Populism as Meta Ideology 3031039335, 9783031039331

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Populism as Meta Ideology k i r e sh a r l a m a nov

Populism as Meta Ideology

Kire Sharlamanov

Populism as Meta Ideology

Kire Sharlamanov International Balkan University Skopje, North Macedonia

ISBN 978-3-031-03933-1    ISBN 978-3-031-03934-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Overview of the Characteristics of Populism  1 1.1 Introduction  1 1.2 The Organizational Structure of the Book  6 1.3 The Historical Beginnings of Populism  9 1.4 The Meaning of the Term Populism 14 1.5 Evolution of the Study of Populism 17 1.6 The Social Structure of the Populist Electorate 20 1.7 Populism and Elitism 25 1.8 Populism and Pluralism 26 1.9 Populism and Clientelism 27 References 29 2 Approaches to the Studying of Populism 35 2.1 Introduction 35 2.2 Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Study of Populism 37 2.3 The Discursive Approach 39 2.4 Organizational Approach 44 2.5 The Cultural (Performative) Approach 48 2.6 The Ideational Approach 52 2.7 Comparison of Populism with Other Ideologies (Populism as a Meta Ideology) 56 2.8 Final Observations on the Approaches to the Study of Populism 63 References 65 v

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3 The Key Concepts of Populism 71 3.1 Sovereignty 71 3.2 The People 74 3.3 The Elite 79 3.4 General Will 83 3.5 Demagogy 85 3.6 The Reasons for the Growth of Populism 87 References 91 4 Modernization 95 4.1 Introduction 95 4.2 Agrarian Versus New Populism101 4.3 Emancipatory Movements, Modernization, and New Populism104 4.4 Cultural Dualism and Populism106 4.5 The Second (Reflective) Modernity and the New Populism107 4.6 Populist Identity in the Second Modernity109 References112 5 Globalization115 5.1 Introduction115 5.2 The Global Political Economy117 5.2.1 Free Trade and Populism123 5.2.2 Economic Globalization and the Growth of Inequality125 5.2.3 The Decline of the Welfare State127 5.2.4 Economic Uncertainty129 5.2.5 Assessing the Significance of Economic Uncertainty for the Growth of Populism131 5.3 Globalization and the Erosion of Nation-States133 5.3.1 Euroskepticism134 5.3.2 Immigration and Cultural Anxiety137 5.3.3 Nativism142 5.3.4 Cultural Backlash and Immigration143 References147

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6 The Crisis of Political Parties153 6.1 Introduction153 6.2 The Decline in Turnout and Populism155 6.3 The Crisis of Representativeness and Populism as an Alternative157 6.4 Changing Values159 6.5 Distrust in the Political System160 6.6 Non-functionality of Mainstream Parties162 6.7 Corruption165 6.8 Globalization and Capacity Constraints of Mainstream Parties166 6.9 Positioning in the Political Spectrum and Populism167 References170 7 Transformation of the Public Sphere175 7.1 Introduction175 7.2 Medialization178 7.3 Tabloids and Populism180 7.4 The Media Promotion of Populism182 7.5 New Media and Populism184 References192 8 Populism and Liberal Democracy195 8.1 Introduction195 8.2 The Populists in Power204 References210 References215 Index231

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2

Аn overview of approaches to the study of populism and its characteristics by individual authors Approaches to the study of populism according to key features and elements

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CHAPTER 1

Overview of the Characteristics of Populism

1.1   Introduction Any politician can be a populist or maybe at least a little populist. As Laclau (2005: 67) argues, populism is part of the ontological nature of politics and hence every politician flirts with populism. Before elections, every politician would like to be liked by as many people as possible, to have open communication with them, to understand their problems, to propose their own policies as a solution for the same (Müller, 2016: 2). If all this is populism, the question is whether politics as such, especially in democracies, is not populist. Moreover, are populists not just successful politicians whom opponents and the media accuse of populism? Is not the accusation of populism populism in itself? Is not the accusation of populism the inherent state of democracy? The question is what is populism? What is populism for some is not for others. Whether and how much a politician will use populism depends on certain circumstances. But, although elements of populism can be found in all politicians, not all political actors are populists (Mudde, 2004: 545). Those who are real populists are convinced of the populist discourse; the rest only use it for strategic reasons, in order to get more votes in the elections. An additional demarcation line between populists and those who are not is pluralism. Populists are not pluralists. They doubt the possibility of a legitimate political alternative to theirs. According to the populists, only the people are a

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_1

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legitimate political entity, and the only ones who have the right to invoke their interests and represent them in politics are the populist parties. Populism has many variants and is nothing new and unknown in the history of mankind. At its core, populism is a reaction against change. Characteristics of populism are anti-elitism, anti-establishment, and anti-­ intellectualism (Gherghina & Soare, 2013: 34). Populist movements and parties are based on strong charismatic leaders, and because they consider their political opponents illegitimate, when populists come to power they tend to establish authoritarian rule. Depending on the strength of democratic institutions and liberal traditions, the end result of populism may be different. One of the significant features of populism is its adaptability to different contexts. Depending on the context, populism occurs in different variants. Thus, it appears as an agrarian phenomenon in the fight against industrialism, as a nationalist phenomenon in the fight against globalism and immigration, but in essence it is constantly a political phenomenon in the fight against alienated and corrupt power elites. Populism appears in different parts of the world and comes in different forms: movements, regimes, discursive styles, and rhetorical strategies, among others (Tarchi, 2016). It adapts to a variety of socio-cultural contexts and transcends leftright divisions, which is inconceivable for traditionally established political ideologies and parties. Populism occurs wherever the interests of the people are neglected, where society is in crisis, and where there is distrust of the elites. If we talk about the evolutionary development of populism, one can make a rough categorization of old populism that originated somewhere in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was based on the myth of the peasantry, but integrated the ideas of nationalism, and to a lesser extent in the 1920s and 1930s fascism. In the historical development of populism, we note the Populist Party in the United States; Narodniki in Russia; the growth of fascism in Europe; the populist movements in Latin America in the 1930s, especially in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile; Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policy in the United States; and Mao Zedong’s Mass Line policy in China (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 2). In its beginnings, populism was attractive to the lower classes and, depending on the context, had the support of the peasantry, but also the first generation of the working class that migrated from the countryside to the big cities, which had not yet managed to integrate and adapt to new living conditions. The roots of the new, modern populism date back to the 1960s. It completely consolidated in the 1990s (Brass, 2013). In modern society, populism is on the rise in many countries. The growth of modern populism is a long-term social phenomenon (Galasso et al., 2017: 5). In some countries the visibility and impact of populism has increased significantly, while in others it has become part

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of mainstream politics (Henrichsen, 2019). In France, Front National became the largest opposition party, and the Freedom Party in Austria and the Five Star Movement in Italy were occasionally coalition partners in forming a government majority. In the words of Woertz (2017), populism has been transformed from a symptom of serious social problems into a serious political alternative. This indicates a restructuring of the political conflict in which populist parties are no longer on the margins, but at the center of political competition. In the last two decades there have been many successful politicians who can be said to be populists; Hugo Chavez (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela,  PSUV), Alberto Fujimori (e.g. Cambio 90), Ted Cruz (Grand Old Party, GOP), Evo Morales (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS), Jair Bolsonaro (Partido Social Liberal, PSL), Marine Le Pen (Front National, NF), Geert Wilders (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, PVV), Rodrigo Duterte (Partido Demokratiko Pilipino,  PDP–Laban), Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia,  FI), Viktor Orbán (Fieatal Demokratak Szovetsege,  Fidesz), Aleksandar Vucic (Srpska Napredna Stranka,  SNS), Jaroslaw Katzinsky (Pravo i Spravje,  PiS), Janez Jansa (Slovenska Demokratska Stranka, SDS), Jeremy Corbin (Labour Party), Beppe Grillo (Five Star Movement), Jörg Haider (Bundnis Zuninft Osterrich,  BZÖ), Nigel Farage (United Kingdom Independence  Party,  UKIP), Donald Trump (Grand Old Party, GOP), Sarah Palin (Tea Party), Pauline Hanson (One Nation), and Bernie Sanders (Democratic Party, DP) are just some of the significant populist-oriented political leaders (Gagnon et  al., 2018; Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 2; Moffitt, 2016). In Europe, the number of populist political leaders is growing, and so is their share of the election results. If in the 1990s populist parties won 5–7% of the vote, today at the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century, they won about 25% of the vote (Flew & Iosifidis, 2020: 12; Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 9). The growing trend of populism affects both the richest and most egalitarian European societies with the most developed welfare states such as Austria, Norway, and Denmark, as well as countries with high unemployment and problems to reach higher levels of gross domestic product such as Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and North Macedonia. Populist parties are in power in some of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Serbia, and Poland. They are the most serious contenders to win the parliamentary and presidential elections in France and have begun to gain support in countries such as Germany. Relevant studies show that the growth of the popularity of populist parties influences the introduction of more elements of populism in the programs of traditional mainstream parties (Bos & Brants, 2014: 705). The election success of Donald Trump in the United States, Marine Le Pen in France,

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and Brexit in the United Kingdom show that modern politics has been swept by a wave of populism. Unlike agrarian populism of the late nineteenth century, modern populism operating in the context of globalization has international dimensions and is a greater challenge than any manifestation of populism we have witnessed in the past (Cox, 2017: 10). It challenges the status quo in society, opens taboos, challenges the political correctness of liberalism, and provides an opportunity to publicly discuss issues that mainstream parties have long sidelined (Smilov & Krastev, 2008: 7). The growth of populist parties is changing the democratic game (Katz & Mair, 2018). In response to the growth of populism, diverse and even antagonistic forces are being mobilized in society. They briefly unite in the election to fight populist candidates such as Geert Wilders or Marine Le Pen. If in the 1960s, populism was an important topic for the analysis of the situation in Latin America, today it is relevant for the study of the situation in Europe and North America (Revelli, 2019: 1). What populist political movements have in common is that they are led by people who claim to not be part of the establishment. They promise ordinary people, on whose behalf they act, that they will restore their power and influence in politics (Bonikowski, 2016: 9). Trends in politics in the last few decades show that populism is a topic of serious debate and is increasingly the subject of academic research. Populism is one of the most widely used terms in political analysis in the twenty-first century. In addition to political analysis, populism as a phenomenon is also used to analyze the media and public discourse. When a term becomes very popular it usually expands its scope and slowly changes its original meaning and acquires new ones. Many candidates, platforms, and parties that at first glance seem diverse and even diametrically opposed are considered as a populist. For example, left-wing parties, politicians, and political movements in Latin America are considered as populist, just as right-wing parties, politicians, and movements outside the moderate right in Europe are considered as populist. While clientelism and economic malpractice are considered as populism in Latin America, xenophobia and anti-migrant positions are considered populist in Europe. In the United States, both left-wing and right-wing politicians are considered as populists. During the twentieth century, there were representatives of the Republican and Democratic parties who sent populist appeals to their potential voters (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016: 7). Populism was an incidental and marginal political phenomenon in the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century, with interest in it grow again in the 2000s following the emergence of the Tea Party,

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Occupy Wall Street, and the 2016 presidential election (Hawkins & Rovira, 2017: 1). According to Krastev (2007), populism has become the most significant phenomenon in modern politics. Today, the dominant discursive political division in many countries, from the United States through Europe to Latin America, is no longer left-right, but populism-­antipopulism (Stavrakakis, 2017: 1). Hence, populism is an increasingly exploited topic in academia, but political theories have difficulties in dealing with it (Urbinati, 2018: 112). The term populism is not only used in academia and journalistic circles. In political life, it is used by politicians from established parties, giving it a pejorative meaning and attaching it to its political opponents (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 12; Stavrakakis, 2017: 1). This creates confusion as to what populism really is. Academic debates are so layered and take into account so many things that instead of giving a clear idea of ​​populism, they further confuse the audience. Hence, in this book we will try to make a typology between the different approaches in the study of populism. Namely, populism is at the same time a rhetorical strategy, but it is also an ideology. Populism as a strategy and populism as an ideology are different. A certain amount of populism can be found in every politician, but anyone who uses populism as a rhetorical strategy is not a populist in the ideological sense. So, Clinton and George W. Bush can be said to have used populist rhetorical strategies, but they cannot be claimed to be ideological populists, as Le Pen, Chavez, and Trump could be said to be. As Revelli writes (2019: 1), there is a difference between populism as a political-cultural climate of our time, which changes the pattern of political life and includes rhetoric, way of arguing, use of language, expression, and behavior of politicians from one side and the inner circle of populism, that is, populism as a project that has a clearly defined collective subject as the bearer of the project and an arch-enemy who tries to defeat. For example, Angela Merkel and Mariano Rajoy cannot be considered populist leaders, although acting politically in a time of growing populism they must take into account that factor in creating and implementing their policies (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 1). Hence the question of whether populism is contagious, that is, whether the growth of populist movements and parties influences the change of political platforms of traditional parties. Galasso et al. (2017) find that under the influence of the rise of populism, moderate center-right parties are beginning to occupy far-right positions, just as moderate left-leaning parties are moving toward far-left positions. Before we begin to slowly clear up the dilemmas that

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have arisen, which are related to populism, we will first dwell on the question of the organizational structure of the book.

1.2   The Organizational Structure of the Book The question arises why someone would write a book about populism when so much has already been written about this socio-political phenomenon. The reason is in the attempt to systematize all that available literature. Populism is a complex, serious, current, and multidimensional phenomenon that requires systematic and comprehensive analysis. The purpose of this book will be to understand (1) populism as a phenomenon, (2) the components of which it is composed, the social context in which it emerges and expands and which influences its development path, and (3) the relationship of populism with liberal democracy. The book is divided into eight chapters. The first three chapters try to answer the first goal. The idea of these chapters is to identify the contour of populism, its key features, the approaches through which researchers seek to analyze it, and its internal structure and interdependencies. From Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 we try to answer the second goal of the book, and among the factors that make up the social context in which modern populism developed, we will look at modernization, globalization, the crisis of political parties, and the transformation of the public sphere. In other words, since in the first three chapters we have already identified populism, we have got acquainted with it, in the next four chapters we will make an attempt to find out how and why populism arises and spreads. The last chapter focuses on analyzing the relationship between populism and liberal democracy. Specifically, since we already know the reasons why populism is spreading, we try to present to the reading audience the consequences of the growth of populism after it becomes a dominant political ideology. We are particularly interested in the consequences that populism left on liberal democracy. In the first chapter we review the characteristics of populism. Here we deal with the questions of the historical beginnings of populism in order to move further to the meaning of the term populism and the evolution of its study in the social sciences. Trying to understand the contours of populism, we tried to come up with an answer to the question of which social strata voted for populist parties. Of course, the answer is not unequivocal. The answer to this question opens space for the debate that develops below in the book about the circumstances in which populism develops, that is, the factors that contribute to its expansion. This chapter, which

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tries to give us a rough idea of populism, that is, to locate populism in social theory and reality, ends by examining the relations between populism and social phenomena from which it is more or less different, such as elitism, pluralism, and clientelism. The basis for the second chapter is laid out in the review of the evolutionary development of the study of populism. However, this chapter pays much more attention to current approaches to the study of populism. Here we first present the categorizations in the study of populism in order to further focus on the catheterization proposed by Cas Mudde and to dwell in detail on the discursive, organizational-strategic, cultural-­ performative, and ideological approaches in the study of populism. One of the goals we set ourselves in this chapter, after which we have titled the book itself, is to show that populism is not less but just a different kind of ideology from other traditional mainstream ideologies, although they may have developed more narrative concepts. The third chapter presents the basic elements of populism. Every definition of populism indicates that it is based on the construction of the collective subject—people, on the insistence on its sovereignty, as well as on the general will, which is in fact the will of the people. But also, every definition of populism indicates that the antipode that populism is fighting against is the elite. Although, at first glance, it seems that the elite is something external and alien to populists, without elite and antagonism between people and the elite there is no populism. Hence, the subject of our analysis will be the conceptualization of the elite in populist ideology. Additionally, in this chapter we will consider a phenomenon that is more a spice and companion of populism than its exclusive constituent—demagoguery. In the fourth chapter we will get acquainted with the relations between modernization and populism. It is a fact that contemporary populism appears with the development of modernization. Populists often react to the social changes brought about by modernization and see modernization as a conspiracy of the elite, which can thus more easily and more efficiently manipulate and work against the interests of the people. The question we will try to answer is whether, to what extent, and how modernization is related to populism. Also, an important question that we will try to answer is whether populism is an agent of modernization or a critic of it. The fifth chapter analyzes the factor that is most often placed in the context of the growth of populism—globalization. Populists are often described as mobilizing the electorate, which is made up of globalization

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losers. But before entering into the analysis of the relations between globalization and populism, we will have in mind that globalization itself has several aspects: economic, cultural, and political. In addition to trying to show the relationship between globalization and populism, we will try to go one step further in our analysis to assess whether the emergence of modern populism is more related to the economic or cultural-identity aspects of globalization. The sixth chapter examines the relationship between the crisis of political parties and the rise of populism. This chapter focuses on examining the relations within the political system, but of course the political system itself is closely linked to the social context. In that sense, the subject of analysis will be the decline in the membership of political parties, the decline in turnout, in general the decline in the readiness of citizens for political participation, the connection of this phenomenon with the decline in credibility of political parties, whether it happens due to the greater exposure to criticism of mainstream parties and the opening of scandals by the media or the dysfunction of the parties in terms of lack of results and failure to solve the problems of the citizens. In this chapter we will try to show how the voters’ distrust of the traditional mainstream parties opens space for a new type of party like the populist ones. The seventh chapter focuses on the analysis of the relationship between the transformation of the public sphere and the growth of populism. Here we will pay special attention to the medialization of politics and the commercialization of the media. In an effort to reach as many viewers as possible, the media try to offer their audience sensations—charismatic leaders who may not be completely politically correct but are relatively new to politics, cause controversy, scandalize the public, and attract an audience. Additionally, the media image is enriched by the new media in which anyone can produce and publish news. Under the pressure of the new ones, and in search of viewership, the traditional media lower the criteria of professionalism and base their content on sensationalism, and here we come to the field of populism. The last chapter deals with the question of the relationship between populism and liberal democracy on a theoretical and practical level. At the theoretical level, populists seem to separate democratic from liberal principles and while respecting ones, marginalize the others. In this way, they establish liberal democracies. The reason is that liberal principles protect the interests of minority groups in society and individuals, while for populists the ideal they aspire to is the general will of the people which is

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manifested through a majority achieved in democratic elections. All other interests, except the majority ones, are illegitimate. Hence, when they come to power, the populists pursue policies that seek to colonize the various spheres of social life and establish control over them. There are no significant differences between the populists here. It is further proof that as chaotic, adaptable, and chameleon-like as it may seem at first glance, populism is an ideology that places imperatives before those who believe in it. One of the qualities of more sophisticated ideologies is that they act more latently than manifestly.

1.3   The Historical Beginnings of Populism The initial use of the term populism in the modern sense of the word dates back to the time of nineteenth-century social movements on both sides of the Atlantic (Rovira et al., 2017). But proto-populism has existed before. Although the term populism did not exist in ancient Greece, a significant part of what we mean by populism today, in terms of the use of popular sovereignty to legitimize the political system, that is, the use of demos to legitimize democracy, was present in ancient Greece. In the late Roman Republic, there was a polarization between the Populares, who had preferred the interests of the people, and the Optimates, who had preferences for the interests of the aristocracy (Stockemer, 2019: 3). The intellectual heritage of Enlightenment, with the idea that individuals are rational, are reasonable, and have the right to fight for their rights, to criticize and change government, the system of government, especially if it is based on privilege and involves corruption, provided a basis for developing different understandings of politics, including populistic ones. The use of the term populism in US newspapers began between 1891 and 1892. This term was often used by representatives of the US People’s Party. It can be said that this party is the first populist party in the world. This party criticized the large corporations, monopolies, merchants, and bankers that dominated Washington (Morgan, 2020; Berlin et al., 1968: 143). Important elements in the party program were progressive taxation, the government owning the railways and regulating their work, and economic protectionism in order to protect the interests of farmers (Miskelly & Noce, 2002: 307). The policies of the US People’s Party were anti-elitist. The party criticized the banks that activated the mortgages of their customers as well as the railways that had a monopoly on the market of transport of people and goods and thus the possibility to arbitrarily determine the prices of

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their services. It seems that the US People’s Party was trying to bring back the lost utopia of American agrarian republicanism (Stavrakakis, 2017: 4). At one of the People’s Party conferences, one of the party leaders, Judge Rightmire, complained that People’s Party members needed a whole sentence to present themselves as party members, unlike members of other major US parties who could claim to be Democrats or Republicans. Hence, the need arose to introduce a name that would make it easier for People’s Party members to operate. The Populist Party appeared as a solution, and the members could say that they were populists. Since then, the media has often used the terms populist party and populists (Balcere, 2017: 21). Populism then lacked the pejorative meaning it has today, with political opponents often blaming each other for populism and linking populism to unrealistic, uneconomic policies in order to gain more votes in elections. Those who criticize restrictive economic policies are often blamed for populism (by Von Beyme 2018: 3). According to Hofstadter, populism had its influence on American progressivism in the Roosevelt-­ Wilson era and in the democratization of society of that period, and traces of populism can also be found in the New Deal and McCarthyism. De la Torre (2018: 573), citing Richard Hofstadter, points out that populism, among other things, sought to cure the ills of American society at the time, but at the same time had a strong moralizing dimension. Namely, the populism of the nineteenth century was a result of agrarian capitalism, which rapidly transformed into industrial capitalism, as there are indications that today’s populism is a result of the crisis of industrial capitalism and its transformation into global financial capitalism. Nineteenth-century populists in the United States sought to restore the golden age of agrarian society. Their supporters were the less-educated citizens with poorer access to information. As Federici (1995: 73) notes, populism as a social movement in the late nineteenth century in the United States leaned toward blaming elites for economic, political, and social failures. The movement was anti-elitist in nature and advocated for better living conditions for farmers. In trying to quickly and easily find the culprits of complex social problems, populism misled the masses. The term populism was also used to describe the Russian social movement narodniki—“going to the people”—and their ideology narodnochestvo—populism. It was a movement of students and intellectuals who in the 1860s and 1870s, with the help of the peasantry, tried to overthrow the tsarist regime in Russia, which they held responsible for the catastrophic state of the peasantry. In general, narodniki sought to respond to

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the threat from capitalism on the one hand and socialism on the other (Brass, 2013). Intellectuals idealized the peasantry and took it as a benchmark for true traditional values and ​​ for building national identity. Compared to the urban population, the peasantry was seen as morally superior, uncorrupted, and selfless (Balcere, 2017: 20). But they were not accepted by the peasants as they hoped they would be. The representatives of narodniki were not religious people and accepted modern science, unlike the peasantry (Eichengreen, 2018: 7). The peasantry did not have the capacity to develop or support policies aimed at overthrowing the imperial regime, which was ultimately the intention of the narodniki. Although narodniki have elements in common with the populist party in the United States, Margaret Canovan (1981: 13) still distinguishes between these two movements. While she characterizes the radicalism of the American People’s Party farmers as agrarian populism, the Russian Narodniks peasant movement categorizes as political populism. Although both movements sincerely fought against the establishment and the elites, narodniki saw collectivism as the basis of social life, while American populists never questioned private property as a basic principle of social life. On the contrary, American populists, as farmers, owned the land they cultivated. They were not bothered by property but bothered by the monopolies established by the elites. Narodniki was basically a movement dominated by students and intellectuals educated at Western European universities, while the American populists were mainly farmers and workers (Balcere, 2017: 22; Urbinati, 2018: 114). In America, unlike Russian populism, the idea was not to overthrow the establishment, that is, the large capital as the embodiment of capitalism, but to overthrow the establishment, that is, large capital because it prevents free competition and an equal and fair chance of success in the free market. Thus, while populism in the United States is a peasant movement, narodniki is a movement of intellectuals who idealize the peasantry and try to instrumentalize it in the struggle against the imperial regime, but in the peasantry do not have the support they hope for (Müller, 2016: 18). The third significant movement in the beginnings of populism is Boulangism in France. General Georges Boulanger was a key political figure between 1896 and 1898 in the French Third Republic. The growth of his popularity began in 1886 when he was appointed minister for war. He promoted nationalist policies, advocated for workers’ rights, and fought against parliamentarism, which he sought to replace with radical plebiscite republicanism. He fled France in 1889 when he was charged with conspiracy and treason. In 1891 he committed

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suicide in Brussels. He criticized the elite for being corrupt and alienated from the people and advocated a strong state and plebiscite democracy (Stockemer, 2019: 3). The four time of populist movements with historical roots are those in Latin America. According to Alan Touraine, in Latin America, there were two types of populist movements in the early twentieth century. One relied on the peasantry and the other on the urban working class. In the first case, there was opposition of the peasantry, mostly made up of Indians, to oligarchy and the traditional establishment. Examples of rural Latin American populism are the Mexican Revolution, in part the Bolivian Revolution, and the Peruvian People’s Movement (Berlin et al., 1968: 145). Examples of populist movements of the urban middle class in Latin America are those led by Getúlio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Perón in Argentina. Four examples from the United States, Russia, France, and Latin America indicate that populism in its infancy invoked and sought peasant support in the village-city division that was central to that time interval. Populism in the late nineteenth century idealized the peasantry and its way of life and sought to protect it and bring about a change in the redistribution of goods in society in a way that would treat the peasantry more equitably. It can be said that populism has its historical roots in the nineteenth century, as well as other most important political ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and conservatism. Probably the first pro-populist president of the United States was Thomas Jefferson (1801–1809), who did not give much importance to ceremonies, demystified politics, and tried to remove from it the glamor that is usually created in public perception. He attached great importance to the farmers who owned small farms from which they supported their families. Significant elements of populism can also be found in the policies of Andrew Jackson, President of the United States from 1829 to 1837. Jackson had a modest background, a popular language of expression, unsophisticated manners that together made him very close to ordinary people (Revelli, 2019: 42). The platform he promoted to the public was “let the people rule” (Miskelly & Noce, 2002: 302). Although they had elements of populism in them, these political phenomena can hardly be spoken of as populism in the modern sense of the word. Unlike established political ideologies, populism was for a time on the margins of political life, although it was constantly present. Occasionally, in some countries it emerged as the dominant ideology in a limited time interval as during the time of President Juan Perón in Argentina in the 1940s, to spread further to Brazil during the reign of Vargas and Venezuela during the

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reign of Chavez. In the Latin American context, populism was seen as a positive mobilizing force in society (Balcere, 2017: 19). He was popular because he introduced into politics strata of the population that were disenfranchised and excluded from political processes (Müller, 2016: 60). The period between 1930 and 1960 is considered the golden age of Latin American populism (Moffitt, 2016). Although in these countries populism had an inclusive and emancipatory dimension, to date this continent is characterized by the greatest economic inequality (Müller, 2016: 18). Relatively marginal populist movements and parties also occasionally appeared in post-World War II Europe. Such is the case with Guglielmo Giannini’s Italian Common Man’s Front, which appeared in the late 1940s. In the late 1950s the French Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisan of Pierre Poujade appeared; in the late 1960s we note the formation of the Dutch Farmers’ Party of Hendrik (Farmer) Koekoek, while the Danish Progress Party of Mogens Glistrup appeared in the 1970s (Mudde, 2004: 548). The 1980s and 1990s were marked by the emergence of “new populism” in Western Europe and “neo-populism” in Latin America. The term new populism usually refers to the emergence of populist leaders such as Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and Christoph Blocher. The new populism in Europe is right-wing oriented. As Mudde (2004: 549) comments, it is relatively easy to synthesize nationalism and enter into symbiosis with people. Neo-populism has been linked to the rise of populist leaders, such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in Argentina, Collor de Mello in Brazil, and Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico, who combine populism with liberal economic policies. This wave of populism aroused serious interest in the social sciences and brought back the topic of defining populism as a concept (Pappas, 2014: 5). Unlike before, in the second decade of the twenty-first century we see an increase in populism, in countries with a developed democratic tradition and a low level of social inequality. Thus True Finns had 20% of the vote in the parliamentary elections in 2011. The Sweden Democrats managed to enter the Swedish Parliament in 2010 and in 2014 to double the support they enjoy from the electorate and win 12.9% (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016: 1). The modern populism that Revelli (2019: 6) calls 2.0 populism differs from the classic, traditional populism. But Müller (2016: 58) rightly states that only the historical perspective in which we will chronologically list the movements and parties that have defined themselves as populist will not give us a complete picture of populism. Hence we will try to put at the center of our interest the meaning of the term populism.

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1.4   The Meaning of the Term Populism Populism is one of the most widely used and one of the least understood concepts in contemporary politics (Taggart, 2002: 62). It is not uncommon and often happens that journalists and analysts describe a specific politician, political program, or party as populist. However, what is populism for one journalist or analyst does not have to be for another. Different people give different meanings to the term populism. Revelli (2019: 4) concludes that the term populism as used in political debates and by journalists in modern society is almost unusable because it is used very imprecisely and has many meanings. Pappas (2014: 3) notes that the spatial and temporal distribution of populism as a phenomenon makes it difficult to define it. Depending on the social context, populism has different manifest forms (Wirth et  al., 2016: 7). Thus today populism is used as an umbrella term to describe the politics of parties and individuals who claim to speak on behalf of the people and oppose the corrupt elite (Bonikowski et  al., 2019: 58). Historically, populism has emerged in different countries, with different political systems, some of them democratic, some not, at different stages of their development and had different characteristics. However, it seems that the generally accepted meaning of populism in the general public is that it is a simpler way of communicating full of emotions. Populists are said to be angry, and their voters to be frustrated and dissatisfied with society. A number of authors such as Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, and Seymour Martin Lipset wrote in the mid-1950s that populism is a helpless articulation of anxiety, anger, and alienation (Müller, 2016: 60). Also it is quite widespread that the understanding of populism as a narrative that promises potential voters things that it assumes they want to hear and that are very difficult or impossible to accomplish (Kudors, 2017: 11). In different socio-historical contexts, this term was given different meanings. Thus in North and South America it was seen as a progressive, “grassroots” phenomenon, while in Europe it caused a negative odium and was perceived as an irresponsible political phenomenon that gives people hope for unrealistic expectations from politics and politicians (Müller, 2016: 11; 2016: 58; Gherghina & Soare, 2013: 1). A contemporary example of populist parties with irresponsible promises that cannot be fulfilled were Syriza and Podemos. Müller (2016: 1; 2016: 58) points out that the term populism is often used as a synonym for anti-establishment. Heinisch and Mazzoleni (2016: 1) suggest that populism is a set of anti-­ elitist beliefs. In addition to being anti-establishment, populism opposes

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anything that goes against the interests of the people. Populism is associated with emotional political appearances and voter frustration. There are two objections to the use of the term populism. First, it is often used in battles with political opponents to denunciate them. The term populism is so full of negative emotions, which is reminiscent of the term terrorism, which also creates a very negative reaction in both the general and academic public (Muro, 2017: 10). In that sense, populism is seen in some circles as a disease, a syndrome, a virus that needs to be cleaned up (Rovira, 2019: 2). Second, the term populism has too broad and vague a meaning, so it can be applied to almost any political actor (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 1 A). As Urbinati (2018: 112) notes, especially after Brexit, politicians and media experts have called populist all opposition movements from xenophobic nationalists to those who criticize neoliberal policies. At one point almost all types of protests were labeled as populist (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 3). Moffitt (2016) states that populism is one of the most disputed terms, at the lexicon level, but it is also one of the most disputed phenomena. Populism is used in a negative context in order to denigrate political opponents to the point where the term loses its analytical value and becomes completely meaningless. On the other hand, that term resonates with a significant social phenomenon without which the modern political landscape cannot be understood and hence populism as a concept cannot be ignored. As Urbinati (2018: 112) states, the term populism can be used polemically in the sense of stigmatizing a particular political movement or leader, but also analytically in the sense of understanding populism as a complex socio-political phenomenon. Unlike public life and especially the political sphere, in academic circles, the term populism is predominantly used as an analytical tool. Many books and academic texts have been written to shed light on the theoretical significance of populism. Nevertheless, almost every theorist defines it in his own way (Balcere, 2017: 17). As Gherghina Soare (2013: 2) notes populism is like a shopping list that includes parties, movements, and ideologies with opposing political orientations. Specifically, populism is like a menu from which each theorist chooses certain things that he analyzes and marginalizes others. According to the Cambridge Dictionary of English, populism means a set of ideas and activities aimed at gaining people’s support by giving them what they want—tax cuts and wage increases (Mcintosh, 2013). It can be said that populism is a catch-all term that contains many different things that have a common basis. Populism is a manifestation of protest, a revolt involving nineteenth-century Russian populists, Italian fascists

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between two world wars, supporters of Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Alexis Tsipras in Greece, and Pablo Iglesias in Spain. Populism is an umbrella under which gathered everything that is on the other side and opposing to the establishment (Revelli, 2019: 5). Specifically, populism is a form of protest against the way political parties mediate between citizens and elites and a desire to abolish mediation between citizens and those in power (Kitschelt, 2002: 179). Populism does not see established, mainstream parties as intermediaries between the people and the establishment, but as an integral part of the establishment. The real function of the parties is not to mediate between the interests of the people and the interests of the elites, but to represent the interests of the people. People, in turn, are conceptualized as a homogeneous collective entity represented by charismatic political leaders. Hence, populism is trying to establish a new type of democracy. It is a direct, that is, populist, democracy. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (1999), a populist is a member of a party that claims to represent the people, that is, one who believes in the rights, wisdom, and values ​​of the people. The subject of populism is the people and their right to make and implement decisions. That right has been usurped by the elite. It can be said that there is an antagonistic connection between people and the elite. Populists in this antagonistic relationship are on the side of the people. Therefore, populism can be said to be a set of ideas that defend the sovereign right of people to be actively involved in politics, to make and implement decisions. A more precise meaning of populism can be sought in the theorizing of democratic legitimacy. An important additional element of this determination of populism is to distinguish the source of sovereignty—the people from those who run public affairs. There must be a connection between the political community and those who govern on its behalf. Populists believe that this relationship should not be mediated as in liberal democracies, but strong, close and direct. Hence, popular support legitimizes democratic policies, but can also lead to populism. In the theory of democracy there is a gap between the administration which is a class of professional bureaucrats, appointed on the basis of meritocracy, and the people in whose name and for whose good the officials govern. Those who govern do so on the basis of certain pre-established rules enshrined in the Constitution, which is also enacted in the name of protecting the interests of people living in a particular political community. The quality of public affairs management is checked at regular intervals through elections. The

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idea that people should govern directly, not through their representatives, is the basis of populism.

1.5   Evolution of the Study of Populism The fact that populism occupies the public sphere and is becoming more and more relevant as a political practice is increasingly attracting the attention of researchers who theorize and analyze socio-political reality. Populism is studied in the framework of various theoretical orientations such as structuralism, poststructuralism, social movement theory, political economy, and theory of democracy (Stefanel, 2016). In academic circles, until the 1950s, populism was associated with the agrarian populist movement in the United States and Russia from the late nineteenth century. It was during this period that Shils (1955) and Lipset (1960) first attempted to define McCarthyism as populism. Both authors point out that populism has many different forms. They find elements of populism in the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, in Perónism of the 1940s, and also in Nazism and Bolshevism (Wirth et al., 2016: 7). Shils writes that a key feature of populism is the trust it has in people as sovereign. The second characteristic of populism, according to him, is the direct communication between politicians and people. Lipset, on the other hand, saw populism as an extremist phenomenon based on xenophobia and anti-Semitism. According to Lipset, supporters of populism come from a similar social stratum. They are mostly members of the declining liberal classes who, frustrated by the decline of their social position, accept political ideologies such as regionalism, fascism, nationalism, anti-cosmopolitanism, and McCarthyism, through which they express irrational protest against society. In the 1960s, in the American context, populism was associated with the libertarian right and authoritarianism (Taggart, 2002: 63). During this period, populism was increasingly associated with Latin America and charismatic leaders with illiberal political agendas. Populism then began to relate more to the characteristics of the political organization from which it emerged (Moffitt, 2016). This period is the beginning of a more systematic study of populism (Pappas, 2019: 14). A particularly important step in the study of populism in academia was the organization of a multidisciplinary conference called “To define populism” which was attended by 43 experts including Isiah Berlin, Alain Touraine, Franco Venturi, and Hugh Seton-­ Watson. The conference was organized in May 1967. According to Pappas (2014: 3), this conference provided the direction for the study of

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populism from the first generation of scholars who were active until the 1970s and 1980s, that is, established the basic features that will be taken into account in the analysis of populism. Ionescu and Gellner (1969) stated that at the time of the organization of the conference, populism was a serious phenomenon, that is, a challenge that is becoming a bigger problem than communism, hence the need to pay more attention to its study. Conference participants disagreed on the nature of populism. In that sense, some analyzed it as an ideology, others as a political movement, and still others as a politician’s syndrome. Until the early 1980s, populism was seen in academic circles as a set of phenomena involving referendums, agricultural movements, and authoritarian regimes. The first generation of scholars studied populism more as a world phenomenon occurring on the periphery of the world political system in Africa, Asia, and communist Eastern Europe than as a phenomenon occurring in Western Europe, where there were in fact only two relevant political entities deserving to be called populist, Italian Common Man’s Front and Poujadisme in France (Pappas, 2019: 15). A feature of the first generation of scholarships is the mapping of populism, but they have failed to penetrate its ontology and find a generally accepted definition. If the first generation of scholars are pioneers, then the second generation of scholars of populism are classics (Pappas, 2019: 15). If the first generation of scholars were made up of people from Europe who, out of academic curiosity, dealt with this issue, the second generation of scholars included mainly Latin American people, that is, people who had experienced populism on their own. After World War II, Latin America entered a period of sustained economic development with the simultaneous expansion of populism. The industrial sector grew and the middle class expanded. Under such conditions, authoritarian leaders saw an opportunity to profit politically through the growing involvement of the broad masses in politics. Thus, there emerged leaders such as Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Juan Perón in Argentina, and Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra in Mexico. In such circumstances, Latin American scholars, instead of dealing with the question of defining populism as their European counterparts, began to associate populism with socio-economic determinants. Many Latin American scholars have seen populism as a positive experience for Latin American democracies. There were generally two approaches to the study of populism in Latin America. One relied on modernist theory and the other on structural Marxism. The first approach sees populism as a policy that mobilized workers and the middle class in urban centers. Structural

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Marxism, more precisely the so-called Dependency School, analyzed populism as a policy that attracts more classes according to the level of industrialization of the country. According to this school, the populist leaders managed to form a coalition between the workers in the urban centers, the middle classes, and the industrialists. Both approaches saw populism as a result of the historical and political development of the semi-periphery of the world political system. Populism was a feature of the Latin American socio-economic context, giving the impression that populism could hardly succeed in other parts of the world (Pappas, 2014: 3; 2019: 18). But in the 1990s, a new generation of hardline neoliberal leaders like Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori, and Fernando Collor de Mello emerged in Latin America. It renewed the interest in studying populistic political leaders, rather than socio-economic factors. Unlike traditional Latin American populism, the one from the 1990s corresponded better to populism that occurred in other parts of the world, for example, in Europe. The paradigm of the study of populism has changed, due to the evolution of the subject of study. The new paradigm envisaged an instrumental approach focused on charismatic leadership, rather than the study of structural factors in the development of populism such as the state and the economy (Pappas, 2019: 18). It can be said that until 1990 populism in Europe was a marginal political phenomenon. The reasons can be traced to the experiences that this continent had with fascism. But since this period, we have seen the growth of new populism, and already from the mid-1990s the study of populism was inspired by a new life. Populism as a phenomenon gained much greater social significance which was reflected in the growing interest in its research. In addition, populism as a phenomenon has changed, so has the prism through which it was seen until then. Several important scientific works on populism appeared during that period. These include Betz’s Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe published in 1994, The Populist Persuasion by Kazin in 1995, and a Taggart article entitled “New Populist Parties in Western Europe” published in 1995 (Moffitt, 2016). Krastev (2007: 57) called the revival of populism in the 1990s a populist wave. That wave was reflected in the growth of the radical right in Europe, and in Latin America in the resurgence of neoliberal populism, which in academic circles was called neo-populism. (Moffitt, 2016). The characteristic of the study of neo-populism was the focus on the role of charismatic leaders. These leaders were able to mobilize massive support for their policies. Neo-populism was analyzed as an instrumental political

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phenomenon, that is, as a political strategy in which personalized leadership seeks to gain institutional power (Pappas, 2014: 6; 2019: 19). The roots of contemporary populism can be traced back to the social processes that took place in the 1990s, and it differs significantly from the populism of the 1960s because it developed in a different political context and media atmosphere. Contemporary (new) populism is developing in conditions of serious influence on the process of globalization, new media technology, changed model of political representation and identification, and increased inequality in society (Moffitt, 2016). The characteristic of the study of the new populism that emerged in Europe in the 1990s was the trend of analyzing the level of populism in certain policies or in society in general. Textual analysis and surveys that measure the level of inclination toward populist values are starting to be used more intensively as a method of studying populism (Pappas, 2014: 6). In this period, from the periphery populism as a topic slowly began to enter the center of debates in political theories. Authors such as Laclau (2005), Mouffe (2005) and Zizek (2006) have published their studies on populism. The next decade was followed by the publications of a new generation of populist scholars such as Cas Mudde, Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Jan-Werner Müller, Takis Papas, and Benjamin Moffitt. Although research on populism by a number of these authors dates back to earlier times, they published their most famous works on populism in the second decade of the twentieth century. A characteristic of this generation of researchers is the inclination to view populism as a thin ideology. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, populism as a topic has already been established at the center of debates in political theories.

1.6   The Social Structure of the Populist Electorate Unlike some other political ideologies, populism is not based on class cleavage, but it divides the political spectrum along the lines of people versus the elite. Members of different classes, as defined by Weber, are on the side of the people. Perceived through the perspective of social classes, people are an eclectic class to which all those who are not part of the elite belong. For example, the Hungarian Fidesz is a catch-all party that addresses and receives support from the class-diverse structure of citizens (Feledy, 2017: 46). However, some social classes and strata show greater

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preferences for populism than others. For example, Fidesz in 2010, immediately after the financial crisis, mostly addressed and drew support from the middle and lower classes of the population, which was most affected by the crisis (Becker, 2018: 38). According to Worsley (1969) in its beginnings, populism had its social base in the peasantry, but also in the urban population, especially that of the first generation of rural migrants who had difficulty adapting to new living conditions. Thus in Europe right-wing populism was supported by the peasantry and workers who supported nationalist myths and ideologies, while in Latin America populism was supported by the urban working class (Balcere, 2017: 20). A similar view is held by Müller (2016: 58) who points out that in its beginnings populism was supported by the peasantry, the farmers, and the petty bourgeoisie, until their weight in politics was completely lost. Lipset (1960) analyzing the populism of the 1950s found that its social base was made up of members of the declining “liberal classes” living in economically depressed areas. Deteriorating social status leads them to embrace ideologies based on irrational protest. Swank and Betz (2003: 2018) point out that in the 1970s and early 1980s supporters of right-wing populist parties in Europe were mainly small business owners, farmers, and the self-employed. In the 1980s and 1990s the electoral base of these parties expanded to the youth, and despite the support of unskilled workers, populism began to receive increasing support from skilled workers. World Value Survey research has shown that among the voters of populist parties more represented than other social groups were the blue collars and small business owners. Ramiro (2016) and Molls and Jetten (2020) suggest that the electorate of populist parties has a U-shape in which the working class is on one side and the descending middle class is on the other. Sadurski (2019: 22) confirms that in Poland populists receive support from the working class, the peasantry, and the lower middle class. In addition to manual workers, middle-class people, the self-­ employed, and people with average and above-average incomes also vote for populist parties. What kind of dominant electorate will be attracted by certain populist parties also depends on what policies they promote. Thus, those who promote welfare policies attract more voters with lower socio-­ economic status, as opposed to those populist parties that promote market-­oriented economic policies (Harteveld, 2016). For example, the average voter for Trump in the US primaries in 2016 came from a family with an average annual income of $72,000, the average Clinton voter came from a family with an average annual income of $61,000, and the

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average Sanders voter came from a family of $56,000 average income (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). It should be noted that Trump’s electorate, in addition to voters who were attracted by his populist messages, also made up a significant portion of traditional Republican Party votes. The middle class has higher expectations of politics than the working class, but if its expectations are not met, there is a chance that it will be disappointed, become skeptical of the political elite, and be subject to populist influence. This is especially true if the middle class begins to lose their position in society (The Global State of Democracy, 2020). Мainly the politics of the populist parties are tuned to appeal to both the middle and the working class. Thus, for example, the Front National promote greater market liberalism, job creation through greater deregulation of the economy, criticizes the large welfare state, but above all its abuse by immigrants. He thus tells his lower-class supporters that possible cuts in welfare benefits will only affect migrants (outsiders) and attract small businesses traditionally hostile to the welfare state (Kitschelt, 2002: 190). Mudde (2007: 121) states that while the populist radical right theoretically stands for neoliberal positions, in practice their rhetoric abounds in promoting the essentially welfare chauvinist program. Norris and Inglehart (2019: 17) point out that although the social structure of the supporters of populist leaders is heterogeneous, they are mostly supported by the working class who feel threatened by job losses, wage stagnation, and perception that the standard of living does not grow. But the sense of threat also comes from the cultural changes that globalization and immigration bring. Globalization brings proletarianization and amalgamation of the electorate. Everyone who feels threatened by the consequences of globalization, especially the working class, the lower middle class, and the unemployed, is more likely to vote for the populists (Kriesi et al., 2008). For example, in the United States, Trump had the strongest support in regions with developed manufacturing industries, which are affected by the import of Chinese products. Such states are, for example, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. The biggest support for Brexit was in northern England and Midlands. These are regions that lag behind in economic development compared to the rest of England and are characterized by low incomes, high unemployment, and manufacturing. In the second round of the 2017 presidential election in France, Marine Le Pen and Front National, in addition to the traditional bastion of populists in the Mediterranean, had the most support in the regions with double-digit unemployment in northern France.

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Emmanuelle Macron had the greatest support in Paris and the rich suburban regions. In the 2017 German parliamentary elections, Alternative for Germany had the strongest support in the former East Germany, which lags behind West Germany in terms of economic development. Moffitt (2016) points out that in Latin America populism was supported by a multi-class urban alliance united by charismatic leaders. In the aftermath of World War II, populists in Latin America were supported by members of the working class and sometimes the middle class, who were mostly settlers in large urban centers disillusioned with the oligarchic structures that governed the political process. The neo-populists in Latin America in the 1990s were largely neoliberal and had massive support from the informal sector in urban centers and from people living in rural poverty. As Müller (2016: 11) notes, a significant part of the social base of neo-populism also consisted of petty bureaucracy. They opposed an organized working class that was the social base of the previous generation of populist leaders in Latin America. Such neo-populist leaders in 1990 were Alan Garcia, Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Pappas, 2014: 5; 2019: 19). According to Müller (2016), the motives for voting for populist parties are more psychological than sociological. Populists are always voted by people who are scared, whether they are afraid of modernization, globalization, or immigration. As Kaufmann points out, supporters of the populist radical right do not give political support and do not vote in elections for materialistic but cultural reasons related to identity policies (Bonikowski et al., 2019: 60). The reason for shaping the sense of threat to the domicile culture and identity of the members of the populist radical right is the advancement of the processes of modernization, globalization, and immigration. People who demand drastic political change vote for populist parties. While it is true that populist parties support people who feel threatened, if the analysis is deepened, it will be seen that individuals feel threatened because of the perception that they are losing their social status, that is, because the group they belong to is losing its dominant position in society. Thus, populist parties turn to and receive support from various social groups who lose their positions in the balance of power in society and are therefore dissatisfied and frustrated. Those who vote for populist parties express distrust of mainstream politics and ideological extremism (Pauwels, 2014). A profile of the level of education of those voting for political parties can be made. In Europe, for example, those who vote for nationalist

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populist parties are relatively poorly educated. Highly educated public and private sector professionals are under-represented in the electorate of right-wing modern populist parties, while less-educated working-class and middle-class members are over-represented (Kitschelt, 2002: 190). The same was confirmed by Elchandrus and Spruyt (2016) who, analyzing populism in Flanders, concluded that less-educated people were more likely to support populist parties than more educated ones. But populism should not be underestimated because its supporters have a relatively low level of formal education. Populist leaders know well how to run their political projects successfully, as evidenced by Brexit and Trump’s results in both 2016 and 2020 (Cox, 2017: 13). As far as gender is concerned, in the United States men are more in favor of populist policies, which is not the case in Latin America, for example. In Austria and France, populist parties have so much electoral support that they look like catch-all political parties. Their electorate consists of workers, but also people belonging to other social groups (Müller, 2016: 15; 2016: 59). In the last few decades, due to the failure of politicians representing established ideologies to deal with social problems, populism seems to be increasingly entering the center of the political arena. Populist voters do not vote in the same way and for the same motives as other voters. They do not behave according to the economic theory of voting. They did not act rationally by voting for the party they believed would bring them the greatest benefits over a period of time but were driven by emotion. Their voting behavior is driven by a sense of fear, insecurity, and hopelessness. They believe that the world is divided into two groups: people and elite. Many of them feel like helpless victims of their own destiny. They dream of egalitarianism, which they are aware will be difficult to achieve. Hence populist leaders have an antagonistic attitude toward the elite, as enemies of the people (Pappas, 2019: 217–19). In addition, supporters of populist parties do not always vote because of their personal position in society, but also because of the sense of threat to the ethnic, national, religious group to which they belong (Müller, 2016: 59). In different situations, populism manifests itself in different ways. It could be said that populism is the opposition of farmers to industrialization, just as populism is nationalism that opposes established power structures, just like rebellion against the elite in a society. Those who vote for the populist parties feel fear of the leading tendencies in society over which they have no control and which they feel threaten their very existence such as modernization and globalization. At the same time, they feel

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dissatisfaction and anger toward those who lead and direct those tendencies (Müller, 2016: 12). Any variant of populism contains mistrust and hostility toward the establishment. It usually occurs in the lower classes, such as the working class, but also in the middle class, which loses its position in society, that is, in the common man, who reacts against technology, intellectuals, and political innovation. For a complete understanding of populism as a social phenomenon, its relation to certain important social phenomena such as elitism, pluralism, and clientelism is important. Elitism and populism are the opposites of populism. Populism is an anti-elitist and anti-pluralist view of politics (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 7 A). Unlike the antagonistic attitude toward elitism and pluralism, populism has an ambivalent attitude toward clientelism.

1.7   Populism and Elitism Populism and elitism are deformations of liberal democracy (Galston, 2020). Both ideologies divide society into two parts, people and elites. Elitism believes that the elite has superior skills and understanding of politics, of society as a whole, but that they should be deprived of the discomfort of seeking support for their views of politics in ordinary people, who do not possess the qualities to understand them. The elitists see ordinary people as dishonest, vulgar, and dangerous to society, while elites are seen as superior not only morally but also culturally and intellectually. Elitists believe that the elite is superior to the masses, knows more, has superior qualities, but is minority. The position of individuals in the social hierarchy is not accidental, but it is the fruit of their qualities. Those who possess superior qualities are at the top. Elitists believe that politics should be an activity of the elite and that democracy as a political system either is unacceptable or should be severely limited (Hawkins et al., 2017: 3). Classics of elitism such as Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca consider ruling elites to be a necessary part of social organization and as such perform important social functions. Societies are hierarchically organized by nature, and an egalitarian distribution of power in society is impossible. For Pareto (1963: 1423) members of the elite are those who possess exceptional knowledge and skills in a particular area of social ​​ life. Those who possess the greatest skills in sports are part of the sports elite, those who possess the most knowledge in science is part of the scientific elite, while those who possess the most knowledge and skills in politics are part

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of the political elite. It is a meritocratic and pluralistic view of the elite. The pluralistic conceptualization of elitism was a significant feature of the elite vision after World War II. Robert Dahl stands out as an important author here. Elitists and populists have very different views on representativeness. For elitists, those who represent the interests of citizens have the right to make decisions that may not be liked in the short term by those on whose behalf those decisions are made. Sometimes, those who make decisions on behalf of people have more information and can better assess the situation and make decisions that are better for the interests of ordinary people even though people themselves may not see it at the moment. Therefore, for the elitists, the representativeness is not blind obedience. Unlike elitism, populism has an egalitarian rather than a hierarchical view of social structure. Populists believe that the elite is not created on the basis of merit, qualities, and skills, but created on the basis of manipulating and exploiting the masses. Populism is a reaction to the elitism and oligarchizing of social structures. According to the populists, the elite is not morally superior, but in fact inferior to people who are naive, honest, and good-natured. Populists believe that power should be in the hands of the people, not in the hands of the elite. According to the populists, the people’s representatives have an obligation to comply with the will of those who represent. As Müller (2016: 8) notes, citing Mudde, populism is a form of illiberal democracy, while elitism is a form of undemocratic liberalism. Hence the rise of populism in recent decades can be seen as a response of illiberal democracy to the spread of undemocratic liberalism. The ideal situation for liberal democracy is to avoid both elitism and populism as two extremes into which it can fall.

1.8   Populism and Pluralism Pluralism is not a dualistic concept of society like populism. On the contrary, for pluralism, the political community is a set of social groups whose interests and ideas can overlap, can be cooperative, but also in competition (Hawkins et al., 2017: 3). The multitude of interests and ideas is not seen as a weakness, but on the contrary as an advantage of a political community. According to pluralists, society has many centers of power that can be in competition, but through compromise can also be harmonized. Power should be dispersed throughout society, in as many social groups and individuals as possible, in order to avoid the possibility of concentrating it on

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only one social group or individual. Populists, on the other hand, have a dichotomous view of society and politics. On one side are the people who are morally superior, while on the other side is the corrupt elite. People are conceptualized as a homogeneous group that has a common general will, values, ​​and interests. There is no room for fundamental differences, divisions, and misunderstandings between those who belong to ordinary people. Although between members of the elite differences may arise, it is perceived as united to achieve higher goals and that is the exploitation of people (Mangset et  al., 2019: 206). Unlike the pluralists, the populists claim that only the interests of the people are legitimate, and the only ones who have the right to represent the interests of the people are the populists. According to populists, all political opponents representing the interests of other social groups are illegitimate (Ferzins, 2017: 60). Here the populists have a line of statism similar to that of the Communists, who also claimed to be the only legitimate representatives of the working class, whose interests according to communists were only relevant and permissible for political representation. The reasons why the interests of the people should be represented and those of the elite repressed and marginalized according to the populists are of a moral nature. People are always morally clean and always right (Müller, 2016: 3). Non-recognition of pluralism, of differences in society, is dangerous for democracy and political life as a whole. If there are no political differences, if the representation of the interests of certain groups in politics is not legitimate, there is no politics. The etatistic dimension of populism is reflected in the challenge to the right to diversity, as well as to the right to have their interests represented and protected. Additionally, anyone can be suspected of being an enemy of the people. In other statist ideologies there is a similar threat to declare its political opponents as enemies of the proletariat in the case of communists or national traitors and opponents of the national interests in the case of the nationalists. Because of statist, anti-pluralist elements in its ideology, populists have been criticized for trying to establish authoritarian regimes when they are given the opportunity to run public affairs.

1.9   Populism and Clientelism Populism is a political ideology that believes that society should be governed according to the general will of the people, while clientelism is an election victory strategy used by certain political leaders and parties (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 8 A; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Clientelism

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is voting for a particular political party in exchange for pre-electoral incentives and post-electoral rewards. There are two types of clientelistic exchanges that often go hand in hand. On the one hand, those who have a lot of resources, but have few votes, give politicians financial support, which they use in times of elections. Entities that provide financial support in return receive beneficial conditions under which they conduct their businesses, when the politician they invest in wins the election. Politicians, on the other hand, use financial resources to trade with those who have votes but no resources (Kitschelt, 2002: 188). Symbiosis between clientelism and populism can sometimes occur. Namely, it may happen that certain politicians simultaneously use clientelism, that is, establish their own network of clients, and at the same time use populist rhetoric, claiming that they represent the interests of the people. Such is the case with local authorities in Romania cited by Pandelea and Mieczkowski (2015). Populism is often confused with clientelism, especially in the literature that analyzes political processes in Latin America (Urrutia, 2007,376). Lately, clientelism has been a significant model of political mobilization and increasing political participation in Eastern Europe as well. For example, in Hungary before the elections, retirees as a social group in which Fidesz has great support usually receive financial benefits. Also, before the elections, the financial support of the Hungarians living as a minority outside Hungary is increasing. In the 2014 elections, it was organized for these voters to be transported to polling stations at the state’s expense (Mares & Young, 2019: 451). In that way, on the one hand, the connection of the populist party with that electorate is strengthened, and on the other hand, a patriotic-nationalist atmosphere is created. Although examples can be found in which populists, especially when in power, use clientelism, in principle populism and clientelism are different. Clientelism is the exchange of votes for direct payment or privileged access to employment, goods, and services, which takes place between voters and politicians. Undoubtedly, many populist leaders especially in Latin America, and in Eastern Europe, use clientelism, particularly when they come to power and use the mechanisms of the state to expand their clientelist patronage networks. But they are not the only ones doing so, and there is no reason why populists should be more inclined to use clientelism than other politicians. Analysts of populism often point out that clientelism in traditional, mainstream parties is one of the important reasons for citizens to look for a credible alternative in populist parties. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party is an anti-clientelist party that opposes the grand

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coalition governments and their clientelistic practices, which include nationalized industries, housing, and public sector employment. A second example of an anti-clientelist populist party is the Lega Nord, which opposes clientelism in northern Italy (Kitschelt, 2002: 182–185). However, the fact that clientelism is based on gaining support based on the benefits received by certain groups of voters, and not on the basis of a political program on the one hand, and that populism is such a fluid political ideology that many define it as discourse, style, etc., which takes elements from other political ideologies indicates both clientelism and populism lack a credible program and that in general populists would be more willing to use clientelism than representatives of other political ideologies. The point of contact between populism and clientelism is that both are crossing the ideological differences left-right. In other words, just as there is left-wing and right-wing populism, clientelism can be used by both left- and right-wing political parties and leaders.

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Shils, A.  E. (1955). Populism and the Rule of Law. In S.  Buchanan (Ed.), Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics Proceedings (1954) (pp.  91–107). University of Chicago Law School. Smilov, D., & Krastev, I. (2008). The Rise of Populism in Eastern Europe: Policy Paper. In G. Meseznikov, O. Gjarfashova, & D. Smilov Daniel (Eds.), Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Institute for Public Affairs. Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). How Did “Populism” Become a Pejorative Concept? And Why Is This Important Today? A Genealogy of Double Hermeneutics (POPULISMIS Working Papers 6). Stefanel, A. (2016). Notes on Populism. Revue Roumaine de Philisophie, 60(1), 129–138. Stockemer, D. (2019). Populism Around the World: A Comparative Perspective. Springer. Swank, D., & Betz, H.  G. (2003). Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-­ Wing Populism in Western Europe. Socio-Economic Review, 1(2), 215–245. Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the Pathology of Contemporary Politics. In Y.  Many & Y.  Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Tarchi, M. (2016). Populism: Ideology, Political Style, Mentality. Politologicky Casopis, 23(2), 95–109. The Global State of Democracy. (2020). Populist Government and Democracy: An Impact Assessment Using the Global State of Global State of Democracy Indices. 9, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Urbinati, N. (2018). Political Theory of Populism. Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 111–127. Urrutia, M. (2007). On the Absence of Economic Populism in Columbia. In R. Dornbusch & S. Edwards (Eds.), The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. University of Chicago Press. Von Beyme, K. (2018). Rightwing Populism: An Element of Neo Democracy. Springer. Wirth W., Esser F., Wettstein M., Engesser S., Wirz D., Schulz A., Ernst N., Buchel F., Caramani D., Malluci L., Steenmergen M., Bernhard L., Weber E., Hanggli R., Dalmus C., & Schemer C. (2016). The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Stiles: A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication (Working Paper, 88, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR). Woertz E. (2017). Populism in Europe: From Symptom to Alternative?. CIDOB. Worsley, P. (1969). The Concept of Populism. In G. Ionescu & E. Gellner (Eds.), Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics. Macmillan. Zizek, S. (2006). Against the Populist Temptation. Critical Inquiry, 32(3), 551–574.

CHAPTER 2

Approaches to the Studying of Populism

2.1   Introduction Relying on case studies and analyses of specific countries and regions in the past decades, researchers have come to an abundance of knowledge about populism, but not to the agreement on how to conceptualize, analyze, and study it (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016: 7). Populism is a multidimensional phenomenon and hence the multitude of approaches in its studying and explanation of its dimensions (Eichengreen, 2018). Studying populism in the social sciences is a dynamic affair, as is the subject matter itself. As Taggart (2000) writes, populism has a chameleonic nature. It adapts to the circumstances in which it exists and constantly mutates. In order to reach the different dimensions in the evolution of populism in space and time, there are several approaches in its definition and study. Some of them are common sense approaches and are usually filled with negative emissions, while others try to rationally perceive the characteristics of populism. Mudde (2004: 542) points to two common-sense approaches of populism. The former sees populism as a politics of pub, while the latter sees it as meeting the needs of voters in the short term, just to get votes in elections. In scientific circles, there are authors who operate with the concept of populism without defining it, while some define it as discourse, others as ideology, leadership, movement, phenomenon, strategy, political behavior, belief system, etc. (Martinelli, 2018: 16). After studying the social base of populism, Mudde (2004: 542) came to the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_2

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conclusion that the common features of populism are very abstract and principled. Therefore, he believed that the study of populism should be taken one step back, to the study of its ideological features and not to the social base that produces it. Some authors like Eichengreen (2018: 1) determine populism as an anti-elitist, authoritarian political movement. But according to Worsley, populism is not a political movement, nor is it an ideology. Although in some situations there may be characteristics of a political movement, the populists know how to position themselves in power structure themselves, and lose the characteristics of a movement. On the other hand, due to the mixing of values and concepts from different political ideologies, populism can hardly be said to be a classical political ideology. It is more like a general political culture, that is, civic activism (Berlin et al., 1968: 157). According to Worsley (1969), when studying populism, one should not insist on conceptual purity because populism does not possess it. Also, populism is not a phenomenon that is specific to a particular region, as it is not specific to any of the parties in the classical ideological spectrum. Specifically, populism can be found in any region of the world, just as left- and right-wing populism can be found. According to Mouffe (2016), populism is a type of collective action to achieve social power, that is, populism is a way of making politics. Populism was similarly studied by Wayland (2001: 1) who considered it to be a specific way of competing for power and exercising it. Depending on the time and place, populism can take many forms. At first glance, it may seem that the difficulty in determining the true meaning of populism stems from the fact that this concept is the subject of study in various scientific disciplines such as art history, criminology, economics, education, history, political science, and sociology. But even if the definition of populism is analyzed from a specific scientific discipline such as sociology, the authors differ significantly in determining the true meaning of populism (Mudde, 2017). However, differences in approaches to defining and studying populism seem to stem from its complexity. As Bonikowski and Gidron (2016: 7) point out, the lack of a single generally accepted approach to the study and definition of populism is a consequence of its amorphous nature. Higgot (2018: 7) states that populism is a heterogeneous, imprecise, stylistically discursive concept of people who are angry with their elite who they think has betrayed their interests. There are long-term structural reasons behind the emergence of populism. The growth of the populist far right in Europe, Brexit, and the victory of Trump are just

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symptoms of the disease, that is, the problems in society that cause the growth of populism. The real reasons for the growth of the last wave of populism are the revolt against the results of globalization, the growth of inequality, the perception of the growth of the number of immigrants, the perception of the growth of terrorism, and distrust of political parties and the political system as a whole. Disagreement over the definition of populism in the social sciences is nothing new. Namely, Tarchi (2016), referring to Ionescu and Gellner, shows that in 1960, Donald MacRae considered populism to be an ideology; Peter Willes was convinced that it was a syndrome, not a classical political doctrine; Kenneth Minogue gave priority to that populism occurs in the form of political movements; and Agnus Stewart associated populism with a specific identity. Gherghina and Soare (2013: 3) indicate that the constituent elements of the definitions of populism are (1) sacralization and idealization of people, (2) confidence in the superhuman qualities of leadership, (3) xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism, (4) promotion of the ideal for an organic society with social, economic, and cultural harmony, (5) intensive use of conspiracy theories and apocalyptic vision for the future, (6) nostalgia for the past, and (7) anti-elitism. Van Kessel (2011: 2) in his operational definition of populism reduces all these elements to three: (1) clear identification of people, (2) addressing people, and (3) hostile attitude toward the establishment.

2.2   Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Study of Populism Almost every author who deals with the study of populism makes his own categorization of the approaches according to which it is studied. One of the most influential categorizations is made by Rovira (2016), who based on the experiences in Latin America proposes a categorization that includes four separate approaches: (1) structuralist approach, which is based on changing the structure of society and includes factors such as industrialization and rural-urban migration; (2) an economic approach that views populism from the perspective of irresponsible short-term economic policies in order to gain more votes in the next elections; the populist approach to the economy usually ends in inflation; (3) the political-institutional approach that sees populism as a strategy, the narrative of political leaders to gain or stay in power; and (4) the ideological approach that sees

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populism as a set of ideas. Moffitt (2016) also points to the need to establish a classification in approaches to the study of contemporary populism. According to Moffitt, populism can be approached, defined, and researched as (1) ideology, (2) strategy, (3) discourse, and (4) political logic. Populism as a strategy and as a discourse can be used by politicians who do not always use populist political logic and who are not ideologically populist. In these cases, populism is used as a means to achieve certain political goals. The difference between politicians who are ideological populists, that is, who have a populist political logic, and those who are not is whether they accept a pluralistic view of politics based on the heterogeneity of interests in society or view society through a dichotomous-binary prism, with only the interests of one entity—the people have a legitimate right to be protected. But the definition of populism does not stop there. Thus Bonikowski and Gidron (2016: 7) point to three dominant approaches in the study of populism. The first studies populism as a strategy for political mobilization, the second as an ideology, and the third as a political discourse. Cas Mudde (2017) points to similar approaches in the study of populism. Namely, Mudde (2017) writes about discursive, organizational, cultural-performative, and ideological approaches in the study of populism. Table 2.1 shows that each of the cited authors points out at least three approaches in the study of populism in a different, characteristic way. Three approaches to the study of populism are repeated by the four authors. Everyone concludes that populism is studied as a discourse, strategy, and ideology. While Bonikowski and Gordon adhere only to these generally accepted approaches, Rovira Kaltwasser adds to that the structuralist approach that analyzes populism from the perspective of structural changes in society such as industrialization, migration, modernization, and individualization. However, it seems that the study of the structure of the societies in which populism originates is more related to the causes of the emergence and growth of populism than to its characteristics. Moffitt and Mudde, on the other hand, suggest another additional approach, although they use different terms to describe it. Namely, what Moffitt calls political logic, Mudde calls performance, mentality, and way of behaving. In general, although each of the categorizations has its own specifics, there are essentially no major differences between them. If we have to choose one categorization according to which we will further consider each of the approaches to the study of populism, it will be the categorization made by Mudde. The reason is that this categorization puts each of the approaches

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Table 2.1  Аn overview of approaches to the study of populism and its characteristics by individual authors Theorist

Approach

Rovira Kaltwasser

Structuralist approach Economic approach Political-­institutional approach Ideational approach Moffitt Ideology Strategy Discourse Political logic Bonikowski and Strategy Gidron Ideology Discourse Mudde Discourse Organization

Cultural–performative Ideation

Features Industrialization, migration Quick and irresponsible economic solutions Strategy, narrative Thin ideology Thin ideology Manner of gaining power Style, story Way of thinking Manner of gaining power Thin ideology Style, story Style, story A strategy by which a charismatic leader acquires the right to rule. A relational approach to populism Performance, mentality, behavior, and decision-making Thin ideology

in a broader context. The study of populism as a political strategy puts it in the context of the organization of populist movements and parties. In this way, a clearer picture of populism is obtained.

2.3   The Discursive Approach The issue of discourse in politics is nothing new. It goes back to Aristotle, who linked discourse and rhetoric to the question of the legitimacy of politics. Probably the issue of discourse, as well as the issue of accurate and effective transmission of messages to citizens, is as old as politics itself (Estrom et al., 2018: 2). Focusing on discourse is probably the first serious approach to defining populism. It focuses on the story promoted by the populists and its articulation in public space. Through the discourse it promotes in public, populism creates political identities. Probably the most important theorist who focuses on defining populism through discourse is Ernesto Laclau. He defines populism as a discourse that articulates a popular democratic story that is antagonistic to the dominant liberal

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ideology. The discursive approach to the study of populism as a narrative of the struggle of people against elites is relevant to this day. According to this approach, populism is not a set of beliefs, but a set of stories, of expression, which can be recorded in speeches and texts. As a discourse, populism uses direct and emotional language and simply worded formulations in order to gain support from people (Balcere, 2017: 25). Thus Kazin (1995: 1) defines populism as a language used by those who claim to speak on behalf of the majority of people. Populism means flattery of ordinary people, of their ethical qualities. Populism is a political style that mobilizes the masses based on the use of language that accuses elites of being selfish and corrupt. In the words of Aslanidis (2016: 9), populism is an anti-elitist discursive framework constructed in the name of the sovereignty of the people. For example, Fidesz supporters use political discourse that disqualifies experts and those working for NGOs as part of an establishment that works against the interests of the people (Feledy, 2017: 47). Populists negatively treat those who are not part of the elite, but also do not fall into the category of people. Marginalized minor groups based on various criteria such as ethnicity and religion are usually included in that category. Foreign Policy magazine editor Moises Naim argued that populism lacked intellectual coherence, but was a more discursive phenomenon used by skilled demagogues. Populism creates and spreads a discourse that divides society, spreads conspiracies, talks about threats and traitors, seeks out enemies, and where there are none, creates an atmosphere that there is an internal political, international crisis, doubts everyone who does not believe in populist discourse, criminalizes them, and presents them as corrupt (Cox, 2017: 14). Populist discourse does not insist on rationality, moderation, and stability, but on the contrary it appears, and itself creates crises, mistrust, an atmosphere of conspiracy, and extremism (Taggart, 2002: 69). The crisis does not have to be just economic; the moral decline is often seen by populists as a greater social crisis than economic hardship. Daniel Bell noted the parasitism on the crisis as a feature of the far right in the United States in the 1950s. The emergence of the far right was then explained by the post-war traumas of World War II, which the far right verbalized (Mudde, 2016: 3). The new populism, on the other hand, grows on the basis of the crisis of the legitimacy of the mainstream parties and often tries to make political capital on the issue of corruption of the mainstream parties, thus further emphasizing the issue of the illegitimacy of the traditional parties. Krastev (2017: 35) believes that although at first glance populism opposed people to the elite, it is basically a post-utopian

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discourse characteristic of societies in which people are more consumers than citizens, that is, a passive political actor. Hence, populism is an anti-­ political performance, that is, a theater that at first glance challenges the dominant order and in fact stabilizes it. Populism seems to stabilize society in relation to the old left-right political divisions, based on deep and lasting social cleavage, but at the same time opens up new divisions on the people-elite line. Unlike the ideological one, the discursive approach in the study of populism does not consider to be based on a set of interconnected coherent ideas, but rather populism is a discourse, a rhetorical style used by charismatic leaders of different ideological orientations. However, the discursive approach does not link populism to the subjects that create the discourses, that is, the charismatic leaders, but to the messages that are sent to the citizens, their structuring and narration. In that sense, the populist discourse contains three elements: (1) a reminder of the golden age, when the people’s sovereignty was respected, when the people had their destiny in their own hands; (2) accusing the corrupt elite of betraying the interests of the people; and (3) demanding a return to the legitimate order, that is, the sovereignty of the people (Surel, 2011). Depending on the context, political actors may use different degrees of populism in their speeches, that is, some political actors use more populism in their speeches than others. The discursive approach primarily focuses on the study of the contextual conditionality of populism (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016: 8). According to Norris and Inglehart (2019: 4), the minimal elements that every populism contains are discursive elements that refer to who should be in power, and they are representatives of those from whom sovereignty springs—the people. Populism does not say much about what should be done when the representatives of the people come to power, what decisions should be made, and what agenda should be implemented. It seems that the only purpose of the representatives of the people, that is, populist leaders, is to be in power. They have to pursue politics the way people want it, and because people are a social construct and can be manipulated, it often comes down to the preferences of populist leaders. Because their preferences may be different, populism takes different forms. Populism does not have an official text, program, and manifesto, among others, like other ideologies. That is why he uses informal language, metaphors, specific rhetoric, style, and way of presenting politics (Moffitt, 2016). Populism is a political discourse in which there is a cosmic struggle between the will of the people and the conspiracies of the elite (Hawkins & Rovira, 2017: 2). Populists use simple, easy-to-understand language

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that simplifies social problems and always finds the culprit for the problems in society and it is always the establishment, but also foreigners, Europeans, Americans, Jews, bankers, Easterners in the United States, and Westerners in Russia (Berlin et al., 1968: 158). In that sense, populism as rhetoric touches people’s emotions and often knows how to manipulate them (Balcere, 2017: 24). Or as defined by Norris and Inglehart (2019: 4), populism is a rhetorical style based on the will of ordinary people. It says nothing about the principles on which policy should be based, what policies should be implemented, and what decisions should be made. A good example of how populism works as a discursive framework is the problem of climate change. It can be explained by the wording of the economy, by arguing how much each additional degree of global warming would cost on the one hand and the prevention of such a problem on the other. But that problem can also be simplified, moralized, and blamed on incompetent and corrupt elites. One approach would be adequate for an international economic summit, while the other could bring a lot of votes in elections. What is important for populism is the story that is told, the speeches that are given, the public debates, and not the institutions that could be treated as the personification of the elite (Bonikowski, 2016: 14). Hence, populism is not coherent. It is a rhetorical tactic, a narrative used by demagogues to come and stay in power (Cox, 2017: 12). In that sense, populism is very flexible and can be adapted to different socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts. According to Estrom et al. (2018: 2), populism lacks specific political content and it is nothing but discourse. Just because it is a discourse does not mean that it has no influence in society and is a marginal phenomenon. On the contrary, populism often has a serious impact on shaping public opinion even when it is not the dominant discourse in a particular society (Urbinati, 2018: 114). Proponents of the discursive approach try to investigate the level of populism in the discourses used by politicians based on an analysis of the content of their speeches, party documents, and so on. The results of such research show that some political entities that were considered to be quite populist, in fact, do not use such pronounced populist discourses and vice versa, for political entities that were considered non-populist, it turned out that they actually use populist discourses. This only sparked a debate about the criteria for what should be considered an indication of populist discourse and which texts should be evaluated. The dilemma also arises as to whether populist discourse is static or dynamic. Whether research is able to record populism or the possible evolution of the discourse of the new

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generation of populists is not registered as populist discourse, because it does not fit into the patterns of traditional populist discourse. To date, there is no consensus among researchers on the criteria for determining the degree of populism, as well as the texts to be analyzed, in terms of whether to analyze speeches provided by leaders, party programs, election programs, etc. (Moffitt, 2016). Some authors suggest that in addition to studying the discourse used by populists to understand populism, the visual impression left by politicians should also be of interest to researchers. Therefore, from the study of discourse, one should move on to the study of the style of populist politicians (Moffitt, 2016). Canavan (1984) considered that the only thing that connects populists is the discourse, behavior, rhetoric they use, which is characterized by invoking people’s interests, antagonistic attitude toward the elite and offering easy, quick, and simple solutions to difficult structural social problems. In doing so, populists raise issues and use explications that are popular among the people and are marginalized among those who make decisions about political processes. Topics raised by populists include immigration, crime, unemployment, and more (Canovan, 2002: 27). According to Gerstle and Nai (2019: 413–14), populists use rhetoric that identifies them with people. A characteristic of populist rhetoric is the critique of the system, of the government, of the institutions, that is, anti-­ establishment, anti-elitist rhetoric. For example, Trump’s campaign for the 2016 election has repeatedly stated that he will clear the swamp of corrupt politicians and lobbyists. In a similar way, Marine Le Pen speaks about the European Commissioners. According to her, these are people that no one knows and for whom no one voted (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 5). The vocabulary used by populists is simple and informal and avoids using technical terms. Populist rhetoric aims to create closeness between the populist leader and the people. Populist speeches are full of insults to political opponents, emotions, and patriotism. A key element of populist political communication is to make emotional connections with people who are dissatisfied and may even be angry with political elites (Block & Nagrine, 2017: 182). The vocabulary of populism can be found in anti-intellectualism, denying the knowledge of experts and invoking common sense, that is, the wisdom of ordinary people. Although populism can be seen through the prism of the style of expression, it cannot be reduced to a political style alone.

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2.4   Organizational Approach This approach seeks to link populism to a particular type of organizational characteristics that are common to all or at least to most populist parties and movements. The organizational approach defines populism as the mobilization of the masses in which the leader connects with his followers without intermediaries. The leader is the embodiment of the essence of the people. Populist movements and parties often reject bureaucratic, precisely regulated forms of leadership, and they rely on charismatic leaders who are in direct contact with their followers, instilling a thread of authoritarianism in them (Taggart, 2003). Moffitt (2016) also calls the organizational approach a strategic approach to defining and studying populism. It is a view of populism as a strategy by which a charismatic leader, who is directly supported by a large number of people, acquires the right to manage public affairs. According to the organizational approach, populism is not an ideology that populists believe in, but a strategy that they apply when the necessary preconditions are created to mobilize citizens and thus get as many votes as possible in the elections. The core of populism is the mobilization of citizens through the direct relationship of populist leaders with their followers (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016: 8). For example, Weyland (2001: 12) defines populism as a political strategy through which a leader seeks or exercises power based on the direct, immediate, non-­ institutional support of a large number of followers who are often ill-­ organized. Almost all populist parties and movements rely on strong leaders, or as Carter (2005) points out, leadership skills are key to populist party results. As Mudde (2004: 545) notes, there is a tendency for populist movements and parties to develop strong leadership and direct, immediate communication between leaders and their followers. Heinisch and Mazzoleni (2016: 2) also note that populist parties are parties of charismatic leaders, centralized leadership, strong loyalty to the leader that strengthens party cohesion, weak organization, and a small bureaucratic apparatus. Populism is characterized by the moralization of politics, the rejection of bureaucracy in party life, the view of the populist leader as a messiah with superhuman characteristics, distrust of intellectuals and the establishment as a whole, and opposition to socio-economic inequality (Tarchi, 2016). The fact that populist parties are more movements without a solid structure, strongly influenced by charismatic leaders, allows for flexibility in policies, where only two levels are fixed—identification with people and open hostility to the establishment—and everything else is

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variable and open to adjustment of the context in which populist parties operate (Muis, 2015: 57). Charismatic leaders are the embodiment of the will of ordinary people, opposing the interests of elites and established institutions. From populist charismatic leaders their voters expect to solve all the problems of ordinary people (Henrichsen, 2019). Populism is done by populist leaders. They are usually part of an elite that is marginalized or feels marginalized and identifies with ordinary people, trying to help them change the elite and thus save democracy (Stefanel, 2016). Populist leaders are subject to support from followers, but also criticism from opponents. Populist leaders like Geert Wilders, Thaksin Shinawatra, and Hugo Chavez are better known than their parties. Individual populist movements and regimes are recognizable by the names of their leaders. Hence we have Pеronism, Chavism, and Trumpism, among others. Populist leaders build an image of themselves as capable of solving the most significant political challenges. For example, Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 declared himself the greatest driving force in power, and everyone else is there just to help him, while Berlusconi described himself as Jesus Christ in politics, in the sense that he sacrificed himself to save citizens (Moffitt, 2016: 71). The direct link between the leader and the followers is the result of a lack of relevant formal organization. Populist parties have personalized leadership. The way populist parties are presented to the public depends on the personality of the charismatic leaders. The organizational approach does not define populism through the values promoted by leadership, but rather through the way leadership communicates with its supporters (Moffitt, 2016). The relationship between the leader and the followers is direct, personal, and without the mediation of the party organization (Balcere, 2017: 26). The charisma of populist leaders replaces the party organization. Because they are built on the authority of a charismatic leader, populist parties can disintegrate when a leader leaves the party or loses influence over it, although there are examples of populist parties based on the authority of a particular leader that in the meantime have built a party structure that can function successfully even after the election of a new leader (Betz, 2002: 210). The very attachment of great importance to leadership and the marginalization of the bureaucratic party structure is a form of anti-elitism. Populists see the bureaucratic structure in the parties as a party-political elite. Criticism of the professionalism and bureaucratization of parties began at the very beginning of this process in the early twentieth century.

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At the time, there were allegations that parties were becoming oligarchic. But the parties were particularly criticized when, despite the bureaucratic structure they developed, they failed to deliver results. It has exposed the party bureaucracy as useless and incompetent, but often accused of corruption. But what is most significant is that the party bureaucracy interferes with direct communication between the leader and the followers, the party becomes sluggish, unable to respond quickly to membership demands, hence the accusations of partisanship. That is, the parties serve only to satisfy the narrow party interests of the party bureaucratic structure. The organizational approach to the study of populism considers various factors that contribute to using a higher degree of populist mobilization of citizens in certain contexts. For example, according to Roberts (2007), the weaknesses of civil society and traditional political parties create favorable preconditions for populist mobilization. According to Bonikowski and Gidron (2016: 10), in the European context, politicians who have long-term ambitions to engage in politics at the national level use populist discourse more than those who have ambitions to engage in politics in the European Parliament, just as those politicians who are in opposition generally use more populist discourses and narratives than those in power. Populist political leadership can appear in two ways. One is for the social group to promote a leader, and the second is for the leader to form a group of followers because of his qualities. In the first case, social movements that grow into populists sooner or later promote leadership that unites and represents the people. In the latter case, certain individuals have such influential rhetoric, a discourse that is followed by many people who form a movement around that person (Moffitt, 2016). The internal organizational structure of populist parties is generally different from that of traditional bureaucratic, party structures (Balcere, 2017: 25). The existence of a charismatic leader facilitates the success of populist parties, but this is not a condition without which they would not exist. Thus Barr (2009: 41) gives the example of Alberto Fujimori who achieves considerable success in Peru without being a charismatic leader. Not all populist leaders are charismatic, but most are. They usually pretend to be one of the people. They present themselves as someone who represents people and did not differ from them. Followers identified with populist leaders may find some traits similar to them, but even then, populist leaders are a better, almost ideal version of themselves. However, some of the populist leaders are billionaires and have enormous political influence, and it is unlikely that their followers can identify with them in that regard. Populist

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leaders must have direct and immediate communication with the people they claim to represent, that is, to say publicly what they think. Hence, they try to depend as little as possible on a bureaucratic and complex party structure that would mediate between leaders and citizens. Populist politicians try to make their relationship with people as little as possible mediated by the media and journalists. A good example is Beppe Grillo, whose Five Star Movement came from his online blog. Similarly, Trump communicates directly with his supporters via his Twitter account (Müller, 2016a: 33–35). Unlike populist parties, populists do not have such a strong organizational structure; they are more dependent on the leader. It attracts individuals and produces discourse, performance, and ideology in which they believe (Laclau, 2005: 100). Although charismatic leadership is an important factor in gaining popularity, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a populist party or movement to emerge. However, empiricism shows that populism implies charismatic leadership and a weak formal organizational structure. Populist parties do not have a developed party infrastructure, because that means bureaucratization and sluggishness of the party, in which the leader will not be able to communicate quickly, easily, simply, and directly with the followers. Therefore, it can be said that populism inclines toward charismatic leadership and weak formal organizational structure (Mudde, 2017). The weak organizational structure, the fluidity of the membership, is reflected in the fact that they often prefer to be organized as movements—Five Star Movement in Italy; as a foundation—Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands; and as a front— Front National (FN) in France, rather than as a party. According to Müller (2016a: 37), there is another reason, not just organizational, that may offer an explanation for why populists do not so much prefer to be registered as parties but as movements, and that is their anti-pluralism. Namely, the parties represent part of the people, but they also accept that another part of the people or other social groups are represented by other parties. Populists, however, have aspirations to be legitimate representatives of all people. Hence, as an organizational structure, they prefer the movements that are much wider and less loosely organized than the parties that are narrower and more strongly structured collective actors. The anti-­pluralism and charismatic leadership of populist parties results in intra-party authoritarianism. Such is the case with Geert Wilders and his Party Voor de Vrijheid (PVV), in which Wilders has absolute control. The situation is

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similar to the Five Star Movement which is completely under the control of Beppe Grillo (Müller, 2016a: 37). As Moffitt (2016) notes, if we define populism only as a direct and immediate connection between the leader and the followers and the lack of an institutional, formal, bureaucratic organizational structure, then problems of an empirical nature arise. Namely, there are many movements, especially religious ones, which have never been considered populist, but according to this definition, they meet the criteria to be categorized as such. On the other hand, there are populist parties such as Front National in France and Partij Voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands, which have a well-developed organizational structure and strong party discipline. This approach to defining populism is seen as being too general and wide-­ ranging in the study of populism, and as concentrating on the relationship between leader and followers, neglecting the debate about people as a key concept of populism (Moffitt, 2016: 53).

2.5   The Cultural (Performative) Approach Populist discourse, what populists have to say, should be communicated to the audience in an appropriate, most effective way. Populist messages must be properly communicated in order to have the desired effect on the audience. The cultural or performative approach to the study of populism refers to the way in which political actors relate to people, that is, to the way in which populist leaders behave and send their messages to the audience. Two dimensions are important here. The first is socio-cultural, which refers to the manners of behavior, the vocabulary used by politicians, and the way their taste corresponds to that of people. The second dimension is political-cultural and refers to the form of political leadership and the way it makes decisions. Populism tends to be quite low in both dimensions (Mudde, 2017). The language used by populists is tabloid, emotional, and based on parolles, not deep thinking. Populists exaggerate, dramatize problems, and use verbal radicalism (Bos & Brants, 2014: 706). Tarchi Marco (2016), citing the work of German sociologist Theodor Geiger on authoritarianism, suggests that populism can also be seen as a mentality. According to him, the actions of populists are based more on emotional impulses than on rational reasoning. Populists are more focused on the past than on the future. The emotional performative capacity of populists is used to exclude them as irrational and frivolous political entities from serious politics and to keep them on the margins of the political

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game. According to Eklundh (2020: 107), in a similar way for a long time, other social groups such as women and young people, not Europeans, were marginalized and excluded from the struggle for power in society. According to her, there is a magic circle between the exclusion of populists from politics and their emotionality. Populists are excluded from politics because they bring too much emotion into it, but at the same time they bring too much emotion into politics precisely because it is excluded from the political process. It is true that populist performances use a lot of emotion, but the question is how emotions are conceptualized and whether they are pointed out to discredit a particular political phenomenon. Given the importance of emotions in the performance of populists, Eklundh (2020) suggests that the cultural-performative approach should also be called the affective approach in the study of populism. Moffitt (2016: 52) notes that more and more researchers are approaching populism as a performance, rather than as an ideology or as a strategy, which is a dominant approach in the study of populism. Moffitt (2016) calls this process a performative turn in the comparative study of populism. The insistence of populism as a performance relies on the importance given to performance in the social sciences since the 1990s as a symbolically mediated action in which the central role is given to the role of the audience, actors, script, as opposed to structurally based social studies. This approach means giving more importance to political practice, as opposed to analyzing party manifestos and documents. Brandt (2020) points out that Trumpism can be seen as a performance that portrays events in a certain light, obscures other events, encourages the audience appropriately, etc. The purpose of the performance is to sell to the audience a certain politician—a charismatic leader—and his politics. Moffitt (2016) suggests that when populism is considered a performance, it should be noted that it is shaped and executed in the context of new media development. New media operate according to their own rules and influence the way populist leaders conduct their political performances. The advantage of an approach to populism as a performance is that it allows research on examples of populism around the world, as opposed to an ideological approach that is largely limited to Europe and an approach to studying populism as a discourse strategy that is limited to Latin America (Moffitt, 2016: 54). According to the cultural (performative) approach, populism is an unprofessional, non-standard behavior of political leaders who try to get closer to the behavior of the people they claim to represent and get as

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much electoral support as possible. In that sense, populism is an irresponsible political act. Irresponsibility can take the form of performing for self-­ promotion through the use of PR tools. The “theater of sovereignty” is performed not to change the substance of politics, but to gain popularity, votes, and power. Populist politics is the politics of creating and selling performances. Irresponsibility as a feature of populism can be viewed on two levels: at the personal level as a way of behaving of the political leadership, and at the level of policies, as irresponsible policies, whether they are economic, fiscal, nationalist, or xenophobic. Economists like Jeffrey Sachs have cited irresponsible economic policies as a form of populism that is covering unresponsible public spending by borrowing money in international financial markets. In this way, politicians gain popularity in the short run, but in the long run they threaten the economic equilibrium in the countries they rule (Weyland, 2017). According to Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, populism overestimates the role of redistribution of goods in society and underestimates the economic consequences, such as inflation, that occur due to excessive government spending (Eichengreen, 2018: 5). The shortsightedness of populism is reflected in the insistence that the needs of the majority of people here and now be met, without delay and without thinking of the long-term consequences. The reason is that usually populist leaders received support from various sections of the population, dissatisfied with their position in society. Expectations are different, sometimes contradictory, and should be met as soon as possible for leaders to cement the support they at one point received. Hence the insistence on immediacy, the inclination toward the abolition of the control of the government, which in the eyes of the populists only delays the implementation of the populist policies, that is, distances populists from the people (Urbinati, 2019: 1070). The question of the difference between the study of populism as a performance on the one hand and as a discourse on the other can rightly be asked. The subject of analysis is the same—the expression of populist charismatic leaders. But when one studies the expression of populist leaders as a discourse, one is analyzing the content, whereas when one is studied as a performance, one is looking at the form of expression. In the words of Engesser et al. (2017) both approaches, the discursive and the performative, have the same root and are part of the populist communication strategy, but the discursive approach focuses on what is said or written, while the performative approach focuses on how and in what way it is said. In

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other words, the performative approach is focused on the stylistic expression of populist charismatic leaders. Moffitt (2016) points out that in the past the treatment of populism as a political style was not fully justified, because the style was perceived as something arbitrary, a phenomenon for which there are no standards, but is more related to the affinities of political leadership, as something non-­ essential, superficial. Moffitt believes that in the literature that analyzes populism, the concept of style is underdeveloped and often equates style with rhetoric or discourse. Style has not only rhetorical elements. Populist leaders often use a communication style that scandalizes the public, dramatizes events, and provokes public tensions. They use manners, body language, accent, and a way of expression that members of the elite consider distasteful, unworthy, uncultured, and threatening. The style of announcing events is, among other things, performance. Hence, Moffitt points out that populist leaders should be seen as actors (performers), people as audiences, and the media as the stage on which performance takes place. To be successful in public, populist leaders must impose certain themes and convince society that they are crucial to its future and that populists know best how to deal with them (Van Kessel, 2011: 5). Characteristics of the populists’ performance are the production of the antagonism between the people and the elite, substandard manners of behavior, and the constant insistence that society is in economic, political, and cultural crisis and that there is a serious threat to the existence of certain segments of society and society as a whole. Populists tend to target liberal elites and hold them accountable for the misfortune of the people, the economic crisis and job losses, or the granting of asylum or the acceptance of immigrants. It is of particular importance to the credibility of the populists that they show hostility toward the establishment even when they are in power and not just when they are in opposition. This means that they constantly acted as if they were in opposition, whether they were in power or not. Substandard manners and tabloid behavior, the use of slang, political incorrectness, and swearing at political opponents are the hallmarks of populist leaders. With this behavior, populists show that they are an authentic part of the people. They behave as an ordinary average person would behave, not someone who belongs to the elite and who has cultivated subtle manners. Insisting that the society is in a severe crisis before complete collapse and under threat creates an atmosphere of danger, the need to take immediate measures to defend against the threat, which can lead society to a state of conflict (Moffitt, 2016: 55). In a

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society with successful populist parties, there is usually a crisis, but populists usually overemphasize it and thus deepen it, offering their policies as a solution. Populist manners differ significantly from technocratic ones, for example, which would appeal to expertise instead of antagonizing society, emphasizing stability and progress, rather than crisis and threat to society. A good example of the populist rhetorical style is Geert Wilders (Partij Voor de Vrijheid), who openly criticizes the establishment in his performances. In his public appearances he uses insults, advocates antiIslamism, uses anti-immigrant rhetoric, advocates the expulsion of immigrants, opposes the euro, and so on (Bos & Brants, 2014: 704).

2.6   The Ideational Approach The ideational approach to the definition of populism puts aside the question of the discourses, political leaders who use them, and their behavior and points out that populism is a political ideology, that is, a system of ideas and beliefs about politics. This approach to determining populism draws on the Shils legacy of the 1950s. This approach to determining and studying populism has become dominant in the last decade. The ideational approach is closely related to the discursive determination of populism. In fact, the ideational and discursive approaches place populism in the sphere of ideas (Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 4). The difference between these two approaches is that the discursive approach is more about a normative transformation of politics and a change in the status quo in a liberal democracy. The ideational approach, on the other hand, insists more on empirical knowledge and avoids normative judgments. The impact of populism on liberal democracy is not a normative issue, but a matter of empiricism (De la Torre, 2018: 576). The ideational determination of populism is value-neutral. Urbinati (2018: 113) suggests that populism is not only discourse, political style, rhetoric, or performance, but much more than that. Populism encourages and directs collective action. It is also associated with power, with governance, with politics. Like any ideology, populism has its own discourse, but it cannot be reduced to discourse alone. The advantage of the ideational approach in the study of populism is that it makes it possible to determine what makes populism what it is, whether it is left-leaning as in Latin America or right-oriented as in Europe and North America (Wirth et al., 2016: 9). Within the ideational approach, ideology is understood as a mental map for the political action of individuals (Freeden, 1996). Ideology is not

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understood as a detailed system of ideas based on political theory, but rather understood as a set of poorly connected ideas. Thus, ideology as understood by this approach is more a set of ideas than a system. Populism is not based on a clear, systematized, unified worldview and a homogeneous political program shared by its proponents, as is the case with other ideologies (Weyland, 2017). Populism is a general, abstract concept of politics and society, open to a diverse set of more specific political ideas and programs, depending on the national and historical context (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 3). It does not have a coherent ideological tradition and appears in combination with different and sometimes contradictory political ideologies. That is, populism does not offer consistent answers to a wide range of politically relevant questions, but depending on the context and needs borrows concepts from more developed political ideologies (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016: 8). However, populism has elements reminiscent of political ideology. He has a set of concepts that he operates with and that he understands in a specific way. Such concepts are the common people, the elite, the general will, the people’s sovereignty, the right of the majority to govern public affairs. Therefore, he can be identified even when he borrows elements from other political ideologies (Tarchi, 2016). Populism is based on a general scheme in which on one side there are authentic, innocent, hardworking, moral people and on the other a powerful, dangerous, selfish and corrupt elite. There are two sides to a populist conception: the people and the establishment. Some authors define this Manichaean dualistic division as a cosmology in which the political universe is divided between the forces of good (people) and the forces of evil (elite) (Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 3). Or as Mudde (2004: 543) writes, populism is a thin-centered ideology that divides society into two homogeneous, antagonistic groups, where politics should reflect the general will of the people. Similarly, Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 2) define populism as the ideology of people as a homogeneous entity and elites who deprive or want to deprive sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and influence. Populism takes the side of the people and fights against the establishment. As Müller (2016a: 41) writes, populists live in a world of political fantasy in which the elite is a priori corrupt and their every move is wrong, while people are morally superior and can make no mistake in politics. The populists claim that the government is usurped by the establishment, that is, that people are deprived of the opportunity to have their interests properly represented and taken into account in making political decisions. Hence, power should be given to

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those who are true representatives of the interests of the people, and that is the populist parties. People as concept are used to unite citizens and create a new political identity—an imaginary community that will oppose the elite as “the others” (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 3). The division between people and the establishment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a populist. Otherwise, anyone who criticizes the establishment and the status quo in society would be a populist. It is not populism to criticize the establishment; it is populism to criticize the establishment in the name of the people as a single, homogeneous, entity in which there is no room for divisions. Unlike humans, according to Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 4), elites are neither homogeneous nor based on respect for values. On the contrary, they are corrupt and constantly make conspiracies that endanger the well-being of the people. Hence, an additional element of the people-elite divide is moralization, which makes populism anti-pluralistic (Müller, 2016a: 20). Populists believe that only they have the right to represent the interests of the people. Those who advocate other options, that is, who are not populists, do not differ only in that, but they have other views, values, and priorities in politics. On the contrary, they are immoral, corrupt, and openly or covertly, willingly or unwillingly protecting the interests of the elite and thus harming the interests of the people. Anyone who does not support the populist party or candidate is not part of the people or is seduced or manipulated. The division that populism makes between people and the establishment allows it to avoid a priori being associated with certain social groups, electorate, political programs, or political issues, that is, it gives populism free space depending on the socio-political context to connect and be supported by different social groups, to implement different political agendas, and to highlight different issues, if they are on the side of the people against the establishment (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 3). Thus, populism aims to defeat the establishment as a political opponent that works against the interests of the people, but unlike other political ideologies it does not have a clear agenda that populists would pursue after overcoming political opponents and getting a chance to govern public affairs. As Müller (2016a: 10) notes, populism does not have a codified doctrine, but it is a set of separate claims that have their own internal logic. The number of key concepts in thin ideology is limited, in contrast to the more complex thick ideologies where one can find more key concepts and tools to achieve the set goals (Freeden, 1996). Viviani (2017: 287) points to several features of populism such as advocating the

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concept of sovereignty that belongs and should be returned to the people, insisting on the instruments of direct democracy such as referendums, the simplified style of expression. However, these elements are not enough to create a completely rounded ideology. Hence populism borrows concepts and agendas from other more established political ideologies. That is why populism is fluid. In one form it can be inclusive and incorporate materially, symbolically, and politically excluded groups in society, while in another form it can be exclusive and exclude migrants and religious minorities whom it considers a threat to national culture. Similarly, populism in one variant may advocate greater state involvement in the economy, while in another variant it may view the state’s greater involvement in the economy as a serious social and political problem (De la Torre, 2018: 572). Depending on the ideology from which concepts and agendas are borrowed, populism itself has several subtypes. Populism does not exist in pure form. It emerges and exists, thanks to mixing with concepts from other political ideologies (Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser 2017a: 6 A). Populism as a thin ideology refers to a limited number of key concepts and the relationship between people, the elite, and a charismatic populist leader/party (Wirth et  al., 2016: 9). But the fact that populism is currently a set of limited number of key concepts does not mean that it will remain so in the future. Thus Freeden (1996: 498) gives the example of ecology and feminism which in their beginnings also had a limited number of key concepts, but today have developed such a wealth of concepts that give the impression of legitimate, valid, and comprehensive political ideologies. Populism is a polysemous and controversial ideology that refers to a multitude of empirical phenomena (Martinelli, 2018: 16). Different groups in society, depending on their needs, knowledge, and interests, define it in different ways. For journalists, for example, populism is associated with regimes dominated by charismatic leaders who claim to speak on behalf of the people and whose rhetoric is opposing in one way or another to the elite. In academic circles, there are several criteria by which populism is identified. These include (1) making a dichotomy between two homogeneous and antagonizing groups of people who are highly moral, virtuous, and respectable and an elite that is corrupt, inefficient, morally inferior, and that consciously or unconsciously works against the interests of the people. Martinelli (2018: 17), in addition to people as a source of power for populists, adds the community as a concept that should help determine people; (2) following the will of the people, which is ideal for

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populist politicians; and (3) rejection of pluralism in society (Tushnet, 2019: 382). All forms of populism involve idealizing people and denouncing elites. While people are seen as authentic social subjects, the elite is seen as non-authentic and morally inferior. Populism always involves criticizing the elite and flattering ordinary people. It can be said that populists usually diagnose problems in society. They locate the problems in the moral corruption of the elites and see a solution for them in support of a political party that will work on behalf of and for the realization of the interests of the people (Bonikowski, 2016: 11). Thus, populism is an ideology based on the division of society into two homogeneous groups of people and the corrupt elite, where politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. Populism is an ideology according to which the majority (people) are always right and the minority (elite) are always wrong. The interests of the people are legitimate, while those of the elite are not. Populism antagonizes society, simplifies and reduces it to only two groups, and hence denies the plurality of both groups and interests in society. Specifically, populism sees different groups and interests through the prism of the dichotomy of people—elite. Also, populism is against mediation, negotiation, or bargaining between people and the elite (Martinelli, 2018: 17). The good side of defining and researching populism as an ideology is that such an understanding of populism can be relatively easily applied empirically. But the ideational approach to exploring populism is criticized because of its insistence on binary logic (Moffitt, 2016, 2016: 53).

2.7   Comparison of Populism with Other Ideologies (Populism as a Meta Ideology) Ideology is a set of ideas about human nature, society, social organization, and goals. It is a vision of what the world should look like. The roots of populism are in the nineteenth century, as well as those of other important political ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and conservatism. Of course, the populism of the nineteenth century is very different from that of the twenty-first century, but the same goes for other political ideologies. There is an opinion that populism, unlike fully embodied ideologies such as fascism, liberalism, and socialism, can be mixed with other ideologies or be assimilated into them. That is why populism is considered as thin-centered ideology. It always appears together with elements of other

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ideologies. The predominant belief is that populism alone cannot provide a complex and detailed answer to the key political questions generated by modern society (Mudde & Rovira, 2017a: 6 A). It is true that populism has not developed a systematic political theory, just as it is true that populists do not usually identify with their populism, unlike liberals or socialists that identify with liberalism and socialism and that are proud of it. But populists are as proud of people as nationalists are of the nation they belong to, or as communists are proud of the working class, conservatives of tradition, or liberals of freedom. People are a collective entity through which populists seek to ideologically legitimize themselves (Molerock & Narita, 2018: 138). In this sense, we can recognize several characteristics of populists: (1) the belief that society is divided into two different and antagonistic sides: the elite and the people; (2) the belief that the goal of the political process is people to come on power; and (3) power to be a reflection of the authentic will of the people (Rostboll, 2019). Shils (1955) argues that populism is the belief that people are sovereign and have the right to govern public affairs and that there is a direct and immediate link between people and government. In that sense, as Muis and Immerzeel (2017: 912) note, voting for populist parties is as ideological as voting for other political parties. Ward (2018: 81) is of the opinion that populism does not have only one characteristic, but it is a set of several ideas that have their own internal logic that leads to a specific attitude toward reality. The prevailing view is that populism is not codified in a fixed doctrine. It is an emotional impulse for all people in society to be treated equally. Insisting that populism be more about emotions than about rationality is part of its marginalization (Eklundh, 2020). Although it may not have a detailed set of ideas, values, and concepts, in populism as well as in other ideologies one can find a set of mutually integrated ideas, values, and concepts which according to Ward can be reduced to the following: (1) sacralization of people and protection of their interests and rights, (2) the affirmation of the people’s sovereignty, (3) anti-elitist attitude, (4) emphasis on the class struggle, in a way characteristic of the populists, by representing the interests of the people against the elite, that is, upper class, and (5) specific attitude toward democracy. More precisely, insisting on direct democracy and a close relationship between the charismatic populist leader and the people. In addition, populist leaders tend to reduce the plurality of political life. In that sense, populism does not focus only on issues related to the relationship between people and the elite, but from that point of view it

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takes a position toward democracy as a political system. In that sense, populism has a broader view of politics. According to Shils (1955), the characteristics of populism are distrust of politicians and elites, frustration with bureaucracy, anti-intellectualism, and demagoguery. As a significant feature of populism, Miskelly & Noce (2002: 306) mentions its grassroots nature. As a political activity, it starts from the street neighborhoods and the villages, and in time he starts to conquer the political institutions. As Canovan (2002: 31) notes, every ideology motivates its followers. It gives a specific vision of the world, of politics. It offers explanations of society’s problems and salvation through the policies it proposes. These elements can be found in populism, which identifies the problems in society in immigration, unemployment, stagnation of the standard of living, and so on. Populists explain that the cause of these problems is the incompetent, corrupt elite. And salvation is in respecting the sovereignty of states and the general will of the people. Ideology is not a science. From the point of view of the functioning of the ideology, it is less important whether it identifies the real problems and offers the right solutions. For an ideology to be effective, it is much more important to believe that it offers the right solutions to problems. It seems that these elements can be identified in populism. Regarding the inconsistency and fluidity of populism, it should be noted that the dividing line populists make in the political spectrum does not follow the conventional division between left and right but people and elite. Hence, for populists, the traditional ideological distinction is irrelevant. Judging by the criterion of populism, it can be said that left- and right-oriented parties and political leaders are inconsistent and fluid. Namely, there are left-wing parties and leaders who side with the people and those who side with the elite. Just as there are right-wing political parties and leaders who side with the people, there are those who side with the elite. Populist parties and leaders, whether left or right, are always on the side of the people. It is a feature that sets them apart from other ideologies and parties. As Berlin notes, populism is apolitical in its treatment of the state. Populists do not see the state as an ideal for themselves. The state is not the pinnacle of human associations. As populism is visibly built on the charisma of populist leaders, populists prefer informal forms of association (Van Kessel, 2015: 6). Populists treat the state instrumentally. They believe in society, in the people, not in the state. But when populism comes to power, they know how to put the state in the function of pursuing the interests of the people (Berlin et  al., 1968: 174). In addition,

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unlike fascism and conservatism, for example, populism is more egalitarian than a hierarchically oriented political ideology (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 4). Because it transcends the demarcation boundaries of traditional established political ideologies, populism seems to be less of an ideology. But he does do so because he does not recognize such boundaries as relevant, especially in the twenty-first century, when those demarcation lines are increasingly being crossed and relativized by the old-established ideological blocs. The demarcation lines of established ideologies and the parties that identify with them are established on the basis of the relation to the means of production and the class. The prevailing view in sociology today is that class is losing its relevance. Lifestyle decomposed the class. Hence, the old demarcation lines no longer apply, not even to the traditional parties that have become catch-all parties, and especially to the newly formed radical right-wing populist parties. Populism actually establishes other, different demarcation lines. The demarcation line of populism is people against the elite. Populism is therefore no less ideologically oriented in terms of its own standards. It is less ideologically oriented than traditional ideological standards, according to which even traditional established ideologies are less ideological. The division of the people versus the elite, and taking the side of the people, is very similar to the division of society made by Marxism into a working class which includes all who live on their labor on the one hand and a few percent, a small group of owners of the means of production make up the ruling class (in the terminology of populists—elite). However, Marxism in the analysis of the working class distinguishes between the workers (people) and the avant-garde. While the avant-garde looks further and is aware of the interests of the class to which it belongs, ordinary workers do not always have to be aware of the real interests of the class to which they belong. So although Marxism tries to defend interests of the working class (people), unlike the populism that flatters and believes in people, Marxism sees people as a manipulated mass—a victim of the cultural hegemony of the capitalist elite—and instead believes in the elite among the people, that is, the avant-garde, who are aware of their real interests and are ready to fight for them. Populism has a characteristic that can also be found in Marxism. It treats the entity it identifies with and advocates for—people as victim of their unfortunate fate. It is disenfranchised and well-meaning and hence has the right to be in power permanently, just as the working class in communist ideology is a historical

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victim of the bourgeoisie, manipulated by the hegemon, always benevolent, and hence has the right to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. But even though the diagnosis is the same, the treatment with which individuals have to fight for their rights is different. Marxism calls for political activism of the working class that includes collective action in the form of revolution, while populism is more moderate and recommend acting in the form of voting. Populism comes in many different forms and can be combined with different, sometimes contradictory, political ideologies. Many suggest that populism be seen as a transient phenomenon. It either fails or, if successful, transitions to a larger and more significant political phenomenon such as authoritarianism (Mudde & Rovira, 2017a: 6 A). It is true that populists, when they come to power, try to establish authoritarianism. But it should be known that authoritarianism is a form of government, not an ideology. Hence the attempt to establish authoritarianism as a political regime is part of the characteristics of populism as an ideology. It is a consequence of the anti-pluralistic understanding of society that is characteristic of populism. As for interfering with thick ideologies, when populists take over their concepts, they do so to achieve their own goals, such as enforcing the will of the people. That is why populism is an ideology, not just a style of behavior. If we look at populism as a value system, we will see that it establishes several related goals that populists aspire to achieve, for example, the establishment of popular sovereignty, the return of nation-states, the curbing of globalization, and the empowerment of elites. But populism seems to lack the doctrines and policies through which it will achieve these goals. Such policies and doctrines should be built by individuals and parties who identify with populism and pursue populist policies. But populism is so demonized in public discourse that there are not many individuals and parties who identify themselves as populists. As Canovan (1981: 5) notes, populists seldom identify themselves as such and usually refuse to be called populists by others. In that sense, populism is more a label that political opponents attach to each other or that journalists attach to certain political entities, usually not without any basis. Although they may not identify with populism themselves, there are more and more political entities with increasing voter support that the general and professional public clearly recognizes as populist. They have specifics at the level of feature and organization that distinguish them from other parties in the political spectrum. But because populism as a term is demonized, populist political entities camouflage themselves in one of the

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established political ideologies and use their doctrines and policies to achieve the goals of authentic populism. When populist leaders, groups, and movements take concepts, tools, and agendas from other political ideologies, if they truly believe in the ideals of populism as the rule of the people, even though they may not identify with populism, they prioritize populist ideals over those of other ideologies they use instrumentally. In that sense, we can say that populism is a meta ideology. For example, the realization of the sovereign will of the people as the goal of the populists can be achieved through the use of socialist instruments and means the realization of social equality, if the populists combine their populism with the socialist ideology. But the sovereign will of the people can also be realized by insisting on respecting the traditions of nation-states if populists combine their populism with conservative political ideology. Hence, in the 2016 US primary election campaign, it was possible for a right-wing candidate like Donald Trump and a left-wing candidate like Bernie Sanders to express completely different and opposing positions on politics, even though both were populists. Similarly, a right-wing political movement like the Tea Party and a left-wing political movement like the Occupy Wall Street had completely opposing views on politics, although both were populists. The specific political agenda of Trump and Sanders differed diametrically. One relied more on the conservative political tradition, and the other on the socialist one. But what the two have in common is that they were anti-establishment candidates. They called for the protection of the interests of the people who are threatened by the elite. This example shows that populism is a meta ideology. It places itself above other ideologies and takes concrete agendas from them. Certain authors such as Canovan (1981) point out that ideologies that are considered to be as complete as socialism, liberalism, and conservatism are not as homogeneous as they seem at first glance. Thus, for example, the difference between left- and right-wing populism is no less than the difference between classical liberalism, which vehemently opposes state interference in the economy, and modern liberalism, which embraces Keynesianism and a form of state interventionism. In a similar with classic socialist ideology that is friendly to the unions and their modified version defined as “the third way” that is business-friendly. The example of one nation conservativism and the new right from the time of Thatcher and Reagan is similar. Populism does not seem to differ as much from other political ideologies as it seems at first glance. It is only more flexible in trying to use them to achieve its own goals. In this sense, populism is a set of

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ideas into which different political concepts can be incorporated. Populism divides society into people and elites and formulates goals, for example, the realization of the general will, but at the same time can offer different views on institutional and socio-economic issues. Although the definition of populism is very close to what ideology is, many authors avoid using that term (Mudde, 2017). In this sense, populism resembles conservatism, which is also an ideology in a broader, not in a narrower, sense, that is, a set of ideas for preserving the status quo, but the status quo can be very different from one society to another. So conservative politicians in one society can push for the preservation of liberalism, and in another for socialism, and both can be conservative in the sense that they protect the status quo in society. For example, the Communists in the former Soviet Union, immediately after the revolution, and especially in the 1980s, protected the status quo in their societies and in that sense were not a revolutionary but a conservative political force. By preserving tradition, conservatives in one country may advocate the conservation of values associated with one religion and in another country values associated with another religion. In a similar way, populists in one society can protect the interests of the peasantry, and in others, the labor, and both can be populists, and what they have in common is that they protect the interests of the people by the fact that in the first example people are the peasantry, and in the latter the workers, and in both cases the populists are fighting the elites. At the next level, conservative authors, as well as authors who write about populism, avoid using the term ideology. Tarchi (2016) rightly raises the dilemma of how much populists would like populism to be defined as an ideology, given their antagonistic attitude toward intellectualism and the possibility of using ideologies for manipulative purposes. For conservatives, conservatism is a concrete pragmatic thing, not a set of abstract ideas. Of course, conservatism, like populism, contains abstract ideas in one case that relate to the protection of the status quo and the stability of society, and in another to the protection of the interests of the people and the fight against elites. Unlike the socialist ideology which is based on demarcation between classes, and the conflict in society occurs due to different class interests, in populism there is a demarcation between the elite and the people, and the demarcation line is morality. People are by definition moral, honest, and dignified, while the elite is by definition morally inferior, corrupt, selfish, and unworthy (Mudde, 2017). The difference between populism and other political ideologies seems to be that it is more susceptible to

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syncretism, that it coexists and borrows from other ideologies, which means that depending on the context it may be compatible with each of them. True populism (when politicians are convinced of the ideals of populism) uses the concepts of other ideologies to achieve its own goals. It is confusing that there are politicians who use populist discourse, behave like populists, but do not actually believe in the goals of populism and only use it to gain more votes in elections. In the first case we have real, that is, ideological populism, while in the second we have populism as a performance. Populism does not seem to differ so much from other established ideologies. It is only less researched than liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. The reason is that although populism has been present in politics for more than a century, it has been more on the margins of political competition than at its center.

2.8   Final Observations on the Approaches to the Study of Populism If we look at the dominant approaches to the study of populism, we will all see that there is an empirical basis for all of them. On the one hand, all politicians are a little bit populist, but on the other hand, not all populists are the same. Populists differ on whether they use populist discourses (speak like populists), whether they perform populist performances (behave like populists), whether they use populism as a strategy to achieve certain goals in politics, to come or survive in power (populism as mimicry, an instrument for achieving political goals), or whether they are convinced of the Manichaean division of the people and elite and their messianic role in pursuing the interests of ordinary people in that struggle (understanding of populism as a goal for itself). The four approaches to the study of populism are not mutually exclusive, although under certain conditions a tension can be found between the strategic and ideological understanding of populism. Populists can only use populist vocabulary and discourses, without behaving scandalously, not making performances characteristic of populists. But it seems that most often these two things go together. On a cognitive level, those who behave and speak as populists can do so for manipulative reasons, that is, strategically only to achieve a specific goal, without being convinced of the populist discourse they use and without having a high opinion of the populist way of behavior. But also those who use populist discourse and behave like populists can be

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convinced that it is the best discourse, in behavior and policy-making. Those who experience populism ideologically are convinced of populism and at the same time use populist discourses and behave like populists. Due to the negative image that is created about populism, they may not declare themselves populists and hence it seems that they understand populism strategically, but at the level of convictions, behavior, and discourse they are populists. Whether one is convinced of the ideals of populism, whether one is an ideological populist or not, is best seen in the policies one pursues when given the opportunity to govern public affairs. The criteria here are whether it pursues a policy that protects the interests of the people, whether it fights against the elite, and whether it establishes a populist-authoritarian regime (Table 2.2). If we accept for a moment the consideration of populism as an ideology, we will see that it is based on the interconnectedness of four key concepts. The first three concepts: people, the sovereignty, and the Table 2.2  Approaches to the study of populism according to key features and elements Approaches to the study Key features of populism

Elements

Discursive

Story, vocabulary

Cultural

Performance behavior

Organizational

Strategy instrumentality

Ideational

Conviction confidence

Emotionality Style of expression Verbal extremism Antagonization of politics Turning to the past, not the future Scandals, sensationalism Primitiveness Performance (actor, audience, script) Substandard, tabloid manners in order to show that populist leaders are part of the people Relying on a charismatic leader Direct relationship with the leader Lack of organizational structure Mental map Lack of consistent ideological tradition A set, not a system, of ideas Borrowing concepts from other ideologies Non-affiliation with specific social groups, but openness to all who oppose the establishment

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general will are in a positive correlation with each other. Opposite them is the fourth concept—the elite that is as opposed to the people, the sovereignty that arises from them, and the general will that is the will of the sovereign. In the next chapter, we will briefly introduce each of the listed concepts.

References Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre. In D.  McDonnell & D.  Albertazzi (Eds.), Twenty First Century Populism. Palgrave Macmillan. Aslanidis, P. (2016). Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and A New Perspective. Political Studies, 55(2), 88–104. Balcere, I. (2017). What Does Populism Really Mean: A Political Science Perspective. In A. Kudors & A. Parkins (Eds.), The Rise of Populism: Lessons for the European Union and the United Stated of America. University of Latvia Press. Barr, R. R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti – Establishment Politics. Party Politics, 15(1). Berlin, I., Hofstadter, R., MacRae, D., Schapiro, L., Seton-Watson, H., Touraine, A., Venturi, F., Walicki, A., & Worsley, P. (1968). To Define Populism. Government and Opposition, 3(2), 137–179. Betz, H. G. (2002). Contradictions Favoring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies. In Y.  Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Block, E., & Nagrine, R. (2017). The Populist Communication Style: Toward a Critical Framework. International Journal of Communication, 11, 178–197. Bonikowski, B. (2016). Three Lessons of Contemporary Populism in Europe and United States. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 13(1), 9–24. Bonikowski B., Gidron N. (2016). Multiple Traditions in Populism Research: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. In M.  Golder, G.  Sona (Eds.) Symposium: Populism in Comparative Perspective; CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Organized Section of the American Political Science Associations, 26 (2), 1–130. Bos, L., & Brants, K. (2014). Populist Rhetoric in Politics and Media: A Longitudinal Study of the Nederland. European Journal of Communication, 29(6), 703–719. Brandt, L. S. (2020). Donald Trump, the Reality Show: Populism as Performance and Spectacle. Zliteraturwiss Linguistik, 50, 303–321. Canavan, M. (1984). People, Politicians and Populism. Government and Opposition, 19(3), 312–327. Canovan M. (1981). Populism. Harourt Brace.

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Canovan, M. (2002). Populism and the Pathology of Contemporary Politics. In Y.  Many & Y.  Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Carter, E. (2005). The Extreme Right in Western Europe. Manchester University Press. Cox, M. (2017). The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalization: Brexit, Trump and Beyond. Irish Studies of International Affairs, 28, 9–27. De la Torre, C. (2018). Populism. In W. Outhwaite & S. P. Turner (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Political Sociology. Sage. Eichengreen, B. (2018). The Populism Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era. Oxford University Press. Eklundh, E. (2020). Excluding Emotions: The Performative Function of Populism. Participation e Conflitto, 13(1), 107–131. Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larson, O. A. (2017). Populist Online Communication: Introduction to Special Issues; Information. Communications Society, 20(9), 1279–1292. Estrom, M., Patrona, M., & Thornborrow, J. (2018). Right-Wing Populism and the Dynamics of Style: a Discourse – Analytic Perspective on Mediated Political Performances. Palgrave Communications, 4(1), 1–11. Feledy, B. (2017). Hungary: Populism or Politics. In E. Woertz (Ed.), Populism in Europe: From Symptom to Alternative? CIDOB. Freeden, M. (1996). Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. Clarendon Press. Gerstle, J., & Nai, A. (2019). Negativity, Emotionality and Populist Rhetoric in Election Campaigns Worldwide and Their Effect on Media Attention and Electoral Success. European Journal of Communication, 34(4), 410–444. Gherghina, S., & Soare, S. (2013). Introduction: Populism a Sophisticated Concept and Diverse Political Realities. In S. Gherghina, S. Miscoiu, & S. Soare (Eds.), Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and its Diverse Form. Cambridge Scholar Publications. Hawkins, A. K., & Rovira, K. C. (2017). The Ideational Approach to Populism. Latin American Research Review, 52(4), 513–528. Heinisch, R., & Mazzoleni, O. (2016). Introduction. In R.  Hienisch & O. Mazzoleni (Eds.), Understanding Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Henrichsen R. J. (2019). The Emergence of Contemporary Populisms and Mediated Discourses: An Introduction. Media and Populism, Lisbon: 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication. Higgot, R. (2018). Globalism, Populism and Limits of Global Economic Governance. Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives, 1, 2–23.

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Kazin, M. (1995). The Populist Persuasion: An American History. Basic Books. Krastev, I. (2017). The Strange Death of Liberal Consensus. Journal of Democracy, 18(4), 56–63. Laclau, E. (2005). On the Populist Reason. Verso. Martinelli, A. (2018). When Populism Meets Nationalism: Reflections on Parties in Power. ISPI. Mazzoleni, G., & Bracciale, R. (2018). Socially Mediated Populism: The Communicative Strategies of Political Leaders on Facebook. Palgrave Communication, 4(50), 1–10. Miskelly, M., & Noce, J. (2002). Political Theories for Students; Detroit. New York: Gale Group. Moffitt, B. (2016). The Performance Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism. In M.  Golder, & G.  Sona (Eds.), Symposium: Populism in Comparative Perspective; CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Organized Section of the American Political Science Associations (Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 1–130). Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation. Stanford University Press. Molerock, J., & Narita, Z. F. (2018). Public Sphere and World System: Theorizing Populism at the Margins. In J.  Molerock (Ed.), Cultural Theory and Authoritarian Populism. University of Westminster Press. Moufe C. (2016). The Populist Movement. Retrieved January 21 September, 2020. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/populist-­challenge/ Mudde, C. (2004). The Populism Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 9(4), 541–563. Mudde, C. (2016). On Extremism and Democracy in Europe. Routledge. Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An Ideational Approach. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa, & P. Ostigay (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Mudde, C., & Rovira, K. C. (2017a). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Muis, J. (2015). Populists as Chameleons? An Adaptive Learning Approach to the Rise of Populist Politicians. European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities AQPAM, 4(2), 56–74. Muis, J., & Immerzeel, T. (2017). Causes and the Consequences of the Rise of the Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe. Current Sociology Review, 65(6), 909–930. Müller, J. W. (2016a). What Is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press. Robberts, M.  K. (2007). Latin Americas Populist Revival. SAIS Review, 27(1), 3–15.

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Rostboll, F.  C. (2019, April 11–13). Populism and Publicity: How Not to Value Populism. Paper Presented for “Populism and Democratic Theory” Workshop at Universität Wien. Rovira, K. C. (2016). Populism in Latin America and Beyond: Concept, Courses and Consequences. CP: Newsletter of the Commutative Politics Organized Section of the American Political Sciences Organization, 26(2), 72–77. Shils, A.  E. (1955). Populism and the Rule of Law. In S.  Buchanan (Ed.), Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics Proceedings (1954) (pp.  91–107). University of Chicago Law School. Stefanel, A. (2016). Notes on Populism. Revue Roumaine de Philisophie, 60(1), 129–138. Surel, Y. (2011). The European Union and the Challenges of Populism. Policy Brief Notre Europe., 27, 1–8. Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Open University Press. Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the Pathology of Contemporary Politics. In Y.  Many & Y.  Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Taggart, P. (2003, March 27–29). The Populist Turn in the Politics of the New Europe. Paper Presented at the 8th Biannual International Conference of the European Union Studies. Nashville. Tarchi, M. (2016). Populism: Ideology, Political Style, Mentality. Politologicky Casopis, 23(2), 95–109. Tushnet, M. (2019). Varieties of Populism. German Law Journal, 20(3), 382–389. Urbinati, N. (2018). Political Theory of Populism. Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 111–127. Urbinati, N. (2019). Liquid Partis, Dense Populism. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 45(9–10), 1069–1083. Van Kessel, S. (2011, August 25–27). Path to Populism: Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Europe. Paper Presented at the ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. Van Kessel, S. (2015). Populist Parties in Europe: Agent of Discontent? Palgrave Macmillan. Viviani, L. (2017). A Political Sociology of Populism and Leadership. Societa Mutamento Politica, 8(15), 279–303. Ward, J.  A. S. (2018). Ethical Journalism in Paulist Age: The Democratically Engaged Journalism. Rowman and Littlefield. Wayland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept. Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. Weyland, K. (2001). Classifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22.

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Weyland, K. (2017). Populism: A Political  – Strategic Approach. In C.  Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa, & P. Ostigay (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Wirth W., Esser F., Wettstein M., Engesser S., Wirz D., Schulz A., Ernst N., Buchel F., Caramani D., Malluci L., Steenmergen M., Bernhard L., Weber E., Hanggli R., Dalmus C., & Schemer C. (2016). The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Stiles: A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication (Working Paper, 88, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR). Worsley, P. (1969). The Concept of Populism. In G. Ionescu & E. Gellner (Eds.), Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics. Macmillan.

CHAPTER 3

The Key Concepts of Populism

3.1   Sovereignty The concept of sovereignty is central to both democracy and populism. It is a concept with a long history dating back to ancient Greece and Rome. The medieval understanding of sovereignty was based on the acceptance of Roman law in which a distinction was made between the authority of peoples and their magistrates. Hence the modern theory of sovereignty distinguishes between the authority of the people and that of government. In the later phase, the idea of popular sovereignty implied a constitutional order adopted in the name of the people as the only source of authority in the state (Rovira et al., 2017: 3). Sovereignty is therefore closely linked to the sovereign’s right to control those who represent him. The key to sovereignty is the right to control and the recognition of that right. Interest in the concept of sovereignty was revived in the seventeenth century with the Treaty of Westphalia. In general, sovereignty connects the ideas of supreme authority and territorial jurisdiction, that is, it refers to the authority that regulates the relations in the public interest of a certain territory. Thus, the implicit meaning of sovereignty as understood in the Treaty of Westphalia indicated that each state had the exclusive right to control the internal affairs of its own territory. Here the right of control is not limited to the people who control their representatives, but it extends to the state that controls its territory. That is, when resolving relations on its own territory, the sovereign state should not be under pressure from © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_3

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external forces. The exclusive right to make decisions and regulate the relations of an individual state on its own territory is called domestic sovereignty. Recognition of the governments of individual states is called international legal sovereignty. In practice, sovereignty means that states are autonomous actors, controlling their territory, electing their own government, and refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. Thus sovereignty is related to the territory, the borders of a certain state, and the policies pursued in it, which should be in accordance with the will of the sovereign. Sovereignists believe that politicians should pursue national policies, relying on national institutions and not on more distant and diffuse supranational levers of governing a particular society (Kallis, 2018: 299). An important element of sovereignty is the right of states to control the crossing of borders (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 18). Contrary to the liberal understanding of sovereignty which restricts the right to exercise power through constitutionalism, separation of powers, check and balance, respect for human rights, etc., populists believe that people have an unlimited and absolute right to rule a country. For populists the basis of state sovereigns is popular sovereignty. Thus the people on the basis of popular sovereignty have the right to govern the state without any restrictions. People’s sovereignty implies the freedom of people to participate in political life and to influence political decisions, including through the right to vote (Ward, 2018: 81). Politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. This is usually not the case, because the elite usurped the right to rule for themselves, interested only in their own narrow interests, and often against the interests of the people. Therefore, the people’s sovereignty for the populists is a counterpoint to the narrow and selfish interests of the elite, which, in contrast to the people’s sovereignty, usurps the right to rule. Populists believe that sovereignty should be restored to the people and through the general will they possess to manage public affairs, that is, to manage their own destiny (Abts & Rasmunsen, 2007: 408). The notion of people as sovereign is based on the modern democratic idea which states that people are not only the source of political power in a democratic society, but they rule in it through their representatives. This understanding of sovereignty is one of the benefits of the French and American revolutions. The formation of a democratic regime does not mean that the distinction between those who rule and those who are ruled disappears completely. Occasionally, people may feel that their interests and will are not protected by the elite in the best possible way. In such

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cases, people can criticize the elite, as well as organize collective actions to change it. Populists often invoke the sovereignty of the people. At the heart of populism as a political phenomenon is sovereignty. Populism is set toward separate entities depending on their attitude toward sovereignty. People have the right to their sovereignty, which has been usurped by the elite. Hence populists have a protective attitude toward people and a hostile attitude toward the elite. The restoration of people’s sovereignty will restore the legitimacy of political power (Viviani, 2017: 288). Advocating for the restoration of popular sovereignty means fighting against the usurpation of power by the oligarchy, as well as fighting against external influences in a country’s politics. People can govern indirectly, through their representatives, populist parties, and directly through direct decision-making. In order to have more influence in politics, people need to unite and support populist parties. For populists, sovereignty could be embodied in the actions of charismatic populist leaders who have a natural and emotional connection to the people they represent and to whose well-being they are committed to (Revelli, 2019: 16). The bridge that connects right-wing and left-wing modern populism is that both insist on the return of the sovereignty of the people. For populists in Europe, this means regaining control of the territory of nation-states and decision-making autonomy in these political units (Alonso-Munoz & Casero-Ripolles, 2020). Populists often advocate for direct democracy because in this way popular sovereignty can be exercised unlimitedly and directly. For example, in his inaugural speech in 2017, Trump, among other things, stressed that the sovereignty of the nation-state is more important than how international relations will be conducted. In particular, international relations should not be allowed to jeopardize the sovereignty of nation-states. He also pointed out that sovereignty, that is, political power, belongs to the common people, and the elites usurped it until his election (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 18). Populist and Euro-skeptical parties use national sovereignty as an argument to mobilize their supporters against the European integration process. According to populist parties, the process of European integration threatens national sovereignty and establishes a new form of statehood that contains impaired autonomy (Borriello & Brack, 2019: 839). Right-­ wing populists link the issue of popular sovereignty to national identity. The definitions of sovereigns in the category of people do not include foreigners and those who are not domicile citizens of a particular country. Sovereignism has reservations about plural identities. In this sense,

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souverainism is a legalist movement with a significant socio-cultural component (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 35). A study of the use of the term “sovereignty” by four modern political parties—Podemos, the Five Star Movement, Front National, and UKIP—shows that this term is among the most used terms in the political discourse of these parties, and the term sovereignty is most often used in the context of the economic and migration crisis (Borriello & Brack, 2019: 841). Marine Le Pen’s Front National, for example, is pushing for a referendum on whether French citizens want to continue to be members of the European Union (EU). Thus, according to Le Pen, France would restore four types of sovereignty—monetary, legislative, budgetary, and territorial (Bourekba, 2017: 31). The most significant argument through which UKIP promoted Britain’s exit from the EU during the Brexit campaign was that it would give Britain back its sovereignty, make it easier to deal with the issue of immigration, and allow it to get out of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (Morillas, 2017: 57). New souverainism is a political movement that rejects the erosion of national sovereignty that came with globalization. The new souverainism refers to the primacy of the nation-state governed by the principle of popular sovereignty. The new sovereignists in the United States, for example, refuse to allow the country to join the International Criminal Court because it restricts the sovereign right of the United States to enact and enforce laws autonomously and independently from this court. The sovereignist movement has many supporters on both sides of the Atlantic (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 18). For sovereignists, domestic law takes precedence over international law. They argue that the establishment of regional human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, limits the sovereignty of countries (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 36).

3.2   The People The term people is vague and imprecise. It is a construct that aims to simplify reality. But such social constructs are both class and nation. Populists have a high opinion of the values and pathos of the people; they idealize them and put them as a counterpoint to the values and way of life of the elite. In ancient Greece and Rome, the term people had three meanings: (1) It meant all members of a particular state as a political community— members of polity. (2) It was used in terms of common people—commoners. These are the ones who make up the res publica, those who deal with

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public affairs. This does not include all those living in a particular political community, but only those who are involved in politics. (3) It was used to denote a certain ethnicity, a certain nationality (Müller, 2016: 22). As Berlin notes, people as a concept are based on the past, on tradition whether it is real or imagined. People are related to each other by brotherhood, the desire to achieve social equality and to be free (Berlin et  al., 1968: 173). Such a connection of people in a community can go in three directions: (1) the nation as a community of people, (2) a community of plebs versus the elite, and (3) ethno-cultural community (Filc, 2020: 49). Many of the key concepts of political ideologies seem to be based on imaginary communities, but that does not make them irrelevant to the analysis of politics and society (Mudde, 2017). Populist leaders refer to people as an imaginary community, which has its own “general will”, which is homogeneous, where there are no fragmentations and minorities (Viviani, 2017: 290). As Hugh Seton-Watson notes, without ideologizing people, putting them on a pedestal and their treatment as a deity, there is no populism (Berlin et al., 1968: 156). But who falls into the category of people depends on both the social and the historical context. For populists, only some of the citizens living in a particular country fall into the category of people (Mansbridge & Macedo, 2019: 63). In general, the majority group in society that is damaged by the elite consists the people. Thus, in the nineteenth century, in the category of people, the peasantry was predominantly thought of. Later, with the marginalization of the peasantry, when we talked about people, we meant the members of the working class, a mix of different classes of a certain ethnic group, of the nation, etc. (Berlin et al., 1968: 176). The concept of people is exclusive; it excludes certain groups of citizens according to socio-economic and cultural criteria. It excludes the elite that is conceptualized as diametrically opposed and hostile to the concept of people. The existence of the hostile elite is the reason that keeps the solidarity between the people at a high level and because of which the unity of the people must survive (Revelli, 2019: 15). According to the cultural criterion, the concept of people excludes ethnic and religious minorities, migrants, and foreigners. The term “people” is a form, not a content. The characteristics that populists attribute to term people as general will, homogeneity, and monolithicity are characteristics of form. Revelli (2019: 14) points out that the category of people is conceived as a pre-political, pre-civic, organic entity, which does not allow internal divisions. Laclau believes that it is precisely the term people that is an empty signifier that makes populism

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such a powerful political ideology (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 9 A). Populism is an empty shelf that can be filled with any goods that populist leaders decide on (Mény & Surel, 2002). Precisely the fact that people as a term are empty signifiers gives populism enough room to maneuver to take elements from other political ideologies, to define the needs and interests of people, as well as their satisfaction in different ways. Populism is a binary phenomenon, which makes a dichotomy of good-bad, friends-enemies, and people-elite and on that basis integrates all who are considered part of the people, regardless of their social origin, hence the potential of populism to create solidarity among socially diverse individuals (Viviani, 2017: 291). Paul Taggart (2000: 95) states that when populists talk about people, they have in mind an idealized conception of the community in which they live. It is the heartland of populism. Populist leaders do not represent people, they construct them. Populist leaders do not meet people, they shape them (Viviani, 2017: 290). People make up all members of the community, with the exception of the elite who are out of that circle due to their moral decline. People as a social construct exclude the elite and include all others. All others can include citizens, residents, the entire population, etc. For the abstract term people to be embodied in a particular collective political actor, in its construction populists introduce elements of the background to which they belong. This is how people most often get the characteristics of specific social groups. So, when populists in America talk about people they do not think of atheists, just as when right-­ wing populists in Europe talk of people they do not think of migrants. This means that in addition to excluding the elite from the people, all those who do not have the characteristics of an idealized community with which populists identify are excluded. Depending on whether they are left wing or right wing, when populists talk about people they may think of members of a particular social class, most often the working class or a particular nation. Therefore, people belong to all members of a certain community with the exception of the elite (due to moral criteria), and depending on the ideal type of community with which populists identify, they exclude certain groups to which there are antipathies in society such as ethnic or religious minorities and migrants (in the case of ethno populism) and the upper social class (in the case of lumpen populism) (Bonikowski, 2016: 11). The right-wing concept of people is nativist and it is a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. It is a concept that believes that in a certain country should live only members of the native

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group, and all others who are not native, that is, foreigners, are a threat to the homogeneity of the nation-state (De Speigeleire et  al., 2017: 39). According to this understanding of the concept of people, the more the access to public resources is reduced to those who are not part of the category of people (immigrants and minorities), the less danger they pose to the nativist group (Filc, 2020: 50). Hence, one of the criticisms of populism is that it advocates that those who are excluded from the category of people be deprived of material and political rights. For example, right-­ wing populists advocate for immigrants to be denied the right to vote and the right to use the services of the welfare state (Wolkenstein, 2015: 113). Although exclusive, populism does not necessarily have to be xenophobic (Van Kessel, 2011b: 70). In the construction of people, an important factor is the enemy they oppose. In Italy, for example, when Giorgia Meloni and Matteo Salvini talk about people, they have in mind the ethno/ national base of people, but they oppose to that substratum various projected enemies. While for the leader of the Northern League members of the people are the Italians, who are the antipode of the migrants, for the leader of the Brothers of Italy, the people are the Italians who oppose the government and the ruling elites (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 8). The ideal community on the basis of which people are constructed as a concept, for populists, is not something that has no prehistory. They usually refer to the golden age in which the ideal community had a prosperous and harmonious social life, but over time due to the influence of the elite, values began to be less or not respected at all, and the interests of the people were not taken into account in political decision-making, as the interests of external groups such as immigrants began to be incorporated into society. That is why the populists are calling for the return of sovereignty to the people in order for them to re-establish natural order. That is why the populists appeal that the order of the ideal community that has started to lose its contours should be restored as soon as possible. In populism there is an element of race against time. They appeal to the threat of an ideal community whose sovereignty should be restored as soon as possible before it disappears completely from the face of the earth. Populism brings salvation to people (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 5). Populist leaders often take and promote elements of the larger but marginalized culture in a society that they idealize. For example, Perón in Argentina glorified the role of previously marginalized social groups such as shirtless (descamisados) and blackheads (cabesitas negras) (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 10 A). The idea is to unite the angry silent majority in one country. To

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mobilize and turn against the enemy, that is, the establishment. Anti-­ elitism goes in the direction of criticizing political parties, large organizations, and bureaucrats that hinder direct communication between the political leader and the people. The basic characteristic of people is their unity. It is the line of demarcation between people on the one hand and the elite, minorities, and migrants on the other and the in-group out-group dynamics that creates the cohesion and unity of the people. As a coherent social group, they have their own interests, and the interests of other outsider groups are illegitimate. People are sovereign in the countries in which they live and their will is the general will. People are a central political entity; they make important political decisions and are able to act to protect their interests and implement their decisions (Canovan, 2002: 34). According to Urbinati (2018: 119), when populists point out that members of the elite are not part of the people, they do not think so much of businessmen as of those who are part of the political establishment. For example, a significant part of the populist leaders such as Silvio Berlusconi, Ross Perot, and Donald Trump have enviable wealth and do not see themselves as part of the establishment. Also, moral obligations apply only when one is perceived as part of the establishment. Populist politicians should not be saints, just as people are not saints. They may commit some offense. Thus, Trump openly said that he used all legal possibilities not to pay taxes or to pay as little tax as possible (Urbinati, 2018: 119). Populists know how to distinguish between right people and those who are not. Right people are those who are part of the ideal type of community with which populists identify and who support populist politics. For example, during the Brexit celebration, Nigel Farage said that it was a victory for the right people, pointing out that 48% of the people who voted against were not right people (Müller, 2016: 21). Populists respect and identify only with right people, only with those who support them. Hence, when they idealize the right people, they actually idealize their own supporters because they vote for them. According to populists, the only legitimate source of political and moral authority is the people. Democracy relies on the people, the silent majority, not the elite or the experts (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 5). True democracy is only one that relies on the opinion of the people, even when it is contrary to the opinion of the qualified public, scientists, journalists, etc. Populism refers to people, justifies their political behavior, and identifies with them. The goal of populist politicians is not to educate, to teach, or

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to change people, but to express their wishes and their will. According to populists, politicians should not show independence, creativity, but reflect the general will of the people (Mangset et al., 2019: 206). According to populists, adherence to moral principles and ethical scruples distinguishes between people and the elite. The conflict between people and the elite is not only political and social, it is ethical and moral (Revelli, 2019: 16). People are innocent, kind, and well-meaning, and the elite is insidious, corrupt, and evil. People are betrayed by the elite; their interests are endangered by the elite, which is out of their control. In that sense, an element of victimization of the people is present in populism. People are treated as victims of the elite. For example, in Belgium, research shows that Flemings feel treated unfairly, that they are unprotected, and that this problem cannot be represented and solved by formal political institutions, which opened space for the growth of populism and parties like Vlaams Blok (Gagnon et  al., 2018). The populists promise their followers that they will protect them from the corrupt elite. So in the campaign for the 2017 French presidential election, Marine Le Pen said that she would fight to free the people from the arrogant elite, while Trump in his inaugural speech, among other things, indicated that he would return power from Washington to the American people (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 5). The question is whether the application of different moral standards to people and the elite is not the result of a situational factor. The dilemma is whether people can seem more moral because in their daily lives, they have far fewer challenges to make a morally erroneous assessment related to the abuse of power, because they do not possess it. But even if the question of the situational factor in assessing the behavior of people and the elite is set aside, for sociologists and political scientists the real question is why such claims find serious social support in modern society, and why and how populism becomes the dominant political phenomenon.

3.3   The Elite Populism divides society into people and elites. The elite controls the most important segments of social life, makes key decisions in a society, and reproduces itself through a privileged approach to education, influential positions in politics, business, and public administration (Eichengreen, 2018: 1). Populists believe that politics is a conspiracy produced by the elite and works against the interests of the people. Hence, the elite is the antithesis of the people. Unlike the people, according to the populists, the

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elite is corrupt. The question arises what is the criterion according to which the elite is determined. Whether it is income, wealth, family background, education, or some other socio-economic factor. For populists, the only valid criterion that distinguishes between people and the elite is morality. The elite originates, is generated by the people, but does not protect their interests, but fights for its own narrow-minded, selfish interests, to the detriment of the interests of the people. The pluralist theory of elites indicates that there is no one homogeneous elite, but that there are several types of elites that compete with each other. Populists not only criticize the political elite (politicians), but also criticize the economic elite (company owners, managers, bankers, etc.), the cultural elite (producers, artists, media workers, etc.), and the intellectual elite (professors, experts, etc.). While the political and economic elite are seen as ignoring, and in the worst case working against the interests of the people, the cultural elite, intellectuals, and experts are seen as manipulating the facts while protecting the interests of the political and economic elite (Balcere, 2017: 29). One remark to the intellectual elite that is not central but that populists place on them is that intellectuals are arrogant (Wodak, 2019). While left-leaning populists are predominantly preoccupied with fighting the economic elite, right-leaning populists are predominantly preoccupied with fighting the cultural and political elite (Wirth et al., 2016: 9). The situational factor can also be very important in determining which elites will be criticized by the populists. While in opposition, populists blame political elites—it is criminal to be in power. Populist leaders themselves are often part of the economic elite, as in the case of Berlusconi and Trump. But when they come to power, populists blame economic and cultural elites and see them as an obstacle to enforcing the will of the people. In different countries, in different political contexts, and for different reasons, populists criticize different types of elites. Thus, in Western Europe and North America, populists are criticizing the cultural and political elites for being too liberal. In Central and Eastern Europe, the subject of criticism is primarily the political elite, but also judges, journalists, civil society, and ex-communists. The elite is generally complained that it has appropriated all the benefits of the transformation of society after the collapse of communism (Sadurski, 2019: 21). In Latin America, the subject of criticism is the economic elite (Mangset et al., 2019: 205). As Norris and Inglehart (2019: 4) note at the rhetorical level, populists disqualify and delegitimize every kind of elite in society, so the media is “fake news”; political parties–“dysfunctional”; public sector bureaucrats–“deep state”;

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people from the intelligence community–“liars and leakers”; lobbyists– “corrupt”; intellectuals–“arrogant liberals”; scientists–“who need experts ?”; the European Union–“Brussels bureaucrats”; and the United Nations–“a talking club”. According to populists, the establishment intentionally or unintentionally neglects the interests of the people. They betray them, thinking only of how to pursue their own selfish interests (Wodak, 2019: 12). Populist leaders accuse members of the business elite of being willing to make more profit by relocating their production to developing countries, closing down factories in developed countries, and leaving many people without jobs and basic incomes. For example, Trump called on people to distance themselves from the elite, pointing out that the victories and triumphs of the elite are not the victories and triumphs of the people (Eichengreen, 2018: 2). On any issue of public life, people are right and the elite makes the wrong decisions. Despite being arrogant and making wrong decisions, the values of the elite are wrong. Hence, the biggest difference between people and the elite is that the elite is immoral, unethical, unlike people who may not have the education of the elite, but have a sense of belonging to the community and respect tradition, religion, and customs. Although the basic difference between the elite and the people is morality, there are additional criteria by which one can determine which individuals belong to the elite. The first and most important criterion is the possession of power. The elite consists of individuals who have power in the field of politics, economics, media, and art. Populists do not include themselves and their supporters in the elite. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) usually accuses the media of protecting the interests of the elite and not treating the FPÖ fairly, but the tabloid Die Kronen Zeitung, which is read by almost 20% of Austrians, is excluded from this criticism (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 12 A). Even more than that, Die Kronen Zeitung was considered by populists to be the real voice of the people. In certain cases, given activities and objects become a symbol of the elite. For example, for American conservative populists, the elite is made up of liberals who drink latte, eat sushi, drive a Volvo, read the New York Times, and watch Hollywood movies (Mudde, 2017). Lasch (1996) suggests that the elite in the United States is selfish. The members of the elite are cutting the ties with the communities from which they originate and live in their own world. In search of status and wealth, they put community ties on the sidelines. The elite distance themselves from the ordinary people from whom they come. It isolates itself from people geographically,

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intellectually, and in every other way. Hence Lash writes about two cultures, one is elitist, individualist, secular, intellectual, and economically prosperous. The second is oriented toward the community, family, religion, the common good, and the values of the middle class. Populists accuse the elite of unjustly controlling resources (Jansen, 2011: 83). However, populists may lack ethics of responsibility. They are underestimating knowledge, expertise which is not a characteristic of the elite (Martinelli, 2018: 18). Because of their anti-establishment stance, many believed that populists could not hold on to power for long. That would make them part of the elite they are fighting against. But what is happening in practice, from Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, denies such positions. Namely, these populist leaders have been in power for a long time, and yet they retain anti-establishment rhetoric, accuse the previous political establishment of corrupt activities, and partially redefine the notion of the elite (Mangset et al., 2019: 213). Populists claim that the real power is not in the hands of democratically elected political leaders, but in the hands of the oligarchy. In this sense, the elite is associated more with economic than political power. Although populists are part of power structures, they accuse the owners of big business, the media, and the intellectual elite, of working against the interests of the common people and sabotaging the legally elected government (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 12 A). This argument was widely used by populists in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America. President Chavez, for example, often blamed the economic elite for not allowing Venezuela to “democratize”. According to Müller (2016: 4), when populists come to power, they try to establish complete control over the state by introduction of mass clientelism, that is, giving material benefits and conveniences to their supporters that they transform into their clients. Allegations of corruption often do not affect very populist parties because their followers do not trust the media, which they believe is working in the interests of the establishment. Even when corruption is evident, supporters of charismatic populist leaders act as clients who see their narrow material interests, rather than as citizens who vote on the basis of the public interest. The populists accuse the elite not only of ignoring the interests of the people, but even more of working against the interests of the country as a whole. For example, populists in the EU accuse the political elite of putting EU interests above the interests of nation-states. In a similar way,

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populists in Latin America accuse their political elites of protecting the interests of the United States, as opposed to the interests of the country in which they live (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 12 A). Hence, populism can enter into symbiosis with nationalism. In that case, elites are seen as people who are foreigners or at least people who protect foreign interests. Bolivian President Evo Morales, for example, distinguished between “mestizo” and corrupt European elites (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 14 A). Although it has the same ethno-cultural substratum as humans, in Eastern and Central Europe, ethno-populists criticize the elite for protecting foreign interests. Similarly, the elite in Western Europe has been criticized for protecting the interests of migrants, not the domicile population.

3.4   General Will The concept of general will differs from that of will of all. While general will refers to the capacity of people to participate in a community that knows how to define and pursue a common interest, will of all is a set of particular interests over a period of time. For populists, the general will comes down to the will of the people, which is also the will of the sovereign. It is not the will of individual groups within society, but the will of the political community as a whole. As early as the mid-1950s, Edward Shils (1956: 98) noted that populists equated the general will with the will of the people. At the same time, the will of the people always meets the criteria of justice and morality. It is the supreme principle on which the standards in the functioning of the institutions are built. However, the general will is not the result of the opinion of all people, but only of the real ones. It is the guesswork of populist charismatic leaders about what real people think about certain issues. In addition, by claiming to carry out the general will, populists are in fact exempting themselves from responsibility for their own decisions and policies by presenting them as an expression of the general will, rather than the personal solutions of populist charismatic leaders (Müller, 2016: 61). Rousseau (1712–1778) and the populists have different understandings of the general will. While for Rousseau general will means the involvement of citizens in politics, for populists it is limited to the will of the people, not even to all people, but only to the real ones (Müller, 2016: 29). If we go consistently to the end, the general will for the populists is the will of the populist leaders themselves, which is supported by their followers. Citizens have their own integrity and independent and critical

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attitude toward politics. The followers of populism, on the other hand, whom populists claim to reflect the general will, have an uncritical attitude toward populist charismatic leadership. People as populists understand is a much narrower category than citizens. Although it does not include the elite, this category does not include the minority on various grounds. Thus, the general will, as understood by the populists, does not take into account the opinion of these groups of citizens. Starting from the idea of general ​​ will, many populists criticize representative democracy. It is representative democracy and elections that produce politicians and policies that serve the interests of the establishment. Populists prefer instruments of direct democracy such as referendums and plebiscites. One of the consequences of the rise of populism is the growing importance given to instruments through which the general will is expressed, such as referendums. It can be said that through referendums, people are involved in making major political decisions and not just in selecting individuals who will exercise power as in elections. In this way, people are more involved in the political process. In Switzerland, for example, referendums are organized on a variety of issues, and they strengthen the political system and institutions (Dustmann et al., 2017: 3). But for populists, referendums are not the beginning of a process of deliberation in which citizens discuss and formulate policies, political alternatives, and make decisions. In referendums, people get the impression that they are participating in politics, in making political decisions, but this only happens occasionally, only on certain issues that politicians will agree on in advance, and people only vote on alternatives that have been formulated in advance. Populists usually initiate referendums on issues on which there is prior agreement in society. Populists use referendums to glorify their leadership. For example, a referendum was organized in Serbia and Montenegro, in which it was known in advance that the vast majority would agree with Milosevic’s policy toward Kosovo. There are times when the dominant opinion is wrong, as well as topics that cannot be the subject of referendums such as respect for human rights. In many countries in Eastern Europe, respect for human rights, the rights of the minority, is not supported by public opinion. Populists usually insist on referendums on such topics. In a liberal democracy, there can be no referendum on whether to abolish the human rights of minorities, whether to introduce racism, whether to introduce slavery, and so on. Populists accuse the establishment of not being interested in taking the general will of the people into account when making important political decisions. Thus,

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populists in Europe criticize that people are not given the opportunity to express their opinion on the future of the European Union. However, it should be noted that following the general will can occasionally lead to the establishment of authoritarian political regimes. Some authors even go so far as to claim that populism is anti-political because it insists on the general will and leaves no room for political differences that are crucial to political dynamics and political life (Mudde & Rovira, 2017: 16–18 A). Populists show distrust in experts. They see the experts as part of the elite (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 5). Populists believe much more in life experience than in theorizing. Therefore, when making political decisions, they give priority to the general will, that is, the opinion of the people over the opinion of the experts. Behind the populist insistence of the common will lies the vulgar interpretation of Rousseau’s writings that politics should follow the general will. People are seen as a homogeneous collective social entity that has the same interests and preferences, in which there are no internal divisions, and if they appear they are artificially created, encouraged by the political elite and intellectuals, and irrelevant because they can be easily overcome without greater consequences due to the common nature and identity of people (Mudde, 2017; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 6). The idea of populists around the world from Trump in the United States, through Marine Le Pen in France, to Geert Wilders in the Netherlands is for people to regain lost control of politics. Return to a strong, solid nation-state in which people decide, not supranational entities dominated by political figures without legitimacy. According to the populists, in this way security, stability, and predictability in people’s lives will be restored.

3.5   Demagogy As Havlik and Pinkova (2012: 9) note, the term populism in public discourse, especially among journalists, is used as a synonym for demagoguery, that is, rhetorical statements that are full of empty promises. Specifically, demagoguery refers to the use of emotions in political communication. Populists use language that appeals to people’s emotions to mobilize their anger and thus manipulate their fears and hopes. Demagoguery is a form of manipulating people’s feelings and hopes. With their rhetoric, populists reinforce people’s fears that the elite is corrupt, treacherous, that it protects external interests, that it works against economic prosperity and destroys the cultural identity of the domicile population, and at the same

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time produces hope that all these “problems” can quickly and easily be resolved by voting for a populist party. Political opponents of populism characterize populist as demagogic. Thus, one of the most influential politicians in Germany in the last decade, Wolfgang Schauble, identified demagogic populism as a serious challenge that could jeopardize the future of the European project (Cox, 2017: 10). In academic circles as early as the 1950s, Shils (1955), when he defined populism, stated that demagoguery is one of the basic features of this political ideology. Journalists have called populists anyone who promises voters things they want to hear, such as pay raises, free higher education, and tax cuts, without a plan to actually implement them (Mudde, 2004: 543). It can be said that demagoguery is one of the techniques that populist leaders use in communicating with the public. Some authors associate populism with demagoguery so much that demagoguery seems to be a populism that manipulates people for its own benefit. Such a definition of demagoguery is given by Singer (2009). According to him, demagogues are people who identify with people, who oppose the elite, whose policies depend on their close relationship with people and the popularity they have, and who manipulate both their connection with people and their popularity for their own benefit. As technology advances, so do the possibilities of using demagoguery to achieve political goals. Thus, Wodak (2019) points out that one of the characteristics of modern populism is the use of digital demagoguery. Although all populist leaders use demagoguery, Kasprowicz and Hess (2017: 203) distinguish between doctrinal populists who are convinced in their ideological positions and true demagogues (discursive populists) that are opportunists who only say what they think will bring them political points, more precisely what they think the majority population will like. In addition to being demagogues, populist leaders are often identified as charismatic leaders. There are several things in common between demagoguery and charisma. Both demagogues and charismatic leaders give the impression that they can solve the biggest problems that burden the public. In both cases, the personal relationship between the leader and his followers is very important. It should be noted that even if all populists are demagogues, not all demagogues are populists. A characteristic of populist demagoguery is to flatter people who are by definition moral and honest and to point out elites who are by definition corrupt. Courtship is an example of demagoguery. Courting people can mean courting the average, mediocrity, and lowering the level of knowledge in politics. Sometimes in politics it takes

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years and a lot of knowledge and experience to see if a certain political decision is right or wrong. Ordinary people evaluate decisions immediately and here, based on scarce, incomplete, and sometimes irrelevant information, and driven by emotions. There is also no evidence that people are more moral than elites. They are only less exposed to the possibility of being corrupted. If populists are demagogues, the question is whether other political ideologies do not use demagoguery. Thus, for example, among the socialists there is an idealization of the working class. Socialists have a paternalistic attitude toward the working class. Members of the working class are honest but often subject to manipulation by the media due to the cultural hegemony of the upper class. As a result, members of the working class are unaware of their true interests. Although they have a positive attitude toward the working class, the socialists are aware that it can make wrong assessments, it can be manipulated, and, in that sense, they do not flatter them to the extent that populists do when they claim that people are always right. That is, only politicians can make mistakes if they do not meet the demands of the people, and the people themselves are sinless.

3.6   The Reasons for the Growth of Populism It seems that the conceptual differences in the approaches to the definition and study of populism come down to which characteristics are given priority in the analysis of this complex socio-political phenomenon. All approaches more or less agree on the basic characteristics of populism as a phenomenon, with the fact that there is a dispute over which characteristics should be given primary importance as crucial to populism. For populism to take root and start growing in a certain society, there must be certain assumptions in it, whether they are social, political, or ideological. Revelli (2019: 17) writes that populism is a symptom of anomalies and dysfunctions in society. In general, it can be said that populism is a reactive political ideology that seeks to change social trends that are unfavorable to important social groups, whether they are the poor, the workers, or religious people. For example, James Weaver reacted against the interests of the rich and defended the poor, Juan Perón in Argentina reacted against oligarchy and attacks on labor, and Jerry Falwell reacted against secularization and the attack on religious values (Miskelly & Noce, 2002: 307). Of course, the populists place all these people under the category of people who are victims of corrupt elites.

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As Urbinati (2018: 115) notes, populist research can be divided into two groups. One refers to the social conditions in which populism appears, and the other to populism as such, that is, its political nature and characteristics. The first type of research is done in political history and comparative social studies, while the second in political theory. This study covers both dimensions of populism. If we have so far paid more attention to the political nature of populism, we will continue with paying more attention to the social conditions in which it occurs. The growth of populism is seen by many as a manifestation of the dysfunction of the social system. Populism appears as a symptom that indicates a serious social problem. In the late nineteenth century it emerged as a reaction to the need to include large groups of citizens from the social currents, while at the beginning of the twenty-first century it emerged because of the senility of democracy, which forgot the interests of the people, manifested through the crisis of representativeness, legitimacy, and sovereignty (Revelli, 2019: 3). If the reason for the rise of populism in the late nineteenth century was that people formally lacked political rights and influence in making decisions that reflected their quality of life, today they have formally guaranteed representation in politics, but their real impact is very small, if they have it at all. Populists distinguish between constitutionalism that has a horizontal dimension and guarantees people formal rights and representativeness that has a vertical dimension and guarantees people influence over those who make political decisions (Mény & Surel, 2002). Populism gives voice to a large but marginalized group that has previously been ignored by traditional political parties. Analyzing the popularity of populism in modern global society, Mudde (2004: 552–555) makes a very simple but very rarely used argument because, as usual, populism as a political phenomenon in academia is often despised and at least underestimated. He points out that populists may be gaining in popularity because voters feel they are right when they criticize the elite. He uses two arguments. First, the perception that there is corruption in the political system is much more pronounced in the period from the 1990s to the present than before. Second, in the period from the 1990s onward there is a much greater distance between the elite and the people than before. Pasquino (2008) analyzes the growth of populism on three levels: social, ideological, and political. At the societal level, the social base that supports populist leaders and policies is composed of people who are marginalized and isolated from influencing political processes and who are concerned about certain issues such as unemployment, migration, and the

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identity crisis. Traditional parties are reluctant to answer these questions, and when they do, they lack credibility, as the public has a perception that they are responsible for the emergence of these questions. Hence, on an ideological level, people reject established policies, parties, and leaders. At the political level, the way politics is practiced and presented in the public sphere has changed because the public sphere itself has been transformed. We are attending a process of commercialization of the media, personalization, and emotionalization of politics, establishing a new type of interaction between the public and politicians. Today, the media pays much more attention to scandals and corruption in the political sphere. In the newly created conditions, populist charismatic leaders cope much better than traditional politicians. Van Kessel (2011a: 24) believes that a key factor for the growth of populism is the populists themselves, that is, the credibility they have in the public, which in a sense comes down to their adherence to populist ideology. Political leadership, communication strategy, and organizational structure of populist parties can be imposed as factors here. Van Kessel (2011a) analyzing 31 European countries concludes that populists have significant political results in countries where there are credible populist parties and much poorer results in countries where such parties do not exist. Modern society is more critical of politics than ever before. That constantly puts politicians in doubt, under critical observation. The reason is the emancipation of the population and the values it represents. People today have higher expectations of politicians and at the same time feel more competent to judge their actions than before. The transformation of the industrial into a post-industrial society provided space for the emergence of new non-standard parties that do not have the ideological matrix of those of the time of the industrial society. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the arch-enemy of liberal democracy opened up new processes both within democratic societies and in relation to liberal democracy. Globalization and the decline of nation-state competencies have also had an impact on the growing popularity of populism, especially since the domestic political elites explained all the economic problems with globalization and attributed the successes to themselves. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 1) in considering globalization as an important factor for the growth of populism distinguish between the economic and cultural dimensions of globalization. Leftwing populism is more a reaction to the economic aspects of globalization such as the growth of social inequalities, while right-wing populism

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is a reaction to cultural aspects of globalization such as immigration, Euro integration, and multiculturalism. The emancipation of society is reflected, among other things, in the critical observation of a number of social phenomena, among which, in addition to globalization, include modernization and electoral legislation (Hawkins et al., 2017; Tushnet, 2019), socio-economic and socio-cultural transformation of society (Betz, 1994), economic insecurity, a sense of threat to national identity and non-responsiveness of the political system (Eichengreen, 2018), migration (Golder, 2003), growing inequality in society, the perception of the prevalence of corruption, financial crises, and demagoguery (Ferguson, 2016). Another important factor is the decline of ideologies and policies based on social classes and the perception of elite’s corruption. Symptoms of the problems in the functioning of the society that eventually led to the emergence of populism were the increased distrust in the political system and politicians, the reduced membership of political parties, the increased apoliticalness in the society, and the reduced turnout in the elections. Martinelli (2018), analyzing the development of populism in Europe, concludes that there are a number of factors that have enabled the growth of populism. The first is the crisis of political parties, the second is globalization, and the third is the transformation of the public sphere. All factors are intertwined. What connects all these factors is the crisis. Most of them point to a social crisis due to modernization, globalization, electoral legislation, growing immigration, growing inequality, reducing ideological differences between mainstream parties, and so on. All these factors can be reduced to discomfort, threat, and fear. As Zygmunt Bauman wrote, emotions play a significant role in contemporary politics, especially the spread of fear (Zaccaria, 2020: 81). Populism cannot exist without a crisis in society and uncertainty about the future (Laclau, 1977: 175). The emergence of populism has historically been linked to the crisis of dominant ideological discourses, caused by the crisis of material living conditions. Summarizing the opinions of most researchers, it can be concluded that populism is a political phenomenon that appears and spreads when society enters a crisis, when the political system through traditional parties is not able to find an adequate and satisfactory response to the crisis. In such situations, distrust toward the traditional mainstream parties is created and space is opened for the emergence of parties that offer alternative solutions. Those parties receive support from voters only if they have a consistent and convincing leadership. The strategies used by the populist

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political leadership, the discourses, the way of behaving, and the ideological matrix were discussed in the first part of the book. In the following chapters we will focus more on the social conditions that create distrust of traditional elites and preconditions for the emergence and growth of populism. From all the mentioned factors, we will analyze the four most important factors: modernization, globalization (its economic and cultural aspects), the crisis of the political parties, and the transformation of the public sphere.

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Mazzoleni, G., & Bracciale, R. (2018). Socially Mediated Populism: The Communicative Strategies of Political Leaders on Facebook. Palgrave Communication, 4(50), 1–10. Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Miskelly, M., & Noce, J. (2002). Political Theories for Students. Gale Group. Morillas, P. (2017). Setting the Brexit Agenda: Populism and UKIP in the United Kingdom. In E.  Woertz (Ed.), Populism in Europe: From Symptom to Alternative? CIDOB. Mudde, C. (2004). The Populism Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 9(4), 541–563. Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An Ideational Approach. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa, & P. Ostigay (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Mudde, C., & Rovira, K. C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Müller, J. W. (2016). What Is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press. Müller J.W. (2016). How to Think and How Not to Think About Populism. In M. Golder, G. Sona (Eds.), Symposium: Populism in Comparative Perspective; CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Organized Section of the American Political Science Associations, 26(2), 1–130. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press. Pasquino, G. (2008). Populism and Democracy. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell Duncan (Eds.), Twenty First Century Populism. Palgrave Macmillan. Revelli, M. (2019). The New Populism: Democracy Stares into the Abyss. Verso Books. Rovira, K.  C., Taggart, P., Ochoa, E.  P., & Ostigay, P. (2017). Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of Art. In C.  Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa Espejo, & P. Ostigay (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Sadurski, W. (2019). Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford University Press. Shils, A.  E. (1955). Populism and the Rule of Law. In S.  Buchanan (Ed.), Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics Proceedings (1954) (pp.  91–107). University of Chicago Law School. Shils, E. (1956). The Torment of Society, The Bedground and the Consequence of American Security Policy. Free Press. Singer, M. (2009). Demagogues: The Fight to Save Democracy from its Worst Enemies. Palgrave Macmillan. Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Open University Press. Tushnet, M. (2019). Varieties of Populism. German Law Journal, 20(3), 382–389. Urbinati, N. (2018). Political Theory of Populism. Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 111–127.

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Van Kessel, S. (2011a, August 25–27). Path to Populism: Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Europe. Paper Presented at the ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. Van Kessel, S. (2011b). Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties: The Nederland’s as Case Study. Perspectives on European Parties and Society, 12(1), 68–88. Viviani, L. (2017). A Political Sociology of Populism and Leadership. Societa Mutamento Politica, 8(15), 279–303. Ward, J.  A. S. (2018). Ethical Journalism in Paulist Age: The Democratically Engaged Journalism. Rowman and Littlefield. Wirth W., Esser F., Wettstein M., Engesser S., Wirz D., Schulz A., Ernst N., Buchel F., Caramani D., Malluci L., Steenmergen M., Bernhard L., Weber E., Hanggli R., Dalmus C., & Schemer C. (2016). The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Stiles: A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication (Working Paper, 88, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR). Wodak, R. (2019). The Micro Politics of Right-Whing Populism. In G.  Fitzi, J. Mackert, & B. S. Turner (Eds.), Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, Volume 2: Politics, Social Movements and Extremism. Routledge. Wodak, R. (2019). Entering the Post Shame Era. Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication. Wolkenstein, F. (2015). What We Can Hold Against Populism. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 41(2), 111–129. Zaccaria, G. (2020). he People and Populism. In V.  Kaul & A.  Vajpeyi (Eds.), Minorities and Populism  – Critical Perspectives form South Asia and Europe. Springer Nature.

CHAPTER 4

Modernization

4.1   Introduction Modernization is a process of great change in which society has been transformed from agrarian and rural to industrial and modern. Historically, this is a process that began in the time of the Enlightenment. But in the process of modernization, the processes of industrialization and urbanization were crucial. They reached their zenith in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In sociology and political science, the concept of modernization was particularly popular in the 1950s and 1960s in developing countries, for its popularity to return to the 1990s by considering the possibility of different types of modernity and different types of modernization of societies (Martinelli, 2005: 1). Modernization is a set of major social, economic, political, and cultural changes that began in Western Europe but spread throughout the world. The process of modernization is crucial for understanding populism as a socio-political phenomenon (Marczewska-Rytko, 2012: 24). Populism is a product of unequal involvement in the process of modernization of certain social strata, which caused increasing social differences, dissatisfaction, and frustration among those who were not involved in the process, that is, who found themselves on the losing side in modernization. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were authors such as Frederick Jackson Turner who believed that populism was a harbinger of a new age and a response to the growing need of people to be involved in social flows and in politics © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_4

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and the reallocation of scarce resources in society. Later, many researchers realized that populism is not the vanguard that demands full inclusion and more rights for people in the new society, but rather opposes change in this way trying to protect the interests of the people (Miskelly & Noce, 2002: 307). Populism is a reaction to the anomie caused by rapid social change. People who found themselves unemployed, impoverished, marginalized, and isolated from the dominant trends in society at the time of modernization, and later during the implementation of neoliberal, post-­ industrial policies, responded by rejecting the discourses of mainstream parties and often returning to before modern identities such as ethno-­ nationalism (Betz, 1994). Stavrakakis (2017: 4) defines the populism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a revolt of the peasantry and the working class against aggressive capitalist modernization. Hence, agrarian populism develops a sense of nostalgia and idealization of the past (Hofstadter 1955). Kitching (2011: 3) considered nineteenth-­ century agrarian populism and the twentieth-century new populism and neo-populism to be social movements that oppose the dominant modernization trends at individual time intervals. Especially through the prism of history, it can be said that populism had traits of nostalgic traditionalism and moral absolutism that hardly accepted the rhythm of modern times, industrialization and modernization (Lipset, 1960). The pejorative meaning attributed to populism is precisely due to its opposition to modernization as a dominant process in the early twentieth century. Hence, populism among liberal authors was perceived as a retrograde movement that opposes the progress of humanity that modernization brings with it. Populism does not oppose social change in general, but only those that endanger the interests of the people. In this sense, populism opposes specific social changes such as modernization, globalization, and reflective modernity. Authors such as Postel (2009: 4) argue that populism was not opposed to a priori modernization, but opposed to how it in practice proceeded in the direction of endangering the interests of the people. In that sense, it is possible to say that the populists were more in favor of an alternative form of modernization than against modernization. When society destabilizes a new wave of change that entails a new repositioning of social groups, then populist positions are taken by those segments of society that are losers in the new wave of change. Hence, ideological coherence can be found in populists in terms of opposing the establishment, but there does not necessarily have to be continuity of organizational structures and the collective entity that produces or supports populist policies. Populism

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does not oppose change a priori, but only those changes that harm the interests of the people. The referent framework in which populism is positioned is not social change versus the status quo, but people versus the establishment. Hence, populists support and sometimes themselves produce social processes that work in the interest of the people, whether it means preserving the status quo or changing it. In Latin America, for example, populists imposed change. Regardless of whether he dictates the changes, arises from them, or establishes the status quo in the society, populism is positioned on the opposite side of the establishment, that is, on the side of protection of the interests of the people. The transformation of society from pre-modern to modern has undergone numerous and significant changes in the sphere of economy, politics, morality, authority, relations between the sexes, and the overall social structure. The most important processes that took place during the modernization were the development of science and technology; the transformation of the nature of science, scientific research and institutions; the change of worldview; acceptance of biological evolution and technology-­ based industrialization; the possibility of production and exchange of goods and services with increased quantity and quality; formation of a global capitalist market with increased economic interdependence of individual nation-states, structural differentiation and functional specialization of certain spheres of social life; increased division of labor; transformation of social classes; increased class mobility; increased influence of the bourgeoisie and the working class; the establishment of secular nation-states; public administration; increasing military and political efficiency; political mobilization through social movements and political parties; the emancipation of civil society; the formation of a value system based on individualization, rationalization, and utilization; urbanization through concentration of the population in large urban centers that are functionally complex, culturally pluralistic, and socially heterogeneous; privatization of family life; separation of working place and home; development of the means of material and symbolic communication; and compression of time and space (Martinelli, 2005: 11). One of the more significant products of modernization is the emergence of the modern state, the centralization of institutions, and the bureaucratization of life. The classics of sociology theorized various aspects of this major transformation of society. As modernization progressed, social reality became more complex and society became one-dimensional in the sense that alternatives to industrial rationalism became increasingly impossible (Marcuse, 1964). Thus, Marx

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was preoccupied with the growth of the working class and the antagonistic relationship between it and the bourgeoisie. He had a dialectical approach to the issue of modernization. The dynamics of modernization with the growth of the division of labor inevitably led to a conflict between the two dominant classes in society, and the resolution of the conflict led to social progress, that is, led society to a new level of modernity where new conflicts would be created. Durkheim theorized the transformation of solidarity from mechanical to organic, that is, from pre-modern to modern, but also dealt with the question of the division of labor and the growth of the complexity of society. He expressed concern about whether the process of individualization could produce sufficient solidarity to integrate society. Hence he proposed the introduction of state education. Weber put the rationalization of the power structure and the bureaucratization of society at the center of his analysis. While in Europe populism was a reaction to modernization, in Latin America, populism embodied in Perónism in Argentina, for example, led the process of modernization. As Germani put it, populism is one of the paths to modernization (Germani, 1978). Hence, the relationship between populism and modernization is much more complex than it seems at first glance. Modernization provided conditions for systematization and manifestation of populist movements. It formed bureaucratic administrative structures that became the target of populist criticism. Liberal democracy itself in the form we know today, based on the representation of the interests of the citizens is a product of modernism. But modernism also provided an opportunity for liberal democracy to be criticized and for various forms of protest to be manifested (Taggart, 2002: 73). Socio-economic modernization, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), underlies “cognitive mobilization” which can be seen as reducing the external limitation of the ability of people to make choices due to increasing material, cognitive, and social resources. This influence is associated with a greater emphasis on the values associated with the self-expression of individuals and the conquest of increasing civil and political freedoms. In other words, it means moving from collective discipline to individual freedom, from group conformism to social diversity, from state authority to individual autonomy, from voting that primarily takes into account the group interests of the class to a vote motivated by personal preferences. This is part of the wider process of individualization which in the field of politics is characterized, among other things, by the less willingness of individuals to

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identify, to integrate into social groups, and to increasingly care for the realization of their own interests (Gauja, 2015: 89). Among the most important authors of the modernist explanation of populism is Gino Germani, an Italian-born sociologist who fled the Mussolini regime to Argentina, where he lost his academic career under Perón’s populist regime. Germani laid the foundation for the study of Latin American populism. According to him, populism is a reaction to the transformation of society. This transformation can be seen through the relationship between social modernization and political mobilization. All societies in which authoritarian political regimes have emerged, whether populist or fascist, have been in a phase of transformation from a pre-­ modern to a modern society. Modernization is the basis of populism as a social phenomenon. Germani was convinced that the processes of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization cause a state of anomie among the masses, which therefore becomes more amenable to top-down mobilization. The most important reason for the emergence of modernization, according to Germani, is secularization, which freed people from traditional dogmatic relationships and gave them greater freedom of thought and action. Freedom is a basic precondition for social mobility. Social mobility, in turn, de-balances the traditional social equilibrium and generates new balances in society. The transformation of society awakened the imagination of individuals for possible alternative forms of regulation of social relations, that is, contributed to the creation of political ideologies. If fascism in Italy was a reflection of the structural factors of modernization, that is, the convergence between secularization and individualization on the one hand and the need for social integration on the other, then populism is an expression of the need to mobilize the lower classes. According to Germani, the social base for Perónism was the new working class, made up of people who had recently migrated from village to town, who had not yet embraced the manners of city life, which are not yet socialized according to the standards of the culture of the working class, and therefore are open to political mobilization, that is, easily fall under the influence of messages from populist leaders. Populism in Latin America is therefore based on perverted class consciousness, which emerges as a result of delayed modernization processes in this part of the world (Filc, 2020: 48). The political incorporation of the masses gave them an experience of direct involvement in political and social life, but it toppled political organizations as a pillar of a democratic society (Germani, 1978: 10). Hence it can be said that by its consequences, populism is a

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process of authoritarian deviation of democratic political systems (Anselmi, 2017: 11). Although neo-populism is quite different from the populism that was the focus of Germani’s interest, and the social circumstances he analyzed have changed significantly, modernization still remains a key factor that must be understood in order to have a clearer picture of characteristics and specifics of populism. Unlike in Latin America, populism was an anti-modernist phenomenon in Europe. From its appearance on the political scene in the late nineteenth century until today, populist movements have mobilized the losers of modernization (Bluhdorn & Butzlaff, 2019: 194; Marczewska-Rytko, 2012: 32). It can be said that in Europe and the United States there are two major waves of populism. One is the end of the nineteenth century and is related to the process of industrialization, urbanization, and secularization. In that period, agrarian populism appeared, which idealized the lifestyle of the peasantry, in contrast to the growth trends of industry, the emergence and expansion of labor. Agrarian populism in the United States has been the result of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the growing influence of corporations in policy-making. Agrarian populism has accused elites of political corruption and demanded that all people be equal before the law. Modern populism is the result of the transformation of the industrial into a post-industrial society, the individualization that has reached the level of atomization, the increased level of social differentiation, the cultural stratification through the increasing importance of lifestyle, and the accelerated dynamics of globalization. It seeks to protect the values of the industrial society that was opposed by agrarian populism. Among those values are the welfare state, job security, and the predictability of standardized biographies of individuals. Modern populism relies on the traditions of industrialism and is a reaction to post-industrialism. It mobilizes the masses, based on the appeals of charismatic leaders who create an image of themselves as protecting national interests. Contemporary right-wing populism, according to Bluhdorn and Butzlaff (2019), is a reaction to a new phase in modernization that Ulrich Beck defined as reflective modernity. In response to post-industrial capitalism, modern populism is characterized by anti-corporatism. Since the 1990s, xenophobia and the ethnocentric views of immigrants have been added to these traits of populism (Kitschelt, 2002: 190). Hence Mudde (2004: 548) suggests that populism can be said to be a reactive rather than an active political actor. It is a defensive strategy. That is why populists do not have to have a well-­ thought-­out and well-developed program for the future. In populism

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believe people who lose their positions in society and through populism as a form of rebellion try to restore lost stability and dignity (Molerock & Narita, 2018: 137).

4.2   Agrarian Versus New Populism Basically we can talk about two types of modernism and two types of populism. Early modernism of the late nineteenth century produced the growth of the complexity of social structures and a reaction to the leadership of the political and economic establishment that drove that process. As a result, agrarian populism emerged. It was mainly concerned with the peasantry, which failed to cope with the process of modernization. The late, reflective modernism of the second half of the twentieth century further complicated the complexity of the social system in which a significant part of the people had a hard time coping. For their misfortune they blamed the political establishment, which was leading the process of modernization and globalization. The structure of society, social movements, the anatomy of politics, the structure of political parties, and social movements in early and reflective modernity differed, as did the populism they produced. Early modernity produced collective identities, in that sense the reaction to it first came from those who were marginalized like the peasantry, but later it was increasingly joined by the working class, which was initially on the winning side of modernization, but over time its interests were increasingly neglected at the expense of the interests of the corporate establishment, which was represented in the face of politicians and the economic oligarchic structure. Durkheim also includes other factors in the analysis of the emergence of working-class populism. According to him, populism in the working class slowly began to appear due to the lack or weaknesses of civil society, the weak organization of the labor movement, and the inability of the traditional religion to integrate alienated workers (Hawkins et al., 2017: 268). Populism is therefore the result of disintegration processes in society. What connects agrarian and new populism is the opposition to modernization, to the reform of society. Although social structures, collective entities that oppose modernization, may differ in different time periods, there is ideological coherence between them. Agrarian and new populism are seriously different. At the level of social movements, there is a huge difference between the agrarian movement and modern social movements. Modern social movements exist in conditions of shattered collective identities. Class identity is particularly

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dysfunctional. Individual identities are created in its place. National identities have not been shattered, but populists accuse that there is an effort for those identities to be deconstructed, diluted, or reconstructed down into regional and up into supranational identities. These processes provoke resistance and nationalist-populist mobilization. At the political level, the mass parties representing interest groups have been transformed into parties that do not have a traditional electorate, but address the average voter. The losers of the first modernity were the peasants, and hence the populism of the late nineteenth century was essentially agrarian. Agrarian populism was a reflection of the symbolic and material degradation of farmers (Goodwin, 1976: 468). The losers of reflective modernity are the working class and the lower middle class. However, they do not react as a collective because there is no solidarity and sense of community among their members. The reaction of reflective modernity goes along the line of localism, ethnicity, or nationalism because that form of collective identity feels threatened by the processes of modernization and globalization. The social strata that oppose the first and second modernizations are different. The first modernization was predominantly opposed by farmers, while the second was opposed by workers and the lower middle class, but what the two groups have in common is a sense of threat and traditionalism. Populism of the late nineteenth century was against urbanization, supported by the agrarian population, and contained elements of irrationality and intolerance. It reflected the clash between the new and the old, secular modernity on the one hand and traditional religious moralization on the other (Postel, 2009). Agrarian populism was a reaction against the changes brought about by progress, demanding the return of the traditional forms of communion and solidarity in society. Even in its organizational structure and the importance of charismatic leadership populism differs from and opposes modernism, which believes more in the rational structure of power. As time went on, the bureaucratic rational structure of power, which is impersonal and relies on abstract principles to be respected, became increasingly dominant, rather than the more traditional charisma-­ based government that relies on personal acquaintances. As Wiesz (2020: 436) notes, with all the excesses they make, modern populist charismatic leaders from Trump, Haider to Chavez and Le Pen operate within constitutionally prescribed rules. Modernization has changed society so much that even those who oppose it and want to lead society in another direction must respect its impersonal abstract rules.

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The most important things that hold society together and that create solidarity in society are values and norms. They shape collective consciousness as an adhesive that integrates society. Industrialization has completely changed the way individuals interact with each other, but also with institutions. The growing division of labor has created a society in which interactions are increasingly state-mediated. Society has atomized, and power has shifted from local loci to abstract, impersonal bureaucratic institutions. This is how Durkheim describes the creation of mass society (Hawkins et al., 2017). If modernization created a complex society, populism as its reaction even in the form of communication of populist leaders simplified things. Populist charismatic leaders send simple, short, clear, and unambiguous messages that their supporters can immediately understand. In essence, populists reduced the complexity of modern society to binary logic: the common people versus the establishment (Morgan, 2020: 341). The change brought about by industrialization had its consequences in the stratification of society. Agrarian populism was not so much a reaction to the economic changes and to some extent the uncertainties brought by the new time, as it was a reflection of the social and psychological anxiety of a part of the people who lost their social status in the new circumstances. Instead of adapting to the new trends imposed by industrialization, to which they willingly or unwillingly belonged, a significant group of farmers decided to oppose these trends by accusing powerful selfish oligarchies of dictating them. Hence the populists had an apocalyptic view of the future, believed in conspiracies, and saw themselves as scapegoats (Brankley, 1985: 465). The emergence of populism in the form of McCarthyism, immediately after World War II, is the transitional phase between traditional agrarian and new (industrial) populism. Talcott Parsons explains the emergence of this populism as an irrational response to structural changes in society. Namely, he writes that due to the structural changes in world politics, there was an increased level of pressure and stress associated with it in society. The response to stress was an irrational spread of aggression on the one hand, even if it was only verbal, and an increase in the level of fantasy, that is, illusions that everything can be returned to the old when people lived in a harmonious, non-contradictory world (Parsons, 1955: 127). The emergence of right-wing populism in the 1980s, according to Hans-­ Georg Betz, was a response to the transformation of the welfare state and the transition from industrial to post-industrial capitalism. Socio-economic and socio-cultural changes have caused insecurity among people.

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4.3   Emancipatory Movements, Modernization, and New Populism In order to understand contemporary populism according to Bluhdorn and Butzlaff (2019: 196), we first need to understand the context in which it appeared. The first significant factor is the emancipatory social movements of the late 1960s that raised expectations of political participation and political self-realization. The emancipatory movements failed to deliver on their promises of equal political representation and to be the voice of those who were marginalized and repressed, and social and political inequalities in society increased. The post-materialist interests of the post-industrial middle class became their priority. Emancipatory movements took care to represent the interests of highly educated well-­ networked social groups. They promoted differentiation, individualization, and internationalization, but were unable to offer a platform for integrating centrifugal social forces. The driving forces of the emancipatory movements were the autonomous entities created on the basis of the logic of the Enlightenment. Such subjects were social movements such as civil rights movement, pacifism, feminism, and environmentalism. Some theorists such as Goodwin (1976) define populism as a coherent, grassroots democratic movement that seeks to offer an alternative vision of the centralizing tendencies of industrial capitalism. It was the emancipatory movements of the 1960s that laid the foundation for the growth of the green movement and populism from the 1980s onward. Long-term studies show that from this moment begins the process of transforming the political and voting behaviors of citizens. The decline of the industrial sector in the economy, the growth of globalization, the mobility of workers, and the migration of production to developing countries have influenced the creation and strengthening of populism (Wirth et  al., 2016: 19). The second important factor in the rise of populism was the strategy of the progressive political forces in the mid-1990s to depoliticize politics. This strategy was to ensure the growth of efficiency, legitimacy, and effectiveness of policies. The assumption was that political negotiation and the democratization of decision-making would reduce the intensity of conflicts for political power and lead to the well-being of society and the realization of the common good. In that period, it was more inclined at the institutional level to make decisions based on competence, rather than based on political majority. It was believed that depoliticization would bring power closer to the people. In contrast, the number of expert bodies

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where decisions are made on the basis of evidence has increased, and politics distanced itself from the people. Among the people and politicians stood the experts, who had no responsibility to the people. So, people were disenfranchised. In order to be able to participate and judge competently in politics, a certain level of prior knowledge and skills were required. Thus, politics began to be associated more with professionalism than with democracy (Mair, 2002: 83). Depoliticization has weakened popular sovereignty and trust in politicians. A third important factor for the rise of populism is that politicians, public institutions, and economic actors have firmly accepted the emancipatory values of social movements. The populists basically had the same demand as the emancipatory groups of the 1960s—greater representation in politics, especially greater representation of people’s interests. A common point is also the demand for responsibility from the political elites (Papadopoulos, 2002: 45). The difference is that the emancipatory movements did not oppose modernization, but sought a way for it to be sustainable and for the benefits of it to be felt by the whole of society. In contrast, the populist movements sought to reconsider the expediency of modernization, which, in addition to endangering the interests of certain social groups, also endangers the interests of the sovereign, that is, the people as a whole. Such newer populist movements in the United States are the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street. For any social movement to be successful, including the populist ones, they must meet certain preconditions such as the following: the movement must propose new ideas and have a realistic agenda; rely on an organizational structure that is outside the established political parties in society to exist division between political, social, and cultural elites; use easy-to-­understand language; appeal to a mass of potential activists; mobilize a large mass of voters; and recruit leadership that can bring about political and legislative changes (Critchlow, 2020: 9). In the case of populist movements, they propose new ideas and an agenda that could be implemented, locating responsibility among the elites and promising to reduce their influence in the public sphere. The organizational structure is beyond that of established party organizations. There is a division among the political elites. Regardless of the fact that populist leaders claim to be representatives of the people, they are part of the establishment in their own societies. In that sense, despite Trump declaring that he is fighting the elites, he himself is part of the business elite in the United States. However, the division among business elites is slightly wider, and it includes division between those who operate in their home country and those who have globalized

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their economic functioning. Populist movements also use simplified language, addressing a wide range of people and recruiting a charismatic leadership that seeks to change the state of society in order to protect the interests of the people.

4.4   Cultural Dualism and Populism Cultural dualism is a concept that society sees as a struggle between two cultures, one that accepts social change and transformations as desirable and prosperous, and another more traditional that opposes change. This concept takes European experiences first and foremost and sees populism as a reactionary political ideology that opposes change. Populism was a reactionary political force in the late nineteenth century when change led to the building of a modern society. The same thing is happening at the beginning of the twenty-first century when change leads to building a reflective, fluid modernity. Stavrakakis (2017) suggests that Greek populism can be understood through the concept of cultural dualism developed by Nikiforos Diamandouros. This concept sees Greek history as a constant battle between the forces of modernization and those who oppose them. Greek society is divided into modernists and traditionalists. The struggle is social, political, and cultural. Modernization is tied to the founding of the modern Greek state, the introduction of new institutions modeled on those that already functioned in the West. The changes brought about by modernization are opposed by the traditionalist, pre-capitalist, and autarchic way of thinking and experiencing politics. Traditional culture is usually supported by older, less-educated, and less competitive people. It is influenced by the Ottoman and Byzantine pasts. Modernist culture is usually supported by younger generations, better-educated ones, and those who are more competitive in the labor market. They are trying to integrate Greece into international relations and the European family. Populism in Greece is a reaction and resistance to the processes of modernization. The situation in Serbia is very similar. The public and academic circles are dominated by the thesis of “two Serbias”, one that aims at traditionalism, medieval history, preserving traditionally friendly relations with Russia, and the other that aims at modernization, acceptance of Western values, and integration. The term “second Serbia” itself came into use after the appearance of Colovic and Mimica (1992) book entitled Second Serbia. The book is a collection of 80 speeches in 10 public forums in Belgrade in the spring of 1992. The speeches criticized media

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manipulation, political dictatorship, the rise of nationalism, and the escalation of the war in the former Yugoslavia. The term “second Serbia” has since become synonymous with resistance to the Milosevic regime. The division of first and second Serbia is a division of nationalist and populist ideology on the one hand and a modernist, progressive, civic political option on the other. The division is not only political but also cultural. Populists unite around the ideology of ethno-national identities that they perceive as homogeneous, thus wanting to respond to the threat posed by the process of change, modernization of society in the form of European integration, migrants, and neoliberal policies. Similar to Greece, the modernist camp is supported by individuals who are younger, more educated, and more competitive, while the traditionalist camp is supported by people who are older, less educated, and less competitive. The generally accepted discourse in the modernist camp is that Prime Minister Djindjic was assassinated in 2003 for opposing the traditionalist-populist camp to modernize the country.

4.5   The Second (Reflective) Modernity and the New Populism In sociology there are a number of authors such as Giddens and Baudrillard who write about the transformation of society, second modernity, reflective modernity (Beck), liquid modernity (Bauman), and new identities. Instead of the traditional class collective identity, populists create the identity of the people. This identity is built in two directions. Positive in terms of the moral superiority of people over the elite and negative in terms of long-term exploitation and manipulation of people from the elite. This new identity is articulated by charismatic leaders who offer themselves as the embodiment of popular sovereignty. In this way, the collective consciousness is reconstructed. But that process can be fragile because it can prove that charismatic leaders are incompetent, are not up to the task of embodying people’s sovereignty, as their economic policy may show to be unsustainable (Hawkins et al., 2017). The dynamics of second modernity have made some of the basic foundations of modern politics as а nation-states, nations as basic political entities, political parties as a pillar of partisan democracy, representativeness as a hallmark of modern democracy, and sovereignty as a basic feature of the modern state dysfunctional. Populism tries to fight for these institutions,

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just as agrarian populism fought for institutions and interests that in the process of modernization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were completely marginalized. For example, modern politics has long relied on the sacralization of secular institutions such as state sovereignty, as opposed to the divine rights on which monarchies were based. The emblems of monarchism were replaced by republican rituals and symbolism (Traverso, 2019). Among other things, modern politics has sacralized the pluralism of interests, the political ideologies that represent them. In postmodern politics, sovereignty is increasingly limited, representativeness is in crisis, and parties are des-ideologizing. Populism tries to keep the forms of these modern political institutions, but completely changes their essence. Bauman (2013) writes that classical modernity is heavy modernity, as opposed to contemporary modernity which is light modernity. Classical modernity is solid as opposed to contemporary modernity which is liquid, fluid. Classical modernity is condensed, and contemporary is diffuse and capillary. Classical modernity is systemic, while contemporary is networked. Classical modernity in the field of economics is based on heavy industry, the Fordist way of mass production, while the second modernity is based on the growth of the service sector and more knowledge-based production and is intended for strictly targeted segments of the population (Revelli, 2019). The transformation of the economic sphere and the transition from the first to the second modernity has its social dimensions, which in turn has its consequences in the transformation of politics. Despite all the differences, the second modernity is an upgrade of the emancipatory values of the first modernity. But it brings with it greater responsibility and greater insecurity. Giddens, for example, writes about the general sense of insecurity, instability, and anxiety that exists in modern society. The negative effects of the post-industrial form of social organization have caused existential fear in a significant part of the population. Bauman writes of a liquid, unstable society in which people are freer and more permissive than ever; Ulrich Beck writes that we live in a society of risk, while Baudrillard writes of hyperreality, a medialized, commodified reality in which subjects are dominated by objects. Populists try to simplify the complex socio-economic structures and relations in society and give a simple explanation to them. The populist response to social change occurring in the second modernity is a distortion of political correctness, the use of anti-elitist rhetoric, symbolic policies, and the introduction of anti-­ pluralist sentiment into politics (Wodak, 2019).

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Characteristics of the second modernity are the growth of service activities, transformation of the economy from industrial to post-industrial knowledge-based, and introduction of new technologies such as cable television, mobile phones, and Internet. Social classes have begun to lose their importance, and fewer and fewer people identify with them. Nation-­ states were de-territorialized and began to lose their sovereignty. Increasing importance was given to supranational organizations trying to generate loyalty among citizens and new supranational collective identities. The parties have lost their ideological division and the power to politically mobilize the citizens. The division within the European party system began to be made along the line of Euroskepticism—Euro fanaticism, at the expense of the classic traditional left-right division. People began to lose faith in science, medicine, so in the time of COVID pandemic the anti-vaccine movement was quite pronounced. The culture of the second modernity is strongly influenced by the media. The difference between what is happening in reality and the image created by the media is blurred. More and more people write and talk about fake news, about the post-­ truth. Television programs mix different genres. The most influential political shows are those that comment on politics in a humorous, sarcastic way. Identity in postmodern society is fluid. If the modern identity was based on the family and the profession, the identity in the second modernity is based on consumerism. The identity of individuals in the second modernity is based on what clothes they wear, what food they consume, what car they drive, and what house they live in. Modern identities are based on interaction, smaller than pre-modern ones, but still significant. In the second modernity we can talk more about the aggregation of individuals than about classical social groups. Interaction between individuals is mediated by social networks such as Instagram and Twitter. The loss of collective identities and the atomization of society for individuals mean an increase in freedom of choice, but also an increase in risk because one of the basic functions of social groups is to give security and protection to its members.

4.6   Populist Identity in the Second Modernity Populism can be seen as a reaction to new trends in society. It diagnoses the crisis in which the society finds itself, finds the culprits in the corrupt elites, and listens to the voice of the people who demand the return of stability and security. New (right-wing) populism offers a strong hand in

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regulating relations at the national level, restoring state sovereignty, reintegrating society at the level of social groups, primarily by designing and constructing people as an entity that should provide helpless and disoriented individuals with the opportunity for group identification and protection (Woertz, 2017: 5). New populism in that sense can be seen as a reaction to the disintegration of social groups and society as a whole. Namely, important segments of the domicile working class are trampled by social trends and left on the margins. They began to feel like strangers in their own country. Their values were not recognized, respected, and taken into account by political elites. Populism can be seen as an attempt to reintegrate society into principles and values that the elite has already left behind, hence the return of ethno-nationalism (Gidron & Hall, 2017: 4). According to Bluhdorn and Butzlaff (2019: 207), new populism is in fact an expression of the struggle between those who have dominantly embraced conventional modernity at a value level but are not yet able to accept the standards and demands of late modernity. In that sense, new populism is a reflection of the bearers of incompatible values. New populists try to play on the card of individuals’ anger at post-industrial society and neoliberalism as its economic logic. Postmodern populists, in addition to directing their appeals to those who are dissatisfied with their position in society, also appeal to those who want greater predictability of the situation in society. New populism is often recognized as anti-globalist, anti-intellectual, anti-establishment defensive nationalism. It is not only anger at the neoliberal economic system, but also because of the confusion created by the cultural milieu which relativizes and obscures collective identities (Axford, 2021: 105). COVID-19 is a good example of postmodern reality and how it is made into postmodern populism. The virus is spreading globally, as is the perception of it created by the media. In a post-truth world, social media is voicing a wide range of alternative views on how the virus occurs, how it spreads, and how it is dealt with. The citizens are confused and disoriented, and a significant part of them express distrust in the explanations and measures taken by the official institutions. The economy, in conditions of a global pandemic, cannot maintain the level of the previous period and a significant part of the citizens lose their jobs, which creates material and social assumptions for the alienation and growing anger among that part of the population. For the rest who have managed to keep their jobs, the insecurity that the epidemic causes in every field of social life remains. The populists are trying to exploit crisis and ride the

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wave of distrust toward the institutions, spreading the distrust toward the measures taken by the institutions and toward the vaccination. The populism of the second modernity offers its own solution to the identity crisis, that is, it offers its own identity policy. Individuals feel small, unprotected, and disoriented. Postmodern populism constructs the identity of people that will protect their interests. The disintegration of social classes also disintegrates the identity of the proletariat. Workers in the second modernity do not identify with the working class. They are not ready to actively participate in the activities of the unions. New individual identities are less determined by social origin and more and more influenced by the specific choices of individuals. New identities liberate the autochthonous, autonomous self. Individuals have increasing self-­confidence, including political self-confidence, and are increasingly challenging the establishment (Bluhdorn & Butzlaff, 2019: 200). New identities require political action, and populism through charismatic leaders offers just that. The identity of the people contains elements reminiscent of the identity of the working class and is able to unite individuals against the ruling elite (Hawkins et al., 2017). Both the identity of the proletariat and the populist identity are collective and call for social action. But social action in populist identities is limited by the democratic political system and often comes down to voting. The serious difference is that the proletarian identity directs the negative energy toward capitalism and the capitalists, while the populists direct their negative energy toward the elite which can be political, economic, or cultural depending on the context and the occasion. But for the creation of populist identity, in addition to the question of the material conditions in which individuals exist, the question of identity and its perception is also important. Postmodern populism is a widespread policy of anger and revolt. It is a reaction to the segmentation of group identities, to the growing imposition of market mechanisms, to their combination with globalization, and to the loss of sense that is projected by the new media reality. Modernist theory seems to explain populism as a reactionary political ideology that responds to social change in many segments of social life. Social changes in late modernity can be identified in various areas such as political economy, culture, political system through the transformation of political parties, and the relationship between parties and voters, but also in the transformation of media coverage which greatly affects the perception of individuals for politics, but also for life in general. Hence, in order

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to better understand populism, we will have to deal in more detail with how changes in certain areas of social life have reflected on the spread and growth of populism.

References Anselmi, M. (2017). Populism: An Introduction. London: Routledge. Axford, B. (2021). Populism Versus the New Globalization. Sage. Bauman, Z. (2013). Liquid Modernity. John Wiley and Sons. Betz, H.  G. (1994). Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. St. Martins Press. Bluhdorn, I., & Butzlaff, F. (2019). Rehinging Populism: Peak Democracy, Liquid Identity and the Performance of Sovereignty. European Journal of Social Theory, 22(2), 191–211. Brankley, A. (1985). Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform Reconsideration. Reviews in American History, 13(3), 462–480. Colovic I., Mimica A. (1992). Druga Srbija.; Borba. Critchlow, T.  D. (2020). Defense of Populism: Protest or American Democracy. University of Pennsylvania Press. Filc, D. (2020). European Populism and Minorities. In S.  Pardo & H.  Zahavi (Eds.), The Jewish Contribution to European Integration. Lexington Books. Gauja, A. (2015). The Individualization of Party Politics: The Impact of Changing Internal Decision-Making Processes on Policy Development and Citizen Engagement. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17(1), 89–105. Germani, G. (1978). Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism. Transaction Books. Gidron N., Hall A.  P. (2017, September 1). Populism as a Problem of Social Integration. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Goodwin, L. (1976). Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America. Oxford University Press. Hawkins, A.  K., Read, M., & Pauwels, T. (2017). Populism and Its Causes. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa, & P. Ostigay Pierre (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Hofstadter, R. (1955). The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Knopf. Inglehart, R., & Wetzel, C. (2005). Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Kitching, G. (2011). Development and Envelopment in Historical Perspective: Populism, Nationalism and Industrialization. Routledge. Kitschelt, H. (2002). Popular Dissatisfaction with Democracy: Populism and Party System. In Y. Surel (Ed.), Y, Many. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics. Doubleday. Mair, P. (2002). Populist Democracy vs Party Democracy. In Y. Many & Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Marcuse, H. (1964). One Dimensional Man: Study of the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Beacon Press. Marczewska-Rytko, M. (2012). Democracy and Populism in Process of Modernization. Postmodern Problems, 2(1), 24–38. Martinelli, A. (2005). Global Modernization: Rethinking the Project of Modernity. Sage. Miskelly, M., & Noce, J. (2002). Political Theories for Students. Gale Group. Molerock, J., & Narita, Z. F. (2018). Public Sphere and World System: Theorizing Populism at the Margins. In J.  Molerock (Ed.), Cultural Theory and Authoritarian Populism. University of Westminster Press. Morgan, M. (2020). A Cultural Sociology of Populism. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society., 29(4), 341–358. Mudde, C. (2004). The Populism Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 9(4), 541–563. Papadopoulos, Y. (2002). Populism the Democratic Question and Contemporary Governance. In Y. Many & Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Parsons, T. (1955). Social Strains in America. In D. Bell (Ed.), The New American Right. Criterion Books. Postel, C. (2009). The Populist Vision. Oxford University Press. Revelli, M. (2019). The New Populism: Democracy Stares into the Abyss. Verso Books. Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). How Did “Populism” Become a Pejorative Concept? And Why Is This Important Today? A Genealogy of Double Hermeneutics (POPULISMIS Working Papers 6). Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the Pathology of Contemporary Politics. In Y.  Many & Y.  Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Traverso, E. (2019). The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right. Verso. Wiesz, E. (2020). The Study of Ancient Israel and Its Relevance for Contemporary Politics. In E. Hanke, L. Scaff, & S. Whimster (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Max Weber. Oxford University Press. Wirth W., Esser F., Wettstein M., Engesser S., Wirz D., Schulz A., Ernst N., Buchel F., Caramani D., Malluci L., Steenmergen M., Bernhard L., Weber E., Hanggli R., Dalmus C., & Schemer C. (2016). The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Stiles: A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication (Working Paper, 88, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR). Wodak, R. (2019). Entering the Post Shame Era. Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication. Woertz E. (2017). Populism in Europe: From Symptom to Alternative?. CIDOB.

CHAPTER 5

Globalization

5.1   Introduction Globalization is one of the most commonly used terms in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It seems easier to use this term than to define it. It is linked to a range of issues such as global warming, Americanization, terrorism, unemployment, music, and more. Globalization itself could be defined as the liberalization and internationalization of markets that are losing their national and local characteristics. It can be measured by increasing integration, by reducing the cost of transport and communications, and by increasing the mobility of goods, services, technologies, capital, and people (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 4). Globalization came with a cosmopolitan vision of the world, but it also brought economic uncertainty, growing inequality in the distribution of wealth, cultural change, shifting traditional values and ​​ norms, and shifting the balance of power in favor of transnational elites (Flew & Iosifidis 2020). Globalization has had a huge impact on the functioning of liberal democracies, their governments, parliaments, and parties. It creates a contradiction between growing economic interdependence globally and the ongoing political fragmentation of the world system of nation-states. In the post-industrial global society, there is a decline in the traditional industrial sector and an increase in the service sector and high-tech production. It created a disparity between those who found themselves on the winning side and those who, for structural reasons such as age, location, or lack of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_5

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skills, found themselves on the losing side of globalization. This was also observed in academic circles. Betz (1994) was among the first to point to the dark side of globalization. Transnational mobile manufacturing companies, financial institutions, highly qualified professionals, technical staff, and managers are on the winning side of globalization. But globalization has brought uncertainty to some professions and sectors of the economy. This is especially true for the semi-skilled and unskilled workforce. Capital mobility, migrations of production in developing countries, and immigration in developed countries contribute to stagnation or reduction in the wages of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. With the advent of globalization, the structure of jobs has changed, the wages of the low-skilled labor force have stagnated, job security has decreased, and the income gap has widened. The traditional middle class has also come under threat due to the threat to traditional institutions, values, ​​and statuses (Swank & Betz, 2003: 220). Whether one is on the winning or losing side of globalization, the general characteristics of the workforce have changed. Workers need to be flexible, professional, entrepreneurial, and ready for permanent education and adjustments. Giddens (2003) suggests that globalization has instilled a sense of insecurity because of the speed and depth of change it has caused. People have lost the feeling that they are in control of the situation. The stagnation of wages and the increase of economic uncertainty had their manifestation in the political sphere through the emergence and growth of parties that oppose these trends. Populism is just such a phenomenon. It is localism that opposes and challenges hypermodern globalism (Axford, 2021: 87), or as Von Beyme (2018: 3) points out if the arch-enemy of early populism is corporatism, the arch-enemy of modern populism is globalization. The populists saw the globalization, whether economic, political, or cultural, as an elite-led project that posed a threat to the security and prosperity of the people. In the realm of economic globalization, populists oppose the liberalization of the economy and markets. In the realm of cultural globalization, populists oppose the Americanization of culture, multiculturalism, and immigration, which creates the preconditions for its implementation. In the realm of political globalization, populists oppose the loss of the sovereignty of nation-states. It can be said that populism undertakes different strategies in the fight against certain types of globalization. These strategies include economic nationalism, protectionism, political chauvinism, isolationism, the return of control of borders, a review of the international obligations of nation-­ states, and discriminatory measures against marginalized groups that do

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not fall into the category of people as defined by populists (Kallis, 2018: 287). There are differing opinions in academic circles as to whether globalization introduces a new type of cleavage or just introduces new content into the already existing cleavage (Wirth et al., 2016: 21). It seems that on the existing social cleavage, globalization introduces another additional cleavage, on globalism—anti-globalization; Euro enthusiasm— European skepticism; emigration—anti-emigration. Some of the citizens who are either declassified or marginalized in the process of globalization, based on this cleavage, vote for right-wing populist parties. It seems that those who are less educated and less competitive in the global labor market are more afraid of globalization than other citizens and are more motivated to vote for anti-globalist populist parties (Bacaria, 2017: 19). The economic dimension of globalization reflected in the deprivation of individuals of economic well-being and the growth of inequality is one of the dimensions that motivates individuals to vote for populist parties. The second equally important dimension that motivates citizens to vote for populist parties is cultural anxiety and cultural backlash (Bornschier, 2010; Molls & Jetten, 2020). Below we will focus on both dimensions.

5.2   The Global Political Economy Some authors such as Downs (1957) argue that people engage politically and vote in elections on rational grounds. When voting, they behave like in a shop. They try to invest the money they have in order to get the best possible product for them. In a similar way in elections, individuals invest their vote, their trust, in the party they believe will bring the greatest benefit to them and their loved ones. Politicians create ideological packages, a set of ideas they offer to citizens. Voters are instrumental—rationally oriented. The reason for the emergence of populist parties is the inability of traditionally established parties to respond satisfactorily to the socio-­ economic challenges of modern society, that is, as a reaction to long-term problems in public administration (Hawkins et  al., 2017). Economic issues are among those that most concern citizens. For example, the results of Standard Eurobarometer (2019: 19) showed that the issue of the economic situation is one of the four issues that worries most EU citizens, and in it that research very high is the issue of unemployment. Namely, 18% of EU citizens said they were worried about the economic situation, while 12% said they were worried about unemployment. The growth of populism usually occurs in moments when countries are economically

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stagnant, when there is a growth of differences between social strata, when economic insecurity and unemployment grow, and more (Eichengreen, 2018). Populists themselves usually present an apocalyptic picture of the country in which they operate, linking it to the actions of the elite. Starting from such a diagnosis of the social situation, they propose their own solutions, that is, political platform. For example, populists in Western Europe find the beginning of all evil in society in 1945 and the political course that elites have been implementing since then. In Central and Eastern Europe that period is located in 1989, while in Latin America in 1990. Tushnet (2019: 282) calls the matrix that governs all these countries “international social welfare constitutionalism”. Each of the parties in any country proposes its own policies and struggles оn elections in order to implement the goals of the above matrix (Tushnet, 2019: 383). International social welfare constitutionalism promised a steady increase in the material living conditions of all sections of the population, with occasional short-term recessions that the elite knew how to solve using macroeconomic techniques. In addition to that, social security was promised for those who will not do well in the labor market, especially in times of recession. People were to have equal participation in meeting the costs of forming such a society by paying taxes (Tushnet, 2019: 384). But what happened was that certain sections of the population—the losers in the new conditions—pay the costs of the new type of economy and another group—the establishment—enjoy the benefits. For example, in the financial crisis, unskilled workers in traditional industries did the worst, their wages stagnated or decreased, the unemployed and those working in inadequate and precarious jobs found it harder to find suitable employment (Martinelli, 2018: 23). Populists do not seek international social welfare. They criticize the domestic welfare state because it does not turn only to the domicile population, but also includes other citizens and thus loses a lot of resources (Mudde, 2007: 187). The international dimension of this program included the increased integration of nations into the global economy, which in turn should provide benefits to all parties involved. The traditional theory of international trade has spoken of the significant benefits to each of the parties involved in trade. For example, the movement of capital from the center to the periphery increases peripheral revenues but reduces the prices of goods and services in the center. An analysis of the import of industrial products from China to the United States from 1991 to 2007 shows that workers receive cumulatively lower wages and much more often lose their original

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job. The study was conducted on a sample of 880,465 workers (Dustmann et  al., 2017: 11). The prices of goods and services as a result of global trade at the center of the world economy are declining, and at the same time, at the center of the world economy the wages and the number of jobs for industrial workers are also declining. International migration increases incomes in the countries from which migrants leave because they send donations to their domicile countries, but reduce employment opportunities or job vacancies in countries receiving migrants. In the United States and Western Europe, the wages of the middle class have stagnated and the working class is losing its jobs (Cox, 2017: 14). The idea was to overcome such issues through training and retraining programs for the workforce, as well as adjusting trade policies. In this way, it was thought that those who would be most affected by globalization would be helped (Tushnet, 2019: 384). However, the failure of such programs and the reduction of the welfare state raised the issue of migrants, who began to be seen as a group stealing jobs and services from the welfare state of the domicile population. For example, Marine Le Pen says “mondialisme” is the new modern slavery, and international finance chiefs are new slave traders who destroy everything like national sovereignty and identity that can stand in the way of making a profit (Martinelli, 2018: 23). Populists’ criticism of the global economy goes in several directions: (1) the global economy and markets mean that foreigners can have an impact on the national economy. Some international corporations have higher GDPs than some countries. (2) Economic globalization is also a threat to the political independence of these countries; it threatens national interests and means the export of jobs to the third world (Mudde, 2007: 187). Populism emerged when political elites failed to achieve the goals that international social welfare constitutionalism promised to its citizens. Domestic political elites lacked the flexibility to deliver on their promises of social welfare in dynamic economic conditions. As Tushnet (2019: 384) writes in the United States, this phenomenon is called “gridlock”. The financial crisis of 2008 further increased distrust in the competence of the establishment to lead society in the right direction. It is probably too much to draw parallels between economic crises and the rise of populism with the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the Great Depression, and the rise of fascism and Nazism across Europe, because every economic crisis, although has political consequences, does not end with the rise of fascism and Nazism. Populists are not fascists and Nazis, although illiberal tendencies

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can be found in their political agenda (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). But Funke et  al. (2016), analyzing elections in 20 economically developed countries since 1870, reveal that financial crises are usually accompanied by partisan conflicts. Namely, the uncertainty that follows the financial crises causes an increase in the polarization of the political scene. Usually such crises have benefited populist parties that blame elites, migrants, and foreigners for the crisis. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, nation budgets were in deficit and countries’ external debt was rising, as was unemployment, while wages were falling. The solution was found in the neoliberal austerity policy, which resulted in the stagnation of the economy (Ferzins, 2017: 58). The result of that policy was high unemployment rates, increasing inequality in society, increasing the tax burden on households, and at the expense of reducing the burden on business, reducing consumption due to low wages and tax increases, job insecurity, reduction of social security contributions, and drastic reduction of public spending on health, education, and social security. Since then, we have seen a growing trend of populist parties in Europe. The sovereign debt crisis that has gripped the eurozone since 2009 and was most pronounced in Greece, in addition to fueling distrust of economic and political elites across Europe, has had the direct effect of bringing to power a left-wing populist party like Syriza in Greece. Economic policy is certainly one of the most important reasons why the popularity of populist parties is growing. Populism is therefore the result of incompetent economic elites who are unable to produce economic growth and the development of society. In times of economic crisis, populist leaders can often capitalize on their anti-elitist and anti-immigrant political positions. They insist on economic populism, which comes down to accusing political elites of betraying the interests of the people, ignoring them, and even working to the detriment of the economic well-being of the people. Characteristics of economic populism are that people have a common destiny in terms of the standard of living. The standard of living of the people is deteriorating due to the ignorant attitude and the corruption of the political elites. That is why people need to regain their sovereignty, which has been usurped by the ruling elite, in order to regain their standard of living with the help of populist leadership. An example of how economic crises affect the growth of populism is the Fidesz party in Hungary. It began promoting economic populism after the global financial crisis of 2008. For the economic crisis, Fidesz blamed the left-wing political elite and international forces. In the 2010 elections, it promised to restore the sovereignty of the people,

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correct the mistakes of the liberal elite, and protect the interests of the people, not businesses (Becker, 2018: 38). There are elements of utopianism in economic populism. Populists give ordinary people hope that by restoring people’s sovereignty they will restore the lost standard of living. Hence, economic populism usually comes bundled with economic sovereignty, which comes down to returning the competencies of nation-states to the economic sphere. Economic sovereignty usually refers to tight border control, autonomous fiscal policy, control of foreign trade, introduction of autonomous customs policy, etc. (Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2019: 202). Right-wing populist parties advocate national capitalism. They partially accept market freedom at the national level, but reject it internationally by insisting on the protectionism of the domestic economy (Mudde, 2007: 125). For example, Euroskeptic populist parties in the EU see the euro as a historic mistake that has robbed nation-states of the practical and symbolic power to pursue their own independent monetary policy (Surel, 2011). It can be said that economic populism can have both positive and negative consequences. Among the positive effects are that (1) populists can put pressure on the establishment to undertake reforms that increase the economic integration of excluded and marginalized segments of the population; (2) populists can increase the responsibility and accountability of technocratic institutions to better explain their policies; and (3) populism also opens the door to another assessment of the agenda of economic liberalism. Negative aspects of economic populism include the fact that (1) populists use the argument of the political majority to erode the autonomy of technocratic institutions and scientific knowledge; (2) populism creates economic instability by polarizing the political scene in which political coalitions are either impossible or unstable and short-lived; and (3) populism can legitimize corrupt policies and clientelism by arguing that they just help the people (Rovira, 2019). Political elites began to be perceived as corrupt. The populists saw them as people who used power to pursue personal interests and increase personal wealth. In addition, the elite is seen as a group that benefits from free trade, as people pay the price for it through job losses, as opposed to the initially promised cost-benefit sharing of international social welfare cosmopolitanism (Tushnet, 2019: 384). Hence populists in many EU countries, such as the Lega Nord, Finns Party, Dutch People’s Party, Flemish Vlaams Belang, and Austria’s Freedom Party, advocate for welfare state services to be available only to the domicile population (Martinelli, 2018: 24). In terms of economic policy, the populists are economic

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nationalists and advocate the protectionism of the domestic economy. In general, populists have a mercantilist view of foreign trade and advocate restricting imports. Populists often have anti-monopoly positions, advocating for the redistribution of goods from monopolies to people. Some populist parties, such as the Austrian FPÖ, speak of a fair market economy instead of a free market economy. Haider called the current economic model in Austria “turbo capitalism”. According to him, the government should have a partnership with stakeholders in the economy. Capitalism does not necessarily mean that only the winners survive, that businessmen exploit their employees, that they tolerate inhumane working conditions, that they do not invest in the permanent education of their employees. Front National, for its part, advocates popular capitalism, which means that 70% of the shares of companies in France are in the hands of French families and the state maintain control over service activities that are essential for the functioning of the nation and its security, such as public transport, telecommunications, the military sector, and energy production (Mudde, 2007: 123–129). Populists promise rapid economic development, higher wages, and the expansion of social programs (Dustmann et  al., 2017: 5). Two economists, Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, have pioneered the study of populist economic policies. They summarized the results of the economic policies of populists in Latin America and concluded that although the economic policies of populists in different countries have their own specifics, what they have in common is that in the long run they all devastate the economy. Historically, especially left-oriented populists tried to address inequality through the use of expansive economic policies. These policies relied on increasing the deficit to finance social needs and disregarding the basic balances of the economy and often ended in economic crises in which the lowest social strata were most affected (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991). But in Europe most populists strictly respect economic balances and advocate a segregation chauvinist economic policy, in which those who can work but prefer to make ends meet by taking benefits from a welfare state cannot do so. Additionally and more importantly, the welfare benefits should be limited to the domicile population. Some populist parties, such as the Austrian FPÖ, advocate the inclusion of the private sector in social policy in addition to the state. In this way, social policy would be more economical and effective. In Europe, where an expanded welfare state is established, there are almost no parties that advocate its complete abolition. But even the center-left parties agree that the system introduced by the welfare state has become

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too large and too expensive to maintain and that some cuts will have to be made (Mudde, 2007: 131). 5.2.1  Free Trade and Populism Rodrik (2018) concludes that in the period after World War II we can talk about two phases of economic globalization. Until the 1980s, we could talk about successful international cooperation that provided benefits for both developed and developing countries. In that period, it was assessed that even greater economic integration is needed. Since then, we have accelerated globalization primarily through multilateral trade agreements. Cox (2017: 14), citing Indian economist Arvind Subramanian, calls this phase hyperglobalization. Trade agreements have become much more comprehensive and remove all obstacles to the mobility of capital. They were formulated to satisfy business interests, especially of investors. The institutional framework of these processes was the transformation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization (WTO) that took about 50 years, specifically from 1947 to 1995. The hope was that the benefits of globalization would be fairly redistributed in society. But what happened through the removal of barriers to capital mobility was the opening up of competition between developing countries that would attract more foreign capital and foreign investment through lower labor costs. The relocation of capital from developed countries has created serious economic problems due to job losses, but has also significantly increased inequality in those societies. Namely, a group of people who later became the target of the populists lost their jobs; if they managed to keep them, the job became insecure and wages stagnated because they were in competition with those in developing countries. On the one hand, a small number of people made extra profits because they invested in developing countries and had much lower operating costs. On the other hand, the losers of globalization were the unskilled and semi-skilled workers who saw the reason for the reduction and stagnation of wages, the reduction of jobs, and the increase of economic insecurity in globalization and the free trade agreements that enabled economic globalization. Their views were represented by populist parties that criticized free trade agreements, accusing them of unfair competition which, according to Front National, is a central problem for French workers. Similarly, FPÖ leader Jörg Haider argued that Austria would need to protect itself from unfair

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competition and that it would need to introduce selective safeguards (Swank & Betz, 2003: 223). Trump, meanwhile, has called for protectionist trade deals, harshly criticized the WTO, and called for bilateral rather than multilateral trade agreements (Higgot, 2018: 9). In 1996, he opposed the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) on the grounds that the agreement would allow the relocation of industry and jobs in the United States to Mexico (Van Der Vaal & de Koster, 2017: 561). The anti-globalization movement in the United States began gaining more media visibility back in 1999, when in Seattle protest against the International Free Trade, Investment, and Services initiative was organized. A significant number of people were then mobilized against the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). Trump’s appearance on the US political scene has brought much greater visibility and clearly defined policies against free trade agreements. In the 2016 presidential election campaign, Trump threatened that the United States would leave the WTO and ignore its rules. He also threatened to revoke NAFTA, and US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross decided to start renegotiating the agreement (Bacaria, 2017: 19). Additionally, on June 1, 2017, Trump announced that the United States would leave the Paris Climate Accord because that agreement is against the interests of the American economy and American workers (Shear, 2017). Multilateral trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) criticize not only populists in the United States, but increasingly those in Europe (Cox, 2017: 17). Anti-globalization activists from Europe protested against the TTIP, as well as against the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The European Parliament, for its part, did not accept the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Bacaria, 2017: 21). According to populists, the implementation of these agreements has the effect of reducing wages and the number of jobs in the center of the world economy. Populists are committed to developing bilateral relations and agreements, not multilateral ones. In developing bilateral relations, each country should be guided by the interests of its own people. In order to protect the interests of the people, in the field of international trade where for various reasons certain industries are not able to enter into equal competition with the respective industries of other countries, populists propose a protectionist policy. The United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, among other things, had this dimension of market protection. The data show that in the referendum on the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, this option was most

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voted for by the regions most exposed to competition from China (Dustmann et al., 2017: 11). Free trade agreements aim to create common markets. Both left-wing and right-wing populist parties oppose it for their own reasons. They are particularly opposed to the common labor market. The metaphor with the fear of “Polish plumbers” is legendary here. For example, the common labor market is opposed by left-wing populist parties such as the Socialist Party in the Netherlands and Die Linke in Germany, and also by right-­ wing populist parties such as the Front National in France and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (Van Der Vaal & de Koster, 2017: 561). While left-wing populist parties oppose the common market because the biggest losers are the unskilled domicile labor force, right-wing populist parties oppose the common market with elements of ethnocentrism and nationalism. Economic nationalism that opposes the free trade agreements is closely linked to nativism and is expressed by encouraging citizens to buy domestic products. Populists promote such policies in order to stimulate domestic production, job creation in the domestic economy, and employment of the domicile population. 5.2.2  Economic Globalization and the Growth of Inequality Economic globalization is an indisputable fact. As Flew and Iosifidis (2020: 5) point out, citing the World Bank, it has contributed to increasing the share of foreign trade in global GDP from 30% in 1973 to 70% in 2018. In general, globalization and redistribution of income at both macro and micro levels have increased the economic insecurity of citizens. At the same time, globalization through immigration, the constant wars in the Middle East, fosters a sense of cultural insecurity among citizens. This creates a basis for distrust of the processes that take place in society, over which citizens have no control. Distrust of the processes is also distrust of those who lead such processes, political elites, or the establishment. It creates preconditions for the development of populism (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 3). Han (2016) points out that the growth of inequalities increases the support for the populist right, especially among those with lower incomes, that is, among manual workers. According to Piketty (2014), the growth of populism is a consequence of the growth of economic inequalities globally. The unskilled workforce is the biggest loser in the growth of the knowledge-based economy, technological automation, the collapse of the manufacturing industry, the

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movement of labor, goods, and services globally, the erosion of organized labor, and neoliberal austerity policies (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 45). Particularly dramatic are the figures for the period between 2005 and 2014, when 65–70% of citizens in the 25 most economically developed countries in the West experienced stagnation or declining incomes. This means marginalization and the loss of social status of a large mass of the population, between 540 and 580 million people. This group includes 97% of families in Italy, 81% of families in the United States, 70% of families in Great Britain, 63% of families in France, and 20% of families in Sweden. This fact caused a political earthquake in the form of the emergence and growth of populist parties (Revelli, 2019: 198). According to Rodrik (2018), if we know well economic history and economic theory, it could be predicted that the advanced stage of globalization could result in the growth of populism. Different forms of populism in different countries occur due to different types of shocks caused by globalization. In the last few years we have witnessed an increase in income inequality and wealth in the world economy (Piketty, 2014). Those with the highest incomes from the 1980s to the present have increased their share of revenues in the world economy (Atkinson et al., 2009). In the same period, the share of wages in total revenues decreased significantly. The reason is that the bargaining power of the workers has decreased due to the lower mobility of the labor force than that of the capital. Companies are blackmailing employees that they will leave the country if employees do not accept pay cuts. We also record growth in non-standard work such as part time, temporary work, and self-employment. Non-standard work, by definition, should not be to the detriment of employees, but most often it entails worse working conditions, less protection at work, lower wages, less training, and less stable work and most often it does not open prospects for career development (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 10). De Speigeleire et al. (2017: 45) indicate that material insecurity and economic inequality in Western countries are increasing. Unemployment among the unskilled workforce is rising, people are increasingly working occasionally and temporarily, and at the same time wage income as a percentage of GDP is declining De Speigeleire et al. (2017: 45). Rising inequality increases the vulnerability of losers in the process of globalization. They are losing their social status. They have fears about what the future holds. This makes them susceptible to accepting messages that are sent by populist parties blaming incompetent and corrupt elites for the people’s plight (The Global State of Democracy, 2020). As shown by Mughan et al. (2003),

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the success of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in the late 1990s is largely due to the insecurity that globalization has brought into the lives of citizens, especially on the issue of job security. Especially in right-wing populist nationalism, the concept of nativism appears on the issue of job security, that is, the inclination to protect the native labor force from the competition of cheap foreign labor. The established parties are accused of introducing economic globalization and thus handing over the interests of ordinary people. 5.2.3  The Decline of the Welfare State After World War II, the welfare state seemed to be an important part of the liberal project. It has established a network of workers’ social protection as well as political stability. The golden age of the welfare state was from World War II until the 1970s. After this period, we notice a decrease in the programs covered by the welfare state. To this day it is constantly written about saving and cutting costs for the welfare state. Academic circles began to write that the welfare state is in crisis (Greve, 2020b). The welfare state crisis was particularly evident at the beginning of the twenty-­ first century when Jurgen Habermas noted that the benefits of the welfare state were shrinking and access to it was more difficult (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). In Europe, where an enlarged welfare state is established, there are almost no parties advocating its complete abolition. But even center-left parties agree that the system introduced by the welfare state has become too large and too expensive to maintain and that some cuts will have to be made (Mudde, 2007: 130). The welfare state crisis was associated with many factors such as the transformation of the economy in which services began to become more important than production, changes in production itself also took place, so it became more flexible instead of standardized mass production, the capital market became internationalized as well as production, the demographic structure of the population has changed, labor migrations have intensified, the position of trade unions has weakened, wages have stagnated, and thus the basis on which welfare state contributions are paid (Huber & Stephens, 2001: 318). The 2009 financial crisis is the latest in a string of developments that have increased pressure on the welfare state. Relying on the assumption of corrupt elites, populists played the card of distrust of traditional institutions such as the welfare state (Pavolini et al., 2019: 6). Thus populists criticized a welfare state that does not help people. From here, academic circles

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began to write about welfare populism and the unnatural voting of part of the working class for right-wing populist parties. People from the lower social classes, on the one hand, did not have a good opinion of the welfare state, and on the other hand, they had an egalitarian view of things. A possible critique of the welfare state does not mean support for neoliberal economic policies, privatization and deregulation (Derks, 2006). The logic here is in the moralization of the economy. Some of the lower social strata are not satisfied with how the welfare state works, but they would not give up its benefits if they received them. Hence, some populist leaders, such as Marine Le Pen, have promised to establish a more functional welfare state (Bartlett et al., 2011: 28). In other words, the populists support neither a fully pro-liberal economy nor a fully pro-socialist economy. They support a pro-nativist economy, in which the welfare state will provide benefits to those belonging to the category of people, but will exclude outsiders from that circle (Mudde, 2007: 122). Although at first glance it seems that right-wing populist parties are gaining the most political points on the issue of immigration and the related issue of sovereignty, it seems that the issue of austerity to comply with the rules in the euro area is also important. The state’s policy of austerity and reduction of welfare has increased inequality in society. Those who are the biggest losers in these processes have no political representatives who will change the dominant political paradigm. Populist parties offer just that. But the policies of right-wing populist parties toward a welfare state are not consistent. They mix elements of nativism and welfarism. Populists accuse migrants of abusing the welfare state and therefore the benefits of a welfare state should only be used by native citizens. The general position of the populists regarding welfarism is ambivalent. They basically criticize the welfare state because it does not help people enough. Instead, it helps those who do not need it like bureaucrats and migrants (De Koster et al., 2012: 15). That is why the welfare state should focus on helping those who really need it like people and especially the elderly population (Greve, 2020a: 3). Populists do not criticize the welfare state so much on the basis of how much resources it spends, but they criticize how corrupt political elites spend those resources and to which social groups they direct them. A Dutch poll shows that right-wing populist parties do not get many votes on the welfare state issue from disillusioned voters of traditional right-wing parties because they do not support redistributive economic policies. However, the impact of the welfare state issue on the voting behavior of the new right-wing voters should not be

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underestimated (De Koster et al., 2012: 15). Another study analyzing the importance of a welfare state suggests that for Alternative fur Deutschland (ADF) voters in Germany, UKIP in the United Kingdom, and the Republican Party in the United States, this issue is not very important when deciding to vote in an election, but voters of Front National in France and Northern League in Italy show more egalitarian views and attach more importance to the issues of a welfare state (Pavolini et  al., 2019: 28). 5.2.4  Economic Uncertainty Populists are playing the card of people’s dissatisfaction with economic insecurity and inequality. The poor economic results that could not have produced or are producing very poor economic growth fuel the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the status quo and the search for alternatives to traditional political parties. The growth of income inequalities causes dissatisfaction among citizens with the management of the economy and society in general. Reduced vertical mobility, in turn, encourages feelings of helplessness and isolation. Rapid changes in the economy bring uncertainty and instability to the system (Eichengreen, 2018: 9). So, many factors in the economy can affect the growth of populism in different ways. Globalization through new technologies creates economic opportunities, but also increases inequalities, unequally distributes costs and benefits in the world economy, and causes economic and political divisions between the winning and losing groups in the new conditions (Martinelli, 2018: 21). Populists associate globalization with outsourcing, product automation, job loss, middle-class income stagnation, and increasing social inequalities (Muro, 2017: 11). Unemployed, inadequately employed, unskilled workers, and those whose jobs are endangered are among the losers of globalization. Many of the losers in globalization feel that their interests are not adequately represented by traditional parties, which pursue market-oriented policies compatible with globalization. That is why they turn their attention to populist parties. As De Vries’ and Hoffman (De Vries & Hoffman, 2016) study conducted in eight EU countries shows, more than half of the voters of the far-right populist parties see globalization as the biggest threat. Citizens’ attitudes toward the European Union have changed significantly since it was created in a climate of tolerance, openness, and pan-Europeanism. European Social Survey on trust in national parliaments and in the European Union showed that the voters of populist parties, regardless of whether they are right or left oriented, have

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little trust in European integration, but also in European institutions such as the European Parliament and national parliaments. If there is one word that can describe the attitude of citizens toward politicians, political parties, and institutions, it is mistrust. That distrust is expressed in the voting of non-traditional parties and in the hostile attitude toward the European Union. Research shows that particularly poorly educated citizens have less confidence in parliaments (European and national) and less support for the European Union (Dustmann et al., 2017: 1). Traditional mass parties, which originated and functioned in conditions of different social divisions, are finding it increasingly difficult to understand the challenges of modern society and in the eyes of the public seem less and less authentic representative of one of the conflicting parties in the emerging divisions. Hence, they are increasingly losing the support of the citizens. The feeling of economic uncertainty and the data on the economic parameters of a certain country may differ. The fact that the country is showing good economic results does not necessarily reflect the standard of living of all citizens and does not mean that a significant part of the population does not feel economic insecurity. Such is the case with Poland. Since the fall of the iron curtain, Poland has had the highest GDP growth of any post-socialist country. Citizens’ incomes from Poland’s accession to the EU from 2004 to 2016 are almost doubled (if inflation is calculated incomes are increased by 60%), the minimum wage is increased by 80% with inflation calculated, and unemployment is reduced by 12%. But economic growth was not evenly distributed in all segments of Polish society. Inequality in Polish society is greater today than in 1990. While the Gini coefficient in 1990 was 0.27, in 2000 it was 0.33, and in 2005 it was 0.35 where it stabilized for a long time. In addition, 28% of Poles have temporary employment, that is, precarious jobs, and many of them, 2.4 million, which is 6%, have migrated to more developed countries of the European Union. Despite the undisputed economic progress of the country, the growth of inequality and job insecurity remained as factors that provide fertile ground for the development of populism (Owczarek, 2017: 40). As Bajo-Rubio and Yan (2019: 16) show, the middle class is most affected by the transformation of the economy in recent decades. On the one hand, the size of the middle class in the social structure is declining. That is why many are talking about reducing the middle class. On the other hand, it cannot keep up with the high class. The welfare state was often structured to help members of the middle class rather than the working and lower classes. But the welfare state cuts have reduced these

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resources. In addition, the limitation of nation-states also meant limiting the power of the middle class in nation-states, but also the resources it could use within nation-states. Hence Viviani (2017: 262) concludes that the middle class in European societies is in a state of insecurity. In conditions of constant deterioration of the situation of the middle class, even those who are relatively well-off live in conditions of constant social insecurity. When its interests are at stake, the middle class may show a tendency toward extremism, which Viviani (2017: 262) calls extremism of the political center. That extremism of the center can be characterized by the defense of the endangered interests, protectionism, and the willingness to accept authoritarianism in order to protect the endangered interests. The question is whether, in addition to economics, there are other factors associated with globalization that may influence the growth of populism. An interesting example is the Netherlands, where due to austerity policies, programs for health, education, disability assistance, infrastructure, and social housing began to be cut, and this corresponds to the growth of populism. But populism began to grow long before these policies were implemented, as early as the early 2000s. In this country, the growth of populism seems to be more related to the issue of identity and identity policies than to the economy, but the crisis of the economy, austerity policies, and the growth of job insecurity also contribute to the growth of populism. (Garces-Mascarenas, 2017: 28). Hence, it seems necessary to deal more seriously with assessing the impact of economic globalization on the growth of populism. 5.2.5  Assessing the Significance of Economic Uncertainty for the Growth of Populism According to De Speigeleire et al. (2017: 47), data suggests that the relationship between economic insecurity and support for populists is not as unambiguous as it may seem at first glance. It is assumed that deprivation of welfare increases the frustration and aggression of the working class, as well as their anger toward elites and immigrants. But empirical research shows that as much as they have support among the unemployed, blue-­ collar workers, and the less educated part of the population, populists also enjoy support from members of the petty bourgeoise, the self-employed, and the craftsmen. Also, although they have great support from the unemployed, the populists do not have much support in countries with high

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unemployment. Populism has grown in the last decade both in countries that have an economic crisis such as Greece and in countries that do not have such a crisis like Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands (Katz & Mair, 2018: 176). Populists have stable support in countries with stable economies, with a vast welfare state like Denmark and Sweden. On the other hand, populists do not have as much support in countries with troubled economies as Portugal. Hence, Molls and Jetten (2020) suggest that support for populism has a U-shaped curve in which on the one hand there are individuals who are deprived and marginalized, and on the other hand there are individuals who belong to the middle class. What motivates both to support populists is economic insecurity, growing inequality, and immigration that causes those problems. Rovira (2019: 2) points out that while economic uncertainty may contribute, it is certainly not the only factor influencing populist popularity. A similar conclusion is reached by Dustmann et al. (2017: 2) in the analysis of data from the European Social Survey on trust in national parliaments and in the European Union. The crisis that is causing the rise of populism is not only economic; it is also related to identity. According to Dustmann et  al., the state of the economy has some influence on the distrust of national parliaments and the European Union, but it is neither the only nor the most important factor that affects the attitude of citizens toward these institutions. The state of the economy is more important for the citizens’ trust in the national parliaments, but it is not so important for their trust and support for the European institutions. This means that the eventual adjustment of the economic variables will not restore the citizens’ trust in the European project. For that to happen despite the strong economy, the European Union, together with national governments, will have to address the issue of security and respect for national identities. Margalit (2019: 153), analyzing the Brexit results, points out that economic uncertainty certainly contributed to a few percent of people wanting Britain to leave the EU, but the Brexit score was 52%, which means that other factors need to be taken seriously. He especially points to the issue of immigration, which in his opinion is unfairly underestimated. The growth of populism is more of a socio-cultural than an economic phenomenon (Kitschelt, 2002: 190). Margalit (2019: 154) points to several sociological and ethnographic studies that show that people are afraid of their status in society. For example, people living in rural areas show great resentment toward the political and economic establishment because they do not show a sufficient level of respect for them. It further fuels economic

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sentiment, the idea that government resources are not being allocated fairly, that urban centers are unfairly using more resources than rural ones, and the firm belief that much of the budget is being spent unfairly on immigrants. Many studies show that the factor of cultural insecurity is related to the integration of immigrants into Western societies. In serious economic crises such as the 2008 Financial Crisis, the issue of acceptance of multiculturalism may be further emphasized. This is the view of Eichengreen (2018: 11) who points out that in times of economic crisis and growing inequality in society, identity policies that blame immigrants and minorities for economic hardship are more acceptable to more people. A good example of this is the sovereign debt crisis in Italy in 2011 which resulted in the electoral success of the Five Star Movement in the 2013 elections (Mancose, 2018: 45). Spektorowski and Elfersy (2020: 53) point out that right-wing populists are less interested in redistributive policies than in correcting immigrant policies, accusing immigrants of using host country resources without paying the necessary contributions. Matt Grossmann’s study (2018) also suggests that support for Trump’s policies is not so much related to the socio-economic status of supporters as to the issues of their attitude toward issues of race, politics, and cultural identity.

5.3   Globalization and the Erosion of Nation-States Globalization has created an atmosphere in which national governments have less and less control over political and economic developments in their own countries. In the 1990s, there were authors such as MacCormick (1993: 1) who argued that the foundation of the international political and legal order on national sovereignty in the light of growing globalization was a thing of the past. Westphalian type of nation-state under the impact of the need to delegate competencies to supranational institutions, the growth of economic globalization, international corporations began to implode. As Higgot (2018: 7) states, the populists’ accusations against globalization for limiting the possibilities in sovereign states to make sovereign decisions are not baseless. It often produces elites who are alienated from the citizens they are supposed to serve. As Betz (1993) noted, it is “politics of resentment”. Populists often criticize incompetent, selfish, and corrupt domestic elites for working in the interests of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European

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Union, and NATO (Balcere, 2017: 30). For example, the Hungarian Fidesz constantly criticized the elites of the Socialist Party that in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the EU sold the interests of the people by putting the country in debt bondage by taking 20 billion euros in loans (Feledy, 2017: 46). When Orbán came to power, he broke off negotiations with the IMF and behaved arrogantly toward this international financial institution (Von Beyne, 2015: 22). For more than three decades, the global economy has eroded the sovereignty of nation-states, reduced the options available to government policy-­ making, and reduced its effectiveness (thus widening the gap between the promises of political leaders and what they can actually fulfill as a political program) and reduces the welfare state which endangers the legitimacy of parties, trade unions, and professional associations and increases citizens’ distrust of political leaders and dissatisfaction with the functioning of liberal democracy (Martinelli, 2018: 22). 5.3.1  Euroskepticism Euroskepticism is a minority but widespread phenomenon in the member states of the European Union, but also in the candidate countries. It often takes the form of anti-elitism and demands greater representation and less integration (Taggart, 2003). Euroskepticism began to become an important political factor after the Treaty of Maastricht and the establishment of the Monetary Union. Up to this point many parties that later became Euroskeptical supported the European project, including Front National (Mudde, 2007: 159). After the Maastricht Treaty, it was increasingly said that the process of establishing European institutions had gone too far in transforming the power of nation-states into a supranational one. Euroskepticism is a common feature of most populist parties. Populists see the EU as a project behind which the interests of the elite are hidden, that is, as a project that creates many of the problems of the people such as immigration, multiculturalism, and economic liberalization (Ivadi, 2017: 165). Populist leaders considered the European Union to be an undemocratic project and compared it to the Soviet Union. For example, Umberto Bossi, the leader of the Lega Nord, called the EU “the Soviet Union of Europe”. Given the populists’ propensity for conspiracy theories, they knew in the EU to see the hidden influence of the United States. Thus, Bruno Mégret, the leader of the National Republican Movement (MNP), saw the EU as “the Trojan Horse of Americans” (Mudde, 2007: 85).

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More and more authors are looking at Euroskepticism in the context of Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of social cleavages. The division between Euro-optimists and Euroskeptics makes divisions in European societies along three lines. The first goes along the center-periphery line. Euroskeptic parties (populist far right or far left) are on the periphery of domestic political systems. Euro-optimistic parties are mainstream parties and as such are at the center of domestic political systems. The next division that Euroskepticism opens is the elites versus the people, with members and supporters of the elite being more pro-European, while a significant proportion of people have dilemmas about the European integration process, as evidenced by the negative results of the Dutch and France referendums for the acceptance of the Constitutional Treaty of 2005. The third division made by Euroskepticism is the cultural one and it can be reduced to the dichotomy of nativism versus multiculturalism (Pelinka, 2009). There are two types of Euroskepticism: hard—opposition to the existence of the European Union as a supranational association—and soft— opposition to the process of European integration, that is, the enlargement of the European Union with countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Alonso-Munoz & Casero-Ripolles, 2020). Mudde (2007: 161) calls hard Euroskepticism Europhobia and soft Euro-pessimism. According to him, most populist parties are European pessimistic. Euroskepticism takes the form of anti-elitism because national elites in most countries, such as France, have fully backed the European project (Pelinka, 2009). For the populists, the opposition to the European project is at the same time the opposition of “certain”, “treacherous” elites who lead that project. According to populists, the EU has too many legal powers and too little electoral legitimacy. Hence, populists accuse EU institutions of not representing the interests of the people. Populists see the EU as an exogenous political system run by technocratic elites who have no electoral legitimacy. They criticize the technocratic elites who are not elected, have no political legitimacy, and make important decisions as members of expert bodies within the EU. Criticism that the EU does not represent the interests of the people could often be heard during the refugee crisis, as well as during the Brexit campaign (The Global State of Democracy, 2020). For the populists, the solution is not to increase the representativeness of the European institutions, but to give more importance to the national institutions where there is a greater degree of representativeness. Front National leader Marine Le Pen believes that the European project is against the interests of the French people, and Geert Wilders believes that

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the European Parliament should be abolished (Surel, 2011). He promised that if he is elected prime minister, he would call a referendum on the Netherlands leaving the EU. Populists from Eastern and Central Europe are also questioning the legitimacy of the EU, through the prism of the sovereignty of nation-states. Populists are particularly critical of the European integration process, which needs to be reformed and slowed down. In an interview with Euro News, Geert Wilders stressed that the process of European integration should be closed and that Romania and Bulgaria should leave the EU. The Wilders party voted against the ratification of accession of these two countries in the EU (Surel, 2011). Populists fear that the EU could grow into a superpower in the future and that nation-states could lose their independence. They often prefer confederalism as a form of integration of nation-­ states in Europe (Mudde, 2007: 168). The populists have Euroskeptic positions even when they are in power, when they establish their own political regime. Such is the case with Hungary, whose prime minister is highly critical of the EU institutions and questions their legitimacy. The Hungarian government has repeatedly claimed that the EU represents foreign interests, even though Hungary itself has an EU commission member (Danaj et al., 2018: 244). The idea of forming ​​ and consolidating a European identity is unacceptable to populists because it would conflict with national identities. Opposition to the formation of a European identity as something fluid was vaguely followed by the spread of nationalist ideology in the EU member states (Zappetinni, 2017: 17). The populists preferred national identities to both European and immigrant identities. They reject immigrants, and especially Muslims, arguing that this is how national identity is protected, just as they reject European identity for the same reasons. Populist parties are particularly opposed to migrants receiving social rights, that is, the right to use the benefits of the welfare state. They see migrants as unfair competition from the domicile population in the labor market. A study of the narrative used on Twitter by eight populist parties including Rassemblement National and France Insoumise from France, Five Star Movement and the Lega from Italy, Podemos and Vox from Spain, and UKIP and the Brexit Party from Great Britain shows that the most significant problem with the EU, according to the rhetoric used by these parties for the 2019 European Parliament elections, is the loss of sovereignty of nation-states. Right-wing populist parties criticize the loss of nation-state sovereignty because it undermines national security, while

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left-wing populist parties criticize the loss of national sovereignty for imposing austerity economic policies. Left-wing populist Euroskeptic parties see the solution to the sovereignty problem in a return to the principles on which the EU is founded, such as solidarity, cooperation, and freedom. Right-wing populist parties see the solution to the problem of losing sovereignty by redefining the EU in terms of disempowering Brussels and restoring the sovereignty of nation-states (Alonso-Munoz & Casero-Ripolles, 2020). 5.3.2  Immigration and Cultural Anxiety As is increasingly being commented, although the resolution of economic insecurity has had an impact on the rise of populism, the real factor on which the demarcation line between populists and mainstream parties is drawn is the issue of identity policies and immigration. Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that there are enough arguments to argue that “cultural backlash”, or in Rensmann’s (2017) terminology “cultural counter-revolution”, more affects the growth of populism than economic uncertainty. The cultural counter-revolution practically means that a section of the people who used to support the dominant liberal cultural normative discourse no longer do so. In many countries today, the dominant issue is immigration. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 222) write that in countries such as France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom on the issue of immigration, mainstream parties are slowly beginning to take over the logic and vocabulary of populist parties. Immigration has had an impact on the labor market. Populist parties have blamed migrants for lowering wages and vacancies for the domicile population, but they have also blamed rising numbers of migrants for changing ethnic composition in Western Europe. For example, in the 1970s in Sweden lived almost exclusively Swedes, and in 2015, 17% of the population was not born in Sweden. Similarly, 12% of the population in the Netherlands and France, 14% of the population in Germany and the United Kingdom, 19% of the population in Austria, and 29% of the population in Switzerland were not born in the countries in which they live. The percentage is similar in the United States, where 13% of the population living in this country was born in another country (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 181). Today, about 74 million migrants live in highly developed European countries, which is about 30% of the world’s migrants. About 1.26 million people immigrated to Europe in the 2015 refugee crisis

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alone. Germany alone, with Chancellor Angela Merkel calling for an open door for migrants, has received 890,000 migrants. These are primarily young people, who are needed by the countries whose population is aging (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 177). But many studies of populism in Europe show that there is an anti-immigrant attitude. Immigrants and foreigners are generally perceived as a threat. There is a rejection of different lifestyles, political views, different moral and value standards. Such sentiments are strongest in closed rural communities and older citizens who feel most threatened by the spread of multicultural diversity. For example, one study shows that in regions where refugees were housed, a larger percentage of people voted for anti-immigrant parties, with people in rural areas having a more resolute response to refugees (Dustmann et al., 2017). In Poland, the populist Law and Justice Party proclaimed the need to safeguard Polish national identity, traditions, culture, Polish way of life, and values ​​in the face of the risky experiments of transnational globalization. In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party argues that Swiss sovereignty must be protected from the elite who is willing to sell it out (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 18). Fears of diversity and the threat to cultural identity are less pronounced among younger, university-educated professionals who study, work, and live in metropolitan areas that are ethnically heterogeneous (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 18). The growth of the diversification of cultures, languages, ethnicities, and religions that goes hand in hand with the change of the value system has its reaction among the more conservative part of the population. Such a reaction is especially intensified in times of economic crisis. Mobility of people is different from mobility of goods, services, and capital. It creates cultural insecurity and preconditions for the development of right-wing populism. The issue of immigration was long been put in the background because it was considered part of the political incorrectness to raise this issue. As early as the 1980s, this topic was exploited by the first sprouts of right-wing populism as the Front National in France. Many studies show that the issue of immigration is very important for the supporters of this party. Supporters of Front National link the issue of immigration to the issue of security, which is also very high on the list of priorities of the voters of this party. Members of the populist far right have linked the concentration of immigrants in certain regions to rising delinquency. Populists accuse that with the growth of immigration, crime also increases, but additionally that immigration is a threat to cultural and social homogeneity, that migrants burden the available resources and the housing market

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in individual countries (Dustmann et al., 2017: 13). The exploitation and politicization of “forbidden” issues were at the heart of the success of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s party. His daughter, Marine Le Pen, like Trump in the United States, is demanding greater border control, blaming the establishment for losing its national identity, calling for the restoration of the people’s sovereignty, and rejecting the tutelage of Brussels and Washington (Bourekba, 2017: 31). Similar attempts, with some success and some failures, followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Belgium, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Ignazi, 1992: 23). The last decade has seen a serious rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in the Scandinavian countries, which have long been bastions of left-leaning liberal policies. In Denmark, for example, the Danish People’s Party uses harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric, arguing that a large influx of migrants threatens Danish culture. The situation is similar in Sweden, where Sweden Democrats, under the slogan “Keep Sweden Swedish”, reject multiculturalism as a concept and advocate for migration restrictions and benefits for migrants who decide to leave Sweden and return to their home countries. In Finland, however, the True Finns, although a nationalist party, do not rely heavily on anti-immigrant rhetoric (Bartlett et al., 2011: 27). In the United Kingdom, much of the campaign to leave the EU has been devoted to the issue of immigration. Photographs of refugee columns were often used for propaganda purposes (Revelli, 2019: 97). Hostility toward immigrants and multiculturalism is one of the central topics on which right-wing populists owe their growth from the 1990s to the present. Basically, populists criticize the permissiveness and tolerance of political elites toward migrants, cultural globalization, ethnic minorities, and other groups that consider outsiders (Pavolini et al., 2019: 7). Populist leaders accuse migrants of endangering welfarism, the social, ethnic, and cultural structure of the European Union. They accuse migrants of being guilty of unemployment, violence, insecurity, crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and more. These accusations are accompanied by racist and xenophobic rhetoric that uses terms such as “influx”, “invasion”, and “flood”. Populist leaders like Geert Wilders and Heinz-­ Christian Strache talk about the “foreign infiltration” of migrants in their countries (Kaya, 2017: 57). Populist leaders such as Marine Le Pen have been refuting accusations of racism by pointing out that anti-immigrant attitudes are a matter of economy rather than racism (Bartlett et  al., 2011: 27).

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De Vries and Hoffman’s (2016) survey of eight EU countries shows that for 53% of those who answered that they are afraid of globalization, the biggest problem is actually migration, and 54% showed that they have negative sentiments against foreigners. Two of the four issues that worried most EU citizens in 2019 were the issue of immigrants which worried 34% and the issue of terrorism which worried 18% of EU citizens (Standard Eurobarometer, 2019: 19). Populists promote a policy of exclusivity, blaming “others”, “foreigners”, for people’s problems, misfortunes, and suffering. Research shows that in Central and Eastern Europe there is a decline in support for immigration and multiculturalism, while in Western Europe there is a steady support for them. Given that the support of populist parties at the same time is stable, it is obvious that the mainstream politics that supports multiculturalism and immigration does not reduce the support of populists who have anti-immigrant and anti-­multiculturalist policies. Eventual growing support for immigration and multiculturalism in mainstream circles can radicalize populist parties and make them more extreme (Greve, 2020a: 143). Combined with the Manichaean binary logic of populism, which marginalizes the pluralism and inflammatory rhetoric used by populists, it can lead to subconscious appeals known from the past for people to defend their homeland from immigrants. It can be said that cultural insecurity is the basis of Donald Trump’s victory in 2016  in the United States, the success of the referendum on Brexit, and the growth of populism in a number of European countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and Poland. Populists like Marine Le Pen in France and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands talk about traditional national culture, about the cultural ties that are built around a particular nation-state. Populists across Europe say mono-ethnic national cultures are threatened by immigrants. Hence there is the growth of anti-immigrant parties that promote nationalism and are openly opposed to multiculturalism and globalization. The rise of populism in Europe and the United States is due to the fear of migrants identified by opinion polls. Although there is a fear of migrants in both Europe and the United States, they are afraid of migrants for different reasons. While in Europe, the fear of migrants is linked to issues of security and terrorism, in the United States it is linked to an increase in job competition (Galasso et al., 2017: 6). Right-wing populists tend to blame outsiders, whether immigrants, Jews, bankers, heretics, for working in the interests of the establishment and against the interests of the people. A feature of many of these parties is a strong identification with Christianity

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and Islamophobia (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 10). According to Spektorowski and Elfersy (2020: 53), the fact that many immigrants are Muslim, right-wing populist parties reinforces Islamophobic positions. Populists in Europe often target Muslims and non-Europeans, although they are often known to be hostile to people from Eastern and Central Europe as well. In France, for example, members of the Front National express Islamophobia through their hostile attitude toward building mosques, as well as their insistence on secularism, feminism, and republicanism as part of French culture (Reynie, 2016; Bartlett et al., 2011: 27). The situation is similar with the Party for Freedom (PVV) and their political leader Wilders who built his political profile on anti-Islamism, as did the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and their political leader Heinz-­ Christian Strache. Opinion polls show that older and more conservative citizens have a higher rate of Islamophobia than younger people. Thus, a survey in the United States shows that Americans over the age of 45 who are white and members of the Republican Party have a higher percentage of Islamophobia than other citizens of the country (Galasso et al., 2017). Van Kessel (2011: 69) points out that the issue of immigration and its cultural integration into society is one of the most important issues for the growth of populism in the Netherlands. Hence populist parties have a hostile attitude toward immigrants. For example, Johann Gudenus, the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, declared that asylum is not a human right (Wodak, 2019: 17 A). In Latin America, immigration is no serious issue, but as a matter of national security, Latin American populists raise the issue of American imperialism, that is, the excessive influence of the United States on the international political scene and especially their interference in the internal affairs of individual Latin American countries which they perceive as a violation of their sovereignty. There are indications that the losers in the migration process, for whom competition for unskilled jobs is increasing, could feel more threatened by the increasing ethnic diversity of countries than the rest of the population, but the findings of Norris and Inglehart (2019: 176) indicate that а more important factor for the growth of populism is the perception of the threat to culture, cultural insecurity, rather than the instrumental factors associated with job loss, wage cuts, and so on. This intensifies the debate on European identity and its exclusive character associated with Christianity. Experiences from the former Yugoslavia indicate that economic well-being cannot resolve interethnic misunderstandings. Namely, the dissolution of the country and the bloody military conflicts occurred at a time when the

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country had much better economic parameters than any other country in Eastern and Central Europe, and the living standard of the population was probably at one of its historical peaks. Populist political leaders such as Vojislav Seselj assured citizens that they are life-threatening and that they must take concrete action in this regard. In this way, populist parties tried to gain popularity in the short term and achieve certain geopolitical goals in the long term, but the end result was the igniting of interethnic hatred that led to bloody wars. 5.3.3  Nativism Many today see nativism as one of the major threats to liberal democracy. Nativism has a long history in American society. For example, the Know Nothings movement, which dates back to the early nineteenth century, has elements of nativism (Mudde, 2016: 6). Nativism as a concept has long been associated with populism. Even Richard Hofstadter, in his famous book The Age of Reform, points out that American populism from 1890 abounded in provincialism, nativism, and nationalism (Stavrakakis, 2017: 4). Right-wing populist parties usually base their policies on connecting and pretending to protect the interests of a homogeneous ethnic group, a populum, or Volk, that is, native residents, as opposed to immigrants or foreigners. Right-wing populists are convinced that the homogeneity of the native group should be preserved, and at the basis of such a domicile nativist group is a common blood, origin, kinship. Hence, they distinguish between real (native) citizens on the one hand and the immigrants and minorities they perceive as a threat on the other. The populist radical right dreams of a utopian monocultural state, that is, ethnocracy (Mudde, 2007: 138). The idea of ​​nativism is related to that of the nation-state, which has long been a basic political unit in world politics. Nation-states are based on the assumption that every nation should have its own state. But it also means that every state should have a nation to rely on. The constitutions of many states state that they are the states of certain nations. Such are the examples with the Slovak and Romanian constitutions (Mudde, 2016: 6). This creates a strong bond between the state and the nation, so the state has an obligation to protect members of the nation from newcomers. Hence, high in the value system of right-wing populist parties is the protection of the nativist group from foreigners, newcomers who are perceived as enemies (Wodak, 2019). The slogan used by many populists is

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“our people first”, which means that society should be made up of and governed by members of a native group/nation and that non-native elements (people and ideas) are a threat to the homogeneity of the nation-­ state and of the native nation (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017: 910). Populism insists on internal homogeneity and the exclusion of all external elements. Nativism does not mean just that the natives should rule in a certain country, but goes a step further and requires only native people to live in a certain country. Hence the slogans “Britain for the British” (NF), “Bulgaria for the Bulgarins” (Ataka), “Netherland for the Netherlanders” (CP 86), and “Slovenia for Sloveners” (SNS) (Mudde, 2007: 138). Nationalist and nativist sentiment can be found among the supporters of right-wing populist parties in Europe, and in the United States it was a very important factor in Trump’s election as president in 2016 (Dustmann et al., 2017: 1). Populist politicians know how to invoke the collective consciousness of the dominant socio-economic group in a given society, which they claim is endangered and which they aspire to protect. In doing so, they refer to the mythologized glorious past of the dominant social group that is losing its position in society. Thus, when Jean-Marie Le Pen declares that all French people are heirs of Jeanne d’Arc, he excludes from the category of Frenchmen Muslims and Jews, who cannot be heirs of a Roman Catholic saint (Filc, 2020: 51). A phrase alluding to the collective consciousness in North America and Europe is Judeo-Christian values ​​or in the case of Viktor Orbán, the reference to European Christian values ​​ (Dustmann et al., 2017: 3). Hence the connection of populism with a tendency toward ethnic discrimination and preference of certain religions, and intolerance toward others. Populists criticize mainstream politicians who advocate for open borders, equal rights for all citizens, respect for differences, and so on (Eichengreen, 2018: 10). Some populist leaders like Geert Wilders promote xenophobic politics. In his program called “Make Netherlands Ours Again”, he advocated for fewer migrants and fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands (Garces-Mascarenas, 2017: 27). Marine Le Pen is also committed to reducing the number of migrants in France and to taking measures to protect all French products and companies (Bourekba, 2017: 31). 5.3.4  Cultural Backlash and Immigration One explanation for the expansion and growth of the new type of populism from the 1990s onward is given by Norris and Inglehart (2019: 32). They developed the theory of cultural backlash. According to them, a

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“silent revolution” has been taking place since the 1970s, which includes the weakening of materialistic values at ​​ the expense of post-materialist ones. Materialist values ​​placed greater emphasis on economic and physical security, while post-materialist values emphasized ​​ the importance of freedom of choice and self-expression. Post-materialist progressive cultural values ​​ include gender equality, multiculturalism, secularism, minority rights, and LGBT rights (Gidron & Hall, 2017: 8). These values ​​have become the mainstream in Western societies. They emphasize tolerance for different lifestyles, religions, and cultures and advocate for multiculturalism, international cooperation, protection of basic human rights and freedoms, and protection of refugees. Such values ​​are more accepted by young, better educated, progressive individuals who predominantly live in large urban centers and are less accepted by older, less educated individuals who predominantly live in smaller settlements (Molls & Jetten, 2020). In the field of politics, post-materialist values ​​have contributed to the establishment of environmental protection, the growth of the peace movement, sexual liberalization, giving greater importance to human rights, gender equality, insistence on cosmopolitanism, and greater respect for the rights of homosexuals, immigrants, and racial minorities. These values​​ were implemented and supported by the United Nations. More specifically, the results of a survey in the United Kingdom conducted in 2018 show that 65% of retirees believe that the decision for Brexit leads the country in the right direction, while 68% of millennials between the ages of 18 and 24 thought this decision was wrong. Older and younger Britons grew up in two different Britain. The older Britons grew up in a society where the vast majority were whites, where there was not much migration, there was a racist worldview, memories of World War II victory were alive, abortion and homosexuality were illegal. Younger Britons born in 1980 grew up in the United Kingdom as a member of the EU, a country that is heterogeneous, very dynamic in terms of migration, support for migration as part of the liberal consensus goes without saying (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). New post-materialist values were ​​ increasingly accepted with the change of generation. Each succeeding generation embraced these values to ​​ a greater extent than the previous one. Acceptance of new values by ​​ the more traditional part of society is usually seen as a moral decline. The acceptance of post-materialist values went ​​ hand in hand with the erosion of the trust in political parties, the reduction of membership in political parties and trade unions, the decline in voter turnout and the general

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decline of civic activism, such as reduced citizen participation in protests, demonstrations, etc. Norris and Inglehart (2019) consider that the development of modern populism is a reaction to the “silent revolution”, that is, to the increasing acceptance of post-materialist values, which in a significant part of the conservative population causes discomfort. They see in these values ​​the danger of losing their national identity. Individuals feel threatened that the group they belong to is losing its identity. Less education and older citizens feel especially threatened by the loss of their identity. In relation to gender and race, such feelings are especially present in white men. This group, which was majority and privileged in Western societies, felt threatened by not being able to maintain the values it ​​ traditionally possessed. In addition, some of these values ​​are declared politically incorrect. These people not only feel that the culture to which they belong is threatened, but also feel a personal threat to their physical safety. They feel threatened by the growth of crime, terrorist attacks, etc., and most often blame foreigners for their insecurity. Hence in this group of people there is resistance to tolerance, multiculturalism, globalization, international cooperation, and progressive values ​​that they consider as values​​ imposed and extended by the establishment (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 47). Major changes in the field of culture, changing values in ​​ society, make older people feel like migrants in their own country. Their values ​​differ from those of their successors, the new generations. They feel alienated, marginalized, and misunderstood (Mead, 1970: 56). The fact that populists are not so much obsessed with the redistribution of goods in society as they are concerned with the rapid and major cultural changes that plague the traditional value system and customs, and especially touch on identity issues, speaks volumes about the acceptance of post-materialist values. It creates a sense of loss of the impact of indigenous national identity in individual countries (Spektorowski & Elfersy, 2020: 53). Populists are openly hostile to immigrants. They implicitly propose such kinds of identity policies that unite the indigenous population and hostilely oppose the influence and presence of foreigners (Dustmann et al., 2017: 4). For example, the widespread prevalence of secularization in Dutch society and the fact that some of the secular liberal values differ ​​ from the values of ​​ migrants have made such values ​​as the right to abortion, the right to gay marriage, and gender equality defined as key to Dutch identity. Anyone who does not accept these values ​​is not considered a true Dutchman (Garces-Mascarenas, 2017: 29).

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The idea of c​​ ultural backlash is not new, and before Norris and Inglehart (2019), in 1992, it was first proposed by Italian political scientist Piero Ignazi (1992). Analyzing the French Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party, he introduces the thesis of silent counter-revolution, but Norris and Inglehart (2019) further developed this thesis. The growing acceptance of post-material values ​​in society is reflected in the changing party agendas of the mainstream parties, but also in the emergence of parties like the Greens. But on the other side of the political spectrum as a reaction appears a growing group of people who feel uncomfortable and threatened because of this and in the field of politics react by supporting populist parties. The success of right-wing populist parties in the elections has shifted the focus of debates in many European countries, and in the desire to make better election results more moderate right-wing parties have begun to take over some of the previously taboo topics, platforms, and policies of populist right-wing parties. For example, if multiculturalism was originally understood as respect and tolerance for other cultures, interdependence and universalism that will develop intercultural communities, today it is increasingly seen as the institutionalization of intercultural differences through the support of autonomous cultural discourses. And the thesis of the collapse of multiculturalism is shared not only by populist parties, but also by those on the right, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former British Prime Minister David Cameron, and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy (Kaya, 2017: 57). Norris and Inglehart (2019) find the difference between the growth of populism in Western Europe on the one hand and Central and Eastern Europe on the other. Namely, the growth of populism in Central and Eastern Europe Norris and Inglehart see as a reaction to the greater acceptance of social liberalism, rather than post-material values such ​​ as Western Europe. Sadurski (2019: 27) states that the spread of populism in Poland and Hungary follows the logic of cultural backlash. Namely, these two countries were among the most successful post-transitional democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. During the period of transformation of the socio-economic system, they had free and fair elections, rapid growth of the living standard of the population, and safe and favorable international environment provided by the membership in the EU and NATO. In the case of these countries, it seems that populism is not a call to return to the old value system, but fear and reaction to rapid and drastic social change.

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Greve, B. (2020a). Welfare Populism and Welfare Chauvinism. Polity Press. Greve, B. (2020b). Austerity, Retrenchment, and the Welfare State: Truth or Fiction. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Grossmann M. (2018). Racial Attitudes and Political Correctness in the 2016 Presidential Elections. Niscanen Center. Available at https://www.niskanencenter.org/racial-­attitudes-­and-­political-­correctness-­in-­the-­2016-­presidential-­ election/. Accessed 11 Apr. 2021. Han, J. J. (2016). Income Inequality and Voting for Radical Right-Wing Parties. Electoral Studies, 42(6), 54–64. Hawkins, A.  K., Read, M., & Pauwels, T. (2017). Populism and Its Causes. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa, & P. Ostigay Pierre (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Higgot, R. (2018). Globalism, Populism and Limits of Global Economic Governance. Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives, 1, 2–23. Huber, E., & Stephens, D.  J. (2001). Development and Crisis of Welfare State: Parties and Policies of Global Markets. University of Chicago Press. Ignazi, P. (1992). The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 22(1), 3–34. Ivadi, G. (2017). Electoral Basis of Populist Parties. In R. C. Heinrich, C. HoltzBacha, & O. Mazzoleni (Eds.), Political Populism: Handbook (pp. 157–168). Nomos. Ivaldi, G., & Mazzoleni, O. (2019). Economic Populism and Sovereigntism: The Economic Supply of European Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties. European Politics and Society, 21(2), 202–218. Kallis, A. (2018). Populism, Suvereignism, and the Unlikely Emergence of the Territorial National State. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 11(3), 285–302. Katz, S. R., & Mair, P. (2018). Democracy and Cartelization of Political Parties. Oxford University Press. Kaya, A. (2017). Populism and Immigration in the European Union. In J. Arango, R. Mahia, D. Moha, & E. Sanchesz-Montijano (Eds.), La inmigracion en el ojo del huracán. Kitschelt, H. (2002). Popular Dissatisfaction with Democracy: Populism and Party System. In Y. Surel (Ed.), Y, Many. Palgrave Macmillan. MacKormick, N. (1993). Beyond the Sovereign State. The Modern Law Review, 56(1), 1–18. Mancose, M. (2018). The Deep Roots of Populism: Protest, Apathy and Success of Movimento 5 Stelle in the 2013 Italian Elections. Italian Political Sciences, 13(3), 44–60.

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Margalit, Y. (2019). Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(4), 152–170. Martinelli, A. (2018). When Populism Meets Nationalism: Reflections on Parties in Power. ISPI. Mead, M. (1970). Culture and Commitment. Doubleday. Molls, F., & Jetten, J. (2020). Understanding for Populist Radical Right Parties: Toward a Model That Captures Both Demand and Supply Side Factors. Frontiers in Communication, 5, 557561. https://doi.org/10.3389/ fcomm.2020.557561 Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2016). On Extremism and Democracy in Europe. Routledge. Mughan, A., Bean, C., & McAllister, I. (2003). Economic Globalization, Economic Insecurity and the Populist Reaction. Electoral Studies, 22(4), 617–633. Muis, J., & Immerzeel, T. (2017). Causes and the Consequences of the Rise of the Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe. Current Sociology Review, 65(6), 909–930. Muro, D. (2017). Let’s the People Rule: Definitions and Theories of Populism. In E. Woertz (Ed.), Populism in Europe: From Symptom to Alternative? CIDOB. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press. Owczarek, D. (2017). The Roots of Populism in Poland. In E.  Woertz (Ed.), Populism in Europe: From Symptom to Alternative? CIDOB. Pavolini, E., Jessoula, M., Natali, M., & Germinario, R. M. (2019). Right Wing Populism and the Welfare State: A Five Countries Comparation. Gli Annali. Pelinka, A. (2009). Determinative Factors of Euroscepticism. In K.  Arato & P.  Kaniok (Eds.), Euroscepticism and European Integration. Political Science Research Centre. Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the 21st Century. Harvard University Press. Rensmann, L. (2017). The Noisy Counter-Revolution: Understanding the Cultural Conditions and Dynamics of Populists Politics in Europe and the Digital Age. Politics and Governance, 5(4), 123–135. Revelli, M. (2019). The New Populism: Democracy Stares into the Abyss. Verso Books. Reynie, D. (2016). Heritage Populism and Frances National Front. Journal of Democracy, 27(2), 47–57. Rodrik, D. (2018). Populism and the Economics of Globalization. Journal of International Business Policy, 1(1–2), 12–33. Rovira K. C. (2019). Populism and the Economy: An Ambivalent Relationship. International Policy Analysis. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Sadurski, W. (2019). Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford University Press.

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Wodak, R. (2019). Entering the Post Shame Era. Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication. Zappetinni, F. (2017). Transnationalism as an Index to Construct European Identities: An Analysis of Transeuropean Discourses. In C.  Karner & M.  Kopytowska (Eds.), National Identity and Europe in Times of Crisis. Emerald Publishing Limited.

CHAPTER 6

The Crisis of Political Parties

6.1   Introduction In the twentieth century, in democratic political systems, the link between citizens and the authorities was established through parties. Citizens were voters, supporters, or members of political parties, who in turn represented their interests. Governments formed political parties that won the majority of citizens’ trust. In that way, the parties connected the citizens and the state. They transformed the interests and preferences of the citizens into political platforms (Sartori, 1976). The voting for the parties legitimized the overall political order. But in recent decades, trust in parties has declined, which corresponds to the rise of populism. The rise of populism would not be unusual at the time of the formation of mass political parties, but it is unexpected and a challenge to study why and how it happens in countries where voters have long voted and been mobilized in the activities of the established political parties (Roberts, 2017). If in the 1980s there were many indicators of declining voter turnout, declining membership in political parties, declining union membership, in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the trend of changing party systems in Europe began (Ignazi, 1992: 4). As Katz Mair (2018: 31) writes before the end of the Cold War, the trend of parties entering the crisis was evident through the increasing accusations of party leadership of susceptibility to corruption, inactivity of party membership, and weak connection with civil society. After a © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_6

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brief period between 1989 and 1992 in which the Cold War ended, the crisis of the parties not only continued but also intensified. The citizens showed growing distrust both in the political parties and in the party system as a whole. They became less and less identified with the parties, less and less willing to participate in their activities, less and less informed about the party-political life, and less and less willing to vote in the elections. The way citizens participate in politics has changed. They no longer identified with the social groups to which they should formally belong, just as they were not willing to spend part of their free time achieving their goals. As Robert Putnam (1995) writes, people who do not trust institutions and collective entities such as political parties were less willing to accept any engagement with them. Instead, social life was individualized, atomized. People are increasingly motivated to participate in private, individualistic projects, rather than to engage in the achieving of common good. Maybe they would sign an online petition on a particular issue, but they were less and less willing to engage in supporting all the policies of a particular party. They might support certain activities of the party, but not necessarily all of its activities. They might be sympathizers, but not formal members of it (Gauja, 2015: 93). Putnam (2000) defines this trend as a decline in social capital. This raises the question of whether the decline in citizen activity, including membership in political parties, is the result only of the higher cost that citizens have to pay to participate in such activities, through the allocation of free time and efforts that are scarce resources or it is a matter of distrust of the political system and more specifically of the political parties. Both factors seem to have an impact. The parties tried to meet the first challenge by reducing the cost of citizen participation in party life. This blurs the distinction between those who are members of political parties and those who are not. This is how it happened that the parties invited their supporters to the party activities, regardless of whether they are members of the party or not. This has happened, among other things, in the selection of candidates for the exercise of public authority. It is increasingly the case that parties for the exercise of public power nominate experts who are not their members (Mazzoleni & Vierman, 2017: 885). All these maneuvers did not solve the problem with the turnout, with the party’s representativeness and with the legitimation of both the parties and the political system as a whole.

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6.2   The Decline in Turnout and Populism Modern parties fail to mobilize mass support for political projects and thus legitimize their place in the political system. Two entities are actively involved in the relationship between the citizens and the parties. They are interacting with each other. Transformations in the sphere of citizens’ rights and freedoms have repercussions on their attitude toward the parties. The more freedoms individuals achieve, the less they will be dependent on the parties. Additionally, the more economically independent the citizens become and the more choices they will have in organizing their own lives, the less time they will have for party engagement. The transformation of the parties also has its impact on the perception and attitude of the citizens toward them. Traditionally, more attention has been paid to the transformation of political parties, and the drop in turnout has been explained by that phenomenon. When citizens are taken into account as a factor, the decline in turnout is associated with dissolution, that is, the distancing of the sphere of the individual and the sphere of politics/power. In the drop in turnout, which marked a crisis of representativeness, mainstream parties responded by opening up to the overall available electorate, rather than focusing solely on traditional voters, as was the case before. It meant the de-ideologizing of the parties, their transformation into catch-­ all parties, and the transformation of democracy into post-ideological democracy. Mainstream parties no longer focused only on representing the interests of a particular social group, but on the average voter (Viviani, 2017: 282). Thus, the parties began to resemble each other, to offer the same product to their constituents, and to put aside their ideological differences. Although this behavior of the parties demotivates a part of the electorate to vote in elections, the de-ideologizing of the parties meant an increase in political volatility across Europe, that is, a growing willingness of more and more people to change their political preferences from one election to another (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). In addition, the convergence of political party programs has led to more voters being open to the appeals of anti-establishment parties (Kitschelt, 2002: 181). Representative democracy works well when the government is legitimized by majority support in free elections and when manages to address complex societal challenges. It seems that today the legitimacy and the efficiency in dealing with the challenges are in crisis. Traditional political parties are less and less able to mobilize electoral support and to structure and channel political conflicts. They are perceived as inauthentic and are

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increasingly losing the legitimacy they once enjoyed. While they have begun to address the entire electorate, not just their traditional voters, the traditional parties that usually fight for power have remained somewhat scrupulous about what is allowed, what is politically correct, and what is not. They avoid politicizing controversial issues such as xenophobia, nationalism, and Islamophobia. Among populists, such considerations and scruples in the fight for vote-hunting do not exist (Muis, 2015: 58). Populists have no scruples and the level of behavior corresponds to the fatigue of part of the electorate from democratic procedures and institutions that are ineffective. Some of them attribute the inefficiency to the procedures. Populists are leaning toward direct democracy. They do not enslave the forms, but seek the Messiah (Bluhdorn & Butzlaff, 2019: 195). In the absence of a cohesive social group that will identify with the party ideology, the parties attach greater importance to the direct relationship between the individual and politics, between the voter and the politician, and thus open space for personalization of politics and clientelism. If in the past the citizens identified with the parties, today they identify with the party leaders. If before the parties were institutions for realizing the interests of certain social groups and classes, today they have been transformed into institutions that work for realizing the ambitions of the party leaders. They do not differ in their ideology but differ in the image and rhetorical styles of their leaders. The image of political parties is created by professional PR agencies and political marketing and advertising specialists (Mair, 2000). The image of the leaders, in turn, takes the role that party programs once played (Viviani, 2017: 283). Democracy has been transformed from a partisan to a leadership democracy. Mass parties have transformed into professional parties. The place of mass membership was taken by communication professionals, marketing specialists, spin doctors, PR experts, etc. Populist political leaders have two contradictory positions: on the one hand they are leaders of political movements and parties, and on the other hand they have anti-party appeals and challenge party democracy. Similarly, in the name of the sovereignty of the people and the rejection of the establishment, populists criticize representative democracy and advocate a plebiscite democracy (Viviani, 2017: 288). The plebiscites weaken the position of political parties as mediators between citizens and political institutions. With plebiscites, people directly make decisions and narrow the working space of parties, which become redundant in political life (Mudde, 2007: 155).

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Van Kessel (2011: 69) identifies the decline in support for traditional parties in the Netherlands as one of the most significant growth factors for populist leaders such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders. Similarly, the creation of negative feelings toward mainstream politics, that is, anti-­ political feelings in Italy after the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, resulted in the election success of Beppe Grillo and the Five Star Movement in the 2013 elections (Mancose, 2018: 45). The vote for the populist parties is a protest vote which indicates that the citizens are not satisfied with the established political parties that either did not recognize the social problems or do not have real solutions for them. As Muis (2015: 57) writes, this is the problem of the political offer of traditional parties that do not know how to deal with economic problems in the most efficient and acceptable way, whether due to incompetence or corruption. Similarly, issues of cultural diversity and immigration remain unresolved by traditional parties and exploited by populists in an attempt to increase their popularity. Namely, politicians were not able to regulate the relations in the societies which with the increasing progress of modernization and globalization became more complex, hence the revolt against the political establishment. In that sense, populism can be considered as a phenomenon of reconfiguration of the collective entities that represent the interests of important groups of citizens who were not previously sufficiently represented, that is, who were excluded from the political game by marginalizing or ignoring. From this point of view, populism goes hand in hand with the institutional procedures of liberal democracy, that is, it regenerates it.

6.3   The Crisis of Representativeness and Populism as an Alternative The crisis of the political parties is a crisis of the subjects that are bearers of representativeness. This means that the entities that were supposed to represent the interests of the citizens did not do that. Hence, those whose interests are not sufficiently articulated in the political system are mobilized through populist parties. A very important element of the crisis of representativeness is identity crisis of the political entities. The identity crisis means that the connection between the parties and their membership is weakening. There is a blurring of both ideological and programmatic identities. Mainstream parties are becoming more like each other.

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They have the same potential electorate. Loyalty to the parties is decreasing. Thus, on the one hand, the number of members of political parties is decreasing, and on the other hand, the number of citizens who identify or have confidence in political parties is decreasing. The populists see themselves more as political movements than as parties (Taggart, 2002: 69). As such, they are a less institutionalized form of political association than rigid, formal party structures. The parties themselves and their organizational structure are changing. The parties with only one member appeared, such as the Freedom Party, whose only member is its leader Geert Wilders. In the absence of members, this party justifies the need for direct communication between the party leader and the people. Membership would complicate direct communication between the leader and the people. With membership, compromises would have to be made on the issue of party platform and personnel policy, which could compromise the ideological purity of populist policies. But although the party has no formal membership, it has its own representatives in  local, provincial, national, and European elections. These people invest their time and reputation in the eventual success of the party and have no formal rights. They do not decide on party affairs, and all power is concentrated in the party leader (Mazzoleni & Vierman, 2017: 789). If the emergence of one-member populist parties is a marginal but significant phenomenon that could be treated as an avant-garde indicating future trends, the emergence of parties founded around a charismatic leader like Berlusconi, Beppe Grillo, and Le Pen is standard for populist. Wanting to attract as many votes as possible, in conditions when the citizens for various reasons are not ready to commit to party engagements, some of the parties resort to registering their followers as supporters and giving them the right to select party candidates for execution of public functions. Also, the parties try to involve the citizens in non-partisan activities and later try to transform those activities into formal party membership (Heider & Wauters, 2019: 4). As Roberts (2017) points out, the rise of populism indicates the failure of traditional parties to represent the views of citizens, the weakness of their party organization, and in some cases accelerates the decline of the traditional order in given societies. Populism in that sense can be seen as an attempt to offer an alternative to traditional parties in representing the interests of citizens by offering new leaders, ideas, or programs and by involving in politics entire segments of society that were previously marginalized, alienated, and passivized. When populist parties offer an alternative to the establishment, the traditional mainstream parties are labeled

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and perceived as part of that establishment. Populist parties in this sense can be defined as parties that (1) aspire to have the exclusive right to represent the interests of the people, (2) address people whose interests are key to political decision-making, and (3) are extremely hostile to the political establishment. Populist parties usually sharply criticize established, traditional parties and point to the need for a new methodology for making political decisions that will be more transparent and efficient in solving people’s problems (Van Kessel, 2011: 70). Populism is an alternative to the mainstream parties at the organizational level. Unlike traditional mainstream parties, populist parties do not rely so much on the formal party organization as on the charisma of populist leaders and the direct and immediate relationship they establish with their membership. Populist democracy is a non-partisan democracy. Representativeness is not provided through competition of interests that are channeled through political parties. There is no room for competition and conflict because all citizens first belong to the category of people and only then are workers, businessmen, villagers, women, men, etc. The government serves all people, not just a certain group in society (Mair, 2002: 89). Here we have only mentioned some of the issues that we will deal with in the future, which are related to the reduction of citizen participation in the activities of traditional mainstream parties. In addition, we will pay attention to the changing values of citizens, the distrust they show toward the political system, the dysfunction of mainstream parties, their cartelization, corruption that erodes the credibility of political entities, globalization as a factor that limits the autonomy in the adoption and implementation of political decisions of the parties, and the convergence of the programs of the political parties.

6.4   Changing Values Value analysis has the potential to explain to some extent the behavior of individuals. They have some influence on the behavior and preferences of individuals. The change in the socio-economic structure of the society influenced the liberation of the citizens from their traditional obligations and the change of the values toward self-actualization instead of solidarity toward the group. The process of individualization is a good example of changing the dominant social values in two dimensions. The first is the transition from values that are preoccupied with survival to values that are oriented to self-actualizing. The second is the transition from traditional

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to rational-secular values (Inglehart, 1977). The process of individualization gives more freedom to the citizens in regard to the groups to which they belong. They are less and less willing to invest their time and effort in engaging the class to which they belong, with which they identify less and less. Same goes for the union, for the community, and so on. Citizens are paying more attention to meeting personal needs and interests, rather than group ones. Identities are more informative and less functional. They are more about how we want to be ourselves and less about how others see us (Axford & Stager, 2021: 87). Politics is losing its grounding in group identities. As a result, voting is no longer a confirmation of belonging to a certain group, but a confirmation of the freedom of choice and affirmation of the personal value system. The greater freedom that citizens have in selecting the parties they vote for has reduced the predictability of voting behavior. New political parties like the Greens have emerged, but also parties like the populist ones. In general, the influence of parties in the political system has diminished. Individualization has opened up space for individuals to rely more on their own choices than on group identity in deciding not only who to vote for, but whether to vote at all. As a result of these changes, the debate on the crisis of the traditional political parties that were the most prominent collective actors of the representative democracy was opened. Namely, in the traditionally regulated party democracies, representativeness was channeled through the parties. Governments have formed political parties, either alone or in coalitions. The accountability of governments was secured through the accountability of parties in elections. Representativeness was based on the assumption that the parties are mediators, link between voters and the government, and that there is competition between different interests that are channeled into the programs of political parties, and the electorate decides how to manage scarce resources over a period of time. With the crisis of the parties, these assumptions are becoming more difficult to maintain. It is difficult to say that modern democracy is a party democracy (Mair, 2002: 85). It seems that the golden age of mainstream parties has passed.

6.5   Distrust in the Political System Distrust in political parties is worrying because citizens do not show such distrust of democratic values as of individual civil liberties and rights, the right to choose between credible political alternatives to elections, the

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right to free expression, and so on (Kitschelt, 2002: 182). This means that the citizens identify the problem in the operational work of the political parties. Distrust, even that of political parties, has deep structural reasons and over time a culture of distrust of the political system can be created. According to Sztompka (1997: 12–14), there are several factors that contribute to creating distrust in the political system. The first is normative chaos, which creates anomie in society. Normative chaos occurs when social norms change too quickly. In such cases, the predictability of social life is disrupted. Individuals are confused and do not know how to behave. They feel disoriented, have a hard time predicting their future, and feel insecure about their future, about themselves, and about the existence of the group to which they belong. In such cases, individuals begin to lose confidence in the system and consider social processes to be unjust, immoral, and unfair. The second factor is the non-transparency of the political system toward the public. The feeling that politicians are not honest with the public produces distrust in them. When political institutions do not provide enough information about the way they function, the way they make decisions, the feeling of mistrust intensifies. The third important factor is the irresponsibility of the political elites, which not only produces distrust, but also produces apathy among the citizens who feel powerless to change the situation. All these factors have one common denominator: dysfunction of the political system. The political system that includes the electoral system, the legislation, the courts, the civil sector, and the media can be set up in such a way as to enable the influence of the citizens in the public affairs. Political institutions are an important factor in political stability and in the implementation of policies aimed at achieving the common good. But when in the long run they are not able to cultivate political consensus on the most important topics, and when they are not able to provide political and economic security and well-being among citizens, a feeling of distrust of political institutions, or dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole and political parties as different alternatives within that system, can be created. Citizens identify and trust parties that are responsible, efficient, and able to implement serious political decisions in the interest of citizens. But serious long-term economic problems, the constant emergence of economic crises, the lack of an adequate response to identity challenges, and the chronic emergence of corruption scandals reduce citizens’ trust in politicians and parties. In such cases, the membership of traditional political parties is reduced, as well as the turnout in the elections. It allows the emergence of political parties

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and leaders who appeal to a socially heterogeneous structure of people who have one thing in common: dissatisfaction with the work of the establishment and the parties as part of it. Reducing the membership of political parties makes the problem even bigger. Namely, one of the functions of the membership of political parties is to control the leadership. In conditions of reduced party membership, traditional parties are further oligarchized, the leadership position is strengthened, and the process of professionalization of parties makes them much more dependent on capital inflows than membership inflows (Mazzoleni & Vierman, 2017: 784). It changes the organizational structure of the parties. Traditional parties that were once mass parties are increasingly being cartelized (Katz & Mair, 1995). With the reduction of the traditional forms of civic participation in public affairs, new channels of civic engagement are being opened at the same time, which are replacing the traditional ones. Among other things, citizens are beginning to vote for alternative non-systemic political parties such as populist parties (Norris, 2002; Eichengreen, 2018). The results of the European Values Survey show that voters of populist parties show more distrust in political institutions than other citizens (Bartlett et  al., 2011: 71). If voters were satisfied with how mainstream parties represented their interests, they would be their loyal voters and there would be no room for new political parties in the party system. But research shows that populist parties, while well accepted among first-time voters who have previously been non-partisan, get the most votes from voters who have previously voted for one of the mainstream parties (Mudde, 2007: 237). It can be said that populism is a result of the crisis of representativeness and legitimacy of modern political systems. The irony is that populism did not offer representation but direct democracy. Entering from one crisis to another, mainstream politicians find it difficult to convince citizens that the mechanisms of power work for the common good (Revelli, 2019: 29).

6.6   Non-functionality of Mainstream Parties The crisis of the mainstream parties is, among other things, related to their non-functionality, that is, the inability to satisfactorily perform the functions that the parties have in the political system. Such functions are (1) mobilizing support for party policies, (2) representing the interests of certain social groups, (3) proposing policies, and (4) procedural and institutional function. Regarding the aggregation and channeling of the interests

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of the citizens, today’s parties are not an instrument for articulating the great social conflicts by formulating and promoting alternative political visions. Gone are the days when parties were an instrument for access to power of social groups that are in competition and even conflict, in order to impose their political, social, and ideological vision through the mechanisms of power (Mair, 2002: 83). Unlike traditional, today’s are catch-all parties. They try to represent the interests of all citizens and not individual groups to which they will address exclusively and whose interests they will protect. In the articulation of interests, non-partisan associations, interest groups, social movements, and the media are becoming more and more important at the expense of weakening the representation of the interests of the social groups by the political parties. When there are conflicting interests between individual groups, they should register and reconcile at the political level, in order to further channel them through public policies. But the expression of public interests and demands in modern society is increasingly happening outside the realm of politics. Significant changes have also taken place in the question of the function of parties in formulating public policies. Public policies are increasingly formulated by experts and non-political bodies, rather than the parties themselves. Public policies are becoming less polarized, and parties are becoming less needed. Government policies are less and less a reflection of party interests and policies. The fourth important function of the parties is procedural and institutional and it includes recruiting and selecting the party leadership and personnel decisions. This is a key function of the parties today. The pool from which potential personnel decisions of the parties are drawn today is much larger than that of the traditional ideological parties. Although the membership of modern parties is reduced, they are open to society and draw potential personnel solutions outside the party membership, among experts who show sympathy or willingness to be loyal to the party. An additional procedural function of parties involves their work in parliament and government (Mair, 2000). The significantly eroded legitimacy of the parties has an impact on the way they perform this function. In general, there are indicators that the representation of political parties, their place, and their role in liberal democracy is devolving. It is declining and is increasingly being replaced by other social actors (Mair, 2002: 86). In general, the parties should be the link between the citizens and the state, but it seems that they are more connected and become dependent on the state, that is, they build a model of the state to their own measure and neglect or fail in a realistic way to represent the interests of citizens in

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state institutions (Katz & Mair, 1995). With professionalization, parties became dependent on capital, began to integrate into the state, and marginalize the acceptance of new membership as well as neglect the existing one (Mazzoleni & Vierman, 2017: 884). Traditional mainstream parties are highly bureaucratized organizations led by political elites in which there is not too much room for individual autonomy and preferences of membership and citizenship to be expressed (Acceti & Wolkenstein, 2017: 100). Hence, a part of the citizens sought a way out in political activity in parties that are not as tightly organized as the populist parties, which more often resemble political movements, rather than tightly organized party structures. The unequal distribution of power in society channeled through the political system, especially the inability of significant and numerous social groups to reach out to politics is a challenge that politics should address in order to have an integrative function and connect different identities and entities in society. In representative democracy, the interests of certain social groups are better and more represented and protected than the interests of others. The media has become much more critical, and people more independent of politics. They began to see politics as a distant, irrelevant thing, and politicians as impotent, incompetent, selfish individuals who are much more like each other than the people they claim to represent. This phenomenon, which is characterized by the oligarchization of liberal democracy, the dominance of corporatist arrangements in political decision-making, and the dominance of interest groups, experts, in academia is called post-democracy (Von Beyne, 2015: 23). In politics has been created a layer of people—the political class who although members of different parties and formally in competition actually have many more common features and even interests than those they claim to represent. Established parties that are constantly changing in power over a long period of time have become professional, become dependent on state resources, and begun to alienate themselves from the citizens they claim to represent. There are authors who claim that mainstream parties are absorbed by the state and become semi-state agents in the political system, especially in conditions when the social divisions on the basis of which the parties are formed weaken as a result of social mobility, the influence of the state on welfare, secularization, etc. The process of cartelization of parties reduces the potential for individuals to vote for them for ideological reasons. Hence, the voters see the established parties as protectors of the selfish interests of the elite, of the political caste, not of the citizens and

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society. This impression is especially heightened when corruption arises involving party representatives. In such conditions, a gap was created between the parties and the society, between the elites and the people. Individuals could no longer fully identify with traditional parties; they became less involved in politics—which became a world unto itself. People had a less ideological approach to politics—they saw all politicians as part of the same political class, had a less emotional attitude toward politics, and showed less loyalty to parties (Ignazi, 1992: 5). This process resulted in a decline in turnout on the one hand and the emergence of populism on the other (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 1).

6.7   Corruption From the mid-1990s until today, corruption has become an unavoidable and ubiquitous topic in public space. International organizations such as the EU and OECD, media and governments deal with this topic. In the last period, this topic is gaining more and more importance in the academic circles. The number of books and articles dealing with this topic has multiplied from the 1950s to the present (Curini, 2018: 3). Corruption has an impact on distrust of the political system, but also the emergence and growth of its alternatives. The rise of corruption gives legitimacy to the idea that political elites work only for their own selfish interests, which are often known to be contrary to the interests of the people. It creates an atmosphere and argues the populist narrative that elites for selfish reasons create a system that harms the interests of the people (Kossow, 2019: 6). The inefficiency of parties and the political system as a whole is associated with corrupt practices which in turn have a systemic and strategic impact on institutions and their ability to achieve their goals (Lessing, 2013: 553). Corruption is the misuse of public functions and resources to achieve private, particular goals. It occurs when those who hold public office violate legal or social norms to achieve particular goals. Corruption is an act taken by those in power, which violates the legal and moral norms in order to pursue private and narrow group interests (Curini, 2018: 3). Corruption violates democratic rules of the game and privileges certain social groups, especially elites who are well established in the social system. When corruption is widespread in a country, citizens feel that they are not receiving fair and just treatment from the authorities. It produces permanent dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy. The perception that a party, or a party leader, is corrupt or does not deal with corruption

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satisfactorily reduces their chances of achieving good election results. Corruption was one of the key factors in the growth of populist anti-­ establishment parties (Hawkins et al., 2017). In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the specific type of consensus-based democracy has created strong inclusiveness but weak accountability and this has been one of the preconditions for rebellion against the establishment (Van Kessel, 2011: 82). The loss of party loyalty to the voters was a precondition for them to start looking for a solution to their problems in the populist charismatic leaders. In this sense, the emergence and voting of populist parties can be interpreted as an expression of protest against mainstream parties and the traditional model of liberal democracy that cannot produce a credible political alternative.

6.8   Globalization and Capacity Constraints of Mainstream Parties Globalization has broken the marriage between politics and power at the level of nation-states. The power of governments to make their own sovereign decisions on a range of supranational issues is declining. Today’s governments are more like facilitators and mediators than regulators and controllers of processes (Mair, 2002: 83). National sovereignty is eroded, and the capacity of national governments to implement effective policy is limited (Martinelli, 2018: 20). Although supranational structures may lack legitimacy, they have the competence to address important issues for citizens, and the fact that political entities do not have such competencies at the national level only weakened their organizational structure and the motivation of citizens to mobilize around them. Thus, globalization undermines democracy and democratic processes. As globalization progresses, more power is concentrated in the hands of elites, corporations, and bureaucracies over which citizens have almost no influence. Citizens have less and less influence over the decisions that elites make on their behalf. Politics has become a gray process dominated by gray people in gray suits (Axford & Stager, 2021: 90). The growth of populism depends on the gap between the mainstream parties and the interests of the citizens, that is, in the words of Andeweg (1996: 144) the division between “agent” and “principal”. The more citizens feel that mainstream parties are unable to find real solutions to problems such as those with immigration, growing inequality, and cultural tensions, the

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more they turn to alternative-populist movements and leaders. Hence the inability to find and implement a solution, the effective action of mainstream political parties is an important factor in the spread of populism.

6.9   Positioning in the Political Spectrum and Populism An important factor why parties fail to mobilize mass support is programmatic convergence. Although parties know how to cultivate clientelist and personal ties to the electorate, cultivating affiliation through party programs is an important part of political party representation. Historically, the articulation of different policies has been the primary function of political parties. But it is difficult for parties to maintain a programmatic connection with voters if they are unable to see a serious difference in the programs and policies offered by the parties, especially if party programs are based on similar views of politics, values, and aspirations to achieve similar goals. In that case, voters see no credible alternative. Differences between parties are reduced to differences in the personalities of leaders (Mouffe, 2005: 51). The process of convergence between party ideologies and programs has its own history. In the 1960s, Bell (1960) spoke of the de-ideologization of politics in the sense that all political entities in Western democracies embraced democratic pluralism and capitalism as the only legitimate framework within which individual policies were implemented. In that context, the party ideologies continued to generate political mobilization for some time. But since 1990, a process of further convergence of party ideologies and program platforms of mainstream parties has begun. There are several reasons for this process. First, after the fall of the Soviet Union, communism and everything reminiscent of it were very unpopular, and left-wing parties in most leading Western democracies were in opposition for years. As a solution to coming to power in that period, they reached for the reform of the ideological postulates, getting closer to the center. A good illustration of this is Anthony Giddens’ The Third Way (1998). A more recent example is the economic crisis of 2008. Many historically left-­ wing parties, for example, in Greece, Spain, and Italy, have been forced to take painful austerity measures, sparking social protests that have fueled citizens’ sense that there is no difference in the policies between the established parties, whether formally left or right-wing oriented (Roberts,

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2017). The example is similar to Eastern and Central Europe, where in the 1990s the privatization process was mostly carried out by left-wing parties, successors to the Communist parties. The second reason for the convergence of party programs and the de-ideologizing of the parties is the professionalization of the parties, their opening to PR experts, political marketing specialists, political advertising, etc. In the process, the parties sought to expand the base from which they can count on votes. To do so, they began to address the average voter, rather than the social groups that traditionally vote for a particular party. In this way they broke off relations with the traditional voters, their electorate became much more unstable, much more variable. As all mainstream parties relied on the same electorate, they turned to the average voter and their policies began to resemble each other. The emerging populist parties offer alternatives that the established parties were unable or unwilling to offer. For example, right-wing populist and nationalist parties cover topics that the traditional conservative right did not cover as anti-immigrant rhetoric. They offer a return to the nation-state, nativism, mono-ethnic societies, that is, a return of the wheel of history. After the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the great ideological narratives lost their persuasiveness. The helplessness of the social democracy to deal with the growth of inequality in the society, in the restraint of liberalism and the self-regulating market, also has its influence here. In the 1990s we witnessed the liberalization of social democratic and socialist parties, for example, in the United Kingdom. The marginalization of trade unions and the adoption of a friendly attitude toward the business sector are examples of this. Instead of curbing liberal economic doctrine, social democratic parties were often its exponents. They distanced themselves from protecting the interests of the traditional working class. Instead they focused on protecting the post-materialist interests of the privileged middle class and began promoting identity policies (Bluhdorn & Butzlaff, 2019: 193). The reasons, in addition to the change in the balance of power between the political ideologies, could also be sought in the disintegration of the classes. Individuals began to attach more importance to their lifestyle than to the class to which according to statistics they belong. Citizens are passive and turned into consumers. Lifestyle, unlike class, is more related to what goods are consumed than to what rights are enjoyed and what ideology is believed. Stijn Van Kessel (2011: 82) reports on the process of policy convergence of traditional political parties in the Netherlands. The great

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political-cultural cleavages, the state versus the church, the center against the periphery, and the great socio-economic divisions such as agriculture versus industry, capitalism against workers, which marked the formation of modern European society and traditional mass parties weakened under secularization, the growth of service economy, and the expansion of the welfare state (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). With the reduction of the relevance of the religious and class conflict, the space for action of the traditional political parties that were representatives of one of the parties in those conflicts has narrowed (Martinelli, 2018: 21). The crisis of political parties is closely related to the de-ideologization of society, that is, the crisis of ideologies and the triumph of the neoliberal political perspective (Fukuyama, 1992). The advancement of globalization is a confirmation of the triumph of neoliberal tendencies in modern society. In conditions of convergence between the mainstream parties, for one part the electorate as an authentic alternative to all mainstream parties seem to be populist parties (Van Kessel, 2011: 4). In contemporary European society, there are more significant new processes and conflicts than traditional ones. Such is the case with the European integration process, which means reducing the sovereignty of nation-states, the free flow of people, the influx of migrants, and so on. The growth of national populist parties is a reflection of the conflicts created by the European integration process, which could be interpreted as a reactivation of the conflict on the periphery versus the center. Representatives of the center are the pro-globalist liberal forces, the establishment, and the representatives of the periphery are the national populist parties (Mudde, 2007: 238). A similarly important issue that the mainstream parties did not address and on the articulation of which space was opened for the existence of political projects such as “greens” was the issue of environmental protection. The center-periphery conflict is not new. On the contrary, the clash of conservatives versus socialist parties was basically a clash of the center against the periphery, those who are at the center and those who are on the periphery of social life. The Socialist and Social-Democratic parties in the 1990s changed their ideology, embraced a friendly attitude toward capital, that is, became neoliberal, thus abandoning the elements of populism in their ideology and action. This opened more space for right-wing populism, but it was not usually promoted by the old-established right-­ wing parties but by newly formed political entities. The emergence of populist parties and movements is not just a matter of the emergence of charismatic leaders. Charismatic leaders are a necessary but not sufficient

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condition for the emergence of populism. In the case of the rise of populism in the last decade, a prerequisite for the emergence of charismatic leaders who promote populist messages is the shift in balance within societies. The change in balances within societies has led to new divisions and groupings. The interests of one of the parties, the periphery in our case, were not represented by the existing traditional parties, hence the need for new parties and leaders who will recognize and affirm the interests of this group of citizens. Structural changes such as post-industrialism, globalization, and European integration have allowed right-wing populist parties to turn to less-educated potential voters, formerly known as the working class, who have lost their class identity in the meantime. If the traditional mainstream parties with their moderate policies tried to attract the winners of globalization, they left room for other political parties, such as the populist ones, to attract the votes of the losers of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008). With the rise of populist parties with their anti-establishment and anti-immigrant agenda, the dominant mainstream parties have three options before them: (1) to silence the issues on which the populists have begun to gain increasing support, (2) to distance themselves from populist policies, and (3) to adopt and implement populist policies themselves. The only option that gave the mainstream parties the opportunity to successfully oppose the populists was to adopt parts of the populist agenda themselves, that is, to play with fire. Therefore, the emergence and strengthening of populist parties had an impact on politics and mainstream parties (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017: 913). Thus, influenced by the success of the populists, the moderate right-wing parties began to take a stronger stance on the issue of immigration and multiculturalism. But sometimes that too cannot stop the growth of populists who are considered more authentic representatives of those ideas. For example, bringing the Conservative Party’s positions closer to that of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) did not prevent UKIP support from 3.1% in 2010 to grow to 12.6% in 2015 (Molls & Jetten, 2020). On the contrary, the copying of the positions of the populist parties by the mainstream parties legitimized such views and further increased the election result of the populists (Mudde, 2007: 241).

References Acceti, C. I., & Wolkenstein, F. (2017). The Crisis of Party Democracy, Cognitive Mobilization, and the Case of Making Parties for Making Parties More Deliberative. American Political Science Review, 111(1), 97–109.

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Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre. In D.  McDonnell & D.  Albertazzi (Eds.), Twenty First Century Populism. Palgrave Macmillan. Andeweg, R. (1996). Elite – Mass Linkages in Europe: Legitimacy Crisis or Party Crisis. In J. Hayward (Ed.), Elitism, Populism and European Politics. Oxford University Press. Axford, B., & Stager, M. (2021). Populism and Globalization: Proto Sociology. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, 37. Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., & Littler, M. (2011). The New Face of Digital Populism. Demos. Bell, D. (1960). The End of Ideology. The Free Press. Bluhdorn, I., & Butzlaff, F. (2019). Rehinging Populism: Peak Democracy, Liquid Identity and the Performance of Sovereignty. European Journal of Social Theory, 22(2), 191–211. Curini, L. (2018). Corruption, Ideology and Populism: The Rise of Valence Political Campaigning. Palgrave Macmillan. Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. Penguin. Eichengreen, B. (2018). The Populism Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era. Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press. Gauja, A. (2015). The Individualization of Party Politics: The Impact of Changing Internal Decision-Making Processes on Policy Development and Citizen Engagement. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17(1), 89–105. Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Policy. Polity Press. Hawkins, A.  K., Read, M., & Pauwels, T. (2017). Populism and Its Causes. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa, & P. Ostigay Pierre (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Heider, K., & Wauters, B. (2019). Do Parties Still Represent? An Analysis of Representativeness of Political Parties in Western Democracies. Routledge. Ignazi, P. (1992). The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 22(1), 3–34. Inglehart, R. (1977). The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton University Press. Katz, R., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing Model of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of Cartel Party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5–28. Katz, S. R., & Mair, P. (2018). Democracy and Cartelization of Political Parties. Oxford University Press. Kitschelt, H. (2002). Popular Dissatisfaction with Democracy: Populism and Party System. In Y. Surel (Ed.), Y, Many. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Kossow N. (2019). Populism and Corruption. Transparency International Anti-­ Corruption Help-Desk. https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/ uploads/helpdesk/populism-­and-­corruption-­2019-­final.pdf Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge University Press. Lessing, L. (2013). Institution Corruption Defined. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 41(3), 553–555. Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Free Press. Mair P. (2000, April 14–19). Populist Democracy vs Party Democracy. Paper Presented at ECPR Workshop on Competing Conceptions on Democracy. University of Copenhagen.l. Mair, P. (2002). Populist Democracy vs Party Democracy. In Y. Many & Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Mancose, M. (2018). The Deep Roots of Populism: Protest, Apathy and Success of Movimento 5 Stelle in the 2013 Italian Elections. Italian Political Sciences, 13(3), 44–60. Martinelli, A. (2018). When Populism Meets Nationalism: Reflections on Parties in Power. ISPI. Mazzoleni, O., & Vierman, G. (2017). Memberless Parries: Beyond the Business – Firm Party Model. Party Politics, 23(6), 783–792. Molls, F., & Jetten, J. (2020). Understanding for Populist Radical Right Parties: Toward a Model That Captures Both Demand and Supply Side Factors. Frontiers in Communication, 5, 557561. https://doi.org/10.3389/ fcomm.2020.557561 Mouffe, C. (2005). On the Political. Routledge. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Muis, J. (2015). Populists as Chameleons? An Adaptive Learning Approach to the Rise of Populist Politicians. European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities AQPAM, 4(2), 56–74. Muis, J., & Immerzeel, T. (2017). Causes and the Consequences of the Rise of the Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe. Current Sociology Review, 65(6), 909–930. Norris, P. (2002). Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone: Americas Declining Social Capital. Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 223–234. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon and Schuster. Revelli, M. (2019). The New Populism: Democracy Stares into the Abyss. Verso Books.

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Roberts, M. K. (2017). Populism and Political Parties. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. E. Ochoa, & P. Ostigay (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party System: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge University Press. Sztompka, P. (1997). Trust, Distrust and Paradox of Democracy (WZB Discussion Paper, No. 97–003). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Fur Sozialforschung (WZB). Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the Pathology of Contemporary Politics. In Y.  Many & Y.  Surel (Eds.), Democracy and Political Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. Van Kessel, S. (2011, August 25–27). Path to Populism: Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Europe. Paper Presented at the ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. Van Kessel, S. (2011). Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties: The Nederland’s as Case Study. Perspectives on European Parties and Society, 12(1), 68–88. Viviani, L. (2017). A Political Sociology of Populism and Leadership. Societa Mutamento Politica, 8(15), 279–303. Von Beyne, K. (2015). Transforming Transformation Theory. In M. Minkenberg (Ed.), Transforming the Transformation? The Eastern Europe Radical Right in the Political Process. Routledge.

CHAPTER 7

Transformation of the Public Sphere

7.1   Introduction Modern representative democracy is based on communication between politicians and citizens, and the media, which is an effective and independent mediator, makes this possible. The media as a pillar of the public sphere enable the circulation of information, ideas, dialogue between political actors, and the formation of public opinion. Politicians want to appear in front of the media to show that they are responsible to the citizens. They want to show how much they care about the interests of the people and how much they deserve to be elected because of it. Through the media, politicians are informed about the challenges facing the public, but they also propose solutions to those challenges. To become politically relevant, politicians need to become media visible. Populist movements and parties are much more dependent on the media than traditional mainstream parties because they have much more modest organizational and financial capacity in relation to them (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017: 914). Moffitt (2016) points out that probably the most important factor for the growth of populism in its modern form is the new media reality, that is, the transformation of the public sphere. In the modern public sphere, there are trends of increasing socio-cultural heterogeneity, increased number of media, media channels, hybridization of genres, blurring of the distinction between journalism and activism, professionalization in the field of communications, cacophony produced by the multitude of media, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_7

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growing cynicism, and decline in motivation for civic activism (Dahlgren, 2005). Under the influence of technological changes and the commercialization of the media business, the public sphere was fragmented, which had a negative impact on the quality of deliberation provided by the media. The fragmentation of the public sphere has caused ambiguity in the public over the crystallization of relevant political entities and alternatives. In order to present themselves as well as possible in public, parties and party leaders hire professionals, PR and marketing specialists (Wirth et al., 2016: 26). It brought to the fore the erosion of civic values such as tolerance, responsibility, and truthfulness as key to building a democratic society. The latest major change driven by technological innovation is social media, which parties are increasingly using to communicate with their followers and for political mobilization (The Global State of Democracy, 2020). One explanation for the rise of populism comes from media studies. Namely, the technology of the new media strengthens the cognitive weakness and the emotional vulnerability of the masses, which for that reason easily fall under the influence of populist demagoguery. Older versions of this theory, which were popular in Latin America, argued that radio and television reinforced the personal connection between politicians and the masses. New versions of this theory prevailing in Europe suggest that the media is a powerful means of mobilizing the masses that populist leaders know how to use. Due to the competition between the media for viewership and readership, they increasingly focus on entertainment, simplification, personalization of politics, personal dramas and conflicts, speculations, sandals, etc. Populist parties know well how to adapt to the logic of the media. They have personalized leaderships that use provocative tabloid language as opposed to traditional parties that use politically correct, dry, and boring vocabulary (Hawkins et al., 2017). They know that modern politics is performance. They know how to dramatize their performances in front of an audience. Populist leaders do not refrain from entering into conflict and creating a scandal in defense of their views which raises television ratings and newspaper readings (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017: 914). They know the audience wants to see the culprits. Hence, they blame the elites. For populists, there is no difference between campaign and politics. For every political move they organize a campaign (Axford & Stager, 2021: 95). The media climate creates an atmosphere of mistrust toward the traditional, established parties, presenting their actions through the prism of personal interests, tactical maneuvers, in order to achieve certain strategic

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goals. Reporting on the inadequacy of these parties is often accompanied by cynicism. It undermines the legitimacy of these parties and the trust that citizens have in them. Hence, on the one hand, an anti-political atmosphere is created, and on the other hand, the feeling of threat is increased by providing significant media space on topics such as immigration, crime, and identity policies (Wirth et  al., 2016: 23). Giving too much media space to conflicts and negativity in society, highlighting issues that arouse strong emotions, sensationalism invoking what “people would like to see” contribute to reducing the quality of public debate on important political issues, the search for a rational answer, and alienation of voters, and open space for bringing populism into the political arena. The general image that is created in the media as an environment in which politics works in formats such as reality programs includes shamelessness, humiliation of opponents, slander, lies, and attacks on opponents’ ad hominem. Political debates involving populist leaders followed this discourse (Wodak, 2019). The public sphere is a dynamic part of our social reality. It is constantly changing. Just in the last few decades, it has gone through three stages of development. In the first phase, until the mid-1960s, the media strictly conveyed the messages of political actors. Citizens’ voting behavior was related to their group loyalty. Citizens followed a certain type of media depending on their political preferences. In the second phase of the development of the public sphere, until the early 1990s, television was the central and most important medium. Television managed to break through, to get viewership in all segments of the electorate, among all segments of the population, among people with different political orientations and lifestyles. In this way, television increased its audience. Given the standards set by television, the parties began to adjust. They began to learn the value of information, how to present them, and so on. They began to prepare the media agenda, to take their political campaigns more systematically and seriously, using the tools of political marketing, public opinion research, and news management. While in the first phase, a responsible approach and impartiality toward informing the citizens prevailed, in the second phase the media were proactive, with an interventionist understanding of the role of the media in politics. The third phase is the medialization of politics and it is characterized by (1) professionalization of public relations of the parties, (2) growth of competition between the media, (3) multiplication of platforms and agendas that promote certain interests, growth of extreme voices in politics, and growth of political challenges, (4) fragmentation and decontextualization of the decoding of

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political messages, and (5) promotion of anti-elitism especially in the new media (Wirth et al., 2016: 22). The way in which the media reported on politics until the 1960s and today is significantly different. Unlike before, today the media pay much more attention to cases of political corruption and to scandals in politics. The traditional Western media was controlled by the parties, especially the newspapers that were part of the party subcultures. That has changed with the advent of radio and especially with the advent of television. It can be said that since the late 1960s the media have been completely independent of political parties. The trends of media commercialization and the race for viewership have favored populism characterized by charismatic leaders, who often do not have the scruples to use politically incorrect language, to create a scandal that raises the ratings of programs. So, media are happy to have populist leaders as guests even though they have no sympathy for populism. By appearing in TV programs, populist leaders raise the visibility of the parties they represent and their own ratings (Mudde, 2007: 251). According to Benjamin Moffitt, when analyzing new trends in the public sphere, special attention should be paid to medialization of politics and to the way in which contemporary populist actors relate to the media. Here, populists use two tactics: the first is to control some of the media, and the second is to use the concept of celebrity, which blurs the line between politics and entertainment, but also among politicians, so that it is more important to attract attention than what political program is offered. Hence there is a process of mixing celebrities and politicians. On the one hand, celebrities are increasingly used to promote political initiatives and programs, and on the other hand, celebrities are increasingly actively involved in politics, leading populist political projects. Comedian Beppe Grillo, for example, has become a leading figure in Italy’s biggest populist project, the Five Star Movement. The media business requires less talk of politics and more use of simple, short sentences. Hence, politicians with show business experience who have charisma and know how to design their speeches in a populist way to present themselves as a representative of the people against the corrupt elite have great success in politics.

7.2   Medialization Modern politics and even populism are closely intertwined with the media. Populists rely on the mass media because they provide them with a direct relationship with citizens (Wirth et  al., 2016: 29). As Moffitt (2016)

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notes, the intertwining of populism and the media can be identified by the names given to populism in the literature such as telepopulism, newsroom populism, and media populism. The link between the media and populism became particularly apparent after World War II when television began to dominate and dictate public life. Some authors define this condition as hyperreality, and others as medialization of politics. Medialization is a concept that refers to the convergence between the logic of the media and the logic of politics. On the one hand, the media, wanting to be an independent actor in social events, tend to avoid the influence of political power. This makes them work in market conditions, that is, to be commercialized. Commercialization makes them orient toward giving space in the public sphere to contents that are attractive and that attract the attention of the audience. In order to gain space in the media and be able to attract voters, parties must follow the logic of the media, which is also called selfmedialization. Medialization actually means that certain segments of life, such as politics, culture, or family, increasingly rely on the logic by which the media function (Moffitt, 2016). Commercialization of media began to intensify in the 1990s and was characterized by the emergence of a multitude of media and their fragmentation. During this period could be seen the growth of extreme voices in the media and new challenges in politics. Because there was an abundance of media that are in competition for viewership, and thus for more of the advertising cake, they gave more and more space for sensationalist news and personalization of politics. This has resulted in the emergence of genres such as infotainment, which blurs the line between information and entertainment. It has become a central feature of modern mass media. Political debates were structured as representing a clash and rivalry between personalities, political leaders, and not between parties and ideologies. Populist leaders because of their charisma and controversy are an inevitable part of such debates (Manucci, 2017). They use simplistic rhetoric, emotional appeals, and spectacular claims that attract the audience, making them attractive guests who raise the ratings of talk shows (Corella, 2018: 28). The medialization of modern politics has had serious consequences, including (1) the professionalization of campaigns that eroded the importance of party membership, (2) the reduction in the number and importance of party newspapers due to the commercialization of media business relations, (3) spin doctors that started to replace the middle and highranking party leadership, and (4) the growing need of the parties for financial inflows (Von Beyne, 2015: 24). Medialization increased the cost of

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election campaigns, personalized leadership, marginalized intra-party dynamics, and depoliticized mass protests (Martinelli, 2018: 24-25). With the PR-ization of politics, the specialists in political communication, political marketing, and political PR replaced the party cadres. The parties were professionalized and their structure was transformed. They started addressing people, not a specific target group such as workers and farmers. In this way, the parties lost their traditional relations with certain social groups whose interests they represented. This is one of the reasons for the decline in support for traditional mass parties, especially those on the left. The commercialization of the mass media has its own logic that politicians had to follow. In an attempt to create a high rating, debate shows are produced as spectacles. In them, serious social issues are simplified and dramatized, rivals are demonized, and scandals are emphasized. Politics is also seen as entertainment. The most-watched political shows are of an entertaining nature in which there is no real debate, but politicians are ridiculed. Commercial media create conditions for the growth of populism through the glorification of the average. Market logic is forcing the media, especially tabloid newspapers and television, to give space to populist political parties. The controversy they create with positions that are opposed to the established parties contributes to increasing their visibility on the public stage. As Manucci (2017) notes, although there is a need for empirical research, at first glance there seems to be a convergence between the market logic on which the media and populism operate. But the fact that there is a convergence between the market logic of the media and populism does not mean that the media automatically supports populists. The logic of all media is the same and commercial, but editorial policy is not. Populists are often criticized in the media and are sometimes involved in clashes between the media. For example, Tea Party stands on the side of Fox News against the media of the liberal elite MSNBC (Moffitt, 2016).

7.3   Tabloids and Populism In the race for readership and viewership, the media insist on increasingly scandalous and extreme political stories and are tabloidized. Commercial television channels and tabloid newspapers are often known to be good allies of populism. They need to sell politics, political topics, to make the political process understandable and interesting for the citizens. Commercial television and tabloids choose topics and cover them in a way that is very close to the populist one. In this way, the media create an

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anti-­elitist atmosphere and set the stage for populism (Mudde, 2004: 553). That is, they set a public agenda that is very close to the populist one in terms of the topics they raise and the way they approach them. Populist leaders, on the other hand, with their anti-elitism and focus on the people are complementary to the idea of ​​the general public. With their provocative statements and attacks on political opponents, populists simply attract media attention (Manucci, 2017). The style of public appearances of the populists is compatible with the logic under which the commercial media operate, in which important elements are dramatization, polarization, and emphasis on political conflicts. As Mazzoleni (2008: 57) writes, populist leaders tabloidize politics with their accusations of leading political discourses. Populists and commercial media have a mutual interest. Just as the media needs populist leaders who speak in a language that people can understand, who are willing to make a fuss and raise the viewership, so do populists need the media to address their voters (De la Torre, 2018: 581). Tabloids that are characterized by personalizing, sympathizing, stereotyping things, division on criminals and victims, emphasizing emotions, and forming opinions without carefully considering all the facts are compatible with spreading populist messages (De la Torre, 2018: 581). The way the tabloids report corresponds to the populists’ style of political communication. The tabloids exist alongside and sometimes opposing the mainstream media. They create a counter-audience and are an alternative to the elitist media. They use a language and style of expression that corresponds to the local working class, which usually has a relatively low level of education. They use simplistic language and try to keep the audience’s attention by concentrating on scandals. They have a long tradition of invoking national feelings and spreading nationalism, which corresponds to the positions of right-wing populists (Anderson, 2006). Due to the competition in the market of informing the citizens, the existence of tabloids tabloidizes the traditional electronic and print media and creates a favorable atmosphere for spreading populist messages in society (Rozukalne, 2017: 40). Although the thesis that commercialization of media helps the growth of populism is very popular, according to Mudde (2007: 249), the relationship between media and populism is twofold. The media are friends on the one hand, but enemies of populism on the other. On the one hand, the media and the commercial logic in them create such a public agenda that skilled populist leaders can use for their own purposes; on the other hand, the mainstream media often have an openly hostile attitude toward populists.

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7.4   The Media Promotion of Populism The modern media function in a way that creates a general public image that suits populist political projects, even though the media is critical of them. Thus Mudde (2007: 250) cites the example of Bild Zeitung and RTL in Germany. Both media use sensationalism, which converges with the propaganda of populist parties, but at the same time are very critical of the populist parties themselves. In such a case, the media set a populist agenda independent of political actors, that is, they produce and promote a populist narrative that later the parties use (Manucci, 2017). Namely, the media in their reports on certain events often use an emotional style of reporting, orient themselves to report on conflicts and scandals, make a division between the morally superior and morally inferior side, put themselves on the morally superior side, and accuse that they cannot realizes their own rights due to the incompetence and corruption that prevails in the society (Rozukalne, 2017: 39). As Bos and Brants (2014: 707) note, it is sometimes very difficult to distinguish between market-oriented media and populism, and journalists in their reports know to promote populism. Given this attitude of the media, Benjamin Kramer (2014: 42) introduced the term media populism. Media populism includes making a distinction between in and out groups, hostility to elites, spreading provocative issues, appealing to the charisma of populist leaders, and sentiments toward morality. In this way, the media can project populism independently of political parties and movements and, by creating populist public opinion, willingly or unwillingly create preconditions for the creation of populist political parties and movements. In addition to creating a media agenda conducive to populism, the media provide space for the promotion of populist political projects. They provide space for messages that meet two criteria: newsworthy—professional criterion, and attractiveness—market criterion. Populist messages satisfy both and are therefore found in the media, but their presentation in public has a negative impact on the development of democracy. From the point of view of liberalism, populism is a threat to democracy. It tries to satisfy the low passions of the audience in political life to see conflict, drama, and negativism. In this way, the marginal stratum in the society are motivated, mobilized, and radicalized, and the middle stratum, which are more moderate and more prone to compromise, are alienated from politics (Manucci, 2017). But there are times when some of the media go a step further, not only giving space to populist political projects, but openly

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promoting them. Such is the case with the Neue Kronen Zeitung, a tabloid that in the 1990s was read by 43% of the Austrian population and not only posed topics in favor of the Freedom Party (FPÖ), but also had an openly positive attitude toward this party (Mudde, 2007: 250). The media can be friends or enemies of populists. Specifically, populists may receive a friendly or openly hostile attitude in the media. But when the media adjusts to produce a populist agenda, even if populist leaders and policies are criticized on certain occasions, it does not have to negatively affect their ratings. Journalist Nick Robinson reports on an absurd example when after an antagonistic interview with Nagel Farage, the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), anti-UKIP people started celebrating on Twitter and Facebook, but the UKIP rating, after that interview, grew by 4% (Block & Nagrine, 2017: 181). The constant accusations against Geert Wilders in 2009 of using hate speech only increased his popularity with the electorate (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017: 915). The criticism and even the sanctions imposed by the European Union on the Austrian government, led by the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 2000, had the opposite effect than expected and only increased the popularity and election results of this party (Wolkenstein, 2015: 112). Fujimori had notable election results in the 1990s despite being severely criticized by the media. In general, populists try to undermine citizens’ trust in journalists and the media who are critical of them. Beppe Grillo in Italy criticizes the traditional media and uses the new media for his own promotion (De la Torre, 2018: 582). Trump called the media he deemed critical of him “fake news” and enemies of the people (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 5). If people are not satisfied with their socio-economic situation, but also with the perspectives they have in a society, if they feel that the establishment is to blame and see the media as an extended arm of the establishment (which together are part of the worldview of populists), when such mainstream media criticize populists, they actually legitimize them. For the proponents of populism, the critical media coverage is just confirmation that the conflict between the populists and the establishment is real. Moreover, populist leaders themselves often criticize and try to discredit the mainstream media, pointing out that they are a tool of the elite and that they manipulate people. From the above, it seems that populists can be both friends and enemies of the media. But what is more important is that in conditions of commercialization of the media business, populists

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must be present in the media, and no matter in what context they are present, they profit from it (Moffitt, 2016). Although populist leaders often have a hostile attitude toward the media, experience shows that when they can, populist leaders take them under their control and use them as a tool to achieve their political goals. Some of the more prominent populist leaders, such as Thaksin Shinawatra and Silvio Berlusconi, owe their political success to the ownership or control of the mainstream media (Moffitt, 2016). When he came to power, Berlusconi tried to influence the independence of the public service broadcaster Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), just as Shinawatra tried to reduce and eliminate negative reports about his own policy. Even opinion pollers were under pressure. Latin American populists were convinced of the power of the media to influence the formation of public opinion and whenever were able they try to influence their editorial policy. Hugo Chavez, for example, passed a law trying to establish control over the private media. Namely, the law provided for the government to have the right to revoke the concession for the work of the private media, if it is assessed that the media works against the interests of the people (De la Torre, 2018: 582).

7.5   New Media and Populism The commercialization of traditional media creates conditions in which populism can develop. But relations between populists and traditional media are often unfriendly. Populists see traditional electronic media as an obstacle to the direct relationship they want to establish with their followers. Hence, populists often criticize traditional mainstream media. But they do not have such a problem with the new digital media. They are becoming more influential today than traditional television. Many websites constantly question the knowledge and experience of experts. Refusal to listen to the opinion of experts and to reconsider the confidentiality of information that is released to the public to create scandals and multiple clicks creates mistrust and hostility toward the establishment. Many people are victims of fake news, manipulations, and many talks about alternative facts and post-truth. The digital revolution has opened up many opportunities, but also concerns about the quality of public discourse (Martinelli, 2018: 26). The media reality in modern society is dominated by new media, web 2.0 technology, that is, social media platforms Facebook and Instagram,

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blogging and microblogging sites such as WordPress and Twitter, and video sharing platforms like YouTube and Vimeo, which helped the online citizen journalism to grow. The majority of the population started to be informed online, and the campaigns are developing in the context of the increasing use of smartphones (Von Beyne, 2015: 24). The expectations were (1) that the new media will facilitate two-way communication, unlike the traditional ones that are one-way, (2) that they will be more interactive than the traditional media and that they will offer more space for communication between citizens and politicians, (3) that they will increase the participation of the citizens in the political processes, (4) that they will offer more and more diverse information to the citizens, and (5) that they will break the monopoly of the mass media and that they will segment the media space (Louw, 2005: 123). Social media is structurally different from traditional ones, which are characterized by asymmetry between those who send messages and those who receive them, that is, between news authors and their consumers. Unlike traditional media such as television, radio, and newspapers where gatekeepers exist and are still maintained, they do not exist on social media. Digital technology has enabled interaction between those who send and those who receive messages, thus overcoming the coercive power of traditional media over what will be published by them. It opened up more space for people to get involved in commenting on events and in online discussions and to express their opinions on various topics (Klein & Muis, 2019: 540). In terms of content production, social media are more inclusive and have an individualistic approach, unlike traditional media in which professionals decide which content can be published and which is not (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 3). In that sense, new technologies have enabled a more democratic way of creating and sharing news, commenting on them, and creating a hybrid media system that has changed the way news is produced and consumed and blurred the gap between them (Chatterje-Doody & Chilley, 2019: 75). The hybrid media system is accelerating the growth of populism because it allows populist leaders to address their supporters directly. Through hybrid media, populists’ charismatic leaders send messages that frame their personal positions (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 3). It often happens that populist parties have more followers on their official Facebook accounts than formal members. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party officially has about 40,000 members, while its official Facebook page has twice as many fans, similar to the British National Party (BNP), which officially has less than 15,000 members, while its official Facebook page has 80,000

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fans (Bartlett et al., 2011: 33). Twitter and Facebook allow populist leaders to present their discourses directly to potential voters in the form of speeches, texts, and videos, without any filter. However, Klein and Muis (2019: 558) point out that there are differences between the official Facebook pages of populist parties and informal online sites representing populist discourses, and they are reflected in the fact that informal pages contain a greater degree of extremism. As Moffitt (2016) writes, traditional media were largely an autonomous and indigenous factor that mediated the relationship between political leaders and people. New media are much more intermediaries than an authentic factor (third party) in the relationship between leaders and the media. After all, populist leaders like Trump use the new media precisely to avoid the influence of traditional ones, that is, their opinion to be transmitted through the mediation of reporters, journalists, and editors, that is, to be filtered on several levels before reaching the receptive organs of the audience. This does not mean that the new media are not a factor in political life. On the contrary, they create the climate, the atmosphere in which the interaction between political leaders and the people takes place. Political leaders who cannot be said to be friendly with traditional media, such as Donald Trump and Rodrigo Duterte, but still become presidents are called the social media presidents, and The New Yorker has questioned whether social media does not produce a new type of populism (Moffitt, 2019: 30). Theorists such as Bartlett et al. (2011: 34) use the term digital populism. Some authors believe that at the time when electronic media appeared, they had a similar function to the new media today. The electronic media then served to avoid the influence of party structures in the relationship between political leaders and their followers, as new media enable populist leaders to avoid filtering out information in established electronic media and to establish a direct link between populist leaders and their followers. Thus Roberts (2006: 135) points out that Fernando Collor did not need party support to achieve significant electoral success because he was supported by the electronic media, just as Alberto Fujimori, in Peru’s presidential election, relied more on the support of state-controlled media rather than party support. Therefore, using the media to establish a direct connection with people is nothing new for populists. Modern populists like Berlusconi, Di Maio, Salvini, and Meloni often appear in the mainstream media. They are present at talk shows, constantly and intensely. The hosts compete to invite them to the show, primarily because of their

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skills in producing news and to ensure the visibility of the shows in which they appear. But despite this, populist leaders need to establish direct communication and intensive dialogue with their constituents through social media. To achieve that goal, they most often use Facebook and Twitter (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018: 8). The new media enabled two-way communication, as well as greater egalitarianism among actors in political life. Individuals are no longer just consumers; they can produce audio-visual content. Every individual who has a sufficient number of followers on social media is a medium. With the new media, geographical restrictions have lost their significance. If the traditional mainstream media broadcast a program in a limited area, the information that is published on the Internet can be seen in every part of the globe. Additionally, if in the past the content had to be viewed at the moment when the media broadcast it, today the internet content can be viewed at any time (Moffitt, 2016). In the age of social media it is almost impossible to censor certain personalities, topics, or events, as it used to be. Social media provides greater opportunity for transparency of policies pursued by individual politicians, greater opportunity for whistleblowers to report cases of corruption, abuse of political power, or violation of human rights (Von Beyne, 2015: 24). But it seems that hopes that the development of cyberspace will enable the democratization of the political environment that existed at the beginning of the twenty-first century have not been fully realized. On the contrary, cyberspace has legitimized and normalized the space and influence of people who are xenophobic, ethnocentric, racist, and populists. Hence, although all politicians use social media to communicate with their potential voters, populist leaders seem to benefit most from using them (Corella, 2018: 28). If in the past there was a possibility for populists not to be allowed or to significantly limit the opportunity to address the public due to the editorial policy behind the ownership structure of the traditional mainstream media, today with the new media this cannot happen. Some analysts point to the opportunities for the spread of populism provided by the Internet through the development of social media. Because they are simple and emotionally charged, populist messages are compatible with online media. In this sense, populism takes precedence over the traditional political establishment. Medialization 2.0 seems to have radically changed political communication and redefined the link between citizens and their representatives. Today it is not possible to imagine the promotion of any political discourse without using the tools of online communication (Manucci, 2017).

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Participation in political life mediated by new media is radically different from participation in politics mediated by traditional media. The new media provide greater interactivity, as well as mаny-to-many communication, instead of the one-to-many communication that characterized traditional media. They are also a relatively inexpensive platform for distributing political content and messages (Flew, Iosifidis 2020: 16). Thus, politics begins to become more accessible to previously marginalized social groups, which may be activated to pursue their own interests, but may also be subject to manipulation. Namely, social media creates an opportunity to create new politically active online communities. Many write about the role of social media in organizing protests in the contemporary political context. One of the more significant examples that are often exploited in academic debates is the role of social media in the Arab Spring. New media have an important place in contemporary politics. Much has been written about the fact that social networks such as Facebook and Twitter have contributed greatly to the mobilization of the masses during the Arab Spring. During Occupy Wall Street, traditional media were forced to follow online communication. It has become more or less a practice for traditional electronic media to report on what is happening on social networks. Many analysts believe that online media could bypass gatekeepers in traditional media. Some even claim that the new media is transforming representative-mediated democracy into direct democracy (Manucci, 2017). The online communities that are formed on social media serve for the exchange of information, but much more importantly for the sharing of emotions, and above all anger, in relation to politics and political issues. Namely, social media applications are structured in such a way that they play on the psychological weaknesses of individuals. They stimulate emotional reactions, instead of providing an atmosphere for a rational exchange of arguments. Social media stimulates a clash between people and the elite. At the very least, they allow the development of hate speech toward the opposing side in the political contest (Henrichsen, 2019). Facebook, for example, is structured in such a way that those who have their own accounts express their emotions оn publicly available information in a symbolic way by putting likes, support, condemnation, anger, shock, etc. (Rozukalne, 2017: 49). Being politically active, even as part of a political organization, is much easier and cheaper today than it used to be. All you need today to participate in a social movement is a smartphone and internet connection (Moffitt, 2016).

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Participants on social media share content that is close to their personal positions, and ridicule or completely ignore content that is far from their personal views on politics. In this way, political sects are created. Social media is thus not used for a rational debate with respect to different and opposing opinions. In fact, they serve to support and encourage like-­ minded people who ignore or ridicule different political positions. If dissenting opinions arise, the arguments are full of insults, not rational exchanges (Flew, Iosifidis 2020: 17). The publicity that social media creates is very different from the public sphere that Jurgen Habermas wrote about. New media are changing the relationship between politicians and citizens. It became much more direct. Populist politicians communicate and mobilize potential voters much more through social media than politicians from traditional, established parties. There are several reasons for this. First, populist politicians often accuse the traditional mass media of being controlled by established political parties. They believe that the new social media is the only neutral and independent arena where they can expose their positions. Second, by addressing social media, populist politicians are building their credibility as outsiders in the political space. In this way they show that they are not in touch with the establishment, that they represent the interests of the people and that they are easily accessible to them. Third, social media is designed for more informal communication and for the use of colloquial language that is more emotion-based than rational. Hence, according to the language used on them, social media is closer to the discourse of populist parties and leaders than to established parties and leaders. Of course, social media can and should be used by established parties. Just as populist parties address the mass media. But, in general, the trends show that the populists see the new media as a new chance in the political contest (Manucci, 2017). They use the digitalization of the public sphere to present themselves as allies of the people. Hence, there is a tendency for populist leaders to present themselves as leaders of movements, not just parties (Flew, Iosifidis 2020: 18). The new media have changed the style and manner of behavior of political leaders. Populist politicians are using new media to circumvent traditional electronic media. Instead of communicating with their followers through the “dishonest” media controlled by the establishment, they address their followers directly. Thus, populist leaders such as Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, and Nigel Farage have publicly identified

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social networks as an important political and social resource (Corella, 2018: 30). Trump, who communicated with his followers via the Twitter account @realDonald Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign, sent 39,746 tweets or 12 tweets a day (Corella, 2018: 30). The syntax that Trump uses with his Twitter followers gives the impression of immediacy and connection. He addresses his followers in the first person singular. This leaves an impression of closeness and trust in his followers. Also, in communicating with his audience, Trump presents himself as part of the people. The next mode Trump uses in communicating with his followers is thanking them for what they have done for him. For example, “thank you America! Together we will #MAGA [Make America Great Again]”. This leaves the impression of a leader’s personal, direct relationship with his followers. Many of the posts accuse or condemn reporters, journalists, public figures, and political opponents. For example, in his posts he describes political opponents as “crooked,” “rigged”, “made up”, “biased”, and “corrupt”. For example, by using the phrase “Crooked Hillary” for Hillary Clinton, he exposes her as an inauthentic and dishonest candidate and presents himself as a transparent candidate who is a true representative of the interests of the people. Similar rhetoric in the elections in Brazil in 2018 was used by Jair Bolsonaro. Even the motto of his campaign was making Brazil great again (Flew, Iosifidis 2020: 20). Twitter as a social media corresponds to the populist communication style. It seeks simplicity in communication and stimulates impulsivity. It is not a medium on which complex topics can be discussed in a serious way (Rozukalne, 2017: 50). The position of the citizens in the communication with the politicians when using the new media is much more active. They are not just passive recipients of messages, but on the contrary they can create and spread content and messages on blogs, websites, YouTube, and more. There are authors who claim that supporters of populist policies are more active on social media and generally spread influential and emotional messages. For example, Flew and Iosifidis (2020: 19) indicate that supporters of Brexit were very effective on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. What connects social media and populism is the ability to implement direct and participatory democracy. Two examples show how populist parties use new media. Podemos, as a left-leaning populist party based on the idea of social ​​ equality, uses a combination of online and offline tools to implement direct democracy and refine the understanding of

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sovereignty. They allow the electorate to have access to and ask questions of their representatives, to debate, to make proposals, to select candidates, to vote, and so on. However, the position of the party leader Pablo Iglesias indicates that this form of democratization of the party, of its building from the bottom up, is folklore. The second example is Five Star Movement (5SM), which uses the internet as an opportunity to implement participatory, digital, and direct democracy. The official views of the party are expressed through the blog of Beppe Grillo (beppegrillo. it), the movement’s leader and former comedian. The party selects its candidates through online voting. It also enables online discussions through the Meetup platform. However, the 5SM logo and name are owned by party president Beppe Grillo (Manucci, 2017). Populists use the new media for direct promotion, but also to build a sense of immediacy, closeness, intimacy, and connection with their supporters. For example, Gabor Vona, who is the leader of Jobbik from Hungary, uses his Facebook account quite successfully, as well as iWiW (Hungarian social network), to promote his own party. But populists also know how to use the new media to incite hatred toward certain groups in society, as well as to spread xenophobia. Geert Wilders’ Partij Voor de Vrijheid has created a website where citizens have the opportunity to write complaints about the behavior of immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe. On the website, citizens complain about losing their jobs due to immigrants, their alcoholism, illegal parking, environmental pollution caused by immigrants, etc. Wilders’ anti-Islamic film, Finta, has also found interest on the internet. Though it has been banned, it is being re-posted on individual websites (Moffitt, 2016). As Moffitt (2016) points out, the trend of populism spreading around the world in the last two decades is not only a result of changing structural economic and political factors, such as the growth of unemployment or the growth of globalization, but a very important factor in changing and the shaping of populism in the last two decades is the changing media landscape. Of course, the new media is not the only reason for the spread of populism, but it is obvious that the emergence of new media and the commercialization of traditional media are happening in parallel with the growth of populism. They enable populists to have a free channel for direct communication with potential voters (Corella, 2018: 31). Populists have taken advantage of the fact that the production and distribution of content through new media is relatively cheap (Moffitt, 2016).

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Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the Media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty First Century Populism: The Specter of Western European Democracy. Macmillan. Mazzoleni, G., & Bracciale, R. (2018). Socially Mediated Populism: The Communicative Strategies of Political Leaders on Facebook. Palgrave Communication, 4(50), 1–10. Moffitt, B. (2019). Populism 2.0: Social Media and the False Allure of “Unmediated” Representations. In G. Fitzi, J. Mackert, & B. S. Turner (Eds.), Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, Volume 2: Politics, Social Movements and Extremism. Routledge. Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation. Stanford University Press. Mudde, C. (2004). The Populism Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 9(4), 541–563. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Muis, J., & Immerzeel, T. (2017). Causes and the Consequences of the Rise of the Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe. Current Sociology Review, 65(6), 909–930. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press. Roberts, M.  K. (2006). Populism, Political Conflict and Grass-root in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 38(2), 127–148. Rozukalne, A. (2017). Is Populism Related Content in New Guilty Pleasure for Media and Its Audiences. In A.  Kudors & A.  Parkins (Eds.), The Rise of Populism: Lessons for the European Union and the United Stated of America. University of Latvia Press. The Global State of Democracy. (2020). Populist Government and Democracy: An Impact Assessment Using the Global State of Global State of Democracy Indices. 9, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Von Beyne, K. (2015). Transforming Transformation Theory. In M. Minkenberg (Ed.), Transforming the Transformation? The Eastern Europe Radical Right in the Political Process. Routledge. Wirth W., Esser F., Wettstein M., Engesser S., Wirz D., Schulz A., Ernst N., Buchel F., Caramani D., Malluci L., Steenmergen M., Bernhard L., Weber E., Hanggli R., Dalmus C., & Schemer C. (2016). The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Stiles: A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication (Working Paper, 88, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR). Wodak, R. (2019). Entering the Post Shame Era. Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication. Wolkenstein, F. (2015). What We Can Hold Against Populism. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 41(2), 111–129.

CHAPTER 8

Populism and Liberal Democracy

8.1   Introduction Populism is often perceived by the general public as an immediate threat to democracy. The New  York Times writes about “European Populist Backlash”, while the New Statesman writes about “a real threat to mainstream democracy under stress” (Moffitt, 2016). But in the professional literature there are ambivalent views of the relationship between liberal democracy and populism. On the one hand, populism is seen as a threat to democracy, but on the other populism is seen as a corrective factor for the political elites who have moved far away from the people (Rostboll, 2019). There are views that populism is an anti-establishment, but not an anti-­ systemic political phenomenon (Wirth et al., 2016: 15). Hence, Bonikowski and Gidron (2016: 7) rightly note that in academic circles one group of researchers points to the tensions between populism and democracy, and another group of researchers points to their deep interconnectedness and interdependence. The insistence on the sovereignty of the people, as well as on constitutionalism, is at the core of democracy. In the words of Mair (2002: 81), constitutional democracy and popular democracy are the levers on which liberal democracy rests and balances. While constitutionalism is related to legality, to procedures, respect for the sovereignty that populists insist on is related to the legitimacy of the political system (Surel, 2011). The legitimacy of the political system is related to the demos, to the right to free association of citizens, to the holding of elections, and to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8_8

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the freedom of expression of political views. The legality of the political system, in turn, is linked to institutional assumptions that guarantee good governance such as the establishment of clear social regulations, limiting the power of those in power, guaranteeing individual and collective rights, checks and balances in order to prevent the abuse of power. The constitutionalism through which legality is secured is the horizontal pillar of liberal democracy, while the representativeness through which legitimacy is secured is the vertical pillar that connects the demos with political elites through elections (Taggart, 2002: 71). Populism emerges and grows when constitutionalism and liberalism become far more dominant than representativeness. This happens when public opinion is ignored when the interests of a significant part of the population are not taken into account (Van Kessel, 2015: 9). Populism relies on one of the levers of liberal democracy—popular democracy. At the same time, he understands the people’s democracy as a direct and immediate rule of the people. Hence, Revelli (2019: 2) concludes that at its core populism and democracy have common roots. They refer to the same subject. Populism is based on Latin populis, while democracy is based on Greek demos. But the conceptualization of the people and the demos are quite different. People are conceptualized as a homogeneous indivisible totalitarian entity, while the demos is a heterogeneous, divided, plural entity. Hence, in the long run populism always has undemocratic tendencies, although at first glance it seems that populists advocate radical, direct democracy (Müller, 2016), or as Revelli writes (2019: 2), when people suffer, which generates a rise in populism, democracy suffers too. The growth of populism coincides with the problems of liberal democracy to provide legitimacy, that is, reducing the engagement of citizens in political processes, electoral participation, the membership of political parties, and reducing the identification of citizens with traditional political parties. In general, populism prefers direct as opposed to representative democracy and direct referendum decision-­ making of all citizens, as opposed to delegating power to citizens’ representatives in political bodies because such a system, according to populists, generates a disproportionately greater representation of elite interests over people (Eichengreen, 2018: 3). Thus, if liberal democracy has the problem of securing greater representation in politics, and thus the legitimacy of the political system, the populist understanding of democracy has a problem with the way decisions are made. This is especially evident when society is fragmented and when it is necessary to use deliberative mechanisms of reconciliation and decision-making that are incompatible with

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direct majoritarianism. Democracy knows the mechanism of representation of individual segments in a fragmented society in political institutions, but the populist understanding of democracy erases such mechanisms and reduces democracy to the principle of majority decision-making. Populism demands greater direct participation of people in politics, more precisely in political decision-making, but with the application of this type of democracy, significant segments of society, the minority, migrants are excluded from the community, and their influence in politics is completely annulled (Papadopoulos, 2002: 57). Populists’ assertion that people have the right to exercise unrestricted power distinguishes between liberal and populist views of democracy (Abts & Rasmunsen, 2007). Populists argue that only people have the wisdom and civic virtues to act and make decisions for the common good. But what if that is not the case? Who guarantees that people possess the necessary qualities to lead the decision-making process from the ideal of achieving the common good and that they will not be manipulated by charismatic populist leaders? Populism tries to build collective subjectivity and question social order in the name of the majority, but it is not undemocratic politics (Mouffe, 2016). The populists claim that they are the only true democrats, that the idea of democracy and a democratic political system has been stolen by a narrow clique of people who only protect their own interests, and that democracy should be returned to the people through the return of the opportunity of people as sovereign to make decisions based on the general will. But also, populism is not, by definition, a democratic ideology. Some populists criticize and reject democracy or some important features of democracy. The idea of the populists is not just to replace the establishment with people in representative democratic institutions. On the contrary, populists want to reform democracy, that is, democratic institutions. That is, instead of one, to introduce another type of democracy. Instead of representative to introduce direct democracy (Rolfe, 2016: 29). According to Mansbridge and Macedo (2019: 60), how populism will affect democracy depends on its position in the political system, more specifically in relation to the elite. First, populism always appears at times when society is in crisis. Populism does not create the crisis, but creates its symptom. While in the phase of a social movement in opposition that opposes the elite, populist leader has a positive impact on democracy and calls for the curbing of irresponsible elites. But instead of solving the problems, he deepens them when he comes to power and takes over the political institutions. If the rise of populist opposition is one of the remedies for the crisis

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of liberal democracy, the populists in power are an overdose that becomes toxic to the body. If we return to the metaphor with the two pillars of democracy, populism is based on the problems that modern liberal democracy has in ensuring representativeness and legitimacy; it consolidates them and uses it as a lever to attack the pillar based on constitutionalism. The populists are frustrated by the institutions, by the role of politics in mediating between the people and the elite, by the “privileged” position of minorities, of migrants. When they are able to dominate social developments, populists begin to introduce a system that Mudde (2007: 151) calls populist democracy. It is a system in which the general will is above all. In such a system, the general will is more important than the politicians, the political parties, the government, the parliament, the law, and the constitution. Populism and democracy have the same starting position and call for the people who should legitimize the political system. But there is no unanimity among populists as to how people should govern. Some populists implement their policies in a more democratic way, while others in a more authoritarian way, by opposing the legitimacy of pluralism in society (Ward, 2018: 81). Democracy itself is not a complete, once given, static project; on the contrary, it is dynamic. It means constant struggle, and democratic norms and institutions are constantly being upgraded, continuously evolving and redefining depending on social circumstances. As Dahl (1994: 34) writes, the openness of the process of building democracy leaves the question of the quality and efficiency of the democratic process, that is, the ability of citizens to be active and control the decision-­ making process in politics. The rise of populism is the best proof of the dynamism and openness of the democratic process. Taggart (2003) points out that although populism points to problems as representativeness, in fact it can be a significant political force only in representative democracies. Citing its view of the importance of popular sovereignty, populism calls for the reconfiguration of democracy. For example, Grattan (2016) points out that populism can be a key factor in the democratization of modern society, but also acknowledges that it can interfere with the survival of liberal institutions and procedures with which democracy is fused. Populism combines democratic ideas and practices as a platform for building authoritarian politics. For example, populism uses elections for its own legitimacy to build an authoritarian conception of people as a homogeneous entity. In this way, populism understands politics in a similar way as Karl Schmitt, that is, as a struggle with enemies (De la Torre, 2018: 572).

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That is, populists see their political opponents as enemies. Experiencing their political opponents as enemies, populists close the door on any dialogue with them (Wodak, 2019). The combination of populism, authoritarianism, and nationalism that Bonikowski (2019: 59) sees in the radical right can lead to very dangerous social dynamics. Disrespect for political differences and the treatment of opponents as enemies give populism traits of authoritarianism, but unlike classical authoritarianism, which does not care much about public support, populist authoritarianism pays great attention to securing popular support (Sadurski, 2019: 21). Hence the populists claim to be the real democrats. Seen from the perspective of populists, the elites are undemocratic, that is, through the manipulation of the popular will they usurp the position of power. In that way, the will of the people is disavowed, not represented, and politics is cartelized. The elite that does this is an enemy of both the people and democracy. In this sense, populists see themselves as defenders of democracy and those who restore sovereignty to the people (Stefanel, 2016). True democracy is a plebiscite democracy in which power is restored to those from whom sovereignty springs—the common people. Populists reduce democracy to the principle of political majority. By respecting that principle, they believe that every victory of the populists is the same as restoring the sovereignty of the common people. As Rooduijn notes, populists reduce democracy to the tyranny of the majority (Bonikowski et al., 2019: 59). Populism separates democracy and liberalism. In the words of Smilov and Krastev (2008), populism points to the tension between democratic majoritarianism and liberal constitutionalism. While respecting the democratic principle of majority rule and linking it to the sovereignty of the people, populists do not respect pluralism in society, the rights of citizens, the separation of powers, and the control of the authorities. The rise of populism indicates a decline in the appeal of liberal solutions in politics, economics, and culture. If Francis Fukuyama in 1989 declared the end of history and the victory of liberalism in the battle with his ideological opponent—communism—it may be stated that today liberalism is again under threat, but this time the threat is not external but internal from the populism that is spreading in the countries with a liberal democratic arrangement (Cox, 2017: 12). Starting from the principle of pluralism that is absent in populism, which is crucial for democracy, the question arises of whether populism has a democratizing effect on society. On the one hand, when populists are in opposition, they speak on behalf of social groups that are marginalized and hence have a democratizing effect, but on the other

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hand when populists come to power, they become a threat to democracy (Rostboll, 2019). In the long run, populism almost without exception degrades liberal democracy, marginalizes its traditional institutions, and often knows how to end with the establishment of authoritarianism, that is, illiberal democracy (Pappas, 2019: 240; Zakaria, 1997: 23). In Halikiopoulou’s words, populism is theoretically a democratic political ideology because it relies on the will of the people, but in practice it is a pseudo-democratic ideology because it rejects the principle of pluralism and ends in authoritarianism (Bonikowski et al., 2019: 59). Namely, starting from the principle of unity and homogeneity of the people, populists do not feel comfortable with the deliberative tendencies of liberal democracy, which balances between different points of view and the interests of different groups in society. Because people are defined as opposition to ethnic, racial, religious minorities, populists are intolerant of representative institutions that protect the interests of minorities. By their nature, populism requires strong charismatic leadership which can end up as authoritarian leadership (Eichengreen, 2018: 9). A very important precondition for the spread of populism is the way in which representative democracy works. Populism as a political strategy succeeds where representativeness is weak or discredited and where there are significant forms of social exclusion or political marginalization that separate and alienate citizens from political institutions. He first appears where those who are excluded from the democratic political game and who for that reason have not built party loyalties are given the right to vote. That was the case with Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the populist movements that emerged in Africa after democratization in the 1990s. The second problem with the political representation that can contribute to the emergence of populism is when a serious dose of irresponsibility of the political system toward the citizens appears. Such was the case with the political system in Venezuela and the emergence of Hugo Chavez. The third problem with political representation is when political competition is strongly personalized when voters support and identify with leaders rather than party organizations (De la Torre, 2018: 575). But the relationship between representativeness and populism is two-way. Just as the lack of representativeness is a precondition for the spread of populism, the presence of populism influences the direction in which representativeness and the political game as a whole will develop (Taggart, 2002: 76). The presence of populism introduces egalitarianism into politics. Populists believed that people were not only equal but that they were a

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superior subject in the political game. They are morally superior, honest, non-corrupt, and selfless, and they strive for the common good. Populism structures the political debate in many ways. It simplifies politics. Populism delegitimizes complex issues, policies, institutions, and even representative institutions such as political parties. It proposes simplified policies on a range of issues such as taxation and public finance spending. According to populists, this is inherently unjust. Elites who make decisions about spending public finances use them to increase social inequality through corruption at the expense of people’s interests. Populism introduces a strong emphasis on exclusivity in contemporary politics. Exclusivity is reflected in the way the term people is constituted and in the treatment of those who do not fall into that category as immigrants and minorities. Müller (2016: 8) points out that liberals are concerned about the growing illiberal tendencies of the masses who are showing increasing confidence in populism, nationalism, and xenophobia. Democracy theorists, on the other hand, are concerned about the growing technocratic tendencies in liberal democracies oriented toward “responsible governance” governed by experts who feel less and less responsible for representing and pursuing the interests of ordinary citizens. Populism generally indicates that democracy has a problem with representativeness. That is, in representative democracies through elections, the interests and will of a significant part of the people are not represented and it is the populist parties that aspire to represent them (Urbinati, 2018: 123). The paradox is that populists do not focus on a particular social group they would represent, but on the whole population, and in the end the leader chooses which segment of the population will be given priority in political decision-­ making. This comes down to manipulating representativeness. According to Müller (2016: 11), the idea that we will be closer to democracy if we allow the silent majority that is ignored by the elite to constantly oppose and confront the elected politicians is disastrous for democracy. There are authors who write that populism is a parasite (Arditi, 2017), a degeneration of democracy, that it is a pathology characteristic of democracy, that it compromises democratic ideals, that it is a pseudo-democracy, and that it is a post-democracy (Mudde, 2004: 541; Gherghina & Soare, 2013: 4). Viviani (2017: 284) points out that populism is an unwelcome guest of democracy. Populism behaves like a drunken guest at a family lunch. He points out the need to reconsider the relationship between citizens and politics, the representativeness of political entities, and the process of legitimizing politics, which is in a crisis that leads to less mobilization of

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citizens. As Laclau (2005: 67) writes, populists have the ambition of making people the only legitimate subject in politics. Those who oppose the interests of the people must be corrupt, selfish, and unworthy and as such are not a legitimate part of the community. They are enemies. Because he insists that only the interests of the people are legitimate and that there is only one legitimate representative of the will of the people, populism actually reduces leaders to populist leaders. Democracy is not a society without leaders, but rather a society with many leaders. By reducing the possibility of more legitimate leaders, populism, when in power for a long time, usually ends in authoritarianism. Populists do not see the opposition as a legitimate opponent; it is tolerated even though it is seen as an external body, as a force that plots against the people (Urbinati, 2018: 119). Populists are not revolutionaries; they are more reformers. They do not abolish opposition political parties, but insist on seeing them as an illegitimate opponent. They do not attack the physical existence of their political opponents but treat their political solutions and ideas as illegitimate (Mudde, 2004: 556). Populism is a shadow that constantly follows the modern liberal democracy and can contribute to a better understanding of it. Populism has nothing against representativeness, it even promotes it, as long as real politicians represent the right people (Müller, 2016: 27). By claiming that no one but them has a legitimate right to rule because it does not represent the people, populists are jeopardizing the right to choose. The rhetoric of populist leaders corrodes the legitimacy of anyone who thinks of engaging in politics who is not himself a populist. Criticizing democratic norms and practices, populist leaders often establish a soft authoritarian regime, which they strengthen over time (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 6). But populism, if understood as a message that citizens send to the elite, can be a corrective factor in consolidating democracy. It should be noted that populists usually address neglected, marginalized social groups. They mobilize those who are dissatisfied with the way things are going in society and who do not trust the mainstream parties. These are people who usually do not vote and who are not represented in political bodies. The rise of populism can be seen as an appeal to reduce corruption and increase transparency and accountability in the social system (Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 22). There is a lot of literature that indicates that the growth of populism is caused by the crisis of representative democracy and even capitalism as a socio-economic system (Gagnon et al., 2018). Since populism by definition criticizes every elite created by the democratic political system, it seems that it can be said that at a deeper level populism criticizes

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democracy. While liberal democracy is indirect and representative, populism demands immediate plebiscite, referendum, and direct democracy. Populists believe that indirect democracy does not provide enough space to express the opinion of the people; on the contrary, according to them, it is manipulated and bypassed. Also, unlike liberal democracies in which political opponents should be treated as rivals who share institutional space and procedural principles, populists treat their political opponents as adversaries who should be destroyed (De la Torre, 2018: 578). Proponents of populism expect them to punish the elite rather than specific policies (Stefanel, 2016). According to Urbinati (2018: 120), populism is not a direct democracy, but a direct representation. There must be permanent and direct communication between the leader and his supporters, which the new media allow. In this way, populist leaders avoid intermediaries in communicating with their supporters, such as parties and the traditional media. Populist leaders speak on behalf of the people’s sovereignty, as opposed to the corrupt party and media establishment. In that sense, from a position of power, they threaten the mechanisms that in a liberal democracy should control the government: the opposition and the media. Populist leaders use direct communication with those they represent in order to prove to them that they identify with them, their interests and that they have not become part of the new establishment. Takis Pappas (2014) argues that populism is in fact an illiberal democracy, on at least two grounds: first, the literal understanding of popular sovereignty and the rejection of liberal checks and balances, and second, the promotion of hostility between those in power and those who oppose them, especially hostility toward political parties. Wirth et al. (2016: 15) agree with Pappas’ arguments, but adds another. Populism develops an illiberal democracy because it creates an atmosphere of distrust of the people’s representatives, presenting them as part of an elite that should not be trusted. It is interesting that populists doubt the representatives of the people and often accuse them of being part of the elite, but do not express such doubts in the charismatic populist leaders who are perceived as challengers of the elite and not as an integral part of it. Distrust of the representatives of the people in representative democracy opens the prospects for thinking that populists would prefer a delegate democracy, where the representatives of the people would not have their own will but, in making their decisions in the political bodies in which they are elected, would strictly respect the will of the people who chose them. Some contemporary directions in the theory of democracy through the development of deliberation want to

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overcome the populist critique of the unrepresentativeness and closure of processes in liberal democracy. But it seems that what creates and sustains the elites is not just democracy, but capitalism. There are elites, such as economic ones, who are not selected on elections. Hence, populism criticizes not only democracy but also capitalism. There are indications that the traits of authoritarianism among populists could result in the creation of an authoritarian state if a populist structure assumes responsibility for running public affairs. Although they declaratively advocate for democracy, there is an anti-democratic impulse among populists that could lead to the exclusion from the public sphere of all those who do not speak on behalf of the people. Populism is dangerous because its narrative is close to conspiracy theory; it sees enemies, conspiracies, corruption everywhere. It often plays the card of external threats, and internal political opponents are accused of serving external interests and in that way are delegitimized (Cox, 2017: 12–14).

8.2   The Populists in Power Populists can be an opposition that seeks to come to power or just criticize without having ambitions to come to power, but also, they can be in power and in some cases for a longer period of time. It was once believed that the longer a politician is in power, the less he or she can rely on populism because even if he or she tries to do so, it will seem unreliable. For the populist parties, there was a conviction that they were protest parties and that they could not survive in power for long without losing the anti-­ establishment element, because if they were in power for a long time, they would be part of the establishment themselves (Müller, 2016: 41). For these reasons, some of the populist leaders even preferred to be in opposition, while others who came to power like Jörg Haider in Austria did not fare very well (Von Beyne, 2015: 20). But the practice has shown that often when populists come to power, they have a clear idea of what needs to be done. They try to stay in power as long as possible by respecting democratic but by abolishing liberal principles. Populists implement similar policies as if they were a template. Some of these policies are (1) colonizing the public administration with its own supporters, (2) increasing the competencies and power of the populist leader and the party populist leader represents, (3) marginalizing and, if necessary, completely eliminating the liberal institutions, (4) introducing a patronage system by providing benefits to his own supporters through employment, subsidies, social

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assistance, etc., and (5) subordinating civil society (Pappas, 2019: 210; Müller, 2016). Hence it can be said that populism is a system of government that transforms the will of the people into politics. Of course, this raises questions about which social groups and individuals enter the construct of people, as well as whether people have a general will or collective consciousness or both—groups and individuals who construct people and their will are a projection of populist leaders (Dustmann et al., 2017: 3). But, in general, Eichengreen (2018) concludes that populism has a corrosive effect on political institutions, confronting people with intellectuals, the natives with migrants and foreigners, the dominant ethnic and religious group with minorities. When populism becomes the dominant discourse in society, there is a risk that racism, nativism, and xenophobes will be normalized, that is, treated as normal, regular positions. There is a risk that racist, nativist, and xenophobic positions and behaviors that were previously restricted to the private sphere will become legitimate in the public sphere (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016: 12). Depending on the political system of the country where it emerges, the establishment of liberal traditions, the strength of democratic institutions, the structure of relations in society, and the personality of the populist leader when populists come to power, three scenarios can occur. The first is for the populist leader to have strong charisma, strong support from his supporters to establish a certain level of influence in the social system, but to fail to fully colonize it. In such cases, populist leaders manage to outgrow their party, to become an institution that is respected even when it is not involved in politics, and the party they led to become part of the party system of the country. Such is the case with Papandreou and PASOK in Greece, which for a long time was one of the two leading political parties in the Greek political system. The second scenario is due to the weak democratic institutions, the disorganization of the opposition, the populist leader to establish complete control in the social system and to establish an authoritarian regime. Such are the examples of Perón and Chavez in Latin America and Orbán in Europe. The third scenario is in countries with strong liberal democracies, the intentions of the populist leader to be rejected and in the long run to fail to influence the social system. Such seems to be the case with Trump (Pappas, 2019: 240). On a purely rhetorical level, it seems that after being in power for some time, populist parties have adapted to the style of communicating with the public, but are far from losing the characteristic of anti-establishment parties altogether. According to Bonikowski (2016: 14), Nixon’s 1968

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presidential campaign was much more populist than that of 1972. The same process of declining populism can be seen in Dwight Eisenhower’s 1956 campaign compared to 1952 as well as the 1996 Bill Clinton campaign, compared to the 1992 one. In general, politicians and parties while still new to the political scene are far more populist than those already established. In that sense, populism is a strategy of outsiders in politics. The assumption that populists in power would lose their authenticity, that they would become contradictory as an anti-establishment party that is part of the establishment, applies only to political leaders who use populism as a rhetorical strategy, but not to those who are convinced of populism, that is, who understand populism as an ideology. Parties that use populism as a rhetorical strategy have been episodic parties (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016: 3), but Orbán has been in power in Hungary for more than a decade, and his policies have not yet lost their authenticity and persuasiveness. After so much time in power, he still uses populism, far more than his opposition. The same was true for Milosevic and Gruevski. Populist leaders when in power create a sanitary corridor around them. They identify with the people, with the masses, but at the same time distance themselves from the coalition parties, from those who make wrong moves in their own party, thus attributing the mistakes to the elite, the coalition parties, and even the collaborators who take on the role of sacrificial lambs. Of course, the credit for good moves populist leaders attribute to themselves. In this way, the charismatic leaders of the populist parties become larger and more important institutions than the parties whose presidents they are. Given the unenviable reputation of the parties in general and the growth of the populism in Eastern Europe, there is a trend of more non-partisan candidates running in the elections. In addition, in an attempt to avoid their own responsibility and to retain the position of anti-establishment, populists borrow from Dahl’s theory of the plurality of elites. They claim real power is in the economic and cultural elite against which they fight from a position of power. They convince their supporters that from a position of power they are fighting against the representatives of big capital and the intellectuals, who manage public affairs behind the scenes, among other things, they are driving globalization. The symbol of the representative of big capital that drives globalization, especially for the populists of Eastern Europe, is George Soros. Every mistake, every failure of the populists when in power is explained by the obscure influence of the economic and intellectual elite.

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When they come to power, populists seize the state, justifying it by applying constitutional, traditional, and ethical principles in politics. They appoint people loyal to the party to key positions in the public administration. They fill the public administration itself with their loyal staff. For example, in Argentina in 1945 there were 120,000 employees in the public administration, already in 1954 there were 540,000. Filling the public administration with its own supporters was one of the levers on which the political regime established by Perón relied. Something similar happened in Greece. When PASOK came to power in 1981, public administration employment increased significantly. According to the International Labour Organization, in the 1980s, the average growth of employment in public administration was 4%, and the growth of employment in the public sector was four times higher than that in the private sector. Because membership in the ruling populist party meant employment opportunities, the number of PASOK members increased from 100,000 in 1981 to 200,000 in 1983. Similarly in Hungary, Viktor Orbán, after coming to power, began filling the public administration locally and centrally with members of his party Fidesz (Pappas, 2019: 190–94; Feledy, 2017: 45). One of the things that are characteristic of the populists in power is the meaninglessness of the work of the independent bodies in the public administration. Populists try to establish control over the media, the judiciary, and the education system and promote serious constitutional change (Pappas, 2019: 190). When in power, populists usually create the impression that society is in crisis in order to legitimize their power in this way. Populists have a trait of authoritarianism. As for populists there are no legitimate political opponents who deserve their respect. While in opposition, all political opponents are corrupt and openly or covertly work for the interests of the establishment. When populists are in power, there is no legitimate opposition (Müller, 2016: 27). When in power, populists usually create the impression that society is in crisis, to promote themselves as the only saviors and thus legitimize their power. There is a trait of authoritarianism among populists. As for them there are no legitimate political opponents who deserve their respect. All political opponents are corrupt and work openly or covertly for the interests of the establishment (Müller, 2016: 27). They are trying to establish as much control as possible over state institutions and independent bodies, at the expense of the opposition, which is demonized on a daily basis. Or as Urbinati (2018: 118) notes, when in power, populists transform democratic principles, though perhaps it cannot be said that they by definition establish undemocratic regimes.

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Without formally abolishing elections, populists use a lot of propaganda and communication techniques when they come to power in order to create the impression among political opponents that it is hopeless to expect that they can defeat the existing majority or that populists interpret that they can win against the will of the people. A characteristic of populist regimes is the humiliation of political opponents and constant accusations that they are morally ineligible because they do not represent the right people (Urbinati, 2018: 120). The value system of populists usually aims at achieving popular sovereignty, and the populist understanding of sovereignty is often at odds with the values of liberal democracy, such as the protection of minority rights. When they stay in power for a long time, the populist parties know how to reform the political system in the direction of underestimating the rule of law and freedom of the press and endangering the separation of powers (De Speigeleire et al., 2017: 32). For example, Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela underestimated the prerogatives of the legislature (Dustmann et al., 2017: 3), and since Chavez came to power in Venezuela in 1998, his first priority has been to adopt a new constitution in which he will have much greater powers. For that reason, he called a referendum in April 1999 in which the idea of adopting a new constitution was supported by 87% of the voters. Of course, Chavez also had an overwhelming majority in the new Constituent Assembly. The new Constitution lacked many of the mechanisms of checks and balances; the term of the president was increased from five to six years. He was also given the power to call referendums, as well as the opportunity to deal with general economic and financial policy (Pappas, 2019: 193). In the United States, Trump often criticized the court and distanced himself from the establishment of his own Republican Party, and in Hungary, Viktor Orbán openly disregarded the constitutional check and balances and, after a two-thirds victory in 2010, passed a new constitution that restricted freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary (Dustmann et al., 2017: 3). The new constitution reduced the powers of the Constitutional Court and later reduced the retirement age for judges. In 2018, there was the reconstruction of the municipal courts. Reforms have also been made in education, which has put that sector under full control in terms of its financing and management. Namely, in 2012, the Klebelsberg Center was created, on which the primary and secondary education depends financially and which appoints the principals of the primary and secondary schools. The processes in taking control of the media are similar (Nahalka, 2018: 6). For example, in March 1947, during the

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promotion of a new government policy, Perón did not miss the opportunity to warn the public that in the media there are traitors who spread lies and work against the interests of the people. He especially mentioned La Prensa, the largest daily newspaper in Argentina. Four years later the newspaper was closed and the owner fled to Uruguay. Through systematic censorship, punishing journalists, controlling the distribution of newspapers, and directing the advertising of public enterprises in strictly selected newspapers, Perón took control of most newspapers in Argentina. Following the adoption of the new constitution, a commission was set up to look into cases of “anti-Argentine activity” that closed more than 150 newspapers. After taking control of the media, the Perón regime turned to subjugate the judiciary and civil society, especially the church and the unions. A similar example is with Venezuela, where after Hugo Chavez was elected president, he began to establish control over the media. In 1989, for example, Venezuela had 34 national television stations, only 3 of which were publicly owned. In 2014 in Venezuela there were 105 TV stations with national coverage of which 46% were privately owned. The Chavez regime also established the pan-Latin television channel Telesur, which was conceived as a counterpart to CNN.  Similar processes have taken place in the print media. In his media appearances for journalists who criticized him, Chavez commented that they were not patriotic, that they were enemies of the people, and that they were counter-revolutionaries. In 2002, a group of Chavez supporters attacked the newspaper El Universal, and a few weeks later bombs were dropped on the newspaper Asi Es la Noticia. In May 2007, Venezuela’s oldest and most-watched TV station, Radio Caracas Television, closed (Pappas, 2019: 197). In order to show that they are part of the people and have not become part of the new establishment, populist leaders when they come to power humiliate other elites in society and independent institutions they deem to obstruct their power. In order to show that they are part of the people who voted for them and that they are constantly winning battles against the establishment, after the elections the populist leaders remain in a permanent election campaign (Urbinati, 2018: 121). Populists know how to skillfully manipulate the media. They need to constantly communicate with their supporters through the media and thus create a sense of closeness and intimacy with people. That is, to create the impression that they are listening to people’s problems and trying to solve them. For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gave an interview to Hungarian radio every Friday; Chavez had his own show Alo Presidente, in which

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people called on the phone and expressed their problems and views on politics. On one occasion, in a live broadcast, Chavez instructed the Minister of Defense to send a battalion with ten tanks to the Colombia border. The show sometimes lasted for six  hours, and social protection measures were announced directly on the show. Bolivian President Evo Morales had a similar show (Müller, 2016: 43). Populist parties try to strengthen their support in public opinion, to get as much undoubted support, which will last as long as possible. In that sense, populist parties do not differ much from any other party in liberal democracies. But what makes populist parties different is the insistence on holism. When in power, populists do not abolish the right to political organization, they do not formally abolish other political parties, and in that sense they do not formally endanger political pluralism. But the holistic tendency of the populists is reflected in the sphere of public opinion. It manifests itself through permanent propaganda that keeps people constantly mobile on issues that the populist leader deems relevant. The propaganda produces a sense of anger toward the anti-populist opposition parties. Populist leaders, parties, or movements when in power are in a permanent campaign, which keeps people constantly awake and prevents apathy and demobilization. Holism as a tendency is transmitted to the institutions, and finally, although formally the political system does not change and remains pluralistic, society and all its segments from public opinion to the institutions dominate a populist authoritarian structure organized by the populist political party. Populist parties differ from others in that they see pluralism as an incident, as a condition that should be tolerated, and not as a condition that is natural and authentic to liberal democracy. For the populists, the only legitimate representative of the people and their interests are the populist party entities (Urbinati, 2019: 1075).

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index

A Anti-globalization movement, 124 Anti-modernist, 100 Authoritarianism, 17, 44, 47, 48, 60, 131, 199, 202, 204, 207 C Charismatic leaders, 2, 8, 17, 19, 23, 41, 44, 45, 50, 55, 83, 86, 89, 100, 102, 103, 107, 111, 166, 169, 178, 185, 197, 203, 206 Clientelism, 4, 7, 25, 27–29, 82, 121, 156 Corrupt, 2, 12, 14, 27, 40, 42, 43, 53–55, 58, 62, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85–87, 109, 121, 126–128, 133, 165, 178, 190, 201–203, 207 Corruption, 9, 40, 46, 56, 82, 88–90, 100, 120, 153, 157, 159, 161, 165–166, 178, 182, 187, 201, 202, 204 Crisis of political parties, 6, 8, 90, 169

Crisis of representativeness, 88, 155, 157–159, 162 Cultural anxiety, 117, 137–142 Cultural backlash, 143–146 Cultural dualism, 106–107 Cultural-performative, 7, 38, 49 Cultural tensions, 166 D Decline in turnout, 8, 155–157, 165 Demagogy, 85–87 Direct democracy, 55, 57, 73, 84, 156, 162, 188, 190, 196, 197, 203 Discursive, 2, 5, 7, 36, 38–43, 50, 52, 86 Distrust, 125, 160–162, 203 E Elitism, 2, 7, 25–26, 37, 45, 78, 134, 135, 178, 181 Emancipatory movements, 104–106

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Sharlamanov, Populism as Meta Ideology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03934-8

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232 

INDEX

Eroded legitimacy, 163 Erosion of nation states, 133–146 Establishment, 2, 4, 11, 14, 16, 25, 37, 40, 42–44, 51, 53, 54, 60, 64, 74, 78, 81, 82, 84, 96, 97, 101, 103, 105, 110, 111, 118, 119, 125, 132, 134, 139, 140, 144, 145, 155–158, 162, 166, 169, 170, 183, 184, 187, 189, 195, 197, 200, 203–205, 207, 209 Euroscepticism, 109, 134, 135 Euro-skeptical parties, 73 G General will, 7, 8, 27, 53, 56, 58, 62, 65, 72, 75, 78, 79, 83–85, 197, 205 Global economy, 118, 134 Globalization, 4, 6, 7, 20, 22–24, 37, 60, 74, 89–91, 96, 100–102, 104, 111, 116, 119, 123, 125–127, 129, 131, 133, 138–140, 145, 157, 159, 166, 169, 170, 191, 206 I Ideological approach, 7, 37, 49, 165 Illiberal democracy, 26, 200, 203 Illiberal tendencies, 119, 201 Immigration, 2, 22, 23, 43, 58, 74, 90, 116, 125, 128, 132, 134, 137–146, 157, 166, 170, 177 Individualization, 160 Inequality, 13, 20, 37, 44, 90, 115, 120, 122, 123, 125–130, 132, 133, 166, 168, 201 Islamophobia, 141, 156

L Legitimacy, 16, 39, 40, 73, 85, 88, 104, 134–136, 155, 162, 165, 166, 177, 195, 198, 202 Liberal democracy, 6, 8, 25, 26, 52, 84, 89, 98, 134, 142, 157, 163, 164, 166, 195, 198, 200, 202, 203, 208, 210 M Mainstream parties, 3, 8, 16, 28, 40, 90, 96, 135, 137, 146, 155, 157–160, 162–167, 169, 170, 175, 202 Medialization, 178–180 Meta ideology, 56–63 Modernization, 6, 7, 23, 24, 38, 90, 91, 95, 97–106, 108, 157 Multiculturalism, 90, 116, 133–135, 139, 140, 144–146, 170 N Narodniki, 10 Nationalism, 2, 13, 17, 24, 76, 83, 96, 102, 107, 110, 116, 125, 127, 140, 142, 156, 181, 199, 201 Nativism, 142–143 Neo-populism, 23, 96, 100 New media, 8, 20, 49, 111, 175, 176, 178, 183–191, 203 New populism, 13, 19, 20, 40, 96, 101–110 New souverainism, 74 O Organizational-strategic, 7

 INDEX 

233

P People, 1, 2, 4, 7–10, 14–18, 20, 21, 23–27, 36–38, 40, 41, 43–49, 51, 53–55, 57–60, 62–64, 71–79, 81–88, 95, 98–101, 103, 104, 106–109, 111, 115, 117, 120, 121, 123, 126–129, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 143, 145, 146, 154–156, 158, 159, 162, 164–166, 169, 175, 177, 180, 181, 183–190, 195, 197, 198, 200–207, 209, 210 Perónism, 17 Pluralism, 1, 7, 25–27, 47, 56, 108, 140, 167, 198, 210 Political parties, 8, 16, 23, 29, 37, 46, 57, 58, 74, 78, 80, 88, 90, 91, 97, 101, 105, 107, 111, 129, 130, 144, 153, 155, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 167, 168, 170, 178, 180, 182, 189, 196, 198, 201–203, 205, 210 Populist parties, 3, 45, 47, 58, 128, 136, 137, 159, 176, 210 Public sphere, 6, 8, 17, 89–91, 105, 175, 177, 179, 189, 204, 205

S Second modernity, 107–112 Sensations, 8 Social media, 110, 176, 184, 186–190 Sovereignty, 7, 9, 16, 40, 41, 50, 53, 55, 57, 58, 60, 64, 71–74, 77, 88, 105, 107, 109, 110, 116, 120, 128, 133, 136, 138, 139, 141, 156, 166, 169, 191, 195, 198, 203, 208

R Representative democracy, 84, 156, 160, 164, 175, 196, 200, 202

X Xenophobia, 4, 17, 76, 100, 156, 191, 201

T Tabloids, 180–181 U Uncertainty, 90, 115, 120, 129–133, 137 US People’s Party, 9 W Welfare, 3, 21, 77, 100, 103, 118, 119, 121, 127–131, 134, 136, 164, 169