Power Games : Political Blogging in Malaysian National Elections [1 ed.] 9789814695299

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POWER GAMES

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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POWER GAMES Political Blogging in Malaysian National Elections HAH FOONG LIAN

I5EA5

YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

First published in Singapore in 2016 by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 E-mail : [email protected]   Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. © 2016 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretation do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Hah, Foong Lian. Power Games : Political Blogging in Malaysian National Elections. 1. Elections—Malaysia. 2. Internet in political campaigns—Malaysia. 3. Social media—Political aspects—Malaysia. 4. Internet—Political aspects—Malaysia. 5. Social media—Political aspects—Malaysia. 6. Political participation—Malaysia. I. Title. JQ1062 A95H14     2015 ISBN 978-981-4695-28-2 (softcover) ISBN 978-981-4695-29-9 (e-book, PDF) Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

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Contents

Acknowledgements

vii

List of Abbreviations of Political Parties

ix

Introduction

1

Chapter 1:

The Cultural, Social and Political Fabric of Malaysia

21

Chapter 2:

Trends in Social Media Use in Malaysian Cyberspace

55

Chapter 3:

A Political Marketing Tool and a Network of Cyber Battles

87

Chapter 4:

Psychological Warfare and Leadership Change

115

Chapter 5:

Negotiating Political Reform and Change

147

Conclusion

173

Bibliography

187

Index

197

About the Author

205

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Acknowledgements

This book, which is an updated version of my PhD thesis submitted to the University of Canterbury in New Zealand in 2012, is the result of a seven-year-long journey that gave me the opportunity to meet various groups of people whose support and assistance were invaluable towards its publication. Sparked by my initial curiosity into the political use of online media and its democratic appeals, the course of this research has shaped my perspectives about the blogosphere. To the many different groups of individuals I encountered in my journey, my deepest gratitude goes to them. I am, firstly, grateful to the bloggers and other participants in the political blogosphere for their patience, understanding and input in providing genuine and honest information to help me make sense of the online environment. The hours of interviews and some repeat meetings helped to clarify the information documented in this book. Additional research and interviews were necessary to explore the use of online media in the 2013 election upon submission of my PhD thesis. For this I would like to record my gratitude to Monash University Malaysia for providing some financial support which enabled me to re-visit the bloggers and interview other online media users in the blogosphere during my short teaching spell at the establishment. Currently, as a teaching staff of Curtin University Sarawak, my thanks go to my colleagues at the Media, Culture and Communication Department for giving me the time and space to complete this work. Last but not least to my friends and family who supported me in this endeavour, which, at times, seemed unending. Many thanks to my family for the unquestioning faith in me when I first embarked on this journey in 2009, and my friends Hwa Mei Shen, Suhaini Aznam, Yeoh Joo Ai and Lee Bee Phang for their unwavering support throughout this project. vii

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Abbreviations of Political Parties

BN

Barisan Nasional (National Front)

DAP

Democratic Action Party

PGRM Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Movement Party) MCA

Malaysian Chinese Association

MIC

Malaysian Indian Congress

PAS

Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia)

PKR  Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, formerly Parti Keadilan Nasional or National Justice Party and became PKR after merging with Parti Rakyat Malaysia or Malaysian People’s Party, formerly Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia or Malaysian People’s Socialist Party) PR

Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Coalition, an opposition coalition)

PSM Parti Sosialis Malaysia (Socialist Party of Malaysia, formerly Parti Rakyat Malaysia or Malaysian People’s Party) UMNO United Malays National Organisation

ix

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Introduction

The twelfth Malaysian general election held on 8 March 2008 was, in many ways, a “watershed in the country’s history” (Ooi K.B, 2008, p. 6). For the first time since 1969 the Barisan Nasional’s (BN) obsession for a two-thirds majority in Parliament had finally been thwarted. The opposition saw a fourfold increase in the number of its parliamentary seats, up from 20 in 2004 to 82 in 2008.1 The widespread victory for the opposition in urban areas was evident from it winning 10 out of 13 parliamentary constituencies in the Federal Territory.2 The 2008 polls also witnessed the successful election of at least 20 parliamentarians who kept and maintained a blog at that time (Hah 2012). The unprecedented outcome saw the opposition parties for the first time presenting a united front by challenging the ruling regime to straight contests in Peninsular Malaysia.3 The informal cooperation of the opposition, involving the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) saw it, for the first time, being swept into power in four states — Selangor, Perak,4 Penang and Kedah — commonly known as the urban, western, industrialized corridor of Peninsular Malaysia.5 The PAS also retained its majority in Kelantan in the 2008 polls. Described as a “political tsunami” (Gan 2008), the result of the 2008 election was far removed from that of the one in 2004 when then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi annihilated the opposition. In 2004 the BN won 198 out of 219 federal seats, or 90.4 per cent of the total number of parliamentary constituencies it contested.6 The new political landscape endorsed at the polls in 2008 prevailed after the country’s thirteenth general election, which was held on 5 May 2013.7 The ruling coalition’s dream of regaining its traditional two-thirds majority and to win back the states of Penang, Selangor and Kelantan remained 1

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elusive. The electoral performance of the BN slid further as the opposition secured 7 more parliamentary seats. Out of a total of 222 parliamentary constituencies contested in the 2013 general election, the opposition captured 89 federal seats while the BN won 133 seats.8 However, the ruling coalition managed to re-capture Kedah state and held its grip on Perak. Politicians, political observers and analysts, including media practitioners, were quick to point to the role of new information and communications technology (ICT) — in particular the Internet, blogs, YouTube videos and short messaging services (SMS) — as significant tools in providing leverage to the opposition during the 2008 election campaign (Abdul Rashid 2009; Gan 2008; Suhaini 2008; Tan 2008). The new technologies were deemed to have provided more advantageous campaigning methods for opposition political parties9 because of the tight media control by the ruling coalition. The online platform was, thus, said to have enabled opposition political parties, which were getting little mainstream media coverage, to reach a wider audience, including young voters (Abdul Rashid 2009). Other media scholars went further by declaring that the online media were important instruments for promoting democracy and could strengthen the democratization process and public deliberation in Malaysia (Mohd Azizuddin and Zengeni 2010, p. 13). This is amidst an environment where Internet usage has been on the rise. Statistics showed that utilization of the Internet grew from 15 per cent in 2000 to 62.8 per cent in 2008.10 By 2009 it had increased to 65.7 per cent. Usage, however, took a slight dip to 60.5 per cent by 2012.11 The popular use of the Internet contributed to the idea that the online platform was becoming a channel for alternative views that received little coverage in the tightly controlled mainstream media. As a channel for alternative information, the Internet can have a democratizing effect by enabling the free flow of information and allowing spaces for public deliberation (Mohd Azizuddin and Zengeni 2010). Political analyst and blogger Khoo Kay Peng was also of the view that the Internet heralded an era of liberalization which could bring about a more level playing field for the opposition, turning opposition support into votes at the ballot box (Tan 2008). The idea was not lost on then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi when he openly acknowledged that ignoring the blogosphere had led to the ruling coalition’s defeat in many of the constituencies it contested in the 2008 election.12 Convinced that the online media had an impact on the 2008 election results, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) resolved to take the virtual sphere seriously in preparation for the 2013 national election. Prime Minister Najib Razak, who replaced Abdullah Ahmad Badawi for the

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Introduction

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top job in April 2009,13 took the initiative to engage bloggers and social media practitioners. In an interview for this book, journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan remarked, “The Prime Minister himself [Najib Razak] became a big Facebooker and Twitterer.”14 Described as a “web-savvy PM” (Ahirudin 2009, p. 82), Najib set up a personal homepage called 1Malaysia to write about his activities and respond to readers’ comments and inquiries. Soon after, the youth wing of UMNO set up the Unit Media Baru (New Media Unit) to enhance the party’s online presence in order to counter the opposition in cyberspace. Ahirudin Attan in an interview for this book explained that one of the first tasks of the Unit Media Baru was to multiply the number of bloggers and, “when Facebook and Twitter became big, they went there”.15 In a separate interview for this book, then Unit Media Baru chairman, Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz,16 lamented that UMNO had “no representation, no presence at all and no one to counter the opposition” in 2008. The then newly instituted Unit Media Baru, under the auspices of UMNO Youth, was given the task of maintaining and building UMNO’s online presence through the use of blogs, Facebook and Twitter.17 With the establishment of Unit Media Baru, the new technology became a part of the party’s machinery to proliferate the use of social media, particularly Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, among UMNO members in the 2013 electoral campaign18 and to promote its political messages to the voting public. UMNO’s online efforts appeared to have peaked with the declaration by Najib Razak that the 2013 general election will be a “social media election”.19 His announcement came just months before the election was held on 5 May. The prime minister had by then garnered a following of one million on Twitter and some 1.2 million likes on his Facebook page. The number of likes on the prime minister’s Facebook page had reportedly outnumbered those of UMNO’s political enemy and opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim.20 Enthusiasm over the use of social networking sites seemed to be further fuelled by statistics which registered the total population of Facebook users in the country at the end of 2012 at 13.5 million.21 Of this total Facebook population, 9 million users are deemed to be potential voters.22 A survey on household use of the Internet by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (2011) revealed that over 80 per cent of users in all states were using the online platform for social networking. The numbers clearly demonstrate a crucial need to dominate the cyberspace discourse and set the social media agenda in order to stay ahead of political rivals during a general election. Efforts channelled into the online platform, however, did not seem to have generated the muchdesired results at the 2013 polls for the ruling coalition.

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On the other hand, the opposition appeared to have dominated the blogosphere in 2008 and the public discourse on social media in 2013. Based on the success of the opposition coalition in the two general elections, it would seem that the online platform had worked favourably for the Pakatan Rakyat (PR). The blogosphere in 2008 was overwhelmingly antigovernment and the opposition seemed to have found a winning formula to connect with the young urban voters on social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter in 2013. According to DAP assemblyman Lau Weng San, in an interview for this book, the party leadership had instructed all DAP elected representatives aged forty and below to create active Facebook and Twitter accounts in order to engage with the young voting public.23 Although the PR did not formally coordinate their social media messages with their partners, issues of public interest would be tagged to the Facebook or Twitter accounts of other like-minded members to ensure that their messages would reach a wider audience. In an interview with Pandan MP Rafizi Ramli, who was also the director of the PKR’s election strategy for 2013, he explained: “A social media strategy is about reaching as many people as possible with one message.”24 Ensuring that their messages went viral was a key component of their online campaigns. This brings us now to the heart of this book, which aims to unpack the much-touted democratizing effects of the online media. To this purpose the book explores the capabilities of the new media and investigates the manners in which individual actors were employing online tools to achieve their goals and objectives at a particular moment in an election. It examines the use of new media at the intersection of social and political realities, the cultural practices and the social and political affiliation and aims of individual actors, including the social ties that subsequently emerged. The objective is to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the extent that new media can enrich political life and bring about new ways of campaigning. It is thus crucial to examine the interrelationship between the device or online platform and its usage within the social and political realities at particular moments in an election. Using an alternative lens this book brings together theoretical frameworks about the media, democracy and the field of journalism for a more thorough examination of the role of the online platform in national elections. It is guided by the political economy approach to the media,25 Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, and the social determinism perspective to understand the extent to which blogging could enrich political life and bring about new ways of campaigning. Concepts such as news slants, framing and priming and citizen journalism are also relevant for the discussion here.

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Introduction

The Political Economy Approach to New Media There are some central concerns of the political economy approach that are relevant to the subject matter of this book. First is the importance of contextualizing the use of blogging and social media within a particular social and political environment.26 Issues relating to the tight control of the mainstream media, existing legislation that stifles public dissent and free speech, and non-censorship of the Internet provide the specific social and political contexts to understand how the new media can be viewed as having democratic potential. For example, blogging is deemed to have democratizing effects in relatively authoritarian societies ruled by regimes that suppress the free flow of information (Keren 2006; Kulikova and Perlmutter 2007; Lim 2009; Moyo 2009). The use of blogs to provide alternative information largely ignored by the mainstream media has also been described as facilitating free speech and promoting the voices of marginalized groups (Perlmutter 2008; Pole 2009). To a certain extent the online platform holds a degree of democratic appeal as an avenue for free expression. Second, the question of blog and social media ownership is of key relevance to the topic of this book. This aspect of ownership is guided by the work of Allan (2006), who examined the online phenomenon of citizen journalism by investigating key information such as the individuals behind the activity within a historical and contextual perspective and matters relating to sources of funding. The issue of funding in Malaysian cyberspace may be elusive for researchers wanting to follow the surreptitious money trail of paid bloggers and cybertroopers, but some of the interviews conducted for this book do point to the different methods of direct and indirect payment.27 The interrogation thus focuses on a deeper assessment of the individuals behind the blogs and Facebook pages, the individuals’ backgrounds and previous work experience. It also examines the political affiliations of the individual actors and the dominant discourse being propagated in cyberspace. These are key areas for examination because the online media can be dominated and appropriated by political and cultural elites to reinforce particular viewpoints, as propounded by Cammaerts (2008, p. 368) or serve the ends of the dominant elite (Herman and Chomsky 2002, p. xi). Focusing on the individual actors can provide vital information about how cyberspace can be used to promote particular ideologies of certain political elites during the elections.

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Habermas’s Notion of the Public Sphere Certain aspects of Habermas’s notion of the public sphere are useful in analysing the extent to which the new media can create spaces for deliberative democracy. The central theme of Habermas’s public sphere that is of great relevance here concerns the ability of all citizens to take part in debates on matters of general interest in an unrestricted fashion (Habermas 2008). This raises the question of a digital divide in terms of a particular section of society that has better access to digital media.28 The issue of a digital divide in the Malaysian context is central because such a gap can determine the level of participation in free speech, public deliberation and levels of engagement for political action. With information being regarded as the core of the public sphere in a democratic society, the type of information generated in the blogosphere also becomes relevant. This is in particular reference to whether the online platform can improve the quality of public debates. This notion is linked to the process of “refeudalization” of the public sphere, which Habermas (2008, pp. 28–29) speaks of. In the context of modern media, the process of “refeudalization” refers to how information is manipulated by spin doctors or public relations experts, including advertisers and corporate-controlled media, which can obstruct public reasoning, thus reducing the ability of citizens to take part in rational debates (Webster 2006, pp. 161–62). The result is a potential for information to be manipulated and slanted for the benefit of prevailing political and economic forces (p. 161).29 Examples of media manipulation are clear from the seminal work of Thompson (2000) and Entman (2007). Thompson (2000) highlights the changing nature of communication media, resulting in a rise in mediated political scandal, while Entman (2007) argues that news slants and biased views can be propagated in the media through agenda setting, framing and priming. The agenda setting function of the media refers to how the press is “stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen 1963, p. 13). It serves to focus public and government attention on a particular issue by providing it coverage which leads to “what is accepted as the public agenda” (McCombs and Shaw 1972, p. 152). When the media move beyond the function of telling the public what to focus on and begin to tell the audience members how to think about an issue, with particular reference to the public assessment of political leaders, those functions are seen as framing and priming (Kuypers 2002). Defining framing as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular

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Introduction

connection” (p. 164), Entman (2007) argues that the process can influence the manners in which audiences interpret a particular event or personality. In short, the process can push its target audiences into thinking, feeling and deciding in a certain way (Iyengar and Simon 1993; Price et al. 1997). These communication theories reflect scepticism over the ability of the media to provide information for the public good. With reference to the formation of public opinion, social engineering in the media can be reflected through the lens of media agenda setting, priming and framing theories. As such, the framing of media texts can lead to predictable priming and agenda setting effects on audiences (Entman 2007, p. 163). This, he argues, potentially positions priming and framing as “tools of power” (p. 163) for influencing public opinion, which has significant implications for political power and democracy. The political communication scholar argues that the media can sway the distribution of power through news slants and bias. He concludes that officials favoured by the news slant can become more powerful without worrying about whether the voters may reject them while those who are not framed favourably will “become weaker, less free to do (or say) what they want” (ibid., p. 170). It is, thus, the interest of this book to examine the extent to which social media can become a tool to sway public opinion in the Malaysian context and the manners in which the actors have made use of the online platform to change public perception in the elections.

The Social Determinism Approach This approach provides a dialectical dimension to an understanding of new information and communications technology and its impact on democratic practices by employing the idea of “social shaping and social consequences” (Lievrouw and Livingstone 2002, p. 8). The approach pays close attention to the dynamic relationships made possible through online platforms, the practices adopted to use the new media to transmit information and the social arrangements that emerge out of these practices (ibid.). In this respect it provides an understanding of the unique moments in which the new media are used in distinct ways to achieve a particular purpose, within which specific social ties can emerge. Sharing some commonality with the network society30 thesis, the social determinism approach focuses on the circumstances and manners in which social ties can be forged out of the use of the new media within a particular social and political context. More specifically, it investigates the dynamic relationships and interdependencies of the device or instrument used to communicate or pass on information, the actions

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that people adopt to convey the information and the social arrangements or organizational forms that grow out of the device and actions (Lievrouw and Livingstone 2002, p. 7). The focus is on the three elements31 — device, practice and social arrangements — to understand the possibilities of the new media in transferring information, how individuals use the instrument or device as a resource to communicate or share information with others and act based on the shared information and meaning (ibid., p. 7). In other words, consequences of new information and communications technologies are also regarded as the result of human actions and decisions and not only caused by the technology itself. Through the use of online tools, social arrangements are consciously formed to achieve a specific political goal in the elections. It is essential here to provide some understanding of the term “network”32 to appreciate its significance in the social determinism approach. Networks have been identified as consisting of three elements — nodes, ties and flows (Barney 2004, p. 26). Ties connect one node to at least another node (or a person to their friend), while flows are the information or communication (for example, gossip) that pass between and through them along the connection (or ties). This model of a network underpins the understanding of network society (ibid., p. 179). The word “network” has also been used to describe the blogosphere in terms of how it can present itself as a “classic social network” (Tremayne 2006, pp. x–xii) or become a “networked phenomena” (Drezner and Farrell 2004, p. 7), in which social ties or networks are established through blogrolls and hyperlinks. However, this perspective of network theory provides the understanding of connectivity emerging incidentally with the notion of a serendipitous network that is “not consciously designed … unplanned, uncoordinated” (Raab and Kenis 2009, p. 199). The two scholars instead argue that increasingly networks are consciously formed to achieve a specific goal instead of creating unplanned and uncoordinated connections that do not have a particular objective. Examining how individual actors were connecting with each other and forming ties could provide a deeper understanding of the sort of network that was formed to achieve a particular political goal at various junctures in the elections. This book argues that the network formed by a subset of bloggers in Malaysia appeared to have developed in a manner similar to the way ties were established before the advent of the Internet. Thus, examining how individual actors were connecting with each other provides a deeper understanding of whether new ways of engagement were being created with the use of the new media.

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The Inquiry Adopting a more nuanced approach, this book attempts to examine two overarching questions pertaining to the role of the online media in the 2008 and 2013 Malaysian elections. Firstly, it attempts to examine the extent to which the new media can enhance liberal democratic practices in an election and, secondly, it aims to evaluate the extent to which the online platform can contribute to methods of campaigning in an election. It must first be clarified here that in this book the term liberal democratic practices refers to the right to free speech and expression of ideas and thoughts, the right to take part in public debates and the right to free association and movement. Some may argue that these liberal democratic practices are based on Western traditions, but it must be acknowledged that they are also enshrined in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. Moreover, many of the participants in this research articulated those rights as being afforded by the new media. The study employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to make sense of the Web phenomenon. This is because the book is interested not only in the “what” question but also in “how”, “when” and “why” the individual actors took on specific roles.33 The study employs content analysis34 as a quantitative research method to track the pattern of blog use in the 2008 and 2013 elections. In-depth interviews were conducted with socio-political bloggers who were actively maintaining and keeping a blog in 2008. Follow-up interviews were conducted with the same bloggers to obtain their perspectives on the use of Facebook and Twitter, which featured prominently in the 2013 election. Key political actors who were social media operators for the 2013 election were also interviewed for this book. Some of the research questions pertaining to democratic practices and the enhancement of political life were examined through a content analysis of socio-political blogs35 in the 2008 and 2013 elections. The objective behind the use of content analysis was to obtain an overview of the pattern of blog use and a profile of the actors who were actively keeping and maintaining blogs. The analysis helped in identifying the role of bloggers in providing democratic space for rational public discussion, for mobilizing political action or keeping readers informed of electoral campaigns. Some of the political actions examined in the content analysis included the mass protest rallies of the Hindu Rights Action Force36 (or Hindraf ) and Bersih,37 and the use of blogs to encourage readers to vote in the 2008 general election. It also assessed the positive or negative tone that bloggers took when composing

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their blog postings to obtain a glimpse into the type of information being propagated in cyberspace. Another key aspect of the content analysis was to determine whether the Web activity could generate public discussions; this was achieved through a content analysis of the comments of readers. A comparison with socio-political blogs created after 2008 was made to identify the similarities and differences in content between the two national elections. Soon after the 2008 election, hundreds of new blogs were created to promote messages for the ruling and opposition coalitions. The blogs were also linked to the respective Facebook pages and Google Friend Connect platform to boost their online presence. With the changing information and communications technology, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were more commonly used in the 2013 election, while blogging was considered to be “yesterday”38 soon after the conclusion of the 2008 election. The blogs and Facebook pages of the 2013 electoral candidates were examined to compare with the trend in blog use in 2008. Similarly, the blogs and Facebook pages of partisan bloggers and individuals who were members of non-governmental organizations were analysed. In-depth interviews were conducted to facilitate a closer examination of the research participants in terms of their socio-economic backgrounds, their work and life experiences, including their political affiliations, the social ties they forged through blogging, the dominant discourse propagated, and the ways in which blogging was used to achieve a particular goal in electoral politics. The interviews also explored the question of “power” and influence the individual bloggers wielded within the blogosphere. In-depth interviews with thirty socio-political bloggers were conducted in Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang between 25 February and 4 May 2010. The interviews covered four separate sections, starting with basic information about the bloggers’ backgrounds, their political blogging activities in general, blogging activities during the 2008 general election and their relationship with their readers and other bloggers. The first section of the interview contained closed-ended questions regarding the background of the bloggers, such as age, ethnicity, religion, language, social or political affiliation, occupation, educational level, computing skills, number of blogs they set up, their involvement in political parties or non-governmental organizations, and reasons for blogging, pseudonymously or otherwise. The other three parts of the interview involved semi-structured particularly open-ended questions which required the bloggers to give their opinions about their activities.39 The semi-structured interview questions also acted as a sort of checklist to ensure that the same areas were covered

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11

in the interviews with all the research participants. The second and third parts of the interview were aimed at obtaining the bloggers’ perspectives on their blogging activities. The questions here were also related to the content analysis of the respective blogs. The last part of the interview attempted to explore the relationships of bloggers with their readers and other bloggers. This sought to examine the dynamics between the bloggers and their readers and with other bloggers, including the possible spillover of their offline tensions to their online activity or an enmeshing of online and offline efforts by the bloggers. Some of the socio-political bloggers interviewed in 2010 were revisited in 2013 and 2014 for a follow-up assessment on their use of blogs, Facebook and Twitter in the 2013 election. Only half of the thirty bloggers responded to this request for an additional interview. New interviews were also conducted with key individuals who actively campaigned through social media in 2013. Among them were Rafizi Ramli, who was the director of strategies for the PKR in the 2013 election, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, an active blogger who was instrumental in ensuring the Internet in Malaysia was given its non-censorship guarantee, UMNO Youth’s Unit Media Baru chairman Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, who was actively involved in the use of social media for UMNO/BN during the 2013 election, and active journalistblogger Ahirudin Attan. The analyses saw the classification of the thirty socio-political bloggers into three relatively distinct groups — politician-bloggers, partisan bloggers and civil society bloggers. The ten politician-bloggers interviewed for this study were individuals who contested the 2008 election and kept a blog at that time. The partisan bloggers were made up of ten individuals who were political party members and who were actively blogging in 2008. Finally, the group of ten civil society bloggers consisted mainly of bloggers who did not belong to any political party but who were involved in nongovernmental organizations and were generally anti-establishment. The three groups of relatively distinct bloggers portrayed different patterns of blog use to reach a particular goal at defining moments during electoral politics. They exhibited different ways of using the Internet within particular social and political environments during the elections. The interviews provided insight into how the democratic potential of the online platform may have been compromised at particular moments during the 2008 election. They indicated that the Internet could be appropriated by former media and political elites in order to promote a particular discourse in the blogosphere. They revealed that blogging was used to promote political scandals of rival politicians by painting certain national leaders in a

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negative light. The interviews also pointed to the use of blogs for purposes of propaganda in 2008 when a sub-group of the partisan and civil society bloggers established ties to manage the flow of blogosphere information in order to shape public perception towards certain national politicians. One of them described the attempt as a form of “psychological warfare”.40 The manner of blog use was also a reflection of the prevailing political culture of surat layang (poison pen letters), providing a window on the intense factional politics within the dominant Malay political party of UMNO. Using social media to promote a particular discourse was also evident in 2013. The blogosphere in 2013 was a distinctly partisan one in which bloggers would openly announce their party affiliation or leanings. This was, in part, related to the prevailing political landscape of 2013. In 2008 this was less the case. A similar practice was the use of social media to promote or revile rival politicians. Facebook pages of politicians contesting the election promoted messages that eroded the image of rival parties and leaders. Some were in the form of scandals while others were in the form of public interest issues that projected the incompetence of the ruling coalition in governing the nation. A key observation that emerged in 2013 was the phenomenon of paid bloggers, or cybertroopers, on both sides of the political divide. This occurred alongside a massive increase in the number of pseudonymous blogs that were used to highlight scandals of rival politicians. The term UMNO cybertroopers was used to refer to bloggers paid by UMNO to disseminate information that could harm the opposition’s reputation. On the other hand, the term Red Bean Army was used to describe paid bloggers of the opposition coalition. Straight answers pertaining to the allegations of paid bloggers were difficult to come by, except through anecdotal accounts and confirmation by UMNO leaders. Within an environment of stringent media control through ownership and strict regulations, blogging could become an online tool for political mobilization and free speech. The pattern of blog use among the group of politician-bloggers to mobilize readers to participate in political action such as public rallies or voting in the elections demonstrated the capacity of the new media for this purpose. However, the in-depth interviews showed that the group of politician-bloggers did not rely on the Internet during the campaigning periods in 2008 and 2013. The interviews demonstrated that they were selective in the ways they used the online platform at particular junctures in an election because of the wider institutional and societal structures, the specific goal they wanted to achieve at a particular moment in an election and the problem of the digital divide in the country. The

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use of blogs was especially significant as a political marketing tool in the lead-up to the elections and after the polls of 8 March. However, during the thirteen-day campaigning period, most of the politician-bloggers revealed that blogging was not a major platform for campaigning. Similar observations were made in the 2013 election, where interviews with some of the candidates revealed that they neglected their Facebook pages and blogs during the campaigning period. The group of civil society bloggers revealed that they were using the online medium to facilitate the free expression of ideas and the setting up of blog campaigns to put forward their demands on the government, mainstream media and the opposition during the 2008 election. Similar uses of blogs and Facebook pages were recorded for the 2013 election and a sub-group of Barisan Rakyat (BR) bloggers was established to support the opposition campaign in cyberspace. However, it was found that the online media were limited in generating public discussion because some of the civil society bloggers were suspicious of the comments made by others on their blogs. State control through stringent regulations on individual freedom had also created a culture of fear among this group of bloggers. The fear of prosecution and defamation suits saw many of them creating anonymous Facebook pages which they used to exercise their free speech, while others stopped blogging to avoid legal entanglements.

Some Weaknesses of the Research Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the politician-bloggers were made up mainly of opposition politicians. This reflects the fact that the 2008 election saw greater activity in cyberspace by opposition politicians than by those of the ruling coalition. However, efforts had been taken to interview bloggers from the ruling coalition to explore their online use in the 2013 election. Interviews with former Unit Media Baru chairman Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, journalist blogger Ahirudin Attan, Dr Mahathir Mohamad and pro-UMNO bloggers provided an account of the use of blogs and social media by the ruling coalition in the 2013 election. Secondly, this research focused primarily on blogs and social media written in English and Malay. It has excluded Chinese and Tamil blogs because of the author’s inability to read Chinese or Tamil. The book may have lost out in the study of the processes of blog use and the dynamics involved in the publication of Chinese and Tamil blog postings. However, it must be noted that the political environment in Malaysia is in the domain of the Malay community. Moreover, many Malay bloggers are proficient in

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English. So it may be more pertinent to study the Malay and English blogs for a clearer picture of the online platform in electoral politics in Malaysia.

Book Outline Chapter One contextualizes the media and the rise of the Internet within the cultural, social and political-economic environment of Malaysia. The aim is to show that although the online media can become a democratic tool for the free expression of ideas in a tightly controlled environment, it also mirrors the social and political realities of the country. It begins with a short history of the race-based politics and policies in the country, a discussion of the culture of patronage that develops out of the dominance of Malay politics with UMNO holding power and a political culture of surat layang. It outlines the media environment tightly regulated by stringent laws and the complex web of the ruling regime’s interest in the industry. The chapter provides an understanding of the use of the Internet during the reformasi days of Anwar Ibrahim and the counter-reformasi efforts of UMNO. Here, it also highlights the term cybertroopers to discuss the emergence of paid bloggers, indicating that a culture of patronage in the real world seems to have spilled over into cyberspace. Chapter Two attempts to understand the patterns of blog use and the questions of ownership and control by examining the people behind the blogs and the prevailing discourse on the blogosphere in the 2008 election. The content analysis provided evidence that the majority of bloggers were highly educated professionals and that many of them were media and political elites. It revealed a blogosphere that was overwhelmingly favourable to the opposition. Critical frames were generally targeted at leaders of the BN coalition and its administration and they were specifically directed at the then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. As social media took prominence in 2013, this chapter explores the use of blogs and Facebook pages for the purposes of political marketing and changing public perception in the election. Chapter Three is an attempt to show that the particular circumstances and the aim of politician-bloggers can shape the ways online activity is practised in elections. It presents in-depth interviews with the group of politician-bloggers, who revealed a limited use of blogs during the official campaigning period in 2008. It discusses several factors which made blogging less appealing during the campaigning period. However, blogging became an important political marketing tool in the lead-up to the elections. It also documents the efforts of some of the politician-bloggers in using social

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networking sites like Facebook and blogs for the cyberspace battle in the 2013 election. It concludes that the function and role of blogs could not be assumed to be homogenous across the board and there were limits to the much-touted democratic appeals of the online tool. In-depth interviews with the group of partisan bloggers, presented in Chapter Four, explore the use of blogging for the purposes of propaganda. It discusses how this online tool was used as a form of “psychological warfare” aimed at changing public perception towards the ruling elite in the lead-up to the 2008 election. The blog campaign, set up by a subgroup of partisan and civil society bloggers through the formation of the “band of brotherhood”,41 also known as the “band of bloggers”,42 was aimed at character assassinations of certain leaders of the ruling regime by highlighting political scandals. It was executed by deliberately flooding the blogosphere with information that could discredit the reputation of the national leadership. Secret meetings were held to draw up arrangements to target particular personalities. Tracing the political affiliations of members of the band of brotherhood revealed the possibility that a blog campaign could be appropriated by former media and political elites. Similar methods to manage perception and coordinate the information flow were employed online during the 2013 election. The follow-up interviews revealed the various strategies adopted to shape public opinion and how certain bloggers were sought out to form a network of like-minded individuals to try to set the online agenda. Chapter Five discusses the online practices of the group of civil society bloggers who were able to exercise their right to free speech and make demands on the government, mainstream media and the opposition. However, the online tool was limited in generating public discussions because some of the bloggers were suspicious of the comments made by others on their blogs. It also details how some of the civil society bloggers established ties with the band of brotherhood, but a collapse in the loose coalition saw mounting suspicion and mistrust in cyberspace. The malaise appeared to continue well into the 2013 election. This chapter, thus, captures the much-heralded democratic potential of the new media but it also highlights the limitations. To conclude, the book argues that the online media can open up a space for free speech and, at times, facilitate wider debate in a relatively authoritarian society. Online connectivity permits the formation of a network of alternative or dissenting views. At the same time, the online landscape is heavily shaped by factors such as the powerful prevailing media and political elites and the existing culture that regulates societal and political

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life, including the particular social and political moments in an election. The online platform also brings new ways of campaigning for politicianbloggers in electoral politics, but this platform is influenced by the wider institutional and societal structures in society. It is a significant political marketing tool but it does not facilitate deliberative democracy. The online media, thus, do not have a simple across-the-board function of promoting liberal democratic practices and transforming new ways of campaigning in electoral politics. As Internet and new social movements researcher Chris Atton cautioned, “It would be mistaken to consider blogs as a homogenous phenomenon” (Atton 2004, p. 55).

Notes  1. Financial Daily, 10 March 2008, p. 12.  2. New Sunday Times, 9 March 2008, p. 12.  3. However, straight fights did not reach fruition in Sabah and Sarawak. This was partly because of the different dynamics of East Malaysian politics. In Sarawak in the 2008 election the BN won 30 out of 31 parliamentary seats while the ruling coalition won 24 out of the 25 constituencies it contested in Sabah (Loh 2009, p. 14).  4. The opposition’s victory in Perak was short-lived. Online news portal Free Malaysia Today reported that, in February 2009, BN regained the state after four assemblymen “defected” and became BN-friendly lawmakers. The four were from the DAP and PKR. The DAP “defectors” were Keshvinder Singh (Malim Nawar) and Hee Yit Foong (Jelapang) while those from the PKR were Mohd Osman Jailu (Changkat Jering) and Jamaluddin Mohd Radzi (Behrang). See FMT News, 11 September 2012 (accessed 8 February 2014).  5. New Sunday Times, 9 March 2008, p. 2.  6. Aliran Monthly, 2004 (accessed 8 February 2014).  7. Parliament was dissolved on 3 April 2013. The Election Commission fixed 20 April as nomination day while polling was set for 5 May. This resulted in a fifteen-day campaigning period for the country’s thirteenth general election. See The Star Online, 10 April 2013 (accessed 10 December 2014).   8. Election Commission of Malaysia, “Statistik Keputusan Kerusi Parlimen Yang Dimenangi 2013” [Statistical results of the parliamentary seats won in 2013]

(accessed 3 December 2014).

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 9. Malaysiakini, 12 March 2008 (accessed 30 December 2011). 10. Internet World Stats, “Malaysia: Internet Usage Stats and Marketing Report”, 2010 (accessed 7 July 2010). 11. Internet World Stats, “Internet Users in Asia”, 2012 (accessed 4 February 2012). 12. New York Times, 25 March 2008 (accessed 26 December 2011). 13. Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, “Biography of Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak”, 30 April 2011 (accessed 8 December 2011). 14. Interview with Ahirudin Attan of the blog Rocky’s Bru, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 15. Ibid. 16. After the 2013 election Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz was replaced by Ibdillah Ishak as UMNO Youth’s New Media Bureau chairman (Azman 2013). 17. On 27 November 2013, UMNO Youth’s Media Unit Baru was renamed Biro Media Baru, translated as New Media Bureau (Azman 2013). 18. Requesting anonymity during an interview for this book, an UMNO leader, who was coordinating efforts with other BN coalition members to promote their presence online for the 2013 general election, revealed that their Chinese partner, the MCA, was too fractious to focus their energies in cyberspace, while it was easier to have joint efforts with their Indian partner, the MIC. 19. Malaysian Insider, 27 February 2013 (accessed 3 December 2014). 20. Ibid. 21. Politweet.org, “Census of Facebook Users in Malaysia, Dec 2012”, 16 January 2013 (accessed 3 December 2014). 22. Ibid. 23. Interview with politician-blogger Lau Weng San, Petaling Jaya, 28 April 2010. 24. Interview with politician-blogger Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 25. A main concern of the political economy approach to media and communication focuses on issues of ownership, the economics of how media contents are produced, circulated and consumed, and the existing laws and regulations of the state in order to examine how people experience media and how media shape the world (McChesney 1998). Another important aspect examines how the communication system and content can affect existing class and social relations (ibid.). This book, thus, adopts certain key elements used to study the

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media to examine the role of blogs, such as the particular social and political context of blog use, laws and regulations, and, more importantly, the question of blog ownership and the connections of blog owners to political elites. 26. The political economy approach to blogging is also reflected in the work of Atton (2004), who focuses on the significance of historical, economic, political, social or cultural aspects. The emphasis demonstrates a rejection of a dichotomous understanding and the need for a more multidimensional approach. In similar ways, Dahlgren (2009) uses the term “culturalist approach” (p. 5) to describe the significance of themes like meaning, identity and practices to understand the impact of media on democracy. The practice examined in this book addressed the people behind the socio-political blogs and the manners in which the Internet was used to assess its democratic potentials. 27. For more, see Chapter Four of this book. 28. The issue of access, or lack thereof, to new information and communication technologies constitutes another aspect of the political economy perspective in seeking to understand the outcomes of new media in contemporary societies (Nicholas 2003; Dijk 2006; Tsatsou 2011). This is because the unequal distribution of resources causes unequal access to digital technologies, which can result in unequal citizen participation in society (Dijk 2006, pp. 178–79). 29. Such observations are also evident in the works of McChesney and Scott (2004), who highlight the emergence of media conglomerates controlling publications and broadcasts, while Herman and Chomsky (2002) point to the use of the media as a propaganda tool that represents “powerful societal interests that control and finance them” (p. xi). 30. The network society thesis argues that social, political and economic practices in modern society are ordered around the network form, which refers to “flows between nodes connected by ties” (Barney 2004, p. 27). The way in which society is organized through media networks is gradually replacing or complementing face-to-face communication (Dijk 2006, p. 240). It has also blurred traditional forms of interpersonal relations or mass communication in contemporary society (ibid., p. 28). 31. The understanding of social shaping and social consequences (Lievrouw and Livingstone 2002, p. 9) is also reflected in the work of Barney (2004, p. 43) who considers four factors — the essence or spirit of technology, the technological design, situation and use — in analysing technological outcomes in contemporary society. Technology, in his view, is deemed not neutral and is not developed or used in a vacuum (Barney 2004). This is evident in the fact that the basic design of the Internet “determines what people can and cannot do” (Lessig 1999, p. 59) through the use of “code” (Barney 2004, p. 51). The “code”, according to Lessig (1999), supports the anonymity or identification of Internet users and their activities, which gives rise to debate over issues such as privacy, liberty, surveillance and regulation. Although the

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analysis focuses on the device itself, it also pays particular attention to the social, political and economic environment in which the technologies are developed and the ways they are utilized. 32. The word “network” has been used in a number of different academic disciplines, originating from computer science, to the social sciences and new media studies (Gane and Beer 2008). The word “network” subsequently took on a social context when sociological research began to focus on how the digital communication systems are connecting individuals (ibid., p. 27). Other researchers later emphasized the need to trace the associations in order to take into account the complex and dynamic connections made between individuals and the digital communication systems (ibid., p. 31). This becomes a point of interest when the political bloggers were actively making connections with other bloggers in order to use the online media to achieve a particular goal in the Malaysian national elections. 33. The context of this study is the 2008 and 2013 general elections in Malaysia, thus helping to situate this research within a particular social and political context. 34. Content analysis, widely used in communication studies, is a research technique that is able to make “replicable and valid inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff 1980, p. 21). Although the content analysis method has been known as a research technique to study the print and broadcast media, it is also a popular tool for new media research. Numerous communication studies on political blogs have used content analysis as a tool to assess various perspectives of the Web phenomenon (Kalstrup and Pedersen 2005; Bichard 2006; Stanyer 2006; Albrecht et al. 2007; Trammell 2007; Wallsten 2007; Hargittai et al. 2008; Koop and Jansen 2009; Wright 2009). These studies examined blog postings or press releases found on the blogs as the unit of analysis, which, in turn, described or identified the multiple roles of blogs in political communication. Similarly, this study attempts to analyse the postings of the socio-political blogs to help in describing or identifying their role in providing democratic space for rational public discussion, for mobilizing political action or keeping readers informed of electoral campaigns. 35. Socio-political blogs included for examination in this book were those that contained postings discussing public interest issues such as human rights, corruption, the electoral system, political parties and scandals of political leaders. Some of the blog postings included in this study were in the form of text, cartoons, photographs and YouTube clips. Blogs that discussed personal matters such as shopping, hobbies, restaurant reviews or family were excluded from the study. 36. The Hindraf public rally was held in Kuala Lumpur on 25 November 2007, to protest against the unfair treatment and economic backwardness of the Indian community in Malaysia (Waytha Moorthy 2008).

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37. The Bersih public demonstration was held in Kuala Lumpur on 10 November 2007, to demand a free and fair election. It was led by a grouping of sixtyfour non-governmental organizations and five political parties (Ooi K.B., 2008, p. 11). 38. Interview with Ahirudin Attan of Rocky’s Bru, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 39. The unstructured interviews could provide “greater breadth” in an attempt at understanding “the complex behavior of members of society without imposing any prior categorization that may limit the field of inquiry” (Fontana and Frey 2005, p. 706). 40. The term was used by partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz in an interview in Kuala Lumpur on 22 February 2010. 41. The term was used by politician-blogger Jeff Ooi during an interview for this book conducted in Subang Jaya on 27 February 2010. Ooi spoke about the ties and cooperation which members of the grouping had established when they were united in the common goal of bringing down the regime of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during the 2008 election. 42. Other pro-UMNO bloggers called it the “band of bloggers”. One blog identified some of the personalities involved and carried a graphic that read “Liberty, Freedom, Justice”. For more information, see Big Dog, “Band of Bloggers”, The Thirteeen Million Plus Ringgit Guy Rambles (blog), 28 February 2007 (accessed 9 April 2015).

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1 The Cultural, Social and Political Fabric of Malaysia

This chapter starts with a brief background of the society of Malaya before it became a British colony, the struggle for independence in 1957 and the policies formulated after the race riots of the 1960s. This brief depiction provides an understanding of the dominance of the Malay community with the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) holding political power as the dominant partner in the Barisan Nasional (BN) ruling coalition. It highlights the race-based politics and culture of political patronage that have existed up until the present day. A brief historical account of the social, political and economic forces that contributed to the country’s multi-ethnic and multicultural environment provides a backdrop to the use of new media in the Malaysian context. One of the defining moments in Malaysia’s recent history is the race riots of 13 May 1969, which occurred after the dismal performance of the ruling regime in that year’s national elections. A brief discussion is dedicated to this period and its aftermath, particularly the creation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) that has been in place since the early 1970s. Certain key elements of the policy will be highlighted to provide an indication of their impact on the country’s economic and political system. The policy has drawn wide-ranging responses from political analysts, some of whom have attributed the creation of the Malay middle-class to this policy while others considered it to be a form of racial discrimination. The policy is seen as having an unequal impact on people’s lives in areas such as education, housing and employment because preferential treatment

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is afforded to the bumiputera (sons of the soil or indigenous people, or more commonly referring to Malays). Yet, other critical scholars argue that the policy has witnessed an emergence of political patronage where preferential treatment is not only given to the Malays in general but more so to bumiputera who are members of UMNO, the country’s dominant political party (Ho 1988; Gomez and Jomo 1997). Tracing the links of those bumiputera businessmen who secured multimillion ringgit projects in the country to political elites in UMNO, the scholars asserted that it was a part of the culture of political patronage that grew out of the NEP. Similarly, a discussion on the close connection of some of the Internet service providers with powerful elites in the country suggests that political patronage runs deep within Malaysian society. An important part of this chapter discusses the country’s laws that impact heavily on the mainstream media, restricting their operation as a free press. Apart from the constraining legislation governing the media industry, it discusses ways in which the traditional media are controlled by media owners who are mainly coalition partners of the ruling regime. It also explores changes in key editorial positions which appear to be connected with leadership change in political parties that control the mainstream media. In addition to the tightly controlled media, other legislation also curtails civil liberties in various facets of political life in the country. Under these circumstances many scholars conclude that Malaysia is a relatively authoritarian society, with some describing the country as a semi-democracy (Case 1993), a pseudo democracy (Tan and Zawawi 2008) or an authoritarian populism state (Munro-Kua 1996). Embracing the Internet in 1996 to appeal to foreign investment, the government, under former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, formulated regulations that guaranteed freedom of speech for the medium (Mahathir 1998, p. 53). This guarantee may be in line with free speech and association enshrined in the Federal Constitution but it can be challenged by other existing laws that restrict those same civil liberties. Despite some pieces of stifling legislation, the non-censorship guarantee contributed to a certain extent to the notion that the new information and communications technologies could become an alternative platform for free speech and expression. One often cited example that the Internet could fulfil its potential to provide alternative information is the reformasi (reformation) movement that emerged after the sacking of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 (Sabri 2000; Abbott 2001). The Internet was widely used to communicate with supporters of the reformasi movement

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and publish information to counter accusations against Anwar (Sabri 2000). On the other hand, UMNO websites were also established to counter information put out by Anwar’s reformasi supporters in the blogosphere.1 Such increasing use of the Internet has also seen an emerging trend of paid bloggers, or cybertroopers, which appears to have plagued both sides of the political divide.

Malaya and the Struggle for Independence Before exploring modern-day Malaysia, it is important to establish some of the defining characteristics of Malay society and Malayan history. The traditional Malay society, which could be characterized as feudal, had its own set of social and political institutions before the Malay Archipelago became a British colony (Hua 1983). The traditional political system of Malay society had the sultan of the state at the top of the hierarchy and he appointed chiefs who were also of the aristocrat class (Means 1970; Hua 1983). The chiefs, on behalf of the sultan, collected produce tax from the peasants. Due to the political subjugation of the peasants by the sultan, the chiefs also demanded free labour from the peasants under a corvée system known as kerah (Hua 1983). The social set-up had the Malay peasantry centred in a kampung (village), which had its own headman, mosque and mosque officials, located within a district (Means 1970; Hua 1983). Such distinct features of the Malay village are still in existence today. Another key feature of Malaya before British colonial rule was the spread of Islam in the fifteenth century. It was after the Sultan of Malacca’s conversion to Islam that the religion began to spread to other states in the Peninsula. Under the influence of the Melaka Sultanate, the sultans in Pahang, Terengganu, Kedah and Johor embraced Islam (Hua 1983). Since then Islam has been an integral part of Malay society to the extent that the religion gives Malays the bonds of communal identity, which are as strong as those developed by social or political institutions (Means 1970, p. 17). However, the spread of Islam had little effect on the relationship between local Malays and Chinese traders, who had been assimilated to a large extent by this point (Hua 1983, p. 19). The colonial power preserved the social and political structure of the Malay society throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The British even co-opted the traditional Malay ruling class into the state after fierce resistance by the Malay peasantry against British rule (Hua 1983, p. 20). The Malay peasants were left to continue with their subsistence

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mode of production in their villages while growing demand for tin and rubber had resulted in the massive immigration of Chinese and Indians into the country (Hua 1983; Jesudason 1989). By the early twentieth century, British Malaya had become one of the world’s biggest suppliers of tin and rubber. The massive influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants had by the 1930s also changed the entire social structure of Malaya (Hua 1983). Chinese immigrants were recruited for tin mining while Indians were employed in rubber plantations. According to the 1939 population records, the number of Chinese and Indians in Malaya had more than doubled between 1911 and 1938. Although the influx of immigrants saw a growing working class, a group of rich Chinese merchants who were favoured by the British administration also emerged. Some of them were coopted to be unofficial administrators of the Chinese community, or Kapitan China, also known as Justices of the Peace (ibid.). The Indian community also had a group of merchants in the banking, moneylending and textile industries, who were generally of a higher caste than the Indian labourers (ibid., p. 56). After the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the British proposed the formation of the Malayan Union for the entire Malay Peninsula, excluding Singapore. However, the proposal was met with strong resistance from the Malay community, including the rulers. Among the aspects objected to were the issuance of automatic citizenships to non-Malays and access to some of the civil service positions by non-Malays (Milne and Mauzy 1978, p. 27). The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), established after a Pan-Malayan Malay Congress in 1946, began protesting against the Malayan Union. In response, the British were forced to come up with another agreement, known as the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948. A working committee representing all parties, including the government, local rulers and UMNO, together with non-Malay representatives, was set up to work out the 1948 agreement (Means 1970, pp. 56–57). The agreement drew up a centralized structure of governance at the federal and state levels, the position of rulers in the state, the provision for a conference of rulers and a stricter citizenship provision for non-Malays (Milne and Mauzy 1978, pp. 29–31). Another problem, however, emerged when members of the Malayan Communist Party resorted to armed violence to wrest power from the British. The colonialists decided, in 1948, to impose a State of Emergency, which lasted for twelve years. To counter the Communist Insurgency the British established new villages, largely inhabited by the Chinese, to cut off

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food supplies to the Communists. About half a million people, including a fifth of the Chinese population, were moved into more than 550 new villages (ibid., p. 33), resulting in further separation of the Chinese from the rest of Malayan society. After the threat of the Communists had been successfully contained, the call for independence began with the introduction of national elections. Starting with the 1952 municipal election in Kuala Lumpur, UMNO and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), which was formed by conservative Chinese and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce in 1949, set up an ad-hoc alliance, which won nine out of the twelve seats contested in the elections (Hua 1983, p. 102). The election result was an indication of the political forces at the time, and the successful formula of an alliance was replicated, institutionalizing the arrangement (ibid., p. 102). By 1955 the alliance included the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The alliance formula was deemed successful because communal divisions in Malaya ran deep (Milne and Mauzy 1978, p. 35). The federal election campaign in 1955 saw the blossoming of communalist politics that would be the highlight in years to come (Hua 1983, p. 105). The Alliance Party (made up of UMNO, MCA and MIC) had a landslide victory in 1955 and, two years later, the Federation of Malaya obtained its independence. Tunku Abdul Rahman, brother of the Sultan of Kedah, became the first prime minister. Made up of the three main ethnic-based political parties, the Alliance Party articulated the concerns of their respective ethnic communities as membership into each of the three political parties was accepted based on the ethnicity of a person. In 1974 the Alliance Party changed its name to the Barisan Nasional (BN), or National Front, which is now a coalition of fourteen political parties, including those from Sabah and Sarawak. This is not to say that there are no political parties in the country that attempt to transcend racial lines. Several have based their struggle on class inequalities. For example, the now defunct Labour Party and the newly registered Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM), which had undergone some changes over the years, were more sympathetic towards concerns of the working class.

The New Economic Policy, Rights of the Bumiputera and Political Links to Businesses Milne and Mauzy (1978, p. 36) describe how the Federal Constitution came into force on 31 August 1957 as the result of bargaining over the

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positions of Malays and non-Malays. Among the provisions enshrined in the Constitution are the fundamental liberties of freedom of movement, speech, assembly and association; citizenship status; Malay as the national language; the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak; the position and power of the rulers; Islam as the official religion; the composition and the election of a national parliament; federalism and the powers of the state (Means 1970, pp. 175–89; Milne and Mauzy 1978, pp. 36–43; Federal Constitution 2008). There are thirteen states in the Federation of Malaysia, nine of which are headed by a sultan. The Constitution also provides for the position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (king), who continues to symbolize Malay dominance (Crouch 1996, p. 142) and is the protector of Malay rights (Federal Constitution 2008). While the Constitution provides for freedom of religion to the citizens, the same cannot be said for the Malays. In Malaysia, a Malay, by constitutional and legal definition, is and must be a Muslim (Means 1970; Federal Constitution 2008). Abandoning Islam can mean the act of renouncing the Malay way of life. Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution reads: “A Malay is a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay customs.” This further sharpens the division between the Malays and non-Malays. According to official reports, the Malaysian population is made up of 66.2 per cent Malays and other bumiputera (indigenous groups), 25 per cent Chinese, 7.5 per cent Indians and 1.3 per cent other ethnic groups (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2009, p. 11). The Chinese and Indians are not as homogenous as the Malays with regards to matters of religion. The other two ethnic groups are free to subscribe to any religion, with some professing to be Muslims, Christians, Buddhists or Hindus. They also speak various Chinese and Indian dialects, which are generally not understood by the majority of Malays. Misunderstandings in matters of religion, education and language can become contentious among the various ethnic groups. With this set-up of race-based political parties and policies to protect the special position of a particular community, it is common for some scholars to describe the Malayan society as divided along ethnic lines, including religion and language (Means 1970; Milne and Mauzy 1978). Means (1970, p. 399) describes the configuration of Malayan society as based on communal and economic divisions. Milne and Mauzy (1978, p. 4) are more direct when they argue that considerations of racial arithmetic dominate everything political or economic in Malaysia. The

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racial arithmetic becomes a crucial calculation at the ballot boxes because of the general appeal of the ethnic-based political parties to the multiethnic voters. Giving a class perspective to communalism, Hua (1983, p. 2) contends that the political domination of the ruling class has been established through communalism, and this is to prevent the masses from coming together to be a unified political force. With the formation of Malaysia in 1963, which included Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore2 (expelled in 1965), the society continued to be divided according to ethnicity, religion and language. When racial tensions flared up into several riots in 1967 and 1969, communal solutions were drawn up to address the matter. The NEP was formulated in 1970 to eradicate poverty and to restructure Malaysian society in a way that would correct the economic imbalance between Malays and non-Malays (Jesudasan 1988; Hua 1983). The NEP was designed to facilitate the special privileges of Malays as provided for under the Constitution, making it the Malaysian version of an Affirmative Action Plan (Mehmet 1986, p. 8). Analysing the NEP from the perspective of communalism and class, Hua (1983) argues that the policy is an attempt by the state to institutionalize communalism, thereby maintaining its domination. Although the main beneficiaries of the NEP were bumiputera, the policy also contributed to a consolidation of political and economic resources in the hands of bumiputera politico-business elites (Ho 1988; Gomez 1990). UMNO gained hugely from the government’s privatization policy in the 1980s under the premiership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad. A case in point is the country’s biggest road construction project, that of the RM3.4 billion North–South Highway, which was awarded to an UMNOowned company, United Engineers (M) Berhad (Ho 1988). The company was awarded the contract in 1985 to build the 1,000-kilometre stretch of highway despite tendering a higher bid than five other companies (Gomez 1990). Bumiputera businessmen, such as Tajudin Ramli, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, Halim Saad and Mohd Razali Mohd Rahman were among some of the close associates of Daim Zainuddin, a former finance minister and close ally of then prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad (Ho 1988; Gomez and Jomo 1997). Even close associates of sacked deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim had been awarded lucrative contracts. For instance, Nasaruddin Jalil, a former political secretary of Anwar, was a director of Diversified Resources Berhad, which obtained a monopoly of privatized minibus services in Kuala Lumpur in 1993. The company also received a moneymaking concession to conduct inspections of commercial vehicles

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(Gomez and Jomo, 1997). This leads to the conclusion that there is a complex web of connections between bumiputera politicians, businessmen, senior bureaucrats and the aristocracy in the Malaysian political system (Ho 1988, p. 248). This complex web of connections involves not only UMNO politicians (Gomez and Jomo 1997). Scholars argue that the new rich or upper classes include elites of the Chinese and Indian communities who have close ties with UMNO leaders. Gomez and Jomo (1997) identify non-Malay businessmen such as Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, Ting Pik Khiing, Eric Chia, Quek Leng Chan and T. Ananda Krishnan who have close ties with UMNO leaders. Instances of such connections are evident from the issuance of numerous licences for Malaysian cellular phones and satellite services to Tajudin Ramli’s Celcom Sendirian Berhad, T. Ananda Krishnan’s Binariang Sendirian Berhad (Maxis) and companies controlled by Shamsuddin Kadir’s Sapura Holdings Berhad and Vincent Tan Chee Yioun’s Berjaya Group (ibid., p. 82). Licences for 3G spectrum mobile digital communications were also awarded to Celcom, Maxis and MiTV Networks Sendirian Berhad3 (co-owned by Vincent Tan Chee Yioun who had a forty per cent stake in the company). Licences in the telecommunications industry were also awarded to those close to UMNO leaders like Daim Zainuddin (former finance minister) and Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Such examples have led several scholars to argue that political patronage (Gomez and Jomo 1997) or patronage distribution (Crouch 1996) has become a culture among those wielding political power in Malaysian society. The culture of political patronage is maintained ideologically and non-ideologically (Crouch 1996, p. 43). It is perpetuated, firstly, through a non-ideological “patronagedispensing nature” and, secondly, ideologically through UMNO in terms of Malay special privileges and domination (ibid., p. 43).

Dominance of Malay Politics The political environment in Malaysia also reflects a dominance of Malay politics. Due to the multi-ethnic make-up of Malaysian society, the ruling coalition led by the three major ethnic-based parties — UMNO, MCA and MIC — exhibits a form of cooperation among the three races, or a version of consociationalism (Milne and Mauzy 1978, p. 354) where cooperation is based on equality. Others argue that the Malaysian polity is best understood as hegemony of the bumiputera elites because of the Malay political dominance of UMNO (Ho 1988). This is because the ruling coalition, led by UMNO, does not see the MCA and MIC as

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equal partners. The formation of the Alliance Party (and later the BN) was due to political convenience and not a deep commitment to communal compromise between the Malay and Chinese leadership (ibid., p. 68). Moreover, incidents of tensions between Malays and non-Malays are likely to be resolved in ways that predominantly favour the bumiputera (ibid., p. 68). With UMNO at the helm of political power, history suggests that the country’s political landscape can be shaped by contestations for power among the party’s top leadership. Previous incidents of intense power struggles in UMNO appeared to have an impact on the performance of the ruling coalition in the national elections, particularly among the Malay electorate. A case in point was the general elections of 1990 and 1999, both of which were held after a serious split in UMNO. The election results saw the Malay opposition party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), performing well. The fallout within UMNO began in 1987 when former finance minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah left the party and formed splinter party Semangat 46 (Spirit of ’464), after failing to topple the then prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad as UMNO president (Khoo 1999, p. 16). Semangat 46 teamed up with PAS to fight the ruling coalition in the 1990 election. The outcome saw the now disbanded Semangat 46 winning only eight out of the sixty-one seats it contested, while PAS recaptured the state of Kelantan that it had lost to the ruling coalition in 1978 (ibid., p. 17). The 1999 election was held after then deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim was unceremoniously removed by Dr Mahathir Mohamad in 1998. Anwar set up Parti Keadilan Nasional (now Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR) to challenge the ruling coalition. The 1999 election also saw PAS performing exceptionally well. It retained the state of Kelantan and wrested control of Terengganu from the ruling coalition. The party was able to win over the Malay votes (Zakaria 1999, pp. 5–6). Parti Keadilan Nasional won five parliamentary seats under the stewardship of Anwar’s wife, Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (ibid., p. 6). The 2008 election also witnessed a contestation of sorts between then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and his predecessor Dr Mahathir Mohamad. As in previous power struggles within UMNO, the infighting was played out through proxy fights or wayang kulit (shadow puppet or shadow play) amid intense production and circulation of surat layang (literally translated as flying letters, meaning poison pen letters). The terms wayang kulit and surat layang have commonly been used to describe the political culture of UMNO (Chin 1997; Hilley 2001; Wain 2009; Raja Petra Kamarudin 2009). Wayang kulit refers to a kind of political manoeuvring

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or politics of deception among political elites, where the real target of political attacks and the actual person behind those attacks are not made known openly (Chin 1997, p. 182; Wain 2009, p. 281). For example, the disclosure of a tape recording of Malaysian lawyer V.K. Lingam, who allegedly spoke about his influence in brokering judicial appointments, became an issue in the 2008 election. It was interpreted as an attack on Dr Mahathir Mohamad by his successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, because the infamous incident occurred during the former’s premiership (Raja Petra Kamarudin 2009). Surat layang refers to anonymously written letters that allege various wrongdoings of rival politicians (Raja Petra Kamarudin 2009; Wain 2009). An example was the circulation of poison-pen letters by political enemies of Anwar Ibrahim in August 1997 to discredit the politician (Hilley 2001; Raja Petra Kamarudin 2009; Wain 2009). In the lead-up to the 2008 election, surat layang aimed at Abdullah Ahmad Badawi were being circulated within UMNO to discredit the then UMNO president and prime minister (Raja Petra Kamarudin 2009). This demonstrates how political scandals are produced and circulated in the form of leaflets to damage the reputation of rival politicians. The underlying hostility created by the culture of patronage within UMNO provided fertile ground for political scandals. The impetus to produce and circulate surat layang does not seem to be confined only to UMNO. The practice was also evident in PAS, which used similar methods to create and spread leaflets to attack certain personalities. For example, two days before the 1969 general election, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), now known as PAS, distributed 50,000 photographs of then education minister Khir Johari and his wife dressed in Chinese traditional costumes in Kedah to put doubts in the minds of the people about his allegiance to the Malay community (Vorys 1975, p. 285). Another picture circulated was that of the first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman eating with chopsticks and with a roast suckling pig in the middle of the table. The intention was to project the image that the leader was too friendly towards the Chinese and non-Muslim community (ibid., p. 285). Letters attacking the first prime minister for being engrossed in playing poker with his Chinese friends during the 13 May race riot were circulated in a move to pressure Tunku Abdul Rahman to resign as prime minister and UMNO leader (ibid., pp. 372–74). The letter questioning the morals and conduct of Tunku Abdul Rahman, which was supposedly written and signed by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, had been widely distributed following the poor performance of the Alliance Party in the 1969 election. However, Dr Mahathir Mohamad denied any involvement

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in circulating the letter (ibid., p. 377). The political culture discussed here appeared to reflect the manner of blog use by the group of partisan and civil society bloggers who staged a blog campaign to tarnish the image of rival politicians, particularly Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in the 2008 election. Similar tactics to destroy the reputation of opposition politicians, such as Anwar Ibrahim, Lim Guan Eng and Hadi Awang, were employed online during the 2013 election.5

Democratic and Authoritarian Traits In the perennial debate of whether multi-ethnic and multicultural Malaysia has a democratic or authoritarian government, many scholars are quick to describe the ruling coalition as authoritarian, while others are more nuanced in their description of the regime. Gomez and Jomo (1997) assert that Malaysia is ruled by an authoritarian regime, while Tan and Zawawi (2008) describe the country as a pseudo-democracy or flawed democracy. Giving a slightly more nuanced analysis, Munro-Kua (1996) describes Malaysia as authoritarian populism, which sees the ruling regime employing a strategy to promote populist appeal (such as policies that favour the bumiputera) while at the same time maintaining a stable system through authoritarian means. In his portrayal of Malaysia as a semi-democracy, Case (1993) argues that the UMNO government has interwoven aspects of “soft” dictatorship and “hard” democracy to remain in power (p. 186). The government tolerates opposition parties and interest groups but closes off their channels to state power, as in a “soft” dictatorship. On the other hand, it follows democratic procedures by holding regular federal and state elections while preventing opposition elements from organizing effectively against the government (ibid., p. 186). Focusing on the particular characteristics of Malaysian society, Crouch (1996) argues that it is more meaningful to analyse the way the government adopts a repressiveresponsive approach when dealing with particular crises. He argues that it is more precise to study the interrelationship between their democratic and authoritarian traits, instead of seeing Malaysian society as being at the midpoint along a continuum between democracy and totalitarianism (ibid., p. 5). As such, the Malaysian government will continue to respond to certain pressures from the electorate while repressing others in the process. While the general debate on democracy in Malaysia reflects many Western assumptions, former premier Dr Mahathir Mohamad argues that “Asian values” must be considered before imposing liberal Western ideals

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on Malaysia. Even his former deputy Anwar Ibrahim spoke of the need for a more “particularized” democracy that took into account the cultural and value systems and the religious beliefs of the people, and not just the Western liberal model (Hilley 2001). As such, Hilley (2001) argues that the notion of a “different form of democracy” for a “different set of cultural values” reflects the interplay of indigenous values and a constructed anti-Western ideology. Thus, any criticism against Dr Mahathir Mohamad by foreign politicians or the Western media can be turned into an attack on the entire nation (Hilley 2001, p. 42). Nonetheless, developments in electoral rules and stringent controls on the media, through ownership and regulations governing the industry, including legislation that curtail civil liberties, point to a relatively authoritarian society.

Election Rules Favouring the Ruling Regime The regular federal and state elections held in Malaysia have commonly been used to denote the country as a democratic nation (Case 1993; Crouch 1996; Loh 2009). However, election rules that work in favour of the ruling coalition have contributed to arguments that the electoral system in the country is not fair (Means 1970; Case 1993; Loh 2009). The practice of gerrymandering, which does not take into consideration certain safeguards in the delineation exercise of political boundaries, is a sore point often raised to depict an unfair electoral system (Means 1970; Lim 2003). The “rules of the game” are changed by shifting political boundaries or tampering with the Federal Constitution (Means 1970, p. 415) and amendments to the Federal Constitution have essentially favoured the ruling regime (Lim 2003). An example was the 1973 constitutional amendments which saw the removal of the weightage limit for rural areas, where the majority were Malay residents (Lim 2003). The shift resulted in more constituencies representing fewer Malays in the rural areas and fewer constituencies representing a much higher number of non-Malays in the urban areas (ibid., p. 33). As such, the exercise gave an additional advantage to Malay political power in the national elections that adopted the simple majority “first past the post” system (ibid., p. 25). Further amendments to the country’s election rules, namely Election Act 1958, also favoured the ruling regime, resulting in an uneven playing field for the opposition (Loh 2009, pp. 92–95). These amendments were described as “particularly insidious” because they did not encourage the electoral process to be free and fair, thus infringing the principles of

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democracy (ibid., p. 93). For example, Section 9(A) of the act states that the electoral rolls are “final and shall not be questioned or appealed against or reviewed, quashed or set aside by any court”. This can result in a denial of a citizen’s “right to question” the state in regard to the electoral rolls (ibid., p. 94). Various protests have been held to call for free and fair elections, for example the first Bersih gathering in November 2007 and subsequent rallies held in 2011 and 2012, but the electoral rules remain unchanged and continue to favour the ruling coalition. Despite the unfair electoral rules, high voter turnout of over 70 per cent in the 2008 polls and in previous elections suggests that an engaged and politically aware electorate exists in Malaysia (ibid., p. 73). In 2013 the voter turnout saw a record high of 80 per cent in the country’s thirteenth general election.6

Stringent Regulations and GovernmentControlled Media The state of the media in Malaysia suggests an industry that faces strict regulations, practises responsible development journalism and is tightly controlled by the BN ruling coalition parties — UMNO, MCA and MIC (Loh and Mustafa 1996; Zaharom 2002). The country’s Press Freedom Index ranking, published on the website of Reporters Without Borders, shows a heavily regulated press. For example, in 2008 Malaysia’s ranking was 132nd out of 173 countries.7 The country moved up one spot to 131st out of 175 countries in the 2009 index8 but dropped to 141st placing in 2010.9 It recorded a low ranking of 145th out of 179 countries in 2013.10 Among the restrictive laws that have an impact on the running of the media are the Printing Presses and Publications Act (1984), the Communications and Multimedia Act (1998), the Sedition Act (1948) and the Official Secrets Act (1972). The Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, which was meant to replace the Internal Security Act (1960), was tabled for first reading in Parliament on 10 April 2012, and was passed on 24 October 2013.11 At the time of writing this book, the Sedition Act (1948) has been amended on 10 April 2015. The amendments, described as vague, could further stifle dissent and limit media freedom, including social media and the Internet.12 The Printing Presses and Publications Act (1984), further revised in 1988, makes certain that the print media industry toes the government’s line (Mustafa 2002; Brown 2005). The act requires all newspapers and regular publications to obtain an annual licence for their publications (Mustafa

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2002). The regulation also gives power to the home affairs minister to reject or approve an application for a licence, which can be revoked or suspended at any time. Section 13(A) of the act provides the minister with wide discretionary powers to suspend the operating licence of a print news organization and the minister’s decision cannot be questioned in any court of law on any ground whatsoever. Licences can be revoked if the minister is satisfied that the contents of a newspaper may threaten public order or national security. Incidents of licences being suspended have occurred in recent years. Three mainstream newspapers — English daily The Star, Chinese-language daily Sin Chew Jit Poh and Malay-language newspaper Watan — were suspended for several months in 1987 (ibid.). It is argued that The Star, which was seen as having exerted some form of independence in its editorial content, did not regain its “old critical stance” after the suspension was lifted several months later (ibid., p. 149). In 2010 the English daily received a show cause letter from the Home Ministry demanding an explanation for an article that questioned the caning of three Muslim women sentenced under syariah law for illicit sex.13 The act has essentially been potent in keeping a tight rein on the daily operations of the media. Government control extends beyond print news organizations. Broadcasting stations are also regulated in a strict manner under the Communications and Multimedia Act (1998), which replaced the Broadcasting Act (1988). The 1998 act, which takes into account services like cable and satellite television and the multimedia industry, provides for tighter government control on signal reception (Zaharom 2002). The information and communication minister is given wide-ranging powers to modify, vary or revoke broadcasting licences and other licences granted under this act at any time (Lim 2009). The act also empowers the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) to investigate any matter if the minister directs it to do so or if the MCMC has grounds to believe that a civil or criminal offence under this act was, is or will be committed. An example was the blocking of popular blog Malaysia Today in August 2008 through the commission (Lim 2009). Despite the initial freedom guarantee on the Internet, the 1998 act allows the government to exert a degree of control. The Official Secrets Act (1972), the recently replaced Internal Security Act (1960) and the Sedition Act (1948) also have huge effects on gagging the media. The regulations provide the government with wide discretionary powers to determine the meaning of “official secrets” and to decide whether any individuals or the media have acted in a manner

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prejudicial to the security of the country (Mustafa 2002). The Official Secrets Act (1972), for instance, provides a minister with sweeping powers to stamp government documents as “official secrets”, making it illegal for journalists to have access to almost all official documents. The Sedition Act (1948) gives a wide interpretation to the meaning of seditious words, acts or publications. Publications that are deemed to have seditious tendencies are those that question any matter pertaining to language, the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and the powers and prerogatives of the rulers and the ruling chiefs of Negeri Sembilan (Lim 2009; Federal Constitution 2008). In May 2008, blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin, who runs the popular blog Malaysia Today, was investigated under the Sedition Act (1948) regarding the content of his blog.14 The Internal Security Act (1960), recently replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, provided for detention without trial against any individuals whom a minister deemed as having acted in any manner prejudicial to the security of the country. The regulation provided for arbitrary detention based on mere suspicion that an individual may have acted in a manner that could compromise the security of the country (Lim 2009). A significant case of the government using the Internal Security Act was on 27 October 1987 when more than a hundred people, including opposition leaders, social activists and academics, were arrested (Mustafa 2002). More recent use of the Internal Security Act took place in September 2008, with the arrests of blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin, opposition politician Teresa Kok and journalist Tan Hoon Cheng.15 These three existing pieces of legislation, coupled with the absence of a Freedom of Information Act, further hamper the workings of a free press and curtail civil liberties in Malaysia. Despite a predominantly regime-oriented mainstream media and the use of restrictive laws on the industry, the traditional media are not monolithic and do offer “sites of resistance and weakness” (Brown 2005, p. 40). Sites of contestation exist due to challenges posed by the Internet and the internal contradictions emerging between partners of the BN regime and the corporate control it has over the media (ibid.). The sites of resistance would appear in the tightly controlled mainstream media when “differing interests and political rivalry” occurred among the BN component partners, and at times internally within the parties (ibid., p. 50). An example was when a government policy to introduce the use of English to teach mathematics and science in all national schools in 2002 was met with strong opposition from Chinese educationists, including

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Chinese BN partners Gerakan and the MCA. The UMNO-linked Malay daily Utusan Melayu and English daily New Straits Times were critical of the Chinese parties, while MCA-controlled English daily The Star was more restrained in its coverage, presenting a moderate image of the MCA (ibid., p. 51). Despite controls on the mainstream media, the contentious events suggest that the industry does provide “spaces for negotiation and contestation” (ibid., p. 55). Another form of tight control of the media in the country is through state ownership, political patronage or trusted proxies (Hilley 2001, p. 121). This is a reminder of the culture of political patronage in which the UMNO leaders select business elites within their close circle to run media companies in order to keep a tight rein on the media. According to Hilley (2001), ownership and control of the press occur through a complex web of interlocking companies. The three main partners of the BN — UMNO, MCA and MIC — have stakes in major newspapers that publish in multilingual Malaysia, thus covering the English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil readers. The control includes private and governmentcontrolled television broadcasting and radio stations in the country (Zaharom 2002). The way the ruling elite invokes “responsible development journalism” among the mainstream press in a developing nation like Malaysia goes further to show how control becomes more pronounced in the context of news filtering. News filtering is particularly clear when the country goes to the polls (Hilley 2001; Mustafa 2002; Zaharom 2002). The mainstream press and television broadcasting stations, including radio, are pivotal in framing opinions, glossing over news, spinning information, promoting BN coalition candidates and demonizing opposition politicians through images and visions of ethnic harmony and nation-building (Hilley 2001). Such observations are supported by research on the coverage of mainstream media in the 2008 and 2013 general elections. A study conducted in 2008 shows the publication of more reports that favour the BN over opposition parties (Sankaran 2008, p. 236). The conclusion was reached after a content analysis of 775 stories selected from five newspapers in four languages published during the 2008 election. The analysis showed that 61 per cent of the coverage was pro-BN, 19 per cent pro-opposition and 20 per cent of stories were neutral16 (ibid.). Similar biased coverage in the newspapers and television broadcasts was detected in the 2013 election. The research, analysing 27 print, televisual and online media in Bahasa Malaysia, English and Chinese, recorded consistent bias towards the BN and against the opposition (Houghton 2013).

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The state of the mainstream media in Malaysia seems to fit the understanding of the propaganda model proposed by Herman and Chomsky (2002), who examined the highly commercialized media ecosystem in the United States. The two media scholars argue that the model is more noticeable as a framework to understand the media in countries where control is in the hands of the ruling regime. As such, the framework allows for a deeper understanding of the state of the Malaysian media, which are under the tight control of the ruling coalition parties. With control in the hands of the ruling regime, high-ranking editors or high-ranking positions in media organizations, such as the chief executive officer or group editor-in-chief, are usually handpicked and endorsed by leaders of the ruling parties that own the media. A regime change in Malaysia often means editorial changes in UMNO-owned media companies.17 For example, a change in the UMNO leadership also sees a change in editors in the UMNO-linked New Straits Times Press (NSTP). This was apparent after the sudden dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim as deputy prime minister in 1998. Two editors, Johan Jaafar, editor-in-chief of Malay daily Utusan Malaysia, and Nazri Abdullah, group editor of Berita Harian, who were described as closely aligned to Anwar Ibrahim, were removed soon after his dismissal (Mustafa 2002). Subsequent editorial changes in the NSTP occurred after Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took over from Dr Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister and UMNO president in 2004. Kalimullah Masheerul Hassan was made group editor-in-chief and director of NSTP, taking over from Abdullah Ahmad who was removed from the post in November 2003 (Brendan 2003). Changes in high-ranking editorial positions also occurred after Najib Razak took over from Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as prime minister in April 2009.18 Similar editorial changes took place at the MCA-owned English daily The Star. After the MCA election in August 2008, newly elected president Ong Tee Keat handpicked Clement Hii, who is the founder of education group SEG International Berhad, to take over from Steven Tan as executive deputy chairman of Star Publications.19 A series of changes at the top management of The Star could be seen at around the same time as the MCA saw a switch in its leadership. Chua Soi Lek was elected MCA president in March 2010.20 Two months later Vincent Lee Fook Loong joined the daily as a non-independent non-executive director and, by 2011, he was made executive deputy chairman until he resigned in April 2014.21 Vincent Lee’s resignation came into effect months after the Chinese-based party elected Liow Tiong Lai as the new president in December 2013.22 The newspaper’s current group managing director and chief executive officer is Wong Chun Wai.23

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Mainstream media that are complicit with the government also face undue pressure from the opposition coalition as seen from the numerous defamation proceedings that have been filed against UMNO-linked Utusan Melayu. The legal suits ended with a string of court victories for the opposition against the Malay daily. In December 2011 Penang chief minister Lim Guan Eng was awarded RM200,000 in damages for a news article published by Utusan Melayu on 12 March 2008, which implied that the MP was anti-Malay and anti-Islam.24 Lim Guan Eng recorded his second victory in his legal suit against Utusan Melayu on 22 June 2012. The High Court awarded another RM200,000 to the Penang chief minister because the news article had falsely reported the DAP MP to say that he would abolish the New Economic Policy.25 His father Lim Kit Siang was also awarded RM250,000 in a defamation suit against Utusan Melayu for a news article published by the paper in August 2013.26 The discussion thus far has shown the string of restrictions that the media industry faces in its day-to-day operation.

New Media Set against the background of a relatively authoritarian government with a policy of non-censorship of the Internet, the online platform has been heralded as an alternative medium by those who want their voices heard (Abbott 2001; Brown 2005; Tang 2006; Tan and Zawawi 2008). It provided an avenue of communication for supporters of Anwar Ibrahim during the early days of the reformasi movement in 1998 (Sabri 2000; Abbott 2001). Describing the emergence of reformasi websites together with the use of email and other online forums as “dissident cyber-networks” (Khoo 2010, pp. 3–4), the Internet was used to provide Anwar’s supporters with information on his trial, activities and roadshows. Over fifty pro-Anwar websites emerged a few months after the sacked deputy prime minister’s arrest (Abbott 2001, p. 104). His supporters were distributing Anwar’s letters from prison and eyewitness accounts of protests held to show their anger over the leader’s removal from office. At that time, reformasi websites were deemed more popular than the government’s political websites and those of mainstream press like the UMNO-controlled Utusan Malaysia and New Straits Times (Tan and Zawawi 2008). The government did not strictly control the Internet and the medium provided reformasi supporters with a political space for negotiation (Brown 2005, p. 46). PKR’s director of strategies, Rafizi Ramli, recalled his involvement in the Free Anwar campaign after the unceremonious removal of Anwar

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Ibrahim from Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s administration. Rafizi Ramli, who is also member of Parliament for Pandan, described his role as back-up webmaster for the campaign, which saw three main figures coordinating efforts from the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Australia. In an interview for this book, he said, It so happened that some of the very people who were behind some of the early websites were my friends and we were all overseas. I know some of the people who were behind mahazalim, mahafiraun [websites to promote the reformasi movement]. They remain unknown until today but we know each other. That was how I started out because I was part of the Free Anwar campaign. I was in the UK, RPK [Raja Petra Kamarudin] was in Malaysia and Rahim Ghouse [a former UMNO Youth leader in Penang] was in Australia. The three of us coordinated everything.27

Rafizi Ramli, however, did not play an active role during the 2008 election. It was only after the 2008 election that he became more involved in the PKR. Two years later he was made the director of strategies for PKR. From 2011 to 2012 he began experimenting with the use of social media to reach the voting public in preparation for the 2013 election.28 Alongside pro-Anwar websites, other online news sites began to emerge in cyberspace. Online news sites did not require an operating licence because of the non-censorship policy for the Internet (Steele 2009). One of them was online news site Malaysiakini, launched in November 1999, almost a year after Anwar Ibrahim’s dismissal from office. Malaysiakini provided news that was not carried by the mainstream media, particularly coverage of the 1999 general elections that were taking place when the news website first started (ibid.). The news portal, which is perceived to be pro-opposition, is another avenue for readers to compare different perspectives and diverse opinions that have been largely ignored by the mainstream media. Malay Internet news website Agenda Daily, staffed by former Utusan Melayu journalists, was launched two years later in July 2001.29 Chinese language news portal Merdeka Review also made its presence felt online during the 2008 general election. Online news sites The Malaysian Insider and The Nut Graph30 are the latest two English language additions to the online news scene to have provided extensive coverage of the 2008 election. All of the online news sites have been set up by former journalists and editors from the mainstream news media organizations, marking a shift from the “old” to the “new” media.

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The country’s opposition parties also resorted to the Internet to express their views, although some of them produced their own newspapers. For example, the DAP produces and distributes The Rocket newspaper, while PAS has the Harakah (Brown 2005). These parties also published their party newspapers online. PAS went further by launching its Web TV (Tan and Zawawi 2008). DAP leaders were also prompt in setting up blogs to post their views online. Party leader and veteran, Lim Kit Siang, was one of the DAP stalwarts who started a website in 1997. A host of other DAP leaders also took up online activity to stay in touch with their supporters and promote their party. More recently, many party leaders have begun disseminating information through the online social media networks, such as Facebook and Twitter. Similarly, PKR leaders have been adept at blogging and the use of social networking sites to spread their messages and information on the party’s activities. As the setting up of websites and Web pages demands certain skills, the user-friendly software for blogging that became available for free in 1999 (Hindman 2009, p. 106) saw many bloggers taking up the role of citizen journalists.31 Some of the blogs32 provided coverage of demonstrations against the fuel price hike in 2006 because the bloggers expected the mainstream press to ignore this as a news item. Blogger Jeff Ooi of popular blog Screenshots posted his version of what happened at the peaceful demonstration (George 2007). The practice of grass-roots journalism spread rapidly during a Hindraf rally on 25 November 2007 in Kuala Lumpur. The rally was held to protest against the unfair treatment and economic backwardness of the Indian community in Malaysia (Waytha Moorthy 2008). Sociopolitical blogs took centre stage to highlight the police action taken on 10 November 2007 against demonstrators who had turned out in full force in Kuala Lumpur city centre to call for free and fair elections. An example was a blow-by-blow account on popular blog The People’s Parliament33 which published dramatic photographs of the protestors and the huge crowd that supported the rally. It also contained details of the use of water cannons and tear gas against some of the protestors by the police. Videos and thousands of photographs of the demonstration posted online indicated the vibrant Web activity by individual bloggers and public interest groups. Blogging became a popular online platform aimed at shaping public opinion during the 2008 general election. After the 2008 election its popularity seems to have waned as many stopped the activity altogether and others turned to the use of newer online platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. An analysis of the blogs that was conducted for this book revealed that half (52 per cent) of the blogs that were created before the

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2008 election had been terminated by 2012. The remaining 48 per cent continued blogging into the 2013 election. On the other hand, hundreds of new blogs had been created for the cyber battle in 2013. An analysis of the blogosphere detected the creation of at least 342 new socio-political blogs after the 2008 election. By early 2013 the blogosphere saw a mushrooming of pro-UMNO blogs. Of the 342 new blogs that emerged after the 2008 election, 70 per cent were pro-UMNO or BN blogs and 30 per cent were pro-opposition. Many of the pro-UMNO blogs stopped blogging after the 2013 election. This seems to support the observation of Ahirudin Attan that many of the blogs, Facebook pages and Twitter accounts belonging to UMNO or UMNO supporters had been closed following the 2013 election because of a lack of funding.34 This brings us now to a discussion of the terms paid bloggers or cybertroopers.

Cybertroopers for Cyber Warfare Anwar Ibrahim’s reformasi team was not the only group using the Internet to promote its cause. UMNO also had three groups active on the Internet to counter pro-Anwar websites during the reformasi days.35 A group of UMNO cybertroopers had set up anonymous websites to counter Anwar’s reformasi Web pages in 1999. However, the term UMNO cybertroopers only surfaced publicly in July 2007 when the then youth and sports minister Azalina Othman, who was also an UMNO supreme council member, announced that the party was getting cyberwriters to counter slanderous Internet postings about the party and its leadership.36 In an interview for this book, pro-UMNO blogger Ruhanie Ahmad37 explained that the term UMNO cybertroopers specifically referred to bloggers who were paid to write favourably for the then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during the 2008 election. At that time there was intense friction between two UMNO political giants, namely Dr Mahathir Mohamad and his successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. However, the meaning of the term changed after the 2008 election. By 2013 the term cybertrooper referred mainly to bloggers who were generally employed to promote the messages of UMNO on the blogs or social networking sites. Information gathered from various sources, such as UMNO insiders, socio-political bloggers and a lawyer involved in drafting an agreement for some of the pro-UMNO bloggers to be employed as online writers, represented anecdotal evidence about the different manner in which some of the pro-UMNO bloggers were paid for their ghostwriting services. Some received monthly allowances to produce articles

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for particular news portals, while some were given token sums of money for producing specific postings published on UMNO websites. Others had their daily expenses taken care of for their online posting services during the election period, yet others received payments from particular UMNO ministers to promote the profiles of the paying leaders on their blogs or Facebook pages. It is difficult to verify the authenticity of payments made or the amount given to cybertroopers for their online services. However, an outburst by Prime Minister Najib Razak at the UMNO assembly in November 2014 confirmed that some of the bloggers paid by the party were instead attacking party leaders on their blogs.38 The UMNO president was reported as saying that the bloggers in question should instead attack the opposition because they knew who was paying them. Addressing the issue of paid bloggers, former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, in an interview for this book, noted, I think it is part of the system already. You get people who are very good at communicating. You pay them to promote your cause. The opposition did the same. These are people who must be paid because they spend all their time doing that.39

Ahirudin Attan expressed similar concerns when he made the observation that politicians would “hijack” or take over the use of blogs and social networking sites and they would use money to pay or hire cyberwriters.40 In an interview for this book, he pointed out that there was even a proposal for the party to spend RM350 million to set up an outfit for social media to counter the opposition in preparation for the next general election, which is expected to be held in 2017 or 2018. He also posted a short write-up about the proposal on his blog.41 Describing the online media as presenting “a pot of gold” for those who have tasted what they could do between 2008 and 2013, Ahirudin Attan said employing people to be bloggers, Facebookers and Twitterers did not necessarily mean that they would be credible content providers. He elaborated in an interview: You have bloggers, social media operators, who are hired to sit there and just do these things [like] create 100 accounts and do stuff with that. You do another 100 accounts, make sure you have different IP addresses, [making them look] very systematic, believable. But you cannot come up with 100 profiles of genuine persons.… It became a political tool for the general election but not so much information for people to readily believe in.42

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It is difficult to verify the amount of money spent to hire online ghostwriters; however, information revealed by a pro-UMNO blogger, who wanted to remain anonymous, provided some insight into the sums of money involved. Revealing the information in an interview in 2013, the proUMNO blogger indicated that he received a “good deal” from UMNO to produce creative inputs on the party’s activities. Part of the funding was used to create an online news portal in 2010, which was specifically set up for the 2013 general election. Its publication came to an end after polling in May 2013. The pro-UMNO blogger revealed that it cost between RM10,000 and RM15,000 a month to run the news portal. Based on a conservative calculation of thirty-six months or three years of operation, the expenditure for this one known project would be between RM360,000 and RM540,000. Based on this estimate it may not be too far-fetched to assume that money spent online in preparation for the political battle could run into millions of ringgit. This seems to justify the remark by Ahirudin Attan that there is “a pot of gold” to be made online for some socio-political bloggers. The opposition coalition was not spared from speculation that they had their own version of cybertroopers, particularly in the form of the Red Bean Army. The DAP was put in a defensive position as they had to issue numerous statements to counter the allegation that first surfaced in April 2013. A speculative piece about the existence of the Red Bean Army first appeared in the UMNO blog, MyKMU.net, on 30 April 2013.43 The blog posting presented a list of 185 Facebook accounts that were said to be part of the Red Bean Army. Two days later, UMNO-linked newspaper Utusan Melayu published a similar article on its online news site.44 Other pro-UMNO blogs also posted similar speculative pieces to keep the issue alive. For example, pro-UMNO blog The “Thirteen Million Plus Ringgit” Guy Rambles had a more elaborate write-up about the Red Bean Army, published on 8 May 2013.45 Another pro-UMNO blog, Dr MiM, went further by calling for action against the Red Bean Army in a post on 28 May 2013,46 while Tunku blog further demonized the DAP and its Red Bean Army on 3 June 2013.47 Pro-UMNO blog AIDC linked the Red Bean Army to communism in a move to further erode the image of the opposition.48 Online news portal The Mole, an outfit of Ahirudin Attan, also jumped on to the bandwagon by publishing the allegation and tweeting about the Red Bean Army on 2 May 2013. A day later, the interview of a former DAP Youth leader, Shen Yee Aun, who claimed the existence of the Red Bean Army, also made its way into Utusan Online.

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The speculation was kept alive even after the 5 May election in 2013. A Red Bean Army Facebook page was also created on 25 May 2013, the same day as Utusan Melayu’s front-page article on the subject. The Malay daily claimed that the DAP paid RM3,000 a month for the service of 200 cyberwriters over six years and that the party’s expenditure for the Red Bean Army was about RM1.5 million a month. The DAP dismissed the allegations, saying that the overall expenditure would work out to be about RM108 million, which the party could ill afford.49 Although the Communications and Multimedia Ministry admitted, on 4 July 2013, that it was unable to identify the Red Bean Army cybertroopers, the allegation continued to feature in pro-UMNO blogs and UMNO-owned newspapers in 2014.50 The opposition coalition believes that the Red Bean Army allegation was concocted to project the impression that the opposition was also guilty of hiring cybertroopers for the online battle leading up to the election. DAP’s second-term Jelutong member of Parliament Jeff Ooi, in an interview for this book, pointed out that the political scenario for the 2013 election saw an outpouring of sympathy for the PR cause on a voluntary basis. Recalling his campaigning days, Jeff Ooi said, “It is the fresh graduates. I led a team of fresh working graduates and working adults to take care of Penang, to play the cyber warfare but we never paid them.”51 He felt that the allegations could have been made because their political rivals thought the opposition was fighting the online battle in the same way and remunerating people for it. PKR’s Rafizi Ramli admitted, in an interview for this book, that he did experiment with cybertroopers. Initially he thought that the party could try emulating BN by using fake accounts to give the impression of a large following. The problem, he later realized, was that he had mainly volunteers who were logging on from the same Internet Protocol (IP) address, and there was a limit to the number of Facebook accounts that one could create. He explained, “We don’t have money to pay people to sit down all over the places [sic] to create fake accounts. We only have a team of six or seven people. So definitely the fake account route does not work.”52 This does not mean that the opposition totally abstains from recruiting bloggers for cyber warfare against the ruling coalition. Glimpses into the various forms of payment to bloggers supportive of the opposition coalition could be detected from interviews with some of them. A pro-opposition blogger revealed in an interview for this book that he did ask the DAP to pay for his travel and board to blog for the opposition in the by-elections

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held after 2008.53 His request for travel and lodging was fulfilled. Another pro-opposition blogger revealed in an interview that he was paid RM400 a month for four months in 2012 to subsidize his Internet bills for his active involvement in blogging for the opposition coalition. However, payment came to an abrupt end and the pro-opposition blogger was not certain why the payment stopped or how many other bloggers received the token sum. Information about the range of payment for pro-opposition bloggers remains elusive, but pro-opposition blogger Nathaniel Tan gave an indication of the amount in an article he contributed to Malaysiakini on 15 July 2014. He wrote that he was receiving a monthly income of just over the five-figure mark towards the end of his employment with the Selangor government.54 During his three-year stint from 2010 to 2013 he was mainly involved in communication work and managing the website and social media accounts of former Selangor menteri besar (chief minister) Khalid Ibrahim. The suspicion that some bloggers were paid by particular leaders of the BN or PR to write certain articles could be further supported by narratives that monetary offers were made to tarnish the reputation of certain leaders. A civil society blogger, who wanted to remain anonymous in this research, revealed that politically connected individuals had offered to pay her to publish biased material on her blog. Elaborating on the incident when the offer was made, she said, The deal was to put vicious comments and at one point they wanted me to slander people anonymously. I would say two or three people approached me to do that. These are people with political parties. This was just before the general election [in 2008]. If I had agreed, I would be paid more than RM5,000 [US$1,400] a month. I would have to pay for my own expenses for the running around like pay for my own petrol. I did not take up the offer. The only thing I would agree to do was to set up portals and write based on facts. We could not agree on the terms. Anonymous comments to attack people are still ok but to slander people or insinuate half-truths are too down low.55

Such offers demonstrate that there could be some factual basis to the suspicion that ostensibly “independent” bloggers were paid to further the agenda of their political paymasters. Anecdotes about socio-political bloggers receiving payments were common during by-elections. The late blogger Bernard Khoo56 disclosed

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in an interview for this book that he asked for free transport, board and lodging when he was approached to help the DAP in coverage of the Sibu by-election in 2010.57 On the other side of the political divide, former Unit Media Baru chairman Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, who led the online media campaign for UMNO in 2013, revealed that he compensated bloggers of his unit, especially when it came to operations like by-elections. He elaborated: For example bloggers like Dr Novandri. He is a practising doctor and if we want his service for by-election, we have to compensate his travel, lodging and food. For Novandri, it [he] is a different case because each time he wants to come over for by-election, he has to pay locum. I think he pays the locum more than what he gets from the operations.58

Two things are apparent here. Firstly, money does change hands between bloggers or social media operators and their paymasters, but it is difficult to say for certain who the paymasters are and how much money is spent in the online battle. Secondly, it would seem that the coalition with a “deeper pocket” could well have a “bigger online presence” to sway the voting public.

Tightening the Noose on the Online Platform As bloggers took to the Internet to publish their views that were alternative to the mainstream media, they quickly became a thorn in the side of the government. On 13 July 2007, blogger Nathaniel Tan, who was a political aide of Anwar Ibrahim, was taken into custody under the Official Secrets Act (1972) for a comment left by an anonymous visitor to his blog. The comment was in reference to allegations of corruption involving then internal security deputy minister Johari Baharum (Tan and Zawawi 2008, p. 69). About ten days later, Raja Petra Kamaruddin of the blog Malaysia Today was charged with insulting the king and Islam in a blog posting on 11 July 2007. The Penal Code, Sedition Act 1948 and the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 were used against Raja Petra Kamaruddin (ibid.). Apart from using such penal laws to restrict the civil liberties of bloggers, the government was also perceived to have reneged on its initial promise of guaranteeing online freedom, made during the launch of the Multimedia Super Corridor (Lim 2009). This became apparent when two

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other bloggers, Jeff Ooi of Screenshots and Ahirudin Attan of Rocky’s Bru, were taken to court for defamation by the New Straits Times in 2007. Jeff Ooi, who was then a member of Gerakan, was sued over thirteen articles that appeared on Screenshots, while Ahirudin Attan, a former mainstream media editor, was charged with defamation for forty-eight articles that appeared on Rocky’s Bru.59 These suits were seen as an indirect crackdown by the government on the two bloggers for their online criticism against the administration of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Tan and Zawawi 2008). Although Prime Minister Najib Razak was considered to be “bloggerfriendly” after he took over as premier in 2009, the government was seen taking a hard stance against bloggers and Facebookers during the 2013 election. The restrictive laws mentioned earlier in this chapter and defamation suits were used against bloggers, Facebookers and Twitterers. In May 2013, pro-opposition blogger Yusuf Al-Siddique Suratman, who blogged as Milo Suam, was investigated under the Official Secrets Act and the Penal Code in regard to two blog postings.60 One posting was said to have contained content that was classified as secret, pertaining to security measures during the Sulu militant incursion in Sabah, while the other was alleged to have contributed to public mischief. PKR supreme council member R. Sivarasa claimed that the investigation was politically motivated.61 A week later, police arrested pro-UMNO blogger Papagomo and pro-opposition blogger King Jason under the Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 for postings on social media that were said to have fuelled racial sentiments and propagated lies.62 In a move seen as further instilling fear and tightening the stranglehold on the online media, Facebook user Chow Mun Fai was sentenced to a year in jail for posting an offensive comment on the Aidilfitri celebration on Facebook in June 2014.63 He was charged, under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, with posting an offensive comment that was intended to hurt the feelings of others. The government also went to the extent of revoking the passport of two Facebookers, Alvin Tan and Ali Abd Jalil, for their postings. The move was taken to serve as a warning to those who “insult the courts, the rulers and Islam”.64 By November 2014 the Home Ministry was reportedly working with the Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Commission to install a “firewall” on websites, in particular YouTube. The move was to ensure that Malaysians would be barred from viewing any content that did not adhere to the guidelines of the Film Censorship Board.65

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Defamation suits also became commonplace for the establishment to keep Internet users on a tight leash. On 21 November 2014, DAP member of Parliament Tony Pua received a letter of demand from Najib Razak, instructing him to retract his alleged defamatory statements regarding the One Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) fund or face a lawsuit. The prime minister claimed that the defamatory remarks, uploaded in a YouTube video, implied that Najib had “robbed and misused the people’s money and abused his power”.66 Two weeks later, PKR MP Rafizi Ramli received a letter of demand from Najib and his wife Rosmah Mansor for alleged defamatory remarks regarding the government’s decision to pull back the oil subsidy.67 The alleged defamatory words were said to have been uploaded to YouTube with the title “Rafizi Ramli: Kenapa kita pertahankan subsidi minyak” (Why we defend the oil subsidy). The statements allegedly implied that Najib and Rosmah were involved in corrupt practices in connection to purported profits from the reform of the national subsidy. Defamation proceedings against bloggers have not only been filed by the ruling coalition. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim filed a defamation suit against pro-UMNO blogger Wan Muhammad Azri Wan Deris on 21 March 2013, claiming that the blogger had posted defamatory words and images on his blog Papagomo.68 Anwar, who was also member of Parliament for Permatang Pauh, claimed that the blog postings implicated him in engaging in indecent acts with another man. Wan Muhammad Azri Wan Deris vehemently denied that he was the administrator of the blog Papagomo. 69 However, the High Court judge was satisfied with the evidence produced and decided in favour of the opposition leader. Anwar was awarded RM850,000.70 The legal proceedings can be interpreted as yet another effective weapon to silence online critics. For some of the bloggers, fear of prosecution and being hauled to court for defamation were real, and many preferred to remain anonymous on their blogs. However, an over-abundance of anonymous blogs or Facebook pages can bring into question the credibility of those postings in Malaysian cyberspace.

Summary Given the tight media control by a relatively authoritarian regime that curtails the free flow of information, blogging can potentially overcome these constraints to promote democracy and enrich political life in electoral politics. However, the existing social structures and political culture of the

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country must be taken into account before meaningful conclusions can be made. Firstly, it is imperative to evaluate the extent to which blogging reflects the existing political culture in Malaysia, the dominance of UMNO politics and factional politics within UMNO. Such an evaluation can address the question of power and control over the blogosphere, in particular the possible control of the cyberspace discourse through the phenomenon of paid cyberwriters. A blogosphere that reflects a dominance of UMNO politics implies that the online tool is used to advance the agenda of the dominant political party and the cyberspace discourse can be appropriated by particular political elites. This means that although blogging does facilitate the expression of alternative views ignored by the mainstream media, political elites continue to dominate the blogosphere. Despite the tight control over the mainstream media by the ruling coalition, the media industry in Malaysia can present spaces of contestation in situations when the government’s grip becomes less firm due to factional politics. This raises the question of whether moments of looser control in the mainstream media have the potential for blogging to mediate an election differently. An analysis on the way blogging is used at various points in an election by the different groups of bloggers can give an indication of the extent to which blogging can transform ways of campaigning. The ruling coalition had provided a guarantee of non-censorship of the Internet, to only promote free speech and not curb it. However, existing laws that curtail civil liberties have the same negative effect on the Internet’s democratic potential. The social and political realities can limit the potential of the online platform in promoting liberal democratic practices and in realizing a political goal in an election. These aspects will be addressed in the next few chapters. It is, thus, within these wider institutional and societal structures, including existing social and political culture, that this book attempts to examine the extent to which blogging can enrich and promote liberal democratic practices and political life. This sets the stage for a deeper examination of the role of blogging in a relatively authoritarian state.

Notes  1. Cuitsikit, “UMNO dan Siber: Tutorial kepada Azalina (I)” [“UMNO and cyber: Tutorial for Azalina (I)], MyKMU.net (blog), 2 July 2007 (accessed 27 September 2010). At the time of writing, the post had been deleted by the administrator of the blog.

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  2. Singapore was a part of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965 (Baker 2008, p. 291). Ethnicity was a pertinent aspect in the proposal to include Sabah and Sarawak in the formation of Malaysia because the two states had large populations of indigenous people that would “offset Singapore’s Chinese majority” (ibid., p. 292). Similarly, Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 was seen as a form of racial arithmetic as the exit saw a decrease in the Chinese population (ibid.).  3. Bloomberg Businessweek, 13 July 2014 (accessed 13 July 2014). The online news portal reported that MiTV Networks Sendirian Berhad changed its name to U Mobile Sendirian Berhad in 2007.   4. The year 1946 was significant because it referred to the time when UMNO was formed to oppose the Malayan Union.   5. See Chapters Two and Four for more details.   6. The Election Commission announced that 12,992,661 voters (or 80 per cent) out of a total of 13,268,002 registered voters cast their ballots in the 2013 general election. See FMT News, 5 May 2013 (accessed 20 December 2014)  7. Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index”, 2008 (accessed 16 January 2012).  8. Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index”, 2009 (accessed 16 January 2012).  9. Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index”, 2010 (accessed 16 January 2012). 10. Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index”, 2013 (accessed 20 December 2014). 11. Malaysia Factbook, “Special Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012”, 2014 (accessed 27 May 2014). 12. Malay Mail Online, 11 April 2015 (accessed 11 April 2015). 13. The Star Online, 26 February 2010 (accessed 20 December 2014). 14. The Star Online, 6 May 2008 (accessed 21 December 2011). 15. The Star Online, 13 September 2008 (accessed 21 December 2011).

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16. The percentages were calculated based on the statistics presented in the study (Sankaran 2008, p. 236). 17. Malaysian Insider, 20 May 2009 (accessed 21 May 2009). 18. Ibid. 19. The Edge Malaysia, 23 March 2009 (accessed 30 May 2011). 20. The Star Online, 28 March 2010 (accessed 20 December 2014). 21. The Star Online, 1 April 2014 (accessed 20 December 2014). 22. Malay Mail Online, 21 December 2013 (accessed 20 December 2014). 23. The Star Online, 20 November 2013 (accessed 20 December 2014). 24. The Star Online, 14 December 2011 (accessed 24 December 2014). 25. The Star Online, 22 June 2012 (accessed 24 December 2014). 26. The Star Online, 10 December 2014 ( accessed 24 December 2014). 27. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 28. Ibid. 29. AgendaDaily.com, January 2011 (accessed 22 December 2011). 30. However, The Nut Graph ceased publication after the thirteenth general election. See The Nut Graph, 28 July 2014 (accessed 22 December 2014). 31. A cornucopia of terms has emerged to differentiate the practice of citizen journalism from traditional journalists in news organizations. Some of the common terms used are “new” journalism, participatory journalism, grass-roots journalism, citizen reporting, amateur reporting, native reporting or networked journalism (Blood 2003; Bowman and Willis 2003; Gillmor 2004; Atton 2004; Allan 2006).

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32. Blogs or weblogs are defined as personal postings or political writings and commentaries which are linked to other websites, weblogs or blogs through hyperlinking (Blood 2003; Drezner and Farrell 2004; Allan 2006; Tremayne 2006; Perlmutter 2008). A weblog is an online journal that has links and postings in reverse chronological order, meaning the most recent posts appear at the top of the page (Blood 2003; Bowman and Willis 2003; Gillmor 2004). 33. Haris Ibrahim, “An Observation of the Hindraf Rally”, The People’s Parliament (blog), 27 November 2007 (accessed 6 June 2009). 34. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, author of the blog Rocky’s Bru, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 35. Cuitsikit, “UMNO dan Siber”. 36. Straits Times, 27 July 2007 (accessed 9 July 2014). 37. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger Ruhanie Ahmad, Bangi, Selangor, 2 March 2010. 38. Malaysian Insider, 29 November 2014 (accessed 22 December 2014). 39. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2015. 40. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 41. Ahirudin Attan, “RM350 Million, That’s How Much UMNO Gotta Spend to Defeat the Red Bean Army by PRU14! [14th general election]”, Rocky’s Bru (blog), 25 June 2013 (accessed 11 February 2015). 42. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 43. Kakchah, “Red Bean Army: Senarai Tentera Cyber DAP Didedahkan” [Red Bean Army: Exposing a list of DAP cyber soldiers], MyKMU.net (blog), 30 April 2013 (accessed 1 December 2014). 44. Utusan Online, 2 May 2013 (accessed 23 December 2014). 45. Big Dog, “Lil Min Yuens”, The “Thirteen Million Plus Ringgit” Guy Rambles (blog), 8 May 2013 (accessed 23 December 2014). 46. Dr MiM, “Tindakan ke atas Red Bean Army DAP! – Menteri KDN” [Take action against DAP’s Red Bean Army, says Home Minister], Dr MiM (blog), 28 May 2013 (accessed 23 December 2014).

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47. Tunku, “The Red Bean Army Shall be Deserted by the DAP”, Tunku (blog), 3 June 2013 (accessed 23 December 2014). 48. AIDC, “SYA: Ada Persamaan Modus Operandi Red Bean Army dan Komunisme” [There are similarities in the modus operandi of the Red Bean Army and Communism], AIDC (blog), 18 July 2013 (accessed 23 December 2014). 49. Malaysian Insider, 26 May 2013 (accessed 20 December 2014). 50. New Straits Times Online, 17 March 2014 (accessed 13 May 2014). 51. Interview with politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2014. 52. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 53. There has been a total of seventeen by-elections and the Sarawak state election after the 2008 election. 54. Malaysiakini, 15 July 2014 (accessed 20 November 2014). 55. Interview with civil society blogger J, who asked to remain anonymous for this study, Kuala Lumpur, 6 April 2010. 56. Bernard Khoo passed away about a month after the 2013 general election. For details, see The Star Online, 4 April 2014 (accessed 23 January 2015). 57. Interview with the late Bernard Khoo, Petaling Jaya, 22 February 2013. 58. Interview with Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, Subang Jaya, 21 November 2014. 59. The Star Online, 30 January 2007 (accessed 13 July 2010). 60. The Star Online, 2 May 2013 (accessed 23 January 2014). 61. FMT News, 3 May 2013 (accessed 23 Januray 2014). 62. The Star Online, 8 May 2013 (accessed 9 May 2013). 63. The Sun, 10 September 2014, p. 7. 64. The Star Online, 8 December 2014 (accessed 24 December 2014).

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65. Malay Mail Online, 24 November 2014 (accessed 26 December 2014). 66. FMT News, 21 November 2014 (accessed 24 December 2014). 67. New Straits Times, 5 December 2014, p. 2. 68. The Star, 1 March 2014, p. 22. 69. New Straits Times, 28 January 2014, p. 13. 70. The Star, 1 March 2014, p. 22

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2 Trends in Social Media Use in Malaysian Cyberspace

This chapter discusses the use of blogs and Facebook pages in the 2008 and 2013 general elections based on findings of the content analysis and in-depth interviews with the socio-political bloggers. It highlights the trends in blog use among the relatively distinct groups of socio-political bloggers and discusses some of the key findings within the prevailing political landscape in 2008 and 2013. This helps to contextualize and present a more comprehensive picture of the manners in which the online platform was used at particular moments in an election. The ways in which the online platform was utilized seems to reflect the particular social and political culture of Malaysian society. Firstly, the content analysis confirmed the findings of previous studies about the dominant use of blogs and social media to mobilize readers for political action (Kahn and Kellner 2004; Perlmutter 2008; Pole 2009; Lim 2009) and to express dissenting or diverse views and opinions (Keren 2006; Kulikova and Perlmutter 2007; Lim 2009) that were largely ignored by the mainstream media. These online tools enabled socio-political bloggers to encourage blog readers to take part in protest rallies and to vote in the elections. Electoral candidates who maintained blogs during this period were able to disseminate information about their campaign activities. However, the online platform was limited in generating public discussion of issues and policies that had an impact on society. An examination of the comments of readers showed that blogging did not appear to have generated discussion or

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engaged readers extensively in public discourse. Some research participants expressed fear of retribution because of comments made on their blogs, they thus took extra precautions to filter certain comments. They also indicated that Facebook pages were less conducive for discussing issues of public interest. The Malaysian blogosphere was, expectedly, more sympathetic towards the opposition than the ruling coalition, given the tight control of the mainstream media by the ruling regime. But, more importantly, the results demonstrated that blogging could be used as a tool to sway public opinion1 in the elections. In the 2008 election the contents of blogs were generally critical of the BN government and specifically negative of the then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The considerable use of pseudonymous blogs to frame the former premier in a negative light suggested some attempts at managing the information flow in the Malaysian blogosphere in order to change public perceptions of the government and national leadership. This effort could be interpreted as a way of managing the voting public’s perception, giving a dominant impression of a blogosphere that was hostile towards Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The political landscape was relatively different in the 2013 election and the online contents seemed to reflect the political realities at the time. The pro-UMNO bloggers, in particular, refrained from painting Prime Minister Najib Razak in a negative light. They instead took a critical stance towards the leaders of the opposition coalition. Chief among them were opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng and PAS leaders Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Hadi Awang and Mustafa Ali. On the other hand, pro-opposition bloggers were critical of government policies, planting doubts in the minds of readers over the leadership of Najib and the demeanour of his wife Rosmah Mansor. The online platform contained negative postings which were indicative of the offensive moves by the respective bloggers. It was a clearly partisan cyberspace in the 2013 election, unlike in 2008 when party affiliations and leanings were less obvious. Finally, the analysis revealed a blogosphere dominated by former political and media elites in society. It demonstrated the possibility that the blogosphere agenda could be appropriated by existing media and political elites in the country during an election. Updated interviews conducted in 2014 with popular socio-political bloggers also indicated the possibility that political elites could hijack the social media by employing bloggers to promote their respective causes.2 An increasing abundance of

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new pseudonymous blogs and Facebook pages also pointed to the notion that political elites could “hijack the social media agenda” because linking the anonymous bloggers to their paymasters in order to unpack the real agenda of paid bloggers proved to be an uphill task. On the other hand, this move to anonymity could reflect the bloggers’ fear of retribution for their blog content. The practice, however, raises doubts about the credibility of some of the content being disseminated online.

Mobilizing for Political Action When the mass protest rallies of Bersih and Hindraf were held just months before the 2008 election, the mainstream media were cautious in their reporting on the two mammoth events. Coverage in the mainstream media was predominantly confined to reports that framed the organizers and the events negatively. The issue of the illegality of the two protests was highlighted to discourage people from participating in the gatherings, which were held in November 2007.3 Organizers of the Hindraf gathering were threatened with arrest under the then Internal Security Act4 or being removed from their jobs in the civil service.5 Media reports also focused on how the public were being inconvenienced by the massive traffic slowdown in the capital Kuala Lumpur because of the Bersih event.6 Organizers of the Hindraf rally were even accused of having links with militant and terrorist groups in Sri Lanka and India.7 It was clear that the tightly controlled mainstream media were attempting to project the organizers and the events in a negative tone. To counter the adverse publicity of the traditional media, many socio-political bloggers took on the role of journalists to post alternative views on their blogs. Many bloggers urged people to show their support by attending the street rallies. The Bersih protest received wide coverage in the Malaysian blogosphere, with many blogs challenging the accounts of the mainstream media by uploading photographs clearly depicting the huge crowds. Politician-blogger Ginie Lim (who contested unsuccessfully in Malacca in the 2008 and 2013 elections) posted information about where protestors could converge for the Bersih rally on her Bloginie blog.8 She informed participants of items they should bring for the gathering in anticipation of action by the authorities. Lawyer and social activist Haris Ibrahim, who blogs on The People’s Parliament, provided information about when and where the protest was to occur.9 His blog posts also intimated the aims of the protest. A day before the event, civil society blogger Susan

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Loone, who is now a journalist with the online news portal Malaysiakini, provided some advice on what to do should protestors be targeted with tear gas or water cannon by the police.10 On the day of the Bersih protest, the bloggers posted photographs of what was happening on the ground, practically doing the job of mainstream journalists. Haris Ibrahim published photographs and provided updates to document his experience at the rally.11 After the gathering, civil society blogger Anil Netto who attended the event compared the situation on the ground with what was reported by the mainstream media. He wrote that a crowd of 50,000 took part in the rally, compared with an estimate of 4,000 people reported in English daily The Star.12 The blogger challenged mainstream media coverage by highlighting the difference in the accounts of the same event. The content of his blog served to demonstrate the bias of the mainstream media towards the ruling regime. A similar trend could be witnessed for the extensive blogosphere coverage of the Hindraf protest. Two civil society bloggers who were tertiary students at the time, Mahendran and Raaja (who only wanted to be known by their first names), devoted their blogs13 to the Hindraf protest in Kuala Lumpur. Mahendran revealed in an interview for this book that his blog only became high-profile when widely read online news portal Malaysiakini carried a banner headline saying that live updates would be available on Mahendran’s blog.14 Following the 2008 election neither Mahendran nor Raaja are active bloggers, but during the Hindraf protests they encouraged and mobilized support for the rally. Like Susan Loone, they published advice on their blogs for protestors who might face arrest or encounter tear gas. Mahendran, who was unable to participate during the protest as he was preparing for his university examinations, relied on the government’s closed-circuit television cameras installed along the streets of Kuala Lumpur as well as updates from his friends and brother who attended the rally to provide live updates. Raaja, on the other hand, was at the gathering and updated his blog from his own perspective. The late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo, who also took part in the gathering, posted photographs and questioned the event’s coverage in the mainstream media.15 The findings from the content analysis of the sampled blogs indicates a significant use of blogs to generate political action, particularly in encouraging readers to attend the protest rallies of Hindraf and Bersih held in November 2007 and to cast their votes in the 2008 general election. Out of the 376 blog posts analysed, 68 posts (or 18 per cent) encouraged readers to take part in political action. The use of blogs to mobilize political action was

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significant across the board for all three categories of socio-political bloggers. However, the group of politician-bloggers recorded the highest use of blog posts seeking to mobilize political action. About 31 per cent of blog entries (13 posts) made by the politician-bloggers were calls to participate in protest marches and vote in the election (Table 2.1). The politician-bloggers were more inclined to mobilize political action among their readers compared with the other groups of bloggers. The same picture emerged when the subset of calls to readers to vote in the 2008 general election was analysed. A considerable 10 per cent of the total sample analysed were blog posts that specifically urged readers to vote. The use of blogs to ask readers to vote in the election was also highest among the politician-bloggers (Table 2.2). This showed that the politician-bloggers were more inclined to mobilize political action among their readers. An example was the blog of Klang member of Parliament (MP) Charles Santiago, who kept and maintained his blog in the 2008 and 2013 elections. During the 2008 election the DAP MP posted a sixty-second YouTube video urging the public to take part in the elections.16 The video clip focused on questions of victimization and marginalization of particular groups in Malaysian society and issues of corruption and abuse of power.

Table 2.1 Number of Blog Posts Asking Readers to Take Part in Political Action, by Blog Type Posts calling for political action (%)

Posts not calling for political action (%)

Total (%)

Candidates Non-candidates Total

13 (31.0) 55 (16.0) 68 (18.0)

  29 (69.0) 279 (84.0) 308 (82.0)

  42 (100.0) 334 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

A-list B-list Total

14 (20.0) 54 (18.0) 68 (18.0)

59 (80.0) 249 (82.0) 308 (82.0)

  73 (100.0) 303 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

Identified Pseudonymous Total

45 (21.0) 23 (14.0) 68 (18.0)

164 (79.0) 144 (86.0) 308 (82.0)

209 (100.0) 167 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

Blog type

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Table 2.2 Number of Blog Posts Asking Readers to Vote in the 2008 Election, by Blog Type

Posts asking readers to vote in the elections (%)

Posts not asking readers to vote in the elections (%)

Total (%)

Candidates Non-candidates Total

  6 (14.0) 33 (10.0) 39 (10.0)

  36 (86.0) 301 (90.0) 337 (90.0)

  42 (100.0) 334 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

A-list B-list Total

  7 (10.0) 32 (10.0) 39 (10.0)

  66 (90.0) 271 (90.0) 337 (90.0)

  73 (100.0) 303 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

Identified Pseudonymous Total

25 (12.0) 14 (8.0) 39 (10.0)

184 (88.0) 153 (92.0) 337 (90.0)

209 (100.0) 167 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

Blog type

It ended with the tagline, “Vote for a new Malaysia.” Santiago, who also created a Facebook page and Twitter account to connect with the voting public, continued to update his blog during the 2013 election. When Facebook became more popular than blogs among netizens after the 2008 election, this platform was similarly used to mobilize for political action. Social activists and politician-bloggers used their Facebook pages to garner public support and participation for the Bersih protests held on 16 July 2011 and 28 April 2012. For example, PKR politician-blogger Tian Chua, who kept and maintained a blog in 2008 but stopped blogging after the election, encouraged the public to gather for the mass protest in 2011 and 2012 through his Facebook page, which he created in 2010.17 Among the other politician-bloggers who urged the public to participate in the protest movements was Rafizi Ramli. A Facebook page was also created to generate support for the Bersih protests; named Generasi Bersih 709 (Bersih Generation 709), it carried the tagline, “People are the boss. Stop us, lose our votes.”18 The slogan hinted at a withdrawal of support at the polls for the ruling regime should the people be blocked from holding public protests. The Facebook page also carried a play on words in the Malay Language mocking Prime Minister Najib Razak that read, “Kuning!

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Kuning! Najib Pening!” (Yellow! Yellow! Headache for Najib!). Twitter was another online platform used to promote the rally.19 And some socio-political bloggers continued to use their blogs as a platform to mobilize political action for the 2013 election. The late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo posted a simple but compelling message to the Bersih 2.0 team that read, “Bravery: Grace in the face of adversity”, to encourage public participation in mass protest in July 2011.20 During the 2013 election, Klang MP Charles Santiago used his Facebook page to remind the voting public of their right to participate in the election. A day before polling he asked voters to be patient when he heard that queues at the polling stations would be long. He posted a reminder that read, “Please stay in line. Do not desert your right to vote.”21 Other politician-bloggers who continued to maintain blogs during the 2013 election disseminated words of encouragement and urged readers to take their vote seriously. For example, politician-blogger Lau Weng San posted an article on polling day to inspire readers to vote for change. His article ended with the slogan, “Change Now, Clean-up Malaysia.”22 Politicianblogger Jeff Ooi, who stopped blogging after the 2008 election, posted photographs of voters at the polling stations to remind readers of the need to cast their ballots during the 2013 election in order to make a change in the political landscape.23

Keeping Readers Informed of Campaign Activities and Electoral Candidates Given the tight control of the mainstream media by the ruling coalition and the government’s non-censorship policy of the Internet, blogging became an important campaign tool for electoral candidates to promote their activities during Malaysia’s elections. During the 2008 election it was commonplace to read blog postings that informed readers of details of the political talks (ceramah) of opposition parties. This was because opposition politicians were more prominent online compared to their BN counterparts. For example, new electoral candidate Charles Santiago of the DAP posted his daily ceramah schedule and campaign activities, from 8 a.m. to 11 p.m., on his blog.24 Other new candidates who made use of their blogs in similar ways were PKR candidates Elizabeth Wong, Zulkifli Noordin (an independent candidate who contested and won under the PKR banner at Bandar Baru Kulim in 2008) and DAP candidate Tony Pua. Elizabeth Wong (who stopped blogging after the 2008 election) included a nine-minute YouTube

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video of electoral candidates speaking at a ceramah in order to reach out to the voting public in other parts of the country.25 Zulkifli Noordin (who contested unsuccessfully as a BN candidate in Shah Alam in 2013) also used his blog to promote his campaign activities during the 2008 election.26 While pointing to information about his ceramah in his Petaling Jaya Utara constituency, Tony Pua posted the link for a photograph depicting the massive crowd at a public rally by DAP politicians in Penang on 6 March 2008.27 The photograph, carrying the caption “My ceramah is bigger than your ceramah”, appealed to the public to turn the massive crowd into support at the ballot boxes28 as well as giving a sense of solidarity to the voting public. As noted by civil society blogger Anil Netto in an interview for this book, the people felt empowered by the blog coverage of the huge turnouts at opposition ceramah and public protests because “the people know they are not alone in feeling the same way”.29 Expressing a similar sentiment that the online contents could provide a sense of community, partisan blogger Nathaniel Tan of the PKR, who was a website operator for Anwar Ibrahim in 2007 and later for former Selangor menteri besar (chief minister) Khalid Ibrahim, said, People are very happy when they read something that expresses their feelings. They feel, “oh, I am not alone.” This was during the early days and it was exciting for them. So they get excited and have a new hope, a sense of community, emboldening and empowering.30

Facebook pages which came to be the predominant online tool for reaching out to the voting public in the 2013 election were used in tandem with the blogs of some of the politician-bloggers to spread messages about their campaign activities. Second-time Petaling Jaya Utara MP Tony Pua, who only had one posting on his blog in April 2013, provided details regarding DAP’s ceramah schedules in the election and a list of DAP candidates in the Petaling Jaya constituency.31 His blog posting also provided photographs of the list of the DAP candidates in the Petaling Jaya constituency. An analysis of his Facebook page showed that Tony Pua was more active there than on his blog. There were 22 postings on his Facebook pages between April and the polling day on 5 May. Out of the 22 postings, 11 (or half ) were on his campaign activities.32 His Facebook postings also encouraged his over 195,000 followers to vote for the opposition. For example, on 2 May 2013 he posted, “Jom Ubah! Ini Kali-lah!” (Let’s make a change! This is the time!). A day later he was more explicit and cheeky by mocking

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his political rivals when he posted, “Jom Undi! Jangan Biarkan Hantu Menentukan Masa Depan Kita!” (Let’s vote! Do not let the phantom voters decide our future!). Prime Minister Najib Razak, who declared 2013 as a social media election, had created various online platforms to reach the voting public. In addition to having access to the mainstream media he had set up a personal website through which he propagated messages pertaining to his One Malaysia policy. The site is hyperlinked to his blog, Najib Razak, set up after the 2008 election. He has a Twitter account and a Facebook page created in September 2008. His Facebook page hit a record high of more than 2.7 million followers.33 The prime minister also launched his Chinese Facebook page called “Ah Jib Gor” (meaning Big Brother Najib) to keep voters informed of his campaign activities.34 He also launched an Instagram account on 28 February 2013. During the fifteen-day campaigning period of the 2013 election, Najib blogged about his campaign activities that saw him criss-crossing the length and breadth of the nation to deliver the BN manifesto, election promises and to explain the One Malaysia policy. His campaign trail was updated on his blog on a daily basis from 21 to 30 April 2013, beginning from Pahang to Sabah, Selangor, Johor and Penang.35 Short write-ups of what he did, the places he visited and the people he met were published on his blog. Photographs of Najib and large crowds greeting him consistently accompanied the write-ups. He also urged his readers to follow him on the campaign trail as he made his way across the nation to meet the people. He wrote, “I’m campaigning for a strong mandate to continue our transformation towards a Better Nation — with your support we can make it happen.”36 It is obvious that the way the writeups were packaged on his blog had striking similarities with the coverage of the prime minister’s campaign programme in the mainstream media, providing reports of the events and including photographs of Najib and the greeting crowds. Although the use of Facebook to connect with the reading public was fast gaining popularity among netizens during the 2013 election, the social media team of Najib seems to have been more active in publishing postings on his blog. The minimal use of Facebook by Najib to inform his followers about the BN’s campaign activities was unexpected, given the reach and popularity of the online platform with the younger generation of Malaysians at that time. According to Politweet, a social media research firm, the number of Facebook users in Malaysia stood at 13.5 million

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out of a population of about 28 million by December 2012.37 During the campaigning period a total of thirteen postings were found on the prime minister’s Facebook page; only four of these dealt with his campaign activities. These four Facebook postings included one about Najib’s election campaign in Kedah, accompanied by a photograph of a big turnout greeting him. Another one was a post to urge his followers to cast their votes on polling day, using the tagline, “Jom Bertindak: 5 May 2013! (Let’s act: 5 May 2013!).”38 The other two posts contained posters asking his followers to vote for the BN. On the other hand, many opposition politicians and civil society bloggers were increasingly shifting their online postings from blogs to Facebook and Twitter. For example, PKR candidate Rafizi Ramli was actively using his Facebook page to inform readers about his campaign activities. His Facebook page, created in 2010, contained a video of a speech of Anwar Ibrahim attended by a massive crowd at a political rally to demonstrate to his over 320,000 followers that they were not alone in supporting the opposition.39 The YouTube video featured Anwar as a fearless public orator who captivated the attention of the massive crowd with his fiery and humorous speech in Pandan, where Rafizi Ramli was contesting in 2013. The YouTube video also showed the rapt attention of the crowd and their warm and positive response towards the PKR leader. The twenty-two-minute long video also captured the crowd responding to shouts of “Ini Kali-Lah!” and “Ubah!” In the video Anwar also introduced to the crowd the electoral candidates contesting in the Pandan constituency. At the end of his speech he led the crowd to chant “Ini Kali-Lah! Ubah! Reformasi! Lawan Tetap Lawan! (This is it! Change! Reformation! Fight We Will!)”. An analysis of Rafizi Ramli’s Facebook page also showed that a total of 29 postings were published during the campaigning period, of which 18 posts (62 per cent) included details of his campaign activities and the leaders who were going to speak at the ceramah. The overall findings suggest that the online platforms of blogging and Facebook were widely used to promote the electoral campaigns and candidates, particularly among opposition politician-bloggers because of the minimal coverage given to them by the mainstream media. The results support the argument of media scholars (Abdul Rashid 2009; Mohd Azizuddin and Zengeni 2010) that blogging in the Malaysian context is an online platform for opposition politicians to overcome constraints of coverage in the mainstream media.

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Free Expression of Ideas An aspect of blogs widely hailed as liberating is the potential for free expression. An analysis of blog posts published during the 2008 election supports the argument that the online platform can be an avenue for bloggers to express their views. The majority of blog posts analysed were used to express the opinions of bloggers based on information obtained from external sources, a trend common in blogging practice worldwide. This accounted for 172 blog posts (or 46 per cent) out of the total sample analysed (Table 2.3). Expressing views based on the bloggers’ own experience or knowledge was the second most frequent use of blogs, as detected in 119 blog posts (or 32 per cent; Table 2.3). Passing on information to readers was the least common use of blogs, accounting for 20 per cent (or 76) of blog posts (Table 2.3). Moreover, many civil society bloggers indicated that blogging did enable them to exercise their democratic right to free speech and to challenge coverage of the tightly controlled mainstream media. Interviews with this group of bloggers provided examples of discussions on demands for a free and fair election, demands for a better living standard for the Indian community or for fairer and more equitable policies. Such issues were largely ignored by the traditional media but they saw wide coverage on the blogosphere. The bloggers even indicated that they adopted the role of journalists and editors by reporting and publishing on issues and events ignored by the traditional media. The collective challenge to mainstream media coverage by a network of bloggers could turn the blogosphere into an alternative media form. Blogging might not be able to change how the traditional media operate, but it could be an avenue for alternative views to thrive in a relatively authoritarian society. Table 2.3 Use of Blogs to Express Opinion and Provide Information

Blog use

Candidates (%)

Non-candidates (%)

Total

Giving views/information Giving views Giving information Others Total

16 (  38.0) 10 (  24.0) 11 (  26.0)  5 ( 12.0) 42 (100.0)

156 (  47.0) 109 (  33.0)  65 ( 19.0)   4 (  1.0) 334 (100.0)

172 (  46.0) 119 (  32.0)  76 ( 20.0)   9 (  8.0) 376 (100.0)

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The ability of blogs to facilitate the free expression of ideas in an election was apparent from interviews with some of the civil society bloggers who took part in this research. Practising surgeon Dr Chris Anthony, who has kept and maintained My Malaysia Today blog since 2006, used the online platform to publish his views regarding the need for fairer and less discriminatory policies in the country. During the 2008 election, the medical doctor, who is also well-regarded among his circle of friends and churchgoers, expressed his views about the need to end racial and religious bias in the country,40 the need to restore an independent judiciary41 and to check the power of the BN by denying the ruling regime its two-thirds majority.42 Although Dr Chris Anthony created a Facebook page that carried photographs of mammoth crowds at ceramah of the opposition parties, he continued to spread the message for political change on his blog. In a blog posting published on 11 April 2013, the civil society blogger wrote about the apparent corruption, abuse of power and racist abuses that plagued the country after fifty-five years of rule by the BN. Encouraging the readers to use the ballot boxes for political change in the 2013 election, he wrote, We must be firm in our conviction that political change is not an option but a must and to achieve that we must rise up boldly without fear to say enough is enough peacefully in the secrecy of the ballot box. Our vote today determines the future of our children in our beloved country so let us not neglect our sacred duty to the country and people.43

The capability of blogs to facilitate the free expression of ideas and opinions was one reason the country’s fourth prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad became an avid blogger. In an interview about his blogging activities that began in May 2008 after the country’s twelfth general election in 2008, Mahathir talked about the ability of the online platform to facilitate his opinions. Recalling the constraints he was facing in obtaining publicity for his views in the mainstream media at that time, the former prime minister began his blog, Dr Mahathir Mohamad: Blogging to Unblock, to express his opinions and to communicate with the people.44 Although Mahathir had also started a Facebook page, he did not spend too much time on it. Instead he preferred to write his ideas on his blog. For the seasoned politician, Facebook and Twitter were used to accommodate “rapid responses” from readers. Apart from the ability to express free speech, some of the bloggers turned to Facebook and Twitter in the 2013 election with the aim of casting

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a wider sphere of influence over a larger audience. DAP politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, who became an active Facebooker during the 2013 election, pointed out, The tags [afforded by Facebook], I tag you and you tag me. I think that is very subversive, in the sense that whoever has the following, you will cast a wider sphere of influence.... The viral impact of blogs gets transferred onto the FB [Facebook] world gets magnified several more times.... It is more organized and more focused. It also allows pictorial contents and I always put pictures around my tags as I find it effective.45

Pro-PAS partisan blogger D, who wanted to remain anonymous for this research, concurred with Jeff Ooi about the ability of Facebook in reaching a wider audience. In a follow-up interview with partisan blogger D, he acknowledged that he had created several Facebook pages with the aim of reaching out to youths during the 2013 election. He observed that, Many youths today have a Facebook account and the party is using Facebook pages to connect to the youths in order to counter arguments of the ruling regime. Information-sharing on Facebook pages can make the social media an influential media. The information shared can have a rippling effect where others [following the Facebook page] will also be able to read those alternative views.46

Facilitating the free expression of ideas essentially saw socio-political bloggers challenging the coverage of the mainstream media. Civil society blogger Susan Loone, at one point dedicated her blog to questioning the possible involvement of the then deputy prime minister Najib Razak in the murder of Altantuya Shaariibuu. Susan Loone, who was based in Bangkok at that time, wrote freely about the death of Altantuya Shaariibuu, posing various questions about the murder case. In an interview for this research, she explained, There are so many questions not answered. Maybe he [Najib Razak] is not the murderer, [but] everyone involved in the case is linked to him. Why is everyone linked to him in some way or another? My final quest is to look for the photo [which allegedly captured Najib Razak with his aide Abdul Razak Baginda and Altantuya Shaariibuu].47

Abdul Razak Baginda was charged but acquitted for abetting the murder of Altantuya Shaariibuu in October 2008.48 Two policemen were convicted

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of killing the Mongolian national in January 2015 after a long court process of appeals and counter-appeals.49 An analysis of Susan Loone’s blog showed she had written 235 blog postings related to Altantuya Shaariibuu since 20 November 2006. However, she stopped blogging in 2012 and became more active on Facebook. Some of the postings cried out for justice for the victim’s family, while others challenged news coverage by the mainstream media. The findings thus far suggest a considerable use of the Internet as an alternative platform for opposition politicians, civil society bloggers and other groups marginalized by the mainstream media to encourage political participation. The Internet was used to generate political action and to spread information on campaign activities and electoral candidates. The medium also served the overall function of enabling the expression of free ideas that could challenge coverage of the traditional mainstream media. The cyberspace coverage on the blogs and Facebook pages, including alternative online news sites like Malaysiakini, could be seen as a collective challenge to the mainstream media and an emerging form of alternative communication in a relatively authoritarian society.

Not Appealing for Public Discussion While the Internet was able to facilitate political mobilization, the promotion of campaign activities and the free expression of ideas, this research found that the online platform was limited in generating public discussion. An analysis of the comments to blog posts published in the 2008 election suggested that blogs were not widely used for public discussion. They were rarely used to express opinions crossing political divisions and the feedback did not encourage extended public debate. Out of the total 383 comments analysed, almost half of the feedback (178 comments, or 46 per cent) did not discuss the blog posts (Figure 2.1). Of the 205 comments that discussed the blog postings, most of the feedback (82 comments, or 40 per cent) did not indicate agreement or disagreement with the blog posts, while 80 comments (39 per cent) agreed with the posts and only 43 comments (21 per cent) disagreed (Figure 2.2). Interviews with the research participants also indicated that the online platform did not appeal to them as a tool to generate public discussions. Several politician-bloggers pointed out that their blogs were not set up to facilitate public discussions or debates, while several civil society bloggers found that the comments they received on their blogs did not help to

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Figure 2.1 Patterns of Readers’ Feedback to Blog Contents

Discuss blog posts

205

Do not discuss blog posts

178

Disagree with blog posts

50

Agree with blog posts

148

No indication of agree/disagree

185

Readers’ reply to a comment

61

Not readers’ reply to a comment

322

Bloggers’ reply to a comment

6

Not bloggers’ reply to a comment

377 0

50

100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Note: The total number of comments examined was 383.

Number of comments

Figure 2.2 Comments that Indicated Agreement or Disagreement with the Blog Posts

100

82

80 43

50 0 No indication of agree/ disagree

Agree with posts

Disagree with posts

Note: The total number of comments that discussed the blog contents was 205.

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advance public discourse and, instead, felt “harassed” by some of the comments. In an interview for this book, politician-blogger Teng Chang Khim of the DAP stated clearly that his Straightforward blog was set up “more for (personal and party) image building and reputation nationwide” and not to accommodate public discussion.50 Echoing similar sentiments was Tian Chua, a politician-blogger of PKR, who pointed out that he did not design his blog to be a public forum for debates. His aim in setting up his e contrario blog, which was no longer maintained after the 2008 election, was to have a personal website where he could tell his readers about the journey he was going through, the activities he was engaging in and his thoughts on various issues.51 Politician-blogger Idham Lim of PAS, who won the 2008 election but lost in 2013, revealed that he did not condone discussions about party leaders or party decisions on his blog.52 He went a step further by suggesting that a code of conduct be drawn up for PAS bloggers to provide guidelines to party members on how they should behave in cyberspace. From information gathered through interviews for this book, the experience of some civil society bloggers who sought to use blogs to generate public discussion sounded harrowing. Civil society bloggers G, H and J53 were of the view that the capacity of blogging to encourage public discussions could lead to personal attacks by rival bloggers. Acknowledging that he subscribed to the “undemocratic” practice of barring readers from giving feedback on his blog, civil society blogger G pointed out that some of the comments he received were derogatory feedback which would have been deleted even if he had allowed his readers to comment on his blog.54 Unlike civil society blogger G, blogger H used to allow his readers to post their comments on his blog, but he became more careful after the 2008 general election. Civil society blogger H elaborated: Now I am rejecting a lot of UMNO comments. They are from the cybertroopers. Even if you say I am undemocratic, who cares. Last time I did allow them but not now, particularly if they were UMNO propaganda. They use filthy words and make derogatory remarks. I moderate them as I am concerned that what had happened to Raja Petra Kamarudin would happen to me. He was arrested for the comments of his readers. So I am fearful too.55

Similar troubling experiences were noted by civil society blogger J, who recalled being criticized for some of her blog contents. Instead of UMNO, blogger J revealed that negative responses were coming from the PKR. In

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an interview for this research, civil society blogger J recalled, Sometimes when I write about Anwar [Ibrahim], the PKR people will come and attack me. The worst attack was when I wrote about Elizabeth Wong.56 I had a hundred over comments whacking me. The cyberattack was so great that I had to keep deleting them. I deleted some of them but they used another username. I had to block them. I was overwhelmed by the reaction.57

The content analysis also revealed a lack of interactivity among readers and between blog authors and their readers, indicating that they were rarely used for extended public debate. Although a considerable number of comments (61 responses out of 383, or 16 per cent) were replies to earlier comments by other readers, a closer examination showed that half of them did not discuss the blog posts (Figure 2.3). This suggests a lack of focused discussion among the blog readers. As for interaction between blog authors and their readers, there were even fewer engagements in such an activity. Only 6 comments (or about 2 per cent) out of the total sample were responses of blog authors to their readers. This indicated that the improved interactivity and openness of blogging was limited in contributing to public discussion in the Malaysian blogosphere. This is unlike the optimism touted by many scholars that the new platform can be a more interactive medium (Perlmutter 2008; Pole 2009; Koop and Jansen 2009). Facebook, which became more popular in 2013, was also limited in encouraging public debates. Active Facebooker Rafizi Ramli felt the Facebook Figure 2.3 Numbers of Responses to Other Comments That Discussed the Blog Post

32

Do not discuss blog posts Discuss blog posts

29

27.5 28 28.5 29 29.5 30 30.5 31 31.5 32 32.5 Number of comments

Note: The total number of comments that responded to another commenter was 61.

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pages were limited in their capacity to allow debate and conceptualization of certain ideas. Based on his experience of using Facebook in the 2013 campaign, Rafizi Ramli believed that Facebook would only be effective if a particular issue that was posted already had a resonance with the public. Citing the example of higher fuel prices, an issue raised during the 2013 election, he explained that people were already angry about the issue. When he updated his Facebook status with postings about the issue, the number of likes shot up immediately. The limitations of Facebook in facilitating expanded public discussions of an issue were in part due to the technology itself. Rafizi Ramli explained, To convince them [people] of an idea is very difficult. You still need to go through the long process of writing articles, books, engaging in a lot of debates. Facebook can popularise it. Facebook can bring awareness but it is too short and too simplistic to carry an idea.... It is too short and too momentary. People don’t want heavy stuff. They go to FB to amplify their sentiments, not to conceptualize an idea on facebook.58

Dr Mahathir Mohamad was also unconvinced of the ability of the online platform to generate public discussion. Recounting his cyberspace writing experience, Mahathir was of the view that discussion was limited because he was unable to reply to all the comments he received. He acknowledged that some of the comments were not favourable towards his articles but he was unable to attend to all of them. He is of the opinion that meeting face-to-face was more conducive for discussion and should not be mediated through the online platform.59 The findings thus demonstrate that public debate was not extensively generated through the online platform.

A Blogosphere Critical of the Ruling Party and Former Premier The Malaysian blogosphere appeared highly critical of the ruling party and former premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during the 2008 election. The findings showed the top target of blog posts that contained a critical tone were the ruling party followed by government departments and policies (Figure 2.4). The analysis also found a considerable number of blog posts that contained a critical tone directed specifically at premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Table 2.4). This lent support to the argument that the framing of the former premier in a negative light could be regarded as a

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Figure 2.4 Targets of Blog Posts Containing a Critical Tone

150

151

125 100 75

Govt dept/policies

Ruling & opposition party

Opposition party

0

5

17

9

9 Others

25

Other communities

26

Mainstream media

49

50

Ruling party

Number of blog posts

175

Note: The total number of targets detected in 206 blog posts containing a critical tone was 266. Up to four choices had been coded for this variable.

Table 2.4 Blogs Containing a Critical Tone Towards Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, by Blog Type

Blog type

Critical of Badawi (%)

Not critical of Badawi (%)

Candidates Non-candidates Total

  8 (19.0) 62 (19.0) 70 (19.0)

  34 (81.0) 272 (91.0) 306 (81.0)

  42 (100.0) 334 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

A-list B-list Total

15 (20.0) 55 (18.0) 70 (19.0)

  58 (80.0) 248 (82.0) 306 (81.0)

  73 (100.0) 303 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

Identified Pseudonymous Total

31 (15.0) 39 (23.0) 70 (19.0)

178 (85.0) 128 (77.0) 306 (81.0)

209 (100.0) 167 (100.0) 376 (100.0)

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Total (%)

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particular attempt by a group of bloggers to try to sway public opinion in an election. The findings, on closer examination, revealed that a critical tone directed at Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was most common among the pseudonymous bloggers (Table 2.4). Blog posts published by the pseudonymous bloggers accounted for a considerable 23 per cent of the postings that were critical of the then prime minister. The second highest group of bloggers critical of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was the group of A-list bloggers. This indicated that the popularly read bloggers were attempting to frame the former prime minister in a negative light with the possible intention of dominating the blogosphere agenda. They could have been using their credibility to try to shape public opinion during the 2008 election. The use of pseudonymous blogs may be common among bloggers who have reasons to hide their identity as it can reflect a concern over restrictive legislation on free expression. At the same time it can indicate the possibility of how the real agenda of bloggers can be hidden from public view. Pseudonymous blogs are familiar occurrences in the Malaysian blogosphere, as seen from the content analysis. About 40 per cent (71 blogs) of the total 179 blogs were published by pseudonymous bloggers during the 2008 election. An analysis of new blogs created for the 2013 election showed the percentage of pseudonymous blogs had increased to 90 per cent. Out of 342 blogs examined, 310 of them (91 per cent) were anonymous. Only 9 per cent (32) of the socio-political blogs revealed the author’s identity. The content analysis was unable to provide a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon. But interviews detailed in the subsequent chapters reveal how some of the partisan bloggers were setting up more than one blog, including pseudonymous ones, to try to shape public opinion. In the lead-up to the 2008 election, the negative frames were usually posted at around the same time, creating the impression of numerous voices expressing their messages in unison with the aim of directing public attention towards the unflattering frames of the national leadership. According to pro-UMNO blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, negative information that bloggers received about Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was posted on their blogs. Recalling some of their initial efforts, Syed Azidi Syed Aziz explained, “That was how one of the first attacks on Pak Lah was the yacht. Then a series of attacks against Pak Lah commenced, on his holidays in Brisbane, on his house in Perth and his marriage.”60 Information about the luxury yacht and rumours surrounding the

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marriage of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to Jeanne Danker in March 2007 were highlighted on the blogs to create suspicion about the integrity of the then premier, questioning his credibility to lead the country. Other negative frames on Abdullah to flood the blogosphere were photographs and posters to create the perception that the national leader was dishonest and “sleeping on the job”. This earned Abdullah the infamous moniker of “Sleeping Beauty”.61 The negative framing of Abdullah as a “flip flop” prime minister unable to take decisive action without being influenced by his infamous “fourth floor boys” also began circulating from as early as February 2007.62 It was then commonplace to find terms such as “sleeping beauty” and “Prime Minister flip flop” to characterize him in the blogosphere. This gave the impression that they were widely held views, not simply those of individual bloggers.

A Partisan Social Media in the 2013 Election The blogosphere in 2008 was predominantly skewed against Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the ruling coalition, but the cyberspace battle in 2013 seemed evenly matched in terms of the existence of logos and slogans that hit out at both sides of the political divide. The battle lines between the opposition and the ruling coalition were clearly marked out in the 2013 election. Unlike the blogosphere of 2008, the socio-political blogs in 2013 were clearly showing their partisan streak. Determining the political leanings of socio-political blogs set up to do battle for the 2013 election was a relatively easier task than in 2008 because of the appearance of logos and slogans which clearly demonstrated the political leanings of the bloggers. Carrying a list of blogrolls that were either pro-opposition or pro-ruling coalition also provided readers with a perception of the political leanings of bloggers who kept and maintained a blog in 2013. During the 2013 election it appeared that the ruling coalition was more active in keeping and maintaining blogs compared with the opposition. A content analysis of newly created blogs aimed at battling in cyberspace in 2013 revealed that there were more pro-UMNO/BN blogs than proopposition ones. Out of a total of 342 blogs analysed, 234 blogs (68 per cent) were pro-ruling coalition compared with 106 (31 per cent) that were pro-opposition. Only two blogs (1 per cent) were deemed neutral. Efforts by bloggers to classify pro-opposition and pro-UMNO/BN blogs could be detected in the blogs created for the 2013 electoral contest. Of the 234 pro-UMNO/BN blogs, 156 (67 per cent) provided readers with a list of blogs that were supportive of the ruling coalition. The percentage

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of pro-opposition blogs that displayed a list of blogs that leaned towards the PR was also comparable with that of the UMNO/BN blogs. A total of 67 pro-opposition blogs (63 per cent) listed the blogs that were inclined towards the opposition. The partisanship of the blogosphere was clearly made known to the reading public. An analysis of the logos and slogans created on the blogs showed an intense blogosphere battle which also clearly demarcated the political leanings of the respective bloggers. A total of 57 pro-UMNO/BN blogs (24 per cent) contained the One Malaysia logo to demonstrate their support for the ruling coalition. Only 16 pro-opposition blogs (15 per cent) contained the “Barisan Rakyat” (contrary to Barisan Nasional) and “Anything But UMNO” logo to sway readers away from the BN. Among other logos that portrayed the allegiance of pro-opposition blogs were “Blogger Pejuang Rakyat” (Bloggers who are defenders of the people), “Vote Pakatan Rakyat” or “Vote PR”, “Boycott MSM” (mainstream media) and “Vote for PAS”. “Ubah” (Change) and “Ini Kali Lah” (This is it) became the rallying calls to be found on the blogs and Facebook pages. Some of the hard-hitting and catchy slogans found on the pro-opposition blogs were “UMNO Pengkhianat Bangsa, Perompak Wang Rakyat” (UMNO a traitor of the race, a robber of people’s money) and the “ABCD campaign”, which stood for “Asalkan Bukan Calun Dacing” (Anything but BN candidates). Not wishing to take such taunts lightly, the pro-establishment blogs came out with several catchphrases and symbols to attempt to counter them. In retaliation to the opposition’s “Ubah” call, pro-UMNO/BN blogs came out with an “Ubah” logo that stood for “U-Bisexual atau Homosexual”. This was clearly in reference to Anwar Ibrahim’s sodomy case, which became a target of attacks by his political rivals in cyberspace. The pro-ruling coalition blogs came out with an offensive-sounding logo — “TIBAI” — to mock Anwar. The TIBAI logo stood for “Tolak Individu Bernama Anwar Ibrahim” (Reject an individual named Anwar Ibrahim). Another campaign called “GEMPUR” was created to defame Anwar. The word is an acronym for “Gerakan Menentang Peliwat Untuk Rakyat” (People’s movement against sodomite). The pro-ruling coalition blogs also came out with their own version of the “ABCD” campaign, which stood for “Asalkan Bukan Cina DAP (Anything but the DAP Chinese). Other logos created to shore up support for the ruling coalition included “Bloggers Pembela Negara” (Bloggers who are the national defenders), “Vote BN”, “PR=Penipu Rakyat” (PR=Cheats of the people), “PR= Pemusnah Rakyat” (PR=Destroyers of the people), “PAS Boneka DAP” (PAS is a puppet of

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the DAP) and “Jom Tolak Opposition” (Let’s reject the opposition). Blogs which appeared to be supportive of the ruling coalition also created logos that made use of race and religion to gain support of the voting public. Three distinct logos were the “Satu Suara, Satu Arah, Satu Akidah” (One voice, one direction, one faith), “Melayu One Bumi” (One Malay earth) and the “Alif Ba Ta” campaign, which stood for “Untuk Agama, Bangsa dan Tanahair” (For religion, race and homeland). Other online slogans also took potshots at the DAP. For example, one of the slogans read: “Orang Melayu Jangan Jadi bodoh dan ikut kemahuan DAP. PAS dan PKR jadi talibarut DAP.” (Malays, don’t be stupid and abide by the wishes of the DAP. PAS and PKR are stooges of the DAP.) The clear political alignment between the opposition and the ruling coalition is, perhaps, a reminder of how the Internet can exaggerate the negative effects of pluralism by polarizing groups of like-minded individuals into fragmented entities without the opportunity for each to engage with the other so as to reach common ground (Sunstein 2007). This is, in part, based on the notion of homophily that describes a basic organizing principle where associations between and among individuals are linked to similar socio-demographic, behavioural and intrapersonal characteristics (McPherson et al. 2001, p. 416). Supporting the proverbial expression of “birds of a feather flock together” are some studies that detected a divided political blogosphere in the Western world. In a study to establish patterns in discussion topics of political bloggers in the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Adamic and Glance (2005) observed that liberal and conservative bloggers were primarily linked to their separate communities and cross-linking was negligible. Other research on blogrolls had found that the vast majority of blogrolls were linked to sites that held the same political positions and views of the political bloggers (Hargittai et al. 2008). The conservative blogs linked to others that had the same conservative views, and the same was seen in liberal blogs. References to alleged sexual trysts of political leaders became common modes of attack during the 2013 election. Several videos purportedly showing Anwar Ibrahim and Mustafa Ali were made available on some pro-UMNO blogs to try to sully their reputations. According to Malaysian TV1 broadcast news, a YouTube sex video dated 27 April 201163 which allegedly showed a top opposition leader with a Chinese woman was uploaded to the UMNO-linked blog, Papagomo. These attacks continued and in March 2013 the Papagomo blogger accused Anwar Ibrahim of engaging in indecent acts with another man. As mentioned in Chapter One, Anwar sued the blogger for defamation and won the case. Another pro-UMNO

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blogger, who runs the blog Parpukari, uploaded still images from a video that purportedly showed a man bearing a likeness to PAS secretary-general Mustafa Ali in his undergarments with a woman who only had a towel draped around her, in a bedroom.64 On the other side of the political divide, allegations of Najib Razak’s involvement in the case of Mongolian woman Altantuya Shaariibuu continued to haunt the prime minister in the blogosphere during the 2013 election. Despite denials from the prime minister and his wife, Rosmah Mansor, that they knew the Mongolian national, some pro-opposition blogs continued to highlight the case. In the lead-up to the election in 2012, Anwar Ibrahim posted an article by the Malaysian Chronicle questioning the links between Malaysia’s acquisition of two French Scorpene submarines with Altantuya Shaariibuu and the relationship between Razak Baginda, Najib and UMNO in the mysterious murder.65 Another pro-opposition blog, Anak Sungai Derhaka, reproduced an article about the Scorpene deal.66 Discussions about the case, particularly accusations involving Najib, continued to crop up in cyberspace in 2013. For example, the Hornbill Unleashed blog highlighted serious allegations of Najib’s complicity in the matters.67 These are some instances which demonstrate how political rivals have used online platforms to paint each other in a negative light during national elections.

Apparent Domination by Media and Political Elites An analysis of the individuals behind the blogs during the 2008 and 2013 elections revealed that the Malaysian blogosphere was broadly representative of the various communities in the country. In 2008 the blogosphere reflected the ethnic make-up of the country, with Malays being the dominant race followed by the Chinese and Indians. Of the 105 bloggers that provided information on their ethnicity, Malays made up the majority with a count of 59 blogs (56 per cent). They were followed by the Chinese (32 blogs, or 31 per cent), Indians (12 blogs, 11 per cent) and others (2 blogs, 2 per cent). Again, for the 2013 election, bloggers of Malay ethnicity seem to have dominated, followed by bloggers of Chinese and Indian ethnicities. Out of the 32 newly created blogs that revealed the bloggers’ identities, 27 (84 per cent) were revealed to be Malay while the rest came from the Chinese and Indian communities. The composition reflected the cultural and ethnic make-up of the country, showing that the blogosphere continued

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to be broadly representative of the population. The analysis indicated that the Malaysian socio-political blogosphere in 2008 and 2013 was dominated by media and political elites, including professionals, instead of “ordinary citizens”. The bloggers were more educated and drew a higher income than the average Malaysian. Journalists, political writers and professionals made up the majority of bloggers in the Malaysian cyberspace. Of the 91 bloggers who revealed their occupations on their profile pages, news editors, former news editors, journalists and political writers topped the list, with 26 (29 per cent) of them being in those professions (Figure 2.5). They were followed by professionals such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, lecturers, consultants, researchers and teachers, accounting for 25 (27 per cent) bloggers who disclosed such information. Politicians came in third, with 19 (21 per cent) of the bloggers being elected representatives, former elected representatives or assistants of parliamentarians. While half of the bloggers did not declare their occupations, there was no indication that they came from different backgrounds to those who did. Figure 2.5 Occupation of Bloggers as Stated on Their Profile Pages

25

26

25 19

20 15 10 3

3

3

4

Non-profit work

Students

5

Businessmen

8

Acting industry

Number of blog posts

30

Media editors & journalists

Politicians

Others

Professionals

0

Note: The total number of bloggers who stated their occupation on their profile pages was 91. The remaining 88 bloggers made no mention of their occupation.

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The huge presence of former media elites in the Malaysian blogosphere in 2008 has been described as “the era of journalist bloggers” (Ahirudin 2008, p. 3). Although the percentage of identified blogs created for the cyberspace war of the 2013 election was a low 9 per cent, the information gave some sense of the socio-economic status of the bloggers. Out of the 32 blogs that revealed the bloggers’ identities, 20 bloggers (62 per cent) gave information about their occupation. Of these 20, politicians topped the list followed by professionals such as lawyers and educationists. Journalists and those in the writing or media industries came in third. Businessmen and a government servant were among the occupations mentioned on the blogger profiles. Overall, the findings demonstrated a prevalence of media and political elites, including professionals, in the Malaysian blogosphere. The pattern seemed to suggest that the blogosphere was a reflection of the existing social and ideological structures in society where access to the Internet could bring about questions of a digital divide in the country. Such a digital divide entails the possibility of greater Internet access for urban dwellers while their rural counterparts lag behind.68 The issue of access is not just limited to the segment of society with the means to utilize the online platform. It also extends to the issue of cybertroopers, which entails concerns of online writers being hired to propagate the agendas of those who have the means to pay.

Summary The use of blogs and Facebook pages to mobilize for political action, to keep readers informed of campaign activities and electoral candidates and the ability for bloggers to voice diverse views were notable functions of the online platforms in a relatively authoritarian society. The new media were able, to a certain extent, to enrich the political life of Malaysians and to change the ways of campaigning for politician-bloggers. However, the online medium could be restricted in its ability to generate extensive public discussion. Interactivity in the Malaysian blogosphere was not fully realized because the blog readers did not engage widely in discussions with other readers. Interaction between blog writers and readers was even less. The results of this study, thus, remind us of the need to be specific in our assessment of blogging and its impact on democratic practices, because the effects can be different under particular

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circumstances. The Malaysian blogosphere, with its focus on partisan politics and personality, may not help in improving the quality of debate, which is an important trait in a deliberative democracy. The framing of particular political leaders in a negative light suggested a focus on scandal politics that could be used to manipulate information to fulfil the agenda of powerful elites in society. The findings suggest that the Malaysian blogosphere had not greatly improved the quality of debate and that the information published on blogs could be manipulated, thus failing to help citizens make informed decisions. Individuals with more education and those from higher income groups were more active online, indicating that they had better access to the online platform than “ordinary citizens”. A high presence of media and political elites supported the argument that the cyberspace agenda could be appropriated by powerful elites. The blogosphere did not see a real shift in power and distribution of resources, but was a mirror of the social and ideological structures in society (Dijk 2006; Cammaerts 2008; Hindman 2009, Davis 2009; Fuchs 2009). While network society scholar Dijk (2006) suggests that social and media networks have an inherent quality of “drawing resources to the already more powerful” (p. 184), critical scholar Fuchs (2009, p. 83) argues that the availability of more tools for easier ways of publicizing opinions on the Internet merely legitimizes existing patterns of domination and does not lead to democratization of the media.

Notes   1. This follows the understanding that the concept of framing and priming can provide insight into how the mainstream news media function as a form of political communication to sway public opinion (Entman 2007). Blogs, as an online platform for political communication, can be used in the same manner, as will be highlighted in the next three chapters.   2. This was noted in an interview with journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan conducted in Kuala Lumpur on 10 November 2014.  3. The Star Online, 11 November 2007 (accessed 22 January 2015). The online news portal reported that the Bersih gathering, held in Kuala Lumpur on 10 November 2007, was a call for free and fair elections in the country. It was organized by the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections, a group of sixty non-governmental organizations, supported by five opposition

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parties. The Hindraf protest, held in Kuala Lumpur on 25 November 2007, was a call for better social and economic treatment of the Indian community in Malaysia.  4. The Star Online, 25 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010).  5. The Star Online, 25 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010).  6. The Star Online, 11 November 2007 (accessed 22 January 2015).  7. The Star Online, 8 December 2007 (accessed 22 January 2015).  8. Ginie Lim, “10 Nov: Empat Tempat Berhimpun” [Nov 10: Four places to converge], Bloginie (blog), 9 November 2007 (accessed 18 January 2010).  9. Haris Ibrahim, “Friday 9th November, 2007: Wear Your Snazziest Yellow Necktie to Support the Call for Electoral Reforms”, People’s Parliament (blog), 5 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010). 10. Susan Loone, “Bersih: A Long and Bloody Road”, Susan Loone’s Blog, 9 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010). 11. Haris Ibrahim, “10-Eleven: We, the People Shall Be Heard and We Shall Prevail”, People’s Parliament, 11 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010). 12. Anil Netto, “50,000 Malaysians Defy Ban to Demand Electoral Reforms”, Anilnetto.com (blog), 11 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010). 13. Mahendran ran the blog Mahendran.com while Raaja was the author of Raajarox.com. The two were Information Technology students when they started their blogs in March 2007. In separate interviews for this research, Mahendran and Raaja revealed that their blogs started as personal diaries but later turned political when they began writing about the conditions of Indians in Malaysia. 14. Interview with civil society blogger Mahendran, Kuala Lumpur, 13 March

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2010. 15. Bernard Khoo, “A Sunday Walk with My Brothers and Sisters”, Zorrounmasked (blog), 26 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010). 16. Charles Santiago, “Vote for a New Malaysia”, Charles Santiago Member of Parliament for Klang (blog), 24 February 2008 (accessed 18 January 2010). 17. Tian Chua’s Facebook page (accessed 12 December 2014). 18. Generasi Bersih 709’s [Bersih Generation 709] Facebook page (accessed 22 January 2015). 19. Generation 709’s Twitter feed, 7 October 2011 . 20. Bernard Khoo, “To Bersih 2.0 Sterling Team”, Zorro-unmasked, 5 July 2011 (accessed 1 January 2015). 21. Charles Santiago’s Facebook page (accessed 23 January 2015). 22. Lau Weng San, “Gunakan peluang keemasan untuk merealisasikan impian Malaysia” [Use this golden opportunity to realize Malaysia’s dream], Frankly Speaking (blog), 5 May 2013 (accessed 23 January 2015). 23. Jeff Ooi’s Facebook page (accessed 23 January 2015). 24. Charles Santiago, “Charles’ Campaign Schedule (6 March/Klang)”, Charles Santiago Member of Parliament for Klang (blog), 6 March 2008 (accessed 18 January 2010). 25. Elizabeth Wong, “(GE 12) Change for the Future”, Elizabeth Wong (blog), 24 February 2008 (accessed 18 January 2010). 26. Zulkifli Noordin, “Berita dari Medan” [News from the field], Zulkifli Noordin: The Riding MP (blog), 25 February 2008 (accessed 19 January 2010). 27. Tony Pua, “Ceramah Friday – SS2/63”, Philosophy, Politics, Economics (blog), 7 March 2008 (accessed 26 January 2015). 28. Malaysia Central, “Sightings: An Eye on Malaysia, a Photoblog by TV Smith”, 6 March 2008 (accessed 26 January 2015).

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29. Interview with civil society blogger Anil Netto, Penang, 23 March 2010. 30. Interview with partisan blogger Nathaniel Tan, Kuala Lumpur, 25 February 2010. 31. Tony Pua, “DAP Petaling Jaya Ceramah Schedule 2013”, Philosophy, Politics, Economics, 19 April 2013 (accessed 26 January 2015). 32. Tony Pua’s Facebook page (accessed 26 January 2015). 33. Najib Razak’s Facebook page (accessed 27 January 2015). 34. Malaysian Insider, 17 January 2012 (accessed 12 December 2014). 35. Mohd Najib Tun Razak, “Day 2 to 11 of Campaign Trail”, NajibRazak.com (blog), 21 to 30 April 2013 (accessed 27 January 2015). 36. Mohd Najib Tun Razak, “Day 7: Stepping into Perak – Meeting the People and Awarding the Heroes of Lahat Datu”, NajibRazak.com (blog), 26 April 2013 (accessed 27 January 2015). 37. PoliTweet.org, “Census of Facebook Users in Malaysia, Dec 2012”, 19 October 2012 (accessed 11 December 2014). 38. Najib Razak’s Facebook page (accessed 27 January 2015). 39. Rafizi Ramli’s Facebook page (accessed 27 January 2015). 40. Chris Anthony, “Let’s Vote Wisely for Credible Candidates”, My Malaysia Today (blog), 12 February 2008 (accessed 24 November 2010). 41. Chris Anthony, “Lingam Video Scandal: Need for Revamp of Judiciary”, My Malaysia Today, 20 February 2008 (accessed 24 November 2010). 42. Chris Anthony, “Why deny BN 2/3 Majority? Part 1”, My Malaysia Today, 1 March 2008 (accessed 24 November 2010). 43. Chris Anthony, “GE13: Our Sacred Duty to Change for the Better”, My Malaysia Today, 11 April 2013 (accessed 28 January 2015). 44. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2015. See Chapter Four for further discussion.

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45. Follow-up interview with Jeff Ooi, Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2014. 46. Follow-up interview with pro-PAS blogger D, Kuala Lumpur, 15 November 2013. 47. Interview with civil society blogger Susan Loone, Penang, 24 March 2010. A follow-up interview requested for 2014 could not be scheduled due to her work schedule. 48. The Star Online, 1 November 2008 (accessed 14 December 2011). 49. New Straits Times Online, 13 January 2015 (accessed 29 January 2015). 50. Interview with politician-blogger Teng Chang Khim, Shah Alam, 26 April 2010. 51. Interview with politician-blogger Tian Chua, Kuala Lumpur, 12 April 2010. 52. Interview with politician-blogger Idham Lim, Ipoh, 31 March 2010. 53. The three civil society bloggers — G, H and J —asked to remain anonymous for this study. 54. Interview with civil society blogger G, Penang, 25 March 2010. 55. Interview with civil society blogger H, Kuala Lumpur, 17 March 2010. 56. Elizabeth Wong was an elected member of the Selangor state legislative assembly in 2008 and 2013. 57. Interview with civil society blogger J, Kuala Lumpur, 6 April 2010. 58. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 59. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2015. 60. Interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 22 February 2010. 61. Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, “War against Blogger is a Crime”, Kickdefella (blog), 6 February 2007 (accessed 24 September 2010). 62. Content framing the former premier as “sleepy” and “flip flop” in his administration are available at the MyKMU.net website. This content was posted in 2007 and February 2008, just before the twelfth general election. Similar negative frames on the prime minister continued to fill the blogosphere after the 2008 elections. 63. RTM (Radio Television Malaysia) TV1, “Papagomo bongkar video seks Anwar Ibrahim” [Papagomo exposes sex video of Anwar Ibrahim], YouTube, 55 sec., 27 April 2011 64. House PK, “Siapa nak tengok video Mustafa Ali ini action secara full? Meh sini” [Who wants to watch Mustafa Ali in full action? Come here], Parpukari (blog), 12 April 2013 (accessed 2 February 2015). 65. Malaysian Chronicle, “Scorpene Altantuya: Who is Razak Baginda to Najib

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and Umno”, Anwar Ibrahim-Demi Rakyat (blog), 13 June 2012 (accessed 2 February 2015). 66. Anak Sungai Derhaka. “Panas!! Scandal Scorpene disiarkan di Cambodia pula” [Hot!! Scorpene scandal gets published in Cambodia], Anak Sungai Derhaka (blog), 7 June 2012 (accessed 2 February 2015). 67. Hornbill Unleashed, “Order for Altantuya Murder came from Najib, Baginda was Sexually Impotent”, Hornbill Unleashed (blog), 15 February 2013 (accessed on 2 February 2015). 68. The Edge Malaysia, 24 March 2009 (accessed 14 June 2009).

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3 A Political Marketing Tool and a Network of Cyber Battles

This chapter explores the practices of politician-bloggers who strategically utilized the online platform with the aim of exerting a wider sphere of influence over the voting public. It discusses how online avenues became less appealing to the politician-bloggers during the official campaigning period.1 The research participants revealed that they instead resorted to traditional non-mediated face-to-face canvassing during that time. Some of the factors cited for abandoning online media during the official campaigning period included the broader political economy of the media, coupled with constituencies defined by ethnicity, location, and the digital divide, as well as the preference of politician-bloggers for a personalized approach. A key point of the chapter examines the use of the Internet as a tool for marketing political images in order to garner public support. Such usage occurred particularly in the lead-up to the general elections. Generally, most of the politician-bloggers had restricted access to the mainstream media so they turned to blogging to publish unfiltered messages to increase visibility for themselves and their party. Content included the scandals of political rivals, which indirectly helped to boost the bloggers’ image in contrast. The politician-bloggers also promoted themselves as reputable politicians worthy of public support by declaring their thoughts on issues of public interest. This can be interpreted as a blurring of boundaries between the private and public sphere.2 However, such boundaries were guarded when politician-bloggers did not want their personal thoughts to jeopardize 87

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the image of their political parties. Such was evident among some of the politician-bloggers who were elected following the 2008 election. The chapter also interrogates the perception of politician-bloggers about Web practices that appeared to have a bearing on the ways they were using the online platform. It examines the emergence of a network of cyber battles that was prevalent for the election of 2013 but not for 2008. During the 2008 election many of the research participants regarded blogging as a personal endeavour and did not connect with other individuals or bloggers to establish ties or a network. Two veteran politician-bloggers treated the online tool like their “own newspapers” without any form of coordination to achieve their political goal. However, the increasing use of social networking tools like Facebook and Twitter saw the creation of fluid ties to help win the support of the voting public during the 2013 election. The politician-bloggers coordinated their online efforts with other contestants, volunteers and online communicators to expand their potential influence over readers. The discussion rounds up with a section on the challenges faced by politician-bloggers in publishing their messages. It details the forms of cyberattacks and counter-attacks that this group encountered during and even after the elections. A common grouse was the issue of personal attacks launched by political rivals. Many of the respondents believe that often such attacks were initiated by paid bloggers. The respondents expressed the need to be vigilant of the information being disseminated on the Internet in order to quickly counter allegations or block cybertroopers from occupying their online spaces.

Traditional Approaches during Official Campaign Periods For most of the research participants, blogging waned in appeal as the elections approached and the focus switched from building support and reputation among opinion-formers to persuading individual voters directly during the official campaigning period. Although some of the politicianbloggers acknowledged they did use their blogs for activities such as publishing campaign information, asking for donations and recruiting volunteers, they stressed that it was more crucial for them to solicit voter support directly through face-to-face canvassing during the official campaigning period. Most of the politician-bloggers — Liew Chin Tong, Lau Weng San, Jeff Ooi, Teng Chang Khim, politician-blogger E3, politician-blogger F4,

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Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad and Tian Chua — voiced the need to make their physical presence felt with their voters through face-to-face campaigning and not just through the blogs. Many of the research participants indicated that traditional methods of persuasion such as meeting the voters directly, making fiery speeches at political rallies, and distributing pamphlets were more effective in engaging their voters, particularly during the short thirteen-day campaigning period in 2008. In an interview for this study, electoral candidate Tian Chua of the PKR did not consider blogging to be a major tool for political campaigning. He stressed that “political activity is really on the ground, it is physical work. It is not only mind work.” He believed that his blog did not help get him elected. Instead, it was the physical work of being “out there” with his voters. The PKR politician further explained that the “actual political activities of reaching out to the people” could not be substituted with the use of technological gadgets and devices. Tian Chua, who no longer blogs after 2008 but who was active on his Facebook page for the 2013 election, also pointed out, When it comes to the election period, it is really the physical ceramah and all those things. Yes, it [the blog] helps to spread a bit about the ceramah where it can be posted online and more people can watch it. But speaking from the viewpoint of voters, if you are successful in capturing their interest, they will prefer to go out to the street to watch your speech rather than sitting behind the computer and watching you online.... The eager fence-sitters will go out to see how Tian Chua looks like, whether he is approachable, how he speaks [and whether] he can speak fluent Bahasa Malaysia or Mandarin.5

Although the use of social networking tools like Facebook and Twitter became more popular among electoral candidates in the 2013 election, the research participants still expressed the need for face-to-face contact with the voting public. In separate follow-up interviews for this book with politician-bloggers Jeff Ooi, Teng Chang Khim and Lau Weng San, they indicated the importance of “on the ground” campaigning. In a follow-up interview with active Facebooker Lau Weng San, who was re-elected as a DAP assemblyman for the second time in 2013, he said, There are three important criteria to win elections. Firstly, policies that touch the people, the personal reach of politicians and social media, Facebook and Twitter, to show your activities. It is not just through your blogs, Facebook or Twitter. It’s not like you have a button to press and when you press it, you can win the election. If

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that’s the case, everybody can win an election. Blogs, Facebook and Twitter are just social media tools to show your activities. At the end of the day, it is the policies and the personal touch of the party and politician.6

The emphasis on personalized contact with voters is reflected in a stepby-step guide on winning elections produced by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (Lynn 2009). Targeting voters directly is described as “the winning political campaign” in the campaign manual for Malaysia and Southeast Asia (ibid., p. 8). Leaflet drops, literature handouts and door-to-door meetings are described in the manual as some of the methods for connecting with voters. These strategies for direct contact with voters were supported by past research that suggested faceto-face canvassing could increase the chance of voters turning out to vote (Eldersveld 1956; Kramer 1970; Blydenburgh 1971; Caldeira et al. 1990; Gerber and Green 2000). The various authors of the research concluded that a personalized approach to contact voters had a significant impact on electoral participation. Face-to-face campaigning was deemed beneficial in elections which did not see a lot of information made available to the electorate (Blydenburgh 1971, p. 381). Similarly, for an election conducted in a relatively authoritarian society like Malaysia, where information is not freely available to voters, the personalized approach could be more significant during the campaigning period. Many of the politician-bloggers acknowledged that they could reach audiences at the global level through blogging, but that the online activity was not useful during the official campaigning period. This was because their target audience at that time was made up of voters confined within particular geographical boundaries and with limited access to the Internet due to unequal distribution of digital resources in the country. It was not the global audience living in a borderless world that this group of bloggers was trying to engage with, but voters living within a particular social and political environment. Moreover, the Malaysian election rules in 2008 did not permit every Malaysian voter living overseas to cast their votes in their country of residence. The 2008 electoral rules only permitted civil servants and overseas students and their spouses to cast their votes in absentia.7 This ruling was relaxed in January 2013 to allow registered Malaysian voters living overseas to vote.8 Nevertheless, the need to engage in traditional methods of campaigning, such as door-to-door meetings, distributing pamphlets and making speeches at ceramah (political gatherings) to connect directly with

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their voters was more pressing than relying on blogs that could potentially reach a global audience. One of the main concerns cited for considering online avenues as less significant in reaching out to voters during official campaigning in 2008 was the digital divide. On one level there was a large digital gap between urban and rural populations; and on another level such a gap affected pockets of the urban poor. Statistics on Internet usage and access to broadband in Malaysia showed a wide gulf between urban and rural residents. A survey on household use of the Internet by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (2008) revealed that, as of 31 March 2008, 85 per cent of users were based in urban areas. For the entire country, Internet usage in Malaysia stood at 62.8 per cent in 2008,9 while the household broadband penetration rate was estimated at just over 21 per cent at the end of 2008.10 The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (2013) reported that, by 2013, urban Internet users continued to represent 82 per cent of total users. These statistics indicate that the concern politician-bloggers had regarding an unequal distribution of digital resources had some justification. A lack of confidence in the ability of blogs to connect with voters was not that far-fetched, particularly for politician-bloggers contesting in the rural areas where voters had limited access to the Internet and broadband facilities. Among those who articulated such a concern were politicianbloggers Teng Chang Khim and F. In an interview for this research, Teng Chang Khim said, “It is more important to reach people who will vote for you … rather than argue with someone you don’t know in the cyberworld.” Disclosing that the majority of his blog readers were not his voters, Teng Chang Khim clearly expressed why blogging became less effective during the campaigning period: Those who go to the Internet consist of a different class of people — mainly middle and upper middle class and most of them are Englisheducated. My constituency is a Chinese-educated area and they don’t rely on blogs to get information. The Chinese press is relatively more open and that is why it [blogging] was not very important for me at that time.11

Politician-blogger F, whose constituents were split between those living in semi-rural and those living in urban areas, also felt that blogging could not be relied upon to reach her voters. Whilst information on her

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campaign activities, requests for donations and requests for volunteers were published on her blog during the campaign period, the elected member of Parliament pointed out that blogging was not as important as face-toface canvassing during this period. The sentiment that blogging was less effective at reaching voters was also raised by politician-bloggers contesting in urban areas. A digital disparity existed not only between urban and rural areas but also among pockets of the urban poor. Politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, who contested the Jelutong parliamentary seat in Penang in 2008, observed that his urban seat was “a place where flats did not even have lifts, [and so] the Internet was not prominent there” (J. Ooi, 2008, p. 2). First-time candidate Liew Chin Tong, who contested and won an urban seat in Penang in 2008, stressed that a lot of effort was put into on-the-ground campaigning, with 30,000 leaflets being distributed, because blogging served “only those who were connected”.12 Similar views were expressed by other politician-bloggers whose constituencies were located in urban areas. Among them were Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, Lau Weng San, politician-blogger E and Tian Chua. In a follow-up interview for this book, Lau Weng San indicated that the battleground for the 2013 election was in the rural areas. The results of the 2013 election seem to justify his concern, as the opposition’s success was concentrated mainly in the urban areas. The ethnicity of voters — coupled with the perception of a freer and fairer Chinese-language mainstream media — appears to have contributed to a decline in the use of blogging during the 2008 campaigning period. This factor seemed to have a more pronounced impact among politicianbloggers who were relying on Chinese voters. Contesting in a largely Chinese constituency, politician-blogger Jeff Ooi pointed out that he was relying on the Chinese press to reach his voters in Penang. The evening edition of three Chinese-language newspapers provided opposition politicians with a “swift mechanism to retaliate and rebut” the attacks of the ruling coalition (J. Ooi, 2008, p. 2). Despite being a part of the mainstream media, the Chinese press was fairer and “helped to impart our messages” (ibid., p. 2). Teng Chang Khim also disclosed that it was more important for him during the 2008 campaigning period to use the Chinese-language media, rather than his blog, to reach his rural Chinese voters. He pointed out that the majority of his voters did not have access to the Internet or broadband facilities and that they depended on the Chinese-language newspaper for information. Blogging for these politician-

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bloggers seemed to have taken a back seat in electoral politics during the campaigning period. The narratives demonstrated that blog use became less significant during the official campaigning period in 2008. The target audience of voters, issues stemming from the digital divide, the ethnicity of voters and the ability to negotiate for space in the mainstream news media, particularly the Chinese press, were central to politician-bloggers when they wanted to reach out to their voters. These circumstances continued to persist in the Malaysian context during the 2013 election.

Blogging to Boost Image of Self and Party before the Elections Promoting the visibility of politician-bloggers and enhancing the image of their political parties was a significant function of blogs surrounding the elections. Many of the research participants revealed that they were publishing their views and activities online in order to promote their reputations. Others chose to expose the scandals of rival politicians in order to paint them in a negative light. Blogging became an essential tool for these politicians to project a positive image in the run-up to the elections because of the miniscule coverage they were receiving in the mainstream media. Politician-blogger Lau Weng San, who contested for the first time in 2008, indicated that he used his blog to promote his credentials, views and activities to his readers. This relatively unknown candidate, who had limited access to the mainstream media, explained, You can’t expect a new guy or candidate like me, who is not prominent, to be famous or prominent overnight with a new blog created overnight. You have to do it from a year or two ago. You have to build up slowly … to utilize your blog by publicizing or putting up comments, inviting public comments or introducing [your blog] to the public via the media or press conferences.13

The blog became a vehicle for Lau Weng San to promote himself as a credible politician in the run-up to the 2008 and 2013 elections. Lau Weng San was successfully elected as a Selangor state legislative member in both elections. He acknowledged that his blog portrayed him as reputable as part of a wider effort to develop his image as a trustworthy politician.

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Promoting himself as honest or “truthful” can be interpreted as a way of boosting his personal image to voters. Veteran politician Lim Kit Siang of the DAP disclosed that he used his blog to publish press statements in a bid to promote his views to a wider audience. Another veteran, Teng Chang Khim, revealed that he sought to expose scandals of rival politicians in order to develop the image of his party nationwide. The two seasoned politicians, who each successfully contested in both the 2008 and 2013 elections, indicated that they used their blogs as an extension of their past practices. Politician-blogger Lim Kit Siang, who described his blog as merely “a switch in the medium”, explained that he adopted it as a change from his previous practice of sending press statements to the mainstream media.14 His daily average of four to five press statements normally touched on affairs of public and national interest that he wanted to share with his readers.15 However, he observed that the mainstream media gave minimal coverage to the daily statements he sent. By publishing those statements on his blog, the experienced politician felt that he could churn out an unlimited number of uncensored statements which had a chance to reach a wider audience. As one of the most widely read political blogs in the country, it could be concluded that Lim Kit Siang’s statements were able to reach a wider audience through his blog.16 The large blog following of this former opposition leader could be from his supporters, party members, journalists and other political elites, including his rivals who would monitor his statements so that they could respond to them, particularly during the elections. Moreover, censorship of Lim Kit Siang and the DAP by the mainstream media could have pushed his supporters and the general public to seek out his political views on his blog. Recalling his early days of blogging in 2006, politician-blogger Teng Chang Khim described his blog as “his newspaper” to expose malpractices in the government, including the scandals of political rivals. This experienced opposition politician, who used to channel information of scandals and malpractices of rival politicians to the Chinese-language newspapers, began to update his blog on a daily basis. His enthusiasm in wanting his blog to be “his newspaper” saw him publishing at least two articles a day when he first started. An examination of his blog Straightforward showed that he published a total of 145 posts when he started in 2006 but the amount dipped to only 12 in 2007. There was an increase to 38 posts in 2008 but the number again dropped to only 13 in 2009. In 2010 he had only one post. He cited his busy work schedule and a shift to the

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more popular Facebook as reasons for a decline in the number of postings published on his blog.17 Using his blog to expose scandals involving leaders of the ruling regime, Teng Chang Khim believed the online content could indirectly promote the credibility of the DAP. This was particularly the case when he felt his blog was able to reach out to the upper-middle-class Englisheducated professionals, whom the DAP had failed to attract for decades.18 He cited three pieces of scandalous news involving his political rivals that could tarnish their reputation and indirectly promote the visibility of the DAP. One item posted in November 2006 was about a male UMNO parliamentarian photographed in a hotel room with a female UMNO senator. Another item, posted in March 2006, was in regard to losses made by two Selangor government-linked companies. And a third item, posted in February 2006, was about UMNO assemblyman, Zakaria Deros, who had built a multi-million ringgit mansion. Teng Chang Khim explained the role of his blog in the following terms: During the 2008 general election, I did not rely much on the blog. I think it was before, which was more important. That was between 2004 and 2008 and there were a lot of scandals, including the Zakaria Mansion. All these were published there.… I achieved my objective in reaching out to the English-educated group. That was part of my work in publishing my type of stories. It helps to build my image and the party’s image and to disseminate information.19

Echoing similar sentiments was Rafizi Ramli, who was actively using his Facebook page to dictate issues in the lead-up to the 2013 election. In an interview for this book, Rafizi Ramli felt that his online efforts were more effective before the official campaign period: In the six months leading to the two weeks’ [official] campaign period, it was effective as it allowed us to dictate the issues. At that time there was a lot of euphoria and optimism that there will be change so Facebook amplified a lot of the messages. So we managed to dictate the issues. By the time we went into the two-weeks’ [official] campaigning period ... we don’t have a focus on issues [there was] a jumble of news [but] no focus. Without a focus, you cannot build a strong momentum.20

Among the campaign issues launched online to build his image and that of his party were the rises in fuel and food prices. The act of highlighting

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topics like these that already resonated with the public portrayed the concerns of the politician-bloggers for the people. The use of blogs to build their own and their parties’ reputations signalled a prevalence of personality politics in the blogosphere. The online platform was used to promote the image of politician-bloggers as trustworthy and to highlight rivals as rogue politicians. The interviews also provided glimpses into how the politician-bloggers were telling readers how to think about them and their parties. This could be interpreted within the framework of framing and priming (Entman 1993; Kuypers 2002; Entman 2007). The cyberspace experience of Malaysian politicianbloggers mirrors the findings of a study of the 2005 Danish elections that suggests that blogs are “primarily tools of political marketing” (Kalstrup and Pedersen 2005, p. 8) for self-promotion rather than for dialogue. The Danish politicians embraced blogging as a tool to communicate in a personal way in which they could frame stories to appear more trustworthy, to thank supporters and to appear interested in listening to readers. The two scholars argued that such priming and framing in a blog context can present the politician as a “competent and reliable person” (ibid., p. 8). Being trustworthy and having a good reputation were deemed important characteristics by which a politician contesting in a general election would be measured. The function of blogs to promote the image of contending politicians and their political parties appears to have influenced the politician-bloggers to impose a clear demarcation of boundaries between the private and public sphere after the election. This was particularly so among opposition politician-bloggers who came into power in the state administration after their success in the 2008 election. Two politician-bloggers decided to stop blogging after the election; while two others disclosed that they were more cautious with the type of content they published on their blogs. Another politician-blogger spoke about drawing up a code of ethics to limit party members from discussing party matters on their blogs so as to subsequently prevent such content from being used by the ruling coalition to damage the party’s image. Politician-blogger F stopped blogging for fear that her own views about policies of the PR made public on her blog could be used by political rivals to damage her party’s reputation. What was initially seen as a platform to express her personal thoughts was later deemed politically “unwise” after the opposition secured an overwhelming victory against the BN in Penang, Perak, Selangor and Kelantan in the 2008 election.

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Politician-blogger E also stopped blogging after the election. Elaborating on her decision, she said, After I won, it became a bit difficult because suddenly you are a public figure.... Whatever I said or wrote, which I could do in some ways very freely in the past, [because] no one was going to judge me [but] now people would associate it with my political party. In the end it got harder and harder to write and I had to straddle between statements, [my] position and expression. The irony was that in the end, it was harder for me to express myself on the blog. As a public figure I no longer have that luxury. I could not use expletives, which I was quite used to before.... It was a platform for free expression essentially but now I am not in a position to express myself. So my blog started to take a backseat. The constraints came from the fact that I was an elected representative.21

Penang parliamentarian Jeff Ooi and Selangor state legislative assemblyman Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad became more cautious about the content of their blogs because they were concerned that their personal views could be misinterpreted as official statements of their respective state governments. Taking over power in Penang and Selangor did not automatically mean that the PR governments would obtain fairer coverage in the mainstream media, because the traditional media were still under the tight control of the ruling coalition. The PR governments in the newly captured states were still finding it difficult to get their policies across to the people without being subjected to some form of censorship or spin.22 Instead of being openly critical about state decisions and administrative matters, politician-blogger Jeff Ooi acknowledged that he used his blog to justify the Penang government’s inability to fulfil some of its election promises to the people. Citing the electoral pledge of reinstating local elections, he explained, During the March 2008 general election, we built within our manifesto ... that once we win, we will bring back election process for the local councils. I can’t question it openly but I question it internally and very intensively. We should be seen to be doing something and if we fail, it is all right. We did none of those. Being partisan now has stifled my liberal stance as a blogger. That’s very painful.23

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The election of local councillors in Malaysia was abolished in 1964. The election manifesto of the DAP had called for local council elections to be reinstated.24 However, the PR government in Penang had been silent about fulfilling this election pledge after they were voted into power in 2008. Three years later the Penang government decided to go ahead with local council elections25 but the Federal Court ruled against it in 2014.26 Similarly, politician-blogger Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad agreed that there were certain constraints on what he could blog about after he became an elected representative because he would be seen as representing his party and working for the chief minister of Selangor. He noted, There are certain boundaries I have to guard and the idea of collective responsibility in the party is there obviously. For example, I can’t discuss the MB [menteri besar, or chief minister] in my blog post because I am working for him and I can only cite him in my job, not outside of it.27

The narratives showed how some politician-bloggers perceived blogging as a personal activity that could have ramifications on their public life as ruling politicians. Their concern was heightened when they felt that blogging on party matters could pose a risk to the reputation of the parties of which they were members. Citing the six-month suspension of DAP leader Voon Lee Shan, who wrote about an internal party matter on his blog in 2010, Lau Weng San explained, He [Voon Lee Shan] wrote about some of the secret internal dealings of the party. Firstly, some of these things will affect the party’s image. Secondly, [is the question of ] whether it is true or not. Thirdly, it is always very difficult to prove whether it is true. And even if you are able to do that, it will have [leave] a long-standing negative image of the party [with] the general public.28

The boundaries between the private and public sphere would thus be actively guarded if blog contents were perceived to be potentially harmful to the image of the political party that the politician-bloggers represented. Under such circumstances the politician-bloggers would refrain from using their blogs to publicize their personal thoughts. The interviews also demonstrated how an active policing of the private and public sphere could limit the use of blogs to generate public discourse and restrict the

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free expression of ideas. This is particularly so when blogging is perceived as having the ability to threaten the blogger’s personal image and that of the party he or she represents.

An Emergent Cyberwar Network The story of the transition from blogging to Facebook over the two general elections in Malaysia reflected some of the lessons learnt from the use of the online platform in the 2008 election. Experience during the 2008 election saw campaigners adopting different approaches in their efforts to influence voters during the 2013 election. I will start this section with narratives from the opposition coalition pertaining to its social media strategies and compare them with the UMNO/BN approaches to the online battle in 2013. Despite the already active involvement of the opposition coalition in the blogosphere to win over the voting public in 2008, the PKR was said to have begun as early as 2011 to research and experiment with ways to develop their social media reach for the 2013 election. According to Rafizi Ramli, director of election strategies for the PKR, the focus then was on Facebook and Twitter. Recalling some of the early experiments and Facebook strategies to build a following, Rafizi Ramli said, It cannot be overloaded with politics and it has to be light.... We started researching and we realized that people like infographics. The young people on Facebook like figures, numbers, facts and infographics. It is precisely that people think there is so much of misinformation around, [so] the ones that can present facts and credible numbers are the ones that are trusted more. That’s how we started with our Facebook strategy.29

Another significant factor was to build a huge following, which meant reaching as many people as possible with a single message. Because of limited time and resources, Rafizi Ramli pointed out that the strategy was to concentrate on two or three PKR politicians who already had traction with the public. By the end of 2012 the PKR strategy was about building followers for three selected leaders — Rafizi Ramli, Nurul Izzah Anwar Ibrahim and Anwar Ibrahim. Starting with 300 followers in 2012, Rafizi Ramli now has a Facebook following of over 300,000.

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Anwar Ibrahim now has more than 1.4 million Facebook followers, while Nurul Izzah Anwar Ibrahim’s Twitter account now has more than 400,000 followers. Creating the necessary online content was a vital hurdle to cross. Working with a team to produce designs, infographics, photographs and videos, Rafizi Ramli explained that he would be in control of the type of issue to promote online: Every day, I decide what issue to fire.... I will email my team and say “this is the issue, these are the facts” and they will design the infographics and I will put in the text. We did this from late 2012 ... and the discipline works until today. I think, in the first few months, until May 2013, we were far ahead of everyone.... We managed to viral some infographics, photos and videos. I did four videos on the [election] manifesto and how to reduce car prices. They went extremely viral.30

In addition to infographics, YouTube videos that mocked rival politicians were a vital component of the cyberspace battle. Rafizi Ramli recalled watching YouTube videos that mocked then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during the 2008 election. One of the videos edited, cut and compressed a whole speech of Abdullah into a video to make fun of UMNO. Similar mocking videos were produced for the cyberspace battle in 2013. One example was a sixty-five second YouTube video recorded at the opening of South Korean performer Psy’s concert in Penang that went viral with over 190,000 views.31 The crowd was heard saying a loud “Yes” when Prime Minister Najib Razak asked whether the people of Penang were ready for Psy but a resounding “No” when the premier asked if the people were ready for BN. A shorter version of the video was circulated on YouTube by PAS TV, which saw a larger audience of more than 290,000 views.32 YouTube videos that poke fun at rival politicians continue to be in the forefront of attacks, even after the 2013 election. The PKR election strategist pointed out there were a few rules by which he and his online team would abide. Firstly, they would never display the party logo along with any content created. It was intended that these remained anonymous and the party would not claim credit for creating them or making them go viral. Rafizi Ramli explained,

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What matters is the message. It does not matter if people do not know it is from PKR. We just want to get the message out. We don’t mind as many people to copy and claim it as their own. We just need it to viral. If you go back to my Facebook, you will not see a single one [infographics] that is credited to me or anyone or [carries] any logo.33

Going into the 2013 election, Rafizi Ramli felt confident because he believed the strategy of his rival politicians was wrong. He observed that his rivals employed a strategy of generating fake accounts to give the impression of a wide following, but without reaching out to the people. He acknowledged that he experimented with creating fake Facebook accounts but abandoned the idea due to a lack of financial means and because there was a limit to the number of Facebook accounts that could be created using the same Internet Protocol (IP) address. The party, he said, relied heavily on volunteers to drive the online campaign. His volunteers were either finishing their university education or just going into their first year of tertiary education. They were generally English speaking. The only paid member of staff in this regard was a designer who created the artwork for his online campaign. Similarly, politician-blogger Lau Weng San revealed in a follow-up interview for this book that he hired the services of Web designers to attract readers to his online sites.34 Banking on the help of volunteers saw the setting up of a network of Facebookers in at least four states to support the DAP in the 2013 election. Experienced politician-blogger Jeff Ooi revealed that a group of supporters, mainly professionals such as doctors and computer experts, offered to help with the online campaign during the final week of the official campaigning period. One of the masterminds of the voluntary group, he said, already had a network of Facebookers in Penang, Selangor, Perak and Johor, which would effectively provide the opposition with an extended sphere of influence in the four urbanized states. The online activists in the states rarely met face-to-face but would organize a team of like-minded people to spread the Facebook messages. Ooi recalled, So, in Penang, I happen to be networking with this guy [mastermind] who came to me voluntarily. He surfaced and unmasked himself. So I give him the cues and the contents to counter the allegations. There were huge likes which ran close to a million likes [and] we never paid them.35

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The viral potential of Facebook was important to create a perception that the political messages being distributed reflected the dominant discussions among the netizens. Jeff Ooi explained, When you have a few thousand [likes for a] posting [which] was updated 40 minutes ago, [let us say] we already have 4,000 likes. It is like the whole world is talking about the same thing, having the same perspective. That is how you create that kind of aura. It is a perception. That is the reality. There is a blind herd being herded around.36

Several Facebook messages accompanied by Photoshopped pictures were created and disseminated by Jeff Ooi and his network of volunteers to attack the ruling coalition in Penang. According to Ooi, one of the messages by the opposition to counter the distribution of angpow (money in red envelopes), free food, beer and gifts by the BN in Penang was to tell voters to “take the money and vote opposition as it is government’s money, [thus] your money”.37 Other Facebook messages circulated by the network were the key points of the opposition coalition’s manifesto. These messages were simplified for Chinese-language Facebookers. Ooi also put out a call for voters to return to Penang to cast their votes, urging his constituents to help overcome the onslaught by the BN. The DAP politician-blogger, who won the Jelutong constituency with a bigger margin in 2013,38 felt that Facebook was effective as a campaign tool because the network of bloggers could help turn certain messages viral, thus expanding the opposition’s sphere of influence. Veteran politician Teng Chang Khim agreed that certain features of Facebook and Twitter allowed other groups of people, including supporters and volunteers, to help push his political messages to a wider audience. Some of the characteristics like sharing, tagging, re-posting and re-tweeting helped to bring about a “multiplier effect” in the distribution of the messages. As a Facebooker, politician-blogger Teng Chang Khim said he was able to know how popular or controversial the messages were and to have access to certain information about the readers, such as their background, interests and age group.39 In addition to the huge group of supporters and volunteers that helped to expand the cyberspace campaign of the opposition coalition, the DAP headquarters conducted close monitoring of the issues raised in the national arena and at the state level. Jeff Ooi explained that the party had one or two staff members tasked to monitor attacks by rival politicians so they could feed the information to the politicians concerned. These staff members

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did not produce content but coordinated with DAP politicians to counter some of the issues raised. The strategy was targeted at fence sitters to try to sway them towards the opposition coalition. Ooi recalled, We are very focused on the fence-sitters. Those who are already converted, we are only keeping them warm. At one point, we are looking at fence-sitters and they can be as high as 20 per cent. If we can swing 80 per cent out of the 20, we have a net gain of 16 per cent. Our Facebook is targeting the fence-sitters.40

Similarly, Rafizi Ramli revealed that the PKR campaign gave premium to the fence sitters. Explaining the party’s strategy in building the following of certain personalities, he explained, A lot of our contents are for our fence-sitters. That is why we decided to ditch the idea of cascading down with our members as we will be stuck with members. Our appeal needs to get out. That’s why we realize fence-sitters follow certain personalities. They don’t follow the party but they follow some personalities and we try to build the reach to the fence-sitters as they will follow the personalities.41

The opposition coalition appeared to be adopting a strategy to package political messages based on facts and humour to attack their rivals in the election. It coordinated the cyber warfare with its massive following of supporters and volunteers who would distribute the political messages through their network of online readers. It was not only the advanced information and communication technologies that provided a platform to circulate the political messages, the opposition coalition also tapped into groups of volunteers to launch and coordinate its cyber campaign. The ruling coalition took a different route in the organization of its online campaign, as revealed by an interview with the former chairman (2009 to November 2013) of UMNO’s Unit Media Baru (New Media Unit), Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, who led the online media offensive against the opposition for the 2013 election. He indicated that UMNO’s social media campaign mainly sought to engage party members and appeared to operate like a newspaper. Firstly, members of the unit were given journalism training, particularly in ways of obtaining information, writing and distributing content online. Secondly, online campaign efforts to engage and coordinate with pro-UMNO bloggers who were active in 2008 were regarded as similar to “how the government engaged media editors”.42 Discussions and meetings would be held with some of the active bloggers

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on how to package the information for an onslaught of the opposition. Thirdly, online news portals were set up for the 2013 election to share and coordinate information to be distributed in cyberspace. The cyber warfare of the ruling coalition appeared to be a multi-prong affair. It began with awareness training to familiarize UMNO members in the use of social media with the aim of increasing their online presence. This extended to efforts to engage with pro-UMNO bloggers who were active in the campaign against Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in the 2008 election. According to Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, he began organizing training sessions for UMNO members with the help of some of the pro-UMNO bloggers who were against Abdullah in the 2008 election. The sessions were mainly for UMNO to reach the rural Malays in order to teach them the use of social media, with a focus on which Facebook pages to read and trust, thus creating a “network that will promote messages from the party and defend those policies and party leaders”.43 After familiarizing the members with blogging and Facebooking, he conducted another round of training to prepare the machinery for battle in 2013. He recalled, I had another round of training just to have a machinery that knew what to do.... They start to know what to do, how to move around, how to report things, how to find information. It is something like what you do in journalism, in which they can write, not confined by space and the medium. They can put a lot of photos and videos and they can also write longer than in newspapers. Most importantly, they know how to report things and know how to get information.44

The journalism training was part of an effort to set up pro-UMNO or progovernment online news portals. It seemed to emulate the organizational set-up of UMNO, as online news portals, blogs and Facebook pages were set up in every state to promote the political messages of the ruling coalition. However, the more active ones were located in opposition-held states such as Kedah, Penang, Selangor, the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Kelantan.45 Pro-UMNO bloggers who were active in their campaign against Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in the 2008 election played a major role in the ruling coalition’s cyber warfare strategy. Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz disclosed that he needed to engage and coordinate efforts with them because he faced difficulties in enlisting experienced and skilled bloggers from within UMNO. On methods to engage the pro-UMNO bloggers for the 2013 election, Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz said,

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We try to feed them information.... It is like what the government does when they engage the media editors. We would have meetings or we talk over the phone. We need to make sure the same message is being passed around. Get their opinion, how to handle certain issues. You have to do that. We need to engage them. The way we handle editors before, we have to work harder as we have to engage more people. Last time we only have newspaper editors, now we have so many independent bloggers.46

The coordination, he explained, was like a newsroom operation, where there was a need to have people on the ground to collect the information, report the events using photographs and videos. It is important to first clarify the notion of “independent bloggers” as used by Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz before proceeding with a discussion of the online efforts of the ruling coalition. The term, he explained, referred to pro-Umno or pro-government bloggers who had their own sources of income as cyberspace writers. Their sources of income were mainly from several party leaders who wanted the ghostwriters to promote their agenda. This group of “independent” bloggers did not fall under the ambit of Unit Media Baru and Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz disclosed that he had no control over them. He cited Papagomo and Parpukari as examples of “independent bloggers” who ran multiple blogs. Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz explained that the situation in UMNO could get “a bit messy” if the leaders hiring the bloggers were jostling for a party position. However, he noted that the same situation was starting to surface in the PR coalition, giving the Kajang move as a case in point.47 One of the most controversial facets of the cyber warfare strategy during the 2013 general election was the use of fake Facebook accounts and Twitter followers to create the perception of influence in the Malaysian blogosphere. Both the ruling and opposition coalitions were accused of setting up fake Facebook accounts and Twitter followers in an attempt to create the perception of having a wider following than the other.48 According to Ahirudin Attan, suspicions of fake Facebook accounts were true because a lot of the accounts were inactive. He elaborated: They were only echoing what the others had said. If Najib Razak, for example, said something [on his Facebook page], there will be 20,000 likes or 10,000 likes. Those accounts were used to like the posts. There was this preoccupation that the more you are liked, the ... more influential you become. That was misguided but it was done.49

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Acknowledging the use of fake Facebook accounts and Twitter followers by UMNO’s Unit Media Baru, Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz explained the purpose was not to distribute the message but to “play with perception”. He explained: Fixed accounts normally have fewer number of followers. But when it likes a page, it gets numbers. When you follow a Twitter account, you give numbers. Then you can use them to spread lies because people don’t know they are not real identities. The Red Bean Army uses it. The Unit Media Baru also has to use it to counter the argument. Sometimes people are not aware that sometimes it is a game. For example the dislikes against Najib’s YouTube session. No way you can get that number very quickly. But if you have a network elsewhere, you buy likes then you can get the numbers quickly. You have different rates for buying likes. Not only can you buy likes, you can buy comments too.50

Voices in cyberspace had been claiming that Najib Razak, Anwar Ibrahim of the PKR, Lim Kit Siang of the DAP and Nik Aziz Nik Mat of PAS had fake Twitter followers.51 The online articles alluded to the use of fake Facebook accounts and Twitter followers by both the ruling and opposition coalitions. Based on anecdotal accounts, Ahirudin Attan claimed that some of the pro-PR bloggers were funded by private businessmen, while payment for pro-UMNO bloggers came through Unit Media Baru. Thus, his remark, “If the Red Bean Army existed, it means that both sides were employing the same tactics. You have the Red Bean Army, you have the Unit Media Baru.”52 Politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, however, disagreed. He explained that the DAP’s Red Bean Army were volunteers and they were not paid. He stressed, They [UMNO/Barisan Nasional] already started this warfare and they thought we are as organized as them and they have been remunerating people. They thought we will fight the war the same way. It so happens that sympathies for the PR cause is voluntary, coming from all walks of life.... The way they referred to the Red Bean Army is that they are paid. We [Ours] are not, they are volunteers.53

Politician-blogger Teng Chang Khim was, however, more “philosophical” about the enormous voluntary support the opposition coalition received from the public in 2013. He said,

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Sometimes it is the trend of the society. The trend of the society you just cannot defy. They have to hire cybertroopers whereas there are a lot of opposition supporters and they are doing on their own initiative. They [volunteers] come and attack them [our political rivals]. So we don’t spend any amount of money to ... counter them.54

The strategies taken by both sides of the political divide in the 2013 election could be different but the motives were the same — to boost the images of the candidates and the parties they represented. At the same time the objective was to paint their opponents in a negative light. Politician-bloggers were in unison in expressing the need for online vigilance to be able to counter quickly any attacks launched by their opponents.

Countering Cyberattacks Cyberattacks and counterattacks appeared to surface in various shapes. An analysis of interviews with the politician-bloggers indicated that the most common form was the use of cybertroopers who would leave multiple foul or unsavoury comments about the postings of their rivals. Many of the politician-bloggers were rather unperturbed by this form of attack because they would normally block the offending users from making further posts. Another popular form of cyberattack was the doctoring of photographs and the creation of offensive texts to give the impression that a particular politician had published unpleasant comments. The politician-bloggers were sensitive and vigilant towards this type of attack because of the need to counter them as quickly as possible. One way of countering cyberattacks was to lodge complaints about a YouTube video or a Facebook post so that the YouTube or Facebook administrator would bar the content. This could also be achieved by getting cybertroopers to increase the number of dislikes for the offending content to the point it would be removed. One surreptitious form of cyberattack that required constant safeguarding against was the compromising of security of websites. This could result in the publishing of articles harmful to the reputation of the website owner and the party it represented. Unpleasant messages left by cybertroopers did little to shake the online campaign efforts of politician-bloggers. According to politician-blogger Teng Chang Khim, who encountered cybertroopers attacking him with vulgar language, the attempts did not worry him because the attacks were not done in “a smart way”. Elaborating on these encounters, Teng Chang Khim said,

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They are actually creating hatred that goes against them. You look at the name and it is very easy to trace. They come and put some very unpleasant message, you just click [on it] and you can see who this person is.... And you can tell this is a cybertrooper. Their names are all funny names. They are not putting the best part in. They should hire those who are more intelligent and can put up good arguments and argue with you on the Facebook.... they just want to have quantity and to bombard you.55

Echoing Teng Chang Khim’s sentiments of not being too concerned about such cyberattacks, Rafizi Ramli pointed out that all he needed to do was to block the comments and to not respond to them. He explained, I block all of them [the online attacks]. So there is nothing they could do. Their tweets are exactly the same. They come from the same people. This has 58 followers supposedly. This can be manufactured. This one has 25 followers and most probably the same person, creating all the same accounts and following each other. When they attack you on Twitter like this, the reach is only three or four people but it gives the impression you are being attacked by hundreds of people. I just block them. They will only be of some effect if I respond to them or reply to their tweets. I have 160,000 followers. If I reply to their attacks, my followers will start seeing their attacks. But if they attack me and I don’t reply, they are just three or four of them, chatting among themselves.56

On the other hand, the strategy of posting controversial remarks together with doctored photographs had to be countered quickly to stop the effect from reaching the audience. The most current cyber offensive that Rafizi Ramli experienced was related to the crash of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 in Ukraine in July 2014.57 The fake tweet even saw the matter being raised in Parliament.58 Another fake tweet pertaining to the MH17 crash accused him of saying that the government was spending millions of ringgit to buy bodies. Rafizi Ramli noted that he had to quickly set the record straight because if the fake tweet went viral it would be difficult to correct the perception. Constant monitoring had to be a part of the social media campaign to manage public perceptions. Sounding like the script of a spy movie, politician-blogger Jeff Ooi described how his online campaign had been “infiltrated to create havoc” for the DAP. In a follow-up interview for this book, the Jelutong member of Parliament recalled that he had to bar the Web access of an online

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administrator in Perak and Johor during the final week of campaigning in 2013. The two online campaigners began publishing messages that cast doubts about the integrity of DAP leaders like Lim Guan Eng and Lim Kit Siang. The messages alluded to Lim Kit Siang’s ambition to become the country’s first Chinese deputy prime minister, a position for which the DAP leader would compromise his principles by supporting PAS’s wish in implementing the Islamic hudud law in Malaysia. Another act of sabotage, he recalled, was through reports of spam and abusive content by political rivals. Four of the DAP’s websites were banned after organized ghostwriters — whom he claimed were from the BN — filed reports against the sites accusing them of producing spam and hosting abusive content. He explained, That is how the cyberwar was fought. I do not think that was what Facebook was intended [for] in the first place. It has mutated to that level. I would say Facebook was used to the max as part of a campaigning tool. It will be effective to the sphere of listeners who are willing to listen or who had been brainwashed by the establishment side. You also have a group of nerd who are brainwashed by the opposition side. Anything the opposition said is the gospel truth. So you have both sides.59

Jeff Ooi’s political rivals had a similar complaint. Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz pointed out that a YouTube video about Anwar Ibrahim was banned within about half an hour of being uploaded. He blamed the “organized” DAP machinery for filing a report against the video, resulting in its removal. Pro-UMNO blogger A, who is a social media operator for the party, revealed that there was an online attack on Prime Minister Najib Razak’s Chinese New Year message through the use of dislikes on YouTube. Elaborating that he constantly monitored the Web for such occurrences, blogger A explained, There was an attack done. So I sent out another set of group just to counter that. This is serious. I keep my set of network ... so the people [will] pass the message on.... Now the game is more serious. You have special war rooms to monitor all these. This is the UMNO side.60

The country’s uber-blogger Dr Mahathir Mohamad was not spared from such activity. He had an article titled “Chinese Dilemma” removed by Facebook.61 When asked about the incident in an interview for this book, the former prime minister sounded nonchalant when he said,

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When they don’t like something, they don’t want you to say it. But when they say something that other people don’t like, they say it is their right. That is the problem. I said it in response to what the other side said. I did not write a book on the Chinese dilemma. But when you say you are indigenous, I have to reply and when I reply, I am racist. But when you are proposing to have your cake and eat it, you say I have no right to reply. That is a denial of my right.62

The narratives of the research participants demonstrated that the cyberattacks appeared to be a part of the campaign strategy adopted to sway public opinion in the Malaysian blogosphere. As politician-blogger Jeff Ooi pointed out, the social media provided a new space for information but it could also be abused. He said, “Arguments sometimes can be planted as hearsay. The nature of [an] untrained citizen journalist is that they don’t verify facts. People are susceptible to any news. Rumour sells better.”63 It may be part of the campaign strategy to cast a wider net of influence in cyberspace, but the practice makes it difficult for readers to discern facts from myths.

Summary For this group of bloggers during the election, the online platform does not have a uniform function, as they alluded to the importance of particular moments where blogging took on greater significance. Blogging was seen as an important part of electoral politics before and after the election period but not so during the official campaigning period. During this period a personalized method of campaigning was more crucial as the politicianbloggers felt that it was more important to meet voters directly. Some factors to affect the significance of blogs at particular moments in elections include the wider political economy of the media, the various target audiences and the existence of a digital divide. In the face of a tightly controlled mainstream media, online tools were considered an alternative avenue for politician-bloggers to build their personal and party reputations in the lead-up to the elections. Choosing to highlight the political scandals of rival politicians could work to indirectly boost the author’s own image. The Internet continued to be a crucial platform after the elections to promote and defend policies and decisions of state administrations, of which some of the bloggers became a part. Thus, the online platform could be deemed significant when politician-bloggers

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were blogging to advance their personal and party image both before and after the elections. On the other hand, the strategic use of online tools to boost the image of politician-bloggers and their parties before and after elections was a reminder that information could be slanted. This was evident in a couple of instances. Firstly, blogging was not used to publish the personal thoughts of politician-bloggers if there was the potential for such posts to jeopardize the image of the individual or the party. Secondly, boundaries between the private and public sphere appear to have been actively policed to prevent personal thoughts from harming the party image. If the online media were to be a successful political marketing tool, only information that could project a positive image would be published on the blogosphere. Thirdly, the alleged strategy of marshalling fake Facebook accounts and Twitter followers to discredit rivals made it difficult for readers to decipher what was true, half-true or false. This does nothing to improve the quality of information available to make decisions and for quality debates. The creation of fake Facebook accounts and Twitter followers became part of the cyber strategy of perception management and political marketing.

Notes   1. The official thirteen-day campaigning period of the twelfth Malaysian national election was from 24 February to 7 March 2008. Polling was held on 8 March 2008 (Election Commission Malaysia 2008a, p. 103). On 10 April 2013 The Star Online reported that nomination day for the 2013 election would be on 20 April, while the polling date was set for 5 May.   2. This understanding supports the idea that a blurring of lines between previously distinct categories — such as journalists and audiences, public relations and news — is recognized as a capability of the online medium (Bowman and Willis 2003; Bruns 2008; Perlmutter 2008).   3. Politician-blogger E, who is an elected state legislative assemblyman, asked to remain anonymous for this study. Interview with politician-blogger E, Shah Alam, 4 May 2010.  4. Politician-blogger F, who is an elected Parliamentarian, asked to remain anonymous for this study. Interview with politician-blogger F, Kuala Lumpur, 8 April 2010.   5. Interview with politician-blogger Tian Chua, Kuala Lumpur, 12 April 2010.  6. Follow-up interview with politician-blogger Lau Weng San, Subang Jaya, 3 January 2014.  7. Malaysiakini, 16 March 2011 (accessed 17 March 2011).

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 8. Radio Australia, 23 January 2013 (accessed 5 February 2015).   9. Internet World Stats, “Malaysia: Internet Usage Stats and Marketing Report”, 2010 (accessed 7 July 2010). 10. The Edge Malaysia, 24 March 2009 (accessed 14 June 2009). 11. Interview with politician-blogger Teng Chang Khim, Shah Alam, 26 April 2010. 12. Interview with politician-blogger Liew Chin Tong, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2010. 13. Interview with politician-blogger Lau Weng San, Petaling Jaya, 28 April 2010. 14. Interview with politician-blogger Lim Kit Siang, Petaling Jaya, 4 March 2010. 15. Lim Kit Siang used to write media statements that were faxed to mainstream media offices when he was chairman of the DAP in 1999. He also used to post his statements on the DAP website starting from 1997 and write on his blog beginning in 2005. He later moved his blog to a new site called Lim Kit Siang for Malaysia. 16. Lim Kit Siang’s blog, Lim Kit Siang for Malaysia, was considered an A-list or popular blog in terms of the high number of comments he received for his posts. A check on the number of comments for posts published in November 2007 and February–March 2008 showed an average of eighty-four comments per blog post during the three-month period. 17. Follow-up interview with Teng Chang Khim, Shah Alam, 15 March 2013. 18. The DAP support base had traditionally been the Chinese-educated working class and a small segment of the Indian community. Because of this, the late blogger Bernard Khoo remarked in an interview for this study, conducted in Petaling Jaya on 3 May 2010, that the DAP had been accused of being “too Chinese” and needed a “bit more colour” by attracting other communities to join the party. 19. Interview with Teng Chang Khim, Shah Alam, 26 April 2010. 20. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, PKR’s director of election strategies, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 21. Interview with politician-blogger E, Shah Alam, 4 May 2010. 22. A mass protest occured in Penang after the 2008 election when DAP secretarygeneral Lim Guan Eng, who was appointed Penang Chief Minister, was quoted by Bernama (the government news agency) as saying on 12 March of that year that he wanted to do away with practices under the New Economic Policy that awards special privileges to the Malays. It was later discovered that the

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news agency had misquoted the Penang Chief Minister. Two days later the editor-in-chief of Bernama, Yong Soo Heong, issued an apology, which was uncommon for the Malaysian media. 23. Interview with politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, Subang Jaya, 27 February 2010. 24. Malaysian Insider, 16 June 2010 (accessed 15 July 2010). 25. Anil Netto, “Penang Govt Says ‘Yes’ to Local Elections”, Anilnetto.com (blog), 3 March 2010 (accessed 29 July 2011). 26. Malaysian Insider, 14 August 2014 (accessed 9 February 2015). 27. Interview with Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, Petaling Jaya, 30 April 2010. 28. Interview with Lau Weng San, Petaling Jaya, 28 April 2010. 29. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 30. Ibid. 31. Mediajer, “Najib Are You Ready for BN? People: Nooo! – CNY@Penang, PSY Gangnam Style”, YouTube, 1 min., 5 sec., 11 February 2013 . 32. TV PAS News, “Najib dimalukan penonton Psy” [Najib embarrassed by Psy viewers], YouTube, 35 sec., 11 February 2013 . 33. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 34. Follow-up interview with Lau Weng San, Subang Jaya, 3 January 2014. 35. Follow-up interview with Jeff Ooi, Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2014. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Election Commission Malaysia, “Official Parliamentary Results for the 12th General Election”, 2008b (accessed 9 February 2015). See also The Star Online, 2013 (accessed 9 February 2015). 39. Follow-up interview with Teng Chang Khim, Shah Alam, 15 March 2013. 40. Follow-up interview with Jeff Ooi, Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2014. 41. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 42. Interview with Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, Subang Jaya, 21 November 2014. 43. Interview with Ahirudin Attan (more popularly known as Rocky), Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 44. Interview with Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, Subang Jaya, 21 November 2014. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid.

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47. The Kajang move is seen as a political ploy to oust former Selangor menteri besar Khalid Ibrahim from his post and pave the way for Anwar Ibrahim to be installed in his place. See the Malay Mail Online, 5 August 2014 (accessed 10 February 2015). 48. Theantdaily, 1 November 2013 (accessed 10 February 2015). 49. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 50. Interview with Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, Subang Jaya, 21 November 2014. 51. Theantdaily, 1 November 2013 (accessed 10 February 2015). See also Uppercaise, “Najib Has 51% Fake Twitter Fans, Anwar 27%”, Uppercaise (blog), 15 May 2013 (accessed 10 February 2015). 52. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 53. Follow-up interview with Jeff Ooi, Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2014. 54. Follow-up interview with Teng Chang Khim, Shah Alam, 15 March 2013. 55. Ibid. 56. Interview with Rafizi Ramli, Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2014. 57. The Star Online, 17 July 2014 (accessed 11 February 2015). 58. The Star Online, 23 July 2014 (accessed 2 February 2015). 59. Follow-up interview with Jeff Ooi, Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2014. 60. Follow-up interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 8 February 2013. 61. Malay Mail Online, 1 August 2013 (accessed 11 February 2015). 62. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2015. 63. Follow-up interview with Jeff Ooi, Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2014.

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4 Psychological Warfare and Leadership Change

This chapter argues that the dominant social and political forces in Malaysia appear to have influenced the manner in which the online platform has been used by partisan bloggers to shape public opinion during the general elections. It begins with a discussion of the particular social and political circumstances of the 2008 election to make sense of the online approach taken by the group of partisan bloggers. The 2008 election witnessed a convergent blogosphere where a sub-group of partisan bloggers, from both sides of the political divide, and some civil society bloggers established a loose coalition to oust the then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The loose grouping — known as the “band of brotherhood” or the “band of bloggers” — coordinated and managed the flow of online information to achieve their political goal.1 The fluid ties, however, collapsed after the 2008 election and, by 2013, the Malaysian blogosphere became “very partisan”.2 Members of the band of brotherhood returned to their political shells, in part because of the results of the 2008 election which saw the opposition coalition denying the ruling regime’s traditional two-thirds majority. The 2013 election saw the clash of two main divergent political forces — the ruling and opposition coalitions — with the opposing camps adopting various online strategies to win the “psychological warfare”.3 The politically divided blogosphere could also be interpreted as a representation of the contentious relationships among members of the loose network formed in the run-up to the 2008 election. The majority of the pro-UMNO bloggers who were critical of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 115

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and the government in 2008 became online defenders of the government and Prime Minister Najib Razak in the 2013 election. By then attacks by the pro-UMNO bloggers were focused on the opposition coalition and their leaders. On the other hand, pro-opposition bloggers who had been traditionally anti-establishment remained aligned against the ruling regime in 2013. The battle lines were clearly drawn and the Malaysian blogosphere in 2013 reflected the partisan landscape of the time. Ahirudin Attan commented that, “After 2008, there was us and them.”4 The two political camps sought to paint their rivals in a negative light. They coordinated and managed the online battle through their volunteers and supporters, some of whom appeared to be remunerated for their efforts. This led to accusations and counter-accusations of bloggers being paid to promote particular politicians through fake blogs and Facebook accounts and with fake Twitter followers. Allegations of this nature were made by both political camps. The online platform that was heralded with so much democratic potential seemed to have degenerated into a vehicle for contending parties to manage public perception by the employment of agenda setting for the 2013 election. An analysis of the loose coalition formed during the 2008 election produced two key findings. The first of these is that the coalition reflected existing relationships and ideological structures in a Malaysian society dominated by the politics of race. An examination of the membership of the band of brotherhood showed it to be composed predominantly of “Malay influential bloggers” who largely supported UMNO and the Malay opposition parties, mainly PAS and PKR.5 Although there were a few non-Malay bloggers in the band of brotherhood, the majority were Malays. This mirrors the dominant political position of the Malays in Malaysian society. The Malaysian blogosphere in 2008 provided a snapshot of the undercurrents of UMNO politics, particularly the contentious relations between factions connected to the immediate past prime minister at the time, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, and his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The use of the Internet to tarnish reputations was a reminder of the common practice of circulating surat layang (anonymous letters alleging various wrongdoings) to discredit political enemies, which could become particularly intense during the UMNO party elections (Raja Petra Kamarudin 2009; Wain 2009). Thus the Malaysian blogosphere of 2008 partly reflected the power struggle between two political elites of UMNO. The online platform could thus provide some transparency to the party infighting that would normally be conducted behind closed doors, privy

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mainly to UMNO members. Similar accounts of internal power struggles, including within PAS and PKR, became more easily available online after the 2013 election, as people started using the medium to air their views about party matters. The second finding is that an examination of the political alignment of members of the loose coalition indicated that the blogosphere was structured according to the interests of former media and political elites. Some of the “Malay influential bloggers” were former mainstream media and political elites whose access to the mainstream news media had been curtailed during the premiership of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Several research participants described themselves as “pro-UMNO bloggers” aligned with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the country’s fourth prime minister who had been in power for twenty-two years, from 1981 to 2003.6 The “psychological warfare”7 carried out by pro-UMNO bloggers could be interpreted as a move supported by powerful elites to pressure Abdullah Ahmad Badawi into resigning as UMNO president. This pointed to the potential for the online media to be appropriated by powerful elites to exert their dominance on the country’s political agenda.

Political Factors Contributing to the Forging of Ties The story of blogging during the 2008 general election was connected to a move to destabilize the president of the country’s dominant Malay political party, UMNO, in 2006 and 2007. The conflict, initially designed on the blogosphere as a move to “cleanse UMNO from within” later snowballed into an attempt to change the national leadership and the ruling regime in the 2008 election. The effort to “cleanse UMNO from within” referred to an attempt by pro-UMNO bloggers aligned to Dr Mahathir Mohamad to pressure Abdullah Ahmad Badawi into giving up his position as UMNO president. Several pro-UMNO bloggers8 disclosed in separate interviews that it was considered timely then because members were expecting a party election and not a general election. Instead, Abdullah called for a national election. As a result, the initial endeavour to affect a leadership change within UMNO shifted to the national level. Although Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took over from Dr Mahathir Mohamad as UMNO president and prime minister on 31 October 2003, the latter continued to wield enormous influence among his followers and party members who remained loyal to him (Raja Petra Kamarudin 2009). Given the culture of political patronage in Malaysia, as discussed in

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Chapter One, it was not surprising that the latter continued to enjoy the support of party members, because the former UMNO president and prime minster had been in power for more than two decades. When Abdullah began reversing some of the decisions put in place by Mahathir, the latter began voicing his discontentment9 (Wain 2009, p. 307–39). Abdullah further earned the wrath of Mahathir when it was later alleged that the former had blocked his predecessor’s bid for the position of a divisional delegate to UMNO’s general assembly in November 200610 (Reme 2006). Unfortunately for Mahathir, his grievances did not receive much coverage in the mainstream media. In some instances he claimed that mainstream newspaper editors had twisted his statements “to suit their own political agenda”.11 He also believed that the government under Abdullah had been blocking his views from reaching the people. In an interview for this book, Mahathir recalled, For some unknown reason, the [then] government decided to blackout anything that I said. It was not that I was not allowed to talk [but] anybody who invited me to talk were told to withdraw the invitation. Newspapers were not allowed to publish anything about me. I felt that I couldn’t communicate with the people. Then I realize that [there is] the Internet and if I have a blog, I can communicate again and can give my views. That’s how I began.12

Control over UMNO-linked media organizations was consolidated in the hands of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi after he took over as president and prime minister. He replaced the top management and editorial teams in UMNO-linked media organizations such as the New Straits Times, Sunday Times, Malay Mail and TV3 with people he trusted. Kalimullah Hassan was made group editor of New Straits Times Press (M) Berhad (NSTP), which owns English daily the New Straits Times.13 Kamarulzaman Zainal, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s former press secretary, was made executive director in 2003 of Media Prima Berhad under a restructuring exercise in Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad, which had majority control of NSTP. Following this Media Prima Berhad became “Malaysia’s largest newspaper publishing company” having total control of TV3 and 43.5 per cent equity in NSTP (Zaharom and Wang 2004, p. 264). The new appointments, however, ruffled the feathers of many editors and journalists, who later left the industry.14 Several editors of UMNOlinked newspapers who were appointed during Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s tenure as prime minister resigned from their posts and many started

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blogging about the country’s social and political landscape. Among them were Ahirudin Attan, whose blog is the popular Rocky’s Bru, and Nuraina Samad, who runs the blog No 3540 Jalan Sudin. Other influential former editors included Kadir Jasin, who started his popular blog known as The Scribe, and Ahmad Talib who kept a blog called Pahit Manis (Bitter Sweet). This contributed to a situation where former media elites, particularly from UMNO-linked news groups, began making their online presence felt before the general election in 2006 and 2007. The blogging phenomenon came at an opportune moment for these prominent media and political actors whose access to the mainstream news media had very recently been curtailed. The Internet subsequently became a tool for former media and political elites to publish their views. One such elite was former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who received wide coverage in the online news portal Malaysiakini and UMNO website MyKMU.net.15 The retired premier had his views published on the MyKMU.net website, which had been described as “Mahathir’s blog” by pro-UMNO blogger Ruhanie Ahmad.16 In a separate interview for this book, pro-UMNO blogger A revealed that the MyKMU. net website, which writes about UMNO politics, was run by a group of well-organized individuals who collectively financed the site.17 Pro-UMNO blogger A, who is one of UMNO’s social media operators, explained that the website was one of the early UMNO cybertroopers from 1997 to 1998 when UMNO was fighting Anwar Ibrahim’s reformasi in cyberspace. An examination of the website showed that from mid-2006, MyKMU. net had been publishing articles supportive of Mahathir and questioning the credibility of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as UMNO president. It also carried press statements by Mahathir expressing his dissatisfaction with his handpicked successor. The blogs of some of the former media elites, including pro-opposition news portal Malaysiakini, also provided publicity for Mahathir. Some of the blogs publicized the press conferences and events attended by the former leader. Active journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan pointed out that Mahathir, who was not writing a blog during the 2008 election, was “so against Pak Lah18 ... [and] he was basically using them [the blogs], from Raja Petra [Kamarudin] to Rocky’s Bru.”19 As some of the bloggers began highlighting statements critical of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi that were ignored by the government-controlled mainstream media, they were inevitably perceived as anti-establishment. A defamation suit20 brought against two bloggers — Ahirudin Attan and Jeff Ooi — by then group editor of UMNO-linked New Straits Times, Kalimullah Masheerul Hassan, and three others in January 2007 was considered a clampdown

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on the right to free speech on the Internet. The mainstream media was thus perceived to be complicit with the administration of Abdullah (Tan and Zawawi 2008). Support for the two bloggers at that time represented a struggle for freedom of speech and expression. The situation culminated in a united blogosphere, spurred on by the struggle for liberal democratic principles against the ruling coalition. The coming together of a sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers to fight for liberal democratic principles apparently presented an opportunity for pro-UMNO bloggers who were strategizing and coordinating the use of their blogs to oust Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. This observation was made by a pro-tem committee member of the National Alliance of Bloggers21 (All Blogs) that was set up to defend free speech and the right of expression. The pro-tem committee member, who was also a blogger and wanted to remain anonymous for this research, recalled that it was not a collective decision of All Blogs to run down Abdullah, but “it was obvious that there was a group which had a particular agenda and this was the UMNO group”.22 The fight for civil liberties against an oppressive regime subsequently morphed into the political drama of a power struggle between two powerful elites. An analysis of interviews with the partisan bloggers suggested that the blogosphere was evolving into a proxy fight (or wayang kulit23 in colloquial terms) between Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi for control of the UMNO agenda. This became obvious when politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, who was then involved in the band of brotherhood, remarked in an interview for this research, “We were facing Kalimullah and the gang because we fought and spoke on behalf of Mahathir. It is basically that. We defended Mahathir versus Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.”24 This was clearly supported by pro-UMNO bloggers aligned to Mahathir who felt they were being pitted against the team of bloggers hired by Azalina Othman25 and Khairy Jamaludin,26 both seen as supporters of Abdullah. Putting it succinctly, pro-UMNO blogger A explained: The other side we were up against was Azalina and Khairy. They were very raw. Her cybertroopers were young and not articulate. They were paid. This [our] side, you are dealing with Kadir Jasin, Ahmad Talib, the whole NST rejects … all the veteran cybertroopers fighting reformasi, Raja Petra [Kamarudin] and the Free Anwar Campaign … [they] are [now] on this [our] side, including Raja Petra.27

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Another pro-UMNO blogger, Ruhanie Ahmad, supported the observation when he revealed that there were “two opposing blocs” at that time. Ruhanie, a former UMNO parliamentarian, set out how “Abdullah’s [Ahmad Badawi] UMNO under Azalina [Othman] maintained a stable of bloggers who were paid quite well off, about RM2,500 [US$657] per head a month, just to discredit bloggers who were not proAbdullah.”28 The political scenario seemed to have been timely for pro-UMNO bloggers to push for a change in UMNO’s leadership by pressuring Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to step down as party president. The bloggers, perceived as anti-establishment with limited access to the mainstream media, had been expecting the then UMNO president to hold a party election. However, Abdullah unexpectedly dissolved Parliament in February 2008, paving the way for the country’s twelfth general election. This took many observers and political groups by surprise. The 2008 election was not due until 16 May 2009, at that time some nineteen months away (Election Commission Malaysia 2008a, p. 92). Thus the aim of changing the party leadership seemed to have shifted by 2008 to one of changing the national leadership. As pro-UMNO blogger A revealed: We, the pro-UMNO bloggers [aligned to Dr Mahathir Mohamad], did not want a general election. We just want to pressure him [Abdullah Ahmad Badawi] to the point where he realizes he has no choice but to quit. I think the fourth floor boys29 [aligned to Abdullah] were thinking of a purge [to get rid of leaders disloyal to Abdullah]. So they were thinking of using the general election to purge.30

Then pro-UMNO blogger, Syed Azidi Syed Aziz,31 agreed in a separate interview that blogging during the 2008 election was aimed at changing the party leadership. Dr Mahathir Mohamad also acknowledged in an interview for this book that he was critical of the government during the 2008 election. This provided insight into the initial efforts among pro-UMNO bloggers to use their blogs to overthrow Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The campaign to change the party leadership was later extended to the national level when Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies were dissolved to make way for the 2008 election.

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Private Meetings and the Secret Pact that Led to the Band of Brotherhood Interviews with the partisan bloggers disclosed that secret meetings targeting influential Malay bloggers were held to set up a blog campaign aimed at tarnishing the image of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi with the aim of removing him from power. Partisan bloggers from both sides of the political divide attended these private meetings which drew up secret agreements on how to conduct the propaganda campaign. The private meetings were described as part of an effort to initiate “psychological warfare” against the national leadership. This was revealed by several pro-UMNO bloggers in separate interviews for this research. Partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz explicitly described the campaign as a form of “psychological warfare”, with the blog being the “best weapon” for that purpose.32 He believed that pro-establishment bloggers who were critical of the BN leadership would be deemed more credible to readers. This is because pro-BN or pro-UMNO supporters traditionally are not openly critical of their own political party. If they expressed open criticism of their own party this would be regarded as putting out “more accurate” accounts of the government. Partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz explained: So when a group of pro-establishment or pro-government bloggers mostly aligned to Mahathir, moves to the other side and starts to attack the government, the people will trust them. For example, [former editors] Rocky [Ahirudin Attan], Nuraina [Samad], [former UMNO Parliamentarian] Ruhanie [Ahmad] and [former editor] Kadir Jasin.33

The use of blogging as a form of psychological warfare to undermine political enemies was also obvious from the narratives of pro-UMNO bloggers A and B. For example, pro-UMNO blogger B described blogging as a way for him to not only share his thoughts and views but to also create blog content to “gun down other political personalities”.34 ProUMNO blogger A described blog efforts to tarnish Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s reputation by alleging that he owned a house in Perth as “propagandistic”. He explained, “Everybody just talked about it. That was very propagandistic. To be frank, we were unable to prove the house. But no one tried to disprove it too.”35 Recalling the first secret meeting that resulted in an informal yet organized effort to set up the band of brotherhood, several pro-UMNO

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bloggers confirmed that the initial meeting was held in February 2007 at the National Press Club, located on Jalan Tangsi, about a hundred metres away from Bukit Aman (police headquarters) in Kuala Lumpur. Then proUMNO blogger, Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, explained: I would say 10 to 11 influential Malay bloggers and we formed a secret plan. We had three to four meetings. Among those at the first meeting were me, Rocky [Ahirudin Attan], Raja Petra Kamaruddin, Syed Akbar Ali, Datuk Ruhanie [Ahmad]. Kadir Jasin was not around but he sponsored the meal. Mahathir’s [Mohamad] special officer Sufi [Yusoff ] was there. They came from all sorts of background. Raja Petra [Kamarudin] was webmaster of Free Anwar Campaign, Ruhanie [Ahmad] was hardcore UMNO blogger.36

Pro-UMNO blogger A described the first meeting as “strange because we had the PKR people, we had the pro-UMNO people, we had the journalists, we had the pro-PAS people and everybody was quiet and we used very measured words.”37 He pointed out that the attempt to bring down Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was a “concerted effort” which included, Go[ing] after the two [Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Khairy Jamaludin] and we will unite on issues. We will have common grounds on certain issues. We will play on those issues and then we attack. Back then, we agreed that Malaysia Today will be the conduit. That was when he [Raja Petra Kamarudin] started opening up to even opposing views.38

Malaysia Today39 was a popular blog run by Raja Petra Kamarudin, who is now self-exiled in London. Raja Petra Kamarudin started hosting postings from other blogs which he later categorized as “From around the Blogs”.40 A blog post in Rocky’s Bru on 19 February 2007 that introduced the new feature “From around the Blogs” also implicated the role of Malaysia Today in the secret pact. However, interviews with Raja Petra Kamarudin for this research failed to materialize despite repeated attempts. Elaborating on the efforts of the band of brotherhood, the group agreed that the aim was not to change the government so that the opposition would win but it was only to ensure a leadership change within UMNO. The members of the secret meeting, according to partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, agreed on several things. First, it was important to ensure Kelantan remained under the opposition rule of PAS. This was necessary because if Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had managed to win Kelantan in the

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2008 election he would be remembered as the leader who had achieved something that even Mahathir had failed to do. The members of the meeting were clear that UMNO must remain in power but that its powers must be eroded by winning fewer seats in the general elections. This, it was hoped, would create enough public anger to force Abdullah into resigning.41 Second, the bloggers agreed to highlight particular issues that would be kept alive by other bloggers who would follow up with different angles. The various investigative angles would ensure the issues were made relevant to a wide range of audiences. Third, the group recognized the importance of offline materials and pushed the Malay opposition party members and pro-Mahathir machinery within UMNO to print the blog postings and circulate them in rural areas where Internet penetration was low. Members of the band of brotherhood were essentially utilizing their blogs to shape public opinion to try to set the agenda that would have an impact on different groups of audiences, including those who were living in remote areas of the country. Further meetings ensued. According to pro-UMNO blogger A, they used to meet at their favourite mamak42 restaurant in Bangsar, Kuala Lumpur. The list of targets apparently grew to include UMNO cabinet ministers who were either supportive of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi or UMNO leaders who were critical of Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Apart from Abdullah and his son-in-law Khairy Jamaludin, other UMNO ministers believed to be targeted by pro-UMNO bloggers in the band of brotherhood were Syed Hamid Albar, Azalina Othman, Zainudin Maidin, Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor and Nazri Aziz. Of the targets listed, only Zainudin Maidin lost in the general election. Despite this, members of the band of brotherhood felt blogging was effective in contributing to the ruling regime’s dismal performance at the polls. Some pro-opposition and civil society bloggers took advantage of the political strife within UMNO and the secret pact of the band of brotherhood to bag a victory at the 2008 election. Parts of the secret plan worked out to be in line with the aspirations of pro-opposition and civil society bloggers who wanted to undermine Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and his administration. Some of them seized on this by linking or copying blog posts that portrayed the then UMNO president in a negative light. For example, partisan blogger D, who is a PAS member and was an active social media campaigner for the party in both the 2008 and 2013 elections, attributed the victory of the opposition in the 2008 election to the discontent of Dr Mahathir Mohamad towards Abdullah. Pro-opposition blogger D made the following observation about the political situation at the time:

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When Mahathir’s criticisms against Abdullah Badawi became louder, I saw it as a chance to raise public sentiments against the government. At that time, PAS was merely taking advantage of Mahathir’s dissatisfaction with Abdullah. For example, PAS did not agree with the construction of a crooked bridge down south43 but when Abdullah cancelled the project and earned the wrath of Mahathir, we just hopped onto the bandwagon and took advantage of the political situation.44

Several civil society bloggers teamed up with the band of brotherhood for a common political goal. They were civil society bloggers Haris Ibrahim, the late Bernard Khoo and civil society blogger H.45 In an interview for this research, civil society blogger H disclosed the following: It happened we had the same line of thinking. Sometimes we did not meet. We had one intention and our “wavelength” was the same. We wrote different angles and took different approaches but it was on the same thing — hentam (criticize) Pak Lah [Abdullah Ahmad Badawi] and UMNO. I became friendly with some of the UMNO bloggers who were anti-Pak Lah.46

Haris Ibrahim knew about the “secret pact” to get rid of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi but he was not too clear then about the objective of pro-UMNO bloggers to keep the BN in power.47 Haris Ibrahim — who writes for his blog called The People’s Parliament — wanted a regime change, while the pro-UMNO bloggers only wanted Abdullah removed as UMNO president. This reflected the fluidity of online ties and the capacity for diverse elements of the blogosphere to unite at particular junctures in electoral politics. Not all the bloggers who got together to defend their right of free expression on the Internet agreed with the political agenda of the proUMNO bloggers. In an interview for this study, civil society blogger Susan Loone pointed out several reasons for not wanting to be a part of the band of brotherhood. She disagreed with an initial idea to officially register an association of bloggers who were in support of freedom of speech and expression. Her reason was because “we wanted to be free, a loose kind of network for people to come in and out”.48 She explained that the idea of registering with the Registrar of Societies made a lot of bloggers feel uncomfortable. After attending one of the gatherings and observing the alliances and affiliations of some of the bloggers, Susan Loone pointed out,

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At that time, they were trying hard to get rid of Pak Lah which was okay. But they wanted Najib [Razak] instead. Mahathir’s influence was very much there. He did not turn up for their events but he sent his assistant Sufi [Yusoff ]. So I did not feel comfortable. We did not want to be made use of. So I decided to go on my own.49

Susan Loone seemed to ascribe strongly to a discourse of freedom and individualism as a blogger. Moreover, the support of pro-UMNO bloggers in the band of brotherhood for Najib Razak did not sit well with her perception of the current prime minister. She had been blogging about the possible involvement of Najib Razak, who was then deputy prime minister, with the Mongolian woman Altantuya Shaariibuu who was murdered in Kuala Lumpur in October 2006.50 The issue of trust seemed to be significant in determining how closely the civil society bloggers would work with each other. This appeared to be a factor that inhibited Susan Loone from teaming up with the group that surfaced in the 2008 election. The civil society blogger (who no longer blogs after 2012 but keeps a Facebook page) indicated that she did not want to get involved with the efforts of the band of brotherhood in the lead-up to the 2008 election because she “did not want to be made use of ” to promote the agenda of UMNO.51 She reached this conclusion after evaluating the background and affiliations of some of the prominent members of the group. Another civil society blogger, who wanted to remain anonymous in this research, felt the same way as Susan Loone. Civil society blogger J felt that some of the members of the band of brotherhood involved in the “secret pact” had a personal agenda in seeking to oust Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.52 The issue of trust that some of the bloggers had in relation to former media elites — such as Ahirudin Attan or Nuraina Samad — might be justified. On this point pro-UMNO blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz observed, To remember all those who were there [as part of the band of brotherhood], I am not sure where [Raja] Petra [Kamarudin] is but everybody is well reimbursed now. Rocky [Ahirudin Attan] has his datukship53 and Nuraina [Samad] is an editor. It is payback time.54

Despite some tension and non-cooperation from certain civil society bloggers, the band of brotherhood was able to unite to bring to bear diverse political forces aimed at bringing down Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, his son-in-law Khairy Jamaludin and numerous UMNO cabinet ministers. Pro-opposition bloggers, particularly those supporting PKR and PAS, took advantage of the

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move to fulfil their own political goal of winning power in the 2008 general election. Other civil society bloggers, who wanted a change in the regime, also took the opportunity to question the credibility of Abdullah and his administration. The narratives demonstrated that blogging facilitated the coming together of competing political forces that had an overlapping agenda of changing the UMNO leadership and the ruling regime at a particular moment in time. Partisan bloggers from the opposition and ruling parties, including some civil society bloggers, were united in the use of blogs to pursue a common goal. The band of brotherhood seemed to have crossed political boundaries but not racial lines, as indicated by a preponderance of Malay bloggers and Malay political party members. However, the online platform presented an opportunity for people who did not have access to the mainstream media to temporarily abandon their political affiliation in order to achieve a particularistic goal.

Managing the Blogosphere Information Flow The secret pact of the band of brotherhood spelt out how they managed and coordinated negative postings about Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and his administration in order to change public perceptions towards the ruling regime. The private agreement seems to have been carefully designed to take into account the varying roles and influence of the specific bloggers and their different audiences. As pointed out by some pro-UMNO bloggers, the credibility that individual bloggers had with their respective audiences was an important factor in capturing and convincing readers to follow their postings. These efforts demonstrated that members of the band of brotherhood actively sought to shape the dominant discourse in the blogosphere. The band of brotherhood also seemed to be conscious about the power-law distribution of influence in blogging pertaining to the relationship between the largest-trafficked blogs and audience sizes (Shirky 2009, pp. 125–29). In particular, popular blog Malaysia Today was used as a conduit for other less-trafficked blogs so that they could gain prominence on the blogosphere. Framing the UMNO leadership and prime minister as inefficient, weak, dishonest and corrupt was the most common method employed to change public attitudes. The pro-UMNO bloggers created the critical blog posts which were readily picked up by other pro-opposition and civil society bloggers. In some cases the bloggers kept more than one blog in order to publish the same negative posts, which were then linked to their

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own blogs. These efforts could capture a wider audience and create the perception that the same negative views were prevalent in the blogosphere. For example, pro-UMNO blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz divulged that he had two blogs, of which one was pseudonymous. Pro-UMNO blogger B also kept two blogs. Pro-UMNO blogger Ruhanie Ahmad, who pointed out that he was not involved in the coordinated blog campaign against Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, revealed that he ran four different blogs at the time. The efforts aimed at framing the ruling party in a negative light and Abdullah as a weak and corrupt leader were most commonly found in pseudonymous blogs.55 Managing the information flow required some form of coordination in order to dominate the blogosphere discourse. When a member of the band of brotherhood authored a negative post, it would be hyperlinked, replicated or presented with a different angle, giving the impression that the blogosphere was flooded with posts critical of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. For example, pro-UMNO blogger Ruhanie Ahmad recalled that some of his blog posts linked to the MyKMU.net website were picked up by opposition parties like the DAP.56 Some of his negative postings were also linked to the popular blog Malaysia Today. Pro-UMNO blogger B also disclosed that a lot of his articles appeared in Malaysia Today. Pro-UMNO blogger B further explained that members of the band of brotherhood would meet to coordinate the information flow. Pro-UMNO blogger B elaborated: “I would meet them and sometimes we planned the stories. I would inform them about a certain issue and I would ask if they could carry those stories. You do this angle and you do that angle. So, it was like ‘pakat’ [planned or coordinated].”57 Pro-UMNO blogger A also revealed that members of the band of brotherhood called each other regularly and met once a month to sound out ideas on what to post. They would also tag each other if they found interesting articles that were appropriate for their political agenda. He also recalled that Malaysia Today had agreed to be the “conduit” for the chain of issues against Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. It was after the secret pact that Raja Petra Kamarudin, webmaster of the Free Anwar Campaign in the late 1990s, began opening up his popular blog Malaysia Today to contents of pro-UMNO bloggers.58 This showed how the informal, ideologically varied network could become an organized group, coming together to achieve a particular political agenda through blogging. Without this kind of coordination, pro-UMNO blogger B believed that the flow of information and the underlying agenda would be less coherent and the people would be confused. Coordination on the kind of

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articles to be posted on their blogs also reflected the belief of pro-UMNO blogger A who observed that “flooding the Internet could result in other bloggers picking up our stories”,59 thus increasing the possibility that those messages would filter down to the audiences. This further explained how and why hyperlinks to other blogs could be used to direct audiences to read what the bloggers wanted them to read, thus giving the impression that the “unconnected” bloggers were incidentally discussing the same failures of the ruling regime. Efforts of the band of brotherhood to manage information flows in order to sway public opinion were also evident from a posting by pro-UMNO blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, who wrote in his blog that, [The secret meeting saw the] Malay big gun in the Malay blogosphere and one non-blogger whose agenda was to topple Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, using a well fine tuned orchestrate[d] informal movement within the bloggers’ circle.… We also strategized our postings by creating a chain of issues against Abdullah’s lifestyle, character, attitude and policies.60

The narratives indicated an effort among a sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers to highlight each other’s views in order to shape public opinion in cyberspace. However, actions taken to coordinate the efforts did not appear to be different from the pre-blog era, because meetings to develop strategy were held physically.

Involvement of Former Media and Political Elites An analysis of bloggers involved in the first secret meeting showed that they were influential people of high standing in society and not just ordinary citizens. Some were former media and political elites. Among the former media elites were Ahirudin Attan, Nuraina Samad, Kadir Jasin, Syed Akbar Ali and Sufi Yusoff, who was also Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s personal assistant. The former media elites were also politically connected. Others who were perceived as politically connected were Ruhanie Ahmad, who was then a former UMNO parliamentarian, pro-UMNO bloggers A and B, Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Raja Petra Kamarudin and Jeff Ooi, who was then a member of Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM), which is a coalition member of the BN. Jeff Ooi, in an interview for this book, clarified that he resigned from Gerakan in early July 2007 and joined the

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DAP on 31 July 2007, after he was invited to be a DAP candidate in the twelfth general elections.61 All of them except Sufi Yusoff and Syed Akbar Ali kept a blog during the 2008 election. The latter, who described himself in his blog profile as a newspaper columnist, a writer of two books and a company director, began blogging in October 2008. Many of the bloggers who attended the initial private meeting were popularly read A-list bloggers.62 Among the popular bloggers were the late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo, who ran the blog Zorro-Unmasked, pro-UMNO blogger B, Jeff Ooi of Screenshots, Raja Petra Kamarudin of Malaysia Today, Kadir Jasin of The Scribe, Ahirudin Attan of Rocky’s Bru, Nuraina Samad whose blog is 3540 Jalan Sudin and Syed Azidi Syed Aziz of the blog Kickdefella. Only the blogs of pro-UMNO blogger A and Ruhanie Ahmad were considered to be less popular B-list ones. This showed that the involvement of influential Malay bloggers was an important consideration in the use of blogs to shape public opinion. Interviews with the band of brotherhood about the relationship of former media elites with Dr Mahathir Mohamad pointed to the role of the former premier as the primary figure behind the pro-UMNO bloggers. Several factors suggested that Dr Mahathir Mohamad was the pillar behind the bloggers who strategized the use of their blogs to bring down his political nemesis Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. One was the presence of Mahathir’s personal assistant Sufi Yusoff at every bloggers’ meeting. Partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz observed that “his private secretary was not a blogger but he was there at the meeting, taking down notes.... [At] every bloggers’ meeting, he would be around.”63 Expressing a similar view in separate interviews for this research were politician-bloggers E and Jeff Ooi. Politician-blogger E believed that Dr Mahathir Mohamad supported the pro-UMNO bloggers’ campaign against Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, which continued after the 2008 general election. In the lead-up to the 2008 general election, politician-blogger E felt that the main targets were Abdullah, Khairy Jamaludin and Kalimullah Hassan. After the election, politician-blogger E observed that some of the pro-UMNO bloggers became more racist in their agenda and “Mahathir’s thinking was to control the bloggers so that he could then control the national and political agenda.”64 Jeff Ooi who was actively involved in the band of brotherhood before the election said: “He [Mahathir] provided us with a platform and he is still a force to be reckoned with as people sorely missed Mahathir especially with Abdullah’s ineffectiveness.” The former prime minister had also been going on roadshows in 2006 to voice his grievances and some of the members of the band of brotherhood were also actively publishing those

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activities on their blogs. It was also a common observation that Mahathir had been vocal about his grievances against his successor (Wain 2009). Thus, Mahathir’s name began surfacing as the primary figure behind the band of brotherhood. Mahathir was open about being critical of the government in the 2008 election during an interview for this book. However, he was not certain whether his criticisms had influenced the people into reducing their support for the government.65 One indisputable fact was the close ties Mahathir had with the former editors of the UMNO-linked media group, such as Ahirudin Attan, Nuraina Samad and Kadir Jasin. They were editors when Mahathir was UMNO president and prime minister. Ahirudin Attan was quick to blog about a press conference of Mahathir with the headline “Pak Lah should resign”, a day after the 2008 polls showed the dismal performance of the BN in the general elections.66 Kadir Jasin wrote the introduction for Mahathir’s book, Blogging to Unblock, published in 2008 (Mahathir 2008). A blog posting that seemed to concur with the perception that Mahathir was the influential figure behind the use of blogs to run down Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and his regime was made by Syed Akbar Ali on his blog Outsyed The Box in May 2010. Syed Akbar Ali, an attendee at the first secret meeting, wrote about the “clandestine meeting” held to discuss strategies among some influential bloggers at the National Press Club. Syed Akbar Ali singled out Mahathir as the “common factor uniting us all at that time”.67 Narratives of the partisan bloggers might not directly link the role of Mahathir in the strategic use of blogs in the 2008 election, but a recent interview with journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan spelt out clearly the involvement of the former premier. Acknowledging the involvement of Mahathir in backing the anti-Abdullah blogs in 2008, Ahirudin Attan remarked, He was so against Pak Lah. He was not writing but he was backing the blogs who were against Pak Lah. He was basically using them, from Raja Petra [Kamarudin] to [his own blog] Rocky’s Bru. We all went to his conferences, even Haris Ibrahim went to his conferences as he [Mahathir] was the guy you can push to clash with Pak Lah.68

Admitting that he was critical of the government in the 2008 election, Mahathir, however, downplayed his role behind the online movement against Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. When asked about the publishing of his views by pro-UMNO bloggers on the MyKMU.net website and on Rocky’s Bru blog, Mahathir said, “These people’s messages and comments on the

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blog showed that a lot of people were interested with what I was saying and the comments they made seem to say that they agreed with me and most of them agreed with me.”69 The retired premier denied influencing former mainstream media editors such as Ahirudin Attan and Abdul Kadir Jasin into carrying his views on their blogs when he said, They already have the view. They came to see me because they were frustrated. They say they don’t have the stature. They have the argument but not the stature. They believe that if I say it, people will take it seriously. So groups of people come to see me and say please do something. So sometimes I have to reflect their views.70

The former premier also disagreed that he was behind the recent airings of grievances published online by former mainstream editors like Abdul Kadir Jasin about current prime minister Najib Razak in 2015. He clarified, The opposite is true. Lots of people come to see me to voice their problems and objections to certain things and they ask me: “Do something, do something.” I merely respond to them to say that there is nothing I can do. The only thing I can do is to write in my blog. So my blog actually reflects their grouses, not the other way around.... I did not go to them to tell them please do this. They come to see me. Lots of people come to see me.... It is up to me whether I want to give my support to them or not. It is not that I instigated them but they asked me to do something.71

What is obvious from the narratives is the possibility that influential former media and political elites can be a force behind a blog campaign in an election. Those involved in the campaign were not ordinary citizens but were individuals who were already politically connected in society and they would attempt to set the blogosphere agenda. Malaysian cyberspace in 2008 demonstrated that the online platform can be a reflection of the existing social and ideological structures of society, rather than creating new ones.

A Collapse in the Band of Brotherhood After the opposition scored an overwhelming victory at the 8 March polls, the band of brotherhood began to disintegrate in 2009 as the political goal that bound members together was becoming a force for division. The 2008 election results revealed the divergent goals among the members as some

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of the pro-UMNO bloggers felt responsible for the dismal performance of the BN. For example, pro-UMNO bloggers A and B disclosed that they felt responsible for the BN’s huge losses in 2008. Pro-UMNO blogger B noted in an interview for this research that his blogging for 2008 was “to put a dent on Pak Lah’s leadership without sinking the ship”, while proUMNO blogger A was more explicit when he said, For us, UMNO bloggers, we have a guilty conscience. We almost toppled the government. If you did your math, we lost Selangor, Perak, Penang, Kedah, [which are] major industrial states where 70 per cent of the country’s revenue are from. You’ve lost your grasp on the nation, the heartbeat of the nation.72

The general election results were definitely not what the pro-UMNO bloggers in the band of brotherhood wanted. Some of their targets, such as Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Khairy Jamaludin, Azalina Othman, Syed Hamid Albar and Nazri Aziz were re-elected, while BN suffered a major setback to its almost fifty-year rule of the country. The pro-UMNO bloggers continued to pressure Abdullah to resign. Some of them began blaming him for the loss of BN’s two-thirds majority in Parliament. Support began to surface for the then deputy prime minister, Najib Razak, to replace Abdullah. The emergence of calls of support for Najib Razak also marked the beginning of the collapse of ties among members of the band of brotherhood. Some civil society members had teamed up with the band of brotherhood with the aim of changing the ruling regime. This segment would not endorse calls made by pro-UMNO bloggers, including some former media elites, to support Najib as a replacement for Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Najib went on to replace Abdullah as prime minister in April 2009.73 When Najib took over he became more favourably disposed towards bloggers and the use of social media, unlike the administration of Abdullah. The partisan bloggers returned to their respective political shells to paint their rivals in a negative light, while a sub-group of civil society bloggers active in the band of brotherhood sided with the opposition. Partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz pointed out that after 2008, Some who were supporting UMNO but hated Pak Lah, started to move back to UMNO and started to point their daggers at each other. When Najib took over, that’s it. Everything collapsed.... There’s a major shift. What’s left to attack the government is the real true blue opposition bloggers. The voice in the middle is no more there. We were not in

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the opposition but we were attacking the government [in 2008]. That position is gone. After Najib took over, that position is gone. You are either with the government or you are with the opposition.74

Making a similar observation, Ahirudin Attan explained that they started turning against each other and becoming partisan. He explained, “We started disintegrating and when we were not united, the blogosphere became more a subject of doubts and suspicion rather than trust.”75 Feeling partly responsible for the break-up, Ahirudin Attan remarked, Even I am not, not guilty. From whacking the Prime Minister to propping up his successor Najib. I was accused of being a turncoat. I was never against the government but I only went after just this one man [Abdullah Ahmad Badawi] and his people. I did not go after him to put Najib there. I saw myself as partly responsible in putting this man [Najib Razak] as PM.76

The re-appointment of some former media elites connected with the band of brotherhood to their positions in mainstream news organizations seemed to have further strained relations among its members. Several former media elites who left their jobs in the UMNO-linked stable of media organizations during the premiership of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi were reinstated.77 Among them were Ahirudin Attan, Nuraina Samad and Ahmad Talib78. Ahirudin Attan, who is now a board member of the Malay Mail, returned to the newspaper as chief executive officer in 2009,79 while Nuraina Samad, who is now retired, was reinstated as an editor of the New Straits Times. The new appointments came about a month after Najib Razak took over from Abdullah as the country’s sixth prime minister in April 2009.80 The break-up suggested that blogging could help create opportunistic associations at a particular moment in electoral politics to achieve a particularistic goal, but failed to build more enduring partnerships. The political landscape at different moments in the elections appeared to be an important factor in understanding how the online platform has been used in electoral politics.

A Partisan Blogosphere in the 2013 General Election The cyberspace battle for voter support saw a clear demarcation between pro-opposition and pro-ruling coalition bloggers. Describing the changing

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blogosphere scenario involving a sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers in 2008 and 2013, Ahirudin Attan said, In 2008, the late Bernard Khoo, Haris Ibrahim, Syed Akbar, myself, Zakhir [more popularly known as Big Dog], we can all sit down at the same table. After 2008, there was us and them.... Either you are with us or not. It was a bit harsh.... We are not enemies but we cannot sit together.81

The opposing political forces were competing keenly online, with each hoping to sway public opinion to their side. Each strategized different approaches to the online platform to try to outdo the other in the 2013 election. Cyber warfare attacks and counterattacks were planned, resulting in various blog campaigns and Facebook pages created to tarnish political rivals. UMNO had the structurally organized Unit Media Baru, the service of paid cybertroopers and a group of volunteers. On the part of the opposition, some of their supporters volunteered their work for free, some of them received token remuneration, while others were fully paid for their online efforts.82 Pro-UMNO blogger A, an active social media operator for the BN who was tasked with leading some of the online campaigns for the by-elections, observed that the contestation for support in 2013 was evenly matched. He elaborated: No one could have a hold of the blogosphere like we used to. We can control what was going to come up, no one has control now. In 2008, you can do that. We can set a certain tone.... Those days you can manipulate. These days you cannot.... So when there is no control, it is no longer a tool.83

He also pointed out that both sides were playing a “similar propaganda game” where similar tactics and strategies were being employed to sway public opinion; by “focusing on the good side” when promoting a political personality and “highlighting the bad side if you are attacking someone”.84 Just like in 2008, the online platform was used to tell the voters how to think about the political leaders as part of the online psychological warfare. However, unlike 2008, there was no “common punching bag” or a political rival to bring down in 2013. As the blogosphere grew more partisan in the lead-up to the 2013 election, efforts to coordinate the online campaign changed. Pro-UMNO bloggers were eager to have a hold over the blogosphere agenda. Through

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the Unit Media Baru, UMNO members in the rural areas were trained to be active online and to use the platform to go after their political rivals. This led to an increase in the number of UMNO bloggers and Facebookers and the appearance of a “new breed of UMNO bloggers”.85 In an interview for this book, pro-UMNO blogger B, who also became an active social media operator for UMNO, elaborated: Like Parpukari, Papagomo, they only came out after that. We call them the post-2008 bloggers. They are gaining a lot of attention, a lot of viewers, some of them were starting to form opinions.... But their readership is only for certain groups, the Malay-speaking ones.... They are talking to the converted but not new readers.... They operate quite separately.86

For pro-UMNO bloggers, the blogosphere became more multidimensional, with different groups operating at different levels for the party and individual leaders. An analysis of the interviews with several pro-UMNO bloggers showed that at one level the post-2008 UMNO bloggers wrote sensational stories, taking gossip and turning it into an exposé, much in the manner of a tabloid newspaper. At another level others were trained to write and run online news portals for the 2013 election. Yet others were focused on writing about the national agenda. Pro-UMNO blogger A felt that members of this “new breed of bloggers” were good irritants to the opposition, but at times they could also be detrimental for the BN. As partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz pointed out, When we talk about how UMNO financed or groomed the social media group, a lot of them backfired on UMNO. The game is totally different when you are in government and when you are in opposition. UMNO’s social media troops were trying to play a game like the opposition social media group. When you are in the opposition, you can oppose anything. But when you are in government and when you play videos like Anwar Ibrahim’s video, just before the election, you play Mustafa Ali’s sex video, it affected the government.... Some people don’t care. Whatever the leaders’ sexual tendencies is not my problem. But how he is going to build or develop or govern me is of concern to me. So, when UMNO blogger play with that issue and overplay it, it has an adverse effect to UMNO.87

However, pro-UMNO blogger B believed that the “new breed of bloggers” became popular and began to receive funding from people who liked

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their work. Unit Media Baru, which ran like an UMNO outfit, initially recruited them but was unable to control them, as acknowledged by its former chairman Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz. The problem, according to pro-UMNO blogger A, was “if you don’t get them on your payroll, you cannot control writers”.88 Concurring with pro-UMNO blogger A about the growing phenomenon of paid bloggers, Ahirudin Attan made a similar observation: A lot of the blogs, Facebook and Twitter accounts that belonged to UMNO or UMNO supporters had since closed down in 2013. Once, I asked what was happening and they said “tak ada [no] budget.” That is the reality — no money, no service. In Pakatan [Rakyat], the money stops at a certain level. It does not go right down to the person opening the blog, say in Cheras. Where BN is concerned ... it is something to do with party membership. You have to be a member to benefit from the party. DAP is not a membership-driven party. It does not go out to boast it has one million members.89

The high number of paid bloggers appeared to have resulted in the creation of an overwhelming number of pseudonymous blogs to mask the identities of their paymasters. This situation could lead to a kind of wayang kulit, or shadow play, in Malaysian politics. The online platform in the 2013 election rapidly became a tool for contesting parties to discredit their rivals. In an interview for this book, Ahirudin Attan pointed out that the use of technology to deceive, to doctor photographs and to poke fun at people became commonplace in the blogosphere. He elaborated: When deal[ing] with anonymous players, social media became very ruthless, brutal and it is not always BN versus PR. It became very dirty when it is used by someone in BN to attack or bring down another person in BN itself.... It happens in Pakatan [Rakyat] as well.90

The use of the Internet by partisan bloggers on behalf of politicians to discredit their political rivals was not confined to just the national election. After the 2013 election some bloggers used the online platform to promote particular politicians in party elections. For example, two proPAS bloggers,91 who wanted to remain anonymous for this study, revealed that they used the online platform to attack the BN coalition in the 2013 election; however, after this was over the two bloggers shared information and coordinated their online efforts with other bloggers in Penang, Ipoh

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and Kuala Lumpur to push for certain leaders to be elected in the party election in November 2013.92 Pro-PAS blogger C revealed that he used more than one blog to push his political messages to his readers, much like some of the pro-UMNO bloggers.93 Another active pro-PAS blogger, who was involved in the social media war for the party, indicated that many pseudonymous Facebook pages were created to promote certain party leaders.94 The new medium was also becoming a window that enabled readers to peek into the internal strife of parties from both sides of the political divide. The return of several former media editors who became bloggers in 2008 to the media establishment saw a “selective” convergence of the online platform and the mainstream media industry. The contents of some of the pro-UMNO blogs were used by the mainstream media to further the agenda of the dominant party. The mainstream media were quick to incorporate social media into the BN’s campaign machinery. This was in contrast to the situation in 2008 when former mainstream media editors were marginalized. Putting it succinctly, partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz said, Since 2008, once UMNO or the government recognized the use of social media, the tendency of newspapers and TV was to quote social media.... I get a few front pages in Utusan [Malaysia] for whatever reasons.... Previously they were not allowed to quote the social media. After Najib took over, they started quoting the social media.95

One obvious example was when blog postings were cited as sources by Utusan Malaysia on 7 May 2011 to run down the opposition. Quoting the postings of two pro-UMNO blogs, the UMNO-linked Utusan Malaysia ran a front-page report claiming a clandestine meeting was held in DAP-led Penang to hatch a plan to turn the country into a Christian state. The article was later denied by Jelutong MP Jeff Ooi.96 The narratives thus far have demonstrated that the blogosphere in 2013 was clearly demarcated. Pseudonymous blogs and Facebook pages flooded the Malaysian cyberspace, either because the partisan bloggers wanted to avoid legal prosecution for their content or paid bloggers wanted to hide the identity of their paymasters. The clicking of likes and dislikes afforded by the online platform was used to strategize various forms of attack and counterattack in cyberspace. The aim of the cyber

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contestation was to change public perceptions to garner support at the ballot boxes. More importantly, the manners in which the online tool was utilized suggest that the political realities and the broader political economy of the media appeared to be important factors in influencing how the new media were used at different moments in Malaysian electoral politics.

Summary During the 2008 election, information flows were managed by a sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers to achieve a particular goal. Efforts to flood and shape the blogosphere with political scandals demonstrated how biased information was managed to fulfil the functions of framing and priming. Although the political landscape had changed during the 2013 election, the partisan bloggers continued to highlight scandals of rival politicians in the blogosphere. The online platform provided an opportunity for this group of bloggers to voice and express their views, but the focus on political scandals did not contribute to more informed public debate. The use of blogs to highlight political scandals involved various strategies, from seeking out influential Malay bloggers to framing, managing and coordinating information flows in the blogosphere. The efforts emerged from strategic planning of members of the band of brotherhood to organize bloggers and manage the flow of blog information to shape public opinion towards the national leadership. It was a consciously created network to achieve a specific goal at a particular point in time. After the collapse of the group, different forms of coordination and approaches were used to strategize the use of the online platform in the 2013 election. In other words the blog campaign did not just occur due to the availability of new digital technologies; rather it grew out of the socio-political environment at a particular moment in electoral politics. Blogging as part of scandal politics could also be interpreted as a reflection of the wider socio-political environment. Campaigns to tarnish the character of certain personalities in UMNO through the production and circulation of surat layang97 (flying letters, or poison pen letters) were not new to Malaysian political culture. Such materials used to take the form of pamphlets but they made their way into the online environment.

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The traditional method of circulating surat layang to UMNO members on alleged scandals of political rivals spilled over into the blogosphere. The political culture of assassinating the character of political rivals became commonplace during the general elections. Thus, blogging as part of scandal politics appeared to mirror the wider political culture of Malaysian politics. The blogosphere in 2008 appeared to be structured according to the interests of former media and political elites. The involvement of former media elites and their connection to certain powerful figures in Malaysian politics were indicative of their dominant presence in the blogosphere. As narratives about politicians hiring cyberwriters to further their political messages grew in the 2013 election, the findings demonstrate the possibility that political elites with huge financial resources could dominate the blogosphere discourse. This demonstrated that the Internet could become the voice of certain political elites, thus negating the democratic potential of blogging and reflecting the existing structures of society (Margolis and Resnick 2000; Cammaerts 2008; Hindman 2009). The tendency for powerful elites to dominate the blogosphere discourse could lead to a lack of confidence in the validity of online political content. The Malaysian blogosphere could potentially become a place where it would be difficult for readers to discern the accuracy of content found there. Readers must question the source and reason for particular blog content or Facebook postings, as well as consider the political elites who might benefit from such content. As pointed out by Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, the former chairman of Unit Media Baru, “You have to be careful and understand the game behind the postings. Sometimes it is a game and sometimes it is real.”98

Notes  1. For more details about the loose grouping, see the Introduction to this book.   2. Interview with journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan, more popularly known as Rocky, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014.   3. The term was used by pro-UMNO blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz to describe the cyber battle in 2008 in an interview in Kuala Lumpur on 22 February 2010.   4. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014.

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  5. PAS and PKR have historical links with UMNO. PAS was a member of the BN in 1973 but left the coalition in 1974. PKR, an UMNO breakaway faction, was formed after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim in 1997.  6. Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, “Profile of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad”, 18 June 2010 (accessed 30 September 2010).   7. The term was used by partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz in an interview in Kuala Lumpur on 22 February 2010.  8. The three partisan bloggers were Syed Azidi Syed Aziz and pro-UMNO bloggers A and B. All three were pro-UMNO bloggers. Pro-UMNO bloggers A and B, who are online media operators for UMNO, had asked to remain anonymous for this study.   9. Among the issues that Mahathir was unhappy with Abdullah about were the cancellation on 11 April 2006 of the crooked bridge planned to link Johor to Singapore and the sale of the country’s 57.57 per cent stake in Augusta, an Italian motorcycle company, for one euro (Ooi 2007; Wain 2009). 10. Ruhanie Ahmad, “AJK cawangan buat laporan polis dedahkan konspirasi MT UMNO?” [Branch committee member lodged police report exposing conspiracy in UMNO supreme council?], Kuda Kepang (blog), 6 November 2007 (accessed 24 September 2010). 11. Patriot, “What TDM Actually Said”, MyKMU.net (blog), 14 April 2006

(accessed 6 June 2010). At the time of writing the post had been deleted by the blog’s administrator. A copy is available with this author. 12. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2015. It is important to note here that his blog, Blogging to Unblock, revealed that he only began blogging after the 2008 election in May of that year. 13. Ahirudin Attan, “The Malay Mail: A Second Tour of Duty”, Rocky’s Bru (blog), 30 May 2009 (accessed 6 July 2011). 14. Ibid. 15. At the time of writing, checks at MyKMU.net revealed that the website administrators had deleted all posts that recorded Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s criticism of his successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The blog posts were published between 2006 and 2008. 16. Interview with partisan blogger Ruhanie Ahmad, Bangi, Selangor, 2 March 2010. 17. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, who asked to remain anonymous in this research, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2010. 18. A name commonly used to refer to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

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19. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 20. The Star Online, 30 January 2007 (accessed 13 July 2010). The online news portal reported that Jeff Ooi was sued for thirteen articles that appeared on his blog Screenshots while Ahirudin Attan was charged with defamation for forty-eight articles that he posted on his blog Rocky’s Bru. The case was settled in 2012 after Ahirudin Attan and Jeff Ooi apologized for the contents of their blogs. See the Malaysian Insider, 31 January 2012 (accessed 8 April 2015). 21. The National Alliance of Bloggers was an organization formed after Ahirudin Attan and Jeff Ooi were sued by the New Straits Times Press. The group members identified themselves by use of the icon “Bloggers United” on their blogs. The late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo disclosed in an interview for this study on 3 May 2010 in Petaling Jaya, that the pro-tem committee, headed by the two personalities, wanted to register the association with the Registrar of Societies of Malaysia, but was met with objections from other bloggers. 22. Interview with politician-blogger E, Shah Alam, 4 May 2010. 23. See Chapter One for an explanation of wayang kulit. 24. Interview with politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, Subang Jaya, 27 February 2010. 25. Azalina Othman was the head of Puteri UMNO, the women’s youth wing of the party. She was also Youth and Sports Minister at that time. 26. Khairy Jamaludin is the son-in-law of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. At that time he was also the Deputy Head of Pemuda UMNO, the youth wing of the party. 27. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2010. 28. Interview with partisan blogger Ruhanie Ahmad, Bangi, 2 March 2010. 29. Malaysian Mirror, 30 June 2009 (accessed 7 September 2010). In the online news portal it is reported that the phrase “fourth floor boys” was used to refer to aides of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, including his son-in-law Khairy Jamaludin, who occupied the fourth floor of the Prime Minister’s Office in Putrajaya. They were accused of using their positions to influence some of the administrative decisions of Abdullah. At the time of writing, the commentary in question had been deleted by the administrator of the portal. A copy of the opinion piece is available on Malaysia Today, 30 June 2009 (accessed 14 July 2014). 30. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2010. 31. Partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, who was an UMNO member during the 2008 election, revealed that he was no longer a member of UMNO

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when he was interviewed for this research in Kuala Lumpur on 22 February 2010. 32. Interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 22 February 2010. 33. Ibid. 34. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger B, Kuala Lumpur, 15 March 2010. 35. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2010. 36. Interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 22 February 2010. 37. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2010. 38. Ibid. 39. The popular A-list blog received an average of ninety-five comments per post published within the three-month period selected for this research. 40. Syed Akbar Ali, “Syed Azidi Syed Aziz”, OutSyed the Box (blog), 3 May 2010

(accessed 4 September 2010). At the time of writing, Syed Akbar Ali had deleted all posts published after the 2008 general elections. His blog now contains postings written in 2014. 41. This scenario is similar to the events that saw the country’s first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, forced out of power when the ruling coalition performed badly in the 1969 general election. Dr Mahathir Mohamad was one of the UMNO leaders who were vocal in calling for the resignation of the Tunku. See Chapter One for more details. 42. This is a common term used to refer to restaurants run by Malaysians of Indian Muslim descent. 43. The crooked bridge project — planned to link Johor to Singapore — was approved by Mahathir during his tenure as prime minister, but Abdullah Ahmad Badawi cancelled the project after he took over, thus turning Mahathir against him (Ooi 2007). 44. Interview with pro-opposition blogger D, Kuala Lumpur, 1 March 2010. 45. Civil society blogger H had asked to remain anonymous for this book. 46. Interview with civil society blogger H, Kuala Lumpur, 17 March 2010. 47. Interview with civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2010. 48. Interview with civil society blogger Susan Loone, Penang, 24 March 2010. 49. Ibid. 50. A cursory look at Susan Loone’s blog showed she had written 235 blog postings related to the murdered Mongolian woman Altantuya Shaariibuu since 20 November 2006. Some of the postings questioned the news stories published by the mainstream media. The civil society blogger even poked fun at Najib Razak, whom she compared to her pet dog, which was more reliable and could protect her and her home (posting of 14 October 2008).

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51. Interview with Susan Loone, Penang, 24 March 2010. A request for a followup interview with Susan Loone in 2013 could not be realised as she had a busy schedule as a journalist for online news portal Malaysiakini. 52. Interview with civil society blogger J, who requested anonymity in this research, Kuala Lumpur, April 2010. 53. Ahirudin Attan, “Istana Negara on a Monday Morn”, Rocky’s Bru, 31 January 2011 (accessed 4 July 2011). 54. Interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 22 February 2010. 55. See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion. 56. Interview with partisan blogger Ruhanie Ahmad, Bangi, Selangor, 2 March 2010. 57. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger B, a social media operator of UMNO, Kuala Lumpur, 15 March 2010. 58. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2010. 59. Ibid. 60. Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, “Goodnight, and Good Luck. In a Nation Terrorized by its Own Government, One Man Dared to Step Aside”, Kickdefella (blog), 22 March 2009 (accessed 26 July 2010). 61. Interview with politician-blogger Jeff Ooi, Subang Jaya, 27 February 2010. 62. As there was no popularity ranking of socio-political blogs in Malaysia, the number of comments received for a particular blog post was used to determine whether a particular blogger was considered A-list or B-list. For this study A-list blogs were classed as those that received an average of ten or more comments per blog post written during the three-month time frame selected for the content analysis. B-list blogs were those that received an average of less than ten comments per blog post during that time frame. 63. Interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 22 February 2010. 64. Interview with politician-blogger E, Shah Alam, 4 May 2010. 65. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2015. 66. Ahirudin Attan, “Pak Lah Should Resign”, Rocky’s Bru, 9 March 2008 (accessed 3 October 2010). 67. Syed Akbar Ali, “Syed Azidi Syed Aziz”, OutSyed the Box, 3 May 2010

(accessed 4 September 2010). See note 40 regarding the current content of his blog. 68. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 69. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2014.

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70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2010. 73. Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, “Biography of Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak”, 30 April 2011 (accessed 8 December 2011). 74. Follow-up interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 23 December 2013. 75. Ibid. 76. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 77. Malaysian Insider, 20 May 2009 (accessed on 21 May 2009). 78. Ahirudin Attan, “Blogger Pahit Manis is Editorial Supremo”, Rocky’s Bru, 10 June 2009 (accessed 8 December 2011). 79. The Sun Daily, 7 May 2009 (accessed 22 October 2015) 80. Malaysian Insider, 20 May 2009 (accessed on 21 May 2009). 81. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 82. The conclusion was drawn from various interviews with bloggers from both sides of the political divide, many of whom had asked to remain anonymous. 83. Follow-up interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 8 February 2013. 84. Ibid. 85. The phrase was used by pro-UMNO blogger B in a follow-up interview in Kuala Lumpur on 1 February 2013. 86. Follow-up interview with pro-UMNO blogger B, Kuala Lumpur, 1 February 2013. 87. Follow-up interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 23 December 2013. 88. Follow-up interview with pro-UMNO blogger A, Kuala Lumpur, 8 February 2013. 89. Interview with Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 90. Ibid. 91. The two pro-PAS bloggers are known in this book as partisan bloggers C and Z. An interview and a follow-up interview with pro-PAS blogger C were conducted in Ipoh on 30 March 2010 and on 25 November 2013. An interview and a follow-up interview with pro-PAS blogger Z were conducted in Kuala Lumpur on 1 March 2010 and in Penang on 27 November 2013.

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92. Malaysian Insider, 23 November 2013 (accessed February 26, 2015). 93. Follow-up interview with pro-PAS blogger C, Ipoh, 25 November 2013. 94. Follow-up interview with pro-PAS blogger D, Kuala Lumpur, 15 November 2013. 95. Follow-up interview with partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, Kuala Lumpur, 23 December 2013. 96. Utusan Online, 7 May 2011 (accessed 25 February 2015). 97. See Chapter One for an explanation of surat layang. 98. Interview with former chairman of Unit Media Baru, Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, Subang Jaya, 21 November 2014.

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5 Negotiating Political Reform and Change

This chapter examines a relatively distinct group of civil society bloggers who were actively blogging about the political landscape during the elections. This cluster of individuals described themselves as “independent” because they were not members of any political party. Many of the research participants were instead members of non-governmental organizations and they were blogging out of their own volition and interest. Although this group of bloggers did not belong to any of the political parties, most of them acknowledged that their aim was to remove the ruling regime with the hope that a change in government would bring about greater freedom and fairer policies in the country.1 An assessment of the ways they were using their blogs suggested that this group of bloggers was generally anti-establishment and leaned towards the opposition. They were neither “independent” nor “neutral” per se. Thus, it would be more appropriate to address this group of socio-political bloggers as “civil society bloggers” as opposed to “independent” bloggers. Although many of the civil society bloggers interviewed for this research acknowledged that they were using their blogs to express their thoughts and fulfil their right to free speech, some of them did more than just propagate their views. Some of them initiated blog campaigns to generate public participation and make demands on the government, the mainstream media and the opposition. Evidence of blogging to generate public participation and make demands on the government could be seen from calls for support of protest rallies, such as Bersih and Hindraf in November 2007.2 In other

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instances the demands could be interpreted as a form of negotiation or bargaining between the blog campaigners and the various political parties contesting in the elections. An example was the blog campaign initiated by civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim, who launched two documents, parts of which were later turned into election manifestoes by the opposition parties during the 2008 election. The two documents were designed to seek the endorsement of political parties contesting the election. In return, the A-list blogger pledged support to any political parties that backed the documents. Other civil society bloggers participated and supported this campaign by linking the contents to their respective blogs or passing on the information to a wider audience. Similar campaigns were launched in the 2013 election. Among them were the “Anything But UMNO” and the “End BN” campaigns. These blog campaigns are a reminder of how civil society can make demands in an election, akin to using their blogs as bargaining tools. Blogging for this group of bloggers facilitated the freedom to express their views and accommodated the functions of civil society in making demands during electoral politics. The ability of blogs to facilitate fluid ties to achieve a specific goal in electoral politics is evident from an analysis of interviews with the civil society bloggers. Some of them chose to blog individually, without any form of coordination or collaboration, in their effort to urge readers to remove the ruling regime. They were selective in the type of online campaigns they supported. A sub-group of civil society bloggers preferred to establish loose ties with the “band of brotherhood”. As described in the preceding chapter, the informal but organized ties with members of the band of brotherhood in 2008 subsequently disintegrated after the 2008 election. The sub-group of civil society bloggers proceeded to establish a network with other likeminded anti-establishment non-partisan bloggers by forming the “Barisan Rakyat” (BR) bloggers to coordinate their online campaigns for the 2013 election. This further enhanced the image that the group of civil society bloggers was primarily pro-opposition. The tense and contentious relationships after the 2008 election also led to accusations that a sub-group of civil society bloggers were paid for their online writing. Allegations that some of the civil society bloggers received payment to publish content supportive of certain political parties could tarnish the bloggers’ reputations and erode the trust of their readers. Some of the civil society bloggers who were critical of Najib Razak after the 2008 polls were accused of being paid by opposition politicians. The competing forces in the blogosphere sought to discredit the civil society bloggers, giving

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the impression that the prevailing social and political forces influenced the blog contents. These efforts bore some resemblance to the methods used by the band of brotherhood to tarnish the reputations of rival politicians. The tendency of bloggers to launch accusations and counter-accusations based on monetary benefits could well be a reflection of the deep-seated culture of patronage within Malaysian society. The tense relations also demonstrated how the quality of debate could degenerate into accusations and counter-accusations. Such a situation did little to enhance the quality of public discussion or debate and led to questions over the validity of the blogosphere content. The democratic potential of the online platform in enabling freedom of speech and providing an outlet to challenge the coverage of the tightly controlled mainstream media were appealing factors for many civil society bloggers. Many of them indicated that blogging could accommodate a multitude of views and discourses, unlike the traditional media. For example, discussions on demands for a free and fair election, a better living standard for the Indian community or for fairer and more equitable policies were largely ignored by the traditional media, but those discussions were widely published on the blogosphere. The online platform was empowering for some of them because it created a sense of solidarity among this group of bloggers who were marginalized from the mainstream media. Many of the civil society bloggers even indicated that they adopted the role of journalists and editors by reporting and publishing issues and events ignored by the traditional media. The collective challenge to mainstream media coverage by a network of bloggers can turn the blogosphere into an alternative media form. Blogging may not be able to change how the traditional media operate but it can be an avenue for alternative views in a relatively authoritarian society. However, an examination of interviews with this group of bloggers suggested that the online platform was, in a limited way, able to generate discussions among readers. Some of the civil society bloggers believed that certain topics of discussion, such as religion, could generate wide-ranging responses from the readers, indicating that public debates could thrive on the blogosphere. On the other hand, some of them perceived that public discussions could be restricted by suspicions as to the real intentions behind comments left by readers. Due to such suspicions, some bloggers disabled the option for readers to give feedback, thus constraining the online platform from expanding public debates.

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Blog Campaigns for Political and Policy Reforms The use of blogs by the civil society bloggers seemed to extend beyond publishing political views and expressing their thoughts about the political situation in the country. Some civil society bloggers indicated that they were using their blogs to launch online campaigns to pressure the government, media owners, and the opposition if they were to be elected into power. Interviews with some of the civil society bloggers revealed that several online campaigns had been initiated during the 2008 general election and most of the campaigns pointed to the political reforms they were hoping to achieve. They were operating much like a pressure group by using their blogs as bargaining tools to push for political and policy reforms. This is similar to the understanding of American political scientist Henry Turner that pressure groups are non-partisan organizations that may attempt to influence, among others, the electoral process and public opinion “using any method or technique which they believe will serve their purpose effectively” (Turner 1958, p. 64). In this case blogging became available for civil society bloggers who were pushing for various reforms during the 2008 election. The new media did not only live up to its technological design in accommodating free speech but it became a tool for civil society to publicize their demands and to exert pressure to ensure that the political and policy reforms promised during the elections were met. One blog campaign that could be interpreted as an attempt at making political changes in the 2008 election was the move to obtain the endorsement of political parties to agree with some of the demands of civil society. The online campaign, containing two documents called The People’s Voice and The People’s Declaration, was launched by civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim on his popular blog The People’s Parliament, after Parliament was dissolved on 13 February 2008. The two documents, containing calls to restore genuine democracy, transparency, justice and equality in the country, were written in Malay, English and Chinese.3 Recalling his blog campaign when interviewed for this research, Haris Ibrahim, who is a lawyer, human rights activist, founder of public interest group Article 114 and now former president of the Malaysian Civil Liberties Movement (MCLM)5, explained, We extended both documents to all political parties from both sides of the divide, with an invitation to endorse. BN completely ignored [them]. The three present Pakatan [Rakyat] parties,6 MDP [Malaysian Democratic Party], PSM [Parti Sosialis Malaysia] and Pasok [United

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Pasok Nunukragang National Organization]7 from Sabah, endorsed them. So we had an official launch of the documents where we formally adopted the three main parties as our Barisan Rakyat [People’s Front]. Clearly in the run-up to the general election, if we take it from January to February, the objective was to dump the BN. I made it very clear that we have to get rid of the BN. There was no guarantee that the Barisan Rakyat parties will deliver. But the message was about people playing the role of boss, people taking back the processes that were put in the Constitution for us.8

The expectations of some of the civil society bloggers, including the position of political parties on civil liberties, were communicated openly through the online platform. Parts of the documents were adopted by the country’s three main opposition parties and incorporated into their pledges for the elections. The success of his campaign in getting six political parties to sign up indicated that Haris Ibrahim was articulating a view felt widely in Malaysian society. Endorsement of the two documents by the three main opposition parties — PKR, PAS and the DAP — which later made up the PR or opposition coalition seemed to have fitted well with the objective of Haris Ibrahim and other civil society bloggers who indicated that they wanted fairer policies in Malaysia. Wider expectations of civil liberties, good governance and better welfare for the people, listed in the two documents, could also be read as failures of the ruling regime. The BN ignored the blog campaign while the opposition parties supported the demands as part of their election pledges. The move was also a form of safeguard for civil society to ensure that the opposition parties would honour those pledges if they were to be voted into power. More importantly, it suggested that influential civil society bloggers like Haris Ibrahim, who was also an A-list blogger, had the potential to be a considerable force in the Malaysian blogosphere. The negotiation was happening in full public view instead of behind closed doors. This provided a more transparent account of the “bargaining” that was occurring between civil society bloggers and political parties. In that sense, political parties could be made more accountable for the promises made in an election. Haris Ibrahim gave a crystal clear reason for why the online campaigns were important when he said, There was no guarantee that the Barisan Rakyat parties [referring to the opposition political parties] will deliver. But if the rakyat [people] could dump BN, that would mean that the people’s power had come

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to the fore. And if you can get rid of BN today, you can get rid of Pakatan [Rakyat] tomorrow. That was the important thing we needed to experience. The empowerment to decide the government of the day. I think that really was my message.9

Another online campaign that focused on the public’s dissatisfaction towards the mainstream media’s electoral coverage which favoured the ruling coalition was launched by Haris Ibrahim in the lead-up to the 2008 election. The blog campaign to boycott the traditional media saw the emergence of a diversity of views in the Malaysian blogosphere as some of the civil society bloggers agreed with it while others did not. For example, civil society blogger Susan Loone pointed out that the country needed a free press instead of a boycott of the mainstream media, which she believed to not be a new campaign effort.10 However, the online call to boycott the traditional media was supported by other civil society bloggers, such as Bernard Khoo11 and Ahirudin Attan,12 while Anil Netto publicized it on his blog.13 Recalling the campaign in an interview for this study, Haris Ibrahim noted, One of the biggest problems we have is circumventing the reporting in the mainstream media. That is a big challenge. In that sense, I think [for] the circle of bloggers who actually worked collectively to try to bring about certain changes to the political tapestry that we see today, that is always a major concern. For example,… how do we reach out to the Malay heartland?... That’s one of our biggest challenges, overcoming the misinformation of the mainstream media.14

To further counter the mainstream media’s coverage, Haris Ibrahim launched the Balik Kampung Bawa Berita campaign, which means “Bringing news back to your village”. It encouraged urban readers who were connected to the Internet to download alternative information from the online platform and circulate it to the rural communities when they returned to their villages to vote in the election. The campaign to help distribute alternative views was aimed at reaching out to the rural people because of the low Internet use and limited access to broadband facilities in remote areas of the country. Haris Ibrahim also indicated his interest to use his blog to start a campaign that could “bring people out of cyberspace into the real world”.15 This, he explained, was based on his realization that engaging readers online was insufficient for political change if they remained online and were not involved in real-world politics.

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The partisan nature of the blogosphere in the 2013 election could be detected in the online campaigns of a sub-group of civil society bloggers. The first of these saw the creation of a sub-group of civil society bloggers who called themselves the BR bloggers after the 2008 election, in preparation for the 2013 election. The second of these, represented by the “Anything But UMNO” and the “End BN” campaigns that began officially in August 2012, appeared to be anti-establishment and could be interpreted as proopposition. Civil society bloggers Haris Ibrahim and the late Bernard Khoo were among the chief campaigners for the “Anything But UMNO” and the “End BN” online efforts. Speaking about the online efforts of the BR bloggers, the late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo explained that the grouping was pro-opposition but the members did not belong to any political parties. The late Bernard Khoo, who was still actively blogging in 2013, elaborated: We call ourselves the Barisan Rakyat bloggers. We blog individually to bring change. Among our group, we link [our postings to] each other but not with the pro-UMNO group.... We are loose. I don’t tell you what to write. We have a common cause — to bring about change. We link material to other similar blogs. Quite a number signed up [as BR bloggers].... I do know them. They are genuine people. The last count, we are 30-odd Barisan Rakyat bloggers. Some don’t use their identities but I know them.16

The BR bloggers were active in the “Anything But UMNO” and the “End BN” online campaigns in the run-up to the 2013 election. The online efforts were launched through Haris Ibrahim’s popular blog The People’s Parliament. Some of the civil society bloggers active on the campaigns would publish the BR icon to tell readers of their affiliation. The late Bernard Khoo, who was helping Haris Ibrahim in the two cyberspace efforts, revealed that he became active in the online campaigns several months before the 2013 election.17 The blog campaigns, whilst appearing to be pro-opposition, were designed to bring about political reform to benefit the people in a more general sense. Giving the reasons behind the “Dump BN” campaign, civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim explained, If you say you “dump BN” and we get Pakatan [Rakyat] in, it will force BN to confront the need to reform. Many of us here are prepared to turn to BN and say, “hey look, we are prepared to help you reform.” I am not pro-Pakatan [Rakyat], I am pro-change. So we will work

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with BN to help them reform. If it moves along the lines we hope it will and if Pakatan [Rakyat] does not live up to scratch, come GE 14, we will get rid of Pakatan and put BN in. That’s what we will keep working on.18

The “Dump BN” campaign did not seem to create the impression that this sub-group of civil society bloggers would be on the side of the BN, because it seemed precisely because of the “Anything But UMNO” and the “End BN” campaigns that led to further tensions with partisan bloggers involved in the band of brotherhood. The campaigns seemed to have created a split in the blogosphere, as observed by journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan in an interview for this book. He pointed out that the blog campaigns in 2013 became very partisan and some of the civil society bloggers were still determined to get rid of the BN in the 2013 election. Ahirudin Attan complained, “The other side was civil society but after 2008 they became more Pakatan [Rakyat] than civil society.”19 Initiatives placed into the “Anything But UMNO” and the “End BN” campaigns were not confined to the cyberworld. Some of the key BR bloggers began strategizing various ways to translate their blog campaigns into action in the physical world. Some travelled to the states to build networks and establish contacts to propagate the campaigns.20 Some of the BR bloggers met occasionally to discuss political matters, much like how members of the band of brotherhood were operating through face-to-face interaction during the pre-blog era. Providing some insights into the efforts of the BR bloggers, the late Bernard Khoo pointed out that they put up stickers displaying the “Anything But UMNO” campaign at various strategic locations. Describing it as “strategic positioning and not graffiti”,21 Khoo revealed that the stickers were placed at parking meters in Petaling Jaya to promote the message of ousting the ruling coalition. The stickers were distributed to opposition party supporters to help cast a wider sphere of influence. He noted that the BR bloggers visited the opposition parties at the state-level to build a network to spread the online campaigns in the leadup to the 2013 election. The state-level network could help to spread their messages in the rural areas. The BR bloggers also established contacts with certain online news portals, such as Malaysiakini, to help give prominence to their messages by pointing readers to their blogs. Khoo indicated that Malaysiakini would pick up some of his blog contents which would later be used by other bloggers to distribute them to a wider audience through the blogs and Facebook.22

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The interviews have thus far suggested that blogging was used to put pressure on the government, media owners and the opposition to get them to concede to the demands of a sub-group of civil society bloggers. It appeared to be a major function for influential bloggers who felt their credibility as opinion leaders within their respective circle or community could influence readers in the elections. The influential bloggers were well educated, employed in respectable professions and were members of nongovernmental organizations that were actively defending civil liberties. For example, Haris Ibrahim, the late Bernard Khoo and the BR bloggers could become a considerable force in the Malaysian blogosphere because they were opinion leaders within their respective social circle or community and had the potential to attract the contesting political parties to their cause. Blogging, in this sense, seemed to indicate that the online platform could be used as a bargaining tool by influential bloggers to push for particular demands in an election. This sub-group of civil society bloggers felt the need to go beyond the online platform to bring about a change in the government. Just like the band of brotherhood in 2008, the BR bloggers took steps to ensure that their online campaign crossed into the physical world. The interviews suggested that such efforts included extending their messages to rural areas in order to expand their sphere of influence.

A Network of Alternative Media While a sub-group of civil society bloggers was creating new ties in the form of BR bloggers with specific campaigns to bring down the BN coalition, analyses of interviews with other civil society bloggers pointed to a diversity of views created to fuel discontentment and encourage online readers to vote for electoral reform. Some of them showed solidarity by giving support to specific online campaigns launched by Haris Ibrahim and the BR bloggers during the election, while others were freely expressing their thoughts on the themes of abuse of power, unfair and discriminatory policies, and issues of corruption and accountability. Showing his support for a change in government, civil society blogger Raaja, who wanted to be known only by this name for the research, demonstrated his preference to be involved in certain online campaigns of the BR bloggers. Having been an active blogger in the 2008 election, Raaja was aware of the online campaigns of the BR bloggers and showed

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his support by sharing information about the “Anything But UMNO” campaign on his personal Facebook page in order to erode the power of the ruling coalition.23 After the 2008 election Raaja switched to using Facebook and no longer maintained his blog. Raaja, who runs a computer business, because of work constraints did not feel as passionate about discussing politics on his blog in the 2013 election as he did for 2008.24 He hardly kept up with the ties he established with other bloggers in 2008 when he was actively publishing content about the Bersih and Hindraf rallies. However, he still used the online platform to share particular information about the online campaigns of the BR bloggers during the 2013 election. Other civil society bloggers who teamed up with neither the band of brotherhood nor the BR bloggers used the online platform to publish original content in order to keep the government accountable and to call for political reform. Among them were civil society bloggers Anil Netto, Dr Chris Anthony, Susan Loone, Mahendran,25 and civil society bloggers G and J.26 For example, Dr Chris Anthony wrote about the need for fairer and less discriminatory policies on his blog My Malaysia Today. The practising surgeon, who still maintained a blog in the 2013 election, also created a Facebook account and continued to focus his online writing on corruption and abuses of power. He also used the online platform to encourage people to vote out the government in 2013. Civil society blogger Anil Netto provided alternative information to the reading public by using his blog to publish his coverage of political events such as the Bersih and Hindraf rallies in 2007 and the political rallies and election results of 2008. After the 2008 election, Anil Netto decided to focus on issues of accountability and transparency; he was critical of the DAP government’s development plans in Penang. A member of Aliran, Anil Netto pointed out that in Penang there were too many construction projects and that a lot of developers’ interests were surfacing. In the 2013 election the civil society blogger published articles about developmental issues, the close links between business and politics, and social and environmental news. He observed: The government is protecting big capital. The government has to be circumspect about the type of development and have proper planning. They have to show they are different.... On the surface, the state looks cleaner, the council is cleaner but on the other side of the plan, it is questionable. What are the considerations?27

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As the original contents of Anil Netto’s blog were critical of the DAP government in Penang, he felt the need to consider how the mainstream media would play up his online articles when raising issues concerning the island and the state government. He explained, The newspapers would not be interested in getting our views but when we say something critical about the government in Penang, they are quite happy to pick them up. Like my blog, I have been critical of what’s going on in Penang.... they will pick it up, maybe to try to embarrass the state government. So I have to think about that when raising issues.... If something is wrong, you have to point it out but it also carries a political cost. I have to consider how it would be played up in the media and I try to state what is happening without making any personal references.28

The observation of Anil Netto about the role of the mainstream media in publishing blog contents after the 2008 general election and in the lead-up to the one in 2013 is similar to the one made by partisan blogger Syed Azidi Syed Aziz. Certain blog contents deemed capable of propping up the image of the BN government or that had the potential to sully the reputation of the opposition coalition would be readily published in the mainstream media. Blog postings of opposition news and events in the elections pointed to a similar trend that blogging was able to publish views alternative to those of the mainstream media. In situations where the mainstream media were biased against the opposition, blogs came out with a different perspective. For civil society blogger Susan Loone, who supported some of the online campaigns such as the “Anti-ISA” (Internal Security Act) initiative and the “Saya Anak Bangsa Malaysia” (I am Malaysian) effort initiated by Haris Ibrahim, the online platform was used to help promote those messages to a wider audience. At the same time she also freely offered her views about the country’s political landscape through her blog writings. As discussed in Chapter Two, her blog contents focused on the mysterious murder of Mongolian model and translator Altantuya Shaariibuu in October 2006. Her original blog contents provided another perspective on the incident and served as a reminder to her readers to be discerning with their votes in the 2008 election. Civil society blogger J, who wanted to remain anonymous for this book, recalled that her aim in maintaining a blog was to offer alternative views. Citing the example of mainstream media projecting a negative view of Kelantan, she explained that the newspapers were not publishing reports that reflected the “real Malaysia”. She elaborated:

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It was quite shocking as the real Malaysia is quite different from what the mainstream media portrayed.... The mainstream media motivated me to see Kelantan for myself and I was shocked.... [the newspapers did not give an accurate account] I went on my own [to Kelantan] and paid for all [my expenses there]. I still had quite a lot of savings [then] as I had worked overseas for six months on a monthly salary of about RM12,000.29

Echoing similar sentiments about providing alternative news coverage, civil society blogger Anil Netto pointed out that his objective in blogging during the general elections was “to overcome the media blackout as they were not covering some of the issues”.30 This was particularly so during the 2008 general election when political gatherings organized by opposition political parties were extensively covered by his blog. Citing the huge crowd at a political gathering of the DAP in Penang during the 2008 campaign as an example, Anil Netto felt that without the blog coverage, readers outside of Penang would not know about the large turnout. Comparing the 2008 general election campaign coverage in the blogs with a previous election in 1995 when the Internet was in its nascent stage, Anil Netto explained, This is the difference in 1995. There was a huge crowd at McCallum Street flats but people outside the circle did not know. That makes a big difference. Not only the elections. During the Bersih and Hindraf, the blogs and YouTube highlighted the crowd. So people know that they are not alone in feeling the same way and I think that sense of solidarity is quite empowering.31

This sense of solidarity and community was also observed by partisan blogger Nathaniel Tan, as discussed in Chapter Two. In the example given by Anil Netto, the still and moving images of large crowds at rallies provided the message to a wider audience that the opposition did have the support of the people and they were not the troublemakers as described in the mainstream media for the past few decades. Thus, it became commonplace for civil society bloggers to provide publicity to opposition political parties and their candidates, highlighting a distinctly pro-opposition leaning in the Malaysian blogosphere. A discussion of the network of alternative media would be incomplete without examining the crucial role of online news portals, particularly that of Malaysiakini, which was established in 1999 and provided extensive

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coverage during the 1999 election (Steele 2009). The capacity of the online platform to accommodate a wider range of views ranging from information largely ignored by the mainstream media to political issues and events deemed sensitive by the traditional media is undeniable. However, Malaysiakini also provided an avenue for civil society bloggers to gain wider publicity for their online postings. According to civil society blogger Mahendran, who was actively blogging about issues affecting the Indian community in 2007 and 2008, his blog Bmahendran32 was relatively unknown before the Hindraf rally on 25 November 2007. It became high profile after he decided to provide live updates on the protest at that time. In an interview for this book, Mahendran pointed out that he contacted one of the Hindraf leaders then, P. Uthayakumar, about his intention to provide the live updates. Mahendran, who was a university student at that time, elaborated: He [Uthayakumar] was very supportive but he took it further by putting a banner ad [advertisement] a month before the rally on 25 November on Malaysiakini. It says live updates available on Bmahendran’s blog. I got traffic but unwanted traffic and unwanted attention.... The next day, my server was down as I had too much traffic.33

The new technology provided the means to enable the university student to blog about the rally from his hostel room. Mahendran recalled, On the day itself [during the Hindraf rally], I had live updates.... We used the government’s traffic CCTV [closed circuit television cameras] as our feed updates.... We got the first teargas warning shock around 8am. We used that and people from all over the world were adding me. My website was down in an hour and I had to create a parallel site and ... that was up and running. There was a security expert from Dubai and he [was] giving me tips on how to tackle too many hits and how the police can give false hits to bring the site down. So we were doing all that. The next day The Star [newspaper] had a story about how the traffic CCTV and webcams were used to report the demonstration. This was run by people in their 20s. We knew what to use.... I was doing all that in my hostel room.34

Mahendran not only had his blog elevated to a high-profile platform, the blogger revealed that his ties with Malaysiakini also saw him providing coverage in the 2008 election for the news portal. He noted that he wrote ten articles for Malaysiakini.

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The important link-up with the online news portal and the prominent role of Malaysiakini were also acknowledged in separate interviews by the late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo, journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan and UMNO’s former Unit Media Baru chairman Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz. Bernard Khoo indicated that one of the efforts of the “Anything But UMNO” campaign was to establish ties with Malaysiakini. A cursory examination of the online news portal demonstrated that it provided coverage on the events organized by the BR bloggers in the campaign. An example of the coverage was the inaugural meeting for the “Anything But UMNO” campaign in 2011.35 It was also obvious that Unit Media Baru was training UMNO members to be journalists for their online news portals which were set up for the 2013 election to counter information published by Malaysiakini. In an interview for this book, Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz remarked, “Malaysiakini has more than 40 reporters. How do we compete with that?”36 The wide coverage of issues and events by the civil society bloggers, including alternative online news sites like Malaysiakini, could be seen as a collective challenge to the mainstream media and an emerging form of alternative communication in a relatively authoritarian society.

Accusations and Surveillance Although the online platform was able to facilitate the formation of fluid ties and fulfil the need for free expression, some of the civil society bloggers alluded to being accused of writing to fulfil the agenda of their political masters, while others pointed to efforts to intimidate them into stopping their cyberspace activity. Some of those accused of being paid were those who had broken away from the band of brotherhood. However, those who were blogging individually were not spared such allegations and they felt that they were watched closely by the authorities. As discussed in the previous chapter, the subsequent break-up of a sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers in the band of brotherhood created bad blood among its former members. Accusations against some of the civil society bloggers centred on the notion that they had been paid by political leaders of the BN or PR to publish certain articles. Such accusations carried the connotation that the blogs of the individuals concerned could not be trusted. Tensions among the bloggers developed as they became suspicious of each other’s motives. These suspicions were fuelled by news reports that UMNO was paying blog writers,

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termed UMNO cybertroopers. With these accusations surfacing after the elections the blogosphere began to appear fractious and fragmented. But, more seriously, efforts to tarnish the personalities of some of the civil society bloggers appeared to be a move to distract readers from the real issues. The experience of the late Bernard Khoo provides an example of the kind of accusations and counter-accusations that surfaced after the band of brotherhood collapsed. Khoo recalled the earlier days of collaborating with the band of brotherhood when he supported Ahirudin Attan and Jeff Ooi, who were sued by editors of the New Straits Times, in 2007. They shared a common agenda of wanting to topple Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. However, the affiliation changed after the election when pro-UMNO bloggers in the band of brotherhood revealed their leanings towards the political ideals of UMNO, which propagates race-based politics. In an interview for this research, the late Bernard Khoo revealed that accusations were hurled at him because of his blog for “either idolizing Anwar Ibrahim or being on the payroll of Anwar Ibrahim”.37 After the 2008 polls Khoo continued to support the opposition and produced blog posts that were supportive of the opposition in ten by-elections subsequent to the 8 March election. Describing the situation after the 2008 election as a split in the band of brotherhood, he explained: “I stayed true to my cause while others got aligned and were bought over.”38 It was obvious that Khoo and other members of the band of brotherhood were no longer in the same camp. The reinstatement of Ahirudin Attan and other former media elites involved in the sub-grouping as editors in UMNO-linked news organizations in 2009 was regarded as a form of betrayal by some of the civil society bloggers from the group. The narratives indicated the accusations revolved around the notion of bloggers being financially remunerated to write certain articles on their blogs. These accusations could be related to the emergence of UMNO cybertroopers. It can also be seen to be rooted in the culture of political patronage, a practice perceived as deep-seated in Malaysian society. The phenomenon of paid cybertroopers, as noted by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, “is part of the system already”.39 Indeed, the accusations spread so widely that some civil society bloggers who did not work closely with the band of brotherhood were not spared. For example, Susan Loone, Mahendran, civil society blogger J and Raaja, all of whom were anti-establishment and A-list bloggers, had been accused of promoting the agenda of powerful agents on their blogs. For her interest

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in the murder of Altantuya Shaariibuu and the possible involvement of the then deputy prime minister Najib Razak, Susan Loone disclosed that she had been accused of being paid and was even called a CIA-operative in Bangkok.40 In an interview for this study, she intimated that those accusations were the work of UMNO cybertroopers. Elaborating on the accusations, Loone said, People make all sorts of accusations. It was not pretty in the way they do it. I was really affected by it. I did not want to answer to any of their allegations at all. They come to my blog to do it, they even do it on their blog. These are done by pro-UMNO bloggers, they are angry with me for being anti-Najib. They call me anti-Najib.... They even counted the number of posts I wrote on Altantuya.... It seems they could not believe that I was doing it out of my own free will and out of my own pocket money.... I had to make calls, interview people and I even went to the trial from Bangkok. I took leave, paid my own ticket. It is just my interest in that subject.41

Because of the unflattering accusations about her circulating in the blogosphere, Susan Loone made it a point to publish her content based on facts. She also noted that as a form of self-protection she had to keep a low profile, refusing requests for interviews with newspapers or to appear on Al-Jazeera’s talk show. During the interview for this book, she noted, “I turned them all down. I don’t want to be a high profile blogger. It is just my hobby and I just wanted to blog freely.”42 However, she was resolute in the right to write freely when she said, “If you want to be afraid of these things, then you will never write anything and never do anything.”43 Civil society bloggers Mahendran and Raaja revealed, in separate interviews for this study, that they had been accused of being paid by the MIC for some of their postings. Mahendran pointed out that he was accused of being a supporter of the MIC at one point, but after the election he received threatening calls from MIC supporters.44 The two bloggers disclosed that they had been called “terrorists” for writing about the demands of Hindraf, a move by rival bloggers to discredit them. Stories about civil society bloggers coming under surveillance by the authorities were not uncommon and were perceived to be real. For civil society blogger J, the reality of police intimidation hit home when she and her family members were subjected to hours of interrogation for her blog coverage. Civil society blogger J explained in an interview for this

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book that she initially maintained a blog under her real identity when she started blogging in 2006. However, due to harassment from the authorities she closed down her original blog and now blogged pseudonymously. The authorities declared the content of her blog as seditious. Recalling her experiences of police intimidation, she said, I was interrogated two or three times for about three hours each time. It did not put fear in me. It annoyed me because I felt that they were not being fair.... They interrogated my sister, using their stupid fear tactic again. It got really annoying. They make it seem like it is such a serious thing.... I don’t have any political backing. I have to find my own lawyer and deal with the case myself or worry [that] something might happen to my family.... First, you don’t want to do anything to your family. Second of all, is the threat because the threat to your income.... If you have a police case, they will come to harass you. Who wants all these problems?45

Relating a similar but less intimidating experience, civil society blogger Mahendran said he had a scary moment when he was actively blogging about the Hindraf issue. Elaborating on the incident, he said, I have an acquaintance who is a police informer and one day, I was on my way to Kuala Lumpur for a day trip when I got a call from him. He asked me what I was doing in KL. I was shocked as I did not tell anyone I was going to KL. Later, I found out that the police was following me. At that time, I had just arrived at the Puduraya bus station when I received the call. I told him I had a few meetings and he told me to go back after the meetings and to not loiter in KL. It was scary for me.46

Susan Loone had her own frightening experience at the same Puduraya bus station when she took a trip to Kuala Lumpur to attend the opening of the murder trial of Altantuya Shaariibuu on 15 June 2007. A bomb blast occurred that day at the platform of the bus station where she was supposed to board her bus back to Penang at the time she was due to board.47 An eleven-year-old girl who was waiting to board a bus was injured in the explosion, the result of a homemade bomb.48 Several days later the police announced that the explosion was not the work of militants and that a taskforce had been set up to investigate the incident.49 However, no further development in the investigations has been reported. The blast was eerily familiar for Susan Loone because Altantuya Shaariibuu was

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killed and her body was blown up with explosives.50 Civil society blogger H also indicated that he was blogging pseudonymously for fear that his blog contents could get him arrested.51 Possibly due to their experience of intimidation by the authorities, civil society bloggers G and J were suspicious of me when I first met to interview them in 2010. After having gained their trust, they explained their fear of surveillance by the authorities. In a follow-up interview with civil society blogger G in 2013, the school teacher revealed that he had been hauled up for updating his website and for reading information on the online news portals when he was in school. Recalling the incident, he said, I only knew that my Internet activities were being monitored when I was updating my website and reading news published on Malaysiakini and the Malaysian Insider in school. My school principal received a call asking who was surfing the two online news portals. He then asked my school IT technician to check. I was later advised not to use the computer in school.52

Capturing succinctly the culture of fear that prevails in Malaysian society, civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim had this to say about the involvement of people speaking their minds online: There is a certain reluctance. I think the fear culture, we still have not completely exorcised it.... [Questions like] will Kamunting [a detention camp located in Perak] be waiting for me, will they check or harass my business? It is still there. I guess 30, 40 years of rules by fist, you cannot undo that in two years. That takes time.53

It would be difficult to provide evidence of tight surveillance by the authorities, but from the anecdotal accounts the fear of it could be seen to hinder the Internet from fulfilling its democratic potential. Whilst the new media could clearly facilitate free expression, the perception of surveillance and intimidation by the authorities could dissuade civil society bloggers from using them to provide alternative information. The interviews had thus far highlighted the underlying tension and suspicions that emerged in the Malaysian blogosphere after the 2008 election. The suspicion of bloggers being used to promote the agenda of other political masters seemed real to some of the civil society bloggers. More importantly, the accusations aimed at tarnishing the reputation of fellow bloggers served to mirror the manner of blog use by the band

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of brotherhood to bring down rival politicians. Accusations of being on the payroll of certain political masters became the key element used to discredit the reputations of fellow bloggers. When former media elites involved in the band of brotherhood were reinstated to their old jobs after the election, the issue of monetary gain became the point of contention among civil society bloggers. It was used to raise doubts about the credibility of some of the bloggers. The different dynamics and the different political scenario after the election seem to have contributed to the emergence of a fractious and fragmented blogosphere dominated by political scandals.

Limits to Generating Public Discussions While blogging has the potential to facilitate the freedom to express a range of different views, an analysis of interviews with the civil society bloggers highlighted some limitation to its capacity to stimulate public debate. Some of the civil society bloggers revealed how their blogs were able to generate lively public debates and how they were keen to engage with their readers despite a need to moderate the comments. Welcoming the potential of blogging in contributing to a lively debate, civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim believed that the online platform was “an arena for others to share ideas” and “a space that had been created for public discussion”.54 Providing an example of how blogging could enhance public discussion on the topic of Islam during an interview for this study, Haris Ibrahim noted, You can find a commenter commenting on mine and then he will comment on several other blogs. You know he or she is savouring different viewpoints and that is good. The commenter would go to mine and then to Malaysian Waves [a blog], which is [run by] Abdul Rahman Talib. He and I cannot see eye-to-eye on anything that has to do with Islam. [But] this means people are getting different views and that is really what you want. They are comparing viewpoints and that is healthy.55

Civil society blogger Mahendran made a similar observation about how religion could become a focus of public discussion. He cited discussions on his blog over the question of halal in a variety of situations such as hair-cutting or blood transfusion for accident victims as examples of the capability of the online platform in generating public debates. Similarly,

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his blog postings on the Hindraf rally led to a lot of discussion on the problems facing the Malaysian Indian community. Agreeing with the ability of the new medium to generate public discussion during an interview for this research, Anil Netto cited his blog content on the development of the Botanical Gardens in Penang as an example of how blogging could enhance public debate. Although he had to moderate the comments for accuracy, he felt that the discussions that were stimulated were wide-ranging. Other civil society bloggers, however, held a less optimistic view when it came to the potential of blogging to promote public debate. Civil society bloggers Susan Loone, G, H and J went further by saying that the capacity of blogging to encourage public discussion also had the potential to facilitate personal attacks by rival bloggers unhappy with their content. The perception could be fuelled by suspicions about paid cyberwriters out to get them into trouble with the authorities. Some of the civil society bloggers were suspicious of the intentions of commentators on their blogs. Civil society blogger G does not allow comments on his blog even though he realizes the practice is undemocratic.56 Civil society blogger H used to allow reader comments on his blog but terminated the practice after the 2008 election because of the derogatory language used in them. Civil society blogger H indicated that he was suspicious that some of the comments were made by UMNO cybertroopers to get him into trouble with the authorities. He remarked, “I am concerned that what had happened to Raja Petra Kamarudin would happen to me. He was arrested for the comments of his readers. So I am fearful too.”57 As noted in Chapter Two, civil society blogger J revealed that some of the comments she received were personal attacks against her for some of her blog postings. She pointed out, “I had a hundred over comments whacking me. The cyberattack was so great that I had to keep deleting them.”58 Partisan blogger Nathaniel Tan also held a similar view about fears of being prosecuted for comments left on his blog. As the country’s first blogger to be arrested for his blog content, Nathaniel Tan pointed out that the experience of his detention made him moderate more carefully the comments that readers left, saying, “Before that, I did not moderate my comments but now I do.”59 Dismissing the readers’ comments to be “senseless chatter”60 at times, Susan Loone noted that some of the comments were not helpful for public discussion and she was also suspicious of the bloggers who left comments on her blog. The interviews have thus far demonstrated that blogging might not be able to uniformly fulfil the potential of providing space for democratic debate but that it could do so sporadically and to a limited extent. This

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was further supported by an examination of reader comments in the content analysis. As highlighted in Chapter Two, the results suggested that blogs were not widely used to create public discussions, were hardly used to express opinions crossing political divisions and were rarely used for extended public debate. The analysis suggested that certain topics of interest, such as race and religion, could generate a multitude of views on the blogosphere, thus promoting public discourse. In contrast, however, blogging could also discourage public debate, especially if the discussions turned into malicious attacks against blog authors.

Summary Blogging was not only used to exercise the right to free speech but also as a tool to push for political and policy reforms. This was evident from the blog campaigns where support for the contesting political parties was determined by those who endorsed the demands of civil society bloggers. The demands became a part of the election manifesto of opposition parties. The blog campaign was also a way of ensuring that election pledges of political parties were fulfilled after the elections. This open negotiation or bargaining through the blogs could provide a more transparent account of the demands that civil society made on political parties in an election. The ease with which a sub-group of civil society bloggers was able to establish opportunistic ties during the elections demonstrated the ability of blogging in accommodating fluid ties. The occurrence of these loose alliances of bloggers to achieve a common political goal at a particular point in time supports the notion that the Internet enables public interest groups and political parties to establish “looser network forms characteristic of social movements” (Chadwick 2007, p. 284). Such ties witnessed the convergence of online and offline efforts, which gives rise to the notion of “organizational hybridity” (ibid., p. 286). The forming of loose ties also demonstrates the emergence of “a complex mosaic” of interconnected public spheres in cyberspace (Keane 2000, p. 76). It demonstrated the ease of establishing informal ties when certain forces in the blogosphere converged to affect a regime change in the country. The blogosphere was able to accommodate fluid ties which seemed to be influenced by a common agenda and the political landscape at a particular time. If the political scenario encouraged the bloggers to share a common agenda, the different groups of bloggers could merge to be a considerable force

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for change in an election. This was evident from the commonality that the different groups of bloggers shared at a particular moment in time in the lead-up to the general elections. A sub-group of civil society bloggers teamed up with a sub-group of partisan bloggers to form the band of brotherhood in the 2008 election. The sub-group of civil society bloggers proceeded to form the BR bloggers group for the 2013 election. Hence blogging can be seen to be an avenue to form loose and opportunistic ties in electoral politics. The blogosphere might be limited in generating public discussion but it did offer an opportunity to emerge as an alternative media form by challenging mainstream media coverage, presenting factual accounts and a range of perspectives to the reading public. Collaboration among civil society bloggers by supporting certain blog campaigns and the close ties developed with online news portals, particularly Malaysiakini, could present the blogosphere as a network of alternative media. The online platform, unlike the mainstream media, was able to accommodate alternative views as seen from the various examples of blog coverage of the murder of Altantuya Shaariibuu and the Bersih and Hindraf protests. The Internet thus could provide an avenue for alternative views in a society ruled by a relatively authoritarian regime. The messages circulated on the online platform could also create a sense of solidarity among voters. While the online platform was able to facilitate the free expression of ideas, a culture of fear appeared to have stymied its democratic potential in two ways. First there was an indirect fear that bloggers could be paid to launch cyberattacks against other bloggers. And second some civil society bloggers faced intimidation by the authorities for their cyberspace activities. After the 2008 polls the divided blogosphere was fraught with accusations of bloggers being paid and suspicions about their real agendas. The accusations were designed to tarnish the reputations of some of the civil society bloggers. This did not help to improve the quality of public debate, a crucial element in the promotion of deliberative democracy. Some of the civil society bloggers who feared police intimidation and legal prosecution by the authorities stopped blogging or kept a pseudonymous blog instead. In the Malaysian context, the online platform did not appear to have fulfilled its much-touted democratic potentials. Interviews with this group of bloggers had, on the whole, drawn out multiple aspects of their experiences and in particular their complex

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relationships with forms of power in society. The analysis suggested that they could blog freely about their views but some of them had to face the consequence of “cyberattacks” for articulating views that were different from other prevailing elites in the blogosphere. Blogging might have become a tool to accommodate dissenting views, to generate public discussion somewhat and to establish opportunistic ties easily in an election. Their experiences, at the same time, indicated their complex relationships with forms of power in society.

Notes  1. In the interviews, most of the research participants referred to the unjust race-based policy that had affected the social, political and economic life of citizens in the country. A more detailed discussion on the complexities of the policy is provided in Chapter One.  2. The Star Online, 11 November 2007 (accessed 22 November 2010). The online news portal reported that the Bersih gathering, held in Kuala Lumpur on 10 November 2007, was a call for free and fair elections in the country. It was organized by the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections, a group of sixty non-governmental organizations, supported by five opposition parties. The Hindraf protest, held in Kuala Lumpur on 25 November 2007, was a call for better social and economic treatment of the Indian community in Malaysia.   3. Haris Ibrahim, “The People’s Voice and the People’s Declaration Despatched to Political Parties”, The People’s Parliament (blog), 6 February 2008 (accessed 24 November 2010).  4. Article 11 refers to the article in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia that says every Malaysian has the right to profess and practise his or her religion.  5. The Sun Daily, 3 January 2012 (accessed 20 January 2012). The online news portal reported that Haris Ibrahim was president of MCLM, a non-governmental organization formed in 2010 aimed at empowering civil society and initiating change. But he resigned after a disagreement with chairman Raja Petra Kamarudin, the blogger of popular blog Malaysia Today.   6. This refers to opposition political parties of the DAP, PKR and PAS.  7. Malaysiakini, 26 June 2008 (accessed 13 July 2014). The party was deregistered by the Registrar of Societies on 27 May 2008, after it failed to resolve a leadership stalemate between John Richard Jayasuria and Cleftus Mojingol.

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 8. Interview with civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2010.  9. Ibid. 10. Susan Loone, “Truth Needs No ‘Boycott’, More Free Press Please…”, Susan Loone’s Blog, 3 December 2007 (accessed 23 November 2010). 11. Bernard Khoo, “No Paper Tuesday Launched”, Zorro-unmasked (blog), 28 January 2008 (accessed 22 November 2010). 12. Ahirudin Attan, “Paper-free Tuesday”, Rocky’s Bru (blog), 27 January 2008 (accessed 22 November 2010). 13. Anil Netto, “Mainstream Media Poised to Turn into BN Propaganda Channels”, Anilnetto.com (blog), 2 February 2008 (accessed 25 November 2010). 14. Interview with civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2010. 15. Ibid. 16. Follow-up interview with the late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo, Subang, 22 February 2013. 17. Ibid. 18. Interview with civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2010. 19. Interview with journalist-blogger Ahirudin Attan, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 20. Follow-up interview with the late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo, Subang, 22 February 2013. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Follow-up interview with civil society blogger Raaja, Penang, 26 November 2013. 24. Ibid. 25. Civil society blogger Mahendran wanted to be known only by this name for this research. 26. Both civil society bloggers G and J have requested anonymity for this study. 27. Follow-up interview with civil society blogger Anil Netto, Penang, 28 November 2013. 28. Interview with civil society blogger Anil Netto, Penang, 23 March 2010. 29. Interview with civil society blogger J, Kuala Lumpur, 6 April 2010. 30. Interview with civil society blogger Anil Netto, Penang, 23 March 2010.

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31. Ibid. 32. A the time of writing, the blog Bmahendran no longer exists. Mahendran decided to stop blogging about politics in 2009 because he became disillusioned with the political situation in the country. In his interview for the book he lamented that the 2008 election results did not have any impact on the citizens and that the politicians “are still busy politicking”. 33. Interview with civil society blogger Mahendran, Kuala Lumpur, 13 March 2010. 34. Ibid. 35. Malaysiakini, 26 December 2011 (accessed 7 march 2015). 36. Interview with Tun Faisal Ismail Aziz, former chairman of Unit Media Baru, Subang Jaya, 21 November 2014. 37. Interview with the late civil society blogger Bernard Khoo, Petaling Jaya, 3 May 2010. 38. In a follow-up interview with the late Bernard Khoo on 22 February 2013, he acknowledged that he began blogging for the opposition in the by-elections held after the 8 March polls in 2008. For the Sibu by-election he explained that he was “supplied transport, board and lodging”. 39. See Chapter One for the entire quote by Dr Mahathir Mohamad regarding paid cybertroopers. 40. Interview with civil society blogger Susan Loone, Penang, 24 March 2010. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Interview with civil society blogger Mahendran, Kuala Lumpur, 13 March 2010. 45. Interview with civil society blogger J, Kuala Lumpur, 6 April 2010. 46. Interview with civil society blogger Mahendran, Kuala Lumpur, 13 March 2010. 47. Interview with civil society blogger Susan Loone, Penang, 24 March 2010. 48. The Star Online, 16 June 2007 (accessed 3 December 2010). 49. The Star Online, 18 June 2007 (accessed 3 December 2010). 50. The Nation, 13 March 2009 (accessed 3 December 2010). 51. Civil society blogger H had asked to remain anonymous for this study. He was interviewed in Kuala Lumpur on 17 March 2010.

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52. Follow-up interview with civil society blogger G, Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2013. 53. Interview with civil society blogger Haris Ibrahim, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2010. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Interview with civil society blogger G, Penang, 23 March 2010. 57. Interview with civil society blogger H, who requested anonymity in this study, Kuala Lumpur, 17 March 2010. 58. See Chapter Two for more details. 59. Interview with partisan blogger Nathaniel Tan, Kuala Lumpur, 25 February 2010. 60. Interview with civil society blogger Susan Loone, Penang, 24 March 2010.

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Conclusion

The book has attempted a nuanced examination of the capability of the online platform to enrich political life in the Malaysian national elections of 2008 and 2013. This was conducted by focusing on the processes and dynamics of blogging, including on the actors themselves, to demonstrate how aspects of the social and political landscape could affect the democratic potentials of the online media within the relatively authoritarian Malaysian society. In seeking to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the democratic potentials of the Internet, a multidimensional approach was employed taking into consideration the wider institutional and societal structures, the social ties that emerged out of the use of the online platform and the practices adopted by the relatively distinct groups of bloggers to achieve their goals. The book argues that the different dynamics and social and political circumstances at particular moments in the two elections must be taken into consideration when examining the democratic potentials of the new media. A key feature of the new media was the ability to open space for free expression of ideas and opinions and overcome the blackout and censorship of the tightly controlled mainstream Malaysian media. However, the function of the online platform to challenge mainstream media coverage did not appear to be uniform over the two elections. In the lead-up to the 2008 general election there seemed to be a clear demarcation between blog contents and mainstream media coverage. The mainstream media did not give any publicity to the content of the blogosphere. At that time many former mainstream media editors and journalists, including former political elites such as Dr Mahathir Mohamad, were sidelined by the mainstream media. The 173

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former media and political elites who were dissatisfied with the country’s leadership at the time used the online avenue to vent their frustrations. Blogging was a timely tool for them to voice their views about the political situation in the country. The distinct boundary, however, became blurred after the 2008 election, when the mainstream media began highlighting the content of particular blogs which could either promote the image of the BN coalition or taint the reputation of the opposition coalition. Many of the former media and political elites who were marginalized in the 2008 election had been co-opted and returned to the mainstream media after Najib Razak took over from Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as prime minister. Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who was critical of Abdullah in the 2008 election, also pledged support for Najib Razak in the 2013 election. The willingness of the mainstream media to publish blog contents that could potentially tarnish the reputation of the opposition coalition drove some of the politician-bloggers into terminating their online activity,1 while others became more cautious about publishing blog articles that were critical of the opposition.2 The change in political scenarios between the two elections indicated that the capability of the online media to overcome censorship and challenge the mainstream media was not homogenous. The particular social and political circumstances must be taken into consideration in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the democratic potential of the Internet. The participation of former media and political elites in the blogosphere during the 2008 election demonstrated that the Malaysian blogosphere was certainly not an egalitarian one. The online agenda in the 2008 election could be appropriated by former media and political elites to promote a particular discourse through framing and priming of the blog information flow. A sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers, with the active participation of blogging former media elites and a political giant, used the online platform to form an informal group aimed at framing certain political rivals in a negative light in an attempt to remove them in the 2008 election. Crossing political boundaries, the band of brotherhood waged “psychological warfare” in a bid to assassinate the character of certain leaders, particularly the then UMNO president and prime minister. Online activity was used to strategically harness various social and political forces and forge opportunistic ties to achieve the removal of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. This sub-group of bloggers felt they were able to “control” the blogosphere agenda in the 2008 election. This pointed to the question of dominance and possible control of the blogosphere agenda. The findings showed that the new digital technologies could be used to push the agenda

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of particular elites during a contestation for political power and control in an election. The research found that the Malaysian blogosphere witnessed a mushrooming of the phenomenon of paid bloggers, particularly UMNO cybertroopers, after the 2008 election. The emerging phenomenon is a reminder of the culture of political patronage in Malaysian society. Accusations of bloggers being paid for their online writing began to surface after the 2008 election. This followed the break-up in the subgroup of civil society and partisan bloggers, including journalist-bloggers, in 2009. To increase their online presence for the 2013 election, UMNO/ BN began training and recruiting bloggers to regain ground lost in 2008. Anecdotal accounts of paid UMNO cybertroopers became widespread3 and confirmation of the phenomenon came from Prime Minister Najib Razak in 2014.4 Dr Mahathir Mohamad also acknowledged that the phenomenon of paying bloggers had already become a part of the system. The acknowledgement that UMNO was remunerating cybertroopers, who were mainly party members, for its online battle in the 2013 election reflected the culture of political patronage within the Malaysian psyche. The notion of political patronage suggested by various Malaysian scholars (Ho 1988; Gomez and Jomo 1997) referred to how bumiputera businessmen, who were also UMNO members, were able to secure multimillion ringgit projects through their links to political elites in the party. On the other hand, the phenomenon of paying UMNO cybertroopers suggests a deeper entrenchment of the culture of political patronage within the party. The opposition had not gone untainted by accusations of paying bloggers for their cyber warfare in the election. The term Red Bean Army had been used to accuse the opposition coalition of paying online writers to become their virtual soldiers. Some of the pro-opposition bloggers did admit to receiving payment, but this was confined to token sums in the form of free board, transport and food for their online services during byelections. Some of the politician-bloggers also acknowledged paying online experts to assist with graphic design or website design. The payment made was minimal as the opposition relied more on the support of volunteers for their cyber warfare. The accusations and counter-accusations about how particular bloggers were paid not only reflected the deep-seated culture of political patronage, it also pointed to the possibility that the blogosphere agenda could be dominated by politicians with vast monetary resources. The way information was managed and framed on the blogs seemed to support the view of media communication scholar Entman (2007)

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who argued that biased views could be propagated in the media through agenda setting, framing and priming. The bloggers pointed out that they were framing their political enemies in a negative light by focusing on scandals that could tarnish the reputation of certain leaders. In the 2008 election a sub-group of civil society and partisan bloggers systematically published similar articles to create a “flooding effect” of negative information about the national leadership in a bid to bring it down. Blogging took on the functions of framing and priming when the bloggers began telling audiences how to think about particular leaders and not only what to focus on. The online tool was used to manage information flows for purposes of propaganda. The 2013 election also witnessed a similar practice with partisan bloggers highlighting sex scandals through YouTube videos or doctored images in order to vilify their political rivals. Efforts were taken to expand the sphere of influence and dominate the cyberspace discourse through the creation of multiple blogs and Facebook accounts with the help of volunteers or paid bloggers. Attempts at managing the flow of cyberspace content can be interpreted as a form of manipulation of information that could hamper the people’s ability to engage in rational debates (Webster 2006). In this sense, the online media were limited in promoting rational public debate and discussion. The blogosphere appeared to reflect the existing political culture in Malaysian politics of focusing on scandals of rival politicians in order to discredit them. In the 2008 election the online platform was used to discredit rival politicians in ways similar to the dissemination of surat layang that would become more intense when factional politics was rife in UMNO. However, factional politics within UMNO appeared to have taken a backseat and the pro-UMNO bloggers seemed united in defending Prime Minister Najib Razak in the 2013 election. The blogosphere in 2013 reflected a sense of solidarity in UMNO where pro-UMNO bloggers were more bent on tarnishing the image of opposition politicians. Similarly, the opposition coalition highlighted the sex scandals of rival politicians in an attempt at gaining voter support during the elections.5 The focus by the online platform on the scandals of rival politicians did not help to extend rational public discourse. After the 2013 election the blogosphere began to see a shift within UMNO politics. In late 2014 and early 2015 signs of cracks within the dominant Malay party were seen when Dr Mahathir Mohamad began making disparaging statements against Prime Minister Najib Razak. Having supported the BN government in 2013, Mahathir was now dissatisfied

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with the country’s sixth prime minister. The former premier voiced his discontent towards Najib on his blog Dr Mahathir Mohamad: Blogging to Unblock. In an interview for this book, Mahathir pointed out that he was unhappy with the BR1M policy6 of Najib which he described as “bribing the people” because the policy “gives money wholesale to a lot of people, most of whom don’t need”.7 Monitoring the actions of Najib closely, Mahathir said, There are certain things which he does that I don’t think he should do. I disagree with him. When the thing is serious enough and I find it difficult to give general support, blanket support for all that he does. He may be doing something which is good or something which is very bad. If you give blanket support, you are supporting bad things. If the bad things outweigh the good things, you have to make a decision.8

Although he was uncertain whether his criticism could work out to be in favour of the opposition in the next general election, Mahathir believed his criticism of Najib might erode some of the prime minister’s support. However, a cursory look at the blogosphere and the mainstream media coverage seemed to suggest that Najib and his loyalists would not take it lying down. A pseudonymous blog called Kronisme Mahathir (Mahathir’s cronyism), set up in July 2014, provided alternative views that were critical of Mahathir. Probably more telling was news coverage by UMNO-linked mainstream media given to opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim who made accusations against former finance minister Daim Zainuddin, known to be a close associate of Mahathir.9 The UMNO newspaper also criticized Mahathir by accusing the former UMNO president of practising “political dynasty” in the party.10 Blogger Kadir Jasin, an influential former news editor at the time of Mahathir’s tenure as prime minister, warned on his blog, The Scribe, that the UMNOlinked mainstream media editors’ attack against Daim Zainuddin could backfire on Najib Razak. Kadir Jasin wrote, “If they say they have juicy information about Daim or any of their boss’ critics, they must remember that these people may also have even tastier information about their boss.” 11 The current political scenario is a reminder of the situation in 2008 when Mahathir became critical of then sitting prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. It deserves closer attention as the country draws nearer to the next general election, scheduled to take place within the next two to three years.

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The focus on scandal politics in the blogosphere, however, provided, in full public view, an account of the power struggle between political elites in the country’s dominant political party. Normally such contestations for power were conducted behind closed doors, privy only to UMNO members. After the 2013 election, accounts of power struggles in the PKR and PAS were similarly published online. Publishing these leadership conflicts on the blogosphere provided a clearer picture about the links between some of the partisan bloggers and the political elites. It might not have improved the quality of public debate but the contentious relationships among political elites could be made more transparent in the online arena. This in turn could provide a clearer understanding of the possible power relations and connections that some of the partisan bloggers had with particular political elites. Blogging, in this sense, could be interpreted as a democratic tool in accommodating a range of micro political spheres colliding with each other at particular junctures in electoral politics. It also captured and reflected the dynamics and changing political relationships of the real world. Marginalized groups were able to take part in counter discourses, launch campaigns and make demands through blogging. However, prevailing restrictive laws in Malaysia and tight surveillance by the authorities continue to contribute to a culture of fear which saw many of the bloggers keeping and maintaining pseudonymous blogs, while others terminated their cyber activity. The civil society bloggers were able to express a wide range of views, aimed at exerting political demands for policy reform. The way in which this group of bloggers was able to promote diverse views projected the idea of a “pluralist public sphere” (Garnham 1994, p. 360), instead of a unified one. Blogging, in this sense, could facilitate and promote diverse views from the various public spheres, a crucial component of liberal democratic political life. However, fear of detention or the threat of violence could restrict the democratic potential of the online media. The establishment of the band of brotherhood illustrated the potential for a consolidation of fluid ties into a cohesive force in the election. The study demonstrated how the Internet facilitated the creation of “looser network forms characteristic of social movements” (Chadwick 2007, p. 284) resulting in a form of “organizational hybridity” that brought together “online and offline efforts” (ibid., p. 286). Subsequently, the opportunistic ties gave way to a partisan blogosphere, demonstrating the political blogosphere as being in a state of “constant flux” (Wright

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2009, pp. 159–60). The disintegrated ties also suggested that blogging in the Malaysian context could facilitate opportunistic associations at a particular moment in the election to achieve a precise goal based on personality. It demonstrated how blogging could be strategically used to organize diverse social and political forces into a significant component in electoral politics. This implied that blogging focused on a shortterm goal based on personality politics could mobilize individuals to crystallize the blogosphere into a political force for change in the Malaysian context. Another aspect of blogging is the claim that the online tool can bring about new ways of campaigning in electoral politics for the politician-bloggers. The study showed that blogging could stimulate new ways of campaigning in the elections by mobilizing for political participation, disseminating information on campaign activities and by promoting electoral candidates. However, the online platform was deemed beneficial only at particular points in the electoral cycle. For many of the politician-bloggers, blogging became an important political marketing tool to increase their visibility and promote their personal and party image before and after the elections. They resorted to face-to-face campaigning to connect directly with their voters. This was largely due to the wider institutional and societal structures that made blogging less appealing for them. The new digital technologies were limited in facilitating campaigning by politician-bloggers during the official campaigning period. In the Malaysian context, the broader political economy of the media and the existence of a digital divide were some factors that undermined the appeal of blogs during the campaigning period. The existence of blogging did not uniformly transform the manner of campaigning for the politician-bloggers. In the process of promoting themselves and their parties, some of the politician-bloggers highlighted scandals of their political rivals. Similarly, the partisan bloggers sought to frame their political rivals in a negative light. Blogging had the potential to enhance certain democratic principles, such as enabling bloggers to freely express their views; however, as it turned out, the content of the blogs did not help to improve the quality of debate or discussion. The politician-bloggers also revealed that their blogs were not set up to generate public discussion of issues or party decisions. This was particularly so if the topics could harm the image of the political party they represented. Similarly, some of the civil society bloggers were pessimistic about the ability of blogs to generate public

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discussion. This research thus argues that the online avenue was limited in fulfilling the potential for deliberative democracy because of Malaysia’s prevailing social and political environment.

Challenges for Network Theory and Network Society Framework The manner of blog use presented by a sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers did not seem to sit well with certain predictions of network theory. The normative understanding of a network as consisting of three essential elements — nodes, ties and flows — where individual actors (or nodes) are connected with each other through the use of digital technologies may not be sufficient to explain the network of the band of brotherhood in the Malaysian blogosphere. This is because the partisan bloggers consciously sought out influential bloggers who wanted to achieve a common political goal, as how citizens would seek out like-minded citizens to form a group during the pre-blog era. The phenomenon observed here was one of different groups transcending political boundaries to form opportunistic ties to realize a common goal. Network theory gives the understanding of connectivity emerging incidentally, characterized by an aggregate of “dyadic relations [that were] not consciously designed … unplanned, uncoordinated” (Raab and Kenis 2009, p. 199). Network theory, in this sense, did not relate well to the particular ways in which the band of brotherhood was set up, managed and linked together by different dynamics and circumstances at a particular moment in the 2008 election. The scenario in the Malaysian blogosphere at that time supported the view of Jorg Raab and Patrick Kenis (2009). As discussed in the introductory chapter, the two scholars argue that Western societies are becoming a “society of networks”, where individuals are consciously forming networks to achieve specific goals (Raab and Kenis 2009, p. 199). They contend that hierarchical organizational forms of the twentieth century are moving towards “consciously created and goal directed networks of three and more organizations” (ibid., p. 198). The two scholars are of the view that whole organizations are consciously seeking out each other to create a network to reach a specific goal. The organized yet informal network of the band of brotherhood, formed to remove then prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, pointed to some similarities with the arguments of Raab and Kenis (2009) about a “consciously created and goal directed” network. However, the consciously created and goal-driven band of brotherhood did not involve whole organizations. They were individuals who temporarily

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abandoned their political shells to form a temporal and opportunistic network with a particular aim. Nonetheless, the formation of the band of brotherhood supported certain aspects of the idea of a “network for itself ” (ibid., p. 199), where the sub-group of partisan and civil society bloggers had consciously created a network for a particular goal. This consciously created network aimed at achieving a particular goal collapsed after the 2008 general election. This suggested that the goal-driven network could only be sustained under certain circumstances, making it crucial to explore the context in which the network was formed. Firstly, the balance of political power in the country tilted towards the opposition after the election while support for the ruling regime dwindled. Partisan bloggers involved in the band of brotherhood began returning to their respective political and ideological boundaries after the election. A more “bloggerfriendly” prime minister also appeared to have paved the way for the proUMNO bloggers to go back to the party in the 2013 election. Secondly, contentious relationships among members of the band of brotherhood began surfacing when the goal that bound them together became a source of friction. The group disbanded as a result of the specific circumstances and different dynamics of the time. The fluid forms of political engagement in cyberspace, as demonstrated by the band of brotherhood, provided evidence that specific circumstances at particular junctures in electoral politics could invoke new dimensions to the terms network and network society. An assessment of the impact of new technologies on politics must adopt a broad-based and contextualized approach by investigating the participants involved, the larger social processes surrounding blogging and the Internet and the wider institutional, political and economic factors, as suggested by some new media scholars (DiMaggio et al. 2001; Agre 2002; Albrecht 2006; Cammaerts 2008). A lack of blog use by the politician-bloggers during the campaigning period challenged certain aspects of the analysis of a blurring of boundaries, which is one of the central discourses within the network society thesis (Castells 1996; Barney 2004; Dijk 2006). One main contention of the network society thesis is the purported global or de-territorialized nature related to the dynamics of time-space compression as a result of digital technologies, in which distance no longer becomes a determining factor (Barney, 2004, p. 62). No longer tied to particular times and places, the network society thesis expects to see mediated communication gradually replacing or supplementing face-to-face communication (Dijk 2006, p. 36). However, priority placed on face-to-face canvassing over the online platform by politician-bloggers to reach voters suggested that the dynamics of time-

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space compression were insufficient to explain the lack of blog use in campaigning. Despite the much-heralded capability of the digital technologies in collapsing geographical boundaries to reach a global audience, geographical distance, coupled with broader institutional and societal structures, such as the digital divide confronting voters, remained determining factors in the preference of campaign method by the politician-bloggers. Another characteristic of the blurring of boundaries afforded by digital technologies in the network society thesis is the blurring of public and private spheres. This pertains to how private thoughts can become public in the realm of online communication, with particular reference to blogging as a form of political communication (Barney 2004) or how the private life of individuals becomes public with the rise of mediated scandals (Thompson 2000). Several politician-bloggers were, instead, actively policing the parameters between their private self as an individual and public life as a politician when blogging was used as a political marketing tool before and after the elections. Moreover, a tendency of the mainstream media to select blog posts that were critical of the opposition coalition after the 2008 election dictated that the politician-bloggers would have to be more selective when publishing their private thoughts online. Instead of a blurring of the private and public spheres, many politician-bloggers were inclined to actively police the boundaries. The findings here possibly reflect how the boundaries of the public sphere can be “discursively constructed, maintained, and altered” (Dahlgren 2001, p. 42) depending on the particular social and political circumstances in an election.

Restoration of Online Democratic Forms The research revealed that efforts to expand the democratic potentials of the online media appear to have faced an uphill task, but that the civil society bloggers exhibited ways they were able to use the new media for the common good. They were able to express views within the boundaries of existing restrictive legislation to promote civil liberties and they demonstrated that the online platform could be used to pressure for fairer and more equitable policy reforms. They displayed flexibility in forming loose ties with other bloggers or by working autonomously to promote marginalized voices in an election. These are some aspects of the broader democratic ideals that may possibly be restored in relatively authoritarian societies. The civil society bloggers, together with particular online news portals, demonstrated that they could present themselves as an alternative form of

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media network by publishing information or covering events ignored by the mainstream media. Some of the civil society bloggers even formed links with alternative online news portals, such as Malaysiakini, to highlight the promotion of civil liberties. As such, the civil society bloggers, together with alternative online news sites, could act as a network of alternative media to keep the reading public informed. This was another way in which blogging could help to provide wide-ranging views and opinions in a society where the rest of the media were tightly controlled by the ruling regime. The group of partisan bloggers sought to demonstrate that a focus on scandal politics could return aspects of democracy to societies where power struggles were fought behind closed doors. This was happening not only among the ranks of UMNO but also within the opposition parties. Blogging about scandals to give bad publicity to particular leaders could help shed light on the links that some bloggers had with certain political elites. This made the fight for power among political elites more transparent. In the past such power struggles had occurred behind closed doors, privy only to party members. Similarly, the group of civil society bloggers who pushed for political and policy reforms in full public view could provide better transparency in the use of blogs as a bargaining tool.

Future of Blogging and Electoral Politics in Malaysia Several lessons could be drawn from the three different groups of bloggers about the future of online media and politics in Malaysia. The most significant was the importance of identifying the social and political realities when attempting to capitalize on particular moments to realize specific goals in elections. Legislation that curtailed civil liberties, the wider political economy of media and the broader societal structures were among the obstacles that could limit the potential of blogging in improving democratic practices and enriching political life. The particular social and political circumstances could also provide an impetus in the use of blogs to achieve a specific goal at a particular moment in time. The use of the online tools could be more effective in achieving a particular goal at a defining moment under specific circumstances in an electoral cycle. The partisan bloggers demonstrated the ability to foster a network based on an opportunistic association driven by a specific goal to manage information flows to change the national leadership. They had the involvement of some of the civil society bloggers to realize political

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change. Blogging crossed political boundaries, facilitated free associations, and enabled the partisan bloggers to use their blogs in a strategic manner for political change. However, it must be recognized that the specific goal was a personality-based one that was sparked during a period of intense power struggle between political elites in the dominant ruling party. The Internet has the potential to be a significant platform for change in future elections if diverse social and political forces are able to unite against specific political personalities. In a relatively authoritarian society where control of the traditional media is in the hands of the ruling regime, the Internet has been described as an alternative avenue of expression for bloggers. It has helped to provide information and views from bloggers shut out of the mainstream media. As such, it continued to be a crucial outlet for the politician-bloggers to promote their personal and party image. Similarly, it remained a pertinent tool for the partisan and civil society bloggers who had limited access to the mainstream media. Compared with the constraints presented by the traditional media, the online media could continue to be a platform for these bloggers to reach an audience that had Internet access. The civil society bloggers had shown that the online platform could facilitate free expression, provide alternative views to the mainstream media and pressure political parties to commit to fairer policies in an election. They displayed a tendency in using the new media to promote liberal democratic principles for the common good. Together with alternative online news sites such as Malaysiakini, this group of bloggers could turn into an alternative media network to supply alternative information to the reading public. On the downside the online media did not seem to have generated public discussion, particularly for the partisan and politician-bloggers. The partisan bloggers were focused on political scandals, which did not help promote deliberative democracy, while the politician-bloggers were not keen to use their blogs to discuss issues that could mar their personal or party image. Even some civil society bloggers felt that blogging was limited in its potential to facilitate public debates. The future of blogging in Malaysian politics will likely continue to be mired in scandal politics with the partisan bloggers showing a tendency to align themselves with certain political elites. Strategic alliances to manage information flows will likely persist in the Malaysian blogosphere in future elections and the common agenda will most likely continue to be overwhelmingly personality-based.

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The online platform could potentially become another media tool for facilitating the rotation of leaders instead of promoting debates on public policies for the common good. The research showed the possibility of control of the dominant discourse being in the hands of powerful political elites who have vast financial resources to hire online writers to their cause. An increase in the number of pseudonymous blogs alongside the phenomenon of paid cybertroopers are serious concerns, because in such an environment it can be difficult for readers to evaluate the accuracy of online content. Given the political culture and the culture of patronage within Malaysian society, the manipulation of information by certain powerful political elites appears highly likely. Under such circumstances members of the Malaysian public must wear a critical lens when reading socio-political blogs and Facebook pages. New media literacy becomes crucial for the reading public to be able to distinguish facts from opinion or conjecture. Scrutinizing blog content, the background of the writers, the tone and the targets of the content and the sources of posts can aid in a better understanding of the power games in Malaysian cyberspace, games that may well take the shady form of wayang kulit. The next round of cyber warfare appears to have already started as the country prepares for the next general election, due to take place in 2017 or 2018.

Notes   1. See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion.   2. See Chapter Five for a detailed discussion.   3. See Chapter One and Four for detailed discussions of the term “cybertroopers”.  4. See Chapter One for a detailed account of Najib Razak chiding UMNO cybertroopers.   5. See Chapter Four for more details of the focus on sex scandals in the Malaysian blogosphere.   6. BR1M stands for Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (1 Malaysia People’s Aid), which was introduced in 2012 by Prime Minister Najib Razak to provide yearly cash aid of RM500 to Malaysians earning less than a monthly salary of RM3,000. See Malay Mail Online, 23 November 2014 (accessed 10 April 2015).   7. Interview with Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Putrajaya, 14 January 2015.  8. Ibid.  9. Malaysiakini, 20 January 2015 (accessed 21 January 2015).

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10. Utusan Malaysia, 14 January 2015, p. 4. 11. Malaysian Insider, 14 January 2015 (accessed 14 March 2015). The original version of the blog post by Kadir Jasin is available at (accessed 14 March 2015).

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Index

A ABCD. see Asalkan Bukan Cina DAP (ABCD) campaign angpow, 102 Anti-ISA campaign, 157 Anything But UMNO campaign, 153–54 Asalkan Bukan Cina DAP (ABCD) campaign, 76 Ahirudin Attan, 3, 11, 13, 134–35 2013 elections, 154 blogging, 129–32, 134–35, 137, 152 cyber war, 105–6, 116 and cybertroopers, 42–43, 137 defamation suit, 47, 119, 161 Rocky’s Bru, 119 Faisal Ismail Aziz, 3, 11, 13, 103–6, 109, 137 2013 elections, 46, 103–4 cyber warfare, 104 Syed Azidi Syed Aziz band of brotherhood, 122–23, 126 pro-UMNO blogs, 121–23, 126–130, 133, 136, 138, 157 pseudonymous blogs, 74

2008 elections, 29–30, 56, 100, 104, 115–31, 133 2013 elections, 75, 174, 177, 180 defamation suit, 47 NSTP, changes in, 37 pseudonymous blogs, 72–74 UMNO cybertroopers, 41 Balik Kampung Bawa Berita, 152 band of brotherhood, 115 agreements, 123–24 Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad, 123 civil society bloggers, 125–27 collapse in, 132–34 Malaysia Today, 123 pro-opposition bloggers, 124–25 Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, 122–23, 126 Barisan Nasional (BN), 1, 21, 25 Barisan Rakyat (BR) bloggers, 148 Bersih protest, 57–58 blog campaigns Anything But UMNO and End BN, 153–54 Balik Kampung Bawa Berita, 152 Bmahendran, 159 Dump BN campaign, 153–54 Ibrahim, Haris, 150–52 influential bloggers, 155 The People’s Voice and The People’s Declaration, 150

B Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad, 1–2, 14, 123

197

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 197

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198 Index

blogging framing and priming, 96 Lau Weng San, 93 Lim Kit Siang, 94 politician-bloggers, 96–98 Rafizi Ramli, 95 rival politicians’ scandals, 94–95 Blogging to Unblock, 131 blogosphere, 56–57, 176–78 critical tone blog posts, 72–73 future prospects, 183–85 negative framing, 74–75 partisan (see psychological warfare and leadership change) pseudonymous blogs, 74 BN. see Barisan Nasional (BN) BR. see Barisan Rakyat (BR) bloggers bumiputera, 27–28 C campaign periods blogging in, 88–89 Chua, Tian, 89 digital divide, 91 ethnicity of voters, 92–93 global audience, 90–91 Lau Weng San, 89–90 personalized approach, 90 Teng Chang Khim, 91 ceramah schedules, 61–62 Chua, Tian, 60, 70, 89, 92 civil society bloggers, 147–49 Communications and Multimedia Act, 34 cyber battles, 87–88 blogging to boost image of self and party framing and priming, 96 Lau Weng San, 93 Lim Kit Siang, 94 politician-bloggers, 96–98 Rafizi Ramli, 95

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 198

rival politicians’ scandals, 94–95 countering cyberattacks, 107–10 emergent cyberwar network, 105 Faisal Ismail Aziz, 103–6 Ooi, Jeff, 101–3, 106 Rafizi Ramli, 99–101, 103 Teng Chang Khim, 106–7 outcomes, 110–11 traditional approaches during official campaign periods blogging in, 88–89 Chua, Tian, 89 digital divide, 91 ethnicity of voters and Chinese-language mainstream media, 92–93 global audience, 90–91 Lau Weng San, 89–90 personalized approach, 90 Teng Chang Khim, 91 cyberspace. see Malaysian cyberspace and social media cybertroopers definition and payments, 41–43 fake accounts, 44 pro-opposition bloggers, 44–45 Red Bean Army, 43–44 socio-political bloggers, 45–46 UMNO cybertroopers, 41 D DAP. see Democratic Action Party (DAP) Democratic Action Party (DAP), 1 democratic and authoritarian traits, 31–32 digital divide, 91 dominance of Malay politics ruling coalition, 28–29 surat layang, 30–31 wayang kulit, 29–30 Dump BN campaign, 153–54

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199

Index

E e contrario blog, 70 emergent cyberwar network, 105 Faisal Ismail Aziz, 103–6 Ooi, Jeff, 101–3, 106 Rafizi Ramli, 99–101, 103 Teng Chang Khim, 106–7 End BN campaign, 153–54 era of journalist bloggers, the, 80 F Facebook 2013 elections, use in, 9–14, 47, 61–62, 88–89, 99–100, 105–6, 135, 176 Anthony, Chris, 66 campaign activities and electoral candidates, 62–64 civil society bloggers, 155–56 fake accounts, 105–6, 111, 116, 138 growth of popularity, 3–5, 10, 60 Mahathir Mohamad, 66, 72, 109 mobilizing for political action, 60–61 Najib Razak, 3, 63–64 Ooi, Jeff, 65, 67 opposition use of, 64 public discussion, 71–72 Rafizi Ramli, 64, 71–72, 95, 99, 101 and the Red Bean Army, 43–44 social influence, 14, 40, 42, 56–57, 67–68, 76, 90, 102, 104, 154 Teng Chang Khim, 94, 102 UMNO’s presence, 3 Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, 24 “first past the post” system, 32 Free Anwar campaign, 38–39

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 199

G GEMPUR. see Gerakan Menentang Peliwat Untuk Rakyat (GEMPUR) Gerakan Menentang Peliwat Untuk Rakyat (GEMPUR), 76 government-controlled media regulations Communications and Multimedia Act, 34 Internal Security Act, 35 New Straits Times Press (NSTP), 37 Official Secrets Act, 34–35 Printing Presses and Publications Act, 33–34 propaganda model, 37 responsible development journalism, 36 Sedition Act, 33, 35 sites of resistance and weakness, 35 The Star, 37 Utusan Melayu, 38 H Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, 6–7 Hindraf protest, 57–58 hudud law, 109 I Ibrahim, Haris accusations and surveillance, 164 blog campaigns, 57–58, 125, 148, 150–53, 155, 157 public discussions generation, 165 ICT. see information and communications technology (ICT) independent bloggers, 105 influential bloggers, 155

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200 Index

information and communications technology (ICT), 2 Internal Security Act, 35 Internet Protocol (IP), 101 IP. see Internet Protocol (IP) K Kapitan China, 24 Khoo, Bernard, 161 L Lau Weng San blogging, 4, 61, 88, 92–93, 98, 101 cyber battles, 89–90 leadership change and psychological warfare. see psychological warfare and leadership change Lim Kit Siang blogging, 94 cyber battles, 94, 106, 109 defamation suit, 42 website launch, 44 Loone, Susan alternate media network, 156–58 bloggers, 58, 67–68, 125–26, 152 political reform and change negotiation, 161–63, 166 M Mahendran, B, 159 Malay Mail, 134 Malaya and struggle for independence, 23–25 Malaysia Today, 127–28 Malaysiakini, 58, 119, 158–60 Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, 108 Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), 25 Malaysian Civil Liberties Movement (MCLM), 150

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 200

Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), 34 Malaysian cyberspace and social media blogosphere, 56–57 critical tone blog posts, 72–73 negative framing, 74–75 pseudonymous blogs, 74 campaign activities and electoral candidates ceramah schedules, 61–62 Facebook postings, 62–64 YouTube video, 64 content analysis, 55–56 free expression of ideas, 65–68 media and political elites domination, 78–80 mobilizing for political action Bersih and Hindraf protest, 57–58 Facebook and Twitter, 60–61 number of blog posts, 59–60 outcomes, 80–81 partisan social media, 2013 election GEMPUR, 76 homophily, 77 Hornbill Unleashed blog, 78 logos and slogans, 75 Malaysian Chronicle, 78 Papagomo, 77 Parpukari, 78 pro-opposition and pro-UMNO/ BN blogs, 75–76 TIBAI logo, 76 Ubah logo, 76 public discussion civil society bloggers, 70–71 e contrario blog, 70 Facebook and, 71–72 numbers of responses, 71

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Index

readers’ feedback patterns, 68–69 Straightforward blog, 70 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), 25 Malaysian national elections band of brotherhood, 178–79 (see also band of brotherhood) Barisan Nasional (BN), 1 blogosphere, 176–78 (see also blogosphere) campaigning ways, 179 (see also blog campaigns) civil society bloggers, 178 cyber warfare, 175 (see also cyber battles) cyberspace battle, 14–15 (see also cyber battles) cybertroopers, 175 (see also cybertroopers) future prospects, 183–85 Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, 6–7 inquiry, 9–13 network theory and network society framework, 180–82 new media and mainstream media, 173–74 (see also Malaysia, cultural, social and political fabric) new technologies and online media in, 2, 14 (see also Malaysia, cultural, social and political fabric) Pakatan Rakyat (PR), 4 political economy approach, 5 political tsunami, 1 psychological warfare, 15, 174 (see also psychological warfare and leadership change) research weaknesses, 13–14 restoration of online democratic forms, 182–83

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 201

201

social determinism approach, 7–8 UMNO, 2–3 MCA. see Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) MCLM. see Malaysian Civil Liberties Movement (MCLM) MCMC. see Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) 1MDB. see One Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) MIC. see Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) Multimedia Super Corridor, 46 My Malaysia Today, 156 N National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 90 negative framing, 74–75 NEP. see New Economic Policy (NEP) Netto, Anil, 58, 62, 152, 156–57, 166 network theory and network society framework, 180–82 New Economic Policy (NEP), 21–22 bumiputera, 27–28 complex web of connections, 28 Federal Constitution, 25–26 race-based political parties and policies, 26–27 new media Agenda Daily, 39 bloggers in, 40–41 dissident cyber-networks, 38 Free Anwar campaign, 38–39 Harakah, 40 Malaysiakini, 39 The Malaysian Insider, 39 Merdeka Review, 39

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202 Index

The Nut Graph, 39 The Rocket, 40 New Straits Times Press (NSTP), 37 NSTP. see New Straits Times Press (NSTP) O Official Secrets Act, 34–35, 46 One Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), 48 Ooi, Jeff, 142 2013 elections, 61 blog content, 97 cybertroopers’ use, 44 defamation suit, 119, 161 face to face campaign, 88–89 Facebook activity, 65, 67 online campaign, 101–3, 108–10 Penang seat, 2008, 92 pro-UMNO blogger, 120, 129–30, 138 Red Bean Army, 106 Screenshots, 40, 47 organizational hybridity, 167 Outsyed The Box, 131 P Pakatan Rakyat (PR), 4 Papagomo, 48 Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM), 129 Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), 1 Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), 1, 4 Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM), 25 PAS. see Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) Pemusnah Rakyat (PR), 76 People’s Declaration, The, 150 People’s Parliament, The, 57, 150, 153 People’s Voice, The, 150 PGRM. see Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM)

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 202

PKR. see Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) political economy approach, 5 political reform and change negotiation accusations and surveillance blogger tension and suspicions, 164–65 Hindraf issue, 163 Ibrahim, Haris, 164 Khoo, Bernard, 162 Loone, Susan, 161–62 UMNO cybertroopers, 160–61 blog campaigns Anything But UMNO and End BN, 153–54 Balik Kampung Bawa Berita, 152 Dump BN campaign, 153–54 Ibrahim, Haris, 150–52 influential bloggers, 155 The People’s Voice and The People’s Declaration, 150 civil society bloggers, 147–49 network of alternative media bloggers solidarity in, 155–56 Loone, Susan, 157–58 Malaysiakini, 158–60 Netto, Anil, 156–57 outcomes, 167–69 public discussion generation limits, 165–67 political tsunami, 1 PR. see Pakatan Rakyat (PR); Pemusnah Rakyat (PR) Printing Presses and Publications Act, 33–34 propaganda model, 37 pseudo-democracy, 31 pseudonymous blogs, 74 PSM. see Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM) psychological warfare and leadership change

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Index

band of brotherhood, 115 agreements, 123–24 Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad, 123 civil society bloggers, 125–27 collapse in, 132–34 Malaysia Today, 123 pro-opposition bloggers, 124–25 Syed Azidi Syed Aziz, 122–23, 126 blogosphere information flow management, 127–29 former media and political elites involvement, 129–32 loose coalition analysis, 116–17 outcomes, 139–40 partisan blogosphere in the 2013 general election Ahirudin Attan, 134–35 pro-PAS bloggers, 137–38 pro-UMNO bloggers, 136–37 Unit Media Baru, 135–36 Utusan Malaysia, 138 wayang kulit, 137 political factors contributing to the forging of ties “cleanse UMNO from within”, 117 editors and journalists, 118–19 Mahathir Mohamad, 117–18 Malaysiakini, 119 Media Prima Berhad, 118 pro-UMNO bloggers, 120–21 two political forces clash, 115–16 R race riots, 38–41 Rafizi Ramli 2013 elections, 11, 38, 99 blogging, 44, 60, 95, 103, 108 cyber battles, 99–101, 103, 108 and cybertroopers, 44 defamation suit, 48

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 203

203

emerging cyber network, 39 Facebook page, 60, 71–72, 95, 99 online campaign, 4, 100–101, 103 Red Bean Army, 43–44 reformasi movement, 22–23 S Sedition Act, 33, 35 short messaging services (SMS), 2 SMS. see short messaging services (SMS) social determinism approach, 7–8 social media. see Malaysian cyberspace and social media Star, The, 37 Straightforward blog, 70 surat layang, 30–31 T Teng Chang Khim blogger, 70, 88–89, 102, 106–8 campaign periods, 91–92, 94–95 cyber battles, 106–7 Twitter 2013 elections, use in, 9–11, 47, 60, 64, 88–89, 99–100, 135, 176 DAP representatives, 4, 40 fake accounts, 105–6, 108, 111, 116 mobilizing for political action, 60–61 Najib Razak, 3, 63 paid bloggers, 137 PKR leaders, 40 Teng Chang Khim, 102 UMNO’s presence, 3, 41 U UMNO. see United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) UMNO cybertroopers, 41, 160–61

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204 Index

Unit Media Baru, 135–36 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 2–3, 21, 24 Utusan Malaysia, 138 Utusan Melayu, 38 W wayang kulit, 29–30, 137 Western liberal model, 31

08 PowerGames_IndexIT-2P.indd 204

Y YouTube 2008 elections, use in, 2, 59, 62, 100, 158 2013 elections, use in, 3, 10, 64, 77, 100, 176 censorship, 47 defamation suit, 48

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About the Author

Hah Foong Lian was formerly a journalist with an English daily in Malaysia from 1994 to 2009. During her fifteen-year stint in the news industry she has written and pursued articles covering a wide range of social and political issues. During this span she also covered four Malaysian national elections and several by-elections. The last national election that she covered as a reporter in Perak in 2008 spurred a strong interest in learning more about the role and function of political blogs and the online media in the country. She became curious about the much-touted democratic appeals of the online platform when she noticed the stark contrast in the coverage of issues and news angles between the mainstream news media and the political blogs. In 2009 she took a break from the industry to pursue a PhD in Media and Communication at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. Her research topic was New Media and Old Politics: The Role of Blogging in the 2008 Malaysian General Election. When the country was gearing up for the 2013 election she updated her research with data and interviews for a further examination on the use of the online media. After completing her doctoral thesis in 2012 she taught Journalism and other media-related subjects at Monash University Malaysia in Sunway from 2013 to 2014. She currently teaches Journalism and Media Studies at Curtin University Sarawak in Miri.

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