Portugal Since the 2008 Economic: Crisis Resilience and Change 9781857439618, 9781032394299, 9781351046916

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Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis

Portuguese democracy is now celebrating its 50th anniversary. Portugal joined the European Union (EU) in 1986, but the enduring legacies of the country’s transition process from authoritarianism to democracy became apparent during the European sovereign debt crisis, when Portugal experienced its third bailout since the institutionalization of democratic government. Although the first decade after EU accession was one of slight growth and investment, Portugal’s economy has, in effect, been performing poorly since the beginning of the 21st century. Among the major changes in Portugal – as in much of Southern Europe – as a result of the ‘great recession’, was the emergence of important new actors, including populist parties, new social movements and the polarization of attitudes towards the EU. In some of these areas, the phrase ‘with the exception of Portugal’ was always present. This book explores the factors that might explain why this is no longer the case, presenting a global overview, with an interdisciplinary focus, of the processes of economic, social and political changes in Portuguese democracy since the 2008 economic crisis. The volume is accessible to a broad academic audience, with chapters examining economic, political, social and foreign policy issues, for scholars interested in an analysis of Portugal’s emergence from the economic crisis. António Costa Pinto is a Research Professor at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon and a Professor of Politics at Lusófona University, Portugal. He has been a Visiting Professor at Stanford University and at Georgetown University, USA, a Senior Associate Member of St Anthony’s College, Oxford, UK, and a Senior Visiting Fellow at Princeton University and at the University of California, Berkeley, USA. His research interests include authoritarianism, political elites, democratization, and transitional justice in new democracies.

Europa Country Perspectives The Europa Country Perspectives series, from Routledge, examines a wide range of contemporary political, economic, developmental and social issues from areas around the world. Complementing the Europa Regional Surveys of the World series, Europa Country Perspectives is a valuable resource for academics, students, researchers, policymakers, business people and anyone with an interest in current world affairs. While the Europa World Year Book and its associated Regional Surveys inform on and analyse contemporary economic, political and social developments at the national and regional level, Country Perspectives provide indepth, country-specific volumes written or edited by specialists in their field, delving into a country’s particular situation. Volumes in the series are not constrained by any particular template, but may explore a country’s recent political, economic, international relations, social, defence, or other issues in order to increase understanding. The Taiwan Issue Problems and Prospects Edited by Benjamin Schreer and Andrew T. H. Tan Facets of Security in the United Arab Emirates Edited by William Guéraiche and Kristian Alexander Disappearances in Mexico From the ‘Dirty War’ to the ‘War on Drugs’ Edited by Silvana Mandolessi and Katia Olalde Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka Presidential Elections, Manipulation and Democracy S. I. Keethaponcalan Global India The Pursuit of Influence and Status Edited by Chris Ogden Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis Resilience and Change Edited by António Costa Pinto For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Europa-Country-Perspectives/book-series/ECP.

Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis Resilience and Change

Edited by António Costa Pinto

Designed cover image: © Shutterstock First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, António Costa Pinto; individual chapters, the contributors The right of António Costa Pinto to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-85743-961-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-39429-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-04691-6 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916 Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

List of illustrations The Contributors Introduction

vii ix 1

ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO

1 Portuguese Democracy at 50

7

ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO AND ANDRÉ PARIS

2 European Misfit: The Portuguese Economy after EU Membership

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LUCIANO AMARAL

3 Social Movements and Political Protests in Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis

52

CRISTINA NUNES

4 European Economic Narratives and the Emergence of a European Public Sphere in Portugal: An Analysis of National Mainstream Newspapers

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SUSANA ROGEIRO NINA

5 Presidents and Governments in Portugal: Variations on a Constitutional Theme (2008–2022)

90

RUI GRAÇA FEIJÓ

6 Patterns of Ministerial Recruitment, Partisanship and Financial Crisis

110

PATRÍCIA SILVA, PEDRO SILVEIRA, ANDRÉ PARIS AND MARCELO CAMERLO

7 Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a more Polarized Party System?

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SOFIA SERRA-SILVA AND NELSON SANTOS

8 The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal

156

vi Contents RICCARDO MARCHI

9 Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal

172

JORGE BOTELHO MONIZ

10 Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy in a Period of German Hegemony: Bandwagoning or Soft Balancing?

186

BRUNO C. REIS

11 Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007: Small State or Equal Partner?

205

LILIANA REIS

12 Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO as an Interoperability Hub

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SABRINA EVANGELISTA MEDEIROS AND DANIELLE JACON AYRES PINTO

Index

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Illustrations

Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 4.1

4.2 4.3 4.4

6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4a 7.4b 7.5 7.6a 7.6b

GDP per capita and GDP per hour worked in Portugal as a % of per capita GDP in more developed countries, 1820–2021 External accounts (% of GDP), Portugal, 1960–2020 Degree of openness of the economy (% of GDP), Portugal and EU-15, 1960–2021 Imports as a % of GDP, Portugal and EU-15, 1960–2021 Exports as a % of GDP, Portugal and EU-15, 1960–2021 Convergence in the EU, 1950–2021 Current account in eurozone countries (% of GDP), 1974–2015 Media Attention to European economic articles according to the three indicators (scope, size and number), before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Distribution of the tone used in EU economic articles before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Average distribution of the Framing dimension before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Narrative direction: the most prevalent sub-frames in each Framing dimension before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Partisan ministers emerging from the party leadership (%) Non-partisan ministers politically close to parties (%) Party system fragmentation Electoral polarization Dalton’s (2008) party polarization index RILE score Polarization index Disagreement over legislative initiatives (%) in the Portuguese parliament (2002–2022) Ninth legislative term (2002–2005). Governing parties: the PSD and the CDS-PP Tenth legislative term (2005–2009). Governing party: the PS

34 35 37 37 38 39 47

78 79 80

81 115 123 136 139 140 141 141 144 146 146

viii List of illustrations 7.6c 11th legislative term 7.6d 12th legislative term and the CDS-PP 7.6e 13th legislative term 7.6f 14th legislative term

(2009–2011). Governing party: the PS (2011–2015). Governing parties: the PSD (2015–2019). Governing party: the PS (2019–2022). Governing party: the PS

147 147 148 148

Tables 1.1 4.1

Electoral Results for the Constituent Assembly, 25 April 1975 Empirical framework to measure European economic media narratives in the Portuguese national media 6.1 Government composition and ministerial recruitment (1999–2022) 6.2 Core ministries and ministerial recruitment (1999–2022) 6.3 Non-partisan ministers in coalition governments 6.4 Partisanship before, during and after the eurozone crisis (1999–2022) 7.1 Vote share and number of seats in legislative elections, turnout rate and electoral volatility (2002–2022) 11.1 Demographic, Territory and Economic Data on European Union Member States

15 77 114 116 117 118 133 209

Contributors

Luciano Amaral is an Assistant Professor at the Nova School of Business and Economics, Lisbon, Portugal. He has a master’s in Contemporary History from NOVA University, Lisbon, and a PhD in History from the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. His research interests concern economic growth in the 20th century, and business and banking history. Recent publications include ‘Measuring Competition in Portuguese Commercial Banking during the Golden Age (1960–1973)’, Business History 57 (8), pp. 192–218, and The Modern Portuguese Economy in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (2019). Marcelo Camerlo is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Science, University of Lisbon, Portugal, and the coordinator of the Presidential Cabinets Project. With a PhD in Political Science from the University of Florence, he was a Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of State and Society, and a Guest Fellow at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies of the University of Notre Dame, USA. He recently co-authored ‘Minister Turnover, Critical Events, and the Electoral Calendar in Presidential Democracies’, The Journal of Politics 77 (3), 2015, pp. 608–619, and ‘Symposium: The European Political Science Agenda: A Multilevel Analysis from a Country Perspective’, European Political Science 17 (1), 2018, pp. 1–9. Rui Graça Feijó is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal, and has a DPhil from Oxford University, UK, 1984. He has been an UN adviser to the presidency of Timor-Leste (2005–2006). His publications include Dynamics of Democracy in TimorLeste: The Birth of a Democratic Nation (2016) and Presidents in Semipresidential Regimes: Moderating Power in Portugal and Timor-Leste (2020). Riccardo Marchi is a Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies of the Lisbon University Institute, and a Guest Professor of Politics at Lusófona University, Portugal. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain (2007), and at the University of

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List of contributors California, Berkeley, USA (2008). His main research areas are the radical right and populism. He is the author of The Portuguese Far Right Between Late Authoritarianism and Democracy (1945–2015) (2019).

Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros is a Professor of Politics at Lusófona University. She has a PhD in Political Science from IUPERG Brazil. A Research Associate at the Instituto da Defesa Nacional, Portugal, she was a faculty member of the Brazilian Naval War College, the Inter-American Defense College, and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Her main research areas in International Relations are Cooperation, Defence Economics, Qualitative and Multi-method Research; Decision-Making Processes and Simulations. Recent publications include ‘The Mobilization of the Defense Industrial Base in South America through the Brazilian Admission in the NATO Catalog System’, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations 7 (14), July/Dec. 2018, pp. 183–208. Jorge Botelho Moniz is an Assistant Professor at Lusófona University, where he is the Director of the BA in European Studies and International Relations. With a PhD in Political Science from NOVA University, he was research policy officer at the Portuguese PermRep in Brussels, Belgium, Visiting Scholar at Sciences Po Paris, Poitiers Campus, and PhD Fellow at the Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil. He is the author of several books, book chapters and articles on topics such as secularization, church-state relations and religious diversity, including ‘Diversity and Secularization in Europe: Analyzing the Correlation between Indexes of Religiosity and Cultural Diversity in Europe’, Revista Española de Sociología 28 (3), 2019, pp. 45–62, and ‘A Culture of Secularity? The Phenomenon of Non-religion in 21st-Century Portuguese Society and Politics’, Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 18 (53), 2019, pp. 123–140. Susana Rogeiro Nina is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lusófona University. Her PhD thesis concerned the Europeanization of public spheres and was conducted within the framework of the ERC-MAPLE project. Her research interests include the European Union and EU attitudes, political communication in EU national media, media effects and electoral campaigns. Her work has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as the International Journal of Press Politics. Cristina Nunes is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Lusófona University. She has been a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon. Her main interests focus on social movements, political and social protests, and globalization. Among other publications, she recently published a book chapter entitled ‘Portugal and Spain in the International Protest Cycles: From Global Justice Movement to Anti-austerity Protests’ (2019).

List of contributors

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Andre Paris is a Junior Research Fellow at ICS-University of Lisbon. With a BA and an MA in Political Science from ISCSP/University of Lisbon, he was a visiting student at the Juan March Institute of Social Sciences, Carlos III University of Madrid, Spain. He has published on political elites, democratization and successor parties in Portugal and Spain, including the book Breve História do CDS-Partido Popular (2019) and more recently he co-authored the chapter ‘Democratization and its Legacies’, in the Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics (2022). Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto is a Professor in the Department of Economics and International Relations at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina and a Research Associate at the InterAgency Institute Brazil. She is the Vice-President of the Brazilian Association for Defense Studies. She recently co-authored ‘Russia, BRICS and Cyberpower: Evoking Synergies under Conjectures of Deviation’, Journal of China and International Relations 1, 2020, pp. 83–97. Antonio Costa Pinto is a Research Professor at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon and a Professor of Politics at Lusófona University. He has been a Visiting Professor at Stanford University and at Georgetown University, USA, a Senior Associate Member of St Anthony’s College, Oxford, UK, and a Senior Visiting Fellow at Princeton University and at the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests include authoritarianism, political elites, democratization and transitional justice in new democracies. He has published articles in many journals, including Democratization, and South European Society and Politics, and he co-edited Who Governs Southern Europe? (2013); Dealing with the Legacy of Authoritarianism: The ‘Politics of the Past’ in Southern European Democracies (2011); Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies (2018); and The Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics (2022). Bruno C. Reis is an Assistant Professor and Vice-President of the Centre of International Studies at ISCTE-Lisbon University Institute, and a Visiting Fellow at King’s College. He has a master’s from Cambridge University and a PhD in War Studies from King’s College, London, UK. He is currently working on Portuguese decolonization and its immediate aftermath in a comparative perspective with Britain and France, with particular attention to the role of strategy, violence, religion, ideology and normative change in the process of decolonization. He recently published (as coeditor) The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-Scholarship in Counterinsurgency (2013), and ‘Decentering the Cold War in Southern Africa: The Portuguese Policy of Decolonization and Détente in Angola and Mozambique (1974–1984)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 21, 2019, pp. 3–51.

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List of contributors

Liliana Reis is an Assistant Professor of European Politics at the University of Beira Interior, Portugal, and a Guest Professor of Politics at Lusófona University. With a PhD in International Relations from the University of Minho, Portugal, she has published on European politics and security studies, including, as co-editor, Climate Change and Global Development (2019). Nelson Santos is a PhD student in Comparative Politics at ICS-University of Lisbon, with a scholarship funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. Since 2019, he has been a Research Fellow at the ERC-funded MAPLE project studying the politicization of the European Union. He holds a master’s in Economics and Public Policy from ISCTELisbon University Institute. His research interests include European integration, political parties and computational social science. Sofia Serra-Silva is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon. She holds a PhD in Comparative Politics from the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon and currently holds a position as FLAD Visiting Professor at Georgetown University. Her research interests are political parties, parliaments, quality of democracy, internet and politics and research methods. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Legislative Studies, Party Politics, European Politics and Society, and one of her most recent articles is ‘Beyond National Boundaries in the Study of Digital Public Engagement: Interparliamentary Institutions and Cooperation in the Austrian and Portuguese National Parliaments’, Policy & Internet (2022). Patrícia Silva is an Assistant Professor at the University of Aveiro, Portugal, and a researcher at the Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies Research Centre, where she has conducted research work on political parties, the politicization of recruitment of appointed elites, public administration, executive politics and youth participation. She has published articles in journals including the International Review of Administrative Sciences, Public Administration, European Politics and Society, South European Society and Politics. Among her latest publications is (as co-author) ‘A Fistful of Followers: The Resilience of the Second-Order Campaign Model?’, European Politics and Society 23 (3), 2022, pp. 301–320 and the co-author of ‘Executive Politics’, in the Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics (2023). Pedro Silveira is an Assistant Professor at the University of Beira Interior and a researcher at Praxis-UBI, Portugal. He has a PhD in Political Science from NOVA University, and a background in Political Science and Law. His main research interests lie in political elites, executive politics and political leadership. He is the author of ‘To Be or Not to Be a Politician: Profile and Governmental Career of Portuguese Junior Ministers’, Revista Espanola de Ciencia Politica 1 (40), 2016, pp. 13–38 and the coauthor of the book chapter ‘Executive Politics’, in the Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics (2023).

Introduction António Costa Pinto

In a pioneering study of the impact of the Great Recession on South European democracies, Morlino and Raniolo (2017) recalled that some of the major changes in Southern Europe resulting from the crisis included the emergence of important new actors, namely protest parties; a partial reshaping of previous cleavages (left–right); a fading away or reshaping of others (centre–periphery) with the appearance and consolidation of a quasi-new cleavage (pro–anti Europe); and a change in the structure of the party system towards tripolarization despite the bipolarizing electoral systems. In the majority of cases, though, the phrase ‘with the exception of Portugal’ was always present. In fact, as we emphasized in a previous collective study on Portuguese democracy if the impact of the crisis and subsequent austerity policies on citizen dissatisfaction and the drop in the responsiveness of the political system created a delegitimization of traditional leaders, in Portugal, the crisis of loyalty led to exit (i.e. a growth in electoral abstention and a decline in party membership), but ironically, it led to the strengthening of traditional parties with the above-mentioned cleavages playing a very minor role in the Portuguese political arena. (Pinto and Pequito 2019) This book explores the factors that might explain why this is no longer the case, and presents a global overview of the processes of economic, social, and political change in democratic Portugal since the Great Recession. In 2024, Portuguese democracy will celebrate its 50th anniversary, a regime consolidated from an abrupt rupture with a long authoritarian experience and with rare political actors in the democratization processes of the 20th century. Chapter 1, ‘Portuguese Democracy at 50’, introduces the main dimensions of Portuguese democratization and its uncertain path, and the most important institutional legacies of the transition towards a consolidated democracy: civil-military relations; the underlying socialist constitution and semi-presidentialism as forms of consolidation through political parties and guided by a gradual and negotiated reversal of institutional legacies; and DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-1

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the more radical economic and social transformations that took place during the transition. These legacies, as Robert Fishman (2019) has demonstrated convincingly, conditioned ‘democratic practice’ and generated a more inclusive and more anti-hierarchical democracy in Portugal. Semi-presidentialism was one the institutional legacies of democratization and Portugal has had two presidents (Aníbal Cavaco Silva, 2006–2016 and Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, 2016–), seven governments and three prime ministers between the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis and the present day. Both presidents came from the same political right-of-centre sphere, while two of Portugal’s prime ministers came from the left-of-centre Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) and one from same political family as that of the presidents. Prime ministers governed using a variety of political solutions: single-party majority, coalition government and single-party minority rule based on confidence and supply arrangements. In a period spanning just 15 years, a vast array of situations was experienced in Portugal. Chapter 5, ‘Presidents and Governments in Portugal: Variations on a Constitutional Theme (2008–2022)’, looks at the relationships between the presidents and their prime ministers, suggesting that the main feature of Portuguese presidents – that they exercise ‘moderating powers’ above the party political fray – was not sustained during the early part of this period, a situation that has been redressed by the election of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa. The appointment of non-partisan ministers and of technocratic cabinets has been evidence of the impact of the eurozone crisis in Italy, but in Portugal it has been a more global phenomenon. Chapter 6, ‘Patterns of Ministerial Recruitment, Partisanship and Financial Crisis’, seeks to characterize patterns of ministerial recruitment in Portugal before, during and after the 2011–2013 eurozone crisis. Using data on ministerial profiles from 1999 to 2022, the chapter demonstrates how, while non-partisanship may be a remarkable feature of Portuguese governments, it was not salient during the eurozone crisis period, and instead was concentrated around critical portfolios for external credibility and technical negotiations with external officials. During the critical juncture of the ‘adjustment period’ Portugal was ruled by a stable centre-right coalition government, but in November 2015 The Economist reported that ‘Portugal’s anti-austerity left seems to be taking power after all’. In fact, for the first time in the electoral history of Portuguese democracy the PS made an unparalleled form of contract parliamentarism in Portuguese politics, the so-called geringonça (‘contraption’), a functioning government led by the PS supported by the radical left parties. During the geringonça years (2015–2019), the Portuguese ‘contraption’ quickly became a reference for many European social democratic parties. Chapter 7, ‘Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a More Polarized Party System?’, assesses the extent to which the party system dynamics in the 21st century, especially in the wake of the 2015 general election, have changed.

Introduction

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Chapter 8, ‘The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal’, deals with the development of radical right-wing populism in Portugal, addressing the history of Chega (Enough) and its leader and analysing the political culture of the party’s rank and file. The analysis is based on a survey of 3,000 party members, and the data reveal attitudes towards national identity and democracy. Chega has grown quickly in terms of militants and electoral performance, expanding from a few hundred members to at least 25,000, while its share of the vote has risen from 1.3% in the 2019 general election to 7% in 2022 (and the number of seats from one to 12 members of parliament). Meanwhile, the party’s leader, André Ventura, obtained 12% of the vote in the 2021 presidential election and in 2022 Chega became the third most important political force in parliament. In April 2011 the Portuguese government requested international assistance to deal with its foreign financial commitments. This was the culmination of a crisis that began in 2008, accompanying similar events around the world. Chapter 2, ‘European Misfit: The Portuguese Economy after EU Membership’, deals with the main consequences of EU membership, arguing that in the case of Portugal, this negative cycle was inserted into an ongoing medium-term trend of mediocre growth. The 2008 crisis came on top of an economy that had been stagnating since the turn of the century. In fact, between 2000 and 2012, the Portuguese economy grew less than that of the United States during the Great Depression or of Japan during its ‘lost decade’. The impact of globalization and the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had a negative impact on the competitiveness of Portuguese economy, with anaemic productivity growth, almost no growth, increasing unemployment, and public and private debt. The economy started to catch up between 2015 and 2019 but at a relatively slow pace, and it was successively overtaken by various Eastern and Central European economies. Over the past decade, Portugal, like other Southern European countries, experienced high levels of social and political mobilization against austerity measures agreed between the Portuguese government and the so-called troika: new groups of protesters and large-scale events contributed to a reconfiguration of social movements (Fernandes 2018; Nunes 2019). However, since 2015 the parliamentary governance agreement between the left-wing parties, along with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, have produced a significant decrease in the activity of social movements. During this posttroika period, a return to micro-scale protests events based on a more diffused thematic agenda was observed. This includes grassroots movements, such as the youth mobilizations calling for climate justice, anti-racist campaigns against police violence and demands for the right to housing in urban areas. Chapter 3, ‘Social Movements and Political Protests in Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis’, following a qualitative approach based on in-depth interviews and document analysis, focus on social movements during and after the austerity crisis, demonstrating that while mobilization

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issues follow an international agenda, the national structures of political opportunity continue to have a strong influence on the organization of protest groups in Portuguese society. The past few decades have been marked by the enhancement of Europeanization and the politicization of European issues in the national public spheres, leading to the realization that the EU is not a ‘sleeping giant’ but instead an ‘awakened giant’ in domestic arenas. There are several reasons to assume that the onset of the eurozone crisis accelerated this process, thereby increasing the EU’s salience and polarization in an unprecedented fashion. Chapter 4, ‘The European Economic Narratives and the Emergence of a European Public Sphere in Portugal: an Analysis of National Mainstream Newspapers’, addresses the role of national media (newspapers) in the emergence of a European public sphere. This chapter considers the eurozone crisis to be a ‘crucial moment’ for the EU, which might have effected important changes in the politicization of the EU in the national media. In recent decades, Europe has undergone a process of cultural and religious recomposition characterized by its conversion into a continent of immigration rather than emigration. This profound transformation, brought about by globalization, the de-privatization of religion and new waves of migration, has forced the continent to be more aware of its cultural and religious diversity and to deal with the underlying challenges that this poses. Even in the most peripheral regions of Europe, such as Portugal, this phenomenon has had consequences, particularly in the more urbanized regions, such as the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, where the growing phenomenon of religious heterogeneity has become more evident and challenging for Portuguese secularism based on the secular relationship with a Catholic canopy. Chapter 9, ‘Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal’, aims to examine the process of secularization in Portugal in the context of the evolution of the country’s cultural diversity. The central question of Chapter 10, ‘Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy in a Period of German Hegemony: Bandwagoning or Soft Balancing?’ is whether the major external shock of 2008 led to a fundamental change in Portuguese foreign policy priorities and, if so, does this fit into a pattern of growing German hegemony in Europe? The answer is yes, it does. The argument is that the main impact of this major economic crisis was to make economic diplomacy and Germany more central in Portuguese foreign policy. But an important divergence emerged regarding what to do diplomatically about Germany: to bandwagon or to soft balance? Bandwagoning prevailed in the initial stages of the crisis when difficulties were more acute, and a right-wing Portuguese government was ideologically more aligned with the same objectives as the German government, namely in terms of austerity and budget discipline. Soft balancing – looking for allies to resist German pressure and aims, primarily France, without antagonizing the latter too openly – was the preferred option for a more left-wing government aiming at more flexible, less austerity-centric policies in a more favourable economic

Introduction

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and European context. This argument is sustained by analysing party and government manifestos, official documents and interviews. While the main focus is on the period up to the end of 2017, the chapter brings the analysis to the present day by arguing that Brexit, the election of a German president of the EU Commission and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic seemed to confirm and reinforce the hegemonic role of Germany, even if the symmetric shock brought about by the pandemic led to a major change in German posture. In recent years, the EU has had to face several challenges, such as the sovereign debt crisis, migration and refugee issues, the departure of the United Kingdom from the Union, the COVID-19 pandemic and, in February 2022, the military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. These challenges inevitably led to the questioning of the unity by the member states of the Union, but also to an institutional redefinition of the decisionmaking process, which led to the reinforcement of EU Council’s powers. Even so, it is in the Council that the weakness of small states is most noticeable and their ability to see their interests safeguarded is less assured. Nevertheless, states, even small ones, have their specificities that allow them to counteract their apparent disadvantages. Chapter 11, ‘Assessment of Portugal’s Role within the EU between 2007 and 2021: From a Small State to a Privileged Interlocutor’, seeks to assess Portugal’s behaviour and policy options within the framework of the EU during this period, while evaluating the actions of the EU Council presidency, namely in its efforts to mitigate the crisis and to ensure European unity. The volume concludes with Chapter 12, ‘Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO as an Upholding Hub to Interoperability Assets’, which deals with regional security and defence, studying the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the area of security and defence, a policy dedicated to deepening defence and security among EU members, upholding their connections and commitments to an integrated structure of investments and knowledge base and logistics framework. This chapter’s main argument is that Portugal may be one of the most important hubs for permitting connections and external ties within PESCO projects, in which the Portuguese Atlantic interface could boost EU defence structures.

References Fernandes, T. (2018). ‘Organizational Sources of Social Resilience and Progressive Governance: Portugal during and after Austerity (2008–2015)’, in F. Bethencourt (Ed.) Inequality in the Portuguese-Speaking World, Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 81–97. Fishman, R. (2019). Democratic Practice: Origins of the Iberian Divide in Political Inclusion, New York: Oxford University Press. Morlino, L. and Raniolo, F. (2017). The Impact of the Economic Crisis on South European Democracies, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Nunes, C. (2019). ‘Portugal and Spain in the International Protest Cycles: From Global Justice Movement to Anti-austerity Protests’, in A. C. Pinto and C. Pequito (Eds.) Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 195–213. Pinto, A. C. and Pequito, C. (Eds.) (2019). Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Portuguese Democracy at 50 António Costa Pinto and André Paris

In 2024, Portuguese democracy will celebrate its 50th anniversary, a regime consolidated from an abrupt rupture with a long authoritarian experience and with rare political actors in the democratization processes of the 20th century: the military. In fact, on 25 April 1974, a bloodless military coup (known as the ‘Carnation Revolution’) put an end to almost five decades of dictatorship in Portugal (1926–1974). Unshackled by international prodemocracy forces and taking place during the Cold War, the coup led to a severe state crisis that was further aggravated by the fact that the processes of democratic transition and the decolonization of what was Europe’s last colonial empire occurred simultaneously. Some of the characteristics of the Portuguese transition to democracy – particularly the role of the military, the state crisis and the momentum created by social movements – were nevertheless difficult to integrate into the comparative study of ‘third wave’ democratization processes (O’Donnell et al. 1986; Huntington 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996). As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan noted, ‘we all too often tend to see [Portugal] in the framework set by later transition processes’, forgetting the greater degree of uncertainty and the extreme conflict path of regime change that, according to some authors, ‘was not a conscious transition to democracy’ (ibid.: 117; Hite and Morlino 2004: 47). The first comparative literature on the third wave of democratization found Portugal to be a deviant case, one that almost always focused on the difficult path towards democratic consolidation. With the majority of third wave democratizations based on elite-pacted transitions, Portugal was considered a negative case, with a wide segment of political science literature considering it as proof that ‘central and direct involvement of mass actors in the transition can, as the Portuguese experience indicates, derail democratization and reduce the chances of consolidation’ (Diamandouros 1997: 15). Compared with other Southern European democracies, the most conspicuous characteristic of Portugal’s democratization during the 1970s was the nature of the rupture with the preceding authoritarian regime, associated with a state crisis.1 With a transition marked by a radical and uncertain attempt at the complete elimination of the legacies of authoritarianism, which in itself resulted in another legacy for the consolidation of democracy, DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-2

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António Costa Pinto and André Paris

the process of regime change led to a significant state crisis in the wake of the April military coup. The fact that the processes of democratization and decolonization occurred simultaneously was the most crucial aspect of the crisis. The decolonization issue was the main factor in the conflict that broke out in the immediate wake of the regime’s collapse between a group of conservative generals and the Armed Forces Movement (MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas), who had planned and executed the coup. This conflict was at the core of the military’s intervention in political life following the overthrow of the dictatorship (Bermeo 2007). One of the limitations encountered in some studies about Portugal’s transition to democracy is their teleological nature, based on the subsequent consolidation of liberal democracy. This assumption underestimates the impact of both the state crisis and the pre-revolutionary phase as ‘critical junctures’ in the early stages of transition. The author of one of the best studies of political mobilization and collective action in Portugal during the 1970s noted the methodological difficulties involved in ‘assimilating a priori the State crisis with the transition to democracy’, but it is precisely this assimilation that represents the analytical challenge of Portuguese democratization (Cerezales 2003). A cursory look at the studies on Portuguese democratization proves to be a more complex exercise than in other examples of the third wave of democratization, because, due to its characteristics, it mobilized a vast and more interdisciplinary field of research (Martins 2018). The models available for emulation or from which political lessons could be drawn by the main Portuguese political actors of the April 1974 coup were based on the second wave of democratization, which occurred after 1945, when ‘pacted transitions’ or ‘transitions by transaction’ had not yet been invented. What happened in Portugal in 1974 was a militarily protected ‘transition by rupture’, that was not just a political and institutional break with the authoritarian regime, but also, and especially from 1975 onwards, an attempt to promote an economic and social model that served as an alternative to capitalism. The combination (or overlapping) of all these factors (democratization, decolonization, radical changes in the economic and social structure) increased the uncertainty about the outcome of the transition process. As a result, the theoretical and empirical mobilization of social sciences went largely beyond the ‘transitology’ of political science and, given its initial characteristic of a pre-revolutionary crisis, it mobilized greater analytical and disciplinary diversity. The real analytical mini-boom on the ‘revolution’ or the ‘liberation by coup’ in Portugal (Schmitter 1975) was initially marked by the studies of political scientists from Latin America, such as Philippe Schmitter, Howard Wiarda, Thomas Bruneau, or Lawrence Graham (see Schmitter 1971) and mainly focused on the role played by the military on regime changes and revolutions, followed by a large body of studies from different areas of social sciences on social movements, as well as land and urban occupations (Fields

Portuguese Democracy at 50 9 1975; Porch 1977; Magarelli 1981; Bermeo 1986; Hammond 1988; Downs 1989; Durán Muñoz 2000). To this first wave we could add a multitude of contemporary studies by left-wing intellectuals and scholars who were more ideologically engaged with the first ‘western revolutionary crises’ after 1968 (Sweezy 1975). Marxist scholars also authored important segments of this first wave of studies (see Chilcote 2010). With the second wave of studies on the Southern European transitions and consolidation of democracy (Gunther et al. 1995a; Diamandouros and Gunther 2001), Portugal continued to embody a case study of a sort of negative and complex path towards a consolidated democracy. As Philippe Schmitter (1999b: 338) put it, ‘[s]o, it cannot be said that Portugal offered a “model” to those who followed it in time—except in the negative sense that it offered an example of what other transitions to democracy subsequently sought to avoid’. Subsequently, the tendency to perceive the institutional and socioeconomic legacies of the revolutionary rupture as ‘birth defects’ of Portuguese democracy which should be gradually amended or obliterated remained unchanged (Bruneau et al. 2001: 37; Gunther 2009). It took a few years for cases as the Portuguese one, where ‘democratization follows one or more violent shocks that disrupt the autocratic equilibrium’ to be fully integrated. In fact, if we look beyond the so-called third wave, ‘a total of 100 of 139 transitions since 1800 follow the shock path’ (Miller 2021; see also Varol 2017). Other scholars have emphasized the enduring positive legacies of the Portuguese democratization process that is rooted in the country’s unusual pathway towards democracy. For these scholars, the ‘democratic social revolution’ that characterized the Portuguese transition led to the emergence of an inclusionary form of democratic practice and a more inclusive and pluralistic civil society, thus promoting high levels of ‘democratic depth’ (Fernandes and Branco 2017; Fishman 2019). Drawing different conclusions from those of his predecessors on the significance of Portuguese transition, Robert Fishman stated that Portugal stands out as ‘an unusually successful example of the democratic genre’ (2020: 33), with ‘great relevance for how students of democracy everywhere understand the ingredients of successful democratic politics’ (2017: 100). This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, it deals with the main dimensions of the transition and its uncertain path, arguing that the nature of the Portuguese transition and the consequent state crises created a ‘window of opportunity’ in which the ‘reaction to the past’ was much stronger in Portugal than in other Southern European transitions, and that its powerful momentum (state crises and social movements) served to form the dominant legacy for the consolidation of democracy itself. In the second section, we deal with the main institutional legacies of the transition towards a consolidated democracy: civil-military relations; the underlying socialist constitution and semi-presidentialism as forms of consolidation through political parties and guided by a gradual and negotiated reversal of institutional

10 António Costa Pinto and André Paris legacies; and the more radical economic and social transformations that took place during the transition.

A Transition by Rupture The nature of the Portuguese dictatorship tells us little about the type of transition to democracy that occurred in the country. Salazarism was close to the Linzian ideal type of authoritarian regime: it was a regime that survived the ‘fascist era’ and was not too dissimilar in nature to the final phase of Franco’s regime, in neighbouring Spain, despite the fact that its single party was weaker and that its ‘limited pluralism’ was greater (Linz 2000). The colonial wars being waged on three fronts by the regime in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, coupled with the inability of António de Oliveira Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano, to resolve some of the war-related dilemmas, led to the coup d’état in April 1974. This was a ‘non-hierarchical’ military coup with a political programme promoting democratization and decolonization. The prior existence of both semi-legal and clandestine opposition to Salazarism, although disconnected from the military officers who led the coup, was of crucial importance, because following the breakdown of the regime they were legitimated by the struggle against dictatorship. The replacement of Salazar with Caetano in 1968 gave rise to a two-year-long process of ‘liberalization’ which, despite being cut short, allowed for the consolidation of a ‘liberal wing’ of dissidents who opposed the dictatorship (Fernandes 2007). Thus, despite the surprising action of the military, there were alternative elites who had close connections with various sectors of civil society, and who were ready to play a leading political role in the democratization process. Unlike Spain’s ruptura pactada (negotiated break), Portugal experienced a transition without negotiations or pacts between the dictatorial elite and opposition forces. However, there is no direct causal link between this marked discontinuity and the subsequent radicalization: other transitions by rupture, such as that of Greece in 1975, did not lead to comparable state crises. The mobilization of various anti-dictatorship forces was crucial in the first days following the 1974 coup. It was especially important for the immediate dissolution of the most notorious institutions of the Estado Novo (‘New State’), as well as for the occupation of the different unions, corporatist organizations and municipalities. The institutionalization of the MFA turned it into the dominant force behind the provisional governments. The interweaving of the MFA in the state’s structures and its emergence as a sort of regulatory authority of social conflicts, which replaced, dispersed and paralysed the classic mechanisms of legitimate state repression, and prevented ‘the recompositing of the state apparatus’ (Cerezales 2003). This was the main reason why, in the Portuguese case, the dissolution of institutions and purges

Portuguese Democracy at 50 11 of management became a component adopted by transgressing social movements. The process of transitional justice in the two years after the coup affected the institutions, the elite and civil servants, and even extended to the private sector (Pinto 2010). Many of the measures adopted during this period were based on a ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ and therefore lay outside normal and democratic legal procedures. Most of the punitive measures taken against the more visible and better-known collaborators occurred prior to the establishment of democratic institutions, and the judiciary played only a minor role in this campaign. These measures included ‘wildcat’ purges and the dismissal of managers in private firms – both of which were symbols of a powerful anti-capitalist wave. The entire process represented a milestone in civil society activism and relied on the participation of the trade unions and workers’ commissions, small political parties of various left-wing and extreme-left ideologies, and segments of the MFA. The revolutionary period of 1974–1975 was the most complex phase of the transition, if one considers ‘transition’ to mean the ‘fluid and uncertain period in which democratic structures are emerging’, but in which it is as yet unclear what kind of regime is to be established (Morlino 1998: 19). During these two years, powerful tensions emerged within Portuguese society that did not begin to subside until 1976, with the promulgation of the new Constitution and the holding of legislative and presidential elections. The disagreements concerning the nature of decolonization, which was the initial driving force behind the conflict between the captains who had led the coup and Gen. António de Spínola and other conservative generals, led to the emergence of the MFA as a political force. This then facilitated social and political mobilization which exacerbated the state crisis, and which can perhaps explain why the moderate elites were incapable of directing the rapid institutionalization of democracy. Many analyses of the transition rightly emphasize the powerful ‘revitalization of civil society’ as a factor leading to the process of radicalization (Schmitter 1999b: 359). As Philippe Schmitter notes, ‘Portugal experienced one of the most intense and widespread mobilisation experiences of any of the neo-democracies’ (ibid.: 360). It is important to note, however, that this mobilization developed in tandem with and under the protective cover of the MFA; indeed, it is difficult to imagine it unfolding in any other way (Durán Muñoz 2000). Another characteristic of the attempt to effect a radical break with the past during Portugal’s democratization – one that is visibly associated with the radicalization of social movements –was the strong anti-capitalist overtone that existed during 1975 (Pinto 2013). The economic elite was also hard hit by the process of nationalization and state intervention, as well as by the flight of industrialists and entrepreneurs from the country. Processes of nationalization, urban and rural property occupation, and the purges of management in private companies were often legitimized by a political language stressing the need to eradicate the legacy of the economic and social elite power that had been associated with the previous regime, making

12 António Costa Pinto and André Paris Portugal the only example of ‘redistributive’ transitional justice in Southern Europe. As in other transitions to democracy, many political parties were formed or legalized after 25 April 1974; however, most of the parties on the left of the political spectrum had existed clandestinely or semi-legally during the final years of the ‘New State’. An example of this was the small group of extreme left Maoist, Trotskyist, Guevarist and Marxist parties. This was also the case of the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party), founded by Mário Soares in April 1973 in exile, and of the Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Communist Party of Portugal), which was the oldest party, and which existed clandestinely throughout the dictatorship period (Jalali 2007; Lisi 2015). More complex, and in many ways more difficult, was the creation of parties to represent the right of the political spectrum. Given legitimacy because of its roots in the ‘liberal wing’ of Marcelo Caetano’s Assembleia nacional (National Assembly) and the clear opposition of its founder, Francisco Sá Carneiro, to the dictatorship, the Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party), which was created in the wake of the coup of 25 April, immediately took part in the provisional governments. Much more difficult was the life of the Centro Democrático Social (CDS – Social Democratic Centre), founded by Diogo Freitas do Amaral, who was Caetano’s former assistant at the University of Lisbon law faculty and who had no history of opposition to the dictatorship (Frain 1997; Paris et al. 2019). Following the illegalization of several right- and extreme right-wing groups in 1974, and an electoral legislation preventing the leaders of political institutions of the dictatorship from participating as voters and candidates, these two parties excluded names associated with the New State and tried to find leaders with democratic legitimacy, while their political programmes tended to be to more to the left of their members and supporters. The MFA’s decision to respect the electoral timetable was an important factor in the legitimation of the democratic regime, and the holding of these elections as scheduled helped to strengthen the position of the moderate political parties. Nonetheless, at this political juncture, and contrary to the general pattern of the third wave of democratization, no ‘authoritarian successor party’ emerged, let alone became consolidated in Portuguese democracy (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Paris and Silveira 2021). Between 25 April 1974 and 25 April 1976, Portugal was led by provisional governments that reflected the dynamics of the crisis and the growing dominance of the military and various MFA factions, all of which resulted in several cleavages. While the conflict between António de Spínola and the MFA mainly pertained to the colonial question, the Palma Carlos crisis at the very beginning of the transition sought to bring about the swift legitimization of the new regime, while proposing that a presidential election should take place in October 1974, together with the approval of a provisional constitution. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were

Portuguese Democracy at 50 13 scheduled for the end of 1976, almost one and a half years after the presidential election. As the leader of the CDS noted, ‘the MFA was to be dissolved, Spínola’s personal authority was to be greatly enhanced and the regime would define itself in practice as “Gaullist presidentialism”’ (Amaral 1995: 212). Supported by parties on the left, but largely on its own initiative, the MFA distanced itself from Spínola both because of his attempts to be the effective leader in the process of institutionalizing democracy, and over colonial policy. With the appointment of the second provisional government, the MFA launched its independent organization and, subsequently, Spínola promulgated Law 7/74, which recognized the Portuguese colonies’ right to independence, determined the legal framework that would enable decolonization, and defined which organizations would be involved in the process. In the summer months of mid-1974, Spínola persisted with his call for a referendum, seeking an alternative to the liberation movements and raising the hopes of the white populations in the colonies – especially in Angola and Mozambique. This was very much contrary to the dominant view within the new party system and the MFA, who were calling for a swift transition to independence. The MFA’s victory over the decolonization issue led to Spinola’s resignation in September 1974. The defeat of the pro-Spínola forces and his exile following the attempted coup of 11 March 1975, as well as the MFA’s turn to the left with the introduction of agrarian reform and the nationalization of the main Portuguese economic groups, were both symbols and drivers of an accentuated state crisis that fed powerful social movements. The MFA established the Council of the Revolution (CR – Conselho da Revolução) and signed several agreements with the political parties, thus securing a dominant position. The MFA’s decision to respect the electoral calendar was a crucial factor in lending the democratic regime’s a founding legitimacy, and the elections of 25 April 1975 gave the moderate parties powerful leverage. The decision to opt for a d’Hondt system of proportional representation was the result of a commitment to ensure that as many parties as possible were represented, with a bonus granted to the party garnering the greatest number of votes (Cancela 2021).

The First Free and Fair Elections The immediate holding of free elections to select a body that would draft a new constitution was a common demand in almost all third wave democratization processes (Fortes 2009). Nevertheless, both the nature of the transition and the conditionality of political forces greatly conditioned this ubiquitous demand. Even before 11 March 1975, the MFA had begun negotiations for a constitutional pact with the political parties. The main goal was to ensure the MFA’s political and institutional survival. The moderate parties, especially the PS, had expressed their preference for elections to

14 António Costa Pinto and André Paris a Constituent Assembly early on, something that had also been proposed and reaffirmed by the MFA. During its first congress, in December 1974, the PS approved a motion stating that the Constituent Assembly must be the result of the ‘expression of the will of the Portuguese people’. Despite tensions between the PCP and the MFA, the PS accepted the first MFA-Political Parties’ Pact, convinced that the party’s eventual electoral victory would ensure its political legitimacy. The PS demonstrated its willingness to compromise with the demands for the MFA’s institutionalization, out of fear that it might turn against the parties. For its part, the PCP was the main supporter of limiting the powers of the Constituent Assembly. The moderate parties signed the first constitutional platform ‘solely to ensure elections were held’ (ibid.: 180). Part of the pact signed by the parties on 11 April 1975 had already been negotiated before 11 March and had been worked on by constitutionalists to include the most ideological dimensions of the implementation of socialism, as well as referencing sovereign bodies. The CR’s power of veto was extensive: ‘[e]laborated and approved by the Constituent Assembly, the new constitution had to be promulgated by the President of the Republic and approved by the Council of the Revolution’ (Rezola 2007: 158). On the other hand, the actions of the Constituent Assembly were limited to preparing the constitution: it held no legislative authority. While the political parties were calling for the direct election of a president, the pact signed between the MFA and the parties proposed an electoral college that consisted of the future parliament and the Armed Forces Assembly (Rezola 2007). In this way, the MFA demanded that parties should take part in a ‘platform for a Constitutional Agreement’ in exchange for holding elections to the Constitutional Assembly. To guarantee that its interests were protected under the new Constitution, the MFA reserved two sovereign bodies for itself: the CR and the Armed Forces Assembly. The CR enjoyed extensive political powers, including control over the constitutionality of law and a monopoly on all legislation affecting the military. The pact ensured that regardless of the result of the elections to the Constitutional Assembly, the CR would retain leadership of the process throughout the transitional period and would be declared a sovereign body within the future constitution. The celebration of the constitutional agreement between the MFA and the political parties on 11 April 1975 gave the CR the guarantees it required to ensure that the Constituent Assembly did not exceed the principles outlined in the MFA programme and that it respected all the ‘revolutionary victories’ already achieved. The first democratic elections in Portuguese history resulted in the victory of the moderate parties, with the PS emerging as the leading political party in the country, followed by the PPD (Table 1.1). The Constituent Assembly that emerged from the elections on 25 April 1975 could not be easily controlled by the MFA due to the poor results achieved by the parties closest to it. After 11 March 1975, some elements of the MFA could no longer hide their hitherto discrete support for either the

Portuguese Democracy at 50 15 PCP or its allies in the Movimento Democrático Português (MDP – Portuguese Democratic Movement). Nevertheless, the 12% of the vote achieved by the communists meant that they were in the minority within the Constituent Assembly. With 38% of the vote, the PS emerged as the clear winner of this election. By the time of the opening of the Constituent Assembly, the PS was already in overt opposition to the MFA and to the fifth provisional government led by Col. Vasco Gonçalves. The PS used the first day of debate in the Assembly to reduce the limits on constitutional powers contained within the MFAPolitical Parties’ Pact. Mário Soares, head of the PS, recalled: ‘[t]he elections radically changed the country’s political landscape. The popular vote gave a new legitimacy to the Socialist Party. From that moment on, we were legitimized by the will of the people’ (Soares 2011: 180). The second winner of the elections was the PPD which, despite the hostility towards the right and despite the fact that its manifesto was much further to the left than its electorate, secured 26% of the vote. While the PPD and the PS combined accounted for almost 70% of the electorate and held an overwhelming majority of seats, it was not until after 25 November 1975 that they succeeded in recovering some of the powers they sought for the Constituent Assembly elected on 25 April 1975. Table 1.1 Electoral Results for the Constituent Assembly, 25 April 1975 Party

Mandates

Partido Socialista Partido Popular Democrático Partido Comunista Português Centro Democrático Social Movimento Democrático Português Frente Socialista Popular Movimento Esquerda Socialista União Democrática Popular Frente Eleitoral dos Comunistas Partido Popular Monárquico Partido de Unidade Popular Liga Comunista Internacionalista Associação para a Defesa dos Interesses de Macau Centro Democrático de Macau Votos Nulos

116 81 30 16 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0

Total

250

Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições, www.cne.pt.

% 37.87 26.39 12.46 7.61 4.14 1.16 1.02 0.79 0.58 0.57 0.23 0.19 0.03 0.02 6.95 100

16 António Costa Pinto and André Paris

A Pre-Revolutionary Juncture: The ‘Hot Summer’ of 1975 It is too simplistic to consider the ‘hot summer’ of 1975 as a mere attempt by the PCP to impose a new dictatorship with the support of the Soviet Union. Naturally, the democratic political elite made much of this argument in its founding discourse, but this does not provide a full explanation of events. This critical juncture was more complex: conflict was fed by the development of strong grassroots political organizations such as workers’ commissions, the growing challenge posed by the extreme left, and its influence within the military. The importance of divisions within the armed forces in driving these events forward means that they cannot be explained simply as part of a programmed conspiracy. Portuguese society became polarized in the summer months of mid-1975, with the emergence of an anti-revolutionary and anti-communist movement in the north of the country. The PS and the PPD backed the moderates within the MFA, leading demonstrations in Lisbon and Porto, and the former opened up a schism with the communists that was to become a longlasting divide on the left of the political spectrum. ‘They succeeded in stabilizing electoral democracy in Portugal, but their success cannot be understood without taking into account popular participation in mass meetings, demonstrations and violent riots’ (Cerezales 2016). In the centrenorth of the country, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and local notables supported parish-level mobilizations, with the local military authorities either remaining neutral or being complicit in the activities. Elements of the right and extreme right, military officers and civilians alike began to mobilize, and the anti-leftist offensive became violent. Attacks were carried out on the offices of the PCP, extreme left groups and associated unions, and radical right-wing terrorist organizations such as the Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal (Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal) and the Exército de Libertação de Portugal (Portuguese Liberation Army) emerged (Marchi 2018). Albeit supported by centre-right parties, it was Mário Soares’ PS that led the anti-communist offensive in 1975, and which also received the greatest international political and financial support. Some campaigns were emblematic of this time, such as the noted denunciation of the occupation of the PS-supporting República newspaper by radical left-wing journalists, which would have serious international repercussions once they were denounced as communist supporters. Another significant event at this time was the occupation of the Renascença radio station, the Catholic Church’s broadcaster, by radical left-wing activists. The PS and the PPD walked out of the provisional government they had joined following the 1974 coup, and the PS broke away from the MFA as Mário Soares demanded the resignation of prime minister Vasco Gonçalves. It was in the context of this growing mobilization that in August 1975 a moderate wing emerged within the MFA: the Grupo dos Nove (Group of Nine), which distanced itself from the fifth provisional government.

Portuguese Democracy at 50 17 In 1974–1975, Portugal experienced significant foreign intervention both in diplomatic terms and in the formation of political parties, unions and interest organizations, as well as shaping the anti-leftist strategy that evolved during the ‘hot summer’ of 1975. The Portuguese case was a divisive issue in international institutions, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community (EEC), affecting relations between these two bodies and the eastern bloc countries led by the Soviet Union. All the evidence suggests that, in 1974–1975, Portugal was an issue of international salience. Caught by surprise by the coup, the international community, particularly the United States, focused on supporting democratic political forces of the centre-left and the right, as well as intervening in the rapid process of decolonization, particularly in Angola. The same postSecond World War methods deployed to deal with Italy were used in Portugal. The moderate political parties were financed by the US administration which, together with the founders of the European ‘political families’ – who often acted as mediators for the US – also supported the training of union and party cadres (Gomes and Sá 2011). The União Geral de Trabalhadores (General Workers’ Union), for example, created by the PS and the PSD as a counterbalance to the communist-dominated Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses – Intersindical Nacional (General Confederation of Portuguese Workers – National Intersyndical), received a lot of external financial and training support. While the communists received considerable support from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, this was easily overshadowed by Western support for the moderates. Although domestic political factors played a critical role in enabling both the triumph of moderate civilian forces and the eventual withdrawal of the military from the political arena, international support and the prospect of EEC membership were more crucial than the early literature on the transition suggests. Caught between the pressures exerted by the extreme left associated with Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho’s Comando Operacional do Continente (Operational Command of the Continent) and the Group of Nine, Vasco Gonçalves’s fifth provisional government resigned at the beginning of September 1975 and was replaced by the sixth provisional government, made up of moderate officers, the PS and the PPD. The new government immediately came under pressure from the extreme left and was mistrusted by the PCP. Tensions between the moderates and the military and civilian left continued to grow, leading to some of the most significant events of the period, including the siege of the Constituent Assembly by a demonstration of civil construction workers at the beginning of November 1975. It was in this context of increasing mobilization that, on 25 November, moderate MFA officers organized a successful counter-coup that toppled the radicals. With the last-minute withdrawal of the PCP on 25 November, the moderates eliminated the radical left in the armed forces. The nature of the transition, and especially the state crisis that it unleashed, is crucial when explaining some of its more radical characteristics, as

18 António Costa Pinto and André Paris well as some of the attitudes with respect to the country’s authoritarian past during this period. Both converged into a double legacy for the consolidation of democracy. However, from 1976 onwards, the process of democratic consolidation was mainly conditioned by the manoeuvring of the legacies inherited from the transition, in a process that Kenneth Maxwell (1995) has defined as a ‘revolution tamed’ and which ultimately involved a protracted sequence of ‘partial settlements’ between civilian and military elites (Graham 1992).

Democratic Consolidation With the victory of moderate forces on 25 November 1975 and the consequent political and military neutralization of the revolutionary left, it proved possible to rapidly institutionalize a liberal democracy that enabled an internal restructuring of the armed forces based on a process of gradual depoliticization and the restoration of discipline and traditional hierarchy. This was accompanied by a purge of radical officers and the dismantling of the parallel ‘revolutionary’ structures that had fragmented and divided the military as an institution during 1974 and 1975 (Castaño and Rezola 2021). The gradual return of the armed forces to their traditional roles, the dissipation of popular mobilization and the new correlation of forces meant that in early 1976 the democratic parties and the moderate military bloc were able to negotiate the revision of the civil-military relations terms through the second Constitutional Agreement Platform. At the same time, now that the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly had been recognized, political parties were able to accelerate their constitutional work in a climate of apparent normality. Shortly after the second MFA-Political Parties’ Pact had been signed, on 2 April 1976, the new political Constitution was approved by a large majority in parliament, with only the CDS voting against it. Of all the liberal democracies that emerged from the so-called third wave of democratic transitions, Portugal’s was perhaps the one that inherited a constitution most anchored to the left. The Portuguese Constitution of 1976 not only declared Portugal a democracy in ‘transition to socialism’, it also consecrated many of the dynamics of the most troubled phase of democratization: the ‘socialisation of the means of production’, or the agrarian reform, ‘as a tool for the construction of a socialist society’ (Pinto 2018). During the consolidation phase, two constitutional revisions eliminated some of these principles, namely the irreversibility of nationalizations; however, many others remained, leaving Portuguese democracy with a durable legacy. Once the new Constitution was in place, three rounds of elections were held: parliamentary (25 April), presidential (27 June) and municipal (12 December). After two years of uncertainty over the democratic outcome of the transition, the new Constitution, together with parliamentary, presidential, and local elections, all contributed to Portugal’s shift towards institutional normalization.

Portuguese Democracy at 50 19 Yet revolutionary legitimacy would be reflected in the institutional architecture of the new political regime. The original version of the Constitution included five sovereign bodies: the president of the republic, the parliament, the government, the courts, and the CR. The Constitution ensured that the CR, a non-elected and strictly military body, was given extensive political and military powers. In addition to advising the president and guaranteeing the upholding of democratic institutions and of the spirit of the 25 April, the CR was defined as a political and legislative body in all military matters. Moreover, although assisted by a Constitutional Commission composed mainly of civilian jurists, the Constitution also ascribed to it jurisdictional functions, embodied in the jurisdictional control of the constitutionality of laws emanating from the other sovereign bodies. Thus, with its legitimacy based on the role played by the military in overthrowing the dictatorship and leading the democratization process, the CR was the MFA’s institutional transfiguration to fit into the new constitutional framework (Lucena 1978; Castaño and Rezola 2021). The need to create an institutional framework for the military in the new democratic order, which extended military authority over the democratically elected civilian authorities, was also a determining factor in the adoption of a semi-presidential system. The thesis that the definition of the system of government adopted by the 1976 Constitution was closely related to the redefinition of civil-military relations in the new democratic regime seems to enjoy a certain unanimity among specialists. This is not to say that other factors, of a systemic nature or associated with historical memory, could not have played a role in the equation (Freire and Pinto 2010; Feijó 2021). However, in the chapter on political organization, the constituent deputies limited themselves to transposing the precepts inscribed in the second platform of constitutional agreement into the fundamental law. Now, as mentioned previously, what was at stake during the negotiations between the CR and the political parties after 25 November 1975 was a redefinition of the military’s role and place within the new constitutional order and establishing the time frame for the subordination of the military to civilian authority (Rezola 2007; Castaño and Rezola 2021). Ultimately, the adoption of a semipresidential system was a way of harmonizing the almost unanimous demand by political parties for the head of state to be directly elected by universal suffrage with the need to accommodate the functional independence and political influence of the military within the new political system (Aguiar 1996; Teles 1998). This fact may help to explain why this issue was barely discussed by the Constituent Assembly, with deputies preferring to wait for the conclusion of the second MFA-Political Parties’ Pact (Miranda 2015) On the one hand, while a semi-presidential system was not on the minds of the main parties, this does not mean it was on the minds of the military. When the negotiations for the second MFA-Political Parties’ Pact began, this was not what they proposed. It was only after several rounds of negotiations that the military accepted the direct election of the head of state, a proposal

20 António Costa Pinto and André Paris originated from the main political parties. However, in return, it demanded that the president should be a military figure who, importantly, would enjoy the trust of the CR (Castaño and Rezola 2021). In some ways, the military nature of the president’s office came to be viewed as a bargaining chip to reduce the powers that the Constitution assigned to the CR. On the other hand, the initial configuration of the presidential powers seems to result from the implicit military nature of the president that was to be elected for the transitional period and the need during this time to enhance the authority and legitimacy of the office of the president, which would be responsible for leading the internal reorganization of the armed forces and ensuring their eventual subordination to civilian authority (Cruz 1994, 2017). There was no constitutional provision to prevent the election of a civilian; however, the clauses contained in the second pact and the political juncture of early 1976 meant that it was almost inevitable that the president would be a military figure (Moreira 1977). Indeed, by establishing that the president of the republic would concomitantly be president of the CR (a body with a strictly military composition) and by presupposing an intrinsic articulation in the functioning of the two sovereign bodies (the exercising of the main presidential powers depended on the authorization or prior opinion of the CR), the second pact defined the institutional coordinates through which the military would exert its influence in the new political system (Miranda 2015). As a renowned Portuguese historian on military issues (Ferreira 1989: 429) underscored, in addition to the constitutional attributions assigned to the CR, the election of a military figure to the presidency of the republic made it possible to ensure the ‘sublimated influence of the military institution in the evolution of the political system’. Given the weight of the military in political life, democratic parties were forced to accept the gradual demilitarization of the regime and to agree that there were advantages in allowing the military to promote its own depoliticization and internal reorganization. In turn, the military was able to ensure that the president was a military figure and to influence the selection of the officer who was to serve as head of state during the period of ‘constitutional transition’. The compromise reached in the second Constitutional Agreement Platform ensured that all the democratic parties (the PS, the PSD and the CDS) backed the presidential candidate supported by the CR. Gen. António Ramalho Eanes, operational commander during the 25 November countercoup and Army Chief of Staff since December 1975, was selected as the presidential candidate by a small group of the CR from among a group of four military officers previously endorsed by the PS (Castaño and Rezola 2021). The level of consensus around the candidacy of Eanes ensured that he was elected after the first round of voting, leading the other candidates by a wide margin. His overwhelming victory added the presidency’s democratic legitimacy to the CR’s revolutionary legitimacy and the functional (or

Portuguese Democracy at 50 21 hierarchical) legitimacy he enjoyed through his position as the head of the armed forces (Aguiar 1996). It was the management of these three sources of legitimacy that allowed Eanes to coordinate with the heads of the other branches of the military and the ‘operational’ sector of the armed forces over the ensuing years to undermine the CR’s political and military role and to pave the way for the normalization of civil-military relations and the demilitarization of the political system (Castaño 2017; Castaño and Rezola 2021). However, the return of the military to the barracks and the normalization of civil-military relations was not a straightforward process. The political and military subordination of the CR, which Eanes had led since 1976, was neither peaceful nor consensual. Right up until the CR was finally abolished in 1982, there remained an important military section within it –historical elements of the MFA – that wanted the CR to play a more substantive military and political role, and in particular to safeguard the ‘revolutionary gains’ and promote the programme contained in the Constitution (Castaño 2017; Castaño and Rezola 2021). The configuration of presidential powers and the persistence of military tutelage through the CR created a conflict between the president and the governing parties. The party system’s inability to produce stable majority governments as the economic situation deteriorated led Eanes to adopt a more interventionist stance concerning the government, basing his actions on the executive’s political responsibility towards both the president and parliament (Cruz 1994). The resulting three presidential cabinets – independents without any parliamentary support base – were a source of great tension between the president and the leading political parties, especially between Eanes and the leaders of the PS and the PSD (Lobo 2000). To prevent a drift towards a presidential form of government, and concerned about moves to establish a presidential party, Mário Soares, leader of the PS, and his PSD counterpart, Francisco Sá Carneiro, distanced themselves from the president and openly criticized his actions. It was in the context of this growing dissent that the guidelines for the inter-party agreement that oversaw the first constitutional revision were established. With the socialists unwilling to alter the ‘economic constitution’, the 1982 revision was virtually limited to the reorganization of the political system, with the democratic parties focusing on ensuring the suppression of military tutelage and reining in the powers of the president. In addition to enhancing the parliamentary nature of the system of government while leaving its semi-presidential nature unaltered (Neto and Lobo 2009; Freire and Pinto 2010), the most important point of the agreement reached between the parties was the abolition of the CR, and its replacement with the Constitutional Court, the Council of State and the Supreme National Defence Council. At the same time, a new National Defence and Armed Forces Law was passed to establish and regulate the institutional parameters of the military’s subordination to civilian authority. Subsequent governments introduced measures to regulate civil-military relations, similarly to those existing in other European democracies (Graham 1993; Maxwell 1995).

22 António Costa Pinto and André Paris In the economic arena, changes would have to wait until 1989, following Portugal’s full integration into the EEC and, partially because of this, for a new inter-party agreement calling for a revision of the Constitution to finally remove the socialist principles and constraints inherited from 1975. The revisions of 1982 and 1989 made it possible to move forward with the democratic normalization of the Constitution and to bring the ‘constitutional quarrel’ to an end (Gaspar 1990; Graham 1992; Gunther et al. 1995b). Albeit with some interpretative divergences regarding the different phases of the democratization process, there is a degree of unanimity in the comparative literature about the importance of the constitutional reversal of the ‘revolutionary’ legacies in the stabilization and consolidation of Portuguese democracy. For Linz and Stepan (1996), the ‘reserve domains’ constitutionally ascribed to the military make Portugal a case of incomplete democratic transition until 1982. In a similar vein, Leonardo Morlino (1998) emphasizes the fact that Portugal could not be considered a full democracy before the 1982 constitutional revision, remaining, between 1976 and that date, as a kind of ‘hybrid’ democratic regime or a ‘semi-democracy’. Converging mostly on the date of completion of the democratic transition or installation, interpretive divergences tend to emerge more sharply when we move on to the chapter of democratic consolidation. In this realm, the reading disagreements on the Portuguese case are mainly a reflection of a lack of broader consensus in establishing a minimum agreement on the definition and operationalization of the concept of democratic consolidation (Schedler 2001; Munck 2004). In their seminal work on the subject, Linz and Stepan (1996) argued that by the time of the first constitutional revision Portuguese democracy had reached the threshold of consolidation. After the constitutional suppression of the ‘reserve domains’ assigned to the military, Portuguese attitudes towards democracy (visible in the reiterated electoral support for pro-democratic parties) and the absence of any political or social organization with national expression using ‘non-democratic means’ to reach their political goals led the authors to conclude that, by 1982, democracy had become ‘the only game in town’ – in constitutional, attitudinal and behavioural terms. Hence, the convergence of these two processes makes Portugal an unusual case of ‘simultaneous transition completion and democratic consolidation’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 124). Other authors, however, prefer to adopt a more extended view of democratic consolidation. Although they recognize the crucial importance of the 1982 revision, according to more maximalist perspectives, the consolidation was only achieved throughout the 1980s, through the election of the first civil president, the integration of Portugal into the EEC and the majority drift of the party system. All these changes facilitated and promoted, from 1986/ 1987, the beginning of a new phase in Portuguese politics, characterized by increasing government stability and the complete civilization of the political system (Cruz 1995; Magone 1997; Morlino 1998). At the same time, other

Portuguese Democracy at 50 23 scholars also consider that, until the end of the 1980s, the consensus around the rules of the new democratic regime was limited by two additional factors. The first of these was the electoral expression of an orthodox communist party, which until the end of the decade maintained an anti-system or semiloyal position vis-à-vis liberal democracy. Second, the socialist clauses inscribed in the economic segment of the Constitution were generally considered to be an obstacle both to the exercise of popular sovereignty and to the full acceptance of the fundamental law by all relevant political actors (Graham 1992; Gunther et al. 1995b; Bruneau et al. 2001; Gunther 2009). As a result, a relevant part of the comparative literature tends to consider the 1989 constitutional revision an indispensable step towards completing the trajectory of consolidation promoted by the 1982 revision. Similarly to other countries in Southern Europe, Portugal was a case of ‘consolidation through parties’ (Morlino 1998: 249). Parties were the main ‘anchors’ in the process of democratic consolidation, either through the stabilization of the party system, or through the intermediary role that party organizations have assumed between the institutional sphere and civil society, thus fortifying the bases of legitimation of the new democratic regime (Morlino 1998). Furthermore, in Portugal, democratic parties were the driving force that lay behind the constitutional revisions and the option for European integration, which would decisively shape the new democracy, gradually adjusting it to Western Europe’s institutional standards. However, it is worth noting that political parties were not the only relevant actors in this process. One of the essential steps that allowed Portugal to complete the democratic transition and accelerate its consolidation – the demilitarization of the regime and the establishment of civilian supremacy over the military – was only possible because of the role played by Gen. Ramalho Eanes and the collaboration of an important (and majority) sector of the armed forces. As has been suggested and reaffirmed, we should not reduce the explanation of the civilian nature of the political regime in 1982 to a simple civil-military division (Graham 1993; Castaño 2017). Recalling a well-known argument posited by Lawrence Graham (1992), one might say that between 1976 and the end of the 1980s, the consolidation of Portuguese democracy was based, approximately, on a prolonged sequence of ‘partial settlements’ between elites, both civilian and military.

Conclusion: The Legacies of Democratic Transition In this chapter, we argued that the process of Portuguese democratization was conditioned by the management of a double legacy, namely the legacy of the authoritarian regime on the one hand, and by the legacy inherited from the ‘revolutionary rupture’ of 1974/1975 on the other hand. Indeed, the first phase of democratization, the two turbulent and uncertain years of the transition period, is marked by the dismantling of the dictatorship’s political institutions, by decolonization and by a strong if incoherent settling of

24 António Costa Pinto and André Paris accounts with the authoritarian past. From 1976 onwards, however, the consolidation process was guided by a gradual and negotiated reversal of institutional legacies and the more radical economic and social transformations that took place during the transition. The radical break with the authoritarian past, and the new cleavages that emerged in the first phase of the transition, were followed by a consolidation of democracy essentially marked by an environment embodying national conciliation. The nature of the revolutionary rupture, by catapulting the political role of the military and promoting a set of economic and social transformations, left the new post-authoritarian political elite, both civilian and military, an important legacy that conditioned and delayed the consolidation of the new Portuguese democracy. In fact, both the consolidation of democracy and integration into the EEC – one of the pillars of foreign policy and the fundamental strategic option made by the democratic regime founded in 1976 (Ferreira 2006) – were dependent on a process of gradual and negotiated review of the legacies left by the ‘revolutionary juncture’ of 1974/1975 (Magone 1997). But if some legacies were gradually eliminated, others continued to shape Portuguese democracy. The gradual and cumulative amendments of the original version of 1976 Constitution had promoted profound changes in terms of its economic organization. In addition to the normalization of the constitutional lexicon, completely purged of the ideological terminology inherited from the ‘revolutionary juncture’ of 1975, the 1989 revision (reinforced by ensuing revisions), eliminated the irreversibility of nationalizations, suppressed the reference to the agrarian reform and removed the remaining obstacles to the development of private initiatives. Following a set of changes registered in the real economy and Portuguese society, the successive constitutional revisions thereby gave constitutional coverage to the emergence of a social market economy and condemned the construction of a ‘socialist society’ to a historical curiosity inscribed in the preamble of the Constitution (Gaspar 1990; Moreira 2006). However, if the economic segment of the Constitution has undergone profound changes, the same is not necessarily true of the original catalogue of social and economic rights. In this realm, Portugal is a paradigmatic example of how ‘ruptures against right-wing regimes seem to leave a powerful and resistant legacy of entrenchment of social rights’ (Magalhães 2013: 460). Even after seven amendments, the Portuguese Constitution has remained one of the most progressive constitutions in terms of social and economic rights and labour rights protection. In comparative terms, the Portuguese constitutional text is not only one of the most extensive and detailed but also one of the most prescriptive regarding the role of the state in the fulfilment and provision of social rights (ibid.; Vieira and Silva 2013). It is worth nothing that, on the eve of the democratic transition, Portugal was, in the context of Western Europe, the country with the highest level of income inequality and the least developed social protection system.

Portuguese Democracy at 50 25 Therefore, this progressive and constitutional pre-commitment to social rights of citizenship represented a break with its authoritarian past and constituted the constitutional foundation for the development and consolidation of the welfare state, broadly considered one of the most remarkable achievements of the new Portuguese democracy. Noteworthy, the larger convergence of the Portuguese welfare system with European standards of social protection, health and education up until the global financial crisis – especially when compared with Spain and Greece – has been explained by the ‘social revolution’ which marked the Portuguese transition from authoritarian rule to democratic politics (Fishman 2019; Branco 2020). The enduring legacy of the Portuguese Constitution could also be seen during the European sovereign debt crisis, when Portugal suffered its third bailout since the country’s democratic transition. Throughout the international rescue, appeals to the Constitution and the quite independent Constitutional Court were important elements in the anti-austerity campaigns mounted by social movements as a main element blocking the attempts of the centre-right government to challenge social rights (Violante 2018). Likewise, albeit with some revisions, the semi-presidential nature of the system of government has remained unchanged. It has been convincingly argued that, after the 1982 constitutional amendments, the Portuguese system of government shifted from a presidential-parliamentary variant of semi-presidentialism to a premier-presidential one (Neto and Lobo 2009; Neto 2022). Although the cabinet’s political responsibility to the president has been removed and the ability of the latter to dismiss the executive has been narrowed, from 1982 onwards the head of state still retained significant constitutional prerogatives (the nomination of the prime minister and other cabinet members, the dissolution of parliament, veto and referral powers on legislation, supreme commandment of the armed forces, etc.). Despite the increasing political prominence of the executive and the leading position of the prime minister within the political system since the 1980s (Lobo 2005), these constitutional attributions (namely the veto and referral powers), assured the president of the ability to preserve some influence over the policymaking process (Freire and Pinto 2010; Neto and Lobo 2009). At the same time, the Portuguese presidents also have the capacity to use ‘extraconstitutional powers’ or to adopt ‘going public tactics’ (ibid.) – usually knows as ‘the power of public word’ (Feijó 2021: 90–91) – that give presidential actions the ability to influence ‘media and public agenda-setting’, thus constraining the government and parliamentarians’ political and policy agendas (Jalali 2011: 170; Feijó 2021). Ultimately, considering the usage of both its formal and informal powers, the head of state is far from being a ‘powerless passenger’ or a ceremonial figurehead in the Portuguese political system (Jalali 2011; Neto 2022). As several authors have pointed out (Bruneau 1997; Gunther and Montero 2001; Jalali 2007), the nature of parties and the dynamics of the party system that emerged during the transition period were also profoundly shaped by

26 António Costa Pinto and André Paris the ‘critical juncture’ of 1974/1975, facilitating the emergence of a party system characterized by a divided left and a ‘non-successor’ right (Freire 2021; Paris and Silveira 2021). The deep divisions within the left and the emergence of new right-wing parties without deep roots in the previous dictatorship help to explain the formation of the ‘implicit democratic coalition’ (comprising the PS, the PSD and the CDS) which, in close alliance with the moderate sector of the armed forces and the Catholic Church, would be decisive in ensuring the democratic outcome of the Portuguese transition (Jalali 2007: 76). This same party coalition would be responsible for the implementation of measures that, from 1976 onwards, made it possible to consolidate democracy and adjust it to the economic and social model that prevailed in the other EEC countries. Finally, it was also within this implicit democratic coalition that, over several decades, the patterns of alternation and cabinet formation were established. The reversal of this cooperative pattern was the continued exclusion of the PCP and the radical left from the government sphere, a pattern only partially altered since 2015, with the unprecedented formation of a PS minority government with parliamentary support from the parties to its left (Jalali 2019). The Portuguese transition to democracy illustrates the multilinear and multifaced nature of democratization and, therefore, the multiple trajectories and outcomes that can follow the process of democratic consolidation (Schmitter 1992, 1999a; Gunther et al. 1995a; Linz and Stepan 1996). To be sure, not all democracies consolidate in the same way and not all consolidated democracies necessarily share the same features. One should always bear in mind, as stressed by Philippe Schmitter (1999b: 344), that ‘it is not democracy that is being consolidated, but one or another type of democracy’. Surely, the type of democracy that emerged and eventually became consolidated in Portugal – considering both its institutional configuration and some qualitative attributes of Portuguese democracy – was shaped by this protracted trajectory towards democratization. Yet the more recent scholarly research that emphasizes the lasting benefits of the Portuguese transition in political inclusion or dimensions other than democratic consolidation has drawn attention to distinctive legacies (such as cultural ones) or different impacts that one can find when addressing varied dimensions of democracy, such as consolidation, quality or depth (Fishman 2016, 2019). The conceptual distinction between these different (albeit interrelated) dimensions of democratization is essential to properly understand the apparent contradiction that opposes what one might define as defective and virtuous perspectives on the enduring legacies of Portuguese transition. There is no reason to presume that the features that might constrain or hold back a transition towards, and the consolidation of, a liberal democracy, might not also favour, in the long term, some of the properties related to democratic quality or depth. In other words, an integrated overview of both readings and their empirical findings suggests a double-edged legacy when considering the enduring consequences of Portuguese democratization.

Portuguese Democracy at 50 27

Note 1 For an abstract of the main arguments in this chapter, see Pinto and Paris (2022).

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30 António Costa Pinto and André Paris Magone, J. (1997). European Portugal: The Difficult Road to Sustainable Democracy, London: Macmillan. Marchi, R. (2018). The Portuguese Far Right: Between Late Authoritarianism and Democracy (1945–2015), London: Routledge. Martins, H. (2018). As Mudanças de Regime em Portugal no Século XX, Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Maxwell, K. (1995). The Making of Portuguese Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miller, M. K. (2021). Shock to the System: Coups, Elections, and War on the Road to Democratization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Miranda, J. (2015). Da Revolução à Constituição: Memórias da Assembleia Constituinte, Cascais: Príncipia. Moreira, A. (1977). O Novíssimo Príncipe, Braga: Editorial Intervenção. Moreira, V. (2006). ‘A Metamorfose da “Constituição Económica”’, Themis (Edição Especial – 30 Anos da Constituição Portuguesa, 1976–2006): 33–47. Morlino, L. (1998). Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Munck, G. (2004). ‘Democracy Studies: Agendas, Findings, Challenges’, in D. BergSchlosser (Eds.) Democratization: The State of the Art, Berlin: VS-Verlag, pp. 65–97. Neto, O. A. (2022). ‘Semi-Presidentialism in Portugal: Academic Quarrels Amidst Institutional Stability’, in J. M. Fernandes, P. C. Magalhães and A. C. Pinto (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 121–135. Neto, O. A. and Lobo, M. C. (2009). ‘Portugal’s Semi-Presidentialism (Re)Considered: An Assessment of the President’s Role in the Policy Process, 1976–2006’, European Journal of Political Research 48 (2): 234–255. O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C. and Whitehead, L. (Eds.) (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Paris, A., Marchi, R. and Raimundo, F. (2019). Breve História do CDS-Partido Popular, Lisbon: 100 Folhas/Público. Paris, A. and Silveira, P. (2021). ‘Um Legado em Forma de Assim: A Gestão do Passado Autoritário na Ausência de Um Partido Sucessor’, in F. Raimundo and J. Cancela (Eds.) As Eleições de 1975 – Eleições Fundadoras da Democracia Portuguesa, Lisbon: Edições Assembleia da República, pp. 63–83. Pinto, A. C. (2010). ‘Coping with the Double Legacy of Authoritarianism and Revolution in Portuguese Democracy’, South European Society and Politics 15 (3): 395–412. Pinto, A. C. (2018). ‘Constitution-Making and the Democratization of Portugal: An Enduring Legacy’, Portuguese Studies 34 (1): 35–51. Pinto, A. C. and Paris, A. (2022). ‘Democratization and its Legacies’, in J. M. Fernandes, P. C. Magalhães and A. C. Pinto (Eds.) Oxford Handbook on Portuguese Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18–37. Pinto, P. R. (2013). Lisbon Rising: Urban Social Movements in the Portuguese Revolution, 1974–75, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Porch, D. (1977). The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution, Palo Alto, CA: The Hoover Institution Press. Rezola, M. I. (2007). 25 de Abril: Mitos de uma Revolução, Lisbon: Esfera dos Livros. Schedler, A. (2001). ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (1): 66–92. Schmitter, P. C. (1971). Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Portuguese Democracy at 50 31 Schmitter, P. C. (1975). ‘Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal’, Armed Forces and Society 2 (1): 5–33. Schmitter, P. C. (1992). ‘The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups’, American Behavioral Scientist 35 (4–5): 422–449. Schmitter, P. C. (1999a). Portugal: Do Autoritarismo à Democracia, Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Schmitter, P. C. (1999b). ‘The Democratization of Portugal in Its Comparative Perspective’, in F. Rosas (Ed.) Portugal e a Transição para a Democracia (1974–1976), Lisbon: Colibri/Fundação Mário Soares, pp. 337–363. Soares, M. (2011). Um Político Assume-se: Ensaio Autobiográfico, Político e Ideológico, Lisbon: Temas e Debates. Sweezy, P. (1975). ‘Class Struggles in Portugal’, Monthly Review 27 (Sept.): 1–26. Teles, M. G. (1998). ‘A Segunda Plataforma de Acordo Constitucional entre o Movimento das Forças Armadas e os Partidos Políticos’, in J. Miranda (Ed.) Perspectivas Constitucionais: Nos 20 Anos da Constituição de 1976, Vol. 3, Coimbra: Coimbra Editora. Vieira, M. B. and Silva, F. C. (2013). ‘Getting Rights Right: Explaining Social Rights Constitutionalization in Revolutionary Portugal’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 11 (4): 898–922. Varol, O. (2017). The Democratic Coup d´État, New York. Oxford University Press. Violante, T. (2018). ‘The Portuguese Constitutional Court and Its Austerity Case Law’, in A. Costa Pinto and M. C. Pequito (Eds.) Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal, London: Routledge, pp. 121–143.

2

European Misfit The Portuguese Economy after EU Membership Luciano Amaral

Introduction In April 2011, the Portuguese government requested international assistance to deal with its foreign financial commitments. This was the culmination of a crisis that began in 2008, accompanying similar events around the world. But in the case of Portugal, this negative cycle was inserted into an ongoing medium-term trend of mediocre growth. Figure 2.1 shows how, after half a century of convergence, the Portuguese economy diverged away from wealthier economies from the beginning of the 21st century onward. This is the longest divergence period since the 19th century, as the figure also shows. The crisis that started in 2008 was unlike that experienced by many other countries; it was a negative event (a ‘black swan’) that interrupted a phase of persistent and healthy growth. Indeed, it was a kind of coda to an already worrying economic situation. The financial assistance programme granted to the country between 2011 and 2014 included a structural reform section, the purpose of which was to make the Portuguese economy increase its pace of growth and become more competitive. The results were far from overwhelming: the economy began to catch up between 2015 and 2019 but at a relatively slow pace, and it was successively overtaken by various Eastern and Central European economies. Meanwhile, all the ground recovered during this period was lost as a consequence of the economic effects of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 (Figure 2.1). At the time of writing of this chapter (May 2022), full recovery from the crash had yet to happen. This chapter argues that the Portuguese economy began to perform poorly in 1986, almost as soon as the country joined what was then called the European Economic Community (EEC). These difficulties were not immediately visible, thanks to an initial trajectory (between 1986 and 1992) of strong growth. However, signs of stress could already be seen, particularly in the country’s trade and current accounts. Portugal’s difficulties chiefly related to the adoption of a monetary and exchange rate policy that led to real exchange rate appreciation and, consequently, a decline in competitiveness. From 1977 to 1986, the economy was anchored to an exchange rate policy (the ‘crawling peg’) that was able to improve competitiveness thanks to DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-3

European Misfit 33 monthly depreciations of the escudo. From 1986 to 1990, the rate of depreciation slowed, and from 1990 it was abandoned completely as the Portuguese authorities adopted an exchange rate-based disinflation policy. Disinflation was successful, albeit not enough to fully cover the inflation differential with the rest of the countries in the European bloc, meaning that real exchange rate appreciation was a hallmark of the economy until the early 21st century. A growing external imbalance developed, which could only be covered by an equivalent growing external indebtedness in relation to those EU countries that had external surpluses. This process is sometimes associated with the period of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from 1999 onwards. This chapter shows that, in reality, it started much earlier. The main point of the chapter is that Portugal’s economic troubles of the last quarter of a century result from a combination of a specific ‘Portuguese problem’ with a wider ‘European problem’, and that the latter did not begin with EMU, but rather with the country’s efforts in the mid-1980s to increase economic integration within the EEC. The remainder of the chapter goes as follows: In the first section we document the difficulties that the Portuguese economy experienced when integrating into the wider European economy. In the second section, we follow the main milestones of Portuguese economic and monetary policy and its relationship with Europe. In the third section, we analyse the consequences, as they became clear in 2011, for the Portuguese economy of both policies followed in Portugal and within the ‘European project’.

European Misfit Figure 2.1 shows that the difficulties the Portuguese economy experienced when attempting to integrate itself into the European project were somehow masked by an extraordinary process of convergence during the early years of EU membership: over the course of six years (1986–1992), the economy very quickly closed the gap with those of the wealthiest nations – in the case of the sample used for comparison in Figure 2.1, the gap narrowed from about 50% to about 35% during the period. From 1992, however, divergence returned. During an initial phase (from 1992 to 2000), the economy was able to maintain its distance; however, from that point until 2014 it diverged persistently. Only between 2015 and 2019 did it recover some of the ground lost. However, the economic impact of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 led to a new decline, with almost half of the ground gained during the early years of membership of the European bloc being lost. Currently, in comparative terms, Portugal’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is more or less what it was in 1989. Figure 2.1 provides some interesting information: for instance, it shows that per capita GDP converged much faster than GDP per hour worked (or productivity), a process that had a growing external imbalance as an

34 Luciano Amaral

Figure 2.1 GDP per capita and GDP per hour worked in Portugal as a % of per capita GDP in more developed countries, 1820–2021 Note: Countries represented in the sample include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Unit: purchasing power parity (constant 2011 US $). Source: Portugal 1820–1910, Maddison (2003); 1910–1950, Batista (1997); 1950–2007, Amaral (2009); 2007–2017, The Conference Board (2018); 2017–2021, OECD (2022); for the other countries: 1810–1950, Maddison (2003); 1950–2017, The Conference Board (2018); 2017–2021, OECD (2022).

inevitable counterpart, as shown in Figure 2.2. This figure shows the evolution of Portugal’s external accounts, from which we can draw many conclusions. The first is that, after the strenuous effort to rebalance during the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention from 1983 to 1985, when the current account increased from –12% of GDP in 1982 to –1.5% in 1986, the external balance was fragile from the moment the country joined the EEC. The trade deficit declined from –6% in 1986 to –12% in 1988, recovering only mildly (to –10%) during the 1992–1994 crisis, where it remained until 2010. The trade deficit had historically been more than compensated for by tourism receipts and emigrant remittances (the latter identified as transfers in Figure 2.2). The situation continued from 1986 until the early to mid1990s. However, emigrant remittances started to decline from the early 1980s (when they accounted for about 10% of GDP). By 1996, they had dropped to 2.5% of GDP, and in the first decades of the 21st century they became negative in net terms due to the combination of lower remittances from

European Misfit 35 Portuguese emigrants and an increased flow of remittances out of Portugal by immigrant communities in the country (which began to increase in number during the 1990s) in addition to the repatriated profits of foreign investors. Inevitably, the current account deteriorated from the 1990s onwards, quickly reaching –10% of GDP and remaining at that level until 2010. European transfers (classified in the capital account in Figure 2.2) helped to balance international payments but became increasingly less important. During the second decade of the 21st century, remittances accounted for close to 0% of GDP. In the same period, however, the contribution of tourism increased significantly, reaching 9% of GDP in 2019, a value similar to that of remittances in the past. The recent overall rebalancing of the Portuguese external accounts (from 2010 onward) is essentially concerned with this impressive growth of tourism combined with some growth in the export of goods (due to a limited improvement in competitiveness, as a consequence of the decrease in the cost of labour resulting from the intervention by the troika (comprising the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission and the IMF) between 2011 and 2014) and the halting of imports as a result of the recession induced by the stabilization programme that accompanied the programme of loans from the troika. The general message of the evolution of the Portuguese external accounts is that most of the ‘European period’ (which commenced when the country joined the EEC) was of external imbalance. This partially contradicts the idea that responsibility for its recent difficulties lay only with EMU (Blanchard 2007; Holinski et al. 2012; Gros 2012). Figure 2.2 shows that EMU

Figure 2.2 External accounts (% of GDP), Portugal, 1960–2020 Source: 1960–1995, Pinheiro et al. (1997); 1996–2021, INE (2021).

36 Luciano Amaral has not allowed for rebalancing; however, it also shows that the deterioration of the economy’s external position started much earlier, during the final 15 years of the 20th century, with pressure being felt from the mid-1980s, a period coinciding with Portugal’s membership of the EEC. Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 provide additional pertinent information. It is often claimed that joining the EEC allowed the Portuguese economy to become more open. Figure 2.3 shows that this is not entirely true. The degree of economic openness increased from roughly 12% to 30% of GDP between the late 1970s and 1984, the decade preceding EEC membership. It then stabilized at that level until 2004, when it increased slightly (to 35%) until 2010, increasing decisively year-on-year, although during the period 2011–14 this was mainly due to a significant decline in GDP. When comparing the degree of openness of the Portuguese economy with that of the EU-15 group of countries (see Figure 2.3), we reach some interesting conclusions. First, when the Portuguese economy became more open between 1976 and 1984, the other economies did not follow suit. The process was so strong that until the late 1990s the Portuguese economy reached a level of openness that was almost equivalent to that of its EU partners. Thereafter, however, the picture changed completely, with the other European economies becoming increasingly open, while that of Portugal did not – at least until 2010. During the second decade of the century, the steady increase in the degree of the Portuguese economy’s openness was accompanied by a similar process among its partners, so that ultimately the gap between them was never closed. More interesting still is the information obtained by deconstructing openness into its constituent parts: imports and exports. When considering imports there is one striking fact: the weight of imports on Portuguese GDP was well within the EU average until the early 21st century, after which it started diverging, becoming lower in Portugal than in the other EU countries. In terms of exports, the picture is completely different, as the Portuguese economy appears below the EU-15 average all the time. Again, the second half of the 1970s stands out: exports as a percentage of GDP increased rapidly from about 15% to almost 25% at that time, thereby converging with the EU-15 average. From the 1980s until 2010, the weight of exports remained the same, while it expanded in the EU-15 from the early 1990s onward, leading to a widening gap until 2010. Only from then did the weight of exports in the Portuguese economy grow, although without closing the gap as exports as a proportion of GDP continued to grow across Europe, with the Portuguese economy among those member states in which exports accounted for the lowest proportion of GDP. What the set of information presented above reveals is the structural difficulty of the Portuguese economy to cope with the integration brought about by both the European and EMU projects. It must be asked: was this problem exclusive to Portugal or was it a problem confronting the whole European venture? Figure 2.6 illustrates the convergence of per capita GDP among EU member states, showing that, independently of the selected group of

European Misfit 37

Figure 2.3 Degree of openness of the economy (% of GDP), Portugal and EU-15, 1960–2021 Note: Openness is measured as the sum of 1/2x(exports+imports)/GDP. Source: AMECO (2022).

Figure 2.4 Imports as a % of GDP, Portugal and EU-15, 1960–2021 Source: AMECO (2022).

38 Luciano Amaral

Figure 2.5 Exports as a % of GDP, Portugal and EU-15, 1960–2021 Source: AMECO (2022).

countries, convergence ceased after the 1980s and 1990s. The largest group is that of the EU-28 (this being prior to the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU on 31 January 2020, known as Brexit). Strikingly, given that this group includes a large number of former Eastern bloc countries, convergence was faster between 1950 and the 1980s. Then it stopped, and even turned into divergence for a while, although as a consequence of the shortterm economic effects of the disaggregation of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. Once the major shock had passed, convergence returned in the early 21st century, but the gap only returned to the one that existed in the early 1980s. The second largest group considered in Figure 2.6 is that of the 19 countries using the single European currency, the euro. The convergence within this group is quite similar to that of the EU-28, and accelerated in the 1970s. The divergence of the early 1990s can be explained by the participation of some of the former Eastern bloc countries in the group. Independently of the effects of that period, we can also see that there has been no long-term convergence within this group since the 1980s. If we restrict our approach to the group of 14 Western European countries in the single currency (i.e. countries not suffering from the disaggregation of the communist bloc), convergence continued until the mid-1990s, when it ceased. As for the period during which EMU existed, there is no sign of convergence – on the contrary, since the outbreak of the 2007–2008 crisis there has been divergence. Finally, if we consider the EU-15 group of countries (i.e.

European Misfit 39

Figure 2.6 Convergence in the EU, 1950–2021 Note: the information in the graph refers to -convergence, which is measured as: P 1 where t ¼ ½n1 ni¼1 ðlnyit lnytÞ2 2, where lnyit is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in country i at time t, and lnyt is the natural logarithm of the average of GDP per capita in the sample under consideration, constituted of n observations. Source: 1950–2018, The Conference Board; 2019–21, AMECO (2022).

Western Europe, excluding the few countries that are not EU members, namely Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), convergence also halted from the 1980s (and there was even a slight divergence in the second decade of the 21st century). This shows that the EU has stopped being a convergence engine since the 1980s, precisely when Portugal became a member of the Union. It is very interesting to verify that convergence was much stronger during the period when Europe was divided into three blocs, namely the European Free Trade Association, the EEC and the communist bloc, one of which did not even share the same market mechanisms as the others. It was when integration got stronger that convergence stopped. The problem of the Portuguese economy within the EU cannot, therefore, be seen in isolation from a wider European problem.

How to Integrate The central issue for the Portuguese economy during the last 25 years has been its relationship with the EU. This relationship has become increasingly complex, in large part due to changes in the EU itself, not just in Portugal.

40 Luciano Amaral The Portuguese economy had to cope with a series of internal challenges related to the 1974 overthrow of the authoritarian Estado Novo (‘New State’) regime that had ruled the country since 1933. In the shift from one regime to the other, the performance of the economy changed substantially. The last 30 years of the authoritarian regime were the best in terms of economic growth in all of Portugal’s history; but from 1974 there was a significant slowdown (Figure 2.1). The economy crashed during the transition from one regime to the other. The years 1974 and 1975 were marked by convulsions that had domestic and external roots. Domestically, they were the result of the revolutionary process that began on 25 April 1974; externally, they were the result of the 1973 oil shock, followed by a serious international crisis (Amaral 2019). One of the most important processes resulting from the revolution was a nationalization programme that caused the disintegration of the country’s business groups. Nationalizations began in March 1975, and by 1976 the state totally or partially controlled a range of sectors: money supply, banking, insurance, basic metals, naval construction and maintenance, cement, paper and paper pulp, chemicals and petrochemicals. By the end of the process, this sector was responsible for 20%–25% of GDP, 30% of investment and 8% of the workforce (Baklanoff 1996), accounting for one of the largest nationalized sectors in the Western world. The economy was also rocked by a series of industrial disputes that led to real wage growth to approximately 15% in 1975. The wage explosion was even more difficult to accommodate because of a concurrent population explosion caused by the arrival of about 600,000 people (or approximately 7% of the total population) in 1975 and 1976 returning to Portugal from the newly independent colonies. Thus, when the international crisis and the increase in the labour force generated pressures for massive wage declines, the exact opposite happened. Unemployment, which was virtually non-existent in 1973 (1.7%), jumped to 6.2% in 1976 (Amaral 2019). In addition to the increase in wages, labour unrest led to a profound change in the institutional framework of the labour market. Between 1974 and 1975, a minimum wage was introduced, a national unemployment benefit system was created, strikes were legalized, unionization became free, collective bargaining became more generalized and new rules governing recruitment and dismissals were approved that made it almost impossible for employers to dismiss individuals or to dismiss staff en masse (Lopes 1996; Amaral 2019). Labour thus became a much more expensive factor of production. From 1976, a succession of governments attempted to stimulate growth using the vast public sector now under their control. The effect of these efforts on economic growth was positive, but difficult to sustain. Growth was excessively dependent on expansionary policies (based on public credit) that led to external imbalances. In 1977, the current account deficit reached 8% of GDP (Figure 2.2). Between 1977 and 1978, the country was unable to meet

European Misfit 41 its external payments, leading to the agreement of two economic stabilization plans with the IMF. The policy followed under these plans consisted of an increase in interest rates and a restriction of credit to both the private and public sectors in an attempt to slow demand; it also consisted of an increase in the price of consumer goods (which were at the time largely set by the government) and the depreciation of the escudo as a means of increasing the competitiveness of Portuguese exports (Amaral et al. 2020). Following a number of ad hoc depreciations, a monetary and exchange policy was adopted from 1977 that marked the Portuguese economy until 1990: the ‘crawling peg’ regime that consisted of the monthly depreciation of the escudo in pre-announced amounts. The IMF policy package also included fiscal discipline. The results of these policies were quite positive in terms of external balance: the current account deficit reached about 4% of GDP in 1978 and was balanced in 1979 (see Figure 2.2) (Lopes 1996; Amaral et al. 2020). The external deficit worsened again in 1980, when for electoral reasons the government of the day adopted an expansionary fiscal policy combined with a public sector wage increase and a revaluation of the escudo. Even if it facilitated an increase in purchasing power, this policy led to a return in external imbalance. Following the 1979 oil shock and the emergence of a new international crisis, the situation again became serious. External imbalance reached a new critical level in 1982 with a record current account deficit of 13% of GDP (Figure 2.2). Another external loan had to be negotiated, as well as a new agreement with the IMF and a new austerity package adopted for the period 1983–1985. Again, the policy was successful in terms of the external balance, which produced a 3.5% surplus in 1986 (Figure 2.2), even if this time the effect on economic activity and unemployment was more serious than it had been from 1977 to 1979. Growth was negative in 1983 and 1984, the annual inflation rate soared to approximately 26%, while unemployment reached 9% (Lopes 1996; Amaral 2019). By 1986, the external situation was balanced once more, although the economy was in a depressed state. These were the circumstances under which Portugal joined the EEC. Membership created new opportunities that led to period of strong growth from 1986 to 1992, albeit brief (Amaral 2019) (Figure 2.1). However, this growth took place in a new context, mainly due to the changes that the EEC project was experiencing at the time. When Portugal joined the EEC, the project was entering a crucial new phase that was marked by the adoption of both the single market and monetary union programmes. The single market was adopted by the EEC in 1986, after the European Council signed the Single European Act. Its purpose was to overcome what was then called ‘Eurosclerosis’, namely the low growth and high unemployment that was at the time undermining the European economies. A recipe of competition, by making truly effective the abolition of protectionism embodied in the Treaty of Rome, was seen as the most appropriate method to achieve this: a European single market would prevent all forms of non-tariff protectionism, such as discriminatory taxes on both imported and

42 Luciano Amaral exported goods and services, state subsidies, legal access to activities and technical standards, and allow for the free circulation of goods, capital and labour (Vetter 2013). In a study commissioned by the European Commission, Cecchini et al. (1988) highlighted the optimism prevalent in EEC circles: it was estimated that the wealth effect generated by the single market could reach 6.5% of GDP for all member countries on aggregate, while the dynamic growth effects could reach 0.9% of GDP per year. A natural complement to the single market was monetary union, as exchange rate devaluations were seen as a form of covert protectionism. In 1989, the Delors Report, a document produced by a commission of experts led by President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, was accepted by the European Council. Its most important proposal was the creation of a monetary union. The idea of unifying the currencies of the countries belonging to the EEC was not new as it had been hinted at in the Treaty of Rome, and since 1969 the Barre Plan, named for the French politician Raymond Barre, prepared for its implementation (Dinan 2004). In 1971, the Council of Ministers adopted the Werner Report, named after the Luxembourgian prime minister and minister of finance Pierre Werner, which was a blueprint for monetary union to be achieved by 1980 (Magnusson and Stråth 2002). In 1972, the so-called currency snake was created, under which European currencies had to contain their value within a ±2.25% band in relation to the US dollar (James 2012). The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in that year and a series of disagreements on sovereignty issues put an end to the Werner Plan, but not the idea of monetary union, as Europeans felt vulnerable in relation to the power exerted by the United States thanks to the reserve currency role played by the US dollar (Eichengreen 1996). In 1979, the European Monetary System was created, through which the currencies of the member states were allowed to float within a narrow band of ±2.25% and a wide band of ±6%. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was the technical device used to keep the system functioning (James 2012). In December 1990, the European Council met in Maastricht, Netherlands, to sign a treaty that created the European Union (replacing the EEC) and established a blueprint for the birth of the single currency (James 2012). The process was to proceed in stages, with Stage I commencing in late 1990, when countries should start removing capital controls (with the exception of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which were given more time due to their higher levels of inflation and interest rates) and to ensure the independence of their central banks from the government; in Stage II, which began in 1994, there was to be a further convergence of national macroeconomic policies; and in Stage III, starting in January 1999, full monetary union was to be achieved. Countries could be part of the process by meeting four criteria: having kept the value of their currency within the normal ERM fluctuation bands for at least two years before entry; having had an inflation rate in the year before 1999 that was no more than 1.5% above the rate of the three best performing member states in terms of price stability; and a public

European Misfit 43 debt no greater than 60% of GDP and a budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP in 1999 (Eichengreen 1996). EMU was the natural conclusion of the integration effort that began with the European single market. There was much political voluntarism in putting it forward, as decision-makers chose not to heed the many reservations that were raised from many quarters (James 2012). The optimistic case for monetary union had its foundations in the ‘optimal currency area’ theory of Mundell (1961). Some authors even suggested that the conditions for such a currency area in the EU were so good that EMU was an endogenous result (Frankel and Rose 1998). The growth impact of EMU would be large, according to many observers, thanks to the expansion of trade generated by the removal of exchange rate frictions (Rose 2000; Rose and Wincoop 2001). The doubts raised by many about whether the EU was an optimal currency area were not enough to halt the process, even if they often anticipated those issues that surfaced after 2010 (James 2012). This entire integrationist process was a huge challenge for the Portuguese economy. Moreover, this was true of the internal changes that were taking place at the same time, especially the revision of the constitution in 1989 that facilitated the reprivatization of assets that had been nationalized during the revolutionary period following the April 1974 coup. This immediately paved the way for a vast programme of privatization that resulted in Portugal having one of the lowest proportions of state enterprises in the developed world (Lopes 1996; Amaral 2019). As the Portuguese governments of day decided to participate in this integrationist process, including monetary union, controlling inflation became a central policy objective (Abreu 2001). The crawling peg exchange rate regime adopted in 1977 had been designed as an instrument to retain competitiveness in a context of high inflation; however, that could not continue if a country was in a currency union with other economies. The objective of controlling inflation was also one that was an independent decision of the Portuguese authorities, which also decided to participate in the common currency. Both factors compelled the country adopt a hard exchange rate policy from 1986 onwards. The pace of depreciation of the crawling peg’s monthly exchange rate began to declerate in 1986 with the result that, as depreciation was no longer compensating for the inflation rate, the value of the escudo began to appreciate. As the rate of the crawling peg implied an increasingly milder depreciation of the escudo until 1990, real appreciation continued (ibid.). These partial measures were unable to control inflation, which started to rise again in 1988 and 1989. Consequently, the government took the more radical step of completely ending the crawling peg regime and instead pegged the escudo to a basket of five currencies inside the European Monetary System (EMS) (the Deutsche Mark, sterling, the French franc, the Italian lira and the Spanish peseta). The purpose was to control inflation and prepare the escudo to enter EMS and ERM, a necessary step to becoming a

44 Luciano Amaral founding member of the common currency. The escudo remained stable until 1992, thus qualifying for EMS membership (Detragiache and Hamann 1997). However, as the inflation differential continued to be substantial (despite a drop in the rate of inflation), real appreciation continued until 1992 when an increase of 30% from 1990 to 1992 was recorded (Amaral 2019), which resulted in a sudden loss of competitiveness. In 1992, the escudo did enter the ERM, which at the time was going through a complex period as doubts began to be voiced about whether EMU would ever become a reality, particularly in the wake of the Danish referendum in 1992 when the Danish people voted against joining the single currency (Detragiache and Hamann 1997; Abreu 2001). Several currencies came under strong pressure, to the extent that in September 1993 both sterling and the lira abandoned the ERM, despite the mechanism’s fluctuation bands widening from ±6% to ±15%. Portugal remained in the mechanism, but depreciated the escudo twice, in 1992 and 1993, albeit by relatively small amounts (6% in November 1992 and 6.5% in May 1993) (Abreu 2001). In order to demonstrate its commitment to disinflation, the Portuguese authorities chose not to use the 15% margin allowed by the new ERM rules. Consequently, Portuguese competitiveness improved only slightly before 1993 as a consequence of a mild real depreciation, with the situation deteriorating again immediately afterwards, ending only in 2000 (ibid.). The anti-inflationary success of this policy, therefore, had consequences for competitiveness and economic growth. Growth slowed in 1990 and became negative between 1992 and 1994. From 1995 to 1999 growth returned, but more slowly than expected between 1986 and 1992. The big stimulus now came from internal demand, mostly as a result of the expansion of certain budget items, such as social expenditure and the recruitment and pay of public sector workers (Braz et al. 2009). It is no accident that this was the period during which the process of external indebtedness increased at a faster rate (Figure 2.2). For Portugal to enter EMU it had to meet the inflation, budget deficit and public debt criteria. Thanks to the disinflation process, the inflation criterion was achieved. As for the budget and debt criteria, they were also achieved, but in a less straightforward way. Fiscal policy was ambiguous: it was expansionary, mostly through the increase in the number of public sector workers and their wages; but this did not prevent it from meeting the Maastricht criteria thanks to two concurrent phenomena: the sharp fall in interest rates that facilitated an equally pronounced fall in debt servicing, and the income from the privatization programme (which was then in full flow), which was used by the government to reduce public debt (Braz et al. 2009; Amaral 2022). Thus, by 1998, Portugal’s budget deficit was within the 3% limit and public debt was below 60%, and this meant that Portugal was able to become a founding member of EMU. EMU launched on 1 January 1999, with 11 countries deciding to adopt the euro (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal), joined by a further eight

European Misfit 45 members following a series of enlargements (Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia). National central banks delegated their authority to a new institution, the ECB, which had a strict mandate to maintain price stability. A Stability and Growth Pact was signed concomitantly, in which countries committed to keep their budget deficits within 3% of GDP and public debt within 60% (James 2012). Since the launch of EMU, growth in Portugal has remained persistently low, for reasons that will be explained below. This poor performance culminated with the 2007–2008 crisis and the subsequent request for foreign assistance.

Consequences of Integration In assessing the impact of this policy rollercoaster, one thing is clear: Portugal was the Southern European country with the largest swings in competitiveness between 1974 and 2015. It was where the real exchange rate declined the most during the decade preceding accession to the EEC, an apparent indication of the success of the crawling peg policy. However, it was also the country in which the real exchange rate increased the most after 1985 (Amaral 2019). This was a consequence of the radical disinflationary policy followed by the Portuguese authorities. As we saw above, Portugal adopted an exchange rate-based disinflationary programme that began in 1986. When the variable chosen to control inflation is the exchange rate, it ceases to be a discretionary policy instrument. The credibility of the policy depends on the currency peg, leaving the authorities able only to manipulate the interest rate to stabilize the peg, which is precisely what the Portuguese authorities did. Interest rates increased between 1988 and 1991 before declining while retaining a significant differential with Germany up until 1997 (ibid.). The escudo depreciated three times between 1992 and 1994, but the Portuguese authorities chose not to take advantage of the margins allowed by the ERM. This implied maintaining a hard monetary policy with high interest rates. The impact of these high rates on credit for investment was dramatic, and many firms found themselves unable to survive (Lopes 1996) and the economy was hit by a severe crisis between 1992 and 1994. Because of this monetary policy, from this period until the present day, a set of incentives were created that favoured the expansion of the non-tradable sectors and the contraction of the tradable sectors of the economy. The exchange rate policy meant that fewer firms were able to cope with external competition. As Abreu (2001) noted, this created a substantial differential between the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods that persisted well into the new century. From 1995 until the early 2000s, most growth was the result of an expansionary fiscal policy that the government could follow without many serious consequences as interest rates finally started to fall (after the depreciations and success of disinflation in the early 1990s) and public debt could be covered with income resulting from the privatization programme that was then under way (Amaral 2006; Bento 2009; Alexandre

46 Luciano Amaral and Bação 2012; Amaral 2019). Not only did the number of public sector employees and their pay increase, but there was also a series of public projects that were mainly funded using EU structural funds (Braz et al. 2009; Bento 2009; Amaral 2022). This is what Alexandre and Bação (2014) call the ‘public sector “bubble”’, which they place within a larger ‘non-tradable “bubble”’. Inevitably, the external trade balance deteriorated further, with the current account deficit reaching around 10% of GDP in 2000 (Figure 2.2). The imbalances developed during the 1990s became clear by the beginning of the new century, when budget deficits were shown to be unacceptable under EMU rules. From then onwards, with the exception of 2009, governments adopted contractionary fiscal policies. The last available growth engine thus disappeared. With the exchange rate (or the implicit exchange rate within the euro) punishing exports and fiscal policy moderating internal demand, the economy entered a period of sluggish growth (Blanchard 2007). By this point, interest rate convergence had been achieved, capital circulation was now free within the EU and financial integration had never been as great (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). All this was a stimulus for debt to compensate for slow growth and as a consequence the current account deficit remained at 10% of GDP until 2010 (Figure 2.2), with Reis (2013) calling this process and the subsequent crisis the ‘Portuguese slump and crash’. Between 2007 and 2008, a global financial and economic crisis erupted. The first reaction of the Portuguese government came in October 2008 and focused initially on the threats to the financial and banking system. This priority was similar to that of the rest of the Western world and was closely linked to the turbulence resulting from the collapse of the US investment bank, Lehman Brothers. A second phase of measures was launched when the government introduced a stimulus package in December 2008. There was a European dimension to this reaction, as it followed the adoption of the selfstyled European Economic Recovery Plan proposed by the European Commission in late November. Thanks to the stimulus package, the Portuguese deficit deteriorated to 10% of GDP in 2019 (Amaral 2019). A budget deficit of this size was impossible to sustain, particularly in the context of the growing threats to Portuguese debt that had developed during the year. The Portuguese government then entered a new phase that was generally marked by austerity. However, all the efforts made in 2010 proved futile. In March 2011, the government proposed a new package of austerity measures that parliament rejected, which led directly to the government resigning. Even if it had attempted to delay formal acceptance of the rescue plan proposed by the troika, mounting political and public pressure forced its hand on 6 April 2011 when, following a series of negotiations, a document was produced that included a large set of measures that were to be implemented between 2011 and 2014. This programme focused on three main areas: fiscal consolidation; the solidity of the Portuguese banking system; and a set of structural reforms that sought to improve Portugal’s potential

European Misfit 47 economic growth and enable it to overcome the lack of competitiveness that had fed its increasing external indebtedness during the previous decade. The rebalancing effect of the troika programme was clear: the current account deficit shrank from 10% of GDP in 2011 to 0% from 2013 on (Figure 2.2): however, so did its punishing growth effects (Figure 2.1). The question now is whether this rebalancing has been enough to set the economy on a new path of growth and to compensate for the dysfunctional nature of monetary integration. The differential impact that EMU had on competitive and less competitive member countries from its inception has lately become accepted wisdom. Cumulative current account deficits are a demonstration that structural macroeconomic imbalances exist within the euro area, mostly separating northern countries (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) from the southern ones (Portugal, Greece and Spain, and often extended to include Ireland), with the remaining countries falling somewhere in between. The former countries have accumulated persistent current account surpluses, while the latter have accumulated deficits. Such differential behaviour has led to a complementary problem of growing debt in the south using money borrowed from the north (Holinski et al. 2012; Gros 2012) (Figure 2.7 documents this process). Portugal and Greece experienced the worst deterioration of their current accounts since the late 1980s and early 1990s right up until the recent improvement dictated by the austerity policies under the troika programme. Spain followed a similar path, albeit later and in a less pronounced way. There can be little doubt that a large part of the Portuguese economy’s

Figure 2.7 Current account in eurozone countries (% of GDP), 1974–2015 Source: AMECO (2022).

48 Luciano Amaral problem is connected with EMU or, perhaps more correctly, with EMU and the preparations the country made to join it. All the Southern European countries suffered from the pegging of exchange rates under conditions of a lack of competitiveness. However, there was also something specific to Portugal. The question is to determine whether this was the result of the forceful way with which the Portuguese authorities tried to comply with the requirements of EMU, the lack of initial conditions to be part of it, or a combination of both. According to recent estimates, the implementation of the European single market has increased GDP in the EU by about 2%–3%, a figure far below the early optimistic projections. Furthermore, the impact has not been equal between states. Countries that are more competitive and which have more foreign trade have been positively affected, while the reverse is true for countries that are less competitive and have less foreign trade. The most significant effect has been on trade, with its importance growing in single market and EMU economies (Vetter 2013). According to Vetter (2013), intra-EU trade intensity increased from 12% to 22% of GDP between 1992 and 2012. Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate this process, while also showing Portugal’s inability to accompany it. In the case of Portugal, as soon as there was a moderation of the escudo’s depreciation in 1986, the trade balance came under stress (Figure 2.2). At the same time that restrictions for trading within the EEC ended, the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy deteriorated, which was long before EMU had been established. A fundamental problem for the Portuguese economy was the start of the structural decline of emigrant remittances, which had always been the historical instrument for keep the current account in balance. The situation deteriorated further after 1994, when the value of the escudo was kept stable within the ERM, causing the country’s competitiveness to deteriorate at the same rate of the inflation differential between Portugal and its EMS partners. All this meant that Portugal was operating under EMU conditions long before the Union was established, with the real currency appreciation and competitiveness problems starting before EMU being masked by borrowing from countries operating at a surplus. Real currency appreciation only improved when austerity began in 2002. The big question in recent years is to know whether the structural reforms implemented during the troika programme were enough to increase the economy’s growth potential. While the answer is uncertain, there is not much room for optimism: the growth rate of GDP has been kept positive since the end of the intervention, before the crisis generated by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, but with the exception of 2018 it has never been very high. Exports have gained a little more weight in the country’s GDP, both in goods and services (Figure 2.5), reaching 45% of GDP in 2019, which is nonetheless below the European average, indicating the persistence of the difficulty in resolving the economy’s competitive issues. The current account has been kept in balance; however, the overall picture points to low growth

European Misfit 49 capacity within the economy in the face of its external restriction – i.e. the external balance has been maintained only because the economy has not grown more rapidly. An acceleration to higher rates, allowing Portugal to catch up with wealthier countries, would probably result in a new disequilibrium because, despite growth, exports of goods and services remain relatively low as a percentage of GDP, while much of this weight is due to the significance of tourism, which is a low value added and productivity sector. None of this looks like a guarantee of change in the economy’s competitiveness and growth path. The dramatic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and of the Russian Federation’s military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have interrupted the normality of this new phase in the Portuguese economy, and at the time of writing uncertainty looms large. What the Portuguese case shows is that there is indeed a ‘Portuguese problem’, but it also shows that this is part of a wider ‘European problem’. Not all economies belonging to the EU have coped well with the much firmer integrationist efforts that began during the 1980s, which is revealed by the fact per capita GDP convergence ceased in the EEC/EU from the 1980s onwards. Portugal was one of the countries least prepared for this, but this does not mean its lack of preparedness was and is only a problem caused by EMU and the EU: some of the problems are to be found within its own structure.

Conclusion In contrast with the recently accepted idea that EMU is at the root of the problems of slow growth and external imbalances within the countries of Southern Europe, we have shown in this chapter that the problems of the Portuguese economy began almost as soon as the country acceded to EEC membership. Responsibility for these problems can only be attributed to EMU in the sense that it was the cornerstone and culmination of the stronger efforts at integration in which the EEC/EU became involved from the 1980s onwards. For Portugal, this meant opening up the economy to its partners, while at the same time discarding the crawling peg exchange rate system that had ensured continuing competitiveness during the previous decade. Early growth after Portugal joined the EEC in 1986 soon created a trade imbalance problem. Initially, this was solved in the same manner as it always had been historically: by covering the trade deficit with emigrant remittances. However, as a result of the decline in emigration from the 1970s onwards, these remittances were drying up even as they still represented a relatively significant share of GDP. Throughout the 1990s, the Portuguese authorities adopted an exchange rate-based disinflation programme that implied stabilizing the exchange rate in relation to the most important partners. Since the inflation differential remained high between Portugal and the countries used as a reference for the stabilization of the exchange rate, real appreciation took place and competitiveness deteriorated accordingly.

50 Luciano Amaral The deterioration of competitiveness did not mean that Portugal’s export sector was uncompetitive, but rather that it was small as a result of the creation of incentives for resources to be diverted into the non-tradable sector. Because of this, the Portuguese economy became one of the least open within the EU, an even more serious problem due to its relatively small size; indeed, this factor alone should have meant that exports would assume greater importance). To date, it remains unclear whether the structural reforms implemented during the 2011–2014 troika intervention were enough to alter this; however, the performance of the economy between 2015 and 2019 does not give cause for much optimism. The economic troubles of the Portuguese economy over the past 25 years appear to be the result of a combination of Portuguese peculiarities and wider EU issues.

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3

Social Movements and Political Protests in Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis Cristina Nunes

Over the past decade, Portugal has experienced different waves of political and social mobilization that transitioned from large to small protests. Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a period of low street protest activity; however, the social movements did not stop, they simply adapted their strategies and tactics to this new reality through online networks and cyber-activism. In 2012, we find a country with high levels of mobilization by protest groups and citizens against the austerity measures implemented by the Portuguese government and the so-called troika comprising the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The huge demonstrations did not last long and their purpose finished with the termination of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed with lenders and, in 2015, with the emergence of an unprecedented institutional political context in which for the first time parties on the radical left supported a government headed by the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party). This new political scenario, which was ‘friendly’ to social peace, resulted in a decline in the number of street protests. However, this does not mean that social movements had ended their activities. After the anti-austerity movements, other collective actors arose with new issues and demands. During the troika period, the protest groups chiefly focused on economic and political issues thereafter, however, post-materialistic protests re-emerged, including youth movements calling for climate and social justice, grassroots movements for the right to adequate housing, protests against structural and systemic racism, and feminist groups dealing with domestic violence, moral abuse and sexual harassment. In this chapter, we analyse the emergence of social movements and protest groups in Portuguese society from 2012 to the present day. We focus on the main trajectories and dynamics of mobilization over the past decade, highlighting the fact that the agendas of the protest groups in Portugal mirrored those of other social movements worldwide and showing how the patterns of rising and falling activism are deeply rooted in the national political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1998). In the context of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, these factors may explain why a period of DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-4

Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis 53 large-scale events was followed by smaller waves of mobilization, marked by demonstrations by small groups and grassroots movements. The first part of the chapter addresses the main theoretical approaches to the recent cycles of protest. The debates highlight the prominent role of new information and communication technologies (ITCs) such as digital media in the configuration of social movements. Next, we present the data and methodology used to conduct our research. In the following section, we highlight our findings over three analytical periods. First, we discuss the most important phase of social mobilization (2011–2014) organized by the protest movement Que Lixe a Troika (Screw the Troika). The strategies and the process of collective identity formation of this group should be understood in the context of the relationship between left-wing political parties and social movements in Portuguese society (Nunes 2019). We then analyse the second period (2015–2020) that was marked by the new PS-led government through the contract parliamentarism with the Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Portuguese Communist Party), the Bloco de Esquerda (BE – Left Bloc) and the Partido Ecologista Os Verdes (PEV – Green Party) (Lisi et al. 2020). This institutional agreement represents a favourable environment for social harmony and strongly influenced a decline in protest activity organized by actors linked to left-wing parties and trade unions. During this phase, at both the international and the national level we see the emergence of environmental groups mainly comprising young people demanding climate and social justice and protesting against the economic and social development models that have threatened the ecosystem. In Portugal, we also observed the formation of groups of young environmentalists who were responsible for the weekly global climate strikes instigated by the young Swedish activist, Greta Thunberg, whose solo strike in 2018 inspired the global Fridays for Future movement. This period of intense activity led by youth ecological movements was strongly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the imposition of a national lockdown, social movements were no longer able to stage demonstrations and marches in the public arena, so they had to shift their activities and strategies to online activism (Kowalewski 2021). The third period began with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdown. This context posed new challenges for social movements, and despite the impossibility of protesting in public to advance their demands, the groups continued to operate online. During the pandemic, the international agenda of social movements was shaken by the death of a black man, George Floyd, after being arrested by police outside a shop in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA. Under the slogan and hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, demonstrations against structural and systemic racism and police violence broke out across several American and European cities. Meanwhile, new issues came to the fore that were boosted by the pandemic, such as anti-lockdown protests against the introduction of measures designed to curb the spread of the pandemic and the mandatory wearing of of masks in public spaces. Unlike other European Union countries, such as Germany,

54 Cristina Nunes France and the Netherlands, in Portugal these protests did not result in mass mobilizations. Finally, we conclude with an overview of protest cycles and social movement trends in Portuguese society over the past decade.

Social Movements and Protest Groups: Recent Theoretical Views The purpose of the social movements and collective action classic paradigms was to distinguish and define the boundaries between a social movement and other types of protest. These perspectives looked at social movements as the most structured form of collective action that, unlike less organized activities, bring citizens together to put forward and achieve their demands (Della Porta and Diani 1999; Melucci 1996; Nunes 2014). The recent literature on social movements has overtaken this debate and focuses both on the influence of ITCs spreading the protest cycles and in the configuration of social movements (Castells 2013). This debate is more prominent due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic that shifted the public arena of social movements into cyberspace (Pleyers 2020). Digital media have introduced several changes to the structure and organization of demonstrations and protest cycles since the emergence of Occupy Wall Street in the United States and the Spanish anti-austerity Movimiento 15-M (15-M Movement). These communication channels have intensified the processes of non-relational diffusion (Tarrow 2006), the online recruitment of new, young activists as well as political parties and social movement organizations, offering the opportunity to create protest events using online connections. Online activism facilitates the sharing of strategies and repertoires, slogans and frameworks among activists without strong ties and face-to-face connections, and may be changing the profile of protesters. Up until recently, activists were usually recruited by political parties and trade unions. Connective action networks (Bennett and Segerberg 2011) are now empowering ‘fluid’ and informal recruitment alongside that of traditional political actors. Digital media are helping to boost the so-called trigger events and modularity processes (Della Porta and Kriesi 2009). However, they seldom create strong connections between activists from different countries. In the antiausterity movements, digital media were not enough to strengthen ties among the protest groups in the countries of Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain and Greece) that were most deeply affected by the global financial crisis and the need to deal with austerity measures. These movements did not build up an international platform of common demands, claims and counterproposals (Fominaya 2017); rather, the international anti-austerity contentious politics was disseminated mostly through equivalence structural processes (Tarrow 2006). The protest movements were linked through anti-troika frameworks and employed similar tactics and strategies, but they were unable to build up any international momentum against austerity. The use of digital media became even more important for the post-austerity social movements. The lockdowns that were imposed from March 2020

Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis 55 were also a challenge for contentious politics. However, protest groups did not scale back their activities (Pleyers 2020); instead, they operated entirely through digital platforms, using the internet to its maximum before returning to urban spaces as soon as it possible to do so. Anti-austerity movements introduced ‘hashtag’ activism for the first time during the past decade. These dynamics were analysed as post-media or techno-political movements, as initially they did not receive attention from the mass media (newspapers and television), but disseminated their activities and slogans on social media (Facebook and Twitter) (Toret and Monterde 2014). While the impact of social media was quite surprising ten years ago, online activism is now common practice in the repertoires of protest activities. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, digital channels proved to be some of the most useful communications tools available to social movements. New post-materialistic movements such as #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo use hashtag activism as the principal means for disseminating their messages and complaints about racism, ethnic discrimination, police violence and even individual cases of moral abuse and sexual harassment. In relation to the significant role of digital media, it has recently become clear that the street remains important, which is why it is once more the focus of demonstrations. Indeed, the pandemic facilitated the acceleration of the use of hybrid spaces mixing online and physical gatherings (Castells 2013). A better understanding of the consequences of lockdown for protest cycles is also a challenge for social movements studies.

Data and Methodology Our empirical analysis is divided into three analytical phases: (i) a period of high mobilization marked by the emergence of anti-austerity movements in Portuguese society including, at the international level, the Arab Spring, the beginning of the Indignados (Outraged) and 15-M movements and the Occupy Wall Street movements (2011–2014); (ii) a period of decline in social and political protests influenced by the ending of the economic programme agreed with the troika and the beginning of the parliamentary agreement established between the PS, the PCP, the BE and the PEV (2015–2019); (iii) the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown that imposed restrictions on people’s physical activities and forced a redefinition of the tactics and strategies used by social movements and demonstrations (2020–2022). We adopted an intensive approach, interweaving in-depth interviews, direct observation of protests and gatherings, and a content analysis of empirical material posted by activists on websites and other digital platforms. However, the biographical interviews were only conducted with activists from the antiausterity movements (2011–2014).1 Our sample consists of 20 Portuguese activists selected through a snowball sampling method. Their biographies represent important periods of Portuguese activism and different protest cycles: from the ‘Carnation Revolution’ through to global justice movements,

56 Cristina Nunes to pro-abortion rights protests and youth activists who began protesting at events such as Geração à Rasca (Desperate Generation) in March 2012 and Que se Lixe a Troika in September of that year.

Anti-austerity Movements in Portugal: From Geração à Rasca to Que se Lixe a Troika In Portugal, the anti-austerity movements were part of a global wave of demonstrations that included the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street and the Indignados in Spain and Greece. The global financial crisis in 2007/2008 gave rise to protests and claims focused on materialistic issues such as politics and the quality of and satisfaction with democracy, economy and unemployment, precarious work and labour rights (Della Porta and Mattoni 2014). This cycle of protests began with the demonstration of 12 March 2011 involving around 200,000–380,000 participants and led by the protest group Geração à Rasca. The group consisted of young people who were engaged in a protest for the first time. They were affected by unemployment, temporary contracts and precarious work and had organized the demonstration to denounce the worsening of living conditions, particularly among Portuguese youth. The event was organized during a period of political and economic instability that followed the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact by the PS government. In April 2011, Portugal applied for a bailout from the troika and austerity measures were implemented by the new coalition government comprising the Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) and the Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular (CDS-PP – Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party). The budget cuts in education and health, wages, pensions and the loss of social and labour rights resulted in a new wave of mass mobilizations. This time, demonstrations were organized by Que se Lixe a Troika, including ‘Queremos as nossas vidas de volta’ (‘We want our lives back’) in September 2012) and ‘O povo é quem mais ordena’ (‘It is the people who lead’) in March 2013 (Nunes 2019).2 This group had a peculiar coordination and features that are better understood through the historical relations between the parties of the Portuguese radical left, social movements and trade unions. Que se Lixe a Troika was a group of 29 activists from different backgrounds acting in several sectors of civil society, including political parties, trade unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, participation at group meetings and gatherings was not open to all protesters and activists, but only to people who were invited. This closed organization was the opposite of the mass movement associated with the occupation of public spaces (acampadas) organized by Indignados in Spain and Occupy Wall Street in the United States (Juris 2012). The logic of this closed relational process is a way to prevent the recurrence of ideological conflict among activists from political parties, namely the BE. In 2011, this radical left-wing party suffered internal divisions, with one of its faction splitting off to establish the Movimento Alternativa Socialista (MAS –

Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis 57 Alternative Socialist Movement) (Lisi 2016), whose militant members were also activists in the anti-austerity movements. These splits involving militants from the same radical left-wing party extended to the social movements and affected the identity and internal organizational of the groups. A member of MAS and an anti-austerity activist explained in an interview: My name was blocked from the first group [referring to Que se Lixe a Troika]. Several activists and I were not invited to participate in meetings. This is putting me on my back foot: the logic of a demonstration that will be organized through a spontaneous call for citizens whose names are approved or denied. I don’t know very well by whom. What is this? It’s not the way that I want to do it…! Until now it was an open call! A representative of Que se Lixe a Troika responded: ‘Meetings are intentionally closed. It was a collective decision. Meetings open to everyone, as they were before, only created problems due to political conflicts that come from the past, from other political organizations’. Considering the results of the thematic content analysis of the biographical interviews, the internal balance of Que se Lixe a Troika seems to have been influenced by a consensus between the PCP (traditionally connected to unions) and BE (more engaged with post-materialistic and grassroots movements) regarding anti-austerity campaigns. According to another activist, I think the great advance of Que se Lixe a Troika was to call the PCP into the process. It was not possible before: to commit the PCP with a mobilization that is not just organized by this political party. Therefore, the organization of this group protest was shaped by the relationships between the militants from both radical left-wing parties that were historically associated with contentious politics in Portuguese society (Fernandes 2017; Nunes 2017). Divisions within Que se Lixe a Troika were quite frequent, which may explain why a continuous and strong mobilization did not come out on the streets as it did in Spain and Greece. However, there were four initiatives that had spread into a national cycle of protests (Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2015).3 The use of online media allowed activists to build activities in very short time frames and with limited human and financial resources. Online tools changed the recruitment networks of social movements, stimulating the engagement of young people who were not particularly active in formal political organizations, such as political parties and trade unions. In fact, youth recruitment through social networks was an important aspect of the anti-austerity movements, where young people who had no previous experience of political and civic engagement, organized protests for the first time.

58 Cristina Nunes Digital media facilitated the engagement of young activists in the organization of protest groups, but it has less impact on the formation of strong ties and connections within the activism networks. The case of some young Portuguese activists shows how digital media boost weak ties and a rapid disconnection from the group. These young activists took part in Geração à Rasca through Facebook. They had never previously participated in political organizations or been involved in other forms of conventional politics. They gave up and left the organization of other protest actions due to the influence of political parties, believing that the political parties had gained too much space within the anti-austerity movements, with the result that non-partisan calls for demonstrations and marches became a fake means for producing mass mobilizations. In addition, digital networks accelerate a more fluid relationship with protest movements; however, the connections are difficult to handle over the long term. Initially, the young activists were keen to take part for the first time as leaders of a national demonstration, but just a few months later they became increasingly disappointed and frustrated, leaving them feeling that they had no option but to leave the group: On 12 March 2011 I really felt that there was an attempt by political parties to manipulate the new young people who had arrived and who were participating for the first time. I also felt that many people had left the social movements and the organization of demonstrations earlier due to [the influence of the] political parties. It was too much for me, and that’s the reason I left. I didn’t want to be part of something more organized or partisan to participate in public life. At that moment, I felt that to do something I needed to be a militant of a political party and play the game of these institutions and that’s why I gave up and ended my active engagement. On the other hand, mass self-communication (Castells 2013) allowed activists to build enough ‘weak ties’ between citizens from different national regions. These channels have facilitated the communication and dissemination of a fast, fluid framing structure to claim the public streets and squares against the troika. An activist from Algarve highlighted the importance of digital media in the organization of anti-austerity protests at the national level: We start with a structure that’s not a political party. We didn’t have the organization of the PCP, we didn’t have contacts or channels of communication like the political parties have. There are seven, ten, 12 people in the organization and there are 5,000 on the streets due to social media, especially Facebook. Otherwise, these demonstrations would never have happened. The wave of national protests ended up with the last mass Que se Lixe a Troika demonstration in March 2013. In 2014, Portugal’s engagement with the memorandum of understanding with the troika ended, and the following

Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis 59 year a new political institutional era began when the PSD/CDS-PP coalition won the legislative elections while losing its parliamentary majority. The parliamentary agreement reached between the PS, the PCP, the PEV and the BE facilitated the formation of a new left-wing government.4 This structural shift in governance also resulted in a sharp decline in political and social mobilization.

A Downturn in Social Protests during the Post-austerity Period In October 2015, a new institutional political phase began with parties on the radical left supporting a PS government for the first time. However, unlike in other Southern European countries, such as Greece, this exceptional context in Portugal did not represent a rupture of the political system, since the major political parties continued to attract most of the votes (De Giorgi and Santana-Pereira 2020). These factors contributed to political stability and had implications in the protest street dynamics carried out by institutional actors, such as the unions, and by grassroots movements that were traditionally linked to parties of the radical left. Therefore, large-scale demonstrations were replaced by small-scale events that were marked by diversity in terms of demand and the rise or re-emergence of small groups raising issues that went beyond austerity, as well as new action frameworks and repertoires. An overview of these new protests shows these grassroots movements were more concerned with defending the universal right to decent housing and protesting the eviction of tenants from properties in the historic centres of Portugal’s major cities. These groups are struggling with the growth of mass tourism and the granting of ‘golden visas’ by the state that has led to an increase in house prices. In this context, acts of civil disobedience and small protests were undertaken by Habita (Association for the Right to Housing and the City),5 and Stop Despejos (Stop Evictions).6 These grassroots movements were already active during the period of anti-austerity protests, although these issues were not part of the main agenda of the anti-troika movements, as they were with the Indignados in Spain and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States (Tulumello 2019). However, during this post-crisis period, climate change and climate justice were the issues that attracted the majority of new activists and supporters in Portugal and around the world. The environment was excluded from the anti-austerity movement debates, but they received new international media attention following the launch of the protests that were initiated by Greta Thunberg. In common with previous global protests, the organization of climate justice actions is conducted via digital and social networks. They also bring a new feature and social identity to social movements: the strong participation of secondary school pupils under the age of 18 who were attending demonstrations for the first time. Studies in the field of political science show that adolescents and young adults prefer civic engagements that are connected to unconventional forms of

60 Cristina Nunes political participation and protest groups rather than to political parties and trade unions (Quaranta et al. 2021). This may explain why climate justice issues encourage millions of young people around the world to participate in grassroots and direct action movements that are organized online and for short, unstructured initiatives (Rainsford and Saunders 2021). The September 2019 global climate strikes, also known as the Global Week for Future, were a series of international strikes and protests held in several cities prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic to demand that action be taken to address climate change, and are a pertinent example of a fluid, decentralized and modular global action. This event continues to take place around the world and involves millions of young people leaving their lessons each Friday to take part in protests that demand a sustainable future for the younger generation. A study by Wahlström et al. (2019) into the Fridays for Future Global Strike for Climate Change protests across 13 European cities7 shows that most of the participants are young women aged between 14 and 19 years, and that Thunberg has become an important icon for them.8 The research also shows that climate justice mobilizes young people who are dissatisfied with political parties and who reject participation in formal organizations. Digital media also represent an important tool for the dissemination of climate events on a global scale, as was also true of the anti-austerity movements. In Portugal, the global movement for climate justice has also inspired young adults. Several grassroots movements have emerged beyond the Portuguese NGOs founded in the 1980s that are included in the national history of environmental activism.9 These new groups, which are part of a global network of young activists, include Greve Climática Estudantil (Student Climate Strike),10 which is part of the Fridays for Future movement, Climaximo,11 and Extinction Rebellion Portugal,12 which promotes non-violent civil disobedience. One of the most notable climate justice events took place during Thunberg’s visit to the Portuguese capital, Lisbon, in December 2019, when the young activist met members of radical left-wing parties and the city’s mayor (Público 2019b). In March 2020, many countries imposed partial or full lockdowns as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The climate change movement was growing at the time, but, as with other group protests, it was forced to halt the Friday strikes and all other public demonstrations. Meanwhile, activists continued their activities in what was the start of a new phase for social movements: the shift to the digital world to protest events around the world.

Reshaping Alternatives due to the Pandemic and Lockdown In October 2019, the PS won the legislative elections while falling short of a majority,13 leading it to renew its agreement with the PCP and the BE to enable it to form a minority government. New political parties won seats in parliament: Chega (Enough), Iniciativa Liberal (IL – Liberal Initiative) and LIVRE (FREE).

Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis 61 The new populist right-wing party, Chega, is also known as a protest party that supported claims related to security and the protection of police and which had taken part in demonstrations in 2019 mounted by members of the Public Security Police calling for improved working conditions. It was also associated with Movimento Zero (Zero Movement),14 a protest movement that was very active on social media in defence of the police (Rego et al. 2021). Emerging in 2019 to support and protect police officers against accusations of racism, the media noted its connections with far-right groups and with Chega.15 The COVID-19 pandemic broke out the following year, bringing with it a series of national lockdowns imposed by the government. There was a high degree of consensus within Portuguese society and the main political parties that stopping the pandemic was the main political priority. The lockdown was also a challenge for social movements and protest groups that had to abandon their main locus of action – the street and public places – to activities that were carried out online. This so-called hashtag activism became one of the main channels through which protest movements were able to disseminate messages and slogans and to report and denounce cases. At the international level, the first phase of the removal of lockdown restrictions coincided with re-emergence of Black Lives Matter, a movement protesting against police violence and systemic racism in the wake of a wave of solidarity following the murder of George Floyd.16 The protests began in cities in the United States in the summer months of mid-2020 before spreading to Europe (Della Porta et al. 2022). Demonstrations were also organized in solidarity with Black Lives Matter in the main Portuguese cities.17 The protesters denounced police violence and racism against ethnic minorities that caught the attention of the Portuguese media in 2018 and 2019. In reaction to the solidarity activities with Black Lives Matter and the Portuguese anti-racism movements, Chega organized a protest in Lisbon under the slogan ‘Portugal is not racist’ in denial of the existence of structural racism in Portuguese society (Reuters 2020). Following these events, radical right-wing groups defended police officers as the main victims of the struggle against violence and crime. That summer also saw episodes in which deputies belonging to radical left-wing parties and the board members of anti-racist associations were threatened. Cultural issues were included in the social movements’ agendas during the lockdown. #MeToo is another example of an active online protest movement in recent years. #MeToo emerged in the United States to defend women against moral abuse and sexual harassment, particularly in the workplace and within the professional sectors of the arts and entertainment industries. Feminist groups were increasingly concerned with the increase in incidents of domestic violence during the pandemic. Social media, and especially Twitter, became an important channel through which to publicize and share cases of sexual and moral violence. Hashtag activism became important to the repertoire of feminist movements and enabled women to act in their own

62 Cristina Nunes name and to share individual cases of abuse (Clark-Parsons 2021). The movement was not particularly visible in Portugal, albeit that some actresses did publicly report incidents of sexual and moral abuse in their workplaces. At the same time, unlike other European countries where events turned violent, the anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine protests did not reach the level of mass mobilization in Portugal. The low rate of participation in these types of campaign is explained by the consensus of political actors, institutions, civil society and even protest movements to focus on stopping the pandemic (Silva et al. 2021), with only some far-right groups, including Chega, supporting such protests. During the past decade, Portugal has experienced two major economic crises – the sovereign debt crisis resulting from the economic crash of 2008, and the COVID-19 crisis of 2020 – both of which produced antagonist levels of social and political mobilization. During the austerity crisis, there was no great political and social convergence around support for the MOU agreed with the troika, with this lack of consensus explaining the opportunity for new protest movements to emerge. However, changes to the political context brought protest to the streets again. On 27 October 2021, the PCP and the BE voted against the proposed state budget for 2022, causing the minority PS government to collapse. The PS won an absolute majority in the subsequent general election held in January 2022.18 Given this political scenario, at the time of writing it was expected that the BE would return to its street protest positions and lend its support to post-materialistic causes, while the PCP would manifest its political opposition on the streets alongside the trade unions. Indeed, considering this context, as well as the economic international instability caused by the Russian Federation’s military invasion of Ukraine in February of that year, the atmosphere was more favourable for the emergence of new repertoires of action, and could provide new political opportunities for mobilization.

Conclusion Portuguese society has witnessed one of the largest social mobilization cycles since 25 April 1974. During the period of austerity, thousands of citizens took to the streets for the first time and new protest movements emerged. This phase of high civic engagement was followed by a sharp decline in mobilization. After the troika years, the PCP and the BE offered their support to the PS minority government to create an alliance that led to a decline in the number of demonstrations. Meanwhile, contentious politics shifted from materialistic to post-materialistic causes. During the post-austerity phase, the frameworks and repertoire for action were further diffused and specific. A range of causes emerged, such as climate change and social justice, anti-racism movements and the groups defending the right to housing. At both the national and international level, the climate change protests by

Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis 63 youths represented a renewal of the ecological movements of the 1980s and 1990s, with this new generation of young activists bringing a new social identity to social movements (Wahlström et al. 2019). Following the emergence of the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street and antiausterity movements in Southern Europe, climate justice began to mobilize people globally, especially the younger generation, with an international agenda of grassroots movements acting across different geographies. The younger generation has always played an important role in the organization of social protests, but climate justice movements has tended to attract those under the age of 18. Thus, if the anti-austerity actions mostly involved university students and young adults looking for their first jobs and struggling with temporary contracts and unemployment, climate justice represented a turning point, in that it tended to involve children and adolescents in a struggle to ensure a sustainable future and a planet they can live on. Analyses of the anti-austerity movements highlight the active role played by young adults who had no political affiliations and who were largely unsatisfied with political parties. At the same time, political parties now had a new challenge: dealing with a younger generation that was generally motivated to engage through unconventional political fora. This aspect is a trend of the new ecological groups, in which teenagers are certainly taking their first steps towards civic participation. These new activists, who are known as digital natives, intensified hashtag activism and the importance of social media in order to promote ‘self-activism’ and ‘influencer-activists’ – such as Greta Thunberg, a global icon who inspires youth mobilization.19 In Portuguese society, groups of young environmentalists have also emerged with the same demands as those of the international movement. They organize weekly strikes on behalf of the youth-led and -organized global climate strike movement Fridays for Future and act alongside ecological NGOs that were established in earlier decades. However, while the COVID-19 pandemic halted the physical protests, it did not stop their activities: these young activists continued to pursue their claims through cyberactivism. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic presented new challenges for social movements and collective action, driving them to act online. The lockdown brought a new set of claims and demonstrations against the restrictive measures and vaccines introduced to combat the spread of the pandemic while reclaiming apparently lost freedoms. These protests were generally supported by groups and parties on the radical right. In Portugal, these protests did not attract much popular support, nor did they result in the level of street violence seen elsewhere in Europe. The first relaxation of lockdown measures coincided with the Black Lives Matter protests in the United States and with the global wave of solidarity. In Portugal, anti-racist associations and groups organized demonstrations and denounced national allegations of racist abuse by police officers. These campaigns also led to conflicts between radical groups on opposing ends of the political spectrum.

64 Cristina Nunes At the national level, Portuguese society followed the global campaigns undertaken by different social movements, paving the way for small marches and demonstrations. At the international level, the empirical data point to large-scale demonstrations in several countries and to social movements that mobilized thousands of people onto the streets. Although it is difficult to identify a global protest cycle as that observed in the global justice or antiausterity movements, during these cycles, different actors emerged with different identities and promoting different issues while struggling with the same demands (Nunes 2011, 2017). As mentioned above, during the post-troika and pandemic periods there was political consensus to make a collective effort to overcome the economic crisis. This ‘friendly’ context slowed the contentious politics associated with both trade unionism and the grassroots movements that are traditionally connected to political parties on the radical left. These political effects contrasted with the troika years, when the economic and social environment contributed to creating a political structure that was favourable towards old and new actors acting together around materialistic topics and common claims. However, these dynamics were also affected by the historical connections between the parties of the radical left and social movements, and the multiple belongings of activists and militants. Future studies and research could assess how political parties deal with young people who reject formal participation more than was the case with previous generations. Despite the role of digital media in the acceleration of contentious politics and global waves of movements, the Portuguese case is well suited to illustrate the importance of national political structures in setting social movements dynamics and shaping the rhythm of the rise and fall of collective action.

Notes 1 The research on anti-austerity movements (2011–2014) was conducted within the scope of a doctoral thesis funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology (SFRH/BD/75909/2011). 2 On 15 September 2012, organizers claimed that one million people took part in the demonstration, with one and a half million taking part in the second protest on 2 March 2013. 3 These protest events were Geração à Rasca (Desperate Generation) on 12 March 2011; Unidos pela mudança global (United for Global Change) on 15 October 2011; Que se Lixe a Troika! (Screw the Troika!) on 15 September 2012; and O povo é quem mais ordena! (It is the people who lead!) on 2 March 2013. 4 The right-wing PSD/CDS-PP coalition won the legislative elections without obtaining a parliamentary majority, while the PS established bilateral agreements with left-wing parties giving it a majority and the ability to form the new government. The October 2015 election results were PSD/CDS-PP (36.86%); PS (32.31%); BE (10.19%); PCP-PEV (8.25%); PAN (1.39%), see bit.ly/ 2015-election-result. 5 habita.info/. 6 stopdespejos.wordpress.com/.

Portugal during and after the Austerity Crisis 65 7 Fridaysforfuture.org/. 8 The biggest Fridays for Future event took place on 15 March 2019 when thousands of school pupils left their classrooms to take part in more than 2,200 climate justice protests in 125 countries. Portuguese climate activists marched in several different cities, with police estimating there were more than 4,000 protesters in Lisbon (Público 2019a; The Guardian 2019). 9 Such as Quercus (National Association for the Conservation of Nature, quercus. pt) and Geota (Group of Planning and Territory Studies, www.geota.pt/o-geota). 10 greveclimaticaestudantil.pt/. 11 Climaximo.pt/. 12 rebellion.global/pt/groups/pt-portugal/#groups. 13 The October 2019 election results were PS (36.34%); PPD/PSD (27.76%); BE (9.52%); PCP-PEV (6.33%); CDS-PP (4.22%); PAN (3.32%); Chega (1.29%); IL (1.29%); Livre (1.09%), see bit.ly/2019-election-result. 14 movimentozero.pt/. 15 pt-br.facebook.com/Publico/posts/10157836108196983/. 16 Blacklivesmatter.com/. 17 Some demonstrations were organized in Lisbon, Porto, Beja, Coimbra, Faro and Viseu (Público 2020). 18 The January 2022 election results were PS (41.37%); PPD/PSD (27.67%); Chega (7.18%); IL (4.91%); BE (4.4%); PCP/PEV (4.3%); CDS/PP (1.6%); PAN (1.6%); LIVRE (1.28%), see bit.ly/2022-election-result. 19 For instance, in Portugal young people are also engaged in ‘self-activism’ and ‘influencer-activism’ on digital media calling a sustainable future or opposing structural racism (Diário de Notícias 2021).

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66 Cristina Nunes Della Porta, D., Lavizzari, A. and Reiter, H. (2022). ‘The Spreading of the Black Lives Matter Movement Campaign: The Italian Case in Cross-National Perspective’, Sociological Forum, pp. 1–21. Diário de Notícias (2021). ‘Discriminação, sustentabilidade e sexo: São mulheres, ativistas e influencers do bem’, 14 November. Available at bit.ly/dn-14-Novem ber-2021 (accessed 24 August 2022). Fernandes, T. (2017). ‘Late Neoliberalism and its Discontents: The Case of Portugal’, in D. Della Porta, M. Andretta, T. Fernandes, E. Romanos and F. C. Vogiatzoglou (Eds.) Late Neoliberalism and Its Discontents in the Economic Crisis: Comparing Social Movements in the European Periphery, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 169–200. Fominaya, C. F. (2017). ‘European Anti-austerity and Pro-democracy Protests in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis’, Social Movement Studies 16 (1): 1–20. Juris, J. S. (2012). ‘Reflections on #OccupyEverywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation’, American Ethnologist 39 (3): 259–279. Kowalewski, M. (2021). ‘Street Protests in Times of Covid-19: Adjusting Tactics and Marching as Usual’, Social Movement Studies 20 (6): 758–765. Lisi, M. (2016). ‘U-turn: The Portuguese Radical Left from Marginality to Government Support’, South European Society and Politics 21 (4): 541–560. Lisi, M., Sanches, E. R. and dos Santos Maia, J. (2020). ‘Party System Renewal or Business as Usual? Continuity and Change in Post-bailout Portugal’, South European Society and Politics 25 (2): 179–203. Melucci, A. (1996). Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nunes, C. (2014). ‘O conceito de movimento social em debate: Dos anos 60 até à atualidade’, Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas 75: 131–147. Nunes, C. (2011). Expressões alterglobais na sociedade portuguesa: Ecos transnacionais de novas formas de acção colectiva?, master’s thesis, ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon, Lisbon. Nunes, C. (2017). Ativismos anti-austeridade: Protestos nacionais em transformação?, doctoral thesis, ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon, Lisbon. Nunes, C. (2019). ‘Portugal and Spain in the International Protest Cycles: From Global Justice Movement to Anti-austerity Protests’, in A. C. Pinto and C. P. Teixeira (Eds.) Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 195–213. Pleyers, G. (2020). ‘The Pandemic is a Battlefield: Social Movements in the Covid-19 Lockdown’, Journal of Civil Society 16 (4): 295–312. Público (2019a). ‘Greve pelo clima: “É uma das manifestações mais bonitas que já vi”’, 15 March. Available at bit.ly/publico-15-March-19 (accessed 24 August 2022). Público (2019b). ‘“Não vamos parar”: Greta Thunberg chegou a Lisboa, onde afinal vai ficar dois dias’, 3 December. Available at: bit.ly/publico-3-December-2019 (accessed 24 August 2019). Público (2020). ‘“Black Lives Matter”, ouviu-se em Portugal e um pouco pelo resto do mundo’, 6 June. Available at: bit.ly/publico-6-june-2020 (accessed 24 August 2022). Quaranta, M., Cancela, J., Martín, I. and Tsirbas, Y. (2021). ‘Trust, Satisfaction and Political Engagement during Economic Crisis: Young Citizens in Southern Europe’, South European Society and Politics 26 (2): 153–179. Rainsford, E. and Saunders, C. (2021). ‘Young Climate Protesters’ Mobilization Availability: Climate Marches and School Strikes Compared’, Frontiers in Political Science 96: 1–12.

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4

European Economic Narratives and the Emergence of a European Public Sphere in Portugal An Analysis of National Mainstream Newspapers Susana Rogeiro Nina

The past few decades have shown that Europeanization process has been enhanced and that European issues are now politicized in the national public spheres (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Risse 2015). The onset of the eurozone crisis accelerated this process in an unprecedented fashion (Rauh 2013). In fact, in the aftermath of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the academic community was compelled to rethink the metaphor of Europe as a ‘sleeping giant’, with the European Union (EU) becoming increasingly salient in national arenas and for EU citizens (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). However, the eurozone crisis also led to the realization that the EU is in fact an ‘awakened giant’ in national public spheres (Hobolt and Rodon 2020). Hence, the eurozone crisis might have created the ideal setting to the emergence of a European public sphere as ‘European citizens have become more aware of the EU as part of the problem and the solution when it comes to major public policy concerns’ (ibid.:161) However, the strengths of the Europeanization process during the eurozone crisis to the emergence of a European public sphere were paradoxically also its weaknesses, particularly in regard to countries that faced bailouts, such as Portugal. One of the concerns that arose with the onset of the eurozone crisis, the economic viability of the eurozone area notwithstanding, was the future of the European project. The European elites feared that the imposition of austerity measures could jeopardize the emergence of a European public sphere and represent a negative turning point in EU’s ambitions for broader European economic integration. In 2010, José Manuel Barroso, the former President of the European Commission (EC), claimed that the future of the EU project relied on solidarity among European countries, coining the expression ‘There is no stability without solidarity and no solidarity without stability’.1 Based on existing studies on the Europeanization of national arenas, this chapter presents a longitudinal analysis of the Europeanization of the Portuguese public sphere, before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis. Focusing exclusively on the mainstream media coverage during the national DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-5

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 69 legislative elections, the analysis of articles on European economic topics sheds some light on the debate surrounding the role of the national media in the emergence of a European public sphere. More concretely, the chapter offers an in-depth examination of Portugal, a eurozone crisis debtor country. It analyses the direction of media narratives and tests the idea of whether the onset of the economic crisis has produced substantial differences in the way in which mainstream newspapers reported on topics pertaining to European economic. In addition, while previous research has focused solely on the European level (e.g. Schuck and de Vreese 2006; Drewski 2015; Salgado et al. 2015; Lahusen et al. 2016; Kaiser and Königslöw 2017), this chapter highlights the importance of considering the national context in setting the direction of national media narratives. The main argument of this chapter follows Jean Monnet’s prediction that ‘Europe will be forged in crisis, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises’ (1978: 417) and, indeed, the economic crisis juncture dramatically changed the national public arenas as EU topics became more salient and contested (e.g. Rauh 2013; Grande and Kriesi 2016). Thus, it will not be surprising if we find that the social and economic effects produced by the eurozone crisis were a harbinger for the flourishing of a European public sphere in Portugal. This would be the case if the Portuguese national media perceived and reported on European economic topics in such a way that the EU project was placed at the core of their narratives instead of the national interests. To evaluate the direction of media narratives in Portugal, we compiled an in-depth manually coded dataset of approximately 1,700 economic articles published by two of the most circulated Portuguese mainstream newspapers, namely Público and Diário de Notícias. The time frame selected was the electoral campaign period for five legislative elections held before (2002– 2009) and after the onset of the Great Recession (2011–2016). Departing from existing studies on media narratives, this chapter introduces a new multidimensional framework of analysis regarding the direction of European media narratives, which encompasses three dimensions, namely Media Attention, Tone and Framing, and looking in particular at five dominant frames, namely Problem, Cause, Responsibility, Consequences and Solution (Nina 2022). The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section focuses on the concept of the Europeanization of domestic arenas and the relevance of this phenomenon to the emergence of a European public sphere, in particular after the onset of the eurozone crisis. The second section introduces the most relevant studies on media narratives and emphasizes the role performed by the national media in establishing a narrative direction. The third section presents the data and methods used, and details the results of the analysis. The final section of the chapter summarizes the main findings and reflects on their potential implications.

70 Susana Rogeiro Nina

Europeanization of National Public Spheres The existence of a European public sphere is paramount to the future of the EU project: it is well established that the EU is facing a long-lasting democratic deficit (e.g. Jensen 2009; Kelemen 2017), which has been linked to the lack of a European public arena (e.g. Habermas 2003; Eriksen 2005). In fact, the existence of a European public sphere may help to mitigate European citizens’ lack of engagement with the EU decision-making process and concerns about the legitimacy of EU decisions and the accountability of European elites (Katz 2012). Habermas (2012: 61) went further arguing that the EU urgently needs a European public sphere as ‘the deficit in democracy can only be eliminated if a European public sphere comes into existence’. Inspired by Habermas’s work on the public sphere, the existence of a European public sphere demands a transnational communication community. This public arena will enable European citizens to interact with one another and to debate the same European political issues (e.g. de Vreese 2007; Risse and van de Steeg 2003; Koçan 2008). However, due to the current impossibility of having a pan-European media system or a common language, many scholars have conceptualized the emergence of a European public sphere as a result of the Europeanization of national public spheres (e.g. Eriksen 2005; Risse 2010, 2015). It is well established in the literature that the Europeanization process broadly refers to the responses of actors – political actors or national media – to the impact of European integration on domestic arenas, or in other words, to the way in which European institutions and their policies might affect national policies and national institutions of EU member states (e.g. Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Börzel and Risse 2007). Over the past few decades, the concept of Europeanization has increasingly insinuated itself into the literature on EU policymaking. A multiplicity of changes have occurred within European politics and these have had repercussions on EU member states and on EU candidate countries, leading to a continuous rethinking and comprehension of the Europeanization process (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), in a meta-analysis study, observed that the concept of Europeanization had been widely used, reflecting in very different ways the changing structural processes that affected not only political actors and political institutions but also ideas and interests. The authors found that the impact of Europeanization on national public spheres is progressive, asymmetrical, irregular, uneven and incongruent in time and space (at both the national and subnational level). Nevertheless, Olsen (2002: 1) claims that it is crucial to clarify ‘how the term can be useful to understanding the dynamic of the evolving European policy’. Olsen links the concept of Europeanization to the changes that occur within the national public spheres of EU member states, describing, thus, the process of institutional arrangements. Once the EU is also a political project – in the context of its

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 71 union – European integration and Europeanization should be perceived as part of the same process and not as different realities. Therefore, Olson identifies five possible phenomena within the Europeanization of the national public sphere: (1) changes in states’ territorial boundaries; (2) the development of governance institutions at the supranational level; (3) the influence and imposition of supranationality at the national and subnational level; (4) the exporting of EU governance and policy procedures across EU borders; and (5) a political project designed to intensify the EU’s integration and union process. These five phenomena are in keeping with Ladrech’s (2001: 4) previous definition of Europeanization, perceived as the ‘incremental process reorienting the direction and the shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policymaking’. However, the approaches to the Europeanization of national public spheres proposed at the beginning of the 21st century by Ladrech (2001), Olsen (2002) and Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) merely encompassed the political and administrative changes as well as the structural adjustments that occurred with the politicization2 of European topics. The increase in the EU’s salience and contestation had consequences for national public spheres, challenging this top-down view. A new avenue articulating a top-down with a bottom-up approach was required, as national public spheres are neither a monolithic entity nor a political institution or a political actor, but instead they are a mediating space for the information conveyed by the media (Kantner 2015). Börzel (2005) was a pioneer in theoretically rethinking Europeanization in these terms. Following the signing of the Single European Act, EU integration was no longer circumscribed to the exclusive domain of governments and political elites. The subsequent demands for greater transparency and accountability for the EU’s decision-making process transformed citizens into crucial actors who actively interact with the EU’s political institutions. This new multi-level feature of the Europeanization of national public spheres led to the introduction of two key dimensions to the Europeanization process: the level at which European policies are decided – local, national or European – and the scope of actors who decide those policies – national or supranational (ibid.). Against this background, Risse (2015: 10) conceptualized the Europeanization of national public spheres as ‘the transformation of domestic as well as transnational discourse arenas, institution and policies in such a way that the EU as a multilevel governance system becomes an integral part of domestic as well as the transnational realms’. In fact, in 2000, Gerhards had already highlighted the existence of two main criteria that should be taken into consideration. First, an increase in the proportion of media coverage of European topics and European actors; second, the evaluation of these issues and actors should be carried out from a similar perspective beyond the national interest. In keeping with this, Risse (2010) later distinguished the

72 Susana Rogeiro Nina Europeanization of national public spheres, according to three main dimensions: 1 2 3

Salience: European and EU issues, policies and actors are sufficiently visible in the various public spheres. Actors: fellow Europeans are present in the various national and issuespecific public spheres (as both speakers and audiences). Substantive content of communication: common European themes and issues are addressed using similar frames (Eder and Kantner 2000) and make claims across borders (Koopmans and Statham 2010).

European Media Narratives We know from the literature that the eurozone crisis has accelerated the Europeanization of domestic arenas (Rauh 2013), and Portugal – a debtor country of the eurozone crisis – is no exception (e.g. Silva et al. 2021; Silva et al. 2022; Santos and Nina 2022). We also know that the media play a fundamental role in this process because they represent the glue that holds the various fragmented domestic arenas together, working as an interface between citizens and political actors (Pfetsch et al. 2008). Moreover, the media are key actors in mitigating the European democratic deficit. Several studies have demonstrated that representative democracy functions better when public opinion is well informed (e.g. Andersen et al. 2005; Hobolt 2005) because knowledge of public affairs links the masses and elites to positive outcomes for political representation (Marinova and Anduiza 2020). Additionally, currently it is agreed that the media are the most important source of political information – producing knowledge and shaping citizens’ political opinions (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) about national and European issues. The media’s focus on certain aspects rather than on others guides what individuals think about (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) and how they should think about it (Entman 1993). This means that the media can create a narrative that might promote the emergence of a European public sphere. Since the beginning of the 21st century, a growing body of literature has emerged that examines how the national media narrate European topics and the impact that these have on the European public sphere. The majority of these studies focus on pertinent European issues that arose at the turn of the 21st century, such as the corruption scandal that damaged the EC’s credibility, the bovine spongiform encephalopathy crisis (BSE – ‘mad cow’ disease) and the debate about the future of European economic integration and its enlargement (e.g. Schmitz and Geserick 1996; Eder2000; Eder and Kantner 2000; van de Steeg 2000, 2002). The Great Recession that took place during the late 2000s amplified the literature on European media narratives and the Europeanization of domestic public spheres, and increased the salience and conflict in national arenas.

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 73 Therefore, the crisis represents a fertile phenomenon for academics who seek to understand how domestic arenas became Europeanized. The current research on media narratives after the onset of the eurozone crisis can be divided into two categories: studies emphasizing media narratives among creditor countries (e.g. Bach et al. 2013; Joris et al. 2014) and studies comparing media narratives among creditor and debtor countries (e.g. Picard 2015; Salgado et al. 2015; Salgado and Nienstedt 2016). However, even though Gerhards (2000) has established the existence of two criteria to evaluate the Europeanization of national arenas, i.e. the proportion of media coverage of EU topics and EU actors and their evaluation beyond the national interest, and Pfetsch et al. (2008) has stated that the national media should agree on the relevant conflict lines when referring to European issues, the study of European media narratives has mostly focused on the salience of EU topics in the national media and the type of frames used to portray it, thereby neglecting the direction of media narratives. To date, there is no systematic knowledge regarding what the direction of media narratives might represent to the European project. After establishing the direction of a narrative, it is of the utmost importance to understand the possibilities of a European public sphere as it might indicate a narrative pointing to a deeper European economic integration or, on the contrary, unveil anti-EU views and a nationalist perspective on economic matters. This chapter aims to fill this gap by uncovering whether national media narratives follow a centripetal path – promoting a more consolidated form of European integration – or travel in a centrifugal direction – pushing towards the national interests. Both the centripetal and centrifugal directions suggest that the national media agree on the conflict lines to narrate the European topics; yet, while a centripetal direction implies that the national media portray EU economic topics in favour of a more consolidated European integration, a centrifugal direction denotes a media narrative that pushes for a perspective that chiefly privileges national interests. As explained above, the Europeanization process comprises two main principles: national arenas must witness an increase in the volume of European issues covered by the national media, while the assessment of these issues should be carried out according to a similar European perspective that goes beyond national interests (Gerhards 2000). Consequently, determining the nature of narratives presented by the national media when reporting on European economic issues is crucial. In addition to revealing the conflict lines used by national media to cover the effect of European economic problems on national public arenas (e.g. Eder and Kantner 2000: Koopmans and Statham 2010), establishing the direction of such conflict lines may help to identify whether the media are pointing to a deeper European economic integration and advocating the EU project, or, instead, may unveil an antiEU feeling and a desire for greater national independence on economic matters. Hence, establishing a narrative’s direction shows whether the Portuguese national media are evaluating the European economic topics in a way

74 Susana Rogeiro Nina that goes beyond the national perspective, thereby advancing the EU project and the emergence of a European public sphere. Only by conducting this analysis it is possible to evaluate whether the frames used by national media are pointing in a direction that promotes a European public sphere and stronger European integration.

Expectation, Methods and Data During the eurozone crisis, the role of the national media in mitigating the democratic deficit and promoting a European public sphere was important in respect of the European economic news. In an economic crisis, citizens demand more information about economic affairs in order to understand key economic developments (e.g. Wu and Coleman 2009). In addition, the more abundant information about the state of the economy in crisis periods (Soroka 2006) can send alarm bells ringing about a country’s economic performance (van Dalen et al. 2019) and lead to a greater demand for information so that citizens can sanction policymakers properly (Shen 2009). This is particularly acute in countries that faced austerity measures, such as Portugal, since citizens who are economically deprived are more motivated to seek information during a recession than in times of economic prosperity (Marinova and Anduiza 2020). Moreover, Portugal was one of the most fragile economies in the eurozone and was hit harder by the crisis due to the bailouts and to the introduction of austerity measures. Consequently, the Europeanization of national arenas was particularly visible. Thus, the main goal of this chapter is to test the idea of whether the crisis produced substantial differences in the way in which the Portuguese national media reported on European economic issues. After establishing the nature of the narrative before and after the crisis, it is relevant to predict and understand how far the European integration process is consolidated in the Portuguese national public sphere, which might shed some light on the emergence of a European public sphere. To evaluate whether the eurozone crisis changed the nature of media narratives, approximately 1,700 economic news articles were examined through an in-depth quantitative and qualitative content analysis of all the European economic articles published in the business sections of two Portuguese daily mainstream newspapers, namely Público and Diário de Notícias, which lead the quality media (Popescu et al. 2011), and those that have the highest circulation rates (APCT 2018). The empirical analysis is divided into two distinct periods, aggregating five national legislative elections: the period before the crisis (2002–2009) and the period after the onset of Great Recession (2011–2016). This time frame is particularly relevant to this study, since the Europeanization process takes place at the domestic level in national public spheres within the national media, and is enhanced in a context of high conflict and polarization (Kantner 2015). The focus on national elections and campaigns enables the

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 75 researcher to capture the political polarization and the degree of Europeanization of the national public arena. Thus, the analysis covers all the economic articles published 15 days before each legislative election took place in Portugal, before and after the outbreak of the eurozone crisis. The economic articles were analysed using a new typology capable of assessing the media narratives in Portuguese national media and the emergence of a European public sphere, combining three dimensions in the same model: Media Attention, Tone and Framing. Next, each dimension is briefly explained as well as their operationalization. Media Attention Media Attention is one of the most widely studied dimensions regarding media coverage of European issues (e.g. de Vreese et al. 2001; Trenz 2004; Sifft et al. 2007), mainly because of the salience of the news in pointing in a specific direction that can be an indicator for the public perception of a specific issue and its engagement in the politics of the EU. It is also a precondition for the evolution of a European public sphere (de Vreese et al. 2006). In this sense, the more the media pays attention to European actors and arguments and opinions across national borders, the more the national public spheres are Europeanized. This dimension was operationalized based on three indicators: (1) the number of articles per page in a newspaper; (2) the size of the economic news articles; and (3) the topic or scope of an article. To measure their salience, we follow a simple scheme: for each newspaper edition, we first determined the frequency of economic news in each business section and then the frequency of any economic articles that mentioned the EU. Then, we calculated the average visibility of EU economic news per legislative election. The same logic was applied to the size of the articles: for each article coded, we defined the number of words by counting the number of characters and then calculated the average number of words. With regard to the topic or scope of an article, all news related to the EU were coded as ‘EU’ on a dichotomous scale (EU is not present = 0; EU is present = 1). Tone The second dimension of the analysis aims to understand the overall tone used to characterize the European economic issues. Following previous studies of the tone used in national media coverage of the EU (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Schuck and de Vreese 2006; Nina et al. 2022; Santos and Nina 2022), this dimension shows whether there is a positive or negative bias within news coverage of economic issues. The underlying rationale is that individuals will pay more attention to negative information than to positive information, as negativity activates individuals’ surveillance systems, helping them to deal better with threats or challenges (Marcus at al. 2000),

76 Susana Rogeiro Nina and economic news tends to reach economic developments asymmetrically: it becomes more negative when the economy declines but does not become more positive when the economy improves (Blood and Phillips 1995; Soroka 2006). The tone of the articles was coded using an ordinary scale: 0 = neutral/no evolution; 1 = negative; 2 = balanced; and 3 = positive. It was based on the overall coder’s impressions, namely whether the article presents the topic as positive or negative. Framing The third dimension of analysis is Framing, which can be defined as a cognitive process in which the media, by choosing what to include and what to exclude from a story, tell individuals how they should think about specific issues (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Pan and Kosicki 1993). It encompasses the most substantive and qualitative information regarding the EU coverage in the Portuguese national media and enables the researcher to ascertain to what extent the eurozone crisis might have contributed to a change in media narratives regarding EU economic affairs. In other words, this dimension assesses the type of narratives that the Portuguese national media present on European economic articles, establishing whether they are centrifugal – i.e. they do not go beyond the national perspective – or centripetal – i.e. they seek to deepen European economic integration. To measure the Framing dimension, five indicators are suggested: (1) Problem; (2) Cause; (3) Responsibility; (4) Consequences and (5) Solution. These five indicators were elaborated based on the template initially introduced by Entman (1993) and enriched by the theoretical work of Touri and Rogers (2013). To measure the extent to which certain frames appear in the economic news, several items were developed for each dimension. They are mutually exclusive and, consequently, only one positive answer was allowed in each dimension. Table 4.1 sums up the empirical framework by displaying the dimensions and indicators used to determine Portuguese media narratives before and after the outbreak of the eurozone crisis.

Empirical Results Media Attention and Tone Figure 4.1 shows that the onset of the eurozone crisis helped to increase the visibility of European economic news in the Portuguese mainstream media. Although the results reveal that there was a decrease in the absolute number of articles mentioning the EU following the outbreak of the crisis, this does not mean that the EU became less visible during the crisis. Indeed, between 2011 and 2016, Portugal faced a substantial decline in the number of

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 77 Table 4.1 Empirical framework to measure European economic media narratives in the Portuguese national media Dimensions

Indicators

Measure

Media Attention

Number of economic news articles Size of economic news articles Topic or scope of articles

Number of articles on a specific page

Tone

Framing

Problem

Cause

Responsibility

Consequences

Solution

Number of words in each article 0 EU is not mentioned 1 EU is mentioned 0 Neutral 1 Negative 2 Balanced 3 Positive 1 Banking and finances 2 Welfare and taxes 3 Deficit, sovereign debt and inflation 4 European economic competition 5 Brexit 1 National 2 European Union 3 Globalization 1 National 2 National and European Union 3 European Union as a whole 1 Individual level 2 National level 3 European Level 1 European solidarity 2 Without EU assistance

economic articles published in the mainstream media (around 45 percentage points); still, the percentage of economic articles mentioning the EU increased by around 7 percentage points. Thus, even though the economic recession affected the national media, leading to a decrease in the size of the newspapers, the crisis also helped to increase the visibility of the EU in economic articles. This conclusion is reinforced by looking to the two remaining Media Attention indicators: the average size of European economic news articles and the average number of articles per page. From Figure 4.1, it is also possible to conclude that the crisis led to longer articles but a lower number of

78 Susana Rogeiro Nina articles per page. This outcome is particularly relevant to support our expectations because even though the eurozone crisis led to a decline in the absolute number of economic articles published in the Portuguese media, the size and the number of articles mentioning the EU increased after the onset of the crisis. This evidence is the first positive indicator that the eurozone crisis changed the visibility of European economic topics and fostered the Europeanization of the national public sphere. Considering now the tone used in the Portuguese mainstream newspapers to report the economic news in which the EU is mentioned, Figure 4.2 shoes

Figure 4.1 Media Attention to European economic articles according to the three indicators (scope, size and number), before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Source: compiled by the author.

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 79

Figure 4.2 Distribution of the tone used in EU economic articles before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Source: compiled by the author.

that a neutral or balanced tone tends to prevail in the coverage of European economic topics before and after the onset of the crisis. This trend is in keeping with previous studies showing that the newspapers’ business sections offer a rather technical treatment of topics and rely on analysts and experts to interpret the news (Doyle 2006). As a result, the financial media tend to privilege an analysis that is not ‘contaminated’ by non-economic approaches (e.g. Arrese and Vara-Miguel 2015). Thus, the prevalence of a neutral and balanced tone in economic news allows the media to have an echoing hegemonic interpretation on economic issues (Damstra and Vliegenthart 2016) and a consonant angle concerning the economic discourse. Despite the prevalence of non-bias tone to report on EU economic affairs in both of the periods under study, after the onset of the eurozone crisis the results also show that there is a substantial increase in the use of a negative tone to report on such topics and a decrease in the use of a positive tone, totalling approximately 10 percentage points in both cases. This evidence reveals that the crisis contributed to increase the negativity towards the EU economic topics in the Portuguese national media, resonating the increasing polarization in national arenas about the EU economic topics. The Framing and the Direction of the Narrative An initial overview of the Framing dimension is provided in Figure 2.3, showing the relative emphasis given to the five pre-selected frames (see

80 Susana Rogeiro Nina above) in EU economic articles before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis. The results show that along with the Consequences and the Problem frames, the Responsibility frame appears to be one of the most common frames used to portray EU economic news in the Portuguese media, following the onset of the crisis. Moreover, the evidence also shows that the eurozone crisis context affected the prevalence of specific frames. Notably, the Problem frame faced an increase of 20 percentage points after 2011, becoming one of the most relevant frames in the post-crisis period. It is also noteworthy that despite the Solution frame being used the least to portray the economic news in both periods, the outbreak of the crisis did not change either its prevalence or the percentage of news framed according to this. Broadly, the results suggest that since the beginning of the eurozone crisis in 2011 the Portuguese mainstream media have tended to portray the European economic topics mainly according to frames that rely on factual information. Indeed, after the outbreak of the crisis the EU economic topics were mostly framed in terms of addressing the ‘Responsibility’ for the economic issue, identifying the main ‘Problem’ and signalling the ‘Consequences’ of these issues, leaving the identification of ‘Cause’ and pointing the ‘Solution’ as secondary. As explained previously, each Framing dimension encompasses several sub-frames that allow to us to establish the direction of EU media narrative in the Portuguese national media. Therefore, we conducted an in-depth examination of each Framing dimension as it encompasses the most

Figure 4.3 Average distribution of the Framing dimension before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Source: compiled by the author.

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 81 substantive and qualitative information regarding the media coverage of EU economic issues. The analysis presented in Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of the most prevalent sub-frame in each framing dimension during both periods. Overall, the results suggest that the eurozone crisis did not change the centripetal nature of the European economic narratives in the Portuguese mainstream newspapers. Indeed, both before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis, the European economic media narratives tended to present a centripetal path, given that the EU is at the heart of most of the frames used to report on EU economic issues. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the eurozone crisis was a decisive moment in national public spheres. Although the results show that the eurozone crisis made no difference to the centripetal nature of European narratives, the results show a conflicting pattern. On the one hand, a slight decrease of the ‘Responsibility’ frame attributed to the EU, as well as a decrease in the number of articles that signal the ‘Consequences’ of the economic issues to the EU and specially a decrease in the ‘solidarity among member states’ as the best ‘Solution’ for the economic problems. On the other, there is an increase in the sub-frame that attributes the main ‘Cause’ of the European economic issues to the EU policies adopted. Even though these results might indicate that the crisis jeopardized the general belief in the EU project, we can conclude that the media narratives strengthened the ambitions for greater EU integration, at least among the Portuguese national media. This assumption is upheld by two main points. First, with the exception of the ‘Problem’, the remaining sub-frames used by the mainstream newspapers place the European project at the core of their coverage, in such a way that goes beyond the national interests, linking the Portuguese public sphere to the EU project. Given that the onus of the

Figure 4.4 Narrative direction: the most prevalent sub-frames in each Framing dimension before and after the onset of the eurozone crisis Source: compiled by the author.

82 Susana Rogeiro Nina European economic problems is placed at the European level, it could be plausible to argue that these are not optimistic views regarding the narrative direction and might indicate a centrifugal path. Nevertheless, considering the EU accountable for the economic problems and assigning EU policies and decisions as the primary cause does not mean that the national media do not follow a centripetal direction. One the one hand, this is because the Portuguese national media tended to portray the EU economic issues beyond the national perspective, partially disregarding the national governments, which in itself already indicates a centripetal direction. On the other hand, addressing the EU as the ‘Cause’ and the main actor responsible for the EU’s economic issues reveals that the national media understand that the EU is a crucial element in national public arenas, and is capable of affecting economic developments. Second, the economic crisis and the austerity measures implemented in the Portuguese domestic arenas were partially imposed by the EU. This could have set in motion a new centrifugal direction in the European economic narrative following the onset of the crisis, mainly because calls for stronger national government participation and less intervention from the EU in economic questions had been made. However, the evidence shows that after the crisis began not only this did not occur, but importantly the EU remained at the core of the Portuguese media narratives, which shows that the belief in the European project was not undermined by the economic crisis.

Conclusion The main goal of this chapter was to test the idea whether the outbreak of the economic crisis produced substantial differences in the way in which the national media reported on the European economic topics. In order to achieve this, we analysed all the economic news published in two mainstream Portuguese newspapers 15 days before five legislative elections held before (2002–2009) and after the onset of the Great Recession (2011–2016). Using a new framework encompassing three dimensions, namely Media Attention, Tone, and Framing, and looking in particular at five specific frames, i.e. Problem, Cause, Responsibility, Consequences and Solution, approximately 1,700 economic articles were manually coded. Counterintuitively, the empirical evidence revealed that the centripetal nature of media narrative was already present before the outbreak of the eurozone crisis, and the Great Recession did not dramatically alter the way in which the Portuguese newspapers narrated the European economic issues. Nevertheless, some of the patterns were amplified in the eurozone crisis context in terms of the salience of the EU and the negative tone to report on the European topics. In the post-2009 period, the Portuguese national media increased the attention given to the EU, with a notable increase in the proportion of

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 83 economic articles about the EU. Moreover, following the Great Recession, the Portuguese newspapers also published longer articles but a lower number of news articles per page. Together, this evidence denotes a deepening of the Europeanization process of the Portuguese domestic arena following the onset of the Great Recession. Furthermore, the results gleaned in terms of the tone used to portray the EU economic issues show that the eurozone crisis helped to increase the negativity of the European economic articles. Although the media mainly reported on the European economic news using a neutral and balanced tone, the increased negative bias when reporting on the European economic questions following the onset of the crisis should not be underestimated. First, the eurozone crisis increased the politicization of EU affairs which led to an increase in polarization on the way in which the EU topics were conveyed by the Portuguese national media (e.g. Silva et al. 2021), which might influence the way in which European citizens connect with the EU affairs and, thus, promote the emergence of a European public sphere. Second, because in the context of important developments, such as an economic crisis when the information about the state of the economy becomes more abundant the individuals pay more attention to negative information than to positive information, sending the alarm bell ringing about a country’s economic performance and motivating them to seek further information in order to properly sanction the policymakers. The onset of the eurozone crisis also led to an increase in the salience of frames that rely on factual information. The ‘Responsibility’, ‘Problem’ and ‘Consequences’ were the frames used the most by the Portuguese national newspapers to portray the European economic issues. The findings in the Responsibility frame revealed a tendency to externalize the attribution of responsibility of European economic news assigning the responsibility to the EU as a whole – which encompasses the EU institutions and the EU countries. This seems to suggest, on the one hand, that during the eurozone crisis the Portuguese national media adopted a more indulgent attitude towards the national government but were much harsher towards the EU. On the other hand, it shows that the EU was at the core of coverage of European economic issues, which might be a step to the creation of a European public sphere since it indicates that the Portuguese newspapers embraced the EU as a key actor in national public arenas. Therefore, the evidence found indicates that the eurozone crisis made no substantial difference to the centripetal nature of the European economic narrative. In fact, the substantive content of communication, i.e. the Framing, remained largely the same in the Portuguese media following the outbreak of the Great Recession. Thus, both before and after the beginning of the eurozone crisis the national newspapers tended to agree on how the European economic topics should be portrayed according to sub-frames that go beyond the national perspective. The empirical evidence reveals that even though there was an increase in the negative tone and polarization to report

84 Susana Rogeiro Nina on the EU topics as a result of the eurozone crisis, the national media decided to place the EU at the centre of their narratives. This centripetal path contributes to the deepening and consolidation of the European project and promotes the emergence of a European public sphere. Based on these findings, some traces of a European public sphere seem to be flourishing in Portugal – a country that was hit hard by the economic crisis. Despite the rise of some EU critical strands and national claims to strengthen the economic sovereignty, this chapter has shown that the Portuguese media narratives steadied the centripetal path displayed in the pre-2009 period. If we consider Portuguese public opinion towards the EU, we realize that these results might not be so surprising. Despite a slight decline during the crisis period (European Commission 2014) Portugal has been structurally pro-EU with a pro-integrationist attitude (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2007). Along with Spain, Portugal is one of the ‘EU’s most pro-European regions’ (e.g. Llamazares and Gramacho 2007; Schmitt and Teperoglou 2015; Teperoglou and Belchior 2020). The Great Recession did not change this trend. In 2018, Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2018) revealed that only 13% of Portuguese and 15% of Spanish citizens had a negative image of the EU – a value below the EU average (Teperoglou and Belchior 2020). Moreover, following the crisis, there was ‘an overwhelming majority with a positive image of the EU’ (Teperoglou and Belchior 2020: 11), as public opinion towards the EU was even more positive than it was during the period before the crisis. Furthermore, this chapter has helped to underscore the importance of considering the national context in establishing the direction of national media narratives. Earlier research has only focused on the European level (e. g. Schuck and de Vreese 2006; Drewski 2015; Salgado et al. 2015; Lahusen et al. 2016; Kaiser and Königslöw 2016). Yet the crisis juncture dramatically changed the national public arenas as the EU topics became more salient and contested (e.g. Rauh 2013; Grande and Kriesi 2016). In this sense, the findings of this chapter highlight the importance of looking into the firstorder elections, namely the national legislative elections, in order to understand the extent of the Europeanization of national public spheres.

Notes 1 www.ft.com/content/4da90494-35f0-11df-aa43-00144feabdc0. 2 Europeanization and EU politicization are often related, but distinct phenomena. EU politicization refers to the increasing salience and contestation of European topics as well the presence of European actors in national public spheres (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2012; Hutter and Kriesi 2019). A systematic and in-depth theoretical approach to the EU politicization concept is beyond of the scope of this chapter. Yet both concepts of Europeanization and politicization share the salience of European issues and the presence of actors in the national arena as a crucial dimension. For more information on EU politicization, see Beyers and Kerremans 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde 2011; de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Statham and Trenz 2012; Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013. For further analysis on EU politicization during the eurozone crisis, see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2012; Green-

European Economic Narratives in Portugal 85 Pedersen 2012; de Wilde 2011; Rauh 2013; Grande and Kriesi 2015; Risse 2015; Silva et al. 2021).

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5

Presidents and Governments in Portugal Variations on a Constitutional Theme (2008–2022) Rui Graça Feijó

Setting the Scene Decisions that are the object of fierce bargaining during the creation of a new regime – as was the case in Portugal in the period between the ‘Carnation Revolution’ of 25 April 1974 and the approval of the democratic Constitution on 2 April 1976 – tend to have long-lasting and pervasive implications, and to frame subsequent forms of political behaviour (Carey 2000: 223).1 They constitute a sort of ‘genetic code’ encapsulating a political DNA (Medeiros Ferreira 1981; Passarelli 2020). It might also be argued that such arrangements fuel the emergence of grand historical narratives with significant normative implications (Elgie and Passarelli 2020) that run parallel to the constitutional text and entertain complex relations with its prescriptions. One may recall Douglass North’s concept of ‘path dependence’ or ‘a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and to link decision making through time’ (1990: 98). Human agency and political choice are not disregarded, but informal benchmarks are established that provide stronger incentives to achieve some outcomes over others. Maurice Duverger (1980) argued that the most solid basis for assessing any given government system is offered by ‘the content of the constitution’. However, when passing from a general discussion to an analysis of individual cases, he recognized that the paradox of ‘similarity of rules, diversity of games’ called for a broader approach. Giovanni Sartori (1997) uses the concept of ‘material constitution’ to encompass established practices rooted in some form of ‘tradition’ or political culture that are not coincident with the formal constitutional letter, but which interact with it and offer a basis for action deemed legitimate by the citizenry. Comparative politics differs from constitutional analysis in that the former deals with the notion of legitimate action, be it grounded on formal or material constitutions, and even beyond. For this reason, it is necessary to begin this chapter with a brief recapitulation of Portuguese political history under the Second Republic (established in 1976), focusing on the expected role of the president of the republic within the system of government. During the first months after the ‘Carnation Revolution’, much was discussed regarding the institutional arrangements that ought to be installed DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-6

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 91 (see Feijó 2020: 26–32). The role of the president of the republic was among the contentious issues: history had its lessons. The experience of the parliamentary First Republic (1910–1926) was tainted by political instability: in less than 16 years, no fewer than eight presidents had been inaugurated, only one of whom served a full four-year term as prescribed by the Constitution. During this short period, more than 40 governments took office and there were a number of coups d’état (both successful and failed). Conversely, the authoritarian Estado Novo (‘New State’, 1933–1974) provided a vivid reminder of an ineffectual formal presidential system few were keen to restore. Doors were opened in the search for an innovative solution. In the wake of the victory of the ‘moderate’ sector of the military that had brought down the authoritarian regime over the radicals who had a very high profile during the ‘hot summer’ of 1975, consummated on 25 November 1975, a new pact between the civilian political parties and the dominant military wing was established. This new pact offered a solution for the institutional architecture of the regime: political parties would fight for seats in an allcivilian parliament from which a government would emerge, while a president would also be elected by universal suffrage who would exercise tutelage over the government. A semi-presidential system was thus born with its intrinsic diarchy of powers, and along with it a political narrative: the role of presidents would henceforth be to supervise, but not to directly exercise executive power. At that moment, another layer of significance was attributed to this diarchy of powers: a military candidate for the presidency, as was widely expected to be the case, would then amalgamate the ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ of its association with the corps that had brought down the old regime with a ‘democratic legitimacy’ emanating from the popular vote. This was known at the time as the ‘implicit clause’ of the pact, and it did in fact materialize with the election of the first president of the republic after 25 April 1974 – Gen. António Ramalho Eanes (in office from 1976–1986). Although this arrangement eventually evaporated when the first civilian president in 60 years was elected in February 1986 (Dr Mário Soares, in office from 1986–1996), it did leave its imprint on the political system: presidents ought to be ‘independent’ and capable of exercising their functions above the party fray. Discussing the variations that may occur within different configurations of semi-presidentialism, Maurice Duverger (1996: 510) noted that there could be three types of relationship between presidents and assemblies: (1) presidents who lead the parliamentary majority; (2) presidents who lead the parliamentary opposition to the prime minister (cohabitation); and (3) presidents ‘who have no partisan majority’, i.e. who are considered independent. He further suggests that this last case evokes the proposal of a ‘neutral’ function for the head of state or a ‘moderating power’ that ‘Benjamin Constant wanted to assign to constitutional monarchs and which the latter were never able to personify’(Duverger 1992: 903). I maintain that this formulation is well suited to render the substance of the narrative on presidential powers in Portugal.2

92 Rui Graça Feijó Assuming that presidents have a moderating role that requires a capacity to maintain their distance from the executive power of governments, and that modern democracies operate on the basis of deep-rooted political parties, what then is the nature of the relationship between presidents and political parties in Portugal? For one, ‘the position of prime minister has been the central locus of political leadership throughout the democratic period and remains the key political prize for parties’ (Jalali 2011: 160). Paraphrasing Bachelot and Haegel (2015), parties are thus ‘prime minister seeking organisations’, and party leaders are selected on the basis of their ability to fight legislative elections and discharge their prime ministerial functions. This fact offers a sharp contrast with France where, in Duverger’s words, ‘all the party system and the majoritarian mechanism have been organised around the election of the president by universal suffrage’ (1996: 510). For this reason, the public profile of a suitable presidential candidate does not derive from their standings in party life, but rather tends to favour those who present themselves with a significant degree of autonomy vis-à-vis party leaderships. In a context in which parties do control the legislative and the executive but not necessarily the presidency, parties may not be ‘the crucial tool that presidents have in dealing with the legislature’ (Passarelli 2020: 91). In fact, once elected, presidents tend to use informal powers that do not as a rule imply an articulation with a given political party. Jalali refers to these tools as ‘extraconstitutional power’ (2011: 170). Another analyst suggested that ‘the Palace of Belém … can become an important centre for political struggle even when the president does not exercise any of the powers that the constitution bestows upon him’ (Araújo 2003: 95). Having said this, two issues remain to be discussed. First, there was an attempt to create a ‘presidential party’. When Eanes was approaching the end of his last term and had expressed critical views of the 1982 constitutional revision that redrafted the presidential powers (as we shall see), a new party was created around his charismatic figure – that is, assuming he and no one else would be a ‘natural’ leader. However, the main purpose of this party, the Partido Renovador Democrático (Democratic Renewal Party), was to fight legislative elections – although it did present a presidential candidate (who was not the party leader). Passarelli has written on presidential parties as ‘the organisation that selected and supported a candidate who ran on its ticket and who subsequently became president’ (2020: 88). In this sense, Portugal has no experience of a presidential party. If not directly expressing the stance of a given political party, what then is the relationship between a president and a broad political family? The tworound electoral system in place in Portugal is conducive to a political dispute along left–right fault lines, at least in those cases when no incumbent – more likely to introduce a centrist option – is present. Ever since elections were effectively fought by civilian candidates (i.e. after the 1982 constitutional revision), two presidents have been associated with the left, and two with the right. Except for one case – Mário Soares in 1986 – no elected president was

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 93 a party leader at the time of the election, although all of them had held such positions in the past. They were all regarded as senior figures, but not as ‘the most eminent politician in the party’ (Passarelli 2020: 93). Their decision to seek the presidency was always announced as an individual gesture that later attracted the more or less enthusiastic support of their party – given that in most cases the relationship between the candidate and the party leader was not close (as the cases of Jorge Sampaio or Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa testify). In this context, Jalali and Fernandes (2017) have proposed the expression ‘political congruency’ to render the common belonging to a broad political family without the necessary mediation of a political party and its structures, offering presidents significant room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the realms in which parties are hegemons. Mário Soares, who publicly renounced his party membership the day he was elected, set the precedent that symbolizes the distance between presidents and political parties. Before we move on to the analysis of the period 2008–2022, a further issue must be discussed. According to the most widely accepted definition of semipresidentialism (Elgie 2011), Portugal adopted that system in 1976. At the time, the Portuguese system clearly fitted the ‘president-parliamentary’ subtype of semi-presidentialism, as the government was ‘politically responsible before the President of the Republic and the Assembly of the Republic’ (Article 193 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic). However, in 1982, the Constitution was the object of a profound revision in which the powers and competences of the president were redrafted (Feijó 2020: 32–40). Most scholars writing on the consequences of these changes point to a change in the semi-presidential subtype that would have become ‘premierpresidential’, and conceive a reduced role for the president in the system of government. Even though the revised Constitution still states that ‘the government is responsible before the President of the Republic and the Assembly of the Republic’ (Article 190), the mere deletion of the adverb ‘politically’ is supposed to have produced a major change. The argument is that a distinction must be introduced, and the government’s responsibility before the president is merely institutional and not political. However, it is utterly unclear what an institutional responsibility amounts to. Even constitutionalists argue: Our system allocates the power to gauge the situation to one sole person, without any possibility of a subsequent judicial syndication of the decision, and does not contemplate any form of sanction for an incorrect appraisal of the existence of substantial reasons. (Farinho 2017: 187) That is to say: it is up to a president, and no one else, to determine whether a motive for action is political or institutional. In this light, I tend to agree with another constitutionalist who stated that ‘at the end of the day, against all expectations and against what is more commonly accepted, the power and

94 Rui Graça Feijó the status of the President of the Republic have been accrued, and in a significant way’ (Novais 2007: 114). One may also follow the late right-wing politician and constitutionalist Francisco Lucas Pires, who thought ‘the powers of political direction of the president have been reduced, but on the other hand the power of moderation and arbitration were increased’ (1987: 305). In brief, I can see no reason to support the idea that the variety of semi-presidentialism has been changed.

The Realm of Presidents We are now equipped with a comprehensive framework within which the action of Portuguese presidents can be analysed: they are vested with moderating powers that place them above the party fray and allow them to discharge a general supervision over all political actors, with an increased weight in horizontal accountability. The electorate has reacted to this arrangement by participating in presidential ballots in numbers that closely match those of parliamentary votes, thus suggesting an understanding of the central, undiminished role for presidents. These ‘are not passengers’ sitting in the back seat of a moving car, rather they are full actors (Jalali 2011). This must be regarded in the context of Article 182 of the Constitution that states: ‘the government shall be the body that conducts the country’s general policy and the supreme authority in the public administration’, thus clearly circumscribing executive functions to the prime minister and his ministers. The realm of presidents must be found elsewhere. What in fact are the main elements in their political toolbox? The moderating function of Portuguese presidents is based on the combination of six major clusters of competency. First, one that exceeds the constitutional letter: the power of the word, that is, the capacity to verbalize – in public as well as in private – views on any subject, with it having a strong impact on the setting of a political agenda (Valle 2013). The power of the word can be formalized (for instance, addressing the parliament) or more often assuming an informal shape, namely in their relationship with the ‘fourth power’ – the media. Critically, the ability of presidents to intervene in the public sphere by means of their ‘power of the word’ is highly contingent on their popularity, for once their popularity wanes, their capacity is consequentially affected. Second, the ‘power of the sword’, as presidents assume the symbolic – but also positive – role of supreme commander of the armed forces. This enables presidents to intervene directly in matters pertaining to national security and to have open channels between them and the military and security apparatus. Third, and in close relation to the previous, as both are often regarded as presidential reserve powers, they have a substantial role in foreign relations – although in the Portuguese case this is a relatively weak power. Fourth, an active role in legislative supervision. All items of legislation must be countersigned by the president, who has the power of veto that are the final word over decrees emanating from the government; in the case

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 95 of laws passed by parliament, the presidential veto can only be overturned by an absolute majority if based on political grounds, and by a two-thirds’ majority if the veto is based on constitutional motives sanctioned by the competent court. Fifth, the power of appointment to and dismissal from a number of institutional positions – including the government. This is considered the key presidential power, contributing decisively to ground their interventions in the policymaking process (Lobo and Neto 2009). In fact, this competence places presidents at the centre of a complex network of powers and attributes the presidency with the ability to exercise an indirect form of conditionality over the country’s political orientation, ultimately revealing the ‘potential for equilibrium, collaboration and control’ over all branches of power, while at the same time being the ‘space of deep solitude’ that surround presidents in their interpretation of their constitutional mandate (Bacelar de Vasconcelos 2011: 293–295). Sixth, a miscellaneous mix of other competencies, some ceremonial and symbolic in nature, nurturing the ethos of the ‘first magistrate of the nation’ (granting pardons, commuting sentences, attribution of decorations), others exceptional and deriving from the status of the president as being at the top of the state hierarchy (determination of referendums, declaration of the state of siege or the state of emergency).

Presidents and Governments after the Financial Crisis Between the onset of the financial crisis of 2008 and the present day, Portugal had two presidents: Aníbal Cavaco Silva (2006–2016) and Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (2016–) and seven different governments under three prime ministers.3 Both presidents came from the same political right-of-centre family, whereas two prime ministers came from the left-of-centre Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) and one from the same party as the president. Prime ministers governed with a variety of political solutions: single party majority, coalition government and single party minority based on confidence and supply arrangements. In a period spanning just 15 years, a number of situations were experienced in Portugal. Aníbal Cavaco Silva (2006–2016) In 2005, the PS won its first absolute majority. A few months later, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the right-wing candidate, secured his first term as head of state. After serving as prime minister for ten years (1985–1995), he ran for president in 1996. Being perceived then as a partisan candidate because he had stepped down from his party’s leadership only a few months before the polls, and at a time when the left had become a majority, he was defeated by Jorge Sampaio (1996–2006). Ten years on, he learned the lesson: his political persona was fashioned to avoid close party attachment (he wrote a key op-ed criticizing the prime minister of his party, contributing to his downfall in

96 Rui Graça Feijó 2005), and to stress his technical skills as an economist (graduated from York University, UK, in public finance) rather than the ‘professional politician’ he pretended not to be, feeding a populist theme against the ‘political class’. His platform consisted of four basic principles: (1) respect the constitutional provisions that do not give presidents legislative or governmental powers; (2) defend political stability; (3) maintain ‘independence vis-à-vis the political parties and other organisations’ – including in the financing of his electoral campaign; and, above all, (4) offer the other organs of sovereignty, namely the government, ‘strategic and institutional cooperation’ (Cavaco Silva 2017: 59; 62). In the minds of many Portuguese, however, the echo of a famous utterance of his was still present. While serving as prime minister, he had strained relations with president Mário Soares, and one day he referred to what he believed were excessive interventions by the president by saying: ‘Leave us alone to carry on with our work’. This utterance encapsulated a minimalist conception of presidential functions that was to accompany the public image of Cavaco Silva in the years to come, even though his presidential mandates did not fit that framework well. It went hand in hand with his frequent condemnation of the ‘forces of blockade’, that is, the institutions – like the jurisdictional powers – tasked with exercising checks and establishing balances in the political arena, which he regarded as intrusive to the workings of his government. The first few years witnessed a generally relaxed coexistence between the right-wing head of state and a moderate left-of-centre prime minister. In the area of Cavaco Silva’s expertise, public finance, the indicators were mostly good. The public deficit was on a downward trend from 6.1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 to 2.9% in 2007, rising again slightly to 3.7% in 2008. This trend allowed the government to lower value-added tax and to award above-inflation wage increases to public sector employees. Public debt was by and large stagnant, increasing from 72.2% of GDP in 2005 to 72.7% in 2007. The most worrying sign was the low rate of economic growth – a phenomenon that mirrored the impact of Portugal’s decision to join the single currency, the euro, and was similar to the difficulties experienced by several other Southern European nations for the same reason. In fact, the economic growth rate declined in the new millennium, albeit that it did increase from 0.78% in 2005 to 2.51% in 2007. One sign of the relaxed atmosphere was Cavaco Silva’s decision to accept the government’s request for a referendum on abortion – a theme he clearly disliked, but which represented a point d’honneur for the prime minister. In private, however, the Cavaco criticized several ministers and their policies – such was the case with the ministers for health and agriculture. The prime minister accommodated those criticisms, and eventually replaced the ministers when the opportunity arose. However, all this changed in 2008 with the emergence of the economic crisis. The first official response from the European Union (EU) to the crisis that had its roots in the United States was to recommend Keynesian policies that

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 97 implied additional public spending to counterbalance the effects of the coming recession. Portugal adopted such policies, and its economic indices suffered severe modifications: the public deficit rose sharply from 2.7% in 2007 to 9.9% in 2009, eventually peaking at 11.4% in 2011; while the public debt similarly rose from 72.7% in 2007 to 100.2% in 2010. Meanwhile, economic performance slowed to 0.32% in 2008 before crashing to –3.12% in 2009 in what was the most severe recession in 30 years before recovering slightly to 1.74% in 2010. In 2008, the divergences between Cavaco Silva and the prime minister grew in intensity, although they were generally kept out of the public domain. As he elaborated later in his memoirs, ‘during the 6 June meeting I realised the prime minister did not know what to do’ (Cavaco Silva 2017: 306). Perhaps the clearest sign that relations between the two politicians had deteriorated was seen in late July 2008, when Cavaco Silva made an address to the nation justifying the political veto of an apparently marginal issue – the new political statute of the Autonomous Region of the Azores. In the preparation for the general election of 2009, the party to which Cavaco Silva was still affiliated, the Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party), chose a new leader, his close personal friend Manuela Ferreira Leite, who defeated two internal rivals. From then on the public perception was that the PSD was advocating Cavaco Silva’s ideas, and the rivalry between the PSD and the PS came to be regarded as a clash between the head of state and the prime minister. The idea that things had turned sour surfaced in the summer months of mid-2009, when socialist sources claimed that Cavaco Silva had been instrumental in drafting the PSD’s election manifesto. In response, a presidential aide publicly accused the government of planting listening devices in the presidential palace. Tensions were running high. The general election returned the PS to power with 36.5% of the vote, although this time without a majority, while the PSD obtained 29%. The left retained control of parliament, although this would not be translated into any form of agreement between the PS and the parties to its left. Cavaco Silva argued for the establishment of a right-left compromise government that failed to materialize, and eventually accepted the formation of a minority cabinet whose parliamentary investiture was made possible by the likelihood the parties to the left and the right of the PS would not converge in voting against the new government. In fact, this solution replicated that which had been followed for the first constitutional government in 1976 (led by Mário Soares), the tenth constitutional government Cavaco Silva formed in 1985, and the 13th and 14th governments headed by António Guterres of the PS. In a speech made on the occasion of the swearing-in of the new government, Cavaco Silva used his ‘power of the word’ to make it absolutely clear that he disagreed with the prime minister’s political choices. The political response to the 2008 crisis unsettled the public finances and did not remedy the economic issues. In 2009, GDP stood at −3.12%, but

98 Rui Graça Feijó increased to 1.74 in 2010 before falling back to –1.70 in 2011. The positive value in 2010 would prove to be the best for the period 2008–2014. The public deficit increased significantly to 3.7% in 2008, 9.9% in 2009 and 11.4% in 2011 while the public debt also rose from 75.6% of GDP in 2008 to 114.4% in 2011. The deterioration of the external trade balance had an impact on these figures. In the international arena, Portugal was increasingly associated with the group of countries targeted by the markets for their weaknesses – the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece). What some have called the sovereign debt crisis, which was in fact a continuation of the financial crisis that can only be fully understood in that context, settled in. In this context, Cavaco Silva presented his bid for a second mandate in the elections scheduled for early 2011 on a slightly different platform. Although he publicly maintained his distance from the party leaders – with the PSD in the meantime replacing Ferreira Leite with an internal rival who had previously led the youth branch and who was a vocal critic of the former leader, as well as being historically associated with the critics of the president – on election night he revealed a new agenda: I thought I should not ignore what the other candidatures had done during the campaign. I made it clear that my victory had been the victory of truth over calumny, that honour had vanquished infamy … I was accused of not being tolerant at the hour of triumph. (Cavaco Silva 2017: 81) In brief, there had been winners and losers. He would no longer be ‘the president of all Portuguese’, as tradition stipulated. This became clear in reminiscences about his inauguration speech in early March 2011: My speech caused profound discontent in the government, and that did not surprise me … I decided that in my second term inauguration speech I ought to make a significant intervention with the aim of putting pressure on the government to change course and adopt new policies … It was a patriotic duty to point out the way forward. (Ibid. 432–433) Overcoming his own minimalist conception of presidential powers, without admitting that he was initiating a new phase in his mandate (and to a large extent, in Portuguese politics) Cavaco Silva was now reviving an old motto of the right-wing political family that had never gained traction: ‘one majority, one government, one president’ (which was initially formulated by Dr Francisco Sá Carneiro in 1980) and was intent on steering political change. Two weeks later the government fell. Having lost a critical vote in parliament, the prime minister tendered his resignation, relieving the president of the need to dismiss him. Early elections were called, and the ‘honeymoon’ or

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 99 ‘coat-tails’ effect produced a new right-wing majority in parliament, bringing together the two parties that had supported Cavaco Silva. The convergence between president and parliamentary majority went further than mere congruency: it was the bedrock for the ensuing years (Feijó 2020: 135–136). The history of the relationship between Cavaco Silva and the new PSD leader and prime minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, was marred by controversy as Sá Carneiro’s dream turned into a nightmare for Cavaco Silva. The political situation in Portugal was dominated by the fact the country had appealed to the troika (comprising the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) for a bailout of €78 billion. External help came at a price: a stringent austerity plan imposing severe cuts to public spending. However, Passos Coelho and his junior partner, Paulo Portas of the Centro Democrático Social (CDS – Social Democratic Centre), saw in this an opportunity to implement a radical neoliberal agenda, proclaiming the need to ‘go beyond the troika programme’, with very significant reductions to established social rights. Pursuing this agenda, the public deficit slowly and erratically fell from 7.7% in 2011 to 4.4% in 2015. However, recession was not avoided, the variation in GDP being –4.06% in 2012 and –0.92% in 2013 before returning to 0.79% in 2014 and 1.79% in 2015. The main issue was the level of public debt, which grew continuously from 114.4% of GDP in 2011 to 132.9% in 2014. By and large, Cavaco Silva stood by the government. In particular, he took a lenient view on many critical proposals enshrined in legislation he countersigned, only to be found by the Constitutional Court to have contravened the Constitution. For some commentators, this was a period marked by ‘judicial activism’ in the face of ‘presidential passivity’ – and even to accusations of ‘political activism’ by the judiciary. At times, he recognized the need to distance himself, such as in 2012, just after the government announced its intention to reduce the employers’ social security contribution by implementing a sharp rise in the workers’ contribution. Cavaco Silva convened a session of the Council of State at which it was made clear to the prime minister that this plan was not feasible. This episode has been interpreted not as a form of putting pressure on the government to change its stance, but rather as offering the prime minister an institutional context in which to do the inevitable. In a New Year address to the nation, Cavaco Silva noted the likelihood of Portugal witnessing a ‘negative spiral’ path leading to recession, prompting Passos Coelho to restate the government’s position and refuse to change course. Perhaps the boldest initiative took place in mid-2013 when Paulo Portas, leader of the junior party, the CDS, suddenly resigned, throwing the survival of the government into question. Instead of accepting the government reorganization proposed by the prime minister (who had promoted his junior partner to deputy prime minister), Cavaco Silva addressed the nation with a proposal for a ‘national salvation compromise’ (Cavaco Silva 2018: 251–280). He suggested that the right-wing parties should negotiate a one-year solution involving the PS, at the end of

100 Rui Graça Feijó which fresh elections would be called. The initiative was generally regarded as an attempt to exercise presidential ‘moderating power’. Under conflicting pressure, the leader of the PS and the leaders of the governing coalition agreed to negotiate. An aide to Cavaco Silva chaired the negotiations that ended with the coalition being unwilling to make any substantial concessions that would allow the PS to accept a deal. As it turned out, there had been no previous articulation between Cavaco Silva and Passos Coelho, and the episode revealed the extent to which party control was far from the head of state. Cavaco Silva blamed the leader of the PS and eventually accepted the government reorganization, realizing that his ability to influence events was curtailed by his previous understanding of presidential powers and lack of sound party links. While Passos Coelho was prime minister, Cavaco Silva only exercised his veto three times, compared to the 16 vetoes he issued while José Sócrates was prime minister (Franco 2020). This is in contrast with what has been regarded as a tendency for second-term presidents to be more active in government control (Rapaz 2017). The image that emerges from an overall appraisal is that of a president who reduced significantly the level of horizontal accountability in the system of checks and balances. In fact ‘Cavaco Silva was the only civilian president who saw his use of “legislative” powers reduced in the second term compared with the first’ (Freire and Santana Pereira 2017: 231). As a result of the projection of the image of a president under the influence of the prime minister who controlled the destiny of the country, despite the official hierarchical relationship between the two, the confidence of the Portuguese in the presidency plummeted from 73.4% in 2008 to 36.3% in 2014 – and probably even lower by 2016 (Freire and Santana Pereira 2017). In general, presidents managed to secure for the presidency first place among the trustworthy institutions, with scores above 50% and often above 70%. In personal terms, presidents are generally highly popular, with figures often in the eighth percentile. Public satisfaction with Cavaco Silva, however, suffered from his association with an unpopular government that had implemented cuts in salaries and pensions, overseen rising unemployment, the downgrading of public services and extensive privatizations. According to a poll published by the weekly newspaper Expresso, Cavaco’s popularity rating plunged to –12.9% – the first president to record negative ratings (Teixeira 2016) As argued above, popularity is a critical factor in explaining the actual room for political manoeuvre at the disposal of presidents at any given time. The decline in Cavaco Silva’s popularity limited his ability to intervene effectively. This became evident in late 2015, when his term in office was drawing to a close (and, by law, presidents have reduced powers during the final six months of their mandate and are unable to dissolve parliament during this time). In the general election that Cavaco Silva refused to anticipate (coinciding with his last six months in office) the left won a majority of

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 101 seats in parliament, but came behind the government parties that were running as a coalition (PSD emerged the largest single party in parliament). For the first time in the history of the Second Republic, the three left-wing parties (the PS, the Partido Comunista Português – Communist Party of Portugal and the Bloco de Esquerda – Left Bloc) interpreted the defeat of the right as a call for convergence, and managed to strike a confidence and supply agreement to support a minority PS government. The role of parliament was clearly strengthened. A political analyst decried the emergence of ‘semipresidentialism based on the assembly’ (Morais 2016). The president felt that he had to react. As PS leader António Costa claimed on the night of the election, it was for the right-wing coalition to ‘find the conditions to govern’ in parliament. In keeping with tradition, Cavaco Silva appointed Passos Coelho as prime minister of the country’s first minority coalition. However, the combined votes of the left-wing parties in parliament denied the prime minister the necessary parliamentary investiture. It was the first time since 1978 (that is, before the constitutional revision of 1982) that such a move took place.4 Cavaco Silva could not dissolve parliament and call for fresh elections as it was both within the last six months of the presidential term and within six months of a general election. He could – but found it hard to accomplish – keep the prime minister in office as a caretaker until the new president called fresh elections (Cavaco Silva 2018: 406). The only viable option was to invite the PS leader to form a minority government, which he did reluctantly. Claiming to be ‘concerned about the country’s political stability and governability’, he demanded written agreements be produced to demonstrate the viability of the government for the duration of the legislature. This was accepted. Still, the terms of the separate agreements were not enough, and Cavaco Silva asked for ‘clarification’ on several items that amounted to critical elements of public policy in order to ‘hold António Costa responsible for the strategic orientations of his government’ that met with the president’s disapproval (ibid.: 415–416). His distance from the political solution was clearly expressed in the speech he gave during the inauguration ceremony. It was evident that the president was acting at the limit of his powers, and that he would have decided differently had he been able to. In the list of public policies he presented to the new prime minister, he went much further than president Jorge Sampaio had gone in 2004 when he spoke at the investiture of prime minister Pedro Santana Lopes. Contrary to president Sampaio, who was able to draw conclusions from his words and eventually dismissed the prime minister a few months later, Cavaco Silva was not in position to be consequential: his term in office came to an end on 9 March 2016. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (2016–) Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is a professor of constitutional law and a former minister and leader of PSD (1996–1999) who was a household name as a

102 Rui Graça Feijó result of his presence as a popular TV pundit who was beamed into living rooms every Sunday evening. He built a political persona of being on ‘the left of the right’, and did not shy away from distancing himself from the PSD-dominated governance of Cavaco Silva and Pedro Passos Coelho, even though he was appointed to the Council of State by the president. At the 2014 PSD congress, a motion was passed defining the ‘profile’ for its presidential candidate, which was widely recognized as being an attempt to block Rebelo de Sousa’s aspirations, given his image of being a ‘catalyst of all sorts of counter-powers and a wind-vane of erratic opinions’. Yet, in 2015, Rebelo de Sousa enacted the traditional presentation of a presidential candidature, appearing alone before the press in the rural municipality of his family’s origins, and declaring ‘the need to build bridges with affection’. In a critical declaration made after the inauguration of the PS minority government, he stated: ‘the president must do his utmost to ensure that governments are viable and long lasting’. Clearly, Rebelo de Sousa’s interpretation of presidential powers restored the traditional understanding that had been broken by Cavaco Silva in his handling of relations with Passos Coelho and Paulo Portas. The right-wing party leaders, however, were faced with polls indicating that Rebelo de Sousa was the favourite to win the election, and they had no obvious alternative candidate. In this context, they eventually declared their support for the candidate, but did not actively participate in the campaign, which was run on a very low budget and far from the party apparatus. Rebelo de Sousa was seemingly alone and in direct contact with the electorate as he scored a comfortable 52% of the vote in the first round. In line with the political tradition in Portugal, the inauguration of a new president does not entail the resignation of the prime minister and his government. President Rebelo de Sousa did not question the legitimacy of the current parliamentary arrangements, introducing from the very start a novel approach in contrast with his predecessor, and when the dissolution of parliament became possible (and was desired by his own party), he decided not to intervene. On the contrary, he expressed the view that no presidential intervention would take place before the electorate was given a chance, albeit indirectly, to express its views on the political situation at the time of the local elections that were scheduled for September 2017, which returned a resounding victory for the PS and the left in general, prompting the resignation of Passos Coelho as PSD leader and his replacement by his long-time critic Rui Rio. Prime minister Costa was able to secure what many thought would be contradictory policies. On the one hand, he promised to ‘turn the page of austerity’ and reversed most of the severe cuts to salaries, pensions, public holidays, length of the working week and more. On the other hand, he managed to steer his budgetary options within the rules set by the EU, which he claimed could be ‘smartly interpreted’. On the whole, he succeeded in securing the support of the parties to his left for a political direction that was acceptable to Brussels and which was well received by the population at large. The president concurred.

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 103 The crisis slowly receded. Powerful efforts were made to reduce the public deficit from the inherited –4.4% of GDP in 2015 to the very first surplus of the Second Republic (+0.1% in 2019). Public debt – on which lower interest rates were negotiated – fell from 131.2% in 2015 to 116.6% in 2019. The variation in GDP was positive every year, oscillating between 1.79% in 2015 and 3.51% in 2017. Adherence to EU norms (albeit in an ‘intelligent’ manner that disregarded some of its most stringent strictures) was compatible with a different internal policy that sought to reverse the most damaging effects of the austerity programme implemented by the previous governments – with a positive impact on the level of confidence in the government. In this context, room for presidential initiative in opposition to the government, as was requested by the leadership of the right-wing parties and some of its followers in the media, was narrow. Rebelo de Sousa did not travel that road. Seemingly, he was content with offering all sorts of comments and suggestions, appearing on the news almost every day with a new idea, and stuck to his promise to guarantee political stability. Despite being a critic of António Costa’s ‘irritating optimism’, the president and the prime minister developed a close relationship that was sometimes referred to as ‘Costelo’ (from Costa + Marcelo). This relationship did not prevent the president from raising several issues in public, however: the most noticeable of which was his call for the resignation of the minister of internal administration following the wildfires of 2017. He also took a strong line in relation to an episode of theft of military equipment, although he fell short of demanding the resignation of the minister of defence. However, on matters concerning the actual exercise of presidential powers, apart from the ‘power of the word’ Rebelo de Sousa used in unprecedented ways, to date there has been no major clash, as one may derive, for instance, from the relatively few number of vetoes (three in 2016; two in 2017; six in 2018; five in 2019; six in 2020) and, except for one, which was based on constitutional rather than political grounds, has offered the majority the chance to make alterations and pass the bills again with a non-qualified majority. In fact, the president uses his own expertise on constitutional grounds and rarely asks the Constitutional Court for advice. Another important aspect is that the PS decided to shelve some of its manifesto initiatives, including the creation of regional administrations, a constitutional provision that has failed to materialize since 1976 and which are known to meet with presidential objections. The prime minister has justified this by claiming that the present constitutional arrangements determine that the chief executive officer must inform the president of all political initiatives – the presidential right to be permanently informed – and this offers him a chance to gauge the likelihood of obtaining his consent for new proposals. It must be inferred, though, that Rebelo de Sousa has repeatedly declared he will not decide on legislative initiatives based on his faith (for instance, as a devout Catholic, in relation to euthanasia) but rather on his reading of the will of the people and the comprehensive nature of the preceding national debate.

104 Rui Graça Feijó The Portuguese electorate responded to the positive evolution of the situation by returning a new, enlarged left-wing majority in the 2019 general election, with the PS substantially increasing its number of members of parliament to become the largest group in the Assembleia da República (Assembly of the Republic). President Rebelo de Sousa deviated once more from his predecessor by not demanding written agreements between the PS and the parties to its left, although the prime minister insisted that his government would be supported on the same political basis as the previous government. For the president, the absence of written agreements did not diminish the government’s legitimacy nor its ability to survive. On the other hand, a more fluid political basis might favour wider agreements, as it would free the PS to entertain some negotiations with the PSD, whose leader was eager to discuss possible ‘regime pacts’ with António Costa. A sign of the entente between the president and prime minister is the fact the government has several independent ministers, some of whom are regarded as politically close to the head of state. It was no surprise that António Costa offered Rebelo de Sousa a free run for his second term. Much like what had happened in 1991, when Cavaco Silva, who was then prime minister and leader of the PSD, offered his party’s support for the re-election of president Mário Soares, in 2020 the PS did not expressly support any candidate (even though there was a socialist in the race), and most of the senior figures in the party openly declared their support for the incumbent. In January 2021, Rebelo de Sousa secured 60.7% of the vote, the second highest electoral score in presidential elections (after Mário Soares who received 70.35% in 1991). Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa’s second term began in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, which reduced the level of partisan confrontation and presented an opportunity for inter-party cooperation. During the early stages of the pandemic, there was a moment of tension between the president and the prime minister, when Rebelo de Sousa insisted on the declaration of the state of emergency that Costa thought premature. However, after those differences were exposed to the public, the government withdrew its objections and parliament passed the necessary authorization for the presidential decree. Emergency measures were in place for long periods through 2020 and 2021, and there was a public display of policy convergence between all the organs of state. In 2021, the president had a chance to mark the political scenario. In midyear, during the summer months, negotiations on the 2022 state budget stalled, with the parties to the left of the PS reluctant to abstain unless more concessions were granted. In early October, Rebelo de Sousa intervened, announcing that in the event the budget was not approved – implicitly by the left-wing majority in parliament – he would dissolve parliament and call fresh elections. This presidential intervention was politically critical. He could have reserved his view or suggest that the PSD might be convinced to negotiate, as his line of seeking centre-ground agreements would imply.

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 105 However, his intervention represented a significant boost for the prime minister, who could harden his position and refuse concessions to the left, confident as he was that a negative vote by the parties to his left and the ensuing victimization of the government might have a favourable electoral response. Costa’s manoeuvring was crowned with success: the state budget was rejected, the president called fresh elections and the PS won its second absolute majority, largely due to the collapse of the vote for the parties to its left, while also gaining some support from centrist voters who were alarmed at the PSD which would not rule out seeking agreements with the extreme right in order to oust the PS. Conditions for political stability being present at the time of writing, when the PS controls 120 of parliament’s 230 seats, the role of the president tends to be reduced. However, it does not seem to be in Rebelo de Sousa’s nature to sit back and watch, and he proved this point in the speech he gave on the inauguration of the new government. Apart from setting out his own view for the next four years with a plethora of benchmarks and suggestions that reveal his rhetoric skills, he introduced a purely political note. His words were: Now that you have won the election, and have won a mandate for four and a half years, I am sure you know that it will not be politically easy that your face, the face that won the election … could be replaced by any other half-way through this journey.5 Addressing speculation as to the prime minister’s future and his alleged desire to take up a role in one of the European institutions, Rebelo de Sousa made it clear that he would not appoint any other PS leader to replace Costa, thus creating, as he has long been famous for, a new ‘political fact’. It has been reported – without any form of denial by the president – that in the near future he may report a substantial number of new laws to the Constitutional Court for revision, as vetoes deriving from constitutional non-conformity require a two-thirds’ majority in parliament in order to be superseded. If true, this inclination of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa would mean a new form of intervention to limit the effects of an absolute majority in the House and force negotiations with the right of centre in sensitive issues.

Conclusion The framework within which Portuguese presidents exercise their mandates is spelled out in the 1976 Constitution and the 1982 revision. It also comprehends elements pertaining to the ‘material constitution’ and what we might call political mores. Both formal and informal presidential powers have long been established, and time offers the advantage of precedent as well as a guide for the main attitudes that presidents are expected to pursue. In a very general way, the status of presidents within the complex system of

106 Rui Graça Feijó governance is best described as that of a moderator, a referee, the tip of the scale or the lubricating oil (these being some of the most common expressions used in the country to refer to the status of presidents), capable of supervising all branches of power and discharging a unique function that cannot be reduced to or be confused with executive power. For this reason, presidents are supposed to perform as independent political agents without unduly close ties to the party machines, which are organized around leaders who primarily aspire to become prime minister. The onset of the 2008 economic and financial crisis shook the political balance between the president and the prime minister. During the first three years of his term, Cavaco Silva followed the conventional path and offered the government led by a political opponent what he labelled ‘strategic cooperation’. The crisis, however, brought to the fore his own expertise as a professor of public finance, and he increased his criticism of the prime minister’s choices. The 2009 general elections were a moment for those differences to surface. Still, the president and prime minister managed to cohabit for another two years. With the emergence of a special aspect of the financial crisis – the so-called sovereign debt crisis – that reached its climax in 2011, the presidential election of that year witnessed the emergence of a new presidential attitude: he publicly criticized the government and encouraged the right-wing parties to bring down the prime minister, using political rather than institutional instruments. In the ensuing four years, Cavaco Silva’s position on the political chessboard became increasingly entangled with that of the new prime minister and his government. The old dream of right-wing politicians – to have a majority supporting the president and the government simultaneously – which had never fully materialized in the Portuguese Second Republic, was then observed. However, that dream seems to have turned into a nightmare. Cavaco Silva erratically oscillated between a minimalist interpretation of presidential powers, in line with what he was famous for while serving as prime minister under president Mário Soares, and a position that would grant him powers to determine major public policies, as expressed, for example, in the speech he gave when swearing in António Costa as prime minister. The critical factor was that Cavaco Silva was no longer the master of a partisan apparatus and thus lacked the instruments to exercise broader powers and lead the articulation between the presidency and parliament. In practice, this situation – accompanied as it was by an increasingly unpopular government due to the severe austerity measures it imposed and with which he was publicly associated – determined a sharp fall in his popularity. In turn, low levels of popularity tend to reduce the room for the president’s political manoeuvre. The aftermath of the 2015 general election witnessed a president who was not only limited in his powers by constitutional provisions that restrict presidential authority during the last six months of the term, but mostly by a lack of any support for his positions within the electorate. The presidential election of 2016 heralded a new and different era.

Presidents and Governments in Portugal 107 By and large, Rebelo de Sousa reversed his predecessor’s political stance and returned to a more canonical interpretation of his function as a moderator over the various elements within the system. Basing his position on a very extensive use of the ‘power of the word’, and endeavouring to establish an affective relation with the population in the so-called presidency of proximity, he respected traditionally established patterns of relationship with parliament and the government, and has been regarded widely as having implementing a more de-sacralized use of his powers – in sharp contrast with the highly ritualized and formalized attitude of his predecessor. These patterns do not imply the president is either a political supporter or opponent of the prime minister. Rather, they conform with Duverger’s suggestion that presidents may have no political attachment to either side of parliament. Presidents are thus entitled to express their opinions publicly and privately; to try and influence the political agenda by means of suggestion or formal proposals; and even to criticize the specific actions of governments or ministers. Rebelo de Sousa did all this. Yet one may wonder whether he has satisfied himself more with his rising popularity (translated in a very high score on his re-election bid) and with the emotional effects of his political rhetoric than with effective impact on public policies. There can be no doubt that he has influenced political outcomes – both through using his veto powers (sparingly) and by restraining the prime minister from moving forward with some of the points in his manifesto. On the whole, however, Rebelo de Sousa restored the traditional function of heads of state and has behaved in line with the popular expectations regarding the status of the president of the republic. He has been assisted in this by his own constitutionalist persona, the way Portugal emerged out of the successive crises of 2008 and 2010, mostly by virtue of the PS government’s decision to ‘turn the page of austerity’ after 2015 and sailing through the COVID-19 crisis of 2020–2022 with an almost unaltered level of partisan competition that has enabled him to be the ‘voice of common sense’.

Notes 1 Special thanks are due to José Reis who made pertinent remarks on the economic and financial aspects of the crisis constituting the background to the political evolution during the period under study in this chapter; and to António Costa Pinto, the editor of this volume, for insightful comments that helped me to finetune the argument presented here. Any remaining faults are this author’s sole responsibility. 2 See Feijó (2020) for an extended version of this argument. 3 These were as follows: XVII constitutional government, prime minister José Sócrates, majority government (PS) (2005–2009); XVIII constitutional government, prime minister José Sócrates, minority government (PS) (2009–2011); XIX constitutional government, prime minister Pedro Passos Coelho, majority coalition government (PSD/CDS) (2011-2015); XX constitutional government, prime minister Pedro Passos Coelho, minority coalition government (PSD/CDS) (2015); XXI constitutional government, prime minister António Costa, minority government

108 Rui Graça Feijó (PS) with confidence and supply agreements on the left (2015–2019); XXII constitutional government, prime minister António Costa, minority government (PS) (2019–2022); XXIII constitutional government, prime minister António Costa, majority government (PS) (2022–). 4 In 1978, the third government presented its programme to the House, but a rejection motion tabled by the PS was approved with votes from both the left and the right, and the executive failed its investiture. 5 www.presidencia.pt/atualidade/toda-a-atualidade/2022/03/presidente-da-republicadeu-posse-ao-xxiii-governo-constitucional/.

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Patterns of Ministerial Recruitment, Partisanship and Financial Crisis Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo

Introduction It is not by chance that Schattschneider’s (1942: 1) famous statement ‘modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties’ became a truism.1 Without these political institutions, voters would lack meaningful choices and have difficulty controlling ex ante and ex post decision-makers. The party government model emphasizes parties’ relevance in the government process and composition (Katz 1986; Blondel and Cotta 1996). One of the most established assumptions of this model is the condition that government positions flow from support within the party. Consequently, cabinet appointments are the most important personnel decisions in parliamentary systems (Neto and Strøm 2006), particularly as these officials are expected to be recruited and held accountable by parties (Müller 2000; Mair 2008). Nonetheless, in the newer, crisis-prone democracies in Southern and Eastern Europe, cabinets have been plagued by a politicized recruitment system that puts party loyalty above professional skills and overall state exploitation by parties (Jalali and Silva 2014). In such contexts, the selection of non-partisan ministers has gained traction (Hanley 2018), emerging as a strategy to increase the legitimacy of governments characterized by state exploitation by political parties, avoiding manifestations of mistrust. Despite the impressive research on ministerial recruitment, many questions remain unanswered. First, patterns of recruitment geared towards appointing non-partisan civil society personalities may be particularly acute in critical contexts where unpopular policies occur, such as political and financial crises (Centeno and Silva 1998). Nevertheless, consistent evidence is lacking in Southern Europe and new democracies – despite notable exceptions (Pinto and Almeida 2018; Cotta 2018). Moreover, research has claimed that patterns of ministerial recruitment suggest the declining appeal of the party government model (Verzichelli and Cotta 2018), with a minister’s experience outside the realm of politics emerging as a relevant credential to the detriment of partisan credentials. However, this begs the question of whether parties – that are office and policy seeking – are willing to relinquish operational control of government policies DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-7

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 111 and ministerial positions. If anything, the opposite can also be posited, as empirical endeavours tend to suggest that as financial crises and EU-related constraints may have been used by parties to advance their own agendas (see Moury and Standring 2017). Moreover, if the increase in non-partisans does not automatically preclude the party government model (Cotta 2018: 272), it becomes necessary to evaluate if and how parties control executive appointments in specific situations, particularly at critical junctures. This chapter aims to assess partisan ministerial recruitment in Portugal, considering an extreme case – the 2011–2013 eurozone crisis. Using data on ministerial partisanship from 1999 to 2022, it seeks to characterize patterns of ministerial selection in Portugal before, during and after the crisis. Two trends make the Portuguese case particularly relevant from a comparative perspective. First, given its weak structural position and the unsustainability of public finances, Portugal was one of the eurozone countries hardest hit by the crisis. It had a highly fragile structural position, unsustainable public finances (a high fiscal deficit of 3% of gross domestic product – GDP) and a deficit that reached over 11% of GDP in 2010 – with the government reaching out for financial support in April–May 2011. Second, despite the party system’s resilience, even in the face of the crisis (De Giorgi and Santana Pereira 2020), there is a remarkable trend of partisan distrust, well above the EU average. Finally, Portugal has been pinpointed as a case with a particularly high and consistent presence of non-partisans in executive power (Pinto and Almeida 2018). Against this backdrop, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how Portuguese parties have maintained their grip on government positions, given the unusually large number of non-partisans. On the one hand, recruitment from senior ranks in the party remained important, while non-partisanship did not increase during the economic crisis. Furthermore, as the chapter documents, while there is an overall trend towards recruiting ministers with no party affiliation, who gravitate towards a particular party’s orbit, this trend was not evident during the crisis. Nevertheless, non-partisan ministers played an important role during the Portuguese crisis, given the selection of non-partisan ministers for critical portfolios. The third section of the chapter delves into the specific nature of nonpartisanship, which explores how non-partisan ministers are often informally attached to parties. The institutional context is briefly described in the next section, setting the stage for understanding the Portuguese case. Then, data on ministerial recruitment in Portugal is presented, capturing the presence of partisans before, during and after the crisis. Finally, the chapter examines the role of non-partisan ministers during the crisis.

The Institutional Context The 1976 Portuguese Constitution established a semi-presidential (Duverger 1980) or president-parliamentary regime (Shugart and Carey 1992), holding

112 Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo the executive accountable to parliament and the president, as this latter position is directly elected and had important powers (Neto and Lobo 2011). After 1982, presidential powers were redefined and reduced (falling into the Shugart and Carey’s president-parliamentary category), but the president remained influential within the political system. The Portuguese political system has often been portrayed as a pervasive example of party government (Jalali 2007; Lobo 2000; Morlino 1995) with a stable governing elite. Despite their weak social linkages, parties managed to consolidate their position in the country’s political landscape, which is reflected in the rapid structuration of the Portuguese party system, presenting a generally stable pattern of inter-party interaction. Government competition is essentially a competition between the Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) and the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party), which have led all constitutional governments since democratization (excluding the short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to establish presidential governments in 1978–1979). Since 1987, the party system has become more majoritarian, as these parties monopolized government, with both achieving single-party parliamentary majorities, as well as large pluralities, despite a proportional representation electoral system (for an overview of the Portuguese parties and party system, see Jalali 2007). While there are signs of a decline in this ‘majoritarian change’ – particularly considering the decline in votes for the two largest parties, mostly visible since the eurozone crises, it has not been translated into executive instability (Pinto 2020). The institutional framework is also characterized by a strong prime minister (King 1994; Helms 2004), which is reinforced by the cabinet formation process. Government formation rules are formulated in negative terms (Bergman 1993) since there is no compulsory inaugural vote in the parliament before a new government assumes power (Leston-Bandeira and Fernandes 2015). The process of forming a government – which tends to be shorter in negative parliamentarism – may also significantly affect positions within the cabinet and their party. The choice of ministers and junior ministers is a prerogative of the prime minister, a process in which they enjoy great autonomy from the president of the republic and the parties that support the government (Lobo 2005; Almeida and Pinto 2009). A by-product of this institutional arrangement is the establishment of a relationship of subordination between the prime minister and other cabinet members from the very outset. Along with other institutional and political arrangements, Portugal has been considered a clear example of a situation in which the status of the prime minister’s position towards other political players is enhanced (Silveira and Silva 2022). The Portuguese literature (Almeida and Pinto 2003; Almeida and Pinto 2009, 2018) has emphasized the low politicization of ministers, considering factors such as the ‘prime ministerialization’, the type and system of government, the Europeanization and the strategy towards openness to civil society due to the low territorial and social penetration of Portuguese parties.

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 113 These institutional features are important for understanding ministerial recruitment. Portugal has been depicted as one of the European countries in which non-partisan ministers are more significant in the executive ranks (Cotta 2018). Economic downturns have been argued to act as a catalyst for a change in the profile of ministers, with experience from outside the realm of politics – to the detriment of partisan linkages – emerging as particularly suitable for efficient policy design and implementation (Pastorella 2016; Yong and Hazell 2011), and this is important given the need to ensure external credibility (Domínguez 1997: 27; Centeno and Silva 1998: 78; Bertsou and Caramani 2020). More recently, the critical juncture argument has also permeated debates about the ruling elite (Camerlo and Rodríguez-Teruel 2020). Nonpartisan ministers are expected to be immune to short-term electoral pressures, with different career goals and a greater capacity to attract support from external actors, which is crucial when dealing with difficult and unpopular reforms (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2019; Caramani 2020; Wratil and Pastorella 2018). Portugal was one of the EU countries most severely affected by the economic and financial crisis. Within this scenario, the Portuguese government reached out for assistance in the form of strengthened cooperation between the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB), dubbed the troika in 2011. The following section describes and interprets ministerial recruitment in Portugal before, during and after the crisis.

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal One of the most analysed and debated dimensions of the ruling elite in Portugal refers to the linkages between ministers and political parties. Despite popular distrust, political parties remain pivotal in representative democracies. It is through parties that citizens delegate authority to their political agents, and it is through parties that the latter are made accountable. This pivotal role derives to a large extent from their de facto (and in many cases de jure) monopoly on political representation. As such, it is largely through parties that individual political actors can run for office, and parties act as a key gatekeeper to public office. The pivotal role of parties is also clearly perceived in the prominence of ministerial portfolios controlled by the party in government, as shown in Table 6.1. A distinction can be made between ministers who, at the time of their appointment, were party militants (rank and file) and those who held management positions in the national bodies of the party. As Figure 6.1 shows, all governments tend to recruit an important share of national leaders for ministerial positions. However, over the past three decades that government structure has become more markedly hierarchical, with powerful ‘core executives’ (Helms

114 Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo Table 6.1 Government composition and ministerial recruitment (1999–2022) Government/time in office

Type of majority

Parties in government

Guterres II 25/10/1999– 06/04/2002 Barroso 06/04/2002– 17/07/2004 Santana Lopes 17/07/2004– 12/03/2005 Sócrates I 12/03/2005– 26/10/2009 Sócrates II 26/10/2009– 20/06/2011 Passos Coelho I 20/06/2011– 30/10/2015 Passos Coelho II 30/10/2015– 26/11/2015 Costa I 26/11/2015– 26/10/2019 Costa II 26/10/2019– 30/03/2022 Costa III 30/03/2022–

Single-party minority government Minimal winning coalition Minimal winning coalition Single-party majority government Single-party minority government Minimal winning coalition Multi-party minority government Single-party minority government Single-party minority government Single-party majority government

PS

36

23 (63.9%)

PSD, CDS-PP

23

18 (78.3%)

PSD, CDS-PP

22

14 (63.6%)

PS

24

10 (41.7%)

PS

17

8 (47.06%)

PSD, CDS-PP

22

17 (77.3%)

PSD, CDS-PP

17

14 (82.4%)

PS

28

16 (57.1%)

PS

22

11 (50.0%)

PS

18

11 (61.1%)

229

87 (38.0%)

Overall

Ministers*

Partisan ministers

Source: compiled by the authors. Note: * number of ministers and partisanship includes both inaugural governments and changes in government.

2012; Smith 1994) – a pattern also consistently identified in the Portuguese case (Silveira and Silva 2022) – presenting a clear predominance, within the cabinet, of key ministries (internal administration, finance, economy). The number of core ministries across governments may vary, as reported in Table 6.2. It is noteworthy that these ministerial positions tend to be occupied by partisan ministers who are of particular importance to the party leadership.

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 115

Figure 6.1 Partisan ministers emerging from the party leadership (%) Source: compiled by the authors.

As depicted, ministries devoted to government coordination and which ‘act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine’ (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990: 4) tend to be partisan. During the entire period, more than 72% of core ministries were occupied by a partisan minister, with the vast majority of ministers (80.9%) emerging from the party leadership. The highest ranking ministries are particularly permeated by partisan ministers in coalition governments, acknowledging the involvement of coalition partners in the core executive decision-making process. Despite the narrative on the age of party decay (Manin 1997; Tormey 2015), with the expected decline in the influence of partisan elites within the political system (Mair 2013), party leaderships retain full de facto control of ministerial recruitment while giving the impression of greater inclusion by opening the process to the party rank-and-file.

Looser Grip on Cabinet Appointments? While the partisan grip on cabinet appointments remains remarkably strong, there are also important pockets of non-partisanship. Existing research has highlighted the significant presence of ministers with no party affiliation or little political experience in the various executives (Lobo 2000, 2005; Almeida and Pinto 2009). Portugal has come under particular scrutiny, considering the weight and importance of ministers without a parliamentary career or party leadership positions, and this is often in sharp divergence from the

116 Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo Table 6.2 Core ministries and ministerial recruitment (1999–2022)

Guterres II 25/10/1999–06/04/2002 Barroso 06/04/2002–17/07/2004 Santana Lopes 17/07/2004–12/03/2005 Sócrates I 12/03/2005–26/10/2009 Sócrates II 26/10/2009–20/06/2011 Passos Coelho I 20/06/2011–30/10/2015 Passos Coelho II 30/10/2015–26/11/2015 Costa I 26/11/2015–26/10/2019 Costa II 26/10/2019–30/03/2022 Costa III 30/03/2022– Overall

Core offices*

Partisan ministers (%)

Partisan ministers emerging from the party leadership

13

69.2 (9)

100 (9)

6

100 (6)

83.3 (5)

7

85.7(6)

66.7 (4)

9

44.4 (4)

100 (4)

5

80 (4)

100 (4)

11

63.6 (7)

57.1 (4)

5

100 (5)

60 (3)

8

50 (4)

75 (3)

5

60 (3)

66.7 (2)

4

75 (3)

100 (3)

x= ̄ 72.8 (51)

x= ̄ 80.9 (44)

69

Source: compiled by the authors. Note: core offices were equated as those of the office of the presidency of the Council of Ministers, and the ministers of internal administration, of foreign affairs and of finance.

prevailing patterns in most European democracies (Pinto 2020). This section aims to identify the specific contexts in which parties lose their grip on cabinet appointments. Two important dimensions need to be mentioned here: government composition and critical junctures. The first dimension pertains to the effects of types of majorities on the selection of ministers. As shown in Table 6.1, there are clear differences in the nonpartisan quota between cabinet types. The proportion of non-partisan ministers seems to increase in single-party majority governments (an average of 49% of non-partisan ministers) and single-party minority governments (45.5%). The percentage of non-partisan ministers is lower in coalition governments (an average of 25.5%). Theoretically, non-partisan ministers (also frequently dubbed independent ministers) tend to be recruited to solve disputes among the parties forming or supporting the cabinet (Verzichelli and Cotta 2018: 90). As office- and policy-seeking actors, political parties in coalitions are expected to claim the portfolios associated with their preferred policies, as a strategy to control those policy areas while also ‘reinforcing the loyalty of

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 117 certain extra-parliamentary clientele groups on which they depend for the maintenance of their parliamentary standing’ (Browne and Feste 1975: 533). In the same vein, party families have been estimated to emerge as relevant predictors of particular portfolio allocations (Budge and Keman 1990: 95), a pattern that seems to hold true in the Portuguese case. Coalition governments – which tend to be partisan – were established between two parties sharing conservative and liberal economic positions. According to Budge and Keman (1990), such party families would be more likely to be allocated the internal administration, foreign affairs, defence, finance, economy and justice ministries. As Table 6.3 shows, these were consistently the positions allocated to non-partisan ministers. As Bäck et al. (2011: 446) posited, faced with a ‘comprehensive policy agreement’, ‘parties are less likely to try to get their most highly valued posts’. Portuguese coalition governments were supported by coalition agreements that implied a ‘permanent collaboration’,2 with ‘interaction’ and ‘mobilisation of structures and officials from both parties’, including ‘the development of efforts’ for the revision of the Constitution and ‘the exchange of information and mutual consultation on what regarding electoral acts’. The trade-off between party satisfaction with portfolio allocation and the Table 6.3 Non-partisan ministers in coalition governments Government

Type of portfolio

Non-partisan minister

Barroso

Social security and labour Health Foreign affairs Agriculture Public works, transport and housing Foreign affairs Internal administration Health Public works, transport and housing Education Social Security and Family Culture Finance Education Finances Health Economy and labour Internal administration Education Health Administrative modernization

Bagão Félix Luis Filipe Pereira António Martins da Cruz Sevinate Pinto* Carmona Rodrigues

Lopes

Coelho I

Coelho II

António Monteiro Daniel Sanches* Luis Filipe Pereira António Mexia Maria do Carmo Seabra* Fernando Negrão* Maria João Bustorff* Bagão Félix Nuno Crato* Vitor Gaspar* Paulo Macedo* Álvaro Santos Pereira* Anabela Rodrigues* Margarida Mano* Fernando Leal da Costa Rui Medeiros*

Source: compiled by the authors. Note: * non-partisan ministers with no prior linkages to political parties.

118 Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo drafting of comprehensive coalition agreements as management mechanisms is evident in the appointment of non-partisan ministers. As Table 6.3 shows, coalition partners could leave their preferred portfolios so long as non-partisan ministers were involved and formal cooperation ensured. While theoretical and empirical accounts of portfolio distribution help us to understand the recruitment of non-partisan ministers in coalition governments, data on the Portuguese case report an important underlying reduction in the presence of non-partisanship within cabinet at times of crises. This is the second important dimension relates to the declining importance of nonpartisan ministers at critical junctures – particularly political and economic crises.

Critical Non-partisan Ministers The eurozone crisis seems to have triggered the transformation of executives (Pastorella 2016). The increasing complexity of policymaking in troubling times tends to require policymakers with an enhanced competence profile, as Blondel (1991) has noted in the past. However, the recruitment of non-partisan ministers can hardly be taken as an isolated phenomenon. Rather, the complexity of contemporary democratic governance, particularly within the context of the multi-level governance system of the European Union, fuelled the trend towards an increasing role of non-partisan ministers in dealing with such complexity. While comparative endeavours highlighted the effect of the economic crisis in the recruitment of civil society personalities as a strategy to avoid further manifestations of partisan mistrust, Portugal emerged as a deviant case. Data on the longitudinal evolution of the proportion of non-partisan ministers (Table 6.4) indicate a statistically significant relationship between the partisan nature of ministers and the critical political and economic variables (chisquare with two degrees of freedom = 6.38, p = 0.041). During the period after the crisis, the share of portfolios secured by nonpartisan ministers increased – albeit at a lower rate compared to the first decade of the new millennium. Harsh economic and political conditions (as a compound and litigious government coalition) did not increase the recruitment of non-partisan members. On the contrary, during this critical period, Table 6.4 Partisanship before, during and after the eurozone crisis (1999–2022)

Before (1999–2011) During (2011–2015) After (2015–2022)

Non-partisan ministers

Partisan ministers

Ministers within parties’ orbit*

49 (40.1) 8 (20.5) 30 (44.1)

73 (59.8) 31 (79.5) 38 (55.9)

31 (63.3) 1 (12.5) 22 (73.3)

Source: compiled by the authors. Note: * percentage of reported non-partisan ministers.

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 119 the cohort of non-partisan ministers was only marginal, reaching the lowest level of 7% of ministerial positions in 2014. This does not imply the reduced importance of such ministers. On the contrary, the eurozone crisis emerged as an important context for selecting non-partisan ministers to occupy critical portfolios. In 2011, the PSD led by Pedro Passos Coelho obtained 40.3% of the vote and sought support from its usual partner, the Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular (CDS-PP – Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party), to form a government enjoying majority support in parliament. This coalition government envisaged the bailout agreement as an opportunity to implement major harsh and highly contested reforms to recover Portugal’s credibility among international institutions and markets (Gaspar and Avillez 2014; Moury and Standring 2017; Pereira 2014). Following an electoral pledge, the government began the term with only 11 ministers and 35 junior ministers, becoming one of the smallest executives in the history of democratic Portugal. Four ministers were members of the PSD, three were members of the CDS and four were non-partisan. All non-partisan members, who had no previous connections to either of the coalition partners, were responsible for implementing the most important structural reforms. The most impressive example of the critical role of non-partisan ministers in this context lies with the minister of finance. One of the most striking features of Passos Coelho’s government was the elevation of Vítor Gaspar, the finance minister, to the second highest ranking in the government hierarchy. Excluding presidential cabinets in the 1970s, it was the first time a non-partisan minister had occupied such a senior position in a Portuguese executive. Moreover, in this case, this also meant that the leader of the junior coalition partner, Paulo Portas, was relegated to third position in the government hierarchy. This choice was perceived as an intention to highlight the finance minister’s internal authority and the government’s commitment to comply with the memorandum of understanding (MOU). The executive’s external credibility was one of the main reasons for appointing Gaspar, as he had been a senior official in international institutions in the economic, monetary and financial areas (the ECB and the EC). He was a renowned economist who knew how European institutions worked and spoke the same language as ECB and EC officials. As the prime minister acknowledged, ‘it was important to have someone they could trust on our side’ (Aureliano 2015: 196). While initially at odds with the EC and several EU member states, Portugal emerged as being capable of disrupting the austerity narrative, particularly signalled by the election of Mário Centeno – the first Southern European from a country receiving a bailout – as president of the Eurogroup in 2017. After the 2011–2015 crisis, the prominence of the finance ministry remained high. Given the PS government’s (2015–2021) focus on maintaining budgetary consolidation, the ministry was kept in the hands of a non-partisan minister. Overall, while the EU integration budgetary discipline may

120 Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo have accorded this ministry increased importance, it has conventionally been taken to be a major element in cross-sectoral coordination given, among other things, its role in the annual budget exercise (Silveira 2021; Lobo 2005). In addition to the finance ministry, the new economy and labour megaministry was also crucial in executing the MOU. Containing portfolios that were previously held by other ministries, this ministry was designed with the intention of implementing important structural reforms, such as crucial labour reform (Pereira 2014). The minister was Álvaro Santos Pereira, an economist based in Canada who was well-known for several proposals to reform the Portuguese economy (Pereira 2014). The other two non-partisan ministers held the education and health portfolios: two areas targeted in the MOU as important to achieving the deficit reduction goal, even although it mirrored government’s agenda and was less of a ‘diktat handed down from international lenders’ (Moury and Standring 2017:10). The former was occupied by Nuno Crato, an academic and former president of the Portuguese Mathematics Society, who gained public notoriety through the dissemination of scientific books and regular media appearances to discuss education issues. The latter was occupied by Paulo Macedo, who had little experience in the area but was considered one of the top Portuguese managers in both the private and public sectors. While particularly scrutinized by international creditors, these have always been sensitive areas at the core of the Portuguese welfare state, not least due to the powerful and highly mobilized interest organizations. Overall, while numbers suggest that non-partisanship was on the wane during the eurozone crisis, these ministers became increasingly important within government, a pattern consistently identified in other European counterparts (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2019; Kaplan 2017). They allowed governments to signal their pro-market credibility to investors (Kaplan 2017) and were targeted to increase the government’s reform credibility. During economic crises, cabinet ministers have to enact policies and adopt reforms that often contradict their electoral promises, the ideological stances of parties and even their convictions. Unlike elected cabinet ministers who fear the electoral costs of policies they introduce, non-partisan ministers have made no election promises and are often appointed to enact their preferred policies for stabilizing the economy, while their professional careers are not subject to electoral approval (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2019). Nevertheless, the history of the Portuguese bailout contains two different periods. The first was 2011–2013, when the most demanding measures were taken, while at the international level the eurozone was facing fragmentation risks caused by the sovereign debt crisis. This was followed by a progressive easing of the austerity measures and the adoption of actions to prioritize the stimulation of economic growth. This period coincides with improvements to the European context, with the changes in the eurozone institutional architecture and the response of the ECB to the crisis. The opening of a new economic and political cycle coincided with a major government

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 121 reorganization, particularly after the coalition crisis in the summer months of mid-2013. After Gaspar’s resignation in July 2013, Passos Coelho recruited Maria Luís Albuquerque (a former junior minister in the Treasury) to take over as finance minister. This appointment was regarded as a sign that the policy of austerity was to continue, particularly by Paulo Portas, whose decision to leave the government provoked a major political crisis that almost resulted in the collapse of the coalition and imperilling any second bailout. This crisis was due mainly to the different views the PSD and the CDS held in respect of the application and political management of the programme. Under these circumstances, and besides his ‘minimalist understanding of presidential powers’ (Feijó 2019: 48), the president had to intervene. For several weeks the head of state tried to negotiate a political agreement between the coalition partners and the PS to ensure fulfilment of the MOU. As the parties could not agree, the president had only two options: either call early elections or accept a new version of the coalition government. He decided on the latter, but imposed some requirements, such as the inclusion of the leader of the junior partner in the executive and other conditions intended to ensure political stability (Franco 2020: 200–201; Silva 2018). The political resolution of this crisis (and the fulfilment of presidential demands) was a turning point in the composition of the cabinet that involved a significant government reorganization and portfolio restructuring that brought an end to the mega-ministries. Paulo Portas became deputy prime minister with responsibility for economic coordination and was put in charge of negotiations with the troika. The junior coalition partner was also allowed to appoint the new minister of economy, Pires de Lima, a businessman who was also a senior member of the CDS-PP and who was very close to Portas (Paris, Marchi and Raimundo 2019). All partisan ministers included in the inaugural government (from both coalition parties) had a strong political background, considerable parliamentary experience and occupied leading positions within their political parties. This pattern was combined with a handful of non-partisan ministers who were positioned strategically to ensure the advancement of the adjustment programme, both in the face of international creditors and national party agendas (Moury and Standring 2017: 674). After the coalition crisis, executive cohesion and political stability became the main priority for the president and prime minister, particularly considering the good results in restoring external credibility with international lenders during the first half of the mandate. Without jeopardizing external credibility, the 2013 reorganization and resulting cabinet composition remained a compromise between the need to finish the execution of the MOU and the need to restore the executive’s political cohesion. The latter was facilitated by strengthening the partisan foundations of the cabinet, with only two non-partisan ministers remaining in office (Paulo Macedo in the health ministry and Nuno Crato in education).

122 Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo The ministers who left the government as a result of this reorganization were not only those who were subject to heavy public criticism (due to austerity measures and unpopular reforms), but also those with whom the CDS, and with Portas in particular, had a more conflictual relationship (Pires and Martins 2015). However, the finance ministry remained under the control of the PSD (Maria Luís Albuquerque), and Passos Coelho also appointed as minister of the environment his number two in the party, Jorge Moreira da Silva. To replace Paulo Portas at the foreign ministry, the prime minister turned to Rui Machete, who had served as justice minister and deputy prime minister in the ‘centre bloc’ government of 1983–1985. These ministers came to join Marques Guedes (presidency and parliamentary affairs) and Poiares Maduro (deputy prime minister for regional development), who had been appointed to the cabinet a few months earlier. As a result, the number of partisans increased substantially, while the group of non-partisans decreased dramatically. A final note worth highlighting is that partisanship does not preclude policy expertise. Indeed, a qualitative analysis clearly demonstrates that expertise, political competence, policy alignment with the prime minister’s liberal agenda (which overlapped the policy commitment in respect of the MOU) and personal trust played important roles in the process of ministerial selection. The PSD, for example, appointed specialists such as Miguel Relvas, Paula Teixeira da Cruz and Moreira da Silva, who represent seamless examples of ministers and senior party members who meet all the requirements. In a similar vein, the CDS selected senior party members as ministers, most of whom had expertise within their policy areas and who were loyal to Portas.

Selecting the Best and the Brightest… so Long as They Are within the Party’s Orbit Data on non-partisan ministers need, however, to be considered cautiously. While non-partisan ministers are broadly equated as individuals without political background and technical expertise (Pinto et al. 2018), there may not be clear boundaries with political parties. Some of the ministers with no party affiliation gravitate towards the orbit of a particular party. Being politically close and having informal connections to the partisan sphere – in most cases with a trajectory of political and governmental collaboration with a certain party – these non-partisan ministers are an important recruitment reserve for the main governmental parties. As Figure 6.2 shows, purely non-partisan ministers are under-represented within Portuguese governments, as the average of non-partisan ministers politically close to political parties is over 58% over the entire period. The Portuguese case presents a hybrid recruitment strategy that combines the ‘aura’ associated with non-partisan ministers while ensuring a modicum of partisan control of the government. This strategy is particularly acute when

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 123 there is partisan alternation in government, which emerges with a lower average of such hybrid recruitment (53%) compared to the selection of such ministers when there is no alternation (62%). The eurozone crisis (which took place during the 2011–2015 Passos Coelho government) emerged with an abnormal pattern, as this recruitment strategy was not used. The specific political context of the period 2011–2015 – a coalition government under presidential pressure to maintain political stability – made partisanship a crucial selection criterion, even presenting a pattern of the selection of partisan ministers emerging from party leadership. In this context, it was essential to ensure that politics remained under control while enjoying the benefits of necessary non-partisan appointments, recruiting experts within specific policy domains and who had professional careers outside of politics. The type of government (coalition) and the system of government (semi-presidential) played an important role because they created incentives for the promotion of partisanship. Partisans would facilitate proper internal and external government coordination, political communication and party-society linkage. As they are expected to have different skills, attitudes and mindsets, the choice of partisan ministers is understandable, especially at critical economic and political moments (Bakema 1991: 95).

Figure 6.2 Non-partisan ministers politically close to parties (%) Source: compiled by the authors.

124 Patrícia Silva, Pedro Silveira, André Paris and Marcelo Camerlo

Concluding remarks The drift of countries towards increasingly restrictive adjustment programmes during the 2011–2013 eurozone crisis triggered the selection of nonpartisan ministers. Such patterns of ministerial recruitment were seen as a symptom of the waning of the party government model. This has been equated as the government’s strategy to avoid the declining perceptions of legitimacy and trust in parties, particularly when faced with austerity narratives and the need to implement wide-ranging fiscal consolidation measures to reduce public spending. Against the conventional narrative focused on crisis-prone Southern European countries, partisanship was not the biggest loser of the austerity narrative in Portugal. As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, during periods of economic and political crises, parties in government faced strong incentives to maintain a grip on policy and government positions. To avoid suffering the consequences of a ‘government performance deficit’ (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000: 13), parties were also faced with powerful incentives to maintain a considerable grip on the selection of ministers. This is visible in three different dimensions. While partisan credentials are still important, not all party members are alike. First, the pivotal role of parties is clearly visible in the prominence of ministerial portfolios controlled by partisan members. The recruitment of partisan ministers tends to revolve around individuals coming from the national structures of the governing parties. This was most visible during the eurozone crises and the implementation of the MOU. Moreover, these individuals tend to occupy core ministerial positions, demonstrating their importance within parties and governments. To a large extent, this mirrors the trend towards partisan governments. Second, non-partisanship remains a remarkable feature of Portuguese governments during the 21st century, with the exception of the eurozone crisis period. In this context, Portugal may emerge as an outlier, as the number of non-partisan ministers steadily declined during the adjustment programme. However, the few ministers appointed with no partisan connections were critical actors (in the finance, economy and trade ministries) in fulfilling the government’s ‘signalling function’, as Bermeo (2003: 222) called it. The portfolios allocated to independent ministers during the first half of the government mandate were crucial for ensuring the government’s external credibility. Moreover, the bailout was perceived by the ruling party’s leadership as a ‘window of opportunity’ to pass neoliberal reforms that were in line with its agenda (Moury and Standring 2017: 674). Hence, the partisanship requirement was modelled by non-partisan experts (due to the need for external credibility and the constant technical negotiations with troika officials) and political and policy alignment with the prime minister’s agenda. Internal government dynamics would further reinforce the partisan composition of the executive, although expertise was never discarded. If anything,

Ministerial Recruitment in Portugal 125 the importance of expertise combined with partisanship demonstrated how the Portuguese case also fits into the theoretical expectation that party leaders tended to look for experts to face crises. Third, ministers with no party affiliation tend to gravitate towards the orbit of a particular party. This gravitation was, however, avoided as a recruitment strategy during the crisis, further reinforcing the party government’s premises. Hence, the abrupt reduction in the number of non-partisan ministers during the last financial crisis needs to be treated cautiously as it did not preclude the salience of a partisan aura.

Notes 1 This research was supported by the research project ‘Into the secret garden of Portuguese politics: Parliamentary candidate selection in Portugal, 1976–2015’, financed by the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) PTDC/ CPO-CPO/30296/2017 and CEECIND/03884/2017. 2 In 2002, the PSD and the CDS signed a document entitled the ‘Democratic convergence towards a legislature government’ (Jornal de Negócios 2011).

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7

Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics Towards a more Polarized Party System? Sofia Serra-Silva and Nelson Santos

Portugal’s last three general elections have made international headlines. On 13 November 2015, The Economist reported, ‘Portugal’s anti-austerity left seems to be taking power after all’ (Economist 2015). The British weekly newspaper reported on what would be an unparalleled form of contract parliamentarism in Portuguese politics, the so-called geringonça (‘contraption’), a functioning government led by the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) supported by the radical left parties (Fernandes et al. 2018). During the geringonça years (2015–2019), the online American newspaper Politico reported: ‘European left wants a piece of Portugal’s “contraption”’ (Politico 2017): indeed, the Portuguese ‘contraption’ quickly became a reference for many European social democratic parties (Jalali et al. 2020). For different reasons, the parliamentary elections of 2019 also made international headlines, mainly due to the emergence of three new parties: the economically libertarian Iniciativa Liberal (Liberal Initiative – IL), the proEuropean left-wing LIVRE (FREE) and, in particular, the populist radical right-wing Chega (Enough), which meant the end of the so-called Portuguese exceptionalism. After two years of government, now without formal support from the radical left, ‘snap elections [were] called after Portugal’s government collapses’ (Economist 2021) due to the ‘government’s budget defeat’ (Politico 2021). The incumbent PS won a surprise outright majority, garnering a majority of the vote in every mainland electoral district for the first time (Lopes 2022). The snap election of 2022 also marked a watershed moment in Portuguese democratic history with the surprising disappearance of one of the founding parties of Portuguese democracy, the Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular (CDS-PP – Social and Democratic Centre-Popular Party) and the growth of two recently founded parties. Portugal has gained so much press coverage recently because it has experienced incremental changes in electoral, parliamentary and governing arenas, especially after 2015. Unlike elsewhere, ‘the Portuguese party system has remained largely resilient to the 2007–8 economic crisis and the subsequent eurozone debt crisis’ (Jalali 2019a: 690), notwithstanding the harsh austerity policies that went beyond traditional ‘belt tightening’ measures (Magalhães 2014). Nevertheless, behind the overall image of stability, events DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-13

130 Sofia Serra-Silva and Nelson Santos post-2015 suggest significant transformations in the Portuguese party system, particularly the reconfiguration of party politics on the right, inter-party relations on the left and the reconfiguration of parliament, which is no longer dominated by the same five parties that have monopolized representation since 1999. In this chapter, we review and describe the reconfiguration of the Portuguese party system in recent years by looking at the governing, parliamentary and electoral arenas over the most recent general elections. How much has Portuguese politics changed over the past few years? To what extent has the party system, that up until now has been known to be quite stable, changed recently? We will provide an in-depth account of the main indicators of party system change (fragmentation, volatility, polarization) during the democratic period, paying special attention to the party system dynamics in the 21st century and in the wake of post-2015 general election events. To this end, we make use of different data sources, including the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), the database on WHO GOVERNS in Europe and beyond by Bértoa (2022) and the Manifesto Research Project (MARPOR) – updating data and indicators whenever necessary (e.g. for the most recent elections). We also draw on party votes from 2002 to 2022, retrieved from the Portuguese parliament’s online archive, in order to calculate the level of disagreement between parties represented in parliament and their relative voting distances. To calculate inter-party relative distance, we rely on multidimensional scaling (MDS) (Torgerson 1952). We combine different data sources and make use of traditional party system measures and computational methods, which to the best of our knowledge have never previously been applied to the Portuguese case, to offer a broad view of party system dynamics (and change) in Portugal. The chapter is structured as follows. We begin by presenting the institutional and historical background of the party system in Portugal during the democratic period. Then we present the empirical analysis: first, by examining patterns of change and the continuity of the party system in recent years by looking at the governing, parliamentary and electoral arenas; and second, by analysing electoral and party polarization and reflecting on its consequences on the functioning of parliament. The final section summarizes our findings and their implications for future research, thereby helping to casting light on party system dynamics in Portugal.

Institutional and Historical Background The Portuguese party system has shown considerable stability in terms of its macrostructure and main interactions since democratization (Freire et al. 2015; Jalali 2019a, 2019b; Lisi et al. 2020). Most parties were created immediately before or after the transition to democracy, except for the (sizeable) Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Communist Party),1 created in 1921. The PCP and the right-wing CDS-PP, the centre-right Partido Social

Continuity and Change in Portuguese Parties 131 Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) and the centre-left PS have dominated the political landscape since 1974 (Jalali 2007). By 1976, when the transition ended, almost 90% of the vote was concentrated in the four parties, forming the so-called ‘quadrangular party system’ (Jalali 2019a). This changed in 1999 with the appearance of the Bloco de Esquerda (BE – Left Bloc), a left-wing libertarian/radical party that challenged both the PS and the PCP electorally (Lisi 2013). Until recently, the previous four main parties and the BE monopolized parliamentary representation. Using Mair’s (1997) notion of competition structures, the Portuguese party system was rapidly institutionalized after the revolutionary period (1974–1976) and enjoyed a somewhat closed competition structure from the second half of the 1980s until 2015. Regarding alternations in government, most of the time, it has been consistently wholesale or non-existent alternation. The main dimension of competition for government in the Portuguese party system is between the two largest parties, the PS and the PSD (Jalali 2019a). In fact, excluding the brief period of presidential government in 1978–1980, every constitutional government has been led either by the PSD or the PS since democratization. As for innovation in government, right-wing coalitions, led by the PSD in conjunction with its junior partner, the CDS-PP and minority PS governments have been the norm (Fernandes 2020). According to Magalhães (2011), the coexistence of several low-magnitude districts (where M 0) as MPs may abstain on some votes. The general disagreement index reveals that overall disagreement in parliament has increased over the years, especially during the 2009–2011 legislative term (29.1). At that time, the Portuguese government was facing serious domestic economic problems (lack of economic growth and increasing public debt) as well as growing political instability, which ultimately led to an early election, that was deepened further by the European debt crisis (Fernandes 2011). During that period, the PS minority government found itself on the losing side in almost 15% of all votes on legislative initiatives in parliament. During the ‘austerity season’ between 2011 and 2015, the two main parties became more antagonistic (Christiansen 2021), as seen by the considerable share of PS disagreement over legislative initiatives. From 2015 to 2019, the disagreement level declined for the radical left due to their integration into the governing system as supporting parties (De Giorgi and Cancela 2019). Finally, in the 2019–2022 legislature, we see that the newcomers also greatly contributed to the overall disagreement level in parliament, especially Chega, which found itself on the losing side in 56% of the votes on legislative initiatives — more than any other opposition party during this period. Overall, we see a pattern of low disagreement at the beginning of the 2000s and a steady increase in recent years, similar to the patterns found regarding the levels of party and electoral polarization. Finally, the analysis of party voting patterns complements the data and calculations on disagreement in parliament by revealing the voting dynamics between parties. We use the MDS method (Torgerson 1952) to calculate relative inter-party distances in a low-dimensional space. Despite votes usually being coded in a binary format (1 = voting in favour, 0 = the remainder) (Hix et al. 2006; Hix and Noury 2008), we follow the approach adopted by Krilavicˇ ius and Žilinskas (2008), which considers abstention and absenteeism as occurring between the two endpoints. Since abstention in the Portuguese parliament is quite common (in 46% of our observations, at least one MP abstained), it is crucial to differentiate abstention from supporting or opposing a specific legislative initiative. Therefore, the following coding scheme was used: 1 for when the party supports the legislative initiative, –1 for when it opposes it, and 0 for when they abstain or are not present for the vote.

144 Sofia Serra-Silva and Nelson Santos

Figure 7.5 Disagreement over legislative initiatives (%) in the Portuguese parliament (2002–2022) Note: * Includes projects of law (Projectos de Lei) and projects of resolution (Projectos de Resolução) from MPs and parties in government as well as proposals of law (Propostas de Lei) and proposals of resolution (Propostas de Resolução) from the government; ** We looked at Joacine Katar Moreira’s voting behaviour during the whole term, even after she had lost the confidence of her party; a = party in government. Source: compiled by the authors.

The analysis of party voting patterns reveals several important features. First, Figure 7.6 shows that party system competition dynamics are mostly one-dimensional. In other words, the variation in voting behaviour is mostly explained by a single dimension, along with other democratic parliaments and the European Parliament (Hix et al. 2008).17 The relative location of political parties suggests that the first dimension mostly captures government/opposition dynamics. While the PCP/BE/PEV location is rather stable on the first dimension, as is expected given their permanent opposition status; it is the position of the remaining parties (the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP) that changes along this dimension, depending on their government status. Whenever one of these parties is governing, the distance from the radical left (PCP/BE/PEV) increases, and when they are in opposition, that distance decreases. Nonetheless, this government/opposition dynamic is intertwined with the left–right dimension since the parties further to the left are continuously in opposition. Moreover, the geringonça, although constituting a watershed moment in Portuguese politics and an exception to our findings, has not changed these long-term voting behaviour dynamics. Second, three main party voting clusters emerge: the first consists of the PCP, the BE and the PEV, joined by PAN and LIVRE in the 2015–2019 legislative term; the second comprises the PSD and the CDS-PP, joined later by IL and Chega in the 2019–2022 legislature; finally, the PS emerges equidistant from both groups, although with some variations over time. While in

Continuity and Change in Portuguese Parties 145 some legislatures, the PS appears closer to the left (mainly when it is in opposition), in others, it moves closer to the right. This seems to be due to the PS’s position alternating between its government and opposition status and the volatile position of both the PSD and the CDS-PP, which can be explained by the government/opposition dynamic. Additionally, the PSD and the CDS-PP distanced themselves from all the other parties in parliament in the 2011–2015 and 2015–2019 legislatures. Again, this is probably connected to the troika bailout that conditioned parties during that period and, as noted above, led to higher levels of party polarization in parliament. Despite the PCP, the BE and the PEV being on the losing side less often between 2015 and 2019, the voting patterns do not show an increased convergence with the PS during the geringonça. The convergence between the PS and parties to its left increased during 2011–2015, when these parties were all in opposition, and during an extraordinarily difficult context as a consequence of the eurozone crisis and the austerity measures that had been implemented. The convergence around anti-austerity measures was one of the main drivers of the geringonça, as disclosed by the agreements signed between these parties and the PS. Therefore, as expected, the relative distance between these parties naturally prevailed during the geringonça, with the PCP, the BE and the PEV increasingly on the winning side due to shifts in the balance of power in parliament from 2011–2015 to 2015–2019. Nonetheless, the convergence between these parties did not prevail after the Geringonça, with the distance between them increasing, as shown in Figure 7.6. Thus, despite the novelty and importance of changes in the governmental arena during this period (2015–2019), these findings suggest that the distance between these parties did not alter significantly. Although IL and Chega seem to be programmatically more distant from the PSD than the CDS-PP, their voting patterns are quite similar, especially in the case of IL. Despite being a little further away, Chega still seems fairly close to the remaining right-wing parties in terms of legislative voting behaviour. The reasons for this may be that party voting behaviour is influenced by tactical considerations and strategic compromises reached between parties (Louwerse 2011). Having said this, we can only speculate that despite the potential challenges of crossing cooperation on the right of the political spectrum suggested earlier by policy differences in party manifestos, there might be scope for cooperation in the future based on their voting behaviour in parliament. Overall, increased polarization in the Portuguese party system is also reflected by an increased level of disagreement between parties over legislative initiatives in recent years, with it becoming more difficult to reach a consensus across party blocs. Despite these results underscoring the growing divisions between parties and new sources of party division created by the emergence of new parties, greater party polarization might have positive effects, such as stimulating voter turnout because ‘citizens see clearer choices and the greater consequences of their vote’ (Dalton 2021).

146 Sofia Serra-Silva and Nelson Santos

Figure 7.6a Ninth legislative term (2002–2005). Governing parties: the PSD and the CDS-PP Source: compiled by the authors.

Figure 7.6b Tenth legislative term (2005–2009). Governing party: the PS Source: compiled by the authors.

Continuity and Change in Portuguese Parties 147

Figure 7.6c 11th legislative term (2009–2011). Governing party: the PS Source: compiled by the authors.

Figure 7.6d 12th legislative term (2011–2015). Governing parties: the PSD and the CDS-PP Source: compiled by the authors.

148 Sofia Serra-Silva and Nelson Santos

Figure 7.6e 13th legislative term (2015–2019). Governing party: the PS Source: compiled by the authors.

Figure 7.6f 14th legislative term (2019–2022). Governing party: the PS Source: compiled by the authors.

Continuity and Change in Portuguese Parties 149

Conclusion Despite the overall stability over the long term, several aspects related to the most recent general elections in Portugal warrant attention. First, the emergence of a new left-wing government formula known as the geringonça directly resulted from the 2015 general election. Second, Portugal no longer constitutes an exception to the lure of the far right as, for the first time, an extreme right-wing populist party entered parliament in 2019. Third, with the disappearance of the CDS-PP at the parliamentary level and the emergence of two new parties that quickly overtook the BE and the CDU in parliament in 2022, the monopoly of parliamentary representation is no longer dominated by the same five main parties,18 which represents growing fragmentation on the right. Fourth, regardless of the indicator used, electoral and party polarization has increased considerably in recent years, as has party disagreement in the parliamentary arena when considering MPs’ voting behaviour. While most of the traditional indicators of party system change (volatility and fragmentation) tend to paint a picture of stability and continuity over the years, an examination of party and electoral polarization as well as the overall disagreement level in parliament reveals a change in Portuguese politics in recent years (compared to the early 2000s) that needs to be further explored. The consequences of increasing levels of party polarization and disagreement in parliament, accompanied by an increase in electoral support for APEPs, to the quality of democracy in Portugal is still unknown. Future research should expand the scope beyond the ‘usual suspects’ when assessing the dynamics of change and continuity in the Portuguese party system. This can be achieved by conducting an assessment of the extent of disagreement between political parties by looking at their voting behavior in the parliamentary arena. As demonstrated in this chapter, this provides valuable insights into the transformation of the patterns of interaction within the party system. Nevertheless, while it is too early to be certain, the changes identified in this chapter may be temporary and constitute a temporary fluctuation in the parliamentary, electoral and governmental arenas. While the long-term survival of the newcomers, Chega and IL, remains unclear, as is the possibility of CDS-PP returning to the parliamentary arena, they have already changed the Portuguese political landscape. Similarly, although the left-wing agreement that led to the geringonça was not repeated in 2019 or 2022, it marked a crucial and previously unseen moment of cooperation between the left that has possible repercussions for government formation in the future. The next legislatures will allow us to see whether these new dynamics have permanently changed the Portuguese party system.

Notes 1 Since 1987, the PCP has contested elections in coalition with the Partido Ecologista ‘Os Verdes’ (PEV – Ecologist Party ‘the Greens’) as the Coligação Democrática Unitária (CDU – Democratic Unity Coalition).

150 Sofia Serra-Silva and Nelson Santos 2 Namely, 86.9% of BE supporters, 84.4% of CSU supporters, 76.3% of PS supporters and 66.7% of the Bes’ MPs, 13.3% of the CDU’s MPs and 70.1% of the PS’s MPs. 3 The survey question was ‘As is the case with right-wing parties in Portugal, leftwing parties (i.e. the PS, the CDU and the BE) should understand each other in order to generate stable government alternatives’. 4 The success of the latter of the three heralds the first time that an extreme right populist party gained parliamentary representation in Portugal (Fernandes and Magalhães 2020; Heyne and Manucci 2021). 5 Despite starting her leadership in March 2016 with a slightly higher approval rating than the outgoing leader and positive results in Lisbon at the local elections of 2017, Crista’s popularity followed a downward trajectory. 6 CSES is a cooperative international project that has set a common questionnaire for use in the national election studies of many contemporary democracies. 7 These are understood as those fulfilling ‘all of the following criteria: (1) it perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment; (2) it asserts that a fundamental divide exists between the political establishment and the people implying that all establishment parties, be they in government or in opposition, are essentially the same; and (3) it challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues’ (Abedi 2004: 12). 8 Previous studies have demonstrated that the left/right placement of parties by citizens is highly correlated with the left/right placements by academic experts and party elites (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012; Dalton and McAllister 2015). 9 For an overview of the method and a comparison with other measures of polarization see Dalton (2021). 10 The formula of polarization = SQRT{∑(party vote sharei)* ([party L-R scorei party system average L-R score]/5)2}. The polarization index ranges theoretically from 0 to 10. The party L–R scorei is the party i’s left–right position according to the CSES dataset. The party system average L–R score is weighted by the size of each party (party vote share). 11 Respondents’ average left/right placement of each party provides the basis for measuring polarization for the overall party system. 12 Polarization = SQRT (∑ (((pi - wmean)/100)2Vi)), where p is a party i’s left-right position, V is the party vote share, and wmean is the weighted mean of all parties’ positions. Here we use the MARPOR ‘RILE’ score as a measure of parties’ left– right positions p. 13 Despite the main advantages of the RILE index (and the MARPOR dataset in general), it is important to note that the index has been criticized due to concerns about the validity and reliability of the scale (Benoit and Laver 2007; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Gemenis 2013; McDonald and Budge 2014; Volkens 2007). 14 This assessment is based on the MARPOR’s welfare indicator (similar to RILE’s) which concerns parties’ positions of welfare state expansion and equality and redistribution: the PSD achieved a score of 15.3, while IL was given a much lower score of 3.7. 15 The original formula only considers laws. 16 Disagreement index = (∑ (partyi disagreement level * MP’s partyi number)) / number of MPs in parliament. 17 The first dimension of MDS explains most of the variance of voting behaviour: ninth legislature: 94%; tenth legislature: 84%; 11th legislature: 90%; 12th legislature: 91%; 13th legislature: 86%; 14th legislature: 73%. 18 Between 2019 and 2022, the BE was the third largest party in parliament after obtaining 9.52% of the vote in the 2019 general election, while the CDU was the fourth largest party after obtaining 6.3% of the vote.

Continuity and Change in Portuguese Parties 151

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8

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal Riccardo Marchi

The Rise of the New Populist Right The legislative election of January 2022 changed the centre-right structure of the Portuguese parliament in a staggering fashion. The dominant party of the centre-right, the Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party), lost its historical partner, the Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular (CDS-PP – Social and Democratic Centre-Popular Party).1 The latter failed to win any seats after 47 years of uninterrupted representation in parliament. The seats of the CDS-PP are now occupied by parliamentarians belonging to two new and growing parties: the centrist Iniciativa Liberal (IL – Liberal Initiative) and the right-wing populist Chega (Enough). Following the 2019 legislative elections, these parties entered parliament with one seat each and 1.3% of the vote, with IL garnering 67,681 of the votes cast and Chega 67,826, which was just enough for them to win election in the Lisbon constituency as a result of the combination of the architecture of constituencies and the proportional electoral law, based on the d’Hondt method (Fernandes and Magalhães 2020). Over the next two years, the parties grew rapidly, and at the 2022 general election IL won eight seats (5%, with 273,399 votes) and Chega 12 (7%, with 399,510 votes). Considering Chega in particular, the results confirmed the exponential growth previously registered by its leader, André Ventura, in his bid for the presidency on 24 January 2021, when he received 12% of the vote (almost 500,000 votes) in a close call for second place. The right-wing populist party showed skill in appealing to the male electorate (two out of three voters) in the 18–54 age-group, which included people with an above average formal education: they are likely to have had at least a basic education, hold a high school diploma, and even a university degree (Cancela and Magalhães 2022; Magalhães 2020a). Such voters come from the rural areas of Portugal, are religious and conservative, but are oblivious to feelings of nostalgia for the regime of Dr António de Oliveira Salazar. They are sophisticated voters who are dissatisfied with politics but who are kept informed mainly through the tabloid newspapers and social media. Although these voters do not belong to the classes most affected economically by globalization, they are critical of DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-8

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 157 certain aspects of it, such as migration and the economic stagnation of the West (Heyne and Manucci 2021). Chega is an exceptional case in Portuguese democracy. Its success sets it apart from the traditionally irrelevant ultra-right in Portugal, which is clear even when considering the latter’s past electoral peaks: 1.21% (72,514 votes) for the Partido da Democracia Cristã (Christian Democracy Party) in 1979 and 0.5% (27,269 votes) for the Partido Nacional Renovado (PNR – National Renewal Party) in 2015 (Zúquete 2007; Marchi 2019). To these figures can be added the 0.7% (40,358 votes) received by the Partido da Nova Democracia (New Democracy Party) in 2005, a failed right-wing group that split off from the CDS-PP. The limited literature dedicated to this party is nonetheless quite consensual in classifying it as belonging to the populist new radical right-wing political family. Chega can be framed within the overarching concept of anti-system parties that are neither subversive nor revolutionary, which respect the democratic rules established by the Constitution, are strangers to the historical legacy of the right-wing authoritarianism of the inter-war period, and are the bearers of the dichotomic rhetoric of the sociopolitical reality: there is a virtuous people, and there is a corrupt and corrupting elite (Ignazi 1992; Mudde 2000). Over the past two decades, in Europe, these political parties have tripled the average number of votes received by the radical right compared to those of the old extreme right that remains marginal (Georgiadou et al. 2018). The combination of these features in Chega results from the political entrepreneurship of its leader and founder, André Ventura. Born in 1983 and raised in the suburbs of Lisbon, Ventura joined the PSD’s youth organization when he was 17. At the time, he believed the PSD to be the closest party to the popular strata from which he came, compared to the more elitist and bourgeois CDS-PP. As a teenager, his religious piety led him to attend a Catholic seminary secondary school before studying law at the NOVA University of Lisbon and obtaining his doctorate from the University of Cork in Ireland. After completing his studies, Ventura worked as a private university professor, a tax inspector and a commentator on crime and football for major national cable television networks. The window of opportunity in the political field arrived in 2017 when he led the PSD-CDS-Partido Popular Monárquico (PPM – People’s Monarchist Party) coalition in Loures, an important municipality in the Lisbon metropolitan area that the left had traditionally governed. Ventura addressed the electoral campaign with its favoured subjects, legalist and security themes, and attacked the alleged subsidization and micro-criminality of the important Gypsy community in the town. His strategy worked: left-wing parties denounced his racism, while several national PSD leaders publicly disassociated themselves from him, although the party’s then president and former prime minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, continued to support him, and the CDS withdrew from the coalition. Amplified by the national media, the controversy put Ventura on the map, and from a municipal candidate, he became a national political figure

158 Riccardo Marchi with electoral consequences. Despite his expected defeat in Loures, Ventura, the PSD candidate, won 5% and 5,000 more votes than the party had won in 2013, a success that was directly attributed to Ventura’s campaign performance. Basking in his success, Ventura attempted to promote himself within the PSD in defiance of the new party leader, Rui Rio, who was following a centrist cooperation strategy with the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) government. To this end, in September 2019, Ventura launched an internal faction, which he called Movimento Chega, that sought to force the convening of an extraordinary congress that he could use to defy the party leader and push the PSD further to the right. Faced with opposition from PSD heavyweights and the impossibility of modifying internal power relations, he resigned from the party and began the process of transforming Movimento Chega into an independent political party – Chega. The move did not represent a split from the PSD but rather Ventura’s project to gather around him a handful of friends from his youth, former colleagues and students at the university and supporters converted during the Loures campaign. Formal recognition of Chega took place between October 2018 and March 2019, after several bureaucratic mishaps in the Constitutional Court: mishaps that reflect the fragility of Chega’s initial structure. In addition, the party’s implementation was characterized by a deep internal conflict among the founders, a trait that persisted and was compounded with the arrival of new members. The first clash occurred between the Eurosceptic liberal-nationalist wing and the pro-European liberal-conservative wing, the latter of which eventually prevailed. Despite these rifts, the dominant political culture among Chega’s founders was fairly homogeneous from the outset: economic liberalism; conservative values; a pro-American Western approach to international matters; and protest against the centrist rotation of power between the PS and the PSD. Within these boundaries, the different sensitivities became more noticeable as the party base broadened, particularly between the confessional and secular approaches. The former represents a social, Christian mobilization in defence of the values of family and life, in opposition to the post-materialistic agenda of the left. The latter is more concerned with issues such as multiculturalism, migration and the dysfunctionality within Portuguese democracy. Furthermore, the original economic liberalism – with a neoliberal propensity: i.e. the state reduced to essential functions with the market providing services including health and education – is also targeted by supporters of a social market economy and a collaboration between the public and private sectors for the benefit of citizens. Chega’s first electoral test arrived with the elections to the European Parliament on 26 May 2019, in which it had to run in a coalition with the PPM and the Cidadania e Democracia Cristã (Citizenship and Christian Democracy Party), given that the Constitutional Court had not yet authorized it as a political party. As the head of the ‘Basta’ (Enough) coalition, Ventura ran

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 159 the election campaign by raising the classic themes of right-wing populism: opposition to the EU’s federal project and supporting the supremacy of national sovereignty within the EU; fighting illegal immigration and international terrorism; defending Europe’s Judeo-Christian identity, which it claimed was being threatened by the Islamism of the growing immigrant communities and by the secularism of the left. The results it obtained – 1.5% and 49,496 votes – were somewhat disappointing, and having failed to elect any members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the coalition, which was initially perceived to be a medium-term project until the national general election, came to an end. Having been authorized by the Constitutional Court, Chega formalized its internal structure at its first National Convention in June 2019 in preparation for the general election scheduled to be held on 6 October. During the legislative election campaign, Chega again proposed its bombastic populist themes: advocating chemical castration for paedophiles; life imprisonment for particularly gruesome murders; zero tolerance of micro-criminality in peripheral neighbourhoods; and an end to public subsidies for ethnic minorities. To these, the party added an anti-system agenda: denunciation of the alleged partisanship between the PS and the PSD; the endemic corruption of the regime; the need to establish the Fourth Republic (through constitutional reform); the adoption of a presidential system; a reduction in the number of members of parliament (MPs) and of ‘useless’ state departments; and revision of the electoral law. The narrow election of Ventura in the Lisbon constituency with just 22,053 votes heralded the second phase of the party’s history. Overnight, Chega became the focus of a media that was attracted by the unprecedented entry of the far right into parliament. The many anti-fascist warnings by its political opponents amplified the media coverage, with a result that is plain to see: in just two years, from mid-2019 to mid-2021, Chega went from being a small party with just 700 members to 25,000 members (its claims that its membership now numbers 40,000 hardly seems credible). The party was organized throughout the country and, as of July 2020, it officially joined the European group Identité et démocratie (Identity and Democracy), whose leaders Matteo Salvini (Lega – League) and Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National –National Rally) came to Portugal to support Ventura’s election campaigns. As of 2020, Ventura and Chega have organized their performance on three fronts. In parliament, Ventura devotes considerable effort to promoting Chega as a protagonist in opposition to a PS government that only came about thanks to the unprecedented support of the radical left, including the Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Communist Party) and the Bloco de Esquerda (BE – Left Bloc). Ventura is always on the look-out for harsh polemics in the media to strengthen the party’s image as the antipodes of political correctness, especially over such sensitive themes as the ethnic-racial issue. Accordingly, in his role as an MP Ventura is the protagonist of harsh

160 Riccardo Marchi confrontations with other media figures. This proved to be the case with Afro-descendant MP Joacine Katar Moreira (LIVRE – FREE), who Ventura insisted should be returned to Guinea-Bissau, the country of her birth after she demanded that all African works of art in Portuguese museums be returned to their countries of origin as a means of decolonizing culture. A similar attack was made on the Portuguese international football player Ricardo Quaresma, an ethnic Gypsy, who had criticized Ventura’s call for the mandatory quarantine of all Portuguese Gypsies after a specific community refused to undergo COVID-19 testing. Finally, on the streets – in an unusual move for a Portuguese right that is usually averse to social mobilization – Chega has supported a social counter-movement in opposition to the most controversial demands of Afro-descendant movements that the parties of the radical left support. The demonstrations of mid-2020, when hundreds of Chega militants mobilized against the marches by anti-racist organizations protesting against the death of George Floyd while in police custody in the United States and the murder in Lisbon of an Afro-descendant actor by a white Portuguese man, are quite significant. Under the banner ‘Portugal is not racist’, Chega denounced the far left’s campaigns against alleged structural and institutional racism. However, on this issue, Chega has rejected the ethnic-nationalistic identity. To drive the message home, in September 2021, Ventura co-opted the intellectual Gabriel Mithá Ribeiro, a Christian mestizo of Mozambican origin and with Islamic ancestry, to the national board of the party. A fierce critic of so-called cultural Marxism (including identity politics and the concept of ‘structural racism’), Mithá Ribeiro became Chega’s ideologue responsible for running its Research Office and reformulating the political programme on which the party ran in the 2022 legislative election. He gave Chega a liberal-conservative, reformist and nationalist identity, with the programmatic proposals revolving around three central axes: the distinction between society and state, with the latter being prohibited from meddling in the space of the former: for example, the nurturing of young people, which must remain a prerogative of the family, since this is different from the teaching provided by public schools; the moral principle of self-responsibility, according to which each individual is responsible for their destiny and cannot be constantly said to be a victim of society due to their sexual, religious or ethnic condition; the principle of hierarchy, authority and order in all institutions that, unlike society, cannot be spaces of freedom and total horizontal democracy. Chega’s growth has made it a target of media scrutiny, particularly concerning its ties with the evangelical lobby, dubious businesspeople and the extreme right. The press carries frequent reports about the extremist past of national leaders, such as erstwhile vice-president and current MP Diogo Pacheco de Amorim, a former member of nationalist student groups at the end of the Estado Novo (New State) authoritarian regime and of the clandestine Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal (Democratic

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 161 Movement for the Liberation of Portugal) during the transition to democracy. While Pacheco de Amorim’s past does not raise major concerns within the party, the issue of its infiltration by the extreme right is another story largely due to the effective affiliation of militants from nationalist groups and the consequent damage to the party’s image. The overwhelming majority of Chega cadres, and Ventura himself, come from the mainstream right (the PSD and the CDS-PP) or those who have previously abstained from voting. Therefore, they are willing to replicate the radical path of fellow European leaders who also come from liberal or conservative parties, such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Matteo Salvini in Italy and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, although they are not set on becoming protagonists of fringe right-wing extremism. Chega strengthened the screening process for new members to meet this challenge and took drastic measures, including freezing the party’s youth organization, which was being infiltrated by young people close to European identitarian currents and the North American alt-right. Overall, media polemics enhanced rather than damaged Chega’s image. The most significant indicator of this was during the presidential election in January 2021, in which Ventura ran as the only authentic anti-system right-wing candidate. Three factors made this procedure easier: the re-election of the incumbent president – the social democrat Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa – supported by the PSD, the CDS-PP and the PS prime minister António Costa; the refusal of the candidate supported by IL to position himself on the right of the political spectrum; the convergence of all other presidential candidates denouncing the right-wing populism represented by Ventura. The fact that Ventura was once more at the centre of the election campaign explains how he obtained 12% of the vote, just behind the runner-up, former PS MEP Ana Gomes, who was herself in the front line in the struggle against Chega, including with a request to the Constitutional Court to ban the party. Chega did not change the central axes of its communication strategy in either the 2021 presidential or the 2022 legislative elections. It created new controversial formulas – such as branding as ‘bandits’ those suburban residents who were involved in clashes with police and who were considered to be opposed to the ‘good Portuguese’, precisely those who Ventura intended to represent as a presidential candidate, and at all times in line with the legalist, security-focused and anti-elitist agenda that has sustained the party’s electoral growth. The successes at the ballot box paved the way for the structural consolidation of the party. The 4% of the vote it obtained in the municipal elections of September 2021 provided Chega with hundreds of representatives on councils the length and breadth of the country. Unlike IL, which favoured candidates selected for their quality in just a few constituencies, Chega adopted a strategy of widespread involvement, focusing on quantity rather than quality as it sought to measure the will of the Portuguese electorate throughout the country. The poor performance of several municipal candidates caused some embarrassment to the party; however, it also allowed it to

162 Riccardo Marchi determine its impact across the country by electing 300 candidates (19 councillors, 171 town councillors and 205 parish councillors) and creating the basis of its political-administrative staff in a vocational course. The journey was not without difficulties; however, five of the 19 elected councillors left the party over the following months and continued in office as independents. Nevertheless, the 7% share of the vote that the party obtained in the January 2022 legislative election was expected to guarantee the party around €5 million in public funding, enabling it to hire the parliamentary advisers and party officials who would be essential to the parliamentary work of its 12 MPs. This is in line with Ventura’s goal: to become the leader of the opposition within the next four years and to transform Chega from a protest group to a contender for government that the other centre-right-wing parties might accept as a partner and an alternative to the PS government.

The Political Culture of Chega’s Rank and File Research into the political culture of Chega members was carried out between May and June 2021 via an online survey, which had the consent of the party leadership of all Chega members. The survey was assembled with questions taken from the most recent national surveys of the Portuguese population, particularly the Portuguese Electoral Studies of 2005, 2015 and 2019, the 2019 Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa and Instituto Universitário de Lisboa survey, the 2020 Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey of 2018. The aim was to analyse the positioning of Chega party members against the background of national political culture, with the survey consisting of sections covering ideas and attitudes on ethical and moral values, democracy, the economy, national identity and Europe. Of the 4,078 responses received, 3,183 were validated from an estimated universe of around 30,000 members. Chega did not inform the research team of the size of the party’s membership, nor did it say anything about their sociographic character. Consequently, this means that the sample is probabilistic rather than representative. It has a preponderance of men (84%), consistent with the homologous distribution registered among Chega voters in the 2022 legislative election: 64% men and 36% women (ERC 2022). By age-group, respondents are mainly in the 35–64 cohort (21% were aged 35–44; 32% were aged 45–54; 20% were aged 55–64). Those in the 18–24 age-group accounted for 3.5% of the sample, while those aged 25–34 accounted for 9%. This translates into an average membership age of 49 (standard deviation = 13.0). As for previous political identity, the survey demonstrates the ability of Chega to appeal to people who had not previously been politically active: 76% of respondents had no previous party political affiliation, while the majority of the remaining 24% came from the ranks of the PSD (45%, with another 3% from the Aliança – Alliance – party, which had split from the PSD) and to a lesser extent from the CDS-PP (22%). The traditional far right party, the PNR, contributed only 3%, although it must be remembered that this party

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 163 is extremely small in terms of members. More interesting is the 9% of members coming from the PS and 3% from the PCP. The quantitative data were scrutinized by three focus groups established in October 2021, with volunteers involved in the survey and focusing on ethicalmoral values, the functioning of democracy, migration and identity issues, respectively. The first main characteristic of the political culture of Chega members is their adherence to the populism of protest rather than to identity-based national populism (Taguieff 2007). This conclusion is provided by answering the question about Portugal’s three biggest problems. Raw analysis of the results via a WordCloud – refining the coding is an ongoing process – shows the frequency of issues related to the functioning of democracy rather than with ethnic-cultural identity as mobilization drivers for Chega’s base membership. By far the most important problem for the membership is the perception of corruption, with the second being that of justice, which it thought to be easily circumvented by the rich, powerful and criminal and dysfunctional for the common citizen. The third problem is evenly divided between the economy, education, health, social state and the performance of politicians. Only in the context of the third problem do the topics of immigration and subsidy-dependence become visible, albeit without great relevance, equated in the latter case, and due to Ventura’s rhetorical strategy, with ethnic minorities. As for foreigners, and despite this being a relatively marginal issue, Chega members demonstrate an assimilationist rather than a multicultural or ethno pluralistic attitude: for 91% of respondents, ethnic minorities must adapt to the typical customs of Portugal; for 58%, the will of the majority must prevail over that of ethnic minorities, whose identity claims cannot clash with the Portuguese identity. These proportions match the majority of respondents (94%) when they say that following Portuguese customs and traditions is ‘a very’ or ‘a reasonably’ important condition for being considered Portuguese. In this sense, the jus culturae – to use an expression coined during the Italian debate on integration – remains associated with the jus sanguinis: Portuguese identity is determined by the fact that an individual was born in Portugal (85%) and had Portuguese ancestors (83%). However, this does not mean that a foreigner cannot acquire the quality of becoming Portuguese. The focus group on migration and identity helps to clarify the combination between jus sanguinis and jus culturae. For focus group participant (FGP) E1, the son of an immigrant is not Portuguese just because he was born in Portugal – the jus soli is not decisive – but rather because the individual had grown up and lived in the country long enough to allow them to understand and respect the history, culture and rules of Portuguese society. For FGP Z1, this process allows the children of immigrants to acquire Portuguese nationality smoothly should they so wish to do so once they reach their legal majority. FGP C1 does not consider strict criteria for acquiring nationality a way of rejecting the ‘other’ but guarantees full and conscious

164 Riccardo Marchi integration into the Portuguese identity. For FGP F1, an immigrant born abroad who voluntarily internalizes and identifies with Portuguese culture is more Portuguese than a native with Portuguese ancestry who shows themselves completely alienated from the national identity. Moreover, none of the participants in the focus group considers the phenotypic characteristics of an individual as impediments to becoming Portuguese. This reasoning is evident in the idea expressed by a Chega member, an immigrant of Brazilian origin, according to whom immigration is ‘responsible’ and positive when ‘immigrants adapt to the culture of the country that receives them, instead of trying to impose their own culture’ (Lima 2022). The significance of integration and assimilation is evident in the high percentage (53%) of Chega members who view immigrants as a possible threat to national culture, with only 23% of Chega members disagreeing with this statement. In national surveys, the proportions are inverted: only 24% of the representative sample of the Portuguese population are concerned about threats to identity, while the majority of Portuguese (59%) do not consider immigrants to be a cultural threat. Among Chega members, negative perceptions in terms of culture are also confirmed by the percentage in terms of security issues, with 63% of respondents convinced of the direct relationship between immigration and an increase in criminality. Focus group testimonies reveal how the perception of the threat is strongly linked to the liberalization of migration and nationality policies implemented over the last two decades by PS-led governments. In the words of FGP F1, the threat to national identity is represented by uncontrolled and excessive immigration. The fear, underscored by FGP M1 and FGP F1, is that Portugal will replicate the multicultural model witnessed in Paris in 1996 and Dortmund in 2021, respectively: the perception is not one of integration but of progressive population and cultural replacement in entire areas of these cities. The cultural factor prevails: referring to the Portuguese, FGP M1 recognizes that, from a biological point of view, ‘we quite simply are not a pure-race people: we are a mixture of races’. Interestingly, when research moves from cultural and security issues to economic issues, the attitudes of Chega members change significantly: only one-quarter of the sample rejects the idea that immigrants are good for the national economy, while 46% recognize the positive contribution that immigration makes to the country’s economic development. In this regard, the focus group reveals all the participants’ awareness that Portugal is traditionally a country of labour emigration and that, therefore, they recognize the positive contribution of foreigners to the economies of their destination countries. According to FGP E1, these positive impacts do not avoid the negatives, such as social and wage dumping arising from receiving immigrants from developing countries, whom employers use at the expense of national workers. For Chega members, the background for the importance of ethnic-cultural identity and its necessary preservation lies in the notion that existing cultures

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 165 are very different from each other (95% agree with this) and that it is possible to rank them according to a greater or lesser degree of civilization (87% tend to agree with this statement). These culturalist positions have a somewhat limited biological correspondence: only 31% of respondents agree with the idea that there are less intelligent races, while 47% reject the notion and 22% say they neither agree nor disagree. The last category is significant: many respondents can take refuge in this neutral stance as an excuse not to overtly reveal racist beliefs. Some 73% of respondents support this hypothesis, convinced that there are more hard-working races than others. However, in this case, respondents could only refer to the types of work typical of the capitalist model and therefore linked to cultural dimensions rather than biological ones within a given population. As for attitudes towards democracy, the responses of Chega members problematize the idea that supporters of right-wing populism embody an authoritarian and anti-democratic threat to liberal democracy. As with other right-wing parties, in Chega, some express nostalgia for António de Oliveira Salazar and his New State regime of 1933–1974; however, these do not determine the party’s official line, with the leadership rejecting this historical legacy. Also, the militant base does not endorse authoritarian revanchism: 70% of respondents agree with the idea that despite its imperfections, democracy represents the best form of government, with only 14% rejecting this assessment. Illustrative of this is the slogan ‘Deus, Pátria, Família e Trabalho’ (God, Motherland, Family and Work) that Chega proclaimed in its fourth congress in 2021, a slogan it intended to restore as it is typical of conservatism, from the instrumentalization made of it by the Portuguese authoritarian regime. More problematic is support for the liberal principle of the democratic game based on a compromise between different ideas: for 54% of respondents, concessions in policies correspond to the betrayal of the upheld principles. Only one-quarter of the sample recognizes compromise as a legitimate component of the political process. Distrust about concessions is linked to the importance of the majority principle. Data collected through the focus group on democracy helps us better to understand this characteristic of Chega members. For FGP A2, democracy works best when obstacles imposed by minorities do not distort the will of the majority. Given the starting equality for everyone to express their positions, minorities resulting from elections must accept the government of the majority until the power balance is modified in succeeding elections, under the penalty of the distortion of the democratic principle itself. All participants in the focus group on democracy prioritize the majority principle of 50% plus one if it is achieved in free elections; the basis for the determination of equal rights and duties for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic-racial, religious or sexual characteristics. Data do not reveal appreciation for the essential aspect of liberal democracies: the existence of constitutional principles that guarantee the rights of minorities, principles that

166 Riccardo Marchi are independent of the will of contingent majorities. For FGP M1, minorities should always be heard, but the final decision belongs to the majority, and there is no point in reversing this order of things. For FGP Z1, the respect due to minorities does not imply acceptance of the imposition of cultural habits that are not desired by the majority. In other words, mutual respect must be based on preserving the rules desired by the majority in the public sphere, which is different from the private sphere. If the minority prevails over the majority, this is viewed as a betrayal of democracy. This is especially so in relation to the top of the politicalinstitutional pyramid and determines the sharp anti-elitism and populism of Chega members. For FGP M2, contemporary Portuguese democracy is merely a tool through which a well-organized minority at the top of the pyramid acts as a sect and manipulates the masses to the benefit of its interests. For FGP F2, this distorted democracy is ‘an anonymous dictatorship … masquerading as democracy’, in which the dictator’s face cannot be seen but must be illuminated to recover the people’s sovereign power. The idea of a betrayed democracy is clear in a dichotomic view of political realities: 82% of respondents believe that political differences between the elite and the people are greater than the differences within the people themselves. Only 6% disagree with this quintessential vision of the populist worldview: a virtuous and homogeneous people opposed to a corrupt and corrupting elite. FGP J2 views this elite as the head of an octopus, whose multiple tentacles ensnare the entire democratic system and deceive the people consisting of hundreds and even thousands of individuals who are dependent on the very same elite. The gap between the elite in power and the people alienated from it is widened by the indifference of politicians towards the needs of the people (according to 89% of respondents) and by their subservience to the rich and powerful (according to 76% of respondents). Therefore, FGP J2 considers the present democracy a ‘dictatorship of the elites’, which explains why half of all voters are currently taking refuge in abstention. For FGP A2, the concentration of legislative, executive and judicial power in the hands of the elite is the clearest sign of the failure of democracy since its establishment on 25 April 1974. Despite their clear anti-elitism, Chega members do not show any particular appreciation for direct democracy as an instrument for regaining popular sovereignty. Even if the notion that important decisions have to be taken by ordinary people and not by politicians is supported by 59% of respondents, 23% disagree outright and 18% cannot make a clear statement. So, the realistic view of the imperfect ability of ordinary people to find solutions to complex problems prevails. For FGP A2, the Portuguese do not possess a sufficient level of culture and political maturity to aspire to a type of democracy other than representative. The assumption was that in Portugal, direct democracy would only generate chaos. For FGP P2, a country with ten million voters is just too big for the necessary direct democracy procedures, which are more functional when applied to small circles.

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 167 Moreover, the unsatisfactory performance of the Portuguese parliament is determined by the installed partocracy and not by the representative principle of the democratic system. FGP A2 recognizes the need for the existence of parties, for the confrontation of ideas and the achievement of consensus, although today, these are undermined by ‘party dictatorship’. The clearest sign of party dictatorship is the voting discipline mechanism in parliament, which prevents each MP from casting a vote according to their conscience, forcing them to betray their principles for the party’s political line. Thus, the principle of one man, one vote seems to satisfy Chega members, albeit within the rules of liberal representative democracy and not of plebiscitary formulas.

Conclusion In the space of three years, Chega grew from a handful of activists based in Lisbon and gathered around Ventura’s personal project to Portugal’s third largest party in parliamentary representation and with a national political infrastructure. Despite the growth of the party’s organization, Chega’s main selling point continues to be its president André Ventura: his characteristics as a young media-savvy, politically pragmatic, ideologically flexible and strategically bold young leader make him an unprecedented phenomenon on the far right of the Portuguese political spectrum as well as a prominent figure among leaders on the centre-right. These features allow him to unite people from different political and non-political backgrounds. The party’s top-down management structure, which is supported by Ventura’s narrow circle of loyalists, and the growing internal tensions that have developed as the party base has expanded, including some of the founder members, are the main factors in Chega’s fragility. To date, the weakness of the internal opposition in terms of their ideology, organization and external image has resulted in its promoters remaining in a subordinate position or leaving the party and consequently posing no real threat to the party leadership and unable to challenge Ventura. The personalist nature of Chega, which is still very much identified with its leader, and the high degree of infighting that has been a trait from the very outset, limit the party’s ability to co-opt human resources using their own social and political capital, which in turn has prevented the party from consolidating on the centre-right. While the structural evolution of Chega still causes raised eyebrows, it has clarified its ideological position during the first three years of its parliamentary life. Ventura’s strategic rhetoric, the political culture of Chega’s founders, leaders and initial members, combined with the evolution of the party’s programme, all position Chega within the new radical-right populist family. Presenting a dichotomic view of Portuguese political reality, opposing a virtuous people to a corrupt elite, Chega is no less than a populist party. In Ventura’s discourse strategy, virtuous people are represented as the ‘good

168 Riccardo Marchi Portuguese’ who work, pay taxes and respect the law; in turn, the corrupt elites are the PS and the PSD that have alternated in power since 25 April 1974, with the complicity of the CDS-PP on the right and, more recently, of the PCP and the BE on the left, all of which Chega claims feeds a network of political and economic cronyism. The party’s self-image as the one force that gives a voice to the virtuous people in the battle to reconquer democracy is built largely on the denunciation of political correctness: the instrument through which the elite silences the revolt of ‘good Portuguese’ against the corruption of partocracy, the subsidy-dependence of ethnic minorities, the social degradation caused by illegality and growing insecurity in metropolitan peripheries and certain other areas of the country. The rejection of political correctness also helps Chega to differentiate itself from competing parties on the centre-right of the political spectrum, gain media coverage and maximize the political offer for the anti-political sentiment that prevails in Portugal. Oddly, Chega’s anti-system rhetoric coexists with its leader’s continued calls for dialogue with the centre-right parties to form an anti-socialist front. That same can be said of the party’s strategy, which combines the populist vertical axis (people versus elite) with the classic horizontal axis (right versus left). This strategy is always translated in terms of the new right. Chega rejects nostalgia for the old regime, and while many in its ranks are nostalgic for Salazar and the New State, Ventura has, in many public statements, blamed the country’s authoritarian past for its current structural backwardness. In contrast, the party has always celebrated 25 April as the foundational moment in the conquest of democratic freedoms that were subsequently secured through the success of the 25 November 1975 counter-coup against the communist threat. This is the traditional political culture of the Portuguese parliamentary right, albeit with the innovative addition of the necessary rescue of 25 April, which has been distorted by the elites who have held power over the past 50 years. Similarities with the new right are also evident in Chega’s commitment to the legalist and security-driven agenda that is based on support for the labour demands of unions representing the security forces and legislative initiatives, including the introduction of life imprisonment and chemical castration, that are typical of punitive populism (López-Rodríguez et al. 2021). Chega’s alleged authoritarianism is more easily detected in respect of its security-driven aspect than it is on institutional illiberalism. In fact, from the top to the bottom of the party, there is no particular preference for direct democracy to the detriment of representative democracy, nor is there an appetite for the concentration of powers. Despite Ventura’s charismatic personality and the conservatism of the rank and file, Chega denounces the ‘authoritarianism’ it sees in the parties that have been in government, which promote promiscuity between political, economic, judicial and media power, to remove democracy from popular scrutiny. In this sense, the radical opposition against the parties on the left and the parties in power does not seek to

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 169 replace representative democracy and nor does it seek to affect political pluralism. Controversial measures, such as reducing the number of MPs and the introduction of presidentialism in the Portuguese system, are mainly designed to dismantle the network of party clientele assembled by the PS and the PSD to secure control of power. Furthermore, the nativist character attributed to right-wing populism also deserves some attention. Existing literature attributes Chega with a clear feature of cultural xenophobia (Carvalho 2022; Mendes 2022). The evidence for this is Ventura’s comments on the Gypsy ethnic minority, which in electoral terms was a more motivating target than was immigration since the latter represents a phenomenon that still does not trouble many Portuguese, including Chega members (Afonso 2021; Magalhães 2020b). On this subject, the political culture of the party’s founders presents sharply different nuances that are equidistant from the extremes of pure ethnic identity on the one hand and multiculturalism completely open to migration absorbed by naturalisation or jus soli on the other (Marchi 2020). At both the national and European level, Chega advocates an assimilationist nationalism that is critical of the communitarian resistance of ethnic minorities. The main targets are Gypsy and Islamic Portuguese communities resulting from immigration. The former is targeted because of their cultural habits (school dropouts and arranged marriages, among others) that are contrary to the national legalistic culture. The latter are targeted for representing the introduction, in Europe, of growing enclaves governed by Shari‘a law that is incompatible with the Judeo-Christian identity of Europe and with the secular nature of the state. For these reasons, Chega rejects affirmative action policies, which it claims only serve to further fragment the national community into identity ghettos, with possible repercussions for the country’s internal security. Conversely, based on cultural equivalence with the West and according to the country’s economic needs, Chega advocates restricted and selective immigration and nationality policies. So, while identity issues are always present in Chega’s discourse, the party prioritizes the populist agenda of anti-system protest, which is more effective at capturing disenfranchised people from across the political spectrum. Chega’s strategy of presenting itself as a protest force rather than an identity party is based on its awareness of the marginal nature of the migration issue within Portuguese public opinion and which focuses more on the themes of corruption, economic stagnation and the dysfunctional nature of democracy in the governance and justice arenas. Chega members share a political culture found throughout the Portuguese population on these subjects. They do not represent a lunatic fringe that is disconnected from public opinion, although their concerns about the impact of migration (particularly Islamic migration) on national security and culture are at odds with the rest of the population. Alignment with mainstream political culture gives the militant base a perception of their being neither extreme nor radical but simply on the right, sharing the concerns discussed daily within the family,

170 Riccardo Marchi professional and leisure environments. This is possibly a common trend of public opinion that cannot be discarded, given the electoral growth of the party in just three years (from 68,000 votes to 400,000 votes) compared with the failure of previous radical right projects and despite the cordon sanitaire established around Chega by the intellectual, political and media elite. This political identity is quite homogeneous among Chega members, with there being no significant differences according to age or gender. In this sense, the most significant variable is the greater or lesser degree of secularism or confessionalism among party members, with Christians tending to be more sensitive to conservative values. Chega members do not recognize themselves as radical and populist militants: their concerns are not directed against democracy as a political system but rather against the unsatisfactory way in which democracy functions. In this sense, its illiberal values are not synonymous with an attack on liberal institutions. If, on the one hand, there is a clear appreciation of democracy as a government of the majority rather than of its liberal aspect of guaranteeing minorities vis-à-vis the majority, on the other, there is no tendency to restrict political pluralism. The fear is that organized minorities – namely the post-materialist and globalist left – may impose cultural models on the disorganized majority and that the consolidation of the partocracy may remove democracy from the control of the people once and for all. Nonetheless, criticism remains within the boundaries of the demo liberal paradigm, with no appetite among the party base for plebiscitary or direct democracy.

Note 1 This research was supported by funding from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, I.P. as part of the project with reference number PTDC/CPO -CPO/28748/2017.

References Afonso, A. (2021). ‘Correlates of Aggregate Support for the Radical Right in Portugal’, Research and Politics 8 (3): 1–9. Cancela, J. and Magalhães, P. (2022). Bases Sociais do Voto nas Legislativas de 2022. Available at: bit.ly/3wFlI2C (accessed 29 August 2022). Carvalho, J. (2022). ‘Understanding the Emergence of Extreme Right Parties in Portugal in the Late 2010s’, Parliamentary Affairs, 1–21. doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsac001. Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social (ERC) (2022). ‘Eleições legislativas 2022–30 Janeiro 2022: Boca de urna’. Available at: bit.ly/3KsXcY4 (accessed 29 August 2022). Fernandes J. M. and Magalhães P. C. (2020). ‘The 2019 Portuguese General Elections’, West European Politics 43 (4): 1038–1050. Georgiadou, V., Rorib, L. and Roumanias, C. (2018). ‘Mapping the European Far Right in the 21st Century: A Meso-Level Analysis’, Electoral Studies 54: 103–115. Heyne, L. and Manucci, L. (2021). ‘A New Iberian Exceptionalism? Comparing the Populist Radical Right Electorate in Portugal and Spain’, Political Research Exchange 3 (1): 1–28.

The Populist Radical Right in 21st-Century Portugal 171 Ignazi, P. (1992). ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research 22 (1): 3–34. LimaJ. G.de (2022). ‘Do próprio veneno: A ultradireita de Portugal e os bolsonaristas que vivem por lá’, Piauí: 189. Available at: bit.ly/3ATuso1 (accessed 29 August 2022). López-Rodríguez, A., González-Gómez, A. and González-Quinzán, S. (2021). ‘Populismo punitivo y extrema derecha en el espacio ibérico’, Universitas-XXI, Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanas 35: 103–126. Magalhães, P. (2020a). ‘Quem quer votar no Chega?’, Expresso, 15 February. Available at: bit.ly/3TBeE0T (accessed 29 August 2022). Magalhães, P. (2020b). O Que Pensam os Que Votaram no Chega? Available at: bit.ly/ 3wzQOZu (accessed 29 August 2022). Marchi, R. (2019). The Portuguese Far Right: Between Late Authoritarianism and Democracy (1945–2015), London: Routledge. Marchi, R. (2020). A Nova Direita Anti-Sistema: O Caso do Chega, Lisbon: Edições 70. Mendes, M. S. (2022). ‘Enough of What? An Analysis of Chega’s Populist Radical Right Agenda’, South European Society and Politics 26 (3): 329–353. Mendes, M. S. and Dennison, J. (2020). ‘Explaining the Emergence of the Radical Right in Spain and Portugal: Salience, Stigma and Supply’, West European Politics 44 (4): 752–775. Mudde, C. (2000). The Ideology of the Extreme Right, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Taguieff, P.-A. (2007). L’Illusion Populiste: Essai sur les Démagogies de l’Âge Démocratique, Paris: Champs/Flammarion. Zúquete, J. P. (2007). ‘Portugal: A New Look at the Extreme-Right’, Representation 43 (3): 179–198.

9

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal Jorge Botelho Moniz

Introduction The fundamental moment for establishing a systematic study of the religious phenomenon in modern societies is consensual within the state of the art on secularization. Most authors point to the post-Second World War period and the early 1960s as the first stages of secularization theory, where the first attempts to develop empirical and systematic formulations can be found (Wilson [1966] 1969; Luckmann 1967; Berger [1967] 1990). This theoretical development meant that during the 1960s, secularization theories were integrated into the modernization theory, becoming one of its main axioms. In general terms, these theories claim that the modernization process and its sub-processes cannot proceed without consequences for religious traditions and institutions. In other words, the structural elements of modernization, such as rationalization or ‘societalisation’ (Vergesellschaftung) pose problems for religion, at least in its traditional form, and reduce or extinguish its social relevance. The tension between modernization and religious growth has become its underlying argument. Despite its development and hegemony in the social sciences, its assumptions have been progressively and more systematically questioned, particularly in the last decades of the 20th century. In the 1980s and 1990s, some alternatives to secularization theories emerged, namely religious economy and individualization. In the 2000s, Norris and Inglehart (2004) proposed yet another approach to analysing the evolution of religion – existential security – and from that point on, some of the main assumptions of secularization began to be more systematically contested and reformulated. Despite its internal flaws and the theoretical alternatives that have emerged, the assumptions of secularization and its basic features (e.g. the disintegration of traditional social structures and communal ties and the growth of social welfare and migration) still provide a useful framework for understanding religion in modern societies (Moniz 2017). Furthermore, as explained in more detail elsewhere (Moniz 2019a), there have been some recent empirical studies that continue to support some of the secularization DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-9

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal 173 hypotheses. This is patent in studies using different analytical grids such as technological connectivity, mobility, geography and cultural diversity.1 This phenomenon is particularly, if not exclusively, evident in Europe. Several authors note that the secularization model is not very relevant in many regions. However, in general, it remains adequate for describing European societies. According to Pollack and Rosta (2015) and Pickel (2017), this theory is based on strong empirical evidence in almost all European countries. Portugal is no exception. In the context of its own modernity, the secularization phenomenon has been evident at different levels in the country (Moniz 2022).2 Portuguese society has undergone several changes in its religious configuration in recent decades. The different aspects of cultural, especially religious, plurality are depicted in the development of religious (non-)affiliation, the rise of minority groups and the disintegration of the Catholic canopy (Teixeira 2013: 115). Therefore, according to Dix (2010: 25), Portugal can be portrayed in a seemingly paradoxical way as a ‘secularised, religious and Catholic’ country. These elements are more pertinent if analysed in the context of the country’s largest metropolitan area – the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) – which has experienced unprecedented globalization, urbanization, tertiarization and scientific and technological evolution. Portugal thus becomes an epistemological framework of analysis for understanding how modernity in Europe and its concurrent processes, such as secularization, are articulated in these complex circumstances.

Diversity in Portugal Christianity came to Portugal in the second century CE in the context of the religious diversity that existed at the time (with Moors and Jews in the territory). It would gradually establish itself within the dimension of religious identity as an existential question. Its evolution was marked, for example, by the expulsion of Muslims and Jews in the 15th century and, shortly after that, the forced conversion of the latter and a dominant Catholicism reinforced after the liberal revolutions of 1820. Furthermore, due to its geographical position in the far west of Europe and with only one land border, Portugal was always a late recipient of the cultural changes occurring elsewhere on the European continent: it did not experience the ideas of the Protestant reformation, for example (Vilaça 1999: 277). These experiences helped to define the monolithic Portuguese religious field. Today, despite a decline after the 1974 ‘Carnation Revolution’ (–15%), the percentage of Catholics in the democratic period has stabilized, standing today at about 80% (INE 2022). The second largest group comprises people without religion (believers without religion, atheists and agnostics). They represent about 14% of the population (an increase of more than 100%, the largest in the 2011–2021 period).3 The remaining religious communities are a minority, and do not pose much of a challenge to the Catholic canopy.

174 Jorge Botelho Moniz Notwithstanding a strong increase since the 1980s (to 380% by 2021), notably comprising Protestant/Evangelical groups, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, their numbers are still relatively negligible. The fact that virtually 80% of people identify as Catholic leads to an overlap of several elements of Portuguese society. For instance, the group of Catholics mainly comprises older women (over the age of 64) and people with low levels of education (elementary school). In addition, there is a strong geographic concentration in the Azores and Madeira archipelagos as well as in the north and central regions and rural or semi-urban areas of Portugal (more than 70%) (Teixeira 2013: 124–132). Despite some level of stabilization, the decline in the number of Catholics between 1960 and 2021 was offset by the growth of other religious groups. At the turn of the 21st century, there was an increase in the number of individuals with a religious position other than Catholic. Thus, during the 40-year period 1960–2001, the increase was almost 1.7% (up from 0.81% to 2.49%), while in the 20-year period that followed, there was an increase, to 3.22%, in the number of individuals who, despite being religious, do not identify as Catholic (2.49% in 2001, 3.87% in 2011 and 5.71% in 2021). It is likely that this rise is related to the passing of the Portuguese Religious Freedom Act of 2001. According to Vilaça (2013: 113–114), these groups have grown mainly by unnatural mechanisms: that is, by the arrival of individuals from other countries and through conversion. The members of these religious denominations are concentrated in metropolitan areas and the south of the country, i.e. in contexts of greater labour supply, mobility and cosmopolitanism, and are composed of younger members in relation to Catholics. With the exception of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Muslims, more than 50% are under the age of 35. This greater vitality is reflected, also in comparison to Catholics, in higher rates of religious practice. This growth is indicative of the metamorphosis of the Portuguese religious landscape, which, according to Vilaça (2013: 82), will have to be framed in different analytical axes of the theories of secularization, encompassing, for example, the phenomena of digital media and migration. Despite these changes, the Portuguese religious scene maintained a status quo. Indeed, the ‘absence of pluralistic experiences in the religious sphere’, the ‘scarce experience in democratic culture’, and the ‘weak numerical representativeness and proportional public impact’ of religious minorities have culminated in the lack of spiritual, cultural, social and political visibility of other religions in social life (Vilaça 1999: 278). Consequently, religious minorities are still in a difficult position when they try to challenge the Catholic canopy. While other non-Catholic religions have not expanded significantly in Portuguese society, the same cannot be said of non-religious or anti-religious groups. In 1900, 99.97% of the Portuguese population identified themselves as religious. The emancipation of religion only became visible during the first

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal 175 years of the 20th century, from the implementation of the laicizing measures of the First Republic,4 up to the Vatican’s Concordat with the Estado Novo (New State) in 1940, with this group growing by about 4.5%. However, this proportion fell during the dictatorship due to António Salazar’s institutionalization of a ‘Catholaicism’ that gave privileges to the Catholic Church and allowed it to evangelize freely outside the state. Following Salazar’s death in 1968, the springtime of the authoritarian regime with its new leader Marcelo Caetano and the publication of Law No. 4/71 on religious freedom, the percentage of irreligion or non-religion grew again. This has been particularly noticeable in recent years. According to the last in-depth national study of this group (Teixeira 2012), between 1999 and 2011, there was a 75% increase in the number of people who do not identify with any religion (the ‘nones’), including, for example, believers without religion (from 2.1% to 4.6%), atheists (from 2.7% to 4.1%), indifferent (from 1.7% to 3.2%) and agnostics (from 1.7% to 2.2%). The number of ‘nones’ increased from 8% to 14% during this period and, as we have seen, this figure remained constant in 2021. This group of individuals without religious ties is composed mostly of young middle- and upper-middle-class men with a high level of education (Dix 2013: 80). According to Vilaça (2013: 82), the rise of the ‘nones’ is another instance that proves that indicators of secularization have been multiplying in the country. Over a relatively short period, Portugal witnessed several political, legal and sociocultural transformations. On the one hand, the country still has a Catholic majority and even significant indicators of religious practice (Moniz 2016) when compared with other European countries; on the other hand, the growth of other non-Catholic groups, and especially of ‘nones’, reveals the effects of Portuguese secularization. Statistically, this cluster is the second largest group in the Portuguese population, corresponding to a trend that has been developing in the rest of Europe for some time. In sum, the data analysed reveal a phenomenon of secularization that has led to the emergence of new dynamics of religious representation. Since the 1980s, the non-Catholic population has been expanding and diversifying. This religious diversification has occurred in two ways: through immigration and the conversion of individuals. For example, from abroad came Islam, Eastern religions, Eastern Christianity, and Pentecostal churches and congregations, both African and Brazilian. However, the most significant development has been the growth of ‘nones’ to become greater than that group that identifies itself as religious but not Catholic. Thus, the secularization of Portuguese society has been accentuated more by the increase in the number of people without religion than by the expansion of other religious identities.

Diversity in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area The previous section showed how migration has marked the integration of new religious identities in Portugal. However, as Teixeira et al. (2019: 7)

176 Jorge Botelho Moniz note,5 it is in the LMA that the ‘greatest religious diversity’ in the country is found. According to Moniz (2022), this has also been followed by a marked increase in indicators associated with secularization.6 Thus, the analysis of this metropolitan area allows for a greater interpretation of the effects of diversity on religiosity and non-religiosity. Catholics remain the most represented group in the LMA. However, since the 2000s, they have undergone a systematic decrease in number. On the one hand, the case of the LMA is similar to that of Portugal as a whole,7 since the progress of Catholic self-identification has been erratic since the 1980s, with rises and falls according to the latest data collected globally for the country (in 1981, 70.1% of the population self-identified as Catholic, in 1991 this figure dropped to 69.4%, in 2001 it rose to 73.7%, in 2011 it fell to 68.9% and, finally, in 2021 it decreased slightly to 67.5%) (INE 1984, 1996, 2002, 2012, 2022). On the other hand, considering the specificity of the LMA – one of the regions with the least elderly population in continental Portugal (about 22% in 2018, second only to the northern region of the country), with a growing population educated to university level and a growing number of urban dwellers, the region has become less compatible and attractive for the type of institutional religiosity associated with Catholicism. Their percentage level in 2018 is a good example of this. According to Teixeira et al. (2019), 54.9% self-declared as Catholics. Despite its hegemony over recent decades, the Catholic canopy has been dissolving. If this downward trend, evident to a greater or lesser degree since the 1980s, were to continue, by the 2050s, the number of Catholics in the LMA would be similar to that of today, albeit closer to 50%. However, if we consider its downward trend only from 2001 when it was particularly pronounced, by the mid-2080s, the number of self-identified Catholics in the region will have disappeared. Conversely, there is a positive evolution of self-identification in religions other than Catholicism. In recent decades, the number of people belonging to another religion has gradually and systematically increased. During the period under study, there was an overall expansion of this group. In 1981, they represented 2.57% of the LMA’s religious universe, 2.78% in 1991, 4.30% in 2001, 6.47% in 2011 and 9.36% in 2021 (INE 1984, 1996, 2002, 2012, 2022). This increase derives less from the long-established traditional religions in Portugal and more from those less traditional ones in the country and region. In this context, the growth of non-denominational evangelical churches and other Christian or Eastern religions, especially Buddhism, should be emphasized. In contrast to Catholicism, but not exclusively, these churches and religious communities have become quite attractive to the modern urban individual. This is due to their liturgical celebrations, which are more in accord with modern forms of cultural life, and the promotion of more contemporary models of religiosity, especially religious interiority. Groups whose growth is more dependent on ‘unnatural mechanisms’ (Vilaça 2013: 113–114), such as immigration, have witnessed a more

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal 177 significant increase. For example, Eastern Orthodoxy, whose growth is mainly due to immigration from Eastern Europe, experienced a rapid increase between 1981 and 2011, mostly as a result of immigration from Ukraine, Romania and Moldova. Orthodox self-identification grew from 0.05% in 1981 to almost 1% in 2011, mainly due to the entry of these immigrants, especially between 2001 and 2011: from 203 Ukrainians to 48,010; from 508 Romanians to 39,312; and from 45 Moldovans to 13,586 at the national level (Pordata n.d.). Since these immigrants tend to concentrate in the metropolitan regions where there are more jobs, their arrival in the country must have influenced the universe of other religions in the LMA. Similarly, the number of people who self-identify with a non-Christian religion increased significantly, particularly during the late 2010s. While between 1981 and 2011, this particular group expanded from just 0.1% to 0.6%, in 2018, the number doubled to 1.2%. Buddhists (0.7%) and Hindus (0.2%) stand out in this context. The religious growth of the former was mainly due to the conversion of Portuguese individuals. In contrast, the latter comprises people of Asian origin, especially immigrants from India and Nepal. Between 2011 and 2018, the number of Indians increased from 5,316 to 11,340 and that of Nepalese from 1,144 to 11,487 nationwide. However, the fastest growing group comprised Protestants/Evangelicals. In 1981, they represented 1.23% of the region’s religious landscape, 1.47% in 1991, 2.20% in 2001, 2.83% in 2011, and 3.54% in 2021 (INE 1984, 1996, 2002, 2012, 2022). In other words, within the minority religious groups, more than one-half are made up of evangelicals and other Protestants. As Teixeira et al. (2019: 10) note, this is ‘a field represented by quite competitive churches … that reveal better conditions for self-reproduction.’ This group has been growing due to immigration, mainly Brazilian (42.3%), but has shown great resilience even with the decrease in these immigrants. Finally, secularization in the LMA has been accompanied by the exponential growth of ‘nones’ – believers and non-believers. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of people without religion rose from 5.1% to 8.2%, between 2001 and 2011 from 8.2% to 12.5% and from 2011 to 2021 from 12.5% to 23.1% (INE 1984, 1996, 2002, 2012, 2022). If we follow the study by Teixeira et al. (2019), which shows that non-believers make up 34.9% of the religious landscape, the weight of non-believers amounts to 21.8%, while the group of believers without religion continues to grow, reaching 13.1%. The group that stands out most is believers without a religion: 2.1% at the national level in 1999; 4.6% in the LMA in 2011; and 13.1% in 2018, an increase of about 285% in the region. Among the group of non-believers, there has also been a very significant increase in the number of atheists: 2.7% nationally in 1999; 4.1% in the LMA in 2011; and 10% in 2018. Agnostics have shown similar but less pronounced growth: 1.7% in 1999; 2.2% in 2011; and an extraordinary increase in 2018, standing at 6.9%. In turn, those who self-identify as indifferent have had a more gradual and linear evolution: 1.7% in 1999; 3.2% in 2011; and 4.9% in 2018.

178 Jorge Botelho Moniz In short, religion in the LMA has shown a similar, albeit more accentuated, dynamic to that at the national level, especially among people who self-identify as non-religious. However, this change has been relatively smooth because it is mainly due to a (Catholic) peripheral group – believers without religion (Teixeira 2013: 204). In turn, the increase in ‘nones’, nonbelievers, particularly atheists and agnostics, has also been very significant. The ‘nones’ mostly share lifestyles, values and behaviours that do not include religion in their daily lives. This helps to underscore how daily life has gradually become less permeable to the influence of religion in the LMA. Unlike the projections for self-identified Catholics, if the development of ‘nones’ continues as it has since the 1980s, by the early 2060s, there will be more people without religion in the LMA than Catholics.

Diversity in the Secular Age Although diversity is not a recent phenomenon, either in the LMA or in Portugal as a whole, and even less so in the rest of the world, with the rapid globalization of the second half of the twentieth century, it has become ‘different and unrecognisable from any earlier epoch’, according to Taylor (2007: 437). The contemporary world has gradually become more heterogeneous in terms of culture, religion and ethnicity and has been marked by an unprecedented diversity of worldviews. As the specialized literature suggests, this is an indelible mark of modernization. For example, according to Berger (2014: 53), modernity and diversity are so intertwined that the former ‘necessarily’ leads to the latter. It triggers all the processes that stimulate it, such as urbanization, mass migration, literacy and the development of communication technologies. Due to increased migration flows and geographical mobility, as well as the massification and digitalization of media, societies have become culturally, ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse. However, this growing heterogeneity is not transient: on the contrary, it has become the new norm (Pickel 2017: 290; Taylor 2007: 300; Vilaça et al. 2014: 2). As a reflection of contemporary global phenomena in Portugal, especially in the LMA, two main reasons account for the increase in diversity. The first has to do with the phenomenon of transnational migration. According to Casanova (2007: 59), since the 1960s, Europe has become one of the ‘main destinations for global migration’, which was one of the engines of the ‘growth of diversity’. In Portugal, this was mostly felt, as we have seen, from the 1980s. Like many others in Europe, the waves of immigration into a traditional emigration society have fostered diversity and increased the perceived value of linguistic, ethnic and religious differences among individuals. The second reason concerns the phenomenon of globalization. During the 1980s and 1990s (with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ending of the Cold War and the spread of new ways of digital media communication), there was a sense that a new era had already begun, namely that of globalization. In

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal 179 analysing this new phenomenon, social scientists remarked that societies would be marked by growing diversity rather than uniformity (Berger and Huntington 2002) and that the former would develop because of the newly emerging global culture (Vilaça et al. 2014). The 21st century deepened this phenomenon. In the face of the reality of economic and media globalization, cultural hybridism and the general growth of heterogeneity, we are experiencing a different kind of diversity than that which has gone before, one that is based more on interrelations and less on autonomy. As Inglehart (2021: 31) explains, diversity is not in itself destabilizing; however, the current speed of cultural change it causes is, especially when analysed in traditionally homogeneous contexts, such as the Portuguese, where it tends to generate cultural anxiety. Therefore, this is one of the most pressing challenges that Portugal, and Europe in general, is currently facing. The question of how to respond, politically or socially, to diversity and how it may affect or be affected by religion are asked with renewed urgency today, according to Triandafyllidou and Modood (2017: 2). Taylor (2007: 300) says that diversity – ‘galloping pluralism’, as he calls it – brings a multiplication of outlooks (religious and non- and anti-religious) that compete and, because of the increasing number of worldviews to choose from, promote mutual ‘fragilization’. This ‘culture of fragilization’ spread across Portuguese and European society, especially during the late 20th century, and has become one of the main characteristics of these societies in the 21st century. Diversity has thus become an important part of the response as to how to understand religion in modernity. In line with Berger ([1967] 1990, 1979), Taylor recognizes that in socially or religiously homogeneous contexts, doubts about our principles or beliefs do not arise as easily. However, in modern societies – which are marked by a diversity that includes the removal of religious elements from public life and their replacement by others associated with a (secular) public culture and by the emergence of the secular individual – it is hardly possible to maintain the general conception that religious beliefs are the centre of the social order. On the contrary, secularity has become the default option in some contexts, such as the Portuguese (Taylor 2007: 12–13, 531, 556). The ‘fragilization’ effect of diversity, which Taylor admits is currently at its peak, will often and inevitably (2007: 532) result in the retreat of religion from public space. Although he acknowledges, as does Casanova (1994), that religion will retain a certain visibility in the public space, Taylor sees the religious-secular competition as an uneven terrain with the predominance of principles of a modern secular moral order. As demonstrated in the case of the LMA and Portugal, under these conditions of modern diversity, ‘the proportion of belief is smaller, and that of unbelief is larger than ever before’ (Taylor 2007: 437). Whether or not one agrees with this approach, we must first understand it in the context of the north Atlantic world, which is where the Taylorian proposal should be read. Second, we must focus on the epistemological

180 Jorge Botelho Moniz assumptions it offers, particularly regarding the recognition of certain elements of diversity that may impact the religious sphere. One such clue can be found in Taylor’s (2007: 531) idea that under modern conditions, the strength of beliefs depends much more than in the past on the ‘powerful intuitions of individuals, radiating out to others.’ Institutional and centralized forms of religion are, therefore, less able to influence the actions of individuals than they could in the past. This argument was shared directly by Enzo Pace and Steve Bruce. On the one hand, the former argues that this can be justified through a Luhmannian systemic approach (Luhmann [1998] 2013) that sees religion as a system of relations established within a given milieu. The basic argument is that traditional religious institutions suffer a relative loss of social relevance, coincident with the phenomena of functional differentiation and the regulation or control of religion. This argument is developed further in Pace (2017). On the other hand, Bruce (2011, 2017, 2018) argues that this decline in the social significance of one of its main bases of support – institutional and traditional religion – stems from the lack of social consensus caused by diversity. Macrolevel (institutional) religious proselytism gradually becomes less able to convert or retain believers. In turn, continuous societal affirmation (through everyday interactions) at the micro level becomes its most effective form of persuasion. However, considering the degree of secularization in modern Western societies, this persuasion is usually carried out around secular values and practices. These ideas derive from the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) and their notion that everyday reality – idealized as self-evident and dominated by pragmatic principles and routines – compels the suspension of (religious) belief. With the pressure exerted by the hegemony of secular principles, sacred forces are gradually removed from the available social stock of knowledge and become more difficult to acquire. As religion is removed from everyday life and face-to-face interactions, it becomes more difficult to retain. Teixeira’s (2012) study, in a way, demonstrates how in Portugal, these situations have become relatively rare in the public space. On the one hand, in 2011, about 50% of the Portuguese population declared that they did not talk about religious issues or topics. This was the case even for people who self-identified as religious. On the other hand, most of those who did (about 30%) restricted discussion of such issues to the private family sphere. Furthermore, one-half of all people (religious and non-religious) do not find religious matters ‘attractive’ (Dix 2013: 68) in their everyday lives. This makes the decision to transition from the world of secular everyday life to ‘finite provinces of meaning’, such as religious experience, extremely challenging (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 37). This line of reasoning is subsidiary to Bergerian sociology (Berger [1967] 1990, 1979), especially the claim that diversity (and the consequent advent of competition between different social spheres – another form of secularization) relativizes religious beliefs, undermining their plausibility structures. With diversity, the idea and knowledge that there are (many) other forms of

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal 181 belief (religious and non-religious) is inevitable. Self-identified believers develop an awareness (even if false) that they are the cognitive minority. This relativizing or sceptical perspective on the beliefs of others is seized as inevitable in culturally and religiously diverse societies. Beliefs become vaguer, no longer central to the everyday actions of individuals.

Conclusion In sum, as a consequence of international migration and the fragmentation of hegemonic religious cultures, Western societies have become culturally diverse places, which has had structural consequences that have transformed social psychology. This is the result of several elements, including (i) the processes of social and structural differentiation; (ii) the assertion and hegemony of secular principles that aim to replace religious ones; (iii) the removal of religion from the public space, especially at the level of control and reassertion of everyday interactions; (iv) the fragmentation of the plausibility structures of religion; and (v) the relativization of beliefs since the diversity of and competition between religious worldviews makes it difficult for any one of them to be declared as the true one.8 This is also the conclusion of Pickel (2017), when he states, albeit with some caution, that religion is unlikely to be reinforced in societies with a high level of cultural diversity. This seems to be a position that cuts across the current debate on secularization since several authors cite different negative effects of diversity in religion: from indifference to suspicion, from silencing to uncertainty to its elimination (Moniz 2019c: 124). It is important to clarify that while modernity intensifies the process of diversity, both in depth and in scope, diversity does not necessarily lead to secularization. What diversity causes, as seen particularly in the LMA with the growth of ‘nones’, is a situation in which the weakening of the certainties by which individuals used to live becomes a perennial experience. This is a situation of cognitive contamination in which no belief is unquestionable and where individuals must choose between the different worldviews that are offered to them. However, as Berger (cited in Bruce 2018: 105) stresses, ‘some of those choices may well be religious – and, in fact, in most of the contemporary world they are.’ This is evident in Portugal, where the religious fragmentation caused by modernization has far from completely undermined the sacred canopy, especially the Catholic one. The secularization of society does not necessarily lead to the decline or the end of religion. In a Weberian sense, individuals have difficulty living with religion in modern societies, but they cannot live without it. This represents the complexity of present times, where religion can simultaneously undergo decline, mutation and resurgence. We are sailing in uncharted waters to a destination that is difficult to predict. What is known is that the processes of modernity described by secularization theorists do not seem to have positive impacts on religion: quite the

182 Jorge Botelho Moniz contrary. Diversity tends to correlate negatively with religion, helping to diminish its social significance directly or indirectly. The fragmentation of absolute certainties caused by diversity, particularly but not exclusively in religion, increases the likelihood that individuals will choose secular options in their daily lives. This helps to deepen religious illiteracy and affects religion’s individual and social significance. There is no reason to think that, even with the spread and deepening of diversity phenomena, we will see a linear process of decline – a ‘creeping social loss of importance of religion’ in Pickel’s (2017: 289) prophetic words – either in Portugal or Europe. However, the idea of a religious revival seems even more unlikely in this context. Suppose that the results collected in the Portuguese case study make it clear that secularization is happening and has consequences for religion. In that case, it also seems obvious that the outcome predicted by the grand narratives of secularization, regarding the fatalism of the decline or perishing of religion, is also wrong.

Notes 1 This concept should be understood as a descriptive or analytical notion that describes the level of heterogeneity within a society. More specifically, the diversity that will be analysed is that associated with culture. In fact, culture is one of the unavoidable dimensions to help to explain, give meaning to, and aggregate the different social cosmologies, such as the ethnic, linguistic, and religious ones. In this chapter, we will pay particular attention to the latter (Moniz 2019b: 93–101). 2 Here we will adopt a minimal but operative definition of secularization, which is understood as the phenomenon of displacement, recomposition, revitalization, and decline of religion caused by modernization. 3 Given its rigour and consistency, we will use the latest census data (2021). This increase can be justified by the fact that in the 2021 census, the question about religion did not offer the option ‘no answer’. That is, we cannot exclude the possibility that people who did not want to answer this question answered that they have no religion. The total sum of ‘no religion’ and ‘no answer’ responses in the 2011 census is similar to the total sum of ‘no religion’ in the 2021 census (approximately 1.36 million in the former and 1.24 million in the latter). 4 The 1911 Constitution stated that Portugal was a non-denominational state and defended citizens’ freedom of conscience. The law of separation of church and state in the same year gave substance to the religious conflict opened by the republicans. 5 Owing to its more in-depth analysis of the religious and non-religious landscape of the LMA, we will use this study to supplement the 2021 census data. 6 In this context, secularization should be understood in the light of its sub-theses: societalization, rationalization and existential security. Moniz (2022: 212–225) states these phenomena have been developing in the LMA, especially since the 1990s, with the typical elements of secularization, such as urbanization, industrialization, socioeconomic development, education, digital mass communication, demography, and migration. 7 The LMA only emerged as an administrative region in 1991. Thus, in the first census, the data concerning religious self-positioning are not exactly those referring to this region. In fact, for 1981, the data collected referred to the Lisbon and Setubal regions and for 1991 they referred to the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region. The remaining data already referred to the LMA (Greater Lisbon and the Setubal

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal 183 Peninsula). This fact should not undermine their longitudinal comparison, although it should be noted and taken into consideration. 8 In Portugal, only a minority of individuals (34.3%) state that there is only one true religion, and that religion is their most cherished cultural and personal value (24.9%) (EVS 2008). However, this is on a downward trend, when compared to other dimensions such as work, family, friends, and leisure activities, for example.

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184 Jorge Botelho Moniz Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) (2012). Censos 2011: XV Recenseamento Geral da População – Resultados Definitivos, Lisbon: INE. Available at: censos.ine. pt (accessed 30 August 2022). Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) (2022). XVI Recenseamento Geral da População. VI Recenseamento Geral da Habitação: Resultados definitivos, Lisbon: INE. Available at: censos.ine.pt (accessed 14 January 2023). Luckmann, T. (1967). The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, New York: Macmillan. Luhmann, N. ([1998] 2013). A Systems Theory of Religion (Cultural Memory in the Present), Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moniz, J. B. (2016). ‘A secularização na ultramodernidade católica europeia: Uma proposta de análise contextual e multidimensional do fenômeno da secularização’, Em Tese 13 (1): 188–219. Moniz, J. B. (2017). ‘As falácias da secularização: Análise das cinco críticas-tipo às teorias da secularização’, Política & Sociedade 16 (36): 74–96. Moniz, J. B. (2019a). As teorias da secularização na Europa: Novas perspetivas qualitativas e quantitativas sobre os fenómenos religiosos contemporâneos, doctoral thesis, Nova University of Lisbon. Available at: https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/76841/ 1/TesePhD%5bJBMoniz%5d.pdf (accessed 30 August 2022). Moniz, J. B. (2019b). ‘Diversidade cultural: Um conceito fundamental para o estudo dos fenómenos religiosos modernos’, Revista de Ciências Sociais 50 (2): 73–109. Moniz, J. B. (2019c). ‘Suspendendo a (des)crença? Diversidade cultural e religião na Europa contemporânea’, Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales 21 (42): 109–132. Moniz, J. B. (2022). ‘Secularização na AML: Deslocação, recomposição ou fragmentação da religião?’, in A. Teixeira (Ed.) Religião, Território e Identidade: Contextos Metropolitanos, Lisbon: INCM, pp. 209–248. Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pace, E. (2017). ‘Systems Theory and Religion’, Civitas 17 (2): 345–359. Pickel, G. (2017). ‘Secularisation: An Empirically Consolidated Narrative in the Face of an Increasing Influence of Religion on Politics’, Política & Sociedade 36 (16): 259–294. Pollack, D. and Rosta, G. (2015). Religion in Der Modern: Ein Internationaler Vergleich, Frankfurt-am-Main: Campus. Pordata (n.d.). Base de Dados Portugal Contemporâneo: Casamentos e Divórcios. Available at: bit.ly/3AywUde (accessed 30 August 2022). Taylor, C. (2007). A Secular Age, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Teixeira, A. (Ed.) (2012). Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Ensaio Interdisciplinar, Lisbon: Paulinas. Teixeira, A. (2013). ‘A eclesiosfera católica: Pertença diferenciada’, Didaskalia 43 (1– 2): 115–205. Teixeira, A., Vilaça, H., Moniz, J. B., Coutinho, J. P., Franca, M. and Dix. S. (2019). Identidades Religiosas e Dinâmica Social na Área Metropolitana de Lisboa, Lisbon: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos. Available at: bit.ly/3CEcGGQ (accessed 30 August 2022). Triandafyllidou, A. and Modood, T. (2017). The Problem of Religious Diversity: European Challenges, Asian Approaches, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Portugal 185 Vilaça, H. (1999). ‘Alguns traços acerca da realidade numérica das minorias religiosas em Portugal’, Lusotopie, 277–289. Vilaça, H. (2013). ‘Novas paisagens religiosas em Portugal: Do centro às margens’, Didaskalia 42 (1–2): 81–114. Vilaça, H., Pace, E., Furseth, I. and Pettersson, P. (2014) The Changing Soul of Europe Religions and Migrations in Northern and Southern Europe, London: Routledge. Wilson, B. ([1966] 1969). Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

10 Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy in a Period of German Hegemony Bandwagoning or Soft Balancing? Bruno C. Reis Introduction My approach to the Portuguese management of the external dimension of the eurozone crisis in Portugal will be that of foreign policy analysis as a subfield of international relations focused on the study of the formulation of policies for the management of external relations by looking at the internal and external factors that condition the options of key actors in formulating and implementing it (Smith et al. 2012; Potter 2016).1 My objective will be to establish how far the European debt crisis and German hegemonic management of it – from its peak in 2010–11 until the end of 2017 – impacted what has traditionally been a largely consensual set of Portuguese foreign policy priorities after the post-1975 transition of Portugal into a Western multiparty democracy (Teixeira 2011). While my main focus will be on the period up to the end of 2017, I will bring my analysis to the present day by arguing that the British decision to leave the European Union (EU; known as Brexit), the election of a German president of the EU Commission and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic seemed to confirm and reinforce the hegemonic role of Germany, even if the symmetric shock brought about by the pandemic led to a significant change in German posture. The more adverse implications of the Russian Federation’s military invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, for German credibility and dominance will be briefly mentioned. However, is hegemony the right word to describe German power within the EU during this major crisis? I believe so given the usual definition of the word as the ‘preponderant influence’ of a country over the policy options of another that are of primary concern for the hegemon.2 I am aware that this is open to question. Some observers, including those in Germany, seem to prefer the concept of semi-hegemony. The latter seems to mean that Germany is either an incomplete or a reluctant hegemon. But no great power is equally powerful across all relevant power dimensions, and a preponderance can exist despite some reluctance to exercise fully a leadership role and accept its full costs.3 We could argue that we were closer, certainly at the peak of the European debt crisis, to a pax germanica with the ‘control of DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-10

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 187 both foreign and domestic policy that characterises empire’, with Germany as a quasi-imperial hegemonic power given the centrality of economics in the EU during a period of major economic vulnerability for many member states (Doyle 1986: 40). This meant that the EU under German leadership had a decisive impact in the domestic policies of poorer more peripheral EU member states with significant implications for their foreign policy. To be clear, there seems to be little doubt among Portuguese foreign policy elites that there was an overwhelming German preponderance in the EU, especially during the eurozone crisis. The dispute seems to focus more on whether it will endure, what to do about it, whether it is benign and inevitable and should be embraced or not, and whether it should be regarded as a source of concern, and alternatives must be actively sought.4 The main question to be addressed in this chapter will be whether Portuguese foreign policy during this period of crisis is paradigmatic of German hegemony over the EU in general and the eurozone in particular. More specifically, it will focus on the problems and possibilities for foreign policymaking by a weaker peripheral power in the EU in a post-Cold War global order and a postenlargement EU. The follow-up questions that will be addressed are: What were the foreign policy priorities of successive Portuguese governments post-2009? Did the eurozone crisis result in a visible change in Portuguese foreign policy priorities? Can this period be characterized and analysed as one of (more or less effective) responses to a crisis under German hegemony via bandwagoning or soft balancing? I posit that the answer to the central question comes from an apparent double paradox. First, Portuguese governments have engaged alternately in bandwagoning and soft balancing of the hegemonic German power, and both seem to have worked, given the changed foreign and domestic circumstances. Second, a fundamentally Eurocentric crisis seems to have led not to a total change but to a significant shift in Portuguese foreign policy priorities with an even greater focus on Germany and France in Europe, but also on economic diplomacy outside Europe, alongside important continuities such as the priority given to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a key collective defence guarantor. This is very much a first draft of very recent history, one that I believe is sound but will certainly have to be deepened and partially revised. One important caveat is that these questions are answered by critical analysis of open access sources, i.e. reports and published interviews in the media, official statements, speeches and other documents. I complemented these sources with background conversations with senior officials. In terms of the structure of the text, the initial sections address the key aspects of Portuguese diplomacy under successive different governments in

188 Bruno C. Reis the relevant years: the Sócrates-led minority Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) government of 2009–2011; the right-wing coalition government of the Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) and the Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular (CDS-PP – Social and Democratic Centre-Popular Party), led by Pedro Passos Coelho from 2011–2015; and the António Costa-led PS minority governments from late 2015 to 2022, with the support of a left-wing majority in parliament until late 2021, and then from March 2022 with an absolute parliamentary majority. A concluding section focuses on the main foreign policy continuities and discontinuities between these different governments, followed by an evaluation of how effective Portuguese crisis diplomacy was under the German hegemony of the eurozone in crisis, as well as the possible implications for my conclusion of a series of more recent and dramatic events up to mid-2022.

The Sócrates Government (2009–2011): From Great Ambition to Great Disappointment This is less surprising if we consider that Portugal seemed to be one of the first countries to emerge from the eurozone crisis. Socialist prime minister José Sócrates managed to win a new mandate in the 2009 legislative elections, losing votes but still making a minority government possible. Sócrates had responded by defending a classical Keynesian counter-cyclical economic policy. This was convenient from the point of view of internal politics in an election year. However, initially, it also had significant external support in the EU, starting with Germany, as well as in the Group of Twenty (G20), including the United States – a point that was highlighted in his government manifesto that states that ‘policies of state economic stimulus had been pursued by all member states of the UE and by the US’ (República Portuguesa 2009: 8). The minister of foreign affairs, Luís Amado, was reappointed and given the go-ahead to implement the ambitious foreign policy agenda for 2010. Lisbon hosted a NATO summit that approved a new strategic concept, and the government led a global diplomatic campaign fora non-permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council for 2010–2011, apparently resisting pressure from Germany, which was also competing for a place, to give this up. Ultimately, both countries were elected, but Canada was not. Perhaps these successes in foreign policy made the acceptance of something as bad as a default and a bailout all the more difficult to consider seriously. If we look at the government manifesto cited above, as well as at the statements and trips made by Amado, we see that they are in line with the three traditional priorities in Portuguese foreign policy: strong engagement with Europe and the EU, with the United States and NATO and with the former colonies in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). The government manifesto mentions the EU 19 times across several areas. There is an explicit commitment to the European Common Foreign

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 189 and Security Policy and to a leading role for Portugal in building up the Common Security and Defence Policy. Also, very significantly, the ‘priority for the government within the EU will be the need to overcome the economic and financial crisis, minimize its impact by promoting measures to promote jobs and growth’. There is also an explicit mention of NATO and the United States, with close ties with Washington being ‘the priority’ in bilateral relations. The CPLP grouping of former Portuguese colonies is mentioned 16 times, particularly regarding cultural diplomacy, language, defence cooperation and aid. It is stated twice that Portugal has strong post-colonial relations and ‘reaffirms its links of friendship and cooperation’ with its former colonies at both the bilateral and multilateral level (República Portuguesa 2009: 119–123). Of course, this is a statement of intent. There were problems with all three priorities. In the case of the United States, after the 2008 global financial crisis, growing rumours of strategic restraints as well as of rebalancing towards Asia caused concern among the Portuguese elites, especially when this resulted in the significant downsizing of the US presence in the Lajes airbase, which was a major employer in the mid-Atlantic Portuguese island of Terceira in the Azores archipelago. The CPLP was not without difficulties during this period. However, there is no denying that economically these were good years for investment, exports and migration by Portugal to some of these fast-growing emerging countries – in particular, Angola and Brazil – to which a community of language made access by the Portuguese easier. The commitment to close relations was reinforced by a personal rapport between Sócrates and several CPLP leaders, first and foremost with Brazilian president Lula da Silva. Nevertheless, occasional tensions that were not atypical of these postcolonial communities emerged. The most difficult dossier was the push by the very authoritarian former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea to become a member of the CPLP, supported strongly by Brazil and Angola. However, the Sócrates government managed to resolve the problem in 2010 by convincing others that more time was needed to consider the request and to introduce a degree of conditionality, namely regarding the official status of the Portuguese language and some changes to human rights, in particular regarding the suspension or abolition of the death penalty. Economic diplomacy as a means of promoting exports was not just important in the context of the CPLP. In the 2009 government manifesto, the promotion of greater internationalization of the economy is mentioned 33 times and economic diplomacy nine times. It is explicitly stated that ‘this must be a national design for the next few years’ because ‘internationalization is the key for economic recovery’ as well as ‘sustainable growth’ and the ‘reduction of the external deficit’ (República Portuguesa 2009: 9). In other words, this was key for responding to the economic crisis. If anything, the Sócrates government had been criticized for overcommitting to economic diplomacy, particularly because of the many trips to promote

190 Bruno C. Reis exports to countries such as Venezuela or Libya, which had dubious human rights records. Amado explained this as part of a deliberate foreign policy strategy of ‘trying to correct large imbalances with our major oil suppliers’, one of the ‘great sources of our structural imbalances’ resulting in a persistent external deficit. Furthermore, while Amado accepted that this raised normative concerns, he argued that foreign policy cannot be driven by values alone and that this was an absolute economic necessity and something many other Western powers also do (Amado 2011; Amado and Sousa 2012). What explains the initial reaction of the Sócrates government to the crisis? Was it the result of ideological blindness, hubris or a personal obsession with remaining in power? Was it simply the result of very good years for Portuguese diplomacy being immediately followed by one of the most challenging external contexts in recent times, and therefore the flawed but natural reaction to a crisis that very few saw coming or fully understood in all its implications and scale? I am aware that there is a massive and intensely partisan debate about the relative role of internal and external factors in the crisis. In Portugal, the left tends to emphasize external factors, while the right points a finger at internal factors. An adequate analysis requires taking both into account; even if given the topic of this chapter, I will focus my attention on the external dimension, the one most relevant when analysing Portuguese foreign policy during this period.5 A key starting point for growing Portuguese difficulties in external markets was the rapid shift of policy in Berlin from stimulus to austerity after the 2009 German parliamentary elections, a quick economic recovery, and the revelation of the unsustainable scale of the Greek deficit. The Portuguese minister of foreign affairs was attentive to these trends and anticipated some negative consequences. In order to manage them more effectively, in November 2010 Amado argued for some kind of grand coalition, stating: ‘2011 will be a critical year for our future, for the European project and for the economic and monetary union’, therefore he was ‘very concerned’ and convinced the challenges of the year to come would ‘require political stability’ in Portugal that could be achieved via a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, an inter-party agreement or, ‘even better’ by a new broad coalition government (IOL 2010). The preventive bandwagoning advocated by Amado was in line with his understanding that ‘Germany would not allow on the [EU] an agenda that was not aligned with its interests and vision for the governance of Europe’. This grand coalition would have been the best option in terms of the credibility and solidity of Portuguese foreign and European policy during such trying times; but as Amado himself recognized, this rational adaptation to the changed European economic circumstances under German hegemony was not possible given domestic politics that were being increasingly polarized by the crisis (Amado 2011). The personal aversion to Sócrates by many in the opposition made any such agreement even more difficult.

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 191

Government of Passos Coelho (2011–2015): Bandwagoning Germany Pedro Passos Coelho, leader of the main right-wing party, the PSD, won the snap parliamentary elections of June 2011 and formed a government with a clear majority in parliament in coalition with the other main right-wing party, the CDS-PP. Passos Coelho made it clear that, unlike his predecessor, he saw the bailout as necessary rather than a national disaster, even stating when presenting his government manifesto that he intended to ‘go well beyond the troika’ bailout agreement (Diário de Notícias 2011a). This was viewed by critics as a sign of neoliberal ideological blindness and by admirers as healthy reformist zeal. Crucially, it had very important external dimensions, stating ‘we do not want to be a burden on our partners’ and ‘Portugal needs to recreate a wave of confidence in the global markets’ (Público 2011). This makes it clear that the main aim of foreign policy during these years was to regain credit externally, even if this required accepting the cost of significant domestic opposition. Both seem to have overestimated their room for manoeuvre internally. In the case of Sócrates this led to a vote of no confidence in parliament, in the case of Passos Coelho this opposition came from a majority of judges in the Constitutional Court, who were willing and able to block some of his key austerity measures. Ironically, this institution was strongly inspired by the equally powerful and independent Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe through German-educated Portuguese jurists. If Sócrates exaggerated his room for manoeuvre and underestimated external constraints, Passos Coelho seems to have done the exact reverse in pursuing the austerity programme that hegemonic Berlin favoured. The central point is that the implementation of the bailout agreement with the troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank – ECB and the International Monetary Fund) in Portugal by Passos Coelho’s coalition government within limits that were acceptable to Germany, led to a degree of polarization that affected foreign policy in a way that had not been seen since 1974–1975. This was certainly true regarding party rhetoric and parliamentary debates, and I argue that it affected foreign policy up to a point, even if not as radically as the heated rhetoric might suggest. For instance, it never led the PS, the dominant party of the left, to question membership of the euro, much less of the EU or NATO. In any event, since a majority in parliament required a coalition of the PSD with the CDS-PP, Paulo Portas, the leader of the latter party, who could pick a major government portfolio, chose to be minister of foreign affairs. No less significantly, however, of the new priorities in Portuguese politics, Portas was outranked by an economist with bureaucratic experience in Brussels and the minister of finance, Vítor Gaspar, who became deputy prime minister. The latter became a key figure in establishing a broader understanding of Portuguese foreign policy during a period in which the key international and European question was a highly internationalized and Europeanized financial crisis. Gaspar built a good working relationship of close alignment with

192 Bruno C. Reis Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who was a central actor in this crisis and the perfect embodiment, alongside Chancellor Angela Merkel, of German hegemony during this period. This Portuguese bandwagoning with the dominant power in the eurozone was rewarded with significant positive German signalling to global markets about Portugal under Passos Coelho. Paradigmatic of this was a Eurogroup meeting held in Brussels in 2012 when during a break, Schäuble confided to Gaspar in a moment of supposedly unguarded conversation that was caught on camera: [I]f, in the end, we need to adjust the [Portuguese bailout] programme, having made the big decisions about Greece … This is key, then, if an adjustment of the Portuguese programme is necessary, we will be prepared [to do it]. Gaspar replied, ‘That is much appreciated’ (Open Europe 2012). This was seen as a sign that extra bailout funds for Portugal would be made available if the deficit did not fall far enough, just so long as Lisbon followed the Berlin line of austerity without complaint. The resulting tensions within the government came to a head in mid-2013. Vítor Gaspar resigned over the very tense and difficult management of the competing claims of external and internal constituencies under very difficult circumstances. Also clearly aiming at limiting the negative external impact of this resignation, not least in Berlin, Passos Coelho promoted Gaspar’s deputy, Maria Luís Albuquerque, to the position of minister of finance. This had the desired effect of winning praise from Schäuble, who made it clear that Portugal was different from unruly Greece, and the main reason was ‘mutual trust’, i.e. bandwagoning (Jornal de Notícias 2015). All is well that ends well. Minister of foreign affairs Portas, the leader of the junior partner in the coalition government, resigned in protest at not having enough say in this excessive bandwagoning and for not having been allowed to vet the name of the new finance minister properly. This, he claimed, was an ‘irrevocable decision’ because ‘how decisions are taken repeatedly in the government make my contribution dispensable’. Passos Coelho, a veteran political operator, against prevailing expectations, refused to resign, which would have meant the fall of his government and early elections. And powerful internal and external pressures helped to convince Portas to stay in government in a new role. This shows how foreign and domestic politics become strongly linked during such a crisis. Portas agreed to continue but only after being promoted to deputy prime minister. Significantly, considering the importance attached to economic diplomacy as a way of achieving domestic prestige and pursuing a strategy of national autonomy and recovery, he retained control of AICEP Portugal Global, the specialized agency responsible for promoting foreign trade and investment, and continued to be the most active face of Portuguese economic diplomacy (Marques 2013).6

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 193 Portas remained less keen on bandwagoning with Berlin. In fact, some of his statements seemed to align with some of the voices in the opposition. Coming from the more openly patriotic right, and having flirted with Euroscepticism in the past, Portas made no secret of the fact that he saw the troika intervention as humiliating, going so far as to speak publicly of a ‘protectorate’. This caused Francisco Seixas da Costa, a retired ambassador and former junior minister in the government of Sócrates, and leading PSD member of the European Parliament Paulo Rangel to criticize Portas. They argued that his statement damaged the country’s external image and prestige, with Rangel asking rhetorically, ‘how will China … Brazil or Angola perceive us if we self-define as a protectorate?’ (Público 2013; Diário Económico 2013). In a long analysis of Portas’s performance as minister of foreign affairs, Teresa de Sousa, one of the most influential editors and commentators on Portuguese foreign policy, praised his efforts at economic diplomacy aimed primarily at emerging economies outside a crisis-hit Europe. At the same time Sousa criticized him for not being more involved in the diplomatic and political management of European affairs to counter what Portas himself seemed to think was an excessively close alignment with Berlin. Despite his public misgivings, Portas did subscribe to one of the clearest signals of German hegemony during the crisis: the manifesto signed by him and 11 of his colleagues, led by the German foreign minister (Sousa 2012). Portas may have wanted, but have been unable, to distance himself more from Berlin, but the junior minister for Europe, Bruno Maçães, seemed happy to be the poster boy of bandwagoning with Berlin. He had previously been an adviser to Passos Coelho and was described by the Greek press as more German than the Germans regarding the European crisis and the situation in Greece (Frommhold 2015). Looking at it from the point of view of increasingly partisan domestic politics, what is also interesting is the level of continuity of Portas’s economic diplomacy with that of the previous government. To be fair, economic diplomacy tends to have the most impact in emerging markets rather than those that are more developed and institutionalized, as in the EU. The most paradigmatic example of this continuity were relations with Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. During a visit by Portas to Venezuela and to Colombia he made it clear that political preferences regarding different foreign regimes would not be allowed to interfere with interest-driven economic diplomacy, with the foreign minister concluding that he ‘had a feeling of duty fulfilled’ with that trip (Diário de Notícias 2011b).7 As deputy prime minister from 2013, Portas continued his involvement in economic diplomacy. This might have led to tensions with Rui Machete, his successor at the ministry of foreign affairs. In practice, however, this does not seem to have been the case. If anything, it might have led the veteran Machete, who was chosen as a safe option, to become an unexpected source of controversy because he was overzealous in his attempt to demonstrate his

194 Bruno C. Reis effectiveness in preserving economic relations with Angola. During a visit to Luanda in September 2013, he expressed ‘diplomatic apologies’ for leaking a corruption investigation into Angola’s vice-president by the Portuguese attorney-general’s office. Passos Coelho described this as ‘an unfortunate choice of words’. Angola, at peace since 2002, had enjoyed a decade of booming economic growth that averaged 10% annually thanks to the high price of its key export, oil, thereby becoming the leading destination for Portuguese exports outside the EU, as well as a major investment destination for major Portuguese companies and home to tens of thousands of Portuguese emigrants. An editorial in the influential Expresso newspaper described this as a ‘serious mistake’ while correctly pointing to a more serious and more structural problem: the ‘worrying imbalance’ in relations with Angola where, in the name of economic pragmatism, creating a preference for automatic alignment rather than a more discerning defence of Portuguese interests (Expresso 2013). Angola did suspend a strategic partnership meeting after a week of growing public criticism in the Portuguese media, but until the unrelated but much more significant sudden drop in the price of oil, this had little impact on the intensity of trade and investment between the two countries. More paradoxical is the fact that, despite the growing economic difficulties in Angola in recent years, some of this trend towards automatic alignment appears to persist. In sum, after 2013 the right-wing government continued to promote active economic diplomacy outside the EU and, in this context, an increasingly economic understanding of relations within the CPLP. In his speech at the 2015 Diplomatic Seminar, an annual meeting of all senior diplomatic personnel intended to set foreign policy priorities for the following year, Machete underlined his support for stronger economic partnerships, calling it a ‘great opportunity’ for the CPLP (Goulão 2015). This is important for understanding the limited Portuguese resistance to the admission of Equatorial Guinea to the CPLP in 2013. Equatorial Guinea was not economically important to Portugal, but Brazil and Angola were, and they had made Guinean membership a priority. The Passos Coelho government does not seem to have wanted to jeopardize the agenda of a stronger economic dimension within the CPLP. The pressure exerted over major human rights violations was not enough to overcome this pattern of crisis diplomacy that made economic diplomacy the priority, even if it influenced a degree of minimal conditionality. It is important to note that the CPLP was never meant to become an integrated regional market – which would be as impossible for Portugal as a member of the EU as it would be for Brazil as a member of the Southern Common Market (known as Mercosul in Portuguese). Rather, the aim was to make it more of a facilitator of business networks geared towards exports and investment. The need for this was perceived as more acute given the strong initial impact of the crisis in traditional Portuguese export markets, like the United States and the EU, and the

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 195 more delayed impact of the crisis in emerging markets making them apparently immune to it for some time. Portas remained convinced to the end that this was the right option. In an interview given in early 2015, he stated: ‘I did not invent economic diplomacy, but I took it further than before’, adding: ‘international relations are increasingly economic. Nowadays, it is almost more important to know who has our debt than who has a larger military’. He complemented this by stating: ‘I always thought that Portugal was stronger in Europe with want it might bring to Europe because of its unique relationship with Africa, Latin America and even with the Far East’ (Portugal à Frente 2015). This is a good summary of the main driving force of Portuguese foreign policy during Portas’s government. How successful was it? It certainly seemed successful in its terms: Germany stood by Portugal during this period, even when results in terms of public deficit were limited, and exports did grow.

Costa Governments (2015–2022): Soft Balancing Germany The Portuguese elections of 2015 reflected the growing political fragmentation and increasing difficulty in forming governments in Europe. The rightwing parties presented a single list and won the most vote, with 38%. The initial expectation was that they would manage to form a government with the abstention of the PS. However, the veteran political leader of the PS, António Costa, surprised many by reaching an agreement with the two parties on the radical left – the Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Communist Party) and the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc) – that had never supported any government, and this gave PS a parliamentary majority and allowed him to lead a minority government. How did this left-wing parliamentary alliance, known as the geringonça (‘contraption’), impact Portuguese foreign policy? Validating my argument that, breaking the post-1976 rule, foreign policy was now more subject to party politics, it led the right to object that this new left-wing government would endanger Portugal’s membership of NATO and the EU, that both had strongly criticized and towards which, especially the PCP, was fundamentally hostile. The government manifesto and, even more explicitly, the first statements by the new minister of foreign affairs Augusto Santos Silva, who held the post until March 2022, were intended to deny that unequivocally (Falcão 2016). A point in PS political heavyweight Santos Silva’s favour among the diplomatic elite was that as the second most senior figure in the government and a close ally of prime minister Costa, his appointment was viewed as an assurance of the willingness and ability to centralize and ensure better funding for foreign policy. Not only did he ensure that the foreign ministry recovered full control of economic diplomacy and AICEP Portugal Global, but he also publicly recommitted to ensuring that his ministry and its embassies coordinated all the growing external activities of the other

196 Bruno C. Reis ministries, not least regarding European affairs. The government manifesto mentioned the ‘internationalization’ of the Portuguese economy 36 times, stating that ‘it is vital to make a strong commitment to economic diplomacy’. It also stated that ‘given the importance of external activity in the economic arena – promotion of external trade and promotion of investment and tourism – the government will strengthen the capacity and instrument of the state’ in those areas. The institutional translation of this was the creation of a new secretary of state for internationalization within the foreign ministry (República Portuguesa 2015: 248). The traditional priority given to relations with the former Portuguese colonies was again in evidence, with the CPLP being mentioned 37 times. The prime minister also made a point of publicly committing to a vision for a common charter of rights for CPLP citizens that would seek to improve the free movement of people within it. While this was not exactly received enthusiastically in all other member states, the opposition to allowing the free movement of people emerged largely from the powerful corporate interests in each country (Filho 2015). In a more or less direct response to some of the criticism levelled at the previous government, the new PS government declared that it would play a much more active role in European affairs. In fact, in an interesting emulation of other European countries, not least Germany, Santos Silva began systematically to refer to ‘European’ and ‘foreign’ policy in an implicit recognition that while engagement with other relevant states within the EU might now sometimes be less traditionally diplomatic, this does not mean that diplomacy in Europe is any less important for the achievement of key Portuguese foreign policy aims – quite the opposite. The need for strong diplomatic engagement across Europe is especially marked if a country wants to proactively influence the European agenda, namely if it wants to engage in soft balancing Germany by seeking alternative alliances for alternative policies. This was done for instance by actively promoting a southern bloc of EU member states. The Portuguese government was very active in promoting this informal minilateralist bloc and organized the second summit of the socalled Southern Europe Group of Seven in Lisbon and remains committed to this group to this day. This is part of a broader trend within the EU of fragmentation into subregions and soft balancing, as well as globally of more flexible and informal minilateralism (Alexandre 2017). Regarding bilateral diplomacy, there was a strong commitment to close relations with the Spanish government, with a renewed drive to hold regular comprehensive bilateral summits, despite different political affiliations. Even more significantly, there was a commitment to seek a closer relationship with Paris – and a criticism of the previous government for not doing more diplomatically with France. This included a public statement of congratulations that went well beyond the usual diplomatic niceties for the newly elected French President Macron in 2017, as ‘the only one that was in the interest of Portugal’ and an explicit compliment for his European agenda as a ‘new step

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 197 in European integration’ (Lusa 2017). This trend was continued with an opinion article with other European left-wing leaders published in the French daily newspaper Le Monde, in which Costa publicly supported Macron’s reelection in April 2022, claiming that his success was vital for the future of Europe. This rare gesture by António Costa which Macron rightly recognized as ‘exceptional’, even more so for a country with a long tradition of diplomatic restraint such as Portugal, should be understood in this context (Diário de Notícias 2022). It is difficult to imagine any successful soft balancing of Germany without support from France. Especially important from the point of view of my analysis was, in 2016, the debate as to whether or not the EU would sanction Portugal for running excessive deficits. The French commissioner Moscovici did signal some understanding for the Portuguese position. But this was not the final vindication of the need for some national flexibility regarding the best approach to keeping public expenditure under control while also growing the economy. The seemingly final vindication came a year later when Portugal managed to situate itself formally outside an excessive deficit procedure, with Schäuble himself calling the Portuguese minister of finance ‘the Ronaldo’ of the Eurogroup (Gomes 2017). From the point of view of my argument, however, the crucial point to make is that despite the strong indicators already available in 2016 that the Portuguese public deficit was on a downward trajectory, the German government, and in particular the German minister of finance, made repeated critical statements about the new Portuguese government and expressed scepticism about the result. They went so far as to note that very high-risk Portugal would require another bailout. This may well be the case, but it has not happened for a decade, and even after Schäuble categorically denied that he had said this, he still insisted that ‘Portugal must listen to EU warnings concerning public policies’, by which, of course, he meant his own (Oliveira 2016). This makes it very clear that what mattered to the governing circles in Berlin, and certainly its finance minister, was not just getting results in terms of controlling public spending; it was more about getting them in the ‘correct’ i.e. German hegemonic model designed by Schäuble, and which had been in place since 2011, for the economic and financial governance of the eurozone. The recurrent leaks and statements from the German minister of finance resulted in an unusual public statement of protest by the Portuguese minister of foreign affairs stating that they were ‘unfriendly and unwarranted’. Significantly, this had never happened during the last Lisbon government’s bandwagoning option with Berlin. But the new Portuguese government took great care to avoid the Greek anti-austerity party SYRIZA’s version of hard balancing by openly and systematically challenging German hegemony withing the EU. Up to a point, the Portuguese government was willing to accommodate German-led EU initiatives and norms, while seeking moderate revisions. While seeking diplomatic support based on the argument that Portugal did not strictly adhere to the austerity-only model of crisis

198 Bruno C. Reis management favoured by the German government, it was still achieving results (Pereira and Meireles 2016). In another significant example, Costa made a point of dismissing Schäuble’s warnings as preconceived misgivings, with new investments by German companies such as Volkswagen, Continental and Bosch arguing that ‘these are the Germans to whom I pay attention to, Germans who know Portugal, invest, produce and create wealth in Portugal’, signalling that his opposition was not against Germany per se but against specific policies of the German government (Expresso 2016). This key turning point showed both the reality and the limitations of German hegemony in the EU, as well as the fundamental fact that being preponderant or hegemonic is definitely not the same as being omnipotent. It also probably points to the fact that even in Germany the decision-making circles are not entirely monolithic. Schäuble might have been the preponderant voice in euro-related matters, but his was not the only one, and we certainly cannot ignore Chancellor Merkel. The support of France was especially important within the European Council, but no less important was the fact that Spain, while somewhat aligned with Berlin and led by a rightwing government, was not in a much better financial shape than Portugal, which made it very difficult to punish one ideologically defiant Iberian country but not the other. A significant sign of a change in posture which showed that even a weakened Portugal had real agency was the ambitious and ultimately successful campaign in 2016 to secure the election of António Guterres, former PS prime minister and UN high commissioner for refugees, as UN secretarygeneral. This was despite German opposition, with the Berlin government going so far as to promote a last-minute alternative candidate, Kristalina Georgieva. The fact that this alternative candidate came from within the European Commission and seemingly also had the support of the president of the Commission can be seen as another sign of German hegemony in the EU. And yet as one senior official, who did not wish to be quoted by name, put it, Germany did not play by the book and still the new Portuguese government, more willing to confront Berlin, won.8 Of course, this is an ongoing story. However, two significant changes facilitated a much more active and successful Portuguese strategy of soft balancing Germany. The first was already in place with Mario Draghi as director of the ECB from 2012 to 2019, with for some time, the Portuguese socialist, Vítor Constâncio, as his deputy. Second, from 2017 on, President Macron became much more critical of German options and was more willing to mobilize a new informal coalition of the seven Southern European countries, including Portugal. All this, and the fact that this was about soft balancing rather than the hard confrontational approach initially favoured by SYRIZA, including acceptance of the need for budgetary rigour alongside fiscal stimuli, facilitated the election of Portugal’s minister of finance, Mário Centeno, as president of the Eurogroup in December 2017, a position he held until the end of 2020.

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 199

Effective Portuguese Foreign Policy Changes to Respond to successive Crises during a Period of German Hegemony? The eurozone crisis, followed by the COVID-19 health and economic crisis, had some impact on Portuguese foreign policy priorities that had been marked by great continuity since the end of the empire and the dictatorship in 1974–1975. This chapter does not claim that there was a complete break with long-term strategic priorities. First, the priority accorded to the United States and NATO as providers of vital security guarantees, despite the challenges posed by US president Barack Obama’s strategic restraint and close alignment with Germany, the uncertainty created by his successor, Donald Trump, and the mixed signals towards European allies from incumbent president Joe Biden. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 only made more evident the importance of the traditional priority of Portuguese strategic culture of seeking a lasting alliance and strong security guarantees by the dominant Atlantic power. Continuity also prevailed regarding prioritizing good relations with former colonies or being part of the EU inner core. There were, however, some changes even within these priorities, alongside the growing importance of economic diplomacy. The economic dimension of diplomacy is, of course, very old, as is attested by the existence of consular systems for centuries. What was new was the vocal insistence by senior political leaders for the need to give priority to promoting the greater internationalization of the economy as vital for a way out of the economic crisis and on economic diplomacy as an indispensable tool and not just a routine activity. This was a significant upgrading of prior trends and an obvious result of the 2011 crisis. It is all the more significant because, unlike other aspects of the response to the crisis, it seems to have endured as a significant continuity between right-wing and left-wing governments, between Amado, Portas, Machete and Santos Silva. Minister of foreign affairs Santos Silva, in office from 2015–2022, actually argued in his most recent book that this dimension of managing economic internationalization is now, with the Transatlantic Relationship, Europe and the CPLP, a new long-term vital priority for Portuguese foreign policy (Silva 2020: 18). Additional economic shocks have reinforced this trend – namely the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic response to Russian aggression in Ukraine – which have made partial deglobalization more likely and with it a greater economic role for states. How successful were these changes? Regarding the effectiveness of prioritizing economic diplomacy, this can be correlated with a period of significant positive change in exports, tourism and growth in the years following the 2011 crisis. Claiming that economic diplomacy was the cause of these positive economic trends is always difficult and would in any case require additional research beyond the scope of this chapter. What it is possible to argue, however, is that it was and is a logical adaptation to a succession of major external economic shocks from 2011 onwards.

200 Bruno C. Reis We can and should ask whether there have been adequate institutional and other changes – for example, in terms of recruitment and staffing or the network of embassies – that fully reflect this new priority. In that respect, the most significant changes so far seem to have been strengthening the role of the prime minister and minister of finance in conducting European policy. Modern technology facilitates, ease of travel and frequent contact between national leaders, as well as recurrent crises have tended to enhance the diplomatic role of leaders (see Spohr and Reynolds 2016; Magalhães 2013). Moreover, while Santos Silva, a senior member of the PS, made it clear that with him, the foreign ministry would regain full control over economic and European diplomacy, this was only partially achieved, and when he left office in 2022, prime minister Costa strengthened his direct control over European affairs. It should be noted that this may also be linked to speculation at the time of writing that Costa might be willing to stand for the presidency of the European Council. Regarding the effectiveness of relations with CPLP countries, it is clear this is more than economics for Portugal; it is also about trying to ensure a positive way out of the empire without a total loss of influence. The danger is that this will lead to a posture of automatic alignment that will likely produce ever-diminishing returns and influence, including in economic terms. Regarding effective changes to Portuguese policy within the EU, the debate is still open and openly partisan. The right-wing government of Passos Coelho and his political heirs defended their close alignment with Germany. The rationale being that Germany in 2011 had both might and right on its side, and this offered an opportunity to enact difficult but necessary reforms in Portugal. German hegemony was not only too risky to challenge but also benign and, in any case, aligned with many of the Portuguese right policy preferences (Observador 2016). This is how I interpret statements by Passos Coelho that the new PS government would mean the Devil would be coming! Or of former finance minister Maria Luís Albuquerque that ‘if I was still finance minister this question’, of possible EU sanctions for the small deviation from the deficit reduction target, ‘would not be on the table’. In other words, they were arguing that the only correct and safe option for Portugal was to bandwagon with Germany. The very public advocacy of EU sanctions on Portugal in 2016 by Schäuble, for its 0.2% deviation from deficit reduction targets, shows that there was some merit in these arguments, at least during the peak of the crisis. From 2015 on, Costa’s governments have been arguing for and pursuing a different option of soft balancing: soft enough not to follow Greek minister of finance Yanis Varoufakis’s approach of openly seeking to counterbalance and confront Berlin and force a revision of eurozone rules. The Costa government has continued to reaffirm that the Portuguese government tax and spend budgetary stimulus was within EU rules while questioning the wisdom of at least some of the latter. Costa has sought to maintain good working relations with the German government – for instance, by praising Merkel’s

Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 201 refugee policy. Of course, this became easier once Merkel was replaced as German Chancellor by a fellow social democrat, Olaf Scholtz, in late 2021. However, Costa has also actively sought a coalition of the so-called Med Seven, the key members of which are France, Italy and Spain alongside Greece, Cyprus and Malta, that more recently turned into the Med Nine following the addition of Croatia and Slovenia. This option was anathema to the previous government. From my reading of history and international relations, it makes no sense to try a priori to prescribe whether bandwagoning or soft balancing is the most effective answer to hegemonic power. At most we can say that both have potential costs and benefits, and that bandwagoning is less risky and more likely to be adopted by a weaker power, while soft balancing is potentially more risky and more likely to be favoured by a more confident power. Additionally, we can also say that in the case of Portugal during the eurozone crisis bandwagoning was the more likely course of action on the part of right-wing governments because of their greater ideological alignment with German hegemonic economic preferences. It is also clear that without a strong southern coalition that includes France, the soft balancing of Germany is much riskier and less likely to be effective. Will a coalition of Southern European countries prove as enduring as the Nordics, the Frugal Four or the Visegrád Group, confirming a trend for a more subregional and fragmented Europe to manage an EU comprising 27 members? Or will it prove too brittle regarding core shared interests to resist the temptation by some of its members for closer alignment with Berlin? What will be the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the economic difficulties that this has created for Germany and a degree of discredit regarding Berlin’s past options of close energy alignment with Moscow? Will the declared intent of a significant increase in investment in defence by Germany as a reaction to Russian aggression signal a major strengthening across all relevant power domains and a significant shift in German strategic culture towards a less hesitant hegemony?9 These are key questions that will remain open for a number of years, but in the short term it is clear that this militarized crisis is a major challenge for the kind of German economic hegemony that had given it such a leading role in the EU in previous crises. What is also clear is that the foreign policy of Portugal since 2011 provides a relevant test case of how to manage German economic hegemony in the EU.

Notes 1 Thanks are due to Carlos Gaspar, Teresa de Sousa, Luís Nuno Rodrigues and Pedro Oliveira, who have long given me much food for thought about the topic of Portuguese foreign policy. Special thanks are also due to the editor of this volume, António Costa Pinto, without whose friendly persistence this text would not exist. 2 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d.) ‘Empire’, available at: bit.ly/hegem ony-definition.

202 Bruno C. Reis 3 For a sophisticated discussion of this topic and German foreign policy see Kundnani (2014). 4 For a positive reading of bandwagoning with Germany see Sá (2015a, 2015b) for a right-wing assessment, and Tavares (2015) for the view from the left. 5 The most exhaustive collection of these differing points of view, with more than 100 interviews with senior politicians and academics on the left and the right is Vieira (2011). 6 Formally the deputy prime minister shared the responsibility with the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of economy, but politically he was the one primarily in charge. See Economia ao Minuto (2013). 7 A right-wing government does not hesitate to congratulate the far left Hugo Chavéz, economic diplomacy speaks more strongly than ideological sympathies (MNE 2012). 8 This was not just the Portuguese perception. See Sengupta (2016). 9 Very useful in analysing these challenges, even if it was published before these events took place, is Giegerich and Terhall (2021).

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Portuguese Foreign Policy and Crisis Diplomacy 203 Giegerich, B. and Terhall, M. (2021). The Responsibility to Defend: Rethinking Germany’s Strategic Culture, London: IISS/Routledge. Gomes, P. Z. (2017). ‘Schäuble confirma comparação de Centeno a Ronaldo: “É uma estrela no Ecofin”’, Jornal de Negócios, 26 May. Available at: bit.ly/3KyLyuP (accessed 30 August 2022). Goulão, J. S. (2015). ‘Machete aponta “lusofonia económica” como oportunidade para a CPLP’, Observador, 6 January. Available at: bit.ly/3B0iPM4 (accessed 30 August 2022). IOL (2010). ‘“Se for necessário a coligação, faça-se a coligação”, diz Luís Amado’, TVI 24, 15 November. Available at: bit.ly/3TrUm9R (accessed 19 November 2010). Jornal de Notícias (2015). ‘Schäuble e Maria Luís Albuquerque afastam Portugal da Grécia’, 18 February. Available at: bit.ly/3e8FLQz (accessed 30 August 2022). Kundnani, H. (2014). The Paradox of German Power, London: Hurts. Lusa (2017). ‘MNE português diz que eleição de Macron é “novo passo na integração europeia”’, 7 May. Available at: bit.ly/3Q5nReCin (accessed 30 August 2022). Magalhães, C.de (2013). A Diplomacia Pura, Lisbon: Bizâncio. Marques, A. L. (2013). ‘Paulo Portas: De ministro demissionário “irrevogável” a vice de Pedro Passos Coelho’, Jornal de Notícias, 23 July. Available at: bit.ly/3Rir4bS (accessed 17 July 2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). ‘Lisboa e Caracas assinaram acordos avaliados em 1.680 milhões de dólares’, 10 September. Available at: portugal.gov.pt/pt/o-gov erno/arquivo-historico/governos-constitucionais/gc19/os-ministerios/mne/mantenha -se-atualizado/20120910-mene-venezuela.aspx(accessed 22 October 2012). Observador (2016). ‘Maria Luís Albuquerque diz que Governo “pode e deve evitar quaisquer sançõeseconómicas”’, 2 July. Available at: bit.ly/3Q5r5yK (accessed 18 July 2017). Oliveira, I. (2016). ‘Wolfgang Schäuble to Portugal: Listen to EU Warnings’, Politico, 3 July. Available at: politi.co/3cB5ccT (accessed 3 July 2016). Open Europe (2012). ‘You’re on Candid Camera, Herr Schäuble’, 10 February. Available at: bit.ly/3Q1Sly7 (accessed 30 August 2022). Pereira, H. and Meireles, L. (2016). ‘Santos Silva: Declarações de Schäuble foram “inamistosas” e já seguiu protesto para Berlim’, Expresso, 1 July. Portugal à Frente (2015). ‘Paulo Portas em entrevista à TVI, dia 3 de Setembro de 2015’. Available at: bit.ly/3Azee2j (accessed 6 September 2015). Potter, P. B. K. (2016). ‘Methods of Foreign Policy Analysis’, in R. A. Denemark (Ed.) The International Studies Encyclopedia, Oxford: Blackwell. Available at: bit. ly/3wIk6oB2016 (accessed 20 October 2016). Público (2011). ‘Passos Coelho diz que governo pode ir além das medidas da troika’, 6 June. Available at: bit.ly/3R4fgtY (accessed 30 August 2022). Público (2013). ‘Paulo Rangel: Temos de nos proteger do protectorado’, 12 November. República Portuguesa (2009). Programa do XVIII Governo Constitucional. Available at: bit.ly/3wG7778 (accessed 13 December 2011). República Portuguesa (2015). Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional 2015–19. Available at: bit.ly/3pXiB2c (accessed 30 August 2022). Sá, T. M.de (2015a). ‘Alianças das fracos acabam sempre com fracos resultados’, Rádio Renascença, 31 December. Available at: bit.ly/3Q1gswQ (accessed 1 April 2017).

204 Bruno C. Reis Sá, T. M.de (2015b). Política Externa, Lisbon: FFMS Sengupta, K. (2016). ‘UN Secretary-General Election: Claims of Dirty Tricks and Backstabbing Mar Search for Ban Ki-Moon’s Successor’, The Independent, 22 September. Available at: bit.ly/3AVN7Qj (accessed 23 September 2016). Silva, A. S. (2020). Evoluir: Novos Contributos para a Política Europeia e Externa de Portugal, Lisbon: Tinta da China. Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. (Eds.) (2012). Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sousa, T.de (2012). ‘Falta uma diplomacia europeia a Paulo Portas’, Público, 3 November. Spohr, K. and Reynolds, D. (Eds.) (2016). Transcending the Cold War: Summits, Statecraft, and the Dissolution of Bipolarity in Europe, 1970–90, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tavares, R. (2015). ‘Não em nosso nome’, Público, 8 July. Available at: bit.ly/ 3dVWgPF (accessed 1 April 2017). Teixeira, N. S. (2011). ‘Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy’, in A. C. Pinto (Ed.) Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society, Culture, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Social Sciences Monograph, pp. 95–130. Vieira, J. (2011). Só um Milagre nos Salva, Carnaxide: Objetiva.

11 Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 Small State or Equal Partner? Liliana Reis

Introduction The consolidation of Portugal as a democratic state took place when it acceded to the European Union (EU). In fact, Integration into the European Union is one of the most important events in modern Portugal history. After decades of isolation and turbulent transition to democracy, it gave political, economic, social, and cultural stability to a country that had to overcome the trauma of losing an empire. (Magone, 2004: 1) According to the former prime minister and president of the Republic of Portugal, Aníbal Cavaco Silva (Silva 2018), ‘if democracy were a necessary requirement for membership, the consolidation of democracy would be the benefit of membership’. In geopolitical terms, the EU expanded in 2004 and again in 2007 when ten1 and two,2 respectively, new member states from Central and Eastern Europe acceded to the Union, thereby posing new challenges for Portugal and refocusing the attention of Brussels towards Eastern Europe and North Africa. Any assessment of Portugal’s role in the context of European integration has, necessarily, to accommodate its unique condition as a small power due to the size of its territory and of its population, totalling approximately ten million inhabitants. In fact, there is no uniformity in the contribution of the 27 member states to the process of EU building, because not all of them have the same weight in the institutional framework, nor did they join the organization in the same year. In addition to these elements related to the deepening and enlargement of the EU, there are also foreign and domestic policy options that are defined by the choices of each state. Understandably, these policy options are also exported during the rotating presidencies of the Council of the EU. There is a biannual agenda that reflects, inevitably, the preferences and interests of each member state that provisionally assumes the direction of essential EU decisions. DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-11

206 Liliana Reis The capture of supranational powers by Brussels is largely reflected in the European Commission and also in the European Parliament. But in both institutions the powers of states are highly constrained. Also, for both large and small states, it is, above all, in the EU Council, which represents the member states’ governments, where power can be observed. In reality, member states, at the negotiating level and as European agenda-setters, are exposed when assuming the rotating presidency. This chapter assesses the Portuguese presidencies of the EU Council and, at the same time, consolidates the main national interests. Portugal has already held the presidency of the Council of the EU four times (1992, 2000, 2007 and 2021) with incredibly different contexts at home and abroad. The present research encompasses the period between 2007 and 2021, in which the last two Portuguese presidencies will be analysed. The main objective of this chapter is to understand the role of Portugal in the EU integration process between 2007 and 2021 and its ability to shape and influence the decision-making process as well as the European agenda. The choice of this chronological framework resulted from the option for Portugal’s third presidency of the EU Council and, simultaneously, with the approval of the Lisbon Treaty and the following year with the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis, which placed huge pressure on Portugal. The period of analysis ends in June 2021, the last Portuguese presidency of the Council and the management of the crisis engendered by the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in the previous year. The first section of this chapter includes a state of the art review of small and medium-sized states in the EU, which are the criteria for their definition as such, and how Portugal corresponds to the conceptual framework presented herein. In the second section of the chapter the possibility of Portugal countering its status as a small state in the European context is evaluated, through negotiation, mediation and leadership during the decision-making process. The third section assesses the role of Portugal during the exercise of the last two presidencies and reflects on its political options and how Portuguese choices maximized national and international power. This final section evaluates the period between the two Portuguese presidencies under study and, inevitably, the management of the 2008 global financial crisis in Portugal and its ability to ensure the interests of the Union at a particularly demanding stage in its history. Finally, some conclusions and future directions for research are presented that may be useful not only for Portuguese policymakers, but also for those of other small and medium-sized states.

The role of small and medium-sized states in the European integration process Integration into international organizations or alliances among states is important to maximize their interests, but even more so for small states. As Lucie Tunkrova (2008: 6) elaborates, ‘acting solely as independent states

Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 207 would leave them with a much smaller possibility of promoting their interests’. However, it is a mistake to think that small states within the EU have the same interests or share the same vision for the Union and, therefore, adopt a unified attitude towards the large states. Indeed, due to the heterogeneity that exists between member states, it becomes an even more difficult task to put them all in the same package, framing them in the definition of small states. All EU member states have their peculiar characteristics and many of them are very different, which makes it harder to provide a consistent theory of the performance of small states in the EU decision-making process. Despite these difficulties, the literature on small states in the European project has been strengthened in several dimensions (Arter 2000; Bunse 2009; Molis 2006; Panke 2011, 2010a, 2010b; Panke and Gurol 2019). Although most authors focus on the weaknesses they present in relation to large states, some underscore the strategies that small states have employed in order to maximize their power, especially at the negotiating level, and when they assume the rotating presidency of the EU Council. For example, according to Panke and Gurol (2018: 144), small states can use different strategies, most notably selective engagement and negotiation strategies that do not require much material power, such as persuasion, framing, and coalition-building, as well as the Council Presidency as a window of opportunity to influence the agenda. Applying these strategies allows small states to punch above their noticeable weight. Yet, doing so is easier for the older states, or those with a wider international history. First-born smaller states have more extensive networks, further insights about past policies, and in-depth knowledge on best practices that help them in effectively navigating day-to-day EU negotiations as well as intergovernmental conferences. International relations and the history of Portugal have made it possible to counteract the more one-dimensional argument of classifying states by tangible data only, the most obvious being the extent of its territory and size of its population. In fact, more than eight centuries of history, the ‘golden age’ of the voyages of discovery, its privileged geopolitical position, or the cultural and identity dimension afforded by its language, have endowed Portugal with a special character within the framework of the EU, although quantitative elements allow a classification as a small power. Many authors (Richard and Trechsel 2014; Panke 2010, 2011; Thorhallsson, 2017, 2006) have identified Portugal as a small state taking into account the tangibility of its weight in the European Council3 or the number of deputies that it has in the European Parliament.4 However, looking at Table 11.1, it appears that following the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU (known as Brexit), only four states can be considered large, and these only under the aegis of global gross domestic product (GDP). Indeed, in 2022, the total population of the EU totalled

208 Liliana Reis approximately 447.4 million inhabitants, a figure that is insignificant when compared to the most populous countries in the world, the People’s Republic of China and India, both of which have more than one billion inhabitants) Therefore, the remaining EU countries, excluding the big four (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), are considered small or medium-sized states in terms of population by country. This, on the other hand, reveals that the strength and influence of member states in the international community results from their unity and cohesion in an integrated Europe. For a better understanding of a country’s size and to show that these indicators can be useful (absolute size) or useless (relative size), Thorhallsson (2006, 2017) elaborated a schematic structure with six indicators pertaining to the size of a country, incorporating its relative weight and comparing it with the other states: fixed size refers to the size of the population and the territorial size of the state; sovereignty size refers to the ability of small states to maintain sovereignty over their territory and to govern it competently; while political size refers to the state’s military and administrative capabilities, its ability to form a foreign policy consensus, and its ability to achieve the internal cohesion needed to solve various problems. Economic size refers to the size of the state’s GDP and development status; while perceptual size refers to the discourse and self-perceptions that leaders, elites, groups and the public have of their own states. Small states that perceive themselves as influential actors, with a role to play in the political world, may be more successful in making their mark, while small states that do not believe they can be influential on the world stage fall victim to this self-fulfilling prophecy. The perceptions of actors outside the state in question are also important. Finally, preference size refers to the specific ideas, ambitions and priorities that state elites have and how expansive they are. From the point of view of the absolute size that gives preference to quantitative indicators, the territorial size, the number of inhabitants and the GDP of Portugal has a direct effect on the European institutional framework, mainly due to low number of inhabitants. In fact, Portugal has only 21 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and only 12 seats in the EU Council. If the framework of Portuguese MEPs in the main European political families has allowed Portugal to make some gains, the meagre number of votes in the Council has forced permanent negotiations and variable geometric alliances with several states. The status of small to medium-sized member states inevitably reduces their ability to influence the EU Council. According to Diana Panke (2010: 803), ‘These limited capacities translate into structural disadvantages for shaping European policies through bargaining and arguing in the Council working groups and COREPER [the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the EU]’. The bargaining negotiations and alliances that small states make in the Council can, in some circumstances, bring them some added value as they put pressure on large states. And yet other small states have shown a predilection for supranational logic, since preferences are mitigated and believe

Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 209 Table 11.1 Demographic, Territory and Economic Data on European Union Member States Country

Population (2020)

Area (km2)

GDP (annual, in millions of US $)

GDP (per capita, US $)

Germany France Italy Spain Poland Romania Netherlands Belgium Czech Republic (Czechia) Greece Portugal Sweden Hungary Austria Bulgaria Denmark Finland Slovakia Ireland Croatia Lithuania Slovenia Latvia Estonia Cyprus Luxembourg Malta

83,783,942 65,273,511 60,461,826 46,754,778 37,846,611 19,237,691 17,134,872 11,589,623 10,708,981

348,56 547,557 294,14 498,8 306,23 230,17 33,72 30,28 77,24

4,225,924 2,935,488 2,099,880 1,426,224 674,127 284,088 1,018,684 599,879 282,341

50,795 44,853 35,449 30,090 17,815 14,795 58,292 51,916 26,383

10,423,054 10,196,709 10,099,265 9,660,351 9,006,398 6,948,445 5,792,202 5,540,720 5,459,642 4,937,786 4,105,267 2,722,289 2,078,938 1,886,198 1,326,535 1,207,359 625,978 441,543

128,9 91,59 410,34 90,53 82,409 108,56 42,43 303,89 48,088 68,89 55,96 62,674 20,14 62,2 42,39 9,24 2,59 320

216,384 250,053 627,438 184,577 477,400 80,327 395,710 299,155 114,871 498,891 67,838 65,479 61,567 38,965 36,287 27,639 86,711 17,201

20,256 24,264 60,029 18,968 53,368 11,614 67,758 54,060 21,039 99,013 16,807 23,473 29,193 20,581 27,282 30,847 136,611 33,329

Source: Adapted from www.worldometers.info/population/countries-in-the-eu-by-population/ (accessed 21 June 2022) and https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/european-union (accessed 25 June 2022).

210 Liliana Reis that the European Commission can accommodate the interests of each and distribute to all, for the good of the greater community. In this regard Esko Antola (2001) has underscored that Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland are inclined to see the finalité in terms of strong institutions and through a communitarian approach. They are ready to outline a new division of labour between the institutions and the member states, in a federalist spirit. They see that supranational institutions secure the influence of small states better than purely inter-governmental structures. Formal structures and rules benefit small states since all Members have to follow them irrespective of their size and power. Instead of being issue-specific these countries are institution specific in their approach.

From a Small Country to a Privileged European Interlocutor Today, states are not single actors in international relations. Non-state actors including private and multinational companies, international intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, non-governmental organizations and national and transnational emergent networks in civil society wield much greater power, although the analytical categories relevant to the assessment of the weight of states cannot be attributed. This is why power in international relations is more contested today and pulverized. The discussion about the power of non-state actors invariably leads to the erosion of the role of the state, usually because the new attributes of power are not only diluted among more actors, but also rely on instruments that are more difficult to assess. Although the realist view of Arunas Molis (2006: 82) that ‘[owing to] the difference[s] between small and large states one may notice that the power and influence of the EU states mainly depends on the size of the territory and population of the state’. This means that their GDP cannot be challenged and size matters in the European institutional framework; thus, it seems that power, particularly that of international influence, does not always correspond to the tangible criteria of power. The dilution of the role of the state is accompanied by the questioning of its elements. On the one hand, state sovereignty is shared both at the subnational and international level. Cultural elements such as language or history and relations with the African continent and the three island countries in the Atlantic Ocean, namely the UK, Ireland and Iceland, mean that the territory and population of Portugal is much larger than the limits of its borders and statistics. In this regard, the IDN and the IPRI organized a seminar from 28–29 October 2021 entitled ‘Small States and Big Powers: Portugal and Iceland’s Foreign Relations’, which resulted in almost complete unanimity among the speakers regarding Portugal’s soft power in the context of the past, present and future of international relations (IDN and IPRI 2021).

Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 211 If for the realist theory of international relations state power is directly linked to the tangible elements that it has, for other theoretical approaches, such as liberalism or constructivism, power is linked to elements that are often intangible and incapable of measuring. Joseph Nye is perhaps one of the most recognized theorists, and in the differentiation between hard power and soft power he has identified the resources of both. In terms of the evaluation of soft power, Portland, a North American communications agency, together with the Center on Public Diplomacy of the University of Southern California, publishes an annual report, Software Power 30, that concluded that Portugal is ranked 22 places higher than China or the Russian Federation, a position it has occupied since 20175 (Portland 2019: 40). The same report emphasizes that for smaller states that want to make a positive impact on the world stage, soft power provides the optimal means to do so. The leaders and policymakers in smaller states can best do this by focusing on how they can contribute to a functioning and secure ‘global commons’, which can be understood as shared common spaces like the open seas (international waters), open airspace, outer space, and cyberspace. (Ibid.: 21) Even after the sovereign debt crisis, and if we look at the data from the Global Finance Report, which evaluates the country’s brand, especially in economic and financial metrics, Portugal is ranked in 28th position worldwide (Brand Finance 2021: 5)6 In the context of the EU, Portugal has assumed the role of a privileged interlocutor with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, with an emphasis on the southern hemisphere, namely Africa, Asia and Latin America, and its largest country – Brazil. However, after Brexit, from a geographical point of view Lisbon became the closest European capital to Washington situated on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This could add value to the longstanding diplomatic alliance between the UK and, more recently, the United States. The peripheral condition of the centre of Europe is also contradicted by the centrality that Portugal assumes with the rest of the Western and non-Western world. Portuguese diplomacy has also stood out at the European level. The country is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, between 2004 and 2014, the Portuguese politician José Manuel Durão Barroso was president of the European Commission,7 and this also helped to increase the country’s standing in Brussels.

The 2007 and 2021 Portuguese Presidencies of the EU Council The EU Council is lauded as the institution with the greatest power in the European institutional architecture. Under the axioms of the intergovernmental approach, only the Council has the ability to influence the integration

212 Liliana Reis process, since it is hostage to the preferences and interests of its members. However, the literature is not consensual regarding the role that the Council presidency assumes in defining the European agenda. While some authors have acknowledged that this role is very small or almost non-existent (Tallberg 2003; Schout 1998; Sherrington 2000), other authors have emphasized its institutional strength. Inevitably, the EU member states that hold the sixmonth rotating presidency of the Council project their national political agendas towards the European approach. According to Severiano Teixeira and Reinaldo Hermenegildo (2018: 70), at a member state level, holding the presidency is regarded not only as an opportunity to lead the Union, but also as a chance to bring national interests into the European Agenda … in the case of small member states that have a limited weight in the context of the Union and regard the presidency as a unique opportunity to increase it. From the point of view of domestic politics, during the last two Portuguese presidencies of the EU Council in 2007 and 2021, the Portuguese prime ministers belonged to the Partido Socialista (Socialist Party). But neither José Socrates in 2007, nor António Costa in 2021, had an absolute parliamentary majority. This condition of permanent negotiation has been reflected much more in terms of domestic policies than in relation to Portuguese foreign policy, where there has been relative stability and unanimity regarding the three fundamental axes: Europeanism, Atlanticism and Lusophony among the parties that have governed Portugal after the democratic transition. Furthermore, in 2007, José Socrates ‘benefited from the unprecedented advantage of having a Portuguese President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, who from the outset openly voiced his commitment that Portugal had an important role to play within the EU’ (Durão Barroso, cited in Ferreira-Pereira 2008a: 61). Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council, 2007 Unlike previous presidencies, the Portuguese presidency of 2007 would take place in the second half of the year, guided by the main slogan ‘A stronger Union for a better world’, articulated its programme around three fundamental axes: reform of the treaties; the modernization agenda of European economies and societies; and strengthening Europe’s role in the world. The document was structured in four main chapters: Future of Europe; Lisbon Strategy; Strengthen the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; Europe and the World, and highlights the topics considered most relevant, with a focus on areas in which the Portuguese presidency could be of added value, such as the summits with Brazil and Africa. After France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty by referendum, it was hoped that Portugal would be able to overcome the

Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 213 blockade for a new legal document suited to the context of an enlarged EU. Although the challenge that was presented to Portugal was not easy, it had the support of the president of the European Commission, Durão Barroso, who, according to Laura Ferreira-Pereira (2008b: 132), was ‘also eager to contribute to increasing the status and prestige of Portugal in the EU and in the world’. After six years of negotiations, it was during this presidency that the Treaty of Lisbon was signed, the result of the fastest Intergovernmental Conference ever performed.8 In addition to the aim of reforming the treaty at an endogenous level, the confirmation of the European global actor and the strengthening of Europe’s role in the world would be the exogenous objective. And it would be at this external level that the role of Portuguese foreign policy would be confirmed. Portugal’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking world enabled the first EU-Brazil Summit to be held on 4 July 2007, in Lisbon. The meeting at the level of heads of state made it possible to launch a strategic partnership aimed at improving bilateral relations and strengthening political dialogue on global and regional issues, as well as cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest, namely ‘maritime transport, science and technology and information society, as well as environment and sustainable development. They welcome[d] the launching of new dialogues on energy, employment and social issues, regional development, culture and education and science and technology’.9 In the context of endorsing the permeability of Lusophony in the global agenda of the EU, the Portuguese presidency also promoted the second EUAfrica Summit10 on 8–9 December 2007, in Lisbon, seven years after the first summit with Africa, in Cairo, Egypt.11 This meeting was the culmination of a long and complex EU-Africa negotiation process, led by Portugal, thus fully complying with the successive conclusions of the EU Council, which reiterated the strategic importance of a dialogue at the highest level with Africa. With this initiative, the Portuguese government put Africa back on the European agenda. The meeting resulted in the approval of a joint strategy,12 an action plan and the Lisbon Strategy aimed at ensuring the concrete realization of the new political and development ambitions between ‘equal’ partners. In the communiqué released after the summit entitled ‘Beyond Lisbon: Making the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership Work’ four broad clusters of policy priorities were identified in the following areas: peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade and regional integration, and other key development issues such as education, health, gender, youth, climate change and environment, energy, agriculture, employment, migration, mobility and financial resources and policy coherence (Commission of European Communities, 2007). Regarding the deepening of relations with the African continent, it is worth mentioning the emphasis given to African countries whose official language is Portuguese. For example, a special EU-Cape Verde Partnership was established in 2007, within the scope of the Cotonou Agreement, with a

214 Liliana Reis cooperation framework based on common interests, namely in political dialogue, security, migration and economic development. Regarding GuineaBissau, a decision was adopted to carry out a European Security and Defence Policy Mission to Guinea-Bissau, with a view to effecting security sector reform, as well as holding an International Conference on Drug Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, in Lisbon, on 19 December and the defence of the inclusion of Guinea-Bissau in the Agenda of the ‘Peace Building Commission’ of the United Nations (UN). A report assessing the outcome of the presidency states that Portugal has developed an important and persistent action in order to draw the attention of the international community to the need to maintain its support for Guinea-Bissau, with a view to consolidating the democratic process, governmental stability and economic development. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007: 100) The success of the Portuguese presidency of 2007, both in terms of internal and institutional deepening, mapped by the Treaty of Lisbon and the achievements in the international domain, reflect its negotiating ability among the other member states, but also exposes its influence in numerous countries around the world. At the same time, the Portuguese agenda of this presidency reiterated the importance that the African continent and Brazil assume for Portugal. In the economic field, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) was held on 10 July, at which a preliminary debate took place on public finance within the economic and monetary union, based on the Commission’s 2007 report, and the Portuguese presidency concluded that there was broad consensus on the need to improve the effectiveness of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. Following this debate, on 9 October ECOFIN adopted Conclusions in order to maintain the ambition in the member states’ budgetary consolidation processes, namely with regard to deficit and debt adjustment, converging towards the medium-term objective and avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal policies in periods of increased economic growth (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007: 26). In the financial field, the commitment of the Portuguese presidency was illustrated by the workshop held in July in Lisbon on the ‘Modernization of Public Administrations and its Impact on Competitiveness’ that preceded the informal meeting of ECOFIN ministers on 14 and 15 September, in Porto. Both meetings were promoted by Portugal and recognized the importance of introducing measures to modernize public administrations for controlling expenditure and strengthening growth and employment and, to that extent, their contribution to achieving the objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy. In the words of Cunha (2013: 168), ‘And so, a small peripheral country would make European politics revolve around it, as if it were a centripetal force’. This optimism generated after the approval of the Lisbon

Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 215 Treaty and the ambition to increase Europe’s influence in the world would be shaken the following year with the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. A Nightmare Decade between Two Portuguese Presidencies In 2008, the year after Portugal had relinquished the presidency, the sovereign debt crisis reached Europe and some member states were deeply affected, especially Portugal and the other countries that would become known as PIIGS.13 The crisis was sparked by the financial guarantees of European countries, which feared the collapse of the euro and financial contagion, and by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Countries that received bailout funds would be required to comply with austerity measures aimed at slowing public sector debt growth as part of the loan agreements. As early as 2009, the EU Council urged Portugal to engage swiftly in policies aimed at medium-term fiscal consolidation (EU Council 2009), but on 7 April 2011, ‘Portugal became the third euro area Member State to request international financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund’ (Lourtie 2011). The application of the austerity measures satisfied Brussels as to Portugal’s compliance with the programme, but led to a feeling of distance from the European decision-making centre on the part of the population, a feeling that was exacerbated by the sense that citizens’ lifestyles were rapidly deteriorating. The fourth Stability and Growth Pact, in particular, was prepared in close collaboration with the European Commission. When representative of the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank arrived in the country, the Portuguese leaders recognized that their negotiating margin and their strength was now smaller. ‘It is always different … negotiating when you are trying to reach an agreement which, at the limit may not happen … from when you are negotiating with the Troika after requesting a bailout’ (former Portuguese minister cited in Moury and Freire 2013: 37). According to Catherine Moury and André Freire (2013: 35), In 2009, the European Commission, following the European Council guidelines, requested government to take measures to promote economic growth and employment, thus allowing them to deviate from the strict budgetary objectives. One year later, however, it required a U-turn towards sharp austerity and deficit reduction, at the same time giving much more specific guidelines to governments as regard their budget. During the management of the financial crisis, Portugal was identified as a good pupil (Majone 2016) At the internal level, and despite the sharp divisions that were observed to have emerged between the countries in the north of the EU and those of Southern Europe, Portugal revealed that it had managed not only to safeguard the goals of integration internally but also to

216 Liliana Reis serve as an example to the other member states. On the other hand, the economic crisis that devastated Europe did lead some authors to point to the possible fragmentation of the European project. As a result, Portugal sought to ensure its survival. Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council, 2021 The sovereign debt crisis in which Portugal assumed a prominent role was followed by the humanitarian emergency caused by an influx of refugees and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. Portugal again assumed the presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2021 at an exceptionally demanding time, due to the environment of uncertainty provoked by the greatest threat to public health that the EU had ever faced, namely the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the seriousness of situation, the motto was ‘Time to act: for a fair, green and digital recovery’. Therefore, the priority was to implement economic recovery instruments. Thus, the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism was approved and put into effect; ratification procedures for the Own Resources Decision by all Member States were completed; and the Commission of the first group of National Recovery and Resilience Plans, including that of Portugal, was evaluated and set in motion. The first India-EU Summit took place on 28 June 2000 in Lisbon14 with the participation of all the member states and was a huge achievement for Portugal, as it resulted in the adoption of a Joint Declaration, the launch of a Partnership of Connectivity and in the relaunch of economic negotiations for a free trade agreement, suspended since 2013, and in the beginning of negotiations for an Investment and Geographical Indication Agreement. Portugal has sought to foster closer relations with Africa, with whom it shares geographical proximity. To that extent, during its presidency of the EU Council, Portugal intended to organize the sixth high-level EU-African Union Summit. Originally, Portugal saw its organization as a potential culmination of relations between the two continents, but it was not possible due to the outbreak of the pandemic. Following several years of great social challenges, a consequence of the period of economic adjustment after external intervention, the Portuguese painful experience at a social level would also be projected in the exercise of its presidency. In November 2017, the European institutions and member states signed the agreement on the European Pillar of Social Rights, reinforcing cooperation in an area in which the competence is mostly national. Four years later and with a pandemic in between, which exacerbated inequality and created social problems, a Social Summit was organized and resulted in the Social Commitment of Porto agreed between the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European Parliament and its social partners, in a joint effort to overcome social challenges. Three main targets were to be achieved by 2030 at the European level: an employment rate of at least 78% in the EU; at least 60% of adults should

Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 217 participate in training annually; the number of people at risk of social exclusion or poverty should to be reduced by at least 15 million, including five million children.15 In his closing speech at the Social Summit, the Portuguese prime minister stated: ‘I am honoured to join this commitment to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan. It is the most ambitious and comprehensive tripartite commitment ever reached at the European Union level’ (República Portuguesa 2021). The prime minister had reason to be proud of the Portuguese performance in European social matters. Under his presidency of the EU Council, the member states signed the Porto Social Commitment, the first commitment on global social issues and as part of the Informal Meeting of Leaders, the approval of the Porto Declaration, the first commitment on global social issues, signed by all European social partners, the EU Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission. The EU been assuming global governance on climate change. However, the member states that have suffered the most from its effects are mainly the countries of Southern Europe, of which Portugal is one. Therefore, it would not be surprising if Portugal did not support the European environmental agenda. The European Climate Law would therefore be approved and signed. It is also worth noting, and in the context of combating the COVID-19 crisis, that the approval of the EU’s COVID Digital Certificate, the Council’s recommendations on internal and external travel to the EU, as well as the agreement on solidarity sharing, between the member states, meant that 10 million doses of a vaccine were given, pursuant to a mandate from the European Council. Taking stock of the most recent Portuguese presidency, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, classified the Portuguese performance as ‘incredibly successful’, despite the difficulties it experienced in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the president of European Council, Charles Michel, noted that ‘Portugal is known for its navigators who helped to discover the world. This talent continues to be very Portuguese, as it allowed the EU to stay on course despite storms and difficulties’ (Público 2021). Meanwhile, according to Laura Ferreira-Pereira (2020: 53), The ability to build bridges for dialogue between Europe and the world demonstrated by successive national governments and diplomats has allowed Portugal to transcend, by far, its geographical and demographic dimension, as well as its political and economic weight, which together define its status as a small state.

Conclusion Although Portugal has been classified as a small state within the framework of the EU integration process as well as in international relations, the

218 Liliana Reis research carried out revealed that its history stretching back over more than eight centuries allows it to intersect national interests in European politics, while the relationships built up over time are a decisive element in the mediation of interests within the EU and between other external partners, with which Portugal enjoys privileged relations. This chapter concluded that the identification of Portugal as a small state in European integration distorts and hides two essential factors: first, it boosts the negotiating capacity of national rulers and Portuguese diplomacy to work in the national interest; and two, it removes soft power and intangible factors such as the country’s history, culture and diaspora, which skews the ability of small states to take the lead in negotiating some portfolios and, above all, to reopen paths in deepening relations with other countries. Although, it was also noticeable that the weaknesses of maximizing the interests of a smaller state mainly occur at the European institutional level, which the economic crisis has exposed. Paradoxically, it is also in the institutional framework, namely in the EU Council, during rotating presidencies, that small states are able to better secure their interests. Whether putting on the agenda the internal affairs that are most favourable to them, as illustrated by the social agenda of the second Portuguese presidency or in the areas of Common Security and Defence Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy, including their bilateral foreign policy, in Africa, Asia and Brazil. The main difficulties in the influence of Portugal during the period under study were observed in the management of the sovereign debt crisis. The Stability and Growth Pact that targeted the country did not have much room for negotiation. In fact, the country was not even in a position to negotiate since it needed immediate financial assistance and would necessarily have to agree with the conditions imposed by the troika comprising the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. However, because it was able to fulfilled these conditions, Portugal was considered a good pupil, and this gave the country more political capital in Brussels. Small states in political integration see their sovereignty limited under various circumstances, but this is also replicated by larger and stronger states. In the strength that already exists in the EU, the suppression of individual preferences is transversal to all states, with a greater incidence in some more than in others, but some positivity does not presuppose symmetrical gains for all actors, even if everyone recognized winnings with cooperation.

Notes 1 Cyprus, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 2 Bulgaria and Romania. 3 According to the European Council voting calculator, Portugal represents 2.30% of the European population. Since November 2014, a new system has been in place to determine whether a vote in the European Council and the EU Council will pass or fail under the Qualified Majority Voting rules. Using this approach of

Portugal’s Role in the EU since 2007 219

4 5

6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13

14

15

a so-called double majority, a qualified majority is reached if 55% of member states (currently 16 out of 28) representing at least 65% of the total EU population vote in favour when the Council acts on a proposal by the Commission or the High Representative, or 72% of member states (21 out of 28) representing at least 65% of the total EU population vote in favour in other cases. See www.con silium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/new-counci l-qualified-majority-voting-rules-in-effect/ (accessed 4 July 2022). Portugal has 21 deputies in the European Parliament. Even after Brexit, when some states saw an increase in the number of MEPs, Portugal maintained the number it already had. The 2017 report highlighted that Portugal had events in its favour such as victories in the European Football Championship and the Eurovision Song Contest, the election of António Guterres as secretary-general of the UN and the improvement in the country’s economic indices. In 2021, measures of soft power were expressed under three main headings – Familiarity, Reputation, and Influence – and based on the seven soft power ‘pillars’ of Business and Trade; Governance; International Relations; Culture and Heritage; Media and Communication; Education and Science; and People and Values. Before him, and in the European context, ambassador José Cutileiro had assumed the presidency of Western European Union, shortly after Portugal joined the organization. The conference was opened on 23 July and a draft Treaty prepared. Negotiations on the draft text began immediately afterwards, on 24 July, within the framework of the IGC Group of Jurists. The Group of Jurists finished its work on 3 October, having managed to reach a general agreement on the text of the draft Treaty, its Protocols and Declarations. Issues outside the scope of the mandate and which, therefore, were not addressed by the Group of Jurists of the IGC were resolved at the political level, at the IGC on 18 October. The document was signed, in the Portuguese capital, on 13 December 2007, at the Jerónimos Monastery. Council of European Union (4 July 2007) EU-Brazil Summit Lisbon, Joint Statement, Brussels, 11531/07 (Press 162), available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/95167.pdf (accessed 1 June 2022). It should be noted that ambassador António Monteiro was appointed a coordinator of the Portuguese presidency at the EU-Africa Summit. Also under the aegis of the Portuguese presidency of the EU Council in 2000. Parceria Estratégica ÁFRICA-UE Estratégia Conjunta África-UE, available at: http s://infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/registo/000039706/documento/0001/ (accessed 12 June 2022). PIIGS is an acronym for Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain, which were the weakest economies in the eurozone during the European debt crisis. According to Godby and Anderson (2016), ‘In the 1990s PIGS referred to countries with a great deal of debt or to the Southern countries of Schengen: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, but not Ireland’. These countries were known as the ‘poor four’ before the 2004 enlargement. The first India-EU Summit took place on 28 June 2000 in Lisbon. The father of the Portuguese prime minister, António Costa, is from Goa, India, and he became the first leader of a European government of Indian origin. See https://lists.indiasp ora.org/governmentLeaders/2021. 2021.Portugal.eu (7 May 2021), Compromisso Social do Porto, available at: www. 2021portugal.eu/media/5ikbpnvw/compromisso-social-do-porto.pdf (accessed 4 June 2022).

220 Liliana Reis

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12 Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO as an Interoperability Hub Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto

Introduction The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is part of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) (Council of the European Union 2019), launched by the Council of the European Union (EU). PESCO was created in 2017 (Official Journal of the European Union 2017) and contains binding commitments among the 25 member states, including Portugal, which focus on the increase of defence and security cooperation and capabilities, reaching 2% of the defence budget on research and technology development, harmonizing requirements and logistics and promoting efficiency in the supply chain that guarantees the EU’s preparedness. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is one of the main instruments that accompany this and suggests progress to national entities regarding compliance with the policy and provides guarantees that cooperation projects are efficient (Nunes 2018; Reis 2018). For this reason, and under the plan to enable the EU’s external action towards its permanent defence and security programmes, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) conditioned the creation of a permanent security and defence structure. Two of the institutions created as part of the CSDP – the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Military Staff, share the PESCO secretariat with the European External Action Service (EEAS). Having voluntarily joined the PESCO initiative, like all member states, the Portuguese government must present a National Implementation Plan (NIP) to accompany the EU at the PESCO Council level. In this regard, Eilertsen (2020) points out that the NIP is part of the PESCO institutionalization and commitment, promoted ‘by the member states, with France and Germany in front, rather than Brussels’ (ibid.: 8). On the other hand, for the author, ‘with the supranational institutional structure, the member states are less likely to participate as they do not want to be constrained. In PESCO, the structure makes participation possible without necessarily being constrained’ (ibid.: 23). Public information on the Portuguese PESCO programme points to the priority to develop logistics planning and the participation of the defence DOI: 10.4324/9781351046916-12

Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO 223 industrial base, as well as efforts to consolidate autonomous systems, maritime security and information exchange on cyber matters.

Synergies to Uphold the Effectiveness of PESCO Portugal leads one of PESCO’s cybersecurity projects and is accompanied by others, including the maritime and cyber defence sectors, systems interoperability and electronic warfare. As of May 2022, there were 60 PESCO projects under development. Julia Tilenni (2019) describes PESCO as an activity that is still far from representing the integration of the EU’s defence project and qualifies the programme as limited, especially concerning European autonomy in this area. On the other hand, she believes that the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU (known as Brexit) was an important milestone in consolidating the idea of a more successful common defence creation strategy (Ferreira-Pereira 2020). The European Security and Defence Policy was launched in 1999, following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), thereby stating the constituency of the EU’s second pillar (Bergmann and Müller 2021). Flexible cooperation mechanisms are provided for by PESCO, which on its inception gave member states non-mandatory alignment conditions for projects (Nunes 2018). In addition, PESCO’s initial projects were both military and civilian, also proposed by the incentives for dual-use resources (Nunes 2018). Dossi (2019) is sceptical about the various elements that form and contradict each other in consolidating PESCO. Its technological ambitions run into political weaknesses in search of minimum common denominators, which also aim to meet the important demands of conciliation in weapons capacity development (ibid.). The policy still lacks a general concept that meets the requirements for the joint projects, which is not visible but is spread across the various objectives in the PESCO Strategic Reviews (Council of the European Union 2020). At the 2020 PESCO Review launch, nearly half of the 47 projects were still not producing practical results. If PESCO represents the most structured initiative in coordinating capacity-building efforts, it is also a motive for criticism and scepticism about the participation of the defence industrial base, which would be a possible outcome of the programme. Dossi (2019) notes that there is no clarity about the conditions for participation in the industrial base, particularly because some of its assets are held by corporate capital and bases that are exogenous to the members involved. At the subregional level, Prezelj’s (2013) study of the implications for defence cooperation in Eastern Europe suggests that the lack of coherence and a common identity affect the ability to make defence cooperation agreements more efficient. In the theoretical context, the treatment of cooperation schemes usually analyses the solidity of cooperative axes through theories that observe cooperative trajectories and mutual trust, in addition to

224 Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto interdependence resources. Otherwise, the theories that address relations of mistrust in the international system and the constitution of the balance of power point to the consideration of a hierarchical system based on military and economic capabilities that avoid the constraints of other actors. In this sense, the EU experiences the dilemma of separating from the United States to comply with an agenda of its own development, one which is at the same time aligned with the consolidation objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a source of the interoperability of the alliance’s defence systems (Jasper 2012). Dyson (2013) refers to the asymmetric crises in defence cooperation that the EU faces as being conditioned by bandwagoning politics, in which the EU submits its defence project to the United States. According to Dyson 2013: 389), ‘Ensuring access to the unparalleled global power projection capabilities of the US is the strategy of least risk for European states to guarantee their security in an uncertain world’. The author calls for the balance of threat theory, whereby he marks the phenomenon of gathering by being attracted by other necessities such as those caused by energy security dependencies (Waltz 1979; Cladi and Locatelli 2012;Dyson 2013). On the other hand, Cladi’s (2022) findings show that European states have been bandwagoning to the United States since the end of the Second World War, observing that there were no plans involving the defence of Europe that could not count on US assistance. While the Russian Federation’s military invasion of Ukraine in early February 2022 repositioned strategic ambitions and the European stability system, the EU’s shift away from the United States and the UK, especially after Australia scrapped its multi-million dollar submarine contract with France, signalled a weakening of relations within NATO.1 Furthermore, following Brexit, transatlantic defence relations have gained new dimensions (Ferreira-Pereira 2013). Defence projects have little chance to come to fruition if they are isolated in the international system, marked by eminently national characteristics, such as the defence of territory and borders, with the technological contribution required and the high cost of war sustainability. Dyson and Konstadinides (2013) highlight two aspects as determining factors for defence integration within the EU, and constituting significant challenges to its consolidation. The first is the alliance security dilemma, which invokes mutual mistrust, while the other invokes the tension between the desire for national autonomy and submitting to multilateral defence under NATO or the EU. With advances and setbacks in the internal confidence system and based on important interdependence networks on energy security, food or exports, European defence also materializes through its various axes of exogenous cooperation and dependence (Pahre 1994). Regarding the defence integration project, Bátora (2009) noted that the logistics issue was an important variable in the integration process. Guay (1996) states that European defence integration is based on national

Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO 225 spillovers, since the Treaty of Rome covers the defence industry and planning at the national level. This makes it possible to characterize the emerging model of defence integration into the European environment. The logistical integration of NATO members’ industrial bases, which is facilitated by the NATO Codification System (NCS), can accelerate European integration. First, the logistics catalogue works as an instrument of development, purchase and support throughout the product lifecycle and cycles of research, development and innovation. Similarly, the European defence integration depends on a common strategic and operational language, with parity and complementarity between military forces. Additionally, the NATO catalogue parameters extend to members and non-members of the alliance, which can help to broaden the EU’s strategic partnerships beyond its borders. The creation of a common identity for defence planning led to the EDA (EDA n.d.), which constitutes its embryonic elements (Bátora 2009). The agency has tasks that comprise associated initiatives’ civil and military nature. Nevertheless, from its inception in 2004 the industries have had little support in coordinating autochthonic and European development properly as part of a project and shared identity in defence. In an interview with its representatives,2 the EDA was characterized as a form of support that allows member states to ensure the assessment and the relevance of projects in light of the 2018 Capability Development Plan, albeit that a review thereof has not yet been launched. Also noteworthy is that it is up to the member states to decide whether to participate in the projects and how they will communicate them to their citizens. In recent years, the EDA has put into operation instruments aimed at the creation of this planning identity, having drawn up a Capability Development Plan (EDA 2018) and having identified the possibilities for cooperation and state-of-the-art of capabilities via CARD, the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO. Established in 2017, the PESCO call was meant to go out annually, but by 2019 it was decided that the call would be posted biannually, with the next one published by 2023 (with the call from July 2022). Bátora (2009) states that the EDA depends on the social structures that are interposed and formed by conflicting institutionalities. In this regard, it observes that different types of logical structures are present, including (1) the Europeanization of markets by limiting access to external producers; (2) the liberalization of markets, increasing competition and lowering prices; (3) the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, which is established through relations with NATO; (4) the Europeanist, which aims at the commitment to joint and combined contributions between members; (5) pooled resources, which include concerted transnational initiatives; (6) sovereignty in search of self-sufficiency; (7) the intergovernmental system, dependent on the corresponding structures and mandates; (8) and the supranational, which also has a multi-stakeholder and transversal nature. The issue of defence collaboration touches on models that can be quite different and deserve attention. Since the ultimate objective is to build up

226 Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto defence assets for the benefit of the EU, a group of arrangements for joint development can be considered. This includes differentiated structures consisting of joint or combined developments, technology transfers, personnel exchanges, human resource training, dual-use goods and technologies, spin-offs and offset agreements. Regarding one of the interoperability and training programmes, in 2022 EDA announced that its Multinational Helicopter Training Centre will be built in Sintra, Portugal, to create ‘a fully renovated and permanently manned infrastructure with an international staff of 10, supervised by the MHTC Steering Committee’ (EDA 2022a). A 2017 report notes the possible barriers to the programme’s implementation, classifying the differing degrees of interest in members joining PESCO (Official Journal of the European Union 2017). Portugal is defined as one of the undecided members, while Italy and Spain are among those wishing to join and Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania are classified as reluctant. Among the different views on France and Germany is the debate on the degree of inclusion or ambition that PESCO should represent. A report published in January 2020 by the European Parliament’s security and defence subcommittee, with the support of external experts (European Parliament 2020), notes that the Lisbon Treaty allowed the EU to create the EDA and facilitated the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In addition, the EDF has been a significant step forward in channelling defence resources. However, several international crisis put military capability development back on the agenda. The EU’s maximum investment in the EDF in 2021 was set at €930.3 billion, with around 30% of the total dedicated to research and development and the remainder to capabilities. It should be noted that EU funding was increased by 10% overall, in consideration of the adoption of the EDF work programme for 2021. Blockmans and Crosson (2019, 2021) make a diagnosis that presents the defence’s opposing face of integration that has been qualified over the years. The authors claim that Germany pushed for a less ambitious programme than that sought by France (Blockmans and Crosson 2019). They also conclude that a more exclusive trend was found in the empirical results of the members’ participation in PESCO: ‘in the first wave of projects there were on average 7.6 participating states per project, the second wave averages about 3.9 participating states, while the third wave average is 3.6 participating states’ (Blockmans and Crosson 2021: 94). They claim that the PESCO programme would reverse this trend through its positive integration. At the EDA level, the Industry Synergies and Enablers Directorate offers the opportunity to get involved in joint development programmes to enable EU members to direct their national interests towards common European defence. Its units comprise the Industries Strategy and EU Policies (ISP), Critical Enablers (CRE), Single European Skies (SES) and Operations, Training and Exercises (OTE) (EDA 2022b). The CRE and OTE units are

Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO 227 critical boosters because they deal with the interoperability assets and the human connections within the capability’s development and market harmonization.

Portugal’s Involvement in PESCO Projects After a number of crises that followed the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the possibility of PESCO and the development of military capabilities lay dormant until 2017 (European Parliament 2020: 6). Following the implementation of the programme, the primary conditions of association were imputed and Portugal, as one of the member states, began to create the internal institutional conditions necessary to hit the milestones set out in its inclusion and leadership criteria. In November 2021, a public archive on ongoing projects presented some examples and divided them by type, namely training facilities, land formation systems, maritime, air systems, cyber, enabling joint multiple services and space. According to this document, Portugal is involved in developing joint multiple services, air and space projects (EU Defence 2021). One of the preconditions for membership of the CFSP includes the need for a dedicated budget in the field of defence based on the split between innovation and development in science and technology. This condition also applies to PESCO under the domestic guidelines of Portugal because among the objectives of the working subgroups assembled is the guarantee that there is a source of funding for each type of project. Furthermore, the subgroups may observe demands by the Portuguese armed forces and the Defence Technological Base (República Portuguesa 2022a). The two subgroups dealing with the requests for and control of the PESCO projects in Portugal, from the perspective of the armed forces and the defence industry, are added to a third subgroup that strategically plans which participation model should be adopted. While the first subgroup is focused on the interests of the armed forces in terms of capabilities, the second is focused on the relations relevant to developing the Technological and Industrial Defence Base. According to the Activity Report of the Directorate-General for National Defence Resources 2017 (República Portuguesa 2017), the constitution of the defence budget had the Operating Budget, the Military Programming Law (LPM), the Military Infrastructure Law (LIM), in addition to the projects characterized by the Central Administration’s Investment and Development Expenditure Programme, and the quotas referring to projects dedicated to NATO. Regarding NATO quotas, the report notes that ‘an amount of €17M has been set up to meet the expenses of the ongoing NATO projects, which did not occur as planned, with a low implementation rate of around 16.93%’. In this respect, it is observed that the issue of investment in defence and continuous development cycles remains uncertain. The LPM is Portugal’s main capacity financing instrument. The financing planning determines the objectives to align with the military priorities and

228 Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto the projects proposed under PESCO. It needs to be anticipated by the participation instruments, which should ensure the continuity of the projects. It is important to note that defence development projects have high volumes of investment and, in addition, are projected, in the long term, to reduce incentives for investment due to increased risks (Rogerson 1994; Lichtenberg 1995). The director-general of National Defence Resources is responsible for authorizing expenses and investments under the LPM and for the destination of resources to the programmes provided annually. This includes the spending group that fits into NATO’s objective programmes so that Portugal, as a contributing country and member of the alliance, has budgetary functions in both defence and security. Regarding the link between the CFSP and the capabilities of the common development agreements, they should also be available to the EU, which is a central requirement of the programme since the provision of national defence autonomy was an earlier condition of the ongoing integration process. The demand for strategic autonomy under the European integration programme has been a decisive factor in recent years, but this does not limit actions within the alliance or even in exogenous partnerships (Lippert et al. 2019). Exogenous constraints to national systems eventually reduce the risks associated with the collaborative development process. On the other hand, the consultation between members on which models to monitor has not been fully agreed. In Portugal, it is up to the Monitoring Group of Participation in PESCO projects to evaluate the progress and prospects for meeting the objectives envisaged. In 2017, Portugal was viewed as an undecided member in its capacity to support PESCO (Official Journal of the European Union 2017). The participation of the Portuguese representation in the European Parliament was also observed. As a public institution, idD Portugal Defence acts as an umbrella for seven companies that collectively manage the way in which public capital is invested. Since 2020, idD has been endowed with new functions, which facilitate mediation and assessment of projects that integrate research centres and companies, with the adoption of a unique and differentiated process. Since then, the defence industry has accounted for an increase in Portugal’s total exports from 2% to 2.5% in 2020. The Portuguese defence industry encompasses about 40 sectors of the economy, while productivity and wages are about double that of the regular market. idD Portugal Defence seems to be a key actor in boosting relations that transit within the various layers attached at different levels to the defence development commitments. idD Portugal Defence is the representative, mediator and catalyst on the definition of interests and acts as a public policy instrument. In terms of interoperability conditions, the efforts directed by idD Portugal Defence are concentrated on the market and the inter-ministerial frameworks. While the Portuguese companies are mostly small and medium-sized enterprises, Portugal has been addressing the PESCO projects and initiatives

Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO 229 in this regard based on its most relevant assets, such as its human resources, the flexibility and adaptability of its type of entrepreneurship, and the armed forces’ institutional culture of patterns of high quality for the required products (idD Portual Defence board member, personal communication, 27 June 2022). Portugal currently participates in 14 PESCO projects, and takes the lead in three of them, namely Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine Systems, the EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub, and Automated Modelling, Identification and Damage Assessment of Urban Terrain. Furthermore, the Digital Innovation Hub marks the promotion of digitization within the armed forces, private companies and local clusters. Three defence academies (the Aeronautical Web Academy, the Computer Aided Implantology Academy and the Academia do Arsenal that is geared at the development of training and education programmes in the field of engineering) have evolved as a result. Since 2021, with the launch of the EDF, approximately €7.8 billion has been earmarked for defence development projects, and PESCO projects are prioritized when applying for financing via the EU defence funding system. Project can be part-financed by the European Fund, which is available to the whole industry, recognizing the priority or competitive advantage between PESCO and non-PESCO projects. The parliamentary resistance of the Portuguese representation was noted by Ana Gomes, a member of the European Parliament, who announced a campaign for the exclusion of offsets from PESCO. She qualifies the system as potentially subject to corruption if included in the PESCO programme (CTO 2018). Offsets are compensation contracts that require parameters for purchases to be established, such as co-production, licensed production or technology transfer. Pirró e Longo and de Sousa Moreira (2013) state that training depends, for example, on the efficiency and effectiveness of contracts such as industrial compensation and (offsets) and technology transfers. Offset agreements are considered in a defence market generation where buyers need to offer some source of impact to the national opinion. That is why offsets do not seem to be a more vulnerable form of interference than other types of defence contracts. Blockmans and Crosson (2019) point out that the PESCO projects have made it possible to set the tone among members, citing the strengthening of cooperation in defence between Greece and Portugal following the signing of a Defence Cooperation Agreement between the states parties. The authors also note that Portugal is part of a group that does not include any of the ‘big four’, namely France, Germany, Italy and the UK, concentrating efforts among smaller EU members in developing autonomous systems for mine countermeasure vessels. Furthermore, Eilertsen (2020) shows that Portugal has increased its level of participation in such projects. One of Portugal’s PESCO projects is dedicated to developing the next generation of Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems, which are expected to be

230 Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto used by tactical army units in maritime and air domains, and will be dual-use (civil-military). One issue in particular touches on the project and the understanding of Portuguese foreign policy. It concerns the ethical and moral code for using drones in war and against military and non-military targets. The Portuguese statement within the Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Group of Experts designated under the UN aligns with that of the EU. It states that: ‘the determination and action according to proportionality, necessity or precaution cannot and should not be transferred to machines’ (Kowalski 2019). Despite the above statement, important criticisms were made to the Portuguese government during the years in which discussions took place at the UN because of resistance towards such regulations for the benefit of restrictions on use. Those elements are intrinsically connected to the way the Ukraine war is developing, both from the resistance capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces against Russian troops, the Turkish strategic positioning in the war (as one of the main suppliers of armed drones), and Russia’s use of armed drones against Ukraine’s military and civilians during the conflict. Furthermore, the implications of these developments for EU countries involved in supporting Ukraine’s military forces advance the prospects for boosting PESCO projects, investments and interests.

The NATO Codification System and the Portuguese Dimension The PESCO projects include member states that are part of NATO as well as those that are not. However, since the programme was launched, it has mostly involved NATO members, which has led to some criticism that PESCO projects are overlapping with those of NATO. Commitment to PESCO can be a strength factor for PESCO, as Eilertsen pointed out in his empirical study (2020), in its relationship with NATO through actors and cooperation, especially in achieving improvements in terms of interoperability. It is worth noting that the project with the most significant number of members was previously promoted under NATO and was successfully incorporated by PESCO to benefit the creation of rapid response centres in Europe. For Portugal to be a relevant actor in the PESCO scenario, it must comply with its determinants and align these requirements with the most pertinent frameworks of its foreign policy trajectory. Considering that Portuguese foreign policy is defined by three essential pillars – Europeanization, Atlanticism and Lusophony – it would be appropriate that the projects associated with PESCO should be in line with the interests expressed on those fronts. On the other hand, it is known that defence projects share particular components in coordinating national interests and the ability to extend commitments within the group. As Olson (1989) says: ‘the existence of a common interest need not provide any incentive for individual interest in the group interest’. Thus, individual actors who might not always benefit from the aggregation of the groups’

Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO 231 intentions would collaborate indistinctively on their personal choices. Olson (ibid.: 62) also states that there are two ways of avoiding the problems associated with collective action: one, through the constitution of small interest groups, and two through the identification of selective incentives that can aggregate individual interests. The common trait of development projects in defence is directed around the combination of national interests, so interoperability is the phenomenon behind it (Møller 2019). The diagnostic here is based on the interoperability aspects, understood as the ability to combine efforts around the possibility of acting together and transferring material, information and human resources among the parties. Møller (ibid.) observes that NATO membership and non-membership among the Nordic states in recent years would negatively impact defence cooperation. However, once participating in the NATO capabilities standardization programmes, the Nordic states benefited particularly in the areas of communications, command and control. Considering the three policy guidance frameworks described above, Portuguese foreign policy is fulfilled by programmes that directly impact the alignment of the international regimes associated with it. In this case, interoperability is the locus of the transaction costs among members of the EU and NATO. Thus, the elements concerning the rigging of interdependence structures cannot rule out the consequences of the programmes that strengthen the matter in its genesis. Accordingly, the NATO Codification System has been upheld by the Portuguese National Central Bureau. It is one of the bases of any interoperability project for the defence cooperative ambience. It works alongside idD Portugal Defence, which represents the interface between the armed forces, the ministry of defence and the industries associated with the Portuguese Defence Industrial Base with the object of supporting technology and development initiatives, which includes the European assistance programmes under the European Peace Facility, to the NATO programmes. In addition, idD concentrates the call for partners submitted to the EDF for the current period, from 2021 to 2027.3 Programmes affecting interoperability capabilities are those that create assets for the logistics systems that contribute to the mechanism between joint and combined means, doctrines and operations. Creating a standard chain of knowledge also mobilizes the level of trust between members and non-members since exogenous actors complement and expand NATO’s operations and means language. Bulgaria, Italy and Spain have also developed their own NATO Master Catalogue of References for Logistics tools under a government programme. Moreover, Spain created a Sistema de Catalogación de la Defensa (defence cataloguing system), including Belgium, Poland and Colombia. The other tools in use are commercial off-the-shelf products, while the Portuguese, Italian and Spanish are employing government off-the-shelf programmes (NATO 2022a).

232 Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto In recent years essential investments have been made to address data manipulation problems among members of the NATO Master Catalogue of References for Logistics. The NATO Allied Committee 135 (AC/135) represents the group work established to connect the national industrial bases and the logistics and means demand system in an efficient and unique system base. A sponsorship Agreement Procedure comes under the remit of the AC/ 135, and it permits NATO non-member states to engage in the NATO Catalogue adhering to the local standardization, first, of its demands and buying in the system (TIER 1), second (TIER 2), by the permission of its offering products in the same base. The NATO programme on normalizing the members’ industrial base spreads through its collaborative ties and amplifies its spreading norms. As of 2021, 35 nations are sponsored by AC/135, 19 at Tier 2 and 16 at Tier 1, but this is changing due to Sweden and Finland’s request to become full members of NATO. The NATO data exchange programme from the 1960s was called NADEX. It was changed to XML (Extensible Markup Language) to guarantee a modern and adaptable way to simplify costs and processes under the catalogue system (NATO 2021). This process, which was to be concluded in mid2021 but was extended, counts on an expressive contribution from Portugal, which developed a bespoke national system for the Catalogue and a testing tool for the whole system to guarantee compliance efficiency. This system has been used by other nations by request, turning processes into national institutions with some standard requirements to be established. In this regard, Portugal took the lead in reviewing the data, processes and systems, and was one of the nations that developed the transition method and systems serving as a benchmark (Colonel Hermínio Santos, personal communication, 20 May 2022). It is important to note that the ability to mirror NATO’s interests in this matter by members can be seen through the shelter of countries such as Brazil as a member of the NATO Catalogue, which in 2022 was in the TIER 2 group, being able to buy and offer goods in the system (Medeiros and de Sousa Moreira 2018). This inclusion resulted in close relations with Portugal, through a memorandum of understanding between the countries that predicted the eventual use of the Portuguese system (which was not consolidated by Brazil), but also the leverage of Portuguese-speaking countries, thus creating a protocolization of the industrial and defence bases within the NATO system.

Avoiding Transactional Costs and Making the Hub Work Transaction cost theories point to the possible high costs embedded in interinstitutional relations, which significantly affect institutional behaviour and organization theory (North 1990; Robins 1987; Coase 1998; Williamson 2005). In defence cooperation, avoiding higher transactional costs may be conditioned by the willingness to simplify processes demanded and to work

Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO 233 within interdependencies. Furthermore, prices are the dominant source of information concerning the availability of resources, and its components may be critically interfered by the technological piece in defence development (Rindfleisch 2020). While Coase’s original theory (1937) does not observe the technology component as a determinant, the interpretations of his subsequent works already incorporate a founding concept on transaction costs characterized by broader social costs and those affecting the price’s economic relations. Rindfleisch (2020), when analysing the evolution of the concept of transaction costs and its most recent trends, notes that the theory has transitioned between nature (Coase 1937), attributes (Williamson 2005) and technology (Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006). Regarding Benkler’s recent contributions, observed here through his work with Nissenbaum (ibid. 2006) on the virtuous cycle of cooperative and peer production technology, examines how relationships are constituted in their macro institutional aspects in transaction agreements and other transaction costs impacted by varied and human social intersections. While Portugal is involved in coordinating a PESCO project for a Cyber and Innovation Academy under the auspices of the EU in the form of a hub (PESCO 2022a), with Spain and Romania as partners, the country was not involved in the critical interoperability programme among national Computer Emergency Readiness Teams, called CERTs (EU CRRT 2021). The EU has had a CERT since 2012 in support of its institutions. Nonetheless, its identity is focused on the multiplication of good practices and reducing the capacity of damage to the whole system. The PESCO projects provide a productive relationship between innovation systems and joint production, reflecting efforts to avoid higher transaction costs. Thus, not only are the supply chain and products on the shelf contemplated, but the production system requires a critical number of adequations between pairs in the development process. We can say that, as mutual or shared development programmes are intensified, the positive impact on operational interoperability programmes is increased. Similarly, all parts of the product and collateral development process demand registration on national platforms under the applied system and are in progress for decades of NATO cataloguing. The logistical improvement of the production chain through the NATO Catalogue demonstrates strong relationships of trust among partners constituted members and non-members belonging to the logistics system and the correct answers regarding classification codes. At the same time, there are recognized improvements in the Defence National Industrial Bases. Thus, even if the transaction costs are recognized as broad since the interdependence system of the defence chains affects the EU, the costs can be decreased given the standardization relationships of the various layers, from development to production and continuous supply through the Catalogue. Møller’s (2019) study on Nordic trilateral defence cooperation also

234 Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto recognizes that cost-efficiency policy is dominant in the face of security policy itself, which can also be compared to the relationship between NATO and EU programmes such as PESCO. The invitation to Canada, Norway and the United States to take part in the military mobility PESCO project (PESCO 2022b), which includes Portugal, is consolidated after the decision of the Council of the EU on the (exceptional) conditions for third countries to participate in the PESCO programme (Official Journal of the European Union 2020). The issue of military mobility appears to be key to the process of progressive interoperability from development projects. It is included among the actions envisaged by the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, promoted by the EEAS (2022). With strategic ambitions outlined for 2030, the Strategic Compass foresees partnerships with countries in Latin America, Africa and the Balkans, planned to promote dialogues and cooperation on interoperability (Nunes 2021). In this regard, contributing to strengthening PESCO and the CSDP is the primary purpose expressed in the decision. The military mobility project in PESCO may guarantee the support for the human resources transborder transferences, which also determines the interoperability prospects between NATO and EU member states.

Conclusion From the definition of capabilities as being characterized by the entire value chain that integrates aspects of different categories such as doctrine, goods and people, the understanding of the EU adheres to the broader sense that comes from NATO (European Parliament 2020). There are 20 PESCO principles (PESCO 2022c), and the ninth provides for a binding commitment, like the others, to harmonize requirements and capacities. In addition, the tenth commitment requires the focus on optimizing resources in search of increased effectiveness, which we should consider as an operational and strategic condition. The European defence initiative, a collaborative network of national associations on defence and security studies, is tasked with encouraging youth involvement in defence and security matters. An article published by a group of young people led by Federica Paolucci (Eurodefense Portugal 2022) states that, for them, one of the advantages of PESCO is that ‘all the military advantages developed within PESCO are available for other circumstances, for instance, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and United Nations (UN)’. The article states that one of the disadvantages of the PESCO programmes is ‘the lack of criteria coordination in national defence apparatuses’, which leads us to consider the negative impact it may still imply in understanding the fundamental dynamics it should govern. Highlighting Portugal’s role as part of limited participation and integration reveals a general pessimism on

Portuguese Participation in the EU PESCO and NATO 235 how integration and development would prevail compared to the concurrence of projects. Fostering Atlantic security is marked by a new chapter on private companies and combined scientific efforts. Regarding NATO, the Madrid summit meeting in June 2021 points to the revision of the NATO strategy on sharpening innovation and defence development, with Portugal leading two of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) affiliated elements. The two Portuguese DIANA sites, the accelerator at Arsenal do Alfeite and the test centre at the Navy’s Operational and Experimentation Centre, are poised to allow Portugal to foster defence-based entrepreneurship in emerging and disruptive technologies (NATO 2022b). In recent years, the Atlantic relations had upheld the Portuguese strategic position bridging relations in a smoother way than possibly its other counterparts in both the NATO and EU systems. Cyber defence and space are two drivers that those types of investments have boosted. idD Defence Portugal considers that during a three-year period, everything changed (idD board member, personal communication, 27 June 2022). The Portuguese MPL is revised every four years and will include space as one of its domains for the next edition. The revision is expected to be in force in 2023, and it will be characterized as ‘the multi-annual instrument that defines the investments to be made in the armed forces, with a horizon of 2034, ensuring the pursuit of national interests and contributing to the positioning of Portugal as a producer of international security’ (República Portuguesa 2022b). Three innovative features in the MPL of 2019 are noteworthy: preferably, Portuguese companies will work on developing military capabilities, the introduction of a strand for cyber defence, and another strand for research and development. That is why transaction costs can be reduced if projects are coordinated so they do not compete with one another and can translate the incentives created by the standardization and interoperability systems that cross the actors. In the experience of a military alliance such as NATO, ongoing programmes that rightly touch on interoperability and information exchange in an environment progressively dominated by the cyber and artificial intelligence dimension, it is essential that efforts can drive integration efficiency, not increased competition resulting from projects. The development of a strategy to enhance the various national fronts and their Industrial Defence Bases is aligned with NATO standard-building efforts (in the light of the NCS), which ultimately improves results. Projects driven by communications and interoperability assets are more likely to prosper. One problem that can be decisive for both integration and interoperability of the programmes within NATO and in Portugal’s cooperative axes is transparency, as one of the issues presented by Transparency International Defence and Security’s Strategy 2021–2023 (Transparency International 2021), the access to information should be the norm, while secrecy is the exception. According to the EDA, it is still up to the states to inform citizens about the programmes under development.

236 Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto Cyber defence, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, space, disruptive technologies, big data, simulation and training are the main areas on which Portugal has been focusing. These initiatives mark a multi-level, multistakeholder, international, and inter-ministerial approach which may work for the approximation of interests between NATO and the EU. In this regard, idD Portugal Defence has been representing the vector of the relationship between NATO and PESCO, through the development of the interoperability conditioning of the defence development programme. Therefore, Portugal may be an essential actor in this area based on the possibility of expanding its interests in interoperability that can reach out to actors behind the PESCO processes. Although limited by the prospects for a unified defence mechanism among the EU members, Portuguese ties to the Atlantic nations such as the United States or Brazil and the Portuguesespeaking countries in Africa (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Macau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe) are components that should not be forgotten. Finally, the ambience in which Portugal is prevailing is characterized by its experience in paving the way in terms of advancing the EU maritime security sector and frameworks of cooperation, cybersecurity and submarine communication cables of expressive impact on the region’s security system.

Notes 1 For more information about the collapse of the Australia-France deal, see The Conversation (2021). 2 Interview conducted by email with the authors. Available upon request. 3 About idD Portugal Defence, see iDD (2022).

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Index

Page numbers in italics and bold indicate Figures and Tables, respectively. adjustment programme 121, 124 agnostics 173, 175, 177–178 AICEP Portugal Global 192 Albuquerque, Maria Luís 121, 192, 200 Aliança Democrática (Democratic Alliance) 137 Amado, Luís 188, 190 Amaral, Diogo Freitas do 12 Angola 193–194 anti-austerity movements: Constitutional Court and 25; digital media, use of 54–55; Geração à Rasca 56, 58; hashtag activism and 55; Que se Lixe a Troika 53, 56–59; in Southern Europe 63; see also post-materialistic movements anti-communist offensive 16 anti-political establishment parties (APEPs) 138 anti-racism movements 53, 61, 63 anti-system parties 157 Antola, Esko 210 Armed Forces Assembly 14 Armed Forces Movement (MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas) 8, 10–14 assemblies, presidents and, relationship between 91 austerity programme 103, 191 austerity season 143 Azores, Autonomous Region of 97, 137, 174, 189 bailout: aftermath of 137; austerity measures compliance 56, 99, 124, 215–216; coalition government and

119; Coelho on 191; economic consequences of 140; Gasper and 192; history of 120–121; implementation agreement 191; as necessary 191; Passos Coelho on necessity of 191; third request for 25, 132 balance of threat theory 224 bandwagoning 4, 190–195, 201 Barre, Raymond 42 Barre Plan 42 Barroso, Durão 213 Barroso, José Manuel 68 Basta (Enough) coalition 158–159 Belgium 231 believers without religion 173, 175, 177–178 betrayed democracy 166 ‘Beyond Lisbon: Making the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership Work’ 213 Biden, Joe 199 bilateral diplomacy 196 #BlackLivesMatter 53, 61 Black Lives Matter 63 Bloco de Esquerda (BE – Left Bloc) 53, 57, 62, 131, 145, 150n18, 195 Bretton Woods system 42 Brexit 5, 38, 186, 207, 223 Bulgaria 231 cabinet appointments 115–118 Caetano, Marcelo 10, 175 Carnation Revolution 7, 90–91, 173 Carneiro, Francisco Sá 12, 21, 98–99 Catholic Church 16, 26 Catholic hegemony 176 Catholics/Catholic self-identification: downward trend 176; in Lisbon

242 Index Metropolitan Area 176; percentage of 174 Cavaco Silva, Aníbal 206; abortion referendum and 96; Autonomous Region of the Azores veto justification 97; Coelho and 99; Coelho appointment 101; divergences between prime minister and 97; election victory 95; inauguration speech 98; new agenda 98; popularity rating 100; ‘power of the word’, use of 96; presidential passivity of 99; presidential powers, interpretation of 106; public satisfaction 100; strategic cooperation with government 106; vetoes by 99–100 Centeno, Mário 119, 198 Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular (CDS-PP – Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party) 12, 56, 99, 119, 129, 135–137, 145, 149, 156 Chavéz, Hugo 202n7 Chega (Enough): adhering to populism of protest 163; anti-system rhetoric 168; assimilationist attitude of 163–164, 169; attitudes toward democracy 165–166; ballot box successes 60–61, 134, 161–162; Constitutional Court authorization 158–159; emergence of 129; first electoral test 158–159; immigrants, views of 164; initial structure 158; media scrutiny of 160–161; National Convention 159; new member screening process 161; parliamentary agreement 137; parliamentary disagreements 143; parliament shake up 135–136; performance standards 159–160; personalist nature of 167; political culture of 162–167; as populist party 167–168; rejecting affirmative action policies 169; rejecting ethnic-nationalistic identity 160; rise of 156–162; slogan 165; structural evolution of 167; voting patterns 145; see also Ventura, André Cidadania e Democracia Cristã (Citizenship and Christian Democracy Party) 158 civil-military relations 19–21 climate justice actions 59–60, 63 Climaximo 60 coalition crisis 120–121

coalition governments 117–118 Coligação Democrátical Unitária (CDU – Unitary Democratic Coalition) 142 Colombia 231 colonial wars 10 Comando Operacional do Continente (Operational Command of the Continent) 17 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 226, 227, 228 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 222 Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) 188–189, 194, 200, 211 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 138, 150n6 competitiveness: crawling peg exchange rate regime and 43, 48; decline in 32; deterioration of 48, 50; improvement in 35; increasing 41; loss of 44; negative impact on 3; reforms to improve 46–47 competitive structures theory 131 Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERTs) 233 Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses – Intersindical Nacional (General Confederation of Portuguese Workers – National Intersyndical) 17 connective action networks 54 Constituent Assembly: electoral results for 15; limiting power of 14; MFA trying to control 14–15 Constitutional Court 21, 25, 99, 103–105, 158–161, 191 Constitution of 1911 182n4 Constitution of 1976: 1982 revisions 22–23, 93, 112; 1989 revisions 23, 24; democratic consolidation and 22–23; legacy of 25; parliamentary approval of 18; presidential mandates and 105; redefining civil-military relations 19–21; revolutionary legacies, reversal of 22; as semi-presidential 111–112; social and economic rights protections 24–25 contract parliamentarism 136–137 contraption 2 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) 222 Costa, António 101–104, 136, 161, 195, 197, 200–201 Costa, Francisco Seixas da 193

Index Cotonou Agreement 213–214 Council of the Revolution (CR – Conselho da Revolução) 13–14, 19 COVID-19 pandemic: consequences of 49; economic impact of 33; EU Council’s response to 216; impacting Portuguese foreign policy 199; inter-party cooperation 104; pandemic-related protests 53–54; Recovery and Resilience Mechanism 216; social movement challenges due to 53, 61, 63; sovereign debt crisis as result of 62 Crato, Nuno 120 crawling peg regime 41, 43 Cristas, Assunção 135, 150n5 cultural and religious recomposition 4 cultural hybridism 179 Cunha, A. 214 currency snake 42 Cutileiro, José 219n7 Dalton’s Party Polarisation Index 139, 140 decolonization 8, 11, 13 defence cataloguing systems 231 defence collaborations 225–226 Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) 235 Delors, Jacques 42 Delors Report 42 democracy, as dictatorship of the elites 166 democratic consolidation 22–23 democratization: during the 1970s 7–8; anti-capitalist overtones 11–12; dimensions of 26; free elections 13–15; limitations in studies of 8; political parties formations 12; positive legacies of 9; third wave of 7–9, 18; transition by rupture 8, 10–13; transition period 23–24 dictatorships in Portugal 7 digital media: online activism 54; in social movements 57–58; use of, in anti-austerity movements 54–55 digital natives 63 disinflation policy/process 33, 44, 45–46, 49 diversity: correlating negatively with religion 181–182; fragilization effect of 179–180; in Lisbon Metropolitan Area 175–178; modernization intertwined with 178, 181;

243

non-denominational evangelical churches, growth of 176–177; in Portugal 173–175; religious denominations, by percentage 173–174; religious minorities 174–175; in the secular age 178–181; secularization, rise in 175; transnational migration and 178–179 Dos Santos, Francisco Rodrigues 135 Durão Barroso, José Manuel 211, 212 Duverger, Maurice 90, 91 Eanes, António Ramalho 20–21, 23, 91 Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 214 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 33, 35–36, 38, 43–45 economic development 74, 75–76, 82, 164, 214 economic diplomacy 189–190, 193–194, 199 economic growth 40–41, 44, 46–47, 96, 120, 143, 194, 214–215 economic internationalization 199 economic openness 36, 37 economic size of a country 208 electoral erosion 135 electoral polarization 138, 139 electoral volatility 132–134, 133 emancipation of religion 174–175 emigrant remittances 34–35 Equatorial Guinea 189 escudo: depreciation of 32–33, 41, 44, 48; entering the ERM 44; purpose of pegging the 43–44; stable within the ERM 48; value of 43, 48 Estado Novo (New State) 91 EU-African Union Summit 216 EU-Africa Summit 213, 219n10 EU-Brazil Summit 213 EU-Cape Verde Partnership 213–214 European Central Bank (ECB) 35, 45, 113, 119–121, 191, 218 European Climate Law 217 European Commission 42, 46, 211, 215 European Council 41–42, 198, 200, 207, 217, 218–219n3 European Defence Agency (EDA) 222, 225–227 European Defence Fund (EDF) 225, 226 European defence initiative 234 European Economic Community (EEC) 17; economic openness and 36;

244 Index integration into 24; membership opportunities 41; single market/ monetary union programmes 41–42; trade imbalances in 49; trading restrictions within 48 European Economic Recovery Plan 46 European External Action Service (EEAS) 222 Europeanization: definition of 71; EU politicization vs 84n2; evaluation criteria 73; of national public spheres 70–72; principles of 73–74; strengths of 68 European Monetary System 42, 43–44 European Parliament: Chega and 158–159; constrained powers of state in 206; Gomes, Ana 229; Portuguese representation in 207–208, 219n4, 228; Rangel, Paulo 193; security and defence subcommittee 226; Social Summit and 216–217 European Pillars of Social Rights 216–217 European public sphere: European Union project and 70; media narratives in 73; national media’s role in 69; transnational communication community in 70 European Security and Defence Policy 223 European single market: EEC’s adoption of 41; estimated wealth effect of 42; trade impacts from 48 European sovereign debt crisis 25 European transfers 35 European Union (EU): as an awakened giant 68; challenges faced by 5; climate change global governance 217; convergence in 38–39, 39; COVID Digital Certificate 217; economic crisis response 96–97; economic data 209; economic diplomacy with 194; German hegemony within 197–198; identifying small states 218; indicators pertaining to a country’s size 208; integration process 206–210; member demographics 209; member expansion 206; membership consequences 3; member territory 209; permanent defence and security programmes 222; PESCO’s defence integrations with 223–225; politicization of 4; politicization vs Europeanization

84n2; Porto Social Summit 216–217; Portuguese economy’s relationship with 39–40; Portuguese foreign policy within 200; public opinion toward 84; replacing EEC 42–43; small states bargaining negotiations 208–210; small states maximizing power in 207; state sovereignty in 210; United Kingdom exit from 5, 38, 186, 207, 223; see also European Union Council European Union Council: constrained influence of small states 208; humanitarian emergencies 216; integration process, influence on 211–212; Portugal holding presidency of 206; Portuguese presidencies of 211–217; Recovery and Resilience Mechanism 216 European Union Military Staff 222 eurozone debt crisis: Europeanization process during 68; executive transformations triggered during 118; framing dimension 80; impacting Portuguese foreign policy 199; impact of 2; increasing politicization of EU affairs 83; media attention 76–78; media narratives after onset of 73; ministerial recruitment 123; national media, role of 74–75; partisanship before, during and after 118; politicization of the EU and 4; Portugal emerging from 188; Portuguese party system as resilient to 129 exchange rate-based disinflation policies 33 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 42, 44 exchange rate policies 32–33, 45 external deficit 41, 189–190 Extinction Rebellion Portugal 60 extra-constitutional power 92 feminist movements 61–62 Ferreira-Pereira, Laura 213, 217 financial assistance programmes 32 Fishman, Robert 9 fixed size of a country 208 Floyd, George 53, 61 fragilization effect 179–180 France 196–197 Freire, André 215 Fridays for Future movement 53, 60, 65n8

Index Gaspar, Vitor 119, 121, 191–192 Georgieva, Kristalina 198 Geração à Rasca 56, 58 geringonça (contraption) years 2, 129, 136, 142, 144–145, 149, 195 German hegemony 4, 186–187, 197–198 Germany: Costa’s working relations with 200–201; Portuguese bandwagoning with 190–195; Portuguese soft balancing of 195–198 global climate strikes 53 global financial and economic crisis 46 globalization 178–179 Global Week for Future 60 Gomes, Ana 161, 229 Gonçalves, Vasco 15 government performance deficit 124 Great Recession 1, 72, 83, 84, 136 Greve Climática Estudantil (Student Climate Strike) 60 gross domestic product (GDP): downward trend 96; exports as percentage of 36, 38; external accounts as percentage of 35; imports as percentage of 37; per capita 33–34, 34; per hour worked 34 Grupo dos Nove (Group of Nine) 16 Guedes, Marques 122 Guinea-Bissau 214 Guterres, António 198 Habita (Association for the Right ot Housing and the City) 59 hard power vs soft power 210–211 hashtag activism 53, 55, 61–63 hegemony: of Catholicism 176; of Germany 4, 186–187, 197–198; of secular principles 180 Hermenegildo, Reinaldo 212 heterogeneity: between EU member states 207; growth of 178, 179; levels of, in society 182n1; religious 4 ‘hot summer’ of 1975 16–18 idD Portugal Defence 228–229, 231, 235, 236 Identité et démocratie (Identity and Democracy) 159 IGC Group of Jurists 219n8 ‘implicit clause’ 91 implicit democratic coalition 26 India-EU Summit 216, 219n14 industrial disputes 40

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Industry Synergies and Enablers Directorate 226–227 influencer-activism 63, 65n19 information and communication technologies (ITCs) 53 Iniciativa Liberal (IL – Liberal Initiative) 60, 129, 134, 135–136, 145, 156 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 34, 41, 215 international relations 210–211 Italy 231 Jalali, C. 136 Jehovah’s Witnesses 174 judicial activism 99 Katar Moreira, Joacine 160 labour reform 120 labour unrest 40 Leite, Manuela Ferreira 97 Le Pen, Marine 159 Leyen, Ursula von der 217 liberalization process 10 Lima, António Pires de 121 Linz, Juan 7 Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) 173, 175–178, 182n7 Lisbon Treaty 213, 214–215, 226 LIVRE (FREE) 60, 129, 134, 135 Lopes, Pedro Santana 101 Loures campaign 157–158 Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio 189 Maastricht Treaty 223 Maçães, Bruno 193 Macedo, Paulo 120 Machete, Rui 122, 193–194 Macron, Emmanuel 196–197, 198 Madrid Summit 235 Maduro, Poiares 122 majority principle 165–166 Manifesto Research Project (MARPOR) 140, 141, 150n14 material constitution theory 90 Maxwell, Kenneth 18 media see national media media narratives, centripetal nature of 73, 81, 82–84 Med Nine 201 Med Seven 201 Mercosul (Southern Common Market) 194

246 Index Merkel, Angela 192 #MeToo movement 61 MFA see Armed Forces Movement (MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas) MFA-Political Parties’ Pact 18, 19 Michel, Charles 217 military, institutional framework for 19 military coup, as non-hierarchical 10 military mobility 234 Military Programming Law (LPM) 227–228 ministerial recruitment: core executives 113–115; core ministries and 116; government composition and 113, 114; non-partisan ministers 112–113; parties, pivotal role of 113, 124; party leaderships retaining control of 115; patterns of 110–111; politicizing recruitment system 110; see also non-partisan ministers, partisan ministers Mithá Ribeiro, Gabriel 160 modern democracy 110 modernization: diversity intertwined with 178; religious fragmentation caused by 181; religious growth and, tensions with 172 modernization theory 172 Molis, Arunas 210 monetary and exchange policies 41 Monteiro, António 219n10 Moscovici, Pierre 197 Moury, Catherine 215 Movimento Alternativa Socialista (MAS – Alternative Socialist Movement) 56–57 Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal (Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal) 160–161 Movimento Democrático Português (MDP – Portuguese Democratic Movement) 14–15 Movimento Zero (Zero Movement) 61 Multinational Helicopter Training Centre 226 Muslims 173, 174 NADEX 232 NATA data exchange programme 232 nationalization process 11–13, 18, 24, 40 national media: attention to European economic articles 78; Consequences

frame 81; economic news reported in 77–79; European economic media narratives in 77; European public sphere, role in 70–72; during eurozone debt crisis 74–75; increasing attention given to EU 82–83; as interface between citizens and political actors 72; media attention 75, 77; narrative framing by 76, 77, 79–81, 81, 82; Responsibility frame 81, 83; role of 74; tone used in 75–76, 77, 78–79, 79, 83 national public spheres, impact of Europeanization on 70–72 see also European public sphere NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 17, 187, 211, 224, 235 NATO Allied Committee 135 232 NATO Codification System (NCS) 225, 230–232 NATO Master Catalogue of References for Logistics 232 new populist right-wing party see Chega (Enough) non-believers 177 non-partisan ministers: in coalition governments 117; critical ministers 118–122; economy and labour mega-ministry 120; eurozone debt crisis and 118–119; finance minister position 119; hybrid recruitment strategy 122–123; ministerial recruitment of 112–113; percentage of 116–117; pockets of 115; politically close to parties 122–123, 123, 125; recruitment of 118; as unique to Portugal 124; see also ministerial recruitment, partisan ministers non-state actors: definition of 210; power of 210 Nordic trilateral defence cooperation 233–234 North Atlantic Treaty Organization see NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NOVA University 157 Nye, Joseph 211 Obama, Barack 199 Olsen, J. P. 70–71 Olson, M. 230–231 online activism 54

Index Pacheco de Amorim, Diogo 160–161 Panke, Diana 208 Paolucci, Federica 234 Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Communist Party of Portugal) 12, 14, 53, 62, 130, 145, 195 Partido da Democracia Cristã (Christian Democracy Party) 157 Partido da Nova Democracia (New Democracy Party) 157 Partido Ecologista Os Verdes (PEV – Green Party) 53, 145 Partido Nacional Renovado (PNR – National Renewal Party) 157 Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) 14, 15 Partido Popular Monárquico (PPM – People’s Monarchist Party) 137 Partido Renovador Democrático (Democratic Renewal Party) 92 Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) 12, 56, 130–131, 145 Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) 2, 12, 14–15, 52, 60–62, 95, 103 partisan ministers: emerging from party leadership 115; policy expertise of 121–122; recruitment of 124; see also ministerial recruitment, non-partisan ministers party dictatorship 167 party government model 110 party polarization: analysing 138–139; changes in 141; consequences of 142–145; Dalton’s Party Polarisation Index 139, 140; difficulty measuring 138; electoral polarization 138, 139; formula 150n10, 150n12; Manifesto Research Project (MARPOR) 140, 141, 150n14; party position and 140; RILE index 141, 150n13; voting behaviour 144, 150n17; voting patterns 144, 146–148 Passos Coelho, Pedro 99, 101, 119, 157–158, 191 Pequito, C. 1 perceptual size of a country 208 Pereira, Álvaro Santos 120 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 5; avoiding transactional costs 232–234; background 222; Cyber and Innovation Academy 233; defence collaborations 225–226; defence integrations within the EU

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223–225; disadvantages of 234–235; effectiveness of 223–227; European Defence Fund and 225; military mobility and 234; National Implementation Plan 222; NATO Codification System overlapping with projects from 230; offsets 229; Portugal’s involvement in 227–230; Portuguese programme 222–223 Pessoas-Animais-Natureza (PAN – People-Animals-Nature) 134, 135 PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece) 98, 215, 219n13 Pinto, A. C. 1 Pires, Francisco Lucas 94 Poland 231 polarization, definition of 137–138 political congruency 93 political mores 105 political size of a country 208 Portas, Paulo 99, 119, 121, 137, 192–195 Portland (communications agency) 211 Porto Social Summit 216–217 Portugal: Catholicism reinforced in 173–174; Christianity arriving in 173; consolidation of democracy 206; diversity in 173–175; economic relations with Angola 193–194; foreign intervention 17; identified as EU small state 218; new religious identities in 173–175; population 206; as privileged interlocutor 211; shifting toward institutional normalization 18–19; soft power 210 Portuguese democracy: fiftieth anniversary 1; institutional legacies 1–2 Portuguese elections: as international headlines 129; turnout rates 133 Portuguese exceptionalism 129 Portuguese external accounts 35–36, 35 Portuguese foreign policy: bandwagoning Germany 190–195; bilateral diplomacy 196; changes within the EU 200; Coelho government 191–195; Costa governments 195–198; COVID-19 pandemic impacting 199; eurozone debt crisis impacting 199; Germany as central to 4; policy guidance 230–231; Sócrates government 188–190; soft balancing Germany 195–198; subject to party politics 195; traditional priorities of 188–189

248 Index Portuguese government: 2008 crisis response 97–98; Cavaco Silva standing by 99; core ministries across 113–115; electoral system 131; ministerial recruitment (See ministerial recruitment); party system (See Portuguese party system); pegging the escudo 43–44; politicizing recruitment system 110; presidential intervention in 104–105; process of forming 112; requesting international financial assistance 3, 32; social rights agenda 99 Portuguese MPL 235 Portuguese National Center Bureau 231 Portuguese parliament 134–136 Portuguese party system: disappearance of a party 137; effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) 134–135; electoral arena 132–134; as example of party government 112; governmental arena 136–137; historical background 130–132; institutional framework for 112; as institutionalized 131; left/right placement 150n8, 150n11; left-wing parties, cooperation by 136; majoritarian change in 112; new party successes 134; Parliamentary arena 134–136; polarization of (See party polarization); resilient to eurozone debt crisis 129; two-party format 132; vote share 133; voting patterns 144–145, 146–148 Portuguese Religious Freedom Act of 2001 174 Portuguese secularism 4 Portuguese society: following global social campaigns 64; as polarized 16; structural racism, denial of 61 post-materialistic agenda 158 post-materialistic movements 52, 55, 57, 62 ‘power of public word’ 25 preference size of a country 208 presidential party 92 presidential passivity 99 presidential veto 94–95 presidents: appointments and dismissal powers 95; assemblies and, relationship between 91; Cavaco Silva, Aníbal 95–101; extra-constitutional power and 92; government’s responsibility to 93; horizontal

accountability of 94; legislative supervision, role in 94–95; moderating function of 94; party leaders’ relationship with 93; powers and competences requirements 93; presidential powers, interpretation of 102, 106, 112; Rebelo de Sousa, Marcelo 101–105; reserve powers 94 prime minister, as central locus of political leadership 92 Protestants/Evangelicals 174, 177 provisional governments 10, 12–13, 15, 16–17 PSD-CDS-Partido Popular Monárquico (PPM – People’s Monarchist Party) coaltion 157 PSD/CDS-PP coalition 59, 64n4 Quaresma, Ricardo 160 Que se Lixe a Troika (Screw the Troika) 53, 56–59 racism 52, 53, 55, 61, 160 racism against ethnic minorities 61 Rangel, Paulo 158–159 real wage growth 40 Rebelo de Sousa, Marcelo 101–105 Recovery and Resilience Mechanism 216 religion: agnostics 173, 175, 177–178; believers without religion 173; Catholics/Catholic self-identification 174, 176; denominations, by percentage 173–174; de-privatization of 4; fragmentation caused by modernization 181; Jehovah’s Witnesses 174; Muslims 173, 174; non-believers 177; Protestants/ Evangelicals 174, 177; from the public space 181; religious diversity 173–175; religious minorities 173–175; restricted discussions of 180; self-identified as religious 180–181; social significance of 180 Renascença radio station 16 ‘revolution tamed’ 18 RILE index 140, 141, 150n13 Rio, Rui 158 Salazar, António de Oliveira 10, 156, 175 Salazarism 10 Salvini, Matteo 159 Sampaio, Jorge 95, 101 Santos Silva, Augusto 195–196, 199 Sartori, Giovanni 90

Index Schattschneider, E. E. 110 Schäuble, Wolfgang 191–192, 197 Schmitter, Philippe 9, 11 Scholtz, Olaf 201 second Constitutional Agreement platform 18, 20 secularization: definition of 182n1 rise in 175; sub-theses 182n6; see also diversity secularization theory 172–173 self-activism 63, 65n19 self-communications 58 semi-democracy 22 semi-presidentialism 2, 19–20, 25, 91, 93 Silva, Jorge Moreira da 122 Single European Act 41, 71 Soares, Mário 12, 15, 21, 93, 96 Social Commitment of Porto 216–217 Socialist Party see Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) social movements: Black Lives Matter 53, 61; downturn of, in post-austerity period 59–60; feminist movements 61–62; hashtag activism and 55, 61–63; mass self-communications 58; MeToo 61; online media, use of 57; purpose of 54; recruitment networks 57; younger generation and 53, 56, 63; youth mobilization 63; see also anti-austerity movements, post-materialistic movements Social Summit 216–217 Socrates, José 212 Sócrates, José 188 Sócrates government 188–190 soft balancing 4–5, 195–198, 200, 201 soft power 210–211, 218, 219n6 Software Power 30 211 Sousa, Marcelo Rebelo de 161 Sousa, Teresa de 193

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Southern Common Market 194 sovereign debt crisis 98, 106, 215 sovereignty size of a country 208 Spain 196, 231 Spínola, António de 11, 12–13 Stability and Growth Pact 56, 215, 218 Stepan, Alfred 7 Stop despejos (Stop Evictions) 59 structural racism see racism systemic racism see racism Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems 229–230 Teixeira, Severiano 212 third wave of democratization 7–9, 18 see also democratization Thunberg, Greta 53, 59, 63 trade deficit 34 transaction cost theories 232 transatlantic defence relations 224 transitional justice 11 Treaty of Lisbon 213, 214–215, 226 Treaty of Rome 41, 224–225 troika programme 46–48, 50, 99 Trump, Donald 199 Tunkrova, Lucie 206–207 União Geral de Trabalhadores (General Workers’ Union) 17 University of Cork 157 Ventura, André 3, 134, 156, 157–162, 167 see also Chega (Enough) wage explosion 40 weight of exports 36 weight of imports 36 Werner, Pierre 42 Werner Report 42 Western European Union 219n7