the Second World War, III, London 1971, pp. 4 5 3 - 4 6 6 ; L. Z e n o , Ritratto di Carlo Florence 1975, pp. 1 5 5 - 1 7 7 . 2

G. Andreotti, op. cit., pp. 1 8 7 - 2 4 4 .

1963,

Milan 1974, in

Foreign Sforza,

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Antonio Varsori

[future] Government should be a personage who enjoys the greatest possible esteem for his capacity and experience [ . . . ] In some circles De Gasperi, former representative and leader of the Popular Party, is being named. He is considered cultured, responsible, active and well-balanced. But as he has never had the experience of participating in a government [ . . . ] , it is impossible to be certain in advance that he will succeed". 3 In early December of the following year, Taylor wrote in a message to Roosevelt: " T h e Pope has informed me that De Gasperi is an intelligent man, that his experience in international affairs is limited, that he was a representative in the Austrian Parliament before the Trentino became a part of Italy; that he took refuge in the Vatican during the German occupation and that he worked in the Vatican Library at that time." 4 In spite of this modest international record, De Gasperi was to become the unquestioned leader of postwar Italy and, with the collaboration of Carlo Sforza, he was to determine the course of the country's foreign policy up to the early 1950s. 5 In December 1944, at any rate, De Gasperi was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a government endowed with very little prestige or authority. Only a part of the peninsula was under the sovereignty of the Rome government. The Italian campaign was still under way. The wealthiest, most important part of the nation was still under German occupation and under the theoretical responsibility of the Social Republic. Power in liberated Italy was firmly in Allied hands, specifically in the Allied Commission. It was only in September, and mainly due to Roosevelt's concern for the Italian-American vote in the up-coming elections that the governments of the United States and of Great Britain had decided, with the so-called "Hyde Park declaration" to relax the control of the Allied Military Government on the peninsula. 6

3

E. di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti 1939-1952.

Dalle carte di Myron

C. Taylor (Vaticano), Milan

1978, p. 296, doc. N o 134, memorandum 'L'ltalia: situazione e rimedi', Dec. 1943, drawn up in all probability by Monsignor Domenico Tardini. 4

Ibid., p . 4 0 4 , doc. N o 2 0 5 , from Myron C. Taylor to F.D. Roosevelt, 13Dec. 1944.

5

F o r some overall evaluations of Italian foreign policy between the 1940s and 1950s and during the 1950s, cf. for example E. di Nolfo, 'Problemi della politica estera italiana: 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 5 0 ' , in: Storia e Politica,

14, 1975, N o 1/2, pp. 2 9 5 - 3 1 7 ; E. di Nolfo, 'Sistema internazionale e sistema politico

italiano: interazione e compatibilita', in: L. Graziano/S. Tarrow (eds), La crisi italiana, I, Formazione

del regime

repubblicano

e societa

civile,

Turin 1979, pp. 7 9 - 1 1 1 ; A. Sterpellone,

'Vent'anni di politica estera', in: M . Bonanni (ed.), La politica estera della repubblica

italiana (La

politica), II, Milan 1967, pp. 1 5 9 - 3 4 5 ; E . Collotti, 'Collocazione internazionale dell'Italia dall'armistizio alle premesse dell'alleanza atlantica ( 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 7 ) ' , in: AA.VV., L'ltalia dalla liberazione

alia repubblica

(L'ltalia dalla liberazione), Milan 1977, pp. 2 7 - 1 1 8 .

' F o r an analysis of the Italian situation with special attention to implications of an international nature cf. for example, G. Warner, 'L'ltalia e le potenze alleate dal 1943 al 1949', in: S.J. Woolf (ed.), Italia 1943-1950.

La ricostruzione,

Rome/Bari 1974, p p . 4 9 - 8 6 ; N. Kogan, op. cit.; D . W .

Ellwood, op. cit.; for the text of the Hyde Park Declaration cf. United States and Italy

1936-1946.

91

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

Thus the new Minister for Foreign Affairs was faced with an especially arduous task. But what were his objectives? In his first months in office De Gasperi focused his attention on a number of short-term goals, closely linked to the primary needs of the government and of the Italian people. The Christian Democrat leader thus committed himself to an attempt to obtain from the Allied authorities greater economic aid for the country and more ample authority for the Bonomi cabinet. Particularly significant in this context, as a symptom of early interest in regard to Washington, is De Gasperi's proposal to visit the United States. 7 In reality, the decisions taken by the Allies in the first months of 1945 in regard to Italy seemed less the result of Italian action than of independent viewpoints formulated in Washington and in London. On February 24, Harold Macmillan, Acting President of the Allied Commission gave Bonomi and De Gasperi an aide-memoire stating the Allied decision to implement the promises made in the Hyde Park Declaration. As Macmillan himself recalls: "They both seemed gratified (if a trifle alarmed) by the concessions. Like all people who cry out for freedom, they are a bit taken aback if it is given to them. However, in general, they appeared fairly satisfied." 8 The international role of Italy was in effect subordinate to the previous solution of a number of domestic problems: from the institutional issue to the relationship between the C. L. N. and the central government, to the imminent liberation of the North, to the uneasy relationship among the six parties of the anti-Fascist coalition. De Gasperi's influence on some of these problems, especially in their international implications, was obviously limited. Nor must it be forgotten that the Trentino politician was at the same time the leader of his party and thus directly involved in the political life of the country. It was therefore

Documentary

Record

(United States and Italy), Washington 1946, pp. 8 8 - 8 9 . F o r a historiograph-

ical evaluation of this declaration cf. the works previously cited, as well as D. W o o d w a r d , op. cit., pp. 4 4 0 - 4 5 3 . For the influence exerted on Roosevelt's attitude by the Italian-Americans and the up-coming elections cf. for example, R. A. Divine, Foreign 1940-1948,

Policy and I). S. Presidential

Elections

N e w York 1974, pp. 1 4 4 - 1 4 5 ; E. Di Nolfo, 'The Italian American and American

Foreign Policy from World War II to the Cold W a r ' , in: H . S . Nelli (ed.), Proceedings Annual Conference

of the American

Italian Historical

Association,

of the

Ninth

New York 1977, pp. 9 2 - 1 0 5 .

7

E. Di Nolfo, Vaticano, pp. 4 1 7 - 4 1 9 , doc. N o 219, letter from Myron C. Taylor to F.D. Roosevelt,

8

H. Macmillan, War Diaries.

16Feb. 1945. Politics and War in the Mediterranean,

1943-1945,

L o n d o n 1984,

p. 701. For Macmillan's declaration cf. United States and Italy, pp. 1 0 7 - 1 1 7 ; for an evaluation of the consequences of Macmillan's declaration cf. Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office Papers, series 371 (FO 371), Z M 1 3 0 1 / 1 / 2 2 , tel. N o 4 0 6 from Sir N. Charles (Rome) to the Foreign Office, 2 M a r c h 1945. Cf. also documentation found in P R O , F O 371, Pieces Nos 3 4 3 8 7 and 34480. Transcripts of Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Also worthy of interest is the analysis made by G. Filippone Thaulero, La Gran Bretagna (1943-1945),

R o m e 1979, pp. 5 6 - 6 8 .

e I'ltalia dalla conferenza

di Mosca

a

Potsdam

92

Antonio Varsori

only "obvious" that his concerns as Minister for Foreign Affairs were at times subordinated to the pressing needs in internal affairs. Moreover, it must be recalled that De Gasperi had to rely on the bureaucracy of Palazzo Chigi, inherited from the previous regime. Symptomatic was the comment recorded by the diplomatic representative to London Nicolo Carandini in his diary on the date of May 1, 1945: " M y information, requests, warnings, etc., where do they end up? At times I am desolate before this frightful lack of reaction, of sensitivity, of contact. It is not De Gasperi's fault. It is the fault of that worn-out bureaucracy of Palazzo Chigi about which I tried to deceive myself, but by which I have been completely deluded [ . . . ] From Rome I receive neither one penny for maintaining the Embassy, nor any line of direction, nor any prompt, pertinent reply to my reports. Financially I live on credit to some of my local friends, politically I extend credit to myself." 9 Another element limiting De Gasperi's role was the confidence the Allied representatives in Italy still had in Bonomi. Both Americans and British in the Allied Commission were familiar with the pro-Western tendencies in foreign policy and conservative attitude in internal policy of the pre-Fascist leader; for these reasons, the exponent of the "Democrazia del Lavoro" was regarded by the Allies to be their privileged partner in dialogue. Since Italy's foreign relations during those months took place mainly through the Commission, De Gasperi was consequently indirectly eclipsed. 10 In 1945 Northern Italy was liberated, in May the occupation of Berlin marked the end of hostilities in Europe, in June, as a direct consequence of the success of the "Wind from the North", Bonomi was forced to resign in favour of Ferruccio Parri. In the new government, more strongly influenced by the ideals and hopes of the partisan movement, De Gasperi remained as Minister for Foreign Affairs; this was the turning point in his role and his activities. Parri, former partisan leader and Actionist exponent, had less experience in relations with the Allied authorities. His aspirations to interpret the Resistance movement's demands for profound renewal placed him in sharp contrast with the hopes for a more moderate development nourished by the Anglo-Americans. Moreover during his months in office, he was unable to establish a close relationship with Allied military and political circles in Italy. De Gasperi, on the contrary, became within the context of the Parri government the representative of a moderate direction for the post-war future of the peninsula. His personal position and prestige were accordingly enhanced in the eyes of the Anglo-American authorities. 11 The sum-

' G. Filippone Thaulero (ed.), 'Diario aprile-giugno 1945 di Nicolo Carandini, III', in: Nuova Antologia, 2146, April/June 1983, p. 17. 10 This is clearly shown by the British documentation to be found in PRO, FO 371. Cf. also D.W. Ellwood, op. cit. 11 In regard to the experience of the Parri government cf., for example, E. Piscitelli, Da Parri a De

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

93

mer of 1945 was also a turning point in the relations between Washington and London as regards Italy. Due to serious international and internal difficulties, the British authorities were forced to accept American leadership in matters regarding the peninsula. 12 The Catholic world was considered with special favour by the United States and now the Christian Democrat Party and its leader were seen as elements on which to build up a policy of "stabilization". 13 By the end of that year, De Gasperi was regarded as a valid partner in dialogue. This was the chance for the Catholic leader to develop in the international field his activity from a short term perspective to a more broadly ranging one. In his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, De Gasperi could not ignore the compelling problems facing his country at its liberation, foremost among them the threats to its territorial integrity - from Yugoslavian claims in regard to Venezia Giulia, Trieste in particular, to French attempts to occupy and perhaps annex some areas of Piedmont and Valle d'Aosta. On both occasions De Gasperi appealed to the Anglo-American powers to defend Italy's rights. The Christian Democrat leader was to encounter in both the Venezia Giulia issue and that of the north-western border, greater sympathy for the Italian position in Washington than in London. 14

12

13

14

Gasperi Storia del dopoguerra 1945/1948, Milan 1975, pp. 11-138. In regard to strengthening of De Gasperi's prestige cf. statements made by Rear Admiral Ellery Stone in December 1945, cited by D.W. Ellwood, op. cit., p. 188. Cf. statements reported by D.W. Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 164-191; cf. also G. Negri, 'Stati Uniti e Gran Bretagna: la politica italiana', in: AA.VV., Italia e Stati Uniti durante I'amministrazione Truman (Italia e Stati Uniti) Milan 1976, pp. 3 1 - 4 4 ; D. W. Ellwood, 'La politica anglo-americana verso l'ltalia. 1945: l'anno del trapasso del potere', in: AA.VV., L'ltalia dalla Liberazione, pp. 119-132. Ellwood points out, however, on more than one occasion that in some British circles the hope was nourished that Great Britain might play a role similar to that of the United States in Italy. On the attitude of the United States in regard to Italy cf. among others E. Di Nolfo, 'Stati Uniti e Italia tra la seconda guerra mondiale e il sorgere della guerra fredda', in: AA.VV., Atti del 1 Congresso internazionale di storia americana — Italia e Stati Uniti dall' indipendenza americana ad oggi (1776-1976), Genova, 16-19May 1976, Genoa 1978, pp. 123-135; J.E. Miller, 'The Search for Stability: An Interpretation of American Policy in Italy: 1943-1946', in: The Journal of Italian History, 1, 1978, N o 2, pp. 264-285; AA.VV., Le relazioni Italia-Stati Uniti dal 1943 al 1953: Storia-Economia-Cultura, ed. E. Vezzosi, Florence 1983, in particular the contributions of E. Di Nolfo, J. E. Miller, O . Barie; AA.VV., Italia e Stati Uniti. As concerns the Venezia Giulia issue cf. for example A. G. M. De'Robertis, Le grandt potenze e il confine giuliano 1941-1947, Bari 1983, pp. 217ff. As concerns the American position in regard to French requests cf. for example Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, IV, Washington 1968, pp. 698-699, memorandum of conversation between President Truman, the French Foreign Minister Bidault, the French Ambassador to Washington Bonnet, the Deputy Secretary of State Grew, 21 May 1945. On French policy toward Italy, cf. P. Guillen, Ί rapporti franco-italiani dall'armistizio alia firma del patto atlantico', in: AA.VV., L'ltalia dalla liberazione pp. 145-180.

94

Antonio Varsori

But De Gasperi's task did not consist only of staunchly defending the Italian borders. He grasped the need to project the future role of Italy into the international context. This objective was however profoundly conditioned by the peace the "great powers" would impose on Italy. Only after the problem of a peace treaty had been resolved would the peninsula recover full freedom of action. And it was not difficult to predict the hard conditions the majority of Allied powers intended to impose on Italy. Between mid-1945 and October of 1946, De Gasperi devoted his energies to the task of softening the harshness of the treaty. In defending the Italian position, De Gasperi consistently maintained at all international conferences in which he participated (from Lancaster House to the Paris conference of Foreign Ministers, up to the peace conference) that Italy was to be considered a victim of Fascism rather than a defeated totalitarian nation. Peace should not assume a punitive character. The victorious powers should consider that Italy, in the co-belligerant period, "had worked out her passage". In a broader perspective Italy, the Christian Democrat leader maintained, had to play a useful, significant role in the international sphere. This aspiration was clearly apparent in the words pronounced by the Catholic leader in his famous speech given at Paris on August 10,1946. 1 J This attitude of willingness to cooperate did not mean, in De Gasperi's opinion, that Italy should abandon her role of European and Mediterranean power. These objectives, in fact, offered further justification for strenuous defence of the Italian positions against the territorial claims from all sides and against any intention of drastically reducing the international potential of the country. In his attempt to achieve these "national" objectives, De Gasperi tried to exploit the various attitudes of the victorious powers in regard to Italy. He did not fail to single out the nation which seemed most highly favourable to the stands taken by Rome: the United States. The favourable attitude of the American authorities towards Italy and De Gasperi seemed to be publicly emphasized during the Paris conference by the Secretary of State James Byrnes. 16 The Truman administration, however, was unable to avoid the imposing of many harsh clauses on Italy, and several British documents reveal the disappointment felt by a number of Italian authorities in the summer of 1946 in regard to the discrepancy between Washington's "promises" and "achievements". 1 7 On the other hand, although De Gasperi openly relied on American support, his foreign

15

For an analysis of the Italian position in regard to the drawing up of the peace treaty, cf., for example, A. Sterpellone, op. cit., pp. 1 7 1 - 2 0 5 ; also B. Cialdea, 'L'ltalia e il trattato di pace', in: M . Bonanni (ed.), La politica,

pp. 3 4 9 - 4 1 8 .

14

J.F. Byrnes, Speaking

Frankly,

17

Cf. the considerations expressed by Nicolo Carandini in a conversation with the head of Western

Westport (Conn.) 1974, p. 1 2 3 - 1 5 5 ; G. Andreotti, op. cit., p. 304.

Department of the Foreign Office, F. R. Hoyer Millar, in P R O , F O 371, Z M 2 3 4 8 / 1 / 2 2 , minutes of F . R . Hoyer Millar, 4 June 1946.

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

95

policy could not in this period be considered as the expression of a definite "American choice". The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs could not forget how the spirit of the "Great Alliance" among the victorious nations was not yet entirely dissolved; how he had to rely on the support of a coalition government, in which the PCI and the allied PSIUP played a not insignificant role; and that formed an integral part of the European context. Nor should it be forgotten that among European statesmen there was a widespread fear that the United States would rapidly come back to the isolationist tradition which had triumphed in the wake of the First World War. It should not then be surprising that De Gasperi, in his tenacious lobbying, did not neglect the British and French authorities. Even in regard to the Soviet Union, standard-bearer of the Yugoslavian position and of the imposition of reparations, De Gasperi appeared more disposed to compromise than to confrontation. 18 Although De Gasperi found himself plunged into the problems of the peace treaty, he could not neglect the evolution of the internal political situation. This evolution was profoundly conditioned by the attitude of the Allies, the Americans in particular. Within this context, which may be defined as pertinent to both the national and the international scheme at the same time, De Gasperi's activity was more effective. In late 1945 Parri had been forced to resign, thanks also to external pressures. The political crisis had witnessed the success of the Trentino politician who had taken the place of the Actionist leader as Prime Minister. This was not only a victory for the Christian Democrat Party within the national context, but also the confirmation of a precise political mortgage on the future of the nation, also in regard to the Allied authorities. This was proven by the solution adopted in regard to the institutional issue. The preference accorded to the referendum over the decision of the Constituent Assembly was not only the result of De Gasperi's mediation among the various political forces, but also of the privileged relationship established between De Gasperi and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, the American Ellery Stone." This element, together with the peaceful solution of the institutional issue through the June 2nd vote, as well as De Gasperi's action in the days immedi-

18

Cf. G. Andreotti, op. cit., pp. 3 0 5 - 3 0 6 . Interesting for comprehension of De Gasperi's foreign policy are also Adstans, Alcide De Gasperi nella politica estera italiana 1943-1953, Milan 1953; G. Petrilli, La politica estera e europea di De Gasperi, R o m e 1975; M . R . D e Gasperi (ed.), De Gasperi scrive, II, Brescia 1974. Nor should be overlooked, although in this case attention is focused mainly on domestic political aspects, P. Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, Bologna 1977.

" Cf. J.E. Miller, loc. cit., p. 273, where reference is made to an important meeting held in January 1946 between Stone and De Gasperi. D.W. Ellwood, for his part, points out that already by the second half of 1945 De Gasperi had become "the privileged partner in dialogue of Kirk and Charles"; cited in D.W. Ellwood, L'alleato tiemico, p. 155.

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Antonio Varsori

ately following the referendum, could not but strengthen the position of the leader of the D C in the eyes of the American and British authorities. 20 It was precisely on the morrow of the referendum that the problems involved in Italy's international role became blatantly manifest. As previously mentioned, in the summer of 1946 the victorious powers reached a series of compromise solutions in regard to the peace treaty with Italy. At first sight, De Gasperi's efforts seemed to have yielded very poor results: an extensive portion of Venezia Giulia was lost definitively, the future of Trieste was uncertain and the T L T solution left Italy little hope of regaining control of the city in a short time; the nation would have to renounce all rights to her colonial possessions; France had obtained some territorial advantages. As for the Italian fleet, it was largely divided among the Allies. Nor should the Allies' intention of imposing harsh economic and military terms be forgotten. In spite of all this, something was changing in the position of Italy and of the Prime Minister. The Christian Democrat leader was considered by the Western Allies to be an able, responsible statesman, worthy of trust and deserving of aid. De Gasperi had managed to conquer a space, albeit minimum, in which to manoeuvre. The American and British intention of denying Trieste to Yugoslavia had been consolidated. Having received their desired border concessions, the French appeared to have softened their position. 21 As regards South Tyrol moreover, Washington and London had favoured Italy in the end. The De Gasperi-Gruber agreement of September 1946 had been accepted by both Bevin and Byrnes as an example of what Italy could achieve independently in the field of international relations. 22 N o w however the peace treaty problem, i.e. the 20

In regard to internal events during this period and the role played by De Gasperi, cf. among others L. Valiani, L'ltalia di De Gasperi (1945-1954), Florence 1982, pp. 9 - 5 8 ; E. Piscitelli, op. cit., pp. 1 4 1 - 1 5 6 ; P. Scoppola, op. cit., pp. 1 6 1 - 2 5 2 ; A. Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra dalla liberazione al potere DC, Rome/Bari 1975, pp. 5 5 - 1 2 8 .

21

On the Venezia Giulia issue after the decisions taken by the victorious powers cf. A . G . M . De' Robertis, op. cit., p. 419ff; more generally, in regard to the entire problem, cf. J.B. Duroselle, Le conflit de Trieste 1943-1954, Brussels 1966; B. C. N o v a k , Trieste, 1941-1954. The Ethnic, Political and Ideological Struggle, Chicago 1970; D. De Castro, La questione di Trieste. L'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954, Trieste 1981. On the colonial issue cf. G. Rossi, L'Africa italiana verso I'indipendenza (1941-1949) (L'Africa italiana), Milan 1980. On the problem of the fleet cf. G. Bernardi, La marina, gli armistizi e il trattato di pace, Rome 1979. On the peace in general cf. the studies of Cialdea and Sterpellone previously cited. On the American position cf. the contributions cited by Di N o l f o and Miller. On the evolution of the French position, cf. P. Guillen, loc. cit., pp. 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 .

22

On the South Tyrol question, cf. M. Toscano, Storia diplomatica della questione dell'Alto Adige, Bari 1968, pp. 2 6 1 - 4 3 4 ; A.E. Alcock, The History of the South Tyrol Question, London 1970, pp. 1 1 0 - 1 4 7 . For Byrnes' reaction, cf. the letter cited by Toscano (p.411, note 105). In regard to Bevin's reactions cf. the statement made by him on 22 October 1946 before the House of Commons, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 427, col. 1052 (HC Deb., 5th, 427/1052), 22 0 c t . 1946.

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

97

question of the dilemma between rejection or acceptance of the document drawn up at Paris, took its place within the national context. De Gasperi knew that Italy, alone, could not oppose the will of the victorious powers who seemed concordant in desiring the Italian signature to the treaty. Acceptance of the document would also have meant the end of Italy's condition as defeated enemy nation; the continuance of such a status would only have favoured nationalistic agitation and, indirectly the fortunes of the Socialist-Communist left. De Gasperi's solution to these contradictions was to present the peace treaty, in spite of its injustice, as a point of departure for a new international presence of Italy, in Europe in particular. This attitude was in line with precise convictions held by the Prime Minister, and could only apparently be considered a tactical expedient to be utilized in dealing with national public opinion. As Ilaria Poggiolini states: "Beginning in late 1946, De Gasperi proposed to avoid the possibility that claims of a nationalistic nature might prevent Italy from participating in the reconstruction of Europe. For the Catholic leader, the demands of reconstruction had to take precedence over the discontent and protests of the Italians that would ensue from acceptance of the terms of peace." 2 3 Although De Gasperi was forced to concentrate his attention on the problem of the peace treaty, he was soon to be called upon to resolve another question: the choice between East and West. Such a decision, however, could be made only after the achievement of certain conditions: reinforcement of De Gasperi's internal position and the assumption by the United States of precise commitments in regard to Italy, going well beyond economic aid and the vague benevolence shown at the peace conference. These conditions were to be verified in the course of 1947. In the meantime, in October 1946, De Gasperi, though maintaining his office as Prime Minister, was replaced at Palazzo Chigi by Pietro Nenni. The Socialist "parenthesis" in guiding the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was to be quite short, but not for this devoid of significance. Nenni assumed this responsibility with precise objectives in mind. As D. Zucaro writes: "In assuming responsibility for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nenni had before him three objectives: attempting to bring about a revision of the Peace Treaty by having the Allies accept the principle of direct, bilateral negotiations; initiating such negotiations with Yugoslavia and arriving with Italy's Eastern neighbours at a Locarno of the East; negotiating good commercial treaties with both West and East." 2 4

"

I. Poggiolini, 'Europeismo degasperiano e politica estera dell'Italia: un'ipotesi interpretativa 1947-1949', in: Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1, 1985, No. 1, pp. 6 7 - 9 4 . " P. Nenni, I nodi della politica estera italiana (I nodi), ed. D. Zucaro, Milan 1974, p. 47. On Nenni's activity in this period cf. also P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda. Diari 1943-1956 (Tempo di guerra fredda), ed. G. Nenni and D. Zucaro, Milan 1981, passim.

98

Antonio Varsori

Nenni had revealed his intention more clearly during a conversation held at the beginning of August 1946 with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Harold McNeil and with the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee. As recorded in a British memorandum: "Signor Nenni is determined to see the Italian Peace Treaty signed as soon as possible. [ . . . ] Once the treaty has been signed Signor Nenni intends to strike out a new line of foreign policy. There will be a clear breakdown with the past and Italy will try to settle down as a contented nation with no illusion whatever as to her greatness. Officially she will declare herself independent of any bloc and seek good relations with all powers particularly with that of the Western democracies to whom she looks for support and particularly with the United Kingdom". 2 5 From a short term perspective, Nenni wanted to tackle the problems left unsolved by the peace treaty through bilateral agreements, the question of Trieste in particular through direct negotiations with Belgrade. An additional goal was that of rapid improvement in the economic situation of the country, and this could be achieved by strengthening her relationship with the AngloSaxon powers. In a broader perspective, the Socialist leader nourished the hope that Great Britain would assume the guidance of a group of European nations whose role would be that o f serving as a "third f o r c e " between the United States and the Soviet Union. This hope reflected Nenni's aspirations in national politics. A more effective role played by Labourite Britain would indirectly reinforce the position of the Socialist Party and a mediating function exerted by London would perhaps contribute to abating international tensions, attenuating the polarization of the political debate between the D C and the PCI in Italy. This involvement of domestic, not to say party-based, political factors, was however to exert a negative influence on Nenni's international activity, as an analysis of the relationship between the Socialist leader and the British Secretary of State demonstrates. On the other hand, Nenni showed his incomprehension of how difficult it would be for Great Britain to help Italy in the economic field. Moreover, in regard to many questions connected wiht the implementation of the peace treaty (ranging from the colonies to the fleet), British interests openly clashed with Italian hopes. From October 1946 to January 1947 Nenni concentrated his energies on achieving a diplomatic success thanks to British support but, although Bevin showed some liking for the Italian Socialist leader, the latter was unable to obtain the slightest concession. 2 6 T h e failure of Nenni's strategy, which also derived from a misconception of Italy's role and potential, was underlined by De Gasperi's visit to the United

"

P R O , F O 371, Z M 2 7 4 2 / 1 2 8 6 / 2 2 , memorandum of the British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, 8 Aug. 1946.

16

Cf. in regard to this matter A. Varsori, 'Bevin e Nenni (ottobre 1946-gennaio 1947): una fase nei rapporti anglo-italiani del secondo dopoguerra', in: II Politico,

49, 1984, N o . 2, pp. 2 4 8 - 2 7 5 .

99

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

States in January 1947. This visit indicated, in effect, that the true maker of Italy's foreign policy was the Prime Minister. De Gasperi, after some contacts with the Ambassador to Washington, Tarchiani, had decided to visit North America. Several studies have pointed out the close relationship established by De Gasperi with influential American political circles thanks to this mission. These studies have focused special attention on the strengthening of De Gasperi's internal position and the building of a solid alliance between Washington and the Italian Catholic world. 27 The implications of this trip for Italy's international position have instead remained in the shadow. But, as Ilaria Poggiolini writes: " [ D e Gasperi] wished to convince the American authorities that [Italian] economic necessities and the need to normalize political life, expressed by the moderate forces, should be dealt with as a single problem. Moreover De Gasperi put to the United States leaders precise questions concerning the problem of Italy's recovery within the context of European reconstruction and collaboration." 2 8 This "European" implication in De Gasperi's conversations with the Americans should not be underestimated, since, going beyond the issue of Italian domestic problems and that of the peace treaty, it foresaw a number of elements in the international strategy of the Prime Minister, of his hopes that Italy, once the peace treaty question was resolved, would play a leading role in the affairs of the continent. Only a few days after his visit to the United States, due to the Socialist split of Palazzo Barberini, the De Gasperi government resigned from office. Within a short time however the Christian Democrat leader was able to form a new government. In this new government, Count Carlo Sforza was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. 29 This appointment should perhaps be considered the real beginning of postwar Italy's foreign policy. Sforza took office with a long political career behind him. Former diplomat, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the last Giolitti cabinet, advocate of the anti-Fascist exiled movement, leader of the "Free Italy" movement in the United States, he had returned to Italy in 1943, apparently in the capacity of - as Kolko writes - an "American ploy". 3 0 After having attempted to play his chances between 1943 and late 1944, Sforza had undergone a partial political eclipse. This had not stopped him from following

27

C f . on D e G a s p e r i ' s visit the interesting r e m a r k s of S. G a l a n t e , ' L a scelta a m e r i c a n a della D C ' , in: M . Isnenghi a n d S. L a n a r o (eds.), La Democrazia

cristiana

p p . 1 1 2 - 1 6 3 ; cf. a l s o S. G a l a n t e , La fine di un compromesso

dal fascismo storico:

al 18 aprile,

Venice 1978,

PCI e DC nella crisi del

1947,

M i l a n 1980. 28

I. Poggiolini, o p . cit.

29

O n C a r l o S f o r z a , cf. L . Z e n o , o p . cit.

30

G . K o l k o , The Politics

of War. The World and United States Foreign

Policy 1943-1945,

N e w York

1970, p. 46. F o r a different a s s e s s m e n t of the role p l a y e d by S f o r z a in his y e a r s of A m e r i c a n exile, cf. A. Varsori, Gli Alleati

e I'emigrazione

l ' e m i g r a z i o n e ) , F l o r e n c e 1982.

democratica

antifascista

(1940-1943)

(Gli Alleati e

100

Antonio Varsori

international events with close attention, as proven by a series of interesting articles published between 1945 and 1946 in 11 Giornale del Mattino and II Corriere d'lnformazione.il In 1946, moreover, Sforza had been sent on an unofficial mission to Latin America to try to influence the attitude of the countries of that hemisphere in favour of Italy. In connection with this mission, Sforza had been in contact with the Prime Minister.32 In any case, his appointment to the top levels of Palazzo Chigi was received with perplexity, especially in some Christian Democrat circles where De Gasperi's choice was seen as a concession to a "spectre" from the pre-Fascist political world. As late as November 1972 the Christian Democrat Luigi Gui recalled: " T o us young people - but not only to the young, to other political forces in Parliament as well — Sforza seemed a man completely detached from the reality of the great popular parties, and thus from the reality of the new Italy emerging from the Resistance and the Liberation. Sforza, linked to pre-Fascist patterns and to the old policy of alliances, was not considered a man capable of interpreting a foreign policy which would itself have to be renewed in respect to the concepts of the Liberal period. He also seemed to us to be too set in his old positions, suspected of preconceived partiality toward the West." 33 It is therefore not surprising that on February 2,1947, in a telegram to London, the British Ambassador to Rome reported: "Locally it is said that [Sforza] will be a convenient stooge for the job of signing the peace treaty." 34 This judgement was to prove erroneous. In spite of growing difficulties, failures and misunderstanding, Sforza was destined to remain Minister for Foreign Affairs for five years, up to 1951. There were recurrent rumours of dissension between Sforza and De Gasperi. Some historians have tendend to underestimate the role played by the Republican leader, attributing De Gasperi with responsibility for the most significant international decisions made by Italy during these years. In reality, these decisions were the result of an association of mutual intentions and objectives which ended by closely linking two personalities, who in other aspects were very far apart. Sforza, given the office he held and his past experience, was obviously to stress the diplomatic, more expressly international aspects of the country's foreign policy. Not belonging to a mass party and holding within the PRI an especially independent position, Sforza was less strongly influenced by internal political events. Moreover, his view of Italian

31

C. Sforza, Gli alleati e I'ltalia (Gli alleati), R o m e 1946.

32

L. Zeno, op. cit., pp. 2 6 4 - 2 6 5 , 4 6 2 - 4 6 6 .

33

L. Gui, Ί democratici cristiani e le scelte nodali della politica estera italiana', in: AA.VV., Italia e Stati Uniti, pp. 175 — 176. In regard to the hostility shown by many political circles toward Sforza, cf. also G. Andreotti, op. cit., pp. 3 4 8 - 3 4 9 .

34

P R O , F O 371, Ζ 1 2 5 4 / 3 2 / 2 2 , tel. N o 288 from Sir N. Charles (Rome) to the Foreign Office, 2 F e b . 1947.

101

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

international activity was linked more to an evaluation of the international context and its equilibrium than to the balance among the parties or the varying moods of public opinion. As for De Gasperi, while not ignoring foreign policy, he placed his confidence on the whole in Sforza's experience and evaluations. It is likely however that on more than one occasion the Christian Democrat leader's attitude was influenced by domestic political considerations, and one has the feeling that in some cases international decisions were utilized as instruments of internal politics. At any rate, Sforza had constant need of De Gasperi's political support and De Gasperi in turn was able to profit by the experience and undeniable capability of Sforza. 3i The first problem which Sforza had to face was the signing of the Peace Treaty. As for De Gasperi, also for the new head of Palazzo Chigi, Italy had to accept, under protest, the terms imposed by the victorious powers. In Sforza's opinion, moreover, the signing of the treaty was merely the last negative legacy bequeathed by Fascism to the Italian Republic. This event would also represent a point of departure for an active foreign policy. This attitude showed a clear rejection of the nationalistic tendencies expressed by senior exponents of the Liberal pre-Fascist establishment, such as Nitti or Croce, who believed that Italy should refuse to sign the document drawn up at Paris.36 The stand taken by Sforza did not mean, however, that he excluded the endeavour to achieve a series of objectives that could be defined as "national". Proof of this was the note addressed by Sforza the day after the signing of the treaty to the victorious powers, in which, on behalf of the country, he called for rapid revision of the clauses of the treaty and implicitly expressed Italy's will to play a definite role in the international context. 37 The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs realised that Italy could not be considered a great power, but she could - and must - attempt to return to the role she had played for a brief period between the end of the First World War and Mussolini's coming to power. During that period Italy had played a significant role in Europe, in the Mediterranean and in some areas of Africa. Sforza was aware that, with the Second World War, the international equilibrium had been radically modified. The main "actors" were now the United States and the Soviet Union, but this evolution meant the re-evaluation of the influence of Great Britain and France. Sforza's objective was that of winning for Italy, in all field of international relations, a status similar to those of London and Paris. To achieve

35

On Sforza's activity in these years, in addition to the previously cited work by Zeno, cf. C. Sforza, Cinque anni a Palazzo Cbigi. La politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951 (Cinque anni), R o m e 1952.

36

On the position of these personages cf. for example the considerations expressed by L. Valiani, op. cit., pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 .

37

The text of this note in C. Sforza, Cinque

anni, pp. 1 6 - 1 7 .

102

Antonio Varsori

this goal, Italy would have to make use of all available means, and especially of the new "internationalism" advocated mainly by the United States. The mixture of idealism - perhaps largely instrumental - and of concrete, though moderate, nationalism was well expressed by Sforza in 1946, when he stated: "Certainly we must remain, and must feel ourselves, profoundly Italian. We must desire that serious, sober national patriotism, continues to exist and to progress. Europe without Italy and her human vitality, without Britain and her poetic background, without France and her enlightened genius would be a sad and colourless thing indeed [ . . . ] But to our ancient national loyalties we must add a new allegiance - to the interdependency of Nations." 3 8 In early 1947 many elements seemed to thwart the aims of Sforza: the economic and military weakness of the peninsula, her political instability, British hostility, French disinterest. 39 Paradoxically however, the growing international tensions and the very weakness of Italy seemed to offer Sforza and De Gasperi their first instruments to be used to allow the country to recover an active role in international relations. Italy, from whose government the forces of the left were about to be banished, had assumed special significance in the contrast between East and West, and moderate political groups could ask the Western world for aid and endorsement. Such aid and endorsement could find expression also through rebuilding Italy's prestige in the traditional spheres of Italian foreign policy: Europe and the Mediterranean. A first, and obvious, consequence of this strategy was the attention focused by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the United States. A stable, close relationship with Washington became the simultaneous objective and instrument of Italian foreign policy. American political support and economic aid to the De Gasperi government were primary goals within the context of internal political equilibrium. These were the factors, in the opinion of De Gasperi and Sforza, which would allow the moderate forces to triumph against the parties of the left. In a different sphere, the European and Mediterranean context, Washington's support became essentially an instrument to be utilized in relations with the most important nations in Western Europe, France and Great Britain.

38 3®

C. Sforza, Gli alleati, p. 89. In regard to Italy's international position and internal situation in this period cf. among others A. Gambino, op. cit., pp. 2 6 1 - 3 2 7 ; L. Valiani, op. cit., pp. 104-134; E. Collotti, op. cit., pp. 9 0 - 1 1 8 . Cf. also remarks made by P. Guillen, 'Le declin de la puissance italienne ä la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale', in: Relations Internationales, 9, 1977, pp. 3 - 2 3 and again by P. Guillen, 'La reinsertion internationale de l'Italie apres la chute du fascisme (1943-1947)', in: Relations Internationales, 31, 1982, pp. 3 3 3 - 3 4 9 . For the state of French-Italian relations cf. P. Guillen, op. cit. As concerns relations with Great Britain, cf. A. Varsori, 'L'incerta rinascita di una tradizionale amicizia: i colloqui Bevin-Sforza dell'ottobre 1947' (l'incerta), in: Storia contemporanea, 14,1984, No. 4, pp. 5 9 3 - 6 4 5 .

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

103

Initially, Sforza concentrated his attention and energies on Europe. It was not only due to the manifest need for American economic aid that Italy immediately assumed a favourable attitude toward the Marshall Plan. It was also a question of showing the American leaders Rome's willingness to support the efforts and ambitions of the Truman administration in regard to the economic cooperation of the continent. Significantly, an anonymous note found among the papers of De Gasperi's Secretariat points out: "With E. R. R we will have this year: a) less than what we had last year with other aid from the U. S. Α.; b) less (in proportion to population) than was granted other countries, which have a higher standard of living and greater natural resources; c) we will have less than is necessary for the purposes of economic rehabilitation, which the plan itself proposes." 4 0 If on the economic level however, the American projects might arouse perplexity, on the political level they became a useful chance to regain a status on the same footing with that of the victorious European powers. As Sforza wrote: "For us Italians this is an historic opportunity. Famished, impoverished, emerging painfully from the abyss of sorrow and shame into which Fascism plunged us, we can regain honours, independence and prosperity if we become heralds of the new law toward which, willingly or reluctantly, the world will in the end march." 4 1 As these words show, it was not merely a question of accepting the American proposal promptly and enthusiastically, but of becoming its "heralds". A favourable attitude toward the economic integration of the continent - a constant factor in Italian foreign policy in the following years - also served as an instrument for overcoming the political and military inferiority sanctioned by the peace treaty. It is not surprising then that in the months following the launching of the Marshall Plan, Italy became the promoter of initiatives aiming at greater integration and that, within the context of this strategy, France was singled out as the most appropriate partner. From these premises was to originate the plan for the building up of a French-Italian customs union. Sforza revealed his ambitions in an article on the Marshall Plan published in April 1948 by Foreign Affairs. He wrote: "Italy, one of the greatest states of Europe, was stupidly humiliated and dangerously mutilated by the treaty of peace, while the divisions between the Great Powers created a bottomless abyss in the heart of Europe - Germany. The burden of mediation, which grew heavier every day as 40

41

Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (PCM). Segreteria di De Gasperi, b. 21, f. 162, 'ERP e Piano Marshall', memorandum s.d., s.f. 'Misure direttiva per 1Έ. R.P.'. For an overall evaluation of the Marshall Plan, cf. AA.VV., ll Piano Marshall e I'Europa, ed. E. Aga-Rossi, Rome 1983; specifically, the part regarding Italy (pp. 119-192). For a critical evaluation, cf. M. Salvati, Stato e industria nella ricostruzione. Alle origini del potere democristiano (1944/1949), Milan 1982. C. Sforza, L'ltalia alle soglie dell'Europa, Milan 1947, pp. 9 - 1 0 .

104

Antonio Varsori

the tension between the United States and Russia grew more acute, fell on the shoulders of France, and France herself felt insecure and could not find any real guarantee against new aggression in the postwar international system." 42 In Sforza's opinion, the Marshall Plan had represented the answer to these problems but, still according to the article, it was implicit that France and Great Britain, which would obviously play primary roles, should consult Italy in managing European affairs. At the end of 1947, thanks to the accession to the Marshall Plan, Sforza had achieved some significant results within the European context. In regard to the Mediterranean and Africa however, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had to face much more difficult obstacles. Great Britain seemed bent on making no concessions. As we know, the administration of the former Italian colonies had fallen under British authority, and since 1942 London had developed precise plans for the future of the Italian empire in Africa. At the end of the war, as a consequence of the crisis of a number of imperial strongholds (Egypt, Palestine), control of the territories formally belonging to Italy, Libya in particular, had become a primary objective of British imperial strategy. 43 On many occasions both Sforza and De Gasperi had declared their lack of interest in the colonies. In spite of this, they made every effort to obtain trusteeship of Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland from the United Nations. Although this objective was shared by the two men, it is likely that the motivations behind it were different. In 1943, at the end of his American exile, Sforza had stated in an interview that he was ready to abandon all the colonies if all other colonial powers were willing to do the same, with the aim of entrusting an international organization with the responsibility for the dependent territories. 44 For the Republican leader the colonies were only the means to, or better the symbols of international status. If Italy wished to be considered in the same rank as France and Great Britain, it was necessary to possess colonial holdings. As for De Gasperi, it is probable that he was more interested in the domestic implications of the colonial issue. As A. Canavero writes: " T h e nationalist and neo-Fascist right denounced the 'remissive' conduct of the Italian government

42

C. Sforza, 'Italy, the Marshall Plan and the 'Third F o r c e " , in: Foreign

Affairs, 26, 1948, N o 3,

p. 450. 43

On the colonial issue, cf. G. Rossi, op. cit. On the British attitude, cf. as emblematical, the documents in P R O , Cabinet Office Papers, series 129, v o l . 2 (CAB 1 2 9 / 2 ) , Cabinet Papers (CP) 4 5 / 1 6 2 , memorandum 'Disposal of the Italian Colonies and of the Italian Mediterranean Islands', by E. Bevin, lOSept. 1945.; CAB 1 2 9 / 9 , C P 4 6 / 1 6 5 , memorandum 'Disposal of the Italian Colonies' by E. Bevin, 18 June 1946; CAB 1 2 9 / 2 4 , C.P. 4 8 / 4 3 , memorandum 'Future of the E x Italian Colonies in Africa: Provisional Policy of His Majesty's Government', by E. Bevin, 4 F e b . 1948.

44

'There are Men in Italy', in: The Chicago

Sun, 1st Aug. 1943. Similar considerations had been

expressed by Sforza on other occasions, cf. A Varsori, Gli alleati e I'emigrazione,

passim.

105

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

[ . . . ] The forces of the left did not fail to utilize the colonial issue as a weapon for propaganda and political dispute. 'De Gasperi had lost us the colonies' became the common slogan of parties which in the past had been opposed to colonialism." 4 5 Nor could De Gasperi forget that nationalistic tendencies were present among the representatives of the Christian Democrat party's right wing. Throughout 1947, at any rate, De Gasperi's and Sforza's attempts to obtain concessions from London in this area remained fruitless. The colonial issue formed a serious impediment to a rapprochement between London and Rome. As previously mentioned, Great Britain and France were the obvious partners in dialogue for Italian policy in Europe. Although at the end of 1947, relations with Paris were substantially improved, softened by the similarity of a number of domestic problems in the two countries, the dialogue with London had remained sterile. In spite of Sforza's visit to the British capital in October of that year and the hopes aroused by the conversations held with Bevin, the AngloItalian relationship was soon disturbed by the Mogadischu riots of January 1948, which evoked anew the contrast between the two nations in regard to the colonial problem. 46 During the first months of 1948 the strategy devised by Sforza and De Gasperi to allow Italy to regain her status as a European power was temporarily put aside as the two politicians had to focus a great part of their attention on the general elections which were to determine the future of the nation. Foreign policy became an instrument in the electoral campaign, for both the coalition government and the opposition. Sforza, at any rate, was able to derive some advantage from the obvious desire of the West to favour a victory of the moderate forces led by De Gasperi. At Turin on March 20th, Sforza and Bidault signed a treaty to establish a Customs union. On the same day the United States, Great Britain and France announced their intention of favouring the return of the entire T L T to Italian sovereignty. Sforza's work in regard to this episode is wellknown. 47 In the period preceding the election, the United States became again 45

A. Canavero, 'Democrazia Cristiana, decolonizzazione e interessi italiani in Africa (Democrazia)' in: AA.VV., Democrazia societä politica,

46

Cristiana e Costituente

nella societä del dopoguerra,

III, Societä civile e

R o m e 1980, pp. 1 1 6 3 - 1 1 6 4 . Cf. also G. Rossi, op. cit.

On Sforza's trip to London cf. A. Varsori, 'L'incerta', loc. cit. On the Mogadishu riots and their consequences within the context of Anglo-Italian relations, cf. G. Rossi, op. cit., pp. 3 1 3 - 3 2 1 ; G. Calchinovati, 'Gli incidenti di Mogadiscio del gennaio 1948: rapporti italo-inglesi e nazionalismo somalo', in: Africa, coloniali.

47

Sept./Dec. 1980, pp. 3 2 7 - 3 5 5 ; A. Varsori, ll diverso

Gli eventi di Mogadiscio

del gennaio

1948 e i rapporti

decline

anglo-italiani,

di due

potenze

R o m e 1981.

On the role of Sforza in the Trieste issue, cf. G. Rossi, 'Trieste e colonie alia vigilia delle elezioni del 18aprile 1948' in: Rivista di Studi Politici lnternazionali,

4 6 , 1979, N o 2, pp. 2 0 5 - 2 3 1 . M o r e

generally, in regard to implications of an international nature on the elections of 18 April, cf. P. Pastorelli, 'La crisi del marzo 1948 nei rapporti italo-americani', in: Nuova

Antologia,

2132,

O c t . / D e c . 1979, pp. 2 3 5 - 2 5 1 ; A. Varsori, 'La Gran Bretagna e le elezioni politiche italiane del 18aprile 1948 (La Gran Bretagna)', in: Storia contemporanea,

13, 1982, N o 1, p p . 5 - 7 0 ; J . E .

106

Antonio Varsori

the privileged partner o f De Gasperi and Sforza, and it cannot be denied that Washington showed willingness to comply with many Italian requests. Once again, an apparent element of weakness, the " C o m m u n i s t peril", became a useful tool to be managed by Palazzo Chigi. T h o s e elements led, however, to overestimation by some members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the role attributed by Washington to Italy and of the degree o f American support for the country's international claims. A symptom of this error was the note addressed in M a y 1948 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Tarchiani in Washington, in which it was stated that: " T h e American policy of support to Italy should not cease after the elections. If in fact, prior to the elections, this policy had the purpose of contributing toward convincing the Italian people that it was to their advantage to remain faithful to democratic principles and Western friendship since only these could fulfill its legitimate aspirations, after the elections such a policy will be even more necessary." 4 8 T h e memorandum went on to indicate how Washington's support could be useful both in the domestic sphere, to convince public opinion of the validity of the governmental decisions, and in the international field as an instrument of resolving the problems existing in relations with France (restitution of the units of the Italian fleet ceded with the peace treaty), with Britain (solution o f the colonial issue) and with Germany. On this matter, Italian ambitions are clearly evident: " A s consequence of the situation created in regard to [the] German problem - after the Anglo-French-American-Benelux conference of London Italy finds herself in a special position as the only great country of Europe, not a satellite of the U . S . S . R . , to have no voice in resolving this problem. All of the arguments already formulated in this regard hold true here to illustrate our political and economic interest in not remaining 'outside of the door' in such an important i s s u e . " 4 ' But Italian hopes were to remain in part unfulfilled. O n April 1 8 , 1 9 4 8 , the Christian Democrats won a landslide victory in the elections. In the eyes of the Western leaders, the country's situation seemed less dangerous. T h e United States had achieved its primary objective: the "stabilization" of Italy. As for the Western European powers, which were at this time focusing their attention on Germany and on the Soviet threat, they lost most of their interest in Italy, as

Miller, 'Taking Off the Gloves: T h e United States and the Italian Elections of 1948', in: tic History, 48

Diploma-

Winter 1982, pp. 3 5 - 5 5 .

Biblioteca Ambrosiana Milano (BAM), 'Carte Gallarati Scotti', c. 16, f. 17, copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to A. Tarchiani, M a y 1948. Cf. also M . Toscano, 'Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione dell'Italia al Patto atlantico (Appunti)', in: M . Toscano, Pagine di storia diplomatica

4'

B A M , ibid.

contemporanea,

II, Milan 1963, pp. 4 6 0 - 4 6 5 .

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

107

proven by the fact that even Paris for a long time played down the customs union project. 5 0 The "Communist peril" became a largely ineffective tool in the activity of Sforza and De Gasperi. Nor should it be overlooked that some American officials had now become doubtful of the full " l o y a l t y " of De Gasperi, because of his refusal in March 1948 of a supply of weapons which, in reality, could have been very embarrassing to the moderate parties during the course of the electoral campaign. 5 1 While the Italian government was concentrating its attention on the elections, relations among the major Western powers were undergoing substantial change. On January 22, 1948, the British Secretary of State Bevin, in a speech before the House of Commons, had launched the project for a union of Western Europe which would include, in his opinion, also Italy. 52 The first Italian reaction to the British initiative was a statement by Sforza in which he expressed his approval of the proposal, although not without adding: " O f course [Italy] could not usefully contribute its total share except on the condition of absolute equality in the organizational role t o o . " 5 3 In the following weeks Bevin's initiative found expression in the elaboration of a European structure aimed at countering the Soviet threat. 5 4 On March 17, 1948, Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels treaty. The United States expressed its full support of this European plan and in March, with the aim of further strengthening the De Gasperi government for the coming elections, proposed to Italy that she adhere to the Brussels Pact. Internal political concerns, however, prevailed. The Brus-

50

51 52

53 54

The hypothesis of the Customs Union was again proposed in early 1949, perhaps not by chance during the period in which the two countries seemed to share objectives and concerns within the context of the constitution of the Atlantic Pact. The Union was however to fail, and the hypothesis that the project was utilized by Paris and Rome as instrument to show the other Western partners the close relationship established between the two "Latin" countries was not without grounds. Cf., as regards this episode, P. Pastorelli, loc. cit. The lines of direction for the union of Western Europe had been traced by Bevin in a memorandum at the beginning of January, in this regard cf. PRO, CAB 129/23, 'The First Aim of British Foreign Policy', 4Jan. 1948. On this occasion Bevin had written: "I believe therefore that we should seek to form with the backing of the Americas and the Dominions a Western democratic system comprising, if possible, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece". The importance of this document has been pointed out on more than one occasion: cf. D. Dilks, 'Introduction', in: D. Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, II, London 1981, pp. 2 3 - 2 4 ; A. Varsori, 'La Gran Bretagna', loc. cit., pp. 13-15. Now for an analysis of Bevin's initiative, cf. A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, London 1983, pp. 512-525. Cited in M. Toscano, 'Appunti', loc. cit., p. 449. For the evaluation of the British project, cf. A. Bullock, op. cit. As concerns British motivations cf. PRO, CAB 129/25, C. P. 48/72, memorandum 'The Threat to Western Civilisation', 3 March 1948, by E. Bevin. In reality, the drawing up of this document may have been influenced by Gladwyn Jebb; cf. Lord Glaldwyn, the Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, London 1972, pp. 212-217.

108

Antonio Varsori

sels Treaty held commitments of a military nature, and alliances of this kind were unpopular with many sectors of Italian public opinion, as well as within two parties belonging to the coalition government. De Gasperi therefore decidedly rejected the American proposal.55 After the elections, the Christian Democrat leader and the Minister for Foreign Affairs could again turn their attention to foreign policy. Western Europe, with the aid of the United States, was rapidly proceeding toward the military and political integration which had been initiated with the Brussels Pact and which in the summer of 1948 seemed to be developing through the involvement of the United States and Canada in the defence of the Atlantic area. De Gasperi and Sforza, grasping the significance of these developments, believed that Italy could not remain outside of the Western alliance that was taking form, on the penalty of political isolation in Europe and retrogression to the level of "peripheral" power, with the consequent impossibility of achieving the other European and Mediterranean objectives of the country. But Sforza and De Gasperi were faced with grave obstacles of both domestic and international nature. Once more, Sforza concentrated his energies on the diplomatic aspects of the situation, while the Christian Democrat leader seemed concerned about the consequences that a clear western choice with military commitments would have on national political equilibrium. Although, as previously stated, some sectors of the DC and of the PSLI seemed ready to manifest open dissent in regard to this perspective, other political spheres - including some officials in the Palazzo Chigi bureaucracy - nourished the illusory conviction that Italy could set conditions to her accession to a Western alliance. It is probable that in the beginning the leaders of Italian foreign policy themselves shared the hopes of those who believed it possible to obtain concessions from the Western powers. The attainment of these concessions would perhaps have silenced those sectors of the government who were hostile to Italian involvement in a military alliance and would have had a positive influence on public opinion. From these contrasting incentives derived a substantially ambiguous position. On May 12, Count Vittorio Zoppi wrote to the Ambassador to London Gallarati Scotti in regard to Italy's possible accession to a Western alliance, the Brussels Pact in particular: "In my opinion, the problem of our 'rearming' should not be viewed as drastically prejudicial. This is because such rearming will be, at the time of our accession, not only to our own interest but also to that of others and it is therefore to be assumed that it will be resolved in due time. It is obvious that, if we are

55

For the attitude of De Gasperi cf. in particular P. Pastorelli, 'L'adesione dell'Italia al Patto atlantico (L'adesione)', in:

Storia cotitemporanea, 1 4 , 1 9 8 3 ,

N o 6 , pp. 1 0 1 5 - 1 0 3 0 . Cf. also M . Toscano,

'Appunti', loc. cit. F o r some interesting assessments by the British of the attitude of De Gasperi and Sforza cf., for example, P R O , F O 371, tel. N o 7 6 9 from Sir V. Mallet (Rome) to the Foreign Office, 3 M a y 1948, important, secret.

109

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

unable to help the other five, we will become an element of weakness and not of strength for them [ . . . ] . It is instead worthwhile to rely on prejudicial factors of a political and psychological nature. It would be very difficult for the government to lead the country to accede to an association whose main members had taken our former colonies from us or who were insisting on the implementation, by now anachronistic, of some of the military clauses. The offense felt by the country would create a morale obstacle of primary importance". 5 6 It was clear then that, just as the "communist peril" had been exploited in the preceding months, fears about public opinion were now to be utilized in contacts with the Western powers. It should also be noted that the Italian government seemed willing to accept the Brussels Pact, subject to specific conditions. In a memorandum addressed by the Italian Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office it was stated: "Although the Italian government do not consider a fully satisfactory settlement of the question of the former Italian colonies as a prerequisite of Italy's accession to the treaty of Brussels, they are of the opinion, however, that such a settlement would be a further proof of European collaboration and would greatly encourage the Italian people towards the close and loyal cooperation with the Western powers which the Italian government are sincerely resolved to achieve." 5 7 The Italian government was however rapidly to discover that the Western European powers opposed Italy's entering either the Brussels Pact or the Western alliance being formed. 58 Even the American authorities had many doubts as to the usefulness and fitness of including the peninsula in the alliance project. 59 Between summer and autumn of 1948, Sforza tried to work out an alternative solution which could at the same time place Italy at the head of the process of integration of Western Europe and allow the government to overcome internal and international obstacles. In August and again in October the Italian Minister

"

B A M , 'Carte Gallarati Scotti', c. 16, f. 17, letter from V. Zoppi (Ministry for Foreign Affairs) to T. Gallarati Scotti (London), 1 2 M a y 1948. Gallarati Scotti did not, in reality, share this viewpoint; cf. A. Canavero, ' T o m m a s o Gallarati Scotti and His Role in Italian Foreign Policy After World War II', in: The Journal

57

of Italian History,

2, 1979, N o l , p. 41.

P R O , F O 371, Ζ 5 1 0 5 / 6 3 7 / 2 2 , aide-memoire from the Italian Ambassador (London) to the Foreign Office, 18 June 1948, strictly confidential.

58

Cf. P R O , F O 3 7 1 , Z 3 6 7 5 / 6 3 7 / 2 2 , tel. N o 1103 from the Foreign Office to R o m e , 6 M a y 1948, important, secret. As regards the Atlantic Pact, it is interesting to note how at the end of August 1948, Sir I. Kirkpatrick had expressed an apparently favourable opinion in regard to Italian accession. This attitude was however to be modified within three days; cf. in this regard P R O , F O 371, Ζ 6 9 4 8 / 3 2 0 7 / 2 2 , draft note by Sir I. Kirkpatrick for E. Bevin, 27 Aug. 1948; tel. N o 9 6 6 6 from the Foreign Office to Washington, 30 Aug. 1948, immediate, top secret. For the attitude of the other powers of the Brussels Pact, cf. the considerations expressed in the works of Pastorelli and Toscano.

59

Cf. FRUS, p.1021.

1948, III, Washington 1974, p. 107, cited also in P. Pastorelli, 'L'adesione', loc. cit.,

110

Antonio Varsori

for Foreign Affairs had two long memoranda drawn up, which were at different times circulated among the major Western capitals. In these memoranda, the Italian government stressed the importance of European economic cooperation, expressed the hope for closer ties among the countries participating in the E. R. P. and suggested that the O. E. E. C. represent a point of departure for the political unity of Europe. 60 Sforza's objectives were twofold: on the one hand he intended to show Western leaders Italy's interest in the process of integration; on the other he hoped to shift the emphasis in the process of European and Atlantic unity from military to political-economic aspects. De Gasperi and Sforza were all aware that Italy was restricted in the military field by the peace treaty, and that in Western spheres the peninsula was considered more a liability than an asset, from this point of view. An objective of only apparently secondary importance was represented by the chance to accustom Italian public opinion to the possibility of participation in a Western alliance. The gist of the two memoranda was in fact made public domain. The Italian proposals were however greeted with skepticism in many Western capitals, London in particular. 61 Between late 1948 and early 1949, De Gasperi and Sforza realized that the Brussels Pact powers, the United States, and Canada were rapidly proceeding to the creation of an Atlantic alliance. Italy's chances of entering this process in an independent manner were few indeed, if not non-existent. On the other hand, in the judgement of De Gasperi and Sforza, Italy could not remain excluded from the political and military integration of the West, nor could it accept being relegated to a "lower ranking" pact with other countries in the Mediterranean basin." The Italian leaders thus abandoned for the moment the hopes of being able to "negotiate" the country's position, as well as the aspiration to become the promoters of European unification. In the last diplomatic stages leading to the drawing up of the Atlantic Pact, Italy's activity seemed limited to singling out the nations which would be favourable to her accession to the alliance. As is well-known, the Rome government finally found a strong "patron" in the 60

For this memorandum cf. C. Sforza, Cinque

61

The British objections to Sforza's memorandum of 27 October were contained in P R O , F O 371,

anni, pp. 6 9 - 8 0 .

Ζ 8 7 3 8 / 6 3 7 / 2 2 , tel. N o 2308 from the Foreign Office to Rome, 1st Nov. 1948, secret. T h e reasons given were the following: " ( 1 ) T h e O . E . E . C. structure is not designed for political co-operation. It is primarily designed for economic co-operation, chiefly on the official level, the completion of certain specific tasks. (2) A political union between seventeen nations so diverse in character and so scattered geographically is not a practical proposition. Moreover many of the seventeen could not or would not join. (3) Count Sforza's proposal would mean scrapping the Brussels Treaty machinery, which is beginning to work well, and replacing it by a ramshackle structure." 62

On the favourable attitude of some Western groups to a Mediterranean Pact including Italy, cf. for example P R O , F 0 3 7 1 , Ζ 8 7 3 9 / 2 3 0 7 / 7 2 , letter from Sir I. Kirkpatrick (Foreign Office) to Sir V. Mallet (Rome), 25 Oct. 1948, top secret.

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

111

French government and De Gasperi and Sforza had to place their hopes in the influence exerted by the Paris authorities. The latter were for their part ready to support the hypothesis of Italy's inclusion in the alliance for the purpose of involving the United States in the defence of the southern flank of the Pact and of Algeria." At the beginning of 1949, De Gasperi and Sforza thus seemed to turn their attention to the implications of a domestic character deriving from accession to a military pact. Once again, "Europeanism" seemed to be an adequate response, and the two leaders of the coalition government were successful in convincing a great part of the Christian Democrat left wing and of the PSLI that Italy's "Western" choice was not of an aggressive nature and that, on the contrary, the Atlantic Pact should be interpreted as a further step in the peaceful process of European integration. 64 On April 4,1949, thanks mainly to French pressure and to the development of the American attitude, Sforza was able to participate in the signing of the Atlantic Alliance at Washington. 65 In spite of the manner in which Italy was finally accepted into the Western alliance, it is probable that Sforza and De Gasperi believed they had achieved a diplomatic success, a success apparently confirmed the following month by Italy's participation, in the capacity of original member, in the Council of Europe. It is interesting to note that, on this occasion too, Italy still aimed at obtaining recognition of a position of equality with the other two major powers of Western Europe. In writing to Gallarati Scotti on January 9,1949, Sforza stated: " T h e Italian Government highly appreciated Bevin's invitation to participate in the Council of Europe. This invitation was appreciated above all for the spirit in which it was made, as a first step to Italy's fuller participation in the Western Alliance. Italy would wishes not to enter the alliance after everything has been arranged, without the possibility of expressing her own thought during the period of organization." 6 6 This unswerving defence of positions only apparently formal was to continue throughout 1949, also within the context of the Atlantic Pact. During the first Atlantic Council held in September of that year and destined to determine

" On the motivations for the French position, cf. PRO, FO 371, Ζ 126/1074/72, memorandum of conversation between E. Bevin and the French Ambassador to London Massigli, 5 Jan. 1949, top secret; PRO, F 0 371, Ζ 24/1074/72, tel. N o 461 from the Foreign Office to Washington, 12 Jan. 1949, most immediate, top secret. For an example of France's defence of the Italian positions, cf. FRUS, IV, 1949, Washington 1975, p. 125, 'Minutes of the 14th meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security', 1st March 1949. 64 I. Poggiolini, op. cit. For an analysis of implications of a domestic nature, cf. G. Di Capua, Come I'ltalia aderi al Patto atlantico, Rome 1571; S. Galante, La politico del PCI e il Patto atlantico, Padua 1973; D. Ardia, Ii Partito socialista e il Patto atlantico, Milan 1976. 65 For some evalutions of general nature, cf. the works cited by Toscano, Pastorelli and Di Nolfo. 66 BAM, 'Carte Gallarati Scotti', c. 16, f. 17, letter N o 3/611 from C. Sforza to T. Gallarati Scotti, 24Feb. 1949, secret.

112

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the organizational structure of the alliance, Sforza vigorously sustained Italy's right to be a member, with France, Great Britain and the United States, of the important "Standing Group". This request was not accepted. In a speech given on September 17 before the representatives of the member nations of the Alliance, Sforza, although denying that the Italian aspiration was dictated by the desire for prestige ended by maintaining: "It is true that we believe that our demographic force and our geographic position might make it natural for Italy to have a permanent place in the Standing Group, but fully aware of our superior European duties, we bow, for the time being, to present necessities." 67 The attention focused on European problems and on the Atlantic Alliance did not mean that Italy was less interested in Mediterranean problems. In the Spring of 1949, Sforza attemped to resolve the colonial issue too by a compromise with Great Britain. Although the Sforza-Bevin agreement (May 1949) was in the end rejected by the General Assembly of the United Nations, this same organization on November granted Italy trusteeship of Somaliland for the duration of ten years. 68 This result seemed to be in evident contrast to the hopes nourished by Italy in the preceding years. The prospect of Libya's rapid independence in particular seemed to expell Italy definitively from Northern Africa. But it cannot be overlooked that Sforza, between May and November 1949, had initiated a new and in a certain sense revolutionary political line in regard to the colonial problem. Italy had suddenly become the advocate of a rapid process of independence for the former subject territories. In all probability, this decision was a tactical move destined to put British strategy in Africa and in the Middle East in difficulty. Nor could Italy insist on this solution because of the negative reactions aroused by the stand in both London and Paris. The "new course" in Palazzo Chigi's formulation of the African problem was however to be a useful precedent. Moreover, it demonstrated Italy's aspirations to work out an independent, original policy in regard to the peoples and the nations that were shortly to emerge from their state of subjugation to Europe. On October 19, 1949, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Brusasca, declared in regard to Italy's imminent return to Somaliland: " N o imperialistic or nationalistic yearnings, no claim to impose our will will accompany us in our return, but we will be guided only by the human, fraternal desire to collaborate with [the natives] for their benefit." 69 And, as A. Canavero comments, " t o 'do good' to the African peoples would have brought Italy considerable economic and political advan-

ACS, 'Carte Carlo Sforza', b. 7, s. Ill, original text of speech given by C. Sforza on 17Sept. 1949. An interesting documentation of the episode is contained in this source; cf. also the documents in FRUS, IV, 1949, pp. 3 1 9 - 3 3 0 . 48 Cf. in this regard G. Rossi, L'Africa italiana, pp.397ff. " A. Canavero, 'Democrazia', loc. cit., p. 1167.

67

113

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

tages". 70 The fruits of such a policy were to be gathered in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 71 More concrete and immediate results were to be achieved by De Gasperi and Sforza in the European sphere from 1949 to 1951. The two leaders consistently carried forward the project for rapprochement and economic collaboration with France. Although the project, several times attempted, for the establishment of a customs union was in the end to fail, economic cooperation between Paris and Rome showed itself advantageous for both countries, providing an example for future projects. By the early 1950s, Italy as a defeated enemy nation belonged to the past. During that period, the Italian government took part in the realization of the Schuman Plan on a footing of equality. Although the nation perhaps had not yet achieved substantial equality with France, England and Germany, it constituted a significant element in the context of Western Europe. At the beginning of 1950 the "actors" in Italian foreign policy, whose activity, motivations and objectives we have attempted to portray, were still active. Nenni, however, had since 1947 been relegated to a political wilderness and had to limit himself to expressing his criticism at times harsh, of governmental decisions. 72 Sforza was 78 years old, almost on the point of abandoning Palazzo Chigi. As for De Gasperi, he still seemed solidly in control of the political life of the nation, but internal problems and party rivalry were slowly to undermine his power. 73 It is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an overall judgement of the activity of these three " a c t o r s " in the international field and to evaluate their "perception" of Italian "power". Nenni's experience as head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs lasted for only three months. He nourished no illusions as to Italy's possibilities of playing an international role of primary importance. If such an interpretation of the country's potential might seem rational in the autumn of 1946, it cannot be denied that other concepts on which the Socialist leader based his action were erroneous. Specifically, he overestimated the role Great Britain could have and would have liked to play in Europe; he underestimated, on the contrary, the worsening of the contrast between the Soviet Union and the United States and he did not realize that Italy could not avoid choosing between East and West.

70

Ibid.

71

Cf., for example, the considerations made by N. Kogan, Storia politica dell'ltalia R o m e / B a r i 1982, pp. 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 ; M . Colitti, Energia

ο sviluppo

in Italia. La vicenda

repubblicana, di

Enrico

Matteii, Bari 1979. 72

On Nenni's position cf. P. Nenni, Tempo

73

On Sforza cf. L. Zeno, op. cit.; on De Gasperi cf. the various works cited, especially G. Andreotti, op. cit., pp. 425ff.

di guerra

fredda;

P. Nenni, I nodi.

114

Antonio Varsori

As for De Gasperi and Sforza, their foreign policy had as reference point an Italy which was a "regional" power, European and Mediterranean, and they dedicated much of their energies to the goal of obtaining formal recognition of this status from the other countries. Through utilization of diplomatic devices, of national political issues, of the direct relationship with the United States, of European ideals, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs attempted to reconstruct for the country the role she had held during the Liberal epoch prior to Fascist aspirations to the status of "great power". Within the context of this strategy, De Gasperi never neglected implications of an internal political nature and at times his international activity seemed to become for the Christian Democrat leader a variable depending on choices made in the national field. As concerns Sforza, it should never be forgotten that he remained always an exponent of the pre-Fascist Liberal political class. He had entered the diplomatic career in 1896 and had previously been Minister for Foreign Affairs under Giolitti. His activity, his cultural parameters, could not but be influenced, at least in part, by the experience acquired in that period. He grasped, in the postwar period, the development of the international system, the emergence of the two super-powers, the slow decline of Europe as the centre of international relations, but in regard to the old continent, to the Mediterranean and to Africa in the late 1940s and early 1950s, there still seemed to be space for manoeuvering for the nations of Western Europe; these for their part were the traditional contexts of Italian foreign policy. Paris and London remained the "natural" partners of the Italian government. It is undeniable that De Gasperi and Sforza attempted to achieve some "national" objectives. Was their activity successful? Perhaps it was the basis for a success that was subsequently to come to maturity. Perhaps the studies carried out for the third international conference on the perception of power politics in Europe will provide a clearer answer to this question.

De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza

115

Zusammenfassung Die italienische Außenpolitik wurde in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit durch das Wirken dreier herausragender Politiker gekennzeichnet: des Christdemokraten Alcide De Gasperi, des Sozialisten Pietro Nenni und des unabhängigen Republikaners Graf Carlo Sforza. De Gasperi war Außenminister von Dezember 1944 bis Oktober 1946 (darüberhinaus Ministerpräsident von 1945 bis 1953); Sforza leitete das Außenministerium von Januar 1947 bis Juli 1951, während Nennis Amtsdauer nur drei Monate betrug (Oktober 1946 bis Januar 1947). De Gasperi sah sich anfangs einer sehr schwierigen Situation gegenüber. Italien war ein besiegter Feindstaat, und auf seinem Territorium herrschte Ende 1944 immer noch Krieg. De Gasperis politische und staatsmännische Fähigkeiten gewannen ihm das Vertrauen der Alliierten, vor allem der Vereinigten Staaten. Vom Frühjahr 1945 bis zum Herbst 1946 richtete der christdemokratische Führer sein Augenmerk hauptsächlich auf die Probleme, die sich aus der Niederlage Italiens und dem Strafcharakter des Friedens ergaben, den die Alliierten, Washington ausgenommen, Italien auferlegen wollten. Trotz De Gasperis Bemühungen mußte Italien einen harten Friedensvertrag unterzeichnen. Er glaubte allerdings, daß diese Unterschrift Italien mehr internationale Bewegungsfreiheit geben würde. Während der letzten Monate des Jahres 1946 versuchte Nenni, Italiens internationale Rolle neu zu definieren. Es war sein Ziel, freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu den Siegermächten zu entwickeln, insbesondere zu dem Labour-regierten Großbritannien. Er war jedoch nur kurze Zeit in der Verantwortung, und sein Bemühen um einen unabhängigen Mittelweg zwischen den Supermächten und ihrem aufkommenden Kalten Krieg erwies sich als wenig fruchtbar. Unterdessen zeigte De Gasperi mit seiner Reise in die USA im Januar 1947 waches Verständnis für die neue internationale Lage und die zukünftige Rolle der Halbinsel. Mit der Ernennung Sforzas zum Außenminister wurde die italienische Außenpolitik neu definiert. Das Hauptziel Sforzas war, für Italien den Status wiederzugewinnen, den es vor der Zeit des Faschismus besessen hatte, d. h. Italien sollte in den zwei traditionellen Aktionsgebieten seiner Außenpolitik - Europa und Mittelmeerraum - eine mit der Stellung Großbritanniens und Frankreichs vergleichbare Position einnehmen. Sforza und De Gasperi konzentrierten ihr Bemühen auf die Revision des Friedensvertrages, auf die Unterstützung der auf eine wirtschaftliche und politische Integration Westeuropas gerichteten Initiativen und auf den Beitritt Italiens zum militärisch-politischen Bündnis des Westens, Bemühungen, die die internationale Rolle Italiens während der folgenden Jahrzehnte bestimmen sollten. Zwar enthielt diese Politik manche Fehler und Schwächen (vor allem soweit sie sich am Prestige Italiens orientierte), unzweifelhaft machte das Land aber zu Beginn der 50er Jahre einen entscheidenden

116

Antonio Varsori

Schritt zur Wiederherstellung seiner Position im internationalen System: Italien wurde nicht länger als ehemaliger Feindstaat betrachtet, sondern als gleichberechtigter Partner in den Schuman-Plan einbezogen.

Senior West German Politicians and their Perception of the German Situation in Europe 1945-1949"' by Manfred Overesch

At a first national remembrance day of the Federal Republic of Germany, on September 7, 1950, in the Bonn Parliament House, in commemoration of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) and namely its preamble, the Federal President complained in his address that the "melody of German history had been broken". 1 Heuss was thinking both of the lost national unity of Germany and of the Germans' lost international reputation; he was speaking of the loss of freedom and identity of a nation divided into two states. Naturally his complaint did not overlook reasons for which the Germans had only themselves to blame: the national and imperial hypertrophy of the Third Reich, for which the ground had been prepared by the Wilhelmine striving for Great or World Power status. The political blunders of two generations had thrown away the gains of that historical stroke of luck by which the German Question had been resolved, in defiance of the interests of Europe, in the second half of the nineteenth century, by the establishing of a unified Prusso-German state: namely, that those powers most interested since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) in preventing such a solution of this basic European problem happened to be weakened or distracted by the Crimean War and the American Civil War.2 After the Second World War the German Question had widened from a European into a world problem. Under the aggravated conditions of a system no * This study is largely based on the following contributions: Jürgen C. Heß, " I m Schatten der Ohmacht'. T h e o d o r Heuss' Sicht der Stellung Deutschlands in Europa ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9 ) ' ; Gottfried Niedhart, 'Konrad Möglichkeiten

Adenauers Perzeption der internationalen Mächtekonstellation und der

westdeutscher

Politik

1945-1949';

Manfred

Overesch,

'Westdeutsche

Ministerpräsidenten und die Perzeption der nationalen Frage 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 4 8 ' . These contributions are published separately in Josef Becker/Franz Knipping (eds), Im Schatten Machtbewußtsein 1

Stenographische

im Nachkriegsdeutschland Berichte

des Deutschen

1945-1949, Bundestages,

der

Ohnmacht.

Paderborn 1986. p. 1210, Heuss to the Bundestag,

7Sept.

1950. 1

Cf. M . Stürmer, 'Kein Eigentum der Deutschen: Die Deutsche Frage', in: W. Weidenfeld (ed.), Die Identität der Deutschen,

Bonn 1983, pp. 8 3 - 1 0 1 , esp. p. 92.

118

Manfred Overesch

longer eurocentrically ordered by several powers of equal rank, but characterized by a global and above all bipolar structure, a system which generated ideological and power-political antagonisms and also manifested these particularly on German soil, it was most unlikely that the "melody of German history" should ever again in "basso continuo" resume the theme of nationalism. The right, indeed the duty, of the Germans to think for themselves about their future at home and their dealings abroad remained of course unaffected by this heritage, which burdened and initially even impeded the new national and international orientation of German policy. One of the first to have a clear perception of power in a Europe which included the western part of Germany was Konrad Adenauer, who advocated this perception with determination. Foreign policy had already become a central concern for Adenauer immediately after the end of the war, and even though he knew that there was no question of political, let alone diplomatic initiative, it was evident for him that the German position could be improved only by active diplomatic feelers and contacts and by declarations of foreign policy intention. 3 In contrast to Kurt Schumacher, for example, who was more strongly influenced by social and domestic considerations, Adenauer's starting-point was the world system, and he developed, and expounded with stubborn persistence, his own ideas as to how an improvement in West Germany's international status could be affected and a position of power thereby regained. 4 " F o r the time being, foreign policy will not be possible for Germany but on a limited scale. It must be her objective to take part, with equal rights, in the peaceful co-operation of the peoples to unite their nations." The readmission of Germany (i.e. West Germany) to an equal status could only be achieved after the security problem, which took precedence for the victorious Allies in the early post-war years, had been resolved: the problem of security from Germany. Germany as the enemy

3

H.-J. Lichtenberg, Sicherung der Freiheit. Die Haltung der CDU/CSU zum Soldatentum und ihre Sicherheits- und Wehrpolitik in den ]ahren 1945-1952, Köln 1979, pp. 51 ff emphasises correctly that Adenauer's active interest in foreign affairs began immediately after the end of the war, with basic statements on foreign and security policy matters and regular diplomatic 'interviews', cf. too R. Morsey (ed.), Konrad Adenauer und die Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart/Zürich 1979, p. 17. Morsey, ibid., p. 11 stresses for this period the identity of Adenauer's public and private statements. Indeed, the recently published first volume of Adenauer's letters offers nothing fundamentally new in the area of foreign policy. Adenauer, Briefe 1945-1947, ed. Η.P. Mensing, Berlin 1983.

4

The significance of an adequate perception of the "political realities in the world" especially in a post-war Germany largely isolated from the rest of the world is pointed out by Adenauer in his memoirs: K. Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953, Stuttgart 1965, 5th ed. 1983, p. 110. On basic questions of Adenauer's foreign policy concept, see H.-P. Schwarz, 'Das außerpolitische Konzept Konrad Adenauers', in: K. Gotto and others, Konrad Adenauer. Seine Deutschlandund Außenpolitik, 1945-1963, München 1975, pp. 97ff, and A. Baring, Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie, München/Wien 1969, pp. 48 ff.

119

Senior West German Politicians

still loomed over international relations for a while, then, after 1946, the Soviet Union slowly began to fill this role. Adenauer began to realize this fundamental change in the international set-up very early, even predicted it. With Adenauer, the Christian democrat, the liberal democrat Theodor Heuss also stands out among the senior West German politicians of the early post-war years. In contrast to Adenauer's, Heuss's perception of the German situation in Europe did not immediately reveal a willingness to integrate a West German state into Western Europe. "In the shadow of powerlessness" - here Heuss saw Germany after the total defeat of 1945 - , ethical postulates, addressed to the German people, took for the moment absolute precedence: " I myself try hard [ . . . ] to help foster a pure feeling of patriotism, free of false hero-worship, that talks of modesty, realism, moderation and fitting in with the occidental tradition". 5 Heuss saw the Western tradition as essentially an obligation of a spiritual or religious kind, rather than as the mere frame for rapid political integration into Western Europe. For a long time his ideas on foreign policy evolved, like Jakob Kaiser's or Rudolf Nadolny's, in the traditions of the Weimar Republic, where he got in fact his political education: "We, the German people must not be forced to 'opt' either for the East or the West though many of our countrymen may, in their heart, be so inclined, but by ignoring the permanent existence of the areas of German settlement". 6 It was only later, in 1948, that Heuss under changing circumstances, abandoned the Brückentheorie (Bridge Theory) derived from Germany's geopolitical position in the middle of Europe, between East and West. He then committed himself, as Adenauer had from the start, to a partial, West German solution in the broader context of European integration. It was noticeable, however, that he was more emphatic in his claim that this was only a provisional solution, and that he called more clearly for the integration of a reunified Germany into a European union. The perception of the German situation in Europe 1945-1949 was substantially influenced by the rapidly discernible failure to achieve a solution to the problem of postwar German unity. It was not Heuss or Adenauer, the representatives of the political parties, but the Minister Presidents of the German Länder, who had to undergo this experience. For lack of a federal German government, they were the first to consider themselves authorised - politically, by the Allies, and then democratically, by the elections to the state parliaments in 1946/47 - to speak and act on behalf of the whole of Germany. The behaviour of their counterparts from the Soviet Zone during the preparation and course of the conferences in Bremen (October 1946), Munich (June 1947) and also Berlin (November 5

Bundesarchiv (BA), Nachlaß (NL) Heuss, 489, Heuss to Gustav and Toni Stolper, 21 July 1946.

6

Heuss, speech of 6 J a n . 1947, in: Das neue Vaterland,

2 5 J a n . 1947.

120

Manfred Overesch

1947) made their failure to restore German unity after 1945 to the Minster Presidents of the western part of Germany fully apparent. It did not cause it. This was done by prior decisions of the Allies. But the Western Minister Presidents showed themselves increasingly willing to accept these decisions. By the end of 1947 their endeavours to restore German unity had failed, but in 1948, when the representatives of the political parties were called upon to act, these endeavours were oriented to help with the new policy of founding a West German state integrated into Western Europe. Their own fundamental political beliefs were conducive to this. Let us see how things happened. The first orientations of West German decision-makers beyond Land or zonal considerations and towards German unity were really encouraging. Of central importance in the year 1946 was the Bremen Interzonal Conference of October 4 - 5 , 1946.7 It was the first all-German conference that sought to bring together in a deliberately political conception all the previous attempts of the Western Minister Presidents to preserve German unity. At the end of September Geiler, Minister President of Hesse, noted in a memorandum that the conference of Bremen should pass its resolutions in terms of Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit (unity, rights and liberty).8 Composed in full awareness of German history, its submission to the conference remained - precisely because of this historicopolitical derivation - under wraps. The conference participants chose as the basis for their discussions proposals of Minister President Hinrich Wilhelm Kopf from Lower Saxony, concerning the "possibilities of the formation of a central German government in the light of the speech of the American Secretary of State Byrnes at Stuttgart" (September 6,1946). 9 In this manner the dominance of the Allies (Americans) was acknowledged; and this was also expressed by resolutions calling for a state system with a strongly federal structure. At a moment of historical importance, with Soviet foreign policy still hesitating between plans for German unity on the one hand and restriction to an Eastern Zone on the other, and with the Truman Doctrine (March 10, 1947) marking the outbreak of the Cold War still some months away, the Bremen conference was convened, and might have helped to give things an all-German emphasis. At first glance, it failed because of the unwillingness of the Minister Presidents from the Eastern Zone to participate, but the truth was that in the background the SED was at work. The party had its eyes fixed on the elections to the local assemblies and state parliaments in the Eastern Zone (set for October 13 and October 20,1946, respectively) and did not wish to attend a forum where German unity was discussed, and which was organised or even dominated by

7

Details of the Bremen Conference in: M . Overesch, 'Der historisch-politische Stellenwert der Bremer Interzonenkonferenz vom Oktober 1946', in: Bremisches

8

Akten zur Vorgeschichte

der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland,

Jahrbuch,

59, 1981, pp.57ff.

Vol. 1, p . 8 7 8 , N o t e 1.

' Details in: Overesch, 'Der historisch-politische Stellenwert', loc. cit., pp. 7 7 f .

121

Senior West German Politicians

other political forces, before it had finished work on the "draft of a constitution of the German Democratic Republic". 10 At the time, the Bremen setback was not yet seen as particularly discouraging. "If we are not completely mistaken", wrote Jakob Kaiser on January 1, 1947, in the newspaper of the Eastern Zone CDU, Neue Zeit, "this is the beginning of a year that will give a new unity to Germany"; to which he immediately added the principle upon which political progress in Germany should be based: "Whoever desires the recovery of Germany can only start from the fact that Germany is situated between East and West; the consequence of this fateful but also challenging situation is not the alternative between either a Western or an Eastern Bloc, but the synthesis of both understanding and reconciliation among the peoples and recovery by one's own spirits." This theory of Germany as a bridge between East and West had also been favoured by Bremen's Senator Harmssen at the Interzonal Conference for Economic Matters. 11 From the political point of view, and in the light of the experiences of German history in the Bismarck era and during the 18th and 19th centuries, this seemed, in the international situation after 1945, to many people not completely wrong. Kaiser, who had his roots in the Christian trade union movement, thought it worth taking into consideration in domestic politics, too, if a form of German Socialism could be found "that does not mean a mechanical fixation of man, but opens spaces for the free development of his personality". 12 This was also the basic idea of, for example, the Buchenwalder Manifest for peace, freedom, socialism, published on April 11, 1945, by Hermann Brill and others in the Buchenwald concentration camp and intended to announce a new orientation of German politics.13 In the light of what, by the end of 1946, the West had seen of the political practices of those with authority or responsibility in the Soviet Zöne, Kaiser's 10

On 22 Sept. 1946, the SED published the 'Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes', on 16 Nov. 1946 they produced the draft of the constitution.

11

Harmssen's analyses and recommendations on economic policies were derived from his principle: " W e happen to have become the frontier between East and West, and so we are assigned an eminently important task, a role in a European and possibly even in a global sense." F o r the content, cf. his study, published one year later, Reparationen,

Sozialprodukt,

Lebensstandard,

Bremen 1947. 12

Kaiser in: Neue

13

Μ . Overesch, 'Hermann Brill und die Neuanfänge deutscher Politik in Thüringen 1945', in:

Zeit, 1st Jan. 1947. VfZ,

27, 1979, pp. 5 2 4 - 5 6 9 . Among the adherents of the Bridge T h e o r y was also the former German ambassador to M o s c o w , Rudolf Nadolny, who (for example) wrote to M o l o t o v on 14 Nov. 1947: "Germany does not want to be a bridgehead either against the East or against the West. In social and economic respects, too, she only wants to play the role that her geographical position in the middle of Europe quite naturally assigns her: to form a bridge between East and West, to be the intermediate country that reduces, if possible, the tension between the t w o poles, to regain, by so doing, [ . . . ] her function as custodian of the European p e a c e " , BA N L Nadolny, Nadolny to Molotov, 14 Nov. 1947.

122

Manfred Overesch

ideas did not become very influential. For the same reason the plan he proposed in Berlin on March 13, 1947 for a national assembly of the tenants of political responsibility in all four zones aroused no noticeable enthusiasm. Moreover, the Bridge Theory lost all real political chances because of the growing dissensions among the Allies indicated by the failure of the Foreign Minister's Conference in Moscow (March 10 to April 24,1947). Gebhard Seelos, the Bavarian plenipotentiary at the Süddeutscher Länderrat (Council of the South German Länder) drew, in a memorandum (which suggested what was to become the Munich Conference of Minister Presidents), a conclusion that marked the political outlook of the following period, namely that for Germans, too, the commitment to German unity "can only be lip-service in the face of the international situation". 14 The events leading to and the course of the Munich Conference confirmed that his assessment was correct. As the Munich events are fairly wellknown, 15 I will give here only a brief sketch with some new points of emphasis. When the Minister Presidents from the Soviet Zone left the conference in the early morning of June 6, Hans Ehard, the instigator and chairman of the Conference, commented that "this incident meant the division of Germany". 16 The drama of the preceding discussions undoubtedly justified such a clear statement. It reflected more than just a momentary impression; Ehard had caught a realistic glimpse of the historical significance of the moment. This did not, however, prevent him from taking only hours later, at the official opening of the Conference, the exactly opposite view, and from veiling the awareness of partition behind an avowed commitment to unity. The objective of the political will of the German people should be Germany with the borders it had in 1937. 17 One can hardly fail to notice the contrast between the elevated tone of such a statement and the sheer inability, unwillingness even, of the Germans to talk to each other. The discussions during the preparatory weeks of May 18 - the speaking against rather than to each other — revealed this just as much as the minutes of the preliminary discussion on the evening of June 5. They recorded the re-

14

Akten zur Vorgeschichte

15

W. Grünewald, Die Münchener gesamtdeutschen

der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland,

vol. 2, p. 398.

Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz

Unternehmens,

Meisenheim

1971;

1947. Anlaß und Scheitern

R.

Steininger,

'Zur

Geschichte

Münchener Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz 1947', in: V / Z , 23, 1975, pp. 375ff; Die Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz

in München

vom 6.-8.

der Bundesrepublik

"

Steininger, loc. ext., p. 438.

17

Die deutsche

Deutschland,

Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz

der

deutsche

Juni 1947, ed. Bayerische Landeszentrale

für politische Bildungsarbeit, München 1947; T h . Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung ( = Geschichte

eines

1945-1949

vol. 1), Stuttgart/Wiesbaden 1983, pp. 277ff.

in München,

pp. 3 5 f. A sound recording of this

speech is in the RIAS Tonarchiv, Berlin. 18

Including a visit by the General Secretary, Rossmann, to the Soviet Z o n e from 1 5 - 2 0 M a y 1947, see the documentation of the report on the journey in: VfZ,

23, 1975, p p . 4 5 4 f f .

Senior West German Politicians

123

commendation by the leader of the delegation from the Eastern Zone, Rudolf Paul, Minister President of Thuringia, that the topic "formation of a German Central Administration by an agreement among the democratic Germ.an parties and trade unions on the creation of a German unitary state" should be placed on the agenda because it could be dealt with in " n o more than 15 to 20 minutes", 1 9 which of course made East Berlin's basic demand seem no more than a trifle. The Minister Presidents from the Eastern Zone wanted at least as an opening an arrangement of political topics at the Conference, in order to see it laid down in an official statement that all-German discussions should be transferred to more plebiscitary bodies (political parties and trade unions). This would enable the SED to emerge nationwide on the German scene, as it had already repeatedly tried. In spite of a fundamental contradiction between their respective ideologies, the SED was thus able to establish at least a formal kind of common action with the SPD. Had not Schumacher just, as he had done repeatedly before, denied the Minister Presidents the so-called Aktivlegitimation to consult or pass resolutions on matters of all-German interest? At any rate, the SED overestimated their political chances in the West enormously. The Berlin elections on October 20,1946, had revealed that in the event of German reunification the party would sink into political obscurity. This is something that was not taken sufficiently into account in the West. In the situation before and during the Munich Conference, the participants from the Western Zones did not want to let themselves be pushed out of the role they assigned to themselves: that of being trustees for the whole of Germany. An exaggerated concern about prestige prevailed, as did the false hope that the economic magnetism of the West could transform the danger of political partition of Germany, heightened by the recent founding of the Bizone or united economic area, into the possibility of German unity. In addition, the Munich position of the decision-makers from the Western Zones was affected by their considerable ignorance of the situation in the East and their exaggerated fear of communism, a fear which could not even be lessened by the fact that Berlin and the Eastern Zone were more attached to German unity than the West was. One must also mention the West German tendency to imitate the demonstrative toughness towards Communism shown by the Western Powers since the Truman Doctrine; the enticing prospect of growing prosperity in the West; and, finally, the lax handling of the negotiations by Ehard, who did not once put the Minister President from the Eastern Zone on the diplomatic spot, but actually gave his support to the excuse they found for leaving. Such official and unofficial positions and moods of fear determined how people actually behaved in an important, albeit not yet necessarily decisive mo" Steininger, loc. cit., p. 426.

124

Manfred Overesch

ment in history. The Conference was accurately assessed by the somewhat melodramatic sounding comment of the Süddeutsche Zeitung of June 7, 1947: "It is part of the tragedy of the Germans that in historic moments they are not capable of finding in questions of common destiny a common denominator". It was adequate to characterise Munich as "another Moscow", as one American journalist did.10 The Germans were reproducing the discord of the Allies. The dual significance attached to the year 1947 by the Bavarian Minister President Ehard, in his radio speech of January 1, "1947 probably hides in its lap some of the most difficult and significant decisions [ . . . ] that have ever been made in German history" - had by the end of the year vanished. After the failure of the Moscow and Munich Conferences, and on the eve of the Conferences in Berlin21 and London, which were also clearly doomed to failure, in other words in the light of national and international setbacks on the German political issue, Ehard and the other Minister Presidents of the American Zone adopted that "bold and far-reaching" perspective that had been offered them in a discussion paper by Hermann Brill: "If, as can be foreseen, it is not possible to carry through an all-German policy, the heads of government should point out that a new constitutional arrangement of a provisional character must be provided for in the German Western states." Brill included Berlin in his thoughts, too, using a formulation that has since become part of Bonn's German affairs policy: "As regards Berlin the heads of government should declare that they would do everything to keep Berlin capable of living."" This West German willingness was in perfect harmony with the American policy towards Germany that was revealed at the same time. On November 3, 1947, Clay, head of the Military Government, had written to the Director of his Economic Affairs Department William H. Draper: "We must have courage to proceed with the government of western Germany, first provisionally and then representative, quickly if the Council of Foreign Ministers fails to produce an answer for all Germany." 23 After the London Conference another American diplomat, Joseph C. Grew, gave it as his view that now, at last, Roosevelt's oneworld-conception was reduced to no more than a political illusion. A realistic perception of power relationship and ambitions in the world called for a policy of Western intergration. Grew wrote at this time to Nadolny: "We have not sought a divided world and a divided Europe, but now we cannot stay in the

20

See Stuttgarter

21

On the antecedents and events of the Berlin Conference of 9 N o v . 1947, see Overesch, deutsche

22

Nachrichten,

9 J u n e 1947.

Illusion und westdeutsche

Realität,

Gesamt-

Düsseldorf 1979, pp. 130 ff.

BA N L Brill, 101, 'Vorschläge für eine deutsche Stellungnahme zur Londoner Konferenz am 4.11.1947'.

23

Τ he Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. Germany

1945-1949,

ton 1974, p. 476; cf. also Lucius D. Clay, Entscheidung

vol. 1, ed. Jean Ε. Smith, Blooming-

in Deutschland,

F r a n k f u r t / M . 1950, p. 203.

125

Senior West German Politicians

background and observe quietly the disintegration of the Western World." This was the reason for founding a West German state at this time "parallel to the recovery of Western Europe." 2 4 This principle of action in German affairs, which developed late in 1947 and resulted from prior decisions of the Allies as well as from the experience gained by the West German Minister Presidents, matched Adenauer's point of view, which however had evolved differently as it was not the result of meetings with representatives from the Eastern Zone but was derived from a broad political vision. Adenauer had consistently made the revolution of the world system and its transformation from a multi- into a bipolar system - with Washington and Moscow as the new centres of world politics — the basis of his analysis of foreign affairs. His starting point was the (for him) fundamental observation that the Soviet Union was " a sort of negative centre of the European post-war s y s t e m " " and had developed into a hegemonic power in Europe. " T h e balance of power in Europe was destroyed." 26 The ensuing feeling of being threatened was expressed by Adenauer both in the domestic and foreign affairs context, and was underlined not only by reference to the "land bulk of the Soviet Union", but also by emphasis on its totally foreign nature. In his dichotomous view of the world the Soviet Union appeared as the antithesis of the West, a "vast power governed by a genius and a way of thinking totally different from our West European traditions". 27 Adenauer's image of the Soviet Union was determined not only by the idea of Moscow as the centre of world Communism but also by emotionally highly effective views of the "Asian" characteristics of Soviet policy. For him, the Soviet Union was "an Asian power". From this Adenauer derived his political programme. In his letter of March 16, 1946, to Wilhelm Sollmann, a formal Social Democratic member of the Reichstag who had emigrated to the USA, we find the following ideas: "Asia stands on the Elbe. Only an economically and spiritually regenerated Western Europe under British and French leadership can check the further advance of the Asian spirit and power, a Western Europe to which belongs, as an integral element, the part of Germany that is not occupied by Russia". 2 8 Henceforth Adenauer proceeded from the assumption that Germany was partitioned. 2 '

24

"

BA N L Nadolny, Grew an Nadolny, 5 J a n 1948. H.-P. Schwarz, 'Adenauer und Rußland', in: Im Dienste Deutschlands

und des Rechts.

Festschrift

für Wilhelm G. Grewe, ed. F . J . Kroneck and T h . Oppermann, Baden-Baden 1981, p . 3 7 7 . "

Adenauer, Erinnerungen,

11

Speech of 17 Dec. 1946, in: Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik,

p. 244.

p. 464; cf. also the speech of 2 8 A u g . 1948, in: Adenauer, Reden

2nd ed., Stuttgart 1980,

1917-1967,

ed. H.P. Schwarz,

Stuttgart 1975, p. 126. 28

Adenauer to Sollmann, 16 March 1946, in: Adenauer,

19

Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 197: " N o b o d y but Adenauer would then have dared to speak of a partition of the R e i c h . "

Briefe,

p. 191.

126

Manfred Overesch

Adenauer's drastic assessment of the Soviet Union was in no way paralleled by a comparable advocacy of the USA. He had doubts about the American commitment to Europe. What he wrote in March 1946 in his letter to America never really completely lost its validity for him: "USA doesn't know Europe. I have got on very well with the officers of the American occupation forces here and again and again have had to learn that they do not know Europe. That is also why USA is not inclined to interest themselves in European affairs". 30 Secretly he feared that the World Powers could come to an agreement over the heads of the Germans and to their disadvantage. This fear seemed justified after the first nuclear detonation of the Russians. At the time he expressed, at one of the first cabinet meetings in Bonn, his concern about possible consequences of the explosion: "This fact will perhaps make the USA disposed to comply more with Russian claims". 3 1 The opposite was actually the case, but Adenauer's perception of the situation was determinated by his almost exaggerated fear (a fear which continued to affect him in the following years) that the Western Powers might make concessions to the Soviet Union at West Germany's expense. His commitment to a Western European union that would include a West German state became proportionately stronger. The remaining European Powers, Britain and France, had both, in Adenauer's view, inherent weakness. He saw no evidence that London was making the determined turn towards Europe which the country surely needed, in the light of its lost role in the world. He complained repeatedly that the British were being shortsighted: "In my opinion, the British pursue a policy that runs entirely counter to their interests. After all, they can only maintain their position in the world as the leader of an economically united and politically reconciled Western Europe including at least the three Western Zones". 3 2 If Europe was once again to become an autonomous factor in the balance of world power, Britain had a central role to play, not only because of its internal stability - in which it clearly distinguished itself from the continental nations - and of its liberal traditions, 33 but also because France was on its own unable to assume such a role. "From the biological and economic point of view France is not strong enough for this role. In my opinion Europe has to be led by Britain and France and this makes necessary the integration of the economic interests of France, Britain and Germany. Like the British themselves we, for our part, have the greatest interest that Britain should see herself as a European power". 3 4

30

Adenauer to Sollmann, 16 M a r c h 1946, see N o t e 28 above.

31

Adenauer in the cabinet meeting on 2 4 Sept. 1949, in: Die Kabinettsprotokolle regierung,

vol. 1, 1949, Boppard 1982, p. 315.

32

Adenauer to H . Müller, 5 Nov. 1946, in: Adenauer,

33

Adenauer to M . Sevenich, 12 Dec. 1946, ibid., p. 392.

Briefe, p. 359.

34

Adenauer to U. Noack, 8 April 1946, ibid., p. 210.

der

Bundes-

Senior West German Politicians

127

But later France became, after all, the keystone of Adenauer's concept of Europe. The reasons were historical and cultural. When, on November 3 , 1 9 4 9 , in Die Zeit, he spoke out for an end of the Erbfeindscbaften (arch-enemities) in Europe, and in particular that between Germany and France, West Germany's position in Europe was already established. Going back to ideas he had already expressed in the twenties, Adenauer moved economic affairs to the centre of the stage in order to defuse thereby the antagonisms among the European powers and to bring the problem of their differences under rational control. In doing so he adopted a position which has been propagated repeatedly since the late eighteenth century as the liberal blueprint for the maintenance of peace. 35 Its central point is the idea of the indissoluble connection between free trade and maintenance of peace. Following this tradition Adenauer considered the "organic integration" of Western European and German industry as a prerequisite "for the safeguarding of a permanent peace". For him "parallel and synchronized economic interests" were "the soundest and most solid foundation of good political relations among the peoples". 36 Calling for 37 "basically new ways" to assure peace in Europe, Adenauer took up threads from schools of thought that reappeared time and again in German politics - admittedly without achieving any lasting success. 38 Here we should above all note analogies with the foreign policy thinking of Gustav Stresemann, though he was not held in particularly high esteem by Adenauer. Stresemann, too, was convinced that only by fostering points of contact, above all with the West, and by pursuing "parallel interests" (which with respect to Germany and the victorious Allies would be found primarily in the area of economics) the reigning inamicability could be overcome. 39 At all events, Adenauer believed that in the Western area of world politics or at least in Western Europe - it was important to surmount purely individual national considerations and in particular economic nationalism. Again and again he advocated the creation of the "United States of Europe including Ger35

See G. Niedhart, 'Das liberale Modell der Friedenssicherung: allgemeine Grundsätze und Realisierungsversuche im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert', in: Frieden und Friedenssicherung in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, ed. M. Schlenke and K.J. Matz, Paderborn 1984.

36

Presseinterview 5 Oct. 1945, and speech, 24 March 1946, in: Adenauer, Reden, Erinnerungen, pp. 35, 41.

37

As for example on 21 Sept. 1949, during his first visit to the High Commissionaries as Federal chancellor. Adenauer, Erinnerungen, p. 234.

38

Frequently pointed out by H.-P. Schwarz, for example in his article 'Adenauer und Europa', in: VfZ, 27,1979, p. 496. At the same time he says (ibid. p. 492) that Adenauer had "founded a 'new tradition' of German foreign policy". One should really put it like this: that in the Adenauer era a new tradition in German foreign policy asserted itself. It was certainly not founded by Adenauer.

39

G. Stresemann, 'The Economic Restoration of the World', in: Foreign Affairs, 2, 1923/24, pp.552f.: cf. also G. Niedhart, 'Stresemanns Außenpolitik, Locarno und die Grenzen der Entspannung', in: Gustav Stresemann, ed. W. Michalka and M. Lee, Darmstadt 1982, pp.416ff.

p. 105; Adenauer,

M a n f r e d Overesch

128

many", 4 0 without however going into details about possible ways of realising it. Indeed, the European Idea may well have been a "magic formula for the disentanglement of difficult problems". 4 1 One of the most difficult problems was how West Germany could improve its status in international politics and make itself felt again as a factor in the balance of international power. This was precisely the point where Adenauer's advocacy of economic cooperation as a means of securing peace in the West coincided with the question of power. Conscious of the connection between the satisfaction of Western needs for security, the reconstruction of Western Europe (with German participation) and the regaining of German equality implicit in the wish to achieve "progressively more state power", 4 2 Adenauer deemed European cooperation of vital interest to West Germany. "We should go ahead in the question of European federation and advance it with all our forces, for this is the only possibility for us to regain some day some kind of influence in the world, to succeed and to prepare a future for our children". 43 Love of Germany, as Adenauer understood it, had for domestic social as well as for foreign policy reasons necessarily to join such a definite orientation towards the West. 44 Unlike his opponent, Jakob Kaiser, Adenauer neither believed in the possibility of an independent German position between East and West nor wished to stick to Berlin as the capital of Germany. Because of the "traditional links between the Rhenish West and Germany's western neighbours", he pleaded for Bonn as capital 45 and thereby for a westward movement of the political centre. In contrast to Stresemann, Adenauer not only made accommodation with the West a priority, he pursued moreover a policy of ties with the West, thus sacrificing correspondingly freedom of action in foreign policy. Theodor Heuss's political thinking after the Second World War did not have the same conceptional consistency as Adenauer's, it showed on the con40

Speech, 2 4 M a r c h 1946, in: Adenauer, Reden,

41

Schwarz, Reich, p. 445. Adenauer, Erinnerungen, pp. 245 f. See also Adenauer's Government policy statement on 20 Sept. 1949: " T h e only way to liberty is that we try to enlarge our rights and competences gradually, in agreement with the Allied High C o m m i s s i o n " , Adenauer, Reden, p. 167. Cf. too R. Aron, ' D a s Außenpolitische Konzept Konrad Adenauers', in: Konrad Adenauer 1876/1976, ed. Η. Kohl, 2nd ed., Stuttgart/Zürich 1976, p . 3 1 .

42

p. 105.

43

Adenauer to the Z o n a l Committee of the C D U , on 2 8 - 2 9 0 c t . 1948, in: H . Pütz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone 1946-1949, Bonn 1975, p.719.

44

A far-reaching study of the links to the West in: H.-P. Schwarz, 'Die Politik der Westbindung oder die Staatsräson der Bundesrepublik', in: Zeitschrift für Politik, 22, 1975, pp. 307 ff; cf. also W. Benz/G. Plum/W. Röder, Einheit der Nation. Diskussionen und Konzeptionen zur Deutschlandpolitik der großen Parteien seit 1945, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 31 ff; F. R. Pfetsch, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 1949-1980, München 1981, pp. 133 ff.

45

Adenauer to the Belgian politician F. van Cauwelaert, 8 Oct. 1948, in: Schwarz, Die Ära Stuttgart/Wiesbaden 1981, p. 48.

Adenauer,

129

Senior West German Politicians

trary an evolution, even a reorientation. And after all it did not share Adenauer's priorities: firstly security, freedom and sovereignty of a West German state and only then reunification of the whole of Germany. Still in 1947, even as late as 1948, Heuss held a systematic assessment of Germany's possibilities for the future to be "presumptuous". He voiced no remarks about the Soviet Union comparable to Adenauer's, who with his exaggerations was a vehement anti-Communist. Heuss made also very few and incoherent remarks about the USA and Britain. Only on the subject of France did he express himself more fully, including in his observations cultural and political ideas about the future of Germany. These thoughts became, however, politically relevant only in 1948/49. Prior to this time the crucial point of reference in his political thinking was the German nation and its moral renaissance. Given his view of the German situation, it was logical that Heuss should emphatically reject a premature German commitment to one or the other side, and this attitude can easily be illustrated until well into the summer of 1947. It may indeed have lasted until autumn. It was most clearly expressed on January 6,1947, in the traditional Twelfth Night speech: "We, the German people, must not be forced to 'opt' either for the East or the West, though many of our countrymen may, in their hearts, be so inclined, but by ignoring the permanent existence of the areas of German settlement". 44 Heuss repeated this admonition in his speech to the parliament of Württemberg-Baden on February 25,1947, and again in Eisenach in July 1947, when he stressed that for the liberals there was "only the option, for Germany". 4 7 Behind this attitude there was a political tradition. During the Weimar Republic Heuss had been a pronounced exponent of the democratic nationalism that dominated political thinking about Germany in the Deutsche Demokratische Partei and Deutsche Staatspartei. Even after its hypertrophy and perversion under the National Socialists, the "nation" remained the crucial point of reference in his political thinking, albeit on the understanding that it was morally purified. The liberal from the south-west of Germany emphasised the obligation of national loyalty, a loyalty particularly characteristic for the south-west and often proved in the past. Freed of those anti-western and illiberal features that had defined Rightist thinking about the "nation" during the Weimar Republic, this notion (das Reich) was in 1945/1946 still the central expression of Heuss's political aspirations. However, gradually he banished from his vocabulary the term Reich. He began to use it "almost hesitatingly", because in the light of German impotence the word Reich, with its "shimmer of grandeur, and glory of power", no longer

46

Heuss, speech of 6 Jan. 1947, see Note 6 above.

47

Heuss, speech of 2 5 F e b . 1947, in: Verhandlungen periode

1946-1950.

des Württemberg-Badischen

Protokollband 1, pp. 1 2 8 - 1 3 3 , and Der Morgen,

Landtages.

8 July 1947.

Wahl-

130

Manfred Overesch

seemed adequate in the post-war years. 48 In reflections which he addressed in July 1947 to Gustav Stolper on the future constitution of Germany, he recommended dropping the term Reich and choosing the designation Deutsche Republik for the future German state. 49 His priority of German unity caused Heuss to reject a unilateral political option - perhaps even that of a fragmentary German state - until well into the year 1947. Was he for this reason a neutralist during this period? Hardly so. Where there was no political sovereignty Heuss pleaded for intellectual sovereignty. He told his audience in Göppingen in December 1945 that it was through a new orientation of German life that one would "have to look for a starting-point for the German future". 5 0 According to Heuss, this mental reorientation called for an opening to the outside world. He sharply criticised the National Socialist fear of foreign infiltration, and countered it firmly with the claim " W i r brauchen wieder Weltluft" (We need cosmopolitanism again)/ 1 He stressed incessantly the importance of returning to the classical and Christian tradition of the West. This was clearly on opening to the West. For Heuss, neither in cultural nor in political matters was there any turning to the East. What mattered to him was to assimilate anew the values of the West (whether spiritual or political) and fill them with new life. This did not mean, however, that the borders to the East should be closed. The Germans' situation in the centre of Europe was, despite all the political and military dangers it entailed (dangers which Heuss clearly saw), at the same time "eine geistige Glückslage" (culturally an asset). 52 Heuss was also able to project a vision of the future along these lines, one in which it was important to rediscover "that mediatory role between West and East that had been the European mission of the Germans". 5 3 In this manner, too, Germany remained in his view a bridge between East and West. But he did not draw political conclusions from this, saying for example that this function of a bridge implied necessarily to compromise on basic political and social structures. If there ever had to be a choice between East and West, the values to which he was pledged pointed him right from the start unequivocally towards the West. However, as long as Germany remained suspended in the uncertainty of those first years after 1945, this orientation towards the West was only latent, and of internal rather than external significance. 48

Heuss, 'Bindung mit Freiheit'; speech to the Twelfth-Night Conference of the DVP on 6 Jan. 1946, in: Aufzeichnungen

1946-1947,

ed. F. Pikart, Stuttgart 1966, p. 204.

49

Heuss, ' Z u r Frage der staatsrechtlichen Gestaltung Deutschlands', M S for G. Stolper, summer

50

Heuss, speech of 7 D e c . 1945, in: BA N L Heuss, 1.

51

Heuss, 'Um Deutschlands Zukunft', speech of 18 M a r c h 1946, in: Aufzeichnungen,

"

ibid., p. 196.

53

Heuss, speech of 1st Jan. 1946 (see Note 48 above), p. 9.

1947, ibid., p. 136. p. 197.

131

Senior West German Politicians

When the antagonism between the two Super-Powers became clearer and for Germany - increasingly ominous, Heuss's views as to the immediate political opportunities that were open to the Germans changed. It is not possible to give an exact date for this change of awareness, but its contours became evident at the beginning of 1948. Previously, Heuss had bluntly refused to contemplate German partition as a political possibility. For example, during the Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers in Paris in the summer of 1946, Heuss's friend Gustav Stolper outlined with remarkable clarity the prospect of German partition: "Within a few months Washington and London will have to decide how long they want to maintain the existing state of war and thus bear the immediate responsibility for starvation and poverty in Germany, only because Russia is not ready to accept the constitution of a German government with which peace can be made, or whether they will simply accept the division of Germany created by military facts and not as the result of political aims, and constitute and recognize without Russia a Western Germany, as a territory of 4 0 to 45 million people. All thinking people are aware that this can be neither a solution to the German Question nor a real peace. Moreover, it will enormously increase the sources of friction with Russia and the danger of open conflict. But for all this, it might possibly be the lesser evil, compared with dragging out the present situation which is materially and morally intolerable, not only for the German people but also for the United States and Britain". 5 4 Heuss did not react. One is led to assume that he was not yet at this moment ready to accept the hard truth of Stolper's letter. A readiness to cooperate in the economic and political consolidation of the three Western Zones and their integration into Western Europe became more apparent in 1947, however, when Heuss gave his endorsement to the bizonal commissions, and even more so in 1948 with his positive reaction to the recommendations of the London Conference. Admittedly Heuss said nothing about a Weststaat, but as early as July 1948 he referred to a "coming German Federal State". One might regard its basic structure as an "interlude" or as a "provisional arrangement" but one must, according to Heuss, " m o s t earnestly endeavour to accomplish something proper and viable", 5 5 if only to ensure its ability to act in internal and external affairs. This assertion indicated the background of Heuss's ample reflections on constitutional theory and his later work in the Parlamentarischer Rat (Parliamentary Council). In his first major speech before this body, on September 9, 1948, Heuss strongly emphasised that one must try to create "something really more stable in its structure". 5 6 And in October 1948 he reflected again on the " t e m p o r a r y " , the "provisional" and, in

54

BA N L Heuss, 489, Gustav Stolper to Heuss and his wife, 8 June 1946.

55

BA N L Heuss, 1, Heuss, ' Z u r Frage des Föderalismus', MS of 1st Nov. 1948.

56

Parlamentarischer

Rat. Stenographische

Berichte,

vol. 1, Bonn 1 9 4 7 / 4 9 , p. 4 1 .

132

Manfred Overesch

answer to Carlo Schmid's formula of the Staatsfragment, he advanced good reasons as to why there had to emerge from the work of the Parlamentarischer Rat "something that was at least similar to a state". 57 This meant that Heuss thought in terms of a West German proxy state, which - geographically and politically speaking - would constitute only, as he put it, a "partial solution". In this sense he was against a provisional arrangement; he emphasised that this could, in his view, only prejudice the earnestness of attempts to think about problems of constitutional structure. Whenever he came later to speak of a Transitorium, he would again intimate how much he regarded the Grundgesetz as the key to an interim arrangement. Acting "as a commissioned representative" ("in einem Auftrag der Stellvertretung") the Germans of the western and southern parts of Germany had, in his view, to "be conscious that they also spoke and thought on behalf of those who are denied participation"; in this sense the name Bundesrepublik Deutschland (about the choice of which he had considerable influence) seemed quite acceptable/ 8 Even more clearly than the final version of the preamble to the Grundgesetz, for which Heuss (as secretary and spokesman on the preamble in the Basic Issues Committee of the Parlamentarischer Rat) had set the tone in the discussions, an earlier version he had proposed expressed his own quandary and the choice of objectives for the whole of Germany: "The German people in the Länder of Baden, Bavaria etc. have, in this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, reestablished for themselves the constitutional basis for the legal order of a state. They are filled with the desire to preserve, beyond the partial solution now forced upon them by the exigencies of time, the indispensable right to organize freely the life of the whole nation. The people in the other German Länder are called upon to join the Federal Republic in order to realize national unity and freedom by common decision and common responsibility". 59 It was more difficult for Heuss to accept the orientation to the West that took place in 1948 than it was for Adenauer. He had to reorientate his thinking on foreign affairs, just as the West German Minister Presidents had previously had to do. He was helped in this by the course of Franco-German relations. France as "the country of the Republique unique et indivisible" could not, he thought, expect as the reward of victory in the Second World War the complete break-up of Germany as a unified state. It could demand concrete guarantees for its own security, but it had also to allow the rebuilding of a German state. The road to this lay in the founding of a West German state as a partial solution to the German Question and its integration into Europe.

57

Heuss, 'Über das Vorläufige', in: Christ und Welt, 16 Oct. 1948. " Heuss, 'Die Präambel', in: Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung (RNZ), 11 Oct. 1948. 59 Quoted in: Der Demokrat. Beilage zu Das neue Vaterland, N o 21, October 1948.

133

Senior West German Politicians

Heuss often treated "the enthusiasm for European congresses" with irony 60 and kept his distance from it. He did not, for example, join any of the European associations or committees for Franco-German understanding. This did not prevent him, however, from seeing at an early time in the European idea something that could contribute substantially to Germany's return into the European family of nations. During the Weimar Republic he had been preoccupied, in the tradition of Naumann's Central European thinking, with dreams of PanGermanic annexations, and he had, at the time, only sceptical, even disparaging, things to say about the Pan-European idea; after the Second World War, he was prepared to attach quite a different value to the European debate. He warned, however, against using the historically inappropriate expression "United States of Europe". But above all, he recommended keeping German commitment to Europe for the time being on a low flame, in order not to arouse the mistrust of the neighbours, who still remembered Hitler's concept of Europe. In this context he also spoke of the nation state as being on the way to historical obsolescence, and of the "integration of Germany into a great European union" as having become a Herzensaufgabe (duty dear to his heart). 61 Heuss's European confessions in the years 1947/48 seem above all to have been the expression of his perceptions of the changed realities in post-war Europe. The opening up of his mind to new possibilities of international understanding, and in particular of a remodelling of Franco-German relations showed his sober realism with regard to the developments of the post-war years. Unlike Adenauer, who could see a final political objective in the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany and its integration into a Western Europe rejuvenating on the cultural basis of the Classical World and Christianity the old Carolingian Empire, Heuss had a more open view of the future. On the Germans' road to self-discovery, 1949 was for him just a year when " a very small piece of solid ground had been gained for Germany's destiny". 62 The renewed discussion of 1984/85 on the German Question shows that political thinking in Germany seems to return not to Adenauer, but rather to Heuss.

60

Heuss, 'Das Europa-Gespräch', in: R N Z , 2, 1949.

"

Heuss, speech of 25 Feb. 1947 (see N o t e 47 above), p. 129.

"

Heuss, 'Vor dem Parlamentarischen Rat', in: Heuss, Die Großen Tübingen 1965, p. 87.

Reden.

Der

Staatsmann,

134

Manfred Overesch

Zusammenfassung Auf dem ersten „Nationalen Gedenktag", den die Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 7. September 1950 zur Besinnung auf den Auftrag des Grundgesetzes im Bonner Bundeshaus veranstaltete, beklagte der Bundespräsident in seiner Festrede, daß „die Geschichtsmelodie Deutschlands zerbrochen" sei. Heuß dachte dabei gleichermaßen an den Verlust der nationalen Einheit Deutschlands wie an den der internationalen Reputation der Deutschen; er meinte den Verlust von Freiheit und Identität eines in zwei Staaten geteilten Volkes. Die westdeutschen Entscheidungsträger haben schon bald nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg versucht, die Einheit des Staates zu erhalten. Gemäß den Vorstellungen des Potsdamer Kommuniques gingen sie von dem Bemühen um eine wirtschaftliche Einheit aus. Dafür stehen die frühen hessisch-thüringischen Kontakte sowie die Bremer Interzonen- und die Münchener Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz. Ihr Scheitern legte den 1948 zu Handlungsträgern aufgeforderten Partei-Politikern den weiteren Gang der innerdeutschen Entscheidung auf. Vor dem Hintergrund der internationalen Lage hat insonderheit Konrad Adenauer in pragmatischer Kalkulation die Integration eines freiheitlichen, gesicherten und souveränen westdeutschen Staates in einen westeuropäischen Völkerverband gefördert. Theodor Heuß, der auch „im Schatten der Ohnmacht" zunächst an der Priorität eines gesamtdeutschen Reiches festhielt, folgte seit dem Spätjahr 1947 der Notwendigkeit einer westdeutschen Staatsgründung als Teillösung der deutschen Frage nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.

II. The Political Parties

British Political Parties and the European Crisis of the late 1940s* by Martin Ceadel

"In many ways we are witnessing and experiencing the same things which frustrated us and made us despair in 1937 and 1938", Labour MP Gordon Lang told the House of Commons during a foreign-policy debate in January 1948. " T h e parallel with 1939 is certainly not precise, but no one can deny that a similar measure of apprehension has been felt throughout Europe during the past seven days", wrote Tribune, a political weekly associated with Labour's left wing, just days after the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia had produced a second Prague crisis painfully reminiscent of the first. It was in large part because the lessons of the 1930s were so easily recalled that the attitude of Britain's parties and politicians towards the power balance in Europe in the late 1940s was clearer and more resolute than it had been ten years previously; "I have not the same sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach - the same certainty of war - as I had in 1 9 3 8 - 9 " , Conservative MP Robert Boothby explained in May 1948.1 Even so, some traces of former uncertainties and confusions still lingered on. The change can to some extent be attributed to a new "realism" learned by the Labour Party's leaders in the course of their participation in Winston Churchill's coalition government from May 1940 to May 1945 and practised by them when they ruled alone under Clement Attlee from July 1945 to October 1951. It can also in part be explained by the wartime pounding British cities had received from Europe-based bombers (which caused Attlee to note in a cabinet memorandum in July 1943 that "we cannot afford to take risks in Europe, particularly in an age of air power") and rockets (which seem a year later to have completed his conversion, for a time at least, to the continental commitment):

* This paper was written before the publication of Kenneth O. M o r g a n , Labour O x f o r d 1984, and Henry Pelling, The 1945-51

Labour

Governments,

in Power

1945-51,

London 1984, both of which

have excellent sections on foreign affairs. 1

Lang, 22 J a n . 1948, Parliamentary Deb., 5th, 4 4 6 / 4 1 3 ) ; Tribune,

Debates,

House of Commons,

5th series, vol. 446, col. 4 1 3 ( H C

2 7 J a n . 1948; Boothby, 5 M a y 1948, HC Deb.,

5th, 4 5 0 / 1 3 8 1 .

138

Martin Ceadel

this had made it clearer than ever that Britain could ignore what went on in Europe only at its own peril. 2 But its main cause was the post-war international situation, in which Stalin's expansionism, following as it did hard upon Hitler's, made it impossible to deny the role of power in international relations as then conducted. Yet certain pre-war attitudes could still be identified, particularly before 1948-9. Defence planners continued to drag their feet about committing Britain to forward defence in Europe, although more because of pessimism about the defensibility of western Europe without active American help than because they felt limited liability by Britain would suffice. 3 A declining but not negligible number of idealists, mostly socialists or federalists (or both), clung to a belief that international relations might nevertheless be reformed, although it was accepted that any such reform would be more difficult and drastic than formerly recognised. And on at least one issue, that of "European union", each of the major parties found itself once again adopting a position embarrassingly discordant with its own traditions - Labour being unwontedly hostile to an "internationalist" initiative and the Conservatives unwontedly encouraging. This paper is divided into three parts. T h e first and major part surveys the parties and shows the extent to which their ideological predispositions and domestic-policy preoccupations conditioned their response to international affairs. T h e second assesses the impact of the cold war in general, since this explains (rather than was itself determined by) political attitudes to Europe in particular, and focusses on the Labour Party since this faced the biggest challenge to its preconceptions. And the third focusses on the particular issues those of " u n i o n " and of Germany - arising from the European situation.

The parties For all its acknowledged seriousness the international situation in the late 1940s was rarely the major subject of political debate. This was partly because fear of war was never quite as great, even at its peak in mid-1948, as ten years previously. But it was also because domestic politics had entered a new era: in July 1945 the Labour party had gained its first parliamentary majority. Thus 2

19July 1943 and 2 6 J u l y 1944, Public Record Office (PRO), Cabinet Office Papers, series 66, vols. 3 9 and 53 (CAB 6 6 / 3 9 and 53), War Papers (WP) 4 3 / 3 2 1 and 4 4 / 4 1 4 , citied in John T. Grantham, 'The Labour Party and European Unity, 1 9 3 9 - 5 1 ' , unpubl. P h . D . thesis, Cambridge Univ. 1977, p p . 6 5 , 7 4 - 5.

3

For the doubts of the Chiefs of Staff up to M a y 1948 see The Memoirs Viscount

Montgomery

of Alamein,

see Keep Left. By a Group of Members pp. 3 0 - 3 1 .

of Field-Marshall

the

London 1958, pp. 498—505; for similar pessimism on the left of Parliament,

New Statesman pamphlet, London 1947,

139

British Political Parties

although, in contrast with much of Europe, the party system remained virtually unchanged, a lasting shift had occurred in the distribution of power between the major parties. Despite a radicalisation of political opinion since 1940, the minor parties of the left had failed in their efforts to exploit the opportunity presented by the wartime electoral truce between the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties and their joint participation in the coalition. In 1942 a new, Christian radical, party had been formed, with the name Common Wealth, by Sir Richard Acland, an MP formerly in the Liberal Party. Though winning three wartime byelections and fighting 23 seats in the 1945 general election, it proved to be but a transient product of the political vacuum: it returned only one MP (the victor of a by-election only three months previously whom the Labour Party had decided not to oppose) who, like Acland, joined Labour almost at once. The older minor parties fared only slightly better in 1945. The anti-war Independent Labour Party (ILP), described at the 1944 Labour Party conference as a "walking corpse", managed to return its three pre-war MPs (the fourth who had been elected in 1935 having defected to Labour in 1939); but all sat for Glasgow constituencies, two of which the Labour Party chose not to contest. The death of its leader, Maxton, in July 1946 marked the effective end of the party: although his seat was held against a Labour challenge in the ensuing byelection, between March and November 1947 all three MPs joined the Labour Party (following the latter's refusal to allow the ILP itself to affiliate). Even after the ILP disappeared from parliament, a foreign-policy tradition could still be identified: in particular, the demand for a "United Socialist States of Europe" the "third force" notion which drew on the ILP's anti-Stalinist contempt for "the reactionary conception of 'socialism in one country'" as well as on the federalist ideas which had become fashionable since 1939. 4 For its arch rival, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), the end of the war proved a major disappointment. Having supported it (and observed the electoral truce) after June 1941, it had benefitted from its association with the heroic endurance of the Red Army and the freedom gained by the abolition in 1943 of the Comintern. But its membership peak of nearly 60,000, achieved in 1943, could not be sustained: a quarter had been lost by 1945, in which year only two seats were won (one of which it already held); while 1946 saw an end to the

4

F. A. Ridley and Bob Edwards, The United Socialist States of Europe,

London 1944, p. 65. Ed-

wards and the ILP were active in the Mouvement Socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe; see Walter Lipgens, A History European

Unity Movement,

of European

Integration,

vol. 1: 1945—1947.

The Formation

of the

transl. by P.S. Falla and A . J . Ryder, O x f o r d 1982, p. 6 0 0 ; for their

early opposition to nuclear weapons see Christopher Driver, The Disarmers.

A Study in Protest,

London 1964, p. 13. An account of the party itself is provided by P. J. Thwaites, 'The Independent Labour Party 1 9 3 8 - 5 0 ' , unpubl. P h . D . thesis, London Univ. 1976.

140

Martin Ceadel

CPGB's longstanding battle to affiliate to the Labour Party when the latter made a constitutional change to prevent this. The formation in October 1947 of the Cominform helped to ensure a continuing decline in membership; and the British Peace Committee, launched in October 1949, was a front organisation which deceived almost no one. During the 1 9 4 5 - 5 0 parliament Communist foreign policy gained extra support from a group of MPs who had at various times been expelled from the Labour Party. The most obvious, having been ejected as early as March 1940 for endorsing the Soviet Union's attack on Finland (and refused readmission in March 1946 after trouncing an official Labour candidate in 1945), was D . N . Pritt, a prominent barrister and pro-Soviet writer. 5 After June 1949 Pritt was joined in a Labour Independent Group by four more ex-Labour MPs expelled in 1948—9 for similar activities. Of these the most famous was Konni Zilliacus (expelled, 18May 1949), known since the early 1930s as an ebullient and indefatigable apologist for two causes which he alone viewed as inseparable, the League of Nations (and its successor) and Soviet foreign policy, and widely viewed (in the words of Labour MP Leslie Hale) " a s a man who holds with complete integrity and sincerity views which it is almost impossible for a man of sincerity and integrity to hold". 6 That he was a maverick rather than a secret Communist seemed to be confirmed by his support for Tito and his refusal to sign the Labour Independent Group manifesto in 1950, and alone of those expelled he returned to parliament as a Labour MP (from 1955 until his death in 1967, although he was denied the whip for a time even then). Rather closer to the orthodox Communist line were John Platts-Mills (expelled, 28 April 1948), a New Zealand Rhodes Scholar who later became prominent, like Pritt, at the bar, and two less vocal figures, Leslie Solley (expelled, 18 May 1949), another barrister, and Lester Hutchinson (expelled, 27 July 1949), a journalist who had specialised on India. It is possible that these were not the only Communist sympathisers. The expulsion process was not especially efficient: permissive standing orders adopted by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) meant that only extraparliamentary activities of a provocative kind - notably association with Communist-organised events such as the 1949 World Peace Congress in Paris -

5

6

For the CPGB see Henry Pelling, The British Communist Party. A historical profile, rev. ed., London 1977; for Pritt's espousal of the Soviet position on the Katyn massacre and the Korean war, see The Autobiography of D.N. Pritt, part 2: Brasshats and Bureaucrats, London 1966, pp. 152, 295. Hale, himself a member of the Keep Left group, in the Commons on 5 May 1948, HC Deb., 5th, 450/135. For Zilliacus's views, expressed at characteristic length, see three works he published in 1949: I Choose Peace; Dragon's Teeth. The background, content and consequences of the North Atlantic Pact·, and Why I Was Expelled.

141

British Political Parties

could be penalised. And a recent defector from the Communist Party, Douglas Hyde, claimed in 1950 that " a t least eight or nine" secret Communists had been elected in 1945. 7 But the others must have lain low: Berrington's careful study of signatories of parliamentary motions (Early Day Motions and amendments to motions for debate), which defines as "ultra left" only those MPs who still attacked the government for fanning hostility towards the Soviet Union and eastern Europe even after April 1949, can identify only the five expellees as belonging in this category. 8 Berrington does not make use of parliamentary divisions or speeches, and it will be seen that he may therefore have omitted some "ultra-leftists". Nevertheless, after the defeat in 1950 of all five Labour Independents and both Communists, no obvious pro-Soviet group can again be identified. When the coalition ended, the Liberals left office for the last time and became a minor party in the full sense. At the election only 12 candidates were successful (one of whom soon defected), constituting only 1.9% of all MPs (as against their lowest inter-war figure of 3 . 3 % , in 1935). Although their share of the vote went up slightly, from 6 . 4 % in 1935 to 9 . 0 % , this was only because more seats were contested. Even as a minor party they made less impact than the "ultra left", having no distinctive policy to offer even on international questions: the United Nations and European union were less of a Liberal monopoly even than the League of Nations had been, and did not anyway arouse the same enthusiasm; while an awareness of a past reputation for having " n o t been sufficiently active on the defence side in promoting large armaments" (as Liberal leader Clement Davies admitted in 1949) led the party to endorse Bevin's foreign policy virtually without criticism as "collective security". 9 In 1950 Liberal representation dropped to nine (and to six at the next two elections), the quartercentury process whereby it had been replaced as a governing party by Labour being thereby completed. The Conservative Party, having benefitted from the period of transition to the extent of holding office (including in coalition governments) for all but three of the previous thirty years, suffered when this came to an end. Its share of the

7

Douglas Hyde, I Believed, London 1950, p. 212. It is possible that one was T o m Driberg, who later claimed to have been expelled from the C P G B against his wishes around 1941; see his Passions,

8

Ruling

London 1971, pp. 150, 252.

Hugh Berrington, Backbench

Opinion

in the House of Commons

This and Philip Norton's compilation, Dissension in the House of Commons

division lobbies

in the House

1945—1974,

194S-5S, of Commons.

O x f o r d 1973, p. 62. Intraparty

dissent

London 1975, which supersede R . Jack-

son, Rebels and Whips, London 1968, have proved indispensable sources for this paper. Older works on the subject are M . A. Fitzsimons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour 1945-51,

N o t r e Dame 1951, and M . R . Gordon, Conflict

Policy, Stanford 1969. ' 1 2 M a y 1949, HC Deb.,

5th, 4 5 4 / 2 0 3 1 .

and Consensus

Government

in Labour's

Foreign

142

Martin Ceadel

vote in 1945, 3 9 . 8 % , was slightly larger than that which it had gained at its four worst performances in the seven inter-war elections; but, with the antiConservative vote no longer effectively divided, it returned only 213 MPs (189 avowed Conservatives, nine Ulster Unionists, two Nationals and 13 Liberal Nationals). This meant that its share of the Commons was only 3 3 . 3 % , compared with 4 1 . 9 % after its worst inter-war election, that of 1923. T h e adjustment from a governing to an opposition mentality presented a few difficulties even for a party aware that power could only be regained if discipline and pragmatism were preserved. Domestic issues, where denunciation o f many of Labour's measures provided an outlet for Tory frustrations while seeming also a "responsible" thing for the party to do, were easiest to handle, although even here the modernisation of its socio-economic rhetoric (as achieved in such declarations as the Industrial Charter) showed an impressive adaptability. But on foreign policy, Conservatives realised the need to use their influence constructively and avoid rocking the ship of state, particularly in the early years. Admittedly, they could relieve some of the frustrations of acquiescent opposition by relishing the embarrassment their support for Bevin could cause all sections of the Labour Party. By taking up European union, moreover, Churchill showed that responsible promotion of western-European security could skilfully be combined with playing Labour at its own pre-war opposition game of professing to be the more internationalist, and therefore the more pacific, party; and in a speech at Edinburgh during the 1950 election campaign he suggested a summit with Stalin, thereby managing to imply that Labour were more intransigent than he would be. But Conservatives had to suffer a lot in silence nevertheless. Moreover, although their left-wing opponents were convinced that the direction of British foreign policy in the late 1940s was wholly to the Conservative Party's liking, this was to overlook the discomfiture experienced by a selfproclaimed party of Empire in having to acknowledge two more urgent rival affiliations - those to the European continent and the Atlantic alliance. T h e potential for intra-party conflict on these questions, although ignored by historians, was not negligible. At the 1948 party conference a motion was tabled calling for " a clear restatement of Conservative Foreign Policy in the light of the present grave tension of international affairs", in proposing which M a j o r C. E. Mott-Radclyffe expressed his fears of Britain being "reduced to the status o f a third-rate power". 1 0 Although the motion was only implicitly critical of the

10

'Conference Report of National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations ( N U C U A ) ' 1948, pp. 8 6 - 7 . There is no study of Conservative foreign policy at this time, it being virtually ignored in J . D . Hoffman, The Conservative

Party in Opposition

John Ramsden, The Making

Party Policy. The Conservative

of Conservative

ment since 1929, London 1980.

1945-51,

London 1964, and Research

Depart-

British Political Parties

143

party's leaders, and was not pressed to a vote, the debate on it showed the degree of uncertainty which existed among the rank and file. Of the two new directions in which the party was being pulled, that towards Europe caused, admittedly, the fewer problems. Although a small group of Conservatives were active in an all-party committee on European union set up in December 1947, and as many as 60 signed an all-party motion in March 1948 calling for British participation in a federal Europe, none seems to have been a "Euro-fanatic" in the sense of being prepared to sacrifice any of Britain's traditional allegiances out of deference to Europe. The normal party line was to insist for as long as possible that this was unnecessary anyway: "Let it not be thought that there is an incompatibility between a United Empire and a United Europe", as Peter Thorneycroft expressed it at the October 1947 conference. In 1948 Conservatives began to make it clearer that they could contribute to European unity only "as long as we are clear in our minds that priority to the Empire comes first", as Leopold Amery, the party's leading imperialist, bluntly put it at that year's conference. The formation of the Council of Europe and the first session of its Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg in August 1949 forced the Conservatives to end all dissembling. As MP and Strasbourg delegate David Eccles assured the Conservative conference two months later: "We bluntly told our Continental friends that if there was a choice for the British people between Europe and the Empire they would always chose the Empire." 1 1 Europe thus posed little threat to the imperialists, who were able each year to carry by acclamation a conference resolution to the effect "that the peace and prosperity, both of these isles and of the world depend, more than anything else, on a strong and independent British Empire" normally following debates in which criticisms of the United States were made in tactfully oblique but unmistakable terms. "Partnership, however close, must be a partnership between equals", as Leopold Amery argued in October 1947; while Bernard Braine warned a year later: "If we are not permanently to become a dependency of our good friend the United States, with whose mass production we can never effectively compete in a free trade world, then we must be free to determine our own economic policy." 12 As many as 47 Conservatives had defied a party whip to vote against the terms of the American loan on 13 December 1945, and eight did the same over the Marshall agreement on 5 July 1948. (The Labour figures were four and two MPs respectively). That there was, however, no fully articulated British imperial "Gaullism" largely reflects the ability of a commercial and industrial party to accept American capitalist values, the lack of status anxiety of a nation

11

Thorneycroft, N U C U A 1947, p. 38; Amery, N U C U A 1948, p. 88; Eccles, N U C U A 1949, p. 64.

12

Resolution on Imperial Policy, N U C U A 1947, p. 63; Amery, ibid., p. 64; Braine, N U C U A 1948, p. 71.

144

Martin Ceadel

which had avoided defeat during the war, and above all the instinctive Conservative awareness that power realities had changed. But to some extent it was because of Churchill's sound political intuition, which was to prove an effective substitute for a properly elaborated party policy. Although at first his emphasis on a "special relationship" with the United States in his Fulton speech of 5 March 1946 alarmed even his colleagues, whom he had not consulted, he managed not to present Atlanticism (or "Fultonism", as the left called it) as an exclusive loyalty. Indeed, as a former diehard over India his imperial credentials could not be impugned; and his commitment to Europe was soon made manifest when in January 1947 he launched what became the United Europe Movement. By October 1948 he had found the ideal rhetoric with which to conceal the ambivalence of Britain's position - that of the "three great circles" (British Empire, English-speaking world, and Europe), which turned ambivalence into a virtue by presenting Britain, the only state inside all three circles, as uniquely at the centre of world politics. The party followed Churchill's lead: Anthony Eden soothed the worries, already noted, of the 1948 conference by expounding the "three unities" of British policy (Europe, Atlantic, Empire) and insisting that they were "not antagonistic but complementary"; and when the following year Duncan Sandys proposed a motion in favour of "closer European unity" which, although already ambiguous in respect both of the nature of that unity and of Britain's relationship to it and also containing a rider pledging "full maintenance of the unity of the British Empire", it had to have an explicit mention added (which Sandys professed to welcome) of the need for "continuing collaboration with the United States" before being passed unanimously. 13 Labour's landslide victory, in which it secured 47.8% of the vote and 393 seats, gave it a majority of 146 over all other parties combined. Not only had two-party politics been restored, but Labour had for the first time to assume full governing responsibility (in the sense that there was no opposition veto on its actions). Its leaders, after five years of coalition experience, understood this. Bevin preached the continuity of foreign policy, arguing that it was determined by external reality not domestic aspiration, although he made the point (for instance, in an election broadcast on 22 June 1945) that the policy to be continued had been "devised by the Coalition Government, not by the Tory members alone, but by a combined effort". This policy had caused little friction during the war, except over the repression of the Communist-led resistance movement in Greece; but even on this issue Bevin made clear at the Labour Party conference

13

For Fulton see Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), The Sinews of Peace. Post-war speeches by Winston S. Churchill, London 1948, pp. 93-99, and, for Conservative worries about it, David Carlton, Anthony Eden. A biography, London 1981, pp. 265-66, for the "circles" speech of 9 Oct. 1948 see Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. Speeches 1947 and 1948 by Winston S. Churchill, London 1950, p. 417; Eden, NUCUA 1948, p. 90; Sandys, NUCUA 1949, pp. 60-62.

British Political Parties

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that it was not Churchill's policy but that of a united war cabinet which the left were condemning. Unsurprisingly, therefore, "the foreign policy of the two parties was remarkably similar" in 1945, as the Nuffield study of that contest noted, and "the Coalition foreign policy survived the election almost unchallenged by either party." Labour's manifesto pledge was thus merely to "consolidate in peace the great war-time association of the British Commonwealth with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. We must join with France and China and all others who have contributed to the common victory in forming an International Organisation capable of keeping the peace in the years to come". 1 4 The reason this satisfied the left at the time was because they assumed that to solve the major international problem, how to establish good relations with the Soviet Union, a truly socialist British government was not only necessary but sufficient. Unwisely, as it now seems, Labour's leadership had encouraged them in this belief; in June 1945, for example, Bevin was reported as claiming: "Russia would deal better and with greater confidence with a Labour Government than with the historical men of Munich. Left can speak to left in comradeship and confidence." But it must be emphasised that this analysis was applied also to Europe - Bevin's famous remark at Labour's 1945 conference ("Left understands Left; but Right does not") referring to relations with France - where it was assumed that socialism was gaining ground. This was why the amendment to the Address (the King's speech outlining government policy) moved by Labour rebels on 18 November 1946 specified the need for Labour to work with "all Nations and Groups striving to secure full Socialist planning and control of the world resources". As understood in 1 9 4 5 - 6 , a "socialist foreign policy" was thus based on two assumptions: that the Soviet Union would co-operate with a Labour government; and - initially a reinforcement to that belief but soon a partial substitute for it - that Europe would become predominantly democraticsocialist and thereby become strong enough to act as a "third force" between the superpowers. As Labour MP Christopher Shawcross admitted in January 1948: "We must all confess that during the election campaign we assured the electorate of two important things: the first was that only a Socialist Government could maintain friendship with Soviet Russia; the second was that only a Socialist foreign policy could restore Europe and bring permanent peace." 1 5

14

The Times, 23 June 1945; Bevin, 'Labour Party Conference Report (LPCR)' 1944, pp. 1 4 5 - 7 ; R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, The British General Election of 1945, London 1947, p. 49; the Labour Party, Let Us Face The Future p. 11.

15

Bevin cited in Daily Worker, 9 June 1945, quoted C. R. Rose, 'The Relationship of Socialist Principles to British Labour Foreign Policy 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 ' , unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Oxford Univ. 1959, p. 159; Bevin, LPCR 1945, p. 119; 18 Nov. 1946, HC Deb., 5th, 430/526; Shawcross, 22 Jan. 1948, ibid., 446/489.

146

Martin Ceadel

Although both these assurances had depended on assumptions concerning the internal politics of other states which had since been undermined - the Soviet Union having not proved co-operative and democratic socialism having not gained ground in Europe - Shawcross still offered as his diagnosis: " t h a t this Socialist Government has never yet had a real Socialist foreign policy". T h e durability of the belief that such a policy was feasible must be contrasted with the decline suffered by the other three strands which went to make up Labour's traditional distaste for power politics. First, pacifism, always a minority viewpoint, had lost further ground. Thus although as many as four ex-officials of the old pacifist society the No More War Movement had been elected as Labour MPs in 1945, only one (Walter Ayles) seems to have retained anything of his former pacifism. 16 Even so, the expansion of the PLP in 1945 was sufficiently large to ensure that the group of committed pacifist MPs was little smaller, at about ten, than it had been in the late 1930s. Yet it was elderly, lacking in leaders of Lansbury's stature (its leading figure being Rhys Davies), and notably cautious (declining to oppose the government's defence estimates). Nor could it draw support to the same extent as formerly from the left's diffuse but deeply felt anti-militarism. In fact, the only occasion it managed to do so was on 1 April 1947 when, in protest against the announcement that conscription would be continued into peacetime, as many as 72 Labour MPs voted against their own government's National Service Bill and further 30-to-40 abstained. But what seems to have provoked many MPs to protest was the proposed 18-month term of service: when the government reduced this by a third on 7 May, only nine MPs voted against the 12-month term. And in 1949 the longer term was restored, virtually without protest. Moreover, a number of left-wing MPs, including Richard Crossman, had consistently refused to oppose conscription because of a conviction that Labour had been wrong in the 1930s to use defence-policy issues to fight what were essentially foreignpolicy battles. Thus both pacifism and anti-militarism had lost confidence in themselves. A second anti-war strand had been radicalism: the belief that war is caused mainly by blinkered and self-serving elites and vested interests. During 1 9 4 5 - 6 the left often claimed that Bevin's policies could be attributed to the malign influence of his officials, and Woodrow Wyatt came to believe that in this period he and his fellow parliamentary rebels were thinking " a s old-fashioned radicals" rather than as socialists. Even in 1 9 4 8 - 5 0 radical "little England" instincts could be detected among opponents of European union; and the creed was occasionally heard in parliament - for example, when Thomas Braddock suggested in a rare foreign-affairs speech in March 1949: " I t may be that the traditional interests of the armament producers, men who believe in armies and in commanding "

T h e others were Lucy C o x Middleton, Muriel Wallhead Nichol, and Ben Parkin.

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British Political Parties

men, that these forces and influences have something to do with this continual preaching of the possibility of war and the need of preparing for war." 1 7 But in general the cold war proved ill suited to the radical critique. The strongest strand in the 1930s, liberal internationalism, had suffered bifurcation between a realist and an Utopian version. For the former, "collective security" was what Bevin was achieving (as he himself made clear): former League of Nations fanatic Philip Noel-Baker thus told the Commons that "the Atlantic Pact is a measure of collective security" and that, although "not what we hoped for when the San Francisco Charter was first signed", it was nonetheless "not an old Power politics alliance against Russia" but would "help us abolish all war". 1 8 For those who rejected this view, however, the failure of the confederal League of Nations showed the necessity for a federal union; and throughout the Second World War federalist slogans had played the same central role in progressive war aims that League slogans had in the First. But by 1945 the Labour leadership, as well as the trade unions and other sections of grass-roots support, had begun to hint that their enthusiasm for federalism had been for other states only; for Britain it was suitable only in the far-distant future. A small group of Labour MPs (including Christopher Shawcross) attempted to win support in their party by arguing that socialism entailed federalism, on the grounds that the latter was the best basis on which socialism could be constructed in Europe. 1 ' But this was to make the federalist cause dependent on the political fortunes of the socialist parties of western Europe, as Labour's anti-federalists were quick to point out. In the light of this decrease in support for the pacifist, radical and liberal alternatives, belief in a socialist foreign policy might have been expected also to decline. That it did not do so was because domestic rather than international issues predominated: this was true of the 1945 election, even though it was, in the words of the Nuffield study, "overshadowed in the press by foreign news, until the closing stages of the campaign", as well as of succeeding by-elections and the next general election. 20 A few former foreign-policy critics - notably Aneurin Bevan - were silenced by their responsibility for implementing a domestic programme which, accumulated over many years, had acquired a nearrevolutionary aura. But others simply drew the conclusion that an equally socia-

17

For the influence of officials see William Warbey's speech (and Bevin's reply), L P C R 1946, pp. 162, 165; Woodrow W y a t t , Into The Dangerous 1949, HC Deb.,

World, London 1947, p. 142; Braddock, l O M a r c h

5th, 4 6 2 / 1 5 5 1 (for his normal reticence see 28 July 1948, ibid., 4 5 4 / 1 4 7 9 ) .

18

1 2 M a y 1949, HC Deb.,

"

This argument is made most effectively in R . W. G. Mackay, Britain in Wonderland,

5th, 4 6 4 / 2 1 2 1 - 3 . London 1948,

esp. p. 19. 20

McCallum and Readman, op. cit., p. 180. For " t h e absence of all argument about foreign affairs" except for Churchill's Edinburgh speech see H . G . Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950, London 1951, p. 102.

148

Martin Ceadel

list foreign policy must be no less possible: it was the "remarkable contrast between the Government's domestic and foreign policies" which Richard Crossman stressed when on 18 November 1946 he moved the amendment to the Address calling for "a democratic and constructive Socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism in which all hopes of World Government will be destroyed". It is clear too that the change in the composition of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) brought about by the 1945 landslide, following which almost two thirds (253 out of 393) of Labour MPs were new to the Commons, increased support for such a policy. Some of the newcomers, selected for what had at the time been regarded as unwinnable seats and not always of the highest calibre for that reason, were easy to mobilise in support of left-seeming causes. Describing the process whereby the names of 37 Labour MPs were appended on 16 April 1948 to a telegram expressing support in the Italian General Election for the Nenni Socialists (collaborators with Communism and opposed by the British Labour Party), Konni Zilliacus later commented revealingly that "Platts-Mills went round and got dunderheads to sign". When the National Executive Committee initiated disciplinary proceedings (leading to the expulsion of Platts-Mills and the securing from 21 others, including Hutchinson, Solley and Zilliacus, of pledges " t o desist in future from such conduct"), 15 of the signatories escaped rebuke by claiming either that they had not known what they were doing or that they had not signed it. It should be noted that, contrary to the normally strict discipline of British parties, no less than 217 Labour MPs voted against their government at least once, and 74 on five or more occasions, in the course of the 1945-50 parliament. 2 1 As well as more rebellious, the PLP had become less proletarian at this time. "This is a mutiny of the intellectuals [...] What is more they appear to be mostly the intellectual new boys", Conservative MP Captain Crookshank observed on 18 November 1946, pointing out that only of the 58 Labour MPs who had signed the amendment to the Address were working-class. He continued presciently: 'In opening the doors so wide to the doctrinaire Socialist, I wonder if the Labour Party has not taken to its bosom a viper which will ultimately destroy it." Berrington's study confirms (with qualifications) the extent to which "the differences in the Labour Party were structural [ . . . ] The dispute between Bevin's supporters and his critics conformed, remarkably closely,,to the picture of a struggle between Hampstead intellectuals and pragmatic, earthy Trade Unionists. Small wonder that there was so much bitterness between the two sides". Lacking backbench experience - as a trade unionist who had been found a seat in

21

Zilliacus, interview with Richard Rose in March 1959 citied in C.R. Rose, op. cit., p. 494; R.K. Alderman, 'Discipline in the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 ' , in: Parliamentary 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 , p. 294.

Affairs, 18,

British Political Parties

149

1940 to enable his to become Minister of Labour - Bevin did not handle dissidents well, making less effective use of the backbench external affairs group than a skilled parliamentarian such as Dalton believed he could have done. But the left were too indiscreet to make effective conspirators; and the unwavering loyalty of most trade unions to the party leadership ensured, of course, that the National Executive Committee remained in right-wing hands and that dissent was always contained at party conferences. 22 The parties' response to international events was thus in certain respects predetermined by other considerations. That the government's foreign policy came under attack can largely be attributed to the utopianism of many Labour backbenchers, to the volubility of a handful of Communists and Labour Independents, and (on the question of European union) to the ILP's third-force tradition, Churchill's mischief making, and the existence of a hard core of federalists. That "realism" prevailed, however, was partly due to the general acceptance by Labour and Conservatives, in their unaccustomed governmental and opposition roles respectively, of the need to pursue a foreign policy that in various ways offended their own traditions.

The cold war Despite a time-lag and a continuing latent dissent dictated by domestic politics, Britain had little choice but to adapt rapidly to the facts of the cold war. "The logic of events proved inevitable", Conservative MP Harold Macmillan told the Commons in November 1949, "and three years after the Fulton speech came the Atlantic Pact". 23 But, however logical and inevitable events soon came to seem, they did not give that impression at the time. Indeed, prior especially to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, uncertainty as to United States intentions was the most important factor in European foreign politics. Though causing problems for Bevin in the short term, this helped in the long term to build a consensus in support of his policy. It was in part because of the lack of sympathy towards Britain shown in Washington in 1945 - 6 , when lend-lease was abruptly terminated, exacting conditions were attached to a loan, and a promise of continued atomic collaboration was reneged on, that Britain's

22

23

Crookshank, HC Deb., 5th, 430/544-5; Berrington, op. cit., p. 81 (noting, however, that the new "public school and Oxford and Cambridge" element were less tenacious in their rebelliousness than "their secondary school and redbrick colleagues"); Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945-60, London 1962, pp. 2 2 - 3 ; for the leakiness of the Keep Left group see Lord Wigg, George Wigg, London 1972, p. 155; Martin Harrison, The Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945, London 1960, p. 218. 17 Nov. 1949, HC Deb., 5th, 469/2120.

150

Martin Ceadel

decision of January 1947 to develop its own atomic weapons provoked such negligible dissent. (This can only in part be put down to the much vaunted fact that the decision was a secret even from many members of the cabinet: few people doubted Britain would develop such as weapon; and its first test, in October 1952, passed off virtually without protest.) Not only did the delay before the United States could bring itself to contemplate a North Atlantic Treaty help to make the British more aware of the need for strong defences, but it also undermined the view, held by certain socialists and nationalists, that America was eagerly looking for an excuse to interfere in European affairs. The aid programme which followed Marshall's June 1947 speech was praised instead for its generosity, and the North Atlantic Treaty accepted with relief. Being too weak to contemplate war without the certainty of American support, the Labour government had as its most urgent priority a settlement with the Soviet Union. Even though it soon came privately to doubt whether this was achievable, it proceeded with great caution because of the danger of provoking the Russians. " N o one can accuse me of taking one single step to divide Europe since I have been in office", Bevin could thus tell the Commons on 19 June 1947; and it was not until his "Western Union" speech of 22 January 1948 that this policy altered. 24 The process whereby the United States revealed itself to be more benevolent than expected and the Soviet Union less so produced a steady erosion of such criticisms as existed of Bevin's policy, as a three-phase analysis of Labour dissent will illustrate. After a honeymoon period in which the American loan provoked, as already seen, fewer Labour than Conservative complaints, the Labour left embarked upon an energetic first phase of protest in the year and a half after March 1946. In that month, 120 Labour MPs signed William Warbey's motion condemning Churchill's Fulton speech; although when Bevin agreed to attend a private meeting of Labour MPs on 27 March to discuss his Greek policy, only six voted against him and 30 abstained. In November 1946, as already noted, a "socialist foreign policy" amendment to the Address was signed by 58 Labour MPs, after a deputation of 21 MPs to Hector McNeil (the Minister of State deputising for Bevin, who was abroad) at the Foreign Office on 12November and a PLP meeting the day after had failed to defuse the situation. Although at the debate on 18 November Crossman and its other sponsors decided not to press it to a vote, 130 Labour MPs failed to vote against it when the ILP insisted on dividing the House. There is no way of knowing how many of these were deliberately abstaining rather than absent for other reasons, but since the nonvoters included all 58 signatories and no fewer than 59 of the Labour MPs who 24

19 June 1947, ibid., 4 3 8 / 2 3 3 7 ; for the Western Union speech see Alan Bullock, Ernest Foreign

Secretary

1945-1953,

London 1983, pp. 5 1 9 - 2 2 .

Bevin.

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British Political Parties

were also to abstain on the North Atlantic Treaty 18 months later, it is likely that a substantial number were registering a deliberate protest. 25 In the same debate an amendment condemning conscription (which, as already noted, the Crossman group did not support) attracted 45 Labour votes; and, as has also been seen, a larger rebellion on 1 April 1947 forced the government - only temporarily, it transpired - to reduce the period of service to a year. In early May 1947 an attempt to spell out a socialist alternative was made in Keep Left, a pamphlet written by Crossman, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo, and signed by other MPs who had been taking part in regular discussions since January 1947. The pamphlet was eclectic, incorporating not only domestic recommendations but a range of individual enthusiasms such as federalism (pressed for by R. W. G. Mackay, an Australian who had been the driving force in the pioneering British federalist society, Federal Union, during the war) and decolonisation (favoured especially by Foot). It was also relatively moderate, describing Bevin's policy as "half-heartedly socialist" rather than actually Tory and acknowledging that "when Labour took office the world was already divided into two blocs, an Anglo-American and a Russian bloc", largely because of Molotov's "folly". But it was suspicious of American motives (noting, however: " I f we feel inclined to blame the Americans for fighting to the last Englishman we should recall our attitude to France between the wars") and argued that "collective security" would merely produce "an unbridgeable gulf" between East and West leading to a "third world war". 2 6 With hindsight - as the group itself later acknowledged - Keep Left marks the beginning of the end of the first phase of dissent, appearing as it did shortly before international perceptions were changed by Ramadier's expulsion from government of the French Communists on 5 May, and by Marshall's speech. A characteristically vigorous pro-Bevin pamphlet by Labour's international secretary Denis Healey helped to ensure that at the party conference in late May critics were less numerous than the year before; and in a Commons debate on 19 June Raymond Blackburn noted with satisfaction that those whose criticisms of Bevin had been "not at all from the purely Communist or semi-Communist angle have been silent today". When in November 1947 the Fabian Society published the result of a year-old "attempt to define the outlines of a socialist foreign policy for Great Britain", it revealed the degree of uncertainty which by then existed on the left: Leonard Woolf advocated neutrality for Britain as the head of a non-aligned Commonwealth, while denying that there was any such thing as a distinctively socialist foreign policy; Harold Laski insisted that

25

"

Berrington, op. cit., p p . 5 5 , 6 2 - 3 ; Bullock, op. cit., p p . 3 2 7 - 9 . Keep Left. By a Group of Members pp. 3 3 - 6 .

of Parliament,

New Statesman pamphlet, London M a y 1947,

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Martin Ceadel

Woolf's policy was indeed socialist; but W.N. Ewer insisted that true socialism entailed collective security rather than isolationism. 27 The second phase was fully under way in early 1948, following the effective breakdown of four-power talks with the break-up of the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, the main events being Bevin's Western Union speech and, more especially, the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. From this point what Berrington calls the "centre left" of at least 39 Labour MPs ceased in general to oppose Bevin. Although Crossman was to take an idiosyncratically sanguine view of events in Prague, he had already been led by the surprisingly small number of conditions being proposed for Marshall aid to admit on 23 January 1948 that his "views about America have changed a good deal in the last six months. Many members have had a similar experience". But for most of them Czechoslovakia was the more crucial lesson. The reservations of Tribune and the New Statesman about Western Union were increasingly offset by their outrage at Communist maltreatment of socialists in eastern Europe. By 4May, moreover, Keep Left signatory Benn Levy had concluded: "There is no longer a third choice. We must travel the Russian road or the American road", and had endorsed the latter, although he tried to minimise the inconsistency with his former viewpoint by claiming that an American-backed Western Union would become socialist. According to Zilliacus, however, the Keep Left group had merely "moved off smartly to the right". 2 8 Apart from the "ultra left" for whom Zilliacus spoke, those who continued to endorse neutralism after Prague are classified by Berrington as the "left": they comprised at least the 26 MPs who signed either or both of two anti-American Early Day Motions tabled in March and July 1948. Leading " l e f t " MPs included: Sydney Silverman, a former pacifist whom Aneurin Bevan distrusted as " 5 1 per cent pro-Soviet"; Emrys Hughes, Keir Hardie's near-pacifist son in law who had long been convinced that condemnations of the Soviet Union were no more than capitalist propaganda; William Warbey, a third-force enthusiast who continually asked: "Why should the British people be forced to choose between Monopoly Communism and Monopoly Capitalism?"; Geoffrey Bing, once suspected

27

Keeping

Left. By A Group of Members

of Parliament,

1950, p. 18; Cards on the Table. An interpretation

New Statesman pamphlet, London Jan.

of Labour's

Foreign

Policy, Labour Party,

London M a y 1947, see esp. p. 5 for the statement that "the victorious powers were like three elephants in a b o a t " and L P C R 1945, p. 114 for Healey's own former belief in a socialist foreign policy; Blackburn, HC Deb., 5th, 4 3 8 / 2 3 2 6 : for his left-wing past see his memoir I am an lic, London 1959; Leonard Woolf, Foreign Policy. The Labour Party's Dilemma,

alcoho-

Fabian Research

Series N o . 121, London 1947. 21

Berrington, op. cit., pp. 61—3; Crossman, HC Deb.,

5th, 4 4 6 / 5 6 6 and New Statesman,

2 0 and

27 M a r c h 1948; for the political journals see Bullock's comments, op. it., pp. 5 2 0 - 1 , 5 4 9 - 5 0 and, for example, Tribune, ibid., 1 3 3 7 - 8 .

5 M a r c h 1948; Levy, HC Deb.,

5th., 4 5 0 / 1 1 3 5 - 7 ; Zilliacus, 5 M a y 1948,

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British Political Parties

by the War Office of being a Communist - wrongly, according to D . N . Pritt; Ronald Chamberlain, a believer in the possibility of bargaining a Soviet share in the control of the Ruhr for improved western rights in Berlin; and Thomas Braddock, an architect whose radical views have already been cited. Several of these were regarded by Tories as crypto-Communists: in the Commons on 5 May 1948, for example, Warbey and Bing as well as Zilliacus were so labelled by Michael Aston 29 The third phase of dissent was inaugurated by the North Atlantic Treaty, at the start of the Commons debate on which Churchill predicted that opposition would come only "from that small band of crypto-Communists whose dimensions have been very accurately ascertained in recent years". If voting against this treaty is taken to define the "ultra lelft" then it includes not merely (in addition to the Communists) the five MPs shortly to form the Labour Independent Group whom Berrington so identifies on the basis of his study of parliamentary motions, but some here classified as "left": Braddock, Chamberlain and Hughes, and perhaps also Warbey who spoke against it but opted for abstention. At least 112 Labour MPs, it must be stressed, were absent from this division, indicating continued reservations about foreign policy which explain why dissent was so quick to revive once the stability produced by N A T O reduced the insecurity which had forced the left to accept it. The costly rearmament it necessitated and the prospect that Germany would be included too, the Soviet testing of an atomic bomb and the United States decision to develop a hydrogen bomb, the Chinese revolution and fear of American over-reaction in the Korean war, and the availability of Bevan to give much-needed leadership to the left following his resignation from the government in April 1951: all these factors were to contribute to the "Bevanite" phase of foreign-policy dissent in the early 1950s. 30 But, even if the "ultra left" was nearer 10 than five and the " l e f t " and even the "centre left" had been silenced rather than converted, open dissent was negligible in the months after April 1949 from the proposition that N A T O was, to quote Bevin at Labour's June 1949 conference, "the biggest step in collective security that has ever been taken in the history of the world". Crossman, for one, now felt Labour "can be proud of four years of foreign policy". In the Commons Zilliacus was sure "the whole House will agree: that there is virtual national unity in foreign policy [ . . . ] achieved by the simple method of the Labour Government throwing overboard the election pledges of the Labour Party and taking

"

Emrys Hughes, Sydney Bolshevik

Bogey

Silverman.

in Britain,

Rebel

in Parliament,

London 1969, p. 128; Emrys Hughes,

Glasgow 1943, esp. p. 180; Warbey, 28 July 1948, HC Deb.,

4 5 4 / 1 4 6 8 ; D . N . Pritt, op. cit., pp. 1 0 3 - 5 ; Chamberlain, 2 8 J u l y 1948, HC Deb.,

5th,

5th, 4 5 4 / 1 4 8 5 ;

Astor, ibid., 4 5 0 / 1 3 2 4 . 30

Churchill, 1 2 M a y 1949, ibid., 4 6 4 / 2 0 2 5 ; M a r k Jenkins, Bevanism, war and the democratic

mass movement,

Nottingham 1979.

Labour's

High Tide. The

cold

154

Martin Ceadel

the Tory line, as the leader of the Opposition has remarked on several occasions, with no denial". To Harold Macmillan, however, the alternative urged by Zilliacus "rings a rather nostalgic note, for he still talks the kind of stuff that socialists used to talk before they got into office." As the tentative nature of Bevanite thought in the 1950s was to show, moreover, socialists found it difficult to talk in quite this way again even after they returned to opposition. Though the logic of events had not been inexorable, the steady intensification of the cold war meant that by February 1951 even Crossman was insisting that "we must not think it is un-Socialist to be strong or that the Socialist thing to do is to 'abolish power politics'". 3 1

European Union and the German

question

The issue on which the Bevanites felt most strongly was West German rearmament. That fear of German militarism could manifest itself as strongly as it did in the Labour Party in the early 1950s is evidence of deep emotions which must have been felt even more strongly the decade before. The reason that they were at the time rarely expressed is not merely that widely agreed assumptions do not need voicing but that the German question could not as yet be disentangled from the cold war. And the cold war required that it be discussed in a new code: as European or Western Union. The British attitude to Europe is best considered as a solution to the problem of how best to insure against the failure to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. The weakness and vulnerability of western Europe made the formation of some sort of reconstruction-and-defence bloc the most urgent priority. In the long run, however, both parties realised that Britain's security would depend less on Europe than on its imperial and Atlantic ties. The Conservative Party's imperial nostalgia has already been noted; but Labour's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth was only slightly less marked, since it tended to assume that the former colonies would continue to defer to Britain after independence. This neocolonialism was, moreover, Britain's last chance to remain a world power: as Attlee had written in a cabinet memorandum in June 1943, if Britain was to carry its "full weight in the post-war world with the US and USSR it can only be as a united British Commonwealth". 3 2 But it soon became clear, of course, that this

"

Bevin, L P C R 1945, p. 189; Crossman, ibid., p. 193; Zilliacus, 1 7 . N o v . 1949, HC Deb.,

5th,

4 6 9 / 2 2 7 8 ; Macmillan, 1 7 N o v . 1949, ibid., 2 3 1 7 ; R . H . S . Crossman and Kenneth Younger, Socialist Foreign 32

Policy, Fabian Tract N o . 287, London 1951, p. 11.

15 June 1943, P R O , Prime Ministers' Office Papers 4 3 0 / 3 , cited in T. D. Burridge, British and Hitler's

War, London 1976, pp. 9 1 - 2 .

Labour

British Political Parties

155

would have to be supplemented by a second, "special", relationship: that with the United States. A short-term commitment to western Europe had thus to be combined with a long-term detachment. Britain's solution was to participate sufficiently in its reconstruction for the United States to be made aware that the western Europeans were doing their best and were thus worthy of American help, but not to such an extent that they might seem too united to need helping. Europe, in other words, was not worth risking American help for. This analysis survived the foundation of NATO: on 14May 1950, during the debate on the Schuman plan, Kenneth Younger, one of Bevin's junior ministers, noted in his diary that the foreign secretary "has no faith in the solidity or efficiency of France or Belgium and believes Western Europe will be a broken reed, and will not even attract the loyalty of Europeans or impress the Russians, unless it is very solidly linked to North America". This, according to Younger, was "realistic though depressing". To implement this analysis, however, required considerable sleight of hand. It involved the constant fine tuning of Britain's image in American eyes: the United States had to perceive Britain as vulnerable, but not as so weak that more of its world role needed to be taken over by Washington than London wanted, let alone as too defenceless to be worth saving.33. And, most obviously, it involved a measure of deceit towards the governments of western Europe which could not be concealed for ever. A considerable part of the confusion in political debate on foreign affairs can be attributed to the subtlety of the government's strategy. In particular, exaggerated hopes were encouraged concerning Britain's participation in European union. Admittedly, as already noted, most Conservatives were aware of the mental reservations with which pro-European pieties had been uttered. They understood, as Churchill had since at least October 1942, that the vital British interest was simply that France revive and be reconciled with Germany. Like most people in a country devoid of constitution-making experience, they were vague about the difference between confederal and federal structures and so did not think it especially significant that Churchill, who had formerly talked about a "council of Europe", had started referring after 16 November 1945 to a "United States of Europe". They were clear, anyway, that unless such a body could embrace the Empire and Commonwealth, Britain could not join it. Although Macmillan and Eccles tried to promote a compromise version of the Schuman plan for a coal and steel community, which Labour had rejected, they were clear that the form eventually adopted by France and Germany was unacceptable to Britain. It was only after the Korean war made German rearmament a major

" Younger diary, cited in Bullock, op. cit., p. 776; for British policy towards the United States see Derek Leebaert, 'America's Assumption of Britain's Strategic Responsibilities 1 9 4 7 - 5 0 . A study in succession', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Oxford Univ. 1983.

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Martin Ceadel

issue and caused Churchill to call at Strasbourg in August 1950 for a European army "in which we should bear a worthy and honourable part" that some Conservative pro-Europeans were for a time misled as to their party's attitude to Europe, since on its return to government in October 1951 it decided not to join such a body. 34 It was Labour's "Europeans" who felt the real grievance. In line with their party's internationalist rhetoric, the leadership had in the 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 period expressed strong support for federalism. Bevin, for example, was regarded by Federal Union as an influential sympathiser; and in his speech to Labour MPs on 8 November 1939 setting out the party's war aims Attlee had included what was to become perhaps his most quoted phrase: "Europe must federate or perish." 35 But the fundamentalist mood of these years of hope and fear did not last in Britain (unlike in western Europe where defeat and occupation perpetuated the belief that the nation-state structure was obsolete, where fascist rule discredited notions of economic autarky, and where the experience of liberation produced a second flowering of idealism), and Labour's leaders had tacitly abandoned federalism except as a distant dream. At the very end of 1947, however, European union came to the fore as a positive initiative which was still possible despite the evident deadlock between the superpowers. Its appeal owed much to its ambiguity: for "realists", it meant "Western Union" of a minimalist sort soon to be achieved in the March 1948 Brussels Treaty; for federalists, this defence bloc was at best a first step towards a political union of western Europe, a more promising second step being the setting up of the Council of Europe in May 1949 with a Consultative Assembly to meet for the first time three months later; and, for the (non-Communist) left, it was a neutral third force which could act as a bridge between the superpowers. Representatives of all three strands of opinion established a PLP Europe Group on 2December 1947; and several of these, notably R. W. G. Mackay, were also involved in the all-party committee on European union set up at about the same time, which in March 1948 promoted a motion signed by 200 MPs - 60 of them, as already noted, Conservatives, but more than half Labour. 36 The division between westerners and neutralists proved to be unimportant, however, since Labour's leaders were determined to block British participation 34

For Churchill's 1 6 N o v . 1945 speech see Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), The Sinews pp. 4 1 - 5 ; for the Macmillan-Eccles plan see Harold Macmillan, Tides

of

of Fortune

Peace, 1945-55,

London 1969, pp. 2 0 1 - 8 ; for puzzlement at Churchill's August 1950 speech see Lord Boothby, My Yesterday,

Your Tomorrow,

London 1962, p. 7 9 and Recollections

of a Rebel,

London 1978,

p. 217. 35

Bevin's name appears as a "supporter of the Federal Idea", Federal Union leaflet Let's Not The Same Mistake

Twice, 1st July 1941; Attlee's speech was published as Labour's

London 1939. 36

Grantham, op. cit., pp. 1 7 5 - 8 ; Berrington, op. cit., pp. 6 9 - 7 0 .

Peace

Make Aims,

157

British Political Parties

in European union of either kind. Though the party did not press its objections at the Conference of Socialists on European Unity held in Paris on 2 4 - 2 5 April 1948, and though at its own conference a month later it accepted (with reservations) a motion for a United Socialist States of Europe proposed by former ILP activist Fenner Brockway, it had done its unrelenting best to discourage Labour MPs from attending the Congress of Europe at the Hague on 7 - 1 0 M a y and in the event only 25 did so. The arguments used were those of internationalist and socialist principle: functional integration was superior to political union; and, anyway, an increasingly right-wing Europe would try to reverse Britain's socialist experiments and block the nationalisation of the Ruhr industries. But they were expressed in robust language, particularly by Hugh Dalton at Labour's 1948 conference ("You should begin, not with conclaves of chatter-boxes but with functional advances by Governments [ . . . ] " ; "There were many queer people at the Hague [ . . . ] " ) . And it was clear that they rationalised several gutreactions: a dislike of helping Churchill further to enhance his reputation as a statesman rather than a mere politician; a desire on the part of the trade unions to protect living standards higher at that time than elsewhere in Europe; and a conviction (to quote Dalton again) "that we are much closer, in all respects except distance, to Australia and New Zealand than we are to Western Europe". 3 7 For a short while in the second half of 1948 the government appeared to be under pressure from European-unity sentiment; but the North Atlantic Treaty undermined the third-force conception, and the Council of Europe appeared to satisfy all except a hard core of federalists. By the autumn of 1949 even R. W. G. Mackay was ceasing to stress federalism in an attempt to build support among Labour's Strasbourg delegates for any kind of British co-operation with Europe, but made little headway nevertheless. When views virtually identical to those which Dalton had presented at the party conference two years earlier were published in the notoriously mistitled Labour pamphlet European Unity on 13 June 1950 - the very day on which Attlee formally replied to the Schuman plan - there was little protest from either inside or outside the party. As Mackay felt it his sad duty to inform the Consultative Assembly: " T h e fundamental fact is that whether it is the Labour party or the Tory party which is in power in Britain [ . . . ] neither party will accept any supra-national authority in this matter." 3 8 Britain's insincere flirtation with Europe had by then clearly achieved the first of its aims - helping to pave the way for the American guarantee. And it had

37

Grantham, op. cit., pp. 2 0 1 - 2 1 0 (and his article 'British Labour and the Hague 'Congress of Europe'

in: Historical

Journal,

2 4 / 2 , 1981; Dalton, L P C R 1948, pp. 118, 177; for trade-union

anti-Europeanism see Bernard Donoughue and G . W . Jones, Herbert politician, "

London 1973, p. 481.

Grantham, thesis, p p . 2 4 4 , 2 5 8 - 6 0 , 322.

Morrison.

Portrait

of a

158

Martin Ceadel

gone a long way towards the second - reconciling France and Germany although in March 1950 Churchill still felt it necessary to drive home the message: "There can be no hope for a United Europe without Germany and there is no hope for Germany except within a free and United Europe". In the summer of 1950 the German question began to be discussed directly, instead of obliquely: this was because of the Korean war, which, by highlighting the need for N A T O to have greatly increased conventional forces (if only to reassure a United States oppressed by its Far Eastern burdens), raised the spectre of West Germany's rearmament. It had long been a commonplace to argue, as for example Boothby did in June 1947: "Germany is the crux"; but in practice it had been treated as a function of the cold war rather than a problem in its own right. Ever since the Labour party had in 1941 —42 officially hardened its heart towards Germany, 39 a consensus had existed which rarely needed articulation. This at first accepted that Germany's rehabilitation, although inevitable in the long run, should not be allowed before the country was truly democratised. But it was gradually modified from about 1947 onwards in response both to the financial costs of supporting impoverished occupation zones and to the fear that their poverty would breed Communism. The revival of the economy in the western zones aroused little political controversy in Britain, being seen as part of the economic rehabilitation of western Europe in general and being objected to only by the small minority who also opposed Marshall aid. One possible explanation for this lack of hostility is, of course, an unspoken assumption that this economic revival had weakened Germany by dividing it. But the rearmament of even a partitioned Germany was bound to cause controversy. The first signs appeared in the wake of the North Atlantic Treaty, the strategic logic of which was unmistakeable. "Germany is undoubtedly the long-range danger", Vyvyan Adams, a former MP who in the 1930s had been the leading Conservative advocate of disarmament told the October 1949 party conference. " T o the Russians the threat of war is a useful form of blackmail, but to the Germans warfare is itself a glorious thing." And the following month Labour MP Aidan Crawley warned the Commons that the Germans were "not a democratic people". Though felt in both parties, this suspicion was strongest on the Labour side, as was demonstrated in the Commons on 28 March 1950 when Churchill twice contradicted Bevin as soon as the latter gave vent to the opinion: " T h e Hitler revolution did not change the German character very much. It expressed it." 4 0

"

Churchill, 28 March 1950, HC Deb., 5th, 473/192; Boothby, 19 June 1947, ibid., 338/2314; Burridge, op. cit., pp. 6 0 - 1 .

40

Adams, NUCUA 1949, p. 94; Crawley, 17 Nov. 1949, HC Deb., 5th, 469/2235; 28 March 1950, ibid., 473/323.

British Political Parties

159

Yet with hindsight opposition to German rearmament was remarkable for its weakness rather than its strength; and even the Labour Party conference was to vote in 1954, albeit narrowly, in favour of the agreements bringing West Germany into NATO. It was, admittedly, relatively easy for the insular British with their tradition of balance-of-power manoeuvrings to adopt a former enemy as an ally. But it was, by the same token, harder for them to accept that a former ally even further away from their shores should now be regarded as a likely enemy — particularly as their governing party had once believed itself capable of establishing a special relationship with the Soviet Union. The adaptation of British parties to the cold war was thus in general efficient, a fact which must be stressed by way of a conclusion since much of this paper has inevitably been concerned with the minorities who opposed this process. Indeed, although Britain's two-party system has recently been criticised for its tendency to exaggerate the adversarial nature of political debate, on foreignpolicy questions in the late 1940s it produced the responsible politics with which it is more often associated.

160

Martin Ceadel

Zusammenfassung Zur Zeit der Krise in der Tschechoslowakei 1948 wurden die britischen Politiker auf peinliche Weise an die ein Jahrzehnt zuvor durchlebte Krise erinnert. Sie reagierten jedoch in den späten 40er Jahren weit konstruktiver auf die europäische Situation als in den späten 30er Jahren - wobei freilich von der Problematik der europäischen Einigung zunächst abgesehen wird. In den Augen vieler hatte der Zweite Weltkrieg die Gefahren aufgezeigt, die durch zu spät einsetzende Bemühungen um die Rettung des europäischen Gleichgewichts heraufbeschworen wurden. Nun da Deutschland besiegt war, schien der ehemalige Verbündete, die geographisch entferntere Sowjetunion, den Kontinent beherrschen zu wollen und damit die Sicherheit Großbritanniens in Gefahr zu bringen. Indessen wurde aufgrund innenpolitischer Vorgänge wenigstens bis M a i 1947 die Lehre der Geschichte von einer starken Minderheit verdrängt. Während die allgemeine Parteienstruktur unverändert blieb - nur die Position der kleineren Parteien hatte sich, trotz der sich für sie aus der kriegsbedingten Wahlkampfpause zwischen den großen Parteien ergebenden Chancen, stark vermindert - hatten sich die Gewichte dramatisch zugunsten der Labour Party verschoben: sie gewann in den Wahlen von 1945 ihre erste parlamentarische Mehrheit, und zwar gleich eine Mehrheit von 146 Sitzen gegenüber allen anderen Parteien zusammengenommen. Der linke Flügel der Labour Party erwartete anfangs, daß dieser Wahlerfolg sich, den Wahlversprechungen entsprechend, in einer sozialistischen Außenpolitik niederschlagen würde. Und selbst der rechte Flügel der Conservative Party, der sich in der ungewohnten Oppositionsrolle wiederfand, artikulierte Unmut über die zunehmende Abhängigkeit Großbritanniens von den Vereinigten Staaten. Indessen ließen die politischen Krisen in Frankreich und Italien, das sowjetische Vorgehen in Mittel- und Osteuropa und die unerwartete Großzügigkeit Amerikas gegenüber Europa solche Kritik alsbald verstummen, abgesehen von einem Dutzend Kommunisten und Fellow Travellers. Viele Zweifler wurden jedoch lediglich still, nicht aber bekehrt: dies zeigte die Stimmenthaltung von mindestens 112 Labour-Abgeordneten in der Abstimmung über den NATO-Vertrag und ebenso das plötzliche Wiederaufflammen außenpolitischer Gegensätze unter der Führung Bevans nach 1951. Dessen ungeachtet war jedoch die Zustimmung zu dem Vertrag in den Jahren 1 9 4 9 - 5 0 bemerkenswert. Hinsichtlich der Frage einer europäischen Einigung war die politische Diskussion zugegebenermaßen verwirrend und inkohärent. Unter der Führung Churchills zeigten die Konservativen zwar begeisterte Zustimmung, damit sollte aber zum guten Teil lediglich die Labour Party in Verlegenheit gebracht werden. Labour hatte sich nämlich, ungeachtet seiner früheren internationalistischen Grundsätze, in eine entschieden anti-föderalistische Richtung entwickelt, mit

British Political Parties

161

der Begründung, daß eine Europäische Union sowohl die sozialistischen Errungenschaften Großbritanniens als auch seine Verbindungen mit dem Commonwealth zunichte machen würde. Insgesamt wurde in dieser Frage britischerseits das gewünschte Ergebnis erreicht: das frühzeitig bekundete Interesse an einer europäischen Einigung reichte aus, um die Vereinigten Staaten zu überzeugen, daß die Voraussetzungen für militärische Garantien an den alten Kontinent gegeben seien; andererseits verhinderte die folgende Obstruktionshaltung, daß Amerika den Schluß zog, ein ausreichender europäischer Zusammenhalt mache militärische Garantien, und vor allem eine ständige starke Militärpräsenz der USA in Europa, entbehrlich.

French Power as seen by the Political Parties after World War II by Serge Berstein

On the eve of the Second World War the French political parties had the greatest doubts concerning the reality of national power. Conscious of the weakness of the country because of the economic crisis and its moral and political divisions, they found some compensation for the material fragility of the nation only in the exaltation of its past or a moral greatness which seemed to provide a kind of substitute for a clear consciousness of the national decline. And in the face of the threatening power contest with the Fascist dictatorships adept at using brutal force, their only reasons for optimism were based on the consideration of a situation that offered to the country some trumps in the face of its adversaries, but trumps outside the Continental hexagon: the alliances and the Empire. Foreshadowing the attitudes of June 1940, there co-existed the feeling that France was thoroughly weakened and the idea that the remedy was to be found outside the national territory. Ten years later, France had seen the catastrophe that the political parties had feared and not one of the deficiencies that had been pointed at in 1938-1939 had failed to be present at the moment of decision. But, as the partisans of global strategy had foreseen, it was the Empire and the allies that allowed her to escape the trial and to take a place among the victors even if in a minor position. At the end of the storm the time had come to take stock, but also to envisage the future in the light of the experiences of the past. And one has to note that a very large consensus emerges if one analyzes the viewpoints of the parties which were once again leading the country. There was scarcely any more discussion of power. On the contrary, there was a quasi-unanimity in recording the national weakness; the only divergencies were about the origin of this weakness and the role - more or less important - that devolved upon the policies of the governmental parties. There was equally a nearly general unanimity concerning the ways to redress a ruined situation and even to regain grandeur, a term that was under the circumstances more convenient and more useful than that of power. From this whole examination, the homogeneous result of which permits the

164

Serge Berstein

conclusion that it is indicative of the general sentiments of the French in the years 1944-1949, there results an impression of pessimism which corresponds only too well to that before the war. France was no longer a country that counted on the global chess-board for her power, and she had to find the means to play a role that was n o longer a function of her own forces. In this respect, well before the Schuman Plan the construction of a new Europe seemed to be the last hope to restore lost greatness.

I. Lost Power Between 1944 and 1947 the French political parties showed themselves very conscious of the national weakness. France no longer disposed of the means of power. She no longer counted on the global scene. Agreeing on the diagnosis, they nevertheless differed on the reasons. And it will n o t be surprising to note that when political analyses reappeared, the parties' explanations of prolonged weakness were determined by their ideological orientation.

1. France, an exhausted

country

After the Liberation the unanimous impression was that at the end of the conflict France was a ruined country. In this respect there was n o dissent: French industry was destroyed; stocks were exhausted; industrial equipment was obsolete; communications were destroyed; the food shortages were omnipresent, all production figures were inferior to those of 1939, particularly the energy figures, which were so fundamentally important for the recovery of national productivity. 1 And on all sides, the same expressions were used to characterize the situation of the national economy after the end of the conflict. France was a " w o u n d e d " , " t i r e d " country, a "victim". 2 " T o m o r r o w we will have to care for a convalescent", Senator Georges Laffargue affirmed at the "interim Congress" of the Radical Party in December 1944. 3 It is interesting to note that in this unanimous chorus only the Socialists pointed out that the present situation did not constitute a new fact, but that it only continued the weaknesses of the prewar years. " T h e r e cannot be any question", declared Andre Philip of the Provisional

1

This contribution is a summary based on the following papers: Jean-Jacques Becker, 'Le parti communiste fran^ais et la perception de la puissance de 1944 a 1949', Alain Bergounioux, 'La perception de la puissance par la S.F.I.O. de 1944 a 1947', Daniele Zeraffa, 'La perception de la puissance par les Republicans Populaires en 1948', and on our o w n research on the Radical Party.

2

L. Blum, in: Le Populaire, 19Sept. 1945, cited in A. Bergounioux. Petit Congres du parti radical, 1 9 - 2 1 Dec. 1944, p. 3.

3

165

French Power seen by the Political Parties

Government, " o f going back to the situation before 1940 when, economically, France was on the point of nearly losing her position as a great nation". 4 Actually this material ruin, so generally noted, seemed to prohibit France from playing any longer a global role and pursuing any power policy; for all strongly realized that the war had been won by the great industrial states with superior material forces. And the Communist Party, referring to the historical understanding of France as a great power shared by all ideologies, stated that the ideas of the Grande Nation could only dominate Europe because France was in possession of grandeur materielle, something which was missing at present. 5 In this panorama of national decline the demographic weakness of the country caused additional uneasiness for the future. France had lost men during the War, a part of its resources had disappeared, and this must obviously cause uneasiness for the future. But, though this uneasiness permeated all evaluations of the French situation in 1944, it is noteworthy that it was of lesser importance in party speeches than before the Second World War. Was this due to an awareness of the rise of the demographic curve after 1943? Or was there a comparison with the much greater bloodletting of the First World War? There is no certainty as to the conclusion that has to be drawn. Be that as it may, one has to note that even with the Christian Democrats, who had made demographic weakness one of their favoured topics in 1939, the attention given to demographic concerns was in 1944 seemingly more superficial than real. More important seemed to be the monetary factor. Maybe this was the normal reaction of a people who had been taught in the years between the Wars that the stability of the currency was a prerequisite of grandeur, maybe it was the result of the record-breaking rise in prices: the fear of inflation held a privileged place in the list of national insufficiencies. And this fear continued to grow from 1944 to 1948 in proportion to the price rise, bringing in its wake strikes, social demands, and, consequently, endangering the national cohesion that everyone thought to be indispensable if the country was to regain the elements of lost greatness. At the M . R. P. congress of 1948 Robert Buron put the problem clearly: " T h e deep reasons for the uneasiness of every Frenchman and for the disturbances of social life are the inflation and the rise of prices [ . . . ] . The inflationist development has now arrived at the crisis point and may rapidly become fatal". 6 Be that as it may - all the parties were aware of the fact that this perceived weakness had the effect of hindering France from playing any role whatsoever on the global scene.

4

A. Philip, Apres la Liberation,

5

M . Thorez, Au service de la France,

' R . Buron, Avant-rapport

cited in A. Bergounioux. cited in J . J . Becker.

sur la crise economique

presented to the 4th National Congress of the

M . R . P . at Toulouse, 6 - 9 M a y 1948, cited in D. Zeraffa.

166

Serge Berstein

2. A country

no longer taken into account

on the international

scene

" T h e military catastrophe of 1 9 4 0 , and particularly the betrayal of the Vichy regime, its surrender to the enemy, its unconditional acceptance o f defeat and bondage, have weakened terribly our reputation in the world. Even the admirable epic of General de Gaulle and his c o m r a d e s in and outside F r a n c e did not succeed in diminishing, in wiping out all the effects. T o d a y still, and so persistently, our reputation is in eclipse. We are only admitted into the category of the rescued victors. We no longer belong to the first rank of leading powers [ . . . ] We are no longer able, as we were in 1939, t o exert by our own decision a determining influence on the course of events and [ . . . ] we have been deprived of a position that allowed us to take initiatives". 7

This pessimistic but lucid evaluation which Jacques Kayser presented to the Congress of the Radical Party in August 1945 was arrived at by all the other parties with more or less clearness, but also with more or less resignation. But it was probably the Radicals, because they had at the time no governmental responsibilities, who drew from 1944 on the clearest conclusions in this respect. In 1946 Rene Mayer, who then had to deliver the reports of foreign policy to the Radical Congress, stated that "the real weight of our country in the international discussion has not augmented", 8 and this judgment scarcely changed until 1949. A similar judgment was made, though containing more nuances, by the Communist Party; it, however, rejected decidedly the idea of resigning "to the idea of a France relegated to the rank of secondary power", 9 and it castigated those who were "already adherents of a France reduced to the rank of Portugal". 10 The Socialists made the same judgment, but observed at once that the fact was without importance and that it was useless to exhaust oneself in the pursuit of the illusory dream of a policy of grandeur and of prestige, as General de Gaulle or Georges Bidault did. Andre Philip qualified the policy of grandeur ironically as follows: " a policy of illusions, renewing the policy of Richelieu, a wrong conception of greatness which does not lead to any positive result, for I do not call it a success to have obtained with great effort a folding seat beside the Big Three". 1 1 The attitude of the M. R. P. was more surprising. Whereas the Christian Democrats showed before the War a mistrust that was identical to that of the Socialists as far as the traditional aspects and bases of power were concerned, their heirs seemed to follow in this respect after the Second World War the

J. Kayser, Rapport de politique exterieure au 36° congres du parti radical, 20 - 23 Aug. 1945, p. 2. R. Mayer, Kapport de politique etrangere au 37° congres du parti radical, 5 - 8 S e p t . 1946. ' M . Thorez, Au service de la France, p.6, cited in J . J . Becker. 10 Idem, Au service du peuple de France, p. 59, cited in J . J . Becker. 11 Le Populaire, l - 2 S e p t . 1946, cited in A. Bergounioux. 7

8

French Power seen by the Political Parties

167

classical Right. The occupation of governmental posts and the responsibility for foreign policy (which they enjoyed as a quasi-monopoly) did probably contribute to this spectacular transformation, but perhaps also the clear consciousness that the electors courted by the M . R . P. were more susceptible in these questions to the views of the political Right than to those of the Christian Democrats. Be that as it may, Daniele Zeraffa mentions that, already in 1945, Jean Letourneau had the impression that General de Gaulle and Georges Bidault had led France back into the rank of the great powers, and that if appearances did not fully confirm this optimistic thesis, the problem was the ill will of the three Great Powers. All parties agreed - with various differences, ranging from disillusioned admission to naive hopes — that France no longer occupied the place it once had on the global scene, even if many people, like Edouard Herriot, thought that "the role presently assigned to France is not justified". 12 It remains to be said that even if the weaknesses of the pre-war years and the destruction of the war were to a great extent responsible for the situation, the principal political forces greatly exploited the situation they deplored to settle their political accounts and that once more (as before the War) France's place in the world became an argument in domestic political quarrels: if France was no longer taken into account on the international scene this was so because the country was politically weakened, and the responsibility for this situation lay naturally with the political opponents.

3. A politically weakened

country, or the correct use of the idea of decline

With the Liberation, as in 1939, came the idea that the recovery of the country demanded that national cohesion which mobilizes energies; whether this necessity was evoked by the propaganda in favour of productivity - as was for instance done by the Communist Party in order to recreate the material power indispensable to the role that the country ought to play, or whether it expressed itself in the appeal to national solidarity preached by the Christian Democrats with a more moralizing perspective, at any rate it was clear that national unity appeared to all to be the indispensable condition for the realization of the recovery that was the prerequisite to the restoration of power. Actually, from 1947 and the beginning of the cold war it has to be noted that not only this aim was not attained, but the country was deeply divided, at least as much as it was in 1944. It is interesting to look for the explanation of this clear failure. An objective contemporary view would maintain that this division was the result of an international conjuncture not controlled by the French political

12

Speech by Herriot to the 36th Congress of the Radical Party, p. 16.

168

Serge Berstein

leaders: the division of the world into two blocs and the cold war. Astonishingly one did not mind recognizing that the two Big Ones dominated in the world, but the relationship between the cold war and the internal divisions in France was never clearly established, as if the logic of national cleavages followed its own rules, quite separately from the great international currents. Certainly the operational efficiency of this line of argument was remarkable, as it allowed the parties to appeal to public opinion by questioning the reasoned choices of the political opponents, thus allowing Manicheanism to triumph over the desire to analyze. There were three explanations presented for French domestic divisions in 1947-1948. The explanation of the M.R.P. was simple. The Communist Party, "the party of a foreign country", was a trouble-maker, principally responsible for the national division, and its activities were the origin of the difficulties for the national recovery. Next to it the C. G. T., seen as its instrument in the world of labour, shared the guilt for the national weakness. The lead headline of L'Aube of 29 October illuminated clearly this position: "Les dirigeants communistes de la C . G . T . devoilent leur veritable but: detruire l'economie fran^aise" ["The Communist leaders of the C. G. T. reveal their real objective: destroy the French economy"]. 1 3 In the face of this "parti de la catastrophe" (this was Maurice Schumann's expression), there was only one attitude possible, the one expressed by J. Coude du Foresto: "We will purge this country of the trouble-makers". 1 4 The simple Manicheanism of the M . R. P. was answered by an equally simplistic Manicheanism of the Communist Party. Whereas in 1944-1945 the latter just looked for means to redress French power, in October 1947, it took pleasure in morbid descriptions of the French decadence. Comparing the French situation with the situation at the time of Munich, Joanny Berlioz evoked in Democratie Nouvelle the material disorganization and the moral break-down of the nation, which was due to the activity of a decadent class that hoped for the demobilization of conscience. The nature of this decadent class was specified: it was the "clan of the stateless" that organized this powerlessness, this economic chaos and "sacrificed French interests to its class policy". 15 In sum, bankruptcy was obvious, and it had a simple and unequivocal explanation: France, in adhering to the Marshall Plan, had joined the American camp. The discrepancy between this tone and the earlier language was striking. The Polish conference of the Cominform had taken place: France, reduced to vassalage by the United States

13 14 15

Cited in D. Zeraffa. L'Aube, 13 July 1948, cited ibid. J. Berlioz, 'Rechute dans le munichisme', in: Democratie

Nouvelle,

Aug. 1947, cited in Becker.

French Power seen by the Political Parties

169

with the complicity of the capitalists could not hope " t o regain her status of a great nation". 1 6 A third explanation, that of the R.P.F., emerging with the cold war, dominated the two others. 17 Beginning with his speech at Bruneval on 30March 1947, General de Gaulle justified his action by reference to the decadence of the country. From then on the founder of the R. P. F. played, in the list of those responsible for this decadence, a balancing role between the Communists and the regime of the 4 th Republic incarnated by the M.R.P. In his speech at Rennes on 27 July 1947 he included among the accused the "separatistes", and the R. P.F. press castigated "the fifth column of Russia", "the villains of the party of a foreign country" whose objective was to paralyze the French economy in order to prepare "the bed of the Cossacks", 1 8 as Andre Malraux wrote. Jean-Paul Brunet observed that the denunciation of Communism, in spite of all its virulence, began only in July/August 1947, but that the denunciation of the 4 th Republic as a "party regime" began much earlier. From autumn 1946 on, the General scolded "the system where everybody cooked his little soup on a little fire in a little corner" 1 ' and accused them of pursuing a policy of "scorched earth" which would leave France "exhausted and devastated". 20 It is evident how essential an element the national weakness was in the arguments used in the political battles and what a marvellous instrument it finally became in the electoral debates. It also permitted those who were furthest from power to propose a remedy to the evil by indicating the ways to recovery.

11. Ways to recovery All political parties were aware of the fact that before France could aspire to a return to power (by the way, the notion of grandeur was generally preferred), it was necessary that the French should put an end to the national weakness by initiating a real recovery of the country. At any rate one can observe in this respect an incontestable distortion between the traditional arguments concerning the ends (recover the sense of the civilising mission of France through its moral and intellectual influence), and the means which were fundamentally defined in terms of material power, taking into account the economic recovery and the restoration of the State.

16

Ibid.

17

Considerations on the R. P. F. are based on the contribution of Jean-Paul Brunet, 'Le R.P.F. et l'idee de puissance nationale (1947-1948)'.

" "

Cited ibid. Cited ibid. Ibid.; Le Rassemblement,

20

8Jan. 1949.

170

Serge Berstein

1. The goals of recovery:

restore French moral and intellectual

glory

T h e discussion that had been going on in 1938/39 on the nature of French power was taken up again with increased vigour after the Second World War, increased particularly by a sharpened consciousness of the weakness of the country. As it was evident that France could not claim to compete with the Super-powers in the domain of material strength, it was only in the moral and intellectual domain that she could take some action commensurate with her means. It is nevertheless interesting to note that not all parties agreed with this analysis, but that two groups differed on this problem. On one side there were the adherents of Realpolitik, the Communists and the R.P. F., who seemingly took very little interest in this somewhat rhetorical dispute. Even when the Communists pleaded for moral recovery, this meant in their eyes to fight the tendency o f the demobilization of energies, and under this heading they put the fight against the decline in the birth rate or the renewal of patriotism. 2 1 T h e Socialist party (S.F. I . O . ) , the M . R.P. and the Radicals followed a quite different line of argument. For them French power was not a specifically material thing, but consisted in the defence of ideas which constituted her particular mission. T h e Radical Auguste Pinton defined this mission in 1947 as follows: " T h e mission of France is not the pursuit of a noisy power policy, which would be in vain for the moment. Neither is it the claim of material interests, legitimate or not. It is the mission of France, because she is materially weakened by a ruthless war whose first blow she had suffered alone and more so because she has not yet rediscovered confidence in her future, to open, out of reason, of idealism, and also of disinterestedness the ways which Europe first, and then the world will have to take if they do not want to perish." 2 2 T h u s reappeared the image of the Grande Nation, a spotlight for the rest of the world, showing the peoples of the earth the way to follow. T h e M . R . P. developed a rather similar topic by glorifying the mission of France, torch bearer of Human Rights, heir to the revolutionary principles of 1789 and who somehow rejuvenated her message in the Resistance: " T h i s historic vocation of France to serve liberty, justice and fraternity remains her greatest strength", wrote A. Gortais. "Beaten, ruined, our country retains her prestige and influence in the world as far as she rests loyal to it. She will keep her self-confidence as long as she does not betray her traditional mis-

21 22

Cited in J . J . Becker. A. Pinton, La politique p. 42.

exterieure

du parti radical,

report to the Congress at Nice, Sept. 1947,

French Power seen by the Political Parties

171

sion. She will maintain her friendships as far as other peoples see in her not a selfish power but the messenger of true human progress." 2 3 Finally, loyal to its traditional views in this respect, the Socialist party (S.F. I.O.) affirmed equally that French grandeur did not consist in material strength and power policy; and Leon Blum opposed vigorously this conception to the other one that saw military force as the basis of all national force: "We consider that the highest form of patriotism is and remains, not an attitude which leads the military power of our country to its maximum, but an effort to make it the interpreter, the agent, the fore-runner of the ideas that correspond to its particular vocation in the world." 2 4 And to underline these conceptions the Socialist party (S.F.I.O.) even proposed to the France of the Liberation an international strategy which would have been equivalent to a rupture with the measures of Realpolitik: "It is the role of our country to group around it the totality of small and medium nations in order to gain attention for a universal conscience." 2 5 There were certainly divergencies between those parties which appealed to traditional realism and conceptions of power based on strength and those parties which believed that only the value of the generous ideas she defended would conserve the grandeur of France, but it must nevertheless be noted that these divergencies vanish when one turns from the ends to the means. Again a very general consensus established itself admitting that irrespective of the final objective, France had first to renew her economy and to restore the State.

2. The renewal of the

economy

There was a widely shared conviction that economic recovery was the prerequisite for any return to " p o w e r " . Equally everyone was conscious that, for its success, there was no alternative to effort and to a long-term effort at that; immediately after the Liberation the time-table was seen as that of a generation: "It will be necessary to remake France and to give her back a place in the great concert of nations [ . . . ] To work at once, with our brains, with our arms, with all our forces, in all the domains. And perhaps within ten or twenty years, we will have climbed up the slope again." 2 6 This analysis of Senator Georges Laffargue, the economic expert of the

"

A. Gortais, Democratic in D. Zeraffa.

et Liberation,

report to the 3rd Congress of the M . R. P., March 1947, cited

L. Blum, in: Le Populaire, 3 Aug. 1945, cited in A. Bergounioux. " Le Populaire, l - 2 S e p t . 1946, cited ibid. " G. Laffargue, La politique economique et financier e, report to the Small Congress of the Radical Party, 1 9 - 2 1 Dec. 1944, pp. 4 - 5 . 24

172

Serge Berstein

Radical Party, was answered in practically the same terms by that of the French Communist Party which explained the rallying call Maurice Thorez hurled at the workers of France and which was to be incessantly repeated by the party functionaries: "Production! This is the first, the most imperative duty proclaimed by the 10th congress of the French Communist Party." 2 7 The same obsessive preoccupation with economic reconstruction motivated the leaders of the S. F. I. O. and explains their view that the main resources in manpower, in machines, and in credit must go to the productive process. It was, by the way, this conformity with the ideological options of the S. F. I. O. that led its leaders to question the budgetary decisions of General de Gaulle: "Firstly, rebuild our ruins and restore our economic power and only then reconstitute our military apparatus." 28 This assertion was to lead the Socialists into a violent conflict with General de Gaulle over the budget in autumn 1945 and to their proposal to the Financial Commission of the Assemblee Constituante of a 20 per cent reduction in military expenditure, thus provoking a very grave crisis that played a major role in the departure of General de Gaulle in the following month. Thus agreement was reached that economic recovery was an absolute necessity. What is more surprising, however, is that at least in 1944 this agreement also included the ways and means of reconstruction. The extent of the ruins and the vivid consciousness that the normal mechanisms of a market economy would not be sufficient to get production going again induced even the most liberal politicians to accept the necessity of state intervention. Ideological reasons may explain that this was the choice of the Socialists and Communists, and even of the M . R . P . who, with its social preoccupations and the inspiration that many of its members took from Mounier, tended to desire a renewal of the economic structures. But Senator Georges Laffargue, who was to finish his speech to the Radical Congress of 1949 with a vigorous "Get up, Liberals!", used quite different words in 1944: " T h e necessity of a plan is evident. We must dominate the problems, classify them and then desire to produce first the indispensable, then the useful, then luxuries. Our factories are destroyed, our resources exhausted. The State will assume its part in the reconstruction. The role which will be incumbent on it may be most important for the activities of tomorrow." And he preached the "battle against the trusts" in order to re-establish competition while accepting the idea of nationalization, provided that the effect was to give birth to autonomous management. Of course, he considered this dirigisme and state intervention to be only a provisional measure destined to 17

M . Thorez, Au Service

28

A. Philip, contribution to the 37° congres

de la France,

p. 12, cited in J . J . Becker. de la S.F.I.O.,

1 4 - 1 6 A u g . 1945, p . 7 1 0 .

French Power seen by the Political Parties

173

rebuild the ruins, so as to allow economic liberty to take its own course as rapidly as possible. 2 ' But until then necessity reigned and measures which before the war as well as some years later would not seem acceptable at all were now accepted readily. By the way, it is interesting to note that in 1947 when the R.P. F. was born, General de Gaulle judged the prerequisite of economic recovery in the same manner as the other parties did in 1944. " T h e renewal of French economic power will be extremely hard work which will take at least one generation." 3 0 But in 1947, in the view of the Gaullists, it was no longer the War itself that was responsible for the lamentable state of the French economy, but the errors of the Fourth Republic. And the substitution programme was more of a statement of general principles - the battle against inflation, the combination of capital and manpower aiming at a society without wages as proposed by Louis Vallon - than a proposal of practicable ways that might permit this goal to be accomplished. Thus, if the reconstruction of the economy was seen by all as the fundamental prerequisite of a recovery of power, in the view of the most modern parties it could not be separated from a real restoration of the State.

3. The restoration of the State T h e interest in a general reform of the structures of the state was far from being unanimous. T h e Radicals who were in favour of a simple return to the Third Republic and who, having fought against the constitution of the Fourth Republic, accomodated themselves to a hidden return to the pre-1939 conditions that characterized the evolution of the new regime, were scarcely interested in the subject. T h e Communists and Socialists were much more interested in it, but for them it was not really a propaganda topic as they found themselves in a strong position in the two constituent assemblies and thus able to impose their views. T h e regime of the Fourth Republic was their work and every kind of revisionism made them feel uneasy. On the other hand, the parties that played only a secondary role in the elaboration of the text of the Constitution or that had the impression that it ignored their convictions were going to make the restoration of the state a major topic of their political reflections about the ways and means of French recovery; they were to understand that the recovery of French power could only be achieved by the mediation of a state really able to govern and to realize the aspirations of the French. 2'

G. Laffargue, op. cit., p p . 5 - 1 1 .

30

Cited in J. P. Brunet.

174

Serge Berstein

For the M . R . P . the reflection on the state constituted, from the Liberation on, a major element of its programme of return to power. Desiring a rapid end of the provisional arrangements, it regarded the future institutions as an original construction that would be in a way the opposite of the two dangers it sought to avoid, and for which recent history provided the archetypes: the ministerial instability of the Third Republic with its party intrigues, its corridor coalitions, and the resulting powerlessness of the country in the face of the dictators, and secondly the personal power regime of Vichy with its alienation of liberty: "Between the way of enslavement followed by the dictatorial government of Vichy and the facile way taken by the pre-war governments, the M. R. R chose a new way. It opts for a strong Republic able to bring together the authority of the State and the indispensable continuity of governmental policies with the respect for civil liberties." 31 A fine programme whose realization, however, was not going to fulfill all desires. The M . R . R succeeded only in amending the project of the Socialists and Communists in 1946. And four years later Maurice Schumann observed that ministerial instability was again characteristic of French political life, and this to the great exhilaration of foreigners. The distance was great to the hopes of the Liberation and to a renovation of the structures, but also to political mentalities permitting a "revolution by law". And the M . R . R itself did not prove capable of becoming the renewed political force which might have served as an example to the new Republic. Actually, the M . R . R hoped vaguely to take a third way between Communism and Liberalism, the way of a "personalist" revolution: "transform the political, economic and social institutions so as to favour more and more the development of man." 3 2 Political democracy, economic and social democracy - this programme of the Liberation was going to vanish in the domestic tensions of the cold war and in the face of the harsh realities of the reconstruction. In 1948, it had to be admitted that the hopes of the Liberation had remained a dead letter and that the new state was neither an institution capable of realizing the full development of man, nor the energy centre able to win back for France its power. Consequently, in response to the revisionist bidding of the R.P.F., the M . R . P . recommended, beginning with its national congress of 1948, a reform of the state; " a modification of the governmental structures that would realize a concentration of powers among a small number of ministers" and it demanded " a revision of the methods of parliamentary work". 3 3 Naturally, the theme of the restoration of the state had more importance still for the R. P. F., as the party of General de Gaulle had been created in order to arrive at this result. Criticizing both Communist "separatism" and the defici-

du M.R.P.

en 1944, cited in D. Zeraffa.

31

Projet de Manifeste

32

A. Gortais, op. cit., p. 9.

33

Motion on the reform of the State adopted by the 4th Congress of the M . R. P., cited in D. Zeraffa.

French Power seen by the Political Parties

175

ency of the Fourth Republic, the Gaullists incessantly pleaded for a revision that would allow the creation of a powerful state commanding undisputed authority "strong enough to make every individual [ . . . ] every class [ . . . ] fulfill their duty, impartial enough not to think of anything else but the common interest", 34 they refused, by the way, to be more precise and were content to refer to the Bayeux speech as a summary of their views on the fundamental rules of the ideal constitution. It can thus be observed that the discussion about the goals favoured the ideological mission of France as a guide to the small nations, but that the examination of the means certainly laid stress on the very material and very concrete aspects of the national recovery. Beyond this debate that served to conceal a weakness which was all too well known, the parties were largely convinced that power did not consist in ideas, but in the mastering of material means. And the Socialists themselves who professly rejected these views (as they did in some respects reject the ideologies, but not the politics of the M . R . P . ) did not escape the contradiction to which such a position of principles gave rise. To convince oneself of this, it is sufficient to have a look at what the French political forces considered to be the means of regained power.

III. The means of power It is striking to observe the extent to which the examination of the means of power led to traditional analyses, which were in all respects similar to those that the parties could develop before the War. As in 1938/39, these means were primarily the army, the alliances and the Empire.

1. The traditional means of power: army and alliances The desire to regain power should have led France, in the first place, to consider the reconstruction of a French army whose breakdown in 1940 had displayed its weakness. But strangely enough most political parties remained silent on this major issue, except the French Communist party. Maurice Thorez, from 1944 on, made himself the bard of the French military renewal, in every speech hammering slogans for the reconstitution of a powerful army that he estimated at one million soldiers! 35 In this domain, the Socialists took a strictly antithetical attitude: as has already been seen, they advocated the postponement of rearmament until the 34

Press conference by General de Gaulle, 12 Nov. 1947, cited in J . P. Brunet.

35

Cited in J . J . Becker.

176

Serge Berstein

economy had recovered, and Leon Blum was perfectly explicit on this point in February 1946: " I f there is a time when France can without being reckless think of a military interim, it is this present time." 3 6 This was a position that resulted quite naturally in relying, as before the War, upon a "collective security" to protect the independence and integrity of the country. This was a position that went beyond the mere recognition of the difficulty of simultaneously building up the economy and the armed forces. It sprang from the perpetual doctrine of the Socialists on international relations. The confidence in the U . N . O . , the desire to ensure its success seemed like the major facts of an isolated but coherent position. Nevertheless, idealism was here not a synonym for Utopia, and it was the very awareness of the French incapacity to play a role vis-a-vis the two super-powers that made the Socialists think that the future role of France must henceforth consist in uniting all the small powers in the U. N. O., but a U. N. O. possessing real political and military means. And, taking a route which others were to follow in order to construct a new Europe, the S.F. I. O. advocated the cession of a part of the national sovereignities to a U. N. O. which alone seemed capable of making the nuclear powers respect the rules of international law. This was an interesting and coherent position that represented an attempt to give back to France an international role in spite of the cruel weakness that the country displayed and which made all hopes vain that it could by its own means regain a real international status. But, however interesting it may have been, this position remained isolated. Most parties, without proclaiming it, but with a revealing silence no longer thought that France could find the means of her power in the strength of her army and guns, but felt instead that the regained position of the country could be based on alliances. Strictly speaking, this appeal to the alliances was a proof of weakness, as in 1938/1939. And we only have to consider against whom these alliances were directed. Until 1948, the opponent remained admittedly Germany. For all parties - except the S.F.I. O. which intended to re-introduce Germany into the concert of the free peoples but nevertheless proposed the internationalization of the Ruhr mines and factories - the feared adversary was a Reich that one considered always prepared to reappear from its ashes as a militaristic and aggressive power, ready to pounce upon France. The German trauma made it appear necessary to maintain war alliances and it must be observed in this respect that all the political parties considered the bloc of the Allies an intangible entity. Until 1947 there was a desire to bring the Franco-Soviet pact into play, not only on the part of the Communists but also with the Socialists and the M . R . P . And the entry into the cold war made all political parties feel very uneasy, as the

36

Le Populaire,

lOFeb. 1946, cited in A. Bergounioux.

French Power seen by the Political Parties

177

French found it hard to accept that they should give up the old cleavage: "Everybody against Germany", and adopt the new East-West division. On 27 November 1947, in his inaugural speech, Leon Blum still tried to escape the new cold war logic: " T h e role, the mission of France is to help constitute the third international force that would do everything within its power to smooth out the misunderstandings, so appease any mistrust by an unceasing effort towards conciliation and mutual persuasion, a force that would not admit that the nations be subject to anything else but the agreements they have concluded among themselves and to the common charter that they have given themselves." 37 In the same manner, the M . R . P . castigated the double hegemony of the USSR and the United States that hollowed out the spirit of the United Nations from its content, and at the congress of 1947 Louis Terrenoire deplored that " w e live in a hard world dominated by two giants that hold in their hands the fate of peace". 3 8 Finally the refusal to be incorporated into the blocs was at the very heart of the thinking of the R. P. F., which denounced the " t w o enormous masses, both inclined to expand but governed by essentially different attitudes and, at the same time, by antagonistic ideological currents"; it felt that, under these conditions, the primary concern must be to maintain national independence. As a consequence, the examination of the traditional means of power ends with a gloomy conclusion. Except for the Communist Party that wanted it, the political forces thought that France could not hope to build up a military power that would redress her status in the world, or, like the Socialists, they rejected these means. As regards alliances, however much they had been desired when it was a question of weakening Germany, they now seemed to give cause for concern, since, in the framework of the cold war, they threatened the loss of French independence within an imperial group dominated by the United States. Did France thus not possess any means of power at all? As in 1938/1939, the Empire seemed to be the last resort.

2. The traditional means of power: the Empire There was not one political party that, in this gloomy context, did not refer to the Empire as the means to make up for the weaknesses, which were by the way evident. And once again, one has to note the remarkable continuity that, even after the War, was typical of the political parties' reflection on the means of

37 38

Le Populaire, 22 Nov. 1947, cited ibid. 3rd National Congress of the M.R.P., cited by D. Zeraffa.

178

Serge Berstein

power. Certainly the role which the Empire played during the War was apt to reinforce a feeling of importance discovered before the Second World War: " A n d then we think of the Empire", exclaimed George Laffargue at the small Radical Congress of 1947, " [ . . . ] the Empire and France are but one. T h e resources of France are at the disposal of the Empire, and the resources of the Empire are at the disposal of France. We must initiate the great stream of exchanges capable of increasing our power without overstraining our finances; one has to make the most of our colonial resources." 3 9 This analysis was, after the Liberation, that of all political parties without exception. Let us begin with the Communist party: "France lives in E u r o p e " , wrote Florimond Bonte, " b u t we must not forget that France is also a Mediterranean power." 4 0 T h e C o m m u n i s t Party doubtless remembered its traditional position, according to which it was necessary to take into account the peoples' aspiration for liberty, but they at once concluded that the "right to separate does not mean the obligation to separate" and that the peoples of the colonies had every interest to maintain their union with France. As the Bolsheviks once did with the nationality problem in Russia, the R C. F. thus proclaimed a principle the application of which was ruled out by expediency. Basically all groups agreed on preserving the Empire in its integrity. T h e only notable divergencies were about the ways and means of maintaining an Empire " w i t h o u t which France would be n o t h i n g " according to a formula that was a unique hit in 1944-1948. "If France, by chance, were suddenly deprived of her overseas extensions [ . . . ] she would be nothing more than a nation of 40 million people; she would be nothing more than an exclusively European power; she would be nothing more than a power lacking vital resources." 4 1 Probably the M . R . P . had the most intransigent position on the colonial question. T h o u g h it thought it necessary to revise the conceptions of the relations between France and her Empire, it violently took sides against any nationalist manifestation, be it in the question of the revolt of Madagascar or of the Viet-Minh's action in Indo-China against which it did not have harsh enough expletives. Moreover, it discovered the actions of the great powers behind these movements which could perhaps result in the country's loss of one of her principal means of future power. From the time of its foundation, the R.P.F. expressed its attachment to the Empire following the definition by General de Gaulle at the conference of Brazzaville:

3

' G. Laffargue, op. cit., p. 11.

40

F. Bonte, La France et I'organisation

41

Dr. Autjoulat, rapport 1 3 - 1 6 D e c . 1945, p. 10.

de la paix,

sur la politique

10th congress of the P.C.F., p.29.

coloniale,

2nd National Congress of the M.R.P.,

French Power seen by the Political Parties

179

"United with the overseas territories which she had opened to civilization, France is a great power. Without these territories she risks losing this status." 4 2 This subject, again and again repeated by the adherents of the General, was complemented by the recognition of the typical character of each territory, of the necessity to allow each its own government and administration. But, even more plainly than in Brazzaville, the recognition of an independent status could in no case mean the questioning of French sovereignty: " T h e Union fran^aise has to be French which implies that the authority, I mean the authority of France, is exercised clearly on the spot, and that her duties, her rights, and her responsibilities remain beyond question in the fields of law and order, national defence, foreign policy and the common economy." 4 3 It was probably in the Socialist party (S. F. I. O.) that the desire to maintain the integrity of the Empire was most apparently accompanied by a real attempt to emancipate the peoples. Like the other political forces, the Socialists thought that France could only remain a great power if she possessed the human and economic resources of her Empire. But to maintain French presence overseas they relied less upon force and political subjection than upon the integration of the peoples into the French community. This double aspect of the Socialist position, that was to survive the beginning of the Indo-China War, was clearly stated by Marius Moutet before the Constitutional Commission: "Basically it is a question of knowing whether France actually sees herself as embracing 100 million souls or whether she wants to fall back upon 40 million inhabitants. Will France be, or will she not be a great power? It is not without importance to show them [the peoples overseas] that they can become the members of a great nation whose actions could be influential in the world." 4 4 Thus, with only slight divergences in the ways and means of maintaining the French presence, there was remarkable unanimity at the Liberation that the Empire was to be considered an indispensable element of French grandeur. Without doubt this was something more than a simple rhetorical element as had often been the case in France with the imperialist discussion. It remained that, even if one found here the means to make up for weaknesses perceived in other respects, France, expanded by her Empire, was clearly not in the position, in the face of the two super-powers, to maintain the independence that most parties desired. How could one reconcile a recognized weakness with the desire not to become the vassal of the great powers? The solution to this squaring of the circle of which all political forces, except the Communists thought since the Liberation, was Europe.

42

C. de Gaulle, declaration of 27 Aug. 1946, cited in J. P. Brunet.

43

Ibid., speech at Bordeaux, 15 May 1947.

44

Speech of Marius Moutet before the Constitutional Commission of the Assemblee cited in A. Bergounioux.

Constituante,

180

Serge Berstein

3. A new means to preserve national power:

create

Europe

If, from 1945 on, the political parties considered Europe as a means of escaping the consequences of national weakness, it was only in a formal and rather rhetorical sense. By contrast, the outbreak of the cold war would make the resort to Europe not only a theoretical solution but a sort of necessity imposed by geopolitics and the awareness of a common danger caused by the cold war and the division of the world into two hostile blocs whose border ran right through the middle of Europe. It will not be surprising that, in this context, the Communist Party scarcely shared in the sudden European enthusiasm that took hold of the other French parties. On the other hand, Auguste Pinton, spokesman on foreign policy at the Radical Congress of 1947 stated the new facts of the question with particular clarity. Europe, he explained in essence, had become a stake in the fight between the two super-powers and ran the risk of being a future battle-field. To escape this doubtful fate that threatened her, there was no other solution for her but to join forces, even if this union disturbed many traditions and habit, and to set up a confederation that would perhaps in the future be capable of balancing the power of the United States and the USSR. Nevertheless, if the Radicals like the other parties so readily pleaded for the constitution of a Europe united in the name of a common past and civilization, it was perfectly clear that the idea of constituting a third bloc half-way between the United States and the USSR did not occur to anybody. If the formation of Europe was so necessary this was - and everybody agreed on this - because of the Soviet threat, and consequently the Europe in question had to be a Europe supported by the United States to check the risk of a potential aggression on the part of the USSR. At the Radical Congress of Toulouse in 1949 the report of Jean Coutard was unequivocal when he insisted on the necessity of protecting the European countries against the risk of a threatening invasion: "For this it is necessary to create as soon as possible, by first joining them together, a continental force leaning upon that of the two great powers whose civilization and political ideas are like ours, strong enough to discourage any aggression, and then, in the remoter future, to maintain itself by its own means." 45 This reasoning was almost identical to that of the M. R. P. which until 1947 did not seem to be of particularly European fibre and for whom nationalism was the governing concept of power. Things changed in 1947 with the cold war: from then on Georges Bidault pleaded for the creation of European institutions, while Maurice Vaussart proposed to transfer the admiration for the French Resistance to all European resistance movements so as to make possible the constitution of

4i

Rapport

de Jean Coutard au congres de Toulouse du parti radical (Nov. 1944), p. 3.

181

French Power seen by the Political Parties

a United Western Europe based on its democratic conceptions and resolved to check the expansion of Communism. 46 While outside the Communist Party, the European topic, much more based on reason than on enthusiasm, was noticeably identical, two original positions can nevertheless be brought out. The first was that of the Socialist Party (S.F. I. O.). As has already been pointed out this party dreamt of a world organized around a powerful U. N. O. in whose favour the countries should consent to give up part of their sovereignty. With the cold war it seemed an empty hope that the U.N. O. would play the role the Socialists assigned to it. They therefore transferred the hopes they had placed in the U . N . O . to Europe whose constitution was imposed by necessity. They considered it necessary to use the Marshall plan and the American alliance to set up Europe as a coherent whole, politically and economically allied with the United States. 47 But the most original and, taking into account the future, most surprising position was that of the R. P. F. Already in 1947, realizing that the maintenance of national independence had become the most urgent problem because of the opposition between the two blocs, General de Gaulle considered it of primary importance "that we applied ourselves to the remaking of Europe so that there would exist, besides the two masses of today, an element of balance" that would permit the maintenance of peace. 48 And, elaborating on the General's ideas, Jacques Soustelle spoke of a "European federation" as a third bloc capable of preventing the confrontation of the two Great Powers. 49 Here was no question of a specifically American Europe like the one contemplated by the Radicals, the Socialists and the Socialists and the M . R. P. but an entity that would hold aloof from the two blocs. Although with the outbreak of the cold war the Soviet Union was regarded as the principal adversary, this did not mean that this Europe had to trail behind the United States. In 1948 the European enthusiasm of the R.P. F. went very far, as Gaston Palewski contemplated a customs union, an industrial streamlining of Europe with the transfer of machines, manpower and even sovereignty: " T h e political problem that had arisen from the technical and economic evolution already before the War was that of limiting the countries' sovereignty rights in favour of an international authority." 50 Along the same line General de Benouville, at the R. P. F. Congress of Marseille proposed a common European strategy, a common European army at the

46

Cited in D. Zeraffa.

47

Cited in A. Bergounioux.

48

C. de Gaulle, Discours

4>

Resolution

50

Le Rassemblement,

du Conseil

et Messages, National

v o l . 2 , Paris 1970, pp. 1 9 3 - 1 9 7 , cited in J.P. Brunet.

du R.P.F.

( 3 0 S e p t . - 2 O c t . 1948), cited ibid.

2 9 M a y 1948, cited ibid.

Serge Berstein

182

disposal of the European government!51 This proposition was adopted by the Commission de la Defense Nationale of the movement where the generals Corniglion-Molinier and Chaban-Delmas had a seat. As a matter of fact, Jean-Paul Brunet shows that this supra-national enthusiasm can be mainly explained by the fact that the R. P. F. was convinced that it would be France after negotiations with Great Britain who would lead this embryonic Europe. But when the Treaty of Brussels of March 1948 rather sanctioned British preponderance over the military organization of Western Europe, the R.P.F. reacted furiously against this "renunciation of national sovereignty". 52

Conclusion This last section concludes the characterization of the perception which the French political parties had of their country's power in 1944-1949. Strictly speaking, this term was little used and that of grandeur was preferred, a term that implied more moral connotations and allowed the material means of influence to be pushed into the background. The feeling that actually prevailed was that of a tragic French powerlessness that was a legacy of history - the crisis of Vichy - or a present misfortune - on account of domestic disputes or the adoption of inadequate institutions. This gloomy conclusion led to the search for ways of recovery, insisting on the fact that French grandeur was primarily based upon her civilising mission or the power of her ideas and at the same time upon the necessity for restoring the country's economic and political foundations which were indispensable to check the country's decline. But when all the political forces speculated about the future nature of French power, pessimism characteristically prevailed. The reinforcement of the army was an unrealistic wish of the Communist Party who, by the way, stood alone in this respect. The pursuit of French power rather resulted in looking beyond the national territory, to the allies, to the Empire and finally to Europe which, around 1947, became the great hope. The France of the postwar years displayed even less confidence than the France of 1938-1939 in the possibility of playing a role in the World. She only considered it through the European whole into which she seemed ready to merge in order to recover a role, even if, on the part of the R. P. F., one could see the emergence of a nationalist dimension of the European construction.

51 52

Le Rassemblement, Le Rassemblement,

24April 1948, cited ibid. 4Dec. 1948, cited ibid.

French Power seen by the Political Parties

183

Zusammenfassung Unmittelbar nach dem Krieg überwog in den französischen Parteien das Gefühl einer substantiellen Schwäche des Landes, die vorerst ausschloß, daß es international eine Rolle spielen könnte. Einig in der Einschätzung der Lage, unterschieden sich die Parteien jedoch in der Beurteilung der Verantwortlichkeiten. Die Kommunisten betrachteten die Schwäche als Ergebnis des Verhaltens der Bourgeoisie, die das nationale Interesse ihren Klasseninteressen untergeordnet und Frankreich von den USA abhängig gemacht habe. Umgekehrt warf die M R P der PC und der C G T vor, die „Partei der Unordnung" zu sein, während das RPF das „Parteiensystem" und die „Separatisten" attackierte. Die wichtigste Sorge war, wie der Weg zum Wiederaufstieg gefunden werden könnte. Über rhetorische Formeln hinaus - daß man sich auch in widrigen Zeiten nicht entmutigen lassen dürfe, daß Frankreichs „grandeur" seiner kulturellen Ausstrahlung entspringe, daß Frankreich die Menschheit aus dem Dunkel herausgeführt habe - bildete sich ein allgemeiner Konsens darüber, daß der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung absolute Priorität zukomme, daß diese einen langen Atem, vielleicht die Dauer einer ganzen Generation benötige, und daß sie zumindest am Anfang Interventionen des Staates erforderlich mache. Weit geringere Einigkeit bestand demgegenüber hinsichtlich der Wiederherstellung des Staatswesens. Die Hauptautoren der Verfassung, Sozialisten und Kommunisten, maßen der Frage kaum Bedeutung bei. Die M R P suchte lediglich eine Vereinfachung des Regierungsapparats. Nur das RPF hielt - dies war seine raison d'etre einen völligen Umbau der Institutionen für notwendig. Die Notwendigkeit der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung implizierte ein Nachdenken über die nationalen Machtmittel, und in dieser Hinsicht setzten sich eindeutig die traditionellen Auffassungen durch: alle Parteien stützten ihre Überlegungen auf die Bedingung militärischer Stärke, und zwar vor allem die militärische Stärke der Alliierten (mit Ausnahme der Kommunistischen Partei, die allein die Bildung einer starken französischen Armee forderte), dann auch auf das Empire, ohne das Frankreich zur Bedeutungslosigkeit verurteilt schien. Der einzige neue Gesichtspunkt in diesem Zusammenhang war der Gedanke, daß durch europäische Konstruktionen eine Verwicklung in die Konflikte des Kalten Krieges vermieden werden könne, daß Frankreich über Europa aber auch wieder in eine internationale Position gelangen könne, die aus eigenen Kräften nicht mehr erreichbar schien.

The Genesis of Political Impotence. Italy's Mass Political Parties in the Years between the Great Alliance and the Cold War* by Severino Galante

A study of Italy's mass political parties from the point of view of power politics obliges us, paradoxically, to investigate the question of the genesis of their international impotence throughout the 1950s and later. Neither the Christian Democrats nor the Communist Party nor the Socialist party, in fact, emerged from the 1940s possessing even a relative capacity for independent, original intervention in international processes. For many years, the positions they assumed and the initiatives in which they participated in this field were genetically heteronomous, even when inspired by subjectively authentic convictions. Such positions and initiatives were substantially internal to analytical schemes, political trends and, above all, totalizing conflicts that had foreign origins, to be found in the duel between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which had imposed a bipolar form on the postwar system of international relations, engulfing within it any collective subject existing in Italy. But if the cause of powerlessness lay in Italy's participation in the bloc policy, to investigate the problem we must go back to the earliest origins of this choice. From the moment of their organization or reorganization, between 1943 and 1944, the future mass parties of Italy realized that the knot of foreign policy was of crucial importance to the fate of their strategies. To unbind that knot was therefore one of the most exacting tasks that the heads of the DC, the PCI and the PSIUP - and their most highly esteemed and farseeing leaders - had to undertake. Each party addressed the issue with reference to an optimal conception of the system of postwar international relations, which derived its specific character from the cultural tradition of the party, from the principles by which it

* In preparing this paper I have utilized, in addition to my own specific studies on the Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party, a preparatory paper by Danilo Ardia on the Italian Socialist Party, entitled: Ί1 rifiuto della potenza. II PSI e la percezione della politica di potenza in Europa, 1943-1950'.

186

Severino Galante

was inspired, from the goals it intended to achieve, but also from the international personality of its leaders, from their perception of the processes and from their interpretation of national and party interests. Among the leaders of the Christian Democrat party, the inciting ideal of Christian universalism - based on solidarity, pacifism and neutrality of popular political ascendency - was mingled with a widespread ideological aversion to Communism and with deeply-rooted political mistrust of the Soviet Union, viewed as ill-sorted partner of the Americans in the present and as latent threat to the Catholic forces of Central-Eastern Europe in the near future. This amalgamation of values and fears suggested the design of a postwar Europe guaranteed against any Soviet Communist influence by an Anglo-American presence extending over the entire continent. The form of such a guarantee, however, would have to be that of hegemony — i.e., of the cohesion deriving from commonly-held ultimate values (freedom, democracy, Christianity, etc.) and mutual interests - rather than that of domination and power politics, in order to allow all the minor States such as Italy a sufficient amount of independence and autonomy. 1 The point of view of the Communist leaders was different. Although they ardently felt the need to safeguard Italy's sovereignty, they believed this could be done only in a system of international relations founded on cooperation between the Western "democracies" and the Soviet "democracy". For the leaders of the PCI, the Great Alliance was the ideal model for international relations. In their opinion, the Great Alliance had introduced a radical innovation into the postwar system of the States. The twenty-year period of encirclement and contestation of the U. S. S. R. seemed over, and the "land of Socialism" was sought after and accepted as fully-ranking partner in dialogue with the Western powers in the definition of postwar international settlements. For those who considered the safety and prestige of the U. S. S. R. to represent not only a value in itself, but also an indirect contribution to the strengthening of the individual Communist parties, the new situation bore inestimable significance. It marked a turning point in history, opening up international and national perspectives unthought

1

Cf. Atti e documenti della Democrazia cristiana 1943-1967, R o m e 1968, specifically pp. 3 2 - 3 3 ; A. De Gasperi, 'La Democrazia cristiana e il momento politico', in: Idem, Discorsi politici, Rome 1 9 5 6 , 2 vols, vol. I, pp. 1—20; and cf. also S. Galante, 'La scelta americana della DC', in: AA. VV., La Democrazia cristiana dal fascismo al 18 aprile, Venice 1978. Studies by G. Baget-Bozzo, II Partito cristiano al potere. La DC di De Gasperi e di Dossetti 1945-1954, Florence 1974; P. Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, Bologna 1978; Idem, Gli anni della Costituente tra politica e storia, Bologna 1980; R. Ruffilli, 'La formazione del progetto democratico-cristiano dopo il fascismo', in: AA.VV., Democrazia cristiana e Costituente, Rome 1980, 3 vols, vol.1, pp. 31 —114, dedicate almost no attention to the international aspects of the Christian Democratic program; the same can be said for G. Andreotti, Intervista su De Gasperi, ed. A Gambino, RomeBari 1977, which however does not overlook the practical implications of such aspects.

Italy's M a s s Political Parties

187

of only a few years previously. The PCI's adhesion to the Great Alliance was therefore not merely a tactical choice but also an authentic strategical option dictated by the most vital interests of the party; 2 interests so vital as to become, within a brief time, misleading. As for the PSI's leading group, its programmed international postulates were highly abstract and contradictory. The PSI, in effect, had no solid, consistent conception of international relations, due both to the traditional lack of interest of its heterogeneous leaders in such issues and to the tendency to deal with them on the basis of a predominantly internal (party or national) viewpoint. These limitations clearly marked the three principles by which, to different degrees, the Socialist leaders were inspired: the destruction of the nationalist structure of bourgeois society, basis of all imperialism; the federal organization of Europe as a first step towards a Union of Socialist Republics, considered the natural outgrowth of the political and economic policy of the continent; the creation of a new "International" as a synthesis of the worldwide experience of Socialist and Communists. Within the contradictory borders traced by these abstract principles lay two basic political choices; acceptance of being "subjected" to the conditioning of the Allies as a state of necessity but also as a longterm perspective in which to place the development of the Italian situation; and the proposal - precise in specifying an objective but nebulous as to the means to achieve it - for a foreign policy aimed at reinserting Italy into the international context on an equal footing. 3 The original " i d e a l " visions of post-war international relations were immediately, even before the end of the war, confronted with the system which was actually being constructed. Views of the reality of the Great Alliance, of its consistency, of its predictable future, as well as perception of the gradual transition from pre-war pluripolarity to post-war bipolarity, and from the coopera-

1

Cf. P. Togliatti, 'La politica di unita nazionale dei comunisti', in: La politica di Salerno. AprileDicembre 1944, R o m e 1969, p. 36; and also, with different emphasis, E. Ragionieri, Ί1 PCI nella Resistenza: la nascita del 'partito n u o v o " , in: Studi storici, 1, 1969, pp. 8 6 - 8 7 ; G . Q u a z z a , Resistenza e Storia d'ltalia. Problemi e ipotesi di ricerca, Milan 1976, in particular Chapter 4; S. Galante, 'Sulle 'condizioni' della democrazia progressiva nella linea politica del PCI (1943-1948)', in: II Politico, 3 , 1 9 7 5 , pp. 4 5 7 - 4 5 9 ; Idem, Lafinediun compromesso storico. PCI e DC nella crisi del 1947, Milan 1980, pp. 3 4 - 3 7 .

3

Cf. the 'Dichiarazione politica del Partito socialista italiano di unitä proletaria', in: 11 Partito socialista italiano nei suoi Congressi, vol. V, 1942—1955, II socialismo italiano in questo dopoguerra, ed. S. Pedone, Milan 1968, pp. 8 - 1 3 ; P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda. Diari 1943-1956, Milan 1981, p. 64; and also E. Di N o l f o , Ί1 socialismo italiano tra i due blocchi', in: AA. VV., Trent'anni di politica socialista, R o m e 1977, pp. 4 7 - 6 6 . On the heterogeneity of the Socialist leading group and on its internal dialectics cf. in particular F. Taddei, II socialismo italiano del dopoguerra: correnti ideologicbe e scelte politiche (1943-1947), Milan 1984, pp. 25 - 4 5 ; this paper refers almost exclusively to the positions of P. Nenni and the sectors of the party closest to him, since it was they who normally characterized the options of the PSI.

188

Severino Galante

tive orientation o f the Great Alliance to the conflictual position of the opposing blocs, were neither univocal nor of equal significance for the three mass parties. Similarly diversified were their responses, both those having to do with the original projects and those expressed by the progressive adaptation of strategies to new facts emerging in the relations between the great powers. Its aversion to Communism and the U . S . S . R . 4 naturally placed the D C among those forces that considered cohabitation within the Great Alliance of the Western " d e m o c r a c i e s " and Soviet "totalitarianism" to be unnatural, hoped for its rapid dissolution and therefore believed it necessary to distinguish immediately, between the Allies, friends from enemies, appealing to the former against the latter. These convictions developed in the Christian Democrat leaders a sharp aptitude for early identification of symptoms of crisis in the Alliance. After the brief tempest of doubt aroused by the Yalta agreements/ which seemed to presage realization of an international cooperative model, 6 the Spring of 1945 brought the Christian Democrat leaders two fundamental certainties: the decided end of United States isolationism and the irreversible maturation of two opposing ideological and political blocs. 7 From that moment on with remarkable anticipation over the other parties - the D C had at its disposal a highly efficient key of interpretation which allowed it to deal successfully with the problem of revision of the principles that had guided its analysis in the preceding period, thus permitting it to exploit successfully the occasions offered by the new trends in the international situation. T h e Communists and Socialists, on the contrary, encountered only two years later - and thus after an immense delay from the political point of view - an irreversible crisis in their hopes of founding a cooperative system of international relations. Both parties of the Left considered, although on somewhat dissimilar grounds, the Great Alliance to be the cornerstone of their strategy. Already during the war, the Communist leaders were faced with a basic problem, both political and theoretical in nature: how was transition to socialism possible in a country within the Anglo-American zone of occupation, characterized not only by a bourgeois class which though weakened was still quite strong, but also by a marked reactionary component pervading the society as a whole? T h e answers to this question were first "progressive democracy" 8 and

* Cf., among many examples that may be cited, II Popolo, 5

Cf. ibid., 12Feb. 1945 and 15Feb. 1945.

6

Cf. ibid., 2 M a r c h 1945.

15 Sept. 1944 and 6 Oct. 1944.

7

Cf. ibid., 6 M a y 1945.

8

For two different definitions of "progressive d e m o c r a c y " , cf. P. Togliatti, La politica di p. 80, and E. Curiel, Scritti 1935-1945,

historiographical debate on the subject, see, as example, M . Flores, Fronte popolare progressiva.

La politica

Salerno,

R o m e 1973, 2 vols, vol.11, p p . 7 5 - 7 6 . In regard to the

del PCI dal 1935 al 1946,

e

democrazia

R o m e 1973; P. Spriano, Storia del

Partito

189

Italy's M a s s Political Parties

then, in early 1947, the "Italian way to socialism" 9 . Although the content attributed to these two formulas was not identical, the aim that inspired them was the same - to define the specific nature of the link between the international situation and the Italian national context and to attempt to render it as favourable as possible to a project for the profound economic, political and social transformation of Italy. Specifically, the choice made by the Italian Communists was that of enrolling its own national political policy entirely within the scheme of international collaboration between Anglo-Americans and Soviets and therefore supporting on all occasions, both inside and outside the party, the Great Alliance as present reality and future prospect. 10 For its part, the Socialist party advocated the themes of institutional split and of struggle against the continuity of the State as bases for a future of profound renovation exemplified by the slogan "Socialist Italy". These objectives and hopes depended in great measure on maintaining unity of action with the PCI in a common front of anti-Fascist parties, and on the collaboration of the more receptive spheres of the Establishment - internal conditions linked solidly to the existence of external situations, such as the Great Alliance, whose crisis would have produced lacerating effects in the national situation as well as in the status of the party. 11 Maintaining concord between the great powers was thus the basic aim of the international policy followed by both parties of the Left during the war and the immediate post-war period. An aim pursued with extreme determination, to which was sacrificed more than one immediate political interest and more than one analytical consistency. The Communists, aware that their capacity to influence international processes was slight and indirect, pursued this aim by choosing as a program the tactics of silence and of omission in regard to relations between the "great democratic powers" and by designating a unified national policy as an authentic option for foreign policy, 12 and the Socialists by pretending not to see the tensions in the Great Alliance, or deploring them while hoping that Italy would not be drawn in, and meanwhile advocating national unity as a shield for national autonomy. 1 3 Tactical expedients of this kind could be useful to gain time, to postpone choices undoubtedly difficult and perturbing for the strategies of the parties of the Left, but they served neither to curtail the internal comunista

italiano, vol V. La Resistenza,

Resistenza

e storia

Togliatti e il partita nuovo,

Turin 1975; G. Q u a z z a ,

d'ltalia.

' Cf. P. Togliatti, 'La nostra lotta per la democrazia e per il socialismo', in: Critica marxista, 1964, pp. 1 5 9 - 1 9 9 ; L. Gruppi, Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo, Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo. 10

4-5,

R o m e 1974; D . S a s s o o n ,

II PCI dal 1944 al 1964, Turin 1980.

Cf. S. Galante, 'Sulle 'condizioni' della democrazia progressiva', loc. cit.

11

Cf. E. Di N o l f o , Ί1 socialismo italiano tra i due blocchi', o p . cit., p p . 5 4 , 61.

12

Cf. P. Togliatti, La politica di Salerno, p p . 5 8 , 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 .

13

Cf. E. Di N o l f o , Ί1 socialismo italiano tra i due blocchi', op. cit., p. 61.

190

Severino Galante

tensions nor, even less, to influence the fate of the Great Alliance, which depended on quite different factors and on much more effective political intervention. Consequently, the time gained by postponement was in reality time lost for policy. T h e unified tactical expedients of the Left - which, notwithstanding the increasingly obvious manifestation of crisis in international collaboration (as demonstrated by the example of Fulton) continued to accredit publicly, although with increasing doubts, 1 4 as realistic and still feasible the policy of international solidarity up until the Spring of 1947 1 5 - actually had the chief effect of obscuring to party militants and to public opinion a perception of the trends materializing in the international field. Although in this regard it should be pointed out that documentation available today attributes the leaders of the PSI with an earlier awareness than that of the Communist leaders that the international situation was now dominated by the "implacable d e m o n " of power conflict, it remains however unquestionable that in its practical effects this had no consequence at all on Socialist political strategy. 16 Both parties irremediably postponed an analytical revision which would have permitted alternative schemes to be sought for or at least to emerge in the face of what was happening. Such a search would perhaps have been efficacious if initiated in time, with the Christian Democrat strategy still in the stage of formulation. T h e revision of their criteria for interpreting the international reality initiated by the Christian Democrats in the Spring of 1945 had, in fact, proceeded to a slow, sinuous rhythm, and had achieved no definitive solutions. T h e D C nourished to spontaneous sympathy for blocs, which were extraneous as much to its traditional ideals as to the concepts underlying its international policy. Faced with the failure of single-pole expectations and the rapid fading of more recent pluripolar suggestions, 17 the tendency toward the establishment of blocs and the institution of a bipolar system was overwhelmingly strong. T o oppose this on the basis of principle would not have been a sign of great political astuteness on the part of those whose immediate objective was that of accumulating the maximum political strength necessary to win or to keep power. T o adapt to these processes, to consider them inevitable was more useful than to oppose them. And moreover, if the policy of blocs was not the ideal and did not perfectly conform to the hopes originally nourished by the D C for the destiny of Europe as

14

15

16

17

Cf., for example, Ί nodi al pettine', in: Kinascita, 4, 1946; and P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, p. 246; and Avanti!, 17 Aug. 1946 and 25 Aug. 1946. Cf. P. Togliatti, 'La nostra lotta per la democrazia', loc. cit., and S. Galante, La fine di un compromesso storico; F. Taddei, 11 socialismo italiano del dopoguerra, p. 374. For the citation cf. Avanti!, 17 Oct. 1946; and more generally, on the Socialist perception of the power conflict, P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, pp. 3 2 6 - 3 2 7 , and passim. Cf. 11 Popolo, 21 Jan. 1945 and 24Jan. 1945.

Italy's Mass Political Parties

191

a whole, it was sufficiently adequate at least as far as the Italian situation was concerned. Accepting the bloc policy meant submitting, at least temporarily, to Soviet domination of the Catholic nations of central Europe; but it also meant having a safe base from which to play, with excellent chances of victory, the game in Italy. The DC was lucidly, realistically cognizant of the possibilities offered it within the context of the bipolar tendency and the power demands that it expressed and, at the same time, unleashed. One thing was certain; in a bipolar system there would be no room for international compromises and acquiescence of the type often denounced in the past by the DC. For the Anglo-American " b l o c " it would be impossible to give up the positions of power it already held or to allow countries currently outside of the Soviet " b l o c " to enter it. This was especially true for a country such as Italy, located in a highly important strategic position, on the geopolitical borderline with the opposing bloc. The internal implications of these basic facts were obvious. It was impossible for the AngloAmericans to favor in any way profound political, social and economic transformations which, by strengthening the Communist party, would have heightened the risk of Italy's passing to the Soviet bloc. Vice versa, it was predictable that they would have given increasing support to forces which, like the Christian Democrats, shared their political and strategic objectives. The ultimate consequence of all this was to be, obviously, a growing interference by the great Western powers in Italian internal concerns and more or less significant limitation of the country's sovereignty and independence. This consequence was important but not decisive for the DC which, presumably, considered inevitable a certain limitation of sovereignty (it had stated as much a number of times, although in different contexts) and proposed to negotiate its levels, well aware that the Party would benefit by the exchange. The first signal of the Christian Democrat leaders' willingness to accept the policy of blocs was given in July 1945, by Alcide De Gasperi 18 and by Guido Gonella 1 '. The position held by the center-line group of the D C was as follows: on the basis of Italy's adherence to the "political-moral bloc" of the West, the Christian Democrat party was asking the Anglo-Americans to support it on the national level in its struggle against the forces of the Left and on the international level in its effort to win maximum prestige as defender of national interests threatened mainly (but not exclusively) by the claims of the Eastern bloc. This request was also a proposal which implicitly assumed hypothetical and conditional forms, i.e., it expected to receive concrete answers that measured the feasibility of the political hypothesis to the point of allowing it to transform itself

18

Cf. De Gasperi, 'Le basi dello stato democratico e la battaglia di domani', in: Idem, politici,

"

pp. 3 7 - 5 0 .

Cf. 11 Popolo,

4July 1945.

Discorsi

192

Severino Galante

definitively into strategy. The process of welding the national interests of the D C and the strategic interests of the United States (from December of 1945, after De Gasperi became Prime Minister, the USA was to become the main external counselor of the D C even officially, 20 with Great Britain increasingly excluded) was an arduous process in view of the need to overcome, elude or ingest numerous national and international obstacles. The process was tenaciously developed, however, following a pragmatic criterion of strictly De Gasperian inspiration which also had the aim of leading increasingly broad sectors of the DC to gradual inurement of the bloc policy. Moreover the process - which encountered the constant but ineffective opposition of the Christian Democratic left wing 21 was long characterized by a predominantly political-ideological interpretation of the blocs, and by the attempt to limit Italy's involvement in the clash of power between the United States and Soviet Union. 22 This attempt, which showed some residual manifestation even on the occasion of De Gasperi's visit to the USA in January 1947, 23 ended however in the Spring of that year when numerous national and international stress points convinced De Gasperi that the moment for breaking with the Left 24 must be hastened. The two choices — that of accelerating internal rupture and that of waiving any reservations in regard to the bloc policy - were closely interwoven, to the point of being fused together. T h e Christian Democrat leaders were fully convinced that in order to maintain power it was essential to weld a new political-

20

See De Gasperi's message to Truman dated 1 6 D e c . 1945 and the telegram of reply from the President of the United States, immediately communicated by the Christian Democratic leader to the Consulta (Discorsi parlametitari

di Alcide De Gasperi,

published by decision of the House of

Representatives, R o m e 1973, 3 vols, vol. I, p. 71); and cf. also D. Ellwood, L'alleato politica

dell'occupazione

anglo-americana

Margiocco, Stati Uniti e PCI 1943-1980, 21

in Italia 1943-1946,

nemico.

La

Milan 1977, pp. 1 9 0 - 1 9 1 ; M .

Rome-Bari 1981, pp. 4 2 - 4 4 .

For a more detailed discussion of this question, see S. Galante, 'La scelta americana della D C ' , op. cit.; and cf. also F. Boiardi, Dossetti e la crisi dei cattolici italiani, Florence 1956, pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 9 ; G. Di Capua, 'Le avanguardie democratiche cattoliche e la politica estera', in: IAI, La politica della Rupubblica Patto atlantico,

R o m e 1971; L. Gui, Ί democratici cristiani e le scelte nodali della politica estera

italiana', in: AA.VV., Italia e Stati Uniti durante pp. 1 6 9 - 1 8 7 ; R Pombeni, II gruppo (1938-1948), 22

dossettiano

I'amministrazione

e la fondazione

Truman,

Milan 1976,

della Democrazia

cristiana

Bologna 1979, pp. 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 , 3 6 2 - 3 6 3 , 3 7 6 - 3 7 8 .

Cf. for example 11 Popolo, 2 0 Jan. 1946 and 2 0 M a r c h 1946; and cf. also 'Pace ο 'Appeasement'?', in: Politica estera,

23

estera

Italiana, Milan 1 9 6 7 , 3 vols, vol. Ill, pp. 1 0 3 3 - 1 0 5 5 ; Idem, Come I'ltalia aderi al

n o i l , 1 7 M a r c h 1946, p p . 2 6 4 - 2 6 5 .

I a m referring to De Gasperi's public speeches (for example, that of Cleveland: A. De Gasperi, II ritorno

alia pace, R o m e 1977, pp. 2 0 1 - 2 1 1 ) in which, as is known, the Christian Democratic

leader did not repeat the same things he was saying to the United States authorities in private conversations: cf., for example, Foreign

Relations

of the United States, 1947, III, Washington

1972, pp. 8 3 8 - 8 3 9 ; and also, S. Galante, 'La scelta americana della D C ' , op. cit., specifically pp. 1 2 0 - 1 2 5 . 24

Cf. S. Galante, La fine di un compromesso

storico.

Italy's Mass Political Parties

193

social bloc guaranteed on the international level by the United States as a power which manifested its undeniable intention to maintain hegemony over Western Europe and its will to oppose the Soviet Union globally. T h e Christian Democrats intended however to prepare this bloc gradually and to arrive at rupture with the Left only after having won the necessary electoral and political guarantees. T o accelerate the time-table would mean dealing with a rupture while still to a certain degree unprepared, and was therefore highly risky. At this point it became more than ever necessary to seek from the outside the strength which the D C did not believe it possessed internally. But, as Ambassador Tarchiani insistently explained, 2 5 the United States was willing to give its support only to those who were ready to marshall themselves within its bloc, accepting as a whole the " l a w s " of power politics which the dominat state intended to apply to each individual member o f its array of nations. National choice must therefore necessarily be accompanied by an international one. Having wagered on internal rupture, the D C intended to win its bet at all costs. During the course of the year from April 1947 to the political elections o f April 1948, the leaders of the D C committed all their energy to the goal o f winning that bet. This period was marked above all by the efforts to utilize profitably on the national level the political investment made in choosing the " b l o c " . T h e search for economic, financial, military, propaganda counterparts requested of the USA for the purpose of national consolidation of Christian Democratic power and electoral sanction of internal rupture with the Left was conducted very intensively. But for these requests to be even partially satisfied, they had to be within the realm of the power politics of the United States, to contribute to the building of the Western bloc. Thus all the choices made by the D C in the international field (emergency ratification of the peace treaty, assent to the Marshall Plan, etc.) were in this direction. 2 6 Similarly, any request for support was presented as mutually desirable, as a manifestation o f the matching interests of the United States and the Christian Democrat domestic policy. T h e guiding line of this policy was that of capitalizing to the maximum on Christian Democratic "yielding" over the question of national autonomy and non-involvement in power politics. T h e Christian Democrat leaders wished to transform this yielding into a point of strength for the party and for De Gasperi. In totally accepting the power set-up laid out by the United States, and thus renouncing any attempt to find a space for international action outside of this scheme (or even for autonomous action within it), the leaders of the D C aimed to exploit their unconditional acceptance of this renunciation as a lever to obtain

25 26

Cf. A. Tarchiani, Died anni tra Roma e Washington, Milan 1955. In regard to these aspects cf., for example, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, 'Verbali del Consiglio dei Ministri', meeting of 17July 1947, b. 13/IV; meeting of 16Dec. 1947, b. 14/XVIII; and also, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, Washington 1974, pp. 7 3 6 - 7 3 7 .

194

Severino Galante

political support and material aid, with the motivation, implicit or explicit, that these served not only to strengthen the position of the party but also to perfect the Western bloc. In other words, De Gasperi and his group within the D C attempted to transform Italy into an essential, irreplaceable tessera in the mosaic of United States power, enmeshing it gradually but irreversibly through now familiar, well-tested pragmatic tactics. 2 7 T h e responses of the Communist and Socialist parties to the strategic and tactics of the D C were initially clumsy, uncertain and slow. T h e Spring of 1947, first with the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine, then with their expulsion from the government, forced the two parties to cling to the more or less convinced idealization of the alliance which had up to that moment shaped, protected and misled their analyses and their political perspectives. T h e continuance of the war-time alliance between the Western powers and the U. S. S. R . showed itself to be ficticious. T h e internal "small alliance", supported and defended at the cost of so many renunciations and compromises, often made in vain, yielded under the united pressure of outer and inner forces. O f the former as well as the latter crisis the D C appeared as either beneficiary or protagonist. All this imposed on the parties a thorough re-examination, no longer postponable, of their policies. For the PCI this re-examination was especially painful and laborious. As regards international aspects, the process was protracted for approximately six months as, between doubts and hesitations, the attempt was made to define some stable coordinate allowing the construction of a new interpretative scheme able to explain what was happening and to salvage as much as possible of the political line followed up to now. T h e undertaking was desperate and the outcome practically certain. T h e leaders of the PC proceeded on the basis of three relatively firmlyestablished points: the anti-Soviet aggression of the United States and its growing interference in the internal affairs of the nations of Western Europe; the 'historical' request of the Communists to keep Italy outside of the scheme of power and opposed blocs; the refusal to accept the antagonism between the former partners in the Great Alliance as definitive and irreversible. 28 Within a few weeks' time, two events - the emergency ratification of the peace treaty demanded and obtained by the Christian Democrats, and the Paris rupture

27

S. Galante, 'La scelta americana della D C ' , op. cit., E. Collotti, 'Collocazione internazionale dell'Italia dall'armistizio alle premesse dell'alleanza atlantica ( 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 7 ) ' , in: Istituto Nazionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia, L'ltalia dalla liberazione

alia

repubblica,

Milan 1977, pp. 2 7 - 1 1 8 ; but cf. also, of different opinion, P. Pastorelli, 'L'entrata in vigore del trattato di pace e il problema della sicurezza', in: AA. VV., Democrazia

cristiana e

Costituente,

vol. Ill, pp. 1 1 3 7 - 1 1 5 5 . 28

Cf. P. Togliatti, 'Per una politica estera di indipendenza e di pace', in: Idem, Discorsi alia Costituente, L'Unitä,

R o m e 1958, pp. 2 1 5 - 2 5 1 ; Ί1 'piano' Marshall', in: Rinascita, 6, 1947, pp. 1 3 7 - 1 3 9 ; 27 July 1947.

Italy's Mass Political Parties

195

between the Anglo-French and the Soviets on the Marshall-Plan - showed the Communists that the situation was irremediably worsening as far as the first two points were concerned. As for the third, hopes remained hanging on the fragile thread represented by the fact that the Soviet Union had not yet officially accepted the crisis of the Great Alliance and that it continued to proclaim itself willing to collaborate with the Western powers. That thread was cut in September of 1947. With the establishment of the Cominform, the cooperative model of international relations was abandoned, and with it fell the Togliatti concept of the "Italian way to Socialism", which was placed in hibernation to await a more favorable international climate. At the Polish conference, Zhdanov illustrated the new model on which the Soviet Union was to act. 29 The U. S. S. R. replied to the power challenge which had been thrown before it by accepting it (for the moment on a predominantly regional scale; the very composition of the Cominform is a demonstration) and inserting it conceptually into a typical model of relations of polarity between closed international aggregations. But the Cominform's analysis 30 went beyond the concept of "pole", by maintaining that around the two " c a m p s " had formed, one directed by the United States, the other by the Soviet Union. This meant that the two opposing poles were not limited to the building of relations between States, but penetrated much more deeply into political and ideological reality, involving parties, movements, cultures, ideal values, and molding them in their own images, subordinating them to the strategic objectives of the chief " p o l e " in the "camp". Total acceptance of these strategic objectives was the element that distinguished and qualified the identity of each collective subject in every part of the world. For the leaders of the PCI, acceptance of these objectives meant assuming the commitment to oppose in Italy — i.e., within the bloc which was forming around the American "pole" - the power challenge launched by the USA to the U.S.S.R. on a worldwide scale. As a consequence, the international position of the PCI tended to become that of outpost of the "Socialist c a m p " in enemy territory - exactly what the Communist leaders had tenaciously tried to avoid since 1943. This was, moreover, a position that in the Autumn of 1947 was very difficult (but probably not impossible) to avoid. With the institution of the bloc policy in fact, the problem originally facing the PCI (how could transition

" Cf. the report by A. Zhdanov in: VII Congresso del Partitio comunista italiano, Risoluzioni e documenti dell'Ufficto d'lnformazione dei Partiti comunisti e operai 1947-1951, Rome 1951, pp. 183-206; cf. also E. Reale, Nascita del Cominform, Milan 1958; A. Guerra, Gli anni del Cominform, Milan 1977; F. Claudin, La crisi del movimento comunista. Dal Comintern al Cominform, Milan 1974; L. Marcou, 11 Cominform. 11 comunismo della guerra fredda, Rome 1979. 30 Cf. 'Risoluzione comune approvata alia Conferenza di informazione di alcuni partiti comunisti', in: La politica dei comunisti dal quinto al sesto Congresso, decisions and documents edited by the Ufficio di Segreteria del PCI, Rome, without date (but in 1947), pp. 297-305.

196

Severino Galante

to Socialism be achieved in a country located within the Anglo-American zone of occupation?) was drastically modified. T h e question was now the following: how was it possible to keep open the hypothesis of transition to socialism in a rigidly bipolar international situation where Italy was placed within the Western bloc, bound to it economically, politically and militarily? T h e reply made by the Communist leaders, in the most bitter years of the Cold War, was the least risky (but not for this the easiest one): to survive as a party and as a leading group, avoiding a reactionary degeneration of the democratic State and combatting resolutely the integration of Italy into the Western bloc. O n this occasion too the international aspects of the issue were indissolubly interwoven with the national ones, and above all with the "existential" interests of the PCI. Total alignment with the Soviet Union was dictated not only by the authentic conviction that the "land of socialism" was subjected to a new, mortal threat of imperialism, but was also based on another order of motives. Any lack of alignment with the State and the party which were still the acknowledged guides of the international Communist movement would have been interpreted by all - starting from the very base of the party - as betrayal and passing to the side of the enemy. Its consequences would have been not only "excommunicat i o n " but also the political suicide of the leading group, the splitting of the party and its presumable reduction to the rank of small, insignificant sect. Obviously, these would be catastrophic results for the creators o f the " n e w party", of the largest Communist party in the capitalist world. T h e hypothesis of nonalignment (given that any member of the Communist top level ever even thought of such a thing) was therefore not feasible for the PCI of that period, when not even the most daring Communist imagination had yet conceived of a "third w a y " . T h e party was thus subjected to the choices of others, and chose for itself survival as party, as organization, as organizational basis for the future possibility of making policy positively and creatively. Alignment with the U . S . S . R . , in fact, meant almost total renunciation of making policy in the active, fruitful sense of the term. It meant, first and foremost, incorporating all the analyses, arguments, choices, objectives and directives established by the Soviets in the international field; i. e., delegating to others the formulation of one's own line of international policy, losing any strategical autonomy in this field, keeping only, in the best of hypotheses, a minimum of tactical freedom in the stage of application. It is easy to guess what nefarious consequences this was to have on the international aspects of the "Italian way to socialism", which was drained of an essential, irreplaceable component. And it is just as easy to understand that the Italian Communist leaders were not enthusiastic about the choice imposed on them, and that they tried to postpone or elude it. And in fact, in spite of the peremptory nature of the Cominform's directives, they attempted for several months to maintain a balanced position, suggested in part by the fact that the campaign for the general political elections

Italy's Mass Political Parties

197

was by now substantially initiated, but also and above all by the need to shield from the hammer blows of the Cold War a prospect in which they firmly believed and which they considered still feasible, on condition that the electoral response favored the Popular Front. Starting from these hopes, the leading group of the PCI interpreted in its own manner the analyses and directives of the Cominform, attempting to reconcile them with the surviving informal residue of previous positions which in part contradicted them. If not the Marshall Plan, at least American aid was welcome as long as it did not imply political counterparts. American imperialism was preparing war but Italy had to participate in the "peace f r o n t " without abandoning the policy of friendship for the United States (which led the " w a r front"). 3 1 In regard to these propositions, anything may be said except that they fully respected formal logic. Within the political logic of the hopes described above, however, they assumed a meaning, albeit dubious from the point of view of realistic recognition of the power factors that now dominated international relations, embuing each individual national reality: that recognition of what the Cominform, in spite of everything, had achieved and which the PCI was not yet willing to accept completely. In spite of the great dialectical ability shown by Togliatti during the sixth Congress of the PCI (January 1948),32 the attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable was destined to rapid failure. First the growing bitterness of the electoral campaign; then the signing of the Brussels Pact which confirmed the Communist thesis that the process of formation of the Western bloc was now proceeding by forced stages toward extreme political and military results, in preparation for aggression against the U.S.S.R; lastly, the smashing defeat of April 18, 1948. These events convinced the leaders of the PCI that "Fascism and war" 3 3 were impending on Italy, with the consequence of impairing irremediably the already precarious and "tenditious" equilibrium which they had attempted, since the Spring of 1948, to maintain in regard to the "great democratic powers". From that moment on, public alignment (private attitudes were perhaps different, but the sources available today contain only brief hints about this) with the Soviet Union was total and devoid of the slightest deviation. The position held by the Socialist leaders underwent an evolution similar to that of the Communists. Some differences however, should be mentioned, even 31

32

33

Cf. the resolution of the Central Committee 'Per un vasto fronte della pace, del lavoro e dell'indipendenza nazionale', ibid., pp. 313-320. Note that the resolution did not yet contain the Cominform concept of " c a m p " but rather the more flexible one of " f r o n t " . Cf. P. Togliatti, Tre minacce alia democrazia italiana, report to the VI National Congress of the PCI, Rome 1948. Cf. 'Fascismo e guerra', in: Rinascita, 3, 1948, pp. 8 9 - 9 1 ; and 'All'avanguardia delle lotte del popolo per la pace, il lavoro e la liberta', in: VII Congresso del Partito comunista italiano, Documenti politici del Comitato centrale, della Direzione e della Segreteria, Rome 1951, pp. 3 1 - 3 5 .

198

Severino Galante

though these remained at the level of simple statements and had not the slightest effect on the party's concrete line of policy. The Socialist leaders interpreted the Truman Doctrine as an unexpected sleight-of-hand trick which overthrew "all criteria of international order, both old and new". 3 4 In other words, the PSI suddenly perceived that neither the multipolar cooperative scheme of international relations nor the bipolar cooperative one were any longer credible or feasible. And it was still quite unclear what alternative scheme the President of the United States proposed to construct by unleashing against the U. S. S. R. a power conflict so bitter and so loaded with ideological components. What stable, lasting international relations were possible apart from the "co-existence of the two American und Russian colossi" 35 , i.e., apart from a solution of compromise between their vital interests? To this question the Socialist leaders were unable to reply for many months, during which they lived, in the same manner as the PCI, under the sign of uncertainty and the anxious expectation that new international events would avert the risk of a definitive split. In any case, the preceding stage of Socialist political development had bequeathed the current one some fragmentary answers - substantially matching those of the PCI — the most consistent of which regarded the objective of keeping Italy outside the conflict for world supremacy unleashed between the USA and the U. S. S. R., following a line of autonomy and independence in regard to both contenders. The growing pressure exerted by the contenders, who demanded total alignment of the States and of their political forces with the positions on the two extreme ends of the nascent bipolar system, generated however the awareness that a policy of autonomy and national independence pursued by the individual minor powers would have very restricted margins. 36 And the perception of this truth suggested to the Socialist leaders a hope which was at the same time an embryonic political hypothesis: the hope that Labourite Great Britain - the only European state attributed by the Socialist leaders with a reserve of power great enough to permit it to react efficaciously to the tendency toward the formulation of blocs - would make itself promoter of a "third force" initiative capable of saving it and the other minor European States from the destiny of subjugation to the clash between the two Great Powers. 37

34 35 34 37

Cf. Auanti!, 25 March 1947. Ibid. Cf. P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, p. 353. Cf. Avanti!, 25 May 1947,24 June 1947 and 27 June 1947. The hopes of the Socialist leaders were presumably fanned by the English Labour Party, which did not hesitate to cultivate even the anxious yearnings for power of Italian members of the government, as for example the Minister for Foreign Affairs Carlo Sforza: cf. Archivio Centrale dello Stato, 'Verbali del Consiglio dei Ministri', meeting of 17 July 1947.

199

Italy's Mass Political Parties

This hope seemed to take concrete form with the Anglo-French invitation to the U. S. S. R. to participate in the tripartite Paris conference on the Marshall Plan. The outcome of the conference, given the hopes placed in it, was for the Socialist leaders "the worst delusion since the end of the war". In spite of this, the final judgement of the PSI on the Marshall Plan remained suspended. Did it exceed or did it concretize the Truman doctrine? 38 For the Communists, doubts on this subject had been short-lived. They had soon opted for the second alternative, and therefore assigned no credit to a European hypothesis constructed around the Marshall Plan, judging it from the beginning to be one of the manifestations of anti-Soviet power politics.3® A part of the Socialist leading group (within which, as is well-known, existed heated debate as to positions) returned several times, during the Summer of 1947, to the issue of European cooperation, touching on it at several different points and alluding to its possible role in reconciling East and West. 40 The European theme was however soon to be abandoned. With the creation of the Cominform and the constitution of the Popular Democratic Front in Italy, the positions taken by the PSI increasingly approached those of the PCI. While well aware of the mortal risks involved in being either "one hundred per cent for the East or for the West", 4 1 the Socialist leaders officially aligned themselves with the "international front for the struggle against the war party" 4 2 , i.e., they arrayed themselves as the Communists had done, and with the same consequences, in the " c a m p " guided by the Soviet Union. If the party thus arrayed itself, the State had to remain neutral. On the basis of this assumption the PSI launched a campaign for "constitutionally organized and internationally notified neutrality" 43 . This was an airy construction hanging on the elegant but artificial distinction between the Italian position and the Socialist position, which failed to take into account either the massive reality of the Communist party - which, given its clear choice of " c a m p " , was not following the PSI at all on the issue of neutrality 44 — or the profound impression

38

Cf. P. Nenni, II cappio

39

Cf. Ί1 'piano' Marshall', loc. cit.

40

Cf. for example Avanti!,

41

Cf. P. Nenni, Tempo

42

Cf. Avanti!,

43

Milan 1949, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 0 7 .

12 July 1947 and 27July 1947.

di guerra

fredda,

p. 353.

18 Oct. 1947.

Cf. Avanti!, 26 Oct. 1947. F o r an inside opinion, but much later, on the neutrality proposal, cf. F. De Martino, Un'epoca

44

delle alleanze,

del socialismo,

Florence 1983, p. 135.

T h e thesis of the Communists - repeated several times by P. Togliatti: cf., for all, the parliamentary speech on the 'Nenni motion': l'Unitä, 3 D e c . 1948 - was in fact that the pure and simple request for neutrality did not correspond to the existing international situation; it would have been valid only if a w a r had actually broken out; but before this happened, to sustain such a request would have misleading political and psychological effects, leading to the conviction that a new worldwide conflict was inevitable, when instead the 'forces of peace' still had the possibility of preventing it.

200

Severino Galante

produced by the establishment of the Cominform on other Italian political forces, now more than ever convinced that Socialist-Communist action was under the absolute domination of the PCI. T h e issue was clearly stated by some Socialist leaders such as Riccardo Lombardi, who asked that the PSI not participate in the declaration of the Cominform. 4 5 Such a position, was however, decidedly minor and ineffective. As has already been noted by others, the internal choice of frontism - the choice between restoration and renovation - coincided in the end with a choice in the international field which led the Socialist Party also to accept the Soviet Union as guide in the worldwide revolutionary movement; 4 6 thus defense of the U. S. S. R . became the self-defense o f those participating in such a movement. By the Spring of 1948, the divergence of the major Italian political forces along the watershed of the international power conflict, and in relation to the internal power conflict, was now a permanent, consolidated fact. Starting from this fact, the outcome of the April 18th elections established the bases for the subsequent stage during which both factions, after having firmly occupied their own trenches, had to equip them politically and organizationally to render them invulnerable and to draw from them the maximum advantages possible. T h e problems remained, on the whole, those of always but the "definitive" character of the electoral results now placed them in a different framework. Prior to the overwhelming victory of April 18th, the international choices made by the Christian Democratic party had been almost totally dictated by national interests. This is true even in consideration of the fact that there had been a problem of external " s a f e t y " linked to a perception of the Soviet threat to the Catholic forces of Eastern Europe. 4 7 But this was obviously an ideological and political threat essentially, not involving the risk of another war. After the stabilization of internal power brought about by the elections, however, typically international concerns returned to the forefront. Italy's international status, degree of sovereignty, of independence, of autonomy became again elements of major importance at the conclusion of the emergency period. T o count in some way on the international level, not to be totally set aside, if not to decide at least to participate, to be present in the places where, directly or indirectly, decisions would be taken that would influence the destiny of Italy as

45

Cf. Avanti!,

22 Oct. 1947.

*6 T h e observation was made by G. Arfe; cf. the discussion on 'Nenni e il socialismo italiano', in: Mondo

Operaio,

2, 1977; and cf. also M . Punzo, Dalla Liberazione

a Palazzo Barberini,

Milan

1973, p. 142. 47

I refer above all, if not exclusively, to the Polish case: cf., among many examples, ll Popolo, 6 Oct. 1944, 2 0 O c t . 1944, 2 N o v . 1944, 1 7 D e c . 1944, 12Feb. 1945, 2 6 J u n e 1945, 11 N o v . 1945, 7April 1946, 10 April 1946. On the ideological and political background of the Christian Democratic perception, see E. Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti 1939-1952. Milan 1978.

Dalle carte di Myron

C.

Taylor,

201

Italy's Mass Political Parties

well as the interests of its managerial classes - these needs were again strongly felt. It was a question of hewing out one's own space within the current power conflict, of demanding defense, both externally and internally, by demonstrating one's utility in the global strategy of the United States and then integrating oneself into the political-military scheme that that country was constructing. This also meant equipping oneself, with the aid of the USA, to play an active role in a hypothetical armed conflict, and thus to participate fully in all aspects of the power politics of the Western bloc: from reconstruction of the armed forces to increased military spending, to participation in an integrated defense system, to an embargo of strategical goods, etc. 48 - On the other hand, the presence of strong political and social opposition, as well as the existence of profound fissures in the majority and in the DC itself, hinted at the risk that the newly conquered power could be menaced or destroyed or, in any case, that its strength might be questioned. All of these factors suggested the feasibility of maintaining and even consolidating the choice of alignment with the United States, in the conviction that only by taking its place within a precise, rigid international hierarchy would it be possible for the Christian Democrat party to satisfy its basic needs and those of the class and nation which it represented. This place was not yet assured, however, as documented by the numerous international and national points of resistance encountered during the process of Italy's accession to the Atlantic Pact as brought about by the De Gasperian group in the DC. This group had to engage all its energies to achieve a result which it considered to be the definite national and international sanction for dispossession of the Communists and substantial monopolization of power by the Christian Democrats. 49 With this aim, the chief task set itself by the De Gasperian majority after the April 18th elections was that of defining in operational and institutional terms the international choice of April 1947; of completing, that is, in both the diplomatic and the military contexts, the organization of the option in favor of the opposing blocs expressed in the preceding year. Negotiations for the Atlantic Pact offered the De Gasperian group a unique chance to achieve the desired results rapidly. And also in this last stage - which might be termed " f o r m a l " - of Italy's long march toward incorporation into the Western power system, the chief motive behind the free decision of De Gasperi and his men was, as always, internal. For them, the "Bolshevik peril" did not take the form of armed Soviet aggression (in which De Gasperi himself did not believe) but that of the "fifth

48

Cf. the testimony of A. Tarchiani, Died anni tra Roma e Washington, pp. 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 ; C. Sforza, Cinque anni a Palazzo Cbigi. La politico estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951, Rome 1952, pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ; I. Giordani, Alcide De Gasperi, Milan 1955, pp. 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 .

49

Cf. the conclusions reached by G. Di Capua, Come I'ltalia aderi al Patto

atlantico.

202

Severino Galante

c o l u m n s " 5 0 of Churchillian memory; i.e., in the form of internal social and political opposition against which the Pact was to serve mainly as deterrent. O n the other hand, as has been subsequently stated by a well-informed source, the Italian leaders " l o o k e d toward the alliance not for its real capacity of defense [ . . . ] but in relation to Italy's return to the international political scene and they therefore instrumentalized an important foreign policy choice to a design of nationalist mark and internal prestige". 5 1 It may therefore be concluded that accession to the Atlantic Pact - formalizing Italy's entry into a system of interoccidental and international relations very far from the one originally hoped for and idealized by the D C - was the climax to a long journey in which the De Gasperian leaders of the party had tenaciously pursued the objectives of first dissolving "forced cohabitation" with the Left, then rendering definitive their dismissal from the Italian political system. From April of 1949, the Atlantic choice would be the altar on which all the majorities hinging on the Christian Democrats would swear allegiance, and the cement that would bind them together. Thanks to that cement, the political edifice established with the rupture of April 1947 would be perpetuated in time and with it would also be perpetuated the secondary role which the Atlantic choice - as it was motivated and fashioned - had assigned to Italy. T o the realization of the latter result - the impotence of Italy and its chief political forces within the international system - contributed also the parties of the Left. Although their contribution was unquestionably supplementary, involuntary and of very different magnitude from that of the D C , it was still significant. If in fact the D C favored Italy's substantial external powerlessness to the advantage of its own internal power, the PCI and the PSI in their turn dissipated their own internal power - i.e., the efficacy of their own intervention in the political choices, not only international ones, of Italy - by bowing to the demands o f an external power and allowing themselves to be locked into the ghetto of the "Socialist c a m p " . T h e enormous effort to mobilize the defense of democracy and peace exerted by the Communists and Socialists in the late 1940s and early 1950s, especially in coincidence with the Korean War, should never be underestimated. It must however be acknowledged that this effort was (and was perceived as such by those to whom it was addressed and for whom it was consequently much less effective) totally pledged to one of the conflicting " c a m p s " and was never able to appear as part of an alternative to their dispute. As for the Soviet Union (a great regional power in cold war with the maximum world power), so for the Italian Left which during those years followed it and imitated it, defensive and self-

50

Cf. ibid., p. 7 2 ; and for confirmation: Archivio Centrale dello Stato, 'Verbali del Consiglio dei Ministri', meeting of 15 July 1948, b. 1 7 / X .

51

Cf. G. Di Capua, Come

I'ltalia aderi al Patto atlantico,

p. 51.

Italy's Mass Political Parties

203

defensive demands prevailed. This meant barricading oneself within the ranks of one's own " c a m p " , - even if as far as possible at its margins - spreading its dogmas in the land of mission into which Italy and Western Europe had been transformed, seeking in the political faith of the militant the means to struggle and resist. For this scope, political and ideal creativity was unnecessary. Since the basic problem was not that of progressing but that of avoiding being pushed backwards, it was essential to possess a system of certainties within which any event could be pidgeonholed by reducing it to simple, elementary interpretive models that could be applied by any militant. Thanks to this scheme, the Left could resist and survive in spite of the asphyxiation of its development and its increasingly repetitive policy, organically incapable of understanding the complexity of real processes and thus of influencing them positively. This incapacity was especially obvious starting from mid-1948, with the initiation of Atlantic Pact negotiations. The Pact found its perfect place and an already prepared explanation within the now familiar schemes which foresaw, not without reason, a development on the military terrain of the initiatives originating from the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. 52 It also confirmed the thesis, formulated by the forces of the Left on the morrow of April 18th, that the Italian political conflict was " a stage of the Cold War" which was being fought in Europe. 53 Substantially, what seemed to be happening was what Togliatti had tried to avoid since the Salerno turning point. 54 Instead of a "democratic and progressive" Italy, around the cornerstone of acceptance of the USA power policy, a new conservative political edifice was beiflg built; this structure presented a major risk of antidemocratic involution. Once again, it was that keystone which the Left must crumble to bring down the edifice, and this appeared to be possible by rejecting any treaty, commitment, peace which would link Italy to the "imperialistic policy of the United States". 5 5 From mid-1948 to the mid-1950s, the PCI utilized its energy mainly in this direction. And the PSI did the same, after the interesting but short-lived and confused hiatus of the centristic leadership (June 1 9 4 8 - M a y 1949), which attempted to elude the logic

54

Cf. P. Togliatti, 'Federalismo europeo?', in: Rinascita, 11,1948, pp. 3 7 7 - 3 8 0 (and also in I'Unita, 28 Nov. 1948); G. De Rosa, 'Primo bilancio della guerra fredda', in: Rinascita, 2,1949, pp. 6 1 - 6 3 ; 'Italia atlantica', ibid., 3, 1949, pp. 9 7 - 1 0 0 ; M. Scoccimarro, 'Un patto di guerra', ibid., 4, 1949, pp. 145-149. Cf. II Partito socialista italiano nei suoi congressi, vol. V, p. 229. "We ask that the democratic and progessive Italy of tomorrow renounce forever any policy of conquest, any adventure and any imperialist intrigue. This, in fact, was the keystone of Fascism, the primary origin of all our ills. Italy must pursue a policy of peace with all peoples, a policy of collaboration with the great democratic nations; and first and foremost with the great Soviet Union; which is the bulwark of democracy and peace for the entire world" (P. Togliatti, 'La politica di unita nazionale dei comunisti', op. cit., p. 36).

55

Cf. 'All'avanguardia delle lotte del popolo per la pace, il lavoro e la liberta', op. cit.

5Z

53

204

Severino Galante

of internal and international frontal opposition, but was first assailed by the left wing of the party (which controlled the parliamentary groups and thus managed to influence decisively parliamentary debate and battle against the Atlantic Pact) and was then overthrown. 5 6 As a result, the PSI finally rejected any autonomous development of the issue from the PCI, and the two parties found themselves marching perfectly in step against the Atlantic choice and against the economic and social policy of the April 18th majority; two objectives which, in reality, were two sides of the same coin, both dedicated to defeating a single policy - that of the Christian Democrats — in its national and international expressions, the latter being the instrument utilized to consolidate the former. N o w the fundamental option - the only real option - open to the foreign policy of the D C and its leaders was, by the end of the 1940s, the Atlantic one. But alongside the Atlantic option, a significant place was also given to discussions of European Unity. Parallel to the Atlantic issue, but above all subsequent to its conclusion, the European theme was increasingly echoed by the Christian Democrat leaders. T h e Europeanism that prevailed in internal discussion was a singular one, having little in common with the federalistic ideals of those who aimed at healing the ancient conflicts which from time immemorial had riven the Old Continent. It was a question, more than anything else, of a European "temptation" 5 7 in which converged differing and at times conflicting demands - from that of consolidating the bonds of Atlantism to that of loosening them. T h e connections between this type of Europeanism and Atlantism were therefore too tangled and intermingled to be easily distinguished. And yet, such distinguishing would have been useful. Although it was true - as believed by the Italian Left that the elements of economic integration present in the E R P and in the O E E C had opened the way to the political and military integration of the "Western w o r l d " , it was also true that the European dimension was not necessarily limited to the Atlantic context. Atlantism, which was a straitjacket for Europeanism, could also become, indirectly, a moving force. T h e Euro-Atlantic choice made by the moderate political forces and governments was not a simple outgrowth of their American choice. At least potentially, the former framework provided margins of flexibility and freedom which

"

Cf. D. Ardia, II Partito socialista e il Patto atlantico,

57

Cf. G. Di Capua, Come Processo

α De Gasperi,

Milan 1976.

I'ltalia aderi al Patto atlantico,

passim.; Idem, Ί1 degasperismo', in:

R o m e 1976, pp. 6 7 - 7 0 ; P.E. Taviani, 'De Gasperi per il nuovo ordine

internazionale', ibid., pp. 8 8 4 - 8 9 5 ; M . R . De Gasperi (ed.), De Gasperi e I'Europa, speeches, Brescia 1976; G. Petrilli, La politica estera ed europea

writings and

di De Gasperi, R o m e 1975. On the

ideological inspiration of De Gasperi's 'carolingian' Europeanism, cf. Atti e discorsi di Pio XII, v o l . X , 1947, R o m e 1952, passim, and in particular p. 2 9 5 and p. 489. On the matrixes and significance of the Mediavalist aspects present in early Christian Democrat Europeanism (cf. for example II Popolo,

20 July 1947), see A. Nesti, 'Questione cattolica e fascismo. Element! per uno

schema interpretativo', in: AA.VV., Religione

e politica,

R o m e 1976.

Italy's Mass Political Parties

205

the latter did not possess. To a relationship of clear subordination to the United States was now preferred a different hypothesis, a collective one, of interdependency between subjects officially equal, although the obvious disparity of power between the nations themselves clearly revealed that the interdependency was asymmetrical, that the weaker nations depended in fact on the stronger ones. But it was expressly this fact that would, sooner or later, have placed before the moderate parties and governments (at least those who were unwilling to permanently subordinate their national interests to those of the USA, and did not intend to forego indefinitely playing an autonomous, active international role) the problem of how to deal with a dominance which they perhaps considered it inevitable to accept for a certain period in order to safeguard clearly-defined positions of class and policy, but which in the long run would become suffocating. The solutions to this problem were innumerable, both individual and collective; but when the issue would take concrete form, the experience of asymmetrical interdependency would probably suggest the model for a new type of symmetrical interdependency based on a collective balanced reapportionment of relations, possible only in a European context. The type of solution and its time of implementation depended however on a multitude of factors - a greater or lesser degree of tension in relations between the greatest powers, first of all; and then the rhythm of growth of the Western European countries, the sense of internal security of the dominant classes, the interests of the major economic forces, the degree of consensus obtained by the governments, the orientation of the main social and political forces, etc. Among the latter, a significant role was played by the parties of the left, the stronger ones at least; in Italy, the PCI and the PSI. These parties placed the defense of national independence and of the international autonomy of the country among their chief objectives. Everything they said or did (or omitted to say or to do) in this field would necessarily influence the solution of the problem outlined above. Now, only by withdrawing from internationalism of the Stalinist type - founded on the defense, in any case and at all costs, of the Soviet Union, in forms often abstract and provocative which found their rationale in a concept of national independence that, leaving aside concrete historical conditions, at times approached nationalistic insularity - was it possible to define the European context as a special area for implementation of national independence in the forms imposed by the existence of blocs which constituted a given fact, unescapable, and even more so for those who wished to change the situation. To turn backward toward the cooperation of the Great Alliance, as Palmiro Togliatti, with a revealing note of regret, was still requesting in July of 1948, was an objective which, though comprehensible, was out of date historically.58 And even less realistic was to be the subsequent proposal to aban58

Cf. I'Unita,

11 July 1948.

206

Severino Galante

don the Atlantic Pact and N A T O . The true problem, at that time, was that of how to be and what to do against the blocs, that is, how to construct an alternative to bipolarism, to the blocs, to power politics, starting from bipolarism, blocs and power politics. The European response was not the only one (nor was it necessarily a response). However, to chose a "pole", to adhere - albeit with scarce enthusiasm - to a " c a m p " , and therefore to reject " a priori" any type of European initiative, from the Schuman Plan to the Pleven Plan to U.E.O., 5 9 meant precluding not only that possible response but also, and above all, the very possibility of establishing the problem in terms that made it possible to operate effectively to resolve it. Thus due to varying causes and purposes, and navigating along different courses, all three of Italy's mass political parties had in the end identified themselves with one or the other of the "poles" in the power conflict and were therefore stranded on the beach of their own international powerlessness. And not until they had managed to free themselves from this identification would any of them go back to being an authentic actor on the international scene. Nor would Italy return to such a status.

S9

For a more detailed examination of the European (more precisely, anti-European) policy of the PCI in the 1940s and '50s, see my soon to be published book.

Italy's Mass Political Parties

207

Zusammenfassung

Von dem Augenblick an, als sich die italienischen Volksparteien (Democrazia Cristiana, Kommunistische Partei und Sozialistische Partei) zwischen 1943 und 1944 konstituierten oder neukonstituierten, wurden für ihre Führer außenpolitische Orientierungen zur Grundlage der politischen Strategie. Jede Partei mußte versuchen, zu einer möglichst zutreffenden Analyse der Kräfteverhältnisse im internationalen Nachkriegssystem zu gelangen. Diese Analyse wurde natürlich mitbeeinflußt von der kulturellen Tradition, in der die jeweilige Partei stand, von den Prinzipien und Grundwerten, denen sie sich verpflichtet fühlte, aber auch von dem Format ihrer führenden Persönlichkeiten, deren Einschätzung der aktuellen Entwicklungen und deren Definition von nationalen Interessen und Parteiinteressen. Allen drei Parteien gemeinsam war die Ausgangslage, die internationale Situation von allmählicher Veränderung unterworfenen innenpolitischen Zielvorstellungen her bewerten und dieser Bewertung entsprechend handeln zu müssen. Etwas vereinfachend könnte man sagen, daß im Ergebnis der so entstandenen Strategien die Democrazia Cristiana zwischen 1943 und 1949 durch das Bemühen um die Erweiterung innenpolitischer „ M a c h t " faktisch eine bestehende außenpolitische Schwäche Italiens begünstigte, und daß andererseits die Kommunistische und die Sozialistische Partei ihre innenpolitische Machtstellung, d. h. ihre Fähigkeit, auf die italienische Innenpolitik einzuwirken, vernachlässigten und sich auf die Vorstellungen einer äußeren Macht einstellten, das von der Sowjetunion geführte „sozialistische Lager". Der Autor ist der Auffassung, daß aus diesen unterschiedlichen, in der Realität aber wechselseitig aufeinander einwirkenden politischen Verhaltensmustern eine gewisse politische Ohnmacht des italienischen Staates, wie seiner wichtigsten politischen Kräfte, im internationalen Nachkriegssystem resultierte. Es scheint angemessen, in Hinsicht auf die italienischen Volksparteien nicht von „Machtpolitik", sondern statt dessen von „Politik der O h n m a c h t " zu sprechen.

The Italian Communist Party and the Italian Imperial Problem. A Forgotten 'Colonial' Position

by Romain Η. Rainero

Within the framework of the big foreign policy decisions of the "new Italy" in the years 1 9 4 7 - 4 9 the position of the Italian Communist Party (P.C.I.) was certainly not lacking in originality and sometimes even audacity. For the Communist Party it was perhaps not a question of renewing the spirit of Salerno, but clearly of remaining in, or returning to, the game of the most important options in foreign policy. The key to this bold policy must above all be seen in the undisputed skill of Palmiro Togliatti, unchallenged head of the party, who was fully aware of just how far the Italian situation was distant from the "types" of situation envisaged by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and hence that for an exceptional situation of this kind an approach had to be made with assumptions of action of an exceptional kind. The purposes of the P. C. I.'s action from this standpoint were twofold: (1) to keep Italy out of the blocs that were being formed as a possible solution and hence preferable to the other solution consisting in having it join the one dominated by the USSR; a "neutralist" Italy could then serve communist aims, since it would mean a retreat from an Italy aligned on positions of total devotion to the United States; (2) to give the P. C. I. the image of a "national" party removed from subservience to Moscow, as the bourgeois oppositions continued to see it. It was necessary to build up the image of a party that defended Italy's "rights", especially with a view to a " j u s t " peace treaty even with regard to the Soviet requests. On this second aspect the question of the fate of the Italian colonies, at least those that had been such before Mussolini's rise to power, was seen by the communist leaders as a "national" question to be defended by somewhat forgetting the ideological positions of communism and the Italian communist party's historical positions. This error of conduct was presented as a decision necessary in order to secure new members to the party; in reality the party leaders did not realise that Italian "public opinion" was the victim of manipulation and that for somewhat obscure reasons De Gasperi had favoured the

210

Romain Η . Rainero

nationalists and colonialists, who had recovered an honourable status, in order to defend the government's arguments at UNO. This effort appeared to be based on Italy's "historic rights" to its colonies, and new consideration was given to the old themes of Eurafrica and European responsibility for "development" of the African continent. The neo-fascists defended these ideas, the "independents" also and, a curious thing, the arguments put forward by L'Unita were the same with regard to their conclusions. An examination of the publications during this period is disappointing owing to the lack of critical perspective. In fact the P. C. I.'s position was to change only in 1949 at the time of U N O ' s decision on the Italian colonies, but its rediscovered anticolonialism was to be expressed more in the contingent aspect of opposition to the government than from a basic ideological perspective. During the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on ratification of the agreement for supervision over Somalia, the Communist G. C. Paietta said that the adventure of Somalia was dangerous and that the Communists did not intend to become the government's accomplices. And so the Communists in parliament voted against assignment of the administration of Somalia to Italy, which they had been loudly demanding for nearly four years.

Annex I felt that, in order to give the problem a certain real dimension (beyond the press, which does not perhaps have much freedom from directives of the parties), it would be of interest to reproduce the results of D O X A surveys undertaken in October 1946 with regard to the Peace Treaty. The question posed was: "Among the three proposed mutilations (Brigue, Tenda and Moncenisio - Venezia Giuliana - the colonies), which seems to you to be most painful?"

First Table: Percentages according to the major geographical zones

Brigue, Tenda &C Monc. Venezia Giuliana Colonies no opinion

Italy

North

Centre

South

Islands

14 54 18 14

18 52 14 16

13 59 15 13

9 58

22

11 49 28

11

12

211

The Italian Communist Party

Second

Table: According to professions

Brigue, Tenda & Moncenisio Venezia Giuliana Colonies no opinion

Third

Employers

Farmers

Agricult. Workers

Artisans

Workmen

Clericals

19

14

13

14

16

10

8

13

59 20 2

45 22 19

44 25 18

55 22 9

50 17 17

69 15 6

60 23 9

59 15 13

Free No ProProfessions fession

Table: According t o political trend of newspapers read

Christian Democrats Brigue, Tenda & Moncenisio Venezia Giuliana Colonies no opinion

Socialists

Communists

Other Parties

Independents

9

27

28

11

14

62 19 10

46 19 8

30 25 17

58 22 9

62 15 9

Source: P. Luzzatto Fegiz, II volto sconosciuto dell'ltalia, Milan 1956, pp. 680—1.

212

Romain Η. Rainero

Zusammenfassung Es ist bemerkenswert, daß die Kommunistische Partei Italiens in den späten 40er Jahren vorübergehend ihre antikolonialistische Grundlinie aufgegeben hat. Dies war offenbar eine Kursänderung, bei der es der PCI darauf ankam, sich das Image einer „nationalen" Partei zu geben. Die vorübergehende „Abweichung" wurde 1949 wieder korrigiert.

The International Political Situation as seen by the German Linksparteien (SPD, SED and KPD) between 1945 and 1949* by Dietrich Staritz and Arnold Sywottek

Preliminary

remarks

Perceptions of German Linksparteien after World War II1 confront us with problems which do not arise when we reconstruct and interpret perceptions formed by other European left parties. The Italian and the French Left, for example, offer favorable conditions for a comparative analysis, for despite party rivalries they conducted themselves in a more (Italy) or less (France) cooperative and compromising way in the first two years after the war. 2 These characteristics can hardly be found among the German Left. And there are several good reasons for avoiding the term die deutsche Linke at all. One reason is that parties in Germany, including the Linksparteien, were built up after the war gradually, partly along lines of tradition from the Weimar period, partly in an attempt to overcome these traditions;3 and party formation had not been completed when

* The section on the SPD was written by Arnold Sywottek. Dietrich Staritz wrote the part on SED and KPD. The authors thank Robin Fisher and Eckart Krause for helping with the translation. 1 See Elmar Altvater/Bernhard Blanke and others (eds.), Die Linke im Rechtsstaat, vol. 1: Bedingungen sozialistischer Politik 1945—1965, Berlin 1976; Arnold Sywottek, 'Die Opposition der SPD and KPD gegen die westdeutsche Aufrüstung in der Tradition sozialdemokratischer und kommunistischer Friedenspolitik seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in: Wolfgang Huber/Johannes Schwerdtfeger (eds.), Frieden, Gewalt, Sozialismus. Studien zur Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung, Stuttgart 1976, pp. 496-610. 2 See Mario Einaudi/Jean-Marie Domenach/Aldo Garosci, Communism in Western Europe, New York 1951 and Dieter Oberndörfer (ed.), Sozialistische und kommunistische Parteien in Westeuropa, vol. 1, Opladen 1978. 3 See Albrecht Kaden, Einheit oder Freiheit. Die Wiedergründung der SPD 1945/46, Hannover 1964; Lutz Niethammer/Ulrich Borsdorf/Peter Brandt (eds.), Arbeiterinitiative 1945. Antifaschistische Ausschüsse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland, Wuppertal 1976; Beatrix W. Bouvier, 'Antifaschistische Zusammenarbeit. Selbständigkeit und Vereinigungs-

214

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

world politics became bipolarized. To stretch this point, one can argue that the Cold War had already begun among the German Left before it came to dominate world politics, and before its consequences in Germany itself were really considered. 4 T h e formation of the postwar German party systems was to a large extent determined by the four-power occupation. T h e four occupation zones were governed with differing concepts of political activity and democratization. These differences hampered the process of harmonizing regional party groups which had emerged at the end of the war; after 1947, in addition, the situation in Berlin with its special four-power administration presented a problem that affected all of Germany. 5 T h u s several factors prevented the formation of an allGerman SPD: the zonal division, the different party development in each individual zone as well as different relationships between the four occupation administrations and the parties. 6 O n the other hand the KPD carried much more political weight in the Soviet zone than in the Western zones. These conditions led to differing political systems in the four (or five) zones of occupation, which made it possible that in April 1946 in the Soviet zone the KPD and SPD merged into the SED, a party which in 1948 decided to become a Stalinist party of a " n e w type". This fusion caused a great deal of altercation not only in the very complicated political system of Berlin, which subsequently was split regionally in 1948, but also in the Western zones. There the KPD existed beside the SPD - in a not clearly defined relationship with the SED in the Soviet zone until 1949. In conclusion, it may be emphasized that the German Linksparteien perceived world politics at least since 1946 as a dimension of the formation of t w o German states. T h e foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and of the G e r m a n Democratic Republic on the other in the long run split the German Left, which had already been divided into differing organizations since the First World War, 7 regionally as well. At the end of the period analyzed here, the Social Democratic tradition in the German Democratic Republic was still in existence as a political subculture in the Stalinist centralized Ersten Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat auf deutschem Boden (the First Worker's and

tendenz. Die Rolle der Sozialdemokratie beim administrativen und parteipolitischen Aufbau in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone auf regionaler und lokaler Ebene', in: Archiv für te, 16, 1976, pp. 4 1 6 - 4 6 8 .

Sozialgeschich-

4

Cf. e.g. Klaus Peter Schulz, Auftakt 1945/46, Berlin 1965.

5

See Gerhard Keiderling, Die Berliner Krise 1948/49. Zur imperialistischen Strategie des Krieges gegen den Sozialismus und der Spaltung Deutschlands, Berlin (GDR) 1982.

6

See Dietrich Staritz, 'Parteien für ganz Deutschland. Zu den Kontroversen über ein Parteiengesetz im Alliierten Kontrollrat 1946/47', in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 32, 1984, pp. 240 - 2 6 8 .

7

Cf. Manfred Scharrer, Die Spaltung

zum Kalten Krieg. Der Freiheitskampf

der deutschen

Arbeiterbewegung,

der SPD in Berlin

Stuttgart 1983.

Kalten

The German

215

Linksparteien

Peasant's State on German Territory), whereas the Communist tradition in West Germany could only be preserved in a marginal and exclusive group without political influence. The Social Democrats now represented the largest opposition party in the federal system of West Germany, although some party organizations at the Länder level - especially in Hessen and Bremen 8 - enjoyed an already established tradition as governing parties. Due to the complexity of the German political situation it seems appropriate first to discuss the Social Democratic and then the Communist views. This separate treatment moreover seems logical because the following observations had to be based on different methods of analysis. The study of the history of the KPD is characterized by a great lack of sources, especially with regard to structures of perceiving and forming party policy.

Social Democratic

views

When one reconstructs the perceptions of political parties concerning political situations, it is necessary (more than with other political actors) to distinguish between official party statements and internal, partly individual analyses and observations. The statements establish party policy and are of some consequence for the legitimation of party leadership vis-a-vis party followers. T h e importance of internal perceptions has to be evaluated according to each individual case. The very fact that freedom of political expression was limited in occupied Germany, where party politics were directly influenced by world politics, suggests that publicized party views should not hastily be regarded as views from within the party. Especially the Social Democrats presented themselves as a quite heterogeneous Gesinnungsgemeinschaft (community of sentiments, convictions), with various ideas and goals. Even the members of the future core of party leadership in the Western zones, as well as in Berlin and the Soviet zone, must be considered - up to the fall of 1945 - as mere speakers for the local groups; they only gradually secured their claim to represent the party as a whole. Their political views of the summer 1945 favoured aiding supraregional party integration. Of no considerable significance to the formation of the new SPD was, however, the SPD group in exile - the Sopade or Union deutscher Sozialisten in London after 1941 - which had seen itself as trustee for the party as a whole. After their return in 1946, its members adapted smoothly to the party strategy already developed. 9

* Cf. Renate Meyer-Braun, Die Bremer SPD 1949-1959. Eine lokal- und parteigeschichtliche Studie, Frankfurt/M./New York 1982. ' Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei. Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945 bis 2965, Berlin/Bonn 1982, pp.78ff.

216

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

The first reported political announcements by the new party leaderships that found domestic approval on the supra-regional level date from the last days of August 1945. The Potsdam conference had taken place three weeks before, the basic agreement on Allied occupation of Germany was public knowledge, and the Allied Control Commission had taken up its duties. The French attitude to the Potsdam Agreement was, however, not yet clear: the French sought to obstruct all provisions of the agreement intended to advance the administration of a unified German economy. Under these circumstances, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, who had set up a party office in Hannover, disclosed on August 28th certain Politische Richtlinien für die SPD in ihrem Verhältnis zu den anderen politischen Faktoren (Political Directives for the SPD's relations with the other political factors) that were designated "for the use of the leading party officials only". 10 Schumacher invited all regional party groups of the Western zones that were known to him to a first conference on October 5th. At about the same time (August 26th), Otto Grotewohl, the chairman of the Zentralausschuß of the SPD in Berlin and the Soviet zone, delivered an address to the first district party convention in Leipzig in which he asked the attending officials to accept the Zentralausschuß as trustee for the party; in addition, he explained his group's policy. Both matters concerned internal party policies. The Richtlinien were first published in 1973; only parts of the comments of Grotewohl, supplementing a public address, have so far been occasionally quoted.11 Both party leaderships obviously knew of each other but did not have any contact. Their respective policies corresponded to different and competing party traditions. Nevertheless, the political goal of both party leaderships was the same: the SPD was to be the future leading political force in Germany. Both leaders founded this leadership claim on the tradition of Social Democracy in Germany. Beyond this, Schumacher argued in socio-economic terms. According to his analysis, the Klassencharakter des Nazismus (class character of Nazism) could only be completely overcome through democratic socialism. Grotewohl referred to the signs of a broad support for the party among the population; in addition he disclosed an encouraging prognosis from the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration. Both positions referred to differences among the occupying powers, that is the Anglo-American and the Soviet sides respectively. French policy was later the predominant object of direct or indirect criticism. Only in connection with the idea of Europe as the third political world power was there a certain amount

10

11

In: Dieter Dowe/Kurt Klotzbach (eds.), Programmatische Dokumente der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Berlin/Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1973, pp. 2 4 5 - 2 8 0 . Erster Bezirkstag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Bezirk Leipzig, am Sonntag, den 26. August 1945 im Rathaus (ms., copy Α. Sywottek).

The German

Linksparteien

217

of political agreement. 12 The western boundary of the Soviet zone was considered by both leaders to be decisive for the future of Germany; it appears that especially in Hannover, but also in Berlin - the possibility of Germany's division along the großen Demarkationslinie (Schumacher) was reckoned with. Schumacher characterized the culture and civilisation of the Anglo-Saxon world as being more in keeping with the German way of life than the quite different culture that confronted the Germans in the Soviet zone. He argued for the moral intervention of the public in the countries of European-American culture against the methods of the occupying power in the Soviet zone, whose boundaries were said to be "advanced too far to the West". Although with this appeal he did not relinquish German unity, Schumacher evidently sought to define Social Democratic policy by aligning Germany with the Western powers (whom he characterized as the Weltdemokratie) and he saw the East-West Conflict as a political possibility. This policy with its tendency to emphazise conflict was not revised by the West German SPD-leadership (dominated by Schumacher until 1952) until after the end of the period analyzed here. 13 In Berlin such attitudes were obviously known during the summer of 1945, and Grotewohl warned against them in Leipzig. He basically described the same phenomenon Schumacher had characterized as the cultural peculiarity of the eastern occupation power, but he pleaded for constraint in commenting on the differences among the Allies with the argument that it would be the Social Democrats who would have to carry the weight of these differences. He said it was not that the Social Democrats in the Russian zone had no freedoms at all or could only move "on the point of the Kommissar's revolver"; he emphasized that "really it was not thus difficult", and that it would be unjustified if Social Democrats would present it in that way; for in fact they still would be able to move about "with fortune" and to make their necessary political statements. Unlike Schumacher, who sought to base his strategy on a strongly geopolitically oriented analysis of the situation, Grotewohl emphasized the "simple instinct" in the efforts of the Berlin leadership, " t o hold together this Germany as far as that is possible at all". The criticism both party leaders articulated with regard to the intendend boundaries between Germany and Poland was to a large extent the same. They referred to the foreseeable food shortages and the difficulties of handling the

12 13

Cf. Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei, pp. 116 ff. See Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD - Deutschland und Europa. Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum Verhältnis von Deutschlandpolitik und Westintegration (1945-1957), Bonn 1972, pp. 73 ff.; Kurt Thomas Schmitz, Deutsche Einheit und Europäische Integration. Der sozialdemokratische Beitrag zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des programmatischen Wandels einer Oppositionspartei, Bonn 1978; Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika 1945-1966, Düsseldorf 1983.

218

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

millions of refugees and displaced persons thronging to the west from regions beyond the Oder. These observations were, however, accompanied by differing considerations. Schumacher argued that in the long run these developments created risks which threatened peace and reason in politics. Grotewohl, however, spoke of a glimmer of hope since the boundary had been drawn only as a Provisorium, adding the comment that "the national claims of our eastern neighbour Poland" had increased to inadequate dimensions.14 "Poland has never had in its whole history that creative power by which states are founded and held together." Such disagreements in details do not necessarily indicate divergences in basic political positions or policies, but rather differences in what was considered an acceptable and advantageous way of formulating party policy in the British or Soviet zones respectively. It was not so much the content as the ways in which it was communicated in which the two Social Democratic Parties differed; in other words, not the perception itself, but the manner in which the situation was perceived, differed. One can, of course, attribute these variations to the different personalities among the leaders.15 Of even more importance, however, seems to have been the extent to which their behaviour was influenced or challenged by the circumstances in which perceptions were formed. Grotewohl articulated this problem quite clearly in Leipzig with reference to the Allied Declaration of June 5,1945: "Those comrades who are profoundly convinced that they cannot or will not be simply obedient followers — those comrades exist - will necessarily come to the conclusion that they cannot do active political work." Grotewohl added that it was important that in the administrative practice the directives were agreeable and broad. He also said that the whole policy of the SPD in the Soviet zone was "essentially nothing else but prudent and discreet sounding and searching and revising". Schumacher, however, stressed in his Richtlinien that the Social Democrats with all this loyalty should not become timid; they should always assert their right to voice their opinions at every opportunity, even in opposition to the allies. Perhaps the essential differences in policy between the two coordinating centres for Social Democratic politics in Hannover and Berlin can be characterized as the demonstrative declaration of adherence to a political position on the one hand, and the reference to the difficulties in realizing political goals on the other. Schumacher's emphasis on principles - this was to characterize his political style until the end of his days - can be attributed to his general distance from government and administration resulting from his preoccupation with party

14 15

In original: "ins Ungemessene". Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher. Persönlichkeit und politisches Verhalten, Köln/Opladen 1967; Heinz Vosske, Otto Grotewohl. Biographischer Abriß, Berlin (GDR) 1975.

The German

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219

headquarters. Grotewohl's statements, however, reflected his practical experiences drawn from participation in the organisation of a political and administrative system - a system that proved to have been already planned out in detail, even down to obligatory language regulation, and which allowed only a few freedoms. The Zentralausschuß apparently saw its main task in using these limited freedoms to gain a broader base: according to Grotewohl, renunciation of political activity would mean that a great part of the German people would be beset by "political despair and homelessness". In view of this background and the task defined by the Zentralausschuß, one has also to consider the problem that became suddenly critical in the following months: relationship with the Communists. Upon its establishment the Zentralausschuß had expressed the intention to work closely with the Communists. A few members had openly expressed their regret that the political labour movement had been reactivated in the form of two separate parties. They called the rebuilding of the SPD an emergency solution. This viewpoint, which Schumacher dogmatically opposed in his area of influence, and which was often the result of tactical calculations, was hardly mentioned in Grotewohl's Leipzig address. Of course, there was a passing statement of loyalty to the United Front, which was referred to as a to a certain extent "given" institution. Central, however, was the statement (greeted with "cheerful approval"): "We must hope to get elections as soon as possible, and we must try to make sure that these elections will be held on the understanding that the parties present themselves as strictly separated groups." This intent did not, however, materialize. Beginning in September, the KPD mounted a campaign aiming at a merger of the KPD with the Social Democrats. The campaign increased in intensity and gained momentum at the beginning of 1946, when the KPD announced that it wanted to carry out the merger in the Soviet Zone alone. The argument often advanced by the Zentralausschuß - that the fusion could be completed without harm to the Socialist labour movement only in the entire Reich - lost its stalling effect. Finally Grotewohl and those who fought with him yielded to the tendency in the Zentralausschuß that had already spread among the lower party organisation. If SPD headquarters, which had never been formally legitimated, did not want to lose their influence, their only alternative aside from presumably useless protests was to assume leadership in the party merger which had already been formally accepted to a great extent in the Soviet zone. The Zentralausschuß passed the decisive resolution on February 11,1946, after a last attempt to reach an agreement with the SPD in the Western Zones had failed. In the course of the internal party conflict - which at this point was especially critical in divided Berlin - the majority of the Berlin SPD members withdrew their support from the Zentralausschuß and established themselves as a

220

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

separate party.16 At first, they remained aloof from the West German SPD leadership in Hannover as well.17 Among the members of the Zentralausschuß who did not join the SED was the future Stadtrat (municipal councillor) for economic affairs, Gustav Klingelhöfer. In late summer of 1945, Klingelhöfer had analysed the international political situation in detail and written a memorandum, which served the Zentralausschuß for some time as a basis for the argument in favor of an Ostorientierung (Eastern orientation) in Social Democratic policy.18 How the report was circulated and the motivations behind it remain uncertain. In a letter to Schumacher, Klingelhöfer emphasized in retrospect that the significance and function of the Ostorientierung concept had been "to convince the highest Russian authority that there was no need to rely upon the Communists for making sure that Germany would not become a threat to Russia". This point was, however, not really substantiated in the memorandum. Klingelhöfer's verbose analysis was supposed to prove clearly that the German working class could join "the party of that world power that by her very structures excludes fascism as the militant organisation of a nation". He claimed that, in view of past experience and of the existing socio-economic situation, this world power should be the Soviet Union. This point had not, however, been thoroughly analysed in his memorandum. Here he surmised accurately that the four power coalition was based on economic and therefore political inequalities. He predicted the future economic dependence of France and England on the USA. At the same time, he prophesied that Soviet foreign policy would offer to French and English industries starving for markets economic possibilities in the countries dependent on the Soviet Union: Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Balkan countries - possibilities that the USA could not offer. He claimed that the German working class, which unlike the English and American working class wanted to avoid mistakes made in 1918 and 1933, was and would remain of central importance to Socialism in Europe. It could not, however, realize its purpose if reconstruction in Germany, which seemed to have been set back for sixty years with the Potsdam Agreement, either did not take place or depended on foreign capitalist aid instead of help from the Soviet Union. The German working class had to assert its freedom and seek support for the restitution of human dignity where it could be found. Aside from this stipulation for the Ostorientierung in the SPD, Klingelhöfer pointed at a second condition, namely that the SPD would not be able completely to convince party sympathizers of the

"

17 18

Cf. Arnold Sywottek, 'Die 'fünfte Zone'. Zur gesellschafts- und außenpolitischen Orientierung und Funktion sozialdemokratischer Politik in Berlin 1945-48', in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 13, 1973, pp. 5 3 - 1 2 9 . Ibid., pp. 102 f. Excerpts ibid., pp. 77 ff.

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policy of Ο st Orientierung as long as the KPD played a double role as a democratic party and as the agent of the Soviet Union. In line with this second stipulation, the KPD propagated the besonderen deutschen Weg zum Sozialismus (special German way to Socialism), 1 ' a theme that the Social Democrats obviously misconstrued in the same way in which they were to misconstrue the theme Partei neuen Typs (Party of a new type), which the KPD chose as an appropriate battle-cry after 1947.20 At this time, it became clear that the first stipulation had no solid basis in the Soviet zone: this region did not receive any substantial economic support from the Soviet Union, and the SED even refused the Marshall Aid that was under consideration for Germany. In its place, the SED promoted a rebuilding of Germany by her own resources, a direction taken since October, 1947, increasingly under Soviet guidance and according to the Soviet mode.21 When solidarity with the Soviet Union was declared the most important goal for the SED in 1948, many Socialists, who still adhered to the Social Democrats, turned their backs on the SED. 22 These developments supported the diagnosis already made by the SPD in the Western Zones in 1945, and since articulated in an increasingly aggressive manner. From the beginning of 1946, it had vehemently opposed the promotion of the SED, thus destroying the hopes of Social Democrats in the SED that a single party in the Eastern Zone would be seen as a model for the West. The party merger, depicted as an absolute Zwangsvereinigung (compulsory unification) under the pressure of the Soviets, became within the SPD a symbol for the totalitarian and dictatorial methods of the Soviet Union. The SED, together with all its governing bodies and institutions, was deprived of the legitimacy to represent German interests. Common meetings, even those on an official and quasidiplomatic level such as the Ministerpräsidenten-Konferenz planned to be held 23 in Munich in June, 1947, were successfully impeded. This policy of the SPD

"

Dietrich Staritz, 'Ein 'besonderer deutscher Weg zum Socialismus'?', in: Ziele, Formen zen

der

'besonderen'

europäischer

Wege

kommunistischer

zum

Sozialismus.

Zur

Parteien in den Jahren

Analyse zwischen

der 1944/45

und

Gren-

Transformationskonzepte und 1948, ed. Arbeits-

bereich Geschichte und Politik der D D R am Institut für Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Mannheim, Mannheim 1983, pp. 127 ff. 20

Frank M o r a w , Die Parole der 'Einheit' und gesellschaftspolitischen Phase der Nachkriegszeit

und die Sozialdemokratie.

Orientierung 1933-1948,

Zur

parteiorganisatorischen

der SPD in der Periode der Illegalität und in der

ersten

B o n n / B a d Godesberg 1973.

21

See below, p. 225 ff.

22

Cf. Ernst Thape, Von Rot zu Schwarz-Rot-Gold.

Lebensweg

eines Sozialdemokraten,

Hannover

1969. 23

See Wolfram Werner, 'Einleitung', in: Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte (eds.), zur Vorgeschichte pp. 37 ff.

der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland

1945-1949,

Akten

vol. 3, M ü n c h e n / W i e n 1979,

222

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

was reinforced by the intensive and systematic propaganda against Soviet Communism in Germany on the part of the Americans. 24 As the SPD took on the battle against Soviet Communism as an "order of the day" and equally the corresponding commitment to principles and priority of a free and democratic society (in agreement with the principles of the Socialist International, to which the SPD again belonged since 1947),25 it became somewhat easier for the party leadership to conceal its failures in realizing other goals, and to alter these goals. For example, the SPD continued to press the Allies to preserve German unity. 26 This could, however, only be carried out, according to the SPD, if the Soviet Union allowed political processes of a western kind to take place in her occupation zone. This viewpoint made possible the basic consent to all preparatory steps towards establishing the West German state, even though reservations were articulated about certain legal terms and political symbols. The formation of the Bizone at the beginning of 1947 as a preliminary stage to the economic unification of the whole of Germany was supported by the SPD, which tended to favour a centralist state anyway. Approval was also shown for the prospect of Marshall Plan aid to West Germany during the middle of 1947 - its implementation was attributed primarily to humanitarian motives as well as for the increase in German participation and responsibility in the Bizone at the beginning of 1948. There were some doubts that this policy might not serve the goal of German unity, but these were countered with the so-called Magnet-Theorie which suggested that an economically recovered West Germany would cause the Soviet Union to lose interest in the used-up eastern occupied zone. The argument raised in public that the Marshall Plan was coupled with designs for the West German economic system which conflicted with the SPD goal to socialize at least the basic industries, was at best discussed coincidentally and led commonly to remark that this problem would have to be solved at a later date. 27 The pragmatism shown here had its origin in part in an assumption that the SPD would become the dominant party after the first (West) German parliamentary elections, and that the party could then realize its essential goals, for instance the Socialist state. To secure the necessary legitimation for this process in the new Germany had been a main goal of the Social Democrats since prepara-

24

Cf. Barbara Mettler, Demokratisierung Rundfunkpolitik in Westdeutschland

25

Cf. Rolf Steininger, Deutschland und die Sozialistische Internationale nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die deutsche Frage, die Internationale und das Problem der Wiederaufnahme der SPD auf den internationalen sozialistischen Konferenzen bis 1951 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Labour Party, Bonn 1979, p. 88.

und Kalter Krieg. Zur amerikanischen 1945-1949, Berlin 1975.

" See for further details Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei, Chapter 112. 27 Cf. e.g. Sywottek, 'Die 'fünfte Z o n e " , op. cit., p. 115, fn. 330.

Informations-

und

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tions for reconstruction had begun. The SPD continued to call for equal rights with the neighbouring countries and with the victorious powers of 1945, and, though in the opposition, did not fall behind Chancellor Adenauer. Nevertheless, the SPD was concerned more than other political groups with formal and legitimate government authority rather than with informal political influence. This can probably be explained by the party's deep respect for the constitutional and parliamentarian state; it also caused SPD politics to be somewhat rigid, even limited its ability to assess the political situation realistically. Apparently it was only as an opposition party in the German Bundestag that the SPD realized that its efforts to integrate Germany into the economic - and military - system of the West would probably not be remunerated with Allied efforts to secure German unity. As the SPD became aware of this, seeing itself as the future alternative government, it quite understandably took its stance towards Germany's entry into the Europarat and the ECSC - a stance, which appears hardly coherent in retrospect, however. Of course, SPD views of the world political constellation were formed not only on the highest party level. Independent approaches and suggestions on how to use and influence the international situation - especially concerning German reunification - showed up at lower political levels as well, in particular among Social Democrats who headed state governments. As examples it may be referred to the contacts between the governments of Thüringen and Hessen achieved through mutual Staatsbesuche; or to the attempts of the Bremen government to organize a conference of governors from all German states in October, 1946; 28 or to the vote in the parliament of Hamburg supporting, in departure from the official party line, the Federal Republic's entry into the organization of the Schuman Plan. 29 Such dissenting behaviour originated from a pragmatism which is more likely to be found in governmental than in party organisations, and which, in the light of the prevailing situation, may indeed have been the result of political or economic calculation. From the outside the SPD appeared to be led and represented by Schumacher with his personal authority alone. That the party allowed room for political maneuverability can be seen, for example, in Berlin, where Ernst Reuter pursued a policy that was at best loosely coordinated with the party chairman, but not collated in detail. Moreover, Berlin was, as far as is known, the only locality where the regional SPD organisation had to be convinced of the future course through a comprehensive world-

Manfred Overesch, 'Bremer Interzonenkonferenz Oktober 1946. Ihr historisch-politischer Stellenwert', in: Deutschland Archiv, 14, 1981, pp. 1172-1190. " Cf. Daniel Riegger, 'Europa-Politik in Hamburg 1945-1953', Hamburg 1984 (ms.).

28

224

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

political analysis. This exceptional case in the history of Social Democratic policy cannot, however, be presented in detail here. 30

Summary: SPD Social Democratic views of international politics, to the extent that they have been considered relevant and are therefore analysed here, can in retrospect be arranged in t w o successive phases. In the first phase (up to the spring of 1946), party views reflect the (accurate) anticipation of the growing antagonism between the world powers due to their structural differences and its effects on occupied Germany. T h e Social Democrats in the Soviet Z o n e experimented for a time with various approaches to an independent party policy taking these antagonisms into consideration. Nevertheless, they conformed or yielded to Soviet policy which determined the party existence after the fall of 1947. T h e western Social Democrats, in comparison, counted at first on solidarity with the political public and then increasingly on the western occupation administrations and governments. Especially the British Labour government initially gave the SPD reason to hope. In its attempt to gain recognition in political systems that corresponded to SPD traditions, the SPD acted as a stimulant for potential conflict and antagonism within these systems; nevertheless, it still sought to carry out G e r m a n national interests. Due to its attitude, an important partisanship with the western position in the Cold War developed. Beside the emphasis on obtaining equal recognition for Germany, the principles of the Weltdemokratie were articulated and used as the standards of criticism against the Soviet Union. Identifying with these norms and taking the side of the West until 1949 left, however, little r o o m for the formulation of independent viewpoints. T h e Social Democrats differed from other leading political forces not necessarily in their world-views, but in their political method and manner. T h e party first realized its special interest in unifying Germany by practical means when the integration of West Germany alone into the western system increasingly became a priority for the SPD n o w in opposition.

30

See Arnold Sywottek, "Pfahl im Gerippe'. Selbstbild und Perzeption der internationalen Politik in der Berliner SPD 1948/49', in: J. Becker/F. Knipping (eds.), Im Schatten der Ohnmacht. Macktbewußtsein im Nachkriegsdeutschland 194S-1949, Paderborn 1986.

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The international constellation of Power 1945-1949 the SED and KPD

as seen by

The attempt to retrace the manner in which the SED and KPD perceived postwar international power relationships is impeded by an unsatisfactory source situation, as are many analyses of communist politics in Germany after 1945: precise information about policy formulation processes is not available, and there is a lack of reliable accounts concerning the cooperation mechanisms that linked both parties during the years discussed here. For these reasons, one essentially has to fall back on party publications as well as to assume that political and intellectual collaboration was consistent with the structure of organisational contacts and corresponding policies announced by both party leaderships. A common party organisation existed nonetheless until February, 1947 (until April, 1946, within the framework of the KPD, and then within that of the SED); later, the parties operated in an Arbeitsgemeinschaft (work team) and, as late as its dissolution in January, 1949, endorsed their concurrence in all fundamental issues. One must also proceed from the assumption that the leading suborganisations of the West German KPD considered themselves subordinate to the KPD and SED leadership and recognized the authority of the party leadership in East Berlin in setting general policy guidelines. 31 For reasons of space, a thorough analysis of the viewpoints of the SED and KPD cannot be made for the entire post-war period. The focal points in this discussion are the establishment of post-war policy and the legitimation of the Cold War policy.

Power relationships and policy formulation

1944—1945

Towards the end of the war, the KPD leadership assumed that the Soviet Union had proved itself to be the "strongest factor in the coalition against Hitler" and supposed that, in the future, all peoples "fighting for peace and human progress" would find a "strong and loyal ally" in the Soviet Union. 32 KPD leadership voiced the certainty that great changes would come about in Europe under

31

See Dietrich Staritz, 'Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands', in: Richard Stöss (ed.), ParteienHandbuch. Die Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980, vol. 2, Opladen 1984, pp. 1175 ff.

32

Cited in: Horst Laschitza, Kämpferische Demokratie gegen Faschismus. Die programmatische Vorbereitung auf die antifaschistisch-demokratische Umwälzung durch die Parteiführung der KPD, Berlin (GDR) 1969, p. 93.

226

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

Soviet guidance, including the "democratization of all nations", 3 3 and it proceeded from the assumption that all resolutions and agreements made in the coalition would retain "their special meaning because of the unanimity that brought them about". 3 4 Two points are therefore discernable: on the one hand, the KPD leadership had confidence in the political power of the Soviet Union and, on the other hand - as had the Soviet leadership itself-, confidence in the hope to be able to sustain the (fragile) consensus among the political powers beyond the end of the war. Yet the KPD leadership was aware of the problems which the constellation of powers could cause for its political activity in post-war Germany. They counted on the help of the Red Army in the Soviet Zone in the "fulfilment of our tasks", 3 5 but anticipated difficulties in the remaining regions of the country. In reference to the chances for all-German labour union initiative, the party spoke of the danger of "divided and fragmented labour unions" in case the military occupation of Germany by the Allied Forces should be organized by sectors. According to the KPD leadership, certain forces ("internationally as well as in Germany"), whose goals were referred to as "different and opposed to each other", 3 6 were interested in the reconstruction of Germany. The party generally anticipated the "differing character of the occupying regimes" and feared that certain tendencies in the West would be promoted in order to create "a counterbalance to the growing Soviet influence". In this way, the "reformist leaders of the Social Democrats and the labour unions" would be given the opportunity to gain a political advantage over the Communists, according to KPD leadership. 37 This unrelated simultaneous existence of world-political optimism and German-political scepticism was apparently not perceived by the party as an acute tactical problem for party strategy, perhaps because the KPD leadership at that point already considered it impossible to realize its goals in all of Germany. This assumption, however, can be supported with only one documentation from the summer of 1946, which conveys the impression that the SED leadership saw little chance for an "antifascist-democratic" development in all of Germany at that time and prepared for a partial realization of its goals in a divided state. 38

33

Wilhelm Pieck, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, ed. the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, vol. VI (1939 until Mai, 1945), Berlin (GDR) 1979, p. 339.

34

Ibid., p. 372.

35 3

Ibid., p. 339. ' Hermann Matern, Im Kampf für Frieden, Demokratie Schriften, vol. 1, Berlin (GDR) 1963, p. 99.

37 38

und Sozialismus.

Ausgewählte

Reden

und

Pieck, op. cit., p. 379. This analysis is taken from the recollections of a former officer in the Soviet occupying forces. H e documented the corresponding quotes from Pieck from September 1946 in a local history publication. ("I believe that a partition of Germany cannot be avoided. Practially speaking, the country

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τη

It is of course also possible that the party leadership reckoned with a shorter period of occupation towards the end of the war and therefore hardly stressed the national elements in its policy at first. In actuality, the KPD leadership, just as the world communist movement, spoke out for a Demokratie neuen Typs (newtype democracy), promoted the "antifascist-democratic order" for all of Germany, projected the transition to Socialism far into the future, and, like all Communist parties, demonstratively emphasized its intention to pursue this path using democratic methods within a national framework. This party platform corresponded, so it seems, to the Soviet leadership's hope to demonstrate the ability of the Communist parties in eastern and western Europe to reach compromises and agreements with other political forces. Through this demonstration, they also hoped to prevent conflict with their partners in the war alliance. Although this correlation has not been mentioned in GDR historiography as a stage in KPD policy formation, it appears nevertheless plausible to attribute it to the German Communists just as it has been ascribed to the Bulgarian Communist Party. The Sofian historian, Ilco Dimitrow, reported on this point in 1982: 3 ' " T h e Soviet government endeavoured to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition, to find solutions without conflict for the differences with its capitalist allies. According to general agreement parliamentary and democratic regimes were to be established in the countries liberated from fascism. Under these circumstances the BWP [Bulgarian Workers'Party] conducted its policies in a manner aimed at avoiding the deterioration of the relations between the allies and the increase of differences of opinion." Aside from this recognition of the scope available to the party for political action, the analysis of power relationships apparently also included considerations of the conditions of economic and political development of "the other side". Of particular consequence was the analysis of the changes in capitalism under the conditions of the war-time economy submitted by Eugen Varga in 1946.+0 Varga relied upon a crisis in the capitalist economies approximately ten years after the end of the war and was convinced that the degree of state intervention implemented during the war could be cut back only slowly in the course of reconstruction. Based on this analysis, Varga came to the conclusion import-

39

40

is already at this moment divided into two parts.") See: Zwei Begegnungen mit Wilhelm Pieck. Eine Dokumentation zum 35. Jahrestag der Gründung der Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft am 30. Juni 1982, ed. SED Local Headquarters in Quedlinburg together with the DSF Executive Committee of Quedlinburg, η. p., n.d., pp. 16 f. Ilco Dimitrow, 'Über den Charakter der volksdemokratischen Macht in Bulgarien', in: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig. Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, 31/2, 1982, pp. 122ff. Eugen Varga, Veränderungen in der kapitalistischen Wirtschaft im Gefolge des zweiten Weltkrieges, Moskau 1946; (partial) Translation from Manfred Kerner, type-written manuscript, Berlin (GFR) 1975, pp. 317 ff.

228

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

ant for the Communist Party's political tactics: in the future, the "greater or smaller participation in government" would determine " [ . . . ] the main issue of the political struggle between the two major classes of capitalistic society". 41 This understanding led him to predictions about the possible formation of Demokratien neuen Typs, which he characterized as social conditions in which "the feudal remnants of the large estates, are being liquidated, where private ownership of the means of production exists, but where big industrial, transport and banking enterprises are being nationalized and the state itself and its bureaucracy no longer serve the interests of a monopolistic bourgeoisie". He considered such developments possible in eastern as well as in western Europe, in agricultural as well as in industrial society, in Soviet as well as in American spheres of influence. The expectation that the latent tensions in the war coalition could be endured must have played a role in this scenario as well. The KPD leadership was certainly aware of the political correlation. They had been in constant contact with Dimitrov in Moscow, who, after the dissolution of the Communist International, had been transferred from his office of General Secretary of Comintern to the position of Director of the "Department for International Information" in the Central Committee of the CPSU. It has been well documented that many party members did not want to accept the new policy of their party leadership and its global deduction. Sympathy for a revolutionary policy still remained among a number of KPD groups operating illegally up to 1945 - an attitude that corresponded a great deal to the strategy and tactics used by the party until 1933.42 Around the summer of 1945, an anonymous paper circulated among KPD cadre members with the title Strategie und Taktik nach dem Vll. Weltkongreß (Strategy and Tactics after the 7th World Congress).43 Its author, just as the Central Committee had done, warned Communists not to head for the "final goal" ("destruction of the capitalistic coercive state, proletarian dictatorship and classless society") at this point in time; in contrast to the party leadership, however, the author names the presence of the "imperialistic occupation power" as the reason for this restraint: "The American occupation power constitutes the only power factor presently in existence in our area and openly to defy it would be a senseless provocation." The message of this pamphlet corresponded to the dominant tone in the party only to a certain extent. The majority of the Communists were quite ready 41

Varga, op. cit., p. 20.

42

See also George Kennan/Hermann Weber, 'Aus dem Kadermaterial der illegalen KPD', in: Vierteljahreshefte

für

Zeitgeschichte,

20/4,

1972,

pp. 375ff.;

Kurt

Kühn,

Die

letzte

Berlin/Potsdam 1949; Erich Köhn, 'Der Weg zur Gründung des Nationalkomitees Deutschland' in Leipzig', in: Zeitschrift

für Geschichtswissenschaft,

Runde, 'Freies

vol. 1 2 / 1 , 1965, pp. 18 ff;

Office of Strategie Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R & A 1550, 10 July 1944, The German Communist Party, p. 47. 43

Cited in: Abschrift im Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Bestand Β 118, vol. 42, pp. 23fif.

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to acknowledge the authority of the Berlin party leadership; the representatives of the KPD in the Western Zones together with its officials agreed with the (optimistic) assessment of the chances for an anti-fascist-democratic "change of system" in all of Germany. In this context, the party chairman in Hessen, Walter Fisch, campaigned for the new policy in September, 1945, with reference to the fact that the party enjoyed the support of the United Nations - and that meant of all victor powers, according to Fisch - in its endeavours to destroy trusts and concerns as well as large landownership. 44 This assessment of the range available for political action and the evaluation of the international situation based on it determined SED and KPD policy until approximately the middle of 1947. In the wake of the formation of political blocs in Europe, however, the tendency increased, especially in the SED, to centralize political efforts in the eastern occupation zone and develop it into a model society for all of Germany. As the fruitlessness of this approach became clear, the party leadership increasingly accepted the politics in Eastern Europe as a model for Germany.

Power relationships and formulation of policy

1947—1948

For reasons of agitation as well as practical politics, however, the SED and KPD continued to count on the possibility of bringing about the same developments that had taken place in the Soviet Zone in the western zones later. However, in comparison to the Soviet Zone, where the SED achieved an absolute majority in three of the five state parliaments in October of 1946, the KPD in the western zone remained a party with little parliamentary influence. The only considerable election success was achieved in Nordrhein-Westfalen in April, 1947, where 14% of the vote was won. Even there, however, where the KPD fought together with other parties for nationalization measures, these attempts failed as they had in Nordrhein-Westfalen due to objections from the occupation powers. This opposition on the part of the Allies destroyed the expectations the Communists had placed in them. At first, the SED and KPD avoided any verbal confrontation with the Western Powers and voiced general disapproval concerning the creation of Bizonia, calling it a poor solution for Germany's economic problems. 45 The reaction to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine was in comparison less restrained.

** Cited in: Walter Fisch, Vorsitzender der KPD Groß-Hessen, Vom Zusammenbruch kratischen

Aufbau,

zum

demo-

Speech at the First Partymember conference of the KPD in F r a n k f u r t / M . on

30Sept. 1945, n.p., n . d . , ρ . 7 . 45

Dokumente p. 153.

der Sozialistischen

Einheitspartei

Deutschlands,

vol. 1, 3rd ed., Berlin (GDR) 1952,

230

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

Neues Deutschland quoted Iswestja and Pravda; Pravda had spoken of American "expansionistic policies" and had compared Truman with Hitler." In June, 1947, after the failure of the Munich Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz, the KPD and SED named - for the first time (and as yet indirectly) - the Western Powers as the driving force behind Germany's division. Reference was made to "efforts of the forces of western monopolistic capitalism to divide Germany into federal states so as to pressue the western and southern areas of Germany into a western bloc". 4 7 After the breakdown of the Paris negotiations concerning Soviet participation in the Marshall Plan, the SED abandoned all discretion. In an announcement from the party executive from July 23rd, it was stated that the American "monopolistic capitalism" wanted to incorporate the industrial western region of the country into a "west bloc dangerous to peace" in which a new "power centre directed by reactionary and war mongering elements" would develop. 48 This was the position that the KPD ultimately adopted as well. Using varying arguments at first, the party organs then aligned themselves also with this view as of the middle of 1947. Thus, all essential elements were named for the future party evaluation of the international power constellation as well as its significance for Germany: American "monopolistic capitalism" (later called "imperialism") was considered expansionist - economically as well as politically. It instituted a peacethreatening power bloc, was not afraid to divide Germany, and made use of the German upper-bourgeoisie, with which it exploited the country as it would a colony. In view of the party's perception of international power relationships and their significance for Germany, the SED's announcement from July 23,1947 marked a turning point: the hope (articulated up to this time) that the social and political concept for all Germany could be realized within the framework of an alliance based on common interests was replaced by the realization that Soviet and western goals were incompatible; both parties clearly placed themselves on the side of the Soviet Union. This change was, however, first incorporated into party policy and implemented in all party organisations in the middle of 1948. 49 Like other Communist parties, the SED and KPD appropriated the new policy guidelines as of the summer of 1948. These guidelines had been announced by Zhdanow and Malenkow during the founding of the Cominform in Schreiberhau (Szklarska Poreba) in September, 1947 as the new world-view of the Soviet Union and had been accepted by the Communist parties represented there. Just

Neues Deutschland, 16 March 1947. Neues Deutschland, 15 June 1947. 48 Neues Deutschland, 25 July 1947 (statement of the party Executive Committee from 23 July). 4 ' See Thomas Hartnagel und Arnold Sywottek, 'KPD, SED und der Marshall-Plan' in: Othmar H.

4< 47

Haberl/Lutz Niethammer (eds.), Der Marshallplan und die europäische Linke, Königsbein i. Ts. 1986.

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231

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as Truman had done in March, Zhdanow divided the world rhetorically. Truman had divided it into different "ways of living", Zhdanow, into "camps" - a progressive, peaceful camp and an anti-democratic, expansionist camp. In view of these general and global fronts, the Communists had inherited a "special and historical role" according to Zhdanow. It was their duty, " t o place themselves at the head of the resistance against the American plans to enslave Europe and courageously to demask all Helfershelfer (accomplices) of American imperialism in their own country". 5 0 The criticism concerning Varga's interpretation of war-time and post-war capitalism had preceded the founding of the Cominform. 51 Now colleagues criticized Varga for underestimating the "further development and deepening of the general crisis of capitalism", for overestimating the possibilities open to governments in those countries, and for inadequately depicting the eastern European countries merely as countries of the "New Democracy" and not as "Peoples Democracies". Varga was removed from his post as Director of the Institute for World Economics and Politics at the Soviet Academy of Sciences soon thereafter. At first, the Communist world movement was hesitant in propagating this new interpretation of the situation. Not until the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia did this new policy become a compulsory party line. Now the parties spoke of an "intensification of the class struggle" and accused the Social Democrats of being an "agency of imperialism" (Zhdanow in 1947); the party disassociated itself from its previous statements about democratic and national ways to Socialism and acknowledged its adherence to the Soviet model of society. At the same time, they took over the organisational forms of the CPSU and changed themselves into "parties of a new type". Since the beginning of 1948, many Communist parties had already declared their willingness to support the Soviet Union in case of war. Maurice Thorez, whose party, like the PCI, had been accused of adhering to the old concept of "parliamentary cretinism", 5 2 had begun this initiative. On February 22, 1948, he stated that " i f our people [ . . . ] should be drawn into a war against the Soviet Union, and if in such

50

See: Für Frieden teien gehalten

und Volksdemokratie.

auf der Konferenz

Bericht über die Tätigkeit

in Polen Ende September

report of the controversy is found in: Eugenio Reale, Avec Jaques reunion 51

constitutive

duKominformaSzklarskaPoreba,22—27septembre

See the discussion concerning the book E. Varga, Veränderungen schaft

im Gefolge

des zweiten

Weltkrieges,

einiger

kommunistischer

Par-

1947, Berlin (GDR) n.d.: A thorough Duclos au banc des accuses a la 1947, Paris 1958. in der kapitalistischen

Supplement N o . 1 to Sowjetwissenschaft,

WirtBerlin

(GDR), n.d. (1947). T h e extract of this critique (of the " B o l s c h e w i k " article) was circulated together with excerpts from Varga's book among the functionaries of the KPD in the British Z o n e in 1947. See: Eugen Varga, 'Veränderungen in der Ökonomie des Kapitalismus im Ergebnis des zweiten Weltkrieges', printed as manuscript for the party functionaries, ed. KPD Headquarters in the British Zone, n.p. (Wuppertal) n.d. (the end of 1947). 52

Eugenio Reale, op. cit. (Note 50), p. 38.

232

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

circumstances the Soviet army should push the aggressors back into France - can the workers and people of France in that case face the Soviet army otherwise than [during World War II] the workers and peoples of Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, etc.?" 53 The SED aligned itself with the new policy more quickly than the KPD. At the beginning of July, it was announced that "the clear and unequivocal endorsement of the Soviet Union is the only possible position for any socialist party which intends to take a firm stand in the struggle against the imperialistic war mongers". 5 4 In September (Sept. 16), it extended this interpretation and fully took over the new line. 55 Among the KPD leadership, however, there were apparent difficulties in making the adjustment. 5 6 The change of course had nevertheless been completed by December, 1948. But the more the party leadership made the national conflict a focal point, and the more it stressed its reliance on the Soviet Union, the more did the party officials react sceptically - and the more did the influence of the party decrease. Uneasiness among top party officials, especially about the militant friendship with the Soviets, was only rarely voiced without compromise. Indirect reactions appeared more frequently. Top party officials at a KPD conference hesitated to read aloud from an official greeting from the SED, in which the population of Western Germany was urged to fight against the (western) aggressors in case of attack and to support the Soviet army in restoring peace. 57 Those in the opposition remained, however, in the minority; a few of them were later accused of opportunism (also in reference to their position in the aforementioned situation), expelled from the party or arrested and sentenced as "agents".

53 54

Cited in: Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart 1948/1949, 1828 F. Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei, vol. II, 3rd ed., Berlin (GDR), 1952, pp. 81 ff.

55

Ibid., pp. 100 ff. " See: Parteivorstand der KPD (ed.), Erklärung des Parteivorstandes der KPD zur politischen Lage, n. p. n. d. The date of this text (26.9.1948) is to be found in Herbert Kuehl, Die Gewerkschaftspolitik der KPD zwischen 1945 und 1956, Hamburg 1981, p. 109, s.a. M a x Reimann, 'Der Weg zum Sozialismus', in: Wissen und Tat, 3/7, 1948, p p . 8 f f .

57

The text of the address is printed in: Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei (Note 32), pp. 221 ff. The refusal to read the address aloud in Solingen is discussed by Wilhelm Pieck in 1950 at the Third SED-Party Convention. M a x Reimann repeats these accusations. See Franz D a h l e m / M a x Reimann, Die nächsten Aufgaben der KPD. Reden auf der Konferenz der westdeutschen Gastdelegierten zum III. Parteitag der SED, ed. the KPD Executive Committee, Hagen, n.d. pp. 18 f.

The German

Linksparteien

233

Summary: SED, KPD The perception of the determinants of political and social developments by parties like the KPD and SED was largely influenced by the special character of these parties. In the post-war period, compulsory since 1948, this character was defined by the recognition of democratic centralism as the guiding principle for the inner-party policy formation process and, even more importantly, by the acceptance of the CPSU's leading role. The Soviet party's claim to leadership and its actual leadership position contributed to the fact that the party cadres developed a policy in which the Soviet Union occupied such an influential position that it had a lasting effect on the way international power relationships were perceived. This bond, which was also based on emotional and - even more - on ideological elements, had been quasi-institutionalized until the dissolution of the Comintern. That is why KPD and SED policy and activity are difficult to interpret as results of their own analytic efforts. One can assume that the party leadership occasionally came to independent, divergent conclusions before they finally appropriated the views of the Soviet leadership; this can only be proven, however, to a limited extent for the years between 1945 and 1949. Attempts to oppose strictly new policies have not been documented and are not very likely. Referring to the atmospheric framework and the material basis of communist politics in Germany, it is therefore difficult to determine whether the statements available reflect at least instances of independent perceptions of international power relationships, or if they merely document the willingness of an "international" party to align itself with a world movement and its leadership.

234

Dietrich Staritz, Arnold Sywottek

Zusammenfassung

Die Perzeption des internationalen Kräfteverhältnisses der Jahre 1945 bis 1949 durch SPD, KPD und (später) SED war zum einen durch die Schwierigkeiten der Reorganisation der beiden politischen Hauptströmungen der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung beeinflußt. Sie wurde zum anderen dadurch erschwert, daß beide Richtungen vor erheblichen Problemen standen, für ganz Deutschland einheitliche und verbindliche Meinungs- und Willensbildungsprozesse in Gang zu setzen. In zumindest gleichem Maße aber war die innerparteiliche Rezeption und Verarbeitung internationaler Politik überlagert durch die (traditionelle) Frontstellung, die sich zwischen beiden aufgrund der (nur im Osten Deutschlands erfolgreichen, auf die Parteibeziehungen im Westen extrem negativ wirkenden) Einheitsfront- und Einheitsparteitaktik der Kommunisten rasch wieder ergab. Vor diesem Hintergrund setzte sich in der SPD der Westzonen schon sehr früh eine Orientierung an westlichem Politikverständnis durch, das auch für die Perzeption der internationalen Kräftekonstellation prägend wirken sollte. Gleichwohl sind in der SPD dieser Jahre unterschiedliche Wahrnehmungen und - aus ihnen folgend - auch unterschiedliche außen- und deutschlandpolitische Konzepte erkennbar. In der KPD hingegen zeigt sich, ebenso wie in der SED der SBZ, schon sehr früh die Bereitschaft zur Übernahme von Weltsicht und Politikverständnis der KPdSU bzw. ihrer Weltbewegung. Nennenswerte Abweichungen von dieser international konzipierten Strategie und Taktik sind deshalb nur in der Formierungsphase der Partei nachweisbar. Die Perzeption internationaler Politik durch die SPD erweist sich mithin als ein notwendig widersprüchlicher, doch eigenständiger Prozeß, die von SED/KPD dagegen als Anpassung an die Generallinie ihrer von der KPdSU inspirierten Bruderparteien.

III. The Economic Area

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power on the Eve of the Cold War* by George C. Peden

The period of post-war drift into " C o l d W a r " was marked by economic problems which reached a crisis in 1947, just as the political estrangement between the western and eastern powers was growing rapidly. For western Europe, the economic crisis of 1947 was a shortage of dollars to pay for goods and materials needed for economic reconstruction after the Second World War. T h e solution was the United States' offer of massive aid to Europe, on condition that European countries co-operated with each other. T h e offer was first mentioned by General Marshall, the American Secretary of State, in June 1947, but Congress did not approve " M a r s h a l l a i d " until April 1948. Although President Truman authorised "interim a i d " from the end of 1947, policy-makers could not be certain how much each country would receive until September 1948, when the European Recovery Programme was agreed. In this period of uncertainty it was the goal of British economic policy-makers to make Britain as little dependent as possible on Marshall aid. Even so, the perceptions of these policy-makers led

* This paper has drawn upon the following unpublished work: Kathleen Burk, Imperial College, London, 'Britain and the Marshall Plan' (seminar paper); Andrew Chester, 'Planning, the L a b o u r Governments and British Economic Policy 1 9 4 3 - 5 1 ' , P h . D . thesis, Univ. of Bristol 1983; Russell Jones, 'The Wages Problem in Employment Policy 1 9 3 6 - 4 8 ' , M . S c . thesis, Univ. of Bristol 1983; Derek Leebbaert, St. Anthony's College, O x f o r d , draft chapter of thesis on Anglo-American relations; Neil Rollings, draft chapters of University of Bristol thesis on ' T h e Control of Inflation in the M a n a g e d Economy 1 9 4 5 - 5 8 ' ; M a r k Stadler, 'Aspects of British Defence Policy 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 5 1 ' , B. A. diss., Univ. of Bristol 1983. T h e author has also benefited from listening to the following seminar papers (all given at All Souls College, Oxford, in 1983): Professor L.S. Pressneil, University of Kent, 'The American and Canadian Loans of 1945-6'; Dr.P. Cottrell, University of Leicester, 'The convertibility crisis of 1947'; Sir Alec Cairncross, University of O x f o r d , ' T h e Devaluation of 1949'; Professor Alan M i l w a r d , U M I S T / E U I , 'European recovery from reconstruction to the Great B o o m ' . Research for the paper was funded by the British Academy, and earlier relevant research had been funded by the Social Science Research Council and the University of Bristol. T h e author wishes to thank Dr. Burk, Sir Alec Cairncross, Professor Pressneil and M r . Rollings for comments on the first draft of the paper.

238

George C. Peden

them to look primarily to co-operation with the United States, and with the British Commonwealth, for the solution to the United Kingdom's economic difficulties. Co-operation with European countries was seen as playing a subordinate role. Britain's economic problems were exacerbated by political factors, principally the disturbed state of many areas within Britain's sphere of interest (notably Greece, Palestine, India and South-East Asia). All governments must try to reconcile political policy with economic resources, but this problem was particularly acute for the Labour government, which came to power in 1945. Labour had achieved a parliamentary majority for the first time, with promises to provide universal social services of a high standard; to build large numbers of houses; to prevent the recurrence of the high unemployment of the inter-war years, and to nationalise, and to render efficient, the coal and steel industries, electricity and gas utilities, and rail and much road transport. Such a programme involved high government expenditure, and would have been sufficient to strain the resources of an economy weakened by six years of war. However, the Labour government was also determined to maintain Britain's position as a firstclass world power, and this involved use of scarce resources of manpower and foreign exchange for defence purposes. T h e government's unwillingness to reduce policy goals increased Britain's dependence on American aid, and goodwill, at least until Britain's short-term problems of economic reconstruction had been solved.

I

Ultimate responsibility for economic aspects of policy lay with a small group of ministers: Clement Attlee, prime minister; Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary; Sir Stafford Cripps, president of the Board of Trade, who in 1947 became minister for economic affairs and then chancellor of the Exchequer; Hugh Dalton, chancellor of the Exchequer until his resignation in November 1947, and Herbert Morrison, lord president of the council. 1 There were other ministers with economic responsibilities, but it was these five who were full members of the Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee, and who, together with Α. V. Alexander, the minister o f defence, formed what was in effect an inner Cabinet. Overall responsibility for economic policy had originally been given to Morrison, but his chief interest was in nationalisation, and he failed to co-ordinate other aspects of

1

For their careers in this period see Kenneth Harris, Attlee, London 1982; Alan Bullock, Bevin. Foreign Cripps,

Secretary

1945-51,

London 1983; Colin Cooke, The Life of Richard

London 1957; Hugh Dalton, High

Bernard D o n o u g h u e / G . W. Jones, Herbert

Tide and After, Morrison.

Memoirs

1945-60,

Portrait of a Politician,

Ernest Stafford

London 1962; London 1973.

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

239

policy. Dalton's approach to economic problems was essentially fiscal, seeking to reduce government expenditure. It was not until Cripps took over from Dalton that the Treasury was given overall responsibility for economic policy. Cripps was the only minister who thought of planning in terms of manpower, foreign exchange, investment, and scarce fuel and materials, and claims upon these resources. 2 Bevin was interested in economic policy both because dependence on American aid influenced his diplomacy and because government policies required austerity, and Bevin, as a former trade union leader, regarded himself as an authority on how much austerity the workers would tolerate. Ministers could turn for advice to a number of economists in government service^ However, it had been a severe blow when the greatest economist of the period, Lord Keynes, died in April 1946. One Treasury official described Keynes as the "controller of the basic strategy" in Britain's approach to the post-war world. 3 Generally, administrative officials rather than economists had the last word in advising ministers. The most important official was Sir Edward Bridges, permanent secretary of the Treasury and head of the Civil Service. Bridges's task was to limit ministers' ambitions to what the economy could afford, and he seems to have been helped by the fact that the permanent secretaries of the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Fuel and Power were former Treasury officials, who were sympathetic to his views. On the other hand, ministers could not ignore the political unpopularity of austerity. The public expected an increase in living standards, even although war-time living standards, meagre as they were, had been maintained only through American lend lease supplies, which had been terminated at the end of the war. 4 Economic arguments pointed to a reduction in imports to a level which Britain could afford to pay for, but the Conservative opposition could not fail to gain politically from austerity imposed by a Labour government. Allegations were made of waste in public services or errors in state planning, and restrictions on private enterprise were blamed for low living standards. 5 Yet it was only by restricting the public's share of the national income that resources could be found for the government's programmes, at least until the economy had recovered. The government was careful to consult trade union leaders and employers' organisations, a fact given official recognition in 1946 by the reconstruction of the National Joint Council, which brought together representatives of

1

3 4 5

Sir Richard Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace 1942-1949, ed. Sir Alec Cairncross, Oxford 1982, pp. 7 7 - 8 0 . Ibid., p. 71. See H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply, London 1955, pp. 4 5 5 - 6 2 , 467f. For example, see three-day debate on economic situation, 1 0 - 1 2 March 1947, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol.434, esp. cols. 1001, 1005 - 7 , 1055, 1 2 4 6 - 5 1 , 1336-45, 1352.

240

George C. Peden

the Trades Union Congress (Τ. U. C.) and the British Employers' Confederation. Civil servants briefing ministers in 1947 commented on the "thoroughly cooperative attitude" shown by the T. U. C. on measures to increase industrial output, and welcomed the T. U. C. 's recognition of Britain's balance of payments problem. 6 However, it was easier for T. U. C. leaders to take a broad view of Britain's problems than it was for workers in mines for factories. For example, in September 1947 the T. U. C. was prepared to acquiesce in government proposals to take powers to direct workers to jobs which were essential to increase industrial output and exports. At the same time, however, there was an unofficial strike in the Yorkshire coalfield, which threatened to bring factories in a major industrial area to a standstill. Neither the T. U. C. nor employers' organisations in Britain can control their members, being able only to advise them to accept government policies aimed at the solution of Britain's economic difficulties. In particular, in 1947 the T. U. C. and employers' organisations agreed on the need to increase production, while limiting wage demands and dividends, so that increased output went to exports. 7

II Britain's economic weakness on the eve of the Cold War was largely the consequence of the high price she had paid for victory in the Second World War. It was estimated at the end of 1945 that overseas investments worth £ 1118 million had been sold or otherwise disposed of during the war, reducing Britain's money income from abroad from £ 168 million in 1938 to £ 50 million in 1945, during which period prices had doubled. British industry had been diverted from production for export to production of munitions, so that exports in 1945 were only 46 per cent of the 1938 volume. Overseas debt had increased from £ 4 7 6 million in August 1939 to £ 3 3 5 5 million in June 1945, while over the same period Britain's reserves of gold and dollars had fallen from £ 6 0 5 million to £ 4 5 3 million. About half of the overseas debt had been incurred in India and the Middle East, largely in payment for supplies or labour services for British armed

* Public Record Office (PRO), Cabinet Office Papers, series 21, volume 2243 (CAB 21/2243), 'Meeting with Trades Union Congress', brief for ministers, 6 May 1947. 7 The Times, 2 Sept. 1947, pp. 4 f and 3 September, p. 4. In the event the government chose not to use its powers to direct labour. For relations between goverment and the TUC and employers' organisations in this period see Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, London 1979, pp. 3 7 1 - 4 0 5 . Middlemas presents a thesis of "corporate bias", whereby under stimulus of government's needs and changing economic and social conditions, the TUC and employers' organisations were raised to the status of "governing institutions", albeit exposed to popular discontent. He believes that, by transferring effective political bargaining outside Parliament, these institutions blurred class conflict.

241

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

forces in these regions. 8 These debts took the form of sterling balances held in London. A large part were blocked, to be released only gradually over the years in amounts which seemed dangerously high to the British Treasury, but which seemed too low to Britain's creditors. Like much of the rest of the world, Britain was critically short of dollars with which to pay for purchases in the United States and Canada. Britain had to draw on these sources for food (especially grain), raw materials, oil and some industrial products (especially capital goods to re-equip industry). This dependence was mainly the result of damage to, or dislocation of, alternative sources of supply. British living standards could be maintained, and the output of British industry restored quickly, only if dollar credit were available. Keynes advised in 1945 that the alternative to an American loan would be for Britain to abandon her position as a first-class power, and " t o retire, as Russia did between the wars, to starve and reconstruct", using "nothing much less than Russian methods", perhaps emerging in good health half a generation later. Keynes estimated that Britain needed American credit of $ 5000 million to be comfortable, but that she could possibly manage on $ 4000 million. 9 In the event, under the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of December 1945, the United States granted a line of credit of $ 3750 million (£ 930 million at the official exchange rate of £ 1 : $ 4.03) and lent $ 650 million to enable Britain to settle outstanding lend-lease claims. 10 Britain also borrowed $ 1250 million from Canada. Under the terms of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, Britain was to repay the principal plus interest of 2 per cent over 50 years, beginning in 1951. Interest was to be waived in years when Britain could not afford to buy her prewar volume of imports. Much more important was the fact that Britain was placed under an obligation to make sterling convertible for current transactions a year after the agreement had been ratified by Congress (which, as it turned out, meant a year after July 1946). This obligation did not extend to war-time sterling balances which had been funded, but the agreement meant that from July 1947 Britain would not use exchange controls to prevent new sterling receipts, or any sterling balances that were released, being converted into dollars. Yet the British government had also agreed to recommend to Parliament a policy of adherence to the Bretton Woods agreement to maintain stable exchange rates. 11 It was not clear how the sterling : dollar exchange rate could be maintained once sterling 8

'Statistical Material Presented During the Washington Negotiations', Cmd. 6 7 0 7 , British mentary Papers (BPP), 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 , vol. 21, p. 1; History of the Second

Parlia-

World War, UK Civil Series,

Statistical Digest of the War, London 1951, Tables 142 and 180. ' Collected

Writings of John

Maynard

Keynes,

v o l . 2 4 , London 1979, pp. 2 7 5 f, 4 2 1 .

10

'Financial Agreement between the Government of the United States and the United Kingdom',

11

See Armand Van Dormael, Bretton

C m d . 6 7 0 8 , BPP, 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 , v o l . 2 5 , p . 7 8 7 . pp. 2 7 4 - 8 5 .

Woods.

Birth

of a Monetary

System,

London

1978,

242

George C. Peden

was convertible, unless world trade was such that demand for dollars did not lead to a greater conversion of sterling into dollars than Britain's meagre gold and dollar reserves could withstand. Demand for dollars could not be reduced by discriminating against American imports, using tariffs or quotas, for Article 9 of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement forbad such measures after the end of 1946. Britain had refused to accede to American pressure to drop existing imperial preference arrangements (discriminatory tariffs) with Commonwealth and Empire countries, but neither the size of the preferences nor the range of goods which these countries could supply made this a decisive factor in AngloAmerican trade. T h e Anglo-American Financial Agreement of 1945 could only have been workable if a world shortage of dollars had not developed. Keynes, writing early in 1946, thought that the chances of the dollar becoming dangerously scarce in the course of the next five to ten years were not very high, but he assumed that, beginning in 1947, the United States' trade surplus would be reduced by the rest of the world recovering its capacity to supply goods which Americans wanted. 1 2 This did not happen. Indeed, the slow recovery of the world economy, and Britain's own production problems, meant that the dollar problem became unmanageable in 1947, unless the Americans granted further credits. In the loan negotiations in 1945 the British Treasury had estimated that there would be a cumulative deficit in the balance of payments amounting to $ 5 0 0 0 million in 1946, 1947 and 1948, or about the same as the combined American and Canadian credits. Further deficits would have to be met out of Britain's gold and dollar reserves (which in December 1945 stood at about $ 2265 million), or possibly loans of up to about $ 320 million in any one year from the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) set up under the Bretton Woods agreement. At first matters turned out better than expected. British exports recovered very rapidly, to 11 per cent above their 1938 volume, by the fourth quarter of 1946. Even so, price changes, and Britain's loss of income from overseas investments, meant that these increased exports were not enough to finance imports of 70 to 75 per cent of the 1938 volume. T h e 1945 calculations had assumed prices double those of 1938, but in 1947 import prices were about 260 per cent of 1938, whereas export prices were only about 210 per cent of 1938. Post-war inflation in the United States had reduced the real value of dollars by about a quarter, falsifying earlier forecasts of the amount of credit needed. Towards the end of 1946 the drain upon British dollar resources accelerated rapidly, and before mid-

12

J . M . Keynes, ' T h e balance of payments of the United States', in: Economic

Journal,

56, 1946,

pp. 1 7 1 - 8 7 . T o be fair to Keynes, one should add that as late as December 1946 the experts of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board did not foresee a world dollar shortage in 1947. See Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar

Diplomacy,

New York 1969, p. 291.

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

243

1947 over half the American and Canadian credits had been used, with every prospect that the drain would continue. 13 Britain's dollar problem has to be seen in a world context. In effect, Britain was a bridge between the eastern hemisphere, with which she traditionally had a trade surplus, and the western hemisphere, with which she traditionally had a trade deficit. Since most eastern hemisphere countries were also short of dollars, Britain was unable to secure from her trade surplus with them the dollars she needed to finance her trade deficit with the western hemisphere. Once Britain was under an obligation to make sterling convertible into dollars, the effect of the world dollar shortage was that countries used current earnings of sterling to convert into dollars. Even before sterling became convertible on 15 July 1947, the British government was explaining to the American administration that convertibility and non-discrimination in trade would place a heavy burden on the British people. The only way to reduce the dollar drain would be to cut all imports, not just imports from America. Under Article 9 of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement Britain was forbidden, for example, to buy Spanish oranges at a higher price than American oranges, even if Britain had spare pesetas but no spare dollars. Consequently the British approached the Americans for the right to depart from Article 9 in the case of particular commodities. As a note by the Board of Trade put the position: " T h e Americans have the choice of letting us have some oranges or no oranges, but in any case they cannot sell us their oranges." 1 4 No such concessions had been made by the time sterling was made convertible (although the Americans were to abandon their rights under Article 9 later). However, Dalton was advised by Treasury officials and the Bank of England that convertibility would not put serious pressure on Britain's gold and dollar reserves. It was believed, wrongly, that speculators had already discounted convertibility. 15 Treasury officials had pressed for cuts in imports to improve Britain's trade deficit, 16 but this alone would not have been enough. Subsequent enquiry showed that the United Kingdom's current balance of payments deficit could account for only three fifths of the loss of gold and dollars in 1946 and 1947. The current deficit worsened in 1947, but this would account for only a fifth of the worsening dollar drain in that year. The rest must have been almost entirely the result of excessive overseas investment or a flight of capital from

13

'Economic Survey for 1947', Cmd. 7046, BPP, 1 9 4 6 - 4 7 , vol. 19, p. 473, paras 3 7 - 4 1 ; PRO, CAB 130/19, 'Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer', 4 June 1947; Prime Ministers' Office papers, series 8, file494 (PREM 8/494), Economic Planning Board, 'Review of the Present Position', 17 Sept. 1947.

14

PRO, CAB 130/19, 'Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer', 4 June 1947, Annex A.

15

Dalton, op. cit., pp. 257 f. Clarke, op. cit., pp.81f, 1 5 7 - 7 4 .

16

244

George C. Peden

sterling. 17 Treasury officials had hoped to secure reductions in dollar imports so that Britain could carry on without additional American credit until after the presidential elections of 1948, but the Ministries of Food and Health argued successfully that cuts in food imports on the scale envisaged would adversely affect health and morale, thus perhaps preventing the increase in industrial output for which the government hoped. 18 Be that as it may, no reasonable reduction in imports could have prevented the convertibility crisis of JulyAugust 1947, which threatened to exhaust Britain's remaining gold and dollar reserves. T h e crisis was probably a necessary one, in that only so clear a demonstration of Britain's inability to carry out the terms o f the Anglo-American Financial Agreement could have persuaded Congress to agree to a relaxation of its terms. Moreover, there were other countries in more dire straits than Britain, and the American administration was anxious in the summer of 1947 not do anything to arouse opposition in Congress to more aid to western Europe. T h e State Department knew that western European countries would soon run out of dollars, and was already planning what became Marshall aid. However, on 25 July - ten days after convertibility began - Bevin sent the first of a series of urgent warnings that Britain's financial position was becoming critical, and on 20 August the Americans agreed to the suspension of convertibility. Even so, the Americans froze $ 4 0 0 million of the credit made under the 1945 agreement until December 1 9 4 7 . " It may be asked why Britain did not respond to the 1947 crisis by devaluation, as she was to do in 1949, when the sterling-dollar exchange rate was reduced from $ 4 . 0 3 to $ 2 . 8 0 . Devaluation would have redirected Sterling Area exports towards dollar markets, assuming, as happened in 1949, that most other countries devalued against the dollar. It would, however, have been premature to take this step in 1946 or 1947, while exports were rising strongly from the low level to which they had sunk during the war, and when lack of productive capacity rather than price determined the volume o f exports. T h e time to devalue would be when British industry had recovered sufficiently to be in a position to expand exports to dollar markets. 2 0 In any case, under the Bretton Woods agreement, devaluation was not a step which Britain should take without showing that there was a fundamental disequilibrium in her balance of pay-

17

J . C . R . D o w , The Management

18

P R O , C A B 1 3 0 / 1 9 , minutes of interdepartmental meetings of officials on 12 M a y and 16 May

of the British Economy

1945-60,

Cambridge 1968, p. 24.

1947. See Clarke, op. cit., p p . 8 1 , 85. "

Foreign

Relations

of the United States, 1947, vol.111, Washington 1972, p p . 3 0 f , 43 f, 63, 6 6 - 8 ,

81 f, 9 0 - 4 . 20

See Sir Alec C a i m c r o s s and Barry Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline. 1949 and 1967, O x f o r d 1983, c h . 4 .

The Devaluations

of

1931,

245

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

ments. Moreover, sterling's role as an international reserve currency placed Britain under a moral obligation not to devalue other countries' reserves unless it were absolutely necessary. This was particularly so since the Sterling Area, of which Britain was the centre, broadly corresponded to the area of Britain's political influence. 21 While the dollar problem was most pressing in 1947, it was realised in Whitehall that there was a long-term problem of Britain's declining competitiveness in world markets. In particular, Treasury discussion in 1945 of the post-war balance of payments took account of the facts that Britain's share of world exports (by value) had declined from 13.0 per cent in 1924 to 9.9 per cent in 1937. It was realised that, while Britain might benefit from a temporary reduction in German and Japanese competition after 1945, she could not, in the long run, expect to increase her share of the world's manufactured exports (which, before the war, had stood at 20 per cent, larger than any other country). The United Kingdom's share of the world's population and productive capacity was expected to fall, as other countries industrialised - the more so since no less than a third of Britain's prewar manufactured exports had been textiles, the first things that industrialising countries produced for themselves. Even in the 1930s Britain had found it difficult to balance her international payments. Britain's best hope was seen by Whitehall officials as co-operation with the United States and other countries to expand world trade, so that, even without increasing her share, Britain could expand the volume of her exports. She would then be able to pay for her pre-war level of imports, despite the loss of income from overseas investments. 22 Competitiveness in world markets depended upon the efficiency of industry, upon exchange rates, and upon the will to sell abroad rather than on the relatively easier domestic market. Such international comparisons as were available in the 1940s suggested that output per worker in British and German industry had been about the same in 1 9 3 5 - 3 7 , but that output per worker in the United States had been roughly twice as great. The figures varied from industry to industry, but the British performance had been particularly poor in industries which had formed an important element in her exports: cotton spinning, coal

21 22

See Susan Strange, Sterling and British Policy, London 1971, esp. pp. 5 5 - 6 2 . 'Towards a balance of payments', memorandum by Richard Clarke, 11 M a y 1945, reproduced with related documents in: Clarke, op.cit., pp. 9 6 - 1 2 5 . A Foreign Office memorandum summed up the position succinctly: "Steps now being taken to re-equip and modernise United Kingdom industry will, it is confidently hoped, lead to a great measure of industrial recovery in the next few years. T h e easy predominance given by our lead in the Industrial Revolution will not, however, be regained", P R O , Foreign Office papers, series 371, file 6 2 4 2 0 (FO 3 7 1 / 6 2 4 2 0 ) , 'Effect of our External Financial Postion on Our Foreign Policy', circulated by Bevin, 1 2 F e b . 1947. F o r a perceptive contemporary American view of Britain's problems in adjusting to economic change see Alfred E. Kahn, Great Britain in the World Economy,

New York 1946.

246

George C. Peden

mining, and steel production. 23 New investment in these industries had been suspended during the war and official reports left no doubt that major reorganisation and re-equipment would be required. 24 The relative inefficiency of British export industries led to the question of devaluation being raised in the Treasury in 1943, and again in May 1945. On the latter occasion Keynes took the view that a comparison of war-time inflation rates showed that Britain had retained most of the advantage of the depreciation of sterling by 20 per cent against the dollar in 1939. He estimated that hourly wages in Britain were about 40 per cent of those in the United States, and commented that "even the celebrated inefficiency of British manufacturers can scarcely (one hopes) be capable of offsetting over wide ranges of industry the whole of this initial cost difference", even if that were the case in some industries. 25 The main bottlenecks restricting industrial output and exports were coal (and coke for steel works) and manpower. Coal output in the fourth quarter of 1946 was 18 per cent below the 1938 level, and it was possible to maintain industrial output at about the 1938 level only by reducing coal exports to a negligible amount. The loss of coal exports compared with 1938 was roughly equivalent in value to the whole of Britain's wheat imports in 1946. 26 The lack of coal output was on the agenda of almost every Cabinet meeting early in 1947. Emanuel Shinwell, the minister of Fuel and Power, blamed excessive absenteeism among the miners, many of whom were too old, and outdated equipment. Even at the end of 1946 some factories were stopping for days when they had run out of coal, and stockpiles at power stations were nearly exhausted. When severe weather interrupted transport of coal in February 1947 Shinwell had to announce the virtual cessation of electricity supply to most of industry (and only intermittent supply to households). The coal crisis lasted three weeks, and was estimated to have cost about £ 200 million in exports. 27 If so, this would account for about half of Britain's current balance of payments deficit in 1947. The manpower shortage of the 1940s was in sharp contrast to the high unemployment of the 1930s. The total working population at the end of 1946 was 20,324,000, or about 570,000 greater than in 1939, but whereas there had been only 480,000 men in the defence services at mid-1939, in November 1946 the figure was 1,510,000. This di'version of manpower from economically useful

"

L. Rostas, 'Industrial production, productivity and distribution in Britain, Germany and the United States', in: Economic

"

Journal,

Ministry of Production, Report

53, 1943, pp. 3 9 - 5 4 .

of the Cotton

Textile Mission

to the United States of

America,

London 1944; 'Coal Mining. Report of the Technical Advisory Committee', Cmd. 6610, BPP, 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 , v o l . 4 , p . 3 1 5 ; 'Iron and Steel Industry'. C m d . 6 8 1 1 , BPP, 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 , vol. 13, p . 4 2 9 . Writings,

v o l . 2 4 , p p . 2 6 1 f.

25

Collected

16

'Economic Survey for 1947', Cmd. 7 0 4 6 .

17

Emanuel Shinwell, I've Lived

Through

It All, London 1973, pp. 1 9 3 - 5 .

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

247

activities was offset partly by a reduction in the number of people employed in producing equipment for the armed forces (474,000 in November 1946 compared with 1,270,000 at mid-1939), and partly by a reduction in the number of workers unemployed (366,000 compared with 1,270,000 at the same dates). Even so, allowing for an increase in the number of people employed in public administration, the number of workers employed in meeting home civilian and export needs in November 1946,14,628,000, was only 318,000 more than in mid-1939. 28 This was not enough, at current levels of productivity, if Britain were to maintain current living standards and to increase exports to the level required to pay for the 1938 level of imports. It was estimated in 1947 that 500,000 more workers were required for export industries, and 100,000 more for agriculture, if planned reductions in food imports were to be possible. It was planned to release 300,000 men from the armed forces by March 1948, but the balance could come only from an increase in the productivity of labour, or a diversion of labour from home to export needs. In September 1947 the Central Economic Planning Staff, working in collaboration with the Treasury and the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, advised that the necessary diversion of manpower was unlikely to take place unless budgetary measures were taken to reduce domestic purchasing power, and even then further reductions in dollar imports would be necessary. 29 The actual increase in workers in manufacturing between 1947 and 1948 was only 149,000, with an additional 43,000 in agriculture and fishing. As it happened, however, a steadier flow of fuel and raw materials made possible a quite exceptional increase of 6 to 7 per cent in productivity in manufacturing industry between 1947 and 1948. 30 Since there were over 7 million workers in manufacturing industry, this increase in productivity was equivalent to an increase of about the 500,000 workers estimated to be required for increasing exports. However, such a development was more than policy-makers could have dared to hope for in 1947. In 1947 Britain's main hope of solvency lay in an export drive at the expense of production for home consumption. In September Cripps announced targets, which had been agreed with industry, for 153 classes of exports for 1948.

28

'Statement on the Economic Considerations affecting relations between Employers and Workers', Cmd.7018, BPP, 1 9 4 6 - 4 7 , vol. 19, p. 1195.

"

PRO, PREM 8 / 4 9 4 , Economic Planning Board, 'Review of the Present Situation', 17 Sept. 1947.

30

N . H . Leyland, 'Productivity', in: G . D . N . Worswick and P.H. Ady (eds), The British Economy 1945-1950, Oxford 1952, p. 393. See also Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics. Historical Abstract 1886-1968, London 1971, Table 116, and C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855 -1965, Cambridge 1972, Table 51. Sir Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery. British Economic Policy 1945-51, London 1985, ch. 2, has estimated that the average improvement in labour productivity in manufacturing was about 3.5 per cent between 1948 and 1951.

248

George C. Peden

Cripps's dirigiste methods seem to have worked on this occasion, since exports rose by 25 per cent in a year.31 The export drive reduced Britain's dollar trade deficit, and this, together with co-operation from other Sterling Area countries regarding restrictions on dollar imports, brought about the virtual elimination of the Sterling Area's dollar trade deficit in 1949. Even then Britain herself had a dollar deficit, and sterling remained vulnerable, since gold and dollar reserves were still too small in relation to foreign holdings of sterling balances. It cannot be said that concern in Whitehall about Britain's economic position after the war was misplaced.

Ill

As in the 1930s, there was a need to maintain a balance between armed strength and economic strength, if Britain were to retain her position as a first-class power. 32 As the war drew to a close, Anthony Eden, Churchill's foreign secretary, circulated a memorandum stating that during the ten years or so before the war Britain had allowed her armaments to decline to a point at which they were inadequate to sustain diplomatic policy, and he expected Britain to maintain a 'reasonably high' level of armaments after the war. On the other hand: "It is equally important that our diplomatic policy should be commensurate with our economic power. If we enter into commitments which our economic situation will not bear, we shall be exposed to another series of humiliations."33

This view that the Foreign Office must have the economic facts in mind, and that there was a need to reduce commitments and expenditure abroad, was endorsed by Bevin.34 The contradiction between the need to rebuild Britain's economic strength on the one hand, and the policies of the defence departments on the other, had been commented on by Keynes in May 1945. He pointed out that expenditure by the defence departments in areas of the world no longer directly connected with the war against Germany were almost wholly responsible for Britain's financial difficulties in 1944-45. In his view, unless economies could be achieved in de-

31

The Times,

32

For position before 1939 see G . C . Peden, 'British Perceptions of Economic Power in the Late Nineteen-thirties', paper given at Colloque international sur La Perception de la Puissance en Europe occidentale a la veille de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Paris 1982. French Translation in: Rene Girault/Robert Frank (eds), La Puissance en Europe 1938-40, Paris 1984, pp. 1 8 7 - 2 0 2 .

33

PRO, FO 371/62420, 'The Effect of our External Financial Position on our Foreign Policy', memorandum by J.E. Coulson, 30 March 1945, circulated under cover of Eden's despatch UE 813/813/53.

34

Ibid. Bevin's circulars of 11 March 1946 and 12Feb. 1947.

13Sept. 1947, p . 4 ; D o w , op.cit., p p . 3 4 f .

249

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

fence departments' expenditure abroad, Britain's ability to pursue an independent financial policy in the early post-war years could be fatally impaired. 35 Moreover, as noted above, slow demobilisation after 1945 was at the expense of industrial output and exports. On the other hand, the increasing importance of Middle Eastern oil reinforced Britain's determination to retain political influence in that region - a task which entailed heavy policing costs as Arab nationalism and Zionism clashed with British interests. 36 There seemed, nevertheless, to be ample opportunities for reducing the defence departments' manpower and expenditure. The Cabinet's Defence Committee agreed in February 1946 that Britain would not have to fight a major war during the next two or three years; that in a future major war the United States would probably be on Britain's side, and that no hostile fleet capable of being a menace to Britain's security would exist during the next few years. 37 On the other hand, the dominions were returning to their pre-war practice of leaving almost the whole burden of defending the Commonwealth and Empire to Britain and India, and it was anticipated that, once Indian independence was achieved, Indian troops might no longer be available for imperial defence. 38 In fact both India and Pakistan pursued neutralist policies after independence in August 1947, but withdrawal from India was to release much British military manpower for other purposes. In 1946 Bevin was a powerful opponent of a rapid reduction in the armed forces. In the Cabinet Defence Committee's discussions in January he asked that reductions be delayed until after peace treaties had been concluded with Germany's former allies. It was largely in support of diplomacy that the army had units in Greece and Venezia Guilia, as well as occupation forces in Germany and Austria. In April Bevin supported the chiefs of staff on the need for Britain to remain a Mediterranean power - to keep the Soviet Union out of the region even although Attlee said that there was no doubt that the United Kingdom could not afford the money or the manpower for forces of the size said to be necessary. 39 Again, later in 1946, Bevin lent his powerful support to the principle

35

Collected

M

This point was made by the Ministry of Fuel and Power and the Chiefs of Staff—PRO, C A B 1 3 1 / 1 ,

Writings,

vol.24, p p . 2 6 4 - 6 .

minutes of Cabinet's Defence Committee, 5 April 1946; C A B 131/3, 'British Strategic Requirements in the Middle East', report by Chiefs of Staff, 18 June 1946. F o r challenge to Britain's position in the Middle East at this time see Elizabeth M o n r o e , Britain's Moment

in the

Middle

East, Baltimore 1963, c h . 7 . 37 38

P R O , C A B 131/1, minutes, 15 Feb. 1946, pp. 4 - 5 . Ibid., minutes, 21 Jan. 1946, pp. 3 f. F o r Commonwealth attitudes to imperial defence before the war see G . C . Peden, 'The burden of imperial defence and the Continental commitment reconsidered', in: Historical

"

Journal,

TJ, 1984.

P R O , C A B 131/1, Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, 11 J a n . 1946, p. 3; 21 J a n . 1946, p. 3 ; 5 April 1946, p p . 4 f .

250

George C. Peden

of universal conscription for the armed forces in peace, despite the shortage of labour for industry, and, at the beginning of 1947, he supported the Ministry of Defence's efforts to retain some industrial capacity, and expert design staffs, despite the need to increase industrial output for exports. He said in October 1946 that he was convinced that, if Britain were not prepared to take risks, and show determination to defend her interests, then all of Europe (meaning continental Europe) would fall under Soviet influence. 40 Bevin's powerful support enabled the minister of defence, Alexander, to resist the full force of the Treasury's demands for reduced defence expenditure in 1946/47, but, in the light of the convertibility crisis in July 1947, the chancellor, Dalton, returned to the question of the size of the armed forces. In discussions in August Bevin agreed that re-organisation of the armed forces ought to release 200,000 men, and Attlee too was described by Dalton as 'fresh-minded' on defence. 41 Alexander argued that demobilisation difficulties, especially a shipping shortage, made this impracticable in the immediate future, but he ordered a review of policy by the chiefs of staff on the assumption that it would not be possible to contemplate undertaking a major war until Britain's economic strength had recovered, and that the risk of a major war must be ruled out over the next five years. On 29 September the Cabinet's Defence Committee agreed to recommend to the Cabinet acceptance of "the serious risks and political consequences involved" in reducing the strength of the armed forces from 1,227,000 men to 713,000 by March 1949, a recommendation which the Cabinet duly accepted three days later. 42 Britain's military weakness was thus emphasised at a time when her economic problems were forcing her to seek financial assistance from the United States.

IV The closeness of Britain's relations with the United States was not simply the consequence of weakness. The Foreign Office believed that, even if Britain had not required financial assistance, maintenance of good relations would be essential, because American co-operation in the creation of a stable world economy, such as Britain hoped for, was essential. It was recognized that other countries requiring American aid were likely to defer to American views, even against their better judgement, but it was felt that the Anglo-American partnership was

40

Ibid., Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, 16 Oct. 1946, pp. 3f; C A B 1 2 8 / 9 , Cabinet minutes, 28 J a n . 1947, p. 85.

41

P R O , P R E M 8 / 8 3 3 (Part 1), Dalton to Attlee, 11 Aug. 1947; Bevin to Attlee, 15 Aug. 1947; Dalton,

42

P R O , P R E M 8 / 8 3 3 ( P a r t i ) , Alexander to Attlee, 2 5 A u g . 1947; ibid. ( P a r t 2 ) , Cabinet Defence

op.cit., pp. 101, 105. Committee minutes, 29 Sept. 1947, and extract of Cabinet conclusion, 2 Oct. 1947.

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

251

worth the price even of acceptance by Britain of the occasionally irksome role of junior partner. Bevin saw maintenance of close and cordial relations with the United States as a matter of overriding importance, but he did not intend that Britain's initiative or independence of action, where necessary, in foreign affairs should be impaired. 43 Bevin was determined to involve the United States in European affairs. His abrupt announcement in February 1947 that British financial aid to Greece would have to stop because of Britain's desperate economic situation brought home to American public opinion the wider implications of Britain's financial weakness, and the British embassy in Washington followed this up with what the ambassador called " a discreet talking campaign" to persuade Americans that political stability in Europe and elsewhere could not be secured without economic stability, which in turn depended on increased American financial aid. 44 President Truman had to win support in Congress for taking over Britain's role in Greece, which he did in March by enunciating the "Truman doctrine", which was a policy of supporting "free peoples" who were resisting armed minorities or outside pressures. The British military mission remained in Greece, while the United States provided economic aid to Greece and Turkey. 45 By August 1947 Bevin was using American concern about British troop withdrawals from Greece and Venezia Giulia to extract information from the Americans about when Marshall aid would become available, and to urge that it would be deplorable if aid arrived too late. 4 i The question of timing was important, since the British Treasury had advised in July that there seemed little chance of Marshall aid coming before the existing American loan was exhausted. The Treasury view was that ministers would have to choose between a gamble on Marshall aid being neither too little nor too late, or a radical change in British policy away from multilateral to bilateral trade, with further retrenchment at home and a review of military and other commitments abroad, all to avoid expenditure of dollars. 47 From June 1947 the American administration made plain that it could no longer deal with Britain apart from the rest of Europe. Congress would grant aid

43

P R O , F O 3 7 1 / 6 2 4 2 0 , ' T h e Effect of our External Financial Position on our Foreign Policy', 30 M a r c h 1945, and Bevin's circular of 12 Feb. 1947, enclosing a m e m o r a n d u m with same title.

44

Ibid., Lord Inverchapel t o Bevin, 18 M a r c h 1947.

4J

Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the U . S . A . and the European Cold War, 1945—8', in: History,

67,

1982, pp. 2 1 7 - 3 5 is the best short study of Anglo-American relations in the period. F o r a fuller account of British policy towards Greece see G . M . Alexander, The Prelude to the Truman

Doc-

trine, Oxford 1982. 46

P R O , P R E M 8 / 8 3 3 (Part 1), memorandum by Bevin, 2 Aug. 1947, and note from American Ambassador, same date.

47

P R O , Treasury papers, series 229, file 136 (T 2 2 9 / 1 3 6 ) , 'Alternative Courses of Action', memorandum by R . W . B . Clarke, 2 3 J u l y 1947, reprinted in Clarke, op.cit. pp. 1 7 5 - 8 0 .

252

George C. Peden

only if there were economic co-operation between European states, including Britain, and only if Europe showed that it could be back on its feet in about three years. 48 The British did indeed take a leading part in the conference on European Economic Co-operation which met in Paris from July to September 1947, but the British did not intend to merge their destinies with Europe, for reasons which will be explained below. Co-operation with European states was primarily to satisfy American opinion and to secure Marshall aid through the European Recovery Programme. It was important for the Labour government to keep in step with American opinion. An increasingly conservative American public was apt, by 1947, to believe that socialist policies were responsible for Britain's economic problems. The American ambassador in London reported at the time of the convertibility crisis that he was certain that the British had "not come to grips with their coal problems and other issues". 49 Accordingly even in October 1947 the Foreign Office, Treasury and Ministry of Labour agreed it was desirable to introduce economy measures to cut dollar imports. This would show the Americans that the British were determined to put their own affairs in order, while also bringing home to the British people themselves the gravity of their country's position. The Foreign Office felt that "our whole relations with the U.S.A. were at present vitiated by our uncertainty as to the extent to which we must seek their assistance in 1948", and urged that Britain's diplomatic position would be enormously improved if she could show that she would survive whether further American aid were forthcoming or not. 50 By December 1947, however, it was estimated in London that, even if Britain got a quarter of her imports free under the European Recovery Programme, she would still be unable to afford a standard of living higher than what had prevailed before cuts in food and petroleum imports had been made in the summer of that year. 51 Early in 1948 Robert Hall, director of the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, noted: "we must either get American help, or recast the basis of our economic existence", which he considered to be a bleak alternative. At the same time he thought that it would be a good thing if Marshall aid did no more than enable Britain to maintain her existing levels of rations, for that would give a realistic basis from which to plan recovery. 52

48

P R O , CAB 1 3 0 / 1 9 , N o t e of a meeting in the chancellor's room, 24 June 1947.

49

Foreign

50

P R O , C A B 1 3 0 / 2 7 , 'The 1948 Dollar Programme', note by Sir Edward Bridges, 11 Oct. 1947, and

51

P R O , CAB 1 3 4 / 2 1 5 , 'Report on Marshall Aid', note by chairman of the London Committee,

Relations

of the United States, 1947, III, 44.

minutes of meeting under his chairmanship, 14 Oct. 1947. 22 Dec. 1947. 52

P R O , CAB 2 1 / 2 2 4 4 , Ί 9 4 8 Dollar Position' (Cabinet Paper(48) 35), 1 2 F e b . 1948, and 'Prospects Under E . R . P . ' , by R o b e r t Hall, 11 M a y 1948.

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

253

Marshall aid was seen on both sides of the Atlantic as a temporary expedient to be terminated as soon as economic recovery was complete (Britain received no further aid after the end of 1950).

V British attitudes towards Europe in 1946-48 were influenced more by economic problems (and the political changes these could bring about) than by any overtly military threat. In 1947 the Foreign Office took the view that the task of economic recovery from the Second World War would make it impossible for the Soviet Union to strengthen its military and strategic position as much as the Russians might wish. Even at the end of 1948 Britain's defence plans assumed that there was no early prospect of a "shooting war", as opposed to " C o l d War", and Britain's plans under the European Recovery Programme assumed that there would be no general rearmament or major political change in Europe. The economic plans also assumed that a reasonable amount of trade would continue across the "Iron Curtain". 5 3 The main limiting factor in east-west trade was the war-time devastation, followed by a drought in the Soviet Union in 1946, which together reduced eastern Europe's grain exports and increased western Europe's dependence on North America. In London this situation was expected in 1947 to last beyound 1949. 54 There were other factors affecting east-west trade. As late as January 1947 Bevin had thought that there was a good prospect of re-establishing Britain's trading connections with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, but seven months later it had become plain that the Soviet policy of dovetailing the economies of her satellites with herself and with each other would largely exclude western traders. 55 As the Cold War intensified, a difference of opinion developed between the Foreign Office and the Treasury regarding economic policy towards eastern Europe. By December 1948 the Foreign Office was arguing that Britain should not become dependent on the Soviet Union and its satellites for supplies of food and raw materials, and also that Britain should impose stricter control over the export of equipment which might strengthen the Soviet Union's war potential. However, even at that date, the chancellor of the Exchequer, Cripps, supported

53

P R O , F O 371/66290, ' T h e Russian Economic Situation and its effect on Soviet Foreign Policy', 22 April 1947; C A B 21/1806: minutes of meeting of [Commonwealth] prime ministers, 11 Oct. 1948, p. 2, and C A B 21/2244, N o r m a n Brook to prime minister, 13 Dec. 1948.

54

P R O , P R E M 8/494, Economic Planning Board, 'Review of the Present Situation', 17 Sept. 1947, para. 18; F O 371/66289, Maurice Peterson to Bevin, 23 J a n . 1947.

55

P R O , C A B 128/9, Cabinet minutes, 2 Jan. 1947; F O 371/66433, 'Soviet Economic Policy in Eastern Europe', report to Bevin, 12 Aug. 1947.

254

George C. Peden

by the Cabinet secretary, Norman Brook, argued against any form of economic warfare. Brook advised Attlee that plans submitted to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) showed that western Europe would still have a large trade deficit with North America in 1952/53, so that alternative sources of supply, including eastern Europe, were essential to western Europe's economic viability. 56 So far as Britain was concerned, the economic origins of the Cold War had little to do with trade relations across the Iron Curtain. What mattered were alleged attempts by western European Communists to subvert the economies, and ultimately the political systems, of their own countries. Bevin became increasingly convinced in the first half of 1947 that it was the purpose of the Communists to promote strikes and eventually to bring about civil war, France and Italy being the countries most at risk. 57 At the beginning of 1947 the British government was informed that the French premier, Leon Blum, had said that "un ou deux millions de tonnes de charbon de plus ou de moins par mois, voila a quoi tient notre reconstruction economique ou notre destruction politique". 58 Attlee told the French that Britain had no coal to spare - which was only too true, in the light of the coal crisis the following month - but Bevin took seriously Blum's estimate of the precariousness of the French government's position. Bevin remarked that "France was now at the cross-roads", with the Communist party, then the largest in France, waiting on events. 59 By the beginning of June he was arguing for American aid to Europe on the grounds that the Communists planned to create a political crisis in July, creating favourable conditions for a return of Communist parties to government office. 60 Bevin's fears may or may not have been exaggerated to spur on the Americans, but Soviet economists had been predicting a serious economic crisis in the western democracies since 1945, and conditions in 1947 seemed to Foreign Office staff in Moscow to give grounds for a conviction that the predicted crisis was at last at hand. 61 In these circumstances, one can understand Bevin's eagerness to grasp Marshall's offer of aid, as much for continental western Europe's sake as for Britain's. The economic and political circumstances of 1947 also led to a modification of British attitudes to Germany. Germany was the key to sustained western European recovery. The key shortages facing western Europe in 1947 were coal, food, steel and industrial

56

P R O , C A B 21/2244, N o r m a n Brook to prime minister, 13 Dec. 1948.

57

P R O , C A B 130/19, 'Economic Recovery of Europe and American Aid', memorandum by Bevin, 4 J u n e 1947, Annex.

58

P R O , C A B 21/2278, copy of letter by Blum, 1st J a n . 1947. P R O , C A B 128/9, Cabinet minutes, 6 J a n . 1947, p. 15.

59 i0 61

P R O , C A B 130/19, memorandum by Bevin, 4 J u n e 1947. P R O , F O 371/66434, Frank Roberts, charge d'affaires, M o s c o w Embassy, to Bevin, 15 Sept. 1947.

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

255

machinery. Britain had no surplus coal or food, and little industrial machinery, to spare for export, whereas Germany could, if allowed more economic freedom, produce surplus coal, steel and industrial machinery, and also make a greater contribution that she was doing to feed herself. In 1945 and 1946 the Foreign Office's main concern had been to destroy Germany's military power permanently. By February 1947, however, Bevin felt that this objective must be balanced against the need to restore Germany's economy to a point at which she would be self-supporting. He went to the Moscow Conference, at which Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union were to discuss the future of Germany, intent on securing an upward revision of the level of German output which had previously been agreed by the four powers. 62 Bevin was also determined that German reparations to Russia, at a time when Britain was subsidizing German living standards, should not lead to Britain paying reparations to Russia indirectly. 63 Again, although there had been a merger of the British and American occupation zones in the summer of 1946, the British still had to pay for some of the food supplied to the German people food which had to be paid for out of Britain's scarce supply of dollars. The West Germans were unable to pay for their own supplies because the overall level output per West German worker, two years after the war, was still only 50 per cent of the 1938 level. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Bevin pressed in June 1947 for measures to be taken to increase German output of coal, food and steel, so that Germany would no longer be a burden on Britain. 64 This would happen quickly only if the Americans provided mining and agricultural equipment for the Germans. The United States made clear that further aid to Germany would only come as part of the Marshall plan, and in October the Americans refused to revise the agreement for fusing the British and American zones, so as to end British dollar expenditure on behalf of the Germans. The British were in an extremely weak negotiating position, and had to content themselves with a revision of the fusion agreement which limited their dollar liabilities for Germany to between £ 10 million and £ 28 million a year. 65 In such circumstances Britain could not afford to strike out an independent line on Germany. As it happened, Britain seems to have found itself in 1948 in an intermediate position between American concern to promote German economic recovery, and French concern that Germany's war potential should not be in-

" PRO, CAB 128/9, Cabinet minutes, 27 Feb. 1947, p. 162. " Ibid., Cabinet minutes, 2 May 1947. 64 PRO, CAB 130/19, 'Discussions with M r . Clayton: note by the chancellor of the Exchequer', 4 June 1947; memorandum by Bevin, same date. 65 PRO, CAB 21/2243, 'Germany and the Marshall Plan', note by Gorrell-Barnes (prime minister's political adviser) to Attlee, 23 July 1947; CAB 134/215, Cabinet Economic Policy Committee minutes, 30 Oct. 1947, item 2, and 16 Dec. 1947, item 2.

256

George C. Peden

creased substantially. 66 However, in the final agreement on the reparations question, reached in April 1949, it was the American view which prevailed. The German problem was to be subsumed under proposals for greater integration in western Europe. Bevin favoured closer links with western Europe, but there was no intention in the Foreign Office of compromising Britain's sovereignty. 67 Broadly it was British policy to enter only such agreements as were necessary to secure American aid. When the Council of Europe was proposed, Bevin declared, in mixed metaphor: " I don't like it. When you open that Pandora's box, you will find it full of Trojan horses." 68 Such attitudes were not simply signs of innate insularity. British reluctance to integrate with Europe appeared to have a sound economic rationale, although, as it turned out, British perceptions of the future were mistaken. The consensus of official opinion in Whitehall was that it would be difficult to reconcile participation in a European customs union, such as was proposed in 1947, with Britain's special relationship with the Commonwealth, and that it was doubtful whether a European customs union would be to Britain's economic advantage. Although Bevin was more sympathetic than his officials seem to have been to the closer integration of western Europe, and said that the possibility of a customs union should at least be examined, he took the point that only a quarter of Britain's trade was then with Europe, so that a European customs union would not be a panacea for Britain's difficulties. Consequently, he suggested that the possibility of a customs union for the Commonwealth and Empire be studied at the same time. 69 The economic interests of western Europe on the one hand, and the Commonwealth and Empire on the other, were not easily reconciled, since both were hungry for such capital goods as Britain could export, either for reconstruction or development, and Commonwealth countries tended to be jealous of capital-goods exports to non-Commonwealth countries. 70 Moreover, since Britain's immediate problem was a lack of dollars with which to buy food and raw materials, it was not at all clear that European reconstruction should have priority for economic reasons, even if it must have priority for short-term political reasons. A world shortage of certain raw materials meant that Britain's colonies were rapidly becoming major dollar earners. By the third quarter of 1948, that is a year after the convertibility crisis, the colonies' net dollar earnings were collectively the equivalent of $ 200 million

"

PRO, CAB 21/2244, Reparations and the European Recovery Programme', unsigned note for prime minister, 21 Dec. 1948. " Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947, London 1982, pp. 4 4 2 - 6 . 68 C.J. Bartlett, A History of Postwar Britain, London 1977, p. 37. " 70

PRO, CAB 130/27, European Economic Co-operation, Committee of Ministers, minutes, 8 Aug. 1947; The Times, 4Sept. 1947, pp.4 and 6. PRO, CAB 21/1806, minutes of meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers, 13 Oct. 1948.

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

257

a year. 71 In contrast, it was anticipated at the conference on European economic co-operation in Paris, in July - September 1947, that the participating countries and western Germany would have a dollar trade deficit throughout the period 1948-51.72 Economic experts' perceptions of the future were conditioned by current world shortages of food and raw materials. For example, the director of the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, Robert Hall, an economist, believed in 1948 that the weight of evidence suggested that primary products in general were likely to remain much scarcer than they had been in the 1930s. This led him to advise close co-operation with Commonwealth countries, who had ample natural resources. 71 The concomitant of this was that any future links with western Europe should not weaken Commonwealth links. As Richard Clarke, a leading official in the Treasury's Overseas Finance Division, observed, western Europe was weak in indigenous supplies of food and raw materials, and he believed that a federation of the United Kingdom, France, Benelux and western Germany would not be readily viable economically. Clarke thought in 1948 that it was conceivable that the United Kingdom, with access to Commonwealth and Empire natural resources, especially oil, rubber and gold, would regain viability "pretty fast", but he doubted whether the same was true of France and Germany. 74 Labour ministers were very keen to develop colonial resources. More active steps were taken to this end by Labour than had been taken by Conservativedominated governments before the war, even although in the 1940s the United States and anti-imperialist elements in the United Nations were pressing Britain and other colonial powers to decolonise as quickly as possible. For example, a world shortage of vegetable oils and fats led Labour to promote an ambitious, if ultimately disastrously unsuccesful, scheme for growing groundnuts in East Africa. 7 i In the autumn of 1947 Cripps said that he believed that the colonial empire must be developed in future as an economic unity with the United Kingdom. Cripps thought that the creation of a customs union with the colonial empire was a more pressing matter than a customs union with western Europe, which, as the president of the Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, pointed out, was something which could not in any event be achieved for many years. Dalton, indeed, remarked that the principal value of any arrangement with western

71 72 73 74 75

D . J . Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, London 1980, vol.2, p. 1. PRO, CAB 134/215, 'Report on Marshall Aid', 22 Dec. 1947, appendix 1. PRO, CAB 21/2244, Robert Hall to Sir Norman Brook, 15 July 1948. Clarke, op.cit., pp. 191, 2 0 2 - 4 . Morgan, op.cit., vol.2, esp.ch.5 and vol.5, pp. 1 - 1 9 .

258

George C. Peden

Europe would lie in the additional colonial resources which would thereby be made available. 76 In January 1948 ministers called for a review of colonial policy, in order to ensure that maximum progress was made with colonial development during the period of Marshall aid, and to ensure that such development was properly integrated with the economic policy of the United Kingdom. In particular, ministers were so enthusiastic that the development of Africa's natural resources should be pushed on rapidly in order to support Britain's economic and political position that the Cabinet secretary, Brook, wrote to Attlee asking: " I wonder whether ministers have considered sufficiently the difficulties of defending this policy against the criticisms and misrepresentations which it may provoke ? It could, I suppose, be said to fall within the ordinary definition o f 'imperialism'. And, at the level of a political broadcast, it might be represented as a policy of exploiting native peoples in order to support the standards of living of workers in this c o u n t r y . "

The government, Brook thought, should take care to put together an argument showing that rapid development would be to the social and economic advantage of native peoples. 77 Be that as it may, emphasis on current and anticipated shortages of food and raw materials led British policy-makers to give priority to co-operation with the Commonwealth and Empire, as well as with the United States, and cooperation with western Europe was limited to what would be compatible with Britain's position as centre of the Commonwealth. Clearly this choice was not dictated by economic factors alone, since the Commonwealth and Empire seemed to confer political prestige as well as access to natural resources. Even so, economic perceptions strengthened political arguments in favour of Commonwealth links. Perhaps one should say economic misconceptions, since, despite expert predictions, shortages of food and raw materials did not persist long into the 1950s, at least so far as Britain and western Europe were concerned. On the other hand, western European recovery, which had seemed so doubtful in British eyes in 1947 and 1948, succeeded beyond anyone's imagining. 78 Moreover, world trade in manufactured goods grew much more rapidly after 1950 than world trade in primary products. This was partly because industrial countries abandoned the autarkic policies of the 1930s; partly because industrial processes became more economical in their use of natural resources, sometimes providing

76

77 78

PRO, CAB 134/215, Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet, minutes, 9 Oct. 1947, p. 2, and 7 Nov. 1947, pp. 1 - 2 . PRO, PREM 8/923, Brook to Attlee, 14 Jan. and 5 May, 1948. Μ. M. Postan, An Economic History of Western Europe 1945—1964, London 1967, esp. chs. 1 and 2.

259

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

man-made substitutes, and partly because rising real incomes created fastergrowing demand for manufactured consumer goods, such as cars or radios, than for food. The great increase in the prices of primary products between 1938 and 1948 proved to be a result of short-term shortages only. 79 Consequently, Britain's trade connections with the Commonwealth and Empire, rather than with industrialised western Europe, proved to be a long-term disadvantage, so far as an expansion in demand for British exports was concerned. Moreover, for the sake of what proved to be relatively stagnant trading connections, Britain sacrificed the chance to influence the development of the E. E. C., at a time when she was still the wealthiest nation in western Europe. 80

VI This paper has discussed economic aspects of British perceptions of power, but no theory of economic determinism in foreign policy is advanced. Britain's economic problems were themselves partly the consequence of failure by politicians to trim policies to the economic resources available. By way of conclusion, one should distinguish between short-term and long-term economic influences on foreign policy, even although these influences acted in the same direction. The post-war dollar shortage, the problems of European reconstruction, and the associated danger of Communist subversion, were all strong reasons to look to the United States for aid, but all these problems were seen as short-term. On the other hand, British interests were seen by the government's economic advisers as requiring an expanding world economy based on multilateral trade. This would only happen if the United States took part in international organisations, such as the I.M.F., and opened her own giant economy to other countries' exports. Thus economic co-operation with the United States could be seen as a long-term goal, extending beyond the period of post-war resconstruction. Again, it was realised that even once the British economy had recovered, and even if Britain prospered as the centre of the Commonwealth and Empire, Britain would be no more able to afford the military resources to maintain the balance of power in Europe than had been the case before 1939. Hence the longterm British goal of preventing the United States from relapsing into political isolationism was independent of short-term economic problems. What one can say is that the short-term problems, and long-term economic policy objectives,

79

Alfred Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade, Cambridge 1963, ch. 4.

80

Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973, 265 - 7.

London 1975, esp. pp.80, 95f, 224f, 239f,

260

George C. Peden

reinforced Britain's wish to co-operate with the United States, even as relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating into the Cold War. To return to the points made in the previous section, if economic perceptions altered the direction of British foreign policy in any way, they did so by discouraging whole-hearted co-operation with Western European countries. This was in spite of American encouragement of western European cooperation. In so far as there is an element of economic determinism in foreign policy, it lies in the need to assess future economic developments correctly, or policy will fail in the long run. Britain's eventual entry to the E. E. C., after that organisation had been shaped by other nations' interests, shows this all too well.

Economic Aspects of British Perceptions

261

Zusammenfassung

In der Folge des Zweiten Weltkriegs sah sich Großbritannien mit ernsten wirtschaftlichen Problemen konfrontiert. Die Umstellung der auf die RüstungsgüterProduktion ausgerichteten Industrie und die Wiedergewinnung von Exportmärkten brauchten Zeit. Währenddessen hingen die Aufrechterhaltung des britischen Lebensstandards und die Unterhaltung von Streitkräften, wie sie jede Weltmacht benötigt, von finanzieller Unterstützung durch die Vereinigten Staaten ab. Außerdem waren die politischen Entscheidungsträger davon überzeugt, daß Großbritannien nur dann prosperieren könne, wenn der Außenhandel gegenüber der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen ausgeweitet würde; dies sei nur durch eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit den Vereinigten Staaten zu erreichen. Daher wurde eine Partnerschaft mit den USA angestrebt. Auf seinen Status als Weltmacht hatte Großbritannien dennoch nicht verzichtet, und die Länder des Commonwealth sowie die Kolonien mit ihren reichen Rohstoffvorkommen wurden als wichtige Quelle britischer Macht betrachtet. Commonwealth und Empire ermöglichten es Großbritannien, begehrte Dollars zu verdienen. Andererseits hatten die westeuropäischen Kontinentalstaaten ebenso wie Großbritannien ein Handelsdefizit gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten, und ihre wirtschaftliche Erholung wurde vorerst von britischen Politikern nicht erwartet. Daher ging man in London auf Bemühungen der USA, das wirtschaftliche Schicksal Großbritanniens mit dem seiner westeuropäischen Nachbarn zu verknüpfen, nicht ein. Ironischerweise schätzten die britischen Entscheidungsträger - wie man angesichts des starken westeuropäischen Aufschwungs in den 50er Jahren und der relativen Stagnation der Märkte des Commonwealth und der Kolonien feststellen muß - die künftige Entwicklung falsch ein. Die vorstehende Studie zeigt, wer die Verantwortlichen waren, und wie ihre Weltsicht von der Dollarknappheit bestimmt wurde. Außerdem wird dargelegt, wie Industrie und Streitkräfte bei ihrer Werbung um die knappen Arbeitskräfte unmittelbar miteinander rivalisierten, wie Großbritannien seine überseeischen Verpflichtungen reduzieren und hinnehmen mußte, in naher Z u k u n f t für einen Krieg militärisch nicht vorbereitet zu sein. Aufgrund der wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten wurde jedoch in den unmittelbaren Nachkriegsjahren mit einer Bedrohung der westeuropäischen Sicherheit durch kommunistische Subversion gerechnet. Dementsprechend beteiligte sich Großbritannien am European Recovery Programme, soweit dies mit seiner Position als H a u p t des Commonwealth und Empire vereinbar schien.

The French Dilemma: Modernization with Dependence or Independence and Decline by Robert Frank

In 1938, the French had been vaguely aware of their country's decline. But their perception had been fundamentally distorted by the persistent image of an eternal France which, by nature, could not be anything else but a Great Power. The economic foundations of power, though not totally neglected, had nonetheless been underestimated in the French evaluation of strength, in comparison with other notions like the cultural aura of France and her mission of civilization. Even when war was near, and when material forces had to be taken into account more than spiritual ones, estimates of power were based less on production and industrial capacity than on money, gold holdings, and savings. Moreover, the reflux of capital in 1939 was taken as proof that France was a power capable of recovery: that is why the French finally accepted the risks that they would not have run in 1938.1 The results are well enough known. Some months later, these illusions and this value system broke down. "My belief in belonging to a great nation (great by the conception that she had of the world, of herself, and of her position in the world, according to a value system that was neither based on number, nor on force, nor on resources) has suffered some severe set-backs. I have experienced 1940: needless to say more." (Francis Mitterrand)2

There cannot be any doubt that the defeat of 1940 was the great break in the image that the French had of themselves. This sudden plunge into gloomy reality did not, however, prevent the return of illusions. In September 1944, in the euphoria of the Liberation, 64 per cent of the French, according to a public poll, thought that France had regained her position as a great power (against 30 per cent).3 But this wave of hope did not last and was quickly submerged by the

1 1

3

La puissance en Europe 1938-1940, ed. R. Girault/R. Frank, Paris 1984, pp. 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 , 301, 390. F r a n c i s Mitterrand, 'L'Abeille et l'Architecte', cited by I'Express, 27 J a n . - 2 Feb. 1984, inquiry: 'La France est-elle encore une grande puissance?' Sample of French public opinion, no. 7, 1st Jan. 1945, Services de Sondages et Statistiques.

264

Robert Frank

ground-swell; the doubts which had arisen in 1940 returned. As early as 1949 the answers to the same question were reversed: only 37 per cent clung to the idea that France was a great power (against 49%). 4 Persistent economic difficulties and an awareness of living at the expense of the United States explain this evolution. But there was still another point. Henceforth economic considerations took the place of politics and culture in the evaluation of power. This was the great difference between the "value system" before and after 1940. As is well known, the key word after the Second World War was modernization. The latter gained priority: it was presented either as an absolute pre-condition of the future power of France or as an end in itself, a replacement ideal. It is possible to comprehend the conditions, effects and perhaps the limits of this intellectual revolution, which did not take place without radical revisions. 5

Modernization

or Decadence?

The economic constraints were such at the end of the war that they imposed new priorities. There was a need to raise the country from its ruins, to get production under way, to tackle the harassing problem of shortages and inflation. In the face of daily economic emergencies the population was impatient. On 25 May 1945, some days after the German capitulation, General de Gaulle addressed the French as follows: "From the very moment when armies are no longer the essence of the nations, it is the ability to cope with life, the capacity for work and production that become at once the essential preconditions for the independence and influence of our country [...] Yesterday there was no national duty that had precedence over the duty to fight. But today there is none that can take precedence over that to produce". 6

* Sample of French public opinion, no. 48, J u n e - J u l y 1949, Service de Sondages et Statistiques. 23 per cent of the Frenchmen think today that France is a great power, 64 per cent that she is a power of medium rank, and 12 per cent give her the rank of a small power", L'Express, above. 5

6

inquiry cited

This summary is primarily based on research carried out by a work team and which resulted in four contributions: Claire Andrieu, 'Une politique de puissance ou d'equilibre? La perception de la puissance fran^aise a travers les relations franco-suisses, 1944-1949'; Gerard Bossuat, 'La politique economique et financiere de la France a-t-elle ete remise en question par l'aide americaine en 1948?'; Michel Margairaz, 'Jean Monnet en 1948: les cinq batailles pour reconquerir la puissance'; Philippe Mioche, 'La perception de la puissance fran^aise par le patronat petrolier vers 1948: les carburants face a la modernisation de la France'. I have also taken some inspiration from the proceedings of an important symposium organized by the Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques (4—5 Dec. 1981): La France en voie de modernisation 1944-1952. Radio speech of 25 M a y 1945, cited in J. Delmas, 'De Gaulle, la Defense nationale et les forces

The French Dilemma

2 65

Would this imperative of production only promote the return to normal living conditions? No, since clearly another ambition was emerging: "the independence and influence of our country". There existed a certain consensus on this subject. The programme of the Conseil National de la Resistance of 15 March 1944 already spoke of "defending the political and economic independence of the nation, of re-establishing France in her power, grandeur and universal mission." Economic recovery had also to promote the restoration of French power and be its centre piece. But as soon as priorities had to be determined, divergences appeared between General de Gaulle and a great part of the political world. There was no doubt, even in de Gaulle's mind, that one had to cut down expenditure on national defence in order to give priority to reconstruction investments. However, the General intended to control and channel this reduction so as neither to sacrifice the military power of France nor to deprive his foreign policy in Germany, the Levant and Indo-China of the necessary means. The famous quarrel which broke out at the end of 1945 at the Assemblee Constituante is well known: the Socialists thought the credits for national Defence were much too high and demanded that they should be reduced by 20 per cent. General de Gaulle held his ground (the amendment was withdrawn), but three weeks later he resigned. Other reasons and other conflicts explain his departure. Nonetheless, at stake in this debate was a fundamental question. It can be summarized by two quotations which set two concepts of French power in 1945 against each other. Edmond Michelet, Ministre des Armees defended his budget before the Financial Commission thus: "We must watch out not to become Montenegro. If we fall short of a certain standard we will have no more than a display army". 7 Christian Pineau, Socialist, rapporteur general of the Financial Commission, expressed an altogether different point of view during a plenary session of the Assemblee: "We believe in the grandeur of France, and our financial policy must aim exclusively at restoring it. But the politics of grandeur are not the politics of bluster, the politics of the swollen-headed frog. We do not work for a naive image of the future, but for the material and cultural development of a nation which has seen her resources destroyed and her culture threatened. And I wonder whether this nation can really consent to so great a sacrifice as is demanded

7

armees, projets et realites (1944—janvier 1946)', in: Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, 110, April 1978, p. 19. Assemblee Constituante, Commission des Finances, 2nd session, 30 Dec. 1945. See Robert Frank, 'Les credits militaires: contraintes budgetaires et choix politiques, mai 1945-janvier 1946', in: De Gaulle et la nation face aux problemes de defense, Paris 1983, p. 181.

266

Robert Frank

of her for the maintenance of an army whose effectiveness, as we know perfectly well, will satisfy only outmoded standards". 8 Actually, the departure of General de Gaulle, on 20 January 1946, was a decisive turning-point in so far as the military credits were revised and considerably cut back by the Gouin Government. Absolute priority was thus given to reconstruction, that is to the medium and long-term restoration of economic power, even if this entailed a short-term surrender of positions acquired by military power. It was better to aim at real power in the future than to cling to present illusory power. The choice in 1946 was made in the light of the mistakes which had led to disaster in 1940. Vlnventaire Schuman, of which F. Bloch-Laine was co-author, denounced the misuse of military credits which had weighed too heavily on the economy between the Wars and had retarded the economic development of the country on which, all things considered, her military potential depended.9 It was thus a new generation which came to power after 1945 and imposed its views, a generation which fought for equipment, investments, economic growth, modernization and which reacted against the pre-war Malthusianism. They wanted "to break with the France of Meline"10 and to introduce into the economic discussion the notions of "expansion" and "production" instead of the anachronistic concepts of "business". 11 Reconstruction should not necessarily mean rebuilding "the same". Jean Monnet expressed this idea while reflecting upon power — a word, a concept that he did not ignore even if he did not use it frequently. In November 1946, he launched the famous alternative: "modernization or decadence": " T h e French who are born today and those who were born in the times of our power are the same [ . . . ] But in the times of our power we were the modern ones of the period. It is our task to become so again. Moreover, we do not have a choice. There is only one alternative to modernization: decadence". 12 One year later, to defend his plan, he warned Rene Mayer that without modernization "we would become another Spain". 13 This "productivism" was also meant to oppose the old philosophy of the liberal creed which was understood by such different men as Pierre Mendes France, Fran?ois Bloch-Laine, Alfred Sauvy and Claude Gruson to have been

8 9 10

11

12 13

Assemblee Constituante, 2nd plenary session, 30 Dec. 1945, ibid., p. 181. lnventaire Schuman, 1946, annex, pp. 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 . 'L'investissement de 1947 a 1952', commentary of F. Bloch-Laine, in: La France en voie de modernisation (symposium cited in note 5 above, xero-copied contributions). A. Sauvy, De Paul Keynaud a Charles de Gaulle, un economiste face aux hommes politiques 1934-1967, Paris 1972, p. 50. Summary of the Plan (Nov. 1946), cited in }. Monnet, Paris 1976, p. 306. Cited by Michel Margairaz, contribution, p. 13.

267

T h e French Dilemma

one of the main causes for the French decline before 1940. 14 Gruson in particular laid the blame on the men who had dominated the directorate of the Mouvement general des Fonds during the 1930s, W. Baumgartner, Jacques Rueff, and M. Couve de Murville: their narrow conceptions of budgetary balance could be used as an "anti-model" for a whole generation. 15 As for Franfois Bloch-Laine, director of the Treasury since June 1947, he was the man who succeeded in getting the Ministere des Finances to abandon its traditional braking role and to accept the necessity of planning and modernization. 16 Jean Monnet similarly thought it necessary to avoid the mistakes of the inter-war period when "the future development of the economy had been sacrificed for financial stabilization". 17 This view of the old liberalism as the source of French powerlessness was not new. Already in 1939, Christian Pineau, defending the Plan advocated by his trade union, the C. G. T. [General Confederation of Labour] wrote: "Liberalism has ensured neither power nor security to those who have remained loyal to it". 1 8 After the defeat of 1940, the modernistic technocrats of Vichy had taken regulating and planning measures; 1 ' the programme of the Conseil National de la Resistance of 1944 had called for " a rational organization of the economy", and for "the intensification of national production following the guidelines of a plan laid down by the State, after consulting representatives of all participants in this production". 20 Thus, beyond deep-seated political divisions, there was a new dominant ideology forcing itself upon everyone in government after the war: modernization and to promote it, state intervention, with the reconquest of power on the horizon. General de Gaulle, even if he did not resign himself to sacrificing the armed forces for the benefit of civil investments, nevertheless fully accepted the necessity of modernization and was easily convinced by Jean Monnet for whom he established the Commissariat General au Plan [Planning Authority] some days before his own departure. His contempt for "intendancy" questions must not be overestimated. 14

Cf. the interesting compilation of interviews and written testimonies published by Franfois Fourquet, Les comptes

15

de la puissance.

Histoire

de la comptabilite

"

Francois Bloch-Laine, Profession:

17

Cited by Michel Margairaz, p. 1.

18

Cf. R. G i r a u l t / R . Frank (eds), op. cit., p. 179.

"

nationale

et du Plan, Paris 1980.

Cited in F. Fourquet, ibid., p. 25.

R. F. Kuisel, Capitalism in the twentieth

century,

Fonctionnaire,

and the State in modern

Paris 1976, pp. 1 0 3 - 1 0 7 .

France.

Renovation

and economic

management

Cambridge 1981; Ph. Mioche, ' A u x origines du plan Monnet: les dis-

cours et les contenus dans les premiers plans fran^ais ( 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 7 ) ' , in: Revue

Historique,

538,

April-June 1981; Henry Rousso, 'L'organisation industrielle de Vichy', in: Revue d'Histoire

de la

deuxieme

guerre

mondiale,

116, Oct. 1979; see also Ph. Mioche, 'Origines et demarrage de la

planification en France 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 6 ' , doctoral thesis (3eme cycle), Universite de Paris I 1983. 20

T h e programme of the C. N . R . is cited in H . Michel/B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les idees et sociales de la Resistance,

P. U. F. 1954.

politiques

268

Robert Frank

The consensus among those in authority after 1945 also appeared in another field: not only expansion but also economic balance had to be achieved. The "modernism" of this generation did not imply the easy acceptance of inflation or surrender to it. Even here the will to control the phenomenon within a framework of planning was evident. Stabilization had to embrace the whole economy and not only the financial sector; it partook of an entirely Keynesian concept which contrasted with the old attitudes of the 1930s: far from conflicting with each other, "modernization and stabilization are mutually dependent [...] Real stability had to lay the foundations of a self-sustaining stability rather than shoring up by endless interventions, an artificial and precarious stability". 21 This consensus obviously concealed differences. Pierre Mendes-France wanted to take up the struggle against inflation as early as 1944. As is well known, his proposals of rigid austerity were rejected by General de Gaulle who preferred Rene Pleven's more flexible approach. Looking back, Jean Monnet thought in September 1947 that Pierre Mendes-France had been wrong when he wanted to secure price and currency stability already at the time of the Liberation, "for the resources had really been too much reduced" and "the discrepancy between production and demand" had been too substantial.12 Yet at the end of summer 1947, Monnet thought the right moment had come. Since spring other people in charge such as Guillaume Guindey, Director of External Finances, had exerted pressure in favour of a plan of action against inflation.23 The conflict between Pierre Mendes-France and the majority of the people in charge was not only about timing. Michel Margairaz and Philippe Mioche have admirably described what was politically at stake in this dispute. Pierre MendesFrance's monetary proposals fitted into an ambitious planning scheme, to be implemented by an oversize Ministere de l'Economie nationale and which essentially asked for a policy of nationalization and structural reform on a very large scale.24 In 1946 Jean Monnet, however, won acceptance for his "flexible method", free from ministerial interference and based on a consensus which included the Communists, who were then less fervid advocates of planning than the Socialists and Mendes France's followers.25 Under these conditions, the struggle against inflation did not seem really necessary until circumstances called

21 22 23

24

25

M. Margairaz, contribution, pp. 1 - 2 . Ibid. G. Bossuat, contribution, p. 3; idem, 'Le poids de l'aide americaine sur la politique economique et financiere de la France en 1948', in: Relations Internationales, 37, spring 1984, p. 22. See also the oral contribution of G. Guindey to the symposium La France en vote de modernisation. M. Margairaz, 'La mise en place de l'appareil de direction economique (1944-1947): des objectifs lointains aux choix du moment', p. 11, paper given to the symposium cited; Ph. Mioche, 'La planification comme reforme de structure: Paction de P. Mendes - France, 1943-1945', Histoire, Sconomies et societes, Oct. 1982. M. Margairaz, 'La mise en place', loc. cit., pp. 1 8 - 2 0 .

T h e French Dilemma

269

for it. These circumstances were: the crisis of 1947, the acceleration of inflation which threatened to become "galloping" and completely to destroy the credit savings mechanism, the danger of a rupture of the stream of supplies from abroad for lack of funds, and the need for American aid. This context favoured a return, to some extent, to liberal mechanisms. Rene Mayer's programme of January 1948 was a " p l a n " of rigid budgetary austerity, monetary puncture (special taxation), lifting of some price restraints, accompanied by a devaluation of 80 per cent. This liberal turn in economic policy seemed to give France a better image in a country such as Switzerland whose press, devoted to financial orthodoxy, was inclined to reduce the French ailment to monetary problems. 26 However, we are by no means dealing here with a return to the methods of the 1930s. The Mayer plan rather took the form of a "return to realities", as Frangois Caron expressed it, after the failure of the "inflationist dirigisme' prevailing from 1945 to 1947. 27 Whatever had been the importance of the national and international political ruptures of 1947 in this development - we will deal with them later - , it is obvious that R. Mayer's "liberal" policy also belonged to an overall project of "modernism": to re-establish the capacity for the internal financing of industrial enterprises, " t o put an end to the abnormal profits of agriculture and trade", and to favour a "profit transfer" to direct investment towards the "industrial cycle". 2 8 The State retained a function: to "cause things to be done" rather than doing them. 2 ' A movement was triggered. From 1950 onwards, public investment declined as private investment rose, 30 while the State retained the means of action and control that made it unnecessary to multiply direct intervention. The "liberals" had their triumph; they were also inspired, however, by the investment mystique, even if they preferred a return to private financing. There was not only one modernization project, there were a number of them, but all were directed at modernization. Frangois Bloch-Laine is right when he throws light on this consensus which existed among a whole generation despite their disagreements which were absolutely real but were too complex to be reduced to a simple contrast between advocates of the public and supporters of the private sector. 31 Basically, the question of economic modernization was also the question of power. Thus, the quarrel over economic modernization was perhaps also a quarrel over power.

26

Claire Andrieu, contribution, p. 7.

27

F. Caron, 'Le plan Mayer: un retour aux realites' (symposium cited).

28

Ibid., p. 8.

25

F. Bloch-Laine, contribution to the symposium, p. 15.

30

Jean Bouvier, 'Sur l'investissement de reconstruction-modernisation au temps de Plan M o n n e t '

31

Ibid., pp. 6 - 8 .

(symposium cited).

270

Modernization

Robert Frank

and Power

Of course, it is useful to underline the contrast between the desire for modernization after 1945 and the somewhat timid attitude of the people in charge in the 1930s. But it is also worthwhile to compare the French ambitions for economic power after each of the two world wars. After the victory of 1918, France hoped to profit from the German defeat and the economic stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles to see her economic influence triumph on the Continent. Was this policy of power with all its illusions still the order of the day after the "victory" of 1945? The answer will have to make subtle distinctions. In the years between 1945 and 1947, the will to draw advantage from the German collapse was evident. To ensure two objectives - the security and power of France, it was necessary to weaken Germany, not only politically, but also economically. The case of 1919 seemed to be re-constituted, 32 and a communication of 24 July 1945 of the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry eloquently confirmed it: "It is necessary to reduce the German industrial potential to a level low enough to render any new aggression impossible. If this is well done, it will be sufficient to modify the economic structure of our country and to make her a great industrial power". 3 3 General Koenig, French commander-in-chief in Germany, also had very clear ambitions concerning the French occupation zone: " t o render the economy of the zone to the highest degree tributary to the French economy which is to become, at the same time, the main customer and main supplier of the German business enterprises of our zone". 3 4 In the report of the first Plan of November 1946 much space was given to German reparations. 35 As can easily be guessed, central to these concerns was iron and steel: France counted on German coal and coke - that is why the question of the Ruhr and Saar was so important in the French approach - but for a short time it was also hoped that the French iron and steel industry could replace the German on the European market. 36 In 1919, the French ambitions for economic power also had an oil compo-

J. Bariety. Les relations franco-allemandes 1918-1924, Paris 1977. Memo cited by Catherine de Cuttoli-Uhel in her written contribution prepared within the work team Les decideurs en politique etrangere, 'La politique allemande de la France (1945-1948), Symbole de son impuissance?', p. 5. 34 Koenig dispatch, 30 Dec. 1946, cited by C. de Cuttoli-Uhel, p. 6. 35 M. Margairaz, contribution, p. 10. 3 ' C. de Cuttoli-Uhel, pp. 5 - 6 ; M. Margairaz/Ph. Mioche, 'Les plans et la siderurgie: du soutien necessaire a l'effacement possible (1946—1960)', p. 3, in: Enjeux politiques et objectifs economiques dans le cadre des quatre premiers plans (1946-1965), round table discussion at the Institut de l'Histoire du Temps Present, 24—25 June 1983. 32 33

The French Dilemma

271

nent. 37 This was also the case after the Second World War. Initially, it was a question of taking conservation measures. 38 T h e first problem to arise was that of crude oil supply which was in jeopardy: during the war the C.F. P. had been split from the Iraq Petroleum Company and "threats of American origin" hung over the French part that had been acquired after the victory of 1919. In October 1947, the case was settled: France continued to be present in the Middle East. 3 9 Secondly, the refining industry, which held second rank after Great Britain in 1938, had been practically destroyed: its capacity which then had reached 8 million tons, was reduced to 1.5 million in 1945. T h e question was whether the subsidiaries of the international firms - the "big o n e s " - would consent to come back to France and participate in her reconstruction. They finally accepted in 1946, but not without having "imposed certain conditions and obtained some guarantees": the assurance that they could transfer their benefits in foreign currency, tax incentives, curtailment of tariff protection, extension of refining permits, and finally, the government's promise that it would not nationalize French private interests. 40 Thus the outlines of the legislation of 1928 were preserved at the cost of these concessions. Continuity was assured. Actually, within the French mineral-oil industry, it was the importers and distributors of refined petroleum products who were most ambitious concerning conquered Germany. These small oil enterprises wanted to penetrate in great numbers the German and Saar markets, to take hold of German patents, and to run the distribution companies in the French occupation zone. They exerted pressure on the authorities and used diplomatic arguments fully in line with French imperialism of the 1920s: the loss of certain interests in East Europe had to be made up for in Germany. But these demands were not fulfilled, as the opposition from the " m a j o r " companies, the Allies, the French refiners and the Ministere de la Production industrielle was too strong. 41 Basically, these "ambitions of conquest" 4 2 of the steel or mineral oil interests had their origin in the "imperialism of the p o o r " , as Georges Soutou understood it when he analyzed the French economic and financial expansion into central Europe during the 1920s: 43 to make the economic influence on foreign countries depend not so much upon the industrial power of France herself as upon the weakening of Germany and the political means of a victorious power.

37

38 35 40 41 42 43

See the publications of Andre Nouschi on the question, especially Luttes petrolieres au ProcheOrient, Paris 1970. The following considerations are entirely based on the contribution Ph. Mioche. Ph. Mioche, contribution, p. 4. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., pp. 1 2 - 2 0 . I take the expression from Ph. Mioche, p. 20. G. Soutou, 'L'imperialisme du pauvre: la politique economique du gouvernement fran^ais en Europe centrale et Orientale de 1918 al929', in: Relations Internationales, 7, autumn 1976.

Ill

Robert Frank

Thus, in 1945, this tendency still existed, but it seems that it was not dominant. The main ambition of the "modernizers", whether they advocated liberalism or dirigisme, was precisely to turn the problem around and to render France powerful by herself. Modernization meant the strenghtening and transformation of the French internal potential rather than a desire for external expansion. This programme, unlike that of the 1920s, was advanced by the majority of the advocates of the plan. The objective was not only a return to prosperity but also the restoration of power, although a power of different means: "A prosperous France [...] but also a powerful France", Jean Monnet wrote in the report of the Commissariat au Plan of March 1946.44 The employers' reactions towards this project varied. We have already seen that the small entrepreneurs of the mineral oil industry did not subscribe to this logic. The big French refiners, however, and the Direction des Carburants under the guidance of Guillaumat, fully favoured the Monnet plan. Their ambition for modernization even exceeded the initial framework. "They have been stronger modernizers than Jean Monnet himself": 45 in 1948, their dynamism established mineral oil as the seventh basic sector of modernization (besides coal, electricity, building materials, and supplies for steel production and farming equipment, which had already been given priority in 1946). But their perception of French power was not that of "a France dominating in Europe". 4 6 The refiners did not really think of acquiring a new position abroad; they preferred to seize a dominant position in the domestic energy market at the cost of coal. 47 Modernization and better energy profits were seen parallel in a new vision of a more internalized French power. In the field of steel-production, the influence of the modernists was less evident. Seen as a whole, this industry did not succeed in "ensuring the technological modernization which was intended by the Monnet Plan". 4 8 Except for one point: The installation of an integral rolling mill in the North continued, as decided upon by the Ministere de la Production industrielle and carried out by the authorities of the Plan. This decision of 1946 was also significant for a new conception of power: the North had been given priority over Lorraine which was considered to be too dependent on German coke; moreover, the priority given to the production of thin sheet metal aimed at satisfying the needs of the consumer industries, such as the automobile sector. Those least in favour of the construction of rolling mills preferred to give priority to semi-finished products made for export. 4 9

44

Cited in F. Fourquet, op. cit., p. 62. Ph. Mioche, contribution, p. 19. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 11. 48 M. Margairaz/Ph. Mioche, loc. cit., p. 8. 4 ' Ibid.

45

273

The French Dilemma

In a general way this tendency to internalise French economic power after the war was illustrated by the spectacular investment effort on French territory. The share of gross fixed capital formation in the national income rose from 13 per cent in 1938 to 20 per cent in 1 9 4 9 - 5 1 . And the share of net fixed capital formation in total investments rose from 13 to 40 per cent between these two dates, which meant that the amortization share fell from 87 to 60 per cent. 50 At the beginning of the 1950s, after 21 years of decline, France regained the production level of 1929, but her economy was no longer the same. Did the priority given to the internal modernization of the economic potential announce the end of French imperialism? One could tend towards a positive answer since the illusions of economic expansion in Europe dissipated quickly. There remained, nevertheless, the colonial outlet. The repli imperial which had begun in the 1930s was continued and confirmed: exports to the Union frangaise were 27% in 1938 and 36% in 1950 of total exports. 5 1 This colonial imperialism, which also had ambitions of economic renewal, seemed to be the last defence of French power abroad. It was not incompatible, however, with the principal objectives, namely those of internal reconstruction. This effort to regain French power did not mean that France isolated herself from the world. On the contrary, Jean Monnet understood his entire programme of modernization as related to an opening of the French economy to the outside world. But from now on the problem was less to seek domination of the market by artifical means than to build up a French economy that was capable of meeting free industrial competition. Monnet thus advocated power instead of protectionist habits as early as December 1945 when he wrote his first "Propositions au sujet du plan de modernisation et d'equipement": "Interests of all kind demand not the transformation of the production instrument which they use, but its protection. The result would be that all improvement of the standard of life would become impossible and France would be pushed back to the status of second-rank power". 5 2 Did Jean Monnet choose these words to convince General de Gaulle to whom this text was addressed? In fact, this choice of words was well in line with the concept which be developed during these years. This discussion about modernization was, indeed, a discussion over power, but power of a different type, based on an economy intrinsically stronger, more open to the outside world and less domineering, the colonial possessions excepted. But the most important condition of success for all these undertakings was the American aid, as was rapidly realized. This leads us to the question: was French modernization possible without sacrificing French independence?

50

J . Wolff, 'Donnees materielles et economiques 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 5 0 ' (symposium cited).

51

Ibid.

"

Cited in Jean Monnet, Memoires,

Paris 1976, p. 281.

274

Modernization

Robert Frank

and

Dependence

From 1945 on the question of economic independence arose. T h e French stock of gold and foreign currency was only 94 billion franc, which was just sufficient to finance the imports for six and a half months. After the expiration of "Lendlease" (August 1945), France was granted a first American loan of 550 million dollars in December, then a second loan of 650 million dollars in spring 1946 as a result of the Blum-Byrnes agreements. For a credit given to Great Britain, the United States had imposed relatively hard conditions: rapid return to the free exchange of currencies and commerical goods. It seemed that American pressure upon France was the same, but unlike the British, the French refused to assume any precise obligations. 5 3 Nevertheless, a certain degree of dependence was accepted from the start. When in December 1945 the ratification of the Bretton Woods agreements was debated in the Assemblee Constituante (the text was unanimously adopted) the Ministre des Finances, Rene Pleven, did not conceal the risk: by joining the I. M . F. and entering the international circuit, France was to lose part of its monetary sovereignty. In a more general sense there was a choice to be made: France could try to re-emerge on her own, " a t the cost of unparalleled sacrifices", or she could recover more rapidly thanks to "international cooperation", but "with all obligations attached to i t " . 5 4 Evidently, a relative consensus was reached on the second solution. Only a relative consensus, for the Communists, even if they did not refuse the " m a n n a " of American aid 55 'preferred a national approach: the reconstruction of France from her own resources by means of " a battle for production which would ensure her independence". 5 6 T h i s difference of opinion naturally became greater after the national and international splits of 1947. For Jean M o n n e t the question was clear: as soon as "modernization" was preferred to " d e c a d e n c e " a "certain temporary dependence" had to be accepted; this was the price of the restoration of power. 5 7 When the negotiations on the Marshall Plan began, he pleaded for a "continuous collaboration" with the United States, for a "natural cooperation", which meant giving to the American administration all economic and financial information, including the French Treasury's plans. As he saw it, this dependence was only temporary and a "pro-

53

M . Margairaz, 'La mise en place', loc. cit., p. 22.

54

R. Frank, 'Les credits militaires', art. cit., pp. 1 7 6 - 7 .

Ji

F. Bloch-Laine, 'L'investissement de 1947 a 1952' (symposium cited), p. 25.

56

Annie Lacroix-Riz, 'Puissance ou dependence franfaise? La vision des decideurs des Affaires etrangeres en 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 4 9 ' , written contribution prepared within the work team Les decideurs

(cf.

note 33), p. 3. See also Rene Girault, 'La France et les autres: les enjeux de la modernisation' (symposium cited), pp. 3 - 9 . "

Ph. Mioche, contribution, p. 1.

The French Dilemma

275

mise of future independence". 58 France was not able to ensure her reconstruction "from her own resources"; in this she differed from the Soviet Union, which - as Monnet rapidly understood - was bound to reject the "Atlantic character of this close cooperation". 5 9 The ambition of power and independence was nevertheless not abandoned: the reason for the marriage between French modernization and American aid was to establish and consolidate the balance of payments. This case is first foreseen for 1950 in the Blum-Byrnes agreements; then, when the Marshall Plan was elaborated, it was put back to 1952. 60 If, theoretically, French grandeur was safe, what about reality? As the months passed, after the illusions and hopes of 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 4 5 France became increasingly conscious of the extent of its dependence. In 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 4 8 the shortages continued, German reparations were slow in coming, the exodus of capital persisted, particularly to Switzerland, and the American demands became more and more urgent. "Very rapidly it becomes necessary to face reality". 6 1 The evolution of the Franco-Swiss relations illustrates this change in situation and mental attitude well. Claire Andrieu shows how a small country, Switzerland, in her relations with France became a wonderful yard-stick, a mirror of French power and powerlessness. Paradoxically, in the moment of her greatest indebtedness to Switzerland, France behaved towards her like a great power, not giving in to any remonstrances of her creditor and refusing to respect the dates of maturity "with the serenity of a totally insolvent debtor". 6 2 In principle, the French leaders remained convinced that this delicate situation would not last and that France would regain her p o w e r . " In 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 4 9 , on the contrary, when the French indebtedness diminished, and perhaps because a recovery announced itself, Switzerland twice succeeded in imposing her will in an atmosphere of crisis. In March 1948, she forced the French government to abandon the dual commercial exchange rate for imports and exports for the Swiss Franc; this system had been set up two months earlier with the monetary reform of Rene Mayer. 64 In April 1949, France, unable to pay back a " s w a p " credit which had been granted one year earlier, saw herself compelled to supply Switzerland with several thousand tons of steel instead of paying in gold or foreign currencies. In these times of difficult reconstruction she thus had to give " a pound of flesh".65

58

M . Margairaz, contribution, p. 7 .

"

Ibid.

60

Ibid., p. 3.

"

Bossuat, art. cit., p. 17.

"

Claire Andrieu, contribution, pp. 18,35.

43

Ibid., p. 22.

64

Ibid., pp. 2 7 - 2 8 . See also the protests of Great Britain and the I. M . F. in Francois C a r o n , loc. cit., pp. 15 ff.

65

Claire Andrieu, contribution, pp. 3 2 - 3 3 .

276

Robert Frank

1948/1949 were decidedly the worst years of French dependence and powerlessness. As long as there was a "belief" in the rapid recovery of French economy, France enjoyed a "credit" which she no longer had when reality sank in. To restore it the franc had to become "real money" 6 4 , and in order to regain "confidence" it was necessary to show a certain measure of compliance with the creditors. This was the policy initiated by Rene Mayer in 1948. Again dependency was accepted for the sake of a postponed future power status. American pressure was obviously of a different scope and of different significance. In the a u t u m n of 1947, when French food supplies were threatened because funds were lacking and a violent strike movement developed, the United States, in accordance with its policy of " c o n t a i n m e n t " , released dollars in anticipation of the official launching of the Marshall Plan. With this "interim a i d " of December 1947, which was confirmed by the bilateral agreement of 2 January 1948, France received 284 million dollars. T h e n came the Marshall aid itself, which was ratified regarding France by the bilateral agreement of 28 June 1948. From then on the American influence on the French decisions became evident and weighed heavily. Annie Lacroix-Riz shows in her paper prepared within the group dealing with the "decision-makers" the cases of blackmail when discontinuation of aid was threatened: to force parliamentary ratification of the agreement of 28 June and to impose the purchase of American products of doubtful priority like cigarettes, dried fruit, chewing-gum. 6 7 There was worse than this chewing-gum imperialism: American interference with French economic policies seemed to increase. N o t only the C o m m u nists, but also journalists like H. Beuve-Mery (Le Monde), high civil servants like H . Alphand, rapporteur of the Comite de Cooperation Economique Europeenne, G. Guindey, Director of External Finances, or politicians like G. Bidault and Vincent Auriol were concerned about it. 68 From the first negotiations over the Marshall aid in the summer of 1947, the American Administration tried to obtain f r o m the European countries generally, and from France in particular, w h a t it had demanded since the end of the War: a " p r o g r a m m e of domestic re-structuration and stabilization" and " a n economy characterized to a greater degree by private initiative". 6 9 Actually, the "liberalization" of the French economy, the replacement of public investment by private investment, coincided with the beginnings of the Marshall plan. In the financial field the government seemed to yield to the American demands for stabilization and fiscal endeavour. Each release of a part of the aid was preceded or accompanied by a French plan of recovery. T h e Mayer plan appeared when the first bilateral agree-

" F. Caron, loc. cit., p. 20. 67 A. Lacroix-Riz, loc. cit., pp. 4 - 5 . ίβ G. Bossuat, art. cit., p. 20; idem, contribution, p. 1 " Idem, art. cit., p. 22.

T h e French Dilemma

277

ment (concerning "interim aid") was signed in January 1948. After the signature of the June agreement, and before the release of the "counterpart" in francs, the short-lived Paul Reynaud government was pressured to cover the deficits. The release was finally conceded in September, one day after Parliament voted for the fiscal bill of the Queuille government. American pressure increased in autumn when the financial difficulties persisted and new strikes broke out: "France is like a beggar [ . . . ] The Americans have to intervene in the country's affairs and to teach her how to run her affairs, even to the last cent" (CH. Η. Kline, U. S. News and World report, 8October 1948). 70 Actually, Harriman, the American ambassador to the Ο. Ε. E. C., D. K. Bruce, the chief representative of the E. C. A. in France, and his deputy Tomlinson each went as far as to propose details for a recovery plan. 71 The Budget for 1949 and the loi des maxima were counterinflationary in the sense desired on the other side of the Atlantic. Last but not least, 1948 was the year when France conformed to the American policy towards Germany. 72 France altogether integrated herself politically into the Western Bloc and followed economically the ways of international economic liberalism. Nevertheless, this gloomy picture of French dependence had varying shades. While the American demands show how the generosity of the Marshall aid was at the same time a weapon in the Cold War, they also reflected considerations of domestic policy: the Washington Government had to render an account of its expenditures to Congress, to the tax-payers and to public opinion. But the latter did not have a high opinion of French management skills and feared that its dollars might dissipate "in the sands of inflation". American pressure to modify the direction of financial policy had a considerably irritating effect on certain French leaders, but men like R. Mayer, P. Reynaud or H. Queuille did not need it in order to become convinced themselves, but rather to persuade Parliament or their government colleagues of the solidity of their programme. It even seems that the Mayer Plan had its origin in a recovery programme that had been outlined by G. Guindey in spring 1947, well before the Marshall plan. 73 In the summer of this year, Jean Monnet, feeling that the United States would ask for financial stabilization, suggested that France should "take the lead" so that the reconstruction "did not appear to be an American interference in our domestic affairs and did not seem to be imposed". 74 The elaboration of these ideas in the Commissariat au Plan and in the Statistical Commission ( C o m m i s s i o n du Bilan) resulted in the measures of the Mayer Plan. 75 The American constraints certainly

70

Ibid., p. 28.

71

Ibid., p. 29.

72

See the cited contributions of C. de Cuttoli-Uhel and A. Lacroix-Riz.

73

G. Bossuat, art. cit., p p . 2 2 , 3 4 .

74

Memorandum to G. Bidault, 2 4 July 1947, cited by M . Margairaz, contribution, p. 3.

75

Ibid.

278

Robert Frank

did exist, but, in the words of Michel Margairez: "dependency, faded away behind convergence". 76 Through this community of ideas between the Americans and Monnet the latter gained, under the circumstances of the time, a strong position in France as well as in the United States. He used it to win a battle he considered essential for future independence: the battle of the "counterpart". This was the problem of the francs which French importers paid for the products received under the Marshall plan. The Americans, consistent with themselves, held that this "counterpart" should be used for the repayment of the internal debts and for the diminution of money in circulation. But Jean Monnet suggested, at the end of 1947, that the equivalent value of the interim aid be assigned to the Fonds de modernisation et d'Equipement and to the Caisse autonome de la Reconstruction, two institutes whose establishment he proposed at the same time. 77 The bilateral agreement of 2 January 1948 went more in the direction of the deflationist proposals of the Americans. Yet Jean Monnet did not lose courage. He referred to the measures of the Mayer Plan and pointed out that the financing of modernization and productive expenditure was indispensable if the battle against inflation was to succeed. But he won a first victory only when the government, on his suggestion, decided to make an earnest effort to stabilize the currency and not to have further recourse to advances from the Banque de France. After this the Americans accepted that a first release of the "counterpart" in April 1948 be assigned to purposes of reconstruction and modernization: 25 billion francs, instead of the 45 Monnet had hoped for. Thus a precedent was set. The bilateral agreement of 28 June - which, by the way, contained some very harsh clauses: including the right to supervise the exchange rate of the Marshall aid dollars and the possibility for the Americans to supply themselves with strategic products from the French overseas territories - envisaged explicitly the use of the "counterpart" for the financing of productive expenditure. 78 Then, reassured about the financial projects of the Queuille government, the Americans agreed to a second release of 45 billion of "counterpart" francs for the F. Μ. E. and the reconstruction of the merchant marine. 79 In this way, 70 per cent of public investment could be directly financed by the Marshall aid in 1948 and 90 per cent in 1949.80 J. Monnet had to fight on two fronts, on both sides of the Atlantic. On the American side he had critics in certain industrial circles who worried about this modernization and the eventuality of European competition. But the E. C. A.

76 77 78 79 80

Ibid. G. Bossuat, art. cit., p. 22; M . Margairaz, contribution, p. 4. G. Bossuat, art. cit., p. 22; M . Margairaz, contribution, p. 6. G. Bossuat, art. cit., p. 28. M . Margairaz, contribution, p. 9.

T h e French Dilemma

279

and Harriman, who understood the importance of making good use of the "counterpart", supported him. On the French side, he had to overcome more than one obstacle: in June 1948, Rene Mayer considered for a time a reduction in investment, because the release of the "counterpart" remained hypothetical; then, at the end of 1948, Queuille and Petsche - who were evidently thinking of the next elections and feared to propose a new financial effort - succeeded in imposing some downward revisions of the programme, but failed in their attempt to favour reconstruction (which was politically more profitable) to the detriment of modernization; lastly G. Guindey supported the investment policy but criticized the utilisation of the "counterpart" (une formule de facilite) and recommended a more rigid austerity, as in Britain. 81 In spite of the various concessions made to both sides J. Monnet safeguarded the essentials: the modernization plan could, though in a modified form, be quite undramatically realized thanks to the Marshall aid and the "counterpart", in a France that was from then on sufficiently supplied and socially less agitated. But what was still more important, the French, in the words of G. Bossuat, "remain free to choose their own kind of planning". 82 Indeed, within the O . E . E . C., J. Monnet, at any rate the future father of Europe, chose not to sacrifice the ambitions of the national plan to the coordination of the European economies: "cooperation is surely needed, but it will come later, basing itself upon the national efforts that will precede and prepare it". 8 3 The Americans had to give up the idea of an integrated programme. Evidently, in 1948 the European projects were at a kind of crossroads. The fact that persistent economic difficulties made the prospect of independence recede incessantly could be favourable for a European development. But the economic divergences with Great Britain within the O. E. E. C. were increasing. And though the French gave up the dream of basing French power on the weakening of Germany, 84 they were not yet at the point of desiring close cooperation with her. The economic reconstruction of Europe was not yet on the agenda. To regain her power France had to rely on her national effort and to accept alignment with the United States, though hoping that this would be temporary. In reality the development of the Cold War and re-armament beginning in 1950 worsened her dependency still more.

81

G. Bossuat, art. cit., pp. 3 0 - 3 1 ; M . Margairaz, contribution, p. 9.

82

Ibid.

83

Letter J. Monnet to Minister President, 13 July 1948, cited by G. Bossuat, art. cit., p. 32 and by M . Margairaz, contribution, p. 18.

84

C. de Cuttoli-Uhel, contribution, p. 25.

280

Robert Frank

Between "modernization" and "decadence" France firmly decided to choose the first. The humiliation of 1940 and the hopes of 1944 even placed this economic ambition at the centre of the new, though precarious, national consensus. The perception of power at the time of the Liberation includes, more so than before the War, the idea of transforming the economy, and certain choices made contrast totally with those made after the victory of 1918. For instance, the reconstitution of military power, judged illusory if not based on renewed economic production, was postponed. In this respect, the departure of General de Gaulle in January 1946 was a first turning-point. Modernization was not a matter of indifference to him — it was he who signed the decree by which the Commissariat au Plan was created - but he could not make up his mind to sacrifice the military tool totally. Very slowly, and not without occasional resistance, France gave up the old practices of financial and industrial imperialism in Europe; this certainly did much to contribute to her renewed reliance on her colonial positions, but it also favoured the domestic reconstruction of her economic power. Modernization pre-supposed, without doubt, external aid from the United States. It was more its consequences than its necessity that was under discussion. To regain French power thus meant paradoxically taking the risk of building a France "under influence". In the short run the heroic option for total independence was rejected because it seemed to sacrifice growth to misery, even to an irreversible decline. There remained the hope that, in the course of time, modernization would do away with precisely that dependence on which it fed in the beginning. But in 1947-1948, - this was another turning-point that corresponded to great political changes - a new reality appeared forcefully: the transformation of the French economy was in need of permanent American aid. For this reason the problems of power changed their meaning: the very word itself, so often invoked in 1944-1945, was less used in 1948, and in its place another discussion began - more so in the press and the political circles than among the economic decision-makers - on the independence of France and on the limits to be assigned to her economic dependence. Compared with the pre-war period, this was a new subject. This seems to show not only that France in 1948 was no longer a great power, but also that she had become aware of it. From all this, there remain the spectacular effects of economic modernization, which have permitted France to take her place as one of the principal middle powers, in a world dominated by the super-powers. The result is not small. But who would have thought in 1945 that the alternative was not between greatness and mediocrity - in its etymological sense - but between mediocrity and degradation to the rank of a small power?

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281

Zusammenfassung

1938, am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkriegs, waren sich die Franzosen nur sehr undeutlich der Tatsache bewußt, daß ihr Land sich in einem Prozeß internationaler Gewichts- und Statusverminderung befand. Maßgebend blieb das Bild eines „ewigen Frankreich", das söiner Natur nach nichts anderes als eine Großmacht sein konnte. Bei dieser Bewertung wurde die Bedeutung, die den nationalen Wirtschaftsgrundlagen für die internationale Machtstellung eines Landes zuzumessen ist, unterschätzt. Am Ende des Krieges schien es für kurze Zeit, als würde die Illusion andauern; sie sollte sich jedoch etwa seit 1948/49 verflüchtigen. Waren im September 1944 noch 64% der Franzosen der Ansicht, daß Frankreich von neuem seinen Rang als Großmacht einnehme, so hielten fünf Jahre später nur noch 37% an dieser Vorstellung fest. Die Schwierigkeiten des Wiederaufbaus und das Erfordernis amerikanischer Unterstützung machten der breiten Öffentlichkeit den Rückstand Frankreichs und die entscheidende Bedeutung des Wirtschaftsfaktors für seine internationale Machtstellung überdeutlich. Frankreich stand nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg vor einem Dilemma. Es konnte sich entweder entscheiden, seine Produktionsstrukturen von Grund auf zu modernisieren·, dazu mußte es die Hilfe und damit eine gewisse Einflußnahme der USA akzeptieren. Oder es konnte heroisch einen völlig unabhängigen Weg einschlagen, d. h. versuchen, seine ökonomische Basis — nach Art des Vorgehens nach dem ersten Weltkrieg - mithilfe von Leistungen aus dem besetzten Deutschland zu stärken. Mit dem zweiten Weg war allerdings die Gefahr verbunden, daß Frankreich im neu entstehenden internationalen System in den Rang einer zweitklassigen Macht zurückfiel. Frankreich hat, nicht ohne Schwierigkeiten, in den Jahren 1947-1948 seine Wahl getroffen: wirtschaftliche Modernisierung unter Inkaufnahme einer Abhängigkeit, die als vorübergehend angesehen wurde; nicht stolze Unabhängigkeit, die wohl von unaufhaltsamem Niedergang begleitet worden wäre.

Betting on the Future. The Reconstruction of Italian Industry, 1946-1952* by Vera Zamagni

A s a result o f t h e limited d e s t r u c t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s ( 8 % o f t h e 1 9 3 8 v a l u e , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e best e s t i m a t e 1 , t h e I t a l i a n i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e in e x i s t e n c e a t t h e beginning o f t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d w a s d e e p l y m a r k e d by t h e p r o l o n g e d w a r effort ( 1 9 3 5 - 1 9 4 3 ) c a r r i e d o u t u n d e r t h e f a s c i s t r e g i m e . A brief r e v i e w o f t h e m a i n effects o n industrial c a p a c i t y o f M u s s o l i n i ' s w a r policies will help set t h e s t a g e f o r a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t h a d t o be f a c e d in t h e p r o c e s s o f " r e c o n s t r u c t i n g " Italian i n d u s t r y . T h e m o s t r e m a r k a b l e effect w a s c e r t a i n l y t h e g r e a t i n c r e a s e in t h e p r o d u c tive c a p a c i t y o f t h e e n g i n e e r i n g i n d u s t r y t h a t , d i s c o u n t i n g d e s t r u c t i o n s , e s t i m a t e d 5 0 % h i g h e r a t t h e end o f t h e w a r w i t h r e s p e c t t o

1938.2

was

T h e growth of

t h e e n g i n e e r i n g i n d u s t r y in this c o n t e x t w a s t h e c a u s e o f t h e d i s t o r t i o n s , 3 t h e

* Research for this paper has been partially completed during a period spent in 1983 at St. Antony's College (Oxford) on a NATO senior fellowship. I have also greatly benefited from discussions with Pier Paolo D'Attore, Martino Pozzobon and Ruggero Ranieri, who are all carrying on research on different aspects of Italian reconstruction at the European Institute in Florence, as well as with John Harper, Adrian Lyttelton, Alan Milward, who have commented on previous versions of this paper. Opinions here expressed are, however, to be attributed only to the author. 1 It is the estimate produced by the Bank of Italy in a mimeographed paper submitted in the autumn of 1947 to the experts of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The industries worst hit were metallurgy (25% of the 1938 value of plants) and engineering (12%). Housing and infrastructures were in a much worse shape, especially the merchant navy, only 1/6 of which had survived. 1 See A. Jacoboni, L'industria meccanica italiana, Rome 1949; the author estimates that, as a result of the first postwar adjustment process in the sector, in 1947 capacity was somewhat less, some 37% higher than in 1938. It has to be noted that 1938 is not a correct base year in this case, to measure the results of the entire war period; but it is conventionally accepted for comparative purposes. See also the remarks made by R. Covino, G. Gallo, Ε. Mantovani, 'L'industria dall'economia di guerra alia ricostruzione', in: P. Ciocca and G. Toniolo (eds.), L'economia italiana nel periodo fascista, Bologna 1976. 3

The best example of distortion is given by the aircraft industry that employed less than 50,000 workers in 1938 and had more than 150,000 at the end of the war.

284

Vera Zamagni

market problems, 4 and the high costs 5 that made reorganization so difficult in the post-war years. T h e steel industry did not have excess capacity after the war but suffered for a quite peculiar circumstance. T h e main plant worst hit by the war - the vertically integrated plant of Cornigliano - was precisely the one that, started in 1939 and never actually entered in operation, could have marked the departure of Italian steel making f r o m scrap iron processing. T h e decision to build Cornigliano came as a result of a long struggle between the supporters of vertically integrated steel mills, to be found in the IRI milieu, and private producers, w h o preferred to w o r k scrap iron in electrical f u r n a c e s / T h e loss of Cornigliano meant that the battle had to be fought anew. T h e chemical and electrical industries were on the whole in good shape, while the consumer goods industries had been starved of investment funds and were suffering therefore f r o m aged equipment. T h e lasting problem of Italian industry since the sanctions declared by the League of Nations in 1936 was the unsatisfactory level of utilization of available capacity because of a chronic lack of raw materials. This was due in the first place to the decline of international trade and the resulting distortions of imports and exports; the alliance with Germany, a country that was herself in a similar position in terms of need of importation of raw materials, made the problem worse; finally, dislocation due to civil war and bombing ended by blocking industrial production almost completely and causing severe hardship to the Italian people. T h e real problem of Italian industry at the end of the war was, therefore, not re-constructing, but projecting a new future7 on the basis of a new development strategy to be substituted for the nationalistic, autarkic, war-oriented strategy that had been followed up to then and had miserably failed together with its most extreme supporter, Mussolini. Such a new strategy was found, as is well k n o w n , in the integration of Italian industry in the European capitalistic market and was centered on exports as the only factor capable of breaking the

4

It must be noticed that the engineering industry in 1938 had about 33% of its output absorbed by state purchases and 8.7% absorbed by exports, of which about 60% going to colonies (and therefore, still bought by the state). See G. Tattara and G. Toniolo, 'L'industria manifatturiera', in: P. Ciocca and G. Toniolo (eds.), op. cit., A. Jacoboni, op. cit.

5

A. Jacoboni, op. cit., p. 147, estimated that the costs of engineering output in Italy had increased between 1938 and 1947 from 50 to 80% more than the prices of US engineering products, while even in 1938 competitivity of the Italian engineering industry had not been good.

' A detailed history of the steel industry in the interwar era is n o w available: cf. F. Bonelli (ed.), Acciao per I'industrializzazione, Turin 1982. 7 A similar point of view has been advanced concerning the process of reconstruction in Milan by P. Boichini, 'Banche, mercato finanziario e industria nella Ricostruzione', in: Milano fra guerra e dopoguerra, Bari 1979, p. 66.

285

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

vicious circle of the Italian economy, providing badly needed markets of outlet 8 and capability to import raw materials and technology. It can be argued that the concern to press exports at all costs, shared by Italian industrialists, 9 was the prime mover of the most important government economic policy decisions, not all of which proved effective or devoid of negative side effects. A clear perception existed that only with a competitive industry could Italy gain a lasting, though modest, position in the new European setting and to that target priority was granted over any other economic urgency.

I

Between the end of the war and the middle of 1947 the most obvious reconstruction projects were carried through, while the Americans met the most urgent needs of food and fuel. Long term decisions were all postponed, because of a difficult international and national political situation. In these circumstances the line prevailed of pressing the most traditional Italian exports - textiles - for which capacity was available, markets were ready and raw materials could be easily obtained from the Americans. The policy that was devised to this end included the lifting of numerous quantitative restrictions on foreign trade and the permission granted to exporters to make free use of 5 0 % of the foreign exchange earned. These measures have come under heavy attack on the part of several economists as a major cause of speculation against the lira, loss of capital and inflationary pressures. 10 This being probably true, what has never been underlined is that the effort made by the government in reviving the private market for exports was not only successful for textiles but for the engineering products too, although this was less impressive, because the starting level was very low. While in 1938 engineering exports accounted for less than 6 % total exports (excluding exports with colonies), in 1947 they accounted for 2 0 % and they were already 2.5 to 3 times larger in volume than in 1938. 11 Notwithstanding, the problems of the engineering sector were very serious.

8

Domestic private

consumption levels were abysmally low, as a result of the policy of wage

compression followed during the fascist regime and of the dislocation brought about by the war. In 1946 per capita private consumption was 9 0 % of the 1913 level and it reached the 1929 level (the highest in the interwar period) only in 1949. ' For the point of view of the Italian industrialists concerning reconstruction, cf. P. Bini, 'La proposta economica degli industriali', in: G. Mori (ed.), La cultura economica ricostruzione, 10

See M . De Cecco, 'Sulla politica di stabilizzazione del 1947', in: Saggi dipolitica 1968 and V. Ruffolo, 'La linea Einaudi', in: Storia contemporanea,

11

nel periodo

della

Bologna 1980.

A. Jacoboni, op. cit., pp. 1 7 4 - 1 8 3 .

4, 1974.

monetaria,

Milan

286

Vera Zamagni

Probably the most devastating one was that of capacity utilization, that did not exceed 50% 1 2 as a result of many plants being ill-suited to civil production and costs of production reaching too high levels also because of the obstacles raised to dismissal of surplus workers.13 This was the real cause of the depressed state of the industry, which discouraged or prevented the necessary investment for technological modernization and reconversion. It has to be added that between 1/4 and 1/3 of the engineering capacity was owned by IRI, the Italian public holding founded in 1933, which started reorganizing its engineering sector only in November 1947, with the creation of Finmeccattica. The speculation on inventories unleashed in the first semester of 1947 was not only produced by uncertainty as to the international situation, but also by the excess liquidity pumped into the economic system by banks left without a tight control that did not meet enough fixed investment projects considered feasible by private entrepreneurs. This, together with shortages coupled with a lack of rationing schemes, revived inflation and made some government intervention inevitable. It must be said that an alternative to the line of monetary restriction that was followed - the "linea Einaudi" as it came to be known - was attempted, as an experiment, in early spring with the trip to America made by De Gasperi. But his call for financial support had such a modest result (a loan of less than 100 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank, that was actually approved only in late October 1947) that no hope for extra help to cover balance of payments deficit during 1947 and early 1948 was left.14 So it was that the "linea Einaudi" came into being. Between July and November 1947 the bank's reserve ratio was raised, the discount rate passed from 4% to 5.5% and the official exchange rate of the lira passed from 225 lire to the dollar to 350 in August and 575 in November, bringing about an effective devaluation of the lira. 15 The rate of increase of public expenditure was slowed down, while revenues were raised. On the inevitable need to stop inflation as well as on the efficacy of the

12

13

14 15

In 1951, still only 6 5 - 7 7 % of engineering capacity was in actual use. See M. Arcelli, C. Maccheroni, L. Peccati, R. Rozzati, II problema del grado di sfruttamento degli impianti, Milan 1973. It should be noted that the government decision not to let firms dismiss their surplus workers affected the metal and enginering industries most because they had increased their labor force for war purposes, while it touched the textile industries only marginally. This point is convincingly argued by V. Ruffolo, op. cit., pp. 6 5 1 - 5 3 . At this level, the official and the black market were unified; the actual devaluation of the lira was not as large as the change in the official rate suggests because black market exchange rates had been much higher than official exchange rates up to November 1947. V. Ruffolo underlines that monetary restriction and devaluation of the lira were enacted at the same time and were not considered alternative measures, as A. Graziani seems to think, in his essay 'Problemi di politica monetaria in Italia (1945-1970)', in: V. Balloni (ed.), Lezioni sulla politica economica in Italia, Milan 1974.

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

287

measures taken, there was 16 and there is17 little disagreement. Opinions widely differed and differ, instead, on their severity. It is often not mentioned that both money in circulation and credit available continued to increase, albeit at a slower rate, 18 and that industry — notably the engineering sector — received direct financial help from many sources. In September 1947 the Eximbank loan was allocated and the Fondo Industrie Meccaniche (FIM) was created; in November the new IRI holding Finmeccanica was constituted, while in December both small to middle size firms and Southern firms received some special provisions. In February 1948, finally, after lengthy discussions, IRI got a new statute that allowed it to function in a more adequate way. It can certainly not be maintained that the "linea Einaudi" - beyond the will of Einaudi himself - represented the victory of a small group of laissez-faire economists, as is increasingly recognized. 19 Rather, it is more correct to define that policy as "liberal protectionism." 20 The main reason that has caused a wide discrepancy of opinions concerning the effects of the "linea Einaudi" is however to be identified in an ideologicaltheoretical conflict over the desirability of using Keynesian policies in the Italian situation of the time., a conflict reinforced by the chaotic state of the statistical publications of the time. It is worth while to pause a moment to consider this latter point. The national institute of statistics, ISTAT, that had been headed in the previous 80 years of unified Italy by renowned statisticians, worked up to 1943 and then was able to reorganize its data collection and publication during 1947. However, some crucial figures, like the index of industrial production, were only available in late 1948 with 1947 as a base year and in April 1949 with 1938 as a base year. This lag caused a proliferation of private estimates and the ensuing chaos. To give an idea of the wide discrepancy of the estimates produced, I have collected in Table 1 the most important estimates of the index of industrial production. 21

See the admirable analysis of the perverse effects of inflation that Raffaele Mattioli sketched in a letter to Palmiro Togliatti of 28 May 1947, in: G. Rodano, II credito all'economia. Raffaele Mattioli alia Banca Commerciale Italiana, Naples 1983, pp. 1 7 5 - 8 6 . 17 See for instance P. Saraceno, Intervista sulla ricostruzione 1943-53, ed. by L. Villari, Bari 1977. 18 See P. Baffi, 'L'evoluzione monetaria in Italia daU'economia di guerra alia convertibilita (1935-1958)', in: Studi sulla moneta, Milan 1965, pp. 2 7 3 - 2 7 6 . " See for instance the main thesis of the book by M. Salvati, Stato e industria nella ricostruzione. Alle origini del potere democristiano (1944/1949), Milan 1982. 20 Expression used in G. Amato, llgoverno dell'industria in Italia, Bologna 1972. U. Ruffolo, op. cit., claims that rather than a victory of laissez-faire economists, one can say that the "linea Einaudi" represented their defeat ("L'intransigenza liberista [ . . . ] ebbe la sua Waterloo", p. 670). 11 Table 1 follows as an annex to this article, p. 298. - Although monthly indices would be more suited to an analysis of the impact of a restrictive monetary policy, and such series do exist, lack of space prevents me here from entering into a technical discussion of them, that would inevitably be lengthy, given the variety and discrepancy of sources.

16

288

Vera Zamagni

Without entering here into a technical discussion of the indices - pending a thorough revision o f Italian historical statistics - 1 limit myself to noting that the discrepancies are not only in level (between the highest and the lowest estimate for 1947, there is a difference of 16 percentage points), but in rate of growth (especially for the two years 1948 and 1949). This unleashed a " p o l i t i c a l " use of statistics. T h e E C A mission, which notoriously distrusted the Italian administration, wanted to build its own index (Table 1, no. 2), the coverage of which was very unsatisfactory, drawing pessimistic conclusions. M o s t American observers preferred the Confindustria index, coming to similarly criticize the "linea Einaudi". 2 2 . Other foreign observers, instead, like the officials of the BIS, 2 3 Vera Lutz, 2 4 Hirschman, 2 5 S i m p s o n " got in touch with the Bank o f Italy 27 or made use of official data when they became available, judging the "linea Einaudi" positively and, above all, underlining the fact that Italy's problems could not be cured with Keynesian recipes. T h e theoretical backing to their arguments was provided by two articles published in 1947 by J o h n Hicks, 2 8 in which the Keynesian model was reworked in a context of inelasticity of supply - a context that was certainly realistic for the Italian situation at the time - coming to conclusions that included the following warning: " I t is [ . . . ] not obvious that a condition of immediate full employment is a sensible objective in the conditions which we are studying." 2 9

22

See J . J . Kaplan, Economic

Stagnation

23

T h e Bank for International

Settlements

in Italy?, N e w Haven M a y 1949. (BIS) prepared two reports on the Italian economy, one in

the summer of 1947 and the other in the summer of 1949. T h e latter contains an explicit discussion of the reasons against a use of Keynesian policy tools in the Italian situation. 24

V. Lutz started in these years a lasting interest in Italian economic development, that she analyzed in several occasions, devoting to it her best scientific production. See a review of V. Lutz interventions in the years here under consideration in R . S . Masera, 'Inflation, Stabilization and Economic Recovery in Italy after the War: Vera Lutz's Assessment', in: Banca Nazionale terly Review,

del Lavoro

Quar-

M a r c h 1983.

15

A. Hirschman, 'Inflation and Deflation in Italy', in: American

26

E. S. Simpson, 'Inflation, Deflation and Employment in Italy', in: Review of Economic

Economic

Review,

1948. Studies, 44,

1949-50. 27

T h e interrelations between foreign economists and the Bank of Italy have been carefully illustrated by the former governor of the Bank of Italy, P. Baffi, — who at the time was the head of the research department of the Bank of Italy — in a paper presented at a conference on Keynes in Italy held in June 1983 in Florence, 'Via Nazionale e gli economisti stranieri 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 5 3 ' , published in Rivista di storia economica,

28

2, 1985.

T h e articles were originally published in Economic W a r . A Theoretical Analysis) and National 0konomisk

Journal,

June 1947 (World Recovery after

Tidsskrift,

1947 (' "Full Employment" in

a Period of Reconstruction'); the latter has to be regarded as an appendix to the former. They are now republished in J. Hicks, Collected 2'

Ibid., p. 156.

Essays on Economic

Theory,

vol. II, Oxford 1982.

289

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

Later commentators have remained as divided on the issue as contemporary observers. Among the supporters, Gualerni 30 recalls the international context of the time, in which a general preoccupation existed of bringing about an effective monetary stabilization as a necessary condition for the implementation of the recovery program launched by General Marshall in June 1947, while Baffi insists on the mildness of the credit restriction that hit severely only speculative positions. 31 The opponents of the "linea Einaudi" have instead denounced the alleged stagnation produced by it, echoing the American position, 32 or have argued that the philosophy, more than the actual results, of the "linea Einaudi" has to be criticized, because it was at the origin of the exclusion of the working class from political decision-making. 33 . What certainly was the most welcome by-product of Einaudi's policy was the boom of Italian exports and the limitation of imports which started the process of readjustment of the Italian balance of payments and, coupled with the relaunching of American aid, helped in building up Italy's exhausted reserves.34 Unfortunately, in this context too, statistics available produce quite a lot of bewilderment because of the wide discrepancies of the different sources. As I have done in Table 1 for the indices of industrial production, I have collected in Table 2 the available volume indices of exports and imports. 343 Columns 1. a and 3. a agree in pointing to a limitation of imports between 1947 and 1948, while columns l . b and 3.b suggest an increase of exports on the order of 50-60% between the two dates. However, the already noted statistical discrepancies prevent any conclusion as to whether or not in 1948 exports had already reached a level higher than in 1938. 30

G. Gualerni, Ricostruzione e industria. Per una interpretazione secondo dopoguerra 1943-1951, Milan 1980, pp. 6 2 - 6 9 .

della politica

industrielle

nel

31

B. Baffi, 'Memoria sull'azione di Einaudi', in: Studi sulla moneta,

32

See for instance B. Manzocchi, Lineamenti di politica economica in Italia (1945-1959), Rome 1960. M. De Cecco, op. cit., p. 134, writes: "L'indice della produzione industriale, che aveva raggiunto 1*82% del 1938 nel settembre 1947, era, nel settembre 1948, ancora all'89%. Nel settembre 1949 esso si trovava addirittura all'87% e solo nel settembre 1950 esso raggiungeva il 104%." Although the author does not quote his source (the table that appears in the same page gives only yearly data), this is the Confindustria index. Comparable figures from ISTAT, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1 9 4 8 - 5 1 , are 94,106, 111, 126. However, 1947 and 1948 ISTAT figures exclude engineering, never included by the Confindustria index (see Table 1).

33

See, for instance, C. Daneo, La politica economica della ricostruzione 1945-49, Turin 1975, w h o appears to overcome in this way what he calls "le cifre [ . . . ] imprecise della stagnazione produttiva" (p. 270).

34

Supporters and detractors of the "linea Einaudi" are also consistently praising or denigrating the above quoted process of accumulation of reserves. I want here only to underline the fact that, whatever opinion one holds, it has to be stressed that accumulation of reserves, unless it becomes a steadily accelerating process, is a temporary sterilization of funds, if it is followed by decumulation at a later date.

343

Table 2 follows as an annex to this article, see page 299.

pp. 1 9 0 - 9 1 .

290

Vera Zamagni

It should be noted that engineering products did better than average, passing from 20% of total exports in 1947 to 26% in 1948, while textiles regressed from 42% in 1947 to 36% in 1948, 35 still remarkably progressing in absolute value. Some of the markets of outlet found at the time (notably in Latin America) proved transitory, but they helped assure Italian policy makers that engineering was to become the strategic sector in Italy's future development.

II With the launching of the Marshall Plan at the international level and the political decision to form a government without leftwing representatives, the time had come to prepare long-run projects. The preparation of plans is an activity distinctly uncongenial to Italians at all times, but in the year between the summer of 1947 and the summer of 1948 it proved to be a particularly hard task. Italy could not count on a generation of technocrats formed during the late 1930s and the 1940s as in France. 36 The few "technocrats" it had were either at the head of banks or gathered in the small "Centro di studi e piani tecnico-economici" of IRI, headed by Pasquale Saraceno. 37 It was precisely on the basis of Saraceno's works 38 that in the summer of 1948 the "Long Term Program of Italy" - required by OEEC - was drawn up. 39 Again echoing the judgement that the 1949 Country Study gave of it, it is widely held that the plan was sketchy, incoherent and ineffective. A close reexamination of it does not support such harsh judgement. The Plan starts by stating that "ultimately, any increase in national income depends upon the increased productivity of labour and on the development and improvement of equipment. The consistent aim of Italian economic policy is to increase the productivity of labour". 4 0 35

Annuario

36

For a brilliant story of the origins of French technocracy, cf. R . F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern

37

Statistico ltaliano France,

1944-48,

R o m e 1949.

Cambridge 1981.

It might be useful to mention that the often quoted volume by Jacoboni on the Italian engineering sector, very well informed and excellently elaborated, was produced by the above mentioned "Centro."

38

I am referring to Elementi

per un piano quadriennale

1948 (prepared in 1947) and Elementi

di sviluppo

per un piano economico

dell'economia

1948-1952,

italiana, R o m e

R o m e 1948 (updated

version of the previous work). Substantial parts of both works, together with other writings by Saraceno of the same years, are now republished in P. Saraceno, Ricostruzione 1943-1948, 3

' See O E E C , Interim Report on the ERP, vol. II: National programmes Period Ending 1948.

40

e

pianificaztone

ed. P. Barucci, Bari 1969.

Ibid., p. 5 4 1 .

30th June

1952, Submitted

to the OEEC.

of Members

of the

Recovery

Italy (Original in French); Paris, Dec.

291

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

In an enlightening presentation of the plan, made by Tremelloni, Minister of Industry, it is briefly explained how it was proposed to reach such a target: "Priority has been given to investment of an immediately productive character in agriculture, industry, transport etc. over investment in public works and housing [ . . . ] The expansion in industries producing capital goods will be considerably greater than that in industries producing consumer goods [ . . . ] The target of the different production plans is an increase in the volume and a reduction in the costs of production, taking into special account the need to increase exports". 4 1 In its simplicity, the philosophy of the plan was pretty coherent: to force productive investments in the field of capital goods, with the aim of lowering costs of production and increasing exports. This was considered indispensable to readjust structurally the Italian balance of payments and to face competition in the process of European integration that the Americans were pushing through. But let us comment on the most important targets of the plan in their quantitative version, with the help of Table 3, where I have compared -plan targets with actual achievements." It can immediately be noted that the level of implementation was good, with more success in industry than in agriculture. The limitation of imports was much less than projected, while exports performed somewhat better than expected. 43 Private consumption improved more than planned, as a result of more imports and more consumer goods domestically produced. The actual rigour of the economic policy pursued was less than the projected one. Unsatisfactory results were reached in transportation of goods by rail, but it must be noticed in this connection that the increase in road transportation was large - lorries increased from 80,589 in 1938 to 266,285 in 1952 and trailers from 8,389 to 28,508 which points to the start of the process of substitution between the two means of transport of goods that developed powerfully later. 44 The plan envisaged investments in the metal and engineering sectors, in the energy sector (electricity and oil) and in transport-communications that absorbed 60% of the total investments planned (29% was allocated to agriculture). 45 41

R . Tremelloni, 'The Italian Long Term Program submitted to the O E E C ' , in: Banca Nazionale Lavoro Quarterly

Review,

the Special Fund for Financing the Italian Engineering Industry', in: Banca Nazionale Quarterly

Review,

del

J a n - M a r c h 1949; by the same author, see also 'Premises and Tasks of del

Lavoro

Oct. 1947, where, in explaining the motivations for the creation of F I M , the

importance of the engineering industry for the future development of Italy is stressed. 42

Table 3 follows as an annex to this article, p. 300. - All the caveats advanced concerning the statistics of the time apply to the second column of Table 3 as well. I note only that I have made use there of the most widely employed and more consistent series available.

43

It might incidentally be noted here that reserves accumulated in the previous years helped overcome BOP deficits in 1 9 5 2 - 5 4 , years in which exports stagnated, without the need to curb imports; see footnote (34) and tab. 2.

44

Air transportation also increased remarkably (almost four times) between 1938 and 1952.

45

O E E C , op. cit., p. 518.

292

Vera Zamagni

In metallurgy, the target was "modernization, involving the formation of three vertically integrated iron and steel units, alone capable of producing 1.7 million tons of steel [ . . . ] Such an expansion of the iron and steel industry will have marked results on the whole of Italian economy. The reduction of the cost price of iron and steel products is, in fact, a prerequisite for the expansion of the machine industry, especially as far as exports are concerned". 4 6 It is well known that this target was embodied in the so-called "Piano Sinigaglia," ready since the end of the war (rather, since the 1930s), but difficult to implement. The difficulties came from various sources. T h e domestic conflict between private and public metallurgy I have recalled above was as alive as ever, complicated by the fact that IRI managers were at first in a difficult political position because of the allegation of collaboration with fascism and of the high costs of the project. 47 It was also not so easy to convince Americans and Europeans to let Italy develop her own domestic steel industry, because this meant that they had to give up Italy as a market for their steel industry. On top of this, it has recently been shown that the fact the "Piano Sinigaglia" was an IRI project delayed its approval on the part of Americans, who were slow in accepting a public enterprise as a trustworthy partner and apparently did so only after Valletta engaged himself in negotiations with the Americans on behalf of Finsider.48 All this meant that the "Piano Sinigaglia" started to be really implemented at the beginning of 1950, but by 1952 the steel produced had already surpassed the level projected in the plan (3 million tons) by Vi million tons. In engineering, " t h e problems [ . . . were] basically those of reorganisation, of renewals, of concentration and of specialisation of plants". 4 9 Here the projects were obviously many more than one and not many of them received much attention so far. A large amount of funds was pumped into the sector, among which 5 0 % of the Eximbank loan and 2 3 % of the IMI-ERP loans approved by December 1951. 5 0 T h e best known case of an engineering firm that renewed its plants and launched its strategy for the future in these years is certainly that of FIAT; 5 1 this firm, as a result of its already solid pre-war position and of the great

44 47

Ibid., p. 577. On the private view of development of the industry, see M . Pozzobon and R . Mari, 'Le acciaierie e ferriere lombarde, Falck (1945—1948)', in: La ricostruzione ronale e organism!

di fabbrica

nel triangolo

industriale

nella grande industria.

1945-48,

Strategic! pad-

Bari, 1978. On the public view,

see G. Toniolo, O s c a r Sinigaglia*', in: A. M o r t a r a (ed.), I protagonisti

dell'intervento

pubblico

in

Italia, Milan 1983. 49

Details of this story can be found in G. L a Bella, L'IRl nel dopoguerra,

R o m e 1983, pp. 1 7 6 - 1 8 6 .

"» O E E C , op. cit., p. 579. 50

CIR, L o sviluppo

dell'economia

See V. Castronovo, Agnelli,

italiana nel quadro

dell'economia

europea,

R o m e 1952.

Turin 1981, for the period up to 1945 and the recent and very well

researched book by P. Bairati, Valletta, Turin 1983, where large attention is devoted to the reconstruction period.

293

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

dynamism of its post-war leader, Vittorio Valletta, got a disproportionate amount of all the funds available and the best American technology. 52 But IRI firms also got substantial reorganization under way, while the output of tractors, typewriters, computing machines' and sewing machines increased remarkably, as well as that of paper and large electrical machinery. 53 The other sector where substantial investments were planned was energy. In electricity, new hydroelectric plants were built, while a number of thermoelectrical plants were also imported from America, doubling production between 1938 and 1952; 2 5 % of the IMI-ERP funds went to these projects. But oil refineries were also considered indispensable. In its somewhat inaccurate English, the plan declared that " t h e intricate programme for the development of installations foresees considerable imports of equipment and machinery for refining and storage plants [ . . . ] in addition to supplies from Italian industry for piping, transport and distribution, and, of course, other storage plant equipment. Moreover, considerable activity is expected in both prospects at home and natural gas production." 5 4 As a result of the efforts in this field, oil refined in Italy increased more than four times between 1938 and 1952, while discoveries of natural gas continued to be made by the other state holding, AGIP. 55 . T h e success of AGIP, already headed by Mattei, aroused the interest of Italian and international private companies which tried to contrast the policy of the state enterprise, without success. In 1953, a reorganization of AGIP, ANIC and S N A M took place that led to the creation of ENI. 5 6 The implementation of the above mentioned intensive capital projects was not going to relieve Italy's vast unemployment and underemployment problems very much. T h e Italian government was well aware that such projects "will only yield their full results later" 5 7 and that "in 1 9 5 2 - 5 3 , even on the most favourable assumptions, there will be about 1.2 million unemployed," 5 8 but it did not seem realistic to hope for a better result even with the two billion dollars ERP aid that was the Italian request advanced in the plan presented to OEEC. 5 9 We are here, I think, at the core of the contrast that opposed Italians and Americans over the use of ERP funds and that had one of its most explicit

"

P. Bairati, op. cit., pp. 2 1 7 - 1 8 .

"

The 1952 index of production (with 1938 = 100) was respectively 4 8 3 , 1359, 272, 239, 163.

54

O E E C , op. cit., pp. 5 6 9 - 7 0 .

55

Gas distributed by AGIP passed from 12 million m 3 in 1946 to 2 , 0 0 0 million in 1953; cfr. L. Bruni

56

See B. A m o r o s o and O . J . Olsen, Lo stato imprenditore,

"

O E E C , op. cit., p. 621.

58

Ibid., p. 622. T h e estimate included a forecast of a net emigration of about 8 5 0 , 0 0 0 people, while

and M . Colitti, La politica petrolifera

italiana, R o m e 1967. Bari 1978.

in the four years 1 9 4 9 - 5 2 emigrants turned out to be about 6 5 0 , 0 0 0 (net balance). Unemployment at the beginning of the 1950s was around 2 million people. 5'

O E E C , op. cit., p. 621.

294

Vera Zamagni

manifestations in the criticisms against the Italian government in the Country Study discussed before the American Congress in February 1949 (but prepared at the end of 1948). 60 Handicapped by the use of what I consider an unrealistically depressed index of industrial production, 61 the American report was literally obsessed by the problem of Italian unemployment. In considering the major projects of industrial investment advanced in the "long term program," invariably the Country Study mentioned as a major obstacle to the full acceptance of them their low employment multiplier." The desirability of a larger program of public works was asserted, for political reasons," while of the four criteria listed for the selection of investment projects, two aimed explicitly at the maximization of employment, one suggested investments with high and swift yields and the fourth insisted on the consideration of comparative costs. 64 Anyone can judge how useful these suggestions could be for a country that had still largely to industrialize! The fact is that the Marshall Plan, conceived as a tool for the reconstruction of Europe on the basis of a philosophy of growth65 had fo face in more than one country problems of development, for which funds were scarcely available 66 and ideas had not yet been elaborated. This explains, in my opinion, the rather contradictory behavior of Americans on a number of Italian issues. I shall give three examples. With reference to the balance of payments, it was a general rule of ERP to aim at a readjustment within the span of the program. When Italy tried very successfully to achieve that target, it was claimed that she was compressing imports too much. This might even have been the case, but in view of the non-existing will to support a longer

40

T h e index of industrial production reported ends with November 1948.

"

See Table 1 below.

"

E C A , Country Study, 1949, Italian version by ISE, op. cit., pp. 2 3 1 - 3 2 . In the case of engineering, that badly needed an improvement of productivity, the Country

Study reached the point of

arguing "Tuttavia e il caso di considerare se [ . . . ] non si debba utilizzare tali investimenti per estendere la potenzialita produttiva anziehe il rendimento unitario per lavoratori occupati." "

Although it was known that such investments could not improve the international competitiveness of the country nor give a definitive solution to the employment problems (ibid., p. 212). In the essay by D. Ellwood, Ί1 piano Marshall e il processo di modernizzazione in Italia', in: E. Aga Rossi (ed.), II piano

Marshall

e I'Europa,

R o m e 1983, there is a confirmation of this: " L e opere

pubbliche, i trasporti, l'agricoltura, l'emigrazione dovevano avere la priorita assoluta" (p. 153). Study, p. 210.

44

Country

"

See the famous article by C. Maier, ' T h e Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II', in: International

"

Organization,

fall 1977.

For example, with reference to the request of 101 million dollars by the part of Portugal for the year 1 9 4 9 / 5 0 , E C A granted only 10 million dollars, stating that many of the Portuguese projects advanced could not be taken into consideration within the framework of ERP.

295

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

term development effort either by ERP or by international organizations, it could hardly have appeared sensible to recommend being less cautious. 67 The second example refers to the question of public investment as against private investment. The Country Study insisted on the fact that until private investors would become mpre daring, the government should step in and bridge the gap, 68 with a coordinated activity of planning. 69 At the same time, however, Americans were politically against the supporters of planning schemes and did not lose an opportunity to hinder the projects of Italian public enterprises, without fully understanding that public investment in Italy was very extensive already and followed different channels. The bet was, in fact, that of reviving the private sector, and an excessive government dynamism in the investment field could easily be interpreted as a sign of distrusting private enterprise. This brings me to the third example. Americans urged the Italian government to enlarge public spending and at the same time to bring about financial stabilization. There was only one way of rendering the two things compatible and this did not pass unnoticed to the ECA mission in Italy: raising taxation. 70 However, the Italians stubbornly refused to follow this approach, which remains in my opinion the single most important negative factor of the Italian reconstruction period. 71 Lacking a substantial increase in revenues, the only possibility of obtaining a readjustment of the government budget was to slow down expenditures. It might be recalled that this was especially done not in the year after monetary stabilization, but in the subsequent year (1949), as a result also of a considerable delay in the approval of a number of projects (the alloc-

67

It might be appropriate to recall here that, in spite of the directive given by O E E C in connection with the second year of E R P administration of cutting down requests, the amount of aid asked by Italy was larger than the 1 9 4 8 / 4 9 amount, but it was cut down first by O E E C and then by E C A of a percentage about equal to the percentage drop in overall aid granted to the participating countries, which left the position of Italy in the scheme practically unchanged. Cf. O E E C , Reports the ECA on the Program

48

July 1949-]une

to

1950, Paris M a y 1949, I, Italy.

"Fino a quando non sara sviluppato un sufficiente investimento privato in capitali fissi, s a r i necessario che il Governo italiano espanda le sue attivita di investimenti in maniera sufficiente a neutralizzare la cedenza dell'economia nel suo complesso", Country

"

Study,

p. 193.

"II superamento di questi ostacoli istituzionali sembrerebbe richiedere una vigorosa azione governativa [ . . . ] coordinata attraverso un adequato meccanismo governativo di pianificazione", ibid., p. 217.

70

See again D. Ellwood, op. cit., p. 155 and ff. on the efforts by the Americans to bring about a

71

This might have been due to political considerations, to administrative shortcomings or, even, to

reform of taxation. a pressure not to " d i s t u r b " private profitability. It proved later very hard to reverse this choice and it cannot be said that even n o w , in spite of the considerable improvements made in the 1970s, the Italian taxation system is efficient.

296

Vera Zamagni

ation of counterpart funds, 7 2 the " p i a n o F a n f a n i " for housing and then the agrarian reform, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and other more limited projects). 73 It has been argued that the slow-down in the rate of increase of public expenditure, and its actual freezing in 1949, had deflationary effects, which is certainly correct. I would like, however, to recall that the big increase in taxation that would have been needed in the alternative case would certainly have depressed the private market a n d / o r discouraged private entrepreneurs (according to the system adopted), besides enlarging substantially the public sector.

Ill

Why the Country Study and its Keynesian inspiration have exercised such a great attraction on the Italian scholars writing about Italian reconstruction - especially on those belonging to the left - is an interesting question that cannot here find a full answer. Americans seemed more sensitive than the Italian government • to employment problems, Americans represented progress instead of backwardness, Americans were the heralds of the new Keynesian philosophy of expansion and of its principal instrument - demand management. There is certainly enough evidence to explain why many have tended to disregard the compatibility of the American Weltanschauung with the Italian situation, above all as far as the policy instruments suggested were concerned, and have criticized the Italian government not because it was unable to find better ways of developing the potentialities of the Italian economy, but because it did not support effective demand. Paradoxically, the only American guideline that the Italian government of the time accepted wholeheartedly - namely integration into Europe - has also come under heavy attack. It has been argued that the swift opening of the Italian economy to international markets prevented the strengthening of an investment goods industry, 7 4 sealed the subordination of Italian industry to stronger part-

71

Only France, Italy and Germany used 90% of the counterpart funds for productive purposes, which made their administration more complex. Cf. W.A. Brown/R. Opie, American Assistance,

73

For details on these developments, see V. Castronovo. Storia d'ltalia economica

74

Turin 1975 and P. Barucci, Ricostruzione,

pianificazione,

Einaudi, vol. IV, la Storia

Mezzogiorno,

Bologna 1978.

M. De Cecco, 'Lo sviluppo dell'economia italiana e la sua collocazione internazionale', in: Rivista internazionale

75

Foreign

Washington 1953.

di scienze economiche

e commerciali,

10, 1971.

G. Savarese, 'Note sulla 'ricostruzione' in Italia', in: Quaderni

Storici,

1977, where the author

writes: "lo sviluppo si organizza intorno al nuovo blocco automobilistico - siderurgico - meccanico-petrolifero - cementiero, fornito della licenza di esportazione limitatamente a poche specializzazioni della meccanica di massa" (pp. 2 6 2 - 6 3 ) .

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

297

ners,75 was too radical and untimely.76 Implicit in this position is the "counterfactual" that a delay in the opening up of the Italian economy to international competition would have allowed a better performance later. It is too easy to argue that the assumption that Italy could postpone the opening up of her economy is unrealistic. The Americans were pushing in this direction and most European countries were accepting the challenge. Italy was not isolated in Asia like Japan. She had always been part of the European economy and could not but continue to share that destiny, for good or for ill. However, the above mentioned "counterfactual" conceals two more subtle implications that must be made explicit. On the one side it implies that there were in Italy enough domestic entrepreneurial talents to be able to adapt foreign technology (assuming that it could be still imported even under this different approach) and make the leap forward necessary to become later a first rather than a second rank power, the only condition being that these talents should not be "disturbed" by too keen a competition at an early stage. Now, all the accounts of the Italian society of the time show quite evidently the high degree of cultural and technological backwardness in which the country still was, and make it all the more unlikely that a process of modernization could come mainly from within and proceed at a rapid pace. After all, the case of Germany is there to show that a destroyed country can be resurrected to a first rank" power in a very short span of time in the presence of a process of integration, while the cases of many underdeveloped countries show by contrast that no degree of protection is sufficient to bring about a viable industry. A moderate degree of protection does help in certain contexts, but it is never a sufficient condition for a sustained development process.77 There is also another implication in the criticism made against the process of integration of Italy in the world markets started during the reconstruction, and this is that the traditional import substitution model of growth of the Italian economy with its nationalistic-protectionist attitudes would not have been given up, with all the dangers that this could have in political and social terms. An implication that, I am sure, would not be accepted even by the same opponents of a too swift process of integration. On the whole, Italy did not want to lean on the past, but rather preferred betting on the future.

76

G. Bonifati and F. Vianello, 'L'economia italiana al tempo del Piano del Lavoro', in: II Piano lavoro delta CGIL 1949-1950, Milan 1978.

77

It must be recalled that up to 1968 Italy was the most protected of the EEC countries. Cf. C. M. Pierucci and A. Ulizzi, 'Evoluzione delle tariffe doganali italiane dei prodotti manufatti nel quadro della integrazione economica europea', in: Contribute alia Ricerca Economica, 3. Dec. 1973; see also P. Alessandrini, 'Note sull'apertura dell'economia italiana: dalla ricostruzione alio SME', in: Rassegna Economica, 1, 1983.

del

298

Vera Zamagni

Table 1: Indices of Industrial Production (building excluded) (1938 = 100)

1947 1. Confindustria 2. ERP, Country Study 1949 3. BIS 1949 4. ISTAT 1949-52 5. ISTAT 1957 6. Fua 1966 a

% 1948

77

84

80 93 87 91 83

83 98 95 97 89

1949 1950 1951 48/47 86

99

-

101a 105 107 98

119

-

-

-

-

120 123 113

138 140 128

49/48

50/49

51/50

2.4

15.1

20.2

9.1 3.8 5.4 9.2 6.6 7.2

-

3.1 10.5 10.3 10.1

-

-

-

-

14.3 15 15.3

15 13.8 13.3

average for the first 6 months only.

Sources: 1. Confederazione generale dell'industria, Annuario, 1949—1953 (figures for the first two years were originally 74 and 82; mining and electricity included, but engineering and food excluded). 2. ERP, Country Study, Feb. 1949 (Italian version edited by ISE, Milan, May 1948, pp. 180-81; mining included, but electricity, building materials, engineering and food excluded). 3. BIS, Economic and Financial Problems of Italy in the Summer of1949, Sept. 1949, p. F. 1 (It must be noticed that the source was ISTAT, the revised version of the index, with engineering included, see 4.). 4. ISTAT, Annuario Statistico Italiano 1944-48, 1950, 1951, 1952 (in 1947 and 1948 engineering was excluded from the index; with its inclusion in 1949, the figure for 1948 was revised up to 99). UN, Economic Survey of Europe Since the War, Geneva 1953 reports these figures with an arbitrary revision of 1947. 5. ISTAT, Indagine statistica sullo sviluppo del reddito nazionale dell'ltalia dal 1861 al 1956, Rome 1957, p. 218. (This index is the one employed also by O. Vitali, 'Documentazione statistica di base', in: G. Fua (ed.), Lo sviluppo economico in Italia, vol. Ill, Milan 1969. It can be noticed that it does not differ from 4. very much, being clearly only a revision of it). 6. G. Fua, Notes on Italian Economic

Growth,

Milan 1966.

299

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

Table 2: Indices of Imports and Exports of Goods at Constant Prices (1938 = 100)

l.a 1929 1938 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

2.a —

101} —

117 111 122 131 162 177

100 88 -

113 139 158 179 204

Imports 3.a

4.a

l.b

2.b

198 100

182 100

_

_

100

-

-

100 54

188 163 163 163 207 221

-

123 129 149 164 189

-

54 81 91 113 135 120

inn 137 144 166 155

Exports 3.b

4.b

176 100

112 100

-

97 157 162 186 231 186

—

89 98 119 143 129

* it should be noted that all these indices exclude trade with colonies from 1938 values, an operation that not always was done in the years immediately following 1945, with the result of understating the rate of growth of exports (imports from colonies were negligible). b the only two causes of discrepancies in the series are the use of different indices and of different deflators (all the series here reported come from the same current value series).

Sources: 1. a and b: UN, Economic Survey of Europe Since the War, Geneva 1953. Data come from Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1949—1952 (they appear to be Fisher indices). 2. a and b: Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1955; the indices are Laspeyres quantity. 3. a and b: ISTAT. Cento anni di sviluppo economico e sociale dell'ltalia, Rome w.d. (but 1961); these are the estimates employed with minor adjustments in O. Vitali, op. cit., Table XII.4.1.A. 4. a and b: ISTAT, Sommario di statistiche storiche dell'ltalia. 1861 —1965, Rome 1968, Table 75; the indices are Paasche quantity.

300

Vera Zamagni

Table 3: Comparison Between the Targets of the Italian Four-Year Plan 1948/49-1952/53 and the Achievements Plan Targets Indices 1952/53 with 1938 = 100 Population National income Industrial production Output of capital goods Output of consumption goods Transports by rail: passengers goods Transports by sea3 Imports Exports Consumption of foodstuffsb Consumption of ind. goodsb Agricultural output0

Achievements 1952 indices with 1938 = 100

109 117 140 150 114

110 117" 149e

200 125 85 156 160 97 105 115

233 89 176 221 186 110 121 105 g

...)f

" tons of merchant navy b

per capita

c

base 1 9 3 4 - 3 8 = 100

d

GDP at constant prices

e

mining, manufacturing, electricity-gas-water, building; the exclusion of building does not change the index.

f

metal-engineering 155; chemicals 185; textiles 108; foodstuffs-beverages 117

8

including forests and fishing

Sources: OEEC, Interim Report on the ERP, vol. II, Paris Dec. 1948. O. Vitali, 'Documentazione statistica di base', op. cit. 1ST AT, Sommario di statistiche storiche. B. Barberi, I consumi nel primo secolo dell'unitä d'ltalia, Milan 1961; ISTAT, Cento anni di sviluppo economico e sociale dell'Italia.

Reconstruction of Italian Industry

301

Zusammenfassung In der vorstehenden Studie wird die These vertreten, daß das politische und wirtschaftliche Problem, dem sich Italien am Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs gegenübersah, im Grunde nicht der Wiederaufbau war, sondern die Entwicklung eines neuen Konzepts, das die Überwindung der langen Tradition einer Importsubstitutionspolitik und der Konzentration auf den Binnenmarkt ermöglichte. Die wesentlichen Elemente eines solchen neuen Konzepts mußten notwendig die schrittweise Erschließung internationaler M ä r k t e und eine besondere enge Anbindung an die europäischen M ä r k t e sein. Der „neue Kurs", den Italien einschlug, basierte auf drei wirtschaftspolitischen Grundelementen: (a) einer Währungsstabilisierung, die umso rigoroser ausfiel, als sie mit dem Gewicht einer nicht durchgeführten Steuerreform belastet war, die zu jener Zeit, und noch Jahre danach, als politisch undurchführbar angesehen wurde; (b) umfangreiche staatliche Interventionen in Form der Vergabe von Krediten und der Errichtung staatlicher Unternehmen, womit eine bereits bestehende Tradition fortgesetzt wurde; (c) eine „zwangsweise" Kapitalakkumulation durch Lohnsenkungen, verbunden mit einigen strukturellen Reformen (Agrarreform, Gründung der Cassa per il Mezzogiorno) und umfangreichen Investitionsprogrammen (Stahlprojekte, Sinigaglia, Energieplan). Alle diese Maßnahmen standen in einem gewissen Gegensatz zum M a r shall-Plan der Amerikaner, die die Steuerreform befürworteten, die den italienischen staatsinterventionistischen Vorstellungen verständnislos gegenüberstanden und die sich aus im wesentlichen politischen - wenngleich in keynesianische Argumente verpackten - Gründen (Furcht vor öffentlichen Unruhen und vor der Ausbreitung des Kommunismus) gegen eine konsequente Kapitalakkumulations-Politik aussprachen. Die Politik der damaligen christdemokratischen Regierungen wurde später von überwiegend der Linken beziehungsweise der Keynes-Schule angehörenden italienischen Politikern und Ökonomen sehr kritisiert. Die Studie setzt sich am Ende mit einer dieser Kritiken auseinander, der Auffassung, daß sich die italienische Wirtschaft weniger rasch hätte international öffnen sollen. Dies erscheint als eine unrealistische Auffassung, die die Fortführung der traditionellen Konzentration auf den italienischen Binnenmarkt impliziert hätte.

The Economic Reconstruction of West Germany in the Context of International Relations 1945-1949* by Hans-Jürgen Schröder

Since the end of the 19 th century economic problems have become more and more important for both international relations and domestic stability or instability. This is obviously the case for 20 th century Germany and the Federal Republic in particular. As West German historian Werner Abelshauser wrote recently: "The history of the Federal Republic of Germany is — above all — its economic history." 1 Until a few years ago both the so-called economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) and the belief in unlimited economic growth were important in shaping the self-image of the Germans, 2 something that muted nationalism and any strong initiatives to overcome the division of Germany. One of the central questions in evaluating the West German reconstruction process is the extent to which either domestic or external factors were decisive in bringing about specific developments in the economic field. With the opening of American, British, and German archives and improved access to French source materials it has become possible to interpret West German recovery in the context of international relations and to evaluate the motives of decision-makers in the countries mentioned. 3 To demonstrate the importance of international de-

* At the Augsburg Symposium the following papers discussed problems of West German economic developments: Werner Abelshauser, 'Westdeutschlands Durchbruch zur wirtschaftlichen Rekonstruktion 1947/48'; Manfred Knapp, 'Deutschlands Wiedereingliederung in die Weltwirtschaft. Außenwirtschaftspolitische Vorentscheidungen in der Gründungsphase der Bundesrepublik 1948/49'; Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'Die Rekonstruktion der westdeutschen Wirtschaft im Kontext der internationalen Beziehungen'. T h e contributions by Abelshauser and Knapp are published in full length in Josef Becker/Franz Knipping (eds.), Im Schatten der Ohnmacht. Machtbewußtsein im Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1949, Paderborn, Schöningh, 1986. 1

Werner Abelhauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte Frankfurt/Main 1983, p. 8.

2

See Harald Mey, 'Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie. Betrachtungen zur Grundlegung der Bundesrepublik', in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 19, 1971, pp. 1 6 0 - 1 8 6 .

3

A number of essay collections investigate the formative years of the Federal Republic, e.g. Westdeutschlands Weg zur Bundesrepublik 1945-1949, Beiträge von Mitarbeitern des Instituts für

der

Bundesrepublik

Deutschland

(1945-1980),

304

Hans-Jürgen Schröder

velopments for the West German reconstruction process the following problems will be discussed: the growing importance of Germany in U. S. European policy and the beginning of West German economic revival, the Anglo-American disputes over the economic order within West Germany, West German reaction to the devaluation of the British pound in 1949, and the economic elements in West German diplomacy as well as problems of continuity in German foreign policy after two world wars. Long before the end of hostilities in Europe the American Government had planned extensively for Germany's role in the post-war world. Most of the studies came to the conclusion that a reconstruction of world trade would in the long run not be possible without the ultimate re-integration of the German economy into the world economy. Although the Morgenthau Plan which called for a de-industrialization of Germany provoked extensive debates it never had any chance to be applied seriously. 4 Long-range economic planning was soon to be complemented by immediate economic and political necessities. Despite the restrictive directive JCS 1067, General Clay, the Deputy Military Governor, became an ardent advocate of rapid economic stabilization of West Germany to make it less dependent on external support. A few weeks before the German capitulation, Clay, in a letter to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, explained his position as follows: "Conditions are getting progressively worse and large sections of all important cities have been obliterated. Of course, we have a long-range problem in preventing the restoration of Germany's war potential. However, this is not the short-range problem as several years will be required to develop even a sustaining economy to provide a bare minimum standard of living." 5 Long before the directive 1067 was officially revised in July 1947 the American Military Government under the

Zeitgeschichte, ökonomische

München

Stabilisierung

1976;

Claus Scharf/Hans-Jürgen

Westdeutschlands

der westlichen

Alliierten,

chenstellungen

im Nachkriegsdeutschland,

(eds.), Vorgeschichte

1945-1949,

Schröder

(eds., Politische

Fünf Beiträge zur

Wiesbaden 1977; Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), Politische

der Bundesrepublik

1945—1953, Deutschland.

(eds.), Economic posium

(=

Reconstruction

Zeitschrift

in Europe:

für die gesamte

gen Schröder, Die Deutschlandpolitik

Zwischen

Kapitulation

und

GrundgeGroßbri-

Wiesbaden 1979; Rudolf Richter/WolfgangF. Stolper The Reintegration

Staatswissenschaft Frankreichs

of Western

Germany.

Α Sym-

137/3, 1981); Claus Scharf/Hans-Jür-

und die Französische

Zone 1945-1949,

baden 1983; Josef Foschepoth/Rolf Steininger (eds.), Die britische Deutschlandspolitik 1945-1949,

und

Wies-

Besatzung-

Paderborn 1985.

* On the Morgenthau Plan in the context of international relations see Warren F. Kimball, or Ploughshares?

Wei-

Göttingen 1979; Josef Becker et al.

setz, München 1979; Claus Scharf/Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), Die Deutschlandpolitik tanniens und die Britische Zone 1945-1949,

und

Deutschlandpolitik

The Morgenthau

Plan for Defeated

Nazi Germany,

1943 — 1946,

Swords

Philadelphia

1976. 5

Clay to Byrnes, 2 0 April 1945, in: Jean Edward Smith, The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay (Clay Papers), Bloomington (Indiana) 1974, p. 6.

305

Economic Reconstruction of West Germany

guidance of Clay had started to pursue a pragmatic stabilization policy. And Clay urged officials in Washington actively to support his policy of "Priming the German Economy," 6 using the Communist danger as a key argument: "It is our belief that the Russian Zone is feeding approximately 1500 calories and will continue to do so until the next harvest season. We have insisted on democratic process in the U. S. zone and have maintained a strict neutrality between political parties. As a result the Communist Party has made little inroad. However, there is no choice between becoming a communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories. It is my sincere belief that our proposed ration allowance in Germany will not only defeat our objectives in middle Europe but will pave the way to a Communist Europe." 7 Due to growing East-West tensions and the emergence of the Cold War this view was largely shared by Washington. And the American Government supported General Clay's pragmatic stabilization policy in West Germany. 8 Referring to this development Werner Abelshauser 9 has repeatedly argued that the significance of both the currency reform of June 1948 and the Marshall Plan for West German reconstruction have been exaggerated by both politicians and historians. And he presents statistical evidence for his view "that the deadlock in German industry was broken" and a "substantial" progress in reconstruction were made "before the currency reform of June 1948" and "that foreign aid did not prove to be the crucial factor in priming the German economy." Abelshauser argues that "American contributions to German economic reorganisation, e.g. the currency reform and the Marshall Plan seem to have been less crucial for the breakthrough. On the other hand the US Military government was more successful in priming the German economy with German means and resources at a very early stage of postwar development." Marshall Plan deliveries had come " t o o late" to initiate an economic upswing which had already been inaugurated

' John M . Backer, Priming

the German

Economy.

American

Occupational

Policies,

1945-1948,

Durham ( N . C . ) 1971. 7

Clay to Echols and Peterson, 27 M a r c h 1946, in: Clay Papers,

8

On Clay see now John H . Backer, Winds of History, The German

p. 184. Years of Lucius DuBignon

New York 1983; on American occupation policy John Gimbel, The American Germany.

Politics and the Military,

' See the following 1945-1948.

publications

Rekonstruktion

1945-1949, by Werner

Occupation

Clay, of

Stanford (Calif.) 1968. Abelshauser:

und Wachstumsbedingungen

Wirtschaft

in

in der amerikanischen

Westdeutschland Zone,

Stuttgart

1975; 'Die Rekonstruktion der westdeutschen Wirtschaft und die Rolle der Besatzungspolitik', in: Scharf/Schröder, Politische und ökonomische

Stabilisierung,

pp. 1 —17; 'Probleme des Wiederauf-

baus der westdeutschen Wirtschaft 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 3 ' , in: Winkler, o p . c i t . , pp. 2 0 8 - 2 5 3 ; 'Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshall-Plan. Westeuropas Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre', in: Vierteljahrshefte

für Zeitgeschichte,

29, 1981,

pp. 5 4 5 - 5 7 8 ; 'Westdeutschlands Durchbruch zur wirtschaftlichen Rekonstruktion', loc.cit.; unless otherwise stated the following quotations are from Abelshauser's unpublished paper ' T h e Role of the U.S. in West German Economic Recovery: A Reappraisal'.

306

Hans-Jürgen Schroder

without foreign aid. 10 Although Abelshauser minimizes the impact of currency reform 11 and the Marshall Plan he also leaves no doubt that an early economic breakthrough could not have taken place against the wishes of American policymakers. The State Department's preparations for Marshall's Harvard University speech of June 1947 leave no doubt that West Germany by then had become the cornerstone of Washington's policy of containment by economic means. As George F. Kennan summed up in a Policy Planning Staff paper: " T h e importance of Germany to general European recovery is well-known and requires no statistical illustration. No impartial student of Europe's pre-war economy can fail to appreciate the vital significance which German productivity and German markets have had [...] There can be no avoiding the fact that some further restoration of German production is essential to European recovery." 12 In August 1947 Secretary of Commerce Harriman summed up his impressions of a visit to Germany in a memorandum for President Truman: "We cannot revive a selfsupporting Western European economy without a healthy Germany playing its part as a producing and consuming unit." 13 This would also be in the interest of those Western allies who asked for reparations from deliveries of dismantled German factories: " T h e best reparations our Western Allies can obtain is prompt recovery of Germany." 1 4 In August 1948 an important State Department Policy Statement on Germany emphasized at great length the close interdependence between European recovery and German economic reconstruction: " O u r interest in Germany's relation to ERP arises from the importance of Germany's economic position in Europe. Germany is potentially one of the most important European suppliers of such acutely needed commodities as coal, mining machinery, and industrial equipment. At the same time she is potentially an important market for Eu-

10 11

Abelshauser, 'Westdeutschlands Durchbruch zur wirtschaftlichen Rekonstruktion', loc.cit. A differing view is now presented by Albrecht Ritsehl, 'Die Währungsreform von 1948 und der Wiederaufstieg der westdeutschen Industrie. Z u den Thesen von Mathias Manz und Werner Abelshauser über die Produktionswirkungen der Währungsreform', in: Vierteljahrshefte

12

für Zeit-

33, 1985, pp. 1 3 6 - 1 6 5 .

geschichte,

'Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint', National Archives (NA), Record Group (RG) 23 July 1947, 59, Records of Charles E. Bohlen, B o x 6 .

13

Harriman t o Truman, 12 Aug. 1947, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence

(Missouri),

President's Secretary's File (PSF), Germany. 14

Ibid., on the reparation problem see esp. Bruce Kuklick, American Germany: Decision

The Clash with Russia over Reparations, to Divide Germany.

Nübel, Die

amerikanische

American

Foreign Policy in Transition,

Reparationspolitik

Policy and the Division

Ithaca ( N . Y . ) 1972; John H . Backer,

gegenüber

of The

Durham (N. C.) 1978; Otto

Deutschland

1941-1945,

Frank-

f u r t / M a i n 1980; and John Gimbel, 'The American Reparation Stop in Germany. An Essay on the Political Uses of History', in: Historian,

37, 1975, pp. 2 7 6 - 2 9 6 .

Economic Reconstruction of West Germany

307

ropean goods. German economic recovery is therefore vital to general European economic recovery. On the other hand, German economic recovery is largely dependent on the economic recovery of other European countries since they are the chief markets for her goods. It is US policy that the fullest possible recognition be given this interdependence in order to achieve the greatest over-all benefits for the European Recovery Program.[...] The US is now completely commited to a far-reaching programme of political and economic reconstruction for Western Germany." 1 5 A few months later George F. Kennan reaffirmed Germany's vital position for the success of the European Recovery programme. He pointed out that when negotiating with the Soviets " w e would [...] accept no arrangements which would inhibit the Germans from participating in ERP. To do so would place Germany economically at the mercy of Russia and would defeat the purposes of this programme." 1 6 Although Marshall Plan aid was not the first step in America's reconstruction policy in West Germany, its implications for West Germany both in the economic and political sphere were - as Manfred Knapp 1 7 and Werner Link 18 have shown - of major importance. This may be summed up as follows: It was, for example, a source of immediate supply of foreign exchange for the importation of key products and for long-range investment programs as well as an instrument to speed up West German reintegration into the world economy. It had major psychological importance for decision-making. It was, in addition, a first step toward the founding of the Federal Republic, a precondition for West Department of State Policy Statement, Germany, 16 Aug. 1948, II, p. 1319. " Policy Planning Staff Paper, 12 Nov. 1948; in: FRUS, 1948, II, p. 1330. 17 On Germany and the Marshall Plan see the following contributions by Manfred Knapp: 'Deutschland und der Marshallplan: Zum Verhältnis zwischen politischer und ökonomischer Stabilisierung in der amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik nach 1945', in: Scharf/Schröder, Politische und ökonomische Stabilisierung, pp.19-43; 'Das Deutschlandproblem und die Ursprünge des europäischen Wiederaufbauprogramms. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit John Gimbels Untersuchung 'The Origins of the Marshall Plan', in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 19, 1978, pp. 48-65; 'U.S. Economic Aid and the Reconstruction of West Germany: Political and Economic Implications of the European Recovery Program', in: Ekkehart Krippendorff (ed.), The Role of the United States in the Reconstruction of Italy and West Germany, 1943 -1949. Papers presented at a German-American Colloquium held at John F. Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien, Berlin, June 1980, Berlin 1981, pp. 4 0 - 5 5 ; 'Reconstruction and West-Integration: The Impact of the Marshall Plan on Germany', in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 137, 1981, pp. 415-433; 'Wiederaufbau und West-Integration: Die Auswirkungen des Marshall-Plans auf Deutschland', in. Willi Paul Adams/Knud Krakau (eds.), Deutschland und Amerika. Perzeption und historische Realität, Berlin 1985, pp. 111-133; 'Deutschlands Wiedereingliederung in die Weltwirtschaft. Außenwirtschaftspolitische Vorentscheidungen in der Gründungsphase der Bundesrepublik 1948/49', loc.cit. 15

18

Werner Link, 'Der Marshall-Plan und Deutschland', in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, 50, 1980, pp. 3 - 1 8 ; see also Erich Ott, 'Die Bedeutung des Marshall-Plans für Nachkriegsentwicklung in Westdeutschland' ibid., 4, 1980, pp. 19-37.

308

Hans-Jürgen Schröder

Germany's fast integration into the West, a lever for an active West German foreign policy, and an instrument to influence the socio-economic order in West Germany. The extent to which American policy shaped the reestablishment of a private capitalist system in West Germany and the formulation of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft19 is still controversial. In the following the problem will be discussed in the context of Anglo-American relations.

When discussing the U.S. policy of reconstruction in West Germany revisionist historians haven taken for granted that a major aim of the Truman Administration was not only to reintegrate Western Germany into the Western political and economic system but also to revamp the German economy according to the American model of free enterprise. Lloyd Gardner, for example, described policy towards Germany as being reactionary: "What actually took place in Western Germany [...] was an American counter-revolution — against the policy of [...] German Social Democrats, and, finally, European radicalism." 2 0 In challenging this revisionist interpretation, Dörte Winkler, in an article published in 1979, even went so far as to speak of " T h e American Policy of Socialization in Germany," 2 1 with the U.S. cast in the unaccustomed role of a spearhead of socialism in Germany. By stressing the different approaches of OMGUS and War Department on one hand and the State Department on the other the author concludes that the United States Government in general was surprisingly open-minded and flexible in its approach towards both German Social Democracy and German trade unions. She also suggests that both German politicians and trade union leaders actually had more freedom to launch their respective programs of socialization and co-determination than they realized at the time. More recently, Werner Link, in his article on the Marshall Plan and Germany has supported Dörte Winkler's approach. Link, whose research is based on a broader archivial basis, is convinced that "the American Government

" On the idea of the social market economy see esp. Gerold Ambrosius, Die Durchsetzung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1949, Stuttgart 1977, and Georg Müller, Die Grundlegung der westdeutschen Wirtschaftsordnung im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat 1947-1949, Frankfurt/Main 1982, with further references; see also the recent contributions by Anthony Nicholls, 'The Other Germany - The 'Neo-Liberals", in: R.J. Bullen et al. (ed.), Ideas into Politics. Aspects of European History 1880-1950, London 1984, pp. 164-177, and Volker Berghahn, 'Ideas into Politics: The Case of Ludwig Erhard', ibid., pp. 178-192. 20 Lloyd C. Gardner, 'America and the German 'Problem', 1945-1949', in: Barton J. Bernstein (ed.), Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, Chicago 1972, pp. 113-148. 21 Dörte Winkler, 'Die amerikanische Sozialisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1945-1948', in: Winkler, op.cit., pp. 88-110.

Economic Reconstruction of West Germany

309

would not have rejected a (German) democratic decision to socialize basic industries." 2 2 The same attitude, he concludes, could have been expected by the American business community. 23 "Whatever the indirect effect of the Marshall Plan in blocking socialization in the Ruhr might have been [...] in the U. S. Zone (Hesse) socialization of basic industries did actually take place despite the introduction of the Marshall Plan." Link adds "that by Military Law No. 75 the American Government was binding itself both to allow and to accept a free and democratic decision of the German people." 2 4 To support his thesis Link points out that the United States finally accepted the British Labour Party's socialization policies that were put into effect in Britain. But was the United States' acceptance of socialization in Britain representative of its position towards continental Western Europe, including Western Germany? While many members of the Truman Administration were critical of Britain's domestic policies, most State Department officials thought it would be unwise to intervene in its internal affairs. When Bernard Baruch urged Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Clayton to do something to stop socialization, the latter objected on the ground that " I don't know of anything we could do or should do to prevent England and other countries from socializing certain of their industries if that is the policy they wish to follow. The attempt to force such countries to adopt policies with respect to their domestic economies contrary to their wishes would, in my opinion, be an unwarranted interference in their domestic affairs." 2 5 In private conversations with their British counterparts members of the Truman Administration often didn't hesitate to express their critical views on various aspects of British domestic policies, socialization in particular. But, as the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad has written, "more important [...] than such more or less private views would be the extent to which Washington more directly tried to influence the domestic policies of other countries." 2 6 Washington's avoidance of such direct pressure on the British Government on the issue of socialization should be viewed against the larger context of American global aims and especially the Truman Administration's strategies to counteract communist influence in Western Europe. In September 1946, R. G. Hooker, Executive Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Berle, drew attention to the phrase coined by Charles E. Bohlen 22 23

24 2i 26

Werner Link, 'Der Marshall-Plan und Deutschland', loc.cit., p. 14. See Werner Link, Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute 1945-1975. Eine Studie über transnationale Beziehungen, Düsseldorf 1978; see also Link's article 'Die Mitwirkung amerikanischer Gewerkschafter und Geschäftsleute an der Stabilisierungspolitik in Westdeutschland 1945-1949', in: Scharf/Schröder, Politische und ökonomische Stabilisierung, pp. 4 5 - 6 0 . Link, 'Der Marshall-Plan und Deutschland', loc.cit., p. 14. Clayton to Baruch, 6 Dec. 1946, NA, RG59, 841. 5 0 3 4 / 1 1 - 2 3 4 6 . Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949, New York 1980, p. 114.

310

Hans-Jürgen Schröder

"that the best way to serve U. S. interests in our relations with the USSR is to 'support the N C L ' meaning the non-communist left." Bohlen's reasoning was as follows: The non-communist left (the Labour Party in Britain, Social Democrats on the Continent) had a program calculated to accomplish the social objectives which communists claimed as theirs. Only the NCL could oppose Soviet expansion without laying itself open to the charge of serving reactionary interests. And only the N C L could command the broad basis of popular support necessary to resist Soviet expansion. 27 This political philosophy doubtless had many adherents in the State Department. They feared that direct U. S. pressure to prevent socialization in Britain might well have weakened the United Kingdom as a bulwark against communist influence in Western Europe. In June 1948, a State Department policy statement on Britain even underlined certain advantages of the Labour Government's policy: "on the ideological level, the election of a socialist-labor government in Britain has strengthened that country's domestic position vis-a-vis Soviet propaganda. A government of this type is not so vulnerable with its own people as a conservative regime might be to charges of reactionary prejudice against the Soviets, and a socialist flavor to its policies is a good antidote to Communist appeal abroad. While the US would not adopt for her own certain of the internal economic and social legislation which the British have adopted, it is not our policy to interfere with or attempt to direct the domestic legislation or policies of the democratically-elected representatives of the British people." 2 8 Similar considerations shaped Washington's policy towards Scandinavia, as recent findings by Geir Lundestad suggest. It would be misleading, however, to extend these pragmatic and open-minded American reactions to socialization schemes in Scandinavia and especially in Britain to explain U.S. attitudes towards the problem of socialization in Western Germany. Immediately after the war there was a strong anticapitalist movement in Germany, the business community having discredited itself through its close interrelationship with National Socialism. Following the end of hostilities there were few indeed who "would make a bet on the survival of the capitalist system" in Germany. 2 9 All major political forces were struggling to find concepts for a socio-economic system different from that of capitalism. Even Konrad Adenauer, soon to become one of the most outspoken opponents to any kind of socialism, called in a speech at the University of Cologne in 1946 for the "early

27

Memorandum Hooker, 20Sept. 1946, NA, R G 5 9 , 711.61/9-2046. I want to thank John Lewis Gaddis who made this document available to me during my research in the National Archives. 28 Cited by Lundestad, op.cit., p. 115. " Jürgen Kocka, 'Restauration oder Neubeginn? Deutschland 1945-1949', in: L76. Demokratie und Sozialismus. Politische und literarische Beiträge, 11, 1979, p. 118.

311

Economic Reconstruction of West Germany

socialization of the coal mining industry." 3 0 T h e Christian Democrats' attitudes towards public ownership, as elaborated in the "Ahlener P r o g r a m m " of the CDU (February 1947) have often been referred to. 3 1 Statements by Karl Arnold, Ministerpräsident of North-Rhine-Westphalia, might also be cited. In a speech of June 17, 1947, he pleaded for a "re-vamping of our economy" adding that "the capitalist system has been brought to a deadlock as a result of its own inconsistencies." 3 2 The strongest opposition to any idea of restabilizing the capitalist system stemmed from the Social Democratic Party and especially from Kurt Schumacher. He particularly stressed the close interrelation of public ownership and democracy. In a political resolution the 1947 party conference at Nuremberg committed itself to the "propagandization of Socialism as the spearhead of democracy." 3 3 It should also be mentioned in this context that Schumacher did not oppose the adoption of the Marshall Plan. T o the contrary: he saw it as a chance for Europe to rebuild its economy and expressed his conviction that it was " n o t motivated by the wish to transplant a bit of America into Europe but to revive the European market." 3 4 T h e Marshall Plan, in other words, was not regarded as being detrimental to the SPD socialization schemes. Another often cited example of the anticapitalist mood in postwar Germany is the work of the Hesse Constitutional Assembly in 1946. 35 T h e Social Democrat's pleas for the adoption of public ownership schemes gained strong support when the British Government announced its socialization plans for the Ruhr in late 1946. 3S T h e British archives clearly reveal the high priority assigned socialization in the Ruhr by the Attlee Government. Both security considerations and social policy were

30

E m s t Ulrich H u s t e r / G e r h a r d Kraiker/Burkhard Scherer/Friedrich-Karl S c h l o t m a n n / M a r i a n n e Welteke, Determinanten

der westdeutschen

Restauration

1945-1949,

5th ed., F r a n k f u r t / M a i n

1977, p. 404. 31

Ibid., pp. 424ff. On "Christlicher Sozialismus" see: Rudolf Uertz, Christentum der

frühen

1945-1949,

CDU.

Grundlagen

und

Wirkungen

der

christlich-sozialen

und Sozialismus Ideen

in der

in

Union

Stuttgart 1981, with further references.

32

Cited by Kocka, 'Restauration oder Neubeginn?', loc.cit., p. 118.

33

English translation from: Murphy to State Department, 4 Aug. 1947, N A , R G 59, 8 6 2 . 0 0 / 8 - 4 4 7 .

34

Ibid.

15

On early Hesse constitutional development see the report by Ministerpräsident Geiler, 6 J a n . 1947, in: Hessischer periode,

Landtag,

Stenographische

deutscher

Drucksachen-Abteilung um die Länderverfassungen

Hl, I. in

WahlHessen

Frankfurt/Main 1978. Text of the Hesse Constitution in: Verfas-

und Bayern 1946 - Dokumente, sungen

Berichte,

3. Sitzung, pp. 12ff.; and: Die Auseinandersetzung Bundesländer

mit Gesetzen

über

die Landesverfassungsgerichte,

München

1979, p. 167, English translation in: N A , R G 5 9 , 8 6 2 . 0 1 1 / 4 - 2 2 4 8 . 36

See for example the remarks by Robertson on 1 4 A u g . 1946, in: Akten Bundesrepublik

Deutschland

1945-1949,

vol. I, München 1976, p . 6 7 5 .

zur Vorgeschichte

der

312

Hans-Jürgen Schröder

important in this respect. Recent publications by Horst Lademacher 37 and Rolf Steininger 38 leave no doubt about this. The American reaction to this gives us a strong impression of conflicting Anglo-American interests in Germany: General Clay was alarmed about the British program calling "for a detailed regimentation of the German economy", which in his opinion "would prove to be completely unacceptable" to the American public. " O u r own concept calls for the minimum control of selected scarce materials which would give private enterprise and initiative an opportunity to participate in rehabilitation." There could be no question, Clay added, "but that the long range issue involved in the entire matter is the establishment of State controls of economy, which will lead to a planned economy as advocated by socialists everywhere and with a substantial degree of State ownership." There would be little field in such an economy for private initiative and free enterprise. Clay asked for "assurance from our Government that its desire to make economic fusion work does not make it willing to accept a highly centralized economic control, which will be utilized in the hands of the SPD with the support of the British Military Government, to extend the socialist influence." 3 ' The Political Adviser for Germany, Murphy, sent an urgent cable to Washington raising the question "whether we are [...] prepared to go along with the British in support of German Social Democrats' design for socialization of German enterprise which apparently has support of British Labor Party and Cabinet." 4 0 And Secretary of War Patterson in a letter to Marshall on June 13, 1947, raised two problems concerning the Army occupation in Germany which he thought were of the most urgent importance: " O n e has to do with preventing famine. The other has to do with the British program of socializing the coal mines in the R u h r . " Patterson asked for the guidance and assistance of the State Department " t o avoid disaster." In referring to British plans for carrying out a socializing of the mines Patterson expressed his view "that the need for maximum production of coal at this critical time, is not for experiments in socialization." He was particularly concerned that "such experiments are certain to interfere with current production", and he added: " I f my house is on fire, I do

37

Horst Lademacher, 'Die britische Sozialisierungspolitik im Rhein-Ruhr-Raum 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 8 ' , in: Scharf/Schröder, Die Deutschlandpolitik

38

Großbritanniens,

pp. 5 1 - 9 2 .

Rolf Steininger, 'Die Rhein-Ruhr-Frage im Kontext britischer Deutschlandpolitik', in: Winkler, op.cit., pp. 1 1 1 - 1 6 6 ; Rolf Steininger, 'Reform und Realität. Ruhrfrage und Sozialisierung in der anglo-amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik 1 9 4 7 / 4 8 ' , in: Vierteljahrsbefte

für Zeitgeschichte,

27,

1979, pp. 1 6 7 - 2 4 0 ; see also Steininger's survey: 'Die britische Deutschlandpolitik in den Jahren 1 9 4 5 / 4 6 ' , in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte.

Beilage zur Wochenzeitung

Das Parlament,

1-2,

1982, 9 Jan. 1982, pp. 2 8 - 4 7 . 3'

Murphy to Matthews, 27 April 1947, in: FRUS, 1947, II, p. 910, and Clay to Noce, 29 April 1947, ibid., p . 9 1 4 .

40

Murphy to Matthews, 27 April 1947, ibid., p . 9 0 9 .

E c o n o m i c Reconstruction of West Germany

313

everything I can to put the fire out, I do not engage in arguments on the state of the title to the house." Patterson urged the State Department that strong representation should be made to the British government, " t o the effect that it must at least postpone its socialization program until the present emergency in production of coal has been overcome." Washington had every right, he argued, " t o insist on this, since the load of carrying the two zones in Germany, particularly in the vital matter of food, is falling more and more on our shoulders." 41 When the Secretaries of State, War and Navy discussed the problem of socialization of German coal mines they agreed "that strong representation should be made to the British Government to the effect that it must cease or defer any experiments in socialization of the German coal m i n e s . " " And Clayton was instructed by Marshall to make it "quite clear" to Bevin that he regarded the British management of the coal problem as "pathetic" and that the United States could not participate in "any big new commitments to help Europe get back on its feet unless we know that the problem of producing coal in the Ruhr will be licked and quickly." Marshall emphasized that the United States" could not sit by while the British tried out any ideas which they had of experimenting with socialization of coal mines; time does not permit for experimentation." 43 During the Anglo-American Talks on Ruhr Coal Production, held in Washington (August 12 - September 10,1947), the American participants left no doubt about their position. The American records clearly reveal the U.S. delegation's enormous pressure on their British counterparts to abandon their plans to socialize the Ruhr mines. 44 Both sides used the argument of efficiency for their respective positions, but owing to their financial difficulties the British had to give in. As General Robertson put it: " H e who pays the piper calls the tune." 4 5 In July 1947 the London Financial Times had already prophesied "that Uncle Sam will put his foot down and that the nationalizers will not be allowed to have their way." 4 6 But the Americans "sweetened the pill": the British were not asked to abandon their plans in principle but merely to put them on ice. As summed up by a State Department official, the "conversations did not pretend to reach a decision on the issue of nationalization versus private ownership in the Ruhr mines." In supporting this statement, however, he referred to JCS 1779 of July 11, 1947,

41 42

Patterson to Secretary of State, 13 June 1947, ibid., pp. 1151 f. Minutes of Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 19 June 1947, extracts printed ibid., p. 927.

43

Memorandum Clayton, 20 June 1947, ibid., p. 929.

44

See especially N A , R G 59, 8 6 2 . 6 3 6 2 .

45

Memorandum Robertson, 5 July 1947, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office Papers, series 371, file 6 4 5 1 4 ( F O 3 7 1 / 6 4 5 1 4 ) ; see also Steininger, 'Die britische Deutschlandpolitik'.

46

Financial Times, 28 July 1947, cited in Clark to State Department, N A , R G 5 9 , 8 6 2 . 6 3 6 2 / 7 - 2 8 4 7 .

314

Hans-Jürgen Schröder

which instructed Clay "not to interfere with socialization if the Germans showed by democratic methods that they wanted it." This directive, of course, left him free " t o preach the advantages of free enterprise", which he had been "instructed to do vigorously during the past few years." 47 To be sure, U.S. officials tried to avoid giving the impression that the results of the Washington Conference of August/September 1947 had fundamental significance. But postponement of socialization plans in fact meant a major defeat for such plans. American opposition also at least indirectly weakened the non-communist left in Western Germany. In October 1947, Schumacher himself complained during his visit to the United States that the US and UK Military Governments' failure " t o effect socialization of the most important industries [...] hurt the prestige and influence of the Social Democratic Party as the most forceful proponent of the nationalization of industry." He added that "particularly great hopes were held out in the beginning that the British Government, not the British military authorities in Germany, would be able to effect socialization of industries within their area." 4 8 Despite American opposition, the SPD continued its drive to achieve some kind of socialization in the Ruhr. On August 6, 1948, the SPD draft law regarding socialization was adopted by the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia with a majority of 104 votes. The Free Democratic Party voted unanimously against the draft and most of the Christian Democrats abstained. 4 ' Taking account of the preceding Anglo-American talks about socialization one cannot be surprised that the law as passed by the Landtag was not authorized by the British. During his visit to the United States Schumacher raised the question as to whether American opposition towards socialization was consistent with the ideal of self-determination. 50 The American Federation of Labor also stressed these inconsistencies. Mathew Woll, Chairman of the International Labor Relations Committee, welcomed General Clay's statement that the "Military Government will not interfere if the German trade unions [...] succeed in winning over a majority for their point of view." Woll nevertheless added, "we find [...] this statement [...] at variance with the Military Government policy and practice of vetoing legislation [which has been] duly and democratically adopted by decisive majorities of German Laender Parliaments — such as the WuerttembergBaden and Hesse laws on co-determination." Woll also criticized the suspension by the British Military Government of the Law of Socialization of the Ruhr Industries which was adopted by the Parliament of Rhineland-Westphalia." 51

47

M e m o r a n d u m Bolton, 22 Sept. 1947, in: FRUS,

48

M e m o r a n d u m Kellermann, 31 Oct. 1947, N A , R G 5 9 , 8 6 2 . 0 0 / 1 0 - 3 1 4 7 .

49

Landtag

50

M e m o r a n d u m Kellermann, 31 Oct. 1947, N A , R G 5 9 , 8 6 2 . 0 0 / 1 0 - 3 1 4 7 .

51

Woll to Clay, 14 Feb. 1949, NA, R G 5 9 , 8 6 2 . 5 0 3 4 / 2 - 2 3 4 9 .

von Nordrhein-Westfalen,

1947, II, p. 966.

Stenographische

Berichte,

6 Aug. 1948, p. 987.

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315

Most American officials, including Clay, were well aware of this inconsistency in American policy towards Western Germany. He commented on this problem in meeting with the U.S. Zonal Council of Trade Unions in early September 1947. Clay felt obliged to mention first "that I come from a country that believes in free enterprise.[...] We do believe that free enterprise has developed a high standard of living in America; however, we believe in democracy more than we do in free enterprise. We have no desire to impose any particular economic structure upon the German people." While stressing the overriding importance of democratic self-determination Clay nevertheless added certain qualifications to the application in practice on a Länder basis. "We are perfectly willing for the question to be resolved at State level for state utilities, city utilities and other enterprises which are clearly needed only for the particular state; however where the enterprise or industry is clearly an enterprise belonging to Germany as a whole, we feel that the final question as to how it is to be operated and managed must be determined by the German people when they can determine it as a whole. I want you to understand this position quite clearly because much has been said about the United States attempting to stop socialization in Germany when it is desired by the German people. That is not our position although we do hope that you will see some of the virtues that result from free enterprise before you make final decision." 52 Lorenz Hagen, President of the Bavarian Trade Union Federation, declared himself "pleased to hear from the General's statement that we, in Germany, are going to be given the freedom to establish our own economic policies on condition, of course, that the German people decide in democratic fashion about this question," Clay immediately interrupted, stipulating: "And as a whole, not by States." 5 3 The insistence that the German people as a whole had to determine the question of socialization made it possible to champion the ideal of self-determination while blocking any significant legislation passed by the Länder, Hesse being an exception. 54 The State Department, in short, "waffled". As was admitted by one State Department official early in 1948: " O n the issues of socialization, 'co-determination', participation in planning and administration, and denazification, we have in spite of our handsome statements of policy regarding German self-determination and initiative, in practice not arrived at any concrete action in these spheres [.. .] 55 This policy of postponement was effective in achieving the desired ends. It weakened the noncommunist left in Western Germany while favoring those

52 53 54

55

Murphy to State Department, 16 Sept. 1947: NA, RG 59,740.00119 Control (Germany) 1 9 - 1 6 4 7 . Ibid. Gerd Winter, 'Sozialisierung in Hessen 1946-1955', in: Kritische Justiz, 7,1974, pp. 1 5 7 - 1 7 5 ; see also Wolf-Arno Kropat, Hessen in der Stunde Null 1945/46, Wiesbaden 1979, pp.258ff. Memorandum Stauffer, 30 April 1948, NA, RG59, 8 6 2 . 5 0 4 3 / 4 - 3 0 4 8 .

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political forces that were opposed to any kind of public ownership. In fact, as already described by John Gimbel, Clay's strategy turned out to be successful: " T i m e is on our side," he had declared in October 1947. " I f we can [...] defer the issue while free enterprise continues to operate and economic improvement results, it may never become an issue before the German people." 5 6 By postponing any large-scale socialization schemes - Hesse being of minor importance in this context - the U. S. Government thus effectively prevented the creation of a new economic order and decisively contributed to the restabilization of the capitalist system in Western Germany. And the British plans which had called for the socialization for basic industries in Germany - as put forward by Bevin in his famous speech of October 1946 - were more or less a brief episode in British occupation policy in Germany. Although Bevin himself had informed the government in Washington that American opposition to British socialization schemes in Germany could damage the Labour Government's reputation, the Truman administration was not impressed. While Washington was prepared to tolerate nationalization in Britain, the Truman Administration clearly rejected the application of any large-scale sozialization schemes in West Germany. The American position was determined by the fact that Washington regarded West Germany as a corner-stone of American reconstruction policy in Europe.

While there can be no doubt about Britain's growing dependence on the United States, 57 this does not imply that the Labour Government's decisions had become a quantite negligeable for Western Germany. The devaluation of the pound in late 1949 must be mentioned in this connection. When London announced the devaluation of sterling by 30% in September 1949 the Bonn Government found itself in a difficult position. Various cabinet meetings were devoted to the problem of a 'proper' realignment of the D-Mark. 5 8 The implications for both the domestic economy and West Germany's export position were discussed at great length. Chancellor Adenauer was particularly concerned that inflation resulting from a potential devaluation of the German mark might hurt the reputation of the new government in Germany. 59 He therefore wanted to avoid any

56

John Gimbel, op.cit., p. 170.

57

See for example Robert M . Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership. Britain and America, 1944-1947, New York 1981, and D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain's Place 1900-1975. A study of the Anglo-American relationship and world politics in the context of British and American foreign-policy-making in the twentieth century, Cambridge 1984, pp. 90 ff.

58

Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, Rhein 1982, pp. 74if, 285 ff.

"

Ibid., p. 293.

vol.1, 1949 (Kabinettsprotokolle), Boppard am

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rise in the cost of living for at least a few weeks and was even prepared to establish price controls. On the other hand, there seemed to be no alternative to devaluation in order to regain a competitive position for German exports since most countries outside the Sterling bloc had already followed the British example. Cabinet discussions on the extent to which the mark was to be devalued revealed clearly two basic assumptions that shaped the young republic's economic foreign policy. These were: 1) the top prioritiy assigned to close cooperation with the United States; 2) the idea of using economic means to regain equality for Germany. Therefore it is no surprise that a 3 0 % devaluation was ruled out from the very beginning of the cabinet discussions. Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard opposed a 3 0 % devaluation on the ground that such a step might create the impression that Germany's decision was completely dictated by the British. 80 The President of the Bank Deutscher Länder put it more bluntly: " T h e greatest danger for Germany would be to become identified with the Sterling bloc." To join the British "pari passu and automatically" had to be avoided at all costs because West Germany would then cease to be what it had become during the years 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9 , namely, "the exponent of American policy." There would also be the danger of West Germany being transformed into a "puppet directed by London." And such a development would put an end to the "free market economy which is the basis of our high standard of living and of progress in general." 61 The D M exchange rate was finally set at a 23.8 cents rate after tough bargaining with the High Commissioners. 62 This meant a return to the old mark-dollar relationship which had prevailed prior to the devaluation of the dollar in 1934. This exchange rate was regarded by some cabinet members as an opportunity to symbolize traditional close German-American relations.

In addition, the outcome of the pound crisis made it quite clear that Bonn wanted to continue its active export policy. A continued German export drive, Adenauer pointed out, would be vital for the new German state. In his first speech before the Bundestag Adenauer referred to the devaluation of the pound and expressed his conviction that without its share in world export markets Germany would be deprived of its economic, social and political foundations. 63