Populist Political Parties in East-Central Europe 9788021078079, 9788021061057

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Aneta Pinková Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, and the Department of Political Science, FSS MU, where she received her Ph.D. Her research focuses on interest intermediation, the role of business groups and employer organizations in the political system of the Czech Republic, and political corruption. “It is a well-constructed and theoretically grounded work on populism that is comprehensive in its regional coverage and offers insights into the cases in question and shows a high degree of internal consistency. The book will serve as a standard reference guide for scholars, advanced students and observers of the region.“ Kevin Deegan-Krause

International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity

ISBN 978-80-210-6105-7

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE

Vlastimil Havlík Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University (FSS MU), and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, FSS MU. His teaching and research activities include Czech politics, Europeanization and Scandinavian politics, especially the area of party systems research. He is the managing editor of the Czech Journal of Political Science.

VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK ANETA PINKOVÁ ET AL.

Recent decades have seen a pronounced rise in political parties which may be identified as populist. Despite the frequency with which one encounters “populism” as a term in academic literature, the media and non-specialist discussions, its meaning remains somewhat unclear. Based on a theoretical framework describing the two basic types of populist political parties, the book analyses the history, electoral performance, organisational structure and the position in the political system of populist political parties in ten East-Central European EU member states.

VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK ANETA PINKOVÁ ET AL.

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES

IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity

M S V. 49

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE

VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK, ANETA PINKOVÁ ET AL.

MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BRNO 2012

The publication of the book has been financially supported by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Czech Republic office

Scientific Board of Masaryk University: prof. PhDr. Ladislav Rabušic, CSc. Mgr. Iva Zlatušková prof. RNDr. Zuzana Došlá, DSc. Ing. Radmila Droběnová, Ph.D. Mgr. Michaela Hanousková doc. PhDr. Jana Chamonikolasová, Ph.D. doc. JUDr. Josef Kotásek, Ph.D. Mgr. et Mgr. Oldřich Krpec, Ph.D. doc. PhDr. Růžena Lukášová, CSc. prof. PhDr. Petr Macek, CSc. PhDr. Alena Mizerová doc. RNDr. Lubomír Popelínský, Ph.D. Mgr. David Povolný Mgr. Kateřina Sedláčková, Ph.D. prof. MUDr. Anna Vašků, CSc. prof. PhDr. Marie Vítková, CSc. doc. Mgr. Martin Zvonař, Ph.D.

Pre-publishing review: Kevin Deegan-Krause

© 2012 Vlastimil Havlík, Aneta Pinková et al. © 2012 Masarykova univerzita ISBN 978-80-210-6105-7 (brožovaná vazba) ISBN 978-80-210-7807-9 (online : pdf)

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 9 V H, A P 2. SEEKING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW TO DEFINE AND IDENTIFY POPULIST PARTIES? ............... 17 2.1. Definition of Populism – Minimalist Definition .............................. 19 2.2. e People and the Elites as a Homogeneous Group....................... 21 2.3. Antagonistic Relations between the People and the Elites ............. 22 2.4. Defence of the People as Sovereign ..................................................... 24 2.5. Typology and Types of Populism ....................................................... 25 2.6. Conclusion............................................................................................... 33 I B 3. BALTIC COUNTRIES.............................................................................. 39 3.1. Politics of Populism in the Baltic States ............................................. 39 3.2. e Evolution of the Party System ...................................................... 42 3.3. Case Selection ......................................................................................... 46 3.4. Party History........................................................................................... 48 3.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style ................................ 52 3.6. Ideology.................................................................................................... 54 3.7. Electoral Support and Social Base ....................................................... 59 3.8. Position in the Political System............................................................ 62 3.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................... 66

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

B C 4. BULGARIA ................................................................................................ 73 4.1. Politics of Populism in Bulgaria........................................................... 73 4.2. e Evolution of the Party System ...................................................... 74 4.3. Case Selection ......................................................................................... 76 4.4. Party History........................................................................................... 79 4.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style ................................ 82 4.6. Ideology.................................................................................................... 86 4.7. Electoral Support and Social Base ....................................................... 90 4.8. Position in the Political System ........................................................... 92 4.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................... 93 V H 5. THE CZECH REPUBLIC......................................................................... 97 5.1. e Politics of Populism in the Czech Republic................................ 97 5.2. e Evolution of the Party System ...................................................... 98 5.3. Case Selection ....................................................................................... 101 5.4. Party History......................................................................................... 103 5.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style .............................. 106 5.6. Ideology ................................................................................................. 112 5.7. Electoral Support and Social Base .....................................................118 5.8. Position in the Political System ........................................................ 124 5.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 128 V H 6. HUNGARY............................................................................................... 135 6.1. Politics of Populism in Hungary........................................................ 135 6.2. e Evolution of the Party System ................................................... 136 6.3. Case Selection ....................................................................................... 138 6.4. Party History......................................................................................... 141 6.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style .............................. 144 6.6. Ideology.................................................................................................. 145 6.7. Electoral Support and Social Base ..................................................... 151

CONTENTS

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6.8. Position in the Political System ........................................................ 154 6.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 156 K W 7. POLAND................................................................................................... 163 7.1. Politics of Populism in Poland............................................................ 163 7.2. e Evolution of the Party System .................................................... 166 7.3. Case Selection........................................................................................ 169 7.4. Party History......................................................................................... 172 7.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style .............................. 175 7.6. Ideology ................................................................................................. 180 7.7. Electoral Support and Social Base...................................................... 184 7.8. Position in the Political System.......................................................... 188 7.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 192 M S 8. ROMANIA ............................................................................................... 199 8.1. e Politics of Populism in Romania................................................ 199 8.2. e Evolution of the Party System .................................................... 201 8.3. Case Selection ....................................................................................... 207 8.4. Party History......................................................................................... 208 8.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style .............................. 210 8.6. Ideology ................................................................................................ 212 8.7. Electoral Support and Social Base ..................................................... 215 8.8. Position in the Political System ......................................................... 218 8.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 222 P S 9. SLOVAKIA ............................................................................................... 227 9.1. e Politics of Populism in Slovakia ................................................. 227 9.2. e Evolution of the Party System .................................................... 228 9.3. Case Selection........................................................................................ 230 9.4. Party History......................................................................................... 234

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9.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style .............................. 238 9.6. Ideology.................................................................................................. 241 9.7. Electoral Support and Social Base ..................................................... 248 9.8. Position in the Political System.......................................................... 252 9.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 254 A K 10. SLOVENIA ............................................................................................. 259 10.1. e Politics of Populism in Slovenia ............................................... 259 10.2. e Evolution of the Party System .................................................. 260 10.3. Case Selection ..................................................................................... 263 10.4. Party History....................................................................................... 267 10.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style ............................ 269 10.6. Ideology................................................................................................ 272 10.7. Electoral Support and Social Base ................................................... 275 10.8. Position in the Political System........................................................ 278 10.9. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 280 V H, A P 11. PARTY POPULISM IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE ...................... 285 11.1. Party history ........................................................................................ 287 11.2. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style ............................ 289 11.3. Ideology ............................................................................................... 291 11.4. Electoral Support and Social Base .................................................. 293 11.5. Position in the Political System........................................................ 296 11.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 298 SUMMARY................................................................................................... 301 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS................................................................. 303 INDEX ........................................................................................................... 305

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INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION Populism is a term which has become established in the public consciousness. It has become a part of the rhetoric (as a form of attack) of political players and has also found a firm place in academic debates. is is despite the fact, or perhaps because, that a generally accepted and heuristically seamless concept of populism does not exist. e term populism somehow carries an automatic negative connotation. Party leaders are accused of populism, proposed solutions to political problems are attacked by their opponents as populist and, as such, summarily rejected. Populism in the public as well as journalistic discourse has in many cases become synonymous – as we describe in the theoretical chapter of this book – with demagoguery or rhetorical statements full of empty promises. Yet there is consensus among professionals dealing with party politics that populism is alive and well in many party systems and does not necessarily have negative connotations. In the academic environment, populism is (mostly) a neutral category, or a defining feature of an attempt to capture certain specifics of some political parties or party politics. e problem is that even in an academic setting politicians and political parties with different historical backgrounds, voter bases or – and this is probably the most troubling area in the contemporary debate about populism – different electoral appeal and political programmes are labelled as populist. e populist epithet has been applied to the French Poujadists, the National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Scandinavian Progress Parties, Hungary’s Fidesz, and the Slovak National Party and to South American politicians in the Juan Peron mould. Likewise, new conjugate forms can be found such as agrarian populism, national populism (also populistic nationalism), extreme right-wing populism or social populism. e theoretical chapter of this book will attempt to systemise the current academic debate about populism and, by following recent articles from scholars such as Ben Stanley, Cas Mudde, Kevin

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Deegan-Krause and Peter Učeň, we hope to offer a clearly defined theoretical basis of the perception of populism. Regarding populism and especially populist rhetoric perceived primarily as emphasising antagonism between a corrupt political establishment (not only governmental political parties) and the “betrayed” people, we distinguish between parties which can be identified as exclusively populist and non-exclusively populist political parties. We unequivocally reject the understanding of populism as demagoguery or policies of empty promises (from discussion with one of the authors of the case studies emerges a certain irony over such an understanding of the term populism as “doubled-wage populism”). In the section of the book consisting of case studies, we focus exclusively on the region of post-communist East-Central Europe, and only on current (mid 2012) European Union member states. First, we believe that the countries in the region, despite their mutual differences such as the level of economic development and different cultures have in common something that could be called a “legacy of communism” – experience with a communist regime and resurgent political pluralism, including newly configured party systems lacking long-lasting links between civil society and its party representation. At the same time the membership of the European Union these countries (with respect to admission) points to a degree of democratic consolidation and political processes. A tricky issue in preparing the concept of this book was whether to include the Baltic countries. On the one hand, of course, all three states meet the requirement of postcommunist members of the European Union. On the other hand, their inclusion in the East-Central Europe region is problematic for geographical and historical reasons. e Baltic countries were therefore finally – also with regard to the fact that they are small states – dealt with in one joint chapter. e main aim of the book is, therefore, through case studies to present an in-depth description of the appearance and activities of political parties and also to compare their differences and similarities. In other words, is there something that unites the populist political parties which would emerge from a study of the specifics of the studied region? e analyses yielded some interesting results, and also incentives for further research. e aim of the book is not only to

INTRODUCTION

11

find answers to the question formulated but also to provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of parties in the region corresponding to our concept of populism. Populism is oen seen as an effective tool for attracting protest votes, which leads to its frequent use by new political parties and formations, or non-parliamentary actors trying to gain relevance in the party system. is book focuses only – except in rare cases justified in the individual chapters – on parties that during their tenure managed to gain parliamentary representation and can therefore assume at least some degree of relevance. e timeframe of the study is set on one side by the foundation of democratic party systems and on the other the year 2011. is limit is not strictly complied with – in justified cases, authors briefly reflect the developments during 2012. e authors of the case studies focus on a wide range of aspects of the political parties, including their electoral performance, program identity, internal functioning and involvement in the political system. All authors of case studies in this book followed the same theoretical framework set out in the theoretical chapter. Each of them used their expertise and knowledge of the particular country to select the parties analysed in their chapter. Should no populist parties be indentified in the political system, the authors were given the option to analyse the possible reasons of the low significance of populism in the party system. In the first case study Ilze Balcere analyses the situation in the Baltic countries, which usually remain on the margins of research interest into populism in post-communist countries. e author identifies four potential populist parties, Lithuanian Order and Justice (TT) and the Labour Party (DP), Latvian New Era (JL), and Estonian Res Publica (RP). With the exception of RP, all the named parties have their leader in a characteristic key role, which not only affects the organisational operation of the party, but oen its successes (or not) in elections. e electoral success of the party, other than the popularity of the leader, is affected by the intensity of the protest vote in elections. As in the majority of other countries, in the Baltic States, populist parties have repeatedly entered into government coalitions, oen as the strongest party of government. Government engagement has led to

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

the abandonment of original populist rhetoric (JL) or to a significant fall in electoral polling (RP, DP). Blagovesta Cholova deals with populist parties in Bulgaria. As in most of the other countries, there is no agreement between Bulgarian authors about which parties can be described as populist. is chapter analyses in detail three parties, the National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV), Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) and Political Party Attack (Ataka). e first two are understood as exclusively populist parties and the last of them as a nationalist party with a strong populist element. Cholova’s analysis confirms the generally accepted assumption that while populist parties can be very effective in mobilizing floating voters, their success is oen followed by voter disappointment when the parties come to power, and is then followed by their marginalization. Vlastimil Havlík in a case study about the Czech Republic deals with the Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ). Czech Republicans tend to be labelled as a radical right-wing political party mainly because of its nationalism bordering on xenophobia and racism. Nevertheless, a significant part of their identity was formed by the populist appeal of accusing the “governmental garniture” (including in their understanding also President Václav Havel) of “stealing the revolution” or “stealing national property”. e republican appeal found its voice in the 1990s, at a time of ongoing economic transformation which quite clearly divided society into “winners” and “losers”. A completely different case is that of Public Affairs (VV), a political party which – as it turned out later – was infiltrated by rich businessmen who wanted to connect their businesses to public contracts and managed in the 2010 election to benefit from a growing dissatisfaction with the political situation, and not only enter the parliament, but subsequently to become part of the centre-right government. Aer a series of corruption scandals and deepening internal disputes VV broke up and le the government. Vratislav Havlík, in the chapter on Hungary, identifies three populist parties, the ecologically oriented Politics Can Be Different (LMP), the nationalistic Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) and the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). e oldest of these parties, MIÉP, managed to enter Parliament in one parliamentary term, but

INTRODUCTION

13

by 2002 had lost its relevance. e radical Jobbik was ideologically quite close to MIÉP and both parties even ran together for office in 2006. As in many other countries, expressions of populism in Hungary are oen closely connected with nationalism. An exception is the le-wing, environmentally-oriented LMP, which has only been on the Hungarian political scene since 2009 and is still establishing its position in the party system. A long tradition of populism in Poland is reflected in the modern Polish party system. Populist elements can be found in many contemporary Polish parties. Kinga Wojtas, author of the Polish case study identifies only one party, Self-Defence, which can be classified as an exclusively populist party and focuses on it in her analysis. A specific feature of Self-Defence, in the context of other parties analysed in this book, is a combination of defending the interests of relatively narrowly defined socio-economic groups (de facto Polish rural areas) with a strong anti-establishment appeal and ideological profile. Also in the case of Romania, only one party really met the criteria for deeper analysis, the Greater Romania Party (PRM). Markéta Smrčková in this chapter describes the organisational and ideological evolution of the party, which managed to remain on the Romanian political scene from 1991 almost to the present day. e party, in spite of its short tenure in government in the early nineties, was able to maintain its protest character and populist rhetoric, and in 2000 achieved its greatest success so far, which brought it to a strengthened position on the party scene and gave it a relatively large blackmail potential. PRM was not able to utilise this credit from the opposition parties and the 2004 elections brought failure, which led to a loss of relevance and, in 2008, parliamentary representation. Peter Spáč in the chapter on populist parties in the Slovak Republic analysed a total of six subjects – e People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS), Party of Civic Understanding (SOP), Direction-Social Democracy (SMER), Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO). Populist parties have long been a part of the Slovak political spectrum. e author of this chapter speaks of two waves of populist parties. e first was epitomized

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by HZDS and ZRS in the early nineties, while the second, later wave, benefiting from high polarisation of Slovak politics at the turn of the millennium, brought the rise of SOP, SMER and ANO. e analysed entities constitute a rather heterogeneous group, both in terms of internal organisation, ideology and partly even electorate. In terms of the success of the party and its position in the party system, we find common features especially for ZRS, SOP and ANO, which aer a successful entry into the parliamentary scene became part of the national government. However, in subsequent elections they were unable to defend their parliamentary party statuses. ey differ from HZDS and SMER, which over time were able to maintain a position of relevance, and even became the strongest of Slovak political parties. Alenka Krašovec, in her chapter, analysed the situation in Slovenia, a country which is not normally focussed on in research on populism. Unlike most post-communist parties, populism does not present a significant force in the political arena. We do not find any exclusively populist parties and only one party according to the author meets the definition of being a non-exclusively populist party. is is the Slovenian National Party (SNS), a right-wing nationalist party with strong populist elements. We would like to acknowledge the role of at least some of the people, who made the publication of this edited volume possible. First of all, the editors would like to thank all the case studies’ authors for their input and participation in the project. Special thanks go to Kevin Deegan-Krause for the comments and insights included in the pre-publication review of this book. We would also like to thank everybody who participated in the discussions during the conference Populist Political Parties in East-Central Europe (Brno, 4th Dec 2012), which helped us clarify some of the issues discussed here. is edited volume was prepared and the research conducted as part of the project Contemporary Challenges of Democracy in East-Central Europe (GAP408/11/0709). e publication of this volume was funded by Konrad Adenauer Stiung. We would also like to thank Mark Alexander, Martina Alexanderová, Todd Hammond, Štěpán Kaňa and

INTRODUCTION

15

Robin Smith for their assistance with the English version of the book, Ondřej Mocek for technical support, and to our publisher, Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, which accepted the task of publishing of this book. Last but not least, the book would not have been published without invaluable and inspirational support from our colleagues from the International Institute of Political Science, namely Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček.

SEEKING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW TO DEFINE AND IDENTIFY POPULIST PARTIES?

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2. SEEKING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW TO DEFINE AND IDENTIFY POPULIST PARTIES? VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK, ANETA PINKOVÁ Recent decades have seen a pronounced rise in political parties which may be identified as populist. Scholars have reacted with an increased number of studies devoted to the phenomena of party populism and other expressions of populism. Special attention has been paid to political parties identified as radical right-wing populist parties and nationalist populist parties. (Former) Communist political parties have also oen been included under the populist umbrella (see, e.g., Deegan-Krause 2007, March 2008). A relatively novel phenomenon, and one whose “breakthrough” has come particularly in post-communist countries, consists of political parties without a clear platform, who have built their electoral success almost entirely as advocates of ordinary citizens and critics of existing elites. Examples of these parties, which we refer to in what follows as exclusively populist parties, include SMER in Slovakia (in the first years of its existence), Self-Defence in Poland, the Bulgarian National Movement for Stability and Progress, as well as Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria and, in the Czech Republic, Public Affairs. Despite the frequency with which one encounters “populism” as a term in academic literature, the media and non-academic discussions, its meaning remains somewhat unclear. Outside of scholarly discussion, populism oen seems to be viewed as interchangeable with demagoguery or opportunism (unfairly from the point of view of how political scientists conceive the term). Although populism may be and oen is connected with demagoguery, the two phenomena are quite different. Populism may, but need not be, accompanied by demagoguery, just as demagoguery may, but need not be, accompanied by populist argumentation. Unfortunately, the way the two terms are equated in ordinary discussion also oen makes its way

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into academic debates, to the extent that some researchers (see e.g., Sikk 2009) doubt whether there is any sense in continuing to use the term at all. Although this position may be too radical, it is true that within the academic environment, the concept of populism preserves, to cite Paul Taggart (2000: 1), “an awkward conceptual slipperiness”. Although it is far from unusual for an agreed definition to be lacking in the social sciences (think, for example of the debate over how to define euroscepticism or interest groups), when it comes to populism, the situation is more complicated than usual (see below). e confusion between populism and demagoguery has contributed to the fact that negative connotations are oen ascribed to populism, or populism may be viewed quite directly as a negative phenomenon. is normative aspect then negatively impacts the otherwise legitimate discussion of the relationship between populism and democracy (see, e.g., Panizza 2005) and is reflected in the interpretation and use of the term “populist political party”. e negative connotations associated with the term therefore present a challenge which must be faced in any attempt at a precise conceptualization of populism (see Deegan-Krause 2007). e utility of the term populism for analytical purposes is also mitigated by the variety of party entities which have been labelled populist and the frequency with which populist parties are equated with nationalist and extreme right-wing parties (see, e.g., Norris 2005). is last problem increases the relevance of populism as a topic of research into radicalism and extremism, where the specific conceptualization of populism as a “basic concept associated with nationalism” (Laryš 2012: 141) blurs even further the already indistinct terms “populism” and “populist political party”. To quote Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 4), to equate or automatically associate the term populism with radical right-wing populism “…is detrimental to our understanding of specific mislabelled parties (for example, the Northern League or the Swiss Lega dei Ticinesi) and populism itself ”. Under this view, the situation is not aided by the creation of various types of populism (exclusive/close to populism, nationalist populism, new populism, xenophobic populism and populist nationalism – see de Lange 2008), which are oen remotely related to or even inconsistent with prevailing notions of populism in the literature (see below).

SEEKING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW TO DEFINE AND IDENTIFY POPULIST PARTIES?

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Also confusing is the fact that the same phenomenon or type of political entity may be described in scholarly discourse with the use of terms or classification schemes which are oen at variance with one another (but whose meaning is similar). e most frequently occurring instances include anti-political establishment parties, anti-party parties, anti-mainstream parties, protest parties, discontent parties, unorthodox parties and anti-system parties. An example would be Italy’s Northern League, which has been labelled a radical right-wing populist party, as well as an anti-political establishment party (see Rooduijn et al. 2012, Zaslove 2008, Abedi 2003). is monograph will not offer yet another complex definition of populism and has no ambition to contribute to the complex debate concerning its character. is may be found in the work of Ionescu and Gellner (1969), Margaret Canovan (1981), Wiles (1969), Mény and Surel (2002), Taggart (2000), Panizza (2005) and many others. e theme of this book is not populism as such but rather populist political parties in a particular region. Questions to do with the nature and definition of populism per se will therefore be touched on only to the extent necessary to explain our conception of a populist party.

2.1. Definition of Populism – Minimalist Definition One of the key topics in the debate on the character of populism is the issue of whether it should be considered an ideology or thin-centred ideology, or a communication strategy. For more on this debate, see e.g. Laclau (2005), Abst Rumments (2007) and Stanley (2011). e portrayal of populism as a full-blown ideology comes primarily from research into radical movements and socioeconomic doctrines defending the interests of peasants and small farmers in the United States and Russia at the end of the 19th century (see Canovan 1981, Miller et al. 1995). It is thus of only marginal relevance for research into current-day populist parties and need not be discussed further. More common in current political science discussions is the vision of populism not as a full-blown classical ideology, but rather as a socalled thin-centred ideology, based upon the work of Freeden (1998).

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For examples, see Mudde (2004), Canovan (2002) and Stanley (2011). In contrast to a full-blown ideology, a thin-centred ideology does not present a comprehensive vision of society, but rather focuses on certain specific aspects of social life, particularly the structure of political power and the form taken by political processes. e third approach to populism sees it not as an ideology, but as a political practice or form of political communication (see Školkay 2000, Fiala 1998, Učeň 2007, Laclau 2005). However intriguing the debate over the nature of populism may be at the philosophical level, in seeking a definition of populist parties, attempting to differentiate between populism as a thin-centred ideology and a political practice or strategy, the distinction essentially loses its meaning. e identity and ideology of a party or political movement are formulated and articulated in the party’s materials and declarations made by its leaders. It thus becomes difficult to classify a party by any means other than analysing the party’s official documents, the rhetoric of its leaders and its relationship to other political actors. From this standpoint, there is no sense in differentiating between populism as a thin-centred ideology and populism as a political practice or communications strategy, because in practice, these two cannot be reliably distinguished. us the group of actors whose statements, platforms and behaviour systematically include populist elements should be labelled populist parties. It is therefore crucial to determine what elements may rightly be considered populist and the extent to which their use entitles us to label a party as populist. e answer to the first question lies in what Panizza (2005: 1) has called the analytical core of populism “around which there is a significant degree of academic consensus…”. is so-called analytical core of populism consists of three fundamental, tightly connected characteristics which we will look at in more detail in what follows. ese characteristics are: 1) the people and the elites seen as a homogeneous entity, 2) a stress on the antagonistic nature of the relations between the two, and 3) a view of the people as a morally pure sovereign (see Mudde 2004, Hawkins et al. 2012, Stanley 2011).

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2.2. The People and the Elites as a Homogeneous Group e key term in populism is “the people”, conceived as a monolithic or homogeneous group with collective interests. To present the people as a monolithic entity is to refuse to divide society into groups as one might do, for instance, with social status or religious faith. e people (citizens, oen the “common people”) are differentiated from the governing elites (in the broad sense of the term) with “particular interests” sabotaging the interests and democratic rights of the “people” (Laycock 2005: 173). e essence of populism thus becomes the discursive construction of enemies (Laclau 2005: 39), which allows the notion to be maintained of a people whose interests are being advanced. Taggart, by contrast, asserts that populists create the notion of “the people” by using the term “heartland”, referring to an idealised image of people living in an idealised region of that name. Taggart does not use the term “people” in defining populism because of its ambiguity (Taggart 2002: 67–68). Taggart’s conception does, though, heavily blur the distinction between populism and nationalism, leading us, in so doing, to one of the problems in the perception of populism as a political ideology: “the people” are a focal point for many other political ideologies, including fascism, liberalism and more (Laclau 2005: 32).1 Taggart’s conception thus stands outside the mainstream of research into populism focusing more on the people/elite dichotomy (see Ionescu, Gellner 1969, Canovan 1981, Mény, Surel 2000, Mudde 2004, Panizza 2005). Although from the standpoint of political philosophy, defining “the people” is crucial to the definition of populism perceived as an ideology, from an empirical point of view suited to research on political actors, it may not be central. Political parties may, for example, intentionally avoid explicitly defining who “the people” are (in terms of a particular social status or race), so that they might attract the widest possible range of potential voters. 1 Taggart also adds a negative view of representative politics which usurps the power of the people as an element of populism. Other authors, however, do not see a rejection of representative democracy as a defining characteristic of populist parties (see, e.g., Stanley 2008: 104).

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2.3. Antagonistic Relations between the People and the Elites One of the key characteristics of the populist appeal, which thus becomes its emphasis, is a necessarily antagonistic relationship between the people and the political elites. Populists maintain that citizens are not represented by the elites voted into power. ese are seen as defending their own interests from a station distant from the common people. A starting point to explore the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite is given by the term anti-political-establishment party (APE), introduced by the Austrian political scientist Andreas Schedler. He says it is typical for APE that they “accuse established parties of forming an exclusionary cartel, unresponsive and unaccountable, and they portray public officials as a homogeneous class of lazy, incompetent, self-enriching and power-driven villains” (Schedler 1996: 291). As this definition makes clear – and as Schedler himself maintains – APE parties share with populism an outrage against the establishment, elites and power blocks. But Schedler sees this similarity as strictly superficial. In his view, the critique offered by populist entities is primarily aimed against economic as opposed to political elites (anti-capitalism, anti-oligarchism and anti-imperialism). Schedler’s conception of APE is also close to political populism as understood by Margaret Canovan (Schedler 1996: 292–293, see Canovan 1981) and Cas Mudde (2000).2 e core of Schedler’s APE argument is symbolised by a triangle whose vertices represent the political class, citizens and the APE itself. APE is presented as the saviour of the citizenry, victims of the ill will of the political elites. In the eyes of the APE, the chief social conflict (or cleavage) is that between the governing and the governed, between voters and the political parties or the silent majority and the (alienated) elites that make up the power cartel. APEs are also character2 It is no surprise that Schedler attempts to set his definition of APE apart from populist party definitions and definitions of populism as such. But as is clear from our foregoing overview, authors who pay systematic attention to populism do not accord economic protest the weight that Schedler does.

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ised by aggressive or mocking rhetoric directed at the political elites (Schedler 1996: 294–295). It is noteworthy that the anti-establishment appeal of populist parties typically does not target the regime as such but “merely” the existing establishment, which is alleged to have “betrayed” voters and eviscerated political trust for a long period of time. Populist political parties thus present themselves as defenders of “clean politics”, as fighters taking on corruption, who are able to renew the “distorted” relationship between the elites and the people. Populist political parties may therefore not be seen as interchangeable with anti-system political parties, who direct their critique against the “democratic” regime and seek its transformation. Giovanni Sartori’s classic study of political parties, in its narrower definition of anti-system parties, emphasised ideologies foreign to a particular regime (typically communism or fascism, sometimes nazism), which were to serve as a guide or tool for changing the system as a whole. For anti-system parties in the strict sense, a “mere” change of government would therefore not suffice (Sartori 1976; see, e.g., Fiala, Strmiska 1998, Kubát 2007).3 With populist political parties, there is no ideology hostile to a democratic regime. To the contrary, there is oen an ideological vacuum which is filled by the anti-establishment appeal. However, the democratic basis of the regime is not called into question. At the same time, the anti-establishment appeal is defined more broadly than is the case with “classic” (loyal) parliamentary opposition parties who are “only” against the government. In anti-establishment rhetoric, there is no difference between the government and the opposition. e parties identify themselves as being against the political establishment as a whole, with populist parties seeing themselves as the only real opposition. is ties into Schedler’s classification of the opposition. is partially builds upon Juan Jose Linz’s concept of dividing the opposition into loyal, disloyal and semi-loyal (Schedler 3 Giovanni Capoccia has largely followed Sartori and speaks of two levels of analysis of anti-systemicity – relational and ideological. Capoccia sees as anti-system only those political parties located at a significant distance from other political parties in the ideological spectrum which, at the same time, have an ideological base which is incompatible with democracy (Capoccia 2002: 23–24).

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1996: 303). Populist political parties critically differentiate themselves from all established political parties, but do not oppose the form of the regime as such. In this respect, the critique they offer is more moderate than that put forward by anti-system parties. Populist political parties are thus actually a part of the loyal opposition, if by that we mean the opposition which does not challenge the democratic basis of the regime. However, they see other parties in the opposition as subject to criticism because, like the governmental parties, they are part of the “corrupt” political establishment.

2.4. Defence of the People as Sovereign Populist parties present themselves as the sole trustworthy defender of the interests of the people, viewed as the morally incorrupt bearers of sovereignty. e established political parties are seen as having stolen their power from the hands of the people and misused it for their own purposes. ey are seen as corrupt. e declared aim of populists is therefore to return power “to the people”, oen by implementing elements of direct democracy. is defence of direct democracy is not, however, the result of an attempt by populist parties to change the regime as such. Nor is it necessarily the result of a critique of the system of representative democracy. e goal is to provide the means of weakening the hold on power of the “corrupt and incompetent elites”. e problem does not lie in institutions or mechanisms of the system as such, but rather in the behaviour of the established elites who have been misusing the system of representative democracy for their own benefit. Ben Stanley (2008: 104–105) notes in this regard that the emphasis on direct democracy is not an essential attribute of populism in and of itself, but rather the importance accorded by populists to the concept of sovereignty (of the people), or the general will, which is elevated above the preferences of the elite. e general will is connected to the concepts of majoritarianism and authenticity. Direct democracy is oen taken as a tool for determining the will of the majority, linked to the authenticity and credibility of the will of the people. Populists present themselves as “sounding boards” which resonate with the “reason of the ordinary person” (Stanley 2008: 105).

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e populist goal, as stated by Peter Učeň is neither to “educate the people” nor to shape voter opinion. Rather populists reflect the opinions of the people and claim to defend the interests of the “common people” (see, e.g., Canovan 1984, Canovan 2004, de Raadt et al. 2004).

2.5. Typology and Types of Populism Populism has become part of the electoral strategy and identity of many different political parties. is brings us to the issue of populism’s importance for individual party actors. Work in this area has been done by researchers including Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton (2009), Peter Učeň (2007) and Andrej Školkay (2000), along with explorations of typologies for populism and populist parties (e.g., Canovan 1981, Mudde 2000, de Raadt et al. 2004). Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2009) point to differences depending upon whether the term populism is used as an identity or as a typical appeal used by the political party in question. ey incline toward the second model and are explicitly critical of attempts at a binary classification of political parties (populist X non-populist). eir preferred conception allows every political party to use populist appeals. ey are differentiated only in terms of their intensity. In contemplating a framework to determine the “level of populism” in political parties, they supplement the four characteristics defined by Stanley (2008) and contrast them with the non-populist appeal represented by the heterogeneity of “the people” (i.e., that parties only protect the interest of particular groups rather than the people as a homogeneous entity), the heterogeneity of “the elite” (vs. elites as a monolithic block), distance from “the people” (not an uncritical perception of the “common people”) and acceptance of elite status (understanding the irreplaceability of the elites in the decision making process as opposed to undifferentiated criticism of the establishment), support for institution-building and maintenance (as opposed to direct democracy) and a positive relationship to compromise and collaboration (as opposed to the populist view of democracy in crisis and the futility of compromising or cooperation with the current elites).

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In a case study devoted to Slovakia, the authors subsequently coded all relevant political parties for the presence of each of the six elements of a populist appeal (High = 1, Medium = 0.5, Low = 0). ey calculated the appropriate values for each political party in each election period and derived an average designating the level of populism for the party in question. ey then examined the values in greater detail for “durability” and the dynamic of the populist appeal (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009). Deegan-Krause and Haughton thus effectively rejected the existence of a dichotomy between populist and non-populist parties, characterizing populism (in terms of its individual elements) as something present to varying degrees in the identity of all political parties. A similar approach was taken in a study of six European political parties conducted by Jasper de Raadt et al. (2004), which prepared a “preliminary typology of populist parties”. ey refused to label the political parties under observation (the Free Will Party in Austria, the People’s Party in Switzerland, the Republicans in Germany, the Flemish Bloc, the French National Front and the Pim Fortuyn List) as populist without further differentiation, creating several categories for the presence and character of individual populist elements (references to the people, direct democracy, anti-establishment appeal) in their platforms. Similarly, the gradualist approach is used by Seán Hanley and Allan Sikk in their study of so-called anti-establishment reform parties in East-Central Europe (Hanley, Sikk 2011). In agreement with Deegan-Krause and Haughton, and partially with the study of de Raadt et al., is the view of Cas Mudde, who sees populism as a “thin-centered ideology easy to combine with other ideologies, whether they be thin or full ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism” (Mudde 2004: 544). In a similar vein, in later work in conjunction with Hawkins and Riding, Mudde maintains that “populism can be associated with a number of different ideologies. It is certainly more likely to be associated with radical versions of a given ideology, and it predictably tacks to the le in developing countries or to the right in the advanced industrial democracies. But populism is to some extent an empty box waiting to be filled with programmatic substance” (Hawkins et al. 2012). As part of a chronological overview of the post-war occurrence of

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various populist parties, in one of his early texts Mudde mentions the Italian Front of the Common Man, the French Poujadists, the Danish Progress Party, the New Le movement in the late 1960s, Green parties, the French National Front, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia!, and the German Party of Democratic Socialism. Mudde concludes by saying (2004: 551): “at least since the early 1990s populism has become a regular feature of politics in western democracies”, while noting the use of populism by mainstream, even governing parties (including among populists the former leader of the British Labour Party Tony Blair and Steve Stevaert of the Flemish Socialists). A similar direction is taken by Paul Taggart, who states that populism “has been a tool of progressives, of reactionaries, of democrats, of autocrats, of the le and of the right” (Taggart 2000: 3), adding that an “empty heart”, i.e., an absence of key values, is typical for populism. is differentiates populism from other ideologies focused on one or another value such as equality, liberty or social justice. In Taggart’s view, populism thus becomes a natural complement to other ideologies. Unlike the “grand ideologies” of liberalism, socialism and conservatism, which oen come modified by other adjectives (e.g., social liberalism or radical feminism), it plays the role of a complement (Taggart 2000: 4). Andrej Školkay takes a somewhat different stance on the issue of the intensity of populism. Školkay stresses the need to differentiate between use of the term populism as a property (in adjectival form) and its use as a characteristic (noun). It makes a difference, for example, if we choose to use the term le-wing populism as opposed to the populist le. In the first case, we have a populist party with le-wing rhetoric. In the second case, we have a le-wing party making use of populist rhetoric, that is to say, populism is not an essential component in the party’s identity. Školkay does not develop this implicitly dichotomous classification scheme for political parties further, but rather focuses primarily on factors contributing to the appearance of populism in post-communist Europe (Školkay 2000). Grigore Pop-Eleches puts forward the provocative thesis that political parties in East-Central Europe should be divided into two fundamental categories: mainstream parties and unorthodox parties. A political party may be understood as mainstream if “its electoral appeal is based upon a recognizable and moderate ideo-

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logical platform rather than on the personality of its leader and/or extremist rhetoric. In other words, a mainstream party represents an ideological orientation that can be mapped with reasonable accuracy onto the mainstream ideological spectrum of established Western democracies” (Pop-Eleches 2010: 225). In contrast, an unorthodox party is differentiated from mainstream parties along one or more of three dimensions/defining characteristics including “adapting extremist political platforms in a number of issue areas and/or by sidestepping ideology and acting as political vehicles for their leaders” (Pop-Eleches 2010: 226). Pop-Eleches differentiates several types of unorthodox parties based upon the dimension which sets them apart from mainstream parties and how great the distance is, with key policy dimensions taken to be economic policy orientation and reliance on ethnonationalist appeals. e two valued dimensions are complemented by an organisational dimension which reflects the relative prominence of individual leaders (Pop Eleches 2010: 227). Pop-Eleches subsequently defines three or four types of unorthodox parties. Alongside the radical le and extreme nationalists (who are subtyped as radical parties), national populist parties and new/centrist populist parties are noteworthy for this discussion. Nationalist populist parties sound nationalist overtones similar to extreme nationalists on Schmitt’s “us vs. them” dichotomy, but they differ from the latter in the moderate nature of their nationalist appeal. Nationalism is not their raison d’être but rather complements a broader non-nationalist policy agenda. New/centrist populist parties differ from the mainstream primarily in declaring themselves to be a non-ideological or anti-political formation which does not even make use of the nationalistic appeal. Typical for parties in this group are leaders hyped in the media for whom the party serves as a tool for fulfilling their personal ambitions. Also typical is a critique of mainstream parties portrayed as the culprits behind a decline in living standards and burgeoning corruption (Pop-Eleches 2010). In comparison to the foregoing approaches, Pop-Eleches introduces new elements in the form of the non-ideological nature of new/centrist populist parties. Particularly in the context of an analysis of Slovak party policy and partially in connection to the work of Pop-Eleches, Peter Učeň developed a concept of new/centrist populism which, aside from its

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anti-establishment appeal, emphasises the tendency of these parties to move toward the geometric centre of the party system (Učeň undated, 2007a, 2007b). We understand populism as a complex body of defining elements which have been discussed above. In our view, none of these elements can be taken as more important than any other. We agree with “gradualists” that almost every political party can meet some of the definitional criteria of populism. On the other hand, it does not mean that every party is populist to some extent. Only if a party systematically meets all the criteria, can it then be classified as populist. One can imagine a political party that criticises the established elites for betraying the people. However, the same party may promote interests of only a narrowly defined social group (a social class, an ethnic minority, or Christians). Such a party does not meet one of the fundamental features of populism – does that mean that the party is populist to a limited extent? We believe not. Otherwise, the heuristic potential of the concept of populist political parties would be very small as almost every political party could be labelled as populist. Only a holistic approach to the definition of populism can be useful for the party politics approach and can enable us to define a specific group of political parties which differ from other parties by the systematical and complex usage of populism. We do not deny that are different forms of populist political parties. It is reflected in our simple typology which distinguish between exclusively and non-exclusively populist political parties. What is very important, they do not differ in the level of populism (both the types of populist political parties meet all the criteria of populism as defined above and a systematic/ not occasional usage of populism is typical for them), but they differ in whether populism is accompanied by another clear set of ideological preferences or not. is distinction is to some extent a reaction to the rise of a new type of political party in East-Central Europe in recent years (new/centrist populist parties, anti-establishment reform parties – see above). e work of Mudde, Taggart, Pop-Eleches and others serves as a starting point for our differentiating between two fundamental categories of populist parties: exclusively and non-exclusively populist political parties.

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Indeed, populist rhetoric appears in political party practice either as a core identity element for a party which is otherwise vaguely defined or as a (more or less logical) complement to a primary program for other political parties. e identity and/or rhetoric of “exclusively populist” political parties is based upon the populist appeal. e core of the identity of exclusively populist political parties is political protest aimed at the existing political elites, which defends the interests of the “common people”. From the standpoint of traditional cleavages and party families, these formations defy classification. In addition, these political parties implicitly or explicitly reject being identified with a clear ideological orientation. e right-le view of political conflict is, in their opinion, obsolete or not relevant to the political situation at hand.4 In this regard populist political parties differ in an essential manner from the “traditional” party establishment (social democracy, liberal parties, Christian democrats), as well as from anti-system parties based upon an ideology which rejects democracy (typically fascist or communist parties). In contrast to that of antisystem parties, their critique is aimed at other actors (the elite, the establishment) rather than at the system as a whole. Probably the closest terminologically to our conception of exclusively populist parties is the term centrist populist parties used by, among others, Grigore Pop-Eleches (2010) and Peter Učeň (2007a, 2007b). We do not consider the term centrist populist party entirely suited because such parties purposely stand outside the le-right division of the political spectrum or reject it outright. e term exclusively populist party, by contrast, clearly reflects the (in this case key) role played by populism in formulating the party’s identity and in its rhetoric. With exclusively populist parties, populism by nature becomes the core of the party identity since, lacking an ideology, there is nothing else upon which to build that identity. As we have indicated 4 Schedler takes a different view of the issue in his interpretation of anti-establishment parties. Although he maintains that APEs are reluctant to take a position along the right-le axis, most of them may be placed clearly to the le or to the right. He even speaks of a tendency to being right-wing parties, tied to allegations of the “dark sides of capitalism”. Aer the fall of the actual socialist regimes, it appears to Schedler that anti-establishment politics has been formulated as a “new ideology of the right” (Schedler 1996: 302).

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above, in both political practice and political science research such a division loses meaning to a significant extent: the party’s identity is projected in its rhetoric and its rhetoric is (at least partially) based upon the party identity. For some political parties, the use of populist rhetoric is a de facto result of or a supplement to their primary “program tools”. e programs of these non-exclusively populist political parties are clearly defined in other respects, sometimes explicitly adhering to a particular ideology and falling into so-called intellectual or party families. Radical right-wing political parties may be cited as a typical example of non-exclusively populist political parties, i.e., political parties who make occasional, complementary use of populist appeals alongside their main ideological orientation. As in the case of exclusively populist political parties, parties that combine populism with a clearly defined ideology must be differentiated from non-populist formations. Particularly from the opposition for whom the key voter appeal centres on the government/opposition dichotomy and not on elites/people dichotomy. In spite of the fact that virtually all political parties make occasional use of the notion of “the people” and present themselves as defenders of the people’s interests versus those of other political actors, as a rule they focus on the government/opposition dichotomy, or sometimes the divide between one actor and another. Neither approach is susceptible to being labelled populism. ey lack the element of rejection constituted by a blanket criticism of the elites/establishment as a whole. With non-exclusively populist parties, the populist appeal is also a constant, significant component of the party’s statements and not just an occasional declaration or restricted to a small number of topics. e chief difference from exclusively populist parties consists in a relatively well-defined ideological program of the party. e proposed categorization of populist parties emphasizing, as it does, a stress on anti-establishment appeals joined with a defence of the interests of the people as a homogeneous entity should contribute to a more precise use of the term populism. We do not share the opinion that each and every political party is, to some extent, populist. Populism may not be identified with demagoguery or with promises that are impossible to fulfil. is oen leads to the classification of all

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political parties and program points as populist. Nor may a declaration in favour of defending the interests of “the people” be considered populist, no matter what definition of populism is used. Instead there must be a defence of the interests of the people constructed using the Manichean people/elites dichotomy. In this sense, populism must be clearly differentiated from nationalism, xenophobia and other exclusionist ideologies working with the dichotomy between “us” and “them”. e existence of two categories of populist parties is a response to the empirical diversity of party populism, separating out a group of political parties whose identity and rhetoric is primarily based upon populist appeals. e second type of populist political party consists of non-exclusively populist political parties, for whom the populist appeal is only one element in the party’s identity and election strategy. Parties can move between these two categories, as they evolve in time, just as they may cease to use populism systematically and no longer fall within the category of populist parties. is typology allows the populist character of a large, heterogeneous group of modern political parties to be reflected. In contrast to other typologies, though, it avoids creating categories using other ideologies and party positions (e.g., radical right-wing populist parties, socialist populist parties, etc.). To do so produces a large number of categories, which also fails to allow for categorization of all existing parties. Two categories – exclusively and non-exclusively populist political parties – allow us to cover any type of party which makes consistent use of the populist appeal. On the other hand, the typology does not (necessarily) aim to describe a new type of political party – especially the exclusively populist parties can just as well be labelled by some of the other terms mentioned in this chapter. We only aim to provide a simple conceptual framework for the study of populism in political parties, which enables us to distinguish between the two different types of parties systematically using populist appeal. It does not preclude other classifications of the parties outside the typology (which is relevant primarily if not exclusively to the study of populism in political parties) or within it (e.g. classification of the non-exclusively populist parties according to their ideological profile). It is noteworthy in comparing perspectives that the relevant exclusively populist political parties have appeared almost exclusively

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in the area of post-communist East-Central Europe.5 Along the same lines, it may be interesting in the future to make a detailed comparison of the activities of exclusively and non-exclusively populist political parties in party and political systems of the other European countries.

2.6. Conclusion Although research into populism and populist political parties is a dynamically developing area of research in political science, there is no general agreement on a definition of populist political parties. is chapter has put forward an overview of basic approaches to defining populist political parties, including a presentation of the so-called analytical core of populism, which is interesting from a heuristic standpoint for researching populist political parties. Based upon the empirically distinct forms of partisan populism, and following on the work of Pop-Eleches, Školkay, Mudde and Taggart, we have formulated fundamental categories for populist political parties which reflect the place the populist appeal plays in the party’s rhetoric. We have differentiated two categories on this basis, one which posits the existence of exclusively and non-exclusively populist political parties. Exclusively populist political parties build their identity upon their populist appeal. However, in other respects, their program tends toward the vague, is subject to frequent changes and is difficult or practically impossible to place in one of the traditional party families. An ideological vacuum is thus typical for exclusively populist parties. Non-exclusively populist political parties, by contrast, combine a populist appeal with another, clearly outlined program. e populist appeal thus serves in this case as a (more or less logical) complement to the party’s primary program. An exception may be presented by the Italian La Rete formation (e Net), which won several seats in 1992 and two years later ran as part of the le-leaning Progress Alliance. Another might concern the Civic Movement in Iceland, which won parliamentary representation in the 2009 elections, taking place in the shadow of the economic crisis. e Civic Movement virtually disappeared during the course of their term or was transformed into the Movement. 5

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Such a categorization scheme does not aspire to be exhaustive, but does reflect the two fundamental forms or institutional expressions of populism in party politics. Empirical evidence suggests – and the case studies presented here attest – that populism may form the cornerstone of a party’s political identity, or may serve as only one component of a broader (ideologically) defined profile.

References Abedi, Amir. 2003. Anti-Political Establishment Parties. A Comparative Analysis. London: Routledge. Albertazzi, Daniele and McDonnell, Duncan. “Introduction: e Sceptre and the Spectre.” In: Twenty-First Century Populism: e Spectre of Western European Democracy. Eds. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell. New York: Palgrave Macmilla, 1–15. Brunclík, Miloš. 2011. “Příčiny vzestupu radikální populistické pravice ve Švédsku.” Politologický časopis 18, No. 2, 111–132. Abts, Koen and Rummens, Stefan. 2007. “Populism versus Democracy.” Political Studies 55, No. 2, 405–424. Capoccia, Giovanni. 2002. “Anti-System Parties. A Conceptual Reassessment.” Journal of eoretical Politics 14, No. 9, 9–35. Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Canovan, Margaret. 1984. “People’, Politicians and Populism.” Government and Opposition 19, No. 3, 312–327. Canovan, Margaret. 2002. “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy”. In: Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Eds. Yves Mény and Yves Surel. Houndmills: Palgrave, 25–44. Canovan, Margaret. 2004. “Populism for Political eorists?” Journal of Political Ideologies 9, No. 3, 241–252. Černoch, Filip, Husák, Jan and Schütz, Ondrej. 2011. Political parties and nationalism in Visegrad parties. Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav. de Lange, Sarah, L. 2008. From Pariah to Power: e Government Participation of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in West European Democracies. esis, University of Antwerp, promotor Cas Mudde. (http:// home.medewerker.uva.nl/s.l.delange/bestanden/Dissertation%20Sarah% 20L%20de%20Lange.pdf). de Raadt, Jasper, Hollanders, David and Krouwel, André 2004. Varieties of Populism: An Analysis of the Programmatic Character of Six Europen Parties. (http: //www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Varieties%20of%20Populism_tcm31-42718.pdf).

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Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2007. “Populism and the Logic of Party Rotation in Postcommunist Europe.” In: Visegrad Elections: Domestic Impact and European Consequences. Eds. Oľga Gyarfášová and Grigorij Mesežnikov. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky, 141–156. Deegan-Krause, Kevin and Haughton, Tim. 2009. “Towards a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia.” Politics & Policy 37, No. 4, 821–841. Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2007. “Populism and the Logic of Party Rotation in Postcommunist Europe.” In: Visegrad Elections: Domestic Impact and European Consequences. Eds. Oľga Gyárfášová and Grigorij Mesežnikov. Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs (IVO). (http://www.la.wayne.edu/polisci/kdk/papers/ ivo_populism.pdf). Dočkal, Vít. 2002.“Aliance nového občana – populistická či protestní strana?” Středoevropské politické studie 4, No 4. (http://www.cepsr.com/seps/clanek.php?ID=30). Fiala, Petr, ed. 1998. Politický extremismus a radikalismus v České republice. Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav. Fiala, Petr and Strmiska, Maxmilián. 1998. Teorie politických stran. Brno: Barrister & Principal. Freeden, Michael. 1998. “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” Political Studies 46, No. 4, 748–765. Hanley, Seán and Sikk, Allan. 2011. e Rise of Liberal Populism in Central and Eastern Europe? Using QCA to understand the Emergence of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties. (http://www.ecprnet.eu/conferences/general_conference/ reykjavik/paper_details.asp?paperid=2343). Havlík, Vlastimil. 2011. “Život a smrt pravicově-populistických politických stran v severní Evropě.” Rexter 9, No. 1, 36–78. Hawkins, Kirk, Riding, Scott and Mudde, Cas. 2012. Measuring Populist Attitudes. (www.concepts-methods.org/WorkingPapers/PDF/1087). Ionescu, Ghita and Gellner, Ernest, eds. 1969. Populism – Its Meanings and National Characteristics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Kubát, Michal. 2007. “Teorie antisystémové strany.” Politologický časopis 14, No. 2, 110–123. Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. “What’s in a Name?” In: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. Ed. Francisco Panizza. London – New York: Verso, 32–50. Laycock, David. 2005. “Populism and the New Right in English Canada.” In: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. Ed. Francisco Panizza. London – New York: Verso, 172–202. Laryš, Martin. 2012. “Recenze: Bastl, M. – Mareš, M. – Smolík, J. – Vejvodová, P. (2011): Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR, Grada: Praha.” Rexter – časopis pro výzkum radikalismu, extremismu a terorismu 10, No. 1, 140–143. March, Luke. 2008. Contemporary Far Le Parties in Europe. From Marxism to the Mainstream? International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiung. (http: //library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/05818.pdf).

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Mareš, Miroslav. 2003. Pravicový extremismus a radikalismus v ČR. Brno: Barrister & Principal. McDonnell, Duncan. 2006. “A Weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord.” Politics 26, No. 2, 126–132. Mény, Yves and Surel, Yves, eds. 2002. Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Houndmills: Palgrave. Mudde, Cas. 2000. “In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People.” East European Politics and Societies 15, No. 1, 33–53. Mudde, Cas. 2004. “e Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition 39, No. 4, 542–563. Panizza, Francisco. 2005. “Introduction.” In: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. Ed. Francisco Panizza. London – New York: Verso, 1–31. Norris, Pippa. 2005. Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2010. “rowing out the Bums. Protest Voting and Unothodox Parties aer Communism.” World Politics 62, No. 2, 221–260. Rooduijn, Matthijs, de Lange, Sarah, L. and van der Brug, Wouter. 2012. “A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe.” Party Politics 18, No. 1, 1–20. (http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/1/4/ 447.full.pdf+html). Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Party and party systems. A framework for analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sartori, Giovanni. 2005. Strany a stranické systémy. Schéma pro analýzu. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury. Schedler, Andreas. 1996. “Anti-Political-Establishment Parties.” Party Politics 2, No. 3, 291–312. Sikk, Andrej. 2009. “Parties and Populism.” CEPSI Working paper 2009-02. University College London School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Školkay, Andrej. 2000. “Populism in Central Eastern Europe.” IWM Working Paper No. 1. (www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-09-11.pdf). Stanley, Ben. 2008. “e thin ideology of populism.” Journal of Political Ideologies 13, No. 1, 95–110. Stanley, Ben. 2011. Populism, nationalism, or national populism? An analysis of Slovak voting behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, No. 4, 257–270. Stojarová, Věra and Vykoupilová, Hana. 2008. “Populism in the Balkans. e Case of Serbia.” Středoevropské politické studie 10, No. 2–3. (http:// www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=335). Taggart, Paul. 2000. Populism. Buckingham PA: Open University Press. Taggart, Paul. 2002. “Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics.” In: Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Eds. Ives Mény and Yves Surel. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Učen, Peter. 2004. Centrist populism as a new competitive and mobilization strategy in Slovak politics. (http://independent.academia.edu/PeterUcen/ Papers/452724/Centrist_Populism_as_a_New_Competitive_and_Mobilization_Strategy_in_Slovak_Politics). Učeň, Peter. 2007a. “Parties, Populism, and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe.” SAIS Review 27, No. 1, 49–62. Učeň, Peter. 2007b. “Populist Appeals in Slovak Politics before 2006 Elections.” In: Democracy and Populism in Central Europe: e Visegrad Elections and eir Aermath. Eds. Martin Bútora, Oľga Gyárfášová, Grigorij Mesežnikov and omas Skladony. Bratislava: IVO, 131–147. Wiles, Peter. 1969. “A Syndrome, Not A Doctrine.” In: Populism – Its Meanings and National Characteristics. Eds. Ghita Ionescu, and Ernest Gellner. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 166–179. Zaslove, Andrej. 2008. One Foot In One Foot Out: Can Radical Right Populist Parties Govern? Political Studies Association, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom. (http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2008/Zaslove.pdf).

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3. BALTIC COUNTRIES ILZE BALCERE 3.1. Politics of Populism in the Baltic States When one is asked to identify a typical populist party from the party systems of East-Central European countries, there is only a slight chance that a party from the Baltic States will be named. Indeed, if we look at the body of research on populism in this region, the usual cases under investigation are, for example, the Slovak National Party, the Party of Hungarian Truth and Justice, Czech Republicans or the League of Polish Families (see, for instance, Dočekalová 2006). So far, cross-national or single case studies on populism in the Baltics have been an exception, rather than a systematic and well-developed research field. However, this does not mean that the Baltic countries have no story to tell or that populism as a phenomenon has, by some strange reason, bypassed the three Baltic republics. If we look from the aspect of party system instability and other factors, it could be argued that the Baltic States, and East-Central Europe in general, have the necessary background conditions for populism to be present on the political scene. Ramonaite and Žiliukaite (2009: 12) note: “In the systems of high instability, personalistic anti-system politicians and populist parties come to power more easily. ‘Floating’ voters without partisan allegiance are the main targets of new populist parties, which destabilise party systems in many young postcommunist democracies.” Among the other factors that show the high potential of party system instability on the side of electoral behaviour is, on the one hand, declining voter turnout and a high level of volatility, and on the other, the increasing popularity of new, in most cases populist, parties (Krupavičius 2005a: 50). Examining the case of Lithuanian political developments and the role of populism in these processes, Laurenas (2006) has made an

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observation that could also be attributed to Latvia and Estonia. He speaks of several waves of populism: “e first wave of populism rose with the euphoria of the restitution of independence. It really was an exclusive period of belief – society, the major part of it, believed in the ‘speeding-up of history’ and ‘moral politics’. is belief cannot be named populism in its true sense. It was a period of exaggerated belief of society in its ability to change itself. Whereas populism is finally established when the satisfaction of needs, far exceeding the possibilities of society, is committed by that society (or its part) to politicians who institutionalise this ‘mission’ (Laurenas 2006: 51). Indeed, the first years aer independence were marked by remarkable popular engagement. e previously oppressed where able to speak out and to finally have a say in political and societal processes. is was most importantly embodied in the popular fronts that established themselves at the end of the 1980s. Aer independence was restored and institution building was under way, the period of “routine politics” began. Parties were forced to fulfil the promises they had made to society. Considering developments in the Baltic countries it could be hypothesised that the second wave of populism in party politics escalated at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Jurkynas (2005: 15) highlights this point by referring to the Lithuanian example that “many people anticipated the fast growth of economy, generous social provisions, transparent politics and privatisation and the like. Failed expectations turned to blame the political establishment and no wonder that new and populist parties like the Labour and the Liberal Democrats found their way to the Seimas.” One of the breeding grounds for populism in party discourse was the critique of the privatization process. Laurenas (2006: 59) states, that “the unsuccessful, unjust and ineffective privatization demoralised society, planting populism and even radicalism in it.” Political parties felt the demand for new, fresh, corruption-free political forces that could overcome the dissatisfaction of voters, replace established old parties and eventually bring to society the long anticipated honest politics and rapid growth in all sectors. In all Baltic countries the first elections in the new millennium were marked by the fact that new, previously inexperienced political parties received considerable electoral support. Most importantly, all of these new par-

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ties had based their platforms on extensive use of populist rhetoric in their electoral campaigns and loose ideological basis. Krupavičius (2005a: 45) describes the tendency of voters to choose novice political forces instead of traditional parties and their ability to form a government through approval from the mainstream parties. He points out that “the best confirmation of this trend in Estonia and Latvia is victories of new non-ideological parties in the latest parliamentary elections and their ability to form ruling coalitions with older and better established as well as more strictly ideologically oriented parties. In 2003, Estonian Res Publica (RP) gained 24.6% of votes in the Riigikogu elections aer an election campaign with the populist slogan ‘Choose order!’. Aer formal talks RP agreed to form a new government with the liberal Reform Party and agrarian People’s Union. A very similar situation developed in Latvia year earlier in the 2002 Saeima elections, when a political novice, the populist conservative New Era (JL) made a coalition with Christian democratic Latvia’s First Party, nationalist For Fatherland and Freedom/ Latvian National Independence Movement and Green and Farmers Union.” A similar situation was also observed in Lithuania. “e Lithuanian party landscape changed once again aer the municipal elections held late 2002 and the presidential elections of early 2003. Established (traditional) parties by and large managed to keep their previous share of municipal seats. However, the party of victorious new President of Lithuania Rolandas Paksas, the Liberal Democrats, attracted the protest vote in the elections and in public opinion polls by using right-wing populist rhetoric. is has become an important factor for future political coalitions” (Jankauskas, Žeruolis 2004: 12). Jurkynas (2005) goes on to describe the Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 2004 as the second “earthquake” that shook the party system. He points out that the “mainstream parties of the 1990s received merely half of the votes cast and the populist Labour Party (DP), the rural Agrarians and the radical Liberal Democrats became relevant parliamentary parties. (…) Liberal Democrats seem to be political outcasts, as parties on the le and on the right are eager to cooperate with them” (Jurkynas 2005: 26). Johannsen et al. (2011: 67–68) had argued, that the “(…) political life in Latvia and Lithuania is more polarised. (…) e political

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polarization is also reflected in the lives and deaths of populist parties. In Estonia, right populism based on extreme ideology has been relatively unsuccessful. In contrast, Latvia and Lithuania have had several prominent populist parties emerging throughout the two decades but in contrast to Estonian right-wing populism, populism in Latvia and Lithuania has taken the form of “pure” populism, building their platform on anti-establishment platforms with only symbolic reference to ideology.”

3.2. The Evolution of the Party System “Given that stable Western party systems constitute the primary point of departure for analysing post-communist party systems, the lack of stable electoral partisan identification and loyal organisational affiliations among politicians in post-communist democracies has widely been read as evidence for absence of any meaningful party systems” (Kreuzer et al. 2003: 77). From a wider perspective, the three Baltic countries represent by no means a successful case of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Nevertheless, the emergence of political parties has been one of the most substantial developments in the post-communist space. However, their role in the transition to democracy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been rather marginal. “Political parties did not play a major part in the institutional framework within which the critical changes of the early democratization period took place, nor were they prime movers in the initial phase of political transition” (Lewis 2000: 18). Indeed political parties generally formed only shortly before, or aer, the first independent elections. In the case of the Baltic countries and also other post-Soviet republics the path to independence was primarily driven by popular movements. Hence, this is oen referred to as society-led transition. e democratization process in Baltic States started in late 1988, aer the rule of the Communist Party was challenged by the emergence of popular fronts. Almost in parallel, civic movements organised themselves around the idea of national resistance to the Soviet regime. In Estonia, the Popular Front was established first among the Baltics and was also the first in the Soviet Union that was led by re-

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form communists. In Lithuania, Sajudis was formed with considerable support from independent communists. In Latvia, the Popular Front (Tautas Fronte) and National Independence Movement were also founded in 1988. us, through the end of the 1980s, the three Baltic republics continued to develop largely in a similar way. Aer the breakdown of the Soviet rule, multi-party systems in Baltic States were free to develop and this process was initially driven along the split of popular movements. In the case of Lithuania, Ramonaite (2008: 92) points out, that “the formation of Lithuanian party system started in 1991 when Sajudis began to disintegrate and early parliamentary elections were announced in 1992.” Similar events were happening in Latvia. Auers (2005: 139) indicates: “(…) e Latvian Peoples Front (Latvijas Tautas Fronte), the political umbrella organisation uniting nationalists, reform communists, dissidents, greens and numerous other political groups in the battle for independence, began to fragment, and new political parties formed in preparation for the first free post-communist elections.” Hence, these civic movements were not only the drivers of independence, but eventually also became the main sources for party formation and development. Party systems formation is oen described as developing along the lines of cleavages, and cleavage formation is an important characteristic of party preferences, and eventually the characteristic of the party system in general. Again, the division between post-communist and Western European states is relevant, as Pettai et al. (2011: 151) points out: “In contrast to Western countries, where cleavages formed organically and over decades across socio-economic as well as rural/urban, clerical/anti-clerical and later post-materialist divides, in post-communist countries the formation of political divisions has taken place along more spontaneous lines.” us, in Western countries cleavage structures developed over a much longer period, while the political systems of the Baltic countries experienced rapid changes. Krupavičius (2005b: 124) summarises this point by stating that “social class identities played a marginal role in the development of party loyalties in the initial phases of the post-communist transition. Here class identities were substituted by sociocultural identities.” Hence, aer independence was internationally recognised and institution building was under way, cleavages started to play a more important

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role in determining voter preference and party policies. Krupavičius (2005b: 124) concludes that “looking at the cleavage structure in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the immediate post-independence period, we can clearly see that ethnicity, ideology, the urban-rural division, and religion constituted the emerging political and party preferences”. Estonia and Latvia have long had latent ethnic cleavages. However, given the effects of their citizenship laws, which le a large parts of their ethnic Russian populations without immediate citizenship in the early 1990s, the essential political cleavages have been socio-economic or populist (Pettai et al. 2011: 152). Krupavičius (2005b: 133) points out, that “Baltic party systems are also different with respect to ideological distribution. Whereas there is more or less bipolar competition on the socioeconomic le-right axis in Lithuania, a unipolar centre and centre-right dominance are found in Estonia and Latvia.” An oen used characteristic to describe the post-Soviet party systems is their lack of stability. One of the indicators that could potentially reflect the level of instability is the formation and success of new parties, namely, do voters switch their electoral votes to new parties that have no prior electoral experience. Lewis (2006: 568) makes this point clear by referring to the Baltic States. He points out that “it surely makes some difference if the displacement is made by one or more formerly existing political organisations or by flash-parties that barely existed before the election was held. e conditions for such abrupt transitions have certainly persisted in Central European political experience and new parties continue to capture a major slice of vote – like the DP in the 2004 Lithuanian election, JL in Latvia, and the RP in Estonia.” A tendency to form brand-new parties has been a hallmark of the Baltic States party system. In analysing the most recent developments Pettai et al. (2011: 153) conclude that “over the last 15 years, an average of 20% of parties participating in Baltic elections have been brand-new. is means that there are constantly new political forces think they can break into the electoral-political market. However, this trend appears differently in Estonia comparing to Latvia and Lithuania. New parties form much more frequently in Latvia and Lithuania, than in Estonia. In Estonia the proportion of new parties sank to zero during the 2011 parliamentary elections.”

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Once again, this trend helps to highlight the different patterns in party system development among the Baltics. Pettai et al. (2011: 154) continue by stating that “Estonia was the only country (indeed in the entire post-communist world) to have an election in 2011 in which all of the parties running were unchanged from the previous poll. Yes, if these aggregate indicators would seem to indicate that Estonia’s party system is the most consolidated, this does not mean that politicians in the other two countries are entirely in flux. When comparing any two parliamentary elections in Baltic States, those candidates that ran in both elections have generally demonstrated a high degree of loyalty to their basic political grouping.” However, also in this respect there are differences between the three republics. While in Latvia and Estonia the largest part of the total vote share goes to established parties with previous parliamentary experience, in Lithuania voters seem to express more affinity towards brand-new political forces. Meanwhile, a different landscape appears when speaking about the share of brand-new parties participating in elections. In this respect Latvia has the highest number of new parties that enter into the electoral race. e popularity of new political parties is influenced by the electorate who shape the policy preferences and eventually decide who will be elected. us, the electorate through their decision-making oversees the political landscape and influences the development of the party system. In regard to electoral behaviour in the Baltic States, several patterns should be emphasised. Voter turnout is still relatively low. Party system formation is always influenced by two factors, namely, supply and demand. Volatility describes the extent to which voters are consistent in their electoral decisions. “Figures of voter volatility are still much higher than in Western democracies, which is a major source of concern for mainstream parties in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania” (Krupavičius 2005b: 134). Electoral turnout is also determined by the general trust in political institutions. In case of the Baltic countries, consistent lack of trust in political institutions and specifically political parties is a long-lasting trend. Despite some weaknesses of the party system in the Baltic States, they are still regarded as a success story. Lewis (2000: 153) concludes that “a strong national consciousness, relatively high levels of socio-economic development and a shorter period of encapsulation

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within the Soviet Union all helped them cope with the problems of post-communist transition more successfully than other areas of the former Soviet Union”. Still, the major problems are the relatively frequent break-up of parties and a tendency for voters to change their preferences as the new political forces receive high support. us, institutionalization is still an on-going process.

3.3. Case Selection Analysis of populism and populist parties, including radical rightwing parties and anti-establishment parties, began considerably late in the case of the Baltics, namely in the 2000s. us, only relatively recently scholars have started to pay attention to the three young democracies in respect to anti-establishment party developments and particularities. For instance, Auers et al. (2009) have attempted to explain the question why extreme right-wing movements in Estonia and Latvia have failed to receive any electoral success despite existing preconditions. Kasekamp (2003) has explored the evolution of the extreme-right political parties in Estonia since the restoration of independence. Appearances of right-wing extremism in the Baltic States have also been analysed by Muižnieks (2005), Kiaulakis (2005) and Poleschuk (2005). Although there is no extensive comparative research on the politics of populism in the Baltics, populism is oen attached as an attribute describing the political landscape and party systems in the three young democracies. It seems reasonable to say that the interest in populism in the case of the Baltic countries originated along the lines of the first elections in the new millennium. Laurenas (2006) has explained the development on populist research in Lithuania, by saying that “analysis of populism in Lithuania began quite late, mainly only in 2000. (…) Generally speaking, researchers of populism were catalysed by the political situation in 2000–2004” (Laurenas 2006: 50). Here the critical moment seems to be the election of previously inexperienced, radical political forces and their leaders, namely the Liberal Democratic Party established by former Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas and DP created by the Russian-born businessman

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Viktor Uspaskich. Laurenas (2006: 51) points out that “populism pushed this situation towards the state of political crisis. e crisis began when R. Paksas and his team, mainly radical and unprofessional, decided to reallocate political powers on behalf of the institution of President. So it seems reasonable to speak about the development of the institution of populism in Lithuania’s social and political life.” As was stated in the previous section, the first elections in the new millennium brought onto the Lithuanian political scene a previously unknown popularity of new political forces – the Liberal Democratic Party (later renamed Order and Justice Party1, TT) and DP. ese two political parties have been characterised as populist (see for instance, Ramonaite, 2008, Jurkynas 2005, Laurenas 2006). Although there have been some attempts to assign the label of populism also to National Resurrection Party (Tautos prisikėlimo partija, TPP), that was established shortly before Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 2008, it was not included in the analysis, mainly because it was rather problematic to characterise TPP as a populist according to the definition used in this book. TTP, consisting of previously inexperienced public figures, mostly show-business stars, in its electoral campaign did not stress the dichotomy between the people and the elite, instead party “just” promised “politics with human face” (Tracevskis 2008). Its overall discourse was rather marked by sarcasm and at some point even lack of seriousness, as its leader Arunas Valinskas once put it during the electoral race: “We do not promise you an easy life, but it would be less boring with us” (Tracevskis 2008). e ideological orientation of TT party is a rightist and populist quasi-anti-system party and the DP represents the new populist le (Jurkynas 2005). Ramonaite (2008: 91) indicates that Labour party is not an advocate of socialist ideology as its name would suggest. Both these parties escape programmatic clarity and instead choose to pursue rather identity-free policies without any clear ideological orientation. TT mainly identifies itself as a nationalistic political force; however Clark (2006: 177) seems to reject this by pointing out that “the populism that these elements represent is not part of the nationalist phenomenon in Lithuania. Indeed, they have been opposed by 1

Further in the analysis the new label “Order and Justice” party is used.

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the nationalist parties. ey appeal to the disillusioned across ethnic and national lines.” Also in Estonia and Latvia the first elections of the 2000s brought in new political actors, taking the place of formerly established “old” parties. In the Estonian case, the party RP, the winner of the parliamentary elections of 2003, has been labelled as populist (Saarts 2011, Krupavičius 2005a). Johannsen and Pedersen-Hilmer (2011: 67–68) point out that in Estonia the extreme right parties have been unsuccessful in saying that “although the rise of RP to muster a quarter of the votes in the 2003 parliamentary elections is evidence of the appeal of an anti-establishment platform in Estonia, RP was soon made a coalition partner in the government and later merged with the conservative Pro Patria.” In the parliamentary elections of 2002 the Latvian political landscape was convulsed by the success of a newly established party JL, which managed to gather eminent voter support with a considerable proportion of anti-establishment and anti-corruption rhetoric. Sikk (2009: 7) describes the similarities between RP and JL, stating that “a common trend among these parties was that they all attacked the corrupt practices of the political establishment or government incumbents. In fact, anti-incumbency was a defining feature of these parties (…).” us, we distinguish between four parties that can (at least in one period of their existence) be labelled as exclusively populist parties with a loose ideological base, namely, New Era in Latvia (from 2002– 2006), Res Publica in Estonia (from 2001–2006), and in Lithuania the Labour Party (from 2003 till present) and the Order and Justice Party (formerly the Liberal Democratic Party) (from 2002 till present). e next section offers a detailed description of the aforementioned populist parties in the Baltic States.

3.4. Party History e Liberal Democratic Party was established in March 2002. However, aer four years it went through self-reformation process and was renamed the TT. Although the analysis here will inevitably touch upon the period before 2006, for the sake of clarity the label TT will

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be used throughout the section. TT was founded by its current chairman, the former Mayor of Vilnius, two-time Prime Minister and former President of Lithuania, Rolandas Paksas. In 1999 Rolandas Paksas was the prime minister of the conservatives. However, due to his refusal to sign the privatization agreement of the biggest Lithuanian enterprise “Mažeikiu naa” he le office, thus sharply increasing his popularity. Paksas joined the Liberal Union, but this marriage was short-lived, since Paksas soon le this party together with his followers and established his own – Liberal Democratic Party. As is evident in the case of other populist parties, the overall development and functioning of the party is highly connected with its leader, at some point serving as a tool in the hands of particular persons to reach their personal ambitions. Ramonaite (2008: 95) has pointed out that TT (at that time – Liberal Democratic Party) was established to serve as a boost and support for Rolandas Paksas in the 2002 presidential elections. Eventually in 2003 he was elected President of Lithuania, mainly due to his aggressive populist campaign. His victory was seen as a surprise win against Valdas Adamkus. However, his presidential career was short lived and aer two years in office he was removed as a result of the impeachment procedure. Yuri Borisov, the former president of the aviation company Avia Baltica, had donated almost a half million dollars to the Paksas presidential campaign and he was soon given Lithuanian citizenship, issued by Paksas’ decree. Later this decree was ruled to be anti-constitutional and was abolished by the Lithuanian Constitutional Court. Eventually Paksas was forbidden to run in the parliamentary elections of 2004. In fact he was prohibited to take up any public office that requires an oath. us, Paksas became the first European president impeached and removed from office for committing severe breaches of the Constitution (Paulauskas 2005: 198). Aer the impeachment procedure and eventual removal from presidential office on 6th April 2004, the Liberal Democratic Party renamed itself the TT. Ramonaite (2008: 95) explains that “aer unsuccessful tenure in the president’s office and subsequent impeachment, the party turned to a radical anti-establishment party and became an outcast in the Lithuanian party system.” e forced resignation and later a prohibition on participating in both national and local elections have constituted solid ground for

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Paksas and his party to organise its political rhetoric on the grounds of populism. e second most visible Lithuanian populist party, the DP, was established by a businessman, Russian-born millionaire Victor Uspaskich in 2003, several months before the Seimas elections of 2004. Its first electoral challenge was participation in the European Parliamentary elections, where it managed to secure 30% of the vote and received 5 deputy seats. e party’s electoral fortune continued also in the national legislative elections of 2004. e development of DP continues to point out the importance of a charismatic leader and the personalization of party politics. Similarly as in the case of Rolandas Paksas, Viktor Uspaskich is also well known as an extravagant and scandalous politician. However, by no means has he managed to safeguard loose public affinity. is has been managed particularly thanks to the increasing role of the media. Ramonaite (2008: 107) points out that “Viktor Uspaskich in this regard can be seen as a direct consequence of the mediatisation of politics. (…) e popularity of Viktor Uspaskich is related with a popular Lithuanian political TV show ‘Dviračio šou’. Being a member of Parliament in 2000–2003, Viktor Uspaskich was used as a prototype of a popular character in the TV show, and it is oen believed that this laid the foundation for the subsequent rise of his popularity.” Similar to Rolandas Paksas, Uspaskich’s political career was aer successful start in the parliamentary elections of 2004 also overshadowed by political scandals, which eventually had an impact on the overall rating of DP and its performance in the parliamentary elections of 2008. In 2006, DP and its chairman Uspaskich were facing charges of submission of a false statement about income, profit or assets and fraudulent accounting. ese accusations made Uspaskich resign from the Parliament and his ministerial post, which eventually led to the collapse of the government. Later on he went to Russia and made an effort not to respond to the invitations of prosecutors to appear at proceedings. Consequently, Uspaskich was arrested in September 2007 at Vilnius International Airport. Later he was placed under house arrest, which was replaced with bail and a written promise not to depart. In case of Uspaskich these personal scandals resulted in a far less successful performance of the party during the parliamentary elections of 2008.

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e Latvian party JL follows the trend of other populist parties in the Baltics – brand-new political parties, using anti-establishment rhetoric gathered considerable popular support. JL was established on February 2nd 2002 shortly before the 8th elections of Saeima, although, the announcement of its establishment had been declared slightly more than a year before. e party was founded by the former President of the Latvian Bank and one of the founders of the National Independence Movement Einars Repse and his followers. Repse has been known as a controversial, extravagant and charismatic politician. Aer he announced his readiness to form a new political force in 2001, he issued a public request that only in the case of being able to gather half a million lats in donations from potential supporters, would he be ready to resign from the Latvian Bank and actively involve himself in politics. Eventually he did manage to gather the necessary funds. Needless to say, this practice was highly criticised by both his opponents and experts. e party constituted its electoral manifesto and ideological base on a loose combination between neoliberalism and conservatism, thus making it problematic to place it into concrete ideological frame. One of JL’s main electoral weapons and cornerstones was the fight against corruption. e only party within this analysis that represents Estonian populist experience is RP. e triumph of RP was preceded by the rise of JL in Latvia less than a year before (Sikk 2003: 10). Although it had already been established as a right-wing political youth organisation in 1989, RP only reorganised itself as a lawful political party at the end of 2001. Hence, again the Estonian case indicates a considerable difference from its Baltic counterparts. As a political organisation it was associated with young conservatives, but without the willingness to officially engage in politics. e party’s only and most successful parliamentary election was in 2003 when it managed to become the largest faction in the Riigikogu. It should be noted, that the party was also rather successful in the local elections of 2002. RP tried to win the votes using populist slogans such as “Vote for new politics!” or “Choose order!”. In general, the party’s main appeal was to replace “old politics” with “new politics” as opposition between established parties and RP. e “newness” was not only embodied in the party’s electoral platform, but also within its organisation structure, since

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it sought to embody personalities excluded and unrelated with the old, established elite. Its history as an independent political force was rather short. In 2006 it merged with Pro Patria Union and established a joint political force, the Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit). As opposed to the previously described populist parties in Lithuania and Latvia, the history of RP was not so closely connected to or dependent on a particular charismatic personality.

3.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style e organisational structures of most parties under analysis here are highly connected with their leader, thus they are leader-centric and for the most part it is this one particular person who has substantial influence on the success and failure of the party’s development. In other facets the organisational structure of these parties are similar to other mainstream political forces with an elected chair, board and presidium. e only exception with respect to the importance of a leader was RP, since this party was not associated with one particular personality. For instance, in the case of both Lithuanian parties – TT and DP – their performance in 2004 parliamentary elections was highly influenced by the popularity of their leaders. Romanaite (2010) underlines that the reason for the excellent performance of DP can be attributed to the popularity of its charismatic leader, Viktor Uspaskich, and its anti-establishment rhetoric. e leadership factor was also evident in 2008 when voters punished both parties mainly because of the scandals their leaders were involved in. e personalization of politics continued to be dominant also in Latvia, where Einars Repse successfully established and secured victory for JL in the parliamentary elections of 2002. Although, Einars Repse has managed to escape such far-sighted conflicts as his colleagues form TT and DP, he has been criticised for a too authoritarian management style. Since keeping a high profile and discipline was always important for the JL these accusations have always been denied by the party officials. Sikk (2006: 135–136) remarks on the important differences in the leadership amongst the political parties in the Baltics, by concluding that: “While others have been clearly gathered around their leaders,

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the Estonian Res Publica has notably had three leaders in its first three years – none of them could be considered to ‘define’ the party, which is clearly the case with its Latvian and Lithuanian2 counterparts. (…) e role of their respective leaders sets Res Publica clearly apart from its southern counterparts by relying least on a leader in its development. Furthermore, the leader problem was close to being a fatal Achilles’ heel for the newborn party”. In contrast to the other three sister-parties, RP has experienced considerable leadership crisis. is fact is partially reflected in the rotation and changes of the party chairman from its establishment until its merger with Pro Patria. Rein Taagepera, first chair of Res Publica at establishment, agreed to hold the office only temporarily. He hardly became an active political figure of the party (Sikk 2006: 137). Eventually he was replaced by the Chief State Auditor Juhan Parts and from 2005 until the party merged with Pro Patria it was led by Taavi Veskimagi. e example of the JL indicates that the most stable position was party chair, since for almost six years members of the party entrusted this post to Einars Repse. Aer the Saeima elections of 2006 Repse was replaced by another visible party member Krisjanis Karins. e rotation of party chairs in the cases of both Lithuanian populist parties was due to objective (in the case of TT) and rather “imposed” circumstances (in the case of DP). Valentinas Mazuronis temporary replaced Paksas while he was fulfilling the post as President of Lithuania. Uspaskich, on the other hand, was forced to step down from the chairman’s post, as the DP and its management were criminally accused of the submission of false statements about income, profit, assets and fraudulent accounting. Uspaskich himself le Lithuania for a year. Ignoring the fact that Uspaskich was hiding from Lithuanian law enforcement institutions in Russia for a year, members of the DP still chose him to fulfil the function as the party leader. Both TT and DP have been frequently labelled as single-person parties, clustered around and benefiting from the popularity of their leaders. In one of his latest interviews to the Baltic Times, Uspaskich commenting on 2 It should be noted though, that Allan Sikk in his research in case of Lithuania refers also to “New Union – Social Liberals”.

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his impact on the manifesto elaboration process admitted that he had “spoken out in regards to its core provisions” (e Baltic Times 2012). At the same time, when asked about the strong association between him and the DP, Uspaskich seems to admit the reality. He stated: “Well, is there anything wrong with that? (…) Such a party’s identification through its leader is a normal thing in the rest of the world except for in Lithuania. When my rank-and-file calls me a ‘steam train’, I am proud of the moniker” (e Baltic Times 2012).

3.6. Ideology e common feature uniting the four parties in the Baltics, who according to the framework used here can be classified as populist, is not only their novelty (as they all ascended to their respective political landscapes in the first parliamentary elections of the 2000s), but most importantly their anti-establishment rhetoric. e antagonism against elites, government, particular politicians, opposition against all political spectrum and abstract promises to reform respective political systems has been an important discursive strategy for these political parties. As we have pointed out in previous sections, the leader embodies the party in the perceptions of voters, thus the ideological analysis of parties will naturally overlap with the discourse of their leaders. e political platform of TT is based on a loose and vague ideological tenor with considerable anti-establishment stances. At its 2004 congress, the party (then under the name of Liberal Democratic Party) approved a declaration or rather a joint statement elaborating on the current situation and pointing out the existing gap between the people and the elite. e declaration states: “ose in power during the last term of their office have not done much for the sake of the State. Corruption flourished in the country; scandals concerning non-transparent privatization came into light. Financial groups made an evident impact on the legislation; law enforcement oen represented not the interests of Lithuanian citizens but those of the interested political clans. e gap between a handful of the so-called self-enriching elite and enormous numbers of impoverished citizens of Lithuania became deep beyond control (Order and Justice Party

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2004). A declaration of this sort was issued aer every congress. e contents of these documents are loose, vague and mainly deal with the description of the current political climate in the country and emphasizing that “a gap between the Lithuanian people and the governing political groups steadily increases” (Order and Justice Party 2006). Anti-establishment rhetoric has not changed much since then. In its electoral programme for the latest parliamentary elections of 2008 TT again used the antagonism as their traditional weapon. Assessing the current situation in Lithuania, TT states: “In our presence Lithuania was seized by the oligarchic clan – the so-called ‘statesmen’, having occupied places in the power and law enforcement structures, related by close economic relations with oligarchic business, seeking goals which do not have anything in common with Lithuania and its people” (Order and Justice Party 2008). e discourse of TT is indistinguishable from that of Rolandas Paksas. Since the party congress is an important gathering, where strategic decisions are made, it also has media attention. us Paksas has a platform from which to deliver his populist statements and acknowledge the ideological lines of the party. e discursive strategy Paksas uses is highly critical of the present situation, and his critique reaches beyond the political elite into the field of mass media. For instance, in his speech at the parties 7th Congress Paksas continued to declare inequality between the people and the elite, by pointing out that: “A model of that system is the Siemens arena. At the bottom, on hard chairs, thousands of common people who bought tickets to basket-ball games, and at the top, in the boxes of the ‘Lietuvos Rytas’, behind glass, in the so arm-chairs with glasses, the prime minister, president, the owner of the daily newspaper and some trade magnates handling business affairs. (…) Lithuania is being governed from that box” (Paksas 2008). e case of the other Lithuanian populist party, the DP, shows a very similar ideological trajectory. As Jurkynas (2005: 23) has argued, “the populist and ideologically inconsistent behaviour of the Labour Party posed difficulties for experts to establish its general position on the le-right axis.” According to experts in politics, populism is typical of the Labour Party and, as to the essential program provisions and rhetoric of the party leaders it is even a radical antisystemic party (Lukošaitis 2008: 290). Ramonaite (2006: 76) points

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that DP is “a populist party without any ideological orientation rather than the Social Democratic Party that the name of the party would suggest, in its manifesto it presents itself as a party of “centrist” orientation seeking economic prosperity, effective performance of the government and the development of the middle class (…).” As has been stated Uspaskich, the founder and chairman of the party, was accused of a criminal offence. Similarly with Paksas, Uspaskich skilfully uses these “unfair accusations” to communicate with the public and to form a basis for anti-establishment rhetoric. In commenting on these offenses, the leader of the DP stated the fallowing: “A politically motivated vendetta was launched against me and my public persona has been systematically butchered by Lithuania’s state media. As a reformer, I had become uncomfortable for the political elite of Lithuania. So I was branded a fraud and criminal. An attempt was made to kidnap me. e object of this and other harassment was always to neutralise me as a political player. e authorities could not stand my commitment to breaking up state monopolies” (Uspaskich 2011). In its pre-electoral campaign for Seimas elections of 2004, the party particularly addressed the more deprived social groups, promising to increase pensions for a large proportion of the elderly and residents from low social stratum, if Uspaskich and his team were to be successful in the parliamentary elections. Markauskas (2004) commenting on the ideological profile of DP highlights the following: “Its election programme contained a range of promises, from changing the electoral laws to raising pensions and cutting taxes. e party has no clear political orientation, and tries to pursue different political ideologies at the same time.” It seems that discursive strategy of DP has not changed much since the elections of 2004 and 2008. Preparing for the new electoral challenge for the upcoming national elections in October 2012, Uspaskich organised a nationwide pre-electoral race, meeting with potential voters from all over the country. Again the political platform is clustered around criticism of the current government, supplemented with promises to increase the minimum wage, create new jobs and implement favourable conditions for the free development of businesses. e Estonian populist party RP entered into the electoral race with anti-establishment rhetoric, blaming the political elite for being

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corrupt and dishonest and calling for reforms in the political system, promising an open and honest policy process. Sikk (2003: 10) points out that “Res Publica’s campaign rhetoric was not particularly radical, but noticeably anti-establishment. One of their main pledges was the introduction of “new politics” to substitute the “old politics” pursued by the established parties and characterised by unaccountability, suspicious political decisions, self-interest and sleaze. Doing that, the immaculate newcomer set itself apart from the rotten cartel of establishment.” RP has been accused of populism, also due to its “refusal to position itself clearly on the le-right scale” (Sikk 2006: 141). e electoral race was accompanied by such slogans as “Vote for new politics!” and repetition of the catchy law and justice slogan “Choose order!”. e desire to eradicate and eliminate corruption was one of the main messages on which the party based its electoral campaign. “In its manifesto, Res Publica had strongly emphasised its commitment to fairness and justice; it promoted zero tolerance towards violation of laws, and even required every member of Parliament and government to swear a public oath in church that they would resign if they broke the law” (Mikkel 2003: 5). When the party was officially established in December 2001, its leader Rein Taagepera said that “existing parties have perforce sunk into a closed, centralised manner of making decisions. Our decisions must arise form discussions in chapters” (Estonian Review 2001). e appeal for “new politics” was promoted via several initiatives in the reformation of institutional mechanisms. For instance, the party was one of the major advocates of the changes in the party financing regime (Sikk 2006: 70) and paradoxically RP even defended the need to restrict the electoral law so that it would be harder for new parties to enter the parliament. e founding of RP certainly coincided with a heightened nastiness among the existing parties, albeit for personal rather than ideological reasons (Taagepera 2005: 7). “e fortunes rapidly amassed in the murky 1990s could evaporate with equal speed, if social instability continued or even worsened – as it looked around 2000 or 2001. e need to secure existing wealth outweighed the desire for risky new opportunities to increase it. e existing parties had fallen in a rut that exacerbated social problems. Hence, sanitation of society called for a new party” (Taagepera 2005: 8).

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However, it was not only novelty and political inexperience at the core of its popular support. RP also managed to gain the attention of a prominent Estonian former politician, namely, Lennart Meri, President of Estonia from 1992–2001. Although he was not an official member, he participated in the founding congress and publicly declared his affinity to this party, but by no means promoted its public profile. Aer the parliamentary elections of 2003, the party entered government and eventually lost its popular support. In 2006 it merged with Pro Patria Union and formed a mainstream conservative party (Učeň 2007). Anti-establishment rhetoric with a particular emphasis on corruption facilitated the entrance of the JL party onto the Latvian political landscape. Stating the necessity for a new political player, its leader Einars Repse explained that “all political parties have become depraved. Latvia needs a new, capable statesman with new political thinking that would secure the welfare of all the people. New Era will attain that” (Lasmanis 2002). His own entrance into politics Repse (2002a) explained: “In the ten years since the restoration of independence we have not reached the welfare of the people. is is unacceptable for me. For me, the irresponsibility of the governing coalition is not acceptable, corruption in uppermost levels, a destroyed health care system, ineffective state governance and the sinking of people into poverty.” us, the novelty was about establishing a basis for policy platform and pre-electoral supply to magnetise potential voters. JL positioned themselves as a “new thinking”, an implacable contrast to all the mainstream governing parties that were to be blamed for the miserable condition of the people and the state. As in the case of RP, JL demanded political reforms in every policy sector and promised remarkable changes in the case they were allowed to govern. JL’s ideological profile can be labelled as a mixture of neo-liberalism and conservatism. e party stood for private initiative, individual rights and free competition. Meanwhile, the populist rhetoric constituted its main communicative strategy, which by no means stipulated its visibility and helped to achieve the desired publicity. In its manifesto for the Saeima elections of 2002 the party outlined its vision and desired goals in various policy sectors. Within the health

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care and welfare sectors the party promised to “double the health care budget”, “creation of fair pension system and increase of small pensions” (Jaunais laiks 2002). Proposed reforms also concerned other sectors, for example, in education JL guaranteed: “Your children will receive good education regardless of your income” (Jaunais laiks 2002). Dramatic changes were promised in all policy fields. However, the manifesto and, most importantly, the electoral campaign were structured around anti-corruption rhetoric. From the very start, at the first congress where the party was officially established, Einars Repse (2002b) announced in his speech: “Combating corruption is our priority; it will not be tolerated in the Latvian state anymore. A fish rots from the head, thus, starting from above, the state governance will be explicated from corruption, bureaucracy and incompetence. Instead a new generation of politicians and jobholders will come, who are not linked with the current situation.” As the other cornerstone for the party’s ideological appeal was to fight those who do not pay taxes, it was linked with the promise to simplify the tax system in general and this would eventually motivate taxpayers to turn away from the shadow economy. Last, but not least, JL pledged to introduce the rule of law back into the state. In its manifesto JL promised: “You will not be afraid to go out of your house. Law in Latvia will have real power. (…) Wrongdoers will receive strict punishment, and in the courts will work only the honest judiciaries” (Jaunais laiks 2002).

3.7. Electoral Support and Social Base e first elections in the new millennium came as a watershed. Suddenly four newly established parties gained enormous electoral success in the national parliaments of the Baltic States. ese developments served as a ground to the continuous discussion and scepticism of party system stability in the region. e main uniting characteristic of these new political forces was their ideological diffusion and the anti-establishment rhetoric they used in their political campaigns. is chapter is devoted to the overview of the electoral support and will try to highlight the profiles of those who voted for these previously unknown parties. However, due to the lack of data

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it will only be possible to outline the general description of a voter’s profile without going deeply into demographic characteristics. For all four populist parties considered here, their first parliamentary elections brought expected results – they received, with various degrees though, high numbers of deputy seats, which allowed them to become important partners in coalition negotiations (with an exception of TT for the elections of 2004). In the Lithuanian Seimas elections of 2004 the largest proportion of votes was given to the DP. Uspaskich, with his team, managed to become absolute winners, gathering 28.4% of the vote, thus securing DP as the largest faction in Parliament with 39 seats (see table 3.1). e coalition of Rolandas Paksas “For order and justice” received 11.4% of votes, resulting in 10 mandates. us, both populist parties together received 49 out of 141 deputy seats (more than 1/3). e share of new parties increased from 20.6% (in 2000) to 35.5% (in 2004) (Jurkynas 2005: 14). is situation by no means complicated the coalition formation process, since mainstream parties were forced to negotiate and fully consider cooperation mechanisms with political parties who had previously highly criticised them (more on coalition formation in the next section). Table 3.1: Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 2002 %

Seats

%

Seats

10*

12.7

15

Labour Party

28.4

39

8.9

10**

26

%

16.4 24.6

Seats

2008

%

23.9

Seats

2006

11.4

New Era

%

2004

Order and Justice Party

Res Publica

Seats

2003

18

28

* In 2004 parliamentary elections TT participated under the name of Liberal Democratic Party. ** In 2008 DP participated in elections as the coalition “Labour party + youth”.

The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, The Central Election Commission of Latvia, Estonian National Electoral Committee.

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Financial scandals and criminal offences harmed the popularity of DP leader Uspaskich and his party decreased its parliamentary representation from 39 (in 2004) to only 10 (in 2008) seats. e electoral performance of TT also could not be described as an enormous success. However, the party increased its representation by five mandates in 2008. e impeachment of President Rolandas Paksas “helped” him not only to secure publicity, but also to build the party’s pre-electoral campaign and to establish his profile as somebody stigmatised by the Lithuanian political elite. On the other hand, part of those voters disappointed by the performance of DP switched their support to TT. It should also be noted that in contrast to TT, DP aer the Seimas elections of 2004 became a coalition member. Describing the rationale behind the successful start of TT and DP in 2004 Jurkynas (2005: 15) wrote: “Anti-establishment voting, which had resulted in votes for Rolandas Paksas or anti-politics, continued. e DP absorbed a deal of political discontent stealing the show from the radical Liberal Democrats of Paksas.” In the case of the DP the biggest share of votes came from rural areas and voters from low social stratum (Krupavičius 2005, Ramonaite 2008). Indeed, DP and TT were able to attract a great deal of voters disappointed by the performance of the traditional parties. Meanwhile, since the protest vote was of high importance for the success of both parties, they largely struggled for the same target audience. Similar success was experienced by the new-born Estonian party with strong anti-establishment appeal – RP. In its first Riigikogu elections of 2003, the party received eminent popular support and consolidated its positions, by receiving 24.6% of votes. is allowed RP to become one of the two strongest parties in Parliament with 28 deputy mandates (the same number of seats also went to the Centre Party who received 25.4% support). As Mikkel (2003: 3) indicates: “e majority of undecided and disappointed voters gave their protest votes to RP.” us, RP from a completely unknown political label sharply became the most important player on the political scene. Public anticipation was high and promised reforms received legitimacy. Aer the euphoria passed, the politics of routine continued, and RP gradually lost is anti-establishment appeal partly because it was unable to fully implement its electoral

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promises and participation in government forced it to soen its populist rhetoric. e results of RP were “inspired” by the events in Latvia a year ago, when in the Saeima elections of 2002, the newly established JL party with charismatic leader Einars Repse made an “earthquake” on the Latvian political landscape. It took only several months for Repse and his team to establish themselves as a prominent political force and eventually it received almost a quarter of all the votes. e success of JL confirmed the longstanding tradition in the Latvian party system where voters’ preferences are generally unstable and they switch their support, choosing to vote for genuinely new parties. Disappointment with the party’s performance was manifested via the decreased vote share in 2006, when JL received only 16% of votes, thus coming third with 18 deputy seats. Repse slowly lost his popularity and eventually ended his political career, at least temporarily, however the interest of the public in his activities outside politics is still notable.

3.8. Position in the Political System e previous section clearly demonstrates that a demand for new parties with strong populist appeal emerged in the first elections of the 2000s in all three Baltic republics. Because of public support and good performance in the elections, all four parties secured important positions in their respective political systems. e Latvian parliamentary elections in October 2002 resulted in an expected victory of JL. Having received the majority of votes and becoming the largest faction in Saeima since 1993 when the party “Latvian Way” managed to receive 33 deputy seats (a still unbeaten record) Repse and his team had the first hand in the government formation process. It should be noted that during these four years, till the next Saeima elections in 2006, Latvia experienced three governments. JL took part in two of them. Already before 2002 election experts conceded the main coalition partners to be JL and the “People’s Party” (TP). Aer the electoral results were officially announced the coalition process experienced its first problems. e negotiation talks went into deadlock, as both the largest right-wing parties JL

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and TP were not able to compromise. However, the reason was less to do with programmatic differences than with personal antipathies between Repse and the leader of TP Andris Skele. us, in further talks JL insisted on leaving TP in opposition and continued the negotiations with other parties. A four-party government, with Repse as prime minister, was approved by Parliament less than a month aer the elections. e overall government duration was marked by various internal disputes which eventually resulted in Repse’s request to the leader of “Latvian First Party” Ainars Slesers to resign. e attempt to work as a minority government was doomed to failure and aer fifteen months from its establishment Repse announced the resignation of his government. Although JL tried to initiate talks with possible coalition partners, including TP, those negotiations were subject to failure. Eventually the president offered a compromise figure Indulis Emsis, a representative from the “Union of Greens and Farmers”, as the next prime minister. JL refused to take part in this government. Aer Emsis’ government resigned, JL entered the coalition and became a member of the government for a second time. It should be stressed that JL has never positioned itself as an outsider. Instead, from its establishment in February 2002 it claimed the right to lead the government with Einars Repse as their leader and potential prime minister. However, the government formation process was outshone by the ambitions of personalities and a lack of experience. e previously dominant anti-establishment rhetoric was slowly replaced by the routine politics that is the inevitable process for parties becoming themselves the establishment. Similarly to its Latvian counterpart, RP was also successful in putting together a governing coalition headed by its leader Juhan Parts. Sikk (2006: 134) compares the performance of JL and RP by pointing out: “While the parties were very successful both in elections and in the formation of cabinets thereaer they encountered more difficulties in actual governing. While the JL managed to retain high positions in public opinion surveys at least three and half years into its existence, the popularity of (…) RP decreased aer their terms in governments significantly (…).” Immediately aer the elections negotiation talks started between three parties – RP, the Reform Party and the People’s Union. e objective was to eliminate the Centre

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Party from the government formation process (Mikkel 2003: 4). Party leader Juhan Parts had announced that the only party with which RP was not prepared to enter the government was the Centre Party (BBC 2003). Despite the fact that initially President Arnold Ruutel announced Edgar Savisaar, leader of the Centre Party, to form the government, his mission would fail in every way, since other potential coalition members objected to his candidacy. is le the cabinet formation process in the hands of RP’s prime ministerial candidate Juhan Parts (Mikkel 2003: 4). Eventually RP agreed to form a new government with the centre-right Reform Party and the centrist People’s Union. However, the balance of power (and experience) shied in favour of the Reform Party, which assertively pushed its agenda. Parts government resigned aer two years in office, on 24 March 2005 aer Parliament passed a vote of confidence in its Justice Minister. Some sources even expressed surprise that this government was able to survive for such a long period of time. As e Baltic Times (2005) pointed in this regard: “Five ministers either resigned or were sacked for various reasons, one party le over a promised tax break and the leading partner, RP, saw its approval rating all but evaporate since propelling to power in March 2003. (…) RP itself is in trouble. e party that was marketed as incorruptible and clean has now been tarnished by about as much muck as any other veteran political formation. It will take a near-miracle to revive it in the image of voters (…).” e inability to fulfil pre-electoral promises, the collapse of government and various scandals had a considerable impact on the popular image of RP, as the polls indicated a constant decrease in trust. Shortly aer Parts’ government resigned, rumours appeared about a possible merge of RP with Pro Patria Union. Initially party members rejected this possibility. However, several months later, in November 2005, party officials expressed approval to the idea of a merger, which eventually took place on 4th April 2006. us the evolution of RP as an independent political party ended less than six years aer its establishment. From being the most prominent political party with high levels of popular support and high coalition potential, it had become a political party which was forced to join with another conservative party in order not to completely disappear from the Estonian political scene. is marked a contrast with its Latvian coun-

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terpart JL, who in spite of its inability to form a stable and continues government was able to hold its popularity. e Seimas elections of 2004 in Lithuania convulsed the overall political landscape as the populist parties – DP and TT (then – Liberal Democratic Party) – received overwhelming electoral credibility, gaining respectively 39 and 10 deputy seats. “e victory of DP, however, was not so notable as it was expected aer the successful European parliamentary elections as it was not able to form a singleparty government and it was in a disadvantageous situation in the coalition negotiations because of the negative approach of some other parties to the populist leader of the party” (Ramonaite 2006: 74). e willingness to weaken the role of DP in coalition negotiations made the post-electoral talks between the parties more complicated. Since DP mainly based its electoral appeal on the grounds of anti-establishment rhetoric and did not have any ideological orientation, other parties were rather reluctant to cooperate. However, it was problematic to ignore the victory of DP as it also “sought the most important posts in Parliament and the Government. (…) e so-called traditional parties, first of all the Lithuanian Social Democratic party and Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives, could not but take this into consideration. What is more, they were supported by President Valdas Adamkus having a substantial influence on the formation of the Government” (Lukošaitis 2008: 290). Eventually a four-party government was formed consisting of DP, Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, New Union (Social Liberals), and another newcomer “Union of Peasants and New Democracy Party”. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia where the negotiators of coalition building were the winners of the elections, namely JL and RP, in Lithuania DP (having received most of the votes) was not the main driver of the coalition building process. is was because the “negotiation tactics of the parties were determined not by ‘proportionality’ but by ‘negotiation ability’ principles, i.e., final agreements by parties were determined not by the number of received mandates, but by their negotiation potential” (Lukošaitis 2008: 290). is tactic was practiced to help to remove the government formation initiative from the DP. Eventually DP managed to receive four ministerial portfolios. e overall function of the four party coalition was complicated, largely due to DP leader

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Uspaskich’s financial scandals and the performance of the ministers delegated from the party. Eventually the government resigned in June 2006, leaving DP to join the opposition forces. It was not invited to the talks on the next government formation. is served to renew the anti-establishment platform of the party and it continued to criticise the performance of the government. In 2008 voters downgraded both populist TT and DP, which excluded them from any possibilities of participation in coalition negotiations.

3.9. Conclusion e party systems of the Baltic countries are characterised as fragmented and unstable, thus indicating the continuous path towards consolidation. Although the second half of the 1990s were perceived to gradually settle the fluctuating party systems, for the most part in the Lithuanian case, the beginning of a new millennium brought unforeseen changes. Almost simultaneously in all Baltic countries in the first elections of 2000 voters switched their electoral preferences towards newly established political parties, who gained considerable popularity and were elected into national parliaments. We refer here to four such cases – Labour Party and Order and Justice Party in the Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 2004, Res Publica in the Estonian national elections of 2003 and New Era in the Latvian parliamentary elections of 2002. ese parties were established several months before the respective legislative elections and became important challengers to the traditional “old” parties. e very fact that a group of new parties emerged and were elected to the legislative bodies of the Baltic States is only one side of the issue. All four newcomers can be classified as exclusively populist parties (according to the definition used in this book) as their anti-establishment and people-centrism not only formed a part of their communication, but also constituted their ideological substance. It was thus problematic to classify these forces in a precise ideological category. Aer winning popular support on the basis of an extensive anti-establishment appeal, these parties suddenly became prominent players on the political field. From political outcasts they became the estab-

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lishment themselves. Aer their first parliamentary elections only TT (then known as Liberal Democratic Party) in Lithuania, due to low number of seats, was not involved in government negotiations. In the case of Latvia and Estonia JL and RP, respectively, became the key players in the newly formed governments, as their leaders received the prime minister posts. In the case of the DP in Lithuania there was a different situation, where traditional and more experienced parties tried to minimise its coalition potential. However, the newly established governments in all Baltic republics were not able to last long and eventually none of them survived till the next parliamentary elections. Personal ambitious, a lack of experience and conflicts led the governments to collapse. e future of these parties developed differently. RP, aer undertaking the main role in the government, lost its anti-establishment rhetoric and was unable to implement part of its promised reforms. is led to a dramatic decline in its popularity. As a result RP merged with the conservative Pro Patria in 2006. Despite the collapse of Repse’s government, JL was able to maintain its popularity. However, its previously ambitious rhetoric became more grounded. Shortly before the Saeima elections of 2011 JL merged with other parties, establishing the joint political party the “Unity”. e transformation has been less relevant in the cases of both Lithuanian parties, as they continue to be prominent players on the political scene. According to the latest polls DP and TT have considerable chances to be amongst the most successful parties in the 2012 parliamentary elections. e race seems especially interesting since in May 2012 the leaders of both populist parties (together with the social democrats) signed an electoral agreement that is intended to set up a potential rudiment for a government coalition, hence indicating the consolidation process of both populist forces.

This work has been supported by the European Social Fund within the project «Support for Doctoral Studies at University of Latvia».

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List of Abbreviations of Political Parties DP JL RP TP TT TTP

Labour Party New Era Res Publica People’s Party Order and Justice Party National Resurrection Party

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e Baltic Times. 2005. Res Publica Brood. (http://www.baltictimes.com/news/ articles/12355/). e Baltic Times. 2012. Welder-turned-millionaire readies for top prize. (Interview by Linas Jegelevicius with Viktor Uspaskich) (http:// www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/31344/). Učeň, Peter. 2007. “Parties, Populism, and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe.” SAIS Review 27, No.1, 49–62. Tracevskis, Rokas. 2008. “Center-right wind of change?” e Baltic Times (23.10. 2008). (http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/21620/). Uspaskich, Viktor. 2011. e EU’s Human Rights Problem. EP Today. (http:// www.eptoday.com/index.php?articleId=148#).

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4. BULGARIA BLAGOVESTA CHOLOVA 4.1. Politics of Populism in Bulgaria Populism has become a widely discussed topic over the last decade, both in Western Europe and in East-Central Europe. Although there is not a clear definition of this political phenomenon, many scholars have tried to tackle the issue of the emergence and the success of populist parties and movements and to offer an insight into its causes and the consequences. One of the most interesting cases of emergence of new and successful populist actors on the political scene is the Bulgarian case. In fact, starting with the elections of 2001, the political scene in this country during the last decade has been dominated by populist parties, which have also ruled the country during the whole of that period. Two of the most prominent cases of populist parties: the National Movement for Stability and Progress (former National Movement Simeon II, NDSV) and the governing party Citizens for a European Development of Bulgaria, GERB, won the first legislative elections in which they took part with a landslide victory of almost 40% of the vote. is makes Bulgaria one of the most prominent cases of “populist dominance” in East-Central Europe and therefore an important example of the success of populist parties. e third party that can be considered as populist is the extreme right party Ataka, which emerged shortly before the elections of 2005 and became the fourth largest party in the country, keeping its initial electoral support of 8–9% until the elections of 2009. e score of this party, combined with the other two populist parties GERB and NDSV accounts for 30% to 50% of the votes in Bulgaria during the last decade, which is the most significant presence of populist parties from all East-Central Europe.

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On the other hand, one of the three populist parties in this country (NDSV) has proven to be short-lived (leaving Parliament aer only two mandates of existence), which raises the question of the life-cycle of populist parties. ese features make Bulgaria a very interesting case study, not only in terms of the type and strength of populist parties, but also with regard development and organisation. In the Bulgarian case, we have two mainstream and moderate parties and one marginal and radical populist party. All three are dominated by a charismatic leader and based on weakly developed local and regional structures. In order to examine the scope of populism in Bulgaria, we will first briefly present the political system, in which the parties have developed during the last decade. en we will turn to the analysis of populist movements, applying the common theoretical framework of this book. Finally we will address the factors explaining their success and failure.

4.2. The Evolution of the Party System Aer the fall of communism the Bulgarian political scene, like that of most of the countries in East-Central Europe, was divided in two separate camps, opposing each other: the transformed post-communist le (the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) and the fragmented anti-communist right (which formed an umbrella organisation – the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS). Aer the victory of the BSP in the first elections (1990), the SDS mobilised all the forces of the anti-communist coalition and took office aer the elections in 1991, winning the presidential elections in 1992. e first right-wing government proved short-lived and failed aer a successful no-confidence vote in Parliament, aer which the BSP won the next elections in 1994. is period was marked by a deep economic crisis, combined with hyperinflation and soon public protests and manifestations lead the BSP government to resign. New elections were held in 1997. ese new elections were very successful for the right-wing coalition ODS (SDS as main party), which won a landslide victory and

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formed the first government to complete its four-year mandate. During this period, the government initiated a round of economic and social reforms, such as the restitution of land and the privatization of the biggest industries in the country, as well as the first negotiations for accession to the EU and NATO. Although the SDS government succeeded in stabilizing the economy aer the 1995 crisis, many corruption scandals, related to some ministers and members of Parliament lead to huge popular discontent. In the wake of the 2001 elections, a new actor suddenly emerged on the Bulgarian political scene: the ex-king Simeon Saxe Cobourg Gotha, who had recently returned to Bulgaria. Several months before the legislative elections, he announced that he would create a new political party- the National Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV) and participate in the elections. is news provoked enthusiasm among the voters, most of them disappointed with both the le-wing and the right-wing mainstream parties. He managed to win a landslide victory, gathering more than 40% of the vote. Even though NDSV could form a majority government, they made a coalition with the party representing the Turkish minority in Bulgaria: the Movements for Rights and Freedoms, DPS. e new government (coalition between NDSV and DPS) continued the reforms, initiated by SDS and signed the accession treaty to join NATO in 2004. Despite these achievements, the “change” promised by NDSV did not happen and internal disputes within the party, as well as some repeating corruption scandals, considerably weakened it. During the elections of 2005, NDSV lost half of its electoral support and BSP won the elections, but it did not have enough seats to form a majority government. Aer a series of negotiations, a large coalition was formed including BSP, NDSV and DPS and therefore the incumbents spent a second consecutive mandate in office, despite their weak returns. At these elections, as mentioned above, a new party entered the political scene and won some 8% of the total vote. is party was Ataka – considered by most analysts as an extreme right nationalist party. It attracted mainly the protest vote, building on an anti-elitist and anti-systemic rhetoric. During this period, Bulgaria became a member of the European Union and entered a new stage of economic development, but public resentment did not

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decrease: corruption scandals and the rise of organised crime, allegedly connected with the government, provoked a huge backlash in public opinion. In this particular context, one new figure gained an increasing influence: the Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior, Boyko Borissov. He ran in local elections and became Mayor of Sofia in 2006. Shortly aerwards he created his own political party: GERB. is newly created party, built on the example of NDSV, succeeded in attracting voters disappointed by the previous coalition government of the three largest parties. At the European and local elections of 2007 and the legislative elections of 2009, GERB won a majority of seats and aer 2009 created a majority government backed by Ataka in Parliament. As we can see from this short overview of the political system, there have been some major changes since 2001, including the creation of new parties aer each election and a complete change of the major political actors in the right-wing space. In terms of volatility, the results show increasing figures during this period, which also accounts for the instability of the party system (Cholova, Bochsler 2011: 95). e particularity of the Bulgarian case, compared with other countries in the region, is that these new political actors have hardly any links with the traditional parties and emerge “ex nihilo”, gathering persons without any political background, most of them unknown to for the larger public (except for the charismatic leader). is phenomenon is closely related to the populist parties, which have been competing for and occupying the right-wing political spectrum during the last decade, covering both the centre (NDSV) and the extremes (Ataka). In order to explain the success of populist parties, we need to focus first on the definition which allows us to consider them as such.

4.3. Case Selection e question of populist parties, their definition and the criteria of classification, has been raised by scholars since the rise and rapid success of the first major populist party – NDSV in Bulgaria (although the first truly populist party in Bulgaria was the Bulgarian Business

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Block in 1995, which achieved less significant results). Most authors (Karasimeonov 2008, Smilov 2008, Malinov 2008, Cholova, De Waele 2011, Cholova, Boschler 2011, Cholova 2009) identify three major populist parties in Bulgaria: NDSV, Ataka and GERB. A different framework is developed by S. Andreev (2009), who argued that all parties can be considered as populist during some period of their existence, but he also includes the above-mentioned parties in his assessment. Other authors also confirm this identification by including these parties in their large-scale studies (Mudde 2007). On the other hand, most of the literature on populist parties in Bulgaria fails to define the different criteria for the identification of populist parties and questions of classification and measurement (Haughton, Deegan-Krause 2009, Cholova, De Waele 2011). In this chapter, I will take into account the common definition (see chapter on theory) in order to verify if the three parties (NDSV, GERB and Ataka) correspond to the notion of exclusively populist parties or they are just non-exclusively populist. e first criterion I take into account is the ideology of the party, generally based on the program, but also on some discourses and interviews with party leaders. I will not apply this framework to all the existing parties in Bulgaria, because not only are the three parties mentioned above the most recognised as “populist”, but also because the remaining parties have a clear ideological stance (either the post-communist successor BSP or the anticommunist right-wing SDS) and they have no anti-elite rhetoric (only criticising their political opponents, as most parties do). If we follow the common definition, we can identify NDSV and GERB as exclusively populist parties, because they have no clear ideological profile and they have based all their rhetoric and electoral campaigns on anti-elite critiques and populist slogans. is classification takes into account mainly the first electoral campaign of NDSV, because during the second one the party tried to re-position itself and to occupy the political centre, without using strong anti-elitist rhetoric and insisting more on values of national unity and cooperation with other parties. erefore, we can say that the NDSV transformed itself from an exclusively populist party to a liberal-centrist party, losing gradually all its populist characteristics. If the lack of structured ideology and the “unifying” discourse can still be considered as

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“populist”, the party lost completely one of the main populist features: its anti-elitist discourse. e third party we have identified – Ataka, can be considered as non-exclusively populist, because it has a clearly stated nationalist and radical ideology (which some xenophobic and anti-Semite elements) which goes beyond the scope of pure populism. Furthermore, it has modified its discourse and its strategy since 2009, becoming much more moderate and supporting the government of GERB. e problem with this definition, which concerns the three parties, is that they don’t stay populist (or at least don’t keep the same degree of populism) during the whole period. Indeed, most of the parties are more populist at the beginning of their existence or before their initial success than aerwards. is can be due to multiple reasons, but the main one is on one hand the increasing responsibility that these parties share with the other political actors, once in Parliament (or in government) and on the other hand the increasing need for coalitionbuilding potential, which can force weaker parties to moderate their stances (e.g. Ataka). For the purpose of this study, we will consider these three parties as “populist” mainly during the initial period of their existence but we will take into account the whole period of their existence in this analysis, GERB being the only party to remain exclusively populist until today. We would argue, in terms of definition, that even though a party emerges as an exclusively populist party, it can evolve into a non-populist party aerwards, or to a non-exclusively populist and the only methodology this distinction implies is to examine each electoral period separately. In order to present each of the main populist actors on the Bulgarian political scene, we will first start with the history and development of the parties and will then continue with an account of the party organisation, structure and leadership. e last three sections will be dedicated to the ideology of the parties, their electoral support and social base and position in the political system. Each party will be considered separately in order to better demonstrate the specificity of each case.

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4.4. Party History In this subsection, I will briefly present the historical development of the three main populist parties in Bulgaria, taking into account their position on the political scene. All three of them have emerged during the last decade and share some common features of development. As I have mentioned above, NDSV was created three months before the elections of 2001 by the ex-king of Bulgaria, Simeon II, who had recently returned from abroad. e party won a landslide victory in the 2001 elections and formed a government with the DPS, Simeon II thus becoming the first ex-monarch to be elected prime minister. ese elections were not only a great success for the party, but also represented a big challenge, because the NDSV was not entirely prepared to assume government responsibility, lacking both sufficiently prepared candidates and a stable organisational structure. is weakness proved to be crucial during the first mandate, because in March 2004 internal disputes lead to a split inside the parliamentary group and a new splinter group was created: Novoto vreme. In spite the successful reforms introduced by this government in numerous areas (administrative reform, fiscal reform, the emission of Brady in order to decrease the national debt), the ratings of Prime Minister Simeon II decreased significantly during the legislature, not only because he was incapable of controlling the internal disputes in his own party, but also because there was no significant improvement in the living conditions of the population, as promised by NDSV during the electoral campaign. is decreasing public approval led to mediocre results during the local elections of 2003 and marked the beginning of the decline of NDSV. In the elections of 2005, the party received only 19.9% of the votes and BSP (in a coalition with other smaller le-wing movements forming “Coalition for Bulgaria”) came first with 31%. Aer several months of negotiations, the three most powerful parties: BSP, NDSV and DPS decided to form a triple coalition and rule the country side by side. is second consecutive term in government transformed NDSV from the biggest governing party to a minor coalition partner and forced it to comply with the socialist agenda, which proved

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to be fatal in terms of electoral support, since most of the voters of this party positioned themselves as right-wing. Aer a series of corruption scandals connected with the government and despite its success in signing the accession treaty to the EU, popular discontent grew even bigger, not least because it was channelled by a new increasingly prominent figure on the Bulgarian political landscape: Boyko Borissov. Even though NDSV tried hard to reposition itself as a centrist, liberal party during this period (it even changed its name to National Movement for Stability and Progress, keeping the same acronym NDSV) and moved away from its initial populist image, in the elections of 2009, the party did not manage to enter Parliament and lost all of its electoral support, which lead to the resignation of its leader Simeon II. Now the party struggles to survive and has hardly any chance of returning to the Parliament, even though it has changed its leader and further modified its platform. We can consider the lifecycle of NDSV as one of a flash party, confirming the pattern of other populist parties of this type (Sikk, 2005, Roberts 2008, Pop-Eleches 2010, Sikk, Hanley 2012) e second populist party to emerge during this period was the party called Ataka. Its leader – Volen Siderov started his journalistic career in the nineties as an editor-in-chief of the official journal of SDS: “Democracia”. Later, he continued as the host of a TV political program called “Ataka” on one cable channel. is show became very popular and several months before the elections of 2005, Siderov decided to create a new party, bearing the same name (Ataka) and using mainly extreme right and populist rhetoric (Ramet 1999, CapellePogacean, Ragaru 2006, Mudde 2007). e party obtained 8.1% in these elections and became the fourth largest party in Parliament aer the three governing parties: BSP, NDSV and DPS. In the presidential elections of 2006, Siderov gained the second biggest vote and went to ballot. e party managed to keep its support in the European elections in 2007, although it won hardly any votes in the local elections held on the same date. In the 2009 elections, the party still confirmed its support, but once it started supporting the government its rating fell and soon internal disputes led to a split at the beginning of 2012 (the parties National-Democratic Party, NDP and Citizens Union for Real De-

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mocracy, GORD). e campaign of 2009 and the politics aerwards marked a shi in the strategy of Ataka. e party moderated its discourse and its program and tried to present itself as an “eligible and normal” party, leaving aside its previous reputation of a protest and anti-systemic movement. Although this strategy increased the party’s coalition potential and transformed it into a partner of the governing party GERB, it did not prove sustainable in the long term because Ataka lost the support of its core radical voters, without gaining any significant centrist support. Aer a series of scandals during 2011, half of the Ataka MPs joined GERB (10 out of 21MPs) and the party split in three, weakening its position on the political scene. Several prominent figures from Ataka created new parties (D. Stoyanov, S. Binev)1 and the levels of public support in 2012, just a year before the legislative elections, show that there is hardly any chance for it to pass the threshold and remain in Parliament. Ataka’s history shows a similar pattern to that of NDSV, with a flash performance at the very beginning of its existence, followed this time by a relative stabilization and then an inevitable decline. Part of the political fate of this party is due to the role played by its bigger partner GERB, which managed to dominate Ataka aer 2009 and pull it away from its core electorate. GERB was created at the end of 2006 around the Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Boyko Borissov. Before occupying this position, Borissov used to be a fireman during communism and at the beginning of the nineties he was the bodyguard of the ex-communist dictator Todor Zhivkov. He was then in charge of the security of Simeon II when he visited Bulgaria in 1997 and again in 2001. Aer winning the elections, Simeon II appointed Borissov to the high position of Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior. Borissov grew increasingly popular in this position, mainly due to his “war” against organised crime and corruption. In 2006 his ratings were stronger than that of most of politicians, which encouraged him to create a political party. e party had (once more) a flash performance and won both the local and the European elections in 2007. Borissov was 1 ey were both MEPs from Ataka since 2007, D. Stoyanov being a stepson of the leader V. Siderov.

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

elected Mayor of Sofia and continued to attract public attention and support, mainly because of his increasing criticism of the governing coalition. In the 2009 legislative elections, GERB won a large victory, similar to the one of NDSV eight years earlier. Aer the elections, GERB formed a minority government with the support of the MPs from Ataka. Although the rating of the governing party has gradually decreased over time, GERB still remains the strongest party on the Bulgarian political scene. In terms of electoral performance and party history, we can observe that the pattern, shown in the other two cases remains unchanged (flash performance, followed by a stabilization [or decline in the case of NDSV]), with one slight difference. Contrary to the other populist parties, GERB has managed to develop its structures at a local level (partially because some of the mayors and local personalities joined the party aer leaving other parties), which guarantees a more stable support for it on a middle term basis. In order to further explain this aspect, I will address the question of party organisation and leadership in the next subsection.

4.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style e three populist parties in Bulgaria not only have a similar history and pattern of development, but also a similar structure in terms of organisation. ey all have a national council (National Assembly or Congress) which is a representative body of all the party organisations and gathers delegates from all regional bodies. is assembly elects the executive body (National council or Executive council) which is in charge of implementing the decisions taken by the national assembly, to implement party policies and to elaborate strategies (in some cases it can also elect candidates). Apart from this executive body, GERB and NDSV also have a Control council, which is in charge of supervising the activities of the executive body and of solving internal conflicts. e regional and local structures gather members and representatives at local level and participate in the elaboration of party politics, submitting proposals to the national assembly via their delegates. ey must also implement the decisions taken by

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the executive body at local level (for example party lists, electoral strategy etc.).2 is structure, which is similar for the three parties and quite complex in terms of decision-making, is only the official organisation of these parties. In fact, most of the decisions are taken personally by the leader or his most loyal collaborators and are implemented at regional and local level. is logic is valid in the three cases, because even when the party is in government, generally the ministers and MPs follow the guidelines of the leader, confirm his proposals and apply his decisions. is personal leadership style oen provokes discontent, in both the party in Parliament and in the party in office (but is most visible in Parliament and the government) and in many of cases leads to splits (this has happened to both NDSV and Ataka). e role of the leader can easily be traced in the media, where he sometimes contradicts his ministers or councillors, who are then obliged to admit that they were wrong (this is especially true of GERB, but was also visible in the case of NDSV, but less so in Ataka). is personalised leadership has another typical populist feature: the strong media presence of the leader who uses TV programs and every other occasion to attract public attention. is presence increases his popularity over time, but also shows his eventual lack of coherence when he expresses the point of view of the party without having consulted his advisors. e other important effect of this increased media presence is the fact that the populist leaders try to satisfy public opinion in most cases and make their decisions according to mass approval or disapproval of an issue. is leads to a very versatile style of decision-making: the leader oen declares his opinion on a subject and then withdraws from it or modifies it according to public opinion. is strategy was even openly admitted by Borissov (the one to use it most oen), saying that this was the real face of democracy: listening to the voice of the people. Beyond these similarities, there are also some important differences between the image and the style of the three populist leaders. Simeon II was not only the ex-king of Bulgaria and therefore a symbol of the unity of the nation beyond political cleavages, but 2

See official documents: Statute of GERB, Statute of NDSV, and Statute of Ataka.

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

also a “European” politician. He put the emphasis of his campaigns on his expertise as a well-known European aristocrat and businessman, who can introduce the “European way” of doing politics in Bulgaria. During his first and part of his second mandate, he maintained his image of a person who wants to unite and not to divide the population and who takes his decisions wisely without strong emotion, but as a result of a mature reflection. His presence in the media was much weaker than that of most other politicians, but this was part of a strategy of creating a “mystery” around his figure and therefore increased his charisma at the beginning. Aer all the scandals inside his party, this “restrained” behaviour started to look more like a weakness in the eyes of public opinion, which basically lead to the decline of his party. e political style of Volen Siderov was very different. Being a wellknown figure in the media since the beginning of the nineties, he developed an increasingly critical stand towards the political elite and the Turkish minority on his TV show and presented the large audience the “shocking” image of a nationalist rebel, revealing the secret plots of the political class and not being afraid of telling the people the truth. Aer the creation of his party, he started organising manifestations in different parts of Bulgaria and followed a clear anti-systemic and radical nationalistic strategy, combined with good speaking skills and simple but catchy messages. Aer his entry into Parliament, he continued with the provocative speeches from the parliamentary tribune (several times being asked to leave the assembly for reasons of offensive behaviour and being charged by several politicians for false allegations). Aer one similar scandal which ended with the decision not to give the floor to Siderov (because of his insulting behaviour), he and his party le Parliament and did not return until the next elections. During the second legislature, Siderov adopted a much more moderate discourse and his media presence decreased in intensity, compared to the first period. e internal problems in Ataka further worsened its media profile and the repeating scandals lead to a split in the party, with half of the MPs joining the governing party GERB. In terms of electoral strategy, the move away from the “rebel’ image proved to be a mistake, since the party lost its core electorate without gaining further votes.

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e third and last populist leader, Boyko Borissov, has built a very different personal image. From the beginning of his political career, he stood for honesty in politics and most of all for the efficiency of political actions. Soon aer being elected as a Secretary General, he started giving interviews and being present at every important occasion, expressing a ferocious critique against the ruling elites and a willingness to put an end to organised crime in Bulgaria. During the first years of his mandate, some strongly media shaped cases of imprisoned mafia criminals produced a huge impact on public opinion and soon Borissov became one of the most popular Bulgarian politicians. At that stage he started elaborating the platform of his new party GERB, promising to solve all the problems in the country and most of all – to replace the incapable elites in power. e situation was very appropriate for this type of discourse because all the major political actors were now taking part in the government: there was no strong opposition player and this niche was successfully used in Borissov’s strategy. His style was different from that of Simeon and Siderov – he can be considered as the most populist of the three, because not only with his discourse, but also with his looks, he emphasised the fact that he belongs to the people. Elected Mayor of Sofia in 2007, Borissov was present at every important occasion, attracting public attention and persuading the electorate that he is the only politician who cares about peoples’ problems and the only one who can solve them. is strategy proved to be successful and he won the legislative elections in 2009. Once in office, his party faced similar problems to those of NDSV in 2001: there were an insufficient number of well-prepared candidates to appoint as ministers and chiefs of administration, which provoked several critiques (for example the case of the candidate for European Commissioner, R. Zheleva). In general, GERB’s government has not lost all its supporters, although public approval for the party has diminished by half since 2009. In conclusion, we can say that populist leaders adopted different styles and created varied public images, but they all faced similar difficulties, in terms of internal party cohesion and the stability of the electoral support for their parties. is weakness of populist parties, especially in terms of electoral support, can be strongly related to a lack of strong ideology, beyond the populist appeal.

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

4.6. Ideology Many studies (Ivaldi 2004, Ivarsflaten 2005, Jasievicz 2008, Smilov 2008) have shown that most of the populist parties lack a strong ideological background and use populism to attract floating voters. Even though all Bulgarian populist parties use similar populist messages, there are some differences between the type of populism and the way they construct their discourse. We will begin with the two exclusively populist parties: NDSV and GERB and will continue with Ataka which, as mentioned above, is a non-exclusively populist party. As we have underlined in the section dedicated to party history, NDSV was created only months before the legislative elections of 2001 and it had no elaborated political program, apart from the 9 political points, formulated by Simeon II and presented to the public as the main electoral manifesto (NDSV 2001a). Most of the points in this document were quite vague (development of the infrastructure, improving the quality of services for business sector) and others just continued the reforms, initiated by SDS (finalizing the restitution of land, the privatization of the biggest companies and integration into the EU and NATO). Since there was no clear political platform, the only important principle, defended by the party, was transparency and a unification of the people beyond the le-right cleavage. Other electoral appeals contained less serious promises, such as “to improve the standard of living in Bulgaria in 800 days” (NDSV 2001b). Overall, the populist message was dominant in the platform of NDSV, its manifesto and discourse: on one hand the party proposed “to make politics the European way”, unlike the other traditional parties. On the other it promised to listen to the people and make their life easier. Furthermore, a strong accent has been put on the process of European integration, which was “slowed down” by the traditional parties and would be achieved much faster by NDSV. In terms of political orientation, the party proclaimed itself as “right-wing” and first attempted to join the EPP in European parliament, but the SDS vetoed this admission and finally NDSV joined the ELDR (Stoychev 2007). is initial hesitation shows the uncertain political stand of the party during this period, when it was still

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in a search of a clear identity beyond the discourse of criticism of traditional parties. is ideological instability led NDSV to accept the proposal to form a coalition government with BSP in 2005. is proved to be a mistake: most of their right-wing electorate did not accept the coalition with the le-wing BSP and mostly the fact that NDSV had to implement a le-wing agenda (for example the projects on: 20% of corporate tax, social security regulation and the salaries of public servants). During the campaign of 2005, the populist message had almost disappeared from the program and the discourse of NDSV (NDSV 2005). When we turn to the issue salience in the program of NDSV, once more we clearly distinguish two main periods. e first one (the program of 2001) is characterised by a much more right-wing profile. e priorities of the party are oriented to the free market, economic stimuli and European integration. roughout the second period (2005–2009) the party has a much more catch-all profile and it addresses more “leist” issues (social justice, regulation, social harmony). is can be explained partly by the desire to attract centrist voters and to play the role of pivot-party, which also allowed NDSV to make a coalition with the le-wing BSP aer the elections in 2005. is strategy proved to have a negative effect on right-wing voters who gradually turned to GERB. In the program of 2009 NDSV has maintained its centrist and catch-all profile, with a combination of right-wing and le-wing issues. GERB repeated in some ways the strategy of NDSV in 2001, and even though he had more time to prepare a coherent program before the elections, Borissov chose to make a list of 10 points for the development of Bulgaria, most of which stay rather vague (GERB 2009). is time the emphasis is put on the business environment, direct investment, European funds and infrastructure, with only a few concrete proposals. e interesting fact about this program, apart from the lack of coherent structure or pre-determined principles and values, is that it proposes only short-term measures, which can be accomplished during one legislature. Most of the critics of GERB pointed to this lack of long-term vision and accused GERB of becoming too dependent on its leader’s personal “ad hoc” decisions on issues which were not included in the program. is lack of a clear stand,

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beyond the question of the use of European funds, infrastructure and a good business climate, indeed allowed Borissov to manoeuvre easily and quite oen change his position according to public opinion (the last example to date is the Law on the Exploitation of Forests). Once in office, the government of GERB accomplished the concrete measures indicated in its program and most of its achievements at the end of the first legislature are indeed related to the improvement of the use of European funds and the modernization of infrastructure. is principle (short-term measures) can be confirmed by the document stipulating the main principles of GERB in 2009 (GERB 2009). In this manifesto the lack of concrete stands persists and the main principles tackle the questions of political transparency, European integration etc., stating clearly the Christian-democratic orientation of the party, but without referring further to the principles of this political ideology (supposedly GERB makes a reference to this ideology through its membership of the EPP group in the European Parliament). If we have to conclude something on the profile of this party (even if this analysis is based mainly on one single program), we can consider it to be a right-wing party, more business oriented, but without any clear definition of its own political profile beyond the concrete measures it offers in its short program. Indeed, the populism of this party and its true public image come from the discourse and the actions of its leader: Boyko Borissov who, with some notable exceptions, remains the main figure to determine GERB’s position and policies (for example, he always speaks of his party’s policies using 1p. sg: “I decided, I stopped” etc.). When we turn to the smallest populist party in Bulgaria, Ataka, we can notice that its programs, both for the legislative elections of 2005 and 2009, are very clear in terms of political orientation: the nationalist stand is stated from the beginning and repeated in almost every paragraph of the program (Ataka 2005). In economic terms, both programs are clearly protectionist, stipulating that the Bulgarian market should be closed to foreign investors (especially when it comes to big industrial plants) and the revenues of ordinary workers should be increased. If we try to position the party on the le-right scale, Ataka could be considered as leist on social and partly on eco-

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nomic issues, but openly xenophobe and conservative on the cultural axis. Even if there is no clear and well-structured political agenda, this party has a much more elaborated profile, similar to many other extreme-right parties in the region (Mudde 2007), combining nationalism, protectionism, exclusionism and a radical critique of the political class. When compared to NDSV and GERB, Ataka can be classified as non-exclusively populist, because even though it attracts mainly the protest vote due to its anti-elitist rhetoric, it also has a clear, well defined and coherent ideology, inspired by the historical tradition of nationalist movements in Bulgaria before the Second World War. On the other hand, Ataka has copied the structure and the design of the programs of the other two populist parties, because it also presented a relatively short program (2 pages), structured around 10 points in 2005 (Ataka 2005) and 7 points in 2009 (Ataka 2009). e discourse of Siderov is quite similar to that of Simeon II or Borissov in terms of critique of the governing elites, but on the other hand, both his message and his style are quite different. Even though he claims the unity of the people, he only addresses Bulgarians, and mainly those who share his patriotic and utopic idea for the future of the country. His speeches, as well as party documents and stances are filled with historical references, contrary to the other two prominent populist figures, who concentrate on the future and not on the past. e other element which differs from the other populist parties in Bulgaria is the strong level of exclusionism in the program and the ideology of Ataka (Ataka 2005 and 2009). If we consider exclusionism as one of the most important features of populism, then Ataka is the only true populist party in Bulgaria (Mudde 2007, CapellePogacean, Ragaru 2006, Ramet 1999). at is why I would argue that exclusionism is not a core characteristic of populism, especially in the Bulgarian case, but rather a feature that defines extreme right parties. Following the definition, chosen in this book, I would then argue that extreme right parties are non-exclusively populist, at least in this particular case, because they have a strong ideological framework, unlike most of the truly populist parties. Aer having examined the ideological features of the three populist parties, it is necessary to turn to their electorate in order to see

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if they appeal to the same social categories and to reveal the logic behind the populist vote.

4.7. Electoral Support and Social Base If we turn to the electoral profiles, we can see that both GERB and NDSV have similar voters. e vote transfer proves that the people who supported SDS during the first decade later turned to the newly created populist parties – NDSV and GERB. As shown in the data, a great number of right-wing voters turned to the NDSV in 2001 and then the voters of NDSV chose GERB in 2009. If we turn to the electoral profile of these two parties in 2009 elections, we can see that both of them appeal mostly to people coming from the big cities, but not from the capital. In terms of age, while most of NDSV’s voters belong to the 30–40 year old generation, the voters of GERB are rather younger (18–30). is could be due to the generational socialization: younger people who started voting in 2000 and beyond vote mostly for the new populist right-wing parties. e elitist profile of SDS and its bad score as incumbent, drew the voters from the smaller cities away from this party and they preferred to support the NDSV in 2001 and aer its decline, turned to GERB in 2009; the same elitist logic can explain why the most educated voters vote for the SDS while those with secondary education turn to the new parties – NDSV and GERB, which have a more catch-all profile and a populist and antielitist message. Aer this short overview of voters’ profiles we can conclude that most of the voters of NDSV and GERB share a similar profile: they are residents of the big cities or the capital, they are relatively young, rich or middle class, they are not very well educated (high school level, less with university degree) and employees or students (which can also be confirmed by the profile of le-wing voters who are the opposite – they are rather old, coming from the smaller cities or villages, having primary or secondary education and most of them being retired or unemployed) (see Karasimeonov 2006, Liubenov 2011). During the second decade, the younger voters and the residents of bigger cities turn away from the traditional mainstream right-wing party SDS and

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voted for the newly created parties – NDSV and then GERB. ere may be different reasons for this phenomenon apart from the generational effect – the consequences of transition were felt much stronger in the small cities, where unemployment rates were higher and people were less competitive in the global market, being less educated (Karasimeonov 2006). is situation led to a huge disappointment and a protest “punishment” vote at the next elections. Furthermore, the supporters of these two parties can be considered as “floating voters” because they tend to vote for a different party at almost each election, which can explain the rapid decline of NDSV in 2005 and beyond. When it comes to Ataka, the voters of this party share many of the characteristics of the other two populist parties. e majority of them are male, either quite young (18–30) or very old (50–65 and 65+), most of them are from the big regional cities, employed but perceiving their living standard as rather low. is profile remained quite stable between 2005 and 2009. e difference between the electorate of Ataka and the other two populist parties comes from the fact that the level of education of Ataka’s electorate is lower than that of the other two parties and the proportion of women voting for this party is smaller. is feature is common for many extreme right parties, which generally tend to attract a male vote, in most cases, of the less educated. If we concentrate on the transfer of votes between the elections of 2005 and 2009, we can observe that there is hardly any transfer from Ataka to the other two populist parties: NDSV and GERB. On the contrary, most of the GERB voters voted for either NDSV or SDS in 2005, which also proved that in spite of similarities, the profile of Ataka is quite different, not only in terms of ideology, but also in terms of electorate. On the contrary, most of the voters who chose Ataka in 2005 and 2009, had voted previously for either other marginal populist parties with anti-corruption stance (like RZS or Lider) in 2005 or for NDSV or SDS in 2001. is means that part of the right-wing floating electorate disappointed with the SDS in 2001 and the NDSV in 2005, have joined Ataka and confirmed their vote at the elections of 2009. Two hypotheses are possible in order to explain this vote transfer. Firstly, these voters may have cast a protest vote at each election and therefore always against the incumbent party (Pop-Eleches 2010, Sikk, Hanley 2012). In 2001 SDS was incumbent, in 2005 NDSV

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was in the same situation and voters turned to Ataka, who gathered the protest vote. e second hypothesis is that there may have been a radical, nationalistic faction inside the floating right-wing voters, who had never really found a party which represented its ideals and Ataka came as a long-expected option (since there were no strong radical right parties in Bulgaria before 2005). In any case, these voters repeated their ballot in 2009. e last important detail concerning the profile of the voters of the three populist parties is that most of them estimate that there are no positive perspectives for the development of the country in the future and that the political elite is to be held responsible for this situation and for their current social status. Even if this perception is shared by most of the voters in Bulgaria, those who expect being marginalised and who are afraid of losing their social status tend to vote for the populist parties (extreme or moderate), who offer them simple solutions and mobilise an anti-elitist discourse during the elections. is makes the loyalty of the voters towards the populist party very weak and the possibility of switching the vote to another party, when the party they have voted for achieves office (or supports the ruling party), is quite probable. Table 4.1: Electoral Performance of Populist Political Parties in Bulgaria 1990

GERB

1991

1994

1997

2001

2005

2009

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

39.7

116

NDSV

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

42.7

120

19.9

53

3

–

Ataka

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

8.1

21

9.4

21

Source: Central Electoral Commission, Bulgaria.

4.8. Position in the Political System Since I have developed already this aspect when I addressed the question of party history and development, I would like to add only a few details concerning the rise and fall of populist parties, once in

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office. e Bulgarian case is a good example of the logic behind the “populist vote”, based mainly on protest behaviour. e lack of any clear ideology and long-term project in the programs and discourses of populist parties weakens them in terms of the loyalty of voters. ere are mainly two reasons for this: the first one is that voters’ attachment is rather superficial, because they choose the party not because of its program and its vision, but because they want to “punish” the traditional parties and especially the incumbents. erefore, in any case, this vote is more an emotional protest vote then a vote of conviction. e second consequence is that once the populist party comes into office and has the possibility of implementing its proposals and electoral promises, the voters judge its performance on a shortterm basis and the next elections represent a sort of evaluation of its achievements. erefore, there is no loyalty beyond the evaluation of the passed legislature and this regardless of all external contextual factors which may intervene. e Bulgarian case shows the results of this electoral pattern: with two populist parties in office and one supporting the government, two out of three have faced rapid decline. e dynamic of public support is proving the same logic: the support radically declines once the party is in office or holds a responsibility in government.

4.9. Conclusion e main objective of this chapter was to tackle the question of populist parties in Bulgaria and to present not only a brief overview of their history, organisation and ideology, but also to shed some light on the question of the logic behind the populist vote and the consequences of the participation of these parties in power. As we have seen from the analysis of the dynamics of party development, one of the important conclusions concerning the Bulgarian case is the fact that exclusively populist parties, which have no clear ideological profile behind the pure populist message, can on one hand be very effective in mobilizing floating voters, but on the other hand their success includes also the initial causes of their future failure.

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

e availability of a floating electorate and the willingness of parties to profit from the specific demand for new political actors can have a further destabilizing effect on Bulgarian political system and on the quality of democracy in terms of responsiveness of the political actors. Populism can be seen in this context as a symptom of the fragility of traditional parties and their failure to create stable roots and long-lasting organisations which are able to mobilise voters on a long-term basis. Furthermore, the dominance of populist governments, who do not have a single and clear strategy in the long term, can indeed have a negative impact beyond the political spectrum: it can lead to changing and uncertain strategy in terms of economy and welfare, which will in turn aggravate some of the countries’ most fragile sectors. Radical attitudes and protest movements could certainly accompany this process, which may lead to the weakening of democracy in this country. On the other hand, the populist mood is an expression of the willingness for a more direct democracy, more accountability and better government, provoked mainly by the failure of democracy in the first place. .

List of Abreviations of Political Parties BSP DPS GERB GORD NDP NDSV ODS SDS

Bulgarian Socialist Party Movements for Rights and Freedoms Party Citizens for a European Development of Bulgaria Citizens Union for Real Democracy National-Democratic Party National Movement for Stability and Progress United Democratic Forces Union of Democratic Forces

References Andreev, Svetlozar. 2009. Is Populism the ’Bad Wolf ’? Post-Accession Crisis of Representative Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania, Studies in public policy, Aberdeen: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Ataka 2005. Official program of Ataka for the elections of 2005.

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Ataka 2009. Official program of Ataka for the elections of 2009. Capelle-Pogacean, Antonela and Ragaru, Nadège. 2006. “La dérive contestataire en Roumanie et en Bulgarie.” Le Courrier des pays de l‘Est, 2006/2 (No. 1054), 44–51. Cholova, Blagovesta and Bochsler, Daniel. 2011. “From big political change to permanent change of governments. e logic of 20 years of political party competition in Central and Eastern Europe.” In: 20 Years aer the Collapse of Communism Expectations, achievements and disillusions of 1989. Eds. Nicolas Hayoz, Leszek Jesień and Daniela Koleva. Interdisciplinary Studies on Central and Eastern Europe – Volume 9, Bern, Peter Lang, 85–119. Cholova, Blagovesta and De Waele, Jean-Michel. 2011. “Bulgaria: a fertile ground for populism?” Slovak Journal of Political Science 11, No. 1, 25–55. Cholova, Blagovesta. 2009. “Bulgaria.” In: e Diversity of Populism: East and West. Eds. Blagovesta Cholova, Teun Pauwels. Sussex: ECPR Press studies. GERB, 2009. Official program of GERB for 2009. Haughton, Tim and Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2009. “Toward a More Useful Conceptualisation of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia.” Politics and Policy 37, No. 4, 821–841. Ivaldi, Gilles 2004. “Anatomie du vote d’extrême droite et populiste.” In: Droites populistes et extrêmes en Europe occidentale. Eds. Gilles Ivaldi. Paris: La documentation française, 41–69. Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2005. “e vulnerable populist parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success.” European Journal of Political Research 44, No. 3, 465–492. Jasiewicz, Krzysztof. 2008. “e New Populism in Poland. e Usual Suspects?” Problems of Post-Communism 55, No. 3, 7–25. Karasimeonov, Georgi. 2006. Партийната система в България, (e Bulgarian Party System). Sofia: GorexPress. Karasimeonov, Georgi. 2008. Post-Communist Populism and the Consolidation of Democracy, paper presented at the International Workshop Corruption Control: Between Populism and the Quality of Democracy, IV Meeting of the Portuguese Political Science Association, Lisbon, 6–7 March, 2008. Liubenov, Milen. 2011. Българската партийна система: групиране и структуриране на партийните предпочитания 1990–2009 (e Bulgarian party system: grouping and structuring of party preferences 1990–2009). Sofia: Sofia University Press. Malinov, Svetoslav. 2008. Radical demophilia. Reflections on Bulgarian populism. (http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-01-22-malinov-en.html). Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. NDSV, 2001. Official program of NDSV for the elections of 2001. NDSV, 2001a. Official speech of Simeon Saxe Coburg Gotha announcing the creation of “National Movement Simeon II”.

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NDSV, 2005. Official program of NDSV for the elections of 2005. Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2010. “rowing out the Bums. Protest voting and Unorthodox Parties aer Communism.” World Politics 62, No. 2, 221–260. Ramet, Sabrina P., ed. 1999. e Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. Pennsylvania State University Press. Roberts, Andrew. 2008. “Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe.” Electoral Studies 27, No. 3, 533–546. Sikk, Allan and Hanley, Seán. 2012. Paths to “Centrist Populism”? Explaining the Emergence of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties, paper presented in the IPSA World Congress, Madrid, 8–12 July 2012. Sikk, Allan. 2005. “How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe.” European Journal of Political Research 44, No. 3, 391–412. Smilov, Daniel. 2008. “Bulgaria.” In: Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov et al. Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 15–38. Statute of Ataka. Statute of GERB. Statute of NDSV. Stoychev, Stoycho P. 2007. “Europeanization of the Bulgarian Party System: Dynamics and Effects.” CEU Political Science Journal 3, No. 1, 2–24.

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5. THE CZECH REPUBLIC VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK 5.1. The Politics of Populism in the Czech Republic e Czech Republic’s experience with a relevant populist political party reaches back to the very beginning of the 1990s and the Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ), a party led by Miroslav Sládek. e Republicans had Parliamentary representation in the years between 1992 and 1998. In addition to their extreme right-wing rhetoric featuring nationalism combined with xenophobia to the point of racism, a fundamental part of their identity was a populist appeal joined to a critique of the changes implemented aer November of 1989 (which the Republicans labelled “the velvet rip-off ”). In 1998, thanks largely to the meteoric rise of ČSSD (discussed in more detail below), the party was unable to surpass the required voter threshold. is, combined with internal strife and financial difficulties, led to the party’s marginalization and eventual disappearance. e successor party, Miroslav Sládek’s Republicans, failed to achieve success even when running under the old party name in 2010. Over the succeeding 12 years, Czech party politics functioned without a populist political party in parliament. Change did not come until the 2010 elections to the House of Deputies, in which the Public Affairs party made a breakthrough aer building its election campaign around criticism of the established parties, thereby profiting from growing dissatisfaction with the current political situation. In contrast to the Republicans and in spite of its own image as a party of protest, Public Affairs possessed undeniable coalition potential and became part of the new centre-right government aer the elections. e lack of a concrete political platform and a lack of internal unity, together with emerging corruption scandals led, in 2012, to the exit of Public Affairs from the government and the party’s dissolution.

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e Czech case is thus an interesting one because of the existence of varied types of populist parties. While the Republicans may be characterised as a party for whom populism was a logical supplement to a primarily radical right-wing identity, Public Affairs was a party which built its identity pretty much exclusively on its populist appeal.

5.2. The Evolution of the Party System e political party system in the Czech Republic may be characterised as relatively stable compared to other countries in East-Central Europe (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009, Olson 1998). Prior to the 2010 parliamentary elections, the same four parties, complemented by one to at most three other parties, had always gained the parliamentary representation. e sole exception was the first free election in 1990. Contributing to the relatively low fragmentation of the party system from its beginnings in the “post-November” years was the proportional voting system employed, which, since 1990, has included a five-percent threshold at the national level.1 In terms of interactions between individual actors, the party system may be characterised as being less stable (Strmiska 2006, Strmiska 2007), something reflected in the makeup of the cabinet (Havlík 2011, Kopeček, Havlík 2008). e 1990 elections were won with almost 50% of the vote by2 the Civic Forum (OF), a broad-spectrum political entity which originated shortly aer the events of November 17 and very quickly took on the role of initiator and representative of the Czech-Czechoslovak3 1 In the 1990 elections to the Czech National Assembly, transformed aer the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the Lower Chamber of Parliament of the Czech Republic, only four of 23 political parties in the race succeeded in getting seats. e situation was identical in both houses of the Federal Parliament. 2 ese results are at the level of the Czech National Assembly. In elections to one chamber of the Federal Assembly, Civic Forum achieved more than 50% of the vote. 3 It should be noted that both the democratic transition and the party system in the two republics within the Czechoslovak Federation evolved differently in many respects. is fact was unchanged even when some Czech political parties ran candidates (unsuccessfully) and both members of the Federation.

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transition to democracy (in which, because of the way the transition was handled, Civic Forum assumed the role of chief partner to the Communist Party during regime change negotiations – Pšeja 2004a, Suk 2009). In second place, at a considerable remove, was the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, continuing to stand behind ideologically unreformed positions. In March 1990, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia came into being as a counterpart of the Slovak Communist Party. In subsequent years, the party’s support has exceeded 10% of the vote. Only in 2002 did the communists approach 20% of the vote (see Fiala, Mareš 1999, Fiala, Mareš 2005a). e Christian Democratic Union also obtained parliamentary representation. is was a coalition of several primarily Christian democratic parties led by the Czechoslovak People’s Party. In later years, the coalition became a long-term stable component in the party system under the name Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL), with support oscillating around 7% of the vote (Fiala, Suchý 2005). KDU-ČSL has been part of the government along with both right-wing parties (1992–1998 and 2006–2009), as well as with ČSSD (2002–2006). Noteworthy in the early years of the democratization process was the success of the Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Association for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS), reflecting a Moravian regionalist outlook (Mareš, Strmiska 2005, Pernes 1996, Springerová 2010, Strmiska 2000). e breakup of Civic Forum was important in the dynamic development of the party system in the Czech Republic. In spring of 1991, this led to the rise of the liberal-conservative oriented Civic Democratic Party (ODS). A substantially smaller portion of the Civic Forum, closer to Havel’s critique of the party system, split to form the Civic Movement. While the Civic Movement failed at the polls in 1992, ODS went on to become the strongest political force over the next six years, with voter support averaging around 30% (Pšeja 2004a, Pšeja 2004b). Harsh criticism of the transformation process directed by ODS served to motivate the rise of the Czechoslovak (later Czech) Social Democratic Party (ČSSD). e party made use of a vacuum of sorts on the le of the political spectrum and in 1996, under the leadership of Miloš Zeman, became the strongest opposition political

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party, acquiring more than four times (!) the vote it had previously received. ODS and ČSSD gradually assumed the position of the two chief poles of the party system, gaining more than 50% of the vote together (in 2006, more than 67% of all valid votes cast – Kopeček, Pšeja 2008). Another party which gained parliamentary representation starting in 1990 (at that time as a part of the Civic Forum) was the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), whose voter support was somewhat over the 5% level. Aer a financial scandal and a critical exodus of party members, the Alliance did not take part in the 1998 elections (Pšeja, Mareš 2005, see also Dimun, Hamerský 1999, Mareš 1998). To a certain extent, the party was replaced by the Union of Freedom, at least insofar as its platform went. is party came into being in 1998 as an offshoot of ODS. Its member had split from the ODS in protest of the party’s lack of funding transparency, among other things (Kopeček 2010). As a result of the so-called opposition contract (Roberts 2003), the decision was taken to join forces with other centre-right parties to form the so-called Coalition of Four (later simply Coalition – Fiala, Mareš 2005b). e 2006 elections ended up in a fiasco for the Union of Freedom party which, at that time, flirted with anarchy and lost voter confidence when it formed a government alongside the le-wing ČSSD. By contrast, the Green Party had not been able to exceed the election threshold until the 2006 elections (Čaloud et al. 2006: 21–25, see also Pečínka 2005). Specific to the Czech political party system of the first half of the 1990s was the relative success with voters enjoyed by the Republican Party, which will be explored in detail further on. e fairly stable party system in the Czech Republic was disrupted by the results of the 2010 parliamentary elections. For the first time since 1990, the Christian democrats failed to gain any seats. By contrast, the Public Affairs and TOP 09 parties were successful (Hanley 2011, Haughton et al. 2011, Havlík 2010). Both of these parties will be explored in detail below. e Greens were unable to defend their parliamentary seats and the voter share of both of the largest political parties dropped more than 20 percentage points.

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5.3. Case Selection No studies have been done devoting systematic attention to the issue of party populism in the Czech Republic. Populism has for the most part been treated heretofore as a compliment or component (and not a key component) of the identity or rhetoric of primarily extremist right-wing political parties. Studies have focused on the SPR-RSČ, the National Party and, in recent years, the Workers’ Party which, aer being dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court, reformed as the Workers’ Party of Social Justice (Hanley 2012, Kyloušek, Smolík 2006, Mareš 2005, Mareš 2012, Mareš, Vejvodová 2010).4 As the SPR-RSČ, which combined a systematic use of anti-establishment appeal with radical right-wing ideology, is the only one of the above mentioned parties that was able to get across the electoral threshold, we will deal with it in detail below. To assign other political parties or their election promises the label “populist” is common, particularly in media discourse, but the term is also sometimes found in academic discourse and in the mutual evaluations of political competitors.5 Use of the term, however, is problematic. ere is no clearly designated definition and the label is equated with the politics of mass appeal or a politics of unrealizable promises. Under this conception, populism has a priori negative connotations as a term of derision for particular political actors. e “social populism” label is usually assigned to the policy of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia for its egalitarianism and requirements for extensive state intervention into economic and social policy, or to the social democrats for their promise of a so-called thirteenth pension payment, something which was part of their 2010 election platform (ČSSD 2010). Nevertheless, over the long-term, the communists and, to a much lesser extent, social democrats did not build their appeal on the divide between ordinary people and other 4 Because neither the National Party nor the Workers Party has ever been represented in parliament, we will not discuss them further. 5 For instance, in the 2012 regional elections the ODS accused the social democrats of being populist. Populism was meant to be rather the politics of unrealistic promises than challenging the establishment in the name of the people.

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elites/political parties, but rather upon their opposition to the turn the country took in the direction of “capitalism” aer 1989 (e.g. the well-known slogan about “scorched earth” used by the former chairman of the ČSSD Miloš Zeman before the 1996 parliamentary elections – Kopeček 2010). e Communist Party particularly lambasted the policies of the right-wing political parties. Its attitude to social democracy was one of moderation.6 e communists’ prevailing political view centred on the dichotomy between le and right, not that between common people and the elites. In their recent study, Seán Hanley and Allan Sikk (2011) defined so-called anti-establishment reform parties (AERP) which are characterised by moderate mainstream (pro-liberal) reform discourse, anti-establishment rhetoric and appeal to voters and by genuine newness.7 Hanley and Sikk scored political parties in terms of the three characteristics and created a list of AERPs in East-Central Europe. e list included also four Czech political parties: Public Affairs, TOP 09, US-DEU and the Green Party. From the point of view of our approach (see the theoretical chapter of the book), out of Hanley and Sikk’s criteria only anti-establishment appeal constitutes key feature of populism. e newness of the party refers only to the circumstances under which a party was established. In other words, a party can be populist in any period of its life. erefore, the newness cannot be taken as defining feature of a populist party as it is defined in this book. If we exclude the newness from Hanley and Sikk’s score-list, only two Czech political parties fully meet the criteria of anti-establishment appeal and the political reformism – Public Affairs (see below) and TOP 09. TOP 09 was established shortly before the 6 e KSČM program for the 2006 elections included, among other things, the statement: “In the elections, people will decide between the neoliberal right-wing policy represented primarily by ODS and the le-wing policy behind efforts to maintain and develop the basic values of a social state!” (KSČM 2006: 1). Before the 2010 elections, the communists emphasised their distance from the large potential coalition between the ČSSD and ODS (KSČM 2010). Nevertheless, statements by top party representatives confirmed the prevailing right-le perception of political competition by KSČM (Grospič 2010, Klán 2012). 7 AERPs therefore share many characteristics with so-called new/centrist populist parties (Pop-Eleches 2010, Učeň 2007) or liberal populism (Mudde 2007), for more see Hanley and Sikk (2011).

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planned 2009 election when a group of MPs led by Miroslav Kalousek le the Christian democraticts (former Minister for Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg became the chairman of the party). From its beginning, the party had very clear idelogical profile, strongly based on the pro-liberal economic policy of reducing of the public debt (of the main electoral slogan of the party referred in a negative way to the economic situation in Greece). e party presented itself mainly as a “purer” representative of right-wing economic policy (in contrast to ODS who was forced to make many compromises during its participation in coalition cabinet between 2006 and 2009). TOP 09 strongly criticised the social democratic party and had a clear anti-communist stance. However, the anti-leist attitude of the party was rather a consequence of its right-wing political programme than an expression of the typical anti-establishment appeal (Havlík 2010, Koubek 2010). erefore, TOP 09 do not meet the criteria of a populist political party as it was defined in the theoretical chapter of this book. e Public Affairs party, which was successful in the 2010 elections has so far not been subject to detailed analysis. However, researchers studying the party have made use of the term populist because of the way the party systematically distanced itself from the existing political actors (Havlík 2010, Koubek 2010). By presenting itself as a pure alternative to all established political parties and as an advocate of the people’s interests but lacking any strong ideological attachment, the party can be classified as an example of an exclusively populist political party. erefore, in the following analysis we will focus on two entities, these being the Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (and its successors) and the Public Affairs party.

5.4. Party History e Association for the Republic–Republican Party of Czechoslovakia was established to represent the republican movement which formed shortly aer November 1989. Aside from Sládek’s group, there was also the Republican Union (for more details, see Mareš 2003). e formal origin of the Republican Party dates to February of 1990, when the party founders selected Miroslav Sládek as chairman.

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Right from the start, the parties reacted radically against practically all other political parties, including the Civic Forum and Slovakia’s Public Against Violence. e party, in coalition with the Grassroots Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradespeople, did not win a seat in the 1990 elections but two years later managed to get past the election threshold, in elections to both houses of the Federal Assembly as well as the Czech Parliament, where it remained until 1998. Because of its radical nationalist (sometimes even racist) stances, the Republicans had very limited coalition potential and remained in opposition throughout the entire period they were in Parliament. In 1998, the party failed to win enough votes to stay in Parliament. Not long thereaer, financial problems arose leading to the “transformation” of SPR-RSČ to the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (RMS).8 RMS was not successful in subsequent elections.9 It was weakened by the exodus of a number of party members, including Tomáš Vandas, the former party secretary, who later founded the Workers’ Party, a competing entity. e Republicans put no candidates forward in the 2006 elections. Two years later, their activities were frozen by the Supreme Administrative Court for failure to submit financial reports (Nejvyšší správní soud 2008). 2008 saw a merger between roughly six radical right-wing parties, including the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek, and the rise of a new formation using the old label, Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia. In 2010, SPR-RSČ unsuccessfully competed in the elections, putting forward a slate in only two of fourteen electoral districts. In December 2010, the Supreme Administrative Court froze the party’s activities on the recommendation of the government. e reason was failure once again to submit financial statements by the party (Nejvyšší správní soud 2010). e origins of the Public Affairs party lay in a citizens’ initiative arising in 2001 in a section of Prague, which led party chairwoman An electoral coalition including the Republican Party, the Czech Association of Pensioners and the Independent Republican Youth stood for regional elections under this name in 2000. 9 With the exception of several seats won at the local level, including seats on the town council of the Brno suburb of Útěchov, where Sládek served out a portion of the term as mayor. 8

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Stanislava Moravcová to found Public Affairs, s.r.o.10 e initiative was originally focused on local politics (the number of parking places available, or the issue of privatizing municipal flats). Public Affairs was registered as a political party in July of 2002. In the local elections of 2002, the party gained one seat on the Prague 1 City Council; four years later it got one-fih of the vote in Prague 1, more than 15% of votes in Černošice (Prague – West district) as well as in Kostelec nad Orlicí. e party’s core activities maintained their focus on the capital city, where other local Public Affairs organisations were founded over time. In the 2008 Senate elections, Public Affairs put up candidates in the Prague 1 and 5 voting districts but neither of its candidates made it to the final round of voting. With its national ambitions gradually taking shape, Public Affairs entered the race for the European Parliament in 2009. Although with only 2.4% of the vote, the party was not able to cross the election threshold, it did manage to come third among political parties lacking seats in the Parliament. In June 2009, the party announced it would compete in the early elections to the Chamber of Deputies planned for that autumn.11 e party also announced Radek John, party chairman from June 2009, would be campaign head. John was a former writer and investigative journalist who gained great popularity during his former position at TV Nova, the private channel with the greatest viewing audience.12 10 e company was later renamed Vydavatelství Pražan, s.r.o., (Pražan Publishing) and began to publish Věci veřejné magazine. Its circulation was alleged to stand at 4 million (the Czech Republic has approximately 10 million inhabitants). According to Pražan and Public Affairs, production costs for one magazine came in at CZK 1.00, approximately equal to 4 Eurocents. is led to speculation that the magazine served as a tool for secretly financing Public Affairs, particularly when it became evident that key magazine advertisers included the ABL agency owned by Vít Bárta, the party’s informal leader (Kaiserová 2009). 11 In September 2009, the Constitutional Court cancelled the elections because the Act used to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies was found unconstitutional (see Balík 2010). 12 John became popular particularly anchoring the program Na vlastní oči, on which he and other journalists did investigative journalism. Between 1996 and 2002, John won the Týtý award as the favourite “TV Journalism Personality” in a nationwide audience poll. He was awarded the prize once more for the 2005–2006 season. In 1995, he had been absolute winner in the contest, garnering the highest number of votes across the competition categories.

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e party attempted to boost its voter appeal by combining forces with the smaller entities SNK European Democrats and Alternativa for planned, but cancelled parliamentary elections. e collaboration with SNK ED also continued into the 2010 elections. e party election campaign was built primarily on criticism of the established political parties (detailed information below). Public Affairs obtained 10.9% of the votes and became part of the governing coalition, together with ODS and TOP 09. In the 2010 senatorial contest, not a single Public Affairs candidate won a seat.13 In the 2010 local elections, Public Affairs won approximately 300 seats representing 0.5%, with its greatest success once again coming in some districts of Prague.14 e party’s time in government brought with it a number of disagreements both with coalition partners and within the party itself. is was capped by the informal leader of the party Vít Bárta’s indictment for corruption which involved several other Public Affairs representatives. Bárta was later found guilty of the charges. e internal disputes inside Public Affairs resulted in the party’s exit from the government, a decision the party’s moderate wing disagreed with. Some delegates around Deputy Prime Minister Karolína Peake decided to remain in the government, le Public Affairs and established a new political party with the name LIDEM. e remaining party members, led by John, le to join the opposition. Polls peg their support as of June 2012 at approximately 0.5% (Kunštát 2012b).

5.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style roughout its existence, SPR-RSČ and its successor RMS have been tightly linked to the person of Miroslav Sládek. Sládek was the decisive figure in the party. anks to his relatively strong charisma and proOnly Stanislav Czudek, from electoral district 73 in Frýdek-Místek, made it to the second round out of all Public Affairs candidates. 14 But the party did not make it onto the Prague City Council, partly because the city had been divided into several electoral districts, something which was decided by the Council before the election. Had Prague remained a single electoral district, Public Affairs would have gotten 5.7% of the vote and won seats on the Council. 13

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nounced rhetorical abilities, he drew interest in television discussions and party meetings alike, of which he attended hundreds.15 e party’s organisational structure16 was bi-level, with both central and local organisations, a point on which the Republicans differed from other parties. e party’s central power was invested in the chairperson, the national committee and the convention (called by the chairman or, in rare cases, the national committee, once every four years), in addition to a review and arbitration commission and the party treasurer. e Republicans typically had a high degree of centralization, with all important decisions involving Sládek himself, who wielded substantial power as chairman. Among other things, he named as vicechairmen whom he could empower to represent him (Mareš 2003, Šimíček 1996). Anti-communism was a fundamental condition for membership in the party. Aside from the standard conditions (legal competence or the attainment of at least 18 years of age) no one who had been part of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia organisation could be admitted (Mareš 2003: 211). e Republicans either established or were closely allied with several other organisations, including the Republican Trade Union, the Association of Pensioners of the Czech Republic and the Republican Youth Movement. In 2002, the Republican Youth Movement was dissolved following a decision of the Ministry of the Interior, later confirmed by the Supreme Court. e reason was the wording of the group’s platform and acts which would beach the provisions of the law which prohibits conspiring to deny or restrict the rights of citizens on grounds of their nationality, race or ethnic origin. A weekly magazine published by the party for many years, the Republic, served as a platform for presentation of the party’s opinions (Mareš 2003). e party’s history was fraught with frequent disputes, oen based upon Sládek’s manner of leading SPR-RSČ. ese repeated internal disputes were apparent within the group of Republicans seated in Parliament, which suffered frequent exits on the part of members. In 1992, for example, the party had 14 seats, only five of which were 15 While participating in meetings (of which he did four or five a day), he confronted representatives of other parties who, in his estimation, “may come to the public square just before the parliamentary elections” (Česká televize 2010). 16 SPR-RSČ and the RMS had almost identical organisational structures.

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still in Republican hands by the end of the term. Prior to the 1998 elections, information appeared regarding an alleged misuse of party funds by chairman Sládek, who was accused of trying to enhance obedience with million crown payoffs (Mareš 2003: 198). Sládek le the party along with his long-time former secretary, Jan Vik, who later became chairman of the new Republican Party. e formal dissolution of SPR-RSČ came about via internal funding problems which led in the end to its bankruptcy. In 2000, SPRRSČ reacted by founding a new political party – the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek, which came into being through the renaming of the Independent Republican Youth.17 RMS was headed by Pavel Procházka, up to that time a member of the Republican Youth. e formal functioning of SPR-RSČ was headed by Laura Rajsiglová, who later became Sládek’s wife. A mass re-registration of SPR-RSČ members in RMS followed. Sládek became RMS chairman in February 2002 (for details on the internal development of both parties see Mareš 2003: 199–201). In 2002, Tomáš Vandas, the former SPR-RSČ treasurer, le RMS and founded the Workers’ Party early in that year. In subsequent years, RMS took part in some integration attempts by extreme right-wing parties, which, in the end, were not successful, and supported the National Party before the 2006 elections. Sládek later became leader of SPR-RSČ, something which arose as the result of integration attempts by several extreme right-wing political parties in 2008 (Bastl et al. 2011: 234). Shortly aer the unsuccessful participation of the Republicans in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled to suspend party activities at the request of the government. e reason was the breach of the party’s obligation to submit annual financial reports in the years from 2006–2009. e formal functioning of Public Affairs during the time the party was competing in the 2010 parliamentary elections was governed by statutes adopted in June 2009 which amended its 2004 statutes. No substantial changes were made to the structure of party leadership 17 As early as autumn of 2000, the RMS coalition competed for votes in regional elections. It included SPR-RSČ, Pensioners’ Association of the CR and the Independent Republican Youth.

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bodies. e highest body in the party is the Conference, consisting of local party chairpersons (referred to in the statutes as the “Club”), the party’s senators and representatives and members of the Council and Guild, other party bodies. e Conference was also to include the chairpersons of special party committees, an inspector (the party’s monitor), members of the arbitration committee and representatives of the party in state administration and local authorities under a system designated by the Council. e Council was to meet at least once per year and adopt “basic decisions concerning political activities”. Its duties also included confirming the choice of the directly elected party chairperson in his or her function and the executive vice-chairperson and other vice-chairpersons, as well as Council members. e Conference also had the right to approve statutes and the budget. e Council was conceived as the executive body by the statutes, consisting of a chairperson, executive vice-chairperson, other chairpersons and other members selected by the Conference. Another body (re)defined by the party was the Guild, a “party body at the central level”, which submits proposals to the Council and approves the slate of candidates for elections. Assemblies, as a regional party organisation, were excised from the statutes (Věci veřejné 2009). In spring of 2011, the party adopted new statutes which made moderate changes to the form and title of party bodies (the National Committee was reinstated, among other changes). e position of the party chairman was also partially strengthened (Věci veřejné 2011). e statutes adopted in June 2009 differed from the foregoing statutes by virtue of their strong emphasis on direct democracy. e party became known by the unofficial designation “e Direct Democracy Party”). Substantial changes were related to the position of the so-called “Véčkaři” – party supporters who have registered to play a defined role in the party. ese members had already been noted in the statutes adopted in 2004, but now they were to play a significant role in party functioning. Under the new statutes, the Véčkaři (as well as registered party members)18 would choose the party’s national and 18 e June 2009 statutes were somewhat unclear on the point – in Art. 3.14, they state that one right of party members is to “vote for and be voted into all Party bodies”. But Art. 4.1 maintains that “party members give up their right to vote for party chairman,

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local leadership and decide which candidates were to head the party slate (Věci veřejné 2009, Věci veřejné 2011). ey were also to decide the party’s position on all important issues. e party did actually bring a number of referendums,19 but these were accompanied by well-grounded allegations that the results were manipulated, as well as low turnout (see Hloušek 2012). As a consequence, party supporters later decided only on the choice of leadership. e first chairman of the party when it came into being was Prague entrepreneur Fredegar Formen, who was replaced by Stanislava Moravcová roughly half-a-year later. Starting in 2005, the chairmanship was assumed by Jaroslav Škárka, who later became an MP. is was the period during which people connected to Vít Bárta and his private security agency e White Lion Agency (Agentura bílého lva, ABL), gained influence, while the party’s founders gradually le. Škárka remained party chairman until the midpoint of 2009, when the post was assumed by Radek John, who shortly before the 2010 elections was identified by opinion polls as the most popular or most trustworthy politician (Kunštát 2010, STEM 2010). As of the date of writing, John remains in the chairmanship of Public Affairs (August 2012). However, following his actions in the government and the party’s development, he has now become one of the least trusted politicians (Kunštát 2012a). To properly understand the internal functioning of Public Affairs, it is even more necessary20 than with other political parties to differentiate between formal and informal party mechanisms. Much more important to the party’s functioning than its statutes or the composition of party organs was the influence of the subsequent head of the Public Affairs parliamentary group, Vít Bárta. Bárta was the owner of the private ABL security agency and one of the foundlocal leaders and leaders of the candidate slate to registered supporters in the interests of direct democracy” (Věci veřejné 2009). Under this article, party members may only vote if they are registered supporters. In practice, however, both registered supporters and registered party members have taken part in voting. 19 An overview of referendums is available at http://www.veciverejne.cz/vysledkyreferend.html. 20 Our focus is strictly on the period during which Public Affairs was elected to Parliament, and the succeeding period.

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ers of the Association of Proactive Entrepreneurs,21 which decided to provide financial support for the Public Affairs party – not yet in Parliament – as part of an officially declared goal to improve the political and economic situation in the Czech Republic. ey contributed CZK 12 million (approximately €500,000 – Kmenta 2010). Although Bárta long stood outside the party’s official organisational structure, some of his colleagues had already been active in Public Affairs. He himself held off becoming a member until May 2010. He first served as election manager for the party, but stories began to leak to reporters that it was Bárta and not John who actually held the reins in Public Affairs. e party’s formal chairman, John, was by contrast seen as the popular face of the party, whose task was “only” to attract voters. e fact that until May of 2010 John could not officially negotiate in the party’s name served as indirect proof that his role was that of a “voter magnet” (this also partially followed from the party statutes, under which executive control was given to the vice chairman of the party, a post held by Jaroslav Škárka at the time. See Pokorný 2010). However, it later became evident that from 2009 functioned the so-called Concept Council which functioned alongside official party bodies headed by Bárta and was comprised of Josef Dobeš, later Minister of Education, Kateřina Klasnová, who later married Bárta and became an MP, and Jaroslav Škárka, among others. Radek John, the party chairman, was not however a member of the council(!). is council, which formed the real decision-making body of Public Affairs, met in Bárta’s apartment. Its members called themselves “gurus” and Bárta called himself the “superguru”. e Concept Council was defined by the so called TOP Managerial Ethical Codex which, together with the 2009–2014 Strategy, another unofficial party document, determined the principles of the party’s actual operations. It also described Bárta’s plans to make use of Public Affairs as a tool for tying political and economic power. Both documents reveal the party’s highly centralised management. Bárta had the final say not only in the Concept Council, but also in making decisions about 21 Members of the Association included later MP Michal Babák and later Minister for the Regional Development Kamil Jankovský. Radek John identified the pair as being the authors of the party’s economic program (Česká televize 2010).

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establishing local party organisations (in the codex this was referred to as the “granting of licenses” – Kmenta 2011, see Hloušek 2012).22 e short parliamentary history of Public Affairs to-date was accompanied by internal strife resulting in the exit of MP Stanislav Huml from the party’s parliamentary group in spring of 2011. Huml le in reaction to the publication of information that party members had acted corruptly in a scheme with Vít Bárta (see below). Aer publication of the information, Škárka and Kristýna Kočí were ejected from the group. e affair, which ended in the conviction of Bárta, Škárka and Kočí, not only led to the fragmentation of the party’s parliamentary group, but of the party as a whole and to the emergence of the platform and later political party LIDEM, headed by then Deputy Prime Minister Karolína Peake.

5.6. Ideology At the meeting which established SPR-RSČ in February of 1990, chairman Sládek characterised the party as “a true radical right-wing party which will be the guardian of democracy and whose platform rejects any cooperation whatsoever with communists or any party close to them” (SPR-RSČ 1990: 2). is sort of anti-communist rhetoric was typical for the entire period the Republicans were in existence, oen combined with anti-establishment appeals. ese included re22 is highly centralized party management was also reflected in contracts to be signed by all candidates prior to the 2010 elections which bound them, if they were elected as MPs, to “act and carry out legal actions in keeping with the interests of the Party and represent its positions and opinions for the entire time of their office as a Member of Parliament of the Czech Republic (…)” (Věci veřejné 2010b). Should an MP elected on the party’s slate refuse to join the party MP group, leave it or repeatedly fail to participate in its meetings, he/she was bound to pay the party CZK 7 million (approximately €280,000) as compensation for party costs incurred during the election campaign for the MP in question. Reacting to the expulsion of a candidate on the slate aer she refused to sign the contract, legal experts mostly agreed that the contract was in breach of both the Constitution of the CR and the Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms (e.g., Pavlíček, Vydrová 2010, Štastný 2010). Some candidates, including some later MPs, refused to sign; others later negotiated changes to the contract (Válková 2010).

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ferring to former Communist Party members as “comrade” or “cadre reservist”23. Sketching out the ideological identity of the Republicans requires analysing not just the party’s official program documents but also books written by24 Miroslav Sládek and the Republika weekly noted above. Already at its inception, the Republican Party attempted to distance itself to the maximum extent possible from other political entities, including the Civic Forum. (“If we’re for democracy, from first principles we cannot acknowledge any body to be above political parties. Regardless of whether the body is referred to as the National Front or, currently, Assembly, the Civic Forum or Public Against Violence.” – SPR-RSČ 1990: 8). Later, the party’s typical broadside made use of the term “governing clique” to refer to practically any other political party. In the book “… A tak to vidím já”, Sládek wrote: “A group that gets to power isn’t interested in the opinions of citizens. It loses contact with what’s going on ‘down below’ and just looks out for its own interests. Laws… are adopted not for the public good but to prolong the group’s mandate… In its confusion, the public has unfortunately put such people in power for a period of time” (Sládek 1992). e governing clique had, according to Sládek, a one-point program: To steal and embezzle in the shortest time possible, because politics has an uncertain future and no one knows what might happen next” (Sládek 1996). e Republicans made repeated verbal attacks on President Havel, sometimes vulgar (Kopeček 2010: 166). President Václav Klaus, too, became the subject of later attacks.25 “Comrade” was a typical form of address used between members of the Communist Party. Sládek happily addressed, among others, the former Minister of Industry and Trade and Civic Democratic Alliance member Vladimír Dlouhý in this fashion, as well as Finance Minister Ivan Kočárník and Jan Stráský, the federal government chair aer 1992. 24 Sládek was the author of the books A tak to vidím já (1992), Znamení doby (1994), To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda (1995), Právě váš hlas rozhodne (1996) and Nikdy jsem vám nelhal (1998). 25 In 2010, a video appeared on YouTube in which Sládek paraphrased an attack which had been made by Peter Cibulka, a former dissident and subsequent head of the right-wing block, on former President Havel. e words were “Vašek, you’re a pig!” and Sládek directed them at President Václav Klaus because of his position towards Germany (Vašku, ty jseš ale prase). 23

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e Republicans presented themselves as the “only actual opposition” compared to other political parties. On the TV program Duel, which aired shortly aer the 1992 elections, Sládek made the following statement regarding the social democrats, then in the opposition: “Of course, this is only opposition for the sake of opposition, because Václav Klaus needs some kind of opposition – not an opposition which might actually eliminate him, but an opposition which will play like the National Front and calm the public for him” (Československá televize 1992). e party’s anti-establishment appeals based on anti-communism discussed above included criticising the events of November 1989 and subsequent developments as part of a staged plot. In a TV debate following the 1992 elections, Sládek stated: “No real revolution took place on November 17, 1989. Not much has changed; the same people are still in power. Everybody sees the antics of Comrade Mečiar” (Česká televize 2012). At a Republican meeting in the spring of 1991, Sládek declared his aim to be to “stop the continuing devastation of the Czechoslovak Republic, to stop the political and economic decline caused by the current rulers of the Czechoslovak Republic and the governing post-communist and cryptocommunist powers” (Sládek 1992). e Republicans presented themselves in contrast to this picture as defenders of interests of the “common man”. In his book “…A tak to vidím já’, Sládek says: “I think everyone deserves the same attention. My real interest is every decent citizen of this country, not the amorphous roaring crowds clapping on command beneath the balcony and the grandstand” (Sládek 1992). is populist appeal in the case of the Republicans must be taken as a supplement to an otherwise fairly clear radical right-wing identity featuring pronounced nationalism, along with xenophobia to the point of racism. Typical was the party’s critical position to Romany people (whom Sládek consistently referred to as Gypsies). He saw them uniformly as people who do not work, who steal and take unauthorised social benefits: “e Gypsy ethnicity is highly rigid. ey’re mostly involved in criminal activities. is country is ours. We make the rules. Either the Gypsies respect them or they can get out… Most Gypsies take disability retirement when they reach 18 and have never worked” (Sládek 1992).

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At the beginning of the 1990s, SPR-RSČ took a firm stance against the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation and demanded a referendum be held on the issue (Československá televize 1992, Sládek 1992). On foreign affairs questions, SPR-RSČ (and later RMS) was against membership of the Czech Republic in NATO and the European Union. Membership in both organisations was seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and was compared to the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Anti-German attitudes were typical of the party for a long period, emphasizing alleged threats by Sudeten Germans, particularly regarding the restitution of property which had been nationalised aer the Second World War on the basis of degrees by President Beneš (Sládek 1992). e Republicans were also in favour of reintroducing the death penalty. e party’s development on socioeconomic issues was interesting. SPR-RSČ’s first platform sided with economic liberalism, putting the individual in the forefront and emphasizing the key role of a free market. e 1990 Republican platform read, “e fundamental goal of economic policy must be the consistent introduction, as rapidly as possible, of a market economy” and “state interference into the market mechanism must be limited to creating conditions for the growth of economic prosperity, solving the ecological situation and improving social policy in keeping with global trends” (SPR-RSČ 1990: 3–4). In the platform document entitled Current and Prospective Tasks, the SPR-RSČ stressed the role of the individual: “e basis for the welfare of all citizens (and society as a whole) is purposeful work and economic activity on the part of the individual. e individual’s own abilities, diligence and labour will allow him to create his own standard of living” (SPR-RSČ 1990: 13). Over time, the Republicans began to stress the need for state intervention, typically in areas to do with housing, agriculture (preserving food subsidies) and “national” culture (Sládek 1996). ese concrete positions on individual policies thus called into question the party’s originally declared right-wing affiliation. In the early years of its existence, Public Affairs focused on issues to do with local politics in Prague. Its identity was based upon a critique of steps taken by the city leadership then in charge, or by the leadership of individual Prague boroughs. e most obvious way Public Affairs distanced itself from other parties was its criticism of

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the Prague 1 municipal apartment privatization (Petrášová 2003), and of other things such as Prague traffic difficulties attributed to poorly thought through roadway reconstructions and excessive noise at night (Hympl 2004, Petrášová 2003, Mladá fronta Dnes (Prague) 7/7/2004). A petition organised by Public Affairs, the aim of which was to recall the mayor of Prague 1 for selling apartments at prices which put the city at a disadvantage (Sehnoutka 2004). e party’s ambition to work its way into national level politics caused it to modify and extend its platform and electoral appeal. e electoral program presented by the party before the 2010 elections covered all important areas and, in this regard, did not differ from the program documents of other political parties. A closer look at the document shows the program was a mixture of right-wing and le-wing ideas on how to resolve particular issues. On the one hand, Public Affairs supported a competitive market environment and limitations on state intervention; on the other, the party supported the re-introduction of progressive taxes (Věci veřejné 2010a). During the election campaign, Public Affairs originally declared itself to be a centre-right party (e. g. vice-chair Kateřina Klasnová referred to the party somewhat schizophrenically as a “right-wing party with social sensibility”, while John later characterised it as centrist – Pokorný 2010, Právo, 30/4/2010). is lack of ideological definition was testified to by official statements from party representatives who frequently questioned the traditional view of politics as a matter of le and right. For example, in early May 2010, John said: “We don’t want to move le or right, we want to move forward” (Pokorný 2010). Vít Bárta answered in a similar spirit: “e classic sign of a political dinosaur is a strict right-le view of society. It’s the view of a political generation which has passed away. is view of the world has aroused our dissatisfaction. It has ceased to function and that’s why there are calls for change. ere is also a centrist ideology, the ideology of correct solutions. at’s what I believe in” (Mladá fronta Dnes, 7/5/ 2010). Before both the ultimately cancelled elections (Balík 2010) and the elections which actually took place, Public Affairs presented itself as an alternative to established political parties and the way politics was conducted (Havlík 2010). As to the coalition preferences the party

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would hold aer the elections had taken place in autumn 2009, party chairman John announced that Public Affairs would be “against everyone”, albeit especially against the Communist Party and the social democrats (Mladá fronta Dnes, 9/9/2009). Party members who had been compromised the most were labelled by Public Affairs as “political dinosaurs” who should exit the political scene altogether. On another occasion, John, the party chairman, identified these “political dinosaurs” with the “first generation of post-communist politicians” (Česká televize 2010). e party’s key election campaign theme was to rein in corruption, which it associated with the established parliamentary parties. e following declaration by Radek John in February of 2010 is illustrative: “ieves (politicians) need darkness so no one sees what they steal… ey’re just assholes (politicians) who have to play games with public funds” (Mladá fronta Dnes, 8/2/2010). Party vice-chairman Vít Bárta let it be clearly known that he was opposed to the “large” political parties: “e large parties are either incorrigible or could be reformed only with difficulty. ey have led to a democracy of robber barons who hold some regions of the country under their control and even influence several political parties at the same time” (Mladá fronta Dnes, 7/5/2010). Public Affairs also emphasised the promotion of various elements of direct democracy, which it presented as a tool for changing the “current (lack of) political culture” (Věci veřejné 2010a: 1). Its declared goal was to expand the use of the referendum to the national and regional levels. Tied to this was a demand for direct election of the president, regional heads and mayors. e party’s election platform stated: “Direct elections are the only way to prevent politicians from creating a system based upon close ties which will allow them to use their influence to abuse their function while still being sure of their own re-election” (Věci veřejné 2010a: 1). Public Affairs also declared it would attempt to introduce an option to recall politicians. On foreign affairs topics, the party presented itself as a pro-European party with the goal of a “unified, capable European Union”. e party came out in favour of economic integration but was against the entry of Turkey into the European Union (Věci veřejné 2010a: 40–41).

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5.7. Electoral Support and Social Base SPR-RSČ first took part in parliamentary elections in 1990, in coalition at that time with the Grassroots Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradespeople. e election coalition had little chance of success going up against the Civic Forum. To make matters worse, inside the Civic Forum was another party also named the Republican Party, and yet another called the Republican Union, independently seeking votes as part of the Freedom Block. e coalition in which Sládek’s party was involved received a total of 1% of the vote and thereby failed to achieve mandates in any of the elected bodies for which it was running (these being the two houses of the federal and national parliaments). During the parliamentary term, SPR gradually began to attract voters, something which was confirmed with the results of the 1992 elections, in which the Republicans obtained a little less than 6% of the vote and 14/200 seats to the Czech National Council. In both chambers of the federal parliament, the party did even better, taking more than 6% of the vote to gain out 8 of 99 seats to be divided among parties in the Czech portion of the federal Chamber of People and out 6 of 75 seats in the Czech portion of the federal Chamber of Nations. But the Republicans’ greatest election success came in the parliamentary elections four years later, when the party received more than 8% of the votes and got 18/200 seats. e early elections in 1998 saw the end of the Republicans’ time as a parliamentary party. With not quite 4% of the vote, the party did not make it past the threshold. In the 2002 elections, now running under the name of the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek, they received less than 1% of the vote. In 2010 (the Republicans did not compete in the prior election four years earlier), the fall of Sládek’s party, running once again under the SPR label, was confirmed when it received only 0.03% of the vote.26 Nor did they achieve any success in regional elections. In no location did they exceed the 5% voting threshold necessary to gain seats in any of the regions. And the same was true for all elections to the European Parliament, where Sládek’s party averaged around one-half of one 26

e Republicans ran candidates in only two electoral districts out of 13.

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percent of the vote. During the 1990s, Sládek’s party repeatedly won more than 10 seats in local government. Sládek himself was successful in 2002 in local elections in one district of Brno (the candidate slate carried the name Independents for Security and Prosperity) and served as mayor for part of the term. Exit polls done in 1996 provided a good look at the structure of the Republican electorate. On a supplementary basis, information from election studies done in 1992 and exit polls from 1998 are also illustrative.27 A study carried out by Martin Kreidl and Klára Vlachová (1999) must also be noted as a secondary source. Over the long-term, the majority of Republican voters were male (e.g., 67.3% in 1996). An age breakdown shows a prevalence of younger voters. In 1996, more than 35% of SPR-RSČ voters were between 18 and 29 years of age, compared to 24% in the population as a whole. e Republicans had a higher-than-average success rate with first-time voters in 1996 (IVVM 1996, see IVVM 1992, IVVM 1998). Age, however, cannot be taken as a decisive variable in the choice to vote for Republicans. As Kreidl and Vlachová note, social status or class as well as level of education played a statistically significant role. Generally, Republican support was higher among less educated members of the lower middle class. Almost one in eight manual workers voted for the Republicans that year, with the same group comprising almost one-third of SPR voters in total. Almost two-thirds of the party’s voters in 1996 had only an elementary school education or attended a trade program which did not grant diplomas (as opposed to 43% of the general population). e Republicans also had greaterthan-average success with unemployed people, particularly those 27 e Center for Public Opinion Research also carried out studies during the 1990s but the limited number of respondents voting for the Republicans – numbering only in the dozens – lessens the utility of the data. In 1996, for example, the election studies contained data from just 60 SPR-RSČ voters. e exit polling done the same year interviewed 971. In terms of size, the 1996 and 1998 election studies and exit polls were comparable to the 2010 surveys. Both surveys focused more or less on key sociodemographic characteristics. In contrast, the 2010 CVVM election study was substantially larger in terms of the number of questions than the exit poll carried out for Czech TV. On the other hand, the disadvantage of the election study compared to the exit poll lay in the relatively limited number of respondents. For this reason both the 2010 exit poll data and the parallel CVVM election study data will be used in what follows.

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with a lower level of education (IVVM 1996, Kreidl, Vlachová 1999). A territorial analysis shows the Republican Party’s major support lay in peripheral areas, particularly in Northern and Southern Bohemia. By contrast, the party had lower-than-average support in Moravia (Pink et al. 2012). e data on the outflux of Republican voters in 1998 is highly interesting. More than two-thirds of those who voted for the party in 1996 voted for one of the le-wing parties two years later (ČSSD, KSČM, Důchodci za životní jistoty – Kreidl, Vlachová 1999, see IVVM 1998). Even in 1996, data showed that most voters who had formerly voted for SPR-RSČ were voting for the social democrats instead. Of those who did vote for the Republicans, the majority had been former ODS and Civic Forum voters, as well as voters for the Le Block – IVVM 199628. With a certain amount of caution, it may be maintained that the fall of the Republicans in 1998 was tied to the rise of the le, particularly of ČSSD. is is fairly interesting in view of the fact that the SPR-RSČ had always presented itself as a right-wing political party. As noted above, in its early years Public Affairs function as a local political party seeking the support of voters strictly in local elections in selected districts of Prague. In 2006, the party entered the race for the Prague City Hall for the first time, but failed to gain even 1% of the vote and therefore received no seats. In that same election, however, Public Affairs had excellent results in Prague 129, where it obtained more than 20% of the vote, taking second place behind ODS. In 2009, Public Affairs took part in national elections for the first time. Elections for the European Parliament (EP), for which Public Affairs put forward Kateřina Klasnová as its candidate, showed the party’s potential with voters. Although it did not manage to gain a seat in the EP, 2.4% of the votes made it the third most successful party which failed to exceed the necessary 5% threshold. e Civic Movement came into being aer the breakup of the Civic Forum, representing a primarily social-liberal stream close to the political vision of Václav Havel. e Le Block was an election coalition headed by the Communist Party. 29 In so-called “statutory” cities, which include the capital, Prague, city boroughs hold their elections at the same time as the city itself. Prague 1, which includes the city’s historic center, is the most populated borough. 28

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By the time of the 2010 parliamentary elections, the party was already headed by Radek John. It received 10.9% of the vote and 24 seats out of 200. Public Affairs had received the highest vote count30 of any new political party in the parliamentary elections since 1992. To characterise the Public Affairs electoral base, we will primarily make use of information from exit polling carried out during the 2010 parliamentary elections and CVVM data. Special attention will be paid to the specific context of the 2010 elections and the advantages and disadvantages of both surveys (see note 36). e geographic distribution of the party’s electoral support will also be briefly noted. e exit polling (SC & C and SPSS 2010) data show most Public Affairs voters were women. e voter gender distribution, however, did not significantly differ from population norms. Public Affairs recorded an above average result with younger voters (18–44 years of age). In contrast, the party was not popular with the oldest voters (only 6% of voters 60 years of age or older voted for it). e lower share of older people among Public Affairs voters corresponds to the reduced electoral support among the retired (7%). In contrast, a slightly above average result was recorded for students (13% of students indicated they voted for Public Affairs). e VV`s voters education distribution did not significantly differ from the population average. Public Affairs was the most successful party among voters who had not participated in the previous parliamentary elections. Almost one fih of the party’s voters consisted of citizens who did not take part in the 2006 elections. is represents the largest share of all parliamentary parties. Almost every fih prior non-voter opted for Public Affairs (TOP 09 was only slightly more successful in this regard). Above average support from younger voters is confirmed by the fact that other than TOP 09, it was Public Affairs which had the highest (5%) share of new voters among the ranks of its supporters. Every sixth new voter decided to vote for Public Affairs (only ODS and TOP 09 were more successful in this regard – SC & C and SPSS 2010). e time it took Public Affairs voters to make their decision is not surprising. Public Affairs was the parliamentary political party with 30 Without prior representation in the Parliament. Under this criterion, TOP 09, which split off from KDU-ČSL, does not qualify as a new political party.

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the highest share of voters who made their minds up no sooner than two weeks before the elections. It is quite interesting that the share of voters who had made up their minds earlier than two months before the elections declined significantly versus the 2006 elections. is trend is also testified to by data from a competing election study carried out by CVVM, which showed that, compared to previous years, there had been a decline in the share of voters declaring strong ties to a particular political party. Although more than half the respondents in 2002 identified with one of the political parties, eight years later this was true of not quite two-fihs of respondents. ese data show a general weakening of ties between (potential) voters and political parties. In other words, the likelihood of changes in voting behaviour between the two parliamentary elections of recent years grew. Data on the decision-making period for a particular political party confirms that Public Affairs was the beneficiary of the drop in party identification and a growing number of indecisive/undecided voters. Almost two-fihs of Public Affairs voters (the most of any parliamentary party including another new political party – TOP 09) decided to vote for the party within a few weeks of the elections (CVVM 2010). e growing number of undecided voters with weak ties to political parties created favourable conditions for the rise of new political parties. e likelihood of a successful populist election appeal was increased by the record numbers of people signifying dissatisfaction with the political situation. Long-term growing dissatisfaction with the political situation shortly before the 2010 elections had reached record levels. Rising dissatisfaction with the political situation is also visible in the changing motivations for taking part in the elections between 2006 and 2010. Although in both cases almost 30% of respondents indicated the main reason for their taking part in the vote was their preference or support for a particular political party, in 2010 twice as many respondents (approximately one-fih) did so because they wanted change and were dissatisfied with the political situation. is made room for political parties presenting themselves as critics of existing politics, or as bearers of change (CVVM 2010). e protest character of the Public Affairs’ vote is confirmed by the motives for participation expressed by voters of the parliamentary parties. Of all parliamentary parties, Public Affairs had the smallest

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share of voters taking part because they supported the party of their preference (only one-seventh of the party’s voters). By contrast more than one third of VV voters (the most of any parliamentary party) took part in the election primarily because of a longing for change or due to dissatisfaction. e other new political party, TOP 09, also had a relatively high share of dissatisfied voters. Compared to Public Affairs, however, a substantially higher number of TOP 09 voters took part in the elections to support the party or its campaign program. e data show that the prevailing motive for Public Affairs party voters to take part in the elections was one of protest, rather than a positive vote in support of the party or its program (CVVM 2010). John’s party may be understood primarily as an alternative for voters who had no close relationship to any of the existing political parties. But the party’s voters did not come from all sides of the political spectrum. Data from the 2010 election study and from the exit poll shows that VV voters were primarily from the centre-right, with only minimal support from voters located on the le of the political spectrum. Almost a fourth of voters – the highest proportion of any parliamentary party – came from the centre of the le-right cline. Also worth noting is the fact that Public Affairs had the highest share of voters (more than 7%) who were unable to locate themselves on the le-right spectrum. e majority of the party’s voters were centrists and those who could not place themselves on the le-right spectrum because of VV’s efforts to portray itself as a political party standing outside the traditional conflict between right and le. A closer look at voter movements between the 2006 and 2010 elections, however, shows that almost half (one third according to the exit poll data) of Public Affairs voters had been ODS voters four years earlier. By contrast, only approximately one-eighth (one-fourth according to the exit poll data) of VV voters had cast their vote for le-wing parties (ČSSD and KSČM – CVVM 2010, SC& C and SPSS. 2010). e geographic support for Public Affairs was very evenly distributed, although significant gains were recorded in primarily border areas to the north and west of the country. e claim that former ODS voters had gone to Public Affairs was confirmed by the fact that the party was successful in areas which had recorded good results for ODS in 2006 (Pink et al. 2012).

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

In the light of the data presented, it would appear that the Public Affairs Party’s election results represent a protest by dissatisfied centrist ODS voters.31 e party was also the most interesting alternative for former non-voters, with more than one-quarter of the party’s voters not having taken part in the 2006 elections (CVVM 2010). Table 5.1: Electoral Performance of Populist Political Parties in the Czech Republic 1990*

1992*

1996

1998

2002

2006

2010

% Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

SPR-RSČ (RMS)

–

–

6

14

8

18

3,9

0

1

0

–

–

0,03

0

VV

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

10,9

24

* The Czech National Council elections results

Data source: Volby.cz

5.8. Position in the Political System Primarily due to its ultra-right-wing ideological profile (nationalism and xenophobia to the point of racism), strong anti-establishment appeal and partially, the excesses of its leaders, SPR-RSČ found itself in an isolated position from the start, one which had zero coalition potential. An exception, but one which was not particularly important in the overall scheme of things for the party, was its election coalition with the Grassroots Democratic Party and indications of cooperation with other minority parties, some anti-communist in nature, others pro-Moravian. Miroslav Mareš also talks of a degree of cooperation with some organisations close to the communists (such as the Czech Borderland Club), made possible by the potent anti-German feelings held by both sides. e party’s attitude to other “competing” rightwing extremist entities was usually critical, with a few regional exceptions such as Ostrava (Mareš 2003: 204–205). 31 e election study data shows that the greatest number of ODS defectors went to TOP 09, but these were more right-leaning voters than those who defected to VV.

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e Republicans were never considered an appropriate partner in coalition discussions (among other things, along with the communists they were le out of the invitation from President Havel to discuss the formation of a government aer the 1996 elections). In 1996, according to representatives of ČSSD, a statement made by Sládek saying citizens believe “Roma people’s criminal liability originates at birth” was one reason ČSSD allowed the formation of a right-centrist minority coalition (see Havlík 2011). On the other hand, the Republicans were never completely cut off from parliamentary soil, because they repeatedly became members of parliamentary committees (Sládek, for example, was a member of the Foreign Committee from 1996–98 and Jan Vik was a member of the Defence and Security Committee from 1992–96). ey never attained a leadership position in Parliament. Alongside their parliamentary activities, the Republicans functioned as a non-constructive opposition, famous for their extensive interpellations of members of the cabinet (Syllová et al. 2008: 282). Representatives of Sládek’s party always voted no in votes of confidence, whether they be against Klaus’s cabinet or that of Josef Tošovský (Havlík 2011). ey earned media attention blocking the vote of President Václav Havel in 1993, as well as with verbal assaults from SPR-RSČ MPs on Václav Havel in the 1998 elections. Republican chairman Sládek was an unsuccessful candidate in both elections. At the time of the latter election, however, he was unable to make any personal appearances, because he was behind bars for an anti-German statement he made at a demonstration protesting the signature of the Czech-German Declaration (Mareš 2003). With the 1998 elections, SPR-RSČ lost relevance and Sládek has never been able to regain it. Public Affairs was identified from the start as an alternative to the existing elites. Its early presentation of itself as a centre-right party was connected with a sharp refusal to cooperate with the communists. Former members of the Communist Party were forbidden from joining the party and it was originally quite reserved in its dealings with ČSSD. e party spoke somewhat more favourably about the possibility of working with centre-right parties such as ODS and TOP 09 aer the elections (Tachecí 2009). e party’s coalition preferences were also oen down to personalities. Before the 2010 elections, John repeated his refusal to form a coalition with the communists

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and conditioned collaboration with other parties on the absence of some of their representatives in the government (e.g., Jiří Paroubek, the chairman of the ČSSD or Ivan Langer, the former ODS Minister of the Interior – Česká televize 2010, Mladá fronta Dnes 7/5/2010). In spite of the fact that Public Affairs had set itself apart from both large political parties, shortly before the elections a meeting was held between representatives of the party and those of ODS and ČSSD on the possibility of John’s party taking part in the government (Mladá fronta Dnes 20/5/2012, Šťastný 2010b). Shortly before the elections took place, Public Affairs announced it was prepared to enter the government and, aer conferring with ČSSD in a formal move, started discussions on a coalition government with ODS and TOP 09. In spite of the fact that Public Affairs repeatedly stated that the alternative to its participation in the government was “mere” support of ODS and TOP, a coalition contract was concluded rather quickly (approved, by the way, by the interparty Public Affairs referendum). Public Affairs obtained the posts of Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister (Radek John), Minister of Education (Josef Dobeš), Minister of Transport (Vít Bárta) and Minister for the Regional Development (Kamil Jankovský) (Kopecký 2010). e party’s participation in the government was fraught virtually from the start with disagreements with coalition partners. Several weeks aer the government took office, budget cuts, with which Public Affairs did not agree, became a topic of dispute. Squabbles between coalition partners brought forth a demand from the party that a change be made in the position of attorney general. Public Affairs eventually backed off the demand. e party’s ideological conference, which took place in December of 2010, resulted in a critique of the government’s taxation policy and retirement policy. Aer this, in a vote of confidence organised by the opposition, Public Affairs conditioned its support on the government fulfilling certain requirements. Václav Klaus helped to “extinguish” the nascent government crisis by initiating a meeting between the coalition partners. A sharp disagreement which resulted in the end in a schism within Public Affairs and its leaving the government was brought on by the revelation of information concerning the actions of Vít Bárta, who allegedly acted corruptly toward members of Parliament. is information was made public by

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Jaroslav Škárka, later joined by Kristýna Kočí, then-deputy chairperson of the party’s parliamentary group. Bárta resigned his ministerial post and the crisis brought personnel changes at the Ministry of Interior (John became Deputy Prime Minister for Battling Corruption). e corruption allegations against Bárta went to court. He was put on probation and both Škárka and Kočí were sentenced, as well. During the court hearings, information surfaced on alleged efforts by Kočí and Škárka to divide the party’s parliamentary group, with the support of ODS and TOP 09, to create a bi-chromatic government including Public Affair dropouts. Within Public Affairs, voices demanding the party leave the government grew stronger. e division of the party into a radical and conservative wing supporting the party staying in the government became ever clearer. e party leadership took sides with the radicals and presented its coalition partners with an ultimatum about whether it would remain in the government and subsequently requested an expression of confidence. Public Affairs ministers also submitted “deferred demission”. e negative reaction by ODS and TOP 09 (who essentially opened the way for early election preparations) reinforced Public Affairs’ conservative wing and led to an agreement on the state budget (for a clear overview of the role played by Public Affairs in Nečas’s government, see Hloušek 2012). e growing schism within the party and the termination of Public Affairs as a governmental party was catalysed by the court sentences handed down to Bárta, Škárka and Kočí. Bárta resigned the post of the chairman of the Public Affairs parliamentary group, but announced he was going to continue his political activity. In reaction to this, Karolína Peake, the deputy chairperson of the party, Chairperson of the Legislative Council of the Cabinet and the most significant representative of the conservative wing, le the party and founded a new political party – LIDEM.32 Only 12 legislators remained members of the Public Affairs parliamentary group. (Together with the “rebellious” MPs, Bárta, who was sentenced, was also excluded from the group.) Public Affairs announced it would leave the government, now consisting of ODS, TOP 09 and Karolína Peake’s platform. In a vote of 32 e name of the party LIDEM means the abbreviation of “Liberal Democrats” and in Czech “To the People”.

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confidence, some Public Affairs MPs supported Nečas’s cabinet. However, the majority of the Public Affairs parliamentary group, including John, the chairman, voted against it (Kopecký, Werner 2010).

5.9. Conclusion e success of populist political parties in the Czech environment has been subject to change. In the 1990s, SPR-RSČ gained success by combining a populist appeal with right-wing rhetoric. e party of Miroslav Sládek was very critical to post-1989 development and its populist rhetoric was closely tied to anti-communism, xenophobia and racism. In contrast, Public Affairs, which first succeeded in the 2010 elections, did not have a clearly defined profile and built its identity on its anti-establishment appeal, with a specific focus upon direct democracy and fighting corruption. Both political parties showed a high degree of centralised management, even though in the case of Public Affairs the real decisionmaking power was located outside the official party structure. In both cases, authoritarian party leadership (in the case of Public Affairs connected to corruption) became a cause for schism and the rise of new political entities. e profile of the constituents of these two parties differed in several aspects. While the Republicans were supported by rather lewing oriented, less educated younger constituents and SPR-RSČ got more votes in areas of high unemployment, Public Affairs profited primarily from the dissatisfaction of centre-right constituents, particularly former ODS voters. Public Affairs achieved greater success with younger constituents. e Republicans spent their entire parliamentary lifetime in the opposition and were not considered a potential coalition partner by other political parties. Aer they le Parliament in 1998, they suffered other schisms and subsequent funding issues led to their transformation into Miroslav Sládek’s Republicans. Before the 2010 elections, Sládek “resuscitated” the old name – SPR – but the repeated funding issues led to the party’s suspension. In spite of its protests aer the 2010 elections, Public Affairs became part of the government along-

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side ODS and TOP 09. A lack of platform clarity and perhaps a degree of political inexperience marked the party’s time in government, with featured frequent disputes with coalition partners. e Bárta corruption scandal, since Bárta was the de facto leader of the party, eventually led to the dissolution of Public Affairs and its exit to the opposition. LIDEM, a faction which split off from the party, remained on as part of the governing coalition.

List of Abbreviations of Political Parties ČSSD Czech Social Democratic Party HSD-SMS Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Association for Moravia and Silesia, KDU-ČSL Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party KSČM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia LIDEM Liberal Democrats ODA Civic Democratic Alliance ODS Civic Democratic Party OF Civic Forum RMS Republicans of Miroslav Sládek SNK ED Association of Independent Candidates European Democrats SPR-RSČ Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia US Union of Freedom VV Public Affairs

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Nejvyšší správní soud. 2010. Rozsudek ve věci č. j. Pst 2/2009–25. (http://www. nssoud.cz/files/SOUDNI_VYKON/2009/0002_0Pst_090_20101213115145_ prevedeno.pdf). Olson, David. M. 1998. “Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe.” Political Studies 46, No. 3, 432–464. Pavlíček, Tomáš and Vydrová, Michaela. 2010. Smlouva Věcí veřejných by se mohla dostat do rozporu s Ústavou. (http://www.rozhlas.cz/zpravy/politika/ _zprava/738727). Pečínka, Pavel. 2005. “Odstíny české zelené politiky po roce 1995.” Politologický časopis 12, No. 4, 471–481. Pernes, Jiří. 1996. Pod moravskou orlicí aneb Dějiny moravanství. Brno: Barrister & Principal. Petrášová, Lenka. 2003. Politici lehce získali městské byty. Mladá fronta Dnes (Praha), 21/10/ 2003. Pink, Michal et al. 2012. Volební mapy České a Slovenské republiky po roce 1993: vzorce, trendy, proměny. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury. Pokorný, Jakub. 2010a. John už si diktuje vládní podmínky. Mladá fronta Dnes, 5/5/2010. Pokorný, Jakub. 2010b. Předseda, který se nepodepisuje za svou stranu. Mladá fronta Dnes, 5/5/2010. Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2010. “rowing out the Bums. Protest Voting and Unothodox Parties aer Communism.” World Politics 62, No. 2, 221–260. Pšeja, Pavel and Mareš, Miroslav. 2005. “Občanská demokratická aliance.” In: Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu. Díl II. 1938–2004. Eds. Malíř, Jiří and Marek, Pavel et al. Brno: Doplněk, 1531–1556. Pšeja, Pavel. 2004a. “Občanské fórum jako katalysátor vývoje stranického systému ČR.” Politologický časopis 11, No. 3, 316–326. Pšeja, Pavel. 2004b. “Občanská demokratická strana jako hlavní “dědic” OF a “agens” stranického systému ČR (1991–1998).” Politologický časopis 11, No. 4, 453–472. Roberts, Andy. 2003. “Demythologising the Czech Opposition Agreement.” Europe-Asia Studies 55, No. 8, 1273–1303. SC& C and SPSS. 2010. Závěrečná zpráva. Exit poll SC& C a SPSS pro Českou televizi. Sehnoutka, Petr. 2004. Praha zkouší odvolat starostu. Mladá fronta Dnes (Praha) 25/10/2004. Šimíček, Vojtěch. 1996. “Vnitřní život politických stran.” Politologický časopis 3, No. 2, 105–121. Sládek, Miroslav. 1992. …a tak to vidím já. Version for Kindle. Sládek, Miroslav. 1996. Právě váš hlas rozhodne! Version for Kindle. Springerová, Pavlína. 2010. Analýza vývoje a činnosti moravistických politických subjektů v letech 1989–2005. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury. SPR-RSČ. 1990. Materiály z ustavujícího sněmu konaného dne 24. února 1990 v Praze.

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Štastný, Ondřej. 2010a. John si véčkaře jistí smlouvou. Kdo přeběhne, zaplatí sedm milionů. (http://zpravy.idnes.cz/john-si-veckare-jisti-smlouvou-kdo-prebehnezaplati-sedm-milionu-ph6-/domaci.aspx?c=A100526_203232_domaci_vel). Štastný, Ondřej. 2010b. Šedé eminence už vyjednávají o vládě. Mladá fronta Dnes 22/5/2010. STEM. 2010. Popularita stranických politiků. Tisková informace z výzkumu STEM Trendy 04/2010. (http://www.stem.cz/clanek/1939). Strmiska, Maxmilián. 2000. “Rise and Fall of Moravian Regional Parties.” Středoevropské politické studie 2, No. 4 (http://www.cepsr.com/ clanek.php?ID=101). Strmiska, Maxmilián. 2006. “Český stranický systém v letech 1998–2006: několik postřehů k fungování semipolarizované stranické soustavy.” In: Parlamentní volby 2006 a česká politika. Eds. Dančák, Břetislav, Vít Hloušek. Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 88–96. Strmiska, Maxmilián. 2007. “e Czech Party System: A Few Observations on the Properties and Working Logic of the Czech Party Arrangement.” In: Parliamentary Elections and Party Landscape in the Visegrád Group Countries. Eds. Hloušek Vít, Roman Chytilek. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 107–115. Suk, Jiří. 2009. Labyrintem revoluce. Aktéři, zápletky a křižovatky jedné politické krize (od listopadu 1989 do června 1990. Praha: Prostor. Syllová, Jindřiška et al. 2008. Parlament České republiky. Praha: Linde. Tachecí, Barbora. 2009. V politice proti všem. Mladá fronta Dnes, 9/9/2009. Učeň, Peter. 2007. “Parties, Populism, and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe.” SAIS Review 27, No. 1, 49–62. Válková, Hana. 2010. Poslanci VV podepisují tajný dodatek smlouvy po vzoru rebela Humla. (http://zpravy.idnes.cz/poslanci-vv-podepisuji-tajny-dodateksmlouvy-po-vzoru-rebela-humla-11i-/domaci.aspx?c=A101006_144148_ domaci_hv). Vašku, ty jseš ale prase. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RzsygMU_j_k). Věci veřejné. 2009. Stanovy strany Věci veřejné. Printed document. Věci veřejné. 2010a. Politický program. Printed document. Věci veřejné. 2010.b. Věci veřejné. 2010.b. Smlouva o úpravě vzájemných vztahů politické strany a kandidáta politické strany pro volby do Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu České republiky konané v roce 2010. Printed document. Věci veřejné. 2010a. Politický program. Printed document. Věci veřejné. 2011. Stanovy politické strany Věci veřejné. (http:// www.veciverejne.cz/stanovy.html). Volby.cz. (http://www.volby.cz).

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6. HUNGARY VRATISLAV HAVLÍK 6.1. Politics of Populism in Hungary ere are many reasons why it is difficult to apply the concept of populism to Hungarian politics. However good a definition of party populism is, research of this phenomenon in the Hungarian party system runs into obstacles which hinder one’s endeavours and to some degree distort the reality. e most important obstacle is the concept’s pervasive presence in the country’s own discourse: in journalism and in society generally, but also in literature, both popular and scholarly. is over-saturation of public and scholarly discussion, and above all the countless ways in which the term populism is used, suggest that it is more difficult in Hungary than elsewhere to determine the subject of research, i.e. the specific populist parties. Were we to employ the common approach to populism, we would have to describe as populist, at the very least, all right-wing parties and also the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) (cf. Rajacic 2007: 652). Such a wide selection of cases would certainly not, however, constitute a suitable first step. It can be assumed that no exclusively populist parties exist in Hungary. e main reason for this claim is that any present or past Hungarian parliamentary party can be located on the right-to-le scale without great difficulty, and matched at least loosely with one of the established party families. Ad hoc protest parties that reach the threshold of relevance have not appeared in post-1990 Hungary. e question arises whether extreme right parties such as MIÉP and Jobbik can be matched with a specific party family. Lubomír Kopeček does so, even in the case of MIÉP, although he admits that unlike their Western European counterparts, these parties are not united in their opposition to immigrants, but rather by a nationalist appeal aimed against ethnic minorities or neighbouring nations. An anti-elitist appeal

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is also important (cf. Kopeček 2005: 39). e 2010 parliamentary election did not feature established exclusively populist parties, although the election rhetoric was oen populist. Although the parties Jobbik and Politics Can Be Different (LMP) have an obvious anti-elitist message, the former is grounded in Christian nationalism, while the latter can be described as an environmental party. is chapter will therefore explore the non-exclusively populist parties in the Hungarian party system. None of the parties which have claimed to undertake a struggle in the name of the people against corrupt, or otherwise criminal, elites have managed to obtain and develop a relevant position on the back of this struggle alone.

6.2. The Evolution of the Party System Multiple cleavages exist in the Hungarian party system. It is possible to highlight two dominant cleavages which indirectly establish Hungarian party populism.1 e first is the axis “cultural right” versus “cultural le”, because the very label of right-wing or le-wing plays a role in the decision-making of many Hungarian voters. is is not a socioeconomic dichotomy, but rather a symbolic or cultural one (cf. Uitz 2008: 60). Since 1998, two parties have established themselves firmly along this axis: Fidesz on the right and MSZP on the le. In terms of their position in the party spectrum and their parliamentary presence, these two parties have been highly stable. e following parties were, or are at present, in the centre of the party spectrum: on the centre-right, Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (FKGP); on the centre-le, Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). e second key cleavage is located on the axis nationalism versus universalism. is conflict has been nourished by the Trianon trauma and by the related revisionist tendencies of cer1 Such a characterisation of the cleavages in the Hungarian party system is obviously somewhat simplifying. In the various stages of the system’s post-1990 development several other cleavages had played a role. Chief among these were the cleavages secular–religious; old–new, or socialist–liberal; city–periphery etc. (cf. Dieringer 2009: 140–150).

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tain parties. Hungarian nationalism is represented in the programmes of the majority of present and past Hungarian parties; radical and extremist nationalism has also been represented in the parliament, in the past by MIÉP, and today by Jobbik. Six parties obtained parliamentary representation aer the first election in 1990. MDF had the dominant position on the right, where it formed a government coalition with the agrarian FKGP and the Christian-democratic KDNP. e liberal centre was constituted by the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) and SZDSZ. On the le was the socialist MSZP, originally weak, but doing much better in the opinion polls preceding the 1994 election. During the years of socialist rule 1994–1998 a fundamental shi occurred on the right, caused mainly by Fidesz’s slide from liberal to conservative and nationalist rhetoric (Hloušek 2005: 488). e consequence of this shi was the weakening of the MDF, which contested the 1998 election together with Fidesz, and in terms of seats obtained became only the third force on the right behind Fidesz and FKGP. e entry of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) into Parliament was a product of the aforementioned nationalist cleavage. e Christian democrats, on the other hand, gained no seats in either the 1998 or 2002 elections; since 2006, they have only been contesting elections in a coalition with Fidesz. e 2002 election clearly outlined the pattern of development of the Hungarian party system. e “supermixed” electoral system with strong majoritarian characteristics, and the Fidesz strategy by which the party was able to absorb smaller parties, caused a situation in which only three entities obtained parliamentary representation, with Fidesz contesting the election together with MDF (cf. Bakke, Sitter 2005: 258). e centripetal force of the electoral system had the clear effect of reducing the number of parties and creating competition between two blocs, one on the le and one on the right, each with two parties (cf. Havlík 2011: 95). Party system developments since the 2010 election have nevertheless tended to question the trends so far. e right-to-le balance has tipped in Fidesz’s favour: the party obtained a constitutional majority in parliament. MSZP was placed second, but found itself significantly weakened and is doing only marginally better than the radical nationalist Jobbik which polled almost 17 % of the vote. SZDSZ lost representation and was replaced in

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Parliament by the liberal-green and strongly anti-corruption Politics Can Be Different (LMP); the latter more or less assumed the former’s place in the party system (cf. Ripp 2011: 378, Havlík 2011: 97). Although some of LMP’s priorities are different to those of SZDSZ, the electorates of both parties are concentrated in Budapest.

6.3. Case Selection As already indicated above, our understanding of Hungary’s populism is significantly hindered by the fact that this term is frequently used in works on Hungarian politics, but with very different meanings, which takes the attention away from the dominant definition of populism. e main obstacle to finding parties that would correspond to the definition of populism used in this book is the all-pervading nationalism of Hungarian politics. is is connected with the cleavage located on the axis universalism versus nationalism. Very oen one encounters the two concepts of populism and nationalism used interchangeably, or so closely that they become confused, and this inevitably produces a somewhat varying understanding of populism in the wider meaning of the term. One illustration of this is Jürgen Dierenger’s monograph on the Hungarian political system. Speaking of former FKGP representative Torgyán, Dierenger talks about the national-populist dimension of the party spectrum (Dieringer 2009: 116). However, is it really possible to understand populism as a dimension within the party spectrum, and can it be precisely defined in this manner? Dieringer locates MIÉP, KDNP and FKGP in the dimension of the populist right because of their anti-government rhetoric and their criticisms of the “national betrayal” (nemzetarulás; cf. Dieringer 2009: 121). ere is another risk connected with the confusion of nationalism with populism. e Trianon trauma, which is oen present in Hungarian political rhetoric, needs to be evaluated precisely, as do the revisionist tendencies of certain Hungarian parties which are related to this trauma. Mere revisionism – an anti-systemic element to which many Hungarians continue to respond positively – does not imply populism, at least not in the understanding used here, because it is not

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necessarily aimed against the elites of the country. (It can, however, have such an aim.) Classifying Jobbik and MIÉP as populist parties is therefore questionable and more characteristic signs of populism must be sought over and above these parties’ revisionist nationalisms. Werner T. Bauer (2012: 26–27) is among those who in this context see the distance between nationalism and populism as very small, and demonstrates on the Hungarian case how moveable the boundary between right-wing populism and nationalism is. But this is precisely a conception against which one can take a stance. Using a similar argument, one could rank even Orbán’s Fidesz among right-wing populists because of the party’s participation in anti-governmental, or, as the case may be, anti-elitist demonstrations that appeared in response to the scandals of Gyurcsány’s government. Traditionally Fidesz has been described in literature as a populist party, or at least populist rhetoric has been attached to the party. Renate Uitz describes Fidesz’s various strategies by which the party seeks to establish low-level contacts with citizens themselves, by creating “civic circles” for discussion, for instance (Uitz 2008: 67). Jens Becker, by contrast, speaks of the right-wing populism of Fidesz’s government as gravitating towards the extreme right, basing his argument on the example of the citizenship law2 (Becker 2010: 315). Both of these cases propose populism as more or less slick politics speaking in favour of the widest popular denominator, as an uncritical advocacy of issues to which people respond favourably. Such a conception is at variance with our narrower definition, however, as the latter demands the additional condition of the populists’ struggle against elites as such, and with Fidesz things are by no means simple. In terms of categorising Fidesz, the period from 2006 to 2010, when the party participated in anti-government rallies, is particularly difficult to deal with. In analysing the Hungarian discourse, one needs to weigh very carefully what is a genuine opposition to the elites, and what is only a declaration of anti-elitism, and in fact motivated by opposition to government policies. Hungarian politics is typically highly polarised. e slogan “us versus them” is omnipresent; it does 2 is law adopted by the Fidesz–KDNP government allows ethnic Hungarians abroad to request, subject to exactly specified conditions, Hungarian citizenship.

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not, however, mean “the people versus the elites” but “le versus right”. Everyday politics in Hungary consists of a struggle between two or three camps sitting in their established locations which correspond to at least two dominant cleavages. To describe as populism the ordinary attacks, both programmatic and personal (anti-elitist), could be misleading and might not tell us much. A study of Hungary’s populism using the definition given here must therefore not satisfy itself with identifying the fact that the ruling elites are indeed attacked; it must assess very carefully whether the elites that are the target of criticism are not simply a personification in the fight against government. Were we to adopt purely the criterion of rhetoric, and seek parties that have at least at some point in the past sided with the people against the elites, we would find that non-exclusive populism spreads throughout the whole party spectrum and as such is a phenomenon present to some degree also on the le. Agnes Rajacic (2007: 647) writes of the former socialist Prime Minister Gyurcsány as someone who “speaks in the name of the people and has an anti-elitist, egalitarian leadership style, which somewhat compensates for the fact that he is among the hundred richest people in the country”. Rajacic also points out, however, that in the 2006 election campaign Fidesz accused the government of defending the interests of the “elites of luxury” rather than those of the “working citizens” (Rajacic 2007: 650). Although the above indicates that the two largest Hungarian parties do employ some populism, a certain amount of restraint is necessary in evaluating the situation. Only then will it be possible to select parties that are exclusively or non-exclusively populist. Crucially, from the nationalists, only those who demonstrably wage their fight against the elites need to be included. As for apparently populist parties, we will only consider them if their populism is not simply an outcome of the ordinary right–le struggle. Jobbik certainly fulfils the definition of populism. e party offers a radical change “in the name of the people”, targeting the oligarchs and the political elites of MSZP and Fidesz (see below for more detail). MIÉP has adopted a similar rhetoric, hedging its bets on the defence of society against a “bolshevik-liberal conspiracy”. It is not difficult to identify that in MIÉP’s figures of speech the “Bolsheviks” are the socialists (MSZP) and the liberals are the SZDSZ elites, the

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latter oen of Jewish extraction (again, see below for more detail). A populist protest is also fundamental to LMP’s ideology; the party rejects the style of politics hitherto and offers a “third way” towards democratic renewal. e party’s appeals are not merely instruments in electoral struggles; its rejection of the political style employed in the country for the past twenty years runs deeper, and leads LMP towards direct street action. e next section will therefore look in greater detail only at the three parties which essentially fulfil the definition of non-exclusive populist parties employed here: MIÉP, Jobbik and LMP.

6.4. Party History MIÉP emerged as the party of nationalist radicals who le MDF in 19933, whether on their own accord or were expelled. A predecessor of the party was the organisation Movement of Hungarian Way Circles, founded by István Csurka, then a MDF MP, as an alternative to the too centrist policies of the Prime Minister and MDF chairman József Antall (Körösényi 1999: 38). e MPs around István Csurka can therefore be understood as a faction of the ruling MDF which was more right-wing and radically nationalist than the rest of the party. What impelled Csurka’s MPs to leave MDF was a treaty between Hungary and Ukraine which Antall’s government signed, but the group around Csurka refused to support, mainly because the treaty recognised the border between Hungary and Ukraine (Körösényi 1999: 38). Recognising the border would mean abandoning any hope of revising the Trianon Treaty, which was unacceptable for some MDF MPs. roughout its history, MIÉP has only managed to obtain parliamentary representation once, in 1998, when the party received 14 seats. Aer the 2002 election, when the party narrowly missed the threshold, a gradual erosion of MIÉP began which was connected with the 3 e weekly Magyar Fórum is connected with the history of MIÉP. Founded by Csurka in 1988, it was originally linked with MDF, of which he was a vice-chairman, but has served as the unofficial newspaper of MIÉP since the latter’s formation (Ripp 2011: 397).

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rise of Jobbik: in 2003 MIÉP’s vice-chairman Zoltán Balczó le and later joined Jobbik, whereas the party chairman István Csurka continued to attack the latter and rejected any future partnership between the two parties (Ripp 2011: 397). Although the parties did eventually cooperate in the 2006 election, the partnership was a failure and led to MIÉP’s ultimate marginalisation. e Movement for a Better Hungary, also known as Jobbik4, was founded in October 2003. Its foundation was preceded by the formation of the Right-Wing Youth Association (Jobboldali Iúsági Közösség), connected with the names of university students Dávid Kovács, Gábor Vona, Ervina Nagy, Gábor Szabó and Előd Novák. Coincidentally, in 2003 the last-mentioned led the MIÉP youth section (Ripp 2011: 362), and this symbolic connection also confirms that Jobbik largely picked up MIÉP’s priorities (the latter party narrowly failed in the 2002 election). Moreover, it was not accidental that the two parties proposed a shared candidate list for the 2006 election, albeit without success. From the outset, Jobbik set itself against MIÉP, describing it as worn out and lacking credibility. Jobbik characterised Fidesz in a similar vein, claiming that the latter party was unable to represent national interests (Ripp 2011: 362). When the Jobbik party was founded, its youth organisation renounced direct political action and announced that it would return to its original goal of youth education. Indeed, it was with this goal of strengthening the national and Christian identity of youth that the organisation was founded, and the idea was later developed into one of the cornerstones of the Jobbik ideology. e first significant success came in the 2009 European Parliament election, which the party contested with the slogan “Hungary for the Hungarians” (Magyarország a magyaroké) and gained three MEPs. e party confirmed its success in the national parliamentary election the following year, when it finished third with 47 seats, closely behind the socialists. e paramilitary organisation Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda), which existed from 2007 to 2009, was narrowly connected with Job4 Similarly to MIÉP, Jobbik presents its ideology in its own party newspaper, the Barricade (Barikád), which has been published every ursday since 2009 by Sándor Pörzse, simultaneously a journalist, a Jobbik MP and one of the founding members of the Hungarian Guard.

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bik, whose chairman Gábor Vona was one of the founding members of the Guard (Ripp 2011: 364). When the links between the party and the Guard were criticised, Jobbik representatives tried to deal with the situation by having three of the Guard’s leading figures, Márton Fári, Dávid Kovács and Ervin Nagy, formally leave the party (Ripp 2008: 364). Gábor Vona, the Guard’s founding member and Jobbik chairman remained in the party, however, and the party was unable to uproot its symbolic connections with the Guard. In 2008, the Guard was banned by a court because of its activities against minorities, and in July 2009 the original decision was upheld on appeal.5 Founded in February 2009 by András Schiffer as a liberal-conservative party, Lehet Más a Politika (LMP, Politics Can Be Different) has presented itself as an alternative to the contemporary Hungarian political style. Disgust at the scandals of the socialists, on-going since 2006 when Prime Minister Gyurcsány’s private utterances about continuous lying to the public were leaked, as well as the general mood in society obviously played roles in the emergence of the party. e party has not limited itself to proposing a “third way”, however; crucially, it has also employed an environmental rhetoric. e first election LMP contested (in a coalition with the Humanist Party [Humanista párt, HP]) was a failure, with LMP obtaining only 2.6% of votes. is apparent failure did mean, however, that it was considered a serious contender for the 2010 parliamentary election. e party presented its goals in a detailed election programme. Entitled “Sustainable future, open society and strategy for renewing democracy”, it ran to 228 pages. Its priorities included environmental policy, sustainability and the fight against corruption. In the first round of the election, LMP obtained 7.5% of votes, in the second, only 3.8%, which in the context of Hungary’s supermixed system meant 16 seats, and fourth place in terms of party competition. Although LMP sought to establish itself in opposition to the prevailing Hungarian style of politics and the established parties, it naturally shied towards the centre-le of the party spectrum.

5 e party continues to attract criticism, however, because the Guard was not entirely disbanded and continues to exist in a different form.

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6.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style e highest body of MIÉP is the Statewide Convention (Országos gyűlés). e executive body is the Presidium (Országos elnökség). Furthermore, there is a body dealing with matters of ethics called the Court of Honour (Becsületbíroság). e party’s economic management is overseen by the Audit Committee (Számvizsgáló bizottság) (Ripp 2011: 395). At the beginning there were two figures in the leadership: Lajos Horváth and István Csurka. Aer a short while, István Csurka, a journalist and writer, became the sole leader, and remained in this position until his death in February 2012.6 Csurka was a real icon of the party and emphasised in his speeches certain very controversial points of the party programme, especially its antiSemitism. He also constantly stressed the issue of ethnic Hungarians living outside the country. Csurka has been dubbed “the Hungarian Le Pen” in literature (Uitz 2008: 39), both because of his dominant, even iconic position in the party, apparent from the convincing majorities with which he repeatedly won party chairman elections (cf. Index, 24/2/2003, Origo, 2/12/2000), and due to the cooperation between MIÉP and Front National. Jobbik’s highest body is the Congress which elects the party chairman. Furthermore there is a Statewide Committee (Országos választmány) and the Presidium. e Committee decides its main strategic issues during the periods between party congresses, while the Presidium led by the chairman is the top executive body comprising eight members. As in MIÉP, the chairman of Jobbik enjoys a very strong position in the party leadership. When Gábor Vona, the party chairman since 2006, announced in spring 2012 that he would stand for re-election, there were no challengers and Vona was elected by 717 votes out of 726, a fact that illustrates his unshakeable leadership position (Origo, 19/5/2012, Budapester Zeitung, 25/5/2012). It cannot be claimed, however, that Jobbik was from the outset a party of one man. Vona only became leader in 2006 aer the previous leader Dávid Kovács le. Krisztina Morvai MEP, who led the party in the 6

István Csurka has died aged 77.

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2009 election of the European Parliament, its first tangible success since foundation, also has a strong symbolic position. In the 2010 parliamentary election, Jobbik put forward Krisztina Morvai as its presidential candidate.7 A particularity of LMP is that there is no party chairman. is function is fulfilled by the Statewide Club, a collective executive body comprising 13 party members who have been elected by the Congress. From these 13 individuals, two spokespersons are appointed, typically a man and a woman. e leadership is therefore strongly decentralised and more or less an antithesis to the principle of strong leadership. ere is nevertheless one figure in the party that could be identified as dominant: the leader of the party’s candidate list for the general election.8 Another crucial body of the party is the Statewide Political Council, whose role is to represent the Congress, the highest body of the party, and to oversee the work of the Statewide Club, i.e. the party leadership in a narrow sense of the word. e party also has an ethics commission which both checks that its MPs act in accordance with its statutes and settles potential disputes between party members. Other bodies of the party include an auditing committee, which has the power to examine its accounts and comment upon the negotiation of its annual budget, and what is called the “escalator for women”, a platform on which female party members and sympathisers can meet.

6.6. Ideology MIÉP, which only had parliamentary representation in the 1998–2002 electoral term, featured certain ideological elements in its programme that will be described in greater detail below in the section about Jobbik. ey concern, above all, revisionism and radical nationalism, both of which are espoused by these parties. MIÉP first of all demands revision of the borders established by the Trianon Treaty of 1920; its 7 Although Krisztina Morvai is not a Jobbik member, she contributes significantly to its electoral campaigns. 8 In the 2010 election András Schiffer was the leader of the LMP candidate list.

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programme is also concerned with the position of ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders of present-day Hungary. Another important point of the party’s ideology is its rejection of the “dominance of global capitalism”, which in its rhetoric is connected with US and Jewish capital or US and Israeli interests (MIÉP Programme 2005, Csurka 2008)9. e party literally says that “Hungary is guided by the interests of the banks and global corporations, by the destructive, egoist and anti-national principles of neo-liberalism” (MIÉP Programme 2005). In MIÉP rhetoric, “liberal-bolshevik” forces form a loose parallel to the above-mentioned US-Jewish capital; the party’s goal has been to cleanse the media and the state administration of former communists and “non-Hungarian elements” (Körösényi 1999: 38). What the party means by the last category are, in addition to the former communists, the Jewish elites, mostly leist intellectuals, philosophers, sociologists and economists, who were largely behind the foundation of the liberal SZDSZ in 1988 (cf. Körösényi 1999: 39). e criticism of liberalbolshevik forces was topical at the time of the party’s foundation in 1993, mostly in connection with the significant gains MSZP had been making at the time, and especially before the 1994 election. MSZP won that election and formed a government coalition with the liberal SZDSZ. e criticism of the liberal-bolshevik or Jewish-bolshevik forces that allegedly control the state then became the cornerstone of MIÉP ideology, and in response to this “threat” the party proposed large-scale lustration in the state administration, local government, justice, education, churches, media, banks, etc. (Benda 2002: 240). Before the 2006 election, MIÉP warned that this chance to stop the phenomena that had been hitherto controlling Hungary must not be missed. “In the next election we must once and for all prevent the nation being led by an elite that speaks in favour of interests foreign to the nation. If there is something we need to shout about, it is liberal bolshevism: no, no, never!” (MIÉP Programme 2005) And this three word cry is a symbolic parallel to another “disaster” that had befallen 9 is description of MIÉP ideology is substantially based on its 2005 programme, because earlier versions of the programme are no longer available. Obviously in 2005 the party no longer had parliamentary representation. Literature suggests, however, that the party has been consistent in its programme, so the lack of older versions does not pose a significant obstacle.

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the Hungarian nation: the Trianon peace treaty. Indeed, MIÉP considers the threat posed by the rule of MSZP and SZDSZ liberal-bolshevik elites equal to that posed by the Trianon treaty. It is in this critique that we can find the populist element of MIÉP. It sees itself as defending the people, not against the policies of the socialist governments as such, but explicitly against the liberal (interpreted by MIÉP as Jewish) and socialist (interpreted as bolshevik) elites – therefore from the point of view of MIÉP, any Hungarian elites is a main threat. Another cornerstone of MIÉP ideology, its revisionism, has been present since the party’s inception. e founding of the party can in fact be interpreted as a symbolic act on the part of István Csurka who had been championing the rights of several millions ethnic Hungarians who live abroad. Some MDF MPs surrounding Csurka criticised the ratification of the treaty between Hungary and Ukraine which recognised the shared border between two countries, le MDF and founded their own party. According to Csurka’s argument, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia the Versailles system falls apart as well and the treaties that established that system have lost their validity (cf. Benda 1999: 116). In this argument, Hungary has regained, or strengthened, its right to renew the pre-Versailles system. As is the case with Jobbik, MIÉP ideology places great emphasis on Christian values, which the party connects with the roots of the Hungarian nation. Like MIÉP and LMP, Jobbik employs an anti-elite rhetoric, which is nevertheless grounded in entirely different issues and attitudes to those employed by LMP (cf. Fábián 2010: 464). For the 2010 election the party adopted the slogan “radical change” (radikális változás, Jobbik 2010d), using it as the name of its official election programme, as well as in its publicity and television spots. e party’s ideology can be defined as Hungarian nationalism with strong elements of Christianity. Connected with this is its nationally-defined conservatism, while its Euroscepticism largely follows from the previous two, despite being an independent ideological line. e party’s programme from 2010 dealt with these areas: national economy, countryside and nature, rebirth of Hungarian culture, renewal of society and the idea of a “proud nation”. It also has sections dedicated to the European Union and justice. Jobbik calls for the creation of a nationally

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controlled economy which serves Hungarian interests. Its specific economic objectives are to review the conditions under which Hungary obtained foreign loans, and a general reorientation of the country’s trade towards the East, where, according to the party, new opportunities are on offer. Jobbik also intends to promote consumption of Hungarian products with the support of a “Buy Hungarian” campaign and to create barriers for multinationals on the Hungarian market, in the hope of making Hungarian companies more competitive (Jobbik 2010a: 13). In Jobbik’s ideology, this nationalist conception of the economy goes hand in hand with its nationalist conception of society. Commenting on the state of the nation, Jobbik alleges that rampant liberalism has caused the decline of the national spirit: “e last decades” intentional liberal destruction of our national consciousness, has proven itself incapable of creating anything other than an emotionally damaged, even physically injured, society; given its inability to provide lasting values (only their denigration) to either individuals or communities.” (Jobbik 2010b: 14) In response to the present situation thus described, the party calls for “the strengthening of Hungarian national self-knowledge, the acceptance by the state of a greater responsibility in the dissemination of culture, and the abolition of the Liberal cultural-dictatorship [sic]” (Jobbik 2010b: 14). Jobbik demands that corrupt politicians are brought to account, singling out MSZP and Fidesz parties for special opprobrium (Jobbik 2010b: 18). e campaigns for the 2009 EP election and for the 2010 election of the national parliament emphasised certain points which were presented much more radically in television spots than in the party’s programme. Jobbik made it entirely clear that the time had come for a radical change, and purported to side with the people. is camp supposedly gives the party the strength to bring about radical change. e party elites had been employing slogans such as “Radical change in the name of the people”, “Here is a new force”, “ere are more of us who want radical change” and “Hungary for the Hungarians”. e “people’s camp” was also indirectly presented as a new force that would deal with the culprits of corruption and shoddy privatisation. is was symbolised by the slogan “Put those responsible in jail”, but the party did not specify precisely who was responsible (cf. Jobbik 2009). In a similar vein, the party presented the rich elite and

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the banks as unrestrained by any limits and therefore as a threat to society, employing slogans such as “We’ll tax multinational corporations” and “Everything is possible for multinational corporations”. Jobbik placed the Romani on the same level as criminal politicians and oligarchs, again saying that for them everything is possible. ese socially “undesirable phenomena” were symbolised by a mosquito which the party chairman Gábor Vona squashed at the end of one television spot (Jobbik 2010c). e most distinctive two-minute advert that best characterised the party’s ideology recalled the protest against Ferencz Gyurcsány’s government in 2006 to which the police response was relatively severe. e spot depicted “innocent” protesters being persecuted by riot and mounted police. What is crucial in the discourse is the sentence: “He who does not listen, will be met with terror, but a new force shall arise”, the latter visualised by the marching Hungarian Guard, a paramilitary organisation associated with the party (Jobbik 2010e). Besides its radical nationalist ideology, the party placed a strong emphasis on Christian values. In Hungary these go hand-in-hand with nationalism: Christianity is traditionally understood as intrinsically linked with the Hungarian state, which was illustrated in the party’s TV spots by the salute “Adjon az Isten” (“May the Lord”) and a shot of the Holy Crown of Hungary symbolising the nation. Jobbik’s anti-Semitism is to a certain degree loosely connected with the party’s emphasis on Christian values. e characteristics of the party ideology outlined above correspond to the results of Karácsony and Róna’s (2010: 42–43) quantitative research, which compared the attitudes of Jobbik, Fidesz and MSZP. Jobbik differed from the latter two in the values researchers calculated for the areas of nationalism, anti-systemic position, and both anti-Romani and anti-Semitic propaganda. e cornerstones of LMP ideology comprise the declaration with which the party was founded in 2009 and its 2010 election programme. e party’s priorities can be summarised as follows: a leist economic policy combined with patriotic and environmental values, a liberal state recognising the rule of law, and an emphasis on gender issues and on integrating the Romani (cf. Boros 2011: 2). Issues of corruption and democratic renewal also play crucial roles in the party’s programme and rhetoric.

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e programme with which the party contested the 2010 election consisted of three main parts: environment and sustainability, open society strategy, and democratic renewal. e party puts the lastmentioned issue at the forefront, criticising in particular the political elites who pursue their personal interests instead of the public good. is means, LMP says, that Hungary faces anti-democratic political tendencies (LMP 2010: 6–7). e system of checks and balances visà-vis the government is poor; the bodies imbued with supervisory powers are weak; and the party system overall is stiff, even “freezing over”. e overall picture reflects the weakness of Hungary’s democracy. In this main part of its programme, LMP especially criticises the torpor and “frozenness” of the political elites, arguing that compared with the situation in neighbouring countries, it is particularly hard in Hungary for new parties to enter parliament. e few parties who have managed to persevere in Parliament are according to LMP increasingly under the control of the economic oligarchs. ese have significant power, LMP says, as they fund the campaigns of the large parties, thus violating the principle of equality in political competition. In this view it is impossible to affect political decisions without economic power (LMP 2010: 25–28). Changes that ought to be made according to LMP include investing supervisory bodies with greater power and more transparency overall. Specifically, LMP wanted to abolish the re-electability of the president, the ombudsman and the judges of the Constitutional Court, thus ensuring these figures’ greater independence from the legislature (LMP 2010: 30). Party elites who chose electoral candidates in a non-transparent way have also been singled out for criticism. e solution according to LMP would be to adopt an electoral system in which voters would play a more active role in choosing the candidates (LMP 2010: 31). Part of the systemic renewal according to LMP ought to consist in reinvigorating the solidarity between the rich and the poor, smoothing of social inequalities, and fair redistribution of resources. e party dedicates a separate space to defending the Romani, disproving claims that their unemployment is above average and that they abuse the social security system, taking instead a stance against the lack of solidarity with the poor over the past twenty years

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(LMP 2010: 11). e third pillar of the party’s ideology is its support for sustainable environmental development. LMP opposes resource waste, environmental pollution and genetically modified food. is part of its programme is the most developed, reaching around a hundred pages. In its everyday rhetoric LMP assumes an anti-elitist stance and even employs street demonstrations for this purpose. Its protest in December 2011, when LMP MPs and supporters chained themselves in front of the buildign of the Parliament and prevented government MPs from entering the building, elicited the biggest response so far (Origo, 23/12/2011). A similar event was organised by LMP adherents at the end of March 2012, when they briefly blocked one of Budapest’s main bridges, protesting the fact that President Pál Schmitt refused to stand down (Origo, 31/3/2012). In the words of its electoral leader András Schiffer, the party emphasises that it “wants to bridge the gap between the streets and the parliament”. Schiffer said in 2011 that politics needs new people and ideas. Such claims correspond to the long-term focus of the party described above, which follows two main goals: to create a new environmentally-aware politics and to take a stance against the old-fashioned, stagnant elites and oligarchs who control the country. e party’s ideology talks a lot about “renewal” and “change”, and the fact this change should not only affect the content of government policy, but should first of all manifest itself in political style. Whereas in 2009, when the party was founded, it criticised arrogant elites of the MSZP without explicitly mentioning the socialists, today its struggle focuses – according to contemporary needs – on Fidesz and its “anti-democratic authoritarian decisions” (cf. LMP 2012).

6.7. Electoral Support and Social Base In the 1998 election, the only one in which MIÉP gained seats, the party received most of its votes from the young and the middle aged, and people with secondary and higher education, typically believers (Körösényi 1999: 112). In 1998 the party’s electoral support was concentrated in Central Hungary, namely Budapest (almost 9% of the

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vote) and in the surrounding Pest county (almost 8% of the vote). In other counties the support for the party ranged from 4 to 6% of the vote, and was lowest in the counties Tolna, Vas and Jász-NagykunSzolnok, where Jobbik scored an above-average success in 2009 (for more see Valasztas.hu). An interesting paradox can be thus observed: although the two parties agree in many points of their programmes and it is only a slight exaggeration to argue that Jobbik is MIÉP’s successor, their electorates are entirely different, mainly in terms of geographic distribution. As with LMP, Jobbik’s electorate mostly comprises young voters. Jobbik’s popularity with the young increased sharply aer the 2010 election and in 2011 about 30% of those polled in the age group 18–37 years expressed their preference for the party, making it the second most popular in this age bracket (Tárki 2011, Hvg, 8 February 2012). Jobbik’s support is strongest in the counties in the North East and East; it is concentrated in an uninterrupted band beginning a few dozen kilometres East of Budapest and ending in the Borsod-AbaújZemplén county on the Slovak–Ukrainian border.10 e city Miskolc in Northern Hungary can be described as the party’s symbolic bastion. As far as the social makeup of Jobbik’s electorate is concerned, so far there has not been much agreement among scholars. Whereas the Austrian political scientist Anton Pelinka (2010) suggests that poorly educated youth are overrepresented in Jobbik’s electorate, the previously-mentioned Jürgen Dieringer says that Jobbik has a greater share of people with secondary school-leaving exam than the other parties, whereas it is lagging slightly in terms of voters with diplomas (Dieringer 2010: 3). Both authors agree, however, that it is men who mainly vote for the party. Research carried out by the British company Demos suggests that Dieringer might be closer to a truer picture. Demos’s research found that voters or supporters of Jobbik face low or average unemployment (ca. 9%) and, in terms of education, 85% of them have elementary or secondary school and 15% college or university (Bartlett et al. 2012: 57). Despite the low information value 10 Jobbik also recorded very strong support in other counties of Eastern Hungary, namely in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok, Heves, Nógrád and Hajdú-Bihar.

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of the broadly-defined category “elementary or secondary school” this more or less precludes the possibility of assigning the lowest social status to Jobbik voters. Dieringer (2010: 3) has aptly called them “the societal middle” (Die Mitte der Gesellscha). According to András Király (2012), Jobbik’s electorate is “Very young, very Hungarian, very ill-tempered”. In 2010, the electorate of LMP was mainly made up of young and educated voters, typically living in Budapest or in Southern Hungary in the Baranya county. e party’s weakest support was recorded in the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county in North-Eastern Hungary, which is the bastion of Jobbik (see Választás.hu for more detail). At the time of the parliamentary election, the preferences for LMP increased, whilst those for SZDSZ decreased. e overrepresentation of Budapest among LMP electorate suggests that the party has profited from disappointed liberals and socialists, as the capital has traditionally been their bastion (Boros 2011: 3). Tamás Boros points out an interesting discrepancy, however. Despite the party leadership’s strong anti-establishment rhetoric, LMP sympathisers are generally more open and less radical in their attitudes towards the socialists (who ruled between 2002 and 2010) than Jobbik’s electorate (Boros 2011: 3). is is all the more remarkable considering the fact that former MSZP voters make up a significant part of the LMP electorate. Table 6.1: Electoral Performance of Populist Political Parties in Hungary 1990 %

1994

1998

2002

2006

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

MIÉP

–

–

1.6

0

5.5

14

4.4

0

Jobbik

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

LMP

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

2010

%

Seats

2.2

0

–

–

%

Seats

0.1

0

16.7

47

7.5

16

Source: Website of Hungary’s National Election Office Választas.hu, available at www.valasztas.hu

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

6.8. Position in the Political System MIÉP understood itself11 as the “third way” and resisted classification on the party spectrum. e party presented this perception as far back as the 1998 election campaign, employing a rhyming slogan “Se nem jobb, se nem bal, keresztény és magyar” (“Neither right nor le, but Christian and Hungarian”). During its parliamentary years 1998–2002 the party was nevertheless perceived as extreme right and as such was an opposition from the right to Viktor Orbán’s first government (Ripp 2011: 396). It is true that the party crossed the threshold of relevance by entering the parliament, but with its 14 MPs it was not a real actor, especially given the fact that Orbán’s government commanded a solid majority and did not depend on Csurka’s votes. During the election campaign in 2002 speculation appeared about possible cooperation between Fidesz and MIÉP, which Fidesz was quick to disclaim when the party discovered that any common action proposed by either party means lost voters for Fidesz (Bőhm 2010: 395).12 e position of István Csurka’s party became entirely clear at the time of the election: before the second round of voting in single-member constituencies, MIÉP supported the candidates of the Fidesz-MDF coalition (Šedo 2002). Aer its failure in the 2002 election, MIÉP quickly became marginal; its electoral alliance with Jobbik in 2006 proved unable to change this. Both parties professed their leaning towards Fidesz openly in their television spots and offered their voters a post-election partnership with Fidesz as a counterweight to the le coalition MSZP–SZDSZ (MIÉP-Jobbik 2006). roughout the period when it was a relevant party, the coalition potential of MIÉP was zero. e Although the MIÉP party continues to exist officially, one can refer to it as past. Following the electoral failure in 2002, the party embarked on the road toward marginality, and in the 2010 election only polled 0.03% of votes in counties. Furthermore, in 2012 the party’s icon and chairman of many years István Csurka died. 12 Back then an issue became apparent that continues to be relevant to this day in discussions about potential relationship between Fidesz and Jobbik. Quite naturally, Fidesz briskly rejects any suggestions of partnership, because they rob the party of centrist voters. Moreover, both MIÉP and Jobbik can be considered Fidesz’s competitors, since to some degree all three compete for similarly-minded voters. 11

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party’s only chance to increase its influence came in 2002. Had it not narrowly missed the threshold for entering Parliament then, it would have caused a stalemate between the right and the le, and as such would have been the crucial actor in the election – but this did not occur (cf. Šedo 2002). As a radical or even extreme right party, Jobbik finds it difficult to find allies within the party spectrum. Its only conceivable partner, the Fidesz party, currently in government, is also its main competitor and can take its voters in elections. e common theme of both parties is that of Hungarian national interests, and Jobbik believes itself able to defend them more consistently. Aer the 2010 election, Jobbik, MSZP and LMP became the opposition to the Fidesz government, but unlike the last two, Jobbik represents an opposition from the right. e opposition is thus significantly heterogeneous, even though it has some common points. One of them is criticism of Fidesz; Jobbik alleges that the party is connected with the oligarchs (Origo, 8/5/2012; Index, 15 May 2012). Generally speaking, Jobbik is now fairly isolated; it is, however, relying on its standing in opinion polls which is currently improving. is might mean that aer the next election Jobbik would become a partner impossible to do without. Indeed, the party is so confident it believes it might win the 2014 election (cf. Index, 19/5/2012). For MSZP and Fidesz, Jobbik is currently a means with which to attack each other. Accusations that the adversary might or intends to cooperate with Jobbik can compromise the accused party in the eyes of the centrist electorate (Origo, 2/12/2011 and 20/3/ 2010). Jobbik will not necessarily remain without a coalition potential, however. Whereas in 1998 Fidesz had two potential coalition partners, FKGP and MDF, and MIÉP was therefore out of question as a candidate for this role because it was unnecessary, aer the 2010 election Fidesz lost all its centre-right partners, with the possible exception of KDNP, which contested the election together with Fidesz. If Fidesz does not repeat its success of 2010 in 2014, Jobbik will be a natural partner for the party – indeed, the only conceivable one. Although LMP has emerged as a result of substantial public dissatisfaction with the establishment symbolised by the socialists, gradually it has become apparent that LMP will not in the long term be able

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

to reject cooperation with MSZP. is already follows from the party’s le liberal programme which makes the socialists its most obvious partner. For the time being, however, LMP will not satisfy itself with the position of the socialists’ junior partner; in fact, such a move could be fatal to the party in terms of its electorate’s expectations. On the other hand, the party’s hesitant moves and unwillingness to declare its leist allegiances seem like an insufficient strategy, if the opinion polls, in which the party is stagnating, are anything to go by. According to Boros the main problem is that the party does not consider itself in opposition to the government, as it is keeping the same distance from the government as it is from other relevant parties (Boros 2011: 6). As already indicated above, one can find certain parallels between LMP and the marginalised SZDSZ: both have a liberal outlook and an electorate concentrated in the capital. is again suggests that LMP might cooperate with the socialists in the future. In any case, the party has considerable coalition potential.

6.9. Conclusion Hungary’s non-exclusively populist politics have been described with reference to three political parties whose populism is most obvious and demonstrable. As already indicated in the introduction, some other parties exhibit certain populist tendencies, yet such traits are most concentrated in the three parties analysed here. is chapter has shown that Hungary’s non-exclusive populism is based on several principles that keep reappearing in the system and are fairly easy to define. ey can be summarised as follows. First, omnipresent nationalism and claims that the elites have betrayed national interests. Second, further accusations levelled at the elites: they are allegedly involved in a liberal-bolshevik conspiracy, or corrupted by the oligarchs. e parties quite clearly belong to the category classified in this book as non-exclusively populist parties. All of these parties belong to one of the party families or/and have clear ideological base beside populism. LMP can be labelled as a green populist party, with strong environmental appeal. MIÉP and Jobbik are characterised by their national conservatism with a specific understanding of na-

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tionalism, which places them to the extreme right of the Hungarian party system. According to MIÉP and Jobbik, the elites have betrayed Hungary’s national interests by not seeking to revise the Trianon Treaty or even renouncing the possibility of its revision. It was the recognition of the border between Hungary and Ukraine by the Antall government that led certain MDF MPs to secede and then found MIÉP under István Csurka’s leadership. Jobbik went even further in its criticism of “cosmopolitan elites” and organised the Hungarian Guard to defend the nation from other states. Anti-Semitism is also apparent in MIÉP’s and Jobbik’s rhetoric. Even when Jews are not explicitly mentioned, the object of criticism is the “liberal-bolshevik elites”, in reality denoting representatives of the liberal SZDSZ and the socialist MSZP, that is the parties which governed Hungary in 1994–1998 and 2002–2009 respectively. For a significant part of the Hungarian public, these (now former) SZDSZ elites are linked with Jewishness, for it was precisely a group of Budapest Jewish intellectuals who stood at SZDSZ’s inception in the late 1980s. It is not accidental that the party has always had its greatest support in Budapest. Corrupt elites and rule by oligarchs are criticised by all the parties analysed here. Jobbik criticises the elites “in the name of the people” and points its finger at MSZP and Fidesz. LMP has launched a broader attack on contemporary political style and argues for democratic renewal, while not eschewing coercive action; consider for instance the incident where LMP adherents blocked government MPs from entering the building of the Parliament. Although unrelated to the fight against corruption, Jobbik’s tradition of direct action is both much deeper and more obvious. e party organised, again “in the name of the people”, the paramilitary Hungarian Guard, notorious for its marches and rallies. Despite being banned by the court, the Guard continues to exist in a modified form and is one of the “faces” of the party. Analysis of the three parties’ electorates in terms of education brings interesting results. Although MIÉP and Jobbik on the one side and LMP on the other have not established their profiles on similar themes, it is true for all three parties that their electoral bases consist

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of those with secondary (Jobbik) or higher education (LMP and MIÉP), and as such are certainly not the socially excluded. Another common characteristic of the electorate is that it is young or middle aged. Its territorial distribution is different, though: whereas MIÉP and LMP have fared best electorally in Budapest, Jobbik’s electorate is generally concentrated in the Eastern part of the country, mainly in the North and North-East.

List of Abreviations of Political Parties FKGP HP Jobbik KDNP LMP MDF MIÉP MSZP SZDSZ

Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party Humanist Party Movement for a Better Hungary Christian Democratic People’s Party Politics Can Be Different Hungarian Democratic Forum Hungarian Justice and Life Party Hungarian Socialist Party Alliance of Free Democrats

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Bőhm, Antal. 2010. “Baloldali visszavágó – 2002.” In: Parlamenti választások Magyarországon. Eds. György Földes and László Hubai. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 381–408. Boros, Tamás. 2011. LMP: Die stille ungarische Ökopartei. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiung (http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzesek/ Arbeitspapier _April _2011 _ Tamas_Boros.pdf). Budapester Zeitung. Vona: Wir wollen 2014 an die Regierung! 25/5/2012. (http://www. budapester.hu/2012/05/vona-%E2%80%9Ewir-wollen-2014-an-die-regierung/). Csurka, István. 2008. Erős, összevont zsidó támadás Magyarország Ellen (http: //www.miep.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1799:ersoesszevont-zsido-tamadas-magyarorszag-ellen&catid=41:hirek&Itemid=63). Dieringer, Jürgen. 2009. Das politische System der Republik Ungarn. Opladen&Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich. Dieringer, Jürgen. 2010. Ungarn vor den Wahlen. Ein fluides Parteiensystem im Zeichen der Doppelkrise.. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiung. és a megújuló demokrácia stratégiája. A Lehet Más a Politika választási programja 2010. Budapest: LMP (http://lehetmas.hu/upload/9/9/201003/LMP_Program_2010_1.pdf). Fábián, György. 2010. “Választás a változásért – 2010.” In: Parlamenti választások Magyarországon. Eds. György Földes and László Hubai. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 453–487. Havlík, Vratislav. 2011. “Maďarsko.” In: Koaliční vládnutí ve střední Evropě (1990 – 2010). Eds. Stanislav Balík and Vlastimil Havlík. Brno: Masarykova univerzita v Brně, Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 91–119. Hloušek, Vít. 2005. “Maďarsko.” In: Politické strany moderní Evropy. Eds. Vít Hloušek, Lubomír Kopeček and Roman Chytilek, Praha: Portál, 480–495. Hvg. Tárki: a fiatalok közel harmada már a Jobbiké. 8/2/2012. (http://hvg.hu/ itthon/20120208_tarki_jobbik_fidesz_mszp). Index. A magyarok kétharmada jobbikos, csak nem tud róla. 19/5/2012. (http: //index.hu/belfold/2012/05/19/a_magyarok_ketharmada_jobbikos_csak_ nem_tud_rola/). Index. Csurka maradt a MIÉP elnöke. 24/5/2003. (http://index.hu/belfold/hirek/ 120045/). Index. Elbukhat a Fideszen az oligarchabizottság. 15/5/2012. (http://index.hu/ belfold/2012/05/15/nem_biztos_hogy_megalakul_az_oligarchabizottsag/). Jobbik Magyarországért mozgalom. 2009. Az új erő EP-kampányfilmje – Magyarország a magyaroké (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGX8IFGvsZo). Jobbik Magyarországért mozgalom. 2010a. Radikális változás. A Jobbik országgyűlési választási programja a nemzeti önrendelkezésért és a társadalmi igazságosságért. Budapest: Jobbik (http://www.jobbik.hu/sites/jobbik.hu/ down/Jobbik-program2010OGY.pdf). Jobbik Magyarországért mozgalom. 2010c. Elég az élősködésből! Jobbik hivatalos kampányfilm 2010 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhMHjzZG_40).

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Jobbik Magyarországért mozgalom. 2010d. Radikális változást! – A nép nevében – Jobbik kampányfilm – 2010 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscr een&NR=1&v=9QK6-pOVrsQ). Jobbik Magyarországért mozgalom. 2010e. Jobbik 2010 kampányfilm – Movement for a Better Hungary campaign (http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=CDiUs_7RRzQ). Jobbik – e movement for a better Hungary. 2010b. Radical Change. A Guide to Jobbik’s parliamentary electoral manifesto for national self-determination and social justice. Budapest: Jobbik Foreign Affairs Committee (http://jobbik.com/ temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf). Karácsony, Gergely and Róna, Dániel. 2010. “A Jobbik titka. A szelsőjobb magyarorszagi megerősodesenek lehetséges okairól.” Politikatudományi szemle 19, No. 1, 31–61. Király, András. 2012. Nagyon fiatal, nagyon magyar, nagyon rosszkedvű. Index, 30/1/2012. (http://index.hu/belfold/2012/01/30/nagyon_fiatal_nagyon_magyar_nagyon_rosszkedvu/). Kopeček, Lubomír. 2005. “Politické strany a stranické systémy ve srovnávací a teoretické perspektivě.” In: Politické strany moderní Evropy. Eds. Vít Hloušek, Lubomír Kopeček and Roman Chytilek, Praha: Portál, 9–54. Körösényi, András. 1999. Government and Politics in Hungary. Budapest: Central European Unoversity Press. LMP – Lehet más a politika. 2010. A fenntartható jövő, a befogadó társadalom LMP – Lehet más a politika. 2012. LMP prepares for demonstrations in 2012 as well. Budapest: LMP (http://english.lehetmas.hu/news/649/lmp-prepares-fordemonstrations-in-2012-as-well/). MIÉP – Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja. 2005. A rend programja. A MIÉP szándékai, céljai, javaslatai. Budapest-Balatonederics: MIÉP (http://www.miep.hu/ index.php?option =com _ content&view=article&id =46& Itemid = 55). MIÉP-Jobbik. 2006. A MIÉP-Jobbik a Harmadik Út kampányfilmje (http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=OueAYLsBcjI). Origo. A parlamentben vizsgálná Simicskáékat a Jobbik. 8/5/2012. (http:// www.origo.hu/itthon/20120508-vona-gabor-parlamenti-vizsgalobizottsagsimicska-es-nyerges-ugyeinek-vizsgalatara.html). Origo. Csurka maradt a MIÉP elnöke. 2/12/2000. (http://www.origo.hu/itthon/ 20001202csurka.html). Origo. Dühös tüntetéssel zárultak a kormányellenes akciók. 23/12/2011. (http:// www.origo.hu/itthon/20111223-ujabb-lmp-tuntetes-a-parlament-elott.html). Origo. Hídblokáddal tüntetett a Jobbik és az LMP Schmitt Ellen. 31/3/2012. (http: //www.origo.hu/itthon/20120331-tobb-mint-egy-tucat-embert-allitottak-eloa-lanchidrol-es.html). Origo. Lázár szerint az MSZP-Jobbik együttműködést jelzik a parlament maratoni ülései. 2/12/2011. (http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20111202-lazar-janos-a-parlamentrol-az-ellenzeki-egyuttmukodesrol.html).

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Origo. Lendvai: A Fidesz kiherélné a demokráciát. 20/3/2010. (http:// www.origo.hu/itthon/valasztas2010/kampanynaplo/20100320-lendvai-ildikoszerint-jobbikfidesz-egyuttmukodes-lesz.html). Origo. Vona az egyetlen elnökjelölt a Jobbik kongresszusán. 19/5/2012. (http: //www.origo.hu/itthon/20120519-vona-az-egyetlen-elnokjelolt-a-jobbikkongresszusan.html). Pelinka, Anton. 2010. Feinde überall: Das Weltbild von Jobbik. Die Presse, 15/5/ 2010 (http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/gastkommentar/558378/Feindeueberall_Das-Weltbild-von-Jobbik). Rajacic, Agnes. 2007. “Populist Construction of the Past and Future: Emotional Campaigning in Hungary between 2002 and 2006.” East European Politics and Societies 21, No. 4, 639–660. Ripp, Zoltán. 2011. “A parlamentáris demokrácia (1989–2010).” In: Magyarországi politikai pártok lexikona (1846–2010). Ed. István Vida. Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 315–471. Šedo, Jakub. 2002. “Parlamentní volby v Maďarsku 2002.” Středoevropské politické studie 4, No. 4 (http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=25). TÁRKI – Társadalomkutatási Intézet. 2011. 2011 a Jobbik éve, különösen a fiatalok körében. Budapest: TÁRKI (http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2012/kitekint/ 20120207.html). Uitz, Renata. 2008. “Hungary.” In: Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov, Oľga Gyárfášová and Daniel Smilov, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs (http://www.isp.org.pl/ files/7832124490738466001218629576.pdf). Website of Hungary’s National Election Office Választas.hu (www.valasztas.hu).

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7. POLAND KINGA WOJTAS 7.1. Politics of Populism in Poland In Poland, populism cannot be regarded as a recent phenomenon. If we consider only the 20th century, a few populist movements of different character can be pointed out. Moreover, the most influential populist movements were a part of the fight for Poland’s independence. erefore, an unequivocal judgment of populism as a threat to democracy and as a negative phenomenon is impossible. Populism became a style of communication and mobilisation, when in 1918 Poland regained independence (until then it had been occupied by Russia, Austria-Hungary and Prussia). Building a sovereign state meant mobilising people who for over 200 years had been second-class citizens of the monarchies occupying Poland. e reason for the popularity of populism was that it was an agrarian society with the highest level of illiteracy in Europe (Landau and Tomaszewski 2005: 261). Universal suffrage required a new rhetoric to include peasants to legitimise new political systems instead of supporting egalitarian and internationalistic leist movements. anks to this, the populism of Polish parties before World War II had a national character – which led to the primacy of national independence over proletarian internationalism. It was not because the system of representation was malfunctioning or because it excluded some groups of the society that populism became a tool for creating and sustaining the system – it was rather based on civic nationalism of Józef Piłsudski (Pankowski 2010: 15). Piłsudski represented different things to different people. Although the 1926 military coup was initially supported by trade unions and a broad leist coalition, his dri away from the le was clear and he skilfully positioned himself “above” party politics and

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the le-right cleavage (Pankowski 2010: 16). e organisation, NonPartisan Block for Cooperation with the Government (Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem, BBWR) became his background – the name itself suggested separation from party politics (a few decades later, the leader of Solidarity and future President Lech Wałęsa created his political organisation called the Non-Partisan Block for the Support of Reforms, BBWR). Moreover, Pilłsudski’s politics were far from xenophobic or nationalistic. Piłsudski was a charismatic leader, “father of the nation”, symbol of the independent state, supporting different social groups and even the coup d’état he carried out and the authoritarian regime (called Sanitation – healing) did not change history’s evaluation of him: he belongs to the national pantheon of heroes. His populism meant the criticism of parliamentarism and of the importance of the parties in the political system that in his eyes were disintegrating the Polish state. His biggest opponent was National Democracy – “Endecja” (Narodowa Demokracja), whose leader was Roman Dmowski. It belonged to a European, inter-war movement of the radical right – ethno-nationalistic and xenophobic. While it’s hard to unequivocally define Piłsudski’s ideology, with Dmowski’s movement it is rather easy. For Endecja populism meant an interpretation of the world and community by ethnic origin. Power and capital should belong to Catholic Poles, not Jews (during the interwar period almost 40% of Warsaw inhabitants were Jewish and in Poland 30%, see Landau, Tomaszewski 2005: 58). Recently, his ideas have been echoed by the contemporary League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR). Another period when the politics of “populism” had an important role in Polish politics was the 1980s. Solidarity was formed – an anticommunist movement which at its largest boasted 9 million members. In 1989, when it was created, it was seen as the beginning of the end for the communist regime in East-Central Europe. e movement had a nationalistic (anti-Soviet), civic (pro-democratic) and working-class (trade union) character. It gathered people from different environments (workers, white collar employees, intellectuals, artists), who in the communist system, where the state was the only employer, might have been called “workers” (see Touraine 1989). Solidarity’s inheritance is diverse as “solidarity had strong traditional values as

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well as a strong modernising tendency” (Kula 1991: 26). Solidarity’s populism meant the struggle for decent work, rest, access to basic products (e.g. food), teaching the true Polish history or freedom of assembly. It was a long and diverse list and Solidarity’s populism did not represent the particular interests of a group calling itself a nation. It was a much wider popular camp against an oppressive regime (Pankowski 2010: 62), which brought together social-democrats, liberals and conservatives for whom the politics of the communist oligarchy under the Soviet Union became a common enemy. erefore, in Polish history populism is not a marginal matter nor does it only apply – according to some authors – to anti-establishment parties. Moreover, it was a part of the policy of organisations playing a substantial role in the existing state. In the 1990s, it also was present in Polish politics. e first free election held in Poland took place in 1990, when a president was chosen democratically for the first time. In the runoff was the charismatic former leader of Solidarity, Lech Wałęsa and his electoral opponent, the relatively unknown immigrant Stan Tymiński (founder of Party X). For both candidates the populist style was present in their actions and electoral campaigns. Lech Wałęsa (“I want to give Poland back to you, I want you to play a role in everything that is connected to the state”) (Cholova, Kasprowicz 2010: 14). Tymiński, on the other hand, constructed his image as a person from outside the system (Cholova, Kasprowicz 2010: 18–19). He based his strategy on populism, criticising the establishment, both communists and Solidarność, and constructed his image around being an outsider to the system, both as a politician and a businessman. Exploiting societal fears, he appealed to common people and drew legitimacy by claiming to be “one of them” (Kucharczyk, Wysocka 2008: 78). e first free choice was actually between two faces of populism. However, the populism of parties existing in sovereign countries cannot be compared to the populist mobilisation of Solidarity in a communist country or to populism in a country just building its independence.

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7.2. The Evolution of the Party System e first entirely free parliamentary elections in Poland took place in 1991 and were the real founding elections (Grabowska 2004: 170).e parliament they brought was characterised by enormous fractionalisation – there were 29 party committees present in it. e two biggest parties, namely the Democratic Le Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna, UD – later transformed into the Freedom Union – Unia Wolności, UW) jointly won only 26.5% of votes. e fractionalisation was partially caused by the adoption proportional representation and the abandonment of election thresholds. e electoral results were shaped by one significant cleavage, attitudes towards the communist system. e post-communist side was represented by SLD and the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) who tried to portray themselves as a historic party, while the anti-communist (post-Solidarity) side was represented by practically all the other parties. Although SLD was isolated in that parliament, it did possess blackmailing potential (Sokół 2011: 327). Within the abovementioned cleavage, we should also mention e Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, KPN) led by Leszek Moczulski, the oldest Polish anti-communist party – established in 1979 and operating illegally until the 1990s (Historia KPN). In the 1991 election it won 7.5% of the vote, which gave it 46 seats in the parliament. KPN was the only party which rejected the Round Table agreements of 1989 that defined the rules for democratising Poland. We can therefore say that it was a party that did not belong to this competitive system of 1991 – although it participated in coalition talks with the post-Solidarity side, it did not join or support the government created by it. e quick disintegration of the democratic opposition was characteristic for the party system in Poland (Grabowska 2004: 173). As a result of the early election of 1993, the government was created from representatives of six parties – the winners were post-communist parties. SLD won 171 seats and PSL 132 seats. Post-Solidarity parties: UD, Labour Union (Unia Pracy, UP), BBWR and KPN togeth-

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er gained 154 seats. A majority government could then be composed of only post-communist parties. e divided post-Solidarity side should be given more attention in order to understand the dynamics of coalition building and alliances within the party system. One attempt to balance the uniformity of the post-communist SLD was the establishment of Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcji Wyborczej Solidarność, AWS) before the elections of 1997. e coalition was composed of 45 entities, the most important being the Conservative People’s Party (Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe, SKL), Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe, ZChN), Social Movement (Ruch Społeczny, RS, 1989–1993: NSZZ Solidarity, S), Party of Christian Democrats (Partia Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczna, PChD/PPChD), Centre Alliance (Porozumienie Centrum, PC), KPN, People’s Alliance (Porozumienie Ludowe, PL), Christian Democracy-Labour Party (Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczne Stronnictwo, ChD-SP), and BBWR. Solidarity Electoral Action contained parties with various political programs1, which later led to the disintegration of AWS. However, in 1997 this coalition won the election (taking 201 seats) and formed a government with the liberal UW (with 60 seats) – Jerzy Buzek, then relatively unknown, became the prime minister. On a wave of social discontent, Self-Defence and LPR got into Parliament in 2001. Before the election the post-Solidarity side gave rise to two new parties: Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) with Centre Alliance (Porozumienie Centrum, PC) at its core and Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) – with some politicians from UW joining it. is parliamentary term ended in 2005 with the defeat of the post-communist side, caused mainly by corruption scandals, which came to light during the term. e post-Solidarity side (PiS and PO) won, but those two parties could not form a coalition, and a government was created by PiS, Self-Defence and LPR. is coalition, due to the presence of Lepper’s party, was symbolic of the move away from the post-communist division. 1 Differentiated and divided post-Solidarity side could be presented in a clearer way using the classification proposed by Mirosława Grabowska. She indicates (taking into account only the major parties): liberal centre-right (UD, KLD, UW, PO), liberal-conservative right (ZChN, PC, AWS, PiS), and radical right (LPR) (Grabowska 2005: 8).

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e post-communist bloc was a monolith until 2004, when a group of MPs led by Marek Borowski le SLD and established Social Democracy of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Polska, SDPL). In the 2005 elections, the new party did not make it into parliament, and the postcommunist side was still represented by SLD. At the level of electoral behaviour this division continued to function for longer (Grabowska 2005: 8), and finally ended in the 2007 election. e post-communist side lost its significance and the competition, which arose between PO and PiS, two parties that grew from the post-Solidarity branch, became the most important. Politicians and commentators called this conflict the clash between liberal and social Poland. In fact, we talk here of the beginning of the social and economic cleavage. Obviously, in the Polish party system there were parties which intentionally rejected the post-communist cleavage – the relevant parties comprised, as we have already indicated, post-communist PSL, which tried to blur its origin and Self-Defence, intentionally rejecting this division and presenting itself as a party that does not belong to the system. Analysing the party system as far as the coalitions are concerned, we can observe that during seven terms of the parliament, 14 governments were formed, with only 7 of them formed immediately aer elections, while others were established during the term – aer the fall or resignation of the previous government. It was not a rule that the party initiating a coalition was the winning party – this was so in eight cases. We should also observe that since 2004 (since the establishment of Józef Oleksy’s government) the initiating party has been the winning party, while this had not been the case before (Jednaka 2011: 365). Voters did not know which party would form the government aer the election or who would become the prime minister. e average duration of a government was 15 months. e party with the biggest coalition potential is PSL, which co-formed 9 governments. Summing up these considerations, we notice that the effective number of parties at a national level in the 1991 parliament was 10.85. e introduction of the election threshold of 5%, the adoption of the d’Hondt formula for calculating votes into seats, and the consolidation of the post-Solidarity side in response to SLD’s return to power limited the fragmentation of the parliamentary party system. In 1993, the effective number of parties at the parliament level was

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3.88, in 1997 – 2.95, in 2001 – 3.6, in 2005 – 4.26, in 2007 – 2,82, and in 2011 – 3 (based on www.pkw.gow.pl). e value of this coefficient grew in 2001 and 2005 due to the fact that Self-Defence and LPR got into Parliament. e consolidation of the system can also be observed by analysing the percentage of votes for the two biggest parties: in 1991 it was 24.3%, in 1993 35.8%, in 1997 61%, in 2001 53.7%, in 2005 51.1%, and two years later 73.6%. In the last election it was 69.1%. Since 2001, the two largest parties have been PO and PiS.

7.3. Case Selection ree Polish parties are usually classified as populist parties: SelfDefence (Pankowski 2010, Kucharczyk, Wysocka 2008, Markowski 2004, Nalewajko 2004, Bauman 2003, Szacki 2003); League of Polish Families (Pankowski 2010, Nalewajko 2004, Kucharczyk, Wysocka 2008, Moroska 2010); and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) (Pankowski 2010, Nalewajko 2004, Kucharczyk, Wysocka 2008). ey have different characteristics: Self-Defence’s appeal is described as peasant agrarian populism of protest (Nalewajko 2004: 59); PiS is regarded either as “so” populist (Nalewajko 2004: 59) or anti-liberal (Pankowski 2010: 151); LPR is labelled more consistently– it is described as populism of identity (Nalewajko 2004: 60), connected with ethnic-nationalism and the radical right (Pankowski 2010: 111). Self-Defence presents itself as an opponent of the state and the elites. It referred to resentments based on the peasant – nobility division (Nalewajko 2004: 59). A peasant is good and honest and because of this he is used and oppressed by the elite. e classical populist dichotomy of “us” and “them” is apparent. Despite its formal peasant character, it cannot be classified as an agrarian party. e reason is not in its origin but in the eclectism of its platform. Andrzej Lepper, SelfDefence’s leader, used elements of right or le ideology depending on the targets. Due to its exclusively populist character Self-Defence is the main subject of this article. It’s quite problematic to analyse the character and range of populism in PiS’s platform. Law and Justice was established in 2001 by

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the twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński. Law and Justice has coupled anti-communism with anti-corruption by proclaiming the need to fight the collusion between the ex-communist elites, big business and the media (Kucharczyk, Wysocka 2008: 79). PiS claimed that elites participating in negotiations dismantling the communist system in 1989 (Round Table) betrayed Poland’s interest and a Fourth Republic of Poland (IV RP) should be built. Although, as Daniel Smilov and Ivan Krastev said their “stance against minorities (life-style minorities), their attempts to criminalise their opponents, and their disrespect for entrenched constitutional principles and foreign relations, in our view justifies their depiction as ‘hard populists’” (Smilov, Krastev 2008: 9). is, however, is not in line with populism as we understand it in this monograph. Since the 2007 election, PiS has tried to build a division between liberal Poland represented by PO and the social one defended by Kaczyński’s party. As mentioned above, such an underlining dichotomy should not be interpreted along populist lines as the division of “us and them” but as creating social-economic cleavage in party system. Primarily, PiS’s rhetoric refers to post-communist divisions and tries to discredit their opponents by refusing them the right to represent Solidarity values – “You are where ZOMO (paramilitary-police formations in communist period – KW) was, we are with Solidarity” (Jarosław Kaczyński addressed to PO during celebrations of 30th anniversary of creation of Solidarity). However, recently PiS has weakened this kind of rhetoric and focused on economic matters. erefore, PiS may be called a conservative party, which points out to the weakness of the Polish le through various social and solidarity slogans. e third mentioned “populist” party, LPR, cannot be categorised as a populist party according to our definition either. Its origins, in the traditions of Roman Dmowski’s Endecja allow it to be classified as one of von Beyme’s extremist and radical right-wing parties. e platform of LPR was “the idea of the people, meaning the national community and its interest”. e following populist elements can be distinguished: definition of community was created by “true Polish patriots” and the enemy were “the elites who do not respect national interests” – postcommunists, Masonic and un-Polish conspirators (Cholova, Kasprowicz 2010: 20). e core elements of the League’s political activity

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consist in its objection to the European Union and a strong accent on Catholicism in its most traditional form (Kucharczyk, Wysocka 2008: 78). erefore, its platform belonged to the xenophobic trend of European radical right. e party uses simple schemes to create community based on foreign threat. LPR had a high level of institutionalisation (developed local network and stable party structure), which was unusual among leader-orientated populist parties. Consequently, a strong connection to historical values, interwar ideology and specific organisational structures indicate that LPR should be regarded more as a radical right-wing party than a populist party. Other contemporary parties use populism as a common communication tool – it is used by all parties to some extent, but not systematically. It is enough to analyse the announcements of PO’s leader – from 2007, the ruling party in Poland. Prime Minister Donald Tusk when accused of irresponsibility and withdrawal from reforms, answered that “maybe critics are familiar with theories, visions, ideas, but he is a pragmatist who understands real problems and he will not allow any harm to come to society now in the name of future dreams” (Smolar 2011: 1). It is typical for populists to disregard the intellectualists. Tusk is compared to Berlusconi, who treats power as “an ingot of gold, hidden under mattress, which may be used to get another ingot – to win the next election” (Smolar 2011: 1). Moreover, the main political dimension in Polish politics is the PO – PiS conflict and Donald Tusk accepts the PiS narrative when he claims that his “main instruments in the struggle for a strong and fair state will be the Kaczyński brothers” (Wprost, 37/2005). However, the politics of Polish governments created by PiS or PO cannot be regarded as populist politics. Decisions that were made may be judged from different points of view, angles or ideological positions. Noticeably, in contemporary politics some communication strategies are common and the fact that a party uses them does not identify them as a populist party. Such assumptions would reduce the complexity of political activities to the label of “populism”. Since Self-Defence is the only party that can be considered to be an exclusively populist party, it is thoroughly described in this article.

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7.4. Party History In 1992, three organisations making up the social movement, Self-Defence, were registered: e Party Alliance Self-Defence of the Republic, the Self-Defence Farmers’ Trade Union and National Self-Defence Commitee. erefore, three sides of the Self-Defence organisation can be discussed: the trade union, the national committee and the political party. e most significant elements became the party and the trade union. Such structures allowed Self-Defence to address different groups of voters and gave it flexibility. Moreover, when necessary it could present itself either as a party or a trade union (that is not uncommon practice in Polish party system – the post-solidarity AWS had a similar setup). Self-Defence was formed by Andrzej Lepper, a farmer from the Pomeranian Voivodeship, a former member of Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), and from 1980 the director of the State Agricultural Farm. Despite attending secondary school Lepper did not take the exam for the secondary school certificate and in his youth he was a boxer. His political carrier started in 1991, when he led protests of farmers affected by drought (Samoobrona RP – kim jesteśmy i o co walczymy? 2004). It is said that in early stages of Self-Defence’s existence communist security service functionaries were involved with the party (Rybak 2006a). e significance of Self-Defence increased in 1992, when it started to represent farmers who had found themselves in a debt trap with fast-growing interest rates and as a result their farms were seized by bailiff and sold at auction. Since such problems affected around 0,8% of Polish farmers, it cannot be said that Self-Defence represented the interests of a significant part of Polish society (Cieśla, Rybak 2006). e main form of protest used by Self-Defence were road blockades, but protestors also went on hunger strike or occupied buildings, such as the Ministry of Agriculture. It was a time when the main party and union slogan was “Balcerowicz must leave” (Leszek Balcerowicz, Vice Premier and Finance Minister in 1989–1991, in first democratic government in Poland, introduced free market reforms aer the fall of communism. Self-Defence regarded his decisions as the source of all

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disasters). In 1994, Andrzej Lepper was arrested for the first time and in the end received an eighteen-month suspended sentence for incitement of violence against a farm administrator (members of the union flogged him and shaved his head). ese kinds of actions in defence of their own interests became characteristic for Self-Defence. In the following years the subject of interest and consequently protests, road blockades and actions involving violence were these: Self-Defence demanded blockades of imported foodstuffs (imported grains were spilled on rails); increases of prices for farm produce; oil and land; globalisation; selling land to foreigners. Members of SelfDefence oen were in conflict with the police and when they broke the law oen convicted. What is important is that their actions were successful – government representatives negotiated and oen yielded. 1999 was a crucial year for Self-Defence. It was a time when Polish society had to face the consequences of four reforms introduced by the Jerzy Buzek cabinet (regarding education, public health, superannuation and administration). Lepper used this moment to consolidate his supporters before the upcoming parliamentary election. Self-Defence organised road blockades fighting for farmers’ interests. Lepper proved to be a cynical player when he rejected an agreement negotiated with the government, considering it as worthless for his party’s development (Cieśla, Rybak 2006). Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska claims that this was the moment when he dominated the scene and eliminated other farmers’ unions. He started to build a political party that joined Parliament two years later (Cieśla, Rybak 2006). Earlier – in 1995, Lepper, as part of party promotion, took part in the presidential election – he gained 1.3% of the vote. e first time Self-Defence participated in parliamentary elections as a party was in 1993 – it gained 2.8%. In 2001, it exceeded the electoral threshold and joined the Lower Chamber (Sejm). It gained 10.2% of votes, which gave it 53 seats in the Lower Chamber and two seats in Second Chamber (Senate). e party placed third overall (aer SLD and PO). One year later, local government elections were held and Self-Defence gained 16% (aer the election the main coalition partner was SLD). In the 2005 European Parliamentary elections, 10.8% of voters supported Self-Defence, in 2005 parliamentary election it gained 11.4% of votes, which gave the party 56 seats in the Lower

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Chamber and meant that Self-Defence was the third largest force in parliament. Lepper became Vice Premier and Minister of Agriculture – it was written that the “nightmare of the Polish intelligentsia had come to life” (e.g. Paradowska 2004). Aer six years in Parliament and two years of being a coalition partner in Jarosław Kaczyński’s cabinet, in 2007 Self-Defence did not enter the parliament. e end of Lepper’s and his co-workers careers was partially the result of decreasing support for the party that joined Kaczyński’s cabinet but primarily was a consequence of charges of sexual harassment levelled at Lepper and his close co-worker Andrzej Łyżwiński regarding women working in Self-Defence (Kącki 2006). e last stage of the Self-Defence – LPR – PiS coalition (July 2007) was the investigation of e Central Anticorruption Bureau called the “land scandal”. Andrzej Lepper was supposed to have enabled changes in the status of agricultural land to construction grounds in return for money. is scandal led to the government’s fall and early elections, in which the compromised party gained only 1.5%. Aer 2007, Self-Defence was looking for new allies and a place in the party system: firstly on the right-wing – it started cooperation with LPR as League and Self-Defence, and it later turned to the le. Charges against Andrzej Lepper, who united the party, resulted in disintegration – leading politicians Renata Beger, Mateusz Piskorski, Sebastian Filipek-Kaźmierczak and Andrzej Aumiller withdrew. A group of activists formed the Party of Regions (Partia Regionów). Election results in 2007 did not qualify Self-Defence for finance support from budget (3% support is required), which resulted in financial problems. Self-Defence returned to its former criticism of the government, presenting itself as a victim of the manipulative politics of Jarosław Kaczyński. Legal problems, lack of money and debts led in summer 2011 to Lepper’s suicide. e party chose the unknown, uncharismatic Andrzej Prochoń as the new leader and exists to this day on the margins of the political scene. In conclusion, the functioning of Self-Defence can be divided into several stages: informal protests; a trade union acting, when necessary, as a non-parliamentary oppositional political party; a coalition partner who fell into disintegration aer the 2007 election; and now a party fighting for survival aer the death of its charismatic leader.

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7.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style As mentioned above, Self-Defence is based on two structures – trade union and political party. is division was sham, as both of them were led by Andrzej Lepper. Personal unification existed at the level of his deputies as well – Krzysztof Filipek and Stanisław Łyżwiński both held these positions in the party and the trade union. Genowefa Wiśniowska was general secretary in the trade union and one of the deputies in the party (Rybak 2006c). Formal separation of these structures, introduced in Status in 2000, allowed indirect (group) membership in the party – trade unions and social associations were able to join. e distinction between a member of the party and the trade union did not practically matter (Pankowski 2010: 133). at status enabled the participation of members of other parties aer approval from the Presidium of the National Council. is procedure was important in the early stages of party formation, when attempts to attract politicians from other parties without forcing them to quit their previous affiliations were made. According to Lepper’s declaration, the party had around 100 thousand members while the trade union had 500 thousand members. Approximately 60% of party members belonged to the trade union as well (Janicki, Zagner 2003). It is hard to verify this data as the party did not keep records of members. Membership of Self-Defence was open to every Polish citizen over the age of 18. ere were no further formal requirements i.e. the requirement of recommendation from two other members. At this stage the main purpose of Self-Defence was building a mass of membership. Its Statutes (e.g. Statut Samoobrony 2001) defined the organisation based on administrative divisions of Poland (municipality, district, voivodship). Nowadays, the party field structures have a significant role during campaigns – their weakness may affect their effectiveness or mean needing to hire paid workers. Practically, 33.3% of party members indicated that field structures were fictitious and existed only in the statutes (Kosowska-Gąstoł 2010: 157). De jure, Self-Defence’s structural organisation guaranteed democracy and decentralisation of decision-making. e main rule said

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that candidates are chosen by provincial congress instead of central authorities. On the national level the most important organ was Congress (consisting of delegates chosen by provincial congresses and members of Provincial Councils). e National Council appointed the chairman to the party. Regarding transparency of competence division and relations between particular organs of the party, SelfDefence was a party with the lowest level of regulations among all Polish political parties (Sobolewska-Myślik et al. 2010: 100). is attitude gave Andrzej Lepper freedom of decision-making. Furthermore, the statute was only created to fulfil the rules of the Act on Political Parties, which enforces democratic structures (Ustawa o partiach politycznych 1997), and did not regulate the functioning of the party: it was only a facade. e rules of creating electoral lists are one of the factors defining the level of inner democracy in the party. Over 70% of Self-Defence members claimed that they have no influence on compiling electoral lists and 66.7% stated that decisions are made behind closed doors (Sobolewska-Myślik et al. 2010: 70). Among all Polish party members, members of Self-Defence had the lowest participation in decisionmaking. Consequently, members themselves judged the functioning of their party as poor, especially the method of decision-making. Over 50% of members regarded the decision to include candidates from outside the party to electoral lists as bad, considering this a way of gaining money for campaign and a proof of arrangements ruling the party. e lack of procedures and clear career paths proves that promotions within the party were assigned on the basis of financial resources of a member and their ability to make deals, while qualifications were disregarded (Sobolewska-Myślik et al. 2010: 60). is data shows that Self-Defence was a grouping devoid of ideals, cynically using the discontent of some groups for their private interests. e party obeyed the rule “If you can afford it – buy yourself a place on a list of candidates (seat)”. Obviously, this raised frustrations among common members. Financial resources are an important element of organisation survival. Each member was obliged to pay the membership fee, but SelfDefence had problem with their collection: 41.7% of members de-

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clared that they did not pay the fee, 25% paid before elections, 16.7% paid on time, the rest chose answer “don’t know” (Kosowska-Gąstoł 2010: 156). It indicates lack of involvement among members and the weakness of the party, which was unable to collect payments. As mentioned above, standard membership fee did not affect the role of an individual within the party – additional sponsoring was decisive. e structure of party financing is an interesting matter – since the party joined Parliament it became completely dependent on public funding with a decreasing role of membership fees: in 2002 year they were 10% of income, in 2003 – 6%, in 2005 – 0.5%, and in 2006 – only 0.8%. Small increase in 2006 was a consequence of selling places on candidate lists by Andrzej Lepper. is practice was more significant with donations, which in the pre-election period reached 5% of party income. When compared to well-institutionalised parties it was not much, but in Self-Defence’s case it was a noticeable change (Wojtas 2008: 33–34). Leadership as a means of legitimisation is another aspect of the party as an organisation. Two kinds of strategic orientation of leaders can be distinguished: inside and outside. e first one requires looking for acceptance among members of an organisation by various means of power. On the outside platform (electoral and parliamentary), a leader’s responsibility is to gather voter support and to access institutionalised system resources that may guarantee the best attainment of organisational and political goals (Nalewajko 1997: 14). In Self-Defence all power belonged to only one person – Andrzej Lepper. at is not uncommon in the Polish party system – both in PiS and LPR the leader consolidated the party (they are called “leadership parties”). Andrzej Lepper was the chairman of the party from its beginning until his suicide in the summer 2011. His position was never challenged by a serious opponent. e role of the leader was not precisely described in party statutes, which created the possibility for arbitrary power relations without the need to follow any rules (Sobolewska-Myślik 2010: 143). at the party was organised around the leader became apparent during the presidential campaigns in which he participated. It was the matter of Lepper’s ambition or promotion of his party – Lepper could say “the party is me”. He was described as “commander, guru and prophet” (Rybak 2006b). Even if the members were not satisfied

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with the decision-making practice, especially aer 2005, the low level of institutionalisation was the reason why the party could not survive without Andrzej Lepper (which was proven in the end). Party members, especially before 2005, looked to Lepper for a chance to improve their life situation – facing bailiffs and the auction of their households, someone who undermined legal solutions gave them hope. One of the party members described those attracted by Lepper as “desperate people, who had no luck in life, not always through their fault. ey hoped he would protect them from banks” (Grabowski 1998). e common paradox of populist leadership is shown here – “supporters become supporters because of who their leaders are (..) not who they represent” (Taggart 2007: 112). e closest of Lepper’s associates came from the trade union period when Self-Defence organised roadblocks, occupied buildings and moved officials on wheel-barrows. Genowewa Wiśniowska was an example of loyal, faithful associate or even subject (she took over from Lepper as Deputy Speaker of the Lower Chamber in 2006, when he became Vice Premier). at’s how she characterised relations within the party: “We do not argue with our leader. I think Lepper feels my faith and trust, though” (Rybak 2006c). at was the reason why aer the 2001 election most members of the Self-Defence trade union sat in Parliament. ey were mostly farmers (62%) (Piskorski2 2010: 90) or inhabitants of small towns previously connected with PSL, and in communist period members of PZPR. Aer his second success in the elections of 2005–2007, Lepper based his leadership on relations with entrepreneurs (in the parliamentary club the percentage of farmers dropped to 39%) (Piskorski 2010: 90) – majority of them were owners of big farms. New groups, such as military men, joined the party. erefore, the personal charisma of the chairman was underpinned with a new dimension of relations – Andrzej Lepper attracted people, who in return for financial support of the campaign gained political influence. One of Lepper’s associates said: “A group of people think that they can make a political career with Lepper. e makeup of his team oen changes, because 2 Mateusz Piskorski was a publisher of hardline neo-nazi publications. He joined Self-Defence in 2002 and rapidly rose to the party ideologist (Pankowski 2010: 145).

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Lepper rules Self-Defence on his own, and appoints people for posts” (Grabowski 1998). In 2005, the wealthiest members of Parliament belonged to the Parliamentary Club of Self-Defence. Still, Lepper did not give away any control – he was careful not to be endangered by his surroundings, either intelectually or as the party`s sole leader – it is enough to mention Renata Beger, a member of Self-Defence trade union in the 1990s and during the period of 2005–2007 the second “face” of the party. She was a symbol of career Lepper could provide – hers culminated when she became a member of the parliamentary committee of inquiry. Beger passed her high school exams in 2004, she was one of the indebted farmers and members of Self-Defence who had a criminal record (apart from unpaid debts she was convicted for falsification of signatures under her candidature). e proof of her competency is her statement, in which she called the then SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, “Anan Kofan” (Rybak 2006b). Acting as people’s tribune, Lepper mobilised masses. His personality, intransigence and contempt for the elites (aer meetings with politicians, Lepper displayed contempt for his interlocutors: he called Wałęsa a petty swindler, Jan Olszewski a drunkard and degenerate, Andrzej Stelmachowski and Jacek Kuroń fatheads) and raised the self-confidence of his adherents (Cieśla, Rybak 2006). Leadership in Self-Defence was based on weak structures and strong personalities; according to P. Taggart such a model of leadership is characteristic for populist parties. e theory about the personalisation of leadership in Self-Defence is confirmed by its members – 75% of them claimed that “power is personal and concentrated in the leader’s hands” (Sobolewska Myślik 2010: 145). According to Ansell and Fish, charismatic leadership develops in a party in which ideological and territorial differences do not matter. Membership in such parties is based on the personality of the leader not the ideology or territorial bonds. Devisive weakening in a party occurs when the leader’s charisma disappears or is routinised (Ansell, Fish 1999: 292). Summing up, power in Self-Defence was consolidated in the leaders’ hands – a populist structure characterised by an anti-institutional attitude and leadership personalisation is one of the variables defining a level of institutionalisation in political parties (Janda 1990: 10). Lepper’s domination was visible in moments such as assigning

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candidates and positions on electoral lists, financing the party, matters regarding nominations of leader, and organisational culture in the wide definition of the term (Olson 1998: 434).

7.6. Ideology Margaret Canovan claims that reaction to governing structures is a distinctive feature of populists (Canovan 1999: 4). Values become populist depending on contexts, character of the elite and issues dominating the political debate. Populism creates an alternative picture of the world which may be called a populist ideology. However, populist ideology cannot be discussed as classical ideologies as every move of anti-elite mobilisation is addressed to different ideological social groups. Self-Defence presents a mix of agrarian and economic populism, statism, and anti-capitalist messages completely rejecting commerce and even anarchism (Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 100). at wide range of epithets makes analysis of Self-Defence ideology bi-spectral – the way the party presents itself and the way it is perceived. Self-Defence presents itself as a broad, patriotic, social movement based on Catholic social teaching, le-patriotic, patriotic, progressive, nationalist, genuinely centrist, and even social-liberal. is shows a pragmatic attitude to ideology, which is redefined with contexts. It can be said that Self-Defence was verging on political nihilism and based on demagogic slogans (Pankowski 2010: 136), because “populism as an ideology lacks core values” (Taggart 2000: 2). In the analysed period, Self-Defence published few texts presenting various aspects of its ideology. Initial radicalism was gradually toned down, which was meant to create a more acceptable party public image. Consequently, it also limited its influence. e Politician’s Decalogue created in 2003 provides an insight. e core party values were: to recognise the Fatherland, the Nation, family and Polish soil as the most important values, demanding respect and protection from every Pole, the fatherland and the nation is more cherished than personal interest; be faithful to the Christian national tradition; respect and take care of life (Dekalog Polityka 2003). According to this document Self-Defence may be seen as conservative-national party.

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In a statement of policy from 2005, the party started to present its goals differently, focusing on the economy. It rejected the so-called neo-liberal social economic changes, demanded the dissolution of the social division between the 3–5% of the oligarchy and the rest of society living in poverty. It was to be achieved by cutting taxes and increasing government spending. e party negatively evaluated the quality of the reforms aer the fall of the communist system calling them “fatal, anti-social politics enforced since 1989 by a group of all sorts of liberals” (Program Samoobrony 2003). e plan, focused on economic matters (it recommended an increase of GDP by at least 6%), demonstrates the intellectual incompetence of its authors and practically postulates the state running into uncontrolled debts. ese plans might be called leist, taking into account their egalitarian character, redistributional role of the state and its role in economy. On the other hand, Self-Defence underlined the necessity for patriotic education of youth, planned a ban on selling land to foreigners and a renegotiation of the EU contract to strengthen Polish agriculture – such demands do not belong to canon of leist values. Summing up the programme, it proved to have a lack of elementary economic knowledge and had demagogic and anti-elitist character. In 2005, Self-Defence declared itself a “third way” party, which was supposed to be an answer to “mediocre, self-regarding, omniscient commentators of the Polish political scene who classified Self-Defence as ultra-rightist, populist or ultra-leist or even communist” (Program Samoobrony 2003). Vladimir Tismaneanu wrote that it was a search for a political myth promising escape from communism without joining the western “false heaven” (Tismaneanu 2000: 307). Self-Defence defined the third way as patriotic le, respecting national tradition and rationally judging Polish history, respecting state and its institutions. Self-Defence added that “such a le had never been created and would never be created by opportunists, acting as social democrats”. Self-Defence was to be the only patriotic le inspired by the social teaching of the Catholic Church (Program Samoobrony 2003). Building and underlining the connection to a traditional peasant movement which struggled for the improvement of peasants’ financial status and national independence was a significant part of Self-Defence’s presentation. Rafał Pankowski points out “Self-Defence

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does not seriously seek to claim the 100-year tradition of the peasant movement (…). It presents itself as newcomer to the political field, standing for the frustrated sections of society who do not identify with any political tradition” (Pankowski 2010: 137–138). Pankowski draws attention to the fact that the presentation on the Polish and English version of their webpage is different. “e super-patriotic slogans are dropped, and others are brought in, such as ecological values and Keynesian economics (…).” It also stresses that “the party has never been opposed to the idea of Poland’s membership in the EU” (Pankowski 2010: 137). Summing up, Self-Defence cannot be classified as belonging to one of von Beyme’s party families. Moreover, as the history of the party has shown, generic criteria cannot be applied as well. Self-Defence has been labelled as “le-wing”, “ultra-leist”, “le-nationalist populist”, “agrarian”, “ultra-nationalist”, “radical right-wing” (Pankowski 2010: 135). Researchers do not unequivocally defy its ideological profile: described it as “social populists (who) combine socialism and populism and represent a form of le-wing populism” or “feature a number of themes associated with right-wing extremism” (Pankowski 2010: 136). Lepper himself explained: “we are neither the le, nor the right, nor the centre, we represent healthy Polish patriotism”. At another time, when it was more applicable Lepper claimed: “I have always been and will always be a man of the le” (Uhlig 2005a). “Let’s leave ideology in offices” he declared another time (Uhlig 2005b). For Self-Defence, their enemy was the elite that created the corrupting liberal model of a state in which the masses are nothing more than a background for the elite (Program Samoobrony 2003). at was politics and the groups that ruled Poland since 1989 and used “Polish democratic changes for the exploitation of our country by international interest groups and international financial institutions”. erefore, the opponent was not only the Polish establishment (embodied by Leszek Balcerowicz) but also the international environment. is characteristic was represented in Self-Defence’s attitude to European integration – during the pre-accession period the party refused to support Polish accession arguing that “Poland cannot join the EU on its knees but proudly on the same conditions as other countries” (Lista Leppera). According to their point of view,

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Poland is treated like a poor relative, who is not only not invited but also robbed of the things he carried into the palace of integration in neo-colonialism. Self-Defence shall not allow even one peasant to become a beggar. Even if Self-Defence loses influence, it will find a way to help Polish farmers – all of Poland – cast off the yoke of modern colonialism (Ostrożnie z Unią Europejską 2002). Aer 2004, Lepper’s party claimed it was necessary to renegotiate membership conditions. His attitude proves two matters: the populist vision of a hostile world that wants to use the Polish peasant (peasantry being the only healthy social group) and Self-Defence’s nationalist thinking. A part of Self-Defence’s programme officially denied by Lepper was anti-Semitism (spreading racial hatred in Poland is a crime and the party would be delegalised). In the 1990s in order to strengthen and broaden its influence Self-Defence started cooperation with the nationalistic and anti-Semitic Patriotic Association “Grunwald” and Bolesław Tejkowski – the chairman of Polish National Community. In 2004, Self-Defence’s members had a Star of David cut out on their heads by the crowd during protests: the oppressors were symbolically marked as Jews (Pankowski 2010: 139). Lepper’s associate from the early period of Self-Defence, Leszek Bubel, published an anti-Semitic book. Meanwhile Lepper in one of his interviews agreed that reference to anti-Semitism “was a cynical move, but at that time Self-Defence could not yet count on mass support in the countryside or on better candidates for electoral races” (Sieciera see in Pankowski 2010: 139). He openly talked about his fascination with social engineering – apart from Le Bon he respected Joseph Goebbels as a “great man in the field of social engineering” (Łuczak 1999). Anti-Semitism in the party’s rethorics can be interpreted as an attempt to attract voters for whom the criticism of liberalism was too sophisticated. Another factor is the legacy of the interwar nationalistic movement based on conspiratorial theories about Jews ruling the world. Paweł Śpiewak wrote that Self-Defence is responsible for the brutalisation of Polish political language, “because of Lepper, violence becomes a way of talking politics” (Śpiewak 2000: 52). Lepper’s rhetoric became typical for the party – emotional and simple. One of his infamous sentences was uttered during his first appearance in parliament: “ere will be no more Versailles”. His

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voters expected that a simple peasant could make order with “lordly rules”. “at is because of you; your groupings, dyed, in suits and ties, perfumed with Dior, Chanel, you flattered one another for twelve years” – he told the MPs in 2001 from parliamentary platform (Mazur 2002: 2). Lepper was compared to Jakub Szela who was the leader of a peasant uprising against the gentry in Galicia (“e Galician Slaughter”) in 1846 (Kutz 2008). By the way, Szela was a puppet of the Austrian government occupying at that time one part of Poland. e role of Lepper as the “Great Tribune of Rights of the Poor Rundown by Ruffian Transformation” (Szostakiewicz 2011) belongs to the populist canon. Self-Defence also had a characteristic “aesthetic dimension”. It attracted celebrities, one of them was the singer Michał Wiśniewski. e artist was the symbol of aesthetic kitsch and he went down well with the movement’s low class base (Pankowski 2010: 141). Wiśniewski sang simple songs, adjusting to the undemanding taste of mass consumers. Self-Defence dazzled with social sensitivity, xenophobia, patriotism or anti-Semitism when it was expected by voters or necessary for achieving some end.

7.7. Electoral Support and Social Base e first element of analysis in this chapter is the question of whether Self-Defence was supported by voters belonging to the target group – farmers and people whose financial status worsened as a result of the transformation reform aer 1989. Obviously, not all of the people who supported the road blockades and protests in 1999 (over 50% of society – Łuczak 1999), gave their vote to Self-Defence in the 2001 election. e survey found similar support among potential voters of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Alliance of the Democratic Le (SLD), although less so among potential voters of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). is suggests that many (potential) protesters were not seeking a “third way’ but simply wanted a better deal for farmers (Krok-Paszkowska 2003: 119). Moreover, Self-Defence had the largest negative electorate – in 2003 year over 52% of voters declared antipathy to the party (CBOS 2003).

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In 1993, Self-Defence for the first time participated in parliamentary election gaining only 2.8% and in the 1997 election the party repeated the poor result with 0.1% of the vote. erefore the result of the 2001 elections was a spectacular success – it became the third party in the country, while the defeat of the intelligentsia’s UW was surprising and worrying. Costly and turbulent, the 2005 campaign brought unexpected results; the party received 11.4% of the votes which was a small increase (1.2% and 20 thousands votes) in comparison to previous elections (Piskorski 2010: 222). In 2007, party gained 1.5% (247 335 votes) which deprived it of parliamentary seats and public funding. As was already mentioned, the decline of support was caused by numerous scandals and disappointments with the toned down policy of Self-Defence as a coalition partner. Self-Defence lost the vote to the PiS (26%), 18.2% of its former supporters voted for the PSL and 8.5% for the PO and SLD (Nalewajko 2004: 60). In the pre-election period (two months before election) only 2% of Poles supported the party. Due to underrepresented support in opinion poll – those questioned were ashamed of admitting their support for Andrzej Lepper (Piasecki 2012: 111) – the basis for identifying a typical Self-Defence voter are data from polls carried out aer the 2001 election. When common support was obvious, Poles openly adhered to it. e first feature of its electorate is the preponderance of men – almost 60% (Instytut Spraw Publicznych 1999: 11). 18% of the supporters were unemployed (Instytut Spraw Publicznych 1999: 10). Aer the 2001 election Self-Defence supporters expected: a decrease in the earning of the rich – 84%; strong state authority including restoration of death penalty – 89%; social care system development – 97%, cessation of selling Polish enterprises to foreign capital – 88% (CBOS 2001). Table 7.1: Electoral Performance of Self-Defence 1991

Self-Defence

1993

% Seats

%

Seats

–

2.8

–

–

1997 % Seats 0.1

–

2001

2005

%

Seats

%

Seats

10.2

53

11.4

56

2007

2011

% Seats % Seats 1.5

Sources: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu, http://www.pkw.gov.pl.

–

–

–

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More characteristic for Self-Defence was a social base with a low education level – before the 2000 presidential election people with primary and basic vocational education constituted 89% of Lepper’s rural supporters, while people with this level of education constituted just 70% of Polish rural population. In 2002 less than 1% of supporters of Self-Defence had higher education (Pankowski 2010: 147). It resulted in the highest level of political paranoia – politics was seen as the field of activity of secret forces. Self-Defence voters were characterised by authoritarism, political anomie and alienation (CBOS 2002). In the 2001 election, Self-Defence attracted inhabitants of small towns (with up to 10 thousands inhabitants) and gained 10.2% of votes. In towns that had more than 50 thousand inhabitants, the party did not cross the electoral threshold. Only 4% of its voters lived in cities with over 500 thousand inhabitants (Pankowski 2010: 146–147). Except for PSL, it was the only party with no support in cities (Kavetskyy 2001: 5). Instead every third farmer voted for SelfDefence (Raciborski 2003: 44). Moreover, they were not smallholder farmers but resourceful entrepreneurs who ran into debts. e SelfDefence electorate were oen owners of at least 15ha farms, owners of smaller homesteads supported PSL (Instytut Spraw Publicznych 1999: 14). Farmers voting for Lepper’s party owned specialised, profiled homesteads. ese are according to Lipset more susceptible for leist radicalism, as they are more affected with changes of economic situation (Lipset 1950 see in Raciborski 2003: 45). In the 2005 election, Self-Defence voters were still characterised with low level of education, low income and negative perception of their financial status. 38% of voters lived in the country, the majority of them were farmers (every second farmer identified with Self-Defence – it become the dominant political party in the countryside). Additionally, unqualified workers identified with Self-Defence (41%), pensioners (30%), house wives (29%) and the unemployed (28%). On the other hand the highest reluctance was among people with higher education (85%), members of management and intelligentsia (80%), white-collar workers (72%). Significantly, political (ideological) attitudes did not influence its support in 2005. Its voters belonged to the right-wing (26%), centre (23%), le-wing (20%)

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and people with little or no interest in politics and unable to identify their views (23%) (CBOS 2005). Such diversity within ideological self-identification of voters might be a justification for Lepper’s strategy and ambiguous ideological status of Self-Defence. e strategy of “something for everyone” was possible due to the low intellectual competence of his adherents. Analysis of the age structure of Self-Defence voters shows that party had slightly bigger support among older voters – 11% for age 40–59 and over 60 years old – than among younger people – in age groups 18–24 and 25–39 years it gained 9% support (Centroprawica zdobyła większość 2005). Defeat in the 2007 election did not change the electorate of SelfDefence – it was still supported by fewer women (33.3%) than men (66.7%), 61.9% of supporters lived in the country and 15.8% in towns with less than 50 thousand inhabitants (Piskorski 2010: 226). Although the number of people with higher education increased, the majority of its supporters had primary education (Pankowski 2010: 147). And still we can observe the pattern – the bigger the city, the lower the support. e territorial arrangement of support did not change either. In the 2001 election, Self-Defence gained the highest support in the regions: West Pomeranian – 15%, Lubelskie – 14.4%, Łódzkie – 13.2%. e municipality with the highest support was Darłowo, where Lepper had his farm. Over half of voters supported Self-Defence in the municipality Głowno in Łódzkie region. Economic analysis of these districts proved that they did not belong to PGR territories (as it was supposed earlier). In Lubelskie or Łódzkie such villages did not exist (Raciborski 2003: 45). Its worst result in those years came in the industrial region of Silesia (Pankowski 2010: 147). In the 2005 parliamentary elections, Self-Defence had its best result in the north western Koszalin districts (Darłowo), where the movement had originated in the 1990s: it got 22.8% of vote there. e worst result was in the Silesian Sosnowiec – 3.6% (Pankowski 2010: 147). Similar territorial results were achieved in the 2007 election – in Koszalińskie, Self-Defence gained 4.2% of votes which was the highest percentage in that election. erefore, even in its fatherland, the party did not cross the election threshold (5%).

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Summing up, the typical voter was a man, lived in the rural areas or a small town, had his own homestead, was not poor, graduated from vocational school and was in his forties. Moreover, Self-Defence voters were characterised as “strongly anti-elitist, anti-intuitionalist, anti-procedural and in consequence, anti-democratic” (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008: 85) and in a 2003 poll, 44% Self-Defence supporters agreed with the proposal “to abolish democracy and introduce the rule of a strong man” (CBOS 2003).

7.8. Position in the Political System Due to the fact that Self-Defence only twice sat in Parliament and only once was a part of a government, it seems baseless to establish an index of government relevancy – the short perspective will not provide proper insight. Moreover, at the time when it had representation in Parliament and did not take part in the cabinet, Self-Defence cannot be analysed as opposition. According to the definition, opposition is created by political groupings that for any reasons do not participate in forming a cabinet, and criticise the cabinet’s program and activity, while creating personal and programatic alternatives focused on taking over the power within the constitutional framework. From this point of view it is only a technical matter whether a party is represented in Parliament or not (Zwirzchowski 2000: 11). Self-Defence did not meet these requirements as it was a secret ally of the cabinet. Because of the described specifics, defining the Self-Defence’s position in a political system becomes strictly descriptive – the answer can be found only aer chronological investigation of Lepper’s alliances or antagonisms with the rest of the Polish political parties. Before the 2001 election, Self-Defence and its leader were not taken seriously by mainstream politicians. Lepper met members of both governing and opposition parties as well as state functionaries, despite his numerous virulent and slanderous attacks against government ministers and the president (Krok-Paszkowska 2003: 125). In 1999, at the Self-Defence congress, Artur Balazs – Minister for Agriculture, Andrzej Śmietanko – Minister in the Chancellery of the President, Jarosław Kalinowski – leader of PSL, Roman Jagieliński –

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leader of Partia Ludowo-Demokratyczna, and General Tadeusz Wilecki preparing for presidential campaign (Łuczak 1999) were all present. e elites were eager to authenticate their social sensitivity by contacts with Lepper. Blockades that were recognised as being illegal were not lied and there were few attempts by the police to intervene. However, aer the above mentioned events in Kobylnica, Lepper was arrested. He was freed aer guarantees from many politicians: Marian Jurczyk, then a leader of Solidarity 80, and PSL and SLD members of parliament. Firstly, Lepper was quietly supported by Lech Wałęsa, then SLD, and at last PSL. During the local government election PSL and e Labour Union formed e Social Alliance. Andrzej Lepper was chosen – as an Alliance representative – to the regional council of West Pomeranian Voivodeship and in 1999 he marched together with SLD leader Leszek Miller in May 1st parade (Łuczak 1999). During the cadence of Jerzy Buzek’s cabinet (1997–2001), Lepper cooperated with PSL – he was to spread ferment and build block roads, while PSL opposition was to criticise Buzek’s cabinet (Grabowski 1998). In that period both post-communist parties (SLD and PSL) and right-wing politicians – Wałęsa, Wilecki, Balazs were attracted by cooperation with Lepper. Self-Defence was characterised by a program of eclecticism and self-presentation opportunism, which allowed politicians in contact with Lepper to choose issues closest to their own political message. It will remain an open question whether Self-Defence was a tool in hands of the elite or whether Andrzej Lepper used (mostly secret) agreements with mainstream politicians for his own purpose. In 2001, Self-Defence crossed the representation threshold and gained seats in Parliament. During this term it supported the government created by post-communist SLD and PSL in projects such as: change of the Lustration Act, criticism of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN), preservation of combatant rights for officers of the communist system etc. (Paradowska 2004). erefore, Self-Defence cannot be perceived as opposition party in that period. Aer election in 2001, the epithet “Self-Defence of Democratic Le” (Samoobrona Lewicy Demokratycznej) was used when describing the informal agreement between Lepper and Miller (Dzierżanowski 2005). Due to the cooperation and support given by SLD Lepper became deputy speaker of Parliament (despite the

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countervote of PO, PiS and a part of LPR). It was a critical moment – Self-Defence was treated as outright partner not a political pariah. e main advantage for Self-Defence from this informal alliance was the possibility to participate in a network of business connections. SLD helped Self-Defence to become another player on political stage, but during the presidential campaign of 2005, before the second runoff between Donald Tusk (PO) and Lech Kaczyński (PiS), Lepper passed on his support (15%) to Kaczyński (brother of Jarosław Kaczyński, PiS leader). Obviously, the liberal Civic Platform could not expect Lepper’s support, however, in the Polish system SLD and PiS are competing parties and Lepper maneuvered between their camps (Pankowski 2010: 135). Moreover, throughout the period from 2001 to 2005 Self-Defence together with PiS and LPR aimed to scuttle PO’s projects. erefore, Self-Defence tended to support either the le or the right. It disregarded division in the Polish political system. SelfDefence was not a crucial party in the parliament and it did not have coalition potential; almost all parliamentary groupings officially renounced cooperation with it – only the nationalistic LPR considered it. Among official announcements the following statements can be found: Wojciech Olejniczak (who took over Miller as a SLD leader) accused Self-Defence of cynicism and conscious blockade of reforms beneficial to Polish farmers (“Lepper kontra Olejniczak” 2005). PO regarded Self-Defence as a force with negative effect on Polish transformation. Donald Tusk claimed that when hearing one of Lepper’s opinions “most people felt terror” (“Tusk o Lepperze” 2001). PO was the party that unanimously refused any cooperation with the “barbarians” from Self-Defence and simultaneously tried to win voters disappointed with attitude of SLD and PiS (Ogdowski 2004). On the other hand, PiS found SLD a greater danger for Poland than Self-Defence (Paradowska 2002). Aer elections in 2005 PiS created a minority government. It was acting with the consent of Self-Defence and LPR. e necessity of passing a budget – if it was out-voted, President might have dissolved the parliament – resulted in a “stabilisation pact” signed by Jarosław Kaczyński, Roman Giertych (LPR) and Andrzej Lepper in February 2006, which allowed the minority government to function properly (Umowa Stabilizacyjna pomiędzy Ligą Polskich Rodzin, Prawem

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i Sprawiedliwością oraz Samoobroną Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 2006). At that time the political relevancy of Self-Defence increased – it became a party without which the minority government could not exist (table 7.1) and consequently a majority coalition was formed in May 2006. What is important though, aer the elections, support for Self-Defence started to drop which made the threat of early elections likely. Secondly, if Self-Defence cooperated only with PiS, its coalition potential was slight. In the first cabinet of coalition PiS – LPR (with Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as Prime Minister) which only existed for two months, Self-Defence gained the position of vice premier and minister of agriculture and Andrzej Lepper was appointed to both of them. Aer Jarosław Kaczyński became the prime minister, Self-Defence had its representative in Ministry of Construction, Labour and Social Policy. erefore, out of 22 portfolios 3 belonged to Self-Defence, 2 to LPR, 11 to PiS and 5 independent ministers were appointed by PiS, which gave PiS 16 positions altogether. PiS not only had the biggest number of departments but also had the most prestigious portfolios (Jednaka 2011: 376). erefore, Self-Defence’s role as a coalition partner did not provide it with even one objectively significant department (although from Self-Defence’s point of view, the Ministry of Agriculture could be one). For that reason, it is difficult to say whether the Self-Defence’s strategy was one of an office-seeking or policy-seeking party. Progressive marginalisation of Self-Defence additionally clouds this situation. PiS did not even allow Self-Defence to participate in appointing chiefs of government administration in voievodeships (Stankiewicz 2006). Simultaneously, Self-Defence, aware of its weakness in human resources, promoted people connected with SLD or Balazs for positions it received as “division of spoils”. Coalition with PiS ended up meaning that Self-Defence lost adherents to its partner. In comparison to a strong partner capable of atracting protest votes, the party was not unique any longer. e cabinet had to face many crises – member parties oen blackmailed one another with breaking the agreement and early election. e so-called “tape scandal” shows the cynical PiS attitude towards Self-Defence – during a recorded conversation Adam Lipiński (PiS) offers Renata Beger a place in his party in return for a lucrative position and paying

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off her liability to Self-Defence (members of Self-Defence had to sign bills of exchange meant to guarantee their loyalty). Finally, the coalition was dissolved in September 2006 when Lepper demanded the influence on military departments, withdrawal of Polish forces from Afghanistan and Iraq and reorganisation of the 2007 budget which was unacceptable to his partners (Kalendarium tarć w koalicji rządowej 2006). Aer one month, the coalition was renewed – Lepper was threatened with potential disintegration of Self-Defence – 20 members considered defecting to PiS (Rybak 2006d). In December 2006, a sex scandal and in July 2007 the land scandal erupted which lead to early election and the subsequent end of Self-Defence’s parliamentary career. Summing up, the importance of Self-Defence as a coalition party was much lower than might be suggested by a mathematical calculation of relevancy (although PiS could not rule without Self-Defence). It was caused by a low level of institutionalisation in Self-Defence, where members did not feel connected with their party. Consequently PiS could cynically try to take over its members. e second factor weakening Self-Defence position was the declining voter support. ese factors made Self-Defence a PiS hostage, threatened by the prospect of early election. Aer they lost 2007 and 2011 (0.1% of votes) elections Self-Defence was no longer relevant in the party system. e death of Andrzej Lepper deprived it of its last symbol, the charismatic ex-leader. Generally, Self-Defence can also be classified as a party of protest. Despite its critical attitude to transformation, the party did not question the basis and legitimisation of the system, therefore cannot be viewed as an anti-system party. Self-Defence participated in the political process, accepted its rules as well as some policies. However, the substance of its function was contestation.

7.9. Conclusion e appearance on the political scene of parties like Self-Defence is nothing new – it might be interpreted as one of the elements of European populism that adjusted to regional specifics in every country.

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In France, it was National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen, in Netherlands, the nationalistic liberalism of Pim Fortuyn, in Austria the FPÖ of Jörg Haider (Bauman 2003: 38). In the Polish case, populism has been seen as the negative effect of democratic transformation – Self-Defence mobilised discontent caused by the costs of transformation and farmers’ fears about integration into the EU. Lepper was the only politician who addressed their fears and said what they wanted to hear. Nevertheless, Self-Defence does not define “the people’ exclusively in terms of one group. It focuses on farmers because many of the activists, and Lepper himself, are farmers, who form a distinct group with an identifiable interest. But Self-Defence’s ambitions are broader (KrokPaszkowska 2003: 113). Some of the Lepper’s goals were realised – he even became vice premier at one point. Concluding the analysis of Self-Defence, it may be said that its crisis and the loss of relevance in the party system had several causes, such as weak organisational structure, lack of coherent ideology, and finally the lack of loyalty among its members. Personalised leadership may explain the weaknesses of the ideological base. All of these elements can be described as lack of institutionalisation. Considering the reasons for the loss of voter support, their specifics should be taken into account: the electorate of Lepper’s party was hungry for action and became anxious when it did not follow. Wronged people were sensitive to form and gesture. ey carried the complexes of ignored people (Rybak 2006b). When Lepper as a vice premier did not fulfil his promises (which was mostly impossible due to their character) the party lost adherents. e attitude of PiS, the coalition partner, who through cynical provocation (aimed at strengthening its own position) uncovered the mediocre ethics of Self-Defence members, was another cause of the party’s defeat. Self-Defence was a part of Parliament only for six years, but it was present on Polish political scene for much longer. Firstly, it was disregarded and despised. When its members sat in Parliament, it was a political pariah. In spring 2006, when Lepper became a vice premier, a new phase of the Polish party system development started. Self-Defence was no longer a pariah – on the contrary, its support was actively sought (Pankowski 2010: 135). Aer his death in 2011, Andrzej Lepper was sometimes referred to as a tribune of the people

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and his participation in Parliament described as a triumph of democracy. Nevertheless, Self-Defence’s political career resulted in a brutalisation of Polish politics (Paradowska 2011) and validated populism as a political tactic.

List of Abbreviations of Political Parties AWS Solidarity Electoral Action AWSP Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right BBWR Nonpartisan Block for Support of Reforms; Nonpartisan Block for Cooperation with the Government ChD-SP Christian Democracy-Labour Party KLD Liberal Democratic Congress KPN Confederation for an Independent Poland LiD Le and Democrats LPR League of Polish Families MN German Minority PC Centre Alliance PiS Law and Justice PL People’s Alliance PO Civic Platform PPChD Alliance of Polish Christian Democrats PSL Polish People’s Party ROP Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland RP Palikot’s Movement RS Social Movement (1989–1993: NSZZ Solidarity, S) SD Democratic Party SDPL Social Democracy of Poland SKL Conservative People’s Party; SLD Democratic Le Alliance SRP Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland UD Democratic Union (1997–2001: Freedom Union, UW) UP Labour Union ZChN Christian National Union (1991: Catholic Election Action, WAK; 1993: Catholic Electoral Committee Fatherland, KKWO)

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Stankiewicz, Andrzej. 2006. Rosną apetyty koalicjantów. Rzeczpospolita, 9/5/ 2006. Statut Samoobrony. 2001. (http://www.samoobrona.org.pl/bip_partia/pages/ 15.statut/). Szacki, Jerzy. 2003. “Pytania o populizm.” Krytyka Polityczna, No.4, 28–35. Szostakiewicz, Adam. 2011. “Andrzej Lepper wybielany po śmierci. Nowa Lepperiada.” Polityka, 13/8/2011. Taggart, Paul. 2007. “Populizm i patologie polityki przedstawicielskiej.” In: Demokracja w obliczu populizmu. Eds. Yves Meny and Yves Surel. Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 106–128. Taggart, Paul. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 2000. Wizje zbawienia. Warszawa: Muza. Tokarczyk, Roman. 2006. “Cechy konstytutywne myśli populizmu.” In: Populizm na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Panaceum czy pułapka dla współczesnych społeczeństw. Ed. Maria Marczewska-Rytko. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Touraine, Alain, Strzelecki, Jan, Dubet, Francois and Wiewiorka, Michel. 1989. Solidarność: analiza ruchu społecznego 1980–1981. Europa. Trybuna. 2005. Lepper kontra Olejniczak. 30/8/2005. Tusk o Lepperze. 2001, (http://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/ tusk;o;lepperze;i;platformie;obywatelskiej,197,0,50117.html) Uhlig, Dominik. 2005a. Andrzej Lepper pisze do działaczy lewicy. Gazeta Wyborcza, 4/10/2005. Uhlig, Dominik. 2005b. Poradnik na II turę. Gazeta Wyborcza, 4/10/2005. Umowa Stabilizacyjna pomiędzy Ligą Polskich Rodzin, Prawem i Sprawiedliwością oraz Samoobroną Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. 2006. (http:// www.samoobrona.org.pl/pages/21.Archiwum/01.Klub/00.Sejm/index.php?do cument=952.html). Ustawa z dnia 27 czerwca 1997 r. o partiach politycznych, Dz.U. 2011, Nr 155, poz. 924. Wojtas, Kinga. 2008. “Finansowanie partii politycznych w Polsce w latach 2002–2006.” Athenetum. Political Science 19, 26–38. Zwierzchowski Eugeniusz, ed. 2000. Opozycja parlamentarna. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo sejmowe cytowany tekst: Zwierzchowski Eugeniusz Opozycja parlamentarna, 9–29.

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8. ROMANIA MARKÉTA SMRČKOVÁ 8.1. The Politics of Populism in Romania Since the beginning of Romania’s political transition to democracy, its politicians have made public promises that the country would follow the principles of democracy and the market economy. Yet between 1990 and 1996 these very same politicians used populist and nationalist slogans to attack not only western-style capitalism, but also the historic legacy of the inter-war period with which traditional political parties were linked, and ethnic minorities (especially Hungarians). Since the beginning of the democratic era, Romanian politics has been dominated by issues related to the country’s communist and pre-communist past rather than by those linked with classifying parties ideologically as le or right (Ciobanu 2005: 2).1 is situation remained true of Romanian politics throughout the 1990s which were characterised by significant ideological distances between parties, a more or less uncompetitive and strongly personalised politics, an expansion of clientelist networks, and a rise in populist slogans. e personalisation of politics and desire for a charismatic leader typical of the Ceauşescu regime continued into the democratic era. Indeed, the legitimacy and credibility of political actors have been linked In examining Romania’s party system in the 1990s one needs to adjust the customary Western division of the party spectrum into le and right to the Romanian context. In the 1990s V. Tismaneanu describes the Socialist Party of Labour (PSM), Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) and Greater Romania Party (PRM) as parties of the le. According to Tismaneanu, some of the parties of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR), such as National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD) stood on the right, whereas others, such as the Democratic Party (PD) and Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), he describes as le-centre and right-centre respectively (Tismaneanu 1997: 432). 1

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more strongly with their relationship to the nation than with their political abilities or economic programmes. e expansion of clientelist networks connected with various political factions and groups have allowed their leaders to win and keep voters, as the latter did not decide on the basis of the identity or ideology of their group; rather, they weighed up the various alternatives in terms of their respective offers of material benefits and disregarded political allegiances (Ciobanu 2005: 2, Tismaneanu 1997: 408). In the 2000 general election, a change in the functioning of the party system was observable. At a time of economic upheaval, chronic instability of the government coalition, and growing corruption on all levels, the election brought significant change to the distribution of power in the parliament, and a significant victory for the post-communists. e enormous gains of the radical right, represented by the Greater Romania Party (PRM), which employed a populist campaign, then opened up space for a greater role for populism in the political system as a whole. e popularity of the fight against established practices and corruption generally continued to grow over the next couple of years, with the opposition gaining substantial public attention and support and using these issues in both the parliamentary and the presidential elections in 2004. e gradual ideological polarisation of political parties provided an opportunity for Traian Basescu, who became the new president thanks, in large part, to his charismatic appearances during the campaign that prominently featured populist and nationalist utterances. e government’s very small majority in parliament, together with the newly elected president’s attempts to dissolve the parliament, led to a protracted political crisis in an ideologically polarised environment in which judiciary reform and the fight against corruption were focal points. e importance of populist rhetoric grew even more as the crisis became personal, in disputes between the President and the Prime Minister. Attempts were made to remove the President from office; yet in the meantime he called populist referenda on questions of electoral system change, the abolition of Parliament’s Upper Chamber, and a reduction in the number of MPs. In this way he hoped to win popular support and increase his chances of being re-elected.

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Populism is therefore not new in Romanian politics. Indeed, it is closely connected with the country’s party system, as populist rhetoric has been intertwined with its development since the beginning of the 1990s, even if its character and importance have varied over time. e main focus of this chapter will be on populist parties and their strategies for employing populism; the “personalised populism” of recent years will be of secondary concern. What follows is a description and analysis that aims to map out populism in Romania’s party system by examining the Greater Romania Party and its position in the country’s political scene.

8.2. The Evolution of the Party System As in other post-communist countries, Romania’s party system has seen many changes. e first period, 1990–1992, was characterised by the political dominance of the National Salvation Front (FSN)2, an umbrella movement bringing together both former communists and their democratic opponents which was spearheaded by Ion Iliescu, himself a member of the nomenclature who spoke out against the regime at the right time. Several new topics appeared on the political scene at the time, including the character and course that economic transformation would take and the country’s stance towards European integration, the latter perceived as expressing values of liberal democracy. Among the most important themes was the party’s relationship to the past, towards the communist regime, and to Ceauşescu in particular. e Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) voiced their support for the previous regime.3 Following the disintegration Aer FSN’s disintegration the position of its successor was assumed by the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN, Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naţionale) headed by I. Iliescu, president at the time. e Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat) led by the technocrat P. Roman split from FSN. 3 According to M. Shafir PRM, PUNR and PSM can be described as parties of “radical continuity” which promote a political line and values similar to that of Ceauşescu’s 2

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of the FSN, PDSR became the main actor, and following its victory in the 1992 election it was instrumental in the creation of the so-called “red quadrangle” which provided support for the PDSR government (Tismaneanu 1997, Strmiska 2001).4 Standing on the side of the critics of the previous regime and its head were parties united chiefly by their anti-communism, their position towards the previous regime, and their belief in quick economic transformation: the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), which represents this ethnic minority. Most of the country’s inhabitants supported a gradual transformation to a market economy, however, one that would guarantee them a certain standard of living and social security. is translated into poor electoral results for this bloc, which did not present an alternative to the PDSR/FSND government in terms of resolving the economic crisis (Tismaneanu 1997: 408). Following the 1996 election, the party system gradually began to stabilise: the number of parties represented in Parliament decreased and the actors in government changed as well. e election was won by a bloc made around UDMR and PNTCD, which served as the main force in the coalition. PNL5 and its candidate Emil Constantinescu also won the presidential election, having been critical in the campaign of insufficient economic reform, growing corruption and a lack of transparency. Although the public initially placed great confidence in the government, its policies between 1996 and 2000 backfired, and voters gradually returned to whatever certainty PDSR provided. e coapatrimonial regime of national communism (Shafir 1999: 214). Similarly, P. Datculescu divides the Romanian party scene into “national conservatives” and “cosmopolitan liberals”, ranking the above-mentioned parties among the former and CDR, PNTCD, PD, UDMR among the latter, who preferred a quicker economic transformation (Datculescu 1999: 173–174). 4 Composed of PRM, PUNR and the Socialist Party of Labour (PSM), it was sometimes also called red-brown coalition or “pentagon” (gradually it also won the support of the small Agrarian Party [PDAR]). 5 In cooperation with the Social Democratic Union (USD), which itself was a product of a merger between Roman’s PD and PSDR, a small historic social democratic party. In 2000 there was a further merger with PDSR.

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lition was also plagued by internal disputes.6 e government was a disappointment overall and contributed to scepticism towards democratic institutions. e economic situation did not improve and corruption became an even more serious problem (Maršák 2006: 4). Iliescu’s PDSR then won the 2000 election and formed a minority government supported by UDMR, later cooperating with PD on an ad hoc basis. CDR failed entirely and did not enter the parliament; PRM, meanwhile, scored a significant success. e government managed to command relatively stable support and PSD did not have a serious opponent at the time. e potential of UDMR was limited as it was an ethnic minority party; PRM gradually lost many supporters due to the hysterical and irrational speeches of its chairman, yet remained the only relatively stable opposition party (Ciobanu 2002: 26). Now led by Traian Băsescu, the mayor of Bucharest, PD was more interested in local politics. Its main activity was distinguishing itself from PSD as a social democratic party rather than as a party in government. PNL was occupied by its endeavours to create a liberal coalition with other groups, but was nevertheless the only alternative to PSD, especially aer PNTCD disappeared entirely from parliamentary life7 (Smrčková 2008: 32).8 e period when there was no alternative to the PSD government came to its close with the gradual increase in support for PD and PNL. A coalition government was formed by the Truth and Justice Alliance (DA), composed of PD and PNL and supported by UDMR, together 6 ese concerned for instance the restitution of property confiscated by the communist regime, on which issue the PD remained in the post-communist camp, and disputes between UDMR and PNTCD over Hungarian issues and the established of a Hungarian university. 7 Voters of the Christian democrats were mostly the victims of the previous regime, and PNTCD thus became the main alternative in the 1996 election. Following their utter disappointment, most of these voters moved towards PNL (Habersack 2003: 10). 8 In this period the whole country was more or less controlled by the party in government to which there was no alternative as the opposition was extremely weak. at the system of checks and balances existed only on paper and not in reality is confirmed by the criticisms raised by many non-governmental and international organisations. e party had a total control of the local level as well, yet the support of the population for rule with an iron hand continued to increase (Habersack 2003: 10).

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with a minor coalition partner of the social democrats, the Humanist Party (PUR).9 From the outset, the Alliance created aer 2004 suffered from considerable disagreement and the coalition was constantly on the verge of a crisis. e new President, DA candidate T. Băsescu,10 unleashed an aggressive anti-corruption campaign which was well received by the public. Băsescu’s reforms were mostly aimed against former government officials from PSD, but his main target was not PSD, which took a back seat for some time, but Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, who despite being a member of PNL and thus in the same DA camp, strongly opposed the president (Smrčková 2008: 108). PSD became involved in the dispute, which was both internal to the DA and between the two highest representatives of the state: it initiated a motion to remove the president from office.11 e motion was supported by the extreme right PRM, Tăriceanu’s PNL, the Conservative Party (PC) and UDMR (Arion 2007). President Băsescu called a referendum on his removal, at which most citizens voted in favour of him staying in office. is failure to remove him caused or deepened the internal disputes within the individual parties, especially affecting PSD and PNL; President and his party (PD) meanwhile emerged victorious from this crisis (Maxfield 2008: 9). When the results of the referendum were made public, PD le the government coalition. Although the coalition only commanded a 20% share in the parliament, the government survived until the next parliamentary election thanks to PSD’s tacit support (Dix 2007: 3, Smrčková 2008: 266). With the gradual weakening of PNL, the focus of the dispute shied, with PSD and PD now the main warring 9 PUR was founded by Dan Voiculescu, a businessman and one of the richest Romanians, and stayed in coalition with PSD for a two-year period ending in 2003. More of a protest party, it did not have a stable electorate. 10 He defeated A. Năstase (who was a PSD candidate) with 51.2% of the vote to Năstase’s 48.8%, even though he came aer him in the first round of the election (e 2004 Romanian presidential election). 11 On 2 April the Prime Minister put together a new government consisting of ministers for PNL and UDMR without the eight ministers loyal to the president who participated in the previous government (Arion 2007).

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sides.12 e next parliamentary election was held according to the newly adopted electoral system,13 though PSD won most of the votes, thanks to the new system PD-L obtained more seats.14 e two parties signed a coalition agreement which excluded PNL, previously in government, from ruling. UDMR managed to preserve its parliamentary representation, and was initially set to form a coalition with PD-L; in the end, however, it was not included in the coalition on PSD’s request. is did not have an ethnic subtext; PSD was merely seeking to increase its importance in setting the government’s agenda (Dix, Voinea 2009: 2). PRM failed to cross the electoral threshold and thus did not win any seats in the parliament. e grand coalition suffered from chronic problems and in autumn 2009 the PSD ministers le the government fearing that PD-L would manipulate the next election. Several attempts to form a new government proved unsuccessful and the country then awaited the results of the presidential election (Romania Post-Election Watch: December 2009 Presidential Election). Referenda on decreasing the number of MPs and abolishing one of Parliament’s chambers were 12 A referendum on electoral system change was held concurrently with the 2007 EP election. Promoted as facilitating more stable governing majorities, the reform proposed by PD was not adopted due to low voter turnout. PSD thus emerged victorious from the political struggle over the electoral system, as its proposal was adopted by the parliament (Grigoras 2008). 13 Since 2008, MPs have been elected using a mixed system combining a first-past-the-post system with a proportional component. Elections are held in single-member constituencies. Candidates who poll more than 50% of the vote in their constituency obtain seats. Seat allocation is then carried out on two levels. In order for parties to obtain seats allocated by the proportional system, they must first pass the 5% countrywide threshold (for alliances the threshold is 8 + 1% for each additional party in the alliance), or six of their candidates must have obtained at least 50% of the vote in their constituency, this being the so-called “UDMR provision”. e number of seats obtained at the level of individual districts (42) is set by a quota which is obtained by dividing all votes cast for the given party by the number of seats allocated in the district. e remaining seats are transferred up to the national level, and allocated using D’Hondt divisor. e overall effect of the system is mostly proportional. e number of deputies was reduced by one fih to 290, and that of senators to 124 (Armaenu, Fesnic 2009: 6, Ogaru 2011:9). 14 PD-L is the product of a merger between PD and the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD). e latter previously split off PNL and in the EP election took 6% of its vote.

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held concurrently with the first round of the presidential election, and the electorate was in favour of both measures.15 e election itself was narrowly won by T. Băsescu over the PSD candidate M. Geoana. e new government was then formed by PD-L and UDMR, supported by individuals from other parties and representatives of ethnic minorities. e opposition (PSD and PNL-CD) attempted to bring the government down several times. Following massive protests, E. Boc’s government eventually resigned and Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu was appointed the new prime minister. Aer only 3 months the cabinet was dissolved and Victor Ponta, the chairman of PSD, became new prime minister.e new government was formed by PSD, PNL and PC, which created an alliance called Social Liberal Union (USL) – opinion polls suggest USL will be a clear winner in the autumn 2012 election. Since 2011, the new People’s Party–Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD) has been appearing in opinion polls which indicate that it will take about 11% of the vote (Centrul de Sociologie Urbana si Regionala 2011). It gained over 9% of the vote in the June 2012 local elections.16 During the democratic era, Romania’s party system has undergone a profound transformation. However since 2000 the number of parties has been relatively stable at four or five. e main pole on the le is the PSD, with PD-L – headed by T. Băsescu – the main pole on the right. Other stable parties which regularly obtain parliamentary representation are UDMR (representing the Hungarian minority), PRM, and PNL. e preferences for PRM ahead of the next election suggest its electability is precarious, and it seems that it is the new party PP-DD which is set to benefit from the present economic and political crisis, as it now has a real chance of entering Parliament and thus increasing the circle of parliamentary parties.

In order for these steps to come into effect the constitution must be changed which can take several years in the unstable Romanian political environment. 16 Founded by a television mogul in 2011, the party was quick to gain significant popular support with its twenty-point programme and distinctly populist slogans. 15

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8.3. Case Selection As already outlined in the introduction, populism and populist rhetoric are strong elements in Romania’s political system. In terms of the definition of populist parties used in this book, it is nevertheless possible to say that none of the parties that have obtained representation in the Romanian Parliament at least once is an exclusively populist party. All Romanian parties can be classified ideologically into party families, and indeed most of the parties themselves do it directly or indirectly by endorsing a certain European party family or group (it is true, however, that the case of PRM is somewhat controversial in the academic literature). One party that would fulfil the conditions classifying it as “populist” might be People’s Party–Dan Diaconescu created in 2011, whose ideological identity cannot be established unequivocally. e party based its programme on the dichotomy between people who are affected by the economic crisis and the established elite, which is unable to resolve the crisis, or even caused it. Despite the fact that PP-DD, which can be classified as an exclusively populist party has passed the electoral threshold and obtained seats in the Romanian Parliament in the elections in December 2012, we didn’t include this party to the analysis because the core of this book was finished in the summer of 2012. In the last 20 years there have been several parties that could be called non-exclusively populist, or indeed have been described as populist. Ion Iliescu’s PDSR, for instance, has used populist slogans, albeit mostly in the 1990s, in an attempt to rally support; Basescu’s PD-L has taken similar steps, particularly since 2004, in order to discredit its political opponents. Albeit largely in connection with the end of the 1990s, though more specifically the period preceding the 2000 election, some authors speak of PDSR as a populist party, or one that employs populism for its political communication (Ciobanu 2002, Tismaneanu 1997). PDSR and Iliescu used populist promises mainly to maintain support for the regime Iliescu had been constructing in the first half of the 1990s. is was not a case where populism would complement the identity of the

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party; rather, the party and its identity complemented the character of the authoritarian regime. Being a key element in the ruling coalition, the party established its profile as a fundamental building block of the regime and government, not as its opponent. Although the party did use populist slogans, it did not fulfil the conditions set and therefore will not be included in this analysis. e situation is similar with PD-L, although the reasons are different. Populist rhetoric is mostly used by the party’s chairman T. Basescu in his presidential capacity in order to discredit his personal opponents who could jeopardise his position in this office. Populism employed by individuals is not the subject of this work, however, and PD-L will thus not be included in the analysis that follows, even if some authors consider the party to be – using the terminology of this monograph – non-exclusively populist (Ciobanu 2005, Sum 2008, Miroiu 2009). Only two Romanian parties can therefore be considered non-exclusively populist: the Greater Romania Party and the New Generation–Christian Democrat Party (PNG-CD). Both use populism as the main instrument of their political communication with the electorate. In their rhetoric they are consistently self-defining against the backdrop of the traditional parties, with the latter described as the cause of the country’s unfavourable economic, political and social situation. e governing parties are then held responsible for the high levels of corruption, poverty and the general decline of the nation. PNG-CD is yet to cross the threshold that would enable it to enter the parliament, however, and will be touched upon here only tangentially. For the above-mentioned reasons this chapter will therefore focus on the Greater Romania Party, the only one fulfilling the conditions of a non-exclusively populist party. Such a description is not controversial in academe, as most authors are in agreement that the party is populist (Gallagher 2003, Shafir 1999, Mudde 2000, Miroiu 2009).

8.4. Party History e Greater Romania Party (PRM) was founded by Vadim Corneliu Tudor and Eugen Barbu on 20 June 1991 as the political wing of the broader, extreme nationalist Movement for Greater Romania, which

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promoted Romanian national interests, the restoration of its territory and the re-annexation of the areas lost during the Second World War; the party also recognises the fascist dictator Marshal Ion Antonescu as a great national leader. e party draws on these ideas and has begun to promote them in the political scene (Hollis 1999:33). In terms of organisation, the PRM did not undergo significant changes during the 1990s. Vadim Corneliu Tudor is the party’s main figure and, with the exception of one brief period, has occupied the post of chairman from the party’s inception to this day. e party was substantially strengthened in 1998 when Gheorghe Funar, formerly of the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), arrived with several fellow party members who brought more radical elements into the party. In 2001, PRM strongly opposed the government’s plan to guarantee language rights for the Hungarians as well as other ethnic minorities, renewing its campaign to ban the UDMR party for its alleged betrayal of Romania (Day 2002: 388). ese and similar activities elicited fairly significant responses from the public. Tudor called for the creation of a National Alliance to renew Romanian unity, accused the Hungarians of attempting to secede and threatening ethnic Romanians in areas where the Hungarians had a majority, and pressed for assimilationist policies in those areas (Serafim 1999: 4). Over the course of that electoral term, support for the party decreased, and the protest appeal with which it was originally successful gradually waned. To gain greater international recognition and acceptance as a coalition partner, Tudor briefly stepped down in 2005 and Corneliu Ciontu replaced him as the party’s chairman (Smrčková 2009). e party also changed its name to the Greater Romania People’s Party, hoping to gain the support of the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament and expecting to be allowed to join this parliamentary group (Lewis 2007: 10). EPP eventually denied membership to PRM and in June 2005 Tudor said his party would not join EPP, citing the latter’s lack of identity as a reason. He then announced that the new PRM leadership had abandoned the party’s main principles, and took the leadership back into his own hands, reverting also to the original party name. C. Ciontu and other party members subsequently le the party and

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founded the People’s Party, wishing to distance themselves from racist and xenophobic PRM policies. is new party subsequently merged with the New Generation–Christian Democrat Party (PNG-CD). Following Romania’s accession to the European Union, PRM gained five MEPs, and the presence of PRM and Ataka in the European Parliament enabled the creation of the group Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS).17 is was a very heterogeneous group which shared anti-constitutional, anti-immigration and anti-Turkish opinions.18 PRM was not very influential within the ITS group: it quickly lost support and although it had to consider its future stance, changes within the party were slow. PRM also had disputes with A. Mussolini of Italy’s Social Alternative, and in November 2007 le the ITS grouping. Unable to fulfil formal requirements, ITS was disbanded. is episode did not significantly affect the PRM programme or organisation.

8.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style Except for one brief period the post of PRM chairman has been held by Vadim Corneliu Tudor. For almost two decades, there has been almost no respect for democratic decision-making processes in the party, which is probably the most centralised in Romania. Party regulations abound and the concentration of the leadership is apparent from its meddling into the internal affairs of local branches. e centre makes decisions about party representatives, routinely installing its own candidates and removing local leaders (Gherghina et al. 2011: 15). 17 In order for a political group to be formally recognised in the European Parliament, it must fulfil several criteria, one being the number of member countries whence the MEPs taking part originate. is number is set at five and with Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession the condition was fulfilled by the ITS. 18 ITS promoted the following: recognition of national interests, sovereignty, identity and differences; engagement in favour of Christian values, heritage, culture and traditions of European civilisation; defence of traditional family as a natural unit in the society; assertion of freedoms and rights for everyone; highlighting the role of the nation state.

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e party’s statutes tell us only that the party’s chairman is chosen in a secret ballot at the National Congress, which is held every four years. Participants in the congress are voted by local branches, but the manner of voting is decided by the central body of the party, the Permanent Bureau (article 43). By setting various criteria, the Permanent Bureau can affect both the number of Congress members who get to vote and the election process itself. At the 1993 and 1997 congresses, Tudor was elected unanimously. In 2001, 2005 and 2010 he was the only candidate. e only exception to this principle was the decision made by the Plenary Session of the National Council which changed the statutes; it renamed the party and on the same day voted C. Ciontu the chairman. Within three months, however, the Plenary Session abolished its decision and Tudor was once again made chairman. Ciontu and one MP were expelled from the party (Gherghina et al. 2011: 12). Over the course of his career as the party chairman, Tudor has sought to operate as a charismatic leader of a group of followers entirely loyal to him, and such is also the image he seeks to project to the public. Drawing on the inter-war legacy, he openly advocates an authoritarian style of ruling and promotes a personality cult of the leader. Although intra-party criticisms do appear, Tudor is renowned for his authoritarian style; the leadership and celebrities of the party are slavishly loyal to him. He is also very suspicious of any independent activity on the part of his associates (Gallagher 2003: 27). Tudor’s long-term leadership points to a very stable organisational structure. In terms of its organisation, we might classify this party among what H. Kitschelt has defined as charismatic political parties, or parties with a charismatic leader.19 is party model consists of a number of followers who surround the leader. is does not mean that the party has been unstable and unstructured, however. Its membership grew rapidly, at the outset mainly in connection with the party’s participation in government aer 1992 (Shafir 1999: 214). e party enjoyed its largest membership 19 A clientelist party emphasises personal protection and invests in the creation of an organisation that effectively supports its followers. A programmatic party, meanwhile, is based on the ideals of a desirable society conceived as a collective good and actively encourages its supporters to implement the common goal (Kitschelt 1995: 449–450).

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numbers around the year 2000 when it counted over 100,000 members and new supporters were signing up on a mass scale. is trend has since reversed, however, and in 2008 the party was back at the 1996 level with approximately 50,000 members (Gherghina et al. 2011: 12).

8.6. Ideology Scholars are somewhat divided over the ideological classification of the PRM. It is usually described as standing on the far right20 due to its nationalist or even racist stances, yet its economic programme is substantially leist. PRM unequivocally rejects the status quo and is critical of the shape of the current democratic system, yet it takes part in democratic mechanisms and recognises the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly on physical violence. Using nationalist doctrine, far right parties aspire to achieve political and cultural unity, where states are expected to undertake an internal homogenisation and create a monocultural society (Mudde 2000: 177). PRM’s point of departure is a nationalist doctrine based on a prosperous state that is sovereign, independent, integral and indivisible – the territory of the Romanian nation (PRM Programme). e party emphasises national values and traditions, and promotes the defence of national interests, culture and religion against all enemies, both external and internal. e Romanian state is obliged to protect all citizens, who meanwhile are required to protect Romania’s interest. PRM’s stance vis-à-vis the previous regime is very positive. e party considers Ceauşescu to be a national hero21 who fought for is is according to Cas Mudde. Mudde defines the far right as a set of four principal characteristics: nationalism, xenophobia, belief in law and order and a programme of welfare chauvinism (Mudde 2000: 177). e designation of PRM as an extreme right party can be somewhat misleading. Some authors identify the extreme right on the basis of nationalism, denial of equal universal rights, and refusal of democracy and endorsement of a volkisch, ethnocentric ideology (Stöss quoted in Ramet 1999: 6). 21 It views Ion Antonescu who ruled the country during the Second World War in similar terms. 20

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Romania’s independence and sought to rescue it from the clutches of Jews, Hungarians and foreign conspirators (Shafir 1999: 214). It also emphasises the idea of social equality. Connected with this are the xenophobic attitudes of PRM and its encouragement of the fight against both internal enemies, such as homosexuals, and external ones, such as multi-national organisations. PRM glorifies the ideology of the Iron Guard active in inter-war Romania, but does not derive much of its programme from it.22 e party strongly opposes the integration of minorities into the country’s politics and is anti-Semitic as well as racist. Its main targets are the Transylvanian Hungarians, Jews and Romani. It demands the ban of UDMR and seeks to have Jews prohibited from occupying public office. It also oen publishes articles in its magazine that deny the Holocaust, etc. (Carey 1997: 164 – 165). According to PRM, Romanians living in areas with a significant Hungarian minority are at risk of losing their identity as a result of pressure exerted by Romania’s Hungarians; the latter, PRM says, should be assimilated. e party professes the need to protect all Romanian nationals wherever in the world they may be living; its understanding of the Moldovans as ethnic Romanians follows this logic, for instance (PRM Programme).23 In terms of its discussion about the position of the Hungarian minority in Romania, PRM has revised its radical claims concerning Moldova, namely its desire to annex it, 22 e Iron Guard was a fascist organisation which carried out pogroms of Romanian Jews in the inter-war period. Its main representative was professor Cuza. When banned in 1934, the Iron Guard organised the murder of the Prime Minister I. G. Duca. In March 1935 the organisation was renewed in the form of a political party, All For e Country (Totul pentru Ţară) and became a mass organisation. Its intellectual nucleus was composed of rural priests, teachers, doctors and journalists; in cities it gained support amongst students. e organisation spoke out against any ideology whatsoever, wishing to become a school rather than a political party. It called for the establishment of social harmony, allocation of land to the landless, expulsion of Jews and dissolution of political parties. Its members wore green shirts and fascist insignia, and participated in rituals and mysticism (Tejchman 1997: 48). 23 For example in February 2008 V. C. Tudor wrote a letter to the President of the European Parliament in which he brought into question the existence of independent Moldova and stressed that Bessarabia and northern Bukovina form part of Romania’s historic territory. He also accuses Moldova’s President Vladimir Voronin of using means similar to those employed by Stalin (V. C. Tudor’s letter of 4 February 2008).

214

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

because any suggestions to review the boundary with Moldova could be used to justify the demands of Romania’s Hungarians represented by UDMR (Hollis 1999: 283). e party’s socio-economic programme is based on the dichotomy “they” and “us” which clearly delineates the group of “our people” on which, oen, generous social programmes are lavished. PRM proposes the full nationalisation of industry and criticises the impact of globalisation on national economies. It also emphasises concerns about the opening of Romania’s market aer EU accession. More generally, PRM opposes any external interference into the country’s affairs, including the entrance of foreign capital. It refuses to cooperate with foreign financial organisations and would not allow the sale of national property into foreign hands (Hollis 1999: 282). e party intends to found a “people’s bank” which would provide credit to small businesses. It promotes a balanced salary policy, an equilibrium between taxes and income for all social groups, greater welfare hand-outs for pregnant women, disabled and pensioners, the return of Romanian property from foreign hands, full employment, etc. (PRM Programme). PRM will support leist policies as long as they are carried out at a national rather than international level.24 Post-1989 political and economic developments are wholly unacceptable to PRM, which demands a radical change, praises the results of Ceauşescu’s regime and demands the release of members of the Ceauşescu elite who have been imprisoned since 1989. e party claims that the fall of the communist regime is the result of an international conspiracy between the USA, Soviet Union and Hungary (Gallagher 2003: 12). It is for this reason that it calls for exemplary punishment of the culprits of the post-1989 “economic and social catastrophe” (PRM Programme). Similar populist proclamations were used by the party at the end of the 1990s when, leveraging a wave of popular dissent, it achieved great success in the 2000 election, during which the moderate right failed to present its own vision. According to a 1999 opinion poll, more than 52% of the population believed that life was better under Ceauşescu’s regime than in the 24 Although its programme is very close to PSM, the economic internationalism of the latter is entirely unacceptable to PRM, and was the cause of several conflicts.

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new democratic state. PRM capitalised on that frustration, achieving considerable popularity with a programme alive to the burning issues of the day. e programme proposed to decrease the influence of the mafia, limit corruption, introduce a national solidarity fund, re-evaluate the privatisation process, and lower the price of food, pharmaceuticals and school supplies. e party’s magazine “Romania Mare” is an important instrument for spreading its propaganda, containing not only the chauvinist opinions of the leadership, but also articles by “common people” who complain of corruption and poverty without sharing much of the party’s ideology (Gallagher 2003: 21). is has helped PRM to attract many voters, and a few dissenting voices were rebuked with proclamations stressing that poverty and injustice would immediately be dealt with. Tudor has carefully presented himself as an ordinary citizen, “one of the people” and a practising Christian, and proved himself a smooth operator in his refutations of “extremist” accusations levelled at him (Gallagher 2003: 28). In ideological terms, PRM employs a blend of Marxism and nationalism grounded in the inter-war traditions.

8.7. Electoral Support and Social Base PRM first entered Parliament aer the 1992 election in which it polled 3.9% of the vote, resulting in 16 parliamentary seats (see table 8.1).25 Aer the election the party became part of the so-called “red quadrangle”, a group of parties providing external support for the PDSR government. is coalition disintegrated before the 1996 election and PRM was to achieve the most gains from its demise, polling 25 Both chambers of Parliament are elected concurrently in Romania. We therefore only indicate the results of the election of the Chamber of Deputies, as the results for the Senate are very similar. A list proportional system is used employing Hare’s quota and the remaining seats are allocated using the D’Hondt method. e threshold has gradually increased from an initial 3% to 5% for parties. It stands at 8% for a two-member coalition, and is increased by one percentage point for each further party in the coalition. In March 2008 a reform was adopted introducing a personalised proportional system.

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4.5% of the vote in the election of the Chamber of Deputies and gaining 19 seats, a slight increase. By contrast, both PDSR and PUNR recorded mild losses. e make-up of PRM’s electorate in the 1992 election was very clear, with over 90% comprised from city inhabitants who were under 40, fairly well educated and enjoying relatively high living standards (Hollis 1999: 282). e party mostly mobilised citizens with higher education. As the issue of Transylvanian Hungarians had no substantial mobilising potential in areas other than Transylvania, in the rest of the country PRM focused on prejudices against Romani and Jews (Hollis 1999: 282). PRM’s rhetoric gradually secured increased support for the party. In the 2000 election, PRM profited from the centre-right governing coalition’s massive unpopularity, and polled 19.5% of the vote, which translated into 84 seats, making it the second strongest force in the parliament (see table 8.1). Tudor also enjoyed substantial support in the presidential election and ended up second with 33.2% of the vote.26 Collecting a large share of the protest vote, Tudor passed to the second round, where he faced Ion Iliescu (PDSR). Iliescu ultimately won by a significant margin, appearing as a moderate man of compromise in contrast to Tudor.27 e increase in PRM’s electoral potential was the biggest surprise of the 2000 election: the party had based its campaign on criticising corruption and had focused on socio-economic issues, but avoided criticising the EU as it was officially supporting Romania’s accession. On the whole, PRM’s success in the parliamentary and presidential elections was mainly caused by protest votes cast by citizens who did not substantially identify with its programme (Gallagher 2003: 24, Strmiska 2001: 49).

26 e President is elected directly for a five-year term using a two-round system (an absolute majority would be required in the first round). 27 PRM’s election campaign was based on nationalist and anti-corruption slogans. For example, one of the banners had shown Ceauşescu and Hitler’s wartime ally general Antonescu as defenders of the Romanian “Fatherland”. Tudor’s aggressive campaign included slogans such as “I’ll rule this country with a machine gun!” (Ciobanu 2002: 22).

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As already indicated above, electoral success strengthened PRM’s nationalist rhetoric and its criticisms of ethnic minorities. Its calls for banning the UDMR party and assimilating the Hungarian minority living in Romania also re-emerged (Serafim 1999: 4). Over the course of the electoral term, however, the party gradually lost support. e protest appeal with which it was initially successful gradually waned; PSD kept a stable government and DA’s rise as a potential alternative government party made PRM look less attractive. With the promise of Romania’s NATO membership, PRM also lost some of its sympathisers; the party’s depiction of Hungary as an alliance insider who could threaten Romania with the support of the NATO became irrelevant (Sellin 2004: 4). PRM’s decreasing approval ratings became apparent in the 2004 election, where it polled “only” 12.5% of the vote, resulting in 48 parliamentary seats. It was not successful in the presidential election either: Tudor obtained 12.6% of the vote and came in third (see table 8.1). e party’s attempts to gain greater international recognition and to be accepted into the EPP, for which purpose it changed its name, chairman, and outwardly also its character, were unable to prevent this further downturn. In the November 2007 European Parliament election , PRM polled 4.2%, failing to cross the threshold and therefore obtaining no seats (EP election results 2007). is was at the time when GNP-CD made its noticeable debut on the political scene, polling 4.6% of the vote in the same election, thereby suggesting that the rhetoric of populist nationalism still had potential, even if GNP-CD had also failed to cross the threshold. Votes for GNP-CD were not the main cause of PRM’s smaller gains, as both parties differ in their economic policies (PRM is le-wing, whereas GNP-CD is rather libertarian). ey also focus on different citizens both in terms of geography and age (see below for more detail). In the 2008 parliamentary elections, however, both parties fared worse, with PRM obtaining 3.2% of the vote. Recent opinion polls indicate support for PRM at around 5%, making it borderline electable (Centrul de Sociologie Urbana si Regionala 2012). It cannot be ruled out that it will be able to capitalise on the present economic and political crisis and thus re-enter the parliament.

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Table 8.1: Electoral Performance of PRM 1990

PRM

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

–

–

3.9

16

4.5

19

19.5

84

12.5

48

3.2

0

Source: Biroul Electoral Central.

PRM’s electorate has undergone a significant transformation in terms of its age structure. Research undertaken by Public Opinion Barometer indicates that PRM’s main supporters are those aged over 55, who respond positively to slogans about protecting jobs, lowering prices, increasing pensions etc. (Public Opinion Barometer 2006). Unsurprisingly, PRM is voted for by citizens who feel side-lined and ignored by the ruling classes: these include the elderly, who desire the return of clear communist hierarchy and stable economic benefits, and the young, who face the challenges of the job market (Gallagher 2003: 13). e party is thus slowly gaining sections of the electorate which in the past typically voted for the post-communist PDSR. is gradual shi in the age structure of the PRM electorate became more prominent with the rise of GNP-CD, whose libertarian economic policies appeal mostly to a younger voter (Public Opinion Barometer 2006). Support for Tudor and the PRM is notably concentrated in administrative centres (comune) which were forcibly urbanised and furnished with non-viable industries, which then collapsed under the new regime, thereby substantially transforming the character of these areas (Sum 2008: 21). Today electoral support for PRM consists mainly of urban voters frustrated by post-communist developments. To a large degree, the typical PRM voter shares the characteristics of radical right voters generally: an ethnic majority male with regional roots (Public Opinion Barometer 2006, Sum 2008: 25).

8.8. Position in the Political System With the exception of 2008, PRM has gained representation in all parliamentary elections and is a long-term player in Romania’s political scene. Its position has not been very stable, however. In the 1990s, the

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party was involved with the government coalition, supporting it for over three years. Towards the end of the decade, however, it exhausted its coalition potential by radicalising its rhetoric and programme, and was not considered a potential coalition partner aer the 2000 and 2004 elections. e continuous growth of PRM’s electoral support during the 1990s, from less than 5% in 1992 to 19.5% in 2000, was a singular exception in the post-communist world, where most similar parties in the region lost out.28 is situation was caused by the overwhelming disappointment in post-communist developments felt by citizens, by economic depression, rising inflation and the general situation turning from bad to worse. PRM took advantage of this, gaining mostly protest votes. In 2000, its most successful election to date, the party established its profile criticising ubiquitous corruption and emphasising socio-economic themes, thus also attracting the votes of citizens who do not otherwise identify themselves with PRM’s programme (Gallagher 2003: 24). PRM had a fairly high “blackmail potential” at the time and this facilitated PSD’s coalition with UDMR, something PSD previously sought to avoid.29 As Mungiu-Pippidi has pointed out, the rhetoric of populist nationalism was at the time the only real alternative actually able to oppose Iliescu’s PSD (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001: 249). PRM’s Parties and movements which understand nation as a moral unity were already at a significant advantage over those promoting a classic class division of society during the first sixty years of Romania’s independence and national culture was promoted throughout the communist era. In Romania’s political life, the tradition of defending national unity is therefore long and well-rooted (Gallagher 2003: 3). 29 e formation of the coalition government was also influenced by the external environment, namely pressure exerted by the EU. At its party congress in 2000, PSD changed its stance towards minorities and towards UDMR, and this allowed parliamentary cooperation between the two parties (UDMR refused to participate in the government, however). PSD had the option of forming a coalition with its previous partner, PRM, but the political situation had changed significantly since the years 1992–1996. e EU accession talks, already in train for one year, were opened on the condition of good inter-ethnic relations, something that the PSD could not afford to jeopardise. V. C. Tudor’s success in the presidential election, in which he proceeded to the second round, created great apprehension, and an alliance with PRM would have been a very problematic step for the PSD government in terms of its on-going negotiations with the EU. 28

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one-time significant success confirms the thesis that the party had occupied at most the position of a minor pole in the party spectrum, with very little chance of achieving a long-term position of the second strongest party, or monopolising the position of the main party of the opposition (Strmiska 2001: 49). e party lost a large part of its electorate fairly quickly, especially those who did not identify with its policies and had found other alternatives to the ruling coalitions. Populist slogans no longer had the necessary appeal to compete with a real right-wing alternative to the government. e gradual decrease in PRM’s support was also caused by the radical transformation in UDMR, where a moderate wing took over the leadership. ey did not have any territorial demands, focusing rather on defending the interests of Transylvania’s Hungarians (Gherghina, Jiglau 2008: 94). PRM thus lost the main “culprit” of the economic problems and had to look elsewhere. e period since 2004 has been very unsuccessful for the party. It both failed to regain coalition potential at the national level and, crucially, to obtain recognition internationally in the European Parliament. e experiment involving the change of party name and chairman did not produce the desired effect and the party then returned to its original programme. e party’s total slump in the European Parliament election, in which it failed to win a single seat, was a huge disappointment30 and a portent of failure in the next national parliamentary election. e reasons for this are many and varied: the “Hungarian question” was by then thoroughly exhausted, and there had been a strong backlash against radical politics both at home, where the party was no longer considered a coalition partner, and abroad, where PRM was not accepted into the EPP family. Voters may even have perceived the changes happening in the party in connection with the EPP episode as evidence of its insecurity. Moreover, other parties and leaders, especially T. Bas30 According to the theory of second-order elections, of which the EP election is certainly one, opposition parties, small parties and those at the margins of the political spectrum achieve in such electoral contests much broader support than large parties and those participating in government (for more detail see Marsh 1998).

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escu, had been employing populist slogans, thus robbing PRM of its initial advantage – and the use of populism certainly contributed to the widely-held negative perception of politics on the part of citizens. Another important factor affecting PRM was the creation of the GNP-CD party which gradually gained strength. Although the electoral breakdown was fairly different for the two parties in terms of age, territory, and religious beliefs, the creation of a new party with a very similar message affected the behaviour of both PRM itself and voters generally. During the 2007 political crisis, PRM sided with PSD, supporting its motion to remove President Basescu from office. is did not lead to long-term cooperation between the two parties, even if in economic terms PSD has been PRM’s closest parliamentary counterpart. e latter’s nationalist rhetoric continues to render it unacceptable as a partner for negotiations, however. Although failure in the 2008 election meant that the party could no longer participate in parliamentary affairs, it continues to publish the magazine promoting its ideas, and Tudor continues to court media attention. Opinion polls currently indicate its support at about 5%, and the party has a real chance of re-entering the parliament. ere seems to be little space for pre-election manoeuvres, however. PRM shares its nationalist appeal with GNP and this could lead to the two parties cooperating or possibly even creating an electoral alliance. But a new competitor has emerged which is using populist rhetoric and hoping, like PRM, to affect public opinion by, for instance, accusing established parties of causing the economic and political crisis. Since 2011, the People’s Party–Dan Diaconescu has gained the support of about 10% of opinion poll respondents, and achieved only a little less than that in the June 2012 local elections. Although this was a disappointing outcome for the party, its exclusively populist character (in the definition used in this book) could have significant repercussions for PRM’s future success or failure.

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

8.9. Conclusion Populist rhetoric in Romania is very oen connected with nationalist slogans and politics. As the only parliamentary representative of non-exclusively populist parties, PRM has explicitly connected the protection of Romanian nationalist values with a populist appeal to the electorate. It is not the only party to use populism, however. In the 1990s, PSDR employed populist slogans in its authoritarian politics, when it promoted the defence of the Romanian nation and its economic interests. T. Basescu (PD-L) likewise resorted to nationalist populism in his communications with voters, hoping to rally support for his own occupancy of the presidential office and for the referenda he called (for example on lowering the number of MPs). e ideological orientation of GNP-CD also implies a combination of nationalism and populism. With the exception of GNP-CD, these parties have been present on the political scene for most of the democratic era and can be considered stable elements of the party system. Only the People’s Party–Dan Diaconescu, created a year ago, can be considered exclusively populist without the nationalist agenda and, it must be admitted, with an unclear ideological profile. Most likely, this party is representative of a broader wave of exclusively populist parties which have been appearing and achieving success in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years. e success of the party in the December 2012 elections was astonishing and it will be fascinating to examine the development of this party in the future.

List of Abbreviations of Political Parties CDR FDSN FSN PCR PDSR PER PL

Democratic Convention of Romania Democratic National Salvation Front National Salvation Front Romanian Communist Party Social Democratic Party of Romania Romanian Green Party Liberal Party

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PLD PNG-CD PNT PP PP–DD PRM PSD PSDR PSM PUNR TPT UDMR USD USL

Liberal Democratic Party New Generation–Christian Democrat Party National Peasant Party People’s Party People’s Party–Dan Diaconescu Greater Romania Party Social Democratic Party Romanian Social Democratic Party Socialist Party of Labour Party of Romanian National Unity All for the Country Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania Social Democratic Union Social Liberal Union

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9. SLOVAKIA PETER SPÁČ 9.1. The Politics of Populism in Slovakia Populism as an ideology has emerged in many regions in the world, including Europe. is raises the question of whether certain features or conditions in regions or particular countries help this phenomenon to appear (and sustain itself), or whether its existence is independent of the context. If the former is true, then the region of East-Central Europe has provided a solid basis for such political movements and parties (Stanley 2011: 258). Slovakia is no exception, and we can trace at least three factors supporting this insight. First, aer the fall of communism in 1989 Slovakia (until 1992 as part of Czechoslovakia) experienced major economic upheaval. is is best seen when comparing Slovakia to its Czech counterpart over several indicators, particularly the level of unemployment (Holman 2000; Hilde 1999: 648). Slovaks were more sceptical than the Czechs of radical economic liberalisation. ese trends were later magnified by the privatisation of state property, a process beset by corruption (Jurzyca et al.1999: 405–408). Secondly, Slovaks usually hold a rather negative opinion of domestic politics and its actors. Although this does not apply to the entire period of the last two decades, the trends here are quite obvious and are regularly supported by surveys of public opinion (Bútorová et al. 1999: 244, Gyárfášová, Velšic 2002: 303). e third and final factor is the polarisation of the party system, which has led to the division of parties into two blocs. As for the distrust by Slovaks toward their politics, this feature has had a changing significance as well, reaching its peak in the late 1990s during the last government of Vladimír Mečiar. Separately or in combination, these three factors have created favourable conditions for the emergence of populism in Slovakia. As

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this chapter shows, the opportunity has been repeatedly exploited, and has led to the creation of a number of political parties. For these parties, populism became a primary or a secondary weapon in their struggle to gain public support, though with varying degrees of success.

9.2. The Evolution of the Party System Since 1989 the party system of Slovakia has gone through many interesting developments. e preceding era of communist rule had a strong impact, as connections to earlier political movements and parties were effectively lost. As in other post-communist countries, the previous cleavages in society were blurred. e party system as such was thus re-constituted on a new basis, mostly without significant historical connections to previous political actors.1 e existing distrust by the society towards political parties based on the negative experiences of communist one-party rule meant there were less than optimum conditions for a stable party system. Subsequent developments bore this out. Of all the parties that competed in the first free elections in 1990, only one, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), is still represented in the current parliament, whereas all other actors from this period lost their relevance or are balancing on the edge. is chapter introduces the evolution of the party system, and stresses its main features. A usual feature of collapsing communist countries was the emergence of a broad dissident movement. Slovakia was no exception, and during the revolutionary days of November 1989, Public Against Violence (VPN) was created. is party had a very weak structure; it was composed of representatives of a variety of ideologies. Although it clearly won the first elections in 1990 and entered both the national and federal governments, centrifugal trends were gaining strength, and in 1991 they finally led to the disintegration of 1 One case was the Slovak National Party (SNS), which emerged in 1990 but claimed to be the direct successor of the eponymous party created in 1871. Despite the SNS’s claim that it was the “oldest Slovak party” this alleged connection was more than doubtful for many reasons (Kopeček 2007: 413–414).

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VPN.2 Its main successor with the strongest influence on later Slovak politics was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar. Other elements of the party system were developing in the early 1990s as well. e former ruling communists transformed themselves into a moderate Party of the Democratic Le (SDĽ); their orthodox branch renewed its existence as a communist party but remained weak. Other parties were newly created, most importantly the Christian democrats (KDH) and nationalists (SNS). As about one tenth of the Slovak society is ethnic Hungarian, parties representing their interests emerged and began to cooperate. A key feature with a strong impact was the last government led by Mečiar in 1994–1998, which led to a sharp polarisation of the system. Against the parties making up the government stood an ideologically heterogeneous opposition including the Hungarian parties. is tension reached its peak in the 1998 elections which ended Mečiar’s rule and prevented the country from continuing down the road to illiberal democracy. e easing of the polarisation, accompanied by falling public support for the HZDS, allowed the party system to become more standardised in an ideological sense. e party Direction (SMER), established by former vice-chairman of the SDĽ Robert Fico, saw a rapid rise in support, and swallowed up the smaller leist parties. Attempts on the right were also made, but with only limited success.3 As a result the le of the spectrum was clearly dominated by SMER, while the right remained fragmented and represented by numerous parties. is configuration continues to the present and was confirmed strongly in the last elections in 2012.4 2 In its program the VPN proclaimed the goal aim of national independence. is goal became complicated with the start of discussions about the future configuration of Czechoslovakia. Ultimately the VPN was split over this issue (Kopeček 2007: 139–140). 3 is was the initial aim of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) led by Mikuláš Dzurinda which envisioned itself as a centre-right union inspired by the German CDU-CSU. 4 In the last elections in 2012 SMER won a majority in parliament. e parties which composed the previous centre-right government led by Iveta Radičová lost their public support, and most of them are now hovering around the threshold needed to enter parliament.

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e Slovak party system has thus been stable in respect to the number of relevant parties, which has ranged from 5 to 7, but not with respect to its composition.5 e system is still undergoing development, and even though most of the parties can be included in traditional party families their stability is an open question. e current shape of the party system resembles some of its past features, since SMER is clearly the dominant party, it has assumed the role earlier held by the HZDS. e same applies to the polarisation of the system. Although it reached its peak during the Mečiar governments and decreased aerward, the rising strength of SMER re-polarised the scene. Before the 2010 elections all of the centre-right parties openly pledged not to enter a government with Robert Fico and his party. ough there has been some movement in these relations and the parties are no longer divided into two strict blocs, the above-mentioned tension still exists and plays a role in Slovak politics.

9.3. Case Selection An overview of the existing literature on our topic brings the expected results: Slovakia provides excellent ground for research as a postcommunist country that has faced severe problems with the sustainability of the quality of its democracy. As such its political development since 1989 has been thoroughly mapped (see Kopeček 2006; Kopeček 2007). On the other hand there is no vast amount of work specifically concentrating on populism in Slovakia, as this is a much narrower 5 During the last two decades many new parties were created and tried to find their place in the system. Such were the cases of the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) and the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) which survived only for a single term although they both managed to enter the government. More successful stories were the SDKÚ and SMER, whose chairmen both became prime ministers. e dynamics of the emergence of new actors has still not ended, as three of the current parliamentary parties, namely the right-wing liberal Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), the Slovak-Hungarian project Bridge (Most), and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) were created in 2009 and 2011 respectively. On the other hand many of the parties which entered parliament were not able to hold their popular support and became marginalized. is counted for the above mentioned SOP or ANO but also for original actors like HZDS which in the 1990s clearly dominated the system.

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focus, and research on populism itself is still evolving. In this chapter some of the papers that have focused on this theme are presented. Aer that we will select the cases to be analysed further in the text. We start with the work of Deegan-Krause and Haughton, which can be presented as an overall study of populism in Slovakia, and so far the only one of its kind. e authors concentrated on the presence of populism in the Slovak party system since 1990 and they mapped the usage of these appeals by all relevant parties. eir insight is both interesting and original, as they use the term “populism” as a scale and not as a strict binary choice (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009: 838). A greater volume of work so far has been done on case studies focusing either on single parties or on smaller party groups. An important contributor to this kind of research has been Peter Učeň, who studied the then-new parties SMER and ANO labelled them as parties of “centrist populism” (2003). According to Učeň, these parties were reluctant or even refused to discuss their ideological affiliation, preferring criticise the elites, and call for easy and fast solutions based on common sense. Another case study was elaborated by Just (2007), who thoroughly described the creation and rise of SOP led by Rudolf Schuster, who later became President of Slovakia. A wider study but one still dealing with a particular issue was a report on national populism edited by Petőcz (2009). e abovementioned Učeň and another important Slovak scholar, Grigorij Mesežnikov, also contributed to this book, the former providing a chapter on the concept of national populism, and the latter identifying the parties in Slovakia that fit into this category. According to Mesežnikov these parties include the HZDS, SNS, and SMER, which share several common topics which they use to mobilise society.6 A somewhat different study was made by Stanley (2011) concerning the Slovak parliamentary elections in 2010. e study focused not on parties as other authors have, but on ordinary citizens instead. Stanley discusses whether the usage of (national) populism among Slovak parties is equally reflected by sentiment within Slovak society. 6 Mesežnikov implies that these topics include the definition of society, relations towards ethnic minorities, the interpretation of problematic issues of Slovak history, and the goal of awakening national consciousness (Mesežnikov 2009).

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In other words, whether Slovaks are attentive to such messages, and whether these affect their sympathies towards the various parties. As Stanley found out, populist appeals have only a limited influence on Slovak citizens, as socio-economic and national questions simply matter more. Now we can move on to select cases for our analysis. Based on our overview of the literature, there are several Slovak parties which might be rounded up as the “usual suspects” when dealing with populism. Most notably this group includes parties which emerged shortly aer 1989, such as the HZDS and SNS, as well as parties that were created in later years, e.g. SMER, SOP, and ANO. Our selection of cases mostly copies these findings, but not for all situations and time periods, as the text below discusses. is book distinguishes between exclusively and non-exclusively populist parties, which we do not need to explain further as this was done in the theoretical chapter. In this chapter, we present those Slovak parties we understand to have been populist at least for some periods of their existence, regardless of whether they fit into the former or latter subgroup. What can be said is that we have not tracked any party that could be labelled as having been populist for the whole time of its existence.7 As Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009: 832–836) correctly conclude, the populist appeals of the respected parties diminish aer these parties enter Parliament and most notably the government. is conclusion has a logical background: because we understand populism as primarily evoking antagonism between people and elites, it becomes harder and harder for such parties to use this language aer they become part of the establishment. e Slovak parties which can be classified as populist thus continued to meet the definition of populist party mostly until their first or second elections; later they drew back on their populism and tried to form closer ties with other ideologies. is strategy proved common to all of the parties, though with sharply different rates of success. Aer these remarks we may proceed to the selection of our cases. As populist parties used in this chapter we will be working with six 7 e only exemption here is OĽaNO, but this may be due to the very short existence of this party.

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parties, namely the HZDS, ZRS, SMER, SOP, ANO and OĽaNO.8 In accordance with the above discussion, in all cases we regard these parties to have been populist only for a limited time, which mostly ended shortly aer their entry into Parliament or government. All these parties shared a common topic, which initially was the division between the people and the elites; they stressed antagonism between these two groups, where the former represented the good guys and the latter the bad guys. e following chapters will elaborate these statements further. For many authors this list may seem incomplete, as they would without a doubt add the SNS. On the contrary, this chapter will not classify the SNS as a populist party, but this requires an explanation. When dealing with national populism, the SNS was clearly a party fitting this profile (Mesežnikov 2009: 41–42). e same goes for the analysis of Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009), which identified a sharp rise in populist appeals by this party aer the 1998 elections.9 Why do the conclusions in this chapter differ from those of the other scholars? e main reason lies in usage of the term populism. If we understand populism mainly as an appeal distinguishing between two antagonistic groups, the people and the elite, the SNS just barely fits this profile. ough this party oen speaks in the name of all Slovaks and understands Slovakia in ethnic terms, we identify this as a sign of its xenophobic character. Appeals pointing to ethnic Slovaks are thus the point that makes the SNS a radical nationalistic party and not a populist party. We are aware that this might be in the strictest terms a disagreement with the other authors, but our point here is that the populism should be defined more narrowly, because otherwise nearly every party could be labelled as populist. In this respect, if praising ordinary Slovaks qualifies SNS as a populist party, than the same could be said of the Hungarian parties in Slovakia, as they is book works with a time frame ending in 2011, which would exclude OĽaNO. Aer consultations with the editors the party was included, and the chapter about Slovakia got a little exemption. 9 For the electoral term 2002–2006 Deegan-Krause and Haughton even rank the SNS as the party with the highest ratio of populist appeals among all others (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009: 832). 8

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appeal with a comparable message to their “target group”, and we could continue on this way ad absurdum.10 Our remark here is that if populism is primarily seen as an ideology that sets groups of people and the elite against one another, then the term should be used carefully; otherwise we may end up with the classical situation in which our only tool is a hammer, and we see all problems as nails. is fully accounts for the supposed rise in the SNS’s populism aer 1998 when the SNS le the government due to internal problems which led to a temporary internal split, and its failure to get into Parliament in 2002. e party reacted by becoming more radicalised, mostly towards Hungarians, Roma, and later the European Union.11 One may see this change as a trend toward populism, but in fact these changes only strengthened the xenophobic and nationalistic features of the party. We thus consider the SNS to be a classical radical rightist formation, and do not include it on our list of populist parties.12

9.4. Party History e political parties included in our analysis were formed at various times over the period aer 1989. e first, chronologically, was Taken to the logical extreme, most parties have some groups in society which they aim at and shape their messages for. e parties of the right stress the importance of employers and entrepreneurs; Christian democrats do the same toward religious voters, etc. But based on these actions these parties are not labelled as populist, which is correct. e question is why nationalists should be regarded otherwise. 11 ere were many visible signs of radicalization within the SNS. One of the most famous was an episode when the leader of SNS Ján Slota urged a tank attack on Budapest, or when he vulgarly offended the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs. e party’s program for 2006 elections was called “We are Slovaks. A Slovak government for Slovaks” which was aimed against the presence of the Hungarian party in the Dzurinda government. 12 For the same reason the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) is not considered a populist party. Although it directs strong criticism toward the political establishment, this is because it is a dogmatic communist party and thus an anti-systemic element that aims to overthrow the current democratic regime. In this sense all anti-systemic parties would have to be regarded as populist, which would only further blur the concept of populism. 10

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the HZDS, which was formed when it split away from the dissident forum Public Against Violence. e reason for the split was tension between the VPN leadership and Vladimír Mečiar, who became the Slovak Premier aer the 1990 elections. e internal conflict came to a head with Mečiar’s removal from executive office. e almost immediate reaction was the departure of his faction from the party, and the founding of the HZDS (Kopeček 2007: 132–135). In the following years Mečiar’s party became the dominant party in Slovakia by far, supported by more than a third of the electorate. However, the party was unable to maintain these levels in the long run, no doubt partly because of the problematic manner of its governance, which went outside the bounds of liberal democracy in 1994–1998. In the latter half of the 1990s, the party’s public support steadily dwindled, and it went into the opposition in 1998. e Movement managed to get back into government in 2006, but only as a smaller coalition partner of SMER. e decline of HZDS became definitive in 2010 with its failure to get into parliament, and subsequent marginalisation.13 e ZRS was born in a similar manner. Its main figure, Ján Ľupták, began in 1990 as an MP from the SDĽ, and represented a certain alternative to its main intellectual current. In 1992, Ľupták founded the civic organisation ZRS,14 which functioned independently from the SDĽ. Aer the SDĽ joined the coalition Moravčík government with some right-wing parties, the civic organisation became a political party. e ZRS got into Parliament aer the 1994 elections and joined the government led by Mečiar. As it turned out, this move eventually led to Ľupták’s party’s downfall, as the actions of the government and in particular its privatisation policy were in direct conflict with the party’s election campaign goals. ZRS voters, who tended to come from the low-income social groups, le the party in droves. Aer the 1998 elections the ZRS suffered a sharp drop in support, and failed to win any seats in parliament. Ľupták tried to reverse this trend in subsequent years, but the party remained marginalised. 13 In the election year 2012 the HZDS received less than one percent of the vote, which led to discussion of possibly dissolving the party. 14 e name of the civic organisation was the same as that of the later political party ZRS.

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ree other parties, namely SOP, SMER, and ANO, were formed under qualitatively different circumstances. e problematic behaviour of the Mečiar government led to serious polarisation on the political scene in the 1990s. As Kopeček tells us (2007: 143), the position of the HZDS was so predominant that the positions of all the other parties in the system were defined by their relationship to the Movement, or rather its chairman. Ideological considerations were secondary. It was this tension that produced dissatisfaction and then frustration among large segments of the public. is created room for the formation of new parties, the pioneer in this regard being the SOP (Učeň et al. 2005: 5–8). e SOP was founded at the beginning of 1998 on the initiative of the popular mayor of Košice and one-time prominent communist functionary R. Schuster. is party was very critical of the existing political polarisation, and set as its goal the achievement of civic unity, the idea of which was contained in its very name (Just 2007: 181–182). It managed to hang on to this ambition for only a short time, as the political situation forced it to choose between the two blocs. Months before the elections the SOP publicly declared itself part of the opposition, and in doing so gave up its position as a potential alternative for all. It thus lost its drawing power for a portion of its membership, and election results fell far short of expectations (Kopeček 2007: 273). Another problem for the SOP was the election of Rudolf Schuster as President of Slovakia, which deprived the party of its most prominent figure. As a part of the first Dzurinda government the party tried to redefine itself ideologically, but its proclaimed refocus on social and liberal values failed to halt its decline. Aer the 2002 elections it went into a tailspin and ceased to be a relevant party.15 Two parties with populist leanings were formed during the term of the first Dzurinda government in 1998–2002. e first was SMER, founded in 1999 by former SDĽ vice-chairman, R. Fico.16 SMER was sharply critical of the established parties, and based its main strategy 15 e SOP did not run by itself in the elections; its candidates ran on the SDĽ ballot. e result of this project, however, was just over one persent of the vote (Štatistický úrad SR). 16 e founding of SMER to a certain degree recalls that of the ZRS: both parties grew out of the SDĽ.

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on this negative stance. e second party was ANO (formed by media magnate Pavol Rusko) which, like SMER, was critical of the existing establishment, but somewhat less intensely so (Učeň 2003: 54–56). e two new parties were in a better position than the SOP had been. e climate aer the fall of the Mečiar government continued to be very polarised, but there was no longer such massive pressure on new parties to commit themselves to one bloc or the other. In the 2002 elections SMER and ANO succeeded in getting into parliament, and the latter party even joined the second Dzurinda government. Here, however, the trajectories of the two parties begin to diverge. While ANO lost voter support because of financial scandals involving its chairman, SMER was steadily building its position. e 2006 elections confirmed this trend. While ANO lost its seats in Parliament and faded away, SMER came to dominate the centre-le, and became the most powerful party in Slovakia. It remains so today; in the 2012 elections SMER won an absolute majority of seats in parliament, and formed a one-party government. e final party we will introduce is OĽaNO. e party was founded in 2011, although its members ran for Parliament as independents on the SaS ballot in the 2010 election.17 Aer the elections it became part of the Radičová government, even though they were not representing an independent member party, but operating under the SaS label, which produced a number of practical problems.18 Aer the Radičová government lost its vote of confidence and was forced into early elections in June 2012, “Ordinary People” founded their own party OĽaNO.19 As its name implies, its declared goal is to cre17 Specifically these were four candidates who were given the last four places on the ballot (numbers 147–150). ey got into parliament due to preference votes, thanks to the strong media ties of their main figure Igor Matovič, who owns a network of regional periodicals. (Spáč 2010: 69) In those elections they ran under the heading of civic association Obyčajní ľudia (Ordinary People, OĽ), and this became part of the name of the new political party. 18 In practice the leading figure of the “Ordinary People” Igor Matovič spoke mainly for himself, which finally led to his expulsion from the SaS parliamentary club. is happened during the debate over the law on state citizenship, when Matovič refused to vote according to the governing coalition’s line. 19 ere was an agreement between OĽ and SaS that the “Ordinaries” would not found their own party until the end of 2010.

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ate a platform for non-partisans, as the Slovak electoral system does not allow them to run independently. With a relatively diverse list of candidates, OĽaNO took part in the early elections and succeeded in becoming the second-strongest party aer SMER. Since SMER has formed a single-party government, OĽaNO is an opposition party at the moment.

9.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style One of the features of populism involves praising the people. Knowing this it can be expected that parties that use populist messages, will, at least for the first years of their existence, concentrate more on the communication with the electorate at the expense of building a strong organisational structure. In the case of the Slovak parties we are studying here, this presumption is for the most part confirmed. ey may not precisely fit this precise organisational model, but a number of similar elements can be observed. One of these is the party’s approach to building internal structures. Not one of the parties began to build a broader party organisation immediately aer foundation. e HZDS is a prime example: in the first years of its existence it had no codified principles of decision making or distribution of powers; its grass-roots organisations grew spontaneously, and there was no formalised membership (Rybář 2011: 70). On the other hand Mečiar’s party began to pick up a large number of members and its membership base continued to grow, until it was the largest party in Slovakia.20 e ZRS started out on similar foundations. Its internal organisation and operation were marked by inexperience and amateurism, but this was compensated for by strong growth in membership. eir base began to grow even before the founding of the ZRS as a party, while it was still a civic organisation, and it continued to increase even aer it became a political party. e ZRS reached its numerical zenith in 1995.21 In 1993 the HZDS already listed 30 thousand members (Minarovič 2004: 54). When the civic association changed into a political party in March 1994 the ZRS had more than 13 000 members. By 1995 membership had risen to around 20 thousand (Kopeček 2007: 223–224). 20 21

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Populist parties that were formed in later eras did not fully share these patterns. Although they did not actually avoid recruiting members, or deliberately restrict their numbers, this aspect of their organisation was on a much lower level than with the HZDS or ZRS.22 As for their organisational structure itself, the SOP gradually created a structural model for the whole party (Ondruchová 2000: 29). In contrast, SMER and ANO emphasised a rather different set of priorities. ese two entities concentrated on forming narrow, professionally-operated structures that proved efficient and successful in running election campaigns. In effect SMER and ANO based their organisation on managerial principles.23 is model was taken furthest by SMER, which unlike SOP and ANO almost completely bypassed the building of regional structures at the beginning. In 2001, this party, almost two years aer its founding, replaced its regional management offices with traditional regional organisations, and began to establish networks in the districts (Kopeček 2007: 286). But not until recent years has SMER become more generally institutionalised. A key point that all Slovak populist parties have in common was a major degree of centralisation, low levels of internal party democracy, and a prominent role for party leaders.24 e strong positions of the chairman derived from the fact that they were all among the groups’ founders. e cases of SMER and ANO were prime examples, says Učeň (2003: 55), according to whom these parties were formed 22 e SOP and ANO reached their peak numbers at around 6 thousand members. At present the voter membership of SMER is one of Slovakia’s largest at over 15 thousand members. ese numbers were built up over a longer the course of time: contributing factors included the gradual strengthening of the party’s position, and the attrition process among the smaller center-le parties. SMER’s original reluctance to take on a larger number of members was shown by the fact that in 2000 it had only around 3 thousand members (Mesežnikov 2003: 82; Kopeček 2007: 286; “Kongres SOP…”, Sme, 28.6.1999). 23 In the context of the financial background that ANO’s chairman provided it, the party from an organisational standpoint was in effect something between a political party and a private firm (Rybář 2011: 18). 24 In Slovak politics centralization is not limited to the populist parties. One strong factor determining this was the introduction of a single country-wide electoral district in 1998, which impacted the other parties as well. One example was the SDKÚ and its choice of candidates, which was officially strongly inclusive, but the deciding role in the process was kept by the party leadership (Spáč 2012).

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basically as an act of will by their chairmen. is was surely true for the HZDS, ZRS, and SOP as well. Perhaps the most visible example in this sense was Pavol Rusko who headed ANO: as the owner of various media outlets, he was not only the party’s founder, but its nearly exclusive funder as well. He was almost literally the owner of the party. Another strength of the chairmen of these populist parties is their longevity. ZRS and SMER both long had or still have only one chairman, and the HZDS was even more extreme in this regard. Vladimír Mečiar announced he would step down aer the 2012 elections, but this only happened aer the party’s definitive marginalisation. During the era that the movement was a relevant force, and for many years aer, Mečiar’s position was unchallenged.25 ere was a change in the chairmanship of the SOP, when in 1999 Rudolf Schuster was replaced by Pavol Hamžík, but this change was necessitated by Schuster’s election as President of Slovakia, an office which is traditionally non-partisan. Likewise, in 2007 Pavol Rusko was replaced at the head of ANO by Robert Nemcics, but again this was at a time when the party had declined into irrelevancy. In the practice of the individual parties, the institution of electing a chairman was a non-conflict confirmation of the chairman in his position.26 e Slovak populist parties took differing approaches to organisational matters. From the beginning the HZDS and ZRS concentrated more on growing their member base, leaving their structures less organised, while SOP, SMER, and ANO on the other hand made relatively little effort to increase membership. While the SOP maintained an almost traditional organisation, SMER and ANO were aiming, at least at first, to construct a narrow but effective framework for winning elections. For objective reasons the process of institutionalisation advanced furthest with HZDS and SMER, while the other parties lost Among the democratic countries Vladimír Mečiar may have been the party chairman with the longest uninterrupted term as party head. is is not fully verifiable, however, given the limited information coming out of some of the Asian or African countries. 26 Elections for party chairmen oen featured a lack of opposing candidates, which was typical for the HZDS for example. Likewise election procedures could be designed to help the favored candidate, as with ANO which used public voting (Kopeček 2007: 404–405). 25

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motivation aer losing elections. With the HZDS there was a marked tendency towards the formation of clientelist networks outside the formal party structure, but when the partly went into opposition in 1998 this trend was halted and eventually negated.27 In this chapter we have not yet mentioned OĽaNO. is party is a special case that differs from any of the other parties in the chapter, or any other political party for that matter. In reality OĽaNO lacks any organisational structure, and since its foundation, it has shown no ambition to become a classic party. is entity continues to present itself almost as a civic association, making it more attractive for independent candidates to run on its ballot. e only fixed point was the party leader, Igor Matovič, whose dominant position is comparable to that of the other populist parties’ leaders. It is impossible to say whether OĽaNO will finally begin building a broader internal structure, or will remain in its current amorphous shape. At the moment the latter seems more likely, but if the party ever becomes part of a coalition government it may be tempted to modify that.

9.6. Ideology is publication distinguishes between two types of populist parties. e first are exclusively populist parties, parties for which ideas are only the backdrop, and populist messages predominate. e second type is the non-exclusively populist party, a party that can still be placed into a specific party family, and for which populism is an accessory. erefore, in defining whether a party is populist or not, we must take ideology into account. e Slovak case gives us a number of interesting examples. Of the parties we are analysing, the HZDS was the first to be founded. Mečiar’s party was formed in 1991, and from the beginning it relied on strongly populist rhetoric. eir perspective was critical of existing elites who had failed to comprehend the needs of “ordinary” 27 In the 1990s the HZDS as the ruling party created a sort of political support network, made up of associated organisations for young people or women. e party also initiated special-interest groups that worked in its favor, such as business, journalistic, or community associations (Kopeček 2007: 161–162; Rybář 2011: 70–71).

242

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Slovaks. e HZDS drove home this point especially in the context of an economic transformation undertaken by the establishment without proper attention to the needs of the public. ese arguments were accompanied to a great degree by nationalist and socially-laden rhetoric (Kopeček 2007: 158). In the case of the HZDS, the exploitation and exacerbation of antagonisms between the people and the elites took on a rather unusual form. e reason was simple: the HZDS itself was part of the elite. Even before the party was founded, many of its officials were part of the political leadership in the regions, and Mečiar himself was Premier until the spring of 1991. Even so, the HZDS used its populist message effectively during its time in opposition in the early 1990s.28 Paradoxically, it was able to do so not only during the initial period from its founding up until the 1992 elections, but even aerward during the time of the Moravčík government in 1994. By then HZDS had experienced a convincing electoral victory, a dominating two-year stint in the government, and was totally identified with what was happening at the time,29 even so it continued to successfully present itself as an outsider party (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009: 830). Its next term in government in 1994–1998 finally exhausted this vein and the HZDS ceased to fall under our definition of populism as it was now clearly perceived as an “insider” of the system. What type of populist party was the HZDS at that time? Mečiar’s party originally refused to categorise itself ideologically, which was a reflection of its internal heterogeneity.30 e program orientation of the party was vague and ambivalent, which meant in practice that the HZDS played on various themes, but carefully and without being 28 A typical example was the failure of talks between Czech and Slovak officials over the shape of the Czechoslovak federation during the first half of 1992. In this situation the HZDS became the party of the “deceived people” and levelled its criticism at the entire existing establishment (Leško 1996: 75). 29 Aer the breakup of the federation the HZDS began to tout itself as the founding party of the state and the standard-bearer of the era. Mečiar himself was presented as the “Father of his Country”. 30 is heterogeneity was the logical outcome of the way the HZDS was founded, in that it did not split off from the VPN primarily on the basis of ideas ideology. Contrast this with Václav Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which as the main successor of the dissident movement Civic Forum (OF) was founded as a clearly right-wing party.

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too contentious or defining itself too much.31 In 2000, the Movement proclaimed itself to be centre-right, but in reality there was no change (Kopeček 2007: 178–179). About the HZDS in the period 1991–1994 we can safely say that it was ideologically unclassifiable, which places it close to the group of exclusively populist parties. On the other hand, the HZDS’s populist issues went alongside a number of various other ideological elements. e HZDS was thus closer in its early days to exclusive populism, but this conclusion remains somewhat qualified.32 e ZRS on the other hand, is a relatively simple case. is party, continuing from its previous activities as a civic association, defined itself as a far-le party appealing to the socially disadvantaged and threatened groups.33 Its central themes were economic, such as the transition to the market economy or the privatisation of state property. Into this message the ZRS succeeded in introducing clearly populist themes. It defined itself as a politically and morally clean party with the goal of unifying the broader segments of society. e existing establishment was accused by the party of being egoistical and placing its own goals above general national and civic interest (Volebný program ZRS 1994). From the beginning Ľupták’s party positioned itself to exploit the tension between society and the elites, with society being seen as morally good, the elites as a stratum that had betrayed its trust. ZRS emphasised the point by identifying itself with the general protest against the developments taking place at the time.34 As in the case of the HZDS, their participation in the coalition government in 1994–1998 e ambiguous character of the HZDS manifested itself in a number of ways. For example the movement styled itself as having helped bring down the communist regime, but at the same time it was opposed to lustration laws. Likewise Mečiar’s party proclaimed Christian values, but never slipped towards hard conservative Catholic positions (Kopeček 2007: 159–160). 32 To a certain degree the HZDS might be classified as a non-exclusively populist party during these years, but it is impossible to determine what “traditional” ideology it actually had. 33 It was the ZRS’s own self-presentation as the party farthest le on the political spectrum except for the Slovak communists. 34 e ZRS specifically called in its election program for voters to choose it as an expression of protest against the economic, political, and moral changes then taking place (Volebný program ZRS 1994). 31

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was a fundamental turning point. When the ZRS became part of the establishment, it lost this issue for the future. Although they did not abandon the theme entirely (Kopeček 2007: 232), they were no longer able to keep from becoming marginalised. Ľupták’s party, including its previous activities as a civic organisation, at least at the beginning, fit the definition of a non-exclusively populist entity with a primarily far-le orientation. Political conditions in Slovakia resulting from developments in the 1990s were also strongly reflected in the appearance and activities of populist parties that were formed later. e polarisation of the party spectrum into two blocs (pro-Mečiar and anti-Mečiar) also impacted the mood of society at the time. e level of tension was so high that a large part of the public viewed it as a negative factor and were willing to consider various alternatives. is freed up a large segment of the voting population, to whom the emerging new populist parties purposefully reached out (Učeň et al. 2005: 17). e first of these new parties was SOP. At the beginning this party, founded by Rudolf Schuster, lacked a clear ideological profile. Instead it put all its energy into criticising the existing conditions: the polarisation of society, ever-present social hatred, and the inability of the two blocs to come to an agreement.35 e SOP saw these two factors as a negative influence on society, and instead stood in need of unity and reconciliation. In this way SOP justified the reasons for its founding as a reaction to society’s need to end this state of affairs, and this was emphasised in the party’s choice of name (Mesežnikov 1999: 92–93).36 SOP’s populism lasted only a short time, however. Circumstances forced the party into the opposition bloc, which rendered the fundamental attributes that distinguished it from the other parties less pronounced. Its participation in the coalition government and the departure of Rudolf Schuster as party leader led the party towards 35 Slovakia’s effort to elect a president was reflective of the period. Originally the Slovak head of state was elected by parliament; a constitutional three-fihs majority was necessary. But in 1997–1998 none of the party blocs possessed this kind of majority, which led to a stalemate. As a result, aer the end of M. Kovač’s term in office Slovakia went almost a year without a president. 36 e SOP described the tension within the party system as “senseless” and “artificial” (Volebný program SOP 1998).

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more social and liberal values, but without a more precise ideological grounding (Kopeček 2007: 278). e ANO party was a different case: from the beginning it defined itself as a centre-right liberal party. is was the primary basis for its program oriented towards economic issues, which called for a diminished role for the state in society. Even so, ANO resorted to a clearly populist messages. e party accused the existing establishment of corruption and strong ties to the business sector. Moreover, according to ANO there was an ever-widening gap between the elites and people, overseen by politicians who were incapable of or uninterested in allowing people to live their own lives as they see fit (Učeň 2003: 54–55). us ANO’s populism was not actually very radical, and when the party entered Dzurinda’s second government these arguments were muffled. Instead, the party decided to focus more on its liberal identity, even on questions civilisational issues, which brought it into frequent conflict with its coalition partners the KDH.37 e last of the three populist parties created in 1998–2002 was SMER. When it was founded this party rejected any classification on the le-right scale, and defined itself as non-ideological (Mesežnikov 2000: 119). Instead, SMER was strongly critical of both party blocs, and the entire establishment. It did not view the prevailing polarisation through the same lens as SOP, but it did blame both sides in the conflict, accusing them of failure and of having lost the right to lead the country and society in the future. SMER’s antagonism towards the mainstream was perhaps best illustrated by the slogan “as they stole under Mečiar, so they steal under Dzurinda” (Wienk, Majchrák 2003: 168). is bon mot should be seen not in the personal context but in the broader sense. Here Vladimír Mečiar and Mikuláš Dzurinda do not appear as individual persons, but as symbols of the era “before SMER”, which R. Fico’s party criticised as a whole. e gap between the people and the elites was so large, according to SMER, that it could only be resolved by replacing the entire current generation of politicians. 37 Between ANO and KDH there were sharp conflicts over the nature and character of the state. In these conflicts ANO represented the secular view. Typical arguments were over the issue of abortion, or the so-called Vatican accord.

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SMER’s populism differed in intensity and range from that of SOP and ANO. As Učeň (2003: 56) observes, ANO made relatively selective use of these appeals, but with SMER populism was applied across the board. Aer the 2002 elections, however, there were changes even in the case of SMER. Shortly before the elections the party talked about following a so-called “ird Way”, but this failed to have the desired effect. Its poorer-than-expected election showing led the party to abandon its non-ideological stance and openly espouse the principles of social democracy. SMER continued to further solidify this ideological stance, which placed it in a better position to criticise the right-wing economic reforms of the second Dzurinda government (Kopeček 2007: 298–300). At the same time it toned down its populist rhetoric, and finally entered the government in 2006.38 From the above information we can rank SOP and SMER among the exclusively populist parties, while ANO with its liberalism belongs among the non-exclusively populist parties. With all three of these parties the populism lasted for only a limited time. e populism of SOP and ANO more or less ended with their first parliamentary elections; the SOP’s populist appeal weakened even before the elections because it had to align with the anti-Mečiar bloc. SMER, on the other hand, had the “advantage” of not getting into the government until aer the first elections, but remaining in opposition, which allowed it to maintain its populism for a longer time.39 But this, too, ended when it entered the government as the winner of the next elections. e last case we will analyse is OĽaNO. In this case, any clear ideological definition is by nature problematic, as the party seeks to serve as a platform for non-partisans of various ideological backgrounds. e party’s program for the 2012 elections does not provide us any more precise guidance, as there is no visible tilt in one direction or the other (see Volebný program OĽaNO 2012). Although OĽaNO 38 e classification of SMER as a social democratic party is not without reservation. e party has long projected nationalist messages as well, and this was clearly reflected in the way they governed during 2006–2010. Moreover, this helped SMER to gradually absorb a big share of former SNS voters. 39 In the period aer the 2002 elections until the elections in 2006 SMER can be seen as gradually moving towards becoming a non-exclusively populist party, mainly by presenting itself as a social democratic party.

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does not reject the right-le categorisation as vehemently as some of the above parties, it remains for the time being an ideologicallyamorphous entity.40 However, the populist element in OĽaNO has been important from the beginning. In accordance with its name, the party assumed the role of representative and defender of ordinary people, and took a strongly critical attitude towards the political establishment. e party drew on the frustration of people who have long felt themselves robbed by politicians and the elites, those symbols of corruption and clientelism (Volebný program OĽaNO 2012). is aspect was displayed during the 2012 election campaign, when OĽaNO pointed to media reports of clientelist ties of political elites to certain financial groups, and placed this in the context of its call for a new generation of politicians.41 Overall OĽaNO can be safely classified as an exclusively populist party, while the future remains quite open in this regard. From the standpoint of ideology, we can point to a number of interesting features among the Slovak populist parties. Most of these parties are, or have been, exclusively populist parties and not the non-exclusive type. e point they shared in common, with the logical exception of OĽaNO, is the transitory nature of these parties’ populism, which usually (though not always) ended with the party’s first elections. Last but not least, because of the closeness of these parties’ ideologies, we can speak of at least two waves of Slovak populism. e first is represented by ZRS and HZDS; their messages were aimed at citizens who lost out in the post-1989 economic transformation. e second wave, started by SOP and continued by SMER and ANO, drew on the exhaustion and frustration among parts of society with developments in the post-communist era exacerbated by the existing polarisation of the party spectrum. In this context, there is 40 One possibility might be to note the candidacies of the leading OĽaNO representatives on the ballots of the liberal SaS in 2010. However, they are not as ideologically close as they may seem given the campaign program of the “ordinaries” along with the statement by chairman Matovič who denied being a liberal. 41 Specifically the so-called Gorilla affair, involving the publication of conversations indicating widespread corruption and influence of financial interests on domestic politics.

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

a question of whether OĽaNO falls under the second wave, or forms the foundation for a new trend, or whether it represents something of a divergent case.

9.7. Electoral Support and Social Base is chapter will provide basic information on the election results of the Slovak populist parties, and the character of their supporters. Two observations at the outset: because the individual parties maintained the populist profile for a limited time, key for us is the information that corresponds to the particular era. e second point is of an entirely practical nature and concerns OĽaNO. is party was formed only recently, and took part in its first parliamentary elections in March 2012. ese circumstances of time limit the amount of available information about OĽaNO and its voters.42 Table 9.1. Election Performance of Populist Political Parties in Slovakia 1992

HZDS ZRS

1994

%

seats

%

seats

37.3 –

74

35

–

7.3

1998

2002

2006

2010

2012

%

seats

%

seats

%

seats

%

seats

%

seats

61

27

43

19.5

36

8.8

15

4.3

–

0.9

–

13

1.3

–

0.5

–

0.3

–

0.2

–

0.7

–

SOP

–

–

–

–

13

1.4

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

SMER

–

–

–

–

–

–

13.5

25

29.1

50

34.8

62

44.4

83

ANO

–

–

–

–

–

–

8

15

1.4

–

–

–

–

–

OĽaNO

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

8.6

16

Note: In 2002 the SOP did not campaign independently, but its candidates ran on the SDĽ ballot. The same was done by ZRS in 2012 when it ran on the KSS ballot.

Source: Štatistický úrad SR.

42 e individual parliamentary elections in Slovakia are regularly mapped in detail and published by the Institute for Public Affairs. is text was written only a few months aer the 2012 election; therefore the 2012 data is lacking. For information on OĽaNO and its voter support we will be able to consult this publication aer it comes out.

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e above information (table 9.1) shows the results the parties achieved in the individual elections. From this data it is possible to observe the paths of the populist parties through parliament. While the HZDS was a clear victor aer its first elections, the others were not quite so successful. Besides SMER, which achieved decent results (though below expectations), the other parties became minor actors with returns up to 10%. But their position was very fragile, as their subsequent election losses proved. Another important point is a closer analysis of the individual parties’ support. e two parties established at the beginning of the 1990s, the HZDS and the ZRS, aimed their messages primarily at the social groups that suffered most during the transformation process aer 1989. is was exhibited especially by the ZRS. Its electorate was made up mostly of working people and the unemployed, while students and businessmen were represented to a lesser degree. is corresponded to the educational profile of ZRS supporters, with trade school education predominating, and minimal support from university graduates. e peripheral profile of the party43 was also illustrated from a geographic standpoint; predictably, party support grew the greater the distance east of Bratislava (Kopeček 2007: 225). In the case of the HZDS the situation was different; at first its voters matched remarkably well the average vital statistics of Slovak society. is can be explained by the HZDS’s heterogeneous character, which differed greatly from the relatively narrowly-focused ZRS. e early support for Mečiar’s party was centred in the villages and smaller towns, in areas with higher proportions of Catholics, and likewise people with less education. Soon, however, this broad profile narrowed significantly: these changes were quite apparent in the data from the 1998 elections. e HZDS as a party began to take on a markedly rural character, with strong support among older voters and people with less education (Krivý 1999). Geographically, the party’s support was stable over time, concentrated in the northern and northwest parts of Slovakia, and came to gradually include some eastern regions as well. A few changes took place in 43 e ZRS was the only one of the relevant parties not to make its headquarters in Bratislava, but in central Slovakia in the town of Banská Bystrica.

250

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

later years, but these were part of the HZDS’s decline (Madleňák 2012: 74–78). e trio of parties SOP, SMER, and ANO were formed at a different time and aimed at other groups of voters. e focus of their interest was not the “losers” of the transformation, but social segments dissatisfied with the long-term direction of the country and political polarisation (Učeň et al. 2005: 18). e result was that, although their voter’s demography was not completely amorphous, still in many respects they diverged little from the statistical norms, and did not range towards the extreme values. A shared trait among these parties was their ability to appeal to younger categories of voters and firsttime voters. is was true for the SOP in 1998, and for SMER and ANO in 2002. eir support did not have any significant religious component, although in the case of SOP and ANO there was a minor tendency to lose Catholic voters. At the same time all three parties gained greater support in larger cities (Krivý 1999: 53–55, Krivý 2003: 89–90. Gyárfášová 2011: 76–78, 86–88, Madleňák 2012: 62–63). On the other hand, in terms of geographical support, the political groups differ. e chairman of the SOP was from eastern Slovakia, where the party drew its earliest; like the ZRS, it was somewhat a party of the periphery.44 ANO was also rooted geographically in central and eastern Slovakia, but its support was not as concentrated as the SOP’s. SMER’s support in its first elections came mostly from the western and central parts of the country (Štatistický úrad SR). In their first elections the voter bases of SOP, SMER, and ANO shared a number of attributes in common despite their differing geographical distribution. With all of the above parties, it was the shallow loyalty of their supporters, especially in the case of the SOP, which was behind disappointing election results and declining support in the polls. e parties did manage to get into parliament, but their position was uncertain; the SOP and ANO would suffer the consequences from this in subsequent elections. On the other hand SMER as an opposition party aimed for the centre-le, and took a strongly critical stance towards the second Dzurinda government; 44 In the Košice districts, which make up nearly 7% of Slovakia’s population, the SOP gained nearly 20% of the vote (Štatistický úrad SR).

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which brought it greater support in the polls. is led to a major shi in the nature of the party’s support; this was partly a result of voters leaving the declining HZDS as well. While SMER went explicitly aer first-time voters from the big cities in 2002, they changed their focus soon aerward. With the influx of former HZDS voters SMER’s electoral base became older, and became well-established in smaller communities (Gyárfášová 2011: 91). Unlike the HZDS, however, SMER continued to enjoy significant support from the other voter segments as well.45 As for OĽaNO, at present we can only make a few general observations. e geographic distribution of their support during the 2012 elections showed nothing specific; on the contrary, its electoral support was quite evenly distributed (Štatistický úrad SR). e one exception in this regard were areas with a larger share of the Hungarian minority, but this has been true of all the “non-Hungarian” populist parties. From the social standpoint, there are several indicators that OĽaNO has especially taken centre-right voters away from the established parties.46 is might make it more attractive to younger people with middle and high levels of education and from bigger towns. is theory requires some more examination, however, and the question remains open for the time being. Election results show that the individual Slovak populist parties enjoyed varying degrees of success in this regard. e fact that they appeared on the scene in two separate waves is reflected in the social background of their electorates. While in their first elections the ZRS and HZDS were supported by the economically weaker strata, the supporters of the second wave displayed different characteristics. Especially with the parties we have classified as exclusively populist, at the beginning their voters did not diverge significantly from the social averages. During in a later period the HZDS electorate became more narrowly concentrated, while SMER’s voting base changed from its original characteristics altogether; but this is no longer relevant 45 SMER’s overwhelming victory in the 2012 elections has led it to re-focus on the less-contentious elements among its voter base. 46 According to polls taken in February 2012 shortly before the elections, 20% of former SaS voters, and almost 15% of SDKÚ voters, were willing to vote for OĽaNO (Prieskum agentúry Polis 2012).

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POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

for our purposes, as these aspects go beyond the bounds of our topic, which concerns the two parties’ populist stages.

9.8. Position in the Political System e last set of topics to be discussed is the position of the populist parties within the framework of the political system. As indicated by the election results shown above, these parties were able to win relevant political support that allowed them to get into parliament. e question is how they dealt with their newfound status. Probably the most important indicator of the success of a political party in general is its ability to gain and hold on to power. Under parliamentary democracies this means becoming part of the executive. e political trajectory of the Slovak populist parties has been impressive in this regard. Of the six formations analysed here, four got into the government aer their first elections: the HZDS, ZRS, SOP, and ANO. Mečiar’s party is something of a special case, as its top officials including their chairmen had held the highest offices previously. SMER won a place in the government aer its second elections in 2006. e only one of these parties that has not served in government is OĽaNO. Our effort to reveal and distinguish among the patterns of behaviour by the Slovak populist parties both in and out of government is problematic for two reasons. e first is that these parties soon abandoned their populist stances, and turned to other messages to accomplish their goals. Typically there was an effort to either strengthen or re-define their ideological profile, as in the case of ANO or SOP. e second reason is the very short lifespan of these parties, half of which were unable to maintain relevance for more than one term. Aer joining coalition governments the parties we have analysed toned down their populist rhetoric, which means that their later activities (in or out of parliament) fall outside their populist stages. e rapid rise of the Slovak populist parties indicates that these entities enjoyed high coalition potential, and oen found themselves in the position of the kingmakers. Both the ZRS and ANO became necessary links in the formation of a minimal winning coalition aer

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the 1994 and 2002 elections.47 e case of the SOP was a bit different: while the first Dzurinda government would have been viable without it, the promised constitutional changes required a minimum of 90 coalition MPs to pass, making it necessary to include Schuster’s party. e presence of ANO was one reason SMER did not join the government aer its first election. Robert Fico had made clear his ambition to do so during the election campaign (Mesežnikov 2002: 86–87), but with the chance to form a homogeneous centre-right government his party became superfluous to building the coalition. Meanwhile, the Slovak populist parties were not only the object of coalition-building interest; they also undertook their own initiative in this regard. We could say that despite the varying degrees of antagonism harboured towards the existing establishment when the parties were first starting out, they all proved willing to adapt to the new situation that typically occurred aer their first election success. e SOP had already taken this step during the election campaign of 1998, when circumstances forced it into the opposition camp. As Učeň observes (2003: 55), the weaker anti-elitist element in ANO, compared to that of SMER, before the 2002 elections helped Rusko’s party get into the government. Probably the most spectacular display of adaptability to changing conditions was the ZRS, which originally planned to remain in the opposition and had been strong critic of the government (Kopeček 2007: 226). Instead the ZRS joined Mečiar’s government, and apart from a few occasions became a loyal partner of the HZDS. Relations with other political parties are an important factor of a party’s position in the political system. In this sense the Slovak populist parties differed little from the established actors, and aer making it into Parliament and the government they fell in line with the existing mechanism. As the political spectrum became increasingly polarised, the ZRS clearly attached itself to the pro-Mečiar bloc. Later on the SOP and ANO did something similar, but with diametrically opposite results. On the other hand SMER resisted this logic 47 An absolute majority in the Slovak parliament is 76 (out of 150 seats). In 1994–98 Mečiar’s government had 83 seats, of which the ZRS contributed 13. Similarly the second Dzurinda government (2002–2006) as a minimum winning coalition had 78 seats to start with, of which 15 belonged to ANO.

254

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

at first, and its ideology and bitter criticism of the second Dzurinda government led to mostly negative relations with the centre-right parties. Working from the same principle at present is OĽaNO, which came out against Fico’s cabinet, but is keeping its distance from the parliamentary opposition. In other words, Slovak populist parties made it into the political system, but found it difficult to stay there. ZRS, SOP, and ANO failed to win re-election to parliament, and this presaged their downfall. It is symptomatic that in every case these were parties that entered the government aer their very first elections (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009: 837–838).48 SMER was different, remaining in the opposition until 2006, which allowed it to better time its ideological shi. ese observations should indicate the options open to the youngest and currently only populist party, OĽaNO. is party, like the previous three, entered Parliament as a minor player, but like SMER it has remained in the opposition. Even if we overlook its special status as a platform for independent figures, it is possible that future survival will depend on its ability to move toward a firmer set of values, and gain loyalty from a specific segment of the voters.

9.9. Conclusion Political developments in Slovakia aer 1989 created a favourable setting for the emergence of populist parties. A marked degree of mistrust by the public toward the political elites, aggravated by a problematic transformation process and ever-increasing polarisation of the party spectrum, have proven to be the factors that together formed fertile conditions for the appearance of populism. ese favourable conditions were noticed and taken advantage of, with varying degrees of success. In the case of Slovakia, we can distinguish two waves of populist parties. e first consisted of HZDS and ZRS, which were formed in 48 is may be contradicted by the very presence of HZDS, which entered the executive at the same time. e basic difference between it and the trio of other parties was that the starting position of Mečiar’s party was different, and from the standpoint of strength incomparable.

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the early 1990s during the political and economic transformation, and focused their attention on segments of society seen as having lost out in these processes. e second wave came during a period of high polarisation in politics and among the public. During this stage SOP, SMER, and ANO gradually formed, and benefited from the existing conflict between two party blocs. e question remains whether OĽaNO can be classified together with these other parties, because it was founded quite a bit later than the others, and under somewhat different qualitative conditions. ese two waves, however, did not form two homogeneous categories that would differ significantly from one another. e parties do not fall into the same defined categories of populist parties that we are working with. While HZDS, SOP, and SMER (and OĽaNO) can be classified during their various periods as exclusively populist types of party, the ZRS and ANO represent non-exclusively populist types of parties. Although differences are observable between the parties of the two waves in various aspects such as the internal organisation or patterns of voter support, we can otherwise draw no strict parallels between the parties of the two waves. Populism in the Slovak context represented and continues to represent a means by which new party-type entities can achieve relevance and seats in parliament. Our analysis of the cases, however, shows that this type of vehicle is fragile and unstable. For this type of party, participation in a coalition government means not only access to power; but a significant challenge, as it involves becoming “contaminated” with policies which they themselves had formerly opposed. As the cases of ZRS, SOP, and ANO show, when a party gets into executive power too soon, it can turn out to destroy the party. It seems to be more advantageous to serve first in the opposition, then later to hone one’s ideological message and move away from populism; although the model of SMER is not of sufficient scope to allow definite conclusions in this regard.49 It will be interesting to see how OĽaNO deals with the same challenge. 49 ere may be a discussion about whether political parties may in time move from one type of populism to another, i.e. from exclusively to non-exclusively. e case of Smer aer elections 2002 suggests that this shi is possible. e party diminished its populist appeals and gradually adopted social democratic values. Although this

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List of Abbreviations of Political Parties ANO HZDS KDH KSS Most ODS OF OĽ OĽaNO SaS SDKÚ SDĽ SMER SNS SOP VPN ZRS

Alliance of the New Citizen Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Christian Democratic Movement Communist party of Slovakia Bridge Civic Democratic Party Civic Forum Ordinary people Ordinary People and Independent Personalities Freedom and Solidarity Slovak Democratic and Christian Union Party of the Democratic Le Direction Slovak National Party Party of civic understanding Public Against Violence Association of Slovak Workers

References Bútorová, Zora, Gyárfášová, Oľga and Velšic, Marián. 1999. “Verejná mienka.” In: Slovensko 1998–1999. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov and Michal Ivantyšyn. Bratislava: IVO, 233–272. Deegan-Krause, Kevin and Haughton, Tim. 2009. “Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia.” Politics & Policy 37, No. 4, 821–841. Gyárfášová, Oľga and Velšic, Marián. 2002. “Verejná mienka.” In: Slovensko 2002. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Eds. Miroslav Kollár and Grigorij Mesežnikov. Bratislava: IVO, 291–332. Gyárfášová, Oľga. 2011. Voličské správanie na Slovensku. Teória, trendy, výskum. Bratislava: Renesans. example suggests the possibility of such trends, we lack other cases which would support this option. Still it seems more probable to move from exclusively populist to non-exclusively populist than the opposite way and the next development of OĽaNO may bring some light here.

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Hilde, Paal Sigurd. 1999. “Slovak Nationalism and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia.” Europe-Asia Studies 51, No. 4, 647–665. Holman, Robert. 2000. Transformace české ekonomiky: v komparaci s dalšími zeměmi střední Evropy. Praha: Centrum pro ekonomiku a politiku. Jurzyca, Eugen, Jakoby, Marek and Pažitný, Peter. 1999. “Celkový ekonomický vývoj.” In: Slovensko 1998–1999. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov and Michal Ivantyšyn. Bratislava: IVO, 389–422. Just, Petr. 2007. “Populism in Slovak Politics: Case Study of Rudolf Schuster and his Party of Civic Understanding.” In: Populism in Central Europe. Eds. Václav Nekvapil and Maria Stazskiewicz. Praha: Association for International Affairs, 174–188. Kopeček, Lubomír. 2006. Demokracie, diktarutury a politické stranictví na Slovensku. Brno: CDK. Kopeček, Lubomír. 2007. Politické strany na Slovensku 1989 až 2006. Brno: CDK. Krivý, Vladimír 1999. Čo prezrádzajú volebné výsledky? Parlamentné voľby 1992 – 1998. Bratislava: IVO. Krivý, Vladimír. 2003. “Volebné výsledky a trendy.” In: Slovenské voľby ’02. Výsledky, dôsledky, súvislosti. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov, Oľga Gyárfášová and Miroslav Kollár. Bratislava: IVO, 61–106. Leško, Marián 1996. Mečiar a mečiarizmus. Politik bez škrupúľ, politika bez zábran. Bratislava: VMV. Madleňák, Tibor. 2012. Regionálna diferenciácia volebného správania na Slovensku (1998 – 2010). Bratislava: VEDA. Mesežnikov, Grigorij. 1999. “Vnútropolitický vývoj a systém politických strán.” In: Slovensko 1998–1999. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov and Michal Ivantyšyn. Bratislava: IVO, 17–114. Mesežnikov, Grigorij. 2000. “Vnútropolitický vývoj a systém politických strán.” In: Slovensko 2000. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Eds. Miroslav Kollár and Grigorij Mesežnikov. Bratislava: IVO, 17–124. Mesežnikov, Grigorij. 2002. “Vnútropolitický vývoj a systém politických strán.” In: Slovensko 2002. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Eds. Miroslav Kollár and Grigorij Mesežnikov. Bratislava: IVO, 19–126. Mesežnikov, Grigorij. 2003. “Parlamentné voľby 2002 a vývoj systému politických strán.” In: Slovenské voľby ’02. Výsledky, dôsledky, súvislosti. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov, Oľga Gyárfášová and Miroslav Kollár. Bratislava: IVO, 31–46. Mesežnikov, Grigorij. 2009. “National Populism in Slovakia – Defining the Character of the State and Interpreting Select Historic Events.” In: National Populism and Slovak-Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006–2009. Ed. Kálmán Petőcz. Šamorín – Somorja: Forum Minority Research Institute. 39–66. Minarovič, Milan. 2004. “Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko.” In: Politické strany ako organizácie. Prípady zo Slovenska. Ed. Marek Rybář. Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského, 32–60.

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Ondruchová, Mária. 2000. Organizácia politických strán hnutí na Slovensku. Bratislava: IVO. Prieskum agentúry Polis 2012 (http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/velkyprieskum-ku-komu-prebehli-volici.html). Petőcz, Kálmán. 2009. National Populism and Slovak-Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006–2009. Šamorín – Somorja: Forum Minority Research Institute. Rybář, Marek. 2011. Medzi štátom a spoločnosťou. Politické strany na Slovensku po roku 1989. Bratislava: DEVIN printing house. Sme. 1999. Kongres SOP sa niesol v duchu očakávaní, podľa Hamžíka sa strana musí profesionalizovať. Sme, 28/6/1999. (http://www.sme.sk/c/2193221/ kongres-sop-sa-niesol-v-duchu-ocakavani-podla-hamzika-sa-strana-musiprofesionalizovat.html). Spáč, Peter. 2010. Priama a zastupiteľská demokracia na Slovensku. Volebné reformy a referendá po roku 1989. Brno: CDK. Spáč, Peter. 2012. e Rise and Fall of Primaries in Slovakia. e Case of Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party. Paper presented on ECPR Joint Session in Antwerp, 10–15/4/2012, Workshop 19 – Party primaries in Europe. Consequences and Challenges. Stanley, Ben. 2011. “Populism, nationalism, or national populism? An analysis of Slovak vořiny behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, No. 4, 257–270. Štatistický úrad SR (http://www.statistics.sk). Učeň, Peter, Gyárfášová, Oľga and Krivý, Vladimír. 2005. “Centrist Populism in Slovakia from the Perspective of Voters and Supporters.” Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 6, No. 1, 28–47. Učeň, Peter. 2003. “Faktory úspechu strán stredového populizmu.” In: Slovenské voľby ’02. Výsledky, dôsledky, súvislosti. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov, Oľga Gyárfášová and Miroslav Kollár. Bratislava: IVO, 47–60. Učeň, Peter. 2009. “Approaching National Populism. In: National Populism and Slovak-Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006–2009. Ed. Kálmán Petőcz. Šamorín – Somorja: Forum Minority Research Institute, 13–38. Volebný program OĽaNO 2012 Volebný program SOP 1998 Volebný program ZRS 1994 Wienk, Zuzana and Majchrák, Jozef. 2003. “Volebná kampaň.” In: Slovenské voľby ’02. Výsledky, dôsledky, súvislosti. Eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov, Oľga Gyárfášová and Miroslav Kollár. Bratislava: IVO, 163–180.

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10. SLOVENIA ALENKA KRAŠOVEC 10.1. The Politics of Populism in Slovenia Although there is no doubt that one can speak about the presence of some elements of populism at least in some time periods since the establishment of a multi-party system and democratic regime, populist politics and populist parties in Slovenia have not been investigated to any bigger extent. Since there have not been any serious attempts by political scientists in Slovenia to deal with populism, one also encounters the problem of its definition. Despite many definitions of populist parties by prominent political scientists abroad, it is usually a problem to adopt such definitions prepared elsewhere and to simply apply them to national contexts without at least some critical assessment. In the absence of any precise definition of populism and populist parties in Slovenia, efforts to write about these topics run into a phenomenon that has no strict definition. is lack of a formal definition is probably why several authors have claimed that almost all Slovenian parliamentary parties have had, at least in some periods, features of populist parties (Maver 2007, Lorenci 2011). In any case, several authors apparently see the Slovenian National Party as the main representative of populist politics in Slovenia, even though others simply treat it as a radical-right party. erefore, in the following article our attention is also concentrated on this party. Analysis of the Slovenian National Party shows that it has indeed included several typical elements of populism in its activities since 1990, in some periods more than others. What is somewhat surprising is the party’s display of eclectic characteristics that may be treated as elements of (radical) right or (radical) le populism.

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Unlike in many other East-Central European countries, populism in Slovenia has not been a major force (perhaps the lack of scientific interest in it is a consequence of this) in the political arena. Yet in the last few years the development of the Slovenian economic and political arena, coupled with people’s big disappointment with the current elites, seems to have allowed more room for manoeuvre for populist appeals and populist parties.

10.2. The Evolution of the Party System e first multi-party and democratic elections in Slovenia aer World War II were held in 1990, but were still for representative bodies designed during the socialist era, namely, the Socio-Political Chamber, the Chamber of Municipalities and the Chamber of Associated Work. Subsequently, the country’s adoption of a new Constitution in December 1991 changed the political system’s structure, paving the way for the first elections to the new representative bodies held in 1992. e Slovenian Parliament is formally bi-cameral, consisting of the National Assembly (the Lower House) and the National Council (the Upper House, involving representatives of local and functional interests).1 However, the National Council has relatively limited powers and hence the National Assembly is commonly referred to as “the parliament”. e National Assembly has 90 members, including two seats reserved for representatives of the country’s Italian and Hungarian national minorities. A new electoral system – a PR system – was introduced for the 1992 elections.2 In general, there has not been any electoral engineering in Slovenia3 since the only alteration of the electoral system came in 1 ese are representatives of trade unions, employers, farmers, universities etc. and therefore Slovenia is frequently described as a corporate country (see e.g. Lukšič 1996). 2 Two representatives of national minorities are elected under the Borda system. 3 Nonetheless, there have been several waves of debates on changing the electoral system (Fink-Hafner et al. 2005), and most frequently the idea to introduce majority system has been proposed, especially by the Slovenian Democratic Party. But it is only possible to change the Constitution with a two-thirds majority of parliament, which can only be achieved with the support of some smaller parties, who have indeed not been enthusiastic about it.

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2000 – a change in the legally defined dynamic threshold to enter Parliament of three mandates (in reality this was between 3.3% and 3.4%) to a constitutionally defined fixed threshold of 4%, and one electoral formula was changed (on the state level the d’Hondt system has been used, while on the level of constituencies the Hare quota was used until 2000 when it was replaced by the Droop quota) (Krašovec 2007). e district magnitude is 11 seats and, according to Cox’s (in Krašovec 2007) comparative analysis, Slovenia is among those countries with a relatively high level of proportionality between votes gained by an individual party at elections and the number of its seats in Parliament. Taking these characteristics into account, the relatively large number of parties in Parliament (in 1990, nine parties entered Parliament, later between seven and eight), with many being small, is no surprise. Formally, establishing a new party is relatively easy in Slovenia. Despite the introduction of some stricter rules in 1994, just 200 signatures along with a party programme and internal party rules are still needed to set up a new party (Fink-Hafner 2001). e only exception in the institutional rules, which discriminate against new and small parties, are the provisions concerning the public subsidising of political parties (Krašovec, Haughton 2011). It can be concluded that Slovenia’s institutional context (a parliamentary system with proportional representation, a relatively low threshold and fairly undemanding requirements for establishing a new party), with the partial exception of the rules on the public financing of political parties, have been fairly stable and open to new parties (Fink-Hafner, Krašovec 2011), and at every election since 1990 (excluding the 2004 elections) some new party (either genuinely new or a breakaway from another party) has entered Parliament.4 Yet so far only two (SNS and DeSUS) parties have remained in more than two consecutive mandates since their first parliamentary entrance (Fink-Hafner, Krašovec 2011). 4 In 1992 the Slovenian National Party (SNS), in 1996 the Democratic Party of Retired Persons (DeSUS), in 2000 the Slovenian Youth Party (SMS) and New Slovenia (NSi), in 2008 Zares and in 2011 the Positive Slovenia (PS) and Citizen’s List (DL).

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As found by Fink-Hafner (2006: 222), the Slovenian party system can be described as dynamic, despite the stability of the electoral rules. While in the early 1990s a polarised party system was established, especially visible in the number of relevant parties, the existence of bilateral oppositions and ideological distance, mainly elements of moderate pluralism can subsequently be observed (Fink-Hafner 2006: 223). Aer the 2000 elections, elements of a predominant party system also emerged in the Slovenian party system (Fink-Hafner 2006: 223) since the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) obtained the biggest share of votes as an individual party in the system so far (36.2%). e 2004 shi towards moderate pluralism has led to bi-polar party competition and the subsequent alternation of centre-right and centre-le governments (Fink-Hafner 2006). According to Fink-Hafner (2006: 223), no party is seeking to change the political system (anti-system parties) in Slovenia, even though, as pointed out by Rizman (1998), there have occasionally been some doubts about the fairness of elections. In Slovenia, naturally enough under the PR electoral system, all governments have been coalitions, but the pattern of coalition formation has changed. Namely, up until the 2004 elections, governments were ideologically mixed coalitions but were nonetheless (comparatively for East-Central European countries) relatively stable (Blondel et al. 2007). Beyond this, aer the 2004 elections, the governments were much more ideologically homogenous, and the rotation of ideological coalitions (centre-le or centre-right) has become the rule. When speaking about the ideological characteristics and main competition lines of the party system, a tripolar (conservative, liberal and social-democratic) ideological structure has been clearly visible in Slovenia (in periods of political pluralism) since the end of the 19th century (Prunk 2011). As in many other countries, several cleavages have existed in the Slovenian party arena, for example, centre–periphery, state–church, rural–urban, traditionalism–modernism, and liberalism–conservatism (clericalism)5, although the latter has been the main cleavage, whereas the social-democratic ideological segment 5 In Slovenia, some of these cleavages have frequently interwoven and thus a strong polarisation has been evident (Fink-Hafner, Krašovec 2006: 82).

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has mainly been weak (Fink-Hafner 1999, Prunk 2011). In the postsocialist period, a further cleavage has been added,6 namely the “communism–anti-communism” one which also significantly relates to the liberalism-conservatism cleavage. Due to the country’s gradualist approach to the economic transition (Stanojević, Krašovec 2011) and the clear expectations of the population to retain the welfare state in the independent country, all parliamentary parties advocated similar, social-democratic socio-economic policies (Fink-Hafner, Krašovec 2006) until the 2004 elections, thereby reducing the more successful electoral appeal of the Social Democrats (SD). Yet this situation changed at the 2004 elections when the socialdemocratic versus (neo)liberal cleavage became more evident, largely because of the SDS’ (a relative winner of the 2004 elections) final turn towards a conservative party camp. Due to the great economic and fiscal crisis, the cleavage became even more pronounced at the 2011 elections but, paradoxically, the parties’ socio-economic policies have – due to external pressures – been becoming more similar and more (neo)liberal-oriented.

10.3. Case Selection According to Rizman (1999: 153), the first harbinger of populist (anti)politics in the Slovenian post-communist era was Ivan Kramberger,7 who was killed by an insane person early in 1992, just before the elections. At the 1990 presidential elections as an independent candidate he attracted 18.5% of votes in the first round. At pre-election meetings he used the language of the common people that was easily accepted by the least educated and poorest in the country (Rizman 1999: 154). 6 Despite the many cleavages examples of big unity between parties could also be observed, for example on independence (Prunk 1992), EU membership and membership in the EMU (Krašovec, Lajh 2009; Zajc 2009). 7 Kramberger was in fact a typical blue-collar worker who in Germany became an innovator of medical machines for kidney failures, which brought him great wealth (Rizman, 1999: 153). He supported humanitarian actions in Slovenia and in Germany and he was therefore also called the “Good man from Negova”.

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In ideological terms, one could not place Kramberger on the le or right of the political spectrum since elements of both could be found in his rhetoric (Kršinar 1994). For example, Kramberger declared himself a patron of the poor, exploited and old, yet he also had some clear-cut xenophobic themes, for example regarding refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs in Slovenia, and generally “Southerners” (Rizman 1999: 154). Nevertheless, when a significant number of “Southerners” were identified among his audience he then praised them. e same politically pragmatic attitude could be seen in relation to communists (Kršinar 1994). When examining populist parties in Slovenia, comparative overviews usually identify the Slovenian National Party (SNS) as a populist (radical right) party (Rizman 1999, Mudde 2007), while Maver (2007: 179) said the party is among the clearest examples of populism in its original sense even though some authors have predominantly classified it simply as a radical right party (e.g. Kuzmanić 1995). Slovenian authors (for example, Rizman 1999, Hribar 2011, Lorenci 2011) have quite oen also described the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), or its leader, as having a populist right orientation, whereas Nation (in Rizman 1999: 160) even placed party leader Janez Janša among the representatives of “demagogic populism” one can find in various post-communist countries: Mečiar in Slovakia, Tudjman in Croatia, Berisha in Albania, Lukashenko in Belarus. Schedler (in Rizman 1999: 160) characterised Janša as a charismatic populist. Lorenci (2011) has a slightly different view on the populism of the Slovenian Democratic Party, by recognising that the SDS can be regarded as a populist party, yet the party is generally not recognised as clearly populist, mainly because its leader Janša definitely has a more ascetic attitude than a classic demagogic attitude compared to the characteristics of the leader of the SNS party. In some periods in the 1990s even the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) was sometimes described as populist (e.g. Mudde 2002), despite clearly not identifying itself as such. According to Lorenci 2011), since 2008 the Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia (DeSUS) has also joined the group of populist parties in Slovenia. In general, the centre-le in Slovenia is described as less populist than the centre-right (Lorenci 2011), mainly because the centre-le (especially

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the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) option was in power for almost 12 consecutive years, with Janez Drnovšek as the leader who was far away from being a populist. Yet it is true that the former long-term leader of the Social Democrats (SD), Borut Pahor, has more populist abilities and predispositions (Lorenci 2011). Some people also think two other parties, established a month before early elections 2011, can be treated as (non-exclusively) populist. Both Positive Slovenia and Civic List gave strong exposure to their leaders and to a lesser extent their programmes. Indeed, the names of the parties at the elections even included names of their leaders, Zoran Janković and Gregor Virant, but in both cases the leaders’ names were removed from the parties’ names almost immediately aer elections. In a way it was expected that both parties would not be able to form an extensive and precise written (electoral) programme just before elections. is indeed was the case since both presented very vague programmes. Nonetheless, it has been clearly possible to identify ideological positions of both parties. Positive Slovenia and Civic List can be easily identified as libertarian parties (defending rights of different minorities, separation of the Church and the State etc.), while some differences are seen in terms of their socio-economic positions; Civic List has a clearly neoliberal stand, while Positive Slovenia is definitely trying to position itself more toward the social democratic pole in this regard. is can be, at least partly, confirmed also by a fact that on the European level the former has been trying to become a member of the liberal party family, while the latter still has been thinking about liberal and social democratic party family. At the 2011 elections both parties, not surprisingly since there was very low trust in all the main political institutions and a huge disappointment of the population over politicians at the time, tried to play the anti-establishment card and therefore tried to present themselves as parties which were supposed to bring some new quality in the Slovenian party arena. Naturally enough, when aer the elections both parties entered Parliament (Positive Slovenia was even a relative winner of the elections, while Civic List has become a governmental party) and have become part of the system, at first glance maybe their populist appeals have disappeared too. is brief overview reveals how differently various authors see Slovenian political parties and how indeed almost all parties can in

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some respects and/or time periods be seen as populist. e question is whether this is really the case or if there is “only” a problem with how populism is defined. Probably both reasons apply; today, it seems that at least regarding their communication style all political parties are close (have to be close) to some versions of populist parties, nonetheless it seems the main problem is simply the absence of a strict definition of populism. In this situation, one can agree with Maver (2007: 178) that at least a small quantity of populism is revealed in all Slovenian parties. Nonetheless, it is also evident that just one parliamentary party is more unanimously treated as populist, namely the Slovenian National Party (SNS). Here, we can briefly mention several arguments that will be elaborated in more detail below, concerning why the SNS can at least in some periods be described as a populist party and not throughout only as a radical right party. In some periods, the party simply did not have any clear ideology, or it very quickly moved from one extreme ideological position to another, therefore making it impossible to classify it on the prevalent le-right ideological spectrum, while according to a party representative, at the start of the 1990s, the SNS was characterised by its non-ideological orientation. Yet this was also the party standpoint even at a time when the external observer would have simply classified it as a radical-right party. Since the mid-1990s the party’s radical right orientation has generally not been as exposed as it was in the early 1990s. e party has obviously tried to be flexible with the idea of responding to the needs of the electorate overlooked by the mainstream political parties.8 erefore, at elections the party has sought to identify electoral niches and stick to topics deemed important to the electorate but ignored by mainstream parties or simply topics where one can see the absence of a distinction between the mainstream parties. is strategy has enabled the party to spread its anti-establishment appeal very easily, stressing to the difference between the elite and the masses, with the latter being represented only by the SNS which can as the only party in Slovenia assure better governance (not more 8 Here it is possible to say the party tended to be very chameleonic and was indeed only constrained by the context, here represented by the mainstream parties.

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representative governance). Such flexibility and looking for electoral niches have been the main ideology of the party since the end of the 1990s. erefore, we believe that it is wholly appropriate to focus our attention on SNS in this article.

10.4. Party History In the period of political transformation and democratisation at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s we can identify two groups of parties in Slovenia: the newly established and the transformed. e SNS is easily classified in the former camp since it was established in 1991. e party’s establishment was connected with a split in another party, but later the party itself was significantly defined by two big internal splits, especially in the parliamentary party group, with the first happening in 1993 and the second in 2008. e party’s formation was connected with the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (today’s Slovenian Democratic Party) since all founders of the SNS were former SDS members (Kuzmanić 1995). ey were disappointed by the too le orientation of the then SDS party leader Jože Pučnik and the not enough radical orientation of DEMOS – the democratic opposition in which several newly established parties had cooperated, vis-à-vis former communists (Kuzmanić 1995: 49–50). As Bratok (1994) stated, the party was the first genuine national Slovenian party, while all others were simply Western political parties since they used adjectives like Christian, liberal, or social-democratic. e party was also defined as an exclusive or elitist club since a special commission decided on which individuals could become party members (Kuzmanić 1995: 51). However, already in summer 1992 important differences in the party could be observed. Kuzmanić (1995: 62) talked about practical and ideological reasons for the differences. It seems the latter were already important at the time, while the former ultimately emerged with the inauguration of Janez Drnovšek’s government at the start of 1993. Regarding the ideological aspect of conflicts in the party, the most crucial were accusations directed to the party leader for having

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reoriented the party to the le of the ideological spectrum, with the important assertion that this was done by clear affirmation of the partisans and a positive evaluation of their battle against the occupiers and their collaborators during WWII (Kuzmanić 1995). A practical reason for the divisions in the party was simply the fact that the party leader had promised Drnovšek he would support his government at the investiture vote in Parliament and indeed some of the party’s MPs voted for the government (Kuzmanić, 1995, Rizman, 1999). Some former party MPs added to this “list of sins” Jelinčič’s concentration of power in the hands of one person (Kuzmanić 1995: 63). A consequence of these divisions was the exclusion/ withdrawal of several MPs from the parliamentary party group at the beginning of 1993 (Kuzmanić 1995: 63). ese were not the only exclusions/withdrawals of MPs of the SNS in the 1992–1996 legislative period as they continued later and the SNS concluded the term with just three MPs (out of the 12 elected at the 1992 elections). A former SNS MP commented that at the end of the legislative term only pragmatic nationalists had stuck with the party (Kuzmanić 1995: 66). In January 2008 there was another big split in the SNS. ere were two main reasons for this. First, it happened due to disharmony in the parliamentary party group and, second, due to the party leader’s open support for the government led by Janez Janša. Four MPs decided to leave the SNS parliamentary group (they later established a party called Linden Tree (Lipa) which failed to enter Parliament at the 2008 autumn elections), although a day later one of them decided not to withdraw from it anyway so altogether three MPs remained in the SNS parliamentary group at the end of the 2004–2008 legislative period. It is also worth adding that before the 1992 parliamentary elections the SNS even faced the attempt of a court to ban it (Bratok 1994: 209) due to the suspicion the party had its own military forces.9 Moreover, 9 is suspicion could have been (partly) right since in the party a position of a technical leader of its armed forces was established (Kuzmanić 1995) and in an interview in 1992 the party leader said the party has no uniforms and formations and it is therefore not possible to talk about paramilitary units, but the party has 5,000 well-armed men who bought weapons by themselves and are simply patriots who are going to take up their weapons if someone is to attack Slovenia again (Kuzmanić 1995: 59). But it is true the Slovenian National Right, established by a former SNS MP, formed

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the party leader Jelinčič has frequently been accused of certain illegal activities, but has never been put in gaol. Nonetheless, it was party MP Srečko Prijatelj, elected at the 2008 elections, who became the first Slovenian MP to be sentenced and sent to prison for several years for corruption and blackmail.

10.5. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style As found by Vehovar (1994), the transformed parties had far fewer problems preserving their resources and developing/maintaining their organisational networks than the newly established ones, although slowly all of them have managed to develop their organisational networks. Yet some political parties have in this regard been more successful than others. Like other Slovenian parliamentary parties, the SNS is organised on the national and local levels (municipalities, cities and possibly also in regions). As Haček (2004) stated, the party nevertheless has a less well-developed local network than other Slovenian parliamentary parties. Another important organisational feature of all parties is their internal organisational complexity, usually reflected in the existence of internal interest organisations and expert bodies. Although this has generally been a key organisational feature of Slovenian parliamentary parties, in this regard we have only witnessed very limited development in the SNS (Krašovec 2000, Krašovec 2012). In the party’s statutes, only the youth organisation is mentioned, despite its absence of public visibility, and in practice one cannot detect the formation or activity of any other internal interest party organisation. e party’s statutes have defined its main bodies, which are very similar to bodies established in other parties. e main party bodies are the congress, the presidency, the council and the leader of the a recreation/sports society called Slovenski sokoli (SS) which had a protective and intelligence role and was the first and till now also the only paramilitary organisation in Slovenia (Olup 2001). e National Social Union of Slovenia established special unarmed forces, called triplet.

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party and, on the local level, an assembly of party members is also established. Although according to party statutes in most democratic systems party congresses are the de jure highest authority in parties, they tend to enjoy de facto limited power regarding policy-making, with much smaller party bodies being the real centres of power (Katz, Mair 1994). Parties in Slovenia, including the SNS, conform to this trend (Krašovec, Haughton 2011: 202). In the 1990s the SNS congress was supposed to meet biennially, but in the 2000s the party fell in line with other Slovenian parties in which congresses are usually convened only every fourth year (Krašovec 2000). It seems that the most important powers held by congresses in Slovenia are adoption of the party’s statutes and programme and election of the party leader, and this is also the case with the SNS. e quorum for the congress is two-thirds of all party delegates, and decisions are made with a relative majority of delegates’ votes, except for adoption of the party’s statutes and the programme where a two-thirds majority is needed. All Slovenian parliamentary parties have established smaller party bodies (known as the “council”, “conference” or “presidency”) with important powers and involving representatives of territorial organisations, members of parliamentary party groups, and ex-officio members of the narrowest party bodies as well as party leaders (and deputy party leaders). In the SNS, such a body is called the presidency and is treated as the executive body. In the 1990s this body had to meet at least every three months, while in the 2000s it was then required to meet at least every six months. Parties have established even smaller groupings to deal with dayto-day politics when the wider party bodies cannot been convened. In the SNS, this body is called the “council” and in the 1990s it was composed of the party leader, parliamentary party group leader, secretary general, editor and chief of the editorial board of the party newspaper, and three party members elected by the presidency. In the 2000s the body became smaller, then consisting of the party leader and its deputies, the parliamentary party group leader, and secretary general of the party.

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e SNS has been closely associated with its leader Zmago Jelinčič pl., who has held that position since the party was established and has frequently been described as a very good rhetorician (Kuzmanić 1995; Rizman 1999). Although tendencies for the presidentialisation of politics (Poguntke, Webb 2005) can be observed in all Slovenian parliamentary parties, it seems the SNS has moved in that direction the most. Moreover, the party leader also formally holds some important powers in the party. Probably the most important one is a veto right on all decisions made by the presidency. Another crucial fact is that the party statutes do not specify whether and how the veto can be overridden (Krašovec 2000). erefore, in candidate selection for parliamentary elections the party leader also has the most important role since the presidency is formally in charge of making the selection decision, but the party leader has the veto power over the presidency’s decisions (Krašovec 2000, Krašovec, Štremfel 2007, Krašovec, Haughton 2011). e party statutes also assign other formal powers to the party leader; to represent the party and be its legal representative; to convene and lead sessions of the presidency as well as other forms of party bodies; to adopt decisions between two sessions of the presidency; to appoint the secretary general (in the 1990s to propose a candidate for the position). In the last decade certain additional formal powers have been acquired by the party leader, for example; to nominate candidates for some party bodies; responsibility over the personnel politics of the party, and to perform other tasks assigned to him by the congress and the presidency. ese powers are probably no surprise if we take into account of what Jelinčič supposedly stated in the early 1990s – a party can function well only if it acts according to the principles of a dictatorship (Kuzmanić 1995: 52). All political parties need resources to function normally and probably the most important resource is financial since it enables parties to acquire other necessary resources (Alexander 1989). In Slovenia, especially the new parties initially faced a lack of resources (human, organisational and mainly financial) and therefore the introduction of public subsidies for parliamentary parties was very important for them. But it seems this has become their crucial source. Namely, data

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taken from parties’ annual reports submitted to the Court of Auditors show that Slovenian parties have, in general and officially, been largely dependent on public subsidies (Krašovec, Haughton 2011: 205). In all parties, public subsidies have represented the largest individual financial source, while in some parties including the SNS they have been almost the sole financial source (Krašovec, Haughton 2011). Since in the last decade many studies (for example, Mair 2000, Lewis, Mansfeldová 2006, Poguntke et al. 2007, Haughton 2009) have examined the question of the Europeanisation of political parties in Western as well as East-Central European countries, we shall conclude this section with some findings in this field. Several analyses of Slovenian parties reveal that the EU arena has not exerted an important impact on internal parties’ organisational changes in Slovenia in general (Krašovec, Lajh 2009). While it is possible to identify some differences among Slovenian political parties in this sense, it is obvious that the SNS is the party least affected by Europeanisation and, moreover, the playing of its revealed Eurosceptic card during the 2000 national parliamentary elections led to a big disappointment for the SNS (Krašovec, Lajh 2009).

10.6. Ideology As pointed out by Rizman (1999: 152), in the 1990s the ideology of the SNS was underpinned by a strictly nationalist and xenophobic ticket and was closest to certain populist parties in Western Europe – for example, the French National Front Party (Jean Marie Le Pen), the German Republikaner or the Austrian Freedom Party (Jörg Haider). Kuzmanić (1995) also described the SNS as a radical right party. At the beginning of the 1990s Jelinčič founded the party on the pretext of it being the only party which cares for Slovenia and Slovenians and his political goal was to achieve an ethnically pure and Great Slovenia, aer annexing Austrian Carinthia, the whole (Croatian) Istria and (Italian) Trieste (Rizman 1999: 152). e heart of the party programme was encapsulated in the slogan “We are going to make this land Slovenian again” (Bratok 1994: 209), so the party’s main slogan in its first electoral campaign at the 1992 elections was no surprise –

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“Make this land Slovenian again” (paraphrasing Hitler’s words in Maribor at the start of WWII when he said “Make this land German again”). Other main points of the party programme were given priority in the context of high unemployment to Slovenian workers; reducing the number of non-Slovenians living in Slovenia by 90%; the cancellation of citizenship of all non-Slovenians who had gained it aer 25 December 1990 and annulment of the law on citizenship. Namely, aer the Slovenian government granted citizenship to more than 150,000 people from other former Yugoslav republics who had obtained jobs and been living with their families in Slovenia for years, the party openly declared that this constituted genocide against the Slovenian nation (Rizman 1999: 152). But aer the first split in the party (in 1993), Jelinčič redirected this radical discourse to more pragmatic nationalism, although several other political parties established by the party’s former MPs or Jelinčič’s former colleagues continued to advocate such radical-right standpoints.10 Even though the first party programme was just one page long, it still reveals some other ideas and goals of the party. For example, the party called for the legalisation of weapons since it declared this is one of the democratic principles of modern societies. Here, it is also worth mentioning that the party leader himself possessed quite a lot of weapons and, aer he used them in a small town in northern Slovenia to frighten several non-Slovenians on the street, court proceedings were initiated against him (Kuzmanić 1995). In addition, the SNS stated that the benefits of the welfare state should only be available to Slovenians and Slovenian citizens. e party has consistently advocated the right to abortion, while it has supported the idea of providing more time for mothers to take care for their families. And naturally enough for a nationalist party, one of the main programmatic point of the SNS was of course to achieve a completely independent Slovenia (from Yugoslavia). As mentioned, the party softened its radical-right discourse aer the 1993 split. Besides the mentioned radical-right orientation, the party has also adopted strict stances on the need for Church-state separation and 10 e Slovenian National Right led by Sašo Lap, the National Social Union of Slovenia led by Matjaž Gerlanc and the Republicans led by Adolf Štorman.

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positive view of the role of the partisans in WWII, positions that are normally associated with the le side of the political spectrum in Slovenia. At the end of the 1990s the SNS added several other topics to the party programme, including a statement that the party supports all “good projects” whoever initiates them – the government or the opposition. Since 1997 the party has been the only parliamentary party to openly declare itself as being Eurosceptic. Another important point is that at the end of the 1990s the party mostly gave up using the term non-Slovenian and has instead almost exclusively used the term nonSlovenian citizens since then. In the 2000s a frequent “target” of the party was the Roma population, with the party leader several times being strongly criticised for making hate speech. In response to such criticism the party leader has several times stated that since the party’s establishment the SNS and its leader have only said out loud what Slovenians privately think. Aer taking all of these points into account, one may agree with the statement that the SNS represents an eclectic combination of le and right political values (Krašovec, Haughton 2011). e party seems to even be proud that it is not possible to easily place it on the existing and traditional le-right ideological spectrum since it is basically characterised by its non-ideological orientation (Bratok 1994: 210) and, since Slovenian nationalists can be either le- or right-oriented, according to Jelinčič, the SNS is a kind of centre party (Kuzmanić 1995). e party and its policies can nonetheless be mainly characterised as a right-wing nationalist party (Krašovec, Haughton 2011). Alongside changes in the party ideology, or more precisely its different emphases in certain time periods, the party was also perceived differently by the public (sometimes as predominantly extreme right and sometimes as predominantly extreme le) on the ideological spectrum in the 1993–2009 period (Toš et al. 1999, 2004, 2009). If in the first half of the 1990s the party was mostly perceived as a radical/ extreme right party, it was later publically more strongly evaluated as a radical le party, and only in the mid-2000s was the party again seen as more radical-right than radical-le (Toš et al. 1999, 2004). e data revealing that quite a considerable share of the public evaluated the SNS as a centre party, particularly since the end of the 1990s, are

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probably somewhat surprising. is is likely connected to the fact that the party has over time advocated some very le and some very right political stances, thereby making people’s task of positioning it on the political spectrum harder.

10.7. Electoral Support and Social Base As we can see, the SNS entered Parliament for the first time in 1992 and stayed in it until the early elections of 2011. Together with DeSUS, it is therefore the only new party to have remained in Parliament for more than two consecutive mandates aer its first parliamentary entrance. Yet, the electoral success of the SNS was not stable. e party’s biggest electoral success was when it first competed in the parliamentary elections. Table 10.1: Electoral Performance of the Slovenian National Party 1992

SNS

1996

2000

2004

2008

2011

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

10

12

3.2

4

4.4

4

6.3

6

5.4

5

1.8

–

Sources: Krašovec, Boh 2002; Krašovec et al. 2004; Official Gazette 95/2008; http:// www.dvk.gov.si/DZ2011/dokumenti/porocilo.pdf.

One can say that at all elections the SNS tried to “play” on issues not addressed (or only to a limited extent) by other parliamentary parties, and therefore sought to mobilise voters who could not find a party to vote for among the other parliamentary or mainstream parties. Since at each election the party tried to find electoral niches, its main appeal-base also changed over the various elections, but the idea was evident all the time – to expose its anti-establishment appeal and to present itself as the only party which cares about ordinary people. For example, at the 1992 and 2004, and to a greater extent the 2008 elections the party exposed its radical-right standpoints, mainly connected with its attitude to people from former Yugoslavia, sometimes immigrants in general and more continually against the Roma population (Kuzmanić 1995, Krašovec, Lajh 2004, Maver 2007). At the 1996

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elections the main emphasis in its electoral campaign was anti-clericalism, very negative standpoints regarding the Catholic Church and its radical opposition to the idea of return state or society assets to the Church, particularly forests, that had been nationalised aer WWII. While the party has consistently been very critical of the Catholic Church, it was especially at the 1996 elections that it sharpened its attitude to the Catholic Church (Maver 2007). Similarly, the SNS has supported the WWII anti-fascist forces and has therefore positively evaluated the actions of the partisans during WWII – attitudes to WWII continue to be a very important question in Slovenian politics and have strongly interwoven with the communism–anti-communism cleavage (Fink-Hafner, Krašovec 2006). e topic was particularly stressed by the SNS at the 1996 elections, and a bit less so thereaer. At the 2000 elections, the SNS embraced Euroscepticism as the only parliamentary party. Namely, in the context of the growth of public Euroscepticism and when almost all parliamentary parties were sharing a very positive stand on EU accession, it had been expected that some parties would try to take advantage of the gap between the politics of almost all parliamentary parties and public opinion when Slovenia’s accession to the EU was in question (Krašovec, Lajh, 2009). is indeed happened and some minor efforts to mobilise the electorate on this issue were already seen in the party in 1996, although the question became more salient in the 1997–2000 period, especially at the elections in 2000 (Krašovec et al. 2006). Here one should keep in mind that in 1997 all other parliamentary parties, except the SNS, had already signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Accession Process with the EU which obviously removed the EU as a potential area of competition between them. In these circumstances, it was no surprise that the SNS made particular efforts to emphasise Euroscepticism at the 2000 elections and to exploit the gap between public opinion and the standpoints of other (parliamentary) political parties (Krašovec, Lajh 2009: 505). Due to the very poor economic and financial situation, economic topics dominated the electoral campaign 2011 with parties trading conflicting views on the origins, consequences and possible solutions to the economic crisis (Krašovec, Haughton 2012: 10). On economic questions in particular, the SNS struggled to find an appropriate niche

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and obviously failed. Moreover, there was a general perception that party leader Jelinčič, as the almost the only representative of the party in the electoral debates, lacked both energy and interest in the elections (Krašovec, Haughton 2012: 10). We may conclude this parliamentary electoral section by noting Maver’s finding (2007: 179) that the SNS achieved greater electoral support when it addressed above mentioned radical-right topics rather than radical le ones, since radical-le standpoints were better represented by some other parties. Of course, the party also competed at the EP elections and local elections. In both cases, it was not as successful as it had been at national parliamentary elections. At the 2004 and 2009 EP elections the party did not get any MEPs, in fact at the 2009 EP elections it received just 2.9% and in 2004 5% of votes. In Slovenia only one level of self-government (municipalities) has been established and therefore only the elections of mayors and municipal councils have been held. Although the party does have local organisations, its local network is actually the weakest among the parliamentary parties, therefore its minor electoral success was somehow expected. Since the 1994 elections for municipal councils, the party has had its own candidates in fewer than half of all municipalities and less than 20% of its candidates were elected (Kukovič, Haček 2011). In less than 10% of municipalities the party has had its own candidates at mayoral elections (Kukovič, Haček 2011). Overall, in the 1994–2006 period the SNS had substantially less support (between 3.3% and 1.5%) at municipal elections (councils) than at the parliamentary elections (Statistični urad 2007). It is also worth mentioning that the party leader Jelinčič competed in the presidential elections of 2007. He competed against three wellknown candidates who enjoyed the support of the main parliamentary parties, so his result came as a surprise since he received even 19.2% of the votes. Analysis has shown that especially a considerable share of the young generation supported Jelinčič (Miheljak 2007). An analysis of longitudinal public opinion polls reveals several characteristics of the SNS’ electorate but, because of a small sample of SNS voters, these results must be treated with care. As found by Klavora (2009), on average over several years in the 2000s the SNS’

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electorate identified itself as more le-oriented (up to 43. 2% of the party electorate) than right-oriented (“only” 28. 7%). In terms of the age of the electorate, the SNS had the youngest supporters since more than 60% of its voters are less than 45 years old. Among parliamentary parties, the SNS had by far the most unbalanced gender structure with more than 70% of men among its voters, while on average over several years in the 2000s somewhat more than 40% of its voters were religious (Klavora 2009). Together with the SLS, DeSUS and New Slovenia, the SNS had the biggest share of less educated voters, while the SNS had the smallest share of voters among parliamentary parties with a higher or university education (Klavora 2009: 56). e analysis also showed those voting for the party mainly come from smaller and rural areas (but not to the same extent as voters of the SLS, NSi, DeSUS and SDS), despite a quarter of them coming from larger and urban areas (Klavora 2009: 57).

10.8. Position in the Political System As mentioned, since 1990 Slovenian governments have been coalitions of several parties. In fact, all parliamentary parties, except the SNS, have experienced cooperation in governments in some form. ere are also examples when particular parties signed a special agreement on cooperation in a government only with the biggest coalition party, namely the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) and not with the other coalition parties.11 In the Slovenian party system, it seems that at least two parties have big coalition potential (in Sartori’s terms), namely the SLS and the DeSUS, even though in the last few 11 In the legislative period 1992–1996 the LDS signed a Coalition Agreement with the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia and the Slovenian Christian democrats, while a special agreement between the LDS and the United List of Social Democrats on cooperation was signed and the latter party had ministers in the government. In the next legislative period, formally only a coalition between the LDS and the SLS was formed, but the PM signed a special agreement on cooperation with the DeSUS which was given the post of minister without portfolio in the government. In the legislative period 2000–2004, the Slovenian Youth Party only signed a special agreement with the LDS on cooperation. e Slovenian Youth Party did not have any minister in the government – it only had a director of one governmental office.

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years it is obviously DeSUS that has had a bigger coalition potential, while the SNS has had the smallest coalition potential. In any case, according to Maver (2007: 179) the SNS was indeed a loyal supporter of all governments. Aer the 1992 elections the SNS even gave enough support (some of the SNS MPs) to the LDS leader Drnovšek for him to be elected as PM and this decision caused (among other issues in the party) a split within the party (Kuzmanić 1995: 62). Also aer the 1996 elections the SNS negotiated with Drnovšek to support his government and also to participate in it. However, Drnovšek’s first proposed composition of the government did not win enough support in Parliament and he later decided not to include the SNS among the coalition partners. Contrary to other Slovenian parliamentary parties, with the partial exception of DeSUS, the SNS has not developed close links with any international or European party organisation (Krašovec and Lajh 2009), despite the party having occasionally cooperated with individual parties from abroad. A similar picture can be observed in the domestic political arena. While other parliamentary parties sometimes or on particular occasions have tried to connect themselves or cooperate with others (for example, parties formed a combined list for EP elections, and have more or less formally cooperated with other, usually non-parliamentary parties at parliamentary elections or supported common candidates on presidential elections), the SNS had been a lone ranger. Even more, in the past and especially in the 1990s the party engaged in conflicts rather than cooperation with several similar, radicalright parties, for example the Slovenian National Right (established by a former SNS MP), the National Party of Work (established by a former SNS MP), the Republicans and with the National Social Union of Slovenia, all of whose leaders were Jelinčič’s colleagues (Kuzmanić 1995). According to Rizman (1999: 152), one can easily agree with the appraisal that the SNS played the role of an incubator which enabled the gathering, maturing and crystallisation of tendencies characteristic of nationalist, chauvinistic, misogynous and racist social discourses. All of these parties slowly disappeared from the Slovenian political arena, the only exception being the SNS, which has indeed since the mid-1990s been less radical than all of the parties

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mentioned above, but it seems it is also still too radical to establish cooperation with other, more moderate parties.

10.9. Conclusion Writing about populist political parties in Slovenia is no easy task, mainly because there is no unified definition or perception of populism. In addition, the term populism is widely used by journalists and columnists in the Slovenian mass media, and yet it is largely absent in political science. Despite the varying perceptions of populism and populist parties, particularly in the mass media, one common point is obvious – if we speak about populism in Slovenia, we can as a rule speak about (radical) right populism, while according mainly to columnists it is hard to talk about le-oriented populism (Lorenci 2011). Despite this, Maver (2007: 178) contends that populist appeal can, as probably is the case in many countries, be at least to some extent found in all Slovenian political parties. Populism and particularly populist parties have not been investigated in-depth by political scientists in the last two decades in Slovenia, probably for two reasons: a) because populist parties have not been among the important political forces; and/or b) because parties most frequently exposed as being populist in the literature are in the Slovenian political arena more oen treated as (radical) right parties rather than populist parties since usually only a few elements (in particular time periods) of typical populist parties can be revealed. In the literature, oen one characteristic in particular of populist parties is exposed, namely their appeal built on highlighting the dichotomy between the people and the political elite. In Slovenia in the 1990s a low level of trust in the main political institutions was evident, especially in Parliament and political parties (Fink-Hafner et al. 2002), but it seems the typical populist appeal was generally not exploited by the parties, except partly the SNS (and occasionally also the SDS). In the last few years, Slovenia has faced a great economic and financial crisis which has led to even lower levels of trust in the main

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political institutions, accompanied by higher levels of stratification. In such circumstances, the social-democratic vs. neoliberal cleavage has become more evident but, paradoxically, the parliamentary parties’ socio-economic policies have due to external pressures been becoming more similar and more (neo)liberal-oriented. e feeling of the absence of a distinction between the parties, accompanied by the low level of trust in the main political institutions (Krašovec and Haughton 2012), together with concentration of the media and the public on party leaders (or presidentialisation tendencies, Poguntke and Webb 2005) and their (supposed) competencies are possibly opening more room for manoeuvre for (le and right oriented) populist appeals and populist parties in Slovenian politics.

List of Abbreviations of Political Parties DeSUS DL LDS NSi PS SD SDS SLS SMS SNS

Democratic Party of Retired Persons Citizen’s List Liberal Democracy of Slovenia New Slovenia Positive Slovenia Social Democrats Slovenian Democratic Party Slovenian People’s Party Slovenian Youth Party Slovenian National Party

References Alexander, Herbert E. 1989. “Money and Politics: Rethinking a Conceptual Framework.” In: Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Ed. Herbert E. Alexander. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 9–23. Blondel, Jean, Müller Rommel, Ferdinand and Malova, Darina et al. 2007. Governing New European Democracies. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bratok, Tadej. 1994. “Slovenska nacionala stranka.” In: Stranke in strankarstvo. Ed. Igor Lukšič. Ljubljana: Slovensko politološko društvo, 209–211. Electoral Commission (http://www.dvk.gov.si/DZ2011/dokumenti/porocilo.pdf.)

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Fink-Hafner, Danica. 1999. “e Le in Slovenia.” In: e Return of the Le in Post-communist State. Eds. Charles Bukowski and Barnabas Racz. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar, 107–129. Fink-Hafner, Danica. 2001. Politične stranke. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Fink-Hafner, Danica. 2006. “Slovenia: Between Bipolarity and Broad Coalitionbuilding.” In: Post-communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems. Ed. Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders. Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 203–231. Fink-Hafner, Danica, Krašovec, Alenka, Kustec Lipicer, Simona and Filej, Živa. 2002. Dejavniki v oblikovanju (ne)zaupanja v državni zbor. Zaključno poročilo. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Fink-Hafner, Danica, Lajh, Damjan and Krašovec, Alenka. 2005. Politika na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, Alenka. 2006. “Ideološko-politički rascjepi u Slovenskoj stranačkoj areni poslije 1989. Godine.” In: Razvoj političkog pluralizma u Sloveniji i Bosni i Hercegovini. Eds. Danica Fink-Hafner and Mirko Pejanović. Sarajevo/Ljubljana: Promocult, 71–104. Fink-Hafner, Danica and Krašovec, Alenka. 2011. e Stability of the Slovenian Party System: Reasons for the Success or Failure of New Parties, paper presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland, 25–27 August 2011. Haček, Miro. 2004. “Rezultati lokalnih volitev 2002.” In: Lokalna demokracija I.: Analiza lokalnih volitev 2002. Eds. Marjan Brezovšek, Miro Haček and Alenka Krašovec. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 184–187. Haughton, Tim, ed. 2009. Does EU Membership Matter? Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Special Issue of e Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 25, No. 4. Hribar, Spomenka. 2011. Svet kot zarota: Analiza političnega sloga Janeza Janše. Mengeš: Ciceron. Katz, S. Richard and Mair, Peter, eds. 1994. How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies. ousand Oaks, etc.: Sage Publications. Klavora, Jan. 2009. Dejavniki sprememb volilnega vedenja v Sloveniji v obdobju 2004–2008. Diplomsko delo, Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Krašovec, Alenka. 2000. Moč v političnih strankah. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Krašovec, Alenka. 2007. Volilne študije. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Krašovec, Alenka. 2012. “Dva vidika slovenskih političnih strank kot organizacij v 20. Letih slovenske neodvisnosti.” In: 20 let slovenske neodvisnosti. Eds. Janko Prunk and Tomaž Deželan. Maribor: Aristej. Krašovec, Alenka and Boh, Tomaž. 2002. “Podatki o preteklih volitvah.” In: Parlamentarne volitve 2000. Eds. Danica Fink-Hafner and Tomaž Boh. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 173–188.

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Krašovec, Alenka and Kustec Lipicer, Simona. 2004. Europe and the Parliamentary Elections in Slovenia. EPERN Election Briefing No. 18 (http: //www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwor k/epernelectionbriefings). Krašovec, Alenka, Lajh, Damjan and Kustec Lipicer, Simona. 2006. “e European Union and Party Politics in Slovenia: An Apparent or Real Impact?” In: e European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Eds. Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldová. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 169–189. Krašovec, Alenka and Urška Štremfel. 2007. “Does the Institutional Context Matter for Candidate Selection?” Czech Journal of Political Science 14, No. 3, 187–204. Krašovec, Alenka and Lajh, Damjan. 2009. “e European Union: A Joker or Just and Ordinary Playing Card for Slovenian Parties?” e Journal of Communist and Transition Politics 25, No. 4, 491–512. Krašovec, Alenka and Haughton, Tim. 2011. “Money, Organization and the State: e Partial Cartelization of Party Politics in Slovenia.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, No. 4, 199–209. Krašovec, Alenka and Haughton, Tim. 2012. Europe and the Parliamentary Elections in Slovenia, December 2011. EPERN Election briefing No. 69; (http: //www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwor k/epernelectionbriefings). Kršinar, Igor. 1994. Analiza politične dejavnosti Ivana Krambergerja. Diplomsko delo, Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Kuzmanić, Tonči. 1995. “Politični esktremizem pod Slovenci: SNS od tigrov do papirja.” Časopis za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in novo antropologijo 23, No. 176, 47–70. Kukovič, Simona and Haček, Miro. 2011. “Non-Partisan Candidates and Lists at Slovenian Local Elections, 1994–2010.” World Political Science Review 7, No. 1, article 4. Lewis, Paul and Mansfeldova, Zdenka, eds. 2006. e European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lorenci, Janko. 2011. Strupeni zvarek populizma: Vzpon populistov govori, da je v družbi nekaj narobe. Mladina, 12/5/2011. Lukšič, Igor. 1996. “Political culture in Slovenia.” In: Political Culture in East Central Europe. Eds. Fritz Plasser and Andreas Pribersky. Avebury: Aldershot, 91–104. Mair, Peter. 2000. “e Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems.” West European Politics 23, No. 4, 7–15. Maver, Aleš. 2007. “Mnogoteri obrazi populizma.” Nova revija 26, No. 307–308, 165–191. Miheljak, Vlado. 2007. Komentar o predsedniških volitvah na MMC RTVSLO, 22/10/2007.

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Mudde, Cas. 2002. “In the name of Peasantary, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe.” In: Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Eds. Yves Meny and Yves Surel. Houndmills, Basingstoke, New Hampshire: Palgrave, 214–232 Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia 95/2008. Olup, Maja. 2001. Slovenska nacionalna desnica. Diplomsko delo, Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Poguntke, omas and Webb, Paul, eds. 2005. e Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Poguntke, omas, Aylott, Nicholas, Carter, Elisabeth, Ladrech, Robert and Luther, Richard Kurt, eds. 2007. e Europeanization of National Political Parties. London and New York: Routledge. Prunk, Janko. 1992. Slovenski narodni vzpon. Ljubljana: DZS. Prunk, Janko. 2011. Usoda socialne demokracije v razvoju samostojne Slovenije, paper presented on the International Scientific Symposium “Osamosvojitev Slovenije – med pričakovanji in realnostjo (1991 – 2011)” , Maribor, 26–28/ 10/2011. Rizman, Rudi. 1998. “Radikalna desnica na Slovenskem.” Teorija in praksa 35, No. 2,249–270. Rizman, M. Rudolf. 1999. “Radical Right Politics in Slovenia.” In: e Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. Ed. Sabrina P. Ramet. Pennsylvania: e Pennsylvania State University Press, 147–170. SNS statutes SNS programmes Stanojević, Miroslav and Krašovec, Alenka. 2011. “Slovenia: Social Pacts and Political Exchange.” In: Social Pacts in Europe: Emergence, Evolution and Institutionalization. Eds. Sabina Avdagić, Martin Rhodes and Jelle Visser, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 232–256. Statistični urad Republike Slovenije. 2007. Lokalne volitve 1994–2006. Ljubljana: Statistični urad Republike Slovenije. Toš, Niko, et al. 1999. Vrednote v prehodu II. Slovensko javno mnenje 1990–1998. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Toš, Niko, et al. 2004. Vrednote v prehodu III. Slovensko javno mnenje 1999–2004. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Toš, Niko, et al. 2009. Vrednote v prehodu IV. Slovensko javno mnenje 2004–2009. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Vehovar, Urban. 1994.”Socialdemokracija, sindikati, korporativizem?” Družboslovne razprave 10, No. 17–18, 50–63. Zajc, Drago. 2009. Oblikovanje koalicij v Srednji Evropi. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.

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11. PARTY POPULISM IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK, ANETA PINKOVÁ e purpose of this book was to use case studies to identify populist political parties, and describe their activities in the region of EastCentral Europe, narrowly defined here as the post-communist EU member countries. A total of eight case studies described the history, organisational structure, ideological appeal, election results, and voter base of a total of 20 parties (for overview see table 10. 1), which the study’s authors have identified on the basis of their own expertise as non-exclusively or exclusively populist. e studies worked from the definition of the two types of political parties that we presented in the book’s theoretical introduction and which were based on the so-called analytical core of populism. e authors of the individual chapters focused only on populist political parties that gained seats in parliament at least once during their existence. is criterion – necessary also because of the limited range of our book – excluded some interesting populist parties (see the chapter on Bulgaria for example), the study of which may become the basis for future research. is last chapter of the book summarises the conclusions of each case study, and tries to set it into a broader, comparative framework. In comparing facts and conclusions of the individual studies, we can observe several interesting trends described below. We should also bear in mind that all conclusions in this chapter here are ultimately based on the party selection and classification made by the authors of the case studies. is is a limitation of both our typology and this chapter.

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Table 10.1: An Overview of Populist Political Parties in East-Central Europe Country

Political party

Estab. Best electoral performance

Represented Cabinet Type of populist in parliament participation party*

Poland

Self-Defence

1992

11.5% (2005)

2001–2007

2006–2007 2007

Bulgaria

NDSV

2001

42.7% (2001)

2001–2009

2001–2009

Exclusively

Bulgaria

Ataka

2005

9.4% (2009)

from 2005

–

Non-exclusively

Bulgaria

GERB

2006

39.7% (2009)

from 2009

from 2009

Exclusively

Romania

PRM

1991

19.5% (2000)

1992–2008

1992–1995

Non-exclusively

Exclusively

Hungary

MIÉP

1993

5.5% (1998)

1998–2002

–

Non-exclusively

Hungary

Jobbik

2003

16.7% (2010)

from 2010

–

Non-exclusively

Hungary

LMP

2009

7.4% (2010)

from 2010

–

Non-exclusively

Latvia

JL

2002

23.9% (2002)

from2002

2002–2004 2004–2006 2009–2010

Exclusively

Estonia

RP

2001

24.6% (2003)

from 2003

2003–2005

Exclusively

Lithuania

TT

2002

12.7% (2008)

from 2004

–

Exclusively

Lithuania

DP

2003

28.4% (2004)

from 2004

2004–2006

Exclusively

Slovakia

HZDS

1991

37.3% (1992)

1992–2010

1992–1994 1994–1998 2006–2010

Exclusively

Slovakia

ZRS

1994

7.3% (1994)

1994–2002

1994–1998

Non-exclusively

Slovakia

SMER

1999

44.4% (2012)

from 2002

2006–2010

Exclusively

Slovakia

SOP

1998

8% (1998)

1998–2002

1998–2002

Exclusively

Slovakia

ANO

2001

8% (2002)

2002–2006

2002–2006

Non-exclusively

Slovakia

OĽaNO

2011

8.6% (2012)

from 2012

–

Exclusively

Slovenia

SNS

1991

10% (1992)

1992–2011

–

Non-exclusively

Czech Rep.

SPR-RSČ

1990

8% (1996)

1992–1998

–

Non-exclusively

Czech Rep.

VV

2002

10.9% (2010)

from 2010

2010–2012

Exclusively

* Some of the parties (most notably SMER) can be classified as populist only in certain periods. See individual chapters for more detailed information.

Table is based on data from individual chapters.

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287

11.1. Party history e populist parties in the region under study can be divided into two groups depending on when they were founded. e first group consists of parties established during the early 1990s, during the transition to democracy, when the competitive party system was just coming into being. Except for the HZDS in Slovakia and Self-Defence in Poland these parties fit the definition of non-exclusively populist parties: parties with a clear ideological profile which also for at least part of their history and in a consistent manner resorted to populist messages. e HZDS in Slovakia differed from the other populist parties in the early 1990s not only because it can be classified as an exclusively populist party, but also for the much better election results it earned, peaking in 1992 at 37% of the vote, while other populist parties earned at most around 10%, up to just under 20% with the PRM in Romania. SelfDefence was formally established in 1992, but unlike most of the other parties it took ten years before it finally got into Parliament in 2001. is sets it apart from the other populist parties that got started in at the early 1990s all of which, except for the MIÉP in Hungary and the SRP-RSČ in the Czech Republic, got into Parliament in the first elections aer they were founded. e MIÉP, founded in 1993, finally won seats in Parliament in 1998, nevertheless we must take into account the specific circumstances of the party’s establishment as a result of the expulsion of Csurka and his followers from MDF. e group of populist parties founded during later phases of the party systems’ development is more heterogeneous; nevertheless it can be said that the majority of them are exclusively populist parties (ten of 14 parties were classified by the authors as exclusively populist). As a rule these parties, too, found success right aer they were established, by getting into the parliament aer their first elections. e exceptions to the rule in this wave were the VV in the Czech Republic and Jobbik in Hungary. e Czech VV breaks the rule only technically: it was founded in 2002, but until 2009 existed only at the municipal level; VV gained seats in Parliament in the first parliamentary elections it took part in. Jobbik was the only true exception to the rule among the “younger” parties, as was Self-Defence among the “older” parties. e

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vast majority of the parties under study won seats in their very first parliamentary elections, many getting their best results in their first election (see below). We can say, then, that where populist parties are successful in getting into parliament, in the vast majority of cases it happens soon aer they are founded. e circumstances under which the individual parties were founded, and the specific set of political and social conditions in a certain country at a certain time, are different for every party. But we can find some trends here as well. All of the parties founded at the beginning of the 1990s emerged in some way out of another political formation: either by splitting off, as with the SNS in Slovenia, the ZRS in Slovakia, or the PRM in Romania; or being founded by figures with previous experience in other parties or movements, as with Self-Defence in Poland or the MIÉP in Hungary. On the other hand, the populist parties founded during the later phases of the party system’s development were oen built “from scratch” by individuals with minimal previous direct experience in politics. ese parties included NDSV and Ataka in Bulgaria, DP in Lithuania, ANO in Slovakia, and VV in the Czech Republic as well.1 Another group of parties was founded by more or less experienced politicians. is includes most of the “younger” parties – the GERB in Bulgaria, founded by a former Deputy Interior Minister; TT in Lithuania and SOP in Slovakia were founded by prominent local politicians, or else by former communist officials; while some of the parties, such as SMER in Slovakia or the JL in Latvia were all founded by experienced politicians. In three of the cases the party grew out of a different type of political formation. In Slovakia the OĽaNO came out of an association of independent candidates; the RP in Estonia was a long-time radical right-wing youth organisation, as was Jobbik in Hungary. Here, too, personalities played a role, for example I. Matovič in the case of OĽaNO or G. Pongrátz with Jobbik. When we look at the circumstances surrounding the founding of populist political parties in the region, and their classification as non-exclusively or exclusively populist parties, only one trend can be 1 At the time the latter party entered parliament it had had eight years of existence behind at the local level; but its rise to the national level was led by persons without previous political involvement.

PARTY POPULISM IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

289

observed: the parties that were founded at the beginning of the 1990s for the most part were classified as non-exclusively populist parties. Exclusively populist parties, with the few above exceptions, appeared only in the later phases of the development of a competitive party system, mostly aer 2000. No other patterns are identifiable – among parties that were created by splitting off from another political formation, that were founded by experienced politicians or by persons previously outside the political sphere, or parties that were carried over from a different form of organisation, we find both exclusively populist parties, as well as non-exclusively populist parties.

11.2. Organisational Structure and Leadership Style From the standpoint of organisational structure, the majority of the parties studied in the case studies show no unusual characteristics; their statutes and formal party structures differ little from most modern political parties. e way these parties work in practice, however, oen differs from their formal structure, and in this sense the populist parties of East-Central Europe do share certain common traits: relatively strong centralisation, with decision-making within the party focused on a strong party chairman, and a low level of internal party democracy in most cases, not grounded in the formal structure of internal party processes, but in everyday political practice, which can be described as “weak structures, strong personalities”. Despite sharing these basic characteristics, of course, we cannot say that all the parties work the same. As Cholova notes in the case of Bulgaria for example, the parties are similar organisationally, and their leaders have a similarly strong role within the party organisation, but their political styles differ widely. e differences among most of the other parties can be characterised the same way. Only in three cases did the case studies reveal any atypical elements of party organisation. e first of these is Poland’s Self-Defence, which until 2000 functioned in parallel as both a political party and a trade union; this was a legacy of the key role unique in the region that was played by trade unions in Poland’s transition to democracy. Other specific characteristics are found with VV in the Czech Republic; its statutes lay down

290

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

very strong mechanisms of direct democracy, such as party referenda, etc., but in practice decisions were made by the party elite; thus its actual workings differed little from that of other populist parties. e key figure in the case of VV was businessman Vít Bárta, who formally stood outside the party structures, and was not the party’s chairman. e biggest organisational oddity was furnished by Hungary’s LMP, which does not have a chairman; instead this function is shared collectively by an executive committee. LMP is also the only party in our analysis to be described as decentralised, and overall its organisational structure can be regarded as unique in the context of the populist parties (although the model occurs among environmentally-focused parties in other countries as well). One of the features of populist parties in East-Central Europe is the dominant role of the chairman, or in some cases the party’s “founder”. In this sense we can divide the parties we are studying (with the exception of LMP and partly Estonia’s RP) into two groups: parties associated with a single powerful figure, and parties in which the chairman has a strong position but which over time have had more than one individual occupying the office. Multiple prominent figures have held the post of chairman in Hungary’s Jobbik, for example. e history of most of the other parties, or at least the period when they were relevant, has been marked by one charismatic chairman. Among the outstanding examples are Slovakia’s HZDS, the SPR-RSČ in the Czech Republic, Poland’s Self-Defence, both Lithuanian TT and DP and Latvian JL or Bulgaria’s NDSV. Typical for the functioning of these parties, besides the low level of internal party democracy, is the leader’s media presence and the strong correlation between the chairman’s popularity and the party’s election results. In some cases, such as the Czech Republic’s VV, Slovakia’s ANO, or Ataka in Bulgaria and the DP in Lithuania, we can even see the party’s founding as a form of entrepreneurial activity on the part of founders whose political involvement in the past was minimal. Despite the above exceptions and differences, we can observe a typical set of organisational characteristics in the populist parties of the region: high centralisation, low level of internal organisation, and heavy personalisation of the party associated with powerful party chairmen. Most of the parties are the “projects” of particular charis-

291

PARTY POPULISM IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

matic individuals who either helped found the party or raised it to relevance. From the standpoint of organisational characteristics and internal party workings there seems to be little difference among the parties classified by the authors as non-exclusively populist, and those ranked as exclusively populist parties.

11.3. Ideology In the introductory chapter on theory we presented a basic definition of a populist political party, and a typology of populist parties based first and foremost on the (non)exclusive presence of the populist message in the party appeal. Case studies of the countries of East-Central Europe that have analysed exclusively and non-exclusively populist parties have shown that despite the traits they have in common, many differences in identity or rhetoric exist among the various political parties. ese differences are no less interesting in the context of the different periods when these parties were most active. While over the course of the 1990s non-exclusively populist parties were the predominant form of party populism in East-Central Europe (for example the SPR-RSČ in the Czech Republic, ZRS in Slovakia, or Hungary’s MIÉP), the new century saw the rise of exclusively populist parties (RP in Estonia, VV in the Czech Republic, or NDSV in Bulgaria); that is, populism has become a principal and sufficient platform for the creation and electoral success of new political parties. is finding is not insignificant, and although it could benefit from further examination, it points to a marked change in voter behaviour over the last decade. For the first time voters are supporting parties without clear ideological profiles; instead these parties feed off of the public’s growing dissatisfaction with the existing political situation, or with the established political parties. Quite a few of the non-exclusively populist political parties that we analysed can be described as far right-wing; their populist messages are associated with nationalism, xenophobia, or even racism (for example SPR-RSČ, PRM or Ataka). Exceptions include the liberally-oriented ANO in Slovakia, the radical-le ZRS, and the LMP in Hungary, which emphasises topics associated with the environment.

292

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

e experience of countries in this region is that parties are able to combine populist messages with all kinds of ideologies, depending on the nature of the particular party system, and niches in the electoral market. It is interesting that the electoral message of populist parties that were successful in the 1990s mainly channelled criticism of the implementation and consequences of political and economic transformation. e populist political parties became the champions of those who lost out in the transformation; parties took advantage of the impact of the economic problems that accompanied the transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy and the necessary restructuring of the economy, which was accompanied among other things by rising inflation and unemployment. For example the SPR-RSČ criticised the transformation by calling the events aer November 1989 a “velvet fraud”. Likewise critical, especially in the early 1990s, were the HZDS and ZRS in Slovakia; the PRM in Romania actually looked back with fondness on the Ceauşescu regime. e populist political parties that won seats in Parliament aer 2000 of course had moved on from talking about the economic transformation; instead they focused on the (alleged) corruption of the existing establishment, and its main platform became self-presentation as a new, alternative, and uncorrupted political force. A typical example of such a party was and is the Czech VV; its campaign against the “political dinosaurs” drew more than a tenth of the votes in 2010 parliamentary elections. Similar ideologically-empty parties were the NDSV and GERB in Bulgaria, populist parties in Baltic States, or OĽaNO in Slovakia. It is no surprise that anti-establishment messages of exclusively populist parties were also accompanied by a rejection of the leright view of politics and vague policy programs, and an haphazard mix of right-wing and le-wing approaches to various political problems. is lack of clarity and vagueness is typical of some exclusively populist political parties in East-Central Europe, but only in the early phases of their existence; that is, until they begin to win seats in parliament. is is logical, for aer the party is seen participating in the parliament or becoming part of a coalition government, its populist appeal begins to wane. Slovakia’s SMER gradually

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took on a social democratic orientation and lost its populist appeal; Bulgaria’s NDSV gradually (aer tactically botched participation in the government alongside BSP) moved in a liberal-conservative direction.

11.4. Electoral Support and Social Base e election results of the populist political parties in the region of East-Central Europe vary widely. Mainly, however, these parties can be characterised in terms of their electoral support as small political parties with electoral support hovering around 10% of the vote at most. On the other hand, there are examples of much more successful populist parties, such as Slovakia’s HZDS, Bulgaria’s NDSV, or the populist political parties in the Baltic countries. e question is whether we can find some common traits or factors to explain the remarkable success of populist political parties in some countries. All of the exceptionally successful formations can be labelled as exclusively populist. Meanwhile, none of the non-exclusively populist political parties in the region was anywhere near as successful. On the other hand, there are exclusively populist parties that have been less successful (such as SOP, SO, or VV). Party systems of countries with successful exclusively populist parties can be classified as relatively less structured (Sartori 1976); they are characterised in the long term (even before the appearance of the populist political parties) by a high degree of volatility, and greater personalisation of politics. In these party systems the ties between voters and their political parties are generally weaker, which creates the conditions for the emergence of new political parties, including populist ones. ese findings are nevertheless to be understood as merely the outline of a more extensive comparative research, beyond the limits of our set of case studies. A significant indicator of the importance of political parties within the framework of a given system is the stability of their electoral support. Over the long term, participation in the parliament by populist political parties in East-Central Europe cannot be described as stable.

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e “life cycle” (Pedersen 1982) of populist parties is typically one of rapid rise and equally rapid fall. Populist parties in East-Central Europe are something similar to “flash parties”, although in this region handicapped by the absence of democracy built up over time it is not just the populist parties that are ephemeral. However – and this is very important – not one of the populist parties we analysed became a stable part of the party system in the given country. e closest any of the parties came to becoming an integral part of the system was the PRM in Romania, and to some extent the SNS in Slovenia, with its populism combined with nationalism, and a far-right ideology. e length of time that exclusively populist parties have held seats in the parliament has typically not gone beyond two electoral terms (JL, RP, SOP, SO, NDSV, and the same fate soon awaits the Czech VV). An exception was the HZDS, which from the time it was founded until the end of the 1990s represented first the only and then still one of the main pillars of the Slovak party system; another exception was SMER. To avoid sharing the fate of its predecessors, Fico’s party transformed its ideology and image and turned itself into a social democratic party of the western type, while at the same time absorbing some of the smaller parties on the le (Kopeček 2007). In comparison, Mečiar’s HZDS never lost its ideological vagueness (Kopeček 2007), which is evidently one reason why this party, once Slovakia’s largest, later became marginalised. Populism itself, it seems, is not a message that can serve in the East-Central European environment as an ideological platform assuring long-term presence in parliament. On the other hand it can be an instrument for producing a temporary surge in electoral support, as shown by the case of Romania’s PRM. e case studies of individual countries of East-Central Europe did not produce fully comparable findings concerning typical voter profile of the populist parties, due to the absence of comparable data. Even so, some characteristics of the populist party voter can be observed. Populist political parties in general show above-average support among younger voters (up to 40 years), or older voters (over 60). Minor differences can be identified in terms of the parties’ ideological profiles (for example the Hungarian LMP was supported mainly by younger voters) and the form of the party system in which the given

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party functions (for example the presence of a relevant communist party in the Czech milieu limits the vote for populist parties among older voters). e populists tend to be more successful in the bigger cities, although not necessarily in the capital. Populist party voters are most oen people with less education. Especially in the 1990s, it seems that support for populist political parties was closely related to the course of the economic transformation and some of its negative effects. Many of the populist voters were counted among the so-called losers of the transformation, oen people with less education and less income. e strength of their support in the cities is something of a surprise here (and has persisted in more recent years as well). An exception were two of the three populist parties in Hungary which were supported also by typical well-educated middle-class voters. According to the study of Hungarian populism presented in this book, it seems that these voters were attracted to support MIÉP and Jobbik not due to their disappointment with the results of the process of the socio-economic transformation but because they agreed with the nationalist appeal of the two parties. e structure of the electorate of populist parties has changed with the new century, and the exclusively populist party has become the preferred platform. ese parties attract voters dissatisfied with the current set of established political parties. A vote for the populist parties can be interpreted as a search for alternatives and a reflection on the performance of the present establishment. Some of the case studies in this book indicate that these voters tend to be without a clearly-defined le-right orientation, and exhibit weak party identification (thought this finding merits more detailed study). e experience of the countries in East-Central Europe also indicates that a move by voters away from government parties and towards populist parties is more likely where there are established opposition parties also present in the system. In other words, if a right-wing government is in power, it is more likely that an exclusively populist party will benefit more from the disappointment of right-wing (but not too strongly-committed) voters. Dissatisfied voters on the le tend to turn to the existing opposition (see case study of Slovakia’s OĽaNO or the Czech VV).

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11.5. Position in the Political System Evaluating the position of populist parties in the political systems of East-Central Europe is complicated by the heterogeneity of the group we are studying: the case studies analysed parties that appeared over twenty years in ten different political systems. e sample of parties would be broader and more diverse if we were not limited to parties that held seats in the parliament at least once during their existence. Even so we can tentatively divide the parties into several groups according to their position in the political system. e clear and natural criterion in this case is the party’s relationship to the government, and whether it is part of the government. For populist parties, becoming part of a coalition government presents a major challenge. e reason is not their anti-establishment message, the bedrock of populist rhetoric: criticism of the elites does not in and of itself rule out taking part in the government, because populist parties do not call for the elimination of elites as such, just the replacement of the current (corrupt) elites. ey present themselves as an alternative to the established political parties; and aer all winning elections and getting into the government is, at least theoretically, the logical goal of a populist party. Most populist parties use their anti-establishment message to draw the protest vote, but this is difficult to hold on to when the party is suddenly serving in the government. Many of the parties studied became, as we have said, a typical “flash performance”: quick electoral success followed by loss of relevance, or at least a serious weakening of the party’s position in the political system. In terms of the parties’ role in the government, we can distinguish between three types of position: parties as the main coalition partner, or forming a single-party government; smaller coalition partners; and parties not in the government. At the boundary between the latter two types of party are those that were not officially members of a governing coalition, but tacitly supported the government, such as Ataka in Bulgaria or Self-Defence in Poland in some phases of its existence. e parties with no history in the government, with the exception of TT in Lithuania, are mostly classified by the case study authors as non-exclusively populist parties. Except for Hungary’s LMP these

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tend to be extreme right-wing parties, which probably explains why they have not served in government, or have minimal coalition potential. is is true for MIÉP and Jobbik in Hungary, the SPR-RSČ in the Czech Republic, and partly for the SNS in Slovenia, the ideology of which contained both extreme le and extreme right elements over the course of time. LMP definitely has coalition potential, but has not yet become part of any government. e party gained seats in Parliament in 2010, so it is too soon to draw any deep conclusions in this regard (the same applies to Slovakia’s OĽaNO, which was founded in 2012). Among parties with a history of serving as smaller coalition parties, we find both non-exclusively and exclusively populist parties. Five of the parties studied have served in government as smaller coalition partners. e parties SOP and ANO in Slovakia and VV in the Czech Republic, barring any surprising developments, will probably end up being typical flash performances, where the party wins seats in the parliament and a place in government soon aer it appears on the national scene, but is soon thereaer marginalised, and may disappear altogether. With Romania’s PRM, the ZRS in Slovakia, and Self-Defence in Poland, their time in government was merely a short episode, followed by an extended period in the parliamentary opposition. Perhaps the most interesting group of parties is that of the populist parties that sometime during their existence won an election and/or became the main ruling party. ere were seven of these in the sample; all of them were classified by the authors of the studies as exclusively populist parties. Besides SMER in Slovakia, they were also parties that achieved their best results in their first elections aer they were founded, and their first time in government was also the first time they won seats in parliament. Slovakia’s SMER represents an exception in the sense that it earned its best election results towards the end of the period we are studying, by which time it had become in many ways a standard social democratic party. SMER, along with the GERB in Bulgaria, are the only parties in this group that during the period under study did not lose their positions as strongest party, although in 2010 SMER was not able to convert its election victory into a position in the government. Likewise with the smaller governing partners, populist parties that find themselves in the position of

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being the strongest party found that being in the government weakened their position going into the next elections. In two cases, that of the NDSV in Bulgaria and the HZDS in Slovakia, their last term spent in the government was followed by loss of seats in the parliament and the marginalisation of the party. In both cases, however, the parties during their last period in the government before their loss of all seats in the parliament had already become smaller coalition partners, having lost their status as the strongest actor in the political system previously.

11.6. Conclusion From case study analysis of populist parties presented in this book, we cannot offer any definitive conclusions. e goal of the book, however, was not to conduct a comparative study, but mainly to provide an overview of the populist parties in the region, and identify the basic trends of their activities in the party and political systems. It is more of a pilot study of a geographically, politically, and historically somewhat distinct region, based on a binary typology of populist political parties which emphasises the role of populist messages for the identity and actions of the specific actors. We believe that our book has achieved its goals. e authors of the individual studies have provided a thorough description of the selected political parties, from which we have drawn the conclusions presented in this chapter and which may serve as a guide for further, more comparative research. From this perspective, what seems most promising is a detailed research on sources of electoral mobilisation, the connections between populist parties’ electoral success and a country’s economic development, the type of the party system, and the role of leaders in the election campaigns, as well as party structures. Of special interest from the standpoint of dynamics of the party systems in the countries under study are the findings on the different periods of success by various types of populist political parties, especially the rise of the exclusively populist parties aer the turn of the century. e most interesting chapters in the functioning of the populist parties are the beginnings of their engagement in the political system, and their short

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lifespan. A few of the parties were able to hold on to their relevancy for a longer time. Detailed analysis of the success of these particular populist parties, and the related changes in their ideological profile, might provide another future line of inquiry. e rise of populism in the political parties in the region points to the appearance of niches in the party systems. Examples from Bulgaria, Hungary, or Slovakia show the long-term nature of these niches as they are gradually occupied by parties that differ in their formal aspects, but are similar in their identity or electoral appeal. It will be interesting in the future to see whether such a rotation of populist political parties becomes the typical pattern for other countries in the region of East-Central Europe, and whether populism becomes a stable part of them.

Bibliography Kopeček, Lubomír. 2007. Politické strany na Slovensku 1989 až 2006. Brno: CDK. Pedersen, Mogens. 1982. “Towards a New Typology of Party Lifespans and Minor Parties.” Scandinavian Political Studies 5, No. 1, 1–16. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

301

SUMMARY

SUMMARY is edited volume focuses on populist political parties in the region of East-Central Europe. e first chapter sets out a theoretical framework of the book. It systemizes current academic debate about populism and proposes a simple typology of populist parties, differentiating between two fundamental categories: exclusively and non-exclusively populist political parties. e identity of the exclusively populist political parties is based solely on their populist appeal. e core of the identity of exclusively populist political parties is political protest aimed at the existing political elites, which defends the interests of the “common people”. From the standpoint of traditional cleavages and party families, these formations defy classification. In addition, these political parties implicitly or explicitly reject being identified with a clear ideological orientation. e second type of populist parties is labeled non-exclusively populist parties. e programs of non-exclusively populist political parties are clearly defined in other respects, implicitly or explicitly adhering to a particular ideology and falling into so-called ideological or party families. Radical right-wing political parties may be cited as a typical example of nonexclusively populist political parties, i.e., political parties who make occasional, complementary use of populist appeals alongside their main ideological orientation. e individual chapters of the book consist of case studies on the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Each case study follows the same structure, offering at first a brief introduction to the country’s party politics, the evolution of the party system and justification of selection of the parties for analysis. e second part of each chapter focuses on the selected parties only, analyzing their history, organizational structure and leadership style, ideology, electoral support and social base, and position in the political system. e final chapter of the volume provides an overview of findings from the case studies and identifies several trends. e most interesting phases of the functioning of populist parties are the beginnings of their

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engagement in the political system, and their short lifespan. A few of the parties were able to hold on to their relevancy for a longer time, most of the parties achieved their best electoral results in their first elections at the national level. e parties that were founded at the beginning of the 1990s were for the most part classified as non-exclusively populist parties. Exclusively populist parties, with a few exceptions, appeared only in the later phases of the development of a competitive party system, mostly aer 2000. We believe that the book may serve as an inspiration for a future research. From this perspective, what seems most promising is a detailed research on sources of electoral mobilisation, the connections between populist parties’ electoral success and a country’s economic development, the type of the party system, and the role of leaders in the election campaigns, as well as party structures. Of special interest from the standpoint of dynamics of the party systems in the countries under study are the findings on the different periods of success by various types of populist political parties, especially the rise of the exclusively populist parties aer the turn of the century.

303

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS V H Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University (FSS MU), and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, FSS MU. His teaching and research activities include Czech politics, Europeanization and Scandinavian politics, especially the area of party systems research. He is also the managing editor of the Czech Journal of Political Science. A P Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, and Assistant at the Department of Political Science, FSS MU, where she received her Ph.D. She wrote her dissertation on employer and business interest groups in the Czech Republic and the promotion of organized interests. Her research focuses on systems of interest mediation, political corruption, Scandinavian political systems, and employer and business groups in the Czech Republic. I B Doctoral student at University of Latvia, Department of Political Science, and assistant lecturer for Comparative Politics at Riga Graduate School of Law, Riga, Latvia. Main research interests concerns populism, political parties, electoral behavior and coalition governments. Currently working on her doctoral thesis “e impact of populism on electoral results: e case of Latvia (1993–2011)”. B C Member of the Centre for the Study of Politics (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles, and a Research and Teaching Assistant at the Department of Political Sciences of the ULB. In her doctoral research, she deals with parties and party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, center-right parties in the CEE with a special focus on the Bulgarian case. She has published several articles on populism and political parties in the region.

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V H Ph.D. candidade in European Studies and a graduate of Media Studies/ Journalism at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University. His research focuses on multi-level governance in Germany and the Czech Republic, post-1990 Hungarian politics and Hungarian-Slovak relations. He has published several articles on this topic. A K Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. She studied at the Universtiy of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences from which she also received her Ph.D. Her research interests lie primarily in the field of political institutions and processes (political parties, interest groups, parliaments, elections, political participation, transition to democracy and politics in the area of former Yugoslavia). M S Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University with specialisation on south Eastern Europe. Her research focuses on nationalism in party politics of Romania and Bulgaria. P S Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, and Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, FSS MU. His main areas of interest include electoral systems, political parties, and Slovak politics. K W Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. She studied at Warsaw University, from which she also received her Ph.D. Her research interests lie primarily in the field of comparative politics, political parties and party systems. She currently prepares postdoctoral degree thesis about coalition politics in post-communist Europe.

305

INDEX

INDEX

Adamkus, Valdas 49, 65 Antall, József 141, 157 Antonescu, Marshal Ion 209, 212, 216 Aumiller, Andrzej 174 Balazs, Artur 188, 189, 191 Balcerowicz, Leszek 172, 182 Balczó, Zoltán 142 Barbu, Eugen 208 Bárta, Vít 105, 106, 110–112, 116, 117, 126, 127, 129, 131, 290 Basescu, Traian 200, 207, 208, 221–223 Băsescu, Traian 203, 204, 206 Beger, Renata 174, 179, 191, 197 Berisha, Sali 264 Berlusconi, Silvio 27, 171, 197 Binev, Slavcho 81 Blair, Tony 27 Boc 206 Borisov, Yuri 49 Borissov, Boyko 76, 80, 81, 83, 85, 87–89 Borowski, Marek 168 Bubel, Leszek 183 Buzek, Jerzy 167, 173, 189 Ceauşescu, Nicolae 199, 201, 212, 214, 216, 226, 292 Ciontu, Corneliu 209, 211 Constantinescu, Emil 202 Csurka, István 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 154, 157, 159, 160, 287 Cuza, Alexandru C. 213

Diaconescu, Dan 206, 207, 221–223 Dmowski, Roman 164, 170 Dobeš, Josef 111, 126 Drnovšek, Janez 265, 267, 268, 279 Duca, Ion Gheorghe 213 Dzurinda, Mikuláš 229, 234, 236, 237, 245, 246, 250, 253, 254 Emsis, Indulis 63 Fári, Márton 143 Fico, Robert 229, 230, 236, 245, 253, 254, 294 Filipek, Krzysztof 174, 175 Filipek-Kaźmierczak, Sebastian 174 Formen, Fredegar 110 Funar, Gheorghe 209 Geoana, Mircea 206 Goebbels, Joseph 183 Gyurcsány, Ferenc 139, 140, 143, 149 Haider, Jörg 193, 272 Hamžík, Pavol 240 Havel, Václav 12, 99, 113, 120, 125 Horváth, Lajos 144 Huml, Stanislav 112 Iliescu, Ion 201, 203, 207, 216, 219 Jagieliński, Roman 188 Janković, Zoran 265 Jankovský, Kamil 111, 126 Janša, Janez 264, 268

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Jelinčič, Zmago 268, 269, 271–274, 277, 279 John, Radek 105, 106, 110, 111, 116, 117, 121, 123, 125–128, 133, 134, 224 Jurczyk, Marian 189

Nagy, Ervina 142, 143 Năstase, Adrian 204 Nemcics, Robert 240 Novák, Előd 142

Kaczyński, Jarosław 170, 171, 174, 190, 191 Kaczyński, Lech 170, 171, 190 Kalinowski, Jarosław 188 Kalousek, Miroslav 102 Karins, Krisjanis 53 Klasnová, Kateřina 111, 116, 120 Klaus, Václav 113, 114, 125, 126, 242 Kočí, Kristýna 112, 127 Kovács, Dávid 142, 143, 144 Kramberger, Ivan 263, 264 Kuronia, Jacek 179 Langer, Ivan 126 Le Pen, Jean-Marie 144, 193, 272 Lepper, Andrzej 167, 169, 172–179, 182–193, 195–198 Lipiński, Adam 191 Lukashenko, Alexander 264 Ľupták, Ján 235, 243, 244 Łyżwiński, Andrzej 174, 175 Marcinkiewicz, Kazimierz 191 Matovič, Igor 237, 241, 247, 288 Mazuronis, Valentinas 53 Mečiar, Vladimír 114, 227, 229, 230, 235–238, 240–246, 249, 252–254, 257, 264, 294 Meri, Lennart 58 Miller, Leszek 19, 167, 189, 190, 197 Moczulski, Leszek 166 Moravcová, Stanislava 105 Moravčík, Jozef 235, 242 Moravec, Stanislav 110 Morvai, Krisztina 144, 145 Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina 219, 225

Olejniczak, Wojciech 190, 198 Oleksy, Józef 168 Olszewski, Jan 179 Orbán, Viktor 139, 154 Pahor, Borut 265 Paksas, Rolandas 41, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 60, 61, 70 Paroubek, Jiří 126 Parts, Juhan 53, 63, 64 Peake, Karolína 106, 112, 127, 131 Pilłsudski, Józef 164 Piłsudski, Józef 163, 164 Piskorski, Mateusz 174, 178, 185, 187, 197 Pongrátz, Gergely 288 Prijatelj, Srečko 269 Procházka, Pavel 108 Prochoń, Andrzej 174 Pučnik, Jože 267 Radičová, Iveta 229, 237 Rajsiglová, Laura 108 Repse, Einars 51–53, 58, 59, 62, 63, 67, 70 Rusko, Pavol 237, 240, 253 Ruutel, Arnold 64 Savisaar, Edgar 64 Saxe Cobourg Gotha, Simeon 73, 75, 79–81, 83, 85, 86, 89, 95 Schiffer, András 143, 145, 151 Schmitt, Pál 28, 151, 160 Schuster, Rudolf 231, 236, 240, 244, 253, 257 Schwarzenberg, Karel 103 Siderov, Volen 80, 81, 84, 85, 89 Skele, Andris 63

307

INDEX

Sládek, Miroslav 97, 103, 104, 106–108, 112–115, 118, 119, 125, 128, 129, 133 Śmietanko, Andrzej 188 Stalin, Joseph V. 213 Stelmachowski, Andrzej 179 Stevaert, Steve 27 Stoyanov, Dimitar 81 Szabó, Gábor 142 Szela, Jakub 184 Škárka, Jaroslav 110–112, 127 Taagepera, Rein 53, 57, 70 Tăriceanu, Călin Popescu 204 Tejkowski, Bolesław 183 Torgyán, József 138 Tošovský, Josef 125 Tudjman, Franjo 264 Tudor, Vadim Corneliu 208–211, 213, 215–219, 221 Tusk, Donald 171, 190, 197, 198 Tymiński, Stan 165

Ungureanu 206 Uspaskich, Viktor 47, 50, 52–56, 60, 61, 66, 71 Valinskas, Arunas 47 Vandas, Tomáš 104, 108 Veskimagi, Taavi 53 Vik, Jan 108, 125 Virant, Gregor 265 Voiculescu, Dan 204 Vona, Gábor 142–144, 149, 159, 161 Voronin, Vladimir 213 Wałęsa, Lech 164, 165, 179, 189 Wilecki, Tadeusz 189 Wiśniewski, Michał 184 Wiśniowska, Genowefa 175, 178, 197 Zeman, Miloš 99, 102 Zheleva, Rumiana 85

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Šmíd, T. a kol.: Vybrané konflikty o zdroje a suroviny. Šmíd, T., Kupka, P.: Český organizovaný zločin. Od vyděračů ke korupčním sítím. Sychra, Z.: Jednotná evropská měna. Realizace hospodářské a měnové unie v EU. Waisová, Š.: Poválečná obnova a budování míru. Role a strategie mezinárodních nevládních organizací. Zbíral, R.: Teorie a praxe vyjednávání v Radě Evropské unie. Ediční řada Výzkum Dančák, B., Hloušek, V. (eds.): Víceúrovňové vládnutí v Evropě: zkušenosti, problémy a výzvy. Dančák, B., Závěšický, J. (eds.): Energetická bezpečnost a zájmy České republiky. Hlaváčová, S.: Islám ve Spojených státech amerických. Hoder, L: Transatlantické vztahy v době krize. Hegemonie USA a emancipace Evropy po 11. září 2001. Machay, M.: Hospodářsko-politické důsledky průzkumu vesmíru. Petrov, J.: Obecná odpovědnost členů představenstva akciových společností v česko-americko-německém srovnání. Ediční řada Studie Dočkal, V. (ed.): Regionální politika EU a naplňování principu partnerství. Případové studie České republiky, Německa, Francie a Slovinska. Havlík, V., Kaniok, P. (eds.): Euroskepticismus a země střední a východní Evropy. Hloušek, V., Kaniok, P. (eds.): Evropské politické strany po východním rozšíření Evropské unie. Hloušek, V., Sychra, Z. (eds.): Rakousko v evropské a středoevropské politice. Kořan, M., Hrabálek, M. (eds.): Česká zahraniční politika: Aktéři, struktura, proces. Krpec, O., Pšeja, P. (eds.): Mezinárodní politická ekonomie. Kříž, Z.: Civilní řízení a demokratická kontrola armády v České republice. Kuchyňková, P., Šmíd, T. (eds.): Rusko jako geopolitický aktér v postsovětském prostoru. Mareš, M. (ed.): Zbrojní politika Evropské unie. Pšeja, P. (ed.): Zahraniční politika České republiky vůči zemím Blízkého východu, Zakavkazska a Střední Asie. Rojčík, O., Vilímek, P. (eds.): Proliferace jaderných zbraní: problémoví aktéři. Smolík, J., Šmíd, T., Vaďura, V. (eds.): Organizovaný zločin a jeho ohniska v současném světě. Ediční řada Sborníky Dančák, B. (ed.): Perspektivy západní civilizace a pět let globálního terorismu. Sborník z konference. Dančák, B., Hloušek, V. (eds.): Parlamentní volby 2006 a česká politika.

Dančák, B., Hloušek, V., Šimíček, V. (eds.): Korupce. Projevy a potírání v České republice a Evropské unii. Dočkal, V., Fiala, P., Kaniok, P., Pitrová, M. (eds.): Česká politika v Evropské unii. Evropský integrační proces a zájmy České republiky. Hloušek, V., Kopeček, L. (eds.): Demokracie. Teorie, modely, osobnosti, podmínky, nepřátelé a perspektivy demokracie. Mareš, M. (ed.): Bezpečnost v oblasti západního Balkánu z pohledu ČR. Mareš, P., Hofírek, O. (eds.): Sociální reprodukce a integrace: ideály a meze. Sborník z konference. Šimíček, V. (ed.): Právo na soukromí. Šimíček, V. (ed.): Role nejvyšších soudů v evropských ústavních systémech – čas pro změnu? Šimíček, V. (ed.): Volby – svátek demokracie, nebo pletich? Závěšický, J. (ed.): Evropská unie a její bezpečnost. Vybrané problémy evropské bezpečnosti. Dvacet let svobody aneb Demokracie není samozřejmost. Výběr soutěžních esejů. Ediční řada EDIS Ferenčuhová, S.: Meno, mesto, vec. Urbánne plánovanie v sociológii mesta a prípad (post)socialistického Brna. Janák, D.: Hodnoty a hodnocení v sociologii Inocence Arnošta Bláhy. Studie z dějin klasické české sociologie. Machovcová, K.: Nesamozřejmé perspektivy. Genderová analýza v psychoterapii a psychologickém poradenství. Řiháček, T.: Zvukové prostředí města a jeho vliv na prožívání. Štětka, V.: Mediální integrace národa v době globalizace. Tomešová Bartáková, H.: Cesta zpátky. Návrat žen po rodičovské dovolené na trh práce v České republice. Vacková, B.: Prostor, moc a utopie. Ideální město a jeho společnost. Vidovićová, L.: Stárnutí, věk a diskriminace – nové souvislosti. Časopisy Politologický časopis – čtvrtletník Středoevropské politické studie – v elektronické podobě na adrese www.cepsr.com Objednávky zasílejte na adresu: Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno, tel./fax: 549 495 769 e-mail: [email protected] Další informace můžete nalézt také na internetových stránkách: www.iips.cz

M S V. 49

V H, A P  . POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE Typography by Lenka Váchová and Zdeněk Granát Published by Masaryk University International Institute of Political Science Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno tel./fax: 549 495 769, e-mail: [email protected], www.iips.cz 1th edition, 2012 Number of copies 300 Printed by Reprocentrum, a.s., Bezručova 29, 678 01 Blansko

ISBN 978-80-210-6105-7

Aneta Pinková Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, and the Department of Political Science, FSS MU, where she received her Ph.D. Her research focuses on interest intermediation, the role of business groups and employer organizations in the political system of the Czech Republic, and political corruption. “It is a well-constructed and theoretically grounded work on populism that is comprehensive in its regional coverage and offers insights into the cases in question and shows a high degree of internal consistency. The book will serve as a standard reference guide for scholars, advanced students and observers of the region.“ Kevin Deegan-Krause

International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity

ISBN 978-80-210-6105-7

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE

Vlastimil Havlík Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University (FSS MU), and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, FSS MU. His teaching and research activities include Czech politics, Europeanization and Scandinavian politics, especially the area of party systems research. He is the managing editor of the Czech Journal of Political Science.

VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK ANETA PINKOVÁ ET AL.

Recent decades have seen a pronounced rise in political parties which may be identified as populist. Despite the frequency with which one encounters “populism” as a term in academic literature, the media and non-specialist discussions, its meaning remains somewhat unclear. Based on a theoretical framework describing the two basic types of populist political parties, the book analyses the history, electoral performance, organisational structure and the position in the political system of populist political parties in ten East-Central European EU member states.

VLASTIMIL HAVLÍK ANETA PINKOVÁ ET AL.

POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES

IN EASTCENTRAL EUROPE International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity