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Power and the People The State and Peripheral Communities in the Russian Far North Yulian Konstantinov
Power and the People
Yulian Konstantinov
Power and the People The State and Peripheral Communities in the Russian Far North
Yulian Konstantinov Bulgarian Society for Regional Cultural Studies Sofia, Bulgaria
ISBN 978-3-031-38305-2 ISBN 978-3-031-38306-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38306-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.
In memory of my father
Preface
The writing of this book has been prompted by two events which happened in the Far North of Russia, in what is known as the reindeer husbandry part of the Kola Peninsula. Administratively, this is the Municipality of Lovozero (Lovozerskii Raion), Murmansk Region. The temporal context is the raging war in Ukraine, following the Russian invasion of February 2022. In the course of the following year, the first momentous event on the local scene was that Fennoscandic Sami organizations suspended their cooperation with Sami NGOs in Murmansk Region. On the Sami Indigenous front, the clock was thus turned all the way back to the chill of the Cold War. The second event was that plans for mining and processing of rare metals in the Kola tundra (lithium and platinum) were spelling the end of a human relationship with reindeer that had endured since time immemorial. These were the concrete facts. What I found deeply troubling was that, publicly at least, these events did not trigger anything like resistance. Concerning the rift on the Sami political front, it was accepted as a logical consequence of Western aggression, and sinister strategies to disintegrate Russia. Consequently, Russian Sami organizations publicly expressed their support for what has officially been called the ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine. As regards mining in the tundra, both reindeer husbandry leaders and the Kola Sami and Komi organizations proclaimed the plans to be environmentally sound, not posing any threat to reindeer husbandry at all.
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In this book, I try to explain such puzzling events. It is written, in the first place, for those who have been involved with Kola reindeer husbandry and Indigenous affairs after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and, in a historical perspective, long before that. This book is the third of a series in which I attempt to meet this challenge. The first, (Reindeer Herders: Field- Notes from the Kola Peninsula) published in 2005, was based on my fieldwork with Kola herders in 1994–1995. The second was Conversations with Power. Soviet and Post-Soviet Developments in the Reindeer Husbandry Part of the Kola Peninsula, which came out in 2015. Both were published by Uppsala University Press in Sweden, thanks to the dedicated support of one of the greatest reindeer husbandry scholars of our time, Professor Hugh Beach of the same university. My fieldwork was generously supported by the Norwegian Research Council (NFR) and by the personal help and warmest encouragement of the prematurely late Professor Trond Thuen, of the University of Tromsø, in Norway. For the present volume, I am grateful to the Arctic Centre of the Lapland University in Rovaniemi, Finland, and personally to its leader, Professor Bruce Forbes. In my work over the years, great inspiration and encouragement came from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany, in particular Professor Chris Hann. The list of supporters and associates is very much longer—it consists of many dear names that came and went over the course of close to a quarter of a century. My ambition in this book is to offer a more general explanation of things which happen in Russia, an account which might be of interest even to those who have little idea of Kola affairs (or possibly no idea about them at all). There has been much talk about breakaway tendencies in the peripheral regions of the Far North, Siberia, and the Far East. Official Russian sources allege that ‘the global West’ promotes such tensions. In contrast, I show in this book that the power centre has the Indigenous peoples of these regions firmly under control. Russian Indigenous organizations have no choice but to toe the line and support the war in Ukraine. The troubling question of how would it be possible without a murmur to relinquish a Human-Reindeer relationship which has come to form the very identity of the local community raises even deeper issues. The answer I propose is an adherence to a virtually unanimous faith in the supremacy of a Soviet way of life, compared to the traumatic advent of a new reality perceived as capitalist. The attachment to Soviet values entails unswerving loyalty to the decisions taken by power holders at the centre, and devoted submission. I conclude with the hope that all those who share the folk
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belief in the inscrutability of ‘the Russian soul’ may appreciate demystification through my engagement with the minutiae of daily life in a remote location. Lastly, there was a third event which hit me personally. In October 2016, a couple of days before Murmansk was to celebrate its centenary, I was apprehended by Murmansk airport officials upon arrival from Moscow. They took my passport and led me into an office. I was given to understand that this was a routine check for all foreign passengers. It consisted of taking fingerprints from both hands—of each finger, as well as the palms. A mug shot was taken from the front and both sides, and I was allowed to proceed. Lectures at Murmansk Arctic State University (MAGU) were followed by two months of tundra fieldwork. Nothing happened during all that time, and I returned safely to Sofia for Christmas. At the time, I constantly thought about that ‘routine check.’ What was its purpose? I asked other colleagues from abroad who had visited Russia, and Murmansk in particular, but nothing like that had happened to them. I decided that it was a hint that next time it could be worse. I had been carrying out fieldwork in the tundra intermittently for 22 years, which might have been more than enough for the regional ‘power structures.’ A trumped-up charge could follow. Keeping an eye on my whereabouts deep in the tundra was simply too demanding, and reindeer herders were a fearless lot and unlikely informers. I hope that readers of this book will understand my apprehension and fears. My own country was a NATO member by that time, and well on the road of becoming what is now called by Russia ‘a hostile state.’ In consequence, I have not been back. This book is based on my experiences during the period 1994–2016, official and public media sources, and also e-mail contact with my tundra friends. To them I owe the profoundest debt of gratitude. Sofia, Bulgaria March 2023
Yulian Konstantinov
Acknowledgements
For generous financial support in writing this book, I am deeply indebted to CHARTER: Drivers and Feedbacks of Changes in Arctic Terrestrial Biodiversity (2020–2024), a project within the framework of Horizon 2020, Call: H2020-LC-CLA-2018-2019-2020 (Building a low-carbon, climate resilient future: climate action in support of the Paris Agreement).
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Contents
1 Introduction 1 References 5 2 Reindeer Husbandry Statistics 9 Towards a Model of Analysis 10 Selective De-centralization 13 Raion and Regional Statistics 18 The Stock-Taking Committee (STC) 34 References 47 3 Actors and Tensions in the Reindeer Husbandry Part of Murmansk Region 51 ‘Urban’ Reindeer Husbandry 54 Military vs. Herders Tensions 62 Salmon Angling and Hunting Camps 73 Tensions in Relation to Industrial Projects 136 Contraction of the Reindeer Husbandry Territory 161 The SVO and the Sami Split 166 References 170
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4 ‘Urban’ (‘Commuting’) Reindeer Husbandry in Murmansk Region183 The ‘Indivisible Fund’ 199 Agricultural Enterprises 201 ‘Urban Herding’ 264 The Aesthetic of Sovkhoism 290 References 297 Summing Up and Conclusions307 Epilogue: War and Lithium313 References317 Index339
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1
Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.8
State of the agricultural sector and reindeer head counts for 2014–2016 with prognostic figures for 2017–2019. The diagram at the top is named ‘Agriculture’ and it shows annual production as a ‘production index, in %’. The bottom diagram reflects the state of Reindeer Husbandry in absolute headcount figures. The blue columns are for total head counts, and the red ones—for those of the two SKhPKs. (Source: Biudzhet, 2017) Herders of Tundra’s ‘Right Wing’ seeking contact with herd fragments along the Barents Sea Coast. (Photo: V. Tkachev, LP 11.9.20, p.1) (a, b) Ostrovnoi/ Gremikha/ ‘Murmansk-140’—residential part. Source: ZATO (2017) Reindeer-sled driving practice for Northern Fleet commando troops on Lovozero Lake. (Source: Pod Lovozerom (2021)) A ‘patriotic upbringing’ event. (Source: Novyi, 2014) Munozero tragedy: recovery of the crashed helicopter. (Source: b-port.com, Na meste (2014)) Elite fishing: former Governor Marina Kovtun on an angling trip in Murmansk Region. (Source: Instagram https://www. instagram.com/marinav_kovtun/; Marina (2020)) Aerial survey over Ponoi River (Photo: Lev Fedoseev; Source: Olen’ia (2017)) Presentation of Head of AO ‘Fedorovo Resources’ A. Gostevskikh before Sami representatives and Lovozero Raion authorities in Murmansk (10.02.21)
28 58 65 69 70 75 77 107 153
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Fig. 3.9 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4
Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6
Fig. 4.7 Fig. 4.8 Fig. 4.9 Fig. 4.10
Indigenous ‘support’ for Putin’s war. Source: NRK screenshot from VKontakte, Larsen (2022a) ‘To Live in the North!’ ad on the entrance of the Nationalities Cultural Centre in Lovozero. Source: Kuznetsova (2023) ‘Symbolic herding’: STC members counting ‘herd’ at ‘Sam’ Siyt’ (Source: Nikolaev, 2016a) Garages in Murmansk. Source: Madslien (2013) ‘The flick of the pencil’: The Head of the Reindeer Husbandry Department of ‘Tundra’ in the booth of Polmos Corral Enclosure (Left Wing). 5 January 2022. Photo: V. Tkachev (Tkachev, 2022e) (a) Lovozero from the air. (Photo: Vl. Kuznetsov, personal communication). (b) Lovozero – street scene. (Photo: Lukas Allemann, personal communication) A poster for a SVO-supporting charity concert at the Lovozero House of Culture, 3 December 2022. The heading reads: ‘We are together!’. All collected sums will be spent for buying goods and necessary equipment for military personnel taking part in the Special Operation. Tickets from 100 rubles (⁓EUR 1.50 – 13 December 2022). LP 48 (9163), 02.12.22, p. 8 ‘Such are our holidays!’ Source: Tarasov (2019) ‘Our sports school has what to be proud of!’ Source: Tarasenko (2022a) (a, b) A sports fishing event on Lake Lovozero (Source: Zadornaia, 2022c) (a, b) ‘Regional ushu tournament in Revda. A regional tournament Class B in wushu discipline sanda took place on 19 November (2022) at the Sports Complex in the Settlement of Revda.’ (Tarasenko 2022b, Photo: Natalia Antonova)
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List of Maps
Map 3.1 Lovozero Raion: outlines of current territorial use (Source: Lovozero Administration, https://www.lovozeroadm.ru/ shemy_territoria/shema_territoria/ (Accessed 25.03.21). 1. Territory of agricultural land-use; 2. Forestry Fund territory; 3. Protected and Special Regime Territories Map 3.2 The BEZRK Affair: Hunting Lot No 7. Source: Tkachev (2019a) Map 3.3 Location of the Fedorova Tundra site (source: Kol’skie karty, 2021). The explanatory note (right) reads: ‘According to preliminary data deposits consist of up to 250 tons of platinoid ores. The license is property of SP ‘ZAO Fedorovo Resources’. Construction of two excavation pits as well as a processing factory are planned at the site. From 2010 on production of 150 thousand tons of concentrate a year have been planned for a period of 13 years with an average platinoid content of 100 grammes per ton. NOTE: The Canadian Company ‘Barrick Gold’ is the world’s biggest gold-mining company
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List of Tables
Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 3.1
Statistics: Lovozero Raion Basic Economic Indexes for the first quarter of 2020 (Source: LP, 2020) Types of usage and types of reindeer Types of reindeer husbandry entities (farms) Current head-counting figures for Murmansk Region (2020) Bans and Red Book entries of wild reindeer and moose in Murmansk Region
12 32 33 40 93
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This book strives to provide answers to a frequently asked question: what is the governing system in Russia today—is it capitalism, socialism, totalitarianism or what? The period that is taken for providing ways of defining the present system of governance is the very recent one, including the impact of the currently raging war in Ukraine. In terms of the site of research, the extreme periphery is taken, and within that periphery (the Russian Far North, Murmansk Region), its most peripheral community—that of the reindeer herding people of the Kola Peninsula (Lovozero Municipality (Raion)). I present a detailed description of how a very distant centre (that of a Putin-embodied apex of power), through a succession of progressively subordinate governing tiers, reaches down to and impacts the lives of people in this remote community. The book is divided into the following parts. Following this introductory chapter, Chap. 2 (Statistics) introduces the context of discussion by looking at the way local power ‘sees’ its subjects through statistical reflection. Chapter 3 (Actors) introduces power conflicts which are vitally relevant for the local community through tensions with superior power circles of various calibre. Chapter 4 (Reindeer herders) presents the outcomes of such tensions as they shape the lives of people of the extreme periphery of Russian life today. Conclusions follow, as well as an Epilogue in which a currently unfolding major development—that of mining for lithium ore deep into the tundra—is seen as promising to deal a major blow to reindeer husbandry and the fragile tundra environment. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Konstantinov, Power and the People, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38306-9_1
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The answer to the initial question is that the present system of governance in Russia, as seen from the vantage point of the farthest provinces (‘the Regions’), can be described as one of selective de-centralization. The attempt at a total power-grasp over each and every citizen, including those of the extreme periphery, characterizing power-people relations in the Soviet Union in numerous bodies of theory, is now changed to one of partial and selective application of unquestioned power. In those cases, when the pinnacle of power finds it ‘uninteresting’ to meddle and arbitrate in its own favour, as is often the case with the peripheral issues discussed in this book, it elects to arbitrate in favour of the bottom of the social pyramid (in our case, the reindeer herding community.) Should the case be of direct interest to the supreme power, or pertinent to extraction of attractive non-renewable or renewable tundra resources, the treatment is uncompromising and cavalier, and the opinion of the people is totally ignored. The resulting regime of governance can be thus described as a hybrid one. A semblance of democracy is being displayed at the level of concerns that are irrelevant to power-holders, whereas an authoritarian regime of governance is displayed above that level. A tendency to narrow the thin ‘democratic’ tier still further is being observed with the progress of the Russian-Ukrainian War. The conclusion made in the final part of the book is that the present regime of selective decentralization works towards an increase of centre- periphery tensions in today’s Russia, composed as it is of a mosaic of extreme peripheries and a single insular centre of concentrated power. Consequently, my aim has been to follow via often microscopic observation how these tensions are evolving in down-to-earth reportage sequences. This is in opposition to a general tendency to see the ‘power-people’ constellation as a uniform entity by applying generalizations based principally on urban encounters at the insular centre. Likewise, my concern has also been to avoid insularity of a diametrically opposite nature: that of adopting a remote periphery field of vision, without linking it to superior power concerns. The book draws on a number of conceptual currents, bringing them to a single focus of analytical observation. The latter reveals the hybrid nature of the current application of power in Russia in the recent past, as well as at the immediately current moment (Melville, 1999). The principal argument is that there exists a thin layer of agency at the bottom of the social pyramid (or of the ‘vertical of power’ in Russian journalese phrasing) in which an
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overwhelmingly pro-Soviet general public is allowed to wield some autonomous power, thereby providing popular support for the current power elites. The system at its bottom layer is one I have captured conceptually in previous writing as ‘sovkhoism’ (Konstantinov, 2015, Konstantinov and Istomin, 2020a, 2020b; for a critical assessment Hann, 2021a, 2021b). Despite such a general populist attitude, upper echelons of power can—and often do—entirely disregard populist considerations. Instead, they answer to the demands of various structures of power (military, FSB, the Industrial- Military Complex, etc.), which are variously connected with the loyal circles of the oligarchate. The conceptual sub-disciplinary current engaged with is thus the ailing one of ‘postsocialism’. Criticized much almost from the very beginning (e.g., Humphrey, 2002), it is truly experiencing crisis today. I believe that the trouble comes from not recognizing the power potential of nostalgic sentiments for recreating a post-Soviet version of reality (Lee, 2011). This has occurred despite strong criticism of the omission (Hann et al., 2002; Kideckel, 2008). A good deal of this critical argumentation rests on evoking the Polanyian concept of ‘substantive vs. formalized’ economies (Polanyi, 1957) within which my own concept of sovkhoism gets placed (Cf. Hann, 2021a, 2021b). Another analytical strand hails back to a tradition of social historians engaging with Soviet Russia (Dunham, 1990 [1976]; Fitzpatrick, 1994). This is a tradition followed by Bruno (2016) and his work directly connected with the region of the Russian Far North I am engaged with— namely, what today is Murmansk Region. The focus in Bruno’s book is on industrial development and, more specifically, on how Soviet management dealt with running tasks despite often fraught relationships with superior power circles. This follows another tradition of ‘Soviet industrial writing’, such as Kotkin’s classic study of Magnitogorsk (Kotkin (1995)), or, in a more general economic context, Kornai’s panoramic study of command socialist economy (1992). In Soviet/Russian administrative tradition, reindeer husbandry, with which I am engaging, falls under ‘agriculture’. Concerning that branch of the national economy, a notable recent book is by Hale-Dorrell (2019). The author perceptively discusses Krushchev’s ‘agricultural adventurism’ and tries to redeem the much-reviled leader by pointing that he followed principally Western management models. As I have pointed out in my review of the book (Konstantinov, 2020), Hale-Dorrell completely misses an essential point: the degree of anti-capitalist resistance in Soviet
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collectives and their ultimate success in this by sustaining the regime of ‘private-in-the-collective’ (or sovkhoist) property relations. This connects with much larger conceptual currents, introduced at the time by David Mitrany (1951), and much earlier by Trotsky himself (1983 [1937]), as well as by the émigré historian Maslov (1937). In more recent times, and in a philosophical mode, the ability to resist and the possibilities of resistance from below are consonant with James Scott’s classics (1985, 1990). A connecting sub-strand here, turning to the cultural climate in which such resistance can thrive, is Michael Herzfeld’s concept of ‘cultural intimacy’ (2005 [1997]), and even more so of ‘culture of theft’ (Herzfeld, 1988). A ‘command socialist’ representation of that has been analysed as ‘institutionalized theft’ by Gerald Creed in his perceptive field-based study of a Bulgarian village in the 1980s (Creed, 1998). On the far-flung margins of agricultural developments—that is, as they concern the reindeer husbandry peoples of the Far North and Siberia— the topic of the relations between the state and this most peripheral tier at the very bottom of the ‘vertical of power’ has been done with sophistication by Nikolai Ssorin-Chaykov (2003). His writing was based on detailed original ethnography. It described a bottom-up view of the world from the perspective of rank-and-file Siberian reindeer pastoralists. More recent work of his turns to related issues in this direction (2016). The theme of ‘peasant resistance’ has turned some to analogies with feudal societies. Conceptually, this harks back to Foucault’s comparisons between feudal and modern social orders, in which feudalism comes as the more ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ up to a certain ceiling, above which superior power acts in a cavalier fashion, while on the whole dispensing with intrusion (beyond tribute and service in war) into lower or local affairs (2012 [1977]; cf. also Bakhtin’s classical studies of carnival and people’s culture (1990 [1965]). These currents of thought have been creatively followed for post-Soviet Russia—notably by Shlapentokh (2007; cf. also Dubin, 2011, p. 233f). I turn now to indigenous studies—since my ethnography comes from nearly a quarter of a century of daily work with Sami and Komi reindeer herders. Despite impressive scholarly production and field-work dedication, much of existing studies in this sub-field has rapidly dated. A strong reason for this was excessive initial enthusiasm. Adopting a uniform ‘liberation from Soviet oppression’ stance, most work here mistakenly expected that the ‘liberation’ will lead the ‘liberated’ indigenous peoples to embracing what I call in the book a ‘truly private’ road of development.
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Instead, what is seen is that even in the most notable ‘success story’ of this kind (Golovnev & Osherenko, 1999), closer up-to-date work of native ethnographers (notably Zuev, 2020) paints a picture in which a return to a ‘sovkhoist’ reality is perceived to be a much more attractive prospect. The failure of understanding such deeper pro-Soviet sentiments has made otherwise excellent books rapidly anachronistic (Fondahl, 1998; Gray, 2005; Vitebsky, 2005). Murmansk Region has seen its own (somewhat comic) example (Robinson & Kassam, 2000). At present, and in view of the fact that indigenous official activism has positioned itself as loyal to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we witness a stunned silence on the part of Western supporters and even the breaking of relations by top western indigenous leadership. On the positive side, a rare exception in the literature on indigenous peoples is Vladimirova (2006), whose experience with reindeer herders of Murmansk Region dates back to 2000. She offers a much more realistic appraisal of the local situation and rejects (as imagined expectations) a wholesale return to ‘truly private’ husbandry on the part of the indigenous population of Lovozero Raion. Instead, a minority has consistently clung to the living ghost of the former sovkhoz, while the majority has become fully urbanized, with scant links to any form of what is known as ‘traditional land-use’. Consequently, indigeneity has been re-interpreted through urban realities (Vladimirova, 2012). Finally, an early perceptive contribution to the study of reindeer husbandry realities after the break-up of the Soviet Union was made by an eminent figure in the field, namely Hugh Beach (1992). He captured the first moment when Kola herders found themselves in a post-Soviet and post-sovkhoz reality. As he was right to stress at that time of tectonic change, the will to sustain a sovkhoz-like reality on the part of the Sami herders with whom he had worked was overwhelming. Regrettably, few paid attention to this warning, preferring instead to proclaim an imminent turn to private reindeer herding in these parts. Later events revealed the fallacy of such expectations. What in fact happened is the subject matter of this book.
References Bakhtin, M. (1990 [1965]). Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaia kul’tura srednevekov’ia i Renessansa [Francois Rablais’ works and the people’s culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance]. Khudozhestvennaia Literatura.
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Beach, H. (1992). Reindeer herding on the Kola Peninsula - Report of a visit with Saami herders of Sovkhoz tundra. In R. Kvist (Ed.), Readings in Saami History, culture and language III (pp. 113–142). University of Umeå. Bruno, A. (2016). The nature of soviet power. An arctic environmental history. Cambridge University Press. Creed, G. (1998). Domesticating revolution. From socialist reform to ambivalent transition in a Bulgarian village. Pennsylvania State University Press. Dubin, B. (2011). Rossiia nulevikh: politicheskaia kul’tura, istoricheskaia pamiat’, povsednevnaia zhizn’ [Russia of the ‘00s: political culture; historical memory, everyday life]. ROSSPEN. Dunham, V. (1990 [1976]). In Stalin’s time: Middleclass values in Soviet fiction. Duke University. Fitzpatrick, S. (1994). Stalin’s peasants. Resistance and survival in the Russian village after collectivization. Oxford University Press. Fondahl, G. (1998). Gaining ground? Evenkis, land, and reform in southeastern Siberia. Allyn and Bacon. Foucault, M. (2012 [1977]). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Vintage. Golovnev, A., & Osherenko, G. (1999). Siberian survival. The nenets and their story. Cornell University Press. Gray, P. A. (2005). The predicament of Chukotka’s indigenous movement: Post- Soviet activism in the Russian Far North. Cambridge University Press. Hale-Dorrell, A. (2019). Corn crusade: Khrushchev’s farming revolution in the post- Stalin Soviet Union. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-1906-4467-3. Hann, C. (2021a, March 17). The State Farm in World History, Warsaw Seminar (online). Hann, C. (2021b). Economy and ethics in the cosmic process. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 28, 1–25. Hann, C., Humphrey, C., & Verdery, K. (2002). Introduction: Postsocialism as a topic of anthropological investigation. In C. Hann (Ed.), Postsocialism. Ideals, ideologies, and practices in Eurasia (pp. 13–40). Routledge. Herzfeld, M. (1988). The poetics of manhood: Contest and identity in a Cretan mountain village. Princeton University Press. Herzfeld, M. (2005 [1997]). Cultural intimacy: Social poetics in the nation-state. Routledge. Humphrey, C. (2002). Does the category “postsocialist” still make sense? In C. Hann (Ed.), Postsocialism. Ideals, Ideologies, and Practices in Eurasia (pp. 12–15). Routledge. Kideckel, D. A. (2008). Getting by in postsocialist Romania. Indiana University Press. Konstantinov, Y. (2015). Conversations with power. Soviet and postsoviet developments in the reindeer husbandry part of the Kola Peninsula. Uppsala University. Retrieved from http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2: 865695
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Konstantinov, Y. (2020). Review of “Corn crusade: Khrushchev’s farming revolution in the post-Stalin Soviet Union by Aaron Hale-Dorrell.”. Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 9(2), 135–140. Kornai, J. (1992). The socialist system: The political economy of communism. Princeton University Press. Lee, M. (2011). Nostalgia as a feature of ‘glocalization’: Use of the past in post- Soviet Russia. Post-Soviet Affairs, 27(2), 158–177. Maslov, S. (1937). Kolkhoznaia Rossiia. Istoriia i zhizn’ kolkhozov [Kolkhoz Russia. History and life of kolkhozes]. Melville, A. (1999). Russia in the 1990s: Democratization, postcommunism, or something else? Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 7(2), 165–187. Mitrany, D. (1951). Marx against the peasant. A study in social dogmatism. University of North Carolina. Polanyi, K. (1957). The economy as instituted process. In K. Polanyi et al. (Eds.), Trade and market in the early empires (pp. 243–270). Free Press. Robinson, M., & Kassam, K.-A. (2000). Saamskaia kartoshka: zhizn’sredi olenei vo vremia perestroiki [Sami potatoes: living with reindeer during perestroika]. Al’fa-Print. Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. Yale University Press. Scott, J. C. (1990). Hidden transcripts: domination and the arts of resistance. Yale University Press. Shlapentokh, V. I. (2007). Contemporary Russia as a feudal society. Palgrave Macmillan. Ssorin-Chaikov, N. (2016). Soviet debris: failure and the poetics of unfinished construction in northern Siberia. Social Research, 83(3), 689–721. Ssorin-Chaykov, N. (2003). The social life of the state in subarctic Siberia. Stanford University. Vitebsky, P. (2005). Reindeer people. Living with animals and spirits in Siberia. Harper Collins. Vladimirova, V. (2006). Just labor. Labor ethic in a post-Soviet reindeer herding community. Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology no 40, Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet. Vladimirova, V. (2012). Indigeneity in the city: “The King of the Tundra’ in the city”. From reindeer herding economy to a symbolic economy. Lecture read to the research symposium ‘Planning with difference - challenges, perspectives and practices’, 31 May–2 June, University of Tromsø, Tromsø (Norway). Zuev, S. (2020). The ‘success story’ of private reindeer husbandry in Yamal? A look at herders’ budgets 30 years after. In Y. Konstantinov & K. Istomin (Eds.), Beyond the sayable: Informal economic precursors of the post-soviet semiotic crisis. Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 9(1): 83–115.
CHAPTER 2
Reindeer Husbandry Statistics
According to current official accounts, reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region is practised almost exclusively in Lovozero Municipality (Raion). There is only one other location in the Region where it exists statistically. That is on the Rybachii Peninsula (Pechenga Raion). A description of the administrative situation there will be given further down. All other places, connected in the past with reindeer husbandry in one way or another (like in Terskii and Kovdorskii Raions, the village of Loparskoe near Murmansk, etc.),1 are absent from current official counts. Information about them exists only in occasional newspaper materials, in tourist blogs, and by oral communication with residents or visiting herders. For this reason, below I focus principally on the flagship of reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region—that of Lovozero Raion. The administrative procedure leading to publicly accessible statistical data about the state of reindeer husbandry in the Raion will be examined further down. I stress again the fact that the statistical data coming from Lovozero Raion presents, in fact, what is officially the state of statistical knowledge about reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region.
1 For the 20th c. contraction of Kola reindeer husbandry to that of Lovozero Raion see (in historical succession): Kertselli (1923); Alymov (1928); Budovnits (1931); Syroechkovskii (1986); Rybkin (1999); KE (2008).
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Konstantinov, Power and the People, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38306-9_2
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Towards a Model of Analysis The problem this part addresses concerns the process and mechanism of production of official statistics. The principal issue I discuss is the type of political will of responsible agencies as regards a reliable picture of the state of reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region. One would expect such accounts to be regularly published, and made accessible to all concerned. I show that, in its current state, the political will of administrations on a Raion, regional, and federal level is not following such an agenda. On the contrary, the state of reindeer husbandry is being either totally ignored, or else it is hidden behind official presentations in which vital elements are missing. My claim is, consequently, that the policy may be called one of obscuring the state of reindeer husbandry, rather than clarifying its actual state. The policy can be called bureaucratic obfuscation. Occasional and incomplete statistical statements about reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region (Lovozero Raion) are to be read with such a background (conscious or unconscious) programme in mind. The following statement by an official who has asked to remain anonymous, illustrates the general climate in which statistical texts get born. To the question whether more reliable and accurate information about the current state of reindeer husbandry could be elicited by considering income taxes paid by reindeer husbandry cooperatives, she answered: The fact of the matter is that relations between tax-payers and the tax-office (nalogovaia inspektsiia) is a separate and a rather closed theme (eto voobshche otdel’naia, ves’ma zakrytaia tema). State and municipal officials are obliged to disclose publicly their income and those of members of their families. Private enterprises, on the other hand, which do not have a public status2, are not legally obliged to disclose publicly their income. Data about it are sent to the tax-office, something about their employees goes to the Pension Fund. But all these are organizations from which an outsider cannot get access to data (eto vse organizatsii, gde cheloveku so storony informatsiiu ne poluchit’). (T.Sh., 27.10.2020) 2 Reindeer husbandry cooperatives can be described, in fact, as having a public status. Firstly, they are officially listed as ‘town-forming enterprises’ (gradoobrazuiushchie predpriiatiia) which implies public responsibility as regards their respective settlements—Lovozero in the case of ‘Tundra’, and the tundra villages of Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and Sosnovka— in that of ‘Olenevod’. And secondly, these enterprises receive state subsidies, and, consequently, are publicly accountable.
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Another illustration of bureaucratic obfuscation is the regular reports of the Statistical Department at Lovozero Raion Administration. These brief reports get published in the rubric ‘Statistics’ of the local weekly Lovozerskaia Pravda. In an example, covering the economy of the Raion for 2019, the index that may inform about reindeer herding appears as ‘stock-breeding production’ (proizvodstvo produktsii zhivotnovodstva). A footnote clarifies this index in the following way: ‘Footnote 6: The data is given for agricultural organizations not definable as small businesses. (Or, in other words, the index covers the reindeer husbandry cooperatives—my gloss.)’ In the slot for ‘production, tons’, there stands only the letter ‘k’ leading to another footnote. The footnote reads: Footnote 4: ‘Data has been provided (iavlenie bylo), but it is not being published for reasons ensuring the confidentiality of primary statistical data received from organizations and in accordance with the Federal Law of 29.11.2007 No 282 FZ “On official statistical accounts and the system of state statistics in the Russian Federation (art. 4, item 5; art. 9, item 1)”’. In effect, although the rubric ‘Stock-breeding production’ is listed in every bulletin of Lovozero Raion Statistical Office, it remains forever blank. This can be seen in every such bulletin published during the last five years (2016–2020). Taken at random, the Statistical Bulleting for the first quarter of 2020 illustrates the point: One needs to add here that there are about 600 cows bred in the Raion, as well as a limited number of poultry in the possession of agricultural organizations. These figures are to be compared to the official number of reindeer claimed to be close to 50,000 head. Despite the huge predominance of reindeer over domestic stock, the item ‘reindeer husbandry’ does not appear in the statistical list of basic indexes, as Table 2.1 illustrates. Reasons that have brought about such a state-of-affairs belong to a variety of analytical levels. To begin with, a legacy of secretiveness inherited from the Soviet past is to be taken into account. As it will be shown in the proper section, Soviet ways of classifying in respect of reindeer husbandry came from an understanding that head-count figures were sensitive information. Consequently, the publishable statistical bias was on amounts of meat produced, ratio of calf preservation, ratio of productive to non-productive parts of the herd, etc. For obfuscation of data, percentages rather than absolute figures (e.g., percentage of fulfilled meat-plans, percentage of increase of head numbers, etc.) used to dominate over
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Table 2.1 Statistics: Lovozero Raion Basic Economic Indexes for the first quarter of 2020 (Source: LP, 2020) Jan.– Mar. 2020
Volume of work carried out in economic activity ‘Construction’ in m roubles Stock-breeding production Stock and poultry harvested (live weight), tons Milk, tons Volume of goods transported by freight vehicles of organizations, thousand tons Average monthly nominal salary for 1 employee of organizations In reference to Murmansk Region: Consumer goods index
Jan.–Mar. 2020 in % value regarding Jan.–Mar. 2019
March 2020 compared to results in:
March 2019
February 2020
x
105.9
72.6
95.3
x x
128.7 60.9
By a factor of 2.0 60.4
43.1 96.0
68.2
70.4
108.6
48,938
111.2
109.5
96.0
x
102.5
102.5
100.5
1.8
absolute figures in statistical accounts. At the same time, absolute figures of meat produced by stock-breeding other than reindeer husbandry did occasionally appear. When it comes to reindeer husbandry, the post-Soviet statistical bias again shunned absolute figures for meat-production. A new moment could be noted however: absolute head-count figures began to appear albeit only occasionally. Still, key details were usually missing, or slots would be left entirely blank as in local bulletins of the type cited above. In the final account, despite some lifting of the veil of secrecy, the overall informational value of post-Soviet statistics had in fact decreased when compared to that of its predecessor. The reasons for such a conclusion may be seen on another level of analysis. It may be called operational as it is connected with the degree of control previously exercised in respect of reindeer husbandry. This historical aspect of the situation will be discussed in greater detail in the
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following chapters. Let it be said for the moment that the former will for strict control and the implementation of necessary mechanisms for its application have been replaced in post-Soviet reality by an operational order built on rather different principles. While the Soviet order demanded the totality of all factual data, from which a greater or lesser part would be classified for ‘insiders’ use’ (dlia vnutrennogo pol’zovaniia), in post-Soviet reality, a demand for strict total grasp of a current state-of-affairs has been withdrawn in the sector under research. Indeed, the very mechanisms for achieving it have been dismantled. The interesting question which raises its head at this point is about the new principles (or drivers) of information gathering in the post-Soviet culture of governance. This is a very big question, indeed. Still, the working of such drivers in the sector at hand promises a glimpse. From such a perspective, a working hypothesis to be called selective de-centralization can be moved forward.
Selective De-centralization In place of a centralized political will for a total grasp on facts, we can see one of withdrawal from sectors deemed as peripheral. Consequently, local players of greater or lesser magnitude are thus enabled (or even motivated) to promote their individual and often conflicting interests. Superordinate agents on various tiers up the vertical of power retain a privilege of arbitration. Information gathering, in such a context, would reflect the configuration of local interests at a given moment, as well as the respective business-cum-political position of the protagonists. Such a model of information gathering in respect of a peripheral socio- economic sector (from the viewpoint of administrative bureaucracies) tends to give local players considerably greater leeway for promoting their interests compared to former times. A parallel consequence of such a model of selective de-centralization is evident in the gathering speed with which centrifugal local developments are taking place. In the case at hand, two principal interest groups will be discussed. On the one hand, these are the governing bodies of reindeer husbandry enterprises (those of the two Lovozero Raion Cooperatives: ‘Tundra’ of Lovozero, and ‘Olenevod’ of Krasnoshchel’ie). On the other, we can see local administrations on the Raion, and further up on the regional level, whose leading representatives may use their current positions to arbitrate interests of outside players. Arbitration of conflicts further up than that is
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not in immediate evidence, but the chance that it is selectively taking place is decidedly probable. As a specific case illustrating this point, the one of the BEZRK Hunting Club of Belgorod Region, entering a prolonged conflict with the ‘Olenevod’ Cooperative, will be discussed in Chap. 3. Another, even longer conflict, between regional administrations, on the one hand, and those of the two reindeer husbandry cooperatives, on the other, over the issue of wild reindeer, will be also presented there. A further consequence of a governance regime of selective de- centralization is the current observable absence of unified inter-regional policies. As regards reindeer husbandry, the immediate example of a general lack of unified policies in respect of reindeer husbandry exists in respect of Murmansk Region and the Komi Republic.3 Given the historical ties between the reindeer husbandry parts of these administrative subjects, one would expect some form of co-operation or, at least, some information exchange between them. Nothing of the sort appears to be in evidence. Ties between the two areas are occasionally highlighted in folkloristic public events, while discussions of problematic reindeer husbandry issues are not a part of their agendas. At the same time, officially a show of inter-regional reindeer husbandry links is regularly presented. The last time representatives of Kola reindeer husbandry took part in such an event was at the 4th Congress of Reindeer Herders of the Russian Federation, held in Yakutsk in 2017. As it can be seen in the Resolution of the Congress (Resolution, 2017), the delegates presented problematic issues, concerning their respective regions and, at the end, came out with recommendations for regional and federal authorities to somehow find solutions regarding the most burning problems. On a bigger scale, and hosted by western (Fennoscandic) reindeer husbandry organizations, much the same was stated at the last World Reindeer Herders Congress in 2017 (Congress, 2017). It is to be strongly emphasized that while such grand events provide much needed visibility for reindeer husbandry, existing as it does in distant and hard-to-access regions of the Subarctic, in terms of cooperative efforts for solving specific problems of the regions of the Russian Federation their value is insignificant. The fact of the matter is that such problems are not even mentioned in congress resolutions unless in vague or euphemistic terms. This concerns, in the first instance, such a burning problem as the 3
On this point see Konstantinov et al. (2018).
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highly dynamic configurations between collective, private, and private-in- the-collective reindeer existing in the various regions of the Russian North.4 A problem of critical importance, remaining in hidden agendas and away from the limelight, is the compromised production of statistical data, and, consequently, their low reliability. The question of suppression of data and the reasons leading to such a state of current statistical affairs is not an item one would find in show-piece congress agendas. An issue calling for inter-regional ties is also the deep-seated fear of an anthrax epidemic coming from the reindeer husbandry regions further east. In an interesting way, the measures considered (and some already taken) also concern the collective vs. private reindeer issue. Briefly put, inoculations against anthrax tend to be applied in respect of collective reindeer, while private owners may see their herds totally wiped out (Yuzhakov, 2020; Zuev, 2020). Centrifugal tendencies promoted by the present culture of governance, defined above as one of selective de-centralization, are in evidence over the whole of the Russian reindeer husbandry territory. Two features central to the model offered here are to be stressed. On the one hand, this is the stepping up of the tendency for autonomous action on the part of reindeer husbandry cooperatives, often in conflict with powerful outside interests. On the other, and as noted in the previous paragraph, this follows from the current very loose inter-regional connections in the reindeer husbandry sector stimulating each region to seek its own solutions. These general features of the current situation will be discussed throughout this book. Below I present first the manner in which available data is being gathered. In the following section, statistical production is discussed first on Raion level, and then on the regional one. Some preliminary conclusions follow. Data gathering has relied on available official documents and statistical texts. Apart from historical documents, data gathering has been facilitated by electronic availability of a great part of current documents, covering the last ten years. The local weekly newspaper Lovozerskaia Pravda has a special place in this. As an organ of Lovozero Raion Administration, it regularly publishes official documents either in the main body of the newspaper or, more
4 For a treatment of the problem across the Far North see: Konstantinov and Istomin (2020a, 2020b).
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often, as appendixes to it. All issues since 2011 are accessible in digital form on the official site of Lovozero Raion Administration.5 The chapter regularly keeps up a small rubric, named ‘Statistics’ (statistika), already illustrated in Table 2.1. What is published in the rubric are short tabular texts about the economic situation in the Raion, prepared by the officials at the Statistical Department of the Administration. While the information value of the tables published is very low as regards Raion socio-economic activities, the tables provide abundant implied information about current policies of exposure or suppression of data. As this concerns critically data about reindeer husbandry, special attention will be turned to the publications from this Raion level source. Besides Lovozerskaia Pravda, administrative documents have been occasionally issued by the following additional sources: (i) Analyses of production and financial-managing activities of SKhPK6 ‘Tundra’ (analizi proizvodstvennoi i finansovo- khoziaistvennoi deiatel’nosti). (ii) Annual reports by the Committee for accounting of head counts of semi-domesticated reindeer, grazed on the territory of Municipal Formation Village Settlement of Lovozero (Komissiia po uchetu domashnykh severnykh olenei, vypasaemykh na territorii munitsipal’nogo obrazovaniia Sel’skogo poseleniia Lovozero, Lovozerskogo Raiona). These are administrative documents which, as a rule, are not in open access. (iii) Concerning the small herd on Ribachii Peninsula, documents are available on the site of Pechenga Raion Administration. Head counts are mentioned in them, but only as projections. Data after 2016 is absent, most probably in connection with the liquidation of the reindeer husbandry Municipal Unitary Enterprise (MUP) ‘Pechengskaia kompaniia’. For the recent history of the herd see also Konstantinov (2015:329).
5 http://www.lovozeroadm.ru/zhizn_Raiona/gazeta_lovozersk/3914/. Usually, the digital issue would be published with a delay of up to 20 days, after the coming out of the paper version. 6 SKhPK stands for Sel‘skokhozyaystvennyy proizvodstvennyy kooperativ (Cooperative for Agricultural Production).
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Administrative documents on the regional level which have been taken into account (and are available in open access) include the following sources: (iv) Final results of the All-Russian Agricultural Census of 2016 for the Municipal Raions and Townships of Murmansk Region (Morozov, 2017). (v) Data Base of the Government of Murmansk Region for Lovozero Raion.7 (vi) Occasional reports of the State Veterinary Service of Murmansk Region (Gossudarstvenaia veterinarnaia sluzhba Murmanskoi oblasti). (vii) Data from the Expert and Analytical Centre on Agricultural Businesses: Reindeer Husbandry in Murmansk Region (AB- Centre, 2020). (viii) Occasional reports of the Federal State Statistical Service for Murmansk Region (Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki po Murmanskoi oblasti—Murmanskstat).8 Another source that has been used is data provided by informants. These include, in the first instance, reindeer herders of various ranks, working in the two reindeer husbandry cooperatives ‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’, as well as officials from administrative offices on the Raion and the regional levels. As a rule, they have asked for their identity to be protected. I have used also various official documents and other publications, presenting head-counting estimates. References for them will be given in the appropriate sections. In the typical case, it is not clear what primary sources the respective authors have used when presenting the counts. It is surmised that the figures are those published in the Data Base of the Regional Government. Last, but not least, I have relied on my own experience from working with reindeer husbandry teams of both cooperatives during the period 1994–2016.
By the date of writing (January 2023), this document was no longer open to access. By the date of writing (January 2023), the official site of Murmanskstat was no longer open to access. 7 8
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Raion and Regional Statistics The principal actors, who influence the production of statistical texts, are the reindeer husbandry cooperatives themselves. This role needs to be seen in the context of their respective positions in the socio-economic and political life of the Raion. To begin with, the current reindeer husbandry cooperatives have the official status of ‘town-forming enterprises’ (gradoobrazuyushchie predpriiatiia). The bigger twin in the twin city complex Lovozero-Revda—the Town Settlement of Revda9—plays this role through the mining-processing complex of ОOО ‘Lovozerskii GOK’.10 This is indeed the main employer in the town, which, in the course of time, it had built around itself. Such is also the case of both reindeer husbandry cooperatives ‘Tundra’ of Lovozero, and ‘Olenevod’ of Krasnoshchel’ie. ‘Olenevod’ continues to be the main employer in the village of Krasnoshchel’ie (600), as also—at least nominally—for the more distant Kanevka (100), and the farthest flung tiny village of Sosnovka (19). In the case of Lovozero the situation is different. SKhPK ‘Tundra’ employs only a fraction of the population of this small town of roughly 3000 people. Its influence on the economic life of the population is more of a symbolic and cultural nature than in real economic terms. The present cooperative is only a shadow of former Soviet times, when the sovkhoz used to be the main employer of the village population. In an attempt to present itself as an attractive tourist destination, Lovozero advertises itself as ‘the Sami capital of Murmansk Region’, ‘a reindeer-husbandry village’, ‘a tundra village’, and so forth. Neither of these claims are strictly true by now. In reality, at least a third of the population are migrants or their descendants from all parts of the former Soviet Union. The other two thirds can be equally divided between people of Sami and of Komi origin. Secondly, the place cannot be called a village in any sense of the term anymore. In all respects, by now it is a small town of blocks-of-flats with the overwhelming part of the population employed in office or service jobs. The main employers are numerous administrative offices, urban infrastructural departments, as well as educational and recreational establishments. 9 The full designation is: Munitsipal’noe obrazovanie gorodskoe poselenie Revda (Municipal Formation Town Settlement of Revda). 10 Full designation: Obshestvo Ogranichennoi Otvetstvenostiu ‘Lovozerskii Gorno- Obogatitel’niy Kombinat’ (Limited Company ‘Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex’).
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Thirdly, reindeer husbandry itself is presented as being mainly Sami, but in reality, it is dominated by employees of Komi (or Komified Nenets) origin. This is especially true when it comes to the administrative leadership of the cooperative as well as by what has been called elsewhere its ‘tundra elite’. These are the Heads of husbandry affairs, vet doctors and technicians, and brigade leaders (Konstantinov et al., 2018). The reindeer husbandry and village claims are true, by contrast, as regards the Komi village of Krasnoshchel’ie, which places it in a ‘province-capital’ relationship with Lovozero. A brief scrutiny of Lovozero Raion economics reveals the fact that it depends on state subsidies to over 80% of its budget. On paper, the town- forming enterprises of the Raion: OOO ‘Lovozerskii GOK’11 and the two reindeer husbandry cooperatives, are its main economic engines. In publicly accessible statistical accounts, however, their contributions to the local economy are currently omitted. Such notable omissions are also noticeable regarding an otherwise much publicized and invested with high hopes economic sector: tourism. These omissions call for an explanation. My answer is that they stem from the possibilities offered by the model of governance presented above: one promoting centrifugal tendencies. Consequently, the arrangement allows local economic players to appear and disappear from public scrutiny at will. The disappearances I engage with mainly concern official and publicly accessible statistical accounts. To elucidate this point, I have used two sets of publicly accessible documents: (i) Raion level statistical bulletins, and (ii) Raion level budget reports. I begin with a look at local statistical bulletins. As it has been mentioned in the Introductory part, statistical bulletins are regularly published in the weekly newspaper of Lovozero Raion Administration in a small column called ‘Statistics’ (statistika). The statistika columns aim to present ‘the basic indexes of the socio- economic state of Lovozero Municipal Raion’, as it is stated in the sub- headings of the bulletins. As it has been shown in Table 2.1 (and in all such bulletins), the basic indexes cover the following economic activities: (i) construction works and delivered residential space (in square metres); (ii) transported goods (in thousand tons); and (iii) average salaries paid by various enterprises. 11 Obshestvo Ogranichennoi Otvetstvenostiu ‘Lovozerskii Gorno-Obogatitel’nii Kombinat (Limited Liability Company ‘Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex’).
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The slot, where one could expect to find reindeer husbandry, namely stock-breeding (zhivotnovodstvo), remains, as previously said, forever blank as regards absolute figures. Not publishing absolute figures in the stock- breeding slots is legitimated by the already quoted Federal Law of 29.11.2007 (FZ-282, 2007). What this amounts to is that the respective enterprises (in our case: the ‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’ cooperatives) have legal rights not to have them published in open access to the general public. It is thus the case that public statistics for head counts of the stock of two of the town-formative enterprises of the Raion are withheld from public scrutiny. The same can be said for other aspects reflecting the current economic state of these enterprises, namely collective vs. private-in- the-collective head figures and respective ratios, gender/age compositions of herds, head counts for respective herding teams (brigades, brigady), produced meat and sub-products, grazing range of the enterprises and the respective brigades, personnel involved, rent paid for the grazing range, income figures, and, finally, state-subsidy figures. It will require substantial space to discuss in detail all these issues. Further down in this and the following chapters, I shall try to elucidate at least two of them. I find these two most pertinent to the model of analysis on which this study is based: collective vs. ‘private’ reindeer; and grazing range size and rents. Besides the two reindeer husbandry enterprises, there is a third enterprise of similar standing, but of historically much greater economic significance. This is the mining-processing complex in the neighbouring mining town of Revda. Until very recently, it existed as a limited company with distant and not quite clear ownership and under the name OOO ‘Lovozerskii GOK’. Despite periodical upbeat statements about the economic future of the enterprise, its economic health has been precarious and close to bankruptcy for the entire post-Soviet period. The failing health of the enterprise has finally brought about its putting under state control. On 25 October 2022, currently acting Regional Governor Andrei Chibis announced the momentous and long-awaited decision at a visit to Lovozero Raion. The event was announced as a meeting with the new Head of the mining-processing complex, Evgenii Vassilevskii (Tkachev, 2022a). The role of Lovozerskii GOK as a town- forming enterprise was highlighted. For that reason, the state had finally decided to take the situation in its hands. I emphatically stress that this re-appearance of the state on the local scene—as a deus ex machina saviour—has strongly boosted local yearnings for a resurrection of a Soviet- like (‘meta-Soviet’) reality all along. A month before the actual event, the
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administrative weekly had anticipated such a surge of local hopes under the heading ‘Revda—a little Soviet Union’ (Bystrova, 2022). The governor visited also the Raion Centre of Lovozero where more of state funding was announced. That included an overall increase of the Raion budget by 1.5 times so that it would reach an annual sum of one billion roubles—compared to 640 million for 2018. Support was to be given for all ‘national projects’ (natsproekty), amounting to 12 in all in practically all social sectors (housing, health services, educational services, cultural activities, youth sports activities). A special mention was made of support for reindeer husbandry, as, in the words of Nadezhda Kuznetsova, Head of the Raion Administration, it represented ‘a key agricultural sector.’ Tellingly, the statement was not backed by any mention of productive input, but only by the fact that the sector’s grazing range occupied 51% of the whole Raion territory. All the good news is to be seen in the context of a rather shocking event, preceding the Governor’s visit by some two months. At a meeting summoned by the regional veterinary authorities, and with the whole administrative leadership of the Raion present, it was announced that five tons of reindeer meat were found buried and rotting on the outskirts of Lovozero. The representatives of the two reindeer husbandry cooperatives vehemently refused to acknowledge any connection with that meat. The Head of ‘Olenevod’s’ meat-processing facility in Lovozero went as far as saying that ‘the meat could belong to private reindeer owners or to poachers’ (Tkachev, 2022b). This obviously absurd statement promised serious investigation, which, by all appearances, was to find the perpetrators of the deed in either of the two cooperatives. The very title of the Lovozerskaia Pravda report suggested however that such an investigation was quite possibly not to follow (‘Law-enforcing organs have given up seeking the culprits?’). That, indeed, proved to be the case—the months went by and no further news of the ‘rotten meat affair’ came. Naturally, there was a wave of rumours, pointing to ‘Tundra’ as the most likely culprit. A popular one ran as follows: Because of unpaid debts, the electricity supply for ‘Tundra’ was cut off for some period of time and the freezers stopped working. The meat went bad and they buried it. Investigations are taking place, but I don’t think a culprit will be found and made to take the responsibility, because there are insiders’ issues there (tam svoi zamorochki) and they (i.e., the management of ‘Tundra’) would come out clean (oni otmazhutsia). (M.K., 25.11.2022)
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Another rumour went like this: As for the buried meat, there is such a variant of this story: that Sovkhoz (sic) ‘Tundra’ had imported some meat from Narian-Mar, but they could not sell it, so it turned out it was more advantageous to throw it away and bury it. (L.Sh., 15.11.2022)
There were many other rumours but one thing was clear: in spite of the local indignation, and the initial will for action on the part of the veterinary authorities, a lid on the case was firmly put. The governor’s visit of 25 October (2022), and the support for the Raion budget and specifically for the reindeer husbandry sector, provides a clue for the understanding of the case. Namely that insofar as Lovozero Raion was concerned, its affairs were to be regarded with a greater deal of engagement by the regional government and by Governor Chibis himself. Hence, negative news about the Raion and its reindeer husbandry economic sector were to be arbitrarily suppressed as damaging to a promoted flourishing image of this administrative subject. In this way, the regional information policy marked another notch up on a Soviet-like scale of arbitrary manipulation. What amounted to a strategic proclamation of such an engaged attitude on the part of the acting governor was the specific flagging of ‘Tundra’ in a sweeping program for stemming outmigration from the Region. The programme, under the name of ‘Strategic Plan “To live in the North!” (Na Severe zhit’!)’ offered improvement and bonuses in practically all economic and social sectors (Pashenkova & Antanovich, 2019). This will be discussed further on in connection with ‘Arctic Hectare’ (Gektar Arktiki)—an outmigration-stemming plan of the former Governor, Maria Kovtun. What can be called ‘the rotten meat affair’ struck a very discordant note concerning the grand strategic plan of acting Governor Chibis. The very irksome part of these events, taking place in the fall-winter of 2022, was that back in 2019 and the time when the strategic plan was made (and the War in Ukraine had not yet begun), ‘Tundra’ had been prominently displayed as successfully exporting meat to Finland (Pashenkova & Antanovich, 2019). The specific part of ‘To Live in the North!’ in which promising export to Finland figured, was called ‘National Project “International Cooperation and Export”’. The invasion of Ukraine introduced heavy revisions in all that, possibly culminating in the rotten meat affair. Whatever the truth of the case, the lid of ‘unsayability’ was put on
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it. Still, the following preliminary conclusions can be made as it concerns this particular case. The ‘rotten meat’ alarm call was raised by the local community and swiftly taken up by the regional veterinary control authorities. This specialized branch of the regional government, under the official title of Department of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control for Murmansk Region, is more popularly known by the abbreviation Rossel’khoznadzor.12 Concerning local skirmishes with the reindeer husbandry cooperatives, it has been acting all through the post-Soviet decades as a prominent rival for establishing control over tundra affairs. This matter I will be discussing repeatedly further on as a struggle for removing the cooperatives from their Soviet-received and sovkhoism- sustaining status of ‘custodians of the tundra’ (khoziaeva tundri). As it will discussed in greater detail further on, clashes with Rossel’khoznadzor, as well as with other relevant departments of the regional government, have been prominently displayed in head-on encounters. This happened in the case of the ‘BZRK Hunting Club affair’, as well as in the one of the over a decade long ‘wild reindeer controversy’. These have been prominent local affairs to be discussed in detail later on. Let it be said in advance that the outcomes of these ‘locals vs. regionals’ conflicts were finally resolved in favour of the local community. By contrast, the hushing up of the ‘rotten meat affair’ was in utter disregard of local opinion. A scandal was thus silenced in the name of superior power interests: those of the Governor’s ‘To Live in the North!’ strategic plan. This latter is to be seen in its connection with the ‘Arctic Strategy’ plans of the Federal Government. It could be concluded therefore that the regional administration was reproducing at its own level the general power model: one of selective de- centralization. Or, in other words, when it found it necessary, the general public could be made part of debates and resolutions, but in others, when superior interests dictated, people’s opinion was to be ignored. Such has proved to be the case of the ‘rotten meat affair’. Some clues to such a turn of events may be seen as connected with a meeting of President Putin with the Governor in June 2022. The meeting put a stress on the successful carrying out of social programs in the Region (Andreeva, 2022). What may have been additional details in the talks (or rather of Chibis’ being summoned to report before Putin) could be the 12 Upravlenie Federal’noi sluzhby po veterinarnomu i fitosanitarnomu nadzoru po Murmanskoi oblasti (http://murmansk.fsvps.ru/index.htm)
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war in Ukraine and the fact that ethnic Ukrainians formed the biggest minority of labour migrants in the Region. It is also to be stressed that mobilization of military personnel was heavily targeting the Region, and the bolstering of social programs could be seen as a compensation for the toll that would take. Another direction could be the planning of large- scale extracting activities of rare metals deep in the tundra. Such activities specifically targeted the grazing range of ‘Tundra’, promising to terminate husbandry activities in its NE half (the so-called ‘Right Wing’ of the coopereative). Extracting activities for platinum and lithium ores were to be carried out by mega-size companies of the top-most tiers of the loyal oligarchate. Given such a top-of-power disposition of concerns, the hushing up of the rotten meat affair was a logical conclusion. It had no place in a new phase of tighter state control of local affairs, padded by budget increases and a Soviet-like suppressing of anything which did not look positive. An upbeat mode of presentation of local issues was to be the new mode of public expression. Returning to the production of statistika texts, it is of note that the economic role of OOO ‘Lovozerskii GOK’ is not even listed as a blank slot in the occasional bulletins. No reasons for this glaring omission are given. One is left only to surmise that while hard data from reindeer husbandry may be supplied to the authors of statistika (or at least up to a recent date, see further below), ‘Lovozerskii GOK’ does not find it necessary to supply any information for public use at all. A brief look at the forever promising branch of tourism will serve to illustrate the ‘data-hiding’ phenomenon. A news item in the administrative weekly Lovozerskaia Pravda of 1 June 2018 provides this illustration. The piece is called ‘Discussing Corrections in the Strategy of (Raion) Development’ (Obsuzhdenie korrektirovki strategiia razvitiia). The event was initiated by the Regional Economic Ministry, with the Minister herself being present, together with other regional officials. The Raion was represented by the Administration, the Soviet of Deputies (Sovet deputatov), as well as by representatives of two of the three economic ‘pillars’, mentioned above: ‘Lovozerskii GOK’, and tourism.13 13 It is significant that the third ‘pillar’—that of reindeer husbandry—was not represented. For a state-subsidized economic sector not to be represented at a meeting for which the Minister and other high-ranking officials had travelled to Lovozero (instead of summoning local officials to Murmansk) can be read only as a strong sign of projecting an image of prominence and autonomy of the Raion. That was despite its de facto complete dependance on Regional and Federal funding.
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Evidently, tourism was seen by the Ministry as a promising driver of economic change in the Raion in the sense of a possible diminishing of its dependance on the regional budget. As it was stressed by the reporting journalist: (The participants) were discussing the development of the tourist sphere as a most important direction for developing the Raion. That targeted the creating of an Ethnographic Complex ‘Sami Fairy-Tale’, an increase in the variety of authentic goods (to be offered to tourists), as also the realization of the Project ‘The Village of Lovozero—A Nationalities14 Village. (Tkachev, 2018)
In the course of this discussion of tourism, the issue of visibility of existing tourist companies came up. This part of the reportage is worth quoting in full: The tourist businesses turned to the representatives of State organs asking for financial support. At the same time, the entrepreneurs did not make the effort to show their withdrawing from a ‘shadow’ management of their businesses. Thus, the two leaders of (tourist) enterprises who were present at the meeting, could not manage to give a clear answer to a simple question asked by the Head of the Administration of Urban Settlement Revda, Vitalii Den’gin15. The question was about the number of employees in these enterprises, as well as about the size of income tax transfers (emphasis mine) from them, going into the Raion budget. Hazy answers were also given as regarded the number of tourists who had visited Lovozero Raion. (ibid.)
This is an eloquent picture of current relationships between local economic players of some scale, on the one hand, and Raion and regional administrations, on the other. I again stress the fact that the latter were being represented in person by the Minister herself. This clearly shows that withdrawing of vital economic data in the name of maintaining ‘shadow’ operations by economic agents was being, in fact, tacitly tolerated. The withdrawal of sensitive data, underpinning an essentially ‘grey’ economy under the ambivalent gaze of state officials, will be further discussed below by looking at official presentations of Raion budgets. 14 The meaning of ‘National’ and ‘Nationalities’ in the local context is ‘Indigenous’ (referring to the Sami), as also ‘belonging to the Numerically-small peoples of the North’ when referring to the Komi and Komified Nenets. 15 V. Den’gin is currently the Head of Lovozero Raion Administration.
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Budget reports are regularly published as Appendices to the administrative weekly. The Bulletins are long, fine-script texts constructed in a manner which is not meant to be easily understood unless the reader is a specialist in public finances. Consequently, this leaves them impenetrable for the general public. The authorities are evidently aware of this fact and hence a more palatable version is published in a site called ‘Budget for Citizens’ (Biudzhet dlia grazhdan). At a first glance, this lighter version appears to be more transparent to a lay reader. A closer look, however, quickly dispels such an illusion. Apart from the more attractive look of the document, presented as a Power-Point series of slides, the original obfuscation remains just the same. It consists in listing debit and credit figures, with no information about specific contributors and spenders. On rare occasions, however, reindeer husbandry (as the specific budget actor of primary interest to us) does appear in very concrete terms. In the ‘light’ budget versions for 2016 for instance, reindeer husbandry got one of its rare statistical mentions. What was most notable about it, was that reindeer husbandry (olenevodstvo) was presented separately from stock- breeding (zhivotnovodstvo). This was a step clearly diminishing obfuscation. Another striking feature of the same order was that head counts finally surfaced here in absolute numbers. That could be seen in a table from the 2017 ‘light’ version, which I reproduce in its original form below. During the following years, however, a specific mention of reindeer husbandry as a sub-category of ‘Agriculture’ no longer appeared. Instead, the degree of generality increased in a number of additional ways. Not only reindeer husbandry (as a specific economic category) had fallen out of the reports, but ‘Agriculture’ itself became lumped together with ‘Fishing’ (Rybolovstvo). This has been the state-of-affairs to date, as a look at the site can prove.16 In the final account, the reindeer head-count estimation for 2016 (53,379 head) remained the last one to be officially published by Raion sources. The same was true about the other two indexes: of mining-processing and tourism, which have been usually absent from the short statistika bulletins. They are next-to-impossible to extract from the much longer budget reports, appearing as extensive appendices to the administration weekly.
16 https://www.lovozeroadm.ru/ekonomika/byudzhet_mo_sels/byudzhet_dlya_gr/ (Accessed 29.11.2022).
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As different from ‘light budget’ versions, the ‘heavy’ ones are regularly published at monthly and quarterly intervals. Moreover, the ‘heavy’ versions cover separately the three existing administrations, each one with their own budget: that of the Lovozero Raion, of the Village Settlement Lovozero, and of the Town Settlement of Revda. To prize out from them information about the current state of agricultural affairs and reindeer husbandry itself is however to be declared a very difficult, if not an impossible task. A recent example will illustrate this point. The example is taken from a document of 19.07.2022, published in the administrative weekly, and called Decree No 425-PG ‘On realizing the budget of Municipal Formation Village Settlement Lovozero17 for the first half of 2022.’ The categories in its Credit part are so general that not even a distant glimpse can be gained of how reindeer husbandry affairs contribute to the Village Settlement budget, and, ultimately—to the Raion one. These categories are given as follows: ‘1. INCOME (Dokhody); 2. TAXABLE AND NON-TAXABLE INCOME (nalogovye i nenalogovye dokhody); 3. Taxable income: 3a. Tax on profit, income; 3b. Tax on gross income; 3c. Tax on property; 4. Non- taxable income: 4a. Income from use of property belonging to the state or the municipality; 4b. Fines, sanctions, compensations; 5. Other non- taxable income’. Insofar that the two reindeer husbandry cooperatives—‘Tundra’ of Lovozero, and ‘Olenevod’ of Krasnoshchel’ie—are registered as commercial enterprises in the Municipality of Village Settlement Lovozero, income from them can be expected to fall into 3a (‘Tax on profit, income’), as well as into 4a (‘Income from use of property belonging to the state or the municipality’). This last follows from the fact that the grazing range is state property, and, consequently, municipal one. As figures in budget tables are globally given for each category, the contribution of the reindeer husbandry enterprises remains hidden. The Debit part of the budget is again so general that reindeer husbandry- specific information is beyond reach. ‘Agriculture’ here appears in the global category ‘National economy’, which has two sub-categories: (i) General economic issues (obshcheekonomicheskie voprosy); and (ii) Agriculture and fishing (sel’skoe khoziaistvo i rybolovstvo). Clearly, specific
17 Agricultural affairs fall into the province of only one of the three Raion administrations: that of Village Settlement Lovozero.
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figures about how much the municipal budget is contributing for the maintenance and development of reindeer husbandry is not possible to see. Despite the obfuscating generalities in budget reports, their ‘light’ versions are capable of pointing to significant details. Or, at least, this is true as regards the uniquely informative ‘light’ report of 2017. Beyond it, as it has been shown, the fog over details seemed to permanently descend. In this context, Fig. 2.1, taken from the 2017 ‘light’ report, is worthy of further and very close attention. In the first place, the table confirms yet again a bias of post-Soviet statistics in its so rare mentions of reindeer husbandry, to speak in head- count figures, rather than in produced meat ones. This is a significant departure from Soviet practices. The difference concerns much more than
Fig. 2.1 State of the agricultural sector and reindeer head counts for 2014–2016 with prognostic figures for 2017–2019. The diagram at the top is named ‘Agriculture’ and it shows annual production as a ‘production index, in %’. The bottom diagram reflects the state of Reindeer Husbandry in absolute head-count figures. The blue columns are for total head counts, and the red ones—for those of the two SKhPKs. (Source: Biudzhet, 2017)
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the Soviet obsessions with secrecy, mentioned earlier on. What was at stake during the Soviet period was numerical expression of achievement and, ultimately, of its use for the legitimation of the Soviet experiment as a whole. The suppression of head-count figures and the corresponding foregrounding of plan-fulfilment in terms of produced meat, with planning for ever-greater fulfilment, was deemed to work in this direction. It can be said, therefore, that the driver for the produced meat-bias was ideological in its essence. For reasons one could speculate about, head counts were found to be less satisfying in this respect. When it comes to the post-Soviet bias for head counts, the driving motives seem to be very different. Instead of preoccupations with proving the successes of the regime and its superiority over past and present ‘capitalist’ foes, the motivations that protrude are to be sought on a much more pragmatic level: namely, to sustain and, if possible, enhance one’s position as a publicly uncontrolled recipient of state subsidies. Going back to details in Fig. 2.1, quoted earlier, one needs to unravel the meaning of the blue and red head-count columns. For the blue column the pertinent gloss says ‘reindeer head count’ (pogolov’e olenei). For the red (and smaller one) it says: ‘including SKhPKs (v t.ch. SKhPK. One may ignore the imprecise formulation here, as what it must really mean is not ‘including’, but ‘for SKhPKs’, or ‘in the case of SKhPKs’— since otherwise there would be only one column, not two. The real point of interest is that the SKhPK columns are smaller than the total ones, but according to the prognostics given, the difference would diminish in the following years. This would be parallel to the increase of the total head- count figures (the blue columns). A lot of information is contained in these small script glosses. Attention is to be directed at the underlying categorization of reindeer property. The table overtly names only one type: that of reindeer belonging to the two cooperatives (SKhPKs). These are popularly referred to as ‘sovkhoz deer’ (sovkhoznye oleni). The columns for 2016 shows a difference of 4000 head for the remaining category, which has not been overtly mentioned, but can be generally called by implication ‘non-cooperative’ reindeer, or what is popularly referred to as ‘private reindeer’ (chastnye oleni). This category is projected to fall to about 1400 head by 2019, while, at the same time, the total head-count figure keeps steadily increasing by, roughly, a thousand head for each year.
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For fully grasping the meaning of this prognosis, still another important, but unsaid distinction needs to be made. The general category of ‘non-cooperative reindeer’ (i.e., not belonging to the SKhPKs, ‘private, chastnye’) contains two highly asymmetrical subtypes. The subtype, representing the overwhelming majority of ‘non-cooperative’ or ‘private (‘chastnye’) reindeer, is officially known as ‘personal’ (‘lichnye’) reindeer, owned by cooperative employees or their heirs. These are kept mixed with cooperative reindeer, and do not exist as separate, individually kept and grazed herds by their owners. The other subtype of ‘private’ reindeer is miniscule, as it will be shown later on. In sober fact, its very existence is more theoretical than practical. The reason for that is that it presupposes something very contrary to the established ‘mixed’ mode. Namely, that owners keep such private herds separate from the big cooperative herds, graze them individually, and, what is of ultimate importance, take all the risks of potential losses by disease or animal or human predation (poaching). This largely theoretical type, with occasional fleeting examples of very rare existence, I have termed ‘truly private reindeer’. My aim has been to clearly profile the difference with the other dominant type: of what I have termed ‘private-in- the-collective reindeer’ (Konstantinov, 2015; Konstantinov et al., 2018). Concerning the ‘truly private’ subtype, the reindeers’ more fictional than real numbers are listed in official accounts as about thirty in all. The ‘private-in-the-collective’ subtype in official documents hovers around 10% of the whole herd. Figure 2.1 gives it in that region for 2016, with planned diminishing in the following years. As it will be shown in the following sections, however, both the total head-count figures and those of the ‘private-in-the-collective’ category show all signs of very heavy doctoring. Reindeer husbandry realities in Lovozero Raion do not suggest the likelihood of either a total figure of 50,000 head being true to the mark or a ratio of 90% ‘sovkhoz’ to 10% ‘private’ reindeer of being anywhere near reality. And thirdly, a progressive diminishing of the ‘private’ percentage can be said to be also sharply contrary to current tendencies. By the opinion of reindeer husbandry insiders, the total figure is about half of what is officially declared, while the ratio of ‘sovkhoz’ to ‘private’ reindeer is considered to be close to a 50-50 one. What is remarkable about this ratio is that it, on the whole, is being kept constant over time. All these aspects of reality as different from official largely fictional accounts will be discussed in Chap. 4. Here I will stick to the picture of reindeer husbandry as currently represented by official statistics.
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This poses another critical question. What is the origin and path of reindeer husbandry data which appears in Raion statistics, and further, in the regional ones? Apart from other implications of the absence of readily accessible statistical data on the Raion level, an important one is that the figures that appear in the concerned literature engaging with reindeer husbandry can be evidently based on the only available figures—those of regional statistics. To this issue, I turn below. Regional level statistics exhibits a general feature of all official bulletins, presenting statistical data about reindeer husbandry: the one of bureaucratic obfuscation. Making texts unintelligible is a general feature of Soviet/Russian bureaucratese. Agricultural bureaucratese, and particularly the one addressing reindeer husbandry, takes the art to a height. To unscramble the obscurity a very serious effort needs to be made. Here I will address the case of types of reindeer which hide behind arcane formulations, or, as it often happens, by complete silence as regards key issues. Some part of that has been introduced in the previous paragraphs, discussing reindeer classification. Here I go on with this task. To begin with, four levels of usage need to be uncovered. These can be named: (i) central bureaucratic; (ii) local bureaucratic; (iii) vernacular; and (iv) analytical (academic). Below I apply the procedure to types of reindeer as they occur in the four stylistic registers. They range from statistical presentation of reindeer husbandry to the way differences in property types of reindeer are described in common as well as in academic usage. This is presented in a tabular form (see Table 2.2): As it can be seen in the Table 2.2, the uncovering of the actual state of current (and former) reindeer husbandry affairs, progresses from (i) to (iv). Or, in other words, at the highest administrative level of presentation, there is no discrimination between reindeer types at all. Central bureaucratese speaks only of reindeer. This procedure of intentional or unintentional avoidance of critical differences is matched by the one concerning types of reindeer husbandry enterprises. Occasional references to reindeer in regional level statistics differs from classification of enterprises. As Fig. 2.1 shows, the difference is that official classification of reindeer husbandry enterprises offers at least a glimpse of the fact that there exist various types of ownership and, consequently, of property types of reindeer. On the level of local bureaucratese, the category of personal reindeer gets mentioned, but only very occasionally. There are other terms used,
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Table 2.2 Types of usage and types of reindeer Stylistic register
Types of reindeer
(i) Central bureaucratic (e.g. in statistical bulletins of the regional or federal governments) (ii) Local bureaucratic (in odd official documents, and in occasional announcements by Cooperative (SKhPK) administrations) (iii) Vernacular (popular usage)
reindeer (oleni)
(iv) Analytical (academic, mostly foreign)
SKhPK reindeer (oleni SKhPK); personal reindeer (lichnye oleni)
sovkhoz reindeer (sovkhoznye oleni); private reindeer (chastnye oleni) collective (belonging to a reindeer cooperative); private-in-the-collective (privately owned but mixed in the cooperative herd and supported by it, as well as by all other cooperative assets); truly private (privately owned and privately taken care of)
like individual reindeer (individual’nye oleni), as, for instance in a Soviet- time regional lore relic (Kiselev & Kiseleva, 1987:134). In the mouthpiece of the Lovozero Raion Administration, that is the local weekly Lovozerskaia Pravda, it may take years before the issue crops up. The last mention I recall goes back to a letter of protest, written by members of former sovkhoz leadership and accusing the current cooperative one of amassing ‘unnaturally’ big herds of personal reindeer (Esli, 2003). This fact alone suggests the great sensitivity of the topic, and consequently, its constant pushing out of sight. Regional statistical bulletins use the term ‘indexes’ (pokazateli) to describe both agricultural entities (‘farms’ (khoziaistva)) and their specialized stock (in our case: reindeer). All such entities (‘farms’) are classified into the following types: (i) All farms (khoziaistva vsekh kategorii); (ii) Agricultural organizations (sel’skokhoziaistvennye organizatsii). (In our case: the two SKhPKs ‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’); (iii) Citizens’ farms (khoziaistva naseleniia (grazhdane));
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Table 2.3 Types of reindeer husbandry entities (farms) Usage (i) Central bureaucratic
Types of farms
Farm (khoziastvo; Agricultural Organization (sel’skokhoziaistvennnaia organizatsiia; Citizens’ farms (khoziaistva naseleniia (grazhdane)); Rural farms (khoziistva naseleniia sel’skikh poseleniy) (ii) Local SKhPK; bureaucratic SKhPK OPKh MNSa; obshchina KMNSb (iii) Vernacular sovkhoz (artel’) (popular usage) obshchina (iv) Analytical cooperative; (academic, obshchina mostly foreign) ‘truly’ private herd
Types of reindeer reindeer
cooperative r. personal (lichnye) r. sovkhoz (sovkhoznye) r. private (chastnye) r. collective (belonging to a reindeer cooperative); private-in-the-collective (privately owned, but mixed in the cooperative herd; ‘truly’ private (privately owned and taken care of)
SKhPK OPKh MNS stands for Sel’skokhoziaistvenniy Proizvidstvenniy Kooperativ Olenevodchesko- Promislovoe Khoziaistvo Malochislennykh Narodov Severa (Cooperative for Agricultural Production Reindeer-Husbandry Commercial Enterprise of Numerically Small Peoples of the North) b The full designation is: Nekomercheskaia Organizatsiia Teritorial’no-Sosedskaia Obshchina Korennogo Malochislennogo Naroda Saami (Non-profit Organization of Territorial-Neighbourhood Community of Numerically Small Sami People) a
In a tabular form, the classification and labelling of types of agricultural entities (farms) can be presented as follows (see Table 2.3): Rubrics (iii) and (iv) need a more detailed explanation. It is in these two formulations that the terms ‘obshchiny’, ‘strictly private reindeer’ (not grazed mixed in the cooperative herd), and ‘private-in-the-collective reindeer’ (mixed in the cooperative herd) hide. The last year for which the Data Base of the Government of Murmansk Region (henceforth: Data Base GMR) provided some lead towards a breakdown of reindeer in all types of farms was 2010. On that basis, the following distribution in terms of head counts could be made:
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(i) (all farms) 55,858 head. (ii) (agri-organizations, i.e. ‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’) 51,236 head. (iii) The difference of 4622 head are the ‘private reindeer’ of all categories. In other words, those belonging to obschiny (very few), and the overwhelming majority of all the rest: personal (private-in-the- collective) reindeer of herders (or their heirs). It needs to be pointed out here that obshchiny reindeer, supposedly ‘truly private’, are in reality ‘private-in-the-collective’ as they graze mixed with the collective herd. A few draft bucks will be temporarily kept at obshchiny recreational camps for offering sled-rides to visiting tourists. ‘Truly private’ reindeer is thus a next to fictional category in Kola reindeer husbandry. Another and much more critical feature of the situation is that only the entities in category (ii) are eligible for receiving state subsidies. This explains why the figures in that rubric are traditionally high, while the figures in (iii) are traditionally low. Below, I describe the production of official statistical text about head counts taking it from one of its two original sources: the reports of the Raion Administration. Further, its second source will be described: that of the respective enterprise administrations. These latter are the offices of SKhPK ‘Tundra’ and SKhPK ‘Olenevod’. Head-counting statistics in Pechenga Raion will be discussed separately. The procedure from tundra counting to administrative participation and resulting official presentations (or from brigada to kontora, cf. Habeck, 2005:47f) will be briefly described.
The Stock-Taking Committee (STC) The administrative procedure of head counting of semi-domesticated18 reindeer in Murmansk Region (henceforth: stock-taking19) is carried out by two administrative bodies. They are: (i) The Administrative Office (kontora) of the respective reindeer husbandry entity (reindeer husbandry cooperative (SKhPK), obshchina, In official terminology: domashnie severnye oleni (domesticated northern reindeer). In official terminology: inventarizatsiia domashnikh severnykh olenei (inventarization (stock-taking) of domesticated reindeer). 18 19
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municipal unitary enterprise (MUP)), carried out physically by the enterprise’s officials at a corral enclosure during counting/harvesting corralling sessions; (ii) A Stock-Taking Committee20 as an overseeing/inspecting body of the Raion Administration. For understanding the nature of final statistical counts, it is critical to know that a principal channel of communicating head-counting texts for official purposes is between the Stock-Taking Committee (henceforth: STC), and the respective administrative office. The second channel is from SKhPK kontora directly to the regional administration. The working of that second channel is ensured by the state mechanism of subsidizing the cooperatives. Since annual subsidies are given per head of cooperative reindeer, the funders (the Regional Ministry of Agriculture21) need to know the size of the herd they are subsidizing. At the same time, the Ministry22 have no separate observers at corral counting from the STC ones. In this way, the figures that determine subsidies are, in fact, the figures that the respective reindeer husbandry entity gives them. These figures can be verified against those, produced by the STCs and ending up in Raion’s statistics. As I show below, however, the source of STC numbers is again the cooperative. In the final account, the channel is in reality only one: from the reindeer husbandry entity to the respective Raion, and further up—to the regional administration. Having said this, some differences can be pointed out as regards the two final recipients. They come from the fact that within the framework of the current form of ‘capitalism’ in Russia, reindeer husbandry entities consider their own counts as their exclusive property, protected by ‘commercial secrecy’ (‘komercheskaia taina’). The legal basis for that is provided by the already-mentioned Federal Law 282/2007. The ‘softening’ of central political will and respective controlling and coercive measures, mentioned at the beginning, can be seen in the fact that superordinate administrations tolerate the very common case in which cooperatives withdraw 20 In official terminology: Komissiia po ucheta domashnikh severnykh olenei (Committee for stock-taking of domesticated northern reindeer). 21 As an overseeing agency, at present this is the Ministry of Investments, Entrepreneurial Development, and Fisheries of Murmansk Region (Ministerstvo investitsii, razvitiia predprinimatel’stva i rybnogo khoziaistva Murmanskoi oblasti). 22 More specifically: The Department of Agro-industrial Complex Development (Otdel’ razvitiia аgro-promishlennogo kompleksa).
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head-counting reports from the superior administrative ‘gaze’. As regards such a ‘liberated’ behaviour favouring cooperative administrations,23 the regional government —as the principal subsidizer—still has some restraining power, compared to its subordinate Raion Administration, which has none. But again, whether the Region would use its power is very much a politically driven process. As in the case of the ‘rotten meat affair’, noted earlier on, a major factor is connected with the political agenda of a given Governor. Or, more to the point: what supreme power wants from her/ him (when summoned to Moscow for a ‘meeting’). Behind that stand the interests of the officials who are responsible for subsidy-distribution. As insiders bluntly put it, the bigger the subsidy figures on the basis of fictionally inflated head-counts, the bigger the size of ‘cuts’ from them the regional officials stand to get. (In current popular jargon, this form of corruption is known as otpylivanie (‘sawing off’).) In the final account, substantial gaps tend to occur in Regional Bulletins, when it comes to head counting. There have not been any head counting figures in the annually published Data Base of the Government of Murmansk Region as regards Lovozero Raion for over a decade by now. The available reports are thus fragmentary and unable to provide a comprehensive picture. Annually (in March–April), the STC Committee issues Head-Counting Statements (Akty o pogolov’ia) of the reindeer owned by the reindeer husbandry entities of Lovozero Raion. The ones I was lucky to have access to (through personal contacts and exchange of favours) are for four such entities: the two cooperatives, plus two Sami obshchiny— ‘Voavshess’(‘Northern Lights’) and ‘Sam’ Syit’ (‘Sami Village’). The statements were made in March–April 2020. The STC statements are further endorsed by the Head of the Administration of Lovozero Raion. The Head issues an Order of Endorsement (Rasporiazhenie ob utverzhdenii) for each statement made by the Committee in reference to each one of the four entities. 23 In a recent case, the Head Office of one of the cooperatives ‘got offended’, in the words of an official from the Raion Administration, because the latter had relocated some of the cooperative’s agricultural land for house construction within the framework of the Federal Program for providing large families with living premises. ‘And now he (the head of the cooperative) refuses to give us any statistical information.’ (G.N., October 2020) This example attests to the fact that Raion administrations at present have much diminished leverage— if at all—in respect of local ‘town-forming enterprises’ (gradoobrazuyushchie predpriyatiya), such as the reindeer husbandry cooperatives.
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After all the statements have been endorsed with the signature of the Head of Lovozero Raion Administration, they reach the Data Base of the Government of Murmansk Region, as well as the Statistical Office of Murmansk Region—Murmanskstat, in its agricultural part.24 The head counts appearing in various concerned publications tend to have this last office as their data source.25 In what follows, I briefly trace the long road that is travelled from the reindeer out there in the tundra to the final official figures. My argument is that the final official figures have tended to be inflated over many years and travel from one report to the next. For over two decades by now, they have been variously quoted in the range of 50,000–60,000 head, a range in which the figures for 2020 fall. The remarkable stability during the entire post-Soviet period calls for a brief historical overview. As a base line I take the data for 1965, that is, from a period before the peak of agglomeration of kolkhozi into sovkhozi occurred. The agglomeration itself began in 1959 when Kolkhoz ‘Vpered’ was incorporated in ‘Tundra’. This continued in 1963 with the incorporation of Kolkhoz ‘Dobrovolets’ of Voron’ie. The year 1971 saw the final formation of Sovkhoz ‘Tundra’ of Lovozero and ‘Pamiati Lenina’ (In Memory of Lenin, present ‘Olenevod’ (Reindeer herder)) of Krasnoshchel’ie. According to an official report by the Murmansk Experimental Reindeer Husbandry Station (MOOS), the overall figure for Murmansk Region was 72,000 in 1965. According to the established practice of the period in question, the counting/harvesting campaigns would be conducted by the end of December, and thus the figures quoted would reflect the after- harvest and before calving herd composition. These were the so-called ‘January reindeer’ (ianvarskie oleni) in the technical jargon of the time. At present, the term ‘January reindeer’ is no longer in official use. Counting procedures are spread from late November to early March, in connection with other corral activities (castration, vaccination, herd separation, etc.). After-harvest STC bulletins are thus to be better called to be of ‘March reindeer’. These ‘March reindeer’ figures cannot be accepted to be precise, however. The reason is that corralling round-ups and the chances they give for head counting can often take place well after March. 24 It is to be noted here that headcounts may take years before being published by Murmanskstat. 25 I.e., (in historical succession): Syroechkovskii (1986); Rybkin (1999); Jernsletten and Klokov (2002); KE (2008). For a recent account, see: AB-Centre (2020).
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That is particularly true for the more far-flung brigades, like those of the eastern half of ‘Tundra’s’ territory (the ‘Right Wing’). These are Brigades 1,2,8, and 9 of ‘Tundra’. Late corrals are also common with ‘Olenevod’s’ brigades, and particularly of those of the farthest tundra villages of Kanevka and Sosnovka. In the final account, the STC figures on this level of data- gathering may be taken only as approximations. At the beginning of the post-Soviet period the newly re-registered ‘Tundra’ was reported to have nine brigades (Digurov, 1987), with ten in the preceding period (Tkachev, 2021a; Rasmussen, 1995). In 2020, these nine (or ten) brigades have gone down to seven, or more accurately said to six as there are only two reindeer herders left in Brigade 9, and it cannot function as a full-fledged brigade anymore. Consequently, the brigades which can be deemed to be more or less in a functional operational shape are Brigades 4, 6, and 7 of the north-western part of the territory (the ‘Left Wing’), and Brigades 1, 2, and 8 of the ‘Right Wing’. Since the ‘Right Wing’ brigades have been heavily understaffed in the last years, they have decided to conduct operations as a single brigade with a common herd believed to be around 9000 head. This new overall composition has been commented upon by a Brigade Leader of the Left Wing in the following way: We have only three people per brigade at present! The entire Left Wing now consists of only nine herders, while the situation in the Right Wing is even worse than ours. (Tkachev, 2020a:7)
Such is the context at present, in which a much-depleted workforce manages what has been left of the better controlled sovkhoz herd of former times. The issue here is about the way in which information about the present state of the herd is produced. In the Order of Endorsement, it is said that the Statement the document endorses is made ‘on the basis of information about stock-taking (emphasis mine) of the domesticated northern reindeer belonging to (Entity X)’.26 The information which is effectively the main source of data comes from the endorsed Statement. In the Statement itself, the acquiring of this information is formulated in the following way: ‘This Stock-Taking Statement asserts that according to the state-of-affairs by (date), the 26 Cited from the Order of Endorsement of the Results of Stock-Taking of the Domestic Northern Reindeer, belonging to SKhPK OPK MNS ‘Olenevod’ of 7 April, 2020.
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following head-counting numbers have been found to be valid (emphasis mine) for the domestic reindeer belonging to (Еntity X)’.27 The primary source of the information which is officially endorsed is thus what ‘has been found to be valid (vyiavleno) by the STC’ as regards each one of the four reindeer herding entities. The question then arises about the procedure by means of which the STC finds what it does. Annually, the STC sends representatives to attend the counting procedure at the main corral counting sessions of the two cooperatives, as well as those of the Sami obshchiny which claim ownership of reindeer. For a number of reasons, this attendance is to be described as a largely formal act. The reasons can be summarized in the following way: (i) Adequate and independent stock-taking is possible only in case representatives of the stock-taking committee are present in the observation booth (budka) of the corral working chamber (rabochaia kamera) at all counting sessions at a given corral enclosure and during the whole working day of each session. (ii) Representatives have to be present at all corral enclosures where counting/ harvesting activities are carried out during the whole period of conducting these activities (late November to March–April). In reality, the presence of the STC’s representatives at corral sessions can be described as little more than token. Usually, a group of two (rarely three) officials will attend a counting session at the main corrals (Polmos, Porosozero, Sem’ostrov’ie) for a couple of days at most, and for a part of each working day. For transport (by all-purpose track vehicle (vezdekhod) or by snowmobile), they would depend on the respective reindeer herding entity. Occasionally, this will be done by municipally sponsored helicopter flights (munitsipal’nye reisi), but in the more common case, travel will rely on what the respective reindeer entity has to offer. Clearly, autonomous travel and inspection is thus precluded. Further than that, living conditions at brigade bases are not inviting. Common rooms get to be overpopulated during counting/harvesting sessions. What is not a little problem is that smoking and alcoholic consumption are rampant at such times. A great number of meat-traders (kommersanty) flock to sessions, bringing in alcohol in great quantities so that buying meat cheaply by the carcass (tusha) is facilitated. In brief, it is no wonder that inspecting townspeople (like the Reindeer Committee representatives) would like to leave 27 Cited from the Stock-Taking Statement of of the Domestic Northern Reindeer, belonging to SKhPK OPK MNS ‘Olenevod’ of 31 March, 2020.
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at first opportunity. Once the main motive of their mission is fulfilled (to mark presence at head counting), they would be off and away, back to their offices. This is the reality of the situation. The head-counting figures would be given to the representatives usually post factum (as in the common case they would have left prior to the completion of the entire round of sessions). The figures will come from the accounting office of the respective reindeer herding entity. It is thus the case that the head-counting figures the Head of the Raion Municipality endorses are fully in the control of the reindeer herding entity and how it would decide the figures to look. At the end of the day, the accounting office of the reindeer herding entity is the author of what we can call the final ‘statistical text’. The issue about the road from the herd itself to the statistical text created by a reindeer herding entity’s accounting office is thus far from a straightforward and objective procedure. Let it be only said here that a conditional beginning of that text is the working chamber of the corral enclosure. The word ‘conditional’ is necessary here since the present system of reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region, marked by hyper- extensivity, precludes the passing of each and every reindeer through the counting chamber. In Table 2.4, it is shown that the head-count numbers of the four entities, which represent reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region to nearly 100%, are vastly disproportionate. The first two (SKhPKs ‘Tundra’, and
Table 2.4 Current head-counting figures for Murmansk Region (2020) Entity
Total herd by STC statement
SKhPK ‘Tundra’ SKhPK OPKh MNS ‘Olenevod’ NO TSO KMNSa ‘Voavshess’ NO TSO KMNS ‘Sam’ Syit’ MUP ‘Pechengskaia kompaniia’b Total
24,614 25,905 6 23 500 (uncertain figure) 51,048
Nekomercheskaia Organizatsiia Teritorial’no-Sosedskaia Obshchina Korennogo Malochislennogo Naroda Saami b For ‘Pechengskaia kompaniia’ the stock-taking agency is the Committee for Property Management at the Administration of Pechenga Raion (Komitet po upravleniu imushtestvom administratsii Pechengskogo raiona, KUI) a
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‘Olenevod’) officially own a total of roughly 50,000 head, while the two obshchiny that remain own only 29 head. In other words, when we talk about head counts in Lovozero Raion of Murmansk Region, we talk about the head counts of the two SKhPKs (former state farms, sovkhozi). The number of reindeer in the other municipality, in which some reindeer husbandry is allegedly practised (Pechenga Raion), is highly uncertain as it is not covered by an administrative procedure comparable with that of Lovozero Raion, much flawed as that latter is. This applies to the two main phases of the process: the one from tundra to working chamber; and from working chamber to official statement. There is currently a herd of uncertain numbers in the grazing range of Rybachii Peninsula. Its origin dates back to the time of the Murmansk Experimental Reindeer Husbandry Station (MOOS) which used the Peninsula as summer pastures of its experimental herd. After the demise of MOOS in the early 1990s, the herd changed ownership several times (Rybkin, 1999:19), until it came to its latest status as Municipal Unitary Enterprise (MUP) ‘Pechengskaia Kompaniia’. A program for the development of reindeer husbandry on the Peninsula was announced by the Administration of Pechenga Raion in 2014, aiming to raise the existing head count of 500 head (by official figures) to 1000 by 2016. To date, no further official news has been published. Reindeer herders used to be hired from SKhPK ‘Tundra’ in Lovozero, and my information comes from them. They talk about ‘a few hundred head’, but a precise figure has not been named. The reasons for what is being described as a very unsatisfactory state of the herd is attributed to poor control of the herd, endemic alcoholism among herders, as well as rampant poaching by visiting outsiders and the nearby military personnel. Of necessity therefore, the figure of 500 head will be used as regards the Ribachiy herd, albeit with serious reservations. In sum, the official head-counts for Murmansk Region, valid by 30 April 2020, are given in Table 2.4: Official statistics in MR tend to be characterized by stability of figures for over two decades, with these figures fluctuating between 50,000 and 60,000 head. A random look back through the years would have ‘Tundra’ with 24,087 head for 2013, and ‘Olenevod’ with 24,200, that is, figures not much different from those of seven years later. To this feature of stability, one has to add one of inflation. Doubts about the veracity of the official counts are pervasive in the opinion of reindeer husbandry insiders, and, indeed, of practically the whole
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population of the reindeer husbandry-connected settlements: Lovozero, Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and Sosnovka.28 Voices to this effect have also been publicly raised, as the one, for instance, of the late Nikolai Bogdanov in his capacity of a reindeer husbandry consultant at the Government of Murmansk Region. In a notable publication, Bogdanov openly criticized the figure of 60,000 quoted officially at the time, calling such deer ‘bumazhnye oleni’ (paper deer) (Bogdanov, 2008). Similar statements have been made by other regional specialists. According to insiders’ opinion, the figures are inflated by at least 20% with the more skeptical talking about an inflation of 50%. At this point, the issue of subsidies becomes relevant. By informants’ opinion, what pushes official counts up is the fact that cooperative reindeer are subsidized by an annual grant per head of deer. It is important to emphasize yet again that the other option—of giving the subsidies per produced meat in some unit of weight (kilogram, centner, metric ton, etc.)—is not the one chosen. Apart from the choice of unit, the amount of produced reindeer meat remains also outside the scope of regional statistics, despite the fact that for other agricultural produce it is given per weight produced (alongside head numbers). This brings up, yet again, the issue of the current ‘head vs. meat’ bias, characterizing the entire post- Soviet period in Murmansk Region. At present, no official treatment of the issue is available which is leaving a large margin for speculation. What that amounts to is the greater opportunity for corrupt practices that are offered by the ‘per head’ option. It is certainly much more difficult for supervising agencies to establish head counts in an objective manner than when the option is for the meat produced. The difference is obviously based on accessibility: to herd fragments roaming the tundra in the first case, as compared to meat stored in the refrigerating facilities at the Raion centre, in the second. By stipulation of the Agricultural Committee at the Government of Murmansk Region, only cooperative reindeer are eligible for regional/ federal subsidies.29 This brings up the issue of the proportion of
28 The figures are given for permanent residents. During the summer, the population of the ‘remote villages’ (otdalennykh sel, otdalenka) doubles due to visiting family and kin. 29 The greater part of the subsidy (2/3) comes from the Federal budget, with the remaining third—from the Regional one.
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‘private-in-the-collective’30 reindeer in the ‘sovkhoz’ herd. I suggest that kontora stock-taking accounts tend to keep official private numbers at a minimum and far below their real size. An aspect of this manipulation of figures is that the two categories are not reflected in STC statements. At the same time, each reindeer processed through the working chamber of corrals during counting sessions is entered in one of the two log-books kept: one for cooperative deer, and the other for the private ones. The log-books, jokingly known as ‘pentiums’, are in the hands of the official of the respective cooperative who is sitting in the observation booth and is presiding over the counting procedure. His job is to enter individually the reindeer processed. This is done by age and sex, as well as by belonging to a specific brigade and cooperative. The ‘private pentium’ is usually in the hands of a pensioned-off herder, observing the procedure from outside of the working chamber. This traditional practice leaves the cooperative’s official in the observation booth as the sole receiver of reliable primary information. The last is being shouted to him from the herders working in the ‘churn’ below in whose hands is each processed deer and whose ear-marks they can read. After shouting the relevant indexes up towards the booth—that is, ‘vazhenka, shestaia’ (productive female, 6th brigade), body marks are slashed on both flanks of the animal, so it is known that it has been processed. What the presiding official will enter into the cooperative ‘pentium’ remains entirely in his competence. I believe that this is done in an objective manner, reflecting the actual situation in the ‘churn’. When an unmarked deer comes up, the situation changes. A very wide margin of arbitration opens up and here objective registration may suffer—or so at least, the herders very privately share. As the current system of hyper-extensivity tends to produce a large number of unmarked calves and even adult reindeer, what a presiding official can do without any possibility of control by superordinate agents or agencies is very great indeed. By the flick of a pencil, an unmarked deer becomes the property of this, rather than that brigade. Further than that, and most critically, it may change its status from being a ‘cooperative’ one to a ‘private’ such, or vice versa. This turns the final official statistical text into a reflection of arbitrary decisions in the sole competence of cooperative leadership. Its first stage is at the corral session and what is entered in 30 For the term Konstantinov (2015) and in numerous publications. The term reflects the fact that in traditional Soviet and post-Soviet practice, private reindeer are grazed mixed with the ‘sovkhoz’ ones.
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the ‘pentium’. This original data is afterwards processed at the respective cooperative office, acquiring its final form. How that differs from the actual state-of-affairs in the tundra is exclusively insiders’ knowledge. How things stand in reality can be known only by working with herders in tundra corrals and pastures for a sufficiently long time. The state-of-affairs is captured by an extensive repertoire of herders’ ironic sayings like the following: ‘Bezhit sovkhoznaia vazhenka po tundre, a riadom—chastniy pizhik’ (A sovkhoz (cooperative) mother-deer is running in the tundra, and by her side—a private new-born calf.) In its turn, the system of reindeer husbandry which is practiced in Murmansk Region has a direct relevance for the welfare of private-in-the- collective herds. As said above, the system can be described as hyper- extensive in the sense that the herds are only partially controlled during the annual migration cycle (Konstantinov et al., 2018). The system facilitates the preservation of ‘private’ reindeer through the fact that an uncontrolled herd defies regular ear-marking procedures. It thus allows arbitrary ear-marking long after the mother-calf bond becomes untraceable. This in turn facilitates the compensation of private losses as well as (according to a herder’s rank) an increase of their private herds. This is the point at which it has to be said that the biggest owners of private herds are at the same time the officials presiding at counting/harvesting sessions and supplying the STCs with numbers that subsequently become official. The fact that official statistics produces steadily rising head-count figures (Fig. 2.1) is understandable since the cooperatives’ leaderships are critically interested in getting ever-rising subsidies. The attitude of the funders themselves—the regional government taking from the regional budget (less) and from the federal (more)—is not so transparent. As already said, insiders’ opinion has it that big numbers mean big subsidies to be distributed along the chain of recipients, and hence open to opportunities for appropriation of a certain percentage from them by ‘sawing off’ on the part of the responsible officials. Such assertions are not improbable, to put it very mildly, but still remain on a speculative level. What can be said with a much greater degree of certainty is the difficulty of access to reindeer which are not only physically absent for counting at corral enclosures, and in the conditions described above, but, further than that, are grazed in a hyper-extensive manner. Or, said simply, they are not herded during the predominant part of the year. In result, contact with them can only be sporadic and uncertain. This makes it next to obligatory for herders with private deer, and in the first instance,
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brigade leaders, to be present at all corral sessions. This is so since with a freely roaming composite herd, a reindeer may pop up at any corral enclosure after a round-up. To be able to match such an omniscient herders’ gaze, superordinate agencies need to make a massive effort with corresponding specialized personnel, as well as to make available to them all the vitally necessary infrastructure (vehicles, equipment, fuel, products, etc.). This is a clear impossibility at present and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Having said this, recent changes suggest a possible shift from another quarter. According to informants, early this year Murmansk authorities have demanded that private reindeer should be grazed separately from the cooperative ones. Or, in other words, an administrative will has been expressed for doing away with the collective/ private-in-the-collective mix. Grazing separately means a reversal to tundra semi-nomadic lifestyle. This, again, is a clear impossibility in view of the current reality of herders’ commuting from town to tundra camps, rather than practicing a tundra- based life-style. In recognition of this fact of what can be called ‘urban reindeer husbandry’, the cooperatives have stated a rather improbable intention to reject receiving subsidies and thus fully liberate themselves from controlling measures on the part of the regional authorities. Should this be more than a political bluff, and such a course of action really be taken, the whole STC statement procedure may come to be simplified even further, or entirely discarded. In its present state, it has been inherited from the previous Soviet era. In the first place, this also included the vigilant Raion Party Committee (henceforth: Raikom), as well as the presently still existing Soviets of Deputies (Sovety deputatov)).31 Despite the preservation of the Sovety, among other extant Soviet relics, the present controlling arrangement remains as only a skeletal version of the previous. What is much more important than these structural resemblances concerns the very nature of the motives shaping the surface edifices of the two regimes: the former Soviet one in comparison to the current post-Soviet Putin-led system. As noted earlier on, this is the difference between an ideologically or doctrinally driven mode of governance, compared to an opportunistically pragmatic one at present. Or, as a former sovkhoz 31 There are three such Soviets at present: of Lovozero Raion as a whole, of the Village Settlement of Lovozero, and a Social Soviet (Obshchestvennyi Sovet). All these bodies aim to provide a community presence as regards the Raion’s administrative affairs, but have restricted decision-making power. (Cf. https://www.lovozeroadm.ru/).
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director had bitterly exclaimed after the dismantling of the previous regime: ‘We do not even have an ideology anymore!’ (Mankova, 2004). On the very concrete level of daily concerns, the possibility for a bold move of rejecting subsidies has been provided by the already mentioned contract of ‘Tundra’ with a Finnish company to which meat was to be sold for 700 r/kg. This is to be compared with the local average market price of 400 r/kg and, besides, with the fact that not all meat manages to get sold. A similar contract with a Swedish firm was rumoured to take care of meat from ‘Olenevod’. All of these plans were destined to be dashed, however, by the sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Other consequences of the war, locally felt, will be discussed in the following parts. The course of such recent processes is to be closely watched. Proximity to the Fennoscandic market was thought to be a serious factor for improving the current health of reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region. At the same time, over the last three decades the number of such promising developments and contracts which have failed in the end has been very great indeed. Even before the onset of Western sanctions, a case in point was the closing down of the facilities on the outskirts of Lovozero of the Swedish meat-processing company ‘Norfrys’. It had built a meat-slaughtering facility and had been exporting meat across the border for over two decades. ‘Norfrys’ had improved many aspects of local reindeer herders’ life but in the end departed from the scene after a protracted law-suit (Cf. Beach, 1998). There are numerous examples of this kind and so it is early days to judge about the possibility of rejecting subsidies. Apart from the current war with Ukraine and western sanctions, it is also to be considered that import of cheap meat from Russia has traditionally met with strong opposition on the part of Fennoscandic reindeer herders. Another salient moment in current developments is connected with what I have called in previous work ‘the foreign snowmobile revolution’(Konstantinov, 2009). By analogy with Pertti Pelto’s seminal book (Pelto, 1973), a momentous shift from home to foreign snowmobile brands marked the post-Soviet period in reindeer husbandry, or at least, that of Murmansk Region. Close proximity to the Finnish and Norwegian borders, as well as easy regulations for travelling, ensured unproblematic flow of spare parts for the growing fleet of western snowmobile brands. Climate change additionally made the Soviet-made ‘Buran’—a relic of the 1970s, an increasingly unsatisfactory vehicle, for reasons I have explained in the quoted work (ibid.)
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The war in Ukraine, and the stiffening of border regulations, imposed by Finland and Norway, has negatively impacted the cross-border trade. In a related development, the sprawling open-air secondhand market in the environs of Murmansk, has been experiencing a renaissance. As that can be only a temporary remedy, the need for a quick response from the home industry and the turning out of machinery not dependent on imports from the West is very great and growing. These prospects are looking very dim at present since they require a tectonic shift in the relevant industrial sector. In the ‘contemporary realities’ (v sovremennykh realiiakh)—as the euphemism for the current war and western sanctions has established itself—a serious engagement with the peripheral agricultural branch of reindeer husbandry is looking to be less likely than ever. In its turn, the ‘new realities’ play into the hands of those power circles whose interests dictate the establishing of new ‘hosts of the tundra’ (khoziaeva tundry) in place of the traditional ones: the reindeer husbandry cooperatives. The manner in which the power struggle over ‘hosting the tundra’ has been evolving during the very recent period is the subject matter of the next chapter.
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Konstantinov, Y., & Istomin, K. V. (2020b). Introduction. In Y. Konstantinov & K. V. Istomin (Eds.), Beyond the sayable: Informal economic precursors of the postsoviet semiotic crisis. Special Issue of Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 9(1): 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1353/reg.2020.0000 LP. (2020, May 22). Statistika. Lovozerskii raion v I kvartale [Statistics. Lovozero Raion during the 1st quarter]. LP 21(9032), p. 4. Mankova, P. (2004). Privatisation face to face. Support networks and the former state enterprise in a remote Russian village. MA Thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Tromsø. Pashenkova, M. & Antanovich, O. (2019). The future of the Subarctic (Budushchee Zapoliar’ia). Komsomol’skaia Pravda. Retrieved February 2, 2023, from https://www.kp.r u/best/mur mansk/na-sever e-jit/?ysclid=ldltyj ywc3479032281 Pelto, P. (1973). The snowmobile revolution: Technology and social change in the Arctic. Cummings Publishing. Rasmussen, H.-E. (1995). The Sami of the Kola Peninsula. In I. Bjørklund et al. (Eds.), The Barents Region (pp. 48–56). University of Tromsø, Tromsø Museum. Resolution. (2017). Resolution of the 4th congress of reindeer herders of the Russian Federation 16-19 March, Sakha, Yakutiia. Retrieved October 10, 2022, from https://arktika.sakha.gov.ru/news/front/view/id/2738187 Rybkin, A. (1999). Reindeer Breeding in Murmansk Oblast. Association of World Reindeer Herders. Syroechkovskii, E. (1986). Severnii olen' [The Reindeer]. Agropromizdat. Tkachev, V. (2018, June 1). Obsuzhdenie korrektirovki strategii razvitiia [Discussing corrections in development strategies]. LP 22(8929), p. 2. Tkachev, V. (2020a, February 28). Vedut koral’nye raboty i ot pomoshchi ne otkazyvaiutsia [Corralling work is taking place, but outside help is welcome]. LP 8(9019), pp. 6–7. Tkachev, V. (2021a, December 17). Budushchee olenevodstva na Kol’skom Severe [The future of reindeer husbandry in the Kola North]. LP 50(9113), pp. 4–5. Tkachev, V. (2022a, October 28). Gubernatora vstrechal novyi director kombinata [The Governor was met by the new Director of the complex]. LP 43(9158), p. 1. Tkachev, V. (2022b, September 9). Pravookhranitel’nye organy otkazalis’ iskat’ vinovnykh? [Law-enforcing organs have given up seeking the culprits?]. LP 36(9151), p.1. Yuzhakov, A. (2020). Siberian private reindeer herders and the market: The case of Iamal. In Y. Konstantinov & K. Istomin (Eds.), Beyond the sayable: Informal economic precursors of the post-soviet semiotic crisis. Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 9(1): 53–82. Zuev, S. (2020). The ‘success story’ of private reindeer husbandry in Yamal? A look at herders’ budgets 30 years after. In Y. Konstantinov & K. Istomin (Eds.), Beyond the sayable: Informal economic precursors of the post-soviet semiotic crisis. Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 9(1): 83–115.
CHAPTER 3
Actors and Tensions in the Reindeer Husbandry Part of Murmansk Region
In this part, I discuss the principal tensions which are currently influencing the state-of-affairs in and around reindeer husbandry, as well as the actors who represent a variety of related interests. The model of analysis follows the outlines presented in Chap. 2. Namely, that the current political environment in which relevant actors operate is one, broadly describable as selective de-centralization. A needed analytical concept for this model is peripherality. It is to be understood as a domain of negligeable relevance from the viewpoint of the pinnacle of the power-pyramid (vertikal’ vlasti). Reindeer husbandry most certainly can be classified as such in the current political context. This is a radical change from the place reindeer husbandry used to have during the entirety of the Soviet period. Belonging to agriculture in the Soviet bureaucratic nomenclature, as it still does, reindeer husbandry used to be part of all significant events in Soviet history. Among them we can name the cooperative reforms of the 1920s and the New Economic Policy (NEP) years, the mass collectivization of the Stalinist period, the role reindeer husbandry had in the war years, the agglomeration and other significant changes in agricultural affairs, initiated by Krushchev’s agricultural reforms. In all these, and as regards the reindeer husbandry sector, what eventually became Murmansk Region had served as a test ground. That was due to its closest proximity to the centre of power, as well as being a
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border region with the West.1 This had been also the case as regarded the darker side of all these events—namely the post-Tsarist system of internment and forced-labour camps, heralded in the very first years of Bolshevik power by Solovetskii Monastery (Solovetskii Monastir, Solovki) on the White Sea coast. It can be also recalled that slave-labour, provided by what became the GULAG internment system, had its first trial runs in the building of the ‘one-mine towns’ (monogoroda) of what is now Murmansk Region. At present, the agricultural sector as a whole has next to disappeared from centre-stage concerns, and reindeer husbandry has found itself in the farthest margins of central political attention. This second peripheralization of reindeer husbandry—if we count the Imperial Russian one as the first— has, in consequence, opened up attractive opportunities of use of tundra and forest-tundra territories with their renewable as well as non-renewable resources. Previously, these territories were considered to be the work- place of the reindeer herders, and following from that, to be in their custody. Again, based on this ‘traditional’ premise, the overwhelming part of tundra affairs were accepted to be managed by the reindeer husbandry collectives: by the collective farms (kolkhozi), and later by the Soviet state farms (sovkhozi). At present, the reindeer cooperatives are being slowly pushed out of their previous status as ‘hosts of the tundra’ (khozyaeva tundri)—a much- loved cliché of local journalism. The Kola tundra itself has shifted its main attraction as a herders’ residence and work-place, to one of promoting an array of hunting, wild-salmon angling, and ‘extreme’ tourism ventures run by outsiders. As some of these have shown to be exceedingly lucrative, like the growing network of exclusive salmon angling and hunting tundra camps, a growing number of local and outside players have re-oriented to this resource. With reindeer husbandry only occasionally nodded at in terms of political attention, the formerly reindeer husbandry part of the region is experiencing a new re-opening. Relative to local, regional, or federal power configurations, and respective protagonists’ positions, various parts of the reindeer husbandry grazing range are increasingly drawing the interest of this or that outside player. Recent developments show that interests are also connected with a parallel exploitation of
1 During the Cold War, the border between Murmansk Region and Norway was one of the two direct contact areas between the Soviet Union and a NATO country (the other one being between Georgia/Armenia and Turkey).
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non-renewables in an expansion of mining-processing ventures deep into the tundra. It is in such a context that global concerns with climate change and biodiversity are to be discussed in Murmansk Region. The tundra ecological theme is generally absent from public discussions, as reindeer husbandry itself. At the same time, ecological arguments are often used as political instruments in the hands of various actors in their attempts to remove competitors. It is through such a prism that local principal actors and the tensions among them will be discussed. Or, in other words, that ecological concerns tend to acquire an instrumental role for both traditional actors (herders) and outside players (administrative-cum-moneyed elites) in competing for control over this or that piece of the tundra. In what follows, various aspects of such conflicting interests will be presented. A defining feature of the overall picture is that it weaves ‘traditional’ problems (like reindeer property issues) into the new realities of post-Soviet Russia. The peculiarities of ‘urban reindeer husbandry’ will be briefly outlined in order to unpack the vulnerabilities of the sector in the face of invasive outsiders. Against such a background I introduce the current spectrum of interests. I divide them broadly into such that are off-limits in terms of local response, and such that are accessible to it. In the first group, located above the threshold of peripherality and in the exclusive competence of supra-regional agencies, I list the military, the exclusive tundra tourisms, as well as the mining-processing programmes of powerful industrial actors. These three are incommensurable entities, but they share the uniting feature of existing in their own untouchable domains. In the second group, I list interests within the domain of peripherality, that is, such that are left open to debate and resolution in regional and Raion contexts. In this second group, I discuss in detail a protracted controversy over hunting wild reindeer and moose in Lovozero Raion. This is a tension which has lasted for over a decade between the tundra-connected population of Lovozero Raion, on the one hand, and the regional authorities, on the other. My main argument is that behind the façade of whether wild reindeer should or should not be an object of hunting in Lovozero Raion, a deeper driver is in evidence. Namely, whether the tundra-connected community of the Raion, represented by the herding cooperatives, can continue to be the sole ‘hosts’ of the renewable resources of the tundra as they used to be in Soviet times, and what goals this may serve. A further
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argument I defend is that the ‘host’ status of reindeer herders constitutes a main supportive pillar of sovkhoism itself, the latter being a view of the world and its attendant practices in which the Soviet state farm (sovkhoz) structures an ideal socio-economic environment (Konstantinov, 2015). In nostalgic community memory, that state of being was reached at the late Soviet-era time when each one of the two reindeer husbandry sovkhozi used to be in truth a town-forming enterprise, functioning as a ‘total social institution’ (Anderson, 1996:110; Humphrey, 1983). In the zone I define as existing below the exclusive interests of the empowered elites—that is, in the domain of ‘true peripherality’ open to public debate—the tendency for sustaining sovkhoism by top power circles may be seen to be the dominant one. A further claim I make is that environmental issues, like biodiversity or climate change, to take two more prominent examples of recent global concerns, have only an instrumental role as regards Kola reindeer husbandry. Or, in other words, the role of the issue I place at the centre of the controversies (like protection of wild reindeer in Murmansk Region), I see as only the publicly open (‘sayable’) part of a political platform. The latter can be spelled out as a de facto protection of sovkhoism as a popularity gaining tool on the local level, which is heavily pervaded with nostalgia for past Soviet times. The issue of climate change has no part in this debate. Finally, I turn to recent attempts for developing industrial exploitation of non-renewables in the reindeer husbandry part of the Peninsula. These briefer episodes in recent Kola history stand in marked contrast with the intensity of debates over renewables. My claim is that they have not been officially proclaimed to be threatening to the present reindeer husbandry system: neither by external agents nor by the cooperatives themselves. What has determined their very different fortunes can be explained by factors external to husbandry. These have been principally connected with regional infrastructural needs contingent on mining-processing programmes of mega state-private companies.
‘Urban’ Reindeer Husbandry A defining feature of a significant part of reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region can be described as ‘urban’. While reindeer herds continue to follow their age-long migration routes from the forest-tundra winter pastures to summer fragmentation along the Barents Sea coast, the dwindling contingent of herders have increasingly become urban dwellers. At
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present, this applies mainly to herders from one of the two herding cooperatives: that of the Lovozero-based SKhPK ‘Tundra’. The second cooperative is that of the Village of Krasnoshchel’ie’s ‘Olenevod’ (with daughter departments in the small tundra villages of Kanevka and Sosnovka). It continues to retain a rural profile in terms of residence. In both cases, however, the pattern of husbandry itself is one of sporadically commuting from settlements to grazing range locations for the purpose of establishing sporadic contact with freely migrating reindeer herds. The gradual shifting from a relatively continuous Human–Rangifer direct contact herding to a predominantly contact-less commuting variety has been studied as a shift from seasonally intensive husbandry forms to extensive or even to hyper-extensive ones.2 The word seasonally is important here as in pre-Komi reindeer husbandry, Sami herders practiced a seasonal shift between intensivity and extensivity. This husbandry pattern has been historically recorded as a Sami-defining trait. Close contact and care for the animals characterized the late fall, winter, and spring months. During the summer, the herds were let loose, while the herders reverted to fresh-water fishing. Komi/Nenets immigration at the end of the 19 c. gradually made the traditional Sami system untenable by introducing (or rather enforcing) year-long intensive care. The new system was prevalent during the initial period of collectivized husbandry in Soviet times, until it gradually relaxed, and had in fact regained its pre-Komi partially extensive traits. As Tat’iana Luk’ianchenko summed up the development fifty years ago: ‘The Izhma (Komi) reindeer husbandry system did not manage to take roots on the Kola Peninsula. At present, grazing management contains a number of features which are very close to traditional Sami husbandry (reindeer fences and semi-free summer grazing).’ (Luk’ianchenko, 1971:34) Luk’ianchenko wrote about the 1950s–1970s. Over half a century later now, the course she charted out has much advanced. It has two interconnected sides, concerning residence, on the one hand, and the Human– Rangifer relationship in a tundra-setting, on the other. In shorthand, the second can be called sporadic contact with herds. Below, these two will be discussed separately.
2 For the term and debate see: Whitaker (1955:27); Beach (1981:503); Konstantinov (2015:308).
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In Chap. 2, Murmansk Regional reindeer husbandry was described as being exclusively represented by that of Lovozero Municipality (Lovozerskii Raion). In the Raion itself, the publicly prominent husbandry entity is that of Lovozero’s ‘Tundra’. The second cooperative—‘Olenevod’ (albeit currently of a slightly bigger herd size)—has a ‘traditionally’ more veiled public face. While both cooperatives get public exposure only on a few annual and mainly folkloristic occasions, in strictly herding matters ‘Olenevod’ is rarely mentioned. More on this will be said in the discussion of the wild reindeer controversy further on. For the moment, I focus on the residential pattern that Lovozero has set, and the manner in which that is being reproduced in the ‘remote’ villages: those of Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and Sosnovka. The residential pattern concerning herders is to be seen as a direct consequence of the radical demographic program of the late 1960s–1970s, known as ‘agglomeration and liquidation of tundra villages’. This is a separate theme and it will not be pursued here. I only mention a few of the driving factors. On the one hand, these were reforms connected with the advent of Krushchev’s agricultural policies of the mid-1950s. They led to the agglomeration of kolkhozes into sovkhozes, to the integration of machine-tractor stations (MTS) into the new Soviet farms, to a shift to salaried pay for sovkhoz employees, and to raising Gosplan3 buying prices of agricultural produce. These structural and economic reforms as regarded the husbandry collectives were followed in the next decade with the demographic resettlement mentioned above. A powerful driving force behind them is to be seen in the militarization of the Peninsula in the context of the Cold War, and the growing strategic relevance of the Arctic Region. In parallel with that, the last reflexes of the ideological drives for ‘de- nomadization’ of reindeer husbandry, fed into the practical outcomes of local forms of sedentarisation. Let it be said in passing here that Soviet policies for de-nomadization were knocking on an open door as regarded Kola realities. This the celebrated ethnographer Vladimir Charnoluskii attempted to prove as far back as the late 1920s (Charnoluskii, 1930). On the one hand, Sami seasonal oscillations between fresh-water fishing and a specific form of reindeer husbandry had never allowed full-scale nomadism. On the other, a gender-marked tendency for seeking a fully sedentary life-style had well preceded heavy-handed Soviet measures in the same direction. In sum, Soviet demographic policies had pushed forward and 3
State Planning Committee during the Soviet period.
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compressed historical events which were taking their course anyway, and thus had made them senselessly traumatic (cf. Afanas’ieva, 2013). As a final result at this moment of time, a commuting pattern of reindeer husbandry has replaced earlier forms. At present, herding teams (‘brigades’, brigady) are composed almost exclusively of male herders, whose permanent residence is either in Lovozero, or in the extant tundra villages of Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and Sosnovka. In numerical terms, we talk of approximately 100 men here: a rough figure, which includes herders and auxiliary personnel (heavy track-vehicle drivers, wardens, vets, vet- technicians, repair workers). The families of this tundra-working contingent are permanent town or village dwellers. In their overwhelming majority, herders’ wives or other family members would be employed in local infrastructural or administrative services. Families would rarely appear at tundra-camps (‘bases’, bazy). A main occasion for that will be cloud-berry (moroshka) gathering at the beginning of August. Commuting to herding team bases is more intensive during the snow/ ice surface months. With the advance of climate change, commuting for carrying out the main husbandry tasks of the year (late fall/early winter round ups and counting/harvesting corralling) has become increasingly problematic. The local topography plays a critical part in this, as snowmobile/ vezdekhod tracks to bases (dorogi, vorgi) need to cross big lakes, rivers, and swamps. For Lovozero itself, the classical issue in travelling to tundra bases is sufficient ice thickness on the big Lovozero and Chudziavre lakes. Numerous water or soft-surface obstacles exist on the track to each one of the nine tundra camps, as on all which are relevant for the remote tundra villages. In effect, the easier to reach corral bases begin their activities of counting/harvesting in late November to mid-December, while the majority may protract these activities well into March or even as far out as mid-April. Given the prevailing settled residential pattern, establishing contact with freely roaming herds has gradually become the principal issue in Kola reindeer husbandry. Brigades would rely on occasional scouting missions during the non-snow/ice months for getting an idea of current fragment positions and likely further movements. The task would be performed on foot, or with available reindeer draft teams. The dwindling of the latter is currently attempted to be compensated by the use of four-wheel bikes (kvadrotsikli), particularly as regards the more distant parts of the grazing range (Fig. 3.1). During the summer months, such scouting trips may be
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Fig. 3.1 Herders of Tundra’s ‘Right Wing’ seeking contact with herd fragments along the Barents Sea Coast. (Photo: V. Tkachev, LP 11.9.20, p.1)
combined with fresh-water fishing and wild berry gathering, in which case heavy track-vehicles (vezdekhodi) will be used. An attempt by a former manager of ‘Olenevod’ for stabilizing summer control of herds has failed. In 2016–2018, that manager (ex-‘Tundra’ Head Vladimir Syrota) planned to position permanent huts along a stretch of the Barents Sea coast, and commission parts of the cooperative herding teams for monitoring fragment movements. Another reason for this decision was that the poaching pressure would be decreased. The attempt predictably failed in view of the fact stated in the previous paragraph. Namely, that the established residential pattern, characteristic not only of Lovozero herders but also of those of the remote villages, has so firmly taken root that it has become practically impossible to reverse the course of events. Following this and similar failures in other connected aspects of the overall situation, particularly as regarded ownership and management of private-in-the-collective reindeer, Syrota was finally fired by the de facto owner of ‘Olenevod’ (Andrei Reizvikh).
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The ‘Syrota episode’, unanimously characterized as ‘adventurous’ by the herding community, highlights the stability of the established reindeer husbandry profile of the Raion—one of commuting as described above. The latter is to be seen in parallel with the extensivity (or even hyper- extensivity) of this husbandry form, and in the context of supra-imposed structural factors. Of these latter, agglomeration and tundra village liquidation are to be seen as having been the most influential. To them, the absence of hard-surface roads is to be added, as well as the absence of linkage to the regional electrical grid, of limited GSM connectedness, of restricted medical and educational services, etc. All of these define the remoteness of the ‘remote villages’—which are otherwise not that remote, compared to Siberian situations. The track to Krasnoshchel’ie is of 150 km, to the farthest flung Sosnovka—of 300 km. All in all, no permanent tundra residence exists at present: either in nomadic or semi-nomadic terms. This makes the reindeer husbandry situation here different from Siberian patterns on the one hand, but also from the infrastructurally well- furnished and road-connected Fennoscandic ones, on the other. From the point of view of the main theme of this chapter, namely that of non-herding tundra competition and its current various agendas, the residential pattern coupled with hyper-extensive husbandry leaves the tundra open to outside interest. Before I turn to those, some more words on faltering herders-to-herds contact will be said. As a rule, contact stabilizes with the fall migration to winter pastures on the western borders of the grazing range of the two cooperatives. Further movements westwards are blocked by the railway and highway traversing the Peninsula from south to north. This North-South line, along which the majority of regional towns are situated, roughly divides the Region into two parts. To the west of the line (the ‘western part’) and beyond the thin urban fringe, lies an area long-abandoned by any form of reindeer husbandry. The ‘eastern part’ where husbandry continues to exist is now represented principally by Lovozero Raion. To this ‘western vs. Lovozero Raion’ division, I turn later on in connection with what I refer to as the ‘wild-reindeer controversy’. A point specific to ‘Olenevod’s’ grazing pattern is that husbandry activities are not carried out south of the Ponoi River, that is, on land adjacent to its right bank (pravoberezh’e Ponoia). Appetites for renting out a big chunk from this territory for carrying out exclusive hunting tourism sparkled one of the biggest conflicts between the herding community and
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outsiders’ interests in recent years. This recent episode, referred to as the ‘Hunting Club BEZRK Conflict’, will be discussed in its special place further down. Late summer–early fall husbandry activities are oriented to intercepting herd fragments migrating towards winter pastures. In the lucky case of a successful round up, some harvesting for immediate purposes will be done, as also ear-marking of unmarked calves or older animals. The occasion will be used also for antler gathering, relative to market demands. Additional Soviet-era husbandry activities, characterizing the period, have been long abandoned. Calf-pelt harvesting for knee-length parkas (malitsa), traditionally carried out around 20 August, is one of them. Separation of herds for ‘fattening’ (nagul) of parts designated for harvesting, would be another. Thirdly, separation of herds in view of the rut period is by now an extinct practice. All in all, husbandry activities during this period bear strong signs of erosion, compared to the Soviet and pre- Soviet periods, or, said in other words, have acquired all features of advancing extensivity. The strongest form of contact would thus be during the winter months, preparatory to the main counting/harvesting operation of the year, as also in view of early spring pre-calving migration of herds. Following calving, which is often only partially under control, contact with the herds is practically relinquished until next early fall. All these developments motivate ever-increasing encroachments of interested outsiders. A motif, definable as the Kola Peninsula being a land relatively free of intensive, meat-focused reindeer husbandry, can be said to have a history of at least a century and a half in what we know today as Murmansk Region. Outside actors have exploited this motif for their various interests in a sufficiently long succession. To begin with, I point out again that Russian ethnographers of the end of the nineteenth century tended, in their main part, to define Sami methods of land use as one principally based on fresh-water fishing, rather than on reindeer husbandry (notably, Rozonov, 1903). Current academic opinion states that such views had motivated early Komi settlers to move into lands they deemed largely free of reindeer husbandry activities in late nineteenth century (Orekhova, 2007, 2008). I argue that present-day attempts for outsiders’ appropriation of parts of Kola tundra and forest-tundra territories can be seen as re-interpretations of the ‘free (from reindeer husbandry) land’ motive. In their current form, such interests do not seek legitimation through the fresh-water fishing argument of former times, but, instead, through ones,
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connected with the prevalence and growing of extensive husbandry patterns. As it will be shown further down, the argument of ‘herders not guarding their herds’ constitutes a principal part of the attempts of outsiders to establish tundra footholds. Thus, at present, legitimation of outsiders’ intrusions tends to be based on the inescapable fact of progressive extensification of husbandry methods. As described in the previous paragraphs, this process is in synergy with a dominantly urban residential lifestyle, and a commuting pattern of sporadic contact with migrating herds. This reinterpreted version of the ‘free tundra land’ motif defines the respective repertoires of the two conflicting sides in whatever tundra- related conflict may emerge. On the part of the local communities, the repertoire involves the main lines of what is necessarily a defensive narrative. Namely, that Lovozero is a reindeer husbandry village, and not a town of office and public-service employees (which it is), and that, according to an often-voiced outcry, ‘in case we lose reindeer husbandry, we lose everything’ (Esli, 2003). As I have shown earlier on, the current state-of- affairs in Lovozero, as well as in the whole Raion, does not support such statements. The Raion depends for its budget not on reindeer husbandry at all, but on regional and federal subsidies which constitute over 90% of the total. An uncertain part of the rest comes from the faltering output of the mining-processing complex in Revda. In more realistic terms (and as the Raion statistical bulletins inform us), contributions come from construction work, as well as from transport and infrastructural maintenance services. Nonetheless, I claim that the statement is fully valid in the sense that the cultural significance of reindeer husbandry for the Raion is one providing a strong sense of social cohesion and identity for a very mixed multi-national population. It is in this way that the above-mentioned statement is to be understood: as a local voice in defence of critical cultural values. Opposing ‘outsiders’ narratives tend to exploit arguments not on the plane of symbolic cultural values, but on ones connected with legislative, economic, and environmental issues. As it will be shown in the sections below, the outsiders and their lobbies in the regional administration exploit the weak points of the prevailing hyper-extensive husbandry system, as well as of its sovkhoist foundations and extant practices. The main weakness exploited is a version of the ‘free tundra land’ narrative to which anti-sovkhoist twists are added. Namely, that herding in a real sense is hardly done, and, secondly, that the sensitive issue of poaching is a feature of the sovkhoist system itself. All that adds up in support of the main claim
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of the outsiders: that ‘custodianship of the tundra’ cannot be considered as an exclusive and inalienable right of the locals. On the larger canvas of the whole country, the Kola case illustrates, in its specific way, the problem of who owns the regions. In what follows, I continue with the main actors in these continuing debates, as well as with the particular features and finer details of the respective controversies.
Military vs. Herders Tensions Tensions with the military existed all through the Soviet period, but they gained visibility only after the collapse of the Union. That, as all other post-Soviet ‘visibilities’, erupted during the first decade of the new post- Soviet era: ‘the dashing nineties’ (likhie devianostye). With the coming to power of acting President Putin in the early 2000s, a gradual sliding back into Soviet-like ‘bolting down of hatches’ (zadraivanie liukov), gradually gathered speed until at present little has remained of the initial spirit of making problematic issues concerning the military, the Military-Industrial Complex (VPK), or the power structures as a whole, open to public scrutiny. At the same time, occasional announcements of outrageous conduct (like cases of ‘poaching’ on cooperative herds) do appear (Shirmer, 2006; Nadezhdina, 2019b). As a rule, they briefly surface in the media air not to be followed thereafter by any further comment. Two focal locations have been prominent in local insiders’ talks. The overwhelmingly prominent one has always been the naval base of Gremikha. The base is situated on the Barents Sea coast in the eastern part of the Peninsula. Close to it rise the blocks-of flats of its residential quarters: the closed town of Ostrovnoi. Olenegorsk-2 (‘Tsar’ Gorodok’), situated near the western rim of ‘Tundra’s’ Left Wing used to represent another threat to reindeer husbandry. With the demise of two herders’ teams in this part (Brigades 5 and then 3), this second location gradually disappeared from the map of tensions with the military. A few words will be said about each, omitting all smaller military detachments (voinskie chasti) strewn around the Raion. On the whole, relations with them seem to be more of cooperation in the way of informal deals and barter of equipment, spares, or fuel for meat, rather than of conflict.
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Gremikha-Ostrovnoi-Murmansk-1404 gained prominence in engaged public talk immediately after the political changes of the early 1990s, and the eruption of Sami activism. During this period, aptly dubbed the ‘Barents euphoria’ by Hønneland (2003), poaching by military personnel stationed at the naval base, as well as by residents of the town of Ostrovnoi, became a prominent theme in Sami-oriented publicity, representing the Sami people as victims of military terror. A culmination of this ‘victimization of the Sami’ theme was reached with the release of a documentary by prominent Norwegian Sami journalist Jos Kalvemø in 1995. In his film, he described the struggle of a Lovozero Sami activist and local entrepreneur Liubov Vatonena to establish a tourist camp by the Lumbovka River in the eastern part of the Peninsula. According to Kalvemø’s report, the military from Gremikha had repeatedly threatened Vatonena with what amounted to bombing her camp unless she cleared out of the area. In the end, the camp was burned down in unclear circumstances (Kalvemø, 1995). The event remained shrouded in mystery. The burning down of Vatonena’s guest-house on the outskirts of Lovozero happened in unclear circumstances not long after the Lumbovka incident. That sparkled another round of gossip and conjecture. Many were of the opinion that the fire may have been an act of the owner for alleged gains from insurance. As Vatonena gradually left the lime-lights of Sami activism, both cases remained as parts of the rich store of local intimate talk. Whatever the truth about Vatonena’s conflicts with the military had been, one theme of ‘military terror’ proved to be durable: that of the military poaching on sovkhoz herds. Local affairs rightly or wrongly implicating the military are traditionally absent from public discussions. The military side themselves have always behaved as a distant state within the state and have been keeping dignified silence as regards accusations coming from civilians. On a rare occasion years ago, I had happened to meet a Lithuanian academic who had served in the Soviet Navy in the late 1980s. His ship had been stationed at Gremikha for some ten months. To my questions about whether he knew of any poached reindeer meat coming to the ship or to the base itself, he replied that to the best of his knowledge there had been no signs of such activities and that he had never seen such meat in his plate. He knew of NCOs using high explosives to poach fish from the sea 4 Cf. Hønneland (2004:172–9).
and
Jørgensen
(1999:141f);
Konstantinov
(1999:27);
Took
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and thus augment a rather scanty diet in those days, but of poaching reindeer he had never heard. This statement coming from the ‘other side’ as it were has been the only one over the years in which I could hear a voice coming from the military themselves concerning the matter of poaching. This in itself is not surprising given the veil of secrecy over military matters. The absence of an official voice on the issue is what raises questions. While the military from the Northern Fleet had never bothered to make any sort of statement concerning tensions with herders, snippets of information may occasionally be garnered from vigorous social media activities of the extant inhabitants of Ostrovnoi. A lively platform for that has proved to be the Russian Facebook version: VK (VKontakte),5 as well as similar Internet blogs. What they present is the ailing state of the ZATO,6 reduced at present to a fraction of its former population. A grim picture of abandoned and dilapidating blocks of flats is what the bloggers present (e.g., Shtein, 2019, Fig. 3.2a and b). Concerning tensions with herders, the way food supplies come to the town is of relevance. The main carrier is the passenger boat MK ‘Klavdiia Elanskaia’ commissioned in 1977. The ageing vessel is the only one carrying goods and passengers from Murmansk to Arkhangel’sk, with stop-overs at Ostrovnoi, and occasionally at the villages of Ponoi and Sosnovka. Numerous promises have been made over the decades of replacing the Soviet relic with a newer vessel, but to date, nothing has appeared on the horizon. After a recent rehauling in Arkhangel’sk (March 2021), the vessel was expected to take foodstuffs to Ostrovnoi by the end of that month. Due to heavy sea-ice, and despite the support of the ice-breaker ‘Kapitan Kosolapov’, the journey took more than a week. Finally, the boat arrived on 3 April, bringing on board 30 tons of foodstuffs (V Ostrovnoi, 2021). To avert the looming food crisis until the ship arrived, products had to be flown in by helicopters. The whole incident allowed opinion of the prevailing food situation in Ostrovnoi to get aired in daily news coverage in the regional press. A woman from Ostrovnoi was quoted as saying that ‘normally, we do not have any problems with provisions’ (Valamina, 2021). https://vk.com/public141107989 (Accessed 5.04.2021). ZATO (zakrytoe administratyvno-territorial’noe obrazovanie) administrative-territorial formation)]. 5 6
[CATF
(Closed
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Fig. 3.2 (a, b) Ostrovnoi/ Gremikha/ ‘Murmansk-140’—residential part. Source: ZATO (2017)
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In the social media, however, other local inhabitants painted a rather different picture. In an appeal to ‘Vladimir Vladimirovich’ (i.e., Putin), one blogger presented a long list of woes, one of which concerned food- supplies to the town: Connection with the mainland (bol’shaia zemlia) and the town is solely by motor ship Klavdiia Elanskaiia, whose age is over 30 years. Repairs of MK Elanskaia are not being carried out!7 We risk our lives each time. The motor ship travels by her own whims, not according to any schedule. She is often not appearing for weeks on end. We often sit here without any fresh provisions (emphasis mine). (ZATO, 2017)
In the regional press coverage of the latest food crisis, a similar opinion was shared: In the opinion of an old-timer of Gremikha Vladimir Basharin, every ‘islander’ needs to have a store of provisions to last for at least a week. Fish, meat, mushrooms, berries—I always have a store of them at home. Fish I either catch myself, or buy it from fishermen; meat I buy from hunters (emphasis mine). (Valamina, 2021)
In a Kola tundra context, when one says ‘meat’, in nine out of ten cases that means reindeer meat. It could be moose, bear, or even hare or tundra partridge, but that would be a rare case. This short comment alerts to the fact that hunters would not miss the chance to take down a reindeer from the cooperative fragments, roaming the coastline during the summer, and with the nearest herder maybe a hundred kilometres away from them. The structure of the foodstuffs that were flown in to Ostrovnoi during the recent crisis also suggested that fish and meat would be mostly locally procured. In all reports of what was finally taken to Ostrovnoi (30 tons by ‘Elanskaia’, and about 5 tons by helicopter), fruit and vegetables mostly figured, together with milk products, and baby foods. The overall picture one tries to piece together from scant and fortuitous bits of information seems to suggest that probable systemic taking from sovkhoz herds may be perpetrated not so much from the military personnel of the naval base as from the remaining citizens of Ostrovnoi—around 2000 people at present. The latest food crisis points to a need of 7 The letter was written in Nov. 2017 and a general overhauling of the ship was finally carried out in March 2021.
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self-sufficiency to the extent one could ensure it. Comparing with the food situation in the ‘remote villages’, where a significant part of provisions is never certain to come in on time, a local informal meat market serves as a back-up option. This is a factor to be always had in mind in the context of tensions with ‘outsiders’. When powerful outsiders from beyond the Region (but often backed by regional administrators) attempt to long-term rent this or that chunk of hunting grounds, local resistance is inevitably driven by subsistence concerns. In moral terms, that pitches a beleaguered local population (like the extant civilian population of Ostrovnoi) with endemic worries over day-to-day subsistence, against powerful ‘outsiders’ with their appetites for trophy hunting and angling, as well as for substantial commercial gain for owners of exclusive tundra camps. A recent case of alleged poaching by citizens of Gremikha (and/or the military personnel stationed there) was published in the social network VKontakte by an anonymous author from the group ‘Gremikha- Murmansk- 140-Ostrovnoi’ (22.02.2019), reported in Lovozerskaia Pravda (Nadezhdina, 2019a). Two photos were posted, showing reindeer carcasses on board of ‘Klavdiia Elanskaia’ as she was sailing from Ostrovnoi to Murmansk. The case was commented on by Andrei Reizvikh, the Chair of ‘Olenevod’ and virtual owner of the cooperative. To the role of Reizvikh in endemic conflicts over deer-poaching between local communities and outsiders, I turn again later in the presentation of the BEZRK Hunting Club vs. ‘Olenevod’ affair. Reizvikh’s comments about the alleged poached carcasses, photographed on the decks of ‘Klavdiia Elanskaia’ were the following: Each year in the course of many decades, poachers from Gremikha-Ostrovnoi transport reindeer carcasses to Murmansk on board the passenger boat. The poached meat is from domestic reindeer belonging to the cooperatives ‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’. We have been repeatedly turning for help to the Governor (of Murmansk Region), to the police (UVD), to the Hunting Inspectorate (Okhotinspektsiia). Our plea was that they carry out anti- poaching activities in the winter period from December to April. (…..) Regrettably, no answer from the Regional authorities has been received by the reindeer husbandry cooperatives, despite the fact that in the past such measures used to be taken. (Nadezhdina, 2019a)
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The military factor, particularly that connected with Gremikha, remains a matter of lasting discussion in the local oral literature, and from time to time finds place in published reports as in the one quoted above. The issue thus appears in an official form for the general public only very rarely and almost instantly disappears. In all events, with the improvement of living conditions in the naval bases and other installations, the motive for strictly military meat-poaching seems to have much receded. Where it has retained its poignancy is as regards the dwindling civilian population of Ostrovnoi. At the same time, give and take between herders and the military concerning equipment and fuel in exchange for reindeer meat has all the appearances of remaining at previous levels. On an institutional level, this concerns mainly repair parts for the ageing fleet of cooperative vezdekhods. The same is true as regards the growing number of privately owned heavy track vehicles. In the case of rank-and-file herders, it can be said that much needed items of tundra clothing are still to be found only through intimate personal networks with the military (like the outer kit of protective waterproof clothing (‘khim-dim’)). Another recent aspect of cooperation with the military has been on a strictly formal level. It concerns the rapidly increasing emphasis by the military on attaining Arctic operational preparedness. Recalling the effective role of reindeer-driven sled teams in the last war (Kanev, 2010), a training programme for driving reindeer-drawn sleds has been going on for the last few years (V Lovozere (2021); Pod Lovozerom (2021), Fig. 3.3). Another aspect of the reindeer husbandry situation in connection with the military concerns the endemic problem of recruitment. With the significantly rising salaries for the military, as for all power structures, the appeal to join the ranks is strong among the local youth. Rather than look towards the ageing log-cabins of the herding camps, not a few choose to pursue careers with the military, police force, or fire-fighting units. One needs to mention in the same context the strong popularity of para-military youth activities, particularly that of Fatherland War archaeology. This part of ideological education, under the name of ‘patriotic upbringing’ (patrioticheskoe vospitanie), has sprouted a system of military- patriotic clubs, the organization of military-sports games, as well as clubs for ‘reconstructing’ military events of the Fatherland War. All of these activities are under the tutelage of the Committee for Relations with Community Organizations and Youth Affairs of Murmansk Region
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Fig. 3.3 Reindeer-sled driving practice for Northern Fleet commando troops on Lovozero Lake. (Source: Pod Lovozerom (2021))
(Komitet po vzaimodeistviiu s obshchestvennymi organizatsiiami i delam molodezhi Murmanskoi oblasti) (Cf. Novyi, 2014; Fig. 3.4). It is important to recall in this context that the present vigorous activities in military-patriotic youth education, and particularly those of Fatherland War reconstruction clubs, can be seen as following almost seamlessly Soviet time educational programs. This is a vast topic in itself as it concerns both school programs, as well as participation in DOSAAF 8 club activities. Let it be only mentioned here that the appeal of school- clubs like ‘The Red trackers’ (Krasnye sledopyty) was strong in Lovozero schools, and, notably, at the Boarding School for Sami children (Natsional’naia shkola-internat) (Konstantinov, 2015:85–87). Many of the young women of the first Sami activist wave after the changes had been prominent members of the ‘Red Trackers’ in their internat days. The appeal of ‘patriotic upbringing’ clubs and related events has far from diminished since those times.
8 DOSAAF Rossii—Dobrovol’noe obshchestvo sodeistviia armii, aviatsii i flota Rossii (Voluntary Society for Assistance of the Army, Air Force, and Navy of Russia), see: http:// www.dosaaf.ru/ (Accessed 8.04.21).
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Fig. 3.4 A ‘patriotic upbringing’ event. (Source: Novyi, 2014)
In sum, the military as a predatory actor in respect of Kola reindeer husbandry can be described as a primarily ideological theme in the heyday of the ‘Barents euphoria’ of the 1990s and its ‘Sami victimization’ offshoots of the period (Berg-Nordlie, 2011; Afanas’ieva, 2000; Afanas’ieva & Rantala, 1993; Vatonena, 1989). The increasing emphasis put on ideological upbringing programs with a heavy military slant, combined with what amounts to a welfare program for the power-structures, has much contributed to a greatly changed situation at present. In it, a military (or power structure) career stands as an attractive prospect for many young persons, including those with hereditary reindeer husbandry connections, or even studying at the Northern College in Lovozero. One can note here a serious difference from the ‘Barents euphoria’ days of ‘the dashing ‘90s’, when the tundra was painted close to a battle-ground between helpless Sami herders, on the one hand, and a crushing military force, on the other. Such Cold War tropes are irreproducible at present. The very Committee for Relations with Community Organizations, which used to have such a large place for Sami activism two decades ago, has been reduced at present to a government office for coordination and financial support of sport, folkloristic, or ‘patriotic upbringing’ activities.
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In terms of a less-ideologized appraisal of the situation, two main lines of argument are to be proposed. On the one hand, the advancing extensivity of husbandry patterns, in syncretic linkage with the currently commuting type of the local Human–Rangifer relationship, lays open the herds to human predation, in which principally Ostrovnoi may have a certain part. My second argument concerns an aspect of the situation which I consider to be far more critical. This stems from the potential the Military-Industrial Complex (VPK) holds for transferring parts of its territorial possessions to power holders with interests in developing exclusive tourist ventures. This latter topic will be discussed further below. It needs to be said that both topics—the military factor as well as that of exclusive tundra tourisms—are united by their absence from public exposure and debate. This is in marked contrast to the case of outside actors and tensions which are open to public discussion. The division reveals the threshold of peripherality defined earlier on. Thus, the military complex, as well as the upper privileged layers of the oligarchate with which the exclusive tourist ventures are connected, seem to enjoy the ‘untouchability’ of their respective exclusive positions in the hierarchy of power. Olenegorsk-2 (‘Tsar Gorodok’): In addition to Gremikha/ Ostrovnoi, the ‘untouchability’ topic can be illustrated by the case of Olenegorsk-2, or ‘Tsar Gorodok’ (‘King of Towns’) as locally known. This is a closed military settlement, some 20 km to the NE of the City of Olenegorsk, on the western side of the grazing range of ‘Tundra’.9 This is the second military settlement which used to be traditionally accused of poaching on ‘Tundra’ herds. As in the case of Gremikha, such cases were much discussed during the first decade of changes, progressively dying down since the early 2000s. Olenegorsk-2, as different from Gremikha/ Ostrovnoi, is situated much closer to ‘Tundra’s’ territory and its western assemblage of herding teams, i.e., in its ‘Left Wing’ part. In the 1990s, it consisted of five brigades (3,4,5,6,7), reduced to only three at present (4,6,7). The herders themselves are much fewer now. As in the ‘Right Wing’, the number of all herders in the extant brigades is little more than that of the herders of one former brigade. Clearly, at present and with this factor added, the system has moved another notch up on the extensivity scale. Similar to the case of Ostrovnoi, the extensive pattern of herding was conducive to poaching forays by military personnel stationed at Olenegorsk-2. In 1994–1996, my research was with the herders of the 9
See: https://armius.ru/rvsn/vch62834 (Accessed 8.04.21).
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now extinct 3rd Brigade, with a main base at the small Polkas Lumpol Lake. The brigade was the closest to the military settlement and thus open to poaching forays from that quarter. One such, resulting in massive killing of reindeer (to the tune of nearly 150 head), was recorded in my field notes of those days (Konstantinov, 2005:23–24). The perpetrators were known by the military authorities, but no proceedings concerning this case were ever made public. Knowledge about this and other similar cases I could thus reach only from sharing with herders and whatever personal observations I could make. Another source was from ROVD10-Revda, whose head in those days agreed to be interviewed concerning the above-mentioned case. From that officer I heard that civilian authorities (including the Ministry of the Interior) had no jurisdiction as regarded such matters—an issue well discussed in the concerned literature (Hønneland & Jørgensen, 1999). Indeed, and as it concerned the case quoted earlier, it was a military court that judged the case of the main perpetrator in the Polkas Lumpol slaughter (an officer with the rank of Major), but what verdict was passed, we never heard. Another unexpected source of information was a Russian academic who happened to have lived as a child in Olenegorsk-2, his father being stationed at the garrison. The nickname ‘Tsar’ Gorodok’ (‘King of Small Towns’), as he explained to me, came from the fame of this closed town as one with the best living conditions (and salaries) for the military and their families. The situation here is therefore radically different from that in Ostrovnoi. The town is situated an hour’s drive from Murmansk on a good road. This makes a very great difference from Ostrovnoi and its dependence for provisions on the shaky fortunes of the ageing ‘Klavdiia Elanskaia’. Remembering his childhood days, my informant shared that he had heard of reindeer poaching from town gossip, but claimed that it had not been for the meat. The reason, according to him, was that the herds grazing near the town offered an opportunity for hunting trips arranged for senior ranks visiting the town on inspecting tours. Some parts of the carcass would be still taken, but the main interest was in getting buck antlers for trophies. They would be collected for home decoration and presents,
10 Raionnoe Otdelenie Vnutrennykh Del (Raion Department of Internal Affairs), Raion Police Department.
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particularly as presents to high-ranking military visitors. This was a version corroborated by herders.
Salmon Angling and Hunting Camps It can be claimed with confidence that in recent years the ‘exclusive angling camps vs. herders’ conflict has a acquired a much greater relevance than the ‘military vs. herders’ one. The birthday of the former of the two can be said to be in 1989, that is, close to the very end of the Soviet Union. Its pioneer was the Finnish-American entrepreneur Gary Loomis. Years later it transpired that already in Soviet days he had managed to develop close ties with relevant authorities in Murmansk (some say also in Moscow), and had been granted the right to set up an exclusive wild-salmon angling camp on a tributary of the Ponoi River.11 At present, such exclusive camps (lageria) dot the entirety of the Kola Peninsula. At the same time, no certain knowledge exists as to their exact number, location, and ownership. A veil of secrecy seems to cover these ventures, much resembling the military/VPK case discussed above. All that is known is that these are luxury angling camps catering for clients with substantial means (a week in them begins at USD 5000 and may reach over 10000 at the time of the June salmon run). In their majority, these are western tourists, but, according to insiders, the percentage of wealthy persons from home in them is growing (Ogarkova, 2007; Konstantinov, 2017). By all available evidence, exclusive salmon-fishing camps are an issue decided high above the heads of Raion authorities, or even the regional ones. As a rule, the camps are not registered as Raion taxpayers. Consequently, the Raion gets no revenue from them. Another hope of the early years had also been dashed: that the camps will give a much-needed chance for well-paid employment to local people. Such are indeed hired, but only as seasonal menial workers: mainly as wardens, chamber maids, and kitchen help. As regards the higher service levels, employees would be generally brought over from outside the Raion, or even outside the Region. In the final account, the exclusive camps have turned out to be a dead loss locally. In effect, local persons have been reduced to poaching on rivers, to which in pre-camp times they used to have sole and uninhibited access (Mustonen et al., 2020; Konstantinov, 2017; Osherenko, 1998). See Osherenko (1998, 2001).
11
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As in all other conflicts of this type, the only line of defence which local people can employ is the one of mobilizing indigeneity and traditionality as an ideological resource. The motif is based largely on fiction and suppression of uncomfortable facts (like salmon and game poaching, as well as internal reindeer taking), but is the only one at hand—as a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott, 1985). It has proven to have little effect, if at all, as regards exclusive luxury camps. The number of such camps continues to grow. There is a considerable resemblance with the military in the sense that Raion and regional authorities are in a subordinate and service position as regards the unseen, but obviously well-connected owners. Peeps into that largely closed area come either through personal connections with service personnel, rare blogs by canoeists or other travellers, or by extraordinary events which cannot be hidden from the general public. Perhaps the most illustrative case in such a list has been the Munozero helicopter crash of 31 May 2014. That tragic event is discussed below. The Munozero helicopter crash occurred not long after take-off from the tourist angling camp ‘Piatka’ by the eponymous river in the southern part of the Peninsula.12 Earlier in the day, a Mi-8 helicopter had arrived at the camp from the town of Apatity. On the way back, the helicopter was scheduled to land at another angling camp by Lake Kanozero. According to the post-crash reports, the aircraft had taken off from Camp ‘Piatka’ at 19:59, on 31 May 2014, Saturday, on course to Kanozero (Sredi, 2014). On board were five crew members and 13 passengers. At 20:40 communication with the craft broke down and that was later supposed to be the time of the crash. The final verdict on the reasons for the crash came a year later. The blame was put on the pilots who had taken off in unfavourable weather conditions. Over Munozero Lake and in bad visibility, the machine had descended too low, got in contact with the water surface, crashed and sank. (Sledkom, 2015, Fig. 3.5) All on board perished, but two of the passengers. They were miraculously saved by anglers who happened to be fishing in the lake. The list of passengers was impressive. Apart from the crew of five,13 it included top-rank officials from the regional government, of the top Piatka is a right tributary of River Varzuga in Terskii Raion. The usual Mi-8 crew is of three members: pilot, co-pilot, and flight technician. Judging by the numerous reports about the accident, the two other technicians could have belonged to a spare crew and taken on board on the return flight from Piatka. Local rumours however had it that the two young men had in fact been service workers at the Piatka camp, and that the ‘bosses’ had agreed to give them a lift to their home town of Apatity. 12 13
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Fig. 3.5 Munozero tragedy: recovery of the crashed helicopter. (Source: b-port. com, Na meste (2014))
management of the Mining-Processing Complex OAO ‘Appatit’ in Kirovsk-Appatiti, officials from Peterburg connected with the Forestry Management (lesnoe khoziastvo) of the Northwestern Federal Okrug, as well as businessmen.14 Top-ranking among the victims was the Regional Vice-Governor Sergei Skomorokhov. Other high-ranking officials were the Regional Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology Aleksei Smirnov, his Deputy and Head of the Forestry and Hunting Department at the Ministry of Natural Resources of Murmansk Region Aleksandr Alkhimchikov, the General Director of OAO ‘Appatit’ Aleksei Grigor’ev, and members of the Regional Duma. There were also representatives of tourist companies belonging to the PhosAgro Group, as well as of the aviation infrastructure of the Region (Na meste, 2014; Na bortu, 2014). The ill-fated trip occurred on the weekend: a fact critical comments in blogs were quick to pounce on. As one blogger wrote: ‘the flight was on a Saturday night—they could not find time in working days, could they? For the full list of passengers see Marina (2014); Stali (2014).
14
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(rabochego vremeni ne khavatalo chto li?)’. In the Moscow Post, economic analyst Nikolai Polikarpov wrote: The helicopter Mi-8 (….) had been chartered by the General Director of OAO ‘Appatit’ (PhosAgro Group) Aleksei Grigor’ev, who had invited officials from the Regional Government, and businessmen on the trip. According to data from ‘SPARK Avia’ (the helicopter company—my gloss), the helicopter had been chartered for angling and for an informal meeting of Murmansk elite circles. (Polikarpov, 2015)
The critical comments were thus targeting a regional government informal mix with business, smacking of corruption (ibid.). An official repudiation immediately followed. A legitimate-looking version of the event was presented: first from the then Regional Governor Marina Kovtun15 and soon after from PhosAgro as the hosts of the whole ill-fated outing. PhosAgro backed Kovtun’s ‘respectable’ version: The PhosAgro Group confirmed the words of the Regional Head (about the purpose of the trip—my gloss). The aim of the trip was defined as assessing the potential for developing the tourist-recreational sphere of Murmansk Region by getting first-hand knowledge of the existing tourist infrastructure of OAO Appatit 16. In addition, information was to be gathered about locations which could attract the interest of likely tourist investors. It was exactly for these reasons that the helicopter Mi-8 landed at the tourist-camp (turbaza) Piatka, and afterwards flew off to another recreational camp. (Selivestrova & Molodtsova, 2014)
The ‘assessing of the tourist potential’ story on a Saturday night and on a free trip offered by PhosAgro to top regional administrators, as well as to Peterburg Forestry officials, did not convince many. In the social media, there abounded more or less open accusations that the Acting Governor herself was in cahoots with oligarchs with a dubious past but sparkling present17 (Lenta.ru, 2014; Odin, 2019). There are numerous 15 Preparatory to her election campaign for a second term, Kovtun was Acting Governor (VRIO) at the time. 16 OAO Apatit is a mining-processing complex within the PhosAgro Group. It is thus the productive component of the giant phosphate artificial fertilizers consortium. 17 PhosAgro owner and mega-oligarch Gur’iev was initially partner of ousted oligarch Khodorkovskii. According to critics, after the latter’s fall and imprisonment, Gur’iev was the one to benefit from his fall, and be kept afloat through serving as ‘one of the main Putin’s wallets’. (Odin, 2019)
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Fig. 3.6 Elite fishing: former Governor Marina Kovtun on an angling trip in Murmansk Region. (Source: Instagram https://www.instagram.com/marinav_ kovtun/; Marina (2020))
ramifications here, as the Acting Governor was well-known for her connections with the tourist sector. That last was as important part of her career biography (in OAO Appatit, and the Federal Committee of Tourism in Moscow). The Governor (2012–2019) was also well known for her salmon angling passion which she has been abundantly advertising to this day (Fig. 3.6). To deflect all criticism that there was something fishy about that trip, the Head and owner of PhosAgro, mega-ologarch Andrei Gur’ev found it necessary to explain:
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The Management of OAO ‘Appatit’, and its daughter (tourist) company OOO ‘Bol’shoi Vud’iavr’, together with academics and members of the Regional Government, were flying around tourist sites. So that there is no way the trip could be considered private, the General Director of OAO PhosAgro Andrei Gur’ev emphasized. (Selivestrova & Molodtsova, 2014)
Naturally, there was intense speculation about the real motives behind the so tragic trip, but at least one thing was certain. The passengers in the doomed craft represented ‘a cross-section of Russian power-holders’ (VIP-krushenie, 2014). The ‘chummy gang’ (shatiia-bratiia), as the more cynical bloggers put it, were a mixture of business of mega-proportions (PhosAgro), the upper tier of the regional government, people connected with the tourist ventures of PhosAgro, as well as with the aviation-transport regional infrastructure. From among this administrative-cum-business mix, of particular interest for this report is the prominent part the Forestry Management Administration had in the group. How was that to be explained? To begin with, Forestry was represented on the regional, as well as on the NW Federal Okrug level.18 Concerning the former, here was the Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region (Smirnov), together with his Vice-Minister (Alkhimchikov), who was also the Head of Department of Forestry Management (as a subordinate branch of the Ministry). The academics mentioned by Gur’ev were in fact one academic: Stepchenko (Vice-Director of Regional Development of the St Peterburg Institute of Forestry Management). The highest official of the Forestry sector was Verenikin (Head of the Department of Forestry Management of the NW Federal Okrug). Also, in the group was Volkov (Vice-Director of OOO Luga-les—a Peterburg Forestry Management company). In this way, of the 13 non-crew passengers, 5 represented Forestry Management either as administrators, educators, or businesspersons. This high representation in the trip suggested that the official story about the purpose of the trip was not to be discarded as some cover-up yarn for a perk of regional and okrug elite circles. There might have been some of that, but a careful analysis of the situation and the list of those present points to the high probability of the presence of a more substantial 18 The NW Federal Okrug comprises of eleven regions in the North of the European part of Russia. (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/)
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objective: that of developing exclusive angling tourist spots in the salmon rivers in the south of the Peninsula. This was Forestry Fund land. In such a probable scenario, the passenger composition acquires sense. Namely, that the financial muscle would come from PhosAgro, while top regional administrative support would come from the regional government: with Vice-Governor Skomorokhov himself as the Governor’s right- hand man. Land-leasing tasks would be taken up by the Department of Forestry Management. All of this went under the slogan ‘developing ecological tourism’ in the phrasing of the post-tragedy PhosAgro press-release (Pettersen, 2014). The role of the rest of the passengers can be seen to have been connected with this or that aspect of infrastructural tactical support. For the purposes of this book, of greatest interest is the high relevance of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology.19 This regards outside interests in what is broadly referred to as the ‘reindeer husbandry part’ of the Peninsula. The fact that the probable exclusive camp (or camps) venture targeted parts of Terskii Raion and not of Lovozero Raion can be considered immaterial in such a context. As other conflicts discussed further down will show, the pattern of power decisions in non-urban regional territories is one and the same: the Ministry of Natural Resources is the relevant arm of administrative power in all cases. The Munozero Helicopter Crash shows that for the concrete stage of the officially described tourist development (which somehow called for an informal weekend trip of power-holders), the subordinate branch of the Ministry—that of Forestry Management—was the most topical one. Another of the Ministry subsidiary branches20—that of Hunting Control (Okhotnadzor)—was not represented at all. Alternatively, the Hunting Control Department would be, naturally, the topical one when outside interests concerned the hunting resources of the Peninsula (see further down). Evidently, the trip at hand did not have such interests in mind. Things pointed heavily in the direction of the Region’s most precious and elitist renewable resource: that of its anadromous fish population.
19 The Current full designation is: Ministerstvo prirodnykh resursov, ekologii i rybnogo khoziaistva Murmanskoi oblasti (Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Fishing Management of Murmansk Region). 20 For the structure of the Ministry see: https://mpr.gov-murman.ru/about/structure. php (Accessed 2.04.21).
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Seen from such an angle, the high presence on all levels that Forestry Management had in the trip was to be connected with the huge expanse of regional land it commands. This covers a very broad strip running from north to south across the Peninsula and covering mountain ranges and along river-lake systems where the forests of the Region are principally located. Concerning Lovozero Raion itself, the Forestry commands roughly half of its reindeer grazing range (Map 3.1): What is often not realized in this context is that it is one thing to call an area ‘reindeer husbandry district’ (whatever that may mean in Russian legal terms), and quite another to consider its administrative land-use status. Current western scholarship seems oblivious to this fact. A look at a very recent publication (Mustonen et al., 2020), focusing on the
Map 3.1 Lovozero Raion: outlines of current territorial use (Source: Lovozero Administration, https://www.lovozeroadm.ru/shemy_territoria/shema_territoria/ (Accessed 25.03.21). 1. Territory of agricultural land-use; 2. Forestry Fund territory; 3. Protected and Special Regime Territories
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anadromous fish resources of Lovozero Raion, stands evidence to such an assertion. In Map 3.1, the reindeer husbandry ‘district’ covers the entirety of the tundra and forest-tundra parts. This is a very inadequate picture in view of the fact that (a) the Forestry Fund controls roughly half of the designated territory, and (b) currently reindeer husbandry extends only occasionally and fractionally into such territory. Only the very basics of what is actually a much more complex picture can be given here. To begin with, the administrative management regimes often overlap in respect of a given territory. Closer to reindeer husbandry concerns stands the fact that when reindeer husbandry is practiced on land designated for ‘agricultural use’ (zemlia sel’skokhoziaistennogo naznacheniia) it is in the administrative prerogatives of Municipal Formation (MO)21 Village Settlement Lovozero (in the case of Lovozero Raion). Since in property terms this is state land, it is leased out to the reindeer cooperatives for a minimal fee and in perpetuity of rental-rights. In the final account, the cooperatives (as rent-holders) are responsible for what happens on that land. It is for this reason that no activity external to ‘agricultural land use’ can be carried out on such territory without the consent of the given cooperative. When it comes to land belonging to the Forestry Fund the situation is different. This is state land again, but another state office is managing it. At the local level, this is the Forestry Office of Lovozero Raion (Lesnichestvo Lovozerskogo raiona). According to the latest administrative re-structuring, all Raion Forestries figure as branches (filiali) of a new Central Office in Murmansk (Lesnichestva, 2020). The Forestry is thus a different bureaucracy. For Lovozero Raion, this is the Lovozero Raion Forestry filial in Revda. Above that stands the new Regional Centre for Forest and Ecological Control in Murmansk, and, ultimately, the Department for Forestry Management at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Fish Management of Murmansk Region. Against such a background, it is a common case for a winter grazing range to be in land which is under the administrative control of the Forestry Fund. When, at the same time, there are Hunting Lots (okhotnichie uchastki) on that land, or attractive salmon fishing rivers, it is the Regional Ministry of Natural Resources which is the ultimate arbiter through its Department of Forestry Management (for salmon fishing), or MO—Munitsipal’noe Obrazovanie (Municipal Formation).
21
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Hunting Control (for hunting). It should also be added that recently the Department has been given additional administrative mandate for control of hunting. According to an announcement in LP of 19.03.2021, any form of hunting has been banned from Forestry Fund land until further notice (Izmenilis’, 2021). There is a great multitude of other categories of territorial land-use: land for urban settlements, land for village settlements, zones with ‘special conditions for the use of the territory’; border zones; zones with controlled regime for visiting of foreign citizens; zones of cultural heritage, etc. The full and very extensive list of categories and sub-categories of land-use can be downloaded from the Official Site of Lovozero Raion Administration (Skhema, 2021). In the final account, it should be said that in the majority of cases reindeer husbandry uses this or that category of land (including border-troops zones) in a manner of a traditionally tolerated liberal regime. Or as the herders jokingly put it: ‘my zdes’ na ptich’ikh pravakh’ (‘we are on birds’ rights here’). Despite the sober self- irony of the joke, traditional toleration in respect of herders creates a false sense of being the ‘hosts’ of this land. Or, as in the imagination of some researchers, that the land is part of a ‘reindeer husbandry district’. As it has been shown in the case discussed above, the real ‘hosts’ are sadly very different. Should they have an interest in a given zone, they can claim their administrative controlling rights over it, or, equally well, change the category itself, so it falls within the scope of such rights. The Ministry of Natural Resources and its Forestry Department have the administrative mandate of managing the renewable resources of roughly half of Lovozero Raion, as well as its neighbouring Raion to the south: Terskii Raion. Tensions in these ‘rural’ (in the sense of non-urban and non-industrial) and roadless parts of Murmansk Region have so far concerned anadromous fish resources (salmon, trout), and hunting resources (wild reindeer, bear, moose). The Munozero fatal event illustrates the very high importance attached to the exploitation of anadromous fish species. As it has been explained above, the form through which this is being done is by organizing exclusive salmon angling lodges, or ‘camps’ (lageria). As it has been noted above, a week in them may cost a client from USD 5000 to 10,000, relative to season. This, in other words, is a business exclusively targeting a high-price range clientele from abroad, and a wealthy/elitist one from home. It is sad to realize that within the currently prevailing political culture in Russia, it takes a fatal accident of the calibre of the Munozero crash to
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get a graphic idea of how such a resource is managed. Should the accident have been avoided, it is more than probable that the general public would have never heard about the weekend trip to Piatka. After all, no press release or another announcement preceded the accident. All news for general consumption began coming in only on the morning after. The second conclusion to be made at this stage is the substantial role the Ministry of Natural Resources plays in cases like this, played out as it was way above the peripheral threshold level. From all appearances, the presence of the regional Vice-Governor, of the Vice-Minister, and of the Okrug’s Forestry Head, spoke of the need to have a strong and secure administrative backing for realizing an attractive business program. At this level of operations and in view of the targeted locations, any engagement with local authorities or communities was clearly found to be irrelevant. When such operations occurred below the peripherality threshold, however, at a level to be called the ‘middle-range oligarchate’, the local administrative and community involvement would be conspicuously displayed. As it will be shown in the following two cases, that would give local communities a sense of still being, in some way, ‘hosts of the tundra’. The more general feeling promoted would be of somehow still living in Soviet times when, as nostalgic reminiscences would have it, ‘power would care for the people’. When exclusive tourism interests are taken one level down, to that of what can be called ‘middle range tourist interests’, the tug of war between ‘middle range’ outsiders, on the one hand, and Kola tundra-connected communities, on the other, acquires such Soviet-like (‘meta-Soviet’) features. Two marked differences with the previous categories become apparent. One is that unlike the case of alleged military poaching, or of exclusive angling for wealthy customers, at the level of middle-range interests debates may become open to the public. Here we are in the zone of the ‘touchable’, continuing all the way down. On the one hand, and ‘unsayably’, this is the zone below the threshold of peripherality, in which upper power does not have direct interests. Instead, it can afford to appear as a ‘people-concerned’ supreme agency. The second difference derives from the first. Under the threshold of peripherality, disputes end, as a rule, in favour of the local communities. The situation is therefore eloquent about the overall architecture of the power pyramid and the place the local tundra-connected communities occupy in it. The smaller herding-connected segment is its most fore- fronted part in such conflicts, with indigenous Sami ‘traditionalism’ in
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land-use serving as a defining argument. All in all, it can be said that it is in such ‘middle range outsiders vs. locals’ conflicts that we can see the outer boundaries of peripherality. Said otherwise, on the level of ‘middle range’ interests, the pinnacle of power is prone to favour the interests of the ‘people’, as well as the meta-Soviet socio-economic system (of sovkhoism) they oppose to the ‘new capitalism’ in Russia. Which is equal to saying that on this level, supreme arbitration is prone to support sovkhoism, as a concrete realization of a meta-Soviet reality. That may be seen as a political concession for the sake of gaining popular support. In terms of ideological content and its attendant ethic and aesthetic, the situation at this level is one of creating a feeling that the Soviet Union still lives. In what follows, I firstly illustrate this reading of the current power architecture by a detailed presentation of a recent conflict which, for working purposes, will be dubbed ‘the BEZRK (Hunting Venture) Affair’. Secondly, I turn to the larger dispute: the one of ‘the wild reindeer controversy’ within the framework of which the BEZRK Affair marked the point of culmination and final resolution. At an auction of 16 January 2019, a City of Belgorod company, called ‘Okhotnichyi Klub BEZRK’ (‘Hunting Club BEZRK’),22 was given renting rights for 30 years for carrying out hunting tourist activities in the Kola tundra. The exact location was in the southern part of Lovozero Raion, on the right bank of the Ponoi, and by its tributary River Sovinaia. Officially, the location was known as Hunting Lot No 7 (Map 3.2): The rented-out territory comprised 72,000 ha not far from the Village of Krasnoshchel’ie and traditionally considered within the bounds of ‘custodianship’ of its inhabitants. Officially, however, the land in question belonged to the Raion Forestry Fund. This detail, in particular, would prove to have a critical influence on the debate about to emerge. Such a debate was initiated as soon as the results of the auction were publicly announced. An immediate angry reaction followed led by all administrative offices of Lovozero Raion. The indignation of the local community was brought to the attention of the regional as well as of the federal authorities. A letter was written to President Putin himself, asking for fair arbitration of what was presented as a violation of indigenous rights. After a year of such protests, in April 2020, the land-renting agreement between the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk 22 BEZRK stands for Belgorodskii eksperimental’nii zavod rybnykh kombikormov (Belgorod Experimental Plant for Fish-Concentrate Feeds).
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Map 3.2 The BEZRK Affair: Hunting Lot No 7. Source: Tkachev (2019a)
Region, on the one hand, and Non-Profit Partnership ‘Hunting Club BEZRK’, on the other, was terminated. The reason given was that hunting wild reindeer and other big game on the previously rented out territory was in breach with the ban on wild deer hunting as a species which had been entered, as of the beginning of 2020, in the Red Book of The Russian Federation,23 and the Red Book of Murmansk Region.24 Below I trace the course of this ‘touchable’ conflict in order to show how a dispute ultimately about exclusive rights to native land found available instruments for resolution. The one that proved effective for this particular case was wild reindeer preservation. Order (prikaz) of the Ministry of Natural Resources (Minpriroda) of 24.03.2020, No 162. Decree (postanovlenie) of the Government of Murmansk Region of 03.04.2020, No 172-PP. 23 24
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For appraising the realities of the situation, it is necessary to go some way beyond the final official texts and take a look at the main actors, representing local vs. outside interests. As noted above, the conflict between them was finally arbitrated in favour of the local community and particularly of the villagers of Krasnoshchel’ie. The principal actor behind BEZRK was the owner of an agricultural business of considerable magnitude, namely A.V. Orlov, officially Chair (predsedatel’) of Agricultural Holding Company ‘Belgrankorm’. The Company was specialized in domestic stock meat production, as well as in grain and concentrated feeds. The holding had 40 daughter structures in Belgorod and Novgorod Regions.25 This, in other words, was a company of considerable size, positioning its owner as an oligarch of the top crust in agriculture. From this angle, the non-profit partnership ‘Hunting Club BEZRK’ looked very much like a luxury side-line, catering for an exclusive circle around the owner when they could find time for a hunting outing in ‘nature’. I have strong reasons for making such an assertion. In 2015, after 50 years of service, the Hydrometeorological Station ‘Kolmiavr’ (GMS) in the grazing range of SKhPK ‘Tundra’, was decommissioned as obsolete and was abandoned. The Station was situated next door to the main base of Herding Team No 8 of the cooperative, by the bank of the big Kolmiavr Lake. The location commanded spring and early fall migrations of reindeer herds and was close to the main corral structure and base for ‘Tundra’s Right Wing. Lake Kolmiavr will make another appearance later on in this book, when a beginning mining/processing exploitation of lithium ore close by it will be discussed. Soon after the liquidation of the Station, its existing building and other structures were rented out to a middle range business person from Monchegorsk. It was soon revealed that this businessman, by the name of Sergei Smirnov, planned to turn the former station into a hunting and fishing luxury lodge. The news threw the herding community into amazement. It was incomprehensible how a fishing-hunting lodge of city persons can be established on a 30-year-long lease right into a focal herding area for SKhPK ‘Tundra’. What was more that the lease was endorsed by the cooperative leadership and its long-serving chair (‘director’), V.A. Startsev. I stress here the fact that the endorsing of this hunting lodge at Lake Kolmiavr was very similar, insofar that herding community See https://jasnzori.ru/company/.
25
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interests were concerned, with that of the Hunting Lot No 7 case, and Orlov’s BEZRK Club activities there. Unlike that latter case however, there was no public response to what, from a herding viewpoint, was a scandalous and incomprehensible deal with wealthy outsiders. In total disregard for such feelings, the new owner moved in and the Station underwent total reconstruction and ‘modernization’ (‘evroremont’), complete with a caretaker and a chamber-maid/ cook. It became known that all of that had been done with the substantial help of Belgorod oligarch Orlov himself, who turned out to be a close friend of the new owner Smirnov from former days of Komsomol youth in Monchegorsk. In the course of time, Orlov came on a visit to the newly acquired premises in his own helicopter. Other fishing and bear hunting outings followed. Such visits became a frequent part of the formerly reindeer husbandry and fishing scene, which herders had for long experienced as a place of their exclusive rights. I myself happened to be an immediate witness of these new developments. My own camp stood at a distance of three kilometres from the Brigade Base and the neighbouring former meteorological station. The news that came from the Base was that the Head of the Hunting Inspectorate in Murmansk (Okhotinspektsiia) was hunting himself with the wealthy outsiders. The herders would mutter that ‘the poachers (i.e., the new owners) were headed by the chief hunting inspector’ (breki oruduiut s glavarem iz inspektsii). This vignette illustrates the unproblematic moving in of ‘New Russians’ (novye russkie) into formerly exclusively reindeer husbandry territory. As said above, it was in complete contrast with the outcry raised when an identical scenario was about to be realized in the grazing range of ‘Olenevod’, headed and financed by the patron-oligarch from Belgrankorm, the very same Orlov. Why the BEZRK affair had ended (at least for the moment) in a fiasco when Smirnov’s lodge stays to this day is therefore a question deserving to be asked. A critical detail that is the likely answer to this question is that ‘Olenevod’ (as different from ‘Tundra’) is headed, and in fact owned, by another oligarch of regional scale: the already mentioned Andrei Reizvikh. In Lovozero Raion previous history, Reizvikh had featured as part of the Komsomol and CPSU young elite. This is a direction that takes us to a well discussed phenomenon in the concerned literature: the transformation of Komsomol leaders into prominent members of the post-Soviet oligarchate (Konstantinov, 2015:134; Dubin, 2011).
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The public face of the ensued confrontation between the two oligarchs of middle-range scale evolved on the plane of indigenous and environmental values. The local side placed a stress on the first, while the ‘outsiders’ chose the second, with a main emphasis on protection of wild reindeer and moose. The local side was spear-headed by the Village Settlement of Lovozero Administrative Office, with the backing of the Lovozero Raion Administration. In a parallel manner, this side was led by Reizvikh in his official capacity as Chair of the Managing Board of SKhPK ‘Olenevod’. The ‘locals’ had also the support of a lobby at the Regional Duma, led by Aleksandr Shestak—a former Head of Lovozero Raion and current Regional Duma member. The ‘outsiders’ were represented in local debates by the Manager of Non-Profit Partnership ‘Hunting Club BEZRK’ A. I. Dadykin, and the legal advisor of the Club V.V. Soloshenko. As it transpired in the course of the confrontation (February 2019–May 2020), the ‘outsiders’ had a strong lobby in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region, and its more specialized departments. An emphasis among the latter is to be placed on the Hunting Inspectorate (Okhotinspektsiya; Okhotnadzor). A closer look into the respective lines of defence of the opponents portrays the ideological platforms which each one of the two sides deemed fit and appropriate for a public debate. The official position of the ‘locals’ drew its argumentation and legitimization from a store of presumably uncontestable moral values. Namely, that local interests were intrinsically morally right as they stemmed from a traditional union with the environment and its non-human creatures, as well as a hereditary concern for their preservation. On this footing, outsiders’ hunting interests were attacked as infringing upon indigenous rights, these latter being in hereditary union with nature. Outside contesters of various ilk (hunting authorities, forestry authorities, tourism, industrial interests, etc.) tended also to exploit the care for the environment line in their defence. Their argumentation was built on accusations of local tundra-connected communities of either not being environmentally concerned (contrary to their own claims) or, in fact, of being guilty of predation themselves. In the specific case of reindeer husbandry, outsiders’ arguments made use of hyper-extensivity (‘the herders are not in contact with their herds’), or of ‘internal poaching’26 (‘the For the phenomenon and term in Konstantinov (2015:309).
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herders themselves predate on cooperative or wild reindeer herds, as well as on other game’). The two positions will be presented below in the words of their spokespersons. The systemic character of the fault lines such presentations depict will be discussed further down in relation to two other sets of contesters: (i) hunting/ forestry authorities as regards the ‘wild reindeer debate’, and (ii) projects for industrial exploitation of non-renewables in parts of the grazing range. At the very beginning of the BEZRK debate, the local position was formulated by the Lovozero Department of Social Movement ‘Iz’vatas’ (Lovozerskoe otdelenie obshchestvennogo dvizheniia ‘Iz’vatas’). OOD ‘Iz’vatas’, as the name shows, is an NGO representation of the Izhma Komi of Lovozero Raion. Their taking a strong official stand was understandable in view of the fact that the land rented out to BEZRK has been traditionally used as part of the grazing range of ‘Olenevod’ and thus was of immediate concern to the predominantly Komi population of the Village of Krasnoshchel’ie. A legal detail which ‘Izvatas’ chose to overlook was that, in strictly legal terms, the contested land was part of the Raion Forestry Fund territory and thus not legally belonging to the grazing range of reindeer husbandry entities: it was not on land designated for ‘agricultural use’. This is an important detail which was being repeatedly used by the opposing side to strengthen the BEZRK position. To it I turn further down. For the moment it needs to be said that a weakness of local communities’ argumentation was that it tended to draw from moral legitimation ‘beyond the legal’. In other words, whatever current legislation prescribed should be disregarded in the name of a higher legal code as it were: of one based on uncontestable rights of indigenous communities, traditional forms of land use, and numerically small peoples’ inalienable union with the environment.27 As we shall see further down, this type of argumentation—‘morality vs. legislation’—was open to disregard and even attack from regional authorities, should outsiders’ influence gain a lobby-base with them. The Iz’vatas position was presented in a letter (adres) sent to members of the Federal Duma, as well as to that of Murmansk Region. The letter stated:
27 It is interesting to note in this connection that foreign watchers go one step further, namely that ‘the Sami people consider the land legally theirs’ (e.g., Pettersen, 2014).
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As a result of the signed agreement with NP ‘BEZRK’,28 irreparable damage will be inflicted on the indigenous population in the places of their traditional residence and land-use, to nature, and to the animal world. By allowing invasion into the native land of numerically small peoples29 by virtue of taking such decisions, state authorities represented by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region would literally destroy the home of the indigenous population, as the concept of ‘home’ for such peoples includes lakes, rivers, and forest. (…) The Izhma Komi have managed to develop their traditional form of land-use – reindeer husbandry— and to preserve all its best features, as well as carrying over this form of land use to the following generations. For this reason, the indigenous population are fighting for a caring attitude to nature, and the defense of their legal rights. (Nadezhdina, 2019b)
The letter was published on 1 February 2019. On 16 February, the case was taken to the Duma of Murmansk Region. In the course of the ensuing discussion, the position of the regional executives appeared to be in favour of BEZRK. They stated that ‘the auction was legal as the land (rented out to BEZRK) had not been previously rented out to the enterprise (SKhPK ‘Olenevod’) and, thus, ‘Olenevod’ had no legal right to it’ (Shebut, 2019). Raion authorities (represented by the Head of Village Settlement Lovozero, Galina Shebut) countered by stating that, in point of fact, ‘Olenevod’ had been applying for the right to acquire holding rights to the contested territory since 2015–2016, but their claim had been rejected. The land remained under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Fund (Lesnoi fond) and thus could not be classified as one of ‘agricultural use’ (i.e., as part of grazing range), to be used by ‘Olenevod’. By this time, meetings discussing the conflict were held practically every week. At a meeting of 15 March, convened in Lovozero with members of the Union of Veterans (Soiuz veteranov), a candid appraisal of the situation was given by the former Head of Lovozero Raion and currently Deputy in the Regional Duma, Aleksandr Shestak:
28 The agreement for renting out land on a 30 years. lease was signed by BEZRK, on the one hand, and the Ministry of the Environment of Murmansk Region, on the other, following the result of an auction held on 16 January, 2019. A detail there was that BEZRK was the sole bidder in this auction. 29 By current legislation, the Izhma Komi and ‘Komified’ Nenets people of Murmansk Region are designated as ‘numerically small people’, while the Sami are designated as ‘indigenous numerically small people’.
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All of this is a pretty tale (krasivaia istoriia) with a previous history and actors known to belong to topmost power circles. Only God knows how it is going to end. Deputies in the Regional Duma suggest that the Raion Administration should initiate a procedure for changing the status of the land belonging to the Forestry Fund.30 (Kuznetsova, 2019)
The phrase ‘previous history’ was telling. It seemed to refer to the acquiring of the former Hydrometeorological Station (GMS) ‘Kolmiavr’, by Orlov’s right-hand man in the Kola tundra Smirnov—a matter discussed earlier on. As Shestak explained in understandably veiled terms, actors in ‘topmost power circles’ had decided the matter in Smirnov- Orlov’s favour at the time. Both the Raion Administration and the leadership of SKhPK ‘Tundra’ had accepted what amounted to radical intrusion into ‘Tundra’ territory without a murmur. An important detail here was that unlike the land rented out to BEZRK, the one on which the former GMS ‘Kolmiavr’ stood was plumb in the grazing range of ‘Tundra’, legally designated as land for agricultural use. In moral as well as in legal terms, the ‘Kolmiavr’ case was thus far more outrageous than that of Lot No 7 by River Sovinaia, rented out to BEZRK. Shestak should have known best of all these details as he had been elected Head of the Raion shortly after the conclusion of the GMS ‘Kolmiavr’ deal. Describing further how matters stood by March 2019 regarding the BEZRK affair, Shestak continues: The Regional Governor (still Marina Kovtun in March) and the Regional Government are against the deal. Entering Northern reindeer in the Red Book is what is on the agenda. The final decision will be given in court, but our hopes hang on the Red Book (my emphasis). (ibid.) This is a highly eloquent passage, describing how the cards were laid. It pointed to one possible way in which such matters could be finally arbitrated in favour of the locals. In other words, where the ‘moral stand’, appealing to indigenous traditional values, did not hold enough water, that could be repaired by appealing to environmental ones—hence the ‘Red Book’ argument. The latter had the advantage over the former in that it had both moral and strictly legal weight. Against this background and configuration of forces, the question now appeared in the following way: what counteracting forces in ‘topmost 30 I.e., change the status from that of ‘land belonging to the Forestry Fund’ to one ‘for agricultural use’.
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power circles’ could Orlov mobilize to strengthen his position with the Government of Murmansk Region and Governor Kovtun herself? Being in the know, Shestak was fully aware of the power an oligarch like Orlov could wield and hence his candid admittance: ‘Our hope hangs on the Red Book’. By ‘our’ he meant that of the pro-Raion and specifically pro- Krasnoshchel’ie lobby in the Regional Duma he could mobilize. Lest the reader form the wrong impression that the ecological (‘Red Book’) stratagem, however critical, was the only one which decided matters, the next round of the conflict deserves the closest scrutiny. On 21 March 2019, the Governor of Murmansk Region Marina Kovtun finally resigned from her post. A long series of scandals had marked her rule, mainly connected with her ostensibly opulent life-style financed by regional funds as well as rumours of shady dealings with local mafia circles (Skandaly, 2019). What is of immediate relevance for the matter discussed here is her part in a long-drawn controversy between the Regional Hunting Control authorities (Okhotinspektsiia; Okhotnadzor), and the reindeer husbandry cooperatives of Lovozero Raion. The conflict concerned wild reindeer hunting. In the words of Kommersant.ru: (In 2016) the Governor stipulated quotas for the hunting of wild reindeer— a species entered in the Red Book of Murmansk Region. After the scandal that arose, Regional authorities explained that the ban on wild reindeer hunting had envisaged only the western population of the species, while hunting licenses had been given only for those of the eastern part (i.e., in Lovozero and Terskii Raions—my gloss). In the final account, 87 licenses had been sold, but the names of those who bought them were not disclosed. (Skandaly, 2019)
What can be dubbed the ‘wild reindeer controversy’, of which the aforementioned is only a small part, has been a lengthy process. Its Lovozero Raion history, it goes back at least to 2009 when the first wild reindeer/ moose ban in the Raion was introduced. The recent history of such bans, as well as permanent ‘Red Book’ entries of the species are summarized in Table 3.1. This table should be read with the following details in mind. What is meant by ‘western part’ is the territory of the Region falling west of the railway line/highway to St. Petersburg/Moscow. The wild reindeer population of this territory is under some form of control only in the Lapland Reserve (Laplandskii Zapovednik) (Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, 1977:16ff,
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Table 3.1 Bans and Red Book entries of wild reindeer and moose in Murmansk Region
1st Ban (wild reindeer and moose) 2nd Ban (wild reindeer and moose) Red Book entry (wild reindeer) 3rd Ban (wild reindeer and moose) Red Book entry (wild reindeer)
Western part
Lovozero Raion
Source
Existing
2010–2013
Postanovlenie-106 (2010); Cf. Otstrel (2009); Andreeva (2010)
Existing
June 2013– June 2016
Postanovlenie-350 (2013)
2014
-
Cf. Zapadnuiu (2013)
Existing
May 2017– December 2019 March 2020
Cf. Nikolaev (2017) and Tkachev (2017)
Existing
Prikaz-162 (2020); 477 (2020), Postanovlenie-172 (2020), and Cf. Zadornaia (2020)
1985; Syroechkovskii, 1986:14–16; Dikii, 2014; Dikogo, 2014). Thus, the wild deer counts in this part, ranging between 800 and 1000 head, refer to those in the Reserve. Concerning the wild reindeer scandal in which M. Kovtun was implicated, of relevance is the fact that since 2014 the ‘western part’ had been entered as a ‘Red Book’ zone for the species. That did not apply to Lovozero and Terskii Raions where the majority of the wild reindeer population resided. The latter was variously cited to range between 3300 and 4500 head out of an alleged total for the Region of 6500 (2016). However, as a regional journalist covering the ‘wild reindeer’ controversy noted in 2009: How many the rest (of wild reindeer) there are (minus those in the Lapland Reserve—my gloss) no one has any idea of (skol’ko drugikh dikikh—ob etom nikto tolkom ne znaet). (Karelin, 2009)
As explained in Kommersant.ru (Skandaly, 2019), quoted earlier on, M. Kovtun had pointed out in her defence that the ‘Red Book’ entry had applied only to the ‘western part’ and thus the Lovozero Raion wild deer were fair game for hunting. As it can be deduced from Table 3.1, the wild reindeer hunting licences for the Raion had been given immediately upon
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the expiring of the second ban in June 2016 and just before the beginning of the hunting season on 1 October in the same year. Strictly speaking, the Governor’s act was within the regulatory limits, but its so fine tuning raised great local indignation. The latter was led by the then Raion Head A. Shestak himself (Olenevody, 2016). In result, a new ban was introduced in May 2017. With two subsequent extensions, it lasted until the final ‘Red Book’ solution of March 2020. As it will be shown below when discussing the case of the BEZRK Hunting Club, the latter’s move to bid at the very end of 2019 was seen by Lovozero Raion authorities as a clear sign of intentions to open up activities in the wake of the expected lifting of the ban at the end of that year. Thus, both as regarded Kovtun’s approval of licensing, as well as BEZRK’s bid planning, the only way locals saw for blocking intrusions into ‘their’ land on the part of outsiders backed by the regional administrators was through hunting bans and, ultimately, ‘Red Book’ solutions. The language in which all that was said was, predictably, often veiled. To give an example. When Kommersant.ru (Skandaly, 2019) say: ‘In the final account, 87 licenses had been sold, but the names of those who bought them were not disclosed (emphasis mine)’, as cited earlier on, the shadows of powerful outsiders with enough clout to be backed by the Governor herself would loom large for any local reader. Insofar that reindeer husbandry is concerned, the wild reindeer issue has always been critical not so much because of considerations for the preservation of the sub-species, but for fears of ever greater invasion of wealthy outsiders into the Raion tundra, traditionally experienced as ‘own’ territory. Since big game hunting (of wild reindeer, moose, and bear) was a principal motive for such a feared invasion, wild reindeer hunting, in particular, needed to be presented as a threat for reindeer husbandry, that latter, in its turn, being the fundamental reason for a presumed ‘ownership’ of the tundra. The threat for reindeer husbandry was represented through the sensitive issue of poaching. The ‘invading’ outsiders were portrayed as poachers who under the pretense of hunting wild reindeer were in fact poaching on the semi-domesticated herds. What exposed the outsiders as poachers hinged on external constitutional differences between semi-domesticated and wild reindeer. According to that logic, since differences were so easily noticeable (according to the locals), killing semi-domesticated reindeer on the pretense of mistaking them for wild, revealed the essentially predatory intentions of outsiders.
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Within the framework of this logic, the reindeer husbandry community had a clear interest in asking for a permanent ban on wild reindeer hunting as endangered sub-species, protected by the Red Book of Murmansk Region. Ostensibly, it would thus help protect the semi-domesticated herds. On the level of the ‘unsayable’, the community would thus defend what was considered by them to be an intrinsic right of deciding themselves what to take or not to take from both sub-species’ populations. This followed from an allegedly received status of being ‘owners’ or ‘hosts’ of the tundra. On the plane of the ‘sayable’, a ‘predatory’ image of the outsiders was being consistently promoted. The attack would be amplified in its more radical forms, by introducing ‘class’ motives in a region and for a population still deeply immersed in Soviet egalitarian values. The following excerpt, concerning the BEZRK ‘invasive’ attempt, clearly illustrates such overtones: The Head (of the Raion) was supported by the Chair of SKhPK ‘Olenevod’ Andrei Reizvikh. It was already clear that the officials from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region were openly lobbying for the interests of hunters. That was coming from a Ministry whose duty was to protect our nature, (but instead) were using their influence in favour of wealthy persons (bogateev), rushing into Lovozero Raion to be shooting around (postreliat). (Tkachev, 2016)
Despite the opposition from the ‘regionals’, a third three years ban on wild reindeer and moose hunting in the ‘eastern part’ was passed in May 2017 (Table 3.1). A telling detail of the situation around this new development was that it was endorsed by M. Kovtun’s closest associate and Vice-Governor, Aleksei Tiukavin. It would be from this quarter that former Lovozero Raion Head A. Shestak may have formed the impression quoted earlier on. Namely, that in spite of general opposition, the ‘regionals’ would finally favour the local side. The future, however, would prove such a conclusion erroneous as regarded M. Kovtun’s Governorship. This came out to be painfully clear in 2019 and at the height of the conflict with BEZRK. The local suspicion that the regional administration were lobbying for the interests of ‘wealthy persons, rushing into the Raion to shoot around’, was confirmed. The event took place in Lovozero on 27 February 2019. It is significant that a lengthy reportage about it was published in the Raion weekly only almost a full month afterwards—on 22 March. That was a day after
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M. Kovtun had resigned from office. By that time, it was clear that the Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region, D.A. Ruusalep, together with his Deputy, V.V. Yokubauskas, who represented Kovtun’s administration at the Lovozero meeting, were already figures from the past. Still a month ahead of these reshuffles, the debate with all sides present was held in Lovozero. The Raion Administration was represented by the then Raion Head Nikolai Kurzen’iev, together with the Head of Village Settlement Lovozero Galina Shebut. The Belgorodians came with the Director of NP ‘BEZRK’ A.I. Dadykin and the Deputy-Director on Legal Matters of Belgrankorm Holding, V.V. Soloshenko. A main item on the agenda was for regional and Raion authorities to acquaint themselves with the BEZRK side in person, and hear their views regarding the controversy. In the course of the meeting, Minister Ruusalep made clear the position of the regional government as regarded the BEZRK case.31 Here I focus on what I consider as the most essential. The main argument in Minister Ruusalep’s position concerned the basic ideological tension in the controversy, as well as that of similar controversies which to a greater or lesser extent had become open to the public. This last caveat excludes controversies which have not been open to the public—like those concerning the military, as well as high-orbit salmon fishing/hunting ventures. When it comes to middle-range interests, the ideological tension which has been pointed out earlier on, I define as one of opposing indigenous/traditional/’green’ values to legal ones. In the words of Minister Ruusalep, this particular tension was presented in the following way: Herding reindeer on grounds belonging to the Forestry Fund constitutes, in point of fact, breaking the law (narushenie zakonodatel’stva)32. Whether (such herding) is a matter of historical developments or (the formation) of traditional territories—that is one thing. But we are living in a world of today and in accordance with the legislation of our country. (Tkachev, 2019a:5)
For the full text see Tkachev (2019a). On this point in another regional context (Yamal), see: Zuev (2020).
31 32
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The statement made it clear that for the Minister historical/traditional arguments were to be set aside and the case put on a contemporary legal footing, consistent with current RF legislation. That the herding community should stand as the rightful ‘hosts of the tundra’ was, in other words, an appeal with no legal foundation. Not only that, but also it was not defensible even in its own terms. By now (and classically for such debates) what delegitimized the moral claim was that the herding community themselves were open to accusations of illegal taking (‘poaching’) on domestic as well as on wild herds. That accusation led the Minister and his Deputy Yokubauskas to explain the legal basis on which BEZRK’s position in the debate was formed. Namely, that the Club would, in effect, police the territory and thus help to eradicate ‘poaching’ on either domestic or wild reindeer, as well as on other big mammals (mainly moose). It was thus next to openly said that the real poachers were the herders themselves and that BEZRK would act to curb such activities and rectify the situation. The legal basis of that was explained by Deputy Minister Yokubauskas: There is a (legal) concept of production and hunting inspectors (proizvodstvenno-okhotnich’i inspektory)33 (…). This is the same as state inspectors (i.e., game keepers—my gloss), only they are production and hunting ones. (ibid.)
The deputy further explained that these inspectors would be game- keepers, employed by BEZRK and they best be local people. In this way, BEZRK would improve the protection of the territory. At the same time, there would be no obstacle to ‘Olenevod’s’ grazing their herds on the territory of Hunting Lot No 7, in case they so wished. It was only that policing the territory would now be realized by BEZRK. That, in essence, was the line the BEZRK representatives at the meeting had been taking all along: that far from being ‘poachers’, as the local community accused them, they would, in fact, protect the grazing range from local human predation. A further detail was added in the same breath: BEZRK would also be the entity which issued hunting licences. Thus, it became evident that as regarded the territory leased, BEZRK 33 Cf. Federal Law ‘On hunting and preservation of hunting resources and on introducing changes in separate legislative acts of the Russian Federation of 24.07.2009 N 209-FZ (latest redaction). http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_89923/ (Accessed 25.01.23).
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would acquire full control and perform functions which elsewhere were in the hands of state organs: the Hunting Inspectorate (Okhotinspektsiia), and the local offices of the Ministry of the Interior (ROVD). It was also evident that the regional government, represented by the Minister and his Deputy fully endorsed this devolution of state functions, relegating them to a private business entity. On the bigger canvas, the devolution of state power into private (oligarchic) hands was analogous with the creation of private armies like Prigozhin’s ‘Wagner’ Group. Understandably, the local community could not be satisfied with such a turn of events. That was intolerable on a level on which they felt their voice carried weight by virtue of direct access to lobbying with Raion and regional administrations. That political instrument, as stated earlier on, could be defined as being in communal hands at the middle range level of the oligarchate, or, said in other words, at the upper limits of peripherality. A further reason for such confidence came for immediately tactical reasons: the supporting BEZRK Minister and his Deputy, by virtue of being hitched to the outgoing train of Marina Kovtun, were on their way to irrelevance in arbitrating such matters. Such a position was voiced in the very next bulletin of how the BEZRK Affair was developing. In the following issue of the Lovozero Administration mouthpiece Lovozerskaia Pravda, a short communication appeared under the title ‘The Minister’s arguments were unconvincing’. The reporting journalist summed up the 27 February meeting in the following way: The arguments (of the BEZRK representatives) that they would help to make reindeer husbandry safer, and that the presence of a hunting enterprise in the Raion’s territory would be of benefit to herding, looked unconvincing. The citizens of Lovozero Raion who were present at the meeting voiced their non-acceptance of the results of the auction (of 16 January) yet again. They insisted that the following items be included in the resolution of the meeting: • for the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region to initiate the introducing of changes in the Forestry Codex of RF; • to exclude Lovozero Raion from the chart (skhema) of hunting lots (okhotuchastki) of Murmansk Region, and, in the future, not allow the leasing of Raion’s grounds for the setting up of hunting enterprises. (Zadornaia, 2019)
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Introducing changes in the Forestry Codex, mentioned in the above passage, is to be understood as changing the status of territories currently belonging to the Forestry Fund and designating them instead as land for ‘agricultural use’, that is, for reindeer husbandry. In sum, and in simpler terms, what the local community wanted (but could not say) was that their status as ‘hosts of the tundra’ be legalized. By inference from that, it followed that whether they engaged in ‘poaching’ or not was a matter to be managed by themselves, and not by outsiders. State organs had the legal right to do that, of course, but as their presence in the tundra was only occasional and largely token, the current state of affairs—that is, the ‘pre- BEZRK’ one—placed such matters exclusively in the competence of the community themselves. This is the real but ‘unsayable’ community narrative.34 All the others: indigenous, traditional, green, and Red Book narratives are to be considered from a politically tactical viewpoint as ‘sayable’ cover versions. Chibis, Andrei Vladimirovich, was appointed Temporary-Acting Governor of Murmansk Region on 21 March 2019, that is, on the very day Marina Kovtun handed in her resignation to President Putin. Chibis was appointed as fully acting governor six months afterwards—on 27 September. (Cf. Gubernator, 2021) During the transitional period between March and September, Chibis visited Lovozero Raion a number of times, but his main attention was on the problematic state of the mining town of Revda and the ailing mining- processing complex there. The problems of Lovozero or of the remote villages and other tundra-related issues, including the BEZRK affair, were thus secondary on his agenda. Consequently, the transitional period caused a lull in BEZRK discussions, which, as we have seen, were markedly frequent during the first four months of the year. A total of eight public meetings were conducted in the period 1 February–12 April. What number of telephone and other communications, as well as formal and informal visits to Murmansk (and Moscow), had been carried out during that time one can only guess. It can be surmised that in anticipation of the imminent transition to a new Regional Governorship, pro- and contra- BEZRK lobbyism had reached a pitch in the final months of Kovtun’s term as the regional governor. After her resignation and the lull that followed, the BEZRK matter was publicly brought to Chibis’s attention only during his second visit to On the ‘unsayable’ in local narratives see Konstantinov and Istomin (2020a, 2020b).
34
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Revda, on 26 July. This was nearly four months after the last public discussion. The pause is to be explained by the abundance of much larger issues during the period of transition. At the same time, the lull of BEZRK- related activities highlights the decisive role relegated to regional authorities when it comes to middle-range oligarchate interests. Or, in other words, that the upper limits of peripherality are marked by matters to be decided at the regional level when that would be politically possible. The degree of a looser or tighter form of coordination of such activities with the federal centre can be automatically surmised, but that remains as a side of the process not accessible to public scrutiny. The BEZRK matter was brought to the attention of the still Temporary- Acting Governor by former Head of Lovozero Raion (1996–2004), Nikolai Brylev. That was amidst a host of other items on a crowded agenda, mainly concerned with Revda residential and other infrastructural problems. Still, Brylev had sufficient time to re-iterate the Lovozero Raion position, as summed up in the Bulletin of 12 April, quoted above. Chibis’s response to that came out as a veiled recognition of community poaching as a fact to be reckoned with. At the same time, he did not go full way to the endorsing of BEZRK as one to be given policing power. In his words: What I have found out is that the situation there (in the leased hunting grounds—my gloss) is as follows: on the one hand there are two sovkhozes (sic), while on the other, this is a territory not controlled by anyone. (….) I asked the person in case to come (s.o. representing BEZRK, maybe Orlov himself—my gloss), he flew over and said ‘As you say! In case you are against it, police that land yourselves, but have in mind that the situation there is tricky (tam takaia vot situatsiia).’ (Tkachev, 2019b)
In the final account, Chibis deferred announcing his decision as regarded policing the grounds by BEZRK, while, by implication, it appeared that he was not likely to revoke the results of the 16 January auction. The dilemma for him, as he explained, was financial. Either the policing of the grounds was to be relegated to ‘those who were winners in the auction’, or ‘we need to take money out of other (Regional) funds and hire people to exercise control over the territory. The situation is not simple at all’ (ibid.) Chibis’ reducing the problem to financial difficulties the regional budget faced on many fronts had every appearance of shelving the BEZRK case for the moment. In the tug-of-war between the two main background
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protagonists and prominent representatives of what I call the middle oligarchate level—namely Orlov vs. Reizvikh—the new governor obviously preferred not to take an explicit stand. It is also very probable that he could not do that unless he had sanction from superordinate authorities, but since the matter hovered on the upper brink of peripherality, the coming of such sanction required time. Such a reading is suggested by his final words on the matter: I understand that the case (of BEZRK) arouses emotions (emphasis mine), but, on the whole, and as a strategy, I consider it proper that the situation as regards poaching be under control. (…) I have left the decision of this problem for now, so that all points be well considered, and how to find the best way to act. (ibid.)
The word emotions which I have stressed above is telling. What it says is practically the same as voiced earlier by Ruusalep. Namely, that appeals of the local community, resting on their perceived rights to be ‘hosts’ of what they see as their native land, were to be considered on an emotional level only, the really decisive factors being legal and financial. The only difference at this point is that Chibis’ way of presenting the issue was more diplomatic compared to Ruusalep’s more abrupt style, particularly with representatives of the Sami indigenous community (Soveshchanie, 2019). The tone was similar to the cavalier gliding over such issues, typical of the style of former Governor Kovtun. As already said, the background motives of Chibis’s deferral can be only guessed. One of the guesses could be that as someone new to the scene and the Region itself,35 and in a possible absence of any prompting from above at this stage, Chibis needed time for deciding whose side to take: that of the ‘native’ oligarch Reizvikh, or the ‘alien’ one Orlov. As we shall see below, the final decision came only many months later. That was announced on 29 May 2020 and was in favour of the herding community, represented by regional ‘middle range’ oligarch and manager/virtual owner of ‘Olenevod’—Andrei Reizvikh. Before that, two decisive developments, leading up to the final result, are to be mentioned. The decisive one was the entering of wild reindeer in 35 A.V. Chibis is a native of Chuvashia where he made his early career in Residential Construction, and as a member of the President’s Party Edinnaia Rossiia (Unified Russia) His previous post was as a Deputy-Minister of the Ministry of Residential Construction of the RF (See: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Чибис,-Андрей (Accessed 25.01.23).
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the Red Book of the Russian Federation in April 2020. It was followed by a decision circumscribing moose hunting quotas. Both developments represent what I have called above ‘sayable cover narratives.’ It is significant that a key part of the official face of the removal of BEZRK from the Lovozero Raion scene came from the environmental lobby in the Regional Duma. It thus overcame the resistance of the hunting one on the regional level, as well as its endorsing by the Federal Ministry. What can be called the ‘surface expressions’ of the underlying faultline, characterized by long-standing tensions, were decisions concerning the status of wild reindeer in Murmansk Region, as well as the manner in which moose-hunting quotas were to be defined. On 10 April 2020, the Lovozero Raion mouthpiece jubilantly announced the resolution of the wild deer controversy in its relevance to the Eastern part of the Peninsula. That principally concerned Lovozero Raion, and also parts of Terskii Raion. The material’s title was significant: ‘The yearnings of the herders have been realized: Wild reindeer are entered in the Red Book’ (Zadornaia, 2020). In essence, it announced that the European wild sub-species of Rangifer tarandus tarandus36 was entered in the Red Book of the Russian Federation. As the reporting journalist stressed, the Region had been waiting for such a decision for a very long time: The document was signed by the Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation, Dmitrii Kobylkin. (…) The last time the list (of banned species) was debated was in 1997 with a subsequent editing of the document in 2004. (ibid.) The resolution of the long-lasting struggle for the ‘preservation of wild reindeer’ strengthened the status of the herding community as ‘hosts of the tundra’. It was enthusiastically acclaimed both by the Sami community and the representatives of the reindeer herding organizations. This summing up of who the centre-stage protagonists of the ‘struggle for entering wild reindeer in the Red Book’ illuminated what the politically minded considered their most convincing cover symbolism. In this as well as in all other similar cases cover symbolism fore-fronted the politically weightier indigenous Sami card (compared to the quasi-indigenous Komi one), and,
36 On the western and eastern populations of Murmansk Region, and those of Karelian, Komi-Arkhangel’sk, and Viat-Kama populations: Decree of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation No 162 of 24 Mar., 2020.
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alongside with it, the one which went by the blanket designation of ‘herders’. What the reportage revealed further than the use of such tactical symbolism, was that by now it could be fully and publicly acknowledged that apart from the more abstract indigenous/ herding issues, there was a single and economically sufficiently powerful figure to represent ‘indigeneity/herding’ interests in conflicts with outsiders. That figure was the formerly much reviled middle-range regional oligarch and virtual owner of ‘Olenevod’ Andrei Reizvikh. Community criticism which had dubbed him a ‘baron’ and ‘slave-master’ in former controversies (Konstantinov et al., 2018) was now forgotten in the name of the struggle with the wealthy outsiders. All past quarrels being set aside, Reizvikh was now given the Lovozerakaia Pravda floor for a jubilant commentary on the wild reindeer victory. Again, for political considerations, Reizvikh was not presented as a regional oligarch, but only as ‘the leader (rukovoditel’) of the cooperative of numerically small people ‘Olenevod”. The fact that he was its de facto owner, as also of the White Sea cooperative ‘Belomorskii Rybak’, was conveniently not mentioned. Through his virtual ownership of both enterprises—one in reindeer husbandry, the other in White Sea fishing—Reizvikh commanded great sways of the Eastern Kola territories, save for those under the control of the military, on the one hand, and of the upper level oligarchate with interests in exclusive salmon angling camps, on the other. Reizvikh figured in the list of the six wealthiest persons in Murmansk Region, owning hotels and restaurants in Murmansk, as well as the hunting enterprise ‘Kola Hunting Grounds’ (Kol’skie ugod’ia), comprising 700,000 ha in Pechenga and Kola Raions. This is the figure which entered in the tug-of-war with Orlov, adopting the position of a representative of local indigenous/herding interests. Asked to comment he said: In Murmansk Region, this problem (of reducing the population of wild reindeer) has been especially critical. After the disintegration of the USSR and during the difficult nineties, due to the collapse of the system of control of natural resources, and the unleashed poaching on domesticated and wild reindeer, carried out also by the military garrisons of Murmansk Region (emphasis mine), the population of domestic reindeer fell from 76,000 in 1991 to 56,000 at present. Likewise, wild deer numbers fell from 5–7,000 to 1,000 head. At the same time, about our land in the East (emphasis mine), the personnel of the State Department of State Hunting Control
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(Otdel’ gosudarstvennogo okhotnichego nadzora), in its Section for Counting and Monitoring of Animal Species (Sektor po uchetu i monitoringu ob’ektov zhivotnogo mira), unreliable numbers were given for wild reindeer as being 3,800–7,000 head during the last years. (….) The fact that the Government are worried about the fate of wild reindeer in Russia, and that they entered the species in the Red Book gives us hope and confidence that the ban on licensed shooting of reindeer on the Kola Peninsula will never be revoked again—as it happened in 2017. That last move proved to amount to officially licensed poaching. Pretending to hunt wild reindeer, (hunters) were actually shooting down domesticated reindeer, belonging to the indigenous people of Murmansk Region. (ibid.)
Two moments in the speech of the Soviet time Komsomol leader of Lovozero Raion/present regional oligarch need to be elucidated. One concerns the clear description of a key faultline: the indigenous/herding vs. outsiders’ hunting one. The administrative supporter of the latter adversary was carefully defined by their precise nomenclature position, otherwise loosely referred to as Okhotinspektsiia. The second is a stone hurled at former Governor M. Kovtun by alluding to the fact that she had allowed wild reindeer hunting in Eastern Kola in 2017. As mentioned earlier on, that incident was one on the long list of scandals which brought her down in March 2019. Still another moment in Reizvikh’s speech concerned a technical issue which would gradually acquire political weight: Winter Track Counting (WTC). In his words: For counting the wild reindeer on the Left Side of the Murmansk-St. Peterburg railway line (i.e. the Eastern side of the Kola Peninsula—my gloss), the Hunting Control authorities employed the WTC method, which, as a rule, cannot be used for counting herd animals (stadnye zhivotnye) such as reindeer. All the more that the method was employed in places of domestic reindeer land-use in our Raion, which constitutes absolute and impermissible breach of regulations. (ibid.)
A detail to be added here is that in his Soviet past, Reizvikh used to be a vet-doctor in ‘Pamiati Lenina’ (present ‘Olenevod’) Sovkhoz Department in Sosnovka, and later in Lovozero’s ‘Tundra’, alongside his Komsomol leadership duties. So, he spoke with professional confidence. The role of WTC as a political tool in the hands of the hunting lobby, and specifically, of BEZRK, I discuss below.
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Winter-Track Counting (Zimnii marshrutnyi uchet) is an administratively established method of counting/ monitoring wild tundra and forest-tundra animal populations, by conducting traverses across the territories to be surveyed. The number of animals or animal tracks registered while traversing would be taken down and, on that basis, estimates about the current population size of the various species would be made (cf. Prikaz-1, 2012; Olen’ia, 2017). As it is obvious from this very short description, the method is mostly a hit-or-miss affair with a large margin for arbitrary evaluation. From 1 January to 29 February 2020, WTCs were carried out in ten Raions of Murmansk Region, targeting both hunting grounds for general access, as well as restricted hunting grounds of juridical persons. Or, in other words, both public and private grounds (such as the unrealized ones of BEZRK) were inspected. For the public type, the inspecting officers were state officials (of the Section for Monitoring), assisted by local hunters. For the restricted (‘private’) grounds, the inspecting officers were the users themselves—that is, the current lease-holders. All in all, 84 WTC traverses were made with a total length of nearly 900 km (Provedenie, 2017; Tkachev, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). The results of the WTC monitoring activities were announced on the site of the Ministry of Natural Resources, and public hearings were arranged in the relevant Raions. Their aim was to use the results from the WTCs for determining the number of hunting licenses to be issued. The greatest interest, as in all such cases, was in hunting licenses for big game: moose and bear. The public face of the whole procedure is one of regularity and democratic treatment, as well as concern for not exceeding limits which may endanger hunting resources. As in all such cases, however, not all is as it looks. In the particular case, the detail which erodes the official façade was not late to be found by the anti-outsiders’ hunting lobby. That detail was about who carried out the monitoring. Further than that, who it was to determine the number of permissible licenses (‘hunting quotas’), who was to issue them, and finally, who was to control their proper use. In the case of ‘restricted hunting grounds’ (zakreplennykh okhotnychykh ugodii), it was legally stipulated that all these functions were carried out by the lease-holders themselves. They were the ones to conduct WTCs, apply for quotas on the basis of the results, and, finally, issue and distribute the quotas. Naturally, there was a great likelihood that these would go to
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themselves or clients. The lease-holders were also to patrol the grounds, which would allow them to push out local competitors. The Lovozero Raion indigenous/herding lobby were quick to protest against such an obviously privileged position of outsiders—in the particular case, of BZRK. As lease-holders, they would be legally allowed to have full control of a chunk of a traditional reindeer husbandry territory (and ‘unsayably’, of ‘own’ hunting grounds) for a long period of time (30 years). In the words of the reporting journalist for Lovozerskaia Pravda of 17 April, 2020: Restricted hunting grounds in Lovozero Raion are only those, which had been leased out to NP Hunting Club ‘BEZRK’. Consequently, (the ‘BEZRK’ personnel) were those who counted the game, they would be the ones applying for quotas (on that basis), and they would be the ones to hunt moose. And this is how they counted (the game): for 2017 there were 1373 moose in Lovozero Raion, in 2018—1642, and in 2019—2674 head (a strange double growth of the moose population!). Quotas for hunting resources are determined as a percentage of the total number of head (in a game population). Maybe in this arithmetic we can see the roots of the unusual fertility of moose? (Tkachev 2020)
During the Soviet period, carrying out aerial counting (aviauchet) was a regularly used effective tool for correcting the errors of directly visual or winter track counting methods. That applied to semi-domesticated sovkhoz reindeer herds as well as to the wild reindeer ones (Semenov-Tian- Shanskii, 1977:31–43). In post-Soviet times and the financial turmoil of, particularly, the first post-Soviet decade, aerial counting was next to abandoned. The situation proved to be a lasting one, but for occasional and only partially-covering sorties. Such have been noted to have occurred in 2001, and then only in 2016 and 2017. The latter of these merits more attention regarding the present topic as it was carried out over parts of Lovozero Raion. A regrettably very imperfect newspaper material in Murmanskii vestnik gives a rare glimpse into the sortie. Despite the numerous factual errors and misunderstandings, there are still useful details to be found in it (Olen’ia, 2017). The main focus, as said above, was on Lovozero Raion. As explained in the material, tight financing did not allow for more than that, while, on the plain of substance, here was the eastern wild reindeer population. As already seen, this was a matter of fierce controversies between the reindeer
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husbandry cooperatives, on the one hand, and Minpriroda/ Okhotnadzor, on the other. From the point of view of that controversy, and the BEZRK Affair as part of it, the survey track chosen also made much sense. The Head of the monitoring team pointed out to the reporting journalist that the wild reindeer were to be found ‘along the River Ponoi’ (Fig. 3.7), mentioning also Peak Kamennik as a reserve winter grazing range of SKhPK ‘Tundra’. To anyone close to herding, both ‘Ponoi’ and ‘Kamennik’ are toponyms pregnant with meaning. The unsayable, but fundamental agenda of Krasnoshchel’ie herders had always been that there was no husbandry on the right bank of the Ponoi, and thus, it ‘traditionally’ served as informal hunting grounds for both wild reindeer and moose. As we shall see below, the ‘sayable’ and defensive version of retaining this freedom of resource use in one’s home place was that ‘no one ever touched those grounds as
Fig. 3.7 Aerial survey over Ponoi River (Photo: Lev Fedoseev; Source: Olen’ia (2017))
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they were considered “moose birthing place”’ (Nadezhdina, 2019a; Tkachev, 2019a). The toponym ‘Kamennik’ can be considered topical from the point of view of the same controversy. Of particular note is the fact that it was around it that a combined aerial cull of wild reindeer had been carried out in 2009–2010 in a joined chartered-helicopter sortie by ‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’. Minpriroda had a long memory for that particular scoop on the part of the two cooperatives. All in all, the survey of May 2017 pointed to a heightened and far from random interest of Minpriroda/ Okhotnadzor in the wild reindeer and moose habitations of Lovozero Raion. This was in view of the fact that it was exactly there that wealthy outsiders were looking eagerly forward to establishing themselves in a ‘custodian’ position. A public hearing of the WTC results and the quota-determining procedures which hung on them were announced to be held on 24 April 2020. For reasons not stated, but probably connected with the raging COVID epidemic by that time, no report about such a meeting taking place was ever published. Instead, the long hoped for announcement came a month later: that the agreement for leasing Hunting Lot No 7 to BEZRK had been revoked. The very phrasing of the subtitle of this material is highly illustrative of the principal lines of competing arguments on the local political stage. The ones that have been singled out so far are ‘locals vs. outsiders’, ‘indigenous/herding vs. hunting’, ‘green vs. predatory’, ‘poachers vs. protectors’, ‘traditional vs. legal’, and now ‘common people vs. elites’. Practically, all of them were either directly signalled or alluded to in the said sub-title: ‘Has VIP-hunting in the moose ‘maternity ward’ been revoked as the people demanded?’ Let it be said here that the ‘maternity ward’ (of moose) had been a prominent item on the ‘cover symbolism’ list, employed in the struggle against BEZRK from the very start. It stems from assertions of the Krasnoshchel’ie community that the hunting grounds rented out to BEZRK, were where moose calving took place. In the very first of the long series of BEZRK-related reports, the conflict itself was introduced in the following way: The organization (i.e., BEZRK) entered into agreement (with Regional authorities) for a 30 yr. lease of ground where historically ‘Olenevod’ has been carrying out reindeer husbandry activities. This is not only the winter
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grazing range of ‘Olenevod’, but also the ‘maternity ward’ (rodil’nyi dom) of the Ponoi moose population, a place which the herders do not enter save out of necessity. (Nadezhdina, 2019b)
A ‘maternity ward’ into which wealthy outsiders come to shoot around most certainly employs very powerful imagery. It would stay during the whole debate, lasting for a year and half, and finally come out again in the final victorious announcement. It is thus, that on the level of politically- relevant oppositions, ‘vulnerability of the defenseless’ as against the ‘murderous intentions of the powerful’ stood out as one of the strongest. Let it be also recalled here, that the counter-attack of the BEZRK side came (as typical of a multitude of similar debates) with the accusation of the herding community being, in fact, the murderous minded themselves. The BEZRK would be those who would save the defenceless deer and moose (by eradicating poaching in said grounds). In their words at the time (22 Mar., 2019): Our first task is to protect. As for what is going on there (in Hunting Lot No 7) we know full well: the place is a breeding ground for poachers. (Tkachev, 2019a)
And further: We also know full well that SKhPK ‘Olenevod’ has a camp (baza) by the River Sovinaia, 5 km. from the Ponoi. The purpose for which it is there we also know full well. ‘What is that purpose?’ (asks Head of Village Settlement Lovozero G. Shebut) ‘To cull reindeer (dlia zaboia olenei)’. (ibid.)
BEZRK thus comes out with the counter-narrative of herders’ slaughter in the very ‘maternity ward’. Not only herders do not fear to tread there, so that calving moose-mothers may not be disquieted, but they in fact have a hunting base there. In the final resolution of the conflict, the ‘maternity ward’ imagery was employed again. This time it was stated victoriously, but also with some doubts: have the wealthy outsiders been decisively and irrevocably pushed out, or they will find a way to still carry out their murderous intentions?
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Such fears were allayed when the official position of the Regional Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology was announced. In it, we may note a shift of accents from moose to wild reindeer. In this way, the words of former Lovozero Raion Head/present Regional Duma member Aleksandr Shestak, pronounced many months earlier (17.03.19), came to be prophetic. As quoted earlier on, his words were: ‘Our hope is in the Red Book’ (Kuznetsova, 2019). This was in fact said in the ponderous bureaucratic idiom of the Ministry.37 Here I present its main points: (i) The revoking of the agreement with BEZRK follows from the ban on wild reindeer hunting due to its entry in the Red Book for Murmansk Region; (ii) The revoking was done by mutual consent by the Ministry of Natural Resources, on the one hand, and NP BEZRK, on the other; (iii) The status of the territory which was the subject of the revoked agreement was changed from ‘restricted hunting grounds’ to ‘public access’ ones; (iv) Consequently, hunting licenses for moose and bear would be issued by established administrative rules; (v) Likewise, the issuing of licenses and hunting control duties would be performed by the responsible state organs. As it can be seen from the five points of the final resolution of the conflict, the status quo ante was fully restored. Things were to be as they had ‘traditionally’ been. Namely, that the territory of 70,000 ha by River Sovinaia was given back to the Krasnoshchel’ie community—to exploit it by applying sayable and unsayable community rules, and their underlying understanding of the locally prevalent environmental ethic. A strong signal of the Ministry adopting such a stance was that no word was said about removing the Base Camp (baza) of ‘Olenevod’ from the territory. No word was said also about additional funding for enhancing control. The policing of the remote territory had always been a token one38 and so, for the time being it would remain. For the full text see Tkachev (2020c). In 2009, the Head of Hunting Control, K. Vostriakov, described the situation in the following way: ‘For policing 12 million hectares we have 6 inspectors. Which is two million hectares per inspector. Even telephone connections we can use only by guaranteeing future payment. Petrol we borrow, so that in the end we can only cover costs for taxes and salaries.’ (Karelin, 2009) The situation today is not much different. 37 38
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Several conclusions can be made on the basis of the whole debate. In the first place, the conflict and its final resolution delineate the upper limits of peripherality insofar that Murmansk Region is concerned. In other words, at one level up, like that of exclusive salmon angling camps, representing higher oligarchate-cum-top vertical of power interests, we could hardly expect that the matter would be discussed on a regional level, let alone be open to public debate. Available observations of this upper range, where Murmansk Region has to accommodate interests of high orbit players, show a next-to-complete veiling of facts in this sector. So much so, that the number of existing high-orbit clubs is only vaguely known (cf. Mustonen et al., 2020; Konstantinov, 2009, 2017; Ogarkova, 2007; Osherenko, 1998, 2001). The limits of peripherality, in the sense used here, are those above which high-orbit players consider matters not to be peripheral to their interests. In a similar way, the same applies to the interests of the military and the VPK Complex, as well as to non-renewable extracting plans of mega-size industrial actors. Below the threshold, and at a middle-to-low level range of actors, matters acquire a more democratic face and are relatively more open to public debate. This is the stage on which a ‘traditional’ repertoire of competing narratives gets recited and symbolisms employed, as it was shown in the presentation of the BEZRK saga above. An important feature to be noticed is the use of environmental/green/ protective arguments by both sides in the conflict. These are irrefutable arguments by definition—the times of ‘conquering nature’ are long gone. At the same time, a strongly instrumental bias protrudes. Namely, that ‘green’ arguments are employed to politically strengthen one’s own position, or defame that of the opponent. In its more aggressive and abrupt form, the latter tactic finds its surface expressions by accusations of both sides that the opponent is ‘the real poacher’. Poaching itself, as its very name and meaning, are, however, contingent on a proper understanding of sovkhoism and the prevailing hyper extensive reindeer husbandry system. An instrumental ‘green’ use was illustrated by the wild reindeer issue in the BEZRK debates and the role it received in the final resolution. As it has been shown, the technical way in which BEZRK were removed was by intense lobbying at the Federal Ministry of Natural Resources and adjacent levels, for entering wild reindeer as a protected species in the Red Book of Murmansk Region. Consequently, no hunting of wild reindeer could be allowed in ‘wild reindeer’ habitat. The breakthrough point here was that the permanent ban on hunting the species extended from the
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‘western part’ (essentially the Lapland Reserve), to the ‘eastern one’, including, along the way, the contested Lot No 7 by River Sovinaia. At the same time, by returning the status of ‘public access for hunting’ for the same grounds and announcing that licenses for moose and bear hunting would be given out for a virtually uncontrolled territory, the Ministry placed the entire matter in the hands of the local community and the local elite actors (like Shestak, Kurzen’iev, Reizvikh, Shebut) who were all decisive for bringing about the final victory for ‘the people’. One could add here that such locally prominent figures represent intense kin-based networks connecting them with the remote villages and that of Krasnoshchel’ie in particular. Finally, it is to be noted in the same vein, that green arguments were used for their mainly political value and not as matters of what could be called absolute concerns: like, for instance, climate change impact or biodiversity issues. These last sound ‘alien’ and even as being western fabrications on a par with gender or multicultural issues, smacking of the liberal agenda of the global West. Their political worth for local use is coming to be increasingly suspect, allowing only for limited (and increasingly frowned upon) instrumental use in case of participation in foreign-funded projects. With the onset of the invasion in Ukraine, however, and in the context of anti-Western rhetoric and corresponding repressive measures, all such projects swiftly became anachronistic. This poses questions about the value and usefulness of the ‘green’ motive in future political skirmishes on the regional and Raion scenes. Such a state-of-affairs can be explained by what in the local context can be defined as the issue of absolute concern: custodianship of the tundra. Compared to it, green concerns pale in relative value, particularly in the very recent hardening of anti-Western stances. For political reasons, however, exclusive custodianship of the tundra for the local community cannot be fore-fronted since it is lacking any legal basis. Thus, it is to remain as the key item in the local repertoire of ‘hidden transcripts’ (if we go by Scott). This is, in my view, the issue of who the rightful owner of tundra resources is and who is to see how they are to be used. The answer of the local community, supported by its more prominent figures like administrators and regional oligarchs is based on a moral understanding of the issue, sanctified by Soviet legacy. Namely, that the land belongs to those who work it. This matter will be examined in the following section by going into the wild reindeer issue in greater detail.
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The Wild Reindeer Controversy: The BEZRK Affair discussed above can be considered as the latest case of a much older controversy which again has wild deer in the forefront and custodianship of the tundra in the back. In its public face, the controversy was about whether wild deer could be hunted in land used in reindeer husbandry or not. As noted above, in case the second solution prevailed, that land remained to a significant extent in the custodianship of the local community. That is, barring the coastal strip in the hands of the Northern Fleet, the VPK, as well as the Border Guard Troops. Additional to that are semblances of feudal estates rented out to exclusive salmon angling businesses, the earlier mentioned ‘camps’ (lageria). Local ‘custodianship of the tundra’ would thus extend to the rest of the tundra territory, existing in vertical-of-power terms, below the peripheral limit. As in the recent case with BEZRK, the only way found to ensure this was the politically-tactical ploy of entering wild deer in the Red Book and, consequently, banning their hunting all over Murmansk Region. The protagonists belong to two broadly definable groups outlined in the discussion of the BEZRK Affair. As shown there, the ‘local side’ was spearheaded by the Lovozero Raion administrative-cum-business elite with its lobby in regional administrative and Duma circles. This leading segment was further locally backed by the Soviet of Deputees (Sovet deputatov), the Club of Veterans (Klub veteranov), and by the Sami and the Komi NGOs. In the context of disputes with ‘outsiders’, this combined political force would, as a rule, position itself as the defender of the indigenous Sami people, the numerically small ‘para-indigenous’ people (Komi and Komified Nenets), and the reindeer herding community—a rather loose entity, but symbolically defining local unity. I say ‘symbolically’ here, as this configuration is supposed to represent the whole Raion population, although in point of fact, the overwhelming part of the population live in Revda, where the single main employer is the Mining-Processing Complex OOO ‘Lovozerskii GOK’. Of the roughly 10,000 inhabitants of Lovozero Raion, around 7000 live in the mining town. Of the rest, the greater part are urban-style inhabitants of Lovozero (close to 3000), employed in infrastructural service jobs and administrative offices. To repeat: reindeer husbandry as such employs as tundra workers not more than a hundred people for the whole Raion. Ethnically, the predominant parts of this tundra force are Komi and Komified Nenets, the Sami coming next, as well as people from heavily mixed ethnic origin. For mainly instrumental uses, the ‘face’ (‘brend’) of the Raion is a ‘reindeer husbandry’ and ‘Sami’ one. Ideologically, the protagonists who
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engage in battling the ‘regionals’ (or appealing for home or foreign support), proclaim adherence to a complex of indigenous, herding, and ‘green’ moral values. Discursively, the complex can be divided into officially presentable registers (of the ‘sayable’), and officially non-presentable (of the ‘unsayable’). A list of what goes in the discursively ‘sayable’ register includes respect and care for the Sami indigenous people; likewise for the numerically small peoples (Komi, and Komified Nenets); and, by extension, to all others who share a tundra-connected lifestyle, that is, all herders, irrespective of ethnic origin. Through what is portrayed as the immemorial ‘oneness’ of this community with the environment, the list of ‘sayable’ moral concerns includes care and respect for the land and the animals (both semi- domesticated and wild) to whom this ‘oneness’ extends. In this kind of argumentation, the term ‘traditional’ is pivotal. The ‘unsayable’ part, or at least the one which is not, as a rule, publicly voiced, may be described as a strong conviction that the tundra-connected community, and above all the herding one, have the moral and inalienable right to be ‘hosts’ of the tundra (hoziaeva tundry). The position contains an even more ‘unsayable’ underlying premise: that the locals have the moral right to use the tundra’s renewable resources in a way and measure which is in their competence and at their discretion. Or, in other words, both the status of ‘hosts’, and ‘responsible users’, stem from the position that the common law on which the whole ideological complex is based is one of stronger moral standing compared to current jurisdiction in the Russian Federation. An implied motif, pregnant with political overtones, is that in moral terms, the present Russian Federation is an inferior and corrupted version of the preceding Soviet Union. The second adversary can be defined as residing in the Ministries and Departments of the Regional Government. The responsible and recognizable public face here is that of the current Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment of Murmansk Region. More specifically, this is its Department of State Hunting Control (Otdel gosudarstvennogo okhotnichego nadzora). This office is popularly known as the Hunting Inspectorate (okhotinspektsiia, okhotnadzor). Other departments in regional ministries occasionally step into the same role. A prominent one is The Department of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control for Murmansk Region, popularly known as Rossel’khoznadzor. In the final account, a faultline becomes visible here, summable as one between ‘locals’ vs. ‘regionals’. From the local perspective, the ‘regionals’
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are seen as little more than administrative pawns in the hands of powerful outside actors, belonging to the upper rungs of the federal political-cum- oligarchate nexus. This is not to say, however, that in each and every case, regional administrative power would be uniformly opposed to local community interests. This was shown by the successful (for the community) resolution of the BEZRK controversy. For, in the final account, it was through regional channels that a federal-level decision for inclusion of wild reindeer in the ‘Red Book’ was taken. ‘Sayable’ and ‘unsayable’ discursive registers are discernible in the regional repertoire as well. The ‘sayable’ part includes, in the first place, non-accepting common law to be part of the dialogue at the expense of current federal and regional jurisdiction. It has been shown above that this is said in plain language in discussions with the ‘locals’. It is important to recall the way this was phrased by Minister Ruusalep at the time of the BEZRK Conflict: Whether (such herding) is a matter of historical developments or (the formation) of traditional territories—that is one thing. But we live in the world of today and in accordance with the legislation of our country. (Tkachev, 2019a:5)
On another occasion in July 2019, Temporary-Acting Governor Chibis called the indigenous/herding/green argumentation ‘emotional’ and, by implication, of little relevance (Tkachev, 2019b). Going further along this path of argument, the ‘regionals’ claim that the hunting community of Murmansk Region, comprising some 25,000 licensed and overwhelmingly urban hunters, have as much right to tundra land-use as anyone else. In the context of the wild reindeer controversy, the position of the frontline detachment of the regionals, the Hunting Inspectorate, has always been that they cannot impair the rights of the hunting community since such rights are juridically ensured. As the Head of the Hunting Inspectorate, K. Vostriakov, said at the time: We cannot impair the rights of the hunters (ushchemliat prava okhotnokov my ne mozhem). There is no legal basis for that. (….) Limitations imposed earlier (in the previous Iu. Ievdokimov’s Governorship—my gloss) had been arbitrary and the present management of the Hunting Inspectorate has no intention of continuing that practice. The hunting specialists (okhotovedy) do not write laws and do not discuss them. They are only obliged to go by them. (Riazanova, 2009a)
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The locals, being in no position to privilege common law over current federal jurisdiction, resort, from this point on, to more palatable and debatable technical issues. As it will be shown below, two main such are used: (i) whether domestic reindeer can be visually distinguished from the wild sub-species; and (ii) whether the latter are to be met in reindeer husbandry land (‘for agricultural use’) or not. The resolution of these two controversial issues in one or the other direction, strengthens the position of one party over the other. Thus, the locals claim that by exterior, the sub-species are easily distinguished from the domesticated type and thus anyone claiming to shoot down a domesticated reindeer ‘mistaking’ it for wild is open to accusations of poaching. Likewise, they claim that the wild reindeer have a separate habitat and migration routes, and thus hunters with wild reindeer licenses have no reason to be in reindeer husbandry grazing range at all. Should they be found there, their intentions would be taken to speak of hunting semi- domesticated reindeer. Predictably, both arguments are refuted by the regionals. Brandishing of ‘scientific proofs’ comes into play. Their general aim is to prove that domesticated and wild reindeer are morphologically similar and can be easily mistaken for each other in the heat of the hunt. As in the BEZRK case, an additional issue here is connected with the regional nomenclature of the status of land. As explained earlier on, reindeer husbandry territory proper is only land designated for ‘agricultural use’ and under the administrative control of Village Settlement Lovozero (as regards Lovozero Raion). Tundra-forest land is placed, on the other hand, under the administrative control of the Forest Fund and its local departments (lesnichestva). Thus, in strictly legal terms, the reindeer husbandry cooperatives are using illegally Forest Fund land,39 as they are not paying any rent for that (in the case of ‘Olenevod’). On the other hand, the Forest Fund has the right to allow hunters to use its land, despite the fact that the land is where the winter pastures of the cooperatives are, and that the reindeer have been using it as such since times immemorial. Technical/ scientific discussions, as well as their related administrative details, usually flare up when the debate slips into mutual accusations between the two main adversaries. In sum, and as it was shown in the BEZRK case, the regionals accuse the reindeer husbandry cooperatives of: Compare with а similar tension in Yamal in Zuev (2020).
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(i) not ensuring that they have their herders in constant contact and control of their herds. Should the herders be with the herds, poachers would be kept away; (ii) that the cooperatives as a whole, or their various herding teams (brigady), maintain a policy of culling wild reindeer themselves in order to fulfil meat plans. What this amounts to in the end is that each side accuses the other of being conducive to poaching, or directly engaging in it. At this point, the only possible resolution is by appealing to supreme arbitration. As it has been shown in the BEZRK case, that officially came from the Federal Ministry of Natural Resources (Minpriroda), and the case was decided in favour of the locals. The technical instrument for that was what had been described above as the ‘Red Book solution’. The ‘unsayable’ part of the regional discourse is to be connected with powerful outsiders’ interests. Structurally, the Region is both financially and administratively dependent on the federal centre in full measure. This vassal status gets translated down the vertical of power at the Raion level. As already noted, the Raion depends for its budget on regional/federal funding to over 90%. One level down, we have the Village Settlement Lovozero—the administrative custodian of tundra lands for agricultural use, that is, the reindeer husbandry grazing range. Its budget, in its turn, depends on the Raion one. In plain language, the cut of the Village Settlement amounts to a rough annual average of 50 m roubles (approx. EUR 540,000). To get things into perspective, the ‘size’ and ‘pull’ of outsiders are to be considered. ‘BEZRK-Belgrankorm’, which was discussed in the previous part, can be used as an example of an outside actor of the current Russian ‘middle-range oligarchate’. The holding company is quoted to have received state-subsidies to the tune of some 440 m for 2018 (approx. EUR 5 m), a sum which had been reduced by a factor of three for 2019— to only 135.4 m (approx. EUR 1.5 m) (Cf. Kakie, 2021). In an aside, it could be noted that the reduction in state-support for 2019 (the year of the conflict with the locals over Hunting Lot No 7) may be indicative of a loss of Belgrankorm’s ‘pull’ as regards the ultimate giver (i.e., the Federal Centre). Should that have been so, it may serve to explain, at least partly, the locals’ victory over a powerful outsider. In all events, published financial data clearly shows that the worth of the contestants is heavily asymmetrical. On the one hand, there is Village Settlement Lovozero with its modest annual budget, and, on the other,
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Belgrankorm, holding the 196th place in the Agroprom list of businesses of scale, and with a profit of 50.2 b roubles for 2019. As the ratio of power, financially speaking, is in favour of the outsiders by a factor of ten, the question of how the wild reindeer/Red Book strategy managed to chase out Belgrankorm from Village Settlement of Lovozero/Raion Forestry Fund land remains one to answer. For the moment, let it be said that in conflicts of this sort—that is, when they are under the threshold of peripherality—vertical-of-power arbitration is likely to tilt scales according to a momentary configuration of political-cum-business considerations from the viewpoint of the ultimate arbiter. Outcomes may be driven by a relative loss of favour as regards a specific oligarchy, by concerns that favour the electoral base (in view, for instance, of approaching elections), or by any combination between these two. Normally, what happens here would not reach public scrutiny, but there is a great likelihood that the final resolution of the BEZRK dispute pointed to a selective populist bias of the federal power regime in what it otherwise sees as a peripheral case. The opening salvoes of the wild reindeer controversy, pitting ‘locals’ against ‘regionals’ came in 2005 in a long interview with newly elected Head of SKhPK ‘Tundra’ V.A. Startsev (Il’ina, 2005). A detail to be mentioned here is that Startsev had just been elected as Head of the Cooperative—a post he holds to this day, over two decades later. The previous Head (V.F. Syrota) had been deposed with accusations of adventurism in running the enterprise. A part of that which was not publicly voiced at the time was that on two occasions, helicopters had been chartered in cooperation with ‘Olenevod’ to carry out culling of wild reindeer in a location near Peak Kamennik in the Keivi Ridge (i.e., in the border region between the two cooperatives). The goal was to augment cooperative meat-plans, which at that period had fallen to all-time lows. The interview was one of the first in which the newly elected Head of SKhPK ‘Tundra’ presented a narrative which had become ‘traditional’ by that time, namely, the ‘herders’ victimization by poachers’ one. As a discursive genre for mainly outside consumption, it can be treated as a continuation of the ‘need-and-misery’ narrative, depicting the sorry fate of the local community in the hands of the Soviet regime, and by the economic and social deterioration (razval), characterizing the first decade after the changes, the ‘dashing nineties’ (likhie devianostye). The ‘need- and- misery’ genre has been discussed elsewhere (Konstantinov et al.,
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2018), and particularly by Berg-Nordlie who gave it the name (Berg- Nordlie, 2011). Here I focus on the ‘victimization by poachers’ follow up. The picture painted at the beginning of Startsev’s longstanding leadership of ‘Tundra’, stressed the defenselessness of the herders due to the absence of firearms in their hands, while, at the same time, the poachers were well armed. The absence of firearms was explained by the bureaucratic hassle and fees connected with issuing licenses as a result of which herders did not take the trouble of applying for them. ‘Before’, that is, in Soviet times, rifles used to be given to herding teams for defense against predators, following an ex officio regime of distribution. In the 1990s, the regime was changed and stricter regulations were applied. Running ahead it is to be said here that in the last years, the regulatory regime for firearms has been made much stricter compared to 2005 when the interview was taken. In addition, new hunting rules, coming into force as of 1 January 2021, put additional demands on hunters. Issuing a hunting licence (okhotnichii bilet) now requires that applicants certify by their signatures that they had acquainted themselves with the basic regulations (okhotminimum). These include knowledge of hunting rules, safety requirements during hunting outings, safety requirements in using hunting weapons, as well as basic knowledge of the biology of wild animals.40 All of that contributed to sustain an ‘unsayable’ status quo, in terms of which people would often resort to using unlicensed guns (nelegal’ki) instead of going into the trouble and expense of acquiring and maintaining firearm and hunting licences, let alone shouldering the price of shop-bought weapons. As in discourses on all levels and by any party, only about half of a given state-of-affairs would be felt to be publicly presentable and, hence, stated as the whole unvarnished truth. This is the part I call the ‘sayable’ one, or, to paraphrase Scott, the ‘upfront transcript’. In the words of the reporting journalist, retelling the statements of the newly elected ‘Tundra’ Head, the ‘upfront’, or ‘sayable’ transcript sounded like this: Vladimir Aleksandrovich (Startsev) refers to the simply unthinkable losses inflicted on the herds. And the reason for that is …. the law. In the ‘90s (…) a new law on firearms came into force. The document stipulates the conditions for the right of a citizen to have in his hands a serious firearm. That includes an unblemished record with the law-enforcing organs, a satisfac About the new regulations see: Tsypyshev (2020).
40
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tory health status in psychic and physical terms, and a lot more besides.41 In result, the herders, who had always been in possession of firearms for defense against predators, and what is more: impressive firearms such as rifled carbines, had to lose the use of those weapons. For some that was additionally connected with health problems, for others it was due to past skirmishes with the law. And still others found it too troublesome to run around offices for procuring documents. (At the same time) the number of predators did not diminish. Wolves, wolverines, and bears began to prowl nearer to appetizing reindeer herds. What means were there to chase them away? (Il’ina, 2005)
The same applied to poachers as well: the ‘two-legged predators’ as the same journalist called them. The whole picture presented was one of suddenly defenceless herders against animal and human predators, and untold losses sustained by the cooperatives. In essence, this will be a narrative repeated over and over again in all similar presentations. A unifying underlying motif, structuring the whole, was that the tundra was a special place with its own demands in the face of which laws applying to the rest of the country were misplaced, unnecessarily complicated, and, in the final account, totally inadequate. Their enforced application allegedly led to a situation in which the tundra-connected community were left at the mercy of animal and human predators. An additional feature belonging to this narrative was that ‘human predators’ were outsiders who came from cities or military bases. We may notice here a specific reiteration of a national ‘besieged own vs. threatening alien’ refrain of defencelessness against aggressive outsiders, calling for ‘own’ strong measures to be taken. In the concrete case, such measures demanded privileging what may be called a common tundra code of moral concerns and appropriate insiders’ rules of conduct over the demands of a distant (federal) jurisdiction. In this general narrative structure, accents may shift. Thus, only a year after the first interview, the firearms issue was all but abandoned. The trying out and subsequent abandoning of such accents will be examined 41 This would include prescribed conditions for keeping firearms and ammunition at home (in a wall-fixed strongbox), as well as a document establishing the technical condition of the weapon. An important part of the overall regime is the provision that the police can inspect the home of the owner at any time for ensuring how the weapon is kept. The whole procedure has to be repeated after three years as a condition for the weapon-holding permit to be updated. Additionally, the hunting license—which is separate from the weapon’s one—is to be updated on an annual basis. See: FZ-209 (2021); Tsypyshev (2020).
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further down. One of them however was gaining prominence. The unfolding of the ‘locals vs. regionals’ conflict would prove its ultimate winning value for the locals: the wild reindeer issue. This issue was introduced in a following interview with the Head of ‘Tundra’. As subsequent history would prove it with the resolution of the BEZRK Affair, this new accent on wild reindeer would be found as politically a much likelier winning card. In the said interview, the cord was struck in the following way (probably, by chance.) A provocation came from the ‘regionals’, represented by an inspecting Committee from the Regional Department of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control for Murmansk Region (Rossel’khoznadzor). Visiting a counting/ harvesting corral session in Lovozero, the Committee of four inspectors claimed that ‘Tundra’ was harvesting wild reindeer, rounded up together with the semi-domesticated ones. In response to the allegation, the Head of the Cooperative stated that such a thing was ‘totally impossible’. There were two reasons for that according to Startsev. One was that the two subspecies looked different and thus could not be mistaken for each other. Hence, as he claimed, herders could not round them up together with the rest. Secondly, the semi-domesticated variety had its own grazing range to begin with, cordoned off by a fence, and thus it was ‘totally impossible’ for the two sub-species to come into contact and be rounded up mixed in the domestic herd. In his words: In Murmansk Region there exists the so-called forest sub-species of wild reindeer (lesnoi podvid dikogo olenia), which has specific exterior characteristic features. The ‘wildoes’ (dikari) are of a lighter hue (than the semi- domesticated ones), and have markedly bigger hoofs. There is also a well-visible strip in the lower part of the belly, the so-called ‘arrow’ (strelka). (Regarding habitat) I will say it again: contact between ‘wildoes’ and domestic deer is impossible. The activities of hunting specialists (okhotovedy) who know full well the differences (in exterior) between wild and domestic deer, as well as that the latter’s grazing range is not in contact with the population of wild reindeer, are unlawful (bezzakonnye). What they are aiming at in fact is to try and change our reindeer husbandry system and appropriate (prisvoit’) our reindeer. (Shirmer, 2006)
Some details in this defence speech require elucidation. One of them is the introduction of what may be called the ‘reindeer fence argument’. For the uninformed urban audience, it served to create an impression that
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cooperative herds were grazed in fenced off pastures. In reality, at the time it was only true of the so-called students’ herd (uchebnoe stado), that is, a small herd used by the local Professional School 26, training reindeer herders on the outskirts of Lovozero.42 Beyond that, reindeer fences criss- crossed the entire grazing range, but in their predominant part they were in an advancing stage of dilapidation and hardly functional. Secondly, it is important to note that at this early stage of what would escalate into the lengthy ‘wild reindeer controversy’, the cooperative’s position was still defensive in its greater part. News about culling wild reindeer for augmenting meat plans must have reached the regional authorities by that time and so it was necessary to prove that such a thing ‘was impossible’. Consequently, the arguments of ‘exterior differences’ and ‘habitat separation’ needed to be stressed for all they were worth. At the same time, an offensive note was also struck. Namely, that what the hunting specialists were in fact aiming at was to use the unsaid (in the report) but hinted at ‘culling wild reindeer issue’ for ‘changing the herding system’ and ‘appropriating’ the cooperative reindeer. How were such accusations, sounding absurd, to be understood? The key to that were two other accents, not openly spelled out at the time. Both are to be seen as key political weapons in the hands of the ‘regionals’, as well as in those of outsiders, whose interests they might represent. Like, for instance, of powerful outsiders like those of BEZRK, who stood still far into the future, but, as we shall see further, the path for their coming was already being cut. By ‘changing our reindeer husbandry system’, Startsev alluded to an often-made accusation against the cooperatives: namely, that their herders were not controlling the cooperative (‘sovkhoz’) herds. By that time, it was already a fully established fact known to anyone close to herding. It stemmed from the progressive sliding of the Soviet and post-Soviet reindeer husbandry system into a state of hyper-extensivity. As said earlier on, that also followed from the equally objective fact that the current system of tundra employment was one of commuting to reindeer herding camps (bazy), rather than of permanent or temporary (shift) residence at tundra bases. By the time of the beginning of the long ‘wild deer controversy’, ‘herding by commuting’ was already a firmly established practice not only for herders from Lovozero but also for 42 Beginning 47 years ago as a Professional School (PU-26), and after many changes of the name, this is now the Northern College (Severnii Natsional’nyi Kolledzh), see: Mimidova (2019); Konstantinov (2015:320 (National Northern Lyceum)).
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those of the remote tundra villages of Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and even of Sosnovka. The meaning of the accusation of ‘appropriating our reindeer’ alluded to the all-important motif of poaching. Both accusations were only flatly stated, without any further elaboration. Simply dropped like that, they were shocking to the point of absurdity: how, in real terms, would Rossel’khoznadzor manage to change a long-established and highly complex husbandry system and appropriate a herd of many thousands of reindeer? What would they be doing with them? Nonetheless, for insiders, the statements were plain enough: the ‘regionals’ aimed to remove the cooperatives from controlling tundra renewable resources and step into that role themselves. The instrument for their appropriating the right of being the legal ‘hosts of the tundra’ would be to accuse the cooperatives of poaching on wild reindeer. The Rossel’khoz mission to Lovozero was thus hinted at as having this ultimate agenda in mind. Three years after the interview, the ‘locals’ vs. ‘regionals’ tug-of-war saw more of a selective change of accents while, at the same time, the wild reindeer and poaching motifs solidified further. The spokesperson, presenting the local side was again Startsev (Karelin, 2009). It can be noted, in an aside, that ‘Olenevod’s’ long-serving Head Ivan Matrekhin rarely appeared on this stage. The same can be said about the administrative leadership of the Raion and of the Village Settlement. Running ahead, the situation significantly changed in this respect only a decade and a half later when the BEZRK Affair came into being. That future development suggested that, by that time, the conflict had escalated to a pitch at which Startsev’s lone stand was found to be in need of strong re-enforcement. That was shown to come from the acting Raion authorities, a strong lobby in the Regional Duma, led by the former Raion Head A. Shestak, and not to a little extent by A. Reizvikh, in his capacity of Head of ‘Olenevod’ and with his financial standing as a regional oligarch of scale. We remember also that the conflict by that time was developing in the context of outgoing Governorship of M. Kovtun, whose fall was precipitated by a ‘wild reindeer scandal’ of her own among a host of other scandalous events. Still back in 2009, and Startsev’s third interview, signs of what was coming were becoming visible. In this new interview for the regional Murmanskii vestnik (Karelin, 2009), Startsev began with intriguing figures about slaughter head numbers as well as losses inflicted by predators and poachers. According to him, reindeer designated for slaughter came up to a total of 5000 head, while losses amounted to 4000 head. The
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figures were consistent with the officially announced head numbers for ‘Tundra’ in 2008—28,000 head, with ‘Olenevod’ lagging a little behind with 24,000. As it was mentioned earlier on, regional specialists placed such figures in heavy doubt. N. Bogdanov, in his capacity of a reindeer husbandry consultant at the Government of Murmansk Region, stopped short of calling them outright lies. As mentioned earlier on, according to insiders’ opinion, the figures were inflated at least by 20%, with the more skeptical talking about an inflation of 50%. Thus, the closer to truth 2008 figure for ‘Tundra’ would have been, according to such opinion, around 14,000 head. If harvesting would be carried at the announced rate, combined slaughter plus predator/poaching numbers would have meant a virtual extermination of the herd. It was therefore very likely, in the face of such more realistic calculations, that some massaging of numbers had taken place. That could have been so both as regarded the overall count for 2008, as well as for the losses sustained. The motive for the first exaggeration had a clear candidate: subsidies given per head of deer, as explained earlier. The one for inflating losses could be less readily seen. Apart from theatrical effects, the inflating called for a more substantive explanation. To begin with, the stressing of outsiders poaching on cooperative herds (by urban poachers, licensed hunters, as also by military personnel) served to deflect regional attention from the theme the local community had been constantly debating ever since early Soviet times. In previous writing I have called that ‘internal poaching’ (Konstantinov, 2015:306), but as it shall be explained further down, ‘internal taking from herds’ reflects the current situation more accurately. The phrase refers to the locally acknowledged, but ‘unsayable’ fact of herders’ augmenting personal (‘private’) herds at the expense of cooperative ones. This very large topic, constituting the essence of the predominant part of Soviet and post-Soviet reindeer husbandry systems, or ‘sovkhoism’,43 will be left for a longer discussion in the next chapter. In it, I discuss the current state of the system. For the moment, the following critical aspects of the overall ethical environment and its practical outcomes will be listed:
43 Originally proposed in Konstantinov (1997), and later developed in subsequent numerous publications. For a recent commentary see Hann (2021a, 2021b).
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(i) The term ‘poaching’ implying crimes against nature is ill-applicable to the reality of both Soviet and post-Soviet sovkhoism. Its inadequacy is analogous to that of ‘theft’ in the same context, as Caroline Humphrey perceptibly noted in her classical discussion of the sovkhoz (Humphrey, 1983). To paraphrase her words: from the viewpoint of a local community (as different from that of a distant legislation) ‘theft’ applies to illegal taking from a private person, while illegal taking from the cooperative (or, ultimately, from the state) is seen as a fair deal, that is, one takes, unlawfully indeed, but only what is considered to be due to them.44 (ii) By the same token, taking from the cooperative herd by the herders themselves, or taking wild game, is a fair deal, following from an understanding of a traditional right. In a Soviet context, the deal was fair in the sense that the land, by virtue of a foundational ideological tenet, belonged to those who worked it. In addition to that, but ‘unsayably’, it was also fair in the sense that those who worked the land, all the more in the harsh conditions of the North, were inadequately paid, and the living conditions they were placed in were often dismal. They were therefore entitled to take what was not legally given to them, but they rightfully deserved. (iii) From the point of view of the cooperative leadership, applying ‘outside law’ would mean losing the workforce. In both Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, this has been a painful and persisting problem for reindeer husbandry.45 (iv) This treatment of ‘poaching’ takes us also to the debate of the term itself, concerning non-Soviet/Russian contexts. Namely, of what, in the concerned literature, has been discussed as a communal right of people who have always lived ‘in nature’ for their s ubsistence, as different from visiting outsiders, who hunt for sport,46 or of largescale international criminal networks, poaching for high-profile species (elephants, rhinos, tigers, etc.). From such a perspective, ‘communal/ traditional subsistence taking from nature’ should be addressed as ‘illegal taking’, but not as ‘poaching’, with the latter term’s pejorative connotations (von Essen et al., 2014). See also Creed (1998:17f) on ‘institutionalized theft’ in a Bulgarian state-socialism context. See Kornai (1992) for a classic treatment of this phenomenon. 46 Cf. the literature on ‘folk crime’ (Forsyth et al., 1998; Forsyth & Marckese, 1993), ‘deviant subcultures’ (Brymer, 1991; Belihouse, 1999). 44
45
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The last point requires extensive discussion which will take us too far afield.47 For the moment, the issue at hand is how the poaching theme has been used in the ‘locals’ vs. ‘regionals’ debate as a political tool. As said above, the political stage on which it has been used is characterized by a principal tension between ‘locals vs. regionals’ (and outside interests the latter may be representing) over ‘custodianship’ of the tundra and its renewable resources. On the local stage, this is essentially a ‘people vs. state’ conflict. What makes poaching (of deer and other game) useful instruments on this peripheral stage is that they are ‘sayable’ discursive items, unlike the respective ‘unsayable’ ultimate agendas. These last, spelled out in full length, would mean, from the point of view of the cooperatives, and the whole system of sovkhoism itself, that while ‘internal illegal taking’ was an intrinsic structural feature of the system, outsiders’ illegal taking, added to it, would break the back of the sovkhoist camel. Or, in other words, the sovkhoz could contain, albeit with some difficulty, illegal taking for the sake of retaining the workforce, but outsiders’ intrusion on the same turf threatened to destroy the whole delicate balance. In addition to that, should the sovkhoz be left to manage the system as its sole custodian, its spiraling into Hardin’s classical ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario would be guaranteed to be prevented. This last is a very valid argument for the preservation of the system in its present state on the Kola, especially if we compare it with current ‘tragedy-of-the-commons’ scenarios in reindeer husbandry areas, where sovkhoism has become marginal. A case to consider in this light is again that of Yamal where ‘truly private’ reindeer husbandry, as different from ‘private-in-the-collective’, has become the dominant husbandry form.48 From the regionals’ point of view, agreeing to privilege the cooperatives (‘sovkhozes’) as exclusive ‘tundra hosts’, would mean dispensing of opportunities for strengthening career-cum-financial gains, increasingly offering in the context of post-Soviet Russian ‘capitalism’. Letting such opportunities offered by influential outsiders slip did not make practical sense. We have to see this from the viewpoint of actors for many of whom leaving the tundra and its attractive renewable resources solely for the use of a peripheral community would be found deeply irrational, if not entirely senseless. The absence of any perceptible economic value of reindeer But see: Paine (1999); Herzfeld (1988). On this point see: Yuzhakov (2020); Zuev (2020).
47 48
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husbandry for the regional economy reinforced such an attitude, let alone the fact that a part of limited regional resources had to go for subsidizing it. Still further than that, there come other equally ‘unsayable’ arguments, of increasingly practical (but important) nature on the personal career and pensioning off levels. Like, for instance, the uncomfortable fact that it would be an extremely rare case for regional administrators to stay in the region after their terms of office expired. To paraphrase Dr Johnson’s famous quip, it would be true to say that the noblest prospect for many a regional administrator or politician would be the airplane to Moscow, or, as a second best—to St. Petersburg. In the final account, both locals’ and regionals’ agendas are to be seen as ‘unsayable’ in their larger parts and thus a meta-idiom for them would be needed at every step. As regards the locals’ position, inflating poaching losses can be considered as an important strand in a narrative told by means of such a meta-idiom. Concerning the use of the latter, the arbitrariness and volatility of its repertoire of key motifs needs to be noted. This follows from the idiom’s artificial construction and pronounced sensitivity to momentary demands of the political context. A surface expression of that can be seen in the ease of changing accents in the overall political debate on the peripheral stage. This is a debate, whose constitutive elements yield to correct interpretation only for involved members and local observes, informed by experience and a rich store of ‘intimate knowledge’ (Herzfeld, 2005) of local affairs. In the absence of such well-honed interpretative skills, the overall situation threatens to remain totally opaque.49 To return to the topic of shifting motifs. A changed one in the new interview with Startsev of 2009 concerned the initially introduced topic of firearms. This eventually abandoned motif can be summed up as ‘disarmed herders are victimized by predators and poachers’. Startsev now claimed that the situation had been repaired:
49 An example of such opacity to local intimate realia would be the following observation made recently by an international team studying salmon species in the basin of the Ponoi River (Kola Peninsula): ‘(Our) observations bring to light a long-term trend in the region: the poaching of game, especially large mammals. This topic has been discussed also with the local administration and the reindeer cooperatives but has not been solved (emphasis mine).’ (Mustonen et al., 2020 (my page 13)) The authors of this text seem to have presumed that the local administration and the reindeer cooperatives had little idea that poaching existed and once they had been enlightened about it, solving the problem would swiftly follow.
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Our people (i.e., the herders) now do have weapons, but not everyone bothers to take them along (when in the tundra—my gloss). Besides, how is one to control such vast territories and, in the final account, what could a single herder do with a well-armed group against him? (Karelin, 2009)
I can confidently claim that this is a good illustration of the meta-idiom I speak of above. Or, to say it bluntly, there is hardly a word of truth in the whole of the statement. To begin with, in a ‘doublespeak’ text of this kind, that is so almost by definition. That is, however, beside the point. Still, it can be noted that weapon-wise very few herders had indeed applied for licenses and the overall situation had not essentially changed as it has not to this day. Control over the vast territories was not exercised anyway by virtue of the fact that a hyper-extensive system of husbandry has been the norm for decades. City and even military poachers tend, as a rule, to shy away as soon as a herder is seen by the herds. Evidence of confrontations between herders and poachers does not belong to the frank oral literature of herding camps, while, at the same time, it tells, and camp-life exhibits, not rare close links, trading, and barter activities between the two allegedly antagonistic groups. With such a closer to truth state-of-affairs in mind, the real point can be said to be that by 2009 the political usefulness of firearms had entirely evaporated. This is to be understood in the sense that it could not serve to advance in any way the right of tundra-custodianship. After a decade of Putin’s rule and the coming of ever stricter firearm regulations, as well as such on all other power-controlled fronts, to privilege traditional tundra understanding of firearms conduct over the official one had become totally untenable, not to say prohibitive. Instead, accents now shifted further in the wild-deer direction and its more promising commercial hunting aspects. That was a major shift and a precursor for future developments—like that of the BEZRK Affair ten years after. The reporting Murmansk journalist (A. Karelin) relates Startsev’s introduction of the new theme in the following way: As the Director (sic) of the SKhPK said, apart from the military, poaching parties are organized for some visiting hunters (from other regions—my gloss) who are taken to hunting locations by some companies. They are promised the opportunity of hunting wild reindeer. The Director of the sovkhoz (sic) told me about ads on the internet. For instance, a Monchegorsk
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company offered a 5–7-day tundra hunting trip. The price was several tens of thousands of roubles, including air-travel to Murmashi (Murmansk Airport—my gloss) and the trip from Murmansk (to the location). (Karelin, 2009)
The astounding fact is that not long afterwards, the Head of ‘Tundra’ signed himself a document of consent for a company from the same Monchegorsk to rent for 30 years the evacuated Hydrometeorological Station ‘Kolmiavr’. As noted earlier on, the Station stood next door to Brigade Base No 8 of ‘Tundra’, on the banks of the big Kolmiavr Lake. Startsev’s consent was necessary since the land had ‘agricultural use’ status. It had always been part of Tundra’s Right Wing grazing range and, consequently, a condition for leasing it out to third parties hung by law on the consent of the sovkhoz. As mentioned before, the company headed by Sergei Smirnov proved later to be the one who paved the way for his close friend and patron, the ‘middle-oligarch’ Anderi Orlov, to bid for the BEZRK so controversial deal concerning Krasnoshchel’ie Hunting Lot No 7. Startsev’s amazing consent in favour of Smirnov’s fishing and hunting lodge had shocked the whole herding community at the time. There was nothing personal about Smirnov or Orlov themselves. In fact, quite friendly relations were very soon struck between the herders of Brigade 8 and Smirnov, as well as with his newly arrived service personnel. It may be added that the relationship had all features of ‘herders-poachers’ relationships mentioned earlier on. Namely, that mutual benefits in the precarious tundra context would rule against any possible antagonisms. This is the line of least tension, traditionally taken by herders, or what has been conceptualized as ‘mutual facilitation’ in ecological theory (i.e., Bruno et al., 2003). What was shocking was that it was widely known among the herding community by that time that outside commercial operators were moving into tundra territory. This was in fact what Startsev himself had been warning against in the Murmanskii vestnik article, quoted above and presenting the development as a great threat to sovkhoz herds. That the Head of ‘Tundra’ himself would be instrumental in the process defied understanding. As the herders said at the time: ‘He (Startsev) is letting the wolves into the pen!’ To make sense of such strange developments one has to consider the ever-present possibility of outside pressure and potential benefits (or in
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case of non-compliance—losses) related to it. Such a conclusion was instantly made by the herders, on a parallel track with the cries of amazement. In that, they did not differ from any average Russian citizen making sense of similar events in their almost daily occurrence. With time and in the face of complete lack of transparency, the matter faded away in the mists of tired speculation and local gossip. Another motif which proved to be dispensable was the one of meaningful use of reindeer fences as an argument in the ‘wild-reindeer controversy’ (‘domestic deer are fenced off and therefore they cannot mix with wild deer’). As it happened, after the ‘firearms’ motif, the ‘reindeer fences’ one was also abandoned. In the words of the reporting journalist: The habitat ranges (raiony obitaniia) of the wild and domestic (stadnykh) reindeer are not separated on the vast tracts of land—one cannot build fences all over the forests and in the tundra. (Karelin, 2009)
How well the words of the interviewee had been understood by the journalist regarding this issue begs a question or two. Namely, that reindeer fence building has been a characteristic feature of Kola reindeer husbandry for ages.50 At the time of the interview and increasingly during the recent years, the two cooperatives have been at great pains to repair the existing system of reindeer fences, as well as build new ones. At the same time, the main aim has been not to separate wild from domestic deer. In real terms, such mixing would be only welcome as it would augment both cooperative, as well as private meat-plans. The aim, instead, was to achieve some form of control of movement of reindeer fragments in an attempt to reduce the negative effects of hyper-extensivity. At the same time, problems with the ageing vezdekhod fleet of the cooperatives, as well as the endemic problems of shortage of personnel, had left many a pile of coils of steel wire all over the tundra, often with the hulks of broken-down vehicles rusting away by dilapidating fences. In brief, pursuing the fence issue contained the possibility of bringing out a host of uncomfortable facts about sovkhoz management and thus do more harm than good. In view of that, it was evidently considered unproductive to pursue the fence motif any further. Instead, the main thrust of argumentation solidified around presenting wild deer hunting by incoming commercial firms as a major contributor to poaching on ‘sovkhoz’ reindeer. See Charnoluskii (1931); Luk’ianchenko (1971:26–27).
50
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Another interview of the same year, and again in Murmanskii vestnik (Riazanova, 2009a), confirmed this line. The position of the reindeer herding community was yet again represented by the Head of ‘Tundra’, the ever-present Startsev. The stress was again on heavy losses inflicted by well-organized and armed poaching groups, victimizing the cooperative. At the same time, the position of the ‘regionals’ began to be more strongly heard. This time it came from the then vice-chair of the Committee for Economic Policy and Production at the Regional Duma, Valerii Strakhov. He noted: But I have a question for the reindeer herders too. (….) Private and collective reindeer are grazed in mixed herds. I have seen personally the following picture. A draft-team travels across the tundra, loaded with reindeer carcasses. We ask the driver: ‘Who is the owner of these carcasses?’ He says: ‘They are my own’. But is that really so? What we have, in fact, are muddy waters, in which both herders and poachers are grabbing. (Riazanova, 2009b)
Strakhov further broaches the reindeer issue, hurling another stone in the herders’ garden: If a vegetable patch stands open, there is no way the hens won’t enter and peck out all the seeds. The tundra now stands open. It is therefore necessary to build fences—as it is done in other parts of the Far North. So that the pastures are not trampled and outsiders kept away. In former times there used to be such (fences). But they have come to be in such a state that are as good as gone. They need to be rebuilt. In other words, order is to be reintroduced beginning at home. (ibid.)
The interview clearly shows the main arguments of the conflicting sides. Concerning the one of the ‘locals’, presented by Startsev all along, it rested on appeals to Regional authorities for reducing the destructive impact of outsiders’ poaching on cooperative herds. Three groups of poachers were variously addressed: well-organized urban poachers, military personnel, and, increasingly, hunters from beyond the region, coming as clients of private companies. The position of what is gradually forming as the opposing side of the ‘regionals’ were voiced by representatives of a wide number of Regional administrators and politicians. In sum, all of them advanced two main lines of argument. One was that of Rossel’khoz and, parallelwise, of Okhotnadzor. Both claimed that the Lovozero Raion reindeer husbandry
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cooperatives had been consistently culling wild reindeer for the sake of augmenting their meat-plans. At the same time, licensed hunting of wild reindeer could not be discontinued, as that would mean infringing upon the rights of the 25,000-strong urban hunting community of Murmansk Region. Instead, demands were made as regarded the cooperatives for eradicating poaching by herders, both of domestic and of wild reindeer. The weak sides of the existing reindeer husbandry system were being exposed and used as political instruments: the mixing of private with cooperative reindeer, and the lack of control over the domestic herds, amounting to the absence of herding per se. A ‘fences’ line, prudently abandoned by the herding side, was also employed by the regionals. By contrast, the fire-arms issue was declared ‘solved’ and abandoned by both sides. This was, in sum, the state-of-the-art by April 2009. In November the same year, the first major breakthrough was achieved by the locals: the first ban on wild reindeer was passed by the regional government. This momentous development will be briefly discussed below. The first wild reindeer ban of November 2009 was for three years, and it applied to Lovozero Raion. The ban additionally extended over hunting moose in the Raion for the same period. The event was widely covered in the Regional and Raion press (Andreeva, 2010; Chernovskii, 2009; Otstrel, 2009; Riazanova, 2009b). The stated reasons for the double ban reflected the main arguments of the reindeer husbandry cooperatives. In Riazanova’s summary: The rapid diminishing of (semi-domesticated) reindeer on the Kola Peninsula, which began in the ‘dashing nineties’ (likhie devianostye), created a long-standing problem. One of the main threats for tundra animals has come to be the lawlessness (bespredel) of hunting, when domesticated reindeer were being killed on the pretense that they were wild. Attempting to protect their herds, the reindeer husbandry enterprises have been asking the authorities time and time again to create some form of order and stop the unlawful killing of animals. Evidently, these voices have been heard at last. (Riazanova, 2009b)
At the same time, an accusatory note against the cooperatives was also sounded in the report and it must have jarred the more sensitive ear: Having said that, order will need to be re-established by the herders themselves, who are often attributing their own sins to poachers. According to
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the (banning) Decree, reindeer husbandry enterprises will be obliged to prove the legal origin of their production, providing the necessary accompanying documents during transportation. The Regional Hunting Inspectorate (Gosokhotinspektsia) has been given the mandate for carrying out control and monitoring of how the ban is being complied with. (ibid.)
The accusation came out more strongly from the Head of the Inspectorate Konstantin Vostriakov, mentioned earlier on. A blogger quoted his opinion in the following way: The local inhabitants (i.e., of Lovozero Raion—my gloss) accuse poachers (kivaiut na brakon’erov), but the Hunting Inspectorate has evidence that the reindeer husbandry enterprises are in the action themselves. They round up wild reindeer and designate them for slaughtering, while preserving their own (animals). (Chernovskii, 2009)
Vostriakov’s voice, sounding from the pages of the most popular regional newspaper, the Murmansk edition of Komsomol’skaia Pravda, clearly delineates the adversaries in the conflict. These are summed up as not only the herders, but as all local inhabitants (the ‘locals’). The ‘regionals’ are represented most graphically by the Inspectorate to whose competence the conducting of the ban has been delegated. An important victory for the latter may be considered the officially delegated duty to inspect the reindeer husbandry cooperatives. However, that victory proved to be utterly symbolic. In the ten years after the First Ban, and until the conflict erupted again in the form of the BEZRK Affair, the ban expired and was reintroduced and extended several times. Meanwhile, the adversaries became progressively entrenched in the long struggle for ‘ownership’ or ‘custodianship’ of the tundra, drawing an ever-wider circle of supporters. On the side of the ‘regionals’, the Hunting Inspectorate had positioned themselves in the forefront of action, but their operational capacity was limited. With a handful of inspectors and on a meagre budget, their ability to control the cooperatives could only be a token one. Vostriakov had said it in plain words, as mentioned earlier on (Footnote 18). In the first place, some form of control could be exercised only as regarded ‘Tundra’. When it came to the remote villages and ‘Olenevod’, effective control was a virtually impossible operation. This was a fact which BEZRK was quick to seize
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upon ten years hence. One would recall that a principal argument of BEZRK would be to control otherwise completely uncontrolled territory. What the hunting inspectors were capable of doing was to occasionally organize inspecting trips across the tundra, known as ‘raids’ (reidi). Two or three armed inspectors would drive by snowmobile from Lovozero to Krasnoshchel’ie, checking documents and sled-contents of anyone they met on the road. News of such a party setting out would spread quickly through the various herding teams as soon as the party arrived from Murmansk to Lovozero. At the most, some of the less well informed would be caught napping and thus provide the whole operation with a semblance of efficiency. Official announcements like the following would tend to reflect such a state of affairs: From 13 to 20 February, officials from the Department of State Hunting Control at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region carried out an inspecting trip for the protection of animal species in Lovozero Raion. In the course of the trip, it was established that three citizens from the settlements of Lovozero and Krasnoshchel’ie, by using snowmobile vehicles, had been illegally hunting ungulates in the area of Lake Toporozero and had killed two wild reindeer. The inspectors from the Department of State Hunting Control confiscated from the perpetrators two items of non-registered hunting fire-arms. (Sotrudniki, 2014)
As regards Lovozero itself what would be done was for a barrier to be placed near Lovozero at the point where the snowmobile road across Lovozero Lake joined the hard surface road leading to the village. A car of the Inspectorate would stand by it with the intention of inspecting incoming sleds. News about the presence of such a patrol would travel quickly and other routes of getting to the village would be chosen. Any carcasses from the sleds would soon disappear in the thick maze of garages, encircling the village. Consequently, controlling transportation would mainly amount to largely futile activities. Bearing out the symbolic nature of the ‘raids’, the situation did not perceptibly change in its substantial part. The first and subsequent bans on wild reindeer hunting did not lead to increase of semi-domesticated reindeer head counts. As a look at the dynamic of head counts shows, official head-count numbers for ‘Tundra’ actually fell after imposing the ban, rather than rise. From the claimed 28,000 head for 2009, they gradually fell to slightly under 25,000 by 2020. ‘Olenevod’ claimed 24,000 head in
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2009, and 26,000 for 2020, which meant that the total figure for Lovozero Raion changed only slightly, and in a negative way, in the intervening ten- year period. The same could be said about unofficial counts in which a more realistic rough figure of about 30,000–35,000 head would be given, without major fluctuations over the said period. Wild reindeer counts gave only puzzling figures. For 2009, a round figure of 1000 head was given for the Lapland Reserve (Laplandskii zapovednik). ‘As for the rest’, to repeat what Karelin had written at the time, ‘there is no one who has any idea of how many they are’ (Karelin, 2009). At the same time, Vostriakov’s claim for 2009 was about as many as 3300 head of wild reindeer in Lovozero Raion, together with some 490 head of moose (Chernovskii, 2009). Overall, the Lovozero Raion wild reindeer counts showed uncertainty over the ten-year period between 2009 and the end of 2019, when the last of the series of bans was about to expire. Figures cited would reflect the political stances taken: for or against the inclusion of wild reindeer in the Red Book for Murmansk Region. Those lobbying for the ‘local side’ would tend to cite lower counts alongside their principal demand for inclusion of wild reindeer in the Red Book. They would thus insist on the existence of a relation between wild deer and moose hunting on the one hand, and poaching on all species concerned, leading up to ever- diminishing numbers. By contrast, the ‘regionals’ with interests in promoting hunting tourism would claim higher numbers and claim that the relation between hunting wild deer and poaching on semi-domesticated ones was constructed by the cooperatives so as to hide the ‘internal poaching’ which they allegedly tolerated. By implication, there was thus no need for inclusion of the ‘eastern part’ wild reindeer in the Red Book, but instead, for the cooperatives to introduce order among their own ranks. The resolution of the BEZRK Affair in favour of the ‘locals’ officially recognized their claims to be the more valid ones. In this way, supreme arbitration favoured the herding community rather than regional bureaucracies and the outsiders’ interests they were connected with. Sovkhoism had received supreme support. In consequence, a sense of caring of supreme power for ‘the people’, nostalgically associated with Soviet times and opposed to the ‘wild capitalism’ that ‘democracy’ had brought, was sustained.
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Tensions in Relation to Industrial Projects Tensions coming from bids for exploitation of non-renewables in the reindeer husbandry part of Lovozero Raion have consistently remained unexplored as regards both the Soviet past of the region, as well as its current, post-Soviet state. A beginning of such an exploration will be made here within the framework of the previously proposed model. In essence, that last rests on the claim that in a domain, situated under the threshold of peripherality from the perspective of top political power, local preferences for land-use management are to be privileged, while those placed above that threshold remain beyond debate. As a rule, they are realized in the spirit of higher regional and federal interests. Any popular response that may follow would be left to cyclically revolve in narratives in the genre of ‘litanies and laments’ (Ries, 1997). When tensions occur under the peripherality threshold, some discursive specifics can be observed. The latter mode of peripheral governance is not officially voiced and finds its expression only through ‘meta-texts’: like those around the wild reindeer controversy discussed in the previous section. In operational terms, ‘under the peripheral threshold’ cases can be said to occur within the framework of a regime of limited informal co- management. Another way of saying the same would be that they then enjoy a respite allowed them by forms of selectively de-centralized (‘liberated’) peripherality. The historical course of such events portrays momentary oscillations of supreme power decisions, placing a given case below, or alternatively, above the peripheral threshold. NKVD Project 509: That was an aborted attempt of the early 1950s for building a railway line traversing the present husbandry area from west to east. The plan was to connect the main south-to-north industrial strip with the Barents Sea coast. The project was to be accomplished by forced labour, which involved the setting up of a GULAG camp in the tundra: Corrective Labour Camp No 509 (Ispravitel’no-trudovoi lager’ 509). (Konstantinov, 2015:300; KE, 2008:191: Took, 2004:238). A trans-peninsular railway was to stretch from the town of Apatity in the middle of the industrial strip, to the village of Ponoi on the Barents Sea Coast, with a branch line to the naval base at Iokanga Bay—the future Gremikha/ Ostrovnoi. Construction was begun from the Apatity end of the future line, but was abandoned in 1953 after Stalin’s death and the momentous power reshuffle which followed. This is the place to recall that the trans-peninsular project had been under the personal curatorship of
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Lavrentii Beria, who, at the same period, had been also responsible for the creation, again with forced labour, of the Mining-Processing Complex of Karnasurt, near Lovozero. Unlike Project 509 however, the latter was not abandoned after Stalin’s death and the removal from power and subsequent execution of the notorious NKVD/MVD Head. The living legacy of the accomplished Karnasurt mining-processing project is the present Lovozerskii GOK, the mining town of Revda itself, as well as Correction Colony (Ispravitel’naia koloniya, IK) No 23 on its northern fringe. Had the trans-peninsular railway project been realized in the same way as the NKVD Project which created Revda and its GOK, there was a good chance that reindeer husbandry in Lovozero Raion would now be history. The best proof of that is that all reindeer husbandry to the West of the existing south-to-north railway line, as well as the tundra area adjacent to it, has been long gone.51 While Stalin’s death and the liquidation of Beria in its wake may have been the reason for aborting Project 509, industrial projects of the same, earlier, as well as later periods continued in full force and made the Region into what we see it today. The fortunate cancellation of some of the plans gave the reindeer husbandry part of Murmansk Region a lease of life in Lovozero Raion. At the same time, even here later plans, made high above the heads of the ‘locals’ and giving them a shrinking peripheral space in which they could still feel as sole ‘custodians’, still impacted and destroyed various chunks of this extant domain. Below I turn to three such developments: Serebrianskoe Hydro-Electrical Complex, Voronia Minerals wouldbe gold mining project, the currently planned Fedorova Tundra rare metals mining-processing project, and the latest in this series: the ‘Nornikel’/’Rosatom’ lithium mining-processing project. All of them concern solely the extant reindeer husbandry parts of Lovozero Raion. They illustrate how an imaginary central power pointer, in its unseen oscillations between what is of interest, or, alternatively, is to be ignored and consequently ‘left’ to the local community, may realize, or abort this or that project. Serebrianskoe Hydro-Electrical Complex is a case in which а huge chunk of reindeer husbandry territory was destroyed together with an ancient Sami winter settlement at its entry point. The reason stated was the growing regional industrial and urban needs for electricity. Satisfying those 51 For attempts to revive reindeer husbandry west of the line see Konstantinov, 2015 (44f); Rybkin (1999:19f).
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needs was presented as an issue not to be debated, but only complied with and its tragic consequences for the local population somehow adapted to. The building of what became the Serebrianskoe Hydro-Electrical Complex and its sprawiling Reservoir system necessitated the damming of River Serebrianka. That meant flooding a substantial part of the grazing range in the north-eastern part of Lovozero Raion and, along with that, the ancient Sami winter settlement of Koarrdegk Sijjt, better known as Voroninskii Pogost, or the Village of Voronia. Local historians give the following account of the event: Fifty years ago, in 1964, in connection with the growing needs of electrical supply for Murmansk Region, the construction of Serebrianskoe Hydro- Electrical Station began at Voronia River. It was accomplished in 1973. In result, two dams were built, and a vast territory flooded by the formation of the cascade of Serebrianskoe Reservoirs. Among the places which were flooded, the ancient Sami Village of Voronia happened to be (my emphasis). (Ustinova, 2019)
As we can see, the project was presented with the inevitability of a geological process, at the centre of which an ancient Sami village happened to be. No attempt seems to have been made for saving the ancient village. Its inhabitants were relocated to Lovozero. Their fate was shared on a much bigger scale by the inhabitants of all ‘administratively liquidated’ tundra villages in the wake of the agglomeration drive of the late 1960s– early 1970s.52 In the memory of the survivors, who were children at the time, the flooding of their village remained as a collective tragedy. In the words of the reporting historian: People had to leave in Voronia all their belongings and houses, often newly- built ones. The flooding of the ‘little motherland’ (malaia rodina)53 was a dreadful tragedy for all inhabitants of the village (ibid.)
52 On agglomeration of collective farms and administrative liquidation of tundra villages see Afanas’ieva (2013). 53 Malaia rodina (little birthland) in local use: the place from which a person had originally come to their more settled place of residence, and where they were born and had spent their significant childhood.
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The text continues in the so painfully common Russian genre of lamenting tragic death and loss, and the vowing to always remember the irretrievable (‘Voronia, you will always live in our hearts!’). In terms of discursive registers, this is the ‘litanies and laments’ one, as so aptly termed by Nancy Ries (1997). Its use reflects the human situation when supreme power’s interests uncompromisingly and heavy-handedly intrude into what is otherwise a peripheral domain. Falling into a ‘litanies and laments’ mode can be seen as the only way its inhabitants see open to themselves. It is in this way they try somehow to adapt to the consequences of tragedies which had befallen them with no chance of aversion. This point of inevitability of something which had to happen beyond ordinary people’s agency is accentuated in the text above by the factual detail of people having to leave all their belongings in the houses to be flooded. How was that? Historical record, part of which I have quoted above, shows that the process of relocation took a full year—from June 1962 to the summer of the following year. Rationally, one would surmise that there were problems with transportation and rebuilding the village at a new site. Still, the inevitable impression is of a flood suddenly coming and engulfing a village, with people fleeing before it. Another notable detail in narratives of this type is that the fate of the livelihood of the people hit, that of reindeer husbandry, is not placed at the centre of ensuing events. The emphasis is put on living conditions after relocation—when the refugees had to live in cramped tiny space for years. The difficult times for them ended only when the blocks-of-flats in Lovozero were eventually built and moving to own premises became possible (Allemann, 2020; Vatonena, 1989). Reindeer husbandry problems remained, as a rule, in the shadow of the dominant living-space ones. From the perspective of reporting historians, as well as of the witnesses themselves, the prioritization of residence over contact with herds can be seen as a shadow of an already emerging pattern. That can be described as tragic events traumatically and excessively accentuating a process already rolling forth, but with intolerable slowness from the point of view of ruling circles. A trickle of a rural-urban migration from Voronia to Lovozero was taking place anyway, given the close proximity to the Raion centre and, via that base, beyond. Let it be re-iterated here, that in his much- celebrated book of the late 1920s, Charnoluskii (1930) unsuccessfully attempted to relay an early version of the same message. Reindeer husbandry problems in the wake of industrial devastation became a common theme much later, but not from an intuitively expected
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angle. That was when the ‘victimization by poaching’ genre became a common theme. The Serebrianskoe Complex involved an asphalt road connection to Murmansk. Consequently, its north-western end placed it in relatively close proximity to the Regional Centre. Inevitably, forays by urban poachers increased in that part of Sovkhoz ‘Tundra’ and its SKhPK successor, or in what today is known as Tundra’s ‘Left Wing’. The Complex as an inducer of poaching was never mentioned in official accounts, but the mentioning of its geographical position (as its very name) pointed an accusing finger at it. This is evident from all ‘victimization- by-poaching’ texts, in which the Complex, together with the military, get accused. The following genre text illustrates this point: The figures of losses due to poaching are truly stunning. If we take only the counts for the last year (for the current one they are not made yet) they are the following. At the time of the harvesting campaign of 2004-’05, only on the Serebrianskoe highway (my emphasis), over 2,200 kg of meat was confiscated, which had been procured by illegal means. And that was not whole animals, with antlers and hooves, but only the choice parts: haunches and shoulders. So, we can only imagine what the real number of killed animals had been. (Il’ina, 2005)
In this account, as in all subsequent texts of the same genre over the following years, vital details of the situation are missing. On the highway leading from Murmansk to the Complex, with connections to the coastal villages of Teriberka and Tumannii, ‘Tundra’ used to have a corral base, known as ‘69-ii kilometr’ (‘Km 69’) (Konstantinov, 2005:338–428). The base serviced the counting and other processing needs of Brigades 3, 5, and 7, which were situated on the northwestern side of the cooperative’s territory. The position of the corral base right on the asphalt highway to Murmansk was a powerful incentive for internal poaching to flourish. Although occasional forays by urban poachers did occur, the major part of losses incurred would be by informal selling to urban visitors who came to the corral base in their cars. As I could personally witness in November 1995, buyers came from as far as Norway. Clearly, it made much more sense to buy at a low price from the herders themselves, rather than shoulder costs and risk life and limb by chasing reindeer around the tundra. The practice eventually wiped off whole brigade teams as their herds were slowly ‘eaten up’ by such sales. Thus, Brigades No 3 and 5 now
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belong to memory, as the Corral Base ‘Km 69’ itself. Indeed, proximity to roads leading up to Murmansk had wiped off the reindeer herd of the Kolkhoz ‘Murmanets’ of Teriberka (2000 head) long before that.54 Two preliminary conclusions are to be made, concerning the case of the Serebrianskoe Complex. The most obvious is that industrial impact does not only kill by direct hit as was the case of the flooded Voroniskii Pogost. The fatal blow also comes by the less visible and largely ‘unsayable’ in its consequences factor of hard road connectedness. The latter is a powerful incentive for the flourishing of internal illegal taking, which, in its turn, is capable of wiping off entire brigade herds, and even collective farms. That not only had happened in the case of the Teriberka Kolkhoz, mentioned above, but also had precluded all attempts of reviving reindeer husbandry to the west of the railway line. Pasture-hungry Finnish and Norwegian herders have been eyeing that land for a long time now, but all attempts to establish some form of cooperation and use of that fallow land have failed. Such efforts have been rendered futile in the face of internal taking from herds, stimulated by road- and railway-connectedness. External poaching has also been a factor, but it can be considered to be of secondary importance. The ‘Boliden’/‘Voronia Minerals’ gold mining project:55 The absence of hard-surface roads and railways, coupled with the absence of a connection with the regional electrical grid, may explain the faltering course of projects for non-renewable exploitation in the deeper forest tundra parts. No attempt, save of the aborted Project No 509, was made to repair the situation over the entirety of the Soviet period. This continued well into the 1990s despite the fact that the mineral map of locations in the extant reindeer husbandry part had been long drawn and geological surveys were being regularly conducted (Luzin et al., 1994). As noted, the reluctance to go forth with effective extraction saved reindeer husbandry. It will not be an exaggeration to say that roadlessness and energy disconnectedness
54 According to Wikipedia’s history of Teriberka (Accessed 30.03.21), the kolkhoz herd of roughly 2000 head had been transferred to Lovozero in the period of agglomeration (1970s). The herders of Brigade 3 of ‘Tundra’, whom I had asked about the fate of the Teriberka herd during my fieldwork with them (1994–1996), gave a brief answer: ‘Oni ikh s’ieli’ (They had eaten them), meaning that the herd went for subsistence and informal sales to traders. 55 Parts of this section are edited versions of a report written at the time of the event (Konstantinov, 1998).
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are among the main reasons for the current existence of reindeer husbandry in the eastern part of the Kola Peninsula. At the same time, the fate of two projects in the post-Soviet history of this part of the Region are indicative of a stronger factor than that of existing infrastructural deficiencies: namely, that of central political will. Within the framework of the analytical procedure offered here, the presence or absence of political will for the realization of an industrial project in an ecologically fragile and infrastructurally deficient environment is not to be gauged by results of originally announced non-renewable extraction projects. Realizations may get protracted for years, or even decades, with hardly anyone knowing what will actually happen at the end of the process, or whether it will have an end at all in the foreseeable future. As a rule, the dynamic of decision making is not an empirically observable process in the reality at hand. Consequently, what at least partially yields to empirical observation is whether the fortunes of a given project are made accessible through the public media and, more decisively, whether they are laid open for public debate. In the model offered here, that last is to be interpreted as a decision made at the upper reaches of the vertical of power. When the significance of a project is considered to be peripheral enough for central power interests (i.e., it exists below the peripherality threshold) its aborted realization can serve better as a political tool for creating a local sense of democratic freedom, rather than preoccupy central attention any further. In the examples given so far: of the wild reindeer controversy, and, particularly, of the BEZRK affair, we can see cases in which the outcome may be considered as indifferent to central needs. Consequently, a sense of democratic freedom of decision on a peripheral local scale has been promoted. As I have shown, in the language of local political discourse concerning the tundra-oriented part of the community that may be paraphrased in the following way: ‘we have won and remain as the custodians of the tundra’. The Boliden/Voronia Minerals Project of the late 1990s illustrate such a case—or, at least for the time being. This is said with the following caveat in mind. The episode occurred towards the end of Boris Yeltsin’s presidentship, but still within that ‘dashing’ time. Equally importantly, that was also the time of the ‘Barents euphoria’ (Hønneland, 2003, see also: Seppänen, 1995), and at the height of western and home support of Sami activism. This context may explain much about the eventual fizzling out of this project. As it will be shown further on, the fate of the next extractive
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project: that of the Barrick Gold/Rostekh platinoid one may well prove to be very different, positioned as it is in the current context of ‘mature Putinism’. According to announcements in the regional daily newspaper Murmanskii vestnik of 25 and 28 March 1998, the Murmansk Regional Administration had opened up a competition for mining and prospecting rights deep into the reindeer husbandry part of Lovozero Raion. The targeted part included a large area stretching from the Voronia River Basin in the north, to Kolmiavr (Kolmozero) Lake and the Pana Hills (Panskie tundry) in the south. The local community immediately reacted to this news. The Lovozero Raion Soviet of War, Labour, and Law-enforcement Veterans56 initiated a protest meeting within days of the announcement. The matter was discussed on 8 April. A letter of protest was written and sent to the Regional Governor. Apart from the Veterans, it was also signed by the Lovozero Branch of the Kola Saami Association, and by the Association of the Izhma-Komi ‘Iz'vatas’. The protest was published by the mouthpiece of the Raion Administration, Lovozerskaia Pravda, on 29 May. In an abbreviated form it read: The Administration of Murmansk Region and the Committee of Geology and Underground Exploitation in Murmansk Region have announced an open competition for the right of exploiting underground mineral resources and of geological surveying with following extraction of gold, copper, molybdenum, low-yield sulphide, and platinum-metal ores in the Voronia River Basin. The total area which can be thus taken from the reindeer- herding pastures equals 675 sq.km. in size, which shall totally destroy a major part of reindeer herding in the Raion, and thus destroy the basis for subsistence of the local tundra-dependent population. (Konstantinov, 1998)
The protest did not seem to have any perceptible effect. By September it became known that a Russian-Swedish joint venture, Voronia Minerals JSC, had won the competition. The renowned anthropologist and reindeer-herding specialist from the University of Uppsala, Prof. Hugh Beach, visited Lovozero in September and made enquiries about the 56 Lovozerskii raionnyi sovet veteranov (Council of Veterans of Lovozero District). A local branch of the NGO Vserosiiskaia obshchestvennaia organisatsiia veteranov (pensionerov) voiny, truda, vooruzhionnikh sil i pravookhranitel’nykh organov (All-Russian Public Organization of the Veterans (Pensioners) of War, Labour, Armed Forces, and Law-enforcing Organs).
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prospects of mining. Upon returning to Sweden, he confirmed that Voronia Minerals had won the competition, adding that 80% of the company was indeed constituted by the Swedish firm Boliden AB, and that it had been granted an exploration and exploitation lease for 25 years in the SKhPK ‘Tundra’ herding range, effective immediately.57 Several important details (or as it said in colloquial Russian, niuansi (nuances)) were missed by the indignant local activists at the time. One was that such a deal could not have been legally possible and permission for exploration granted without the written consent of SKhPK ‘Tundra’s’ management. This followed from the legal fact mentioned earlier on in connection with the Kolmiavr hunting/fishing lease case. Namely, that the grazing range in question was on land designated for the cooperative’s ‘agricultural use’. Legally, no non-agricultural activity could be carried out there without the consent of the cooperative. Secondly, and in the same vein, the activists seemed to have been innocent of who the Russian part of the newly created company were. The winners of the competition were registered as Open Joint Stock Company (OAO)58 Voronia Minerals. As Hugh Beach had reported at the time, the principal shareholder was the Swedish mining and smelting company Boliden AB with 77.78 % of the invested capital. The rest of the shares (at 11.11% per holder) were equally distributed between a Monchegorsk-based company for geological exploration (AO59 ‘Tsentral’no-kol’skaia ekspeditsiya’60), and the Administration of Lovozero Raion (emphasis mine). The whole investment package of the minor investors constituted the symbolic sum of 90,000 roubles (Otkrytoe, 2021). It was thus the case that the Administration of Lovozero Raion was a partner in the plans for mining in its own reindeer husbandry part, and, what was equally disturbing, that the reindeer husbandry cooperative itself had given its consent for exploration. In December the same year, a new protest was circulated, this time by the Center for Civil Society International61 in the form of a resolution passed by The Second Indigenous Circumpolar Youth Conference (Resolution on Lovozero District 4/11/98). This statement voiced Personal communication, Hugh Beach, 10 October 1998. OAO: Otkrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo. 59 AO: Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo. 60 See: https://geokola.com/about/ (Accessed 11.03.21). 61 Personal communication of 12.12.98; e-mail: [email protected] 57 58
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essentially the same concerns as in the Lovozerskaia Pravda proclamation of 28 May, quoted above, and was again signed by the Lujavvri (Lovozero) Local Branch of the Kola Saami Association, the Association of the Komi- Izhemtsi ‘Iz'vatas’, and the Lovozero Committee of War and Labour Veterans. Despite these two protests, it looked as if come summer 1999, ‘Voronia Minerals’ would begin their activities as per contract. Though it was not clear exactly where in the very large area referred to (from the Voronia River Basin in the north, to the Pana Hills in the south) the activities would take place, they would undoubtedly transect the trek-routes of the SKhPK ‘Tundra’ herds, both of its Left and Right Wings. The area between River Voronia and Kolmiavr (Kolmozero) Lake, in particular, lied across the trek-routes of all ‘Tundra’ brigades at the time, excepting the now defunct Brigades 3, 5, and 7. These latter, as was said in the previous section, went one by one under the impact of Serebrianskoe Hydro- Electrical Complex, together with their Corral Base ‘Km 69’. Sensitive to the international outcry raised at a time in which the Russian Sami aspect of the situation spelled the grossest political incorrectness, Boliden pulled out of the deal. The official reason for the withdrawal that was stated by the company was the financial crisis in Russia, in the wake of the default of August 1998. To my knowledge, neither local nor international protests were officially referred to. In the history section on the web-site of the company, the Kola episode of 1998 was not even mentioned (New Boliden, 2021). After Boliden left, the remaining Russian part of Voronia Minerals quietly wrapped up operations and in 2007 the company was legally liquidated. The official reason stated was that the reasons for which the company was created had expired, that is, that exploratory activities had been completed (Otkrytoe, 2021). The Boliden/Voronia Minerals aborted project illustrates a process of gradual falling under the peripheral threshold. At the beginning, it looked like a case drawing some central attention, coupled with provincial hopes for financial gain coming through the involvement of a mighty western investor. A number of factors caused the exit of the promising investor: sensitivity to the indigenous local and international outcry, as well as the havoc in Russia, following the August 1998 default. Under the impact of the last event, in particular, central political attention had dismissed a project in its distant periphery.
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Within the consequently opened theatre of operations, the local side, represented by a mix of Sami, Komi, and Communist Party62 activism, and supported (in its Sami part), by the Fennoscandic neighbours, had ‘won’. In the context of this local victory, the fact that both the SkhPK management and the Raion Administration had taken their respective parts in what was for all intents and purposes a project capable of dealing a mortal blow to reindeer husbandry was overlooked. Another moment is also to be noted. The reindeer herders themselves were not represented in the debate, although all the NGOs spoke in their name and in that of reindeer husbandry. In the lull that followed, all uncomfortable facts were gradually forgotten until a new danger appeared. That came in the form of the currently evolving Barrick Gold/Rostekh saga. The ‘Barrick Gold’/‘Rostekh’ platinoid mining-processing project: In 2006, that is, eight years after Boliden had pulled out, a Canadian mining company expressed interest in the rare metal ores that lay beneath the reindeer grazing range. It was officially announced that this company (Barrick Gold) had procured a licence for beginning exploration of platinum ore deposits in Fedorova Tundra.63 The area in question comprised 2.5 thousand hectares, located in the winter grazing range of SkhPK ‘Tundra’ (see Map 3.3): As it is said in the explanatory note above, two open excavation pits were to be dug and an adjacent mining-processing complex built. Vice- Governor A. Selin announced at the time that annual dues paid into the regional budget would be in the region of one billion roubles (Novoe, 2006). The announcement was met with great apprehension by the local Lovozero Raion public. Neither the prospect of serious income for the regional budget, nor the promise of creating as many as 1200 jobs during the construction period, and 900 during exploitation, was seen as a cause for enthusiasm. In practically all developmental projects, taking place in the Region, specialists and even workers were being imported from outside the region and would be working in shifts for the duration of the project. On the one hand, finding locally trained personnel was highly problematic, as it still is. On the other, companies importing labour would deflect social security costs. Let it be said in passing, that the same policy 62 The Council of Veterans is overwhelmingly represented by members of KPRF (CPRF): the post-Soviet successor of KPSS (CPSU). 63 [Tundra] in the local toponymy means ‘hilly’, ‘mountain ridge’ area.
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Map 3.3 Location of the Fedorova Tundra site (source: Kol’skie karty, 2021). The explanatory note (right) reads: ‘According to preliminary data deposits consist of up to 250 tons of platinoid ores. The license is property of SP ‘ZAO Fedorovo Resources’. Construction of two excavation pits as well as a processing factory are planned at the site. From 2010 on production of 150 thousand tons of concentrate a year have been planned for a period of 13 years with an average platinoid content of 100 grammes per ton. NOTE: The Canadian Company ‘Barrick Gold’ is the world’s biggest gold-mining company
has been adopted by owners of exclusive salmon fishing camps, discussed earlier on. The fact of the matter is that a temporarily hired employee is much cheaper for the employer than a permanently hired one. Or as a Russian journalist puts it: ‘It is simply more profitable for the employer to import outside workers than to take responsibility for the maintenance of local specialists’ (Britskaia, 2020) Instead, grave fears were voiced in the local and regional press that such a project, spread over 20 sq. km of grazing range, would destroy irreparably the fragile environment, as well as sound the death knell for reindeer husbandry in the targeted area. Additionally, the poaching pressure on reindeer herds would massively increase. Sami activists were indignant that devastating mining and processing activities were to take place at sacred Sami sites. International attention was also alerted to the case. The protestbarrick.net portal, monitoring Barrick Gold mining activities worldwide
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published an article, specifically addressing projected activities of the corporation in Fedorova Tundra (Mwanjisi, 2009). To allay such fears and assure the local community that proper measures for environmental protection would be taken, the Russian representatives of Barrick Gold set up an information office in Lovozero’s public library. A regular information program was conducted, involving a stand with descriptions of environmentally protective activities, and a stack of leaflets. A series of public meetings stressing the environmentally concerned policy of the group were also held. While the local community was far from being calmed by such Barrick Gold proclamations of allegedly great concern for the environment and Sami sacred sites, the cooperative management instantly agreed with the project taking place. A legal nuance could make such acquiescence understandable—but only to an extent. Unlike the previously discussed Boliden/ Voronia Minerals case, projected construction and extractive activities were to take place in Forestry Fund land, and not in one designated for ‘agricultural use’. In decades past, ‘Tundra’s winter grazing range had extended to those parts, but with the contraction of the cooperatives herd and severe lack of a full complement of herding teams, the winter pastures had been long staying fallow. Still, the cooperative could have claimed them as reserve pastures. Predictably and following from their vassal subsidized status, that was a right they chose to forego. The ease with which that was done stunned the community not a little. Running ahead, the shock would be repeated five years later, albeit as regards an incomparably smaller deal: that of the Kolmiavr hunting/fishing lodge being allowed in Tundra’s grazing range territory. Concerning the Kolmiavr area, representing the very heart of ‘Tundra’s’ Right Wing territory, an even greater shock would come with the acquiescence of the cooperative’s leadership for a huge mining/processing complex to be built right by it. To this Lithium-mining project, I return later on. Going back to days of 11 years earlier, I asked people from ‘Tundra’s’ leadership about their opinion of the Fedorova Tundra Project. They answered that the parts of winter pastures in question had not been used for decades anyway. They also repeated the official mantra that ‘many of the local people will be able to get well-paid jobs at the future mining- processing complex’, in which, as explained above, no one had serious reasons to believe. As in the ‘Kolmiavr’ hunting lodge case (still to come), and the much more ominous Lithium one after it, the herders of the teams concerned,
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as well as the Raion public in general, reached the unsurprising conclusion that pressure for the deal had come ‘from above’. Consequently, the cooperative management could do nothing but comply. Such a conclusion, which any Russian citizen would make in similar circumstances, was unsurprisingly borne out by subsequent developments. In nearly a decade and a half after the first announcement, nothing much happened with the Fedorova Tundra project. It gradually began to look frozen into perpetuity. Local opinion went to the extent that protesting had been effective—as in the case of the previously discussed Boliden/ Voronia Minerals case. Such conclusions proved to be naïve. In May 2020, it was announced that Barrick Gold had pulled out of the deal and had sold their license. As the regional hibiny.com put it: ‘Fedorova Tundra has acquired new masters’ (U Fedorovoi, 2020). The new masters proved to be а consortium of investors around the giant State Corporation (goskorporatsiia) Rostekh. Apart from the other state companies involved, the participation of a private investor was also mentioned, but who that was remained unsaid. Regional media suggested that that might have been A. Chemezov—director of the Cheliabinsk Pipe-Rolling Works (ChTPK) and an oligarch of considerable means. Against this brief history of events, comparing the case with that of Hunting Club BEZRK throws additional light on how tundra matters fare in domains above and below the threshold of peripherality. A surface similarity serves to introduce such a comparison. By chance or not, both developments coincided with the change of Governorship and the advent of A. Chibis to the post in the spring of 2019. It will be recalled that the change triggered a tour around the administrative subjects of the Region for the purpose of ‘personal acquaintance’ of the new Governor with ‘local problems’. As mentioned earlier on, the tour included Lovozero Raion. The acquaintance with ‘local problems’ in that largest part of the Region took place at two public meetings in Revda in the spring-summer of 2019. Unlike the BEZRK case however, plans for resuming non-renewable exploitation in a part of the grazing range were not voiced by the locals as ‘local problems’ at those meetings. Nor did they find any place in the local media or in any other form of public activism. Official sources were also either totally silent or provided dated information. Something had changed in the period since the early protests in 2006. A look at the annual Arctic Business Forum, held in Rovaniemi (Finland), also failed to clarify the situation. In its part for Murmansk Region, it
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relied on information provided by the Ministry of Economic Development of Murmansk Region, thus reflecting the official position of the regional government. In the last available issue of the Forum, which is for 2019, an account was given concerning the Fedorova Tundra project. By the time of publication, it was heavily outdated, not to say totally fictitious: Fedorovo Tundra platinum project has made a comeback to the official investment list. The main operator is Fedorovo Resources together with the Canadian Barrick Gold Corporation. (ABF, 2019:83)
Further in the ABF Yearbook, the investment of Fedorovo Resources/ Barrick Gold Corporation Platinum Mine and Mill was quoted at 650 m euro (p.85). All that by that time was entirely somewhere in the clouds as Barrick Gold had been planning to pull out of Russia practically from the start.64 As the regional hibiny.com explained the dynamics at the time and since: According to ‘Kommersant’65, already in 2006 Barrick had taken a decision in principle to cancel their activities in Russia. They had planned to invest in much bigger projects, like the massive gold deposits at Sukhoi Log in Irkutsk Region. The procedure of selling that asset dragged on for more than 20 years and in January 2017 it was bought by a joint venture, consisting of Said (sic) Kerimov’s66 Polius, and Rostekh. For the Fedorova Tundra license, it is not likely that Barrick Gold had received more than they had invested. The sum was 60 m USD according to the Head of the Group for Assessing Risks for Sustainable Development AKRA Maksim Hudalov. The Canadian company was driven to selling out the asset because of license problems for Fedorova Tundra (the current one expires in 2021, and the company had asked for it to be prolonged as far back as 2017), as well as due to the location of the site, as he (Hudalov) supposed. The price of the deal Chibis did not name, as well as who the representative of Rostekh was. (U Fedorovoi, 2020)
For a detailed account of the process by that time Helmer (2007). A Russian daily newspaper covering business developments. 66 Billionaire Russian industrialist and politician Suleiman Kerimov, a senator in the Russian Parliament, is known to belong to President Putin’ topmost circle of loyal oligarchs. His name has surfaced recently in connection with the US seizure of a mega-yacht, believed to belong to him. The USD 325 m Amadea was arrested in Fiji in November 2022 (Bonomolo & McLennan, 2022). 64 65
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From this account, it becomes clear that Barrick Gold were being pushed out across the whole front: both as regarded the massive deposits in Irkutsk Region, as well as the much smaller ones in Murmansk Region. In both cases, the favoured new owner was the giant Rostekh, in conjunction with various oligarchs of the top-most loyal-to-Putin circle. The instrument used was through licensing: either granting a licence dragged on for years or even decades, or, should it have been already granted at a former time (as in the Fedorova Tundra case), its prolongation after the initial period expired was blocked. It is notable that in AKRA’s assessment, no word about winter pastures, Sami sacred sites, or local protests in Lovozero Raion was ever said. This may be seen as a clear indication that at that stage of the process, the case was being decided well above the heads of the ‘locals’, or, in other words, well above the peripheral threshold. The fortunes of both the giant state company Rostekh had every appearance of directly engaging the attention of upper power circles, or even of the top-most pinnacle. The same message can be read in an account of the case addressed to the more general public. On 28 May 2020, an article with the eye-catching title Kol’skiy Klondaik (The Kola Klondike) appeared in Murmanskii vestnik (Iudkov, 2020). The article was written in the usual manner of announcing bonanzas coming to the Region. The local reader had seen many such, let it be said in passing, which either did not happen at all, or even in case something did happen, it had to do more with Moscow bank accounts rather than with local fortunes. Be as it may, great riches were again proclaimed to be lying underground in the Fedorova Tundra area and that their extraction would soon begin. On the question about the reason for the Canadians pulling out of the regional Klondike, the reporting journalist wrote: For the time being one can only guess what had made the Canadians abandon this project and why Russian business became interested in it. It is possible that Fedorova Tundra had attracted the new investors (i.e., Rostekh, etc.) because of the high prices of palladium and the prospects of using precious and rare metals in technologically advanced branches of industry. I reiterate that the consortium in which Rostekh participates is prepared to invest in the site 60 b roubles. (ibid.)
The phrase ‘I reiterate’ (povtoryus’) refers to the beginning of the article where it occurs in the following context:
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Fedorova Tundra is the world biggest deposit of palladium, (which is) highly topical and important—the Governor of Murmansk Region Andrei Chibis said at a discussion of the State Committee (Goskomissiia). According to him, the project was in need of Federal support, because the case in point required investment to the tune of 60 b roubles. The deposits are comparable with the biggest global ones, situated in Southern Africa’s Bushveld. (ibid.)
According to Arctic Russia, what Chibis was asking in the way of federal support concerned the infrastructural part of the project: 6 b roubles, of which 5 b were needed for connecting the site with the regional electricity grid (Osvoenie, 2021). The main investment of 60 b for extraction and processing would be shouldered by state corporation Rostekh and its private partners. The project’s presentation by the Governor of Murmansk Region before the State Committee (Goskomissiia) marked it as one of federal interest of the highest level. Intentionally or not, Chibis’s words were reported in a way that reflected the reality of the situation: at that level of magnitude state and business were one. Clearly, Barrick Gold had little else to do in such an environment, but pack up and go. Prudently, they would not say as much, preferring to hint the reasons as connected with the 2008 global crisis. This cover version was either adopted by the Russian media (i.e., Britskaia, 2020), or they preferred to be ‘puzzled’ as to why the Canadians had chosen to opt out. As for the ‘locals’, reindeer husbandry, and Sami sacred sites, no word was reported to leave the lips of either Chibis, or of anyone else at that stage of the process. Voices of concern for the environment and for Sami interests were to be heard only a year later, when by all appearances top level decisions in Moscow must have already been taken. Whatever followed on the local level was to be in the way of information about the progress of such decisions: much as in the case of the Serebrianskoe Complex. The difference was that human tragedy would not occur this time as the project site was remote and uninhabited. The informational motif in the public campaigns of the new ‘masters’ was very much that of the previous ones. In their mining-processing activities, as well as in the auxiliary infrastructural ones, the new ‘masters’ would follow ‘an environmentally-protective policy and concern for Indigenous Sami interests’ (Fig. 3.8). That was reiterated by a daughter company, created for local action. That was AO Fedorovo Resources,
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Fig. 3.8 Presentation of Head of AO ‘Fedorovo Resources’ A. Gostevskikh before Sami representatives and Lovozero Raion authorities in Murmansk (10.02.21)
created originally by Barrick Gold in 2001, frozen during the interim period, and now resurrected by Rostekh (Osvoenie, 2021). In this way, as a legacy from the initial years of the Barrick period, AO Fedorovo Resources lay dormant and waiting for top-end decisions to be finally made. That must have happened only in January–February 2021, as, according to a reporting journalist, towards the end of the previous year matters there had stood as follows: there is an office building on Lenin Street in Apatity where you can find everything from a notary to a travel agency. On the 4th floor of this building, there is a piece of paper glued to an inconspicuous door with the inscription: ‘Fedorovo Resources’. But apart from the piece of paper, there is nothing there. The door is tightly shut, there are no signs of life behind it and certainly no traces of platinum investment. (Britskaia, 2020)
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It was thus that matters had stood by November 2020. By February 2021, Galina Zadornaia of Lovozerskaia Pravda reported a meeting in Murmansk at which Fedorovo Resources looked once again up and going. Its newly minted General Director (Aleksei Gostevskikh) presented the ‘green’ message, already familiar from former Barrick presentations at the Lovozero Public Library. As seen in Fig. 3.8, it read: ‘Metals from Fedorova Tundra for Green Technologies.’ The heading in Lovozerskaia Pravda was ‘The indigenous population discuss topical issues’ (Zadornaia, 2021). The indigenous population was represented by two parties. One was the Council of Representatives of the Indigenous Numerically-small Peoples of the North at the Government of Murmansk Region (henceforth: The Indigenous Council). The other: the Sami NGO ‘Sam’ Sobbar’ (Sami Assembly). Also present were representatives of the Regional Ministry of Tourism, of Internal Policy, of Natural Resources and Ecology, officials of Lovozero Raion Administration and Village Settlement Lovozero, of AO ‘Fedorovo Resources’, as well as some participants under the vague heading ‘public representatives’ (predstaviteli obshchestvennosti). In the total attendance of about fifteen participants, the ‘indigenous population’ was represented by two ladies of each one of the two Sami organizations. The history and current state of these two organizations calls for a detailed discussion in its own right. I will only mention here that the first one (the Indigenous Council) is a counselling organ at the Government of Murmansk Region, entirely toeing the line of that state body. It is, in this sense, a part of the regional state structure, although the office of its members, is not a salaried one. The career of the second body (Sam’ Sobbar) has been more chequered. Originally, it began as a bold attempt of creating a Kola Sami Parliament, as an analogue of the ones existing in the neighbouring Fennoscandic countries. In the course of the last decade, its militant initiators (V. Sovkina, A. Danilov) were replaced by a more docile leadership and gradually turned into an NGO version of the Indigenous Council. Moving to Norway after the beginning of the Ukrainian War, the original militant leaders now constitute a Kola Sami émigré circle in that country. At a local Lovozero Raion level, and among what prominent Sami specialist Elisabeth Scheller aptly called ‘the silent (Sami) majority’, both organizations are eyed with suspicion as state organizations with a principally folkloristic function.
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The official end of the ill-fated Sami Assembly came in the last days of 2022. At its 5th Congress, it was decided to terminate its activities (Nikolaev, 2022). Before closing down, the Assembly recommended that Sami Soviets be created at the Municipalities where the Sami people were living. A course of further fusing of the Sami movement into state structures was thus firmly charted. Still at the beginning of the so fateful 2022, the ‘indigenous people’ present at the meeting about future exploration at the Fedorova Tundra site listened politely to the ecological manifesto of Fedorovo Resources and made no objections to extraction activities. That was also the case with the Raion administrative representatives. By an already established tradition for such events, the reindeer husbandry ‘town-forming enterprises’ did not attend the event. After the first short presentation of the Murmansk meeting of 10 February (Zadornaia, 2021), a much longer one appeared in the next Lovozerskaia Pravda issue of 5 March (Shebut, 2021). The heading was ‘Fedorovo tundras: plans and prospects’. A fact of note was that it was written by the Head of Village Settlement Lovozero herself, that is, Galina Shebut. It will be recalled here that Village Settlement Lovozero is the branch of Lovozero Raion Administration responsible for the Village of Lovozero itself, for the ‘remote villages’ (Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and Sosnovka), as well as for the reindeer husbandry part of the Raion. In other words, it governs the whole of the ‘rural’ part of the Raion, minus Forestry Fund land. According to this last detail, the Village Settlement (sel’skoe poselenie), as it is called for short, does not hold Fedorovo Tundra within its range of office as that is legally within the management of the Forestry Fund. On the whole front page of Lovozerskaia Pravda, the Head of the Village Settlement presented a glowing account of what AO Fedorovo Resources (with Rostekh and the unnamed oligarch behind) would bring to the Region, to the Lovozerians, and to the inhabitants of the remote villages. These were flows of taxes into the regional budget, consequent stabilization for the Raion budget, jobs all around, infrastructural improvements (roads and energy) for the remote villages, and training local youth for specialist jobs at the future mining-processing complex. Reindeer husbandry would also benefit: it would get a big market for selling its meat. The Head of Fedorovo Resources was quoted by Shebut to have gone as far as saying that the mining-processing activities would take special care
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to preserve ‘the unique flora and fauna of the Kola Arctic and contribute to the preservation of the national cultures and the traditional forms of land-use of the indigenous population’. In this way, it could be said with confidence that Shebut’s eulogy of future mining-processing activities fell fully into the Soviet genre of the promise coming from ‘underground treasures’ (klady pod zemlei).67 In more recent times, the genre had been repeatedly recalled in connection with the Shtockmann Off-shore Gas deposits, Teriberka Liquified Gas Plant, Murmansk Port and Railway Node, as well as a host of other smaller promises. As a rule, all of them called for new governors to replace the enthusiasms of the previous ones, the in-coming accusing the out-going of adventurism and of lacking a sense of reality. Nonetheless, the production of ‘endless deferral of promise’ (Ssorin-Chaykov, 2003:110f) has never stopped. Despite Shebut’s bright-eyed presentation of the latest Aladdin cave about to open, a soberer note was struck towards the end. It touched on the sensitive issue of where the venture would be registered: in Lovozero Raion or not? The matter was critical for the prospects of the Raion budget. Should Fedorovo Resources, currently with a registration in Apatity, move to Lovozero, taxes paid would go into the Raion budget. Gostevskikh’s answer to this sensitive question was evasive: An issue not lacking in importance for the Municipality (of Lovozero) will be the juridical registration of the enterprise on Raion’s territory. According to a statement by the General Director of AO ‘Fedorovo Resources’ such an idea is being considered (takaia ideia prorabatyvaetsia). (ibid.)
The future will show what that consideration will bring in the end. That is, whether Fedorovo taxes would go into the Raion budget, new jobs for the local people become available, and all other promises fulfilled. Or, instead, outsiders would be imported for the jobs, the ‘green’ policy would end up in fatal pollution, and all the rest of the promises be again the subject of endless deferral, responded to by means of the ‘litanies and laments’ genre. Of preserving traditional land-use and indigenous culture no one seemed to have any illusions at all. No one lived there anyway. The ‘Nornikel’/‘Rosatom’ Lithium mining/processing project: On 29 April 2022, Lovozerskaia Pravda reported the setting up of a new mining/ 67 On the genre and trope see in particular Ushakov and Dashchinskii (1988:170–75); Konstantinov (2015:22, 126).
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processing project. The site of the future exploitation was by Lake Kolmiavr in the ‘Right Wing’ of ‘Tundra’s’ grazing range (Tkachev, 2022a). The report cited the announcement as being made by Rosatom’s Vice- President Kirill Komarov. He spoke at a meeting of the Economic Committee of the Sovet of the Federation—that is, the Senate which is the Upper House of the Federal Assembly of Russia. Komarov explained that lithium was needed for the production of batteries. For the last three years, the need had been satisfied exclusively through imports. That was in the form of lithium carbonate from Chile, Argentina, China, and Bolivia. China, however, had stopped its exports to Russia. Chile and Argentina had also stopped supplying Russia with the ore ‘after the start of the special military operation in Ukraine’ (Yagupov, 2022). There remained only Bolivia.68 Consequently, a ‘gigantic’ lithium problem arose, as there was no own mining of the mineral. In view of the situation, supreme power found it necessary to begin mining/processing operations in the Lovozero Raion of Murmansk Region, a little to the north of Lake Kolmiavr. The state-private companies chosen for the task were the gigantic ‘Rosatom’ and ‘Nornikel’, both of them occupying the top-most tier of the loyal oligarchate. In the meta- idiom of reporting such news, concerning a specific top-favoured selection, the information came out as follows: This spring ‘Rosatom’ and ‘Nornikel’ announced their joint plans of utilizing the (Lovozero Raion) site, with a following deep processing of lithium ore. In October, the Chairman of Nornikel’s Council of Directors (sovet direktorov), Andrei Bugrov, confirmed the company’s plans for utilization. As TASS reported, the announcement was made in Murmansk, at the Forum ‘State- private partnership in the sphere of sustainable development of indigenous peoples. (Yagupov, 2022)
Lithium deposits in Lovozero Raion were named as the largest in the country, amounting to nearly 19% of all Russian deposits of the mineral. At the Sovet mentioned earlier on, Komarov also stated that deposits of other much needed rare metal ores were situated along a line between Polmos in the northwest, and all the way to Kolmiavr, that is, between ‘Tundra’s’ Left Wing brigade ranges (of Brigades 4,6,7), and the Right 68 Until very recently, Bolivia was not even listed in global lithium charts (Kurmelovs, 2022). With China’s growing demand for lithium for car batteries, news came of a ‘huge Bolivian lithium deposit’ (Chinese, 2023). See also: Winrow (2021).
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Wing with its presently much reduced Brigades 1,2,8, and the practically defunct Brigade 9. I had mentioned Lake Kolmiavr before in connection with the closing down of the Hydro-Meteorological Station ‘Kolmiavr’, and the acquiring of its premises by Sergei Smirnov. As said, Smirnov had proceeded to refurbish the ageing former station and turn it into a sparkling angling and hunting lodge. That was right next door to the base camp of Brigade 8 which had stood there since the early 1970s. The appearance of Smirnov’s lodge was seen as a major intrusion into the very heart of the grazing territory and thus a thing barely comprehensible from the point of view of the herding community. Little did these people know what was coming. Compared to the looming mining/processing operations on the horizon, next door to the herding base camp, Smirnov’s luxury villa was hardly worth considering. The ore deposits had been first discovered in 1947 by a geological team headed by A.A. Chumakov. Instantly recognized to be one of the biggest deposits of this kind in Russia, intensive geological research began. For reasons unknown, work on the site was quietly terminated in the mid-1960s. In the spring months of 2008, Vladislava Vladimirova and I visited the abandoned site.69 On the map, the place was marked as Urochishte Kolmiavr (Landmark Kolmiavr)—possibly fixing a salient point on reindeer migration routes. The place was very close to a tiny Sami village, known by its Russian name of Melent’evskii Pogost (Melentiev’s Hamlet), where our base-camp had stood since 2000. What we saw on the top of the landmark hill was rusting machinery and remnants of picks and shovels strewn all around. Open exploratory trenches (shurfi) criss-crossed the lichen-covered ground. Vladi nearly fell into an open well-like pit, going down to a considerable depth. The site looked abandoned for good. But now, a decade and a half later, the hitherto sleeping lithium giant has been awoken by the global thirst for ‘green lithium’, that is, for batteries for electric cars. In the Russian case, the War in Ukraine and the following Western sanctions meant turning to own deposits. In this way, the fragile Subarctic environment of ‘Tundra’s Right Wing grazing range came under the threat of what local journalism called by a new
69 The trip was made as part of the research team’s participation with an individual project within the framework of the International Polar Year 2007–2009.
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euphemistic cliché: that of ‘the current complicated international situation’. Or, as Elena Iakovleva, Vice-President of the Kola Sami Association put it: Today, the international situation is very complicated and, understandably, for the purposes of compensation of imports the exploitation of lithium deposits in the vicinity of Lake Kolmiavr in Lovozero Raion shall be carried out (my emphasis). But before industrial activities begin, it is necessary for a series of discussions to be conducted. Based on informed consent, as well as following Russian legislation, an Agreement (as a legal document) will be drawn for extraction from the territories of traditional land-use of the Sami People. (Tkachev, 2022b)
What the vice-president of AKS was obviously saying was that decisions had already been made at the highest level, all the more in the context of the current ‘complicated situation’, so that the Sami representatives at the regional government were expected to give their approval for excavation in ancient herding land without a murmur. That such an approval was needed at all, as well as of summoning the Forum mentioned above (‘State-private partnership in the sphere of sustainable development of indigenous peoples’), can be interpreted to mean that the indigenous card had political value. Consequently, meetings with the ‘indigenous numerically small peoples’ were to be held in Lovozero and Krasnoshchel’ie on 5–6 June 2022. In the agendas of these meetings, cooperation with PAO ‘GMK Noril’skii Nikel’70 was described as ‘minimizing a possible negative impact from the exploitation of Kolmozero mineral deposits on the traditional life style and economic activities of the indigenous peoples, as also on their religious and sacred places’ (Predvaritel’nye, 2022). As it was to be expected, both the representatives of the indigenous peoples and the reindeer husbandry community as a whole gave their consent for the future explorations (Tkachev, 2022b). On the ‘sayable’ side of discourse, it was deemed possible for reindeer husbandry to be preserved in the face of a very major industrial incursion deep into the tundra reindeer pastures. As a compensation for what would probably wipe out reindeer husbandry in at least half of the present range of ‘Tundra’, a monetary compensation would be given, beginning with one of 65 m roubles for 2022 (Olenevodov, 2022). Public Joint Stock Company ‘Mining and Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel’.
70
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The extraction plans were ambitious. Nornikel’ planned to carry out geological surveys during 2023–2025. In 2024–2026, an electric supply line was to be set up, as well as a railway line connecting the site with Monchegorsk-Apatity. In 2026–2029, a mining-processing complex was to be built at the site. The total workforce was to be of 1500 people, with 800 of them working at the complex. Production plans were for 950 tons of ore concentrate a day, filling 16 freight cars. How reindeer husbandry could be preserved in such conditions defied imagination. By October 2022, the situation at the site was reported to be the following. In the words of a reindeer herder: The geologists are actively working. By now (10 Oct.) three helicopters (Mi-8, my gloss) have flown back with full loads of ore. They fly in empty and two of the herders have arrived to the Base (of Brigade 8, my gloss) on them. On the way back they are loaded with the ore. (Personal communication, 10.10.2022)
As for how the herders felt about the future of reindeer husbandry in that part, the following comment was made: When a road will be build crossing the Keivi Ridge, it is likely that another mine will be opened there as large aluminum deposits have been discovered. On the whole, the end of the Kola tundra is coming: it will be mines and processing plants all over. You were lucky to have lived here before all this! (V.K., 11.11.2022)
By January 2023, news came from the herders that the second mine would be close to Krasnoshchel’ie’s 4th Brigade Base by Lake Kuroptevskoe. When travelling with herders to that camp, back in 1997, we saw the scars of abandoned exploration from the 1950–1960s. The mining-processing front was now advancing to that place as well. It is perhaps still early days to anticipate the end of reindeer husbandry in ‘Tundra’s’ Right Wing as well for the 4th Brigade of ‘Olenevod’ (and possibly others). History remembers other projects, coming from the highest level, and being suddenly terminated by unexpected turns of fate. That was the case of the aborted NKVD Project 509 of the early 1950s, discussed earlier on. A railway line cutting right across the ancient reindeer migration routes did not happen then due to historic events at the very pinnacle of power-pyramid (Stalin’s death, and Beria’s arrest soon after).
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Reindeer husbandry thus received a lease of life which held for the next 70 years. Whether the miracle could happen yet again is open to speculation. Judging by recent words of the Head of ‘Tundra’, Viktor Startsev, he did not seem to entertain any such hopes. The reporting journalist summed up his statement at the 5 June meeting in Lovozero in the following way: (He said) that the building by Nornikel’ of a mine and a processing complex in the grazing range promises to the cooperative a fair compensation of damages. (Tkachev, 2022b)
Startsev had obviously given it up all for lost and was hoping at least for some compensation, as in the case of the Fedorova Tundra Rostekh venture, discussed earlier on. It can also be speculated, by analogy with the Fedorova Tundra abandoned winter pastures, that since the husbandry affairs of ‘Tundra’s’ Right Wing were in a rapidly declining shape anyway, putting up a fight for the doomed brigades did not make much sense. On their part, Nornikel’ were making generous promises as was usual in such cases. They were: Guaranteeing the inviolability of sacred sites and support for the preservation and further development of Northern reindeer husbandry in the Region—experience of that Nornikel’ had already accumulated in respect of the indigenous population of Krasnoyarsk Region. As for ecology, the Company planned to minimize environmental damage, and after termination of activities to recultivate the site. (Pri razrabotke, 2022)
Contraction of the Reindeer Husbandry Territory The contraction of the reindeer husbandry territory of what today is Murmansk Region is a long-drawn historical process propelled by synergies of external and internal factors. Among the external ones we can count those connected with wholesale emigration to Finland of the Western Sami population in the wake of the First and Second World Wars, but, most decisively, by the industrialization of the region, which began in the late 1920s–early 1930s. In result, the whole part of the region west of the main railway and motorway lines had gradually become entirely devoid of reindeer husbandry activities.
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In the remaining part east of the railway and the motorway, reindeer husbandry activities have remained preserved in the roadless part of the forest-tundra and open tundra, administratively belonging to what today is Lovozero Raion. Contraction in this part has been conspicuous both as regards general herd numbers, and, parallel-wise, with the progressing of difficulties with herders’ recruitment. The trend had begun already with the collectivization of reindeer husbandry in the late 1920s–1930s. The only check to the escalation of this process is to be connected with favourable opportunities for herders, offered by the general socio-economic system of sovkhoism. That latter exhibited itself through opportunities for sustaining and expanding personal (‘private’) reindeer property at the expense of state-subsidized sovkhoz assets. In Chap. 2, it has been shown by an examination of regional reindeer husbandry statistics that the reindeer husbandry form of land-use has gradually fallen under what I have termed a ‘peripherality threshold’. What is meant by this is the current positioning of a socio-economic domain, below what power-holders at the regional and federal levels consider to constitute their political and economic priorities. The only value assigned to the ‘under-the-threshold’ zone can be considered to be of sustaining a sense of political agency on the part of the ‘under-the- threshold’ actors. These are the reindeer husbandry community, as well as all others at the bottom of the social pyramid who are dependent on the tundra for their survival and well-being. It has been shown that in ‘under- the-threshold’ cases, power holders are prone to support sovkhoism at the expense of the current Russian version of what passes for ‘capitalism’. The logic of this selective procedure is that in this way, nostalgic Soviet-era leanings of the peripheral actors are being sustained, simultaneously enhancing a sense of local agency. The resulting mix of pro-Soviet, democratic, traditional/indigenous, as well as increasingly ‘green’ values is found to be politically expedient for ensuring а lasting popular support of the ruling elite. In all other cases, in which a situation is considered to be standing above the peripherality threshold, plans are carried out in full disregard of local opinion. A publicly palatable face on that would be put by largely empty promises for concern about the environment, for providing training and employment to the local community, for preservation of indigenous traditions, culture, and ‘sacred sites’. Such proclamations would be met by disbelief by a traditionally sceptical not to say habitually cynical local audience, but could be of some value in diplomatic skirmishes with the Western neighbours.
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Contraction of the general reindeer husbandry complex, both as regards herds and herders, has thus much advanced in such a context of feudal-like political governance.71 In the conditions of the present highly extensive (even ‘hyper-extensive’) reindeer husbandry system, herd management has been shown to be one of commuting from town/village to tundra camps. During periods of time at them, rarely exceeding a few weeks, herders would try to establish contact with freely roaming herd fragments and, with luck, round them up for seasonal processing in corral enclosures. Some limited form of relatively close contact with herd fragments has been retained at present only during the late fall-winter months. It is this part of the seasonal husbandry cycle that involves fragmentary use of Forestry Fund land. In addition to hyper-extensive husbandry in conjunction with a commuting pattern of tundra presence, a powerful factor of contraction is to be seen in internal and, to a lesser extent, external taking from the total herd (‘poaching’). As it has been shown, the ‘illegal taking’ vs. ‘poaching’ distinction is a necessary one. Being a contested term, ‘poaching’ needs to be restricted to: (a) taking from herds by ‘outsiders’ (to husbandry), and (b) taking from the wild animal populations (principally of wild reindeer, moose, and bear) both by husbandry insiders and outsiders. Separate to that we may talk about taking fish (salmon species in particular), and timber (an advancing issue). In the available literature, the Forestry Fund factor in the context of rising tensions in the reindeer husbandry part of the Peninsula has been poorly understood. This also concerns the whole nomenclature of land- use status of the various parts of the Peninsula. In terms of this nomenclature, reindeer husbandry can be legally practiced only in territories designated for agricultural use. Map 3.1 shows that this is roughly only a half of what is habitually thought to comprise the Kola reindeer husbandry territory. This is to the east of a zig-zag line, cutting through the Peninsula from north-west to south-west and roughly tracing the boundary between forest-tundra and tundra proper (‘open tundra’, otkrytaia tundra, lisaia tundra). In its SW part, the line of separation coincides with the Ponoi River. The discussion of the BEZRK Affair has shown that tensions and conflicts arise from the fact that when husbandry cooperatives claim rights
71 This has been elsewhere treated in the context of ‘uncontrolled sovkhoism’, see: Konstantinov et al. (2018).
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of traditional ‘custodianship’ of land beyond the line of separation, i.e., in Forestry Fund land, they are not on legally firm ground. Such could be gained by the following expedients either singly, or in various combinations: (i) by changing the status of contested land from ‘Forestry Fund’ to land for ‘agricultural use’; (ii) by paying rent to the respective Forestry Fund Branch Office (filial, in our case: the Lovozero Raion one in Revda) for use of Forestry Fund land for reindeer husbandry purposes (i.e., as winter pastures); and (iii) by banning of hunting of one or more big game species (by local restrictions of hunting, or by wholesale inclusion in the ‘Red Book’) and by this means making a contested territory irrelevant to outside interests. On the whole, it is to be concluded that currently the resolution of conflicts is critically connected with the legal mechanisms listed above. By comparison, the use of political mechanisms, based on what is termed as ‘traditional’, or ‘indigenous’ rights, have significantly weakened over the last two decades. It has been reduced to what superimposed political agents openly define as ‘emotional’ appeals or political stances with no legal value. The advancing of this current state-of-affairs has been ensured by reducing existing indigenous (Sami) organizations, or numerically- small people’s (Komi) NGOs, to little more than ‘culture-preservation’ associations with mainly folkloristic functions. A further conclusion to be made at this point is that tensions in the future may be expected to continue to derive from the fact that in strictly administrative and legal terms, reindeer husbandry has no right to be in Forestry Fund land unless the cooperatives have taken care (and expense) to proceed by way of (i) or (ii) above. At present, only ‘Tundra’ has done that as regards (ii). The more eco-political tool of (iii) has been applied on a region-wide scale, and concerning only one sub-species (wild reindeer). The more general conclusion to be made from the cases discussed above is that a given situation is always subject to the extent superimposed political-cum-financial interests are involved. In this sense, a scaling of peripherality (‘peripherality gradient’) can be offered as an analytical tool. Or, in other words, we can make better sense of what is going on by attempting to judge the extent to which a given case is considered more
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peripheral (to sufficiently empowered outside interests) than another. Consequently (and relative to the means at hand), one has to consider whether a case is directly of interest to upper or even top power tiers at a given moment of elite power dynamics. As it has been shown, some glimpses of that rather opaque zone may be gained only through extreme events—like that of the tragic Munozero helicopter crash. In the logic of the peripherality gradient offered here, should a direct bid on the part of superimposed power agents be judged to be in evidence, local assets, targeted by such a bid, will have to be considered as lost. It has been suggested that such is the case with the military and the military-industrial complex (VPK). In a parallel fashion, in direct interest and control of supreme power are major industrial projects where high- range state-cum-private interests converge (Like Fedorova Tundra or the Kolmiavr Lithium Project). A high-power concern of even greater magnitude can be considered to be an expanded Russian presence in the Arctic. This strategic program has had a number of local reflections. One has been the Arctic Hectare, as well as the Arctic Home initiative, to be discussed in some detail further down. The local impact of this ‘population retaining’ program has been rather limited so far. Its main aim: to stem outmigration from the Region cannot be said to have brought about any perceptible results at present. As it will be explained further down, its existence has shown all signs of swift ageing as soon as former Governor Marina Kovtun left the regional stage. In the local tradition of each Governor being associated with a particular grand strategic initiative, a new one came together with the Kovtun’s successor Andrei Chibis. His plan is the currently reigning one of ‘To live in the North!’ (Na Severe zhit’!), to be discussed further down. For the moment, let it be said that the plan relies on economic bonuses for the population and can be thus seen as a replay of the Soviet policy of economic attractants to the North, which created the labour-migrant demography of the Region. Whether current economic conditions will allow this ambitious program to work yet again, it is still early days to see. In respect of the state of reindeer husbandry in Lovozero Raion, a transformation of the existing commuting pattern of husbandry to one based on tundra residence cannot be seen as following from either of the above initiatives. As it will be shown, the allotting of sites for home- building exclusively in the environs of the Lovozero-Revda twin-town complex is far from conducive to a relocation of herders’ residence from town to tundra. The successor, and much more ambitious, ‘To live in the
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North!’ programme is urban-oriented in its predominant part and a reversal of the urban commuting type of reindeer husbandry is not even hinted at in it. It is quite possible that it may not have been even conceptualized as a problem by the regional strategic thinkers.
The SVO and the Sami Split The war in Ukraine, ‘sayably’ called ‘special military operation’ (spetsial’naia voennaia operatsiia, SVO), has brought about very radical rearrangements on the indigenous stage. A serious split within Sami activism has occurred. A whole epoch of close connections between Sami activists from the western Fennoscandic neighbouring countries, on the one hand, and their ‘liberated from Soviet oppression’ Russian part of a common national entity Sapmi, on the other, has come to an end for the time being. In addition to the long-established Western Sami organizations, there has appeared in the course of the last decade also what can be described as a Russian indigenous émigré circle. These are Sami activists from the Russian Federation who had sought political asylum in the West (principally in Norway), motivated by the progressive etatization of political organizations at home, and particularly by the onset of the Russian- Ukrainian War. On the opposite side remained loyal to the Putin-led regime Kola Sami political activists. To them, loyal Komi and Komified Nenets local representatives have also attached themselves. The event that can be said to have ushered the rift between the Russian Sami, on the one hand, and their Fennoscandic neighbours, on the other, occurred a month after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that is, on 25 March 2022. The signal was a picture published by the Sápmi Section of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) (Fig. 3.9). It portrayed three people with a Russian and a Sami flag, and two reindeer with the ‘Z’ SVO insignia, strapped on their bodies, with the inscription: ‘Svoikh ne brosaem’ (‘We do not abandon our own people’): According to the reporting journalist: Two of the participants are Komis (sic), a minority group on the Kola Peninsula. The third is Anna Igontova. She is a well-known Sami craftsman and Sami politician on the Russian side. (Larsen, 2022a)
The ‘Z’ sign next appeared on a guitar on which Ivan Matrekhin, a prominent figure in Russian and international Sami activism was playing.
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Fig. 3.9 Indigenous ‘support’ for Putin’s war. Source: NRK screenshot from VKontakte, Larsen (2022a)
Side-by-side with his political career, he has been running the most successful Sami tourist venture in Murmansk Region—‘Sami Village’ (Sam’ sijt). On the political side, he is vice-president of the Organization of the Sami of Murmansk Region (OOSMO72), and, formerly, he used to be the vice-president of the Sami Council of Russia, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Matrekhin is also a member of the Council of Representatives at the Government of Murmansk Region. Reacting strongly to Matrekhin’s symbolical support of the ‘special operation’, the President of the Sami Council Christina Henriksen explained why he has been now removed from his position in that international organization: ‘Firstly, the Kola Sami association signed the declaration of support for the war. This weekend we learned that our Vice President Ivan Matrehkin also publicly declared his support. He did that with both pictures and text in VKontakte’, explains Henriksen. (Larsen, 2022b) Henriksen also announced:
72 Obshchestvennaia organizatsiia saamov Murmanskoi oblasti (Non-governmental organization of the Sami of Murmansk Region).
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We have decided that we will cut cooperation with our member organizations in Russia until further notice. This lasts at least until the autumn. (Larsen, 2022b)
In this way, the clock went 30 years back to Soviet times. All through them, the Iron Curtain was firmly cutting off the Russian Sami of Murmansk Region from the rest of the Sami people living in Norway, Finland, and Sweden—a transnational historical habitation of the Sami people, known as Sapmi. The difference was that in those days Russian Sami visibility used to be very subdued and was manifested only in intimate community settings. An interesting part of this momentous back-swing development, propelled by the ‘Special Operation’, was that a discordant note was struck in July, when the war was in its fifth painful month. A big article appeared in the Administration’s weekly, announcing with pride that local Sami activist Valentina Sovkina had been elected as a representative of the Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation at the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues at the United Nations (Zadornaia, 2022). That a glowing account of the event should be prominently publicized was very strange indeed. Sovkina was known for a very militant career as a local Sami activist, pushed out of active politics after an unsuccessful bid to found a Sami Parliament and become its leader. Subsequently, she emigrated to Norway, becoming one of the key figures of what can be called by now an émigré Russian Sami opposition. Another high-profile figure of the Kola Sami rebel group was former OOSMO Leader Andrei Danilov. Recently, yet another prominent Sami politician joined this group— Aleksandr Slupachik, again a former leading figure in OOSMO. The broader Russian indigenous activism was represented by former RAIPON73 official Vladimir Berezhkov. The praise given to Sovkina in the administrative weekly was in sharp contrast to an Open Letter, signed by RAIPON’s Chair S.N. Khariuchi, and addressed to the President of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, Ambassador Lachezara Stoeva. It expressed the indignation of RAIPON’s Council of Elders (Sovet stareishin) caused by Sovkina being appointed as a representative of the Indigenous Peoples of the Russian North without any consultations with the responsible Indigenous organizations. The decision needed to be revoked since: ‘Valentina Sovkina Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North.
73
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does not represent neither the interests of the Indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, nor those of any Indigenous organization in our socio-cultural Region’.74 The only way to interpret the Lovozerskaia Pravda announcement, coming into such a harsh dissonance with the official RAIPON position, was to think of it as a bold autonomous action on the Lovozero Raion Administration level, aiming to retain diplomatic channels on the international Indigenous scene. The future will show how this very dramatic plot will unfold. At a level of a greater generalization, suggested by all the cases discussed in this part, a somewhat paradoxical conclusion emerges. It points to a state-of-affairs in which a local sense of popular power can be boosted by outcomes of conflicts and tensions irrelevant to high-power interests in terms of financial gain, but still relevant enough for ensuring popular support. The paradox inherent in such a hypothesized strategy is that a sense of local agency in such a granted political space ideologically rests on a sovkhoist, or a meta-Soviet, basis. A socio-economy initially born by extreme coercion and recurrent eruptions of state-terror has proven, in the long run, to evolve into the only democratic space available. I have shown the curious fact that in those cases, in which an open tug-of-war with oligarchic capital becomes possible on the local stage, traditional/ indigenous activism operates in a common camp with that of the former Soviet ruling elite of the Raion. As the War in Ukraine demanded loyalty to a cause beyond doubt and debate, local indigenous leadership, as well as the para-indigenous one of Komi and Komified Nenets, found it imperative to demonstrate a loyal pro-war stance. This response is to be considered analogous to the acceptance of all other decisions of supreme power in respect of matters above the threshold of peripherality—like, for instance, the non-renewable extractive projects previously discussed. The War was certainly a matter not only above such a threshold, but at the top- most end of central power concerns. In the final account, local indigenous and para-indigenous political leadership demonstrated a firm presence in the loyalist and nostalgically pro-Soviet camp. The only note out of tune was sounded by the puzzling praise of Sovkina’s UN appointment, mentioned above. Since transnational entities like ‘Sapmi’ or, indeed, ‘Barents 74 The full text of the Letter was published in VKontakte at: https://m.vk.com/ doc323519495_656516720?hash=uQsezs3tNLheFtA7z56AfL9bz4t7c62UmcbkKZteK5z (Accessed 18.03.2023.)
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Region’, have been rapidly losing their local relevance, so popular during the ‘dashing nineties’, that discordant note could be interpreted to signal a future reversal of the trend. In case it proves to be more than an uncoordinated individual action and an editorial slip, further exocentric moves could be expected on the part of what the power centre sees as a distant and loyal periphery.
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von Essen, E., Hansen, H. P., Källström, H. N., Peterson, N., & Peterson, T. R. (2014). Deconstructing the poaching phenomenon. A review of typologies for understanding illegal hunting. British Journal of Criminology, 54, 632–651. Whitaker, I. (1955). Social relations in a Nomadic Lappish community. In Samiske samlinger 2. Norsk folkemuseum. Winrow, M. (2021, January 15). Protecting fragile ecosystems from lithium mining. BBC News. Retrieved January 21, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/ business-54900418 Yagupov, I. (2022, November 1). Litievye perspektivy Murmanskoi oblasti [The Lithium prospects of Murmansk Region]. MV. Retrieved November 5, 2022, from https://www.mvestnik.ru/newslent/ekonomiks-litievye-perspektivymurmanskoj-oblasti/ Yuzhakov, A. (2020). Siberian private reindeer herders and the market: The case of Iamal. In Y. Konstantinov & K. Istomin (Eds.), Beyond the sayable: Informal economic precursors of the post-soviet semiotic crisis. Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 9(1): 53–82. Zadornaia, G. (2019, April 12). Dovody ministra ne ubedili [The Minister’s arguments failed to convince]. LP 14(8973), p. 1. Zadornaia, G. (2020, April 10). Chaianiia olenevodov opravdalis’: dikyi severnii olen’ vnesen v Krasnuiu knigu [The yearnings of the herders have been realized: Wild reindeer are entered in the Red Book]. LP 14(9025), p. 1. Zadornaia, G. (2021, February 26). Korennoe naselenie obsuzhdaet aktual’nye problemy [The indigenous population discusses topical problems]. LP 8(9071), p. 1. Zadornaia, G. (2022, July 22). Nashi liudi – v Organizatsii ob”edinennykh natsii [Our people – in the United Nations]. LP 29(9144), p. 4. Zapadnuiu. (2013, October 16). Zapadnuiu populiatsiiu severnogo olenia khotiat vkliuchit v Krasnuiu knigu (Murmanskaia oblast’) [The western population of wild reindeer is intended for inclusion in the Red Book (Murmansk Region)]. Regnum.ru. Retrieved April 1, 2021, from http://www.regnum.ru/ news/1720374.html ZATO. (2017, November 2). ZATO Ostrovnoi, Gremikha, “Murmansk-140”. [CATF Ostrovnoi, Gremikha, ‘Murmansk-140’]. Retrieved December 16, 2022, from https://pikabu.ru/story/zato_ostrovnoy_gremikha_murmansk1 40_5455332 Zuev, S. (2020). The ‘success story’ of private reindeer husbandry in Yamal? A look at herders’ budgets 30 years after. In Y. Konstantinov & K. Istomin (Eds.), Beyond the sayable: Informal economic precursors of the post-soviet semiotic crisis. Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 9(1): 83–115.
CHAPTER 4
‘Urban’ (‘Commuting’) Reindeer Husbandry in Murmansk Region
The aim of this chapter is to present in greater detail the current state of reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region. As it has been stated in the previous chapter, reindeer husbandry in the Region has contracted by now to that of Lovozero Raion. Here, reindeer husbandry is the principal activity of the two former state farms (‘sovkhozi’), presently existing as reindeer husbandry cooperatives—‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’. They command the reindeer husbandry scene very close to a 100% of the existing semi- domesticated reindeer population of the Region. Apart from head counts, there is a second factor which cements the leading position of the two cooperatives in all matters concerning regional reindeer husbandry. The simplest way to say this is the following: there is hardly a reindeer owner at present, individually or in association with others,1 who would consider it viable to keep reindeer unless they migrate mixed with the big cooperative herds. It is in the light of this unwritten rule of local reindeer husbandry that I proceed to report its momentary state at the time of writing. This is dominated by sovkhoism as the overwhelmingly preferred socio-economic arrangement. My claim, further than that, is that there is a very good chance that within the entire reindeer husbandry universe of the Russian Reports have come recently of the Brigade Leader of the 8th Brigade (Ivan Terent’ev) leaving the Cooperative (‘Tundra’) and setting himself up as a ‘truly private’ herder. It is still early, however, to make any definitive conclusions about this case. 1
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Subarctic, Lovozero Raion reindeer husbandry presents a best-example case of the sovkhoist system. In what follows, my aim will be to elucidate those aspects of the system which support such a claim. In previous writing, singly or with other reindeer husbandry researchers, the present reindeer husbandry system has been defined as a sovkhoist one (Konstantinov, 1997, 2015; Konstantinov & Vladimirova, 2006; Konstantinov & Istomin, 2020a). The thrust of the term is obvious: the system depends critically on the preservation of extant institutional features of the former Soviet state farms (sovkhozi), as they live on in the present cooperatives. The multitude of these institutional features can be generalized in terms of the overall socio-economic bias of the sovkhoz institution, namely that it is primarily oriented towards seeking collective security for its members, rather than striving for economic efficiency (cf. Hann 2021: 4f). In that sense, it functions as ‘a total social institution’ (Humphrey, 1983; Anderson, 1996:36). In former Soviet times, the financing of this socialist programme came from the state. This feature of the system has been largely retained at present, albeit in a reduced and changed form, answering to the social, political, and economic changes in the country after the demise of the Soviet Union. Let it be said immediately in this connection that reindeer husbandry in a north-European (Fennoscandic) context is again a heavily state- dependent one. At the same time, there is a significant quantitative difference between the two north-European regions when compared along this vector.2 In terms of formally represented size, support for reindeer husbandry in the Fennoscandic neighbours, realized through a multitude of supportive measures, is incomparably greater than what we can see as state support in Murmansk Region. Having said that, formally represented is an important qualification. This is because what comes as informal support in the Murmansk Region case is an unknown figure in monetary terms due to the confusing pathways to an objective estimation. Should such an operation be somehow performed, the difference with the Western case in all probability will be much reduced.
2 An attempt of the early 1990s for uniting the regions (as well as adjacent Russian ones) under the broad designation of the Barents Region is in need of reappraisal in view of new political and biophysical realities in the Arctic. For recent overviews, see Vylegzhanin et al. (2018) and Tennberg (2012).
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A second and more transparent line of comparison concerns the institutional type of recipient. While Fennoscandic support is overwhelmingly addressed to the private producer or an association of such producers, in the Murmansk Region case, it is exclusively addressed to what is defined as ‘agricultural production cooperatives’ (SKhPKs), as successors of the former Soviet state farms. In direct terms, state support coming in the form of annual subsidies per head of semi-domesticated reindeer excludes private reindeer owners from its provisions. Associations of the indigenous Sami people, in the form of clan or territorial neighbourhood communities (obshchiny), get state support, but following different principles and methods. This matter will be gone into further down, but let it be said for the moment that in the case of obshchiny, it is marked by a selective, case- by-case procedure, often of one-time character, and concerns principally infrastructural support (Postanovlenie-411, 2021). Another comparison which needs to be made, this time at home and diachronically, regards the very marginal regional position reindeer husbandry has at present, when compared to the state it used to enjoy during the Soviet period. A reflection of this process of increasing marginalization can be seen in current statistical coverage, as already shown in Chap. 2 (Reindeer Husbandry Statistics). Not only the state of current private ownership of reindeer and its input for the regional economy, as well as such coming from obshchiny, is bypassed in regional statistics but reindeer husbandry as a whole tends to fall out from statistical bulletins. The logic (and not rarely, the puzzles) around the process of marginalization of reindeer husbandry in a regional context will be looked into in the following sections. Such exclusions, reflecting the current state of relations between state bureaucracies, on the one hand, and reindeer husbandry practitioners, on the other, point to the rather special position Murmansk Region husbandry holds when compared to situations not only in the west but also in the east. What sets the Region apart from the latter ones is that tundra land-use in it is not solely dominated by reindeer husbandry and certainly not primarily so. Other resource opportunities are pursued as regards the whole spectrum of holders: the ex-sovkhozes, the personal/private owners in them, and, most prominently, the obshchiny. Thus, tundra land-use is becoming more attractive as a terrain for engaging with a variety of tourist activities, rather than with reindeer husbandry. A historical motive, such as fresh-water fishing as a next-to-primary concern for the Kola Sami, is, again, a feature of the local tundra-oriented economy, which shows
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marked differences with neighbouring regions to the east. An often-met bureaucratic indifference to reindeer husbandry matters could be attributed, on the whole, to the relatively meagre return from reindeer husbandry compared to other tundra-based economic activities. As it will be shown further on, this feature is to be explained not only by more attractive returns from other forms of tundra resource use but also by their greater compatibility with an urban lifestyle as different from a tundra- anchored one. This is again a feature whose roots go considerably back in time. It is borne out by the fact that unlike in Siberian reindeer husbandry regions, the Kola one has never been more than semi-nomadic. In what follows, examination of the current state of Kola reindeer husbandry, against the background of such regional specifics, will be conducted from the perspective of its relations to relevant state administrations. The necessity of choosing this specific angle of observation stems from a whole array of puzzling questions. These arise unless we look at the current state-of-affairs by employing a categorial apparatus, devised by home state agencies, rather than by mechanically applying alien notions. An example of such a categorial mismatch, in the sense of erroneous application of alien categories to local realities, can be the Kola obshchiny puzzle. In purely categorial terms, for Western sympathizers and other supporters, the setting up of obshchiny was equal to returning to indigenous private family/kin reindeer husbandry as it had existed before collectivization. Return to private reindeer husbandry, as it had occurred in the Nenets AO, as a best example of such developments,3 was expected to be duplicated here. And yet, when it became possible for setting up indigenous obshchiny in Murmansk Region, no such thing as private reindeer husbandry ever emerged. It is highly unlikely that that will happen in the foreseeable future either. What are the reasons for a sovkhoz-like form of management remaining as the dominant form in conducting reindeer- husbandry affairs, even in the case of obshchiny? What are the drivers of the currently progressing pattern of extensivity and the virtual demise of classical forms of husbandry? Such and related questions arise. My claim here is that for answering them one needs to begin with an analysis of the analytical categories used by state bureaucracies, as well as by their equivalents in local usage. A closer scrutiny of the two principal idioms describing reindeer husbandry matters will help us understand how their state and dynamics are 3
On the NAO ‘success story’, see Golovnev and Osherenko (1999); Zuev (2020).
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conceptualized along the hierarchy of usage. It is useful to begin at the higher rungs of such a hierarchy and, in this sense, at the level of the legal documents which define the general categories. An equal stress needs to be put on the way state bureaucracies use them for statistical reflection, as well as for formulating supportive measures. Below I first discuss the current categorial usage as it appears in official discourse as well as in various shades of non-official communication. Insofar that reindeer husbandry is connected with a type of categorial usage from a list of other local land-use forms and the principal resources to which they are oriented, there is a necessity for a detailed discussion of each one of them in turn. This will be done from the point of view of the mode of resource extraction which has uniformly evolved as an ‘urban’ one in contrast to that of a largely imagined past, characterized by a seasonally dispersed residential pattern. I argue that such an ‘urban’ orientation of relevant actors works in a syncretic linkage with the attractiveness of a post-Soviet ‘sovkhoist’ mode of socio-economic existence, so that a ‘non-sovkhoist’ or ‘truly private’ form of resource extraction has practically become an impossibility in the local land-use context. Further than that, it will be argued that a pervasive general mode of post-Soviet governance, defined as ‘selective de-centralization’, allows for contentious issues to be resolved in support of sustaining sovkhoism and the present mode of ‘urban’ land-uses. This part follows a list of three principal land-use forms of priority to local actors: (i) of personal land plot (zemel’nyi uchastok); (ii) of fishing resource use; and, finally, (iii) of semi-domesticated reindeer. Insofar that the fishing resource is of great significance for local actors, special attention is turned to indigenous (Sami) actors in this context, as well as to the community as a whole. The following main oppositions are offered to be examined. They are united in their principal treatment of property relations. A key binary in this sense is ‘collective vs. private (property)’—a matter well treated in existing legal documents and thus belonging to official usage. At the same time, a distinction which is at the very root of the sovkhoist system, but is marked by absence of reference at any level of discourse, is the one between ‘truly private’ property of reindeer, on the one hand, and ‘personal/private’, on the other. Here we have a case of a meta-idiom since it does not belong to any overtly formulated opposition. At the same time, it belongs to ‘covert’ ones, in the sense of ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott, 1990), or ‘intimate cultural knowledge’ (Herzfeld, 2005 [1997]). The opposition,
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reflecting actual and overt usage at all idiomatic registers, is ‘etically’ yielding only to a formulation such as ‘collective vs. personal/private’. Having said that, we need to be aware at all times that the ‘emic’ corollary of the opposition in a daily register of usage is ‘sovkhoz vs. private (reindeer)’. This shorthand mode of expression alerts to the polysemantic use of the term ‘private’ which is at the root of misapprehensions concerning the local state of reindeer husbandry affairs. I have freely used the term ‘private’ in what has been said so far, but a more precise categorial analysis necessitates the disentangling of the polysemantic knot around it. This should begin when the adjective is used as a qualifier to the noun ‘reindeer’. While the noun phrase ‘private reindeer’ has a high frequency of usage in all registers (see: Fig. 2.1 in Chap. 2), the noun phrase ‘private herder’ is hardly used at all. Occasionally, the term chastnik (private owner) comes up, but only in contexts where it is clear that it refers to private ownership, not to private herding. This fact alone alerts to the specifics of the existing situation: owning of ‘private reindeer’ does not entail herding them. The historical origin of this peculiarity goes back to the onset of mass collectivization in the late 1920s to early 1930s. Elsewhere (Konstantinov, 2015:300f), I have traced the process in detail. Here only its most essential features will be recalled. They stem from the drive for eradicating private property in early Soviet reality and, consequently, from discursive usage. The best way Bolshevik/Soviet ideological thought found for eradicating the hated adjective ‘private’ from existence (alongside that of the institution of private property itself) was by supplanting it with ‘personal’, or in a more extensive bureaucratic rendering: ‘property for personal use’ (imushchestvo dlia lichnego pol’zovaniia). In reference to reindeer, the formulation has introduced the noun phrase ‘personal reindeer’ (lichnye oleni), sometimes also met in Soviet- time use as ‘individual reindeer’ (individual’nye oleni) (as in Kiselev & Kiseleva, 1987:134). Insofar as herding these reindeer was concerned, it stood to reason that they should be herded together with the kolkhoz herd, rather than separately. One could not work in a kolkhoz (later sovkhoz) herding team (brigade), and, at the same time, herd his personal reindeer. At best, one could keep a few draft-bucks close by, so they could be readily available for daily tasks. In the course of time, however, the ‘personal reindeer’ acquired all features of being private property. To begin with, they were marked with the ‘private’ earmark of the owner, and at counting corral procedures
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would be entered into a separate register for ‘private reindeer’, and by a separate registering actor, known as ‘verifier of private reindeer’ (schetchik chastnogo pogolovia). Furthermore, personal reindeer could be inherited after the demise of the original owner as any other type of property, or given away as presents, usually to young family or kin members. On the official side of presenting, a female reindeer (vazhenka) would be presented to young herders after a year’s work in a brigade. A common practice used to be to present renowned herders with prizes of a reindeer on their birthday anniversaries (iubilei), as prizes at sport competitions on Festival of the North (Prazdnik Severa) events, or on other festive occasions. Once a reindeer became the property of a reindeer herder or of an heir through such and similar channels, it would be treated as private property. It became an accepted practice for such reindeer to be slaughtered whenever the owner saw fit and the meat to be used for domestic consumption or sold. The selling of the meat itself would be on an informal insiders’ market and thus outside any state-run outlets. The harvesting of such animals acquired a specific profile. Instead of being separated in a fragment designated for harvesting (zaboinii kusok), together with the collective (‘sovkhoz’) reindeer, they would be usually slaughtered right outside the corral enclosure fences. Meat traders (kommersanty) would then buy the carcasses at advantageous ‘corral prices’, the process being assisted by alcohol brought in by the traders. No end of attempts to block the practice have been made, but to no avail. It continues unabated to this day in defiance of all measures for veterinary control. Having practically given up on that, local authorities have been trying at least to diminish the unbridled use of alcohol during corral procedures. That has also proved to be largely in vain. Another side of corral sales to meat traders concerns avoidance of taxation. This aspect of the situation seems to cause little concern to the relevant authorities and, consequently, paying taxes for sales of private meat within personal networks is a thing unheard of to this day. Such features of private ownership gradually pushed out the adjective ‘personal’ from active usage, leaving it only to dwell in obscure bureaucratic texts, but even in that register consistency was not always observed. Authors of what may be called ‘official texts’, not infrequently would slip into common usage. Where they should have said ‘personal’, they would say ‘private’. In the course of time, demands for purity of official
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expression lessened in this respect, until by the time of Brezhnev’s ‘mature socialism’, hardly any notice of such ideological lapses would be taken. While, thus, ‘personal’ gradually slipped back into ‘private’, its founding trait stood firmly in place: the fact that it referred to a type of property which existed in a mix with public property. In earlier writing (Konstantinov, 2015), I have explained how this feature modified the type of property beyond any of its hitherto known states. Bypassing details, I will repeat only the essential aspect of this transformation: the fact that a risk-proof property form has been created as the lynchpin feature of sovkhoism. A mixed private-in-the-collective regime of maintenance makes it possible for any loss or damage to a personal/private animal to be compensated by replacement from the large and loosely controlled collective herd. Ease of replacement would be guaranteed by close community links, often based on a family/kin composition of reindeer herding teams (brigades, brigady). Outside administrative control would be greatly impeded by the herders working in remote and hard to access locations. In addition, they worked in conditions in which occasionally visiting urban officials would not like to spend more than a few hours. But the factor more important than all of these has always been the lack of will for eradicating the system on the part of superordinate administrations, since otherwise they faced loss of an already dwindling contingent of employees. Such, in brief, has been the history of the emergence of a peculiar form of property: the ‘personal/private’ one. Or, to take it to its ultimate practical quality, of having something which one could not lose. The terminological difficulty comes from the fact that ‘personal/private’ (or ‘private-in-the-collective’ for that matter) do not belong to any register of non-academic usage. The ‘unsayability’ of the case, leading to the absence of a name, may be connected with the clear fact of loss or damage being taken care of not by the owner but by the collectivity as a whole. For while one could not lose personal/private property as a person, the loss still remained an objective fact being covered by taking from a diffuse, distant, and virtually alien structure, known as the ‘state’. The emergence of what is effectively a new kind of property is the result of a major historical phenomenon: the emergence and temporary flourishing of the command-socialist state. In the case at hand, the specific representation of the new property type as ‘personal/private’ reindeer has been more specifically brought about by a cluster of converging aspects of social development not necessarily directly following from the rise of the Soviets. That last may be seen as a catalyst or a unifying force, but the composing
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parts are extremely diverse. There is, to begin with, the remoteness and high specificity of the reindeer-husbandry setting, subject to a rich body of descriptive and analytical reasoning peculiar to itself. Side-by-side with that, one needs to account for the substantive, rather than formalized, quality of this type of property, to use the Polanyian distinction (Polanyi, 1957; Hann 2021 a, b). Or, in other words, that it is realized as a function of strong community links, despite the officialized fact of individual ownership and its codification as a normative practice. A most telling proof of such an assertion is provided by a semiotic phenomenon. In essence, it is rooted in a communal refusal of signification, whose surface expression is the persistent absence of a signifier for both the type of property in question, as well as for a long-standing set of practices bringing it about. This is a phenomenon which can be called ‘communal semiotic resignation’. One has also to take into account the results from studies of moral discrimination by contemporary actors as regards the opposition ‘state vs. private property’. An outcome of such discrimination concerns taking from the ‘state’ as being different from taking from a private person in the sense that the second is morally reprehensible as ‘theft’, while the first is not (Humphrey, 1983:136). As noted earlier, to capture the difference, Gerald Creed has offered the term ‘institutionalized theft’ (Creed, 1998: 197–200). Concerning the specific line of relations between administrations and workers, the phenomenon of the deficit of working force in command socialism has to be addressed (cf. Kornai, 1992). This needs to be seen in the deficit’s specific representation in reindeer husbandry and the role of personal/private reindeer as a recruitment-conducive strategy. A host of other directions of reasoning need to be pursued as well, that of ‘silent resistance’ (Scott, 1990) being one. The list of all converging influences, culminating in the property type in question, is too long to be exhausted. One thing can be said with certainty, however: this is a matter of emergence, that is, of a sublimation of a process not dismantlable to its constituent parts. A certain historical process effected in a remote setting has brought about a highly specific result. It has outlived the original system which brought it about. Its reinterpreted form throws light on the ‘command- capitalist’ system succeeding it. The particular direction of exploration chosen here—the current state of reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region—provides a good example of the irreducibility of an emergent phenomenon to its historical predecessor. In the given case, this
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last is ‘private’ reindeer. The startling fact of the situation is that in the context at hand, while the referent is ontologically present (personal/private reindeer), a name for it is subject to elision. The resulting analytical problem concerns the presence of a binary opposition between an emergent phenomenon—that of ‘personal/private’ property in local reindeer husbandry, as against its by now absent predecessor, that is, ‘truly private’ property (of reindeer), for which no proper term exists either. As already noted, both categories, that of ‘personal/private’ as well as of ‘truly private’, would be called ‘private’ in common parlance. This absence of codified distinctions has resulted in simultaneous and indiscriminate usage of the term ‘private’ applying to non-sovkhoist contexts, as well as to sovkhoist ones. Or, in other words, the term ‘private’ is used, on the one hand, to describe the highly risk-laden privately owned reindeer as they exist both in western (to Murmansk Region) reindeer husbandry contexts, as well as in eastern Siberian ones. On the other, however, it is also used to refer to ‘personal/private’ reindeer as they exist in the exclusively sovkhoist Murmansk Region context. To unravel this polysemantic knot I have offered the term ‘truly private’ for the non-sovkhoist and risk-laden property type. The resulting binary (‘truly private vs. personal/private’) thus captures the difference between property ownership outside or inside collective (public) or state property. All practical consequences of the latter state have remained beyond ‘the sayable’, as noted above, and, in result, in the limbo of semiotic resignation: in the vacuity of an acceptable defining term either in bureaucratic or general usage. Let it be stressed again that here we have a rare case of referential vacuity which can be taken as an instance of persisting ambivalences and indeterminacies surviving the Soviet era. This is a line of reasoning, however, which needs to be treated on its own. Below I turn to the practical outcomes of such a state-of-affairs as they pertain to contemporary reindeer husbandry reality in Murmansk Region. A bold but ill-advised step of abolishing the limits of personal/private reindeer ownership, taken by ‘Tundra’ in the early 1990s, did not have any perceptible effect apart from the rapid and ‘unnatural’4 growing of personal/private herds. Its proclaimed aim, to solve the endemic problem of recruitment, was never reached. Initially, there was the fear that big chunks of the cooperative herd would be taken away by opting out herders 4 In a rare protest, the matter was brought up in an Open Letter of the Council of Veterans (Esli, 2003).
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and that would lead to the rapid disintegration of the cooperative, still stubbornly called ‘sovkhoz’. Below I turn to this second item from the long list of hoped for or feared events which did not happen after the renaming of the sovkhoz: the ‘non-happening’ of a flight from ‘personal/ private’ herding in the name of embracing a ‘truly private’ one. In the light of what has been said in the previous paragraph, the question of why ‘truly private’ herding did not happen might seem nonsensical. Indeed, why should one abandon private property which one could not lose in exchange for such that had to be guarded day and night against all possible risks? Marketing the produce could not be expected to change. In all probability, that would continue to be garage sales to fellow villagers. At the same time, risks accompanying this insiders’ and purely informal trade could be expected to sharply escalate. The hitherto ‘understanding’ controlling organs, who demand a transaction registering device and the issuing of a sales receipt (chek) even for the sale of a newspaper, could be expected to pounce on a ‘truly private’ herder once the latter was no longer protected by the sovkhoist umbrella covering the cooperative herders. And yet, the question looked to be full of sense in the context of the early 1990s, or at least to visiting sympathizers. Reading through the ‘fact- finding reports’ of the time (Fenge & Reimer, 1992), project plans (Oreskov, 1998), or more extensive texts (Bjørklund et al., 1995; Robinson & Kassam, 2000; Kalstad, 2009), one can see clearly now, several decades after those heady times, that what seemed to be the obviously right way to go from the point of view of western well-wishers, looked utterly absurd to the local members of the herding community. In my own naivete at the time, I had put the question point-blank to a brigade leader in one of my very first field seasons, back in 1995. The answer was very short and uncompromising: ‘We are not crazy to do so’ (i.e., to go private) (Konstantinov, 2005). It took a far more perceptive mind and a lot more herding experience of a veteran reindeer husbandry scholar, Hugh Beach, to immediately see how matters stood. It took him only a week of a visit to the same brigade to write: The sovkhoz organizational structure provides herders with a basic income security independent of their personal ‘reindeer luck’. (Beach, 1992:141) But this was a rare ray of light and I am certain hardly noticed by the swarm of enthusiastic supporters at the time. By and by, the initial ‘go private’ enthusiasms evaporated, together with all related funding, and
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only rare echoes of these early illusions can be still heard from time to time (Harder, 2013; Fryer, 2007). Reality proved that sovkhoism had a much firmer foundation on the local terrain, and that the dangers reindeer husbandry faced were of an entirely different order. A way to generalize them would be the following: the relative share of reindeer husbandry in the totality of local significant concerns has been undergoing a progressive downward trend. In Chaps. 2 and 3, major aspects of such a trend were outlined. In Chap. 2, I have shown that statistical coverage of reindeer husbandry matters was imperfect and prone to what I have called ‘bureaucratic obfuscation’ in dealing with a marginal socio-economic concern. In Chap. 3, I have shown that tundra-related matters as a whole have been relegated to a marginal position, unless very serious outside concerns prevailed. This feature of ‘central-periphery’ relations I have called ‘selective de-centralization’. In what follows, I turn to those aspects of marginalization of reindeer husbandry in the local context which are more directly connected with current husbandry practices. Compared to the administrative attention given to reindeer husbandry during the Soviet period, the state-of-affairs concerning the reindeer husbandry sector now bears features of an ever-growing marginalization. It is in this light that the current strong sovkhoist tendencies in reindeer husbandry are to be understood. Such a statement may seem to be paradoxical at a first glance. It raises the intuitive question as to why a receding of state interference in reindeer husbandry affairs does not translate into the seeking of private (‘truly private’) paths of development. Why, indeed, instead of persisting in clinging to a system of socio-economic relations formed in the heyday of command socialism, one does not eagerly embrace a globally prevalent private mode? The answer to this question requires considering the current state-of- affairs in reindeer husbandry from a multitude of mutually related aspects. I propose to begin with looking at the situation as it used to be during the Soviet period. Against such a background, I then proceed to look at the drivers that have shrunk the work-force in cooperative husbandry, but, at the same time, have not supplanted it with any form of non-cooperative ones. Further than that, I will show that the greatest candidates for embarking on a ‘truly private’ path, the indigenous clan or neighbourhood communities, obshchiny, became only very marginally connected
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with herding, and what is more, to the extent they did that was again in a sovkhoist way. Soviet administrative attention to reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region (and primarily in Lovozero Raion) can be described to have been strong all through the Soviet era, but especially so during the decades of the Brezhnev period, that is, in the 1970–1980s. In a recent long interview, the former Head of Reindeer Husbandry of Sovkhoz ‘Tundra’ during that period, Sazon Niurov,5 repeatedly stressed the point. To that remarkable and open-hearted interview, I return again in the final section. For the moment, I focus on the great emphasis he put on the close monitoring and commanding control of reindeer husbandry. It was exercised by the Raion CPSU6 Committee in respect of the two Raion sovkhozes: ‘Tundra’ and ‘Pamiati Lenina’ (‘In Memory of Lenin’, today’s ‘Olenevod’). To the questions of the interviewing journalist, stating that the readers of the local weekly Lovozerskaia Pravda were highly interested in comparing the Soviet state of ‘Tundra’ with the present-day situation, Niurov answered at length. This part deserves to be quoted in full: People are interested: I am certainly in agreement with that. Because the elderly generation are still alive, the middle-aged one, the youth who are connected (with reindeer husbandry) by the memories of their parents, kin, acquaintances. But this is what I am not sure about: whether the regional authorities are interested in the multitude of problems of reindeer husbandry. As for the local (Raion) authorities, one does not even need to mention their indifference. In those old Soviet times, the attention and attitude to reindeer husbandry used to nearly equal the one towards our miners (the complex7 was quite successful in those days). There was also considerable attention paid by the administration on the local (Lovozero) Raion level. On the whole, there was ample attention towards reindeer husbandry and that was for the good of the sector. (Tkachev, 2021a: 4)
The great and repeated emphasis on the prominence of state/Party concern in respect of reindeer husbandry in the late Soviet period is further illustrated by numerous examples of how successful Sovkhoz ‘Tundra’ had been in those days. There used to be as many as ten brigades, with eight to ten herders in each. With all auxiliary personnel, that brought the Niurov’s labour history in ‘Tundra’ lasted from 1967 to the early 2000s. Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 7 The mining-processing complex in Revda, Lovozerskii GOK. 5 6
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number of employees at the Reindeer Herding Department to 138 people. Niurov also stressed on the great number of women working alongside their husbands as chumrabotnitsy (female tundra camp cooks and caretakers). A very telling difference, compared to the present situation, concerned the much greater rotation of sovkhoz directors. No less than ten of them came and went during Niurov’s working career. Many of them were described as either coming from higher regional or Raion administrative/ Party positions, or moving into such after a period of work as sovkhoz directors. According to him, it was in this, as well as in other ways, that reindeer husbandry expertise reached up to Raion administrative and Party levels, and further up to the regional ones. Niurov bitterly remarked that presently there was a complete absence of reindeer husbandry specialists at those levels. Comparisons were also made between the tighter control over the herds in the late Soviet period, and the hyper-extensive system practiced today. He recalled that a strict requirement existed about harvesting corralling to be accomplished before the New Year holidays. The number of animals which were harvested reached up to an annual total of 14,000 head. The Raion Party Committee required even more he said, but the very primitive slaughter facility the sovkhoz had did not allow greater yields. The 14,000 head answered to a meat plan (miasoplan) of nearly 600 carcass weight tons. This is to be compared to 100–120 tons today, although the figure is a conjectural one: current yields are kept as ‘commercial secret’ by the cooperative leadership and thus no official figures are available on a regular basis. What is missing in this glowing account of the state of the sovkhoz in the late Soviet period is about how the vast yields were utilized. All herders of the older generation with whom I have been discussing the topic were of the opinion that a considerable part of the produce was lost. The reason was the absence of proper refrigerating and storage facilities. The major part of the produce went to the Meat Processing Factory (miasokombinat) in Murmansk and ended up as a non-specified sausage ingredient. Some meat was sold in shops, as well as to enterprise canteens, but the state of the poorly stored product was such that a robust demand for it was never developed. This sobering detail points to the political and ideological value of reindeer husbandry being considerably higher than what made economic sense. In this way, it shared the overall ideological bias of the Soviet system
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and its constant seeking of legitimation through the magic of figures. In the case at hand, that concerned the figures of sovkhoz meat yields writing a narrative of success. Besides figures about fulfilment and over-fulfilment of the meat plan, other significant figures, relating the same message, were head-count ones (36,000 head in ‘Tundra’), of punctual and frequent counting/harvesting sessions, of calf-preservation, of stable gender/age ratios in the composition of the herd, of timely carrying out of all relevant reindeer husbandry activities (‘campaigns’), and so on. All of these indexes were part of the system of socialist competition between the brigades, as well as between the two sovkhozes (cf. Vladimirova, 2006). Turning to the state-of-affairs at present, a comparison with the late Soviet period clearly shows a downfall on all significant counts. In terms of head counts, the fall is from approximately 70,000 head for the entire Raion during the Soviet period to some 50,000 officially proclaimed head at present. As repeatedly mentioned earlier on, however, the 50,000 are referred to among insiders as ‘paper reindeer’ (bumazhnye oleni), while realistic counts may be half that, making the down-going trend much more pronounced. Other relevant figures are of production, which may be down to hardly more than 250 carcass meat tons for both cooperatives, but again, no one knows for sure due to the secretive behaviour of the cooperatives’ leadership. The number of brigades has sharply fallen, as also the number of herders in each one of them: from eight to ten herders in Soviet times to two to three at present, or even as low as one to two herders, as in Brigade 9 of ‘Tundra’. Women have practically disappeared from brigades, and the recruitment rate for young herders is minimal. Many other aspects of reindeer husbandry can be mentioned in the same vein, but one thing is palpably clear: the overall trend is steadily pointing downwards. Given such a gloomy picture, the directions in which solutions are being sought are telling. To begin with, the position of Lovozero Raion Administration may be seen to be reflected in the title of the extensive interview with the late Soviet-time head of reindeer husbandry. Lovozerskaia Pravda, as the mouth-piece of the Administration, had the interviewing journalist to be the editor-in-chief of the weekly himself. The title he had chosen was: ‘The future of reindeer husbandry in the Kola North needs to be discussed at all levels’ (Tkachev, 2021a). The meaning of that is to be read as an appeal for greater attention (and help) from all administrative levels starting (in a self-rebuke) with that of the Raion itself, going up to that of the regional government, and (in a flight of fancy) all the way up to the federal one.
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The appeal is thus for amplification of state support over and above the current one amounting to a modest annual subsidy per head of cooperative reindeer. The larger meaning of that can be seen as some form of resurrecting the Soviet past and clearly not pointing to a ‘privatization’ of the sector. In the concluding section, I revisit in greater detail the main recipes for revival, appearing in official sources. On a practical level, such appeals and related hopes are to be carefully noted when other possible remedies are considered. These concern the utilization of the produce and go into two main directions. One concerns meat exports to Fennoscandia and beyond it into the EU—a hope that came to an end due to the invasion of Ukraine. The second was tapping the home canteen market (particularly, the school canteen one), as well as of seeking restaurant possibilities on the regional and federal capital city market. These have been appeals long made, but no palpable results have been evident so far. There are good reasons to claim that promises and hopes of this kind belong to the genre of ‘endless deferral’. What deserves to be taken a good notice of by any outsider as a potential concerned party can be spelled out in the following way. An outsider as a remedy-bringing agent is expected to function as a sovkhoism-supporting agency, that is, in the way the state used to function in Soviet times. Typically, when outsiders realize (too late) what role has been attributed to them, the hopeful deal is over (until next time with another party). Such a preliminary assessment of current stable patterns requires a detailed look into the drivers that work for the durability of sovkhoism. As in all matters related to it, a recognition needs to be made of both overt and covert mechanisms, relating to the long-term sustainable existence of the system. Overt and covert I use from the point of view of accessibility for perusal of accounts or statements by interested outsiders. Overt is to be understood as belonging to discursive registers in the official part of informational production. Or, in other words, as it may appear in statistical bulletins, legislative formulations, official media, specialized literature, and the like. This concerns also the very categories, conceptual apparatus, and terms used, forming in this way the formal part of usage. Covert, by contrast, tends to fall into what may be called vernacular, popular, everyday, or generally what is sweepingly referred to as ‘simple language’ usage in Russian, prostorech’e. A third register is to be also included here, despite its evasion of performing any outwardly perceptible communicative function. This ‘empty’ register, as it were, is the one of what I call ‘unsayability’, that
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is, when even in ‘simple language’ and even in intimate circles a persistent semiotic resistance exists in respect of a body of referents. Understanding here can be considered as an exclusive property of insiders and can be called ‘silent communication’, or a ‘default’ one. It is often the case that overt mechanisms have a limited bearing on the day-to-day running of the system and may even have all the appearance of being anachronistic relics. Despite such attributes, however, they do have the value of functional components insofar that existing legislature is resting on them, rather than on covert and, even more so, on unsayable parts of the system. Such an interplay between the two parallel hypostases of the system allows for selective instrumental usage, on the one hand, should a political need arise, while, on the other, allows for bureaucratic obfuscation, again subject to a particular political necessity. It is from such an analytical angle that current overt safeguards of reindeer husbandry sovkhoism need to be approached. Below I begin with possibly the oldest extant overt mechanism, namely that of the so-called indivisible fund of a collective enterprise.
The ‘Indivisible Fund’ The stipulation of an ‘indivisible fund’ (nedelymii fond) of cooperative assets is to be discussed as an overt part in the Statutes of the present cooperatives allegedly safeguarding against disintegration. As it will be seen from what is said below, that role has come to be insignificant by now and thus largely symbolic. Nevertheless, it describes the general environment in which personal decisions of reindeer herders are being made. The disintegration which the indivisible fund of assets is supposed to prevent is by the blocking of members deciding to opt out of the cooperative to take along with them the original and/or aggregated assets with which they have entered it. The history of the mechanism is long and goes back to the dawn of Russian cooperative movements already active by mid-nineteenth century.8 Jumping abruptly to the first post-Soviet decade, new Federal Laws adopted the long-standing mechanism as a cornerstone of the emerging post-Soviet cooperative legislation. Let it be noted here that principles and mechanisms for safeguarding cooperatives against disintegration provide a rare example of stable continuity in Russian/Soviet 8 See Nagovitsina (2018). For pre-collectivization consumer cooperatives in the Far North, see Voronin (1997).
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history. Such a continuity cannot but speak of extreme communal sensitivity concerning the risks collective structures face. To emphasize yet again: here we speak of a sustainable institutional practice of some 190 years, managing to navigate extremely turbulent historical waters. The ‘share fund’: In the particular case, the preservation of the sovkhoz collective structure, in the course of its transformation into a post-Soviet cooperative one,9 was seen, in the first instance, as determining the status of the ‘share fund’ (paevoi fond) of the new cooperative. The latter constitutes the aggregated shares of individual cooperative members. The key moment here was that by decision of the meeting drafting the Statutes of the new/old cooperative, the determining of the shares was according to work history, and not to property with which the members’ predecessors had entered (or had been forced to enter) the collective at the time of mass collectivization. The share (pai) was estimated in monetary terms. However, due to the inflation spiral, characterizing the 1990s, the value of shares had become symbolic.10 Which in effect meant that so-long as a member retained their position as a salaried cooperative employee, their personal/private herds remained intact. In case a member decided to opt out along with their shares, they would end up with a paltry sum paid out to them upon leaving. Here, consequently, we can see a rather powerful deterrent against a sudden dismantling of the cooperative due to everyone taking out their shares and leaving. Additionally, even in the improbable case that happened, given the conditions described above, there was the stipulation that exiting shares should not threaten (by definition) the indivisible fund. During the very last years, it became known among herders that a far simpler tactic was devised by ‘Tundra’s’ management for preserving the ‘sovkhoz’ herd in its unbroken unity. When a rare case of a herder wanting
9 Both sovkhozes in Lovozero Raion initially re-registered as Tovarishchestva ogranichennoy otvetstvenostyu, TOOs (Limited liability companies) in 1991–1992. Since 1993, they exist as Sel’skokhoziaistvennye proizvodestvennye kooperativi, SKhPKs (Agricultural production cooperatives). In the case of Krasnoshchel’ie’s ‘Olenevod’, the new status was further qualified as SKhPK OPKh MNS (Agricultural production cooperative—reindeer-husbandry farm of the numerically small peoples of the North). 10 For a detailed presentation, see Vladimirova (2006:150–153).
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to pull out with his personal/private reindeer arose,11 the management would refuse by stating that fees for mixed grazing of personal/private reindeer with those of the ‘sovkhoz’ had not being paid. It is to be recalled here that the policies of ‘Tundra’ and ‘Olenevod’ in respect of paying such fees had diverged after Andrei Reyzvikh’s becoming ‘Olenevod’s de facto owner in 2011. He had very steeply risen those fees, causing the great indignation of the entire Krasnoshchel’ie community. ‘Tundra’s’ management preferred not to create such tensions and made no strict demands on fee-paying. Instead, what it preferred to do was to keep the herders on leash, as it were, should someone suddenly decide to leave taking their reindeer along. As explained above, in such a case, the fee issue would be used as an argument for refusal. Given such a state-of-affairs, leaving the cooperative and setting up oneself as an independent herder can be said to be, for all intents and purposes, an option very few would be inclined to take, or indeed, be realistically capable of taking. An interesting detail here concerns the setting up of the indigenous obshiny as they pre-supposed exactly a reversal to pre- collectivization ‘truly private’ husbandry. The statistics presented in the second chapter convincingly attests to the fact that no such thing happened there either. There are only about thirty head of deer in currently existing obshchiny and, moreover, they are not privately herded. This matter shall be examined in greater detail in its proper section further below.
Agricultural Enterprises Before that, an overall look of the agricultural dynamic in Murmansk Region is instructive. It is to be noted in parenthesis that ‘agriculture’ and ‘agricultural’ are used here due to the fact that reindeer husbandry belongs to the nomenclature of agricultural activities in current bureaucratic terminology. Consequently, its state needs to be assessed by comparing with other prominent forms of land-use from the official list of agricultural activities. The first question to be asked in such a context is whether the binary ‘personal/private vs. truly private’ has analytical value beyond the 11 To date, I know of only one such case: that of the brigade leader of ‘Tundra’s Right Wing 8th Brigade. In the autumn of 2022, he resigned his position and left the cooperative announcing his intention to take his personal/private reindeer and set himself up as a ‘truly private’ herder. Whether he will manage to perform this unprecedented task is not known yet (February 2023).
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domain of reindeer husbandry. The reindeer husbandry analytical origin of the binary should be considered as purely circumstantial: it reflects my conviction that reindeer husbandry is to be considered as a ‘best-example’ case of sovkhoism in contexts like the Kola one, without the latter being its exclusive host. From here it follows that agricultural forms proper (as working with land and stock/poultry) could be analysed by the use of the same tools. The question, therefore, can be rephrased addressing the ‘collective vs. (truly) private’ ratio in the larger agricultural picture. According to a short bulletin from Murmanskstat (2020), the principal producers in stock breeding and plant growing of Murmansk Region are agricultural organizations (sel’khozorganizatsii). In 2019, 75% of all agricultural production came from them. ‘Farmers’ holdings’ (fermerskie khoziaistva) produced 5%, with the remaining 20% being produced by what the nomenclature calls ‘people’s farms’ (khoziaistva naseleniia). What is the meaning of each one of these terms and how do they connect with the agricultural activities of the reindeer husbandry part of the Region— Lovozero Raion? By ‘agricultural organization’ or ‘enterprise’ (sel’khozorganizatsiia/ predpriiatie), the official jargon means present collectives, according to their various types of registration, but, in all cases, answering to a general blanket designation as cooperatives (kooperativi). In Lovozero Raion, these are SKhPK ‘Tundra’ and SKhPK OPKh MNS ‘Olenevod’. Whatever the chequered history of re-registration of each one of them in the Raion and beyond has been, these are the heirs of the former Soviet Farms (sovkhozi). ‘Farmers’ holdings’ (fermerskie khoziaistva) can be dubbed ‘private farms’ which will make their meaning more transparent. In covert substantive terms, they are the nearest to what one would expect to be ‘truly private’ agri-business entities as different from ones which are supported by a ‘personal/private’ link with a collective. As we can see from Morozov (2017), in his position as the (then) Head of Murmanskstat, the share of such farms is small. They account for only 5% of the total agricultural production. Or, in other words, agricultural activities in Murmansk Region emphatically had not gone on a ‘truly private’ road of development. There is a difficulty in assessing the true nature of farms in this category. It comes from the fact that many are not what one could imagine to be small or middle-sized family farms, but are again organizations of scale, particularly those engaged in grain production. They are in reality ‘agri- organizations, definable in terms of other structural and legislative forms
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according to the Russian legislation, i.e., OOO (limited liability companies), ZAO (closed share-holding companies), etc’ (Balashov & Rudoi, 2018: 37). In plainer terms, here we talk of substantial businesses set up by people who had often held leading positions in the Soviet-time agricultural nomenclature, and had presently come to belong to the middle-to- high rungs of the post-Soviet agri-business oligarchate. In the resulting unspecified substantial meaning of the category ‘farmers’ holdings’, it is unclear what share ‘truly private’ farms constitute in this category. There is a great likelihood, however, that in the regional context this share may be very small. As regards the reindeer husbandry sector, of which not a word is said in Murmanskstat bulletins by currently available knowledge, the percentage of that share could well be nil. Having said that, there is a form which roughly corresponds to that of the private farm. This is what is known as indigenous clan or territorial community, or obshchina. The case of this land-use form, created in the regional context for exclusively supporting traditional land-use and culture of the Sami indigenous people, will be examined in detail in the next section. As it will be explained there, at present, there is no evidence of any obshchiny acting as ‘truly private’ farms, least of all as regards what is officially invariably flagged as their principal traditional land-use form: that of reindeer husbandry. For the moment, it will be stated, therefore, that the presence of a ‘truly private’ farm as regards reindeer husbandry cannot be seen in the regional context. The third type of agricultural producing entity is what in administrative jargon is called ‘people’s farms’ (khoziaistva naseleniia) (Khoziaistva, 2015). This is the closest analogue to personal/private reindeer in reindeer husbandry and thus it requires special attention. Since the topic is vast and includes a great variety of sub-forms, only the basic ones will be given here. My attention is on those of them which are administratively connected with the case at hand: that of agricultural developments in Murmansk Region (Lovozero Raion). ‘People’s farms’ Historically, the origin of the category ‘personal reindeer’ (‘reindeer for personal use’, lichnye/individual’nye oleni) coincides with that of today’s ‘people’s farms’ (khoziaistva naseleniia). During the period of mass collectivization (1928/9–1934), the corresponding term was ‘kolkhoz member’s plot’ (kolkhoznii dvor). It referred to the plot of land around the house, together with all its auxiliary buildings—pens, sheds, storage buildings, sheep folds, poultry coops, and so on. That described the physical part of the kolkhoz member’s belongings, while, at
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the same time, it described what he had (or rather, was left for use to the household) as an agri-producing entity. The term kolkhoznii dvor that we meet in the literature expanded with time to cover not only a villager’s yard but also land allotted to citizens for recreational use, combined with small farming activities. Consequently, the material part of the entity stabilized as ‘land plot’ (zemelnii uchastok). When looking at present-day terms, it has to be taken into account that synonymous usage with other terms is common, stemming from the various functional uses through which a piece of land can be enjoyed. Relevant juridical instruments would specify them in a more or less standard list, as in the recent Federal Law No 119 of 2016. In it, the land plot can be used ‘for personal (individual) residential construction, for carrying out personal auxiliary farming, for fruit or vegetable cultivation, as well as for setting up a villager’s farm’ (FZ-119, 2016). While pursuing the meandering avenues of legal thought is a clear necessity, the definitive functional capacity of a piece of land will not be revealed. For, in all appearance, legislators do not see it as their task to prescribe the degree to which an owner may maintain and, ideally, increase the success of ownership by employing a connection with a pool of collective assets for reducing, or again ideally, avoiding all risks around their property. Or, said in other words, the legislator, in devising taxonomies of functional usage, is ignoring risk-avoidance as a determinant. From the legislator’s impartially statist point of view, owners have to satisfy all their risk-avoidance needs by virtue of their citizen’s status, that is, by relying on the legislative system. It may be stated right away here that the low percentage of ‘truly private’ farming is in direct proportion to a high disbelief on the part of owners in the validity of the legislator’s implied statement, concerning the key matters of security and well-being. In the agricultural sector at least, it is equally true to say, mutatis mutandis, that it answers to a very high belief in sovkhoism. To zoom in on our particular case, it is necessary to go back to the collectivization-time origins of the concept of the ‘personal plot’ and, on that basis, relate it to the reindeer husbandry case. We can see in those origins the logic forming out of an ideological dogma meeting with the acute necessities of daily human needs. In the same way, in which authorities recognized the need for allowing a small contingent of reindeer for domestic use, the need for a piece of land necessary for auxiliary non- residential buildings, as well as for small-time plant-growing and stock- breeding uses, could not be ignored or be accommodated to through state
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channels. This covers, albeit in very general terms, the overt side of the process. In the case of ‘personal/individual reindeer’ (later and etically: ‘personal/private’), the semi-overt aspect of the process concerned the institutionalized fusion (‘mixing’) of the personal herd with the collective one, while the covert one was the turning of the personal contingent into a completely new type of property, namely what I have called earlier on ‘risk-free property’. On a scale of shades between overt and covert discursive forms and usage, ‘risk-free property’ marks the extreme of covertness to the point of complete semiotic resignation or ‘unsayability’. A caveat to be made concerning this last point is that what is formally ‘unsayable’ can be referred to in popular discourse in a euphemistically oblique way. An example of that is jocular usage as in adages like ‘our (personal/private) reindeer are immortal’, ‘our bears are very clever—they eat only sovkhoz reindeer’, and the like.12 Where the personal reindeer and the personal plot strands connect is in their linkage with the carrying platform of the overall configuration: that of the ‘softly controlled’13 pool of collective assets. In today’s terms, this is an ‘agricultural organization/enterprise’, that is, a cooperative. In a way which is analogous to the fusing of personal reindeer into the collective (SKhPK) herd, the ‘people’s farm’s existence is formally codified as depending on that of an ‘agricultural organization’. A text-book definition presents the official version of the fusion in the following way: In people’s farms (khoziaistva naseleniia), family members, using the means of production at their disposal, and the support of agricultural enterprises (my emphasis), realize production and carry out basic processing and storage of agricultural produce, principally for their own use. (Khoziaistva, 2015) Again formally, the support mentioned above refers to provision of seeds at, ideally, preferential prices, supplying tractor power for the heavier cultivation tasks, giving agricultural advice, veterinary help, and so on. The point of contact with the covert side of reindeer-husbandry realities is in the enhancing of such services and provisions in direct proportions to personal connections with the agricultural enterprise. Clearly, the ideal state of fusion is when the personal plot owner is simultaneously an employee of the enterprise in question. 12 For a rare example of personal/private vs. ‘sovkhoz’ reindeer ownership and related tensions, see Savirskii (2000). 13 Following Janos Kornai’s felicitous phrase ‘soft budget constraints’ (Kornai, 1992).
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Returning to the statistical bulletin of agricultural production of Murmanskstat (Morozov, 2017), one needs to note the high share of people’s farms’ production in the overall agri-production of Murmansk Region. For 2016 that has been 20% of the total. The text-book referred to above (Khoziaistva, 2015) explains this feature (which is nation-wide) by emphasizing the significance of the support tools listed above, and further specifying their spectrum: The high share which people’s farms have within the total of agricultural production has been reached to a considerable extent in result of their use of production resources of agricultural enterprises (my emphasis), which provide them with pasture land and land for production of animal feeds, often sell them feeds, provide support for plot cultivation, etc. (ibid.) An aspect of the situation which is not elucidated by these two text- book excerpts concerns the connection of the farm’s owners and the agricultural enterprise which provides land and support. Since the principal means of production is land, it stands to reason that the latter is provided to the farm owner by the agricultural enterprise which is physically proximal to the place of the owner’s residence. In the case of Lovozero, as well as in that of Krasnoshchel’ie, plot owners, who comprise the overwhelming totality of the population, are connected in some way with their cooperatives. This is either through being current employees, or as veterans from past sovkhoz days. The linkage may be direct or based on family, kin, or para-kin14 links. This ensures the keeping of a personal plot on an enterprise-supporting level higher than that of the ‘missing link’ category: that of the ‘(truly) private’ farm. The higher level of nourishing connection with an agricultural actor of scale, such as the cooperative, explains a principal factor for the low level of emergence of ‘(truly) private’ farms (fermerskie khoziaistva) compared to that of ‘people’s farms’. As it has been already mentioned, in the Lovozero Raion case, the percentage of the latter can be considered to be very low, or even nil. Another reason for the disproportion is to be seen in the relations between farm and state. A basic difference between the ‘(truly) private farm’, on the one hand, and the ‘people’s farm’, on the other, is in accountability and monitoring by state organs. To turn to the text-book description again: 14 What is meant by para-kin is a relationship with non-kin members of the local—or even distant—community, which has functional and emotional value often considerably above that provided by kin members.
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People’s farms as different from agricultural enterprises are created without founding documents. They are not subject to state registration, are not entered in a unified register, do not have a bank account. They are only accounted for by local administrations as farming units for the purpose of being accessible to state statistical monitoring and taxation. (ibid.) It is evident from this short description that the (truly) private farmer is subject to a much stricter monitoring regime that what may be called by analogy with the reindeer husbandry situation: the ‘personal/private’ plot owner. Given the average size of the personal plot, generally amounting to the proverbial shest’ sotok (600 sq. m.),15 it obviously does not make sense to enter into the endless bureaucratic hassle of registering a private farm. This points to the necessity of a deeper look into the nature of the land plot (zemel’nyi uchastok), whose size closely resembles another quantitative relic from the socialist past: that of the quota of personal/private reindeer. Land plots As noted above, the history of the land plot in Soviet reality goes back to its early collectivization form as kolkhoz member’s yard (kolkhoznii dvor). It has been also pointed out that it was officialized as a means of production for villagers’ household needs, with the allowance for surplus production (with the exception of grain) to be sold on the so- called kolkhoz markets in towns, at ‘free’, that is non-state-regulated prices. Here are the origins of today’s ‘people’s farm’ as the micro-form of agricultural production. In its totality, people’s farms answer for nearly 90% of the production of certain crops, notably potatoes. This micro-form uses a ‘land plot’ (zemel’nii uchastok) as its principal means of production. It is important to note that ‘land plot’ and ‘personal plot’ are often used synonymously in the concerned literature. ‘People’s farm’, on the other hand, tends to belong practically only to administrative usage. The relation between the people’s farm on its usually tiny land plot, and the big agricultural enterprise (former sovkhoz) with which it is likely to enjoy a nourishing link, strongly resembles the connection between the personal/private herd and the reindeer husbandry cooperative. At the same time, certain differences need to be noted. In the first place, the land plot as the key material unit, is a piece of immovable (real estate) property unlike the personal/private herd. In this way, it cannot be physically fused into the collective land and be thus next to indistinguishable from it to a fleeting administrative eye. Instead, it See: Zemel’nyi (2022).
15
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exists on the margins of collective land and is thus much more open to administrative scrutiny. Further than that, the key quality of the personal/private herd—its status as risk-free property—is less pronounced in the case of the people’s farm on its firmly marked and immovable land plot. The umbilical link with the former sovkhoz may provide various components in the working of the land plot: seeds, fertilizers, or repair parts at advantageous prices (‘po blatu’), tractor power, and so on. In all events, the degree of interchangeability between personal/private reindeer, on the one hand, and the collective ones, on the other, is lower when we look at land plot produce. The latter being chiefly potatoes (which the collective enterprise does not produce as a rule) bears all its attendant risks. Or, said in other words, should one’s crop be decimated by blight, or gets stolen, its replacement from a common pool is not to be accomplished with the ease of replacing unmarked reindeer in corral enclosure round-ups. While all these differences are fully valid, there still remains a strong degree of similarity between private plot (‘people’s farm’) maintenance and that of the personal/private herd. That consists in the joint evolution of the two institutionalized forms of property ownership as already noted, but more fundamentally, in the continuing aversion to going ‘truly private’ in the domain of agricultural production—be that engaged with plant-growing, or reindeer husbandry. For bringing out in more graphic contours this generalized feature, one needs to look more closely at the interface between the two agricultural orientations as revealed in the daily practices of the population of Lovozero Raion. In this reindeer husbandry part of the Region, practically every family owns a land plot. On it what goes in statistics as a ‘people’s farm’ (khoziaistvo naseleniia) is organized. The overwhelming part of the produce the tiny farm turns out is potatoes for own subsistence. The measure of that is in vedra (pails). An average family would consider their minimal annual needs of potatoes to be covered by eight to ten pails, which roughly amounts to 70–90 kg of potatoes. Reindeer herders’ families do not make an exception as regards this widespread pattern of land-use. Since, however, the share of celibacy is greater in the case of reindeer herders compared to that of the rest of the Raion’s population, in the typical case, an unmarried or divorced herder would be attached to the family of his parents and/or grandparents and be expected to contribute to the maintenance of the plot, depending on the time he can afford beyond herding duties. This part of a herder’s life
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stimulates the forming of the overall pattern of current husbandry, which I have referred to earlier on as a commuting town-to-tundra one. Or, in other words, rather than spend the greater part of working time with the herds out there in the tundra, herders will commute to tundra brigade bases for performing essential round-up and corralling tasks, with the rest of the time spent at town or village, these latter being their principal loci of residence. The working part of this town/village spent time would be devoted to repair and maintenance of snowmobiles and related transport equipment, but it will also include contribution to land-plot maintenance. It is in this way that town/village-to-tundra commuting, and the highly extensive husbandry practiced today, should be seen in their syncretic link. In this context, reindeer husbandry may be described as holding only a small share in the overall land-use spectrum in what is otherwise known to be the ‘reindeer husbandry part’ of the Kola Peninsula. Land-plot acquisition and maintenance certainly contribute to the support of such an appraisal. At the same time, this latter’s part of local life, hardly taken notice of by outside observers, occupies an incomparably greater place in local public attention than that which is engaged with reindeer husbandry. Among other consequences of such asymmetries, they call into question the extent to which it is realistic to consider the current role of the reindeer husbandry cooperative as a ‘town-forming enterprise’, or consider that more correctly as a fond community relic from nostalgically remembered former times. In the same connection, it has been mentioned earlier on that the Raion budget depends on regional and federal subsidies to nearly 90% of its total size, or, as the local phrasing calls it, ‘ours is a “subsidy budget” (dotatsionnyi biudzhet)’. Should the Raion rely on income from its two nominally ‘town-forming enterprises’: that of the Revda Mining-Processing Complex, and Lovozero’s ‘Tundra’, it may consider itself as good as gone. What keeps the striking multitude of administrative offices going, and the ‘budget sector’ salaries and pensions they ensure, are regional/federal subsidies, constituting, in this way, the principal resource of the Raion. This living in practical terms on what is being provided by the state creates the meta-Soviet ambiance in which the Raion exists. Outside of such ‘parental’ care, land-use activities are to be considered as supplementary resources. Apart and in addition to state-subsidized salaried employment, the following ranking order would describe supplementary agricultural activities. In order of their availability for an average household, the list could start with returns from the land plot (principally potatoes), and
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continue with returns from fresh-water fishing and wild-plant gathering. As regards this latter category, wild berries (principally cloud berry (moroshka), blueberry (chernika), cowberry (brusnika), etc.) are seasonally bought out by traders. Apart from what goes for own subsistence, selling to visiting traders would thus form a valuable addition to the monetary income of a household. Direct or Indirect contributions from reindeer husbandry would tend to come last on such a list, except in the case of reindeer-herders’ households. While this is so, the symbolic significance of reindeer husbandry is such that an inflated budget coverage for that traditional form of land-use is ensured by superordinate authorities. It is in this way that a very delicate socio-economic balance is currently being kept. In a short list of land-use returns (from personally cultivated land, fresh-water river/lake systems, and tundra grazing range), they appear to be ranged in people’s consciousness exactly in this order. This is reflected in the local public media (mainly the weekly of the Raion administration), as well as in meetings and often-heated debates of the numerous public institutions and administrations. Here a leading role is to be attributed to the Municipal Administration of the Village Settlement of Lovozero, popularly known as ‘sel’skoe poselenie’ (‘village settlement’). It has administrative mandate over all land in question. To that the Soviet of Deputies (Sovet deputatov) is to be added, as well as the very vociferous and influential Soviet of Veterans (Sovet veteranov). This administrative side of the overall situation needs to be considered first. What it speaks of is a constant pressure on the part of Raion inhabitants for expanding acquisition of land plots. The problems this general will for expansion faces from the point of view of administrative regulation concerns the need for parcelling out land (mezhevanie), thus making it accessible to the administrative and legislative ‘gaze’. The process requires tense negotiations with the various enterprises as principal land holders. There is also the need for plots to be kept close to settlements, so that both administrative and infrastructural maintenance be ensured. The process of officially approved border-sketching, however, has proved to be a costly and lengthy procedure. In many cases, it blocks the use of land, otherwise indifferently regarded by the big lease-holders. ‘Arctic Hectare’ Some promise for the solving of this thorny problem has been offered by a recent national initiative, briefly mentioned earlier on as ‘Arctic Hectare’ (Gektar Arktiki). This initiative for utilizing tundra land has been imported from other parts of the Russian Subarctic for
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application in Murmansk Region. In the Lovozero Raion case, land plots have been marked for distribution along the banks of Umbozero and Lovozero Lakes. As already noted, the principal thrust of this recent initiative has been to stem outmigration from the northern regions. Murmansk Region, in particular, has seen a great number of similarly intended programs, but unlike the present one, they have invariably targeted the industrial sector.16 In the last but one governorship (that of Marina Kovtun), an emphasis was additionally put on the development of tundra tourism. As it has been shown in Chap. 3, this orientation tended to target exclusive salmon- angling tourist activities, which benefitted mainly distant oligarchic circles close to central power, rather than budding local entrepreneurs. It has been also shown that such developments, which had been taking root even before the post-Soviet era began, had been infringing upon traditional tundra-connected interests of the local population, rather than being of benefit to them. This time, these latter interests seemed to be in focus by providing tundra land for small-scale agricultural use on an allegedly democratic basis. From the viewpoint of the present discussion, it was consequently of interest to see what the program could mean for potential actors taking a course independent of post-sovkhoz structures, or, alternatively, enhancing a pro-sovkhoist course of action with the help of the new provisions. A key part of such a query concerned the reindeer husbandry sector. Acquiring up to a hectare of tundra or forest-tundra land could be seen as an opportunity for setting up a family version of the sovkhoz/post- sovkhoz herding brigade base (olenevodcheskaia baza) and, in this way, fill in the currently empty slot of ‘truly private’ herding. From such a perspective, the recent ‘Arctic Hectare’ federal initiative could be seen as inadvertently gauging the respective pull of a sovkhoist vs. ‘truly private’ (‘capitalist’) future in the problem-ridden present state of Lovozero Raion reindeer husbandry. Hence, the conceptualization and current local applications of the ‘Arctic Hectare’ deserve close attention. As already noted, the engendering of the program was connected with tensions looking to be rather remote from the one I have sketched out above, namely, to stem outmigration from the Subarctic regions of the 16 See International Arctic Forum ( https://www.facebook.com/pg/forumarctica/ posts/), Murmansk Transport Node (https://ppp-transport.ru/o-retu/proekty-retu/ kompleksnoe-razvitie-murmanskogo-transportnogo-uzla/).
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Federation. This is not the place to go into this increasingly troubling problematic area in depth. Let only one of its numerous aspects, concerning Murmansk Region, be noted. This is the evaporation in the course of post-Soviet changes of a substantial part of the major Soviet-era attractants to the north: the significantly higher salaries and other bonuses given there. At present, one would get roughly the same salary (if not better) by working in the South rather than in the North, and without having to face harsh climatic conditions in distant northern towns. What has remained has been a bigger holiday period, and the larger (‘Northern’) pension. Concerning specifically the latter residual attractant, a common practice is for people to hold it out until they get it, and then leave all the same. The means for solving the problem federal thinkers devised in the case of this (yet another) program was to offer to all Russian citizens living in the Subarctic regions the right to acquire a land plot up to a hectare free of charge. After five years, the land could be bought out or rented. The program, under the name of ‘Far Eastern Hectare’ (Dalekovostochnii gektar), was first introduced in 2016 in view of stemming outmigration from the most hard-hit outmigration zone: that of the Far East (FZ-119, 2016). Subsequently, the scope of application was extended all along the Subarctic zone, coming also to include Murmansk Region (FZ-226, 2021). Even before this last version of the original law of 2016 came officially into force, it was announced to the citizens of Murmansk Region that they will be able to get a hectare ‘through a lighter procedure’ (Andreeva, 2021). This last, in the words of the (then) Regional Minister of Property Relations, Victoria Minkina, consisted of shortening the period for needed paper-work down to forty-five days (ibid.). What was to be counted as ‘relaxing’ was also the absence of any auction procedures, as the Minister announced. In her words, the chance to get a free hectare of land ‘was open to all willing’. One had to only submit an application by hand, post, or e-mail. The land allotted for distribution was announced to be over 740,000 ha. The overwhelmingly dominant part of that was within land of the Forest Fund, comprising 630,000 ha. The remaining 112,000 ha covered plots, presumably outside the Forest Fund zone. With a population of 732,000 (by 1 January 2021), it thus appeared that there was a free hectare for every citizen of Murmansk Region. Some check on such a bright-eyed vision was introduced by an emphasis for the coming land to be on ‘regulated’ territory. Thus, the plots had to be situated close to settlements and in access to transport links and other
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infrastructural networks and services. This meant that the ‘Arctic Hectare’ would be subject to the same requirements which were valid for ‘regulated land’, that is, not just anywhere in the tundra but within the administratively regulated proximal-to-settlement zones. Zooming in on Lovozero Raion and the land allotted for distribution there, one could see that the major part of the available plots were situated on the western and northern rims of the mining town of Revda, while the rest of the plots were along the banks of Lake Lovozero, close to the Village of Lovozero itself. No plots could be seen beyond these two locations deeper into the tundra, or around the three tundra villages of Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and Sosnovka. Clearly, the owners of the future ‘Arctic Hectare’ plots were seen to be the inhabitants of the twin-town pair of Revda-Lovozero. The obvious conclusion to be made at this initial point was that the Raion Administration had no wish at all to add more than it had already on their plate concerning transport and other services for the roadless part of the Raion. There was more than enough trouble with keeping the ‘remote’ villages going (in a fashion), let alone face new demands appearing from all tundra corners. In sum, that meant that the family-size herding unit, in case such an option was seriously considered by anyone at all, was ruled out from the start. I asked for opinion people close to herding in Lovozero. My question was whether the new program could be expected to contribute to the development of ‘truly private’ family farms and, most of all, whether it could induce family herding. The following answer sums up the general attitude. I quote it in full (including the smiley): Regrettably, things are not so sunny (k sozhaleniiu, vse ne tak bezoblachno ). An Arctic Hectare can be chosen only on specially designated plots. Here is a link to an interactive map: https://portal.kgilc.ru/private/a/arctic.html17. A hectare can be chosen within the plots given in light-green. At best (from the point of view of herding activities – my gloss, Y.K.), one could get a plot only along the banks of Lovozero (Lake) – there are two smallish plots there, but from what I have heard, they have already been grabbed. (V.K., 11 December 2021)
Given such realities that came to almost instantly protrude, researchers, responding as fast as any feedback reached them, put forward the Gektar v Arktike (Arctic Hectare) (Accessed 19.12.22).
17
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legitimate question: ‘While it is clear that the program aims for preservation of population in the Arctic, what specifically would that population be doing on the hectare given them?’ (Shachin, 2021:50). Further down, the same author pointed out the risk that the land given may in fact be enlarged by powerful actors and its most attractive resources, such as timber, or wild salmon, be parcelled out among those close to local or central power (ibid.:51). In this way, both local academic and lay opinion were quick to fear a course of development inducing an exploitative potential by local or outside powerful players. Time will show whether such initial apprehensions will be borne out by facts on the ground. For the time being, data coming in from other regions and specifically from the zone of earliest application, the Far Eastern one, has shown that the predominant part of owners have been using their hectare for building a house (42%) and for developing personal auxiliary farms (12%) (Khomichev 2016:6, in Shachin, 2021). This type of ‘people’s farming’ (khoziiastva naseleniia), to use the statistical jargon again, does not suggest a rise of entrepreneurial activities over and above subsistence plant or fruit growing. Current developments in Murmansk Region, and specifically in Lovozero Raion, point to the drawing of similar conclusions. It is early days yet, but it does not look promising to look into this direction for anything like ‘truly private’ farming appearing on the scene. In the same way, its reindeer husbandry analogue in the form of ‘truly private’ family herding is also highly improbable. Once again, the family potato-supplier, the ‘land plot’, in its extant connections with the post-sovkhoz, has come out as the best option for the two sides concerned: the state and the people. At present, the only remaining option for anything different from that appears to be the indigenous community or obshchina. ‘To Live in the North!’ As soon as the currently acting Governor Andrei Chibis came into office in March 2019, a new strategy for stemming outmigration from the Region was announced by this name. It has been mentioned earlier on in connection with the ‘rotten meat affair’ of August 2022 when 5 tons of rotting reindeer meat and hides were discovered on the outskirts of Lovozero. Despite initial vigorous action on the part of the veterinary control regional authorities (i.e., Rossel’khoznadzor), threatening of serious consequences for the perpetrators, the scandal was hushed up, and months went by with nothing being publicly said about it. Finally, some mention was made in February 2023, nearly seven months
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later. That was in the annual report of the Head of the Raion Administration Nadezhda Kuznetsova. In a very matter-of-fact tone and with no names mentioned, she reported that some 8 tons of meat and hides had been removed and incinerated (Kuznetsova, 2023). As suggested earlier, putting the lid on this scandalous affair was to be seen in the light of ‘Tundra’s’ featuring prominently in the new strategic plan ‘To Live in the North!’. It will be recalled that the cooperative was pointed out as an example to be followed by regional business. That occurred in a section of the initiative called National18 project ‘International cooperation and export’ (Pashenkova & Antanovich, 2019). The specific mention ran as follows: Yet another notable example (of exporting activities—my gloss) is presented by the agricultural enterprise (sel’khozpredpriiatie) “Tundra”, which is striving to be licensed for exporting reindeer meat in foreign countries. Within the framework of the program for cross-border cooperation, the enterprise has already realized a cooperative project. Finland has provided meat- processing facilities, which will satisfy the demand for high-quality produce. The main market of the “Tundra” Cooperative are restaurants and tourists (…). When the licensing process is over “Tundra” will have the right to export reindeer meat abroad. (ibid.)
With the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and subsequent numerous waves of Western sanctions, all these bright plans were to be wholly or partially revised. Locally, some connected the ‘rotten meat affair’ with failed plans for exports abroad. In all events, official explanations were not given. That is, more than the dry statement of the administrative Head that the meat had been removed and incinerated. These were all signs that the lid on the case was firmly put. It was suggested earlier on that such a move spoke of placing ‘Tundra’ in the priority list of the Governor’s concerns. In this way, the model of selective de-centralization could be seen to be transposed into a regional format. Consequently, negative news about the cooperative needed to be suppressed, all the more in the context of the raging war and the demands for loyal support it placed on the Region. Let it be reiterated here that ethnic Ukrainians and their descendants comprise the biggest minority in the Region, amounting to a third of the entire multi-national 18 ‘National’ in this context means ‘of the whole country’. It is not to be confused with its homonym with the meaning of ‘ethnic’.
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labour-migrant population. Lovozero Raion’s ethnic mix is also heavily marked in this respect. Ukrainian-sounding family names are a very common occurrence here. A curious feature of the local anthroponymic landscape is that a great majority of Sami people bear Ukrainian family names. These have come through Sami women marrying Ukrainians, and by their children bearing the same family name. A host of other issues may have contributed for the current status of ‘Tundra’ as gaining a ‘supra-peripheral’ status, that is, as one of being placed above the threshold of peripherality. In the concrete case, when the local community was indignant about tons of meat rotting on the outskirts of Lovozero with stench and serious polluting risks attached, their protests were ignored and the veterinary control authorities were evidently ordered to forget about the case. What was loudly proclaimed instead was a lengthy annual report by the Raion Head of Administration, Nadezhda Kuznetsova, about improvements brought about in result of the third year of application of ‘To Live in the North!’. It is of note that the removal of the rotten meat figured in the list of such improvements (Kuznetsova, 2023). The benefits that came with the plan concerned, in their main part, various infrastructural improvements in key social sectors. Doors and roofs were mended in schools and kindergartens, new equipment bought for hospitals, and, not least, the name of the plan itself was prominently displayed by installing ‘an image-promoting illuminated construction “To Live in the North!” with decorative architectural lighting’ (ibid.) (Fig. 4.1). What was meant by this arcane administrative phrasing was that an ad of the grand plan was placed on the wall of the entrance of the Nationalities Cultural Centre in Lovozero. In the list of projects realized with the help of the Raion Administration, a mention of the ‘Arctic Hectare’ program was also made. What it had brought to the Raion, apart from some land plots along the banks of the big local lakes, was a tourist centre on the banks of Revdozero Lake close to Revda. Under the name ‘SapStantsiia “Giperborea”’ (Stand-up Waterboarding Station ‘Hyperborea’), it offered waterboarding and related services. No reference to any big land plot distribution was made (Kuznetsova, 2023). Another moment in the report called for attention. That was the total absence of any improvements connected with the two allegedly town- forming enterprises: that of SKhPK ‘Tundra’ and of ‘OOO Lovozerskii GOK’.
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Fig. 4.1 ‘To Live in the North!’ ad on the entrance of the Nationalities Cultural Centre in Lovozero. Source: Kuznetsova (2023)
In the case of ‘Tundra’, the absence of any mention could be read as a silent admission of the fact that its performance as an example of successful cooperation with Finnish companies for deep-processing and export of reindeer meat had failed. In this way, the part of ‘To Live in the North!’ called National Project ‘International Cooperation and Export’ had to be cancelled in ‘Tundra’s’ case. In a possible relation to that, the ‘rotten meat affair’ had to be somehow bypassed in the manner shown above. As regards the other local economic ‘pillar’, ‘Lovozerskii GOK’, the silence in the report raised questions given its recent coming under state tutelage. One would recall here the Governor’s visit to the Raion in October 2022, and all the hopes of a rebirth of Revda as a ‘little Soviet Union’ that the visit sparked.
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Both of these currently failed expectations may have been due to the adverse effects of the ill-fated SVO which caused revisions of bright plans in every direction. In the case of ‘Tundra’ and its exporting plans to Finland that was more or less clear (although not officially even hinted at), while the GOK case remained totally in the mists of surmise and local rumours. Their upshot was that the SVO had its financial price for the Region, resulting in scrapping subsidizing plans for the perennially ailing mining-processing complex. It could be that all top-of-power plans relied now on the Kolmozero lithium project, with the fate of the loparite concentrate that the GOK produced to have fallen from the list of priorities. It thus appeared that the only grounds for mentioning economic ‘success’ in the Report of the Administration for the past year was in the tourist sector. In the words of the Administrative Head, the three local tourist companies were ‘carrying out a number of activities for the development of tourism in Lovozero Raion. They aim to attract tourists, as well as to increase the awareness of the population about the importance of tourism, and stimulate young people to spend their spare time in an active and cultural way’ (ibid.). That was it as regarded the Raion’s economic output. All the rest came from regional and federal subsidies. In this way, despite the endemic fragile state of the so-called ‘town-forming enterprises’, a sense of living in a Soviet-like bubble could be sustained. It is early days as yet to say whether the new programme will manage to stem the tide of outgoing citizens of Murmansk Region. Some worrying signs can be discerned though, even at this early stage. The program is flagged about with the Governor’s name prominently displayed at every mention. By contrast, the name of his predecessor Marina Kovtun has firmly disappeared together with her ‘Arctic Hectare’ initiative and its dubious results. Another fond brain-child of hers—the promotion of tourism as the magic game-changer—has been fully absent from Chibis’s strategic plan. As regards the Raion, it has produced a small (and largely grey) economic sector, with scant returns for the Raion economy as a whole. Such lack of succession and continuity has become traditional for the Region, it could be said. Every Governorship so far has come up with their own ‘Arctic visions’ and ‘seas of opportunities’, but the stream of leaving population has not been stopped. An important detail here is that the Governors themselves have not stayed either after the end of their terms. It is very likely that the pattern may be repeated yet again.
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Obshchiny Much has been written about the Sami indigenous revival in Murmansk Region with a surge of such writing immediately after the tectonic changes of the early 1990s. The original expectations were that with state support and even more so with that of a sympathizing West, the long-suppressed Sami yearning for resurrecting their traditional way of life would be satisfied in the new post-Soviet conditions. In this context, it was taken for granted that the meaning of that would be to resume private reindeer husbandry on a family, kin, and neighbourhood basis. Three decades on, the sober fact is that nothing of that sort ever happened. While there were very substantial changes in indigenous visibility, and the emergence of an entirely different public climate in which the indigenous status was upheld, the reindeer husbandry aspect of the indigenous revival remained a rather poor relative. At present, only two among the great number of registered obshchiny have some symbolic claim of being engaged in reindeer husbandry activities. The natural question to be asked is about the rest: what are the activities they are engaged in? A parallel question is to be also asked as regards the two obshchiny whose herds have been monitored by the Reindeer Herding Committee. What are the reindeer husbandry activities they have been engaged in? To answer these questions proves to be far from an easy task. A general reticence about what the obshchiny are exactly doing seems to prevail. Official sources are available in connection with the realization of state programs for economic and social support of the indigenous population of Murmansk Region (Gosudarstvennaia, 2022). According to such sources, support to obshchiny is being provided ‘for developing traditional forms of land use: reindeer husbandry, fishing, (wild-fruit) gathering, etc.’ (ibid.). Since the activation of the programs in 2009, the total number of obshchiny so targeted has grown from seventeen to thirty-seven at present, thus marking an over two-fold increase. What each one of the obshchiny is engaged in remains in shade. Some idea of that can be got by considering the general criteria for subsidy eligibility. The condition is that a given obshchina should prove use of rented out land plots or fresh-water fishing lots (Postanovlenie-411, 2021; Postanovlenie-160, 2012). Judging by the fact that for each year of granting of subsidies only about half of them get approved, one could surmise that the rest cannot fulfil the eligibility criteria. On the other hand, since the Reindeer Committee acknowledges only two obshchiny in Lovozero Raion who are
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engaged in a minimal form of reindeer husbandry, a tentative conclusion to be made is that the rest are oriented to the second main item in the list of traditional land-use activities: that of fishing. Evidence from other sources suggests that this concerns almost exclusively fresh-water fishing. This follows from the fact that annual quotas available for sea-fishing lag behind in demand compared to those for fresh-water fishing. In this way, it gradually appears that fresh-water fishing is the main form of traditional land-use activities, to which obshchiny have oriented, with reindeer husbandry showing up in a token way. Such a general distribution of land-use interests is not inconsistent with historical precedents, as well as with synchronic contemporary features. Concerning the first, one would recall again the late nineteenth to twentieth century often- heated debates about whether the Sami of the Kola Peninsula should not be considered practicing fresh-water fishing as their principal occupation. Turning to present times, as it will be discussed further down in connection with cooperative reindeer-husbandry practices, fresh-water fishing has certainly been a parallel economic activity of both sovkhoz and post- sovkhoz employees. Wild-fruit gathering would be the third main type of so-called traditional land-use activities, but it is also a general seasonal occupation of the Murmansk Region population in their near totality. Focusing back on the obshchiny case, several progressively narrowing analytical angles have to be employed. A first cut is to separate what is known as ‘urban indigeneity’ from specifically ‘tundra’ one. From there on, the reindeer-husbandry and fresh-water fishing parts have to be considered in their highly asymmetrical relationship to each other in which fishing most certainly predominates. An orienting vector in an attempt to make more transparent the opaque situation presented by accessible official sources would be to consider the extent to which obshchiny development is replicating existing sovkhoist patterns, or, conversely, is moving towards ‘truly private’ ones. Sufficient time has passed by now to be able to determine the main tundra-related interests of the Kola obshchiny. ‘Tundra interests’ is an important emphasis in this discussion. Тhere is a strong need to separate it from what has been analysed in existing studies of developments in Murmansk Region as ‘urban indigeneity’ (Vladimirova, 2012). Such studies are most timely and deserving, as what has been happening on the indigenous scene during the last decades, has been overwhelmingly in urban settings. By the same token, ‘non-urban indigeneity’ has been marginalized to an even greater extent than it used to be during the Soviet era.
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At the same time, the instrumental role of the Human-Rangifer link, symbolized by the Sami people, has been promoted as a ‘tourist brand’ (brend) of the Raion. These two parallel processes, happening as if in parallel realities, will be examined in some detail below. A look at the state-of-affairs as regards ex-sovkhoz husbandry will quickly attest to the fact that the post-Soviet Sami indigenous revival left a scanty imprint on the tundra scene. The overall diminishing of the work- force seemed, in fact, to be more pronounced in its Sami part, compared to that of the Komi, Komified Nenets, or other ethnicities one. In the first place, this concerns the village-based administrative offices of the two cooperatives. The ‘tundra elites’, heads of reindeer husbandry departments, head vets, vet technicians (zootekhniki), brigade leaders (brigadiri), have lost much of their Sami presence of former times. In the case of Lovozero’s SKhPK ‘Tundra’ and its administration, the non-Sami presence in its top tiers is prominent. Thus, apart from a decision of the first post-Soviet years, to elect as the Head of the newly re- registered cooperative a Sami woman (Ol’ga Anufrieva), no other Sami person succeeded her in that position. By now, the leadership has firmly established itself as a Komi one. The same is true for the greater part of the ‘tundra elite’, the Heads of the two ‘sides’ or ‘wings’, as well as the vet doctors and vet technicians (zootekhniki). In the ranks below them of brigade leaders and senior herders, it is again noticeable that the Sami are in a decided minority. At present, the asymmetry is most pronounced as regards brigades in the north-eastern part of the cooperative, or its Right Wing. In the four brigades of this wing (1, 2, 8, and 9), comprising at present hardly more than ten active herders, the Sami herders among them are only two: one in the first and another in the second brigade. In the ‘left wing’ (Brigades 4, 6, and 7), the Sami presence is bigger and reaching up to over a third of the active herders’ contingent. In the top leading positions, of Heads of Reindeer Herding, as well as vets, Sami herders have been absent for a long time. That tendency became especially pronounced with the dissolving of Brigades 5 and 3 (the latter known as the ‘Sami brigade’) in the late 1990s. The case of Krasnoshchel’ie’s ‘Olenevod’ is more nuanced in this respect. To begin with, in the broad ethnic configuration of Lovozero Raion, Krasnoshchel’ie figures as a predominantly Komi village, founded by Komi and Komified Nenets families back in the early 1920s. In the course of agglomeration of kolkhoz structures and administrative liquidation of tundra villages, Sami in the main, most Sami families were forced to move
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to Lovozero. Many families moved also to Krasnoshchel’ie (Afanas’ieva, 2013). Thus, in the course of time, the originally Komi/Komified Nenets ‘remote’ village came to include a Sami ‘minority’, together with that of people of mixed ethnic origin, characteristic of the Raion as a whole. Unlike Lovozero, Krasnoshchel’ie had a very able Sami director, the prematurely late Ivan Matrekhin.19 Under his initiative, a long process of experimentation with choosing an optimal administrative status for the cooperative took place. It finally ended in an unpronounceable acronym, namely SKhPK OPKh MNS ‘Olenevod’. In a deciphered form, this abracadabra, capable of raising an eye-brow even among the well-seasoned in the way of acronyms Russian public, comes out as ‘Agricultural production cooperative—reindeer husbandry commercial farm—of the numerically small peoples of the North’. The idea there was to stress both the numerically small peoples’ ethnic profile of the village, as well as its predominantly reindeer meat producing and trading orientation. While the OPKh (reindeer husbandry commercial farm) symbolic (and correspondingly, juridical) stress is transparent, the MNS one (of numerically small peoples of the North) requires elucidation. In the nomenclature of official ethnic (‘nationality’) labels, currently pertaining to ethnic status in Murmansk Region, the MNS one introduces a fine shade of differentiation from the indigenous (korennoi) status. The meaning of that is that while the descendants of Komi/Nenets’ late nineteenth– to early twentieth century newcomers are not indigenous to the land, they are to be treated by the state on a similar footing. Consequently, in terms of state support, the privileged status of the Sami has been continuously pushed also to apply to the case of the numerically small peoples (MNS), that is, the Komi and Komified Nenets. The argument for promoting the drive rests on the recognition of the fact that although not indigenous, these people, defined as numerically small, have been sharing for a sufficiently long time the local traditional forms of land-use of the indigenous (Sami) people. A very recent example shall be used to illustrate this point. It concerns granting ‘Veteran of Labour’ (Veteran truda) title and corresponding privileges in reindeer husbandry not only to Sami but also to non-Sami herders. The ‘Veteran of Labour’ distinction goes back to the mid-1970s when a medal with that name was introduced in the Soviet civilian heraldry. In 19 Not to be confused with the Sami entrepreneur and politician with the same name, mentioned earlier on.
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Kola reindeer husbandry sovkhozes, it was habitually awarded to long- serving Sami herders. Until 1995, the medal did not have more than an honorific function, but after that date it was additionally adorned with a number of monetary bonuses. They included an annual salary bonus, holiday-travel support, as well as support for transportation costs in case of outmigration from the Region.20 On 30 March 2021, the Regional Ministry of Labour and Social Development announced that a move for a new law was passed by the Regional Duma, concerning the introduction of two significant changes of the previous regime of granting the title to reindeer herders (i.e., the one which had been in force since 1995). The published announcements in the regional press, as well as in that of the Raion, clearly indicated a recognition of the fact that by 2021 two parts of the previous provisions had seriously aged. One concerned the length of time of continuous employment which used to be forty years (for men). Given the present pensioning-off age for herders (at the age of fifty years for men, previously fifty-five), it was clearly untenable and legally impossible to demand continuous employment since the age of ten. Hence, the requirement was lowered to twenty-five years for men and twenty for women. The second provision concerned the sensitive ethnic (‘nationality’) issue. The existing regime was a relic of the 1970s when the majority of active herders had been Sami. Since by now, the Sami part had shrunk to practically a handful of active herders, the remaining herders, Komi and Komified Nenets in the main, came to be in a clearly disadvantageous position. At the same time, their administrative presence in leading Raion posts had perceptibly grown and, correspondingly, their lobbying power on the regional level. The growing asymmetry has come to be one which included indigenous presence mainly in the sphere of symbolism and its various cultural offices, while executive ones tilted heavily in the non- indigenous direction. Pronounced political sensitivities of upfronting the divergence and the corresponding hold on local power demanded their delicate handling in official public exposure. To get a sense of the careful treading on this politically charged terrain, it is revealing to see how the changes, demanded by current realities in reindeer husbandry, were spelled out in official texts—like the ones, discussed here in connection with the ‘Veteran of Labour’ honorary title. For a full list of bonuses: Dlia prisvoeniia (2021); V Murmanskoi (2021); Kovaleva (2021).
20
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The Ministry of Labour’s announcement, which can be considered as the original shortened version of the actual Decree (Prikaz) for changing the rules concerning ‘Veteran of Labour’ status, chose the politically acceptable wording the Ministry had found fit for the occasion. In the heading of the document, it came out in the following way: ‘The requirements for granting the title “Veteran of Labour” will be relaxed (my emphasis) in Murmansk Region’. For some reason, the lowering of the length of labour history was not chosen to be the main accent. Instead, the stress was put on what was obviously seen as the main thrust of the legal change, namely that ‘the “Veteran of Labour” title would be granted to all reindeer husbandry employees independently of their nationality (my emphasis)’ (V Murmanskoi, 2021). Alongside that, a list of the eligible positions was given: those of herders, vets, vet technicians, and reindeer husbandry workers. In that last category fall all of the auxiliary personnel, namely, vezdekhod drivers, repair technicians, ‘tent-workers’ (men or women), and brigade-base wardens. In effect, that covered the totality of tundra-working personnel in both cooperatives. The non-existing ‘truly private’ herding scene was left entirely outside the scope of provisions (possibly as an implied recognition of its non-existence). On the other hand, ignoring the ‘truly private’ was consonant with the exclusive bias of state support in the direction of collectives, as noted earlier on. The other official announcements in the regional and Raion media followed almost verbatim this accent. An exception was made only by the regional Arktik-TV, which chose work history to come first (Dlia prisvoeniia, 2021). In the final account, behind the overall delicate treatment of the whole case and its round-about speaking of new ‘relaxed requirements’, lies the recognition of the current ethnic asymmetry in tundra reality: its indigenous part was shrinking with a corresponding growing of the non-indigenous (or para-indigenous) one. Administratively, and with the political instruments at hand, that latter had managed to gain a point in the variegated Northern bonuses field, leaving the symbolic one to indigeneity. There was no harm in that last either, it can be said in an aside, given its value for promoting the Raion brend, and its much desired stimulation of tourism. The first thing concerning this outside-of-cooperatives, but ethnically defined side of local processes, is that current indigenous-related legislation recognizes the right of obshchiny to engage in traditional non- commercial practices in tundra or forest-tundra locations. In consequence, various obshchiny have reached agreements with the two SKhPKs leading
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to sub-letting of land, designated for agricultural use, in respect of which the SKhPKs figure as the original rent-holders of state land. In both cases, the amount of annual rent paid is symbolic. Where tensions have been expected to occur has been in the case of cooperative land in active grazing use, as in the environs of the Village of Lovozero. Since, however, no obshchina embarked on reindeer husbandry in more than a symbolic way, even holding sub-rental rights over grazing range in active cooperative use has proved to be of little consequence. Such is the case for instance of the Obshchina ‘Shantambal’ of Krasnoshchel’ie, holding rights over the biggest territory of obshchina usage in Lovozero Raion. This lack of serious tensions follows from the fact that although some obshchiny, like notably ‘Shantambal’, have managed to stake out very large pieces of the ex-sovkhoz grazing range, they had not engaged in reindeer husbandry activities. In the words of Viktor Maiagin, at the time Vice- Head of ‘Olenevod’, concerning ‘Shantambal’: As regards the obshchiny, they are not using the land according to their stated goals. They have obtained long-term leases of land for developing reindeer husbandry, but for many years now they are not showing up with any herds. What they have been flagging are a couple of reindeer—that has been all so far….’ (Kuznetsova, 2012a) This summing up of the situation in the grazing range of ‘Olenevod’ has proved to be a typical case. The fact of the matter is that the most active among the obshchiny have been engaging in the more promising business of tundra tourism. Practically all the rest, as well as individual persons eligible for obtaining indigenous support, have oriented themselves to obtaining fishing quotas. Tundra tourism of obshchiny in Lovozero Raion has currently been developing as working business concerns of some scale as regards two of them: Sam’-Siyt (‘Sami Village’), and Voavshess (‘Northern Lights’). At the same time, they are the only ones with reindeer husbandry figuring as their primary aim in their documents of legal registration. The legal status of these obshchiny is abbreviated as a complex acronym, as in the case of SKhPK OPKh MNS ‘Olenevod’. Going by the home rule that a complex acronym speaks of an extended portfolio of legal provisions, I first look at this label. In the case at hand, the acronym is NO TSO KMNS, decipherable as: ‘Non-commercial Organization of the Territorial-Neighbourhood Obshchina of the Indigenous Numerically-small People of the North’. Two parts of the complex acronym require elucidation.
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One is of them is the NO (non-commercial organization) part of the abbreviated title. The logical question that may arise is about an apparent legal contradiction. How is it that a non-commercial (i.e., non-profit) organization is at the same time a business venture? This question arises particularly as regards Sam’ Siyt which by the time of writing is a well- established Sami tourist firm which can boast of serious success on the Murmansk Region variegated tourist market.21 The answer to this may be found in Article 2 of the Federal Law on Non-commercial organizations, namely that ‘a non-commercial organization is one for which the gaining of profit is not the main objective of its activities and in which profit is not distributed among its members’ (FZ-7, 1996). Given this provision, it is, therefore, legally possible to conduct tourist business activities for supporting the goals inherent in the next part of the complex title, namely that these activities are carried out by a TSO (territorial-neighbourhood obshchina). This latter formulation is taken care of by the Federal Law on organization of obshchiny (FZ-104, 2000). According to it, obshchiny are either based on family/kin basis (semeinye, rodovye), or they are territorial- neighbourhood ones (territorial’no-sosedskie). A TSO status is thus not limited to family/kin links, but is presupposing only inhabiting together in a territory where an indigenous people are traditionally living (Article 1). Clearly, such a formulation gives more freedom for setting up an obshchina without limiting membership solely to family/kin links. An important further provision for a greater freedom of composition is contained in Article 8, Item 4 of the same law. It says: By decision of the General Assembly (skhod) of the obshchina of numerically small peoples, as members of the obshchina may be included persons, who are not part of numerically small peoples (but) are engaged in traditional forms of land-use of numerically small peoples. (ibid.) This is an important provision as it allows the composition of business partners to include non-indigenous members,22 retaining, at the same time, its general indigenous or numerically small people’s character, and the privileges and state support that ensue from such a status. As it will be shown further down, such an extension of the limits of indigeneity proves to be often exploited in the use of fishing rights for indigenous people.
21 See the firm’s brochure and customers’ comments at https://gidvezde.ru/murmansk- saamskaya-derevnya/?yclid=17546403128841076735. 22 A limit that the Law imposes is that non-indigenous membership should not exceed one- third of all members.
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Returning to tourist ventures, the provision in both laws cited is that there is a certain elasticity in the applications of indigeneity, but, in all events, whatever they are, they have to be bound in some way with traditional forms of land-use. In the eyes of the law-maker, ‘indigeneity’ and ‘traditionality’ are thus inseparably bound in a definitional manner. In this sense, an obshchina (RO 23 or TSO 24) is an entity whose principal mission is to preserve in a sustainable manner traditional forms of land-use. In accordance with this legal understanding, the tourist firms proclaim their principal goals. In the publicly accessible registers of business activities, the primary goal of NO TSO KMNS ‘Voavshess’ (‘Northern Lights’) is entered as ‘reindeer husbandry’ (razvedenie olenei). As additional activities, the following are entered: ‘Hunting, trapping, and shooting of wild animals, including the offering of services in these spheres; collecting and processing of wild-growing fruit; collecting and processing of wild- growing nuts; fishing’ (Severnoe 2022). This list exhausts all forms of traditional land-use which are defined by current legislation as applicable to renewable resource opportunities in the local case. Below I examine the existing obshchina practices concerning the primary one usually listed in obshchina missions, namely ‘reindeer husbandry’. The principal question to be asked here concerns reasons for which obshchina reindeer husbandry has not happened to this day, despite proclamation of such goals and the use of corresponding legal provisions. Obshchina reindeer husbandry as private-in-the-collective herding is the short answer to the question posed above. Currently, business interests of obshchiny are best promoted by a successful combination of legal provisions envisaging support for traditional forms of land-use by KMNS, on the one hand, with the current status of cooperative structures as state- supported enterprises promoting private-in-the-collective management of tundra resource use, on the other. As shown in Chap. 2, the Stock-Taking Committee (STC) head-count bulletins for 2020 listed twenty-six head of deer to Sam’ Siyt, and 6 to Voavshess. The animals (mainly draft-bucks) were used for joy-rides offered to clients, as well as for other tourist purposes. These are described in the following way in the Sam’ Siyt’s brochure. In a five-hour trip around what the obshchina advertises as a ‘Sami village’, among other attractions ‘you can caress and hand-feed the reindeer’ (‘Sam’ Siyt’ 2021). There is also a choice of ‘traditional reindeer-meat dishes’. RO—Rodovaia obshchina (Clan community). TSO—Territorial’no-sosedskaia obshchina (Territorial-neighbourhood community).
23 24
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According to informants, all members of the two tourist-oriented TSOs have personal/private herds in SKhPK ‘Tundra’. Since use of the same draft-bucks for tourist rides and caressing by clients cannot extend over a given period and the animals need to recuperate during the summer, they are regularly replaced from personal/private contingents, migrating together with the big cooperative herds. The loophole used here is that there are no legal provisions, barring obshchina members from functioning as private herders in a tourist firm context, on the one hand, and as individual owners of personal/private reindeer in a cooperative one, on the other. This ‘dual hat’ arrangement explains why the reindeer numbers of obshchiny, who are listed as developing reindeer husbandry as their primary objective, are so low. What is happening is that the STCs, in their annual stock-taking sessions, are able to count only the animals rounded up at the tourist camps of the obshchiny, and presented as constituting their ‘private herds’ (Fig. 4.2). Meanwhile, the personal/private reindeer of obshchina members are somewhere out there in the tundra, mixed in the freely roaming cooperative fragments. When the fragments get rounded up in the corral
Fig. 4.2 ‘Symbolic herding’: STC members counting ‘herd’ at ‘Sam’ Siyt’ (Source: Nikolaev, 2016a)
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enclosures, these personal/private reindeer will be entered as belonging to their various owners. Whether they are obshchina members or not is of no concern to those conducting the counting procedure. Or, said in other words, there is neither an administrative, nor a legal provision for treating the issue. It is also to be taken into account that given the current hyper- extensive system of cooperative reindeer husbandry, there is also a good chance for some part of such personal/private contingents not to end up in the corrals at all. The distinction between the categories ‘truly private’ vs. ‘personal/private’ consequently gets stretched to the utmost in such an arrangement. In sum, those reindeer rounded up at the tourist camps of the obshchiny in the environs of the Raion centre figure in the counting documents as ‘private’ (to the obshchiny). The rest, counted at tundra corral enclosures, end up listed as ‘personal/private’ heads of reindeer, belonging to individual owners. The arrangement is advantageous because the necessity of allotting labour effort for conducting reindeer husbandry activities in real terms is thus avoided. Even in the improbable case that obshchina members would be willing to invest in such an effort to mobilize herding labour is by now practically unthinkable. Obshchina members, as everyone else in matters related to reindeer husbandry, are by now urban inhabitants in every sense of the word. Consequently, the functioning of a labour market for reindeer husbandry tasks has become highly problematic, not to say, fictional. The case of the next-to-mythical herd on the Ribachii Peninsula serves as an illustrative example. As described in Chap. 2, the Pechenga Raion MUP who is its owner and allegedly in possession of some 500 head has been constantly trying to find such labour in Lovozero. So far, all such efforts have brought disappointing results. In the absence of a supporting structure of sufficient scale, such as that provided by the Lovozero Raion cooperatives, herders find it pointless to get engaged for a mere salary and at a location far from home. Consequently, when the MUP manage to organize a herding team somehow, it is a matter of a year at most before it disintegrates and they have to start searching for new people all over again. Before examining the reasons for the absence of labour market in herding, a phenomenon which is at the heart of the current reindeer husbandry system on the Kola, some more will be said about the obshchiny case. There is nothing in the existing relevant legislation stipulating that severance of RO/TSO reindeer husbandry activities from cooperative ones is a hard-and-fast requirement. It is therefore quite possible for an
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arrangement like the one described in the cases of Sam’ Siyt and Voavshess to legally exist. Namely, that such obshchiny may conduct entrepreneurial activities as, in effect, private businesses, while their members can continue to be part of the personal/private cooperative structure as owners of personal/private reindeer. From the point of view of the obshchiny actors in this ambivalent ecology, the regional/federal choice of cooperatives as exclusive recipients of subsidies, earmarked for the support of reindeer husbandry, is immaterial. On the one hand, obshchiny also get supported by state subsidies, but in accordance with other aims, as support for the economic and cultural well- being of the indigenous and numerically small peoples. Given this distinction, obshchiny members’ interests dictate that the carrying platform of the private/public mix (the ‘sovkhozes’) are supported to keep afloat. The fact that the obshchiny themselves receive state support under ‘indigenous’ and ‘traditional land-use’ labels only stabilizes their syncretic link with the sovkhozes. If we take the TOS ‘Voavshess’ case as an example, this position will be well understood. The current subsidy per head of sovkhoz reindeer is 420 roubles annually. With six heads listed in the books, ‘Voavshess’ would thus get as an obshchina the sum of 2,520 roubles per year, which at the current exchange rate (in 2020–2021) roughly equals EUR 30. Clearly, it is much more preferable that the ‘sovkhoz’ lists an inflated figure of 26,000 head, and with the total of subsidies for that keeps their infrastructure and herd going. At the reverse side of the same coin, personal/private numbers need to be kept artificially low. Since obshchina members can be simultaneously owners of personal/private herds, the system eventually extends (informally) to them too, as well as to any other owner of personal/private reindeer. In the final account, it can be concluded that consciously or unconsciously, obshchina and private are not synonymous in the mind of the law-maker. What is synonymous there is obshchina and traditional land- use, reindeer husbandry being the first on that list. The synonymy between ‘obshchina’ and ‘truly private’ reindeer husbandry (and reindeer husbandry at all), taken in its Murmansk Region context, may thus be said to have probably existed only in the minds of sympathizing outside supporters (and the organizations funding them) who thought of the foundation of obshchiny as a way to resurrect private reindeer husbandry on the Kola Peninsula. With no such appearing some three decades after the initial enthusiasm in this direction, support under
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this banner has diminished, and, with the war in Ukraine, it has entirely ceased. It has been gradually replaced (as of 2006) by home state support along ‘indigenous-traditional’ lines. Given such a re-configuration of the overall political environment, outside support has gradually moved to less problematic symbolic destinations on the fully urban stage. Part of that is the continuing support for preservation of the Kola Sami language. A major role here has to be acknowledged as regards the decades long unflagging efforts of German-Norwegian linguist Elizabeth Scheller, currently based at the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø. Despite such notable exceptions, western supportive measures have considerably cooled in the context of the currently raging war in Ukraine. On the institutional level, we have seen that the Western-led Sami Council has practically frozen its links with the two Kola representations: that of the AKS (‘Kola Sami Association’), as well as of OOSMO (‘Community Organization of the Sami of Murmansk Region’). According to some insiders from the Western part of Sami activism, that was done under pressure from the Arctic Council and other government bodies in Fennoscandia that their financing will be discontinued in case they continue their co- operation with Russian Sami organizations. Fishing rights and regulations Indigenous fishing rights is, beyond doubt, among the hottest local topics. Fresh-water fishing in inland waters has been historically a significant part of Sami tundra and forest-tundra resource use. By long-established academic consensus, the summer uncontrolled form of reindeer husbandry, as a traditional practice of the Kola Sami, has been seen in this light (Luk’ianchenko, 1971:35–44). From another angle, there arose the opinion that the Komi/Nenets arrival in the late nineteenth century was stimulated by rumours circulating among the Izhma Komi of the time, that there were abundant and rich pastures for reindeer on the Kola. They were left unused by the Sami, it was said, as they were only marginally engaged in herding, devoting their main attention to inland fishing and other available resource opportunities. A main part of these latter came from auxiliary services for Pomor sea-fishing teams (Orekhova, 2007, 2008). In all events, the Kola situation in this respect shows marked differences with Nenets, and subsequently, Komi reindeer husbandry in Bol’shezemelskaia Tundra where inland fishing has, by comparison, a very marginal significance. My task here is to look at inland fresh-water fishing from the point of view of current realities and in direct relation to the state of reindeer husbandry at the present moment. The accent I put is again in connection
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with the virtual absence of ‘truly private’ reindeer husbandry. I examine the state of inland fishing as a parallel way of explaining the situation through this prism. In doing so, I am guided by the fact that the opposition ‘truly private’ vs. ‘personal/private’ can receive further depth when the second main ‘traditional’ resource use is considered: that of fresh- water fishing. Such an additional depth can be gained by examining the recent very dynamic process of parcelling out rights and rules regulating the rich fresh-water fishing resources of the Region. Concerning the richest part of these resources, the anadromous fish ones, an appraisal of the current dynamic, has already been presented in Chap. 3. That was done by proposing a two-tier practice of natural resource distribution, as exercised by the top crust of the power pyramid (‘vertical’ vlasti’). From such an analytical angle, one tier concerns natural resources of significant value. They fall within the distributive competence of exclusive circles, high above the Raion and regional ones. Since these last are in a subservient (‘vassal’) position, they can only serve as operational instruments for barring common access to lucrative resources. This has been shown by considering the case of exclusive salmon fishing camps. When resources at such levels of intrinsic value, as well as of the tourist potential they hold is debated, that happens at the upper rungs of power, leaving no say for actors at the base of the social pyramid. The analogy with ‘king’s game’ in medieval Europe (Eliason, 2012) is hard not to come to mind here, as indeed in the way it has been used in analyses of current game-resource distribution in African countries (Nelson & Blomley, 2010). As we shall see below in the survey of indigenous fishing rights in the Kola, anadromous fish has been placed outside of local discussions. Occasional protests do take place, but they are cavalierly ignored by superior circles and that is usually the end of the case. ‘Allowable’ debate is thus being left open for ‘common’ fish species, or ‘white fish’. They are emphatically distinct from ‘red (salmon) species’, following the terms used in nineteenth century accounts of Sami fishing. The division in those days came from the fact that ‘white fish’ (sig, pike, etc.) were principally used for satisfying own subsistence needs, while ‘red fish’, salmon in the first place, used to be a trading item. Reflections of such divisions are to be seen today, re-interpreted through recent contextual circumstances, principally those reflecting the much higher intrusion of high-power interests in current Kola affairs.
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Returning to comparisons with reindeer husbandry matters, finding a common denominator allowing for the working of the ‘sovkhoist’ vs. ‘capitalist’ opposition (the ‘personal/private’ vs. ‘truly private’ one), in reference to both resources, is complicated further by a factor of still another nature. This concerns the intensity of interest connected with each one of these ‘traditional’ resources. Reindeer husbandry, as different from fresh- water fishing, is a resource of an incomparably narrower scope of interest in the local and outside contexts, compared to fishing. As previously shown, currently, its principal interest is in its sovkhoist potential based on the real-life presence of sovkhoz-like structures such as the current reindeer husbandry cooperatives. Albeit much reduced in influence, they are still a factor for social coherence, as well as being a source of economic benefit for their directly related participants, relative to their respective ranks within cooperative hierarchies. In a comparison with the fresh-water fishing situation, the first thing to be noted is the next-to-universal interest in fresh-water fishing, in the Region and far beyond it, when placed alongside reindeer husbandry. Russian legislation does not even consider who can be a reindeer herder or not. There are no restrictions here unlike in some of the Fennoscandic countries (Sweden and Norway), where by law only Sami indigenous people can practice reindeer husbandry. Despite the ‘free for all’ regime in Murmansk Region, there is only a very tiny fraction of the population who are interested in reindeer husbandry. What is more, even that miniscule fraction is diminishing all the time. When we come to fresh-water fishing, however, the interest is so great that a mountain of regulations needs to be constantly produced so that the fresh-water resources get properly used according to the lights of the relevant authorities. A palpable proof of such an assertion is the never-ending stream of regulatory documents coming out and made known by the local and regional media channels. Compared to that, it is hard to find even a single regulatory document, broadcast to the wide public and saying how reindeer husbandry is to be conducted. Fresh-water fishing is of widespread and intense interest. It stretches from the resident of a one-mine town or a closed city and garrison, to the wealthy fly-fishing client of salmon-fishing camps, arriving with gear the price of a good chunk of a remote village annual budget. Consequently, the various parts of the extensive ‘fishing-scape’ have to be considered separately.
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In the first place, what the relevant documents describe under the general term ‘recreational fishing’ (rekreatsionnoe rybolovstvo) has to addressed. Within this blanket category, some regulatory distinctions exist between the sub-types of ‘amateur fishing’ (liubitel’skoe rybolovstvo), ‘sport fishing’ (sportyvnoe rybolovstvo), and ‘fishing tourism’ (rybolovnii turizm) (Federal’noe, 2020; Pravila, 2020; Prikaz-727, 2021; FZ-475, 2018). In broad substantive terms, Russian regulations treat the whole matter by distinguishing between ‘industrial fishing’ (promyshlennoe rybolovstvo), on the one hand, and ‘hobby fishing’ (rekreatsionnoe rybolovstvo), on the other (Cf. FZ-166, 2004: Art.19). In what follows, ‘industrial fishing’ will be of interest to us insofar that it enters into a relationship with yet a third broad type of fishing: ‘traditional fishing’ (traditsionnoe rybolovstvo). The relationship itself, being essential for an appraisal of the indigenous fishing situation, will become apparent after this last type is discussed in some detail. In regulatory terminology, ‘traditional fishing’ (traditsionnoe rybolovstvo) is defined as a type of fishing exercised by the Indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation. The aim of separating this type of fishing from the rest, and of creating favourable conditions for its realization, is spelled out as follows: (…) for the purpose of ensuring a traditional way of life and the carrying out of traditional economic activities of the Indigenous Numerically- Small Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation for 2022. (Prikaz-659, 2021) When this broad formulation is applied to the Indigenous Sami population of Murmansk Region, two principal questions arise. The first one concerns the meaning of the term ‘traditional’ in reference to ‘a way of life’ and its related ‘economic activities’. Of particular significance here is the fact that Lovozero Raion boasts of the greatest concentration of Sami people. The second question concerns what may be broadly called ‘the Komi issue’. Is ‘traditional’ in reference to way of life and economic activities applicable also to the Komi and Komified Nenets population of the Raion? The question is a legitimate one to ask, given the fact that in terms of ‘traditionality’ the Komi and Komified Nenets residents, particularly of the ‘remote’ villages, are undoubtedly more ‘traditional’ (even in the official understanding of the term) compared to the urbanized Sami residents of Lovozero. This poses the question as to how traditionality is calibrated. Or, in concrete terms, about the principle defining the ‘Indigenous Numerically Small People Sami’ (KMNS), that is, the Sami people, as
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being more ‘traditional’ than the ‘Numerically Small Peoples of the North’ (MNS), that is, the Komi and Komified Nenets, who are residents of the remote villages of the Peninsula. From the wording of official documents and other regulations concerning fishing, it appears that there is positive discrimination favouring only the first group (KMNS). Added to these two principal questions, a third one appears. It concerns those who are engaged in reindeer husbandry and for certain periods of time reside in the tundra. Given the demands of their way of life and economic activity, which is as traditional as any definition of traditionality will have it, the legislator has taken the position that reindeer husbandry is practiced exclusively by KMNS. The matter is treated in connection with the very hot issue about whether KMNS have the right to fish in the ‘traditional manner’, that is, by using gill-nets, or have to fish by rod-angling as all those who practice ‘recreational fishing’ (Volkova, 2016; Zadornaia, 2019). In the final account, the KMNS have been allowed to fish by using nets as netting has been defined to be more traditional than angling. The position has been extended to privilege also reindeer herders by assuming, as noted above, that herding continues to have a predominantly KMNS general profile. In the latest version of the relevant document (May 2021), the exact wording appeared as follows: Indigenous people (KMNS-my gloss) who are engaged in reindeer husbandry are allowed for satisfying their personal needs to procure fish by using one fixed net with an eye-size of not less than 36 mm and of total length of not more than 50 m. (Prikaz-659, 2021: Amendment 1, Art. 8, Item 89) It has been further specified that herders are allowed to fish in this manner ‘in water-basins along their nomadic trek-routes, by temporary camps, as well as in places of traditional residence of individual persons or obshchiny’ (ibid.). From this brief account of the current state of fishing regulations, and the place of KMNS in them, it is clear that the legislator has uniformly applied their understanding of ‘traditional way of life and traditional economic activities’ without accounting for the specifics of Murmansk Region. These latter concern the three problematic issues noted above. Namely, that indigeneity in Murmansk Region at present has a pronounced urban profile, that insofar that ‘traditionality’ has any meaning in this context, it is equally shared by other local ethnic groups, and, what is more, with the whole regional majority of ‘Northerners’. And, third, that insofar that
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reindeer husbandry is concerned, the Komi and Komified Nenets (i.e., the MNS) have a predominant presence in it. The overall result of a heavy mismatch between the legislator’s understanding of the very problematic status of ‘traditionality’ and ‘indigeneity’ in the local context, on the one hand, and the current realities of reindeer husbandry, on the other, is that local actors are driven to find their own solutions to the problems that arise at every step. As that invariably brings either circumventing the maze of regulations with every means at hand, or totally ignoring them, the overwhelmingly greater part of the picture is placed in the ‘grey’ or even ‘black’ zone of what has been called ‘unsayable’ in earlier text. Consequently, a veil of non-transparency tends to cover the entire very delicate and complex ecology when the task of researching it is attempted. The method proposed here for solving such tasks has been one and the same all through. Namely, to penetrate pervasive opacity by use of the opposition ‘sovkhoism vs. capitalism’ or ‘personal/private’ vs. ‘truly private’ as analytical tools. These tools will be applied again in addressing the three problematic issues outlined above. I choose not to take on the prodigious task of engaging in a theoretical discussion of the very problematic concepts of ‘traditional’ and ‘traditionality’. At the same time, I find it useful to approach them from the point of view of the current legislation, on the one hand, and the way they are used as political tools of all actors at the receiving end of regulatory regimes, on the other. Given such a much-circumscribed agenda, two significant asymmetries in the second, political part of the local ecology need to be pointed out. One is the preponderance of ‘urban indigeneity’ matters of debate among local indigenous (KMNS) people. The second asymmetry brings the ‘reindeer husbandry’ vs. ‘fresh-water fishing’ issue to the fore. This latter is connected with the fact that a considerable part of the local minorities now share an urban way of life and urban economic activities with the rest of the population, while there is only a tiny part engaged in tundra land- use activities as their main occupation. In consequence of such lifestyle patterns, reindeer husbandry activities are subject to a fraction of indigenous involvement when it comes to tundra land-use. The same cannot be said, however, when the fresh-water fishing scene of debate is visited. Although, as it will be shown below, the pattern of direct involvement is not much different from that of the rest of the urban population, positive discrimination in favour of KMNS has
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placed fresh-water fishing at a very high position of interest in relevant public debate. In sum, the two asymmetries I speak of here are (i) between ‘urban’ and ‘tundra’-centred way of life, and second, (ii) between ‘fishing’ and ‘reindeer husbandry’ tundra land-use activities. Insofar that the Raion population is concerned as regards their way of life, as well as land-use activities, the ‘urban’ part heavily predominates over the ‘tundra’ one. Further than that, even given the relatively smaller space remaining for tundra-related concerns and economic practices, urban profiles of use again predominate. All of this places reindeer husbandry and its practitioners at a very marginal and exotic end of an imagined ‘urban-tundra’ vector. The case of fresh-water fishing and the KMNS part in it will serve to illustrate the case. A way to do this is to consider the typical agenda of a local KMNS public debate. To this end, I take at random a meeting of the Lovozero Department of OOSMO,25 which was announced as a ‘Sami Gathering’ (Rus. Saamskii Skhod ; Sam. Sarnep mine baiias).26 At this meeting of 6 February 2018,27 which is well representative for many others, the agenda consisted of nine items, eight out of them being concerned with urban indigeneity matters, while only one was concerned with tundra land-use issues. That specific issue was about fresh-water fishing problems that the Sami people faced. Below I present the whole of the agenda. What may be termed ‘urban indigeneity’ matters belonged to the political and broadly cultural spheres of debate. The specific items were the following: 1. Proposal for writing the Sami toponym ‘Lujavre’ alongside the Russian one ‘Lovozero’ on the sign post at the entrance to the village; 2. Similarly, proposal for putting Sami equivalents on street signboards, as well as on municipal office buildings; 3. Install shelves for flowers at memorial plaques of Sami heroes of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989); 4. Set up a memorial plaque commemorating A.E. Mozolevskaia, a renowned Sami teacher; 5. Ceremonial minute of silence in memory of Sami soldiers who lost their lives in the Fatherland War (1941–1945); 25 Obshchestvennaia organizatsiia saamov Murmanskoi oblasti (A non-governmental organization of the Sami of Murmansk Region). 26 About this meeting, see Shebut (2018). 27 6 February is celebrated as International Sami Day.
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6. Bring to the attention of the Raion Administration the lack of a grocery shop in the remote village of Sosnovka; 7. Submit an address to the regional authorities asking for legalization of buildings along the banks of the Lovozero Lake; 8. Set up a working group for preparing participation in the 4th Sami Congress (November 2018). The item concerning specifically tundra land-use was the following. The meeting moved for sending a petition to the regional authorities concerning the problem of limitations of access of the Indigenous Numerically Small People (Sami) to fresh-water resources in internal waters at places of compact residence. In more specific terms, the petition addressed the problem of the absence of licenses (putevki) for salmon fishing close to settlements. What this meant was that Sami people had difficulties in obtaining licenses for salmon fishing at locations proximal to the Lovozero/ Revda urban complex, as well as along the Ponoi River and its tributaries.28 No item concerning reindeer husbandry problematic issues was part of the agenda. The disparity between the attention given to fresh-water fishing as compared to reindeer husbandry is evident from a multitude of other documents, instructions, and regulations, regularly brought to the attention of the local indigenous, as well as non-indigenous population. It can be said right away that when it comes to reindeer-husbandry matters, there are several occasions in the course of any given year when they are brought to the attention of the general public. One substantial part of them is devoted to the annual Festival of the North (Prazdnik Severa), where the principal part are the reindeer-draft races in which the herders of the two cooperatives are the exclusive participants. The second part of such mentions are reports in the local media of corral round-ups, mainly in Lovozero, or at the SKhPK ‘Tundra’ corral enclosures in winter and early spring. All in all, the coverage of both types of events hardly numbers more than five for any given year. In contrast to this sporadic and often folkloristic coverage of reindeer husbandry, there is a constant stream of very factual information concerning fresh-water fishing. In a large part, this is about KMNS fishing rights. Below I turn to the most prominent aspects of this informational stream.
28 In 2013, two exclusive salmon-fishing camps allowed Sami access for fishing in their lots: FGBU ‘Murmanrybvod’ and ZAO ‘Serebro Ponoiia’ (Saamy 2013).
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Fishing quotas ‘ensuring the carrying out of traditional way of life and for realizing traditional land-use activities of KMNS are annually granted by the Ministry of Fishing and Agriculture of Murmansk Region’ (V Murmanskoi, 2020). For 2020, quotas for sea-fishing (for cod and haddock) were received by 108 physical persons, including two clan communities (obshchiny). As regards fresh-water species, 135 quotas were given to representatives of the Sami indigenous people, as well as to six obshchiny (ibid.). The fresh-water species were specified in a long list, but salmon did not figure there. Or, in other words, quotas were granted to the Sami only for ‘white fish’. When considering the issue of fishing quotas, a distinction between sea- fishing quotas and fresh-water fishing quotas needs to be made. The necessity arises from two directions. First, while the total size of sea-fishing quotas is made publicly accessible, that is not the case with fresh-water fishing quotas. And second, while sea-fishing quotas are occasionally underused, fresh-water fishing quotas get invariably fully used. It is also common for authorities to state that such quotas are being overused. The differences may be seen as ‘surface’ projections of an underlying pattern which, as suggested above, is characterized by ‘urban indigeneity’ features in its predominant part. Some small and largely symbolic space remains for ‘traditional’ ones, whatever that nebulous term may mean. Below I discuss each one of the ‘sea-fishing’ vs. ‘fresh-water fishing’ differences in an attempt to throw some light on the drivers, bringing to the surface the recurrent projections noted above. In official announcements, it is flatly said that catch sizes (or quotas) for fresh-water fishing of KMNS ‘are not determined’ (ne ustanavlivaetsia).29 The exact wording in media documents, as well as in legislative ones is uniform: Quotas for fresh-water biological resources, the total allowable catch for which is not determined (my emphasis) are for: (…..) (follows a long list of fresh-water species – my gloss). (V Murmanskoi, 2020; Saamy, 2020:2; Prikaz-659, 2021) As different from this withholding of catch-size limits, total allowable catches for sea-fish species, cod (treska) and haddock (piksha) in the main, are given for both the whole region, as well as for each applicant. Thus, for 2022, sea-fishing quotas of applicants in Lovozero Raion have been 29 The last time when fresh-water fishing quotas had been mentioned as ‘determined’ was in 2016 (Nikolaev, 2016b).
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granted to seven individual applicants, as well as to one newly created obshchina. That latter was TSO KMNS ‘Akhkhtan’ (‘Together’).30 The total size of the quotas of the seven physical persons, each one entered by name (Prikaz-659, 2021), amounted to 243.249 tons, of which 165.3 were for cod, and 77.949 for haddock. ‘Akhkhtan’ got a total of 1471.326 tons, of which 1173.7 were for cod, and 297.626 for haddock. The example shows that sea-fishing quotas are substantial. In the physical persons part, five of the seven applicants have been allowed catches of cod of a little less than 30 tons each, with lesser allowances for the rest (of 17 and 1 ton, respectively). The haddock figure for one person was of 3 tons, for 5—of 2.5 tons each, and for the remaining one—of 0.5 ton. It is to be noted here that the person with the highest limit for haddock (the more valuable species) was the Head of the ‘Sam’ Siyt’ most successful tourist obschina, Ivan Matrekhin. It will be recalled that he is a member of the Sami Representative Council at the Government of Murmansk Region.31 As mentioned before, ‘Sam’ Siyt’ is also an obshchina which claims practicing reindeer husbandry. Another member of the Council and head of Obshchina ‘Puaz’ (‘Reindeer’) was listed with a slightly lower quota allowance. It can be concluded from these examples that political position and fishing quotas seem to be linked. Sea-fishing quotas for ‘Akhkhtan’ were also very substantial. Each one of the twenty-seven members got an allowance for, roughly, 58.5 tons of cod, and 15 tons of haddock. It is clear that such quantities of fish require vessels and tackle of the calibre of a medium-sized fishing trawler. Accordingly, the general practice of utilizing such quotas has been for a private person or an obshchina which has been allotted a quota, to enter into an agreement with a fishing company. (In another reading: that fishing companies are looking around for obshchiny whose political weight is likely to ensure them getting big quotas.) The fishing company then catches the fish, sells it, and transfers an 30 Judging by the list of members of ‘Akhkhtan’(Together), this is a new version of the previous ‘Sam’ nurr puldegk’ (Sami youth generation), which has been officially closed down. It is to be noted that ‘Sam’ nurr puldegk’ had been created with the mission of being a reindeer-husbandry obshchina of young Sami people, some of them being formerly employed in SKhPK ‘Tundra’. ‘Akhkhtan’ has proclaimed the same goal. Its leader Andrei Dubovtsev has stated that the proceeds of the obshchina from its sea-fishing quota will be used for organizing a reindeer-herding team in a grazing range close to the now extinct 3rd Brigade of ‘Tundra’ (personal communication, Andrei Dubovtsev). 31 On the newly elected membership of the Council of Representatives, see Nikolaev (2021).
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agreed part of the profit to the original quota-holder. The practicing of a ‘traditional way of life’, and ‘traditional land-use activities’, is thus amounting to a part of profits from the selling of catches to be transferred to the bank accounts of the quota-holders. The procedure has been explained in the following way by the Vice-Head of the Regional Fishing Committee, answering a journalist’s question about how quotas are utilized: It is clear that there is no such thing as a Sami (fishing) fleet. But they have full right to hire a ship and its crew and realize as well as process their quotas. (Antonian, 2011) The relevant authorities seem to be fully aware of the extreme stretching of the term ‘traditional’ in such an arrangement. In its ‘unsayable’ and never even hinted at side stands the fact that generous sea-fishing quotas translate into the lion’s share of profits going to the fishing companies who catch and sell the fish. The authorities granting the quotas cannot be ignorant of this fact. A few years ago, the issue was raised at a top federal level of debate: that of The Council of the Federation (Sovet Federatsii). Some radical reforms were proposed. Namely, to fully change the concept of ‘fishing for carrying out a traditional way of life and traditional economic activities of Indigenous Numerically-Small Peoples (KMN)’ (in the sense of FZ-166, 2004, Art.1, my gloss) (Traditsionnoe, 2013). What was in fact being proposed was to restrict traditional fishing only to fishing for ‘satisfying personal, domestic needs’ (ibid.). The Indigenous communities (the Murmansk Region Sami one included) naturally protested against such a new reading of the term ‘traditional’. Their position was: ‘We protest against such a policy and are prepared to use all lawful means to defend the rights of the Indigenous peoples of access to aquatic biological resources, including economic activities (emphasis mine) of KMN in that sphere’ (ibid.). Important moments are to be noted here. The formulation ‘for satisfying personal domestic needs’, which was discussed earlier on in connection with reindeer husbandry and the birth of the ‘personal/private’ property category, tends to inevitably come diachronically first when radically authoritative measures attempt to intrude into a ‘substantive’ socio- economic reality (in Polanyian terms). This heavy-footed initial rush, provided it is below the threshold of top- power interests, is soon checked by concerns about operational issues, which authoritative power feels unable to tackle or be bothered with.
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The same progression is to be observed in the case of ‘traditional’ being applied to the treatment of fishing rights. In this case, as in the historically preceding one of reindeer husbandry, economic activities were not excluded as incompatible with a traditional way of life by top-power authorities. Specifically in the case of Murmansk Region KMNS, economic activities remained under the ‘traditional’ label, translating into what amounted to relegation of quota-holding rights to non-KMNS business entities. Thus, the private interest of a quota-holder retained compatibility of existence by virtue of a program for state support of an indigenous collectivity: the indigenous people and their right to preserve a ‘traditional way of life’. The fishing quota issue illustrates, in this way, yet another realization of the private-in-the-collective (or sovkhoist) principle, analogous to the personal/private reindeer husbandry arrangement. The difference is only in the specific nature of the collective resource, serving as a carrying platform for the personal/private one. In the case of reindeer husbandry, this specific collective resource are the assets of the reindeer husbandry cooperative, critically augmented by state subsidies. In the fishing quota case, it comes from state management of the country’s fishing resources in the name of supporting the traditional livelihood of the Indigenous Sami people. Having said this, it is to be emphasized again that economic activities in the past were never severed from what is now termed ‘a traditional way of life’ of the Kola Sami people. It needs to be stressed again that the typical pattern noted by a long succession of nineteenth- and twentieth-century ethnographers (Luk’ianchenko, 1971; Charnoluskii, 1930; Gebel’, 1909; Rozonov, 1903; Kharuzin, 1890) was for non-anadromous species (‘white fish’) to be used for satisfying domestic subsistence needs, while anadromous species (‘red fish’) were used for trade. At present, KMNS holding rights extend over ‘white fish’ only, ‘red fish’ (wild salmon and trout) being above the threshold of democratic debate and in the sole competence of superordinate interests. Any debate or protest concerning the infringement of the ‘traditional’ arrangements as regards ‘red fish’ as they used to exist are generally ignored. The final conclusion that may be drawn at this point is that ‘traditionality’ is heavily stretched both from ‘below’ and from ‘above’, according to the respective needs of political instruments of the various actors. In addition, placing ‘red fish’ exclusively in the competence and for the benefit of elite actors shows a strong ‘family resemblance’ with feudal-like governance of renewable resources (game and fish).
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A second principal moment concerns specifically the Murmansk Region reformulation of the designation. In the pan-Federal application of the term, it has the meaning Indigenous Numerically-small Peoples of the North (Korennye malochislennye narody Severa). In the Murmansk Region case, the same abbreviation is often read as Indigenous Numerically-small People Sami’ (Korennoi malochislennyi narod Saami). Deliberately or not, the polysemy of the letter ‘S’ in the abbreviation (Sever vs. Saami) reflects the very specific standing of the Sami people of Murmansk Region, as compared to other similar peoples of the Russian North.32 As different from many other northern indigenous peoples, the historical process has brought about the degree of urbanization of indigeneity in Murmansk Region an extent which is highest not only in the Russian North but quite possibly in the global Subarctic. With this specific feature in mind, it could be said in plainer terms that it is one thing to have an indigenous people in Siberia or the Far East who depend on a single land-use resource for satisfying all their needs: subsistence, as well as monetary ones. When this is compared to an urban indigenous mode of life, the notion of ‘traditionality’ tends to get progressively vacuous in its purely existential part. Statistical data is absent as regards such a development, but it may be said with a great deal of certainty that the historical process has hardly left a Kola Sami person outside salaried employment ever since the setting up of sovkhozi in the late 1960s to the early 1970s. In the final account, while ‘indigenous’ is not a relative concept, ‘traditional’, apart from other conceptual deficiencies, most certainly is. Consequently, it allows considerable manipulation as shown above. Returning to the manner quotas get utilized in real terms, it is to be said that when it comes to fresh-water fishing quotas, the established practice is generally very similar to that of sea-fishing ones. At the same time, certain important differences are to be noted. A principal one here concerns the mode of participation in the specific resource extraction. Consequently, the ability of controlling the management of the quota so that fishing companies to which it is relegated do not end up with the lion’s share of the profit. Sea-fishing clearly poses much greater obstacles in this respect compared to fresh-water fishing in internal waters. Given the fact that in many cases quota holders are old-age pensioners, their physically engaging in sea-fishing is hardly possible in the typical case. Another reason for such people being hesitant to apply for Properly: of the Russian North, Siberia, and the Far East.
32
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sea-fishing quotas is their apprehension that without some very strong backing—coming from a politically influential obshchina—they stand a good chance to be cheated by the fishing companies. When it comes to fresh-water fishing quotas, the situation is different, particularly as regards internal waters close to the place of habitation, like in the big Lovozero and Umbozero lakes, or in adjacent rivers and smaller lakes. In such cases, quota holders may engage physically in fishing, or mobilize family, kin, or para-kin members for the purpose. It is also possible to entirely dispense with the engagement of industrial fishing companies for utilizing their quotas. In this way, apart from satisfying subsistence needs, the margin of purely monetary profit is certainly greater. The situation, in this part, resembles very much the utilization of personal/private reindeer quotas. On the technical side of procedures, allowable catches are eventually specified and the applicant is assigned to a specific fishing lot (rybopromyslovii uchastok, RPU). By regulation, all catches are to be entered into a log-book (rybopromyslovii zhournal), together with all other details concerning nets, type of species caught, etc. The log-book is obtained from the office of the respective fishing authorities in the locality of residence. The nets themselves have to bear a mark indicating ownership, while total length, height, and eye-size are entered in the log-book (Uchet, 2019). The material of the netting is not specified, but recently the use of cheap nets, made of very thin nylon thread, imported from China or South Korea (so-called koreiki), has been banned. It is to be noted also that the publicity around the applying for quotas and their eventual utilization constitutes a stream of information beginning in January and lasting practically throughout the year. This distribution of very factual regulatory information is to be seen as heavily contrasting with the occasional snippets of folkloristic coverage of annual reindeer husbandry events. The contrast accentuates land-use priorities which are rather different from their short list of officially proclaimed ‘traditional land-use activities’ (traditsionnoe pryrodopol’zovanie). If the intensity of the regulatory informational stream is considered, personal plot (zemel’nyi uchastok) and fishing regulations (for the whole population, but especially for KMNS) would compete for the first place. Extraction of timber for construction and fire-wood needs and wild-plant gathering may be considered to come next, while reindeer husbandry would not figure at all. This surprising fact may be explained by the running and regulating of reindeer husbandry matters being entirely in the hands of the managing
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boards of the two ex-sovkhozes, and, as the other side of the same coin, the absence of any private person managing reindeer husbandry on their own. Unsurprisingly, a crucial juncture in the whole process is the stage of selection of KMNS applicants to be sent for endorsement to the Fishing Agency in Murmansk. The Agency would check for a possible previous infringement of fishing regulations by a specific applicant, which may lead to a refusal of endorsement. In all other cases, this will be a formal procedure, with the substantial debate occurring at village KMNS meetings. I well remember an occasion when I was present at a general KMNS meeting in Lovozero when organizational matters were on the agenda. I was surprised at the very low attendance. There were not more than twenty people present, mostly elderly women. Typical of such low-key occasions was also the total absence of reindeer herders. When I showed some surprise at the low attendance, the organizer told me: ‘Wait for the meeting when fishing quotas will be discussed—there would not be room for a pin to drop then’. As further experience proved, that was exactly the case. Interest in quota distribution was very intense at such meetings, and the debate was invariably very heated. It was not difficult to see that the local KMNS organization did whatever they could to moderate intense rivalries between vying community factions. The overall concern could be described as one providing support for the most needy, as well as avoiding the over- privileging of certain persons at the expense of others. Fresh-water fishing needs decidedly were much higher on the agenda than sea-fishing ones. In all events, ‘quota scandals’ invariably mark such events. The managing of selection is analogous to that of distribution of subsidies for obshchiny. The responsible governmental Committee33 is allotted a total budget of subsidies to be granted. This is according to a list of obshchiny which have been proposed to be subsidized. The size of the subsidiy for each one of the successful applicants is determined according to a Regulation for size and distribution of funds from the Regional Budget.34 Elligibility is based on evidence of carrying out some activity and not 33 Committee for granting and distribution of subsidies (Komissiia po vydeleniiu i raspredeleniiu subsidii) at the Ministry of Internal Policy and Mass Communication of Murmansk Region (Ministerstvo vnutrennei politike i massovym komunikatsiiam Murmanskoi oblasti). 34 Regulation for determining the size and distribution of subsidies from the Budget of Murmansk Region to obshchiny KMNS, endorsed by Decree of the Government of Murmansk Region of 12.04.2012 (Postanovlenie 160, 2012).
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being only registered as an obshchina. Proof of real-life carrying out of activities (i.e., proof of real existence) is based on the presence of rented land and fishing lots (RPU). (Saamskie, 2020) For any given year, the list of subsidized obshchiny is roughly about half of all which have been registered. As obshchiny come and go all the time, it may be surmised that only half of them are active in any given year. The budget of subsidies is a fixed total sum, so it is a ‘limited pie’ situation, which Raion KMNS representations have to arbitrate. Official announcements present the case in the following way: 16 Sami obshchiny will get subsidies in 2016. The decision has been taken by the Committee for Granting and Distribution of Subsidies. The Murmansk Region budget has envisaged for the prupose a sum of over 2.5 m roubles. The size of subsidizing of each particular obshchina has been determined according to the number of obshchiny which have been entered in the list of beneficiaries. (Nikolaev, 2016a)
The allotting of a fixed sum of subsidies to be further distributed happens according to documentary evidence and the opinion of Raion KMNS representative bodies about the state of actvities in each obshchina. This places a critical part of the matter entirely in the hands of Raion level KMNS politicians. At a final arena of debate, the matter goes to the KMNS Council of Representatives at the Government of Murmansk Region. It should be mentioned in this connection that the leaders of some of the obshchiny are themselves members of the Council of Representatives. Generous fishing quotas and other subsidies are often granted to such obshchiny. Naturally, such a conflict of interests is an issue often provoking heated discussions at KMNS meetings and, in consequence, creating a general opinion of intense factional strife. At times, the strife gets to scandalous proportions. While this part of ‘behind the scenes’ debate never reaches light, rare exceptions point to what is going on. One such has been the controversy around the fishing- quota distribution of August 2011. The cause of the debate was the fact that while 577 Saami people had been granted fishing quotas for 2011, for over 600 others, such quotas had been refused. Let it be noted here that the total number of applicants, some 1200 people in all, roughly equals the totality of Sami people in Murmansk Region, barring young minors. It is thus evident that the
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overwhelming majority of the Sami population of Murmansk Region apply for quotas.35 Since, on the average, only half of all applications get approved, the natural question to ask is about the principle of selection. The rare public announcement throwing light on the process appeared in the regional daily Murmanskii vestnik of 3 September 2011, subsequently reprinted verbatim in Lovozerskaiia Pravda of September 16 (Antonian, 2011). (All quotes below are from the LP reprint.) According to the reporting journalist, the question about why half of the applicants had been refused quotas was answered by the Head of the Regional Committee for Fishing, Oleg Zabolotskii. As he explained, the main reason was that a great many applicants had submitted their applications through a ‘third party’. Zabolotskii did not say who that ‘third party’ had been, but immediately after the meeting, the reporting journalist managed to interview this ‘third party’ person. It turned out that he was again Ivan Matrekhin, the then Vice-President of the Organization of the Sami of Murmansk Region (OOSMO). He has been already mentioned in connection with fishing quotas, as also earlier on in connection with his support of the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine. As said earlier on, that led to his expulsion from the position of a Vice-President of the Sami Council of Russia, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. At home, Matrekhin continues to hold his positions in Sami Indigenous organizations, being, as previously said, also a member of the Council of Representatives at the Government of Murmansk Region. The investigating journalist consulted with the Head of Fishing at the Fishing Committee, Andrei Dolgolevets. This official showed all the 637 declined applications. As he explained, they contained all required documents, but the part asking for a quota itself (zaiavka). On this score the reporting journalist notes: While describing this situation let me also note that in the case of Ivan Matrekhin himself, this document (the zaiavka—my gloss) had been properly submitted and, consequently, he had been granted a quota. (Antonian, 2011) And further: In the final account, the total volume of fish, ear-marked by the state, was distributed among those, whose applications had been properly 35 For a detailed presentation of eligibility criteria, allowing under-age persons to apply for quotas, see Kurzen’iev (2013).
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submitted. These applicants, as it turned out, only gained from the situation, and gained in a big way, as the remaining quotas had been distributed among the winners. (ibid.) The case is interesting as subsequently, year after year, a similar situation was repeated: only about half of all applicants got quotas. While all concerned debate the topic continuously, with accusations against those who come out as ‘privileged benefactors’, no further official statement has ever been published. After the single case of 2011, when a regional journalist took the trouble to go into the matter and revealed who gets benefiited by the manner of proceedings, a lid of silence has covered the topic. The overall dynamic of utilization of fishing resources may also serve to explain the willingness of authorities to eagerly advertise generosity in allowing sea-fishing quota sizes far above any imaginable understanding of ‘traditional’ subsistence needs, or, for that matter, even of the allowed ‘economic activity’ ones. On the one hand, local opinion sees in this the influence of sea-fishing companies who end up as the bigger winners on the ‘traditional’ theme. On the other, authorities could thus claim their generous care and very substantial support for the KMNS to carry out their ‘traditional way of life’. Reticence for doing the same as regards fresh-water fishing quotas may be seen as prompted by the regionally spread next-to-universal interest in this form of resource extraction falling under the regulatory definition of ‘recreational fishing’. This brings to the fore important issues for the regional urban population. One of them is the very restrictive regime of using coastal waters. Being almost exclusively a military and border-troops domain of operations, regulations for recreational fishermen, especially when it comes to using small fishing craft are of such rigour, that only very few are prepared to shoulder the regulatory burden. A glance at any part of the Barents Sea coastal waters would hardly fail to notice their general emptiness of any small craft. The internal waters situation is very different. Consequently, proclamations of generosity to KMNS is politically unwise from the point of view of regional power. The average non-KMNS angler is sensitive to what is not infrequently perceived as a regime of discrimination against them. Fishing blogs are full of bitter comments like the following, which had come after an announcement that the Sami of Murmansk Region were allotted quotas for sea-fishing and fresh-water fishing for 2020. A detail to be noted in the announcement (V Murmanskoi, 2020) is that sea-fishing quotas were granted to 108 physical persons as well as to two obshchiny,
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while fresh-water fishing ones to 135 persons and 6 obshchiny. In the comments to the announcement, bloggers question Sami rights for a preferential regime: Devil knows how many years I have lived in this God-forsaken North, but I am not a Sami. For the Sami—there is an earlier pension, fish you can catch whichever you want and wherever you want, and all else you want! I want to be a Sami! Where is the place where I can sign up to become a Sami?! (ibid., NOMM, 12 January) Well, I agree with this chap. Where are the preferences for the old- timers of this region? Aren’t they the same as the indigenous population in case they were born here more than 50 years ago? Where is the place for signing up (to become) a Sami? I am with you, NOMM! (ibid., amigo84, 12 January) Predictably, the inhabitants of the tundra villages along the salmon-rich Ponoi river—Komi in the main—have for long echoed such sentiments: I would like to know why preferences for fishing go only to the Sami, why are we being restricted? We were born in Krasnoshchel’ie, grew up here, worked during all our lives in the North, got pensions, and now we cannot fish, cannot make a living. Why the Russians who were born here and all their lives have been working here do not have fishing rights? Why—don’t they live in the same conditions? Krasnoshchel’ie’s age is 95 years, that of Chal’mny Varre36—100 years, and all the same we are not ‘locals’? (Shirmer, 2015:7)
A comment from the previous forum is notable for its more balanced approach to the issue, protesting against the overblowing of Sami priveleges. At the same time, some important points are raised concerning the fishing lots (RPU) issue, reindeer herding rights, and salmon net fishing: You are not quite right about that. The indigenous (people) are subject to the same fishing regulations (as everybody else)—excepting some minor preferences. What they are given are fishing lots (RPU). Outside of the RPUs, net fishing is allowed only for reindeer herders. Netting salmon is forbidden. (V Murmanskoi, 2020, stream, 12 January) Sensitivity as regards a resource to which anyone living in the North feels they have a right brings about the need of a regulatory regime in which a part of the population, like the Sami in the present case, do not An ancient Sami village (now uninhabited), some 80 km downriver from Krasnoshchel’ie.
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appear as overprivileged. This in turn brings about an intensity in the total volume of regulations, noted earlier on. From the point of view of evaluating the respective significance of land-use forms, a particular feature needs stressing. This is the heavy asymmetry between a greatly expanded body of rules and regulations concerning land plots and fresh-water fishing, on the one hand, and the extreme paucity of such when we come to reindeer husbandry matters. The population at large appears as not even considering reindeer husbandry to be of interest to anyone but its direct practioners: the next-to-mythical exotic circle of the ‘herders’ (olenevody). Their priveleging in such a sensitive matter as fresh-water fishing seems to be taken for granted by the rest of the population. In this connection, the last of the quoted comments contains an important reference to net-fishing vs. angling. I turn to it below. Net-fishing vs. Angling: On 8 December 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation endorsed a Decree (Prikaz) according to which fishing rights of Indigenous peoples were to be equalized with those of the category of ‘recreational fishermen’. What that meant in practical terms was that net-fishing was to be banned for the Indigenous minorities. They had to fish by rod and tackle, like everyone else in the category of ‘amateur and sport fishing’. The use of nets was reserved for industrial fishing (promyshlennoe rybolovstvo), and, in a subsequent amendement, for nomadic reindeer herders.37 Naturally, this caused widespread protests on the part of the Indigenous peoples, voiced by many, including those from Murmansk Region. The protests were based on angling as not being the traditional manner of fishing for KMNS. The Sami people of Murmansk Region claimed that their way of utilising fishing resources had always been by netting fish. A prominent Lovozero Raion Sami activist phrased the protest comparing engagement in reindeer husbandry with that in fishing. I quote it in full: We know the difficulties reindeer husbandry is facing at present. We also know that private Sami reindeer husbandry in our Raion practically does not exist at all (my emphasis). It is only in fishing that things have been going tolerably well, in our opinion. A considerable progress was noticeable as regarded the preservation of a traditional national38 mode of land-use—that of fishing. But all of a sudden, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture have On industrial fishing see: FZ-166 (2004), Art. 19. The meaning of ‘national’ is ‘ethnic’ in a Russian context, in the particular case, Sami.
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come to the conclusion that regarding this traditional national form of land- use, the Sami have now to practice it in a non-traditional way, i.e. without the use of nets. (…) It is simply not possible to utilize the fishing-quotas granted by using rod and hook. (Yushkov, 2016)
The argument presented above is based on a specific interpretation of how the Sami had been traditionally fishing. This is a matter full of a great many factual details which cannot be given justice to in the present report. Let it only be mentioned here that concerning sea-fishing, historical sources mention the Sami as principally auxiliary personnel, providing reindeer-draft transport and warden services for those engaging in seasonal sea-fishing: the Pomors of the White Sea Coast. The Pomor fishing teams, being mostly focussed on cod-fishing in Murman coastal waters, as well as on sea-mammal hunting, used bottom hooked lines (iarusi) for fishing and not nets at all. Nets came in only as regarded catching smaller species for baiting the lines. As regarded specifically Sami fresh-water fishing, nets figure alongside various types of fishing traps and weirs, the latter particularly as regarded salmon fishing (Mustonen et al., 2020; Zaikov & Troshina, 2017; Osherenko, 1998). The emphasis on nets as a traditional implement thus bears a degree of correction insofar as the historical record goes. In the overall very heated polemyc, this may be considered as a relatively minor detail, to be ignored when vital resource-use rights are at stake. Where the crux of the matter is has been spelled out by another prominent activist. That was again the head of the highly successful tourist-business obshchina ‘Sam’ Siyt’, and, simulatenously, the Head of the KMNS Council of Representatives at the Government of Murmansk Region, the ubiquitous Ivan Matrekhin. He has been mentioned in relation to the ‘quota scandal’, earlier on, as well for precipitating the rift between Western and Russian Sami political representation. In an interview for the regional Arktik TV, his argumentation took a very rarely stated fully candid turn. To the description of how quotas get utlized by teaming up with fishing companies, he added the important detail that an intermediary step was often taken before that—of relegating quota-rights to an obshchina: Sami people, as physical persons, relegate (doveriaiut) an obshchina the quota they have been allotted by the state. (….) The obshchiny then enter into an agreement with a fishing company and this has been the way in which fishing quotas have been utilized until now. (Bez prava, 2016)
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This is the reality of the situation said as plainly as it could be by a person we can trust for this kind of information. It does not take much to surmise that an average quota-holder will seek the mediation of a politically influential obshchina, which will be likely to receive a generous quota itself. Matrekhin’s own history as a middleman or ‘ethnic entrepreneur’ (Wielecki, 2015; Ingold, 1976) provides abundant illustration of how an obshchina acquires the role of a successful intermediary between Sami rank-and-file applicants, on the one hand, and the regional government, on the other. Such an obshchina needs to have a leader who commands sufficient political capital both in respect of Sami activist circles, as well as in relation to the regional government (through the Council of Representatives). In my own experience, this reading of the situation has been corroborated by discussions with people I have known, Sami and non-Sami alike, over the course of more than two decades of fieldwork in Lovozero Raion. The name of the game is getting a ‘winning’ quota through proper connections, often relying on family/kin links. As to the technical realization itself, it is a fishing company that does the actual fishing, particulalry in the case of sea fishing. Presently, that is the only way sea-fishing quotas can be technically utilized. As mentioned earlier on, they are in the region of nearly 60 tons per person in the lucky case of being a member of a successful and politically well-positioned obshchina. When individual quotas of other physical persons are added to that, an obshchina may end up with a really prodigous size of licensed catch. What part of the profits from that catch will go to the obshchina, and what to the fishing company is a different and publicly ‘unsayable’ theme. Privately, the opinion is that unless one is connected with a politically powerful obshchina, one may end up with a very insignificant share of the profit. Coming back to the debated Prikaz for banning nets, the overall situation threatened to change significantly. Should it come into effect, the Sami would be barred from utilizing sea-fishing quotas and may also be ceriously circumscibed in uitlizing fresh-water fishing ones. In the eye of the legislator, they were supposed to do the fishing themselves and by using ‘traditional methods’. The aim would be that ‘traditions’ were preserved in a sustainable fashion, and the extraction itself would be oriented to satisfying domestic subsistence needs. In the spirit of such proclaimed goals for preservation of traditionality, it was rightly surmised that the relegation of fishing quotas to industrial fishing companies was striking an incongruous note which could not be
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tolerated anymore. Superior administrators on a federal level were indirectly questioning the fact that for a long time regional authorities had preferred to overlook the incongruity. Likewise, another question begged explanation: why sea-fishing quotas were being granted in obviously inflated proportions given the intitial ‘traditional way of life’ motive? The reasons for such a course of action on the part of regional authorities can only be speculated about. To my present knowledge, no official statement on that score has ever been published. As said before, connections with big fishing companies were suspected. A parallel explanation would be pointing to the political sensitivity enveloping indigenous matters at a level well below the treshold of high-power interests. By default, the latter would come to bear when more valuable fishing resources were concerned, namely those of anadromous fish (salmon). Federal circles had suddenly decided to disrupt the existing order and meddle in matters below their habitual ceiling of attention. The eventual resolution of the netting controversy would show, however, that although such aberrations did ocasionally occur, the system soon regained its habitual balance, leaving lower-tier actors with a sense of coming out as winners. As shown before in the case of the BEZRK Hunting Club, and the Wild Reindeer Controversies, a sense of democratic procedure, related to electoral support, was to be considered a relevant and stable part of the present mode of political governance. On the regional level, the interests of fishing companies were certainly to be taken into account. The war in Ukraine (the ‘special military operation’), as well as the recent expansionary accents of the Russian Arctic strategy, also prompted the need to have the indigenous aspect of the situation firmly under control. That, in turn, pointed to the need of making compromises in those cases when their significance was well under ruling elite interests (under the ‘peripherality threshold’). In such cases, the rule was for exercising positive discrimination favouring the extreme periphery: the tiny indigenous minority as well as the even tinier reindeer-husbandry one. This ecology is to be considered in respect of its more sensitive part: that of fresh-water fishing. The situation here is rather different in the sense that unlike sea-fishing, fresh-water net-fishing is something which is often done on a personal basis and by the three relevant groups concerned. In many cases, it would be practiced illegally by recreational fishermen of Murmansk Region and, when caught, such people would be penalized for ‘poaching’. Legally, however, net-fishing is practiced by Sami people (KMNS), as well as by the tiny community of reindeer herders. With the
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Prikaz of 8 December 2015, the threat was that only the herders would remain privileged in that way. The matter was part of the agenda of KMNS meetings, generally under the banner of infringement of ‘traditional rights of the indigenous peoples’. The argumentation the Head of the Council of KMNS Representatives used as regarded the chain ‘personal quota—obshchina quota—fishing company’ would not be mentioned at such meetings, possibly due to considerations akin to those of the regional authorities, as well as of the authors of the Prikaz themseves. Such considerations remained, therefore, as belonging to the discursive domain of the ‘unsayable’, both from ‘below’, and from ‘above’, insofar that public statements from these two poles of the political spectrum were concerned. Following KMNS protests about banning nets for them, the Prikaz was eventually quietly forgotten, following the logic outlined earlier on, that is, of always leaving a thin bottom layer of people’s power when issues well below high-power concerns were at stake. By 2018, nets were back for KMNS, with a long list of regulations attached (Nikolaev, 2018). In this way, the dynamic illustrated yet again the ‘two-tier’ manner of governing peripheral issues. Having said that, some differences need to be mentioned when comparing with the previous cases, which have been discussed. Namely, that of Hunting Lot 7, or what may be called ‘the people vs. the middle-orbit oligarchate’ controversy, as well as the ‘wild reindeer’ one. As different from those two cases, the bottom-level ‘winning’ group in the ‘net controversy’ were only a fraction of all interested actors at the broad ‘vertical-of-power’ base. This fraction was constituted by the regional minority of KMNS people, as well as by the tiny group of reindeer herders. Privileging principally KMNS swiftly raised indignation among both the majority group of users: the regional army of recreational fishermen, as well as among the non-indigenous MNS of the remote villages (Komi and Komified Nenets). It may be supposed that privileging the KMNS minority in spite of protests circulated in the social media by the other groups, who came out as ‘dispriveleged’, was prompted on the part of regional as well as of federal authorities by political considerations. The ‘ban netting—allow netting’ sequence happened while Marina Kovtun was still in office as Governor. The emphasis she consistently put on developing tourism, with a Sami ‘traditional brand (brend)’ on it, must be considered as highly relevant in that context. In other words, Sami traditionality was an asset for developing tourism. This stance of the regional leadership was not to be impaired by KMNS protests against
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regional authorities in the case of banning the use of nets as a ‘traditional Sami’ fishing method. Being a markedly vociferous group, their presence on the international indigenous arena has always been in the list of sensitive issues on the regional, as also on the federal level. The standard form of the message consistently broadcast would be voiced on all suitable occasions, like typically in connection with celebrating the International Sami Day (6 February). The Government would stress its support of the Sami people, as in the following standard message voiced by Marina Kovtun at a meeting of the leadership of the ‘Sami Meeting’ (Sam’ Sobbar): The Governor put a stress on their position that a caring attitude towards the ancient traditions, customs, and everyday life of the Sami people, the protection of the rights and interests of the Indigenous Numerically-Small Peoples, constitutes a significant priority for the Government of Murmansk Region as well as for the entire state policy of Russia. (Saamskaia, 2015) An indication of the veracity of such a reading of the regional political ecology and the KMNS place in it, may be gleaned from a meeting in Lovozero at which the net-fishing issue was a critical part of the agenda. The meeting was held on 19 June 2019, that is, after the resignation of Marina Kovtun in April of that year. It is notable that practically all fishing- relevant regional authorities were present at this meeting. Their list was impressive. Here were not only all the top Lovozero Raion officials but also the Deputy in the Regional Duma Aleksandr Shestak (former Head of Lovozero Raion), the Plenipotentiary for Human Rights of Murmansk Region M.V. Shilov, the Consultant of the Department of Realization of State Ethnic Policy at the Ministry of Internal Policy and Mass Communication of Murmansk Region Yu.V. Shandarova, the Head of Department for State Control and Protection of Aquatic Resources in Lovozero Raion at the Barents and White Sea Territorial Office of the Federal Fishing Agency E.Yu. Trofimov, the Head of the Lovozero Raion Soviet of Veterans of War, Labour, and Law-Enforcing Organs N.N. Brylev. At a subsequent session in Revda, there were present the Vice-Head of the Department of Organization of Fishing, Aquatic Culture, and On-shore Processing at the Ministry of Agriculture of Murmansk Region A.I. Dolgolevets, and the Head Specialist at the same Department A.I. Sevina. From the general public, there were seventy-three people present at the Lovozero session of the meeting, and 197 at the Revda one. This kind of presence, both from ‘above’ (in a regional format) and from ‘below’, serves to emphasize the intensity of interest of all parties
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concerned. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the issue was of interest to the entire population of the Raion, as well as for that of the whole Region. The fact of the matter is that at least 80% of all the male population of the Raion (and likewise, of the Region) would practice fresh-water fishing with varying degree of frequency throughout the year. Recreational fresh-water fishing is also popular among many women. On weekends whole families can be seen on the banks of the local lakes, or engaged in under-ice fishing during the winter months (Fig. 18 a,b). It is to be emphasized again that this overall picture is radically different when the other main ‘traditional resource’ is considered, that of reindeer husbandry. The two hearings eventually unanimously resolved that the ban on netting for recreational fishing would be resumed as of 1 January 2020. This implicitly left KMNS and the reindeer herders outside of the ban. At the same time, the citizens of Revda moved a resolution whose final outcome would impair KMNS interests. That concerned banning the declaring of parts of Revdozero and Lake Sikir (both on the environs of Revda) as Fishing Resource Extraction Lots (RPU) designated for industrial fishing. What that in fact meant was that KMNS could not hire fishing companies to utilize their quotas in these lakes, where anglers from Revda were ‘traditionally’ fishing. With these two resolutions some compromise between recreational fishing interests, on the one hand, and KMNS ones, on the other, seemed to have been reached. While KMNS remained with their netting priveleges, the recreational fishing community managed to ward off industrial fishing companies from recreational angling spots. Needless to say, the official (‘sayable’) part of the debates did not treat the problematic points in this way, but solely as an effort to protect the aquatic resources of the Raion, while, at the same time, also protecting Sami traditionality. On the whole, the resoltion of the ‘netting controversy’ may be said to have protected the interests of the whole population and thus to have had a democratic character. In the fresh-water fishing context, the model selects de-centralized governance for all species, save for the most valuable fresh-water resource: anadromous fish. That latter remains in the control of the regional authorities, and ultimately, of the federal ones. This means that the resource is left in the hands of exclusive fishing camps for a wealthy foreign and home fly-fishing clientele. Who could own and run such camps remained as belonging to negotiations far above the heads of local actors.
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Herders and fishing Fresh-water fishing for herders invites again a careful distinction between private-in-the-collective fishing, on the one hand, and a ‘truly private’ one, on the other. It can be said at the start that only recreational angling, as practiced mainly by urban inhabitants, can be tentatively listed in the second category. ‘Tentatively’ implies some reservations, the reasons for which will become apparent below. Theoretically at least, when one practices recreational fishing, one would rely only on their own resources. One would bear all attendant risks concerning whatever they had invested in the way of fishing implements and other necessary equipment. A major part of that is constituted by their private car. Another vehicle, like a snowmobile and, increasingly, a four- wheel bike (kvadrotsikl), would be very eagerly added should income possibilities allow. Other major items are rubber dinghies and bigger open craft, often with outboard engines. Fuel, lubricants, and repair parts and related costs for all these pieces of equipment add up on this list. Critically, a big and very essential item on it is a garage, where the family car is kept, as well as the whole paraphernalia around fishing. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a good part of an average family budget would go for the maintenance of the whole lot. It is also to be stressed, that the garage constitutes the next thing to a ‘second home’ for much of the regional male population (Fig. 4.3). In a Lovozero context, apart from the car/workshop garage, there would often be a separate ‘boat garage’ (lodochniy sarai) along the banks of River Virma. On the whole, the ‘garage theme’ in Russian reality, and specifically in its Murmansk Regional variant, constitutes a separate and extensive topic, going much beyond the aims of this study.39 At the same time, what concerns the present topic against this background is that while the recreational motive is a strong accent in the whole complex of activities of regional citizens, the returns from it in the form of fish directly consumed as well as stored away, has a significant subsistence meaning for the practitioners and their families. Besides the fishing itself, socializing in garages, and the sharing of returns beyond family consumption, has implications for building up durable social networks and a distinct lifestyle. This helps to build up what in the regional popular as well as academic discourse is 39 Garages have been reported to constitute 20% of the territory of Murmansk (Garazhi, 2013). In smaller towns like Revda or Lovozero, situated close to major regional lakes (Umbozero, Lovozero), the percentage may be very much bigger when boat garages (lodochnye sarai) are added.
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Fig. 4.3 Garages in Murmansk. Source: Madslien (2013)
known as being a ‘Northerner’ (severianin).40 As a BBC journalist commented in a photo-gallery reportage of ‘Murmansk’s gorgeous garages’: It is strange that behind all these doors, inside all these garages without windows, there is so much going on, like it’s a secret society. (Madslien, 2013) This is another strand of exploration going beyond the aims of this report. Yet, it has relevance to our topic in the sense that the lifestyle formed around fresh-water recreational fishing, with its parallel subsistence and socializing meanings, points to tensions between a Northerner’s way of life, and that of one belonging to the KMNS minority segment. For in all practical aspects of the engagement, the degree of similarity is high, while the second group enjoys a positive discrimination status. As noted 40 On the formation of the ‘Northerner’s’ identity in Murmansk Region, see Petrov and Razumova (2006).
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earlier on, the tensions on this arena flare up constantly in inner discourse, as well as in the social media. In official discourse, as illustrated above, positive discrimination in favour of the indigenous minority remains a constant priority. Another infrastructural detail, eroding a division between the majority group of ‘Northerners’, on the one hand, and the KMNS/MNS/herding minority communities, on the other, comes from constructing and maintaining a fishing cabin (domik) at favourite fishing locations. These can be around big lakes, on river banks, as well as deeper into the open tundra of the Peninsula. This part of the fresh-water fishing complex is related to hopes, briefly kindled after the announcement of the Arctic Hectare program discussed earlier on. As the meaning of the programme was to motivate Northerners to stay on in the North (Shachin, 2021), its fresh-water fishing implications may be seen in the light of the authorities trying to diminish the sense of discrimination, otherwise embittering many a city angler. At the present stage of the complex fresh-water fishing political ecology, the fishing cabin extension usually involves the collective investment of several anglers. A small cabin, or a wheel/ski trailer, would thus be used collectively, as well as by anyone happening to be around. This fragment of the whole fresh-water fishing picture bears a strong resemblance to the non-nomadic, multi-residential pattern of Sami life, studied well by Soviet ethnographers of the 1920s to 1930s, and remembered mainly by Charnoluskii’s ‘Materials on Sami everyday life’ (1930). Everyday practices bear out such a resemblance as sharing shelter in the tundra is a matter taken for granted. City anglers are freely accepted in herders’ cabins at tundra bases (bazy), or corral-enclosure locations, as, likewise, herders would use city anglers’ cabins or trailers for fishing or at stop-over breaks on the village-to-base treks. When we come to fresh-water fishing by the herding community, as well as to its extensive periphery through kin and para-kin relations, the picture changes considerably. Here any imagined ‘truly private’ trappings fall off and one enters a totally sovkhoist reality. Below I present the main characteristic features of this side of the fresh-water fishing scene. The ‘private-in-the-collective’ mode of using collective assets for complementing private interests, exemplified by sovkhoist reindeer husbandry, is well evident in fresh-water fishing by herders. At the same time, some basic structural differences need to be pointed out.
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In the case of fresh-water fishing, the owner and supreme manager of the basic asset, the fish itself, is the state and not a reindeer husbandry cooperative. In an appraisal of how the private-in-the-collective mechanism works as regards this fundamentally different environment, the first thing to be said is that while a state-owned resource gets exploited, it is the reindeer husbandry cooperative infrastructure which serves as the ‘carrying platform’ for what may be called ‘sovkhoist fishing’. In other words, the substantive part is managed by state agencies outside the reach of collectives’ management, while the collectives provide a great deal of what otherwise city anglers pay from their own pockets. What that amounts to is that apart of some basic costs for nets, as well as for maintaining own garages, a hefty expenditure like transportation falls entirely on the shoulders of the cooperative. Further than that, herders enjoy netting and RPU privileges, together with KMNS, as has been illustrated by the resolution of the 'netting controversy’. This extension of positive discrimination for herders is to a large part based on the understanding of the legislator that herders are in fact KMNS. As it has been explained earlier on, such a conviction is only thinly justified. The reasons because of which the mismatch with the real ethnic distribution in reindeer husbandry is supported by the regional fishing authorities, as reflected in various legislative documents, can only be speculated about. It is probable, however, that this stems from the general policy of regional authorities to present reindeer husbandry in Lovozero Raion as an exclusively Sami ‘traditional’ land-use occupation. The tourism- oriented brend of the Raion is certainly consistent with such a construction. It is promoted by the Raion administration as well as by the heavily Komi-dominated cooperative leaderships. In the final account, the ‘Sami reindeer husbandry’ label certainly benefits the community as a whole, as certain KMNS privileges extend in that way to all. Such is indeed the case of fishing by herders which is being discussed here. Herders’ fresh-water fishing, consequently, combines the liberal use of cooperative infrastructure with the KMNS netting privilege. Beyond that, since there is a herder-specific provision for fishing along husbandry- related trek routes, as well as in lakes close to herding bases, herders get a sufficiently big hand in the whole equation. This makes their position very different from that of the average recreational angler. In sum, the difference strongly stresses the benefits of a ‘sovkhoist’ status compared to a ‘truly private’ (‘capitalist’) one.
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An aspect of the difference needs a more detailed look because of the fact that a pure ‘truly private’ mode of economic existence in the overall Russian environment is a rare occurrence. Hardly anyone does not rely on some form of informal dealings for conducting private affairs. Fresh-water fishing, discussed here in its local contexts, brings out the necessity of distinguishing between blat, on the one hand, and sovkhoism, on the other, when considering the broad area of economic informality, as classically described by Keith Hart (1973). The extensive field of blat research need not be surveyed here. Only a basic definition will be taken, for which there is a general consensus. Namely, Ledeneva’s by now classical dictum that ‘blat exchange can be characterised by a reciprocal dependence, which engenders regard for and trust in the other over the long-term’ (Ledeneva, 1998:1). Taking it directly to the topic at hand, one of myriad illustrations in current post- Soviet reality is provided by the fact that while the deficit-ridden Soviet economy is now a thing of the past, the specificity of reindeer herders’ needs has been only partly satisfied by a ‘capitalist’ market. Unlike the situation at the supermarket in Ivalo across the border with Finland, one cannot buy essential items of herder’s equipment at the supermarket in Lovozero. For this, one goes on cross-border trips to Finland or Norway, still possible despite the war-related regime of western sanctions. In addition, trips will be made either to the sprawling open-air market near Murmansk, or to the weekly open-air markets in Lovozero or Revda. The goods sold there come through informal chains of relationships, often leading to shady sources, and not infrequently are connected with the military. Numerous direct connections between herders and military personnel are thus very helpful. On a sovkhoz management level, many essential items of consumables and equipment get provided by blat exchange through institutional, as well as personalized connections with relevant enterprises and military bases. This has preserved the institutional position, key in Soviet times, of the ‘supplier’ (snabzhenets), on whose ability to find critical spare parts or fuel the entire sovkhoz meat-plan may depend (Belova, 2001). In the local case, the source enterprises immediately involved are the mining-processing complex in Revda (OOO ‘Lovozero GOK’), and, no less importantly, the military from the numerous military units and closed towns in the Raion or near it. From such and similar sources, the ex-sovkhozes get spare parts and fuel for their ageing fleet of vezdekhods, tractors, and other heavy vehicles, while the rank-and-file
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herder gets parts of heavy diver-suits, ropes, repair parts for older, Soviet- made vehicles, and, again, fuel and lubricants at more bearable prices than those in shops or filling stations. The return coin is reindeer meat. Naturally, a ‘truly private’ city angler will make use of similar opportunities, relative to his ability to participate satisfactorily in a blat relationship. When we come to the practice of fresh-water fishing in reindeer husbandry cooperatives, blat can serve only partially as an explanatory tool. In the same way as regards the primary resource itself, that of the collective structure and its herd, the principal case here is one of a much wider understanding of ‘exchange’. Simply put, the return coin is by working in the collective, and not by establishing some sort of concrete material exchange with it. In this way, the ’herder-sovkhoz’ relationship appears as liberality for ‘institutionalized theft’ in return for loyalty to the institution. This ‘patron-client’ relationship has a definitely feudal-order tinge to it, explored in the origin of its much-discussed Chinese analogue, guanxi (e.g., Barbalet, 2021). What working in the collective provides as regards a private-in-the- collective use of the fishing resource is by definition standing on an informal footing. This concerns two parts of collective assets to be used for private purposes. One of them is salaried time, and the other is the cooperative’s infrastructural base. As it will be shown below, while the first can be considered to be of only marginal importance, the really significant part concerns a liberal regime of infrastructural use. When reindeer herding teams are at their respective brigade base camps (brigadnye bazy), bottom nets will be regularly set in lakes on the banks of which the camps are usually situated. Various members of the team will be engaged in this activity, but mainly a group who have been called earlier on honorary or emeritus members. As it has been described, this latter group is represented by pensioned-off former herders. In the typical case, these are people who have spent all their working lives in the same brigade. In many cases, they have been leaders of that brigade, or have been senior herders in it at the time when the presently working contingent were still apprentices or junior herders, and they had been tutoring them in the profession. Strong family and kin connections between the generations are often typical of such an extended brigade composition. During the summer months and especially in late July to August when wild-berry picking time is at its peak, what may be called the affiliated
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periphery of the brigade would significantly expand. Wives and children of the active herders will arrive, other kin members, as well as invited friends. During the winter months, when the brigade is stationed at its base in the forest-tundra part, this extended periphery will contract, often leaving only the honorary pensioned-off members present, or, not infrequently, only a padlock on a snow-drifted front door. Given such a composition and an expanding-contracting social dynamic of the brigade, the part of salaried time an active brigade member may devote to fishing is a highly fluid value, hardly amenable to any dependable estimation. At least two further variables compound the complexity of the picture. One is that part of the fish caught goes for immediate consumption and so it adds to the common pot (obshchepyt). In this way, it can be regarded as fulfilment of salaried-time duties and thus not as time taken away for private use. Another variable comes from the fact that a herder may actually use holiday time for wholly engaging in fishing while living at the base camp—often with family members. What the outcome of this whole much-mixed and complex picture amounts to is that neither the herders, nor the cooperative management take seriously the issue of what part of salaried time had gone for private fishing, or, indeed, of meriting any notice at all. Where it does get of such importance, however, is when it comes to transporting the proceeds from tundra camp to village. Here cooperative managements have every reason to be seriously concerned. The sheer weight to be carried across rivers, bogs, and swamps is of such proportions that it tests the strength of the cooperative vezdekhods to the utmost. The problem is greatest during the summer months when besides a multitude of barrels of salted fish, another lot of barrels, full of wild-berries gets added. While both fish and berry surpluses get sold in the villages, and the money is pocketed by the actors involved, all transport running and maintenance costs are grudgingly shouldered by the cooperative. In Soviet times, and residually at least in part today, cooperative managements solve the task by relying on state subsidies on the one hand, and the mentioned above well-oiled blat exchanges with kindred organizations, on the other. Here is one (but not only) reason for cooperative managements to exist perennially in debt. While this is indeed so, hardly any corrective measures can be taken apart from empty threats at meetings. Directors know full well that should radically curbing measures to fishing be applied, few
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would remain working in reindeer husbandry. Looking at the arrangement from the herders’ end, hardly anyone would consider getting employed should the complex of privileges be curbed, leaving one to rely solely on their salary. It is to be stressed yet again that the complex consists of the personal/private status of a herder’s reindeer, and, in addition to that, of a sovkhoist mode of using cooperative infrastructure for realizing meat, fish, and wild-berry tundra resources. To these, one can add the virtual autonomy of a herding team in matters such as working time and infrastructural use of cooperative assets. A further dimension is the position of a ‘host’ as regards all these and the privilege of sharing with preferred non-employed others. In overall sum, a herder’s status as a valuable community member gets an important and needed boost. In the majority of cases, particularly in those of single, and alcohol-dependent herders (the two often going hand-in-hand) this averts the danger of extreme social downgrading and stigmatization. Should such herders leave herding and return to the village, seeking for some menial job, downgrading and stigmatization would, in many a case, be certain to follow.
‘Urban Herding’ It is only against the current urban profile of land-use practices that herding proper can be discussed. At least two preliminary lists of prioritized land-uses appear to be in evidence. One of them is the officially circulated one, as previously stated. It can be called ‘traditional’, as ‘traditions’ is the key term in it. The list appears in various official proclamations about KMNS rights, and about supporting them, as well as regards such concrete matters like obshchiny subsidies and fishing quotas. More by inference than by direct proclamation, the list also appears to describe priorities of the tundra-oriented and ethnically very mixed reindeer husbandry community. According to this ‘traditional’ list, the most important local land-uses for the KMNS, MNS, and the mixed herding community is reindeer husbandry with fishing and wild-plant gathering coming next. Hunting is also sometimes mentioned as a ‘traditional’ activity. The first member in the list, that of reindeer husbandry, goes to form the tourist portrait of the Raion, its brend. In this stereotyped portrait for external consumption, what the Raion Centre of Lovozero is about are
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Sami people engaged in reindeer husbandry. This is the label by which local authorities strive to attract tourists and subsidies.41 The reality is rather different. Reindeer husbandry cooperatives’ input in the local economy is unclear. As shown before, it does not figure in Raion statistical accounts in the same way that the mining-processing complex at Revda is not there either. The reason is that both enterprises are continually on the brink of bankruptcy. In terms of sheer numbers, hardly more than a hundred people are directly engaged in reindeer husbandry today. Ethnically, this is a very mixed group over a succession of generations. In it, those who identify as Komi people, tend to form over a half, and are certainly dominating the upper tier in the herding hierarchy. The KMNS obshchiny, who are subsidized in the spirit of the ‘traditional’ land-use list, given above, in reality are oriented to fishing and tourism. As already explained, the fishing part is realized mainly by relegating fishing quotas to industrial fishing companies. In this way, the list of actual land-use activities tends to differ considerably from what goes under the ‘traditional’ label. This follows from the fact that the overwhelmingly dominant part of the Raion population (over 90%) are urban dwellers in every sense of the word. Consequently, actual land-use priorities follow an urban orientation. As it has been already shown, on such an ‘urban’ list personal garden plots (zemel’nye uchastki) are of great prominence, bearing a family resemblance to peri-urban mini- agricultural units, as well as to recreational (dacha) plots. In a parallel manner, subsistence-cum-monetary returns make fishing and wild-berry gathering key priorities. Returns from hunting and reindeer husbandry are in the hands of a restricted number of users. The discrepancy between dominant land-use concerns which figure, respectively, in the ‘traditional’ vs. ‘urban’ land-use lists given above, acquires a different meaning when considered from the point of view of the products land and water provide for the local population and are part of daily consumption. In the general case, they complement what is bought from shops—with the exception of potatoes. This latter feature explains the high priority personal garden plots hold in the ‘urban’ list of land-uses, potatoes being their overwhelmingly dominant produce. Apart 41 The same message was projected in the electoral campaign of Aleksandr Shestak in 2012: ‘Lovozero-olenevodstvo, Revda-proizvodstvo. Doroga-vsem!’ (Lovozero-reindeer-husbandry, Revda-(mining) production. Realization for all!). Shestak was elected Head of Lovozero Raion under this banner, and after two terms as Head, became Deputtee at the Regional Duma.
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from that, ‘sovkhoz milk’, as well as ‘sovkhoz bread’, both bought at local groceries, are commodities of, one might say, cult local value. The production of ‘sovkhoz milk’, in particular, has been of such significance in the local political ecology, that despite the heavy losses it was constantly inflicting on the slender financial state of SKhPK ‘Tundra’ as its sole producer, local authorities have been keeping the dairy farm going, disregarding protests from the cooperative’s management.42 Finally, however, even they had to give in. In the earlier mentioned visit to Lovozero of 25 October, 2022, Governor Chibis announced a higher level of subsidizing the Raion budget. As previously said, it was announced to have grown by 1.5 times to reach over 1 b roubles annually (EUR ⁓16 m, 21.11.22). However, further subsidizing of sovkhoz milk was not mentioned among the various targets of the new round of support. The dairy-farm was finally closed down, and the cows were sold. In this way, a significant Soviet-time relic was removed from the extant sovkhoist structure. The regional administration had evidently decided to dispense with this item, in the name of other numerous social needs of the Raion. What remains on the broadly social scape is fish caught by so-called ‘recreational fishing’. While the ‘recreational’ part is truly there, the subsistence one approximates that of home-produced potatoes from personal garden plots. Those of the inhabitants of the twin-town complex of Lovozero/ Revda, who find it impossible to engage in fishing on a regular basis, rely on the informal market, where the more engaged sell surplus fish. A significant part of such sellers are herders, as well as persons from their extended periphery of ‘affiliated members’ of herding brigades. The much richer fishing resources deeper in the tundra and in close proximity to brigade bases, combined with a liberal netting regime for herders, as well as free transportation of produce by the use of ‘sovkhoz’ vezdekhods, ensure a steady import of tundra-caught fish on the urban informal market. Compared to this source, very little fish or fish products are bought from town shops. The items bought are principally sea-species: the traditionally specially salted herring (seledka), as well as capelin (moiva), mainly used as bait for pike. When we come to reindeer meat, the manner of procurement is again predominantly urban. For the majority of Lovozero/Revda inhabitants, it 42 There is a continuous debate concerning the topic, the economic arguments of SKhPK ‘Tundra’ giving way to popular sentiment that ‘sovkhoz milk’ is the only ‘natural milk’ that people can use. See Kuznetsova (2012b); Tkachev (2017b, 2021b).
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comes partly from the ‘sovkhoz’ meat and sausage shop in Lovozero (kolbasnyi tsekh),43 while a bigger part is being informally procured through connections with herders. As in the case of fish, no figures are known about turnovers in this parallel and completely ‘grey’ local economy. Going by the opinion circulated by insiders that the number of personal/private reindeer may be close to that of the ‘sovkhoz’ ones, informally sold meat may approximate what is sold by the meat and processed meat shops of the two cooperatives.44 As the latter do not publish yields and sold-produce figures, this is an area of surmise. Going again by local opinion, a figure close to the real may be of at least 100 tons of carcass meat annually sold informally in the Raion. The speculation rests on rare statements in the local press. According to them, SKhPK ‘Tundra’s’ meat plan envisages an annual cull of about 3000 head (e.g., Sashenkova, 2012). Going by an average yield weight in carcass meat of 42.2 kg, that would amount to a figure of 127 tons, or, roughly, 250 tons for both cooperatives. Since, however, reindeer meat prices tend to be in the luxury bracket for many local consumers, in a ranking of meat and processed- meat products, ending up on their table, chicken, and then pork would come considerably ahead of reindeer meat. Yet, a third ranking list is of relevance: of gastronomical value and local taste. Fresh reindeer meat, personally caught fish, potatoes from the garden plot, as well as personally gathered wild berries, herbs, and mushrooms would have a very high place on it. Other much valued items are ‘sovkhoz milk’ (while it lasted), ‘sovkhoz bread’, as well as locally baked small cakes (pechenushki), and other pastries. Beyond any doubt, all these have uniquely praiseworthy quality, and project the feeling of belonging to a distinct community in its strong connection with the ’sovkhoz’ and the Northern tundra land. This specific blending of urban, peri-urban, and tundra features of daily life provides the background against which the place of the herding community and reindeer husbandry itself needs to be seen. It can be stated with confidence that of the present contingent of active herders and auxiliary tundra-connected personnel, hardly more than a 43 The official name of the facility is Tsekh po pererabotke miasa SKhPK ‘Tundra’ (Meat- processing shop of SKhPK ‘Tundra’). 44 The second Raion cooperative—‘Olenevod’ of Krasnoshchel’ie—has a meat-processing facility in Lovozero, as well as a meat shop in the centre of the village. Both are run by a daughter company of ‘Olenevod’—OOO ‘Reindir’. On recent developments concerning the company, see Kovaleva (2020).
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hundred people when the two cooperatives are taken together, half of them live in blocks of flats in Lovozero, with the second half living in log- houses in the ‘remote villages’ of Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka and tiny Sosnovka. From their main place of residence, herders regularly travel to brigade bases for the performance of essential husbandry tasks, after the completion of which return to their town and village homes. Relative to personal circumstances, the time spent at home may exceed that spend at the bases, that is, in herding proper. An exception to such a ‘commuting’ profile of present-day Kola husbandry practices is made only as regards a handful of cooperative employees who work as wardens at bases (storozhi). The very low pay they get as also the excessive toll of early mortality have both worked to much deplete their numbers. At many brigade bases, and for stretches up to a month and more, one may find the front doors locked and snow-drifted up to the eaves, with no sign of human presence around. A great number of factors have worked for present-day reindeer husbandry to acquire such a ‘commuting’ profile, rather than retain an almost forgotten by now semi-nomadic one. The erosion of that latter progressed steadily with the advance of the Soviet period, until it was finally abandoned in its final years. To begin with, what we know of Sami reindeer husbandry demography is that it had been only seasonally nomadic. This is to be understood as an annual movement between winter and summer places of residence, the winter ones being devoted to care for the reindeer, while the summer ones used to be mainly connected with fishing. There were numerous variations of this rough sketch, connected with finely tuned extraction of seasonal resources. Apart from those, procurement of fire-wood needs to be added (Rikkinen, 1981), as well as opportunities for paid work from auxiliary services for sea-fishing Pomor teams (Rippas, 1895; Gulevich, 1883, 1891), reindeer sled transportation of people, goods, and felled timber for outside parties, and even transport and accommodation services for tourists from St. Petersburg (Engelhardt, 1899). Not last, sheep breeding extended the portfolio of resources.45 Kola Sami land-use practices were thus characterised by a variety and movement between a series of permanent habitation points in marked difference to the uniformity of reindeer 45 I myself witnessed possibly the last of sheep-breeding at reindeer-herding camps. That was in 1995 at the base-camp of the now extinct Brigade No 5 (‘Left side’ of ‘Tundra’). Some sheep and goat breeding can still be seen in Krasnoshchel’ie and the other two tundra villages (Kanevka and Sosnovka).
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husbandry further East and its dominant engagement in long nomadic trekking (cf. Zaikov & Troshina, 2017). Kola Sami ‘non-nomadism’ was well underlined in the work of the late nineteenth-century ethnographers and travellers, who invariably noted the rationale of Kola Sami free-grazing practices of husbandry during the non- snow months. That rationale, given the shorter migration routes in comparison to the ones in Siberia, as well as the reliance on reindeer fences, allowed the Sami to devote their time to exploitation of other resources in both snow and non-snow months. Ethnographic attention was mainly fixed on the non-snow part of the year and the engagement in fresh-water fishing. A good part of that was connected with an ethnographic agenda on which the research question of whether the Sami were herders or fishermen had a priority. The latter was related in not a little part to regional authorities’ policy as regarded the Komi/Nenets immigration in the mid-1880s. Should it be proven that the Sami were only ‘partly’ herders, and very ‘backward’ at that, as well as ‘virtually doomed to extinction’ (Gebel’, 1909), the Komi influence, as a ‘progress-bringing’ and ‘capitalist oriented’ one was hailed as ‘timely and welcome’ (Engelhardt, 1899).46 The ‘fishing Sami’ theme vs. the ‘meat/suede trading Komi’ one, thus oriented research attention in a direction which tended to disregard the variety of resource opportunities the region offered, motivating existing Sami land-use practices away from single-purpose nomadic involvement. It is also to be stressed that although the Komi themselves had become nomadic herders out of sheer necessity (Konakov & Kotov, 1991: 22–25), their strong connections with settlements in their homeland region, even when reindeer husbandry for them unequivocally meant long nomadic trekking, was, nonetheless, a pivotal lifestyle feature (ibid.). In the final account, as Luk’ianchenko had well proved (1971), the Komi nomadic herding methods, brought by habit to the Kola, gradually got eroded in the different Kola conditions, and significantly pushed by Soviet managing methods, eventually began to resemble older Sami patterns. The role of sovkhoism, in particular, is to be seen as a decisive driver for what we see today far in excess of seasonally uncontrolled Sami grazing, namely its heavy leaning towards hyper-extensive husbandry methods.
46 In the late nineteenth-century and contemporary with the Komi/Nenets immigration, Alexander Engelhardt was Governor of Arkhangel’sk Province to which present-day Murmansk Region belonged.
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The ‘commuting’ husbandry pattern of today has thus historically evolved on the basis of the Sami non-nomadic foundation of pre-Komi husbandry organization. For a time, the Komi emphasis on fully controlled herding throughout the year managed to push existing Sami husbandry partly in the same direction, but, as said above, eventually, its own hold on the herds relaxed. A major factor for events taking such a course can be considered to be the agglomeration of the existing kolkhozi into the two big sovkhozi of the after-war Soviet period: ‘Tundra’ of Lovozero, and ‘In memory of Lenin’ (today’s ‘Olenevod’), of Krasnoshchel’ie. This move, as part of the sweeping agricultural reforms initiated during Nikita Khrushchev’s period in supreme power (1953–1964), was immediately followed by a local demographic development of decisive and traumatic impact: the liquidation of tundra villages (Afanas’ieva, 2013). As a result, by the beginning of the 1970s all ancient Sami summer villages, as well as some of the late nineteenth century to early half of the twentieth century Komi ones, were administratively liquidated and their inhabitants moved to Lovozero, with a lesser part to Krasnoshchel’ie. That latter predominantly Komi village survived the liquidation together with the smaller one of Kanevka, and the tiny Sami/ Pomor village of Sosnovka on the White Sea coast. The whole tundra demography was, in result, moved to the ‘winter’ part of the Peninsula, that is, the part connected by a hard-surface road with the Regional Centre, and the rest of the country. Krasnoshchel’ie and the two other extant villages remained in the ‘roadless’ part to the south- east of Lovozero. For connecting with the ‘road’ part of the Region, and the Raion centre of Lovozero in the first place, they continued to depend on winter snow/ice roads. In the after-war Soviet period this link came to be enhanced by the gradual introduction of mechanized vehicles, as well as by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter transportation. In this way, a main centre of demographic and administrative gravity was formed in the case of the Lovozero-Revda twin complex, with Krasnoshchel’ie playing a subsidiary role. Both became administrative seats of the respective agglomerated sovkhozi, while Lovozero was also the administrative centre of the whole of the present Lovozero Raion. The pre-agglomeration kolkhozi, each one of them formerly with its own village, were scaled down to herding teams (brigades) in the sovkhozes, while their home villages were administratively liquidated. In the course of time, main brigade camps (bazy) began to resemble in a much-reduced
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way such former villages. With the progressive disappearance of family life from brigade bases, however, even this reinterpreted relic of former times eroded away until they reached their present state of temporary seasonal camps. This very brief demographic sketch of developments, characterizing the late Soviet period, as well as the current post-Soviet one, emphasizes the consolidation of Lovozero-Revda as the ‘civilizational’ hub of the forest- tundra and tundra parts of the Raion. As noted earlier on, this role is truly impressive when compared with other Subarctic settlements in neighbouring parts of the European North as well as beyond. There is a density of administrative offices in the twin Lovozero-Revda urban complex which would take much space to fully enumerate. Let it only be said, that the urban complex seats no less than three big civilian administrations: that of Lovozero Raion, of the Village of Lovozero and the remote villages, as well as of the Settlement of Revda. When all other smaller offices are taken into account, together with those of the two cooperatives and the mining- processing complex, the educational, health, cultural, communications, energy, construction, transport, sports, etc., the total number of the personnel engaged in office jobs would exceed many times over those in reindeer husbandry. This is a factor to be taken in mind, when one considers the situation from the view point of employment opportunities for non- herding members of herders’ families. Or, said in plain words, the chance that a herder’s wife and grown-up children have office or other urban jobs is so high that a departure from it may be only very occasionally found. In this way, a common pattern of combining a herder’s income with that of a wife with a town job, well-noted in Fennoscandia, is the dominant feature here. In a much-reduced way, this employment pattern is replicated in Krasnoshchel’ie, which also offers a number of ‘urban’ jobs in administration, education, culture, services, and essential infrastructure. In a further reduction, the same is true of the remaining two villages of Kanevka and Sosnovka. Concerning the herding community, the ‘centeredness’ of Lovozero has to be understood as a place of permanent residence from which longer or shorter trips to brigade bases and their respective grazing ranges are made. Krasnoshchel’ie, as well as the other two villages, do not differ in this respect. When the interests of the rest of the family are considered, however, the pull of the Raion centre becomes critical. Apart from educational, employment, and connectedness opportunities, the primitive state
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of living conditions in the tundra villages heavily tilt the balance that way. The fact of the matter is that the remote villages are to this day lacking not only hard-surface road connections but also running water and sanitation. They are not connected to the regional electricity grid and there is no stable telephone or internet coverage. Commercial food supplies depend on faltering transportation and end up in much inflated prices compared to those in Lovozero/Revda. Educational and medical services are skeletal, and employment opportunities restricted to a minimum. In such conditions, it is hardly surprising that the rate of outmigration is progressing constantly, particularly when it comes to the youth cohort. Given this disposition of services and opportunities, Lovozero/Revda form undoubtedly the centre of maximum demographic pull in a Raion format. The attractions of the urban complex are enhanced by a good road, connecting it with the four-lane motor-way from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Murmansk, as well as with the rail-road station at Olenegorsk. From a tundra and remote village perspective, Lovozero/Revda thus represent the gateway to the outer world. The ‘Big Earth’47 local meaning of the urban twin-town complex of Lovozero/Revda motivates a husbandry pattern for Lovozero herders which has been generalized here as ‘urban’ or ‘commuting husbandry’. It is characterized by temporary long-prepared ‘bursts’ from the respective ex-sovkhoz seats, taking a herding team and its entourage to a brigade base for performing a given set of tasks. These latter constitute a ‘reindeer husbandry campaign’ (olenevodcheskoe meropriiatie). The campaigns are very unequally distributed over the year. Counting- harvesting corralling constitutes the main part of these events, dragging on from fall to early spring, while the rest of the time is engaged in skeletal teams’ scouting for herd-fragments with the purpose of having an idea of their movements. Not infrequently, due to absence of vehicles in working order, or for other reasons, husbandry tasks may be relinquished entirely during the summer months. The same pattern holds true for the remote villages. In rough outlines, the pattern speaks of a much eroded reversal to the Sami pre-Komi annual rhythm, which Luk’ianchenko pointed out already in the early 1970s. As the field-work for what culminated as her doctoral dissertation and her well-known book of 1971 was carried out in the late 47 ‘Big Earth’ (bol’shaia zemlia) in this context signifies urban centres on the continent from the perspective of island dwellers.
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1950s to 1960s, she must have seen the process germinating even as early as that. This is very much contrary to how the period is remembered today in oral memory accounts. They are nostalgically coloured in their main part, and portray a period in which the herds, according to many, were still firmly controlled, or as it is said: ‘Stado eshche bylo v rukakh’ (‘the herd was still in hand’). This nostalgic narrative is recounted by a sadly decreasing number of living witnesses. Many of them were children at the time, and their appraisal of actual herding practices was not based on direct involvement. Additionally, and almost without exception, stories of living witnesses are coloured by pro-Soviet and heavily pro-sovkhoz sentiments and fond memories of a youth spent in the tundra. The rising salaries from the early 1970s on, the introduction of mechanized vehicles and aircraft, the construction of timber huts at brigade camps replacing tents, all these and other improvements are remembered as the ‘best times’ of narrators. Oral accounts are thus fully in unison with memories of the period all across the board: not only in the Soviet Union itself, but also in all of the satellite countries. This is however a topic much beyond the aims of this report (but see: Mankova 2018; Allemann, 2020; Vladimirova, 2012; Konstantinov, 2005, 2015). At present, SKhPK ‘Tundra’ of Lovozero commands seven herding teams, with a grazing range of some three million hectares. Officially, the cooperative’s herd is of 23,000 after-slaughter head of reindeer. As previously said, the figure is considered much inflated by insiders, with their estimates ranging between 12,000–17,000 head. A total of about 120 tons of carcass-meat seems to be annually produced. The figures for the second cooperative, ‘Olenevod’ of Krasnoshchel’ie, are roughly similar as regards the four general indexes. The ‘herding team’ (brigade, brigada) continues to be in currency as a term, despite the fact that its original meaning is next to lost. The original meaning which I have in mind here is the one of after-agglomeration times, that is, after the incorporation of former small ‘collective farms’ (kolkhozi) into the one or other newly created big ‘state farms’ (sovkhozi). During these ‘best times’, as the period until the collapse of the Soviet Union exists in communal memory, a herding team consisted of eight to ten herders and one to three camp cooks (chumrabotnitsi). Gradually, as a heavy track vehicle (vezdekhod) was attached to each brigade, two more people were added: a vezdekhod driver (vezdekhodchik), and a co-driver
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(‘driver’s mate’, naparnik). All in all, those working in the Reindeer Husbandry Shop came up to nearly 140 people in ‘Tundra’. (Tkachev, 2021a) In what is now remembered as ‘the best times’ of Sovkhoz ‘Tundra’, that is, the two decades between the early 1970s and the early1990s, the tundra-based personnel were distributed into ten brigades, constituting the Reindeer Husbandry Department. This latter included also a vet doctor and vet technicians (zootekhniki), repair technicians, as well as general workers (rabotniki olenevodstva). The sovkhoz, performing its role as a ‘total social institution’ (Anderson, 1996; Humphrey, 1983) had several more departments: for vehicle maintenance, construction, sewing, dairy farm, hay production, as well as an administrative office. Various subsidiary farms appeared and disappeared under the sovkhoz roof over the years, breeding pigs, mink, polar fox, rabbits, and so on. The long interview with the Head of the Reindeer Husbandry Shop of ‘Tundra’ of the time Sazon Niurov, mentioned earlier on, provides a lot of details about how the farm was run from the late 1960s to the early 1990s (Tkachev, 2021a). A diploma paper by a member of the sovkhoz administration, Vladimir Digurov, provides a very precise account of the state of the farm in the first half of the 1980s (Digurov, 1987).48 Today’s structure of the former sovkhoz is better discussed in terms of ‘sides’ or ‘wings’, rather than as brigades. ‘Sides’/’wings’ are terms which have been in use since sovkhoz days, reflecting a geographical distribution of brigades. Those of them (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10) whose ranges were situated to the left of the line connecting Lake Lovozero with the Serebrianskoe Reservoir System (Serebrianskoe vodokhranilishche), that is, to the NW of this line, were known as belonging to the Left Side/Wing (levaia storona/ levoe krylo). Brigades 1, 2, 8, and 9, situated to the right of the line, that is, in the SE part of the sovkhoz territory, belonged to its Right Side/ Wing (pravaia storona/krylo). All in all, the two big parts of the herd distributed between the two sides, and further among the brigades of each side, reached up to 36,000 head, with a maximum annual slaughter figure of 14,000 head. At present, all of these figures are drastically diminished. To begin with, the number of brigades has gone down to only three in the Left Side (4, 48 These documents by key officials in the management of ‘Tundra’ during the Soviet period are to be considered as the most reliable sources of information we have to date. For other available sources, see Konstantinov (2015:340–341 ‘Tundra’).
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6, and 7), and another four in the Right (1, 2, 8, and 9). There are only two herders working in Brigade 9 however, so it hovers on the brink of being attached to Brigade 8. All in all, it will be realistic to say that the present number of brigades is seven, with a strong likelihood of becoming only six in the near future. What is more important is that the number of herders in each brigade has also drastically diminished. The women camp-cooks have practically disappeared, while the number of herders in each brigade is hardly more than two to four in each. To a question asked by a journalist present in a corralling session at Lovozero corral enclosure, a brigade-leader describes the situation in the following way: Why is the help of Lovozerians who come to help in corral round-ups so important for you? – I asked Ivan Apitsyn, Leader of Brigade No 4. - We have only three herders per brigade! There are only nine men working in the Left Wing, while in the Right Wing the situation is even worse. (Tkachev, 2020a)
Given this serious depletion of personnel, those remaining combine all herders of the respective side to perform necessary tasks. The notion of a brigade herd, ‘keeping to the brigade territory’ (‘derzhat’ teritoriiu’) is also a thing of the past by now. The actuality is of herd fragments, scattered over the whole territory of the respective side. During the summer months, the fragmentation reaches its maximum all along the Barents Sea Coast, down to individual animals. There is mixing therefore not only between brigades’ herds but also between the two wings. What is more and despite all efforts invested in fence-building, mixing occurs also with the herds of the neighbouring ‘Olenevod’. This last feature is confirming a long-observed tendency of a shifting of the general direction of migration routes from a meridional SW-to-NE axis within a given brigade territory, to a latitudinal W-to-E one, thus laterally crossing former brigade borders. This progressing feature of ‘herds moving crosswise’ (‘poperek’) followed the gradual relaxation of control caused by depletion of brigade-teams, as well as by the general relaxation of management by the sovkhoz administration. During Soviet times, the sovkhoz management used to be under the watchful eye of the Raion Party Committee (Raikom). It monitored husbandry affairs closely, particularly as regarded herd numbers meat-harvest results. With the collapse of the Union and the advent of the chaos of the first post-Soviet decade,
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the absence of superordinate control became a permanent feature. Former leading figures, like Niurov, the former Raion Head Brylev, as well as many others grouped in the Soviet of Veterans, firmly believe that postsovkhoz health will improve only when the state renews its ‘attention’ in respect of the enterprise. They never tire of repeating that at present the Agricultural Ministry at the Government of Murmansk Region has no reindeer husbandry specialists in its staff and is indifferent to the shaky fortunes of the branch. It is interesting to observe that the shift of migrational directionality is not connected with relaxation of control over the herds in the opinion of the older generation of leaders. What may be called ‘folk etymology’ interpretations abound. Thus, the advent of snowmobiles around the mid-1970s occurs as a motive. In another part of the previously mentioned interview with the Soviet time Head of the Reindeer Husbandry Department, Sazon Niurov, he said: When reindeer walk from south to north and back within their (brigade) territory, that facilitates round-ups (sbor). When the snowmobiles came, the situation changed—the reindeer learned to walk crosswise (oleni nauchilis’ poperek khodit). (Tkachev, 2021a:5) This is an indirect way of saying that the time when brigade herds were ‘in herders’ hands’ ended around the time of the advent of snowmobiles, that is, by the mid-1970s. I myself have often heard other baffling interpretations. One that has stuck in memory was by a brigade leader who summed up the situation (by spring 1999) in the following words: ‘With the coming of this damned democracy even the reindeer do not trek as before!’. Let it be said here in an aside that this way of explaining husbandry affairs is very characteristic of ‘herders’ talk’ (Heikkilä, 2006), and may baffle many a young ethnographer. One way to see it is as a hedging device: as a way of preserving the exclusivity of herders’ competence, and, in this way, of maintaining a distance between them and inquisitive outsiders. With the increasing relaxation of control and the response of the herds, it came to be that by now the two former sides are operating as two brigades, rather than the nominally existing seven. The total herd figure, rumoured among herders to have gone down to as little as 13,000 head, makes sense from such a perspective. Given the fact that each wing can hardly summon more than six to seven able herders for contacting and rounding up of a heavily fragmented herd moving often unpredictably,
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some 6000–7000 head are about the maximum they can handle. The 12,000–13,000 per wing, as claimed officially by the cooperative, thus sounds highly improbable given such a number of herders. Looked at from the other end, the figure of 3000 head in the slaughter plan tallies with a total herd number of 12,000–13,000, rather than the ‘paper’ figure of 24,000. The same can be said for the modest production figure of 125 tons for ‘Tundra’, when compared to 400 tons in sovkhoz days. Nonetheless, there is also the more optimistic opinion, that head figures are actually higher, but not going above the 17,000 mark for each one of the two cooperatives. Gradual relaxation of control and the movement towards hyper- extensivity as a defining feature of today’s commuting husbandry has a large number of consequences. The shift in migrational directionality can be considered only one of them. In itself, it can be seen as a response of the herds for greater plasticity over the terrain, or, in other words, of utilizing opportunities for better grazing in combination with evasion of insect pressure during the summer, previously curbed by the greater rigidity of control. Looked at from such an angle, a more precise way of describing the dynamic would be to say that variability of migratory route selection has increased, rather than generalizing it in latitudinal vs. meridional terms. Going by own field observations, as well as by generously shared experience of herders, fine-tuned route adaptations often also mean back movements from sea to tundra in response to availability of mushrooms, or even seeking vertical hill escape from insect pressure rather than trekking all the way to the Barents Sea coast. One direct consequence of the whole trend, pointing to fragmentation as well as diversification of movement, has been the obsolescence of former brigade territory fences as well as of those demarcating the territories of the two former sovkhozes. An answer by the management of the two cooperatives has predictably been the erection of new demarcating fences. A lot of effort has been invested, but the results have not been promising. A major reason for that is that the upkeep of fences requires unflagging and costly repairs. The depletion of the herders’ contingent, the ageing of the vezdekhod fleet, the consequent need to charter private vezdekhods at often inflated prices, all of these are factors working in the opposite direction. Cooperative funds get stretched to the utmost and upkeeping tasks are often left unfinished or entirely aborted. A familiar sight in the tundra is of abandoned coils of rusting wire, piles of wooden stakes, and, not rarely, the rusting hulks of broken-down vezdekhods.
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At the same time, the vezdekhod trips from village and back the cooperatives can manage to organize, serve well during the summer for transporting the seasonally expanded brigade team entourage, as well as the teams themselves. Ostensibly for fence repair or construction, as well as for other brigade tasks, the trips are essential for fishing and berry-picking, and, critically, for transporting the harvests back to the settlement. As explained earlier on, while cooperative managements have abundant reasons to grumble on this score, their hands are tied due to back-grumbling on the part of herders and threats about leaving herding altogether. A deadlock is thus formed, with the management clenching teeth and plodding on. A development in the Left Wing has been the taking of the private-in-the-collective spiral one notch up on the berry-picking theme. Recognizing the futility of struggling against herders’ interests, the current Head of ‘Tundra’ Reindeer Husbandry Shop has set up his own private berry-picking firm on the territory of the wing, using his own private vezdekhod. The herders, as well as their extended family members were able, in this way, to directly sell their harvest to him, as a private entrepreneur while being simultaneously a ‘tundra boss’, right there at the central corral camp. Still another side of the overall process is connected with the advancing hyper-extensivity and its shoots in all directions. The increasing percentage of unmarked or ‘whole-eared’ reindeer (tseloushnye oleni) is to be considered as the most critical among them. It is self-evident that hyper-extensivity is conducive to the growth of the ‘whole-eared’ part of the herd. This concerns, in the first instance, the inability to ear-mark the full number of new-born calves. While a certain number of calves have always escaped marking due to not fully controlled calving, the advance of hyper-extensivity has pushed the tendency critically forward. The development is to be connected with the dragging on of harvest corralling well beyond the New Year’s Eve limit of Soviet times. As the commanding branch of the state in all Raion matters, the local Raikom absolutely insisted on all counting/harvesting to get completed by New Year’s Eve. Sovkhoz directors came and went according to their ability to reach the production figures set by the Raikom, as well as to turn out produce on time. The pronounced turnover of sovkhoz directors speaks of the vigilance of Party authorities on these critical counts as a strong feature of Party-prescribed ‘correct’ sovkhoz management. No less than ten directors of ‘Tundra’ came and went during the twenty-year period from 1970 to 1990. This is to be compared with the prolonged stay in office at
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present, despite the constantly falling main indexes on every side: of herd numbers, meat produced, and personnel numbers. The over ten years’ stay in office of the present Director of SKhPK ‘Tundra’, together with his wife as a Head Economist, has been marked by the steadily worsening condition of the cooperative. Despite such a lack-lustre performance, invariably explained as being mainly due to devastation of herds by external poaching, no serious investigation has ever been carried out. This can be seen as a clear sign of reindeer husbandry not being among the priority concerns of either the present Raion leadership, or of the regional one. We can see here another instance of the two-tier model of present governance, in which a nominally ‘agricultural’ branch like reindeer husbandry falls well below the threshold of priority concerns at superior power tiers. It can be argued in this connection that the unitary model of Soviet governance, with its bent for a panopticon vision (Foucault, 2012 [1977]:195f) in every nook and corner of existence, has been supplanted in post-Soviet reality by a model of restricted vision. Having said this, it has to be taken into account that while panopticon vision and a consequent all-encompassing grasp on reality was a Soviet political fixation, it overreached the operational capacity of power. There were a host of reasons for the deficiency, the principal of those stemming from restrictions imposed by a deficit-ridden economy (Kornai, 1992), and not in the least, of cadres. In result, swathes of Soviet reality had to remain ignored, particularly in peripheral regions. Concerning the world of Northern reindeer- husbandry, marking peripherality to its extreme, the structurally most significant of these has been the fact of leaving the predominant part of tundra-land in a state of roadlessness, down to this day. The liquidation of the majority of tundra villages is to be attributed to the same forces. Apart from flagging sedentarization as a more ‘progressive’ form of life, the concentration of the tundra inhabitants in the ‘agro-centre’ (Fondahl, 1998; Habeck, 2005) of Lovozero, together with the much smaller addition of Krasnoshchel’ie, lifted a great operational burden from the shoulders of local power, reducing, simultaneously, the need for its tundra projection. As a consequence of the same and similar forces, stimulated by the tension of operational deficiencies against political ambitions, we can consider the neglect of living conditions at the extant tundra villages, and at reindeer herding permanent camps (bases). Ultimately, this amounted to turning a blind eye to family problems and the resulting growing gender asymmetries at herding camps and herding life in general.
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It can be argued, therefore, that the propensity for what has been here called ‘selective de-centralization’ has been engendered and continuously present already at the height of Soviet power. Rural realities graphically exemplified the weakest side of the Soviet experiment: the near impossibility to control events at the micro level. This chink in Soviet power made it possible for rural actors to tilt the balance in their own favour, as a succession of analysts have been arguing since the very beginning of Stalin’s ‘mass collectivization’: Powell (1997); Mitrany (1951); Maslov (1937); Trotsky (1983 [1937]:84). The reindeer husbandry case adds to this the difficulties of monitoring a far-flung and forbidding terrain. The way supreme power was compensating for the deficiency was by insisting on the turning out of ‘production success’ in the form of often cooked figures. It is against such a background that current exercising of power can be read. Following Foucault’s analysis again, it can be suggested that present political power, with its greatly reduced panoptic ambitions, stands much closer to a feudal model of governance, rather than the high-modern one of the Soviet State (Cf. Shlapentokh, 2007). Bringing this latter suggestion down to the day-to-day life of local reindeer husbandry, it can be said that at present, the matter of keeping sovkhoism in check has been totally relinquished by superior authorities. Older cadres, like the Soviet-time Leader of the ‘Tundra’ Reindeer Husbandry Department, Sazon Niurov, have already been mentioned as lamenting for the time when, in a paraphrase of his words, ‘reindeer husbandry problems were in the attention of all superior levels (of power)’. His appeal for that state of central concern and consequent control may be considered as a voice crying in the wilderness. The fact of the matter is that such affairs have long fallen off from central agendas and have been left in the hands of the reindeer husbandry community itself. When looking at how this plays out as concrete activities, the following picture emerges. At present, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, counting/harvesting begins some time in November and drags on almost until mid-April. This latter date being only a month away of calving, the productive part of the herd, that is, the female reindeer in a state of advanced pregnancy, use every opportunity of crossing still frozen rivers and lakes so they can calve in the open tundra far from human intervention. The driving factor is the fear of getting rounded up in a state of advanced pregnancy. An account of counting/harvesting activities at the moment of writing (early 2023) stresses the adverse influence of climate change, a factor
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invariably noted over more than a decade. In the words of a herder of Brigade 8 (‘Tundra’): We have all gathered at the corral and at Base 1 (both by Lake Porosozero—my gloss). A lot of problems with rounding up the reindeer this year. In November-December there was very little snow, so we could not go seek for fragments along the (Barents Sea) coast. Right now some snow fell at last, so some rounding up has been done. By now, some 3,000 (head) have been counted. A part of those has been designated for harvesting, but for that we mainly rely on the Left Wing—the situation there is somewhat better. As they say (i.e., the herders from the Left Wing), that was because their fence was better done and the reindeer gathered together on their own at a good spot (for rounding up). By now they have managed to count around 10 thousand. But we ourselves are very few by now: the whole Right Wing has only 8 herders! (P.T., letter, 20.01.23) Given such a state-of-affairs, dragging on with harvesting has become a permanent feature for the eastern half of ‘Tundra’. The response on the part of the animals, motivating flight away from human control, radically curtails the chance of ear-marking of newborn calves. This takes us to the second principal side of the consequences: the way whole-eared reindeer of six months and more get marked when eventually rounded up in late fall winter/early spring corrals. Marking whole-eared reindeer is to be seen in the context of progressing fragmentation of herds as well as diversity of migration trek-routes. The end result of these serious outcomes of a hyper-extensive management, amounting to a minimal degree of herd-control, is that in any successful round-up a fragment shows up in which many different brigade herds would be represented. Not only that, but particularly at the corral enclosures on both sides of the border between the two cooperatives,49 there will be a heavy mix of their respective reindeer. The response to this development has been to ensure representation from the most mix-exposed brigades at rounding up time. The situation resembles to a great deal the one described by Hugh Beach as regards marking of reindeer in the Swedish reindeer husbandry territories (Beach, 2007). Beach writes about small private owners who need to be present at a series of corralling sessions, so that marking of their animals goes to satisfaction. A much similar situation is developing now in the Kola, but with 49 Porosozero Corral on the ‘Tundra’ side of the border, and Sem’ostrov’ie on the ‘Olenevod’ one.
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the difference that both cooperative brigade interests, as well as personal/ private ones need to be negotiated to a generally acceptable resolution. The practice existed in some form already in Soviet times. Inevitably, a degree of mixing existed, particularly during the summer, when heavy fragmentation would occur with freely ranging reindeer along the Barents Sea coast. In the current situation, and the far advanced process of unmarked calves and adult reindeer showing up, the pattern of negotiations has been retained, but, of necessity, the margin of arbitrary decisions about marking has seriously escalated. Essentially, as it used to be done before, processing of the rounded-up fragment would privilege the dominant brigade in the mix. Following from there, the majority of unmarked animals would be marked for that brigade. In the typical case, the privileged brigade would be the one organizing the round up and investing the greatest effort for its success. The operation would take place on its own territory, which the team knows best. In the final account, the primacy of that brigade when it came to marking would not be challenged. Given such a framework for negotiating interests, the person presiding the procedure would belong to the management of the cooperative to which the privileged brigade, territory and corral enclosure belong. The same would be true for the ‘verifier’ of personal/private reindeer (shchetchik). His (rarely her) role would be, however, much less decisive and more as one of an onlooker, rather than as a decision-maker. Finally, a fleeting presence of members of the so-called ‘reindeer committee’ (the STC) would advertise a formal interest of the Raion administration in the proceedings. Decision making about marking of whole-eared reindeer thus stands in the hands of the official perched in the booth above the working chamber of the corral enclosure (Fig. 4.4). In the typical case, this would be the Head of Reindeer Husbandry of the cooperative to which the corral enclosure belongs. That member of the ‘tundra elite’ acts, simultaneously, as the Head of all brigades belonging to the wing in which the corral-enclosure is situated. Should procedures be conducted at the other wing of the cooperative, the Head Vet, or Vet technician, acting as the Head of that side, would preside in the booth. Unsurprisingly, the members of the tundra-elite holding the position end up as the biggest owners of personal/private reindeer. Members of the Soviet-time tundra-elite, now grouped in the Soviet of Veterans, and knowing full well how the cards are laid, occasionally grumble about ‘cooperative leaders increasing their herds by “unnatural” means’ (Esli,
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Fig. 4.4 ‘The flick of the pencil’: The Head of the Reindeer Husbandry Department of ‘Tundra’ in the booth of Polmos Corral Enclosure (Left Wing). 5 January 2022. Photo: V. Tkachev (Tkachev, 2022e)
2003). What they mean by ‘unnatural means’ is an ironic way of saying that what is happening is that a great deal of unmarked deer get marked with the personal/private ear-mark of said leaders. The marking itself is done by those present in the working chamber. In the typical case, these are brigade leaders or senior herders. The work is grindingly exhaustive and not a little dangerous. It drags on for many hours and for up to three to four days until a fragment of about 3000 head gets fully processed. Consequently, those working in the ‘churn’ would be replaced at intervals of a few hours, by trusted deputies—a group usually composed of family or kin members. Unsurprisingly again, great care is taken for personal/private interests of all these actors to be observed. An important part of the process is connected with protecting the interests of
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family, kin, or para-kin members, who are not present, but are of social and emotional significance for members of ear-marking crews. The interests of elderly community members are high on this agenda. Knowing that such an elderly person, say ‘Auntie Valia’, has a female reindeer or two, even without them showing up, one or two calves will get marked for her. At the losers’ end stand owners of reindeer who have migrated away from the community and do not maintain close links with acting reindeer- herders. Such ‘absentee’ reindeer owners, in case they bother at all to inquire about how their reindeer are faring, would be usually told that ‘they had failed to show up’. Against this general background of procedures, it is obvious that the greater the contingent of unmarked reindeer, the more personal/private material capital is accumulated by decision makers. In addition, they also accumulate social capital in a family, kin, para-kin, and generally community formats, undoubtedly, a very considerable gain. Its critical significance is all the greater in view of the fact that growing gender asymmetry has resulted in enforced celibacy for many a herder. The tendency is paralleled by the tragic fact of equally great alcoholic dependence in many cases. In everyday terms, this means that when an unmarried herder is in his home settlement, it is a family of close kin that keep him away from subsiding to a social outcast standing: that of a ‘bum’ (bomzh). The growth of unmarked reindeer within the overall composition of the Kola herd is thus not an unwelcome consequence of the hyper- extensive spiral. At the same time, it is clear that a ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario (Hardin, 1968) is a danger for all concerned. In the case described, it does not concern depletion of grazing range as in Hardin’s classical analysis. Here the danger is that the herd may get fully uncontrolled and become totally ‘wild’ in the local popular phrasing. That, in turn, will make successful round-ups of large enough fragments an ever- chancier affair. All available evidence points to every member of the tundra-connected community being intensely aware of the dangers of a hyper-extensive spiral getting out of control. Consequently, a most interesting question is about how the community finds it possible, (or at least to date), to contain the development. That community, to remind us again, delimits its boundaries by how and for whom unmarked reindeer get marked. The way reindeer herds get processed in corral enclosures, and more specifically, how ‘whole-eared’ reindeer get marked, is to be considered an ‘unsayable’ topic in local discourse. ‘Unsayable’ is here used in the sense
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of being auto-censured not only in formal discourse, but also in an intra- community one. In conversations even in very intimate settings, as at reindeer-herding camps, herders tend to avoid the theme. This form of self-tabooing may be interpreted as a sign of very grave fears that even the mentioning of the theme may have fatal consequences. In this sense, it belongs to a community-protective strategy of which taboo and euphemism are certainly among the rhetorical devices. The protection for which they strive constitutes a defence against inquisitive and potentially harmful outsiders, but deep down and at a more critical level, against the awakening of destructive forces even by mentioning them. Despite all such pre-historic measures for protection, the ‘whole-eared’ topic inevitably surfaces in official discourse in a variety of veiled forms. One such has been the already mentioned outcry of the ‘veterans’, that is, by former Soviet-time Raion Party and sovkhoz leaders, about ‘unnatural growth’ of personal/private herds of the present cooperative elite (Esli, 2003). This has been a rare direct alarm call that the process of appropriating ‘sovkhoz’ reindeer, led by members of the tundra-elite, is in grave danger of getting out of hand. Other, albeit more veiled warnings, are also sporadically voiced. A rhetorical trope under which they can be grouped can be called ‘divining the future of reindeer husbandry’. Structurally, the device consists of an introductory ‘lament’ part, and a second one concerning ‘measures’ to be taken to save reindeer husbandry from total collapse. This is the ‘recipe for saving reindeer husbandry’ part. The ‘lament’ one depicts the present sorry state of affairs, typically comparing it with the period of flourishing during late Soviet times. Following the introductory description of the present fall, saving measures will be offered: the ‘recipe’ for saving the patient. The ailment itself remains largely implied, but for the insiders it is clear that unless a limit is put on appropriation of ‘sovkhoz’ reindeer, the collective herd and all other ex- sovkhoz assets will be soon fully exhausted. In this way, the inherited collective carrying platform, supporting in its sovkhoist way the entire community will be destroyed. A direct consequence of the resulting collapse will mean that personal/private herds will become of necessity ‘truly private’. One generally detested outcome of this would be present rank-and-file herders becoming hired hands (‘slaves’, rabi) of the present tundra bosses turned into rich big-herd owners. Those with medium-size to small herds will have the option to continue as independent, self-employed herders. In all events, however, a radical departure from the present sovkhoist mode of
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existence would spell transformation in the direction of the so consistently avoided ‘truly private’ husbandry. As an immediate logistic consequence of that, the town-to-tundra commuting pattern of today will become impossible. It is to be noted at this point that the Rybachii example is a strong pointer in this direction. It has alerted the community to the fact that not so much transportation (not a negligible factor in itself), but the need of constant control and protection of herds will become a must in an ex-sovkhoist environment. All of a sudden, property will regain its risk- laden state of being. In the final account, resuming semi-nomadic herding, if not fully nomadic as in the ‘truly herding’ parts further East, will become an existential imperative. Such a reversal from an urban to a tundra-based lifestyle is seen as a catastrophic outcome of an ex-sovkhoist ecology. In sum, the danger of sovkhoism collapsing, like the Soviet order before that, truly raises apocalyptic fears. A short list of officially aired recipes for avoiding a post-sovkhoist apocalypse is instructive. The following three main ones can be named: (i) return of supreme intervention; (ii) an ethic revival; and (iii) elimination of alien evil. The best expression of the ‘return of supreme intervention’ solution can be seen in the previously mentioned long interview with the Soviet- time ‘Tundra’ Head of Reindeer Husbandry, Sazon Niurov (Tkachev, 2021a). As mentioned before, Niurov held this highest of tundra-elite positions during the entirety of the late Soviet period, as well as during a part of the post-Soviet one (1970–2000). The full title of the interview itself sums up the particular recipe: ‘By now, the future of reindeer husbandry in the Kola North needs to be discussed at all levels’. The meaning of this very Soviet-officialese manner of expression is cryptic by the very conventions of the genre. In the text itself, cues for deciphering the plain meaning come to a large part from the stress on the Raion Party Committee (Raikom) former vigilance and commanding position in respect of the branch. That state of Party control and guidance is compared with the present one: Well, at present, both in the Region (i.e., in the Regional Government—my gloss), as well as in the Agricultural Department (at the Regional Government) there are no reindeer husbandry specialists. In former times, they (i.e., the superior authorities) knew about everything, while now it is complete fog up there (temnyi les), there is no one there with any idea about reindeer husbandry! (ibid.)
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The remedy for the present problems is expressed in the form of a lament for what is now not being done: If only attention had been turned to our problems! Now the time is for seeking all manner of support from the state in the name of what has been repeated so often: ‘revival’ (vozrozhdenie). As a special item in the Regional budget, this is what you should write about, knowing how matters stand. (ibid.)
It is clear that the interviewee is appealing to the journalist in the latter’s presumed capacity of a ‘super-addressee’: that he is capable of relating the plea to those ‘above’ (tam naverkhu), so that reindeer husbandry be revived. Leaving aside the Soviet-time belief in the ‘super-addressee’ abilities of journalists, of their having the ear of those at the helm of leadership, the recipe is anachronistic in a more critical sense. It assumes that the former unitary structure of governance is still in place, but ‘they’ who are at the top have somehow forgotten about the branch, perhaps by the absence of proper specialists. Once they get properly informed, saving measures will follow. The speaker, in other words, is wittingly or unwittingly innocent of the reality of a current political ecology in which the supreme leadership are not fixated on a total reach of governance, but only in such that applies to key sectors, relevant for keeping them in power (and wealth). A variant of a deus ex machina intervention exists in a recurring motif that a solution may be brought by the wealthy Fennoscandic neighbours, as well as by outlets for reindeer meat and other reindeer products (velvet antlers, blood, etc.) falling into the vision of metropolitan buyers. The most recent of these has already been mentioned: exporting meat to Finland. While such and similar deals get concluded from time to time and may end in positive outcomes, the general state of the ex-sovkhozes remains mired in debts and uncertainty as ever. The reason is plain in the light of what has been described earlier on. A sovkhoist system which needs a carrying platform of collective assets to be kept stable by constant financial infusions cannot be supported by occasional trading deals. It needs the ideological fixation of a command socialist state, not of ‘truly private’ (‘capitalist’) trading. In this sense, exporting raw meat can be compared on its miniscule scale with the exporting of raw energy non- renewables (oil and natural gas) as the mainstay of post-Soviet economy.
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For all its utopian ring, the ‘ethic revival’ recipe can be considered closer to the mark. In its clearest form, it has been spelled by the already mentioned reindeer husbandry specialist Nikolai Bogdanov. That was still in the 1990s when appeals for a resurrection of a Soviet-type of governance in respect of the branch used to be less common. The thrust of Bogdanov’s argument was very properly put on intra-community management, rather than on a desired intervention of ruling elites embodying the ‘state’. His appeal was for such an ethical climate to come into being inside the herding community itself: that it was only they themselves who could save the collective herd. Bogdanov was thus very close to what is keeping the system afloat in real terms. Namely, that the community themselves, led by their Komi tundra-elite, strongly resist a post-sovkhoz ‘truly private’ future. So far at least, they have managed to prove Hardin wrong, as innumerable academic critics have been doing for over fifty years by now. Namely, that in the face of an apocalyptic outcome of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario, a community may mobilize and keep developments close to the red line, but still on its safe side. At present, the strongest proof of that is that even in the most pessimistic appraisal of the sovkhoz vs. personal/private reindeer ratios, the share of the latter is considered to be close or even below the 50% mark. Bogdanov was, at the same time, fully aware of the precariousness involved in intra-community management of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ type. For him, that was still a question to be answered, rather than a matter of certainty. His doubts were summed up in the title of a long article he published on the topic: ‘Will herders’ ethic get healed?’ (Vyzdoroveet li etika olenevoda?, Bogdanov, 2008). The spokesperson of the third popular recipe: of elimination of alien evil, has consistently been no less a person from the local elite, than the Head of ‘Tundra’ Managing Board, Viktor Startsev. In former Soviet terms, and still current conversational ones, this is the SKhPK ‘Director’. Ever since his first term of office, which began in the now distant 2011, the Director has been incessantly attributing the main ills besetting the cooperative as coming from poachers and predators. In a decade of interviews and other public appearances, the following statement has always been a key accent: Over a succession of years, a number of problems directly impairing the vital functions of our cooperative have been ignored. The first one among them consists in external losses in reindeer husbandry (neproizvoditel’nye poteri v
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olenevodstve). This is the killing of domesticated reindeer on the pretense of licensed hunting of wild reindeer, regular plunder of domesticated reindeer by armed individuals, losses inflicted by predators and the absence of state compensation for such losses. (Kuznetsova, 2012c)
The main enemy is thus named as various forms alien evil takes. A main accusation addresses the hunting authorities (although they are not directly named): their connivance in making it possible for hunters to take domestic deer on the pretence that they are mistaking them for wild. This belongs to the ‘wild reindeer controversy’ debate, discussed earlier on. The counterargument of the hunting authorities has always been that the cooperatives themselves were poaching on the wild reindeer herd of the Peninsula so they could augment their meat-plans. The final outcome of that particular hurling of accusations at each other, in its linkage with the BEZRK Hunting Club case, has been the inclusion of the wild reindeer in the Red Book of Murmansk Region. The second constant refrain on the ‘alien evil’ theme, is the accusation against poachers and the absence of protection from the state. This part, together with the one about predators, has been surfacing in various public statements, but invariably by the same ex-sovkhoz director. The only exception has been an accusation against military poaching by the virtual owner of the second ex-sovkhoz ‘Olenevod’, Andrei Reizvikh (Nadezhdina, 2019a, b). The evil poachers/predators’ refrain has stabilized over the years as a constant feature of ‘directors’ talk’. An image of a future in which once this evil was eradicated, the fortunes of the cooperatives would improve have not been publicly voiced by anyone else. Since this form of ‘directors’ talk’ has always been directly or indirectly accusing the hunting authorities, they have not been missing occasions of saying the ‘unsayable’. Namely, that while some form of poaching and predator attacks have always existed, the real crux of the matter has been appropriation of reindeer within the herding community themselves. Judging by two decades of my own discussions on this topic with herders, they have given round- about signs of being of the same opinion, but, naturally, it is unthinkable to say that in public, or even, in so many words, in private. It is thus the case that unlike the other recipes for the future, the eradication of alien evil one lacks the element of sincerity. What unites them, apart from this last discrepancy in moral stance, is that there is again an appeal for state intervention, be that in the form of compensations or, in
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some cases, as setting up a ‘reindeer police’ (Artieva, 2011). In all events, however, the main objective is the preservation of the present state of sovkhoist husbandry, rather than taking the ‘truly private’ road.
The Aesthetic of Sovkhoism For a newcomer, the first experience of Lovozero will most likely be of surprise or even shock. Having arrived from Murmansk, a city uniformly built of huge and graceless blocks-of-flats, Lovozero comes into view as only a smaller version of the same. Instead of any picture of a reindeer herders’ village of wooden huts, sleds, and reindeer the newcomer may have in their head, what is seen are the same blocks-of-flats, encircled, on the outer perimeter by the same bidonville shacks (‘garages’) (Figs. 4.5a and b). Nothing connects with reindeer, herders, or, indeed, a village at all. The town-scene of Revda, the bigger part of the Lovozero-Revda complex, is more of the same. A feature speaking of the mining past and present of the town is the industrial monstrosity of the mining-processing complex, stuck halfway up on a flanking ridge overlooking the town. The descendant of a founding feature, the NKVD labour camp, at present
Fig. 4.5 (a) Lovozero from the air. (Photo: Vl. Kuznetsov, personal communication). (b) Lovozero – street scene. (Photo: Lukas Allemann, personal communication)
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Fig. 4.5 (continued)
Correction Colony No 23, can be seen on the road leading up to the mining-processing complex. It is very difficult indeed to discern in such depressing appearances, an expression of a sense of well-being, which the locals implicitly connect with extant features of a Soviet-like life, or what I generalize by the term of sovkhoism. For that to be perceived it needs an extended period of time, best of years, until it becomes possible to see the local scene through the eyes of its inhabitants. When that stage of perception is eventually gained, the entire perspective magically changes. A host of other features gain prominence in such a new view. To begin with, the pre-fabricated high-rise hulks disappear. Or, rather, there are there just the same, but one does not see them: in the same way, that we do not see the air we breathe. Instead of the concrete boxes, the new gaze sees other scenes hidden in-between them, or inside them. The accent shifts to people, while the backdrop of industrial ugliness recedes. The expression of sovkhoist reality is increasingly voiced through images of regaining a lost world of purity, or what the sovkhoists themselves imagined that to be. In a recent text on the pages of the
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administrative weekly, the image is expressed in the following way under the title ‘Revda—a little Soviet Union’: Soviet time was a great time when every school-child knew who Lenin was and about his role in history. Pioneers wore their red ties with pride, their pioneer’s badges, and also took active part in collecting scrap-paper (for recycling—my gloss). The best holiday-time for schoolchildren was when playing the youth military sports game ‘Lightning’ (‘Zarnitsa’), and in summer, at the pioneers’ camp and around the evening bonfire. (Bystrova, 2022) This Soviet image of a happy childhood is portrayed in present reality through what one can see in the streets of the twin-towns. This is the presence of young people and children, and of young mothers with prams. A visit to one of the three kindergartens in Lovozero presents a picture of a full and colourful flow of life, invested with hopes, plans, and promises. In the whole of the Raion, with a total population of some 10,000 people, there are as many as eleven kindergartens. In local media exposure, the exuberance of city life is an obligatory part of portrayal. Three images are constantly accentuated: of swarms of children and cheerful school life, of numerous cultural events, and of award- winning youth at sporting events. Another prominent feature are reports and pictures of indigenous cultural life. These are of women in traditional Sami or Komi clothing, of traditional crafts, and of choir and dance performances. From time-to-time, presentations of reindeer herders engaged in corral work, or in reindeer draft-team races remind us of the background presence of reindeer husbandry. Family under-ice fishing on Lake Lovozero is another recurrent theme. The war in Ukraine, or, ‘sayably’, the ‘special military operation, SVO’, has taken the youth and culture aesthetic accents to a new and higher level. Acting Governor Chibis has expressed this recently, in a more or less direct way: ‘While the men are at the SVO, it is important to create festivities for the children’ (Pashenkova, 2022). The so-called SVO has been gradually gaining presence in the portrayal of local life (Fig. 4.6). By the time of writing, it has become palpably evident that a sense of normalcy needs to be constantly broadcast. The official aesthetic strongly needed a counterpoint to the confusion and a general sense of darkness suddenly descending and standing in poignant contrast with the images of Soviet-like bliss. This sense of a sudden darkness engulfing life was expressed by a war correspondent:
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Fig. 4.6 A poster for a SVO-supporting charity concert at the Lovozero House of Culture, 3 December 2022. The heading reads: ‘We are together!’. All collected sums will be spent for buying goods and necessary equipment for military personnel taking part in the Special Operation. Tickets from 100 rubles (⁓EUR 1.50 – 13 December 2022). LP 48 (9163), 02.12.22, p. 8
We are thinking about those who are on the frontline, and in the towns and villages near the front. And about when all of that will end. And most importantly: how will it end. Doubt and uncertainty. Fear and stress. This is what a lot of people are feeling. We are all walking in darkness. It is possible that it will get deeper before there is a ray of light. Walking in the dark—this is hard, painful, terrifying (…). (Zadornaia, 2022b) The much-needed counterpoint, battling against such a suddenly descending sense of confusion and darkness, is in what has always been in abundance: the exuberance and optimism of youth. In visual terms, this draws on what can be called an obsession with collective portrayal (Figs. 4.7 and 4.8). Its concrete representation is a painstakingly choreographed collective picture with tens of participants, implying the excitement in finding oneself in it, as an integral part of the collective (‘This is
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Fig. 4.7 ‘Such are our holidays!’ Source: Tarasov (2019)
Fig. 4.8 ‘Our sports school has what to be proud of!’ Source: Tarasenko (2022a)
me!’). It needs to be stressed here that such a picture of children, young people, adults, would be very difficult to take in an absence of a tradition of such portrayal, harking back to a Soviet cult of collective life. This collective visuality speaks of a strong will to reproduce a life of security and optimism nostalgically associated with the Soviet past. This, in other words, is the visual language through which sovkhoism is expressed (Fig. 4.9). And yet, the ever-present polyphony of simultaneous expressions of conflicting idioms, so characteristic of local life, as in Russian life in general, are also there. In the themes of collective Soviet-like visualities: of kindergartens and schools, of cultural life, of folkloristic indigeneity, of youth in sports, although colourful and soothing, are never uniformly
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Fig. 4.9 (a, b) A sports fishing event on Lake Lovozero (Source: Zadornaia, 2022c)
simple. The theme of youth in sports provides an example. For some reason, the Chinese martial art of woshu (or Kung fu, in Russian: ushu) has come to be a prominent local obsession. It is hard to find anything more distant to reindeer husbandry, Sami or Komi traditions, or indeed the labour-migrant Northerners’ culture, than this exotic martial arts form. The thought that it could be exactly because of that is difficult to suppress. Following it, one could see the wish of the young to remove themselves from the locality, and sports is certainly a way out. Higher education, music, the military, all of these venues are relevant to such a mind-set. All of that taken, behind the bustling and youthful local scene outward trajectories may be seen, borne out by unrelenting out-migratory trends. To that background reality the local aesthetic imagery may only inadvertently hint. Overt expressions would be in another idiom. That will be in the ‘litanies and laments’ texts of how the tundra villages are losing their young people, alongside the slow fading away of the ancient profession of reindeer husbandry, which once gave their reason of existence (Fig. 4.10).
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Fig. 4.10 (a, b) ‘Regional ushu tournament in Revda. A regional tournament Class B in wushu discipline sanda took place on 19 November (2022) at the Sports Complex in the Settlement of Revda.’ (Tarasenko 2022b, Photo: Natalia Antonova)
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Summing Up and Conclusions
A specific reindeer husbandry form has gradually evolved in Murmansk Region. Represented today exclusively by husbandry in Lovozero Raion, it can be called ‘urban’ or ‘commuting’. The main pattern is exhibited by the Village of Lovozero in its twin-town relationship with the nearby monogorod (‘one-mine town’) of Revda. In a smaller way, the commuting husbandry pattern is present in the three extant tundra villages of Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, and Sosnovka. Commuting from a settlement to a grazing range and the herd itself is not uncommon in Subarctic reindeer husbandry. It is, in fact, the typical form of husbandry in Fennoscandia, characterizing the snow/ice periods of the year. During these, reindeer herders would reside in permanent village dwellings. Contact with the herds, grazing not far off, would be partly by car along available roads, with further stretches being covered by snowmobile. Here, however, the resemblance ends. In the Lovozero Raion case, the absence of hard surface roads beyond the settlements, introduces a significant difference. To reach the herds, reindeer herding teams initially cover stretches ranging between 50 and 150 km by heavy track vehicles (vezdekhodi) until they get to their brigade base: a cluster of log-houses, resembling a tiny village or a hamlet. From there on, establishing contact with herd-fragments will be by snowmobile during snow/ice months, or by reindeer-draft teams or simply on foot, during non-snow ones. Recently, the draft teams are being replaced by four-wheel bikes (kvadrotsikli). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Konstantinov, Power and the People, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38306-9
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Once a given herding task gets completed (principally, round ups for corralling), the teams return to their settlements by ‘sovkhoz’ vezdekhods, or by individual vehicles. On the whole, time spent in town/village would exceed that at the tundra base at a rough ratio of 3 to 1 in the case of actual herding tasks. Herding, however, may as well be put in inverted commas. It has been reduced, for decades by now, to mainly scouting for freely grazing fragments, rounding them up, and processing them at corral enclosures. This commuting pattern has evolved on the historical basis of semi- nomadism, characterizing what is now known as traditional Sami reindeer husbandry. For a period of time, from the beginning of Komi/Nenets immigration in late nineteenth century, until the Soviet collectivization of the late 1920s to 1930s, the system re-oriented to more intensive forms. With the advent of collectivization, however, it gradually slid back to the earlier Sami one of uncontrolled or ‘free’ grazing (volnyi vypas) during the summer months. This propensity for limited extensivity had been gradually accelerating, until by the end of the Soviet period it had reached a fully extensive stage. In the post-Soviet period, the development accelerated even further, so that today there are strong reasons to state that it has reached a stage of high (or ‘hyper’) extensivity. I have argued throughout the book that the present state of hyper- extensivity has had sovkhoism as a main driver of the development. As it has been shown, sovkhoism is to be understood as a world view and consequent life-style in which life, as it used to be in the Soviet state-farm (sovkhoz) of the late Soviet period, stands as the best of possible worlds. In its larger meaning of a total socio-economic institution, the lasting attraction of the sovkhoz is in its ability to create a risk-free form of property. In reindeer husbandry, this form is represented by ownership of private reindeer which are, at the same time, replaceable by sovkhoz ones, should the need arise: of them getting lost, injured, or simply slaughtered for own use. This is the phenomenon of the personal/private reindeer, the ownership of which transfers all benefits to the owner, while all liabilities are burdened by the sovkhoz. All costs of this private-in-the-collective form of ownership, or, in another phrasing, of ownership at the expense of collective assets, were ultimately taken care of by the Soviet state. To use Karl Polanyi’s term, an overall substantive socio-economic environment characterized the command-socialist state. Such an environment, apart from its economic benefits at the base of the social pyramid, created an experience of
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heightened sociality, which is so much nostalgically remembered today. In visual terms, the lasting presence of the collective portrait relives those days. After an initial crisis during the 1990s, the advent of post-Soviet reality retained much of the attractions of a sovkhoist mode of existence, notwithstanding a considerable withdrawal of direct state support. This raises the question of how that mode of life is still possible while, in a technical sense, the sovkhoz is no more. The answer lies in a characteristic feature of the post-Soviet ‘command socialist’ state to wind down previous totalitarian ambitions, bringing them to a restricted circle of ruling control. In broad strokes, that latter may be said to have contracted to sheer hold of supreme power, as well as to full control of key assets ensuring it. In consequence, what has been called here a ‘two-tier’ model of governance has emerged. It is characterized by a tier of full and rigid control of supreme concerns, while leaving bottom swathes of post-Soviet socio-economic existence at the discretion and competence of local actors. It is here that we can see the answer to the question posed above: the continuing existence of sovkhoism without the sovkhoz. In reindeer husbandry day-to-day reality, a free terrain of local governance has been shown to shrink sovkhoz herds to about half their previous size. The main driver for the trend can be seen in the steep rising of personal/private ownership of reindeer. In this context, the trend towards hyper-extensivity has been shown to be one of instrumentality, rather than being the key driver itself. While operating on a newly opened terrain for enhancing private gain has proved to be attractive, the looming danger of cutting at the roots of the sovkhoist tree has become a grave concern on a broad social level. The rising of apocalyptic fears is being partly stemmed by incessant pleas to regional and federal authorities for increasing subsidies for the reindeer husbandry sector and hopes this might happen. In a similar manner, there have been recurrent hopes connected with exporting meat and other produce to the wealthier Fennoscandic neighbours. The war in Ukraine and the stepping up of Western sanctions have much dampened such hopes. Nonetheless, belief in sustaining—and even enhancing—the post-Soviet state of sovkhoism abound. The resurrection of Soviet-like (‘meta-Soviet’) reality is seen to come with a greater engagement of the state in local affairs, noticeable in the recent years. This engagement has increased by comparison with the two previous decades of existing under the threshold of peripherality, and consequently, living in a strangely decentralized environment. Supreme power
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ambitions like, notably, an expansive Arctic strategy, have motivated the creation of Regional programs like ‘Arctic Hectare’, and, particularly the current ‘To Live in the North!’, so that the tide of out-migration from the Region be stemmed. Bringing such Federally funded ambitions to the Raion level has resulted in hopes for a new lease of life for sovkhoism, and for once again living in a Soviet-like reality. As part of this process, the reindeer husbandry sector of the local economy has re-appeared in the gaze of the Regional Government. Having said this, it needs also to be admitted that such and similar hopes have been flaring up and dying down all through the last decades. It is still early days to know what will happen with the last bid for recapturing the past. Meanwhile, day-to-day operational measures are needed for keeping the extant version of sovkhoism going. It has been shown that a sense of communal preservation has dictated the keeping of the ratio between ‘sovkhoz’ and ‘personal/private’ reindeer just below the point of no return. It is thus that a Hardinian ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario is still being averted. Finally, and in concrete terms, it may be predicted that concerning the central ‘Tundra’ post-sovkhoz, a further contraction of brigades is likely to occur. It is very probable that the entire Right Wing of ‘Tundra’ may have to go in the middle-term future, with the existing personnel regrouping in the Left Wing brigades. Those latter’s territories are much closer to the Raion Centre of Lovozero, thus making the existing commuting form of husbandry easier. Climate change may be predicted to motivate the use of wheel rather than track transport. As for sovkhoism itself, it can be predicted to stay, although in an inevitably contracted, and of necessity restricted form, subject to intra-communal control. The following general conclusion can be made on the basis of the highly specific case that has been examined. It concerns the feudal-order features of current governance in the Russian Federation. The resemblance comes from relinquishing ambitions for total control which characterized the Soviet mode of governance. The two-tier model offered here contracts the sphere of rigid control to a limited number of economic and military interests. They enjoy the favour of supreme power and are capable of creating feod-like own estates, complete with their own policing and other controlling organs. In the cases examined in this book, apart from the military and the VPK, such have been shown to be the exclusive angling and hunting lodges, or ‘camps’ (lageria). On the national scene, perhaps the most eloquent example of the promotion of such feudal
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tendencies has been Evgenii Prigozhin’s private army known as the Wagner Group Private Military Company (PMC). The overall arrangement thus allows a bottom-level terrain for action. It has been shown that so long as superior power interests are not infringed, local communities may win in conflicts with mighty outsiders. My claim has been that allowing such small victories (in the eyes of supreme power) answers to the demands of an agenda for enjoying broad popular support. Continuing support for the economically draining sovkhoist order, as a legacy of nostalgically remembered Soviet times, is seen to be useful in the same direction. While supreme power may benefit from such a double-tier policy, it has to be acknowledged that it is capable of engendering grave dangers for itself. As it has been shown, such a policy creates a palpable perception of a growing rift between power and the people. In the Northern regional case I have discussed, an adherence to sovkhoism and to a meta-Soviet existence demands what former local leaders have called ‘attention to the problems of reindeer husbandry’. Despite the fact of the insignificant economic performance of this form of Subarctic land-use, its symbolic value of attributing uniqueness in a regional context is considerable. Further than that, the loss of a received status of the herders being ‘hosts of the tundra’ is painfully felt by all residents of Lovozero Raion. In the final account, selective de-centralization, in this and other regional contexts, may be considered to be a factor for bringing about critical exocentric tendencies.
Epilogue: War and Lithium
After the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the dynamic sketched out above suddenly jumped to a fast-forward pace. The War (‘SVO’) and following Western sanctions impaired existing links with the Fennoscandic neighbours from whom support had been coming ever since the opening of the borders in the early 1990s. In concrete terms, the Russian part of Sapmi was again parted from the Fennoscandic ‘mainland’. On the local Lovozero Raion side of it, the deal for exporting meat to Finland faced an uncertain future. The second blow that came was again connected with the sanctions: lithium ore exports to Russia had been practically discontinued. Additionally, global demands for the rare metal had risen considerably and so had the price. Ironically, the global thirst for battery storage of ‘green’ electricity was dealing a mortal blow to a paradigmatically ‘green’ form of Subarctic land-use—that of reindeer husbandry. In the specific case, the blow was levelled at ‘Tundra’s’ Right Wing. By mid-November 2022, the following reports began coming from the Brigade Base No 8 on the left bank of Kolmiavr (Kolmozero) Lake: The territory of Brigade 8 has been rented out to the geologists and construction work has begun on the site of the (herders’) base-camp. Eighty people will be living there. The rumour is that the (renting) agreement is for three years, and after that the buildings will be handed back (to the Brigade).
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But I suspect that may not happen at all: building a working settlement at the site of the base looks far more probable. The site is good for that, allowing for a road to the mine to be built so the workers can be transported back and forth. In brief, with such neighbours that will be the end of herding. What is more, a road will be built across the Keivi Ridge and there will be another mine there. The rumour is for big aluminium deposits being discovered on that site. On the whole, the end of the Kola tundra is coming: there will be mines and processing plants all over. This is the end…. (V.N., 15.11.22)
A friend from the village wrote: As for the Right Wing: geologists are surveying the site, they are being transported by helicopters. The reindeer have been moved to other parts. (M.K. 22.11.22)
By mid-December, the following news came: The geologists have already built one hut at the 8th Base (base-camp of Brigade 8—my gloss) and for the moment two people are on duty there. The plans are for drilling rigs to be brought over by tractors and only after that the drillers and geologists will start coming. (Vl. Kh., 13 Dec., 2022)
That was what looked like to be the coming end of the NE part of the grazing range of SKhPK ‘Tundra’. The War in Ukraine and the global demand for electric batteries had combined to bring to an end a human- reindeer relationship which had begun in times immemorial. Consequently, reindeer husbandry in Murmansk Region was to experience a new round of contraction. The relentless process of shrinking, begun at the end of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, is now about to circumscribe reindeer husbandry to about half of its previous size. In the case of Lovozero’s ‘Tundra’ that will certainly push it still further in the direction of ‘commuting’ or ‘urban’ herding. Supreme power concerns in combination with global industrial developments triggered by climate change have selected for this particular outcome in respect of a Northern setting and its people. A last note. At the end of January 2023, the news came that the Regional Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Fishing intended to take measures for including Atlantic salmon in the new edition of the Red Book of Murmansk Region. It will be remembered that by including wild
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reindeer in the Red Book, ‘custodianship of the tundra’ by the herding community was enhanced. The ‘Red Book solution’ for that species translated into a significant victory of local community interests over those of wealthy outsiders—true, of those belonging ‘only’ to the ‘middle oligarchate’ and not close to top power. With salmon the struggle against outside interests promised to be taken to a level above that. The future will show whether this more ambitious regional move will be successful. In all events, it speaks of under-the-surface tensions between regional and central power interests, which may erupt at any moment from little expected quarters.
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Index1
A Administration Head of Raion Administration, 21, 215 Lovozero Raion Administration, 11, 15, 16, 19, 32, 88, 154, 155, 169, 197 Pechenga Raion Administration, 16, 40, 41 of Village Settlement Lovozero, 27, 27n17, 81, 116–118, 154, 155, 210 (see also Village Settlement, Sel’skoe poselenie) Working Settlement Revda Administration, 27, 270, 271 Administrative administrative-cum-business mix, 78 attention (of Raikom), 195, 275, 278 ‘gaze,’ 36, 210
control, 81, 82, 116, 190 documents (regional), 17 jargon, 203 leadership, 19, 21, 123 office, 17, 18, 34, 35, 84, 113, 209, 221, 271, 274 (see also Kontora) situation (Pechenga Raion), 9 Soviet administrative attention, 194, 195 weekly, 11, 21, 24, 26, 27, 32, 168, 210, 292 (see also Lovozerskaia Pravda (weekly of Lovozero Raion Administration, LP)) Administratively ‘liquidated’ tundra villages, 138, 270 regulated (zones), 213 Afanas’ieva, Anna (on administrative liquidation of Sami villages), 57, 222, 270
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.
1
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Konstantinov, Power and the People, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38306-9
339
340
INDEX
Afanas’ieva, Nina (on ‘Sami victimization’), 70 Affiliated members (of brigades), 266 (see also Emeritus members (of brigades, honorary members); Honorary members (of brigades)) periphery (of brigades), 263 Afghan War, 237 Sami heroes of Afghan War, 237 Agglomeration beginning of agglomeration, 221, 270 drive, 138 of kolkhozi into sovkhozi, 37, 270, 273 and liquidation of tundra villages, 56, 59, 138n52, 221, 270 Agricultural land-use (zemlia sel’skokhoziaistennogo naznacheniia), 81, 89–91, 91n30, 99, 116, 117, 129, 144, 148, 164, 201, 211, 225 organizations (sel’khozorganizatsii), 11, 32, 202, 205 reforms, 51, 270 territory of agricultural land-use, 80 Agriculture and fishing, 26, 27 of Murmansk Region, 51, 201, 239 in national economy, 3, 27 of the Russian Federation, 250 in the Soviet bureaucratic nomenclature, 51 sub-category of ‘agriculture,’ 26, 27 ‘Agro-centre,’ 279 Agroprom (list of businesses), 118 ‘Akhkhtan’ (‘Together,’ obshchina), 240, 240n30 AKRA (Group for Assessing Risks for Sustainable Development), 150, 151
AKS (Kola Sami Association), 159, 167, 231 Akty o pogolov’ia, 36 Alkhimchikov (Deputy and Head of the Forestry and Hunting Department), 75, 78 All-purpose track vehicle (vezdekhod), 39 ‘Amadea’ (mega-yacht, Kerimov), 150, 150n66 Analysis/analyses categorial analysis, 188 of game-resource distribution, 232 model of analysis, 10–13, 20, 51 of production, 16 Anderson, David (on the state farm as a ‘total social institution’), 54, 184, 274 Andreeva, Ekaterina (on wild-reindeer bans), 132 Andreeva, Oksana, 23, 212 on ‘Arctic Hectare,’ 22, 165, 210, 211, 213, 213n17, 216, 218, 259, 310 on ‘lighter’ Arctic Hectare procedure, 212 on Putin-Chibis meeting (June 2022), 23 on Regional social programs, 23, 24 Angler average non-KMNS angler, 248 city anglers, 259, 260, 262 protests against fishing privileges for KMNS, 254 recreational angler, 260 from Revda, 256 Angling exclusive angling camps, 73, 82, 103, 111, 113, 310 salmon-angling, 77, 79, 82, 103, 111, 113, 211 (see also Salmon- angling and hunting camps) wild-salmon angling, 52
INDEX
wild-salmon angling camp (on Ponoi), 73 AO ‘Tsentral’no-kol’skaia ekspeditsiya’ (mineral exploration company), 144 Apitsyn (Leader of Brigade No 4, ‘Tundra,’ on too few herders in brigades), 275 Apocalypse, 286 post-sovkhoist apocalypse, 286 Appatit’ (Mining-Processing Complex OAO Appatit in Kirovsk- Appatiti), 75–78 Appatiti (town), 75 Archaeology, 68 Fatherland War archaeology, 68 ‘Arctic Hectare’ (Gektar Arktiki) federal initiative ‘Arctic Hectare,’ 211 ‘lightening’ of ‘Arctic Hectare’ procedure, 212 only on proximal to settlements territories, 213 Arkhangel’sk passengers from Murmansk to Arkhangel’sk, 64 rehauling Klavdiia Elanskaia in Arkhangel’sk, 64 ‘Arrow’ (in wild reindeer, strelka), 121 Association of the indigenous Sami People, 185 (see also AKS (Kola Sami Association)) Kola Sami (Saami) Association, 159, 167, 231 (see also AKS (Kola Sami Association)) Lujavvri (Lovozero) Local Branch of the Kola Sami Association, 145 of the Izhma-Komi ‘Iz’vatas,’ 143 Auction (of 16 January 2019 for Hunting Lot No 7), 84, 98, 100 Auto-censure, 285
341
B Bakhtin, Mikhail (on carnival and people’s culture in Rablais), 4 Balashov and Rudoi (on villager’s farms), 203 Ban (on hunting) 1st ban (wild reindeer and moose), 92, 93, 104, 105, 133 2nd ban (wild reindeer and moose), 94 3rd ban (wild reindeer and moose), 93, 94 hunting ban, 94 on wild reindeer and moose hunting, 95 on wild reindeer hunting, 92, 95, 110, 134 ‘Barents euphoria’ (Hønneland), 63, 70, 142 Barents Sea herd fragments along Barents Sea Coast, 58 initiative for building huts along Barents Sea Coast (V.F. Syrota), 58 mixing of herds along the Barents Sea Coast, 275 ‘Baron’ (‘herders’ dubbing of Reizvikh), 103 ‘Barrick Gold’ (precious metals mining-processing company) and AO Fedorovo Resources, 152, 153, 155 Barrick Gold/Rostekh platinoid project, 143, 146 getting a license, 146, 149, 150 monitoring of ‘Barrick Gold’ activities, 147 protestbarrick.net portal, 147 pulling out (May 2020), 151 Barter with the military, 62, 128 with poachers, 128
342
INDEX
Base (baza), 110, 211 Basharin (old-timer, Gremikha, on food in Gremikha), 66 Beach, Hugh, viii, 5, 46, 143, 144, 193, 281 on ear-marking, Sweden, 281 on field-research with Brigade 3 in 1992, 5, 193 interviews with Birger Wallström (of Norfrys), 46 Belgorod (city), 84, 87 Belgorod (region), 14, 86 Belgorod Experimental Plant for Fish-Concentrate Feeds (Belgorodskii eksperimental’nii zavod rybnykh kombikormov, BEZRK), 84n22 Belgrankorm (Agricultural Holding Company), 86, 87, 96, 117, 118 Belomorskii Rybak’ (‘White Sea Fisherman,’ kolkhoz), 103 Berezhkov (former RAIPON official, émigré indigenous activist), 168 Berg-Nordlie, Mikkel (on ‘need-and- misery’ discourse), 70, 119 Beria, Lavrentii, 137, 160 curatorship of trans-peninsular railway project, 137 Karnasurt mining-processing site, 137 Bespredel (lawlessness), 132 ‘Bezhit sovkhoznaia vazhenka’ (‘a sovkhoz female reindeer is running’), 44 BEZRK Affair, 23, 84, 85, 87, 91, 98, 99, 107, 113, 121, 123, 128, 133, 135, 142, 163 Hunting Club, 23, 60, 67, 84–86, 88, 94, 106, 149, 253, 289 (see also Okhotnichyi Klub BEZRK) Hunting Venture, 84
Non-Profit Partnership, 85, 86, 88 Big Earth, 272n47 See also Mainland (bol’shaia zemlia) Bike, 57, 257, 307 four-wheel bike (kvadrotsikli), 57, 257, 307 Binary ‘collective vs. private,’ 187, 192 ‘truly private’ vs. personal/private binary, 187, 192, 201 Biodiversity instrumental role of biodiversity, 54 as a ‘Western concern,’ 112 Birthday anniversary (of reindeer herders, iubilei), 189 Blat (informal deals) difference between blat and sovkhoism, 261 for getting sovkhoz supplies, 261 through informal channels (‘po blatu’), 208 Bogdanov, Nikolai (reindeer husbandry authority, Regional Government, on ‘paper reindeer’), 42, 124, 288 Boliden AB (mining-processing company), 144 Bolivia (import of lithium ore from), 157, 157n68 Bol’shezemelskaia Tundra (NAO reindeer husbandry area), 231 ‘Bolting down of hatches,’ 62 Brand (brend) Sami traditional brand, 254 tourist brand, 221 Brigade (brigada) base camps (brigadnye bazy), 262 Brigade (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), 38, 62, 71, 72, 129, 140, 141n54, 145, 157, 158, 160, 183n1, 197, 221, 275, 281, 313, 314
INDEX
herd, 141, 276, 281 herd keeping to the brigade territory (‘derzhat’ teritoriiu’), 275 leader, 19, 45, 193, 201n11, 221, 275, 276, 283 extended brigade composition, 262 Brylev, Nikolai (former Head of Lovozero Raion, on BZRK affair), 100, 255 Budget ‘for citizens’ (Biudzhet dlia grazhdan), 26 ‘light’ budget, 26, 27 of Lovozero Raion, 19, 27 subsidized budget, 209, 245, 246 (see also ‘Subsidy budget’ (dotatsionnyi biudzhet)) Bulletin ‘indexes’ in bulletins, 19, 26, 32 of Lovozero Raion Statistical Office, 11 Regional bulletins, 31, 32, 36, 185 statistical bulletins, 11, 19, 32, 61, 185, 198, 206 STC bulletins, 37 of 12 April, 2019, 100 ‘Buran’ (snowmobile), 46 Bureaucratic obfuscation, 10, 11, 31, 194, 199 Bushveld (Southern Africa, lithium or deposits), 152 C Calf-pelt harvesting (malichnii zaboi), 60 Camp (‘lager,’ lageria) cook (chumrabotnitsi), 273 Corrective Labour Camp, 136 Corrective Labour Camp No 509 (Ispravitel’no-trudovoi lager’ 509), 136
343
exclusive camps, 73, 79 forced labour camps, 52, 136 herding camps, 68, 122, 128, 279 luxury camps, 73, 74 salmon-angling camps, 52, 73–135 tundra camps, 45, 52, 57, 67, 163, 263 ‘Campaign’ reindeer husbandry campaign (olenevodcheskoe meropriiatie), 272 seasonal campaigns in reindeer husbandry, 271 Capelin (moiva), 266 Carbines, 120 Carcass (of reindeer, tusha), 39, 67, 72, 131, 134, 189, 196, 197, 267 Carnival (in Rablais, Bakhtin), 4 Castration (of reindeer), 37 Census All-Russian Agricultural Census of 2016, 17 Central bureaucratic (usage), 31 power, 137, 142, 169, 211, 214 Centre centre-periphery tensions, 2 of concentrated power, 2 of demographic pull, 272 distant centre, 1 insular centre of power, 2 power, viii, 170 Raion Centre of Lovozero, 21, 264, 270, 310 ‘Centredness’ (of Lovozero), 271 Centrifugal local developments, 13 tendencies, 15, 19 Chal’mny Varre (tundra village), 249 Chamber working chamber (rabochaia kamera), 39–41, 43, 282, 283
344
INDEX
Chambermaid (in exclusive camps), 73, 87 Chastnik (private owner), 188 Chemezov (Director ChTPK), 149 Chernovskii, Platon, 132, 133, 135 on accusations of herders’ poaching, 132, 133 on 1st wild-reindeer ban, 132 on wild-reindeer counts, 135 Chibis, Andrei (acting Governor of Murmansk Region), 20, 22, 23, 99–101, 101n35, 115, 149, 150, 152, 165, 214, 218, 266, 292 appointed Governor March ‘19, 99 and the BZRK Affair, 23 meeting with Putin June ‘22, 23 visits Lovozero Raion March- Sept. ‘19, 99 visit to Lovozero Raion 25.10.22, 20 Chudziavre (lake), 57 Chumakov, A.A. (geologist, discovery of lithium deposits near Kolmiavr Lake), 158 Climate change, 46, 53, 54, 57, 112, 280, 310, 314 and biodiversity, 53, 54, 112 and delayed harvesting, 57, 280 and snowmobiles, 46, 57 Cloud-berry (moroshka), 57, 210 Cod (treska), 239 Co-management, 136 limited informal, 136 Command, 3, 80, 183, 191, 194, 252, 273, 287 capitalism, 191 socialism, 191, 194 ‘Commercial secrecy’ (komercheskaia taina), 35 Committee Agricultural Committee at the Government of Murmansk Region, 42
Committee for Accounting of Head-Counts (Komissiia po uchetu), 16 (see also Committee for stock, taking of domestic northern reindeer, (komissiia po ucheta domashnikh severnykh olenei); Committee for stock, Stock-Taking Committee (STC)) Committee for Property Management at the Administration of Pechenga Raion (Komitet po upravleniu imushtestvom administratsii Pechengskogo raiona, KUI), 40 Committee for Relations with Community Organizations and Youth Affairs of Murmansk Region (Komitet po vzaimodeistviiu s obshchestvennymi organizatsiiami i delam molodezhi Murmanskoi oblasti), 68 Economic Committee of the Sovet of the Federation, 157 Lovozero Committee of War and Labour Veterans, 145 State Committee (Goskomissiia), 152 Committee for stock Stock-Taking Committee (STC), 34–47, 227 taking of domestic northern reindeer, (komissiia po ucheta domashnikh severnykh olenei), 35n20 Common pot (obshchepyt), 263 Communication ‘default communication,’ 199 ‘silent communication,’ 199 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 87
INDEX
Community, 1, 2, 23, 45n31, 54, 59, 61, 67, 83, 84, 86, 89, 95, 97–103, 108–110, 112–115, 118, 124–126, 129, 131, 132, 135, 137, 142, 143, 148, 158, 159, 162, 168, 187, 190, 191, 193, 194, 201, 206n14, 209, 214, 216, 239, 241, 245, 253, 256, 259, 260, 264, 267, 271, 280, 284–286, 288, 289, 311, 315 tundra-connected community, 53, 83, 88, 114, 120, 284 Community (rural, obshchina) clan community (rodovaia obshchina), 239 territorial-neighbourhood community (territorial’no- sosedskaia obshchina), 185, 226 Commuting husbandry, 270, 272, 277, 307 reindeer husbandry, 183–295 Congress 4th Congress of Reindeer Herders, 14 Contact with herds, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 88, 139, 163, 307 with reindeer, 36, 55, 121 ‘Contemporary realities’ (in connection with the Russian- Ukrainian War), 47 Controversies, 53, 54, 62, 92, 96, 103, 106–108, 118, 246, 253, 254 wild-reindeer controversies, 23, 56, 59, 84, 92, 93, 102, 113, 136, 142, 253, 289 Cooperative Cooperative for Agricultural Production (SKhPK), 185, 200n9, 222
345
Cooperative for Agricultural Production Reindeer- Husbandry Commercial Enterprise of Numerically Small Peoples of the North (SKhPK OPKh MNS), 33 Corral, corralling, 35, 37–40, 43–45, 57, 86, 140, 163, 188, 189, 196, 208, 209, 228, 229, 238, 275, 278, 281, 282, 284, 292, 308 counting-harvesting corralling, 35, 57, 121, 272 Corral enclosure Lovozero corral enclosure, 238, 275 Polmos corral enclosure, 39, 283 Porosozero corral enclosure, 39 Sem’ostrov’ie corral enclosure, 39 69 Km., 140, 141, 145 Corrective Colony No 23 (Ispravitel’naia koloniya (IK) No 23), 137, 291 Corrective Labour Camp No 509 (Ispravitel’no-trudovoi lager’ 509), 136 Council Council of Representatives of the Indigenous Numerically-small People Sami, 154 Council of War, Labour, and Law-enforcement Veterans (Lovozerskii raionnyi sovet Veteranov), 143 Counting (of reindeer) aerial counting (aviauchet), 106 counting/harvesting activities, 39, 280 head counting, 17, 34–37, 39, 40 head-counting texts, 35 statistics, 34 tundra counting, 34
346
INDEX
Counting and Monitoring of Animal Species Section for Counting and Monitoring (Sektor po uchetu i monitoringu ob’ektov zhivotnogo mira), 104 Counting-harvesting (corralling), 35, 57, 196, 272 Counts head counts, 11, 16, 20, 26, 28–30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 37n24, 40–42, 44, 134, 183, 197, 227 moose counts, 135 wild-reindeer counts, 135 Cows, 11, 266 Creed, Gerald (on ‘institutionalized theft’ in Socialist Bulgaria), 4 Crosswise migration (poperek), 275 Cull aerial cull of wild-reindeer at Peak Kamennik, 118 annual cull, 267 Culling wild reindeer, 117, 118, 122, 132 Custodianship (of the tundra), 62, 112, 113, 126, 133, 315 ‘Custodians of the tundra,’ 23, 142 See also Khoziaeva tundry D Dadykin, A.I. (Manager of Non-Profit Partnership ‘Hunting Club BEZRK’), 88, 96 Danilov, Andrei (Sami activist, former OOSMO Leader, member of émigré Sami opposition), 168 ‘Dashing nineties’ (‘likhie devianostye’), 62, 118, 132, 170 Data Base of the Government of Murmansk Region, 17, 33, 36, 37 for Lovozero Raion, 17, 36
Debate beyond debate, 136, 169 over renewables, 54 political debate, 126, 127, 237 public debate, 23, 54, 71, 88, 111, 142, 237 wild reindeer debate, 89, 111 Decree (Postanovlenie) Postanovlenie No 106 2010. ‘On determining the limits for extracting hunting resources on the territory of Murmansk Region,’ 93 Postanovlenie No 160 2012. Regime of granting subsidies from the regional budget to obshchiny, 219, 245n34 Postanovlenie No 350 2013. ‘On introducing a ban on catching wild reindeer and moose in the hunting grounds of Lovozero Raion,’ 93 Decree No 411 2021. [Regulations for subsidizing obshchiny], Art. 3, 185, 219 Decree No 425-PG ‘On realizing the budget of Municipal Formation Village Settlement Lovozero for the 1st Half of 2022,’ 27 Decree (Prikaz) Decree (Prikaz)-1 2012 On (hunting) guidelines, 105 Decree (Prikaz)-659 2021 On allotting (fish) catches, 234, 235, 239, 240 Decree (Prikaz)-727 2021 Of the Federal Fishing Agency, 234 Decree (Prikaz) for changing the rules concerning ‘Veteran of Labour’ status, 224
INDEX
Prikaz-162 2020 On Red Book list, 85, 93 Prikaz-477 2020 On hunting rules, 93 Deer, reindeer individual deer (individual’nye oleni), 32, 43, 188, 203, 205 ‘paper deer’ (‘bumazhnye oleni’), 42, 197 personal deer (lichnye oleni), 30–32, 34, 162, 188, 189, 193, 199, 203, 205 personal/private deer, 187, 188, 190–193, 201, 201n11, 203, 205, 205n12, 207, 208, 228–230, 232, 233, 241, 242, 244, 267, 282–284, 288, 308–310 private deer (chastnye oleni), 5, 15, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 43n30, 44, 45, 126, 131, 132, 162, 185–189, 192, 201, 203, 219, 230, 232, 233, 308 private-in-the-collective deer, 4, 15, 30, 33, 34, 43–45, 58, 126, 190, 227, 242, 259, 308 sovkhoz deer (sovkhoznye oleni), 29, 30, 43, 43n30, 106, 130, 188, 189, 200, 201, 205, 205n12, 230, 267, 285, 288, 308–310 Default (financial, of August 1998), 145 Den’gin, Vitalii (Acting Head of Lovozero Raion Administration), 25, 25n15 ‘De-nomadization,’ 56 Department Department of Agro-industrial Complex Development (Otdel’ razvitiia аgro-promishlennogo kompleksa), 35n22
347
Department of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control for Murmansk Region (Upravlenie Federal’noi sluzhby po veterinarnomu i fitosanitarnomu nadzoru po Murmanskoi oblasti, Rossel’khoznadzor), 23, 114, 121, 123, 214 ‘Deviant subcultures,’ 125n46 Digurov, Vladimir (reindeer specialist; on state of ‘Tundra’ in the 1980s), 38, 274 Director, 86, 96, 128, 222, 263, 278, 279, 288, 289 sovkhoz director, 45, 196, 278, 289 ‘Dobrovolets’ (kolkhoz), 37 Dolgolevets, Andrei (Head of Fishing, Fishing Committee, on fishing quota scandal of 2011), 247, 255 DOSAAF (DOSAAF Rossii), 69 ‘Doublespeak,’ 128 Dubovtsev, Andrei (Sami activist, Head of OOO ‘Reindir,’ Leader of Obshchina Akhktan), 240n30 Duma Regional Duma, 75, 88, 90–92, 102, 110, 123, 131, 223, 255, 265n41 Federal Duma, 89 E Ecology ex-sovkhoz ecology, 286 Minister (Regional) of Natural Resources and Ecology, 75, 78, 96 and Nornikel’s lithium project, 137, 156 political ecology, 236, 255, 259, 266, 287
348
INDEX
Edinnaia Rossiia (Unified Russia, President’s party), 101n35 Eliason, Stephen (on ‘king’s game’ in medieval Europe), 232 Elite administrative-cum-moneyed elites, 53 circles, 76, 78 fishing, 77 local elite, 112, 288 power elite, 3 ‘tundra elite,’ 19, 221, 282, 285, 286, 288 Emergence low levels of emergence of ‘truly private’ farms, 206 of new property form, 190 Emergent phenomenon, 191, 192 Emeritus members (of brigades, honorary members), 262 ‘Emotions’ (vs. legal norms), 101 ‘Endless deferral’ (Ssorin-Chaikov), 156, 198 Engelhardt, Alexander (Governor, late 19 c.), 268, 269, 269n46 on Komi immigration, 269, 269n46 on Sami auxiliary services for late 19 c. tourists, 268 Enterprise agricultural enterprise, 201–264 Municipal Unitary Enterprise (MUP), 16, 35, 41, 229; ‘Pechengskaia kompaniia,’, 16, 40, 41 town-forming enterprises (gradoobrazuyushchie predpriiatiia), 10n2, 18–20, 36n23, 54, 155, 209, 216, 218 Environment economic environment, 308 ex-sovkhoist environment, 286 political environment, 51, 231
socio-economic environment, 54, 308 traditional union with environment, 88 Essen, Erica von (on ‘illegal taking’ vs. ‘poaching’), 125 Ethnic entrepreneur (Ingold), 252 Euphemism for the current war, 47 taboo and euphemism, 285 Euphemistic/euphemistically, 14, 159, 205 terms, 14 Extensive herding, 71 husbandry, 55, 61, 111, 163, 209 Extensivity, 55, 59, 60, 71, 186, 308 Exterior differences (of semi- domesticated as against wild reindeer), 121 F Far East, viii, 212, 234, 243 ‘Far Eastern Hectare’ (Dalekovostochnii gektar), 212 Farm (khoziaistvo) ‘citizens’ farms (khoziaistva naseleniia (grazhdane)), 32 collective farm (kolkhoz), 52, 138n52, 141, 273 people’s farms (khoziaistva naseleniia), 202, 203, 205–208 rural farms (khoziistva naseleniia sel’skikh poseleniy), 33 state farm (sovkhoz), 41, 52, 54, 183–185, 273, 308 ‘truly private’ farms, 203, 206, 213 ‘villagers’ farms (khoziaistva naseleniia sel’skikh poselenii), 207
INDEX
Farmers’ holdings (fermerskie khoziaistva), 202, 203 Fatherland War archaeology, 68 reconstruction clubs, 69 Fattening (or reindeer, nagul), 60 Faultline, 102, 104, 114 of herding vs. hunting, 104 Federal Security Service (FSB), 3 Fedorova Tundra (mining-processing project), 148, 151, 152, 154, 161, 165 Fedorova Tundra (ridge), 137, 146–151, 155 Fence reindeer fence argument, 121, 130 reindeer fence building, 130 reindeer fences, 55, 122, 130, 269 Fenge and Rymer (on Kola reindeer husbandry in the early 1990s-fact- finding report), 193 Fennoscandia, 198, 231, 271, 307 Fennoscandic (countries) neighbours, 146, 166, 184, 287, 309, 313 reindeer husbandry organizations, 14 Festival of the North (Prazdnik Severa), 189, 238 Feudal vs. modernity orders, 4 -like political governance, 163 Russia as a feudal society, 4, 280 society, 4 Feudalism, 4 Filial, 81, 164 Finland, viii, 22, 47, 149, 161, 167, 168, 215, 218, 247, 261, 287, 313 Finnish (company), 46, 217 Firearms absence of firearms (for herders), 119
349
law on firearms, 119 possession of firearms, 120 regime for firearms, 119 Fire-fighting units, 68 Fish anadromous fish (salmon, trout), 52, 73–135, 127n49, 147, 163, 214, 232, 238, 239, 242, 249, 253, 256, 314, 315 ‘red’ fish, 232, 242 ‘white’ fish, 232, 239, 242 Fishing amateur fishing, 234, 250 cabin, 259 companies, 240, 241, 243, 244, 251–254, 256, 265 elite fishing, 77 fresh-water fishing, 55, 56, 58, 60, 185, 210, 219, 220, 231–233, 236–239, 239n29, 243–245, 248–253, 256, 257, 259–262, 269 industrial fishing, 234, 244, 250, 252, 256, 265 (see also Promyshlennoe rybolovstvo) lots, 219, 244, 246, 249 (see also Fishing lots RPU) quota scandal (of 2011), 245, 251 recreational fishing, 234, 235, 248, 256–258, 266 (see also Rekreatsionnoe rybolovstvo) resources, 187, 232, 242, 248, 250, 253, 262, 266 sea-fishing, 220, 231, 239–241, 240n30, 243–245, 248, 251–253, 268 sovkhoist fresh-water fishing, 259 sports fishing, 234, 250, 295 (see also Sportyvnoe rybolovstvo) tourism, 234 (see also Rybolovnii turizm) traditional fishing, 234, 241 (see also Traditsionnoe rybolovstvo)
350
INDEX
Fishing lots RPU, 244, 246, 249 ‘Folk crime,’ 125n46 Folk etymology, 276 Fondahl, Gail (on agro-centre), 5, 279 Foodstuffs, 64, 66 Forest and Ecological Control Regional Centre of Forest and Ecological Control, 81 Forestry branch, 81 (see also Filial) Department for Forestry Management at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Fish Management of Murmansk Region, 81 Forestry Management, 75, 78–80 (see also Lesnoe khoziastvo) Forestry Office, 81 (see also Lesnichestvo Lovozerskogo Raiona) Forestry Office of Lovozero Raion, 81 (see also Lesnichestvo Lovozerskogo Raiona) Fund, 80, 81, 90, 91, 91n30, 96, 99, 155, 163, 164 (see also Lesnoi fond) Fund land, 79, 82, 148, 155, 163, 164 Forest tundra, 52, 54, 60, 81, 105, 141, 162, 163, 211, 224, 231, 263, 271 ‘For insiders’ use’ (dlia vnutrennogo pol’zovaniia), 13 Formation Closed Administrative-Territorial Formation (CATF, ZATO), 64n6 Municipal Formation (MO), 81 Municipal Formation Town Settlement Revda, 18 Municipal Formation Village Settlement Lovozero, 27
Forsyth, Craig (on folk- crime), 125n46 Forum Arctic Business Forum, 149 International Arctic Forum, 211n16 Foucault, Michel, 4, 279, 280 on feudal order, 4 on ‘panopticon vision,’ 279 Four-wheel bikes (kvadrotsikli), 57, 257, 307 Fragment (of herd), 42, 58, 60, 163, 272, 275, 307 slaughter fragment (of herd) (zaboinii kusok), 189 ‘Free tundra land’ (motif), 61 Fryer, Paul (on ‘go private’), 194 Fund, 96 indivisible fund, 199–201 FZ (Federal Law) FZ-7 1996 (‘On non-profit organizations’), 226 FZ-104 2000 (‘On general principles of organization of obshchiny of the indigenous numerically-small peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation’), 226 FZ-119 2016 (‘On land plots’), 204, 212 FZ-119 2016 (‘On specifics of providing land plots for citizens’), 204 FZ-166 2004 (‘On industrial fishing,’ ‘on “traditional fishing” (Art. 1)’), 234, 241 FZ-209 2021 (‘On hunting and preservation of hunting resources’), 97n33 FZ-226 2021 (‘On “Arctic Hectare” in Murmansk Region’), 212
INDEX
FZ-226 2021 (‘On introducing changes in FZ-119’), 212 FZ-282 2007 (‘On official statistical accounts’), 11, 20, 35 FZ-475 2018 (‘On amateur fishing’), 234 G Game keepers, 97 ‘king’s game’ (in medieval Europe), 232 poaching, 74 wild game, 125 Garage boat garage (lodochnyi sarai), 257, 257n39 car/workshop garage, 257 garage sales (fish, reindeer meat), 193 Gathering (of wild plants, dikorosy) wild-berry gathering, 58, 265 wild-fruit gathering, 219, 220 ‘Gebel,’ German F. on Kola Sami being primarily fishermen, 242 on Sami ‘backwardness,’ 269 Golovnev, A. (on NAO ‘success story’), 5 Gosplan (State Planning Committee), 56 Gostevskikh, Aleksei (General Director AO ‘Fedorovo Resources), 153, 154, 156 Gosudarstvennaia 2022 (Legislative document on state support for KMNS), 219 Governance culture of governance, 13, 15 de-centralized governance, 256 feudal order regime of governance, 310
351
model of governance, 19, 280, 309 regime of governance, 2 system of governance, 1, 2 Governor acting Governor, 22, 76, 77, 99, 214, 292 former Governor, 22, 77, 101, 104, 165 Vice-Governor, 79, 95, 146 Grazing range, 20, 21, 27, 41, 52, 55, 57, 59, 80, 81, 86, 87, 89, 90, 97, 107, 109, 116, 117, 121, 122, 129, 138, 144, 146–149, 157, 158, 161, 210, 225, 240n30, 271, 273, 284, 307, 314 range of ‘Tundra,’ 24, 71, 91 semi-free summer grazing, 55 ‘Green’ policy, 156 vs. ‘predatory’ poachers, 108 values, 96, 162 Gremikha (naval base), 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71, 136 Grigor’ev, Aleksei (General Director of OAO Appatit), 75, 76 GSM (connectedness), 59 Guanxi, 262 GULAG, 52 camp, 136 Gulevich, Vladislav (on Sami auxiliary services for Pomor sea-fishing teams), 268 Guns (unlicensed, nelegal’ki), 119 Gur’ev, Andrei (oligarch, owner of PhosAgro Group), 77, 78 H Habeck, Otto, 34, 279 on agro-centres, 279 on kontora vs. brigada, 34
352
INDEX
Habitat ranges, 130 separation, 122 wild-reindeer, 111 Haddock (piksha), 239, 240 Hann, Chris, viii, 3, 184, 191 on Karl Polanyi (substantive vs. formalized economies), 3 on sovkhoism, 3 Harder, René (German filmmaker, film on Krasnoshchel’ie), 194 Hardin, Garrett (on ‘tragedy of the commons’), 126, 284, 288, 310 Hart, Keith (on informal economy), 261 Head Head of Lovozero Raion Administration, 37 Head of Village Settlement Lovozero, 90, 96, 109, 155 Head (of reindeer) annual grant per, 42 count/counts, 29, 134 Head-Counting Statements, 36 (see also Akty o pogolov’ia) Heikkilä, Lydia (on ‘herders’ talk), 276 Helicopter flying in supplies to Ostrovnoi, 64, 66 municipally sponsored helicopter flights (munitsipal’nye reisi), 39 Munozero helicopter crash, 74, 79, 165 Henriksen, Christina (President of the Sami Council), 167 on severing links with AKS, 167 Herd ‘the herd was still in hand’ (‘stado eshche bylo v rukakh’), 273 personal/private herd, 30, 44, 124, 192, 193, 200, 205, 207, 208, 228, 230, 285
private herd, 30, 44, 124, 192, 200, 207, 208, 228, 230, 285 separation of herd, 60 ‘students’ herd (uchebnoe stado), 122 ‘truly private’ herd, 183n1, 192, 201n11 Herder fishing rights, 257–259 residence, 139 Herding brigades, 211, 266 by commuting, 122 teams, 20, 57, 58, 71, 117, 119, 134, 148, 188, 190, 229, 262, 264, 270, 272, 273, 307 Herring (cured, seledka), 266 Herzfeld, Michael on ‘cultural intimacy,’ 4 on ‘culture of theft,’ 4 on ‘intimate cultural knowledge,’ 187 ‘Hidden transcripts’ (Scott), 112, 187 Honorary members (of brigades), 262 ‘Hosts of the tundra’ (khoziaeva tundry), 47, 52 Hudalov, Maksim (Head of AKRA Group), 150 Human-Rangifer (contact) direct contact herding, 55 link, 221 relationship, 55, 71 Humphrey, Caroline, 3, 54, 125, 184, 191, 274 on theft, 125 on ‘total social institution,’ 54, 184, 274 Hunting basic regulations (okhotminimum), 119 Chart of Hunting Lots (Skhema, okhotuchastki), 98 Club BZRK, 23 community, 115, 132
INDEX
license (okhotnichii bilet), 119 quotas, 102, 105 specialists (okhotovedy), 115, 121 Hunting Control Department, 79 Section at Hunting Control Department for Counting and Monitoring of Animal Species (Sektor po uchetu i monitoringu ob’ektov zhivotnogo mira), 104 Hunting grounds, 67, 100, 105–108 restricted hunting grounds, 105, 106, 110 (see also Zakreplennykh okhotnychykh ugodii) Hunting Inspectorate (Okhotinspektsiia; Okhotnadzor), 67, 87, 88, 98, 114, 115, 133 Regional Hunting Inspectorate (Gosokhotinspektsia), 133 Hunting inspectors, 87, 97, 134 production and Hunting inspectors (proizvodstvenno-okhotnich’i inspektory), 97 Hunting Lot No 7, 84, 85, 87, 97, 108, 109, 117, 129 Hunting lots (okhotnichie uchastki; okhotuchastki), 81 Hyper-extensive (husbandry) husbandry, 59, 61, 163 husbandry methods, 269 management, 281 reindeer husbandry system, 111, 163 spiral, 284 I Ideology, 46 ‘We do not even have an Ideology anymore!,’ 46 Ievdokimov, Iurii (former Governor of Murmansk Region), 115
353
Igontova, Anna (Kola Sami politician, support of SVO), 166 Il’ina, Elena (journalist, PP), 118, 120, 140 on beginning of wild-deer controversy (2005), 118 ‘Illegal taking,’ 97, 125, 126 vs. poaching, 163 Income disclosing income (state officials), 10 non-taxable income, 27 taxable income, 27 taxes, 10 Indigeneity limits of indigeneity, 226 mobilizing indigeneity, 74 non-urban indigeneity, 220 re-interpreting indigeneity, 5 ‘urban’ indigeneity, 220, 236, 237, 239 Indigenous fishing rights, 231, 232 Indigenous Council, 154 Indigenous Numerically-small Peoples Saami, 255 (see also KMNS (Indigenous People Sami/Saami)) obshchiny, 186 people, viii, 4, 5, 104, 114, 155, 157, 159, 169, 203, 226, 233–235, 239, 241–243, 250, 254 ‘In Memory of Lenin’ (‘Pamiati Lenina,’ reindeer husbandry sovkhoz), 37, 195 See also ‘Olenevod’ (reindeer husbandry cooperative, Krasnoshchel’ie) Inspectors, 110n38 production and hunting inspectors (proizvodstvenno-okhotnich’i inspektory), 97
354
INDEX
Intensive care, 55 husbandry forms, 55 meat-focussed reindeer husbandry, 60 Intensivity, 55 Intervention ex-machina intervention, 287 human intervention, 280 state intervention, 289 supreme intervention, 286 ‘Intimate knowledge’ (Herzfeld), 127 Intimate realia, 127n49 Iokanga Bay, 136 Irkutsk Region, 150, 151 Istomin, Kirill (on sovkhoism), 184 Izhma (Komi), 55, 90, 90n29, 231 Izvatas’ (etnonym, Izhma Komi), 89 Izvatas’ (NGO, OOD), 89 Lovozero Department of Social Movement ‘I’ (Lovozerskoe otdelenie obshchestvennogo dvizheniia ‘Iz’vatas’), 89 J ‘January reindeer’ (ianvarskie oleni), 37 K Kalstad, Johan (on private reindeer husbandry), 193 Kalvemø, Jos (Norwegian Sami journalist and documentary film-maker, on Vatonena’s tourist venture, 63 Kamennik (Peak), 107, 108, 118 Kanevka (remote village), 10n2, 18, 38, 42, 55–57, 123, 155, 213, 268, 268n45, 270, 271, 307 Kanozero (Lake), 74
‘Kapitan Kosolapov’ (ice-breaker), 64 Karelin, Anatoli (journalist, PP, on wild-reindeer controversy), 93, 110n38, 123, 128–130, 135 Karnasurt (Mining-Processing Complex), 137 Keivi (Ridge), 118, 160, 314 Kerimov, Suleiman (mega-oligarch, owner Polius, Rostekh), 150, 150n66 on Amadea ownership, 150n66 on Fedorova Tundra Project, 150 Kharuzin, Nikolai (on historical Russian Sami (Lapp) ethnography), 242 Khodorkovskii (former mega-oligarch and Putin’s critic, on past co-ownership of PhosAgro), 76n17 Khomichev, Evgenii (on ‘Arctic Hectare’ in the Far East), 214 Khoziaeva tundry, 47 Kin, 42n28, 186, 189, 190, 195, 206, 206n14, 219, 226, 244, 252, 259, 262, 263, 283, 284 para-kin, 206, 206n14, 244, 259, 284 Kirovsk (town), 75 Appatiti-Kirovsk (twin-town complex), 75 Kiselev and Kiseleva (on ‘individual reindeer,’ individual’nye oleni), 32, 188 ‘Klavdiia Elanskaia’ (coastal passenger liner), 64, 67, 72 KMNS (Indigenous People Sami/ Saami), 227, 234–239, 242, 244–246, 245n34, 248, 250, 253–256, 258–260, 264, 265 state support for KMNS, 227, 242 Knee-length parka (malitsa), 60
INDEX
pelt harvesting for (malichnyi zaboi), 60 Koarrdegk Sijjt, 138 Kobylkin, Dmitrii (Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation), 102 ‘Kola Hunting Grounds’ (property of A. Reizvikh, Kol’skie ugod’ia), 103 Kola Peninsula, vii, 1, 55, 60, 73, 104, 127n49, 132, 142, 166, 209, 220, 230 Kola Raion (Kol’skii raion), 103 Kola Sami Association (AKS), 159, 167, 231 Kolkhoz, 37, 141, 141n54, 188, 203, 207, 221 member’s plot (kolkhoznii dvor), 203 Kolmiavr (Hydrometeorological Station (GMS) ‘Kolmiavr’), 86, 91, 129, 158 Landmark Kolmiavr, 158 (see also Urochishte Kolmiavr) Kolmiavr (Lake), 86, 129, 143–145, 157–159, 313 See also Kolmozero (Lake) Kolmozero (Lake), 143, 145, 313 Komarov, Kirill (Vice-President, ‘Rosatom’), 157 Komi Izhma Komi, 89, 90, 90n29, 143, 231 (see also Izvatas’ (etnonym, Izhma Komi)) meat and suede trading, 269 protests against fishing privileges for KMNS, 254 Komified Nenets, 19, 25n14, 90n29, 113, 114, 166, 169, 221–223, 234–236, 254 Komi/Nenets (settlers), 60 Kommersant (newspaper, Kommersant. ru), 92–94, 150
355
Komsomol, 87, 104 Komsomol’skaia Pravda (daily newspaper, Murmansk edition), 133 Kontora, 34, 35, 43 brigada-kontora distinction, 34 Kornai, Janos, 3, 125n45, 191, 205n13, 279 on deficit economy, 279 on soft budget constraints, 205n13 Kovdor Raion (Kovdorskii Raion), 9 Kovtun, Marina (former Governor of Murmansk Region), 22, 76, 76n15, 77, 91–96, 98, 99, 101, 104, 123, 165, 211, 218, 254, 255 in ‘elite fishing,’ 77 Krasnoshchel’ie (remote village), 10n2, 13, 18, 19, 27, 37, 42, 55–57, 59, 84, 86, 89, 107, 108, 110, 112, 123, 129, 134, 155, 159, 160, 200n9, 201, 206, 213, 221, 222, 225, 249, 249n36, 267n44, 268, 268n45, 270, 271, 273, 279, 307 Krushchev, Nikita, 3, 51, 56 agricultural reforms, 51 Kurzen’iev, Nikolai (former Head of Administration Lovozero Raion, on applications for fishing quotas), 96, 112 Kuznetsova, Anna (journalist, LP), 91, 110, 225, 289 on disputes with BZRK, 91, 110 on few herders in brigades, 38 on obshchiny and reindeer husbandry, 225 on ‘sovkhoz milk,’ 266, 266n42, 267 Kuznetsova, Nadezhda (acting Head of Administration Lovozero Raion), 21, 215, 216
356
INDEX
L Land for agricultural use (zemlia sel’skokhoziaistennogo naznacheniia), 81, 91, 91n30, 116, 117, 163, 225 Forestry Fund land, 79, 81, 82, 90, 91, 91n30, 99, 148, 155, 163, 164 land for urban settlements, 82 parcelling out land (mezhevanie), 210 plot (zemel’nyi uchastok), 187, 203, 204, 207–212, 214, 216, 219, 244, 250 regulated land, 213 for village settlements, 82 Land-use traditional forms of land-use, 89, 156, 219, 222, 226, 227 traditional land-use, 5, 156, 159, 203, 220, 227, 230, 239, 241, 244, 260, 265 Lapland Reserve (Laplandskii zapovednik), 92, 93, 112, 135 Law common law, 114–116 Federal law, 11, 20, 35, 97n33, 199, 204, 226 herders and the law, 120 Lawlessness (bespredel), 132 Leader brigade leader, 19, 38, 45, 183n1, 193, 201n11, 221, 275, 276, 283 of Indigenous Council, 154 OOSMO leader, 167, 168, 231, 237, 247 of SKhPK ‘Tundra,’ 18, 34, 41, 55, 86, 91, 107, 118, 144–146, 202, 216, 221, 228, 238, 240n30, 266, 266n42, 267, 267n43, 273, 279, 314
Leadership, 5, 19, 21, 32, 43, 44, 86, 91, 104, 119, 123, 125, 148, 154, 169, 196, 197, 221, 254, 255, 260, 279, 287 Ledeneva, Alena (on blat), 261 Lesnichestvo Lovozerskogo Raiona, 81 Lesnoe khoziastvo, 75 Lesnoi fond, 90 Letter (adres, to members of the Federal Duma), 11, 32, 66n7, 84, 89, 90, 143, 168, 169n74, 192n4, 243, 281 Open Letter of the Veterans, 168, 192n4 Licenses (for salmon fishing), 92–94, 97, 105, 110, 112, 116, 119, 120n41, 128, 146, 147, 150, 151, 238 See also Putevki ‘Litanies and laments’ (discursive genre, Ries), 136, 139, 156, 295 Lithium carbonate imports from, 157 deposits in Lovozero raion, 157 ‘Nornikel’/‘Rosatom’ lithium mining-processing project, 137, 156, 157, 160, 161 Lithuanian academic (and Gremikha poaching), 63 ‘Little motherland’ (‘malaia rodina’), 138, 138n53 Liubitel’skoe rybolovstvo, 234 ‘Locals’ vs. outsiders, 108 rights of locals, 62 Loomis, Gary (Finnish-American entrepreneur), 73 Loparskoe (village), 9 Lovozero Lake Lovozero, 213, 274, 292, 295 municipality, vii, 1, 9, 27, 56, 156 Raion, 5, 9, 9n1, 10, 12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 36, 41,
INDEX
45n31, 53, 59, 79–82, 84, 87–90, 92–95, 98–100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 113, 116, 131–138, 143, 144, 146, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 162, 164, 165, 183, 184, 195, 200n9, 202, 203, 206, 208, 211, 213, 214, 216, 218, 219, 221, 225, 229, 234, 239, 250, 252, 255, 260, 270, 271, 307, 311, 313 Raion Administration, 15, 16, 19, 25n15, 32, 37, 82, 88, 96, 154, 155, 169, 197 Lovozero (corral enclosure), 275 Lovozero/Revda (twin-town complex), 165, 238, 266, 272 Lovozerskaia Pravda (weekly of Lovozero Raion Administration, LP), 11, 12, 15, 16, 21, 24, 32, 58, 67, 82, 98, 106, 143, 145, 154–156, 169, 195, 197, 247, 293 Luk’ianchenko, Tat’iana (on Sami and Komi husbandry history), 55, 231, 242, 269, 272 Luzin, Gennadii (on Kola Peninsula geological surveys), 141 M Machine-tractor station (MTS), 56 See also Krushchev, Nikita, agricultural reforms Madslien, Jorn (journalist, on Murmansk’s garages), 258 Mafia, 92 Mainland (bol’shaia zemlia), 66, 272n47, 313 Marginalization, 185, 194 of reindeer husbandry, 194 ‘Maternity ward,’ 108, 109
357
for moose (roddom, rodil’nyi dom), 110, 112 Matrekhin, Ivan (entrepreneur, Sami politician, Leader of Sami obshchina), 166, 168 on fishing quota distribution scandal, 239 on ‘Z’ on guitar scandal, 166 Matrekhin, Ivan (former Head of SkhPK ‘Olenevod’), 123, 166, 167, 222, 240, 247, 251, 252 Mature Putinism, 143 socialism, 190 Meat meat-plan (miasoplan), 11, 117, 118, 122, 130, 132, 196, 197, 261, 267, 289 rotten meat affair, 21–24, 36, 214, 215, 217 traders (kommersanty), 39, 189 Meat-processing facility (kolbasnyi tsekh), 21, 215, 267n44 of ‘Olenevod,’ 21, 267n44 (see also OOO ‘Reindir’ (meat- processing factory and shop of ‘Olenevod’ in Lovozero)) Meat Processing Factory in Murmansk (miasokombinat), 196 Mechanisms (of discursive behaviour) covert mechanisms, 198, 202, 205 overt mechanisms, 198, 199, 205 Meeting Chibis-Vassilevskii meeting (25.10.22), 20 on net-fishing June ‘19 (in Lovozero; in Revda), 255 Putin-Chibis meeting (June ’22), 23 Ruusalep in Lovozero meeting (27.02.19), 96 Shestak with Veterans meeting (15.03.19), 91
358
INDEX
Meta-idiom, 127, 128, 157, 187 Mi-8 (helicopter), 74, 76, 160 Migrant, 18, 24 labour migrants, 24, 165, 216, 295 Migration crosswise migration (poperek), 275 directionality, 276, 277 latitudinal migration, 275, 277 meridional migration, 275 routes, 54, 116, 158, 160, 269, 275 treks, 281 Military cooperation with the military, 68 detachments (in Lovozero Raion, voinskie chasti), 62 garrisons, 103 vs. herders tensions, 62–73 Military Industrial Complex (VPK), 62, 71, 165 poaching, 63, 68, 83, 289 sports games, 68, 292 Mimidova, Ol’ga (teacher Northern College), 122n42 Mining-processing complex, 18, 20, 61, 75, 76n16, 99, 113, 137, 146, 148, 155, 160, 195n7, 209, 218, 261, 265, 271, 290, 291 Complex OAO Appatit in Kirovsk- Appatiti, 75–78 Limited Company ‘Lovozero mining-processing Complex’ (Obshestvo Ogranichennoi Otvetstvenostiu ‘Lovozerskii Gorno-Obogatitel’niy Kombinat, OOO Lovozerskii GOK), 19n11 OOO Lovozerskii GOK in Revda, 216 Minister Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology (Yokubauskas), 96, 97
Minister of Natural Resources of RF (Kobylkin), 102 Regional Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology (Ruusalep), 96, 101, 110, 115 Regional Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology (Smirnov), 75, 78, 86, 87, 91, 129, 158 Regional Minister of Property Relations (Minkina), 212 Vice-Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology (Alkhimchikov), 75, 78 Ministerstvo investitsii, razvitiia predprinimatel’stva i rybnogo khoziaistva Murmanskoi oblasti, 35n21 Ministry Federal Ministry of Natural Resources (Minpriroda), 85n23, 108, 117 Ministry of Agriculture, Regional, 35, 250, 255 Ministry of Investments, Entrepreneurial Development, and Fisheries of Murmansk Region (see Ministerstvo investitsii, razvitiia predprinimatel’stva i rybnogo khoziaistva Murmanskoi oblasti) Minkina, Victoria (Regional Minister, On ‘lighter’ Arctic Hectare procedure), 212 Mitrany, David (on ‘peasant victories’), 4, 280 Monchegorsk (city), 86, 87, 128, 129, 144 Moose ‘maternity ward,’ 108, 109 wild reindeer and moose (bans, hunting), 53, 88, 93, 95, 107, 108
INDEX
Morality, 89 vs. legislation, 89 Morozov, Viacheslav (Head of Murmanskstat), 202, 206 Moscow Post (e-newspaper), 76 Motif, 60, 61, 74, 114, 120, 123, 127, 130, 152, 287 ‘wild reindeer’ motif, 123 Municipal Formation (munitsipal’noe obrazovanie, MO), 18n9, 81, 81n21 Municipality (Raion), vii, 1, 9, 40 Municipal Unitary Enterprise (MUP), 16, 35, 41, 229 Munozero helicopter crash, 74, 79, 165 tragedy, 75 Munozero (Lake), 74 ‘Murmanets’ (kolkhoz, Teriberka), 141 Murmansk (city, Regional capital), vii, ix, 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, 17, 18, 23, 24n13, 33, 34, 35n21, 36, 37, 40–42, 44–47, 51–170, 52n1, 85n24, 90n28, 90n29, 102n36, 196, 245, 257n39, 258, 261, 272, 290 Murmansk-140, 63, 65, 67 (see also Gremikha (naval base); Ostrovnoi (CATF)) Murmansk Experimental Reindeer Husbandry Station (MOOS), 37, 41 Murmanskii vestnik (daily newspaper, Murmansk), 106, 123, 129, 131, 143, 151, 247 Murmansk Region, vii, 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 14, 17, 18, 34, 37, 40–42, 44, 46, 51–170, 183–295, 307, 314 Murmanskstat, 17, 17n8, 37, 37n24, 202, 203, 206 Murmansk Transport Node (Port and Railway Node), 156 Mushrooms, 66, 267, 277
359
Mustonen, Tero (on Atlantic salmon fishing in the Ponoi, on poaching), 73, 80, 111, 127n49, 251 MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 137 N Nadezhdina, Vera (journalist, LP), 62, 67, 90, 108, 109, 289 on military poaching, Gremikha, 67 on ‘moose birthing place,’ BZRK Affair, 108 Nagovitsina, Elena (on cooperative ‘indivisible fund’), 199 Narrative, 61, 99, 99n34, 111, 118, 120, 127, 136, 139, 197, 273 counter-narrative, 109 ‘National,’ 25n14, 120, 156, 166, 210, 215, 215n18, 250, 250n38, 251, 310 ‘Nationalities,’ 25n14, 222–224 National Northern Lyceum, 122n42 National projects, 21, 22, 217 ‘Need-and-misery’ (discursive genre, Berg-Nordlie), 118 Nelson and Blomley (on game- resource distribution in African countries), 232 Nenets AO (Autonomous Okrug), 186 descendants of Komi/Nenets, 222 ‘Komified’ Nenets, 19, 25n14, 90n29, 113, 114, 166, 169, 221–223, 234–236, 254 Numerically-small people (of the North, MNS), 25n14 Komi/Nenets immigration, 55, 269, 269n46, 308 ‘success story’ (Golovnev and Osherenko; Zuev), 5, 186n3
360
INDEX
Nets mesh-size of nets, 244 ‘net controversy,’ 254 nylon thread nets (koreiki), 244 regulations for use of net, 244, 254 traditional use of net, 235, 251, 255 use-of-net controversy, 255 Netting, 235, 244, 249, 250, 253, 256, 260, 266 New Economic Policy (NEP), 51 ‘New Russians’ (novye russkie), 87 Nikolaev, Valerii (journalist, LP), 155, 239n29, 246, 254 on abolishing Sam’ Sobbar, 154, 255 on Council of Representatives, 240n31, 246 on regulations for net-fishing, 253, 254 on subsidies for obshchiny, 246 Niurov, Sazon (former Head of Reindeer Husbandry in ‘Tundra,’ interview in LP), 195, 195n5, 196, 274, 276, 280, 286 NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), 136, 160, 290 ‘Non-happening’ (of ‘truly private’ herding), 193 ‘Norfrys’ (reindeer-meat processing company), 46 ‘Norilsk Nickel,’ 159n70 Public Joint Stock Company ‘Mining and Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel,’ 159n70 (see also ‘Nornikel’ (mining and metallurgical company)) ‘Nornikel’ (mining and metallurgical company), 137, 156, 157, 160, 161 North Far North, viii, 4, 15n4, 131, 199n8 Russian Far North, vii, 1, 3 Northern College, 70, 122n42
‘Northerner’ (severianin), 235, 258, 258n40, 259, 295 Northerner‘s way of life, 258 Northern National College (Severnii Natsional’nyi Kolledzh), 122n42 North-South line, 59 Northwestern Federal Okrug, 75 See also NW Federal Okrug Norway, viii, 47, 52n1, 140, 154, 166–168, 233, 247, 261 Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), 166 Sápmi Section of NRK, 166 Numerically-small peoples (of the North, MNS), 25n14 NW Federal Okrug, 78, 78n18 O Obfuscation, 11, 26 bureaucratic obfuscation, 10, 11, 31, 194, 199 Observation booth (in a corral enclosure, budka), 39, 43 Obshchina/obshchiny (indigenous community) hiring of fishing companies, 240–241, 243–244, 248, 251–253, 256, 265 holders of fishing quotas and obshchina/obshchiny, 240, 244, 245, 251 rodovaia obshchina/obshchiny, 227, 229 teritorial’no-sosedskaia obshchina/ obshchiny, 33, 185, 203, 225–227 Okhotnichyi Klub BEZRK, 84 Okrug, 78, 83 Federal Okrug., 75, 78 Olenegorsk-2, 71, 72 See also Tsar’ Gorodok ‘Olenevod’ (reindeer husbandry cooperative, Krasnoshchel’e), 13, 14, 17, 18, 27, 116, 183
INDEX
Oligarch mega-oligarch, 76n17 middle oligarch, 129 Oligarchate agri-business oligarchate, 203 loyal oligarchate, 3, 24, 157 middle-range oligarchate, 83, 100, 117 post-Soviet oligarchate, 87 Oligarchic capital, 169 OOO ‘Bol’shoi Vud’iavr, 78 OOO (Limited liability companies), 203 OOO ‘Lovozerskii GOK,’ 18–20, 24, 113, 216 OOO ‘Luga-les,’ 78 OOO ‘Reindir’ (meat-processing factory and shop of ‘Olenevod’ in Lovozero), 267n44 OOSMO (NGO of the Sami of Murmansk Region), 167, 247 Open Joint-Stock Company (OAO) Appatit, 76, 77 Voronia Minerals, 144 Open Joint Stock Company (OAO) Voronia Minerals, 144 Order, 4, 26, 53, 85, 117, 131, 132, 135, 194, 209, 210, 253, 272, 311 feudal vs. modernity orders, 4, 280 operational order, 13 Order of Endorsement (Rasporiazhenie ob utverzhdenii, of STC statements), 36 Soviet order, 13, 286 Orekhova, Ekaterina (on colonization of Murman Coast; on Sami auxiliary services for Pomor fishing crews), 60, 231 Oreskov, Claus (on privatization of Kola reindeer husbandry), 193 Organization (organizatsiia)
361
agricultural organizations (sel’skokhoziaistvennye organizatsii), 32, 202 Non-profit Organization of Territorial-Neighbourhood Community of Numerically Small Sami People (Nekomercheskaia Organizatsiia Teritorial’no-Sosedskaia Obshchina Korennogo Malochislennogo Naroda Saami (NO TSO KMNS), 33 reindeer husbandry/herding organizations, 102 Sami organizations, vii, 154, 164, 166, 231 western organization, 166 Orlov A.V. (owner and Chair of Agricultural Holding Company ‘Belgrankorm’, BZRK Affair), 86, 87, 91, 92, 100, 101, 103, 129 Osherenko, G. (On NAO ‘success story’), 5 Osherenko, Gail (On salmon fishing and luxury fishing camps, (with A. Golovnev) on NAO ‘success story’), 5, 73, 111, 251 Ostrovnoi (CATF), 63–68, 71, 72, 136 See also Gremikha; Murmansk (city, Rergional capital), Murmansk-140; Ostrovnoi (CATF); ZATO (CATF, Zakrytoe administratyvno- territorial’noe obrazovanie) ‘Outsiders,’ 10, 41, 52, 53, 60–62, 67, 83, 84, 87–89, 94, 95, 99, 103, 104, 106, 108, 109, 113, 117, 118, 120, 122, 124–126, 131, 135, 156, 163, 198, 276, 285, 311, 315 narratives, 61
362
INDEX
P Pail (measure for potatoes, vedro), 208 ‘Pamiati Lenina’ (‘In Memory of Lenin’), 37, 195 Pana Hills (Panskie tundry), 143 ‘Panopticon vision’ (Foucault), 279 Parcelling out land (mezhevanie), 210 Parka, 60 knee-length parka (malitsa), 60 Parts (of Murmansk Region) eastern parts, 92 reindeer-husbandry parts, 14, 18, 137 road parts, 270 roadless parts, 82, 162, 213, 270 western parts, 93, 231 Pastures, 41, 44, 122, 131, 143, 148, 159, 206, 231 winter pastures, 54, 59, 60, 116, 148, 151, 161, 164 Patriotic upbringing (patrioticheskoe vospitanie), 68–70 Pechenga Raion, 9, 34, 40, 41, 229 Pechenga Raion Administration, 16 Peripheral community, 1, 126 socio-economic sector, 13 tier, 4 Peripherality ‘true peripherality,’ 54 decentralization of peripherality, 2 gradient, 164, 165 limits of peripherality, 98, 100, 111, 113 scaling of peripherality, 164 selectively de-centralized (‘liberated’) peripherality, 136 threshold of peripherality, 53, 71, 83, 118, 136, 142, 145, 149, 151, 162, 169, 216, 253, 309 Peripheralization, 52 second peripheralization, 52
Periphery affiliated periphery, 262 centre-periphery tensions, 2, 315 extended periphery (of brigades, ‘affiliated members’), 266 extreme periphery, 1, 2, 253 remote periphery (field of vision), 2 Pettersen, Trude (journalist, Barents Observer, on Munozero crash), 79, 89n27 PhosAgro (Group), 75–79, 76n16, 76n17 See also FosAgro (Group) Piatka (river), 74n12 ‘Piatka’ (tourist camp), 74, 74n13, 76, 83 Platinoid (or deposits), 147 Platinum concentrate (production), 147 Fedorova Tundra platinum Project, 137, 148–151, 165 ore deposits in Fedorova Tundra, 146 platinum-metal ores in the Voronia Basin, 143 Poachers city poachers, 67, 87, 94, 97, 119–120, 124, 128, 131, 133, 140–141 military poachers, 128 urban poachers, 124, 131, 140 Poaching external poaching, 141, 279 ‘illegal taking’ vs. ‘poaching,’ 97, 125, 163 internal poaching, 88, 124, 135, 140 military, 63, 83, 128, 289 Polanyi, Karl (On substantive/ formalized property), 3, 191, 308 Police, 68, 97, 100, 120n41 reindeer police (Artieva), 290
INDEX
See also ROVD; UVD (Police Department, Upravlenie Vnutrennykh Del) Polikarpov, Nikolai (economic analyst, on Munozero crash), 76 ‘Polius’ (company, Kerimov), 150 Polmos (corral enclosure), 39, 157, 283 Pomor fishing teams, 231, 251 sea-fishing, 251, 268 Pomor (people), 251 Ponoi (river), 59, 73, 107, 109, 127n49, 163, 238, 249 right bank of Ponoi (pravoberezh’e Ponoia), 59, 84, 107 Ponoi (village, on Barents Sea coast), 64, 136 Population (of wild reindeer) eastern population, 102n36, 106 Karelian population, 102n36 Komi-Arkhangel’sk population, 102n36 Viat-Kama population, 102n36 western population, 92, 102n36 Porosozero (corral enclosure), 39 Postanovlenie 160 2012 (On subsidies for obshchiny KMNS), 219, 245n34 Postanovlenie 411 2021 (On subsidies for KMNS), 185, 219 Post-Soviet, 3, 5, 12, 13, 20, 23, 28, 29, 37, 38, 42, 43n30, 45, 46, 62, 87, 106, 122, 124, 125, 136, 142, 146n62, 187, 199, 200, 203, 211, 212, 219, 221, 261, 271, 275, 279, 286, 287, 308, 309 Potatoes, 207–209, 265–267 Power centre of power, viii, 1, 2, 51, 170 high-power interests, 169, 232, 253
363
pinnacle of power, 2, 51, 84, 151, 160 power-pyramid, 51, 83, 160, 232 (see also ‘Vertikal’ vlasti (vertical of power)) regional power, ix, 248 supreme power, 2, 36, 135, 136, 139, 157, 165, 169, 270, 280, 309–311, 314 vertical of power, 2, 4, 13, 111, 113, 117, 118, 142, 254 (see also ‘Vertikal’ vlasti (vertical of power)) Pravila (rules, regulations) for fishing, 231–235, 244, 245, 249, 250 for hunting, 119 Predation, 30, 71, 88, 97 Predators animal predators, 120 human predators, 120 ‘two-legged predators,’ 120 ‘Predatory’ (image of outsiders), 95 Prigozhin, Evgenii (oligarch, owner of Wagner Group), 98, 311 Private ear-marks, 283 farms, 202, 203, 206, 207 herders, 183n1, 188, 193, 201n11, 228 herds, 30, 44, 124, 192, 200, 207, 208, 228, 230, 285 personal/private reindeer, 187, 190–192, 201, 201n11, 203, 205, 205n12, 207, 208, 228–230, 242, 244, 264, 267, 282, 288, 308–310 reindeer, 5, 15, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 43n30, 44, 45, 126, 162, 185, 186, 188, 189, 192, 219, 230, 232, 308
364
INDEX
Private-in-the collective, 4, 15, 20, 30, 34, 43–45, 58, 126, 190, 227, 242, 257, 259, 260, 262, 278, 308 Professional School 26, 122, 122n42 See also Northern College; PU-26 Project ‘Barrick Gold’/‘Rostekh’ platinoid mining-processing project, 146 ‘Boliden’/‘Voronia Minerals’ gold mining project, 141, 145, 148, 149 Fedorova Tundra project, 137, 146, 148–152, 155, 161, 165 industrial projects, 89, 136–161, 165 NKVD Project No 509, 136, 141, 160 ‘Nornikel’/‘Rosatom’ lithium mining-processing project, 137, 156 Promyshlennoe rybolovstvo, 234 Property new kind of property, 190 new property type, 190 risk-proof property, 190 relations, 4, 187 PU-26, 122n42 See also Northern College ‘Puaz’ (‘Reindeer,’ obshchina), 240 Putevki, 238 Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 23, 62, 66, 76n17, 84, 99, 128, 150n66, 167 meeting with Chibis (June ’22), 23 plea to Putin from citizens of Ostrovnoi, 64 Q Quota application for a fishing quota (zaiavka), 247
‘determined’ quotas, 106, 239, 239n29 discussions of quotas, 245 fishing quota, 225, 239, 240, 242, 245–247, 251, 252, 264, 265 fishing quota distribution of 2011, 246 fresh-water fishing quota, 239, 239n29, 243, 244, 248 ‘non-determined’ quotas, 239 quota holders, 241–244, 252 sea-fishing quotas, 239–241, 240n30, 244, 248, 252, 253 R Raids (reidi), 134 Railway Monchegorsk-Apatity (railway-line to Kolmiavr lithium site), 160 Murmansk-St. Peterburg railway- line, 104 trans-peninsular railway (NKVD Project 509), 137 Raion, 1, 9, 53, 195, 310 Raion Party Committee (Raikom), 45, 196, 275, 278, 286 Rangifer tarandus, 102 Rasmussen (on ten brigades in ‘Tundra’), 38 Recipes (for avoiding a post-sovkhoist apocalypse) ‘elimination of alien evil’ recipes, 286, 288 ‘ethic revival’ recipes, 286, 288 ‘return of supreme intervention’ recipes, 286 Recruitment problems with, 68, 192 of reindeer herders, 162, 191 Red Book
INDEX
Red Book of Murmansk Region, 85, 92, 95, 111, 289, 314 Red Book of the Russian Federation, 85, 102 ‘Red Trackers’ (‘Krasnye sledopyty’), 69 Regionals, 95, 114, 115, 118, 121–123, 126, 127, 131–133, 135 Register (discursive) analytical register, 33–35 central bureaucratic register, 31 discursively ‘sayable’ register, 114, 115 local bureaucratic register, 31 stylistic register, 31 vernacular register, 31 ‘Regulated territory’ (for ‘Arctic Hectare’ plots), 212 Reindeer female reindeer (vazhenka), 189, 280, 284 fence, 55, 121, 122, 130, 189, 269, 281 ‘individual reindeer’ (individual’nye oleni), 32, 188, 203, 205 January reindeer, 37 March reindeer, 37 ‘paper reindeer’ (bumazhnye oleni), 42, 197 personal reindeer (lichnye oleni), 31, 32, 188, 189, 203, 205 private-in-the-collective reindeer, 15, 30, 33, 34, 58 semi-domesticated reindeer, 16, 94, 116, 132, 134, 183, 185, 187 ‘truly private’ reindeer, 187, 194, 201, 201n11, 203, 211, 229, 230, 232, 233, 262 unmarked reindeer, 208, 284 whole-eared reindeer (tseloushnye oleni), 278, 281, 282, 284 Reindeer fragment, 130
365
designated for harvesting (zaboinii kusok), 189 Reindeer husbandry absence of reindeer husbandry specialists, 196 campaign (olenevodcheskoe meropriiatie), 197, 272 ‘commuting’ reindeer husbandry, 57, 163, 165, 166, 183–295, 307 divining the future of reindeer husbandry, 285 hyper-extensive reindeer husbandry, 163 ‘urban’ reindeer husbandry, 45, 53–62, 166, 183–295 Reindeer meat, 21, 42, 63, 66, 68, 214, 215, 217, 222, 227, 262, 266, 267, 287 market, 215 ‘Reindir’ (meat-processing facility), 267n44 Reizvikh, Andrei (regional oligarch, Head of SKhPK ‘Olenevod), 58, 67, 87, 88, 95, 101, 103, 104, 112, 123, 289 Rekreatsionnoe rybolovstvo, 234 Relocation (to Lovozero), 165 ‘Remote villages’ (Krasnoshchel’ie, Kanevka, Sosnovka, otdalennye poselki, otdalenka), 56, 268 Report budget reports, 19, 26, 28 of the Federal State Statistical Service for Murmansk Region (Murmanskstat), 17 Residence, 52, 55, 57, 59, 90, 122, 138n53, 139, 165, 206, 209, 235, 238, 244, 268, 271 Resource non-renewable resources, 52 renewable resources, 53, 79, 82, 114, 123, 126, 227, 242
366
INDEX
Responsible users (of tundra resources), 114 Revda (town), 18, 20, 21, 61, 72, 81, 99, 100, 113, 137, 149, 164, 165, 195n7, 213, 216, 217, 238, 255, 256, 257n39, 261, 265, 265n41, 266, 271, 272, 290, 296, 307 Municipal Formation Town Settlement of Revda (Munitsipal’noe obrazovanie gorodskoe poselenie Revda), 18n9 Revdozero (Lake), 216, 256 Rhetoric anti-Western rhetoric, 112 Rhetorical device, 285 trope, 285 Riazanova, Tat’ana (journalist, MV), 115, 131, 132 interview with Startsev, 131 interview with Strakhov, 131 interview with Vostriakov, 115 Ries, Nancy (on ‘litanies and laments’), 136, 139 Rifles, 119 Rights, 5, 20, 59, 62, 73, 74n12, 79, 81, 82, 84–91, 95, 99, 101, 107, 114–116, 119, 123, 125, 128, 132, 140, 143, 147, 148, 154, 158, 160, 163, 164, 189, 193, 204, 212, 215, 224–226, 231, 232, 235, 238, 241, 242, 249–251, 254, 255, 264, 274, 278 herders’ fishing rights, 257–259 Rikkinen, Kalevi (On fire-wood for Sami households), 268 Rippas, Boris (On Sami auxiliary services for Pomor sea-fishing teams), 268
Road, 270 part of Murmansk Region, 272 Roadless, 82, 162, 213, 270 of forest-tundra, 162 of Lovozero Raion, 213 part of the Murmansk Region, 82 to SE of Lovozero, 270 Roadlessness, 141, 279 Robinson and Kassam (On Sami reindeer husbandry during perestroika), 5, 193 Rosatom, 157 ‘Rosatom’ (state corporation), 137, 156, 157 ‘Rostekh’ (state corporation), 146, 149–153, 155, 161 Round-up, 37, 45, 57, 60, 133, 208, 209, 238, 275, 276, 281, 282, 284, 308 Rovaniemi (city), viii, 149 ROVD, 72, 98 Rozonov, A.S. (on Sami being primarily fishermen), 60, 242 Rut period, 58 Ruusalep, D.A. (Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region), 96, 101, 115 Rybachii Peninsula, 9, 41 reindeer husbandry on Rybachii Peninsula, 9 Rybolovnii turizm, 234 S Saamskii Skhod, 237 Salaried time, 262, 263 of active brigade members, 263 Salmon angling, 52, 73–135, 211 angling and fishing camps, 73, 111, 147, 232, 233, 256 Atlantic salmon, 314
INDEX
fishing, 81, 96, 238, 251 fishing/hunting ventures, 84, 96 net fishing, 249 rivers, 79 runs (June), 73 salmon-fishing licenses(putevki), 238 wild-salmon angling, 52, 73 Salmon-angling and hunting camps, 52, 73–135 Sami Day International Sami Day (6 Feb.), 255 ‘Sami Fairy-Tale’ (ethnographic complex), 25 Sami, Saami Assembly (‘Sam’ Sobbar’), 154, 155 émigré Russian Sami opposition, 168 4th Sami Congress (Nov. 2018), 238 Indigenous Numerically-Small People Sami (Korennoi malochislennyi narod Saami, KMNS), 236, 239, 241, 253 International Sami Day (6 Febr), 255 Sami capital of Murmansk Region, 18 Sami Council, 167, 231, 247 ‘Sami gathering’ (meeting), 237 (see also Saamskii Skhod; Sarnep mine baiias) Sami heroes (of the Afghan War), 237 Sami indigenous people, 114, 203, 233, 239 Sami village (‘Sam’ ‘Siyt,’ obshchina), 36, 138, 158, 167, 225, 227, 249n36 ‘Sami Youth Generation’ (‘Sam’ nurr puldegk,’ obshchina), 240n30
367
Western Sami organizations, 166 ‘Sam’ Sobbar (Sami Assembly) abolishing of ‘Sam’ Sobbar (Dec. ’22), 154 Sarnep mine baiias, 237 Sashenkova, Liudmila (journalist, On harvested reindeer in ‘Tundra’), 267 Savirskii, Yurii (On sovkhoz vs. personal/private reindeer), 205n12 ‘Sawing off’ (‘taking a cut,’ ‘otpylivanie’), 36, 44 ‘Sayable’ (discourse), 159 cover narratives, 102 Scheller, Elisabeth, 154, 231 on preservation of Kola Sami language, 231 on ‘silent Sami majority,’ 154 School (adj.), 294 School (n.), 69, 198, 216, 294 Scott, James, 4, 74, 112, 119, 187, 191 on ‘hidden transcripts,’ 112, 187 on ‘silent resistance,’ 191 Security, 146, 184, 193, 204, 294 Sedentarization, 56, 279 Selective de-centralization, 2, 13–17, 23, 51, 187, 194, 215, 280, 311 Selin, A. (former Vice-Governor of Murmansk Region), 146 Selivestrova and Molodtsova (journalists, KP, on Kovtun re. Munozero tragedy), 76, 78 Sel’skokhoziaistvenniy Proizvidstvenniy Kooperativ Olenevodchesko-Promislovoe Khoziaistvo Malochislennykh Narodov Severa (SKhPK OPKh MNS), 33, 200n9, 202, 222, 225 ‘Olenevod,’ 222, 225
368
INDEX
Sel‘skokhozyaystvennyy proizvodstvennyy kooperativ (SKhPK), 16, 16n6, 18, 28–30, 32, 34, 35, 38n26, 40, 41, 55, 86, 88, 90, 91, 95, 107, 109, 118, 128, 140, 144–146, 185, 200n9, 202, 205, 216, 221, 224, 225, 228, 238, 240n30, 266, 266n42, 267, 267n43, 273, 279, 288, 314 ‘Tundra,’ 16, 18, 32, 34, 40, 41, 55, 86, 91, 107, 118, 144–146, 202, 216, 221, 228, 238, 240n30, 266, 266n42, 267, 267n43, 273, 279, 314 Sem’ostrov’ie (corral enclosure), 39 Semiotic communal semiotic resignation, 191 phenomenon, 191 resignation, 191, 192, 205 Sentiments pro-Soviet sentiments, 5 pro-sovkhoz sentiments, 211, 273 Serebrianka (river), 138 Serebrianskoe highway, 140 Hydro-electrical Complex, 137, 145 Reservoirs, 138 Shachin, Viacheslav, 214, 259 (on ‘Arctic Hectare’), 22, 165, 210, 211, 213, 216, 218, 259, 310 Shantambal (Krasnoshchel’ie, obshchina), 225 Share (pai), 200 fund (paevoi fond), 200 Shebut, Galina (Head of Village Settlement Administration, journalist, LP), 90, 96, 109, 112, 155, 156 on BZRK Affair, 23, 106 on Fedorova Tundra Project, 148–150
‘Shest’ sotok (600 sq.m.), 207 Shestak, Aleksandr (former Head Lovozero Raion, Deputy in Regional Duma), 88, 90–92, 94, 95, 110, 112, 123, 255, 265n41 on political significance of Red Book, 91, 94, 107 Shirmer, Ol’ga (journalist LP, on Komi protests against fishing privileges for KMNS), 62, 121, 249 Shlapentokh, Vladimir (On contemporary Russia as a feudal society), 4, 280 Shtockmann (Off-shore Gas deposits), 156 Siberia, viii, 4, 234, 243, 269 ‘Side’/‘Wing’ (of ‘Tundra’ grazing range) Left ‘Side’/‘Wing’ (levaia storona/ krylo), 274 Right ‘Side’/‘Wing’ (pravaia storona/krylo), 274 Sikir (Lake), 256 ‘Silent resistance’ (Scott), 191 ‘Simple language’ (prostorech’e), 198, 199 Skomorokhov, Sergei (former Vice- Governor of Murmansk Region), 75, 79 Slave master, 103 ‘Slaves’ (rabi), 285 Smirnov, Aleksei (Regional Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology), 75, 78 Smirnov, Sergei (businessman, Monchegorsk), 86, 87, 91, 129, 158 Snowmobile ‘foreign snowmobile revolution,’ 46 changing migrational directionality, 276
INDEX
revolution, 46 Soviet-made snowmobile (‘Buran’), 46 Social downgrading (of herders), 264 Socialism command socialism, 191, 194 post-socialism, 3 Society, 258 Voluntary Society for Assistance of the Army, Air Force, and Navy of Russia (Dobrovol’noe obshchestvo sodeistviia armii, aviatsii i flota Rossii) (see also DOSAAF (DOSAAF Rossii)) Soiuz veteranov, 90 Soloshenko, V.V. (legal advisor of BEZRK), 88, 96 Solovetskii Monastery (GULAG camp, Solovetskii Monastir, Solovki), 52 Sosnovka (village), 10n2, 18, 38, 42, 55–57, 59, 64, 104, 123, 155, 213, 238, 268, 268n45, 270, 271, 307 Sovet deputatov, 24, 113, 210 Sovet veteranov, 210 Soviet of Deputies, 45, 113, 210 (see also Sovet deputatov) Sami Soviets, 155 of Veterans, 210, 276, 282 (see also Sovet veteranov) Soviet (adj.) ‘meta soviet,’ 20, 83, 84, 169, 209, 309, 311 Navy, 63 Soviet Union, viii, 2, 5, 18, 21, 52n1, 73, 84, 114, 184, 217, 273 ‘Revda, a little SU,’ 21, 217, 292 Sovinaia (river), 84, 91, 109, 110 Sovkhoism vs. capitalism, 84, 162, 211, 233, 236, 260
369
‘uncontrolled sovkhoism ,’ 163n71 Sovkhoist, 4, 5, 61, 126, 169, 184, 187, 192–195, 211, 220, 233, 242, 259, 260, 264, 266, 285, 287, 290, 291, 309, 311 anti-sovkhoist, 61 Sovkhoz, 54, 128, 129, 200, 308 Sovkhoz (adj.) bread, 266, 267 milk, 266, 266n42, 267 Sovkina, Valentina (Sami activist, émigré Sami opposition leader), 154, 168, 169 ‘SPARK Avia’ (helicopter company), 76 Special military operation, vii, 157, 166, 253, 292 ‘Special military operation’ See also SVO (spetsial’naia voennaia operatsiia) Sportyvnoe rybolovstvo, 234 Ssorin-Chaikov, Nikolai (on ‘endless deferral’), 4, 156 Stalin death and Project No 509, 136, 137, 141, 160 mass collectivization, 51, 280 Stalinist period, 51 Startsev, Viktor (Head of SkhPK ‘Tundra’), 86, 118, 119, 121–123, 127–129, 131, 161, 288 Statistical Office of Murmansk Region, 37 See also Murmanskstat Statistics raion statistics, 18–34, 61, 265 regional statistics, 18–34, 42, 185 reindeer husbandry statistics, 9–47, 162, 185
370
INDEX
Stepchenko (Vice-Director of Regional Development of the St Peterburg Institute of Forestry Management, 78 Stigmatization (of herders), 264 Stock-breeding, 12, 20, 26, 202, 204 production (proizvodstvo produktsii zhivotnovodstva), 11 Strakhov, Valerii (Deputy Regional Duma), 131 Strategy, vii, 101, 118, 169, 191, 214, 253, 285, 310 of Raion development, 24 ‘Students’ herd’ (uchebnoe stado), 122 Subsidy committee for granting and distribution of subsidy, 245n33, 246 for cooperatives, 35, 42, 45, 198, 230, 263 federal subsidy, 42, 61, 209, 218, 309 for KMNS, 245n34, 264, 265 for obshchiny, 230, 245, 245n34, 246, 264, 265 per head (of reindeer), 35, 42, 124, 198, 230 regional subsidy, 42, 45, 61, 127, 209, 218, 309 ‘Subsidy budget’ (dotatsionnyi biudzhet), 209 Sukhoi Log (gold deposits site, Irkutsk Region), 150 Super-addressee, 287 ‘Svoikh ne brosaem' (‘We do not let down our people’), 166 SVO (spetsial’naia voennaia operatsiia), 166–169, 218, 292, 313 Sweden, viii, 144, 167, 168, 233, 247 Swedish
company (Krasnoshchel’ie hopeful deal), 144 meat-processing company, 46 (see also ‘Norfrys’ (reindeer-meat processing company) Symbolism ‘cover symbolism,’ 102, 108 tactical symbolism, 103 Synonymous, 204, 230 Synonymy, 230 Syroechkovskii, Evgenii (On wild reindeer), 9n1, 93 Syrota, Vladimir (former Head of ‘Tundra,’ former Head of Reindeer-Husbandry in ‘Olenevod’), 58, 118 episode, 59 System, 1–3, 11, 40, 43–45, 52, 54, 55, 61, 68, 71, 80, 84, 103, 111, 121–124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 138, 162, 163, 184, 187, 190, 191, 194, 196–199, 204, 210, 229, 230, 253, 287, 288, 308 electric grid system, 59, 141, 272 T Taboo and euphemism, 285 self-tabooing, 285 Tax income tax, 10 income tax transfers, 25 Tax-office (nalogovaia inspektsiia), 10 Team, 17, 57, 68, 107, 127n49, 131, 140, 148, 158, 158n69, 231, 251, 262, 268, 272, 278, 282, 307, 308 herding team, 20, 57, 58, 62, 71, 117, 119, 134, 148, 188, 190, 229, 240n30, 262, 264, 270, 272, 273, 307
INDEX
Tennberg, Monica (On the Barents Region), 184n2 Teriberka (Liquified Gas Plant), 156 Teriberka (village), 140, 141, 141n54 Territorial land-use, 82 territorial-neighbourhood communities (territorial’no- sosedskie obshchiny, TSO), 185, 226–229 Territory for agricultural use, 116 Forestry Fund territory, 80 of Municipal Formation, 16, 81 Protected and Special Regime territories, 80 Raion territory, 21 reindeer husbandry territory, 15, 87, 106, 116, 137, 161–166, 281 remote territory, 110 special regime territories, 80 ‘Tundra’s’ territory, 38, 71 Terskii Raion, 74n12, 79, 82, 92, 93, 102 Text, 10, 15, 16, 18, 24, 26, 31, 34, 35, 40, 43, 86, 127n49, 128, 139, 140, 167, 189, 193, 223, 236, 286, 291, 295 meta-text, 136 Theft ‘culture of theft’ (Herzfeld), 4 ‘institutionalized theft’ (Creed), 4, 191 from a private person vs. from the cooperative (Humphrey), 125 in a reindeer husbandry culture (Paine), 124n47 Threshold (of top-power interests) above the threshold, 53, 169, 216, 242 below the threshold, 83, 111, 149, 241, 279
371
level, 83, 111 peripheral threshold, 83, 136, 145, 151 of peripherality/peripherality threshold, 53, 71, 83, 118, 136, 142, 149, 162, 169, 216, 253, 309 ‘under-the-threshold,’ 83, 118, 136, 145, 162, 253, 309 Tiukavin, Aleksei (M. Kovtun’s closest associate and ViceGovernor), 95 Tkachev, Valerii (journalist, editor LP), 20, 21, 25, 38, 58, 95, 96, 100, 105, 106, 108, 109, 115, 157, 159, 161, 195, 197, 274–276, 283, 286 on BZRK Hunting Club Affair, 85, 95–96, 100, 106, 108–109, 115 on Chibis-Lovozero Raion meetings, 20 on Chibis-Vassilevskii meeting, 20 on counting at Lovozero Corral, 275 on counting at Polmos Corral, 283 interview with Sazon Niurov, 274, 276, 286 on lithium mining project, 156 on number of brigades, 38, 275, 276 on sovkhoz milk, 266n40 on strategies for Raion development, 24 on wild reindeer controversy, 95, 115 ‘To Live in the North!’ (Na Severe zhit’!), 22, 165 Toporozero (Lake), 134 ‘Total social institution’ (Humphrey, Anderson), 54, 184, 274
372
INDEX
Tourism exclusive tourism, 53, 59, 71, 83 fishing tourism, 234, 265 hunting tourism, 52, 59, 88, 135 late 19 c. tourism, 268 salmon angling tourism, 52, 77 vs. herders, 52 tundra tourism, 52, 53, 71, 211, 225 Town one-mine town (monogorod), 52, 233, 307 town-forming enterprises (gradoobrazuyushchie predpriyatiya), 10n2, 18–20, 36n23, 54, 155, 209, 216, 218 Tradition, 3, 155, 162, 165, 252, 255, 264, 294, 295 Traditional fishing practices, 231, 235 forms of land-use, 90, 156, 201, 210, 222, 226, 227, 251 Traditionality, 74, 227, 234–236, 242, 243, 252, 254, 256 ‘calibration’ of traditionality, 234 Traditsionnoe rybolovstvo, 234 ‘Tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin), 126, 284, 288, 310 community avoidance of tragedy, 288 Troops Border Guard troops, 113 commando troops Lovozero training, 69 Trope Cold War tropes, 70 rhetorical trope, 285 ‘Truly private’ property, 187, 192, 193, 208 reindeer, 30, 34, 187, 192 reindeer husbandry, 34, 126, 202, 203, 207, 208, 211, 214, 230, 232, 233
Tsar’ Gorodok, 62, 72 TSO (territorial-neighbourhood obshchina), 226–229 Tumannii (village), 140 Tundra ‘open tundra’(otkrytaia tundra, lisaia tundra), 59, 162, 163, 259, 280 Bol’shezemelskaia Tundra, 231 tundra-camp, 45, 52, 57, 67, 163, 196, 263 tundra-connected community, 53, 83, 88, 114, 120, 284 tundra-dependent community, 143, 162 tundra-hut (domik), 58 ‘Tundra’ (reindeer husbandry cooperative, SKhPK) director, directors of ‘Tundra,’, 86, 278, 279 organizational structure of ‘Tundra,’, 193 Reindeer Husbandry Department of ‘Tundra’, 274, 280 Tundra villages, 10n2, 18, 38, 55–57, 59, 123, 138, 138n52, 213, 221, 249, 268n45, 270, 272, 279, 295, 307 liquidation of tundra vs., 56, 59, 138n52, 221, 270, 279 Two-tier model of governance, 309, 310 U Ukraine invasion of Ukraine, 5, 22, 46, 112, 166, 198, 215, 313 war in Ukraine, vii, viii, 1, 22, 24, 46, 47, 158, 166, 169, 231, 253, 292, 309, 314 Ukrainians, 24, 154, 215, 216 ethnic Ukrainians, 24, 215
INDEX
United Nations, 168, 169 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues at the U.N. (Sovkina elected in), 168 Unsayability, 22, 190, 198, 205 ‘Unsayable’ (discourse), 95, 99, 107, 110, 114, 115, 117, 119, 124, 126, 127, 141, 199, 205, 236, 241, 252, 254, 284, 289 Urochishte Kolmiavr (Landmark Kolmiavr), 158 Ustinova, Ekaterina (Archival Office- Lovozero), 138 UVD (Police Department, Upravlenie Vnutrennykh Del), 67 V ‘V sovremennykh realiiakh’ (Sechko on SVO), 47 Vaccination (of reindeer), 37 Vacuity, 192 referential vacuity, 192 Valamina (old-timer, on food-supplies in Ostrovnoi), 64, 66 Varzuga (river), 74n12 Vassilevskii, Evgenii (Director Lovozero GOK), 20 Vatonena, Liubov (Sami entrepreneur and politician), 63, 70, 139 Vehicle, 39, 45, 46, 68, 130, 134, 257, 261, 262, 270, 272–274, 307, 308 all-purpose track vehicle (vezdekhod), 39 Verenikin (Head of the Department of Forestry Management of the NW Federal Okrug), 78 Verifier of private reindeer (schetchik chastnogo pogolovia), 189, 282
373
‘Vertikal’ vlasti (vertical of power), 2, 4, 13, 51, 111, 113, 117, 118, 142, 254 Vet, 19, 57, 221, 224, 274 vet-technician (zootekhnik), 19, 57, 221, 224, 274, 282 Veterans Club of Veterans (Klub veteranov), 113 Council of Veterans (Sovet veteranov), 146n62, 210 Open Letter of the Council of Veterans, 192n4 Union of Veterans (Soiuz veteranov), 90 Veterans of Labour (Veteran truda), 145, 222–224 Veterinary control, 23, 189, 214, 216 Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control (Rossel’khoznadzor, Rossel’khoz), 23, 114, 121, 123, 131, 214 Vezdekhod (All-Purpose Track Vehicle) broken-down vezdekhods, 130, 277 co-driver (‘driver’s mate’, naparnik), 274 driver (vezdekhodchik), 273 freightvezdekhods, 160 private vezdekhods of ‘tundra boss,’ 278 repairs, 262 rusting away vezdekhods, 130 track, 273, 307 transporting fish/berries, 278 ‘Victimization’ Sami victimization, 70 by poaching/poachers, 118, 119, 140 ‘victimization of the Sami’ theme, 63
374
INDEX
Village remote villages, 42n28, 56–59, 67, 99, 112, 123, 133, 155, 213, 222, 233–235, 238, 254, 268, 271, 272 tundra villages, 10n2, 18, 38, 55, 57, 59, 123, 138, 138n52, 213, 221, 249, 268n45, 270, 272, 279, 295, 307 VillageSettlement (Municipal Administration), 210 Village Settlement, sel’skoe poselenie, 155, 210 Visibilities, 14, 25, 62, 74, 168, 219 post-Soviet visibilities, 62 Vision panopticon vission, 279 restricted vission, 279 VK (VKontakte, e-forum), 64, 67, 167, 169n74 Vladimirova, Vladislava, 5, 158, 184, 197, 220, 273 on indigeneity in the city, 5 on share fund, 200 on socialist competition, 197 ‘Voavshess’ (Northern Lights, obshchina), 36, 225, 227, 230 Volkova, Evgeniia (journalist, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, on Sami fishing rights), 235 Volkov (Vice-Director of OOO Luga-les – a Peterburg Forestry Management company), 78 Vorga (ice/snow tundra road), 270 See also Koarrdegk Sijjt, Voroninskii Pogost ‘Voronia Minerals’ (mining-processing company), 137, 141, 144, 145, 148, 149 See also Open Joint Stock Company (OAO)
Voronia (village), 138 Voronin, Aleksei (on pre-Soviet cooperatives), 199n8 Voroninskii Pogost, 138 Vostriakov, K. (Head of Hunting Control), 110n38, 115, 133, 135 ‘Vpered’ (kolkhoz), 37 VPK (Voenno-promishlenii kompleks, Military-Industrial Complex), 62, 71, 73, 113, 165, 310 Vylegzhanin, Alexander (on the Barents Region), 184n2 W Wagner Group, 98, 311 Wagner Group Private Military Company (PMC), 311 War, vii, viii, 1, 4, 22, 24, 46, 47, 51, 68, 83, 158, 166–169, 215, 231, 253, 261, 292, 309, 313–315 Russian-Ukrainian War, 2, 166 Warden (of reindeer-herding camp, storozhi), 268 Waterproof clothing (for herders through barter with the military, khim-dim), 68 Wealth, 287 ‘Weapons of the weak’ (Scott), 74 Well-being, 162, 204, 230, 291 Whitaker, Ian (on hyper- extensivity), 55n2 White Sea Coast, 251 Cooperative ‘Belomorskii Rybak,’ 103 fishing (in connection with Reizvikh properties), 103 Pomors of the White Sea Coast (19 c. fishing), 251
INDEX
Wild reindeer controversy, 23, 53, 54, 56, 59, 84, 92, 93, 113, 115, 118, 122, 130, 136, 142, 253, 289 eastern population of wild reindeer, 102, 102n36, 106 forest sub-species of wild reindeer (lesnoi podvid dikogo olenia), 121 western population of wild reindeer, 92, 102n36 Wild-berry picking, 262 ‘Wildoes’ (wild reindeer, dikari), 121 Will, 19, 294 political will, 10, 13, 35, 142 ‘Wing’ (of ‘Tundra’) ‘Left Wing, 38, 62, 71, 140, 145, 157, 221, 275, 278, 281, 310 ‘Right Wing, 24, 38, 58, 71, 86, 129, 145, 148, 157, 158, 160, 161, 201n11, 221, 275, 281, 310, 313, 314 Winter track counting (WTC, Zimnii marshrutnyi uchet), 104–106, 108 Work history (for determining shares), 200 Y Yakutsk (4th Congress of Reindeer Herders, 2017), 14 Yamal, 96n32, 116n39, 126 Yokubauskas, V.V. (Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Murmansk Region), 96, 97 Yushkov, Iakov (Sami activist, on use-of-nets controversy), 251
375
Yuzhakov, Alexander (on sovkhoism in Yamal-Nenets O), 15 Z ‘Z’ sign (SVO), 166 ‘Z on guitar’ scandal (I. Matrekhin), 166 Zabolotskii, Oleg (Head of the Regional Committee for Fishing, on fishing quota scandal of 2011), 247 Zadornaia, Galina (journalist Lovozerskaia Pravda), 98, 102, 154, 155, 168, 235, 293 on netting ban for KMNS, 235 on Sovkina elected in UN Indigenous Forum, 168 Zaikov, Konstantin and Tat’ana Troshina (on Skolt Sami fishing), 251, 269 Zakreplennykh okhotnychykh ugodii, 105 ZAO (Closed share-holding companies), 203, 238n28 ZATO (CATF, Zakrytoe administratyvno-territorial’noe obrazovanie), 64, 64n6, 66 Zones border zones, 82 of cultural heritage, 82 with controlled regime for visiting of foreign citizens, 82 with ‘special conditions for the use of the territory,’ 82 Zuev, Sergei (on NAO ‘success story’), 5, 15, 116n39