Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding

Citation preview

positivism A STU.DY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

RICHARD

von

MISES

positivism A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

•

GEORGE BRAZILLER, INC. NEW YORK

1956

Translated from the German with the collaboration of the author by Jerry Bernstein and Roger G. Newton • Copyright, 1951, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College • Published, 1956, by George Braziller, Inc., New York, N. Y. • Printed in the United States of America

preface This book, essentially a translation of the Author's Kleines Lehr­ buch des Positivismus of 1939, is not a treatise on positivism, weighing the pros and cons of this kind of outlook on the world of experience. It is the positivist himself who speaks and argues, who tries to describe the world as he sees it. He addresses in the first place not the scholar interested in philosophical technicalities, but the open-minded educated man who feels a want for information that remains consistent even when it touches upon the most diversified areas of human knowledge. The table of contents will show the range of subjects discussed. The reader who likes to learn in ad­ vance where he will be led may turn to the short summary of results at the end of the book, or he may look through the introduction, which offers a preliminary survey of the principal ideas to be expounded later. The au­ thor was particularly anxious to avoid vagueness, and not to indulge in generalities-obvious dangers in a project of the present type. This is why, in a rather pedantic way, every one of the 195 paragraphs of the book is followed by a concise statement summarizing its content. Some of the arguments and conclusions in the book may be found new and original, at least in detail, and the author does not want to shun re­ sponsibility. However, he considers himself only an interpreter of a certain line of thought that has developed through centuries of intellectual efforts of men. The very term "Positivism" has been taken over from Auguste Comte's Philosophie Positive, which itself is rooted in conceptions one can trace back to antiquity. From Comte a clearly distinguishable line leads to Ernst Mach and Henri Poincare. The work of Mach has been continued and in essential points amplified by the so-called Vienna Circle, Carnap, Frank, V

vi

preface

Hahn, Neurath, Schlick. It is this development which provides the basis for all comments on the various problems presented in the following text. This preface should not close without a word of remembrance of a man who decisively contributed to the publication of the first edition. Otto Neu­ rath, the founder of the Unity of Science Movement and of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, died prematurely in December 1945. He was an unusually clear thinker, a polyhistor, a successful writer and bril­ liant speaker, and he had a unique goal in life: the improvement of human understanding. The author offers his book as a most modest contribution toward this goal. Harvard University August 1950

R.

V. MISES

contents 1

introduction PART I · LANGUAGE

1

19

introductory remarks

l. The question 19; 2. Speaking about language 19; 3. Change of usage 20; 4. Magic of language 21; 5. Instinctive learning 22; 6. Limita­ tion to the written word 23; 7. Improvement of the use of language 24

2

3

language in the school philosophy

26

l. The school philosophers 26; 2. Kant's analytical judgments 27; 3. Defi­ nitions and theorems 28; 4. Linguistic carelessness of Schopenhauer 29; 5. Misunderstood terminology 31; 6. Predilection for generalities 32; 7. Mauthner's critique of language 34

some points of logical grammar

36

l. Denotations in ordinary language 36; 2. The core area and the area of indeterminacy 37; 3. Sentences and sequences of sentences 39; 4. Grammatical rules 40; 5. Typification by the linguistic rules 41; 6. Derivations of words 42; 7. Temporal changes 43

4

differences among languages. the language of sci-

45

ence

l. Untranslatability 45; 2. Mutual assimilation of civilized languages 46; 3. Examples of deviations 47; 4. The formation of scientific languages

vii

contents

VIII

49; 5. The necessity for scientific languages 50; 6. The abuse of technical terms 52; 7. Conclusions 53

PART II · ANALYSIS

5

6

7

8

negativism

57

1. "Synthesis and not analysis" 57; 2. Skepticism and faith 58; 3. Berg­ sonism 59; 4. Time and duration 61; 5. Goethe and anthroposophy 63; 6. Enemies of the mind 65; 7. Fixation of our point of view 66

connectibility

69

1. Delineation of the problem 69; 2. Consistency with linguistic rules 70; 3. Connectible with . . . 72; 4. Connectibility as such 73; 5. Verifi­ ability 75; 6. Questions and commands 76; 7. No valuation 77

mach's elements

80

1. Element sentences 80; 2. Mach's elements 81; 3. Denotations of the elements 83; 4. The double purpose of the elements 84; 5. Body and substance 85; 6. The ego 87; 7. Success of Mach's doctrines 88

protocol sentences

91

1. Logical empiricism 91; 2. Solution in principle 92; 3. the form of the protocol sentences 93; 4. The concept of reduction 95; 5. The postulate of reducibility 97; 6. Descartes' starting point 98; 7. The significance of analysis 99 PART Ill · THE EXACT THEORIES

9

10

axiomatics

103

1. High-school axiomatics 103; 2. Classical axiomatics 104; 3. Mach's reform 105; 4. Hilbert's geometry 107; 5. Non Euclidean geometry 108; 6. Application of the axiomatic method 110; 7. Axiomatization in general 112

logistic

114

1. Tautologies and factual statements 114; 2. Tautological systems 115; 3. Basic logical relations 117; 4. Further formalization 118; 5. Difficulty of deduction 119; 6. Russell's theory of types 121; 7. Universal phys­ sics 122

contents

11

the foundations of mathematics

ix

125

l. Tautological part 125; 2. M{lthc111{lfical evidence 127; 3. lntuitionism 128; 4. The excluded middle 129; 5. Nea· logic 131; 6. Formalism 132; 7. Logicism 134

12

the structure of physica I theories

136

l. Physicalism 136; 2. Description and explanation 137; 3. Economy of Thought 139; 4. Induction and deduction 140; 5. Supplementary axioms 142; 6. The ''inductii·e. inference" 144; 7. Methodology 146 PART IV · CAUSALITY AND PROBABILITY

13

causal propositions

151

l. Isolated occurrences 151; 2. The problem of causality 152; 3. So,ne historical remarks 154; 4. Further amplification 156; 5. The inductive inference I 58; 6. The law of causality 159; 7. . . . And its limita­ tions 161

14

probability 163 l. Frequency 163; 2. Subjective probability 164; 3. Probability calculus

166; 4. The limiting value of frequency 167; 5. The complete theory 169; 6. Transgression of the borderline 171; 7. Different points of view 174

15

177 deterministic and statistica I physics l. Differential equations 177; 2. Additional axioms 178; 3. Intervention

of statistics 180; 4. Classical statistics 181; 5. Atomism 183; 6. The indeterminacy relation 185; 7. Intuitiveness. Decline of causality 186

16

miracles

189

l. Disruption of causality 189; 2. Astrology 191; 3. "Ausdruckskunde" 192; 4. The supernatural 194; 5. Occult sciences 196; 6. Teleology 198; 7. Final considerations 199

PART V · SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES

17

the alleged limitation of scientific concepts

205

l. Dualism 205; 2. The characteristics of natural science 206; 3. . . . And of humanistic science 208; 4. The unity of method 209;

contents

X

5. History and physics 211; 6. The alleged incomparability 213; 7. The "system" of sciences 215

18

19 20

history and psychology

218

1. The subject matter of history 218; 2. Historical truth 219; 3. Explicit theories of history 222; 4. Historicism 223; 5. Psychology of life 225; 6. "Understanding" in history 227; 7. Group psychology 228

psychology and biology

231

1. Experimental psychology 231; 2. Psychophysics 232; 3. Physicalism 234; 4. Psychoanalysis 236; 5. Vita/ism 238; 6. The evolution of biol­ ogy 240; 7. Genetics 242

social sciences

245

l. Characteristics 245; 2. Natural science, normative science 246; 3. Classical economics 248; 4. Marginal utility and mathematical theory 250; 5. Sociology 252; 6. Demography 254; 7. Incidental questions 256 PART VI · ME TAPHYSICS AND ART

21

22

23

we shaII not cease to ask questions

261

l. Three differences 261; 2. The common aim 263; 3. Lack of con­ nectibility 264; 4. Science in the beginning stage 266; 5. Antiquity and the Middle Ages 268; 6. Contemporary metaphysics 269; 7. Questions and answers 271

a priori and the whole

274

l. The aim of the a priori 274; 2. The psychologic basis 276; 3. Descrip­ tions, not slogans 278; 4. Gestalt psychology 280; 5. The whole and the sum 281; 6. Examples of wholes 283; 7. Conclusions 285

poetry

287

l. The origin of myths 287; 2. Other sources of poetry 288; 3. Poetics 290; 4. Rules of language 291; 5. Lyric and e�perience 294; 6. Poetry and science 295; 7. Assessment 298

24

art

301

l. Beginnings 301; 2. Not deception, but theory 302; 3. Condensation and beauty 304; 4. The doctrine of proportions 306; 5. The range of the beautiful 308; 6. The science of art 3 IO; 7. Irrationality 312

contents

XI

PART VII · HUMAN BEHAVIOR

25

we will, we ought, we may and we must

317

1. Starting point 317; 2. Will 319; 3. Ought sentences 320; 4. Moral value 321; 5. General doctrine of values 323; 6. Must and the free will 325; 7. Prirnary and derived concepts 327

26

law and ethics

329

1. Positive law 329; 2. Normative science 331; 3. Right originating in wrong 333; 4. Uncertainty of judgment 335; 5. Sociology as basis 337; 6. The categorical imperative 339; 7. Naturalistic ethics. Statements and commands 341

27 28

ethics and religion

343

l. Religious and duty ethics 343; 2. Utilitarianism. Socrates 345; 3. In­ stinct and reasoning 346; 4. Spinoza 348; 5. Religious systems 350; 6. Philosophical "justification" 352; 7. The religious drive 353

historical remarks. coniectures and conclusions

357

l. The development up to Kant 357; 2. The newer development 359; 3. Separation of the realm of science 361; 4. Progress in science and art 363; 5. Progress in metaphysics and ethics 365; 6. A view of the future 366; 7. Summary 368

notes

373

index of names

403

... die kleinen, unscheinbaren, vorsichtigen Wahrheiten, welche mit strenger Methode gefunden werden, hoher zu schatzen als jene weiten, schwebenden, umschleiernden Allgemeinheiten, nach denen