(Post)Transformational Migration: Inequalities, Welfare State, and Horizontal Mobility [150th ed.] 9783653006513, 3653006511

Citation preview

Bd./vol. 13

Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński und Piotr W. Juchacz

Marek Nowak, PhD in sociology; lecturer at the Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University Pozna´n (Poland); specialised in Economic Sociology and sociology of social activism. Michał Nowosielski, PhD in sociology, Deputy Director of the Institute for Western Affairs, Pozna´n (Poland); research interests: Poles in Germany, ethnic and immigrant organizations, diaspora policies. www.peterlang.de

DIA 13-Nowak-261756HCA5-IM.indd 1

ISBN 978-3-631-61756-4

LANG

Perceived inequalities, such as the lack of a proper job or bad living conditions, can play the role of push factors that make people migrate. Apart from this, there are studies which focus more on relative deprivation, exacerbated by inequality, as a basic determinant of people’s mobility, and also some are focused on the influence of income inequality on migration. Such “structural conditions” are only a part of the story of migration, particularly because differences and inequalities are social facts, elements of the universal shape of modern open societies. Ultimately inequality, as more general departure point, can’t be merely an element of explanation, and it is important to remember that not only do “objective” social differences and the inequalities caused by them foster migration behaviour, but so do their social perceptions.

Marek Nowak / Michał Nowosielski (eds.) · (Post)transformational Migration

HKS 65

13

Dia-Logos

HKS 43

Dia-Logos

Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences

(Post)transformational Migration Inequalities, Welfare State, and Horizontal Mobility Marek Nowak Michał Nowosielski (eds.)

Peter Lang

Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften

01.03.11 22:31:31 Uhr

Bd./vol. 13

Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński und Piotr W. Juchacz

Marek Nowak, PhD in sociology; lecturer at the Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University Pozna´n (Poland); specialised in Economic Sociology and sociology of social activism. Michał Nowosielski, PhD in sociology, Deputy Director of the Institute for Western Affairs, Pozna´n (Poland); research interests: Poles in Germany, ethnic and immigrant organizations, diaspora policies. www.peterlang.de

DIA 13-Nowak-261756HCA5-IM.indd 1

LANG

Perceived inequalities, such as the lack of a proper job or bad living conditions, can play the role of push factors that make people migrate. Apart from this, there are studies which focus more on relative deprivation, exacerbated by inequality, as a basic determinant of people’s mobility, and also some are focused on the influence of income inequality on migration. Such “structural conditions” are only a part of the story of migration, particularly because differences and inequalities are social facts, elements of the universal shape of modern open societies. Ultimately inequality, as more general departure point, can’t be merely an element of explanation, and it is important to remember that not only do “objective” social differences and the inequalities caused by them foster migration behaviour, but so do their social perceptions.

Marek Nowak / Michał Nowosielski (eds.) · (Post)transformational Migration

HKS 65

13

Dia-Logos

HKS 43

Dia-Logos

Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences

(Post)transformational Migration Inequalities, Welfare State, and Horizontal Mobility Marek Nowak Michał Nowosielski (eds.)

Peter Lang

Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften

01.03.11 22:31:31 Uhr

(Post)transformational Migration

Dia-Logos Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński and Piotr W. Juchacz Advisory Board Karl-Otto Apel (Frankfurt am Main) Manuel Jiménez-Redondo (Valencia) Peter Kampits (Wien) Theodore Kisiel (Illinois) Hennadii Korzhov (Donetsk) Marek Kwiek (Poznań) George McLean (Washington) Evangelos Moutsopoulos (Athènes) Ewa Nowak (Poznań) Miklos Tomka (Budapest)

Bd./vol. 13

PETER LANG

Frankfurt am Main · Berlin · Bern · Bruxelles · NewYork · Oxford · Wien

Marek Nowak Michał Nowosielski (eds.)

(Post)transformational Migration Inequalities, Welfare State, and Horizontal Mobility

PETER LANG

Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

Published with the financial support of Adam Mickiewicz University (Pozna´n), Institute for Western Affairs (Pozna´n) and the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education

ISSN 1619-005X ISBN 978­3­653­00651­3 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Frankfurt am Main 2011 All rights reserved. All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. www.peterlang.de

Introduction

5

Contents Introduction. Inequalities and migration in Central and Eastern European countries (Marek Nowak, Michał Nowosielski) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 19

Part I The Problem of Welfare State, Inequalities, Migration, and Politics Marek Nowak, Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective). Why Do Central and Eastern European Societies Need More Welfare States? Alena Pařízková, Working Europeans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Guglielmo Meardi, Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Serena Romano, Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . Iveta Ķešāne, Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics: the Case of Latvian Labour Emigrants in Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bartłomiej Walczak, Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23 59 77 99 121 151

Part II The Differing Contexts of Migration Konrad Miciukiewicz, Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe: The impacts of European Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michał Nowosielski, Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ingrid Jungwirth, The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration: highly qualified migrant women in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Francesca Alice Vianello, Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine . Marta Kolankiewicz, Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

273

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

295

177 201 225 251

6

Introduction

Introduction

7

Introduction. Inequalities and migration in Central and Eastern European countries The thesis that inequities and their social consequences are among the main factors which make people leave their homes and homelands in the search of a better life is by no means a new one. Ernst Georg Ravenstein first noticed that there are legible links between migration and the will to better one’s economic position.1 The role of economic scarcity in fostering migration was especially underlined by the neoclassic theory of push factors and pull factors. Perceived inequalities, such as the lack of a proper job or bad living conditions, can play the role of push factors that make people migrate.2 Apart from this, there are studies which focus more on relative deprivation, exacerbated by inequality, as a basic determinant of people’s mobility,3 and also some are focused on the influence of income inequality on migration.4 Such “structural conditions” are only a part of the story of migration, particularly because differences and inequalities are social ________________ 1 Everett Lee, “A Theory of Migration,” Demography 1966, vol. 3, pp. 47–57, after Ernst G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 1889, vol. LII, pp. 241–301. 2 Ibidem.   3 Oded Stark and You Quiang Wang, “A theory of migration as a response to relative deprivation,” German Economic Review 2000, vol. 1, pp. 131–143. 4 Thomas Liebig and Alfonso Sousa-Poza, “Migration, self-selection and income inequality: an international analysis,” Kyklos 2004, vol. 57, pp. 125–146.

8

Introduction

facts, elements of the universal shape of modern open societies. Ultimately inequality, as more general departure point, can’t be merely an element of explanation, and it is important to remember that not only do “objective” social differences and the inequalities caused by them foster migration behaviour, but so do their social perceptions. State policies towards inequality may, we suggest, have a great impact on the willingness to emigrate. The relation between emigration and inequality varies widely across different social and state regimes. The state policy—the actions that the state can take to prevent or reduce the significance of social inequalities—may in different cases cause a strengthening or weakening of migration pressure. One of the important ways in which the social regime can vary in its ways of dealing with inequality is in its ideological interpretation of social difference. From one side, inequality can be seen as a basic element of competitive society (a sine qua non of capitalist maximalization). From another, it can call up pictures of barriers developing between people—as a consequence of the vertical division of labour, and with the consequence that vertical mobility tends to decrease as result of social barriers—and of a gulf between the “top” and the “bottom” of the society. This ideological opposition can be described as a contrast between liberal and community (especially family) orientation, and it reflects historically specific differences between European states and societies that are usually described in rather popular dichotomies such as “east” and “west,” or “north” and “south.” For example, when we compare the “familism index” (an index of reciprocity networks) with the “statism index” (an index of redistributive institutions), Central and East European societies like Poland seem to represent pure “family oriented” types similar to Italy, Greece, and Portugal; On the opposite side, among the “state oriented” societies, we find Denmark and the UK.5 Apparently even the processes of democratization and subsidiarization, which appear to have been universal across most European societies from the 1980s onwards, have not succeeded in removing intersocietal differences. ________________ 5 Yuri Kazepov, “The Subsidiarization of Social Policies: Actors: Processes and Impacts. Some reflections on the Italian case from a European perspective,” European Societies 2008, vol. 19, no. 2.

Introduction

9

In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the main context of such changes—affecting both inequality and its ideological interpretations—was the systems transformation. Although it was in some interpretations a unique process, it should be remembered that it also could be described as an element of a more general trajectory which has influenced European societies,6 and accrued in consequence of the deeper reorientation of the global economy (the next wave of the globalization processes),7 and the deconstruction of the postwar Welfare State formula. It is clear, however, that the “skew” of its curve was different. The changes in postcommunist states seemed to be (from this comparative perspective) more concentrated—they occurred in a shorter time, and because of the simultaneous reorientation of the state regime, they were much deeper, and ultimately gave rise to much higher social costs.8 The key points of this transformation were the process of radical (not evolutionary) opening of national markets, and the activation of market regulation in many areas of social life which traditionally had lain in the domain of the state. As the author of a report on the welfare system in postcommunist countries in the 1990s describes, ... the governments of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia were each spending on the average about 10–15 percent of the GDP annually on pensions and other social security benefits ... This level of ________________

Manuel Castells, Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, Świat międzyepoki. Globalizacja, demokracja, państwa narodowe [World of the Epoch in the Middle. Globalization, Democracy, Nation State], Kraków: Znak, 2004. 8 Although the systems transformation may seem to be a unique phenomenon in the history of Europe (when we consider the well-being and previous experiences of the inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe), it was possible to achieve these deep changes in the 1990s almost without the social costs of more significant mass protests. The very rapid change was, in that sense, a rationalized strategy to avoid potential resistance of the main political groups and parties in society. The success of this strategy was possible for two reasons: the political atmosphere of the “thaw,” and the vitality of the neoliberal transition ideology, which described rapid transition as the no-alternative way of escape from the economic collapse of Real Socialism. David Ost, Klęska “Solidarności.” Gniew i polityka w postkomunistycznej Europie [The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe], Warszawa: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza, 2007. 6 7

10

Introduction

expenditure matched or even exceeded that of the more developed western countries, many of which had been struggling to control government spending and reform their social security systems for more than two decades.9

At that time, even in spite of such high expenditure, one of the main transformational changes was the lack of sufficient social support and the growth of social inequalities. The dynamic of the processes was not simultaneous for all countries involved. Looking at the basic indicator of social inequality—the Gini coefficient—at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is clear that the processes of social transformation did not have the same trajectories and consequences in all the involved countries and societies. Although states such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland now have a relatively high Gini coefficient (indicating greater levels of inequality), far above the European average, the position of the Czech Republic is different. A similar market-oriented transformation there did not correlate with the more common increase in social differences, which may be a good explanation for the fact that the Czech Republic did not experience mass migration at the start of the twenty-first century. When we ask the question of why such a significant increase in social inequality (and in level of emigration) did not occur in certain countries, a simple answer should draw attention to some cultural factors. We want to offer here one possible interpretation, in our opinion an important one for understanding the conscious uniqueness of the deregulation dynamic. This interpretation concerns the degree and specificity of the acceptability of social costs in the transformational project, and ultimately concerns also the agreement on inequality as an ideological background of the change. Possible elements of an explanation might consider the questions of how market-oriented were particular postcommunist societies, and how successful was the “gestalt switch.” As we know from social surveys, respondents’ orientations are sometimes very different, and may change in time. ________________ 9 Tomasz Inglot, Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919–2004, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Introduction

11

In the Polish case, and less so in the case of the Czech Republic, the darker sides of the relatively successful economic and political transformation included the dynamic growth of unemployment (in Poland in the first decade of the twenty-first century, ten years after the start of the transformation, more than 20% of labour force was unemployed), and growing differentiation (asymmetric increases in different social segments, and in different positions in class structure).10 Apart from this, the problem of mass poverty appeared, particularly in small cities and in the countryside.11 In the Polish transitional experience, the relatively high level of child poverty in rural areas and in the south of Poland (close to the Ukrainian border), as well as in the northwest region which became a part of Poland after the Second World War, was particularly traumatic. At the same time, the first decade of the twenty-first century was politically the final step in the structural adjustment required for accession to the European Union, which opened a new period of modernization. The main differences in comparison to the recent period were the decrease in unemployment in 2008 to below 10%, (partially as a consequence of mass, legal emigration),12 the qualitative improvement in the economic condition of Polish citizens, and the paradoxically still high level of emigrants to countries with open labour markets for Poles (the United Kingdom, Ireland, then the Netherlands and so on).

Migration as a problem As we suggest, migration seems to be a more or less popular social reaction to inequalities. Nevertheless, although it is a chance to change one’s position in the labour market, and offers the hope of self________________ 10 Irina Tomescu-Dubrow, “Rapid Changes in Labor Market Segmentation and the Risk of Unemployment: An Analysis of Polish Panel Data,” in: Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Sandra T. Marquart-Pyatt (eds.), Continuity and Change in Social Life: Structural and Psychological Adjustment in Poland, Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Polish Academy of Sciences, 2007. 11 Elżbieta Tarkowska, “Poverty and Education. Risk of ‘Inheritance’ of Poverty in the Former State Farms in Poland,” Polish Sociological Review 2002, no. 2(138), pp. 203–215. 12 Discovering new benefits of an employee oriented labor market with a significantly lower level of unemployment.

12

Introduction

realization in a different place and in a different social environment, it is at the same time a stimulus for other social problems. Those problems can be a source of further social inequalities. To list only those problems that often negatively affect migrants and their sending societies, one has to mention the social—especially family—costs, the not always good conditions of work and life abroad, the lack of prospects the emigrants have for development, and the labour market drain in the sending country. The first social problem of migration relates to the threat to family life. One of the most striking examples of this threat is the case of the so called Euro-orphans—children whose parents are working abroad, whether for a longer or shorter time, and the parents are replaced in the child’s life by other family members. This of course may cause a number of social problems which negatively affect family relations, and also, for example, the educational opportunities of migrants’ children, which can have negative impact on their social positions in the future. The second social problem concerns the living and working conditions abroad. The position of many migrants in the workplace is underprivileged because of their unsuited professional qualifications (migrants are frequently either underskilled or overskilled for the positions they occupy) and language skills, as well as their frequently risky positions in the workplace (migrants being very commonly employed in nonstandard or even illegal ways). Apart from that, in some cases the welfare service offered to migrants is insufficient. In other words, for some migrants their escape from inequality in their home country only leads to a change of environment, and not to an improvement in their life opportunities. The third problem can be described by the term “lost generation,”13 which refers to the generation of young temporary migrants from the middle of the first decade of the century. Their migration experiences in many cases will not bring the expected improvement in their social status, because their work experience is not really suitable in the “native” labour market, and even their foreign language skills often turn out to be insufficient to help them ________________ 13 Krystyna Iglicka, “Interview with Krystyna Iglicka,” Gazeta Wyborcza 2010, 12 March.

Introduction

13

compete with those who have been employed without migration experience. Again, migration experience may negatively influence their social status in homeland. Last but not least, migration also has negative consequences for the whole labour system of the sending country. Although in crisis situations the tendency to use individual or network strategies (looking for work abroad, in the case of migrations) to solve economic problems in contemporary life seems to be an ideal strategy for social stability (as it tends to decrease social conflict), it can in fact also have negative consequences. The high number of migrants—the high number of workers absent from the work force—creates new developmental barriers. This was clearly visible in the Poland of 2007–2008, when a new kind of labour power deficit become visible, affecting low and medium skilled jobs, and particularly manifesting itself as a lack of young people employed in a number of growing production sectors—particularly in construction and the electronics industry. The lack of the “Polish plumber” in Poland was a sign of the 180 degree reorientation of the labour market in comparison with the 1990s. In the case of Poland, a similar type of immigration from southeast Europe—from Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine— was insufficient to fill the growing gap, especially because Polish employers could hardly compete with much better paying labour markets in Spain, Italy, and Germany. In this migration process, Poland was just a “transit country.” To recapitulate, the thesis that we want to put forward is that the mass migration from some of the Central and East European countries is in fact a deferred reaction to the social changes which began 20 years ago, and a sort of adaptation to the nonfunctionality of the labour market and welfare regime which have been rebuilt in the course of the post-1989 social transition process. This thesis served as an introduction and an invitation to the discussion about Central and Eastern European migration which took place at the “Inequalities and Migration” workshop in Poznań in September of 2009.14 This topic, in our opinion, could serve to inspire ________________ 14 The Central and Eastern European Sociology Workshop “Social Inequalities and Migration in Post-Communist Societies. Searching for Positive Identity of Central and Eastern European Sociology” was organized by the Polish Sociological Association;

14

Introduction

discussion on the links between social inequalities, welfare regimes, and more generally the processes which contemporary affect citizens of the region. Our goal in this sense was more universal than mere description of the particular phenomenon. In the end, our intentions were not realized completely successfully. Nevertheless, what we got was a picture of the discourse on the subject, and we believe that it is the first step to more systematic, and more reflective interpretations of the problem of mass migration, in which postcommunist Europe is, on one hand, the area of study, and on the other, the point of view of reflection. The book consists of two parts. The first tries to describe the problem of welfare states, inequalities, and politics as possible contexts for migration behaviour. The second discusses the different contexts and consequences of migration as the main problem itself. The first part, entitled “The Problem of the Welfare State, Inequalities, Migration, and Politics,” opens with the text of Marek Nowak, who tries to show one of the possible quantitative ways of describing the differences between Central and Eastern European countries, using the Polish case to identify factors which may cause mass migration behaviour. The interpretation is based on Polish data and data from surveys undertaken in thirteen postcommunist countries during 2007. The next text, by Alena Pařízková, discusses aspects of migration from the Czech Republic. The main issue that the narration takes up is the problem of the motives and goals of migration. She suggests that the majority of migrants could be interpreted as economic migrants, but that there are other possible (mostly “pulling”) motives that also might be good explanations of, for example, the choice of destination. The text is based on secondary quantitative data and qualitative indepth interviews with labour migrants. It is significant to notice that this case study of Czech migration could be a picture of a different type of postcommunist migration, which is less common and less ________________

the Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań; the Institute for Western Affairs, with the support of the International Sociological Association; GESIS Servicestelle Osteuropa; the Polish-German Cooperation Foundation; and the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Introduction

15

visible than in the case of neighbouring countries, and apart from that concerns what is perhaps the only Central European country where more people immigrate than emigrate. A picture from the other side is suggested by the third author, Guglielmo Meardi. He describes the relation between migrants and the trade unions of their European destination countries. The main idea of the text is that organized labour faces a strategic choice of whether or not to support workers from abroad. This way of making policy is reflective in the sense that it tries to find a solution in a very complex and unstable situation which involves coercive relationships. Meardi suggests that the strategy of labour organizations is located somewhere between the insider model and the outsider model. Here we have different ideologies, the former defending the interests of native workers, and the latter trying to discuss a form of solidarity based on the necessity (and functionality) of migration in capitalists market relationships. An important Rubicon was crossed after the last enlargement of the European Union, formally reorienting the trajectories of mobility of the labour force typical of Western Europe. A less social-mobility centred narration is offered by Serena Romano in the article “Poverty and welfare reform in Eastern Europe.” The text is the only one in this volume which does not concern the problem of migration itself, although it is useful in understanding the dynamic of social processes accelerating international mobility within the lower segment of societies in Central and Eastern Europe. She bridges “the gap between welfare reform theory and poverty studies.” The key question concerns practical solutions in povertystricken areas, and the phenomenon of exclusion in particular countries of the postcommunist region. The text is divided into two parts. The first tries to explain the logic of the transformation of social policy in postcommunist countries—from an opposite point of view to the one presented in this introduction. The second part discusses particular solutions based on the cases of Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. Iveta Ķešāne presents an intriguing text on the correlation between politics and the migration behaviour of citizens. Migration, as Ķešāne understands it, can be interpreted as a variety of political action, in opposition to passive adaptation to a new environment. Her

16

Introduction

examples of Latvian migrant experiences are useful in understanding the tensions which accompany radical economic reorientation, and can in the end serve as a picture of coercive relations between citizens and the state in transition. Such a picture does not offer the expectation of mental return to the previous etatist regime, but uses the language of self-realization with the arguments of self-government, in the light of the radical change of roles in a game without sufficient social support. The last article in this part, written by Bartłomiej Walczak, describes the fundamental problems of the changes that have affected family life, and parental relations in the light of the contemporary processes of the opening up of societies and more mobile labour relations. His article, “Economic, Class, and Gender Inequalities in Parental Migration” looks at the problem of migration from the perspective of the sending country. He forms an image of the social position of migrant families, and shows that mediating factors such as the immigration policy of the receiving country and the specificity of the chosen location in the sending country, constitute the basis for the interpretation of inequalities. The second part of the book is entitled “The different contexts of migration,” and opens with a text on the problem of gender inequalities, as described by Ingrid Jungwirth. In her contribution, “The Change of Normative Gender Orders in the Course of Migration,” it is suggested that inequality may be a problem in the sending country, but can also increase in the destination society. Jungwirth describes this problem in the context of gender, and in the particular case of highly qualified women. As she shows, “migration has not been recognized in Germany for a long time as a vital social process shaping social relation.” She describes the relatively common idea which “neglects the participation of migrants and often leads to exclusionary processes in labour and society.” Social relations in the sending country may be more equal than in the case of the destination, Germany, as is shown with examples of migrants— particularly technology workers—from the postsocialist European states. As Jungwirth suggests, this idea is a part of the traditional picture of the role of migrants in German society, and is an element of the shape of the market-determined policy on migration, particularly

Introduction

17

in the case of scientific disciplines and technological sectors which have a more traditional approach to gender issues. Francesca Alice Vianello in her article “Suspended Migrants. Return Migration to Ukraine” describes a similar problem, but from the point of view of the subject. She explains the gender position of migrant woman from Ukraine in Italy. The main goal of the text is to offer a useful typology of migrant woman, where three kind of dispositions or mental-normative structures: “migrants in transition, permanent migrants, and suspended migrants … with different migratory experiences and plans” play a unique role. The third type—suspended migrants—seems to be the most interesting. It is defined by active disposition to social environment which does not cut the roots with native local community, and gives the hope of changing (improving) gender relation. The text “Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland,” written by Marta Kolankiewicz, is less concerned with the concept of Central and Eastern European migration, but provides an interesting description of a certain aspect of migration to Eastern European countries. The perspective is thus changed, not focusing on migration behaviour itself, but rather on intercultural relations in Poland as a destination country. The picture is expressive, and sometimes normative. On one hand, it shows racist violence against strangers, while on the other it shows the social consequences of the new phenomenon of migration to the relatively conservative and less open societies of postcommunist Europe. The changes in immigration systems which are correlated with processes of social transformation and integration of Central European Countries with Western Europe are described by Konrad Miciukiewicz in his article “Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe.” As is suggested in the article, there are facts and tendencies which although they have definitely improved the social condition of migrants and refugees in European countries, have also made horizontal mobility across the continent much more difficult. The main fact which Miciukiewicz underlines concerns the increasing effectiveness of the control of citizens by state institutions, and the building of an effective international structure based on EU policies and funds. These systems make it possible to implement an effective

18

Introduction

immigration policy, but at the same time bring about increasingly immobile bilateral relations between EU states and their neighbours outside the border of the EU. Michał Nowosielski looks in his contribution at the problem of migration from an institutional point of view. His interpretation is based on a quantitative survey of Polish organizations in Germany. He reconstructs the main facts of the more than hundred year history of Polish minority organizations in that country, and illustrates the contemporary situation of migrants’ self-organization. As he suggests, there are a few factors which now slow the numerical increase of participants, and which limit the support policy which the organizations can perform for their participants. The main problems are financial difficulties, the weakness of their social capital, disintegration, and a lack of collaboration between organizations with similar goals. Marek Nowak and Michał Nowosielski

Introduction

19

Acknowledgments The editors would like to express their gratitude to the institutions and people that enabled this book to be published: the International Sociological Association; the Polish-German Cooperation Foundation; the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education; GESIS Servicestelle Osteuropa, and especially Dr Agnieszka Wenninger there; the Polish Sociological Association and its chairman Professor Piotr Gliński; the Institute for Western Affairs and its Director, Professor Andrzej Sakson; the Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University with its Director at the time, Professor Krzysztof Podemski; and the Scientific Publisher of the Institute of Philosophy AMU and its Editor-in-Chief, Professor Tadeusz Buksiński.

20

Introduction

Part I

The Problem of Welfare State, Inequalities, Migration, and Politics

22

Marek Nowak

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

23 

Marek Nowak

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective). Why Do Central and Eastern European Societies Need More Welfare States? … welfare policy arrangements and institutions exacerbate or ameliorate existing social cleavages and conflicts. Liberals regimes, which are characterized by market-dominated welfare provision, tend to produce and reproduce classbased differences, while conservative corporatist regimes tend to create distinctions based on “insiders” and “outsiders” in the formal labor market. In contrast, social-democratic regimes tend to create distinctions by gender and sector. M. Christy Glass, Sandra Marquart-Pyatt1

Abstract: This article describes the possible correlations between inequalities and migration. A sociological interpretation is based on public data (especially Eurostat) and the scientific results of the EUREQUAL project which quantitatively investigated the problems of inequalities in 13 European post-communist countries. The comparative strategy provides an opportunity to show central and eastern Europe in the mentioned context, and shows a possible way to understand why emigration is a relatively rare way of solving individual existential problems in spite of the relatively stable structural differences in quality of life, typical of this part of Europe. ________________

M. Christy Glass and Sandra Marquart-Pyatt, “Welfare State Change and Attitudes Toward the State,” in: Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Sandra Marquart-Pyatt (eds.), Continuity and Change in Social Life: Structural and Psychological Adjustment in Poland, Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Polish Academy of Sciences, 2007. 1

24

Marek Nowak

My suggested conclusion answers the question of mass emigration in the context of three factors which together make it possible, namely the transformational processes of increasing inequalities, the state of public consciousness, and the new shape of welfare regimes in particular states in the context of the beginning of the 1990s (it is mainly the Polish experience that is described here). In the offered interpretation, the 2004–2008 mass emigration from Poland was a kind of mass reaction to the radical social change which took place 20 years earlier. Finally, it is suggested that there is no clear universal and statistically simple measurable correlation between social inequalities and mass migration (which is something that commonly takes place), but some of the factors discussed in the paper cannot be dismissed. Keywords: inequalities, welfare expectations, Central and Eastern Europe, mass emigration from Poland, EUREQUAL.

Introduction It should be particularly emphasized that the deconstruction of former real socialist solutions in the so-called new democracies was the result of a fundamental ideological reorientation, and not of an evolutionary process. In some cases there was even a kind of a social engineering effort to build the democratic state’s new institutions from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. In both the east and the west, the key notion in this process may be described as an aspect of liberal subsidiarization processes.2 But the overall implementation of these projects depended most of all on the general specificity or “macroconditionality” of system relations, and on the “microconditionality” of the particular actions undertaken by the main actors operating at all levels of the process, and influenced in addition—or not influenced—by a more or less active civil society.3

________________

Which means, it’s worth repeating, bringing responsibility for functions down to a lower level of authority and to the local community.  3 At the same time, the process of subsidiarization seems to be difficult to achieve as an object of political strategy or of practical policy making, particularly since (a) it is centrally designed as a process of state transformation, and (b) because “central authority should have subsidiary function” (Yuri Kazepov, “The Subsidiarization of Social Policies: Actors: Processes and Impacts. Some reflections on the Italian case from a European perspective,” European Societies 2008, vol. 19, no. 2). In the case of Poland we can observe a repeated compulsive movement between different policies in 2

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

25 

Finally, subsidiarization as a political strategy of democratic power (giving an opportunity to activate more effective developmental mechanisms) may make for weaker state regulation4 (as Yuri Kazepov5 attempts to show in case of Italy), and may cause or remake regional differentiations, as a consequence of local or regional policy, in social and economical relations. There are many problems which are typical of developing countries,6 but again, the ways to find solutions in most democratic countries of the postcommunist region are “philosophically” rather similar. The level of migration could be the indicator of the fruitfulness of such as politics. The most visible aspects of the current migration dynamic in Central and Eastern Europe can be described in relation to the macroeconomy of particular regions at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Krüger describes7 the situation from 2004, showing on a map the developmental differences between regions in Europe. On the right side of the map a clearly distinguishable strip joins together the Baltic countries, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, while the capital city regions are significantly different in colour (Warsaw, Budapest).8 As Krüger says, “particularly ________________

the consecutive elections of 1989, 1993, 2001, 2005, and the similar ideological backgrounds of subsidiarization in solving sometimes very different problems. 4 snd simultaneously establish new “first plan actors” on the subnational level, who decide on a particular solution and on regulative practices (for example, in the fight against social exclusion).  5 Y. Kazepov, op. cit.   6 For example, a much higher level of deprivation which affects the existence of the society at many levels (increasing age of the population, increases in family instability, decreases in fertility rates, and so on).  7 Andreas Krüger, “Private Household Income in the Regions of the European Union, 2004,” Statistics in Focus 2008, no. 8. 8 Analysis of the collected data shows that in the group of regions with the greatest positive change between 2000 and 2004, we can find 5 regions in postcommunist countries (Közép-Magyarország, Praha, Lietuva, Eesti, and Latvija—the last three regions comprising the entirety of the states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, respectively). Among the regions with the lowest disposable income in 2004, we find only regions from south and east-central postcommunist Europe (9 Romanian, 3 Polish, and 1 each of Slovak, Estonian, and Latvian regions). In two cases—Eesti and Latvija— they are the same regions. 

26

Marek Nowak

dynamic developments were noted in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic States and Romania. Only 8 regions—all of them in Poland—dropped back in relation to the EU-23 average”.9 In the data from 2002, the ten regions with lowest GDP per inhabitant consist of 6 Polish, 2 Hungarian, 1 Slovak, and 1 Latvian region.10 In a document published in February 2010 (6 years later, and following the next wave of EU enlargement), the 20 regions with the lowest GDP per inhabitant include 5 regions from Bulgaria, 6 regions from Romania, 5 regions from Poland, 4 regions from Hungary, and no regions from the Baltic states.11 What should be noticed here is that there are visible tendencies for central areas to dynamically escape from the list of poorest regions, but the position of regions outside the main centres of particular countries was relatively stable, and relatively unchanged. These tendencies can also be thought of in the context of population changes. The decrease in, and ultimately the aging of, the population is and was rather typical for most of the central European regions, but significant negative change can also be observed in the case of the poorest regions. The projection to 2030 shows a worsened situation, with a tendency for developmental stagnation to coincide with the population decrease and aging.12 This worse aspect of subsidiarization processes may, in my opinion, constitute an argument in the discussion about the real causes of migration, and also seems to be crucial for understanding the differentiating push tendencies in particular countries or regions (and the lack of significant migration in others). In my opinion, it makes the causes of increasing inequality clearer (on both national and international levels), but only as one of a number of indicators of the increased movement of the labour force. We can describe theoretically two aspects of the process which may have an influence on the social mobility and the decision to emigrate of a particular person: ________________

A. Krüger, op. cit., p. 6.  EUROSTAT. News Release 2005, no. 47. 11 EUROSTAT. News Release 2010, no. 25. 12 Konstantinos Giannakouris, “Regional Population projection EUROPOP2008: Most EU regions face older population profile in 2030,” Statistics in Focus 2010, no. 1. 9

10

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

27 

1) the personal aspect, which relates to individual rationality, individual motives, the individual condition of the person, as well as the person’s social attitudes, education, life expectations, and so on; and 2) the structural aspect (i.e. what are called “push factors” in the theory of migration behaviour), which in the case of Central and Eastern Europe can be very close to the concept of Durkheim-Merton anomy, or Sztompka’s transformational sociocultural trauma,13 and which describes common labour relations, typical social mobility patterns, and institutional design. The policy of the state, in the sense of the previously mentioned concept of Espring-Andersen (described by Glass and Marquart-Pyatt) can catalyse or weaken the tendency to emigrate. But social mobility, and particularly the decision to emigrate, could be in offer interpretation a kind of “subjective rational” behaviour (in opposition to “goal-oriented rationality”), and could be understood (in Weber’s sense) in opposition to the scientific process of explaining. The above-mentioned theoretical perspectives seem to be particularly fruitful in conceptualizing the problem of the processes of mass migration which may or may not happen in the process of social change in the context of a central and eastern European countries. (Here I use the sociological interpretation of migration behaviour14). Now I want consider the problem of the relation between inequalities, the state of the social regime, and migration behaviour (see Figure 1).

Fig. 1. Inequalities and migration mediated by welfare attitudes of the state ________________ 13 Piotr Sztompka, Trauma wielkiej zmiany [The Trauma of the Big Change], Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2000. 14 See: Markus Hadler, “Intentions to Migrate within the European Union: A Challenge for Simple Economic Macro-Level Explanations,” European Societies 2006, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 11ff.

28

Marek Nowak

It could be suggested (as a hypothetical assumption) that the coincidence of the negative aspect of deprivation (related to the individual reception of the factors of inequality), with some sort of micro and mezzo “structural aspects,” could make the decision to emigrate more expected (in the prognostic sense) and sociologically more probable. It seems to be of some importance that social consciousness—or a kind of “universal ideology” of society, in Mannheim’s sense—might (or in fact might not) be helpful in understanding why particular behaviours may be (or may not be) so widespread in a particular society. At the beginning of the 1970s, Albert O. Hirschman employed a very useful metaphor describing strategies which might relate to interpretations of differences between more active and more passive attitudes to organization, but which might be also an intriguing base from which to explain migration as a strategy. Hirschman differentiated “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty“ as common ways of acting in market societies in relation to firms and organizations—and we can add the state to this list.15 As Tatiana Mizguireva describes16 in the context of the macro social analysis of systemic crisis in Russia, “Hirschman argued that those who were most loyal to an organization will try voice first, because they would have the stronger desire to see the positive change in the organization.” In this sense, political action would be a more typical way of solving problems as a consequence of a more active orientation to the subject, or as in Mizguireva’s interpretation of the Russian case, as a consequence of the impossibility of “exit,” when it seems to be the only alternative. Emigration would definitely be in this sense an “exit strategy,” but the real reason for emigration could be differently understood in different situational contexts. What seems to be always true is that this kind of decision isn’t typically part of activism in the political sense (what Hirschman called “voice”), and in fact could be rather a kind of resignation from action within the society—but in relation to Mizguireva’s assumption, the ________________ 15 Albert O. Hirschman, Lojalność, krytyka, rozstanie [Exit, Voice and Loyalty Respons to Decline in Firms. Organizations and States], Warszawa – Kraków: Znak, 1995, pp. 9–49.  16 Tatiana Mizguireva, “Between Voice and Exit: National Response to the Crisis of Wage Arrears, 1992–2000,” Polish Sociological Review 2001, no. 1 (133).

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

29 

presence of a “systemic” and legal option is an important aspect of arriving at a decision (in the context of mass action). This “exit strategy” may, from my point of view, be more typical of the homo economicus “toolkit,” where a rational subject acts in order to maximize the individual (and not the communal) surplus.17 The questions of which factors more strongly influence emigration strategy seems to be a very interesting one, and a more particular question is which (personal or structural aspects) are central in the context of emigration behaviour in postcommunist Europe?

1. “Transformational” migration: the Polish case When we analyse the basic state labour statistics data for Poland (EUROSTAT data) for the years 2003–2004 (being the beginning of the second wave of emigration) as a source of a some description of the structural motives of emigration, we can find much worse conditions in the labour market in Poland than in the EU-15: 13% lower employment rate than in the EU-15 (51.7%, compared with 64.7% in the EU-15), 6% lower activity rate (64.0%, EU-15: 70.6% ), 10% higher unemployment rate (18.8%, EU-15: 8.1%), and the relatively high youth (< 25 years old) unemployment rate in the EU-15 (16.6%) is 20% greater in Poland (39.5%). Finally, the EU-15’s 3.4% long-term unemployment rate contrasts with a 10.2% in Poland. Comparing the same data for Lithuania and Latvia shows much better situation than in Poland and a little worse than in UE15 (a 3% less of employment rate than in the EU-15), a similar activity rate as in the EU-15 level of activity rate, and a 2% higher rate of unemployment. The data mentioned here could be used to describe differences in the previously discussed “structural aspects” of migration behaviour. In the long term, it could be useful for the interpretation of the change in the timing of push factors in relation to observable increases or decreases in the real flow of migrants. ________________ 17 This is, of course, much more common in economists’ interpretation of the migration processes, than of sociologists’. 

30

Marek Nowak

Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski describe18 the migration behaviour of Polish citizens, and suggesting a basic systematization of the periods of systems transformation in relation to emigration behaviour. The first period finished when Poland joined the European Union, an event which happened fifteen years after the beginning of the systems transformation project (1989–2004). The second period opened a new route of legal emigration which was (and which by now has really been noticed as) definitely more of a mass action. Let us briefly describe these two periods.

1.1. International mobility “before accession”: “structural” emigration in the 1990s As Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski argue,19 describing the moment when the labour market opened after Poland’s accession to the EU, “never before have there been the conditions for such a mass and cumulated in time outflow of the demographic population overhang.” This involves a suggestion about the correlation between the existence of an “unnecessary” part of the labour force and the tendencies which—in the case of the Polish transformation—have acted to increase migration. Consequently the main question does not strictly refer to the problem of structural pressure, but should involve the problem of barriers to mobility in the national and ultimately in the international labour market. The first barrier was the formal restriction on going abroad temporarily, and even then after the change, there remained restrictions on going abroad for longer periods, and a lack of options to choose the destination of legal mobility, mainly on account of the limitations tourist visas. Because at the beginning of the 1990s migration was in most cases of the illegal or informal type, we know very little from direct research about migrants at that time. What we do know is ________________ 18 Izabela Grabowska-Lusińska and Marek Okólski, Emigracja ostatnia [The Last Emigration?], Warszawa: Wyd. Scholar, 2009.  19 As ibidem, p. 37.  

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

31 

information from retrospective sample research, which measures this phenomenon in the origin dwelling place of the migrant (asking what was the respondent’s migration behaviour, how long did they stay abroad, when did the migration occur, and so on).20 As the authors describe, the systems transformation played the role of a push factor, promoting temporary movement rather than the emigration of whole families, something which was more common for the wave of emigration oppositionists at the beginning of the 1980s and for the Aussiedlers. Those contemporary movements involved people of mostly different socioeconomic characteristics, and rather affected local relations (on the level of smaller local communities), and influenced local labour markets much more frequently outside the main urbanized centres. Sometimes it meant living officially in the local community in Poland, while simultaneously working somewhere abroad. As a consequence of the increase of this “invisible social mobility,” and because of the weaker position of employees in the context of rises in unemployment at the end of the 1990s, international labour movement became more and more common, and constituted a part of the experience of a growing segment of society. Emigration mainly affected regions with a general low quality of life, but this didn’t necessarily mean less developed in the industrial sense of the word. We can describe this situation more as a coincidence of the logic of the changes of deindustrialization (rather than the previous economic changes), and the developmental position (the situation of simply being poorer). Before accession, migration was highest from Małopolskie voivodeship with its capital city of Kraków (together constituting 14% of migrants), and from Lubelskie and Pokarpackie voivodeships, which suggests something more than just pure “structural motives,” when we compare the level of migration in different and sometimes much less developed regions of Poland.21 When we try to answer the question of how many people emigrated before the accession, Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski point to the number 900,000 as the number of people who become invisible to official statistics, ________________ 20 21

Ibidem, pp. 37–61.  Ibidem, p. 106. 

32

Marek Nowak

suggesting that in reality they were living outside the home country for a long time.22 Before accession, in the terminology of Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski, there was “incomplete migration” which was invisible from one side, and which from the other side represented a sort of “refrigerator” of a segment of labour power endangered by unemployment.23 The refrigerator metaphor indicated the “contramobility” aspect of migration experiences, and its social functions which act rather to stabilize local relations (in the sociological sense), and which don’t mobilize to the more active (horizontal) social mobility on a local or a regional level. It should be mentioned that because of its informal nature, migration was invisible not only from the state statistical point of view, but was also invisible to public opinion, which helps us to understand the absence of migration as a problem, and its absence as a leitmotiv in political discussion. The positive economic consequences of migration were another aspect of this stability function. Labour circulation was at the same time a source of small investment capital, which possessed functions of social stabilization, without the need for civic pressure on local authorities to improve a condition of local labour market. We can finally emphasizes (and it’s really no surprise) that longer migration was quantitatively less common than other forms of invisible, temporary, or short circulation (less than 3 month) of the labour force.24 To summarize the migration behaviour of the 1990s, short term migration and its rise in popularity may be one of the factors leading to an increase in emigration over the next few years. The “before accession” mobility might be in this sense a first step, a step to more ________________

Ibidem, p. 65.  Ibidem, p. 39. They mentioned three main types of migration: (a) circulation migrations; (b) a short period migration; (c) long term migration (emigration in formal nomenclature).  24 And this was another reason for believing in the relative effectiveness of the policy which was implemented in the country in the area of social relations. The salary increases in the local labour market in 1990s (which was systematically described in official statistics) was not dynamic enough to equal the potential surplus of two- or three-month (commercial or labour) “tourists excursions” to western neighbors.  22 23

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

33 

organized mass movement in the future. But more than that, it makes more probable hypotheses about the positive correlation between short “successive experiences” in living and working abroad, and the final decision of the same people to emigrate when it becomes legally possible.25 Finally, it also activates the process of “diffusion of innovation”, which builds social nets as an introduction to more organized dynamic and mass action over the next few years.

1.2. International mobility “after accession.” “Structural” emigration in the first decade of the twenty-first century The facts about mass migration from Poland were unconditionally proven empirically after the census (Narodowy Spis Powszechny) of 2002, when state researchers found that 786,000 Polish inhabitants had “disappeared” somewhere abroad. In that group, 626,000 people were outside Poland for more than one year.26 From the beginning of the twenty-first century, suggest Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski, “the exodus was still in progress,” which was particularly visible after 2004 in London’s international bus stations and streets, where many thousands of the Polish citizens could meet the children of the “old emigration” of the 1940s. The peak of the temporary migration came two years later in 2006, and was followed by a small decrease in 2008. The estimated amount of emigration in 2004–2008 was around 1,100,000 Polish citizens. The number of emigrants spending one year or more abroad increased after the departure of the first, largest wave (mainly to the UK and Ireland).27 Now 406,000 Polish citizens live legally in the UK. Nonetheless, temporary—and in most cases illegal—work migration could be a “transformational” specificity of Polish “incomplete” mobility. The legalization of migration (in the UK through the Worker Registration Scheme) was the first step to measure the real flow of

________________

I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Okólski, op. cit., p. 61.  Ibidem. When we compare the results of the previous Census in 1988, the gap was even bigger—around 900,000 “invisible” inhabitants.  27 Ibidem, pp. 74–81.   25 26

34

Marek Nowak

workers, but of course it didn’t provide a complete picture of the labour migration movement, which once again depend mostly upon the legal possibilities available and the motivation to travel abroad. It should be particularly noticed that a main difference between “before accession” and “after accession” migration was the destination chosen. While before accession the bulk of the (in this case, invisible) labour force transfer was directed to Poland’s neighbour Germany or Austria, after accession, the UK and Ireland became the new destinations, offering as they did the opportunity to stay legally. This second wave was more intense and more visible in the public discussion. Let us picture the typical Polish migrant to the UK or Ireland: relatively young (based on Polish legal statistics, BAEL/OBM data), having in the case of pre-accession migration an average age of 32 years, or in later waves a little more than 31 years; more likely to be a man than a woman (183 men to every 100 women); possessing greater experience in the labour market (relative to the demographic structure of Polish society) than that of the average 20–29 year-old.28 He was typically vocationally educated, though a little more often his female counterpart had higher education, and in general better educated migrants were more common in the postaccession wave. A larger number of migrants came from the countryside, and also from the very biggest cities. After accession the amount of migrants from the Polish countryside was a little smaller than before.29 *** On the basis of this brief description, the huge number of emigrants from Poland in the years 2005–2007 (no less than 1 million Polish citizens),30 could be understood as a specificity of coincidences, (1) of the consequences of the collapse of “real socialism”, and (2) of the deep, and radical (in the case of Poland) economic reorientation without the effective support of state institutions at the beginning of the 1990s, but which, at the same time, can be seen as (3) an element ________________

Ibidem, p. 97.  Ibidem.  30 A similar situation could be observed in Lithuania and Latvia.   28 29

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

35 

of more general economic, political, and conscious processes which could be observed in the European countries, and (4) which finally leads me to analyse the tempo of migration—as a specific reaction on the macrosocial and macroeconomic levels—to solve more universal problems.

2. Inequalities and migration in Central and Eastern Europe, based on EUREQUAL data The empirical data which I use comes from the EUREQUAL project.31 As the designer of the project has said, [EUREQUAL] will assess the economic and political causes of social inequality among both individuals and countries and its consequences for social cohesion, economic development, social conflict, social mobility, democratic consolidation, and international integration. The research will proceed comparatively by examining differences within Central and East European (CEE) states (including EU members, Associated States, and International Cooperation target states in the FSU) and by looking at changes over time in the character and consequences of social inequality within CEE.32

In my analysis I want to create a statistical picture of the distribution of push factors in relation to the 13 countries investigated in the EUREQUAL project. The basis of the description of inequalities— in my opinion the fundamental element existing push pressure— would be the indicator of ownership. The distribution of ownership will form the basis of a quasitypology of CEEC countries, and give us an opportunity to compare the correlation between the main indicators of inequalities in few aspects of the problem (based on the same

________________

31 The questionnaire survey was run in 13 countries by a consortium of scientific institutions. In Poland the consortium was represented by the Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University.  32 Material published on the website of the project EUREQUAL coordinated by Oxford University: . 

36

Marek Nowak

data). In the next step I will discuss the problem of welfare expectation in the opinions of the respondents of the 13 countries, and finally I will try to show the available indicators of migration: the attitude to emigration in general, and the declared experiences of working abroad.

2.1. Description of the possible ownership background of migration behaviour The basic level of interpretation starts from the material condition of selected European societies.33 Simply speaking, material conditions often seem to be very different (which explains the problems of the first plan with regards to the adequacy of social generalizations). In the analysis I used as an indicator of ownership the respondents’ statements that they own particular goods.34 The distribution of the indicator (in my opinion) offers the chance to divide the postcommunist countries into three groups, based on the descriptive statistics. The first group is made up of societies such as Poland and Slovakia (where the average of the ownership indicator is highest, ________________

In relation to the above-mentioned introductory statements, is very difficult to conclude something precisely based on simply description and the interpretation of one questionnaire. What we can really do is to compare between the countries researched at one moment of time in the year 2007 (when the research took place), but in the same sense it is very difficult to conclude something more precisely about the relation of a given society to other European societies (which could be particularly interesting), or to come to a conclusion based on more standardized indicators of inequalities (such as have been used in inequalities research in Europe for a long time). It is in my opinion the weakest point of the EUREQUAL project, but in fact such quantitative material is very unique among research on the postcommunist regions, and definitively should be updated a few years in the future. 34 For the interpretation it isn’t important what goods in particular were declared to be owned, but rather how many particular goods were owned. The interviewers during the survey asked questions about ownership of a car, a washing machine, some land, shares, a second home, satellite television, a telephone, a mobile phone, a home cinema system, a computer, and access to the Internet. The indicator is the total number of positive declarations (respondents may accumulate 0 to 11 points). In the suggested interpretation, a lower indicator shows a lower level of ownership, and vice versa.  33

37

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

Table 1. Ownership indicator for particular countries (total number of owned goods declared)* Skewness coefficient

(9) Poland

5.4913

2.21768

–0.103

200

(12) Slovakia

5.7267

2.21514

0.043

200

(6) Latvia

4.7153

2.33235

0.087

200

(2) Bulgaria

4.6559

2.26326

0.125

200

(5) Hungary

4.8628

2.12853

0.153

200

(7) Lithuania

4.898

2.26073

0.182

200

(1) Belarus

4.429

2.29657

0.249

200

(3) Czech Rep.

5.0113

2.18054

0.264

200

(10) Romania

4.5201

2.40366

0.370

200

(8) Moldova

3.5096

1.96668

0.397

200

(11) Russia

4.0245

2.16315

0.496

200

(13) Ukraine

3.6188

1.96142

0.503

200

(13)

200 0 400

(12)

0 400

(11)

0 400

(10)

0 400

(9)

0 400

(8)

0 400

(7)

0 400

(6)

0 400

(5)

0 400

(4)

0 400

(3)

0 400

(2)

0 400

(1)

0 ,00

1,0

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,0

6,00

7,00

8,00

9,0

10,00

11,00

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

Standard deviation

400

Average

Country

* On the right side of table 1 appear graphs which show distribution curves of the ownership indicator in particular countries. The country codes, shown on the right of the graphs, are as follows: Ukraine 13, Russia 12, Romania 11, Slovakia 10, Poland 9, Moldova 8, Lithuania 7, Latvia 6, Hungary 5, Estonia 4, Czech Republic 3, Bulgaria 2, Belarus 1).

37

38

Marek Nowak

and the skewness coefficient, which analyses the relation between the average and the median, is lowest: –0.103; 0.43). The last group consists of societies such as Moldova and Ukraine, where the average of the ownership indicator is lowest, and the skewness coefficent is highest (0.397; 0.503). In between we can find the rest of the postcommunist countries. Later, in a more detailed analysis, I will compare the particular cases of Ukraine, Poland, and the Czech Republic, as representing different types of ownership distribution. As a first step in the analysis, we can compare the declarations on ownership of shares, computers, and Internet connections. The highest level of share ownership declarations are found in the former Czechoslovakia (i.e. in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the process of privatization of state bodies took place in the 1990s), and in Romania. In the rest of the postcommunist countries, the level of positive declarations is (more or less) 50% lower, and the lowest level of declarations is found in Hungary (which may be a little surprising). When we consider the statements concerning possession of a computer and Internet access, the interpretation is less clear. The highest levels of declaration of computer ownership were found in Estonia, Slovakia, and Poland (with more than 50% of respondents saying “yes”). The lowest level of positive declaration is observed in Moldova and Ukraine (below 20%), and Bulgaria (at 25%). When we compare the levels of positive response to the Internet access query, we find that the largest group of respondents saying “yes” is to be found in Estonia (with close to 50% positive declaration), followed by more than 30% in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Lithuania, and slightly lower declarations in Hungary, and Latvia. The lowest level of declaration was found in Ukraine and Moldova (5%) (see Table 5, in the Appendix). To make the picture clearer, we can compare these levels of ownership to the level of ownership of washing machines (which is particularly interesting, as it may describe changes in lifestyles). Washing machine ownership is found to be most frequent in the Czech Republic (99%), Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (95%)—all countries where the systems transformation started during the 1980s or at the beginning of the 1990s. A somewhat lower level of ownership is found in Lithuania (90%), Latvia, and Estonia (87%). Summarizing, there is a rather clear picture in which

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

39 

the central European countries (including the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary) hold relatively high positions, but these positions are very close to those of post-Soviet Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. This is particularly interesting when we additionally take macroeconomic indicators into consideration. On this basis, we can see much more intensive economic growth (with Estonia approaching the level displayed by Poland and Hungary— see Figure 2, in the Appendix) and significant progress over a relatively short timeframe in computerization, informatization, and individual consumption. Such progress (in comparison with the central European countries mentioned) shows the presence of developmental obstacles in the biggest and “oldest” post-transformation democracies, when we compare the historical trajectory of social change. These obstacles, after 20 years of transformation processes, relate in my opinion to pure capitalistic developmental (inter)correlations, and less to the residua of real socialism. Is very interesting to ask questions concerning the “essence” of these obstacles, and concerning the sources of opportunities in the developmental context of the postcommunist regions. To answer such questions is much more difficult. It could be added, using the same sort of argument, that we can see stable progress in the level of the GDP per capita in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) in the larger numerous group of postcommunist countries, but this change is definitely less dynamic than could be expected simply because of system transformation (see Figure 2, in the Appendix). This probably means that there are many developmental factors and obstacles interacting simultaneously, and the strategy of treating postcommunist countries just in the context of one process, and just as one separate “block” may lead to basic misunderstandings. The same sorts of objection, in my opinion, relate to the interpretations of migration which do not challenge the purely deprivational vision of social action, which may appear in some explanational schemes as “satisfying needs”, and as “exit” strategies in others. Now I try to show coincidences between countries which make visible the less obvious sociological factors mediating (per hypothesis) between push factors and the mass actions of people. Let look at the correlation between a few measurements of inequality in the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Poland.

40

Marek Nowak

The first interpretation should find a relatively strong correlation between the answers to the question of how positive were the changes (in relation to systems transformation),35 and the respondents’ own financial wellbeing (as measured by access to the healthcare system), in the opinion of respondents (see Table 6, in the Appendix). Its level of correlation may indicate two things: first, that there are rational interpretations of the changes from the individual point of view; second, that it is difficult to understand macroprocesses without the context of individual experience, and (more importantly) the context of the reflexivity of the person who actually decides to form a mainly conscious picture of the change. It is important to note that these pictures differ decisively, depending on one’s position in society— and this may be a crucial statement in relation to emigration behaviour. Such interpretations suggest similar (but in fact even stronger) correlations between assessment of one’s financial position and the summed values of the indicators of ownership, a correlation which is actually found. The highest Pearson correlation is seen in the case of Czech society, followed by Poland and Ukraine. The following crucial statements relate to the scale of egalitarianism (which describes the acceptance of egalitarianism in wages, and generally for social inequalities). The correlation exists but is inversely proportional (has a minus sign), reaching its highest level in the case of the Czech Republic, is rather lower in Poland, and is very low in Ukraine (see Table 6, in the Appendix). Once again: What we can call the “etatist syndrome” is very strong in the Czech Republic, weaker in Poland, and is very weak in Ukraine, which could be summarized in the linear context of the modernization processes. The picture of the transformation (as modernization) goes as follow: the poorest respondents (those who declare that they own fewer goods) tend not to accept differences in wages, and generally tend not to accept higher levels of social inequalities. The second part of the respondents (those in a better economic position) are more positively disposed to social change—as characterized by more optimistic attitudes—and tend to accept social ________________ 35 Which may indicate the optimism of respondents in relation to the macroprocesses acting on the level of the whole society.

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

41 

inequalities and a competition in the labour market. A common interpretation from Polish sociology of the 1990s describes this opposite state of social consciousness as the observable difference in conditions between the winners and the losers of the transformation process.36 It is intriguing to interpret this observation as a mirror of the class conflict which took place during the organization of capitalist relations in society in the 1990s. Any understanding of the phenomenon in a Marxian context should point out the consequences arising from the system of distribution (in a particular society) of surplus, as result of the commoditization processes which accompanied the market reorientation. In this process, as described by Polish sociologists37 using Bourdieu’s categories, “social capital”— transformed to capital in the more mercantile sense—played a crucial role. Victory, as these sociologists suggested, was most easily accomplished by those who could inherit a higher position from the past (Jadwiga Staniszkis describes this tendency as the Central European “Managerial Revolution”). But alongside institutional position, educational position (educational capital) was also important, as it contributed a better starting point to reach a specialist position, and ultimately the status of middle class in the contemporary sense for the intelligentsia.38 This formally meritocratic tendency which we can observe more or less clearly in particular postcommunist countries (see Table 7, in the Appendix) gives rise to horizontal differentiation based on educational criteria, and particularly in the Polish and Hungarian cases, differentiates the status of the new and old middle classes. In the EUREQUAL research, we can find a clear sign of such a relationship in Polish social structure (as compared to Czech and ________________

See: Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, Krystyna Janicka, Goldie Shabad and Irina Tomescu-Dubrow, “Changes in Class Structure in Poland, 1988–2003: Crystallization of the Winners-Losers’ Divide,” in: K.M. Słomczyński and S. Marquart-Pyatt (eds.), op. cit. 37 Rafał Drozdowski, „Kontrowersje wokół klasy średniej w Polsce lat 90” [The Controversies Around Middle Class in Poland in 90s], Kultura i Społeczeństwo 1998, no. 1. 38 Who are, as we find in the statistical analysis, the real winners of transformation process (see: Henryk Domański, Struktura społeczna [The Social Structure], Warszawa: Scholar, 2007, p. 308 f.). 36

42

Marek Nowak

Ukrainian society). The clue to the problem depends on the features and the quantity of that sector of the labour force which was (as suggested by the authors of the publication on Polish emigration) pushed outside the labour market in the consequences of the deindustrialization processes of the 1990s. In my opinion we could find the participants of this group now self-employed, which in Poland occurs twice as frequently (15.3%) as in the Czech Republic (8.3%) or Ukraine (8.6%) (in both societies we find similar distribution of work positions), and the position of this relatively numerous group of people was not strongly correlated with educational status. This interpretation we can also follow in the narration of David Ost, who has described the specificity of the systems transformation which was undertaken by the democratic opposition in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s.39 If we accept this point of view, migration could be interpreted as an individual (with reference to rationality) class reaction to the social division between “losers” and “winners,”40 but as we know well, the level of migration processes in the above mentioned example of the Czech Republic was decisively lower (while being the same in the case of Hungary, the Baltic states, and even Ukraine). A simple generalization lacking a description of the dynamics and philosophy of the first articulation of the transformation processes is, in my opinion, too limited. I suggest that we need a particular interpretation based on the description of particular social relations and the abovementioned regional dynamics of the change. One of these could be the correlation (or lack thereof) between expectations of state policy with regard to intervention in the particular areas of citizens’ lives, and the dynamics of participation of citizens. This idea of correlation can be found in Marshall’s concept of social citizenship.41 The same problem in relation to Espring________________ 39 David Ost, “Labor Weakness is no Condition for Success. Comments,” Polish Sociological Review 2001, no. 1(133); idem, Klęska “Solidarności.” Gniew i polityka w postkomunistycznej Europie [The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe], Warszawa: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza, 2007. 40 And this may be a specificity of the central and eastern European inequalities.   41 Thomas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950.

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

43 

-Andersen’s view shows that lack of such a policy—in other words, the domination of the opposite ideology (more purely neoliberal or conservative) which is forced by a democratic regime—could result in increasing the frequency of the “exit” strategy in the lower segment of society. From another point of view, the problem of social relations and the social regime could be interpreted either as an aspect of selfselection of potential migrants in the home country—which can also be helpful in understanding, for example, the type of participation of migrants in the labour market in the destination country.42 Let us attempt to answer the question: what do the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe expect from the state?

2.2. The expectations of citizens of Central and Eastern Europe from the state In the EUREQUAL project, 5 questions were asked on whether the respondent accepted that the duty of the state included (1) a guarantee of work (for those who want to work); (2) a guarantee of health care for those who need it, and of sufficient quality of life for old people; (3) a guarantee of sufficient quality of life for the unemployed; (4) a guarantee of housing for those who cannot obtain it on their own; and finally, (5) a guarantee of childcare for working parents. At first—and this could be an element of the final statement of this part of the article—respondents from postcommunist Europe in general accept the described active role of the state. This acceptance is common enough that we may ask the question, where can we find a less clear picture of state-oriented social relations? At first we should ask the question of whether this disposition to the state exists in the case of the countries mentioned, and if so, how clear is it? Beyond all doubt, respondents from postcommunist countries accept the idea of the state guaranteeing work (to those who want to work), and even ________________

See: Irena Kogan, “The Role of Host Countries’ Institutional Characteristics in the Labour Market Success of Third-county Immigrants in Europe”, in: Henrik Egbert and Clemens Esser (eds.), Migration and Labour Markets in the Social Sciences, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2007. 42

44

Marek Nowak

more so, health care and sufficient quality of life for old people. Such acceptance is the most definite in Ukraine (where it has the lowest average and standard deviation), followed by Hungary, Romania, and Poland (see Table 8, in the Appendix). Much less clear are opinions about the state guaranteeing sufficient quality of life for the unemployed, or guaranteeing housing. A little surprising is the lowest level of acceptance found across a range of very different countries (with respect to the level of economic deregulation), such as the Czech Republic, Belarus, Russia, and Poland, where it occurs with a significantly higher level of standard deviation, suggesting a more noticeable polarization of opinion. Similarly surprising is the distribution of answers to the question of the state guaranteeing child care. A significantly lower level of acceptance is found in Lithuania, and once again in Belarus and Bulgaria, while a much higher level of acceptance is seen in the Czech Republic and Slovakia—with significantly lower level of standard deviation. The distribution of responses seems on one hand to be clear— as was previously suggested—while on the other hand, there are no linear differentiations between countries, what might if present suggest divergences in the ideologies of welfare regimes, or some cultural distinctness between different countries. Significantly, however, it is evident that there are no simple conjunctions between the level of articulation of the market relation and level of expectation with regard to state policy (which could be a clue to the interpretation of differences between, say, Belarus and the Czech Republic). The problem of the duty of the state seems to be (for citizens of postcommunist countries) something more in their mentality than in context of the contemporary policy of the state. In the other words: the problem of adequacy and agreement on a particular policy in the area of welfare regime depends more on the internal specificity of the traditional relation to the particular nation state than on external models of economic relation.43 ________________

Finally, in the democratic model of the state (where policy is indirectly moderated by the people) it is rather difficult to find simple link (as an “exit strategy” in reaction to the particular policy) between social regime and mass migration. This is assuming of course, that such democracy really exists.  43

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

45 

It should be added that if my interpretation of data is right, this relation between the person and the state is much more deeply rooted, and much more difficult to change than might be expected.44 We can refer to this (in the basic factor analysis) as the presence in some postcommunist countries of one or even two symptoms which are more or less supported by the vision of the omnipotent state. In this context, there are significant differences between Hungary, on one hand, and for example Poland and the Czech Republic one the other. The latter countries would be the more differentiated ones, and it seems their citizens are more liberal in relation to the duty of the state. When asking again the question of the cause of mass migration in relation to inequalities (and the welfare state), we should go back and discuss the existence of specificity, and the attitudes of the citizens of the particular country. Let us ask the question of how widely accepted is emigration among citizens? It is not surprising that the highest level of acceptance of emigration can be observed in Poland (average 2.09), and then in Ukraine (average 2.16), Latvia, the Czech Republic (average 2.21), and Estonia (average 2.26). The opposing answer was formulated more often in Slovakia (average 3.62), Russia (average 2.81), and Hungary (average 2.82). The highest diversity of opinions was observed in the answers of Russian and Belarussian respondents. This data indeed seems to be not very surprising in the context of mass emigration behaviour, but the very weak (though statistically significant) inverse correlation of the interpretation of one’s quality of life with the acceptance of emigration, should not be overlooked. Once again a more significant inverse correlation is found in Belarus (Pearson –0.172), than in the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Lithuania. It is interesting in this context to consider if the positive answer to this question could be an element of (or an indicator of) a more general disposition to an increasingly open orientation involving general inclusiveness. ________________

In relation to the last statement, the difference between the duties of the state toward the labour market, the healthcare system, and the quality of life of old people on one hand, and the problem of the unemployed and housing on the other hand, may be understood in different ways by respondents in some countries.  44

46

Marek Nowak

In the same block of questions from the EUREQUAL survey it was asked whether or not any person who lives in the country should be entitled to become a citizen of this country. The Pearson correlation is shown in the last column Table 2. Table 2. Average answers to the question of the acceptability of emigration (five point Likert scale, from “definitely accepted” to “definitely not accepted”) Country/descriptive statistics

Average

Standard deviation

Pearson correlation*

Belarus

2.73

1.776

0.386**

Bulgaria

2.47

1.479

0.236**

Czech Republic

2.21

1.282

0.115**

Estonia

2.26

1.318

0.258**

Hungary

2.82

1.443

0.386**

Latvia

2.21

1.204

0.250**

Lithuania

2.51

1.419

0.269**

Moldova

2.37

1.424

0.116**

Poland

2.09

1.139

0.185**

Romania

2.32

1.018

0.364**

Russia

2.81

1.751

0.326**

Slovakia

3.62

1.224

0.208**

Ukraine

2.16

1.347

0.352**

* The last column gives the Pearson correlation between acceptance of emigration and answer to the question of whether anybody who lives in the country should be entitled to become a citizen of the country.

The Pearson correlation is higher, paradoxically, in the case of Hungary and Belarus where the level of acceptance of emigration was relatively lower, than in Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. The values show (in countries with significant emigration experience) a basic incoherence between readiness to emigrate and readiness to live in a multicultural society. This second aspect, on the basis of the EUREQUAL research, is much weaker in postcommunist societies. Ukraine occupies in this context a very special position, but in fact

 

47 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

this country has been multicultural from the beginning of its independence. Finally I want to ask the question, which will lead me to my final statement: have the surveyed EUREQUAL respondents ever worked abroad? The answer to that question could serve as a basis for the interpretation of how common was the experience of horizontal mobility in the case of international labour movement in the 13 researched countries. Table 3. Answer to the question: have you ever worked abroad? (N, and in %) Country Belarus Bulgaria Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania

Yes 58 5.8% 63 6.4% 81 8.2% 149 14.2% 48 4.7% 106 10.6% 111 11.1%

No 942 94.2% 914 93.6% 910 91.8% 903 85.8% 982 95.3% 895 89.4%

Country Moldova Poland Romania Russia Slovakia Ukraine

Yes 184 17.7% 213 14.4% 126 8.4% 70 3.5% 159 15.4% 85 6.1%

No 858 82.3% 1268 85.6% 1366 91.6% 1930 96.5% 873 84.6% 1299 93.9%

889 88.9%

Moldovans most often (17.7%) gave the answer “yes,” followed by Slovaks (15.4%) and Poles (14.4%). A lower level of affirmative responses was found in Russia (3.50%), Ukraine (6.1%), and Belarus (5.80%). Among the group of citizens who said “yes,” persons with intermediate levels of education (secondary school) dominate. There was also very weak correlation with the indicator of ownership used in this text, and no correlation with the above-mentioned education.

48

Marek Nowak

What is the general social portrait of these respondents, in relation to our earlier description of the typical Polish migrant? We consider societies where respondents more often declared that they had worked abroad. Table 4. Have you ever worked abroad? (N, and in percentages) Moldova male female

> 25

26–37

38–49

50–61

Poland all

Slovakia all

all

17

10

16

10

17

20

% age

63.0

37.0

100.0

61.5

38.5

100.0

45.9

54.1

100.0

% sex

15.6

13.3

14.7

11.1

14.5

12.2

21.3

25.3

23.3

% all

9.2

5.4

14.7

7.5

4.7

12.2

10.7

12.6

23.3

63

24

43

67

37

27

% age

57.8

42.2

% sex

33.9

36.0

% all

20.1

N

25

% age

52.1

47.9

% sex

22.9

30.7

% all

13.6

N

23

% age

65.7

34.3

% sex

21.1

16.0

All

12.5

64

26

male female

N

N

27

male female

37

42

21

100.0

66.7

33.3

100.0

35.8

64.2

100.0

34.8

29.2

30.4

29.6

30.0

54.4

42.1

14.7

34.8

19.7

9.9

29.6

15.1

27.0

42.1

23

48

35

15

50

26

11

37

100.0

70.0

30.0

100.0

70.3

29.7

100.0

26.1

24.3

21.7

23.5

32.5

13.9

23.3

12.5

26.1

16.4

7.0

23.5

16.4

6.9

23.3

12

35

31

10

41

12

2

14

100.0

75.6

24.4

100.0

85.7

14.3

100.0

19.0

21.5

14.5

19.2

15.0

2.5

8.8

4.7

19.2

7.5

1.3

8.8

33

1

3

4

6.5

19.0

14.6

7

3

10

20

13

% age

70.0

30.0

100.0

60.6

39.4

100.0

25.0

75.0

100.0

62 < N % sex gen. % all

6.4

4.0

5.4

13.9

18.8

15.5

1.3

3.8

2.5

3.8

1.6

5.4

9.4

6.1

15.5

.6

1.9

2.5

N

109 % all

59.2

75

184

40.8

100.0

144 67.6

69

213

80

79

159

32.4

100.0

50.3

49.7

100.0

The picture of the respondents is relatively similar to that described before. This is particularly true in the case of Moldova, and is a little different in Slovakia. Generally, respondents from the 15–39

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

49 

age group constitute at least 50% of the total of respondents working abroad, which suggests that the experience of migration is much more common among relatively young people, particularly in the last 20 years. In Slovakia, the level of experience of working abroad (65.4%) of young respondents was definitely higher. The number of respondents in the 38–49 age group was very similar in the case of all three countries, at 26–23% (see Table 4). On the other side of the continuum, relatively more members (15.5%) of the oldest age groups were represented among the Polish respondents working abroad, while this figure was relatively low in the case of Moldova and Slovakia (2.5%–5.4%). Male respondents dominate definitively, constituting around 40% in the analysis of the distribution of sex among groups of respondents from Moldova and Poland. We found more equal distribution of the sexes in the case of young Slovakians (there being more women than men), but for the oldest generations this distribution is reversed (see Table 4), and at the older ages, the ratios of men and woman are close to equal.45 Underrepresentation of women is found in Moldova, and we even find twice as many declarations of men working abroad than found in Poland. The interpretation of the observations described here is a little tricky. At first, generally speaking, there is a picture of migrants relatively similar to that shown in the description of Polish migrants in the past two decades. From the more detailed narrations, we find much younger migration experiences in Slovakia and Moldova than in Poland. Polish respondents reported a relatively constant level of migration experience across all cohorts, which suggests that a more general tendency to work abroad is present in all generations, one which was just relatively increased in case of younger generations (undoubtedly as a consequence of the observed social change). But there is something more: in the case of the Polish respondents there is no correlation between the coefficient of ownership and the declaration of having worked abroad, a correlation which is observable (though rather weak) in the case of Moldova and Slovakia (eta 0.198 and 0.181 respectively). In all 13 countries there is no ________________ 45

There are 50% more men than women in the 38–49 age group.

50

Marek Nowak

significant correlation between education and working abroad. This regularity (if it really is a regularity), suggests that the experience of working abroad doesn’t really influence individual property in the overall statistical picture of the society, and applies without exception to all levels of education.

3. Final statement The problem of inequalities in an enlarged Europe (in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century) could be analysed in the context of reconstruction (or deconstruction) of the formula of the European Welfare State. This point of view coincides with the knowledge on the direction of economic processes which Central European citizens have been experiencing and taking part in over the last 20 years. The processes which the editors described in the Introduction have been realized in every area of social activity, but their dynamics are different in different societies. The problem of migration, or emigration (as a mass action) could be analysed in the same context, but—once again—the dynamic of mobility (and particularly of international mobility) was different, and in fact rather rare in most postcommunist countries. If that observation is legitimate, the factors which can have an effect on the mass action of free citizens must be strong, and could be analysed not only as consequences of pure structural pressure (which is still powerful and very common in most central European and eastern European societies). The main question is, what in particular decides on mass migration in the relatively stable political and economic situation of postcommunist countries after 20 years of transformation? (a) Firstly, I suggest that a wrong direction was taken at the beginning of the transformation process. The consequences of this fault are related to the problem of inequalities which influence attitudes to the social order and the vision of the social regime, and more practically involve fulfilling or failing to fulfil expectations in relation to the perceived duty of the state. As we know (based on EUREQUAL data), in postcommunist countries the more active role

 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

51 

of the state in relation to problems of employment, healthcare, and care of old people is relatively commonly accepted. Expectations sometimes tend to construct a whole complex etatist syndrome (as in Hungary, for example), or sometimes it may split into a different vision when the problems of employment, healthcare, or (as in the Polish case) pensions play the crucial role. The main theoretical point of view relates to the problem that “welfare policy arguments and institutions exacerbate or ameliorate existing social cleavages and conflicts,”46 which in my interpretation may in certain social environments result in more or less high migration tendencies. I suggest that (b) inappropriate solutions in the welfare regime may be one of important factors which can increase structural pressure, but at the same time there are no universal rules, and there are—in my opinion—more conditions which distinguish the positions of the citizens of, say, Estonia (where migration is still at a low level), from its neighbour Latvia, where the level of migration is significantly higher. (c) The second important factor relates to the more conscious aspects, an element of the comparison of the chances that the whole system will make “progress” (that is, will in the future result in improved conditions for the individual), with the possibilities of misfortunes in the local community where potential migrants live, all of which may—once again—strengthen or weaken the “push.” (d) The third aspect is related to the cultural process of internalizing the “exit” strategy as an element of universal ideology which creates visions and gives the tools to solve individual problems outside of the context of one society. This third aspect could be either analysed as a much more longue durée factor, and in this sense reinforces the more general atmosphere of emigration as a solution in the way of the “diffusion of innovations,” where migration experiences are collected in individual histories, and become an element of the culture. This third element is in my opinion relatively strong in Poland. These four factors should be added to the standard interpretation of the causes of emigration in the context of processes of systems ________________ 46

M.Ch. Glass and S. Marquart-Pyatt, op. cit. 

52

Marek Nowak

transformation, but in relation to the Polish case it is important to note that the relatively common “exit” strategy could be an element of the neoliberal philosophy, which dominates in the Polish public sphere, and in this sense might be either an illustration of the similar and paradoxical success of marketization as the means of modernization from the beginning of 1990s (with conservative institutions, formally present from the late 1990s, regulating industrial relations). The answer to the question of the title—why do central and eastern European societies need the Welfare State—is still difficult, and mass migration, generally, could be described as the problem. If we agree that there is a problem, the mass “exit” behaviour could be interpreted in the context of (or could be a coefficient of) much too liberal state regimes and welfare practice. It could also be interpreted somewhat differently in the opposite vertical segments of the society, which makes the general picture of social relations less transparent than could be expected. Finally there is no clear universal and statistically simple measurable correlation between inequalities and migration, and between migration and the welfare state, but some of the factors discussed in the paper cannot, I think, be dismissed as irrelevant or in reality insignificant.

 

53 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

Appendix Table 5. Declarations about ownership of shares, computers, and Internet connection (percentages of “no” and “yes” responses) in 13 countries Country /shares

No

Yes [%]

Country /computer

No

Yes [%]

Country /Internet

No

Yes [%]

Belarus

93.8

6.2

Belarus

67.9

32.1

Belarus

88.1

11.9

Bulgaria

95.9

4.1

Bulgaria

74.6

25.4

Bulgaria

86.2

13.8

Czech Rep.

89.1

10.9

Czech Rep.

51.4

48.6

Czech Rep.

65.7

34.3

Estonia

93.7

6.3

Estonia

41.1

58.9

Estonia

51.2

48.8

Latvia

94.3

5.7

Latvia

52.8

47.2

Latvia

70.9

29.1

Lithuania

93.8

6.2

Lithuania

47.8

52.2

Lithuania

68.9

31.1

Moldova

91.8

8.2

Moldova

88.3

11.7

Moldova

94.7

5.3

Poland

94.5

5.5

Poland

46.2

53.8

Poland

62.6

37.4

Romania

87.4

12.6

Romania

64.7

35.3

Romania

79.8

20.2

Russia

94.8

5.3

Russia

66.8

33.3

Russia

89.2

10.9

67.2

32.8

Slovakia

87.0

Ukraine

93.4

Hungary

96.8

13.0

Slovakia

41.6

58.4

Slovakia

6.6

Ukraine

80.3

19.7

Ukraine

94.4

5.6

3.2

Hungary

55.5

44.5

Hungary

71.9

28.1

54

Marek Nowak

Financial wellbeing (SOF)b

Egalitarianism (SE)c

Participation in associations (SS)d

Trust (SZ)

Own properties (PZ)

Pearson correlation /bilateral significance

Optimism (SPO)a

Table 6. Pearson correlation between a few scales of inequalities for the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Poland (based on EUREQUAL data)

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

Czech Republic (SPO)a (SOF)b (SE)c (SS)d (SZ) (PZ)

1 0.490**

0.490**

–0.382**

0.104**

0.171**

0.363**

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.000

0.000

–0.329**

0.211**

0.142**

0.504**

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

–0.129**

–0.245**

–0.304**

0.000

0.000

0.000

1

0.094**

0.298**

0.003

0.000

1

0.114**

1

0.000 –0.382**

–0.329**

1

0.000

0.000

0.104**

0.211**

–0.129**

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.171**

0.142**

–0.245**

0.094**

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.003

0.363**

0.504**

–0.304**

0.298**

0.114**

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

–0.096**

0.085**

0.151**

0.252**

0.000 1

Ukraine (SPO)a (SOF)b (SE)c (SS)d (SZ) (PZ)

1

0.444** 0.000

0.444**

1

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.000

0.000

–0.255**

0.155**

0.116**

0.428**

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

–0.097**

–0.111**

–0.157**

0.000

0.000

0.000

–0.096**

–0.255**

1

0.000

0.000

0.085**

0.155**

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.151**

0.116**

–0.111**

0.054*

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.038

0.396

0.252**

0.428**

–0.157**

0.178**

1

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

–0.097**

1

0.178** 0.000 1

0.023

 

55 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

con. Table 6 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.092**

0.312**

0.000

0.000

0.103**

0.480**

Poland (SPO)a (SOF)b (SE)c

1

0.000 0.465**

(PZ)

1

0.000 –0.206**

–0.289**

0.000

0.000

–0.206** 0.000 –0.289**

0.096**

0.000

0.000

1

0.096**

(SS)d (SZ)

0.465**

0.000

0.000

–0.198**

–0.185**

0.000

0.000

1

0.104**

0.000

0.000

0.092**

0.103**

–0.198**

1

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.312**

0.480**

–0.185**

0.104**

0.090**

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.090** 0.001 1

** 0.01. * 0.05. a How positive were the changes (in relation to the system transformation) / indicator of optimism. b In terms of respondents’ access to the heathcare system. c Scale of acceptance of egalitarianism in wages, and generally for social inequalities. d Summed declarations of participation in associations (NGO, political parties, trade unions, clubs etc).

56

Marek Nowak

Fig. 2. GDP per capita in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) (EU-27 = 100, 1997–2008) Eurostat

Table 7. Correlation (eta) between education and the summed ownership indicators for particular countries Country Eta

Country Eta

Belarus 0.348

Poland 0.423

Bulgaria 0.432

Romania 0.419

Czech Republic 0.356

Russian Federation 0.225

Estonia 0.236

Slovakia 0.344

Latvia 0.294

Ukraine 0.325

Lithuania 0.402

Hungary 0.454

Moldova 0.395

 

57 

Inequalities and Migration (Mainly from the Polish Perspective)

Table 8. Standard deviation and average answers (Likert Scale from 1 (agreement) to 5 (disagreement)) to questions on expected government intervention (“What in your opinion is a duty of the state?”) in 13 European countries (the five lowest values of standard deviation are indicated by the numbers in brackets, 1 being the lowest) Country code

Gov. /Job

Belarus (average)

1.55

Standard deviation

1.079

Bulgaria (average)

1.58

Standard deviation

.925

Gov. Gov. Gov. Gov. Gov. /health care /old people /unemployed /housing /childcare 1.40 .997 1.23 .594 (4)

Czech Rep. (average)

1.68

1.22

Standard deviation

1.116

0.548 (3)

Estonia (average)

1.81

1.26

Standard deviation

1.152

Hungary (average)

1.49

Standard deviation Latvia (average) Standard deviation

.806 (2) 1.51 .956

Lithuania (average)

1.72

Standard deviation

1.058

Moldova (average)

1.43

Standard deviation Poland (average) Standard deviation Romania (average) Standard deviation

.899 (5) 1.48 .888 (4) 1.46 .821 (3)

Russia (average)

1.47

Standard deviation

1.002

Slovakia (average)

1.52

Standard deviation Ukraine (average) Standard deviation

.925 1.21 .487 (1)

.654 (5) 1.29 .659 1.19 .544 (2) 1.36 .721 1.39 .837 1.25 .583 (3) 1.24 .745 1.29 .751 1.21 .613 1.16 .433 (1)

1.39

2.55

2.68

1.72

1.059

1.646

1.934

1.275

1.21

1.72

1.99

1.69

1.050 (2)

1.326

1.236

2.68

2.54

1.49

1.605

1.631

2.15

2.19

1.64

1.459

1.587

1.278

1.99

2.09

1.38

1.199

1.292

2.01

1.62

1.299

1.040

1.97

2.25

1.85

1.468

1.777

1.426

1.59

1.65

1.54

1.021 (1)

1.003

1.024

2.14

2.09

1.60

1.541

1.562

1.124

1.57

1.69

1.50

1.071 (4)

1.152

1.048

2.24

2.16

1.56

1.665

1.772

1.178

1.98

2.00

1.46

1.068 (3)

1.296

1.91

2.00

1.470

1.674

.584 1.33 .791 1.27 .692 1.33 .766 1.21 .649 1.44 .892 1.42 .872 1.29 .639 1.24 .788 1.25 .713 1.25 .694 1.15 .459

.874

.803 1.39 .895

.934 1.36 .788

58

Marek Nowak

Alena Pařízková

Working Europeans1 Abstract: Labour migrants always leave their home country with some expectations or goals which they want to achieve in the destination country. These are strongly influenced by the economic and political situations of both countries. This paper is based on ethnographic research and focuses on the motives and strategies of current labour migrants from the Czech Republic. The research on current migrants shows that they look abroad more for self-realization than for saving money, and the desire to improve language skills plays the greatest role. Yet economic motives persist. The other main factor is the present favourable political situation, which also acts to motivate migrants to look for self-fulfilment. Among migrants there exist two main strategies of entrance—the use of social networks and the use of labour agencies. Key words: Economic migration, influencing factors, motives, strategies of entrance.

Introduction In economic migration individuals leave their home country in order to improve their socioeconomic standard. They leave for better jobs and higher earnings with which they can achieve these better living conditions either back home or in the destination country. The majority of citizens who leave the Czech Republic can be placed in the economic migration category, a situation which is similar to that of other countries of Central Europe.2 The possibility of labour ________________ 1 The author would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Czech Science Foundation (Grant no. 403/09/0038) and of the University of West Bohemia in Plzeň via an internal grant from the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts.  2 Marek Okólski, “The Effects of Political and Economic Transition on International Migration in Central and Eastern Europe,” in: Douglas S. Massey and

60

Alena Pařízková

migration appeared after 1989, when the political regime changed. From that time the countries of Central Europe begin to integrate into the global capitalist economy and to open their markets and societies to the foreign influences of the developed world. This market penetration is considered to be the initiating impulse for the flow of labour migration to the West from this region.3 This flow was started by trade and seasonal workers who returned home with goods or savings and began to create the social infrastructure to sustain and reinforce future migration flows.4 Until the accession of the Czech Republic and seven other countries to the European Union in May 2004, illegality was important part of this process. These legal restrictions emphasized the importance of social networks to the migration process, because they were necessary in order to obtain information and to reduce the risk and costs of the process.5 After 2004 the EU countries slowly started to open their labour markets to the new member states, and opportunities for legal labour migration began to grow.6 Developments in the political situation in both the source and destination country significantly influence migrants, their behaviour, and their strategies and reflections. In the case of Central Europe, economic development has also a significant influence. Since the political changes of 1989, the countries in Central Europe have experienced economic transformations, and these political and economic factors have had the power to influence the motives and goals of labour migrants, and therefore their strategies of entering and staying in the destination country. There also exist other important factors, including social and psychological reasons, which signi________________

J. Edward Taylor (eds.), International Migration Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 35–58. 3 Douglas S. Massey, Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouchi, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor, World in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the end of the Millennium, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 4 Ibidem.   5 Alejandro Portes, “Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual Overview,” in: Alejandro Portes (ed.), The Economic Sociology of Immigration, New York: Roussell Sage Foundation, 1995, pp. 1–41. 6 Such opportunities are also growing for some other non-EU countries, for example New Zealand from 2005. But labour migration within the EU is currently more attractive. 

Working Europeans

61

ficantly influence the migration process, but this paper focuses especially on economic and political factors, for it is they that have dramatically changed during last twenty years, influencing the form of migration flows from the Czech Republic. The paper focuses on the motives for migration, and the strategies and behaviour employed in the destination country. The article’s aim is to describe possible connections between the economic and political situations in both countries, and the migrants’ motives and actions. For this reason a comparison of former and current migrants is made to identify some of the differences in motives and in strategies of migration. This paper is part of a broader research project based on ethnographic research on labour migration from the Czech Republic to foreign countries from the point of view of the individuals involved. The research focuses on Czech labour migrants in the United Kingdom and Ireland. These two countries play significant importance in labour migration flow from the Czech Republic: they opened their labour markets in May 2004 as the Czech Republic entered the European Union. In the middle of the year 2006, approximately 43,000 Czech citizens were working in “old” European countries. From this number, almost 22,000 Czechs7 worked in the United Kingdom.8 For Ireland the numbers are not so high—5,761 Czechs9 worked there in 2005—but together with the United Kingdom it was clearly preferred by Czech citizens in Vavrečkova’s ________________ 7 This estimate was arrived at on the basis of the Worker Registration Scheme in the United Kingdom. Up to 2007, 29,000 Czech citizens were registered in the United Kingdom, but this number doesn’t correspond to the actual numbers of Czechs living in the UK, because the system does not count those migrants who left the country and returned to the Czech Republic.  8 Jana Vavrečková, Jakub Musil and Ivo Baštýř, “Počty a struktury českých migrantů v zahraničí a ekonomická motivace k zahraniční pracovní migraci (se specifickým zaměřením na migranty ve Velké Británii)“ [Numbers and composition of Czech migrants in foreign countries and economic motivation for external labour migration (with specific orientation on migrants in United Kingdom)], Praha: VÚPSV, 2007, available at: . 9 In the same year, 17,600 Czech registered in the United Kingdom. Ministry of labour and social affairs, “Přehled zaměstnanosti občanů ČR na území států EU/EHP a Švýcarska v roce 2006” [Overview of the employment of the citizens of the Czech Republic in the states of EU/EHP and Switzerland]. Interní dokument (internal document).

62

Alena Pařízková

survey of potential migration destination.10 The number of migrants shows that these two countries have been very popular among Czech labour migrants in recent years. There are several reasons for such popularity, at least one of which was mentioned by every respondent of the research. The first important reason is that it is legal: both countries opened their borders and labour markets, so no-one need be worried about legal restrictions or any other consequences of illegal residence and work, which simplifies the whole process of migration. Nor is there a need to deal with bureaucratic systems of visa administration. Another positive aspect of legality in the migration process is the ability to freely cross the border, which means that migrants can always enter and leave the country without fear. The second reason is the English language: Both countries are Englishspeaking countries, and migrants see in this a potential opportunity to learn or improve this language which is so much in demand. As will be shown, many Czechs leave their country for these reasons in particular. The third reason which makes these two countries so attractive for labour migrants is their closeness to the source country. This nearness has some important advantages in the minds of migrants: it lowers travel expenses, and transport is quick. It also gives a sense of security to the migrants, providing a sort of safety-net: You know that if something happens, if you fail, you can go home at any time [Respondent 14].

1. Methodology The research is based primarily on in-depth interviews with labour migrants who worked or still work in the United Kingdom. For the purpose of the study there were two groups of respondents. One group consists of individuals who are current migrants and who currently dwell in Great Britain: the field work focuses on London ________________ 10 Jana Vavrečková, Migrační potenciál po vstupu ČR do EU (Výsledky terénního šetření) [The migration potential after EU accession (Results of field survey)], Praha: VÚPSV, 2006, available at: .

Working Europeans

63

and Bournemouth. London attracts most labour migrants and Bournemouth offers plenty of jobs in the tourism sector. This sample consists of 25 interviews conducted in July 2008 and 35 interviews conducted in July 2009. The second phase of interviewing contains 12 re-interviewed respondents from the previous year. The second group consists of people who had already completed their migrant experience and returned to their home country. This sample consists of 14 interviews conducted in the period from March to May, 2009. The criterion for the selection of respondents of the second group was the length of their emigrant experience, which must have been longer than 2 years and shorter than 10 years. The information from interviews is supported by statistical data from the country of origin and the destination country. A common criterion for the selection of respondent in both groups was their orientation towards nonqualified and low-qualified work positions at the beginning of their migration experience. All participants of research were found through personal networks, the snowball technique, and websites. The period of migration of respondents of both groups in many cases overlaps. For this reason the comparison of both groups was made only in relation to the motives and goals of migrants. For other topics, the data were analyzed together. There were 62 respondents in total, almost equally split between the sexes (32 men, 30 women). More than a half of the respondents (46) were 27–33 years old. The data of the UK Home Office shows that 81% of workers who recorded by the Worker Registration Scheme between May 2004 and March 2009 were 18–34 years old, and the male to female ratio was 56:44.11 These statistics don’t differentiate between the nationalities of migrants, but it can be expected that Czech migrants conform these trends. The range of migrant age also matches Jansen’s definition12 of the likeliest age for migration. The fact that both sexes are represented almost equally in labour migration is the result of the former political and ideological situation: ________________ 11 Home Office, “Accession monitoring report, May 2004 – march 2009,” available at: . 12 Clifford J. Jansen, “Migration: A Sociology Problem,” in: Clifford J. Jansen (ed.), Readings in the Sociology of Migration, Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1970, pp. 3–35.

64

Alena Pařízková

the political ideology of socialism emancipated women in the context of paid work, and made it a norm that they participate in the labour market.13 Most respondents (34) have secondary education, others (23) have higher education, and five are skilled workers. In most cases migration is individual, undertaken independently of family decisions. This is common for most migrants from Central and East Europe.14 We can often find an immigrant non-married couple without children. In the group of the respondents there were 14 who came as part of a couple. Most labour migrants from the Czech Republic plan and undertake their stay in the destination country only for a limited period of time, before returning to the Czech Republic. This follows from the migration potential survey,15 and field research among Czech migrants in the United Kingdom. Most interviewed individuals (29) mentioned that their planned length of stay was 1–2 years. However it is quite common that the planned duration of the stay is extended. Most of the migrants who had returned to the Czech Republic (7) had stayed in the UK for two years, while the length of stay of current migrants is most commonly (33) from three to seven years. The returned migrants had achieved their goals, and wanted to settle down home and end their migration experience. A significant number of respondents also went to the UK without having decided on an exact duration of their visit. A typical comment in this situation is, “We’ll see...”. This way of thinking allows the openness of both spaces and eases the migration and transportation processes. The migrants know that they can go back home anytime they want to. Whether the stay is lengthened or not often also depends on the age and marital status of migrants: young single people concentrate on their experience during their stay, and don’t hurry back home—a place which they may associate with family and with a sedentary lifestyle. Only ten respondents stated that they would never return to ________________ 13 Mirjana Morokvasic, “‘Settled in mobility’: engendering post-wall migration in Europe,” Feminist review 2004, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 7–25; Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, The Politics of Gender after Socialism: A comparative-Historical Essay, Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 2000. 14 M. Morokvasic, op. cit.   15 J. Vavrečková, op. cit.  

Working Europeans

65

the Czech Republic, and that they wanted to settle in the United Kingdom. The rest of the respondents—despite their lack of a clearly defined departure date—still indent to definitely return. Very often this plan is connected with establishing a family. Many respondents mentioned that they wanted to raise their children in the Czech Republic. Plans of return to the Czech Republic are sometimes complicated by the migrant’s involvement in a relationship with a foreigner, whether British or of another nationality. They know that it is difficult to find a solution to this problem, and this is why they frequently postpone solving it, despite their desire to return home.

2. Motives and goals Migrants always have some motives for leaving their homeland, and some goals which they wish to achieve during the migration process. There exist a wide range of motives, related to many aspects of an individual’s life. The motives may be influenced by material condition, by family, by deprivation, by social networks, by values, and by lifestyle. A significant class of motives for labour migration are those connected to economic factors. These are of various sorts, including the goal of accumulating money for a specific reason, the desire to avoid unemployment in the home region, for the search for better employment conditions. The importance of these motives varies with the development of the economic situation in both countries. From the point of view of traditional economic micromodels of labour migration, these are individuals who want to increase their income and improve their living conditions. For this reason, they go to places where there are higher earnings and greater demand for labour.16 This purely economic view of the migration process has been subjected to strong criticism over the years, yet differences in wages remain a factor influencing migrants.17 Migration research has shown how social networks play an important role in the migration process, especially since they maintain and reinforce the ________________ 16 17

D.S. Massey et al., op. cit.  Ibidem. 

66

Alena Pařízková

flow between countries.18 While the migration process is embedded in a social context, it is nonetheless the result of interactions of social, economic, and political factors.19 In this paper I am especially concerned with economic and political factors, although the influence of social factors is also included. Therefore from an economic perspective migrants look for a country with higher earnings, which helps them first to accumulate funds faster, and then to fulfil their goals, which is their priority. The economic situation in the Czech Republic and low exchange rate of the Czech Crown for a long time encouraged this economic perspective. After 1989, the Czech Republic went through an economic and political transformation, but as a consequence of previous economic and political developments the economic situation of the Czech Republic was worse than the situation of most of “old” European countries, especially the United Kingdom. Even though the Czech Republic is slowly approaching the economic level of these “old” countries, difference in earnings and purchasing power still exist.20 Yet as the gap in earnings and living standards is changing, so is the importance and meaning of monetary resources. The situation started to change around the end of 2006. The Czech Republic was showing stable and positive economic growth, and continually growing standard of living.21 Opposed to this, there stood the decreasing exchange rate of the Pound Sterling with the Czech Crown, converging purchasing power in net earnings, and high competition between migrants in the labour market in traditional destination countries. An example is the exchange rate of Pound ________________ 18 Monica Boyd, “Family and personal networks in international migration: recent developments and new agendas,” International Migration Review 1989, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 638–670; A. Portes, op. cit.; D.S. Massey et al., op. cit.  19 M. Boyd, op. cit.   20 In a comparison of the 2007 purchasing power of citizens of European countries, the United Kingdom was in seventh place and the Czech Republic was in twenty-second place. Petr Gola, “Propastné rozdíly průměrné mzdy a kupní síly” [Abysmal differences of average earnings and purchasing power], 2008, available at: . 21 ČSÚ [Czech statistical office], “Česká republika: hlavní makroekonomické ukazatele” [The Czech Republic: main macro-economic indicators], available at: .

Working Europeans

67

Sterling, which was at its peak between in the years 1999–2001 at around 57 crowns to 1 pound, and thereafter slowly started to decline. A sharp drop occurred in the middle of 2007, and currently the exchange rate is around 30 crowns to the pound.22 These are effects which significantly influence the motives and strategies of labour migrants. One indicators of this development can be seen in the decreasing number of Czechs registered for work in the United Kingdom. In last three years, the number of applicants to the Worker Registration System has been falling by about 1,000 applicants per year, and the evidence suggests that it will continue to fall in the year 2009.23 This development is reflected in one respondent’s statement: It’s important to realize that being here slowly stops paying off. Seven years ago, when I arrived, one pound was 60 crowns, but now it’s only worth 30. It’s OK for living, but you don’t save so much [Respondent 12].

The results from the research of the current migrants show that they look abroad more for self-realization than for money. For most migrants, the financial part of migration is still important but not a main goal. Usually the decision to migrate is composed of several motivations and goals. Currently an important role is played by the fact that legal residence and work is possible, and the simplicity of the process is also significant. While leaving for a foreign country is still associated with some risk, political circumstances, and the strong infrastructure connecting the two countries lower the risks in the eyes of migrants. ________________ 22 “Kurzy.cz. Graf Kč / GBP, ČNB, grafy kurzů měn” [Czech national bank – graphs of the exchange rates for currencies], available at: . 23 Home Office, “Control of immigration: quarterly statistical summary, United Kingdom. January – March 2009,” available at: . There is the question of whether the decrease in applicants in the years 2008 and 2009 is due to better economic developments in the Czech Republic, or the economic crisis which has lowered the opportunities for work in the United Kingdom. Some importance may also be attached to the increasing number of open labour markets available in the European Union, but this may not be significant.

68

Alena Pařízková

Respondents mentioned 15 different reasons for deciding to go to the United Kingdom. Among the current migrants, language plays the most important role. Their main motive was their insufficient level of their English language skills, and they defined their goal as the need to learn or improve their English (28 respondents). The language was also an important aspect of migration for the former migrants. Despite the small sample size of former migrants, there are some differences: firstly, for the former migrants the language wasn’t the first and only reason to migrate. Secondly, the current migrants do not rely solely on daily contact with the language and communication with native speakers in order to learn, which is what the former migrants did. Rather they tend to invest time and money in improving their language skills: nearly one third of respondents (19) paid for and attended language classes in the United Kingdom. This systematic effort supports the weakening of financial motives, for if the financial side of migration were dominant then the migrants would work as many hours as they could in order to make money. When an employer offered them overtime, they would accept them, stay at work, and as a consequence attend language courses less regularly. For this reason they wouldn’t want to pay for courses which they don’t attend consistently. The next factor is tiredness: it is difficult to work a lot and then afterwards attend language classes, and do homework. Respondents mentioned these reasons for not attending language courses, although language was an important goal for them. They rather depend on communication with natives. This can be generalized to other migrants with strong economic motivations. However among the current migrants, some respondents stated that they improve the language by studying themselves and by communicating with natives. Yet depending on daily communication with natives can be a very unreliable way of learning the language, since it depends strongly on migrants’ surroundings, both at home, and more especially in work. If they work and live with other migrants, it will be very difficult for them to improve their skills to a significant level. An interesting method of learning was independently used by three respondents: they learned the language not only by everyday contact, but also by playing online games in English, which served as their main educational method.

Working Europeans

69

The language is so important not only because migrants want to invest in their own education, but also because they know that English improves their chances in the labour market. The language is the key to getting a good job. If a migrant plans to develop a career, he or she needs a good level in English. In general, ignorance of the language is a significant barrier to obtaining work opportunities. This emphasis on the language motive does not mean that economic reasons play no role. The next two motives belong in economic category. The second reason for migration was to earn “some amount of money” (12 respondents). For 9 respondents, this was the main reason for their migration. They planned to save money for buying a flat or for funding other travel. The others just thought about saving an indeterminate amount of money. In interviews with a small sample of former migrants, financial resources were more important, occurring as the main reason 11 times. The language as a second motive for migration was mentioned only 5 times. At present saving money is difficult if a person wants to have a satisfying standard of living and personal life. The third reason for migrating was connected with employment and the lack of it in the Czech Republic (9 respondents). These respondents were either unemployed or unhappy at work. An unsatisfying job—or the lack of a job—may trigger migration, especially when the individual has already been considering the idea for some time. This motive was often associated with other motives—such as improving language skills or improving one’s knowledge of the destination country. This motive also shows how the current migrants think about both the source and the destination country. Distances are getting shorter thanks to good infrastructure, and the favourable political situation simplifies the process so that moving within the Czech Republic can sometimes be as complicated as moving to England, as shown in this statement: Since I had to go to Prague, why not go to London? [Respondent 7]

In the view of this respondent, the travel time is almost the same, and it is only necessary to use a different means of transport. Others aspects don’t make much difference: visits to home are difficult from both destinations, and both places feature fewer friends and more expensive accommodation. When the respondent compared both

70

Alena Pařízková

destinations, he or she chose to move to London as it appeared to be a place which could offer more experiences. A further economic motive for migration was the search for better business opportunities: three respondents moved for this reason, finding in the UK a more liberal environment and less red tape for business. All of them had had experience in the Czech Republic and were unsatisfied with the legal system and bureaucratic situation there. Other motives which were mentioned included the desire for knowledge, “boredom” with the Czech Republic, and problems in personal relationships at home. Divorce or splitting up with a partner can serve as a significant impulse for migration, which can act as a way of leaving the problems behind. There also exist significant political influences on migration, which mainly affect the decision itself. Since 2004 there has been no political restriction on moving, no need to apply for a visa, and no immigration controls to be feared, all of which strongly supports migration, its motivations, and its goals. The favourable political situation motivates migrants to search for self-fulfilment. They don’t have to hide, and they can think about career and study. Almost a quarter of respondents studied specific courses to increase their qualifications. The change in the motives and goals of labour migrants also has consequences in the living standards they demand. In the view of the classic economic migration model, it can be considered that the temporary nature of migration and the expectation of considerable improvement in a migrant’s financial situation might tend the migrant to accept lower standards of living, and worse working conditions, because all this helps to increase the profit. In a situation where migrants want to accumulate some amount of money in a short time, they greatly lower their standards of living they demand. They don’t mind living in a shared house with ten other immigrants, or sharing a small kitchen and bathroom to save money. They also cut their expenses in many other ways, not frequenting restaurants or pubs at all, or at least only on special occasions. They may buy the cheapest food in large supermarkets, scornfully referred to as “Tesco Value food” by some current migrants. For them this is a symbol of the kind of migrant who came only for money, and who has no other interests in the country.

Working Europeans

71

Most current migrants still live in shared houses, but selected according to their financial situation. They generally look for flats or houses with housemates, and want to some comfort and privacy. Seven respondents lived in a flat with only their partner. One worker for a Czech agency which provides accommodation in London acknowledged the increasing number of requests for better quality accommodation, stating that their clients want to stay in a house with less housemates, and where the furniture is clean and properly functioning. They won’t settle for less comfort and will complain if they are not satisfied.

3. Strategies of entrance There are two main kind of strategy of entrance, depending on the political situation at the time of migration. The dividing point is May 2004, when the United Kingdom opened its labour market to the newly acceded states. Some of the former migrants came to the country in the years 2001–2005, and nine arrived after 2004—after the Czech Republic entered the EU. The current migrants entered the country in the years 2000–2008, 18 of them coming before the opening of British labour market. These strategies are also sometimes influenced former migration experiences of the migrant. Among the respondents, it is possible to identify two dominant ways of entering the country and its labour market. The first significant way is by using social networks. These are an important resource for migrants to lower the risks and costs of the migration process.24 The easiest way to integrate oneself into social migration networks is via relatives or friends: these ties within the family or close relationships provide migrants with information about the process, help them succeed in the labour market, and give them a feeling of security. Nineteen respondents were helped by a friend or relatives, often with their orientation in the destination country, and sometimes with getting a job. Weaker ties can be also effectively help by acting as a ________________ 24

M. Boyd, op. cit.; A. Portes, op. cit. 

72

Alena Pařízková

broader source of information.25 An example of such a contact might be the daughter of someone a parent of migrant works with. In some cases the migrants do not actually contact these people for information; it is enough to know that the person is there and closer than those at home. Sometimes weak ties from home are not used: currently it is not difficult to obtain information from specialized websites26 or from housemates. Some respondents mentioned their housemates as effective sources of information, especially when no friend or relatives are available. Secondly, the use of agencies has also become increasingly important, with 21 respondents using their services at the beginning of the migration process. Using an agency gives them the feeling of security: they don’t want to risk staying in the destination country without accommodation and work. It is reasonable to use the services of an agency when a person doesn’t have any trusted contacts in the destination country. The importance of such services in the migration process is emphasized by one respondent: I had never been here before [Britain] and I didn’t know the country. Most people don’t go blindly, and at least it’s good to have accommodation. The agency arranges this. You can’t [otherwise] get accommodation without the help of a friend. With an agency accommodation is certain. There are agencies for everything here [Respondent 31]

The services of au pair agencies were used by 13 of these cases. Only 2 respondents entered the United Kingdom this way after 2004. The rest used an au pair visa as the only possibility they had to legally enter the country and legally work there before 2004. In total 20 respondents used au pair status sometime in their life. In eleven cases they began their current migration as an au pair, and the rest used it at some time in the past. They went to the United Kingdom or to the USA. An important factor here appears to be the possession of previ________________ 25 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 1973, vol. 78, no. 6, pp. 1360–1380. 26 There are plenty of sites on the web which both specialize in migration generally, and specialize in migration to a particular country. They offer not only direct information on how to get there and on what is needed, but they also they offer space for discussion, exchanging experience, and contacting others. 

Working Europeans

73

ous migration experience. Nine of the respondents had had previous experience staying in a foreign country before their current migration, usually as an au pair. This experience helped them to enter the space of the destination country, gave them a greater sense of security during the migration, and helped them to orient themselves more easily in the new destination. Typically they still have some contacts (migrant or local) in the former country. They already have some experience that qualifies them for greater success in the migration process. Strategies of entrance are gendered. Migration ties are important for both genders, but more for men than for women. However, using au pair agencies is more typical for women than for men. When entering the United Kingdom was still legally difficult, only 3 men compared with 9 women from the group of current migrants used an au pair agency. This disparity is due to the existing gender segregation in the labour market and in households. The Communist regime proclaimed the emancipation and equality of men and women, but the reality was somewhat different, because the responsibility for care of children and the house remained exclusively with women. Women were considered as a category that needs special attention, and in this way existing gender stereotypes were maintained. For this reason women’s work was primarily in the service and care sectors.27 The position of an au-pair seems, from this point of view, to be more suitable for women than for men. For women it is considered to be more “natural” than for men to work as an au pair, so in this service they are overrepresented. For this reason men are more dependent on social networks when other kinds of labour agencies exist.28 Because it is now legal for Czechs to reside and work in the United Kingdom, it is no longer necessary to use au pair agencies exclusively. With the increasing demand for labour migration to the United Kingdom, plenty of agencies have appeared promising to ease and secure the migration process. Eleven respondents used the services of Czech agencies. This is the case when a migrant doesn’t ________________

S. Gal and G. Kligman, op. cit.  At present in the EU these disparities persist in Germany and Austria, which have not yet fully opened their labour market, and which have many au pair agencies.  27 28

74

Alena Pařízková

have any contacts in the destination country. The fear that they won’t find accommodation and work forces them to use such agencies. British labour agencies are another type: they arrange work not only for foreigners but also for UK citizens. They are part of the British labour market, and migrants learn to use them, particularly because not only can they find you a job, but their services are also free. Another important way of finding a job is through social contacts, or via websites.

Conclusion The article demonstrates how changing economic and political situations shape migrants’ motives and strategies in the migration process. In general, in every migration process two kinds of factor act: those that push people to move away from the source country, and those that pull people to the destination. In the context of Czech-UK migration, Czech citizens perceive stronger pull factors towards the UK, and weaker push factors away from the Czech Republic. At the present time the strongest pull factors are the English language, higher earnings, and the simplicity of the migration process. The push factors are weaker but not negligible: even though the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic has been low for a long time,29 the problem of finding work can still trigger migration. In interviews with respondents this factor was sometimes “hidden,” not mentioned among the reasons for migration, but rather emerging during the interview. Another economic push factor is dissatisfaction with one’s job or earnings in the home country. Some other push factors of different kinds involve personal reasons, especially separation from a partner. The motives and goals of migrants conformed to these factors. The most significant motive among current migrants is the desire to learn or improve their English language skills. The difference here with the

________________

29 According to the Czech statistical office (ČSÚ), the unemployment rate was 8.8% in 2000, and from there it declined to 4.4% in 2008. ČSÚ, “Zaměstnanost a nezaměstnanost v ČR podle výsledků VŠPS – časové řady” [Employment and unemployment in the Czech Republic according the results of VŠPS – time series], available at: .

Working Europeans

75

past is that they are now willing to invest their time and money into it. Economic reasons have lesser importance for current migrants. However this doesn’t mean that the economic side of the migration process is unimportant. They need to work to finance their stay, and so their evaluation of their job and the search for a better one is an important part of their thinking about their experience. The migrant network and migration industry provide for the persistence of the migration process.30 The importance of social ties has been known for a long time, since they serve not only to obtaining information but also to make securing all the process involved and to lower risks.31 In the case of migrants from the Czech Republic, the importance of weak ties can also be highlighted: in many cases the contact in the United Kingdom is a friend from a former job or abode. The migration industry strongly supports the maintenance of migration flows. First of all, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom are connected by good infrastructure, with air services especially being very effective. Secondly, many labour agencies offer their services, and their existence is influenced by the political situation. Before 2004 au pair agencies were more significant because they offered a legal way to enter the United Kingdom and its labour market. Some migrants used them as a strategy of safe entrance and an opportunity to orient themselves in the country. The use of this type of agency is gendered: in the context of the prevailing gender segregation, au pair migration is used more by women than by men. Political and economic developments influence how migrants see their possibilities and benefits from the migration process. The open European migration space, with its stable and positive economic situation makes the migration process secure and enables migrants to think differently about it. Among the current migrants, there are many who have lower economic expectations and look instead for self-realization. Their legal situation gives them a certain selfconfidence to seek a better position in the society of the destination country. This self-definition is also supported by the economic situation of their country of origin, because most of the migrants earn ________________ 30 31

D.S. Massey et al., op. cit.  E.g. A. Portes, op. cit. 

76

Alena Pařízková

money only for themselves, for their own needs and goals. From this perspective, it can be said that they are looking for that kind of life situation which they could call “normal.” They want the living condition and standards which they would have in their home country. As stated by one of the respondents, they are not “some” immigrants, they are working Europeans. They are a part of the EU migration system, and this gives them positions with some rights. In 2008 the credit crunch appeared and affected economies all around the world. The migrants interviewed in 2009 mostly stated that the crisis hadn’t affected their lives directly. Their life in the United Kingdom didn’t change much.32 The further question remains of showing whether and how the crisis will affect migration flows from the Czech Republic.

________________ 32 Some migrants mentioned that they had heard about unemployed migrants returning to Eastern Europe, but from among their friends and contacts in the United Kingdom only a few people had left. 

Guglielmo Meardi

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU Abstract: The chapter discusses the interactions between trade unions and migrants in the case of intra-EU migration following the EU enlargement eastwards. Against representations of unions as insiders’ exclusionary organizations, it will point to the rich evidence of cooperation between unions and migrants, not only from top-down but also from bottom-up. In the case of the EU, it is argued, unions have particular incentives to organize migrants rather than oppose them. However the role of unions is much more difficult in the case of movement of services. Keywords: migration, European Union, trade unions, international solidarity.

Introduction In debates on the liberalization of the movement of services in the EU (the so-called Bolkenstein Directive), on freedom of movement, and in legal cases concerning “social dumping” in the European Court of Justice, migrants from the new EU member states are often portrayed as a threat to established worker rights in Western Europe. This is consistent with some traditional approaches to labour migration, but oversimplifies the dynamic nature of the current migration flows and their interactions with labour regulations and worker organizations. This paper discusses the nature of the movement of workers in the EU, and the interaction between Central Eastern European workers and labour market institutions in the West (especially in the United Kingdom). It will argue that the “transnational” nature of current

78

Guglielmo Meardi 

migrations, and the emerging elements of a European civil society prevent a simple opposition between eastern and western European workers, despite political and legal pressures in that direction. The role of trade unions, in particular, differs in most countries from the “protectionist” one that is traditionally associated with them, and they are also open to migrants in allegedly “restrictive” countries such as Germany. Differences between the social and legal nature of labour migration and of the movement of services, however, cause differences in union capacities and attitudes.

1. Trade unions: from exclusive to inclusive actors? Current debates on labour markets are frequently framed within an “insider-outsider” model. Typically, insiders would be middle-aged male local workers belonging to the ethnic majority, with no disability, while the most typical outsiders are migrants. To guarantee the perpetuation of their advantageous position, insiders have a number of institutional devices—the most typical of which, it is argued, is the trade union. As a corollary, within the EU it is often claimed that western European trade unions are potential obstacles to the employment opportunities of migrants from the new member states. However, while it is historically true that trade unions in many cases have supported barriers against migrants, this is less and less the case around the world. Moreover, it will be argued, this is least true in the case of the EU, given the transnational nature of much intra-EU migration and the specific forms of socialization European trade unions are involved in. This does not automatically mean, however, that trade unions will help migrants and outsiders instead. Trade union action on migration is still limited, and is particularly difficult on the emerging issue of movement of services and posting of workers abroad. The insider-outsider idea of migration is rooted in structuralist conceptions of the labour market. A pioneering work in this regard was that of Piore,1 who argued that capitalist economies require ________________ 1 Michael J. Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

79 

continuous flows of new migrants in order to maintain occupational hierarchies, that is to provide labour for low-prestige occupations (marginal jobs). Without migrants, employers would have to pay local workers considerably higher salaries to take these positions, which in turn would have caused demands for higher pay from workers in mainstream jobs, who would not accept being paid as little as those in marginal jobs. Old migrants are never enough, as they gradually socialize into the host society and adapt their understanding of prestige and their economic demands to the local practices. Piore’s work resonates, but in a more sophisticated way, with the Marxist arguments by Castle and Kosack,2 who similarly see migration as a capitalist strategy, but without distinguishing between labour market sectors. According to them, migration is used to keep wages low in general, and trade unions are in the difficult situation of having to resist it, but at the same time to offer solidarity to immigrants. The distinction between insiders and outsiders varies by country, and among industrialized economies it is assumed to be strongest in “Southern European” and “Continental” welfare states, especially Germany.3 An emerging consensus in organizations like the OECD and the EU argues that flexible labour markets such as those in English-speaking or Scandinavian countries constitute a solution to such labour market segmentation. In the past there have been famous cases of trade unions erecting barriers against migration. The American Federation of Labor campaigned for migration controls from the turn of the twentieth century until the 1920s, when it obtained them, and around 1900 exclusionary practices against migrant groups (especially Eastern and Southern Europeans, and even more against the Chinese) were commonplace in US unions. French trade unions were still asking for migration controls around 1970,4 despite the rise of new social movements at the time. ________________ 2 Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973. 3 Maurizio Ferrera, Anton Hemerijck and Martin Rhodes, The Future of Social Europe, Lisbon: Celta Editora, 2000. 4 S. Castles and G. Kosack, op. cit.  

80

Guglielmo Meardi 

However, Piore5 had already noted that unions are not permanently against migrants, and that migrants are not permanently excluded from trade unions. By the 1930s, second-generation migrants undergoing assimilation in the USA were joining the unions en masse, and the development of industrial unionism, replacing the more selective craft unions, offered an opportunity for their incorporation.6 Yet the image of unions as insider strongholds remained, and still remains, strong. Historically an association between mass migration and the weakening of trade unions (notably at the beginning and the end of the twentieth century) cannot be denied in the USA.7 More recently there has been an increase in the number of studies on trade unions policies towards migration, following the emergence of debates on globalization.8 These studies have problematized the role of trade unions, pointing at the dilemmas they face and at the strategies and choices they could develop. Importantly, migrant characteristics (such as language, educational level, country of origin, ________________

M.J. Piore, op. cit.  Ruth Milkman, Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Contemporary California, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2000. 7 Roger Waldinger and Claudia Der-Martirosian, “Immigrant Workers and American Labor: Challenge… or Disaster?” in: Ruth Milkman (ed.), Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Contemporary California, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2000, pp. 49–80. 8 E.g. Albert Martens, “Migratory Movements: The Position, the Outlook. Charting a Theory and Practice for Trade Unions,” in: Andrea Rea, Nouria Ouali and John Wrench (eds.), Migrants, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Integration and Exclusion in Europe, St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1999; Leah Haus, Unions, Immigration and Internationalization: New Challenges and Changing Coalition in the United States and France, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2002; Julie Watts, Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization: Unions and Employers in Unlikely Alliance, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002; R. Milkman, op. cit.; Ruth Milkman (ed.), L.A. Story, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006; Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad (eds.), Trade unions, Immigration and Immigrants in Europe 1960–1993. A Comparative Study of the Actions of Trade Unions in Seven West European Countries, New York: Berghahn Books, 2000; John Wrench, “Trade union responses to immigrants and ethnic inequality in Denmark and the UK: the context of consensus and conflict,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 2004, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 7–30. 5 6

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

81 

and previous experience in unions) have been shown to have hardly any influence on union inclusion outcomes.9 At the same time, empirical studies have dismissed the complementary idea that migrants are not likely to unionize. Their propensity toward joining unions is actually high, and in the USA, is even independent of the migrant’s legal status (documented or undocumented), although the length of past and planned stay in the country is very important.10 Where density of union membership among migrants is low, it is an effect of occupational segregation and the difficulty migrants have getting jobs in unionized workplaces.11 Overall empirical evidence suggests that it is the institutions of industrial relations, as well as union attitudes and practices, rather than subjective factors related to migrant workers, which are the most important factors in the determination of union-migrants relations. Nonetheless, migrants are also actors of change and, for instance, their self-organization can in turn affect unions.12 The most recent studies challenge, therefore, the frequently held assumption of a difficult relationship between migrants and trade unions. Both the European and the North American reality have shown that the opposite can be the case: trade unions (even if with some major ambiguities) can be at the forefronts of migrant defence and organization, in countries as different as the UK,13 Spain, Italy,14 and the USA.15 Even in the supposedly exclusionary corporatist Germany and Switzerland, trade unions have organized migrants to a ________________

R. Penninx and J. Roosblad (eds.), op. cit.  R. Milkman, op. cit.  11 R. Waldinger and C. Der-Martirosian, op. cit.   12 E.g. John Wrench, “Ethnic Minorities and Workplace Organization in Britain: Trade Unions, Participation and Racism,” Paper at the Conference “Ethnic Minorities and their Chances of Participation: A comparison between France, Great Britain, The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany”, Bonn, 1992; Satnam Virdee and Keith Grint, “Black Self-organisation in Trade Unions,” Sociological Review 1994, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 202–226. 13 Gamze Avci and Christopher McDonald, “Chipping Away at the Fortress: Unions, Immigration and the Transnational Labour Market,” International Migration 2000, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 191–212.  14 J. Watts, op. cit.   15 R. Milkman (ed.), L.A. Story, op. cit.   9

10

82

Guglielmo Meardi 

large and growing extent.16 According to Haus,17 the factors behind American and French unions’ moves towards inclusive practices are economic and political internationalization, and the entrenchment of the human rights discourse. The former means that trade unions are now aware of the impossibility of preventing migration, and the latter refers to the fact that it would be inconsistent for a trade union’s own policies and campaigns to be seen to be working against migration. Watts reiterates18 the point on internationalization in the case of the shifts of French, Spanish, and Italian unions towards open migration policies. She also adds two more factors: the importance of the illegal economy (especially in Italy and Spain), with the consequent union interest in channelling migrants towards legal status; and organizational needs in the face of declining membership—a point also made by Milkman.19 These studies focus mostly on migration from outside the EU, and were carried out before EU enlargement. The next sections will discuss whether the reality of mass migration following the enlargement confirms the thesis of a promigrant shift in labour organizations.

2. Challenges of the EU enlargement During the negotiations leading to the 2004 EU enlargement eastwards, the freedom of movement of workers was the most debated social issue. Although they did not formally take a position against enlargement or against the principle of freedom of movement, some western trade unions, especially the German and Austrian ones, supported the introduction of transition periods as protection for the host country labour markets.20 The overall debate on migration was

________________

16 Barbara Schmitter, “Trade Unions and Immigration Politics in Switzerland and Germany,” Politics and Society 1981, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 317–334; Roland Erne, European Unions, Cornell: ILR Press, 2008. 17 L. Haus, op. cit.   18 J. Watts, op. cit.   19 R. Milkman (ed.), L.A. Story, op. cit.   20 Guglielmo Meardi, “The Trojan Horse for the Americanization of Europe? Polish Industrial Relations Toward the EU,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 2002, no. 8, pp. 77–99; Dorothee Bohle and Dóra Husz, “Whose Europe is it? Interest

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

83 

polarized between the EU arguing that migration flows would be minor—as in the previous enlargement to Southern Europe in the 1980s21—and some fears of massive “social raids” which would dismantle western European welfare states.22 In fact, migration flows after 2004 to those countries that had not introduced transitional barriers (initially the UK, Sweden, and Ireland), were much larger than the EU expected, but also more employment-oriented and economically beneficial than the skeptics feared. At the same time, however, the previously neglected issue of the freedom of movement of services and posting of workers abroad has led to tensions, both symbolically and in real disputes. The mythical figure of the “Polish plumber” was a crucial factor in the French rejection of the European Constitution in the referendum of May 2005. Real tensions emerged in the transport sector, and major disputes occurred in both transport and construction (sectors where labour mobility is a normal occurrence). The Laval and Viking union disputes in Sweden and Finland led to rulings by the European Court of Justice (on these cases as well as on the Rüffert and Luxembourg ones) which had the effect of undermining union efforts to protect established worker rights. But the freedom of movement of workers as such—by far the biggest social concern—failed to confirm the worst fears, at least until the start of the economic downturn in 2008. Some common union reactions to further liberalization took place, with at least partially successful union protests against the “Bolkestein Directive,”23 following the previous example of the Port Services Directive,24 which although only indirectly connected with enlargement, had proved the potential of cross-border mobilization ________________

group action in accession negotiations: The cases of competition policy and labor migration,” Politique Europeenne 2005, no. 15, pp. 85–112. 21 Tito Boeri and Herbert Brücker, “Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labour Markets: Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities,” IZA Discussion Paper 2001, no. 256. 22 Hans-Werner Sinn and Wolfgang Ochel, “Social Union, Convergence and Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 2003, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 869–896. 23 Katarzyna Gajewska, Transnational Labour Solidarity, London: Routledge, 2009. 24 Peter Turnbull, “The War on Europe’s Waterfront – Repertoires of Power in the Port Transport Industry,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 2006, vol. 44, pp. 305–326.

84

Guglielmo Meardi 

on EU policies. The social concerns marginalized by the enlargement can reemerge even more strongly because of it. The situation of migration is made more complex because of different regulations that the various old member states have introduced. Between 2006 and 2009, most old member states followed the example of the UK, Ireland, and Sweden in opening their borders, leaving Austria and Germany as the only member states applying restrictions until the final deadline of 2011. The movement of workers from the new to the old member states was unprecedented in the EU, and estimated at around one million migrants to the UK and 200,000 to Ireland. For the first time in the history of the EU, the assumption that mobility is a prerogative of capital but not labour has been proved wrong, and this has not failed to impact on the power relations between capital and labour. Even if the “voice” of employees in the new member states has remained feeble, their massive exit has forced employers, and to a lesser extent governments, to introduce important concessions, leading to higher than expected wage growth and some improvements in employment conditions. Moreover the effect of the exodus on the labour market have in turn resulted in more attention being paid to the voice of employees, with multiple instances of trade union revitalization and new-found assertiveness:25 strike levels increased in 2007 (though from very low levels) in the new member states, while they kept falling in the old ones.26 Immigration can be a threat to labour conditions.27 In the case of the enlargement, the disruptions to social standards have been noticed not only in working conditions in the receiving states, but also in the social conditions in the “leaving states”—in particular in the extreme case of Latvia.28 A government census (not survey) of migrants’ families in Poland found 110,000 so-called Euro-orphans, ________________ 25 Guglielmo Meardi, “More Voice after more Exit? Unstable Industrial Relations in Central Eastern Europe,” Industrial Relations Journal 2007, vol. 38, pp. 503–523. 26 Mark Carley, Developments in Industrial Action 2003–2007, Dublin: Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008.  27 S. Castles, G. Kosack, op. cit.   28 Charles Woolfson, “Labour Standards and Labour Migration in the new Europe: Post-communist Legacies and Perspectives,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 2007, vol. 13, pp. 199–218.

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

85 

i.e. children missing at least one parent (and often both) to migration,29 raising in Europe the issue of “care drain.”30 Unexpected migration has also modified the terms of an EastWest divide among trade unions. While trade unions usually have an interest in controlling the supply of labour and limiting migration, once migrants have arrived (or when their imminent arrival can no longer be prevented), they have an interest in organizing and defending them—bypassing reciprocal scepticism. How this has happened is discussed in sections 3 and 4.31

3. Trade union reactions to intra-EU migration In such a situation of strain on both sides of the migration movement, the risk of mobilization against migrants rather than for their social rights was strong. This is an instance where the risk of conflicts between eastern and western trade unions was particularly high, as had been indicated by tensions during the accession process.32 The possibility of the specific risk of liaisons dangereuses between western European employers and eastern European labour in converging against employment protection in western Europe was raised. The diverging interests of some of the western trade unions (especially in Germany and Austria) and eastern trade unions33 might have turn into a divide between western and eastern labour. Indeed, ________________

“Co czują EUrosieroty” [What do EUro-orphans feel?], Gazeta Wyborcza 2008, 12 May.  30 Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie R. Hochschild (eds.), Global Woman, New York: Metropolitan, 2003. 31 An earlier version of sections 3 and 4 was published in “Union Immobility? Trade Unions and the Freedoms of Movement in the Enlarged EU,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 2010, vol. 48, no. 4.  32 G. Meardi, “The Trojan Horse for the Americanization of Europe?” op. cit.   33 Ibidem; Georg Menz, The Political Economy of Managed Migration. Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Torben Krings, “A Race to the Bottom? Trade Unions, EU Enlargement and the Free Movement of Labour,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 2009, vol. 15, pp. 49–69; Béla Galgóczi, Janine Leschke and Andrew Watt (eds.), EU Labour Migration since Enlargement, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009. 29

86

Guglielmo Meardi 

the European Trade Union Confederation elaborated its own policy against transitional limits on the freedom of movement of workers, but lacked the authority to impose it on its reluctant Austrian and German members (resolution “Towards Free Movement of Workers in an Enlarged European Union”, December 2005). The cases of liaisons dangereuses between labour and capital, as well as international intra-labour conflicts have remained extremely rare, though. Much more visible have been the organizing efforts by trade unions regarding the new migrants, especially in the UK and Ireland,34 which have led to numerous successes and to attention in the media, with even reports of Polish migrants as “bringing solidarity back in fashion in Britain”.35 The organization of migrants in the UK included innovative practices such as cooperation with ethnic associations (e.g. with the Polish Catholic Association in Birmingham) and the setting up of Polish-language sections (in Southampton and Glasgow). It focused on two particularly important antidotes to migrant exploitation: provision of information on employment rights, and skills—including recognition qualifications and English language skills. Regarding the former issue, the unions made an effort to publish information materials, and it is now unlikely that any new migrant would not to receive a publication on employee rights in their own language. Moreover the unions reinforced their campaigning for employment rights in Temporary Work Agencies, an important labour market segregating institution: over one third of new migrants receive their first job from such agencies, which in the UK do not guarantee the same rights as do direct employees. This campaign had some success, forcing the government to introduce new legislation in 2008 and preparing the ground for EU regulations. On the second issue, the defence of free ________________

34 Jane Hardy and Ian Fitzgerald, “Negotiating ‘Solidarity’ and Internationalism: The Response of Polish Trade Unions to Migration,” Industrial Relations Journal 2010, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 367–381; Jason Heyes, “Recruiting and Organising Migrant Workers Through Education and Training: A Comparison of Community and the GMB,” Industrial Relations Journal 2009, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 182–197; G. Meardi, “A Suspended Status: The Puzzle of Polish Workers in the West Midlands,” in: Heinz Fassmann, Max Haller and David Lane (eds.), Migration and Mobility in Europe, Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2009, pp. 102–122. 35 Guardian 2006, 6 December.  

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

87 

English language classes (threatened by public funding cuts)—and the subsequent provision of them directly by the unions through the government-sponsored Union Learning Fund36—became an important area of both organizational activity and service. Western trade unions have also engaged in cross-border coordination. The most significant activity has been the cooperation with eastern European trade unions (mostly Polish, given the “critical mass” of Polish migration), leading to the posting of organizers from the Polish trade unions Solidarity and OPZZ to UK and Ireland, which in turn facilitated the recruitment of activists and organizers among migrants. Such cooperation is made easier by the frequently “transnational” nature of intra-EU migration, and it has established inclusion as the dominant union approach towards migrants.37 British trade unions have proved to have the strategic capacity of putting migration in the broader context, avoiding the temptations of localized exclusionary conflicts. The Trades Union Congress placed the migration issue within the broader social context of—not exclusively migrant—vulnerable work,38 shifting the focus from migrants to poor employee rights as the problem: the case of Temporary Work Agencies shows clearly that campaigns for migrants can also improve working conditions for large numbers of British workers. The British experience is similar to that of Ireland39 and of construction sector unions in other European countries, especially Switzerland.40 Combined, they represent clear examples of new cooperation between trade unions and other social movements in complex social settings, and not simply in the workplace, something which has received particular attention in the USA.41 ________________

J. Heyes, op. cit.  J. Hardy and I. Fitzgerald, op. cit.  38 TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment, Hard Work, Hidden Lives. Commission Report, London: Trades Union Congress, 2008. 39 Tony Dundon, Maria Gonzalez-Perez and Terrence McDonough, “Bitten by the Celtic Tiger: immigrant workers and industrial relations in the new ‘Glocalised’ Ireland,” Economic and Industrial Democracy 2007, vol. 28, pp. 501–522. 40 R. Erne, op. cit.   41 R. Milkman (ed.), L.A. Story, op. cit.; Lowell Turner and Daniel Cornfield (eds.), Labor in the New Urban Battlegrounds: Local Solidarity in a Global Economy, Ithaca: ILR Press, 2007.  36 37

88

Guglielmo Meardi 

However, in terms of cross-border trade unionism, the focus on the national, political level of trade unionism is limited and leads to an unwarranted conclusion that there is a gap between the “openness” of British and Irish trade unions in comparison with their German or Austrian counterparts. Such a conclusion is often based on the institutional argument that “Liberal Market Economy” trade unions are more prone to organizing than those which rely on corporatist institutions.42 This argument is not entirely convincing as it neglects, behind the idea of encompassing national models, the intra-sector differences, and especially the fact that in the low-wage sector the German labour market is actually less institutionally protected than the British, due to the lack of a minimum wage: it is therefore in countries like Germany that a migrant organizing effort is needed more, and indeed there is evidence of some movement in that direction.43 The argument is also unconvincing empirically, because behind the focus on national official policies, it overlooks developments on the ground. In fact not only, as we have seen, have UK trade unions been active in servicing just as much as in organizing, there have also been a number of campaigns on migration by German trade unions— which not only provide advisory and training services to migrants, but have also reacted politically, notably demanding the introduction of a national minimum wage. German trade unions provide advisory and training services for migrants. Most notably, major developments have occurred in cross-border cooperation, especially in the border regions, through the Interregional Trade Union Councils (seven of them involve Austrian or German trade unions and partners from the new member states). In 2006, for instance, DGB, Ver.di and Solidarity jointly protested in the border region against a megastore that was violating worker rights.44 In May 2009, a Polish-German trade union ________________

T. Krings, op. cit.  Lowell Turner, “Institutions and Activism: Crisis and Opportunity for a German Labor Movement in Decline,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 2009, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 294–312.  44 Robert Szewczyk and Joanna Unterschütz, „Labour Emigration: Government and Social Partner Policies in Poland,” in: B. Galgóczi, J. Leschke and A. Watt (eds.), op. cit., pp. 211–227. 42 43

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

89 

forum was launched in Gdańsk. In Austria, trade unions are distinctive in their explicit rejection of special projects geared to migrant workers, on the grounds that all members should be treated equally,45 which reflects a different national approach to the issue of diversity.46 But even there, information initiatives have not been lacking, and it is reported that most people seeking help from the Chambers of Labour have a migrant background.47 Interviews with trade union members in Austria and Hungary in 2005 and 2006 have revealed that, on the ground unionist of both sides involved in crossborder contacts did not consider the issue of transitional periods to be an obstacle to cooperation, and that they easily “agreed to disagree” on that point while still cooperating on others. German and Austrian trade unions, despite supporting transitional arrangements of the freedom of movement of workers, are aware that soon (2011) these arrangements will end, and therefore have the same need as British trade unions to organize migrants.48 Moreover, at the grassroots level, where socialization occurs between workers, possibilities for transnational cooperation do emerge.49 If there are limits to German trade union activity on migration, we should not forget that there are also limits to the more publicized British action. The UK unions’ programs of cooperation with Solidarity relied largely on public funding, and some proved not to be self-sustaining once such funding finished. Interestingly, in Poland both Solidarity and OPZZ’s international affairs officers, as well as Polish construction sector unionists50 consider cooperation with German unions on the ground to be easier and more productive than with British trade unions. ________________

Günther Chaloupek, Johannes Peyrl, “EU Labour Migration: Government and Social Partner Policies in Austria,” in: B. Galgóczi, J. Leschke and A. Watt (eds.), op. cit., pp. 171–184. 46 Anne-Marie Greene, Gill Kirton and John Wrench, “Trade Union Perspectives on Diversity Management: A Comparison of the UK and Denmark,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 2005, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 179–196.  47 G. Chaloupek and J. Peyrl, op. cit.   48 James Donaghey and Paul Teague, “The Free Movement of Workers and Social Europe: Maintaining the European Ideal,” Industrial Relations Journal 2006, vol. 37, pp. 652–666. 49 K. Gajewska, op. cit.   50 Author’s interviews, 2009.   45

90

Guglielmo Meardi 

The overall implication for cross-border unionism is that— whether in the UK or in Germany and Austria—cooperation on migration issues, despite the political difficulties that may come from the extreme Right, proves the potential for combining inclusion and dialogue within trade unions with solidarity and dialogue among national unions.

4. Trade union responses to movement of services The freedom of movement of services has emerged as a contested social issue at the same time as the enlargement, due to conflicts with the so-called Bolkestein Directive. Unlike the freedom of movement of workers, it is not subject to any transitional period. In spite of the service Directive not being approved in the original Bolkestein text— with the “country of origin” principle—the destabilizing effect of the freedom of movement of services for industrial relations has very quickly become apparent.51 The Laval conflict, with the subsequent ECJ ruling, has been the most visible case. On that occasion, the Swedish and Latvian employers tried to organize Latvian workers in Latvian trade unions to bypass and undermine the Swedish ones,52 an example of the feared ‘liaisons dangereuses’ between unions and employers that might disrupt the Europeanization of industrial relations. Hardy and Fitzgerald53 have highlighted an even clearer case: the Polish union FZZiZ (Seamen’s and Fishermen’s Trade Union – federated with the OPZZ confederation) organized recruitment for jobs abroad for its members (who were suffering from massive redundancies in the Polish maritime sector). This was done in cooperation with western employers, in a fashion similar to a job agency, and without contact with the western (notably British) trade unions. Such activity was ________________ 51 Herwig Verschueren, “Cross-Border Workers in the European Internal Market: Trojan Horses for Member States’ Labour and Social Security Law?” International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 2008, vol. 24, pp. 167–199. 52 Ch. Woolfson, op. cit.   53 J. Hardy and I. Fitzgerald, op. cit.  

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

91 

criticized in both Poland and UK and resulted in the official disapproval of OPZZ and the disaffiliation of FZZiZ. More generally, there is also some evidence of a trade-off being reached between the free movement of workers and the free movement of services, the latter being more disruptive where the former is limited. In 2007 both Polish and German media highlighted the case of Polish subcontractors employed by the largest meat-processing company in Germany, Tönnies, within its own factories: The German trade unions were struggling to find a way to oppose the employment conditions of Polish contract workers (€3.50/hour pay, 84-hour working week), as these were not considered to be German employees. The later Rüffert and Luxembourg cases and ECJ rulings highlighted the disparity between EU-protected economic freedom and national regulations. Interestingly enough, however, the most visible mobilizations against foreign contract workers occurred not in Germany or Austria, but in the “open border” states of Sweden (Laval), Ireland (Irish Ferries), and UK (in construction engineering). The question is whether the nature of such mobilizations was nationalistic or not. In the Irish Ferries case, the Latvian trade unions were involved, and some efforts in this regard was made also by the Swedes in Laval: these cases are not primarily protectionist or against international solidarity. The case that rang the alarm bell of nationalism occurred in the UK in January and June 2009 at the Total Lindsey refinery, under a banner of “British jobs for British workers”. It did not actually involve workers from the new member states, but contractors from one of the oldest, and a founding member of the EU, namely Italy, but the case quickly gained national relevance for the issue of foreign contract workers in general, and especially of those from eastern Europe. In the Lindsey case, the role of the media was instrumental in depicting the protests against the Sicilian contractor IREM as “xenophobic”. BBC reports engaged in selective quotations when showing protesters saying “we cannot work alongside the Eyties” (a politically incorrect, but not necessarily offensive, colloquial term for “Italians”), cutting off the subsequent explanations that they were not allowed to (rather that they did not want to) work together with

92

Guglielmo Meardi 

the contractor workers. Even worse was the representation of the events in the Italian media. The leftwing newspapers il manifesto and l’Unità devoted their entire front pages to the issue, and compared the protests to the concomitant rightwing anti-migrant actions in Italy, while the state broadcaster RAI opened its reports with information on the safety of the Italian workers who were allegedly under siege on their barge, and even provocatively interviewed Italian workers on Italian sites where British workers were employed, asking whether they wanted to take revenge for the treatment of their compatriots in England (to the bafflement in the interviewees). Such reports had political effects, with strong condemnations of the protests, among others, by Business Secretary Lord Mandelson in the UK, and even from the Italian President Napolitano. The Sicilian governor Lombardo even threatened to stop procurement contracts to British companies in retaliation. Such portrayals influenced national- and international-level trade unions. The European affairs officers of the largest Italian union, CGIL, Nicolosi and Petrucci, signed a declaration opening with the words “What’s going on in Lincolnshire is one of the ugliest pages in the history of the trade union movement in these globalized times: English workers against Italian workers”.54 The initial reaction of the second Italian trade union, CISL, was similar. However, if one moves from the official level to the local one, the picture was different. In its home town of Syracuse (author’s interviews with CISL and CGIL union officers), IREM was known to the trade union for its anti-union practices and for its by-passing of national collective agreements (through affiliation to the artisans’, rather than to the employers’ confederation). Unionists on the ground understood the British protesters for two reasons: they were not surprised that IREM would have tried to undercut British collective agreements on pay (something that, crucially, the arbitration body ACAS failed to investigate in its report), and they agreed with the British concern on employment, given the Italian unions’ practice of signing local “employment continuity” contracts in large industrial sites or ports, to bind foreign contractors to the use of already locally employed ________________ 54

Ufficio Stampa CGIL 2009, 2 February. 

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

93 

workers (whether Italians or foreigners), local labour, and the respect of collective agreements. In short, as one unionist said, if the same problem with a foreign contractor had occurred in Syracuse, “we would have done exactly the same.” At Lindsey, at the same time, a question mark regarding the xenophobic nature of the demonstration is raised by the participation of locally resident Polish workers in the protests. The Lindsey case demonstrates the disruptive effects of the freedom of movement of services, and the possibility of workers’ success only through major political pressure: legally, IREM and Total could have claimed, like Laval, that the protests were illegal (and Total did so in June, but still had to succumb to unofficial worker strikes). On transnational trade union action, it confirms the weakness of transnational organization: Italian unionists were only informed of the issue through the Italian media at the end of January, even though British trade unions had started negotiating the issue with Total before Christmas. At no stage had there been direct Italian-British union contact, which was also due to the non-union nature of the IREM foreign operations, but also indirectly due to the slow and easily distorted links through European federations in Brussels. However, as in the manufacturing cases described in section 3, the existence of some, perhaps vague, sort of common European labour organization and identity has prevented, in spite of strong political and media incentives, the emergence of xenophobic conflicts—even if it has proved too weak to produce any positive, active solidarity. In the case of the freedom of movement of services, the emergence of transnational networks is more difficult than in the case of migration, not only because of the lack of institutional and structural resources (union-unfriendly legislation), but also because of the segregation, in the workplace as well as in housing, of foreign contract workers—as the IREM barges symbolize. This situation is confirmed by the developments at similar, if less prominent, protests against Polish contractors in England and Wales in winter and spring of 2009 (especially at Alstom in England and at the South Hook natural gas refinery in Wales). Again, no contact was established between Polish and British trade unions (even though Alstom’s Polish contractors Remak and ZREW are unionized, while Hertel’s Polish workers were

94

Guglielmo Meardi 

not), but nationalistic developments were at least sidelined, and the focus remained on the labour issues of working conditions, respect of collective agreements, and employment security. Interestingly, in a parallel case involving the same Polish company ZREW in France (another country that initially had transitional limits on migration), ZREW’s Solidarity and Alstom’s CGT cooperated in June 2005 to campaign against the mistreatment of Polish workers in the French ZREW site, and the French court ordered ZREW to respect French collective agreements.

5. Cooperation between unions and Polish associations55 Community organizing has gained relevance among trade unions in the USA, and subsequently in the UK. Polish migration offers an important large-scale test bed in this regard. The picture of cooperation between trade unions and Polish associations in the UK is mixed, with failures reported in Southampton, and would require systematic analysis. As an illustration of the potential of such cooperation, I describe here the cooperation project between the TUC and the Polish Club which ran in 2006 and 2007. The project covered primarily information and advice on basic social and employment rights, with the secondary aims of recruiting and organizing migrants into the unions as well as creating the capacity (in terms of organization and expertise) within the Polish Club to pursue such activity autonomously in the future. In practice, it mostly consisted of surgeries offered by union experts in the Polish Club one afternoon per week, with translation provided by volunteers of the Polish Club. The project is interesting for the interaction between cultural/ /ethnic associations and class-based ones. The Polish Club in Birmingham (officially named Polish Catholic Association) was created by Second World War veterans in the post-war period, and so far it has had mostly a cultural and religious function (it includes a church and the most attended event is the Sunday Mass). There is a ________________ 55 An earlier version of this section was published in “The Polish Plumber in the West Midlands,” Review of Sociology of the Hungarian Sociological Association 2007, no. 2. 

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

95 

large generational and cultural gap between that generation of Polish refugees and the current generation of migrants. The old generation’s identity was based on staunch anti-communism, and an idealized version of patriotism which is alien to the new generation. The old generation did not even recognize the People’s Republic of Poland as a legitimate state – while the new generation was born in it and, willy-nilly, accepted it as a matter of fact. The borders of Poland also changed so much after 1945 that the two generations may often refer to different homelands: the old one mostly coming from the eastern territories that now belong to the Ukraine or Belarus. This cultural and generational gap seems to have been bridged, however, by the emergency of the large number of young Polish migrants coming to the Club with requests of help. The Club, lacking the necessary expertise and capacity, turned to the Trades Union Congress which, coincidentally, was keen to start a project on migrant workers. The project seems to have met the approval of workers, and the surgeries enjoy certain popularity. Questions are however raised as to the degree to which the secondary aims have been reached. Recruitment has been meagre, and the unions have doubts about the autonomous capacities developed by the Polish Club. By contrast, the Polish translators already claim to know by now all that needs to be said and to be able to answer queries quickly and effectively, even without the presence of union experts. The issues emerging from the Polish Club–TUC cooperation can be further examined through the migrants’ answers. Most migrants have no experience and nearly no interest in trade unionism. According to a survey run by the TUC among 100 Polish people who attended the surgeries, 10 per cent had been trade union members in Poland, and 3 per cent are members in the UK. Qualitative interviews carried out in 2007 show that respondents seem to put more hope and trust in Polish organizations rather than in local trade unions. First of all, the initiative for helping Poles should be taken by the Polish Club. [Male cleaner, 37]

However, the weak interest in trade unionism should be contextualized and not treated as inherent to migrant or Polish

96

Guglielmo Meardi 

workers. Low unionization is normal for low-pay young employees in temporary employment, whether migrants or not. Some respondents actually express some appreciation for trade unions, while others point to the difficulty in organizing in sectors where the employers are anti-union. Generally it’s always good if there is an institution or a trade union which represents the employees. [Female cleaner, 49] There is such a tyrannical management that there is no chance for a trade union. They would sack half of the people. [Male driver, 40] There was a trade union but when I arrived it didn’t exist anymore. The people who had created it had been sacked, as simple as that. … it would be certainly useful; thanks to the union we got a half-hour break. [Female warehouse operative, 21]

In the 1980s and early 1990s the experience of Polish workers abroad (especially in Germany) was in the informal economy, with no contact with the trade unions or else only with negative contact, the unions being seen as obstacles and barriers because of their opposition to the work of illegal migrants (especially in the construction industry). The situation appears to be different now, as Poles enjoy the status of EU citizens, and host-country trade unions prove to be potential resources rather than enemies.

Conclusions While European Trade Union Confederation policies appear ineffective in implementing a common migration policy from above, this paper shows that networks are developing from below between trade unions from the eastern and western parts of the EU. Union are facing the challenges presented by the freedom of movement of labour with some unexpected successes, and the occasion provides fertile terrain for coalitions with other social movements. By contrast,

 

Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU

97 

unexpected difficulties have emerged concerning the freedom of movement of services. Focusing on the “transnational”, rather than the “methodologically nationalist” analytical framework allows us to understand why developments do not depend very much on national countries, as would appear to be the case judging from top-level developments:56 it is imprecise to oppose British “openness” with German “closure”, for instance. They depend rather on the ground: on the degree of broader European socialization and networking resources and opportunities. Migration provides more opportunities than just the movement of services. In particular, migration seems to make it easier for trade unions to “humanize” foreign workers and develop solidarities with them, than does the simple existence of remote foreign subsidiaries. Regarding the freedom of movement of services, the opportunities for socialization are minimal, and the only positive effects come indirectly from broader European labour socialization, in which nationalism tends to be sidelined.

________________ 56

T. Krings, op. cit. 

98

Guglielmo Meardi 

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

99

Serena Romano

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe Abstract: This work investigates the links between poverty patterns and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe by focusing on antipoverty policy change in Estonia, Poland and Hungary during the last two decades. It aims at examining how transformation processes have so far re-shaped institutional mechanisms of social redistribution and understanding the implications of recent policy change for most vulnerable groups. The paper analyzes unemployment, family and social assistance reforms through the concept of multidimensional ‘recalibration’ and suggests that social inequalities and the impoverishment of specific social groups is deeply bound to normative ideas, distributive scope and functional change characterizing each system of social redistribution. Keywords: welfare reforms, recalibration, post-communist welfare, poverty.

Introduction This work is an attempt to bridge the gap between welfare reform theory and poverty studies by focusing on antipoverty programmes undertaken by Estonia, Hungary, and Poland over the last two decades. The essay does not seek to conceptualize a new posttransition “welfare regime.” It rather aims at understanding the nature and the directions of welfare change by looking at policy reforms introduced to alleviate poverty and social exclusion. Accordingly, it addresses a number of issues, such as: Why are welfare systems undergoing complex processes of transformation? How are these welfare reforms being implemented? Who is being excluded from the mechanisms of social redistribution? In order to answer these

100

Serena Romano 

questions, antipoverty policy change is here regarded as a key aspect of welfare reforms and examined through the concept of recalibration, described as “an act of institutional reconfiguration and re-balancing” which gives rise to specific responses resulting from political choices which have emerged on the domestic level.1 In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of antipoverty measures, in this article we seek to go beyond classical sectorbased distinctions. Even if family and unemployment policy are usually identified as specific categorical schemes, their role in preventing and reducing social exclusion cannot be neglected, and they can thus be considered as major indirect means to alleviate poverty and social exclusion. The paper is structured as follows: The first part of the work briefly reviews the debates on welfare transformation in Central and Eastern Europe and outlines the theoretical framework used in this work. Then the work turns to the neglected relationship between poverty and reform in the studied countries, and explains how the notion of “recalibration” can provide a new perspective for the analysis of welfare in this context. The third section examines the antipoverty programmes in Hungary, Poland, and Estonia in light of reforms undertaken during the last twenty-five years. This section summarizes the collected data in order to understand the directions of change observed along the dimensions of functional, distributive, and normative recalibration.

1. Understanding welfare transformation in Central and Eastern Europe Over the last few decades, the need to broaden the analysis of welfare models by investigating the role of social protection within “non-Western” societies has been increasingly acknowledged. Among these studies, the welfare regime approach stands as a major contribution to the progress of comparative social policy. Besides ________________ 1 Maurizio Ferrera, Anton Hemerijck and Martin Rhodes, The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy, Report prepared for the Portuguese Presidency of the EU, Oeiras: Celta Editora, 2000.

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

101

giving further momentum to the comparative analysis of social and economic systems, it has significantly contributed to detecting common trends among groups (or “clusters”) of socioeconomic systems and has helped to outline the features of Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Eastern, and Southern European typologies of welfare models according to a number of dimensions, such as levels of social expenses, mechanisms of redistribution, generosity and coverage of welfare programmes.2 Nonetheless, while there is a long-standing tradition in classifying and discussing the main traits of Scandinavian and Continental European welfare systems, the identification of the Central-Eastern variant among welfare regimes is rather recent and requires further investigation. In the aftermath of the economic and political transition, a wide range of interpretations of the evolution of “post-Soviet” systems created new room for social policy comparisons. The shift from a planned to a market economy, and the preparation of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to enter the EU suddenly aroused great interest in transitional welfare models, while questions on prospective scenarios of change also began to emerge among economists and social policy scholars, such as: How will the legacy of the social and economic Communist model affect the new social redistribution system? Will post-Communist social protection systems converge towards a common novel welfare typology? Or will they slowly acquire the main features of West European welfare states?3 In fact, further social policy research has shown that these first enquiries often overstressed both the role of the inherited common characteristics of the Communist socioeconomic model and the rhetorical assumptions on the alleged drastic selectivity measures introduced across the region, assuming that the geographical and historical ________________

2 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton: Polity Press, 1990; Stephan Leibfried, “Towards a European Welfare State?” in: Chris Pierson and Francis C. Castles (eds.), The Welfare State Reader, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000; Guy Standing, “Social Protection in Central and Eastern Europe: A Tale of Slipping Anchors and Torn Safety Nets,” in: Gøsta Esping-Andersen (ed.), Welfare States in Transition. National Adaptations in Global Economies, London: Sage, 1996. 3 See: Bob Deacon (ed.), The New Eastern Europe: Social Policy Past, Present and Future, London: Sage, 1992.

102

Serena Romano 

proximity of these countries would have resulted in common strategies of reconstruction. Conversely, despite the fact that the more these countries continued to build their own systems of social protection, the more their original dimensions of resemblance seemed to be weakened by different strategies of transformation, it is only recently that investigation has underlined the role of domestic paths of gradual welfare reforms.4 At the same time, social policy studies have widely shown that by emphasizing the characteristics of each social policy model, welfare regime clustering describes a “frozen landscape” of immutable welfare patterns, failing to adequately outline the dynamic dimensions of cumulative transformations which have been in progress for the last thirty years within most western welfare states,5 though such dynamism should be acknowledged as the final outcome of a continuous struggle between pressures for change and pressures for continuity driven by political and economic choices which have emerged on the domestic level. This work accordingly aims to go beyond the analysis of regional convergence scenarios, and beyond the rhetoric on the alleged status of institutional inertia among welfare systems. While the convergence hypothesis may raise the pertinent question of whether similar progresses in social and economic development necessarily lead to similar outcomes in social policy design, the argument of a common inevitable trend to a welfare “retrenchment” has been questioned and debated,6 and it has been gradually replaced by new attention addressed to the analysis of the adaptive capacity of welfare systems heading to positive reform processes. ________________ 4 Tomasz Inglot, Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919–2004, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 5 Alfio Cerami, Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006; Anton Hemerijck, “Welfare Recalibration as Social Learning”. Paper presented at the ESPAnet Doctoral Researcher Workshop “The Politics of Recalibration: Welfare Reforms in the Wider Europe,” Forli, 2008, June 5–7. 6 Giuliano Bonoli, Victor George and Peter Taylor-Gooby, European Welfare Futures: Towards a Theory of Retrenchment, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

103

In an attempt to conceptualize the process of readaptation of advanced economies to the imperatives of competitiveness and to new responsibilities, some scholars have introduced the notion of “recalibration,” described as “an act of institutional reconfiguration and re-balancing,” which gives rise to specific responses resulting from political choices which have emerged on the domestic level.7 As has been emphasized, the struggle for the reconciliation of economic efficiency and social justice across Europe is not necessarily driving welfare states towards an alleged overall process of welfare retrenchment. Even if in most cases reforms stem from common pressures to change, the current European landscape shows instead a wide range of different combinations and institutional arrangements of social policy transformation and reform.

2. Poverty and reforms: a neglected domain Though the relation between institutional change and poverty can be considered a major theoretical and political concern in the current debates on welfare transformations, the two topics are seldom discussed together. While reforms are generally considered in terms of intentional attempts at change that may underlie “highly reflexive and knowledge-intensive political processes,”8 the alleviation of poverty has often been relegated to extraordinary and discretionary measures. The literature on social policy has widely underlined how the progressive expansion of national social insurance systems, together with the overall progress in social and economic development, has acted at length as a crucial mechanism of social redistribution. By reducing social inequality, the combined effect of socioeconomic development and social insurance programmes have also gradually decreased the extent and the scope of former local actions of poverty relief.9 As a result, during the second half of the ________________

M. Ferrera et al., op. cit., p. 71.  A. Hemerijck, “Welfare Recalibration as Social Learning,” op. cit., s. 106.  9 Maurizio Ferrera (ed.), Welfare State Reform in Southern Europe. Fighting poverty and social exclusion in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, Oxford: Routledge, 2005.  7 8

104

Serena Romano 

twentieth century, poverty became interpreted as a phenomenon related to falling income (affecting specific stages of the life cycle), whose surfacing could be easily prevented by the general methods of social security. While welfare reforms thus became increasingly related to categorical interventions, the importance of specific and intentional efforts aimed at reducing poverty became neglected as an explicit object of policy, and poverty itself has been at length left out of political agendas in most industrialized countries. Nonetheless, the last decades have increasingly revealed that the comprehensive nature of social protection systems across Europe was becoming inadequate to face emerging social risks and to deal with growing social demand expressed by new categories of poor (lone mothers, children, unskilled workers). As for the countries examined here, antipoverty schemes first began to be established only after the transition, when the shift to the market economy revealed the huge extent and spread of hidden unemployment and poverty. This is not to say that material deprivation was not experienced during Communism; poverty did exist, but it represented a social, political, and ideological taboo during socialism.10 The existence of poverty was only accepted as a temporary phenomenon, mainly attributed to individual behaviour. As a result, the “culture of denial”—as it has been called— encouraged procrastination (or banishment) of proper consideration towards the spreading phenomena of marginalization and pauperization of certain social categories.11 Yet even if poverty has been increasingly recognized as a major and urgent issue at stake in most posttransition agendas, the reforms implemented for the poor have rarely constituted an explicit object of research or political ________________

Elżbieta Tarkowska, “An Underclass without Ethnicity: The Poverty of Polish Women and Agricultural Laborers,” in: Rebecca J. Emigh and Iván Szelényi (eds.), Poverty, Ethnicity and Gender in Eastern Europe during the Market Transition, Westport: Greenwood Publishing 2001; Julia Szalai, “Power and Poverty,” Social Research 1997, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 1403–1422; Mihály Simai, “Poverty and Inequality in Eastern Europe and the CIS Transition Economies,” DESA Working Paper 2006, no. 17 ST/ESA/2006/DWP/1. 11 Sandra Hutton and Gerry Redmond (eds.), Poverty in Transition Economies, New York: Routledge, 2000; R.J. Emigh and I. Szelényi (eds.), op. cit. 10

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

105

interest. Most cross-sectional investigations of CEE countries have by and large focused thus far on the analysis of contributory measures of social protection. On the other hand, antipoverty measures have been at length delegated to residual social assistance schemes, which have turned out to be completely inadequate in the face of old and new social risks which have emerged since the transition. Resorting to family, survivor, and unemployment benefits as indirect measures of income support has frequently substituted for a comprehensive reform of social assistance schemes, which had to be put off due to the economic and political constraints of the transition. Recently introduced as a posttransition product, the decentralization of public administration has first pushed for the devolution of social policy duties and responsibilities from the central level to the local government jurisdiction. This has suddenly required new organization of local social assistance centres, which have since been responsible for the management, financing, and provision of a number of social benefits. In such a context, social benefits schemes for the poor represent a complicated, traversal realm to investigate, and no comprehensive analysis can be carried out without an adequate acquaintance with domestic systems. It is important to stress that our work does not seek to compare antipoverty measures in order to provide a classification of social benefits models. We rather aim to understand what the main directions of welfare change are, by examining social benefits for the poor in the three countries under investigation. From this perspective, we found that the mere description of welfare measures established for the poor may fail to provide an adequate answer to our enquiries concerning the nature of welfare change within the Eastern European region, especially since the distinction between universal and selective systems can be misleading. The pioneering description provided by Titmuss in 1974 first introduced the distinction between universalism and selectivity principles in comparative social policy analyses. Further developed by Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes approach, this perspective soon revealed that a universal entitlement to receive social protection is not necessarily adequate to lift people out of poverty, and that a number of variants should be taken into consideration in order to

106

Serena Romano 

assess its efficiency. Diane Sainsbury12 underlined the extent to which a comprehensive understanding of specific categorical measures (such as benefits addressed to women and mothers) cannot rely only on the analysis of overall eligibility criteria, and suggested further investigation into the different typologies of entitlement which allow people to receive social protection. As far as antipoverty benefits are concerned, this perspective can be developed even further through the concept of recalibration. Additional dimensions of analysis derived from the welfare recalibration approach are used in this work as a theoretical background which can help in detecting the main directions of welfare transformation. The first dimension of analysis of welfare change regards the paths of transformation (or continuity) regarding principles of social justice. As many scholars have emphasized, normative values have a key influence on political legitimization, stigmatization, and institutionalization of poverty and the role of ethical and social justice principles which underlie welfare provision is significantly meaningful in the implementation of effective distributive policies.13 It has been pointed out that the dynamics of social exclusion are directly related to social policy configuration, as poverty can be read as the result of a social construction process which identifies the poor even before antipoverty measures are established.14 Attention should therefore be paid to the principles of social justice underlying antipoverty policy, in order to understand whether social policy reforms arrive with the introduction of a new value perspective which includes new ideas of equality. In a nutshell, the normative dimension of recalibration stems from ideas concerning ________________

Diane Sainsbury (ed.), Gendering Welfare States, London: Sage, 1994.  Claus Offe, “Designing Institutions in East European Transitions,” in: Robert E. Goodin (ed.), The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Vivien A. Schmidt, “Values and Discourse in the Politics of Adjustment,” in: Fritz W. Scharpf and V.A. Schmidt (eds.), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Daniel Béland, “Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutional Perspective,” Social Policy & Administration 2005, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 1–18. 14 Chiara Saraceno (ed.), Le Dinamiche Assistenziali in Europa. Sistemi Nazionali e Locali di contrasto alla povertà, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004. 12 13

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

107

individual, family, social, and state responsibilities with regard to the protection of vulnerable strata, and answers the following questions: What is the idea of equality underpinning a given society? Should it protect the most disadvantaged? Should it act as a safety net which can prevent social exclusion? A second aspect of change concerns the extent to which posttransition countries are coping with new social needs. During the last few decades, the nature of most “Western” social protection systems has become inadequate to face emerging postindustrial social risks, and to deal with growing social demand expressed by new categories of poor in advanced economies: lone parents, children in extended households, and unskilled workers—all of which demand the introduction of new sets of tools to fight new social risks. From this perspective, antipoverty policy should also be examined with regard to social demand, especially when this is a representative of “aggravated” postindustrial problems experienced after the transition to the market, in order to understand to what extent social policy reforms have so far addressed these issues by adapting antipoverty policy to new functions, such as the reconciliation of family and work, single parenthood, and activation in employment. The third dimension of change concerns the transformation of social protection according to its distributive effect among social, economic, and income groups. This aspect can provide further elements to understand the direction of welfare change, besides those concerning the analysis of clefts between insured and uninsured workers, and among occupational sectors. The distributive dimension of welfare change can help detect important mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion according to social and class differences among the recipients of social protection programmes. It goes without saying that recalibration must be read as a complex and multidimensional process encompassing different aspects of welfare transformation (Fig. 1) and that the distinctions summarized here between normative, functional, and distributive recalibration are made with merely descriptive intent. Therefore functional, distributive, and normative dimensions of social protection change can be included in a “side mechanisms of inclusion” category which can help us understand the direction of

108

Serena Romano 

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from M. Ferrera et al., op. cit.

Fig. 1. Recalibration dynamics

recent reforms with regard to noncontributory social benefits provided within family, unemployment, and social assistance schemes. These side mechanisms constitute the shift from old to new generations of social needs, the introduction of new normative ideas on deserving categories of the poor and redistributional effect across social, economic and ethnic dimensions.

3. Recalibration dimension and reforms in Hungary, Poland, and Estonia One key element of posttransition change, it is frequently suggested, concerned a major shift from a system whereby the eligibility of social benefits was universal, to new “Western-like” targeted programmes of social protection. As a matter of fact, as far as CEE countries are concerned, this was not the always case. To be sure, having a strong tradition of universalized social benefits, these countries had to transform their own inherited system of social

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

109

benefits, but surprisingly this change did not imply a direct tightening of eligibility criteria everywhere, as the case of Hungary shows. The first attempts at reform introduced during the first postCommunist conservative governments in the 1990s delayed political debate on the role of the new social redistribution system. Core ethical principles of the inherited socialist system were put into question, and the nature of the social contract between citizens and the state was transformed in depth, but—as Kornai has put it—this occurred without a strategy.15 As a result, the issue of poverty was excluded from the social agenda, and indirect support to income (mainly addressed to the poor through family benefits) continued to act as a major antipoverty measure. To date, Hungary has the highest percentage of social protection expenditure on both unemployment and family-children policy among the countries examined (Fig. 2). While it has a long tradition of allowances for families with dependent children, the Hungarian commitment in restructuring unemployment and social assistance schemes has only recently undergone a first stage of the reform process. Data collected (mainly from MISSOC, OECD, ILO, UNICEF, and national sources) on recent reforms undertaken with regard to family, unemployment, and minimum resources support (Fig. 3) show that Hungary has conserved a comprehensive universal system of family benefits whose main entitlement is based on residence. Recent changes in family benefits, as mentioned above, do not comprise a transformation in eligibility criteria for families; nonetheless, a number of side mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion result in a certain degree of transformation. The main family benefit, the family allowance, remains a universal benefit. Yet the amount of the benefit increases only up to the third child in the family, often preventing families with more than three children (who representing 21% of total poor households in Hungary) from receiving adequate support according for their household size and related needs. The reformed taxation rules (2005) rule that the special third child tax allowances may not be received by smaller households. While ________________ 15 János Kornai, Highway and Byways. Studies on Reform and Postcommunist Transition, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.

110

Serena Romano 

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from EUROSTAT data

Fig. 2. Social protection expenditure by function in Hungary as percentage of total social benefits, 2006

representing a first step towards the acknowledgement of large family needs, this reform is mainly addressed to workers’ families, and has a weaker effect in the absence of alternative means of poverty alleviation for non-middle-class families. As for regular child protection allowance—which has recently replaced the former regular child support—its rationale seems still bound to residual, meanstested social assistance, whose eligibility criteria and provision depend on a “social test” occurring at the local municipality level. The main changes in family benefits policy has come from the recent Amendment to the Family Act (2005) concerning childcare allowances, which enables parents receiving the benefit to undertake work activity after the child has reached one year of age, introducing a crucial mechanism for triggering the work-family reconciliation processes. The unemployment benefits system has been recently reformed after fourteen years, in accordance with the new requirements of the labour market concerning activation measures. Traditional unemployment insurance benefits have been replaced by “job seeker” benefits and aids, provided for individuals who have lost their job as

111

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

Reform

Measure

Eligibility

Side mechanisms of inclusion

Universal

Residence

Benefit amount increases for families with up to 3 children

Selective

Means test; locally determined

Disability, unemployment, single parenthood are protected

Selective

Household size

Small families and non working families are excluded

Locally determined

Discretional managment at local level; control on children school attendance

Universal

Residence

Childcare benefits beneficiaries can work after the first year of age of the child

Universal

Activation

National average wage applicable to the last applicant's position

Entitlement

Family Support Act (1998) Family allowance

Family

Regular Child Protection Allowance Act on the Third child tax rules of allowance taxation (2005)

Amendment on Family Act (2005)

Extraordinary child protection support

Minumum resources

Unemployment

Childcare benefits

Amendment to Promoting Employment Job seeker and Providing benefit and job for the seeker aid Unemployed Act (2005) Government Decree 239/2006 on the regulated equalization system

Regular Social Benefit; Special needs allowance

Selective

Selective

Amount is Means test; calculated by disability; family unemployment consumption but it is limited

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from MISSOC, OECD, and national data.

Fig. 3. Family, Unemployment, and Minimum Resources Support Reforms in Hungary

112

Serena Romano 

well as for those who cannot rely on previous earnings-related unemployment benefits. As for social assistance schemes, Hungary is well known (together with Italy and Greece) for being a laggard in the introduction of minimum income schemes among EU member states. Even though this theme has recently been introduced in the political agenda as an important issue, only small changes in the Hungarian social assistance system have occurred, mainly concerning the introduction of equivalence scales for family income measurement and a limit on the provision of cash transfers. Social assistance stands as a “residual box,” where a number of last resort, means-tested, and often stigmatizing measures16 traversal to each social policy areas converge to provide a discretionary safety net for the poorest. A look at recent social protection expenditure trends for Hungary reflects the low political acknowledgement of poverty and social exclusion as important sectors that should need complete reform (social expenditure has decreased to even lower percentages during recent years), while the strong political consensus linked to the universalized family benefits system is confirmed by continuous stable high expenditure on family and children policy. As far as the expenditure on unemployment is concerned, its recent increase after years of relative low commitment is consistent with the ongoing process of reform. The overall process of change in Hungary highlights a normative dimension of change, detected around the boundaries between a generous safety net addressed to “deserving” and “not so poor” working families, and a discretionary, fragmented, and residual antipoverty policy for the poorest. To some extent, Poland and Hungary show similar characteristics with regard to antipoverty measures. They both have a long-standing tradition of generous family benefits which are also used as indirect means to mitigate poverty. Nonetheless, social protection expenditure in Poland shows a significant imbalance in favour of the protection ________________

Such as the “behaviour test” performed during home visits in order to check the reliability of the applicant. Balázs Krémer, István Sziklai and Katalin Tausz, “The Impact of Decentralization on Social Policy in Hungary,” in: K. Tausz (ed.), The Impact of Decentralization on Social Policy, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002. 16

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

113

from old social risks, addressed to old age and survivor support (Fig. 4). Unlike Hungary, where the attempt to introduce selectivity measures for family allowances during the 1990s created great unrest among the middle classes, Poland came out of the transition with little opposition to a renewed means-tested system. The recent reform on Family Benefits (2003) (Fig. 5) has introduced a new regulation regarding the amount of the family allowances and of the eight supplementary allowances addressed to cope with special needs (such as single parenthood, long term unemployment of lone parents, child disability, and extended households). The benefit amount is now related to child age rather than to the size of the household of the recipient family. A comprehensive reform has also affected the Polish employment sector and accordingly has changed the overall system of former generous unemployment benefits, which (together with early retirement benefits) acted as a strong safety net during the first phase of transition. The new system has been regulated in accordance with activation and labour market inclusion requirements, and provides a fixed amount of unemployment benefit to every job

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from EUROSTAT data

Fig. 4. Social protection expenditure by function in Poland as percentage of total social benefits, 2006

114

Serena Romano 

Reform

Measure

Entitlement

Eligibility

Side mechanisms of inclusion

Meanstested

eight supplementary benefits for special needs; benefit amount depends on child age and not on family size

Family

Law on Family Benefits (2003)

Family Allowance

Unemployment

Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions Act (2004)

Unemploy ment benefit Universal Activation and assistance

Flat-rate benefits; benefit duration depends on regional unemployment averages

Minumum resources

Law on Social Assistance (2004)

Permanent benefit Temporary benefit

discretionary benefits based on “social criteria”

Selective

means test; disability; Selective unemployment

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from MISSOC, OECD, and national data

Fig. 5. Family, Unemployment, and Minimum Resources Support Reforms in Poland

seeker, though decisions on the duration of the benefit must take into account regional unemployment averages. As far as social assistance is concerned, even if a subsistence level is fixed for minimum income, no guaranteed minimum income scheme exists in Poland. Permanent and Temporary benefits are means-tested and socially tested. The entitlement to receive assistance is determined at the local level according to social criteria. A list of social needs requiring social aid includes “poverty,” “homelessness,” and “unemployment” but their provision nonetheless remains discretionary. Permanent benefits are only guaranteed to individuals unable to work due to age limit or disability. Children remain a very vulnerable category of poor in Poland, even after social transfers (Fig. 6). These considerations may suggest that a major part of the increased expenditure trends in social exclusion since 2004 comprises passive measures which go to protect inactive people (such as individuals applying for old age and disabled social assistance benefits). The reconfiguration of the Polish antipoverty policy addressed to the introduction of selectivity measures can be read in the light of an overall process of rebalancing social costs and benefits.

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

115

Among these, the role of socioeconomic groups able to influence the decision-making process stands as a crucial element of pressure, which has introduced a distributive dimension of change in the protection addressed to specific economic groups (which outlines professional cleavages) rather than a reconfiguration of the welfare led by an institutionalization of deserving and nondeserving poor.

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from EUROSTAT data

Fig. 6. At risk of poverty rates by age groups, after social transfers, 2007

Among the three countries examined, Estonia represents the most peculiar case. While its geographical and cultural proximity to the Scandinavian social model created room for emulation and experimentation, Estonian reforms passed through a gradual transition and complete reconstruction of a number of welfare sectors, and current social spending trends reflect an overall preference for old social risks to the detriment of social exclusion and unemployment areas, which both present low expenditure percentages (Fig. 7). A great deal of theoretical assumptions on social policy reforms acknowledges that the evolution of contemporary mature welfare states is strongly connected with the social demands expressed by

116

Serena Romano 

people increasingly exposed to new typologies of social risks. It is said that the economic, social, and demographic transformations typical of post-Fordist societies have pushed for changes in the social agenda at national and local levels. While it is now rather commonly acknowledged that not only does marginalization from the labour market create social exclusion, but also that a number of different and mutually reinforcing paths of social isolation may lead to persistent forms of impoverishment,17 nonetheless the functional transformation process is far from being completed everywhere. This shows a particular relevance in the context of Estonia. Though Estonia has frequently been regarded as an early and radical reformer,18 the social agenda has at length failed to take into account a number of key issues of demographic (ageing), social (family structure change), and economic (labour force competitiveness) transformations. Estonia established an extensive system of means-tested and earnings-related family allowances (ten different kinds of allowances exist), but the benefit amount is not always adequate to meet the social needs of families. Among the countries examined Estonia is nonetheless the only one which has established special allowances for extended families (those with seven or more children). This policy has the evident aim of supporting fertility rates, which are now undergoing decline in the country, rather than protecting large families from poverty. Not surprisingly, Estonia is also the only country examined here which shows higher poverty rates among households without dependent children (Fig. 8). As a former Soviet republic, Estonia experienced lower rates of unemployment (compared to Poland and Hungary), and has at length relied on passive measures of income support for unemployed unfit and for dealing with both long-term and unskilled young unemployed. Recent unemployment reform ________________

17 Duncan Gallie and Serge Paugam, “Unemployment, Poverty and Social Isolation: An Assessment of the Current State of Social Exclusion Theory,” in: D. Gallie (ed.), Resisting Marginalization. Unemployment Experience and Social Policy in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 18 Milan Vodopivec, Andreas Wörgötter and Dhushyanth Raju, Unemployment Benefit Systems in Central and Eastern Europe: A Review of the 1990s, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2003; Avo Trumm, “Poverty in Estonia. Overview of main trends and patterns of poverty in the years 1996–2002,“ Fafo Report 2005, no. 497. 

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

117

introduced unemployment benefits for insured people, and meagre allowances for uninsured people. One major mechanism of inclusion for working parents concerns child, sick, and disabled care, which can be regarded as working activities required in order to benefit from the allowances. Activation measures have been introduced both in the employment system and in local social assistance schemes, whereby the means-tested subsistence benefit can only be granted if the requirement of “willingness to work” is fulfilled. As far as the direction of Estonian change is concerned, on one hand, we cannot detect major processes of legitimization of antipoverty policy or outstanding distributive dimensions of transformation. On the other hand, we can note that the struggle for industrial reconversion and labour market restructuring has paved the way to a functional transformation addressed towards the introduction of individual responsibility and activation in different realms of social policy, driven by the acknowledgement that a number of new social risks, such as single parenthood, professional obsolescence, work and family reconciliation, require a new definition of priorities.

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from EUROSTAT DATA

Fig. 7. Social protection expenditure by function in Estonia as percentage of total social benefits, 2006

118

Serena Romano 

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from EUROSTAT data

Fig. 8. At risk of poverty rates by household type after social transfers

Eligibility

Side mechanisms of inclusion

Universal

Means-tested

child care allowances for families with 7 or more children

Parental Benefit

Universal

Earningsrelated

Low Childcare allowance amounts

Unemplyment benefits and Allowances

Insurancebased (insured)

Activation

child, disabled and sick care is considered as previous work

Selective

Means-tested; unemployed related; Locally determined

willingness to work is a requirement to receive assistance

Reform

Measure

State Family Benefit Act (2002)

Child Allowances

Parental Benefit Act (2004) Social Protection of the Unemployed Act (2000); Labour Market Services and Benefit Act (2006)

Entitlement

Family

Unemployment

Minumum resources

Social Welfare Act, 1995

Subsistence Benefit

S o u r c e: Author’s elaboration from MISSOC, OECD, and national data

Fig. 9. Family, Unemployment, and Minimum Resources Support Reforms in Estonia

Poverty and welfare reforms in Eastern Europe

119

Conclusions This paper has attempted to link together studies on social policy and poverty in post-Communist countries with a focus on specific patterns of reforms according to different dimensions of change. Even though further investigation is needed in order to attempt a first assessment of the transformations in progress, specific trajectories can be identified for each country. First this study reveals that an attempt at analysing the direction of change can provide novel and interesting perspectives on welfare typologies. While many scholars agree on the existence of a common model of “post-Communist welfare,” we can detect an overall effort of post-Communist welfare systems to create adaptation to new social needs and to achieve a new balance between social demand and economic and political constraints in accordance with domestic paths. Furthermore, our analysis of the dynamics of welfare recalibration may suggest deepening our understanding of the “side mechanisms” of redistribution processes, while such an approach may help disclosing new dimensions of transformation that go beyond the traditional alternative between universalism and selectivity. With regard to former Communist countries, the analysis of welfare reforms can be even more useful if these dynamics are acknowledged as processes of multidimensional change. In this work we therefore seek to examine antipoverty policy transformation along redistributive, normative, and functional dimensions of change. Driving attention towards the strategies of adaptation established at the domestic level, the concept of recalibration can help us understand the nature of the change in progress. It can tell us more about what idea of social justice underlies welfare restructuring processes (normative recalibration), how they are being implemented (functional recalibration), and who is being excluded from the current systems of social redistribution (distributive recalibration). As a matter of fact, while countries from the Central European region are commonly regarded as welfare states with a strong tradition in universal family policy, our enquiry found that a number of elements combine together to bring specific path-dependent trajectories of change. The Polish case has shown that the redistributive scope of antipoverty welfare change has fostered a shift from the protection of

120

Serena Romano 

one economically strategic category (employable men and women who had to be supported by a maternalist policy during Communism) towards support guaranteed to specific social categories (such as the elderly) and professional groups, for reasons of political consent. Hungary revealed a strong process of normative recalibration which transformed the ideas at the base of the traditional welfare question: Who deserves protection? Accordingly, the distinction between the deserving small middle-working-class family and the undeserving extended household has led the whole system to acquire a more explicit class and racial character. The case of Estonia indicated major keys to the analysis which may help us to understand the prospective scenario for a functional transformation of social inclusion objectives in support of important objectives such as the reconciliation of work and family life (as indirect outcomes of an overall natalist policy) and labour market activation policies. Ultimately our analysis found that antipoverty policy reform in Central and Eastern European countries needs more attention both at the research and political levels. While the lack of attention paid to poverty dynamics during Communism left little room for the analysis and comparison of social assistance programmes, economic and political constraints have boosted fragmentation among different sectors of social inclusion policy. Nonetheless, the strong tradition in family and child support observed in most postsocialist countries should be read as a major resource that could be used as a significant starting point for the establishment of a new comprehensive antipoverty policy which combines elements of the past (such as the maternalist approach to social protection) with elements of the new EU context (focused on new social risks such as those concerning work/family reconciliation and single parenthood) and elements derived from specific priorities which have emerged on the domestic level.

Iveta Ķešāne

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics: the Case of Latvian Labour Emigrants in Ireland Abstract: This article, based on interviews with Latvian labour emigrants who left Latvia at the time of the transition from socialism to a free market economy, will explore the intricate reasoning behind the emigrants’ decisions of whether or not to remain in Latvia, and how this decision indicates a means of resistance to some forms of governance. It also explores how emigration became a strategy for improving one’s quality of life and transforming one’s subjectivity. Furthermore, this article explores the political dimension of emigration, arguing that particular environments can entail certain modes of governance, and reveals the character of power relations between an individual and the state. From the perspective of emigration discourse, the author draws the conclusion that the question of governance becomes a question of selfgovernance. Keywords: emigration, everyday politics, self-governance, transition

Introduction In recent years, Latvian labour emigration has become a subject of public debate, irony, and even entertainment in Latvia. SIBĪrija (a play on words meant to compare Ireland to Siberia) was the title of a series of documentaries broadcast on Latvia’s national TV channel LTV1 in the spring of 2007. In an ironic way, it compared the Latvian labour experience in Ireland with the mass deportations of Latvians during and after the Second World War to Siberia, to the labour

122

Iveta Ķešāne

camps known as Gulags. The title implicitly portrays labour emigration as a sacrifice one makes leaving one’s country of origin. Nevertheless, this series of documentaries resulted in an Internet discussion forum1 entitled “Are they traitors?” which provoked a discussion as to whether Latvians working in Ireland could be considered traitors because they left their country in difficult times. Labour emigration is a new phenomenon in Latvia, and has achieved unprecedented attention since Latvia’s incorporation into the European Union. The free movement of labour gave a legal opportunity to many Latvians to go abroad in order to earn their livelihood, to provide for their families, and also to find self-esteem and fulfilment. This mobility has been perceived by scholars as a serious problem, resulting in a population decrease and shortages of labour supply, thus hindering both business and the national economic development.2 Although initially it was not an issue of public and political agenda, labour emigration from Latvia seemed to silently begin or rather to “quietly encroach”3 in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This article, based on interviews with Latvian labour emigrants who left Latvia at the time of the transition from socialism to a market economy, will explore the intricate ________________

LTV1 Internet at: discussion forum .  Raita Karnite, “Labour shortages due to emigration of Latvian workers. Euronline. European Industrial Relations Observatory,” 2006, available at: ; Feliciana Rajevska, “Preface,” in: A. Pabriks et al. (eds.), Effect of Migration on European Polticial Thought and Decision-Making Process, Valmiera: Vidzeme University College, 2007; Artis Pabriks, “Migration: Time to Change the Political Course,” in: A. Pabriks et al. (eds.), Effect of Migration on European Polticial Thought and Decision-Making Process, Valmiera: Vidzeme University College, 2007. 3 Bayat’s concept of quiet encroachment refers to a silent, protracted, pervasive strategy of ordinary people conditioned by political, socioeconomic, and cultural constraints without structured organization, leadership or ideology. Usually the gains of the agents are at the cost of the state. The struggles of those people “are not necessarily defensive, but cumulatively encroaching the actors tend to expand their space by winning new position from which to move.” Asef Bayat, “Cairo’s Poor: Dilemmas of Survival and Solidarity. MERIP organization,” 1996, available at: ; idem, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 1 2

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

123

reasoning behind the emigrants’ decision of whether or not to remain in Latvia, and how this personal decision can be viewed as their resistance to particular forms of governance. After independence was reestablished on May 4, 1990, Latvia took concrete steps towards establishing a free market economy and democratic governance. These steps included integration into the European Union, NATO, and the OECD. At the same time the Latvian political elite also promoted very nationalistic policies.4 All the objectives had a similar purpose—to ensure political, economic, and cultural security for Latvia. However, apart from those clear and strong political objectives to ensure national security, the provision of social and economic security for the population at the micro level was left largely unattended. Firstly, this can be explained by the structural changes promoted by IMF via the “Washington consensus,” requiring ex-Soviet states to leave several provisional responsibilities to market forces. A second explanation can be found in the low efficiency and problematic targeting of public spending in Latvia.5 Thirdly, the notion of social justice had been cast aside as a relic of the Soviet occupation.6 The prevailing discourse of ethnopolitics in the Latvian parliament and the absence of a discourse on social welfare provide ________________

For example, the sense of political and cultural security was approached through the issue of citizenship. With the regaining of independence in 1991, citizenship was granted to those who were citizens of the Republic of Latvia on June 17, 1940, and to their descendants. This was further strengthened by the Citizenship Law passed in 1994 (The Citizenship Law, edition of 1994, 2nd paragraph). This was also intended to deny citizenship to people who came from the other Soviet Republics as economic immigrants during the Soviet period. Likewise, the Citizenship Law made naturalization impossible for the first years. 5 Hyppolite Fofack and Celestin Monga, “Dynamics of Income Inequality and Welfare in Latvia in the Late 1990s,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2004, 3336, p. 32. According to Folfack and Monga, the dramatic increase in poverty among the most vulnerable groups was paralleled by rising social spending. Public assistance in the form of social expenditure and transfers to households increased from 12.5% to 19.3% of GDP between 1992 and 1999. However, this rising pattern of social spending is not paralleled by improved welfare in the target groups and intended beneficiaries. 6 Rita Naseniece, “Acis (joprojām) plaši aizvērtas. Franču revolūcijas sauklis patiesībā ir par pašcieņu, nevis maize māju un mašīnu” [Eyes (still) wide shut. The slogan of the French revolution actually is about self-respect, not about a bread, house and car], Diena 2009, 25 April, p. 11. 4

124

Iveta Ķešāne

evidence of this.7 As a result, socioeconomic changes in Latvia, occurring amidst the transition from socialism to a free market economy, had great impact on disparate members of the population. After the mid-nineties, impoverishment and uneven development was observed in the society.8 The Gini coefficient had increased from 25% in 1991 to 31% in 1996, and further to 39% in 2006.9 In 1997 and 1998, articles pertaining to this problem appeared in the largest Latvian newspaper Diena, illustrating the deteriorating living conditions of people across the country: Last year’s estimate shows that 666,000 households10 in Latvia are impoverished, and that the [average] income per person per month is 52 lats. Among the impoverished households, 289,000 are families with children.11

Furthermore, a survey conducted from December 1999 to January 2000 concerning personal perceptions of human rights observance in Latvia, indicated that the most important problems were the provisions of social guarantees (47%), the right to work, as well as fair and favourable work conditions (41%), the right to education (34%), and children’s rights (32%).12 On the other hand, macroeconomic development in Latvia has been considered to be among the most rapid of the new EU member states, with an annual, real GDP growth of over 6%.13 Thus, while at ________________ 7 Ivars Ijabs and Sergejs Kruks, Saeima, vārdi un demokrātija. Pilsoniskā sabiedrība Latvijas parlamentārajā diskursā [Parliament, words and democracy. Civil society in the Latvia’s parliamentary discourse], Riga: SFL, 2008. 8 H. Fofack, C. Monga, op. cit.   9 Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 10 The population of Latvia in 1997 was 2.44 million; in 2002 it was 2.35 million, while in 2007 it was 2.28 million (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). 11 Daily newspaper Diena, 1998, 17 October, p. 4. 12 Baltic Data House, “Research The Main Problems of Human Rights in Latvia,” The Office of the Ombudsman, 2000, p. 2, available at: . 13 Eurostat data indicates that the GDP in Latvia between 1996 and 2002 increased by an average of 5.8% per year—approximately twice as fast as in the EU, and one and half times as fast as in other accession countries at that time. Eurostat, “Eurostat Regional Year Book,” 2007, European Commission, available at: .

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

125

the macroeconomic level there was evidence of development, at the microlevel there was clear evidence of growing inequality and poverty. Along with these realities, this transitional toward the west also introduced a profoundly different structural arrangement to be dealt with, either by business structures, politicians, or society. The transformations in the actual economic and social conditions of the people were paralleled by changes in the government regime and the everyday living practices of people. It was a complete reversal of social life, where autocracy replaced democracy, central planning replaced the market, and in so doing produced a society of shortage, intoxicated by consumerism.14 Dreifeld has observed that “the Baltic republics have most closely embraced the ‘shock therapy’ method of change.”15 Whereas Verdery predicts that: ... it is possible that as Romanians, Russians, Poles, Latvians, and others live through the effort to create liberal democracies and market economies, they will be driven to a criticism of these forms even more articulate than before...16

At the political level, these transformations articulated a mixture of democratic and old Soviet-type governance.17 Political systems revealed a dark side of the gestation process on the way to democracy, and were characterized as a “corruptive symbiosis of business and politics.”18 In the process of democratization, the principle of accountability has been lacking and the notion of “pol________________ 14 Piotr Sztompka, “The Trauma of Social Change: A Case of Postcommunist Societies,” in: Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. (eds.), Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, p. 171. 15 Juris Dreifelds, Latvia in Transition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 3. 16 Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 11. 17 Talis Tisenkopfs and Valts Kalnins, “Public accountability procedures in politics in Latvia”, Centre for public policy Providus, 2002, p. 32, available at: . 18 Marja Nissinen, Latvia’s Transition to a Market Economy: Political Determinants of Economic Reform Policy, London: Macmillan Press, 1999.

126

Iveta Ķešāne

itical responsibility” has been loose and often ignored.19 Corruption in the state government, as well as populism and inefficiency in the output of policy itself has been present throughout the transition, and persists to this day. Against such a political backdrop, powerlessness and alienation between the state and its population has only grown.20 An analysis of the post-Soviet societies by Sztompka21 demonstrates that the period following transition shows that much was unexpected about the change, and that the society was not prepared for it. This is despite the fact that Latvians largely welcomed the collapse of the socialist regime and the transition towards the west. In reference to Durkheim, Sztompka refers to this condition as the “anomie of success.”22 For example, it is often argued that a “dependency on the caretaker state”23 developed during the Soviet years and could not so easily be abandoned by a post-socialist society such as Latvia. On the contrary however, Yurchak argues24 that postsocialist society was prepared for the change, despite the seeming abruptness of the collapse of socialism. His argument derives from his observations that living socialism for ordinary people “meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by the state.”25 [While] the Soviet state called upon its citizens to submit completely to party leadership, to cultivate collective ethics and to repress individualism, by living socialism these citizens became enlightened and ________________

T. Tisenkopfs, V. Kalnins, op. cit.  1996, there was only 10% trust in political parties and 21% trust in the parliament (Brigita Zepa, “Pētījums un rīcības programma Ceļā uz Pilsonisku Sabiedrību” [Research and action program Enhancing the Civil Society],Tirgus un sociālo pētījumu centrs “Baltijas Datu Nams” [Market and Social Research Centre “Baltic Data House”], 1997, p. 16). Similarly, in 2000, there was 11% trust in political parties, 20% in the parliament and 24% in the government (“Research Enhancing the Civil Cociety – 2000,” Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2001, p. 69, available at: ). 21 P. Sztompka, op. cit.   22 Ibidem, p. 157, 158.   23 J. Dreifelds, op. cit., p. 5.   24 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 25 Ibidem, p. 8.   19

20 In

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

127

independent-minded individuals who pursue knowledge and are inquisitive and creative.26

The aforementioned puzzlement, constraints, and disappointment of the society, I assume, also require one’s self-problematization to find strategies to overcome limiting socioeconomic conditions. In this article, I would like to examine how emigration became a strategy for improving one’s quality of life and transforming one’s subjectivity during the period of transition. I will also explore what the phenomenon of labour emigration tells us about Latvians’ level of preparedness for the transition. Furthermore, I intend to explore how emigration remains a strategy within modern politics, what kind of governance it entails, and how it reveals particular power relations between an individual and a state. That is, to look for politics “beyond the state,”27 that highlights the shaping of individual capacities and conduct. I believe that the question of governance becomes the question of self-governance in the discourse and technique of emigration. To scrutinize this, I will evoke the case of Latvian labour emigrants in Ireland in order to show, how the decision to emigrate formed and how problematization of self occurred when the decision was made; what was the substance of the main problems and the contexts leading to the decision to emigrate; and what this problematization tells us about one’s self-governance and its relation to other forms of governance.

1. Theoretical background Traditionally, labour migration studies have employed economic, structural, and social network theories to explain the phenomenon. For neoclassical economics, labour migration is explained by the process of economic development, being caused by differences in the supply and demand of labour; migrants here are viewed as rational ________________

Ibidem, p. 11.  Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nicolas Rose, “Introduction,” in: A. Barry, Th. Osborne and N. Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, and Rationalities of Government, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. 26 27

128

Iveta Ķešāne

actors, basing their decision to remain or emigrate on personal calculations of cost and benefit. For the new economics of migration, migration is seen to be as promoted by a household which decides to emigrate in order to maximize income and to the minimize risk associated with a variety of market failures.28 The structural approach in turn looks at migration as influenced by various social and institutional factors in the home country of the migrant; while social network theory emphasizes the role of social ties as increasing the likelihood of international movement.29 None of these theories allow for the examination of how the individual conceives of the decision to emigrate, nor do any of them allow for analyse of the emigrant’s self conduct throughout the emigration process, and the problems that their decisions entail. It is for this reason that I have applied a Foucauldian perspective that allows for qualitative microanalysis of the individual at the time of the migration decision.

2. Governmentality, self conduct and problematization Foucault’s earlier works30 look at the sites where power is articulated on the human body, namely hospitals, schools, and disciplinary institutions.31 Some of his earliest essays, like “Security, Territory, and Population”, look at how the population can be managed by the state through economic thought, which consistently observes the population, analyses it, and controls it according to political objectives.32 Foucault viewed technologies of domination as ________________ 28 Douglas S. Massey et al., “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Population and Development Review 1993, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 431–466. 29 Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Theorising Return Migration: the Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited,” International Journal on Multicultural Societies 2004, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 253–279; D.S. Massey et al., op. cit. 30 For instance, “Madness and Civilization” in 1961, “The Birth of the Clinic” in 1963, and “Discipline and Punish” in 1975.  31 Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, “Introduction,” in: P. Rabinow and N. Rose (eds.), The Essential Foucault, New York: The New Press, 2003, p. ix. 32 Michel Foucault, “Security, Territory, and Population,” ibidem, p. 261.

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

129

based on the knowledge of the subject, and the mentality of government was analysed at the level of the state institution. In his later works, Foucault proposed that much greater emphasis should be placed on the human being and the individual as a site of a multiplicity of practices. His assumption was that “the contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can call government.”33 Now, Foucault would pay particular attention to the role of the acting individual or “governing individual” that develops his behaviour according to conflicts between techniques of other forms of government (for example, the state and market) and “processes through which the self is constructed and modified by himself.”34 The mentality of “government” has been extended here from the level of the state institutions into the level of the individual. This idea provides for a “politics of ourselves” as “one of the main political problems nowadays.”35 Extending the analysis from the mentality of state government to the individual government also changed the character of the individual. The individual was not only seen as the site where power is exercised upon, but also as a locus of social change and an active participant in his own subjection: I am saying that ‘governmentality’ implies the relation of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use...36

These observations of Foucault’s concerning the governing individual become particularly crucial in the context of Latvia where neo-liberalism swiftly replaced socialism and has moulded the present-day reality, leaving a great deal of responsibility to the individual. While socialism is based upon the values of collectivism, ________________ 33 Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Darmouth,” Political Theory 1993, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 203. 34 Ibidem, p. 204.   35 Ibidem, p. 223.   36 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in: P. Rabinow and N. Rose (eds.), op. cit., p. 41. From the 1984 interview, “Concordia”, Revisita internacional de filosophia 6.

130

Iveta Ķešāne

egalitarianism, solidarity, and security,37 neo-liberalism requires a different type of society and a different type of citizen to come into being, manifesting “personal autonomy, enterprise and choice.”38 The idea behind a neo-liberal government presumes that an individual is accountable for his own action.39 Nevertheless, in post-Soviet Latvia the formation of the neo-liberal individual seemed to be hampered by the fact that the new ways of life were at odds with vestiges of the Soviet regime.40 Burawoy and Verdery emphasize that though the regime of the state had radically changed its mentality, the society could not change as rapidly, for it continues using previous symbols, words, and practices.41 For methodological purposes, other concepts derived from the analytics of governmentality will be discussed. To analyse governmental practice at the level of the individual, Foucauldian scholars have advanced the term self-conduct, which presumes “some conception of an autonomous person capable of monitoring and regulating various aspects of their own conduct.”42 According to Dean43 considering that to conduct oneself is a reflexive verb, this term is also ethically and morally charged for the reason that human beings take their own conduct to be the subject of self-regulation, and make themselves accountable for their own actions.44 Self conduct commences with (ethical) problematization,45 that is, “those forms of ________________

37 Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma,” in: J.C. Alexander et al. (eds.), Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, p. 172, 173. 38 A. Barry, Th. Osborn and N. Rose, op. cit., p. 10.   39 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society, London: SAGE Publications, 1999, p. 11, 12. 40 P. Sztompka, op. cit.; K. Verdery, op. cit.   41 Katherine Burawoy and Michael Verdery, Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World, Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p. 2. 42 M. Dean, Governmentality, op. cit., p. 12.   43 Ibidem.   44 Ibidem, p. 10, 11.   45 According to Dean (Mitchell Dean, “Foucault, government and the enfolding of authority,” in: A. Barry, Th. Osborne and N. Rose (eds.), op. cit., pp. 209–231), ethical problematization arises in particular domains of practice (the management of health, of a household, of relations, etc.) rather than from a general theory or set of ideas

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

131

understanding which the subjects create about themselves.”46 This self-regulation then takes place through questioning one’s own conduct in order to govern oneself better. As Dean47 explains it, an analytics of governmentality is “not concerned with a general figure of the self, bound by a necessary social determination, but with an attempt to problematize our lives, our forms of conduct, our politics”48 in such a way that “identity, subjectivity, and self come to be hooked questions of politics, authority and government.”49 The thoughts and problems of self conduct identified during problematization then are solved by applying technologies of the self that helps an individual to transform oneself and attain a certain state of satisfaction.50 In this article, the strategy of emigration itself will be revealed as a technique to overcome certain limitations that individuals encounter. Furthermore, emigration will be looked at as a practical and productive technology as it allows for the production of a certain kind of selves. The analysis of this case is based on in-depth interviews with Latvian labour emigrants living in Ireland. The fieldwork was conducted in January and February of 2008. In total twenty-two indepth interviews were conducted with persons who had arrived in Ireland before Latvia’s entrance into the EU, which marks the peak time of the transition. Additionally, at the time of this field work each interviewee had been living in Ireland for at least five years.

3. Transition: “...everything went to rack and ruin...” In order to trace how the problematization of self occurred—what constituted the main substance of the problem leading to the decision ________________

about the nature of human beings, or from a global and necessary process of the social shaping of self (ibidem, p. 215). 46 Ibidem.   47 Ibidem.   48 Ibidem, p. 216.   49 Ibidem, p. 212.   50 M. Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self,” op. cit., p. 203.  

132

Iveta Ķešāne

to emigrate—the main question I asked the respondents during the fieldwork was how the decision to come to Ireland had been made, or why they emigrated. The responses collected were often detailed and emotional, describing both the context and content of the circumstances leading to their decision to leave Latvia. Since such responses are not found in the existing research conducted on Latvian emigration,51 which mostly emphasizes the socioeconomic reasons for emigration, I found it intriguing how much the transition itself held sway over emigrants’ decision to move abroad. Some respondents imply that the system change itself was the reason for their emigration. The transition has been conceived of as a break with their conventional routine, as an empty gap in their life’s continuity, one unable to provide new prospects. Throughout respondents’ narratives, the transition and the development it conferred across Latvia is referred to in a negative light and with feelings of disappointment. I gave birth to my youngest daughter when I was forty... she finished Gaujienas Secondary School, and then I understood that there’s nothing she can do in Alūksne.52 There’s nothing to do anywhere [HYAN] I had a good marriage, good education, the children were growing. We were hoping that we would graduate from university and have better salaries. And then everything went to rack and ruin [SLRH]

This feeling of transition as a breakdown and emptiness can be explained by the incomprehensibility of the structural changes taking place in the various domains of social reality. These changes were perceived to be something done wrongly, something that would impede development, either the state’s or society’s, rather than advance it. For instance, in the perception of respondents, the closing of factories built during the Soviet occupation was a consequence of ________________ 51 Ivars Indans et al., “Latvija un brīva dabaspēka kustība: Īrijas piemērs” [Latvia and Free Movement of Labour: The Case of Ireland], Latvia’s Commission of Strategic Analysis under the Auspices of the President of the Republic of Latvia, 2006, available at: . 52 Alūksne is the town with around 10,000 inhabitants, located comparatively far from the capital, Riga, and close to the Estonian and Russian borders.

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

133

a new, “unfair” business environment. Likewise, the people involved in business in the new market economy are disdainfully characterized. This thinking could be explained in part by the preexisting Soviet view of entrepreneurship. Supule53 points out that entrepreneurial activities in Soviet times were illegal, and that entrepreneurs were known as “speculators”, that argues that “it was difficult to change perception of activities that were illegal in Soviet times and are now legal and desirable.”54 It is important to mention that most of the people I spoke with come from rural areas, and they refer specifically to these places when they talk about the transformation. We paid an employment agency to find a job. But it was all totally wrong. In our rural area, where we used to live, two big fish processing factories went bankrupt. That was just because there were no cheaters with golden necklaces there, for example, investors, shareholders, the ones able to subordinate. A lot of money has been lost, everyone suffered financial losses. Maybe that is the reason why... There were practically no ways out anymore... [LMNF]

One informant, who did not want to be recorded, explained that at the end of the 80s her husband was very patriotic and got her involved in the struggle for independence. In the interview she pointed out that “[as] it turns out now, those were just slogans.” The disappointment of this respondent becomes clearer knowing that the new business standards introduced in independent Latvia proved an obstacle to the sustainability of her family vegetable business. As she mentions, most of her clients—small shops—went bankrupt once the new shopping chains were opened. There was nobody to whom they could supply their products anymore. She refers to all the production inspections and standards she had gone through as the “law of terror” [CPHZ]. Another major reason the transition is viewed with disappointment is the changes that occurred in the labour market, and intro________________

Inese Supule, “The Business Environment: Case Study of Latvia,” in: Heinz Rieter and Joachim Zweynert (eds.), Economic Styles in The Process of EU Eastern Enlargement, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009, pp. 185–219. 54 Ibidem, p. 185.   53

134

Iveta Ķešāne

duced the reality of unemployment. Previously, employment was guaranteed and provided by the party once an individual had completed his studies; thus everyone was employed.55 After the collapse of the Soviet system, unemployment became an integral part of the labour market. For some respondents, being unemployed gave them a feeling that they were unnecessary and unworthy people. I had entered the Polytechnic Institute and graduated from the Technical University [the name of institution was changed after Latvia regained independence]. That was the last year that people studied for five years ... And we were the last graduates who were neither bachelors nor masters. Also there were no appointments to jobs, nothing—look for a job yourself! And at that moment nobody needed anything anymore and it was like the Russians used to say, kupi i praday [buy and sell]. The most important thing was to trade, to launder money, and at that moment nobody thought about specialists anymore [KGFC]

At the time the informants were looking for a job, unemployment (jobseekers in the population) among the economically active population was high: in 1999 it was as 14.5%, in 2000 at 14.6%, in 2001 at 13.1%, and in 2002 at 12%.56 Nevertheless, informants imply that the job offers were there, but tend to think that they were disregarded in the “new” labour market. While looking for a job in Latvia, even those in their thirties had been branded as “old.” I assume the respondents were regarded as old because their work experience and skills, acquired during the Soviet system, were incompatible with the new labour market requirements. Naseniece57 points out that ageism has been present in Latvia since the middle of the nineties, as a way to encourage denial of the past: new was presented as good, old as bad. I was working in the fish processing factories as a head engineer. I had a disagreement with the employer. It was an issue with a lawyer and all...There was nowhere to complain. There was just one solution: to find a job somewhere ________________

J. Dreifelds, op. cit.; K. Verdery, op. cit.  Statistical Bureau of Latvia.  57 R. Naseniece, op. cit.   55

56 Central

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

135

else; back at that time I went to Riga58 to look for a job somewhere.59 ... In Riga, they told me that I’m too old and they can’t take me. We need young, forward looking people! Then they told me that they didn’t need me [LMNF]

Likewise, job requirements were perceived as “too high” by the respondents. This was particularly true with respect to the requirement of language knowledge and higher education for simple service-sector job positions. It could be that this feeling of having overly stringent requirements arose because in Soviet times, higher education and language knowledge were not promoted aspects of human capital. As Dreifelds puts it, “under communism there was an inherent upgrading and even glorification of physical work at the expenses of mental work. In particular, the value of the services sector as a legitimate sphere of economic activity was discounted and the sector was chronically underdeveloped.”60 Consequently, these new requirements for a job in the service sector seemed inappropriate and extraordinary. It was the time when jokes were made in advertisements in Latvia, that to be a cleaner one needs a higher education. For example, to work in Statoil61 as a cashier one needed a higher education and the ability to speak in two foreign languages ... so, what are they assuming? [NGPR]

Along with the introduction of unemployment as a new social problem, there are cases where illegal employment in Latvia was mentioned as a catalyst for emigration. This was in addition to the common dissatisfaction with how the labour market was regulated by the state and, in particular, the interviewee’s perception of the state as having failed to control the informal labour market. For the respondents, undocumented labour meant great insecurity and vulnerability for their future prospects. Thus, this became an obstacle which expedited their decision to emigrate. ________________

The capital of Latvia. informat at that time lived and worked in Mērsrags, a city that during Soviet times was famous for its fishing industry. 60 J. Dreifelds, op. cit., p. 111.   61 The Norwegian oil company, which runs gas stations in Latvia. 58

59 The

136

Iveta Ķešāne

...I was always paid “under the table” ... The same with my husband. We never could count on having a regular income. We were in some way illegals, without any documents. And when payday came, it was always possible that we might not be paid. We couldn’t count on anything. ... I thought a lot about it, about this being “paid under the table.” And I realized that I can’t go alone against the state, it is a system. What can I do? It is a system. In my shop it’s like this. In the next shop it’s just the same... [CHMD]

However, this transition was experienced differently across generations. Among respondents, there are people—mostly young— who view the collapse of the socialism as a “window of opportunity.” This shows that the transition facilitated many people’s decision to leave, but not all in the same way. One respondent explains that his decision to live and work abroad was actually conceived before the fall of socialism. The decision to leave ... maybe I am very different in this sense... In 1989, I think, we weren’t even separated yet from the Soviet Union... we went to sing with the choir to Germany, and then I saw how people live there. I understood that I didn’t want to live anymore in the Soviet Union, in our system. Then I understood that I had to leave. It was like a fever! [FDHD]

In this chapter we saw that the transition and the changes it brought about have frequently been the substance of the problem, albeit sometimes implicitly, that is posed for one’s selfproblematization, leading eventually into the decision to emigrate. I suggest that labour emigration from Latvia, at the time of the transition, was for some of the emigrants a type of protest against these new ways of living and the way they were articulated in Latvia, and that emigration provided a mode of “exit” for these people. Moses62 similarly views emigration as a strategy articulating dissatisfaction towards the state. He denotes emigration as “exit” and explains it in relation to “voice” and “loyalty.” “Voice” is dissatisfaction expressed publicly, “loyalty” is when one does nothing but sulks, and “exit” is about trying another perspective under new circumstances.63 In the next chapter, on problematization, we look at disclosing more particular domains of everyday practice. ________________ 62 63

Jonathon W. Moose, International Migration, London: Zed Books, 2006. Ibidem, p. 90, 91. 

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

137

4. Resolution: “...I plucked up my courage, left my husband and came here...” For respondents, the decision to leave also arises while problematizing very particular domains of practice, for instance, household management, responsibility, and personal relation to self and others. Nevertheless, these circumstances of the decision also are embedded in the context of transition. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the social and economic security guaranteed by the Soviet state collapsed. Many areas which in Soviet times had been located in the social sphere, are now predominantly represented in the market sphere, and are regarded as commodities—such as education, public facilities, housing, health services, employment, etc. Responsibility for the provision of these suddenly became the domain of the individual. This additionally required assuming the new role of a consumer. At the same time the transition period marked a discrepancy between the income of the population and the price for those services.64 As can be observed from the responses, this restricted respondents’ practices in everyday life, sometimes leading to a sense of dissatisfaction with the self. There are some informants who did have a respectable job in Latvia, yet whose income could not provide for decent living standards. Likewise, people in vulnerable situations found it especially hard to protect themselves and still stay in Latvia. Among the respondents’ stories it is common to hear of parents who, given their income in Latvia, were not able to provide for their family. Provisions which were previously of the state were now left to the responsibility of the individual and the market, and often proved too expensive, leaving some to a condition of poverty. This thus facilitated self-interrogation in order to find strategies to satisfy, as well as to fulfil, one’s responsibility to oneself and others. ________________ 64 According to the data of the Central Statistical Bureau, from 1995 to 2006 there was a substantial imbalance between the state defined minimum wage and the subsistence wage for goods and services. By 2006, the official minimum wage was lower than the subsistence wage. Likewise, the purchasing capacity was very low: the average net income in 2000 was 109 lats per month, while the official subsistence wage was 84 lats. One lat (LVL) is approximately 1.3 euro. 

138

Iveta Ķešāne

I had an extreme amount of work and social duties. It came unexpectedly. Somehow that decision came slowly, but in reality the situation ripened fairly solid—I’ve just realized that now ... With my salary I couldn’t afford a mortgage in a bank. ... I was in such a sorry state, as I wanted to buy a flat for myself and so. And this was bothering me all the time. ... Now I am 48 years old, then I was 41. Actually at that age a person should have had a lot already! [MLCF] There was no money, I couldn’t provide for my children ... I have five children and I had no other choice. ... Actually, at that moment I didn’t have a job. I had back surgery and I was on a disability pension and children’s allowance, and I really didn’t have [enough income] ... and the children went to school, and there were no options [LOGC]65

Some respondents emigrated in order to give their children a good education and to improve their future prospects. During the years of transition, education was booming and it “was perceived as a crucial asset, transferable into occupational or professional positions, higher living standards, or raised prestige.”66 Yet as higher education became increasingly dominated by market forces, education became less emancipatory for lower classes than advertised. Since Latvia regained its independence, the number of state-sponsored place of study has tended to decrease, while the numbers of private universities being established has increased. In the academic year 1997–1998, about 50% of all Latvian students achieved a state sponsored-study place, while the rest had to pay tuition; in 2003– 2004, only about 24% of students achieved a state sponsored study place.67 She wanted to go to Turiba, to the university, to study tourism. And I thought —alright! I’ll give her that opportunity! Just then all those opportunities opened and I plucked up my courage, left my husband, and came here [HYAN] ________________ 65 According to the data of the Welfare Ministry, the children’s allowance at that time for school-aged children was 4.5 lats per month, for one child in a family. Since 2003 the allowance has been 6 lats for one child in a family, 7.20 lats for the second child in a family, 9.60 lats for the third child in a family and 10.80 lats for the fourth and further children in a family. One lat (LVL) is approximately 1.3 euro.  66 P. Sztompka, op. cit., p. 184.   67 Feliciana Rajevska and Alf Vanags, “Economic and Social Rights,” in: Juris Rozenvalds (ed.), How Democratic is Latvia. Audit of Democracy, Riga: The University of Latvia, 2005, p. 72.

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

139

Due to this socioeconomic limitation a sense of dissatisfaction with the self arose. Unemployment and low income imposed restrictions on one’s freedom and self-realization. Not being able to provide for the family gave a feeling of failing to fulfilling a social role, such as that of mother or father. In other cases, unemployment caused some respondents to feel unworthy of the new society that was forming around them. Emigration helped them solve these problems, and provided them with new life prospects. In Latvia, I was thinking that something’s wrong with me. It gave me such an inferiority complex ... And then I came here and I have completely different outlook. I am a worthy person! [CHMD]

Yet emigration also brought psychological costs, as for example when not every family member could follow immediately—or ever. Though some problematic issues are solved by emigration, selfproblematization with respect to life abroad seems to persist, particularly regarding redressing one’s relation with others and themselves. The respondents’ avowal of a decision already made portrays the difficulty of physically living abroad while emotionally longing for “home.” Here self-problematization manifests as deontological reasoning or a mode of subjectification68 that one is constantly going through as a part of the emigrant experience. A note of poverty sounds inside me. I try to eradicate it. ... And all the time to myself I seem like a bad mother. But my child has been educated, how can I be a bad mother? [SLRH] I feel like I’m a bad daughter; my mother is not doing so well at the moment. And maybe I should be with her, but I have managed to help her a lot. She had thyroid gland surgery. I never could have helped her if I stayed in Latvia; just as the house is put in order... [MLCF]

In this chapter we saw that it is the socioeconomic context also which made everyday practices problematic, and posed certain restrictions on people’s everyday lives and—in common with the previous chapter—facilitated their thinking of new strategies to overcome these limitations. Instead of relying on the state or ________________ 68

M. Dean, Governmentality, op. cit., p. 17. 

140

Iveta Ķešāne

requesting help from it, the shaping of individual capabilities to overcome unsatisfactory conditions took place in the form of mobility. For some, emigration was a strategy decided upon by weighing up its pros and cons (going on purpose to the recruitment agencies). Others, according to their stories, came across it by chance (somebody “suddenly” gave them a flyer promoting labour abroad) and made the decision in the grip of hope and despair. However, in both cases it seems that initially it was not an attractive decision, but was arrived at as a result of pressures they felt during the transition. Having shown the problems leading to the decision to emigrate, I will now turn to the decision to return—a consideration that has been present since the decision to emigrate was undertaken. Most respondents said they left Latvia for Ireland for just a year or two, in order to save some money to solve their socioeconomic and individual misfortunes. Yet some of them are entering their seventh and eighth years in Ireland.

5. Problematizing return: “I do have a wish to returning, but not to that Latvian government...” A common element of a Latvian’s initial decision to emigrate is the brooding decision concerning when to return. The emigrants’ narratives I collected often showed evidence of their good knowledge of Latvian current events, as they commonly spoke of the political, economic and social processes in Latvia. So firstly we can say that respondents make their decision to return on the basis of news about the situation in Latvia. Secondly, their decision to return is based on the observations of Latvia that they have made during their visits there. I found that my respondents’ decisions were also commonly linked to the way Latvia is being governed at a particular moment. I assume this constant observation of the conduct of the state in Latvia has developed into particular power relations between the state and its people. According to Foucault,69 political power is not just the ________________ 69 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in: P. Rabinow and N. Rose (eds.), op. cit., pp. 145–170.  

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

141

virtue of a state’s institutions, but rather it is the relation between the “how” of the state and the “how” of the self.70 This relation appears in the words of the interviewees as they speak of the governance in Latvia as a crucial obstacle to their return to Latvia. For the respondents, one of the main conditions impeding their return is their discontent with the inefficiency of politicians and their views of corruption in Latvia. Implicitly, Latvian politics is considered to be a major factor in the Latvian “bad life.” Staying abroad is then both a technique to overcome potential obstacles to the “good life” and a protest against the current state governance in Latvia. The mode of “exit” still seems to be the most secure prospect for their life. I do have a wish to return but not to that Latvian government and that order, which is now there because social life there is different [KGFC] Now you see how nothing is going on there. Godmanis71 is again in power. Thanks to the looting he permitted [meaning the privatization in the first half of the nineties], I don’t want to see him anymore [HYAN]

In particular, as most of the informants come from towns and areas remote from the capital, they are very concerned about regional development and the poverty there, and mention it as an obstacle to their returning. What’s going on there? In Riga nobody notices inflation; but in the countryside you’re afraid to turn on the electricity. Yes! Because you know how it can end up! [LMNF] I am from the countryside and there’s still total poverty there. Maybe not total, but still people buy second hand goods, and the cheapest food past its expiry date. And people do that. I tell you, it’s poverty! Riga is a completely different world [DPNK] ________________

Ibidem, p. 146. From December 20, 2007 to January 2009, Ivars Godmanis was Prime Minister of Latvia. From November 7, 2006 to December 20, 2007 he was Interior Minister. From November 26, 1998 to July 16, 1999 he was Finance Minister. He was formerly the leader of the Latvian Way party (Latvijas Cels), and when in 2006, Latvian Way entered a coalition with Latvia’s First Party (Latvijas Pirma Partija) he became cochairman.  70 71

142

Iveta Ķešāne

Another aspect considered in the context of return is the lack of social guarantees, especially for people that find themselves in vulnerable situations. They were provided these assurances, as with many EU countries, only after they left to Ireland. Respondents expressed excitement about Ireland’s social provisions for single mothers, which provide for a flat and comparatively high child allowance. Pensioners enjoy generous benefits as well, with a guarantee that their money is safe. It’s different here. In Latvia I don’t know if they help single mother, or pensioners. It is very problematic in Latvia. Here they help a lot. Here they’ve made various advances [DPNK]

Not trusting the Latvian government to provide social security has encouraged some emigrants to stay abroad longer in order to have their pension guaranteed in Ireland, or to save enough to provide themselves with a decent future once they do return. These are techniques of calculation for the provision of better life prospects, which they do not believe is possible in Latvia. My daughter has finished university but I wanted a bit more [initially the informant came to earn money for her daughter’s university education]. And then I realized that I can earn my pension and that’s why I am still her ... I will spend my old age in comfort. I hope that with an Irish pension I will have a better life in Latvia than with the Latvian pension [HYAN] It’s necessary save up for the future, so there is no need in Latvia to run around and search for somebody, to grovel before somebody to take you on for work and to be, to be content with that, and how much they give you for it ... just, I will go home and do what I want [PONH]

Another aspect, expressed by many respondents as a factor hampering their return, is the social environment they perceived as present in Latvia. Specifically this refers to the level of tolerance in Latvia. Nearly every informant recalled times when they went to Latvia and encountered impolite, insulting, and intolerant situations. They refer to the people in Latvia as angry, proud, dissatisfied, and ill tempered, which is opposite to their experience in Ireland. That [in Latvia] there’s some kind of elite selection ... you know ... here in Ireland everybody is equal. The millionaire can come to you and slap you on

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

143

your shoulder. ... In Latvia, as soon as you have a bit more money, you are at your height [PNDJ] I go home and everyone is angry, dissatisfied, everyone’s elbowing and jostling and then somebody curses at you, yes. ... What’s the worst that can happen if, instead of cursing, you’d just apologize? Then both people would have a nice day [FCLM]

Respondents have also experienced insulting situations in the state institutions in Latvia. On the other hand, one man spoke of how politely and respectfully a tax office clerk in Ireland welcomed him and expressed thanks to him paying Irish taxes. The parallel experience in Latvia is described fairly negatively: I can’t imagine some tax collector in Latvia, for example, standing up, shaking my hand, and saying thanks. Here [in Ireland] if you go to fill out your documents, you don’t feel like you’ve done something wrong. [In Latvia,] Truth is always in favour of the government. Here it’s completely the opposite— you are the one... [LMNF]

What should be emphasized is that the return decision is noticeably more difficult to make when living standards in Ireland are greatly preferred to those in Latvia. Circumstances in Ireland now become the point of reference to assess their self-conduct. Additionally, the aim of one’s governance, from the very first day in Ireland, expands to include new demands for a more secure and better life. Now when I have everything, I have free time, I have the internet—I see the real face of Latvia. Not really Latvia’s. Latvia itself is a familiar thing but the government, politics, and developments, frankly speaking, it is better to observe them from the outside. Once you’re inside you want to accept your bad life, right?! [SDPG]

As we’ve seen, the return decision is often made with consideration of the situation in Latvia, particularly of its mode of governance and social life. The way the emigrants problematize their return decision reveals that there is little trust that the governing elite in Latvia is able to provide a secure life for its people. Likewise, society in Latvia is perceived as not tolerant enough, which is seen as an important factor in a good democracy.

144

Iveta Ķešāne

From these life experiences, we saw that the migration decision is very much a decision of self-governance. Emigration is both an individual protest towards the new ways of living as they formed in Latvia at the time of transition, and an individual strategy to solve poor socioeconomic conditions in order to fulfil one’s responsibilities towards oneself and others. Their decision to remain in Ireland is a protest against the current Latvian state governance, particularly its social system governance, and one’s understanding that social security is an individual responsibility.

Conclusion This paper looked at the subject and the subject’s self-governance concerning Latvian labour emigration during the time of transition. Focusing on how the emigrant’s decision to leave Latvia at the time of transition occurred, and how their decision to return is currently developing, we have traced emigrants’ self-governance and its relation to other forms of governance at the time of transition and now, at the time of the return decision. The informants’ stories allude to socioeconomic and political transformations and how this historically meaningful and rapid transition marked profoundly different practices. The new structural arrangements, new socioeconomic problems and new organization of everyday life had a profound influence on the decision to emigrate. In informants’ discourse, this change is referred to negatively, and at the same time, with nostalgia for the “ordered” past; having achieved the long-cherished goal of independence, suddenly the decline of the old order brought “a sentiment of loss and displacement.”72 Although independence was eagerly anticipated, the transformation turned out to be incomprehensible for many: a dream of how an independent Latvia should be was not reconcilable with the everyday life it brought. Along with this distinctive way of thinking of the transition as something “wrong,” there were other, more particular reasons behind the decision to emigrate. ________________ 72

Svetlana Boym, Future of Nostalgia, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. xiii.

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

145

Firstly, the decision seemed to be both a resistance to and a submission to the neo-liberal governance where emphasis is placed on market forces. Transformation in the labour market and the development of entrepreneurship left peoples’ everyday life open to market rule. For the respondents, it proved difficult to think of themselves as an entrepreneur selling one’s skills, and neither was it easy for them to accept the entrepreneurship exhibited by others as something positive. Likewise, the commoditization of social services, health services, accommodation, and education—previously considered to be the provisions or domain of the state—were “suddenly” left to the market sphere. In the new social system, access to these services took the form of a market, and a person can “learn to exercise his freedom on such a market as a consumer.”73 For the respondents, it was puzzling to play the new role of consumer, considering their low incomes and the situation of scarcity. Emigration helped to resolve these misfortunes by providing a system which allowed them to fulfil this new role more easily. However, although they “exited” during the inception of neo-liberalism in Latvia, they entered a similar neo-liberal arrangement in Ireland, but one grown to a mature level of development. Ireland proved able to provide these emigrants “order” that had been lacking in their lives during the transition in Latvia. Through this ‘exit’, what is interesting and somehow also paradoxical, that emigrants themselves often displayed a great deal of entrepreneurial behaviour. This coincides with what Foucault74 argues, in that migration is very much an economic activity and mobility is human capital enabling one “to make the choice of mobility as an investment choice for improving income” and “to obtain some kind of improvement.”75 Though Sztompka76 and Dreifeld77 argue that Latvian society was not ready for the abrupt change and exhibited a dependency on the “caretaker state,” my respondents provide evidence to the contrary. Respondents, instead ________________

M. Dean, “Foucault, government and the enfolding of authority,” op. cit., p. 172.  Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the College de France, M. Senellart (ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 75 Ibidem, p. 230.   76 P. Sztompka, op. cit.   77 J. Dreifelds, op. cit.   73 74

146

Iveta Ķešāne

of relying on the state to improve their living circumstances, took full responsibility for their lives. At the same time, the need to emigrate engendered resentment towards the state among respondents, through their feeling that something had broken down in the relationship between the state and its citizen. The study shows that remaining in Ireland also becomes a conscious political claim that one’s rights are respected. The informants’ self-conduct takes place according to their continuous observation of state conduct. While the decision to leave was affected by a feeling of displacement in the new order and limiting socioeconomic conditions, the decision to remain in Ireland also shows a strong political dimension and a lack of trust that the Latvian state is able to provide proper social security. As the case study shows, second of all, emigration is also a technique of resistance to the governance of a particular state. Access to a better social system, guaranteed by the state, is a crucial factor reinforcing their decision to stay in Ireland. Ditchew,78 in his study of Romanian emigration, has argued that an individual’s navigation between different territories in search for better living conditions among different social systems is essentially a political act. According to Ditchew, “territory is the stage where an individual assumes to confront power, comply with it, or revolt.”79 The internet news bulletin “Baltic Ireland,” created by Latvians labouring in Ireland articulates this political dimension. The bulletin has a political slogan, “our own republic,” implicitly showing the emigrant’s discontent with the state management of Latvia and, at the linguistic level, constructing their own state with its own management, which must be better. Some of the articles and comments in the bulletin reiterate a popular resentment among Latvians, and for some, a feeling of hurt towards their native country. Thirdly, both emigration and the dilemma of return demonstrate the ethical problematization which the informants have been experiencing. This ethical reasoning has been seeking to minimize the ________________

Ivaylo Ditchev, ”Fluid citizenship: Utopia of freedom or reality of submission?”, Eurozine, 2006, available at: . 79 Ibidem.   78

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

147

social and economic constraints, which have smothered the satisfaction of an individual as an ethical subject. Not being able to sustain a family or provide the basic necessities for a decent life has become a question of self-respect. The migrant’s decision was essentially a search for a state that would help them overcome these limitations. Foucault points out that nowadays the self has to make “the ethico-political choice” every day, as this form of ethics is now beyond any legal institutional system, due to the lack of belief in them.80 This appears to be the case in Latvia, both during the years of the transition and now. Interestingly, Naseniece81 points out that the very practices of Latvian politicians since independence have bruised the ego of their populace, and in this case, some form of resistance is inevitable. It seems that the current emigration deals on one hand with the protest against governance in Latvia, and on the other hand with one’s self-respect. In the summer of 2009, the Latvian government substantially decreased the salaries of public sector workers as a tool to balance the state budget. In response to this government policy, a forensic medicine expert with high qualifications and experience asked me, “is it too much at my age [39] to want to be able to afford with my earnings a one room flat to live in and a small car to move around in?!” This substantial decrease in salaries puts her at the risk of giving up some seemingly essential things, and thus facilitates such self questioning. From my case study and observations of recent emigration from Latvia, I consider the migration decision has been largely charged by social, economic, and political problems. However, according to Ditchev,82 in the case of emigration these problems are solved on an individual basis and not at the societal level. Foucauldian scholars would call this individual approach “politics beyond the state, politics of life, of ethics, which emphasize the crucial political value of the mobilization and shaping of ________________

Michel Foucault, “On the Geneology of Ethics: an Overview of Work in Progress,” in: P. Rabinow and N. Rose (eds.), op. cit., p. 104. 81 R. Naseniece, op. cit.   82 I. Ditchev, op. cit.   80

148

Iveta Ķešāne

individual capacities and conduct.”83 The analysis of emigrants’ selfproblematization at the time of their decision demonstrates that it is a strategy of everyday politics for the reason that it attempts to resists and evade limitations set by the mode of state governance and instead increasingly relying on self government.

________________ 83

A. Barry, Th. Osborne and N. Rose, op. cit., p. 1. 

149

Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics

Interview Codes 65 year-old woman; working in Ireland as a florist for 8 years; used to be an accountant in Latvia 48 year-old woman; at the moment working as a pharmacist; used to be a biology and Latvian language teacher in Latvia 40 year-old man; has been in Ireland for 6 years; currently works as a driver; used to be a driver in Latvia 32 year-old woman; has been in Ireland for 7 years; at the moment partly works in a restaurant and raises her 8 year-old daughter; used to be a bank clerk in Latvia 42 year-old man, has been in Ireland for 7 years; currently works as a logistic manager; used to be a head engineer in the fishing plant in Latvia 50 year-old man, has been in Ireland for 7 years; currently works with a bulldozer; used to be a stocker in Latvia 42 year-old man; has been in Ireland for more than 7 years; currently working in a production plant making airplane engines; used to be a trade manager in Latvia 48 year-old woman; has been in Ireland for 7 years; used to be a Latvian language teacher in Latvia; currently works as a supervisor in a hotel 47 year-old woman; has worked in Ireland for 5 years; currently as a worker in a fruit warehouse; used to work as a nurse and a shop-assistant in Latvia 32 year-old woman; has been in Ireland for 7 years; now works as a manager in hotel; used to work as a shop-assistant in Latvia; B.A. in theology 31 year-old man; has been in Ireland for 7 years; currently works in a flower delivery company; B.A. in economics. the spouse of a 40 year-old man; in some places she answers instead of him; he used to be a driver in Latvia, and currently also works as a driver 46 year-old woman; has been in Ireland for around 5 years; currently works in factory; used to have a family vegetable business in Latvia 32 year-old man; has been in Ireland for 7 years; currently is unemployed; used to perform agricultural work in Sweden and the USA 43 year-old woman; has been in Ireland for 6 years; currently works as a florist; also used to work as florist in Latvia

HYAN SLRH PONH DPNK

LMNF

SDPG KGFC

MLCF

LOGC

CHMD

FDHD

NGPR

CPHZ

PNDJ

FCLM

150

Iveta Ķešāne

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

151

Bartłomiej Walczak

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration Abstract: I would like to show the complexity of migration decision-making among parents, on both the macro and the micro levels. Their motivation is often directed toward economic goals. The economy, in particular job availability in the local and host markets is crucial, and it gives rise to significant regional differences, for instance in the proportion of mothers in the migration stream. However other features of parental migration, like the length, structure (single parent/both the parents departure) and forms of childcare during absence of parents do not depend only on economical factors, but also on social and cultural ones. My main aim is to identify regional and status inequalities that influence characteristics of parental migration. On theoretical level rational choice theory approach with interpretivist cultural analysis will be combined. The family is a set of individuals acting under the influence of a complex of factors. The combined influence of these factors, including those of the economic sphere (i.e. unemployment, income differences), the political sphere (i.e. access to the external job markets), the social sphere (migration networks, cooperation within the extended family), and the cultural sphere (cultural aims and means) is reinforced by social inequalities and shapes the structure of parental migration. Keywords: Transnational family, parental migration, migrational culture, gender paradox.

Introduction The question of the relationship between migration and the family attracts the attention of researchers, policy makers, and journalists alike. On one hand, the discussion involves the different sets of factors that have created the transnational family. On the other hand, the in-

152

Bartłomiej Walczak

fluence of migration on the members of such a transnational family is also being analysed. I would like to focus on the causes: I will attempt to analyse the economic, class, and gender dimensions of the process of creation of a transnational family in Poland, in order to show the possible impact of inequalities on the structure of parental migration. I will start with a brief introduction to understanding the term, and will try to depict the characteristics of research on the transnational family. It seems that there is a limited set of areas that researchers focus their attention on, including changes in gender construction and analysis of experiences of separation. In my opinion, the perspective of receiving countries and migrants prevails, so I will try to give more detailed descriptions of research performed in the sending countries on the children and family members left behind. In the second part of this text I will try to justify an understanding of the transnational family as a process. I will refer to rational choice theory and gender-related changes, using the achievements of the Polish sociology maritime communities as an empirical reference, moving toward Parreñas’s category of “gender paradox.” The later part of the text is an analysis of three dimensions—the economic situation, gender scripts, and class stratification—that in my opinion reveal a logic of inequality in parental migration. I will start from selected mediators, like migratory policy in the receiving country, the geographical location of the sending region, and technology. These factors may enforce inequalities caused by economic, gender, or class differentiation. The following analysis of economic, gender, and class inequalities in the structure of parental migration is based on my 2008 research.

1. The transnational family Transnational families, sometimes referred to as multilocal or multisited families (or spatially separated families), are closely tied with migration dynamics. They are not a new phenomenon,1 but the ________________ 1 Deborah Bryceson, “Europe’s Transnational Families and Migration: Past and Present,” in: D. Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela, The Transnational Family. New European

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

153

flow from the periphery or semiperiphery to the centre, characteristic of modern world-systems,2 has obviously increased its scale.3 The transnational family should not be treated merely as a set of relatives, geographically and administratively separated. Rather it helps to understand it as an ongoing process, happening on different levels (and for different reasons). Interestingly, analyses of transnational families are often made from the parents’ perspective (and from the receiving countries point of view). Questions about changes in gender construction and migrants’ experiences of separation from their family are also raised within this perspective.4 There are, however, several studies in the English-language literature covering the perspective of nonmigrating family members (including children), undertaken from the point of view of the sending country—among them an anthropological study by Deborah Bryceson.5 Of course, in the non-English literature there are more texts written from the perspective of the sending countries and nonmigrating family members.6 ________________

Frontiers and Global Networks, Oxford, New York: Berg, 2002; Joanna Dreby, “Managing International Separation: Gender and Parenting in Mexican Transnational Families,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Philadelphia, 2005, p. 1. 2 Immanuel Wallerstein, Analiza systemów-światów. Wprowadzenie [World-system Analysis. An Introduction], Warszawa: Dialog, 2007. 3 Piotr Koryś, „Peryferyjność a migracja niepełna” [Periphery and Uncomplete Migration], in: Ewa Jaźwińska and Marek Okólski (eds.), Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje pomiędzy peryferiami Polski i Zachodu [People on a Swing. Migration between the Perypheries of Poland and the West], Warszawa: Scholar, 2001, pp. 188–205. 4 Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ernestine Avila, “I’M HERE, BUT I’M THERE The Meanings of Latina Transnational Motherhood,” Gender & Society 1997, pp. 548– 571; Andrew Halpern-Manners, “The Effects of Family Member Migration on Education and Work among Nonmigrant Dependents in Mexico,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal 2006; J. Dreby, op. cit.; D. Bryceson and U. Vuorela, op. cit. 5 D. Bryceson, op. cit.   6 For example in Polish: Bożena Balcerzak-Paradowska, „Wpływ okresowej migracji zarobkowej małżonka na warunki życia rodziny” [An Influence of One Parent’s Temporary Migration on a Family Life], Problemy Rodziny 1994, nr 5 (197); Wioletta Danilewicz, Sytuacja życiowa dzieci w rodzinach migracyjnych [The Situation in Life of Children from Migratory Families], Białystok: Trans Humana, 2006; Anna Giza,

154

Bartłomiej Walczak

In her quantitative study based on the Mexican Family Survey, Alexis Silver7 has shown a correlation between the migration of family members and the emotional well-being of nonmigrating family members. Her analytic model consists of the following dimensions mediating between migration and the observed changes: separation, changes of roles, breakdown of support structures, and adoption of additional roles. The level of changes depends on the role played in the family life by the migrant and on support received from the extended family and local community.8 Andrew Halpern-Manners has shown that the likelihood of a youth successfully completing each subsequent educational level is lower in transnational families than in other families.9 Rhacel Salazar Parreñas has analysed transnational families from various perspectives. Her Servants of Globalization (2001)10 is based on interviews with Filipino domestic workers in Los Angeles and Rome. Parreñas understands the reconfiguration of migrant households from nuclear to transnational structures as a consequence of migrants’ attempts to maximize resources and opportunities in the global economy. She places this process within a structural analysis of general family changes.11 She emphasizes the underprivileged position of migrating women in capitalistic economy: “Notably, the ________________

“Long term international migration: covering costs and minimising risks,” in: Ewa Jaźwińska and Marek Okólski (eds.), Causes and Consequences of Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Podlasie and Slask Opolski: basic trends in 1975–1994, Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Społecznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1996; Ewa Kozdrowicz and Bartłomiej Walczak, “Postawy wychowawcze rodziców—migrantów w percepcji dzieci” [Migrating Parents’ Parental Attitudes from the Perspective of their Children], Pedagogika Społeczna 2008, pp. 163–181. 7 Alexis Silver, “Families Across Borders: The Gender and Repercussions of Family Member Migration,” Paper presented at American Sociological Association Conference, Montreal 2006. 8 Ibidem, p. 14.   9 A. Halpern-Manners, op. cit.   10 Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, Servants of Globalization. Women, Migration, and Domestic Works, Stanford: Stanford Univeristy Press, 2001. 11 See also Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive Labor,” Gender and Society 2000, August, pp. 560–580.

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

155

actions of domestic workers involve the maintenance of inequalities, particularly the system of global restructuring in which their constitution as subjects is situated”.12 The analysis conducted in her next book, Children of Global Migration (2005)13 focuses on the sending country’s perspective, and includes a deep analysis of gender script changes, family functioning (including socioeconomic motivations for migration), and the significance of the gap between a migrant and other members of the family caused by separation. The structural characteristic of migration from the Global South to the Global North makes the separation wider: administrative borders, visa policy, high costs of transport, and employer policy have significant influence on the length of Filipino women’s absence.

2. Transnational family as a process I would like to start to embed my deliberations on transnational the family within the frame of rational choice theory. Despite its many minuses, such as its one-sided view of family and household roles (which will be confronted later in the text with feminist theory), as well as the deprivation of women’s work,14 I found it useful in interpreting parental migration. First of all, it provides an explanation in terms of rational calculation, sometimes simplified to an income/ outcome calculation,15 and it suits the analysis of migration as a way of balancing the household budget.16 After all, the dominant discourse on migratory households is clearly economically oriented. ________________

R.S. Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, op. cit., p. 253.  Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, Children of Global Migration. Transnational Families and Gendered Woes, Stanford: Stanford Univeristy Press, 2005. 14 Krystyna Slany, Alternatywne formy życia małżeńsko-rodzinnego w ponowoczesnym świecie [An Alternative Forms of Marriage-Family Life In Postmodern World], Kraków: Nomos, 2006, pp. 61–62. 15 See: Gary Becker, Ekonomiczna teoria zachowań ludzkich [The Economic Approach to Human Behavior], Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1990. 16 See for example, Mariano Sana and Douglas S. Massey, “Household Composition, Family Migration, and Community Context: Migration Remittances in Four Countries,” Social Science Quarterly 2007, June, pp. 509–528; Paweł Kaczmarczyk, 12 13

156

Bartłomiej Walczak

Secondly, rational choice theory emphasizes an individualistic approach to the family. The family is seen not as an impenetrable unit, but as a set of individuals acting according to their own outcome/income speculations. To quote Anna Giza-Poleszczuk, “The family is treated as a function of individual decisions made by individuals acting under the pressure of a complex set of factors and heading toward a solution to specific problems”.17 So we may assume that the existence of the family depends on mediations between its members, who need to solve conflicts arising from their contrary individual interests. Although I am willing to retain this individualistic orientation, I have to express one reservation: The explanatory model in rational choice theory assumes a particular kind of equality among family members. This particular equality is the freedom to withdraw from or to stay in the “business”—and this freedom may be disputable, even when we recognize the relativization of rationality in rational choice theory.18 The subjectivity of an agency may be driven by gender or class factors, and results in unequal experiences of being a member of a transnational family. A good illustration of this process is provided by the Polish school of maritime sociology. Ludwik Janiszewski and his associates focused on seamen and fishermen’s families. The separation in a seaman’s family lasts relatively long compared to the average separation in a migratory family:19 almost half of the sailors from TarnowskaJakóbiec’s sample spent over two years away from their families ________________

Ewa Kępińska and Joanna Napierała, „Próba oceny „natężenia” migracji w regionach wysyłających przez pryzmat gospodarstw domowych” [An Attempt to Measuer the „Intensity” of Migration In Sending Areas from the Point of View of Households], in: P. Kaczmarczyk (red.), Współczesne migracje zagraniczne Polaków. Aspekty lokalne i regionalne [Contemporary Abroad Migrations of Polish. Local and Regional Aspects], Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008. 17 Anna Giza-Poleszczuk, „Rodzina i system społeczny” [Family nad the Social System], in: Mirosława Marody (red.), Wymiary życia społecznego. Polska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku [The Dimensions of Social Life], Warszawa: Scholar, 2007, pp. 291–292. 18 Ibidem.   19 Average separation in migratory families runs to seven months (for fathers) and five months (for mothers). 48% of migrating mothers have spent no more than two months abroad (within the 36 months before the research). I will summarize this research methodology and sampling in the following section. 

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

157

within the 36 months preceding the research.20 A seaman’s family is a mother-centred family, well integrated and separated from the social environment.21 Tarnowska-Jakóbiec describes the changes in gender scripts: the “male component” of socialization was delivered by the mothers.22 In fact, women had to play both an instrumental and an emotional role, to employ Talcott Parson’s old categories. When women claimed the culturally specified male space within the family, there was nothing left for the sailor himself. The seaman’s position within the family changed—his link with the children weakened, his responsibility became limited mostly to keeping discipline (when at home) and providing financial support. A similar process may be observed in other labour-separated families (soldiers, geologists), as well as in transnational families. Moving toward gender analysis, we may assume that transnational families simply follow quite a typical gender script, where the father plays the role of primary breadwinner, and mother is the primary caregiver. However migration—as we already have seen above—may lead to some negative consequences for the father’s role within the family. The fact that the father’s cultural role is still that of the primary breadwinner may reduce the consequences suffered by men. But when the woman is migrating, there is no normative umbrella over her head. Migrating mothers still serve (both in individual imagination and in public discourse) as primary caregivers.23 This process was described by Rhacel Salazar Parreñas in her Children of Global Migration, where she referred to it as a gender paradox: ________________

Urszula Tarnowska-Jakóbiec, Rodziny marynarzy i rybaków dalekomorskich jako środowisko wychowawcze [Seamen and Fishermen Families as an Upbringing Environment], Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 1998, p. 105. 21 Ludwik Janiszewski and Adam Sosnowski, Socjologia morska. Wybór zagadnień [A Maritime Sociology. Excerpts], Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1984, p. 108; Ludwik Janiszewski, Rodzina marynarzy i rybaków dalekomorskich. Studium socjologiczne [The Family of Seamen and Fishermen. A Sociological Study], Warszawa, Poznań: PWN, 1976. 22 U. Tarnowska-Jakóbiec, op. cit.   23 Umut Erel, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood: Experiences of Migrant Women from Turkey Living in Germany,” in: Deborah Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela (eds.), The Transnational Family. New European Frontiers and Global Networking, Oxford, New York: Berg, 2002. 20

158

Bartłomiej Walczak

... the reorganization of households into transnational structures questions the ideology of women’s domesticity but the caring practices in these families maintain this view. Significantly, this paradox mars children’s acceptance of the reconstruction of mothering and consequently hampers their acceptance of growing up in a household split apart from their mothers.24

Parreñas shows how this process is reinforced in public discourse, as well as in daily practice and her informants’ experiences. In fact, the raising of a transnational family does not affect, but rather enforces, traditional patriarchy—a migrating mother is still responsible for the care, while a migrating father insists on disciplining from a distance.25 In her latest book, Parreñas analyses the intersection of patriarchy and global capitalism in the life of Filipino migrants from the perspectives of global economy, national (Philippines) economy, legal regulations, the family, and local community.26

3. Empirical database The data presented below was gathered in two Poland-wide surveys: A stratified random sample of school educationalists (N = 173, technique: CATI); A stratified, multistage random sample of students aged 9–18 (N = 3893, technique: four types of self-administered questionnaires adjusted to the respondent’s age).

The survey was conducted between February and May 2008 with the support of the bureau of the Polish Ombudsman for Children (Rzecznik praw dziecka). I found the student survey to be more

________________

R.S. Parreñas, Children of Global Migration, op. cit., p. 92.  Ibidem, p. 6; see also Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, “Mothering from a Distance: Emotions, Gender, and Intergenerational Relations in Filipino Transnational Families,” Feminist Studies 2001, Summer, pp. 361–390. 26 Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, The Force of Domesticity. Filipina Migrants and Globalization, New York, London: New York Univeristy Press, 2008. 24 25

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

159

valuable, and I will henceforth refer mainly to this source of data, although some serious limitations on its representativeness must be indicated. First of all, it should be noted that—in particular within the higher age brackets—some children avoid attending school. Moreover, the situation of children younger than the youngest pupils cannot be established directly. Some techniques of indirect measurement were adopted here, but their application was limited only to some areas.

4. The dimensions of inequality Parental migration is shaped by many factors. We can split such factors into several groups on different levels. Generally speaking, main areas such as economy, policy, class, community, gender, and culture may be specified. Each area (the list of which may easily be enlarged) affects parental migration on different levels. For instance, economic factors may be analysed on the macro level (the macroeconomic situation in the sending country/region), on the mezzo level (e.g. the level of unemployment on local job markets or for particular professions), and on the micro level (family budget and financial strategy). In this text I will focus mainly on the macro and mezzo level, keeping in mind that finally they meet in subject agency.27 In the following section, I will try to analyse several areas: economy, gender, and class stratification, as places where the logic of inequality is revealed. It should be added that the influences of the economic situation, gender, or class are usually mediated by other factors. Let me briefly consider three such factors: migratory policy in the receiving country, the geographical location of the sending region, and the technology available to the migrant. Although these three groups of determinants cannot cause inequality, they can increase the existing level of inequality. Migratory policy—in particular visa policy—usually affects migrants from countries that don’t have a strong international ________________ 27 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, Zaproszenie do socjologii refleksyjnej [An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology], Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2001.

160

Bartłomiej Walczak

Fig. 1. The structure of the analysis

position. The role of migratory policy in the creation of the transnational family has been analysed by Deborah Bohem.28 She has shown the influence of US policy on the reorganization of transnational families of Mexican origin. A correlation between transnational family structure and administrative borders is out of the question.29 Changes in the regulation of labour movement have significantly affected transnational families based in Poland, but in a positive way. The freedom of labour flow that initiated the mass migration after May 1, 2004, caused a shortening of average migration duration. For example, earlier immigrants to the UK were aware that after exceeding their tourist visa, which had given them entrance into the country, they would be prevented from visiting the UK again. ________________ 28 Deborah Bohem, “‘For my Children:’ Constructing Family and Navigating the State in the U.S.–Mexico Transnation,” Anthropological Quaterly 2008, pp. 777–802. 29 See studies in D. Bryceson and U. Vuorela, op. cit.  

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

161

A decrease in transatlantic migration—in particular a significant drop in the outflow to the USA30—also limited separation length. Geographical closeness to external job markets causes an increase in seasonal migration and in general reduces migration length. Of course, there are several other factors that may redirect migratory flow even to a distant market, like a local migratory tradition or demand for workers in the local market. Some examples may be seen in Figure 2.

S o u r c e: own research.

Fig. 2. Average length of absence of father, by voivodeship ________________ 30 Irena Grabowska-Lusińska and Marek Okólski, Migracja z Polski po 1 maja 2004 r.: jej intensywność i kierunki geograficzne oraz alokacja migrantów na rynkach pracy krajów Unii Europejskiej [Migration from Poland after 1 of May 2004. It’s Intensity, Geographical Directions and Migrants Allocation on UE Job Markets], Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Migracjami, 2008; Krystyna Iglicka, Kontrasty migracyjne Polski. Wymiar transatlantycki [Migrational Contrasts In Poland. An Transatlantic Dimension], Warszawa: Scholar, 2008.

162

Bartłomiej Walczak

Technology, in particular transport and communication technology, is another aspect that can influence the transnational family. Changes in transport—especially the broad availability of cheap carriers—can decrease the separation length, while new communication technology—such as VOIP telephony and internet communicators—helps to maintain relations within the family. Of course, technology skills may also be class driven.

5. Economy The intensity of parental migration is connected with a household’s economic situation, which may be considered to be a consequence of regional tendencies.31 Employment is a good indicator, as it opens the door to the world of resources, to quote Ralph Dahrendorf.32 Unemployment as a main push factor may be a complex indicator: discrepancies between employees’ qualifications and the job opportunities available on the local market, low incomes, unfavourable working conditions, or the lack of opportunities for selfdevelopment can all increase the chance of migration.33 ________________

Dorota Osipowicz, „Marginalizacja społeczna migrantów” [Social marginalization of Migrants], in: Ewa Jaźwińska and Marek Okólski (red.), Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu [People on a Swing. Migration between the Perypheries of Poland and the West], Warszawa: Scholar, 2001, pp. 382–409. 32 Ralf Dahrendorf, Nowoczesny konflikt społeczny [The Modern Social Conflict], Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1993. 33 Joanna Napierała, „Regionalne aspekty zróżnicowania mobilności Polaków w świetle wyników sondażu” [Regional Differences In Poles Mobility. Report from Survey Research], in: Paweł Kaczmarczyk (red.), Współczesne migracje zagraniczne Polaków. Aspekty lokalne i regionalne [Contemporary Abroad Migrations of Polish. Local and Regional Aspects], Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami, 2008, p. 149. The economical determinants of contemporary Polish migration have been analyzed by many economists and sociologists, and I will not review their findings here; see, for instance, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, Migracje zarobkowe Polaków w dobie przemian [Economical Migration of Poles In the Time of Transformation], Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2005; Antoni Rajkiewicz (ed.), Zewnętrzne migracje zarobkowe we współczesnej Polsce. Wybrane zagadnienia [External Economical Migration In Contemporary Poland. Selected Issues], Włocławek: WSHE, IPiSS, 2000; Marian Malikowski, Społeczeństwo Podkarpacia po wstąpieniu Polski do Unii Europejskiej [The 31

163

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

The economic situation is still the main push factor in parental migration. The intensity of migration (the number of migrants among the parents) depends mainly on the unemployment rate (R = 0.77 for mothers and R = 0.83 for fathers). Regions with long migratory traditions and a high rate of migrants even before May 1, 2004 are in a better situation than the new Table 1. Characteristics of parental migration, by region. All the indicators also cover seasonal migration. Based on GUS (Central Statistical Office) data and author’s own data

Voivodeship

Dolnośląskie Kujawsko-Pomorskie Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie Warmińsko-Mazurskie Wielkopolskie Zachodniopomorskie *

Average Percentage of Percentage of Average Average annual migrating migrating length of length of unemployme mothers from father from mother’s total father’s total nt rate for the among all among all absence absence years mothers father (months)* (months)4 2004–2007 16.3 20.1 15.8 20.5 15.9 12.2 12.4 16.7 17.1 13.9 16.7 13.6 18.9

10.9 10.3 7.9 8.8 5.2 7.5 3.7 13.1 14.8 5.3 7.4 7.5 13.7

23.2 23.4 22.7 24.4 12.3 20.3 9.1 37.0 28.0 14.8 26.1 27.9 27.0

4.9 2.7 2.5 6.9 7.4 1.5 5.2 1.3 8.7 7.3 1.8 6.7 9.2

5.0 14.8 2.5 5.1 8.2 3.5 5.9 1.8 13.3 7.6 3.5 7.8 9.2

24.8 12.6 22.8

16.4 6.2 10.7

29.7 15.2 32.2

9.4 2.0 3.2

12.6 3.0 6.0

Within the thirty-six months preceding the survey.

________________

Society of Podkarpacie after an Accession to EU], Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2008; Stanisława Golinowska, “Profile emigracji zarobkowej z Polski” [The Profiles of Economic Migration from Poland], In: Stanisława Golinowska, Anna Ruzik, Christophe, Gandziarowska, Jagoda Starzec and Andrzej Graś, Wyjazdy zarobkowe Polaków do Francji [Polish Economical Migration to France], Warszawa, Paris: IPiSS, 2007, pp. 27–50; Ewa Jaźwińska and Marek Okólski (eds.), Causes and Consequences of Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, Warszawa: ISS, 1996.

164

Bartłomiej Walczak

reservoirs with the highest unemployment rate. For instance, Opolskie voivodeship, which had the highest rate of migrants in 2002,34 has the highest rate of migrant fathers, but only when we include seasonal migration. As shown in Table 1, the average length of father’s absence in this region is the shortest in Poland. Its location in the western part of the country decreases the separation length in the regions with high average unemployment rate, such as Lubuskie and Zachodniopomorskie voivodeships. Voivodeships lacking such a favourable location but with an adverse situation in the job market are characterized by the longest periods of absence of father: about fifteen months in KujawskoPomorskie, thirteen in Podkarpackie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie.

S o u r c e: own research.

Fig. 3. The percentage of women among migrating parents ________________ 34 I.

Grabowska-Lusińska and M. Okólski, op. cit. 

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

165

When we compare different regions, it appears that while the intensity of migration is closely tied to the unemployment rate (as an indicator of the regions’ economic situation), the share of women among migrating parents is not correlated with the unemployment rate (p > 0.05). However, as shown in Figure 3, the highest share of women among migrating parents was observed in Podkarpackie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie—the two voivodeships with the highest unemployment rates. The fact that an economic indicator has no simple, statistically significant influence on the parental migration gender balance should focus our attention on other regulators, such as the proximity of external job markets, the local migratory tradition, and the strength of traditional families (strong parental families usually being characteristic of regions with more rural and small city areas).

6. Gender The language of Polish public discourse on the transnational family and parental migration is simply the language of deprivation. Newspapers quote painful stories of separated families, children being taken care of by their grandparents, or even sent to an orphanage. In fact, a new definition of social orphanage has been proposed by journalists, one that is not only fundamentally contrary to the definition recognized in family studies,35 but also stigmatizes those parents who decide to migrate, even temporarily. A similar process has been described by Rhacel Salazar Parreñas in the Philippines—while migration is necessary to obtain some culturally defined targets, migrating parents are seen as a “worse” kind of parent. Gender scripts play a crucial role here: while the fathers’ migration fits the cultural scheme, migrant mothers break from the conventional role of the mother as a primary caregiver.36 The structural characteristics of parental migration confirm these assumptions on gender roles in raising children. The percentage of men among migrating parents is significantly higher than in the ________________

35 Stanisław Kozak, “Kilka uwag o zjawisku sieroctwa migracyjnego” [Some Remarks about the Migratory Orphanage], Problemy Rodziny 1992, no. 6, pp. 18–19. 36 R.S. Parreñas, Children of Global Migration, op. cit.  

166

Bartłomiej Walczak

entire migratory flow. I have estimated it to be between 69% and 77%,37 while in the entire population it was about 65%.38 The culturally specified assumptions on men and women’s roles in the family39 generally decreases the level of maternal migration. However from the traditional point of view, maternal migration does not fit the model of mothering. Therefore a migrating mother will face a culturally specified, strong negative reaction. This has been well described by Rhacel Salazar Parreñas.40 On one hand, all the factors that stimulated Philippine women’s migration, reinforced by the receiving country’s migratory and employment policy, prevent them from frequent visits. On the other hand, while being abroad a Philippine mother is stigmatized as being a “bad mother”. Maternal migration goes against the traditional definition of mothering.41 A similar mechanism is visible in Poland; here I quote one of the leading (neo-liberal!) newspapers: The mother left little Paulina with her grandparents in Nowy Sącz. Nevertheless, she was still writing letters. She was sending gifts. After several years, she received the letters and packages less and less often. The girl is angry, she says she hates her mother. She stays out all night, her grandparents say she goes out with “just about anyone”. And they are helpless.42

Maternal migration challenges the traditional model of mothering,43 a fact which is reflected in the public discourse. Children from ________________

All the estimations are shown for a confidence level of 95%.  I. Grabowska-Lusińska and M. Okólski, op. cit., pp. 60–62; see A. Giza, op. cit., pp. 135–136; J. Napierała, op. cit.  39 Anthony Giddens, Przemiany intymnosci. Seksualnośc, miłość i erotyzm we współczenych społeczeństwach [The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love and Erotism in Modern Societies], Warszawa: PWN, 2006; Scott Coltrane and Michele Adams, “Men’s Family Work: Child-Centered Fatherng and the Sharing of Domestic Labor,” in: Arlene Skolnick i Jerome Skolnick (eds.), Family in Transition, Boston: Pearson, 2005, pp. 117–130. 40 R.S. Parreñas, Children of Global Migration, op. cit.   41 Ibidem, p. 17.   42 Małgorzata Kozerawska, „110 tys. eurosierot czeka na pomoc” [110 Thousand Euro-Orphans is Waiting for Help], Gazeta Wyborcza 2008, 10–15. 43 See: Anna Kwak, Rodzina w dobie przemian. Małżeństwo i kohabitacja [Family In Transformation. The Marriage and Cohabitation], Warszawa: Żak, 2005; K. Slany, Alternatywne formy życia małżeńsko-rodzinnego w ponowoczesnym świecie. 37 38

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

167

transnational families are described as orphans (literally “Euroorphans”), not only in newspapers but also in official documents and reports issued by educational and family-support institutions. Yet the critique is focused on migrating women. The newspapers’ stories about “Euro-orphans” describe children whose mother or both parents are abroad. There are almost no stories about families with only a migrating father. Because the father’s responsibility as the primary bread winner is well established in traditional families, kids are not “orphaned” when he leaves. As we discovered during our research, migration of the father is rarely recognized by educational or family-support institutions. The levels of parental migration recognized by the interviewed school educationalists are maternal and dual (father and mother) migration. This shows the strength of gender roles in the family. It should also be noted that the discrepancy between the numbers of transnational families recognized by educationalists and the real level of migration depends on the local migratory tradition. The range of parental migration known to educationalists from “new” migratory reservoirs (for example Warmińsko-Mazurskie) is about six times lower that the actual level, while educationalists from “old” reservoirs (Opolskie, Podlasie) perceive a level close to the real scale. The culturally specified gender roles are eventually internalized by the migrants themselves. Research by Anna Krasnodębska shows how migrating women have doubts about whether they satisfy the role of mother as primary caregiver when they are playing the role of breadwinner. My daughter nursed a grudge against me. I heard more than once, when she felt down, ‘You’ve gone, you’ve left me’. I thought my heart would break. There are all sorts of parents… I wanted to make my child’s living circumstances better than mine.44

So we may summarise that the position of women is deprived on many levels. They are deprived as employees in the receiving ________________ 44 Anna Krasnodębska, „Migracja zarobkowa a życie rodzinne kobiet z Opolszczyzny” [Economical Migration and Family Life of Women from Opolszczyzna], Pedagogika Społeczna 2008, no. 3 (29), p. 77.

168

Bartłomiej Walczak

countries of Global North,45 and they are deprived as “bad” parents in sending countries. Finally, children’s assessments of their mothers’ fit the gender scripts, and seem to be more severe than their assessment of their absent fathers. I will try to show this through the changes in children’s perception of parental attitudes. In our research we used a Polish adaptation of the Roe and Seligman PCR psychometric test.46 We found that children, in particular girls, seem to idealize an absent father (high indicators on the Love and Attention scales), while relations with an absent mother are described as cooler.47 When a mother migrates, indicators of the coolness-based attitudes increase, and after one year of separation the indicators of warm-based attitudes (in particular Love) begin to decrease. An analysis of changes in care structure—in particular the role played by grandparents—reveals that separation exceeding one year simultaneously leads to reconstruction of the father-centred family.48 The informants’ attitudes toward father and mother are coherent. The Love scale for the father is positively correlated with the Love scale for the mother. There are no substitutions, nor does migration change children’s general perception of the family (except for long term migration). ________________

R.S. Parreñas, “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive Labor,” op. cit.; idem, The Force of Domesticity; Krystyna Slany, „Trauma życia codziennego: z badań nad migrantkami polskimi w USA i Włoszech” [Trauma od Daily Life. From the Researches on Polish Female Migrants In US and Italy], in: Andrzej Flis (ed.), Stawanie się społeczeństwa [Becoming the Society], Kraków: Universitas, 2006, p. 587. 46 Parent-Child Relation test, version 3; Polish adaptation by Włodzimierz Kowalski, Kwestionariusz stosunków między rodzicami a dziećmi A. Roe i M. Siegelmana [A. Roe and M. Siegelman Parent-Child Relations Question-naire], Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Radia i Telewizji, 1983. See also E. Kozdrowicz and B. Walczak, op. cit.  47 Cf. Józef Rembowski, „Funkcjonowanie rodziny marynarskiej dwudzielnej w warunkach długotrwałej rozłąki z ojcem“ [Seaman’s Nuclear Family during Longterm Separation with the Father], Roczniki Socjologii Morskiej 1987, III, pp. 33–54.  48 E. Kozdrowicz and B. Walczak, op. cit.; Bartłomiej Walczak, „Euromigracje rodziców i opiekunów uczniów: skala zjawiska oraz jego wychowawcze i edukacyjne implikacje” [Euro-migration of Parents and Legal Carrers. The Scale Educational and Upbringing Implications], Pedagogika Społeczna 2008, pp. 143–162. 45

169

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

Table 2. Changes in particular PCR scales by migration length Mother

Migration length49

love

rejection

attention

demand

casual

No migration

10.1

9.8

10.0

9.9

9.8

9.7

10.0

11.0

12.2

9.4

Seasonal Short-term

11.9

8.7

11.1

10.7

9.8

Mid-term

8.1

13.1

6.8

9.3

14.3

Long-term

11.7

6.4

10.4

5.9

11.6

9.9

9.8

9.8

9.9

9.8

Seasonal

11.2

9.2

11.0

9.9

10.8

Short-term

11.1

9.5

10.6

10.1

11.4

Mid-term

11.0

10.9

10.2

11.3

9.8

Long-term

9.6

10.7

10.1

8.9

10.8

Father No migration

S o u r c e: own research.

Table 3. Correlation (R Pearson) matrix: attitudes toward migrating and remaining parents Remaining Migrating Father Mother

love rejection love rejection

Mother love rejection 0.532** –0.245** –0.446** 0.590**

love

–0.091 0.104

Father rejection

–0.021 0.085

** p < 0.01 Quoted from E. Kozdrowicz and B. Walczak, op. cit., p. 178.

7. Class I will treat class stratification as a useful analytical structure only,50 and look for contrasts rather than systematization. Class identification will be based on two dimensions: profession and

________________

Seasonal migration = up to two months; short-term migration = two to six months; mid-term migration = six to twelve months; long-term migration = more than twelve months.  50 P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, op. cit.   49

170

Bartłomiej Walczak

education. Due to the characteristics of the respondent, I do not use income as an indicator; however, the actual profession and level of education are strong indicators of social status.51 Social status will be analysed in relation to the entire household, rather than focusing on individuals. The social status of each household is specified by the highest status attributed to profession, and the highest educational level obtained by the parents (father or mother). It should be noted that the class structure of a migratory flow can be translated into transnational families. A migrant is somehow deprived, politically or economically, while transnational elites enter the spaces of flows.52 “Transnational elites are perceived as ‘mobile’ rather than ‘migrant’”, say the editors of The Transnational Family.53 I won’t refer to transnational elites again, but it seems that their freedom of choice is significantly higher than that of the families not situated at the high end of the status hierarchy. The impact of class on migration may be treated simply as a factor that increases or decreases the motivation of an individual to migrate. The migratory stream after the May 1, 2004 is often seen as an exceptionally well educated one.54 Among migrating parents, however, higher education is relatively rare. This migratory stream is dominated by qualified workers, farmers, and nonqualified workers with secondary or vocational secondary education. The high share of households with unemployed parents who declare that they have such education is not surprising. ________________ 51 Henryk Domański, Struktura społeczna [Social Structure], Warszawa: Scholar, 2007; Henryk Domański, Zbigniew Sawiński and Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, Nowa klasyfikacja i skale zawodów. Socjologiczne wskaźniki pozycji społecznej w Polsce [The New Classification and Scales of Professions. A Sociological Indicators of Social Position in Poland], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2007. 52 Manuel Castells, Społeczeństwo sieci [The Rise of the Network Society], Warszawa: PWN, 2007. 53 D. Bryceson and U. Vuorela, op. cit., p. 8.   54 I. Grabowska-Lusińska and M. Okólski, Migracja z Polski po 1 maja 2004 r.; Paweł Kaczmarczyk and Marek Okólski (red.), Polityka migracyjna jako instrument promocji zatrudnienia i ograniczenia bezrobocia [Migratory Policy as an Instrument of the Promotion of Employment and the Reduction of Unemployment], Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008; K. Iglicka, op. cit.; Irena Grabowska-Lusińska and Marek Okólski, Emigracja ostatnia? [Last Emigration?], Warszawa: Scholar, 2009.

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

S o u r c e: own research.

Fig. 4. The highest level of education obtained within a household

S o u r c e: own research.

Fig. 5. The highest currently held job within a household

171

172

Bartłomiej Walczak

Therefore we may conclude that the higher the social status, the smaller the probability of parental migration (with the exception of elite migration).55 Economy plays a crucial role here: the income of a highly skilled and well educated employee should be sufficient to secure the survival of a family without migration. However, we may also risk the hypothesis that the process of constructing family and gender scripts in the upper-middle and upper classes prevents family members—in particular men—from making migratory decisions. I presume that the lifestyle generated by the upper classes and reconstructed by the lower classes may also increase the possibility of migration among representatives of the lower classes. I agree with Pierre Bourdieu56 that class status manages not only specific goals and means, but also experience itself. Therefore, I assumed that the ways of dealing with migratory experience will be different in different classes (keeping in mind other factors such as other migratory experiences in family, the local migratory tradition, etc.). The hypothesis that there is a significant correlation between class status and the changes in how children from migratory families assess their families was confirmed (p < 0.05). It seems that different a habitus means different expectation from internal relations within the family: in higher status groups, the children’s demands are apparently bigger—and the relative cost of separation is seen as even bigger.

Summary In this paper I have tried to show some of the implications of class, gender, and economic inequalities for the structure of contemporary parental migration from Poland. The complexity and interdependency of all the factors that shape a transnational family with Polish origins makes the precision of such an analysis debatable. ________________

On the other hand, middle and upper middle class families may migrate in their entirety, together with children, and therefore be excluded from my sample. I owe this conclusion to Dorota Osipovic.  56 P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, op. cit.   55

Economic, class, and gender inequalities in parental migration

173

However I hope that some of the conclusions presented here are well founded. It is a truism to say that the probability of migration is correlated with the economic status of a family: It shapes migration length and structure (for example, in the regions with the poorest economic situation, the occurrence of simultaneous migration of both parents is highest), but is also shaped by culturally specified gender scripts and factors, such as policy, geographical location, and demand for work. Gender inequality may lead to the deprivation of women’s position—by migrating, they challenge their roles as mothers and wives. They must play two roles simultaneously: the economically forced role of the main breadwinner, and the culturally specified role of the primary caregiver. This inequality may deepen with class stratification. Therefore it may be assumed that the probability of parental migration depends on economic and class stratifications. While the correlation of migratory decisions with economic status is almost linear, the correlation with social strata is more complicated. Transnational families are constructed within two social levels: transnational elites (for example, experts, managers from multisited companies, and researchers) and transnational workers, filling the socalled secondary job market, with low-skill, low-income, and lowprestige jobs. So on one hand, migratory experiences enforce the class stratification system. On the other hand when we turn to the migration of mothers, migration seems to weaken their status due to the inconsistency of these two roles. Migration is an indicator of changes in a culture and society, but changes must be complex to reduce class and gender inequalities. So far it seems that migratory experience increases the level of inequalities, rather than bridging a gap.

174

Bartłomiej Walczak

Part II

The Differing Contexts of Migration

176

Konrad Miciukiewicz

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

177

Konrad Miciukiewicz

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe: The impacts of European Integration Abstract: The paper looks at harmonization of immigration and asylum policies in the new Central Eastern European Member States of the EU with the Schengen Acquis, the new legacy of immigration and asylum, and the institutional practice towards new migrants. The author argues that the European integration process has been dominated by the deployment of repressive security measures, while admission policies in the NMS-10 have not been given sufficient legal, institutional, and financial support from the EU-15, and have remained underdeveloped. As a result, the NMS-10, where an effective Europeanized system of border controls and surveillance of migrants coincides with poor standards of international protection and the absence of progressive immigration policies, have become neither a “substantially safe” destination for asylum seekers nor an attractive geo-region for economic migrants. Keywords: migration; asylum; immigration control; Central Eastern Europe; European integration.

Introduction Since the 1990s, Central Eastern European countries have seen large-scale movements of people, both documented and undocumented, as well as voluntary and involuntary migration. The pre-accession process, which had a decisive impact on shaping migration and asylum policies in the CEECs, took place at a time when the negative consequences of immigration were receiving increased attention, and Western European policy-makers were experiencing a growing political imperative to strengthen control over international

178

Konrad Miciukiewicz

migration, in the name of both national and personal safety understood in its various cultural, psychological, political, and economic dimensions. Central Eastern European states, which had had little experience with illegal migration and had not paid much attention to controls on their Eastern borders under Communism, were regarded by the EU-15 as a major threat to the internal security system of the Union. Hence, the European integration process was highly influenced by the political desire of the EU-15 to strengthen the Eastern borders, and to externalize—at least partially—the costs of immigration control and international refugee protection to the candidate states. This paper looks at the harmonization of immigration and asylum policies in 10 new Central and Eastern European member states (the NMS-10: i.e. the CEEC-8 accession countries which joined the EU in 2004, together with Romania and Bulgaria, which were admitted in 2007) with European law and institutional practice. The first section describes and interprets the Schengen security policies and instruments implemented by the NMS-10 as a result of their accession to the EU and the Schengen area. The second section comments on the extension of the asylum regime to Central Eastern Europe, and problems with refugee protection in the region. The third section looks at the development of legal and illegal economic migration in the NMS-10, as well as new migration policy developments. In the last section, conclusions are drawn and progressive ways forward for future asylum and immigration policies are proposed. The author argues that the European integration process has been dominated by the deployment of repressive security measures, while admission policies were greatly overlooked. While most security objectives—particularly those stressed by the EU-15 in the preaccession process—were reached by the NMS-10 before 2004, the human rights instruments have remained underdeveloped. The European system of negative redistribution for the handling of asylum claims, which had been set up to bring relief to particular Western European states, was extended to Central Eastern Europe too rapidly, and without proper legal, institutional, or financial assistance, which resulted in a weakening of international protection offered to those fleeing wars and political persecution. At the same

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

179

time, the acceptance of EU limitations on the scope of their own migration policy-making together with internal political and social pressures, and the lack of vision or roadmap for migration made Central Eastern European governments neglect pro-active migration policies that could attract labour force from abroad. In spite of the great progress in humanitarian protection made throughout the last 15 years, and the economic prosperity which followed EU accession, the new Member States are still neither a “substantially safe” destination for refugees nor an attractive region for economic migrants. Most of voluntary and involuntary migrants who increasingly penetrate Central Eastern Europe remain with irregular status and/or decide to seek refuge and opportunities for a better life in Western Europe. First, restrictive regulations, low refugee recognition rates, poor legal and social help for asylum seekers, and the various cases of human rights violations which are still being reported in NMS-10, all result in low standards of refugee protection. Second, underdeveloped channels of legal economic migration do not allow Central Eastern European states, which suffer from workforce shortages in construction, manufacturing, and other sectors, to successfully recruit workers from abroad and profit from economic migration.

1. The Schengen Acquis and the new security policies in the NMS-10 Rather than develop new policy instruments to enhance refugee protection and benefit from migration, Central European States tend to reproduce repressive European policies. Not only have the new Member States been implementing the old EU security measures, but along with the EU-15 they have experienced significant processes of change in immigration policies. The traditional repertoire of strategies employed by European countries to tighten their external borders has recently been substantially substituted by a new repertoire of strategies for surveillance of population flows within national territories, and remote policies which extrapolate the power of EU states into other national territories. The EU is also gradually pulling

180

Konrad Miciukiewicz

various “non-policing” public institutions (such as hospitals and jobcentres) and private companies in immigration control. By adopting these relatively new policy developments—which are constantly defining, refining, framing, and reframing the processes of inclusion and exclusion of European “others”—the NMS-10 are constructing a sometimes more apparent and sometimes more discreet, but always restrictive migration regime.1 Four major instruments are now crucial to border and immigration control in Central Europe: (1) controls on external borders, (2) internal controls, (3) the Schengen Information System (SIS), and (4) the visa regime.

1.1. Controls on external borders The demand that Schengen external borders be secured, which was explicitly defined as a precondition for granting free movement of people in the Schengen area, was fulfilled in several aspects. First, more staff were hired or gradually relocated to the new EU external borders, and this was intertwined with demilitarization of the border forces. Second, more watchtowers and border stations were built on the new eastern EU borders. Third, European funds were used for training staff and dogs, and for purchasing new equipment such as cars, helicopters, patrol boats, electronic detection devices (thermovisual and night vision equipment, CO2 detectors, etc.), computers, and software. Fourth, the European agency for the management of external borders, FRONTEX, was set up in Warsaw, and is building a transnational European Corps of Border Guards. Fifth, stringent ________________ 1 Cf. Rey Koslowski, “New Technologies of Border Control in an Enlarging Europe,” Meeting Report 299 from the EES noon discussion on 2 June 2004; Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Sarah Léonard, “The EU Fight Against Illegal Migration and the Eastward Enlargement: To what Extent is the EU Policy on Illegal Migration Consistent with the Forthcoming Eastward Enlargement?” Paper presented at the meeting of UACES Study Group on “The Evolving European Migration Law and Policy”, Liverpool, 5 December 2003; Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration. Towards Fortress Europe? Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2000.

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

181

admission policies at border checkpoints were introduced, leading to increased numbers of entry refusals, and intensive surveillance on green borders was launched. Finally, border checks were tightened at the major international airports, involving airline personnel in immigration control.2

1.2. Internal controls The implementation of the Schengen security acquis in CEECs involved not only the protection of the EU eastern frontier, understood as a geographic line constructed of checkpoints, watchtowers, and the spaces of “green border” between them. After the European Border Control Act of 2001 came into force, the Border Guard was transformed into the Border Police, and their jurisdiction was extended into the entire national territories, with special mobile corps being set up.3 As a result, when travelling through Poland one may face a “border control” not only at the checkpoint in Terespol, but also on a train from Warsaw to Poznań, or at the railway station in Wrocław. In all of the NMS-10, greater powers and responsibilities for immigration control were also delegated to the police, fiscal police, and labour inspectorates. Generally speaking, due to overlapping responsibilities, border guards became policemen and the police became something like border guards. Moreover, much attention is paid to the development of interstate cooperation between police forces in issues of organized crime and immigration offences of all kinds, as well as to the coordination of national police operations in Eastern Europe with Interpol and Europol.4 The “intra-territorialized” borders are indeed the alter ego of ________________ 2 Gallya Lahav, Migration and Security: The Role of Non-State Actors and Civil Liberties in Liberal Democracies, paper presented at the ‘Second Coordination Meeting on International Migration, United Nations Secretariat, New York, 15-16 October 2003.  3 Krystyna Iglicka and Robert Rybicki, Report 1: Schengen—Consequences for National Migration Policy, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2003. 4 Jörg Monar, “Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion,” ESRC “One Europe or Several?” Programme Working Paper, July 2000.

182

Konrad Miciukiewicz

the free movement of people in the Schengen area. Whilst the “real” practiced borders run across territorial divisions, and are manned by various forces, the boundaries between crime and illegal migration also become blurred.

1.3. The Schengen Information System and EURODAC The inter-state cooperation between Schengen countries involves extensive data sharing. For this purpose, a gigantic database containing data on illegal migrants, lost and false travel documents, as well as wanted and missing persons, was created and made operational in all police stations and patrol vehicles. Until 2007, Schengen Information System I (SIS) was in operation in thirteen Member States and two non-EU Schengen states (Iceland and Norway), and partially operational in the United Kingdom and Ireland, even though these latter had opted out of Schengen membership. Problems with the capacity of SIS I were announced by the EU-15 as a major reason for postponing the CEEC-8 accession to Schengen area to 2007. Since the deployment of the new European SIS II database—designed to operate in over 30 countries—is still being postponed and will not be achieved before the end of 2011, the CEEC8 were allowed to join the Schengen area using an improved version of the old database, called SIS I+ (the SISone4ALL initiative). In January 2009, SIS I+ was also deployed in Switzerland. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area is expected to take pace in 2011, but this date is not yet confirmed, as the Netherlands point to the slow progress of these countries in combating organized crime and corruption, as well as continued delays in the deployment of SIS II. SIS II, which has raised serious privacy concerns and has already been a target of numerous protests, is to be even more powerful than its predecessor. It will store and transmit not only text and figures like SIS I, but also photos, fingerprints, and other biometric data. SIS II will also be integrated with EURODAC—the very first European Automated Fingerprint Identification System designed solely to identify asylum seekers. Since 2003, EURODAC has been used to

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

183

register, store, and compare fingerprints of each asylum seeker over fourteen years old, along with certain other categories of migrants who arrived in the Schengen area. EURODAC was not only designed to control asylum seekers by “preventing fraudulent applicants from shopping around”,5 but also to monitor operations of the Border Police, in the NMS-10 in particular. The fingerprinting system allows a person’s first point of entry to be determined, and thus helps to make that particular state responsible for processing an asylum application, and possibly for expelling a failed asylum seeker from the EU.

1.4. Visa regime Another restrictive measure—probably the most difficult for the NMS-10 to adopt—was the joint Schengen visa list. In March 2001, the CEECs were finally forced to introduce major changes to their visa policies and accept a “non-negotiable” negative visa list consisting of 134 countries. The greatest problem was the fact that the list contained most of the post-Communist countries which had for many years been political and economic partners of the new EU Member States. In the first stage, visas were imposed on nationals of several states from the post-Soviet bloc, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. The most difficult decision concerned the application of EU visa policies to neighbouring countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Balkan states. In Poland the most widely reported consequence of the new visa policies is the disappearance of the cross-border commerce, which had been a very significant source of income for Poles living in the poor eastern part of the country. On the other side of the border, in Ukraine, the Schengen border is seen by Transcarpathians as a little short of an impending disaster. In Hungary and Bulgaria, the EU visa regulations were heavily criticized mostly for their effects on diaspora

________________

5 European Commission, “EURODAC. The fingerprint database to assist the asylum procedure,” Brussels: Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom, and Security, 2004, p. 2.

184

Konrad Miciukiewicz

politics. As a result of the obligation to impose visas on the citizens of Serbia and Ukraine, Hungary—considering itself responsible for the ethnic Hungarians who live just outside the EU-27 borders (approximately 300,000 in Serbia and 200,000 in Ukraine)—started issuing certificates of Hungarian origin, the holders of which can enter their homeland without visas, and easily obtain work permits. On the top of that, the new visa regime negatively impacted the political relations of all the NMS-10 with their neighbour states in Eastern Europe, Russia in particular. Last but not least, the new visa regime in CEECs probably most severely affects the lives of migrants, asylum seekers, and war refugees who seek protection in Western Europe.

2. Asylum in Central Eastern Europe 2.1. Changing European asylum regime Central Eastern Europe recently became one of the regions most heavily penetrated by land-travelling refugees. The emergence of the NMS-10 as significant asylum-receiving countries resulted not from the individual choices of asylum seekers or from substantial improvement of international protection systems in the region, but from external changes in the EU asylum regime in the 1990s. The adoption of the so-called “safe third country” rule by European states shifted the responsibility for the examination of an asylum claim to the first “safe” country to admit the asylum seeker to its territory. Ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention, which allows EU states to consider a country as “safe”, was made a precondition for EU membership for the Central Eastern European candidate countries, and thus all accession states had signed the Convention by the end of the 1990s.6 While the “safe third country” rule determined which country was responsible for an asylum claim, readmission agreements7 ________________ 6 See: Sandra Lavenex, Safe Third Countries. Extending EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central and Eastern States, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999. 7 The first readmission agreement was signed by Poland and Germany in 1993. Signing this agreement, Poland undertook to readmit any person—whether Polish national or national of another country—who enters Germany via Poland and does

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

185

signed between the EU-15 and the NMS-10 provided a legal basis for the assisted return of claimants to the countries where their applications were expected to be lodged. As a result of the adoption of the “safe third country” rule and the readmission agreements, the asylum regime had been extended to CEECs in the 1990s. After the accession, the determination of which CEEC country was responsible for the examination of a particular asylum case was further defined by the Dublin II Regulation, and backed by EURODAC.8 In practice, and as a consequence of political decisions being taken in the EU, Eastern and Southern countries had to take the responsibility for all land-travelling refugees from Africa and Asia. The abovementioned changes to European legislation, together with new military and political developments in Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Balkans, resulted in rocketing numbers of asylum applications being lodged in Central Eastern Europe. The overall number of asylum applications in the region increased twentyfold from 2,386 in 1994 to 46,799 in 2001.9 The sharpest increase in this period was recorded in Hungary and Slovenia, which received higher numbers of asylum seekers per capita than those recorded in Western Europe. In Slovenia, where only 19 cases were recorded in 1995, 9,244 applications were lodged in 2001. At the same time, the numbers of applications registered in several Western European countries decreased to reach the lowest level in many years in 2008.10 ________________

not fulfil the conditions of entry or stay in Germany. Later, the Polish-German readmission agreement became a model for similar interstate EU-15—NMS-10 and NMS10—third-countries agreements in the region.  8 See: ECRE, “Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered,” Brussels: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2008. 9 Number of asylum applications lodged in CEECs: 1994—2,386; 1997—11,793; 1998—20,732; 1999 – 29,044; 2001—46,799 (see: Albert Kraler, Martijn Pluim, Frank Laczko, and Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels. “Recent Trends in Asylum Applications in and from Central and Eastern Europe”, in: F. Laczko, Irene Stacher, and A. Klekowski von Koppenfels (eds.), New Challenges for Migration Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, The Hague: Asser Press, 2002). 10 UNHCR, “Europe Regional Operations Profile—Europe. Working environment,” UNHCR report, available at: (retrieved 30 September 2009).

186

Konrad Miciukiewicz

2.2. Problems with access to international protection in Central Eastern Europe This situation was highly problematic as the new Member States had had almost no tradition of refugee protection before 1989 and, still suffer from a serious lack of institutional, economic, and social basis to support such a practice. While the repressive aspects of the EU acquis were implemented, the regulations granting basic human standards, and, foremost, the institutional background for respecting these regulations, were often disregarded during and after European integration. Until the mid-1990s, authorities in several countries did not put the proper legal mechanisms in place to distinguish between asylum seekers and economic migrants.11 As a result of focus being put on development of non-admission migration policies and compliance with international and EU legal provisions for migrants and asylum seekers, the human rights instruments in CEECs were incorporated into national systems rapidly, but without sufficient translation into “jurisprudence and practice, and the development of right organisations at the same speed”.12 When the international migration regime was being extended to the CEECs, human rights were partly regarded by Eastern European governments as external expectations, and restrictive interpretations of the Geneva Convention often shaped national legal systems.13 For instance, Latvia and Hungary first joined the Convention with the so-called “geographical limitation”, giving the right to claim asylum only to European applicants, and only removed this restriction after bargaining with the EU-15. Moreover, some continuing deficiencies in legal frameworks and institutional practice in the NMS-10 put the assurance of human ________________ 11 European Parliament, Migration and Asylum in Central and Eastern Europe 2002, Brussels: European Parliament, Civil Liberties Series, 2002.  12 Judit Toth, “The Impact of EU Migration Policies on Central-Eastern European Countries,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 2001, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 107. 13 UNHCR, “Central Europe and the Baltic States Sub-Regional Operations Profile—Central Europe and the Baltic States. Working environment,” UNHCR report, available at: (retrieved 30 September 2009).

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

187

rights at risk and raised serious doubts on the question of whether Central Eastern Europe was “safe” in terms of international law. Among other issues, there are concerns whether the Geneva Convention is fully respected in regard to treatment of asylum claimants. Various institutional violations inherited from Communist regimes are still present in the practice of law enforcement officers who often operate in a climate of impunity.14 Hungary and Bulgaria still authorize security police to deal with asylum claimants at border checkpoints, and in most CEECs detention is used excessively. In Bulgaria, cases of police harassment of claimants have been reported. In Poland, several groups of Chechen asylum seekers were refused entry at the Belarusian border, and in Bulgaria, asylum claimants transferred in accordance with the Dublin system from Western Europe faced deportation, despite UNHCR interventions. International reports also indicate worrying restrictions in asylum procedures occurring in some countries. The Polish Border Guard has been known to deny undocumented migrants access to asylum, unless they arrived directly from the country where they had been persecuted.15 Hungary explicitly promotes asylum seekers with Hungarian origin, and Slovakia privileges “in situ” applicants who demonstrate the ability to speak Slovak.16 Although CEECs have recently made significant progress in the development of their asylum systems, and are becoming increasingly ________________ 14 Ibidem; European Parliament, Migration and Asylum in Central and Eastern Europe 2002, op. cit.  15 European Parliament, Migration and Asylum in Central and Eastern Europe 2002, op. cit.  16 For more, see: ECRE, “Position on the Enlargement of the European Union in Relation to Asylum,” The European Council on Refugees and Exiles Executive Summary, September 1998; ECRE, “Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered,” op. cit.; UNHCR, “Central Europe and the Baltic States Sub-Regional Operations Profile—Central Europe and the Baltic States. Working environment;” European Parliament, Migration and Asylum in Central and Eastern Europe 2002, op. cit.; Virginie Guiraudon, “A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate. The Case of Migration Control,” Comparative Political Studies 2000, no. 33 (2), pp. 163–185; eadem, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policymaking as Venue Shopping,” Journal of Common Market Studies 2000, June, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 251–271.

188

Konrad Miciukiewicz

safe for asylum seekers, the level of protection offered in the region to those who are fleeing wars and political persecution remains too limited. Refugee recognition rates averaged from 3% to 10% over the last 15 years, and differed from country to country. While in some countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, increasing numbers of refugees have been granted protection, in the Baltic states and Slovenia the number of successful applications remains extremely low and has recently fallen, e.g. to 1% in Slovenia.17 There are still great disparities in recognition rates between Eastern and Western countries. In 2005, for example, 90% of applications lodged by Chechens in Austria were successful, compared with approximately 0% in Slovakia.18 New developments in asylum law are now being introduced in CEECs to provide forms of tolerated stay and supplementary protection to those who are not granted refugee status (e.g. 2008 revised Act on Providing Protection to Foreigners in Poland). On one hand, these forms of partial protection—which often involve access to the labour market and limited financial aid—are offered to higher numbers of applicants and, as such, are considered a step forward in international humanitarian protection. On the other they also bring the risk of leaving many vulnerable foreigners on the margins of the receiving society.

2.3. Integration of refugees in the NMS-10 The integration of both recognized refugees and recipients of partial protection into Central Eastern Europe is indeed very difficult. In most countries poor housing and the lack of a properly tailored system of local welfare and labour market assistance remain the biggest problems. In practice, without proper vocational training and command of local languages, it is very difficult for foreigners to find employment, in particular for those who originate from non-Slavic countries. As a result, many recognized refugees and people who

________________

UNHCR, “Central Europe and the Baltic States Sub-Regional Operations Profile—Central Europe and the Baltic States. Working environment,” op. cit. 18 ECRE, “Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered,” op. cit., p. 15.  17

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

189

were granted the tolerated stay status live under the constant threat of impoverishment and end up homeless. Negative public attitudes towards foreigners in Central Eastern Europe also severely affect the everyday life of asylum seekers. Public indifference, lack of solidarity and willingness towards people who need help,19 xenophobic initiatives of far-right political parties, which raise distrust, hatred, and cause local communities to protest against those living refugee camps,20 as well as racist and xenophobic violence committed by right-wing “skin-head” type groups further jeopardize opportunities for social integration.21 Moreover, in spite of positive development in recent years, the NGO sector—which plays a key role in the provision of legal assistance and material aid to asylum applicants and recognized refugees in Western Europe—is still underdeveloped, underfunded, understaffed, and undertrained in CEECs, and its relations with government authorities remain ill-defined. NGOs in the region still operate under conditions of constant financial insecurity, and thus often compete against each other in substituting for absent state integration policies without any real opportunities of influencing these policies. They also suffer from a lack of communication with other organizations working with refugees, and a lack of reflection on their own practices.22 Probably not surprisingly, most asylum seekers mean only to transit Central Eastern Europe and seek refuge in Western European countries. The danger of arbitrariness in the assessment of claims in ________________

Annabelle Roig and Thomas Huddleston, “EC Readmission Agreements: A Reevaluation of the Political Impasse,” European Journal of Migration and Law 9, 2007, pp. 363–387; Peter Futo, Undocumented Migration—Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe: Hungary, Budapest: CLANDESITO Country Report, 2008. 20 “Wyrzucają Czeczenów” [They throw out Chechens], Gazeta Wyborcza 2010, 26 March, retrieved from . 21 UNHCR, “Central Europe and the Baltic States Sub-Regional Operations Profile—Central Europe and the Baltic States. Working environment,” op. cit. 22 J. Toth, op. cit.; Alice Szczepaniková, “Migrants’ Contributions will Depend on the Conditions we Provide for Them...,” in: A. Szczepaniková, Marek Čaněk and Jan Grill (eds.), Migration Processes in Central and Eastern Europe: Unpacking the Diversity, Prague: Multicultural Centre Prague, 2006; Radka Klvaňová and Marek Čaněk, “Slovak Assistance for Refugees and Asylum Seekers,” ibidem. 19

190

Konrad Miciukiewicz

different states, which constitutes the European “asylum lottery,” as well as the poor receiving infrastructure in CEECs, combined with dreams about Western Europe, encourage them to turn to smugglers in the hope of avoiding Dublin readmissions, rather than claim asylum in the new Member States. Large numbers of people claim asylum in Eastern Europe only when caught by the police, and still try to make their way to Western Europe, often repeatedly being caught and sent back to the country where their application was first lodged.23 One of most dramatic reported attempts to leave Poland for Western Europe took place in December 2009, when over 200 Chechen refugees occupied an international train, trying to get to Germany, and further to Strasbourg, with the intention of lodging a complaint in the European Court of Human Rights against inhuman treatment and bad reception facilities in Poland.24 In effect, sometimes the reluctance of asylum seekers to stay in Central Eastern Europe only further discourages public authorities from improving legal and material provisions, as those who they are designed for often do not wish to use them... and the vicious circle continues.

2.4. Moving asylum regime further east While in the new Member States the legal frameworks and institutional provisions for international protection have significantly improved over the last 15 years, the EU’s recent attempts to push responsibility for asylum seekers further east to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and beyond seem to be more striking. As of 2008, 21 readmission agreements have been concluded between EU member states and third countries, and further clauses were under nego________________

Boris Divinský, Undocumented Migration—Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe: Slovak Republic, Bratislava: CLANDESITO Country Report, 2008; Krystyna Iglicka and Katarzyna Gmaj, 2008. Undocumented Migration—Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe: Poland, Warszawa: CLANDESITO Country Report, 2008. 24 “Czeczeńskich uchodźców siłą wyprowadzono z pociągu” [Chechen refugees were forced to leave the train], Gazeta Wyborcza 2009, 15 December, retrieved from . 23

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

191

tiation.25 Their impact was most visible in Slovenia, where after a bilateral readmission agreement had been signed with Croatia, the number of asylum applications in Slovenia plummeted from 9,244 cases in 2000 to 1,500 in 2001.26 UNHCR expressed particular concerns after several CEECs concluded readmission agreements with Ukraine, where international protection measures are very limited.27 In recent years the European Commission has also taken the initiative to negotiate new readmission agreements with third countries on behalf of the European Union; amongst others, a long negotiated readmission agreement was signed between Russia and the Commission in 2007,28 and further non-committing clauses were concluded with Albania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Yemen, Laos, Cambodia, Pakistan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Syria.29 Many of the countries concluding these agreements, and some which have recently been approached by the Commission, are refugee sending countries, and should by no means be regarded as “safe”. The European Commission seems to aim at concluding as many agreements as possible at the cost of jeopardizing the international humanitarian regime and worsening diplomatic relations with third countries (such as Turkey) which do not have the long-established democratic traditions, material resources, or willingness to readmit asylum seekers expelled from the EU.

2.5. Restrictive asylum policies and the increase in human trafficking ECRE argues that sight has been lost of the need for international protection in the Dublin system and the abovementioned tools which limit access to asylum in the EU to shift responsibilities to the NMS-10 and further east, without offering proper assistance and funds to ________________

B. Divinský, op. cit.  A. Kraler, M. Purim et al., op. cit.  27 UNHCR, “Sub-Regional Operations Profile—Eastern Europe. Working environ ment,” UNHCR report, available at: (retrieved 30 September 2009). 28 European Commission, Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on readmission, Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2007. 29 A. Roig and Th. Huddleston, op. cit.   25 26

192

Konrad Miciukiewicz

mitigate the burden.30 Not only are the EU policies tailored to offer merely minimum standards of protection, but they are also based on an inadequate and tokenistic assumption that if a state is a signatory of the Geneva Convention, then it automatically becomes “safe”. Furthermore, increasing gaps between UNHCR and EU standards, as well as conflicts between the EU and UNHCR experts in regard to protection against refoulement,31 unveil increasing contradictions between international law and EU law, as well as between European law and European humanitarian practice. On one hand, the European Commission claims that “no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a state where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”32 On the other hand, the EU member states, with support from the Commission, have put into motion and continue to strengthen a chain deportation machine, which “produces ‘orbit’ situations where asylum seekers are sent from state to state trying to find one that is willing to examine their asylum claims,”33 and are often transferred to and through places which are not “substantially safe”. Nowadays, as a result of changing migration and asylum policies in Europe, the NMS-10 are ironically more under threat from human smuggling and trafficking than they were formerly. According to research carried out by ECRE, the tightening of the eastern borders at the end of 1990s caused an increase, not a reduction, in the number of illegal entries and in recourse to traffickers in the region.34 Finally, the fortified eastern border of the EU impacted on the changing routes of ________________ 30 ECRE, “Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered,” op. cit.  31 Johannes van der Klaauw, “European Asylum Policy and the Global Protection Regime: Challenges for UNHCR,” in: Sandra Lavanex and Emek M. Uçarer (eds.), Migration and the Externalities of European Integration, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 32 European Commission, Readmission Agreements. MEMO/05/351, Brussels: European Commission, 2005, p. 2.  33 Sandra Lavenex, “Passing the Buck: European Union Refugee Policies towards Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of Refugee Studies 1998, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 142. 34 European Parliament, Migration and Asylum in Central and Eastern Europe— Summary, LIBE 104 EN, European Parliament Working Papers, February 1999, retrieved from: (accessed 10 July 2009).

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

193

undocumented migration, which have recently challenged the maritime borders of Mediterranean countries—Greece, Italy, and Malta in particular.35 As increasingly restrictive policies develop into new obstacles, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants turn to smugglers rather than abandon their hopes of getting into Europe. The greater sophistication of border control only prompts the development of greater sophistication in the smuggling business. Smugglers also have cars, night vision equipment, an international network of personnel, etc. For the undocumented migrants, only the prices and the risk increase, while the market for smuggling expands, granting higher profits on each illegal entrant. Tougher border controls in the NMS-10 may decrease smuggling “only if they increase smugglers’ fees beyond that which their customers are willing to pay,”36 but this is not likely to happen soon. The disappearance of legitimate safe channels of refugee protection is increasingly turning asylum seekers into illegal entrants. The over-restrictive European asylum measures contribute to blurring the boundaries between asylum and illegal migration, and are de facto catalysers in the process of making of illegal migrants out of people who are fleeing wars and persecution.

3. Economic migration in the new Member States 3.1. Attempts to reconcile the Schengen Acquis with the demand for foreign labour in the NMS-10 The Central Eastern European anti-immigration policies, which to a large extent follow common EU practice, have played an important role in shaping not only the relationship between asylum and illegal migration, but also between regular and irregular economic migration. At the time when the new Schengen security measures ________________

B. Divinský, op. cit.  Rey Koslowski, “Personal Security and State Sovereignty in a Uniting Europe,” in: Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke (eds.), Controlling a New Migration World, New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 20. 35 36

194

Konrad Miciukiewicz

were imposed on the NMS-10, all the economies in the region were booming and demanded cheap labour from abroad. The most urgent need for foreign labour was seen in Poland—due to the post-accession outflow of approximately 1.5 to 2.5 million people to the EU-15 countries—and in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where most new jobs in manufacturing emerged. Whilst Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Latvia lost a significant share of their young population as a result of emigration, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia suffer from severe natural population decrease.37 Although most new Member States have been struggling to reconcile the Schengen Acquis with the need for foreign labour ever since their EU accession in 2004, they have failed to do so successfully. The rapidly adopted European anti-immigration law and border regime have not been supplemented with explicit, comprehensive, and pro-active immigration policies. Only the Czech Republic—where labour migration policies are most developed— recorded a significant level of legal foreign labour force (300,000), which partially balanced the population decrease resulting from natural decline and emigration. In Hungary, around 130,000 foreign nationals hold residence permits and approximately 60,000 work permits are issued per year,38 while in Poland less than 50,000 foreigners work legally, and in other countries of the region numbers are very low.39 ________________ 37 Milada Horáková, “Legal and illegal labour migration in the Background and current trends in the Czech Republic,” International Migration Papers 2000, no. 32, Geneva: International Labour Office; eadem, “Labour Migration in the Czech Republic in the Context of the Economic Crisis,” Paper presented at the conference “Hospodářská politika v zemích EU: Ekonomická krize – výzvy budoucnosti”, Prague, 16–18 September 2009; K. Iglicka and K. Gmaj, op. cit.; Endre Sik, Increasing Labour Supply through Economic Migration: Hungary, Dublin: Mutual Learning of the European Research Strategy Programme Research Report, 2005. 38 It is worth noting that majority of foreigners working legally in the Czech Republic after the EU accession are Slovakian nationals (Dusan Drbohlav and Lenka Medová, Undocumented Migration—Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe: The Czech Republic, Prague: CLANDESITO Country Report, 2008), and 50,000 out of 60,000 foreigners who held work permits in Hungary are Slovakian and Romanian passport holders of Hungarian origin (P. Futo, op. cit.). 39 Viktoria Acs and Klara Petrovics, “Migration and integration policy in Hungary,” Paper presented at the International Conference on “The Current Situation

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

195

3.2. Illegal Employment in Central Eastern Europe Despite very good economic performance and low unemployment rates in recent years, salaries in CEECs remain at low levels, which is probably the most important reason why new Member States are not considered attractive destinations by workers from abroad. Furthermore, the lack of pro-active migration policy discourages migrants from seeking opportunities for legal employment. Failed policy is to be blamed for channelling the existing migration towards irregular forms of employment. Taking into account the relatively low salaries in CEECs, the expensive and time-consuming procedures of obtaining a work permit make the legal employment of foreigners economically unjustifiable both for employers and the prospective employees. Moreover, tough work permit issuance procedures, combined with quite liberal tourist visa policies for nationals of postSoviet republics (e.g. 1.2 million Polish visas are issued to Ukrainian nationals per year), encourage short-term, circular illegal employment of Ukrainians and Belarusians who legally enter and leave the NMS10. Significant numbers of illegal workers are also recruited from among asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, who stop for a while in CEECs, intending to proceed to Western Europe. Furthermore, for at least a few reasons, attempts to combat illegal employment in Central Eastern Europe generally prove to be ineffective. First, the NMS-10 have not had a tradition of counteracting illegal employment. Second, there are many microenterprises which operate in a grey zone and illegally employ both nationals and nonnationals, which still is a socially accepted practice in tune with the common mentality of “beating the system” and “bending the law.”40 Third, illegal labour forces seem very suitable for seasonal jobs offered at farms, as well as part-time housekeeping and childcare jobs. Fourth, in most countries, although new labour inspectorates have been set up to introduce compliance with EU regulations, the authorities are not ________________

in the Integration of Immigrants in the Czech Republic and Europe”, Prague, 24–25 November 2008; P. Futo, op. cit.; M. Horáková, “Labour Migration in the Czech Republic in the Context of the Economic Crisis;” K. Iglicka and K. Gmaj, op. cit.  40 S. Léonard, op. cit.  

196

Konrad Miciukiewicz

really keen on developing stringent workplace inspections, or on introducing harsh employer sanctions. It must be said that both the legal and illegal employment of foreign nationals in the NMS-10 are at low levels in comparison to Western Europe. However, the informal sector has been growing, and national statistics show that it has become a much more common form of employment than the regular sector for foreign nationals. Although the estimates of illegal employment are difficult to verify, the highest disparity between the regular and irregular employment of foreign nationals occurs in Poland, where less than 50,000 foreign nationals hold legal jobs, while 450,000 work illegally.41 Approximately 160,000 foreigners were employed illegally in the Czech Republic;42 estimates fluctuate between 50,000 and 200,000 for Hungary43 and less than 50,000 in Slovakia.44 Most illegal workers in CEECs are Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Russian citizens employed in construction and housekeeping. Notable numbers of Vietnamese and Chinese (in case of Hungary) illegal workers are estimated to work in retail trade and restaurants. Low but considerable numbers of illegal workers recruited also from among Chechen, Iraqi, and Afghan asylum seekers, as well as from undocumented migrants from several East Asian countries, and from former African and Asian students of Central Eastern European universities, who became vulnerable as a result of changing political and economic conditions in their countries.

3.3. Policy responses Both illegal and legal migration has not raised public concern in the NMS-10, and there is almost no public debate on these issues. Political parties failed to address the problem of pro-active migration strategies, and few policy measures have been taken. The most developed migration policies were introduced in the Czech Republic, ________________

K. Iglicka and K. Gmaj, op. cit.  D. Drbohlav and L. Medová, op. cit. 43 P. Futo, op. cit.   44 B. Divinský, op. cit.  41 42

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

197

where the progressive Green Card Programme was launched in 2009.45 It is however worrying that CEECs adopt a “dualistic migration policy” model, which focuses on introducing open policy for high-skilled migrants and closing doors to the low-skilled, which recently has been common practice in Western Europe. At the same time, attempts to regularize illegal unskilled migrants—who are often already established and wish to stay in CEECs—are very limited. Regularization programmes in Poland (2003 and 2007) and Hungary (2004) included such strict requirements that very few foreigners could comply and become legalized, while in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the possibility of regularization is strongly opposed by rightwing political parties. In the Baltic States and Slovenia—where the problems of post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian statelessness have not been solved yet—it is not even discussed. Moreover, discriminatory policies against migrants from different cultural (as well as religious and racial) backgrounds have recently been put in place in the NMS10: both in Hungary and in Poland, projects to attract migrants from East and South Asia have failed—in Hungary as a result of minority politics,46 and in Poland as a result of the explicit strategy of the Polish government to attract Slavs whilst discouraging immigration from countries with “distant cultural backgrounds.”47 Last but not least, the current economic crisis has resulted in many new pro-active migration policy developments in CEECs being frozen. At a time when jobs are being lost in manufacturing and staff hours reduced, governments rather work towards short-term solutions (i.e. voluntary and assisted return programmes in the Czech Republic), than on shaping a long term migration policy.

Conclusions and ways forward The European integration process in regard to migration and asylum was pretty much determined by the protectionist spirit of the

________________

See: M. Horáková, “Labour Migration in the Czech Republic in the Context of the Economic Crisis,” op. cit.  46 P. Futo, op. cit.   47 K. Iglicka and K. Gmaj, op. cit.   45

198

Konrad Miciukiewicz

EU-15 which resulted in the emergence of various instruments restricting the access of migrants and asylum seekers to Western Europe. On one hand, the new anti-immigration toolbox extrapolated EU migration control onto distant territories. On the other hand, the Dublin system—in seek to bringing relief to Western European states—regionalized international responsibility for human rights, producing a European chain deportation machine. Regrettably, both the international protection of refugees, and the migration interests of the NMS-10 were overlooked in these processes. New border and immigration control strategies have blurred the boundaries between interior and exterior, public and private, refugee and illegal migrant, police force and public service, and continue to produce categories of unwanted aliens, thereby loosing sight of those in need of protection, help, and opportunity for a better life. Rather than developing a new humanitarian culture and working towards social, cultural, and economic integration of asylum seekers and migrants, the CEECs have focused on fortifying the eastern borders, deploying intra-territorial policing systems, and developing non-admission policies. Having had no previous experience with immigration or refugee protection, the NMS-10 were too rapidly made responsible for processing high numbers of asylum applications without sufficient guidance, and without material or institutional help from the EU-15, which results in continuing deficiencies in legal frameworks and institutional humanitarian practices, as well as limited opportunities for integration of refugees and migrants with the host societies. Moreover, the acceptance of EU limitations on the scope of migration policy-making, internal labour market characteristics, political and cultural constraints, and the lack of roadmap for immigration have caused the NMS-10 to fail to attract economic migrants, which in the long run, may put Central Eastern Europe—already struggling with demographic decline and large emigration flows following the EU accession—at risk of a long-term economic slowdown, and of pension and social security systems disaster. Even more worrying—both from the perspective of potential immigrants and Central Eastern European economies—is the fact that at the same time immigration policies in the EU-15 are being changed in the assumption that the need for low-skilled labour would be fully

Migration and Asylum in Central Eastern Europe

199

matched by the new Central Eastern EU nationals. Immigration schemes for low-skilled workers, which were used for channelling the most vulnerable migrants and those of undefined category (e.g. climate refugees) into Western Europe, have recently been closed. Regardless of the fact that most new jobs in Central Eastern Europe emerge in manufacturing, the NMS-10 tend to follow these patterns in migration policy-making. As a result, the international human rights regime has been weakened, European solidarity has been put into question, the culture of hospitality has been undermined in the NMS10, and Central Eastern European economies have been put at risk of a labour force crisis. Both the EU-15 and the NMS-10 should re-evaluate their humanitarian traditions in order to facilitate fair migration and asylum systems, and to build inclusive multicultural societies. The changes proposed by ECRE48 provide several ways forward for this purpose, including replacement of the Dublin system with allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers in accordance with connectivity criteria and the choices of the individuals involved, close European cooperation on handling asylum cases, a joint EU asylum refugee fund with capacity for substantial cost sharing, enhanced integration of refugees into receiving societies, and free movement of recognized refugees. The new rules on asylum policy set out by the European Parliament49 on the 7th of May 2009, which are currently being negotiated with the Council (while mentioning, e.g. the creation of the European Asylum Office, burden-sharing between EU states, better reception conditions and access to work for asylum seekers, further restrictions on the use of detention, and changes to the Dublin II regulation) are an important but only partial step in this direction. As for economic migration in CEECs, there is a need for a simplified procedure of issuing work permits, more liberal regularization programs, vocational training and language courses for migrants, ________________

48 ECRE, “Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered,” op. cit.  49 European Parliament, The European Parliament sets out new rules on asylum policy, European Parliament Press Release, retrieved from (accessed 20 October 2009).

200

Konrad Miciukiewicz

reunification of families, as well as for cost assessment and pro-active migration policy for short- and mid-term migration of those who might choose to proceed to Western Europe at a later stage. Last but not least, asylum and migration systems, as well strategies for the integration of foreigners in CEECs, need to be discussed in open debate with the wider society facilitated by independent NGOs, and followed by public information campaigns and local community projects aimed not only at the integration of migrants and refugees into the host societies, but also at building the willingness and capacity of Central Eastern European societies to welcome and integrate with the newcomers.

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

201

Michał Nowosielski

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany Abstract: Poles—one of the biggest immigrant groups in the Federal Republic of Germany—have been establishing immigrant associations in Germany for almost 150 years. This article aims to describe the condition and standing of Polish immigrant and ethnic organizations in Germany, which are important factors in their ability to represent immigrant interests. The article consist of two parts. The first describes the history of Polish immigration to Germany, as well the organizing process of the Polish diaspora. The second part contains an empirical analysis of the condition of Polish organizations in Germany. Keywords: minority association, diaspora, Polish immigrant associations, history of Polish emigration to Germany, barriers to self government.

Poles are one of the largest immigrant and ethnic groups in Germany. According to data from Mikrozensus 2007,1 citizens of Poland living in Germany constitute the third most populous group of foreigners in the Federal Republic, coming to 289,000 people2 (after 1,180,000 Turks and 410,000 Italians). Poles naturalized in Germany ________________ 1 Statistisches Bundesamt, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit – Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2007, Wiesbaden 2009.  2 According to Polish statistics, the number of Polish citizens residing in Germany amounts to 490,000 (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, “Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2007” [Information about the size and directions of Polish emigration in the years 2004–2007], available at: ).

202

Michał Nowosielski

(about 240,000 people) constitute another element of the Polish group, as do about 100,000 Polish immigrants of second and later generations with German citizenship. Apart from these, there is also a significant group of resettled people (Aussiedler), who have strong links with Poland, the Polish language, and Polish culture, and the descendants of the prewar Polish national minority in Germany, whose number is hard to estimate. The size of the Polish and Polish-speaking group in Germany is assessed at about 1.5 or 2 million people. This high number is not necessarily reflected in the status of the Polish group in German society. Poles are one of the most invisible immigrant and ethnic groups in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). One of the reasons for this situation is the fact that the organizations which associate Poles and which represent their rights and interests are not developed to a satisfactory degree. Polish organizations seem to be in bad condition—their resources are highly limited and their possibilities of action are restricted. At the same time it is difficult to select a coherent representation for Poles and the Polish-speaking group, one which would be good partner to the German authorities. This article aims to describe the condition and standing of Polish immigrant and ethnic organizations in Germany, as their status may be an important factor in their capability of representing immigrants’ interest. The role of immigrant organizations has been widely discussed.3 Looking at particular roles or functions played by immigrant organizations, at least three can be clearly delineated. The first role is that of supporting the ethnic identity and culture. This means making it possible to use one’s mother tongue, to meet and cooperate with compatriots, and to express one’s nationality and identity. It may also mean providing opportunities—especially for the second and later generations—to acquire the identity, language, etc. This role would mostly be performed by cultural organizations. The second role is advocacy—that is, representing the interests of ________________

3 José Moya, “Associations and Immigrants: A Global and Historical perspective,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2005, vol. 31, pp. 833–864; Grzegorz Babiński, Więź etniczna a procesy asymilacji. Przemiany organizacji etnicznych [The ethnic bond and processes of assimilation. Transformation of ethnic organizations], Warszawa: PWN, 1986; Michael A. Stoll, “Race, Neighborhood Poverty and Participation in Voluntary Associations,” Sociological Forum 2001, vol. 16(3); John Rex, Daniele Joly and Czarina Wilpert (eds.), Immigrant Associations in Europe, Aldershot: Gower Press, 1987.

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

203

immigrants who are usually powerless before the authorities of the host society. The interests of migrants are usually supported by political and human rights organizations. The third role is to secure the economic existence of the immigrant community. Immigrant and ethnic banks and insurance companies are examples of organizations which fulfil this function. The question of the relevance of immigrant organizations is generally analyzed according to two different approaches.4 The first approach focuses on the role of organizations in the life of immigrant communities. The second approach pays more attention to the integration of immigrants into host societies. This distinction would seem to be slightly misleading, because the integration or incorporation of immigrants into the host society is important not only from the point of view of the host society and its structures, but also from the point of view of the immigrant group. The article is organized in the following way: Initially, as necessary background, the history of Polish immigration to Germany will be described. This will also be enriched by the history of the organizing process of the Polish diaspora in Germany. The reason it is worth analyzing this historical background is that it directly influences the current shape of the Polish movement in Germany and its potential. The second part contains an empirical analysis of the condition of Polish organizations in Germany. I assume that their condition is of great importance in analyzing the role of immigrant organizations in representing immigrants’ interests. The last part of the paper is devoted to the self-evaluation of the organizations in the context of their role in representing the interests of Poles and the Polishspeaking group in Germany.

1. History of Polish emigration to Germany and the process of organization of Polish groups Polish migration to Germany has been going on for about two hundred years, occurring in a number of waves. For this reason, Poles ________________ 4 Floris Vermeulen, The Immigrant Organising Process. Turkish Organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese Organisations in Amsterdam 1960–2000, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 11.

204

Michał Nowosielski

in Germany are very heterogeneous group. Individuals vary from each other by legal status (some have Polish citizenship, some German, some both, while some are stateless), material situation, and the strength of their relationship with Poland and with Polish identity. The first waves of migration from Poland to Germany began at the beginning of the nineteenth century. After the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and after a series of unsuccessful uprisings (in 1794, 1830, 1848, and 1863), many of the insurgents either migrated or were forced to migrate. Among the migration destinations were some of the German states—especially Saxony, which had close historical relations with Poland.5 Germany’s unification and the creation of the German Empire in 1871 mark the beginning of its great economic growth and industrial development. This of course caused an acceleration in its need for workforce. Poles were the most important immigrant group settling in Germany at the time. It is worth noticing however, that at first there were only internal migrations from the Prussian partition—from the former territories of Poland acquired by the Kingdom of Prussia during the partitions. Later on, Poles from the other two partitions, the Russian and the Austrian, also begin to settle in Germany.6 The most popular settlement places were industrial centres like the Ruhr Area in North Rhine–Westphalia and industrial cities such as Dresden, Hamburg, Hannover, and others. The developing capital of German Empire, Berlin, was also an important destination for Polish immigrants.7 ________________ 5 Grzegorz Janusz, „Polonia w Niemczech” [Polonia in Germany], in: Polonia w Niemczech. Historia i współczesność [Polonia in Germany. History and the present day], Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2001, p. 21. 6 Andrzej Plich, „Ogólne prawidłowości emigracji z ziem polskich. Próba typologii i syntezy” [General regularities of Polish migration. Sample of synthesis and typology], in: Hieronim Kubiak and A. Pilch (eds.), Stan i potrzeby badań nad zbiorowościami polonijnymi [Status and research need of Polonia communities], Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976, pp. 35–49. 7 Bogdan Ciamała, „Polacy w Berlinie w XIX i XX wieku“ [Poles in Berlin in XIX and XX century], in: Michał Lis (ed.), Polacy w Niemczech [Poles in Germany], Opole: Instytut Śląski, 1996.

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

205

An interesting feature of Polish economic migration to Germany was that it soon began to develop a network character. Very often migrants coming from the same regions or even locality settled in the same locations in Germany.8 This caused the integration processes to proceed more slowly, because the migrants reconstructed the social networks needed for basic existence in a Polish environment. Sometimes whole Polish districts were created, offering not only the opportunity to freely speak Polish, but also to use Polish shops and craft workshops. From another point of view, this network migration also had negative consequences, especially for the process of selforganization. Organizations that had been created by migrants already closely linked by regional and local ties had a specific character. Relations between members of such organizations normally tended to be more Gemeinschaft-like. They tended to be based on similarities such as common local memory and local dialect. They supported and sustained ties more with the particular locality and local identity than with the universal and sometimes abstract Polish identity. In this sense, their role in organizing the process of the Polish diaspora was not positive, because it acted as a significant centrifugal force which held back the creation of the Polish immigrant and ethnic movement.9 It is estimated that in the years 1870–1914 about 3.5 million Poles migrated to Germany. About 1.2 million migrants came from the Prussian partition, 1.2 million from the Russian partition, and less that 1.1 from the Austrian partition.10 The size of Polish Diaspora in ________________ 8 Valentina-Maria Stefanski, Zum Prozess der Emanzipation und Integration von Außenseitern: Polnische Arbeitsemigranten in Ruhrgebiet [On the process of emancipation and integration of outsiders: Polish migrant workers in the Ruhr Area], Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Mitteleuropa, 1984. 9 Marek Kostrzewa, Procesy integracyjne i konsolidacyjne Polonii w Niemczech w latach 1990–2000 [The processes of integration and consolidation of Polonia in Germany in the years 1990–2000], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawo i Praktyka Gospodarcza, 2005, p. 16. 10 Adam Galos, “Stan liczebny emigracji polskich w XIX wieku” [Polish emigration in XIX century in numbers], in: Liczba i rozmieszczenie Polaków w świecie [The number and location of Poles worldwide], part 1, Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 1981, p. 31.

206

Michał Nowosielski

Germany fuelled the development of the Polish immigrant and ethnic movement. Although Poles did not have the right to create political organizations based on ethnic grounds,11 they started to establish cultural organizations whose main role was to preserve and support Polish identity. At first this function was fulfilled by Catholic Church organizations which reflected very clearly the religiousness of the Poles. The first Polish organization in Germany was the Dormundbased Jedność Society (Towarzystwo “Jedność”), dedicated to Saint Jadwiga, which was founded in 1877. As Janusz12 states, “over the next few years in western Germany, about one hundred such organizations were created”. Apart from the religious character of these organizations, they also focused on social and cultural activities. Very often they founded choirs and other groups preserving Polish cultural heritage. At the end of the nineteenth century, the first secular Polish organizations in Germany were founded: the Polish Club (Klub Polski) in 1887, the Kłosy Polish Society (Towarzystwo Polskie “Kłosy”) in 1891, and the Association of Poles in Germany (Związek Polaków w Niemczech) in 1894. Their role was to represent the interests of Poles living in Germany, and to secure their material and social rights. Apart from that, some associations of different characters were created, such as the Sokół Gymnastic Society (Towarzystwo Gimnastyczne “Sokół”), which focused on keeping Poles fit and healthy. The Professional Union (Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie) was an organization that was very important for the economic well-being of Polish workers in Germany. It was established in 1902 as the first Polish workers union. The Union integrated the dispersed Polish workers movement, and became a very important and powerful organization, representing almost 80,000 members.13 The First World War and the assumption of independent statehood by Poland in 1918 changed the situation. First, a great wave of return migrations begun. Secondly, some of the Polish migrants in ________________

M. Kostrzewa, op. cit., p. 16.  G. Janusz, „Polonia w Niemczech,” op. cit., p. 22.  13 Ibidem, p. 23.   11 12

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

207

Germany decided to migrate to other Western countries—especially France and Belgium.14 This, together with the assimilation of some migrants, caused the number of Poles living in the Weimar Republic to decrease significantly from 1.5 million to about 300,000.15 During the interwar period, only seasonal migration from Poland to Germany took place, on account of restrictions imposed by the German government, and also because of Polish-German agreements. The number of these migrants was close to 500,000 in the years 1927– 1939.16 At the same time, the process of organization of the Polish Diaspora became increasingly intense. This activization expressed itself mostly as unification processes. After the First World War, three different centres of the Polish movement were established. The first was the Executive Committee of Polish Organizations and Societies in Westphalia and Rhineland (Komitet Wykonawczy Organizacji i Towarzystw Polskich w Westfalii i Nadrenii) in Bochum in the Ruhr Area, which united Polish associations in western Germany. The second was the National Committee (Komitet Narodowy) in Berlin. The third was the Association of Poles in East Prussia (Związek Polaków w Prusach Wschodnich). Although as Kostrzewa17 observes, “activity in organizational structures of Polish migrants was complicated by the existence of different Polish clusters, historical backgrounds, professional sectors, and regional separatisms”, the unification ________________ 14 Jerzy Kozłowski, „Geneza i ewolucja zbiorowości wychodźstwa polskiego w Europie” [The genesis and evolution of community of Polish migration in Europe], in: Barbara Szydłowska-Cegłowa (ed.), Polonia w Europie [Polonia in Europe], Poznań: PAN, 1992, p. 24. 15 The complicated changes of the Polish diaspora in the Weimar Republic can be illustrated by the example of the city of Bottrop, which was deserted by 23% of its Polish population in the years 1919–1933. Some of them returned to Poland, but some moved to other German cities or to the Netherlands (Panikos Panayi, Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany. Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Turks and Others, Harlow: Longman, 2000, p. 150). 16 Halina Janowska, “Emigracja z Polski w latach 1918–1939” [Emigration from Poland in the years 1918–1939], in: Andrzej Plich (ed.), Emigracja z ziem polskich w czasach nowożytnych i najnowszych [Emigration from Poland in modern and contemporary times], Warszawa: PWN, 1984, p. 367. 17 M. Kostrzewa, op. cit., p. 17.  

208

Michał Nowosielski

process was nonetheless very dynamic. On 27 August 1922, the Association of Poles in Germany (Związek Polaków w Niemczech) was established, associating German citizens of Polish origin and their organizations. Although not all of the Polish organizations were members, most recognized the Association as their representative. Its 45,000 members and its influence over an estimated 150,000 Poles in Germany18 gave the Association great power. This power was used mostly for defending the Polish minority against discrimination and forced assimilation. Apart from that, the Association acted in other fields, such as Polish-language education, and ethnic banking and insurance. Janusz19 also observes that the Association of Poles in Germany played a vital role in creating a cooperative platform between minorities in Germany. The situation of Polish organizations and of the Polish minority in general changed when the National Socialists took power in 1933. Their policies towards minorities were far more restrictive than the policies of the Weimar Republic. The political rights of ethnic groups living in the Third Reich were limited, which mobilized the Polish ethnic movement and encouraged its radicalization in order to protect Polish identity. The movement’s character became more nationalistic, and this found its expression in the adoption of the Rodło ideology. This provided “Five Rules for Poles”: (1) We are Poles; (2) The faith of our fathers is the faith of our children; (3) All Poles are brothers; (4) We serve our nation every day; (5) Poland is our mother—you shall not speak ill of her. These rules were adopted at the First Congress of Poles in Berlin in 1938. Those actions did not change the situation. The suppression of the Polish movement in Germany began in 1939. The Association of Poles in Germany, along with other Polish organizations, were outlawed by the Nazi government in February 1940. They were liquidated, their possessions confiscated, and their leaders arrested.20 ________________ 18 Ibidem,

p. 18.  G. Janusz, „Polonia w Niemczech,” op. cit., p. 25.  20 Tadeusz Radzik, „Polska mniejszość narodowa w Niemczech w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym” [Polish national minority in Germany during the interwar period], in: Polonia w Niemczech. Historia i współczesność [Polonia in Germany. History and the present day], Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2001, pp. 19–20. 19

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

209

During the Second World War, about 1.7 million Poles were displaced within the territories of Germany. They were mostly forced labourers, concentration camp prisoners, and prisoners-of-war. After the war, many of them returned to Poland or—chiefly for political reasons—migrated to other Western countries. Some, however, decided to stay in West Germany. In 1951, there were about 50,00021 or perhaps 120,00022 so-called Dips—displaced persons—of Polish nationality within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The legal situation of these Dips was completely different from that of the older Polish migrants. The Dips became so-called heimatlose Ausländer (stateless foreigners), while most of the old migrants were German citizens.23 This difference became one of the reasons why the Polish movement in Germany after the Second World War began to develop along two distinct tracks. Each group—ethnic Poles with German citizenship and Dips—created their own organizations, and usually did not cooperate with each other. Immediately after the war, the ethnic Poles with German citizenship started to reconstruct the prewar organizations. The first reactivated structures were those of the Association of Poles in Germany. The redevelopment of the Association began in April 1945, and the Association as a whole was registered in the western part of Germany in 1948. Similarly, in the Soviet occupation zone, another Association of Poles in Germany was established in 1947. Its aim was to organize reemigration to Poland, and it had very close connections with the Polish communist authorities. However, it was dissolved in 1950. Although quite large, the Bochum-based Association of Poles in Germany also had serious problems which resulted from very strong internal conflicts based mostly on political reasons and relations with the authorities in Warsaw. These conflicts caused a split in 1950, when a new organization—the Zgoda Association of Poles in Germany— detached itself from the structures of the old Association, which from that time on called itself the Rodło Association of Poles in Germany.24 ________________ 21 G.

Janusz, „Polonia w Niemczech,” op. cit., p. 28.  Kozłowski 1992, op. cit., p. 26.  23 G. Janusz, „Polonia w Niemczech,” op. cit., p. 28.   24 Ibidem, p. 35.   22 J.

210

Michał Nowosielski

This split marked the end of the unity and integrity of the Polish movement in Germany. The result was a focus on current activities— mostly cultural —with relatively little interest in political matters.25 At the same time, the displaced persons started to establish their own organizational structures. In each of the western occupational zones of Germany immediately after the war, displaced Poles had created different organizations. In 1947, an umbrella organization was established—the Polish Union in Germany (Zjednoczenie Polskie w Niemczech), and was recognized by the occupying powers as the representative of the Polish Dips. Due to internal political conflict, in 1951 the Union was converted into the Union of Polish Refugees in Germany (Zjednoczenie Polskich Uchodźców w Niemczech).26 Aside from this, other organizations were created, including the Union of Frontier Soldiers (Związek Żołnierzy Kresowych), the Polish Association of War Invalids in Germany (Polski Związek Inwalidów Wojennych w Niemczech), and others.27 In the years 1945–1955, both factions of the Polish movement underwent lively development, but after this busy period their activity diminished. This was mostly a result of reemigration to Poland and also of the partial integration of some Poles into German society. Conflicts within organizations also brought negative consequences, including an aversion to organizational life. In the 60s and 70s, the Polish movement in Germany was dominated by the Rodło Association, with about 3,500 members, and the Zgoda Association with 9,500 members. Zgoda had pursued more aggressive policies of unification, and had absorbed many members of the Dips organizations.28 The situation of the Polish ethnic group in Germany began to become more complicated after 1956, when the campaign to unite ________________

M. Kostrzewa, op. cit., p. 27.  Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, „Polska emigracja polityczna w Niemczech w latach 1945–1980” [Polish political migration in Germany in the years 1945-1980], in: Zbigniew Kurcz and Władysław Misiak (eds.), Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce i Polacy w Niemczech [German minority in Poland, Poles in Germany], Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1994, pp. 209–218. 27 M. Kostrzewa, op. cit., p. 25.   28 Ibidem, p. 29.   25 26

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

211

families divided between Poland and Germany started. The so-called Aussiedler29 (resettlers) came to Germany in three great waves in the 50s, 70s, and 80s (these last being the so-called spät Aussiedler—late resettlers). In total they amounted to about one million migrants. Resettlers claimed German family connections, which allowed them to obtain German citizenship and social assistance when living in Germany. Many of them, however, especially those from the later waves, kept dual citizenship and retained close relations with Polish identity and culture.30 In the late 70s and in the 80s, another type of migration from Poland was observed—the so-called Solidarity or independence immigration. Such migration was politically motivated, as the migrants were political dissidents forced to leave Poland. Apart from these, there was also a large wave of economic migrants due to crises in the Republic of Poland. Both these waves together amounted to about 250,000 people, enough to reanimate the Polish movement in Germany. Once again new migrants began to create organizations— mostly political in nature and aimed at supporting Polish dissent and democratic change in Poland and the Soviet bloc as a whole. Organizations such as the Solidarity Workers’ Group (Grupa Robocza Solidarność) and the Solidarity Information and Coordination Bureau (Biuro Informacyjno-Koordynacyjne Solidarność) and many others ________________ 29 Aussiedler also came from other countries, such as the Soviet Union, and after its collapse from the new countries of the former Soviet Union—mostly Russia and Kazakhstan—but also from Romania, Czechoslovakia, and others. For more information about this specific type of migration to Germany see, for example: Klaus J. Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Foreigners, resettlers, asylum seekers in the Federal Republic of Germany], Hannover: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1990; Günther Gugel, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Übersiedler: Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Foreigners, refugees, resettlers: Xenophobia in the Federal Republic of Germany], Tübingen: Verein für Friedenspadagogik, 1990; and Silke Delfs, „Heimatvertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler“ [Expellees, refugees, resettlers], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 1993, B. 48, pp. 3–11. 30 Valentina-Maria Stefanski, „Die polnische Minderheit“ [Polish minority], in: Cornelia Schnalz-Jacobsen and Georg Hansen (eds.), Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein Lexikon [Ethnic minorities in Federal Republic of Germany. Lexicon], Munich: C.H. Beck, 1995.

212

Michał Nowosielski

appeared. It is worth noticing that in many cases these organizations were financially supported by the German government which, beside the enthusiasm of their founders, was one of the reasons for their growth. At the same time, the decline of the older wave of Polish movements was observed. First of all the Dips organizations found themselves in deep crisis. Also the Zgoda Association—which was on good terms with the communist government in Poland—began to lose members and significance. Solidarity migrants took power throughout the whole movement. It seemed that the fall of communism in Poland would stop the flow of Poles to Germany, and the flow indeed lessened somewhat. Yet Germany is still an attractive migration destination. Until Poland’s accession to the European Union and the resulting free access for Poles to most of the labour markets of EU member states, Germany was the first destination for Polish migrants. Until 2006, the country with the greatest number of Polish emigrants was Germany (with 430,000 in 2005, and 450,000 in 2006), while since 2006 the United Kingdom has become the primary destination for Polish migrants, with 580,000 Polish citizens.31 The German statistics also reflect the fact that since at least the second half of the 90s, the number of Polish migrants entering Germany has been greater than the number of migrants from any other individual country. In 2006, the approximately 150,000 Polish migrants comprised 27% of all migrants entering German territory.32 The 90s were a period that saw another change in the Polish movement in Germany. The end of communism made the organizations of the Solidarity wave useless. Their basic aim— democratic change in Poland—had been achieved. This lowered enthusiasm for participation in these organizations, and the level of involvement in them dropped. However, in 1991 the signing of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation changed the situation. Although the German government ________________

GUS, Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2007, op. cit.  32 Migration Policy Institute, . 31

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

213

did not recognize Poles living in Germany as an ethnic minority33 in the way that Poland recognized ethnic Germans living in Poland, the Treaty stated that actions should be taken by the German government to protect and support the ethnic identity of German citizens of Polish origin.34 This was interpreted by Polish immigrants as a promise to support actions and organizations promoting Polish culture and national identity, which resulted in the growth of cultural organizations relying on financial support from the German authorities. Socially, these organizations had their origins mostly in migrants from the waves of the 80s—Solidarity and economic migrants, and to a lesser extent, late resettlers who remained closely connected with their Polish identity. As the German support did not turn out to be as generous as expected, many of these organizations were soon liquidated. Professional organizations were also established, including the Polish Medical Association (Polski Związek Medyczny), the Berpol Association of Polish Merchants and Businessmen (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Handlowców i Przemysłowców w Berlinie “Berpol”). The aim of such organizations was to protect the interest of occupational groups of Poles working in Germany. This was a result of the qualitative change of Polish migration to Germany, as a result of which more and more professionals began to settle there. At the same time, and accompanied by another crisis of the Polish movement in Germany, the process of reintegration began. This was also a result of the signing of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. The centralization of the Polish organizations had been taking place since the beginning of ________________ 33 Unlike the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany recognizes as ethnic minorities only those ethnic groups that are connected with certain territory. The German state also does not recognize the so-called new minorities—new migrants without German citizenship. Only four ethnic groups are recognized as minorities: the Schleswig Danes, the Frisians, the Sorbs, and additionally the Sinti and Roma (Grzegorz Janusz, „Mniejszości narodowe w Niemczech” [National minorities in Germany], in: Anna Wolff-Powęska and Eberhard Schulz (eds.), Być Polakiem w Niemczech [Being a Pole in Germany], Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2000). 34 Andrzej Graś, „Pozycja prawna Polaków w Niemczech” [The legal position of Poles in Germany], in: A. Wolff-Powęska and E. Schulz (eds.), op. cit., p. 180.

214

Michał Nowosielski

the 90s, and proceeded rather turbulently. In 1992, the first Polish umbrella organization was established: the Congress of German Polonia (Kongres Polonii Niemieckiej). In the very same year, a competing structure was founded—the Polish Forum in Germany (Forum Polskie w Niemczech). Additionally, both the Rodło and Zgoda Associations of Poles in Germany aspired to represent the whole Polish group. In 1995, the Polish Council in Germany (Polska Rada w Niemczech) was established. Although at the beginning of its existence the Council was recognized by the German government as the representation of the Polish ethnic group, it did not complete the centralization processes because it lacked sufficient support from other Polish organizations. However in 1998, the Assembly of Polish Organizations in Germany (Konwent Organizacji Polskich w Niemczech) was formed by five umbrella organizations: the Rodło Association of Poles in Germany, the Zgoda Association of Poles in Germany, the Congress of German Polonia, the Polish Council in Germany, and the Catholic Centre for the Propagation of Culture, Tradition, and the Polish Language (Katolickie Centrum Krzewienia Kultury, Tradycji i Języka Polskiego). Although this structure is not registered (nicht eingetragener Verein), and the Rodło Association no longer participates, it is the most representative organization of Poles in Germany.35 Although it has been officially recognized by the Polish government as the representative of the Polish movement in the Federal Republic, such recognition has not been granted by the German authorities. New Polish organizations are still being established, e.g. the Nike Association of Polish Businesspeople (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Przedsiębiorców NIKE). Some—such as the Pomeraniak Polish-German Association (Polsko-Niemieckie Stowarzyszenie “Pomeraniak”)—have been created by new waves of Polish immigrants that have arrived in Germany since the accession of Poland to the European Union. Many of them are outside of the Assembly’s structures. In some cases, they have attempted to create their own umbrella organizations, such as the Central Union of Polish-speaking Citizens of Berlin (Centralny Związek Polskojęzycznych Obywateli Berlina). ________________ 35 M.

Kostrzewa, op. cit. 

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

215

2. The condition of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany The data presented in this section come from my 2008–2009 empirical study of Polish nongovernmental organizations in Germany,36 which was based on two research techniques: in-depth interviews with the leaders of the most important Polish immigrant organizations, and a postal survey of organizations. Of about 100 Polish organizations in Germany, 42 took part in the survey research, and 8 organization leaders were interviewed. The first indication of the state of Polish organizations in Germany, and of the state of the Polish nongovernmental sector in Germany as a whole, is their personnel. Table 1 shows the responses provided by the 42 organizations concerning their employment practices. Table 1. Paid personnel of organizations During the previous year, did the organization employ any paid staff or in any other form pay for work?

Count

Yes, we permanently employ paid staff

6

Yes, we do pay for work, but not on a regular basis

9

No

25

Most of the organizations did not employ staff in any form. That means that they were maintained by members only, which usually gives rise to several problems. The first such problem is a lack of efficiency: in most cases, members are professionally active people who can devote only their free time to the organization’s activities. No matter how great their devotion may be, their capabilities are limited. The second problem comes from a lack of professionalism: contemporary organizations are often professionalized, which on one hand brings serious threats (such as the threat of ignoring the organization’s mission or of losing the spirit of civil society), but on ________________ 36

The project was funded by the Polish-German Cooperation Foundation. 

216

Michał Nowosielski

the other hand it enables the further development of the organization. Professional staff is more effective in fundraising, looking after the organization’s image, and dealing with external contacts. Since so many organizations do not employ paid workers, other kinds of workforce are gaining importance. Two significant sources of manpower for organizations are first, volunteers, and second, the members of the organization themselves. Volunteering does not seem to be a very popular way of dealing with the lack of personnel among Polish organizations in Germany. Only 18 of 42 organizations declared that volunteers take part in the organization’s activities. It is worth noticing that those organizations which do not employ paid staff usually do not use volunteers either as their workforce. That means that almost half of the researched organizations do not have any workforce apart from their members. Evidently this may have a negative impact on their power and ability to act. There are two possibilities regarding members. First, there are organizations whose members are people. Second, there are institutional members—this is typically the case for umbrella organizations and organizations which associate firms and companies. In the first case, the mean number of members in organizations is 109.37 The largest of the organizations claims to have 800 members; the smallest, only eight. Ten of 40 organizations have more than 100 members, while six have less than 19 members. The number of members does not show the extent to which the members are actively engaged in the activities of the organization. The mean proportion of members that actively take part in the organizations’ operations amounts to almost 50%, which is relatively high. Although this shows that the lack of other workforce is made up for by the work of the members, altogether the data on the personnel of Polish organizations in Germany give evidence of one of the weaknesses of the movement: the members of these organizations may be diligent and enthusiastic, but in some cases this may not be enough. ________________ 37

The median is 43. 

217

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

Table 2. Number of individual members Range Less than 19 20–49 50–99 100–199 200 or more

Count 6 13 8 3 7

In the case of seven organizations which associate other organizations or institutions, the mean number of members is 22. Together, all of the researched umbrella organizations associate 158 entities—about 100 enterprises and about 50 organizations. While the fact that as many as five of the organizations are unions or other umbrella organizations might suggest that the Polish movement in Germany is generally well organized and integrated, a closer look at the data shows that this number comes from division rather than from unity. Out of 40 organizations, 24 stated that they belong to some Polish umbrella organization, and three were members of two such organizations. Valid answers regarding their membership of umbrella organizations were given by 17 organizations. Table 3. Membership of umbrella organizations Name of organization belonged to

Count

Polish Council in Germany (Polska Rada w Niemczech)

6

Congress of German Polonia (Kongres Polonii Niemieckiej)

4

Bureau for the cooperation of associations in Hannover and Lower Saxony (Biuro Współpracy Stowarzyszeń w Hanowerze i Niedersachsen)

3

Assembly of Polish Organizations in Germany (Konwent Organizacji Polskich w Niemczech)

3

Polish Forum in Germany (Forum Polskie w Niemczech)

1

The dispersion of umbrella organizations not only creates conflict between them, but also lowers the potential of the whole movement. Although, as described above, there have been some attempts to unify

218

Michał Nowosielski

the umbrella and general organizations (such as the Assembly of Polish Organizations in Germany), the negotiating power of such unified bodies is rather limited. At the same time, Polish organizations are rather cautious when it comes to membership in German umbrella organizations and in other supranational or international organizations. In both of these cases, only 9 of the organizations surveyed declared that they belong to such organizations. This may also lower their potential. Another important indicator of organizational power is financial resources. Assets and operational capital do not only reflect the condition of the organization, but play a major role in influencing the activities of the organization, its range, its potential power, etc. Only 33 of 40 organizations answered the question on their annual income. The results are shown in Table 4. Table 4. Annual income in 2007 Range 0–100 euro

Count 2

101–500 euro

7

501–1 000 euro

6

1 001–5 000 euro

7

5 001–10 000 euro

5

10 001–50 000 euro

2

50 0001–100 000 euro

3

100 001–500 000 euro

2

“Hard to say”

1

Most of the organizations (almost 63%) administer an annual budget no bigger than 5,000 euro. The income of only five organizations exceeds 50,000 euro, and none surpasses 500,000 euro. These data show that the organizations’ financial conditions and capabilities are rather poor. This also finds confirmation in the figures concerning the value of the organizations’ assets. As many as 24 out of 40 organizations stated that they have no material assets. The value

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

219

of the assets of the other organizations in most cases (12 out of 20) does not exceed 10,000 euro. The most striking example of these material shortcomings is the case of the organizations’ offices. Although having an office would seem to be rather simple and practical issue, it may also be significant when considering the openness of the organization to other representatives of Polish groups in Germany, quite apart the members of organization themselves. An organization with no office will typically be more difficult to contact, which means that a person looking for help from the organization might not be able to obtain it. Table 5. The value of organizations’ assets in 2007 Range 0–100 euro

Count 3

101–500 euro

4

501–1 000 euro

5

1 001–5 000 euro

4

5 001–10 000 euro

1

10 001–50 000 euro

1

50 0001–100 000 euro

1

100 001–500 000 euro

1

“Hard to say”

3

Table 6. Organizations’ office facilities Type of office Organization rents an office

Count 16

Organization’s office is in the residence of one of the members

8

Organization shares an office with other organizations

7

Organization possesses its own office

6

Organization does not have permanent office

6

Organization shares office with other institutions (e.g. a firm of one of the members)

5

Other

6

There were multiple answers.

220

Michał Nowosielski

As the data in Table 6 show, only 6 organizations possess their own office, while an additional 16 rent. As many as 13 organizations use the company or residence of a member as an office, and another 6 do not have any permanent office at all. On one hand, this shows the material shortcomings that affect these organizations; on the other hand it indicates a possible source of weakness in the operation of the organization. Despite these problems, the surveyed organizations perform many activities. When asked if during the last two years the organization has performed any projects or actions, 33 of 40 which answered that question stated that they had. The remaining 7 organizations answered that they had not acted in this way. The mean number of such projects implemented by the organizations during the last two years amounts to 23. Most of the organizations (17) have undertaken from 10 to 49 projects. As many as 9 declared that they have implemented 9 or fewer projects during last two years. The number of organizations which carried our more than 50 projects was 3. This shows the high activity level of the Polish movement in Germany. These data may be further reinforced by the number of likely recipients of these projects. The researched organizations estimated the number of recipient of their activities at more than 82,000 people, with the mean number of recipients at the level of 2,500 per organization. Although this result seems to be slightly overestimated, one has to notice that—considering the material and human capital problems of the Polish organizations—the movement nonetheless seems to be very active. When talking about the role of Polish organizations in representing immigrant interests, it is in the first instance worth inquiring about the most important fields of activity of the Polish movement in Germany. As previously mentioned, most of the organizations seem to deal with culture and identity. This finds confirmation in the data presented in Table 7. The two most often chosen categories—“Promotion of Poland in German society”, and “Improvement of Polish-German affairs”—are closely related to Polish-German relations. As many as 34 and 33 organizations respectively (out of 42) declared that these two are

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

221

Table 7. Fields of activities of Polish organizations in Germany Field of activity Promotion of Poland in German society

Count 34

Improvement of Polish-German affairs

33

Culture and art

33

Supporting tradition and national identity

32

International affairs

19

Education

18

Advocacy—actions in defence of the interests of Poles and the Polish-speaking group

16

Counselling and help for new immigrants from Poland

16

Youth affairs

15

Sport, tourism, recreation, and hobbies

15

Self-help

13

Trade and professional matters

11

Women’s affairs

11

Veteran affairs

10

Media

9

Social help and philanthropy

8

Politics and ideology

7

Scientific research

5

Health

4

Religion

2

Ecology

2

Finance

2

Other

9

There were multiple answers.

important fields of activity for them. This however only shows the peculiarity of immigrant organizations, and especially of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany, and the significance of PolishGerman relations. The two next most common choices were “Culture and art” (33 of 42 organizations) and “Supporting tradition and national identity” (32 of 44 organizations). This means that about 75% of the researched organizations are expressive—their main activity is

222

Michał Nowosielski

to articulate and sustain national identity. Culture in this case plays a crucial role as one of the most important carriers of identity. As mentioned above, this focus on identity and cultural matters results also from the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. The focus on promotion and the expressive function results in underdevelopment of other fields of actions and functions— particularly the instrumental ones. Advocacy (16 organizations), counselling and help for immigrants from Poland (16 organizations), and especially social help (8 organizations) are developed to an unsatisfactory degree. This becomes even more significant when taking into consideration the fact that cultural organizations must now be of less importance than previously, because of the easier practice of transnational culture (thanks to open borders, Internet, and easy access to Polish media). This also brings about a lack of institutional completeness which forces immigrants to look for many services in other institutions outside the Polish movement. This may have a negative impact on their attachment to associations and on the perceived need to take advantage of them. This is especially visible in the case of the new waves of immigrants.

3. Discussion The history of Polish organizations in Germany is an interesting example of the growth, development, and decline of an immigrant organization movement. The subsequent waves of immigrants did not contribute to a growth in the importance of the ethnic group as a whole, or of its organizations. On the contrary it resulted in conflicts and a tendency to create new organizations instead of integrating into the old structures. In other words, new flows of immigrants tended to lower the potential and cohesion of the Polish group. The contemporary organizations and their potential to represent immigrants’ interests results from the overall history of the whole movement. The results of the research show also that as a consequence of their condition, the potential of the organizations is not great. Both

Growth and decline—the situation of Polish immigrant organizations in Germany

223

the human and material resources available for Polish organizations are limited. The overall lack of unity of the movement is also an argument in favour of a rather negative evaluation of their potential. At the central level, there is no strong partner in contact with the German authorities. Cooperation with other non-Polish organizations is also limited, which may hinder the role of Polish organizations in the immigrant movement in Germany. This also may contribute to the relatively low status of Poles in German society. Yet a closer analysis of the research data shows that this picture is somewhat misleading. Although the condition of the Polish movement is indeed rather poor, the results of their activities give evidence of their vitality. This paradox may result from two causes. The first is connected with the significant differentiation of the organizations. There are on one hand organizations which seem to be sunk in crisis; lacking both human and material resources, their activities are reduced to minimum, and therefore their power is insignificant. Their potential for effectively representing Polish im-migrant interest is very low. Yet on the other hand there are organizations which are capable of overcoming difficulties and unfavourable conditions, and which have the ability to adapt to varying situations. These organizations are indeed capable of representing the interests of the Polish group in Germany. At the moment it cannot be said what factors give rise to this differentiation; is not in any case a matter of any objective feature of the organization, such as size or age. Nevertheless, these organizations drive the whole Polish movement. The second reason which should be more thoroughly researched is the enthusiasm displayed by some of the organizations’ leaders and members, which may be of great importance when trying to explain the differences between the low capabilities and relatively high performance of Polish organizations. Their engagement may help to overcome some of the problems and barriers. To summarize, it seems that the Polish movement in Germany has a certain potential in representing the interests of Poles and the Polish-speaking group. The organizations, though relatively weak in resource terms, seem to be lively and to some extent efficient. Yet the question remains open as to whether they are fully taking advantage of their potential to represent immigrant interests.

224

Michał Nowosielski

Ingrid Jungwirth

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration: highly qualified migrant women in Germany Abstract: This paper adresses gendering processes as a mode of structuring in the course of migration. It is argued that, additionally to the exclusionary processes many migrants experience, gendering processes have to be considered as well. Apart from a structural level, including the social positioning in the labour market in the country of destination as well as migration regulations, the significance of gender norms is pointed out for the analysis of migrants’ participation in labour and society. Taking up the migration of highly qualified migrant women from postsocialist states to Germany, it is argued that they also experience a change of normative gender orders in the course of migration which influences their scope of action. Keywords: Gendering processes; gender norms/normative gender order; migration of highly qualified/highly skilled; migration from postsocialist states.

Introduction In this paper the change of gender norms in the course of migration is discussed as a mode of reproduction of social inequality. The analysis of the reproduction of social inequality against the background of migration processes has to be conceptualized not only within the nation state, but also across the borders of the nation state. Migration has not been recognized in Germany for a long time as a vital social process shaping societal relations. Consequently, the status and social position of migrants in Germany are affected by an

226

Ingrid Jungwirth

ideal of a society which neglects the participation of migrants and often leads to exclusionary processes in labour and society, particularly of migrants from the South and East. This ideal is still effective, even though an explicit change of policy took place at the end of the 1990s through the regulation of highly skilled migration and other means, which together defined Germany as a country of immigration. This paper is concerned with the situation of highly qualified migrant women in Germany, thus including the much larger group of highly qualified women who migrated via clauses in the migration regulations other than those dealing with the highlyskilled.1 With reference to the situation of highly qualified migrant women in science and technology who migrated from postsocialist countries to Germany, I argue that in addition to the exclusionary processes that many migrants experience, gendering is to be understood as a mode of structuring in the course of migration. This process takes place on a structural level as well as on the level of normative orders—the significance of which is pointed out in this paper. First, the significance of gender norms and their changes for the analysis of social inequality is discussed. Second, recent highly skilled and highly qualified migration is located within the history of migration and migration policy in Germany. Third, findings on the situation of highly qualified migrants to Germany, as well as on the growing significance of migrants from postsocialist countries, are presented. With reference to gender norms, the case of migration from postsocialist societies to a (post)industrial society with a market economy tradition like (West)Germany is very interesting, because— particularly in science and technology—occupations in postsocialist countries are less sex segregated. Migration thus also entails the change into a society where knowledge and competence in natural sciences and technology are more strongly associated with the male ________________ 1 The term “highly-skilled migration” refers to demand-driven migration, i.e. migration directed by the demand of the market for highly skilled labour in the destination country. This is a highly restricted form of migration. I am additionally using the term “highly qualified migration” to denote migration of highly qualified individuals which takes place independently of market demands for particular skills and independently of the respective migration regulations. The term refers to the level of qualification, rather than to skills required for particular jobs. 

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

227

gender than in the country of origin of migration. Finally, a concept for the analysis of the change of normative gender orders in the course of migration is sketched.

1. Gender norms and the pluralization of gender concepts The problematization of gender norms in recent feminist theory has had some rather productive effects in gender studies. Most prominent in this respect is Judith Butler’s theory of gender.2 The idea was established that gender is culturally and socially produced, and that biological sex is an effect of cultural constructions which assume a biological essence of gender. The suggestion that the assumption of a “nodule … in the psychobiology of personality”3 as the essence of the Self, is an outcome of performance, had of course been previously introduced into social theory by Erving Goffman.4 Furthermore, the ethnomethodological approaches of Garfinkel5 and West and Zimmermann6 have shown how doing gender in everyday life is essential in the reproduction of gender relations. The longevity of definitions and ideals of gender is caused in part by these seemingly self-evident performances which are as coercive as they are internalized in our bodies and the subconscious. One outcome of recent feminist theory is to put on the agenda, once more, the significance of norms and ideals, of culture, values, and traditions, for the reproduction of gender and gender relations. It is a challenge for social theory and the social sciences to take up these incitements. ________________

Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, New York: Routledge, 1990. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Doubleday, 1959. 4 Ingrid Jungwirth, 2007 “Zum Identitätsdiskurs in den Sozialwissenschaften – eine postkolonial und queer informierte Kritik an George H. Mead, Erik H. Erikson und Erving Goffman“ [The discourse of identity in social sciences – a postcolonial and queer informed critique of George H. Mead, Erik H. Erikson and Erving Goffman], Bielefeld: transcript, 2007. 5 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1967. 6 Candace West and Don H. Zimmermann, “Doing Gender,” Gender & Society 1987, June, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 125–151. 2 3

228

Ingrid Jungwirth

Another outcome of recent theorizations of gender is the idea of the contingency of gender norms: If they are socially produced, they might also be—consciously or unconsciously—rejected. Since roughly the middle of the 20th century, a pluralization of gender conceptions can be observed, going hand in hand with social movements like the women’s movement, the gay and lesbian movements, and more recently the queer, intersex, and transsexual formations in Western (post)industrial nations. Regarding social theory, the pluralization of gender concepts can be understood to be a result of growing differentiation of social relations,7 a result of individualization8 or, in a more general sense, of modernity.9 Accompanying the pluralization of gender—i.e. a pluralization of what is understood to be a legitimate performance of gender in certain societal contexts—is a widening of the scope of action. This liberating effect through the assertion of individual rights has had a groundbreaking outcome, particularly for women. With reference to the analysis of social inequality, gender inequality has not been systematically included insofar as gender has not been considered as a mode of structuring. With the formation of the women’s movement in Western industrial nations in the 1960s, a new political group was formed, claiming recognition and equality for women. In this sense, gender can be understood as a “new” category of social inequality. With the subsequent development of women’s studies, it became evident that theories and approaches based on class were insufficient to analyse gender inequality. The division of labour according to gender difference into production and reproduction, and the approach developed in accordance with ethnomethodological theory—briefly sketched above—were only two of the many theoretical approaches introduced by women’s studies. The significance of the symbolic level for the analysis of gender inequality proved to be essential. The ascription of gender in ________________

E.g. Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage, 1992. 9 Anthony Giddens, The consequences of modernity, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Patterns of Modernity, New York: New York University Press, 1987; Peter Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity. Liberty and Discipline, New York: Routledge, 1994. 7 8

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

229

everyday life, in face-to-face action, and the concepts, values, and ideals of gender—the ideology, if you like—form a base line for an understanding of gender inequality. So far, however, the question has not been raised of how the pluralization of gender concepts and the enlargement of the scope of action are experienced by different groups of women. What differences can be detected in these social changes? What function does gender have in the analysed social change, be it individualization or structural changes within the world of labour? In this paper, I discuss the hypothesis that along with the differentiation and pluralization of gender in postindustrial societies and the liberating effects this has had for many women, opposing effects can also be described. These seem to particularly affect those women who cannot profit in the same way from these structural changes in postindustrial societies. I argue that in particular migrant women in postindustrial societies do not necessarily experience a widening of their scope of action. Especially in the world of labour, it seems, migrant women are reduced to jobs and occupations that are related to their socialization as women (UN 2004), as will be outlined later in this paper. While the assumed universal upbringing as a woman becomes a resource in the labour market of the destination country of migration, the professional qualifications of migrant women are often neglected. In terms of social inequality, two levels of reproduction of inequality should be differentiated: on the one hand structural allocation in the labour market—and consequently in the social hierarchy—and on the other hand the symbolic level of ascriptions as well as the ideals and norms they are based upon.

2. Germany as a country of immigration: pitfalls of the economic determination of migration politics The political discourse in Germany has long neglected the fact that Germany is a country of immigration. Only since the end of the 1990s, when a new immigration law was under debate, has it been officially recognized—even by conservative political parties—that immigration is an ongoing process and not a temporary phenomenon.

230

Ingrid Jungwirth

Beyond this, it has also been recognised that immigration may become a desirable development, since there are industries with a considerable demand for skilled labour power which are unable to fulfil this demand from among the autochthonous population. The goal of recruiting those migrants, and only those migrants, who are demanded by the labour market coincides with the migration policies of the European Union. The creation of supranational institutions in the EU to promote the process of Europeanization has been guided by the idea of enabling the free exchange of people, goods, and capital between the EU states. At the same time, migration politics has been aimed at strongly restricting immigration from other states and at “harmonizing” the migration politics of different states with this purpose. Thus, one could describe the migration policies of the EU as determined by the economic point of view. The OECD also encourages migration programmes among its member states, programmes which aim at the “management of migration” according to the demand of the country receiving the migrants.10 In Germany, where the idea that attracting highly qualified migrants could be of vital interest for the knowledge society has not been widely acknowledged, there has until recently been little regulation of immigration.11 A major innovation in this policy was the establishment of a green card immigration programme for IT professionals in 1999. The aim was the recruitment of IT specialists, since the ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) sector was then expanding at a fast pace. In particular, the requirement for a lengthy examination of the job market before granting a work permit was abolished.12 Still, the political discourse accompanying the implementation of this program was dominated by a rhetoric ________________ 10 E.g. SOPEMI, ”International Migration Outlook,“ OECD, 2008; SOPEMI, ”International Migration Outlook,“ OECD, 2009. 11 Doris Dickel, Einwanderungs- und Asylpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Frankreichs und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: eine vergleichende Studie der 1980er und 1990er Jahre, Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2002; Arnd-Michael Nohl, Karin Schittenhelm, Oliver Schmidtke and Anja Weiss, “Cultural Capital during Migration—A Multi-level Approach to the Empirical Analysis of Labor Market Integration amongst Highly Skilled Migrants,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 2006, May, vol. 7, no. 3, art. 14. 12 Holger Kolb, ”Die Green-Card: Inszenierung eines Politikwechsels“ [The GreenCard: staging of a change of policy], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 2005, vol. 27, pp. 18–24.

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

231

opposing the idea of Germany as a country of immigration.13 The regulations restricted immigration, rather than enabling it. For example, the stay in Germany was limited to five years. In 2005, a new immigration law, the Zuwanderungsgesetz, was passed, which included regulations for the immigration of different highly skilled professionals, e.g. engineers. Some moderations of the law were later introduced, including the possibility of allowing a long-term stay.14 Since 2009, the job market has been further opened up for academics, dropping the requirement of a prior examination of the labour market before granting a work permit to EU citizens, and allowing migration of academics from non-EU states.15 Roughly 5,600 job permits were given to highly skilled migrants in 2007, an increase of 20% in the number of IT specialists and other academically trained professionals, as compared with the year before.16 Only 1,302 highly skilled migrants were living in Germany with a permanent stay permit in 2007, of whom 299 (about 22%) were women. Most of these residents had a partner (83%), 92% of whom were staying with them in Germany. The employment rate of partners was disproportionately low, ranging between 24% (full-time employment) and 35% (part-time employment). The increase in work permits granted to highly skilled migrants indicates that the new immigration law might well advance its intended aim: to strengthen the position of Germany in the international competition for highly skilled specialists.17 At the same time, the low employment rate of partners shows that the efforts taken have been insufficient. The migrant is still conceptualized as ________________ 13 This rhetoric was taken up conservative politicians, but also by trade unions (cf. Kolb’s analysis, ibidem).  14 Certain requirements still have to be met: A job offer is required, and it must be demonstrated that one is able to make a living independent of the means of the welfare state. The level of minimum income which is required to receive a residence permit was lowered to a level comparable to the income of highly qualified autochthonous professionals. ”Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung“ [Migration report of the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees on behalf of the Federal Government], 2008, p. 88.  15 Ibidem, p. 89.   16 Ibidem, p. 82.   17 Ibidem, p. 88.  

232

Ingrid Jungwirth

a single person who only fulfils the function of a source of labour power, and accordingly might leave the country after some time. This is an idea of the migrant that neglects his or her social character, i.e. as a social being maintaining social relations and a family life. The history of migration shows, though—particularly in the German case—that this kind of economic determination of migration policies is undermined by the processes of migration. Even though it may hold true that migration can be regulated by governments through legislation, it cannot be fully determined and controlled. For example, when a recruitment stop (Anwerbestop) was proclaimed in Germany at the beginning of the 1970s, immigration from former recruitment countries such as Italy, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Spain, which was based on the expectation of work permits, was stopped. Since then, the most important mode of immigration has been for the purpose of family reunification, the largest group being from Turkey. Another example is of how the course of migration is not determined solely by economic considerations, as the history of migration in Germany (and elsewhere) shows. The immigrants present in Germany since the late 1950s, the so-called guest workers, might have come with the intent of staying and working only for a few years, but in the end it has become evident that they are social beings who cannot be reduced to just their labour power. They have built families and other relationships, and have settled in the destination country. Today with the EU a major actor in migration policies, it should be kept in mind that, first, migration cannot be reduced to just an economic point of view, and second, that it cannot be fully controlled by governments and their legislation. This is also the case with highly skilled migrants who for several years have been sought after and welcomed by some European countries.

3. Means of migration Apart from these effects on highly skilled migrants, the predominantly economic orientation of migration politics has lead to widespread underestimation of family-related migration. Still, “fam-

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

233

ily-related migration has been a dominant mode of legal entry into the European Union for the past two decades,”18 as Eleonore Kofman points out. People who immigrated in accordance with the regulations for highly skilled professionals make up only a small share of the migration population in Germany. It can be expected that other groups of migrants in Germany contribute to highly qualified migration as well. Apart from IT specialists and other academic professionals, who immigrated in accordance with the regulations laid out above, and who comprised roughly 5,600 people in 2007, an important group of highly skilled migrants are the university graduates, i.e. migrants who partly or entirely studied in Germany. Their numbers have also increased during the last 10 years, to about 24,000 people in 2007. This corresponds to a threefold increase since 1998. The main countries of origin of these migrants are China, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Russian Federation. They can obtain a work permit within one year after graduation, and in 2007 around 4,400 work permits were granted. In this group, among the highly skilled Russian, Ukrainian, and Japanese migrants, women made up more than 50% of the total,19 i.e. women are disproportionally represented in this group of highly skilled migrants.20 In comparison, migration for the purpose of family reunion, along with other forms of immigration, accounts for a considerable number of immigrants in Germany. For example, there are the Aussiedler ________________ 18 Eleonore Kofman, “Family-Related Migration. A Critical Review of European Studies,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2004, March, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 234–262. 19 “Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung“ [Migration report of the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees on behalf of the Federal Government], 2007, p. 66 f. 20 Interestingly, the percentage of academically trained migrant women between 30 and 45 years in Germany (12.6%) exceeds the percentage of German women (11.2%), German men (11.5%) and migrant men (10.2%) (Monika Stürzer, “Bildung, Ausbildung und Weiterbildung“ [Education, professional training and further training], in: Waltraud Conelißen (ed.), Gender-Datenreport. 1. Datenreport zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Gender-Data report. 1st Data report on gender equality of women and men in the Federal Republic of Germany], 2005, p. 84). This shows that many women immigrate with the purpose of taking up or completing studies in Germany.

234

Ingrid Jungwirth

(ethnic German resettlers), whose countries of origin are the former Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania. Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who immigrated especially during the 1990s, form another group. These groups play a considerable role in the recruitment of highly qualified migrants.21 The number of visas granted for family reunions were 85,300 in 2002, and 42,200 in 2007. This decrease was caused partly by the accession of the new EU states.22 A different set of data, the AZR (Ausländerzentralregister), lists 55,000 visas granted for family reunions in 2007. This figure exceeds the number of visas granted for highly skilled professionals many times over. Turkey is the country of origin of the largest proportion of family-related migration to Germany, followed by Serbia and the Russian Federation. Since 1990, the Aussiedler (ethnic German resettler) group has consisted of about 2.5 million immigrants. Approximately 4.1 million actually live in Germany, including those who migrated before 1990 and their family members. Among these, 20% were born in Germany.23 Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union also form an important group of migrants to Germany: by 2007, about 209,000 such migrants and their relatives had immigrated.24

4. Migration from postsocialist states Since the 1990s, there have been new migration movements from East to West—from postsocialist countries to the market economies of the EU. For example, in 2007, EU migration to Germany had a positive balance. Previously, there had often been a negative balance, for example in 2005. In 2007, 73.3% of the EU migration to Germany was from the twelve new EU states. That year, EU migration made up 50.5% of the total migration to Germany.25 ________________

Cf. A.-M. Nohl et al., op. cit.  “Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung“ 2007, op. cit., p. 119 f.  23 Ibidem, p. 51 ff.   24 Ibidem, p. 95.   25 Ibidem.   21 22

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

235

Looking at the 2007 size of the resident migration population in Germany without German citizenship, the largest group was from Turkey, accounting for 1.7 million people and 25.4% of the foreign population, followed by migrants from the former EU-14 states who make up 24.4% of the foreign population. About one third of migrants (31%) without a German passport are from postsocialist countries: They consist of migrants from the new EU states (who make up 10% of the migrants without German citizenship), from the former Yugoslavia (14%), and from the former Soviet Union (7%).26 Thus one can conclude that the EU enlargement led to an increase of migration between eastern European countries and Germany, compared to other countries of origin. A large percentage of the resident migration population have become nationalised. About 9.5% of the German population have either experienced migration themselves or have family members who migrated.27 The largest group of these migrants are from Turkey (16.5%), with those from Russia (6.2%) and Poland (5.6%) also forming large groups.28 Migration from postsocialist countries in particular might contribute considerably to highly qualified migration in Germany. This has increased during the last two decades and is expected to further increase with the EU enlargement. Migrants from the former Yugoslavian states (14%), the new EU states which acceded in 2004 and 2007 (10%), and the former Soviet Union (6%) make up a large proportion of immigrants to Germany, with migrants from Turkey being the largest group (25.4%), followed by migrants from the EU-14 states (24.4%). Since the education systems in socialist countries were well developed, most migrants from these countries have professional training when they arrive in Germany. Moreover, it can be expected that among women migrating from the new EU states to Germany, there are a certain proportion qualified in science and technology. According to Eurostat figures, in many post-Communist states, such ________________

Ibidem, p. 178.  Ibidem, p. 189 f.  28 Ibidem.   26 27

236

Ingrid Jungwirth

as Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Poland, the proportion of science and technology professionals who are women is considerably higher than in the EU generally, and in many of the EU-15 states in particular (i.e. the EU states before the enlargements of 2004 and 2007). In 2006, the proportion of science and technology professionals who were women in some of the new East European EU states considerably exceeded the average in EU states, then 50.8%. In Lithuania, the percentage of women among science and technology professionals was 72%, followed by Estonia with 69.7%. In Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary, women made up more than 60%, in Slovakia 58.4%, and in Romania 57.3%. Compared to this, Germany was below the EU average, with women comprising 49.9% of science and technology professionals. Even between East and West German states there were differences, since in some East German states the average was above 55%. The lowest percentage in Malta (40%), followed by Cyprus (44.7%) and Switzerland (45%). These figures refer to people employed in scientific and technical professions as scientists (ISCO ’88 COM Group 2), and additionally to technicians as well as to nontechnical professions (ISCO ’88 COM Group 3):29 in other words, these figures include qualified and highly qualified professions and occupations. Although the category of “science” is rather broad, including all subject areas, it still can be concluded that in postsocialist states the share of women in science and technology is higher than the average in all EU-states, including (West)Germany. The figures indicate that the science and technology sectors are less segregated in postsocialist states than in other EU states.

5. Labour market integration of migrants from postsocialist countries Looking at the figures for labour market integration in these larger groups of migrants, one has to conclude that migrants from postsocialist countries who came to Germany on the basis of family ________________ 29 Tomas Meri, “Frauen in Wissenschaft und Technik“ [Women in science and technology], Statistik kurz gefasst 2008, vol. 10.

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

237

reunion, as Aussiedler, or as Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union, have had considerable difficulties integrating into the labour market. With respect to integration into the labour market, I will present some figures on the situation of the Aussiedler, as more indepth research exists on this group than on other migrants from postsocialist countries. Findings on the labour market integration of the Aussiedler group show that they have significantly more difficulties integrating in the labour market than the autochthonous population, although their level of qualification is only slightly lower. They earn 25% less and are located more often in lower positions in the labour market than are West Germans. About 60% of the qualified or highly qualified members of this migration group are not working in the profession they were educated for. Indeed, more than 50% of them are employed in jobs that do not require any qualification.30 Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union also have high levels of qualification: 70% are academics,31 a level which is above average for Germany. But there are indications that they are affected by unemployment relatively often.32 The situation of labour market integration of these groups is in some respects comparable to the situation of other groups of migrants ________________ 30 Dirk Konietzka and Michaela Kreyenfeld, “Die Verwertbarkeit ausländischer Ausbildungsabschlüsse. Das Beispiel der Aussiedler auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt“ [The usability of foreign certicfications. The example of Aussiedler in the German labour market], Zeitschrift für Soziologie 2001, August, vol. 40, no. 4, p. 278; Wolfgang Seifert, Geschlossene Grenzen – offene Gesellschaften? Migrations- und Integrationsprozesse in westlichen Industrienationen [Closed frontiers – open societies? Processes of migration and integration in Western industrial nations], Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2001. 31 Karsten Roesler, “Berufliche Integration. Potentiale erkennen – Potentiale integrieren“ [Professional integration. Recognizing potentials – integrating potentials], Blickpunkt Integration 2006, no. 1, ed. by BAMF – Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge, pp. 6–7. 32 Sonja Haug, “Soziodemographische Merkmale, Berufsstruktur und Verwandtschaftsnetzwerke jüdischer Zuwanderer“ [Sociodemographic features, professional structure and kinship networks of Jewish migrants], Working Paper 8, ed. by Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [Federal Office for Migration and Refugees], 2007, p. 13 ff.

238

Ingrid Jungwirth

in Germany, particularly from Southern and Eastern Europe. The growing tertiarization in the world of labour has not affected these migrants in the same way as it has the autochthonous population of Germany. While the percentage of labourers among German men fell from 41% in 1980 to 37% in 1996, 70% of Turkish migrant men were labourers in 1996, as were 49% of Spanish migrant men, and 86% of men of Eastern European origin (this group was composed of 33% craftsmen and 53% labourers with low or no qualifications).33 At the same time, migrant men from Southern and Eastern European countries are less well represented in the tertiary sector. For example, only 5% of Turkish migrant men and 14% of Eastern European men were tertiary-sector employees in 1996,34 compared to 41% of autochthonous men.35 The employment structure of the Aussiedler is comparable to that of migrants from Eastern Europe. Seifert, who analysed their employment history before and after migration on the basis of representative data of the German Socioeconomic Panel, concludes that even though there is an improvement in social position after one or two years of migration, men disproportionally often work as labourers, as compared to autochthonous men. In 1996, 78% were labourers and 20% were employees.36 The picture is different for women. In 1996, 37% of women from the Aussiedler group were working as labourers and 58% as employees.37 In summary, members of the Aussiedler group have substantially lower chances of joining the labour market than have West Germans or East Germans, but at the same time they have clearly better chances than many other migrants in Germany.38 Concerning the labour market participation of qualified and highly qualified migrants, the case of the Aussiedler is quite inter________________

W. Seifert, op. cit., p. 252.  For Eastern European men the employment structure has changed “drastically”, as Seifert puts it: 36% of them were tertiary-sector employees in 1980, which exceeded the percentage (34%) among autochthonous men (ibidem).  35 Ibidem.   36 Ibidem, p. 268.   37 Ibidem.   38 Ibidem, p. 273.   33 34

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

239

esting. They make up a group of privileged migrants, insofar as their qualifications are formally acceptable. They are the only group of migrants in Germany to have the right to claim an acknowledgement procedure for all professions.39 Moreover they have privileged access to citizenship. At the same time, the figures of labour market integration show that formal recognition of qualifications is not sufficient for integration into the labour market—particularly for obtaining positions which suit their qualifications. Put differently, there is already quite a large population of qualified and highly qualified migrants who cannot use their qualifications in their integration process. Thus it is necessary to analyse the mechanisms which play a role in the process of allocating migrants into the labour market and into society. And it is important to understand that the highly skilled professionals who immigrate with a work permit to Germany make up only a small proportion of migrants, and consequently other groups of migrants have to be considered in order to understand the effects of migration on their life course and on their occupational history.40 ________________ 39 Bettina Engelmann and Martina Müller, “Brain Waste. Die Anerkennung von ausländischen Abschlüssen in Deutschland“ [Brain Waste. The recognition of foreign certifications in Germany], Augsburg 2007, p. 91. Concerning the recognition of qualifications in Germany, the Aussiedler group is privileged in the so-called nonregimented professions, while EU citizens are privileged in the so-called regimented professions, encompassing professions in the health sector and security sector (ibidem, p. 31 f.). 40 This is the aim of the research project on the integration of highly skilled and highly qualified migrant women in science and technology into the German labour market, which I am conducting at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin from 2009 to 2011, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and by the European Social Fund. It is a network research project, with Hamburg University of Technology analysing the integration of highly qualified migrant women in technical occupations in businesses (Wibke Derboven, Grit Grigoleit and Gabriele Winker), and RWTH Aachen University analysing their integration at universities (Anna Bouffier, Miriam Lämmerhirt and Andrea Wolffram). At the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Ingrid Jungwirth and Hildegard Maria Nickel), integration processes are being analysed in a more general sense, as laid out in this article, also including migrants who migrated without prior job permits and including women who are not employed in jobs which accord with their qualifications. 

240

Ingrid Jungwirth

6. Gendering as a mode of structuring in the process of migration Social inequality is related to the structure of the labour market, its segmentations, the institutionally defined structure of professions, and the status granted to social actors thereby. Economic participation is an important mode of inclusion in society. Even if labour market participation does not fully account for the position of social actors, it remains dominant in determining societal participation. With reference to the labour market participation of immigrants from postsocialist states in Germany, some figures available at the moment also reveal that there are gender differences in the mode of integration into labour and society. Women have more difficulties than men in finding a job, particularly one that accords with their qualifications. For example, many of the Aussiedler are highly employable: around 80% of the men and about 70% of the women were employed before they migrated, corresponding to the employment rates in their socialist or postsocialist countries of origin. After migration, the share of employed is halved to 35% (47% for men), but for women the employment rate is even less: in 1996, only 22% of the migrant women were employed one year after migration, and only 32% two years after migration.41 Women especially are not employed to the extent that they had been before migration and probably expected to be in Germany. Moreover, it is particularly difficult to be employed as a clerical worker—the kind of occupation for which many women are qualified. These qualifications are state-specific, with the effect that, women’s qualifications may not be recognized after migration. This problem is also confronted by other women migrants within the EU: the kind of occupations for which they are qualified are more excluded for migrants than jobs in the private economy.42 OECD ________________

W. Seifert, op. cit., p. 264 f.  Cf. Roland Verwiebe, Transnationale Migration innerhalb Europas. Eine Studie zu den sozialstrukturellen Effekten der Europäisierung [Transnational migration within Europe. A study on the social structural effects of the Europeanisation], Berlin: edition sigma, 2004; Louise Ackers, Shifting Spaces. Women citizenship and migration within the European Union, Bristol: Polity Press, 1998. 41 42

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

241

figures show that especially highly qualified migrant women from non-OECD countries are overqualified for the jobs they occupy in countries such as Germany, Spain, Italy, and others. 32.3% of these women—and 23.6% of migrant women from other countries of origin—were overqualified for their jobs in Germany in 2003/2004, compared to 9.9% of autochthonous women.43 Accordingly, studies indicate that highly qualified women among the Aussiedler group are particularly affected by unemployment.44 A consequence of the difficulties they have in making full use of their qualifications is that most of these migrants—both women and men— do not work in the professions for which they are qualified, meaning that they are employed in jobs with low qualification requirements.45 Referring to income, women earn considerably less than men, so that the conclusion of one study is that women not only have difficulties in entering the labour market, but also that when they do succeed in entering it, they are employed in low-paid sectors.46 Still, the situation of the Aussiedler group is a special case, since their qualifications are formally acceptable. This shows that other processes of closure have been effective in excluding women migrants from the labour market. Different approaches have been applied to analyse the integration of migrants into the labour market. The human capital approach explains positions in the labour market on the grounds of equipment with qualifications. According to this approach, the difficulties of migrants in integrating into the labour market are predicated on the lack of required qualifications or on the devaluation of existing qualifications.47 Economic discrimination approaches posit that preju________________ 43 OECD, International Migration Outlook. Annual Report 2006, Paris, p. 53 ff.; cf. B. Engelmann and M. Müller, op. cit., p. 24 f. 44 Andreas Janikowski, “Berufliche Integration der Aussiedler und Aussiedlerinnen“ [Professional integration of Aussiedler], in: Rainer K. Silbereisen et al. (eds.), Aussiedler in Deutschland. Akkulturation von Persönlichkeit und Verhalten [Aussiedler in Germany. Acculturation of personality and behaviour], Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1999, pp. 113–142; W. Seifert, op. cit. 45 D. Konietzka and M. Kreyenfeld, op. cit.; W. Seifert, op. cit.   46 W. Seifert, op. cit., p. 270.   47 Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964; Nadia Granato

242

Ingrid Jungwirth

dices and incomplete information lead to the valuation of labour power based on the ascription of certain characteristics unconnected to productivity.48 Yet another approach uses Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital (i.e. qualifications) to explain migrant success in the labour market,49 and also aims to analyse the devaluation of qualifications in the course of migration.50 In this paper, I would like to put forward the suggestion that in addition to these approaches, gendering needs to be considered and analysed as a mode of structuring in the process of migration and in the entailing integration processes. Research on the integration processes of migrants has revealed that they have difficulties in using their qualifications and knowledge,51 and not that they are insufficiently qualified. To what extent discrimination takes place, or to what extent qualifications are not recognized—whether formally or ________________

and Frank Kalter, “Die Persistenz ethnischer Ungleichheit auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt“ [The persisitence of ethnic inequality in the German labour market], Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 2001, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 497–520; Frank Kalter, “Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft“ [Searching for an explanation for the specific disadvantages of adolescents of Turkish origin in the labour market], Zeitschrift für Soziologie 2006, vol. 35, pp. 144–160. 48 Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971; Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert Smith, Modern Labor Economics, Longman, 1991; cf. Nadia Granato, “Ethnische Ungleichheit auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt“ [Ethnic inequality in the German labour market], Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2003; Holger Seibert and Heike Solga, “Gleiche Chancen dank einer abgeschlossenen Ausbildung? Zum Signalwert von Ausbildungsabschlüssen bei ausländischen und deutschen jungen Erwachsenen“ [Same chances thanks to a completed vocational training? On the signaler of vocational training of foreign and German young adults], Zeitschrift für Soziologie 2005, vol. 34, pp. 364–382. 49 A.-M. Nohl, op. cit.   50 Moreover, Karin Scherschel has proposed defining the legal status of migrants in line with the cultural capital approach as well; Karin Scherschel, “Dimensionen der Ungleichheit im nationalstaatlich stratifizierten Raum“ [Dimensions of inequality in the social space stratified by the nation state], in: Marion Müller and Dariuš Zifonun (eds.), Ethnowissen. Soziologische Beiträge zu ethnischer Differenzierung und Migration [Ethnoknowledge. Sociological contributions to ethnical differenciation and migration], Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2009, pp. 237–256.  51 N. Granato, op. cit.; D. Konietzka and M. Kreyenfeld, op. cit.  

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

243

informally—requires further research. In fact, the discrimination approaches enable investigation of processes by which people are excluded from particular jobs and careers because of stereotyping of gender difference, nationality, ethnicity, or race. But in addition to this, how gendering as a mode of structuring influences migration and allocation processes in the course of migration needs to be explored. I am referring to “gendering” as a process which goes beyond the idea of gender difference affecting migrants and their integration. I would like to propose the hypothesis that gendering is a process which may take place in the course of migration, leading to a lowearning position (dropping below the low income of many migrant men) and exclusion from jobs with higher qualification requirements. Apart from this, it seems that women migrants find jobs particularly in occupations that are thought to be typical of women. The UN World Survey on the Role of Women in Development (2004) states that most women migrants are employed in “traditionally female occupations”. This usually means domestic work or other work within the private sphere. Likewise, jobs for qualified and highly qualified women disproportionately include occupations such as teachers and health professionals.52 Kofman and Raghuram53 point out that skilled employment of migrant women in the welfare sector has so far been neglected. They argue that the reshaping of the welfare state in many countries of the North/West also relies on the migration of skilled women—and not only in domestic work, but in public care services as well. For example, the crisis in nursing in countries such as the US, the UK, and Ireland has been addressed by nurses on a “global labour market”, specifically from the Philippines.54 Furthermore, other ways in which migrant women address shortages in the welfare system need to be further researched. Particularly, it has to be asked in what way are qualified and highly qualified migrant women who cannot integrate ________________ 52

United Nations (ed.), World Survey on the Role of Women in Development, 2004,

p. 63. 53 Eleonore Kofman and Parvati Raghuram, “Gender and Global Labour Migrations: Incorporating Skilled Workers”, Antipode 2006, vol. 38(2), pp. 282–303. 54 Cf. ibidem, p. 293.  

244

Ingrid Jungwirth

into the labour market in accordance with their qualifications relegated into these segments of the labour market. At the same time, the recruitment of migrant women into occupations in science and technology is far below the level of recruitment of migrant men within this sector. Mirjana Morokvasic55 has shown that in 1992, only 20% of the scientists from postsocialist states recruited by the leading science organizations in Germany were women, even though many women were qualified in these professions. This disproportionate situation continues and has even been exacerbated, as the figures of IT specialist recruitment in Germany show. Between 1999 and 2004, only 12% of the IT specialist work permits were granted to women.56 With reference to postsocialist countries, the disproportion between migrant women in this sector in Germany and the number of women occupied in their country of origin needs explanation and further research. Apart from processes in the labour market itself, migration regulations can work as gendering processes as well, for example by ignoring the qualifications of spouses contributing to the labour market in the case of family-related migration.57 In addition, immigration policy favouring the selection of occupations which are male dominated can also lead to the gendering of work and residence permits, leading to them being granted disproportionally to men.58 ________________ 55 Mirjana Morokvasic, “Gender-Dimensionen der postkommunistischen Migration in Europa“ [Gender dimensions of postcommunist migration inEurope], in: Ursula Apitzsch and Mechtild Jansen (eds.), Migration, Biographie und Geschlechterverhältnisse [Migration, biography and gender relations], Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2003, pp. 143–171.  56 “Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung“ [Migration report of the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees on behalf of the Federal Government], 2005. The largest group of IT specialists migrated from India, followed by Romania and states of the former Soviet Union (ibidem).  57 Cf. E. Kofman and P. Raghuram, op. cit.   58 For recent figures refering to Germany see “Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung” [Migration report of the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees on behalf of the Federal Government], 2008.

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

245

7. Normative gender orders and migration Returning to the initial argument, I would like to sketch the significance of norms and ideals concerning gender in the reproduction of social inequality with reference to migrant women.59 Differentiating between structural and symbolic levels in the reproduction of inequality, the structural level in the case of migration includes the labour market as well as migration policy and regulations. Moreover, the difficulties described above that migrant women from postsocialist countries have in entering the German labour market indicate that on the level of ascriptions, relevant processes are taking place for inclusion into labour and society. The case of Aussiedler is interesting, because it reveals mechanisms which exceed the formal recognition of qualifications in labour market processes, indicating the significance of cultural capital in the sense of knowledge going beyond formal qualifications.60 I propose to take gendering processes into account for the analysis of allocation processes of migrants as well, i.e. the ascription of knowledge, and the devaluation of knowledge, respectively, according to concepts of ________________

Cf. Ingrid Jungwirth, “The change of normative gender orders in the process of migration: a transnational perspective,” COMCAD Working Papers 2008, vol. 48 (Bielefeld: Centre of Migration, Citizenship and Development), available at: ; eadem, “Die transnationale Organisation von Arbeit durch Geschlecht und Migration im Zuge der EU-Erweiterungen“ [The transnational organisation of labour through gender and migration in the course of the EU extension], in: Karl-Siegbert Rehberg (ed.), Die Natur der Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen des 33. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Kassel 2006 [The nature of society. Negotiations of the 33rd congress of the German Scoiological Association in Kassel 2006], Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2008, pp. 2096– 2109. A more general approach on relating gender and migration to the structural changes in the world of labour is sketched by Ingrid Jungwirth and Karin Scherschel, “Ungleich prekär – Zum Verhältnis von Arbeit, Geschlecht und Ethnizität“ [Unequally precarious – on the relation of labour, gender and ethnicity], in: Alexandra Manske and Katharina Pühl (eds.), Prekarisierung zwischen Anomie und Normalisierung? Geschlechtertheoretische Bestimmungsversuche [Precarisation between anomaly and normalisation? Gender theoretical attempts of definition], Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2010, pp. 110–132. 60 A.-M. Nohl et al., op. cit.   59

246

Ingrid Jungwirth

gender accepted and held to be legitimate in a specific societal context. With respect to women migrating between postsocialist countries and West European market economies, qualified and highly qualified women in science and technology might especially experience a devaluation of their qualification and knowledge. In Germany, for example, these occupations are more sex-segregated than in postsocialist states. Thus, in addition to the devaluation of qualifications that many migrants experience, the devaluation of knowledge because of prevailing gender concepts has to be taken into account as well. In terms of this, women are not expected to be qualified as scientists or to have the required skills at their disposal. In order to analyse this phenomenon, one has to consider that migration takes place between nation states and between their specific traditions of “gender culture,” a concept of Birgit PfauEffinger.61 She showed the importance of culture in the structuring of labour force participation of women, defining “gender culture” to be the ideals referring to societal integration of women and men, the gendered division of labour and ideals of “relations between generations of the family and obligations in these relations”. These ideals are institutionalized as norms. In her study, she compares national development paths of “gender cultural models and with reference to class structure and social milieu,” which can also vary between different regions of a country.62 Following Pfau-Effinger’s concept, I want to define normative gender orders as the historically specific complex of norms and cultural ideals referring to gender roles, to a gendered division of labour, and to sexuality, norms and ideals which are reproduced in institutions such as the welfare state, the labour market, the family, and the educational system. The normative gender order furnishes the symbolic reproduction of inequality between the sexes. ________________

Birgit Pfau-Effinger, Development of culture, welfare states and women's employment in Europe: Theoretical Framework and Analysis of Development Paths, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004.  62 Ibidem, p. 42 f.   61

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

247

The concept of normative gender orders goes beyond that of gender norms. It relies on the concept of gender order, developed by Connell, which aims at the “macro-politics of gender” comprising the “conflict of interest” on a “society-wide scale, the formation and dissolution of general categories and the ordering of relationships between institutions”. Emphasizing its dynamic character, gender order can be understood as “the current state of play in this macro-politics.”63 Locating gender norms in the dimension of societal order permits the recognition of its vital role in the shaping of social hierarchies, and at the same time differentiates it from the micro level of face-to-face interactions. It implies a comprehensive organization and structuring of individual norms, depending on societal institutions and their current state of play, as Connell puts it. With reference to migrant women, the restriction of their scope of action during the course of migration can be analysed on a macro level as well, going beyond face-to-face interactions. In order to analyse allocation processes in the course of migration, concepts are needed that go beyond the nation state, as migrants’ socialization is being increasingly internationalized. Saskia Sassen has introduced conceptual considerations for the analysis of globalization processes which transgress the restriction of sociological concepts to the nation state and its society.64 She argues that the novel conditions accompanying globalization require new categories, including not only dualities like national/global, but also other forms, like the “subnational.” In globalization processes, the national is reshaped, i.e. the level of the nation is still vital, but it is transformed. Sassen calls this “denationalization.”65 Processes of internationalization lead to an international distribution of labour, enabled by economic globalization as well as by the migration of geographically mobile individuals. These people are social actors who transgress territorial boundaries in order to offer their labour power. With technological ________________

Robert W. Connel, Gender and Power. Society, the Person and Sexual Politics, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987, p. 139.  64 Saskia Sassen, A Sociology of globalization, New York: Norton, 2006. 65 Sassen calls this “denationalization,” ibidem, p. 8.   63

248

Ingrid Jungwirth

progress, the opportunities to participate in more than one society have also increased and changed the forms of migration. Migrants are integrated on the level of nationally determined societies and their institutions, but they participate in a labour market which can be termed supranational, if it is enabled by free-trade areas like the EU. A considerable welfare gap between the origin region the destination region of migration seems to be one of the prerequisites for a particular international distribution of labour, caused in part by economic globalization. It is one of the powerful forces determining the participation and allocation of migrating women in nationally located labour markets. Taking up the concept of normative gender order allows for the identification of influences on gender norms, and for ideals for migrant women on the macro level. In the case of a (possibly) emerging supranational labour market, one has to take into account, though, that it is shaped on various levels. The concept of normative gender order has to be thought of as a multilevel approach, including the national level of nation state of origin as well as nation state of destination of migration, and moreover a supranational level determined by economic processes on a global scale and international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Assuming the influence of normative gender orders on this level, I want to propose that processes such as economic globalization and structural relations such as a strong welfare gap between the states and societies of the North/West and South/East do not work solely on an economic level, but accompany specific normative requirements on and ascriptions to the social actors involved. My hypothesis is that migrants experience these normative requirements as they respond to the opportunities created by economic forces and processes that enhance their social positions through migration. Concerning migrant women, it has been argued in international gender studies that they are structurally gendered, finding employment mainly in jobs for which women are thought to be particularly apt, including caring for children and the elderly and cleaning. I want to add to this the hypothesis that, along with this structural gendering in the labour market, normative requirements and ascriptions can be analysed aiming at the gender of migrants. An assumed universal gender

The change of normative gender orders in the course of migration

249

socialization as women is transformed into a resource in an international distribution of labour and on supranational labour markets, respectively.

Conclusion I have argued that the analysis of the reproduction of gender inequality needs to include a symbolic level as well as a structural level, going beyond the analysis of social inequality preoccupied with the labour market and the social stratification based upon it. The pluralization of gender norms and the liberating effects which accompany it—particularly for women—have been initiated by the women’s movement and other social movements in Western industrial nations, and have to be differentiated for different groups of women. In the case of migration, social change takes place with reference to at least two nation states and their gender orders. I have taken up the migration of highly skilled women from postsocialist states to Germany, arguing that for them migration does not necessarily entail a widening in the scope of action, but may lead to a restriction. I have introduced gendering as a mode of structuring in the process of migration, in order to grasp those mechanisms which cause the allocation of migrant women within the labour market to jobs and occupations that are thought to be typical for women, and which moreover result in low income or even in (temporary) exclusion from the labour market. I have proposed analysing these processes not only on the level of face-to-face interactions, but also on the level of societal orders. Normative gender orders vary between nation states, regions, and social groups. Consequently, migrant women experience different gender orders in the course of migration. In order to analyse the experiences of migrants, a multilevel approach is needed, one which includes the normative orders of the nation states concerned, as well as the possibly emerging gender order between nation states—on a supranational level, in the case of the EU. With reference to migration and its history, I have argued that a predominantly economic determination of migration politics fails

250

Ingrid Jungwirth

to account for the different modes of migration. Migration policy in the EU and its member states, based solely on an economic definition of migration, cannot fully control migration processes. Concerning highly qualified migration, for example, family-related migration and other forms of migration must also be considered in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

251

Francesca Alice Vianello

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine1 Abstract: This article examines women’s migration from Ukraine to Italy. I will present three typologies of migrant women: migrants in transition, permanent migrants, and suspended migrants. However I will focus mostly on the third category, because it demonstrates the difficulties of the returnees. When migrant women repatriate, they have more self-confidence, and they want to change their life and act out their plans in Ukraine. This innovative propulsion clashes with a society that is changing for the most part in a neoconservative direction, so they often begin planning to leave once again. A transnational women’s network is born; it is in conflict with the neoconservative wave that is crossing Ukraine which is, albeit timidly, starting to have a voice in the Ukrainian public sphere. Thus these migrant women can be understood as transforming agents in gender relations. Keywords: migrant women, redefining gender relations, emigration from Ukraine, suspended migrants.

Introduction This article articulates some of the results of my doctoral dissertation on Ukrainian women’s migration practices, based on broad field research carried out both in Ukraine and in Italy.2 The research was designed to investigate how migrant women move ________________ 1 I am grateful to my friends and colleagues Olena Fedyuk and Victoria Volodko, who helped me to process the ideas that made their way into this article.  2 Francesca Alice Vianello, Migrando sole. Legami transnazionali tra Ucraina e Italia [Migrating alone. Transnational ties between Ukraine and Italy], Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009. 

252

Francesca Alice Vianello

through the transnational space, mediating continuously between their own ambitions and external obligations, dictated both by structural processes, and by family and community social bonds. These women are usually wives and mothers, who hold de facto the role of breadwinner, but are not recognized as the heads of their households by the originating society. On the contrary, they are blamed by Ukrainian society as rebel women who turn away from their children and husbands. Migrant women, thanks to their migratory experience, redefine gender relations within the family and society, and reinforce their power position. Indeed, this migration process can be understood as a reverse of the patriarchal and patrilineal order in favour of a matriarchal and matrilineal model, because the family is reorganized around the mother figure. In this article, I will present three typologies of migrant women: migrants in transition, permanent migrants, and suspended migrants. However I am going to focus more on the third category, because it reveals some of challenges that have been produced in the originating country by migration. The paper is organized as follows: in the first section I position my study within the international literature, and I present the research questions which orient this article; in the second section, I introduce the case study and the research methods adopted; in the third section I review the migrants’ social background and their living conditions in Ukraine; finally in the forth and fifth sections I illustrate the three female migrant profiles.

1. Theoretical approach and research questions In the world at present, there are around 200 million migrants, half of whom are women.3 In Europe there are around 65 million international migrants, and in this case also half of the figure consists of women.4 A lot of these women migrate alone in order to fight

________________

United Nations, “Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision,” Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009, available at: . 4 Ibidem.   3

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

253

against pauperization, to maintain their extended family, to escape from violence, or to avoid patriarchal imperatives.5 Until the mid-1970s, women were invisible in studies of migrancy, being represented as the dependents of men. Thanks to scholars like Morokvasić6 and Buijs,7 who introduced a gender perspective into migration studies, the specific experience of women within the mass movement of people is widely studied today. The reasons for their invisibility in the history of migration movements are several, but it is possible to underline two principal points. The first deals with the typology of migration: in the past century, many women migrated with their husbands or fathers, so they were seen as passive members of a male migratory strategy. The second point concerns the labour dimension: migrating women worked as unpaid members in the family business, as homeworkers, or in poorly paid sectors such as manufacturing.8 Many scholars have highlighted the importance of gender within the migratory experience. Gender influences migrants’ projects, work opportunities, social networks, social capital, as well as their perspectives and goals. In fact, migration for women sometimes also means the possibility of emancipation from a patriarchal system, since during migration they often acquire a degree of economic and social autonomy that they previously lacked. At the same time, labour migration often means self-devaluation, because the work niches in which migrants are more likely to work in destination countries are stigmatized by gender, race, ethnicity, migrant status, and are lower paid. They are employed in the service sector of rich countries9— as housecleaners, carers, babysitters, laundry workers—and in the ________________

5 Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild (eds.), Global woman: Nannies, maids, and sex workers in the new economy, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003. 6 Mirjana Morokvasić, “Birds of passage are also women,” International Migration Review 1984, vol. XVIII (4), pp. 886–907.  7 Gina Buijs (ed.), Migrant women: Crossing Boundaries and Changing Identities, Providence: Berg, 1993.  8 Eleonore Kofman, Annie Phizacklea, Parvati Raghuram and Rosemary Sales (eds.), Gender and international migration in Europe, London and New York: Routledge, 2000.  9 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy, Pine Forge Press: Newbury Park, 2000.  

254

Francesca Alice Vianello

global garment industry.10 As far as Ukrainian immigrants in Italy are concerned, they usually work in the domestic and care sectors, and they are particularly widespread in the sphere of geriatric care. Nowadays the perception is still current of the migrant woman as a “beautiful victim” on one hand, and as a “sacrificing heroine” on the other.11 On the contrary I believe that, in spite of structural constraints, women are not passive subjects or victims, but instead they are active and autonomous actors of migratory processes. I thus adopt a gender and agency perspective in order to comprehend and analyse Ukrainian female migratory trajectories. The theoretical approach proposed here stimulates many research questions on the migration of women. In this article I will concentrate upon some of the research questions that have helped orient my investigation. The first of these regards the social context in Ukraine and, in particular, the gender order in force in Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s when the first pioneers began to emigrate. With regard to gender-based patterns of migration, we will see that female migratory trajectories differ from male ones. Furthermore, the study of the specificities of the countries of origin—the cultural, social, economic, and political context—is very important because these specificities very profoundly influence the migration experience. The second research question concerns the migratory strategies of women with regard to family duties. Women migrating alone may be unmarried women or adult mothers. This makes a very significant difference when we try to comprehend how migratory projects and migratory trajectories differ from one woman to another. The first category is composed of women who maintain their extended family and sacrifice themselves for their family’s sake, but who at the same time gain an opportunity to start a new life abroad, since they are young and have children no waiting for them at home. On the other hand, the group of women who have left their children, and some________________ 10 Radhika Balakrishnan (ed.), The hidden assembly line: Gender dynamics of subcontracted work in a global economy, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2002.  11 Helen Schwenken, “Beautiful victims and sacrificing heroines: Exploring the role of gender knowledge in migration policies,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2008, vol. 33 (4) (06/01), pp. 770–776. 

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

255

times also a husband, behind, have strong ties connecting their migration to the originating country. Finally, the third research question regards the return experiences of female migrants, because I consider that this is a sphere where gender conflicts are particular evident. I noticed two omissions in the international literature on migration processes: firstly, the scarcity of studies on migrant return experiences;12 and secondly, the fact that gender is rarely taken into consideration.13 The existing studies which explore this particular outcome of migration—“the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration,” according to Bimal Ghosh14—focus on the development potential of returning migrants. Return migration is not considered a failure of the migratory project, as it was viewed in the neoclassical approach, but as a potential tool of development for the countries of origin.15 According to this approach, migrants to Western countries acquire a human, economic, and social capital that helps them become entrepreneurs in their own countries.16 Following this approach, many studies have been conducted in Italy in order to investigate ________________ 12 Among the few, see: George Gmelch, Double passage: the lives of Caribbean migrants abroad and back home, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992; Robyn R. Iredale, Fei Guo and Santi Rosario, Return migration in the Asia Pacific, Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2003.  13 Apart from E. Panayotakopoulou, “Specific Problems of Migrant Women returning to the Country of Origin, particularly as regards Employment and Social Services,” International Migration 1981, vol. 24 (3), pp. 559–572; Maria Dikaiou, Grigoris Kiosseoglou and Despina Sakka, “Return Migration: Changing Roles of Men and Women,” International Migration 1999, vol. 37 (4), pp. 741–764; and Robert B. Potter, Dennis Conway and Joan Phillips, The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives, Farnham: Ashgate, 2005.  14 Bimal Ghosh (ed.), Return Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair, Geneva: IOM and United Nations, 2000. 15 Amelie Constant and Douglas S. Massey, “Return Migration by German Guestworkers: Neoclassical versus New Economic Theories,” International Migration 2002, vol. 40 (4), pp. 5–38; Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited,” International Journal on Multicultural Societies 2004, vol. 6 (2), pp. 253–279.  16 Henrik Olesen, “Migration, Return, and Development: An Institutional Perspective,” International Migration 2002, vol. 40 (5), pp. 125–150. 

256

Francesca Alice Vianello

transnational entrepreneurs17 and return migrations.18 From these studies, it has emerged that the return migrants the greatest chance of success are the male migrants. Thus, I wonder, what becomes of women migrants? With the intention of answering this question, I interviewed some returned migrant women in order to comprehend, first of all, why a woman decides to return home after a certain period. And next, how they go through the return emotionally, and what are the main difficulties they encounter. Finally, I wondered if female return migration had some implications on gender relations both within the family and in Ukrainian society.

2. Case study and methods I have chosen Ukraine as a case study, because relations, exchanges, and transnational mobility between Ukraine and the European Union seem destined to increase. This study has to be understood within the international political framework of the European Union’s eastward expansion. Ukraine, like other countries bordering the EU, has recently assumed a decisive role in European migratory policies, especially as they concern border control and the expulsion of undocumented migrants.19 In exchange for cooperation on border control, European member states usually offer economic investment to the bordering countries, and privileged entry channels to their citizens, as the Romanian, Albanian and Polish cases highlighted. ________________

Maurizio Ambrosini (ed.), Intraprendere fra due mondi [Undertaking between two worlds], Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009.  18 Pietro Cingolani, Romeni d’Italia [Italian Romanians], Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009.   19 Helmut Dietrich, “Campi profughi ai nuovi confini esterni” [Refugees camps at new external borders], in: Sandro Mezzadra (ed.), I confini della libertà [The borders of freedom], Roma: Derive Approdi, 2004, pp. 109–124; idem, “The Desert Front—EU Refugee Camps in North Africa?” 2004, available at: ; Frank Düvell, “La globalizzazione del controllo delle migrazioni” [The globalization of migration control], in: Sandro Mezzadra (ed.), I confini della libertà [The borders of freedom], Roma: Derive Approdi, 2004, pp. 23–50. 17

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

257

The outflow of Ukrainian nationals is mainly composed of men aimed toward Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Portugal, but in the Western region there is a significant female outflow directed toward Italy, Poland, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Approximately 3.5 million foreign citizens live in Italy (counting both EU and non-EU citizens), of which Ukrainians constitute about 200 thousand—making them the fourth largest foreign nationality living in Italy, after Romanians, Albanians, and Moroccans.20 Approximately 80% of these Ukrainians are women. Their presence in Italy has emerged as a result of the amnesty of 2002, which legalized around 100 thousand Ukrainian citizens; since the amnesty, the number of Ukrainians in Italy has increased eightfold. Approximately 60% of all applications for legalization were made by Central and Eastern European migrants. Most of these applications (89,000) were made by Ukrainians, and these were principally related to the area of domestic labour.21 Now, another forthcoming legalization22 will probably legalize several thousand more women. Ukrainian migrants are primarily concentrated in five regions: 29,000 Ukrainians live in Campania (Naples region, southern Italy), 25,500 in Lombardy (Milan region, northern Italy), 18,000 in Emilia-Romagna (Bologna region, northern Italy), 16,000 in Lazio (Rome region, central Italy), and 10,000 in Veneto (Venice region, northern Italy). The preferred destination for Ukrainians in Italy is Naples, probably because its port has had long-lasting commercial relations with the port of Odessa,23 and because the shadow economy is widespread there. Thus it is easier for those migrants without documents to live and find work there. ________________ 20 CARITAS/MIGRANTES, Immigrazione. Dossier Statistico 2008 [Immigration. Statistic Dossier 2008], Roma: Idos, 2008. 21 Oliviero Forti, Franco Pittau and Antonio Ricci, Europa. Allargamento a Est e immigrazione [Europe. Eastern enlargement and immigration], Roma: Idos, 2004.  22 Aimed only at domestic sector foreign workers.   23 Cristina Mazzacurati, “Dal blat alla vendita del lavoro. Come sono cambiate colf e badanti ucraine e moldave a Padova” [From blat to job sale. How Ukrainian and Moldavian domestic and care workers are changed in Padua], in: Tiziana Caponio and Asher Colombo (eds.), Migrazioni globali e integrazioni locali [Global migrations and local integrations], Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005, pp. 145–174. 

258

Francesca Alice Vianello

My research investigates the migratory experiences of Ukrainians living in Veneto. In this region, located in the northeast of Italy, the legalized non-EU immigrant population is around 150,000 people.24 As in the nation as a whole, in this region too, the Ukrainian presence emerged with the 2002 regularisation. The Ukrainians living in Veneto principally come from western Ukraine, but there are also people from the south and the centre of that country. Unfortunately, most of the data about the provenance of Ukrainian migrants has been lost, and continues to be lost, during the registration process, because Italian civil servants do not understand the Cyrillic alphabet, and thus often write only migrants’ country of origin, and not their birthplace. Nevertheless, the collected data25 suggests that the Ukrainian citizens living in Veneto come mostly from Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Mykolaiv, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad. Migration from western Ukraine is a more established phenomenon, given that it started around fifteen years ago. The flow from southern, central, and eastern Ukraine, however, is recent and consequently more typically undocumented, in comparison to that from western Ukraine. I have adopted a transnational perspective, enabling me to observe the migratory process from a double point of view—that of the originating country, and that of the destination country—in such a way that I could observe manifold facets. I conducted about sixty semi-structured interviews (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2) with migrants, return migrants, and the children of migrants, as well as about twenty interviews with privileged informants, such as priests, cultural mediators, representatives of associations, and journalists. Besides this I spent two months in Ukraine, in some of the regions from which ________________ 24 Istat, “Permessi di soggiorno dei cittadini extracomunitari per classe di età, area geografica e principali paesi di cittadinanza, per sesso e regione, al 1° gennaio 2008” [Residence permits of extra-communitarian citizens for age, geographic area, principal citizenship countries, sex and region], 2008, available at: .  25 This data has been gathered from the offices of vital statistics and from the Venice police headquarters. 

259

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

migrants originate, namely the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Chernivtsi provinces. During this time I was able to combine the collection of interviews with ethnographic observation. Table 1.1. Sociodemographic characteristics of the interviewed migrants Divor- Wid-

Un-

With

20–29 30–39 40–49

50+

Total

Married

Migrant women

29

8

14

3

4

26

1

Migrant men

2

1

..

..

1

1

2

Returned women

12

8

3

1

..

12

1

1

5

5

Returned men

8

5

..

..

3

3

1

5

1

1

Total

51

ced

owed married

Children

years years

years

years

10

10

8

..

..

..

Table 1.2. Sociodemographic characteristics of the interviewed migrants

Migrant women Migrant men Returned women Returned men Total

Total

High school diploma

Academic degree

Care workers

Domestic workers

Other job

29

18

11

10

8

11

2

1

1

..

..

2

12

7

5

8

2

2

8

5

3

1

..

7

51

3. Women and the collapse of the Soviet Union Since Ukrainian women emigrated during and immediately after the economic crisis of the 1990s, I studied the impact that the postSoviet economic and social transformation had on gender relations. The two most important phenomena that affected Ukrainian women’s lives were the expulsion of women from the labour market—and thus from the public sphere—and the reinforcement of patriarchal systems occasioned by the spread of nationalism and pre-Soviet religious values. So it is possible to read migration as a strategy of fighting the

260

Francesca Alice Vianello

process of increasing poverty and professional devaluation, and the worsening of relationships within the family. In order to comprehend the autonomy of migrant women and the characteristics of this flow, it is necessary to consider the gender discrimination and inequalities that have emerged since the postSoviet reorganization of the Ukrainian socioeconomic system. Men and women have been affected in different ways by the transformation of work opportunities. The Soviet regime formally supported gender equality. During that time, the rate of women’s participation in the labour market was higher than that of many western countries; furthermore, Ukrainian women had full-time jobs. State policies were oriented to conciliate professional roles with familial ones, continuing to assign to women the traditional duty of family care.26 So during the Soviet regime, despite the adoption of egalitarian gender legislation, inequalities persisted in different ways, and women did not enjoy the same career opportunities as men. First of all, powerful political and economic positions were occupied by men, while women predominated in some other work sectors, such as education and the health service. Secondly, despite the emphasis that the State gave to maternity and infant health, there were high rates of maternal and infant mortality. Third, within the household men continued to be the master, while domestic work continued to be the duty of women, who undertook the second shift. Finally, violence against women continued to be widespread and hidden, particularly in the domestic sphere.27 Buckley28 examines the implications of the political and economic transformation on the female population. Women’s living conditions and their social status worsen the fastest, because they have a higher ________________

Jacqueline Heinen, “Sfera privata e sfera pubblica nell’Europa dell’Est” [Public and private sphere in Eastern Europe], in: Alisa Del Re and Jacqueline Heinen (eds.), Quale cittadinanza per le donne? [Which citizenship for women?], Milano: Franco Angeli, 1996, pp. 233–250.  27 David Stuart Lane, Soviet Society under Perestroika, London: UnwinHyman, 1990; Rosalin Marsh (ed.), Women in Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; UNICEF, “Women in Transition,” Regional Monitoring Report 1999, no. 6.  28 Mary Buckley (ed.), Post-Soviet women: From the Baltic to central Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  26

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

261

risk of losing their jobs, of suffering an increase in the incidence of male violence and cuts in the provision of family social services. They find themselves coping alone with the household and parenting duties, at a time when a double salary is becoming increasingly essential to the family livelihood. Some scholars29 contend that reaction strategies to socioeconomic transformation differ by gender. They thus suppose that women and men respond in different ways to the loss of their job. Many men face unemployment and the loss of their social and professional identity by taking refuge in alcohol abuse, while women—accustomed to the multiple identities of worker, mother, and wife—live through the occurring transformation in a less troubled way. Women, we may presume, adapt themselves more easily to the new economic condition, because they were already effectively second-class workers. The majority of the interviewed migrants had a high level of education, and prior to emigration had skilled jobs, but the economic transformations which affected Ukraine after 1991 modified their life trajectory. The migratory decision was influenced by different factors: the reduction in purchasing power, unemployment, an increase in the rhythms of consumption, a lust for travel and a desire to see new places, and last but not least, the pursuit of the western well-being myth. These reasons, moreover, often hide a more complex and perhaps implicit characteristic of migration: a rejection of and rebellion against social norms and work conditions prevalent in Ukraine. The migrants emigrated alone, bringing into question the gender stereotypes predominating in Ukraine. In Ukraine, the man is designated the master of the household and is therefore more powerful than women; yet many women migrated alone in order to support their family. Reflecting on the interviews, I concluded that in many cases women emigrated because they were in a worse and weaker position than their male counterparts—men didn’t want to lose their prestige, to devalue themselves working, for example in the ________________

Sarah Ashwin (ed.), Gender, state and society in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 176; Nora Dudwick, Elizabeth Gomart and Alexandre Marc (eds.), When things fall apart: Qualitative studies of poverty in the former Soviet Union, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003, p. 445.  29

262

Francesca Alice Vianello

construction sector—but thanks to migration, the women achieve more power and autonomy. For instance, the child of one migrant woman said: My father didn’t emigrate, because at that time men didn’t go to Italy because there wasn’t work for them. My mother is stronger than him... my father is a weaker person, he likes to stay at home, to cook, to clean; he is a househusband. Because my mother is strong, she decided to go to Italy to provide a future for her children. At home they didn’t discuss it; they stopped speaking with each other. My father felt guilty, because his wife was leaving to do menial work, while he was unable to do anything. Men are prouder then women, women have less problems in doing menial work. [Olexandra, Lviv 11/09/2006]

And a migrant reported: My husband worked abroad too, he worked in the construction sector in Moscow, but he didn’t like it because he was an agronomist and not a builder. He worked there for a few months and then he came back home. He told me that the work was too hard for him. Then he went to the Czech Republic, but there it was difficult find a job because there was a lot of competition. So I decided to go to Italy. [Natalia, Truscavez 26/08/2006]

Such women migrants are often criticized in their native country because of their decision to migrate; for this reason they have developed a strong defensive discourse, based on the Soviet rhetoric of the strong woman.30 Indeed, women declare themselves to be more reliable and stronger than their husbands, because they also have the duty of child care. Mothers are considered more trustworthy and rational in the management of money, because they do not spend it on futile consumption, but rather for the benefit of the whole family. The women’s migratory decision is a reaction to apathetic and unemployed husbands, who cannot accept labour migration, which would cause them to lose their status. Motherhood characterizes the discourses of many migrants, because it is one of the strongest justifications a woman can use in ________________ 30

S. Ashwin, op. cit. 

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

263

order to defend her decision. The sacrifice rhetoric is an alibi that hides a process of emancipation developed during the migratory experience. Finally, migratory experience influences gender roles within society and the family. Salary differentials and the strength of their income enable women to acquire more decision power within the family, even if husbands often try to defy this process. Husbands often attempt to devalue the importance of earnings, spending them on futile consumption. This seems to be a way of stating that money is not really the principal necessity, and that they should continue to be the master of the family.

4. Migrants in transition and permanent migrants I propose three variable and transitory ideal types of Ukrainian female migrant, given that each migrant can cross more than one type during her mobility path. The typology highlights the migrants’ subjectivity and agency in the elaboration of different strategies, on the basis of personal perspectives, family relationships, social networks, and working conditions. The first profile, that of migrants in transition, describes a category of Ukrainian migrants very similar to the female Filipino migrants studied by Parreñas31 and the Somali female migrants studied by Decimo.32 This category is the most widespread one among Ukrainian women living in Italy. Female migrants in transition are breadwinner mothers, often (but not necessarily) single mothers employed as cohabiting family assistants. Generally these migrants leave Ukraine as a short-term project, in the hope that they will collect sufficient capital in a short time—one or two years. However their experience often continues for years and years, keeping migrants abroad in a transitory condition for a longer ________________

Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, Servants of globalization: Women, migration, and domestic work, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.  32 Francesca Decimo, Quando emigrano le donne [When women emigrate], Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005.  31

264

Francesca Alice Vianello

period: they are firmly focussed on return, but they continually postpone it, living on the margins of Italian society.33 There are two reasons for this protracted migration. First, their earnings become essential income for the family left behind. These women are a source of significant income needed to preserve the family status and the new standard of living they enjoy. A significant part of the income is invested in home improvement. Usually the kitchen and bathroom are restored. Secondly, migrants start to model their new identity within the frame of migration, so that they actually cannot see themselves being back in Ukraine. They affirm that in the future they want to return, so their behaviour, choices, jobs, consumption, and lifestyles are geared toward maximum earning, and not toward the improvement of their quality of life in Italy. Migrants in transition do not invest energy on social inclusion, because their life abroad is instrumental only in the accomplishment of family interests. The maternal role is their primary identity, giving purpose to the whole migration. Family ties represent the emotional source supporting migrants during their labour experience abroad. Usually migrants in transition are women between 40 and 60 years old, divorced or widowed and with adolescent or adult children, but not economically independent. Their age reduces their working prospects in Ukraine, so they prefer to complete their active life in Italy and to accumulate enough money to guarantee themselves a dignified old age in their native country. Their life in Italy is perceived as a short interval. These are women constrained by a network of social conditionings: maternal duties, family expectations, Ukrainian economic insecurity, and the suffocating job of being a caregiver. In any case, if we see the protracted migration from another point of view, it seems that these migrants often look for new reasons to prolong their stay abroad, as a ________________ 33 Annamaria Spanò and Anna Maria Zaccaria, “Il mercato delle collaborazioni domestiche a Napoli: il caso delle ucraine e delle polacche” [The market of domestic collaborations in Naples: the case of Ukrainians and Poles], in: Michele La Rosa and Laura Zanfrini (eds.), Percorsi migratori tra reti etniche, istituzioni e mercato del lavoro [Migratory walks between ethnic networks and labour market], Milano: Franco Angeli, 2003, pp. 193–224. 

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

265

way to justify their absence. A migration oriented toward paying for the children’s educational costs can shift continually to other goals. In these cases, migration becomes a life strategy, a new social identity for the migrant women. They live suspended between two worlds; while in the originating country they often have emotional attachments, in the destination country, by contrast, they have economic independence and more control over their life. The second typology is that of permanent migrants. These women invest more energy in the project of individual fulfilment. They evade family and community constraints and undertake a new life in Italy. They learn the Italian language, widen their social network, and find a job which allows them to have more time for themselves. Furthermore they often bring their children to Italy, but rarely their husbands, putting a matriarchal and matrilineal model into practice. What differentiates these women from the first group is their approach to migration. Usually, they are single mothers with young children and a damaged personal and social identity in Ukraine, who decide to invest in a future abroad. The transformation of the reasons behind migratory projects varies by individual, but there are some common factors that facilitate migration trajectories, namely: finding a job that allows them to have a private and social life, the enlargement of their social network, and the transformation of family relationships. The first two factors modify their living conditions in Italy: after a long period of isolation as cohabiting family assistant, migrants have a chance to dedicate themselves to their own well-being. In contrast to this, the third factor concerns an event that takes place in Ukraine—specifically, the marriage crisis and divorce. Often, the standing migrants only desire to rejoin their children. Unlike male migration, female migration has several implications for the family, since husbands rarely join their wives, because they resist facing an inversion of power relations within the relationship. Women’s migration is often a reason for divorce: sometimes the decision to leave is a strategy devised in order to obtain separation from the husband; in other cases, divorces are due to husbands finding a less emancipated partner during the absence of his wife. Finally, divorces may also arise due to the woman finding a new

266

Francesca Alice Vianello

partner in Italy. In the case that they are reunited with their children in the destination country, they stop sending money home, and sometimes this produces a further fracture with the native country.

5. Suspended migrants Finally, the third category is that of the suspended migrants. This demonstrates the transformations and challenges produced by migration for the woman’s situation in the originating country. This profile refers to those migrants who decide to suspend the migratory experience and return home. Those who take this decision can be differentiated into two groups: the first one is composed of young women, still married and with young children; the second is represented by more mature women, who after a long period as migrants in transition, decide to enjoy their old age back in Ukraine. I focus my analysis on the first group, because this kind of returnee shows us the difficulties that women face when they repatriate, and their subsequent reactions to these difficulties. The first group of migrants return to Ukraine after a short period abroad, usually one or two years—enough to achieve their goals. They do not want to run the risk of divorce; indeed they affirm that they returned in order to consolidate their marriage. Furthermore, in respect of their age they have definite working prospects in Ukraine, so they return with the idea of recovering the professional and personal path that was temporarily suspended by their migration. In the words of Olha, I came back for two reasons. The first one is because I miss my family, my husband, and my daughters; the second one is because I heard that I could get my job back. Then I was also aware that if I stayed in Italy more than one year I would run the risk of losing my family. [Olha, Sambir 17/08/06]

Another reason for returning is because the children have grown up and do not need their mother’s economic help anymore. Thus, the motive for the original migration is negated, and the mother’s absence is no longer justified. Furthermore, the existence of a hus-band—a

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

267

person they can return to—is a significant factor. Some-times, husbands or children ask the migrant woman to terminate her period of migration in order to rejoin her family, in respect of social norms. Svetlana,34 for instance, recounts, “I returned because my mother was sick, then because my son, who had finished his studies, told me: ‘Come on mum, come back, now I can work, you can stay with dad!” Often, the return is not what the migrants expected; even if they lived abroad only for one or two years, they soon realize that many things have changed during this time, emanating both from themselves and from their relationships. Once home they have to reestablish a relationship inevitably affected by the separation. The husbands who remained in Ukraine in order to sustain their social status or due to health problems are very suspicious, doubtful of their wives’ fidelity, and may hold a grudge against their partners because they feel deprived of their role as “head of the family.” When migrants return, a negotiation starts to redefine roles and duties within the domestic sphere. There are several potential conflict areas, from the use of income to the woman’s very lifestyle. Relationships with children are also often affected by mothers’ migration. Even children recognise the mother’s sacrifice, but they lack the intimacy characterising the relationship between mothers and their children. In spite of the father’s presence, the children suffer an emotional deficit due to their mother’s migration, because the father does not take adequate care of them. This male attitude can be explained as a method of defending their masculinity, which has been called into question by the woman’s new pivotal role.35 Finally, friends and neighbours are often envious of the migrant’s achievements. They exclude the returnee migrant from their circle of friends, accusing them of excessive enrichment, of illegitimate social promotion, and of damaging the family’s integrity. Feelings of envy demonstrate that migrants are socially acknowledged, but at the same time they are criticized because of their migrational behaviour and their apparent well-being. ________________

Drohobych 26/08/06.  Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, Children of global migration: Transnational families and gendered woes, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 34 35

268

Francesca Alice Vianello

Returnees soon become aware of having lost their original role within the family. They realize that the idea of a happy return was only a dream, and they start to reconsider their choices. Consequently, they entertain the idea of a new migration. Through migratory experience, migrants acquire more poise and develop a desire for self-realization. Women migrating alone face a risky experience, but one that also enables them to get a sense of their capabilities. This sensation enables them to think about their selfrealization, regardless of their age, gender, education, etc. Another element that contributes to increasing their expectations is the experience of a new social “time-space”, in which women “age” more slowly than in Ukraine. So when they return home, they want to realize themselves. However, this is a very difficult prospect in Ukraine. Returnees feel alone, like foreigners, because they have gained financial independence and greater decision-making power, but the originating society obliges them to adopt old patterns of behaviour. In the face of these difficulties, many women decide to leave again. Others, instead, remain in Ukraine, readapting themselves and suffering in silence their neighbours’ disapproving look and the distrust within their family. However, during my field research in Ivano-Frankivsk, I met a group of actively motivated women who founded a public organization, called by the Italian name Pietà (pity), whose aim is to valorise returned migrant women. It provides support for returnees and reports—through a column in a local Christian newspaper and a touring exhibition—how women actually live in Italy, in order to challenge common stereotyping which portrays migrant women as being in some way bad. Last year this group advanced the idea of building a statue in honour of migrant women. The model is illustrated here (look at the appendix). As we can see it is the form of a woman wearing a long dress, and with her head covered by a shawl like the Virgin Mary, or like the Ukrainian holy image of Pokrova. Indeed, Pietà is trying to contrast social disapproval of migrant women with a discourse that represents women as martyrs who leave their children only in order to provide for them. Since family break-up is at the core of the critics’ argument against migrant women, Pietà’s women appropriate the

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

269

neoconservative rhetoric and affirm that migrant women fully respect the duties of motherhood. They are real mothers who cannot be blamed for their choices.

Conclusions Migrant women are the active agents of their migratory trajectories. On the basis of their particular migratory project they adopt different mobility strategies. Migrants in transition, permanent migrants, and suspended migrants are three types of migrant women with different migratory experiences and plans. As we have seen, even migrants in transition—who endure the worst living conditions—conquer, through the experience of migration, their own action space. The dividing lines between the three ideal types presented here are so fluid that many women present characteristics of more than one type. Indeed, this typology might be a useful tool in identifying different stages in the mobility experiences of some women: a woman might leave her country with a short-term migratory project, and then subsequently decide to remain in Italy because of love, or because she does not have a home anymore; on the other hand a woman might decide to conclude her migratory experiences and go back to Ukraine. In this article I focused attention on suspended migrants, these being women who have interrupted their transnational mobility in order to return to Ukraine, with the intention of recovering their place in that society, but keeping migration in mind as a possible exit strategy. The profile presented here doesn’t claim to be exhaustive; rather, it is a first attempt to highlight a facet of migration that is rarely taken into consideration. Ukrainian female migration to Italy is still too recent a social phenomenon to be able to have an accurate picture of it. In spite of this, at present it is possible to identify two types of returned migrants: elderly women and young women who are often married and with young children. I have focused my attention on the second group, because the return decision of the first group seems to me to be inevitable, while the return decision of the second group is the

270

Francesca Alice Vianello

result of specific valuations regarding the opportunity of returning. To me it was interesting to be able to comprehend the reasons for repatriation, and the repatriation process of women who lived through an experience as transformative in nature as migration. We have seen that women’s migration affects gender and social norms in the country of origin, relating to the concept of motherhood and masculinity, and power relations within the family. When migrant women repatriate, they have more self-confidence, they want to change their life and realize their aspirations in Ukraine. This innovative propulsion clashes with a society that is changing, but in a neoconservative direction, and so they often begin to plan to leave once more. Some migrants are building a transnational women’s network; one that is in conflict with the dominant outlook, but which uses a neoconservative discourse in order to achieve positive social and public acknowledgement of migrant women. These women are beginning, albeit timidly, to have a voice in the Ukrainian public sphere. Their action can be understood as a form of women’s agency, even if they use the traditional gender model. Thus, these migrant women can be interpreted as being transformational agents in gender relations.

Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine

Appendix

271

272

Francesca Alice Vianello

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

273

Marta Kolankiewicz

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

Abstract: This article aims to contribute to an understating of racism and ethnic discrimination as a tangible experience in the everyday life of immigrants in Poland. The empirical material used are survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews with immigrants from Africa and Asia. The results of this study undermine the reliability of the official data, by demonstrating that a large portion of racist crimes committed in Poland go unreported. Moreover, the study shows some strategies of dealing with everyday racism and discrimination adopted by the immigrants and it illustrates the negative and far-reaching effects of racism. Keywords: racist violence, discrimination, immigrants, Poland.

Introduction For over half a century there was almost no immigration at all to Poland. The fall of communism permitted the opening of the country’s borders, and contributed to an increase in migration. Today, even though the population outflow is still larger than the inflow,1 and even though the number of immigrants is low in comparison The estimated net migration for 2009 was –0.47 per 1,000 population (World Fact Book).  1

274

Marta Kolankiewicz

with many other countries of the European Union,2 immigrants have started to become a part of the social landscape.3 However, knowledge of the situation of immigrants in Poland is still very limited; even more limited is knowledge of their experiences of racism and ethnic discrimination. Relying here mainly on police Nonnationals and foreign-born people amount to about 1.6% of the population (OECD, SOPEMI, 2007).  3 Even though the focus of this article is on immigrants, and not on members of historical minorities, it might be interesting to give a very short introduction to the history of minorities in Poland, especially as it can provide a background to today’s approach to diversity in Poland. Following the First World War, when Poland regained its independence after a more than century-long period of partition, it was one of the most multiethnic countries in Europe: during the interwar period, the citizens of Poland belonged to more than eight different ethnic groups. The largest group were the ethnic Poles that constituted over 64 percent of the population. Second most numerous were Ukrainians (16 percent), followed by Jews (almost 10 percent), Byelorussians (over 6 percent) and Germans (almost 2.5 percent). Other smaller minorities included Russians, Lithuanians, and Czechs (Marek Waldenberg, Narody zależne i mniejszości narodowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej [Dependent nations and national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe], Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2000, p. 371). At the time, the minorities in the emerging nation-states in Eastern and Central Europe were protected by the League of Nations under specially designed Minority Treaties. However, in 1934 Poland pulled out of the Treaties. This was, on one hand, a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the selectivity of the Treaties that, by applying solely to the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, left e.g. the Polish minority in Germany unprotected. On the other hand, it was a part of a larger transformation in Polish policy towards minorities (Stanisław Pawlak, Ochrona mniejszości narodowych w Europie [The protection of national minorities in Europe], Warszawa: Scholar, 2001, p. 19), as Poland underwent radicalization in this area, becoming an increasingly nationalist state. While in the 1920s Piłsudski had tried to build a multicultural republic based on citizenship rather than nationality, in the 1930s when the National Democracy began to gain more and more influence, a nationalist policy towards minorities started to predominate. This meant that the members of the Slavic minorities were expected to assimilate, whereas e.g. Jews—treated as spiritually alien—were condemned to isolation, exclusion, and finally emigration (Anna LandauCzajka, W jednym stali domu… Koncepcje rozwiązania kwestii żydowskiej w publicystyce polskiej lat 1933–39 [They lived in one house… The ideas to solve the Jewish question in Polish newspapers in the years 1933–1939], Warszawa: Neriton, 1998, p. 184). This strategy was never fully carried out, even if Parliament managed to pass some antiJewish acts: the process was soon interrupted by the war. The Second World War drastically transformed Poland’s shape and population. It was undoubtedly the most tragic episode in the history of Polish Jewry, which was practically annihilated during 2

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

275

and court records may prove insufficient, as racist violence and discrimination are known to be largely underreported, not only in Poland, but also more generally.4 In addition, the implementation of antidiscrimination legislation in Poland falls short of the country’s international obligations, leaving immigrants and members of minorities unprotected from acts of ethnic discrimination and often the Holocaust. Jews who fled to the Soviet Union and returned to Poland after the war were encouraged to emigrate, first to Palestine, and then to Israel. The pace of emigration increased after the 1946 pogrom in Kielce (Janusz Wrona, “Mniejszości narodowe w programach i polityce polskich partii politycznych (1944–1949)” [National minorities in programs and policies of Polish political parties (1944–1949)], in: Jan Jachymek and Waldemar Paruch (eds.), Między rzeczywistością polityczną a światem iluzji. Rozwiązania problemu mniejszości narodowych w polskiej myśli politycznej XX wieku [Between the political reality and the world of illusion. The solution of national minorities problem in Polish political thought in 20th century], Lublin: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2001, p. 221). The change of the country’s borders considerably reduced the population of other minorities. In addition, the drawing up of new borders in Eastern and Central Europe was followed by mass relocations of population, aimed at creating states whose territory would coincide with what was perceived as ethnic divisions. As a consequence, thousands of Poles were resettled from the area of today’s Ukraine. The same happened to Germans in northern and western Poland and from Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. Thus, in the aftermath of the Second World War and during the communist period, Poland was constructed, both in the political discourse and through concrete political decisions, as a monoethnic nation-state. In the first years of communism, the policies towards minorities were aimed at assimilation, but they also took on more radical forms. For example, in 1947 a campaign known under the cryptonym “Wisła” was carried out by the Polish Army in order to suppress the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; 140,000 members of the Ukrainian, Boyko, and Lemko populations were transferred from south-eastern Poland to other regions. In the 1950s and 1960s, the policies towards minorities became more liberal. But towards the end of the 1960s, the idea of a monoethnic Poland significantly shaped official policies, limiting the possibilities of minorities to develop their languages and culture (Sławomir Łodziński, The Protection of National Minorities in Poland, Warszawa: Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, 1999, p. 4). In this period an anti-Semitic campaign took place in the aftermath of the 1968 student manifestations, as a result of which between 15,000 and 30,000 people with Jewish background left Poland on a one-way ticket (Alina Cała, “Mniejszość żydowska” [Jewish minority], in: Piotr Madajczyk (ed.), Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce [National minorities in Poland], Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1998, p. 283). The transformations towards democracy meant a change in the situation of minorities in Poland. This was partly related to the necessity to regulate the relations with neighbours, and partly to Poland’s aspirations to integrate with West European

276

Marta Kolankiewicz

unaware of their rights.5 When studying racism and discrimination, this means that one can search in vain for reports of racial discrimination in schools, hospitals, housing, or the private service sector; these are simply not specifically prohibited under Polish law.6 The lack of data on one hand, and its presumed unreliability on the other, constituted the initial impetus for a study of the experience of racism and ethnic discrimination among immigrants in Poland. It also influenced my choice of research approach: I decided to search for answers not by turning to police, judges, politicians, or employers, structures. Also the very change towards democracy opened up opportunities for minorities to participate politically, socially, and culturally (S. Łodziński, op. cit., pp. 5–6). The situation of minorities in post-1989 Poland improved slowly. In 2001, Poland signed the Framework Convention for The Protection of National Minorities. Still it took more than fifteen years to pass a law on minorities recognizing the following minorities in Poland: Byelorussian, Czech, Lithuanian, German, Armenian, Russian, Slovakian, Ukrainian, and Jewish. Silesians, the largest minority in Poland according to the 2001 census, are not officially recognized as a minority.  4 Cf., e.g. the results of the EU-wide survey “EU-MIDIS: European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey” (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2009, p. 11, available at: ).  5 Cf., “Migrant Integration Policy Index” (2007, p. 144, available at: ).  6 The Polish Constitution includes a general provision according to which “all persons shall be equal before the law” and “no one shall be discriminated against in political, social, or economic life for any reason whatsoever” (Article 32). It does not however specify any grounds for discrimination. The Polish Penal Code from 1997 provides for the punishment of hate crimes (Article 118 punishes murder committed on the grounds of ethnic, racial, political, or religious affiliation; and article 119 punishes the use of violence or threats on the same grounds). In addition, articles 256 and 257 provide for punishment for incitement to racial hatred and public insult of a group or a person on the basis of their national, ethnic, racial, or religious origin. Still, one common criticism is that crimes that fall within the ambit of these articles are rarely investigated and the perpetrators are rarely prosecuted (ECRI, “Third Report on Poland,” 2004, p.10, available at: ). Discrimination, on the other hand, is specifically addressed by labour law. This means that, according to Polish law, discrimination is prohibited exclusively in workplaces or when looking for employment, which is unsatisfactory in the light of the EU Racial Equality Directive (“Migrant Integration Policy Index,” op. cit., p. 144). 

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

277

but to those who are potentially vulnerable to fall victim to racist practices, i.e., the immigrants themselves. Thus, the starting point of this empirical study, the results of which are presented in this article, is racism as experience. This starting point is important for several reasons. First of all, when dealing with statistics, we often forget that behind every figure there is a face and a story. Detailed accounts of how racism and ethnic discrimination are experienced, how they shape the everyday lives of those exposed to them, and what impact they can have,7 allow us to see the problem as something tangible and real, and hopefully not so easily ignored or underestimated. Second, by focusing on the experience, we get access to the opinions, beliefs, and attitudes of those who are the targets of racism and ethnic discrimination. This data is valuable, as it offers an alternative to the data produced by official sources, but also because it represents an understanding of racism as a lived experience. Finally, the very act of giving voice to those whose integrity and dignity are violated and who are denied equal rights as a result of unpunished acts of racism and discrimination may be empowering, as it includes them in the process of creating knowledge about phenomena that concern them more than anybody else. Racism will thus be presented in this article in the way that it appears in the accounts of my respondents—those who experience it. This means that issues that might be relevant when looking at racism—such as the state’s anti-discrimination policies, NGO activities in this field, xenophobic discourses in the media and politics in Poland,8 and existing polls on the attitudes of Poles towards immigrants and members of ethnic minorities—will be referred to insofar as they appear in the interviews. They have no other place in this article, considering the research approach adopted here. When formulating the research questions, I was inspired mainly by W.E.B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon.  8 This kind of analysis has been done elsewhere, e.g. in Aleksandra Gliszczyńska et al., Monitorowanie treści rasistowskich, ksenofobicznych i antysemickich w polskiej prasie [Monitoring of racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic content in Polish press], Poznań: Poznańskie Centrum Praw Człowieka Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN, 2007.  7

278

Marta Kolankiewicz

Moreover, this study has no ambitions of making far-reaching generalizations about racism and ethnic discrimination. Nevertheless, studying the experience of racism in its everyday manifestations does not mean that we are dealing merely with the particular. As soon as we notice some patterns emerging from the everyday experience of racism, as soon as these start to form recurrent, systematic, and familiar practices, we must treat them not as individual incidents, but as a social problem. In this sense, the present study draws on those sociological traditions that study social phenomena as they exist in everyday life, defining “the everyday” in the following way: The notion of ‘everyday’ is often used to refer to a familiar world, a world of practical interest, a world of practices we are socialized with in order to manage in the system. In our everyday lives sociological distinctions between ‘institutional’ and ‘interactional’, between ideology and discourse, and between ‘private’ and ‘public’ spheres of life merge and form a complex of social relations and situations.9

Hence, this article is aimed at contributing to an understating of racism and ethnic discrimination as a tangible experience in the everyday life of immigrants in Poland. It uses their accounts to enrich our knowledge of these phenomena.

Methodology and material The material for the study was collected using mainly a qualitative method consisting of six in-depth interviews. This informs the nature of the study, placing it in the qualitative tradition. The interviews were preceded by a questionnaire distributed to fifty respondents. At an early stage of the study, I realized that only a part of the questionnaires were returned to me. In order to limit nonresponse, I therefore decided to continue by assisting the interviewees in filling in the questionnaires. In total I received answers from thirty eight respondents. The survey had a quantitative 9 Philomena Essed, Understanding everyday racism: an interdisciplinary theory, Newbury Park: Sage, 1991, p. 3. 

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

279

character, but the limited number of the respondents and the sampling method allows us to treat it only as a pilot study providing a first glance at the situation of some immigrants in Poland. Still, even though the number of respondents was low, I decided that in crucial places—such as ethnic discrimination, racist violence, and the reporting of incidents to the police—I would include the quantitative results, as they allow us to identify the most urgent and serious problems, thereby preparing the ground for a more extensive study. This decision was also motivated by the complete lack of more comprehensive quantitative studies of immigrants’ experience of racism and discrimination in Poland.10

Sampling The study targets Africans and Asians11—immigrant groups that are new in Poland and, at the same time, particularly vulnerable. This choice is motivated by the necessity of limiting the studied population on one hand, and the assumption that the minorities’ “visibility” may be a key factor for their vulnerability to discrimination and racist violence on the other hand. The main problem with defining the studied individuals in this way is that I force people from very different places into constructed categories (Africans and Asians), thereby referring to them in a manner that relies in a way on a stereotypical view and carries with it a risk of reductionism and essentialization. I use the criterion of “visibility” to refer to traits, such 10 Most of the studies of racism and discrimination conducted among immigrants in Poland are qualitative, e.g., CMR Working Papers, published by the Ośrodek Badań nad Migrantami or the series Raporty Migracyjne Instytutu Polityki Społecznej UW. In 2009 the first EU-wide survey of immigrant and ethnic minority groups’ experiences of discrimination and victimization was conducted. In Poland, the study addressed the Roma minority.  11 My respondents identified their places of origin as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Kashmir, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Vietnam. It is important to notice that only one respondent came from Vietnam, which means that the study does not address the situation of one of the largest immigrant communities in Poland, namely the Vietnamese. 

280

Marta Kolankiewicz

as skin colour, that may identify my participants as different from the majority population. The only reason for this is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to study racism in any other way. The respondents were selected using a combination of the snowballing technique and subjective sampling. The choice of this sampling method was motivated by the fact that it is impossible to access current data from official immigration registers, from which a random sample could have been drawn. The respondents were selected from two large cities: Warsaw and Kraków. The fieldwork was carried out during the spring and summer of 2008. Initial contacts with circles of African and Arab immigrants made it possible to reach other respondents. Still, the most effective method of recruiting respondents turned out to be subjective sampling by visiting places frequented by these groups of immigrants, such as bars, shops, and restaurants. However this method turned out to be problematic when it came to female respondents, who were difficult to reach in this way. For this reason, the only questionnaire filled in by a woman was eliminated, and the results of the study limited to male immigrants.12

Survey questionnaire The questionnaire was composed of three sections. The first was intended to provide general background information about the respondents, such as age, gender, and place of origin. The second focused on the respondents’ stay in Poland, the reasons for it, its length, the respondents’ plans for the future, and their level of wellbeing in the country. Finally, in the third and most extensive section, detailed questions were asked about the respondents’ experience of ethnic discrimination as well as of racist violence. This certainly constitutes a weakness of this study, since women have often turned out to be subject to multiple discrimination, both as women and as members of minorities or as immigrants (cf., e.g. Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2000).  12

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

281

Interviews Six respondents from those who completed the survey questionnaire were invited to in-depth, semi-structured interviews aimed at providing qualitative and comprehensive data on the experience and impact of discrimination and racist violence, on the ways these are perceived and understood by the respondents, and on their strategies for coping with them. This data constitutes the main material of the study.

Reservation Considering its mainly qualitative character, the study does not aim at giving a full picture of the situation of all immigrants in Poland. Nor does it enable us to make any far-reaching generalizations concerning the selected groups of immigrants. Rather it is aimed at providing an understanding of what it means to be a target of racism and discrimination, and how such treatment influences a person’s daily life.

Ethnic Discrimination and Racist Violence One of the main objectives of the study was to collect information about the scale and nature of ethnic discrimination and racist violence in Poland. To avoid confusion between different and often very divergent notions, the words “discrimination” and “racism” were not used in the survey. By formulating questions on discrimination in the following way, “Have you ever been treated worse than others just because you are not Polish, e.g. when looking for a job?”, I reduced the risk of misunderstandings and misinterpretations, while at the same time following the legal definitions of discrimination, such as the one offered by the EU Racial Equality Directive. Similarly, when asking about racist attacks, the question was formulated as, “Have you ever been attacked (physically or verbally) during your stay in Poland just because you are not from Poland?” There were, however,

282

Marta Kolankiewicz

fewer problems with the understanding of the concept of racist violence, although it must be stressed that for many there was no clear distinction between discrimination, harassment, and violence. They all seemed to be interrelated forms of the same phenomenon, often occurring simultaneously. Discriminatory treatment was often accompanied by harassment; physical attacks were accompanied by verbal abuse. And discrimination could turn into violence. By formulating my questions in this way, I tried to maintain a balance between receiving information about forms of racism and discrimination that are criminalized or forbidden under Polish law, while still leaving space for accounts of other experiences that, even though not addressed on the political or legal levels, may be defined as racism by those targeted. This means that I tried to cover different aspects of racism in my study: from the most extreme violence threatening the life or physical integrity of an individual, through symbolic violence aimed at humiliating an individual or problematizing his or her identity, to marginalization by limiting access to resources such as work, housing, services, etc. In this way, the twofold nature of racism is revealed: as both a symbolic and a material act of exclusion. The results of the survey show that ethnic discrimination is a serious problem facing immigrants. Almost three in four respondents13 stated they had been treated worse than others during their stay in Poland just because they were not Poles. The respondents were most frequently discriminated against when looking for a flat. Also the labour market was mentioned as a place where they were treated worse than others. Discrimination was less frequent, but still present, in private establishments (bars, restaurants, clubs, and banks) and in public offices (including police stations). Surprisingly, many of the respondents took discrimination to be something natural, and had never considered that it might be illegal. For example, one of the interviewees insisted that discrimination is, by definition, systemic. 13 I use the term “respondents” when referring to the results of the questionnaire survey and the term “interviewees” when talking about the six individuals that participated in the in-depth interviews. 

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

283

One old lady that shuts the door in your face and doesn’t want to rent you her flat isn’t discrimination. The state can discriminate, or a political party that campaigns against foreigners. [Interview 414]

When asked about their experience of racist violence, more than half of respondents said they had suffered racist attacks during their stay in Poland. Broken down by different groups, the results suggest that the groups that are most “visible” are also the most vulnerable to attacks: all Sub-Saharan African respondents stated they had been subjected to racist violence, as did half of the North African and West Asian respondents and about one quarter of other Asian respondents. Racist violence ranged from invectives and other kinds of harassment, through threats, to physical attacks, sometimes even involving weapons. A story told by one of the interviewees is a good example of the verbal violence experienced by the respondents: I was in school once, in AGH [University of Science and Technology in Kraków], and people were talking, and you know, Africans when we talk, people say our voices are louder. We were talking, laughing. And this guy just said: “Hey niggers, keep quiet!”. [Interview 1]

Verbal abuse was not the only form of violence faced by the respondents. In the survey and during the interviews they also reported having suffered physical attacks. Some ended up in hospital. One of the respondents recounted an attack he had suffered as follows: In order to guarantee the anonymity of my interviewees I have not used their names in the text. However it might be useful to say a couple of words about them. Three of the persons I interviewed were from Nigeria, one from India, one from Tunisia, and one was a Palestinian born in Lebanon. Four of them came to Poland to study and stayed on afterwards. Most of them had been in Poland for a couple of years already, and one had lived in Poland more than fifteen years. Five of them were married to a Pole. All the interviewees had employment when I met them: four had their own business, one was a language teacher, and one worked in the private service sector.  14

284

Marta Kolankiewicz

In Warsaw, yes. I was once attacked by… they had this thing… they wanted…they must have bought it somewhere, I don’t know… I was attacked with it, but I didn’t know what it was, in the beginning I didn’t know what it was. It was dark, pitch dark… I thought there would be boxing or something, but it was awful, I was hit in the head, here… I’m lucky to still be alive now. It was the worst attack in my life, they could have killed me back there, really, I don’t know how it happened, but I escaped, you know, I had the strength to escape… [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

One of the interviewees was the target of a larger attack organized by a group of skinheads. The attack ended with no physical injuries, as the police were alerted by the neighbouring restaurant’s security staff. However, he suffered material losses, parts of his bar having been vandalized. Although not all the attacks were as serious as the last two mentioned, different forms of racist violence seem to be a common element of many respondents’ everyday life. “I really have been in Poland so long that I’m looking where the next attack will come from” [Interview 1], as one of the interviewees put it. Physical attacks were without a doubt the most serious. Yet the damage caused by verbal abuse and harassment should not be underestimated: Verbally or physically—the same thing, I’d say. Or physically is actually better, because physically you can defend yourself. You’ve been beaten up, but so has he and you’re quits. You know, it’s ok... I mean, you weren’t beaten up for nothing, he too, he was beaten up... but the words... such words are the worst, such words, I’ll tell you, they’re the worst... the conversation... the way they talk: You should feel like you’re in my place, you understand, here in Poland, and that you should keep quiet here... [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

Verbal attacks often took the form of threats and accusations in which the interviewees were aggressively questioned about their reason for staying in Poland by people they have met for the first time, who gave interviewee the impression that they should be

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

285

grateful to be hosted here. The attackers behaved as if they had the right to ask about their private life, speaking in terms of host and guest, with all that these concepts mean in power relationships: Who gave him the right to ask me what I’m doing in Poland and why? Then you feel like you have to thank every Pole on the street for living here. What have others given me? What have they given me? A lot of money that I have to thank them for? Me too… I work hard to earn my living, nobody has given me anything for free. Nobody. I alone, by myself, I found my job, I don’t steal money, I don’t harm anybody. [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

In most cases, the attackers were young men, but several respondents mentioned that they had met with aggression or harassment from people of different ages and gender: it might be a child screaming insultingly [Interview 2], a middle-age woman sending them “back to the jungle” [Interview 2], an elderly lady making the sign of the cross “like she’d seen a devil” [Interview 1]. The respondents had been attacked at school, at work, in buses, in bars, and in their neighbourhood; but most frequently the attacks had happened on the street. The respondents had learned to identify situations involving racism. One of the interviewees talked about the racist nature of the attacks he had experienced in the following way: I’d never in my life thought that you could be attacked because of your appearance, your appearance… I’d heard about racism, we’d read... but I didn’t think that there were such people in the world, until I came to Poland. You can be attacked for your religion, for the colour of your skin, and so on, even for your language…just for that… [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

All the cases of racist violence or discrimination went unpunished, but in one case the police identified the offenders and advised the victim to agree to a settlement. The respondents were asked in the survey whether they had reported the incidents to any institution or organization that could help them, including the police, other public institutions, or NGOs. From those who had suffered

286

Marta Kolankiewicz

attacks, only one third had reported this to the police, and none of them had sought support in other institutions or organizations. This result is in line with other studies showing that crimes experienced by ethnic minorities and immigrants, including those racially motivated, go in large part unreported.15 This is also the most serious challenge presented by this study to the existing data in police records, as it proves that much of the racist violence remains in a grey area and is not visible in official statistics.16 The reasons for not reporting can be summed up in two words: resignation and distrust. One interviewee openly expressed his doubts about filing a complaint with the police, saying that it made no sense. Another recalled all the times he went to the police only to be given the advice that “You have to be careful here” [Interview 6]. Still another said: “The police, they’re the worst” and told a story of a fight that started as a result of racist taunts and ended with the police arresting the Africans involved in it, keeping them in the police station for ten hours without giving them anything to drink and without pressing charges against them; when they protested, the police said: “Fine, if you don’t like it, go to another country” [Interview 2]. This kind of treatment by the police strengthened the feeling that the problem was not limited to merely individual incidents by violent racists, but also involved injustice and inequality on a more structural level. One of the respondents summed it up in the following way: This country…. There is no law here, no justice… they know that this is their country, the Poles know that this is Poland and what rights they have here. Fundamental Rights Agency, “EU-MIDIS: European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey,” 2009, p. 11, available at: .  16 To demonstrate the seriousness of this challenge, I will quote some figures: According to the official criminal justice data on racist crimes, 238 such crimes were committed in Poland in 2007, 150 in 2006, 172 in 2005, 113 in 2004, 111 in 2003. So on average, from 2000 to 2007, the police registered about 150 such crimes per year (Fundamental Rights Agency, “Annual Report 2009,” 2009, p. 25, available at: ).  15

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

287

They know that Poland will only defend foreigners who have a lot of money or are diplomats. The rest doesn’t interest people at all, it just doesn’t interest them. [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

Understandings of ethnic discrimination and racist violence Many of the respondents proposed interpretations of the causes of racism. For some, the problem lay in Poland’s past isolation behind the Iron Curtain, as a result of which Poles had little contact with foreigners. From this point of view, people are more open-minded and tolerant in places where there are more immigrants [Interview 4 and 6]. Racist attacks would thus be less frequent in Warsaw, where there were more immigrants, than, for instance, in Białystok [Interview 6]. Not everybody agreed. For one respondent, it was quite the opposite—according to him, Poland, with its few immigrants, was in this respect a better place than the West, where there were so many immigrants that people felt threatened and turned to racism [Interview 4]. Some interviewees distinguished between curiosity about the unknown and hostility, like one interviewee who described the attitude of the inhabitants of a small village that he had visited in the following way: When I entered [the village] everybody came out to look at me and greet me. They weren’t fighting me, some even ran to me, tried to shake my… and they were so excited that a Black man came to their city. So you have to imagine that I was surprised. That in this village, every young kid came to me, people tried to be with me, people tried to look at something different, and nobody fought me. It was like a dream to them that there was a Black man in their community. And I was laughing; I was telling them “I’m a king of Black men in this community”. I don’t know how they looked at me, I don’t know what they were thinking in their minds, but for me it was special that I’m special for them… [Interview 5]

There was no agreement whether racism is something typical of particular places, or rather a universal phenomenon. One of the interviewees thought it was necessary to see racism in the context of

288

Marta Kolankiewicz

Polish history, as a result of what he called a “historical complex” from which the Poles suffered, that is, a necessity to look down on countries that are poorer, while admiring those more prosperous [Interview 3]. Some interviewees claimed that the situation was better for immigrants in other countries of Europe [Interview 6], and in particular in the US [Interview 3], another maintained that an African could only feel safe in Africa [Interview 2], while still another saw racism as a universal phenomenon: “Beliefs, race, where you come from… men have always found a way to divide themselves” [Interview 1]. In the last case, racism was seen as only one form of aggression that people can manifest. The aggression could stem from a “lack of love” or a “lack of thought” [Interview 5]. It was sometimes interpreted as a result of ignorance and poor education but not always: Education has nothing to do with this. You have educated idiots in the whole world, not just here. So whether they’re educated or not, it doesn’t matter. What matters is the type of people they are and the type of soul. We have humans that have animal souls. [Interview 5]

This way of seeing racism—as a “sickness of mind” [Interview 6], something deviant or inhuman—was a recurring motif: You beat a person that’s not from here… for me it isn’t human, for me you’re just not a human being. You know why? For example, a lion has its territory, it’s an animal… Just an animal… If an animal arrives, a rival arrives, even by accident… the lion will kill him and eat him, even by accident… but here we aren’t animals, we’re humans. If they want to be animals—no problem, but we’re humans and we have to respect other humans… [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

Dealing with Racism in Everyday Life The confrontation with racism left a distinctive mark on each of the respondents. In some accounts this was formulated explicitly; in other cases it could be read between the lines. They all had to adapt in

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

289

one way or another to a situation where they were vulnerable to racist violence or discrimination. A part of this adaptation could be called a survival strategy, i.e., a strategy of dodging everyday discrimination and violence, be it physical or verbal. The most obvious example was that many respondents avoided certain places, and tried not to go out late by themselves. They seemed to know which places they should stay away from, in what bars or clubs they were not welcome. Some went as far as not using public transport and avoiding going out in general. The strategies adopted as a result of encounters with racist attitudes and attacks were not limited to daily survival. They seemed to permeate lives of the interviewees and to influence their attitude towards the world and other people. They often bore a resemblance to different defence mechanisms, ranging from denial and idealization, through confrontation, to isolation and withdrawal. These different mechanisms could be temporary and it was possible for one single individual to go through all of them. They could also occur in different combinations. Still, it seems that in case of the interviewees one single strategy had become a way of life and an element of their identity. How did these mechanisms manifest themselves? What were their main features? And what was their impact on the lives and attitudes of those who adopted them?

Denial This mechanism consisted in denying that the racism existed or that it was a problem in Poland. The Poles were perceived as foreigner-friendly and this feature was attributed to the innate Polish hospitality. Distinctive of this kind of attitude was that racism or discrimination were explicitly denied, even in cases where the interviewee’s stories clearly indicated that he had, if not actually experienced, then at least witnessed, racist attacks. One interviewee, right after telling a story of his fellow foreign student who had been stabbed so badly that he almost died, stated that “there is no

290

Marta Kolankiewicz

discrimination in Poland, just negative opinions about Arabs” [Interview 4]. He recalled the times when he had been mistreated by civil servants at the immigration office; nevertheless, his only comment was: I’ve never been discriminated against. Maybe because I’ve always worked only for myself, in my own business. And I also look like a Pole. People only realize that I’m not from here when I start to speak. [Interview 4, translated from Polish]

The denial was exposed by stories that suggested that the interviewee was at least familiar with the existence of racist violence and discrimination. In addition, the language sometimes betrayed the denier, like in the following account where the interviewee—trying to show that there is no racism in Poland, just curiosity—used an insulting Polish word to describe an African, clearly unconscious of its racist undertone: I know that sometimes, when somebody is different, people pay attention to him. I have a friend from Africa, who once went to a small village to visit somebody. And the entire village was on the street to see the nigger [czarnuch in Polish]. [Interview 4, translated from Polish]

This attitude of denial could also assume other, subtler, forms. One interviewee admitted that racism existed and that it had been directed against him. Still, he claimed that the attacks had had no negative impact on him and that his life had not changed because of them. In his case, the impact denial was accompanied by very rapid forgiveness of those responsible: – [After the skinheads had attacked the bar] the police took them to the police station. On Monday I was there on the interview on how it happened. I told them. They asked me if I could recognize some people among them. They brought me some pictures and I pointed out some people that I saw the faces of. Well, later the process was going on. The Polish people came by themselves. They came by themselves to beg. That what they did they’re sorry for, and they don’t want go to court and go on around with the police case. They wanted a settlement. And I said there was no problem, since I’m realistic. Everything ended.

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

291

– So you are satisfied with this settlement? – Of course. Everything became ok… we told them that we were friends. If ever they want to come here and drink, they can come here and drink. We don’t have problem with anybody. [Interview 5]

The interviewee clearly denied the impact of the racist attacks and would tone down their importance or make a joke about them. He stated: “I don’t take it seriously, I just go my way…” [Interview 5] or tried to find a bright side of the situation: I was insulted in the bus… Because I was the only Black man in the bus and it was deadly late. What obviously joyed me was that the Polish people intervened on me… [Interview 5]

Withdrawal Another strategy in dealing with racist attacks which could be identified in the accounts of the interviewees consisted of isolation and withdrawal. Isolation could begin by limiting one’s circles of friends and acquaintances to other immigrants and rejecting the very idea of making friends with Poles [Interview 2]. Then what at the beginning had been just a reasonable caution started to become almost total isolation. Two interviewees avoided going out at all, and quit school or work. It can happen right now. You never know. … That’s why I try to avoid… I don’t go to school anymore. I avoid going out. I just go to work, home, work, home… [Interview 2]

Finally, the isolation changed into a general mistrust—everything started to revolve around the racism that could come from everyone, at any time. And just like the deniers idealized Poland, withdrawers tended to paint a gloomy picture of it. Often they did not see a future in the country and stayed just because circumstances forced them to. They openly expressed their desire to move elsewhere [Interview 2].

292

Marta Kolankiewicz

Confrontation Finally, a third way of dealing with racist violence could be identified in the accounts of the interviewees—confrontation. This confrontation could take different forms, beginning with the most literal one, i.e., fighting back when attacked. Some of the interviewees admitted that their way of coping with violence was fighting back and being prepared for an attack: They are afraid of me, because I don’t talk. They know about my experience, some other students. I don’t fight early. I know that one person will come, and others are hiding. I use bottles, glasses, everything I see … [Interview 2]

Those who used force as a response to racism often felt forced to do so by the circumstances, and said that they had become violent as a result of the negative experience of racist attacks: I personally believe… I should take care of this trouble myself, because I’m doing the right thing. So if something bad is coming to me, I have all authority to take care of it, ... I’m not very predictable and this is the part of me that I really don’t like, I can tell I won’t do anything, and when it happens, you can see blood on me. I’m not a violent man and that’s the only sad thing, and Poland has pulled that out of me. [Interview 1]

But the confrontation could also be understood more figureatively—as a way of facing reality. Instead of trying to deny the existence of racism, confronters recognized it and identified it as a problem, neither trying to avoid it nor to let life revolve around it. They opposed racism and racist incidents by going on living as if nothing had happened. The following quotation is a good illustration of the attitude of confrontation: Even when they hurt me, when they say such words, they can’t give me any complexes, they just can’t do it, at all… This is strength, this strength is inside, in the heart, in the head, in the soul; it has to be there. And this strength means that nobody can give me a complex about not being from here, having dark

Experiences of Racism and Discrimination among Male Immigrants in Poland

293

skin… I don’t know…They can’t give me this complex, because then, they would really hurt me… [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

Thus, to the confronters, their attitude meant resisting the psychological harm of racism. It meant not giving in to the feeling of inferiority that racism projected onto them, thereby retaining their own identity. They resisted becoming colonized people as defined by Frantz Fanon, that is “every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created.”17 Sometimes I’m just fed up, I’m fed up, I’m fed up with all that’s happened to me, I’m fed up… but I’ll tell you, I wouldn’t react differently, I wouldn’t escape… Escaping the truth is the worst thing… you escape, there is some truth and you escape from this truth… There are different ways of escaping, for example, I can go to another country, or return to my homeland… Drugs… I drink alcohol every day, I don’t know… There are different ways of escaping… or I just sit at home and look through the window… But this is the truth and we can’t escape from it, you have to go to work, you have to go out for a walk, you have to live normally… [Interview 3, translated from Polish]

Conclusions Racism in the forms of violence, harassment, and ethnic discrimination is one of the critical experiences in the everyday life of those affected by it. The results of this study seriously undermine the reliability of the official data, mainly by demonstrating that a large portion of racist crimes committed in Poland go unreported. It does not seem sufficient to rely on police records and existing statistics to assess the extent and nature of this problem. An extensive and representative study conducted among immigrants and members of ethnic minorities seems indispensable if we are to assess the real scope and nature of the phenomenon. In this sense, the accounts of the 17

Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, New York: Grove Press, 1967, pp. 17–18. 

294

Marta Kolankiewicz

interviewees and the results of the quantitative study pose a challenge to the official data. Moreover, the study of racism experienced in the daily life of the interviewees reveals that it is impossible to treat it as an exclusively structural phenomenon or as a merely individual problem. By focusing on structures and institutions, the concept of structural racism “underrates the power of ideology in the structuring of racism in society”, while the concept of individual racism “is a contradiction in itself because racism is by definition the expression or activation of group power.”18 In this sense, the definition of everyday racism proposed by Essed is useful as it combines the structural and the individual: it helps us to grasp those individual procedures, practices and actions that maintain and strengthen a system of domination and inequality. Thus, for the interviewees, not only do physical violence, harassment, and discrimination contribute to the feeling of nonbelonging and exclusion, but so do minor remarks, pointing, and intrusive questions. It is the intersection of the ideological, the symbolic, the material, the structural, and the individual that form everyday racism. Essed’s concept helps us to capture this intersection and to interpret these too-often ignored racist incidents as a part of a larger structure of domination and exclusion. Most importantly, this study illustrates the negative and farreaching effects of everyday racism on immigrants. It clearly shows that people who are forced to confront racism in their daily lives end up adjusting their daily routines—what they do, whom they meet, where they go—so that they can mitigate the risk of encountering racism. They also adopt different strategies in order to deal with the harm of racism, which has long-lasting and profound consequences on who they are and how they perceive the world and people around them. The question remains of what influence this has on their possibilities of finding a place in their new home.

18

Ph. Essed, op. cit., pp. 36–37.

Contributors Ingrid Jungwirth (PhD), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany, Institute of Social Sciences, Director and project coordinator. Research interests: Gender Studies, Labour and Migration, Life Course Perspective, Sociology of Culture. Publications: Zum Identitätsdiskurs in den Sozialwissenschaften – eine postkolonial und queer informierte Kritik an George H. Mead, Erik H. Erikson und Erving Goffman, Bielefeld: transcript, 2007; “The change of normative gender orders in the process of migration: a transnational perspective,” COMCAD Working Papers 2008, vol. 48 (Bielefeld: Centre of Migration, Citizenship and Development); “Geschlechtliche Konfigurationen in grenzüberschreitenden Berufsverläufen von Migrantinnen“, in: Dagmar Vinz and Sandra Smykalla (eds.), Intersektionalität und Chancengleichheit, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2011 (to be published) [Gender configurations in transborder professional histories of migrant women]. Iveta Ķešāne, MA in Social Sciences. Baltic Institute of Social Sciences researcher. Research interests: migration, integration, social change. Most important publications: [with: Zepa B., Šūpule I., Krastiņa L., Grīviņš M., Bebriša I., Ieviņa I.], Integration practice and perspective, Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2006, pp. 1–250; [with: Kaša R.], “Learning to Welcome: Immigrant Integration in Latvia,” in: Learning to Welcome: Immigrant Integration in Latvia and Poland, Centre for public policy PROVIDUS, 2008; [with: Zepa B., Šūpule I., Lulle A., Hazans M., Žabko O., Bebriša I., Krastiņa L.], Immigrants in Latvia: Possibilities and Conditions of Inclusion, Rīga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2009, pp. 1–215.

296

Contributors

Marta Kolankiewicz (PhD Candidate), MA, MSSc in Department of Sociology, Lund University, Sweden. Research interests: racism, discrimination, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, human rights, transitional justice, feminist theories Publications: “Between Life and Science: A Comparison of the Fieldwork Experiences of Bronisław Malinowski and Kirsten Hastrup,” The Applied Anthropologist 2008 Spring,vol. 28, no. 1; „Bardzo im współczuję, ale… Wizerunek uchodźcy w dyskursie politycznym, medialnym i społecznym. Przypadek Kamisy Dżamaldin” [“I feel really sorry for them, but… The image of the refugee in the political, media and social discourse. The case of Kamisa Djamaldin”], co-author, in: Izabela Czerniejewska and Izabella Main (eds.), Uchodźcy: teoria i praktyka [Refugees: theory and practice], Poznań: Stowarzyszenie „Jeden Świat”, 2008. Guglielmo Meardi (PhD), Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Associate professor (Reader) of Industrial Relations. Research interests: international and comparative employment relations, multinational companies, migration. Main publications: Trade Union Activists, East and West, Aldershot: Gower, 2000; “More Voice after More Exit? Unstable Industrial Relations in Central eastern Europe,” Industrial Relations Journal 2007, vol. 38; Where Workers Vote with Their Feet: Social Failures of EU Enlargement, 2010 [in press]. Konrad Miciukiewicz (PhD) was appointed lecturer at the Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland. Since 2008 he has been a postdoctoral researcher in the Global Urban Research Unit at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne for an FP7 project, SOCIAL POLIS: Social Platform on Cities and Social Cohesion; and for SPINDUS: Social Innovation, Planning, Design, and User Involvement, a project funded by the Flemish Government. Marek Nowak (PhD) is a lecturer at the Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland. Specialised in Economic Sociology, sociology of social activism. Now he is realised projects on voluntary work in organisation of big sports events, and on revitalisation of the city funded by Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Contributors

297

Publications: Instytucjonlizm w socjologii i ekonomii. Problem i jego konceptualizacja [Institutionalism in Sociology and Economics. The Problem, and It’s Conceptualisation], Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Społecznych, 2009; „Działania obywatelskie a transformacja ustrojowa w Polsce” [Civic Action, and Systems Transformation in Poland], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 2010, vol. 1. Michał Nowosielski, PhD in sociology, Institute for Western Affairs, Vice Director. Research interests: Poles in Germany, ethnic and immigrant organizations, diaspora policies. Publications: “Revival of the civil society. Development of the Third Sector in Poland 1989– 2008,” IZ Policy Papers 2009, no. 2 (Poznań); [edited with M. Nowak], Declining Cities/Developing Cities. Polish and German Perspectives, Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2008, [with A. Nolka], “Poles Living in Ireland and their Quality of Life”, Journal of Identity and Migration Studies 2009, vol. 3, no. 1. Alena Pařízková (Mgr.) PhD student of Ethnology; Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia. The research interests: international migration, gender, social inequalities. Serena Romano (PhD) has recently obtained her PhD in Sociology and Social Research at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Napoli Federico II. Her main research interests concerns comparative social policy, welfare reforms, poverty and social inequalities and the Central Eastern model of welfare. Bartłomiej Walczak (PhD), University of Warsaw. Research interests: sociology of family, migration, transnational family, history of anthropological research. Publications: Antropolog jako Inny. Od pierwszych badań terenowych do wyzwań ponowoczesnej antropologii, Warszawa: SCHOLAR, 2009; „Dziecko w sytuacji rozłąki migracyjnej,” in: M. Duszczyk, M. Lesińska (ed.), Współczesne migracje: dylematy Europy i Polski, Warszawa: OBM UW, 2009; „In Sorcery’s Shadows: a critial approach to a narrative genre,” Anthropology Matters 2009, vol. 11 (1).

298

Contributors

Francesca Alice Vianello, PhD in Sociology, is a research fellow at the Sociology Department, Padua University. Her present research interests are the cultural construction of European citizenship, gender violence in confrontation with cultural differences, and the social costs of migration in Central and Eastern Europe. She has recently published a book entitled Migrando sole: legami transnazionali tra Ucraina e Italia [Migrating alone: Transnational ties between Ukraine and Italy], Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009.

DIA-LOGOS Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences Herausgegeben von Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński & Piotr W. Juchacz "Dia-Logos. Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences is a peer-reviewed book series publishing valuable monographs and edited volumes on various aspects of philosophy and social sciences. The series is intended to be an interdisciplinary forum of deliberation according to our firm belief that challenges of the contemporary world require common and multilevel research. The Dia-Logos series does not represent a single ideology or school of thought, but it is open to different trends and various styles of reflection, trying to understand better the contemporary world. We invite the submission of manuscripts of monographs and edited volumes from academic philosophers and social scientists."

Bd./Vol. 1 Piotr W. Juchacz / Roman Kozłowski (Hrsg.): Freiheit und Verantwortung. Moral, Recht und Politik. 2002. Bd./Vol. 2 Norbert Leśniewski / Ewa Nowak-Juchacz (Hrsg.): Die Zeit Heideggers. 2002. Bd./Vol. 3 Marek Kwiek (ed.): The University, Globalization, Central Europe. 2003. Bd./Vol. 4 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (Hrsg.): Philosophie an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts. Geschichte der Philosophie, Philosophische Anthropologie, Ethik, Wissenschaftstheorie, Politische Philosophie. 2003. Bd./Vol. 5 Danuta Sobczyńska / Pawel Zeidler / Ewa Zielonacka-Lis (eds.): Chemistry in the Philosophical Melting Pot. 2004. Bd./Vol. 6 Marek Kwiek: Intellectuals, Power, and Knowledge. Studies in the Philosophy of Culture and Education. 2004. Bd./Vol. 7 Marek Kwiek: The University and the State. A Study into Global Transformations. 2006. Bd./Vol. 8 Andrzej Przylebski (Hrsg.): Das Erbe Gadamers. 2006. Bd./Vol. 9 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (ed.): Values and Norms in the Age of Globalization. 2007. Bd./Vol. 10 Tadeusz Buksiński (ed.): Democracy in Western and Post-Communist Countries. Twenty Years after the Fall of Communism. 2009. Bd./Vol. 11 Marek Zirk-Sadowski / Mariusz Golecki / Bartosz Wojciechowski (eds.): Multicentrism as an Emerging Paradigm in Legal Theory. 2009. Bd./Vol. 12 Bartosz Wojciechowski: Philosophical Approach to the Interculturality of Criminal Law. 2010. Bd./Vol. 13 Marek Nowak / Michał Nowosielski (eds.): (Post)transformational Migration. Inequalities, Welfare State, and Horizontal Mobility. 2011. www.peterlang.de

Peter Lang · Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften

Alpago Alpago

Immigration – Isolation – Integration Is that the only solution? Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2011. 175 pp., num. fig., tab. and graph. ISBN 978-3-631-61440-2 · hb. € 31,80* The target of this project is to consider cross-border mobility of economic, cultural and historical happenings from a long-term historical perspective. And moreover to deal with humanitarian issues such as peace, integration, immigration and peacefully living together as well as providing long-term perspectives for changes and promotion of peaceful change in society. The study breaks down the barriers and leads the readers to go beyond the borders. The components of the project are all focused on the sociological issues like immigration, isolation and integration. The method, which has been used, is a new kind of way to investigate sociological phenomena and interpret them in a manner which provides the background of challenges in a concrete and uncomplicated way with emotion and reality. The theoretic motto is: “Science for all”. The project is particularly applicable for anthropologists, ethnologists, sociologists and philologists. Content: The Dreams and Nightmares of a Refugee Teacher in Europe · Immigration, Isolation, Integration in Empirical Facts and Statistics · Demographic Challenges of the European Union in Facts and Statistics · Immigration in the USA in Facts and Statistics · Poverty and Immigration in Facts and Statistics · Visual Field Study

Frankfurt am Main · Berlin · Bern · Bruxelles · New York · Oxford · Wien Distribution: Verlag Peter Lang AG Moosstr. 1, CH-2542 Pieterlen Telefax 00 41 (0) 32 / 376 17 27 *The €-price includes German tax rate Prices are subject to change without notice Homepage http://www.peterlang.de