Populism and Globalization: The Return of Nationalism and the Global Liberal Order 3030720322, 9783030720322

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Populism and Globalization The Return of Nationalism and the Global Liberal Order Richard W. Mansbach Yale H. Ferguson

Populism and Globalization

Richard W. Mansbach · Yale H. Ferguson

Populism and Globalization The Return of Nationalism and the Global Liberal Order

Richard W. Mansbach Department of Political Science Iowa State University Ames, IA, USA

Yale H. Ferguson Division of Global Affairs Rutgers University Newark, NJ, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-72032-2 ISBN 978-3-030-72033-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © titoOnz/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

For decades, we have been persuaded the spread and deepening of globalization was a beneficent trend and that, owing to technological change and other factors, was unlikely to be reversed. However, recent years have revealed growing opposition to globalization and to the Americandominated global liberal order that had facilitated globalization. We also noted that declining U.S. hegemony, growing geopolitical conflict, and the spread of authoritarianism were endangering principles that we regard as essential to world peace and happiness, including democracy, human rights, and equality among races, ethnicities, religions, and genders. President Franklin D. Roosevelt reassured Americans at the height of the Great Depression by asserting, “Let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.”1 However, in reality, Roosevelt was wrong. America and other democracies had much more to fear in 1932—the emergence of Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, militarism in Japan, and Communism in the Soviet Union. It took two wars—World War II and the Cold War—to overcome those threats. It was Roosevelt and his successor, Harry S. Truman, who were responsible for the global liberal order and for the surge in globalization. All of this is endangered by the rise of a vulgar and bigoted new class of politicians termed “nationalist populists.” Thus, President Donald Trump, the poster boy of nationalist-populism, far from pursuing liberal values, v

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reinforcing the rule of law, or even fostering America’s national interest, is their antithesis. “Everything he does,” two observers wrote, “is for ‘himself’ and his reelection, not for the country he is supposed to govern.”2 As Michael Gerson argues, we have “an American president who doesn’t understand the meaning of America.”: “He calls for the renewal of nationalism, but in a manner that has little to do with our national values. He wants us to take pride in blood and soil rather than in a set of universal ideals. His calls for loyalty are based on geography not morality,” and in a 2017 meeting with the Russian foreign minister, “Trump effectively threw his country under the bus—endorsing the Russian perception of American hypocrisy on election tampering.”3 President Trump routinely violated the Constitution and U.S. laws and undermined the norms of a civilized country. He was caught red-handed trying to get Ukraine, China, Italy, Australia and anyone else willing to listen to provide information that would smear Vice President Joseph R. Biden to facilitate his own reelection. Like fellow populists in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, Trump is an irresponsible authoritarian, narcissist. He defended other authoritarian leaders such as North Korea’sKim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin and demeans his own country and its values. Peter Sloterdijk eloquently explained it. “Trump is a degenerate sheriff. He acts as if he doesn’t care if the state comes into being or not, and mocks the upright townsfolk. What makes Trump dangerous is that he exposes parts of liberal democracies that were only shadowly visible up until now. In democracies, there is always an oligarchic element, but Trump makes it extremely, comically visible.” For Sloterdijk, Trump’s true significance laid in the way that he instinctively subverted the norms of civilized governance. “He’s an innovator when it comes to fear. Instead of waiting for the crisis to impose his decree, his decrees get him the emergencies he needs. The playground for madness is vast.”4,5 Indeed, spreading fear is Trump’s policy toward undocumented aliens at the U.S. border: If his wall on the Mexican border was not funded, he was prepared to close the entire border in March 2019. “Privately, the president had often talked about fortifying a border wall with a waterfilled trench, stocked with snakes or alligators, prompting aides to seek a cost estimate. He wanted the wall electrified, with spikes on top that could pierce human flesh. After publicly suggesting that soldiers shoot migrants if they threw rocks, the president backed off when his staff told him that was illegal. But later in a meeting, aides recalled, he suggested that they

PREFACE

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shoot migrants in the legs to slow them down. That’s not allowed either, they told him.” Donald Trump’s violations of American constitutional restraints, his willingness to ignore U.S. laws, and his response to the prospect of impeachment owing to his confessed effort to employ U.S. foreign policy in a smear campaign against domestic political foes reveal his contempt for democratic rules and traditions and his attraction to authoritarian leaders rather than democratic friends of America. Nationalist-populists and racists like Trump, ranging from Hungary’s Viktor Orba˙ n and Poland’s Jarosław Kacynski ´ to India’s Narendra Modi and Italy’s Matteo Salvini, who claim to work on behalf of the “people” against “elites,” actually constitute new “elites” that foster authoritarianism and undermine civility and norms such as the rule of law, free trade, democracy, and human rights. It is the dangers they increasingly pose that has led us to write this book. Ames, IA, USA Newark, NJ, USA

Richard W. Mansbach Yale H. Ferguson

Notes 1. “‘Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself’: FDR’s First Inaugural Address,” History Matters, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5057/. 2. Mark Mazzetti, and Katie Benner, “Trump Pressed Australian Leader to Help Barr Investigate Mueller Inquiries Origins,” New York Times, September 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/pol itics/trump-australia-barr-mueller.html. 3. Michael Gerson, “An American President Who Doesn’t Understand the Meaning of America,” Washington Post, September 30, 2019, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-cant-even-get-american-nat ionalism-right/2019/09/30/be903b0e-e3a2-11e9-b403-f738899982d2_ story.html?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 4. Cited in Thomas Meaney, “A Celebrity Philosopher Explains the Populist Insurgency,” The New Yorker, February 26, 2018, https://www.newyor ker.com/magazine/2018/02/26/a-celebrity-philosopher-explains-the-pop ulist-insurgency. 5. Michael D. Shear, and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Shoot Migrants’ Legs, Build Alligator Moat: Behind Trump’s Ideas for Border,”New York Times, October 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/politics/ trump-border-wars.html.

Introduction

This book reviews some of the generally optimistic conclusions that we reached about globalization in our 2012 volume, Globalization: The Return of Borders to a Borderless World?,1 as well as the work of others concerning globalization and the liberal order. Populism of all stripes in politics is a doctrine that, among its additional characteristics, appeals in demagogic fashion to and ostensibly serves “the people” rather than “elites.” Over the last decade or so, it has become clear that, ironically, both populism and anti-globalization as a related movement have themselves become increasingly global phenomena. Two key definitions are in order at the outset. Globalization is an evolutionary, multi-dimensional, non-unilinear process that has been happening for millennia. The essence of the globalization process is the spread of contacts and influence, exchange of ideas and goods, and cooperation and conflict (“interconnectedness”) across territorial space and beyond. Such “interconnectedness” today has come to encompass in some respects virtually the entire world and even to extend in limited fashion into outer space. The process has multiple interrelated dimensions: including (in no particular order and by no means a complete list) ecology, disease, demography, migration, governance, economics, trade, finance, technology, society, culture, religion, ideology, politics, and military. Globalization may advance, stall, or retreat in one or more dimensions without necessarily affecting others. Integration and disintegration

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are normal parts of the process. Forward advance frequently encourages pushback. Populism is somewhat more difficult to define than globalization because it tends to share some characteristics with a variety of other more familiar “isms”: nationalism, authoritarianism, fascism, libertarianism, and socialism of the democratic left and Marxist authoritarian variety. Sometimes we will emphasize a particular linkage by using a hyphenated term like “nationalist-populism” or “authoritarian-populism.” This book is divided into several parts, Part I includes this introduction. Subsequent chapters in Part I will examine the erosion of the global liberal order, the origins and characteristics of nationalist-populism, and the return of geopolitics in global politics. The latter refers to the partial retreat of U.S. hegemony in recent decades, the resurgence of Russia, and the rise of China. Part II consists of four chapters that examine the spread and impact of nationalist-popularism in the United States, Great Britain, continental Europe, and the Global South and describe how populist policies and politicians have increasingly endangered and disrupted the post-Cold War world. The first of these focuses on Donald Trump and the Trump years in America; the second on the evolution of Brexit; the third on the spread of nationalist-populism to Poland, Hungary, Italy and elsewhere in Europe and the resulting divisions in the European Union (EU); and the fourth on nationalist-populism in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America and leaders such as India’s Narendra Modi, Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu, and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro. Part III consists of three chapters that analyze the impact of nationalistpopulism on three key dimensions of globalization: political, economic, and socio-cultural. Finally, Part IV offers conclusions and predictions regarding populism, globalization, and the global liberal order. The subjects we discuss are controversial, and there are already several books that we have found helpful. For example, Manfred Steger, Globalisms: Facing the Populist Challenge 2 ; John Agnew and Michael Shin, Mapping Populism, which explores how and why populism emerged and grew3 ; Richard Haass, A World in Disarray 4 ; Stephen King, Grave New World: The End of Globalization 5 ; and Robert Kagan’sThe Jungle Grows Back.6 Owing to the relatively contemporary nature of the key topics we treat, we have found much of our information in media such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, The Economist, and theFinancial Times.

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Former President Donald Trump has decried such media as consisting of “crazed lunatics” and “the enemy of the people.”7 Such comments reflect demagoguery that threatens to undermine key democratic institutions and norms. “The current wave of populism,” as Steger argues, “demonstrates that the ideological contest over the meaning and shape of globalization has deeply impacted the political landscape of the new century,”8 contradicting Francis Fukuyama’s belief that history had ended after the Cold War.

Notes 1. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Globalization: The Return of Borders to a Globalized World? (London and New York: Routledge, 2012). 2. Manfred B. Steger, Globalisms: Facing the Populist Challenge, 4th ed. (Lanham: MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2019). 3. John Agnew, and Michael Shin, Mapping Populism: Taking Politics to the People (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019). 4. Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2017). 5. Stephen D. King, Grave New World: The End of Globalization, The Return of History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). 6. Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World (New York: Knopf, 2018). 7. Cited in John Wagner, “‘Crazed lunatics’: Trump again attacks the news media as ‘the enemy of the people’,” Washington Post, January 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/crazed-lunatics-without-exp lanation-trump-again-attacks-the-news-media/2019/01/07/290aed10126d-11e9-b6ad-9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html?utm_term=.1b205a5e96c7. 8. Steger, Globalisms, p. 5.

Contents

Part I The Sources and Evolution of Nationalist-Populism 1

Globalization and the Global Liberal Order

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2

Nationalist-Populism, Its Causes, Content, and Consequences

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The Return of Geopolitics and Declining U.S. Hegemony

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3

Part II The Spread of Nationalist-Populism 4

The Sources and Spread of Populism: America

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5

Great Britain: Brexit, and Nationalist-Populism

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6

Europe and the Spread of Nationalist-Populism

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7

Nationalist-Populism in the Global South and Middle East

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Part III

Three Dimensions of Globalization: Present and Future

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The Political Dimension of Globalization

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The Economic Dimension of Globalization

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The Socio-Cultural Dimension of Globalization

Part IV 11

Conclusions

The Future of Globalization and the Liberal Global Order

Index

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459 497

PART I

The Sources and Evolution of Nationalist-Populism

CHAPTER 1

Globalization and the Global Liberal Order

A Dialectical Perspective The question as to whether globalization is deepening, slowing down, or even reversing is, to say the least, complex. As a multidimensional condition and nonlinear process, changes that affect globalization may constitute advances in some of its dimensions, while others are in retreat. King concluded that “there is more than one version of globalization,”1 although his examples suggested these were really different dimensions of globalization that may simultaneously move in different directions. King seemed to recognize this when he wrote that in the nineteenth century, “Globalization flourished economically and financially, yet politically it was both unfair and unstable.”2 Although we focus on only three of these in this book, it is notable that the spread of pandemics like avian influenza and the presence of 703,000 (2015–2016) students studying on extensions of British university branches around the world3 were also manifestations of globalization. Fragmentation of polities occurs alongside the integration of others, a combination that James N. Rosenau called “fragmegration,” an imaginative concept and a term that emphasized the contradictions between complex trends in global politics. Both fragmentation and integration persist in any era. Like Rosenau, we regard the dimensions of globalization and localization and liberal and illiberal global orders (or disorder) as dialectically linked, that is, when they advance or ebb significantly in one © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_1

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direction, pressures will emerge to move in the opposite direction. “Globalization,” Rosenau wrote, “is but one component of the transformative dynamics that underlie the emergence of a new epoch,” yet “localization” remains “a powerful force throughout the world.”4 Thus, the acceleration and deepening of globalization in past decades produced a nationalist and state-centric backlash against it. King correctly argued that, “globalization can all too easily go into reverse,”5 which is true, but he implied it might essentially disappear if the wrong actors enjoyed hegemonic power. What he omitted is that historically globalization has moved back and forth dialectically in fits and starts even in the absence of a liberal order. The dialectical perspective becomes clearer in contrasting the liberal order and its populist foes. Both sought to move the world away from the other. The liberal order encouraged political globalization, multilateral institutions and agreements, and cooperation to meet global problems that constituted every country’s national interest (as earlier “collective security” was perceived to do). In 1992, for example, the UN produced a Framework Convention for Climate Change that was extended in a 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a 2012 Doha Amendment, and a 2015 Paris Accord, a nonbinding agreement committing developed countries to reduce carbon emissions and prevent the average global temperature from rising more than 3.5 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) during the twenty-first century. The U.S. Senate failed to ratify these, because of a belief that the agreements would harm the U.S. economy and China and other developing countries were exempted from such reductions. By contrast, nationalist-populism encouraged nationalism, national interests, and zero-sum relationships. Liberal democracy was flawed, but populists only offered authoritarianism as a “solution.” Opposed to multilateralism, former President Trump, as we shall see, declared his intention formally to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris agreement and withdrew America from the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), despite the vocal effort of U.S. allies to dissuade him. Both globalization and the liberal order fostered the movement of things, people, and ideas. In thinking about whether globalization is deepening or whether it is in retreat, we will use Rosenau’s distinction between globalizing and localizing processes. “What distinguished globalizing processes,” Rosenau observed, “is that they are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional barriers. They can spread readily across national boundaries and are capable of reaching into every community everywhere in the world.” Moreover, “they consist of all

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those forces that impel individuals, groups, societies, governments, institutions, and transnational organizations toward engaging in similar forms of behavior or participating in more encompassing and coherent processes, organizations, or systems.”6 “Globalization,” Rosenau concluded, “is rendering boundaries and identity with the land less salient while localization, being driven by pressures to narrow and withdraw, is highlighting borders and intensifying the deep attachments to land that can dominate emotion and meaning…. In short, globalization is boundary-eroding and localization is boundary-strengthening. The former allows people, goods, information, norms, practices, and institutions to move about oblivious to or despite boundaries. On the other hand, the boundary-strengthening processes of localization are designed … to inhibit, control, or (in some instances) prevent the movement of people, goods, information, norms, practices, and institutions.”7 The end of the Cold War and the subsequent ability of Russia and other post-Soviet states to join the global economy and multinational institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) on which political globalization was built—especially China’s accession and its economic reforms—fostered several dimensions of globalization while the so-called “elites” they criticize tend to support cosmopolitan globalization. Following Rosenau’s analysis, if globalization were in retreat, we would expect “boundary-strengthening” trends and events to be outpacing “boundary-eroding” trends and events. This is difficult to determine because both trends may be occurring simultaneously and may be complexly linked as when the spread of global norms fosters a reaction among threatened political, ethnic, and religious elites. Nationalistpopulism encompasses nationalism, sectarianism, and economic protectionism, all of which are manifestations of “boundary-strengthening” reactions to “boundary-eroding” trends such as multilateral agreements, pandemics, undocumented migrants, intrusive governance by international and transnational institutions and groups, and the spread of norms like secularism, democracy, human rights, and free-market capitalism.

Cyber-Technologies, Globalization, and Populism Globalization owes much to information and communication technologies and social media. Cyber-technologies created global markets and accelerated the movement of ideas and capital. Over 50% of the world’s

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population was online by mid-2019. Along with container shipping and jet aircraft, cyber-technologies removed barriers to trade, investment, and ideas and enhanced the movement of people, many of whom sought to escape poverty and violence or join relatives who had emigrated earlier. Cyber-technologies eroded borders, national governance, and sovereignty, and local ideas, and populations became increasingly effected by remote events. Hacking, identity theft, and cyberespionage have also become cyber-challenges. “That the globalization of this epoch,” argued John Agnew and Michael Shin, “has its roots more in technological change and in the strategies of multinational businesses searching for ways to overcome the limits to their profitability imposed by remaining national in orientation escapes much notice.”8 Technology and the proliferation of Internet-based media initially served globalization and the extension of the liberal order. It had been widely believed that cyber-technologies and social media would provide an enlightened public with new sources of information that would foster the spread of democracy, as they did during the Arab Spring. Social media fostered pro-democracy uprisings that toppled dictators throughout the Middle East. Today, however, these technologies also have the opposite effect owing to the proliferation of sites that permit users to avoid alternative information by viewing only those that reinforce their views. Paradoxically, globalization technologies including online social media and smartphones have been responsible for globalizing national-populism as an ideology. Cyber-espionage and bots that spread rumors and misrepresent reality are among the consequences of the cyber-revolution. Social media such as Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, and cable television narrow political views by encouraging users to limit the exchange of ideas and information to individuals and groups with whom they already agree and to remain oblivious of “true facts.” Social media have become a force that can erode democracy as much as promote it and can spread disinformation to millions. Even more dangerous, according to a recent analysis, owing “to the rise of ‘deepfakes’—highly realistic and difficult-to-detect digital manipulations of audio or video—it is becoming easier than ever to portray someone saying or doing something he or she never said or did,” and “social media [will be] fertile ground for circulating deepfakes, with

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potentially explosive implications for politics.… Deepfakes will also exacerbate the disinformation wars that increasingly disrupt domestic politics in the United States and elsewhere.”9 The proliferation of numerous online and television media customized to reflect the views of specific subgroups reinforces misinformation and prejudices that frequently foster hatred and social divisions. Thus, Russia used social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to spread misinformation in America and Europe and support the candidacy of those they sought to help like Donald Trump. The Russians aimed to animate conservatives on issues such as gun rights and immigration while reducing the political influence of minorities like African American voters. The report of special counsel Robert S. Mueller III, released in April 2019, provided many details to reinforce U.S. intelligence reports of Russian meddling in American politics. Elsewhere, an analysis of Swedish nativism described a Russian-aided “international disinformation machine, devoted to the cultivation, provocation and amplification of far-right, anti-immigrant passions and political forces.” Thus, Russia operates an international disinformation machine that fosters right-wing, anti-immigrant passions and the spread of intense nationalism. Among those who rely on media with a narrow single perspective were former President Trump and his base. Trump read little and obtained much of his information from Fox News. His contact with sycophantic programs like “Fox & Friends” reinforced his misconceptions and conspiracy theories about the world around him. Trump also appeared frequently on Fox to amplify these views. Trump’s tweets repeatedly fed misinformation that reinforced racism, misogyny, and xenophobia and sometimes even encouraged violence among the sixty-six million Americans who got his tweets. Almost half of Americans use Facebook to get news, much of which is false. With two billion users posting in over 100 languages globally, Facebook has assumed the almost impossible task of trying to eliminate content that fosters extremism, violence, or disinformation, a task historically in the hands of government officials. Moreover, as the director of global social action at the Simon Wiesenthal Center noted, “Evildoers around the world learned from the 9/11 terrorists that you don’t need the backing of a state or a mass movement. And then individuals who are probably psychiatric cases are inspired to do these things because social media spreads a culture of hate in the most public ways, and encrypted communications allows them to go private to discuss the how-tos.”10

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“This is an existential moment for global power structures, turned upside down by technology,” wrote a Filipino journalist. “When journalists globally are under attack. When power structures are shifting. Our problems are partly caused by yours: American social media technology platforms, once empowering, now weaponized against journalists, activists and citizens, spreading lies across borders; and, a president so much like ours whose attacks against the press (and women) give permission to autocrats (like ours) to unleash the dark side of humanity and extend their already vast powers with impunity, especially in countries where institutions have crumbled.”11 In sum, the idea that cyber-technologies would increase knowledge and foster democracy seems naïve in retrospect. Instead, they enable authoritarian populists and political extremists to enlarge and popularize their own ideas and organize their followers, an accusation some make about tech giants like Google.

Our Earlier Conclusions About Globalization In what follows, we review and revise some of our earlier conclusions regarding globalization. In 2012, we saw globalization as persisting and declared it would take a catastrophe to end globalization. The global pandemic of coronavirus (COVID-19) certainly gave the world at least a temporary pause. As of 2021, the pandemic had sharply reduced the movement of people across national borders, and even within liberal countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Italy, and had caused economic chaos owing to the severing of production chains, lower production, and unemployment, consequences that would persist until the pandemic waned. Nevertheless, globalization dimensions wax and wane. And, just as growing trade, economic outsourcing, supply chains, trans-border migration, cyber-technologies, and global social media reflected accelerating globalization in earlier decades, so events like the Great Recession and, even more, industrial automation and robotics allow a marked renationalization and re-localization of industries and thus a retreat from economic globalization. “The combination of robotics, artificial intelligence, and 3D Printing,” wrote T. X. Hammes presciently, means “‘on-shoring,’ returning manufacturing to the home market, is increasing rapidly…. As robotics, artificial intelligence, and 3D printing eliminate jobs, the political pressure for protectionism will rise.”12

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Perhaps, the single greatest misjudgment in our earlier volume was our assumption that the United States would remain at the forefront of globalization and the guardian of the liberal order. Many of the trends and shifts in the dimensions of globalization owe much to the shocking triumph of Donald Trump in America’s 2016 presidential election. Trump, of course, is a singular human being, although other populists exhibit some of the same symptoms. He “is a textbook example of narcissistic personality disorder. Reading the list of symptoms on the Mayo Clinic’s website is like scrolling through the president’s Twitter: ‘Require constant, excessive admiration,’ ‘exaggerate achievements and talents,’ ‘be preoccupied with … brilliance, beauty or the perfect mate,’ ‘monopolize conversations and belittle … people,’ ‘expect special favors and unquestioning compliance,’ ‘have an inability or unwillingness to recognize the needs and feelings of others.’”13 Among our most important conclusions were that, although globalization would not disappear, it might ebb in some dimensions and simultaneously deepen in others. “Typically, some dimensions of globalization, while others slow or stop for at least a while, and a few retreat.”14 We also noted that globalization benefited developing countries like China and India as well as the developed world. Indeed, although the global order may become illiberal, China and most of the developing world continue to support it. We also concluded that, “global processes…consist of apparent contradictions. Fission produces fusion and vice versa; centralization of authority makes for diffusion of authority and vice versa; fragmentation creates pressures for integration; and so forth.”15 Recent examples of these three conclusions will appear later in this book. We also observed, “Globalization has been facilitated by state behavior even as at constrains state autonomy and reduces state capacity” and that the claim of politicians that “globalization limits authority provides justification for policies they wish to undertake while denying responsibility for them.”16 These conclusions will be apparent in our discussion in this book of issues such as immigration and protectionism. However, we should have added that those same claims could be used to justify opposition to globalization and the liberal order. We also spoke briefly of how multilateral organizations like the WTO and International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided political leverage for major states, while institutions were established to cope with waves of refugees or form military alliances. Still others dealt with mundane issues like international mail. We did not foresee that politicians like Trump, Vladimir Putin, and British

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Brexiteers would believe that bilateralism would afford them advantages in negotiating with other states, but we did predict correctly that some politicians like Trump or Viktor Orbán would try to rescind concessions to increase their political power. We did not appreciate, however, how such efforts might also increase authoritarianism at the expense of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and other liberal norms. We remain comfortable with our conclusion that the sovereign state would not become “obsolete” although we did not explicitly predict the emergence of a populist belief in closure behind “walls” and less porous borders. In addition, we argued that international organizations could impose order and help form “an incipient global civil society.” We also suggested that “efforts by international institutions. NGOs, or states to foster global governance” might produce a “backlash.” This has in fact taken place. Populists, as later chapters argue, have indeed resisted multilateral institutions and multilateral cooperation. Whether such resistance endures and proves effective remains to be seen. Regarding the economic dimension, we noted, “Migration from poor to rich regions … dilutes traditional cultures and poses problems of assimilation. The influx of Latinos into the United States and of Africans and Muslims into Europe involve cultural contradictions that produce social tensions.”17 In fact, this trend has intensified since 2012. Concerning the military dimension, we observed how terrorism would enhance the power of states, and this trend continues today. Indeed, some leaders attribute terrorism to globalization as did Russian President Vladimir Putin after a mass shooting in a school in Kerch, Crimea. Putin declared that the massacre was a “result of globalization.”18 In 2012, we also suggested that economic globalization, notably outsourcing, would continue and would foster opposition to globalization, a theme we still emphasize, and we spoke of economic cycles, citing the growth in trade after the Great Recession. The recent proliferation of tariffs reflects the emergence of yet another cycle. As for political/environmental globalization, we refer in what follows to what might be called “to Paris and back” in describing the shift from the Obama to the Trump and then Biden eras. Finally, in 2012, we described how globalization was seen to spread democratic and capitalist values globally. This book will assess how globalization more recently has spread illiberal values. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd wisely argued, “The United States also needs to

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re-embrace its responsibilities to the liberal international order it painstakingly created after World War II. This order was anchored in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund and other institutions and principles that have become the bedrock of free societies, free economies and free polities. The world now asks: Does the United States still embrace this order?”19

Three Key Dimensions of Globalization The Political Dimension The political dimension of globalization is reflected by the number and variety of multinational and transnational international and nongovernmental organizations and by the number and variety of multilateral treaties and agreements, especially those aimed at dealing with global or regional problems. These are the elements of international and/or transnational regimes that Stephen D. Krasner famously defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”20 The Economic Dimension Consider, for example, the liberal economic order. By late 2014, transnational investment had risen to its highest level since 2011, but it was still only a third of what it had been in 2007 and its growth has been impeded by post-financial-crisis national regulations.21 Likewise, after the crisis and negotiations to complete the Doha Round of global trade talks had stalled, the IMF and World Bank concluded that world trade had grown more slowly than the global economy between 2012 and 2014 for the first time in decades. “That particular engine [trade growth] appears to have exhausted its propulsive energy for now,” according to IMF economists.22 Nevertheless, the WTO’s dispute resolution system continues to be moderately successful (though stalled by America under Trump), and the WTO—having failed to achieve any new Doha-style comprehensive agreements—has shifted its focus to achieving agreements in key economic sectors. Highly significant in this regard was the conclusion in July 2015 of the second Information Technology Agreement

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(ITA-II). The fifty-four countries involved agreed to eliminate import tariffs on 90% of the trade in IT products, which together represent 10% of all world trade. Meanwhile, negotiations were completed for an ambitious and comprehensive “regional” trade and investment agreements—the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) among eleven North American, South American, and Asian countries (excluding the U.S. and China). By contrast, negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union have stalled, encountering resistance from several European governments as well as a firestorm of complaints from NGOs and activists. Among the controversial issues are provisions allowing investors to bring cases alleging unfair treatment directly against the country hosting the investment, financial regulations (now more stringent in America than in Europe), laborunion rights, genetically modified organisms, intellectual property, and location-specific food designations (like parmesan cheese). Washington signed the TPP, but in May 2015, Democratic Party protectionists and labor unions initially blocked the Senate from giving President Obama “fast track” authority to have trade agreements voted on up-or-down, without potentially crippling amendments. However, in June 2015, a Senate filibuster was narrowly averted and the “fast-track” process finally did clear Congress. Nevertheless, both candidates for the presidency in America’s 2016 presidential election opposed the TTP, and Trump pulled America out of the negotiations after assuming office. President Biden, although elected by a party that is historically suspicious of multilateral trade deals, seeks to minimize economic friction between the U.S. and allies in Europe, Asia, and North America. China had originally strongly opposed the TTP agreement, but, as it appeared more likely to happen and Washington soured on the agreement, Beijing becomes less vocal and rhetorically assumed the mantle of global advocate of free trade. China positioned itself to negotiate TTP membership later and in 2020 joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade deal across the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to China, it included the 10 members of ASEAN, as well as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The deal gave China significantly more influence in Asia, while shutting out America. Also, as we shall see later, Beijing expanded trade and investment rapidly with

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its Belt and Road Initiative. Although China has a long history of neomercantile practices, over time Beijing has shown a greater propensity to play by free trade and market rules. China joined the WTO in 2001 and remained actively involved in that organization’s dispute resolution mechanism, even while Washington endangered it by preventing the appointment of new judges. Beijing is pursuing reserve currency status for the renminbi, founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and has launched a sweeping new foreign investment program. Moreover, although the close linkages between the U.S. and Chinese economies are no longer viewed as a marriage made in heaven, crucial interdependencies still exist despite the trade war. Beijing is keenly aware that its hoard of U.S. financial assets that help finance Washington’s budget deficits also reduces its own autonomy. To begin dumping those assets would cause the value of its remaining assets to plummet. Neither country prospered from the trade war. Also, neither could afford a shooting war (although the same was said of Europe on the eve of World War I). Meanwhile, the United States and other countries are anxiously watching China’s slowing growth rate for its possible negative consequences for world trade, investment, and value of equities. Russia’s meddling in eastern Ukraine and in U.S. and European elections and its role in creating “frozen conflicts” elsewhere have shattered what many believed was a stable post-Cold War security order in Europe and has given NATO something of a new lease on life. Economic sanctions levied against Russia by the U.S. and Europe, although by no means trivial, have not been nearly as severe as they might have been, partly because the Europeans have a significant trade and investment stake in Russia and their economies were already battling recessionary trends. On balance, it is safe to say that Russia suffered less from sanctions than it did from the precipitous drop in 2017–2018 in the price of oil to less than $50 a barrel. The collapse of global oil prices at that time was a result of growing U.S. oil production (partly shale coming online), the refusal of Saudi Arabia to reduce production, and reduced demand in China. That fall in price has been reversed, benefiting the Kremlin in its resistance to Western sanctions. Could any more eloquent testimony to continued globalization be found than how global energy production and prices have affected global politics? The military capabilities of states like Russia are of little value in combating the “discipline” of global markets. Turmoil in the EU was evident in a revival of English nationalism and threatened European political and economic integration. “Brexit”

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was essentially over the reacquiring of the economic authority previously ceded to the EU. The British decision in June 2016 to leave the EU reflected the influence of nationalist-populists and threatened European political and economic integration. The Brexit debate in the European Union also highlighted the impact of financial markets, as well as the particular constraints and weaknesses of the regional Eurozone. Having imposed austerity on member states like Spain and Portugal, the EU, led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has been at wit’s end trying to deal with the bankruptcy of Greece. Successive Greek governments cheerfully mortgaged their country’s future, and the time came when it had to pay the piper, Athens was bludgeoned into accepting draconian creditor terms and reforms that most observers believed were unrealistic. Ironically, part of the problem could be attributed to the long-standing failure of the EU to communicate in a consistent fashion how far member countries could deviate from fiscal responsibility targets without being “exited”—or indeed, even establishing a formal procedure for orchestrating such an exit. The Eurozone is thus still far from a full-fledged monetary union, or indeed a banking union, able to accomplish even the modest level of post-crisis reforms of the financial sector that had already been enacted in America after the Great Recession that began in 2008. The challenge posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the pitiful condition of Europe’s military preparedness and capability for unified diplomacy. Several EU countries and candidates for membership like Serbia openly refused to support sanctions against Russia. Potentially even more serious is the rise of xenophobic right-wing parties in Europe opposed to the very concept of the European integration and, especially, EU immigration policies. Thus, if regional integration contributes to globalization—a debatable proposition—the most successful “experiment” is in trouble. That said, EU doomsayers are not new and have repeatedly underestimated the capacity of that regional organization to adapt. The Socio-Cultural Dimension The socio-cultural dimension of globalization was challenged by populist opposition to immigration in America and Europe and by the pandemic’s barrier to the movement of people. According to Manfred Steger, “Interconnectivity caused by cultural globalization challenges parochial values

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and identities because it undermines the linkages that connect culture to fixity of location,” and “As images and ideas can be more easily and rapidly transmitted from one place to another, they profoundly impact the way people experience their everyday lives.”23 The issues we have examined revolve around how the “local,” “regional,” and “global” continuously shape one another but still involve numerous layered, overlapping, and interacting authorities. In sum, the presumed post-Cold War security order has vanished with Russia’s resurgent ultra-nationalism, China’s not-so-peaceful rise, and widespread turmoil in the Middle East. Yet, despite U.S. protectionism, the liberal economic order appears to be surviving and global and regional political intercourse and institutions persist. As for the putative role of America’s decline in undermining globalization, we are skeptical about this claim. As noted in Chapter 3, American decline is relative. With the possible important exception of U.S. partisan legislative gridlock in the Biden years, there need be no significant diminishment of U.S. capabilities in an “objective” sense—instead the “rise” of other countries and polities that are increasing their own capabilities and autonomy. Perceptions of America’s decline, however, are a “reality” that may ultimately produce its decline. Two sets of perceptions are crucial: those of governments and publics worldwide that closely follow what Washington says and especially what it does, and those of U.S. leaders and attentive publics. Of late, both audiences seem to have accepted or perhaps even welcomed U.S. decline—or at least significant retrenchment to the level of a “normal” country—as a foregone conclusion. However, America’s retreat from global leadership under former President Trump accelerated the erosion of the global liberal order to which we now turn.

The Evolution of the Global Liberal Order The global liberal order and globalization are distinct phenomena. Richard Haass saw the two as linked and contended that both were in retreat. “What we are witnessing,” argued Haass, “is a widespread rejection of globalization and international involvement and, as a result, a questioning of long-standing postures and policies from openness to trade and immigrants to a willingness to maintain alliances and overseas commitments.”24 Haass viewed nationalist-populism as a consequence of globalization rather than conflating the two. Populist extremism advanced in both mature democracies with authoritarian leaders and in

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authoritarian societies. “The result was the opposite of a virtuous cycle: challenges stemming from globalization contributed to many of these domestic developments, while these same developments made it more difficult to deal with global challenges.”25 Trump also saw the decline of America as a consequence of what he denounced as “the false song of globalism.” Shortly before his election in 2016, Lawrence Summers presciently cautioned that, “Reflex internationalism needs to give way to responsible nationalism or else we will only see more distressing referendums and populist demagogues contending for high office.”26 Although Stephen King correctly observed that globalization could rise and fall, he also revealed how the liberal order and globalization could be conflated. Hence, he described how “the emergence of the US as the world’s dominant superpower was, in many ways, the apotheosis of post-Columbus globalization, signaling the triumph of Western liberal democratic values and free-market capitalism.” King contrasted this with the rise of “countries that are not natural cheerleaders of for Western political and economic values,” adding that many of “the values and beliefs that the Western world embraced following the end of the Second World War are rapidly crumbling.”27 These trends, he believed, were also likely to bring some aspects of globalization to an end. Later, King recognized that events affecting contemporary perspectives of globalization predated the liberal order when he identified the Black Death and the fall of Constantinople, China’s silk road, and a fifteenth-century Chinese financial crisis respectively as “accidents” that shaped Western and Chinese versions of globalization.28 He again conflated liberal values and globalization when he claimed that the “Western view of globalization has always been based…on the spread of liberal values.”29 What King called “values” were elements of the liberal order rather than globalization itself, and the confusion left the mistaken assumption that globalization began after World War II. The difference between globalization and the liberal order becomes clearer when we recognize that China’s rise may ultimately bring about an illiberal order while still fostering globalization. Also, the expansion of empires and the spread of religions in past centuries constituted globalization without reference to values, liberal or illiberal. Thus, writing about right-wing populists like Trump, Quinn Slobodian recognized that Trump opposed the liberal order more than globalization as a whole. “Trump and the far right preach not the end of globalization, but their own strain of it, not its abandonment but an alternative form. They want

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robust trade and financial flows, but they draw a hard line against certain kinds of migration. The story is not one of open versus closed, but of the right cherry-picking aspects of globalization while rejecting others.”30 Nevertheless, the decline of the liberal order was related to Trump’s opposition to global governance and civil society, reflected in opposition to multilateralism, trade, and immigration. Moreover, was the liberal order ever truly “global”? Certainly, the USSR and its bloc were never part of that order, and China and Russia have not adopted liberal norms. Moreover, many postcolonial states were not and remain not part of the liberal order. Indeed, with exceptions such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, much of the liberal world is located in North America and Europe, and populist leaders have assumed power in countries as varied as Hungary, Poland, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and, of course (until 2021), the United States. Former President Donald Trump befriended many of the leaders of illiberal countries, while assailing leaders of liberal societies. Illiberal societies were characterized by sham democracy, authoritarianism, weak judicial and legislative institutions, the absence of civil society, opposition to multilateral institutions and agreements, and nativist attitudes about minorities.

The Liberal Order: Another Dialectical Phenomenon The liberal order had some of its intellectual roots in the European Enlightenment and the republican aspects of the American and French revolutions. The woes of World War I and the 1930s followed an earlier liberal era under British hegemony, which saw among other things, the end of slavery and the spread of free trade and democracy. The interwar League of Nations and Woodrow Wilson’s support for national self-determination, though potentially subversive to existing states, were liberal projects. However, the global liberal order evolved with remarkable speed after World War II, with the creation of a panoply of institutions and liberal norms, rules, and practices. These, in turn, encouraged more of the same. After World War II, the American hegemon— with the support of wartime allies and former enemies Germany and Japan—made possible the inauguration of an even more ambitious and extensive global liberal order.

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Among the initial pillars of the global liberal order and political globalization were economic institutions, all of which are within the UN “family.” The Bretton Woods institutions (1944) were early institutional pillars of economic globalization—the World Bank (IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and an International Trade Organization (ITO), later the less powerful General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which focused on defining “unfair trading practices” like “dumping” (selling goods abroad at prices lower than those in the home country) and on reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods. The abortive ITO was intended to have the power to make binding rules for international trade, but proved to be too ambitious an undertaking until the World Trade Organization was founded in 1995. The latter’s mission extended well beyond traditional goods trade to services and more leading-edge concerns like intellectual property. Unlike the GATT, the WTO was a formal international organization state with the capacity to negotiate and enforce its rules. The World Bank (now World Bank Group-WBG) initially concentrated on making loans for postwar reconstruction and development but soon shifted to making loans primarily for infrastructure projects undertaken by credit-worthy middle-income and lower-income countries. An International Development Association window of the World Bank offered “softer” loan terms to needier recipients. In the 1970s, the bank’s focus migrated to government projects designed to contribute to reducing poverty. Maintaining a stable global financial system was the IMF’s responsibility. Most national currencies were fixed to the U.S. dollar, at that time backed by gold. The IMF made loans to countries to help them weather trade deficits while keeping their currency’s exchange rate within set bounds. Although the U.S. dollar remained the most important currency in global trade, America’s “Nixon shock” of 1971 unilaterally ended the direct international convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold (the “gold standard”), with the objective of countering inflation, the outflow of gold, and persistent U.S. trade deficits. It ended fixed exchange rates between the dollar and other currencies and allowed the value of the dollar to “float” owing to the supply of and demand for U.S. currency. The global economic system still depends heavily on the U.S. dollar (61.82%). The IMF also recognizes seven other “reserve” currencies that are widely traded (in 2019 order): the EU euro (20.24%),

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Japanese yen (5.25%), British pound sterling (4.24%), Chinese renminbi (yuan, 1.95%), Canadian dollar (1.92%), Australian dollar 1.67%), and Swiss franc (0.15%).31 The post-World War II global economy enjoyed remarkable growth, and the 1990s and beyond experienced a period of expansion not seen since the nineteenth century. There was a surge in public and private institution-building, including a parallel growth of multinational corporations and banks, as well as transnational networks and global supply chains, and a veritable revolution in IT with digitalization. EU regional integration proceeded apace, and there were major new trade agreements including the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). The United Nations was launched in 1945. Among the key tasks of the new world organization were maintaining international peace and security, fostering economic and social development, exercising oversight over decolonization, and advancing international law. The General Assembly reflected state sovereignty and its decisions were non-binding. The Security Council recognized power with five permanent members that could veto resolutions, which, if adopted, were binding. The UN Charter gave the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and to that end provided a range of possible measures from economic sanctions or the use of armed force. The Charter also established an International Court of Justice, to which states could refer disputes. Moreover, regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU) became major actors. The wider UN System or “family” included a range of associated “specialized” agencies that currently number seventeen. The Universal Postal Union and International Labor Organization long predated the UN. Other examples were the World Health Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). There was a significant globalization human rights dimension earlyon to the postwar global liberal order. In 1948, the General Assembly passed a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in 1949, it passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and four Geneva Conventions that created standards for treatment of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of the armed forces; treatment of prisoners of war; and protection of civilians in time of war. In 1998, representatives of more than 160 countries gathered in Rome and agreed upon the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC). The

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ICC’s jurisdiction included crimes of genocide and other crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Liberal institutionbuilding continued apace in the transatlantic political space. During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 with twelve members, which number has now swelled to thirty with the addition of Montenegro (2017) and North Macedonia (2020). Article 5 of the NATO treaty defined the obligation of all member states to regard an armed attack on any one of them as an attack upon all. However, the emergence of nationalist-populism undermined the liberal order.

The Erosion of the Global Liberal Order Robert Kagan presciently observed that the liberal order was “fragile and impermanent” and “is ever under siege from the natural forces of history, the jungle whose vines and weeds constantly threaten to overwhelm it.” He saw “signs all around us that the jungle is growing back” with “nationalism and tribalism reemerging” and with the reemergence in America of “racial and tribal forces that have always been part of the ‘subterranean stream’ of American history.”32 In fact, strains in the post-World War II global liberal order were evident shortly after its establishment, with the Latin American “dependency” theorists in the 1960s-1970s. Both Latin American liberal reformists and neo-Marxists agreed that Latin America was caught in a core-periphery trap, in which exports of raw materials would never be sufficient to allow countries to import sufficient manufactured goods. They argued that commodity prices tended to fluctuate wildly and tended to decline over time. The only solution was for these countries to prioritize import-substitution industrialization and protectionist tariffs sheltering fledgling industries. Dependency theorists seemed to be vindicated in the 1980s when Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina found themselves unable to meet debt payments, and lending institutions had to accept a “haircut” on loans, reducing principal owed and interest. In subsequent decades, developing countries began to question and push back against the Washington Consensus that reflected the views of major banks and the Reagan-Thatcher governments that budget austerity, low tariffs, and an emphasis on private enterprise were the keys to national development.

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Even as economic globalization accelerated in the 1990s, so did antiglobalization sentiments among those who were convinced that their jobs and status were threatened and that they were “left behind” in the global trend toward greater prosperity. In America and Europe, industrial workers and farmers viewed with alarm the flow of jobs and market shares to China and other countries with lower labor costs, while immigration was seen as presenting additional threats to jobs and wages at home. For industrial workers with less education and fewer technical skills, the growth of employment opportunities in national and transnational banking, finance, and high-tech companies offered little solace. The financial crisis had raised doubts about whether states or multilateral institutions were able to control globalized economic and financial markets. “As liberal democracies have become worse at improving their citizens’ living standards,” argued Yasha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa, “populist movements that disavow liberalism” were “emerging from Brussels to Brasilia and from Warsaw to Washington.”33 The Great Recession had suggested that free-market capitalism was flawed. Global inequality continued to shrink between countries after the 2008 crisis, for decades, and Cardiff García noted: “This makes sense: growth in advanced economies suffered a deeper and more protracted collapse than in the rest of the world, which had already been catching up quickly.”34 China, for one, weathered the crisis remarkably well and in the process reduced the lead of the United States and other advanced economies. The bad news about inequality after the financial crisis was that in most of the world, the domestic gap between the very rich and almost everyone else has been growing.35 Thus, Oxfam’s 2018 analysis found that 82% of the wealth generated in 2017 went to the richest 1%, while the 3.7 billion who represent the poorest half of the world’s population saw no increase whatsoever.36 Trends in the world’s two largest economies, America and China, reinforced this conclusion, and about million Americans live in “distressed communities.” These were areas with a declining number of businesses and in which the population has low median income, insufficient jobs, high levels of poverty, and low educational achievement.37 As for China, a pre-pandemic World Bank summary noted that that country’s GDP growth since the beginning of market reforms in 1978 had averaged nearly 10% per year, constituting the “fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history,” which “lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty.” Nevertheless, by China’s own reckoning,

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there were still 55 million poor in rural areas alone, and with 1.3 billion people, the country’s per capita income remained “a fraction of that in advanced countries.”38 Meanwhile, many in China’s globalized business elite and even some in high government circles were living lives of conspicuous consumption, and corruption was endemic.

Donald Trump: Enemy of the Liberal Order The remainder of this chapter encapsulates and summarizes the essential features of what follows in the book. As we shall see, Trump and his populist followers in America and abroad had little regard for democracy and the institutions that sustained it. Their nationalism puts them at odds with globalization. Nationalist-populists like Trump pushed back against political globalization by opposing multilateral institutions ranging from the World Health Organization (WHO) and WTO to the UN and NATO, preferring bilateral arrangements in which powerful countries like the U.S. could impose its policies on others—foes or friends. Right-wing populists also loathed sociocultural globalization and were fiercely hostile to the free movement of people, notably immigrants and refugees, and frequently harbored racist vies, including white supremacy or the inferiority of ethnic and/or religious groups. Citizens increasingly regarded democracy as less important, and inequality and slowing growth in individual income fueled anti-globalization sentiment. Antiestablishment sentiment that populists, many of whom were authoritarian, armed with new tools of social control and misinformation could mobilize. Authoritarianism, Kagan argued, was among the greatest threats to the liberal order. “Today,” he wrote, “authoritarianism has emerged as the greatest challenge facing the liberal democratic world — a profound ideological, as well as strategic, challenge. Or, more accurately, it has reemerged, for authoritarianism has always posed the most potent and enduring challenge to liberalism, since the birth of the liberal idea itself.”39 Shortly before he passed away, John McCain cited the growing attraction of authoritarianism and the spread of intolerance. “In recent years, we have seen the steady erosion of the liberal order and the institutions that protect it. Citizens of many nations have turned away from universal values and toward old ties of ethnicity, race and sectarianism…. They have warmed to authoritarianism and embraced strongman politics. Most troubling, they seem to have given up on the very idea of liberalism

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itself, betraying the underlying will that is necessary to maintain any world order.”40 Populist rejection of democratic values in America was evident in the global fortunes of democracy. Larry Diamond concluded that “In every year since 2007, many more countries have seen their freedom decrease than have seen it increase, reversing the post-Cold War trend.” “What went wrong?” he asked, and answered, “democracy lost its leading proponent,” and Americans turned inward after disastrous interventions in the Middle East “soured Americans on the idea of democracy promotion” as well as a “wave of illiberal populism” was “sweeping developed and developing countries alike, often in response to anxiety over immigration and growing cultural diversity.”41 As Agnew and Shin contended, “Populism is not just an issue for the so-called liberal democracies. Rather, it signals the end of the optimism about the spread of liberal democracy that was based in large parts on multiparty elections and the institutionalization of the rule of law that characterized the 1990s.”42 As Robin Niblett concluded, “The liberal international order has always depended on the idea of progress. Since 1945, Western policymakers have believed that open markets, democracy, and individual human rights would gradually spread across the entire globe.”43 But history is not linear, and globalization, in the eyes of populists, had reduced the belief in progress. Recent years have witnessed growing unpredictability and disorder in global politics that raise questions about the durability of the liberal order. As Jonathan Freedland pessimistically expressed the historical shift, “Put starkly, the norms and taboos established after the world witnessed the Holocaust are eroding before our eyes. For 70-odd years, roughly the span of a human life, they endured, keeping the lid on the darker impulses that, we had seen, lurked within all of us.”44 “We have for the first time in American history an administration that actually prefers authoritarians over democrats,” declared Mounk about Trump. He repeatedly ignored the Constitution and the separation of powers, notably the role of Congress, evident in his refusal to turn over information to congressional committees and his efforts to prevent individuals from testifying before those committees. “That provides cover for autocrats, because they don’t have to pay any price for what they do. And it encourages others to go in that direction.”45 In sum, the liberal order and democracy were endangered less from outside than irrational rage from within.

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Other threats to democracy that became apparent under Trump included politicizing national security, replacing professional experts with fawning partisans, ignoring evidence, propriety, and reason, selectively enforcing the law, polarization, which led politicians to see their rivals as illegitimate. He “unleashed a barrage of attacks on the underpinnings of democratic governance, threatening checks and balances, civil liberties, civil rights, and long-established norms,” and “discarded the notion of facts as necessary anchors of political discourse and challenged the legitimacy of his political opponent, Hillary Clinton, threatening to ‘lock her up’.”46 Trump assailed courts and judges, and even the electoral process. During the Mueller investigation and congressional hearings that led to his first impeachment, Trump manifested angry frustration expressed in self-pity and invective. His electoral defeat did nothing to change his views except to intensify his contempt for the rule of law and other features of the liberal order. His refusal to concede the 2020 presidential election was unprecedented and undermined his followers’ belief in the legitimacy of the election itself. Trump’s attraction to authoritarian leaders’ ability to maintain order was evident in a comment during an interview in 2015. “I mean, look at Libya. Look at Iraq. Iraq used to be no terrorists. He (Saddam Hussein) would kill the terrorists immediately, which is like now it’s the Harvard of terrorism.” He added, “If you look at Iraq from years ago, I’m not saying he was a nice guy, he was a horrible guy, but it was a lot better than it is right now. Right now, Iraq is a training ground for terrorists. Right now Libya, nobody even knows Libya, frankly there is no Iraq and there is no Libya. It’s all broken up. They have no control. Nobody knows what’s going on.”47 In the 2016 presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton had promised to adhere to the rule-based liberal order. Her ideas emphasized “smart power,” “choosing the right combination of tools—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—for each situation.”48 By contrast, Trump’s populist counselor, Stephen K. Bannon, argued, “Trump stands as a direct challenge to the postwar, international rulesbased order where America gave an open-ended security guarantee.”49 Unlike Clinton, Trump had no foreign-policy experience and expressed bewildering and inconsistent positions during the campaign. Concerning policy towards North Korea, Trump talked about everything from holding direct talks to launching a preventive military attack. Rather than supporting internationalism and multilateralism, Trump emphasized

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isolationist and unilateralist themes. He spoke of increases in military expenditures while threatening to cut U.S. funding for UN peacekeeping. He proposed a vast increase in U.S. military expenditures, without outlining a clear set of strategic objectives. His proposed budget reductions in the State Department’s budget along with the extraordinary delay in filling State’s senior positions reflected his contempt for traditional diplomacy. Far from supporting the liberal order, Trump disliked the “network of institutions and alliances—the United Nations, NATO, the international monetary system” that were the foundation for the rules-based order. Unlike Trump’s zero-sum views, the liberal order was “based on cooperation among countries and respect for individual rights,” that had been “created and upheld by the world’s leading liberal democracy.”50 His protectionist sentiments, his denigration of NATO allies, and ditching of international agreements, such as the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal, led even America’s closest partners to conclude that he sought to wreck the liberal order. Trump claimed that America had been a victim rather than the beneficiary of the very norms, rules, and institutions that Washington had fostered. He wanted “to make America great again,” while never clarifying what had happened to make America “not great.” “Trump’s dark narrative of national decline,” G. John Ikenberry argued, ignored “the great American accomplishment of the twentieth century: the building of the liberal international order,” and his “every instinct” ran counter to the ideas that underpinned the liberal order. “A hostile revisionist power has indeed arrived on the scene, but he sits in the Oval Office, the beating heart of the free world.”51 Like Ikenberry, Eliot Cohen concluded that Trump had turned away from the liberal order as well as globalization. “The president,” he argued, “has outlined a deeply misguided foreign policy vision that is distrustful of U.S. allies, scornful of international institutions, and indifferent, if not downright hostile to the liberal international order that the United States has sustained for nearly eight decades…. To a stunning degree, the Trump administration has diminished the sense of U.S. constancy that has been indispensable to the postwar liberal order.”52 Trump’s decisions to leave the Paris climate accord and the Iranian nuclear deal reflected the former president’s whims and his willingness to ignore liberal norms and rules and evade multilateral commitments. He imagined that America could act unilaterally, shaking hands with

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foes or “giving the finger” to allies in pursuit of transactional advantages that would free America from the constraints of multilateralism. In other words, American populists, as Joseph Nye concluded, “argued that the costs of maintaining the order outweigh its benefits and that Washington would be better off handling the interactions with other countries on a case-by-case transactional basis, making sure it ‘wins’ rather than ‘loses’ on each deal or commitment.”53 A Brazilian diplomat’s pithy comment captured the mood of knowledgeable observers (“elites” as populists call them): “Time to buckle your seatbelts and cross your fingers.”54 Consequently, Trump did not see alliances like NATO as mutually beneficial among countries with shared values and would support agreements only if he believed that U.S. gains would exceed those of others. Trump’s transactional approach better was evident in his defense of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after the murder of a journalist who had criticized Saudi policies. For Trump, U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Saudi wealth were more important than human rights. “They are ordering military equipment. Everybody in the world wanted that order. Russia wanted it, China wanted it, we wanted it. We got it,” Trump said. “I don’t want to hurt jobs. I don’t want to lose an order like that.” According to Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Trump was saying that. In effect, “the U.S. will ignore your human rights abuses, assassinations or war crimes as long as you buy things from us. He’s got it totally and completely backwards…. World leaders will now know they can act with impunity so long as they are buying American weapons. That’s an insane message to send.”55 Donald Tusk, then president of the EU, was so concerned with Trump’s deviation from America’s liberal past that he added the Trump administration to a list of threats to the EU that included China, Russia, and Islamic extremism. Tusk declared that “the change in Washington” put the EU “in a difficult situation seeming to put into question the last 70 years of American foreign policy” and that “worrying declarations by the new American administration, all make our future highly unpredictable.”56 German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas even placed the Trump administration among the world’s rogue regimes: “Donald Trump’s egotistical politics of ‘America First,’ Russia’s attacks on international law and state sovereignty, the expansion of gigantic China: the world order we became used to, it no longer exists.”57 After taking office, Trump continued to react to criticism with insults and threats, leading Philip Gordon to lament, “there is a real risk that events will turn out far

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worst—a future in which Trump’s erratic style and confrontational policies destroy an already fragile world order and lead to open conflict—in the most likely cases with Iran, China, or North Korea.”58 Had Trump been reelected president for a second term, America might, indeed, have become an illiberal rogue state. “Quite explicitly,” argued the deputy director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “the leader of the free world” wanted “to destroy the alliances, trading relationships and international institutions” that had “characterized the American-led order for 70 years.” If he succeeded, she concluded, “America will be seen as — and may even become — no different from Russia and China, and countries will have no reason to assist America’s efforts rather than theirs.”59 Trump’s “base” included voters who were weary of foreign entanglements and doubtful that America could maintain the existing order. Paradoxically, Trump’s “Make America Great Again” projected a nationalist message. That message echoed around the world and encouraged other populist movements that were already concerned about economic stagnation, income inequality, migrants streaming across porous borders, and erosion of sovereign autonomy. Trump’s belief in U.S. decline and his rhetorical isolationism underscored that the self-perception of weakness may actually undermine a country’s policies. Hence, a Chinese official declared that Xi Jinping’s advocacy of free trade “is not China rushing to the front, but rather the front-runners have stepped back, leaving the place to China.”60 What China’s leaders hoped “to achieve, with the chaotic Trump in the White House” declared Michael Burleigh, was “to add international engagement, colossal overseas infrastructural investment and a predictable solidity to the limited things China is already renowned for, namely autocratic governance and remarkable economic growth….” Referring caustically to Trump, Burleigh added, “Foreign and national security strategy is not for amateurs, Tweeters, or the easily bored.” He described Trump as a “capricious, bullying narcissist… a creature of the age of Twitter, a perfect 140-character vehicle for his impulses.”61 During Trump’s tenure, American soft power swooned. During Barack Obama’s first year as president, median global approval of the U.S. rose from 34% during George W. Bush’s final year in office to 49%, and disapproval dropped from 34 to 21%. On leaving office, Obama left a note for Trump in which he wrote, “It’s up to us, through action and example to sustain the international order that’s expanded steadily since the end of the Cold War, and upon which our own wealth and safety depend.”

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Instead, as Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay noted, “As Trump has jettisoned old ways of doing business, allies have worked their way through the initial stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, and depression. In the typical progression, acceptance should come next.” They concluded, “American diplomacy is in shambles, but beneath the daily chaos is an erosion of the postwar order that is even more dangerous.”62 Within a year after Trump had assumed office, America’s median approval rating plummeted from 48 to 30% and its disapproval rating had soared from 28 to 43%. “The weakened image of the U.S. in 2017,” according to Gallup, reflected “large and widespread losses in approval and relatively few gains. Out of 134 countries, U.S. leadership approval ratings declined substantially — by 10 percentage points or more — in 65 countries that include many longtime U.S. allies and partners — and aspiring U.S. partners.”63 In a 2019 poll of 32 countries, a median of 64% lacked confidence that Trump would do the right thing in foreign policy in contrast to Obama’s consistent positive ratings. Negative views of Trump were especially strong within America’s European allies,64 when leaving office, his approval rating at home had dropped to 34%, the worst evaluation of his presidency. Populist leaders like Trump were demagogues who scapegoated minorities to create fear and violated norms of decency and propriety. “It is worth noting,” argued Anne Applebaum, “how often the president repeatedly conflates refugees with illegal immigrants and MS-13 gang members. This is not an accident: He has targeted a group and given them characteristics — they are violent, they are rapists, they are gang members — that don’t belong to most of them. He then describes them with dehumanizing language.”65

Conclusions The eminent historian John Lewis Gaddis concluded that, unlike the USSR, “the United States… proved surprisingly adept at managing an empire. Having attained their authority through democratic processes, its leaders were experienced—as their counterparts in Moscow were not— in the arts of persuasion, negotiation and compromise.”66 However, the liberal order is eroding owing to America’s relative decline, growing global economic inequality, cultural trends that had alienated many white males, and Trump’s illiberal rhetoric and policies and ignorance.

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Trump was perhaps the most ill-prepared of those who have held the highest office in the land. The president knew no history, was ignorant of facts, was guided by sycophants and family members, and was unwilling to hear views that did not coincide with his prejudices. After he took office, America’s foreign policy became unpredictable and chaotic. It began shortly after the election when Trump paid little attention to former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie who was preparing the transition. Although Christie had not considered General Michael Flynn as a candidate for national security adviser because of “poor judgment,” Trump appointed him. Shortly thereafter Flynn was fired for lying to Vice President Mike Pence about meetings he had had with Russia’s ambassador. Daalder and Lindsay described a meeting that Trump had with his foreign-policy advisers in July 2017. They sought to explain how and why U.S. policies had supported the liberal global order. “[Secretary of Defense] Mattis set the context for the meeting at the start. ‘The greatest thing the ‘greatest generation,’ left us,’ the retired Marine four-star general said…, ‘was the rules-based postwar international order.’… The student, though, eventually challenged his tutors. He wasn’t impressed with the alliances. At several points, agreements they were praising. ‘This is exactly what I don’t want,’ he objected…. Some of the exchanges grew testy as the experts tried to persuade a president who thought he knew more than he did to adopt a worldview utterly foreign to his thinking: At several points Trump rebuked his briefers with a simple and direct rebuttal: ‘I don’t agree!’”67 It was after this meeting that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson described the president as a “fucking moron,” and John Kelly, then White House chief of staff, was reported to have described Trump as an “idiot.” Both Tillerson and Kelly recognized that their country had elected a president with the emotional and intellectual maturity of a small child who screamed while having tantrums. His advisers realized the president knew nothing about foreign affairs or economics, and the leaders of America’s friends and foes learned this quickly. In Trump, Russia’s Vladimir Putin saw an opportunity to divide its democratic foe. America’s intelligence agencies concluded, “Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s long-standing desire to undermine the USled liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to

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previous operations.”68 Trump, owing to his violent rhetoric and dislike of societal norms, became a perfect agent for Moscow’s objective. Immanuel Kant and later liberals believed that economic interdependence, along with democracy and international organizations—all pillars of the liberal order—fostered peace. After the Cold War, it was widely believed that China and Russia would join that order. However, America’s intelligence community concluded in early 2019 that Russia and China were cooperating to take advantage of growing doubt about liberal democracy. Graham Allison concluded, that the “‘long peace’ was not the result of a liberal order but the byproduct of the dangerous balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the four and a half decades of the Cold War and then of a brief period of U.S. dominance.” Although Washington itself had frequently pursued antiglobalization policies and ignored rules of the liberal order, “when the United States” had an “opportunity to advance freedom for others”69 it had done so. Allison concluded that peace was a consequence of U.S. global dominance, and the order reflected American efforts to globalize its domestic norms and practices. Although Allison’s emphasis on balance of power in creating the liberal order as the Cold War loomed has merit, as Michael Mazaar suggests, it was only part of the story. Elements of the order predated the Cold War and thrived as U.S. officials sought to avoid the mistakes of the 1930s. Although U.S. military power was used to protect and further America’s global interests, as Allison contended, those who established the order had more than that in mind. As Mazaar argued, “The order is far from a myth; it is the United States’ most important competitive advantage.”70 Analysts remained divided about U.S. foreign policy even as Trump left Washington. On the one hand, Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Friedman Lissner concluded that “liberal universalism” was no longer possible and argued for a strategy “in which states are free to make independent political decisions; international waters, airspace, and space remain accessible to military and commercial traffic; and countries cooperate informally and through modernized international institutions,”71 that is, a modification of globalization. The United States and its allies should collaborate to modernize international institutions like the WTO and prevent illiberal actors like China from exploiting the openness of others or of cyberspace. Authoritarian great powers will certainly compete to try to shape the future global order. Rapp-Hooper and Lissner

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predicted that great power rivalries would persist, and both liberal and illiberal actors would compete with illiberal China as threats to openness. By contrast, Stephen Walt offered a “hard-nosed” realist alternative. He argued that America had abandoned realism after the Cold War and “tried to remake global politics in accordance with American values,” a strategy he called “liberal hegemony” that led to “hegemonic hubris.” That strategy, concluded Walt, had expanded American “security obligations without providing new resources,” even as globalization contributed to growing disparities in wealth among those who would vote for Trump, “an incompetent vulgarian.” Instead, Walt advocated “a strategy of ‘offshore balancing’” while abstaining “from crusades to remake the world in its image, concentrating instead on maintaining the balance of power in a few key regions” such as East Asia and the Middle East.72 Finally, in an essay that diverged from both Rapp-Hooper’s and Lissner’s “openness” and Walt’s realism, Kori Schake concluded that, until Trump, American support for the liberal order had been successful in, “committing to the defense of countries that share U.S. values or interests, expanding trade, upholding rules-based institutions, and fostering liberal values internationally.” Trump’s policies, he declared, “should serve as a wake-up call” about straying from “the ideas that built the America-led order,” but “not as a cause for fundamental change.” Schake concludes that America would be wise to return to multilateralism and rules-based institutions. “Washington doesn’t need to reinvent the wheel, but it does need to improve on the things that have worked in the past.”73 In the following chapter, we describe nationalist-populism and its roots. We shall explain how and why the phenomenon emerged and spread, the perils it had fostered, and some of its implications for globalization.

Notes 1. King, Grave New World, p. 7. 2. Ibid., p. 7. King also argued (p. x) that growing inequality and declining economic growth tempt leaders to “use globalization as a scapegoat.” 3. “Dreaming of New Spires,” The Economist, August 25, 2018, p. 44. 4. James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 8. 5. King, Grave New World, p. 6. See also Dan Balz, “Instability and Populist Unrest Is the New World Order,” Washington Post, December 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/politics/instability-and-pop

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6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

ulist-unrest-is-the-new-world-order/2018/12/11/0959c858-fd7b-11e8862a-b6a6f3ce8199_story.html. James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 80, 83. Emphasis in original. Ibid., pp. 81–82. John Agnew and Michael Shin, Mapping Populism: Taking Politics to the People (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2020), p. 2. Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron, “Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War,” Foreign Affairs 98:1 (January/February 2019), pp. 150, 151. Cited in Marc Fisher, Roxana Popescu, and Kayla Epstein, “Ancient Hatreds, Modern Methods: How Social Media and Political Division Feed Attacks on Sacred Spaces,” Washington Post, April 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ancient-hatreds-modernmethods-how-social-media-and-political-division-feed-attacks-on-sacredspaces/2019/04/28/51543e1a-69d5-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story. html?utm_term=.a14394c2a35c&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in Philip Bump, “The Warning Offered by a Filipina Journalist Targeted by Her Country’s President,” Washington Post, November 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/21/war ning-offered-by-filipina-journalist-targeted-by-her-countrys-president/? utm_term=.93ae1a43eae5. T.X. Hammes, “The End of Globalization? The International Security Implications,” War on the Rocks, August 2, 2016, https://waronther ocks.com/2016/08/the-end-of-globalization-the-international-securityimplications/. David von Drehle, “Let’s Asks the Psychiatrists, Mr. President. But Let’s Start with Yours,” Washington Post, January 4, 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lets-ask-the-psychiatrists-mr-presid ent-but-lets-start-with-yours/2019/01/04/ce2d42e4-1055-11e9-89385898adc28fa2_story.html?utm_term=.af019ab727df&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Globalization: The Return of Borders to a Borderless World? (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 279. See also Ferguson and Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2004). Ferguson and Mansbach, Globalization, p. 279. Ibid., p. 280. Ibid., p. 283. Cited in Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Crimean City Turns to Mourning 20 Victims of School Attack,” Washington Post, October 18, 2018, https://www.

1

19.

20.

21.

22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

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washingtonpost.com/world/europe/wounded-in-crimea-school-attackto-be-flown-to-russia/2018/10/18/ffafbda2-d2ab-11e8-a4db-184311 d27129_story.html?utm_term=.3ec6a5bb675f. Kevin Rudd, “The Rise of Authoritarian Capitalism,” New York Times, September 16, 2018, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/ opinion/politics/kevin-rudd-authoritarian-capitalism.html. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36:2 (Spring 1982), p. 186. Elaine Moore, “Cross-Border Capital Flows Return to 2011 Levels,” Financial Times, November 30, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ 0/10803656-74b5-11e4-8321-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UZL5KnrO/. Cited in Shawn Donnan, “IMF and World Bank Warn of ‘Peak Trade’,” Financial Times, November 18, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 0237d9fa-6f29-11e4-b060-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UZL5KnrO. Steger, Globalisms, p. 32. Haass, A World in Disarray, p. 2. Ibid., p. 11. Lawrence Summers, “Voters Deserve Responsible Nationalism Not Reflex Globalism,” Financial Times, July 9, 2016, https://www.ft.com/con tent/15598db8-4456-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1. King, Grave New World, pp. 5, 12. Ibid., pp. 102–122. Ibid., pp. 130–131. Quinn Slobodian, “Trump, Populists and the Rise of Right-Wing Globalization,” New York Times, October 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/10/22/opinion/trump-far-right-populists-globalization.html. Jeff Desjardins, “The World’s Most Powerful Reserve Currencies,” Visual Capitalist (October 7, 2019), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-wor lds-most-powerful-reserve-currencies/. Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back, pp. 4, 10. Yasha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa, “The End of the Democratic Century,” Foreign Affairs 97:3 (May/June 2018), pp. 29, 30. Cardiff Garcia, “How Global Income Inequality Has Shifted Since the Crisis,” Financial Times (August 11, 2017). https://www.ft.com/con tent/f301d0d4-7ea3-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c. See Thomas Piketty, The Economics of Inequality, tr. by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015). Oxfam, “Richest 1 Percent Bagged 82 Percent of Wealth Created Last Year—Poorest Half of Humanity Got Nothing,” January 22, 2018, https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/richest-1-percentbagged-82-percent-wealth-created-last-year-poorest-half-humanity.

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37. Sam Fleming and Lauren Leathersby, “Millions Mired in Poverty as US Upturn Passes Them By,” Financial Times, September 25, 2017, https:// www.ft.com/content/82f5f0e8-9fcf-11e7-8cd4-932067fbf946. 38. World Bank, “China Overview,” http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ download/GDP_PPP.pdf. 39. Robert Kagan, “The Strong Men Strike Back,” Washington Post, March 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/ 2019/03/14/feature/the-strongmen-strike-back/?utm_term=.93d533 033685&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 40. McCain, “Defending the Liberal World Order.” 41. Larry Diamond, “Democracy Demotion,” Foreign Affairs 98:4 (July/August 2019), pp. 17, 18. 42. Agnew and Shin, Mapping Populism, p. 1. 43. Robin Niblett, “Liberalism in Retreat,” Foreign Affairs 96:1 (January/February 2017), p. 17. 44. Jonathan Freedland, “Inspired by Trump, the World Could Be Heading Back to the 1930s,” The Guardian, June 22, 2018, https://www.thegua rdian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/22/trump-world-1930s-childrenparents-europe-migrants?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 45. Cited in Griff Witte, Carol Morello, Shibani Mahtani and Anthony Faiola, “Around the global, Trump style is inspiring imitators and unleashing dark impulses,” Washington Post, January 22, 2019, https://www.was hingtonpost.com/world/europe/around-the-globe-trumps-style-is-inspir ing-imitators-and-unleashing-dark-impulses/2019/01/22/ebd159521366-11e9-ab79-30cd4f7926f2_story.html?utm_term=.f3736d2bf1ac& wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 46. Suzanne Mettler, “Democracy on the Brink,” Foreign Affairs 96:3 (May/June 2017), p. 121. 47. Cited in Jeremy Diamond, “Trump: World Would Be ‘100%’ Better with Hussein, Gadhafi in Power,” CNN , October 25, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/25/politics/donald-trump-moa mmar-gadhafi-saddam-hussein/index.html. 48. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 31. 49. Cited in Anne Gearan and Robert Costa, “‘I Think You Mean That, Too’: Trump’s Aides Struggle to Defend, Explain His Foreign Policy Statements,” Washington Post, March 6, 2019, https://www.washingto npost.com/politics/i-think-you-mean-that-too-trumps-aides-struggle-todefend-explain-his-foreign-policy-statements/2019/03/05/b196149c3ea1-11e9-9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html?utm_term=.fddc9e309e95& wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1.

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50. George Packer, “Donald Trump Goes Rogue,” The New Yorker, June 25, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/25/don ald-trump-goes-rogue?currentPage=all&wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_daily202. 51. G. John Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 96:3 (May/June 2017), pp. 3, 1. 52. Cohen, “America’s Long Goodbye,” pp. 138, 142. 53. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Will the Liberal Order Survive?” Foreign Affairs 96:1 (January/February 2017), 12. 54. Cited in Azam Ahmed, Steven Erlanger, and Gerry Mullany, “Leaders Abroad, Joyful or Wary, Face Uncertainty of Trump Era,” New York Times, January 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/ world/donald-trump-reaction-france-germany-japan-brazil.html. 55. Cited in Josh Rogin, “Trump Has It ‘Totally and Completely Backwards’ on Saudi Arms Sales,” Washington Post, October 18, 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/10/16/trumphas-it-totally-and-completely-backwards-on-saudi-arms-sales/?utm_term=. ce26688c9f41&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 56. Cited in “EU Chief Sees Trump Announcements as Threats,” Boston Herald, January 31, 2017, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/intern ational/2017/01/eu_chief_sees_trump_announcements_as_threats. 57. Cited in Packer, “Donald Trump Goes Rogue.” 58. Philip Gordon, “A Vision of Trump at War,” Foreign Affairs 96:3 (May/June 2017), pp. 10, 11. 59. Kori Schake, “The Trump Doctrine Is Winning and the World Is Losing,” New York Times, June 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/ 15/opinion/sunday/trump-china-america-first.html?wpisrc=nl_todayw orld&wpmm=1. 60. Cited in “Tortoise v Hare,” The Economist, April 1, 2017, p. 36. 61. Michael Burleigh, The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: A History of Now (London, Macmillan: 2017), pp. xii, 277, 300. 62. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 16, 2018, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/public ation/empty-throne-americas-abdication-global-leadership?utm_source= gi&utm_campaign=book&utm_medium=email&utm_term=empty-thr one&utm_content=text. 63. Jon Clifton, “Rating World Leaders: 2018,” Gallup, 2018, https://www. politico.com/f/?id=00000161-0647-da3c-a371-867f6acc0001, pp. 3, 4. 64. Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, Janell Fetterolf, and Shannon Schumacher, “Trump Ratings, Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 6, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/01/08/trump-rat ings-remain-low-around-globe-while-views-of-u-s-stay-mostly-favorable/.

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65. Anne Appelbaum, “The Dark History Behind Trump’s Inflammatory Language,” Washington Post, June 22, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-dark-history-behind-trumpsinflammatory-language/2018/06/22/54288982-7649-11e8-b4b7-308 400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.5f1de6da542f&wpisrc=nl_todayw orld&wpmm=1. 66. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 43. 67. Daalder and Lindsay, The Empty Throne, p. 2. 68. Intelligence Committee Assessment, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” January 6, 2017 (ICA 2017-01D), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. Italics added. 69. Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs 97:4 (July/August 2018), pp. 125, 128. 70. Michael J. Mazaar, “The Real History of the Liberal Order: Neither Myth Nor Accident,” Foreign Affairs, August 7, 2018, https://www.foreignaf fairs.com/articles/2018-08-07/real-history-liberal-order. 71. Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “A Foreign Policy for the Day After Trump,” Foreign Affairs September 30, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/202009-30/foreign-policy-day-after-trump. 72. Stephen M. Walt, “The End of Hubris and the New Age of American Restraint,” Foreign Affairs 98:3 (May/June 2019), pp. 26, 29–30. 73. Kori Schake, “Back to Basics: How to Make Right What Trump Gets Wrong,” Foreign Affairs 98:3 (May/June 2019), p. 36.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. Which of the following is not one of the three key dimensions in globalization? (choose one) a. Economic b. Trade c. Socio-cultural d. Political 2. According to Rosenau, localization is __________ a. Boundary strengthening b. Boundary eroding

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c. Boundary dismantling d. Boundary reforming 3. Which of These is an example of a Multinational Institution? a. American Medical Association b. France c. Iowa State University d. World Trade Organization 4. Haas sees what as a consequence of globalization? a. Nationalist populism b. Liberalism c. Trade d. Localization 5. What did Rosenau call the combination where fragmentation of some polities occurs alongside of the integration of others. a. Integramation b. Globalization c. Politicization d. Fragmegration 6. Which one of these has resulted in the slowing of economic globalization in recent times? a. Post-World War II free trade norms b. Immigration c. Violation of free trade norms by major actors (ex. U.S. & China) d. Multilateralism 7. Which of these is an example of a “boundary-eroding” trend? a. Undocumented Immigrants b. Nationalism c. Sectarianism d. Economic protectionism

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8. Which of these is a manifestation of “boundary-strengthening” trends? a. Intrusive governance by international and transnational institutions and groups b. Nationalism c. Multilateral agreements d. Pandemics 9. Which of these politicians or types of politician believe that bilateralism would afford them advantages in negotiating with other states? a. Donald Trump b. Vladimir Putin c. Brexiteers d. All the above 10. Which country prospered as a result of the U.S.-China Trade war? a. U.S. b. China c. Both d. Neither 11. What is one reason why the U.S. and EU economic sanctions on Russia may be, while no means trivial, not severe as they might have been. a. Russia does not trade internationally b. The U.S. and Europe already had minimal trade with Russia c. The Europeans have a significant trade and investment stake in Russia and are going through a recessionary trend. d. Russia has a larger economy than both the U.S. and the EU 12. The bankruptcy of what EU member lead to talks of it being “exited” from the union? a. United Kingdom

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b. Italy c. Germany d. Greece 13. What country, in June 2016, decided to leave the EU reflecting a revival of nationalism and threatening European political and economic integration? a. United Kingdom b. Italy c. Germany d. Greece 14. Ideas from which period, in many ways, inspired the liberal order? a. The Renaissance b. The post-Cold War era c. The Enlightenment d. Directly after World War II 15. Which of the following is NOT one of the “Washington Consensus” points? a. Small budget deficits b. Legally-based property rights c. Elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment d. Reduce privatization of state-owned enterprises 16. Which of the following has not been declared a threat by the EU President? a. Islamic extremism b. Russia c. The Trump administration d. All the above 17. The United States withdrew from a nuclear non-proliferation agreement involving the lifting of sanctions in exchange for postponing efforts to seek nuclear weapons. Which country had agreed to postpone their efforts to seek nuclear weapons? a. Iraq b. Syria

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c. North Korea d. Iran 18. One year after Trump assumed office, what had happened to America’s global approval ratings? (compared to the time when Obama was in office) a. The ratings rose b. They dropped c. They stayed the same d. The approval ratings were unclear due to faulty data collection 19. What did greater global trade produce? a. Just Economic globalization b. Just Political globalization c. Economic and political globalization d. Neither economic nor political globalization 20. What is the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) primary role? a. Maintaining a stable global financial system b. Preventing pandemics c. Preventing climate change d. Increasing growth in the agriculture industry True or False 1. True or False? Globalization gets most of its support largely from populist. False, populist do not like globalization 2. True or False? According to James Rosenau what distinguishes globalizing processes “is that they are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional barriers. True 3. True or False? Globalization and the global liberal order are synonymous.

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False, they are distinct phenomena 4. True or False? Populist extremism only has advanced in authoritarian societies. False, it has also advanced in mature democracies 5. True or False? China’s rise may ultimately bring about an illiberal order while still fostering globalization. True 6. True or False? All anti-globalizers are national populist. False 7. True or False? Some leaders, such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, attribute terrorism to globalization. True 8. True or False? After the Doha Round of global trade talks had largely stalled, the IMF and World Bank concluded that world trade had grown more slowly than the global economy between 2012 and 2014 for the first time in decades. True 9. True or False? China has a long history of neo-mercantile practices, and therefore over time Beijing has shown a lesser propensity to play by free trade and market rules. False, Although China has a long history of neomercantile practices, over time Beijing has shown a greater propensity to play by free trade and market rules (ex. joining WTO in 2001, launching a sweeping new foreign investment program) 10. True or False? Russia suffered more from U.S. and EU sanctions than it did from the precipitous drop in 2017–2018 in the price of oil to less than $50 a barrel. False, it suffered more from the drop in the price of oil

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11. True or False? For the U.S. to decline in power there needs to be a significant diminishment of U.S. capabilities in an “objective” sense. False, the U.S. decline could be relative, caused by the “rise” of other countries and polities that are increasing their own capabilities and autonomy 12. True or False? There has been a rise of xenophobic rightwing parties in Europe opposed to the very concept of the European integration and, especially, EU immigration policies. True 13. True or False? Populists view themselves as fighting for the “elites.” False, they actively oppose the “elite.” 14. True or False? Populist movements around the world are concerned with economic stagnation, income inequality, migrants streaming across porous borders, and erosion of sovereign autonomy. True 15. True or False? The greatest threat to the liberal order is a multipolar system. False, the greatest threat to the liberal order is authoritarianism. 16. True or False? Stephen K. Bannon claims that “Trump stands as a direct challenge to the postwar, international rules-based order.” True 17. True or False? President Trump’s actions regarding NATO, and international agreements indicate that he believes America is a victim, rather than a beneficiary, of the liberal institutions it fostered. True

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Give an example that demonstrates globalization exclusively promotes liberal values. A major reason is the rise of authoritarian China, which does not spread the values of democracy, care for human rights, or market capitalism as it globalizes. Short Answer Did globalization exist before WWII? Explain. Yes, the world was connected in many ways before WWII; It existed in the trade routes of the silk road, the spread of the Black Plague, can be seen in the fall of Constantinople and more. What sort of backlash did the acceleration and deepening of globalization in past decades produce and according to Rosenau why did it produce this backlash? It has produced a nationalist and state-centric backlash against globalization, because of the natural wax and wane of globalization and the force of localization Describe James Rosenau’s distinction between globalizing and localizing processes. Globalizing processes are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional barriers. They are boundary-eroding while localizing processes are boundary-strengthening. What trends and happenings today that reflect accelerating globalization? Trends and happenings today that reflect accelerating globalization include economic outsourcing, supply chains, trans-border migration, cyber-technologies, and global social media reflect accelerating globalization in recent decades. How might events like the Great Recession and, even more, industrial automation and robotics may allow a retreat from economic globalization? They may allow a marked renationalization and re-localization of industries with the reduction of outsourcing and global trade.

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What are some challenges of the migration of people from poor to rich countries? It dilutes traditional cultures and poses problems of assimilation. For example, the influx of Latinos into the United States and of Africans and Muslims into Europe involve cultural contradictions that produce social tensions. What are some of the controversial issues that lead to negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union to stall. Controversial issues include provisions allowing investors to bring cases alleging unfair treatment directly against the country hosting the investment, financial regulations (now more stringent in America than in Europe), labor-union rights, genetically modified organisms, intellectual property, and location-specific food designations (like parmesan cheese). Explain why leaders of the post-WWII era were determined to create a liberal world order. They had seen the previous world order break down during the wars. Open markets had collapsed, and ethnic and nationalist groups were able to perpetrate unspeakable violence. These leaders wanted nothing to do with the failures of the old world order and pivoted from ethno-nationalism, spheres of influence, and might-makes-right imperialism to universal values, human rights, rule of law, open commerce, and national sovereignty. In what ways has Donald Trump expressed views that conflict with American ideals of democracy? Examples include: Trump praised authoritarian leaders, encouraged violence, threatened to jail Hillary Clinton, called the press “the enemy,” insulted judges and the electoral process, and prevented individuals from testifying before congressional committees. How are globalization and the liberal order linked? There was a legal order governing commerce, travel, and communication between people, corporations and countries.

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The liberal order’s norms extended to politics and facilitated international cooperation and diplomacy, in turn strengthening the possibilities of international regimes. Essay Questions 1. Describe how changes and innovations in technology have impacted globalization. 2. Describe the impact of Donald Trump on the liberal order. 3. Why is authoritarianism such a threat to the liberal order? Under what circumstances would the public find authoritarianism appealing? 4. The United Nations, when it was formed, placed decolonization near the top of the priority list. How would decolonization foster both globalization and state sovereignty? 5. How does the deterioration of United States hegemony impact the liberal order?

CHAPTER 2

Nationalist-Populism, Its Causes, Content, and Consequences

What Is Nationalist-Populism? “The common thread of all these movements,” argued Martin Wolf, was “rejection of the contemporary western elite and the synthesis of liberal democracy, technocratic governance and global capitalism that it promoted.”1 Democracy provided the public with participation in decision-making and, if healthy, holds those elected responsible what takes place. As noted earlier, populism was a revolution against the establishment and democratic norms. While claiming it represented ‘real’ people, Nationalist-populism fosters corruption and exploitation, while placing the blame on globalization. It denies science and experts and their expertise in everything from climate change to economics and health. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the leaders of the four countries in which the coronavirus was increasing rapidly—Brazil, America, Russia, and Britain—were governed by antiestablishment populist men. More succinctly, Agnew and Shin asserted that “today’s populism is a style of mobilization and communication based on the language and identity of ‘ordinary people’ versus a commanding political ‘elite’” that “reflects a blistering critique of established mechanisms of politics such as traditional political parties, state bureaucracies, professional politicians, and technocratic expertise.”2 Thus, populists believe that ordinary people using “common sense” are preferable to professional experts.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_2

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Mainstream political parties found it difficult to appeal to both proand anti-globalizers. Globalized elites and corporations were sources of wealth creation as well as economic inequality. On the left, egalitarian philosophy clashed with attention paid to minorities, whether people of color, religious or ethnic group, women, or gays. On the right, parties sought unsuccessfully to balance spending for local projects to bring money to a politician’s district in exchange for votes with charges of corruption and vaguely defined special interests. Mainstream parties were torn asunder. In America, the Republican Party was divided between traditional conservative low-budget conservatives and television personalities with no clear political views like Donald Trump. In Great Britain, the Conservative Party divided between Brexit “leavers” and “remainers.” The Labour Party was split between the traditional class-conscious leftists and the globalist Blair supporters. Such parties could no longer send coherent messages to ideologically anchored electorates. For heated rhetoric toward and dislike of technocrats and experts, Trump must take considerable responsibility, having obsessively undermined his country’s law enforcement and national security apparatus like no prior president. He frequently seemed at war with his Department of Justice, the CIA and FBI, and even the Federal Reserve Bank. Like fellow populists, Trump assailed mainstream media and fostered the use of social media like Facebook and Twitter to mobilize supporters. These media, however, began to censor Trump’s misstatements and provocations to violence and prevent voting in 2020 and suspended his accounts. Like other populists, Trump also repeatedly violated constitutional constraints and the rule of law essential to democracy’s survival. Thus, in 2020, Freedom House concluded that U.S. and Indian populist leaders were eroding institutional safeguards and the rights of critics and minorities, thereby undermining democratic norms. “Between the world of chaos and the world of order stands the rule of law,” wrote former FBI chief Andrew McCabe. “Yet now the rule of law is under attack, including from the president himself.”3 As noted earlier, nationalist-populism also involved rejection of globalization as well as the liberal order. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 2018, former President Trump decried political, economic, and socio-cultural globalization. “We reject the ideology of globalism and accept the doctrine of patriotism,” and “America will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control and domination.” He continued, “Together, let us choose a future of patriotism,

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prosperity, and pride.”4 In these three sentences, Trump rejected globalization and the liberal order in favor of economic protectionism, nativism, and opposition to multilateral cooperation. A year later, the former president said much the same. “The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots,” he argued. “The future belongs to sovereign and independent nations who protect their citizens, respect their neighbors and honor the differences that make each country special and unique.”5 Concluded Eliot Cohen, “Patriotism,” as Trump saw it, was “opposed to global governance, prosperity to bad deals that cheat the United States, and national pride to universalistic visions of humanity.”6 Trump emphatically declared himself a “nationalist” and believed globalization was weakening America’s relative power and prosperity. “After more than 30 years of stagnant or declining real wages, the American people were receptive to that message,”7 thereby upending the liberal global order and “protecting” America from a world of free trade, immigration, or alliances. Liberals, he believed, allowed others to take advantage of America in the name of democracy and human rights and that he could close the door and terminate global interdependence. Other populists around the world emulated Trump’s acerbic style, authoritarian beliefs, and nationalist rhetoric. By his inauguration, the world had come to recognize that America’s new president was determined to carry out his campaign rhetoric, and his views were not confined to the U.S. Others across Europe and elsewhere demonized immigrants and minorities to gain votes. Trump was prepared to see enemies everywhere, alienating friends as well as rivals like China. America’s intelligence community had already recognized Russia’s support of Trump and its interference in the presidential election. It was hardly surprising that after hearing the populist rhetoric in Trump’s inaugural speech, that his predecessor, George W. Bush, was overheard saying, “That was some weird shit.”8 Walter Russell Mead viewed America’s nationalist-populists as antielitist “Jacksonians” prepared to jettison long-time U.S. foreign policies. “For Jacksonians—who formed the core of Trump’s passionately supported base–the United States is not a political entity created and defined by a set of intellectual positions rooted in the Enlightenment and oriented toward the fulfillment of a universal mission”9 but a state that should be preoccupied with national interests. Jacksonians emphasized transactional realism that assumes a zero-sum world and benefits the state rather than humanitarian internationalism, liberal norms, or ethnic

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or racial subgroups. Andrew Jackson (Trump’s favorite president) was a white supremacist who used the spoils system to drain what Trump called “the swamp” and to defend white male farmers and workers against wealthy financiers. Like Trump, he resented wealthy and highly educated elites while despising the lower classes. Mead claimed that Trump’s supporters perceived their country as “being attacked by internal enemies” like “an elite cabal or immigrants” that “offers economic benefits and social advantages” to “AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, women, the LGBTQ community, Native Americans, Muslim-Americans” but not to white males of European ancestry. Mead concluded that globalists who believed “tribal loyalties” were obsolete “failed to understand the deep roots of identity politics in the human psyche.”10 Similarly, Michael Burleigh argued that Donald Trump was “very much a product of our times, whose rage became a running dialogue with enough voters angry about globalization,” who elected “a billionaire with weird hair and a foul tongue.”11

Populist Authoritarianism However, rather than Jacksonians at home or abroad, many American populists, especially Trump, are inclined to illiberal democracy (even authoritarianism), racism, misogyny, strident ignorance, and unilateralism. Trump’s xenophobic and racist rhetoric spurred white supremacists, including some who resorted to violent extremism, and terrorism by right-wing supremacists in America was significantly more dangerous than Islamic terrorism or the amorphous left-wing “Antifa,” accounting for three-quarters of extremist-related killings during the past decade. By mid-2019, there had been more violent white supremacist incidents than in all of 2018, but according to the Department of Homeland Security’s former intelligence chief, a year later, the department’s senior officials forced him to downplay white supremacy and Russian meddling in U.S. election so as not to arouse Trump or harm his re-election campaign. However, in November 2020, the Department of Homeland Security warned that violent white supremacy was the “most persistent and lethal threat in the homeland.” Referring to Trump after the massacre at a Pittsburgh synagogue by a violent anti-Semite, an official of the American Civil Liberties Union declared, “The numerous statements he’s made, calling himself a ‘nationalist,’ crowds at his rallies chanting threats against George Soros — it’s

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all connected.”12 Historian Douglas A. Blackmon noted that Trump, “is now invoking the white supremacist mentality of the early 1900s, when anyone who looked ‘not white’ could be labeled as unwelcome in America.”13 He also refused to condemn white supremacists in his September 2020 presidential debate with Joe Biden even though his FBI director, Christopher Wray, had testified in a congressional hearing that racially motivated extremism accounted for the largest share of the FBI’s domestic terrorism cases, and white supremacism was involved in most racially motivated cases. In March 2019, the Australian white supremacist Brenton Tarrant, who massacred fifty Muslims in New Zealand, described Trump as “a symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose.”14 In the U.S. in 2018, 7120 hate crimes motivated by bias against race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, or gender were reported to the FBI, up from 6121 in 2016. Argued Adam Serwer, Americans mistakenly “believe that the surge in white-supremacist violence and recruitment— the march in Charlottesville, Virginia, where neo-Nazis chanted ‘Jews will not replace us’; the hate crimes whose perpetrators invoke the president’s name as a battle cry—has no roots in U.S. soil, that it is racist zealotry with a foreign pedigree and marginal allure.”15 Nevertheless, the Trump administration refused to support a New Zealand-initiated effort supported by major tech firms and eighteen governments, including U.S. allies, to prevent online extremism. In a joint statement, Amazon, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter declared, “It is right that we come together, resolute in our commitment to ensure we are doing all we can to fight the hatred and extremism that lead to terrorist violence.” However, the White House claimed rather ludicrously that it could not support the “Christchurch Call” (named after the massacre) because it threatened free speech.

Who Are the Nationalist-Populists? In 2004, Samuel Huntington wrote presciently that the “public, overall, is concerned…with societal security…existing patterns of language, culture, association, religion, national identity.” However, for elites “these concerns are secondary to participating in the global economy, supporting international trade and migration, strengthening international institutions.”16 Recent events have fostered fear that markets were no longer free and societies were no longer open. Among the unanswered questions in global politics, as Huntington sensed, was whether the global

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order remained open or was increasingly closed, consisting of inwardly looking territorial states that nationalist-populists seek. Huntington’s final book, Who Are We?-- a wide-ranging treatise that argued, among other things, that American elites were dangerously out of touch with the American public when it came to issues of patriotism, foreign policy, and national identity—was panned by most mainstream reviewers in 2004 as an ideological and careless screed that flirted with xenophobia. At 77, the eminent scholar was accused in respectable circles of losing his marbles.17

The conflict that Huntington predicted was between “cosmopolitism” and “nationalism.” The former was the ideology of pro-globalist liberal elites. “The idea would be an open society with open borders, encouraging subnational ethnic, racial, and cultural identities, dual citizenship, diasporas, and led by elites who increasingly identified with global institutions, norms, and rules rather than national ones.” By contrast, a “national approach would recognize and accept what distinguishes America,” and “America cannot become the world and still be America. Other people cannot become American and still be themselves.”18 Huntington’s cosmopolitans were similar to those who James Rosenau regarded as living in one of four “global worlds,” notably “Affirmative Globals” “who share positive inclinations toward the processes of globalization” and resembled the elites that populists disliked. By contrast, “Resistant Globals” “regard one or more of the prevailing dynamics that sustain globalization as detrimental to the well-being of peoples,” and “Specialized Globals” were “oriented toward only limited issues on the global agenda.” “Territorial Globals,” who have a large “scale of thought and action” but viewed “problems that arise anywhere abroad…in terms of their country’s interest,”19 were similar to populists in some respects. Huntington’s nationalists resembled those who lived in one of Rosenau’s “local worlds,” and “whose orientations are toward proximate horizons.” “Insular Locals” were solely concerned “with the geographically near at hand” and resembled those who did not follow the Russian investigation or the later impeachment hearings. “Resistant Locals perceive the spatially remote as so threateningly close as to necessitate opposition.” “Exclusionary Locals are inclined to avoid the distant proximities they view as becoming too close,” and “Affirmative Locals” “work and

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think in a world that has imported foreign practices without substantially altering their small-scale orientations.”20 “Resistant Locals,” who overlapped “Resistant Globals,” were similar to contemporary populists, who disliked multilateral institutions and agreements, supported protectionism, opposed immigration, and voted for Trump. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that nationalistpopulism “is intent on blowing up traditional conservative politics and replacing it with a new coalition, comprising traditionally left-leaning supporters in working-class communities who feel ignored by those in charge and left behind by globalization and traditionally right-leaning supporters who hate liberalism. Both constituencies believe that traditional culture is at risk from immigration and ‘political correctness.’ Both believe in the nation-state as opposed to international alliances. Both feel let down by the so-called elites and think that the solution is an authoritarian figure strong enough not to care what a biased establishment thinks about him.”21 Thus, nationalist-populism seized control of conservative political parties, notably America’s Republicans and Britain’s Tories, “in rhetoric and deed,” as Ben Rhodes eloquently argued. Republicans “betrayed the United States’ values, coddled its adversaries, and subjugated its interests to the political whims of an incompetent authoritarian.”22 Whereas traditional conservatives valued the institutions they inherited, right-wing populists focused on identities such as ethnicity, race, religion, and gender rather than national interests. Nationalist-populism transformed anxieties and resentments into the politics of anger, involving what Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane called “the belief that each country has an authentic ‘people’ who are held back by the collusion of foreign forces and self-serving elites at home.” As noted above, it embraced leaders who claimed legitimacy by representing “the people,” a normative “imagined community” with a common and sometimes mythical history, regardless of regional, professional, or other particularistic interests, seeking to unite them as their “base.” Such leaders try to weaken or destroy mediating institutions such as parties, legislatures, judiciaries, and the press—all led by self-interested “elites”— and undermine foreign limits on the people’s national sovereignty. The “Brexit and Trump phenomena” reflected “a breakdown in the social contract at the core of liberal democracy: those who do well in a marketbased society promise to make sure that those disadvantaged by market forces do not fall too far behind. But fall behind they have.”23 Elites, argued nationalist-populists, used the liberal order to enrich themselves

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in contrast to those whom Edward Luce called the “squeezed middle” or “precariat.”24 Globally, in 2018, the top 1% had 47.2% of all household wealth, and blue-collar workers, formerly the core of leftist parties, became followers of right-wing populists. Put differently, unlike those whom they loathed, populists were, as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt described them, “antiestablishment politicians—figures who, claiming to represent the voice of the ‘people,’” waged war on corrupt and conspiratorial elites. “Populists tend to deny the legitimacy of established parties, attacking them as undemocratic and even unpatriotic. They tell voters that the existing system is not really democratic but instead has been hijacked, corrupted, or rigged by the elite. And they promise to bury that elite and return power to the ‘people.’”25 They also tended “to offer superficial answers to complex problems”26 to garner support among those who had lost confidence with the politics of their country. Lech Walesa, who led Poland’s transition to democracy after the Cold War, concluded that the masses could “sense the world has changed, but it hasn’t changed in their favor. So that’s why so many people vote for those individuals or groups who claim they will introduce change. That’s how they voted for President Trump and for our leadership. We have to be truthful and say that both Trump and our politicians diagnosed the situation correctly, but the treatment they have been applying is wrong.”27

The Globalization of Nationalism Donald Trump’s surprise electoral triumph in 2016 accelerated a global revival of nationalism and reversed long-term American and European domestic and foreign policies and the responsibilities they entailed. As we shall see, Trump galvanized populist politicians elsewhere such as Hungary’s Viktor Orba˙ n, Poland’s Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ Italy’s Matteo Salvini, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, and Israel’s Benyamin Netanyahu. Polish, Hungarian, Italian, and other populist politicians were similar, all supported by white Christian majorities and adamantly opposed to immigrants, especially Muslims. These politicians appealed to historical grievances, seeking the votes of those who felt ignored. As in America, they attracted rural rather than urban support. Thus, the agenda of nationalist-populists was much the same globally. They opposed elites and migrants (especially minorities) whom they

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blamed for the loss of jobs and the erosion of their national culture. As in America, populists elsewhere fostered unilateralism, intolerance, racism, and malignant nationalism. They focused on national interests rather than global cooperation in confronting global challenges and providing collective goods, and they have a transactional view of global politics. (Liberals believe governments can and should do both.) Their ideology and policies threatened the free movement of goods and people, multinational global organizations and agreements, and challenged transnational and international political, economic, and social networks that fostered interdependence. Nevertheless, many of the most ardent populist politicians, including Trump, are themselves “elite” by any objective standard— wealth, education, or status. Trump’s supporters, like those in Britain who favored Brexit, reflected widespread alienation of relatively uneducated white males in areas outside the country’s cosmopolitan and relatively prosperous cities who believed that the country’s political elites—the “failed ruling class” as Trump called them—in the major political parties had ignored them. They believed the parties catered to racial minorities and competed to be “politically correct” even as they feared they would soon become a minority in their own country. Moreover, a surprising number of women also supported “macho populists.”28 “Neither Brexit nor Trump,” observed Ian Buruma, were “likely to bring great benefits to these voters,” but “they can dream of taking their countries back to an imaginary, purer, more wholesome past.”29 Indeed, populists sought to return to an imagined past of national sovereignty that Stephen Krasner termed “organized hypocrisy.” Krasner described several types of sovereignty that “do not necessarily covary.” “Outcomes in the international system,” he wrote, “are determined by rulers whose violation of, or adherence to, international principles or rules is based on calculations of material and ideational interests, not taken-for-granted practices derived from some overarching institutional structures or deeply embedded generative grammars.”30 Krasner’s realist logic described Trump’s transactional approach to foreign affairs. Advocates of globalization were partly responsible for populism. In a creative analysis of the sources of nationalist-populism, Dani Rodrik argued. “Even globalization’s biggest boosters now concede that it has produced lopsided benefits and that something will have to change.” He continued, “Today’s woes have their roots in the 1990s, when policymakers set the world on its current, hyperglobalist path, requiring domestic economies to be put in the service of the world’s economy

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instead of the other way around.” “Globalization became the end, national economies the means,” and leaders “came to view every conceivable feature of domestic through the lens of global markets.” Thus, national leaders established the WTO and liberalized capital flows that “freed up vast quantities of short-term finance to slosh across borders in search of higher returns.” Rodrik describes how WTO trade norms fostered a loss of manufacturing jobs in developed countries, and unregulated capital flows and anonymous market forces produced the Great Recession. He contended that this system, unlike the original Bretton Woods system, resembled the earlier “intrusive” gold standard in which countries could not use monetary policy to reduce “domestic economic pain.”31 Growing economic inequality made many individuals feel left behind by globalization and suffered what Arthur C. Brooks calls a “dignity deficit.” In turn, the beneficiaries feared the impoverished, and both groups turned away from democracy. Automation has eliminated lowpaying jobs and globalization has moved manufacturing jobs to less developed countries. Brooks argued that, as president, Lyndon Johnson viewed his War on Poverty as a commitment to human dignity. Although such programs were well intentioned, they “got the U.S. government into the business of treating people left behind as liabilities to manage rather than as human assets to develop.” Lacking skills and with little education, they suffered an “acute dignity crisis” and “languished while elites …largely ignored them or treated them with contempt.”32 Perceptions of inequality and spreading anti-globalization sentiments increased, especially after the Great Recession began in 2007–2008. It was accompanied by a demographic shift in which previously dominant racial and gender elites were becoming minorities and losing political power in their own countries. The financial crisis also intensified resentment of minority groups and migrants in America and Europe owing to a belief that those minorities were receiving more aid from their governments than they merited. Thus, a 2017 poll revealed that many of Trump’s supporters, that is, “white working-class Americans believe discrimination against whites is as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.”33 As wealthy residents moved back into cities like New York and London, gentrification raised housing prices so high that less wealthy residents were forced out, often further from their jobs creating greater political divisions between wealthy urban elites and those who previously had regarded themselves as “middle class.”34

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During the financial crisis, markets appeared to foster what Susan Strange called “casino capitalism,” a winner-take-all economy that eroded democratic institutions and favored educated and wealthy elites. As interest rates fell, financial institutions made increasingly risky investments, and global governance provided by institutions such as the European Central Bank and the IMF proved inadequate to remedy the problem posed by transnational capital flows and the bundling and sale of risky investments. Consequently, populists advocating “nationalism” and “national interests” criticized economic globalization. Economic globalization had winners and losers, and the former, among the hated “elites,” supported a global economy that increased monopolistic and oligarchic firms. The growing contemporary wealth gap was partly a result of the global movement of capital, which encouraged outsourcing by firms to other countries and to poorly paying subcontractors. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal argued that in America “inequality rose in a period of increasing wealth, with the added riches going more to the haves than to the have-nots.”35 As Thomas Piketty contended, the rich got richer because the return on capital investment exceeded the rate of economic growth except during periods of great violence. Among the factors that contributed to this were returns on education, declining unions, global trade, greater compensation for corporate executives, the increasingly regressive U.S. tax code, and “the massive wave of immigration – legal and illegal, since the 1960s.”36 Poor white males, mainly Trump voters, perceived racial and ethnic minorities as having been the major beneficiaries of government welfare programs, and suicide rates among this group soared. Some extremists believe that the liberal order furthered “white genocide” by permitting immigration and miscegenation. Vann R. Newkirk claimed, “All the talk right now among people in the alt-right and the broader white supremacist movement is about the need for a white ethnostate.” Referring to Trump, he contended, “the pipeline that Trump and his allies have built between hate groups and the mainstream isn’t accidental, unwitting, or merely the product of being repeatedly taken in by grifters. This is what was always promised with the refrain of ‘Make America Great Again,’ a dog whistle that many minorities were once ridiculed for properly hearing.”37 Peter Wehner added. “He takes a blowtorch to the tinder.” “For Trump and for his presidency, the culture war

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is central and defining — and it’s a culture war of a particular kind…. It’s a culture war that manifests itself in race and ethnicity and nationality.”38 The rise of populists reflected a deep division between urban and rural voters. The rural-urban divide appeared throughout Europe and was evident in Britain’s 2016 Brexit referendum in which rural citizens were mainly “leavers” and urbanites were largely “remainers.” Although Trump was from New York City, his rhetoric depicted cities such as Baltimore, San Francisco, and Chicago as either bastions of rich elites and/or repositories of crime and poverty. Such cities, he claimed, harbored undocumented minorities and liberal globalists unlike “real” America, which encompassed states with declining populations and disappearing towns but still had two U.S. senators and a disproportionate share of electoral votes. Trump’s campaign emphasized raising barriers to immigrants, both legal and illegal, opposition to multilateral institutions and agreements, and protectionism (economic nationalism). After the campaign, he accused globalist elites of fostering immigration and trade policies that forced American workers to face unfair competition from migrants and poorly paid workers overseas. His anti-globalism was echoed by Stephen K. Bannon who greeted the firing of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson with the tweet “Come on dude!!!…end of the globalists!!!”39 Trump derided professional economists and technocrats, who, for example, opposed his trade policies. “These dummies say, ‘Oh, that’s a trade war. Trade war? We’re losing $500 billion in trade with China. Who the hell cares if there’s a trade war? Think of it: $500 billion and they’re telling me about a trade war.”40 He supplemented economic nationalism with vows to make wealthy investors pay more and introduce huge infrastructure funding, much of which was alien to conservative Republicans. However, with the exception of his regressive tax proposal, he achieved virtually none of his campaign promises, including completing the building of a border wall that Mexico would pay for. His other breaks with the past, notably criticism of allies and multilateral institutions and agreements, and his protectionism, which threatened to undo complex global production chains, eroded the liberal order and Western unity. His effort to get rid of Obamacare was a dud as was his tax reduction a gold mine for billionaires, and his efforts to roll back environmental and safety regulations have proved disastrous. Populists like Trump are, of course, not uniquely American. Even Southeast Asia hosts demagogic populist politicians such as Thailand’s

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Thaksin Shinawatra and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, who exhorted culture and identity to acquire power. As in America and Europe, populists in Southeast Asia exploited economic and communal divisions like that between Chinese minorities in Malaysia and Indonesia and rural Muslims and between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar. Closer to home, Ontario’s Premier Douglas Ford exploited populism to foster cultural and identity conflicts. In his electoral campaign, he attacked “elites” and emphasized his province’s Christian roots. His policies were similar to Trump’s, stirring cultural and economic resentment in Ontario.

Nationalist-Populism and Democracy Does nationalist-populism threaten democracy? “Over the past decade,” wrote Ronald Inglehart, “marginally democratic countries have become increasingly authoritarian. And authoritarian, xenophobic populist movements have grown strong enough to threaten democracy’s long-term health in several rich, established democracies,”41 including the U.S. “I don’t think people will look back on the Trump years and think either that was a complete outlier or that was the moment when everyone realized ‘the change’,” argued David Runciman. “They will, I think, look at the Trump era as part of a long story of democratic decline. So Trump for me is more symptom than the cause, and when Trump goes, democratic institutions will have been damaged and corroded.”42 Indeed, the weeks after Trump’s electoral defeat in 2020 during which he refused to concede the outcome reflected this. Trump’s base included Americans who admired authoritarianism, and his policies encouraged authoritarian leaders everywhere. Referring to Trump, conservative pundit George Will insightfully observed, “today’s foremost enemy of modernity is populism, which cannot abide the idea that majorities are not self-validating, and neither are intense minorities (e.g., the ‘Elvis lives’ cohort). Validation comes from the ‘critical testers’ who are the bane of populists’ existence because the testers are, by dint of training and effort, superior to the crowd, ‘no matter how many’ are in it.”43 At this point, we must recognize that globalization, too, posed threats to democracy. For one thing multinational and transnational institutions like the World Bank and corporations made decisions without consulting

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citizens of member states. Their bureaucrats and technocrats are responsible to member states but not to the latter’s voting public, thus creating a “democratic deficit.” Although populists claimed to represent the voice of a country’s citizens and advocated plebiscitary rather than representative democracy, populists such as Trump and Viktor Orbán also undermined democracy by attacking institutions such as political parties, legislatures, courts, government bureaucracies, and the media and were contemptuous of alternative views or policies. Populists have a majoritarian view of democracy in the sense that those who get the most votes (popular or electoral) should be able to impose whatever institutions and policies they wished regardless of the views of minorities. They were unwilling to tolerate dissent and utilized referendums to justify illiberal democracy. Demagogic authoritarians bypassed democratic institutions by going directly to the people, thereby doing away with genuine democracy. Populist leaders are demagogues, and they claim there is no room for separation of powers in government or even of constitutional restraints on their actions. Martin Wolf described what he called “the age of the elected despot,” all of whom were men. “He presents himself as a protector of the ‘real people’ against foreigners, minorities and treasonous elites. This is a moral, not a political claim. His is also the politics of paranoia. If anything goes wrong, it is necessarily the fault of the ‘deep state’, or some other enemy within or without. Their foes are damned as ‘elites; and their enemies vary by country but frequently include the media, epistemic communities, and the judiciary.”44 Donald Trump was one of these. District Judge Carlton Reeves argued that Trump’s attacks were the third major assault on America’s judiciary. Earlier ones occurred after the Civil War and the Supreme Court’s decision banning segregation. “When the executive branch calls our courts and their work ‘stupid,’ ‘horrible,’ ‘ridiculous,’ ‘incompetent,’ ‘a laughingstock,’ you can hear the slurs and threats of executives like George Wallace, echoing into the present.”45 Even worse, Candace Owens, a Trump supporter, averred, “I actually don’t have any problems at all with the word ‘nationalism.’ I think that the definition gets poisoned by elitists that actually want globalism. Globalism is what I don’t want, so when you think about whenever we say nationalism, the first thing people think about, at least in America, is Hitler.” She continued, “The problem is that he wanted, he had dreams outside of Germany. He wanted to globalize. He wanted everybody to be German, everybody to be speaking German. Everybody to look a

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different way. To me, that’s not nationalism.”46 Although Ms. Owens claimed she was misunderstood, one need not be a postmodernist or a Freudian to recognize what she meant. Populist leaders undermine democracy, particularly in countries where there was a backlash against cultural diversity. In Hungary, Orbán erected “the Orwellian-sounding System of National Cooperation, which included drastic restrictions on media pluralism and civil society; and weakened the independence of the judiciary and other sources of checks and balances.”47 This was only one example of how populist leaders undermined a country’s institutions on which democracy depended. Recognizing the danger of nationalist-populism to democracy, Dan Coats, then Director of National Intelligence, included a warning in America’s 2019 National Intelligence Strategy. “Traditional adversaries will continue attempts to gain and assert influence, taking advantage of changing conditions in the international environment — including the weakening of the post-WWII international order and dominance of Western democratic ideals, increasingly isolationist tendencies in the West, and shifts in the global economy.”48

Populism and the Media Former President Trump like other populists repeatedly attacked mainstream media. He decried such media as consisting of “crazed lunatics” and “the enemy of the people.”49 Such comments reflect demagoguery that threatens to undermine key democratic institutions and norms. “The current wave of populism,” as Steger argued, “demonstrates that the ideological contest over the meaning and shape of globalization has deeply impacted the political landscape of the new century,”50 contradicting Francis Fukuyama’s belief that history had ended after the Cold War. Whether Trump knowingly told falsehoods or was simply ignorant is unclear. However, his repeating the same lies frequently without evidence or even after they had been debunked suggested either a pathology and/or deliberate deception. If journalists pointed this out, Trump violently assailed them. He declared that 80% of news was “fake,” and, if he achieved something, journalists ignored it. At the 2019 G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, Trump showed his contempt for journalists. A journalist tweeted Trump’s comments to Russia’s President Putin. “Get rid of them. Fake news is a great term, isn’t it?” Trump said. “You don’t have this problem in Russia, but we do.”51 “Putinism,” wrote The Guardian, “has

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an ally in Donald Trump, who greeted Russia’s president as an honoured friend at this weekend’s Osaka G20 summit. The two men share a liking for authoritarian governance by executive decree, intolerance for democratic, legal and parliamentary constraints and a crude vision of a world divided by nations, money and brute force.”52 When winning elections by the narrowest of margins or even (as Trump in 2016) without a majority in the popular vote, populists nonetheless claimed a “mandate” and ran roughshod over any opposition. Blatant lies and conspiracy theories abounded, and they dismissed unflattering facts as “false” or “fake” news. Trump repeatedly referred even to factual material as “fake news” (a term he claimed to have coined), and populists globally emulated him, denouncing their media and political foes for spreading “fake news.” “At this point,” wrote one commentator, “the falsehoods are as much a part of his political identity as his floppy orange hair and the ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan.”53 As a serial liar, President Trump was a major source of “fake news” in American politics. For example, he repeatedly claimed that voter fraud in the 2016 election cost him victory in the popular vote for which there is absolutely no evidence and that he lost in 2020 owing to “fraud,” again without evidence. Trump also repeatedly called journalists an “enemy of the people,” a term used by Nazis to refer to Jews and the USSR against dissenters. In response, seventy U.S. news organizations agreed in August 2018 to deny Trump’s bizarre claim simultaneously. Nevertheless, Trump refused to acknowledge that his rhetoric regarding the press might be dangerous. Instead, he repeatedly claimed to be the “victim” of “fake news.” Trump’s incendiary rhetoric and his personal attacks on political foes created a climate of violence against racial and religious minorities as well as journalists and even those state officials who checked his claims of fraud in 2020. Thus, in October 2018, a Trump supporter sent bombs to numerous Trump critics and politicians, and an anti-Semitic Trump adherent massacred Jewish worshipers in a synagogue in Pittsburgh. It was the deadliest anti-Semitic incident in U.S. history. Conservative Republican thinker Irving Kristol, whom Trump had called a “loser” at a raucous political rally, declared, “The idea that Trump and conservatives share no blame for scaremongering on immigrants and the refugees is really ridiculous.”54 Although Trump had intended to visit Pittsburgh after the massacre, Jewish leaders addressed a letter to him declaring that he was not welcome unless he denounced “white nationalism.” Noting

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that Jews were frequently viewed as globalists, Brian Levin accused Trump of other anti-Semitic incidents and tropes including his failure to mention Jews on Holocaust Remembrance Day, his disavowal of former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke, and his comment that some of the white supremacists and neo-Nazis demonstrating in Charlottesville in August 2018 were “very fine people.” At a meeting with Trump, New York Times editor A.G. Sulzberger told the president that he “thought that his language was not just divisive but increasingly dangerous. I told him that although the phrase ‘fake news’ is untrue and harmful, I am far more concerned about his labeling journalists ‘the enemy of the people.’ I warned that this inflammatory language is contributing to a rise in threats against journalists and will lead to violence.”55 “What’s clear” Kathleen Parker concluded, “is that Trump has made it a verbal open season on journalists, many of whom have felt the sting one way or another. For all of us ink-stained wretches, the hate mail is more vicious than ever. The death threats more frequent.”56 Populist politicians elsewhere emulated Trump’s attacks on the media, even in countries that claimed to be democratic such as Lebanon, Kenya, and Iraq. In Italy, the short-lived populist government appointed the conspiracy theorist Marcello Foa as chairperson of Italy’s state broadcaster RAI. Foa had “spread the claim that Hillary Clinton attended a satanic dinner. He broke the news on his blog of a full-scale American military mobilization that never happened.”57 Among the allies of populists was President Putin’s Russia. In this, Moscow emulated the former Soviet Union. However, instead of seeking a communist world, Putin’s Russia sought to build a reactionary bloc based on nationalism, traditional values, and dislike of liberal democracy. Its targets included NATO and the European Union (EU), both targets of Trump as well. Finally, the Trump administration took a major step against the media when it sought to prosecute WikiLeaks co-founder Julian Assange under America’s Espionage Act. U.S. politicians in both political parties loathed Assange, and, after being expelled from Ecuador’s embassy in London where he had enjoyed immunity for four years, Washington sought his extradition. In recent decades, however, the First Amendment had protected U.S. journalists when publishing classified material. Among the best-known cases that had cited “freedom of speech” in this way was the publication of the Pentagon Papers that contained voluminous classified material about U.S. decisions regarding the Vietnam War that Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon official, had provided to the New York Times .

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Nationalist-Populism and National Interests Nationalist-populists advocate “national interest” in the realist sense, including reliance on the territorial state for security and relative gains and losses without recognizing why principles matter. As Daniel Drezner argued, “the Trump administration seems wedded to a vulgar form of realism that harms the national interest far more than it helps,” and U.S. foreign policy had been previously “premised on the notion that even in an anarchic world, one could nurture an international order grounded on American values of liberty and democracy and free enterprise.”58 Donald Trump’s “realism” denied American exceptionalism, that is, its uniqueness in upholding and spreading democracy and human rights. Trump viewed America as a “normal” country that should enhance its own security and seek advantages in dealing with others. “Every president in recent history except Donald Trump,” wrote Daniel Baer, “has understood (as Russian President Vladimir Putin surely does) that America has a strategic as well as a moral interest in standing with democrats around the world, and that America grows stronger and more powerful the more successfully it represents universal values on the world stage.”59 Trump failed to see that, for America, “values” served U.S. “interests.” Instead, for the president, the pursuit of values was of no significance. Thus, the Trump campaign and subsequent administration repeatedly criticized civil rights measures at home, spoke approvingly of the torture of terrorism suspects, railed against the admission of legal refugees, sold military aircraft to countries without imposing human rights conditions, refused to raise the subject of human rights with authoritarian leaders, and even incited violence against those who refused to claim that he had actually won the 2020 presidential election. Moreover, having emphasized Kim Jong-un’s violations of human rights early in his presidency by referring to Otto Warmbier, who died after being released from captivity, Trump later cynically declared that Kim probably had known nothing about what had happened. Warmbier’s parents were horrified by the president’s thoughtless comment, which betrayed his willingness to surrender principle. Moreover, the Trump administration prevented that UN General Assembly from even discussing North Korea’s horrendous human rights record in order to avoid offending that country’s President Kim. As these incidents showed, Trump had little regard for human rights.

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Further confusing the administration’s human rights policy, following Syria’s use of poison gas against civilians, then Secretary of State Tillerson declared that America would punish those who committed crimes against “the innocents anywhere in the world.” After the Syrian government used illegal nerve gas against civilians, Washington condemned the event while retreating from the demand that President Bashar al-Assad resign. Ultimately, the U.S. did launch multiple cruise missiles that struck the airbase from which the use of nerve gas had originated. Finally, wrote Elliot Abrams, “the ‘America first’ administration had used U.S. military force on behalf of justice, the international community, and international norms.”60

Negotiation and Compromise As we have seen, former President Trump believed that America should maximize its gains and minimize its losses in a zero-sum world and that values were reflections of idealism rather than interests. He viewed the world as a jungle in which people “act nice to your face, but underneath they’re out to kill you…. Lions in the jungle only kill for food, but humans kill for fun.”61 Thus, Trump viewed America’s trade deficit as indicating who won and who lost in trade agreements although such agreements did not produce trade deficits but simply set trade rules. Like other xenophobic nationalists, Trump sought “profitable” deals or else coerced the “other” in trade wars or reducing foreign aid, while ignoring diplomacy. In contrast to his predecessors, Trump “promised a foreign policy that is nationalist and transactional, focused on securing narrow material gains for the United States.”62 Indeed, he repeatedly called foes “losers,” and his contempt for “losers” was reflected in his extreme and baseless effort to overturn the 2020 election to prove he was not a “loser.” Erratic, unpredictable, inconsistent—all of these descriptions fit Trump’s decision-making style. Thus, after meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in March 2017, Sylke Tempel, editor-in-chief of Internationale Politik, wrote: “Once again, we’ve seen Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. He was Mr. Jekyll while reading his statement, saying nice things about economic ties, his commitment to Ukraine, common friendship; all the niceties.” “Then, in the question-and-answer session, he’s his old self: disparaging the media, criticizing the British.”63 Similarly, in the midst of South Korea’s presidential campaign, Trump suddenly

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commented that Seoul should pay for America’s THAAD anti-ballistic missile system and assailed America’s bilateral trade agreement with South Korea as “horrible.” Two days later, the administration reaffirmed that the U.S. would indeed pay for the missile system. All this led Philip Gordon to contemplate a worst case, “a future in which Trump’s erratic style and confrontational policies destroy an already fragile world order and lead to open conflict—in the most likely cases, with Iran, China, or North Korea.”64

Nationalist-Populism and Economic Nationalism As we shall describe in Chapter 10, nationalist-populism rejected economic globalization and sought to raise barriers to free trade and multilateral trade deals. Tony Blair characterized the cleavage as between the “open-minded” who “see globalization as an opportunity but one with challenges that should be mitigated” and “the close-minded” who “see the outside world as a threat.”65 As noted earlier, in addition to white evangelicals, many Trump supporters were relatively unskilled, poorly educated, working-class white males who believed that global trade and immigration caused them to lose their jobs or shut them out of the labor market completely. They also suffered declining wages and rising mortality rates. Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” encouraged the outrage of his “base”—those whom Hillary Clinton had called “deplorables”—about the alleged impact of existing global and regional trade regimes on America’s trade deficit and decline in manufacturing. In reality, domestic factors, notably automation, especially “breakthroughs in sensors, machine learning, and artificial intelligence,”66 and outsourcing “noncore” jobs by major corporations within the U.S. to low-wage and non-union subcontractors have been the most important factors in the loss of manufacturing jobs. Trump halted progress toward U.S. involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and threatened and then initiated trade wars with countries he perceived to be treating America “unfairly” and contributing to the U.S. trade deficits or loss of jobs. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin explicitly refused to condemn protectionism and endorse free trade. Trump denounced and threatened to terminate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that had governed trade among the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, despite the fact that it had demonstrably

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raised the growth rate of all three. Although the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico was $58 billion in 2015, additional impediments to trade with Mexico would have harmed, among others, U.S. farmers in states such as Iowa, Texas, Nebraska, and Idaho (all of which had supported his 2016 election). The administration’s trade policy was outlined in a document it sent to Congress in 2017, which expressed a preference for bilateral rather than multilateral deals. This was because, since America was more powerful, it could bully the other. The 2017 document recommended using sections 201 and 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which permitted imposing tariffs to protect U.S. firms from “serious injury” (201) caused by a surge of imports (though not an unfair practice) and taking action against unfair trade practices (301) like “dumping”—selling goods below the cost of producing them. The document also implied that, in defending “national sovereignty” in trade, Washington might ignore the rules of the WTO. Protectionist sentiment, of course, was not uniquely American. China, too, violated liberal trade norms. Beijing planned to achieve selfsufficiency in crucial high-tech industries from aircraft to electric cars by 2025 by providing low-interest loans from state funds and banks, research subsidies, aid for buying foreign competitors, and taxes on foreign cars. Foreign firms such as Boeing, Airbus, Siemens, and Samsung feared that the plan would effectively shut them out of China’s market and prevent them from competing elsewhere as well. Beijing also refused to admit that it had become an economically developed state, insisting China remained a less developed country (LDC). It did so the World Trade Organization permitted China, as an LDC, to impose average tariffs roughly three times higher than America, thereby allowing Beijing to export far more to America than it imported. John Paulson concluded, “Chinese firms have almost unrestricted access to U.S. markets, yet U.S. firms face severe restrictions and roadblocks when trying to do business in China.”67 Nevertheless, China had profited from and worked hard to enter the liberal economic order. It was revisionist but not revolutionary.

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Nationalist-Populism and Socio-Cultural Globalization Populists feared the “other” and sought to reduce immigration that they believed diluted their culture and traditions and harmed their economies. They scapegoated minorities—religious, ethnic, racial, and even women— for perceived economic, political, and social woes. Almost half of white Republicans said it would bother them “some” or “a lot” to “hear people speak a language other than English in a public place.”68 Most Republicans believed that the American way of life needed to be protected from foreign influence and concluded that, when whites were outnumbered, America’s way of life would end. Indeed, observers frequently overlooked the importance of whiteness itself among those who feared that impact of demographic change that will alter America’s cultural profile. Tarrant and Patrick Crusius, who massacred some 50 Latinos in El Paso, for instance, both cited the “Great Replacement” theory that first appeared in Europe and referred to migrant “invasions.” These so-called “Identitarians” argued that falling birthrates of whites and immigration of non-Europeans would “replace” whites in Europe and North America. They also believed that elites intentionally sought to encourage migration of non-Europeans, and they used violence to produce social turmoil that would bring about what Cynthia Miller-Idriss called “an apocalyptic race war which will result in a rebirth into a new world order and a restored white civilization.”69 Anne Applebaum linked Identitarians’ fears of white genocide and anti-Semitism with other murderous incidents. “The synagogue shooting suspect in Poway, Calif. said he believed that ‘global Jewish elites’ were secretly plotting to change the ethnic composition of the United States. The Pittsburgh synagogue shooting suspect also said Jewish organizations were bringing in ‘hostile invaders’.”70 When Trump spoke of “immigrant invasions,” he encouraged such individuals, as did the Russians, who used social media to spread divisive misinformation during the 2016 presidential election. Nevertheless, unlike Trump’s repeated attacks on Muslim extremists, he dismissed white supremacists as “a small group of people that have very, very serious problems.” The Internet and social media globalized white supremacy and white nationalism and fostered links between its advocates and Identitarians, who sought to spread xenophobic conspiracy theories. In 2019, America’s Department of Homeland Security declared

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that white supremacism was a dangerous security threat. “I would like to take this opportunity to be direct and unambiguous in addressing a major issue of our time. In our modern age, the continuation of racially based violent extremism, particularly violent white supremacy, is an abhorrent affront to the nation,” declared the department’s acting director.71 Max Fisher compared white supremacist violence to the terrorism of the Islamic State (IS). “In both, there is the apocalyptic ideology that predicts — and promises to hasten — a civilizational conflict that will consume the world. There is theatrical, indiscriminate violence that will supposedly bring about this final battle, but often does little more than grant the killer a brief flash of empowerment and win attention for the cause.”72 Similarly, General John R. Allen and Brett McGurk, both of whom had been involved in the conflict with the IS, wrote, “The United States now faces a new national security threat. The enemy is not the Islamic State but domestic and homegrown white nationalist terrorism…. The strain of thought driving this terrorism is now a global phenomenon, with mass atrocities in Norway, New Zealand, South Carolina and also, law enforcement authorities suspect, El Paso…. The terrorist acts may differ from Islamic State attacks in degree, but they are similar in kind: driven by hateful narratives, dehumanization, the rationalization of violence and the glorification of murder, combined with ready access to recruits and weapons of war.”73 Former President Trump sought to end legal migration of Muslims and Latinos. In response to a refugee caravan seeking to escape violence in Honduras, he tweeted, “I must, in the strongest of terms, ask Mexico to stop this onslaught — and if unable to do so I will call up the U.S. Military and CLOSE OUR SOUTHERN BORDER!” As with other issues, Trump was prey to authoritarian xenophobic nationalism as were other populist leaders. Hence, after Hungary’s populist leader Viktor Orban ˙ held a referendum about whether to accept its EU quota of refugees, an elderly Holocaust survivor observed, “It very much feels like the atmosphere in the 30s before the second world war. In the 1930s, we were in a very bad economic situation. People had to be blamed, and then it was the Jews. And that’s what I’m reminded of when I read the Hungarian government’s propaganda.”74

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Conclusions As Tony Blair concluded, “The modus operandi of this populism is not to reason but to roar,” and “[i]ts supporters welcome the outrage their leaders provoke.”75 Although Trump was an archetypal populist, other politicians elsewhere fit the description equally well. Ironically and ominously, the rise of populism was accompanied by the “downfall” of social democratic parties across Europe including Blair’s own Labour Party.76 With Trump in mind, it was fitting that in a statement released shortly after his death, John McCain declared, “We weaken our greatness when we confuse our patriotism with tribal rivalries that have sown resentment and hatred and violence in all the corners of the globe. We weaken it when we hide behind walls, rather than tear them down, when we doubt the power of our ideals, rather than trust them to be the great force for change they have always been.”77 Nationalist-populism is a dangerous ideology. It threatened to undermine genuine with sham democracy that brings with it demagogic authoritarians. As such, it also threatened the global order that had fostered democracy, human rights, and rule-based norms and practices that had been established under America’s leadership. The next chapter examines the decline of the hegemon and its possible replacement by one or more major illiberal powers. In subsequent chapters, we will show that nationalist-populism has infected ever more countries but that its most important advocate had remained Donald Trump, former president of the declining and increasingly marginalized hegemon. Former European Council President Donald Tusk argued that what was particularly alarming was that the challenge was driven not by the “usual suspects, but by its main architect and guarantor, the U.S.” Trump’s behavior, Tusk observed, played “into the hands of those” who sought “a new post-West order where liberal democracy and fundamental freedoms would cease to exist.” Former U.S. national security adviser Stephen Hadley echoed Tusk, asking rhetorically what Trump’s illiberal actions and policies meant for America itself. “First, does the accumulation of these incidents over time begin to erode trust and confidence?” asked Hadley. “Secondly, what is it doing to public opinion and public views of the United States.”78 Nationalist-populism has spread across Europe, notably Great Britain and the eastern members of the EU, and elsewhere, including Latin America and South and Southeast Asia. Populism attracted “illiberal democrats”

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and charismatic leaders who consistently lied, undermined democratic institutions, and repressed opposition. The decline of the liberal order owed much to American nationalistpopulism. For America, a successful foreign policy, as Jake Sullivan contended, “must combine the best kind of patriotism (a shared civic spirit and a clear sense of the national interest) and the best kind of internationalism (a recognition that when your neighbor’s house is on fire, you need to grab a bucket). And it should reject the worst kind of nationalism (damn-the-consequences aggression and identity-based hatemongering)….”79 Trump immeasurably damaged America’s democratic institutions and liberal norms, while popularizing authoritarian tactics. A powerful actor—a hegemon—or group of actors must be prepared to impose and enforce the rules of a global order. Early in the nineteenth century, the great powers that had defeated Napoleon established the Concert of Europe, which enforced the rules adopted by the Congress of Vienna. Hegemonic actors must be satisfied with the status quo and regard such rules as legitimate. By contrast, the late nineteenth century and, later, the 1930s witnessed the rise of dissatisfied great powers that sought to revise the rules of the order. Before World War I, Great Britain had been the hegemon. After World War II, America assumed that role. The two oceans assured U.S. military security, and its two neighbors posed no threat. America’s economy was immense, and the combination of military security and wealth allowed it to be generous. America envisioned the new order implementing Enlightenment ideals expressed in Magna Carta and its own Declaration of Independence—individual rights, protection from arbitrary state behavior, free speech, and freedom to assemble and protest peacefully. America sought to make these norms universal. However, as Luce averred, “Belief in an authoritarian destiny is staging powerful comeback.”80 Thus, strong revisionist states still seek to undermine the postwar geopolitical status quo.

Notes 1. Martin Wolf, “The Price of Populism,” Financial Times, October 23, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/06181c56-d13b-11e8-a9f2-7574db 66bcd5. 2. Agnew and Shin, Mapping Populism, p. 3.

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3. Andrew G. McCabe, The Threat: How the FBI Protects America in the Age of Terror and Trump (New York: St. Martin’s, 2019), p. xi. 4. Cited in Alex Ward, “Read Trump’s Speech to the UN General Assembly,” Vox, September 25, 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/9/ 25/17901082/trump-un-2018-speech-full-text. 5. Cited in Anne Gearan and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Condemns Globalism, Touts Nationalistic View of Foreign Affairs at U.N.,” Washington Post, September 24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ trump-touts-nationalistic-view-of-foreign-affairs-at-un/2019/09/24/e4a 8486a-ded2-11e9-8fd3-d943b4ed57e0_story.html?wpisrc=nl_politicspm&wpmm=1. 6. Cohen, “America’s Long Goodbye,” p. 143. 7. Gideon Rachman, “Donald Trump Embodies the Spirit of Our Age,” Financial Times, October 22, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/f3e 9fac6-d550-11e8-ab8e-6be0dcf18713. 8. Cited in Yashar Ali, “What George W. Bush Really Thought of Donald Trump’s Inauguration,” Intelligencer, March 29, 2017, http://nymag. com/intelligencer/2017/03/what-george-w-bush-really-thought-of-tru mps-inauguration.html?gtm=top>m=top. 9. Walter Russell Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt,” Foreign Affairs 96:2 (March/April 2017), p. 3. 10. Ibid., pp. 4–5, 7. 11. Burleigh, The Best of Times, the Worst of Times, pp. 284 and 288. 12. Cited in David Nakamura, “Critics Say Trump Has Fostered the Toxic Environment for the Political Violence He Announces,” Washington Post, October 27, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/thecentral-premise-of-his-presidency-critics-say-trump-has-fostered-the-toxicenvironment-for-the-political-violence-he-denounces/2018/10/27/cd4 5e43e-da1e-11e8-a10f-b51546b10756_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ term=.9348800c398c&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/28/how-pittsburgh-shootingcompares-attacks-jews-europe-where-anti-semitism-has-been-growing/? utm_term=.490a9c1c335f&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 13. Cited in Peter Baker, “Trump Fans the Flames of a Racial Fire,” New York Times, July 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/pol itics/trump-twitter-race.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190715? campaign_id=2&instance_id=10894&segment_id=15214&user_id=318 a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea®i_id=43321680715. 14. Cited in Anne Gearan, “A Church Service on a Blue-Skied Sunday Interrupts Trump’s Weekend of Presidential Pique,” Washington Post, March 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-churchservice-on-a-blue-skied-sunday-interrupts-trumps-weekend-of-president

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ial-pique/2019/03/17/4c103b68-48d1-11e9-b79a-961983b7e0cd_ story.html?utm_term=.02f08d9d8f02. Adam Serwer, “White Nationalism’s Deep American Roots,” The Atlantic, April 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 2019/04/adam-serwer-madison-grant-white-nationalism/583258/?wpi src=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Samuel P. Huntington, “Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite,” National Interest (Spring 2004), http://archive.wphna. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/04-03_The_National_Interest._Sam uel_Huntington_Davos_Man.pdf, p. 1. Jason Willick, “How Samuel Huntington Predicted Our Political Moment,” The American Interest, July 14, 2016, https://www.the-ame rican-interest.com/2016/07/14/how-samuel-huntington-predicted-ourpolitical-moment/. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 363, 364–365. James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 119. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization, pp. 89, 91. Tony Blair, “Tony Blair: Against Populism, the Center Must Hold,” New York Times, March 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/ opinion/tony-blair-against-populism-the-center-must-hold.html?rref=col lection%2Fspotlightcollection%2Feditorials-and-opeds-about-world-news. Ben Rhodes, “The Democratic Revival: What It Will Take to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 99:5 (September/October 2020), p. 55. Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2017), pp. 36, 38, https://www.foreignaf fairs.com/articles/world/2017-04-17/liberal-order-rigged. Edward Luce, The Retreat of Western Liberalism (New York: Grove Press, 2017), p. 10. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown Publishing, 2018), p. 22. Kenneth Roth, “Human Rights in the Age of Trump”, Foreign Policy (April 2018), p. 7. Cited in Michael Hirsh, “Lech Walesa on Why Democracy Is Failing: ‘There Is No Leadership’,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2019, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/14/lech-walesa-poland-why-democracy-fai ling-there-is-no-leadership/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email& utm_campaign=18108&utm_term=Editor#39;s%20Picks%20OC. Jill Langlois, “The Feminine Appeal of Macho Populism,” Foreign Policy, December 1, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/01/the-fem inine-appeal-of-macho-populism/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=

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email&utm_campaign=28098&utm_term=Editors%20Picks%20OC&? tpcc=28098. Buruma, “The End of the Anglo-American Order.” Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 4, 9. Dani Rodrik, “Globalization’s Wrong Turn,” Foreign Affairs 98:4 (July/August 2019), pp. 26, 28. Arthur C. Brooks, “The Dignity Deficit,” Foreign Affairs 96:2 (March/April 2017), pp. 109, 110. Cited in Philip Bump, “How to Understand Trump’s Condemnation of ‘All Types of Racism’,” Washington Post, August 12, 2018, https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/08/12/how-to-unders tand-trumps-condemnation-of-all-types-of-racism/?utm_term=.b1bd92 595a40&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Richard Florida, The New Urban Crisis (New York: Basic Books), p. 90. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), p. 2. Thomas Picketty, The Economics of Inequality (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 3. Cited in Vann R. Newkirk II, “Trump’s White-Nationalist Pipeline,” The Atlantic, August 23, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/arc hive/2018/08/trump-white-nationalism/568393/?utm_source=twb& wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Philip Rucker, “‘A Blowtorch to the Tinder’: Stoking Racial Tensions Is a Feature of Trump’s Presidency,” Washington Post, June 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-blowtorch-tothe-tinder-stoking-racial-tensions-is-a-feature-of-trumps-prrefleesidency/ 2018/06/20/e95e71dc-73d9-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html? utm_term=.4f4ffe71ac60. Cited in Brian Levin, “Bannon’s Revenge: How Globalism Went from a Mainstream Ideology to the Far-Right’s Favorite Smear,” Think, April 1, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/bannon-s-revengehow-globalism-went-mainstream-ideology-far-right-ncna860221?wpisrc= nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Katie Zezima, “Trump ‘Who the Hell Cares If There’s A Trade War’?” Washington Post, May 20, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/05/20/trump-who-the-hell-cares-iftheres-a-trade-war/. Ronald Inglehart, “The Age of Insecurity,” Foreign Affairs 97:3 (May/June 2018), p. 20. Cited in Ishe Tharoor, “Trump’s Hard-Line View of Immigration Draws Parallels to the 1930s,” Washington Post, June 25, 2018, https://www.

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washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/25/trumps-har dline-view-of-immigration-draws-parallels-to-the-1930s/?utm_term=.84b ef8878389. George F. Will, “Trump’s Presidency Is One Giant Act of Trolling,” Washington Post, October 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/trumps-presidency-is-one-giant-act-of-trolling/2018/10/10/ d6aa4632-cbe6-11e8-920f-dd52e1ae4570_story.html?utm_term=.74b 43628be48&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Martin Wolf, “The Age of the Elected Despot Is Here,” Financial Times, April 23, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/9198533e-652111e9-a79d-04f350474d62. Cited in Reis Thebault, “‘You Can Hear the Klan’s Lawyers’: Federal Judge Likens Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary to KKK,” Washington Post, April 13, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/ 13/you-can-hear-klans-lawyers-federal-judge-likens-trumps-attacks-judici ary-kkk/?utm_term=.626a55067e1b. Cited in Eugene Scott, “One of Trump’s Most Vocal Black Supporters Seemed to Defend Hitler in a Recent Speech,” Washington Post, February 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/08/onetrumps-most-vocal-black-supporters-seemed-defend-hitler-recent-spe ech/?utm_term=.b2bf2e87a5ea. Jan-Werner Müller, “False Flags: The Myth of the Nationalist Resurgence,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2019), p. 37. Daniel R. Coats, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2019, p. 4, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/docume nts/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf?utm_source=Press%20Rele ase&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=NIS_2019. See Shane Harris, “New Intelligence Strategy Warns of Threats to Western Democracy,” Washington Post, January 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/national-security/new-intelligence-strategy-warns-of-threatsto-western-democracy/2019/01/22/a8ca5a5e-1e93-11e9-8b59-0a2 8f2191131_story.html?utm_term=.129c52ae85c3&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. Cited in John Wagner, ““Crazed Lunatics’: Trump Again Attacks the News Media as ‘the Enemy of the People’,” Washington Post, January 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/crazed-lunatics-wit hout-explanation-trump-again-attacks-the-news-media/2019/01/07/ 290aed10-126d-11e9-b6ad-9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html?utm_term=.1b2 05a5e96c7. Steger, Globalisms, p. 5. Cited in Margaret Sullivan, “Trump Joking with Putin over Eliminating Journalists Is a Betrayal of America: So Is Ignoring It.” Washington Post, June 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/

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trumps-jokes-with-putin-over-eliminating-journalists-is-a-betrayal-ofamerica-so-is-ignoring-it/2019/06/28/b7ada93a-99be-11e9-916d-9c6 1607d8190_story.html?utm_term=.e71227e926a0&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. “The Observer View on Liberal Views Being as Vital to the World Order as Ever,” The Guardian, June 30, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2019/jun/30/the-observer-view-on-vladimir-putin-anddefence-of-liberal-values?CMP=share_btn_link. Susan B. Glasser, “It’s True: Trump Is Lying More, and He’s Doing It On Purpose,” The New Yorker, August 3, 2018, https://www.newyor ker.com/news/letter-from-trumps-washington/trumps-escalating-waron-the-truth-is-on-purpose. Cited in Robert Costa and Felicia Sonmez, “Trump, GOP Defiant Amid Allegations That Incendiary Rhetoric Contributed to Climate of Violence,” Washington Post, October 28, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/george-washington-saw-america-as-a-safe-place-forjews-trumps-america-isnt/2018/10/28/e21ea6e6-dade-11e8-b3f0-626 07289efee_story.html?utm_term=.63d36f5711bc. https://www.washin gtonpost.com/politics/trump-gop-defiant-amid-allegations-that-incend iary-rhetoric-contributed-to-climate-of-violence/2018/10/28/eecd91f6dae1-11e8-b732-3c72cbf131f2_story.html?utm_term=.90b137866b7d. Cited in Philip Rucker, “N.Y. Times Publisher Said He Told Trump That Attacks on Media Could Lead to Violence,” Washington Post, July 29, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-sayshe-called-media-enemy-of-the-people-in-meeting-with-ny-times-publis her/2018/07/29/fec5adee-9330-11e8-810c-5fa705927d54_story.html? utm_term=.2a7a2cac87bf&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Kathleen Parker, “Trump Has Made It a Verbal Open Season on Journalists,” Washington Post, June 29, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/trump-has-made-it-a-verbal-open-season-on-jou rnalists/2018/06/29/0d0f8090-7bcc-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story. html?utm_term=.04406f97cfce. Jason Horowitz, “Journalist Who Spread Conspiracy Theories Will Oversee Italy’s State TV,” New York Times, September 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/world/europe/italy-journalistrai.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&con tentCollection=world®ion=rank&module=package&version=highli ghts&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sectionfront. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Most Extraordinary Op-Ed of 2017,” Washington Post, June 1, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/postevery thing/wp/2017/06/01/the-most-extraordinary-op-ed-of-2017/?utm_ term=.fb646319e341.

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59. Daniel B. Baer, “Trump’s Silence on Russia’s Corruption Protests Shows Just How Big Putin Won,” Foreign Policy, March 29, 2017, http://for eignpolicy.com/2017/03/29/trumps-silence-on-russias-corruption-pro tests-shows-just-how-big-putin-won-in-taking-down-hillary-clinton/?wpi src=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 60. Elliot Abrams, “Trump the Traditionalist,” Foreign Affairs 96:4 (July/August 2017), p. 14. 61. Donald J. Trump and Bill Zanker, Think Big: Make It Happen in Business and Life (New York: HarperCollins, 207), p. 29. 62. Stewart M. Patrick, “Trump and World Order,” Foreign Affairs 96:2 (March/April 2017), p. 52. 63. Cited in Melissa Eddy, “Germany Reacts to Merkel-Trump Visit: ‘Could Have Been a Lot Worse’,” New York Times, March 18, 2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/world/europe/angela-merkel-trumpgermany.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope&_r=0. 64. Philip Gordon, “A Vision of Trump at War,” Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-03-22/vis ion-trump-war?cid=nlc-twofa-20170323&sp_mid=53691138&sp_rid= bWFuc2JhY2hAaWFzdGF0ZS5lZHUS1&spMailingID=53691138&spU serID=MjEwNDg3NTgxNTQ5S0&spJobID=1123983649&spReportId= MTEyMzk4MzY0OQS2. 65. Blair, “Tony Blair: Against Populism, the Center Must Hold.” 66. Fred Hu and Michael Spence, “Why Globalization Stalled,” Foreign Affairs 96:4 (July/August 2017), p. 58. 67. John Paulson, “Trump and the Economy,” Foreign Affairs 96:2 (March/April 2017), p. 11. 68. Christopher Ingraham, “Nearly Half of White Republicans Say It Bothers Them to Hear People Speaking Foreign Languages,” Washington Post, May 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/05/ 08/nearly-half-white-republicans-say-it-bothers-them-hear-people-spe aking-foreign-languages/?utm_term=.819dcd2f32df&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. 69. Cited in Jennifer Rubin, “A Guide to the Ugly Ideology We’re Up Against, and How Politicians Like Trump Spread It,” Washington Post, August 12, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/ 08/12/guide-ugly-ideology-were-up-against-how-politicians-like-trumpspread-it/?wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 70. Anne Applebaum, “How Europe’s ‘Identitarians’ Are Mainstreaming Racism,” Washington Post, May 17, 2019, https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-europes-identitarians-are-mai nstreaming-racism/2019/05/17/3c7c9a6e-78da-11e9-b3f5-5673ed f2d127_story.html?utm_term=.731ad8b615b8&wpisrc=nl_todayworld& wpmm=1.

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71. Cited in Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “Homeland Security Dept. Affirms Threat of White Supremacy After years of Prodding,” New York Times, October 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/ politics/white-supremacy-homeland-security.html?nl=todaysheadlines& emc=edit_th_191002?campaign_id=2&instance_id=12641&segment_id= 17504&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea®i_id=433 21681002. 72. Max Fisher, “White Terrorism Shows ‘Stunning’ Parallels to Islamic State’s Rise,” New York Times, August 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/08/05/world/americas/terrorism-white-nationalist-suprem acy-isis.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190806?campaign_id=2& instance_id=11320&segment_id=15907&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30a bd1bb02c4382ea®i_id=43321680806. 73. John R. Allen and Brett McGurk, “We Worked to Defeat the Islamic State: White Nationalist Terrorism Is an Equal Threat,” Washington Post, August 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-wor ked-to-defeat-the-islamic-state-white-nationalist-terrorism-is-an-equal-thr eat/2019/08/06/e50c90e8-b87d-11e9-bad6-609f75bfd97f_story.html? wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 74. Cited in Patrick Kingsley, “Hungary’s Refugee Referendum Not Valid After Voters Stay Away,” The Guardian, October 2, 2016, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/hungarian-vote-on-refugees-willnot-take-place-suggest-first-poll-results. 75. Blair, “Tony Blair: Against Populism, the Center Must Hold.” 76. Pierpaolo Barbieri, “The Death and Life of Social Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eur ope/2017-04-25/death-and-life-social-democracy?cid=nlc-twofa-201 70427&sp_mid=53952057&sp_rid=bWFuc2JhY2hAaWFzdGF0ZS5l ZHUS1&spMailingID=53952057&spUserID=MjEwNDg3NTgxNTQ 5S0&spJobID=1144755899&spReportId=MTE0NDc1NTg5OQS2. 77. “Read Senator John McCain’s Farewell Statement,” New York Times, August 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/us/politics/ john-mccain-farewell-statement.html. 78. Cited in Cited in Karen DeYoung, “In Trump, Some Fear the End of the World Order,” Washington Post, June 8, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/world/national-security/in-trump-some-fear-the-end-of-theworld-order/2018/06/08/d6026dde-6b44-11e8-bf8c-f9ed2e672adf_ story.html?utm_term=.18c20a621d4a. 79. Jake Sullivan, “What Donald Trump and Dick Cheney Got Wrong About America,” The Atlantic, January/February 2019, https://www.theatl antic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/yes-america-can-still-lead-theworld/576427/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 80. Luce, The Retreat of Western Liberalism, p. 9.

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Questions Multiple Choice 1. Which of these provides the public with participation in decisionmaking and, if healthy, holds those elected responsible what takes place? a. Democracy b. Nationalist populism c. Authoritarianism d. Globalization 2. According to Martin Wolf, what is the common thread in all forms of nationalist-populism? a. Promotion of human rights and the desire to spread democratic ideals on a global scale b. Rejection of the contemporary western elite, the synthesis of liberal democracy, technocratic governance, and global capitalism c. Rejection of authoritarian leadership d. The predisposition to increase immigration whether illegal or legal, especially to fill jobs requiring relatively unskilled labor 3. Nationalist-populism _______? a. Involves the rejection of globalization, but not the liberal order b. Involves the rejection of the liberal order, but not globalization c. Involves the rejection of globalization as well as the liberal order d. Involves the rejection of neither globalization nor the liberal order 4. What term does Walter Russell Mead use to describe America’s nationalist-populism? a. Trumpism b. Liberalism

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c. Backwardization d. Jacksonian 5. Many American populist, including Trump, are inclined to which of these? a. Illiberal democracy (even authoritarianism) b. Racism, misogyny, and strident ignorance c. Unilateralism d. All the above 6. Huntington’s final book — Who Are We? — is a wide-ranging treatise that argued, among other things, that American elites were dangerously out of touch with the American public when it came to all these issues except what? a. Research in Technology b. Patriotism c. Foreign policy d. National identity 7. Which of James Rosenau four “global worlds” includes those who share positive inclinations toward the processes of globalization and resemble the elites that populists dislike? a. Affirmative Globals b. Resistant Globals c. Specialized Globals d. Territorial Globals 8. Which of James Rosenau four “global worlds” includes those who regard one or more of the prevailing dynamics that sustain globalization as detrimental to the well-being of peoples? a. Affirmative Globals b. Resistant Globals c. Specialized Globals d. Territorial Globals 9. Which of James Rosenau’s four “local worlds” includes those who perceive the spatially remote as so threateningly close as to necessitate opposition?

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a. Insular Locals b. Resistant Locals c. Exclusionary Locals d. Affirmative Locals 10. Which of James Rosenau’s four “local worlds” includes those who are solely concerned “with the geographically near at hand?” a. Insular Locals b. Resistant Locals c. Exclusionary Locals d. Affirmative Locals 11. Nationalist-populist leaders try to weaken or destroy mediating institutions. Which of these is not a mediating institution they would try to weaken or destroy? a. Legislatures b. Judiciaries c. The Press d. Their own political base 12. Growing economic inequality can make many individuals feel left behind by globalization and can make them suffer something called what according to Arthur C. Brooks? a. Nationalism b. Dignity deficit c. Globalization byproducts d. Clouded Outrage 13. What is the term President Trump uses to dismiss unflattering facts or factual material about him? a. Fake news b. Wrong news c. Journalistic integrity d. The facts 14. Which of these demographics is not typically Trump supporters? a. White b. Male

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c. Highly educated d. Working-class 15. President Trump denounced and threatened to terminate which Trade Agreement that governs trade among the U.S., Mexico, and Canada three? a. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) b. Western Free Trade Agreement (WFTA) c. North American Trade Partnership (NATP) d. Liberal Migration Agreement and Order (LMAO) 16. The World Trade Organization (WTO) permitted China to have average tariffs roughly how much higher than the America, thereby allowing Beijing to export far more to America than it imports? a. Ten percent b. One and a half times c. Three times d. Ten Times 17. To what does Max Fisher compare white supremacist violence? a. Terrorism of the Islamic State (IS) b. Gang violence c. Secret Police d. Striking workers 18. In 2019, which of these declared that white supremacism was a dangerous security threat? a. President Trump b. Department of Homeland Security c. Vladimir Putin d. State Department 19. Either a group of actors or a what must be prepared to impose and enforce the rules of a global order? a. Non-governmental organization b. No powerful actors are necessary c. Powerless actor d. Hegemon

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20. Before World War I, Great Britain had been the hegemon. After World War II, who assumed that role? a. Germany b. France c. China d. United States True or False 1. True or False? Populism is a revolution against the establishment and democratic norms. True 2. True or False? Populists believe that professional experts are preferable to ordinary people using “common sense.” False, populists believe that ordinary people using “common sense” are preferable to professional experts 3. True or False? Like fellow populist Trump uses mainstream media to reach out to and mobilize supporter. False, Trump undermined mainstream media and fostered the use of social media like Facebook and Twitter to mobilize supporters 4. True or False? Trump has emphatically declared himself a “nationalist” True 5. True or False? Mead agrees with globalists who believed “tribal loyalties” were obsolete. False, Mead believes the globalist “failed to understand the deep roots of identity politics in the human psyche.” 6. True or False? Many American populists, especially Trump, are inclined to illiberal democracy (even authoritarianism), racism, misogyny, strident ignorance, and unilateralism.

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True 7. True or False? Terrorism by right-wing supremacists in America was significantly more dangerous than Islamic terrorism or the amorphous left-wing “Antifa,” accounting for three-quarters of extremist-related killings during the past decade. True 8. True or False? Whereas traditional conservatives valued the institutions they inherited, right-wing populists focus on identities such as ethnicity, race, religion, and gender rather than national interests. True 9. True or False? The agenda of nationalist-populism does not have much in common globally. False, the agenda of nationalist-populism has a lot in common globally. 10. True or False? The benefits of globalization have been spread evenly across economic and social classes. False, it has had lopsided benefits that have tend to go to the already successful. 11. True or False? Some extremists believe that the liberal order furthers “white genocide” by permitting immigration and miscegenation. True 12. True or False? Populists like President Trump are uniquely American. False, they exist around the globe. Examples being southeast Asian demagogic populist politicians such as Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, or Ontario’s Premier Douglas Ford. 13. True or False? Populists have a majoritarian view of democracy in the sense that those who get the most votes (popular or electoral)

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should be able to impose whatever institutions and policies they wish regardless of the views of minorities. True 14. True or False? President Trump himself has been notably honest and not a major source of what he might call, “fake news.” False, as a serial liar, President Trump was a major source of “fake news” in American politics. For example, claiming voter fraud cost him the popular vote with no evidence. 15. True or False? Donald Trump understands that America has a strategic as well as a moral interest in standing with democracies around the world, and that America grows stronger and more powerful the more successfully it represents universal values on the world stage. False, according to Daniel Baer, “every president in recent history except Donald Trump” has understood this. 16. True or False? After the Syrian government’s use of illegal nerve gas against civilians, Washington condemned the event and steadfastly demanded that President Assad resign. False, they retreated from the demand that President Assad resign. 17. True or False? Trump viewed America’s trade deficit as indicating who wins and who loses. True 18. True or False? In 2019, America’s Department of Homeland Security declared that white supremacism was a dangerous security threat. True 19. True or False? The rise of populism was accompanied by the rise of social democratic parties across Europe.

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False, it was accompanied by the “downfall” of the European social democratic parties. 20. True or False? Nationalist-populism has spread across Europe, notably Great Britain and the eastern members of the EU, and elsewhere, including Latin America and South and Southeast Asia. True Short Answer Why would mainstream parties find it difficult to appeal to both proand anti-globalizers? On the left, egalitarian philosophy clashed with attention paid to minorities, whether people of color, religious or ethnic group, women, or gays. On the right, parties sought unsuccessfully to balance spending for local projects to bring money to a politician’s district in exchange for votes with charges of corruption and vaguely defined special interests. Also, globalization are sources of wealth aside from the inequality. According to Sam Huntington how are the concerns of the public different from the concerns of the elites? The public, overall, is concerned with societal security, existing patterns of language, culture, association, religion, and national identity. However, for elites “these concerns are secondary to participating in the global economy, supporting international trade and migration, strengthening international institutions.” What part of the agenda of nationalist-populism is consistent globally? They oppose elites and migrants (especially minorities) whom they blame for the loss of jobs and the erosion of their national culture. They foster unilateralism, intolerance, racism and malignant nationalism. They focus on national interests rather than global cooperation in confronting global challenges and providing collective goods, and they have a transactional view of global politics. Their ideology and policies threaten the free movement of goods and people, multinational global

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organizations, and challenge transnational and international political, economic, and social networks that foster interdependence. Many of the most ardent populist politicians including Trump are themselves “elite” by any objective standard–wealth, education, or status. How are advocates of globalization are partly responsible for the acceleration of the rise of nationalist-populism? Dani Rodrik argued, “Even globalization’s biggest boosters now concede that it has produced lopsided benefits and that something will have to change.” Domestic economies were put in the service of the global economy. Rodrik describes how WTO trade norms fostered a loss of manufacturing jobs in developed countries, and unregulated capital flows and anonymous market forces produced the Great Recession. Many people, especially white working-class males, at least in America, felt left behind and perceptions of inequality and spreading anti-globalization sentiments increased. About the 2007–2008 recession, what did Susan Strange mean when she said the markets appeared to foster a “casino capitalism?” That it was a winner-take-all economy that eroded democratic institutions and favored educated and wealthy elites. Lowering interest rates allowed financial institutions to make increasingly risky investments, and global governance provided by institutions such as the European Central Bank and the IMF proved inadequate to remedy the problem. How might globalization itself pose a threat to democracy? For one thing multinational and transnational institutions like the World Banks and corporations make decisions without consulting citizens of member states. Their bureaucrats and technocrats are responsible to member states but not to the latter’s voting public, thus creating a “democratic deficit.” How have President Trump’s incendiary rhetoric and personal attacks on political foes result in real world consequences?

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It has created a climate of violence against racial and religious minorities as well as journalists. The recent massacre at a Jewish synagogue in Pittsburgh and the massacre of 50 Muslims in New Zealand by a white supremacist, are both examples of extremist motivated by hate speech. How did domestic factor play into a loss of American manufacturing jobs? They include automation, especially breakthroughs in sensors, machine learning, and artificial intelligence, and outsourcing “noncore” jobs by major corporations within the U.S. to lowwage and non-union subcontractors have been the most important factors in the loss of manufacturing jobs. Why is Nationalist populism such a dangerous ideology? It threatens to undermine genuine democracy with sham democracy that brings with it demagogic authoritarians. As such, it threatens the global order that had fostered democracy, human rights, and rule-based norms and practices established under America’s leadership after World War II. Along with its relationship with other dangerous ideologies like racism, sexism, nativism, and others. What is the importance of a hegemon to the global order? Either a hegemon or a group of actors is necessary for the rules of a global order to be imposed and enforced. Essay Questions 1. Who are the Nationalist-populist? 2. What is the role of institutions as a target and as a resistance to nationalist-populism? 3. How have current events and the current climate lead to the acceleration of nationalist-populism? 4. Will the liberal order be able to survive the threat of nationalistpopulism? 5. Why do nationalist-populist movements so often coincide with racism, misogynistic, and nativist sentiments?

CHAPTER 3

The Return of Geopolitics and Declining U.S. Hegemony

Recent years have witnessed growing disorder in global politics that raises questions about the durability of the liberal order and globalization. Simultaneously, geopolitical analysis, which focuses on geographic influences on power relationships among states, is getting renewed attention owing to events such as Russia’s seizure of Crimea and China’s claims in the South China Sea. Only a few decades earlier, commentators like John Lewis Gaddis called attention to “the long peace,” that is, the post-World War II era. This was said to be the longest documented period since the Roman Empire when the great powers of the time had not gone to war directly with one another and indeed had experienced relative peace.1 John McCain summarized: “Leaders of the post-war era had seen the breakdown of the world order. They saw open markets give way to protectionism and poverty. They saw ethnic and nationalist passions give way to violence and misery. They saw the brutal ambition of hostile great powers give way to war and genocide. In the aftermath of that tragic era, those leaders forged a liberal world order that ushered in an unprecedented era of stability, security and prosperity.”2 However, the global liberal order was not entirely a reflection of idealism or altruism. It was also the expression of what American leaders regarded as U.S. interests and responsibilities as a hegemon. The multilateral institutions it established benefitted

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everyone, but the rules and norms these institutions fostered were of special advantage to America.

Declining American Hegemony and the Liberal Order Whether the spread of globalization, that was linked to American leadership after World War II and accelerated during the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” will continue is in doubt. With the Cold War’s end, America was an unchallenged hegemon in a world in which globalization was making people increasingly interdependent economically, politically, socially, and culturally and was removing obstacles to the movement of persons, ideas, and things. The proliferation of nongovernmental groups (NGOs) advocating solutions to collective problems like global warming fostered global civil society and enhanced prospects for global governance in issue areas that required global cooperation. Washington’s foes were not “just up against the United States; they would also have to contend with the most globally organized and deeply entrenched order the world has ever seen, one that is dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic.”3 “The United States,” Ikenberry wrote, “took on the duties of building and running an international order, organizing it around multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and client states…. Defined in terms of the provision of security, wealth creation, and social advancement, this liberal hegemonic order has been, arguably at least, the most successful order in world history.” But, observers believe we “are witnessing a passing of the American era” that began with the George W. Bush administration’s unilateralism, “a return to multipolarity, and the rise of rival nonliberal order-building projects.”4 Although recognizing the role of rising China and resurgent Russia, Fareed Zakaria concluded that America’s loss of hegemony was its own doing. Washington failed to pay sufficient attention to Russia after the USSR collapsed. After 9/11, America got bogged down in disastrous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Argued Zakaria, “one is struck by the ways in which Washington—from an unprecedented position—mishandled its hegemony and abused its power, losing allies and emboldening enemies,” “under the Trump administration, the United States seems to have lost interest, indeed lost faith, in the ideas and purpose that animated its international presence for three-quarters of a century.”5

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America’s retreat from the order it had established was evident as Washington accelerated its retreat from its role in world affairs. “America,” argued William Martel, no longer “had a coherent, functioning grand strategy” as it did during the Cold War when “containment” guided U.S. foreign policy. Without a grand strategy, “the nation, its leaders, and people will experience a sense of drift and confusion. How do we know what is important, what threatens our interests, when we should act, and what instruments of power should we use?”6 In recent years, it became increasingly difficult to shape a grand strategy owing to the proliferation of actors and crises, often simultaneously, in many locations and issue-areas. Absent a grand strategy, there could be no consensus about America’s interests, and neither allies nor foes could perceive with any certainty what Washington sought—for what issues and in what circumstances, for example, if and when America would use military force. Thus, foes became more willing to test U.S. resolve. Whether considered an era of “nonpolarity” or “disorder”7 in which many actors exercised different types of power or “compounding complexity” in which challenges grew exponentially and fostered one another, the strategic environment became bewildering. What was taking place was a transition from “an age of order to an age of entropy.”8 Concluded Kagan, “The United States, in short, was the ‘indispensable nation,’ as Bill Clinton would proclaim—indispensable, that is, to the liberal world order.” Defending the liberal world order, he added, “was the thinking behind most of Clinton’s foreign policy initiatives,”9 the enlargement of NATO, the effort to save Boris Yeltsin’s political and economic reforms in Russia, and containing rogue states like North Korea that undermined the global order. As for the consequences: “When the prevailing order breaks down, when the rocks are overturned, the things living beneath them, the darkest elements of the human spirit, crawl out. That was what happened in the first half of the 20th century. The circumstances in which Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini rose to power — a world in which no nation was willing or able to sustain any kind of international order — gave them ample opportunity to show what they were capable of. Had there been an order in place to blunt those ambitions, we might never have come to know them as tyrants, aggressors and mass killers.”10 Those who argued that a hegemon like America is crucial for global order and maintenance of international institutions that are pillars of globalization pointed to America’s “decline” as a key factor. In fact, the

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liberal order was hardly peaceful. There was continuous conflict involving ideology, the legitimacy and utility of differing principles and institutions, the limits of state sovereignty, and the virtues of democracy and human rights. Moreover, the world witnessed an upsurge in terrorism, the spread of ethnic and religious strife, and the proliferation of fragile states like Somalia. By the twenty-first century, U.S. hegemony was eroding; multipolarity was growing; and the norms of the liberal order were increasingly ignored. However, some analysts feared that America was losing its dominant position and was growing less able to maintain order. As Stephen Kotin observed, “Every hegemon thinks it is the last; all ages believe they will endure forever. In reality, of course, states rise, fall, and compete with one another along the way.”11 The issue of hegemony is important, not least because the liberal order manifested American leadership in fostering democratic norms, international institutions, and economic interdependence. This is in contrast to nationalist, ethnic and sectarian exclusionism, arms races, and preoccupation with geopolitical interests associated with interstate war, identity conflicts, and barriers to the movement of things, ideas, and persons. Other challenges emerged in recent years with changes in the relative economic, military, and political power of America and the growing influence of “rising” China, and other poles of power. “The United States,” as Ikenberry wrote, “took on the duties of building and running an international order, organizing it around multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and client states…. Defined in terms of the provision of security, wealth creation, and social advancement, this liberal hegemonic order has been, arguably at least, the most successful order in world history.” However, he believed we were “witnessing a passing of the American era” that began with the George W. Bush administration’s unilateralism, “a return to multipolarity, and the rise of rival nonliberal order-building projects.”12 Those who believed that a hegemon was necessary for global order pointed to America’s “decline” as fostering growing global disorder. Both claims—American decline and growing disorder—were contested. If hegemonic-stability theory were correct, however, in time there would be no single, benign leader willing and able to shape global institutions and enforce the rules and norms that enabled globalization to flourish. In fact, U.S. hegemony has at times been malign as in America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 or its brutal mistreatment of alleged terrorists after 9/11.

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Similarly, market capitalism in the West and elsewhere had produced great economic benefits, but also had experienced cycles of inflation and recession. Evidence of hegemonic decline included Russian aggression in Ukraine, its annexation of Crimea, its intervention in Syria, and former President Trump’s hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria. Observers also cited China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan, Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East, and North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. They also pointed to the proliferation of fragile states as additional evidence of hegemonic decline, spreading sectarian and nationalist movements, and a return to a realpolitik world.

Hegemony Stability and American “Decline” Realist scholars like Robert Gilpin, who concluded that, “a hegemon is necessary to the existence of a liberal international economy”,13 treated hegemonic stability and the consequences of its decline extensively. Gilpin described the cyclical “hegemonic wars” as the ultimate tests “of change in the relative standings of the powers in the existing system”14 that erupted when a challenger threatened a hegemon. Graham Allison called this the “Thucydides’s trap”15 because clashes of hegemon and challenger resembled the relations between Sparta and Athens that Thucydides viewed as the cause of the Peloponnesian War. Hence, former President Trump upped U.S. resistance to China’s actions and policies, and, by 2020, it appeared Trump was making dislike of Beijing central to his reelection despite having asked President Xi earlier to aid his campaign. However, Robert Keohane argued persuasively that cooperation could persist even after the decline of a hegemon owing to interdependence and the presence of international regimes.16 Keohane admitted “hegemony often plays an important role, even a crucial one” in establishing international regimes, but he argued that regimes were easier to maintain than construct and “may continue to foster cooperation even under conditions that would not be sufficiently benign to bring about their creation.”17 The coming years will test Keohane’s optimism. The claim that the U.S. was declining may be misleading because there was little evidence of absolute decline. Instead, America’s decline was relative to the growing capabilities of countries like China and Russia. Although both sought to undermine U.S. hegemony and opposed universal liberal values like democracy, their growing capabilities did not

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mean that America’s capabilities were declining in absolute terms. Instead, what may have been happening is what Barry Buzan and George Lawson call “decentered globalism,” in which the configuration of modernity was “no longer concentrated in a small group of states” but was “increasingly dispersed.”18 Concern about “American decline” had been expressed before, notably in the 1980s with respect to Japan’s economic growth, but that forecast proved baseless. In 1990, Joseph Nye responded to this claim, citing the “World War II effect” in which comparisons of contemporary U.S. power with its power in 1945 were meaningless because major states like Germany and Japan had been devastated during World War II. Nye observed that there was “a history of premature and misleading predictions of decline”19 and argued that a belief in decline may actually produce it or tempt the “decliner” to begin a war to end its perceived decline. More recently, Nye argued that the “American century,” which began in 1941, would continue beyond 2041 because America would still have “primacy in power resources and play the central role in the global balance among states.”20 Nye’s prediction will also be tested in the coming years. Under recent presidents, as America increasingly abdicated its role as a global hegemon, illiberal rivals grew aggressive. Potential targets of China, Russia, and Iran still relied on America extended deterrence to protect them. The world following America’s retreat from hegemony will be dangerous. Nuclear proliferation would become more likely; strategic stability would be at risk; and deterrence would be less credible.21

Rising Powers The concept of “rising powers” has a distinctly realist flavor. Realists saw an anarchic world in which states must increase power for security and survival. “Power factors,” primarily but not exclusively military in classical realism, constituted the “power” of states until, according to John Mearsheimer, they acquired global hegemony.22 States pursued “national interests” that ultimately translated into maintaining security by increasing power and/or balancing others. Rules, norms, and morality played a minor role in realist thought. Whatever “order” existed under anarchy derived from a “balance of power” and “prudence” of leaders.23 When realists spoke of “power,” they usually meant “capabilities,” that is, resources useful to influence others. States had different capabilities, and some were powerful and others less so. Some were rising

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and others declining in what realists saw as a perennial struggle for power. Realists believed shifting alliances were common, and the overall distribution of power determined the nature of the global system as a whole. The problems with traditional realist worldviews are well known. “Power” remained difficult to define and hard to measure. Realists described leaders who fail to follow their eternal “laws,” “idealists,” or “utopians and focused on “hard power” (capabilities for coercion or reward). However, “soft power” (characteristics that others admire) were also significant. The American superpower lost the Vietnam War even though Henry Kissinger was convinced that hard power would win the war and that a “fourth-rate power” like North Vietnam would capitulate. America’s defeat was not due to insufficient hard power but to domestic opposition and inadequate soft power to win Vietnamese “hearts and minds.” Capabilities are not fungible. They are situationally specific and contextual. Nuclear weapons, for example, were of little value except to generate prestige or deter (and possibly frighten) others. Currently, the major powers are involved in expensive nuclear modernization programs. Russian President Vladimir Putin frequently described his country’s nuclear prowess and was using a third of Russia’s growing military budget to increase it, while America embarked on a $348 billion modernization effort. None of this was likely to provide additional security.

“Rising” China China was the most important challenge to American hegemony and was most likely to be America’s foe in the Thucydides trap. In 2016, Stephen K. Bannon, Trump’s populist adviser, predicted a “war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years,”24 China staked illegal territorial claims on islets and reefs in the South China Sea and militarized some of these, sent warships into Japanese territory near the Senkaku Islands, rammed fishing boats in other countries’ territorial waters, occupied Indian territory in the Himalayas, and sent an aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Straits. China’s pride in having overcome foreign humiliation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was frequently cited, especially by President Xi Jinping, after his accession as China’s “paramount leader” in 2012. Beijing no longer followed the advice of then-supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping that China should “hide its capacity and bide its time” in order to maintain a stable and secure environment necessary to achieve rapid

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economic growth. America’s incentive to engage Beijing was partly to gain access to China’s immense economic market. Beijing viewed the 2008 Beijing Olympics as reflecting China’s historical status as a great civilization along with its influence in neighboring states, its claims in the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan, and its deployment of modern weapons. Economic Rise China practices state capitalism in which states play major roles in markets. This system, introduced by Deng in the late 1970s after the death of Mao Zedong and the chaos caused by Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), became an engine for growth. In 2007, America’s economy was four times larger than China’s. Five years later the U.S. economy was only twice the size of China’s. After three decades of rapid growth, the size of China’s economy as measured by nominal gross domestic product (GDP) surpassed those of France, Britain, and Germany. Using gross national product (GNP) as a baseline, analysts calculated that China’s economy replaced Japan’s in 2010 as the world’s second largest and might pass America’s by 2030. Huge Chinese firms like Alibaba already accounted for 42% of global e-commerce in value, and, in the near future, China will have 45% of the world’s largest companies. Economist C. Fred Bergsten forecast an economic “G-2” in 2005.25 The World Bank in 2014 switched to purchasing power parity (PPP) to calculate GNP. This suggested that China was poised to become the world’s largest economy. However, even Beijing opposed the PPP standard and refused to endorse the World Bank report. Leading Western experts also criticized the PPP referent as potentially misleading. Martin Wolf and David Pilling wrote, “It is possible to debate whether the newly revised numbers are right. The answer is they are reasonable. A more important question is what they mean. What they do not mean is that China is already the world’s greatest economic power.”26 Wolf and Pilling observed that China remained in many respects a poor country. Its purchasing power per capita was relatively low, and, since China invested almost half its output, per capita consumption was lower than macrostatistics might suggest. PPP measured national incomes in terms of what they could buy domestically. Inasmuch as domestic spending on food and housing were not internationally traded and since goods and services

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were cheaper in China than America, China’s economy appeared relatively larger. By contrast, comparing China and the U.S. by using market exchange rates that measured national incomes by what they could buy on international markets, America’s economy became almost twice China’s. Nevertheless, in a few years, global income in illiberal societies will surpass that of Western liberal democracies. China also passed the U.S. in annual patent applications. Its scientists ranked second in peer-reviewed research articles, and Beijing planned to become globally competitive by 2025 in ten advanced manufacturing sectors currently dominated by America including commercial aircraft, robotics, 5G mobile phone communications, and computer microchips. In sum, China was becoming a science and technological superpower. When Deng initiated reforms in 1978, China was among the world’s poorest countries. Since then, China’s economy has grown by an annual average exceeding 8%, outstripping other major countries. China became the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer, overtook America as the world’s largest automobile market, and was an insatiable consumer of raw materials. China has the world’s largest number of homeowners, Internet users, and college graduates. Extreme poverty has fallen to less than 1%. What had been an impoverished country had become America’s most significant economic rival. Past growth rates did not necessarily predict the future. Referring to China and India, economists Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers pointed out, “the single most robust fact about growth rates, which is strong reversion to the mean,”27 that was, a lower growth rate over time. Indeed, China’s growth rate had begun to slow to 7% (or less) at present, depending on the reliability of Beijing’s statistics. It remained to be seen whether large-scale government stimulus programs will succeed in reversing China’s downward trend. The heavy debt burden of businesses, local governments, and private individuals in China was, however, a significant problem. By 2019, China’s total debt —individual, corporate, and government—had soared to over 300% of its GDP, twice that of 2008. China’s growth has been uneven and produced widespread corruption, food safety concerns, and environmental problems. Beijing remained dedicated to communist rule and Xi was increasing centralized regulations on markets.28 Consequently, its state capitalist system was experiencing strains in adopting freer markets, private investment, and greater domestic consumption. Moreover, by 2016 inequality in China had become greater

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than that of any major country. Although three-hundred million Chinese had emerged from poverty—an example of positive globalization—its per capita gross domestic product (PPP purchasing power parity) ranked 73rd ($18,110) globally compared to America, which ranked 10th ($66,609). Rural China remained poor, and many of the country’s 250 million migrant workers have left rural communities to work in cities where they often resided illegally, lacking the detested hukou (required household registration). Millions of migrants were squatters in cities where they lacked legal protection and government services and were exploited as cheap labor. The gap between China’s wealthy coastal regions and less prosperous interior threatened political stability and placed pressure on Beijing to maintain high growth. China’s economic growth was driven by exports, aided by government subsidies that kept the costs of domestic industries low. Between 1981 and 2017, the value of U.S.-China trade increased from $5 to $421.4 billion. In 2018, America’s trade deficit with China was $419.2 billion, accounting for over half of America’s total trade deficit. U.S. exports to China increased fivefold after 2001 when China joined the WTO. Key Chinese exports to America included cell phones, computers, video equipment, solar panels, and toys, while U.S. exports to China included soybeans, airplanes, automobiles, and semiconductors. Until the Sino-American trade war, China was America’s largest goods trading partner, and the two countries were linked by complex supply chains that are currently unraveling. Chinese overseas investment and tourism increased Beijing’s global visibility and soft power. Chinese leaders, while securing the country’s peripheries, sought to maintain peace and stability, while expanding political and economic links and avoiding war with America. This strategy extended China’s influence and interests globally. Beijing also desired to extend its “soft power” by establishing “Confucius Institutes” at U.S. universities to teach Mandarin while spreading propaganda that some American scholars believed should be shut down. China sought to attract high-performing students to China, even while Chinese students overseas in Australia and elsewhere were suspected of conducting espionage for Beijing. In 2015, China’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, with the National Development and Reform Commission, announced President Xi’s hugely ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) to invest in projects across Europe, Asia, and Africa to improve infrastructure,

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encourage trade and finance, and boost China’s presence and image. Silk Road Economic Belt targeted corridors in Asia and Europe and already sends trains to Germany and Iran, while a Maritime Silk Road focused on infrastructure projects including naval facilities in South Asia and East Africa.29 The initiative also sought to invest in the northern Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas. Italy’s government accepted China’s offer for investment in much needed infrastructure and was one of twelve EU members and the first of the Group of 7 (G-7) to do so. By 2020, China had invested $400 billion in BRI projects and promised much more and had persuaded 86 countries and international institutions to participate.30 Washington established the International Defense Corporation in response to China’s Belt and Road initiative, but it had far less capital to invest ($60 billion) than the BRI. A Chinese company owns the port of Athens, the Piraeus, and China is investing in the Italian ports of Genoa and Trieste. A spokesperson for America’s National Security Council was critical of Italy, arguing that it had not needed to “lend legitimacy to China’s infrastructure vanity project,” and adding that China’s plan was “predatory” and that the deal “will bring no benefits to the Italian people.”31 Such links provided China with political and military clout as well as economic benefits, especially in the developing world. What was more recent is China’s growing influence in Europe, notably, Cyprus, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Montenegro, and Portugal among others. Although Italian leaders were delighted by Chinese investment, some Europeans were suspicious of China’s economic influence. Some observers argued that China played off EU members against one another, and they needed to protect their industries. European leaders like France’s President Macron argued for closer cooperation among Europeans toward China. Chinese penetration contributed to growing Western coordination in policies toward Beijing, and this cooperation is likely to deepen in the Biden years. Days before becoming president, Biden warned the EU not to conclude a mutual investment agreement hastily that would facilitate China’s ownership of European firms, and, instead, wait for U.S.-EU consultation and cooperation regarding Beijing’s economic and human-rights policies. Investment for the BRI came from China’s $50 billion Silk Road Fund, the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the China Development Bank that promised to invest over $890 billion in over 900 projects in sixty countries. If this gigantic project succeeds, it would

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foster claims that authoritarianism could achieve security and growth more effectively than “erratic” democracies. Some observers viewed the BRI as a project to foster an illiberal world order. The BRI provided outlets for China’s surplus investment funds and overproduction of products like steel. It also afforded China with strategic influence in regions like Central Asia, and the Indian and Arctic Oceans. Indeed, China described “a ‘Pacific Silk Road’ a ‘Silk Road on Ice’ that crossed the Arctic Ocean and a ‘Digital Silk Road’ through cyberspace.”32 China also invested where the West was reluctant to do so. African and the Middle Eastern borrowers included countries that would find it difficult to pay its loans such as Yemen, Syria, and Zimbabwe, countries largely ignored by Washington. Moreover, Chinese loans placed no conditions on recipients like fostering democracy. Hence, China’s economic, political, and military involvement in Africa, in particular, surpassed the West’s. Recipients by no means received a free ride. The BRI has already created serious debt problems for countries like Nepal, Malaysia, and Ecuador that borrowed Chinese funds at commercial interest rates, forcing them to pay steep interest and surrendering to China control of their natural resources. One example was the price tag China put on railroad construction in Malaysia. Ultimately, Beijing reduced the cost by $11 billion. This concession entailed a reassessment of BRI because of fear that it saddled countries with a huge debt for unnecessary projects. Moreover, China’s treatment of debtors was reminiscent of the worst of old-style Western imperialism, and Beijing has become sensitive to charges of “debt-trap diplomacy,” that is, using loans that recipients could not repay to acquire political and military influence. Beijing also had a poor record of worker safety, environmental standards, and cultural understanding. An example of China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” was Chinese loans to Ecuador for a gigantic dam. The dam has never functioned properly; cracks appeared in its machinery; and many Ecuadoran officials involved in the project were accused of taking bribes. Silt clogged the dam’s reservoir, and when Ecuador tried to use the facility, it shorted out the national electricity grid. China’s loans were far beyond Ecuador’s financial capability to repay. Therefore, China receives 80% of Ecuador’s oil production in repayment. Beijing then profited by reselling the oil at a discount. Nevertheless, competition between China’s public and private firms with the latter’s effort to put its own profits before China’s objectives and China’s

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losses on overseas investments suggested that the BRI is not entirely favorable for Beijing. In Pakistan, Beijing was investing more in the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” than all U.S. aid to that country since 2002. Pakistan’s debt made it request a large loan from the IMF. However, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo opposed the loan after he and Treasury Secretary Mnuchin received a letter from a bipartisan group of U.S. senators. The senators claimed that the BRI’s goal was “the creation of an economic world order ultimately dominated by China,” and, therefore, “It is imperative that the United States counters China’s attempts to hold other countries financially hostage and force ransoms that further its geostrategic goals.”33 Nevertheless, the BRI’s priorities remained unclear, and it was uncertain which projects would prove profitable and successful. The scheme alienated those who see China as a new imperialist that buttressed authoritarian leaders. Recipients unable to repay China’s loans might find themselves unable to protect their sovereignty. Sri Lanka, for example, sought to terminate Chinese construction of a strategically located port on the Indian Ocean, but had to reverse its decision and grant China a 99years lease for the port. Beijing has recognized the negative views about the BRI and sought to reduce criticism. President Xi demanded that investments be transparent and declared that China would not tolerate corruption. Nevertheless, as a scholar at the National Bureau of Asian Research argued, “You can’t differentiate the Belt and Road with China’s overall foreign policy, which is to push itself to the center stage of the world.”34 In June 2015, China hosted the formal opening of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an institution established to rival the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. China held a 30.34% share of the AIIB’s initial $50 billion in assets and controlled 26.06% of the voting rights. Some 93 countries had joined the AIIB by 2019, including Britain, Germany, Australia, and South Korea, and others in Asia and the Middle East. Most conspicuous in their absence were America and Japan, which had opposed the AIIB from the outset. The AIIB, along with U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and later establishment Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a free trade area encompassing the members of ASEAN and countries with which ASEAN had free trade agreements, as well as China, seriously reduced U.S. economic and political influence in Asia. Moreover, in Asia, as

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elsewhere, China used its economic clout by reducing imports from countries including Australia, Japan, and South Korea, all U.S. allies, with which it had asymmetric economic relations and regarded as hostile to Beijing. However, China’s economic growth still confronted difficulties. For example, according to British analysts, “What was conceived as the world’s biggest development programme is unravelling into what could become China’s first overseas debt crisis. Lending by the Chinese financial institutions that drive the Belt and Road, along with bilateral support to governments, has fallen off a cliff, and Beijing finds itself mired in debt renegotiations with a host of countries.”35 China will soon become the world’s largest foreign investor. Much of this will be in the form of foreign capital reserves and portfolio investments, but also direct investment in the West and in poorly governed countries that the West avoids such as Yemen and Syria. Beijing is also investing in oil pipelines in Myanmar, Turkmenistan, and South Sudan, and an enormous hydroelectric-producing dam in Sudan. The sheer size and variety of its commitments are impressive. China also invested heavily in America, and its State Administration for Foreign Exchange, which is in charge of Beijing’s foreign-exchange holdings, established a New York office to acquire U.S. assets. Although such investment may be mutually beneficial, some U.S. observers feared giving Beijing influence that could harm America’s national security. Therefore, in 2005 Washington barred the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) effort to purchase UNOCOL, a U.S. oil company, and in 2013 CNOOC was permitted to buy the Canadian oil firm Nexen only on condition that it surrender operating control of Nexen’s assets in the Gulf of Mexico. More recently, the Trump administration described Huawei Technologies as a “national security threat” because the acquisition of U.S. telecommunications firms by such Chinese corporations would allow them install equipment to conduct espionage. America’s National Security Agency apparently had hacked into Huawei’s headquarters to learn whether it had links with China’s army and whether it could access the telephone and computer networks of countries that purchased its equipment. Also controversial was a decision by Virginia-based Smithfield Foods, one of America’s largest pork producers, to sell itself to China’s Shuanhui International in China’s largest corporate acquisition in America to that time. Critics (who did not prevail) were concerned about the safety of Chinese food products and feared Beijing’s exports of Smithfield’s pork

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to China might cause a pork shortage in America. The Smithfield sale reflected America’s willingness to do business with China. Agricultural products accounted for a quarter of U.S. exports to China and could rise significantly if not hindered by U.S. regulations and the Sino-American trade war that began in 2018. China and America have been economically interdependent for years, so much so that Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick coined the term “Chimerica” to describe their relationship, which was “a key driver in the global economy.”36 An example of Sino-American interdependence was Chinese purchases of U.S. government securities that finance America’s budget deficits. A precipitous decline in the value of the U.S. dollar would result if China sold these securities but would also trigger a dramatic decline in the value of China’s remaining dollar assets. In an exercise of neo-mercantilism, China for years kept the value of its currency, the renminbi, undervalued relative to the U.S. dollar. This lowered the price of Chinese exports and tilted the trade balance in China’s favor. American politicians charged China with “currency manipulation,” intentionally keeping the renminbi’s value artificially low, thereby costing American jobs and encouraging U.S. firms to move to China. However, after 2005, China gradually allowed its currency to appreciate, thereby defusing the issue, Candidate Trump claimed China was a currency manipulator but later walked back from his claim. However, a dramatic drop in the value of China’s currency amid the trade war in 2019 led Washington to renew the charge that China was a “currency manipulator,” even though the decline was due to market forces.37 China also sought to make the renminbi a reserve or hard currency like the U.S. dollar, but that would require the currency to be “managed” less by China’s authorities and more by market forces. China’s capital controls prevented the establishment of, globally accessible capital markets that safeguard assets, and therefore any market for renminbi as a reserve currency would have to be outside of China. With the shutdown of Hong Kong, it was difficult to imagine where this would be. In 2015, Chinese authorities rattled global markets by allowing the renminbi to fall 2% over consecutive days, an action widely regarded as demonstrating greater market flexibility in its currency campaign and fostering a boost to slumping Chinese exports. By 2014, China was settling 20% of its merchandise trade in renminbi assets. Despite such progress, the renminbi remained a modest factor in the global currency markets.

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China also became a major “offshore” destination for U.S. firms seeking to become globally competitive by reducing labor wages and benefits, lowering taxes and avoiding costly environmental regulations. Many American firms also “outsourced” (subcontracted) work to Chinese suppliers. In 2017, China became the world’s second leading destination (after India) for outsourcing based on cost competitiveness, resources skills, and business and economic environment. U.S. states such as Michigan and Ohio deeply resented the loss of jobs to China as industries moved overseas, and this was a key factor in Trump’s 2016 electoral victory in America’s Midwest “rust belt.” A slowdown in China’s economic growth gave some corporate giants pause about that country’s attraction. A shrinking population of workingage Chinese and rising wages increased costs in China, encouraging U.S. and Chinese firms to move elsewhere such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Moreover, as costs were reduced in America by trimming corporate health and pension obligations and making available new sources of energy, some firms returned home, a process termed “resourcing.” Nevertheless, by 2019, China exceeded the number of U.S. companies on the Fortune Global 500 list. “Fortune’s Global 500 shows how profoundly the world’s balance of power is shifting.… For the first time since the debut of the Global 500 in 1990, and arguably for the first time since World War II, a nation other than the U.S. is at the top of the ranks of global big business.”38 Growing wealth enabled China to undertake military modernization. America’s response was a combination of economic and political engagement with China, while seeking to contain that country’s ambitions. Military Rise China’s military modernization was rapid. The process was not easy owing to the resistance of commanders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to shifting strategic and budgetary emphases toward air and naval forces to project military power into the Western Pacific. As Andrew Scobell argued, “You’ve got a lot of fiefdoms and there’s the strong disproportionate influence and power of the ground forces.”39 China ranked second worldwide behind America in total defense spending. In 2013, China increased its defense budget by 10.7%, in 2014 by 12.2%, and in 2015 by 10%. In 2016, China raised its military budget to over $146 billion, less than previous years, but in 2018 upped it

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to $228 billion. Although the gap between the two great powers had narrowed, by 2019 U.S. defense spending had risen to $686 billion and $743.3 billion by 2020, and China’s to $177.5 billion in 2019. America’s military budget remained over three times larger than China’s and exceeded the combined total of the seven next largest military budgets (including China’s). Its 2021 defense base budget was $671 billion plus a warfighting budget of an additional $69 billion. Only Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Israel spent more per capita on defense than the U.S. Arms sales also reflected international influence, including political links as well as price and quality. America remained first in arms sales, and Russia was a distant second. The U.S. accounted for 75% of arms sales and Russia less than 15%. China ranked seventh in sales globally, but had few scruples about selling arms to any regime—however unsavory—that could pay. A 2012 Department of Defense report concluded that Beijing was pursuing a long-term, military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of China’s armed forces “to fight and win ‘local wars under conditions of informatization,’ or high-intensity, informationcentric regional military operations of short duration.” Such modernization was “an essential component of their strategy to take advantage of what they perceive to be a ‘window of strategic opportunity’ to advance China’s national development during the first two decades of the 21st century.”40 Under Xi, China established a new Strategic Support Force to develop space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, and Xi had begun to emphasize joint operations among its military services. A study by the Carnegie Endowment concluded that China’s military capability in Asia was nearing America’s capability. It raised the question of whether America could reassure its Asian friends that they were secure, and in the Western Pacific, China enjoyed growing advantages over the U.S. Hence, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan justified the proposed 2020 defense budget with three words, “China, China, China,” and the commander of America’s Indo-Pacific Command concluded, “We run the risk, if we don’t take proactive action, that China will indeed surpass our capabilities in the middle of the next decade,”41 As Christian Brose, observed, “Over the past decade, in U.S. war games against China, the United States has a nearly perfect record: We have lost almost

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every single time.”42 This was a consequence of the growing vulnerability of U.S. satellites, aircraft carriers, refueling aircraft, and bases in Guam and Japan, and the geographic fact that China’s short range missiles could reach virtually all U.S. military assets in Asia. In a 2020 report, America’s Defense Department concluded that China was surpassing the U.S. in shipbuilding, air defenses, and land-based missiles. Unlimited by arms control agreements, notably the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Beijing had 1,250 ground-launch ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 311 and 3,418 miles. Does China’s intend growing military power for aggressive purposes such as seizing Taiwan or cowing neighbors like Japan and Vietnam? Chinese leaders insisted theirs was a peaceful rise and pointed out that America remained the world’s leading nuclear power, that America’s Pacific Command was the largest of its regional commands with some 180 naval vessels and 1,900 aircraft, and that alliances with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea augmented such forces. Taiwan remained a contentious issue. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, Washington had agreed that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part China.” This agreement led to a subsequent visit to China by President Richard Nixon. Nixon’s joint statement with Mao declared, “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of ‘one China, one Taiwan’.” Beijing also promised not to seek regional hegemony. However, America guaranteed Taiwan’s de facto independence and promised to defend Taiwan if China used force. The subsequent Taiwan Relations Act described U.S. policy: 1. to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area. 2. to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern.

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3. to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. 4. to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States. 5. to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and 6. to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. In early 2019, President Xi spoke of his desire for reunification, offering a “one country, two systems framework” like that which defined Hong Kong’s relationship with Beijing. Taiwan’s leaders quickly refused, noting that Beijing had violated the Hong Kong framework and had imposed harsh security laws, reducing democracy and autonomy there. Under Xi, China also pursued genetic and psychological genocide of its Muslim Uighurs in detention camps. China repeatedly threatened war if Taiwan declared formal independence and sent numerous military aircraft across the Taiwan Strait in September 2020 after it appeared America would sell Taiwan advanced weapons, including drones and missiles that could reach targets in much of China. Thereafter, Chinese increased missile-testing and sent aircraft near Taiwan, and its propaganda increased references to a possible war with China and America. China accomplished its own military modernization beginning in the 1990s partly by espionage of military technologies of others that enabled it to avoid costly research and development. Beijing successfully flew a stealth drone in 2013, landed a spacecraft for the first time on the far side of the moon, and was preparing a manned moon mission. Moreover, China had large numbers of advanced military aircraft. It also has intercontinental and intermediate ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle technology and antisatellite capability. China’s naval capability grew rapidly after Beijing shifted its focus from land-based threats to advancing sweeping claims to sovereignty over virtually all South China Sea islands, reefs, and atolls and adjacent

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waters. Beijing sought access to the Pacific and was pursuing an “antiaccess/area-denial” policy. Its growing naval power aimed to push beyond what Beijing termed America’s “first island chain” that included the Japanese home islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Nevertheless, Beijing has sought to avoid direct military confrontation with America, preferring to use economic capabilities to extend its influence. “The task of building a powerful navy has never been as urgent as it is today,” declared Xi in April 2018, and he told Defense Secretary Mattis in June that China would not yield “even one inch” of territory it claims in the South China Sea or the Sea of Japan. The Pentagon predicted that China’s submarine fleet would grow significantly, although it was widely believed that China’s submarine technology lagged well behind America’s. In 2012, sea trials were held on China’s first aircraft carrier, which had been refitted after its purchase from Russia. China built a second carrier, was building a third, and perhaps several others in subsequent years. China’s navy has more naval vessels than does America. It was designing a new class of heavy cruisers and deploying additional nuclear-armed submarines. Beijing also had anti-ship missiles called “carrier killers.” With rapidly improving radar and satellite capabilities, cruise missiles, and additional aircraft carriers, “China,” declared America’s naval commander in the Pacific, was “now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.”43 In 1947, China’s Ministry of the Interior had published a U-shaped “nine-dash-line” map of the South China Sea, reflecting a blend of historical and modern legal claims. President Hu Jintao in 2004 spoke of China’s “Malacca dilemma” because most of the country’s oil passed through the Strait of Malacca and then the South China Sea. In 2009, China sent a diplomatic message to the U.N. Secretary-General, reasserting its claims and conveying the nine-dash map as documentation. The nine-dash line became a ten-dash line encompassing the South China Sea and Taiwan in a 2014 version. Although there had been frequent minor clashes between rival claimants in the South China Sea, tensions heightened in 2014 when China began mobile drilling operations near the Paracel Islands. That resulted in a standoff with Vietnam, collisions of contending vessels, the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat, riots in Vietnam, and the evacuation from Vietnam of Chinese citizens. Thereafter, China conducted major landfill (“island building”) in order to lay claim to the territorial waters

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and their natural resources within surrounding exclusive economic zones. In response, Washington imposed economic sanctions on companies that aided China to build the islands. The Philippines challenged China’s tendash-line claims in 2013 in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. The Court ruled that that map itself constituted a “plea” and decided in favor of the Philippines, although its decision is unenforceable. China also fortified many of these islands with airplane hangars, anti-ship cruise missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. According to Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States” and “easily overwhelm” other Asians who claimed the islands.44 Nevertheless, America and its allies continued to oppose China’s claims, and conducted maritime drills and “freedom of navigation operations” to assert their rights. Some of these threatened collisions with Chinese vessels in dangerous games of chicken. According to China analyst Michael Pillsbury, the Chinese are “interpreting these freedom-of-navigation exercises, even when they’re innocent passage, as something more — provocations, or a declining hegemon trying to maintain its power.”45 Trump Beijing shortly after his election when he accepted a phone conversation from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen. This implied that the new administration might not feel compelled to adhere to the “OneChina” policy that on which Sino-American relations were based. In December 2016, Trump declared, “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a one-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”46 Trump changed his mind in February 2017 and agreed to honor the one-China policy “at President Xi’s request.” Like its predecessors, the Trump administration sold additional arms to Taiwan and also allowed President Tsai, who Beijing suspected sought Taiwanese independence, to visit America and later eased visits of U.S. personnel to Taiwan, all anathema to China. The trade war with China portended new geopolitical dangers. America had depended on SinoU.S. economic interdependence to stabilize its relationship with Beijing. However, as Trump intensified the trade war, that stability vanished, increasing the probability that Sino-American conflict might spread to issues such as sovereignty over international waters. Chinese leaders concluded that these events were part of a U.S. effort to “contain” China. They also blamed Washington for anti-Beijing demonstrations in Hong

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Kong and for China’s slowing economy. One venomous Chinese news anchor declared that Americans “stir up more troubles and crave the whole world to be in chaos, acting like a shit-stirring stick.”47 Cyber-Capabilities Chinese cyber-espionage and cyber-strategy of Integrated Network Electronic Warfare posed other challenges. President Obama had alluded to this in his 2013 State of the Union Address, noting “we know foreign countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets,” and “our enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions and our air traffic control systems.”48 Obama raised the issue in a conversation with Xi in March 2013, and Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew raised it again that month in Beijing. Press Secretary Jay Carney declared, “The United States has substantial and growing concerns about the threat to U.S. economic and national security posed by cyber-intrusions, including the theft of commercial information.”49 Although sources of cyberattacks are difficult to trace because they are routed through computer servers elsewhere, the Pentagon’s 2013 annual report concluded, “In 2012 numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. government, continued to be targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military.”50 All the digital addresses of a hacking group that had stolen secrets from U.S. military contractors, chemical plants, mining companies, universities, and telecommunications corporations were traced by the cybersecurity company Mandiant to a building in Shanghai on Datong Road that housed the PLA’s Shanghai Unit 61398, also called the “Comment Crew” or the “Shanghai Group.” According to Mandiant, Unit 61,398 had stolen massive amounts of data from many companies including Mandiant’s clients. Stolen data included aerospace designs, clinical trial results, pricing documents, negotiating strategies, and wind-energy product schematics. In 2012, American officials responded to complaints by U.S. companies about Chinese cyber-espionage of industrial secrets, presenting detailed evidence of such hacking. In December 2018, Washington alleged that two Chinese hackers, “in association with” the Chinese Ministry of State Security, were part of a hacking squad known as “Advanced Persistent Threat 10” or “Stone Panda,” that stole secrets from twelve countries. “China’s goal, simply put,” according to America’s

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FBI director, was “to replace the U.S. as the world’s leading superpower, and they’re using illegal methods to get there.”51 Although Xi had promised that China would not hack for commercial gain, Beijing continued to do so. Hence, in 2015, it was revealed that Chinese hackers had breached computers at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and obtained personnel records and social security numbers of at least eighteen million current and prospective federal employees. If companies hacked by China complained, Beijing was liable to hack their computer systems again in retaliation. In 2014, Washington indicted five members of Unit 61398 in absentia, not for national security spying but for commercial espionage-for-profit theft. A private Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property chaired by former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and former ambassador to China, Jon Huntsman, argued that Washington needed to adopt strong measures that would prove costly to China in response to Beijing’s persistent cyberespionage. China had “an elaborate, comprehensive system for spotting foreign technologies, acquiring them by every means imaginable, and converting them into weapons and competitive goods.”52 The growth of the digital economy intensified competition for intellectual property, especially patents, and several countries, including China and Russia, used the excuse of cybersecurity to impose digital protectionism by requiring foreign firms build local data servers and store data locally. China’s cyber-capabilities were not limited to espionage but also threatened America’s computer-dependent infrastructure, and the tools China used for espionage could destroy a foe’s computer networks. Legal and illegal hacking was widespread in China, and hacking and cybersecurity competitions attracted military, academic, and corporate observers. China’s army recruited hackers from universities and has a training center, the PLA Information Engineering University in Zhengzhou. Beijing’s cyber-capabilities could initiate a surprise attack on U.S. command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance facilities. “These capabilities,” declared Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, “put all sectors of our country at risk—from government and private networks to critical infrastructures.”53 Washington indicated that it might use nuclear weapons to retaliate if it were the victim of a major cyberattack. China cited information revealed by former CIA contractor Edward Snowden that America had hacked numerous Chinese computer sites as evidence that Washington was also guilty of hacking. Obama responded

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defensively. “Every country in the world, large and small, engages in intelligence gathering,” but gathering intelligence was different than “a hacker directly connected with the Chinese government or the Chinese military breaking into Apple’s software systems to see if they can obtain the designs for the latest Apple product.” That was “theft, and we can’t tolerate that.”54 America was engaged in an asymmetrical digital war with China, and the Obama administration considered actions ranging from trade sanctions and diplomatic pressure to offensive and defensive cyber countermeasures if China did not cease cyber-espionage. “After several years of making very little progress to improve behavior,” declared a former State Department adviser, “it’s reasonable to throw out what you’ve done in the past and use new instruments to try to get them to behave responsibly.”55 Washington explained to China’s leaders its doctrine for countering cyberattacks, hoping that China would reciprocate. While visiting Beijing, Secretary of State John Kerry reached an agreement with China’s leaders to establish a “cyber working group” to establish a code of cyber-conduct, but China closed it down after America accused the five Chinese military officers of cyber-espionage. China’s Goals and Future Owing to Beijing’s sensitivity to what Xi described as its “core interests,” U.S. military leaders have tried to understand what those interests were. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd concluded that China’s interests included “maintaining the territorial integrity of the country (including countering separatist movements and defending offshore maritime claims),” “ensuring China’s energy security,” “modernizing China’s military and more robustly asserting China’s foreign policy interests, and enhancing China’s status as a great power.”56 Will China become a superpower or, like Japan some decades earlier, will its “rise” prove illusory? According to two scholars, China was “setting itself up as an autocratic superpower without any interference from the usual counterweights which might otherwise submit its world conquest to international scrutiny.”57 The belief that China is supplanting America was widespread. Hence, a 2019 poll concluded that “the stagnant, low approval rating of 31% for the U.S. in 2018” suggested “that the doubts sowed in Trump’s first year about U.S. commitments abroad” had taken root and had “provided an opening for China and Russia to

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assert global influence,”58 and, by 2020, a median of 20% of adults in 45 countries and areas approved U.S. leadership under outgoing President Donald Trump.59 In sum, during Trump’s term I office, America’s soft power had virtually disappeared. Nevertheless, while acknowledging that “global publics” perceived China’s global standing more positively, far from seeing China as an incipient superpower, David Shambaugh argued that China was only a “partial power” and had “a very long way to go before it becomes—if it ever becomes—a true global power.” He claimed that China was deficient in the most important measurement of power—influence. Its global influence was largely limited to trade, commodity and energy markets, finance, real estate purchases, and tourism. Militarily, except for ballistic missiles, a small space program, and cyber mischief-making, China was not (yet) able to “project power outside of its Asian neighborhood” and only in a limited way even there. The country possessed “little soft power, if any, and is not a model for other nations to emulate.” Its pursuit of narrow self-interests with regard to the South and Japan Seas, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and human rights does not inspire widespread admiration. “China is a lonely power, lacking close friends and possessing no allies.” Even its relations with Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea involved “distrust.”60 Asian, European, North American countries began to push back against China’s “wolf warrior” behavior. U.S. ad Chinese policies on issues ranging from China’s territorial claims, violations of human rights, and trade had brought the two to the brink of a cold war by autumn 2020. However, like Shambaugh, Dan Blumental described China’s numerous domestic economic, social, and political weaknesses, and attributed Xi’s assertive foreign policy as an effort to compensate for these problems. He concluded that “in lieu of Marxism-Leninism,” Beijing offered “increasingly strident appeals to an imperialist nationalism” and pointed out that “declining powers are no less dangerous than rising ones.”61 Unlike Donald Trump, China’s President Xi fostered an image of efficiency and predictability, and as a leading supporter of free trade and foe of global warming. Xi posed as a reliable friend, the antithesis of Trump, whom Burleigh described as “capricious and erratic and mainly preoccupied with his (abysmal) ‘ratings’,” and among the growing number of “incommunicative idiots capable of little more than a tweet.” Burleigh

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added, “With Trump and Putin around, Xi seems like the only responsible adult in the room.”62 It was not that America lacks the capabilities for remaining a superpower, even a hegemon, in the near future. Nye had cautioned, “A nation may also decline in power relative to other nations because it chooses not to use the power resources at its disposal.”63 If so, America’s decline had begun during the Obama administration that had overreacted to the hubristic excesses of the George W. Bush administration, notably, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Barack Obama: Idealist or Realist? Allies and domestic foes (correctly) regarded George W. Bush’s administration as overly eager to use military force in the War on Terror after 9/11 and willing to violate human-rights norms in a failed effort to spread democracy in the Middle East. America’s emphasis on antiterrorism contributed to the erosion of its conventional military capability and delayed technological advances needed to fight China or Russia. Bush’s “neo-conservative” triumphalism, militant unilateralism, and illfated intervention in Iraq did immense damage to America’s image around the world and left the U.S. public war-weary. In reaction, Barack Obama adopted a cautious foreign-policy posture, preferring optimistic rhetoric, negotiation and multilateralism, and deferring to allies as though the world were already multipolar. Obama explained, “One of the reasons I am so focused on taking action multilaterally where our direct interests are not at stake is that multilateralism regulates hubris.”64 However, although Obama was a dedicated liberal, his reluctance to engage with foes militarily contributed to the erosion of the liberal order, a trend that Trump would continue and was partly responsible for Trump’s reckless unilateralism. The Obama presidency coincided with the Great Recession and a period of escalating partisanship in domestic politics that produced legislative deadlock. Obama had to face a world that seemed to be “falling apart.” If the financial crisis was the worst since the 1930s, his administration’s foreign challenges were the most complex since the Cold War. The EU and Eurozone were in disarray; the rise of IS produced turmoil in the Middle East; Iranian nuclear talks threatened to collapse; China continued saber rattling in international waters; and Russia was meddling in Ukraine. The Obama administration’s geopolitical leadership, however,

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was generally weak and indecisive. Although polls agreed that Obama’s self-effacing leadership style increased his popularity and that of America abroad, nevertheless, soft power, though significant, was no substitute for a willingness to lead. During the Obama years, America was punching below its weight. Having declared a “pivot” to Asia in response to China’s rise, Obama failed to convince Beijing that America was not seeking to contain it. Events in the Middle East and the danger in Europe posed by Russian aggression in Ukraine, however, prevented a significant pivot. With minor increments in its military forces in Asia, Washington’s scolding irritated Beijing but failed to persuade Asian countries that U.S. commitments were credible. It was difficult to believe that Washington would become embroiled in a military confrontation with China over uninhabited islets unless the security of Japan, South Korea, and/or Taiwan was in imminent danger. Trump’s efforts to paper over U.S. differences with North Korea, including concessions that would reduce America’s military presence in East Asia, strained U.S. ties with allies. Whether or not China sought to compete with America globally, it did seek dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. This was evident in skirmishes with Indian troops in Ladakh, a disputed Himalayan border area, in 2020, which fostered a process of U.S.-Indian cooperation against Beijing.

America and Global Disorder As American relative capabilities declined, U.S. military strategy relied more on local proxies trained and armed by Washington and largely directed toward counterterrorism. Although this approach was more acceptable to U.S. public opinion, it rarely achieved what Washington sought, a fact reflected in the collapse of Iraq’s army in 2014. Robert Kagan criticized Obama’s foreign-policy establishment when he wrote of a “sense of futility” that followed America’s financial crisis and embodied what John Mueller called the “Iraq syndrome,”65 the fear that America could be dragged into another Middle East civil war. “Senior White House officials,” wrote Kagan, “especially the younger ones, look at problems like the struggle in Syria and believe that there is little if anything the United State can do. This is the lesson of their generation, the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan: that America has neither the power nor the understanding nor the skill to fix problems in the world.” Kagan thought this was “escapism”66 because officials, including the president,

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did not appreciate what was at stake and how quickly the liberal global order might disappear. Responding to criticism, Obama’s final National Security Strategy contained “lead” and “leadership” ninety-four times in referring to America, but simply repeating the word was no substitute for genuine leadership. When President Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, he had admitted: “We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations - acting individually or in concert - will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” Obama touched upon the dilemma he would face. “So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths--that war is sometimes necessary, and war at some level is an expression of human folly.”67 That dilemma became manifest as allies questioned U.S. commitments, thereby eroding the post-Cold War order. Obama’s policies reflected America’s declining interest in foreign adventures. Events in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere seemed beyond U.S. control and peripheral to its national interests. The president’s caution was apparent when he defended his foreign-policy legacy by asking: “Why is it that everybody is so eager to use military force after we’ve just gone through a decade of war at enormous cost to our troops and to our budget.” He used a baseball analogy to express his thinking: “You hit singles, you hit doubles; every once in a while, we may be able to hit a home run. But we steadily advance the interests of the American people and our partnership with folks around the world.”68 Obama’s policy of restraint was reasoned and thoughtful, but led a former national security official to conclude pointedly, “We’re seeing the ‘light footprint’ run out of gas.”69 After the Cold War, Americans were optimistic about the future. However, the George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama years witnessed growing pessimism in the U.S. about America’s “decline” that was accompanied by support for limiting America’s role in world affairs and placing greater responsibility on its friends and allies. Donald Trump’s would in part be a consequence of these sentiments and would reduce America’s military footprint in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere. It was Obama’s misfortune that multiple and simultaneous geopolitical challenges simultaneously confronted him. This made it virtually impossible to design a coherent strategy. While imposing sanctions on Russia over Ukraine, Obama sought to cooperate with Moscow on arms control and negotiate with North Korea and Iran about their efforts to acquire

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nuclear weapons. While differing with Iran over the future of Syria and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, America tacitly cooperated with Tehran against the Islamic State, even as he sought a coalition against the IS consisting of Sunni states and opponents of Syria’s President Assad. Obama also sought to reassure Israel while condemning its war in Gaza and pressuring it to seek a two-state solution and end settlement expansion. In the absence of a clear strategy, allies became concerned about the credibility of America’s deterrence of China, Russia, and Iran. Under Obama, the U.S. lost political and military influence in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Regarding Asia, former deputy secretary of state William J. Burns argued, “Without the steady centripetal force of American diplomacy,” disorder in Asia is spinning in all sorts of dangerous directions. The net result is not only increased risk of regional turbulence, but also long-term corrosion of American influence.70 Afghanistan and the Middle East Before 9/11 President George W. Bush had tried to limit overseas commitments including America’s humanitarian interventions in which the Clinton administration had become involved. The U.S., declared Richard Haass, would become a “reluctant sheriff,”71 involving itself only when local powers could not maintain peace. The wars of the Bush years led Kagan to conclude, “the rest of the world saw the United States not as a global leader seeking the global good but as an angry Leviathan narrowly focused on destroying those who had attacked it.” He warned, “the only thing worse than a self-absorbed hegemon is an incompetent self-absorbed hegemon.”72 In a speech in 2014, Obama declared: “You are the first class to graduate since 9/11 who may not be sent into combat in Iraq or Afghanistan.” He then added, “Since world war two, some of our most costly mistakes came not from our restraint, but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without thinking through the consequences.”73 Obama observed that unless critical interests were at stake, “the threshold for military action must be higher.” “I would betray my duty to you, and to the country we love,” he continued, “if I sent you into harm’s way simply because I saw a problem somewhere in the world that needed to be fixed or because I was worried about critics who think military intervention is the only way for America to avoid looking weak.”74

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The president also essentially declared an end to the War on Terror and (admirably) brought an end to U.S. human-rights abuses involving the War on Terror. However, Washington continued drone strikes and Special Forces actions against terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Iraq, and Syria and proposed to fund counterterrorist partnerships with countries under threat from terrorists. In a major escalation of terrorist violence in the Middle East, the Islamic State seized large areas in Syria and Iraq and announced the establishment of a territorial “caliphate.” America had few options other than airstrikes to counter IS. Obama had assumed office committed to ending the “bad” war in Iraq, while pacifying and reforming Afghanistan in a “good” war. In neither case did Washington achieve its goals. Although IS was driven from the territory is had occupied in Iraq and Syria, both remained deeply divided by sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Afghanistan remained threatened by the Taliban-led insurrection against a government installed by Washington and descended again into civil war among warlords with little to show for decades of U.S. intervention. AS U.S. troops leave, al-Qaeda and IS militants may reoccupy Afghan sanctuaries. Elsewhere, the Obama administration reluctantly contributed airpower to assist America’s NATO allies in protecting Libyans foes of Muammar al-Qaddafi. Qaddafi was overthrown, but America’s ambassador was murdered in Benghazi. Chaos soon resumed, and Libya joined the sorry roster of fragile states. The death of Osama bin Laden was Obama’s most memorable foreignpolicy triumph (as was the death of IS “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi during the Trump years). Otherwise, in the Middle East, the policies of the Obama and Trump administrations seemed irresolute. Having threatened to use force against Assad if he employed chemical weapons, Obama backed off in return for a deal brokered by Russia for destroying Syria’s remaining chemical weapons. Obama’s decision to back away on this occasion was disastrous for America’s credibility. In 2013, Obama also began to contribute non-lethal aid covertly to Syria’s Sunni opposition in the areas it controlled. This led an opponent of Assad to comment acidly, “Nonlethal assistance—blankets and cellphones—do not topple a regime,” adding “Only Allah knows how Washington works.”75 By this time, Assad was in the driver’s seat again, aided by Russia, Iran, and Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah. Only after IS had occupied much of the region, did Washington help train “moderate” rebels. Obama authorized additional U.S. aid and

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dispatched several hundred troops to train and arm rebels in September 2014. Obama had previously dismissed the claim that aid to “what was essentially an opposition made up of former doctors, farmers, pharmacists and so forth” would have made a difference in Syria as “a fantasy.”76 Relations between Israel and America had been warm during the Bush presidency but soured after Obama pressed Israel to cease building settlements in the occupied territories. A new round of peace negotiations initiated by Secretary of State Kerry yielded little and collapsed in mutual recriminations, exacerbated by Washington’s willingness to consider dealing with a Palestinian government that included Hamas if the PLO wished to do so. America’s passivity during the Arab Spring, especially in Syria’s civil war and turmoil in Egypt, enhanced Islamic extremism in the Middle East and North Africa, and the region became the “chief cauldron of contemporary disorder.”77 America’s 2003 intervention in Iraq had radicalized Muslims worldwide, and Obama’s indecisiveness encouraged al-Qaeda affiliates After U.S. withdrawal in 2011, Iraq again descended into sectarian violence with a weak Shia government that grew increasingly dependent on Iran. Shia militias in Iraq also provoked conflict with America in 2019–2020. Some observers argued that Obama’s failure to carry out his threat against Syria if the regime used chemical weapons undermined the credibility of U.S. threats toward Iran regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. Moreover, having approved the overthrow of pro-American authoritarian President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in the name of democracy, Washington said little about the elected Muslim Brotherhood government’s anti-democratic policies. American support for Egypt’s Islamic government incensed long-term allies Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Nor did America object after a coup by General Abdel Fattah Sisi overthrew that government and installed a military dictatorship. Obama’s willingness to negotiate with Iran over that country’s nuclear ambitions provoked suspicion of U.S. motives among its allies. Israel and America’s Sunni friends—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—opposed Washington’s negotiations with Tehran. Iran continued to provide arms, fighters, and funding to Assad and remained on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons. Domestic partisan divisions surfaced in Washington where Israeli leader Binyamin Netanyahu denounced a U.S.-Iranian agreement as “a bad deal.” Republican senators sent Iran’s leaders a letter that undermined presidential prerogatives

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in making foreign policy by declaring (presciently) that a Republican president might withdraw from the deal. Both events contributed to an appearance of foreign-policy disarray and political gridlock in Washington. A nuclear agreement with Iran that Obama called the best that could be had was concluded in 2015 and would become a casualty of Donald Trump’s myopic foreign policy. Those policies isolated America, alienated U.S. allies, and allowed Russia to manipulate the Trump administration.

Resurgent Russia Russia remained America’s chief military rival although it lagged far behind America and China economically. Early post-Cold War relations between America and Russia were relatively cordial as long as Boris Yeltsin remained Russian president. Relations began to worsen after Vladimir Putin became Russian president in 2000. A brief “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations began during the Obama administration but ultimately failed. Putin sought to restore Russia as a great power and cited “the collapse of the Soviet Union” as the one event he would have liked to change, “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century.” Instability also became endemic in Eastern Europe. Russia argued that there had been an agreement with America that NATO would not move eastward, a claim that remains controversial. A united Germany was already in NATO. In 1999, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joined NATO. In 2004, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia also joined. During the Trump years, Washington alienated its European allies, and held NATO and the European Union (EU) in contempt. In 2008, Russia and Georgia went to war, and Russia occupied the Georgian provinces of Abhazia and South Ossetia. Thereafter, civil war engulfed Ukraine, and Russian intervention in Ukraine’s Donbas and annexation of Crimea, along with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and “frozen conflicts” involving South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transdniestria, produced considerable instability. The annexation of Crimea violated the Cold War norm that countries should not use force to seize territory, and Russian troops remained in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transdniestria. The situation in Ukraine, much as observers predicted, became another “frozen conflict.” Putin did not directly attack foes. He practiced judo that was sufficiently subtle not to justify a major Western response.

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Having removed U.S. forces from Europe and cut back plans for European missile defense, the Obama administration was unprepared to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its heavy-handed “hybrid war.” Geopolitics had returned to Eastern Europe as Russia responded to NATO and EU expansion, and Putin exploited political divisions within America and Europe to probe how much the West would tolerate. Few Americans wanted to send U.S. troops to Ukraine, and the economic sanctions imposed by Washington and the EU were insufficient to prevent Russian “volunteers” from aiding those in eastern Ukraine seeking to “federalize” the country or secede entirely from it. Trump’s willingness to accept Putin’s denial of Russian involvement in Ukraine intensified mistrust among U.S. allies about America’s policy toward an aggressive Russia. The timing of America’s declining credibility was especially unfortunate owing to Russia’s growing military capabilities. Since 2008, Russia has modernized its forces, showed a willingness to use military force to achieve foreign-policy objectives, and improved its ability to project that force at greater distances. Russia had become a revanchist and hostile foe, seeking to revise the European security system and divide Europe into spheres of influence. In October 2018, Washington announced its intention to exit the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with Russia (banning land-based missiles with a range of 300–3,400 miles) that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev had signed in 1987. The Trump administration justified its action by alleged Russia’s violations of the treaty and China’s INF missiles in the Pacific. Moscow’s cruise missiles in southern Russia threatened America’s NATO allies in violation of the treaty and 95% of China’s missiles were of the range of those covered by INF. (China was not a party to the treaty.) Alexander Motyl concluded, “Kennan’s case for containing Russia makes just much sense now”78 as it did during the Cold War. Regarding U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, Gorbachev asked rhetorically, “Do they really not understand in Washington what this can lead to?”79 Trump’s decision further eroded U.S.-Russian relations and widened divisions between America and Europe. Trump declared, “We’ll have to develop those weapons, unless Russia comes to us and China comes to us and they all come to us and say ‘let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons,’ but if Russia’s doing it and if China’s doing it, and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable.”80 America’s withdrawal from INF and the Open Skies treaty in 2020 and its

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reluctance to renew the New START treaty that placed limits of 1,550 deployed nuclear-armed missiles on Russia and America unless China joined these undermined the nuclear arms-control regime. U.S. withdrawal from INF was followed by a poll in which 41% of Germans believed Trump was more dangerous than Putin, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, or China’s Xi Jinping. A nuclear arms race with Russia further destabilized the liberal order, and Russia’s massive cyber hacking of U.S. government facilities in December 2020 deepened Russian-U.S. hostility.

Conclusions Many contemporary issues reflected the return of geopolitics antithetical to the liberal order. This coincided with growing nationalism in America, Russia, China, and Iran. Putin was determined to restore Russia’s great power status. Xi strove to give China a status equal to America’s, and Iran’s ruling theocrats sought to extend their influence across the Middle East. All three felt constrained by U.S. hegemony and perceived threats to their regimes by American democracy promotion. Although many U.S. and European populists embraced Russia, they regarded China as a foe that must be contained owing to its challenges to U.S. hegemony. For its part, Russia supported American and European populists and will find a less friendly though more pragmatic rival than Trump in President Biden. Notwithstanding America’s immense capabilities, Obama’s belief in U.S. decline may have promoted it. Many defense officials cited Obama’s foreign-policy accomplishments, but concluded that too often he had failed to act, waiting for conditions to improve. This allowed foes to probe further to learn how far they could go, leading to dangerous misperceptions and increasing the prospect of military confrontations. “In short,” as Haass argued, “the post-Cold War order is unraveling, and while not perfect, it will be missed.”81 Even those who contributed to the erosion of U.S. hegemony will miss it. No sensible analyst would wish a return of U.S. hubris and triumphalism reflected by the reckless intervention in Iraq in 2003. Should America’s leaders reassess their role in the world with a clearer eye and greater resolve, we may yet be able to write a different geopolitical story. The institutions of globalization that America founded after World War II served to organize and extend U.S. hegemony. Donald Trump failed to seize the opportunity and accelerated America’s retreat.

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As we shall see, Trump’s sudden announcement in 2018 that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria created shock waves. Many observers, including Republicans, considered Trump’s decision dangerous. Even worse, after changing his mind and leaving U.S. troops in Syria, Trump impetuously decided to abandon America’s Kurdish allies. This made clear his willingness to abandon America’s global role and cast another shadow on the credibility of U.S. commitments. Even some of the president’s consistent defenders denounced his abrupt decision. Mitch McConnell, the Republican majority leader of the Senate wrote, “Withdrawing U.S. forces from Syria is a grave strategic mistake.…. When the United States threw off the comforting blanket of isolationism in the 1940s and took the mantle of global leadership, we made the whole world better, but we specifically made it much better for the United States. If we abandon that mantle today, we can be sure that a new world order will be made — and not on terms favorable to us.”82 Abandoning America’s Kurdish allies left Russia, Iran, and Turkey to control Syria’s future. Putin praised Trump’s announcement, and a Russian commentator gleefully declared, “Trump is God’s gift that keeps on giving. Trump implements Russia’s negative agenda by default, undermining the U.S.– led world order, U.S. alliances, U.S. credibility as a partner and an ally. All of this on his own. Russia can just relax and watch and root for Trump, which Putin does at every TV appearance.”83 Trump’s negativism toward allies and cozy relationship with authoritarians like Putin led French analyst François Heisbourg to conclude ominously, “Until now, you could talk about hedging, and all allies were doing it fairly prudently.” He added, “But now everyone will have to work on the assumption that the alliance system is no longer there. The organizations are there, the treaties are there, the troops and equipment are still there, but the high priest of that church is gone.”84 Geopolitics had never actually disappeared. Conflict was inevitable owing to global division between liberal and illiberal regimes. China, Russia, and Iran shared the objective of targeting liberal democratic societies to make the world safer for authoritarianism. Wrote Stephen Kotkin, “now, as U.S. relative power has diminished and the U.S. brand has run into trouble, the fragility of a system dependent on the might, competency, and image of the United States, has been exposed,”85 and Daalder and Lindsay sadly noted, “Trump saw himself doing what he had promised, making America great again. But his actions were in fact setting

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America on the road to a less secure and prosperous future—and ironically for a president who insisted he was defending American sovereignty, one in which Americans would have less and not more control over their destiny.”86 Chapter 5 deals with American populism. It is followed by descriptions of populism in Great Britain, and continental Europe.

Notes 1. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 2. John McCain, “Defending the Liberal World Order,” The Economist, The World in 2018, November 20, 2017, https://www.theworldin.com/edi tion/2018/article/14416/defending-liberal-world-order. 3. G. John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs 93:3 (May/June 2014), pp. 84, 89. 4. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), Preface. 5. Fareed Zakaria, “The Self-Destruction of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 98:4 (July/August 2019), pp. 10, 13. 6. William C. Martel, “America’s Grand Strategy Disaster,” The National Interest, June 9, 2014, https://commentators.com/americas-grand-str ategy-disaster-the-national-interest/. 7. Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008), https://www.foreignaf fairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity. 8. Randall L. Schweller, “The Age of Entropy,” Foreign Affairs, June 16, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141568/randall-l-sch weller/the-age-of-entropy. 9. Robert Kagan, “Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire,” The New Republic, May 26, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/117859/superpowersdont-get-retire?utm_medium=App.net&utm_source=PourOver. 10. Robert Kagan, “Welcome to the Jungle,” Washington Post, October 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/welcome-to-the-jun gle/2018/10/09/0f8ffb58-cbc5-11e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede_story.html? utm_term=.f19ad88a3bb8&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 11. Stephen Kotkin, “Realist World: The Players Change, but the Game Remains,” Foreign Affairs 97:4 (July/August 2018), p. 10. 12. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), Preface.

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13. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 88. 14. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 198. 15. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018). 16. Robert O. Keohane, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 17. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 49, 50. 18. Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 274. 19. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 13. 20. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Is the American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), p. 14. 21. Michael Mandelbaum, “The New Containment,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2019), pp. 130–131. 22. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of the Great Powers (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). 23. See Yale H. Ferguson, “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Theoretical Perspectives,” in James Gasgarth, ed., Rising Powers, Global Governance and Global Ethics (Milton Park and Abington, Oxon, UK: Routledge. 2015). Pp. 21–40. 24. Cited in Max Fisher, “Trump’s Military Ambition: Raw Power as a means and an End,” New York Times, March 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/03/03/world/americas/donald-trump-us-military.html. 25. C. Fred Bergsten, The United States and the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economic, 2005), p. 53. 26. Martin Wolf and David Pilling, “China: On Top of the World,” Financial Times, May 2, 2014, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c355e0e6-d1d1-11e38ff4-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz33A0ZMQ00. 27. Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers, “Asiaphoria Meet Regression to the Mean,” November 6, 2013, https://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/events/2013/november/asia-economic-policy-conference/pro gram/files/Asiaphoria-Meet-Regression-to-the-Mean.pdf. 28. Michael Schuman, “The Undoing of China’s Economic Miracle,” The Atlantic, January 11, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2021/01/xi-jinping-china-economy-jack-ma/617552/?=. 29. See Yale H. Ferguson, “China’s OBOR Policy, China-U.S. Relations, and the Return of Geopolitics,” Mainland China Studies 60:2 (June 2017), pp. 55–85.

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30. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Stealth Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 98:1 (January/February 2019), p. 32. 31. Cited in Chico Harland, “A Defiant Italy Becomes the First G-7 Country to Sign on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Washington Post, March 23, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/defiantitaly-becomes-the-first-g7-country-to-sign-on-to-chinas-belt-and-road-ini tiative/2019/03/22/54a732d4-4bdf-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story. html?utm_term=.31c0f29b1c9f&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 32. “Planet China,” The Economist, July 28, 2018, p. 7. 33. Cited in Natalie Malek and David R. Sands, “U.S. Balks at IMF Bailout Loan, Fearing Chinese Debt Trap for Pakistan,” The Washington Times, August 8, 2018, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/ 8/us-china-clash-pakistans-imf-loan/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 34. Cited in Gerry Shih, “China Once Boasted About Its Global Economic Plans, That Swagger Has Faded a Bit.” Washington Post, April 26, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-onceboasted-about-its-global-economic-plans-that-swagger-has-faded-a-bit/ 2019/04/25/373e699e-6500-11e9-a698-2a8f808c9cfb_story.html. 35. James Kynge and Jonathan Wheatley, “China Pulls Back from the World: Rethinking Xi’s ‘Project of the Century’,” Financial Times, December 17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinaonce-boasted-about-its-global-economic-plans-that-swagger-has-faded-abit/2019/04/25/373e699e-6500-11e9-a698-2a8f808c9cfb_story.html. 36. Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, “‘Chimerica’ and Global Asset Markets,” International Finance 10:3 (2007), pp. 215–239. 37. See Yale H. Ferguson, “The Renminbi-Dollar Relationship: Politics and Economics of a Diminishing Issue,” in Thomas Oatley and W. Kindred Winecoff, eds., Handbook of the Global Political Economy of Monetary Relations (Northampton, MA: Elgar, 2014), pp. 123–143. 38. Geoff Colvin, “It’s China’s World,” Fortune, July 22, 2019, https://for tune.com/longform/fortune-global-500-china-companies. 39. Cited in Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “China’s Leader, Seeking to Build Its Muscle, Pushes Overhaul of the Military,” New York Times, May 24, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/world/asia/ chinas-leader-seeking-to-build-its-muscle-pushes-overhaul-of-the-military. html?ref=world. 40. “US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2012, May 18, 2012,” USC US-China Institute, https://china.usc.edu/us-department-defense-mil itary-and-security-developments-involving-people%E2%80%99s-republicchina-2012-may. 41. Cited in Brian Everstone, “INDOPACOM Boss: China Close to Surpassing the Command’s Capacity,” Air Force Magazine, July 19,

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2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/July%202 019/INDOPACOM-Boss-China-Close-to-Surpassing-the-CommandsCapacity.aspx?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in David Ignatius, “Think We Have Military Primacy Over China. Think Again,” Washington Post, May 12, 2020, https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/global-opinions/think-we-have-military-primacyover-china-think-again/2020/05/12/268e1bba-948b-11ea-9f5e-56d 8239bf9ad_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium= email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most. Cited in Steven Lee Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge U.S. Navy in Pacific,” New York Times, August 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navyaircraft-carrier-pacific.html. Cited in “Making Mischief,” The Economist, May 12, 2018, p. 42. Cited in Edward Wong, “Military Competition in Pacific Endures as Biggest Flash Point Between U.S. and China,” New York Times, November 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/world/ asia/usa-china-trade-pacific.html?emc=edit_th_181116&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321681116. Cited in “One China, Many Meanings,” The Economist, March 11, 2017, p. 13. Cited in Jane Perlez, “China Reacts to Trade Tariffs and Hong Kong Protest by Blaming U.S.,” New York Times, August 2, 2019, https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/world/asia/china-trump.html?nl= todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190803?campaign_id=2&instance_id= 11317&segment_id=15843&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4 382ea®i_id=43321680803. Cited in David E. Sanger, “In Cyberspace, New Cold War,” New York Times, February 24, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/ world/asia/us-confronts-cyber-cold-war-with-china.html. Cited in Julian E. Barnes, Siobhan Gorman, and Jeremy Page, “U.S., China Ties Tested in Cyberspace,” Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2013, https://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788 7323764804578314591857289004.html. Cited in David E. Sanger, “U.S. Blames China’s Military Directly for Cyberattacks,” New York Times, May 6, 2013, https://www.nytimes. com/2013/05/07/world/asia/us-accuses-chinas-military-in-cyberatta cks.html?pagewanted=all. Cited in Ellen Nakashima and David J. Lynch, “U.S. Charges Chinese Hackers in Alleged Theft of Vast Troves of Confidential Data in 12 Countries,” Washington Post, December 20, 2018, https://www.was hingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-and-more-than-a-dozen-all ies-to-condemn-china-for-economic-espionage/2018/12/20/cdfd0338-

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66. 67.

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0455-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html?utm_term=.3aa87819c1da& wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 2. Cited in Siobhan Gorman and Siobhan Hughes, “U.S. Steps Up Alarm Over Cyberattacks,” Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2013, p. A1. Cited in Jennifer Martinez, “President Is ‘Very Blunt’ with Xi on Hacking,” The Hill, June 18, 2013, https://thehill.com/policy/techno logy/306107-obama-i-confronted-xi-on-hacking. Cited in Lisa Barron, “US Pushes Cyber Diplomacy with China,” Newsmax, April 22, 2013, https://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/ china-cyber-diplomacy-us/2013/04/22/id/500734/. Kevin Rudd, “Beyond the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2013), p. 4, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138843/kevin-rudd/bey ond-the-pivot. Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araújo, China’s Silent Army: The Pioneers, Traders, Fixers and Workers Who Are Remaking the World in Beijing’s Image, trans. Catherine Mansfield (New York: Crown Publishers, 2013), p. xi. “Rating World Leaders: 2019: The U.S. vs Germany, China and Russia,” Gallup, p. 4, https://www.gallup.com/analytics/247040/rating-worldleaders-2019.aspx. Gallup Analytics Weekly Briefing: January 12, 2021, https://www.gallup. com/analytics/213617/gallup-analytics.aspx. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press), quotes and argument, pp. 7–10. Cited in Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino, “China Is Both Weak and Dangerous,” Foreign Policy, December 7, 2020, https://foreignpo licy.com/2020/12/07/china-weak-dangerous-china-nightmare-dan-blu menthal-review/. Burleigh, The Best of Times, The Worst of Times, pp. 253, 362, and 370. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 15. Italics added. Cited in Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/ the-obama-doctrine/471525/. John Mueller, “Iraq Syndrome Redux,” Foreign Affairs, June 18, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141578/john-mue ller/iraq-syndrome-redux. Kagan, “Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire.” “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize,” The White House, December 10, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.

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68. Cited in Mark Landler, “Ending Asia Trip, Obama Defends His Foreign Policy,” New York Times, April 28, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/04/29/world/obama-defends-foreign-policy-against-critics.html. 69. Cited in David E. Sanger, “Global Crises Put Obama’s Strategy of Caution to the Test,” New York Times, March 16, 2014, https://www. nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/obamas-policy-is-put-to-the-test-ascrises-challenge-caution.html. 70. Cited in Edward Wong, “Waning of American Power? Trump Struggles with an Asia in Crisis,” New York Times, August 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/asia/trump-asia. html?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 71. Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997). 72. Robert Kagan, “The September 12 Paradigm,” Foreign Affairs 87:5 (September/October 2008), pp. 29, 30, 36. 73. Cited in “The War on Terror, Part Two,” The Economist, May 31, 2014, p. 23. 74. Cited in Peter Baker, “Rebutting Critics, Obama Seeks Higher Bar for Military Action,” New York Times, May 28, 2014, https://www.nytimes. com/2014/05/29/us/politics/rebutting-critics-obama-seeks-higher-barfor-military-action.html. 75. Cited in Adam Entous, “Inside Obama’s Syria Debate,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142 4127887323639604578368930961739030. 76. Cited in Thomas L. Friedman, “Obama on the World,” New York Times, August 8, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/pre sident-obama-thomas-l-friedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html. 77. Richard N. Haass, “The Unraveling,” Foreign Affairs 93:6 (November/December 2014), p. 70. 78. Alexander J. Motyl, “The Sources of Russian Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142366/ alexander-j-motyl/the-sources-of-russian-conduct. 79. Cited in Andrew E. Kramer, “Gorbachev Calls Trump’s Nuclear Treaty Withdrawal ‘Not the Work of a Great Mind’,” New York Times, October 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/world/europe/mik hail-gorbachev-trump-russia.html. 80. Cited in Jim Heintz, “Bolton Faces Tense Talks with Russia Over Nuclear Treaty,” Washington Post, October 21, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/national/trump-says-us-will-pull-out-of-intermediate-rangenuke-pact/2018/10/21/4b462540-d4ea-11e8-a4db-184311d27129_ story.html?utm_term=.1515c3d70e8e&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 81. Haass, “The Unraveling,” p. 74.

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82. Mitch McConnell, “Mitch McConnell: Withdrawing from Syria Is a Grave Mistake,” Washington Post, October 18, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/mitch-mcconnell-withdrawing-from-syriais-a-grave-mistake/2019/10/18/c0a811a8-f1cd-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414 732_story.html. 83. Cited in Neil MacFarquhar, “Glee in Russia Over Trump’s Foreign Policy Largess,” New York Times, December 21, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/12/21/world/europe/russia-trump-foreign-policy. html?emc=edit_th_181222&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321681222. 84. Cited in Steven Erlanger and Jane Perlez, “America’s Allies Fear That Traditional Ties No Longer Matter Under Trump,” New York Times, December 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/world/ europe/trump-jim-mattis-syria.html?emc=edit_th_181222&nl=todayshea dlines&nlid=43321681222. 85. Stephen Kotkin, “Realist World,” Foreign Affairs 97:4 (July/August 2018), p. 13. 86. Daalder and Lindsay, The Empty Throne, p. 11.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. What is the term used to describe America’s and China’s economic interdependence? a. “Americhina” b. “China-merica” c. “Chimerica” d. “China-America” 2. Which country would most likely oppose America in a Thucydides trap? a. Russia b. China c. Iran d. Iraq 3. Why did Taiwan reject a “one country, two systems” framework offered by China? a. The UN offered a better deal

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b. Taiwan’s leaders had witnessed Beijing violate the same system with Hong Kong c. America threatened to withdraw any form of support to Taiwan if they accepted the deal with China d. Taiwan’s leaders would have rejected anything offered by China 4. Which of the following is NOT a reason that America-Israel relations suffered under President Obama? a. Israel opposed the Iran nuclear deal b. President Obama refused to give financial aid to Israel c. Obama wanted Israel to cease building settlements in occupied territories d. Washington was willing to consider dealing with a Palestinian government that included Hamas if the PLO so wished 5. What economic system does China use? a. State capitalism b. Capitalism c. Socialism d. Communism 6. When China modernized its military, its priorities shifted. What are the new priorities? a. Focusing on taking arms sales deals from the United States b. Air and naval forces in the western Pacific c. Coordinating joint military strategy with Russia against the United States d. Cultivating new proxies for future proxy wars 7. What is the current yearly growth rate of China’s economy? a. 7% or less b. 8% c. 9% d. 9.5% 8. To what school of thought do we attribute the concept of “rising powers”? a. Realism

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b. Liberalism c. Constructivism d. Neorealism 9. Which country has the largest economy by GNP? a. China b. America c. Japan d. Germany 10. What is NOT one of the three main goals of “Belt and Road Initiative” noted in the textbook? a. Boosting China’s image b. Investing to improve infrastructure in countries on multiple continents c. Encouraging investment in the clothing and textile industry d. Encouraging trade and finance 11. What currency is China trying to make a “hard” currency? a. Yen b. Dollar c. Pound d. Renminbi 12. What is stopping China from selling U.S. securities to drop the value of the U.S. dollar? a. The United States would retaliate with military action b. There would be economic sanctions against China in response c. The United States would trigger a cyberattack against China d. China’s remaining U.S. securities would also drop in value 13. How many countries spend more money per capita on their military than the United States? a. 1 b. 2

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c. 3 d. 4 14. How do the foreign policies of Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump relate to each other? a. Bush overused military force, influencing Obama’s preference for negotiation and deference to allies, which influenced Trump’s unilateralism b. Bush appropriately used military force, having no impact on Obama’s preference for negotiation and deference to allies, which influenced Trump’s unilateralism c. Bush overused military force, influencing Obama to do the same, which impacted Trump’s preference for multilateralism d. Bush overused military force, teaching Obama to prefer negotiation and deference to allies, which influenced Trump to follow Obama’s example 15. Under President Obama, there were many conflicting issues that had to be addressed. Which of the following did NOT occur? a. Obama cooperated with Iran against the Islamic State but argued with Iran over their nuclear ambitions b. Obama sought to reassure Israel even as he condemned its war in Gaza and pressured it to seek a two-state solution c. The United States tried to cooperate with Russia on arms control while imposing sanctions due to Russia’s activity in Ukraine d. The United States condemned Ukraine for provoking Russian aggression while providing arms to Ukraine in an attempt to deter the Russians 16. In 2019, which of the following did President Trump decide to abandon? a. American spies in China b. American allies in Ukraine c. America’s Kurdish allies in Syria d. American allies in Iran 17. What is NOT one of the three elements of a Kantian triangle? a. Democratic norms

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b. International institutions c. Economic interdependence d. Racial and ethnic diversity 18. What were the results of the World Bank’s switch to using purchasing power parity to calculate GNP? a. It appeared as if America was easily the largest economy b. China appeared ready to replace America as the world’s largest economy c. Japan’s economy appeared to surpass China’s d. Nothing appeared to deviate from the old standard 19. Despite China’s uneven growth and wealth gap, extreme poverty has fallen to what level in China? a. 1% or less b. 2% c. 5% d. 10% or more 20. In 2018, what was America’s trade deficit with China? a. $207 billion b. $352 billion c. $419 billion d. $529 billion True or False 1. True or False: President Xi is posing as President Trump’s opposite. True 2. True or False: President Obama is liberal, so even though he was indecisive and hesitant in his foreign policy, he did not harm the liberal order. False, President Obama’s Beliefs and Views Do not Erase the Fact that His Actions (or Inactions) Contributed to the Erosion of the Liberal Order.

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3. True or False: The United States has more vessels in its navy than China does. False, China now has more naval vessels than the U.S. 4. True or False: China’s economy has an average annual growth rate of greater than 8% and is the world’s second largest economy by GNP. True 5. True or False: Global income in illiberal societies will surpass income in Western liberal societies in a few years. True 6. True or False: China has over $400 billion invested in the Belt and Road Initiative. True 7. True or False: American resentment of outsourcing jobs to China helped Trump win votes in 2016 in the Rust Belt, but it was not a major factor in his victory in the region. False, China now has more naval vessels than the U.S. 8. True or False: The United States honors the “one China” policy but will defend Taiwan if Beijing uses force against it. True 9. True or False: The United States is concerned about Huawei’s potential to become a major player in the 5G market because it could take too much business from domestic companies. False, the United States is concerned about the security of telecommunications if Huawei becomes a major player in the 5G market. 10. True or False: Putin’s military actions in Eastern Europe are sufficient to justify a major Western response, but not enough Western countries are willing to engage in a major response.

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False, the United States is concerned about the security of telecommunications if Huawei becomes a major player in the 5G market. 11. True or False: Obama essentially declared an end to the War on Terror, but continued drone strikes against terrorists in the Middle East. True 12. True or False: Obama didn’t follow through on his threats of force against President Assad after Assad employed chemical weapons, but Obama restored his credibility by providing nonlethal aid to the Sunni opposition. False. Assad’s opponents even commented that “nonlethal assistance … does not topple a regime.” 13. True or False: America’s passivity and Obama’s indecisiveness during the Arab Spring enhanced Islamic extremism in the Middle East and North Africa. True 14. True or False: China’s rapid military modernization is due in part to espionage, enabling them to skip the R&D phase. True 15. True or False: The wealth gap between China’s coastal regions and its interior will close very soon due to the rapid economic growth of China’s economy. False, the wealth gap is threatening political stability and Beijing is pressured to maintain high growth. 16. True or False: After numerous cyberattacks and instances of espionage against the U.S., Washington communicated to China’s leaders its doctrine for countering cyberattacks, and China reciprocated in the interest of maintaining peace. False, China has not reciprocated and China closed down a “cyber working group” to establish a code of cyberconduct after America accused the Chinese military officers of espionage.

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17. True or False: The death of Osama bin Laden during Obama’s presidency is comparable to the death of ISIS “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi during the Trump presidency. True 18. True or False: President Putin once called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century.” True 19. True or False: America lost the Vietnam war not because of insufficient hard power but because of a combination of domestic opposition and inadequate soft power. True 20. True or False: When the World Bank switched to using purchasing power parity (PPP) to calculate GNP, China embraced the change because it suggested China was poised to become the world’s largest economy. False, even China opposed the PPP standard because it was so misleading. Short Answer Questions What is the “one China” policy? “There is but one China and Taiwan is a part China.” Nixon declared jointly with Mao that the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and that Taiwan is a province of China, that no other country has the right to interfere in the liberation of Taiwan, and that the Chinese government firmly opposes any activities that aim to create “one China, one Taiwan.” Explain what was meant by describing the U.S. as a “reluctant sheriff.” Under President Bush, the U.S. would involve itself in overseas commitments only when local powers could not maintain peace. Kagan remarked, “the rest of the world saw the United States not as a global leader seeking the global good but as an

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angry Leviathan narrowly focused on destroying those who had attacked it … [it was an] incompetent self-absorbed hegemon.” Describe President Obama’s simultaneous foreign policy challenges and how they impacted one another. The EU and Eurozone were in disarray, ISIS was causing turmoil in the Middle East, Iranian nuclear talks were at risk, China was posturing in the Sea of Japan and the south China Sea, and Russia was meddling in Ukraine. Obama’s effort to “pivot” to Asia to respond to China’s rise was not as effective as hoped, due to the disorder in the Middle East and Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. What are “debt traps”? How can they be used to gain political and military influence? Debt traps involve lending money to countries, frequently without conditions such as fostering democracy, but at high interest rates that are impossible to repay. This forces the recipients of the loans to hand over control of natural resources or other assets. The lending country can acquire military and/or political influence as well owing to debt-trap diplomacy. Recipients may find it difficult to maintain sovereignty. How did President Trump justify his withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and how might withdrawal and efforts to develop low-yield nuclear weapons impact relations with Russia? Trump justified it because Russia violated the treaty, and China had INF missiles already (though China was not part of the treaty). Moscow had deployed cruise missiles that threatened American NATO allies, so Trump felt it acceptable to withdraw. US-Russian relations have soured, and it’s very risky to develop low-yield weapons because Moscow has no way of knowing if a weapon is low-yield or high-yield and may therefore escalate an already precarious situation. “This risks a future without a nuclear taboo.”

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Define and provide two examples each for “hard power” and “soft power.” Hard power consists of resources that allow for coercion or reward, such as military action and economic sanctions. Soft power consists of characteristics that others admire and “help to provide co-optive behavioral power,” such as strong relations with allies, economic assistance programs, and cultural exchange. How might the success of the Belt and Road Initiative alter public perceptions of authoritarianism? What would that mean for the global liberal order? It will foster claims that authoritarianism can foster security and growth more effectively than “erratic” democracies, thus making the general public more amenable to authoritarianism over democracy. Some believe that the entire BRI is an attempt to foster an illiberal world order. In 2019, a Pew poll of 32 countries found that a median of 64% lacked confidence that Trump would do the right thing in foreign policy. What are some of the implications of this low rating? It suggests that Trump’s actions during his first year in office were not an anomaly, that doubts about U.S. commitments abroad are widespread, that the unpredictability of the sitting U.S. president is almost to be expected, the United States has declining soft power, and that there is now an opening for China and Russia to assert dominance. In response to American accusations of hacking, China cited information from the Snowden leak that America had hacked numerous Chinese sites. How did President Obama justify it? Obama replied by saying that “every country in the world, large and small, engages in intelligence gathering.” However, he made it clear that there was a difference between intelligence gathering and a hacker directly connected to the Chinese government or military trying to hack Apple to get designs for the newest Apple product, the latter of which he considered theft.

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America is pulling back from its role in international affairs. If America abdicates its role as a global hegemon, what are some potential consequences that may arise? Rivals may grow aggressive and coerce their neighbors. American allies that are potential targets of China, Russia, and Iran will be vulnerable to attack. Nuclear proliferation would become more likely, strategic stability would be at risk, deterrence would be less credible, and the world in general would be more dangerous. Essay Questions 1. Joseph Nye warns that the belief that a country is declining may produce a decline, even if there was not one to begin with. Is this true? Why or why not? 2. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo opposed Pakistan’s loan request from the IMF due to the debt traps of the Belt and Road Initiative. Explain his reasoning and elaborate on what it could mean for the future of the liberal world order. 3. Gilpin argues that a hegemon is necessary to sustain a liberal international economy, while Keohane claims that once a hegemon establishes international regimes, it may not be needed to maintain them. Based on current events, which prediction appears more accurate? 4. David Shambaugh argues that China is deficient in influence and soft power. How might this hobble China’s foreign relations and its rise to becoming a global superpower? 5. What does President Trump’s abandonment of the United States’ Kurdish allies communicate about his views on international commitments, and the status of U.S. isolationism now as opposed to the 1940s? What does this mean for Syria?

PART II

The Spread of Nationalist-Populism

CHAPTER 4

The Sources and Spread of Populism: America

“Populism” in America during the last century was used mainly to describe left-wing efforts to reduce economic inequality. Right-wing nationalist- and authoritarian-populism were responsible for the election of President Donald Trump.

Introduction: Authoritarian-Populism According to Timothy Garton Ash, the Trump administration inaugurated “a new era of nationalism” in which “nationalists are giving one another the Trumpian thumbs-up across the seas”1 that included contempt for democracy and human rights. The administration denounced the International Criminal Court and forced the UN Security Council to dilute a resolution outlawing sexual violence in war by deleting references to reproductive health. This provoked the UN’s French representative to comment acidly, “Women and girls who suffered from sexual violence in conflict, and who obviously didn’t choose to become pregnant, should have the right to terminate their pregnancy.”2 Trump also spoke approvingly of torturing terrorism suspects. Trump threatened to send military units into cities and demanded that local officials “dominate” demonstrators after demonstrators across America demanded an end to police brutality and racism after George Floyd, an African-American, died in police custody in Minneapolis. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_4

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Former Defense Secretary General James Mattis responded to the president’s incendiary rhetoric, “Donald Trump is the first president in my lifetime who does not try to unite the American people—does not even pretend to try.” Mattis continued, “I swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution. Never did I dream that troops taking that same oath would be ordered under any circumstance to violate the Constitutional rights of their fellow citizens….”3 In America, authoritarian-populism accompanied declining trust in government and rising political divisions. Growing economic inequality was one of the causes. Declining status was as important as economic fear for white Trump voters, except in America’s “rust belt,” and contributed to cultural and racial anger and existential fear for their dominance of the country. These factors endangered American democracy. Trump supporters tended to be older, poorly educated, blue-collar white males who opposed change, and believed “elites” and mainstream politicians did not respect them. They thought other countries had unfairly treated America and U.S. workers. Trump’s opponents tended to be young, nonwhites and college-educated white voters, suburbanites, and women. Republicans, which became the party of those “left behind” in 2016, believed they could increase turnout among older blue-collar whites without losing young and racially diverse voters who constituted future voters. Evangelical Christians, among Trump’s most reliable voters, hypocritically supported Trump despite his blatant moral lapses. Not all evangelicals, however, were so accepting. Mark Galli, editor of Christianity Today, demanded Trump’s removal because it was “not a matter of partisan loyalties but loyalty to the Creator of the Ten Commandments,” and Trump was “a near perfect example of a human being who is morally lost and confused.”4 Trump’s populism influenced populist leaders elsewhere. He admired authoritarian leaders who sought to undermine the liberal order and engaged in publicly demanding his attorney general and secretary of state take unprecedented steps to smear political foes in the midst of the 2020 presidential campaign, actions that those like Putin, Xi, and Erdoˇgan used against their political foes. “What’s so dispiriting is to see the president throwing away 70 years of accrued commitment, bipartisan commitment, to America promoting human rights and freedom in the world,”5 declared a former state department official. “He’s just a bull carrying his own china shop with him whenever he travels the world,” declared one

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historian.6 “Who are the three guys in the world he most admires? President Xi of China, Erdogan and Putin,” a Trump aide confided. “They’re all the same guy.”7 He praised China’s President Xi Jinping’s contempt for democracy and congratulated Xi for his “extraordinary elevation” after China’s president had removed limits to how long he could remain in power and had placed most of China’s Muslim Uighurs in concentration camps. Trump defended Putin’s murder of political foes, comparing that behavior favorably with America’s. Putin was unopposed in his rigged election to a fourth term as Russia’s president, yet Trump ignored a warning from his own advisers “DO NOT CONGRATULATE.” Indeed, then National Security Adviser John R. Bolton expressed concern about Trump’s doing favors for leaders like Erdoˇgan and Xi. Trump and Putin had in common a dislike of the liberal globalist establishment. personified by Obama and Hillary Clinton. The president also congratulated Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte for doing an “unbelievable job” in his drug war, which involved thousands of extrajudicial killings, and he called Egypt’s murderous President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi a “fantastic guy.” Also, influenced by the dictators of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Trump blindsided his secretary of state and backed Libyan strongman Khalifa Hiftar in his effort to seize control of his country from a UN-backed government in Tripoli. Trump also said he would be honored to meet North Korea’s murderous leader Kim Jongun, a leader whom he had previously ridiculed. Kim, he declared, was still young. “There was a lot of potential threats that could have come his way. He’s managed to lead a country forward, despite the concerns that we and so many people have.”8 Trump shrugged off Kim’s repression by labeling him a “tough guy.” After meeting Kim in June 2018, Trump declared. “He speaks and his people sit up at attention,” and “I want my people to do the same.”9 Reflecting Trump’s contempt for human rights, John Bolton described how Trump approved of Chinese President Xi’s internment of China’s Uighurs, which he thought “was exactly the right thing to do.”10 He and his son-in-law Jared Kushner also defended Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman whom the CIA concluded had arranged the brutal murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Iranian consulate in Istanbul. He minimized the significance of the murder. Instead of accepting the CIA’s “high confidence assessment,” Trump closed the matter by saying, “It could very well be that the crown prince had knowledge of this tragic

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event — maybe he did and maybe he didn’t!”11 Trump also emphasized the importance of U.S. arms sales to the Saudis and Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran and resisted congressional efforts to end U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia that MBS was using in Yemen, producing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. One critic wrote, “Trump’s reaction—or non-reaction—to the Saudi regime’s brutal killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi is a holiday-season gift to autocrats around the globe. It shows them that if you just shower Trump with over-the-top flattery, feed him some geopolitical mumbo jumbo and make vague promises to perhaps buy some American-made goods in the future, he will literally let you get away with murder.”12 Iran ultimately condemned and executed five minor officials for the murder but took no action against the crown prince or his advisers. A former aide to President Ronald Reagan concluded, “A clear and dangerous message has been sent to tyrants around the world: Flash enough money in front of the president of the United States, and you can literally get away with murder.”13

Populist Themes in Trump’s Policies and Governance Since Donald Trump had no foreign-policy experience or knowledge and no consistent ideology, those appointed as advisers and cabinet members had more significant roles than usual. In campaigning, Trump voiced controversial views that ran counter to U.S. support for a liberal order, and, consequently, he was termed a “demolition man.” Rather than supporting internationalism and multilateralism, he emphasized bilateralism and unilateralism. Trump’s populism also entailed a propensity to ignore traditional diplomacy. Trump’s campaign contained several themes, which persisted during his presidency and some that he later reversed. Among the former was dislike of multilateralism, which was evident in criticism of alliances and international regimes. Another was hostility toward long-time friends and allies and praising foes. This led former Vice President Dick Cheney, a neoconservative hardliner, to conclude, “we’re getting into a situation when our friends and allies around the world that we depend upon are going to lack confidence in us.”14 Trump’s nationalism and contempt for science led to his refusal to participate in cooperative efforts to solve collective dilemmas. He

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dismissed scientific evidence about climate change, expressing skepticism that global warming was manmade and calling it a “hoax” despite a report by thirteen U.S. government agencies to the contrary that the administration refused to publish. Trump also reduced funding of scientific research. He rolled back environmental regulations, promoted using coal, and withdrew from the Paris climate accord although America’s defense authorization bill referred to climate change as a national security threat. Trump rejected globalization’s emphases on free trade and the unfettered movement of people. Hence, he supported protectionism and racist efforts to eliminate illegal and legal immigration. His racism was evident when he attacked four new left-wing Democratic members of Congress— Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida Tlaib—all U.S. citizens and women of color and of whom only one who had been born overseas. Referring to them, he declared “if you’re not happy in the U.S., if you’re complaining all the time, very simply, you can leave.” “Trump’s demand,” wrote one observer, “is less a factual assertion than a moral one, an affirmation of the president’s belief that American citizenship is conditional for people of color, who should be grateful we are even allowed to be here.”15 Democratic congressional leader Nancy Pelosi argued that Trump’s “plan to ‘Make America Great Again’ has always been about making America white again.”16 Trump’s ugly xenophobia followed earlier tweets about Mexican immigrants as “criminals, drug dealers” and “rapists,” Nigerians going back “to their huts,” Haitians all having AIDS, or of African migrants from “shithole countries.”17 The president was blind to the economic role that young migrants played in paying taxes to provide medical and social funds for an aging population. His administration rejected a Department of Health and Human Services’ study that showed that refugees provided billions of dollars more in government revenue than they cost. Although liberal immigration was a source of America’s soft power, in 2017, Washington withdrew from U.N. talks about a Global Pact on Migration, claiming it would violate U.S. sovereignty. In addition to railing against Hispanic immigrants, he pardoned the anti-Hispanic Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio who had been imprisoned for violating prisoners’ rights. He sought to build a wall on Mexico’s border, and, when Congress denied him funding, he declared a national emergency to get around congressional authority.

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Trump also demonized Islam and imposed a travel ban on Muslim visitors. He praised Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, repeatedly questioned the relevance of America’s alliances, publicly insulted friendly leaders, and opposed free trade, all contrary to the liberal order. These were elements of a strident populism, reflecting impetuosity, bullying and racism. The president made policy with little information and read little, ignoring, for example, multiple warnings from the intelligence community in presidential daily briefs concerning the dangers of the coronavirus. He flogged mainstream media, ignored intelligence reports, and made policy based on whims, Fox News, and false claims. Frequently, without warning, he altered “decisions” abruptly, and was routinely inconsistent, a nightmare for his advisers “In place of the march towards truth,” wrote Luce, “we had reality-TV politics.”18 Trump told tall tales, especially in mass meetings, which expressed his followers’ grievance, and he repeatedly attacked mainstream media to undermine “true news” that he called “fake news.” As president, Trump made 30,573 false and misleading claims, nearly half in his final year, averaging six a day in his first year, 16 days in his second, 22 claims day in his third, and 39 claims a day in his final year.19 “As a result of Trump’s constant lying through the presidential megaphone, more Americans are skeptical of genuine facts than ever before,” observed historian Michael Beschloss.20 “Some days were extraordinary: 189 claims (a record) on Aug. 11, 147 claims on Aug. 17, 113 claims on Aug. 20.”21 Many of these concerned the coronavirus, foreign policy, events leading to his impeachment, the protests following George Floyd’s death in police custody, and allegations and conspiracy theories about President Obama spying on his campaign. Indeed, his references to the crimes of “Obamagate” were entirely imagined. In 2019, almost 1,000 lies concerned the Ukraine investigation, including efforts to smear Joe Biden. Media sycophants like Sean Hannity, Tucker Carlson, and Rush Limbaugh echoed and amplified Trump’s lies, and his base, living in an Orwellian world, ignored them. Trump also lied 21 times in his acceptance speech of 70 minutes to the Republican convention in August 2020, involving the border wall, drug prices, unemployment, the pandemic, and Joe Biden’s supposed desire to defund the police (that he actually opposed). Many of his lies spread conspiracy theories or were in vicious personal attacks on foes. Others promoted racial, religious, or ethnic hatred, often directed at immigrants. Former FBI director Andrew McCabe wrote, “Every day brings a new low, with the president exposing

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himself as a deliberate liar who will say whatever he pleases to get whatever he wants.”22 In her essay, “On Bullshit and the Oath of Office: The ‘LOL Nothing Matters’ Presidency,” Quinta Jurecic argued that Trump was not simply a bald-faced liar but created his own reality. She wrote “foundational disrespect for meaning and consequence” would make it “impossible for Donald Trump to faithfully execute the laws of this nation and the duties of the oath of office and to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.”23 Trump fit the role of a “bullshitter,” as defined by Harry Frankfurt, even better than “liar,” “Someone who lies and someone who tells the truth are playing on opposite sides, so to speak, in the same game. Each responds to the facts as he understands them, although the response of the one is guided by the authority of the truth, while the response of the other defies that authority and refuses to meet its demands. The bullshitter ignores these demands altogether. He does not reject the authority of the truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to it. He pays no attention to it at all.”24 “We in the intelligence world,” wrote Michael Hayden, former CIA and NSA director, “have dealt with obstinate and argumentative presidents through the years. But we have never served a president for whom ground truth really doesn’t matter.” Over time, he continued, “it had become clear to Hayden that reaching security decisions in the Trump administration had a pattern.” “Discussion seems to start with a presidential statement or tweet. Then follows a large-scale effort to inform the president, to impress upon him the complexity of an issue, to review the relevant history, to surface more factors bearing on the problem, to raise second- and to raise second- and third-order consequences and to explore subsequent moves.” Hayden recalled that Trump insisted “on five-page or shorter intelligence briefs, rather than the 60 pages we typically gave previous presidents.” 25 Many key issues could not easily be simplified. “One dismaying factor of it all,” commented Nancy Pelosi, “is that the president doesn’t just seem to have the attention span or the desire to hear what the intelligence community has been telling him.”26 Trump’s tweets were frequently gibberish. After one “tweet storm,” Nick Bilton, author of Hatching Twitter, declared, “It’s almost like a kid who is screaming for a lollipop and an ice pop and a caramel and a chocolate, and is eventually going to get one of them, and it’s like, ‘Which is the thing that’s going to work?’”27

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Adding to the chaos in the White House, the former president was remarkably lazy and was a part-time president, spending 60% of his time as “executive time”—watching Fox TV, reading newspapers, and then phoning advisers and friends, and officials rather than conducting official business. Trump also spent considerable time grooming himself. “By Trump’s own account, shampooing with Head & Shoulders and then an hour of drying. Only then does the extensive combing and hair-spraying begin. In addition, there is the coloring of both hair and skin to whatever bad ombre of orange he desires. Self-tanning creams can take four to eight hours to do their magic before they can be washed off.”28 Trump’s impetuosity was evident in his sudden decision in December 2018 to withdraw America’s troops from Syria owing to the “defeat” of the Islamic State. Only a month later America’s intelligence community denied the president’s claim that the IS was no longer a threat, and two months before Trump’s decision Bolton had vigorously reiterated the administration’s determination to remain in Syria and repeated this in January 2019 after Trump had announced his decision to withdraw. Trump’s flipflop also triggered the resignation of Secretary Mattis, who protested what he believed was not in America’s national interest. Eliot Cohen, a former senior State Department official, wrote, “Henceforth, the senior ranks of government can be filled only by invertebrates and opportunists, schemers and careerists.”29 Shortly after his December decision, Trump reconsidered keeping troops in Iraq to keep watch on Iran, but Iraq’s president rejected the idea. Congressional concern about Washington’s support for Saudi Arabia and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria and Afghanistan led bipartisan Senate majorities to adopt nonbinding resolutions that decried Trump’s policies. Then Republican majority leader Mitch McConnell offered an amendment warning that, “the precipitous withdrawal of United States forces from either country could put at risk hard-won gains and United States national security.”30 Trump then reversed himself owing to the Pentagon’s objections. America maintained a small military presence in Kurdish-occupied Syria near the Turkish border. However, shortly after conversing with Turkish President Erdoˇgan in October 2019, who claimed the American-backed Kurds were linked to domestic Kurdish terrorists, Trump ordered America’s withdrawal of the few remaining troops, virtually inviting Turkish forces to invade Syria. This left America’s Kurdish allies at Turkey’s mercy. Trump had again shocked his security advisers and members of Congress.

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It seemed a capitulation to U.S. foes including Syria’s Assad regime, Iran, and Russia, as well as Turkey’s authoritarian president, and was a decision influenced by criticism from conservative radio hosts and right-wing supporters. The few hundred U.S. troops remaining to guard the “oil wells” were faced with Russian military pressure, a dangerous development. Trump then changed his mind yet again. He agreed to leave troops in Syria to patrol the border with Iraq and protect Syria’s oil wells from the Assad government and IS, and to send an additional 1,800 troops to protect Saudi Arabia. Conflicting signals tweeted by Trump produced confusion. “It is chaos,” said Michael Stephens of London’s Royal United Services Institute. “The region is in chaos because the hegemonic power does not seem to know what it wants to do, and so nobody else does.”31 The Kurds, who had been loyal American allies, were forced to make a deal with Syria’s. After this, Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded, “The prevailing mood is low and getting lower, if it can.”32 In an op-ed article, Senator McConnell wrote that U.S. withdrawal from Syria would “leave the American people and homeland less safe, embolden our enemies, and weaken important alliances.”33 Unlike McConnell, Trump’s obsequious Secretary of State Mike Pompeo endorsed Trump’s unprincipled decision. Following a critique of Pompeo’s humiliating willingness to support every unwise and unconscionable presidential decision, two former U.S. diplomats concluded, “If he continues on his current trajectory,” Pompeo may end up being remembered as the worst secretary of state in modern times,34 indeed, the worst in history.35

President Trump and Chaos in Government Trump had ignored repeated warnings from intelligence officials in early 2020 that the coronavirus was becoming a global pandemic, and Secretary Pompeo refused to cease calling it the “Wuhan virus.” Although it may have first appeared in Wuhan, there was no evidence that the virus had been manmade or genetically modified. Washington charged China with withholding information about and failing to contain the virus. Chaos was evident well into 2020 in the Trump administration’s confused, delayed, ineffective, and politicized response to COVID-19, and its clumsy effort to obtain global medical supplies even at the expense of allies. Even wackier were Trump’s public recommendations that Americans consume

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poisonous Lysol or implant ultraviolet lights inside themselves to avoid the virus. Shortly after America’s Centers for Disease Control identified the first U.S. case of COVID-19 not linked to foreign travel, Trump said “when you have 15 people — and the 15 within a couple of days is going to be down to close to zero — that’s a pretty good job we’ve done.” Trump, of course, got it wrong as he tried to understate the seriousness of the pandemic. He paid no attention to a Department of Health and Human Services’ scenario, code-named ‘Crimson Contagion.’ It had simulated an influenza pandemic carried out in 2019 and presciently predicted the seriousness of a pandemic to Americans, while identifying “just how underfunded, underprepared and uncoordinated the federal government would be for a life-or-death battle with a virus for which no treatment existed.” It also accurately predicted the problems of coordinating agencies and the confusion it would cause within federal agencies and between Washington and state and local agencies. Trump demanded loyalty to him personally rather than the country and tweeted criticisms of U.S. institutions including the State Department, FBI, CIA, Congress, the courts, and the media. Indeed, the State Department’s international organization bureau compiled “loyalty lists” after Pompeo became secretary of state. Whether requiring America’s ambassador to Britain to lobby for tournaments at his Scottish golf club or replace professionals with avid followers, Trump showed that Martin Wolf’s conclusion about recruiting authoritarian populists was correct. “Replacing people of talent and principles with mediocrities who will do anything for success has never been difficult” and who “shifted to the nostalgia and cynicism of Trump.”36 In angry tweets, President Trump repeatedly attacked America’s intelligence and law-enforcement agencies led by nonpartisan professionals such as Robert S. Mueller III, James Comey, and Andrew McCabe. After Trump fired Comey, the FBI initiated a counterintelligence investigation of the president to see if he was working on behalf of Russia, and a potentially explosive question was whether Putin had damaging information about Trump. Thereafter, the Mueller investigation took over the FBI inquiry. The president’s contempt for America’s security, intelligence, and law-enforcement agencies eroded their morale and compromised their effectiveness in providing intelligence information and timely advice vital. Sometimes the president almost seemed at war with current and former intelligence and national-security advisers. At the State Department, for

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example, there was a significant increase in those who believed they could disclose violations of law or rules without reprisal and a dramatic increase in those who believed that State’s leaders were neither honest nor had integrity. Thus, in January 2019, contrary to Trump’s claims that Iran was still seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and that North Korea was no longer a threat, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Daniel Coats testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee. “We do not believe Iran is currently undertaking the key activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device.” Astonishingly, Trump claimed to know what he imagined in his alternate reality and derided his intelligence community. “The Intelligence people seem to be extremely passive and naive when it comes to the dangers of Iran. They are wrong!” He then insultingly tweeted, “Perhaps Intelligence should go back to school!”37 The president also tweeted that the U.S-North Korea relationship was better than ever and offered a good chance to denuclearize Korea. Although the president claimed that Kim Jong-un wrote him “beautiful letters,” Coats proved correct when in February 2019 the second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi collapsed with no agreement or even final statement, an outcome caused partly by Trump’s overconfidence in his negotiating skills and lack of preparation and discipline. This “should not have happened,” wrote Richard Haass. “A busted summit is the risk you run when too much faith is placed in personal relations with a leader like Kim, when the summit is inadequately prepared, and when the president had signaled he was confident of success.”38 Trump later said he was “happy” with Coats when, in reality, he was furious, and told a former adviser that Coats was “not loyal” and was “not on the team.” In this, as in many other instances, Trump demanded loyalty to him personally rather to his country. “This is a consequence of narcissism, but it is a strong and inappropriate public political pressure to get the intelligence community leadership aligned with his political goals,” said a C.I.A. official. “The existential danger to the nation is when the policymaker corrupts the role of the intelligence agencies, which is to provide unbiased and apolitical intelligence to inform policy.”39 The policymaking process of the National Security Council that involved key agencies such as the State Department and CIA became moribund. In an unprecedented decision, Stephen K. Bannon, Trump’s “chief strategist,” was given a role on the NSC’s decision-making Principals Committee to assure that the president’s senior advisers carried

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out his wishes. Equally unprecedented, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CIA director were no longer regular attendees in the Principals Committee meetings. Bannon and Trump viewed professional foreign-policy bureaucrats as pro-globalist, and Bannon vowed to fight for the “deconstruction of the administrative state.” Several months later, Trump reversed the decisions regarding NSC organization. Bannon was removed, while the DNI and the CIA and JCS chiefs again became regular attendees of the Principals Committee. Trump, as former French Ambassador Gérard Araud observed, “is the opposite of a bureaucratic president,” and “the chain of command, of information up and down, is basically broken. So it’s quite difficult to pick up information or transmit messages.”40 This was made worse by Trump’s irascibility, vulgarity, his poor use of English, and his ignorance of the Constitution and American law. Trump’s idiosyncratic decisionmaking style fostered the breakdown of the systematic processes in the NSC to develop and formulate alternative policies. As National Security Adviser, John R. Bolton further weakened the NSC process. Bolton had advocated overthrowing the Iranian regime, but Trump, while in Japan in May 2019, undercut Bolton by declaring that Washington was not seeking regime change in Iran. In September 2019, Bolton became the third national security adviser fired by Trump who tweeted that he strongly disagreed strongly Bolton’s suggestions. It was a case of a hardline president finding his hardline national security adviser too hardline regarding Iran, North Korea, and Afghanistan. Bolton was replaced by a fourth adviser, Robert C. O’Brien. Under O’Brien, the NSC ceased developing policy and was relegated to executing what Trump wanted. Some months later, a U.S. drone assassinated Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, the external component of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The assassination was a significant escalation after tit-for-tat provocations between America and Iranian-supported militias, culminating in an effort by a Shia militia to occupy America’s embassy in Iraq. Although Trump claimed the assassination preempted Iranian violence against Americans, he was seeking to increase his credibility after not reacting vigorously to previous Iranian provocations. Thereafter, Iran announced it would resume unrestricted uranium enrichment, production, research, and expansion that would violate the 2015 deal. That deal would prevent production of uranium for a nuclear weapon for another

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decade rather than a few months. Furthermore, Iraq’s parliament passed a nonbinding resolution demands that U.S. troops in the country leave, declaring the drone attack had violated Iraq’s sovereignty. The Iranian imbroglio illustrated former Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s view of the president’s policymaking. “Mr. Trump’s failure to develop policies — and his tendency to countermand them by tweet — have caused major confusion worldwide about where we stand on issue after issue,” resulting in “a long list of self-inflicted wounds.”41 Soleimani’s martyrdom revealed how dangerous was Trump’s neglect of the NSC, which normally would have examined carefully consequences of the action and the perils it posed to Americans and America’s relations with Iraq and Shia Muslims. Trump’s comments were conflicting and muddled, menacing and conciliatory. His threat to bomb Iranian cultural sites violated international law and undermined a norm supported by advisers. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper thereafter withdrew the threat to bomb cultural sites, and Trump unexpectedly ceased his bellicose comments after Iran retaliated by attacking U.S. bases in Iraq with ballistic missiles. Trump also shocked America’s military leaders by overruling the Navy’s decision to punish a SEAL who had committed war crimes. He thereby interfered with the Navy’s chain of command, apparently viewing the military services as part of anti-Trump “deep state.” The Navy’s politicization intensified when the commander of a U.S. aircraft carrier was dismissed after requesting help to protect his crew from additional COVID-19 cases. “The decay of norms, the rise of unaccountable fiefdoms, the discounting of civilian oversight, the loss of senior talent, and the collapse of recruitment for new talent—none of those issues is solved by a president with a different process or… a different ideology,”42 declared a former Justice Department official. Civil-military relations in America were also complicated by fears before the 2020 election that Trump might try to send troops into U.S. cities to quell disturbances if he lost but tried to remain in the White House. U.S. military personnel take an oath to protect the Constitution, not to any individual, including the president. Many positions in key agencies and ambassadorships remained vacant. After four years, the Trump administration had failed to fill many key government positions, including ambassadorships, directorships, and undersecretaries. By February 2019, Trump had failed even to nominate 150 of 705 Senate-confirmed positions. As of mid-2019, only 455

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confirmed appointees filled the 713 top positions in government, and senior Pentagon positions were vacant or filled by temporary officials. Trump named “acting” officials to high positions that could not muster Senate approval, thereby evading the Senate’s constitutional authority to “advise and consent” by confirming prudential appointees. The Foreign Service had lost nearly half of its Career Ministers and 20% of its Minister Counselors within two years. The highest percentage of political appointees in history were appointed U.S. ambassadors (44%), and some 1,200 senior career service employees left during Trump’s first three years. Trump’s reduction in the State Department’s budget prompted Mattis to comment: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.”43 Overall, during Trumps’ term, ten cabinet positions had a turnover, eight of which had serial turnover (e.g., two secretaries of homeland security and two secretaries of defense and state). Moreover, 91% (59/65) of Trump’s senior-ranking advisers lost their jobs, 39% of which had serial turnover (e.g., four chiefs of staff).44 Trump repeatedly declared “I’m the only one who matters, because when it comes to it, that’s what the policy is going to be.” He declared “I have a gut and my gut tells me more sometimes than anybody else’s brain can ever tell me,”45 thus he did not need experts. Instead, Trump surrounded himself with advisers, many of whom were bootlickers, and some of whom were criminals. Within three months of the 2020 elections, among those who had served him six were convicted felons—Michael Cohen, Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, Rick Gates, Roger Stone, and George Papadopoulos—and Stephen K. Bannon had been indicted. Moreover, shortly before ending his term as president. Trump was involved in discussions involving pardoning family members such as his Jared Kushner, and his children Ivanka, Donald Jr., and Eric, who had acted as his advisers. He even considered pardoning himself, although those whom he pardoned must be presumed to have committed crimes for which he is pardoning them. What were their crimes? Unfortunately, as Stephen Walt noted, the professional members of these agencies, unlike political appointees, possessed “much of the institutional knowledge and expertise that enables the government to function.”46 As former Ambassador William J. Burns observed, “the real threat to our democracy is not from an imagined deep state bent on undermining an elected president. Instead, it comes from a weak state of hollowed-out institutions and battered and belittled public servants, no longer able to uphold the ever more fragile guardrails of our democracy

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or compete on an ever more crowded, complicated, and competitive international landscape.”47 America’s career diplomats disliked the president’s bullying of allies and transactional policies like his effort to “buy off” China’s president in return for purchases of U.S. agricultural products to aid his reelection. Trump’s impeachment further persuaded him that the “deep state” included disloyal and partisan diplomats and advisers, some of whom had testified. The consequence was his firing additional professionals like Inspectors General of the intelligence community and the State Department (whose successor resigned shortly afterward). The foreign-policy community was in shambles. The administration’s dysfunction, its failure to vet officials, and presidential impetuosity were reflected in the revolving door of Trump’s appointments. Thus, Trump axed DNI Coats whom he had praised only days before and announced he would nominate to the position Rep. John Ratcliffe (R-Tex.), who had served on the House intelligence committee and had earned presidential approval by denouncing the Mueller report. Coats was the tenth cabinet member to leave the Trump administration. Ratcliffe had no experience in intelligence and, like many presidential appointments to top national-security positions, was something of an amateur. Ratcliffe also apparently had falsely overstated his achievements, and, for this reason, Trump suddenly withdrew Ratcliffe’s nomination and nominated Joseph Maguire, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, as acting director of national intelligence. Ratcliffe’s nomination as permanent DNI was reinstated in 2020 to carry out Trump’s wish to “rein in” the intelligence agencies that “have run amok.” After resigning, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recalled, “What was challenging for me coming from the disciplined, highly process-oriented ExxonMobil corporation” was “to go to work for a man who is pretty undisciplined, doesn’t like to read, doesn’t read briefing reports, doesn’t like to get into the details of a lot of things, but rather just kind of says, ‘This is what I believe.’” Tillerson added, “So often, the president would say, ‘Here’s what I want to do, and here’s how I want to do it,’ and I would have to say to him, ‘Mr. President, I understand what you want to do, but you can’t do it that way. It violates the law.’”48 The next day, Trump responded with a vulgar ad hominem tweet, declaring that Tillerson “was dumb as a rock and I couldn’t get rid of him fast enough.”49

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Trump and Russia Among the mysteries of the Trump era was the president’s pro-Russian views. President Obama had left a difficult problem for his successor by expelling Russian operatives after accusing Moscow of meddling in America’s 2016 election. Should the new administration confront Russia or seek to reduce tensions? Had Trump been elected by Russian cyber-activities; had the Trump campaign colluded with Moscow; and how would Trump deal with Putin after assuming office? During and after the campaign, there were numerous contacts between Trump’s aides and Russians, including connections with Russian banks and intelligence agencies. In December 2016, the CIA announced that Russian computer hacking during the campaign was intended to make Trump president. Some members in Trump’s coterie, including Jared Kushner, Secretary Tillerson, national security adviser Michael Flynn, and former campaign chairperson Paul Manafort had links with Russians. Nevertheless, Trump denied Russian interference in the 2016 election despite the unanimous judgment of U.S. intelligence agencies. Instead, he insisted that Ukraine had meddled in America’s elections in order to aid Hillary Clinton, a baseless claim. Trump regarded the intelligence community’s investigation of foreign involvement in America’s 2016 presidential election as politically tainted. He described special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of Russian involvement as “a disgusting, illegal and unwarranted Witch Hunt.” Nevertheless, before his inauguration, the CIA had shown Trump evidence that Putin himself had ordered hacking before the election. David Ignatius hit the nail on the head when he concluded that “Putin probably doesn’t mind that his intelligence activities are so blatant that they’re a subject of daily public debate. His goal isn’t to steal secrets but to destabilize America’s political system.”50 Consequently, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report in April 2020 affirming the Mueller investigation’s claim of Russian interference in America’s 2016 election. Trump’s disagreement with his intelligence agencies about Russian motives increased their mutual mistrust. Standing next to Putin in Helsinki in July 2018, Trump publicly cast doubt on his own intelligence leaders and their voluminous evidence of Russian hacking in 2016 and its continuation before the 2018 congressional elections. This took place only days after the indictment of twelve Russian intelligence agents for hacking. Referring to the 2018 election,

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Christopher Wray, Trump’s appointed FBI director, reiterated that Russia had interfered in 2016 and continued to do so. In the face of intense bipartisan criticism, Trump improbably declared he had “misspoken,” and that he had said to Putin, “I let him know we can’t have this,” and “We’re not going to have it, and that’s the way it’s going to be.”51 In effect, Trump had admitted he had made a huge blunder in Helsinki, perhaps the worst since he had equated white supremacists (including Ku Klux Klan members and neo-Nazis) with counterdemonstrators in Charlottesville. Later, when asked if Moscow was still trying to manipulate America’s elections, Trump answered “no,” but, when confronted with Coats’ opposing conclusion, the president reversed course. “Well, I accept. I mean, he’s an expert,” Trump declared. “I have tremendous faith in Dan Coats, and if he says that, I would accept that.” Two days later, Trump reversed himself again, describing the issue of Russian interference in U.S. elections as “a big hoax.”52 In fact, on hearing of Trump’s election, Boris Chernyshev, a nationalist member of Russia’s Duma, lauded Russia’s interference. Paraphrasing President Obama’s 2008 slogan, he declared, “Tonight we can use the slogan with Mr. Trump: Yes we did,”53 and, when asked if he had wanted Trump to win, Putin admitted. “Yes, I did.”54 Trump was also skewered for discussing Putin’s proposal to allow Russian officials to interrogate America’s former ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, in return for allowing special counsel Mueller to interview the twelve Russian agents he had indicted (“an incredible offer” Trump called it). McFaul called Trump’s action another example of his naivete about Putin. Trump, McFaul argued, should not have had a private talk with Putin in which the gullible president might have reached other agreements. Former DNI James Clapper declared, “I’ve never heard of such a thing. To turn over any U.S. citizen, particularly a former ambassador, for the Russians to interrogate him? You’ve got to be kidding.”55 Putin’s offer was possibly a trap sprung in their private meeting. Trump thought he was a skilled dealmaker and wanted to leave the meeting with a deal that reflected they could agree to a trade. Probably, Putin did not want to interrogate McFaul nearly as much as he wanted Bill Browder, who had run Hermitage Capital Management, and whose Russian attorney, Sergei L. Magnitsky, had died in jail in Russia after receiving inadequate medical assistance. Browder had been instrumental in persuading Washington to pass the Magnitsky Act that imposed

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sanctions on Russians involved in Magnitsky’s death. Washington did not accept Putin’s proposal.

A Strategic Void The fact that Trump’s unpredictable behavior fostered a confusing mix of policies that collectively did not constitute a strategy was on view the week following his disastrous summit with Putin in July 2018. For the White House, the days after the summit demanded repeated corrections, clarifications, and reversals in an effort to justify Trump’s pro-Russian comments in Helsinki. Whatever Trump’s objectives, they were undermined by his mixed and muddled messages. Frequently, the confusion took the form of Trump contradicting his own senior advisers and undermining their authority. This was not only apparent in his dealings with Russia. Undermining his advisers was evident in Trump administration’s shifting policies on other issues. For example, when then-Secretary of State Tillerson declared he was working to open negotiations with North Korea, Trump tweeted that it was a waste of time. “Save your energy Rex, we’ll do what has to be done!”56 Notwithstanding the exchange of insults and threats with Kim Jong-un, Trump met Kim in Singapore in June 2018 and again in Hanoi the following year. The two leaders met a third time at the Demilitarized Zone in Korea in June 2019, marking another shift in tone and policy between Trump and Kim from mutual bellicosity to engagement. “When you talk about a wall,” Trump declared admiringly, “when you talk about a border, that’s what they call a border. Nobody goes through that border.”57 America and North Korea agreed to resume negotiations although Washington continued economic sanctions against North Korea, a policy Trump called “maximum pressure,” that differed little from the Obama administration’s strategy of “strategic patience.” Other examples included how Trump’s contradiction of U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer regarding a potential trade deal with China. He also publicly disagreed with his CIA director as to whether Iran had violated the 2015 nuclear deal and contradicted National Security Adviser Bolton about the value of negotiating with North Korea. He again gainsaid the CIA regarding whether Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad had ordered the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. In May 2019, Trump contradicted Bolton again after North Korea had tested several short-range missiles. Bolton called the tests violations of UN resolutions,

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while Trump declared he was unconcerned about them. In fact, the tests significantly modernized Kim’s nuclear arsenal. America’s president had again ignored “reality,” and, instead, had seen what he wished to see rather that what was really happening. Trump’s bewildering policy shifts in the Middle East had alarmed U.S. allies that sought to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Trump appeared both to abandon America’s longstanding positions that a Palestinian-Israeli peace required a two-state solution and U.S. opposition to additional Israeli settlements. Nevertheless, Trump’s foreign-policy advisers reiterated the administration’s commitment to an independent Palestine, and Trump’s press secretary suggested that: “while we don’t believe the existence of settlement is an impediment to peace, the construction of new settlements beyond their current borders may not be helpful in achieving that goal.”58 Then, after Trump hosted Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, whom he praised, there was concern among pro-Israeli hardliners in the U.S. that Trump was coming under the influence of moderate Jewish friends like Ronald S. Lauder. During a trip to Saudi Arabia in May 2017 where he met several Sunni Arab leaders, Trump did not criticize Islam as he had previously done or repeat that “Islam hates us,” but focused on the common fight against terrorism, political Islam, and Iran as challenges to “decent peoples” of all religions. He later claimed that his visit had been responsible for the fact that Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen had imposed a diplomatic and commercial boycott of Qatar, a longtime U.S. regional military ally, for allegedly funding terrorist groups. Trump had even encouraged Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their quarrel with Qatar, contradicting his Secretary of State Tillerson shortly after Tillerson had called for an end of the blockade. These events suggested that the president, his secretary of state, and his advisers were at odds over the Middle East as well as other issues. Pointing out that, although Qatar hosted America’s largest airbase in the region, its Arab foes hosted some of Trump’s business assets, a former State Department adviser noted, “Other countries in the Middle East see what is happening and may think, ‘We should be opening golf courses’ or ‘We should be buying rooms at the Trump International.”59 The blockade of Qatar led lasted January 2021 and reflected the desire for unity in the face of President Biden’s desire to lower tension with Iran.

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Trade and Tariffs In the case of trade, Trump also repeatedly moved the goalposts. He went back and forth on whether to leave NAFTA as well as trade wars with Europe. Then, Trump threatened a trade war with China in early 2018, but after brief bilateral negotiations, he backed off in May, and Secretary of the Treasury Stephen Mnuchin announced, “We’re putting the trade war on hold.”60 Trump’s new “decision” was greeted with dismay by the president of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, a group representing steelworkers and their employers. “It’s a huge disappointment, given the expectations,” he declared. “It plays right into Beijing’s hands... and is more of the same old failed policies we saw under the Bush and Obama administrations.”61 Others declared that Trump, who. As noted above, viewed himself as a great “dealmaker” may have made a terrible deal. China had already planned its “concessions” to America, which the president trumpeted as a victory. China’s rapid growth and increasing wealth increased its demand for fossil fuels and meat, especially pork, both of which it could buy from the U.S. Notwithstanding Mnuchin’s comment, the White House went forward with tariffs on Chinese goods a month later, focusing on imports containing “industrially significant technologies,” and emphasizing Washington’s opposition to Beijing’s requirement that U.S. companies in China’s turn over proprietary technological information. Trump’s indecisiveness was also evident when he walked back from a decision to impose penalties on China’s ZTE electronics maker for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea. Considering the allegations about ZTE, it was particularly odd that Trump tweeted that his reason had to do with Chinese jobs, not sanctions. Comments by administration advisers indicated that they were unsure of what Trump sought from China in return. Mnuchin declared that the president was not “going easy” on China over ZTE and wanted to be “very tough,” and Larry Kudlow, then Trump’s chief economic adviser, ambiguously claimed that the amount of tariffs to be imposed on China number was a “rough ballpark estimate” that “interests the president a lot.” When the Department of Commerce finally removed restrictions on ZTE sanctions, it ignored the Senate’s concern that ZTE might steal U.S. technology. As described in Chapter 9, a Sino-American trade war ensued. Washington also announced it was canceling an invitation for Beijing to

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participate in a naval exercise in the South China Sea, thereby threatening to poison Sino-American relations further. “On every issue, the balance of power in this administration leans toward a more hostile and adversarial relationship with China,”62 said a former adviser to President Obama. Trump’s comments did not reveal how divided and chaotic the administration was in shaping trade policy as in other issues. Mnuchin and trade adviser Peter Navarro, a virulent opponent of multilateral trade agreements and a fervent economic nationalist, fought loudly and bitterly over the issue of trade with China. Mnuchin unsuccessfully sought to exclude Navarro from negotiations with China. He sought more and better investment terms from Beijing, while Navarro sought to impede corporate outsourcing that he (wrongly) believed had eroded U.S. industry and produced unemployment at home. These were very different objectives. U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer, who remarked that the administration might yet impose tariffs on China, also undercut Mnuchin.

Astonishing Inconsistencies “How to square these astonishing inconsistencies?” asked Max Fisher. “Within the United States, the most common explanations draw on Mr. Trump’s personality or on domestic politics. Perhaps he opposed the Iran deal because he was not the one to close it, for instance, but he can support a North Korea deal that would bear his signature.”63 Others focused on the president’s psychology. “It doesn’t take a person with an advanced degree in psychology,” wrote Peter Wehner to see Trump’s narcissism and lack of empathy, his vindictiveness and pathological lying, his impulsivity and callousness, his inability to be guided by norms, or his shamelessness and dehumanization of those who do not abide his wishes.”64 Indeed, far from pursuing America’s national interests, former National Security Adviser Bolton, wrote In The Room Where It Happened that in his year and a half in the White House, he was “hard pressed to identify of significant Trump decisions … that weren’t driven by reelection calculations.”65 Trump’s niece also focused on the president’s narcissism, and his sister declared, “He has no principles. None. None,” and “His goddamned tweet and lying, oh my God.”66 George Will, one of America’s most respected conservative thinkers, wrote what was among the most amusing and insightful description of Trump. Shortly after Trump’s disastrous summit with Putin in Helsinki. “America’s child president had a play date with a KGB alumnus ….

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Like the purloined letter in Edgar Allan Poe’s short story with that title, collusion with Russia is hiding in plain sight,” and “just as astronomers inferred, from anomalies in the orbits of the planet Uranus, the existence of Neptune before actually seeing it,” we might infer, and then find, “still-hidden sources of the behavior of this sad, embarrassing wreck of a man.”67 Inconsistencies also reflected changing advisers. Trump’s appointment of Mike Pompeo, former director of the CIA, as secretary of state replacing Tillerson, and Bolton as national security adviser after General H. R. McMaster in April 2018 left only one high-ranking official that some termed “grown up,” Secretary Mattis. Both Tillerson and Mattis had sought to maintain the Iran nuclear deal, but Pompeo and Bolton were hardliners regarding Iran. In addition to using force against Iran, Pompeo sought to foster a regional Arab alliance against Tehran. However, divisions among Arab states made this difficult. As for Bolton, one observer noted, “There are few more notorious hard-liners in Washington than Bolton….He shares President Trump’s scorn for multilateralism, and his loathing for the United Nations…is matched by his contempt for the European Union. He sees both institutions as forums for ponderous deliberations that undermine American sovereignty and impede Washington’s ability to act decisively.”68 Thus, while attacking the International Criminal Court and “supranationalism,” Bolton emphasized unilateralism and power in referring to America’s “righteous might” as “the only deterrent to evil and atrocity.”69

Conclusions Within a few years, most of those who were experts on foreign affairs including Generals Mattis, H. R. McMaster, John F. Kelly had left. Mattis was the last of those who Kimberly Dozier termed the “Axis of Adults,” that had been “guiding national security by quietly tutoring the most powerful man in America.”70 They had pushed back against ideological amateurs like Bannon and Kushner and fostered policies to support the American-led liberal order. Mattis’s resignation marked “the end of the ‘contain and control’ phase of Trump’s administration — one where generals, business leaders and establishment Republicans struggled to guide the president and curb his most disruptive impulses.”71 The “adults” were gone, leaving the White House in the hands of obsequious parvenus and inexperienced relatives like Jared Kushner.

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Especially frightening was the role of Trump’s “gut” in making policy, confidently asserting, “I know what I’m doing and I listen to a lot of people, I talk to a lot of people. But my primary consultant is myself and I have a good instinct for this stuff.”72 Thereafter, Trump’s effort to pressure Ukraine’s new president to declare he would investigate a false claim about Joe Biden and the role played by Trump’s personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, proved that the “adults” had lost the battle to prevent Trump from making foreign policy for his own political ends. There was no longer any accountability and no knowledgeable and influential adviser. Not surprisingly, Bannon praised the president’s chaotic style of decisionmaking. “The apparatus slow-rolled him until he just said enough and did it himself. Not pretty, but at least done.”73 Trump fired General Kelly, his second chief of staff, in December 2018, by which time an astonishing 62% of those in the executive office had changed. With the resignation of White House Counsel Don McGahn in August 2018, turnover in senior level of White House staff members had reached 83% including ten of twelve Tier One staff members. Trump’s initial choices to replace Kelly in early 2019 refused the job. “Why would anybody want to be Donald Trump’s chief of staff unless you want to steal the office supplies before they shut the place down?”74 said one observer. Mick Mulvaney became Trump’s third chief of staff and after several months was fired and replaced by number four, Mark Meadows, a rightwing congressman who had chaired the House Freedom Caucus from 2017 to 2019. Then, amid the coronavirus pandemic, the director of the Office of Personnel Management, who was charged with protecting America’s 2.1 million civil servants, resigned. Chaos was the result when. Trump ignored professional advisers, who were forced out if they disagreed with the president. The final example was the resignation of Attorney General William Barr only weeks before Biden was inaugurated president after the otherwise submissive Barr had declared that there was insufficient evidence of fraud presidential election to alter its outcome. Trump had also derided allied leaders like French President Macron and pandered to authoritarian foes like Putin and Kim, and he charged Barack Obama with responsibility for everything that went amiss and tweeted vulgar comments and lies about those who angered him. In defense, trade, the environment, foreign aid for the COVID-19 pandemic and other issues, Trump surrendered U.S. leadership notably to China, undermined the liberal order, and increased U.S. isolation. “Right

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now,” declared a Russian observer, “the Kremlin is looking for ways that Russia can use the chaos in Washington to pursue its own interests.”75 Even after Russia backed Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, who was faced with giant protests for having rigged that country’s election, and Russia had poisoned reformer Alexei Navalny, Trump refused to criticize Moscow despite the efforts of the State and Defense Departments to adopt a tougher policy. However, when it was revealed in late September 2020 that Trump had paid virtually no income taxes for many years and that he had huge debts to pay in the near future and had hidden sources of income, there was renewed concern that the president may have been compromised by Russia or another country. Two knowledgeable observers argued that Trump’s “financial situation presents a significant counterintelligence risk.”76 “The strong-arm leaders Trump assiduously cultivates, from India’s Narendra Modi to the Philippines’s Rodrigo Duterte and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” wrote another, “all head countries that house his most lucrative overseas businesses—and they know it,” and “their leaders have cannily used his business entanglements to diplomatic advantage.”77 Trump’s policies forced friends to look elsewhere for allies. The result accelerated the end of the postwar liberal world that America had designed. This was no small thing. Nye warned, “Americans and others may not notice the security and prosperity that the liberal order provides until they are gone—but by then, it may be too late.”78 As Trump’s impeachment loomed, Stephen Walt concluded “the Trump administration has yet to anything significant in foreign affairs, and its various misguided initiatives have left it stuck in the breakdown lane,”79 and Thomas Friedman described the president as “an amoral chump,” who “sells out American values — awful enough — but then gets nothing of value in return.”80

Notes 1. Cited in Rod Nordland, “Authoritarian Leaders Greet Trump as One of Their Own,” New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/02/01/world/asia/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-rodrigodutert-kim-jong-un.html. 2. Cited in Rick Noack, “The U.N. Wanted to End Sexual Violence Kin War. Then the Trump Administration Had Objections,” Washington Post,

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April 24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/ 24/un-wanted-end-sexual-violence-war-then-trump-administration-hadobjections/?utm_term=.3f2dee4f922c&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in Jeffrey Goldberg, “James Mattis Denounces President Trump, Describes Him as a Threat to the Constitution,” The Atlantic, June 3, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/ james-mattis-denounces-trump-protests-militarization/612640/. Cited in Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “Christianity Today, an Influential Evangelical Magazine, Say ‘Trump Should Be Removed from Office,” Washington Post, December 20, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/ 2019/12/19/christianity-today-an-influential-evangelical-magazine-sayspresident-trump-should-be-removed-office/. Cited in Anne Gearan, “‘Don’t Worry About Us’: Critics Fault Trump’s Hands-Off Response to Autocrat Abuses,” Washington Post, October 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dont-worry-aboutus-critics-fault-trumps-hands-off-response-to-autocrat-abuses/2018/10/ 10/d977fcce-cc9a-11e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html?utm_term=.1a6 88c1e4349&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in Josh Dawsey and Philip Rucker, “Five Days of Fury: Inside Trump’s Paris Temper, Election Woes and Staff Upheaval,” Washington Post, November 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ five-days-of-fury-inside-trumps-paris-temper-election-woes-and-staff-uph eaval/2018/11/13/e90b7cba-e69e-11e8-a939-9469f1166f9d_story. html?utm_term=.dd2301f99da9&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Greg Miller, Greg Jaffe, and Philip Rucker, “Doubting the Intelligence, Trump Pursues Putin and Leaves a Russian Threat Unchecked,” Denver Post, December 14, 2017, https://www.denverpost.com/2017/ 12/14/trump-pursues-putin/. Cited in Jeremy Diamond and Zachary Cohen, “Trump: I’d Be ‘Honored’ to Meet Kim Jong Un Under ‘Right Circumstances’,” CNN Politics, May 2, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/don ald-trump-meet-north-korea-kim-jong-un/. Cited in Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “Trump’s Promises to Kim Jong-un Leaves U.S. and Allies Scrambling,” New York Times, June 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/world/asia/us-trumpnorth-korea-credible-military-exercises.html?emc=edit_th_180616&nl= todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680616. John R. Bolton, The Room Where It Happened (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), p. 282. Cited in Mark Landler, “In Extraordinary Statement, Trump Stands with Saudis Despite Khashoggi Killing,” New York Times, November 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/world/middleeast/

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trump-saudi-khashoggi.html?emc=edit_th_181121&nl=todaysheadlines& nlid=43321681121. Eugene Robinson, “Trump Is Not a Champion of Human Rights. He Is a Clueless Clown,” Washington Post, November 22, 2018, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-not-a-champion-of-human-rig hts-he-is-a-clueless-clown/2018/11/22/979a1342-edd7-11e8-8679934a2b33be52_story.html?utm_term=.7ddd50cd80f6&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. Fred Ryan, “Trump’s Dangerous Message to Tyrants: Flash Money and Get Away with Murder,” Washington Post, November 21, 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-dangerous-message-to-tyr ants-flash-money-and-get-away-with-murder/2018/11/21/4202e69eedc2-11e8-8679-934a2b33be52_story.html?utm_term=.97285d4182ac& wpisrc=nl_ideas&wpmm=1. Cited in Robert Costa and Ashley Parker, “Former Vice President Cheney Challenges Pence at Private Retreat, Compares Trump’s Foreign Policy to Obama’s Approach,” Washington Post, March 11, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/former-vice-president-cheney-challengespence-on-trumps-foreign-policy/2019/03/11/ecddbff6-4436-11e9aaf8-4512a6fe3439_story.html?utm_term=.94a733011a69. Adam Serwer, “What Americans Do Now Will Define Us Forever,” The Atlantic, July 18, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 2019/07/send-her-back-battle-will-define-us-forever/594307/?wpisrc= nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Felicia Sommez and Nike DeBonis, “‘Trump Tells Four Liberal Congresswomen to ‘Go Back’ to Their Countries, Prompting Pelosi to Defend Them,” Washington Post, July 14, 2019, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-four-liberal-congresswomen-shouldgo-back-to-the-crime-infested-places-from-which-they-came/2019/07/ 14/b8bf140e-a638-11e9-a3a6-ab670962db05_story.html https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/he-always-doubles-down-inside-the-politi cal-crisis-caused-by-trumps-racist-tweets/2019/07/20/b342184c-aa2e11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html?utm_term=.80b88dc8a981&wpi src=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in Fred Barbach, “Trump’s Racist Comments Can Be Used Against Him in Courts as Judges Cite Them to Block Policies,” Washington Post, July 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/tru mps-racist-comments-can-be-used-against-him-in-court-as-judges-citethem-to-block-policies/2019/07/16/6ed0ea6a-a7f1-11e9-86dd-d7f0e6 0391e9_story.html?utm_term=.53bad714dc34&wpisrc=nl_daily202& wpmm=1. Luce, The Retreat of Western Liberalism, p. 77.

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19. Glenn Kessler, “Trump Made 30,573 False or Misleading Claims as President. Nearly Half Came in His Final Year,” Washington Post, January 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-fact-checkertracked-trump-claims/2021/01/23/ad04b69a-5c1d-11eb-a976-bad643 1e03e2_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email& utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2. washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F2edd9cf%2F600da33e9d2fda0efbb ef8d4%2F596b51d8ae7e8a44e7d58086%2F9%2F66%2F600da33e9d2fd a0efbbef8d4. 20. Cited in ibid. 21. Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo, and Meg Kelly, “Trump Is Averaging More Than 50 False or Misleading Claims a Day,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/ 10/22/president-trump-is-averaging-more-than-50-false-or-misleadingclaims-day/?utm_campaign=wp_the_daily_202&utm_medium=email& utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_daily202. 22. Andrew G. McCabe, “Every Day Is a New Low in Trump’s White House,” The Atlantic, February 14, 2019, https://www.theatlantic. com/politics/archive/2019/02/andrew-mccabe-fbi-book-excerpt-thethreat/582748/. 23. Cited in Roger Cohen, “Donald Trump Can Just Not Help It,” New York Times, January 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/opi nion/donald-trump-illegal-immigration-border-wall.html. 24. Harry Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” n.d., https://www2.csudh.edu/cca uthen/576f12/frankfurt__harry_-_on_bullshit.pdf. 25. Michael V. Hayden, “Michael Hayden: The End of Intelligence,” New York Times, April 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/28/ opinion/sunday/the-end-of-intelligence.html. 26. Cited in John Wagner and Shane Harris, “Trump Blasts U.S. Intelligence Officials, Disputes Assessments on Iran and Other Global Threats,” Washington Post, January 30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/trump-claims-great-progress-on-isis-north-korea-after-intellige nce-officials-present-less-optimistic-view/2019/01/30/e95b74c6-23b711e9-90cd-dedb0c92dc17_story.html?utm_term=.f8e39eec8a19&wpisrc= nl_most&wpmm=1. 27. Cited in Ashley Parker, “Fifty-Two Tweets in 34 Hours: How a Trump Twitter Frenzy Defined a Weekend,” Washington Post, March 24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fifty-two-tweets-in-34hours-how-a-trump-twitter-frenzy-defined-a-weekend/2019/03/23/3be d256c-4bf0-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html?utm_term=.6c6c38cf1 a98&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 28. Dana Milbank, “It’s Obvious What Trump Is Doing During His Executive Time,” Washington Post, February 4, 2019, https://www.washin

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gtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-take-all-the-executive-time-youneed/2019/02/04/88ab921a-28bb-11e9-8eef-0d74f4bf0295_story. html?utm_term=.21591b3442d5. Eliot A. Cohen, “You Can’t Serve Both Trump and America,” The Atlantic, December 22, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/arc hive/2018/12/mattis-proved-you-cant-serve-both-trump-and-america/ 578902/?utm_campaign=Feed%3A+TheAtlantic+%28The+Atlantic+-+ Master+Feed%29&utm_medium=feed&utm_source=feedburner. Cited in Catie Edmondson, “Senate Rebukes Trump Over Troop Withdrawals from Syria and Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/us/politics/senate-vote-syriaafghanistan.html?emc=edit_th_190201&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21680201. Cited in David D. Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubbard, and David M. Halbfinger, “Trump’s Abrupt Shifts in Middle East Unnerve U.S. Allies,” New York Times, October 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/12/ world/middleeast/trumps-abandonment-of-the-kurds-in-syria-has-otherallies-worried.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_191013?campaign_ id=2&instance_id=12939&segment_id=17841&user_id=318a8b2e197d 8de30abd1bb02c4382ea®i_id=43321681013. Cited in Karen DeYoung, John Hudson, Josh Dawsey, and Ellen Nakashima, “Demoralized State Department Personnel Question Pompeo’s Role in Ukraine Crisis,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/demoralized-statedepartment-personnel-question-pompeos-role-in-ukraine-crisis/2019/ 10/07/85536c3c-e93b-11e9-9306-47cb0324fd44_story.html?wpisrc= nl_powerup&wpmm=1. Mitch McConnell, “Mitch McConnell: Withdrawing from Syria Is a Grave Mistake,” Washington Post, October 18, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/mitch-mcconnell-withdrawing-from-syriais-a-grave-mistake/2019/10/18/c0a811a8-f1cd-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414 732_story.html. Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky, “Pompeo May Go Down as the Worst Secretary of State in Modern Times,” CNN , October 5, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/05/opinions/mike-pompeo-worst-sec retary-of-state-miller-sokolsky/index.html?utm_medium=social&utm_sou rce=twCNN&utm_term=link&utm_content=2019-10-06T17%3A45% 3A06&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Jackson Diehl, “Mike Pompeo Is the Worst Secretary of State in History,” Washington Post, August 30, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/global-opinions/mike-pompeo-is-the-worst-secretary-of-statein-history/2020/08/30/00515750-e869-11ea-bc79-834454439a44_

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story.html?utm_campaign=wp_todays_worldview&utm_medium=email& utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld. Martin Wolf, “Alarm Signals of Our Authoritarian Age,” Financial Times, July 21, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/5eb5d26d-0abe434e-be12-5068bd6d7f06. Cited in Mark Landler, “An Angry Trump Pushes Back Against His Own ‘Naïve’ Intelligence Officials,” New York Times, January 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/us/politics/trump-intell igence-agencies.html. Cited in David E. Sanger, “Trump-Kim Summit’s Collapse Exposes the Risks of One-to-One Diplomacy,” New York Times, February 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/asia/trumpnorth-korea-nuclear-sanctions.html?emc=edit_th_190301&nl=todayshea dlines&nlid=43321680301. Cited in Landler, “An Angry Trump Pushes Back Against His Own ‘Naïve’ Intelligence Officials.” Cited in Karen DeYoung, “Departing French Ambassador Reflects on a Turbulent Time in Washington,” Washington Post, April 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/departingfrench-ambassador-reflects-on-a-turbulent-time-in-washington/2019/ 04/18/a7cf350e-6202-11e9-9ff2-abc984dc9eec_story.html?utm_term=. f2cd239b0203&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Anthony J. Blinken, “No People. No Process. No Policy,” New York Times, January 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/opi nion/trump-foreign-policy-crisis.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&wpisrc= nl_powerup&wpmm=1. Heather Hurlburt, “Bolton Leaves the National Security Council in Ruins,” Foreign Policy, September 13, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2019/09/13/bolton-walks-away-from-the-national-security-councils-cor pse-trump/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign= 14961&utm_term=Editor#39;s%20Picks%20OC. Cited in “China First,” The Economist, March 25, 2017, p. 10. Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, “Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration,” Brookings, October 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/res earch/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/?utm_campaign= wp_power_up&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_ powerup. Cited in Philip Rucker, Josh Dawsey, and Damian Paletta, “Trump Slams Fed Chair, Questions Climate Change and Threatens to Cancel Putin Meeting in Wide-Ranging Interview with The Post,” Washington Post, November 27, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ trump-slams-fed-chair-questions-climate-change-and-threatens-to-cancelputin-meeting-in-wide-ranging-interview-with-the-post/2018/11/27/

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4362fae8-f26c-11e8-aeea-b85fd44449f5_story.html?utm_term=.741d0f 6ca6b0. Stephen Walt, “Impeachment Is Redeeming the Blob,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2019, NPR, November 3, 2017, https://foreignpolicy. com/2019/11/14/stephen-walt-foreign-policy-establishment-my-apolog ies-to-the-blob/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_cam paign=18108&utm_term=Editor#39;s%20Picks%20OC. William J. Burns, “Trump’s Bureaucratic Arson,” The Atlantic, November 17, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/ deep-state-isnt-problem-weak-state/602131/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld& wpmm=1. Cited in Aaron Blake, “Rex Tillerson on Trump: ‘Undisciplined, Doesn’t Like to Read’ and Tries to Do Illegal Things,” Washington Post, December 7, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/ 12/07/rex-tillerson-trump-undisciplined-doesnt-like-read-tries-do-illegalthings/?utm_term=.0cce54e1ca34&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in Peter Baker, “Trump Says Tillerson ‘Is Dumb as a Rock’ After Former Secretary of State Criticizes Hum,” New York Times, December 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/us/politics/trump-tiller son.html?emc=edit_th_181208&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321681208. David Ignatius, “This Is Not Your Grandfather’s KGB,” Washington Post, July 26, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-is-notyour-grandfathers-kgb/2018/07/26/f8775c04-9118-11e8-b769-e3fff1 7f0689_story.html?utm_term=.27d0781bdebc. Cited in Mark Landler and Eileen Sullivan, “Trump Says He Laid Down the Law in His Latest Account of His Meeting with Putin,” New York Times, July 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/us/pol itics/trump-putin-higher-intelligence.html?emc=edit_th_180719&nl=tod aysheadlines&nlid=43321680719. Cited in Felicia Sonmez, “Trump Again Reverses Course on Russian Interference, Calls It ‘All a Big Hoax’,” Washington Post, July 23, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-again-reverses-courseon-russian-interference-calls-it-all-a-big-hoax/2018/07/22/c83215288e13-11e8-b769-e3fff17f0689_story.html?utm_term=.12b56eb6f1f7& wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in David Filipov and Andrew Roth, “‘Yes We Did’: Russia’s Establishment Basks in Trump’s Victory,” Washington Post, November 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/ 11/09/yes-we-did-russias-estnablishment-basks-in-trumps-victory/?utm_ term=.b899a44e487c. Cited in Robert Draper, “Unwanted Truths Inside Trump’s Battles with U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” New York Times Magazine, August

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8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/magazine/us-russiaintelligence.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article. Cited in Samantha Schmidt, “Outrage Erupts Over Trump-Putin ‘Conversation’ About Letting Russia Interrogate Ex-U.S. Diplomat Michael McFaul,” Washington Post, July 19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/07/19/trump-putin-conversationabout-russian-interrogation-of-u-s-diplomat-prompts-outrage-astonishm ent/?utm_term=.9ab2a86c2cde&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in Peter Baker and David E. Sanger, “Trump Says Tillerson Is ‘Wasting His Time’ on North Korea,” New York Times, October 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/us/politics/trump-tiller son-north-korea.html. Cited in Margaret Talev, “Trump Calls Korean DMZ a ‘Real Border’ Compared with His Wall,” Bloomberg, June 28, 2019, https://www.blo omberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-29/trump-calls-korean-dmz-a-realborder-compared-with-his-wall. Cited in Mark Landler, Peter Baker, and David E. Sanger, “Trump Embraces Pillars of Obama’s Foreign Policy,” New York Times, February 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/middleeast/ iran-missile-test-trump.html. Cited in David D. Kirkpatrick, “Trump’s Business Ties in the Gulf Raise Questions About His Allegiances,” New York Times, June 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/world/middleeast/trumps-bus iness-ties-in-persian-gulf-raise-questions-about-his-allegiances.html?_r=0. Cited in Allen Rappeport and Noah Weiland, “U.S. Suspending New Tariff, While Negotiating Trade with China, Mnuchin Says,” New York Times, May 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/20/us/pol itics/mnuchin-kudlow-china-trade.html?emc=edit_na_20180520&nl=bre aking-news&nlid=4332168ing-news&ref=cta. Cited in David J. Lynch, “Critics Fear Trump Is Ceding too Much to China on Trade,” Washington Post, May 20, 2018, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/business/economy/critics-fear-trump-is-ceding-too-muchto-china-on-trade/2018/05/20/6d6d2b76-5c6a-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f 315_story.html?utm_term=.d8642270e58d. Cited in Mark Landler and Ana Swanson, “Trump, Strung by Being Attacked at Soft on China, Pushes Ahead on Tariffs,” New York Times, May 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/business/ white-house-moves-ahead-with-tough-trade-measures-on-china.html? emc=edit_th_180530&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680530. Max Fisher, “How Trump’s Mixed Signals Complicate America’s Role in the World,” New York Times, April 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/04/27/world/asia/korea-iran-trump-interpreter.html?wpi src=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1.

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64. Peter Wehner, “A Damaged Soul and a Disordered Personality,” The Atlantic, March 18, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/arc hive/2019/03/trump-tweets-attack-john-mccain/585193/?wpisrc=nl_ daily202&wpmm=1. 65. Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, p. 437. 66. Cited in Michael Kranish, “In Secretly Recorded Audio, President Trump’s Sister Says He Has ‘No Principles’ and ‘You Can’t Trust Him’,” Washington Post, August 22, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/maryanne-trump-barry-secret-recordings/2020/08/22/30d 457f4-e334-11ea-ade1-28daf1a5e919_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_ post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_ most. 67. George F. Will, “This Sad, Embarrassing Wreck of a Man,” Washington Post, July 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thissad-embarrassing-wreck-of-a-man/2018/07/17/d06de8ea-89e8-11e8a345-a1bf7847b375_story.html?utm_term=.71da98d0c2e1&wpisrc=nl_ most&wpmm=1. 68. Ishaan Tharoor, “The Return of John Bolton Paves the Way for More War,” Washington Post, March 26, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/03/26/the-return-of-john-boltonpaves-the-way-for-more-war/?utm_term=.ad6336fa0ccc. 69. Cited in Ishaan Tharoor, “The White House’s New Attack on the International System,” Washington Post, September 11, 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/09/11/white-houses-new-att ack-international-system/?utm_term=.840f139e557a. 70. Kimberly Dozier, “New Power Center in Trumpland: The ‘Axis of Adults’,” Daily Beast, April 16, 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ new-power-center-in-trumpland-the-axis-of-adults. 71. Julie Pace and Zeke Miller, “Analysis: One by One, Trump’s ‘Axis of Adults’ Leaving,” AP, December 23, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/ b3e12e162abd46f2bb4ac9b4f3a81109. 72. Cited in Eliza Collins, “Trump: I Consult Myself on Foreign Policy,” Politico, March 16, 2016, https://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gopprimary-live-updates-and-results/2016/03/trump-foreign-policy-adviser220853. 73. Cited in Mark Landler, “Trump Unites Left and Right Against Troop Plans, but Puts Off Debate on War Aims,” New York Times, December 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/us/politics/trumpsyria-afghanistan-withdraw.html?emc=edit_th_181228&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321681228. 74. Cited in Katie Rogers, Maggie Haberman, and Annie Karni, “After Ayers Turns Down Chief of Staff Job, Trump Is Left Without a Plan B,” New York Times, December 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/

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12/10/us/politics/white-house-hiring-trump.html?wpisrc=nl_daily202& wpmm=1. Cited in Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Looks to Exploit White House ‘Turbulence,’ Analysts Say,” New York Times, February 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/world/europe/rus sia-looks-to-exploit-white-house-turbulence-analysts-say.html. Michael Morrell and David Kris, “Trump Is in Debt. We Can’t Ignore the National Security Risks That Come with It,” Washington Post, October 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/ 10/11/trump-is-debt-we-cant-ignore-national-security-risks-that-comewith-that/. Ananya Chakravarti, “Trumpworld’s Corruption Is as Globalized as the Ultra-Rich the President Mingles With,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/12/trumpworld-corruptionelliott-broidy-ultra-rich/. Nye, “Will the Liberal Order Survive?” p. 16. Stephen M. Walt, “Welcome to Trump’s Impeachment Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, October 7, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/ 07/impeachment-trump-foreign-policy-turkey-syria/?utm_source=Pos tUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=15477&utm_term=Editor# 39;s%20Picks%20OC. Italics in original. Thomas Friedman, “Trump’s Black Friday Sale: Oil, Guns and Morals,” New York Times, November 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/11/20/opinion/trump-mohammed-bin-salman-khashoggi.html? emc=edit_th_181121&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321681121. Italics in original.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. In America, what has accompanied declining trust in government and rising political divisions? a. Democracy b. Authoritarian populism c. Multilateralism d. Socio-cultural globalization 2. Which of these are one of Trump’s most reliable voters, and hypocritically support him despite his blatant moral lapses? a. Evangelical Christians

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b. Liberals c. Muslims Asian-Americans 3. President Trump congratulated the Chinese president Xi Jinping for his “extraordinary elevation” after China’s president had done what? a. Launched a manned mission into space b. Passed Marriage equality legislation c. Declared July 4th a national holiday d. Removed limits to how long he could remain in power 4. Which of these actions or policies regarding climate change did President Trump do or enact while in office? a. Instituted environmental regulations b. Promoted the use of coal c. Joined the Paris climate accord d. Ordered dumps of oil in the Pacific Ocean 5. How many lies or misleading statements did Donald Trump tell during his first three years as president? a. 1,000 b. 3,363 c. 5,679 d. 16,241 6. Instead of consulting professional diplomats concerning Middle East policy, President Trump assigned which member of his family, who like Trump had no diplomatic experience, to lead an effort to break the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate a. Jared Kushner b. Ivanka Trump c. Eric Trump d. Donald Trump Jr. 7. President Trump recognized what city as Israel’s capital? a. Tehran b. Jerusalem c. Tel-Aviv

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d. Nazareth 8. President Trump’s impetuosity was evident in his sudden decision in December 2018 to do what owing to the “defeat” of ISIS? a. Claim that he would send more troops anyway b. Decrease the military budget by a third c. Removed all US sanctions against Iraq and Syria d. Withdraw America’s 2,000 troops from Syria 9. What is the name of Trump’s “chief strategist,” who was, in an unprecedented decision, initially given a role on the NSC’s decision-making Principals Committee to assure that the president’s senior advisers carried out the president’s wishes? a. Eric Trump b. Robert Mueller c. Stephen K. Bannon d. Donald Trump Jr. 10. In early 2020, after the US assassination of an Iranian general, Iraq’s parliament passed a nonbinding resolution demanding what? a. All U.S. troops in the country leave b. A formal apology from the president c. A billion dollars in aid. d. The deployment of 2,000 more troops to their country 11. Trump unexpectedly ceased his bellicose comments about Iran after what? a. Iran allow an increase in the amount of US troops b. Tehran targeted U.S. bases in Iraq with ballistic missiles c. The discovering of WMD in Iran d. Meeting with the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani 12. In December 2016, the CIA announced its judgment that Russian computer hacking during the campaign was intended to do what? a. Encourage voters for Hilary b. Make the America election less corrupt c. Discourage Trump voters d. Make Trump president

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13. After returning from the fiasco in Helsinki, Trump tweeted “The Summit with Russia was a great success, except with the real enemy of the people.” Who did President Trump say was the real enemy of the people? a. The Russians b. The French c. The Fake News Media d. The American People 14. Under President Trump, America and North Korea agreed to resume negotiations although Washington continued economic sanctions against North Korea, a policy Trump called what? a. Maximum pressure b. Strategic patience c. Maximum patience d. Strategic pressure 15. President Trump threatened a trade war with what country in early 2018? a. Canada b. China c. Brazil d. Costa Rica 16. President Trump regards himself as being which of these? a. Expert b. Academic c. Politician d. Dealmaker 17. Secretary Defense General Jim Mattis was the last of the professionals whom Kimberly Dozier wrote had been “guiding national security by quietly tutoring the most powerful man in America” and last of which she called which of these terms? a. Trumps minions b. Axis of Adults c. The Alliance d. The Conspirators

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18. President Trump said in a 2016 interview, that which of these was his primary consultant in decision making? a. Experts b. His advisors c. History d. His gut 19. Which country’s president did Trump make an effort to pressure into declaring they would investigate, what was a false, claim about Joe Biden? a. Russia b. Ukraine c. China d. France 20. As of February 2019, Trump had failed even to nominate how many of 705 Senate-confirmed positions? a. 10 b. 20 c. 30 d. 105 True or False 1. True or False? Trump proposed slashing America’s budget for the National Endowment for Democracy. True 2. True or False? Trump opponents tend to be young, nonwhites and white voters without a college education, suburbanites, and men. False, Trump opponents tend to be college-educated white voters not white voters without a college education and tend to be women not men 3. True or False? Trump and Putin share a dislike of the liberal, globalist establishment. True

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4. True or False? Candidate Trump had the benefit of foreign-policy experience and knowledge along with a consistent ideology. False, Candidate Trump had no foreign-policy experience or knowledge and no consistent ideology 5. True or False? President Trump’s populism entailed a propensity to utilize traditional diplomacy. False, Trump’s populism has a propensity to ignore traditional diplomacy 6. True or False? President Trump supported protectionism and racist efforts to eliminate illegal and legal immigration. True 7. True or False? Trump also demonized Islam and imposed a travel ban on Muslim visitors Muslim in his presidency. True 8. True or False? Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA and NSA, recalled that Trump “insists on five-page or shorter intelligence briefs, rather than the 60 pages we typically gave previous presidents,” but “[t]here are some problems that cannot be simplified.” True 9. True or False? Donald Trump’s relationship with the US intelligence agencies has been one of mutual support. False, the president’s contempt for and disregard of America’s security, intelligence and law-enforcement agencies eroded their morale and threatened to compromise their effectiveness in providing intelligence information and advice vital in making foreign policy 10. True or False? The second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi lead to widespread agreement and was a major success. False, the second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi collapsed in disarray with no agreement or even final statement

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11. True or False? The foreign service lost nearly half of its Career Ministers and 20% of its Minister Counselors during Trump’s first two years. True 12. True or False? During and after the presidential campaign, there were numerous contacts between Trump’s aides and Russians, including connections with Russian banks and Russian intelligence agencies. True 13. True or False? The details of all President Trump’s conversations with Vladimir Putin were open to the public. False, Trump concealed details of his conversations with Putin during five meetings with the Russian president 14. True or False? Trump described the issue of Russian interference in U.S. elections as a genuine problem. False, Trump described the issue of Russian interference in U.S. elections as “a big hoax” 15. True or False? When Talking about the Demilitarized Zone in Korea, President Trump said admiringly, “when you talk about a border, that’s what they call a border. Nobody goes through that border.” True 16. True or False? Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Trump appeared both to support America’s longstanding positions that a Palestinian-Israeli peace required a two-state solution and support U.S. opposition to additional Israeli settlements. False, President Trump seem to abandon support for both 17. True or False? The Chinese have one of the slowest-growing economies and middle classes in the world. False, they have one of the fastest

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18. True or False? Trump indecisiveness was evident when he walked back from a decision to impose penalties on China’s ZTE electronics maker for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea. True 19. True or False? During Trump’s term, trade war notwithstanding, the United States had not gone to war with a major foe such as Russia or China. True 20. True or False? When President Trump fired General John F. Kelly, his second chief of staff, in December 2018, an astonishing 62% of those in the executive office had changed. True Short Answer What are some factors that endanger American democracy today? The declining trust in government and rising political divisions as a result of growing economic inequality and for many white Trump voters fear of declining. Declining status was even more important than economic fear for white Trump voters, except in America’s “rust belt”, and contributed to cultural and racial anger and existential fear for their dominance of the country. What has Donald Trump’s relationship been like with authoritarian leaders? Be specific. The president admires authoritarian leaders who seek to undermine the liberal order. He praised Chinese President Xi Jinping’s contempt for democracy and human rights and congratulated Xi for his “extraordinary elevation” after China’s president had removed limits to how long he could remain in power and had placed most of China’s Muslim Uighurs in the equivalent of concentration camps. Trump defended Putin’s murders of political foes, comparing that behavior favorably with America’s. The president also congratulated Philippine President Rodrigo

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Duterte for doing an “unbelievable job” in his drug war, which involved thousands of extrajudicial killings. Why did those appointed as advisers and cabinet members under President Trump have a more significant role than usual? President Trump had no foreign-policy experience or knowledge and no consistent ideology, and because of all this inexperience he would supposedly need to rely on those advisors and cabinet members more. How was President Trump and his administration blind to the political and economic role that young migrants play in paying taxes to provide medical and social funds for an aging population? His administration rejected a Department of Health and Human Services’ study that showed that refugees provide billions of dollars more in government revenue than they cost. Although liberal immigration has been a source of America’s soft power, in 2017, Washington withdrew from U.N. talks about a Global Pact on Migration, claiming it would violate U.S. sovereignty. He sought to build a wall on the Mexican border, and, when Congress denied him the necessary funding, he declared a national emergency to get around congressional authority. How has President Trump damaged the prospect for a PalestinianIsraeli two-state solution? Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moved the U.S. embassy there, refused to endorse a two-state solution to the issue, and no longer regarded Israeli settlements in the occupied territories as violating international law. He also recognized Israel’s illegal annexation of the Golan Heights and provided cover for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who threatened to annex the West Bank as well. What were the consequences of President Trump’s use of a drone to assassinate of General Qasem Suleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force? It was a significant escalation after tit-for-tat provocations between America and Iranian-supported militias. Iran announced it would resume unrestricted uranium enrichment,

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production, research and expansion, essentially ending the 2015 deal that would have prevented production of sufficient uranium for a nuclear warhead for another decade rather than a few months. Also, Iraq’s parliament then passed a nonbinding resolution demands that all U.S. troops in the country leave. When ambassador William Burns said, “the real threat to our democracy is not from an imagined deep state bent on undermining an elected president. Instead, it comes from a weak state of hollowedout institutions and battered and belittled public servants.” What did he mean? Under the Trump administration many positions in key agencies and ambassadorships in key countries remained vacant. For example, by July 2019, only 455 confirmed appointees filled the 713 top positions in the government. Without these people to do their job the US cannot compete on the ever more crowded, complicated, and competitive international landscape. Did President Trump accomplish any specific objectives or goals during the 2018 Helsinki summit? Most of President Trump’s statements required repeated corrections, clarifications, and reversals in an effort to justify his proRussian comments in Helsinki. Whatever Trump’s objectives, they were undermined by his mixed and muddled messages. How was the Trump administration’s dysfunction, its failure to vet officials, and presidential impetuosity reflected in President Trump’s appointments? Give an example. All these were reflected by how Trump’s appointments were a revolving door of people he would continually contradict and fire. One example is Trump’s firing of DNI Dan Coats whom he had praised only days before and announcing he would nominate to the position Rep. John Ratcliffe (R-Tex.), Ratcliffe had little experience and was something of an amateur so Trump suddenly withdrew Ratcliffe’s nomination and nominated Joseph Maguire, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, as acting director of national intelligence.

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Why did a former State Department adviser remark, “Other countries in the Middle East see what is happening and may think, ‘We should be opening golf courses’ or ‘We should be buying rooms at the Trump International”? He was suggesting that President Trump has a conflict of interest since he has business interest in the Middle East which could lead him to do what best his financial self instead of what’s in America’s interest.

CHAPTER 5

Great Britain: Brexit, and Nationalist-Populism

Although overturned days before it was to take effect, British voters narrowly favored their country’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in a flawed referendum that former Prime Minister David Cameron had promoted in order to overcome cleavages in his Conservative Party over whether to remain in or leave the EU. Cameron had expected that voters would wish to remain in the EU and resigned after “Leavers” narrowly outnumbered “Remainers.” The Leavers narrow victory left unclear what the UK’s relationship with the EU would be thereafter. Fifty-two percent of Britons voted to “leave” the EU and 48 percent sought to “remain” in the EU. The UK was deeply divided. Wales and England had voted to “leave,” but Scotland and Northern Ireland had voted to “remain.” A high percentage of elderly voters participated in the referendum and were more likely to favor leaving than younger voters. Moreover, a much lower percentage of the young voted. This was a key factor in the outcome.

The Brexit Debate There followed several years of constitutional crisis in the UK and increasing disarray in the ruling Conservative Party, once the home of an elite establishment but transformed into a group of nationalist-populists. Brexit had become Britain’s leading ideological division, overcoming © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_5

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class, religion, or economic status. Toward the end of the path toward Brexit, British voters appeared to have changed their mind. Only months before the Britain were initially due to leave the EU. Boris Johnson’s action reflected authoritarian populism as he sought to avoid Parliament. “Britain is in an existential crisis, and the U.S. is in a form of crisis,” declared a former leading State Department official. “Both of their leaders are mercurial, and they’re entirely unpredictable.”1 The proponents of “leaving” exemplified nationalist-populism in the UK, especially nostalgia for England’s imperial past as well as opposition to globalism, multilateralism, and, most importantly, immigration, “Many Remainers” argued George Will, “disparage many Leavers as ‘English nationalists.’” Brexiteers can cite a noble pedigree for their sentiments: Speaking in 1933 to the Royal Society of St. George, Winston Churchill had said: ‘On this one night in the whole year we are allowed to use a forgotten, almost a forbidden word. We are allowed to mention the name of our own country, to speak of ourselves as ‘Englishmen’.”2 However, Fareed Zakaria predicted that if the UK left the EU in a fit of nationalism, it would mark the end of that country as a great power. “To me, the best evidence of this is that Britain’s Euroskeptics generally want to leave the E.U. because they see it as a statist juggernaut. In virtually every other member country, Euroskeptics dislike the E.U. because they see it as a free-market juggernaut. So either all of those other countries have it backward, or Britain’s Conservatives have gone nuts.”3 During the debate over Brexit, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), founded by Nigel Farage, had led the pro-Brexit movement. Farage stepped down as party leader in late 2016. Thereafter, the party lost most of its voters although Farage became Vice Chairman of the proBrexit organization, Leave Means Leave, which advocated leaving the EU whether or not Britain reached an agreement with the EU. The candidates of Farage’s Brexit Party, established a few months earlier in the run-up to the EU’s parliamentary elections, had advocated bare-bones populism without of any clear political ideology or policies except taking Britain out of the EU even with no deal. Farage attracted those, who sought to eliminate the liberal order, and he was more aware of the global reach of his actions than those whom he sought to undermine. In the 2019 elections to the EU Parliament, the Brexit Party (renamed Reform UK), as expected, did well, winning at the expense of both the Conservative and Labour Parties. The Liberal Democrats came in second, Labour third, the Greens fourth, and the

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Conservatives last. Both the Liberal Democrats and Greens were proEU and anti-Brexit. The results showed that the UK remained deeply divided. Farage pushed British politics to right-wing nationalism and was an effective and dangerous demagogue. Farage publicly supported Donald Trump and was the first British politician to visit the president after his electoral triumph in 2016. He was praised by Trump and appeared with him at campaign rallies in the U.S. in 201,8 and also became involved in Mueller’s investigation of Russian meddling in America’s election. The FBI viewed Farage as “a person of interest” in Russia’s hacking of U.S. elections, notably, his relationship with Julian Assange and WikiLeaks. Moreover, despite reports of Russian efforts to influence the Brexit referendum, the UK apparently failed to investigate Russian meddling in the referendum. Like many national-populists, the Brexiteers opposed membership in a multilateral group, the EU, which they claimed limited British sovereignty. Their campaign emphasized ‘take back control’ and raised fears about immigrants. Trump applauded “leavers” because they had “taken back their country.” Withdrawal from the world economy was never their objective. On the contrary, Brexiteers advocated a pivot from the EU to the global economy without EU regulations or the European Court of Justice. Most negotiations after the referendum sought to preserve the free flow of goods and money across the channel but without accompanying labor migration or other EU regulations. Brexiteers argued that Britain would enjoy the benefits of a common market as well as trade deals with other countries and regions. Although at a summit in March 2017 in Rome, EU leaders declared “Europe is our common future,” and the EU is a “unique union with common institutions and strong values, a community of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law,” fissures in the group were evident. To some, Brexit seemed inevitable, but others hoped that London might reverse its course. Moreover, illiberal populist politicians across the continent were also assailing the EU. Like Trump, populists elsewhere were suspicious of political globalization, as reflected in opposing participation in multilateral organizations and agreements. Nationalist-populist Europeans feared migration could bring about the EU’s collapse. Nevertheless, “Now, as Europeans struggle with the social and political strains set off by migration from poor and war-torn nations outside the bloc,” wrote Max Fisher, “some are clamoring to preserve

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what they feel they never consented to surrender. Their fight with European leaders is exploding over an issue that, perhaps more than any other, exposes the contradiction between the dream of the European Union and the reality of European nations: borders.”4 Brexit reflected a retreat from several dimensions of globalization owing to its impact on the world’s most significant economic and political regional polity as well as cultural change. In addition to the challenge posed by Brexit, the EU was increasingly divided between the liberal states of the West and a populist bloc consisting of Italy, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, and Poland.

The Brexit Political Divisions In the British referendum, “Leavers” won by a narrow margin of 52–48% for “Remainers.” To achieve this, the Vote Leave group waged a campaign filled with false claims regarding among other things the amount of money, Britain would save by exiting the EU. The group also apparently violated election laws by spending more than the legal limit of $9.2 million. All this led James Moore to conclude “we are being governed by a caucus of fanatics, ideologues and unprincipled power-mad crazies (I see you, Boris Johnson) that Osama bin Laden might happily have palled around with in another life.”5 Brexiteers had a similar profile to Americans who had voted for Donald Trump. Like Trump’s election, the Brexit referendum revealed divisions between urban and rural voters, young and old, level of education, and those who had benefited from globalization and those “left behind.” Typical pro-Brexit voters were poorly educated males living in old industrial towns similar to those in America’s “rust belt.” “Brexit,” wrote Bagehot, “was driven by a peculiar combination of despair (about the way that the old model had left so many people behind) and optimism (that by freeing itself from the EU Britain would be able to reignite its growth engine. The despair may have been justified, but the optimism certainly wasn’t.”6 The similarity between Trump’s supporters as described by Peter Hall, notably the combination of economic and cultural factors, was striking. The pro-Brexit vote was the result of “a virulent populist nationalism, stirred up by a campaign laden with wild and inaccurate claims that 80 million Turks were on the brink of gaining EU membership and that a British contribution of 350 million pounds ($460 million) a week might otherwise be spent on the National Health Service.”7

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Candidate Trump had publicly supported Brexit. “I know Great Britain very well. I know, you know, the country very well. I have a lot of investments there. I would say that they’re better off without”8 the EU. In 2017, he even tweeted that “Many people would like to see @Nigel Farage represent Great Britain as their Ambassador to the United States. He would do a great job!”9 These were improper intrusions in Britain’s domestic affairs, and a British spokesperson responded, “There is no vacancy. We already have an excellent ambassador to the US.”10 Farage had campaigned for Trump’s election and declared that Trump’s victory and Brexit were the beginning of a revolution in the West. As in America’s 2016 election, Russia was covertly involved in supporting “Leavers” in Britain, seeking to divide and weaken the EU. Given the close vote Russia may have altered the outcome. The leading contributor to the Brexit campaign was Aaron Banks, who had secretly been in contact with Russians officials between 2015 and 2017. Banks turned out to have had significant Russian business connections that he tried to conceal. Concluded Anne Applebaum, “Arron Banks was the most important funder of the pro-Brexit UK Independence Party (UKIP) as well as Leave.EU…. It illustrates how the modern Kremlin political influence machine operates—legally, and without necessarily incurring any government expense.”11

An Endless Drama Several years after the referendum, the outcome remained unclear, but it slowed the British economy owing to widespread uncertainty. “A stubborn three-way divide over Brexit…” noted William Booth, persisted “between supporters of a hard, clean divorce with the European Union and a soft, fuzzy separation — followed by a third alternative, all those who want a do-over in a repeat referendum (these folks don’t want any Brexit at all).”12 Norway and Switzerland, both of which refused to join the EU or its custom union (goods from member states are traded for reduced or no tariffs) but had access to its single market, represented one of the soft alternatives. One poll found “almost 60% of voters ready to accept free movement of people from the EU in exchange for free access to its single market,”13 similar to the Norwegian model. Fear that Parliament might reject whichever course Prime Minister Theresa May, Cameron’s successor, selected or be unable to muster a majority for the course she selected produced growing interest in a second referendum,

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and the European Court of Justice ruled that Britain could unilaterally reverse its decision to leave the EU. The UK’s political parties remained deeply divided, and the British party system was undergoing the most significant change since the nineteenth century because the most important cleavage in British politics was no longer between Conservatives and Labour, but between Remainers and Leavers. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party, which voted against the no-confidence motion, also opposed the prime minister’s compromise proposal owing to its inclusion of a “backstop” at the border with the Republic of Ireland. Since Northern Ireland was part of the UK, it seemed to be necessary either that Britain remained in the customs union or establish checkpoints, separating the Irish Republic that was an EU member and Northern Ireland. However, such a border would endanger the fragile peace that had ended decades of violence between Protestants and Catholics and the efforts of many in Northern Ireland to join the Irish Republic. The Protestant and unionist community and the Catholic nationalists continued to argue about the status of Northern Ireland. Decades of violence between Catholics and Protestants, known as “the Troubles,” had left many dead near their border. The violence ended with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which established a power-sharing arrangement and guaranteed unimpeded passage between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. A hard border between the two Irelands would violate the terms of the Good Friday Agreement and might trigger renewed violence and deepen political divisions in the UK. “The backstop provision says that as long as there is no long-term trade pact, Britain would remain in the European customs union (the E.U. Customs Union means it negotiates trade laws as a bloc), and Northern Ireland would also be bound by many rules of the single market (the EU has no trade barriers within it).”14 This was anathema to hardline Brexiteers and the DUP. For his part. President Trump continued to urge Brexit and meddled in British politics, tweeting, “My Administration looks forward to negotiating a large-scale Trade Deal with the UK. The potential is unlimited!” Criticizing Prime Minister May, he later added, “I’m surprised at how badly it’s all gone from the standpoint of a negotiation,” Trump said. “I gave the prime minister my ideas on how to negotiate it, and I think you would have been successful. She didn’t listen to that and that’s fine — she’s got to do what she’s got to do. I think it could have been negotiated

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in a different manner, frankly. I hate to see everything being ripped apart now.”15 According to PM May, Trump “told me I should sue the E.U. — not go into negotiations. Sue them.”16 What this meant remained unclear. Stephen Bannon said that Trump gave May three pieces of advice. These were, “Number one, overshoot the target on your deal because it will come apart. Number two, get on with it — you ought to be on terms agreed within six months — and number three, use every arrow in your quiver even if you have to do litigation later.” Trump indicated that May did not do so because she was “not terribly sophisticated.”17 Not only had Trump disparaged the EU, but he had also insulted Britain’s prime minister.

“The Mother of All Messes” It was “the mother of all messes.”18 Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour Party, argued that the first vote was “the largest defeat in the history of our democracy,” and that the prime minister was leading a “zombie government.”19 Many Labour Party members supported a second referendum and formally adopted this position in its September 2018 party conference. Corbyn himself was a euroskeptic who had voted for Brexit, and he feared the loss of blue-collar Labour voters in northern England and Wales. However, Corbyn’s refusal to mobilize his party against Brexit and his indecision left the Labour Party even more divided over Brexit than the Conservatives. Corbyn’s refusal to lead his party against Brexit and Labour’s alleged anti-Semitism led nine Labour MPs to leave the party and form the Independent Group, further fragmenting an already fragmented Parliament. One of those who had bolted, Chris Leslie, said Labour had been “hijacked by the machine politics of the hard left” by Corbyn and his shadow chancellor of the exchequer, John McDonnell and that its “betrayal on Europe was visible for all to see.”20 Shortly afterward, three Conservative MPs also joined the Independent Group because, as Anna Soubry, a former minister, said “The right wing, the hard-line antiEU awkward squad that have destroyed every leader for the last 40 years are now running the Conservative Party from top to toe.”21 Under pressure, Corbyn changed his mind and declared his support of a second referendum, prompting one anti-Brexit Labour MP to applaud Corbyn’s reversal, “This is a big step towards uniting our party and most importantly our country. No Brexit deal meets the fantasy promised in

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2016. So, the only way any specific form of Brexit can be made legitimate is through ratification in a #PeopleVote which includes the option to remain.” By contrast, an anti-Brexit Liberal Democrat, Tim Farron, was critical. “This is so weak. Or utterly cynical. One or the other.”22 Nevertheless, after getting a delay from the EU, three parliamentary defeats of her proposal, a parliamentary defeat of “no deal,” and its failure to muster a majority for any alternative, PM May in desperation offered to resign if Parliament finally accepted her proposal. Then, to the dismay of Conservative Brexiteers after this failed, she undertook to negotiate a deal with Corbyn and Labour. Brexiteers grew increasingly fearful that this would lead to a soft deal that would keep the UK in the common market. However, these negotiations failed to produce an agreement, and May sought to offer Parliament a fourth vote on her plan. The prime minister also requested an additional delay and grudgingly was forced to agree that the UK participate in elections to the European Parliament, which she had sought to avoid by reaching a deal earlier. “It is in the interests of neither the United Kingdom as a departing member state, nor the European Union as a whole, that the United Kingdom holds elections to the European Parliament,” she wrote to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council.23 For their part, Brexiteers sought to elect as many anti-EU politicians as possible to the EU Parliament. “A situation where Britain is with one foot inside the E.U. and with one foot outside the union is a tragedy, is bad for the European Union,” 24 declared the European Parliament’s Brexit coordinator. The threat still remained of a hard and disorderly Brexit if no other solution were found. As a new deadline loomed, Prime Minister May made a last fruitless effort to persuade the EU to drop its requirement for an Irish backstop. Wrote Peter Kellner, “If you drive from Northern Ireland into the Irish Republic, the only obvious indications that you have entered another country are that kilometers replace miles on road signs, and post boxes are green instead of red. The unrestricted flow of trade and people is one of the great benefits of two decades of peace. Nobody wants to return to the era of border posts, far less the paraphernalia of passport checks and customs buildings.”25 Brexiteers argued that customs officials were unnecessary and could be replaced by untested modern technology, but the technology did not yet exist. The EU wanted Northern Ireland to remain within its customs union, but, while agreeing there should be no “hard border” in Ireland, it demanded an “Irish backstop” in the Irish

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Sea that would establish controls between Northern Ireland and mainland Great Britain and keep Northern Ireland in the EU customs union until a trade deal was finalized. Also, Scottish politicians demanded that, if Northern Ireland remained in an EU customs union, then Scotland, too, should have that option. Consequently, British firms began to prepare for the possibility of no deal with the EU, taking steps such as shipping goods for sale before the new March 2019 date. Some firms did not wish to wait. Anticipating Brexit, major automobile firms including Honda and Nissan announced they were moving manufacturing out of the UK. “Dublin is our headquarters for our European bank now — full stop,” the Bank of America’s vice chairman, declared. “There isn’t a return. That bridge has been pulled up.”26 Thus, during a visit to the U.S., Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Leo Varadkar reasoned, “Potentially, when the U.K. leaves the European Union, we can be a strong partner for the U.S. [in the E.U.]. We will always be on team Europe, but we are going to be an Englishspeaking country — the only one in the European Union — and a country with a very similar business culture to the U.S.”27 He added that the Irish Republic could replace the UK as a bridge between the EU and the United States. Donald Tusk sadly concluded, “I’ve been wondering what that special place in hell looks like, for those who promoted Brexit, without even a sketch of a plan how to carry it out safely.”28 Brexiteers criticized Tusk’s comment, but The Guardian’s Martin Kettle concluded, “he should have said far more. He should have added that, within that special place, there should be an executive suite of sleepless torment for those politicians who promoted Brexit without ever giving a stuff about Ireland.”29 Concerning no deal between the EU and UK, Jean-Claude Juncker, then president of the EU’s executive arm, the European Commission, declared, “While we do not want this to happen, the European Commission will continue its contingency work to help ensure the EU is fully prepared.”30 Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator said. “It’s up to the British government to indicate how we ought to take things forward on March 29 toward an orderly withdrawal.”31 The EU had been willing to extend the transition period after Brexit from a year to 21 months. However, if no agreement were reached, London could request an extension of Article 50 of the EU treaty, which the UK had invoked on March 29, 2017 to leave the group on March 29, 2020. Such an extension though would require the approval of all EU member states.

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Negotiations between the UK and EU began in June 2017. The EU made it clear that it wanted agreement regarding the terms of Brexit before considering future relations with the UK, and in November 2018 an agreement was reached that the prime minister submitted to Parliament for approval. Meanwhile, the populism sweeping Europe has deepened the resolve of mainstream politicians, who argued that Brexit should not be viewed as beneficial for Britain. The Brexit referendum threatened a retreat from several dimensions of globalization. First, Brexit would have eroded the political dimension because it rejected multilateralism. It would also have been a retreat from globalization’s economic dimension inasmuch as it entailed restoring impediments to trade between Britain and the remaining members of the EU. Finally, it would have been a retreat from the socio-cultural dimension of globalization because it would have erected additional barriers to the free movement of persons between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and allowed the EU to prevent British citizens from freely traveling or residing in much of Europe and vice versa. Reducing immigration, concern for relative deprivation, and resentment of elites were crucial elements of the Leavers’ arguments for Brexit. A poll revealed that 58% of those who thought that “politicians do not listen to people like me” were Leavers, and 87% of Leavers sought to reduce immigration, while 40% believed it was the country’s most important political issue. In fact, a marked reduction in immigration, which was actually relatively small in Britain, would harm the country’s economy in several ways. Brexiteers’ criticisms of the EU were similar to those of populists elsewhere in Europe, emphasizing what they regarded as disadvantages of membership. First, free movement of EU migrants, they claimed, fostered crime and terrorism across national borders and took jobs from citizens. Second, membership entailed a variety of fees and costs, which they thought onerous. Third, members had to adhere to EU laws and regulations regardless of costs and preferences. Complaints about “meddling eurocrats” were linked to a more general concern about the loss of sovereignty to Brussels. Other Europeans emulated the Brexiteers. Following Britain’s referendum, Marine Le Pen called for a “Frexit” vote; Geert Wilders demanded a “Nexit” referendum; and sentiment for “Grexit” remained high. Like Trump, many of these politicians used social media to taunt foes, denounce mainstream media, and animate their base.

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Political Turmoil and Brexit Prime Minister Theresa May had initially opposed Brexit but soon decided she had more to fear politically from the Leavers in her party. “Appeasing them would become her top political priority. She launched her leadership campaign on July 11, 2016, with a speech declaring: “Brexit means Brexit,”32 and Britain, she decided, would leave the EU’s political institutions, the single market, and the customs union, and get what she wanted through negotiations. British political stability had eroded owing to absence of a majority government, the divisions within its major political parties, and the poor quality of party leaders. One observer of May’s performance as prime minister wrote, “She is not sensible, she does not know what she is doing, and, increasingly, she doesn’t seem to be entirely sane either,” but “almost everything about Brexit — from the nature of the deal she negotiated to the divisions in her party and her country — is very much her fault.”33 Following May’s decision to call a quick election in April 2017, the governing Conservative Party, which had previously enjoyed a clear parliamentary majority, had retained the largest number of seats (318), but lost its majority in a surprising outcome. This led to a minority government that depended on the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland that had won 10 seats for the government’s survival. The Conservative Party’s dependence on the DUP complicated negotiations with EU regarding Brexit because the DUP vigorously opposed reinstating a border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. If such a border were reinstalled, it would harm Ireland’s trade with the EU’s continental members because the Channel Tunnel in England was the quickest route for trucks going in either direction. The Conservatives had lost 13 seats, and the Labour Party was the major beneficiary, adding 30 new seats in Parliament. The prime minister had called the election because she believed it would provide a mandate to facilitate carrying out the Brexit referendum. The Scottish National Party (SNP), which had opposed Brexit, also lost a significant number of seats, and the Liberal Democrats, which supported remaining in the EU, gained a few. Both of Great Britain’s two leading political parties were divided over Brexit, and their leaders were mediocrities who were described by The Economist as “a charisma-free robot [Theresa May] and a superannuated Marxist [Jeremy Corbyn].”34 The Conservatives had for many years been deeply divided between those Members of Parliament (MPs) who wished

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to remain in the EU and those who wanted to leave and reassert British sovereignty and autonomy. The prime minister had opposed Brexit but was determined to get a mandate to carry out the majority of referendum voters’ decision to leave the EU. Her decision to call an election proved a major mistake and left her greatly weakened and vulnerable to potential rivals for party leadership. A majority of Labour MPs supported remaining in the EU, but Corbyn, had only tepidly supported remaining in the EU and had failed to put forward a plausible Brexit policy. Corbyn had been a highly controversial choice to lead the Labour Party. That choice had been opposed by a majority of Labour MPs, but he had been chosen in a poll of party members. He was a long-time member of the party’s extreme left wing, which advocated nationalization of key industries, unilaterally surrendering the UK’s nuclear weapons, and persistently criticizing U.S. foreign policy and NATO. Although Corbyn had retreated from his pacifist views to enable his selection, the opposition of many Labour MPs weakened his position as did repeated claims that, along with several other Labour parliamentarians, he was anti-Semitic. The party as a whole was criticized for refusing to accept the definition of anti-Semitism provided by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. The charge that Corbyn was anti-Semitic was partly a result of a photographs of his presence at a wreath-laying ceremony in 2014 at a memorial in Tunis for Black September terrorists that had carried out the 1972 attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich.

Seeking a Deal Negotiations between London and Brussels had divided British politicians in both major parties, and, with divided parties and uncharismatic and weak leaders, it proved difficult to reach a decision in London about how to conduct those negotiations. Some like Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson sought a “hard” exit when Britain was due to leave the group on March 29, 2019, while others preferred a “soft” deal in which London would remain in a customs union and accept many EU regulations and norms involving environmental and social policies in return. The former would free Britain from EU trade policies and migration regulations, while the latter would allow Britain to avoid EU tariffs but give it no voice in EU decisions and would entail large payments that London still owed the EU. The result would be catastrophic for the British economy if no deal were

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reached, and predictions of the consequences of a hard exit were frightening. Efforts to “bluff” the EU that London would accept “no deal” were at best dangerous and at worst potentially self-fulfilling. Indeed, the mere fact that Brexit was approaching had a negative impact on Britain’s economy. The debate in Britain was virulent, especially among the Conservatives, and May’s cabinet was split. Growing sentiment for a second referendum, especially within the Labour Party, and the prospect of a majority in Parliament opposed to a catastrophic hard exit pushed the prime minister toward a softer exit and produced a complex compromise involving a “facilitated customs arrangement,” which the cabinet accepted in a meeting at Chequers, the prime minister’s country residence. After the cabinet announced that Britain would seek “a common rule book for industrial goods and agricultural products,” that is, it would follow EU regulations until a final agreement was reached even though it had no voice in establishing them, Johnson and Brexit Secretary David Davis, both advocates of a hard Brexit, resigned. Johnson wrote bitterly, “You can’t leave an organisation and still be bound by its rules. But that is what the Chequers white paper means. It is vassalage, satrapy, colony status for the UK. For the first time in a thousand years, our laws will be made overseas, enforced by a foreign court. It can’t and won’t work. Chuck Chequers.”35 In a speech to the annual Conservative conference, Johnson violently attacked May’s effort to compromise with the EU, which he argued was anti-democratic and would not allow the UK to regain control of its own affairs. Johnson’s successor as foreign minister, Jeremy Hunt, compared the EU to the Soviet Union, which stopped people from leaving. If the EU did the same, other members would also seek their “freedom.” In either event, EU leaders remained opposed to the prime minister’s effort to achieve a soft Brexit that would allow “frictionless” trade to continue between the UK and EU, while excluding the free movement of people and services. French President Emmanuel Macron called those who argued that Brexit would not be painful “liars,” adding that “The Chequers plan cannot be take it or leave it.”36 Donald Tusk said May’s proposal to allow British-EU free trade that included agriculture and goods but not services was unacceptable and might undermine the single market. Tusk added that, as regards the Irish question or the framework for economic cooperation, British proposals needed to be revised, reworked, and renegotiated.

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According to the chief European analyst for the Eurasia Group, “The French won the argument that the E.U. has to come out more firmly against Chequers, and we see that in the Tusk statement that Chequers ‘will not work.’ I didn’t expect that and I don’t think the prime minister’s office did, either.”37 May, who sought to delay making additional compromises or accepting a sudden and complete rift with the EU, was confronted by a united front of leaders who were frustrated by the slow pace of decision-making in London. Most polls indicated that British voters regretted the initial decision to leave. To make matters more difficult for May, President Trump criticized her movement toward a “soft Brexit,” declared it would make a bilateral trade deal with America difficult to achieve because Washington would have to negotiate with the EU rather than Britain, and expressed admiration for Johnson whom he said would make a fine successor to Theresa May as prime minister. Trump even had the gall to tell the press that he had told the prime minister what he thought she should do. In a state visit to the UK in 2019, Trump continued to criticize the EU and support Brexit, even meeting with Farage again and denouncing Sadiq Aman Khan, the Muslim mayor of London. Observers denounced Trump’s involvement in British politics and argued that any arrangement for a trade deal on Trump’s terms would reduce British sovereignty. They also pointed out that, as well as Trump’s sympathy with the populist characteristics of Brexit, “this orange blow-in” sensed a profitable bargain and opportunity, that is, a large bilateral trade deal with a pro-Brexit British leader. Columnist Ian Birrell concluded, “Britain sent out a message that it is replacing bridges with walls — walls less obvious but more of a barrier than the one Trump wants to build …. Trump is terrible. But Brexit is a bigger and more enduring act of sabotage.”38 To complicate matters Britain’s Parliament had to approve any final deal with the EU. This was by no means assured. May’s government had only a slender majority that included the small DUP that opposed any boundary between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Majorities in both houses of Parliament preferred a soft Brexit and were prepared to reject a deal that did not compromise with the EU. The governing Conservative Party was deeply divided between Brexiteers in the European Research Group (ERG) led by Jacob Rees-Mogg and Foreign Minister Johnson, which demanded that London walk away with no deal rather than compromising with the EU. About 100 Conservative

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MPs who formed the ERG were among the most determined Brexiteers. Rees-Mogg declared that any compromise would make Britain a “slave state.” They opposed remaining in either the EU’s single market and/or customs union or leaving Britain subject to any EU regulations that would limit the UK’s sovereignty. However, the prime minister was aware that she needed to negotiate a compromise. She was also willing to remain in several EU agencies and accept trade regulations. Her so-called customs partnership, some Brexiteers feared, would become a customs union, which they vigorously opposed. Britain, they argued, had rejected these conditions, requiring London to choose that either the UK as a whole remain in the customs union or left it but granted Northern Ireland a special status.

Incompetent Dealmakers In November 2018, Prime Minister May revealed the final deal she had offered the EU, which in turn had accepted the prime minister’s proposal for a soft Brexit. The prime minister opted for a lengthy transition period during which Britain would remain a non-voting member of the EU, and she agreed to pay billions of dollars that the EU claimed London owed it. The UK would also remain a member of the customs union but without an entirely independent trade policy that May had sought until at least 2021. The proposal preserved the EU’s four freedoms—free movement of goods, services, capital, and people, although the UK would regain the right to limit immigration from Europe. “This is the deal,” said JeanClaude Juncker. “It’s the best deal possible. The European Union will not change its fundamental position.” And he added, “It’s not a moment for jubilation nor celebration; it’s a sad and tragic moment.”39 “This deal,” wrote Anne Applebaum, “offers something for everyone to hate.”40 Brexiteers were angry because the deal meant that Britain would temporarily remain in the EU single market in which there were no barriers among members to the movement of goods, services, investment, and people. The negotiators had agreed that the UK would remain in the single market (still under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice) and customs union including existing regulations with no clear date for finalizing matters, and this would limit British efforts to negotiate other trade agreements. However, the deal would not allow the “frictionless” trade in the EU that the UK enjoyed because London would have to face separate markets with different legal systems.

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Opponents also feared that the UK might be indefinitely obliged to follow the regulations of the European single market yet would be unable to shape them. Remaining in the single market would make it impossible for the U.K. to pursue separate trade deals with anyone else including the United States. “Trade flexibility, supposedly, the great advantage of Brexit,” “would become a distant dream,” wrote Applebaum. “AntiBrexit campaigners were furious because the deal would leave Britain weaker and less influential than before. The Northern Irish hate it because it implies that they still might end up in a separate trading arrangement from the rest of Britain. The Scottish hate it because they would like a guarantee similar to the one that the Northern Irish had obtained. And so on.”41 Because it was a compromise, it was no surprise that British politicians from all sides of the controversy criticized it. After Brexiteers had promised that leaving the EU would be costless, Prime Minister May had agreed to pay the EU a substantial sum ($50 billion) of what Brussels thought London still owed. The arrangement would also preclude the need to erect a customs border that would separate Northern Ireland from the Irish Republic during this period. However, the deal allowed a “backstop,” that is a period to devise technology to establish a boundary during which the entire UK would remain in both the customs union and the single market with its numerous regulations. This period would also enable London with time to dismantle and replace EU regulations with its own rules. During that time, the UK would remain in the EU customs union that Brexiteers feared might become permanent because the withdrawal agreement could not be altered to include a time limit or an exit clause without undermining Brexit. However, Britain would no longer have to allow citizens from other EU member states to live and work within its borders, a victory for Brexiteers. In the event a technological solution to the Irish boundary issue proved impossible, all of Great Britain might remain in the EU customs union, but Northern Ireland would be subject to more of the bloc’s economic regulations, a clause that Northern Ireland’s members of Parliament opposed. Indeed, Brexit had significantly complicated UK relations with Republic of Ireland, which remained an EU member. “The general discourse in parts of the U.K. is extremely arrogant and quite condescending, the feeling that ‘these people don’t know their place,’” declared Tony Connelly, the author of Ireland and Brexit. “That, in turn, has awakened a kind of ancient defiance on the Irish side as well,”

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he argued. “All these historical nerve endings that were buried by the Anglo-Irish peace process have reawakened a bit.”42 British leaders refused to hold a second referendum, and modification of the government’s decisions regarding Brexit rested with Parliament. Although Parliament could not scrub Brexit as a whole, a plurality favored a soft landing that would include negotiating a customs union with the EU. In the end, if London could not settle the issues raised by Brexit with the EU, there would be no agreement, which would be a catastrophic outcome for Britain’s economy and for Western unity more generally. Although polls in late 2018 indicated that British voters preferred to “remain” rather than accept a hard Brexit with no deal, in January 2019, as feared, Parliament overwhelming voted down the prime minister’s proposal by a vote of 432–202, and shortly afterward she narrowly survived a vote of no confidence by the majority. The defeat of May’s proposal was the worst in modern British history. “Historians had to go as far back as the Victorian age to find a comparable party split and parliamentary defeat — to Prime Minister William Gladstone’s support for Irish home rule in 1886, which cut the Liberal Party in two.”43 Just weeks before the March 29 deadline she resubmitted the same proposal to Parliament with a few minor tweaks, and, not surprisingly, the “new” proposal was defeated 391–242 with 75 Conservative MPs deserting the prime minister. “Deeply saddened by the outcome of the #Brexit vote this evening,” Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen tweeted. “Despite clear EU-assurances on the backstop, we now face a chaotic #NoDeal #Brexit scenario.”44 Thereafter, Parliament rejected leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement and sought an extension beyond the March 29 deadline, while turning down having a second referendum. However, the drama continued. May requested an additional three months before Brexit would take effect, but the EU was only willing to grant her a few weeks. As the UK approached the wire, Parliament took control of the issue away from the prime minister and empowered itself to vote on alternatives to the government’s Brexit plan, even as over five million people signed a petition to override Brexit. However, none of eight options could muster a majority in Parliament. Parliament turned down May’s proposed deal for a third time only two weeks before Brexit was to take place, and shortly thereafter failed to muster a majority for any of four options put before it again. Only two days before a Brexit with no deal was to occur, the EU agreed to an

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additional delay until October 31, 2019. In May 2019, Prime Minister May offered Parliament her original Withdrawal Agreement Bill that was tweaked to assure Labour MPs that the UK would apply European standards on workplace protections and environmental rights. She also would permit Parliament to demand, at least temporarily, a customs union with the EU and allow it to vote again on the issue of a second referendum. Hence, the drama continued. When it became clear that the tweaked version of Prime Minister May’s compromise proposal would not pass muster in Parliament, she resigned in June 2019, and several Conservative MPs fought to succeed her. The prime minister’s resignation triggered a constitutional crisis. Britain’s unwritten constitution placed its sovereignty in the House of Commons. However, this had been eroded by several referendums, notably the vote in Scotland about remaining in the UK and then whether to remain in the EU. After PM May’s resignation as leader of her party, her successor as prime minister would be selected by its 124,000 members. If it were a candidate supporting Brexit like Boris Johnson, the former mayor of London, foreign minister, and something of a political buffoon, it would mean that the result of an “unrepresentative sample” would reverse the decision of Britain’s sovereign Parliament that had voted against “such a no-deal Brexit on the ground that it would do the country grave harm.”45 The “quirks of British parliamentary procedure provide various ways in which a sufficiently bloody-minded prime minister might force a ‘nodeal’ Brexit without a majority in Parliament.”46 It would also ignore the decision of the Scots who had voted against Brexit in the referendum and who might seek a new referendum on whether to remain in the UK. Johnson was a nationalist-populist, a characteristic reflected both by his support for Brexit and his comment that all British residents, especially immigrants and presumably Scots, Welsh sand Irish, should speak English as their first language. A Scottish politician tweeted in response, “Boris is just moronic & clueless.”47 After Johnson became the new prime minister, he sought to prorogue parliament to prevent any serious effort to avoid a hard Brexit before the new date when Brexit would go into effect. Although legal, the effort was an affront to the UK’s democratic tradition. Declared The Economist, “Boris Johnson, lacking support among MPs for a no-deal Brexit, has outraged his opponents by manipulating procedure to suspend Parliament for five crucial weeks.”48 Unable to muster a clear majority in Parliament, he sought to silence it, a dangerous precedent for British democracy. After

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one Tory joined the Liberal Democrats, Johnson lost his parliamentary majority. “Remainers,” including Tories, sought to pass a bill to delay Brexit, and Johnson warned that, if his foes succeeded, he would call a snap election and refuse to let defectors run as Conservatives. Johnson’s foes succeeded in regaining control over the process and sought to ask the EU for yet another delay. Parliament then passed a proposal to prevent a no-deal Brexit and refused to authorize a national election until that proposal became law. Johnson retaliated by informing Tories who voted against him that they would be thrown out of their party and would not be able to compete as Conservatives for their parliamentary seats in the next election. Among those were leaders of the party including several former cabinet ministers such as Philip Hammond, a former foreign secretary and chancellor of the exchequer and David Gauke a former Lord Chancellor. It also included Winston Churchill’s grandson, Nicholas Soames. Shortly thereafter, Work and Pensions Secretary Amber Rudd quit the cabinet and her party, accusing Johnson of committing “political vandalism.” Britain’s Supreme Court also unanimously ruled that Johnson had violated the country’s constitution and had misled Queen Elizbeth II when he suspended Parliament to prevent it from meeting to deal with Brexit. The court ruled that Johnson was preventing Parliament from meeting its legal obligations. Confronted by a hostile Parliament that had voted against no-deal exit, Johnson reached a minimalist agreement with the EU, unlike the deal that Prime Minister May had sought, under which Northern Ireland would be legally outside the EU and its customs union. Johnson’s proposal would keep Northern Ireland subject to EU rules in practice but legally outside the group with the rest of Britain. Parliament, however, voted to delay final approval on the agreement until after it passed detailed legislation to enact it. This made it difficult to achieve Johnson’s goal of leaving the EU by the end of October 2019 and forced him to request yet another extension required by Parliament (while simultaneously denouncing such an extension and having said he would rather be “dead in a ditch” than asking for it). Johnson did so, and Brexit was deferred once more. Although polls indicated that the opponents of Brexit, especially young voters, narrowly outnumbered Brexiteers, Parliament approved the proposal. The prospect of any agreement before that deadline darkened after London announced in September 2020 that it was passing legislation to revise the Northern Ireland Protocol of the Withdrawal Agreement to

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which it had earlier agreed to give its government authority to decide, unilaterally, about checks on goods between Northern Ireland and the rest of Britain. Johnson described this Internal Market Bill as a “legal safety net” to prevent a border at the Irish Sea in the event no agreement was reached. In addition to no additional checks on goods from Northern Ireland to the rest of Britain, were no agreement EU-UK agreement reached, the bill provided London with authority to renege on obligations concerning state assistance to British business even if a violation of international law. London’s unilateral action prompted the EU to begin legal action against the UK. Moreover, U.S. presidential candidate Joe Biden with Irish roots warned that if London’s action led to a solid border between the two Irelands, thereby endangering the Good Friday Agreement that had brought peace to Ireland, he would oppose the British effort to forge a trade agreement with America. The UK, however, remained in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of 2020 and was given a year to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with the EU. The added year was a short time to finalize a complex trade deal and proved fractious regarding such issues as which EU standards and regulations to accept or refuse or reach agreements on issues such as fishing quotas and state aid to industries. The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy gave European vessels access to British waters, and the EU demanded that these rules remain after Brexit. In British fishing fleets in Scotland, discontent took the form of whether to have a second referendum about leaving the UK, but, with the Scots opposed to Brexit, the likelihood of a pro-independence majority in Scotland had grown, led by Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the SNP. Moreover, in the absence of a deal with the EU, the supply chains of Britain’s major industries like automakers were at risk. Although Johnson’s proposed deal closely resembled that which Prime Minister May had proposed and that Parliament had repeatedly voted down, Johnson’s deal might have been adopted because, as Yascha Mounk explained, “Brexit is best understood as a civil war over the country’s culture,” and Johnson is a nationalist-populist who “understood that Brexit is as much a symbol as a cause. A lot of people voted for Brexit out of a desire to show an establishment they had come to loathe who was really in charge; above and beyond negotiating an exit, pleasing them would require the leader to prove that (s)he is on the side of the angry people rather than on that of technocratic elites.”49

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Amid this tumult, Trump continued to support Johnson, even though Johnson’s own brother resigned from Parliament to protest his actions. When Johnson was asked if he would resign, Trump, who was standing next to him at the UN, commented, “I’ll tell you, I know him well, he’s not going anywhere.” Johnson agreed. “No, no, no,” he said.50 Trump then described Johnson as a friend who knew how to win. Johnson finally led Parliament to declare a general election before the end of 2019, and Trump again interfered, supporting Johnson and criticizing the Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, as bad for the UK. “He’d take you into such bad places.” In July 2019, Trump virtually endorsed Johnson, declaring, “They call him ‘Britain’s Trump,’ and people are saying that’s a good thing.”51 The outcome of the election was a decisive Conservative victory. Johnson’s pro-Brexit supporters included many formerly pro-Labour working-class voters from both rural and northern “rust belt” constituencies. Had Labour won, it would have great strained NATO unity. Jeremy Corbyn, as we noted, was a pacifist who had repeatedly criticized NATO, the use of force more generally, and Britain’s retention of a nuclear deterrent, while advocating left-wing policies. Britain’s withdrawal from NATO would have removed a nuclear power that accounted for about one-quarter of Europe’s military capability. Close military cooperation, consultation, and planning would continue between post-Brexit Britain and its European allies only if t remained in NATO. Military coordination required constant communication among the EU, the UK, and the United States. Brexit officially took place on January 31, 2020 and was approved by the EU although negotiations about specifics continued to days before January 1, 2021. An agreement remained difficult owing to Johnson’s demand for a free-trade agreement with zero tariffs and quotas such as those to which Canada and the EU had agreed, and London’s effort to revise the Northern Ireland Protocol unilaterally. Such a revision made it more difficult for the EU and UK to sign a deal by the end of 2020, which would, under World Trade Organization rules, mean that goods traded between the two would allow tariffs and quotas in both directions and fracture long-time supply chains. Notwithstanding the compromise that London finally negotiated, the consequences were significant. Since the UK was leaving the customs union and single market, unregulated free movement of people between the EU and UK ceased, and many individuals were forced to leave

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where they had come to consider “home.” Britain was losing access to migrants, who had provided taxes and helped compensate for an aging and shrinking population and had benefited from lower prices and lower taxes because care homes, hospitals, public transport, and much else had been cheaper to run. Nevertheless, one of Johnson’s first acts as prime minister had been to alter immigration rules to reduce the number of unskilled workers from non-English speaking countries and impose a skills-focused, points-based system of immigration. A reduction in immigration of EU and non-EU citizens will harm the British economy, particularly in health care, especially for the elderly, and agriculture, which depended on migrants in food processing and seasonal work on farms. Business and labor union leaders denounced the change, warning about job losses, factory closings, and the reduction in health care. In addition, there would be a loss of skilled immigrants who were needed for the economic benefits they brought through innovation and technology. In a word, Britain will decline unless the EU adopted a multi-tiered system in which members in each group have different obligations. A potentially serious consequences of Brexit would be a decision by Scotland to seek independence. Scots had been anti-Brexit and retained deep links with the EU and were unhappy with fishing quotas provided EU members in Scottish waters in the December 2020 deal. Scottish MPs voted against the compromise deal in Parliament, Ian Blackford, an SNP MP, declared, “Scotland’s story is European. And that story does not end today.”52 As for Northern Ireland, in June 2020, the UK and EU had managed to agree that there would no hard customs barriers t goods moving between Northern Ireland and elsewhere in Britain. Notwithstanding Johnson’s metaphor that the UK was “leaving its chrysalis” like a butterfly entering a world of global free trade, Joe Biden declared that, unlike Trump, he would be unwilling to conclude a bilateral trade pact with UK if there were a hard border between the two Irelands. Hence, under the December 2020 compromise, the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland would remain open even though Northern Ireland would no longer remain in the EU. To retain this unique status, Northern Ireland would have had to follow all EU rules on agricultural and manufactured goods. Moreover, although there will be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, goods sent to Northern Ireland from elsewhere in the UK may be checked at points of entry into Northern Ireland, and, if those goods were to be sent on to the Republic

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of Ireland, a tariff would be imposed, with refunds to firms that can prove the goods remained in Northern Ireland. As time grew shorter, in September 2020, Michael Gove, minister for the Cabinet Office, provided a potential preview of what might happen with no deal. After January 1, 2021, he predicted, truck drivers would need a “Kent access permit” to get into Britain or arrive in Kent intending to board a ferry or use a Eurotunnel train to enter the EU. To some extent, a “de facto Brexit border” was to avert traffic chaos after the UK let the EU.53 The December 2020 deal made these unnecessary.

All’s Well that Ends Well Only days before the Brexit rupture was due to begin, an EU-British compromise agreement regarding UK-EU relations after Brexit was reached on Christmas eve 2020. “It was a long and winding road, but we have got a good deal to show for it,” said Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission. “This moment marks the end of a long voyage,”54 the EU’s chief negotiator declared, “Today is a day of relief but tinged by some sadness as we compare what came before with what lies ahead. The United Kingdom has chosen to leave the European Union and the single market, to renounce the benefits and advantages enjoyed by member states.”55 The UK left the customs union and EU single market, and there were neither tariffs nor quotas on traded goods. Nevertheless, Britain agreed to a “level playing field,” continuing to follow EU standards and regulations, especially those dealing with workers’ rights, environmental standards and state subsidies, to prevent either the EU or the U.K. from undercutting the other. Consequently, Britain agreed to continue following many EU rules and regulations and permit arbitration in the event of disagreement, not automatic penalties that the EU had sought. Boris Johnson had previously and repeatedly refused any deal that would make London follow EU rules, but the EU feared that if it permitted the UK to do as Johnson wished it would have to compete with a highly competitive, less regulated economy. The deal thus undermined Johnson’s claim, “We have also today resolved a question that has bedeviled our politics for decades and it is up to all of us together as a newly and truly independent nation to realize the immensity of this moment and to make the most of it.”56 The UK also retained the right to negotiate additional free-trade agreements with non-EU countries including the U.S.

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Also, although there will be no tariffs or quotas on goods traded that would interfere with the $900 billion in cross-channel trade (2019), services, which account for four-fifths of the UK economy, were not included. Although London’s enormous financial sector would remain relatively unaffected by the deal, Brexit complicated the ability of British financial institutions to provide services to foreign clients in the EU. According to the former director of a research institute, “The result of the deal is that the European Union retains all of its current advantages in trading, particularly with goods [in which it enjoyed a trade surplus], and the U.K. loses all of its current advantages in the trade for services [in which it enjoyed a surplus],” Consequently, he concluded, “Brexit was always going to be a long-running hit to the U.K.’s competitiveness. But the way it’ll play out is by damaging investment in the U.K., so it’s a slow puncture, not a quick crash.”57 However, the agreement will generate considerably more red tape for those involved in EU-UK trade. Because London left the EU’s frictionless single market and customs union, firms have to file forms and customs declarations. There are also different rules on product labeling as well as checks on agricultural products. Goods require sufficient inspections to prevent smuggling, especially of live animals, and the UK no longer participated in the Erasmus exchange program, a Europe-wide program that allowed many students a year to travel abroad for study and/or work experience. Regarding the difficult question of fishing in British waters, the negotiators agreed on a 25% reduction in EU quotas for European Union members to be phased in over five and a half years. Britain had had sought a three-year transition, while the EU had demanded a slower, fourteen-year transition. Finally, people were no longer able to move freely between EU members and the UK. EU citizens require visas to live and work in Britain although those already in the UK are free of this, and British citizens can no longer freely work or retire in EU member states. The agreement also meant that Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland remained without a hard boundary between them. Trade between the two Ireland’s will only be minimally affected. There would be no need for physical customs barriers between them. Goods sent from Britain to Northern Ireland were exempted from EU tariffs. EU customs officials can observe border checks but not carry them out, and Northern Irish firms only have to complete few British export declarations. Finally, British subsidies for Northern Ireland’s fishing and farming businesses

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are not subject EU regulations that govern state aid. Thus, according to Michael Gove, “The deal protects unfettered access for Northern Ireland businesses to their most important market.” The last-minute agreement was made even more important by the negative economic impact of the pandemic, especially a more transmissible strain in the UK that briefly closed British ports and caused chaos owing to the backup of trucks, a condition that will recur in early 2021. The new strain of the virus showed up in several other countries, including the US, Canada, and many were linked to arrivals from the UK. However, scars remained, including mutual EU-UK political and economic mistrust. Brexiteers, especially Boris Johnson, had reflected the spread of nationalist-populism in Great Britain. Johnson had violated the UK’s unwritten constitution repeatedly during his tenure as PM. He had declared that with Brexit the UK would become “Global Britain,” when it was more likely to become “little England.” As prime minister, Johnson emulated Trump’s conflict with professional civil servants, that is, against the so-called deep state, most of whom would have preferred for the UK to remain in the EU. British leaders during the Brexit era were profoundly incompetent. Concluded Pankaj Mishra: “Britain’s rupture with the European Union is proving to be another act of moral dereliction by the country’s rulers. The Brexiteers, pursuing a fantasy of imperial-era strength and self-sufficiency, have repeatedly revealed their hubris, mulishness and ineptitude….”58 Equally harsh, Thomas Friedman argued, “Conservative and Labour members of Parliament keep voting down one plan after another, looking for the perfect fix, the pain-free exit from the E.U. But there is none, because you can’t fix stupid.”59 One consequence of the chaos caused by the Brexit controversy was a dramatic decline in Britons’ faith in their political system. As the deadline for decision was imminent, a British worker in a pro-Brexit community expressed a widely held perception. “I think people have totally lost confidence in democracy, in British democracy and the way it’s run. You’ve got egotistical people in politics, and they want to follow their own agenda.” He added, “They don’t want to follow what the people have voted for…. We’re in the last hour. I’m wondering: What does more damage? Leaving without a deal? Or the total annihilation of faith in democracy?”60 A poll revealed that 71% of respondents agreed that British political parties were so divided “within themselves that they cannot serve the best interests of

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the country,” and 54% said they would approve of a prime minister, like Johnson, who was willing to break the rules. After expanding eastward after the Cold War, the liberal European project as a whole suffered significant setbacks, most importantly the controversy over Brexit. As we shall see in later chapters, the EU’s and NATO’s expansion after the Cold War had made their membership politically and economically more diffuse, their management more complex, and negotiations among members increasingly fractious. An extended period of economic malaise during the Great Recession, threats from Russia and Islamic terrorism, a flood of refugees from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, and the coronavirus all undermined the EU’s cohesion. Stewart Patrick observed, “The European Union is locked in a perpetual state of crisis management. It has had to head off the collapse of the Eurozone, deal with waves of undocumented migrants, and now come to terms with a renewed terrorist threat, underscored by the recent attacks in Brussels and France. On top of all this, the EU confronts a British exit, or Brexit…. The European idea, which has helped to inspire the continent’s integration since World War II, may be the next casualty.”61 Although resolved, the Brexit controversy dealt a blow to the EU and its multilateral approach to global and regional issues, thereby slowing political globalization. Resistance had spread in the UK to immigration, that is, socio-cultural globalization, and the liberal norms of the free movement of persons and free trade. Tom McTague summarized what had happened as “a process in which the EU moved inexorably forward as Westminster collapsed into political infighting, indecision and instability.”62 Dani Rodrik described “the inescapable trilemma of the world economy.”63 In a globalized world, European countries could have economic integration, an independent state, or democracy, but not all three. Thus, British voters repeatedly discovered that their preferences were rejected by the EU or some other globalizing agent because the UK could not have both democracy and economic integration with independence. Only if London agreed to abide by EU regulations could it have remained in a common market, a demand that would have given it significant advantages over EU members.64 Although the Brexit agreement required the approval of the British and European Parliaments, it overturned the original referendum, and critics will denounce it as violating democratic norms. Moreover, the agreement itself had maintained limits on British “independence.”

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Notes 1. Cited in Edward Wong and David E. Sanger, “Trump and Johnson: Allies in Disruption,” New York Times, July 23, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/07/23/world/europe/trump-boris-johnson.html?nl=todays headlines&emc=edit_th_190724?campaign_id=2&instance_id=11093& segment_id=15491&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea& regi_id=43321680724. 2. George F. Will, “Theresa May’s Brexit Plan Isn’t Dead Yet,” Washington Post, January 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/glo bal-opinions/theresa-mays-brexit-plan-isnt-dead-yet/2019/01/16/17f c6a00-19cd-11e9-8813-cb9dec761e73_story.html?utm_term=.f6c967ac4 780&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Italics in original. 3. Fareed Zakaria, “Brexit Will Mark the End of Britain’s Role as a Great Power,” Washington Post, March 14, 2019, https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/global-opinions/brexit-will-mark-the-end-of-bri tains-role-as-a-great-power/2019/03/14/5df139fa-468c-11e9-8aab-95b 8d80a1e4f_story.html?utm_term=.ee7ebf70b9e1&wpisrc=nl_daily202& wpmm=1. 4. Max Fisher, “Why Europe Could Melt Down Over a Simple Question of Borders,” New York Times, July 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/07/06/world/europe/europe-borders-nationalism-identity.html? emc=edit_th_180707&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680707. 5. James Moore, “If You Weren’t Scared by the Prospect of a No-Deal Brexit, You Sure as Hell Should be Now,” Independent, August 23, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/no-deal-brexit-assessment-dom inic-raab-papers-scared-you-should-be-trade-a8504726.html?wpmm=1& wpisrc=nl_todayworld. 6. Bagehot, “Downhill All the Way,” The Economist, July 28, 2018, p. 43. 7. Peter A. Hall, “The Roots of Brexit,” Foreign Affairs, June 28, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-kingdom/2016-06-28/ roots-brexit. 8. Cited in Sam Levin, “Donald Trump Backs Brexit, Saying UK Would be ‘Better Off’ Without EU,” The Guardian, 9. Cited in “Donald Trump: Niger Farage Would be Great UK Ambassador,” BBC, November 22, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-380 60434. 10. Cited in Nicky Woolf and Jessica Elgot, “Nigel Farage Would be Great UK Ambassador to US, Says Donald Trump,” The Guardian, November 22, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/22/nigelfarage-uk-ambassador-us-donald-trump. 11. Anne Applebaum, “This is How Putin Buys Influence in the West,” Washington Post, June 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/

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opinions/global-opinions/this-is-how-putin-buys-influence-in-the-west/ 2018/06/15/45ccbb2a-70b2-11e8-bf86-a2351b5ece99_story.html? utm_term=.e3d90dae98fa. William Booth, “Two Years After Brexit Vote, British Leaders Still Tied in Knots Over How to Leave Europe,” Washington Post, June 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/two-years-after-brexit-vote-bri tish-leaders-still-tied-in-knots-over-how-to-leave-europe/2018/06/20/ 53af6192-73ce-11e8-bda1-18e53a448a14_story.html?utm_term=.f63482 fdaf79. 45229426?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/top ics/c8nq32jw5jpt/nigel-farage&link_location=live-reporting-story. “The Elusive Will,” The Economist, March 30, 2019, p. 59. Richard Pérez-Peña, “What Is the Irish Backstop, and Why Is It Holding Up Brexit?” New York Times, January 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/01/30/world/europe/irish-backstop-brexit.html. Cited in William Booth, Karla Adam and Michael Birnbaum, “British Parliament Votes to Delay Brexit, Rejects a Second Referendum for Now,” Washington Post, March 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/europe/brexit-vote-delay-and-second-referendum/2019/03/14/ d97ffdd8-4405-11e9-94ab-d2dda3c0df52_story.html?utm_term=.541c49 e272ab&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in “Theresa May: Trump Told Me to Sue the EU,” BBC News, July 15, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-44838028. Cited in Amanda Walker, “Steve Bannon Talks Russia, Brexit, 2020 and His Controversial Following,” Sky News, March 18, 2019, https://news. sky.com/story/steve-bannon-talks-russia-brexit-2020-and-his-controver sial-following-11668563?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. “The Mother of All Messes,” The Economist, January 19, 2019, p. 12. Cited in Stephen Castle and Richard Pérez-Peña, “Theresa May Survives No-Confidence Vote in British Parliament,” New York Times, January 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/world/europe/bre xit-theresa-may-no-confidence-vote.html?emc=edit_th_190117&nl=tod aysheadlines&nlid=43321680117. Cited in Karla Adam and William Booth, “Seven Lawmakers Quit Britain’s Labour Party over Brexit and Anti-Semitism,” Washington Post, February 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/seven-lawmakersquit-britains-labour-party-over-brexit-and-anti-semitism/2019/02/18/ a90c5154-7f8d-451a-b941-78b7cc32fe86_story.html?utm_term=.cc84c4 6e1344. Cited in “Independent Group: Three MPs Quit Tory Party to Join,” BBC News, February 20, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics47306022. Cited in William Booth, “Jeremy Corby says Labour Would Back a Second Brexit Referendum,” Washington Post, February 25, 2019, https://www.

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washingtonpost.com/world/europe/jeremy-corbyn-says-labour-wouldback-a-second-brexit-referendum/2019/02/25/ea765b14-392e-11e9b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html?utm_term=.69920c52229e&wpisrc=nl_ powerup&wpmm=1. Cited in Karla Adam and Michael Birnbaum, “Brexit: Britain Preps for E.U. Elections, Three Years After Voting to Leave the E.U.,” Washington Post, April 5, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/britainto-take-part-in-european-parliament-elections-signaling-a-brexit-delay/ 2019/04/05/e7042028-577f-11e9-a047-748657a0a9d1_story.html? utm_term=.ae22a5b43b07. Cited in ibid. Peter Kellner, “The Reopening of the Irish Question,” Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/76208?utm_source= rssemail&utm_medium=email&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT1RsbFpUQm1OVFk0 TldVeiIsInQiOiIydzF5dzFHTjc4ZDJoMnRycTUxNFwveDNKTDNtSE JPRnZUN0tWbkI4S0ZDVzZxbXROV0wzdmtHMDczYmY3bVJoM0 gzRk9IWDFuVEF2WXhQSFwvQkRHV0N2NUNMTFwvb1lvYnU5bE tXTW5cL0hXVUpkTTRpUkgxRlp0YnRIRXNRdWxsMzcifQ%3D%3D. Cited in Karla Adam and William Booth, “Will Brexit happen? When? And how? The Uncertainty is Maddening for Business,” Washington Post, March 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ will-brexit-happen-when-and-how-the-uncertainty-is-maddening-for-bus iness/2019/03/09/900525fe-3468-11e9-8375-e3dcf6b68558_story. html?utm_term=.9aa526df2640&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in Adam Taylor, “Ireland’s Prime Minister Talks Brexit and Trump. Today’s World View,” Washington Post, March 14, 2019, C:\Users\mansbach\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache \Content.Outlook\HVCX7VXP\email (004).mht. Cited in Stephen Castle, “Theresa May Is Off to Brussels for Brexit Talks, but She’s Not Feeling the Love,” New York Times, February 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/world/europe/theresamay-brexit-tusk-brussels-backstop.html?emc=edit_th_190207&nl=todays headlines&nlid=43321680207. Martin Kettle, “A Special Place in Hell? Donald Tusk Didn’t Go far Enough,” The Guardian, February 6, 2019, https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2019/feb/06/donald-tusk-brexiters-ireland-tories? CMP=share_btn_tw&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in William Booth Karla Adam and Michael Birnbaum, “Brexit Vote: British Parliament Rejects Theresa May’s Brexit Deal, Leaving Withdrawal from E.U. and Prime Minister’s Future in Doubt,” Washington Post, January 15, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/europe/brexit-vote-2019/2019/01/15/8eb6579a-1816-11e9-

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b8e6-567190c2fd08_story.html?utm_term=.80f64555e885&wpisrc=nl_ powerup&wpmm=1. Cited in Michael Birnbaum, “As Brexit Deal Goes Down in Flames, Exasperated Europe Wonders What Britain Wants,” Washington Post, January 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/asbrexit-deal-goes-down-in-flames-exasperated-europe-wonders-what-thebritons-want/2019/01/16/33abb552-1979-11e9-a804-c35766b9f234_ story.html?utm_term=.549e66fe7f1c. Cited in David Frum, “It’s Five Minutes to Midnight in the U.K.,” The Atlantic, March 10, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 2019/03/brexit-short-history-bad-idea/584524/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_ todayworld. Anne Applebaum, “Theresa May isn’t the Adult in the Room. She’s Part of the Problem,” Washington Post, March 22, 2019, https://www.was hingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/dont-pity-theresa-may-shesthe-worst-prime-minister-in-living-memory/2019/03/22/405920e64ca5-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html?utm_term=.dcf44cd77abb. Bagehot, “An Equilibrium of Incompetence,” The Economist, September 8, 2018, p. 49. Boris Johnson, “Boris Johnson: Why we Should Chuck Chequers,” The Spectator, July 28, 2018, tps://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/07/boris-joh nson-why-we-should-chuck-chequers/. Cited in William Booth, “As Theresa May Tries to Sell her Brexit Plan, Macron Calls Brexit Backers liars,” Washington Post, September 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/as-theresa-may-triesto-sell-her-brexit-plan-macron-calls-brexit-backers-liars/2018/09/20/ 5f7779c6-bcec-11e8-8243-f3ae9c99658a_story.html?utm_term=.892433 4bbf41&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Steven Erlanger, “U.K.’s Brexit Plans Will Not Work,’ a Top E.U. Official Says,” New York Times, September 20, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/europe/brexit-european-union-che quers-plan.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action= click&contentCollection=world®ion=stream&module=stream_unit& version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=sectionfront. Ian Birrell, “Trump is Terrible, but the Sabotage of Brexit will Outlast Him,” Washington Post, February 18, 2019, https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/trump-is-terrible-but-the-sabotage-of-brexit-willoutlast-him/2019/02/18/51ef7fb0-3082-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_ story.html?utm_term=.a9e53a03c5fa&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in Stephen Castle and Steven Erlanger, “E.U. Leaders and U.K. Agree on Brexit Divorce Terms,” New York Times, November 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/world/europe/brexit-uk-eu-

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41. 42.

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45. 46. 47.

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49.

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agreement.html?emc=edit_na_20181125&nl=breaking-news&nlid=433 2168ing-news&ref=cta. Anne Applebaum, “Theresa May’s Brexit Deal Gives Everyone Something to Hate,” Washington Post, November 15, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/11/15/theresa-mays-bre xit-deal-gives-everyone-something-to-hate/?utm_term=.a43691664bea& wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Ibid. Cited in Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “Amid Brexit Strains, Anglo-Irish Relations Are ‘Fraying’,” New York Times, February 23, 2019, https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/world/europe/ireland-brexit-britainuk.html?emc=edit_th_190224&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680224. William Booth, Karla Adam and Michael Birnbaum “Brexit vote: British Parliament Rejects Theresa May’s Brexit Deal, Leaving Withdrawal from E.U. and Prime Minister’s Political Future in Doubt,” Washington Post, January 15, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ brexit-vote-2019/2019/01/15/8eb6579a-1816-11e9-b8e6-567190c2f d08_story.html?utm_term=.07fd4cf26294. Cited in William Booth and Karla Adam, “Brexit Vote: British Parliament Overwhelmingly Rejects Theresa May’s Plan, Diminishing Chances of Withdrawal on March 29,” Washington Post, March 12, 2019, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/british-parliament-to-vote-tue sday-on-theresa-mays-new-brexit-plan-but-the-tweaked-deal-faces-strongopposition/2019/03/12/850e2c52-4405-11e9-94ab-d2dda3c0df52_ story.html?utm_term=.77192c6939c1&wpisrc=nl_powerup&wpmm=1. “The Next to Blow,” The Economist, June 1, 2019, p. 9. “The Referendums and the Damage Done,” The Economist, June 1, 2019, p. 16. Cited in Siobhán O’Grady, “‘Moronic & Clueless’: Boris Johnson Sparks Outrage, Saying Everyone in Britain Should Speak English First,” Washington Post, July 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 2019/07/06/moronic-clueless-boris-johnson-sparks-outrage-saying-eve ryone-uk-should-speak-english-first/?utm_term=.3c09e2f84c06. “The Corrupting of Democracy,” The Economist, August 29, 2019, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/08/29/the-corrupting-ofdemocracy?cid1=cust/ednew/n/bl/n/2019/08/29n/owned/n/n/ nwl/n/n/NA/299863/n. Yascha Mounk “Brexit Is a Cultural Revolution,” The Atlantic, October 24, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/irchive/2019/10/whatbrexit-mieans-europe/600583/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Landler and Castle, “Boris Johnson Sends Letter to E.U. Asking for Brexit Delay.”

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51. Cited in William Booth and Karla Adam, “Trump Isn’t Running in Britain’s Election. That Hasn’t Stopped Him from Getting in the Middle,” Washington Post, November 30, 2019, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/world/europe/trump-isnt-running-in-britains-electionthat-hasnt-stopped-him-from-getting-in-the-middle/2019/11/29/d49 73fee-0bb4-11ea-8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html?utm_campaign=post_m ost&utm_medium=Email&utm_source=Newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. 52. Cited in Adam Taylor, “The Looming Questions the Brexit Deal Didn’t Answer,” Washington Post, January 1, 2021, https://www.washingto npost.com/world/2021/01/01/brexit-deal-unanswered-questions/? utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=new sletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost. com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F2e079e9%2F5fef50879d2fda0efb9af245%2F596b 51d8ae7e8a44e7d58086%2F27%2F72%2F5fef50879d2fda0efb9af245. 53. Lisa O’Carroll, “Lorry Drivers Will Face de facto Brexit Border in Kent, Gove Confirms,” The Guardian, September 23, 2020, https://www.the guardian.com/politics/2020/sep/23/truck-queues-could-be-7000-longwhen-brexit-transition-ends-ministers-warn, 54. Cited in Mark Landler and Stephen Castle, “Britain and E.U. Reach Landmark Deal on Brexit,” New York Times, December 24, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/24/world/europe/brexit-tradedeal-uk-eu.html?campaign_id=60&emc=edit_na_20201224&instance_ id=0&nl=breaking-news&ref=headline®i_id=4332168&segment_id= 47735&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea. 55. Cited in David M. Herszenhorn, “EU and UK Wrap up Christmas Eve Deal on Post-Brexit Trade,” Politico, December 24, 2020, https://www. politico.eu/article/uk-eu-brexit-trade-deal-agreed/. 56. Cited in ibid. 57. Cited in Benjamin Mueller, “Brexit Deal Done. Britain Now Scrambles to See How It Will Work,” New York Times, December 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/25/world/europe/brexitbritain-european-union.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20201226& instance_id=25423&nl=todaysheadlines®i_id=4332168&segment_id= 47831&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea 58. Pankaj Mishra, “The Malign Incompetence of the British Ruling Class,” New York Times, January 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 01/17/opinion/sunday/brexit-ireland-empire.html?wpisrc=nl_todayw orld&wpmm=1. 59. Thomas L. Friedman, “The United Kingdom Has Gone Mad,” New York Times, April 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/opinion/ brexit-news.html.

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60. Cited in Ellen Barry and Benjamin Mueller, “‘We’re in the Last Hour’: Democracy Itself Is on Trial in Brexit, Britons Say,” New York Times, March 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/world/eur ope/uk-brexit-democracy-may.html?emc=edit_th_190331&nl=todayshea dlines&nlid=43321680331. 61. Stewart Patrick, “An Ever-Looser Union,” Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-03-29/ ever-looser-union. 62. Tom McTague, “How the UK Lost the Brexit Battle,” Politico, March 27, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/how-uk-lost-brexit-eu-negoti ation/?wpisrc=nl_powerup&wpmm=1. 63. Cited in Jonathan Derbyshire, “Why Governments Can’t Have it All,” Financial Times, July 28, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/632 46e18-72b4-11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c. 64. Edward Alden, “Why the World Should for the EU in Brexit Talks,” Foreign Policy, December 11, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/ 12/11/johnson-brexit-negotiations-european-union/?utm_source=Pos tUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=28307&utm_term=Editors% 20Picks%20OC&?tpcc=28307.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. After the 2016 referendum, three years of constitutional crisis in the UK followed and increasing disarray in the ruling Conservative Party, once the home of an elite establishment transformed into a group of which of the following? a. Socialist b. Nationalist-populists c. Neoliberals d. Labour Party 2. Which of the following is a proponent of “leaving” that exemplified nationalist-populism in the UK? a. Opposition to immigration b. Opposition to globalism c. Opposition to multilateralism d. All the above

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3. During the debate over Brexit, what political party, founded by Nigel Farage, led the pro-Brexit movement? a. UK Independence Party (UKIP) b. Labour Party c. Conservative Party d. Scottish Nation Party (SNP) 4. In addition to the challenge posed by Brexit, the EU was increasingly divided between the liberal states of the West and a populist bloc. Which of the following is not a member of that populist bloc? a. Italy b. Poland c. Spain d. Hungary 5. As in America’s 2016 election, what country was covertly involved in supporting “Leavers” in Great Britain, seeking to divide and weaken the EU, in which members were already at odds over immigration? a. Russia b. Ukraine c. France d. Israel 6. Which of the following is true about the leading contributor to the Brexit campaign Aaron Banks? a. Banks had secretly been in contact with Russians officials between 2015 and 2017 b. Banks had significant Russian business connections that he tried to conceal c. Neither a nor b d. Both a and b 7. As a result of Brexit, most important cleavage in British politics was no longer between Conservatives and Labour, but between what groups? a. Left-wing and right-wing

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b. Labour and Liberal c. Remainers and Leavers d. Conservative and Remainers 8. Decades of violence between Catholics and Protestants, known as “the Troubles,” ended with which of the following, which established a power-sharing arrangement and guaranteed unimpeded passage between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic? a. 1998 Good Friday Agreement b. Treaty of Versailles c. 1991 Dissolution of the USSR d. Brexit 9. The EU wanted Northern Ireland to remain within its customs union, but, while agreeing there should be no “hard border” in Ireland, it demanded the creation of a what? a. A separate Scottish state b. EU-UK Trade deal c. Irish backstop d. Scottish soft borders 10. The EU had been willing to extend the transition period after Brexit from a year to how long? a. 21 months b. Two years c. Five years d. Ten years 11. Why had British governance had deteriorated post Brexit referendum? a. Absence of a majority government b. Divisions within its major political parties c. Poor quality of party leaders d. All the above 12. What was the name of the Labour Party leader post Brexit? a. Theresa May b. Nigel Farage

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c. Boris Johnson d. Jeremy Corbyn 13. In November 2018 Prime Minister May revealed the final deal she had offered the EU, which in turn accepted the prime minister’s proposal for what type of Brexit? a. Quick b. Slow c. Hard d. Soft 14. After Brexiteers had promised that leaving the EU would be costless, Prime Minister May had agreed to pay the EU a substantial sum of how much that Brussels thought London still owed? a. $1 billion b. $5 billion c. $10 billion d. $50 billion 15. Britain’s unwritten constitution placed sovereignty in the crown where? a. House of Commons b. House of Lords c. Prime Minister d. House of Youngs 16. After Boris Johnson became the new prime minister, he sought to do which of the following? a. Rejoined the EU b. Conduct a second referendum c. Deter Parliament and force a “hard” Brexit d. Convince parliament to consider a “soft” Brexit 17. After it became to difficult to achieve Johnson’s goal of leaving the EU by the end of October 2019, he was forced to request an additional extension required by Parliament. What of the following had Johnson previously said about asking for an extension? a. He would do it if necessary

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b. It would be “the best-case scenario” c. He would “probably need to do it eventually” d. He would rather be “dead in a ditch” 18. Who warned that if London’s action led to a solid border between the two Irelands, thereby endangering the Good Friday Agreement that had brought peace to Ireland, he would oppose the British effort to forge a trade agreement with their country? a. President Donald Trump b. The, at the time, U.S. presidential candidate Joe Biden c. U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders d. President Emmanuel Macron 19. Although negotiations about specifics continued to January 1, 2021, when did Brexit officially take place? a. March 19th, 2019 b. July 19th, 2019 c. December 30th, 2019 d. January 31st, 2020 20. Because of Brexit, Britain would lose access to migrants. Migrants did which of the following for Britain? a. Filled lower paying jobs b. Provided taxes c. Helped compensate for an aging and shrinking population d. All the above True or False 1. True or False? In 2016, British voters narrowly opposed their country’s withdrawal from the European Union False, British voters narrowly favored their country’s withdrawal from the European Union 2. True or False? Toward the end of the path toward Brexit, British voters appeared to have changed their mind and leaned more toward remain.

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True 3. True or False? In the 2019 elections to the EU Parliament, the Brexit Party, as expected did well, winning at the expense of both the Conservative and Labour Parties. True 4. True or False? UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage publicly opposed Donald Trump during Trump’s presidential campaign. False, Farage publicly supported Donald Trump and was the first British politician to visit the president after his electoral triumph in 2016 5. True or False? In the British referendum, “Leavers” won by a wide margin over “Remainers.” False, in the British referendum, “Leavers” won by a narrow margin 52–48% for “Remainers.” 6. True or False? Three years after the referendum, what Brexit would entail remained unclear. True 7. True or False? One poll found “under 30% of voters were ready to accept free movement of people from the EU in exchange for free access to its single market,” similar to the Norwegian model. False, One poll found “almost 60% of voters ready to accept free movement of people from the EU in exchange for free access to its single market,” similar to the Norwegian model 8. True or False? President Trump continued to urge Brexit and meddle in British politics, tweeting, “My Administration looks forward to negotiating a large-scale Trade Deal with the United Kingdom. The potential is unlimited!” True

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9. True or False? Many Labour Party members supported a second referendum and formally adopted this position in September 2018 party conference. True 10. True or False? Brexiteers believed in the need for customs officials to enforce customs laws and regulations. False, they argued that customs officials were unnecessary and could be replaced by untested modern technology, but the technology did not yet exist 11. True or False? Reducing immigration, concern for relative deprivation, and resentment of elites were crucial elements of the Leavers’ arguments for Brexit. True 12. True or False? David Cameron’s successor as British Prime Minister, Theresa May, had initially support Brexit but soon decided she had more politically to fear from the Remainers and in her party. False, Theresa May had initially opposed Brexit but soon decided she had more politically to fear from the Leavers and in her party. 13. True or False? Observers denounced Trump’s involvement in British politics and argued that any arrangement for a trade deal on Trump’s terms would reduce British sovereignty. True 14. True or False? The British parliament did not need to approve any final deal with the EU. False, the British parliament had to approve any final deal with the EU 15. True or False? In late 2018 indicated that the British preferred to “leave” rather than accept a “hard Brexit” with no deal. False, they preferred to “remain”

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16. True or False? In 2019, Parliament turned down the proposed deal for a third time only two weeks before Brexit was to take place, and shortly thereafter failed to muster a majority for any of four options put before it again True 17. True or False? Boris Johnson is something of a nationalist-populist, a characteristic suggested both by his support for Brexit and his comment that all British residents, especially immigrants and presumably Scots, Welsh sand Irish, should speak English as their first language. True 18. True or False? After Parliament passed a proposal to prevent a “nodeal” Brexit and refused to authorize a national election until that proposal became law. Boris Johnson began to work towards that goal. False, Johnson retaliated by informing Tories who voted against him that they would be thrown out of the Conservative Party and would not be able to compete as Tories for their parliamentary seats in the next election 19. True or False? The UK remained in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of 2020 and had a year to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with the EU. True 20. True or False? The EU feared that if it permitted the UK to do as PM Boris Johnson wished it would have to compete with a highly competitive, less regulated economy. True Short Answer What was the demographic turnout of the 2016 Brexit vote? The Leavers narrow victory left unclear what the UK’s relationship with the EU would be thereafter. Fifty-two percent

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of Britons voted to “leave” the EU and 48 percent sought to “remain” in the EU. The United Kingdom was deeply divided. Wales and England had voted to “leave,” but Scotland and Northern Ireland had voted to “remain.” A high percentage of elderly voters participated in the referendum and were more likely to favor leaving than younger voters. Moreover, a much lower percentage of the young voted. This was a key factor in the outcome. How was the Vote Leave group dishonest in its campaign to leave the EU? The Vote Leave group waged a campaign filled with false claims regarding among other things the amount of money, Britain would save by exiting the EU. The group also apparently violated elections laws by spending more than the legal limit of $9.2 million. What was the economic objective of the Brexiteers’ opposition to membership in a multilateral group, the EU? Brexiteers advocated a pivot from the European economy to the global economy without EU regulations or the European Court of Justice. Most negotiations after the referendum sought to preserve the free flow of goods and money across the channel but without accompanying labor migration. Brexiteers argued that Britain would enjoy the benefits of a common market as well as trade deals with other countries and regions. Brexit supporters had a similar profile to the Americans who voted for Donald Trump. Describe this profile. Like the election of Trump, the Brexit referendum revealed divisions between urban and rural voters, young and old, education, and those who had benefited from globalization and those “left behind.” Typical pro-Brexit voters were poorly educated males living in old industrial towns similar to those in America’s “rust belt,” who won the election for Trump. According William Booth, who was the three-way divide over Brexit between?

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According to Booth, it was “between supporters of a hard, clean divorce with the European Union and a soft, fuzzy separation — followed by a third alternative, all those who want a do-over in a repeat referendum (these folks don’t want any Brexit at all).” Why is the fact that Northern Ireland was a part of the UK, such a complicating factor for Brexit? Since Northern Ireland was part of the UK, it would be necessary either that Great Britain remain in the customs union or establish checkpoints, separating the Irish Republic that was an EU member and Northern Ireland. However, such a border would endanger the fragile peace that had ended decades of violence between Protestants and Catholics and the efforts of many in Northern Ireland to join the Irish Republic. The Protestant and unionist community and the Catholic nationalists continued to argue about the status of Northern Ireland. How did the Brexit referendum demonstrate a retreat from several dimensions of globalization? First, Britain’s withdrawal from the EU eroded the political dimension because it rejected multilateralism. It was a retreat from globalization’s economic dimension since it entailed additional impediments to trade between Britain and the remaining members of the EU. Lastly, it was a retreat from the sociocultural dimension of globalization because it erected additional barriers to the free movement of persons between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and allowed the EU to prevent British citizens from freely traveling or residing in much of Europe and vice versa. Why was the choice of Jeremy Corbyn to lead the Labour Party highly controversial? He was a long-time member of the party’s extreme left wing, which advocated nationalization of key industries. He had also been a leader of the effort to force Britain to surrender unilaterally its nuclear weapons and had been a persistent critic of U.S. foreign policy and NATO. Although he had retreated from his pacifist views to enable his selection, the opposition of many

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parliamentary Labourites weakened his position as did repeated claims that, along with several other Labour parliamentarians, he was anti-Semitic What occurred in the immediate blow back to Boris Johnson informing Tories who voted against him that they would be thrown out of the Conservative Party and would not be able to compete as Tories for their parliamentary seats in the next election? Work and Pensions Secretary Amber Rudd quit the cabinet and the Conservative Party, accusing Johnson of committing “political vandalism.” Britain’s Supreme Court also unanimously ruled that Johnson had violated the country’s constitution and had misled Queen Elizabeth II when he suspended Parliament to prevent it from meeting to deal with Brexit. The court ruled that Johnson was preventing Parliament from meeting its legal obligations. How would of a Labour Party win in the general election before the end of 2019 impacted the United Kingdom’s membership in NATO? Had Labour won, it would have great strained NATO unity. Jeremy Corbyn was a pacifist who had repeatedly criticized NATO, the use of force more generally, Britain’s retention of a nuclear deterrent, while advocating very leftwing policies including renationalization of British industries. Britain’s withdrawal from NATO would have removed a nuclear power that accounted for about one-quarter of Europe’s military capability. Essay Questions 1. How has Brexit changed and impact the parties in British Parliament? 2. Compare and Contrast the “Remain” and “Leave” movement. 3. Describe why three years after the Brexit referendum, the outcome still remained unclear. 4. What are the implications for Brexit on globalization? 5. Predict the short—and long-term impact of Brexit.

CHAPTER 6

Europe and the Spread of Nationalist-Populism

Europe was a beneficiary of the American-led liberal order. The Marshall Plan fostered postwar reconstruction, and American leaders, both Democratic and Republican, consistently supported European integration, liberal norms, open borders, and free trade that generated unparalleled prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. No longer did NATO’s members arm against one another, pursue geopolitical goals, or seek a favorable balance of power as long as America provided security in which liberal norms thrived. This would change with America’s election of Donald Trump in 2016. Thereafter, nationalist-populism spread across Europe.

Trump and European Populism During and after the campaign, Trump encouraged Brexit, applauded European populists, appeared unwilling to confront Russia over Ukraine, insulted German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other allied leaders. “Europe,” wrote Susan Glasser, “has had many fights with American Presidents over the years, but never in the seven decades since the end of the Second World War has it confronted one so openly hostile to its core institutions.”1 Shortly after Trump’s election, the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in a letter to European leaders warned, “For the first time in our history, in an increasingly multipolar external world, so many are becoming openly anti-European, or Euroskeptic at best.”2 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_6

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European integration had been fostered by the cooperation required by Washington among European recipients of Marshall Plan funds in 1947, the establishment of NATO in 1949, and the formation in 1952 of the European Coal and Steel Community in which France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries agreed to pool their coal and steel industries. Donald Trump was the first postwar American president not to favor deeper European integration. “Not only that, but he’s against it and sees the destruction of the European Union as in America’s interest.” The result, according to the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, was that Europeans saw “Trump as the biggest threat to global order and the European ideal of how the world should be organized.”3 Thereafter, Tusk’s warning seemed prescient. “There’s no question it’s a big moment,” declared a fellow at the Center for a New American Security after the disastrous G-7 meeting of June 2018. “All the fundamentals are being called into question. We’re at a point where we have a U.S. president who doesn’t value the rules-based international order, and I’m not convinced he even knows what it is.”4 Also, following the same meeting, Tusk admitted that it was America, the architect of the rule-based order that threatened it. Simultaneously, nationalist-populism divided Europeans much as it divided Americans. The populist disease infected several of the eastern members of the EU as well as Italy. Stephen Bannon argued, “The fight right now in the E.U. is between those who look at the nation-state as something to be overcome and the others, who look at the nation-state as something to be nurtured.”5 Nationalist-populists in America and Europe viewed Vladimir Putin as a potential ally because, like Russia, they feared Islamic radicalism, opposed global economic integration, and disliked secularism, and the liberal order. The EU had been established to avoid another war in Europe, but that memory was dimming. Thus, Italy’s populist leader Matteo Salvini exclaimed, “In 1990, Europe was our future. Now, we are Europe’s future.”6 Salvini and his populist colleagues threatened EU unity as reflected in the unprecedented enmity that triggered France to recall its ambassador to Italy, claiming that Salvini had made France “the object of repeated accusations,” and “unfounded attacks.” If national sovereignty were Salvini’s priority, European integration was French President Emmanuel Macron’s priority. The dispute had focused on Italy’s criticism of French refusal to accept migrants who had initially entered their country and on Italian populists’ encouragement of the “yellow

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vest” (les gilets jaunes ) French protesters, who had demonstrated against Macron and growing economic inequality.

Populism: Infecting Europe The EU was increasingly divided between liberals and immigrant-nativists. Europe’s populists consisted largely of relatively older and pious men, the less well-off, the poorly educated, and ethnic majorities. Many thought the EU cost countries their sovereign independence and that migrants were diluting their cultural heritage. The Schengen Agreement (1995) permitted citizens and investment to move freely across members’ borders, thereby enhancing economic efficiency. However, it also allowed terrorists to move across the continent. Moreover, unified monetary policy in the Eurozone prevented currency devaluation by less competitive members like Italy. Before the euro, Italy had devalued the lira to cope with slow growth. Its economic growth fell increasingly behind the EU’s northern members after entering the Eurozone, and in 2019 Italy fell into recession as growth in the entire EU fell. As nationalist-populism spread across Europe, one group of analysts used the term “authoritarian populism” because of the anti-democratic tendencies of American and European populists. They shared “a rhetoric that divides society between good, pure-hearted ordinary people and a self-serving, out-of-touch elite; a lack of patience with the standard procedures and constraints of liberal democracies, often accompanied by demands for direct democracy; and promises of radical changes to policies and institutions—both at home and internationally.”7 Although at a 2017 EU summit, leaders declared “Europe is our common future,” and the EU is a “unique union with common institutions and strong values, a community of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law,” fissures were evident. Post-Cold War members of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe manifested “authoritarian populism,” which spread elsewhere as well. Italian elections brought a populist government to power in 2018. Populist politics even infected Latvia in elections that increased support for a pro-Russian populist party, Harmony Center. Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Estonia also saw the spread of nationalist-populism. Thus, the Sweden Democrats, like other populist parties, opposed immigration and came in third in the country’s 2018 election, while Sweden’s Social Democrats suffered their worst defeat since 1908. The Sweden Democrats

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won 17.5% of the vote, sufficient to create difficulties for Sweden to form a working parliamentary coalition. As elsewhere in Europe, Sweden put the brakes on immigration, using rhetoric like that of the Trump administration. Austria, too, formed a populist coalition. Immigration was a seething issue across the continent, and in Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland anti-immigrant populist parties emerged. The spread of populism facilitated Russia’s efforts to destabilize European politics and foster European differences with Trump’s America. Like Trump, Putin preferred bilateral negotiations with individual states rather than multilateral groups like the EU because it increased Russian bargaining leverage. Thus, Moscow befriended Greece during that country’s acute economic problems as Putin sought to intensify Greek resentment of the EU’s austerity program and mobilize opposition to EU sanctions on Russia. In several elections, about a fifth of Europe’s electorate voted for a populist party. Their numbers grew after the 2008 financial crisis, and support for right-wing populists reached over 12% in 2016. In Hungary, over two-thirds voted for populists as did almost half of Polish voters. In a pessimistic article, Thomas Friedman wrote, “the European pillar” of the community of Western democracies “has never been more under assault — so much so that for the first time I wonder if this European pillar will actually crumble.” After describing problems such as refugee flows from Africa and Russian efforts to divide America and the EU, he added, “As for Trump, he has no appreciation for how important the E.U.-U.S. partnership has been to catalyzing the global cooperation and rule-making that has made America, Europe and the world as a whole steadily freer, more stable and more prosperous since World War II.”8 Nobelist Paul Krugman was as pessimistic as Friedman. “There was a time, not long ago, when people used to say that our democratic norms, our proud history of freedom, would protect us from such a slide into tyranny…. But believing such a thing today requires willful blindness. The fact is that the Republican Party is ready, even eager, to become an American version of Law and Justice or Fidesz….”9

European Populism: A Political Pandemic Although nationalism reemerged throughout the EU, its supporters proved less successful in older western member states such as the Netherlands, Germany, and France than in more recent eastern members in

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Europe such as Hungary and Poland. The latter had a shallower democratic tradition and less resilient political systems and institutions than the former. Additional factors that determined the relative success of populist politicians and parties were a country’s electoral system and political parties, and whether voters were selecting members of a parliament or voting in referendums. Many working-class whites in France and Germany, like Trump supporters in America, were rural and had assumed populist views. These included resentment toward immigrants, who they believed were diluting their cultures and harming their economies. Western Europe Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party (PVV) and known as a “Dutch Trump,” was among Europe’s leading Islamophobes. Wilders’s political party ran second in Dutch elections in March 2017 but won fewer seats than had been predicted. Other right-wing populists in Europe, notably Marine Le Pen who led France’s National Front (renamed National Rally), threatened mainstream parties. Le Pen lauded Trump supporters who had “kept faith with their national interest,” while insisting that the French had been “dispossessed of their patriotism.”10 She called her supporters “patriots” and her foes “globalists” who were pro-EU and supported the admission of Muslim refugees in Europe. In an ideological twist, many of her followers were “left-behind” workers who had previously been members of France’s Socialist Party. The founder of the National Front had been Marine Le Pen’s overtly anti-Semitic father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who had been a follower of the earlier French populist Pierre Poujade. Despite her belated efforts to depict herself as a moderate, neo-Nazis remained among her political advisers. Le Pen, whose political party had borrowed Russian funds for France’s presidential campaign, echoed Trump’s admiration of Putin and Russia. “She’s the only one who can speak with both Putin and Trump,” declared one of her advisers. “She’s got a privileged relationship with Putin. You can’t be isolated when you’ve got both Putin and Trump on your side.”11 In the first round of the French 2017 presidential election, Le Pen came in second, qualifying for a run-off with Emmanuel Macron who had established a new party, En Marche! (Onward!). Macron was a centrist who believed in liberal democracy and free trade and supported deeper EU integration. Neither was a candidate of France’s existing mainstream parties. Obama and outgoing French President François Hollande

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endorsed Macron, and Trump and Putin indicated they supported Le Pen. Although many voters did not vote, Macron won the second round with over 63% of the vote, to the immense relief of beleaguered defenders of the EU and the liberal order. Had France followed Britain out of the EU, it would have fatally weakened the group. After the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in Germany, Macron sadly observed, “Our world has never been so divided. Centrifugal forces have never been so powerful. Our common goods have never been so threatened.” He added, “We need those organizations that were created out of the Second World War. Otherwise, we will be moving back toward narrow-minded nationalism.”12 Germany, the preferred country for many refugees, witnessed a surge in the anti-immigrant right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD), with the support of about 16% of the electorate (only 2% behind the Social Democrats), and it won seats in all of Germany’s state parliaments. In Saxony, only Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) enjoyed greater popularity. In elections in September 2019, although the AfD failed to form a government in either Saxony or Brandenburg as had been feared, it made significant gains from earlier elections. The AfD advocated policies that overlapped with the extreme left-wing Left Party that encompassed the former Communist Party. AfD extremism was evident in an e-mail sent in 2013 by one of its leaders, Alexander Gauland. “The reason we are inundated by culturally alien [kulturfremden] peoples such as Arabs, Sinti and Roma etc. is the systematic destruction of civil society as a possible counterweight to the enemies-of-the-constitution by whom we are ruled. These pigs are nothing other than puppets of the victor powers of the Second World War….”13 The AfD also fostered neo-Nazi violence in Germany, as did Pegida (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident”). Chemnitz, site of anti-foreigner riots by neo-Nazis in August 2018, had been in East Germany. Thereafter, Merkel removed Germany’s chief of domestic intelligence whom she regarded as too sympathetic to right-wing extremists. In February 2020, a xenophobic extremist, probably influenced by the AfD, killed nine Germans with immigrant backgrounds in Hanau, and German politicians began to receive death threats. After Germany’s reunification, the former East Germany suffered a loss of jobs owing to the closing of obsolete industries. Also, unlike West Germany, it had done little to eliminate pro-Nazi sentiment. The AfD,

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with the smaller but less overtly offensive right-wing Generation Identity, became a major political force in the east. In August 2019 found Merkel’s conservative CDU-CSU alliance at all-time low of 20% of voters, while the AfD achieved a record high. Consequently, after the CDU did poorly in elections in Hesse, Merkel announced she would retire in 2021, which would prove a blow to European stability. Although the AfD initially attracted voters by vigorous opposition to migrants, political analyst Paul Hokenos argued that this was changing. “The AfD is racking up supporters in the east by claiming to be the real heir of the democratic revolution of 1989–1990, when millions of East Germans took to the streets to overthrow the Soviet communist system in the German Democratic Republic. The job, the AfD says, was just half completed, leaving a cluster of western German parties in charge of a corrupt, undemocratic, colonialist regime.”14 As Germany’s centrist parties retreated, another alternative to the AfD emerged. The center-left Green party, which was pro-environment, proEuropean, and pro-refugee, became the country’s second most popular political force. “We are the anti-populists,” said Robert Habeck, the party’s co-leader. “We see ourselves at the center of the nation, and that also means reclaiming the symbols of our country from the nationalists.”15 Thereafter, the Greens increasingly became a target of Europe’s right-wing populists. Nevertheless, Robert Kagan contemplated the frightening prospect of a German return from its postwar liberalism to the extreme nationalism that had characterized German history from its unification to World War II. “In the coming years, Germans may find themselves living in a largely renationalized Europe, with blood-and-soil parties of one type or another in charge of all the major powers,” and, referring to the AfD, he asked, “Could the Germans under those circumstances resist a return to a nationalism of their own?” Kagan identified Trump as a source of spreading nationalism in Europe and concluded his essay darkly. “Think of Europe today as an unexploded bomb, its detonator intact and functional, its explosives still alive. If this is an apt analogy, then Trump is a child with a hammer, gleefully and heedlessly pounding away. What could go wrong?”.16

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Italy Nationalist-populism also gained traction in one original members of the EU, Italy. In that highly indebted country, the anti-euro Five-Star Movement (M5S) and the right-wing anti-immigrant Northern League (now called The League or La Lega), led by Luigi Di Maio and Matteo Salvini, respectively, gained fifty percent of the vote in March 2018 parliamentary elections. They ran on a joint platform of increasing budget deficits, more welfare, closer relations with Russia, and a less integrated EU. The euroskeptic coalition sought to alter Italy’s relationship with Europe, and possibly withdraw from the Eurozone. Thus, Italy became the first of the original EU members and the third largest Eurozone economy in which anti-EU populists assumed power. Its populist coalition soon engaged in conflict with the EU over Italy’s increased deficit spending and, more importantly, its anti-immigrant policies as well as its opposition to continued EU sanctions against Russia. Salvini’s career began in the 1990s when anti-globalization protests fostered populism in the Northern League. That party was unified by its belief in regional secession from Italy and its contempt for southern Italians. Salvini was once recorded chanting a derogatory song mocking Neapolitans, saying they “‘smell so bad, even the dogs run away’.” According to Salvini’s biographer, Alessandro Franzi, “He understood that people were fighting against globalization, inequality, migration, unemployment….”17 Salvini sounded a populist anti-EU theme when he declared, “Today Italy is not free; it is occupied financially by Germans, French and eurocrats.”18 Concern about Italian potential withdrawal from the Eurozone was even greater in the EU than the financial bailout of Greece, whose economy was dwarfed by Italy’s. However, Italy’s coalition collapsed, and Salvini, who had been minister of the interior and sought to become prime minister, lost his role in Italy’s government. The League had to withdrew from the government, although Salvini hoped there would be a new election soon. Instead, the Five Star Movement and the center-right Democratic Party combined to form a new government without Salvini and with Giuseppe Conte remaining as prime minister. “Many members of the League accept that they are racists,” argued Cecile Kyenge, Italy’s first black cabinet minister, “It is very difficult for me to see that a party that accepts it is racist is going to manage law, which is supposed to protect all the community.”19 The anti-establishment

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populists were skeptical about the EU and advocated “Italy first” policies. Together, their economic policies threatened Italy’s solvency. The League sought to lower taxes, while the Five-Star Movement sought to raise spending for a “citizenship income” for all citizens. Elsewhere in Europe, there also was criticism of the EU. As noted above, the single currency (the euro), without EU-wide fiscal integration, prevented laggards like Italy or Greece from devaluing their currency to increase exports, requiring instead painful austerity and/or lower wages and slow growth. The European Central Bank had limited capability, and bonds and banking tended to remain national. Finally, the EU was largely unable to help poorer members because the debt crisis after 2008 persuaded Germany and hawkish northern members that fiscal and monetary discipline was lacking in the south and that they would have to fund needed bail-outs. For such reasons, Germany, the EU economic dynamo, was concerned about events in Italy. “The whole German worry is about risk sharing and giving other countries guarantees and not being able to have any sort of rules-based mechanism working well,” declared the director of Germany’s Council on Foreign Relations. “The arrival of a populist government in Italy — or the scenario now is uncertainty in Italy — basically feeds into the fear that Italy doesn’t play by the rules and that will make any move toward deeper integration more difficult.”20 The crucial fault line in the EU’s West-East fracture involved immigration. Trump used the issue to divide Europeans and reinforce illiberal leaders in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (collectively the “Visegrad”), and Romania, which inveighed against immigration and, like other European countries including Ukraine, were nearing “state capture” by corrupt authoritarian politicians. “The people of Germany,” declared Trump, were “turning against their leadership as migration is rocking the already tenuous Berlin coalition.”21 Eastern and Central Europe Populism infected the politics of several more recent EU members in Eastern and Central Europe, notably the increasingly authoritarianism of the governments of Poland and Hungary that were undermining the rule of law, institutions like the courts, and democratic values. Ivan

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Krastev argued that “two of the region’s poster children for postcommunist democratization, Hungary and Poland, have seen nationalistpopulists win sweeping electoral victories while demonizing the political opposition, scapegoating minorities, and undermining liberal checks and balances.”22 Others like Romania and the Czech Republic may follow. Thus, the Czech Republic elected Prime Minister Andrej Babis, a billionaire whose views mirrored Trump’s. Ivan Krastev argued that after the Cold War “the most educated and liberal eastern Europeans” emigrated westward, “provoking major demographic and identity crises in the region,” “the stage for the nationalist revolt against liberalism seizing the region today.” Surprisingly, postCold War young people joined their elders in “casting themselves as the authentic voice of the nation against its internal and external enemies.”23 Populists resented admitting migrants from the Middle East and Africa into their homogeneous Catholic populations, fearing that their culture would be diluted amid shrinking populations. Immigration and emigration in Eastern Europe help to explain the emergence of populism there and produced fissures in the EU. Eastern members were also aware of the economic benefits derived from EU membership and benefited from grants, Structural Funds, and other EU outlays. However, the move toward populism there was largely driven by political opportunism, which tapped into frustrations that many years after joining the EU their quality of life was not yet equal to that of western members. Trump provided them with useful ideological support although the protectionism of “America First” and the erosion of NATO unity were threats to Europe’s stability and security. Former EU foreign minister Federica Mogherini concluded, “A more transactional approach means Europeans will be more transactional, and we will base our approach on our interests.”24 Populists in Eastern Europe were cut from the same cloth as those in America, while those who supported the liberal order were young and relatively well educated. However, the movement of young and educated Eastern Europeans westward in the EU in search of economic opportunities contributed to the emergence of populist politicians such as Jarosław Kacyznski ´ in Poland, Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, and Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, Turkey’s president. Poland’s populist President Andrzej Duda visited Trump for a lift in his polls only days before Poland voted in June 2020.

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In these countries, populist authoritarian leaders and parties attracted older, less educated, and rural voters who remained passionate nationalists and venerated traditionally hard national boundaries. Brexit will send many skilled migrants home, where they may liberalize politics in their own countries in Eastern Europe. Eastern European populists also identified with Trump’s effort to push back globalization and multilateralism. Nevertheless, even in Hungary and Poland where populists were in power, there remained large numbers of voters who maintained liberal values. Hungary: An Illiberal Democracy Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán praised Trump’s election as bringing an end to “liberal non-democracy.” Orbán led a populist political party, Fidesz. “Fidesz” is an abbreviation of “Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége”, meaning “Alliance of Young Democrats”. Under Orbán, it became a populist party that sought to move Hungary toward “illiberal democracy.” Orbán, who was invited by Trump to the White House in May 2019, had endorsed Trump’s candidacy in July 2016, the first foreign leader to do so. They had much in common. “Both Donald Trump and Viktor Orban have made immigration their signature issue,” wrote a sociologist and analyst of international affairs. “Whipping fears and nationalist sentiments is exactly how they operate. So it would be really tempting to say that they’re working from the same song sheet.”25 Orbán and his party altered the country’s constitution, packed its Constitutional Court while limiting its authority, and attacked Hungary’s independent media. Like Trump, Orbán sought to erase the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. Corruption also increased. and government accountability declined. Consequently, Freedom House downgraded Hungary, which since 1990 had ranked as “free,” to “partly free,” the first EU member to be downgraded from “free.” Secretary of State Pompeo visited both Hungary and Poland in February 2019 despite the authoritarian populists that governed both. Orbán and other Fidesz leaders also denounced “foreign-funded” nongovernment organizations and imposed control over those receiving foreign funding, especially groups aided by Jewish liberal billionaire George Soros. Orbán’s effort to close the Central European University, which had been founded by Soros in Budapest to spread democratic

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values, and his personal attacks on Soros reflected hyper-nationalism and anti-Semitism. “We sent home the [Ottoman] sultan with his army, the Habsburg Kaiser with his raiders and the Soviets with comrade,” declared Orbán in one tirade. “Now we will send home Uncle George.”26 After anti-Orbán demonstrations erupted in Budapest in 2018, the Fidesz blog dismissed the participants as “Soros network putschists.” Orbán was “a state-of-the-art autocrat; he understands that he need not resort to the truncheon or the midnight knock at the door,” wrote Franklin Foer. “His assault on civil society arrives in the guise of legalisms subverting the institutions that might challenge his authority.”27 Orba˙ n undermined democracy’s institutions by gerrymandering parliamentary districts, providing government positions to relatives and followers, drafting a new constitution, establishing a powerful National Judiciary Office, and passing laws that made Hungary a one-party state. Then, in 2020, Orba˙ n began to govern by decree with the COVID-19 epidemic as his excuse. Although rule by decree ended in July 2020, the government essentially retained it by declaring a state of public health emergency without a parliamentary vote. Like Hungary, in Italy, too, Salvini accused migrants of spreading COVID in summer 2020, tweeting “An invasion of illegal migrants, a boom of infections, Sicily is collapsing.”28 Orba˙ n’s attacks on George Soros were part of his effort to destroy civil society and eliminate critics in Hungary. Soros, as a former Polish foreign minister noted, had “been a consistent advocate of the liberal order….”29 The Central European University was ultimately forced to leave Hungary, and Trump-appointed U.S. ambassador to Hungary refused to criticize the action although it was a flagrant violation of academic freedom. Instead, he called Orbán his “friend” and shamelessly said it simply reflected a conflict between Soros and Orbán, and had nothing to do with academic freedom. It was remarkable how a small country was able to manipulate the Trump administration. Orbán, like many other populists, was Islamophobic. In response, Manfred Weber, another right-wing politician, declared, “If we say generally that you have to be afraid about Muslims and generally attack a religion, then we do the job of the Jihadists who want to create a clash inside of our societies.” Weber added. “We have invented human rights, and not Christian rights, on this Continent.”30 Orba˙ n also enjoyed influence among Hungarian speakers in western Ukraine whom he used to loosen Kiev’s ties in the West even as Russia was conducting a hybrid war on Ukraine from the East.

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After his overwhelming re-election victory in 2018, Orbán sought to export populism across Europe, especially to Slovenia and Macedonia, and an effort to tame him by bringing him into an alliance of conservative political parties failed. A one-time liberal during the Cold War, Orbán had become an “illiberal democrat,” a majoritarian populist who, like Trump, promoted nationalism and cultural purity and vehemently opposed Muslim refugees. Influenced by Orbán, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and his Austrian People’s Party had a close relationship with extremists in Austria’s Freedom Party. They echoed Orbán’s opposition to immigration, and, more dangerously, Freedom Party supporters were appointed to the country’s interior ministry and its security agencies. After an official in the ministry, Sybille Geisler, refused to provide the names of informants who had penetrated right-wing groups, armed police forced their way into her office and seized intelligence information. As in Hungary, “what we’ve seen in different corners of Europe — an assault on independent institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law,” declared Yascha Mounk. “The Freedom Party plainly believes that the security apparatus should serve its worldview, and that is dangerous.”31 Consequently, other countries were wary about sharing intelligence information with Austria. However, Austria’s coalition collapsed when Vice Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache was filmed offering government contracts to the niece of a Russian oligarch in May 2019. Despite all the nationalist rhetoric of populist leaders, Strache’s fall was evidence that “lofty” ideas were used for political opportunism and that political moderates might regret seeking support from populists. Thereafter, Kurz also had to resign, although he regained leadership of a coalition government with Austria’s Green Party in January 2020. Stephen Bannon described Orbán as the “most significant guy in the European scene,”32 and “Trump before Trump.” Like Trump, Orbán attacked the judiciary and the media. Moreover, Bannon and Raheem Kassam, a former adviser to British populist Nigel Farage, formed a group called “The Movement” that, according to Kassam, “will be our clearing house for the populist, nationalist movement in Europe. We’re focusing attention on assisting individuals or groups concerned with the matters of sovereignty, border control, jobs, amongst other things.”33 Like Orbán, Bannon denounced Soros and sought to incite a European-wide rightwing revolution. In September 2018, Salvini joined “The Movement,” in what Bannon called a joint effort to create a “loose association” for

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right-wing populist leaders to meet and form alliances. Salvini also hosted Marine Le Pen and advocated a “Europe of nations,” while establishing a political bloc in a populist European Parliament bloc called the European Alliance for People and Nations. Orbán also reasserted Hungary’s sovereignty within the EU and, after his reelection, he implied that he was prepared to combat the EU and declared war on its values by saying, “Now we will be hunting for big game.”34 The European Parliament invoked Article 7 of the EU Treaty to impose sanctions on Hungary as a “systemic threat” to democracy and considered revoking Hungary’s voting rights in the EU. “The alt-right in Europe is trying to undermine this European Union,” declared a Belgian member of the parliament. “And it is, in fact, trying to take over European politics from within.”35 According to a Dutch member who was leading the process, “the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded.”36 Orbán described the report as insulting to him and the “Hungarian nation.” “Democracy is not just a voting system. It is a culture that respects truth,” declared Jason Stanley discussing Hungary. “If a government prevents the public from accessing true information…through a propaganda system that lies to everyone in the country, then everyone will vote for the supreme leader every time. And that’s not democracy.”37 Poland The populism of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) and its leader, Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ led to purges of the government bureaucracies and judiciary, and efforts to control the state media, limit checks and balances and the rule of law, and “repolandize” firms in the country owned by foreigners. Kaczynski ´ sought to emulate Hungary’s “illiberal democracy” and “have Budapest in Warsaw.” The narrow reelection in 2020 of Polish President Andrzej Duda, who had Donald Trump’s support, further threatened Polish democracy. The PiS threatened gay rights and outlawed claims that Poland was complicit in the Holocaust. It also staffed public enterprises with those who supported the PiS agenda. Kaczynski’s ´ populist ideas appealed to farmers and factory workers who had lost their jobs after Poland entered the EU. In 2019, the PiS was again reelected. Polish leaders believed that Trump supported such policies, and they were correct. In a speech to the UN in September 2018, Trump praised

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Poland’s illiberal leaders and their emphasis on national sovereignty. This prompted Stanford’s Amy Zegart, to respond, “What makes Trump’s comments so disturbing is that they reveal a president who believes in projecting American power but not American values — he believes in might but not right.”38 It was hardly surprising that, while visiting Europe in July 2017, Trump felt at home in Warsaw and expressed a belief in “the clash of civilizations,” asking: “Do we have the desire and the courage to preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert or destroy it?”.39 The European Parliament accused Poland’s government of “endangering democracy, human rights and the rule of law” by appointing additional justices to the country’s Constitutional Tribunal and limiting the tribunal’s authority. Moreover, the opposition of Poland’s populist leaders to the reappointment of former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as president of the European Council was seen as attacking the EU itself. Thus, its Supreme Court warned that Poland, like Britain, might exit the EU if it continued to ignore EU rules. Despite populist politicians, Poland’s highest court ruled a year later that judges appointed under new government rules could not issue judgments. In December 2018, Poland’s government reversed its purge of the country’s Supreme Court owing to pressure from the EU, and reinstated judges who had lost their positions. Divisions in Polish society between populists who opposed democracy and those seeking to sustain it were evidenced by the assassination of Gdansk’s liberal mayor, Pawel Adamowicz in January 2019. The struggle between populists and their opponents was also evident regarding immigration. Poland reneged on a pledge to accept 6,000 refugees because, as a government spokesperson declared, “We can’t allow for events in Western Europe to happen in Poland.”40 Paradoxically, Poland had quietly issued the highest number in Europe of first residence permits in 2017. Most were given to Christian Ukrainians even while Poles living elsewhere in Europe remitted significant funding home. One consequence of growing authoritarianism among the EU’s eastern members was Brussels’s redirection of funds away from Poland and Hungary and toward southern members in its 2021–2027 draft budget. One policy paper put this shift in the context of “cohesion and values.”

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Turkey Turkey was among the European countries in which nationalist-populism found traction. For the West, President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan had argued that Islam and democracy could coexist. However, after an abortive military coup in 2016 allegedly planned by a Sufi group led by exiled Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, who had fled Turkey and resided in Pennsylvania, Erdo˘gan became increasingly authoritarian and began to distance himself from the West. He demanded that America extradite Gulen, which Washington refused, supported Hamas terrorists, and bought advanced Russian weapons. His expansionist military and political policies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean threatened American interests and those of allies, including Kurdish militias, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, and even France. Erdo˘gan’s attacks on U.S.-supported Kurds also strained relations with Washington. Then, Turkey invaded Syria after Trump withdrew U.S. troops, thereby tacitly permitting the Turks to do so. America did not respond vigorously largely because Erdo˘gan publicly supported Trump’s reelection and denounced Joe Biden. After the abortive coup, Erdo˘gan purged Turkey’s army, government bureaucracies, universities, media and, like other populists, the elites they represented. His repressive policies alienated the country’s Kurds (whom he initially had sought to appease). His growing emphasis on Islam and references to the glories of the Ottoman Empire appealed to relatively poor, rural, and elderly citizens. Thus, Erdo˘gan won a decisive electoral victory in 2018 that allowed him to change Turkey’s constitution to give him vast authority to issue decrees, dissolve parliament, singlehandedly draw up the country’s budget, and place his friends in key government positions. Thus, Freedom House ranked Turkey as “not free” in 2018. However, Erdo˘gan was increasingly challenged by the Republican People’s Party led by Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu and the party’s district head in that city, Canan Kaftancioglu. Erdo˘gan’s increasingly militant foreign policies included Turkey’s involvement in Libya against a Russian-supported faction, his incursion into Syria to eliminate the Kurds there, a shift from opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and his cooperation with Russia and Iran in Syria. Russian and Turkish cooperation in Libya threatened NATO’s southern flank. However, Turkish aid to Azerbaijan in its renewed conflict with Armenia over control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed region in the

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southern Caucasus, including sending Turkish-backed members of the Syrian National Army to aid Azerbaijan, who are ethnically Turkic, put it at odds with Russia because Azerbaijan was not Russia’s foe, and Armenia was a member of Russia’ Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, the Armenian government had criticized Armenia’s dependence on Russia, reneged on an agreement reached earlier in Madrid for negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh, and, citing a defunct post-World War I treaty claimed territory in Turkey itself.41 Then, in November 2020, much to Armenia’s dismay, Russian peacekeepers entered ethnic Armenian territory in Nagorno-Karabakh, preserving Azerbaijani gains. Thereafter, the Russians were joined by Turkish soldiers. Even more dangerous were Turkey’s claims to and military presence in an oil rich area of the Mediterranean claimed also by Greece and Cyprus. The dispute gave Erdo˘gan an opportunity to spout nationalist slogans and threatened violence as France and Italy also deployed naval vessels to support Greece in August 2020. The dispute reflected the region’s geography. Greece owned numerous islands in the area and thus legally was entitled to resources on its continental shelf with sole drilling rights, while Turkey argued that many of Greece’s eastern islands were on Turkey’s continental shelf. Therefore, they had overlapping economic zones. Erdo˘gan’s refusal to release an imprisoned American pastor triggered a crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations and Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia forced the U.S. to impose sanctions on Turkey, and America suspended its sale of jet fighters to Ankara, fearing that the Russian missiles could reveal information about the advanced aircraft. Trump doubled tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum, exacerbating Ankara’s economic woes, notably a precipitous fall in the value of its currency. Erdo˘gan argued that America failed to understand Turkey’s concerns, citing American policy concerning Gulen and Turkey’s Kurdish foes, and he implied a willingness to look for allies elsewhere. Moreover, in a provocative populist gesture in July 2020, Erdo˘gan decreed that Hagia Sophia, a World Heritage Site—originally a sixth-century cathedral, then an Ottoman mosque, and thereafter a museum—again become a mosque, further alienating the West and Christians globally. North Versus South Economic issues were also divisive. Southern EU member, Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Portugal were the hardest hit by the Great Recession

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and remained poor compared with northern members, Germany, France, and the EU’s Scandinavian members. They viewed themselves as “backward” and sought the EU’s help to even the economic playing field. Along with economic differences, there were perceptions of different values between these groups of states. The wealthier populations viewed themselves as hardworking, dedicated, and pragmatic and condemned the laggards for their focus on the good life and unwillingness to knuckle down and put in the hours at the job. The former cited the latter’s shorter working hours, long vacation times, and early retirement ages. In Greece and Italy over a third of taxes were never collected, and over half of households paid nothing. This division had an important financial dimension, that is, southern Europe’s heavily indebted countries could not devalue their currencies to increase exports. Also, wealthy members like Germany and international institutions such as the IMF and the European Central Bank forced southern European members to impose austerity, raise taxes, and reduce public services as conditions for receiving additional loans. This fostered left-wing and right-wing populist political parties such as Italy’s FiveStar and Northern League, Greece’s Syriza and Golden Dawn parties, and Spain’s left-wing populist Podemos and right-wing Vox. Populists opposed domestic austerity and the growing domestic and intra-European wealth gaps. Vox, for example, copied the tactics used by right-wingers in America and elsewhere in Europe. It used social media to deepen polarization, spread conspiracy theories, and denounce “elites” and mainstream parties, politicians, and media. During and after the Great Recession, much of the media had focused on Greece and its fiscal problems. Although Greece had begun to recover, it found it difficult to service its debt. In the case of Italy, in October 2018, the EU refused to approve Italy’s budget owing to the “irresponsible” deficit—far higher than the previous government’s commitment of 0.8%—it would produce. This was the first time in EU history that it had taken such an action, and Salvini responded, “This doesn’t change anything. Let the speculators be reassured, we’re not going back.” He then added a populist interpretation. “They’re not attacking a government but a people. These are things that will anger Italians even more.”42 Italy’s populist government then returned a similar budget to the EU that would decide whether to penalize Italy for breaking EU rules. The populists claimed that the EU was responsible for Italy’s weak economic

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growth, claiming their budget deficit would be an economic stimulus. The EU, notably the frugal northern members, viewed the populist budget as a giveaway with tax cuts, pension benefits, and welfare programs that Italy, one of the EU’s largest economies, could not afford and might lead to the collapse of Italy’s banks and produce political instability. In December 2018, the Italian government acceded to EU demands for a budget reduction, thereby lowering the risk of Italy’s exit from the Eurozone or the EU. Although the EU took steps to reform its financial structure including the Stability Mechanism, EU budget oversight, and special fund for economic downturns, there was still no overall financial strategy. Unemployment remained stubbornly high in some countries, and growth rates remained low. The very mechanisms that had been designed to avoid another crisis like that of 2008 remained controversial. The Stability Mechanism and special bailout funds were underwritten by additional levies on member states, and many voters, especially in Germany, were reluctant to increase their country’s contribution, anticipating that the funds would wind up bailing out the laggards. The latter objected not just to the austerity measures imposed on them, but also the oversight of their budgets by the European Central Bank and the European Commission. These measures, they argued, limited their sovereignty and interfered in national policies.

Transatlantic Frictions Anti-populists applauded the sweeping electoral triumph EU-enthusiast and liberal Emmanuel Macron and his new party En Marche over Le Pen’s populist followers. France’s new president sought reforms to the EU including a more integrated EU banking system. After assuming office, Macron declared, “The American people have chosen their president,” and “Our relationship with the United States is absolutely critical, in fact, fundamental.”43 Nevertheless, in a speech to Congress on a state visit to Washington (the first during the Trump presidency), Macron took issue with several of Trump’s policies, and lauded the liberal order when he spoke of the need to oppose “isolationism, withdrawal and nationalism.” He added, “The United States is the one who invented this multilateralism; you are the one who has to help to preserve and reinvent it.”44

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Regarding America’s withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, Macron argued, “we must find a transition to a low-carbon economy. What is the meaning of our life, really, if we work and live destroying the planet, while sacrificing the future of our children?”45 Macron phoned Trump to defend the climate agreement. He declared, “Nothing is renegotiable in the Paris accords. The United States and France will continue to work together, but not on the subject of the climate.”46 Germany’s Chancellor Merkel vigorously reiterated Macron’s support for the Paris accord. “We will and must take on this existential challenge,” she said, “and we cannot and will not wait until every last person in the world can be convinced of climate change by scientific evidence.”47 Trump’s nationalist view, however, was that he was fighting for “Pittsburgh, not Paris.”48 Macron also restated his support for the Iran nuclear deal, which Trump had denounced. “There is an existing framework,” Macron said, “the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] to control the activity of Iran. We signed it, at the initiative of the United States.”49 However, Macron was unable to alter Trump’s populist views, and transatlantic differences grew. Trump’s telephone conversation with Macron in June 2018 was described as “Just bad. It was terrible,” according to one source. “Macron thought he would be able to speak his mind, based on the relationship. But Trump can’t handle being criticized like that.”50 Macron remained an even more crucial advocate of the liberal global order in Europe after Merkel said she would step down. Macron, according to a French social scientist, was “pretty isolated, because he represents the idea of a world that’s open — multilateralism, defending liberal society.”51 However, Macron’s position was weakened by massive protests against his domestic reforms, his criticism of French Muslims, and plummeting popularity at home. In November 2018, at a memorial in Paris to the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, Macron made clear his differences with Trump, Putin, and others who had declared themselves “nationalists” by decrying “selfishness of nations only looking after their own interests. Because patriotism is exactly the opposite of nationalism.”52 In France for the ceremonies, Trump seemed politically alone. “Watching the event from France I cannot recall a time when America seemed so isolated,” said David Axelrod.53 Europeans reacted strongly when Trump ditched the Iranian nuclear agreement partly because it had marked one of the first instances that Europe had confronted a complex security issue and appeared to solve

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it. Europeans, however, still depended on America for security, notably against Russia. Security and Defense Europeans were profoundly concerned by President Trump’s antics, and America’s NATO allies were alienated by Trump’s policies. Europeans had clues of the future during Trump’s campaign when he demanded that allies “pay more” for their own defense and had initially refused to confirm his adherence to Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which committed members to collective defense. European security concerns included Russian aggression in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea, Islamic terrorism, and a massive influx of refugees fleeing from conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia that produced divisions in the EU. Right-wing European populists tended to be culturally insecure, proRussian, authoritarian and opponents of the EU and NATO. They were preoccupied with tribalism and identity politics. Eastern members regarded the EU and NATO as safeguards against Russian imperialism and were disturbed by candidate Trump’s criticisms of these groups. They were among those willing to meet Trump’s demand that allies contribute more to their own defense. These countries had been either Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia Lithuania) or members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) and were sensitive to Russia’s aggressive behavior in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, fearing that Moscow might extend its aggression westward. Hence, they advocated more militant responses to Russia than either the Trump administration or the more cautious NATO western members. The Ukraine crisis had been triggered by that country’s effort to align itself more closely with the West. Ukraine seemed eager to sign an EU association agreement at a meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania in November 2013. Such agreements, part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, would establish a framework for bilateral relations with the EU that provided for trade liberalization and could lead to EU membership. Moscow sought to dissuade Ukraine from accepting the agreement, coercing Kiev by imposing restrictions on bilateral trade and warning Ukraine that signing the association agreements would be “suicidal.” Moscow wanted Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Union, that consisted of Russia, Armenia. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

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Moscow sought regional hegemony, and Putin viewed Ukraine’s choice as a zero-sum competition with the West. Russian threats and promises persuaded Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich to turn down the EU agreement. His eastward turn left pro-European Ukrainians in the country’s western region aghast and triggered large demonstrations. The association agreement was an important initiative because the EU, according to a European analyst, had “major strategic and economic interests at stake: strategically, the EU strives to create a benign environment for itself by spreading its model of rule of law and transparency to its periphery. And inducing Russia to respect the sovereignty [of Ukraine] would finally cement the post-Cold War European order.”54 Without Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership program was at risk. For the EU, Ukraine’s decision to capitulate under Soviet pressure was a serious setback. As protests continued in February 2014, violence in Kiev exploded and special police and shadowy government supporters massacred over 100 demonstrators. Ukraine’s parliament ultimately impeached the president who fled to Russia. Thereafter, Moscow initiated hybrid war against Ukraine, aiding pro-Russian separatists in the county’s eastern region. The Baltic states, members of the EU and NATO, were frightened by Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Their large ethnic Russian minorities constituted what Moscow termed its “near abroad.” The doctrine implied that in the region was an area of exclusive Russian interest. Russian minorities in the Baltic countries had indeed been persecuted after Russia’s withdrawal. Hence, although Russians accounted for almost a quarter of Estonia’s population, after independence in 1991, they were neither given citizenship, even if they had been born there, nor could they vote in national elections. To obtain citizenship, they had to pass an Estonian language exam. The Baltic states were, therefore, especially sensitive about the threat from the east and the intensification of Russia’s military presence in and around the Baltic and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Based on geography and history, they feared that Moscow. at a minimum, would bully them and, at worst, threatened their recent independence. Europeans were horrified when President Trump sought a meeting with Putin while its NATO allies were trying to isolate Moscow after its intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Europe’s place in the world was defined by both its alliance with America and America’s enforcement of the liberal order, and Trump seemed to pressure Europeans to choose between them. Russia exerted pressure on EU and

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NATO members in other ways as well, and, though the EU imposed punishing economic sanctions on Moscow, western members remained reluctant to go further in defense of Ukraine and take strong measures like providing Kiev with arms. EU sanctions had a differential impact on members. Thus, 6,000 German companies were involved in selling to Russia, and 300,000 German jobs depended on these exports. Britain’s financial sector profited from investments by wealthy Russians in everything from bonds and property to private schools for Russian children. Sanctions did not only hurt Russia, but also all of Europe. Differential European access to energy accentuated differences within the EU. Germany began to import natural gas—a Russian geopolitical weapon—directly via the Nord Stream pipeline. Western Europe had easier access to pipeline gas than Eastern Europe, much of which was landlocked and lacked access to liquefied natural gas delivered by sea. Pipelines already linked some European countries. Germany could send gas to Italy, Poland, and the Czech Republic, but the Baltic countries and Bulgaria depended entirely on Russian gas. Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland could re-route gas to Ukraine (“reverse flow”) but were reluctant to do so, fearing Russian retaliation. Germany was crucial because of its unique postwar economic, political, and military relationship with America. That relationship had emerged out of co-dependency that began in 1945, and continued with Germany’s entry into NATO, America’s role in Germany’s reunification in 1990, and German desire for American presence on Europe’s front line and its bases in Germany that America used to project power to Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. America and Germany were economically interdependent and, in 2019, Germany had been America’s fifth largest trading partner globally and it’s largest in Europe. However, after Trump’s July 2018 Helsinki summit with Putin, Wolfgang Ischinge, a former German ambassador to America, declared, “Let’s face it: Mr. Trump’s core beliefs conflict with the foundations of Western grand strategy since the mid-1940s.… He expresses admiration for autocrats like Kim Jong-un and Mr. Putin, while reserving his most acidic comments for democratic partners like Germany’s Angela Merkel and Canada’s Justin Trudeau.” Ischinge concluded, “Mr. Trump’s performance seemed to indicate that America is ready to give up its ambition to be the free world’s respected leader.”55 Confronted by Trump’s criticisms of NATO and the EU and his demands that Europeans pay more for defense, France and Germany

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were fearful that Trump’s America was no longer a reliable partner. Thus, Macron sought to deepen EU security cooperation, including an integrated defense policy and a European army. He proposed to go beyond the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation that committed signatories to develop joint defense capabilities, arguing that Europe must protect “civilization” by protecting itself and not depending on Trump’s America. After all, the EU already had two nuclear-armed states (France and Britain), and Russia’s economy was smaller than Italy’s. Macron proposed a “European intervention initiative” to establish a military coalition of EU members plus Britain that would be available for threats in Europe and beyond. He also sponsored the Paris Peace Forum that sought to mobilize global cooperation in confronting issues like climate change. Trump was among the few leaders who refused to come to Macron’s forum. Germany and France signed a treaty in January 2019 that promised to develop the “efficiency, coherence in the military field,” leading Germany’s defense minister to argue that “Europe’s army is already taking shape.” However, Germany’s military ambitions for the EU were more modest than Macron’s. Meanwhile, Trump was undermining multilateral institutions like NATO, the EU, and the WTO and multilateral agreements like the Iranian deal and NAFTA. Argued former German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel: “We can’t live with Trump. And we can’t live without the United States,” adding, “I find it shocking that, in such a short time, he has managed to rip apart a relationship that has taken decades to build.”56 Two-thirds of Germans had begun to see relations with America as “bad,” while three-quarters of Americans appeared unaware of developments after 2016 and thought relations with Germany were “good.” As we shall see in Chapter 9, trade was an especially difficult multilateral issue. In spring 2018, the G-7 summit declared that tariffs undermined confidence in the global economy and expressed “unanimous concern and disappointment” over U.S. tariff threats. A second meeting of the group in Ottawa with was acrimonious. Although Trump had initially proposed ending all tariffs among G-7 members, he then assailed Europe’s tariffs on U.S. exports. “It’s going to stop, or we’ll stop trading with them. And that’s a very profitable answer, if we have to do it. We’re like the piggy bank that everybody’s robbing — and that ends.”57 Trump’s unilateralism was on view in his delay of the G-7 meeting scheduled in America

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for July 2019 because Merkel refused to attend in person owing to the coronavirus. Before Trump left the 2018 G-7 meeting, he agreed to a joint communiqué in which the participants pledged “free, fair, and mutually beneficial trade and investment.” Thereafter, however, Canada’s Justin Trudeau, who had hosted the meeting, reaffirmed his opposition to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports and said Canada would retaliate. “I have made it very clear to the president that it is not something we relish doing. But it is something that we absolutely will do. Because Canadians, we’re polite, we’re reasonable, but we also will not be pushed around.”58 After learning of Trudeau’s comments, Trump backed away from the joint statement and rudely attacked Trudeau, claiming he had been responsible for the disagreement by making “false statements” and that Canada’s “massive” tariffs were harming U.S. farmers and workers. After a NATO summit in 2019, Trump again attacked Trudeau for consoling other leaders about Trump’s behavior, calling him “two-faced.” Trump’s personal attacks on Trudeau, an American ally, were another of similar insults to the leaders of France, Britain, and Germany. It seemed an intentional effort to unravel the western alliance, isolate America, and undermine the liberal order. Trump’s tantrum may have been a first step toward destroying the WTO, a pillar of liberal trade. Trump also denounced the Russian-backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline under the Baltic Sea to Germany that he said would make Europe dependent on Russia for energy, and he threatened to impose economic sanctions on German firms working on the pipeline with Russia’s Gazprom. Trump’s behavior widened fissures between America and its allies. European leaders were angry at his violations of diplomatic norms and long-time trade agreements. “I think this is a case of ‘kick the dog.” concluded Fen Hampson. “My reading is that Trump is, you know, trying to negotiate with the Koreans and dealing with much bigger players, the Chinese and the Europeans, on trade issues. I think he’s trying to make an example of Canada. Canada’s a small, super-friendly ally... and I think he’s just kind of sending a message to the rest of the world: ‘If we can treat the Canadian this way, you ain’t seen nothing yet in terms of what might be coming your way.’”59 Perhaps it was inevitable that Donald Trump would dislike multilateral groups like NATO and the EU that had been established on a normative foundation of democracy, free trade, human rights, and collective efforts to solve global dilemmas.

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Conclusions Trump was more willing to forgive dangerous foes than U.S. allies with which America shared common values. Hence, the transatlantic rift posed a growing danger to the liberal order. As Kagan concluded, “The crucial issue is not the Middle East or even Russia, and it may not even be China. The big game is what it’s been for over a century. If we lose Europe, if we send Europe back to its normal condition, it’s over.”60 Nevertheless, as a British analyst argued, as long as Trump was in power, Europe could “expect more sanctions, selfish stupidity and brutishness where US foreign policy used to be.” If Trump were reelected in 2020, he continued, Europe “would face a second-term, president hostile to Germany in particular, contemptuous of the EU in general, and free to indulge his destructive instincts to the full.”61 In sum, Europeans were taken aback by Trump’s hostility but were seeking ways to push back, including discussions about an EU military cooperation and retaliating against U.S. tariffs. One point of consensus among America’s allies midway in Trump’s term in office was that it was uniquely unsettling, even frightening. Nevertheless, despite the attacks on the liberal order and globalization, the world avoided catastrophe. Trade war notwithstanding, the United States had not gone to war with a major foe such as Russia or China. However, Trump may not be a transitory anomaly. Instead, America’s long-term commitments to security, stability, and the liberal order were eroding, and dangers lay ahead. The EU represented the multilateralism, economic and social liberalism, and environmental anxiety that Trump loathed. Shortly after Trump had attended a NATO summit and had met with Putin in 2018, David Brooks wrote disturbingly about the future. “This trans-Atlantic partnership was a vast historical accomplishment, a stumbling and imperfect effort to extend democracy, extend rights, extend freedom and build a world ordered by justice and not force…. Over the weekend, Trump ripped the partnership to threads…. Trump essentially sided with Vladimir Putin.”62 Trump further exacerbated transatlantic relations two years later by blaming Europeans and banning their entry into America owing to the coronavirus without consulting EU officials. In March 2020, the EU banned Americans and renewed it later in a stinging rebuke to Trump’s incompetence in dealing with the pandemic. European populists’ retreat from the EU’s four freedoms had eroded the liberal order and slowed globalization. The schism between liberal

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governments in Europe and populists in Italy and Eastern Europe threatened EU unity. Nationalist-populists found it difficult to compromise, fanned conspiracy theories, and were consistently provocative. Divisions deepened when mainstream parties adopted populist ideas and rhetoric to gain votes. Populism also exacerbated the desire of national sub-groups like Spain’s Catalonians for independence. The traditional East/West split of the EU member states widened. Divisions appeared between old and new (post-communist) states involving security and democracy. Populism eroded European cohesion. Hungary and Poland had populist leaders and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Italy, and Austria had prominent populist politicians who emphasized national sovereignty, opposed immigration, tapped racism, and did not comply with EU directives. Populists, advocating white Christianity, viewed it as equivalent to European culture and civilization. In the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, anti-EU populists who opposed immigration and sought greater control over the EU budget did well, although not as well as they had hoped. In France, the vote suggested President Macron would find governing increasingly difficult, and in Italy it reinforced the populists who had briefly taken control of the country’s government. The Greens in Germany came in second behind the CDU, while Germany’s Social Democrats continued to fade, endangering their participation in the country’s governing coalition. Chancellor Merkel had announced that she would not seek reelection as leader of her party and would step down as chancellor in 2021. Her successor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer urged Europe to foster the “European way of life”—representative democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom, and a market economy. However, Kramp-Karrenbauer stepped down as Merkel’s successor after an election in Thuringia forced her party to cooperate with the AfD, breaking the taboo of not cooperating with extremists. Armin Laschet, governor of North-Rhine Westphalia, was then elected to head Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and will likely become the CDU’s candidate for chancellor after Merkel steps down. Nevertheless, the EU continued to muddle through despite the European elections that showed how much right-wing populism had become mainstream. Consequently, a neo-Nazi party became the third largest in Germany and among the largest in several other EU member states. The division between euroskeptics and supporters of deeper European integration was visible in the razor-thin confirmation of newly elected

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Ursula von der Leyen by the European Parliament in 2019 as president of the European Commission. Alluding to Presidents Trump and Xi, she declared, “Some are turning toward authoritarian regimes. Some are buying their global influence and creating dependencies by investing in ports and roads, and others are turning toward protectionism. None of these options are for us. We want multilateralism. We want fair trade. We defend the rules-based order because we know it is better for us.”63 Voter turnout was higher than in previous elections, and anti-EU parties increased their share of the vote to 25%. Along with the populists, the Greens were the main beneficiaries of the election, confirming growing European consciousness of and concern about climate change. EU-U.S. trade frictions impeded the free movement of goods and services. The quarrels between wealthy EU members like Germany and poorer European states like Greece and Italy fostered resistance in southern EU states that threatened the Eurozone. The North–South cleavage reappeared after Germany and several other northern states rejected an effort led by Italy, Spain, and France to issue joint bonds (“coronabonds”) for nine countries in the Eurozone during the COVID19 pandemic to spread debt among members in which costs would be lower for highly indebted countries. Along with Brexit, these were setbacks to political and economic globalization. In addition, the growing role of services like banking in the EU was eroding the single market because, unlike goods, they were largely regulated nationally, sometimes even locally. Finally, the flood of immigrants in 2015 provoked resistance to the liberal norm of refugee asylum and triggered nationalist resistance to the free movement of people even within the Schengen zone. No longer was Europe as integrated nor as stable as it had been before the spread of populism. Nevertheless, anti-populist sentiment had begun to emerge. In Italy, for example, the liberal Sardines (named for its ability to pack piazzas) grassroots movement emerged, opposing Salvini’s nativism, his dislike of the EU, and his attacks on Italian institutions. Furthermore, in May 2020, Germany and France proposed a coronavirus “recovery fund” that would permit the European Commission to borrow huge sums and distribute the money as grants and loans to members most afflicted by the pandemic such as Italy and Spain. Raising money centrally and redistributing it (thus, creating common debt), as well as issuing EU-backed bonds had never been done before in the EU and was a welcome step toward deeper integration. Despite divisions, members agreed to a massive $2.2 trillion

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budget and stimulus package of funds and emergency pandemic aid. The main disagreement had been between “frugal” and wealthy countries— the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and Finland—that sought to minimize funds for southern Italy, and Spain and how much control donors should have over how the funds were spent. The compromise involved reducing grants (the remainder will be loans), and donors would receive billions in rebates from their contributions to the EU budget. Populists in Hungary and Poland cooperated after distribution of funds was no longer made contingent to upholding the rule of law. Hence, the EU failed to resolve the growing problem of illiberal democracies with authoritarian leaders, and George Soros declared, “The primary victims of the deal that Merkel has reportedly struck with Orbán will be the people of Hungary.”64 However, the transatlantic community continued to erode. To the east, Russia remained a security threat even as Trump’s America to the west grew more distant. Also, the risk of renewed flows of refugees was again growing owing to America’s retreat from the Middle East, Turkey’s intervention in Syria, and the victory of Assad’s Russian- and Iranian-supported army. The next chapter describes nationalist-populism in areas of the global south, which will be followed by chapters that deal with the three key dimensions of globalization.

Notes 1. Susan B. Glasser, “How Trump Made War on Angela Merkel and Europe,” The New Yorker, December 24–31, 2018, https://www.newyor ker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/how-trump-made-war-on-angela-mer kel-and-europe?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 2. Cited in James Kanter, “Trump Threatens Europe’s Stability, a Top Leader Warns,” New York Times, January 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/01/31/world/europe/trump-european-union-donald-tusk.html. 3. Cited in Steven Erlanger, “For Europe: There’s a New Threat in Town: The U.S.,” New York Times, February 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/02/02/world/europe/trump-european-union.html. 4. Cited in Peter Baker, “Trump Shakes Up World Stage in Break With U.S. Allies, New York Times, June 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 06/08/us/politics/trump-russia-g7-readmitted-tariffs.html. 5. Cited in Elisabeth Zarofsky, “Viktor Orban’s ˙ Far-Right Vision for Europe,” The New Yorker, January 14, 2019, https://www.newyorker.

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com/magazine/2019/01/14/viktor-orbans-far-right-vision-for-europe? wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Katrin Bennhold, “Can Europe’s Liberal Order Survive as the Memory of War Fades?” New York Times, November 10, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/world/europe/europe-armistice-mer kel-macron-peace-war.html?emc=edit_th_181111&nl=todaysheadlines& nlid=43321681111. Matt Browne, Dalibor Rohac, and Carolyn Kenney, “Europe Populist Challenge,” Center for American Progress, May 10, 2018, https:// www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/05/10/ 450430/europes-populist-challenge/ Thomas L. Friedman, “Can I Ruin Your Dinner Party?” New York Times, August 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/opinion/cani-ruin-your-dinner-party.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fopin ion-columnists&wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_todayworld. Paul Krugman, “Why It Can Happen Here,” New York Times, August 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/trump-rep ublican-party-authoritarianism.html?emc=edit_th_180828&nl=todayshea dlines&nlid=43321680828.. Cited in Adam Nossiter, “Marine Le Pen Echoes Trump’s Bleak Populism in French Campaign Kickoff,” New York Times, February 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/world/europe/marinele-pen-trump-populism-france-election.html. Cited in Adam Nossiter, “Marine Le Pen of France Meets with Vladimir Putin in Moscow,” New York Times, March 24, 2017, https://www.nyt imes.com/2017/03/24/world/europe/marine-le-pen-of-france-meetswith-putin-in-moscow.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fw orld&action=click&contentCollection=world®ion=rank&module=pac kage&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront. Cited in Steven Erlanger, “Feeling That Trump Will ‘Say Anything,’ Europe Is Less Restrained, Too,” New York Times, July 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/europe/donaldtrump-europe.html. Cited in Timothy Garton Ash, “It’s the Kultur, Stupid,” The New York Review of Books December 7, 2017, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 2017/12/07/germany-alt-right-kultur-stupid/. Paul Hokenos, “Germany’s Far-Right Freedom Fighters,” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/29/germanysfar-right-freedom-fighters-afd-merkel-saxony-brandenburg/?utm_source= PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=14719&utm_term=Edi tor#39;s%20Picks%20OC. Cited in Katrin Bennhold, “Greens Thrive in Germany as the ‘Alternative’ to Far-Right Populism,” New York Times, November 27, 2018, https://

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www.nytimes.com/2018/11/27/world/europe/germany-greens-mer kel-election.html?emc=edit_th_181128&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21681128. Robert Kagan, “The New German Question: What Happens When Europe Comes Apart?” Foreign Affairs 98:3 (May/June 2019), pp. 118, 120. Cited in Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Matteo Salvini: A Political Chameleon Thriving on Fears,” The Guardian, June 22, 2018, https://www.thegua rdian.com/world/2018/jun/22/matteo-salvini-a-political-chameleon-thr iving-on-fears?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=. Cited in Steve Scherer, “Italy’s Fresh Election Risks Being Referendum on Euro,” Reuters, May 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/usitaly-politics-euro-election-analysis/italys-fresh-election-risks-being-refere ndum-on-euro-idUSKCN1IT1IF?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Jennifer Rankin, “Italy’s First Black Minister Fears Far-Right Party’s Government Influence,” The Guardian, May 18, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/18/ italy-government-cecile-kyenge-the-league-lega-far-right?wpisrc=nl_tod ayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Rachel Donadio, “Spitting in Europe’s Face Won’t Help Italy,” The Atlantic, May 28, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/internati onal/archive/2018/05/italy-five-star-league/561365/?wpisrc=nl_tod ayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Patrick Kingsley, “As Europe’s Liberal Order Splinters, Trump Wields an Axe,” New York Times, June 18, 2018. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/06/18/world/europe/germany-merkel-coalition.html. Ivan Krastev, “Eastern Europe’s Illiberal Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 97:3 (May/June 2018), p.49. Ibid, pp. 50, 51. Cited in Gardiner Harris, “As Ties With U.S. Cool, Europeans Look to Forge Other Alliances,” New York Times, February 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/europe/asties-with-us-cool-europeans-look-to-forge-other-alliances.html. Cited in Joanna Kakissis, “In Trump, Hungary’s Viktor Orban Has a Rare Ally in the Oval Office,” NPR, May 13, 2019, https://www.npr. org/2019/05/13/722620996/in-trump-hungarys-viktor-orban-has-arare-ally-in-the-oval-office?wpisrc=nl_powerup&wpmm=1. Cited in Griff Witte, “Once-Fringe Soros Conspiracy Theory Takes Center Stage in Hungarian Election,” Washington Post, March 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/once-fringe-soros-con spiracy-theory-takes-center-stage-in-hungarian-election/2018/03/17/ f0a1d5ae-2601-11e8-a227-fd2b009466bc_story.html?utm_term=.4b74cf aa5d7c.

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27. Franklin Foer, “Viktor Orba˙ n’s War on Intellect,” The Atlantic, June 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/ george-soros-viktor-orban-ceu/588070/?wpisrc=nl_powerup&wpmm=1. 28. Cited in Gaia Pianigiani and Emma Bubola, “As Coronavirus Reappears in Italy, Migrants Become a Target for Politicians,” New York Times, August 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/world/eur ope/coronavirus-italy-migrants.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_2020 0829&instance_id=21739&nl=todaysheadlines®i_id=4332168&seg ment_id=37150&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea. 29. Cited in “Public Enemy Number 1,” The Economist, May 20, 2017, p. 26. 30. Cited in Maïa de la Baume and David M. Herszenhorn, “Orbán Clashes with European Parliament Critics,” Politico, September 11, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-unbowed-in-face-ofeu-criticism-hungary-president/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 31. Cited in Katrin Bennhold, “As Far Right Rises, a Battle Over Security Agencies Grows,” New York Times, May 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/05/07/world/europe/austria-far-right-freedom-party.html. 32. Cited in Ishaan Tharoor, “How Viktor Orban Became the Real Threat to the West, Washington Post, April 6, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/06/how-victor-orban-bec ame-the-real-threat-to-the-west/?utm_term=.1b9e8cfc727d&wpisrc=nl_ todayworld&wpmm=1. 33. Cited in Mark Hosenball, “Former Trump Aide Bannon Sets Up Group to Undermine EU,” Reuters, July 23, 2018, https://www.reu ters.com/article/us-eu-parliament-bannon/former-trump-aide-bannonsets-up-group-to-undermine-eu-idUSKBN1KD20J?wpisrc=nl_daily202& wpmm=1. 34. Cited in Marc Santora and Helene Bienvenu, “Secure in Hungary, Orban Readies for Battle with Brussels,” New York Times, My 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/europe/hun gary-victor-orban-immigration-europe.html. 35. Cited in de la Baume and Herszenhorn, “Orbán Clashes with European Parliament critics.” 36. Cited in Michael Birnbaum and Griff Witte, “E.U. Parliament Votes to Punish Hungary for Backsliding on Democracy,” Washington Post, September 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/eur ope/amid-threats-to-rule-of-law-in-hungary-european-lawmakers-voteto-start-sanctions-proceedings/2018/09/12/4ba20fe8-b63d-11e8-ae4f2c1439c96d79_story.html?utm_term=.7814b9233257. 37. Cited in Patrick Kingsley, “On the Surface Hungary Is a Democracy. But What Lies Underneath,” New York Times, December 25, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/europe/hungary-democracyorban.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&

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contentCollection=world®ion=rank&module=package&version=highli ghts&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront. Cited in Philip Bump, “In His Speech at the U.N., Trump Again Embraces Poland’s Shift Away from Liberal Democracy,” Washington Post, September 25, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 2018/09/25/his-speech-un-trump-again-embraces-polands-shift-awayliberal-democracy/?utm_term=.3afad0d15b9d&wpisrc=nl_daily202& wpmm=1. Cited in Glenn Thrush, “Despite Deep Policy Divides, Europe Trip Seen by Buoyant Trump as High Point,” New York Times, July 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/world/europe/ group-of-20-trump-europe.html. Citied in Liz Alderman, “Migrants in Greece, Ready to Go Anywhere in Europe, Scramble to Enter E.U. Relocation Program,” New York Times, March 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/world/eur ope/migrants-in-greece-ready-to-go-anywhere-in-europe-scramble-toenter-eu-relocation-program.html. Robert M. Cutler, “Azerbaijan Has the Upper Hand in NagornoKarabakh,” Foreign Policy, October 8, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2020/10/09/russia-aid-armenia-azerbaijan-putin-nagorno-karabakh/? utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=26049& utm_term=Editors%20Picks%20OC&?tpcc=26049. Cited in Jason Horowitz and Steven Erlanger, “E.U. Rejects Italy’s Budget, and Populists Dig In,” New York Times, October 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/world/europe/italy-budgeteu.html?emc=edit_th_181024&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321681024. Cited in Alisa J. Rubin and Adam Nossiter, “Macron Takes a Risk in Courting Trump But Has Little to Show for It,” New York Times, April 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/eur ope/donald-trump-emmanuel-macron.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncol lection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world®ion=rank& module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sec tionfront. Cited in Karen DeYoung, “French President Macron Charms Both Parties in an Impassioned Speech to Congress,” New York Times, April 25, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-sec urity/french-president-macron-charms-both-parties-in-an-impassionedspeech-to-congress/2018/04/25/bbd600ba-4894-11e8-827e-190efa f1f1ee_story.html?utm_term=.606d87b7757c&wpisrc=nl_todayworld& wpmm=1. Cited in ibid. Cited in Michael Birnbaum, “Trump’s Tangle with Europe Leads the Continent to Find Partners Elsewhere,” Washington Post, June 2, 2017,

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/trumps-tangle-witheurope-leads-the-continent-to-find-partners-elsewhere/2017/06/02/ 429b1c0c-4599-11e7-8de1-cec59a9bf4b1_story.html?utm_term=.8a4c18 38eadf. Cited in Melissa Eddy, “Angela Merkel Sets Collision Course with Trump Ahead of G-20,” New York Times, June 29, 2017 https://www.nytimes. com/2017/06/29/world/europe/angela-merkel-trump-group-of-20. html. Cited in Birnbaum, ““Trump’s Tangle with Europe Leads the Continent to Find Partners Elsewhere.” Cited in DeYoung, “French President Macron Charms Both Parties in an Impassioned Speech to Congress.” Cited in Michelle Kosinski and Maegan Vazquez, “Trump’s Phone Call with Macron Described as ‘Terrible’,” CNN , June 4, 2018, https:// www.cnn.com/2018/06/04/politics/donald-trump-emmanuel-macroncall-terrible/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_daily202. Cited in Alissa J. Rubin and Adam Nossiter, “Macron Hopes WW1 Ceremonies Warn of Nationalism’s Dangers. Is Anyone Listening?” New York Times, November 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/ 08/world/europe/macron-nationalism-populism-wwi-armistice.html? emc=edit_th_181109&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321681109. Cited in David Nakamura, Seung Min Kim and James McAuley, “France’s Macron, Denounces Nationalism as a ‘Betrayal of Patriotism’ in a Rebuke to Trump at WW1 Remembrance,” Washington Post, November 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/to-mark-endof-world-war-i-frances-macron-denounces-nationalism-as-a-betrayal-of-pat riotism/2018/11/11/aab65aa4-e1ec-11e8-ba30-a7ded04d8fac_story. html?utm_term=.a3fcf8ebca99&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Cited in David Nakamura, “In Paris, a Relatively Understated Trump Finds He’s Still the Center of the World’s Attention – and Outrage,” Washington Post, November 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/politics/in-paris-a-relatively-understated-trump-finds-hes-still-thecenter-of-the-worlds-attention--and-outrage/2018/11/11/cc39320ce5ff-11e8-bbdb-72fdbf9d4fed_story.html?utm_term=.ef344a8f5221&wpi src=nl_most&wpmm=1. Jonas Grätz, “Freedom of Association,” Foreign Affairs, November 20, 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140280/jonas-graetz/fre edom-of-association. Wolfgang Ischinger, “For Allies, Trump’s Behavior Is Painful to Watch,” New York Times, July 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/ 21/opinion/sunday/trump-europe-nato-russia.html?wpisrc=nl_todayw orld&wpmm=1.

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56. Cited in Dan Balz and Griff Witte, “Europeans fear Trump May Threaten Not Just the Transatlantic Bond, But the State of Their Union,” Washington Post, February 4, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/pol itics/europeans-fear-trump-may-threaten-not-just-the-transatlantic-bondbut-the-state-of-their-union/2019/02/04/a874e9f4-25ad-11e9-81fdb7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.6ca1b34cc3e4&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. 57. Cited in Michael D. Shear and Catherine Porter, “Trump Refuses to Sign G-7 Statement and Calls Trudeau ‘Weak’,” New York Times. June 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/world/americas/don ald-trump-g7-nafta.html. 58. Cited in Damian Paletta and Joel Achenbach, “Trump Accuses Canadian Leader of Being ‘Dishonest’ and ‘Weak’,” Washington Post, June 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-canadato-show-north-korea-hes-strong-aide-says/2018/06/10/afc16c0c-6cba11e8-bd50-b80389a4e569_story.html?utm_term=.d4eaeea170fa&wpi src=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 59. Cited in Selena Ross, “Trudeau Takes His Turn as Trump’s Principal Antagonist, and Canadians Rally Around Him,” Washington Post, June 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trudeau-takes-histurn-as-trumps-principal-antagonist-and-canadians-rally-around/2018/ 06/10/162edcf8-6cc6-11e8-b4d8-eaf78d4c544c_story.html?utm_term=. a497b2194881&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 60. Cited in Steven Erlanger, “Is the World Becoming a Jungle Again? Should Americans Care?” New York Times, September 22, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/09/22/world/europe/trump-american-foreign-pol icy-europe.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action= click&contentCollection=world®ion=rank&module=package&ver sion=highlights&contentPlacement=11&pgtype=sectionfront. 61. Simon Tisdall, “How Should Europe Respond Now That Its American Ally Has Turned Hostile?” The Guardian, August 30, 2020, https:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/30/how-should-eur ope-respond-now-its-american-ally-has-turned-hostile?utm_campaign= wp_todays_worldview&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter& wpisrc=nl_todayworld. 62. David Brooks, “The Murder-Suicide of the West,” New York Times, July 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opi nion/trump-nato-european-union-history.html. 63. Cited in Michael Birnbaum, “European Divisions on Display as Ursula von der Leyen Wins Narrow Approval for E.U.’s Top Job,” Washington Post, July 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ european-parliament-faces-nail-biter-confirmation-vote-on-ursula-vonder-leyen-for-european-commission-president/2019/07/16/bd8510ea-

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a7b1-11e9-ac16-90dd7e5716bc_story.html?utm_term=.2d750b1a7841& wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 64. Cited in Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Benjamin Novak and Monika Pronczuk, “E.U. Reaches Deal on Major Budget and Stimulus Package,” New York Times, December 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/ world/europe/eu-deal-poland-hungary.html.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. Nationalist-populists in America and Europe viewed Vladimir Putin as a which of these answers? a. A dangerous foe b. A potential ally c. A globalist d. Ally to global elite 2. What EU agreement signed in 1995 permitted citizens and investment in member countries and movement freely across their borders, thereby enhancing economic efficiency? a. Paris Climate Accord b. NAFTA c. Brexit d. Schengen Agreement 3. What policy in the Eurozone prevented currency devaluation by less competitive members like Italy that had previously devalued the lira to cope with slow growth a. Unified monetary policy b. Diversified monetary policy c. Deflation policy d. Inflation policy 4. Who, to the immense relief of beleaguered defenders of the EU and the liberal order, won the second round of the French presidential election with over 63 percent of the vote? a. Marine Le Pen b. François Hollande

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c. Gene Wilder d. Emmanuel Macron 5. After Germany’s reunification, which of these sections of German suffered a loss of jobs owing to the closing of obsolete industries, and had little done to eliminate pro-Nazi sentiment? a. North Germany b. East Germany c. South Germany d. West Germany 6. As Germany’s centrist parties retreated, what pro-environment, pro-European, and pro-refugee party emerged as a center-left alternative to the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and became the country’s second most popular political force a. Freedom Front party b. Republican party c. Green party d. Northern League 7. Which country became the first of the original EU members and the third largest Eurozone economy in which anti-EU populists assumed power? a. Italy b. Germany c. Turkey d. United Kingdom 8. Which Eastern European Leader invited by Trump to the White House in May 2019, and had endorsed Trump’s candidacy in July 2016, the first foreign leader to do so. a. Angela Merkel b. Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan c. Viktor Orbán d. Jarosław Kacyznski ´ 9. Orbán and other Fidesz leaders also denounced “foreign-funded” nongovernment organizations and imposed control over those

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receiving foreign funding, especially groups aided which billionaire? a. Bill Gates b. Jeff Bezos c. George Soros d. Jack Ma 10. The European Parliament accused which of Europe’s government of “endangering democracy, human rights and the rule of law” by appointing additional justices to the country’s Constitutional Tribunal and limiting the tribunal’s authority? a. France b. Britain c. Germany d. Poland 11. in July 2020, Turkey’s President Erdo˘gan decreed which World Heritage Site—originally a sixth-century cathedral, then an Ottoman mosque, and recently a museum—to again become a mosque, further alienating the West and Christians globally? a. Hagia Sophia b. Uffizi c. Taj Mahal d. Borobudur 12. Europeans had clues of the future during Trump’s campaign when he demanded that allies “pay more” for their own defense and had initially refused to confirm his adherence to what, which committed members to collective defense. a. United Nations b. WHO c. Article 5 of the NATO treaty d. Paris Climate Agreement 13. Which of these are most sensitive about the threat from the east and the intensification of Russia’s military presence in and around the Baltic and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad? a. Nordic countries

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b. Western Europe c. British Isles d. Baltic states 14. Which of these are major factors in defining Europe’s place in the world? a. Its alliance with America b. America’s enforcement of the liberal order c. Neither its alliance with America nor America’s enforcement of the liberal order d. Both its alliance with America and America’s enforcement of the liberal order 15. Which two EU states are currently nuclear-armed states? a. France and Britain b. France and Germany c. Britain and Italy d. Germany and Italy 16. What world leader sponsored the Paris Peace Forum that sought to mobilize global cooperation in confronting issues like climate change? a. Donald Trump b. Emmanuel Macron c. Vladimir Putin d. Victor Orbán 17. Why did America strongly object to Europe’s acquisition of Huawei Chinese 5G telecommunications equipment? a. It may increase immigration b. 5G telecommunications are not an improvement over 4G c. Europe had previously agreed to exclusively let American companies do it before Huawei offered to do it cheaper d. Concern that backdoors in Chinese-manufactured infrastructure would make Europe vulnerable to Chinese spying

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18. In March 2020, the EU did something that they also renewed later in a stinging rebuke to Trump’s incompetence in dealing with the pandemic. Which of these was it? a. Declared the U.S. had the initial cases of Covid-19 b. Cut funding to the World Health Organization c. Banned American travelers d. Objected to funding cuts in U.S. vaccine research 19. Voter turnout was higher than in previous elections, and anti-EU parties increased their share of the vote by how much. a. 25 percent b. 80 percent c. 100 percent d. Zero percent 20. What happened in 2015 that provoked resistance to the liberal norm of refugee asylum and triggered nationalist resistance to the free movement of people even within the Schengen zone? a. The Paris Climate Accord b. The U.S. Election c. A massive influx of immigrants d. Brexit True or False 1. True or False? Trump was the first postwar American president not to favor deeper European integration. True 2. True or False? In recent elections, about a twentieth of Europe’s electorate voted for a populist party. False, about a fifth did 3. True or False? Although nationalism has reemerged throughout the EU, its supporters have proved less successful in getting elected in more recent eastern members in Europe such as Hungary and Poland than in older western member states such as the Netherlands, Germany, and France.

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False, vice versa its supporters have proved less successful getting elected in older western states than in eastern states 4. True or False? Marine Le Pen her France’s National Front (renamed National Rally) borrowed Russian funds for France’s presidential campaign and echoed Trump’s admiration of Putin and Russia. True 5. True or False? Populism infected the politics of several more recent EU members in Eastern and Central Europe, notably the increasingly authoritarianism of the governments of Poland and Hungary that were undermining the rule of law and democratic values True 6. True or False? Economic issues divide Europe. Germany, France. and the EU’s Scandinavian members were the hardest hit by the Great Recession and remained poor compared with Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Portugal. False, the opposite. Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Portugal were the hardest hit by the Great Recession and remained poor compared with Germany, France. and the EU’s Scandinavian members 7. True or False? In Greece and Italy over a third of taxes were never collected. and over half of households paid nothing. True 8. True or False? Populists support domestic austerity and the growing domestic and intra-European wealth gaps. False, populist opposed these. 9. True or False? The Stability Mechanism and special bailout funds were underwritten by additional levies on member states, and many voters, especially in Germany, were reluctant to increase their country’s contribution, anticipating that the funds would wind up bailing out the laggards.

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True 10. True or False? In Eastern European countries, centrist liberal leaders and parties attracted older, less educated, and rural voters who remained passionate nationalists and venerated traditionally hard national boundaries. False, the populist authoritarian parties attracted these demographics 11. True or False? A one-time liberal during the Cold War, Orbán had become an “illiberal democrat,” a majoritarian populist who, like Trump, promoted nationalism and cultural purity and vehemently opposed Muslim refugees. True 12. True or False? The European Parliament invoked Article 7 of the EU Treaty to impose sanctions on Hungary as a “systemic threat” to democracy and consider revoking Hungary’s voting rights in the EU. True 13. True or False? Poland’s populist leaders threw their support behind the reappointment of former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as president of the European Council. False, they opposed it and the opposition was seen as attacking the EU itself 14. True or False? Liberal European centrist tended to be culturally insecure, pro-Russian, authoritarian and opponents of the EU and NATO. They were preoccupied with tribalism and identity politics. False, those are tendencies of Right-wing European populist 15. True or False? President Macron sought to deepen EU security cooperation, including an integrated defense policy and a European army. True

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16. True or False? The Russian economy is smaller than Italy’s economy. True 17. True or False? In sum, Europeans were taken aback by Trump’s hostility but have not yet gone to seeking ways to push back. False, they have been seeking way to push back including discussions about an EU military buildup and retaliating against U.S. tariffs 18. True or False? A neo-Nazi party became the third largest in Germany and among the largest in several other EU member states. True 19. True or False? In the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, anti-EU populists who opposed immigration and sought greater control over the EU budget did well, including far better than they hoped and any other group did. False, they did well, but not better than they hoped or all other groups 20. True or False? Despite divisions, EU members reached a compromise of $857 billion for a coronavirus “recovery fund” that was proposed in May 2020. True Short Answer Why have Nationalist-populists in America and Europe viewed Vladimir Putin as a potential ally? Because, like Russia, they feared Islamic radicalism, opposed global economic integration, and disliked secularism and the liberal order.

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Post-Cold War members of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe clearly manifested “authoritarian populism,” but it spread elsewhere as well. Give an example of its spread across Europe? Italian elections brought a populist government to power in 2018. Populist politics even infected Latvia in elections that increased support for the pro-Russian populist party, Harmony Center. Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Estonia too, saw the spread of nationalist-populism. Thus, the Sweden Democrats, like other populist parties opposed immigration and came in third in the country’s 2018 election, while the Social Democrats suffered their worst defeat since 1908. Austria formed a populist coalition. Immigration was a seething issue across the continent, and Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland had anti-immigrant People’s Parties. Why has nationalism’s reemergence in elections been stronger in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe? The Eastern European countries typically have a shallower democratic tradition and less resilient political systems and institutions than the former. What factors helped determine the relative success of populist politicians and parties in Europe? The factors include the country’s electoral system and political parties, and whether voters were selecting members of a parliament or voting in referendums. Many working-class whites in France and Germany, like Trump supporters in America’s Midwest, had left their cities and assumed populist views. These included resentment toward immigrants, who they believed were diluting their cultures and harming their economies and were most evident in eastern Europe. What criticism of the EU exist throughout Europe? The single currency, without EU-wide fiscal integration, prevented laggards like Italy or Greece from devaluing their currency to increase exports, requiring instead painful austerity and/or lower wages and slow growth. The European Central Bank had limited capability, and bonds and banking tended

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to remain national. Finally, the EU was largely unable to help poorer members because the debt crisis after 2008 persuaded Germany and hawkish northern members that fiscal and monetary discipline was lacking in the south and that they would have to fund needed bail-outs. Why did populist resent migrants from the Middle East and Africa? They feared the impact that migrants would have by entering their homogeneous Catholic populations, fearing that their culture would be diluted amid shrinking populations How has Viktor Orba˙ n undermined his country’s democratic institutions? He undermined them by gerrymandering parliamentary districts, providing government positions to relatives and followers, drafting a new constitution, establishing a powerful National Judiciary Office, and passing laws that made Hungary a one-party state. Also, in 2020, Orban ˙ began to govern by decree with the covid-19 epidemic as his excuse. How did the Trump administration deal with the fact that President Erdo˘gan’s expansionist military and political policies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean threatened American interests and those of allies, including Kurdish militias, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, and even France? The Trump administration did little, largely because Erdo˘gan publicly supported Trump’s reelection and denounced Joe Biden France’s President Macron has lauded the liberal order when he spoke of the need to oppose “isolationism, withdrawal and nationalism” and has taken issue with which of President Trump’s policies? He took issue with President Trump’s rejection of the Paris Climate Agreement, denouncement of the Iran Deal, and Trump’s declaration of himself as nationalist. What are some of the main European security concerns? Security concerns include Russian aggression in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea, Islamic terrorism, and a massive influx of

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refugees fleeing from conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia that produced divisions in the EU. Why were EU members were shocked that Trump justified his tariffs as protecting “national security?” Because tariffs on things like metal imports hurt European allies, and how could America’s closest allies be perceived by an American president as threats to U.S. “national security?”

CHAPTER 7

Nationalist-Populism in the Global South and Middle East

Nationalist-Populism Latin America We begin this survey of nationalist-populism in the global south with Latin America, focusing on Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, Unlike the United States, Latin American populism was dominated by leftists, at least until Jair Bolsonaro assumed office in Brazil. One left-wing populist leader was Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador who attacked his critics, ignored Mexico’s constitution, planned to call a referendum to put five ex-presidents on trial, and assailed the country’s institutions. Argentina and Peronism Among the most durable populist movements in the global south was Argentina’s Peronists. Juan Perón was elected president of that country in 1946. Argentina was among Latin America’s earliest countries to industrialize, thereby attracting many European (especially Italian) migrants in a rapidly growing population. It became prosperous by exporting beef and grains, and the wealthy conservative elites established a sham democracy until voted out of power in 1916. Perón, a colonel in the Argentine army, became involved in politics as a member in a secret society, the United Officer’s Group, that ousted that overthrew the Argentina government in 1943. Becoming the new government’s minister of labor, he became increasing sympathetic to the needs © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_7

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of workers, advocating policies that seemed to threaten the armed forces. He was imprisoned in 1945 but was released after a short time owing to demonstrations organized by the Argentine labor confederation. The following year he led a victorious coalition of workers and elements of the middle class, and his political career continuously required efforts to bridge worker-military tensions. As Perón himself explained, “Peronism is humanism in action; Peronism is a new political doctrine, which rejects all the ills of the politics of previous times; in the social sphere it is a theory which establishes a little equality among men… capitalist exploitation should be replaced by a doctrine of social economy under which the distribution of our wealth, which we force the earth to yield up to us and which furthermore we are elaborating, may be shared out fairly among all those who have contributed by their efforts to amass it.”1 Notwithstanding his links with workers, Perón and his second wife Eva, who was idolized by the poor, were attracted by Benito Mussolini’s fascism, notably its corporatist aspect. Corporatism required economic sectors to join a government-sponsored interest group that collaborated with the state in making policy, thereby giving the state influence over the country’s economic and political life. Fascism more broadly appealed to Perón because it encompassed industrialization, nationalism, authoritarianism, and militarism, that is, many of the elements of nationalistpopulism. It also utilized referenda and demagoguery rather than genuine democracy but entailed recognition of mass popularity. Peronism increasingly became a massive workers’ party, determined to eliminate poverty, but Argentina’s military establishment became its foe. Perón was again elected as president in 1952. After Eva died, Perón’s vigorous efforts to conscript young Argentinians into the movement led Argentina’s Catholic Church to consider forming its own political party to oppose Peronism. Perón reacted by ceasing to subsidize Catholic schools and trying to legalize divorce and prostitution. Peron’s actions also alienated many officers in the military, who eventually seized power. In 1954, the Catholic Church, opposed to Perón’s legalization of divorce, joined conservative military officers in an unsuccessful effort to oust Perón, but, in September 1955, he was overthrown. As perhaps, his greatest political error, as James W. McGuire argued, “was the government’s failure to leave space for political opposition.”2 Retaining popular support but unable to enter politics, Perón and his followers turned to organizing labor, and Peronistas became Latin America’s most influential labor movement. Thereafter, Peronistas alternated

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political power with military coups, and their hostility dominated Argentine political life. However, radical Peronists leftists calling themselves the Montoneros resorted to terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the 1970s. The so-called Dirty War of that period led the army to “disappear” some thirty thousand Montonero followers. Peronism’s ideology was “a vague blend of nationalism and labourism, expressed in the Justicialist Party founding ‘three banners’ of political sovereignty, economic independence and social justice.”3 Perón had his aides develop a five-year plan that aimed to achieve full employment, increase workers’ pay, trigger significant industrial growth, improve transportation, communication, energy and social infrastructure, and diversify the Argentine economy. “Perón was a populist politician who provided for and was supported by the masses, yet his regime was in many ways authoritarian.” Katherine J. Wolfenden argued that Perón “exploited the poor to get and to stay in power, and enacted progressive reforms, but he did so in ways that were calculated to maintain his control of the country…. At the same time, by recognizing industrial workers as legitimate citizens and by uniting and then supporting them as a social and political class, Perón brought the urban masses into politics and paved the way for increased political participation.”4 During the following period of two military dictatorships, interrupted by two civilian governments, the Peronist party was outlawed and Perón was exiled in 1955. Nevertheless, as of 2015, of “the presidential elections since 1946 in which Peronists were permitted to run, they won nine, losing only two.”5 After Perón’s follower Héctor José Cámpora was elected Argentina’s president in 1973, Perón returned and thereafter was elected to a third term as president. After he died in 1974, his third wife Isabel, who had been his vice president, became Argentina’s president. Presidents Carlos Saúl Menem (1989–1999), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (2001–2002), Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), Néstor Kirchner (2003– 2007), Cristina Kirchner (2007–2015), and Alberto Fernández (2019–), with Cristina Kirchner, despite having been tainted with corruption as president, as his vice president, were all heirs of Juan Perón. The Peronistas triumphed in the 2019 election largely owing the country’s economic difficulties. The country was beset by debt. The value of its currency had plummeted, and inflation along with poverty had soared. “When we have a [government] that excludes Peronism, we always go back to Peronism,” argued Felipe Solá, a long-time Peronista. “Because that is [our] model of national survival.”6

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Among leading left-wing populist leaders in Latin America were Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl, both communists, Fidel came to power in 1959 after a lengthy guerrilla war led to the overthrow of U.S.-backed military dictator Fulgencio Batista. Thereafter, Cuba was allied with the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War. Fidel eliminated other political parties and politicians, establishing a one-party, socialist state under communist rule that emphasized economic equality. Fidel served as Cuba’s president and prime minister and was First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party between 1961 and 2011 and was succeeded in that position by and his brother, Raúl, who stepped down in 2018. Venezuela and Bolivarianism Elsewhere, the left-wing populist Hugo Chávez served as president of oilrich Venezuela from 1919 and 2013. Chávez led what he called the “Bolivarian Revolution,” a socialist political movement, named after Simón Bolívar, the nineteenth-century leader of an independence movement from Spain. Chávez secretly established the Bolivarian movement within the Venezuelan army in the 1980s, and like other populists, rejected democracy. According to Chávez, the Bolivarian ideology fostered nationalism and a state-controlled economy. After Chávez assumed power in Venezuela in 1999, he established a constitution that imposed a socialist economy that was paid for with Venezuela’s oil revenue. Chávez rejected democracy and pursued authoritarian policies that he believed fostered the philosophy of Simón Bolívar including the violent overthrow of democratic and/or capitalist governments. However, although he viewed his ideology as a means for regime change across Latin America, it was copied in only a few countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador and did not achieve traction in countries that continued to uphold the norms of the liberal order. Bolivarianism eroded democracy and fostered authoritarianism. Chávez, however, considered Bolivarianism as a populist form of democracy featuring state intervention in economic life. In 2004, Venezuela and Cuba established the leftist populist group, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), later renamed the Alliance, that Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and a number of small Caribbean countries joined. Prominent leftist populists such as Chávez, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador were spokesmen of Bolivarianism, but its ideas

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ran far deeper, infecting such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay as well. Evo Morales was of Aymara ethnicity and was elected Bolivia’s president in 2006. He was that country’s first indigenous leader and indigenous tribal groups were his “real” or “authentic” people. His policies of “communitarian socialism” increased tensions between the country’s indigenous and non-indigenous citizens. While serving a second term in office, Morales initially said he would not run for a third term in 2014, but changed his mind. Bolivia’s constitutional prohibited a president from serving more than two consecutive terms, thereby precluding Morales from running for a third term. However, after disruptive protests, Bolivia’s constitutional court removed term limits for the presidency, claiming it did not apply to Morales, because his second term had preceded the ratification of the 2009 constitution, a decision upheld in December 2018 by the Supreme Electoral Court. The decision triggered widespread protests among his foes, but allowed Morales to run for reelection in 2019. Bolivians, mainly supporters of Morales, brought the country to a standstill in August 2020 by blockading some seventy roads to protest a delay in deciding an election in which Morales won a plurality but which had not reached the required majority of voters. The election was then “fixed” to achieve the necessary majority, thereby avoiding a run-off between Morales and his closest contender. In Venezuela, Chávez’s left-wing populist policies included the redistribution of land and wealth from the rich to the rural poor and improving education and medical access, while emulating Castro’s Cuba in establishing state control over political life and the economy. In 2006, after winning the presidential election for the third time, Chávez obtained parliamentary approval to nationalize key economic sectors, beginning with oil and telecommunications. When U.S. oil companies, Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhilips, refused to surrender areas they owned in the Orinoco Belt to the Venezuelan government, it expropriated them. Chávez was anti-American and consistently opposed what he called American imperialism. Consequently, Washington regarded him as a threat and supported an unsuccessful coup to overthrow him in 2002. According to Venezuelan academic, Leopoldo E. Colmenares Gutiérrez, “Chávez’s plan was characterized by a hostile and confrontational posture toward the United States,” and his Bolivarian Revolution “was characterized by a hostile and confrontational posture toward the United States, actions designed to export Chávez´s autocratic, socialist model to

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other countries of the region,”7 including support for the violent Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Chávez also cultivated close relations with Russia. In 2006, he negotiated a multi-billion arms deal with Russia that involved Venezuela’s purchase of fighter jets and helicopters. He also negotiated a deal with Russia to develop jointly Venezuela’s oil and gas resources. Chávez established PetroCaribe to extend his country’s influence by providing Venezuelan oil to Caribbean countries, especially communist Cuba, at discount prices, while seeking to foster popular unrest in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. On two occasions in 2008 and 2013, Chávez organized joint military maneuvers with Russia during which, Russian Tu-160 intercontinental bombers landed in Venezuela, creating concern and anger in Washington. “If the Russian long-distance planes that fly around the world need to land at some Venezuelan landing strip, they are welcome, we have no problems,”8 Chávez said. He defended his military ties with Russia, claiming he feared an American invasion and arguing that Venezuela needed Russia as an ally to help deter the United States. After the death of Chávez in 2013, he was succeeded by Nicolás Maduro, the country’s vice president. In addition to virtually destroying the country’s economy and crushing virtually all political opposition, Maduro retained Chávez’s foreign policies and political ideology. Two days after talks with Russian President Putin, two Tu-160 Russian strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons flew 6,200 miles, landing at Maiquetia airport near Caracas in Venezuela in a show of Russian support for Venezuela’s embattled leader. This infuriated Washington. America’s angry Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted, “The Russian and Venezuelan people should see this for what it is: two corrupt governments squandering public funds, and squelching liberty and freedom while their people suffer.” This led a Russian spokesman to respond, “As for the idea that we are squandering money, we do not agree. It’s not really appropriate for a country half of whose defense budget could feed the whole of Africa to be making such statements.” Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza termed Pompeo’s comments “not only disrespectful, but cynical,” alluding to overseas U.S. military bases. “It’s strange the U.S. government questions our right to cooperate on defense and security with other countries, when @realDonaldTrump publicly threatens us with a military invasion,”9 For its part, the United States, along with many other states, recognized Juan Gerardo Guaidó, President of Venezuela’s National Assembly,

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as the country’s legitimate, though largely powerless, president. Although Venezuela had the most oil reserves in the world, Venezuela’s state oil company, Petròleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), which had provided 95% of the country’s export revenue, had virtually collapsed in the face of inadequate capital investment, corruption, incompetence, falling global oil prices, and multinational sanctions owing to the government’s violence against protesters. In February 2019, U.S. refiner Citgo Petroleum Corp, the country’s largest foreign asset, ended ties with Venezuela’s state-run oil firm, making it necessary for the oil-rich country to import necessary refined energy products. In 2019 alone, Venezuela’s oil exports fell by a third in the face of sanctions. Chávez had previously established close links with Iran to acquire oil that it could no longer produce at home, thereby aiding Tehran to evade American and European economic sanctions aimed at bringing an end to Iran’s program to acquire nuclear weapons. Also, Russia’s state oil company Rosneft became the main purchaser of Venezuelan oil, thereafter exporting it to India and China. Maduro intensified his country’s anti-Americanism and increased its isolation. He encouraged criminal activities, especially drug smuggling by transnational networks linked to his government. This led America’s Justice Department to bring charges against Maduro and his associates in March 2020. “The Venezuelan regime, once led by Nicolás Maduro, remains plagued by criminality and corruption,” declared Attorney General William P. Barr. “For more than 20 years, Maduro and a number of high-ranking colleagues allegedly conspired with the FARC, causing tons of cocaine to enter and devastate American communities. Today’s announcement is focused on rooting out the extensive corruption within the Venezuelan government – a system constructed and controlled to enrich those at the highest levels of the government. The United States will not allow these corrupt Venezuelan officials to use the U.S. banking system to move their illicit proceeds from South America nor further their criminal schemes.”10 Bolivarianism Elsewhere In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, a Marxist trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba, became a leader of the leftist Sandistas who had overthrown the U.S.-supported dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979. Thereafter, Ortega became leader of the ruling Junta of National Reconstruction, and in 1984 Ortega easily won Nicaragua’s presidential election. However, after

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the Sandinistas provided weapons to leftist Salvadoran rebels, the Reagan administration aided the anti-Sandinista Contras in a civil war that lasted until 1987. Although unsuccessful in several subsequent elections for president, Ortega was finally returned to office in 2006, and became an increasingly repressive dictator who remained in power as of 2021. After taking office in Ecuador in 2007 and serving until 2017, Rafael Correa, another leftist populist, raised spending significantly for health care and education and increased subsidies for agriculture. Like other leftwing Latin American populists, Correa, who served until 2017, pursued anti-American policies, and Ecuador’s London embassy gave WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange asylum for almost seven years. In Honduras, President Manuel Zelaya (2006–2009) was a demagogue who broadcast propaganda on radio and television for two hours or more every day and aided and obtained the support from rural farmers. In 2008 Honduras joined Alba, the Bolivarian alliance. However, the populist Zelaya went too far in 2009 when he organized a referendum that had been declared illegal by the Honduran Supreme Court to change the constitution and allow him to seek reelection. Thus, on June 28, 2009— the day the referendum was to be held—army officers ousted him from office. Chávez’s Bolivarianism had initiated to “a ‘pink tide’ that rolled over much of South America after the turn of the millennium with a number of left-wing governments winning elections,”11 and riding “a wave of popularity based on generous government spending that was underpinned by the commodities boom…. But leftist rule in most countries came to an inglorious end when the bubble burst.”12 However, Bolivarian ideas influenced Pablo Iglesias, a Spanish political scientist, who opposed the spread of neoliberal economic globalization. They worked with Latin American leftist populists including Correa and Morales, and Iglesias and his followers established a populist political party they named Podemos (“We Can”). Brazil: From Lula to Bolsonaro In Brazil, a left-wing populist government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva governed between 2003 and 2011. “Lula,” as he became known, was a founding member of Brazil’s Workers’ Party and ran for the presidency three times—1989, 1994, 1998—before being elected in 2002. Although moderating his tone, Lula governed with his eye on Brazil’s grassroots

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citizens offering a program aimed at ending corruption, enhancing the economy, and enacting social reforms. As his first term ended, crime, corruption, and inadequate education remained key issues. Although members of his Workers’ Party had been tainted by corruption, Lula was not implicated, and he won a decisive victory in the second round of voting in 2006. Lula remained extraordinarily popular during his second term, and Brazil’s economy thrived. Oil was discovered, and Brazil was chosen to host the 2016 summer Olympics. Brazil’s constitution precluded a third consecutive term as Brazil’s president, and Lula selected his chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, to succeed him. Promising to continue Lula’s populist policies, especially the Growth Acceleration Program, Rousseff was elected as Brazil’s first woman president. She was reelected in 2014, but shortly afterward found herself confronting a massive scandal involving kickbacks by Brazilian corporations and the Workers’ Party to officials of Petrobras, the country’s state-owned oil company. Among the many official and politicians who were arrested was Lula’s former chief of staff. Thereafter, Lula himself was caught up in the investigation, and in March 2016 he was charged with money laundering regarding hiding ownership of a luxury apartment that had been paid for by a construction company. Although Rousseff tried to protect Lula by appointing him her chief of staff, a judge blocked the appointment, which would have legally exempted him from prosecution and revealed a phone conversation that indicated she was trying to protect him. Thereafter, President Rousseff was impeached, and, although Lula proclaimed his innocence, he was tried and was convicted in July 2017. Despite subsequent appeals all the way to Brazil’s Supreme Court, Lula’s conviction was upheld, thereby legally precluding his running for the presidency in 2018. In April 2018, Lula was imprisoned. Nevertheless, he remained enormously popular, and in August, the Workers’ Party nominated him as its candidate for the presidency. However, after Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court declared that Lula was ineligible to run, the party had to nominate Lula’s running mate, Fernando Haddad, a former mayor of São Paulo, who was easily defeated by Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro, a right-wing nationalist-populist, became Brazil’s president in 2019. He had copied Trump’s example in temperament, tactics, and style during his campaign, exploiting Brazil’s racial and social divisions to become president. After Bolsonaro, whose followers called him “Trump of the Tropics,” was elected in 2018, Trump phoned to congratulate him.

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Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso explained, “Bolsonaro surfed a tsunami of popular anger and despair that swept away the entire Brazilian political system, along with the old party leaders. He was able to do so because of the people’s growing suspicion that representative democracy is incapable of delivering what they need.”13 His supporters included white supremacists, and one declared, “We don’t have a social debt to blacks. We need to be responsible for ourselves.” “Bolsonaro’s slogan,” wrote an observer, “is ‘Brazil before everything, and God above all,’”14 a variant of Trump’s “make America great again.” Perhaps, the most destructive evidence of Bolsonaro’s nationalism was his encouragement of Brazilian landowners to step up the burning and clearing of the Amazon rainforest in order to provide more land for loggers, ranchers, and miners. The Amazon jungle, frequently termed the world’s “lungs,” absorbed large amounts of carbon dioxide and thereby fights global warming. By contrast, the burning of the rainforest released large amounts of carbon dioxide, while destroying the habitat of endangered species of animals and plants that might have medicinal or genetic value, and reducing the living space of indigenous peoples. “Where there is Indigenous land,” Bolsonaro said, “there is wealth underneath it,” and “The Indigenous person can’t remain in his land as if he were some prehistoric creature.”15 Thus, instead of protecting indigenous peoples, Bolsonaro supported legislation to overturn the country’s constitutional protection of them, cut funding for the National Indian Foundation, the agency responsible for upholding those indigenous rights, and supported oil and gas exploration and hydropower plants on their land. Bolsonaro also argued that it was a “fallacy” to describe the Amazon as belonging to the entire world humanity and a “misconception” that the rainforest was the world’s lungs. “Using and resorting to these fallacies, certain countries, instead of helping … behaved in a disrespectful manner and with a colonialist spirit,” and “They even called into question that which we hold as a most sacred value, our sovereignty.”16 “Deforestation and fires will never end,” Bolsonaro told reporters. “It’s cultural.”17 However, in 2020, under pressure from the EU, foreign investors, and Brazilian companies, Bolsonaro outlawed forest fires for the four months of the dry season during which fires had been intentionally started to clear land for cattle grazing and planting crops and ordered the armed forces to prevent deforestation and illegal mining and logging. His shift owed much to finalizing of a trade deal with the EU, acquiring membership

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in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and retaining private foreign investment in Brazilian companies. Bolsonaro paid an official visit to Washington in 2019. On meeting Trump, he declared, “We do have a great deal of shared values. I admire President Donald Trump,”18 Prior to Bolsonaro’s arrival, Stephen Bannon had hosted an event for Olavo de Carvalho. Carvalho, who was Bolsonaro’s adviser, “writes and rants against ‘cultural Marxism’ and climate change, immigrants and Islam…”19 His influence on Bolsonaro had earned him the title “Bolsonaro’s Bannon,” owing to Bolsonaro’s repeated claims that Carvalho had inspired his racism, sexism, and homophobia. Moreover, in an effort to rally his base of right-wingers and evangelicals seeking to gather in churches after several weeks of quarantine, Bolsonaro became a COVID-19 denier, encouraging citizens, especially the thirty-eight million Brazilians who were in the country’s vast informal economy, to leave their homes and go to work and congregate. “The virus is there,” he said. “We need to face it like a man, dammit. We will all die someday.”20 He described the deadly virus as a “measly cold,”21 and even spoke enthusiastically at an anti-quarantine protest. Like Trump, he rejected science and saw the virus as more a political than a medical problem, and he fired his minister of health, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, for disagreeing with him. Mandetta had continued advocating social distancing and enforcement of lockdown orders. Bolsonaro himself contracted the illness in early July 2020. Bolsonaro’s adamant position regarding the pandemic isolated him from former allies, most government ministers, and many average Brazilians. The country’s highest court blocked his appointment of a personal friend to head the federal police, who had been investigating his sons for defamation and disinformation campaigns. Brazil’s parliament began investigating Bolsonaro’s efforts to control the police with an eye toward possibly impeaching him. In addition, Brazil’s chief justice authorized investigating into Bolsonaro for alleged corruption and obstruction of justice. Fabrício Queiroz, an aide to Flávio Bolsonaro, one of President Bolsonaro’s sons, was arrested for allegedly siphoning public funds to the Bolsonaro family. Moreover, Queiroz’s daughter had been on the payroll of Bolsonaro’s congressional office between 2016 and 2018, although she was working as a personal trainer elsewhere at the time during which she sent tens of thousands of dollars to her father. Another of the president’s sons, Carlos,

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was also being investigated for improper use of public funds and involvement in a disinformation campaign, while a third, Eduardo, was accused of involvement in the same campaign. “It’s a return to the old political practice of being shielded by judicial maneuvers,” declared a former Brazilian prosecutor. “In Brazil we have a republic of untouchables and a republic for the rest of the population.”22 Bolsonaro was caught on microphone during an April 2020 cabinet meeting declaring that the federal police “want to fuck with my family,”23 seemingly confirming the allegations of Sergio Moro, the former justice minister, who resigned two days after the video was recorded. After Bolsonaro threatened a military takeover, Moro declared “This is destabilizing the country, right during a pandemic,” and “It is reprehensible. The country does not need to be living with this type of threat.”24 The rightwing governor of the country’s most populous province, São Paulo state, João Doria, declared “Do not follow the guidance of the president.”25 To reinforce his political position, Bolsonaro, himself a former military officer, increased the influence of military personnel in his government, perhaps to prepare for a military takeover. “We are not going to tolerate interference — our patience has ended,” he declared in May 2020 to a crowd that called for the removal of a congressional leader. “We have the people on our side, and we have the armed forces on the side of the people.”26 As in Trump’s America, regional leaders were left to fight the pandemic. Doria declared, “The president despises us and attacks us. He has put us in an impossible position by creating a narrative that impedes the protection of people and life. The governors — from the left, center and right — have decided to follow the correct path and maintain the [World Health Organization] protocols.”27 In May 2020 Bolsonaro encouraged anti-democracy demonstrators in front of his presidential palace, as they called for the closing of the Supreme Court and a return to the dictatorship used that had accompanied Brazil’s years of military rule.

Asia We now turn to populism in Asia, starting with China and then turning to the Philippines, India, and Myanmar.

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China At least three of China’s Paramount Leaders have used populist themes to reinforce their authority and force China’s Communist Party and governing institution to change. Beijing’s repression of the Muslim Uighurs and Tibetans were examples of cultural and genetic genocide in which the Buddhist or atheist Han Chinese were regarded as authentic Chinese. It is difficult to show these were populist policies. However, both found approval among the dominant Hans, many of whom settled in non-Han areas of the country. Asian populists in China, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and, to some extent, the Philippines had in common an antipathy toward Islamic minorities. China’s paramount leader for life, President Xi Jinping, was a communist dictator, who encouraged nationalism and blamed foreigners when confronting domestic challenges, and he would not usually be thought of as a populist. However, his genocidal policies toward Muslims in eastern China and Tibetans reflected his belief that the Han Chinese were the “real” or “authentic” people in China. Beijing forced over one million Muslim Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities into huge indoctrination camps in order to make them abandon their traditions, culture, and language. Among the practices that China sought to change were worshipping at mosques, participation in pilgrimages to Mecca, growing beards, maintaining a “heavy religious environment” for their families, having more than one child, seeking passports, and having “suspicious” friends or acquaintances. Tibetans, too, suffered at the hands of the Han Chinese. Although Buddhist, Tibetans were an East Asian ethnic and cultural group of about 6.5 million people, and, like the Uighurs, constituted one of China’s fifty-six non-Han ethnicities. In 1950, a year after the communist triumph in Beijing, China invaded Tibet in part because of its strategic location north of India, and Tibet became a semiautonomous region in China. According to one scholar, “Tibet in 1950 was an isolated, working theocracy, possibly unique among the various political systems of the modern world,” governed by its supreme Dalai Lama (thought to be an incarnation of the Buddha), but “was doomed as a result of conflicting British, Chinese and Russian imperialist interests in Central Asia.” Between 1951 and 1959, “the only contacts the common Tibetans had with the Communists were at were at road camps and on journeys.”28 However, in 1959, an unsuccessful revolt took place that “was

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caused fundamentally by the inevitable clash of two diametrically opposed value systems,” Tibetan Buddhism and atheist communist “democratic reformism.” Thus, “the moment the Chinese tried to alter the functioning and sacred social system in Inner Tibet which they considered de jure China proper, the revolt began”29 in defense of Buddhist values. The Philippines The Philippines was governed by one of the world’s most dictatorial rightwing populists, Rodrigo Duterte, who had made repeated references to cultural identity and nationalism to acquire power and led him to sever the country’s previously close relations with the United States. Like his predecessors, Duterte had to combat a pro-independence insurgency by Muslim Moros in the Mindanao region of the Philippines that began in 1969 and lasted to 2019, and which still erupts from time to time. Nevertheless, Donald Trump expressed his approval of President Duterte, whose policies exemplified the trampling of human rights. Duterte met his country’s drug problem by ordering police to kill drug suspects without a trial. These were largely poor young men living in impoverished slums. Consequently, more than 20,000 suspected Philippine drug offenders were summarily murdered in three years. Instead of criticizing Duterte, Trump phoned Duterte and told him that he was doing an “unbelievable job on the drug problem.”30 Duterte’s response to the coronavirus epidemic was equally violent. The Philippines had suffered the second-highest number of deaths and the second-lowest recovery rate in Southeast Asia. As in Hungary in which parliament had granted Prime Minister Orbán authority to rule by decree, Duterte used the pandemic to undermine his country’s democratic institutions. Despite the opposition of the Philippine congress, he imposed the Bayanihan Act (Republic Act No. 11469), in March 2020, which gave him vast additional authority including control of private medical facilities, public transportation, and government-owned and controlled corporations. In addition, the Enhanced Community Quarantine placed Manila and the entire island of Luzon on lockdown, suspending domestic and international travel, closing most businesses, and imposing a curfew 8 pm and 5 am. Duterte threatened to kill anyone violating the country’s curfew or other rules to cope with the pandemic. “My orders to the police and military … if there is trouble or the situation arises where your life is on

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the line, shoot them dead,” Duterte declared. “Understand? Dead. I’ll send you to the grave. … Don’t test the government.” A police broadcast was even blunter: “Anyone out at the wrong time will be shot, you sons of bitches.”31 “I personally experienced being the victim of the weaponization of the law to silence democratic dissent, a useful tool in the Tyrant’s Toolbox,” declared an imprisoned Philippine politician, and, as a human-rights advocate observed, “The most worrisome aspect of tens of thousands of arrests is that they are thrown into crowded jails and holding areas, which completely eliminates the possibility of social distancing.”32 By contrast, Singapore managed to control the pandemic better than other Asia countries, at least until large numbers of migrant workers in crowded dormitories, many of whom were from Bangladesh or India, became infected. Myanmar Myanmar, too, was steeped in Islamophobia on the part of the country’s Buddhist majority and thus became a model for India’s Hindu extremists. Myanmar’s armed forces were charged with war crimes and/or genocide, and two soldiers confessed to the charge in September 2020 in an ICC hearing. The result was a crisis in neighboring Bangladesh as 723,000 of its Muslim Rohingyas from Myanmar’s Rakhine State fled in 2017. Myanmar’s army killed thousands, although its army, the Tatmadaw, continued to deny it targeted the Rohingyas. Previous violence in 2012 had resulted in confining about 130,000 Rohingya as internally displaced persons in squalid camps in Sittwe, where they remained without freedom of movement. Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for encouraging human rights and democracy and had become Myanmar’s first State Counsellor, repeatedly denied allegations of genocide, thereby greatly disappointing her followers. India India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist followers in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were re-elected for a second five-year term in 2019. Modi had been appointed Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2001 and was assailed for having failed to control and even encouraging anti-Muslim riots in that province in February–March 2002. The riots began after a train caught fire, resulting in the death of a large number of

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Hindus. The event was almost immediately blamed on local Muslims, and Hindu extremists triggered the subsequent violence that led to roughly 2,000 Muslim deaths.33 Although a Special Investigation Team found no evidence of Modi’s culpability personally, Muslims held him responsible for the violence. His policies in Gujarat had fostered economic growth, a factor that would later aid him in running for office. In August 2020, Modi began the construction of a Hindu temple on the site of a destroyed mosque in Ayodhya. This was among his many provocative actions as he sought to transform India from a secular democracy into a Hindu nationalist country. During his 2019 campaign, Modi and the BJP repeatedly assailed India’s Muslim minority, and Modi’s muscular approach to Pakistan and Kashmir was among the leading reasons for his re-election. He unilaterally rescinded the constitutional autonomy of Kashmiris to make their own laws, eroding the rights of Muslims in that region. By eliminating a law that barred non-residents from buying land in Kashmir and Jammu, the constitutional change permitted an influx of Hindus into the province as part of Modi’s effort to encourage a demographic shift there in which Hindus would outnumber Muslims. Although the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) had given nonMuslim migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh a path to citizenship, Modi also established the all-India National Register of Citizens to identify “foreigners.” This required Muslims to “prove” their citizenship, although many Indian-born Muslims lacked the documentation to show they were citizens. Combined with other laws that brought the citizenship of many of India’s own people into doubt, the CAA triggered violent demonstrations among India’s large Muslim minority as well as among many secular Hindus. In the year after the CAA updated India’s National Register of Citizens, the official register of Indian citizens in Assam, a northeastern province bordering Bangladesh, excluded 1.9 million people, primarily Muslim Bengalis, leaving them effectively stateless. An Indian constitutional expert argued the new laws were a movement toward “an arrangement where citizenship is centered on the idea of blood and soil, rather than on the idea of birth.”34 According to Snigda Poonam, “Jai Shri Ram” (Victory to Lord Ram, a Hindu god) had become “a Hindu chauvinist slogan but also as a threat to anyone who dares to challenge Hindu supremacy.”35 “I could be lynched right now and nobody would do anything about it,” said one Muslim.36 Hindu anger at and violence

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toward India’s 200 million Muslims was further intensified by claims that an Islamic seminary was spreading the coronavirus. The Muslim group, Tablighi Jamaat, had sponsored a large meeting of preachers in March 2020. By late 2020, the coronavirus had shattered India’s once vibrant economy, threatening to send two-hundred million people back into poverty. Notwithstanding criticism of Muslims, the blame was increasingly placed on Modi’s lockdown of the country and premature reopening it. Hindus referred to Modi as “our Trump,” and, during his campaign, he encouraged anti-Muslim polarization. Like other populists, Modi undermined India’s democratic institutions, notably its court system, political parties, and the media. He closed the media in Kashmir after annexing it and shut down TV channels and/or increasingly pressured advertisers not to use media that criticized his government, described the increasingly violent unrest caused by the government’s anti-Muslim laws, or reported the effects of his lockdown of the country’s 1.3 billion inhabitants in response to COVID-19. Modi’s attack on India’s vast and previously lively media also produced self-censorship among the country’s journalists. Rajdeep Sardesai, a leading news anchor, concluded, “A large section of the Indian media has become a lap dog, not a watchdog,” and Shakuntala Banaji, a professor of media and communication, declared “In the past six years, the Indian media has deteriorated. There is no semblance of truth or responsibility left in the vast majority of media reports.”37 Modi’s Islamophobia spread to the Hindu diaspora elsewhere and attracted the support of right-wing populists in the West.38 Modi’s foes argued that he was undermining India’s vibrant democracy, and his anti-Muslim populism appeared to do so. However, the country’s institutions like its judiciary and parliament remained strong, and good governance reinforced “middle democracy.” Subrata K. Mitra focused on the “perception” of Modi’s anti-democratic actions, arguing that in India, “where partisanship is based not on long-term party identification but short-term opportunity, these factors, thanks to a combination of low trust and high citizen efficacy, get easily transformed into mass protest. This explains the paradoxical resilience of India’s flawed democracy that neither rises to the Scandinavian heights of full democracy, nor goes down to a hybrid democracy or worse. I call it India’s ‘middle democracy’ trap.”39

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Iran Iran’s theocratic leaders were also populists. They claimed that true Muslims were Shia and emphasized that most Iranians were Shia Muslims and were Persian rather than Arab. Iranian leaders have repressed Iran’s Arab minority, supported the Shia terrorist group Hezbollah, both in its effort to aid Syria’s al-Assad regime and aiding that regime by providing it with funds and arms. Iran’s pro-Shia policies extended to supporting Lebanese Shia political groups like Amal in addition to Hezbollah as well as Shias in Bahrain and the Zaidi-Shia Houthi movement in Yemen’s seemingly endless civil war that began in 2004. Tehran also provided aid to Iraqi Shia militias in their struggle with the Islamic State and acquired considerable influence over Shia politicians and parties in that country. If Tehran developed nuclear weapons, those would surely be described as “Shia” bombs and/or missiles. If this occurred, Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states would almost certainly develop “Sunni” bombs and missiles. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman publicly stated that Saudi Arabia would acquire nuclear weapons if Iran acquired them, and, with China’s help, was building a nuclear reactor. Satellite photos taken in spring 2020 revealed that the Saudis had placed a roof over its reactor and had not asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the site and inspect the reactor’s design as required under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that it had signed. Moreover, The Guardian claimed that western intelligence sources believed that the “Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the Pakistani nuclear programme, and in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal (five to six warheads) off the shelf if things got tough in the neighbourhood.”40

Middle East Egypt and Nasser Among the most significant of the region’s nationalist-populist leaders was Egypt’s Gamel Abdel Nasser, as was his successor Anwar Sadat. As Saadedine Ibrahim, an Egyptian political activist, recalled: “One of the very early phrases that Nasser coined was addressing the common man: ‘Raise your head fellow brother, the end of colonialism has come.’ And that is the kind of language, message that echoed very deeply with the average man, because it was a simple language and people who were downtrodden, people who were beaten, mistreated, felt worthless, began

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to gain that kind of confidence, spirit that they didn’t have before.”41 More recently, during the Arab Spring, the elected President Mohamed Morsi, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, sought to encourage populist policies before being overthrown by in a military coup. Israel and Netanyahu Before Israel’s 2019 elections, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu cultivated nationalist-populist leaders ranging from Trump and Putin to Orba˙ n, and they aided him diplomatically and politically. He was indicted for fraud, breach of trust and bribery, sought to limit the independence of Israel’s Supreme Court, and shut Israel’s public broadcasting station. He derided Israel’s Arab minority, annexed the Golan Heights, and said he planned to annex areas of the occupied West Bank. Additional symbolic support from the Trump administration was evident in Secretary of State Pompeo’s precedent-breaking visit to illegal Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights and the West Bank in November 2020. Regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, as with other issues, Trump ignored professional diplomats, while trusting his family’s advice. Thus, instead of consulting professional advisers familiar with the region, he assigned his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who like Trump had no diplomatic or regional experience, to lead an effort to break the IsraeliPalestinian stalemate. Previous presidents had sought to mediate the Palestinian-Israeli imbroglio and avoid taking sides. Trump made no effort to do so. He recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moved the U.S. embassy there, refused to endorse a two-state solution, and no longer regarded Israeli settlements as violating international law. He also recognized Israel’s illegal annexation of the Golan Heights, providing cover for Netanyahu just before an Israeli election. Trump’s action was intended to aid Netanyahu, who was seeking reelection despite his indictment. Kushner revealed the Trump administration’s plan in January 2020 after Netanyahu and his electoral opponent Benny Gantz were consulted in Washington. If Israel accepted the plan, Netanyahu planned to annex settlements in the West Bank and part of the Jordan Valley that would encircle a small divided Palestinian non-sovereign entity and undermine the Oslo Accords that had made the Palestine Liberation Organization sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, governing the West Bank after 1994 through the Palestinian Authority.

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Ironically, Netanyahu’s annexation plan facilitated an improvement of Israeli-Arab relations. In August 2020, Israel “suspended” the annexation in exchange for “full normalization of relations” with the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—the Abraham Accords—as part of an effort to improve relations with the Arab states and forestall a possible break in relations with Egypt and Jordan if it had gone forward with the annexation. In addition to diplomatic recognition, the UAE-Israeli agreement also encompassed investment, tourism, security, technology, energy, and flights between the two countries and led to U.S. sales of highly sophisticated warplanes to the UAE. Bahrain followed the UAE, indicating that other Arab states might establish formal relations with Israel. Thereafter, Sudan normalized trade with Israel in return for which the U.S. removed Sudan from its list of states sponsoring terrorism, and Morocco, too, normalized relations with Israel in exchange for U.S. recognition of that country’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, ending America’s forth years of neutrality on that issue and a violation of legal norms. The UAEIsrael agreement was a major setback to the cause of an independent Palestinian state and was partly a consequence of their joint opposition to Iran. It also offered Israel profits from an oil pipeline built in Israel decades earlier that would enable Persian Gulf states to offload oil from supertankers that are too large to pass through the Suez Canal. Although the plan aimed to improve the electoral prospects of Trump and Netanyahu, neither candidate won Israel’s 2020 election, and Netanyahu and Gantz agreed to rotate the post of prime minister. Israel’s judiciary determined that Netanyahu could remain prime minister despite his indictment for corruption. Although Netanyahu had been praised for his initial response to the coronavirus, he was later besieged by Israeli protesters, who were angered at the resurgence of the pandemic. The resulting tension between the two brought down the government in late December 2020 with a fourth election in two years scheduled for March 2021. For his part, Trump continued to praise Netanyahu in order to increase his electoral prospects with America’s Jewish and evangelical Christian voters. However, the Biden administration and/or Congress may remove the incentives for the Abraham Accords, thereby leaving those countries that had endorsed them in the lurch. No Palestinians accepted Kushner’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan, and Israel cannot be both a Jewish state and a democracy while governing over two million more Palestinians. Palestinian Administration President Abbas angrily declared he was freed from

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commitments made in the Oslo accords, including security cooperation with Israel in the West Bank and its more than two million Palestinians. Israeli annexation would have surely produced violence, but this prospect was further reduced after the PLO again began to accept taxes it was owed by Israel and once more pay Palestinian police to help maintain security in the West Bank. “Cut from the same political cloth, Trump and Netanyahu have forged a symbiotic alliance,” argued Shalom Lipner. “Trump’s benevolence toward Israel — attributed singularly to Netanyahu’s success in cultivating his friendship — buoys the prime minister’s prospects. And when he responds gratefully by heaping praise on Trump, Netanyahu bolsters the president’s standing among his core Republican and evangelical supporters.”42 Comparing the two, Thomas Friedman wrote, “They are both men utterly without shame, backed by parties utterly without spine, protected by big media outlets utterly without integrity.”43

Conclusions The evolution and impact of populism in the global south varied by region and country. Much of the global south was endangered not only by the novel coronavirus but by mass starvation owing to lockdowns and social distancing that broke production chains and reduced income for millions, especially poor laborers, as well as the collapse of oil prices, no tourism, shortages of hard currency to buy imports, the end of remittances home from workers living abroad, and climate change and the catastrophes like drought that it causes. In Latin America, for example, the coronavirus threatened democracies, partly because their economies depended so heavily on trade and the export of commodities. The coronavirus crisis gave “populist leaders the opportunity to use the tools of the state to sideline the opposition and build in unfair political advantages. And it could also give the growing ranks of budding autocrats in the region pretense to delay elections, suspend freedom of assembly and speech, and shut down institutions like congress and the courts.”44

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Notes 1. Cited in “What Is Peronism?” telesurtv.net, November 10, 2014, https://www.telesurenglish.net/analysis/What-is-Peronism-201411110014.html%20What%20Is%20Peronism?. 2. James W. McGuire, Peronism Without Perón: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 73. 3. Bello, “The Persistence of Peronism,” The Economist, October 15, 2015. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2015/10/15/the-per sistence-of-peronism. 4. Katherine J. Wolfenden, “Perón and the People: People’s Democracy and Authoritarianism in Juan Perón’s Argentina,” Inquiries 5:2 (2013), https://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/728/peron-and-thepeople-democracy-and-authoritarianism-in-juan-perons-argentina. 5. Bello, “The Persistence of Peronism.” 6. Cited in Anthony Faiola, “Argentina’s Economy Is Collapsing. Here Come the Peronistas, Again,” Washington Post, October 23, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/argentinas-eco nomy-is-collapsing-here-come-the-peronistas-again/2019/10/23/c83 b3f04-f131-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.html. 7. Leopoldo E. Colmenares Gutiérrez, “Criminal Networks in Venezuela: Their Impact on Hemispheric Security,” Military Review, January– February 2016, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/militaryreview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art012.pdf, p. 54. 8. Cited in “What Is Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution?” TRTWorld, January 24, 2019. https://www.trtworld.com/americas/what-is-venezu ela-s-bolivarian-revolution-23587. 9. Cited in Andrew Osborn, “Russian Nuclear-Capable Bomber Aircraft Fly to Venezuela, Angering U.S.,” Reuters, December 11, 2018, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-russia-airforce/russian-nuclear-cap able-bomber-aircraft-fly-to-venezuela-angering-u-s-idUSKBN1OA23L 10. “Nicholas Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges,” I.S. Department of Justice, March 26, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-moros-and14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism. 11. Michael Reid, “Obama and Latin America: A Promising Day in the Neighborhood,” Foreign Affairs 94:5 (September/October 2015), p. 46. 12. Michael Albertus, “The Coronavirus Will Cause New Crises in Latin America,” Foreign Policy, April 6, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2020/04/06/the-coronavirus-will-cause-new-crises-in-latin-america/? utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20797& utm_term=Editor#39;s%20Picks%20OC&?tpcc=20797.

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13. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “How the Unthinkable Happened Is Brazil,” Washington Post, October 29, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/10/29/bolsonaro/?utm_ term=.f5a3b44a8b53. See also Bello, “The Apprecentice President of Brazil, The Economist, March 30, 2019, p. 41. 14. Cited in Anthony Faiola and Marina Lopes, “’Just Like Trump’: Bolsonaro Leads Brazil’s Presidential Race with Right-Wing Populist Pitch,” Washington Post, October 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/the_americas/just-like-trump-bolsonaro-leads-brazils-pre sidential-race-with-right-wing-populist-pitch/2018/10/04/c4ba3728c65c-11e8-9c0f-2ffaf6d422aa_story.html?utm_term=.823288a8bc2c&wpi src=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 15. Cited in Ernesto Londoño and Letícia Casado, “As Bolsonaro Keeps Amazon Vows, Brazil’s Indigenous Fear ‘Ethnocide’,” New York Times, April 19, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/19/world/ame ricas/bolsonaro-brazil-amazon-indigenous.html?campaign_id=2&emc= edit_th_200419&instance_id=17771&nl=todaysheadlines®i_id=433 2168&segment_id=25495&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4 382ea. 16. Cited in “Amazon’s Rainforest Belongs to Brazil, Say Bolsonaro,” BBC News, September 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-49815731. 17. Cited in Marina Lopes, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Calls Deforestation ‘Cultural,’ Says It ‘Will Never End’,” Washington Post, November 20, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazils-bolson aro-calls-amazon-deforestation-cultural-says-it-will-never-end/2019/11/ 20/ba536498-0ba3-11ea-8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html. 18. Cited in Anne Gearan, “Trump Sees a Lot to Like in Brazil’s Unapologetically Far-Right, Nationalist Leader,” Washington Post, March 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-sees-a-lot-tolike-in-brazils-unapologetically-far-right-nationalist-leader/2019/03/19/ bcd1542c-4a4d-11e9-9663-00ac73f49662_story.html?utm_term=.5ea 491362efe&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 19. Travis Waldron, “Brazil President’s U.S. Visit Kicks Off With Steve Bannon-Sponsored Paranoia Fest,” Huffpost, March 18, 2019, https:// www.huffpost.com/entry/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-steve-bannon-olavode-carvalho_n_5c8fb5a1e4b0d50544fe2318?ncid=engmodushpmg000 00004&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 20. Cited in Bryan Harris and Andres Schipani, “Bolsonaro Doubles Down on Denialism,” Financial Times, April 1, 2020, https://www.ft.com/con tent/36020f3c-cf50-427b-a83a-bda122bec593. 21. Cited in Ernesto Londoño, Manuela Andreoni and Letícia Casado, “Bolsonaro, Isolated and Defiant, Dismisses Coronavirus Threato Brazil,”

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28. 29. 30.

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New York Times, April 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/ 01/world/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-coronavirus.html?campaign_id=2& emc=edit_th_200402&instance_id=17267&nl=todaysheadlines®i_id= 4332168&segment_id=23587&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb0 2c4382ea. Cited in Ernesto Londoño, Manuela Andreoni and Letícia Casado, “‘A Family Business:’ Graft Investigation Threatens Brazil’s Bolsonaro,” New York Times, August 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/ world/americas/brazil-bosonaro-corruption.html?campaign_id=2&emc= edit_th_20200829&instance_id=21739&nl=todaysheadlines®i_id= 4332168&segment_id=37150&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb0 2c4382ea. Cited in Tom Phillips and Dom Phillips, “Bolsonaro Claims Police Are Persecuting in a Foul-Mouthed Rant-Reports,” The Guardian, May 12, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/12/jair-bolson aro-claims-police-persecuting-family-foul-mouthed-rant-reports#img-1. Cited in Simon Romero, Letícia Casado, and Manuela Andreoni, “Threat of Military Actions Rattles Brazil as Virus Deaths Surge,” New York Times, June 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/world/ americas/bolsonaro-coup-coronavirus-brazil.html?campaign_id=2&emc= edit_th_200610&instance_id=19251&nl=todaysheadlines®i_id=433 2168&segment_id=30516&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30a. Cited in Dom Phillips, “Bolsonaro Ignored by State Governors Amid Anger at Handling in Covid-19 Crisis,” The Guardian, April 1, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01/brazil-bolsonaroignored-by-state-governors-amid-anger-at-handling-of-covid-19-crisis. Cited in Terrence McCoy and Heloísa Traiano, “As Brazil’s Challenges Multiply, Bolsonaro’s Fans Call for a Military Takeover,” Washington Post, May 12, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/ brazil-bolsonaro-military-takeover-coronavirus/2020/05/11/935b680e8fce-11ea-a9c0-73b93422d691_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_todays_ worldview&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_tod ayworld. Cited in Matt Sandy and Flávia Milhorance, “Brazil’s President Still Insists the Coronavirus Is Overgrown. These Governors Are Fighting Back,” Time, April 6, 2020, https://time.com/5816243/brazil-jair-bol sonaro-coronavirus-governors/?utm_campaign=wp_todays_worldview& utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld. Dawa Norbu, “The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation,” China Quarterly 77 (March 1979), pp. 74, 78. Ibid., pp. 80, 81, 82. Cited in David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Praises Duterte for Philippine Drug Crackdown in Call Transcript,” New York Times, May

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32. 33. 34.

35.

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38.

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23, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/us/politics/trumpduterte-phone-transcript-philippine-drug-crackdown.html. Cited in Lynzy Billing, “Duterte’s Response to the Coronavirus: ‘Shoot Them Dead’,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2020, https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/04/16/duterte-philippines-coronavirus-response-shootthem-dead/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign= 20946&utm_term=Editors%20Picks%20OC&. Cited in ibid. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Clash Within Democracy: Religious Violence, and India’s Future (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 2. Cited in Aatish Taseer, “India Is No Longer India: Exile in the Time of Modi,” The Atlantic, May 20, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ magazine/archive/2020/05/exile-in-the-age-of-modi/609073/?utm_ campaign=wp_todays_worldview&utm_medium=email&utm_source=new sletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld. Snigda Poonam, “The 3 Most Polarizing Words in India,” Foreign Policy, February 13, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/13/jaishri-ram-india-hindi/. Cited in Jeffrey Gettleman, Kai Schultz, Suhasini Raj and Hari Kumar, “Under Modi, a Hindu Nationalist Surge Has Further Divided India,” New York Times, April 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/ 11/world/asia/modi-india-elections.html?module=inline. Cited in Vindu Goel and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Under Modi, India’s Press Is Not So Free Anymore,” New York Times, April 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/asia/modi-indiapress-media.html?smid=em-share. Steven Zhou, “From India, Islamophobia Goes Global,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/india-islamopho bia-global-bjp-hindu-nationalism-canada/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_ medium=email&utm_campaign=22789&utm_term=Editors%20Picks% 20OC&?tpcc=22789. Subrata K. Mitra, “For India, ‘Middle’ Democracy Works,” AsiaNow, March 2020, italics in original, https://www.globalasia.org/v15no1/ cover/for-india-middle-democracy-works_subrata-k-mitra. Julian Borger, “Pakistan’s Bomb and Saudi Arabia,” The Guardian, May 11, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-global-sec urity-blog/2010/may/11/pakistan-saudiarabia. Cited in “Arab Unity: Nasser’s Revolution,” Al Jazeera, June 20, 2008, https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200 852517252821627.html. Shalom Lipner, “Mr. Netanyahu Goes to Washington,” Atlantic Council, March 24, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlant icist/netanyahu-trump-washington?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1.

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43. Thomas L. Friedman, “Bibi Trump and Donald Netanyahu,” New York Times, April 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/opi nion/netanyahu-trump-israel-election.html?emc=edit_th_190411&nl=tod aysheadlines&nlid=43321680411. 44. “The Coronavirus Will Cause New Crises in Latin America.”

Questions Multiple Choice 1. Unlike the United States, Latin American populism was dominated by which of the follow groups, at least until Jair Bolsonaro assumed office in Brazil? a. Alt-Right b. Leftist c. Neo-Nazis d. Classic Liberals 2. What Argentinian group increasingly became a massive workers’ party, determined to eliminate poverty? a. Republicans b. Stalinist c. Military Establishment d. Peronistas 3. Fidel eliminated other political parties and politicians, developing a socialist state under communist rule that emphasized economic equality, and created a ______ party system? a. One b. Two c. Multiple d. Zero 4. Leftwing populist Hugo Chávez led a socialist political movement, named after a nineteenth-century leader of an independence movement from Spain called what? a. Columbus Revolution b. Francesco Revolution c. Bolivarian Revolution

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d. Garcian Revolution 5. Hugo Chavez established a constitution that imposed a socialist economy for Venezuela that was paid for with which of the following? a. Oil revenue b. Arms sales c. Foreign Investment d. Mineral trade 6. Hugo Chávez established which of the following to extend his country’s influence by providing Venezuelan oil to Caribbean countries, especially communist Cuba, at discount prices? a. VenPetro b. PetroCaribe c. C Petroleum d. Oil Caribbean 7. After the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013 he was succeeded by which of the following? a. Simon Bolivar b. Juan Peron c. Nicolás Maduro d. Hugo Chávez Jr. 8. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, a Marxist trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba, became a leader of which leftist group that overthrew the U.S.-supported ruling dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979? a. Sandistas b. Gueverians c. Bolivarians d. Peronistas 9. In January 2014, Pablo Iglesias, a Spanish political scientist, who opposed the spread of neoliberal economic globalization, and his followers established a populist political party that they named what? a. Vamos (“We Go”) b. Peronistas

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c. Podemos (“We Can”) d. Republicans 10. Brazilian president Bolsonaro rejected science and saw the virus as more a political than a medical problem and therefore fired Luiz Henrique Mandetta for disagreeing with him. What government position did Mandetta hold? a. Minister of Health b. Minister of Public Safety c. Minister of Security d. Minister of the Environment 11. Asian populists in China, India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka have in common their antipathy toward which of the following? a. Communist b. Hindus c. Islamic minorities d. None of the above 12. Which of these groups have suffered greatly at the hands of the Han Chinese? a. Uighur Muslims b. Tibetans c. Neither a or b d. Both a and b 13. The current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who is still regarded by China as its enemy, fled to which country after Lhasa was occupied? a. Russia b. France c. United States d. India 14. Which country is governed by one of the world’s most dictatorial rightwing populists, Rodrigo Duterte, who has made repeated references to cultural identity and nationalism to acquire power? a. Vietnam b. Brazil c. China

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d. The Philippines 15. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist followers in which of the following parties were re-elected for a second five-year term in 2019? a. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) b. Hindu Party c. India Party d. Communist Party of India 16. Which of the following gave only non-Muslim migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh a path to citizenship? a. Non-Muslim Citizen Statue b. Locality Act c. The Citizenship Amendment Act d. Recoverment Act 17. Like other populists, Modi undermined which of the following of India’s democratic institutions? a. Court System b. Political Parties c. The Media d. All the Above 18. In August 2020, Israel “suspended” the annexation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and part of the Jordan Valley in exchange for “full normalization of relations” with which country? a. Iran b. United Arab Emirates (UAE) c. United States d. Saudi Arabia 19. The UAE-Israel agreement was a major setback to the cause of an independent Palestinian state and was partly a consequence of which of the following? a. The coronavirus pandemic b. Shared religious background of populations c. Benjamin Netanyahu’s indictment of corruption d. Their joint opposition to Iran

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20. Instead of consulting professional advisers familiar with the region concerning, President Trump assigned who to lead an effort to break the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate? a. John Bolton b. Jared Kushner c. Ivanka Trump d. Mike Pence True or False 1. True or False? Notwithstanding his links with workers, Juan Perón and his second wife Eva, who was idolized by the poor, were attracted by Benito Mussolini’s fascism, notably its corporatist aspect. True 2. True or False? Perón’s vigorous efforts to conscript young Argentinians youth into the Peronist movement received support from the Catholic Church. False, this conscription lead to the Catholic Church to consider forming its own political party to oppose Peronism 3. True or False? After Perón died in 1974, his third wife Isabel, who had been his vice president, became Argentina’s president. True 4. True or False? Cuba clashed with the Soviet Union back and forth until the end of the Cold War. False, Cuba was allied with the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War. 5. True or False? When U.S. oil companies, Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhilips, refused to surrender areas they owned in the Orinoco Belt to the Venezuelan government, the Venezuelan government expropriated them. True

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6. True or False? Hugo Chávez was overtly pro-American and consistently received support from the United States government. False, he was overtly anti-American and consistently opposed what he called American imperialism 7. True or False? On two occasions in 2008 and 2013, Chávez organized joint military maneuvers with Russia during which, Russian Tu-160 intercontinental bombers landed in Venezuela. Both fully supported by the United States. False, it created concern and anger in Washington 8. True or False? After the Sandinistas provided weapons to leftist Salvadoran rebels, the Reagan administration aided the antiSandinista Contras in a civil war that lasted until 1987. True 9. True or False? Bolivarian ideas influenced Pablo Iglesias, a Spanish political scientist, who opposed the spread of neoliberal economic globalization. True 10. True or False? Lula remained president for three consecutive terms in Brazil. False, Brazil’s constitution precluded a third consecutive term as Brazil’s president 11. True or False? Instead of protecting indigenous peoples, Bolsonaro has supported legislation to overturn the country’s constitutional protection of them, cut funding for the National Indian Foundation, the agency responsible for upholding those indigenous rights, and supports oil and gas exploration and hydropower plants on their land. True 12. True or False? In an effort to rally his base of right-wingers and evangelicals seeking to gather in churches after several weeks of quarantine, Brazilian President Bolsonaro began to stress the need to follow Covid-19 recommendations seriously.

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False, Bolsonaro became a Covid-19 denier, encouraging citizens, especially the 38 million Brazilians who were in the country’s vast informal economy, to leave their homes and go to work congregate 13. True or False? In May 2020 Bolsonaro encouraged anti-democracy demonstrators in front of his presidential palace, as they called for the closing of the Supreme Court and a return to the dictatorship used that had accompanied Brazil’s years of military rule. True 14. True or False? Although China’s paramount leader for life, President Xi Jinping was a communist dictator, who encouraged nationalism and blamed foreigners, when confronting domestic challenges, he would not usually be classified as a populist. True 15. True or False? President Trump has been consistent on rebuking President Duterte’s disregard of human rights in his dealing of his country’s drug problem. False, instead of criticizing Duterte, Trump phoned Duterte and told him that he was doing an “unbelievable job on the drug problem.” 16. True or False? The Philippine’s President Duterte threatened to kill anyone violating the country’s curfew or other rules to cope with the pandemic. True 17. True or False? As Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi was assailed for failing to control and/or even encouraging antiMuslim riots in that province in February-March 2002. True 18. True or False? During his 2019 campaign, Modi and the BJP repeatedly pandered to India’s Muslim minority, and Modi’s supportive approach to Pakistan and Kashmir was among the leading reasons for his re-election.

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False, Modi and the BJP repeatedly assailed India’s Muslim minority, and Modi’s muscular approach to Pakistan and Kashmir was among the leading reasons for his re-election 19. True or False? Modi’s attack on India’s vast and previously lively media also produced self-censorship among the country’s journalists. True 20. True or False? Benjamin Netanyahu won Israel’s 2020 election outright and will hold the position of prime minister. False, neither Netanyahu or his opponent Gantz won Israel’s 2020 election, so they agreed to rotate the post of prime minister. Short Answer The region referred to as the “global south” harbors both leftwing and rightwing populists with traits like populists in the United States, Europe, and Great Britain. List three of these traits. Preoccupation with nationalism, dislike of globalization, antiliberal and authoritarian tendencies, and preoccupation with identity politics After Peron was overthrown in 1955, and for the time being unable to enter politics, what did he and his followers do? They turned to organizing labor and became Latin America’s most influential labor movement. Peronistas alternated political power with military coups, and their hostility dominated Argentine political life. Some radical Peronists leftists calling themselves the Montoneros resorted to terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the 1970s What economic difficulties helped the Peronistas triumph in the 2019 election? The country was beset by debt, the value of its currency had plummeted, and inflation along with poverty had soared.

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What leftwing populist policies did Hugo Chávez’s institute? The redistribution of land and wealth from the rich to the rural poor and improving education and medical access, while emulating Castro’s Cuba in establishing state control over political life and the economy. What led America’s Justice Department to bring charges against President Maduro and his associates in March 2020? He encouraged criminal activities, especially drug smuggling by transnational networks linked to his government Why did army officers oust Honduras President Manuel Zelaya from office? Zelaya went too far in 2009 for them when he organized a referendum that had been declared illegal by the Supreme Court to change the Honduran constitution and allow him to seek reelection. Thus, on June 28—the day the referendum was to be held—army officers ousted him from office What is the impact of the Amazon or the destruction of the Amazon on the environment? The Amazon, frequently termed the world’s “lungs,” absorbs large amounts of carbon dioxide and thereby fights global warming. By contrast, the burning of the rainforest released large amounts of carbon dioxide, while also destroying the habitat of endangered species of animals and plants that might have medicinal or genetic value, while reducing the living space of indigenous peoples Give an example of an investigation into President Bolsonaro or his associates? Brazil’s chief justice authorized investigating into Bolsonaro for alleged corruption and obstruction of justice. Fabrício Queiroz, center, an aide to Flávio Bolsonaro, one of President Bolsonaro’s sons, was arrested for allegedly siphoning public funds to the Bolsonaro family. Moreover, Queiroz’s daughter was on the payroll of Bolsonaro’s former congressional office between 2016

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and 2018, although she was working as a personal trainer elsewhere at the time during which she sent tens of thousands of dollars to her father. Another of the president’s sons, Carlos was also being investigation for improper use of public funds and involvement in a disinformation campaign while a third, Eduardo, was accused of involvement in that campaign. How did President Duterte of the Philippines respond to the problems of coronavirus pandemic domestically? Duterte’s response to the coronavirus epidemic had the same intensity as his response to the drug epidemics. The Philippines had suffered the second-highest number of deaths and the second-lowest recovery rate in Southeast Asia. As in Hungary in which parliament had granted Prime Minister Viktor Orbán authority to rule by decree, Duterte used the pandemic to undermine further his country’s democratic institutions. Despite the opposition of the Philippine congress, Duterte imposed the Bayanihan to Heal as One Act (Republic Act No. 11469), in March 2020, which gave him vast additional authority including control of private medical facilities, public transportation, and government-owned and controlled corporations. In addition, the Enhanced Community Quarantine placed Manila and the entire island of Luzon on lockdown, suspending domestic and international travel, closing most businesses, and imposing a curfew 8 pm and 5 am Describe the recent treatment of Muslim people and group in Myanmar? Myanmar is steeped in Islamophobia on the part of the country’s Buddhist majority and thus became a model for India’s Hindu extremists. Myanmar’s armed forces were charged with war crimes and/or genocide, and two soldiers confessed to the charge in September 2020. The result was a crisis in neighboring Bangladesh as 723,000 of its Muslim Rohingyas from its Rakhine State fled in 2017. Myanmar’s army killed thousands, although its army, called the Tatmadaw, continued to deny it had targeted the Rohingyas. Previous violence in 2012 had resulted in confining about 130,000 Rohingya to internally displaced

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persons in squalid camps in Sittwe, where they remained without freedom of movement Essay Questions 1. How has the Trump administration handled the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate? 2. What has been the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the global south? 3. How has the rhetoric and policy of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi impacted the nations Muslim minority? 4. Describe one aspect of the rise of populism across Central and South America? 5. Describe the political and socio-economic background behind the rise of right-wing populism in Brazil?

PART III

Three Dimensions of Globalization: Present and Future

CHAPTER 8

The Political Dimension of Globalization

Support for multilateral, international organizations and international regimes, and transnational nongovernmental organizations such as corporations indicates political globalization. “For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests, intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale.”1 Few multilateral institutions and agreements are universal and governments frequently joined or established institutions and agreements that they believed were rewarding to themselves and their friends such as the G-7 (Group of Seven) and the 5 + 1 group that negotiated with Iran in 2015. In 2011 Donald Trump published Time to Get Tough: Making America #1 Again, emphasizing a perspective central to his 2016 campaign. During his campaign, Trump attacked international and transnational organizations and agreements that fostered cooperation and provided rules and norms of the liberal order. In challenging institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and NATO and promoting transactional and bilateral strategies, Trump questioned U.S. leadership of the order and threatened to increase barriers to globalization. In Europe, Brexit had a similar impact. Ivo Daalder described Trump’s speech to the UN in September 2018 as declaring “war on multilateralism.” All multilateral groups “in Trump’s telling” were “agents of ‘global governance, control, and domination’.”2 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_8

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Trump’s aversion to multilateralism was evident when he asked French President Emmanuel Macron, an EU enthusiast, “Why don’t you leave the E.U.?”3 promising he would offer France a better bilateral trade deal than the multilateral union. At a political rally, America’s former president denounced the EU and supported Brexit. By contrast, China’s Xi Jinping was more active and supportive of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the WHO, as well as agreements like the Iran nuclear deal, thereby fostering Beijing’s effort to replace America as a global hegemon. Unlike those who had established the multilateral institutions of the liberal order, populist critics like Trump and Vladimir Putin preferred bilateral negotiations that made it easier for them to bully weaker countries and gain advantages that served their interests in a zero-sum world. Former President Trump’s preference was evident when the administration announced it would renegotiate bilateral trade deals with the EU, Britain, and Japan. The administration also considered making bilateral deals with members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership from which Trump had withdrawn, thereby indirectly placing pressure on China to deal bilaterally to end the Sino-American trade war. Trump’s dislike of multilateralism was echoed by Secretary of State Pompeo who declared, “Multilateralism has become viewed as an end unto itself. The more treaties we sign, the safer we supposedly are…. Was that ever really true?”4 Trump’s preference for bilateralism disturbed U.S. allies. For example, as it became clear that Trump’s bilateralism with North Korea was not reaping benefits, South Koreans—U.S. allies since 1950—became nervous. Trump later shocked South Korea by demanding that they quintuple their contribution to $4.7 billion in 2020 to cover the cost of keeping U.S. troops there. Not only did this demand alienate a long-time American ally and its president who had sought to help Trump achieve North Korean denuclearization, it might ultimately persuade South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. If it did so, this might lead Japan and Taiwan to do the same.

Trump and Multinational Organizations Trump has shown contempt for NATO, the EU, the UN, the Universal Postal Union, and the WHO. NATO fostered security, prosperity, and stability in Europe and elsewhere. NATO, wrote Germany’s defense

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minister, “is a political alliance as well, based on the common aspirations of its members which, as the NATO Treaty says, ‘are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of its peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,’”5 that is, the values of the liberal order. NAFTA sustained free trade, investment, and corporate chains in North America. The UN was established for the collective maintenance of peace and security, and the WTO was responsible for enforcing the norms and practices of the global economic system and sustaining open trade and investment. The UN and Affiliated Agencies Trump’s former UN ambassador, Nikki Haley, described the UN as “basically a club” and spoke of “a wave of populism that is challenging institutions like the United Nations, and shaking them to their foundations.”6 She threatened those who failed to support Washington’s positions in the UN. “For those who don’t have our back, we’re taking names.”7 Indeed, America was the only UN member to vote against a nonbinding draft resolution to reduce violence against girls and women, and was one of two members to oppose forced marriage of women. The Trump administration’s proposed budget cuts for the UN, declared a UN spokesperson, “would simply make it impossible for the U.N. to continue all of its essential work advancing peace, development, human rights and humanitarian assistance.”8 UN Secretary-General António Guterres thought America’s retreat from leadership was neither good for the U.S. nor for the world as a whole, and, if America retreated from leadership in issues like climate change, it would allow illiberal others like China to replace America. Visiting the UN General Assembly, Trump declared, “I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries, will always and should always put your countries first.”9 This appeared to refute America’s role in the UN’s mission to undertake collective action in coping with collective problems. Washington withdrew from the UN Human Rights Commission, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and cut its contribution to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), reducing aid to Palestinian refugees. Moreover, although U.S. health experts at WHO provided Washington with timely information, Trump claimed that it had not investigated a Chinese coverup of the origins of the coronavirus and “terminated America’s relationship” with the organization. America

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thus refused to participate in a global effort to develop a vaccine for the coronavirus because it would not cooperate with the WHO even though more than 170 countries were negotiating to participate in the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (Covax) Facility. Trump’s actions stunned those who believed no one would refuse cooperation on health issues. Contrasting himself with Trump, China’s President Xi pledged $2 billion to the WHO to aid developing countries deal with COVID-19 and agreed to international collaboration to review the pandemic’s origins, although only after it had ended. On taking office, President Biden almost immediately restored relations the WHO and entered America into Covax, a multilateral plan to distribute coronavirus vaccines, especially to less-developed countries, which Trump had spurned. Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, even attacked the little-known Universal Postal Union, claiming that its rules were exploited by China to send inexpensive e-commerce packages to America because developing countries enjoyed lower “terminal dues” than developed ones. These were fees post offices paid foreign mail services to deliver mail from airports to its final destination. John Bolton, Trump’s third national security adviser, encouraged Trump’s opposition to multilateral institutions and agreements. He singled out the International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent international court that prosecuted those accused of war crimes and genocide because he regarded it as violating U.S. sovereignty. Fearing that the court might indict U.S. soldiers stationed overseas, Bolton declared, we will “ban its judges and prosecutors from entering the United States,” and “sanction their funds in the U.S. financial system.”10 In April 2019, Washington revoked the visa of the ICC’s chief prosecutor who was investigating war crimes in Afghanistan and continued threatening investigators after Bolton left office. European Allies and NATO: “Pay Up!” Trump criticized NATO for several reasons. He admired authoritarian leaders like Putin and disliked multilateralism. In another example of transactional policy, Trump argued that America’s NATO allies failed to pay their fair share for defense. He questioned America’s presence in Japan and South Korea and their costs, even suggesting that those countries should develop their own nuclear weapons. In February 2017, Defense Secretary James Mattis tried to meet Japan’s concern, assuring Prime

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Minister Shinzo Abe that “we stand firmly, 100 percent, shoulder with you and the Japanese people,” and that “our mutual defense treaty is understood to be as real to us today as it was a year ago, five years ago, and as it will be a year and 10 years from now.”11 Mattis gave similar assurances to South Korea, and Vice President Mike Pence reiterated these shortly thereafter. Pence retuned for the same purpose in February 2019, along with Pompeo and Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan. An Asian specialist likened Japan and South Korea to “skittish small dogs that need constant reassurance and are constantly nervous.”12 Pence declared in Warsaw that “the United States will always put the security and prosperity of America first. But as the president has made clear — and as all of you prove every single day — America first does not mean America alone.”13 Thereafter, Congressional leaders extended a bipartisan invitation to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to speak before a joint session to celebrate NATO’s 70th anniversary. Stoltenberg’s appearance was significant owing to Trump’s “Cost Plus 50” idea for allies to pay the cost for U.S. troops stationed in their countries plus an additional fifty percent. Former Vice President Dick Cheney’s reaction to the idea was caustic. “I don’t know, that sounded like a New York state real estate deal to me.”14 Much to the relief of allies, Shanahan denied that the administration was considering the “Cost Plus 50.” After the 2008 financial crisis, NATO allies had slashed defense expenditures while Washington continued spending 3.6% of America’s gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. NATO had agreed in 2014 that all members should spend a minimum of 2% of GDP for defense and meet that goal by 2024. Trump also spoke of tariffs at a NATO summit unless members paid the alliance’s “dues,” although, there are no “dues” associated with NATO membership. NATO members paid their required share of NATO’s collective budget, based on their GDP. By 2018, only a few—Belgium, Estonia, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Poland—had reached the 2% goal. Indeed, during the previous decade, several members, including Spain and Italy, had cut their military budgets to about 1% of GDP. Germany spent only 1.2% of its GDP on defense, and its armed forces were poorly prepared to carry out their mission. Germany may not even reach its current objective of 1.5% in 2024. America’s ambassador to Germany declared, “That the German government would even be considering reducing its already unacceptable commitments to military readiness is a worrisome signal to Germany’s 28

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NATO allies.”15 By contrast, several east European and Baltic members increased their defense budgets owing to their perception of a growing Russian threat. Although German leaders agreed with Trump in principle, his demands tended to create a counter-reaction among Germans who believed they were being bullied. After meeting Germany’s Chancellor Merkel in March 2017, Trump tweeted, “Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany!”16 At NATO’s May 2017 summit, Trump again hectored allies about the need to increase defense budgets, singling out Germany in an angry tweet: “We have a MASSIVE trade deficit with Germany, plus they pay FAR LESS than they should on NATO & military.”17 Trump’s advisers were concerned that the president’s choleric rhetoric would undermine the July 2018 NATO summit as it had the previous summit. To prevent this, Bolton told America’s NATO ambassador, Kay Bailey Hutchison, a month before the meeting to press America’s allies to complete a declaration before the summit. The president was only given a short outline of what the declaration would contain without the “details of the document of 79 paragraphs, running 23 pages” in order to protect the alliance from the president’s “unpredictable antipathy” and salvage a successful outcome. Indeed, before NATO’s July summit, Trump wrote threatening letters to allies, demanding increased defense spending. “Many countries are not paying what they should, and, frankly, many countries owe us a tremendous amount of money from many years back,” and “They’re delinquent, as far as I’m concerned, because the United States has had to pay for them.”18 In his letter to Merkel, he argued that America provided more resources to the defense of Europe than its prosperous allies, and decried German dependence on Russian natural gas owing to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea that would allow Russian gas to reach Germany without passing through Ukraine or Poland. As the NATO summit ended, Trump surprisingly declared, “I believe in NATO,” and “The United States commitment to NATO is very strong, remains very strong.”19 Equally surprising, he exclaimed, “The additional money that they’re willing to put up has been really amazing.” President Macron disagreed, noting that the final communiqué did no more than reaffirm the two-percent goal.

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In June 2018, Trump authorized a study of the cost and impact of a large-scale withdrawal or transfer of U.S. troops in Germany. As a former NATO secretary-general pointed out, “The danger is that he’s turning at least his base, and maybe other Americans, against NATO and against U.S. global leadership by falsely defining it as a protection racket where we haven’t been paid enough by the protectees, rather than as a mutually beneficial alliance that has kept peace and expanded the frontiers of democracy.”20 America’s allies had been particularly disturbed by Trump’s reluctance at the NATO’s summit in May 2017 to reaffirm Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which committed all members to collective defense. Secretary of State Tillerson had hastily told reporters, “Of course we support Article 5,” and, thereafter, the president shifted, reaffirming Article 5. Nevertheless, Trump indicated that the commitment made him uneasy when discussing NATO’s newest member, tiny Montenegro. “They have very aggressive people. And they may get aggressive, and congratulations, you are in World War III.”21 After Trump’s initial comment about Article 5, Mattis and Tillerson sought to reassure allies. Mattis described NATO as the “fundamental bedrock for the United States and the trans-Atlantic community.”22 Vice President Pence delivered a similar message when visiting Europe, and Nikki Haley, America’s UN ambassador, indicated that Washington remained committed to Europe’s defense in confronting Russian provocations. Like Haley, Tillerson endorsed sanctions against Russia, but later seemed to waver, asking the G-7 foreign ministers, why U.S. taxpayers should be interested in Ukraine? Although Trump continued criticizing NATO allies, especially Germany, for failing to pay their “fair share” for defense, NATO’s July summit accomplished several goals. Members agreed to improve the readiness and mobility of NATO’s armed forces, invited Macedonia to join the alliance, agreed to cooperate on cybersecurity, and criticized Russia’s seizure of Crimea. The allies also agreed to establish an Atlantic Command to coordinate a response to any attack by allowing members’ armed forces to cross one another’s borders quickly. Prodded by Mattis, the allies also agreed on the “Four 30 s”: mobilizing 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air force squadrons and 30 warships, within 30 days. However, in another impulsive decision after Chancellor Merkel refused to come in person to the G-7 meeting in America in June 2020 because of the pandemic, Trump decided to remove 12,000 of the 36,000 U.S. troops stationed in Germany and cap U.S. forces there at

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25,000. The announcement led the premiers of Bavaria, Hesse, BadenWuerttemberg, and Rhineland-Palatinate, which hosted U.S. bases, to write letters to thirteen members of Congress, urging them to persuade the president to reverse his decision. Although then Defense Secretary Esper, who defamed U.S. protesters and journalists as “adversaries,” explained the withdrawal was to increase U.S. deterrence of Russia, Trump undercut Esper by explaining it was his reaction to Germany’s failure to pay nonexistent “NATO fees.” Putin was surely pleased. Trump’s perverse, dangerous, and petulant decision regarding Germany threatened to weaken NATO, please Putin, and possibly persuade Russia to test Trump’s commitment to Article 5 by seizing Estonia or starting hybrid war in that country. Thus, the proposal met with significant opposition in Congress including a letter to Trump from 22 Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee, led by ranking member Mac Thornberry (Tex.). “We believe that such steps would significantly damage U.S. national security as well as strengthen the position of Russia to our detriment,” they wrote. “In Europe, the threats posed by Russia have not lessened, and we believe that signs of a weakened U.S. commitment to NATO will encourage further Russian aggression and opportunism.”23 Hence, in its annual defense policy bill in December 2020 Congress proposed minimizing any reduction of U.S. troops in Germany. The bill was vetoed by Trump, but Congress overrode the veto. In a meeting with Trump, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven explained that Sweden, though not a NATO member, partnered with the alliance on a case-by-case basis. Trump responded jokingly that America should consider that approach. In 2018, Trump even suggested that America withdraw from NATO, leading observers to ask why any U.S. leader would even think of leaving NATO now. “The things that are the most debilitating from the perspective of most of the Europeans,” concluded Joe Biden, “is the way he [Trump] conducts himself when he is with allies,” and European leaders “have said to me the degree of disrespect shown is debilitating.”24 Trump’s criticism of allies for insufficient burden-sharing led two former U.S. ambassadors to NATO to conclude that NATO’s “single greatest danger is the absence of strong, principled American presidential leadership for the first time in its history.”25 Such concerns triggered growing sentiment for larger German and Japanese military forces, and discussion of a nuclear “Eurodeterrent.” French President Macron argued

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that Europe should regain its “military sovereignty.” “To my mind, what we are currently experiencing is the brain-death of NATO.”26 Macron’s conclusion divided NATO allies, some of which believed his comment would embolden foes, notably Russia, with which Macron proposed a “strategic dialogue.” His comment, however, was largely aimed at mistrust that Trump’s America would fulfill its commitment to defend Europe. Secretary-General Stoltenberg described a growing Russian military threat from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and congressional Democratic leaders declared that the president’s behavior reflected Trump’s loyalty to Putin rather than U.S. allies. At a contentious meeting of the G-7 in Quebec in June 2018, Trump’s pro-Russian views were on view. Without consulting, U.S. allies, he proposed readmitting Russia to the G-8 group from which it had been expelled after its aggression in Ukraine, a proposal he made again in 2020 despite the continued opposition of U.S. allies. He also described Crimea as historically Russian. Always unpredictable, a month later Trump agreed to a NATO communiqué that condemned Russia’s “illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimean, which we do not and will not recognize.” Then, in November 2018, NATO held its largest military exercise since the Cold War in Norway and the surrounding seas close to the Russian border. NATO also deployed additional battle groups in Poland and the Baltic states. Although polls indicated that U.S. public opinion did “not support” Trump’s “view that U.S. alliances may be obsolete,” or that Washington should reduce its involvement overseas, Robert Kagan’s take on the NATO summit was pessimistic. “Any student of history knows that it is moments like this summit that set in motion chains of events that are difficult to stop. The democratic alliance that has been the bedrock of the American-led liberal world order is unraveling. At some point, and probably sooner than we expect, the global peace that that alliance and that order undergirded will unravel, too.”27 Trump’s attacks on the press and American intelligence and law enforcement agencies led Celeste A. Wallander, a Russian expert, to conclude that “Americans must face the fact that the biggest threat to NATO today may be the United States itself.” NATO, she argued, was also threatened by “the breakdown of liberal democracy itself” and its commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Populist politicians in Hungary, Poland, Italy, and Turkey have rejected NATO’s requirement

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for high standards of “good governance” and its “belief that liberal institutions, practices, and values would prevent a return to the nationalist, and intolerant dynamics that had driven destructive conflicts in Europe for centuries.”28 The World Trade Organization (WTO) After World War II, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) reduced global tariffs and other impediments to trade in eight “rounds” of negotiation until the Uruguay Round (1986–1994). The ninth round of the GATT, the Doha Round that began in 2001 accomplished little largely because many developing countries were dissatisfied by the progress in opening the markets of the developed world to their agricultural exports while subsidizing their own agricultural exports. Replacing the GATT with the WTO in 1995 was a high point of the postwar rules-based economic order. Using arbitration panels of trade experts to determine if countries had violated those rules, the organization became a powerful multilateral institution. In sum, as Peter Gallagher wrote, the “World Trade Organization, with a clear legal status and mandate was in itself the crossing an important threshold in international trade relations.”29 With China’s admission in 2001 and Russia’s in 2012, all major countries had become WTO members and accepted its authority to make decisions that limited their sovereignty. Nevertheless, Trump told aides that he wanted America to leave the WTO in which China used its “developing-country” status to take advantage of others. One of them revealed that Trump had told them, “I don’t know why we’re in it. The WTO is designed by the rest of the world to screw the United States.”30 Responding to Trump’s criticism, the WTO began to consider significant reforms, that included establishing measures to judge whether countries pursued policies that distorted markets and facilitating gathering information on violations of the rules. However, it would be difficult to get the unanimous consensus needed to institute reforms. Nevertheless, the Trump administration threatened the WTO’s survival because only three members of seven remained on its decision panel in 2019, the minimum to hear a case. The terms of two of them have had ended, but Trump refused to permit their replacement, thus blocking resolution to trade disputes. The Trump administration also prepared a bill called “the United States Fair and Reciprocal Trade Act” that was submitted to Congress in

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2019. It would permit Washington to raise tariffs without congressional consent regardless of WTO rules, including the Most Favored Nation principle that prohibited discrimination in tariffs imposed on different states. If passed, the bill would permit America to ignore the WTO’s trade rules, ending the liberal economic system and possibly reviving the “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that exacerbated the Great Depression in the 1930s. However, President Biden will likely reverse this as well as America’s refusal to add the necessary additional judges to the WTO.

Multilateral Agreements President Trump’s preference for bilateral bullying was also evident in America’s withdrawal or threats to withdraw from multilateral agreements. Among Trump’s first acts was removing America from the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), even while the remaining signatories moved toward its completion and renamed it the Comprehensive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP came into effect among the signatories and their 500 million consumers in 2019. Negotiations began among the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which constituted most of the members of the CPTPP and countries with which ASEAN had bilateral free trade deals—Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—for an additional multilateral trade group called the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The TPP would have reduced tariffs on thousands of U.S. exports and provided many Asians with unprecedented workers’ rights and environmental protection. When withdrawing from the TPP, Trump explicitly expressed a preference for bilateral trade negotiations. Unless Washington changed its policies, America will be economically isolated in Asia and enjoy none of the benefits of membership in these groups. President Biden may try to join these groups to restore America’s waning economic and political influence in Asia. The Paris Climate Accord Despite irrefutable scientific evidence concerning the causes and consequences of climate change, in November 2019, Trump confirmed that America was leaving the multilateral Paris Climate Accord a year later— the first country to do so—that had been signed by virtually all countries.

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America’s official withdrawal took place in November 2020. The U.S. had been the world’s leading source of greenhouse gases until surpassed by China, and Trump’s decision was an example of his contempt for science and scientific evidence. The Trump administration even sought to eliminate any mention of climate change by the multinational Arctic Council that included eight Arctic countries despite the importance of the issue to the region. Trump’s decision also reduced U.S. competitiveness in the enormous clean energy global marketplace, and abandoned leadership on a major global issue, isolating it from America’s friends while allowing China to assume global leadership on another critical issue. The accord was a nonbinding agreement to mitigate the impact of greenhouse gas emissions and provide funding for countries that needed to adapt to global warming. In Paris, America had agreed to cut its greenhouse gas emissions 26–28% below 2005 levels by 2025 and provide $3 billion to aid poor countries by 2020. However, Trump argued that the claim that climate change was anthropogenic was a “hoax” although 11,258 scientists in 153 countries confirmed that the planet faced a manmade climate emergency. He also advocated renewed dependence on coal, rolling back the environmental initiatives of the Obama years including limits on methane (among the worst carbon emissions), and making deep cuts in America’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) budget, including support for research on climate change. Announcing his decision in 2017, Trump had declared, “The Paris climate accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers…and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.”31 Trump’s posturing led Chancellor Merkel to conclude, “There’s a situation where it’s six…against one.”32 Trump’s justification for leaving the agreement was untrue as well as divisive. The agreement had met all of Washington’s demands. At a meeting of the G-20 in Hamburg, Germany, Washington was isolated as the other nineteen members declared the agreement “irreversible.” Merkel declared that the president’s decision would “not deter all of us who feel obliged to protect the earth,” and Japan’s environment minister said that Trump had “turned his back on the wisdom of human beings.”33 “Whatever leadership is,” declared a French diplomat, “it is not being outvoted, 19 to 1.”34

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Major U.S. corporations including oil producers, states such as California and New York, and cities as varied as Atlanta, Orlando, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City were determined to maintain the Paris Accord regardless of Washington’s withdrawal. Foes of Trump’s decision, which were being organized by New York City’s former mayor Michael Bloomberg and California Governor Jerry Brown, joined a coalition called “We Are Still In” that by 2019 consisted of 2,918 CEOs, governors, mayors, college presidents and other political, civic, and religious leaders. The coalition sought to do what America would have done under the terms of the accord. Even the heavily Republican state of Alaska, which depends on revenues from oil and gas production, recognized the dangers of climate change. However, the withdrawal process required Washington to remain a member until November 4, 2020, the day after America’s presidential election, and President Biden made reducing climate change a major goal and rejoined the Paris agreement when he took office. The Trump administration also removed fuel-efficiency requirements for automobiles and trucks. This effort to reverse the Obama administration’s effort to reduce carbon emissions was an attack on America’s federal system because individual states wished to retain higher standards to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In May 2018, seventeen states led by California sued to maintain Obama-era standards requiring automobiles sold in America to average more than 50 miles per gallon by 2025. By contrast, China assumed leadership in global climate efforts by announcing in September 2020 that it would “scale up its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by adopting more vigorous policies and measures. We aim to have [carbon dioxide] emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.”35 However, Biden committed himself to restoring Obama’s fuel-efficiency requirements. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Despite the 1968, Nonproliferation Treaty, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea violated the effort to prevent nuclear proliferation, and Iran, too, began developing nuclear weapons. In May 2018, President Trump abrogated the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which he called “the worst deal ever.” That deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which had been negotiated with Iran by the P5 + 1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) lifted the economic sanctions that the UN had placed on Iran. Tehran agreed to

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limit development of centrifuges to enrich uranium for ten years and cease enriching uranium for fifteen years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was empowered to inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities, and Tehran agreed to surrender its existing low-enriched uranium. However, Trump, pressured by Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, officially withdraw from the JCPOA in May 2018, although the IAEA had issued ten reports stating Tehran had been abiding by the agreement. Trump’s decision, which the director of the CIA had warned would be “the height of folly,”36 was among the Obama administration’s greatest achievements. Trump claimed he wanted Iran to cease developing its nuclear program permanently and end developing ballistic missiles and “terrorist activities,” in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq. Thereafter, Trump re-imposed harsh sanctions on Iran in August and November 2018, including banning Iranian oil imports, a step that greatly exacerbated Iran’s economic woes. In May 2019, Washington also removed the significant reduction exceptions (“SREs”) that had allowed countries like China, India, and Turkey to continue purchasing Iranian oil without being subject to U.S. sanctions. “The policy of zero Iranian imports originated with Secretary Pompeo,” declared a State Department official. “He has executed this policy in tight coordination with the president every step of the way. Because the conditions to not grant any more SREs have now been met, we can now announce zero imports.”37 Whether Washington sought to overthrow Iran’s regime was unclear. Clearly, former National Security Adviser John Bolton had been a hawk on this issue, declaring, “The people of Iran, I think, deserve a better government; there’s absolutely no doubt about it. …. We’ll see what happens as the economic pressure continues to grow.”38 Sanctions rarely worked unless they were supported by many countries, but they appealed to Trump because they did not require congressional approval. American sanctions reinforced the claim of Iranian hardliners that American commitments could not be trusted. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who had negotiated the 2015 deal, said there was only a “short time” to salvage the agreement and ordered preparations to renew uranium enrichment in case the other four signatories failed to do so. “We will proudly break the sanctions,” declared Rouhani.39 Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared he would be “worm food” before Iran capitulated. Nevertheless, Trump predicted his action would make Iranian leaders agree to “a new and lasting deal.” Instead, Iran stepped up its military activity in Syria and support for Hezbollah. Tehran also

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launched missiles against Israel, which retaliated by bombing Iranian military facilities across Syria. Only Russia had sufficient leverage to rein in Iran, but the two began to compete for influence in Syria. America’s European allies urged the president to retain the Iran deal and were furious when he ignored them. Trump’s unilateral action again isolated Washington from its allies, which continued to support the deal and sought ways around America’s renewed “highest level of economic sanctions” on Iran. The coalition that negotiated with Iran proved difficult to recreate, and Trump was unable to persuade allies to enforce renewed sanctions. Thus, the EU sought to prohibit its companies, especially those which provided parts for U.S. products, from complying with the resumption of “secondary sanctions” against Iran despite the prospect of U.S. actions against them. American sanctions, Europeans believed, reflected America’s “creeping extraterritoriality” that Europeans claimed was intended to promote U.S. economic interests. Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt angrily tweeted, “U.S. Iran sanctions are hardly hitting any U.S. companies, but aim primarily at European ones,”40 and Trump’s new ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, infuriated Germans by tweeting, “German companies doing business in Iran should wind down operations immediately.”41 Thereafter, Ambassador Grenell behaved even less diplomatically, declaring to the far-right Web site Breitbart that he sought to empower conservatives throughout Europe. Trump later appointed Grenell, who had no experience in intelligence, as Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a position he held between February and May 2020. Secretary Pompeo demanded that Iran fulfill twelve “basic requirements.” These included ending ballistic missile development, ceasing involvement in countries like Syria, releasing American citizens it had imprisoned, and permanently ending its nuclear enrichment program. After sanctions resumed, Pompeo declared, “Iran will be forced to make a choice — either fight to keep its economy off life support at home or keep squandering precious wealth on fights abroad. It will not have the resources to do both.”42 Despite Washington’s re-imposition of tariffs, Iran initially continued abiding much of the agreement. Consequently, a group of fifty former high ranking foreign-policy authorities from both Republican and Democratic administrations warned Trump that the outcome could be an unwelcome war. “Applying pressure and unilateral sanctions without

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viable diplomatic options… could lead to a more dangerous, destructive and enduring regional conflict with Iran.”43 Visiting Warsaw in 2019, Vice President Pence threatened additional penalties against Europeans who violated American sanctions on Iran, a threat that hardly “reassuring” to allies. Responding to Pence, Merkel declared, “The only question that stands between us on this issue is, do we help our common cause, our common aim of containing the damaging or difficult development of Iran, by withdrawing from the one remaining agreement? Or do we help it more by keeping the small anchor we have in order maybe to exert pressure in other areas?”44 However, the murder of Saudi-American journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018, just days before the Trump administration prepared to re-impose sanctions to cut Iran’s oil exports, could not have occurred at a worse time. Trump regarded the Saudis and their leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (a close friend of Jared Kushner) as Washington’s closest regional ally against Iran and sought to protect him from congressional anger that might undermine that relationship. Iran gradually resumed uranium enrichment in violation of the 2015 deal as remaining signatories failed to provide sufficient incentives to compensate for American sanctions and refused to reopen negotiations. In May 2019, Rouhani announced that Iran would withdraw from part of the deal and retain enriched uranium and heavy water, rather than sell these to other countries, unless the other five signatories of the 2015 deal allowed Iran to sell its oil to them. After Washington assassinated Qasem Soleimani the leader of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps in a drone attack in January 2020, Tehran announced it would no longer be bound by limitations on its nuclear program, and Britain, France, and Germany reluctantly initiated the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism to “snapback” UN sanctions. By March, Iran had resumed enriching uranium and restarted development of advanced centrifuges, halving the time it would need under the JCPOA to produce enough weapons-grade fuel to build a nuclear bomb. Iran also began blocking the IAEA’s inspection of several nuclear sites identified in documents smuggled from Iran by Israeli agents about which the agency expressed “serious concern.” Although a fire in July 2020 destroyed its Natanz facility for making advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges, Tehran, which had claimed the fire had been caused by sabotage, began reconstructing the facility later in the year.

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The assassination of a leading Iranian scientist and member of the Revolutionary Guard Corps in late November, probably by Israel, perhaps intentionally, complicated the plans of the Biden administration to renew the nuclear deal and led Tehran’s hardliners to legislate requirements that the government speed up enriching nuclear fuel. However, Tehran hesitated retaliation, indicating it remained prepared to negotiate with the incoming Biden administration although the steps already taken by December 2020 had reduced the time Iran needed to make a nuclear bomb from one year under the 2015 deal to three months.45 Moreover, Tehran threatened to bar IAEA inspectors and ramp up uranium enrichment unless sanctions were lifted after Biden would become president. Facing additional problems including Arab Sunni states that opposed it, a slowing economy, and growing dissatisfaction of its Arab minority, Iran had few alternatives. It might seek to close the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint for the oil exiting the Persian Gulf. This would be risky and would likely trigger war. Declared Secretary Mattis, “Clearly, this would be an attack on international shipping,” and “it would have, obviously, an international response to reopen the shipping lanes with whatever that took, because of the world’s economy depends on that energy….”46 Efforts by America’s European allies and Russia and China to compensate Iran for the costs of renewed U.S. sanctions failed owing to Washington’s threats to impose secondary sanctions on firms that violated its sanctions on Iran. Washington bullied European states and their companies while these sought ways to continue trading with Iran and maintain the nuclear deal. Thus, in January 2020, Trump threatened to impose a 25% tariff on European autos unless Germany, France, and Britain accused Iran of violating the nuclear agreement. Nevertheless, America’s European allies sought ways to keep the Iran deal alive by devising the means to move money from place to place free from U.S. control. Since banks would have to cease handling transactions with Iran or face U.S. penalties, the Europeans considered using their central banks to move funds to Iran, believing that Trump would not go so far as sanctioning the central banks of its allies. According to EU representative for foreign affairs, Federica Mogherini, EU members were seeking to establish an institution to facilitate financial transactions with Iran, while allowing European companies to continue trading legally with Iran. Ms. Mogherini and the foreign and finance ministers of Britain, France, and Germany jointly declared, “We remain committed to

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implementing” the nuclear deal “as a matter of respecting international agreements and of our shared international security….”47 Europeans were particularly concerned about Trump’s effort to disconnect Iran from SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), a service that moves funds among countries. This would force firms trading with Iran to use barter or pay in cash. “I want Europe to be a sovereign continent, not a vassal,” declared French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire. “And that means having totally independent financing instruments that do not today exist.”48 Finally, the EU announced it would use the European External Action Service to provide European companies with a new “special purpose vehicle” to avoid U.S. sanctions against companies dealing with Iran. Ms. Mogherini explained: “In practical terms, this will mean that EU member states will set up a legal entity to facilitate legitimate financial transactions with Iran and this will allow European companies to continue to trade with Iran in accordance with European Union law, and could be open to other partners in the world.”49 Nevertheless, companies’ fear of U.S. retaliation made this difficult to implement. Seeking to retain the JCPOA by enabling European companies to do business with Iran despite U.S. threats, in January 2019, Britain, France, and Germany established the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), as a “special purpose vehicle” to enable European companies to trade food, medicine, and medical devices with Iran. To avoid using real money for Iranian-European trade that Washington could use as evidence to justify sanctions, INSTEX was a clearinghouse for “credit points.” Companies involved in Iranian-European trade could use credits to pay for goods. “This is really the first instance in which Europe is trying to stand up to the coercive economic power the U.S. is wielding,”50 declared the founder of the Europe-Iran Forum. However, Europeans were only able to purchase about a third of Iran’s exports because many firms refused to trade with Iran lest they incur Washington’s wrath. According to the Centre for European Reform, Washington was “making the euro’s standing in global markets a question of foreign policy, rather than simply of economics.” Consequently, giving “the euro a greater role in global markets faces huge economic and political obstacles. Not only is the dollar’s role in the world economy deeply entrenched, the policy changes that would bring about the conditions necessary for growing the euro’s role – an ample supply of European safe assets and a European Central Bank … – would meet fierce resistance,

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especially in Berlin.”51 America placed countries in a dilemma. They are obligated by the U.N. Security Council to support the JCPOA, while America threatened to impose penalties unless they obeyed U.S. sanctions. Washington was isolated in the Security Council regarding Iran when Trump visited the UN in September 2018. U.S. threats regarding secondary sanctions divided Washington and its closest allies. Owing to the sanctions, admitted President Rouhani in January 2019 that Iran was suffering its worst economic crisis since the Islamic revolution of 1979 and that Iranians should not blame their government. Rouhani depicted Iran as a law-abiding state that kept its part of the bargain. He declared that, after Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, he had considered either reciprocating or “a short grace period for the remaining parties to compensate” for the impact of America’s sanctions and had chosen the latter. Iran’s continued compliance of remaining participants in the JCPOA, Rouhani claimed, opened “a serious chasm between the United States and its European partners on a critical foreign policy matter.”52 Rouhani concluded that the American-led liberal system isolated Washington, not Tehran. Trump had put Washington in the unenviable position of appearing as the “bad guy,” especially after the International Court of Justice ruled that not permitting exports of humanitarian goods and services to Iran violated the 1955 U.S.-Iranian Treaty of Amity. Thereafter, Secretary Pompeo announced U.S. withdrawal from that treaty, an action that he claimed was “39 years overdue” referring to Iran’s 1979 revolution. Trump’s criticism of the JCPOA was denounced by all other permanent members of the Security Council. The failure of America’s policy toward Iran became evident in July 2020, when Iran and China signed a comprehensive economic and security agreement, dramatically increasing Beijing’s influence in a region in which it previously had little. A Brookings Institution fellow argued that the absence of a clear U.S. policy on Iran was the result to Trump’s refusal to think through issues and pay attention to detail. Instead of crafting a plan to deal with Iran after dumping the nuclear deal, Trump remained “undisciplined and impervious to normal forms of argumentation and bureaucratic process.” He likes those who praise him and hates those who don’t.53 Although Trump had withdrawn America from the JCPOA, Washington argued that it remained a “participant state” in a deal it had abrogated, allowing it to “snapback” sanctions if the pre-JCPOA arms embargo on Iran was lifted. The claim was bizarre, and a snap back would be of dubious legality.

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Although Secretary Pompeo declared it would be “just nuts” to let Tehran purchase arms, when the fifteen members of the Council, which included key U.S. allies, voted on renewing the embargo in August 2020, it passed. Only the Dominican Republic supported Washington, prompting Pompeo to accuse U.S. of “siding with the ayatollahs.”54 The same day the U.S. announced that, during previous weeks, it had seized over 1.1 million barrels of Iranian oil heading to Venezuela in Greek-owned ships that violated American sanctions. The U.S. “snapback” of sanctions, while causing Iran more economic pain, provided another incentive for Iran to continue developing nuclear weapons. Indeed, extending the embargo would have violated Security Council Resolution 2231, which had endorsed the Iranian nuclear deal. Then, in January 2021, Iran announced it was resuming uranium enrichment in an underground facility at Fordow to the level of 20% and only a step from the 90% of uranium 235 needed for nuclear weapons, raising tensions dramatically and pressuring President Biden to act swiftly after taking office. At the same time, it seized a South Korean oil tanker. Moreover, here, again, regarding the Iran nuclear deal, Biden declared he would try to reverse Trump’s policy, a commitment he may find difficult to achieve owing to Iranian suspicions of U.S. motives. In sum, Trump trashed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris climate accord, and the Iran nuclear deal, which were multilateral. By contrast, he pursued unsuccessful bilateral summits with Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin.

Bilateralism: Russia and North Korea Russia National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster had argued that Washington should improve its relationship with Russia but that this required changes in Russian behavior. Russia’s UN ambassador admitted it would be “frivolous” to speculate about Trump’s policies toward Russia, and a Russian journalist noted that Russian leaders thought Trump was “unstable, that he can be manipulated, that he is authoritarian and a person without a team.”55 The chaos in Washington, declared Putin, “made us laugh at first” but had become “a matter of concern”56 in Moscow.

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U.S. allies were inadequately consulted about Trump’s bilateral summits and were disturbed about how poorly equipped he was for personal negotiations with Kim and Putin. The nadir of Trump’s first years in office was his summit with Putin in July 2018 in Helsinki. The two leaders met alone with no advisers, no written notes. DNI Daniel Coats, who knew nothing of the meeting, said that he would have advised against it. We can only infer what they discussed from their interviews with journalists and their joint public appearance after the summit. Putin spoke of “agreements” they had reached but gave no further information. Thomas Friedman concluded, “There is overwhelming evidence that our president, for the first time in our history, is deliberately or through gross negligence or because of his own twisted personality engaged in treasonous behavior — behavior that violates his oath of office to ‘preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States’.”57 Following the Trump-Putin meeting, after which Trump said he did not believe his intelligence agencies concerning Russia, former CIA director John Brennan used the word “treasonous,” adding that Trump was “wholly in the pocket of Putin.”58 Trump’s behavior horrified analyst Max Boot. “As with a rotting fish, the stench from President Trump’s execrable performance in Helsinki only grows more putrid with the passage of time. The leader of the sole superpower was simpering and submissive in the face of a murderous dictator’s ‘strong and powerful’ lies.”59 Trump retaliated against Brennan by revoking his security clearance. Thereafter, thirteen former senior intelligence officers sent Trump a letter objecting to the reprisal against Brennan as violating free speech and using security clearances for political ends. Among those who signed the letter were seven former CIA directors, five former deputy directors, and a former director of national intelligence. Later, another former director of national intelligence and a former CIA deputy director added their names. Two of the signatories, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former CIA Director Michael Hayden, who had criticized the president, also had their clearances reviewed. Nevertheless, after returning from the Helsinki fiasco, Trump tweeted “The Summit with Russia was a great success, except with the real enemy of the people, the Fake News Media.”60 Such claims explained why, some months earlier, in an oblique criticism of the president, Tillerson concluded that the president’s unwillingness to be truthful was a threat to American democracy. “If our leaders seek to conceal the truth or we as people become accepting of alternative realities that are no longer

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grounded in facts, then we as American citizens are on a pathway to relinquishing our freedom.”61 Two weeks after the Trump-Putin summit, Coats admitted that he was “not in a position to either understand fully or talk about what happened in Helsinki,” and had previously declared that he did not “know what happened in that meeting.”62 Despite the controversy surrounding the summit, Trump planned to invite Putin to visit Washington. The plan surprised Coats, who, when informed, asked, “Did I hear you?” When told again, he let out a loud sigh, “Okaaaay,” Coats said. “That’s going to be special.”63 Trump was furious with Coats because he believed Coats’s awkward response was intended to embarrass him. Trump concealed details of conversations with Putin during five meetings with the Russian president. Thus, in March 2019, the chairmen of three House committees sought that information from the White House owing to national security concerns. A year before, after a TrumpPutin meeting at a G-20 summit in Hamburg, Tillerson, who had been present, was unwilling to discuss what had been said, and Trump took the translator’s notes and told him not to discuss what had transpired with other officials. Later, Trump and Putin met again and spoke quietly with each other after dinner for about an hour with only a Russian translator present. There was no record kept of what they discussed. Such behavior was extraordinary. No one knew what Trump and Putin had agreed to. Trump never revealed what transpired at his meetings with Putin, and two Democratic senators wrote him: “Your insistence on secrecy related to these interactions, even with your own staff, is alarming, unprecedented, and could be in violation of the Presidential Records Act and Federal Records,” should “be preserved and immediately provided to Congress.”64 An adviser during the Clinton administration concluded, “The fact that Trump didn’t want the State Department or members of the White House team to know what he was talking with Putin about suggests it was not about advancing our country’s national interest but something more problematic.”65 Trump’s statement at the joint news conference in Helsinki met harsh criticism. Senator John McCain observed, “No prior president has ever abased himself more abjectly before a tyrant.”66 Indeed, as a Republican congressman and former CIA operative wrote, “By playing into Vladimir Putin’s hands, the leader of the free world actively participated in a Russian disinformation campaign that legitimized Russian denial and weakened the credibility of the United States to both our friends and

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foes abroad.”67 Trump had violated every norm about how a president should conduct himself and so at odds with his advisers that some even questioned whether Moscow knew something secret about Trump that enabled Russia to influence him. Had Trump made agreements with Putin at the expense of America’s allies? Had he made commitments to Russia that were contrary to U.S. interests? Why was he pandering to Russia and appeared so “weak” in their “shameful” joint press conference? Kagan argued that the Helsinki summit “was not a meeting between adversaries” but between two leaders, “with convergent interests and common goals.”68 Both, he concluded, sought to destroy the liberal order. In capitulating to Putin and leaving the Iran deal, Trump gave North Korea a reason to question America’s honesty in any agreement to denuclearize Korea. North Korea Trump’s initial interactions with Kim were characterized by insulting rhetoric and threats. North Korean officials provoked Trump by declaring that his Asia visit in November 2017 had been “nothing but a business trip by a warmonger to enrich the monopolies of the US defense industry,” and Trump had “laid bare his true nature as destroyer of the world peace and stability.” Kim called Trump “a frightened dog,” “a gangster fond of playing with fire,” and a “mentally deranged dotard.” Trump tweeted back: “Why would Kim Jong-un insult me by calling me ‘old,’ when I would NEVER call him ‘short and fat’?”69 Trump directed part of his speech before South Korea’s National Assembly to Kim. “The weapons you are acquiring are not making you safer, they are putting your regime in grave danger. Every step you take down this dark path increases the peril you face.”70 In turn, the official newspaper of North Korea’s communist party denounced Trump. “The worst crime for which he can never be pardoned,” having “dared [to] malignantly hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership.”71 After returning to Washington, Trump repeated his description of Kim as “Lil’ Rocket Man,” adding: “He is a sick puppy.”72 Thereafter, after threatening North Korea with “fire and fury” and trading new insults with Kim, Trump succumbed to Kim’s charm offensive in early 2018 and undertook his transactional approach to foreign policy. South Korean President Moon Jae-in persuaded Trump that Kim would surrender North Korea’s nuclear weapons in exchange for

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increasing North Korea’s security from an American attack or effort to overthrow his regime and acquiring economic aid and legitimacy for his regime. Kim then offered to negotiate directly with Trump, and, though advisers feared that Trump would be overly eager to accept a bad deal, a summit was arranged for June 12, 2018 in Singapore. A deal with North Korea in which Kim agreed to surrender long-range missiles would drive a wedge between Washington and its allies Japan and South Korea, both of which were in range of Kim’s shorter-range missiles. Hence, Japan urged Washington to demand complete denuclearization before making significant concessions. In May 2018, during U.S.-South Korean annual military maneuvers, Kim announced he would not “unilaterally” surrender his country’s nuclear weapons, threatening to cancel the summit and denouncing Bolton for comparing U.S. policies toward North Korea with the “maximum pressure” that had forced Libya to cease its nuclear program in 2004. Kim apparently thought Bolton was referring to Qaddafi’s overthrow and death in 2011. Bolton had previously published an op-ed piece in which he had argued that “the inconvenient truth is that only military action like Israel’s 1981 attack on Saddam Hussein’s Osirak reactor in Iraq or its 2007 destruction of a Syrian reactor, designed and built by North Korea, can accomplish what is required.”73 Infuriated by Bolton’s analogy, Kim backed away from the planned summit. Still seeking to bring Kim to the negotiating table, however, Trump dropped his demand that Kim dismantle his entire nuclear arsenal before Washington made concessions. Kim then let journalists witness the destruction of its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. However, a day later in an impetuous decision, Trump canceled the planned summit, alluding to a comment by a North Korean official who had called Vice President Pence “ignorant and stupid.” In effect, Bolton’s references to Libya influenced Trump, who seemed to echo Bolton, causing Pence to defend America’s president. This triggered North Korean insults about Pence, which persuaded Trump to cancel the meeting. The cancellation was a setback for South Korea’s President Moon and reinforced perceptions that Washington was an unreliable negotiating partner. Steny Hoyer (D-MD) criticized the cancellation, calling it “a sad example of the petulance and shallowness of the foreign policy being pursued by this President,” adding, “From the beginning to the present, the dealings with North Korea have been sophomoric and without strategic or tactical merit.”74 A Chinese newspaper also assailed

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Trump for having “tricked” Kim, having announced his decision shortly after North Korea had dismantled its test site. Moon and Kim then met again, and the following day Trump indicated he might change his mind again. Bolton’s opposition to the meeting and his comparison of Korea with Libya led to a violent argument with Pompeo who persuaded the president to keep Bolton out of a meeting with a high-ranking North Korean emissary who had come to Washington to rescue the Trump-Kim meeting. Paradoxically, Bolton’s rhetoric and reputation as a warmonger and bully and his influence over Trump may have frightened Kim to try to change Trump’s mind again. Thus, after soothing words from Kim, the self-professed “great” dealmaker reversed himself yet again, agreeing to meet Kim. Kim might have been willing to make some concessions like ending nuclear testing since he had already succeeded in deploying a “state nuclear force” capable of striking America’s homeland and a deterrent to A U.S. attack, but however, probably had no intention of surrendering his entire nuclear arsenal, which was “a sacred national goal.” An intelligence estimate predicting that North Korea would not denuclearize soon angered Trump because it contradicted his own belief. Although Trump said he would no longer speak of “maximum pressure,” it was unclear whether the change was merely rhetorical or whether Washington would reduce sanctions and agree to a process of gradual denuclearization, much as President Bill Clinton had sought unsuccessfully. Democratic senators urged the president to remain firm and demand complete and verifiable North Korean denuclearization, while Pompeo assured critics that sanctions would be withdrawn only after complete denuclearization. Nevertheless, with nothing tangible in return, the president abruptly declared an end to joint military exercises with South Korea. The unilateral action shocked South Korea and threatened to divide the two allies. A retired South Korean general declared, “We sometimes wonder, ‘Is he really the president of our ally?’ He is so confusing. Is he really the shrewd negotiator he says he is, with us missing the method behind his madness, or is he just plain impulsive?”75 On returning from his summit with Kim in Singapore, the president blithely tweeted, “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” Trump’s claim prompted Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) to suggest that Trump did not know what he was talking about: “What planet is the president on?” asked Schumer. “Saying it doesn’t make it

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so. North Korea still has nuclear weapons. It still has ICBMs. It still has the United States in danger. Somehow President Trump thinks when he says something it becomes reality.”76 U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that North Korea immediately began to disperse and hide its nuclear assets and was expanding two secret sites including an underground plant to enrich uranium the existence of which it had never admitted. North Korea was also upgrading the Yongbyon facility for nuclear enrichment, producing additional mobilelaunch vehicles for ballistic missiles, expanding its production of solid fuel engines, and assembling additional long-range missiles. Indeed, the two sides had come away from the summit with different versions of what had taken place. There had not even been agreement on the meaning of “denuclearization.” Secretary Pompeo declared that U.S. sanctions would be lifted only after “complete denuclearization,” while North Korea claimed that the president had offered “security guarantees” and had agreed to “lift sanctions” while negotiations continued. Kim also demanded that Washington declare a formal end to the Korean War before Pyongyang would provide a detailed, written disclosure of its stockpiles of nuclear weapons, its nuclear facilities and missiles. After much toing and froing between Pyongyang, Beijing, Washington, and New York, Trump reversed gears again, agreeing to meet Kim. Following the Singapore meeting, North Korea took none of the steps toward denuclearization that Washington thought had been agreed upon. Consequently, the Trump administration continued sanctions on North Korea and canceled a trip to Pyongyang by Pompeo. Washington also urged China not to resume normal relations with North Korea, a demand that Beijing, already the target of Trump’s tariffs, ignored. In September, however, Kim sent Trump what his press secretary called a “warm, very positive letter,” inviting the president to a second summit, and Trump accepted. Trump’s first meeting with Kim, which the president regarded as a success, had accomplished less than the Iran deal, which he had trashed. While reducing the immediate risk of war, it would not have denuclearized Korea. Such an agreement would have entailed further negotiations, verification of dismantling, and Kim’s willingness to cease breaking agreements. Thus, shortly before Trump’s second summit with Kim in Hanoi in 2019, America’s threat assessment concluded, “we currently assess North Korea will seek to retain its W.M.D. capability and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and production

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capability.”77 As with Iran, Trump declared the intelligence community was wrong, although North Korea continued to enlarge its nuclear capability. Neither the second Kim-Trump meeting nor a third brief meeting at Korea’s demilitarized zone (DMZ) achieved anything. Then in June 2020, amid harsh North Korean denunciations of Washington, North Korea blew up the liaison building used for contacts with South Korea and America and threatened to send additional troops to the DMZ.

Conclusions Hundreds of leading international relations scholars joined in a petition, which argued that the Trump administration “has called into question the U.S. commitment to NATO, threatened to pull the United States out of the WTO and NAFTA, and imposed tariffs on our partners under dubious national security rationales. In doing so, the president abdicates U.S. leadership of these institutions,”78 undermining the liberal order and political globalization. Some multilateral institutions have survived, at least for moment, including NATO, the IMF, and the World Bank. Among the most endangered multilateral institutions was the WTO. Under Trump, U.S. “leadership” meant that Washington did what Trump wanted. Although he preferred bilateralism, it had achieved little, as meetings with Kim and Putin illustrated. However, the election of Joe Biden as president will restore a preference for multilateralism in Washington. The next chapter deals with economic globalization and, again, reflects Trump’s dislike of multilateralism. Trump was a protectionist who agreed with the director of the East India Company in the 1600s. “Wherein we must ever observe this rule: to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value.”79 From this perspective, trade deficits were viewed as incurring a cost to the debtor, making it less powerful globally, lowering economic output, and losing jobs.

Notes 1. Deudney and Ikenberry, “Liberal World,” p. 17. 2. Ivo Daalder, “The Week’s Reads: America Was Alone at the United Nations,” September 27, 2018, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, https://engage.thechicagocouncil.org/webmail/557772/531391492/ 5788b061b0f0e86ed3d3e27785e62d80d116b2d8a666c7d75ccc8e892 625d009.

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3. Cited in Josh Rogin, “Trump is Trying to Destabilize the European Union,” Washington Post, June 28, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-is-trying-to-destabilize-the-eur opean-union/2018/06/28/729cb066-7b10-11e8-aeee-4d04c8ac6158_ story.html?utm_term=.ad8be9e3ef56&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 4. Cited in Daniel W. Drezner, “Europeans are Quite Aware of What They’re Going Through. Is Mike Pompeo?” Washington Post, December 6, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/12/06/eur ope-is-quite-aware-what-theyre-going-through-is-mike-pompeo/?utm_ term=.5df073318169&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 5. Ursula van der Layen, “The World Still Needs NATO,” New York Times, January 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/opi nion/nato-european-union-america.html. 6. Cited in “Nikki Haley Calls United Nations Human Rights Council ‘So Corrupt’,” New York Times, March 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/03/29/world/nikki-haley-un-human-rights-council-corrupt. html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&con tentCollection=world®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=lat est&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=sectionfront. 7. Cited in Somini Sengupta, “World’s Diplomats, Seeking a Bridge to Trump, Look to Haley,” New York Times, February 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/12/world/world-diplomatstrump-nikki-haley.html. 8. Cited in Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Says Trump Budget Cuts Would ‘Make It Impossible’ to Do Its Job,” New York Times, May 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/world/americas/ un-trump-budget-cuts.html. 9. Cited in Mark Landler and Maggie Haberman, “Trump to Preside Over U.N. Security Council, Prompting Anxiety All Around,” New York Times, September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/pol itics/trump-un-security-council-iran.html?emc=edit_th_180907&nl=tod aysheadlines&nlid=43321680907. 10. Cited in Mark Landler, “Bolton Expands on His Boss’s Views, Except on North Korea,” New York Times, September 10, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/09/10/us/politics/trump-plo-bolton-internationalcriminal-court.html?emc=edit_th_180911&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21680911. 11. Michael R. Gordon and Motoko Rich, “Jim Mattis Says U.S. Is ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ With Japan,” New York Times, February 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/world/asia/us-japanmattis-abe-defense.html. 12. Cited in Motoko Rich, “Rex Tillerson, in Japan, Says U.S. Needs ‘Different Approach’ to North Korea,” New York Times, March 16, 2017,

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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/world/asia/rex-tillerson-asiatrump-us-japan.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&act ion=click&contentCollection=world®ion=rank&module=package&ver sion=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront. Cited in Anne Gearan, Carol Morello and Missy Ryan, “Pence and Cabinet Officials Seek to Reassure NATO Allies that Trump has Their Back,” Washington Post, February 13, 2019, https://www.washingto npost.com/politics/vice-president-pence-and-cabinet-officials-seek-to-rea ssure-nato-allies-that-trump-has-their-backs/2019/02/13/6171e81a2fa6-11e9-86ab-5d02109aeb01_story.html?utm_term=.7edee1c0b45f. Cited in Costa and Parker, “Former Vice President Cheney Challenges Pence at Private Retreat, Compares Trump’s Foreign Policy to Obama’s Approach.” Cited in Katrin Bennhold, “German Defense Spending is Falling Even Shorter. The U.S. Isn’t Happy,” New York Times, March 19, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/world/europe/germany-natospending-target.html?emc=edit_th_190320&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid= 43321680320. Cited in Roger Cohen, “The Offender of the Free World,” New York Times, March 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/opi nion/the-offender-of-the-free-world.html. Cited in Mark Landler, “Blind Spots in Trump’s Tirade Against Germany,” New York Times, May 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/05/30/world/europe/trump-merkel-germany-macron.html?rref= collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope. Cited in Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “In a Combative Start, Trump Belittles Allies, Especially Germany” in “NATO Summit Live Updates: Trump Pushes Allies to Increase Spending,” New York Times, July 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/world/europe/ trump-nato-live-updates.html. Cited in “A Sedate Dinner, but a Bombshell Interview, for Trump’s U.K. Visit,” New York Times, July 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 07/12/world/europe/trump-nato-summit-uk.html. Cited in Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Presses NATO on Military Spending, but Signs Its Criticism of Russia,” New York Times, July 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/world/europe/trumpnato-summit.html?emc=edit_th_180712&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21680712. Cited in Jeffrey A. Stacey, “A Russian Attack on Montenegro Could Mean the End of NATO,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2018, https://foreig npolicy.com/2018/07/27/a-russian-attack-on-montenegro-could-meanthe-end-of-nato-putin-trump-helsinki/. Cited in “Pay Up,” The Economist, February 18, 2017, p. 44.

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23. “22 HASC Republicans Object to Reducing U.S. Forces in Germany,” House Armed Services Committee, June 9, 2020, https://republicansarmedservices.house.gov/news/press-releases/22-hasc-republicans-obj ect-reducing-us-forces-germany?utm_campaign=wp_the_daily_202&utm_ medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_daily202. 24. Cited in Josh Rogin, “Biden: European Leaders Reeling from Trump’s Hostile Behavior,” Washington Post, June 26, 2018, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/06/26/biden-european-lea ders-reeling-from-trumps-hostile-behavior/?utm_term=.b6cb48932380. 25. Cited in Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lite, “NATO’s Biggest Problem is President Trump,” Washington Post, April 2, 2019, https://www.was hingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-problem-is-president-trump/ 2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html?utm_ term=.6fd8a7457126. 26. Cited in “A President On a Mission,” The Economist, November 8, 2019, p. 19. 27. Robert Kagan, “Things Will Not be Okay,” Washington Post, July 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/everything-willnot-be-okay/2018/07/12/c5900550-85e9-11e8-9e80-403a221946a7_ story.html?utm_term=.5992077d5f37&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 28. Celeste A. Wallander, “NATO’s Enemies Within,” Foreign Affairs 97:4 (July/August 2018), pp. 70, 71, 81. 29. Peter Gallagher, The First Ten Years of the WTO 1995–2005 (Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK: 2005), p. 2. 30. Cited in Jonathan Swan, “Scoop: Trump’s Private Threat to Upend Global Trade,” Axios, June 29, 2018, https://www.axios.com/trump-thr eat-withdraw-wto-world-trade-organization-f6ca180e-47d6-42aa-a3a3f3228e97d715.html. 31. Cited in Robert N. Stavins, “Why Trump Pulled the U.S. Out of the Paris Accord,” Foreign Affairs, June 5, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2017-06-05/why-trump-pulled-us-out-paris-accord. 32. Cited in Alison Smale, “Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump,” New York Times, May 28, 2017, https://www.nyt imes.com/2017/05/28/world/europe/angela-merkel-trump-alliancesg7-leaders.html. 33. Cited in Michael D. Shear and Alison Smale, “Leaders Lament U.S. Withdrawal, but Say It Won’t Stop Climate Efforts,” New York Times, June 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/climate/paris-cli mate-agreement-trump.html. 34. Cited in Steven Erlanger, “Feeling That Trump Will ‘Say Anything,’ Europe Is Less Restrained, Too,” New York Times, July 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/europe/donaldtrump-europe.html.

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35. Cited in Adam Tooze, “Did Xi Just Save the World?” Foreign Policy, September 25, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/25/xi-chinaclimate-change-saved-the-world%e2%80%a8/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_ medium=email&utm_campaign=25600&utm_term=Editors%20Picks% 20OC&?tpcc=25600. 36. Cited in Dan Bilefsky, “C.I.A. Chief Warns Donald Trump Against Tearing Up Iran Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, November 30, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/americas/ciatrump-iran-nuclear-deal.html. 37. Cited in Josh Rogin, “No more waivers: The United States Will Try to Force Iranian Oil Exports to Zero,” Washington Post, April 21, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/21/no-more-wai vers-united-states-will-try-force-iranian-oil-exports-zero/?utm_term=.b99 17f3f9d76. 38. Cited in Kathy Gilsinan, “Pay Attention to What the U.S. Is Doing to Iran,” The Atlantic, May 1, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/pol itics/archive/2019/05/five-things-know-washington-iran-sanctions-oil/ 588508/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_todayworld. 39. Cited in Erin Cunningham and Carol Morello, “Heated Rhetoric Commences as Trump Reimposes Sanctions on Iran,” Washington Post, November 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranvows-to-defy-us-sanctions-and-resist-psychological-warfare-as-embargotakes-hold/2018/11/05/45370cdf-7162-43be-ba01-c297b7b00c93_ story.html?utm_term=.162c95dcb606&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 40. Cited in “The Highest Level,” The Economist, May 12, 2018, p. 35. 41. Cited in Alanna Petroff, “Can Europe Keep Doing Business with Iran?” CNN, May 9, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/09/investing/ iran-sanctions-europe-business/index.html. 42. Cited in Jason Rezaian, “Mike Pompeo Gives a Silly Speech on Iran,” Washington Post, May 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/global-opinions/wp/2018/05/21/mike-pompeo-gives-a-silly-spe ech-on-iran/?utm_term=.f74129f87f2e. 43. Cited in Nahal Toosi, “Foreign Policy Bigwigs: Trump Risking War with Iran,” Politico, September 23, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/ 2018/09/23/trump-iran-war-foreign-policy-836411. 44. Cited in Katrin Bennhold and Steven Erlanger, “Merkel Rejects U.S. Demands That Europe Pull Out of Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, February 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/world/eur ope/merkel-speech-munich.html. 45. Maysam Behravesh and Erwin Van Veen, “What Iran’s Leaders Really Think About Biden,” Foreign Policy, December 1, 2020, https://foreig npolicy.com/2020/12/01/what-irans-leaders-really-think-about-biden/?

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utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=28098& utm_term=Editors%20Picks%20OC&?tpcc=28098. Cited in Barbara Starr, “US Officials say Iran has Begun Naval Operation in the Middle East,” CNN, August 2, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/ 2018/08/02/politics/us-iran-navy-hormuz/index.html. Cited in Steven Erlanger, “As U.S. Sanctions on Iran Kick In, Europe Looks for a Workaround,” New York Times, November 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/us-iran-sancti ons-europe.html?emc=edit_th_181106&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21681106. Cited in, Josh Lederman and Dan De Luce, “How Europe Plans to Skirt Trump’s Sanctions and Keep Doing Business with Iran,” NBC News, September 4, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-sec urity/how-europe-plans-skirt-trump-s-sanctions-keep-doing-business-n90 6161?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in “EU, Iran Vow To Keep Trying To Finds Ways To Get Around U.S. Sanctions,” REFE/RL, September 25, 2018, https://www.rferl. org/a/eu-iran-vow-keep-trying-find-ways-get-around-us-sanctions-/295 08158.html. Cited in Ishaan Tharoor, “Trump’s New Conflict with Europe,” Washington Post, February 1, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/2019/02/01/trumps-new-conflict-with-europe/?utm_term=.bd5 16ce32275&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Patrick Wintour, “EU’s Dependence on Dollar to be Reduced under New Proposals,” The Guardian, December 5, 2018, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/05/european-union-dependenceon-dollar-to-be-reduced-under-new-proposals. Hassan Rouhani, “Iran is Keeping its Nuclear Commitments—Despite Trump,” Washington Post, September 21, 2018, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/opinions/iran-is-committed-to-honest-dialogue-is-trump/ 2018/09/21/7c1a2754-bdb4-11e8-be70-52bd11fe18af_story.html? utm_term=.76c8753663ff. Thomas Wright, “Trump’s Mystifying Victory Lap at the UN,” The Atlantic, September 26, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/intern ational/archive/2018/09/trump-united-nations-bolton-foreign-policyiran-north-korea-russia/571339/?wpisrc = nl_todayworld&wpmm = 1. Cited in “Iran Nuclear Deal: European Nations ‘Siding with Ayatollahs’— Pompeo,” BBC News, August 21, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-53847650. Cited in Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Looks to Exploit White House ‘Turbulence,’ Analysts Say,” New York Times, February 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/world/europe/rus sia-looks-to-exploit-white-house-turbulence-analysts-say.html

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56. Cited in Ilya Arkhipov, Evgenia Pismennaya and Henry Meyer, “Chaos Engulfing Trump Stirs Anxiety in Russia Over U.S. Ties,” Bloomberg, May 19, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-0518/russia-grows-anxious-over-u-s-political-chaos-engulfing-trump. 57. Thomas L. Friedman, “Trump and Putin vs. America,” New York Times, July 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opi nion/trump-and-putin-vs-america.html?emc=edit_th_180717&nl=todays headlines&nlid=43321680717. 58. Cited in John Wagner and Shane Harris, “Rand Paul says He’ll Ask Trump to Revoke Former CIA Director John Brennan’s Security Clearance,” Washington Post, July 23, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/politics/rand-paul-says-hell-ask-trump-to-revoke-former-ciadirector-john-brennans-security-clearance/2018/07/23/8eb11ccc-8e7c11e8-b769-e3fff17f0689_story.html?utm_term=.24effd7000f1&wpisrc= nl_most&wpmm=1. 59. Max Boot, “The Stench from Trump’s Execrable Performance Grows Ever More Putrid,” Washington Post, July 18, 2018, https://www.was hingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-stench-from-trumpsexecrable-performance-grows-ever-more-putrid/2018/07/18/6fce82c88aa2-11e8-85ae-511bc1146b0b_story.html?utm_term=.82fb4b6eefc8& wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 60. Cited in Andrew E. Kramer, “Putin Says Trump’s Critics in U.S. are Trying to Undermine Meeting,” New York Times, July 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/world/europe/putin-donaldtrump-summit.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Art icle®ion=Footer. 61. Cited in Anne Gearan and Carol Morello, “Rex Tillerson Says ‘Alternative Realities’ are a Threat to Democracy,” Washington Post, May 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/former-trump-aide-rex-tiller son-says-alternative-realities-are-a-threat-to-democracy/2018/05/16/ 4d0353f0-594b-11e8-8836-a4a123c359ab_story.html?utm_term=.470 758ca251b&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 62. Cited in Zachary Cohen, “Trump’s Intel Chief Still Doesn’t ‘Fully Understand’ What Happened in Putin Meeting,” CNN, August 2, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/02/politics/dni-coats-trumpputin-helsinki-meeting/index.html. 63. Cited in Shane Harris, Felicia Sonmez and John Wagner, “‘That’s Going to be Special’: Tensions Rise as Trump Invites Putin to Washington,” Washington Post, July 19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/trump-says-hes-looking-forward-to-second-summit-with-putin/ 2018/07/19/450a0424-8b59-11e8-8aea-86e88ae760d8_story.html? utm_term=.b0d69d2d2e59&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1.

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64. Cited in Jennifer Rubin, “Just How Long are Republicans Going to Enable the Trump-Putin Partnership?” Washington Post, January 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/01/17/justhow-long-are-republicans-going-enable-trump-putin-partnership/?utm_ term=.492dbe487680&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 65. Cited in Peter Baker, “Trump and Putin Have Met Five Times. What Was Said is a Mystery,” New York Times, January 15, 2019, https://www.nyt imes.com/2019/01/15/us/politics/trump-putin-meetings.html?emc= edit_na_20190116&nl=breaking-news&nlid=4332168ing-news&ref=cta. 66. Cited in Boot, “The Stench from Trump’s Execrable Performance Grows Ever More Putrid.” 67. Will Hurd, “Trump Is Being Manipulated by Putin. What Should We Do?” New York Times, July 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/07/19/opinion/trump-russia-putin-republican-congress.html? emc=edit_th_180720&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680720. 68. Robert Kagan, “The United States and Russia Aren’t Allies. But Trump and Putin are,” Brookings, July 24, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/24/the-united-states-and-russia-arentallies-but-trump-and-putin-are/. 69. Cited in Faith Karimi, “Trump Sarcastically Responds to Kim Jong Un Insults,” CNN, November 13, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/ 11/politics/north-korea-trump-asia-trip/index.html. 70. Cited in Karimi, “Trump Sarcastically Responds to Kim Jong-un Insults.” 71. Cited in “North Korea ‘Sentences Trump to Death’ for Insulting Kim Jong-un,” The Guardian, November 15, 2017, https://www.thegua rdian.com/us-news/2017/nov/15/north-korea-sentences-trump-todeath-for-insulting-kim-jong-un. 72. Cited in Cristiano Lima, “Trump: North Korea’s Kim a ‘Sick Puppy’,” Politico, November 29, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/ 11/29/trump-north-korea-kim-jong-un-sick-puppy-270135. 73. John R. Bolton, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran,” New York Times, March 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/opinion/tostop-irans-bomb-bomb-iran.html?_r=0. 74. Cited in John Wagner, John Hudson and Anna Fifield, “Trump Cancels Nuclear Summit with North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un,” Washington Post, May 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumpcancels-nuclear-summit-with-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un/2018/ 05/24/e502d910-5f58-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=. 30dd8f4799ae&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 75. Cited in Choe Sang-Hun, “Pause in Military Drills, Ordered by Trump, Leaves South Koreans Uneasy,” New York Times, August 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/world/asia/south-korea-

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trump-military-drills.html?emc=edit_th_180831&nl=todaysheadlines& nlid=43321680831. Cited in Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Sees End to North Korea Nuclear Threat Despite Unclear Path,” New York Times, June 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/politics/trumpnorth-korea-denuclearization.html?emc=edit_th_180614&nl=todayshea dlines&nlid=43321680614. Cited in David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes, “On North Korea and Iran, Intelligence Chiefs Contradict Trump,” New York Times, January 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/politics/ kim-jong-trump.html. David A. Lake and Peter Gourevitch, “Hundreds of Scholars have Signed a Statement Defending the International Relations Institutions that Trump has Attacked,” Washington Post, August 14, 2018, https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/08/14/hundredsof-scholars-have-signed-a-statement-defending-the-international-instituti ons-that-trump-has-attacked/?utm_term=.21c7c0fe3653. Cited in Binyamin Applebaum, “On Trade, Donald Trump Breaks With Two-Hundred Years of Economic Orthodoxy,” New York Times, March 10, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/-tradedonald-trump-breaks-200-years-economic-orthodoxy-mercantilism.html.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. Which dimension of globalization reflects the extent of crossborder trade and investment and revenue flows in relation to GDP as well as the impact of restrictions on trade and capital transactions? a. Socio-Cultural b. Economic c. Political d. None of the Above 2. Which of these facilitated the organization of enormously large and complex economic enterprises and the movement and assembly of valuable products more inexpensively overseas and their “export” back to countries of origin? a. Protectionism

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b. Isolationism c. Analogism d. Digitalization 3. Which of these undermines international economic institutions of globalization like NAFTA and the WTO? a. Economic Nationalism b. Free Trade c. Multilateralism d. Trade Surpluses 4. Economic nationalism frequently finds support among Trump supporters in what predicament? a. Stable job in highly populated areas b. Rising industries like tech c. Obsolete industries who have lost jobs or fear they will lose them d. Those with strong job security 5. Free trade rewards industries in which countries have what, which then emphasizes the value of improving products and keeping prices down, thereby reducing inflation? a. Trade deficit b. Tariff c. Low job security d. Comparative Advantage 6. What did the Trump administration used to justify the use of tariffs, using the WTO’s 1962 Trade Expansion Act? a. Condemnations of free trade b. National Security c. Common good rule d. Trade Surpluses 7. Which country had become the single largest source of U.S. imports by value in 2010? a. Germany b. Brazil

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c. China d. Japan 8. Owing to their violations of American sanctions on Iran and its theft of trade secrets, the U.S. and several other countries banned the use of what? a. Huawei’s 5G cell phone networks b. Chinese factories c. Verizon 5G networks d. Russian oil 9. By March 2019, the trade war had become the most expensive since when, costing U.S. exporters about $40 billion a year? a. The fall of the Berlin Wall b. The Civil War c. The Great Depression d. The 2008 Great Recession 10. Which of these did Washington do to attempt to minimize the tariff’s impact on Americans? a. Placed tariffs on Chinese products for which there were alternative suppliers b. Agreed to only place tariffs in response to Chinese tariffs c. Promised to refrain from future use of tariffs as a tactic d. Placed tariffs on things that only impacted U.S.-China trade 11. Why did the U.S.-China trade war also affect other countries in East and Southeast Asia? a. Because armed conflict threatened the stability of the region b. Because they were force to introduce tariffs of their own c. Because they produced intermediate goods in supply chains d. It did not affect countries in East and Southern Asia 12. China has allowed the value of the renminbi to do what thereby increasing its exports and reducing its imports? a. Increase

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b. Depreciate c. Appreciate d. Stay the same 13. Economists from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Princeton, Yale and Columbia Universities concluded that who was bearing nearly the entire cost of Trump’s tariffs? a. Chinese Businesses b. Chinese Government c. Europeans d. Americans 14. In 2019, after Beijing devalued its currency to an 11-year low, making its exports less expensive, and Washington swiftly named Beijing a what? a. Bad faith trader b. Unfair trader c. Loyal trade partner d. Currency manipulator 15. Which multilateral trade agreement, that the president repeatedly referred to as “the worst trade deal maybe ever,” was a particular target of President Trump’s venom? a. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) b. European Union (EU) c. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) d. Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 16. Which of these allowed Beijing to limit the political blowback of the trade war more effectively than could Washington? a. China’s democratic institutions b. China’s authoritarian system c. China’s significantly larger economy d. None of the Above

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17. What cost General Motors $300 million more in additional expenses and Ford $145 million more in the second quarter of 2018 than in the same period the year before? a. Corporate tax rate increases b. Increased cost of labor due to outsourcing c. Tariff-fueled increases in commodity prices d. Chinese corporate espionage 18. Which of these countries’ economic growth in mid-2019 had fallen to its lowest level in almost three decades? a. United States b. China c. United Kingdom d. Canada 19. What group was especially vulnerable to foreign tariffs? a. Chinese farmers b. European farmers c. Southern Asia farmers d. U.S. farmers 20. New corporate cross-border investment was ________ relative to GDP, and trade using supply chains was ________? (filling in the blank) a. Chinese farmers b. Falling, slowing c. Rising, increasing d. Rising, slowing True or False 1. True or False? Populists, as a rule, support the economic norms and practices of the liberal global system and seek to uphold globalization. False, populist, as a rule, oppose the economic norms and practices of the liberal global system and seek to reverse globalization.

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2. True or False? Trade surpluses or deficits do not measure economic vigor. True 3. True or False? Some of Trump’s policies will increase America’s trade deficit and cost U.S. jobs by protecting obsolete industries like coal and steel, and persuading others to retaliate against U.S. exports. True 4. True or False? Free Trade creates employment in obsolete industries but harms more skilled workers. False, it creates employment in innovative industries but harms relatively unskilled workers. 5. True or False? Overall, U.S. firms liked the trade war, which increased profits for major corporations like Apple owing to boosted sales in China. False, US firms disliked the trade war, which decreased profits for major corporations like Apple owing to decreased sales in China. 6. True or False? In July 2018, Trump declared he was prepared to place tariffs on all Chinese imports. True 7. True or False? Chinese state banks provide unprofitable loans to state-owned and highly subsidized industries like steel. These industries can increase production, dump their surplus production overseas, and create global excess capacity that reduces prices and makes private foreign companies uncompetitive. True 8. True or False? President Trump strategy of imposing tariffs rather than continuing to negotiate is consistent with the U.S.’s longtime multilateral approach to trade False, it is unique in this case.

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9. True or False? Chinese leaders regarded the U.S. tariffs as part of a concerted effort to contain their country. False, although Washington had collected tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods, the amount, as of 2019, was insufficient to meet the cost of Trump’s two bailouts for farmers of $12.6 and $16 billion as well as other U.S. industries harmed by the trade war. 10. True or False? The U.S. supply chains for tech and energy industries do not rely on foreign countries. False, China is a major source of rare earths, encompassing seventeen elements on the periodic table that turn oxides into metals and these into products necessary for semiconductors, batteries, cellphones, and other high-tech products. 11. True or False? President Trump’s bailouts for farmers of $12.6 and $16 billion as well as other U.S. industries was payed for by Washington with the collected tariffs, as of 2019, on $250 billion of Chinese goods, False, although Washington had collected tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods, the amount, as of 2019, was insufficient to meet the cost of Trump’s two bailouts for farmers of $12.6 and $16 billion as well as other U.S. industries harmed by the trade war. 12. True or False? President Trump threatened a 25-percent tariff on imported automobiles in order to force America’s trading partners, especially, Mexico, Japan, Canada, and Germany, to increase the content of U.S-made parts in their autos. True 13. True or False? It cost American consumers more than $900,000 a year for every U.S. job saved or created by the metal tariffs True

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14. True or False? NAFTA may have increased China’s exports by aiding U.S. companies to source products from Mexico instead of China. False, this would cause a reduction in China’s exports. 15. True or False? U.S. tariffs on aluminum imports raised prices for cans of beer and soft drinks sold by American companies. For example, Coca-Cola raised prices because his aluminum tariffs were making its cans more expensive. True 16. True or False? In a survey of 430 U.S. firms in China released in September 2018, almost two-thirds answered that Trump’s tariffs had harmed by actions such increased inspections and difficulties with Chinese customs, but most still said they might return to America. False, only 6 percent said they might return to America. 17. True or False? GM sells more cars in China than in the America, and BMW, a German firm, is the largest exporter of cars from America by value. True 18. True or False? The Europeans and Chinese tariffs targeted exports like motorcycles and agricultural products such as soybeans, apples, orange juice, and pork produced in key political districts, especially those that had voted Republican in states like Florida and Iowa. True 19. True or False? At the G-20 conference in March 2017, President Trump joined other members in expressing concern about protectionism. False, President Trump pointedly refused to join other members in expressing concern. 20. True or False? Americans seem unpersuaded by Trump’s tireless protectionist rhetoric. One 2017 poll suggested that a record-high

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of 72 percent of Americans viewed foreign trade as an opportunity and 71 percent, including majorities in both political parties, believed promoting favorable trade policies was “very important.” True Short Answer Over time what are the impacts of protectionism by one country followed by retaliatory tariffs and/or currency manipulation of others? It becomes painful for everyone because they undermine supply and production chains that depend on intermediates necessary for products. Severing such chains harms trade, costs jobs in export-oriented firms, reduces economic growth, and triggers inflation globally. How does free trade impact those in more obsolete industries? It increases economic inequality between those working in hightech export industries and those in uncompetitive companies. Unemployment in those industries can stem from outsourcing. It creates employment in innovative industries but harms relatively unskilled workers. If China opened its markets to U.S. exports why would it not change America’s global trade deficit? Even if China opened its markets to U.S. exports, the U.S. could not produce the additional goods to export to China, and China would merely shift to imports from countries like Brazil and South Korea. Although they do not share Trump’s harsh tactics, what do, to some extent, other countries share complaints with Washington about China’s trade actions? They share complaints regarding China’s tariffs, its coercive demands that foreign firms provide it with their technology, and its cyber-espionage of high-tech information.

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In what ways could China retaliate to U.S. trade policy? China could impose new regulations, slow goods passing through customs, or resort to a host of other non-tariff barriers. It could halt exports of critical components or items that US producers would be hard-pressed to replace. Also, it could to resort to non-economic forms of retaliation, for example easing up on sanctions on North Korea or accelerating the militarization of the South China Sea. What was did a provision in the USMCA involving large pharmaceutical companies do that was highly objected to? There was a provision in the USMCA that allowed large pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”) to raise prescription drug prices, especially ultra-expensive drugs produced in living cells, by extending some patents, to ten years, thereby precluding inexpensive generic versions and competitive pricing. How did President Trump eventually gain Democratic support for the USMCA in January 2020? The president agreed to strengthen labor, environmental, pharmaceutical and enforcement provisions of the agreement. Give an example of how U.S. manufacturing firms had to alter their supply chains significantly due to the U.S.-China trade war. As global firms, U.S. automakers require massive amounts of steel and aluminum and many components made elsewhere as well as in Chinese-owned factories in Michigan including automotive supplier Nexteer and Henniges that produces sealing products for cars, both of which are owned by China’s stateowned Aviation Industry Corporation. America’s large tech firms like Google, Dell, Intel, IBM and others also depend on components from China in their production chains. Many U.S. companies began responding to tariffs on Chinese exports, not by moving production back to America, as the Trump administration had hoped, but how? They responded by moving it to countries such as Indonesia and Mexico, which are less expensive.

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How did the U.S. China trade war and President Trump’s wholesale resort to tariffs and his refusal to use the WTO, constituted severe attacks on economic globalization? The tariffs challenged the post-World War II consensus on free trade, and decades of trade liberalization. His trade wars disrupted investment and global supply chains, and slowed the spread of new technologies, thereby lowering global productivity. America’s trade-weighted tariffs of 4.2 percent were higher than those of other G7 members. Despite the initial agreement, mutual tariffs may become permanent, ending SinoAmerican economic interdependence, dubbed “Chimerica,” that had contributed to China’s rapid growth and economic globalization. Essay Questions 1. Has the U.S.-China trade war been beneficial or harmful for the countries involved? How? 2. In what ways does economic protectionism cost economies? 3. Has the Trump administration’s trade policy made the U.S. weaker or stronger on the international stage? 4. Are the Trump administration’s tariff proposals and trade wars against both foes China and allies like those in the EU and Canada a logical move? 5. Is economic globalization in retreat?

CHAPTER 9

The Economic Dimension of Globalization

As with political globalization, our approach to economic globalization uses the KOF index. “The economic dimension of globalization reflects the extent of cross-border trade and investment and revenue flows in relation to GDP as well as the impact of restrictions on trade and capital transactions.” Economic equality affords greater opportunity, democracy, tolerance of diversity, and social mobility, while inequality produces the opposite. Thus, the financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 heightened perceptions of domestic and global economic inequalities that contributed to the spread of nationalist-populism. Foes of globalization emphasize inequality and low economic growth because the blame falls on foreigners, especially rival states and/or immigrants.

Economic Roots of Populism Digitalization has facilitated the organization of enormously large and complex economic enterprises and the movement and assembly of valuable products more inexpensively overseas and their “export” back to countries of origin. Tariffs and retaliation, as well as Trump’s preference for bilateralism, impeded global trade. Populists, as a rule, opposed the norms and practices of the liberal economic system and sought to reverse economic globalization, but that was only part of the story.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_9

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The economic costs of protectionism by one country followed by retaliatory tariffs or currency manipulation by others were painful for everyone because they undermined supply and production chains that depended on intermediate items necessary for finished products. The U.S.-China trade war also affected other countries in East and Southeast Asia because they produced intermediate goods in supply chains such as Taiwanese computer chips that were sent to China, which assembled iPhones for export to the U.S. Such intermediate products accounted for more than half of the exports and three-fifths of the imports of these Asian countries. Foxconn, a Taiwanese company, for example, provided semiconductors for Apple iPhones and iPads assembled in China. Chinese and South Korean firms provided batteries; Japanese firms provided LCD screens; France, Britain, China, South Korea, and Taiwan provided semiconductors; and German and American firms provided additional components. Severing such chains harmed trade, cost jobs in export-oriented firms, reduced economic growth, and triggered inflation globally. Protectionism was an existential threat to the global economy, undermining economic institutions of globalization like the WTO. Transnational corporations and banks proliferated, and transnational production and sales were steps in a production process from initial research to aftersales service that used to take place within state boundaries. These stages were linked such that changes in any step caused by tariffs, inaccessible resources, or industrial strikes affected all stages. Indeed, much of global trade takes place within transnational firms even though they are counted as national imports and exports. Industries reduced overall costs by creating economies of scale, moving funds among different currencies, merging with foreign firms, and outsourcing to countries with lower costs and fewer regulations. Firms could utilize labor, resources, components, investment, and services from around the world. Protectionism in one country encouraged transnational firms to move facilities elsewhere, thereby avoiding additional costs. Consequently, workers in protectionist societies lost jobs, which moved elsewhere to increase profits and sales.

Protectionism and the Trump Administration U.S. nationalist-populists assailed economic globalization, claiming that foreign investments outsourced jobs. As one economist put it, President Trump displayed “a breezy ignorance of facts and limited understanding

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of basic principles of economics.”1 Trump and his trade advisers, Peter Navarro and Robert Lighthizer, opposed trade deficits although these merely reflected relative savings and consumption in different countries. China, in which citizens were savers, exported more and imported less than America in which citizens spent a lot but saved relatively little. As consumerism in China grows, however, China may begin to import more and seek additional foreign investment. Trade surpluses or deficits do not measure economic strength. Some of Trump’s policies increased America’s trade deficit and cost American jobs by protecting obsolete industries like coal and steel, and persuading others to retaliate against U.S. tariffs. Economic nationalism found support among Trump supporters in obsolete industries who had lost jobs or feared they would lose them. Free trade is “win-win” because consumers have a better choice of products. It rewarded industries in which countries enjoyed a “comparative advantage,” an ability to produce goods and services at a lower opportunity cost than that of trade partners. If prices were low, such countries would export more. However, free trade penalized those in obsolete industries, increasing inequality between those working in hightech export industries and unskilled workers in uncompetitive industries. Unemployment owing to “outsourcing” fostered populism. “We must,” thundered Trump in his inaugural address, “protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies and destroying our jobs.” Trump believed that “unfair” trade costs American jobs. Tariffs, he claimed, were necessary for “national security” according to Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act and a rarely noted passage in the WTO treaty preventing the organization from dealing with issues that affected national security. His use of the concept was simply an excuse for protectionism. Other countries may do the same, thereby undermining the WTO. A former WTO deputy director observed, “If the United States has rewritten the rules of the W.T.O. system to say you can do anything you want if it’s in your national security interests, be prepared for every country in the world to come up with a new definition of what is its critical national security interest.”2 Trump’s critics denounced his protectionism. “This is dumb,” declared Senator Ben Sasse (R-Neb). “We’ve been down this road before—blanket protectionism is a big part of why America had a Great Depression. ‘Make America Great Again’ shouldn’t mean ‘Make America 1929 Again.’”3

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Although Trump justified his actions in terms of national security, he was actually indulging his populist followers by appealing to their nationalist sentiments. Tariffs on imports were taxes on consumers and imposing them for “national security” invited retaliation. American presidents could do so without congressional approval, and Trump’s protectionism split the Republican Party, which was traditionally “pro-free trade,” and several Republican senators joined Democrats in seeking to require congressional approval for presidential tariffs. One Republican senator asked Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, “Know that you are taxing American families, you are putting American jobs at risk, and you are destroying markets — both foreign and domestic — for American businesses of all types, sorts and sizes.” Ross replied, “allowing imports to continue unchecked threatens to impair our national security,” and another Republican senator responded, “I wish we would stop invoking national security because that’s not what this is about. This is about economic nationalism.”4 Trump’s rhetoric and his dislike of the WTO’s dispute-settlement system weakened the economic norms of the liberal order. They also allowed China’s President Xi Jinping to pose as a leading defender of world’s open trading system (despite China’s own protectionism). At the 2017 World Economic Forum, Xi had declared, “Pursuing protectionism is really like locking oneself in a dark room,”5 and in late 2020, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang called the phase 1 Sino-American trade deal “a victory of multilateralism and free trade.”6 As president, Bill Clinton had abandoned the link prior U.S. presidents had made between trade and human rights. Nevertheless, notwithstanding Sino-American economic interdependence, Trump initiated a trade war with China and threatened to do so with Europe. The president also announced he was ending the benefits received by India and Turkey under the Generalized System of Preferences, which promoted trade from developing countries. Terming India a “high-tariff nation,” he stripped that country of its special status that exempted many of its exports from U.S. tariffs. India predictably retaliated by placing tariffs on 28 U.S. products and aiming particularly at Walmart and Amazon. “Protection,” Trump claimed in his inaugural, “will lead to great prosperity and strength,” a view reflecting the influence of economic adviser Navarro. An “America first” trade policy based on tariffs would lose, not create, new jobs or shrink the trade deficit. They would harm all countries involved as they did during the Great Depression. As economist

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Douglas Irwin argued, “The share of Americans who work in manufacturing has fallen steadily since the early 1950s, mainly due to automation and productivity growth,” long before the “‘China shock’ of the first decade of this century.”7 Navarro put it succinctly, “We love tariffs. Tariffs are a wonderful thing.”8

The Trade War with China China had become the single largest source of U.S. imports by value in 2010. In 2018, China sold $558 billion in goods and services to America while importing about $179 billion in U.S. goods and services. America’s merchandise trade with China had become its largest in history—over $891 billion—as had goods deficit with China, which had ballooned to $419 billion and, including services, to $621 billion. Moreover, Trump’s tax cuts exacerbated the deficit because they increased domestic consumption, which includes purchasing imports. Even if China opened its markets to U.S. exports, it would not reduce the U.S. trade deficit because America could not produce the additional goods to export to China, and China would merely import more from countries like Brazil. Technological Rivalry and Huawei “China apparently has no intention of changing its unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and technology,”9 Trump declared. China’s theft of intellectual property and its requirement that foreign firms turn over proprietary technology to Beijing to foster its “Made in China 2025” goal and dominate global high-tech industries such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing exacerbated Sino-American trade relations. U.S. firms disliked the trade war, which reduced profits for major corporations like Apple owing to declining sales in China. In 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs on $50 billion in Chinese goods and threatened to increase this from 10 to 25% on an additional $250 billion of Chinese imports. In July 2018, Trump declared he was prepared to place tariffs on all Chinese imports. In response, Senator Orrin Hatch, chair of the Senate Finance Committee and a staunch Trump supporter, announced that, if the administration did so, he would advance legislation to limit presidential trade authority. Washington also considered limiting China’s ability to invest in high-tech start-ups in America that might threaten U.S.

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national security. The trade war reflected a significant deterioration in Sino-American relations that was part of emerging hegemonic rivalry. “You don’t do this with the Chinese. You don’t triumphantly proclaim all their concessions in public. It’s just madness,”10 declared a China analyst. Negotiations were complicated by Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou, an executive in China’s tech corporation Huawei and eldest daughter of the company’s CEO, for extradition to America for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran. China retaliated by detaining two Canadian citizens. Washington was concerned that backdoors in Chinese-manufactured infrastructure would make its recipients vulnerable to Chinese spying and undermine national security. Moreover, Huawei was required to cooperate with China’s intelligence agencies and could conduct espionage. According to an official in the U.S. intelligence community, “We are going to have to figure out a way in a 5G world that we’re able to manage the risks in a diverse network that includes technology that we can’t trust.”11 Declared Trump, “Secure 5G networks will absolutely be a vital link to America’s prosperity and national security in the 21st century.”12 Although Britain reversed its earlier decision to use Huawei’s 5G network, other U.S. allies still considered allowing it, despite Washington’s threat to cease sharing intelligence information with them. Although Huawei-made servers in the African Union headquarters had provided classified information to a server farm in Shanghai, Beijing put enormous pressure on Germany not to follow America’s ban by threatening German auto sales in China where it had sold 7 million cars in 2019. Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei combatively said he wanted his company to be the world’s best and that required conflict with America. After a brief ceasefire in 2019, Washington intensified the conflict, banning companies from using U.S.-made machinery and software to design or produce chips for Huawei after September 2020. The Sino-American Trade War Deepens By early 2019, the trade war had become the most expensive since the Great Depression, costing U.S. exporters about $40 billion a year. The Federal Reserve estimated that America’s “2018 tariffs imposed an annual cost of $419 for the typical household” and would rise to $831 in 2019 owing to additional tariffs on Chinese goods. Some observers believed that the Trump administration was overstating the negative impact of China’s economic practices. Journalist Peter Beinart argued that China’s

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policies were similar to those of many countries at the same stage of development and that China was seeking to avoid “the ‘middle-income trap,’ in which rising wages undermine its advantage as a center of low-cost manufacturing before it develops the capacity to produce highervalue goods.”13 Beinart insisted that U.S.-Chinese economic relations had reduced Sino-American geopolitical and human rights differences and that U.S. politicians had intensified their criticisms of Chinese economic practices to appeal to pro-Trump voters in America’s Midwest. He also contended that “the best way to accelerate China’s transition” was “to build alliances with other governments concerned by its economic practices” rather than “the self-destructive absurdity of Trump’s behavior” that included economic warfare against U.S. allies.14 Other countries shared Washington’s complaints about China’s tariffs, its coercive demands that foreign firms provide it with their technology, and its cyber-espionage. German firms, for example, discovered that operating in China meant surrendering technology and following rules that favored Chinese rivals. Chinese state banks provided unprofitable loans to state-owned and highly subsidized industries like steel. These industries increased production, dumped surplus production overseas, and created global excess capacity that lowered commodity prices, making private foreign companies uncompetitive. America’s trade representative described cyber-espionage and requiring foreign firms to surrender technology as “an existential threat to America’s most critical comparative advantage.” Michael Schuman concluded that “many of the problems Washington wants resolved in China will require more than a few regulatory tweaks. The bureaucratic harassment, theft of intellectual property, and overt favoritism toward local firms that make doing business in China such a nightmare for American chief executives are caused by the very way the Chinese economy works.”15 Although Trump began the trade war, Washington and European and Asian countries agreed that China’s state subsidies made it an economic foe. Central to these complaints was the dominant role of China’s government, which funneled cheap capital toward state firms, distorting markets. Nevertheless, unlike America’s longtime multilateral approach to trade, Trump was largely alone in imposing tariffs rather than continuing to negotiate. However, by unilaterally placing tariffs on others rather than bringing complaints to the WTO, Trump was breaking existing rules and looked at the world like a property developer who feared being screwed. Washington sought to minimize the impact on Americans by placing

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tariffs on Chinese products for which there were alternative suppliers. A few days later, Trump claimed, “China has been taking out $500 billion a year out of our country and rebuilding China. They’ve taken so much. It’s time folks, it’s time. So we’re going to get smart, and we’re going to do it right.”16 In July, China retaliated with $34 billion in tariffs on U.S. goods, the same amount that Trump added in tariffs on Chinese goods and lodged a complaint with the WTO, and in August 2018 another tit-for-tat Sino-American tariff increase took place. China’s Reaction to the Trade War Even while Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin began trying to renew U.S.-Chinese trade talks, Trump decided to carry out his threat in September 2018. U.S. tariffs encompassed half of America’s imports from China. Trump also threatened to increase tariffs on the remaining Chinese imports valued at $267 billion if Beijing retaliated, a step that Beijing, of course, took, adding $60 billion in tariffs on U.S. goods. “The Chinese are livid and drafting their own battle plan — they won’t take this sitting down,” said James Zimmerman, the former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing. “Washington’s view seems to be that tariffs and threats of more tariffs will soften up the Chinese and make them more amenable to negotiations,” argued a Cornell economist and trade specialist. “The evidence that, in response to U.S. bullying tactics, China just stiffens its spine and strikes back with proportionate tariffs against U.S. imports has had no discernible effect on the Trump administration’s take-no-prisoners approach to this rapidly escalating trade war.”17 Agreement also proved elusive owing to the lack of clarity in what Trump was seeking from China. “As long as our market is expanding economically and growing, China will win the trade war,” declared a Chinese journalist. “The Chinese are more tolerant of pain because we have been poor for so long,” said a Chinese private equity investor. “Wealth has only arrived in the last decade.”18 Thus, the Chinese, he argued, were better prepared than Americans for a lengthy trade war. In addition, the ill will generated by the trade war spilled over into other areas. China, for example, canceled the annual high-level “diplomatic and security dialogue” with American officials, and Washington imposed sanction on China’s military Equipment Development Department owing to its purchase of weapons from Russia.

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Chinese leaders regarded the U.S. tariffs as part of a concerted effort to contain their country. Beijing argued that Washington used threats to extract concessions. Beijing had to retaliate because China’s growing middle class was becoming increasingly nationalistic, and President Xi had to look tough. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd pointed out that “China has politics too,” adding, “The whole notion of ‘back down’ and ‘face’ is as live a consideration within internal Chinese politics as it is within U.S. politics.”19 Trump’s tariffs threatened a larger conflict with China, frightening firms in both countries and undermining complex global commercial and financial links. Additional escalation could lead to an economic Cold War with China “We’re probably talking about a world with two centers: a China-centered economic domain… and another centered on the United States,” predicted Aaron Friedberg.20 As the trade war continued, it became ever more difficult to deescalate and resolve differences. Beijing might even dump some of the more than $1 trillion in U.S. foreign debt that it holds. Both countries would suffer from such a step, but Beijing might be sufficiently angry to do so. China denounced the tariffs, alluding to WTO rules. “The wrong actions of the U.S. have brazenly violated the rules of the World Trade Organization, attacked the whole world’s economic sustainability and obstructed the global economy’s recovery,” declared a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry. “It will bring disaster to multinational corporations, small and medium businesses and normal consumers across the world.”21 However, in a trade war, China, too, had much to lose. Indeed, China could not match Trump’s tariffs because it imported less from America than America did from China, and Washington could ultimately deny Chinese banks access to its markets. U.S. tariffs were violations of the WTO’s rules-based trading system as were China’s retaliation. Beijing, however, threatened to kill major deals of U.S. multinational corporations like Qualcomm that involved mergers with other firms. Having begun a trade war with China, however, Washington had to recognize that Beijing would prove unlikely to assist Washington in preventing North Korea from retaining nuclear weapons, would retaliate against Trump’s American base, and could intensify the pain by adding qualitative impediments on U.S. imports. In addition, Beijing could employ bureaucratic non-tariff barriers to make life difficult for U.S. companies. Ivo Daalder elaborated this. Beijing could establish new regulations, slow processing goods through customs, or erect other non-tariff

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barriers. It could halt exports of key components of production chains or items for which there were few substitutes. China could also respond politically, for example, easing sanctions on North Korea or accelerating the building of island bases in the South China Sea or opposite Taiwan. Finally, the tariff would ultimately create economic pain for American consumers, who pay most of the tariffs as taxes on purchases. Trump was “treating trade policy as though it were a real estate deal, where the goal is to beat your opponent, step on his throat and humiliate him,”22 said the director of trade policy studies at the Cato Institute. Trump’s objectives regarding China were murky but, even if they were achieved, trust in America would decline. A fellow at the US. Council on Foreign Relations presciently warned, “The Trump administration is gambling that by wielding such a big club, it will force China to back down. That is almost certainly a serious miscalculation. China is far more likely just to find other ways to hit back in kind.”23 For example, China was a major source of rare earths, encompassing seventeen elements that turn oxides into metals and these into products necessary for semiconductors, batteries, cellphones, magnets for motors of electric vehicles, wind turbine generators, and missile-guidance systems. By withholding them, Beijing could disrupt crucial supply chains of Western high-tech corporations. China’s vice minister of commerce and deputy international trade representative warned that while China “has the biggest reserves of rare-earth metals, and we would like to meet the justified demands,” it would be “unacceptable” for other countries to use these resources to impede China’s economic development.24 The Huawei controversy was a major escalation, and President Xi responded by paying a symbolic visit to a rare earth company. The Pentagon began to seek new sources of rare earths, for instance, in Africa, and U.S. firms contemplated how to reduce dependence on products manufactured in China that were components in their production chains. Although U.S. officials claimed they were prepared to bargain, it was difficult to see how to end the trade war. Mnuchin admitted to a congressional committee in July 2018 that trade talks with China had “broken down.” However, at the 2018 G-20 conference in Buenos Aires, Trump and President Xi agreed that Washington would postpone increasing tariffs of Chinese imports to 25% in return for additional Chinese imports of U.S. goods, including agricultural exports for ninety days, while negotiations continued. The negotiations were to include “structural changes” in Chinese activities such as technology transfer, cyber-espionage, and

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non-tariff barriers. Trump, however, seemed confused regarding what was in the deal, and Lighthizer and Navarro sought to prevent him from compromising with Beijing. Navarro also advised the president to order the purchase of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals manufactured in America, seeking to reduce dependence on their import from China and punish Beijing for its reluctance to provide information about the coronavirus. The two countries seemed far from resolving their differences and were prepared for a lengthy conflict. Negotiations to End the Sino-American Trade War Negotiations to end the trade war resumed in early 2019, but the issues were difficult to resolve owing to differences between China’s state capitalism and America’s reliance on free markets and private firms. Shortly before China’s Vice Premier Liu He, regarded as an economic reformer, was due in Washington to foster a deal in May 2019, U.S. officials charged Beijing with reneging on crucial commitments involving key issues such as intellectual property and forced technology transfers. Trump responded with new threats of tariffs on all Chinese imports, declaring that Beijing had broken the trade deal. Although American business continued to have major problems with China’s commercial policies, “we simply must find a way to tackle these that doesn’t turn our most competitive companies into collateral damage,”25 urged Peter Robinson of the Council for International Business. The negotiations collapsed in May 2019 over the issue of Chinese government subsidies to home industries. Trump, as he had threatened, raised tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports from 10 to 25%. Several days later, the Trump administration moved ahead with plans to impose 25% tariffs on additional $300 billion in Chinese imports, which would place the same tariff on over 90% of China’s exports to America. China retaliated by raising its tariffs on numerous U.S. imports to 25% and adding tariffs of between 5 and 20% on many other U.S. imports. Combined, these raised tariffs on $60 billion in U.S. imports to China on June 1, 2019. With the G-20 2019 summit meeting looming, American companies were desperately trying to persuade Trump not to impose the additional tariffs on China. “If we are forced to move production from China, it will take a long time to make sure that new factories will make the garment correctly and can get the proper materials. The costs may be

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too great too, as we are barely profitable now,” declared one company executive. Others argued, “We know firsthand that the additional tariffs will have a significant, negative and long-term impact on American businesses, farmers, families and the U.S. economy.”26 At the G-20 summit, Presidents Trump and Xi agreed to continue negotiating. China continued to act cautiously. Beijing could have roused nationalism at home, encouraged a boycott of U.S. goods, ceased exports of rare earth minerals, and imposed additional nontariff barriers on U.S. imports. Worse, it could have dumped its vast holdings of $1.1 trillion U.S. treasury securities on the global market, causing a precipitous increase in interest rates and a dramatic decline in the value of the U.S. dollar. It would also harm itself by lowering the value of those securities it had not sold. Moreover, America’s Federal Reserve could purchase those securities, and China’s sale of them would increase the value of its own currency, the renminbi, thereby increasing the cost of and thus reducing demand for its exports. China might also allow the value of the renminbi to depreciate thereby increasing its exports and reducing its imports. This, however, posed a problem for China because it would reduce Beijing’s dollar reserves that were needed for overseas investment, debt repayment, and payment for imports. Nevertheless, President Xi symbolized his willingness for a long fight by visiting a monument to the beginning of the 4,000-mile yearlong 1934 Long March by followers of communist leader Mao Zedong. Notwithstanding fears of U.S. investors, farmers, and businesspersons, President Trump tweeted, “Tariffs will make our Country MUCH STRONGER, not weaker.” In reality, U.S. consumers and farmers would bear many of the costs. Although Washington had collected tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods, the amount in 2019 was insufficient to meet the cost of Trump’s two bailouts for farmers of $12.6 and $16 billion as well as other U.S. industries harmed by the trade war. Although the compensation was inadequate to make up expected losses, Trump took this step because of the negative reaction in farm states. Unlike Trump’s claim, the Director of the National Economic Council Larry Kudlow admitted that America and China would pay for the tariffs on Chinese imports. Some economists concluded that Americans were bearing nearly the entire cost of Trump’s tariffs. According to a study by Trade Partnership Worldwide, if the president imposed all the tariffs on China that he had threatened, they would cost a U.S. family of four about $2,400 annually, and the economy would lose 2.2 million jobs and $200

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billion. By 2020, tariffs in the trade war had cost Americans an additional $46 billion, and China may have suffered even more than the United States. Even if a final settlement were achieved, mistrust would persist in U.S.-Chinese trade relations. A “final” deal to satisfy Trump would require a structural transformation to make China a market economy like America’s economy. China regarded this as nonnegotiable, and analysts in both countries recognized this. After negotiations failed again in August 2019, the president carried out his threat to add tariffs of 10% that could rise to 25% on the remaining $300 billion of Chinese imports. “We thought we had a deal with China three months ago, but sadly, China decided to renegotiate the deal before signing,” Trump tweeted. “More recently, China agreed to buy agricultural products from the U.S. in large quantities but did not do so.”27 A Chinese spokesperson responded that America sought to remedy its domestic problems through the negotiations. There was more than a grain of truth in this. China retaliated against Trump’s planned tariffs, announcing tariff increases in late 2019 on about 69% of U.S. exports. Beijing also devalued its currency to an 11-year low, making its exports less expensive, and Washington swiftly named Beijing a “currency manipulator.” China also asked state-owned companies to cease importing U.S. agricultural products. Trump then tweeted, “Our great American companies are hereby ordered to immediately start looking for an alternative to China, including bringing your companies HOME and making your products in the USA.”28 It is doubtful that the president had the legal authority to “order” companies this way. Trump also angrily tweeted, “China should not have put new Tariffs on 75 BILLION DOLLARS of United States products (politically motivated!) Starting on October 1st, the 250 BILLION DOLLARS of goods and products from China, currently being taxed at 25%, will be taxed at 30%.”29 He also declared he would tax another $300 billion in Chinese imports at 15%, rather than the 10% initially planned to go into effect in September. If Trump went ahead, they would affect virtually all Chinese imports. However, a day later at the 2019 G-7 summit in Biarritz, Trump seemed to have “second thoughts” about increasing tariffs on China. In September 2019, the president delayed the increases for two weeks as “a gesture of good will,” and China reciprocated. U.S. companies were aghast at Trump’s tweets. An official of the National Retail Federation complained, “It’s impossible for businesses

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to plan for the future in this type of environment. The administration’s approach clearly isn’t working, and the answer isn’t more taxes on American businesses and consumers.”30 “Is Trump really losing it, or is this just more of the same, but more?” asked presidential scholar Russell Riley, adding that democracies tended to avoid trade disputes with authoritarian regimes because they recognized they lack “the tool of last resort for the autocrat: a command economy.”31 Both countries seemed prepared for a lengthy conflict. Like a poker player, Trump believed he had a strong hand. However, the best he could hope for was minimizing the inevitable political and economic damage. Trump, who had earlier predicted a quick deal, suggested that, if necessary, he would wait until after America’s 2020 election for an agreement. In October 2019, Washington and Beijing achieved a partial ceasefire. America agreed not to proceed with its planned tariffs on additional Chinese imports in return for Chinese increases in imports of U.S. agricultural exports. However, knotty disagreements remained unresolved, delaying the ceasefire. After additional negotiations, Washington and Beijing reached an “agreement in principle.” Between July 2018 and 2020, U.S. firms had paid roughly $42 billion in additional tariffs. In January 2020, Washington and Beijing agreed to “Phase 1” of an agreement. China pledged to enforce protection of intellectual property, open financial services such as banks, insurers, and pharmaceutical companies to foreign investors, and cease forcing foreign firms to transfer technology to China. America suspended a planned tariff on $162 billion in additional Chinese goods and halved its 15% tariff on $110 billion of Chinese imports imposed earlier. In return, China would purchase additional American agricultural and energy products as part of an increase of $200 billion in exports to China by 2021. China would also open markets for U.S. biotechnology, beef, and poultry. Washington also canceled its scheduled tariffs on an additional $160 billion of Chinese exports shortly before they were due to go into effect. Despite the agreement, a 25% tariff on $250 billion in Chinese goods remained, mainly involving automobile components and equipment. U.S. tariffs also remained on $360 billion worth of Chinese imports or about 65% of U.S. imports from China. Finally, the two countries agreed not to use the WTO to determine whether either was violating the agreement. Instead, they would monitor each other and restore higher tariffs if violations occurred. The agreement entailed a retreat from free to managed trade.

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Given previous failed “agreements in principle” in 2019, observers remained cautious about the deal. Phase I was in danger, owing to China’s economic woes resulting from the coronavirus that had reduced imports, especially oil, from America. Beijing could invoke a clause in the agreement that allowed for additional negotiations “in the event that a natural disaster or other unforeseeable event” postponed the ability of either country to verify that commitments were being met. Tough issues also remained for “Phase 2,” including U.S. objections to Chinese subsidies for state enterprises and cyber-espionage. Trump’s former economic adviser, Gary Cohn, had argued the president was “desperate” to reach a trade agreement with China and needed “a win,” but he was pessimistic about a lasting agreement. “I think market access, the Chinese will give because they’ve been close to giving it for a while. But how are we going to stop the Chinese from stealing intellectual property or not paying for it?” he said. “How are we going to stop them from copyright infringement? What is the enforcement mechanism, and what are the punitive damages if they don’t stop?”32 Until the Sino-American trade war ended, economic globalization would stall. American tariffs remained among the highest of any major country, a trade-weighted tariff rate of 4.2%. That was more than twice the rate for Canada, Britain, Italy, Germany, France, Russia, and even China. Moreover, the mutual tariffs may become permanent, bringing an end to Sino-American economic interdependence—“Chimerica”—and pushing back economic globalization. Sino-American relations remained strained in 2020 after Beijing ended Hong Kong’s autonomy, and Washington terminated Hong Kong’s preferential economic status that had allowed it to avoid the Sino-American trade war.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Even more than China, NAFTA was a special target of Trump’s venom. The president repeatedly referred to NAFTA as “the worst trade deal maybe ever.” Canada’s former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who had negotiated NAFTA, responded, “when they say Nafta is the worst deal ever, remind them of what it has done. There are 500 million people who are 7 percent of the world’s population producing 29 percent of the world’s wealth.”33 Without NAFTA, complex supply and production chains would have to be reassembled, probably at great expense to

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consumers. The Ford F-150, for example, had a body made with Canadian aluminum, window wipers and pistons from Mexico, and an engine and transmission made in America. Trump’s former ambassador to Mexico revealed how disorderly was the administration’s decision-making process regarding NAFTA. “The back story of Mr. Trump’s campaign to dismantle Nafta is not just about his obsession with one agreement. It is also a window into a chaotic decisionmaking style that has undermined America’s diplomacy and national interests across the globe.…. I learned about the draft one-page notification of our plan to exit Nafta from countless emails and phone calls from reporters and Mexican officials.”34 Although an agreement in principle was reached, it still had to be ratified by a reluctant Congress. Trump declared that he was unhappy about the deal being negotiated and would not sign anything until after America’s congressional elections in November 2018. After multilateral talks to change NAFTA stalled, the president set out to reach trade agreements with Canada and Mexico separately. His demands included lower America’s trade deficits with Canada, higher U.S. content in North American-made automobiles, changing the dispute-settlement system that largely exempted Mexico and Canada from U.S. anti-dumping tariffs, duty-free imports of textiles to the U.S. from Canada and Mexico that contain large amounts of Chinese yarn, and the mandatory five-year renewal of the treaty. As multilateral negotiations to alter NAFTA ground to a halt, President Trump began bilateral negotiations with Mexico, again reflecting his preference for bilateral rather than multilateral deals. An agreement was reached in August 2018 that would only modestly alter NAFTA. Mexican workers in the automobile industry would receive a minimum wage of at least $16 an hour for cars sold in America, and at least 75% of those cars had to be made in the U.S. or Mexico. The purpose of this was to reduce outsourcing of components from other countries such as China and South Korea. Canada was left out of U.S.-Mexican negotiations, and Trump demanded that Ottawa acquiesce to the bilateral agreement almost immediately. That agreement would produce higher prices for consumers and a less competitive auto industry in North America. It would also rearrange supply chains, probably at the expense of Mexico owing to the requirement that it grant workers higher wages and reducing incentives for auto companies to move south. America’s International Trade

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Commission concluded that the agreement would have a marginally positive impact on the U.S. economy, “a minor update to NAFTA,” said a U.S. senator, with limited benefits for U.S. workers. Joining America and Mexico was complicated by Canadian anger at Trump’s insulting description of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as “very dishonest and weak” and Trump’s highhanded demand that Canada immediately accept the U.S.-Mexican deal with no changes. Trump also alienated Mexican leaders shortly after praising the U.S.-Mexican agreement when he repeated his campaign vow that Mexico would pay for the wall that would be built on its border. However, recognizing that Congress would probably reject a bilateral arrangement and that many American states depended on exports to Canada, Trump sought to bring Ottawa on board and lengthened the time available for Ottawa to consult Washington. Nevertheless, Trump continued to criticize Canada in remarks that he thought were off the record. A Canadian newspaper published his remarks, and the president went ballistic, tweeting “Wow, I made OFF THE RECORD COMMENTS to Bloomberg concerning Canada, and this powerful understanding was BLATANTLY VIOLATED.”35 Nevertheless, Washington and Ottawa reached an agreement an hour before the U.S. deadline of September 30, 2018, to rescue NAFTA, renamed “United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” (USMCA). Washington agreed to retain NAFTA’s tariff dispute settlement system involving anti-dumping rules and countervailing duties that Trump had sought to eliminate. America got modest access to the highly protected Canadian dairy industry, which Trump had declared was a “disgrace” to America’s dairy farmers. In fact, retaliation for Trump’s aluminum and steel tariffs threatened the survival of dairy farmers in Wisconsin who stored their product in metal containers. In addition, Trudeau denied Trump’s claims, noting that the U.S. had a dairy surplus with Canada. The USMCA upgraded environmental and safety rules and increased protection of intellectual property. The deal, which must be reviewed after six years, gave Canada and Mexico “accommodations” for their automobile industries in the event Trump decided to impose tariffs on imported cars. The agreement required that by 2023 a tariff-free vehicle would have to contain at least 40% of its components made in a “high wage” factory, that is, with a minimum wage of $16 an hour. Although reducing the

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number of automobiles made in Mexico, North American auto manufacturers would find it more difficult to compete with European and Japanese automakers. Trump had vowed to leave NAFTA if Congress did not ratify the new agreement. One objection to the USMCA involved a provision allowing pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”) to raise prescription drug prices, especially ultra-expensive drugs produced in living cells, by extending some patents to ten years. This would preclude inexpensive generic drugs and competitive pricing. Democrats sought to reduce drug prices by shortening patent protection for drugs by making it easier for generic companies to force Big Pharma to provide materials to develop generic alternatives. They also sought to prevent Big Pharma from paying other companies to delay developing generic alternatives. Finally, some members of Congress demanded that Trump rescind his tariffs on steel and aluminum imports before approving the new deal. To gain Republican support for the new USMCA, Trump removed tariffs on industrial metals from Mexico and Canada (later restoring some on Canada) but tried to make those countries agree to impose quotas on exports of these metals, thereby preventing Chinese exports to enter America indirectly via its neighbors. U.S. consumers would have paid the price if trilateral negotiations had collapsed, a fact evident when Trump imposed a tariff on Mexican tomato imports, leading to price increases on tomatoes sold in America. The president also threw a wrench into the works by threatening to raise tariffs against Mexico beginning in June 2019 if that country failed to end the migrant flow of Latinos to the U.S. border. This would have ended any prospect for the USMCA. However, Mexico increased efforts to reduce Central American migration and agreed to take unprecedented steps to curb irregular migration. Mexico’s apparent capitulation further convinced the president of the utility of tariffs in dealing with China and Europe. “People haven’t used tariffs,” Trump said, “but tariffs are a beautiful thing when you’re the piggy bank, when you have all the money.” Richard Fontaine of the Center for a New American Security responded “Where we seem to be right now are that tariffs are a big hammer and every foreign policy problem looks like a nail,”36 and are used to deal with every issue. Trump gained Democratic support for the USMCA in January 2020, after he agreed to strengthen labor, environmental, pharmaceutical, and enforcement provisions of the agreement. Had Trump failed to enact the

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USMCA, farmers such as those in Idaho who exported potatoes and dairy products to Mexico, those in Iowa who exported high-fructose corn syrup to Mexico, and Texans who sold chickens to Mexico would have suffered most. Trump also thought the deal strengthened his hand with China and hailed the agreement as a victory. NAFTA may have reduced China’s exports by aiding U.S. companies to source products from Mexico instead of China. However, after Trump threatened tariffs on Mexico if that country failed to slow migrant movement to the U.S. border, American firms that were considering leaving China and moving to Mexico began to rethink their plans. The USMCA and the Sino-American trade ceasefire slowed the decline of economic globalization. However, the two deals reversed the reduction of trade barriers that had existed before the Trump years and moved the global economy from the free trade sought by supporters of the liberal order. Despite the agreement, three-quarters of Mexican and Canadian adults disapproved of U.S. leadership.

Tariffs on Allies Trump’s decision in March 2018 to impose tariffs of 25% on steel imports and 10% on aluminum imports affected numerous firms. In May, he extended these metal tariffs to allies in the EU, Canada, and Mexico, earning the opposition of domestic firms. Among the first to suffer in America were employees who lost their jobs at the Mid-Continent Nail Company in Missouri in June. Trump’s aluminum tariffs on aluminum for washing machines created 1,800 American jobs, costing more than $817,000 apiece. Washington’s tariffs on solar panels and aluminum and steel imports harmed Germany in particular. The EU exported $6.2 billion of steel and $1.1 billion of aluminum products to America in 2017 and was prepared to retaliate. EU members were shocked that Trump justified his tariffs as protecting “national security.” How could America’s closest allies be perceived by an American president as threats to U.S. “national security”? Opponents also included the United Steel Workers, which feared a loss in jobs for union members in Canada, and the U.S. Aluminum Association, because 97% of the workers in the aluminum industry depended on supply chains that went back and forth into Canada. Indeed, it cost American consumers more than $900,000 a year for every U.S. job saved or created by the metal tariffs. The cost was so high because steel and

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aluminum were capital-intensive industries with relatively few workers. Overall, including retaliation, additional tariffs could have affected over $1 trillion in global trade. Mexico announced it would retaliate with tariffs on U.S. cheese, bourbon, pork, apples, and other exports produced in states governed by Republicans. Although Europeans declared they would retaliate, they remained uncertain about how far to go, fearing that if they responded too vigorously, the situation would worsen, harming everyone, including themselves. With remarkable hypocrisy, U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer declared that reciprocal tariffs imposed by Europe, Canada, Mexico, and China damage the “multilateral trading system,” and he vowed to act according to both U.S. law and international rules to protect American interests. Merkel stressed the role of multilateral institutions, and Macron emphasized that the correct course would be using the World Trade Organization (WTO) and following rules. The EU, Japan, Russia, Turkey, and India swiftly filed formal complaints to U.S. metal tariffs at the WTO. A year later, Washington added Brazil and Argentina to this list (later removing the threat to Brazil), claiming they were manipulating their currencies to increase exports. “It’s unprecedented to have gone after so many U.S. allies and trading partners, alienating them and forcing them to retaliate,” said Douglas Irwin. “It’s hard to see how the U.S. is going to come out well from this whole exercise.”37 Thomas Donohue, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, was still sharper: “If this proposal is carried out, it would deal a staggering blow to the very industry it purports to protect and would threaten to ignite a global trade war.”38 Although Europe depended on America for trade and thus prosperity, China was increasingly investing in the EU, including a deal reached in early 2021 to let China invest more easily in EU-based companies. Both deplored Trump’s protectionist policies, and the investment agreement created a wedge in U.S.-EU relation. U.S. trade was especially vital for the UK, which was completing Brexit and negotiating free trade agreements with countries such as New Zealand and Japan. Although President Biden had hoped Europe would wait until consulting Washington, the agreement benefited both China and Europe. European companies, for example, would no longer be required to operate joint ventures with Chinese partners or be required to share technology with Beijing. Trump also threatened to impose tariffs on automobiles and car parts in the event of retaliation for U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum, an

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action that would especially harm U.S. allies Germany and Japan. He also threatened a tariff on imported automobiles from America’s trading partners—Mexico, Japan, Canada, and Germany—to make them increase the content of U.S-made parts in their autos. Ironically, Europeans had been coming closer to U.S. views about China’s economic practices when Trump’s actions threatened transatlantic trade. Trump’s threat was met by angry criticism. Pointing to the “car situation,” Trump declared, “The European Union is possibly as bad as China, just smaller.”39 “If there’s a full-blown trade war, it will be pretty tough for the auto industry and consumers,” said one analyst, adding, “If you add a tariff, my guess is a lot of people just won’t buy new cars.”40 Trump dismissed these concerns. “What’s going to really happen is there’s going to be no tax. You know why? They’re going to build their cars in America. They’re going to make them here.”41 Trump’s threat was again rationalized by national security. “It would be very difficult to imagine” how automotive imports to America would “create any sort of threat to the national security,”42 argued Jyrki Katainen, a European Commission vice president. “Economic security is national security,” declared Peter Navarro. “And if you think about everything the Trump administration has been doing in terms of economic and defense policy, you understand that this maxim really is the guiding principle.” Irwin dismissed Navarro’s claim, especially regarding European. “In the past, we’ve used trade sanctions as a way of trying to punish or discipline other countries when they’ve violated a particular norm. But deliberately going after European allies over autos, where the domestic auto industry does not want protection, seems like a needless antagonization.”43 Trump’s threat to impose tariffs on imported autos led General Motors, which already was paying higher prices for metals imported to make cars and components made by foreign subcontractors, to warn that it would produce “less investment, fewer jobs and lower wages” for its employees and increase car prices in America. Indeed, many “foreign” cars such as BMWs, Volvos, and Mercedes were manufactured in pro-Trump southern American states and exported overseas depended on imported components. “We are vulnerable to further escalations of this conflict because we ship products from the U.S. to Europe and from Europe to the U.S.,”44 said an executive of a German company with a transmission factory in South Carolina.

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Following a meeting with EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, Trump, who had called the EU a trade “foe,” backed down, a least temporarily, on imposing new tariffs on European autos. Trump and Juncker also agreed to try to achieve “zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods.” Juncker tweeted “I came for a deal, we made a deal.”45 Negotiations proved difficult, especially owing to EU refusal to discuss agricultural trade. Trump was concerned about the prospect of Republican losses in congressional elections in states like Tennessee that hosted foreign car plants and the agricultural Midwest. Consequently, the EU sought alternative trade partners. It already had bilateral trade agreements with fifteen countries including Canada and Japan—the latter signed shortly after Trump had imposed tariffs on EU members—and was awaiting ratification for a deal with the Latin American trade group, Mercosur. The EU also updated trade agreements with Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam. A German member of the European Parliament pointedly declared, “we don’t want to build walls, we want to build bridges,” and Canada’s minister for international trade declared, “The world was waiting for a strong voice from Europe and Canada, and today, Europe has spoken with a strong voice for open and progressive trade.”46 “We did everything we could to avoid this situation, but now we have no choice but to respond,” said Cecilia Maelstrom, then the European commissioner for trade. “The E.U. has a responsibility to stand up for open global trade.”47 Indeed, an official of a Belgian economic research institute rhetorically asked, “The question is, how much do you give into a bully?” She added, “But you can’t really depend on Trump. His understanding of global trade is bilateral balance, which is as good as arbitrary, given global supply chains. And it depends on what side of the bed he wakes up on tomorrow.”48 Another trade spat erupted between Europe and the U.S. in 2019 involving a long-running quarrel over government subsidies to Europe’s Airbus and America’s Boeing Corporation. The WTO decided that EU subsidies to Airbus had harmed America. Thereafter, Washington imposed tariffs on European goods as permitted by the WTO. Washington adopted “carousel retaliation,” rotating tariffs on different European products every six months. Thereafter, the WTO also ruled that the EU could place tariffs of $4 billion on U.S. products annually owing to American subsidies given to Boeing and the EU did so. In January 2020, the U.S. imposed WTO-approved tariffs on $7.5 billion worth of EU

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goods. However, both Boeing and Airbus began to remove the subsidies in November 2020, and an agreement ending the U.S. and EU tariffs seemed likely. A U.S. report about French taxes on online services that “discriminates against U.S. companies” produced another spat until a ceasefire in January 2020 to facilitate negotiations. However, in July, Washington threatened tariffs on French goods in January 2021 unless France forewent its tax. Trump also threatened tariffs on Germany at the 2019 NATO summit unless it paid the alliance’s “dues,” although there are no “dues” for NATO membership. Unfortunately, Washington and Brussels were threatening tariffs rather than solving mutual grievances. European reaction to Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on allies was one of anger that Washington would treat allies as though they were foes. As Macron had said, “We will talk about anything in principle with a country that respects W.T.O. rules,” but “We will not talk about anything when it is with a gun to our head.”49 Juncker called America’s unilateral tariffs “unjustified” and “protectionism, pure and simple.”50 Malmstrom observed, “Throughout these talks, the U.S. has sought to use the threat of trade restrictions as leverage to obtain concessions from the EU,” sadly concluding: “This is not the way we do business, and certainly not between longstanding partners, friends and allies.” France’s finance minister was irate. “Our U.S. friends must know that if they were to take aggressive actions against Europe, Europe would not be without reaction.”51 Trump’s tariffs directed against allies seemed strange. Argued Paul Musgrave. “Since the campaign, he has made clear that he views allies as takers and wants to renegotiate the post-World War II liberal trading order to put the screws on them.”52 A senior official in Trump’s administration declared, “The Trump Doctrine is simply ‘We’re America, Bitch.’ That’s the Trump Doctrine.” The author explained: “To Trump’s followers, ‘We’re America, Bitch’ could be understood as a middle finger directed at a cold and unfair world, one that no longer respects American power and privilege. To much of the world, however, and certainly to most practitioners of foreign and national-security policy, ‘We’re America, Bitch’ would be understood as self-isolating, and self-sabotaging.”53

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America’s Domestic Economic Consequences What were the domestic consequences of Donald Trump’s tariffs? They triggered retaliatory tariffs and raised the costs for companies in America that imported components or resources. Canada, for example, retaliated to Trump’s tariffs on imported metals by imposing tariffs on U.S. products like Heinz ketchup. In 2014, Heinz had angered Canadians by closing a factory in Canada, putting 700 employees out of work. Thereafter, Canadians began a campaign to boycott Heinz and hired a Toronto subcontractor to set up a complete production line, which produced bottles with labels that read: “Bottled in Canada with 100 percent Canadian Tomatoes.” Prime Minister Trudeau encouraged Canadians to buy French’s ketchup. Interestingly, both companies were owned by McCormick & Co., a Baltimore-based food company. As a Canadian trade union leader observed, Canada had oil, water, and all the things that America needed. Thus, a trade fight with Canada made no sense. However, having raised tariffs on Canadian aluminum still higher in 2020, Washington retreated in September of that year in the face of threatened retaliation. Tariffs were less likely to help home industries today than in earlier decades. Many U.S. imports currently were components in transnational production chains, and American firms sold these to foreign firms further up the production chains. Import restrictions that helped some upstream producers by raising the prices of their products hurt industries that needed those goods in production. America’s auto companies uniformly opposed Trump’s metal tariffs. American automakers depended on imported parts and cars and were enmeshed in a global value chain. No U.S. automaker sought protection because the industry was so highly globalized. About half the cars sold in America were imported. Of those made at home, nearly half were made by foreign firms. As global firms, U.S. automakers required massive amounts of steel and aluminum and many components made elsewhere as well as in Chinese-owned factories in Michigan, including Henniges that produced sealing products for cars and was owned by China’s state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation. If a tariff raised the price of U.S. steel, it harmed American firms like General Motors by raising their prices relative to foreign companies like Volkswagen. Therefore, two large American steel manufacturers, Nucor and U.S. Steel, with close ties to the Trump administration successfully objected to the efforts of hundreds of smaller U.S. firms for exemptions

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from Trump’s steel tariff. Nucor and U.S. Steel presumably sought to make smaller firms buy such components as pipes, wire, and screws from them for their supply chains. Retail companies had a particularly difficult time because they imported much of their inventory from China and could not reroute their supply chains easily. Thus, stores across America were closing as Trump’s tariffs persisted. China’s authoritarian system allowed Beijing to limit political blowback more effectively than Washington. Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on Chinese imports led many normally pro-Republican businesspersons to try persuading the president not to carry out his threat for fear of Chinese retaliation. By mid-2018, it was evident that prices were rising owing to Trump’s tariffs. U.S. tariffs on aluminum imports, for example, raised prices for cans of beer and soft drinks. Coca-Cola raised prices because aluminum tariffs were making its cans more expensive. Winnebago, maker of RVs, also had raised its prices, blaming higher steel and aluminum costs. One Republican businessperson, who expected the tariffs would halve profits, complained, “If we fail because the company is being harmed by the government, that just makes me sick.”54 In a 2018 survey of U.S. firms in China, almost two-thirds answered that Beijing had met Trump’s tariffs with nontariff barriers such as increased inspections and difficulties with Chinese customs. However, only six percent said they might return to America. It was always unlikely that China would capitulate in a trade war with America, especially with its own immense domestic market. Beijing’s initial tariffs affected about 5,200 types of U.S. exports to China. Apple predicted that America would suffer more than China, leading to lower U.S. competitiveness and higher prices. China could boycott Apple products, and the trade war would sever the company’s production chain in which cellphones were assembled in China and exported to America. If continued, Trump’s tariffs would raise the price of Apple cellphones significantly for Americans. In response to Apple’s concern, the president tweeted that Apple should make its products in America, not China. Other large U.S. tech firms like Google, Dell, Intel, and IBM also depended on components from China in their production chains. Tariffs harmed the infrastructure of the Internet, thus hurting America as well as China. Many manufacturing firms also had to alter their supply chains. The supply chains of America’s auto industry were particularly vulnerable and therefore, so was the state of Michigan. Declared a business executive

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in Michigan, “I’m angry, I’m frustrated, and honestly, I’m scared.”55 Chinese investment in Michigan, including in firms that were subcontracted for U.S. autos, accounted for numerous American jobs. GM sold more cars in China than in America, and BMW, a German firm, was the largest exporter of cars from America by value. Japan’s Honda Odyssey was thought to have the highest proportion of content of U.S. and Canadian parts. Separating China and Michigan would harm the entire auto industry. Tariff-fueled increases in commodity prices cost GM $300 million more in additional expenses and Ford $145 million more in the second quarter of 2018 than in the same period the year before. Trump declared that his tariffs on China would make it possible for Ford to build its Focus Active in the U.S. instead of China, but Ford refused. Apple feared it would be caught in the middle of a Sino-American trade war. It had forty-one stores in China and sold millions of cellphones there. Apple designed phones in America but assembled the components in China. In a Sino-American trade war, Apple feared that Beijing would delay its supply chain and investigate its products, alleging, like America, national security concerns. Indeed, many U.S. companies began responding to tariffs on Chinese exports, not by moving production back to America, as the Trump administration had hoped, but by outsourcing to countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Mexico, which were less expensive. Owing to declining exports, China’s economic growth in mid-2019 fell to its lowest level in almost three decades, and Chinese investment in America declined by 90 during Trump’s presidency, reflecting the deterioration in Sino-American economic relations. The Europeans and Chinese targeted exports like Harley-Davidson motorcycles and agricultural products like soybeans that were produced in key political districts, especially those that had voted Republican in 2016. To evade these, Harley-Davidson infuriated Trump by moving some production from America to Europe. Trump had earlier thanked the company for “building things in America,” but after it had announced it would move some facilities, he tweeted angrily, “they surrendered, they quit!” U.S. farmers were especially vulnerable to foreign tariffs. “I would like to tell the president, ‘Man, you are messing up our market,’” exclaimed the secretary of the American Soybean Association. Changing NAFTA, he added, “gives us a lot of heartburn in farm country.”56 The tariffs were also “potentially devastating” for farmers argued the president of

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Iowa’s Pork Producers Association. Trade had been good for farmers, until Trump’s tariffs, and farm exports had been near record highs in value. China’s retaliatory tariffs, however, reduced the price of U.S. soybeans by 20%. The chair of the American Soybean Association observed that the market was volatile, and, consequently, farmers were nervous. Between January and September 2018, U.S. pork and soybean exports to China fell 36 and 98%, respectively, and plummeting soybean prices proved disastrous for U.S. farmers. Following the breakdown of Sino-American trade negotiations in 2019, China completely ceased purchasing U.S. soybeans that it had previously continued buying while negotiations continued. Trump tweeted that China had focused on U.S. farmers. “Not good. Not nice,” but farmers are saying we’re standing firm. In fact, Trump’s tariffs were “not good” for U.S. farmers, companies, or consumers. America’s agricultural exports, which had been growing, began to fall, and farm incomes declined. Farm organizations appealed to Trump for help, and he responded with direct payments to farmers, mainly those with large farms. Nevertheless, farm bankruptcies rose, and farmers’ income fell significantly in 2019 and 2020. The 2020 budget Trump submitted to Congress proposed to reduce subsidies for crop insurance premiums to 48 from 62% and limit current subsidies for less prosperous growers. However, the late December 2020 COVID-19 relief package included some $13 billion to aid farmers and ranchers. Trump’s tariffs harmed the U.S., European, and Chinese economies, as well as the global economy. China’s policies had contributed to the trade war, but Trump’s wholesale resort to tariffs and his refusal to use the WTO constituted attacks on economic globalization. The tariffs challenged the post-World War II consensus on free trade and decades of trade liberalization. In September 2020, a WTO panel ruled that Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports were illegal. Trump’s trade wars disrupted investment and global supply chains, and slowed the spread of new technologies, thereby lowering global productivity. America’s trade-weighted tariffs of 4.2% actually were higher than those of other G-7 members. Despite the Phase 1 agreement with China, mutual tariffs may become permanent, ending Sino-American economic interdependence. Moreover, America’s Magnitsky Act that imposed sanctions on foreigners who violated human rights further magnified SinoAmerican tension by preventing imports from a Chinese paramilitary firm

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that produced over 7% of the world’s cotton owing to its exploitation of Muslim Uighurs.

Conclusions: Is Economic Globalization Entering a New Phase? Economic globalization enriched the entire world. It reduced inequality among countries but fostered inequality among individuals that intensified opposition to it. Globalization had created wealth by persuading firms in rich countries to invest abroad rather than elsewhere at home, thereby increasing economic efficiency. As resistance by U.S. corporations and politicians to Trump’s tariffs suggested, those most effected continued defending economic globalization. Trump’s trade policies undermined the liberal order by debasing the system of rules. Launching trade wars against U.S. trade partners was counterproductive. It raised domestic prices, cost U.S. jobs, and reduced America’s global influence. It was unclear whether Trump sought to balance exports and imports with individual countries, run a trade surplus rather than a deficit in trade, and/or emasculate postwar trading norms. The answer probably depended on the time of day, the president’s mood, which White House adviser was speaking, or what Trump heard on Fox News. Haass concluded that Trump’s “focus on narrowly defined economic interests” led to “almost total neglect of other aims of U.S. foreign policy” and “reinforced the corrosive message that U.S. support for allies has become transactional and conditional.”57 Trump’s views and actions, and Brexit and the divisions between the EU’s liberal and populist governments eroded economic as well as political globalization. Thus, at a 2017 G-20 summit, Trump pointedly refused to join other members in expressing concern about protectionism. The communiqué merely noted, “We are working to strengthen the contribution of trade to our economies.” To thrive, free trade must benefit all participants and foster a win-win situation. However, Americans seemed unpersuaded by Trump’s tireless protectionist rhetoric. A 2017 poll suggested that a record-high of 72% of Americans viewed foreign trade as an opportunity and 71%, including majorities in both political parties, believed promoting favorable trade policies was “very important.” A 2018 poll found “a record level of Americans” thought that trade was good for the US economy (82%), consumers (85%), and creating jobs (67%).

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Moreover, despite more than 6,000 protectionist measures instituted by G-20 members after the Great Recession began, globalization was in fact “continuing its forward march—but along new paths.” Until then, it had been trade-based and largely Western. “Today,” concluded Susan Lund and Laura Tyson, “globalization is being driven by digital technology and is increasingly led by China and other emerging economies.” As the role of trade declined, “new digital technologies mean that more actors can participate in cross-border transactions than ever before, from small businesses to multinational corporations.”58 Digital flows include e-mail, video streaming, Skyping, and Internet links among computers, involving data exchanges and financial flows, including purchases of foreign bonds and equities, international lending, and foreign direct investment. By contrast, the retreat of multinational corporations in recent years may indicate receding economic globalization. A key feature of economic globalization was the effort of companies to acquire transnational customers and foster transnational production, investment, and management. These trends were slowing owing partly to fears about the future. New corporate cross-border investment was falling relative to GDP, and trade using supply chains was slowing. Trump’s rhetoric initially persuaded some U.S. companies to invest at home, but investment slowed in 2018. U.S. companies that the former president had bullied to remain in America increasingly ignored his threats, and many of his promises concerning companies such as General Motors, Ford, and Harley-Davidson proved wrong. Increasingly, his tweets were less effort to persuade and more merely evidence of Trump’s tantrums. However, despite American tariffs, surprisingly the pandemic dramatically increased Sino-American trade because of growing online purchases as people stayed at home. In November 2020, China had a record trade surplus of over $75 billion, owing to 21.1% surge in exports compared with November 2019. American purchases which climbed a record 46.1% were the leading cause.59 Nevertheless, U.S. tariffs remained and that most exclusions from tariffs for U.S. companies were terminated in January 2021. Nevertheless, the trade war continued. “In one way,” as Paul Krugman concluded, “Donald Trump’s attack on our foreign trade partners resembles his attack on immigrants: in each case, the attack is framed as a response to evildoing that exists only in his imagination. No, there isn’t a wave of violent crime by immigrants, and MS-13 isn’t taking over American

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towns; no, the European Union doesn’t have ‘horrific’ tariffs on U.S. products (the average tariff is only 3 percent).”60 As the next chapter emphasizes, Trump’s economic illogic only makes sense when you link it to xenophobia—hence, the centrality of immigration in his MAGA agenda.

Notes 1. Cited in Ana Swenson, Jim Tankersley and Alan Rappeport, “Trump Blasts Fed, China and Europe for Putting U.S. Economy at a Disadvantage,” New York Times, July 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/07/20/business/trump-fed-china-economy.html?emc=edit_th_1 80721&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680721. 2. Cited in Ana Swanson and Jack Ewing, “Trump’s National Security Claim for Tariffs Sets Off Crisis at W.T.O.,” New York Times, August 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/us/politics/trumpstariffs-foster-crisis-at-the-wto.html?emc=edit_th_180813&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321680813. 3. Press Releases, “Sasse Statement on Trade War,” May 31, 2018, https:// www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/5/sasse-statement-on-tra de-war. 4. Cited in Erica Werner, “Republicans, Commerce Secretary Square Off in Heated Hearings over Tariffs,” Washington Post, June 20, 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/republicans-trump-off icial-square-off-in-heated-hearing-over-tariffs/2018/06/20/21bfe670749b-11e8-b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.47263bc75 281&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 5. Cited in Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, “Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order,” New York Times, May 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-onebelt-one-road-1-trillion-plan.html. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/ 13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-plan.html. 6. Cited in Keith Bradsher and Ana Swanson, “China-Led Trade Pact Is Signed, in Challenge to U.S.,” New York Times, November 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/business/china-trade-rcep. html?smid=em-share. 7. Douglas A. Irwin, “The False Promise of Protectionism,” Foreign Affairs 96:3 (May/June 2017), pp. 45, 47. 8. Cited in David J. Lynch, Heather Long, and Damian Paletta, “Trump Says He Will Impose New Tariffs on $300 Billion of Imports from China Starting Next Month, Ending Brief Cease-Fire in Trade War,” Washington Post, August 1, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/eco

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nomy/trump-says-he-will-impose-new-tariffs-on-300-billion-in-chineseimports-starting-next-month-ending-brief-cease-fire-in-trade-war/2019/ 08/01/d8d42c86-b482-11e9-8949-5f36ff92706e_story.html. Cited in Ana Swanson, Keith Bradsher, and Katie Rogers, “Trump Threatens Tariffs on $200 Billion in China Goods, Escalating Fight,” New York Times, June 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 06/18/us/politics/trump-says-us-may-impose-tariffs-on-another-200-bil lion-worth-of-chinese-goods.html?emc=edit_th_180619&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321680619. Cited in Damian Paletta, David J. Lynch, and Josh Dawsey, “Cracks appear in Trump’s Claims of China Trade Agreement,” Washington Post, December 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ economy/i-am-a-tariff-man-trump-says-as-china-talks-show-signs-of-spu ttering/2018/12/04/516425e4-f7e0-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story. html?utm_term=.a2d75159fcc6. Cited in Ellen Nakashima and Souad Mekhennet, “U.S. Officials Planning for a Future in Which Huawei Has a Major Share of 5G Global Networks,” Washington Post, April 1, 2019, https://www.washingto npost.com/world/national-security/us-officials-planning-for-a-future-inwhich-huawei-has-a-major-share-of-5g-global-networks/2019/04/01/ 2bb60446-523c-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html?utm_term=.0ee 267db3893&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger, “Trump Announces 5G Plan as White House Weighs Banning Huawei,” New York Times, April 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/us/politics/trump5g-network.html?emc=edit_th_190413&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21680413. Peter Beinart, “China Isn’t Cheating on Trade,” The Atlantic, April 21, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/us-tradehawks-exaggerate-chinas-threat/587536/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_todayw orld. Ibid. Michael Schuman, “The U.S.-China Trade War Isn’t Going Anywhere,” The Atlantic, January 28, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/internati onal/archive/2019/01/us-china-trade-talks-resume/581434/?wpisrc= nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Ana Swanson, “Trump’s Trade War Spooks Markets as White House Waits for China to Blink,” New York Times, June 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/business/china-trade-warpeter-navarro.html?emc=edit_th_180620&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21680620. Cited in Jim Tankersley and Keith Bradsher, “Trump Hits China with Tariffs on $200 Billion in Goods, Escalating Trade War,” New York

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Times, September 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/ us/politics/trump-china-tariffs-trade.html?emc=edit_th_180918&nl=tod aysheadlines&nlid=43321680918. Cited in Jane Perlez, “China Is Confronting New U.S. Hostility, But Is It Ready for the Fight?” New York Times, September 23, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/09/23/world/asia/china-us-trade-war.html? emc=edit_th_180924&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680924. Cited in Mark Landler, “Trump Has Put the U.S. and China on the Cusp of a New Cold War,” New York Times, September 19, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/us/politics/trump-china-trade-war. html?emc=edit_th_180920&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680920. Cited in David J. Lynch and Danielle Paquette, “New U.S.-China Tariffs Raise Fears of an Economic Cold War,” Washington Post, September 18, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/newround-of-us-china-tariffs-raise-fears-of-an-economic-cold-war/2018/09/ 18/749ec99a-bb74-11e8-bdc0-90f81cc58c5d_story.html?utm_term=. c4beb13037a3&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in Raymond Zhong, “China Strikes Back at Trump’s Tariffs, but Its Consumers Worry,” New York Times, June 6, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/07/06/business/china-trump-trade-war-tariffs.html? emc=edit_th_180707&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680707. Cited in Ana Swenson and Neil Irwin, “Trump Starts a Trade War, but the Path to Success Remains Unclear,” New York Times, July 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/us/politics/trumptrade-war-unclear-outcome.html. Cited in David J. Lynch and Danielle Paquette, “President Trump Makes Good on His Threat to Target an Additional $200 Billion in Chinese Imports with Tariffs, Ramping Up the Trade War,” Washington Post, July 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/presid ent-trump-makes-good-on-his-threat-to-target-an-additional-200-billionin-chinese-imports-with-tariffs-ramping-up-the-trade-war/2018/07/10/ aee91cbc-8489-11e8-8f6c-46cb43e3f306_story.html?utm_term=.023d95 d7ea53&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in Alexandra Stevenson, “China Strikes Defiant Stance on Trade Against Trump,” New York Times, June 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/06/02/business/china-trump-trade-fedex.html. Cited in Ana Swanson and Alan Rappeport, “Trump Increases China Tariffs as Trade Deal Hangs in the Balance,” New York Times, May 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/chinatrade-tariffs.html?emc=edit_th_190510&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433 21680510. Cited in David J. Lynch, “Companies in Furious Bit to Prevent New China Tariffs as Summit Looms,” Washington Post, June 17, 2019,

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31. 32.

33.

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THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-plan-formore-china-tariffs-sparks-business-uproar/2019/06/16/5e7f71d8-904811e9-aadb-74e6b2b46f6a_story.html?utm_term=.96298b5ee853. Cited in Lynch, Long and Paletta, “Trump Says He Will Impose New Tariffs on $300 Billion in Imports from China Starting Next Month, Ending Brief Cease-Fire in Trade War.” Cited in Peter Baker, “A Gyrating Economy, and Trump’s Volatile Approach to It, Raises Alarms,” New York Times, August 23, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/us/politics/trump-economytrade.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190824?campaign_id=2& instance_id=11597&segment_id=16450&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30a bd1bb02c4382ea®i_id=43321680824. Cited in Alan Rappeport and Keith Bradsher, “Trump Says He Will Raise Existing Tariffs on Chinese Goods to 30%,” New York Times, August 23, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/business/china-tariffstrump.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190824?campaign_id=2& instance_id=11597&segment_id=16450&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30a bd1bb02c4382ea®i_id=43321680824. Cited in Nathaniel Popper, “Business Groups Warn of Peril as Trump’s Trade War Spirals,” New York Times, August 25, 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/2019/08/25/business/trump-trade-war-businesses.html? nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190826?campaign_id=2&instance_id= 11842&segment_id=16478&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4 382ea®i_id=43321680826. Cited in Baker, “A Gyrating Economy, and Trump’s Volatile Approach to It, Raises Alarms.” Cited in David J. Lynch, “Gary Cohn Says Trump Is ‘Desperate’ for Trade Deal with China,” Washington Post, March 13, 2019, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/gary-cohn-says-trump-isdesperate-for-trade-deal-with-china/2019/03/13/56af2396-45c9-11e98aab-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html?utm_term=.3f3ade50b273. Cited in Guy Lawson, “First Canada Tried to Charm President Trump. Now It’s Fighting Back. Inside Justin Trudeau’s Campaign Against the American Trade War,” New York Times, June 9, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/06/09/magazine/justin-trudeau-chrystia-freelandtrade-canada-us-.html?nl=top-stories&nlid=4332168ries&ref=cta. Roberta S. Jacobson, “My Year as a Trump Ambassador,” New York Times, October 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/opi nion/sunday/nafta-mexico-trump-ambassador.html. Cited in Greg Lacour and Anne Gearan, “Trump Stands by Disparaging Remarks on Canada and Trade,” Washington Post, August 31, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-stands-by-dispar aging-remarks-on-canada-and-trade/2018/08/31/24d41cec-ad52-11e8-

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8a0c-70b618c98d3c_story.html?utm_term=.b544a7cd9281&wpisrc=nl_ politics-pm&wpmm=1. Cited in Cited in David Nakamura, “‘Tariffs Are the Answer’: Trump Appears Emboldened After Economic Brinksmanship with Mexico,” Washington Post, June 10, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/pol itics/tariffs-are-the-answer-trump-appears-emboldened-after-economic-bri nkmanship-with-mexico/2019/06/10/a701b63c-8b93-11e9-b08e-cfd 89bd36d4e_story.html?utm_term=.c30bde14c83a&wpisrc=nl_daily202& wpmm=1. Cited in David J. Lynch, Josh Dawsey, and Damian Paletta, “Trump Imposes Steel and Aluminum Tariffs on the E.U., Canada and Mexico,” Washington Post, May 31, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ business/economy/trump-imposes-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-on-the-eur opean-union-canada-and-mexico/2018/05/31/891bb452-64d3-11e8a69c-b944de66d9e7_story.html?utm_term=.76c1923cc01f. Cited in Ana Swanson and Jim Tankersley, “Potential Auto Tariffs Prompt Warnings From Industry and Allies,” New York Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/us/politics/trumpauto-tariffs-trade.html. Cited in Heather Long, “Trump Stands Firm on Trade, Even as Foreign Tariffs Begin Kicking in,” Washington Post, July 1, 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/national/trump-stands-firm-on-trade-evenas-foreign-tariffs-begin-kicking-in/2018/07/01/796142c2-7d6d-11e8b0ef-fffcabeff946_story.html?utm_term=.0db77cb691f0&wpisrc=nl_dai ly202&wpmm=1. Cited in Tiffany Hsu, “G.M. Says New Wave of Trump Tariffs Could Force U.S. Job Cuts,” New York Times, June 29, 2018, https://www.nyt imes.com/2018/06/29/business/automakers-tariffs-job-cuts.html?emc= edit_na_20180629&nl=breaking-news&nlid=4332168ing-news&ref=cta. Cited in Heather Long, “Trump Says He Won’t Sign Any NAFTA Deal Until After Midterms,” Washington Post, July 1, 2018, https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2018/07/01/trump-sayshe-wont-sign-any-nafta-deal-until-after-midterms/?utm_term=.2e5a21 7e7b60. Cited in Ana Swanson, “Trump Initiates Trade Inquiry that Could Lead to Tariffs on Foreign Cars,” New York Times, May 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/business/trump-tariffsforeign-autos.html. Cited in Ana Swanson and Paul Mozur, “Trump Mixes Economic and National Security, Plunging the U.S. Into Multiple Fights, New York Times, June 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/ business/trump-economy-national-security.html?nl=todaysheadlines& emc=edit_th_190609?campaign_id=2&instance_id=10026&segment_id=

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14127&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea®i_id=433 21680609. Cited in Jack Ewing, “Trump Voters May Be the Biggest Losers from Trump’s Auto Tariffs,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/07/03/business/trump-auto-tariffs.html?emc=edit_th_180704& nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680704. Cited in “Sealed with a Kiss,” The Economist, July 28, 2018, p. 19. Cited in James Kanter, “E.U. Parliament Votes to Ratify Canada Trade Deal and Send Trump a Message,” New York Times, February 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/business/canada-eutrade-ceta.html. Cited in Jack Ewing, “Europe Retaliates Against Trump Tariffs,” New York Times, June 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/ 21/business/economy/europe-tariffs-trump-trade.html?emc=edit_th_1 80622&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680622. Cited in Steven Erlanger, “Europe Averts a Trade War With Trump. But Can It Trust Him?” New York Times, July 26, 2018, https://www.nyt imes.com/2018/07/26/world/europe/donald-trump-us-eu-trade.html? rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentColle ction=world®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&conten tPlacement=1&pgtype=sectionfront. Cited in Peter S. Goodman, “For Europe, an Unpleasant Question: Confront Trump or Avoid a Costly Trade War,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/business/europe-trump-tradewar.html?emc=edit_th_180602&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680602. Cited in James McAuley and Griff Witte, “European Leaders Plan to Hit Back Against Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs,” Washington Post, May 31, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ european-leaders-plan-to-hit-back-against-trumps-steel-and-aluminumtariffs/2018/05/31/d1a38934-56ec-416d-99cc-57e09031d667_story. html?utm_term=.631ec7a06539&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in James McAuley and Griff Witte, “European Leaders Plan to Hit Back Against Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs,” Washington Post, May 31, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ european-leaders-plan-to-hit-back-against-trumps-steel-and-aluminumtariffs/2018/05/31/d1a38934-56ec-416d-99cc-57e09031d667_story. html?utm_term=.631ec7a06539&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Zach Beauchamp, “Why Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs on US Allies Are so Dangerous,” Vox, May 31, 2018, https://www.vox. com/world/2018/5/31/17413172/trump-tariff-steel-aluminum-eu-can ada-mexico?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Senior White House Official Defines the Trump Doctrine: ‘We’re America, Bitch’,” The Atlantic, June 11, 2018,

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55.

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58. 59.

60.

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/a-senior-whitehouse-official-defines-the-trump-doctrine-were-america-bitch/562511/? utm_source=twb&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Peter S. Goodman, “Trump Has Promised to Bring Jobs Back. His Tariffs Threaten to Send Them Away,” New York Times, January 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/06/business/trump-tariffstrade-war.html?emc=edit_th_190107&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=433216 80107. Cited in Ana Swanson, “Businesses Race to Washington to Sway Trump on China Tariffs,” New York Times, May 15, 2018, https://www.nyt imes.com/2018/05/15/us/politics/trump-china-tariffs-hearings.html? emc=edit_th_180516&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680516.states. html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading& module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news. Cited in Coral Davenport and Ana Swanson, “How Trump’s Policy Decisions Undermine the Industries He Pledged to Help,” New York Times, July 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/04/climate/ trump-industry-policy-consequences.html?emc=edit_th_180705&nl=tod aysheadlines&nlid=43321680705. Richard Haass, “Present at the Disruption: How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 99:5 (September/October 2020), pp. 28, 31. Susan Lund and Laura Tyson, “Globalization Is Not in Retreat,” Foreign Affairs 97:3 (May/June 2018), pp. 130, 132. Ana Swanson, “With American Stuck at Home, Trade With China Roars Back,” New York Times, December 14, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/12/14/business/economy/us-china-trade-covid.html. Paul Krugman, “Trump’s Taking Us From Temper Tantrum to Trade War,” New York Times, July 2, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 07/02/opinion/trump-trade-war.html.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. Which dimension of globalization reflects the extent of crossborder trade and investment and revenue flows in relation to GDP as well as the impact of restrictions on trade and capital transactions? a. Socio-Cultural b. Economic

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c. Political d. None of the Above 2. Which of these facilitated the organization of enormously large and complex economic enterprises and the movement and assembly of valuable products more inexpensively overseas and their “export” back to countries of origin? a. Protectionism b. Isolationism c. Analogism d. Digitalization 3. Which of these undermines international economic institutions of globalization like NAFTA and the WTO? a. Economic Nationalism b. Free Trade c. Multilateralism d. Trade Surpluses 4. Economic nationalism frequently finds support among Trump supporters in what predicament? a. Stable job in highly populated areas b. Rising industries like tech c. Obsolete industries who have lost jobs or fear they will lose them d. Those with strong job security 5. Free trade rewards industries in which countries have what, which then emphasizes the value of improving products and keeping prices down, thereby reducing inflation? a. Trade deficit b. Tariff c. Low job security d. Comparative Advantage 6. What did the Trump administration used to justify the use of tariffs, using the WTO’s 1962 Trade Expansion Act? a. Condemnations of free trade b. National Security

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c. Common good rule d. Trade Surpluses 7. Which country had become the single largest source of U.S. imports by value in 2010? a. Germany b. Brazil c. China d. Japan 8. Owing to their violations of American sanctions on Iran and its theft of trade secrets, the U.S. and several other countries banned the use of what? a. Huawei’s 5G cellphone networks b. Chinese factories c. Verizon 5G networks d. Russian oil 9. By March 2019, the trade war had become the most expensive since when, costing U.S. exporters about $40 billion a year? a. The fall of the Berlin Wall b. The Civil War c. The Great Depression d. The 2008 Great Recession 10. Which of these did Washington do to attempt to minimize the tariff’s impact on Americans? a. Placed tariffs on Chinese products for which there were alternative suppliers b. Agreed to only place tariffs in response to Chinese tariffs c. Promised to refrain from future use of tariffs as a tactic d. Placed tariffs on things that only impacted U.S.-China trade 11. Why did the U.S.-China trade war also affect other countries in East and Southeast Asia? a. Because armed conflict threatened the stability of the region b. Because they were force to introduce tariffs of their own

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c. Because they produced intermediate goods in supply chains d. It did not affect countries in East and Southern Asia 12. China has allowed the value of the renminbi to do what thereby increasing its exports and reducing its imports? a. Increase b. Depreciate c. Appreciate d. Stay the same 13. Economists from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Princeton, Yale and Columbia Universities concluded that who was bearing nearly the entire cost of Trump’s tariffs? a. Chinese Businesses b. Chinese Government c. Europeans d. Americans 14. In 2019, after Beijing devalued its currency to an 11-year low, making its exports less expensive, and Washington swiftly named Beijing a what? a. Bad faith trader b. Unfair trader c. Loyal trade partner d. Currency manipulator 15. Which multilateral trade agreement, that the president repeatedly referred to as “the worst trade deal maybe ever,” was a particular target of President Trump’s venom? a. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) b. European Union (EU) c. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) d. Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 16. Which of these allowed Beijing to limit the political blowback of the trade war more effectively than could Washington? a. China’s democratic institutions

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b. China’s authoritarian system c. China’s significantly larger economy d. None of the Above 17. What cost General Motors $300 million more in additional expenses and Ford $145 million more in the second quarter of 2018 than in the same period the year before? a. Corporate tax rate increases b. Increased cost of labor due to outsourcing c. Tariff-fueled increases in commodity prices d. Chinese corporate espionage 18. Which of these countries’ economic growth in mid-2019 had fallen to its lowest level in almost three decades? a. United States b. China c. United Kingdom d. Canada 19. What group was especially vulnerable to foreign tariffs? a. Chinese farmers b. European farmers c. Southern Asia farmers d. U.S. farmers 20. New corporate cross-border investment was ________ relative to GDP, and trade using supply chains was ________? (filling in the blank) a. Falling, increasing b. Falling, slowing c. Rising, increasing d. Rising, slowing True or False 1. True or False? Populists, as a rule, support the economic norms and practices of the liberal global system and seek to uphold globalization.

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False, populist, as a rule, oppose the economic norms and practices of the liberal global system and seek to reverse globalization. 2. True or False? Trade surpluses or deficits do not measure economic vigor. True 3. True or False? Some of Trump’s policies will increase America’s trade deficit and cost U.S. jobs by protecting obsolete industries like coal and steel, and persuading others to retaliate against U.S. exports. True 4. True or False? Free Trade creates employment in obsolete industries but harms more skilled workers. False, it creates employment in innovative industries but harms relatively unskilled workers. 5. True or False? Overall, U.S. firms liked the trade war, which increased profits for major corporations like Apple owing to boosted sales in China. False, US firms disliked the trade war, which decreased profits for major corporations like Apple owing to decreased sales in China. 6. True or False? In July 2018, Trump declared he was prepared to place tariffs on all Chinese imports. True 7. True or False? Chinese state banks provide unprofitable loans to state-owned and highly subsidized industries like steel. These industries can increase production, dump their surplus production overseas, and create global excess capacity that reduces prices and makes private foreign companies uncompetitive. True

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8. True or False? President Trump strategy of imposing tariffs rather than continuing to negotiate is consistent with the U.S.’s longtime multilateral approach to trade. False, it is unique in this case. 9. True or False? Chinese leaders regarded the U.S. tariffs as part of a concerted effort to contain their country. True 10. True or False? The U.S. supply chains for tech and energy industries do not rely on foreign countries. False, China is a major source of rare earths, encompassing seventeen elements on the periodic table that turn oxides into metals and these into products necessary for semiconductors, batteries, cellphones, and other high-tech products. 11. True or False? President Trump’s bailouts for farmers of $12.6 and $16 billion as well as other U.S. industries was payed for by Washington with the collected tariffs, as of 2019, on $250 billion of Chinese goods, False, although Washington had collected tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods, the amount, as of 2019, was insufficient to meet the cost of Trump’s two bailouts for farmers of $12.6 and $16 billion as well as other U.S. industries harmed by the trade war. 12. True or False? President Trump threatened a 25% tariff on imported automobiles in order to force America’s trading partners, especially, Mexico, Japan, Canada, and Germany, to increase the content of U.S-made parts in their autos. True 13. True or False? It cost American consumers more than $900,000 a year for every U.S. job saved or created by the metal tariffs True

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14. True or False? NAFTA may have increased China’s exports by aiding U.S. companies to source products from Mexico instead of China. False, this would cause a reduction in China’s exports. 15. True or False? U.S. tariffs on aluminum imports raised prices for cans of beer and soft drinks sold by American companies. For example, Coca-Cola raised prices because his aluminum tariffs were making its cans more expensive. True 16. True or False? In a survey of 430 U.S. firms in China released in September 2018, almost two-thirds answered that Trump’s tariffs had harmed by actions such increased inspections and difficulties with Chinese customs, but most still said they might return to America. False, only 6% said they might return to America. 17. True or False? GM sells more cars in China than in the America, and BMW, a German firm, is the largest exporter of cars from America by value. True 18. True or False? The Europeans and Chinese tariffs targeted exports like motorcycles and agricultural products such as soybeans, apples, orange juice, and pork produced in key political districts, especially those that had voted Republican in states like Florida and Iowa. True 19. True or False? At the G-20 conference in March 2017, President Trump joined other members in expressing concern about protectionism. False, President Trump pointedly refused to join other members in expressing concern. 20. True or False? Americans seem unpersuaded by Trump’s tireless protectionist rhetoric. One 2017 poll suggested that a recordhigh of 72% of Americans viewed foreign trade as an opportunity

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and 71%, including majorities in both political parties, believed promoting favorable trade policies was “very important.” True Short Answer Overtime what are the impacts of protectionism by one country followed by retaliatory tariffs and/or currency manipulation of others? It becomes painful for everyone because they undermine supply and production chains that depend on intermediate necessary for products. Severing such chains harms trade, costs jobs in exportoriented firms, reduces economic growth, and triggers inflation globally. How does free trade impact those in more obsolete industries? It increases economic inequality between those working in hightech export industries and those in uncompetitive companies. Unemployment in those industries can stem from outsourcing. It creates employment in innovative industries but harms relatively unskilled workers. If China opened its markets to U.S. exports why would it not change America’s global trade deficit? Even if China opened its markets to U.S. exports, the U.S. could not produce the additional goods to export to China, and China would merely shift to imports from countries like Brazil and South Korea. Although they do not share Trump’s harsh tactics, what do, to some extent, other countries share complaints with Washington about China’s trade actions? They share complaints regarding China’s tariffs, its coercive demands that foreign firms provide it with their technology, and its cyber-espionage of high-tech information. In what ways could China retaliate to U.S. trade policy?

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China could impose new regulations, slow goods passing through customs, or resort to a host of other non-tariff barriers. It could halt exports of critical components or items that US producers would be hard-pressed to replace. Also, it could to resort to non-economic forms of retaliation, for example easing up on sanctions on North Korea or accelerating the militarization of the South China Sea. What was did a provision in the USMCA involving large pharmaceutical companies do that was highly objected to? There was a provision in the USMCA that allowed large pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”) to raise prescription drug prices, especially ultra-expensive drugs produced in living cells, by extending some patents, to ten years, thereby precluding inexpensive generic versions and competitive pricing. How did President Trump eventually gain Democratic support for the USMCA in January 2020? The president agreed to strengthen labor, environmental, pharmaceutical and enforcement provisions of the agreement. Give an example of how U.S. manufacturing firms had to alter their supply chains significantly due to the U.S.-China trade war. As global firms, U.S. automakers require massive amounts of steel and aluminum and many components made elsewhere as well as in Chinese-owned factories in Michigan including automotive supplier Nexteer and Henniges that produces sealing products for cars, both of which are owned by China’s stateowned Aviation Industry Corporation. America’s large tech firms like Google, Dell, Intel, IBM and others also depend on components from China in their production chains. Many U.S. companies began responding to tariffs on Chinese exports, not by moving production back to America, as the Trump administration had hoped, but how? They responded by moving it to countries such as Indonesia and Mexico, which are less expensive.

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How did the U.S. China trade war and President Trump’s wholesale resort to tariffs and his refusal to use the WTO, constituted severe attacks on economic globalization? The tariffs challenged the post-World War II consensus on free trade, and decades of trade liberalization. His trade wars disrupted investment and global supply chains, and slowed the spread of new technologies, thereby lowering global productivity. America’s trade-weighted tariffs of 4.2% were higher than those of other G7 members. Despite the initial agreement, mutual tariffs may become permanent, ending SinoAmerican economic interdependence, dubbed “Chimerica,” that had contributed to China’s rapid growth and economic globalization. Essay Questions 1. Has the U.S.-China trade war been beneficial or harmful for the countries involved? How? 2. In what ways does economic protectionism cost economies? 3. Has the Trump administration’s trade policy made the U.S. weaker or stronger on the international stage? 4. Are the Trump administration’s tariff proposals and trade wars against both foes China and allies like those in the EU and Canada a logical move? 5. Is economic globalization in retreat?

CHAPTER 10

The Socio-Cultural Dimension of Globalization

According to KOF, socio-cultural globalization entailed the movement of people and ideas across boundaries, including “the size of the resident foreign population,” “cross-border personal contacts,” “information flows,” and “cultural proximity to the global mainstream.” This encompassed national homogeneity/heterogeneity, languages, religious and racial diversity, and migration flows. Socio-cultural factors, notably migration that brought with it linguistic, religious, and racial diversity, roused passionate anger among populists. Their nationalism, nativism, and xenophobia constituted a significant effort to reduce globalization’s socio-cultural dimension. Samuel Huntington feared that large-scale migrations were fostering a “clash of civilizations,” each civilization being a “cultural entity.”1 Such conflicts, he argued, would replace interstate wars. Religion and race were elements of culture, and populists appealed to their followers by stressing cultural purity and stoking fears of multiculturalism. In Europe and America, cultural and racial purity was central to populist opposition to the immigration of “aliens.” Hungary’s leaders, for example, only accepted “Christian” refugees, and Trump asked, regarding Africans, “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?” adding, “Why do we need more Haitians? Take them out.”2 Some months later in another diatribe about undocumented Latino immigrants, the president declared, “These aren’t people. These are animals.”3 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_10

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Instead, Trump preferred Caucasian migrants from “Norway.” When Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen was asked whether she knew whether Norway was predominantly white, she answered to everyone’s astonishment, “I actually do not know that, sir. But I imagine that is the case.”4 As law professor Amy Chua, argued, “tribalism remains a powerful force everywhere,” and “has begun to tear at the fabric of liberal democracies in the developed world, and even at the postwar liberal international order.”5 Tribalism in America was not entirely partisan. “Mr. Trump’s immigration policies may be more popular with Republicans than with Democrats,” wrote Robert Kagan, “but few Democratic politicians are running on a promise to bring more immigrants into the country.”6 Like America in the 1920s, isolationism, anti-immigration sentiment, and protectionism were central to Trump’s MAGA slogan. Even earlier, in the late nineteenth century the influx of European migrants produced violent resentment of immigrants in the U.S. They formed the “Know Nothing” movement (1844–1860), named the Native American Party and the American Party after 1855. The “Know Nothing” (their response to questions about the movement), like contemporary populism, was a far-right nativist movement during the 1850s. Members loathed urban Polish, Italian, and Irish migrants and Catholics generally, who they feared would exercise political influence. Before the emergence of the Republican Party but after the decline of the Whigs, the movement was a rival of the Democrats. One early Republican supported by the Know Nothing movement, Nathaniel Banks, was elected to Congress and became Speaker of the House of Representatives, and another Know Nothing politician, Millard Fillmore, had been America’s president, but running as a Know Nothing in 1856, lost badly.

Donald Trump and Immigration Former President Donald Trump intensified identity politics in America by denigrating religions (e.g., Islam and Judaism), nationalities (e.g., Mexican, Central American, and African), gender (e.g., women), and race (e.g., African-American and Latino). In America, elections, demagoguery, and xenophobia owed much to a demographic change in which “whites” were losing their dominance as the country’s majority. Trump’s appeal was partly racial, and many of his tweets explicitly or in coded fashion appealed to racial biases of white supremacists. Indeed, his

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second impeachment was based on his arousing violent right-wing white supremacist populists who entered the Capitol in January 2021. Populists elsewhere emulated Trump. Among Trump’s earliest quarrels with an ally began when he argued with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Trumbull who had phoned to congratulate America’s new president. Australia had also been opposed to admitting undocumented migrants and had detained refugees in isolated camps in Papua New Guinea, Nauru, and Manus Island. Trump took the “opportunity” to denounce an agreement that Australia had reached with the Obama administration under which the U.S. would accept a number of refugees that Australia had refused to admit. Declared the new president, “I think it is a horrible deal, a disgusting deal that I would have never made. It is an embarrassment to the United States of America, and you can say it just the way I said it… As far as I am concerned that is enough Malcom [sic]… I have been making these calls all day and this is the most unpleasant call all day. Putin was a pleasant call.”7 Donald Trump’s views about immigration, as with other issues, were, as former National Security Adviser Susan Rice argued, “impulsive, improvisational and inchoate” and were “simply to service his domestic politics.”8 An ardent nationalist-populist, President Trump tried to reduce immigration and promote socio-cultural homogeneity. He sought to end “birth tourism,” the practice of entering a country as a tourist and giving birth there so the child can obtain citizenship. He also criticized “chain migration,” that is, cases in which legal immigrants could sponsor members of their families who were foreign nationals living elsewhere for American citizenship. A week before America’s 2018 midterm elections, Trump threatened to reinterpret the Constitution’s 14th amendment by using an executive order to revoke the citizenship to those born in America to noncitizens. Trump even considered invoking the 1807 Insurrection Act to deport undocumented aliens. This obscure law was intended to let the president use troops in America to put down insurrections. In 2020, he again considered invoking the act to end demonstrations after the death of African-American George Floyd. Under Trump, the State Department denied passports to migrants from Mexico with official birth certificates proving they were born in America and to the children of U.S. Vietnamese veterans who were immigrants and had green cards but had never become U.S. citizens. Trump sought to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that protected 400,000 immigrants from several developing countries that were in the throes of

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violence or had experienced natural disasters, and in September 2020 a U.S. Appeals Court upheld Trump’s right to do so. Perhaps most controversial, Trump sought to terminate Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) that President Barack Obama had introduced to protect hundreds of thousands of “dreamers,” who had been brought to America illegally as children and had led productive lives. In June 2020, the Supreme Court refused to let him do so because he had not provided adequate justification for his decision. Then, in December, a federal court overturned a memorandum of the acting director of Homeland Security that restricted DACA to those already enrolled. Consequently, as many as 300,000 new applicants could join the program.

Categories of Migrants There are several categories of migrants who included all those who moved to different countries. Countries have no obligation to admit “economic migrants,” who migrate to escape poverty. The flow of economic migrants will intensify in the future owing to high birth rates, overpopulation, insufficient water and fertile land, and environmental stress in less developed countries (LDCs) like Nigeria. Developed countries like Canada regularly admit migrants who have professions that recipient countries need or do jobs that a country’s citizens are unwilling to take. China has sought to attract highly educated Chinese or others living overseas, especially those with skills in hightech professions. Those who enter another country without permission are termed “illegal aliens” or “undocumented migrants.” Undocumented aliens may have to pay high fees to individuals or groups able to smuggle them across borders (“human smugglers”) or who coerce them (“human traffickers”) to enter other countries as slaves or prostitutes. Many undocumented aliens had entered countries legally but remained after their visas had expired. By contrast, “refugees” (sometimes called “asylum-seekers”), according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, are persons “who, owing to a well-founded fear of” being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable, or owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. According to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

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“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” “Refugees” apply for admission outside countries they seek to enter, whereas “asylum-seekers” are those who have legally or illegally already entered those countries. To obtain asylum in America, according to Philip Bump, “a migrant has to actually be on U.S. soil. So, migrants enter the country either by crossing the border between established border checkpoints — an illegal crossing — or by showing up at one of those checkpoints, called a port of entry.” In other words, the “image of migrants entering illegally to surreptitiously make their way further into the country is somewhat outdated; now, migrants often turn themselves in immediately.”9 Countries are bound by the principle of “non-refoulement” in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, that is, not forcing those to return to their own countries if their fears of persecution are legitimate. Migrants who enter America legally at points of entry or illegally can claim to be victims of persecution. However, the Refugee Convention includes a “geographical exception” that limits the rights from outside Europe who are given only “temporary protection status.” Hence, Turkey termed Syrian refugees as “guests,” not “refugees.” According to the UN refugee agency, by the end of 2019, America, Peru, Turkey, Germany, and Brazil had the highest number of pending asylum applications.10 America’s Supreme Court has ruled that refugees’ fear is “wellfounded” if there is a 10% chance, they will face persecution, and such persons are referred to immigration judges. If that official decides there is a “significant possibility” that the refugee will face persecution on returning home, a court date should be set for a final hearing regarding granting asylum. In fiscal year 2018, America’s Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) “confirmed a credible fear of persecution” of 74,677 of the 97,728 of those asylum-seekers it interviewed. Only about 20% of asylum-seekers succeed in remaining permanently in America. USCIS began rejecting applications unless every field was filled in, however irrelevant like “middle name” for applicants without a middle name.

“Unwelcoming” America America has the world’s largest number of foreign-born residents, although they constitute a smaller percentage of the population than those in Australia or Canada. America’s population now has the highest

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percentage of foreign-born residents than any time since 1910. “This is quite different from what we had thought,” said William H. Frey, a demographer at the Brookings Institution. “We think of immigrants as being low-skilled workers from Latin America, but for recent arrivals that’s much less the case.”11 According to the UN, the number of asylumseekers or internally displaced persons (IDPs) increased by 9 million in 2019 to about 80 million. America resettled only 27,500, fewer than Canada. Until the Trump administration, roughly 75% of those coming to America claiming a “credible fear” passed their initial hearing. Under Trump, however, America has ceased welcoming refugees. As Amy Chua noted, tribalism in America based on “electoral outcomes, hatemongering, demagoguery,” and “political tribalism” owe much “to a massive demographic transformation” in which “whites are on the verge of losing their status as the country’s majority.” “Trump’s appeal,” Chua continued, “is racial” and. as candidate and president, “Trump has made many statements that either explicitly or in a coded fashion appeal to some white voters’ racial biases.”12 In 1980, the U.S. resettled more than 200,000 refugees. In 2017, America admitted only 33,000 refugees, far lower than 2016, when it accepted 97,000 and a precipitous drop from the numbers admitted during the Obama years. This was the first time since the 1980 Refugee Act that America had resettled fewer refugees than the entire rest of the world. In 2018, the U.S. admitted just 22,491 refugees, and Trump lowered it to 15.000 for fiscal year 2021. This indicated Washington’s abdication of its leadership of the liberal order. Thus, the president of Church World Service declared, “With one final blow, the Trump administration has snuffed out Lady Liberty’s torch and ended our nation’s legacy of compassion and welcome.”13 Stephen Miller was the leading anti-immigration zealot in the Trump administration. “When the news stories began to surface … of sobbing young migrant children being forcibly removed from their parents at the border, many close White House watchers instantly suspected Stephen Miller was behind it,” and he had “cultivated a reputation as the most strident immigration hawk in the West Wing.”14 Miller’s antipathy toward immigration ignored international law and long-time U.S. norms, and his right-wing populism and nationalist rhetoric stirred cultural hatred of multiculturalism.

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At meetings, Miller focused on “horror stories” about immigrants, and he was largely responsible for reducing the number of immigrants after 2016. A former National Security Council official recalled Miller saying, “What are we doing to save American lives? We must save American lives! We must save Americans from these immigrant criminals!”15 Miller’s proposals included ending aid to Central American countries from which many recent migrants came to escape violence and threatening to close the border with Mexico unless it reduced the flow of Central American migrants. Responding to advice from Miller, who was furious that a high percentage of asylum-seekers were being approved at their initial screening, the Trump administration provided new guidelines for interviewing refugees to ascertain “discrepancies” between the credible-fear interviews and other sworn statements and substituting border patrol for trained asylum officials to determine “credible fear.” The administration was prepared to fund enforcement, while refusing to meet the needs of the children it detained. However, what makes asylum “legitimate” is contested. The immigration issue has greatly aided populists attract public support in America, Europe, and elsewhere. Many Trump supporters were nativist opponents of “foreigners,” and the Trump administration arbitrarily decided that those fleeing in “caravans” from Central America who feared that their lives were threatened by domestic abuse, gang brutality, and/or environmentally-caused poverty could not claim asylum in America. Although asylum is a human right, Trump viewed it differently. “The asylum program is a scam,” involving people “who look like they should be fighting for the U.F.C [United Fighting Championship]” with large muscles and face tattoos. “Some of the roughest people you’ve ever seen.”16 Some Trump supporters even claimed that billionaire philanthropist George Soros had funded a caravan of Central Americans who were marching northward. The president also considered sending detained asylum-seekers to “sanctuary cities” like San Francisco as a punishment for refusing to let local police aid federal officials find undocumented migrants. The president claimed without evidence that these cities did not want these asylum-seekers, thereby showing that the sanctuary city thing was a “big scam.” Then, in February 2020, the president took revenge against New York State, which had been unwilling to cooperate with federal officials, by barring New Yorkers from the Trusted Traveler Program that

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permitted thousand to move more quickly through airport security lines. Trump claimed with no evidence that New York endangered national security by letting undocumented aliens obtain driver’s licenses. The administration also deployed agents from elite U.S. Border Patrol Tactical Unit in sanctuary cities to enhance the capability of immigration officers with whom those cities had refused to aid., In July, however, the administration admitted it had made false statements that had improperly justified “a central argument” in Trump’s case regarding New York and restored New Yorkers access to the program “effective immediately.” Trump berated then acting head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Ronald D. Vitiello, for failing to institute a ban on benefits to legal immigrants and eliminate protections for migrant children and in April 2019 fired Homeland Security Secretary Nielsen, who was replaced by Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan. Nielsen had repeatedly cautioned the president not to violate laws regarding asylumseekers, including closing the border. He had humiliated Nielsen in front of his entire cabinet the year before. She believed that the President was becoming “unhinged” about the border crisis and making “unreasonable” demands. Nielsen’s ouster was followed by a purge of senior administrators involved with immigration and undermined McAleenan’s authority by appointing Thomas D. Homan as his “border czar.” who would report directly to him.

Soft Power and Demography Soft power increased by admitting refugees who were victims of persecution in their own countries. America’s admission of refugees was an important tool of U.S. foreign policy and enhanced America’s global standing. “We evacuated Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon,” declared two former officials, took in Soviet Jews in the 1980s, airlifted Kosovars fleeing genocide in the 1990s, admitted thousands of Sudanese “Lost Boys” orphaned by war in this century. In each instance, we sent an important signal to the world—and so goaded governments into action, undermined the legitimacy of authoritarian leaders and defended religious freedom.17 America’s soft power had enabled the country to attract the best and brightest from around the world. “That should come as no surprise if you are familiar with the origins of the most iconic companies of the last few decades,”18 noted Farhad Manjoo. Among Google’s founders

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was a Russian immigrant, and its CEO was an immigrant from India as was Microsoft’s chief executive, and immigrants founded EBay and Yahoo. Facebook’s largest subsidiaries, Instagram and WhatsApp were co-founded by immigrants, the child of an immigrant established Apple. Thus, immigrants have been crucial to America’s high-tech industries. A member of a U.S. venture-capital firm predicted that, if he were asked in ten years why Silicon Valley had failed, he would answer it was because of screwing up immigration. In sum, America had attracted much global technological talent to Silicon Valley. Skilled immigrants under America’s H-1B visa system played a major role in technological and scientific innovation and attracting venture capital. Nevertheless, the Trump administration limited such immigrants, and many chose to go elsewhere where governments were actively seeking them. Recognizing the need for highly-skilled workers, former President Trump endorsed a proposal in 2019 that focused on admitting high-skilled workers rather those with family members who were U.S. citizens. However, the proposal met opposition from both Trump’s followers because it did not reduce immigration sufficiently and critics who asked why family ties were insufficient. Applications for such visas and the rejection rate have increased in America. Following the expiration in 2004 of the 195,000 cap, the number of H-1B visas annually available declined to 85,000. Available on first-come, first-served, the demand for H-1B visas exceeded supply. In 2019, requests for these visas were over 100,000 more than that year’s cap. Consequently, the deans of fifty U.S. university business schools called on the Trump administration to increase the H-1Bs owing to the prospect of the loss of talented migrants needed for America’s economy to prosper. Trying to force universities to reopen despite the coronavirus, the Trump administration issued a directive on July 6, 2020, requiring international students, another source of soft power, to take at least one in-class course to retain their visas. Almost immediately some twenty states, as well as Harvard and M.I.T., sued the administration to block the directive, which they argued would undermine their efforts to ensure students’ health. Some forty universities filed declarations supporting the states’ lawsuit as did major hi-tech companies such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Under pressure, the Trump administration rescinded the directive a week later.

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Demographic factors created a need for immigrants. America, Japan, Russia, and even China have aging populations and relatively fewer of those of working-age, and immigration eased that problem. Migrants to America from Latin America and elsewhere provided young workers who paid taxes that supported social security and medical benefits for the elderly and work in low-paying jobs that most Americans shunned. In February 2020, the Trump administration began refusing green cards to those who were not financially self-sufficient and declined to release a study by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that concluded that migrants had provided $63 billion more in government revenue than they had cost during the previous decade. They were less likely to seek welfare benefits and, when they did, consumed a lower dollar value of them than native-born Americans. Nevertheless, nationalistpopulists believed that government programs that benefited them were deserved, while foreigners receiving benefits were exploiting the system. Although President Trump tweeted “Our country is full,” demographers and economists saw an aging population and declining birthrates among the native-born population. Trump’s efforts to curb immigration, including highly skilled migrants needed in high-tech industries and laborers needed in agricultural states, harmed U.S. firms and farms. America’s H-2A visa program, which permitted unskilled nonagricultural workers to take temporary jobs, was capped at 66,000. America would be unable to replace undocumented Latin Americans who worked in seasonal agricultural jobs. Thus, there was an incentive to hire undocumented aliens, especially for low-paying jobs in fruit picking or meatpacking. The owners of farms, who had voted for Trump but depended on seasonal workers from Guatemala with H-2A visas, feared they might go out of business owing to the cap. Ironically, Trump’s properties in Florida and New York had knowingly hired undocumented and poorly paid Latin Americans. Globally, migrants in agriculture played an important economic role, and Trump tweeted, “We’re gonna let them in,” as the demand for temporary workers soared after 2016 from 165,000 to 242,000 owing to a decline in undocumented aliens. The demand was especially high for berry, tobacco, and apple pickers in states such as Georgia, Florida, Washington, North Carolina, and California. Agricultural firms sent people to Mexico and elsewhere to recruit such workers. In Hungary, where the fertility rate had plummeted to 1.5, Prime Minister Orbán, who vehemently opposed immigration, offered to

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exempt Hungarian women who gave birth to four or more children from paying taxes and other rewards. “We are living in times when fewer and fewer children are being born throughout Europe. People in the West are responding to this with immigration,” declared Orbán. “Hungarians see this in a different light. We do not need numbers, but Hungarian children.”19 However, America’s economy fared better than that of countries like Hungary owing to immigrants, who compensated for declining populations in countries with fertility rates below replacement level— 1.79 in 2019. Although immigration was important for countries where birthrates were falling and populations were aging, nativists opposed the entry of “foreigners.”

Islamophobia Concern about issues connected Muslim migrants has received much publicity globally. The Palestinian Conundrum A major source of refugees in the Middle East was a consequence of Arab-Israeli hostility. Palestinians born in the West Bank, Gaza, and refugee camps elsewhere, whose descendants were driven from or left their homes in what is now Israel have “refugee” status provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). They originally numbered about 750,000 but have increased to about five million. UNRWA was a vital source of aid for Palestinian refugees, but their status as refugees implied that they had a right to return to their ancestors’ homes. Israel’s government objected to the “refugee” status of Palestinians who had never lived in those homes. Many of Israel’s leaders also opposed a “two-state” (Israel and Palestine) solution to the conflict. Trump met Israel’s ambitions, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and supporting Israel’s annexation of territories it had occupied after the 1967 Six-Day War. Jared Kushner, whom the president appointed as an envoy to mediate the Israel-Palestine conflict, advocated removing the refugee status of Palestinians. Regarding UNRWA, Kushner wrote, “This [agency] perpetuates a status quo, is corrupt, inefficient and doesn’t help peace.”20 The Trump administration’s decision to end funding UNRWA, along with recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, were actions that Kushner

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believed would take the issues of refugees’ right of return and the status of Jerusalem off the negotiating table. Ending funding for UNRWA threatened a humanitarian crisis for Palestinians who depended on it for medical care, jobs, and education. Syrian Civil War Millions of Syrians fled their homes during Syria’s civil strife that began in 2011 when the country’s Sunni Muslim majority sought to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime and its minority Alawite Muslims. The conflict included Kurds, aided by America, who sought to end the Islamic State’s occupation of much of Syria and Iraq and its territorial caliphate. Kurdish militias, seeking their own state, triggered Turkish intervention in Syria. Russia and Iran also became involved, supporting Assad and increasing their influence in the region. Turkey became home to almost 4.1 million refugees, the largest number in any country. Other Syrians sought refuge in Jordan or Lebanon, which hosted the world’s highest number of refugees relative to population. In all three countries, citizens increasingly wished them to leave, and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoˆgan sought to move many of the Syrian refugees to a slice of territory in Syria near Idlib. Many already had fled to Europe, but Syrian/Russian attacks on Idlib triggered countless additional refugees, and Turkey closed its Syrian border and reopened its border with Greece (see below). Regarding admitting Syrian refugees to America, Trump declared, “This could be one of the great Trojan horses.”21 Overestimating the number of Muslim migrants, populists in the West feared Islamic terrorism, although America’s DHS declared that domestic white supremacist terrorism was more dangerous. Nativists fit the profile of American, European, and Australian populists—poorly educated, rightwing male workers in low-skill jobs. Many who had voted for Trump in 2016 viewed America as divided between white and angry “us” and nonwhite “others.” Immigration opponents argued that many asylumseekers really sought economic benefits, thereby disqualifying them for refugee status. Trump was Islamophobic, even nominating an ambassador to Germany in 2020 who had said Islamic migrants in Europe had “the goal of eventually turning Europe into an Islamic state.”22

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Islamophobia in America Although the Supreme Court ultimately upheld former President Trump’s ban on travelers from seven Muslim-majority countries in December 2017. Previously, two federal judges had blocked the executive order, and one wrote that a “reasonable, objective observer” would view the revised order as “issued with a purpose to disfavor a particular religion, in spite of its stated, religiously neutral purpose.”23 UN Secretary-General António Guterres argued that the ban violated global norms and would not reduce the threat of terrorism. Defending Trump’s original executive order, John Kelly, then Director of Homeland Security (DHS), noted that unvetted travel was not a universal privilege, especially if it involved national security. Later, the administration added six additional countries with substantial numbers of Muslims to its ban, including Nigeria, Africa largest country. Despite a DHS report that concluded that citizenship was a poor indicator of potential terrorism, Trump also added checks on Muslims seeking visas as tourists, business travelers, or relatives of Americans as part of a policy of “extreme vetting” to prevent the entry of terrorists. During his campaign, Trump had defended his promise to keep out visitors from Islamic countries, “terror states,” claiming “those people that knocked down the World Trade Center most likely under the Trump policy wouldn’t have been here to knock down the World Trade Center….”24 Trump’s Islamophobia was evident. “The hateful ideology of radical Islam,” the president declared, must not be “allowed to reside or spread within our own communities.”25 Trump’s first National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, tweeted “Fear of Muslims is RATIONAL,” adding: “Islam is not necessarily a religion but a political system that has a religious doctrine behind it.”26 Trump was using the post-9/11 fear of Islam that appealed to his supporters. However, it seemed to confirm the claim of Muslims that the West hated Islam rather than terrorism, probably helping recruit additional supporters of extremism. It also reduced immigration to America. The number of migrants apprehended by authorities along the Mexican border dropped by 72% between May and October 2019. During Trump’s second fiscal year, travelers from the Muslim countries on Trump’s travel ban dropped by 81% although 6.6 million U.S. jobs remained unfilled.

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European Islamophobia As in America, Muslim migration to Europe posed the question of how to deal with migrants from alien cultures. In the Netherlands, migrants who entered for a lengthy period of time and were between eighteen and state pension age were obliged to learn Dutch and taking a civic integration exam, rules that applied even to clerics. In France, an historian wrote, “Laïcité, the French term for secularism, today has acquired so much mystique as to be practically an ideology, a timeless norm that defines Frenchness.” Originally a guarantee of religious pluralism, wrote historian Robert Zaretsky, became “a series of battles over a simple strip of clothing. In 1989, a few Muslim girls were expelled from school when they refused to take off their hijabs, or headscarves, which the principal believed was an assault on the secular character of public schools.” Although “all ‘ostentatious’ signs of religious faith — be they Jewish yarmulkes or Sikh turbans — were declared verboten in public schools, everyone knew that the principal target of the law was the hijab.”27 French President Macron took a hardline position against political Islam, the result of terrorist incidents experienced in France in 2015 and 2016. “Islamist separatism is incompatible with freedom and equality,” he argued. “We are talking,” he said in another speech, “about people who, in the name of a religion, are pursuing a political project, that of a political Islam that wants to secede from our Republic.”28 In 2020, Macron introduced measures that heightened perceptions of Islamophobia, including limits on home-schooling, increasing attention on religious schools, forcing institutions that sought public funding to commit themselves to secularism, and ending the practice of bringing foreign imams to France. Islamic migration became an inflammatory issue in Europe after a tsunami of Muslims entered in 2014–2015. Driven by civil wars in Syria and Iraq, strife in Afghanistan, and violence elsewhere, the number of asylum applications in the EU in 2015 rose to 1,321,560, not including those who had not then made claims for asylum. The largest number of applications were made in Germany (476,000), with Hungary second (177,130). Hungary had the highest ratio of applicants to population— 1,800 per 100,000—followed by Sweden and Austria. The flood of Islamic migrants fueled fears about the future of “Christian” Europe, terrorism, and the imposition of “Sharia law.” The EU had sought to export democracy to the Arab world, but owing to the influx of Muslims,

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European governments embraced authoritarian governments in Egypt and Turkey. Most Muslim asylum-seekers to Europe initially traveled via Turkey, but, by mid-May 2016, many had taken the perilous voyage across the Mediterranean, mainly from Libya. The Italian government used Libya’s coast guard rather than Italian naval vessels to rescue refugees from danger because Libya had agreed to return them to North Africa, while Italy would have had to admit them to obey international and EU laws. Italy’s parliament also enacted a law declaring rescuers accomplices of traffickers. Rome funded Libya’s coast guard, established migrant centers in North Africa, and tried to mobilize Saharan tribes to secure Libya’s country’s southern border and send migrants elsewhere in Africa. The result was a humanitarian disaster for those seeking to reach Europe but caught in Libya’s vicious civil war. Germany initially welcomed the refugees, assuming that many would remain in Greece and Italy, because the EU’s 1990 Dublin Convention required that refugees register in the first EU country that they entered and those countries determined whether migrants qualified for asylum. However, Greece and Italy, lacking facilities to house refugees, hoped they would move to wealthier countries. Chancellor Merkel defended Germany’s liberal policy, but, as their number mounted, she began to face growing electoral opposition. Hostility soared after sexual assaults upon women by migrants in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2016, and a deadly terrorist attack on a Christmas market in Berlin. Consequently, Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered a significant loss of seats in Germany’s 2017 federal election owing to her stance on immigration. Several of Germany’s EU partners also resisted accepting migrants, and their resistance threatened survival of the Schengen zone. “A Europe without internal borders can only exist if it has functioning external borders,”29 declared Sebastian Kurz, Austria’s populist chancellor. In fact, Schengen intended free movement only for Europeans and permitted screening to detect illegal migrants. Merkel’s coalition government threatened to collapse, owing to the potential defection of the CDU’s traditional Bavarian ally, the Christian Social Union (CSU). “Beset by the surge of the anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany, or AfD,” wrote Josef Joffe, “the Christian Social Union is staring at polls giving it only 36 percent of the vote in the state elections on Oct. 14 — after almost four decades of holding absolute majorities in mighty Bavaria.” Joffe added, “Trying to claw back voters from the

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AfD, the CSU is echoing the nationalist upstart, which has vaulted from nowhere to become the Bundestag’s third-largest party.”30 Horst Seehofer, the CSU chairman and federal interior minister, wanted to turn refugees away at Germany’s borders as his party began to adopt populist themes. Had the CSU defected, it would have brought down the government, requiring new elections. Trump maliciously tweeted, “The people of Germany are turning against their leadership as migration is rocking the already tenuous Berlin coalition. Crime in Germany is way up. Big mistake made all over Europe in allowing millions of people in who have so strongly and violently changed their culture!”31 In German state elections in October 2018, the CSU lost its absolute majority in Bavaria’s parliament, and the AfD won seats for the first time. Thereafter, Merkel modified her position, proposing to distribute the refugee burden among EU members because it was a European-wide problem. The EU was divided. One group led by Austria and several Balkan countries limited the number of refugees they were willing to accept and imposed strict border controls on those seeking to move northward. Macedonia closed its border with Greece, stranding migrants there. Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia also began to screen refugees by nationality, admitting only those from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. In Italy, the Northern League (renamed “the League”), which assumed influence in a coalition government in June 2018, virulently opposed immigration, and among the first of the new government’s actions was to turn away a rescue boat with 600 migrants. “Rescuing lives is a duty, transforming Italy into an enormous refugee camp is not,”32 wrote Matteo Salvini, the populist minister of interior in Facebook. “The good times for illegals are over,” said Salvini when rescued migrants disembarked in Sicily, adding, “Get ready to pack your bags.”33 After meeting with Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte in July 2018, Trump praised Italy’s new populist leaders, declaring he was “most closely aligned” with them. “We agreed that border security is national security — they are one and the same,” and, like America, Italy was “under enormous strain as the result of illegal immigration,” and “got tired of it; they didn’t want it any longer.”34 On returning from Africa, Salvini aped Trump’s criticism of Mexican refugees. Refugees, he declared, “who rape, steal and deal” will be stopped, and Italy has had enough of migrants “who aren’t fleeing from war but who are bringing war to our country.”35 On another occasion, Salvini assailed “the hotshot do-gooders,” who “condemned to

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death thousands” by encouraging migrants to “come, come, come.”36 With strict border controls in France, Austria, and Switzerland, 160,000 refugees were living in temporary quarters in Italy. Italians were growing fearful of migrants owing in part to Salvini’s heated rhetoric. Then, in late June 2019, Italy arrested German Captain Carola Rackete, whose vessel had rescued migrants at sea and forced its way into the Italian island of Lampedusa rather than returning them to Libya as Italian authorities demanded. Salvini accused Rackete of being a “pirate” for ramming an Italian motorboat in order to enter Lampedusa, and his arrest further divided Europe over the migration issue. “We are now entering a situation in which everybody is trying to stop of the refugees before they reach their border,” noted Bulgarian scholar Ivan Krastev. “The basic question” was “which country turns into a parking lot for refugees.”37 Greece and Italy constituted Krastev’s “parking lot” because most migrants crossed their borders first, forcing them to bear a disproportionate burden for their care. Both also faced fiscal crises that were exacerbated by the requirement to host refugees. Northern EU members argued that Greece and Turkey failed to vet those who were entering, adding to the terrorist threat. As democracies and open societies, many EU members were vulnerable and failed to coordinate their efforts to prevent terrorism. Terrorist attacks increased xenophobic sentiment throughout Europe. France suffered deadly terrorist attacks in Paris on the magazine Charlie Hebdo office in January 2015, a concert hall and a stadium in November, and in Nice, against marchers, on Bastille Day in 2016. Several of the terrorists in France had traveled from Belgium, and Brussels’ airport and a metro station were attacked in March 2016. Germany was the victim of four terrorist attacks in six days in July 2016, two of which were committed by asylum-seekers, as well as a later attack in Berlin at Christmas. Then, in March 2017, central London was the target of a terrorist, who drove a car into pedestrians as had the terrorists in Berlin and Nice. Manchester, too, was a victim of a brutal terrorist attack at a pop music event in May. Journalist Henry Porter wrote, “The great fear that swept through the Continent focused on the threat from within, from suburbs such as Molenbeek, in Brussels, and St. Denis, just outside Paris’s Périphérique,” and he concluded that Europe could not “protect its citizens, let alone defend its borders.”38 In distributing asylum-seekers so that Greece and Italy, and other major migrant recipients would not have to bear an unfair share of the

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burden, the EU concluded a deal with Turkey that was described as “temporary and extraordinary.” Turkey agreed to repatriate migrants arriving illegally in Greece if they had not sought asylum or their applications were rejected and would take “all necessary measures” to prevent refugees from opening new routes from Turkey into Europe. In return, Turkish citizens would be allowed to travel to the EU without visas, and the EU would accelerate consideration of Turkey’s application to become a member. The EU would also provide Turkey with funding to cope with its refugee population, and EU members would accept asylum-seekers from Turkey equivalent to the number whom they would return to that country. UN officials and NGOs criticized the arrangement as illegal. In January 2020, Turkey threatened to end the deal because the EU had not provided promised funding. Then, in late February, citing EU failure to aid Turkey’s incursion into Syria, Erdo˘gan declared that his country could no longer absorb additional Syrians and reopened its border with Greece, thereby terminating the 2016 deal. Syrian asylum-seekers again sought to flee to Europe, but Greece refused to admit them, thus violating the EU’s norm regarding refugee treatment. Athens argued that Turkey had committed a hostile act and used force to prevent the entry of refugees. Greece also began to expel migrants illegally at sea by forcing them back beyond Greek territorial waters. After European criticism of Turkey’s repressive measures, its foreign minister declared that the EU was fanning anti-Erdo˘gan sentiment for domestic reasons. Although the refugee issue remained politically divisive, the actual number arriving in Europe had declined dramatically. A 2018 Eurobarometer poll found that immigration was “seen as the most important issue facing the EU in 21 Member States (up from 14 in autumn 2017).”39 In April 2020, the European Court of Justice ruled that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had failed to honor EU agreement to accept their fair share of asylum-seekers. Populist politicians including Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Austria’s Sebastian Kurz, and Italy’s Matteo Salvini continued calling immigration a “crisis,” using the issue to attract voters who associated migrants with cultural dilution, crime, and terrorism. Even the leaders of liberal Denmark, noted for its willingness to accept refugees, became concerned about their Muslim communities. Denmark’s populist People’s Party announced an agreement with the ruling party that migrants who had committed crimes were not wanted. As criminals, their own countries might not accept them. Denmark would send them to

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a tiny seventeen-acre island, called “the Virus,” because it had a crematory of a laboratory that studied contagious animal diseases. At a tumultuous EU summit meeting in June 2018, Europe’s leaders reached a compromise to paper over differences regarding migrants. Germany, Austria, Greece, and Spain agreed to strengthen their borders and increase “support for the Sahel region, the Libyan Coastguard, coastal and Southern communities, humane reception conditions, voluntary humanitarian returns, cooperation with other countries of origin and transit, as well as voluntary resettlement.”40 The deal would establish “transit centers” in Europe and possibly North Africa to house, screen, and determine swiftly whether asylum-seekers were genuine. Screening at the German-Austrian border would prevent asylum-seekers whose asylum hearings were the responsibility of other EU countries from entering. Germany’s “transit centers” would send ineligible asylum-seekers back to “relevant third countries” notably Italy, Austria’s neighbor, but only if those countries agreed. Otherwise, they would be returned to Austria. However, during the ensuing years few people were stopped by Germany at the border in accordance with the agreement, and some of Europe’s detention centers had become squalid humanitarian concerns. Islamophobia and the growing popularity of nationalist politicians in several EU states reflected both racism and nostalgia. Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and Bulgarians believed that the influx of refugees would slow their economic development, increase unemployment, and permit terrorists to enter the Schengen zone. They also recalled the Ottoman Turkish occupation of much of the Balkans. Like Austria, these countries aided Macedonia in its efforts to isolate refugees in Greece and supported police efforts elsewhere to screen asylum-seekers. Hungary tried to stop the flow by closing its frontier with Croatia in October 2015. It held a referendum a year later about whether to cease accepting its EU quota of refugees, which passed easily but was invalidated because too few had voted. Prime Minister Orbán described migration as terrorism’s “Trojan horse.” He argued that, like the Ottoman rulers, he was defending Christian Europe from Muslim terrorists, and sought to save Hungary for “genuine” Hungarians. To mobilize support, Orbán distributed a questionnaire implying that migrants were spongers or terrorists. He also had billboards erected, addressed to migrants, declaring that they would not be permitted to take Hungarian jobs. When Czech President Milos Zeman declared his opposition to the EU’s quota system, he described the influx of migrants as an organized invasion. In

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2019, Hungary’s government even claimed that George Soros and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker were encouraging migration that threatened the country’s security, notably, “mandatory resettlement quotas” that would erode its right to protect its borders, and Hungary’s parliament passed several laws against migration, including a “Stop Soros” bill that outlawed assistance to migrants seeking asylum permits. In late 2020, following the burning of a large Greek camp for asylum-seekers on Lesbos, the EU proposed a migration system that would speed up deportations and, with cash incentives, seek to persuade members to accept migrants voluntarily. However, the EU border agency Frontex was accused of concealing the Greek policy of sending migrant back to Turkey without a hearing.

Latin American Migrants and Refugees Many refugees in Latin America fled dictatorships in Venezuela and Nicaragua. About five million Venezuelans (over an eighth of its population) left their country between 2016 and 2019 owing to human rights abuses and the collapse of the country’s economy resulting from the policies of President Nicolás Maduro. At the present rate, the number could reach eight million by 2021. Neighboring Colombia bore much of the refugee burden, allowing more than 1.4 million Venezuelans to enter by September 2019, and by mid-2018, Peru hosted over half a million Venezuelan refugees. Even the status of 70,000 Venezuelans who fled to America to acquire TPS status was heatedly debated in Washington notwithstanding the Trump administration’s efforts to oust Maduro. Colombia and Peru saw a backlash against the refugees, and there was opposition in Brazil, Trinidad, and Ecuador to Venezuela’s economic migrants. Moreover, 23,000 Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica owing to President Daniel Ortega’s violent repression of political demonstrators. Costa Rica was a tolerant society, but the influx of many refugees in a small country led its foreign minister and president to conclude that the Nicaraguans were too numerous. However, the movement of Latinos northward from Central America proved the most contested Latin American refugee issue. After Trump called Hispanic immigrants vermin that would “pour into and infest our country,” Peter Wehner of the Ethics and Public Policy Center declared, “He takes a blowtorch to the tinder. For Trump and for his presidency, the culture war is central and defining.”41

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Donald Trump and Latino Asylum-Seekers Samuel Huntington provocatively claimed that Hispanic migrants in the U.S. were diluting America’s European Protestant identity by not assimilating. He argued that “the ideologies of multiculturalism and diversity eroded the legitimacy of the remaining central elements of American identity, the cultural core and the American Creed.”42 Millions of undocumented immigrants live in the U.S., many of whom reside in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Houston. However, it was the flood of asylum-seekers in caravans from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the “Northern Triangle”), seeking to escape violence and poverty and reach America through Mexico, that laid bare Trump’s nativism. Indeed, in a June 2019 cable the U.S. embassy reported that Guatemala “remains among the most dangerous countries in the world” and “does not provide sufficient safeguards against refoulement.”43 Trump’s comments about Hispanic asylum-seekers were appalling. He began his presidential campaign by deriding Mexican migrants: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”44 Regarding Central Americans, Trump later tweeted “Many Gang Members and some very bad people are mixed into the Caravan heading to our Southern Border,”45 “These aren’t people,” he declared, “These are animals.”46 Data do not show, however, a relationship between the number of refugees and crime. White supremacists and right-wing anti-Semites threatened more violent terrorism in America and Europe than did Muslim refugees. America’s refusal to reduce the number of displaced people by resettling them threatened U.S. national security by prolonging conflicts, destabilizing fragile states, and undermining allies. Nevertheless, in April 2018, frustrated by the failure to prevent undocumented immigrants from entering America from Mexico, Trump sent National Guard units to the border to deter them. Shortly thereafter, the governors of New Mexico and California withdrew their units. The administration then imposed a regulation (Migrant Protection Protocols) requiring that asylum-seekers remain in Mexico until their cases were resolved. This clashed with the existing practice that refugees could remain in America while courts considered their claims. Trump also reached an agreement with Mexico, the Migrant Protection Protocols program, also known as “Remain in Mexico,” to keep refugees in that country while awaiting an initial hearing in a process that might last for months, even years. Only 11 of the roughly 10,000 initially completed

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cases under the program resulted in asylum, and a year later, of the 1,155 cases in the “Remain in Mexico” program, only 14 applicants—1.2%— had legal representation. Of 12,997 cases then pending among those in Mexico, only 163 had been filed with legal assistance. If America decided not to grant asylum, it would immediately deport the applicant back to his/her own country, violating international law. After a federal judge temporarily blocked the “Remain in Mexico” program, the DHS began allowing Central American migrants waiting in Mexico to enter the U.S. Meantime, U.S. officials found it increasingly difficult to house migrants in detention centers, and briefly considered housing migrant children at Guantánamo Bay. Trump further tightened asylum policies by banning work permits for those crossing the border illegally, adding a fee for asylum application and requiring that applications be judged within 180 days. After several different lower court rulings, in March 2020 the Supreme Court agreed “Remain in Mexico” could continue. Also, a federal judge negated directives that halved the time that detained asylum-seekers could consult with attorneys before being interviewed by asylum officers and prohibited officers from granting migrants extensions to prepare for interview to assess their fear of returning to their own countries. Still frustrated by the entry of Central Americans, Trump exploded in October 2018, declaring “Close the whole thing!” The president angrily tweeted, “If for any reason it becomes necessary, we will CLOSE our Southern Border.”47 His threat covered all 1,954 miles of the border, including entries used by tourists, businesspeople, and others who had a legal right to enter America. Had advisers not dissuaded him, Trump might have made a decision that would have severed U.S.-Mexican trade, travel and, tourism at immense cost to both countries owing to stopping trade of $1.7 billion in goods and services that daily crossed the border. It would also have severed the production chains of major U.S. corporations. Trump urged DHS Acting Secretary McAleenan to go ahead and close it, promising to pardon him if he were later faced with legal problems. Frustrated by Trump’s policies, McAleenan resigned in October 2019 and was replaced by Acting Secretary Chad Wolf. According to a former administration official, Trump promised to pardon others whom committed illegal acts to keep out immigrants, a promise that would be illegal.48 Simultaneously, Trump deployed troops to the border, possibly violating the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 that prohibited using the

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armed forces (“power or force of the country”) for law enforcement except as explicitly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. Marine Commandant General Robert Neller sent a remarkable internal memo to Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan arguing that Trump’s action posed an “unacceptable risk to Marine Corps combat readiness and solvency.” According to a DHS email, troops were being sent to the Mexican border with California with “the primary purpose” of improving “the aesthetic appearance” Trump’s wall “by painting it.”49 Although international and U.S. laws required governments to provide hearings for all asylum-seekers to determine whether their requests were legitimate, even if they had entered illegally, the president asserted emergency powers to deny asylum to anyone entering the country illegally by not using official “ports of entry.” The DHS contended that low standards for claiming a fear of persecution had allowed undocumented aliens to argue “credible fear,” and then be released pending lengthy hearings. Trump’s action violated long-standing laws that provided asylum-seeker status to all those who reached U.S. soil and expressed a fear of persecution, whether or not they had entered illegally, thus denying them due process, that is, without a judicial hearing. The administration also considered a proposal to cease using “ports of entry” as asylum processing centers. If adopted, refugees could only apply for asylum from abroad, leaving them in the peril they sought to escape. Moreover, DHS agents in unmarked vehicles illegally transported migrants in Guatemala heading to the U.S. back to the border with Honduras. “The law is clear: People can apply for asylum whether or not they’re at a port of entry, and regardless of their immigration status,” declared an American Civil Liberties Union official, adding, “The president doesn’t get to ignore that law, even if he dislikes it.”50 A federal judge barred enforcement of Trump’s decision: “Whatever the scope of the President’s authority, he may not rewrite the immigration laws to impose a condition that Congress has expressly forbidden.”51 Trump’s action, argued a migration expert, showed, “The more brazen you get, like Trump, and the more frequent you get, you can easily imagine a norm being completely torn down,” adding that the president was “taking an ax” to “one of the strongest norms we’ve got in international law.”52 Moreover, Trump’s decision to cut aid to Central American countries as punishment for not stopping migrants heading through Mexico to the U.S. border actually increased that flow. Trump had announced he was cutting the $500 million in U.S. aid to increase employment and improve

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law enforcement in Central America only a day after Secretary Nielsen had announced a Memorandum of Cooperation with those countries to use U.S. aid to overcome the causes of migration. Trump also erroneously declared that Central American governments were “taking our money” and “doing absolutely nothing” to prevent the migration of their citizens. “No money goes there anymore,” declared Trump. “We’re giving them tremendous aid. We stopped payment.”53 Trump’s decision to cut aid ran counter to the policy advocated by Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who argued that aid that improved the lives of Central Americans would keep them at home. Cutting aid was “shooting yourself in the foot” because it addressed problems of governance and corruption and provided economic opportunities for those who stayed. Such aid, for example, had begun to help poor Guatemalan farmers who were moving northward partly owing to droughts at home and low coffee prices. Aid to improve conditions in Central America addressed the causes of migration and cutting it increased those emigrating. Fortunately, the State Department decided to provide $432 million in projects and grants that had been previously approved. The number of asylum-seekers again soared in spring 2019, exceeding America’s capacity to detain them while awaiting a hearing and forcing immigration officials to release increasing numbers into U.S. cities. Owing to insufficient facilities and resources, those detained in Mexico or America were held in deplorable conditions. The immigration issue heightened tension between the president and the DHS, which Trump assailed for not resolving the “problem.” Trump also threatened to sever trade with Mexico if it failed to reduce migration within a year. Mexico managed to do so by sending its National Guard to patrol the Guatemalan border. Owing to this and the intensification of America’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, there was a marked reduction of Central Americans able to reach the U.S. border. Nevertheless, in July 2019, Trump’s DHS and Department of Justice announced that migrants seeking asylum in the U.S. could not do so unless they had requested asylum in “third” countries, for example, Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, or Guatemala, while moving northward. Although Mexico resisted U.S. efforts that it call itself a “safe third country,” the Trump administration continued urging it to do so to deny asylum to those who had failed to seek Mexican asylum first. The administration also sought to expedite deportations by eliminating hearings for those who did not have an asylum-court date pending. In

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response, the ACLU filed suit against the government, observing, “it is long-standing federal law that merely transiting through a so-called ‘safe third country’ is not a basis to categorically deny asylum to refugees who arrive at our shores.”54 Nevertheless, in September 2019, the Supreme Court allowed Trump’s policy of refusing asylum to those who had failed to request asylum from third countries to continue. Washington signed “safe-third country” agreements with El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—none “safe”—to allow America to send asylum-seekers back if they had failed to apply for asylum in those countries or Mexico. Such agreements and procedural rules were building a paper wall on the southern border, that was just as cruel and hard as brick or metal walls. Many Guatemalans opposed the agreement, and Guatemala’s Constitutional Court ruled that the agreement required President Jimmy Morales to get the approval of Guatemala’s congress. Morales’ successor indicated he would not prevent Guatemalans from emigrating. Nevertheless, Trump’s “safe-third country” policy successfully reduced the numbers of asylum-seekers that were forced to remain in Mexico until their cases were decided. However, in July 2020, a federal judge ruled against the “safe-third country” policy, eroding the “paper wall,” and President Biden was determined to terminate the so-called ‘asylum cooperative agreements’ with these countries. Refugees could also seek protection called “withholding of removal” or protection under the Convention Against Torture, but both entailed a higher burden of proof. Seeking that protection threatened the permanent separation of families because anyone who was granted “withholding of removal” would have no right to petition to be reunited with their children under the age of 21. They also left no pathway to permanent residence, which meant those granted this protection would remain in limbo. “Under this unlawful plan,” declared the ACLU, “immigrants who have lived here for years would be deported with less due process than people get in traffic court.”55 Family Separation One of the appalling consequences of Trump’s efforts to halt Central American migrants was separating children from their families. By law, children of asylum-seekers should be sent to ICE facilities until their cases could be heard, and the HHS should care for unaccompanied children. However, Trump argued that traffickers used children as pawns to violate

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U.S. laws and gain entry to America. According to exit polls after the 2016 presidential election, 64% of those who believed that immigration was America’s most important issue had voted for Trump, influencing the administration to announce a “zero tolerance” policy in June 2018 that entailed arresting all illegal aliens, including those with children. Then Attorney General Jeff Sessions was cited as declaring, “We need to take away children,” and “If care about kids, don’t bring them in.” His deputy added that it did not matter how young they were.56 Children were separated from parents or relatives, who were imprisoned while awaiting a decision on their status. “If you’re smuggling a child,” said Sessions, “then we’re going to prosecute you, and that child will be separated from you, probably, as required by law.”57 Separation was necessary because the 1997 settlement of the class-action lawsuit, Flores v. Reno, limited the detention period for minors to twenty days, and they could not be held in jails like their parents. Stephen Miller forwarded a plan to allow ICE agents to collect fingerprints and biometric data from adults seeking to claim their children. The Trump administration claimed that some parents employed smugglers to send children into America, and the ICE could then screen adults for criminal behavior. If adults were deemed ineligible to take custody of children, the ICE could arrest and deport them. The Trump administration’s problem was that Flores did not apply to parents, leaving immigration officials the unpalatable choice between releasing the whole family (“catch and release”), after which many disappeared, or releasing children while continuing to imprison parents. If parents remained in prison, children would be supervised at a government facility, and the entire family would receive an order of ‘expedited removal’ and separated. Children would remain in the care of HHS, and parents would be in a marshal’s custody while the family awaited deportation. This meant children would likely be detained for over 20 days, violating Flores. However, in June 2020 another judge restored the 20day limit that migrant children could be held in one of America’s three family-detention centers. Trump claimed he was only carrying out the law by enforcing “zero tolerance” of asylum-seekers, insisting that only Congress could remedy the situation. Secretary Nielsen denied that the policy existed at all, despite video coverage of what was taking place, including weeping children in ‘baby jails,’ the facilities holding separated children. At an emotional press briefing, Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders falsely

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insisted Trump was carrying out the law. One journalist responded, “There is no law that requires families to be separated at the border,” and another said, “They come to the border with nothing, and you throw children in cages. You’re a parent. You’re a parent of young children. Don’t you have any empathy for what they go through?”58 The administration neither knew where all these children were nor their number. In addition, a federal court blocked the Trump administration from deporting unaccompanied migrant children with no hearing owing to the pandemic. Later congressional hearings into the consequences of “zero tolerance” revealed how disastrous it had been for separated children. It had also been used a year before it was announced, and there was no plan about how to reunite families. House Oversight Committee chair Elijah E. Cummings (D-Md.) described the policy as “government-sponsored child abuse” that would traumatize children. Trump had instituted the policy to deter migration and provide leverage to force Congress to tighten immigration regulations and approve funding for the wall he sought to build on the Mexican border. Aleksander Hemon argued that the zero-tolerance policy revealed Trump and Miller as borderline fascists. “Witness Stephen Miller and Donald Trump’s ‘zero tolerance for illegal immigration’ policy. Fascism’s central idea…is that there are classes of human beings who deserve diminishment and destruction because they’re for some reason (genetic, cultural, whatever) inherently inferior to ‘us.’ …You know: they are contaminating our nation/race; they are destroying our culture; we must do something about them or perish.”59 Under intense negative publicity, Trump signed an executive order a month after Session’s announcement, which he had earlier denied he could legally do, to end the policy and reunite families awaiting a decision on asylum. This created chaos, and, over a month after a court deadline for reuniting families, almost five-hundred children remained separated from their parents. After family separation had supposedly ceased, U.S. officials were required to release refugee families until they received a final hearing. Despite Trump’s executive order putatively caused by an “infestation” of migrants, HHS still had 12,800 minors in custody in September 2018, the highest number to date. As late as November 2020, a parent of 545 children had not been found. As the number of Central Americans seeking asylum soared in 2019, Trump argued on Fox News that ending family separation had been a disaster. “Now you don’t get separated, and while that sounds nice and all, what happens is you have literally you have

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ten times as many families coming up because they’re not going to be separated from their children.”60 Trump also reconsidered re-imposing “zero intolerance” despite its unpopularity. A Border Crisis According to Russ Voight, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, emergency action was required to reunite families. Vought declared, “The migration flow and the resulting humanitarian crisis is rapidly overwhelming the ability of the Federal Government to respond.”61 Although Trump denied he was renewing family separation, the administration was considering a policy of “binary choice” under which migrant parents would have to choose staying in detention with their children or allowing them to be separated and placed with alternative caregivers. The separation of families continued long after Trump claimed to have rescinded it. The HHS inspector general claimed that the Trump administration had separated thousands more children from their parents than reported. In October 2019, the Justice Department revealed that the administration had separated 1,556 more children from their parents than the 2,700 known the previous year. Between September 2018 and 2019, America detained a record number of minors (76,020), an increase of over 52% from the previous year, and Mexico detained 40,500 minors during the same period. Overall, Border and Protections Agents detained a record 970,000 migrants during this period. The situation at the border, as Trump noted when asking Congress for additional funding, was “a crisis.” In early 2019, the number of asylum-seekers arrested soared to over 100,000 in March and April and in May to 144,200, the largest number in thirteen years. “Our apprehension numbers are off the charts,” Carla Provost, chief of the Border Patrol, declared. “We cannot address this crisis by shifting more resources. It’s like holding a bucket under a faucet. It doesn’t matter how many buckets we have if we can’t turn off the flow.”62 However, the effort to stem migration from Central America reduced that number for each of the ensuing six months. Nevertheless, in October 2020 the number of migrants arrested at the border jumped to 69,237, 21% higher than September and the highest one-month total since February 2019. Although previously asylum-seekers, who tried to enter the U.S. illegally, had been released from detention until a final hearing, in April

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2019, Attorney General William Barr declared that asylum-seekers could be imprisoned and denied bail, perhaps for years, to await a final decision about whether they could remain in America even though they had established “a credible fear of persecution or torture” in their initial screening. This meant that thousands of people might be unlawfully jailed. To prevent those on bail from disappearing, the administration’s decision meant that asylum-seekers might be held indefinitely. By August 2019, U.S. immigration courts had a backlog of over a million cases, and the administration was giving judges a one-year deadline to decide each and setting each judge a quota of 700 cases annually, many held in tent courts. Trump’s harsh rhetoric had actually increased the flow of asylum-seekers, notably among those whom smugglers warned that Trump was about to shut down all immigration, and, if they wanted to go to America, they should leave immediately. In July 2019, a federal judge ruled that indefinite detention was unconstitutional because seeking asylum was not a crime and “plaintiffs have established a constitutionally-protected interest in their liberty, a right to due process, which includes a hearing before a neutral decision maker to assess the necessity of their detention and a likelihood of success on the merits of that issue.”63 The judge ordered the Trump administration to grant individual case reviews to over 1,000 asylum-seekers who had been jailed for lengthy periods. Thereafter, the administration began to test a process called Prompt Asylum Claim Review to review and deport asylum-seekers within 10 days, effectively denying due process. To deal with the backlog of cases, Attorney General Sessions announced an increase of immigration judges by fifty percent. Also, a federal judge ruled in January 2019 against adding a question about citizenship to America’s 2020 census, which would have reduced response rates in immigrant communities. Trump’s Wall Among Trump’s campaign tweets were “I want nothing to do with Mexico other than to build an impenetrable WALL and stop them from ripping off U.S. Secure our border now,” and “Build a massive wall & deduct the costs from Mexican foreign aid!”64 Trump thus argued that Mexico would pay for the wall. However, a PRRI poll in September 2018 indicated most Americans opposed building such a wall. In 2020, the Trump administration extended its idea of a wall to include a “Buoy

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Barrier System” that would prevent illegal migrants from crossing the Rio Grande where effective shoreline barriers could not be built. Trump’s desire for a wall to keep out migrants, his signature issue, ignored that most Latin Americans seeking entry to the U.S. were legal asylum-seekers. Nevertheless, he refused to compromise. After the 2018 elections, he was angered when the new Democrat congressional majority would not provide funding for his wall. “A wall,” declared House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, “is an immorality,” and “it’s a wall between reality and his constituents, his supporters.”65 The president was so determined to get his wall that he announced he would take responsibility for closing the government unless the House of Representatives appropriated $5.7 billion to begin building it. Democrats in Congress refused to do so, and Trump ordered a partial government shutdown, which lasted 35 days (December 22, 2018–January 25, 2019), the longest in U.S. history. One consequence was a delay in processing the cases of asylum-seekers. In his effort to end the shutdown, Trump sought to require Central American refugees under the age of eighteen to apply for asylum in their own countries, a requirement contrary to refugee norms. By law, anyone whose life was at risk in their own country can seek asylum elsewhere and their case must be assessed. Trying to evade the need for congressional approval, Trump declared an emergency at the border in early 2019, “I didn’t need to do this,” he said. “But I’d rather do it much faster,”66 thereby unintentionally admitting there was no emergency. Both houses of Congress voted to rescind Trump’s declaration of emergency, but by insufficient majorities to overturn his veto. Trump demanded that officials ignore environmental issues and seize necessary land on the border, whether legally or not. He told them that voters expected him to build a wall, and it had to be completed by the 2020 election, even using unconstitutional powers. Trump’s used his declaration of national emergency to remove $3.6 billion in funding from 127 Defense Department projects in America and overseas in February 2019. Wrote one correspondent acidly that Trump’s justification of his wall involved national security was “a barrel of bunkum and balderdash served with generous helpings of hogwash.”67 In July 2019, the Supreme Court approved the reallocation of $2.5 billion in Department of Defense anti-drug funding for the wall, and, in September, Trump diverted $3.6 billion from U.S. military construction projects despite Pentagon concerns about the consequences of delayed funding. In December, a federal judge ruled that the administration could not

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divert the funds for building the wall, but, ten days later, a federal appeals court granted a stay of the judge’s order, thereby freeing funds for the wall. In February 2020, Trump sought to divert $3.8 billion from the defense budget for his wall including $1.6 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations and $2.2 billion from new aircraft, ships, and army vehicles. However, in June 2020, another appeals court ruled that the administration needed congressional approval to divert funds from the Pentagon, sending the issue again to the Supreme Court. In August 2019, the administration took another step, announcing it would deprive even legal immigrants of public programs, notably food stamps and government-subsidized housing, and admit only immigrants able to support themselves. Thereafter, the administration announced it would only provide visas or green cards to immigrants who had medical insurance or sufficient funds to pay for medical care. The Supreme Court set aside injunctions on the “wealth test,” called the public charge rule, and allowed it to go forward until a final ruling on its merits, On this basis, application of the regulation was suspended by a federal court in November 2020, and the judge cited an earlier ruling by a U.S. Court of Appeals that found Trump’s interpretation of the public charge statute did “violence to the English language and the statutory context.”68 Nevertheless, as litigation continued, fear of not getting green cards and deportation in U.S. immigration communities led thousands of families to be dropped off the benefit rolls, even if their American-citizen children could use such programs, thus increasing poverty and hunger. Moreover, if ultimately upheld, reversing the regulation would prove difficult for the Biden administration. During a discussion of this change in regulations the acting director of USCIS was asked, “Would you also agree that Emma Lazarus’s words etched on the Statue of Liberty — ‘Give me your tired, your poor’ — are also part of the American ethos?” He uttered his version: “Give me your tired and your poor who can stand on their own two feet and who will not become a public charge.”69 Thereafter, Trump issued an executive order requiring state and local governments to agree in writing before migrants could enter their jurisdictions, allowing states and cities to ban one another’s refugees.

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Conclusions “The immediate cause of rising support for authoritarian, xenophobic movements,” wrote Ronald Ingelhart, “is a reaction against immigration (and, in the United States rising racial equality)… Cultural and demographic shifts are making older voters feel as though they no longer live in a country where they were born.”70 However, stricter rules on migration in the West increased one modest aspect of globalization, that is, the purchase by the wealthy of citizenship and passports other than those of their own country. About a hundred countries, many small with few resources, offered “residence by investment” that could reduce an individual’s taxes and provide safe havens. Washington introduced EB-5 visas in 1990, requiring an investment of at least $1million or $500,000 invested in areas of high unemployment. A lobbying group, the Investment Migration Council, estimated that about 5,000 wealthy investors gained U.S. citizenship this way annually. Although Trump’s wall was not completed during his term, it metaphorically assailed socio-cultural globalization as well as attacking norms regarding the treatment of refugees. The president falsely claimed that this barrier was necessary to maintain U.S. sovereignty. However, the promise of a wall symbolized Trump’s tacit pledge to his white supporters to erode America’s multiracial society. As a pro-Trump evangelical leader explained, “For white evangelicals who see the sun setting on white Christian dominance in the country, the wall is a powerful metaphor” because the world is “a dangerous battleground” between “chosen insiders and threatening outsiders.”71 Trump, Orba˙ n, Salvini, and other populists were cut from the same cloth, refusing to acknowledge asylum as a human right. Trump epitomized anti-immigration cruelty. His policies undermined virtually every aspect of immigration—asylum protection, wealth requirements on immigrants including spouses and relatives of citizens, separating families, punishing businesses that relied on immigrant workers, and threatening mass deportations. Green cards issued abroad after 2016 plummeted 25%. Although America and Europe erected impediments to immigration, demography and economic reality suggested that leaders will have little choice but to use migrant workers, including those in caregiving for aging populations or meatpacking to those with skills in technology, science, and medicine. In April 2020, pointing to the coronavirus, the president signed an executive order suspending the issuance of green cards for 60 days to

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foreigners seeking to live in America. Although Trump agreed to admitting seasonal agricultural workers and professional workers on temporary visas when confronted by angry employers, Stephen Miller viewed this as a step in a broader plan to turn off the faucet of migrant labor. Miller also was involved with the HHS refugee office that began to review whether to allow undocumented adults to take custody of refugee children. Miller believed that this rewarded illegal adults and began considering a resumption of fingerprinting adults to whom such children were released, thereby persuading them not to take custody of the children because it might facilitate their deportation. Nevertheless, the number of migrants seeking entry from Mexico more than doubled between April and July 2020 owing to economic woes, and the administration, using a private firm MVM Inc., resorted to hotel chains to detain children and families, without safeguards. In June 2020, despite the opposition of hi-tech companies, Trump suspended H1B visas and new green cards for highly skilled workers for the rest of the year, exempting health care professionals and farmworkers. Many migrants were unable to work in America during this period. Simultaneously, USCIS’s contract ended with the company that had printed green cards. Although USCIS was supposed to do the printing, its “financial situation” prompted a hiring freeze. Consequently, 50,000 green cards and 75,000 employment authorization documents promised to legal immigrants were left unprinted. Legal residents awaiting these documents were liable to deportation because they could not prove they were legally in America. Trump also issued a rule, denying asylum-seekers entry to America if they posed “threats from the spread of pandemics.” Owing to the need for skilled migrants in a declining economy, in July 2020, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and trade associations, including the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Retail Federation and TechNet, sought an injunction to stop the Departments of State and Homeland Security from restricting various worker visas. Trump seemed unaware that America’s 2019 National Intelligence Strategy described the danger posed by increasing migration as “straining the capacities of governments” and “further fracturing of societies, potentially creating breeding grounds for radicalization.” The Trump administration sought to hide the cruelty of its migration policies and objected to showing the documentary “Immigration Nation” about ICE before the 2020 election. It demanded deletions because it had included officers illegally entering an apartment, mocking those whom it arrested, lying to

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gain entry, demanding more arrests, and pulling a weeping three-year-old boy from his father. Is socio-cultural globalization in retreat? By 2021, Trump’s wall had not been completed, and, shortly before the 2020 election, soaring numbers of asylum-seekers on the Mexican border caused the highest number of arrests in September since 2006. In January 2021, a federal judged ruled against the Trump administration’s further restricting asylum applications. The Schengen zone remained intact in Europe. Trump tried to reinvent his nonsense, declaring the wall need not be “concrete,” but could be “steel” because America’s steel companies need business. Moreover, Merkel’s effort to integrate migrants in Germany had largely succeeded by 2020, indicating that her approach was superior to Trump’s. Overall, public opinion in major countries still regarded immigration as beneficial and destination countries increasingly believed immigrants strengthened their societies and did not share the fear of migrants that is the core of populism. Moreover, after assuming office, President Biden moved quickly to liberalize U.S. immigration policies, seeking to reverse the ban on people from seven Muslim-majority countries, and end funding Trump’s border wall and cease excluding undocumented immigrants from the census. He also sought to provide undocumented aliens with an eight-year path to citizenship, allow “dreamers” to apply immediately for a green card, substitute technology for migration officials to manage U.S. borders, and eliminate the “1776 Commission” that that would “restor[e] patriotic education” about U.S. history, which many historians had assailed as politically divisive. The new president also ordered an100-day moratorium on deportations that the courts overturned. Despite such reforms, the consequences of global warming are likely to increase environmental migration dramatically in the coming decades.

Notes 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). 2. Cited in Josh Dawsey, “Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries,” Washington Post, January 12, 2018, https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protections-for-immigrantsfrom-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-

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f711-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html?undefined=&utm_term=.de9 420e29346&wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1. Cited in Eugene Scott, “In Reference to ‘Animals,’ Trump Evokes an Ugly History of Dehumanization,” Washington Post, May 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/05/16/tru mps-animals-comment-on-undocumented-immigrants-earn-backlash-his torical-comparisons/?utm_term=.f8477b08e7d4. Cited in Patrice Dupuy, “Trump’s Homeland Security Secretary Claims She Doesn’t Know If Norway Is Mostly White,” January 16, 2018, http://www.newsweek.com/kirstjen-nielsen-trump-norway-white782678. Amy Chua, “Tribal World: Group Identity Is All,” Foreign Affairs 97:4 (July/August 2018), p. 25. Robert Kagan, “’America First’ Has Won,” New York Times, September 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/23/opinion/trumpforeign-policy-america-first.html?emc=edit_th_180924&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321680924. Greg Miller, Julie Vitkovskaya, and Reuben Fischer-Baum, “’This Deal Will Make Me Look Terrible’: Full Transcripts of Trump’s Calls with Mexico and Australia,” Washington Post, August 3, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/politics/austra lia-mexico-transcripts/?utm_term=.b14856a32ba0. Susan E. Rice, “The Real Trump Foreign Policy: Stoking the G.O.P. Base,” New York Times, May 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/05/05/opinion/trump-venezuela-cuba.html?wpisrc=nl_daily202& wpmm=1. Philip Bump, “The Surge in Migrants Seeking Asylum, Explained,” Washington Post, April 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/2019/04/09/surge-migrants-seeking-asylum-explained/?utm_ term=.991278eec478. Annex Table 1, UNCHR, Global Trends 2019, June 18, 2020, https:// www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-tre nds-2019.html. Cited in ibid. Amy Chua, “Tribal World: Group Identity Is All,” Foreign Affairs 97:4 (July/August 2018), pp. 30, 32. Cited in Michael D. Shear and Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “Trump Slashes Refugee Cap to 18,000, Curtailing U.S. Role as Haven,” New York Times, September 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/ 26/us/politics/trump-refugees.html?campaign_id=60&instance_id=0& segment_id=17373&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea& regi_id=4332168ing-news.

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14. Mckay Coppins, “The Outrage Over Family Separation Is Exactly What Stephen Miller Wants,” The Atlantic, June 19, 2018, https://www.theatl antic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/stephen-miller-family-separation/ 563132/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 15. Cited in Nahal Toosi, “Inside Stephen Miller’s Hostile Takeover If Immigration Policy,” Politico, August 29, 2018, https://www.politico.com/ story/2018/08/29/stephen-miller-immigration-policy-white-housetrump-799199. 16. Cited in Emily Cochran, “Pushing for Tighter Borders, Trump Asks Jews for Support,” New York Times, April 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/04/06/us/politics/trump-jews-border-asylum.html. 17. Ariana A. Berengaut and Antony J. Blinken, “Trump’s Hugh Mistake on Refugees,” New York Times, September 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/09/11/opinion/syria-trump-refugees-quotas-discrimination. html?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 18. Cited in Farhad Manjoo, “Why Silicon Valley Wouldn’t Work Without Immigrants,” New York Times, February 8, 2017, https://www.nyt imes.com/2017/02/08/technology/personaltech/why-silicon-valleywouldnt-work-without-immigrants.html. 19. Cited in Patrick Kingsley, “Orban Encourages Mothers in Hungary to Have 4 or More Babies,” New York Times, February 11, 2019, https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/02/11/world/europe/orban-hungary-babiesmothers-population-immigration.html. 20. Cited in Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “Trump and Allies Seek End to Refugee Status for Millions of Palestinians,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/03/trump-palestinians-isr ael-refugees-unrwaand-allies-seek-end-to-refugee-status-for-millions-of-pal estinians-united-nations-relief-and-works-agency-unrwa-israel-palestinepeace-plan-jared-kushner-greenb/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 21. Cited in Tal Kopan, “Donald Trump: Syrian Refugees a ‘Trojan Horse’,” CNN , November 16, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/16/pol itics/donald-trump-syrian-refugees/index.html. 22. Cited in Em Steck and Andrew Kaczynski, “German Ambassador Pick Disparaged Immigrants and Refugees, Called fro Martial Law at USMexico Border,” CNN , August 4, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/ 2020/08/04/politics/kfile-douglas-macgregor-german-ambassadorpick/?utm_campaign=wp_the_daily_202&utm_medium=email&utm_sou rce=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_daily202. 23. Cited in Alexander Burns, “Revised Travel Ban Is Blocked Nationwide,” New York Times, March 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html?hp&action=click&pgtype= Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-lede-package-region& region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.

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24. Cited in Nolan D. McCaskill, “Trump: Muslim Ban Would Have Stopped 9/11,” Politico, August 3, 2016, https://www.politico.com/ story/2016/08/donald-trump-muslim-ban-september11-226637?wpi src=nl_powerup&wpmm=1. 25. Cited in Scott Shane, Matthew Rosenberg, and Eric Lipton, “Trump Pushes Dark View of Islam to Center of U.S. Policy-Making,” New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/us/ politics/donald-trump-islam.html. 26. Cited in Scott Shane, Matthew Rosenberg, and Eric Lipton, “Trump Pushes Dark View of Islam to Center of U.S. Policy-Making,” New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/us/ politics/donald-trump-islam.html. 27. Robert Zaretsky, “How French Secularism Became Fundamentalist,” Foreign Policy, April 7, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/ the-battle-for-the-french-secular-soul-laicite-charlie-hebdo/. 28. Cited in Lorenzo Vidino, “Emmanuel Macron’s War on Islam Is Europe’s Future,” Foreign Policy, February 24, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2020/02/24/emmanuel-macrons-war-on-islamism-is-europes-future/. 29. Cited in Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, “For Europe, Cutting the Flow of Migrants Challenges Basic Ideals,” New York Times, July 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/world/europe/mig rants-merkel-kurz-austria.html?emc=edit_th_180706&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321680706. 30. Josef Joffe, “The Greatest Miscalculation of Angela’s Merkel’s Career,” Washington Post, June 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opi nions/the-greatest-miscalculation-of-angela-merkels-career/2018/06/ 21/21298284-7572-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html?utm_term=. 89dc2f370676&wpisrc=nl_ideas&wpmm=1. 31. Cited in Griff Witte, “As Merkel Holds on Precariously, Trump Tweets Germans ‘Are Turning Against Their Leadership’ on Migration,” Washington Post, June 18, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ europe/merkels-government-faces-internal-rebellion-over-immigrationin-germany/2018/06/18/69efe4e6-70bc-11e8-b4d8-eaf78d4c544c_ story.html?utm_term=.22072c737138. 32. Cited in Gaia Pianigiani, Jason Horowitz, and Raphael Minder, “Italy’s New Populist Government Turns Away Ship With 600 Migrant Aboard,” New York Times, June 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 06/11/world/europe/italy-migrant-boat-aquarius.html?emc=edit_th_1 80612&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680612. 33. Cited in Craig Spencer, “What Populists Get Wrong About Migration,” Politico, June 7, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/populists-wrongabout-migration-matteo-salvini-italy-mediterranean/?wpmm=1&wpisrc= nl_todayworld.

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34. Cited in David Nakamura and Anne Gearan, Washington Post, July 30, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-sayshead-of-europes-lone-fully-populist-government-is-doing-a-fantastic-job/ 2018/07/30/09cad232-940d-11e8-80e1-00e80e1fdf43_story.html? utm_term=.b5ee17848a87&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1. 35. Cited in Walter Mayr, “The Dangerous New Face of Salvini’s Italy,” Spiegel, December 12, 2018, http://www.spiegel.de/international/eur ope/matteo-salvini-has-emboldened-fascists-in-italy-a-1243164.html. 36. Cited in Jason Horowitz, “In Matteo Salvini’s Italy, Good Is Bad and ‘Do-Gooders’ Are the Worst,” New York Times, April 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/world/europe/italy-do-goo ders-buonisti-matteo-salvini.html?emc=edit_th_190415&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321680415. 37. Cited in Jim Yardley, “With No Unified Refugee Strategy, Europeans Fall Back on Old Alliances,” New York Times, February 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/world/europe/with-nounified-refugee-strategy-europeans-fall-back-on-old-alliances.html. 38. Henry Porter, “Terrorism, Migrants, and Crippling Debt: Is This the End of Europe?” Vanity Fair, February 2016, http://www.vanityfair.com/ news/2016/01/europe-terrorism-migrants-debt-crisis. 39. Standard Eurobarometer 89 Spring 2018, “Public Opinion in the European Union,” file:///C:/Users/mansbach/Downloads/eb_89_first_en.pdf, p. 6. 40. “READ: Text of the European Union Migration Deal,” CNN , June 29, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/29/europe/eu-miggration-dealtext-intl/index.html. 41. Cited in Philip Rucker, “’A Blowtorch to the Tinder’: Stoking Racial Tensions Is a Feature of Trump’s Presidency,” Washington Post, June 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-blowtorch-to-the-tin der-stoking-racial-tensions-is-a-feature-of-trumps-presidency/2018/06/ 20/e95e71dc-73d9-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html?utm_term=.cea 7b39982e7&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1. 42. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 18. 43. Cited in Kevin Sieff and Mary Beth Sheridan, “The U.S. Sent Central American Asylum Seekers to Guatemala to Seek Refuge. None Were Granted Asylum, Report Says,” Washington Post, January 16, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/asylum-mig rants-trump-guatemala/2021/01/15/aeae4b84-56bc-11eb-a08b-f1381e f3d207_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email& utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2. washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F2e956af%2F600314e79d2fda0efbb

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2a324%2F596b51d8ae7e8a44e7d58086%2F47%2F70%2F600314e79d 2fda0efbb2a324. Cited in Katie Reilly, “Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico,” Time, August 31, 2016, https://time.com/4473972/donaldtrump-mexico-meeting-insult/. Cited in “Migrant Caravan: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?” BBC News, November 26, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america-45951782. Cited in Gregory Porte and Alan Gomez, “Trump Ramps Up Rhetoric on Undocumented Immigrants: ‘These Aren’t People. These Are Animals’,” USA Today, May 16, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/pol itics/2018/05/16/trump-immigrants-animals-mexico-democrats-sanctu ary-cities/617252002/. Cited in Joshua Partlow and Nick Miroff, “Deal with Mexico Paves Way for Asylum Overhaul at U.S. Border,” Washington Post, November 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dealwith-mexico-paves-way-for-asylum-overhaul-at-us-border/2018/11/24/ 87b9570a-ef74-11e8-9236-bb94154151d2_story.html?utm_term=.5e6 ae9acecb8&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. Aaron Blake, “Miles Taylor’s Very Serious Allegations About Trump, Explained,” Washington Post, August 26, 2020, https://www.washingto npost.com/politics/2020/08/26/miles-taylors-very-serious-allegationsagainst-trump-explained/?utm_campaign=wp_the_5_minute_fix&utm_ medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_fix. Cited in Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “Military to Spend Month Painting Border Barriers to ‘Improve Aesthetic Appearance’,” CBS News, June 6, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/military-to-spend-a-monthpainting-border-barriers-to-improve-aesthetic-appearance/?wpisrc=nl_dai ly202&wpmm=1. Cited in Michael D. Shear, “Trump Claims New Power to Bar Asylum for Immigrants Who Arrive Illegally,” New York Times, November 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/politics/trump-asy lum-seekers-executive-order.html?emc=edit_na_20181108&nl=breakingnews&nlid=4332168ing-news&ref=cta. Cited in Maria Sacchetti and Isaac Stanley-Becker, “In Blow to Trump’s Immigration Agenda, a Federal Judge Blocks Asylum Bans for Migrants Who Enter Illegally from Mexico,” Washington Post, November 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/20/blowtrumps-immigration-agenda-federal-judge-blocks-asylum-ban-migrantswho-enter-illegally-mexico/?utm_term=.4caf3f7a8c42&wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. Max Fisher and Amanda Taub, “Trump Wants to Make it Hard to Get Asylum. Other Countries Feel the Same,” New York Times,

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November 2, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/world/eur ope/trump-asylum.html. Cited in Elisabeth Malkin, “Trump Turns U.S. Policy in Central America on Its Head,” New York Times, March 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/03/30/world/americas/trump-turns-us-policy-in-centralamerica-on-its-head.html?emc=edit_th_190331&nl=todaysheadlines& nlid=43321680331. Cited in Nick Miroff, “ACLU, Others File Suit in San Francisco Federal Court to Halt Trump Asylum Ban,” Washington Post, July 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/aclu-others-file-suit-insan-francisco-federal-court-to-halt-trump-asylum-ban/2019/07/16/ece 066be-a806-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html?utm_term=.cbe473 95094b&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in Maria Sacchetti, “Trump Administration to Expand Its Power to Deport Undocumented Immigrants,” Washington Post, July 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-administrationto-expand-its-power-to-deport-undocumented-immigrants/2019/07/ 22/76d09bc4-ac8e-11e9-bc5c-e73b603e7f38_story.html?utm_term=.1bc 091dfeefe&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in Michael D. Shear, Katie Benner, and Michael S. Schmidt, “’We Need To Take Away Children,’ No Matter How Young, Justice Dept. Officials Said,” New York Times, October 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/10/06/us/politics/family-separation-border-immigrationjeff-sessions-rod-rosenstein.html?smid=em-share. Cited in Sari Horowitz and Maria Sacchetti, “Sessions Vows to Prosecute All Illegal Border Crossers and Separate Children from Their Parents,” Washington Post, May 7, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/sessions-says-justice-dept-will-prosecute-everyperson-who-crosses-border-unlawfully/2018/05/07/e1312b7e-521611e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html. Cited in Callum Borchers, “’You’re a Parent!’ Things Got Personal in the White House Briefing Room,” Washington Post, June 14, 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/06/14/youre-a-par ent-things-got-personal-in-the-white-house-briefing-room/. Aleksander Hemon, “Fascism Is Not an Idea to Be Debated; It’s a Set of Actions to Fight,” Literary Hub, November 1, 2018, https://lithub.com/fascism-is-not-an-idea-to-be-debated-its-a-setof-actions-to-fight/. Italics in original. Cited in Kimberly Kindy, Nick Miroff, and Maria Sacchetti, “Trump says Ending Family Separation Practice Was a ‘Disaster’ That Led to Surge in Border Crossings,” Washington Post, April 28, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-ending-family-separation-pra ctice-was-a-disaster-that-led-to-surge-in-border-crossings/2019/04/28/

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73e9da14-69c8-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html?utm_term=.a6f935 7874b8&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. Cited in Erica Werner, Maria Sacchetti, and Nick Miroff, “White House Asks Congress for $4.5 Billion in Emergency Spending at Border,” Washington Post, May 1, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/bus iness/economy/white-house-asks-congress-for-45-billion-in-emergencyspending-for-border/2019/05/01/725e2864-6c23-11e9-8f44-e8d8bb 1df986_story.html?utm_term=.b0a2cd8f0a9b. Cited in Nick Miroff, “From the Border, More Frustrating Immigration Numbers for President Trump,” Washington Post, May 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/from-the-border-morefrustrating-immigration-numbers-for-president-trump/2019/05/08/ ad6ac140-71a7-11e9-9eb4-0828f5389013_story.html?tid=hybrid_con tent_2_na&utm_term=.7f7620a3f65e. Cited in Vanessa Romo, “Federal Judge Blocks Trump Policy Ordering Indefinite Detention for Asylum-Seekers,” NPR, July 3, 2019, https://www.opb.org/news/article/npr-federal-judge-blockstrump-policy-ordering-indefinite-detention-for-asylum-seekers/. Cited in Katie Reilly, “Here Are All the Times Trump Insulted Mexico,” Time, August 31, 2016, https://news.yahoo.com/times-donald-trumpinsulted-mexico-153525059.html. Cited in Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Peter Baker, “The Border Wall: How a Potent Symbol Is Now Boxing Trump In,” New York Times, January 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/us/politics/donaldtrump-border-wall.html?emc=edit_na_20190105&nl=breaking-news& nlid=4332168ing-news&ref=cta. Cited in Aaron Blake, “’I Did Not Need to Do This’: Trump Just Kneecapped His Own Case for a ‘National Emergency’,” Washington Post, February 15, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 2019/02/15/i-didnt-need-do-this-trump-just-kneecapped-his-own-casenational-emergency/?utm_term=.7b472d0fc4be. Peter Bergen, “There Is No National Emergency,” CNN , February 14, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/opinions/border-wallwould-do-nothing-to-stop-terrorism-bergen/index.html. Cited in Miriam Jordan, “Trump’s ‘Public Charge’ Immigration Rule Is Vacated by Federal Judge,” New York Times, November 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/us/trump-immigrationpublic-charge.html. Cited in Ron Charles, “Don’t Let the Trump Administration Vandalize Lady Liberty’s Inspiring Message,” Washington Post, August 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/dont-let-thetrump-administration-vandalize-lady-libertys-inspiring-message/2019/

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08/14/68adba46-bea8-11e9-9b73-fd3c65ef8f9c_story.html?wpisrc=nl_ most&wpmm=1. 70. Inglehart, “The Age of Insecurity,” p. 20. 71. Cited in Greg Sargent, “The Walls Around Trump Are Crumbling. Evangelicals May Be His Last Resort,” Washington Post, January 2, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/01/02/wallsaround-trump-are-crumbling-evangelicals-may-be-his-last-resort/?utm_ term=.12fd9c320f30&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. Which of the following are entailed in Socio-Cultural Globalization? (choose one) a. Cross-border personal contacts b. The size of the resident foreign population c. Cross-border information flows d. All the above 2. President Trump’s controversial and unsuccessful attempt to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (known as DACA) would have removed protections for which of the following? (Select best answer) a. Children born in the United States to undocumented immigrants b. A group of undocumented immigrants brought illegally into the United States as children c. Children currently being brought into the United States illegally. d. Families who immigrated to the United States legally. 3. Which choices is False regarding economic immigrants? a. Countries hold no obligation to accept them b. They consist of only unskilled and uneducated immigrants c. They often fill needs or jobs that a country’s citizens are unwilling to take

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d. They are likely to increase in numbers in the future due to overpopulation, environmental stress in poor countries, and more. 4. What term do people less opposed to migrants who enter a country without permission call those migrants? a. Economic Immigrants b. Illegal Immigrants c. Undocumented Immigrants d. Criminals 5. In Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, what does the principle of “non-refoulement” say countries must do a. They must accept asylum-seekers if their fears of persecution are found to be legitimate b. They may turn away refugees of countries without needing a reason c. They must accept asylum-seekers that cannot be proven to be a financial burden. d. Deny refugees of countries of that harbor terrorist. 6. What has America’s Supreme Court ruled makes refugees fear “well-founded.” a. It is more likely than not that they will experience persecution b. There is 10 percent chance, they will face persecution c. They are or have experienced persecution d. They could in theory experience persecution 7. In 1980, the U.S. resettled more than 200,000 refugees. In 2017, how many refugees did the U.S. admit? a. 250,000 b. 175,000 c. 110,000 d. 33,000 8. Globally, what type of migrants play an important economic role in agriculture? a. Economic

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b. High Skilled c. Seasonal d. Legal 9. What country became home to the largest amount of Syrian refugees? a. Turkey b. France c. Germany d. U.S. 10. In the Netherlands, migrants who entered for a lengthy period of time and were between eighteen and state pension age were obliged to do what? a. Join the military b. Learn Dutch c. Pay an annual fee d. Own Dutch property 11. In 2015, the largest number of EU asylum applications were made in what country? a. Germany b. U.K. c. Hungary d. France 12. How many undocumented immigrants live in the U.S.? a. 1.5 million b. 4.8 million c. 10.7 million d. 22 million 13. What did the Trump administration cut that according to five former commanders of U.S. Southern Command was crucial to addressing the causes of migration? a. The budget of ICE b. The EB-5 Visa Program c. Funding for a southern border wall d. Aid for Central America

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14. Which of these occurred as a consequence of the Trump administration’s efforts to stop Central American migrants from entering the U.S.? a. Family Separation b. Better living conditions for migrants seeking asylum c. Economic Upturn in Central America d. Construction of a wall across the entirety of the US-Mexico border 15. What court decision, that limited the detention period for minors to twenty days and ensured they could not be held in jails like their parents? a. Flores v. Terrell County b. Flores v. Reno c. United States v. Lopez d. Shaw v. Reno 16. In August 2019, the Trump administration gave immigration how long to make a decision on asylum-seekers cases? a. 6 months b. One year c. Two years d. Five years 17. In July 2019, a federal judge ruled that indefinite detention was unconstitutional because of what? a. It was unduly cruel b. Punishment cannot be indefinite c. They did not rule it was unconstitutional d. Seeking asylum was not a crime 18. To deal with the backlog of cases, Attorney General Sessions announced an increase of immigration judges by how much? a. Ten percent b. Thirty-three percent c. Fifty percent d. A hundred percent

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19. In response to not getting funding for the border wall, Donald Trump order a partial government shutdown that lasted how long? a. One week b. Fifteen days c. A month d. Thirty-five days 20. Which of the following is true? a. Public opinion in major countries regard immigration as beneficial b. Donald Trump’s wall has been fully funded, but not built c. Donald Trump has successfully completed the border wall d. The Schengen zone no longer exist True or False 1. True or False? Refugees by definition have already legally or illegally entered the countries they seek asylum. True 2. True or False? Only about 50 percent of asylum-seekers succeed in remaining permanently in America. False, only 20 percent of asylum-seekers succeed in remaining permanently 3. True or False? America has the largest number of foreign-born residents in the world. True 4. True or False? America’s population now has the highest percentage of foreign-born residents than at any time since 1910. True 5. True or False? Soft power is decreased by admitting refugees who are victims of persecution in their own countries. False, soft power is increased

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6. True or False? There is an incentive to hire undocumented aliens, especially for low-paying jobs in fruit picking or meatpacking. True 7. True or False? In 2018, Trump moved the U.S. embassy in Israel from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. False, it was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem 8. True or False? A report by the DHS revealed that citizenship was a poor indicator of potential terrorism. True 9. True or False? 2018 Eurobarometer poll found that national debt was “seen as the most important issue facing the EU in 21 Member States False, Immigration. 10. True or False? Over an eighth of the Venezuelan population left their country between 2016 and November 2019 owing to human-rights abuses and the collapse of the country’s economy resulting from the policies of President Nicolás Maduro. True 11. True or False? White supremacists threaten more terrorism in America than do refugees. True 12. True or False? Through the Migrant Protection Protocols program, also known as the “Remain in Mexico” Program, 2,000 of the roughly 10,000 initially completed cases under the program resulted in asylum. False, only 11 did 13. True or False? International and U.S. laws do not require the government to provide hearings for all asylum-seekers to determine whether their requests were legitimate. False, they do

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14. True or False? According to exit polls after the 2016 presidential election, 64 percent of those who believed that immigration was America’s most important issue had voted for Trump. True 15. True or False? The “zero tolerance” policy ended when Trump signed an executive order to end the policy and reunite families awaiting a decision on asylum. True 16. True or False? President Trump could not legally sign an executive order to end the “zero tolerance” policy. False, Trump falsely claimed he could not legally sign an executive order 17. True or False? The separation of families continued long after Trump claimed to have rescinded it. True 18. True or False? By August 2019, U.S immigration courts had a backlog of ten thousand cases False, it was over a million cases 19. True or False? Because of President Trump’s harsh rhetoric in 2019 the flow or asylum seekers decreased. False, it increased 20. True or False? Most Americans supporting building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. False Short Answer What is the distinction between referring to migrants who come into the country without permission as illegal aliens as opposed to referring to them as undocumented migrants?

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Typically, those who oppose migration referred to them as illegal aliens, and those less oppose use the term undocumented migrants How does admitting refugees fleeing persecution in their own countries increase a country’s soft power? Enhances America’s global standing, can send an important signal to the world, enables the country to attract the best and brightest from around the world. How do a countries demographic factors play into a need for immigration? A more developed country will have less people willing to work in low skilled manual labor jobs. Also, immigration is important for countries where birthrates have fallen and populations are aging How might Islamophobic rhetoric from the leaders of the western world help with recruitment of additional supporters to the extremist cause? It is used to prove the claim to Muslims that the West hates Islam rather than terrorism Frustrated by the entry of Central Americans, Trump exploded in October 2018, declaring “Close the whole thing!” What could have been the consequences if his advisors had not persuaded him otherwise? It would have severed U.S.-Mexican trade, travel and, tourism at an immense cost to both countries owing to stopping trade between them of $1.7 billion of goods and services that daily crossed the border. It would also have severed the production chains of major U.S. corporations Why might President Trump’s policy of cutting aid to Central America as punishment for migrants have the opposite of its intended effect. Reducing aid to those countries can increase the amount of people who leave, because it further disenfranchises the people

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of those countries potentially increases crimes while taking away funding that could be used to fight that crime. Why were immigrant families separated under the Trump administration? The Trump Administration had a policy of “zero tolerance” which means they would push to deport undocumented immigrants regardless of complicating factors. This allowed children to be separated from their parents or relatives who were imprisoned while awaiting a decision on their status. Why would of adding a question about citizenship to the 2020 census reduced response rates in immigrant communities? Immigrants in those communities who now reside in the country without permission would be dissuaded from filling them out, because of fear of being deported. How does Donald Trump’s rhetoric regarding immigration help him appeal to voters? Many of the voters that tend the strongest to President Trump see immigrants as stealing their jobs. Also for some older voters, the cultural and demographic shifts are making feel as though they no longer live in a country where they were born What does “residence by investment” mean? It is the purchase of citizenship and passports of another country by the very wealthy. In America an example would be the EB-5 visa.

PART IV

Conclusions

CHAPTER 11

The Future of Globalization and the Liberal Global Order

As noted above, the several dimensions of globalization, though linked, need not move in the same direction although they tended to do so in the halcyon years after World War II. We conclude that globalization will advance after Trump, at least in several of its dimensions. Nationalistpopulism itself was globalized, and the technologies that fostered globalization also fostered nationalist-populism. Social media like Facebook, for example, repeatedly spread ideologies and rumors throughout and among societies, producing anxieties and dangerous conflicts among subnational and transnational groups. In his thoughtful volume, A World in Disarray, Richard Haass concluded that globalization had created such deep interdependence among sovereign states that “we no longer have the luxury of viewing of what goes on in another country as off-limits.”1 Haass also concluded that, for actors to enjoy legitimacy, they had to accept “sovereign obligations” in policies toward one another (“realism for an era of globalization”2 ), a claim he illustrated by reference to phenomena such as climate change (“the quintessential manifestation of globalization”3 ), cyberspace, and spread of infectious diseases. These regimes would be established by new forms of multilateral consultation.4 Neither Haass nor we foresaw the emergence of a global pandemic or the globalization of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9_11

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populism in which key actors fell prey to the antitheses of sovereign obligations. The global economy was devastated by the pandemic and made worse because of economic nationalism and actors were interdependent. Although most populists assailed globalization, illiberal states such as China and Russia benefited from a globalized world and were eager to join the WTO. They will probably support economic globalization regardless of the erosion of the liberal order. Their corporations and state funds have an interest in global trade and investment and the supply chains. Indeed, China’s vast Belt and Road scheme depended on extending infrastructure, trade, and even tourism that reduced impediments to the movement of goods and people. Moreover, globalization increased the size of informal economies in developing countries that relied on distribution chains and reduced tax receipts and regulatory enforcement. Illiberal societies have as much of a stake in curbing climate changes and supported the Paris accord as well as the multilateral Iran nuclear deal and efforts to denuclearize North Korea. Although Russian and Chinese societies faced domestic opposition to migrants, both benefited from unskilled and highly educated migrants whom their governments sought to attract. Even while defending their sovereignty and increasing geopolitical involvement globally, globalization served their interests. Moreover, political crises and resulting political instability in America and Great Britain reflected the moribund condition of the leading advocates of the liberal order and were perhaps a prelude to the demise of that order. Referring to America’s political gridlock regarding former President Trump’s demand for funding a wall on Mexico’s border, reports that Trump had considered leaving NATO, the British Parliament’s rejection of former Prime Minister May’s compromise proposal regarding Brexit, and divisiveness of politics in both leading democracies, James Hohmann wrote: “The two most important beacons of freedom in the world are dimming. And just as the seas become more dangerous when lighthouses go dark, the same is true on the increasingly stormy world stage. Will January 2019 be remembered as the month that the West came unmoored? Previous generations had Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. Harold Macmillan and John Kennedy. Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. In 2019, there is Theresa May and Donald Trump.”5 Ellen Barry and Mark Landler concluded: “Rarely have British and American politics seemed quite so synchronized as they do in the chilly dawn of 2019, three years after the victories of Brexit and Donald J.

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Trump upended the two nations’ political establishments. The countries seem subject to a single ideological weather system—one that pits proglobalization elites against a left-behind hinterland.”6 Trump, as Thomas Wright observed, “slowly and steadily chipped away at the pillars of the free world and used the rubble to lay the foundations of an illiberal alternative.”7 Trump believed that “walls” around states were solutions to problems. His was a realist Westphalian world, consisting of sovereign and independent states, engaged in realpolitik. He ignored transnational politics and collective problems such as climate change, pandemics, or nuclear proliferation except in terms of relative gains or losses. Those beliefs necessarily introduced misperceptions and thus conflict in global politics.

The Political Dimension of Globalization Donald Trump was an enemy of multilateralism. Indeed, in his book, The Room Where it Happened, John Bolton quoted Trump as saying in an August 2019 videoconference about U.S. assistance to Ukraine, “I don’t give a shit about NATO,”8 before ordering Vice President Pence to call NATO’s Secretary-General to tell him that NATO should pay Ukraine $250 million in assistance because the president did not want to alienate Russian President Putin by providing direct U.S. aid to Ukraine. Although multilateralism was under attack by Trump, it remained significant. Hence, as NATO celebrated its 70th anniversary, France and Germany proposed an Alliance for Multilateralism “to create a network of countries ready to support multilateralism and cooperate, including to fight inequality, tackle climate change and address the consequences of new technologies.”9 The French foreign minister added that the new group would “show the world what could be the consequences of unilateralism and isolationism enabling nationalism and extremist speeches to flourish.”10 However, aspects of the liberal order such as democracy and free market capitalism that had previously been spread by globalization were being undermined even in democratic societies. Nationalist-populism showed signs that it had begun to recede. Most importantly, Donald Trump lost the 2020 election and a last-minute compromise was reached between the EU and the UK regarding UKEU post-Brexit relations. Also, polls suggested that Americans still had faith in multilateral institutions and agreements. Despite the coronavirus

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pandemic, a Pew poll revealed that most Americans agreed that cooperation is a priority for their country. “About six-in-ten (62%) think many of the problems facing the U.S. can be solved by working with other countries. Similarly, 61% think the U.S. should consider the interests of other countries rather than following its own interests alone.”11 Americans preferred engagement and shared leadership in world affairs, and most of those polled thought that the coronavirus pandemic increased the importance of American collaboration with other countries to solve global issues. Most Americans also supported economic and political globalization despite Trump’s nationalist-populism. Thus, 65 percent believed that globalization, especially the increasing connections of the U.S. economy with others around the world and international trade, was largely good for America. In addition, 73 percent supported U.S. involvement in NATO, and 71 percent believed that Washington should consult with major allies before making foreign-policy decisions. Majorities agreed that alliances in Europe (68%), East Asia (59%), and the Middle East (60%) benefited both the U.S. and its allies or mostly the United States alone. A majority continued to support coming to the aid of allies and were willing to send U.S. troops to defend South Korea if it were attacked and supported using of U.S. troops if Russia invaded a NATO ally, such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia.12 Similarly, a late 2018 survey also revealed strong U.S. support for political globalization and the multilateralism that was its indicator. Some 91 percent believed that it was “more effective for the United States to work with allies and other countries to achieve its foreign policy goals.” Twothirds of respondents also supported “the United States making decisions with its allies even if it means the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (66% agree, 32% disagree),” and that “the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if it means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.”13 Similarly, most Americans supported U.S. participation in the multilateral Iran deal (66 percent) and the Paris climate accord. Unlike Donald Trump, an overwhelming majority thought “admiration (73%) of the United States is more important is more important than fear (26%).”14 Finally, in a September 2019 poll “seven in 10 Americans (69%)” agreed that “it would be best for the future of the country to take an active part in world affairs.”15 All of these reflected appreciation of

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America’s global participation and soft power, which had declined precipitously after Trump became president, especially after America’s inability to cope with COVID-19 and the riots following the brutal death of George Floyd, an African-American in Minneapolis. People were “stunned about the effect of incapable leadership, or of polarizing leadership, of not being able to unify and get the forces aligned so you can address the problem [of the coronavirus],” declared a vice president of the German Marshall Fund. “And that, of course, results in a nosedive in how you view [the United States]. What you’re seeing is a collapse of soft power of America.”16 The pandemic, of course, had political implications for populism. “Three of the four largest democracies run by illiberal populists—the United States, Brazil, and the U.K.—now rank one, two, and three in deaths from the coronavirus,” observed James Traub. The populist leaders of those countries sought to minimize the gravity of the pandemic. Populist leaders, added Traub, denied COVID-19 for the same reasons they denied climate change: “first, because acknowledging a force beyond their control might break the spell of omniscience in which they have bound their followers; and second, because deference to science and logic undermines the emotional sources of their appeal.”17 Two of those leaders, Trump and May, were ousted, and Bolsonaro was subjected to widespread criticism. Elsewhere, the election of Ekrem Imamoglu as mayor of Istanbul and a liberal foe of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, the defeat of Greece’s left-wing populists, and the vibrancy of Taiwan’s democracy were encouraging signs. The electoral victory of a foe of Viktor Orban ˙ as mayor of Budapest and, in Poland, the Law and Justice (PIS) party’s loss of a majority in the country’s upper house of parliament suggested that populism may have begun to ebb in Eastern Europe as well. In addition, massive demonstrations in Hong Kong in support of democracy and opposition to Chinese repression in the city, and mass anti-regime protests in Moscow, all in mid-2019, may be harbingers of a reaction to authoritarian populism. Thus, Peter Pomersantsev argued, “This ability to find connections and momentum in a fractured landscape is perhaps the underlying essence of the current protests. The regimes they fight have no single ideology, united only in their aim to demotivate people and break up common efforts.”18

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The Economic Dimension of Globalization The growing economic interdependence between America and China after China joined the WTO, the institutional core of economic globalization, has begun to unravel. According to Neil Irwin, President Trump’s protectionist pressure on U.S. allies in Europe and North America was merely a prelude to his principal objective. “The ultimate goal” was “to reset the economic relationship between China and the rest of the world. It may take time and cause pain in the interim. But the idea is it’s a multistep process to attain more leverage with which to force China to allow American companies to sell their goods and operate freely, without having their technology stolen,”19 and aided Washington in its geopolitical rivalry with Beijing. According to Trump, “When people or countries come to raid the great wealth of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so.”20 By contrast, according to an American financial economist, “Play with fire and threaten the world with tariffs and sanctions, and someday you’re going to get burned. The economy is clearly losing here. Not only are factories not coming back to America, the existing companies in the country are not churning out new jobs.”21 Perhaps, the most significant factor argued Gene Sperling, an experienced economic adviser in the Clinton and Obama administrations, was Trump himself. “The irony here is that Trump’s erratic, chaotic approach to the economy is probably the most significant economic risk factor in the world right now…. It’s economic narcissism. It’s economic policy by whim, pride, ego and tantrum.”22 Trump’s use of sanctions against China and others, including allies, was harmful to America in the long run. “Two giant powers that once seemed to be moving closer together are now tearing themselves away from each other—propelled by both politics and the impact of the global spread of the coronavirus,” noted sinologist Orville Schell, adding that, “as each country tries to blame the other for the coronavirus crisis, as the world becomes starkly aware of supply chains and their vulnerability, and as the global order shifts tectonically, China and the United States are moving further and further apart.”23 As Fareed Zakaria argued, the U.S. dollar is a major source of American influence, allowing Washington to issue debt in its own currency, without concern for inflation or depreciation, but the “more Washington abuses its power, the greater the efforts to find some alternative to the hegemony of the dollar. The Russians and Chinese have

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long been trying to find ways to skirt dollar control. Infuriated by the Iran sanctions, the Europeans are now doing the same.”24 The demand for economic efficiency has made the global economy more fragile, a fact shown by the coronavirus. Corporate efforts to control markets forced states to compete vigorously with one another, fostering economic nationalism. Moreover, in some areas, in a liberal economic world, suppliers were geographically concentrated, while in others, firms were forced to rely on a single supplier for necessary components. Consequently, supply chains of transnational corporations, a feature of economic globalization, were eroding, and global trade declined after 2017. The Economist concluded that “the golden age of globalization may be over,”25 and it was further undermined by U.S. tariffs. Supply chains were also changing owing to technology and rivalry in supply chain security, the growing role of services instead of manufacturing, and political factors such as Sino-American geopolitical rivalry. Supply chains were also becoming more regional than global, for example, Southeast Asia.26 However, a compromise had been reached to reduce the potential economic catastrophe of Brexit. Although economic interdependence persisted, it exacerbated political tensions as on Sino-American relations. According to The Economist , “China’s growing tech prowess is putting new strains on globalization,” and “supply chains, carrying semiconductors from China to devices in America, actually raise the political stakes” of their trade war. It added, “Critical infrastructure may contain components from a dozen nations, require software updates from a provider on one continent and send streams of real-time data to another.”27 Cyber-espionage and technology theft also fostered zero-sum perceptions of global trade. In the meantime, Trump’s trade wars proved costly. The WTO prediction for growth in trade of merchandise in 2019 was the lowest since 2009 at the height of the Great Recession. “Trade conflicts heighten uncertainty, which is leading some businesses to delay the productivity-enhancing investments that are essential to raising living standards,” argued the WTO’s directorgeneral. “Job creation may also be hampered as firms employ fewer workers to produce goods and services for export.”28 Although The Economist tended to equate globalization as a whole with its economic dimension (using the term “slowbalisation,” coined by a Dutch commentator in 2015), when it concluded that globalization “has slowed from light speed to a snail’s pace in the past decade,”29

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much of this only encompassed by the globalization’s economic dimension. Hence, that journal reached its conclusion using indicators ranging from gross capital flows and flows of direct investment (FDI) to trade in goods and services as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and stock of cross-border bank loans as a share of GDP. The Economist gave as reasons for this slowdown factors such as higher costs in moving goods that increase the costs of trade, thereby increasing the relative attraction of intra-regional trade, even as global trade slowed, and the shift from production of goods to the growing role of services, which are difficult to trade. “A Chinese lawyer,” as it noted “is not qualified to execute wills in Berlin and Texan dentists cannot drill in Manila.”30 Also, banks were less willing to finance trade owing to the pain of the Great Recession in 2008; the rate of return from multinational investments had plummeted; and local firms were increasingly capable of competing with transnational corporations. Nevertheless, U.S. “manufacturing is undergoing a revival, especially among agile smaller firms and those using advanced techniques.”31 However, loose fiscal and monetary policy in many countries fostered economic globalization and stabilized markets.32 This constituted “the fragile backdrop to Mr. Trump’s trade war” in which the “principle that investors and firms should be treated equally regardless of nationality is being ditched.”33 Instead of taking steps to avoid trade wars, “the Trump administration has charged in. Its signature policy has been a barrage of tariffs, which cover a huge range of goods, from tyres to edible offal,” and it has “weaponized” the “dollarbased payments system.”34 Other countries, not surprisingly, retaliated with higher tariffs, antitrust actions, and regional arrangements, and the results have been painful for everyone. If the trade wars continued and FDI remained low, “exports would fall from 28% of world GDP to 23% over a decade,” which is “equivalent to a third of the proportionate drop seen between 1929 and 1946, the previous crisis in globalization.”35 Americans still believed in the importance of trade. In May 2018, a Pew poll found that 56 percent of respondents thought “free trade” a good thing for the U.S., while only 30 percent thought it was a “bad thing.”36 Another poll in August 2018 had found that 82 percent of Americans thought trade was good for the U.S. economy, and 85 percent answered that it was beneficial to them personally. In addition, 63 percent had supported NAFTA and 61 percent had supported the Trans-Pacific Partnership.37 A May 2019 poll found that “a majority expects that American consumers will bear the brunt of the latest round of tariffs on Chinese

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goods and they are not particularly hopeful that this policy will bring the manufacture of those goods back to U.S. soil.” Only 32 percent thought that tariffs were good for America, while 37 percent thought they were bad. A majority thought that free trade was beneficial for the U.S.38 Moreover, although populism had spread across the European Union, Brexit had been put aside, and the EU had concluded the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada that came into force in 2017 and had signed a historically significant free trade agreement with four Mercosur countries—Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay—in mid-2019.39 “I measure my words carefully when I say that this is a historical moment,” declared Jean-Claude Juncker, then president of the European Commission. “In the midst of international trade tensions, we are sending today a strong signal with our Mercosur partners that we stand for rules-based trade.”40 Moreover, despite the Sino-American trade war, financial links between the two continued to proliferate. Beijing has allowed foreign investors to acquire a greater share in local firms, and foreign investment in China’s stock and bond markets has soared.41 However, the negative aspects of free trade, especially as regards rising China, were becoming better understood. Economists had failed to recognize the negative economic consequences of economic globalization, especially for the industrial middle class in America and Europe that could not compete with subsidized Chinese firms. Economic globalization had slowed partly in consequence to violations by major states, including Trump’s America, of free trade norms and U.S.-Chinese rivalry in high-tech industries. Moreover, as noted earlier, the U.S.-China and North American trade agreements actually raised barriers to global trade and rendered it easier for those states involved to “manage” trade instead of leaving it to open markets. Even worse for the liberal economic order was the potential demise of the WTO owing to America’s refusal to add new personnel for WTO panels. “America is deploying new tactics— poker-style brinksmanship—and new weapons that exploit its role as the nerve centre of the global economy to block the free flow of goods, data, ideas and money across borders…. America is also the central node in the network that underpins globalization. This mesh of firms, ideas and standards reflects and magnifies American prowess.”42 However, Trump’s zero-sum perception of trade was likely to pale with Joe Biden’s election as America’s president.

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The Socio-Cultural Dimension of Globalization More than the economic and political dimensions of globalization, the socio-cultural dimension had declined in recent years owing to racism and xenophobia. Indian essayist Pankaj Mishra graphically described the perspective of white supporters of populist politicians and political parties precipitating racial violence. “A century ago, the mere suspicion of being thrust aside by black and yellow peoples sparked apocalyptic visions of ‘race suicide.’ Today, … the religion of whiteness increasingly resembles a suicide cult. Mr. Trump’s trade wars, sanctions, border walls, deportations, denaturalizations and other 11th-hour battles seem to push us all closer to the ‘terrible probability’.” Mishra then cited James Baldwin’s cataclysmic description of the rulers of the “higher races,” “struggling to hold on to what they have stolen from their captives, and unable to look into their mirror, will precipitate a chaos throughout the world which, if it does not bring life on this planet to an end, will bring about a racial war such as the world has never seen.”43 The impact of Trump’s violent and inflammatory rhetoric was revealed after the arrest of a passionate pro-Trump supporter, who had sent bombs to Trump’s political foes in 2018, his refusal to criticize the Confederate flag and divisive advocacy of violence to end protests against racial inequality in 2020, and the repeated use of Trump’s language by violent white supremacists like the Proud Boys. Most, but not all Republicans had surrendered to Trump’s populist dislike of immigrants. For example, George W. Bush pushed back against Trump’s nativism in greeting new U.S. citizens. “America’s elected representatives have a duty to regulate who comes in and when,” said the former president. “In meeting this responsibility, it helps to remember that America’s immigrant history made us who we are. Amid all the complications of policy, may we never forget that immigration is a blessing and a strength.”44 However, as Trump’s term ended in 2020, the issue, which had played a key role in Trump’s 2016 election, had lost much of its impact on voters in the 2020 presidential campaign.45 After almost four years, the Trump administration remained in day-today chaos, oscillating recklessly between positions on many vital foreign policy issues. Hence, an unprecedented anonymous op-ed article by an administration official in September 2018 described Trump as “erratic.” Meetings with Trump “veer off topic and off the rails, he engages in repetitive rants, and his impulsiveness results in half-baked, ill-informed

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and occasionally reckless decisions that have to be walked back.” The author then asserted, “many of the senior officials in his own administration are working diligently from within to frustrate parts of his agenda and his worst inclinations.”46 In October 2017, Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn), observed that “Secretary Tillerson, Secretary Mattis and Chief of Staff Kelly are those people that help separate our country from chaos…”47 With the resignation of Mattis in February 2019, all three had left, leaving Trump in the hands of fawning and inexperienced advisers and the prospect of even worse chaos, especially after the Democrats assumed control of the House of Representatives in 2018. “Mattis was the last man standing for what had been U.S. foreign policy since World War II,” said Norbert Röttgen, chairman of the foreign affairs committee in Germany’s parliament. “With him gone, this really marks a juncture in the Trump presidency. Now we have an unrestrained Trump, which is a dangerous signal for the year ahead.”48 In his resignation letter, Mattis made clear his concern that Trump did not fully recognize the danger posed by Russia and China and the president’s opposition to the liberal order. “One core belief I have always held is that our strength as a nation is inextricably linked to the strength of our unique and comprehensive system of alliances and partnerships,” Mattis wrote, adding, “we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies…. We must do everything possible to advance an international order that is most conducive to our security, prosperity and values, and we are strengthened in this effort by the solidarity of our alliances.” Mattis also alluded to his differences with Trump. “Because you have the right to have a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on these and other subjects, I believe it is right for me to step down from my position.”49 Much of this appeared to be the product of Trump’s own pathetic ignorance of public affairs coupled with his volatile personality and “keep ‘em guessing” style. There obviously were also major policy differences among his immediate advisers, including family, business, military, and right-wing ideologues. Conservative Republicans in Congress and powerful interest groups—including multinational companies, which generally favored multilateral trade agreements and immigration—were able to do little more than express “concern” about Trump’s most egregious policies and desperate attempts to stop investigations demanded

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by outraged political foes. American politics no longer pitted proDemocratic blue-collar workers against wealthy pro-Republican voters. Instead, Trump had attracted the blue-collar workers while losing wealthier and more highly educated voters, and his administration focused on America versus the rest of the world. President Biden promised to reverse Trump’s anti-immigration policies. Trump had used executive orders to impose many of these, and Biden is doing the same to discard many of those. He ended bans on travel from Muslim and African countries and he halted the Trump administration’s efforts to strip protections for about 700,000 “dreamers.” Biden also raised significantly America’s cap on refugee admissions to 125,000 and said he would establish a 100-day moratorium on deportations, directing Immigration and Customs Enforcement to focus on criminals. Such actions will enhance sociocultural globalization and enhance transnational groups that will simultaneously foster political and economic globalization.50 Until Biden’s election, the U.S. hegemon appeared to be flailing, in a dangerous condition of near-collapse, and American prestige was at low ebb except among Trump’s counterparts abroad. Stephen Sestanovich argued that Trump had sensed “that the public wanted relief from the burdens of global leadership without losing the thrill of nationalist selfassertion. America could cut back its investment in world order with no whiff of retreat. It would still boss others around, even bend them to its will.”51 What we got, however, in Luce’s words was “hard-right pugilism with the best of postmodern vaudeville.”52 As Anonymous acknowledged, “The bigger concern is not what Mr. Trump has done to the presidency but rather what we as a nation have allowed him to do to us. We have sunk low with him and allowed our discourse to be stripped of civility.”53 A major danger to globalization was the spread of the invisible global coronavirus. “The coronavirus crisis,” argued Phillippe Legrain, “highlighted the downsides of extensive international integration while fanning fears of foreigners and providing legitimacy for national restrictions on global trade and flows of people.”54 It disrupted global supply chains, reduced foreign direct investment, and impeded the movement of people. The pandemic caused a decline in economic globalization, but this was temporary and likely to lead to positive changes that may make “existing systems work better” like “diversifying supply chains away from a single country and instead throughout a region.”55

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The Future of Globalization and the Liberal Order After Trump’s defeat and the global pandemic ends, matters may turn around dialectically as described in Chapter 1. Thomas Friedman was optimistic. “So what world are we living in? For starters, we’re living in a world that is becoming so interconnected— thanks to digitization, the internet, broadband, mobile devices, the cloud and soon-to-be 5G wireless transmissions,” and “growth increasingly depends on the ability of yourself, your community, your town, your factory, your school and your country to be connected to more and more of the flows of knowledge and investment — and not just rely on stocks of stuff.”56 In contrast to Friedman’s optimism, however, is Edward Luce’s pessimism. “We are on a menacing trajectory brought about by ignorance of our history, indifference towards society’s losers and complacency about the strength of our democracy.”57 Trump’s MAGA slogan was always an illusion, and in time its supporters will recognize that Trump’s America and China were rogue states. When America’s UN ambassador, Nikki Haley, announced in October 2018 that she would be leaving her post, she declared, “Now the United States is respected; countries may not like what we do, but they respect what we do.” “They know that if we say we’re going to do something, we follow it through. And the president proved that, whether it was with the chemical weapons in Syria, whether it’s with NATO saying that other countries have to pay their share.”58 This, of course, was nonsense. A 2020 Pew poll revealed that globally Trump, unlike his predecessor, was more unpopular than other leaders of major powers—Germany’s Angela Merkel, France’s Emmanuel Macron, and even China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Respondents, including those in U.S. allies such as Canada, Sweden, Germany, and France, overwhelmingly declared that they had no confidence that Trump would do the right thing in global affairs. Almost 75 percent of respondents in America’s key European allies lacked confidence in Trump. In Europe, only in Poland did a bare majority (largely right-wingers) have confidence in Trump. Among America’s allies, Israel, largely Jews but not Arabs, thought highly of Trump. In the 32 countries surveyed, a median of an overwhelming 64 percent declared they lacked confidence in Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, while just 29 percent expressed confidence in America’s president.59 Moreover, a September 2020 poll found that in thirteen

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countries, including close allies, a median of only 15 percent said America had handled the pandemic well, while 85 percent said the country had responded poorly. In at least seven countries, including allies such as Britain and Japan, approval ratings for the U.S. fell to record lows.60 Until Trump left office, many Europeans no longer considered America an ally. German analyst Karl Kaiser declared, “a majority of French and Germans now trust Russia and China more than the United States.” A senior German official declared, “No one any longer believes that Trump cares about the views or interests of the allies. It’s broken”; and director of a branch of the German Marshall Fund concluded: “If an alliance becomes unilateral and transactional, then it’s no longer an alliance.”61 Observers believed that Trump’s unilateralism was dangerous and weakened the global order. However, they also believed that Biden would restore multilateralism and foster political globalization, a prediction reinforced by the national security team he assembled. James Mattis and his colleagues had concluded that, with Trump as president, the United States was undermining the foundations of an international order manifestly advantageous to U.S. interests, “reflecting a basic ignorance of the extent to which both robust alliances and international institutions provide vital strategic depth.” They insisted that, “Rather than treating countries as pawns in a great-power competition, a better approach would emphasize common codes of behavior and encourage states to publicly promulgate a vision for their country’s sovereign future and the types of partnerships they need to pursue it.” “It would also expand the cooperative space in which all countries supporting a rules-based order can work together to advance shared interests.”62 Thus, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Biden’s ambassador to the UN, declared, “multilateralism is back, diplomacy is back,” thereby committing the new administration to deeper political globalization.63 Despite Trump’s repeated criticisms of allies for not paying their “fair share,” one poll found that 83 percent of Americans supported NATO, including large majorities of both Republicans and Democrats. “The idea is that you’re putting the respondent in the shoes of the policymaker so they’ve really heard the essential side of the issue,” noted the director of the survey.64 Finally, two-thirds of Americans supported maintaining or increasing U.S. commitments to NATO and providing U.S. troops to defend allies such as South Korea and Japan.65 As Admiral James Stavridis, former NATO military commander, wrote, “They were built not on the ambitions of cold-eyed leaders but something more noble. NATO is a

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pool of partners who, despite some egregious outliers, by and large share fundamental values.”66 President Biden has begun to repair relations with America’s allies in Europe and Asia, thereby restoring these indispensable partnerships and the liberal order in the face of illiberal China and Russia. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, was optimistic, writing, “After a rocky four years, it is time for a fresh start. The election of Joe Biden as U.S. president gives us the chance to make it happen.”67 Regarding economic globalization, almost two-thirds of American respondents supported NAFTA, considerably more than in 2017, and 61 percent believed “the United States should participate in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.” Moreover, 70 percent were “very” (31 percent) or “somewhat” (41 percent) concerned that a trade war with China would harm their local economies. In addition, a “new” NAFTA—USMCA—was negotiated and is relatively similar to what it replaced. The authors of the poll concluded, “The Trump administration’s bold attempts to reshape US foreign policy have not convinced many Americans to join the bandwagon.” “Instead, most Americans are more convinced about the benefits of active US engagement and the need to work with allies.”68 Scott Clement and Dan Balz suggested that the poll showed that Americans rejected “key elements of President Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda, expressing near-record support for global engagement amid widespread worries that the United States is losing allies around the world.”69 After Trump’s four years, large majorities of the foreign-policy elite and public supported multilateralism in trade, immigration, and security. Large majorities of both groups also subscribed “to the belief that the United States should play an active global role.”70 The future of the liberal global order was darker than the future of globalization. The world no longer had a benevolent hegemon. It had become increasingly multipolar, and hegemonic war with China and/or Russia remained a possibility. Indeed, National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien called Washington’s miscalculation of China’s political trajectory the “greatest failure of American foreign policy since the 1930s.”71 Neither of America’s rivals would defend the liberal order. Both would support an illiberal global order and some of the elements of globalization. Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon argued that there is a “growing sense that the international order sits at an inflection point, driven by

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the conspicuous lack of leadership by the Trump administration; China’s aggressive efforts to showcase its domestic political model and its status as a provider of international club and private goods; and the possibility that the pandemic may fuel a growing populist backlash against political, economic, and cultural liberalism.” To avoid their depending on a single great power, populists sought a multipolar world that included alternative patrons such as Russia and China and enabled them “to increase their freedom of action by playing alternative suppliers of international club and private goods against one another.”72

Conclusion The challenges to the liberal order reflected the erosion of Western leadership in general and especially that of America. Trump’s willingness to break the rules—notably, in trade—his refusal to follow America’s Constitution—for example, his baseless insistence that the 2020 U.S. election be delayed or be rerun by the military, his admission that he sought to limit the U.S. Postal Service to reduce write-in ballots, and his refusal to say in advance that he would accept the outcome of the election, along with Trump’s lies and authoritarianism, accelerated the decline of the liberal order. Moreover, after having accused the Democrats of having stolen the 2020 election, Trump’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, admitted in court, “This is not a fraud case.” Then, as his term came to end, Trump encouraged violence by his supporters to come to Washington in January 2021 to prevent the Congress from confirming Biden’s election. The result was the violent occupation of the Capitol by right-wing extremists, authoritarian populists, white supremacists, and demands by Republicans as well as Democrats that Trump resigned only two weeks before Biden was to take the oath of office. In effect, Trump had threatened American democracy with a violent coup and consequently became the first U.S. president to be impeached a second time. “The Trump presidency has brought American democracy to the breaking point,” concluded Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. “The president has encouraged violent extremists; deployed law enforcement and other public institutions as weapons against rivals; and undermined the integrity of elections through false claims of fraud, attacks on mail-in voting and an apparent unwillingness to accept defeat.”73 Finally, America’s courts, more than ninety state and federal judges, including the Supreme Court (December 2020), unanimously turned down about fifty

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lawsuits in President Trump’s bizarre efforts to overturn the presidential election. The judicial system, in effect, prevented former President Donald Trump, “a buffoonish one-term wannabe autocrat,”74 from undermining America’s constitutional democracy. Following Trump’s lead, however, other governments were increasingly led or challenged by authoritarian populists. Even in Europe, notably France and Germany, where there remained leaders who advocated a rule-based world, populist politicians remained popular in Italy, Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere. Like Trump, they opposed immigration, were wary about multinationalism, and favored economic protectionism. Great Britain, too, had nationalist-populists, especially among those who had supported Brexit. Democracy had waned and democratic institutions such as free media, a law-based judiciary, and genuinely elected legislatures were under attack in countries ranging from the Philippines, the Maldives, and Thailand to Brazil and Venezuela. Human rights abuses were increasing globally, and international institutions that fostered human rights and liberal norms including the ICC, the UN, and its agencies such as UNRWA, the WTO, the WHO, and even NATO and the EU were targets of populists like Trump, Orba˙ n, and Salvini. In July 2020, the UN Human Rights Committee assailed the brutality of federal agents dispersing Blacks Lives Matter protesters in Portland, Oregon, and elsewhere. By contrast, Britain’s Prime Minister Johnson planned to invite the leaders of India, Australia, and South Korea to the 2021 G-7 summit, which Britain is hosting with an eye to add them to G-7 and establish a group of democracies, the G-10, to coordinate policies to restore the liberal order and, with the Biden administration, deepen democracy throughout the world after four years in which former President Trump had curried favor with authoritarian leaders. During 2018, populist enthusiasm had waned, but hardly disappeared except in countries like New Zealand in which liberal Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern controlled the country’s parliament and its pandemic, and appointed the most diverse cabinet in the country’s history, including a Maori as foreign minister. However, as Max Fisher warned, “Many Western populists,” including Trump, were “falling back to their message of besiegement and threat, as much out of the paranoid worldview that is central to populism as out of any conscious strategy.”75 The Biden administration seeks to restore elements of the liberal order but will find it difficult to do, especially given the popularity of nationalist-populism in

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the Republican Party. Moreover, Washington will be increasingly unable to do so globally owing to “rising” China and Putin’s Russia. Nothing more clearly reflected declining U.S. hegemony than its incompetent response to the novel coronavirus pandemic. “When people see these pictures of New York City they say, ‘How can this happen? How is this possible?’” said Henrik Enderlein, president of a university focused on public policy. “I feel a desperate sadness,” said British historian Timothy Garton Ash, and French political scientist Dominique Moïsi summed it up, “America has not done badly, it has done exceptionally badly.”76 Trump made matters worse by tweeting falsely that America’s Food and Drug Administration was impeding vaccines and treatment research and blaming everyone but himself for America’s dolorous performance. “Globalization, with its vast, fast flows of just about anything and everything real and imaginable across borders, is a reality that governments often cannot monitor, much less manage” wrote Haass, noting, “The gap between the challenges generated by globalization and the ability of a world to cope with them appears to be widening in a number of critical domains.”77 Sebastian Buckup used the metaphor of “architecture” to describe changing globalization, and he cited Hillary Clinton’s speech when she stepped down as U.S. secretary of state to make his point. “I’ve come to think of it like this: Truman and Acheson were building the Parthenon with classical geometry and clear lines,” Clinton had declared. “The pillars were a handful of big institutions and alliances dominated by major powers. And that structure delivered unprecedented peace and prosperity. But time takes its toll, even on the greatest edifice…. Where once a few strong columns could hold up the weight of the world, today we need a dynamic mix of materials and structures.”78 Globalization, wrote Buckup, “is often associated with the dismantling of walls,” but the world of Donald Trump, as expressed by his secretary of state at the 2019 Davos meeting, “asserted the primacy of the nation-state’s sovereignty and its right to build walls and fortresses.”79 Nevertheless, “the era of globalization will continue to evolve,” Haass reminded us, “and existing arrangements will be increasingly inadequate in dealing with contemporary challenges” like climate change. “Globalization,” he concluded, “is here to stay, and the inadequacies of the traditional approach to order, based on sovereignty, will only become more obvious over time.”80

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Unlike Haass, Buckup exuded despair. “From Trump’s wall with Mexico to UK prime ministers Theresa May’s and Boris Johnson’s red line on immigration to Xi Jinping’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, politicians seem to be refurbishing medieval fortresses.”81 There are still optimists like Fareed Zacharia, notwithstanding the bleak “view of modern life–seen as a dysfunctional global order, producing stagnant incomes, rising insecurity and environmental degradation.” Zacharia takes a long view of globalization and, despite growing inequality, pointed out how a globalized and liberal world continued to make progress. “Even in the West, it is easy to take for granted the astounding progress. We live longer, the air and water are cleaner, crime has plunged, and information and communication are virtually free.”82 As Anne Applebaum concluded, the future will not be like the past. “Non-Americans reading this, especially in allied countries, are now warned: There will be no automatic return to the status quo ante. Americans are now reminded: The Trump presidency may turn out to be not a blip we can ignore, but the beginning of a long period of disengagement that will not end in 2020 or 2024.”83 Finally, after it had become clear that Trump had tried to force Ukraine to smear Biden and aid his reelection in 2020, the House impeached him. In his reelection campaign, Trump shifted his divisive hatred from immigrants to antiracist protesters and liberals whom he called responsible for “American carnage.” Despite his impeachment, Trump’s populism persisted, and, during the 2020 campaign, he described the election as an opportunity to finally “dethrone the failed political class.”84 Thus, as the 2020 U.S. presidential election neared, America’s intelligence community concluded that Russia again sought to aid Trump and defeat Biden by smearing him and spreading misinformation using bots and social media to reach American voters and manipulate voting results.85 The community’s Key Judgment 2 in a 2019 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that in the 2020 election, Russia favored Donald Trump, a conclusion later confirmed by FBI Director Christopher Wray. A watered-down version to avoid angering Trump but which was the same conclusion read, “Russian leaders probably assess that chances to improve relations with the U.S. will diminish under a different U.S. president.”86 In sum, as Friedman concluded, “If America starts to behave as a selfish, shameless, lying grifter like Trump, you simply cannot imagine how unstable — how disruptive —world markets and geopolitics may become.”87 However, with the election of Joe Biden, an experienced

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pragmatist, U.S. foreign policy will change significantly. His foreign-policy advisers include numerous veterans of the Obama administration, indicating a preference for continuity with pre-Trump presidents. Biden will reduce organizational chaos while restoring stability and morale among those in the State and Defense Departments, intelligence agencies, and, especially, the National Security Council. Consequently, he will cease (mis)using “national security” as a bizarre excuse for policies ranging from banning visitors from Muslim societies, weakening environmental protection, and imposing tariffs on Canada to immigration, diverting money from the military budget to fund his wall on the Mexican border, and excluding New York from a program to facilitate security inspections for airline travel. Biden’s first phone call was to Justin Trudeau, a reminder of how important U.S.-Canadian relations were, and he undertook to renew the START II arms control treaty with Russia. The election was greeted warmly overseas. “Welcome back America!” tweeted the mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo. Canada’s Prime Minister Trudeau declared, “I’m really looking forward to working together.” French President Macron noted happily, “We have a lot to do to overcome today’s challenges. Let’s work together!” Germany’s Chancellor Merkel concluded, “Our trans-Atlantic friendship is irreplaceable, if we want to overcome the great challenges of our time.”88 At one time or another, Trump had insulted and/or denounced all of these leaders of America’s allies. Biden is renewing the advance of political globalization by rejoining organizations like WHO, restoring U.S. support for alliances like NATO and institutions like the WTO. He is trying to restore U.S. support for multinational agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate accord, which he declared America would rejoin. He is also reversing many other of Trump’s executive orders like the travel ban on Muslim countries and other anti-immigrant actions and the global “gag rules” that prohibit federal aid to all organizations that provide or discuss abortions or birth control. He will probably be a hawk as regards U.S. relations with China and Russia but will try to avoid a new cold war with either, but he may seek to reduce Sino-American tensions. He will also be less biased toward Israel and favor a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue and will be less supportive than Trump of authoritarian leaders such as Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, North Korea’s Kim Jongun, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, and, perhaps most important, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping .

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Biden’s approach to economic globalization is more problematic. Democrats in general are frequently cautious about multilateral trade agreements unless they have worker and environmental protections. However, Biden is a centrist who is unlikely to pursue Trump’s antagonistic attitude to such agreements that both harm Americans, violate international rules, or are based on inaccurate economic knowledge like Trump’s view of trade deficits. Biden may also seek to enter Asia’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the successor to the failed TPP, that has the potential to become Asia’s equivalent to the EU. Biden’s long record suggests he will reverse Trump’s racist attacks on sociocultural globalization. He will likely support multicultural immigration in general for personal, political, and economic reasons, will restore DACA for “dreamers,” and will do away with harsh rules regarding refugees and their families requesting asylum. Although these changes may meet vigorous opposition by Republicans in Congress who supported Trump and despite his “tough” rhetoric about foreign policy, Biden, who was inspired by President Truman, seeks to return America’s pre-Trump support for a liberal global order. In sum, James Traub heard Biden say, “Foreign policy is like human relations, only people know less about each other.” Traub concluded that the new president, “pledges to restore ‘the soul of a nation’—to make America noble again. He believes that America has both the right and the obligation to lead. That belief includes the patriotic premise that America’s national interests are not inimical to the interests of the world.”89

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Haass, A World in Disarray, p. 226. Ibid, pp. 227, 289. Ibid, p. 244. Ibid, pp. 253–255. James Hohmann, “The Daily 202: From Brexit to NATO and the shutdown, Putin is winning so much he might get tired of winning,” Washington Post, January 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2019/01/16/daily-202-from-bre xit-to-nato-and-the-shutdown-putin-is-winning-so-much-he-might-gettired-of-winning/5c3eb0a71b326b3b88fef0a0/?utm_term=.fd111071b 3a6&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1. 6. Ellen Barry and Mark Landler, “Brexit and the U.S. Shutdown: Two Governments in Paralysis,” New York Times, January

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7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/12/us/politics/brexitshutdown-us-britain-trump.html. Thomas Wright, “Trump Couldn’t Ignore the Contradictions of His Foreign Policy Any Longer,” The Atlantic, July 5, 2019, https://www. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/trump-tries-to-fix-his-foreignpolicy-without-bolton/593284/. Cited in Jim Townsend, “Bolton’s Book Is a Terrifying Warning About What Trump Could Still Do,” Foreign Policy, June 23, 2020, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/23/bolton-book-trump-nato-ukraine-ele ction/. Edith M. Lederer, “France and Germany launch alliance to back multilateralism,” Washington Post, April 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/europe/france-and-germany-launch-alliance-to-back-mul tilateralism/2019/04/03/79493974-5621-11e9-aa83-504f086bf5d6_ story.html?utm_term=.43c4f4286719&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. Cited in ibid. Mara Mordecai, “How Americans envision a post-pandemic world order,” Pew Research Center, June 2, 2020, https://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2020/06/02/how-americans-envision-a-post-pandemicworld-order/. Dina Smeltz, et al., “Divided We Stand,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2020, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/ files/report_2020ccs_americadivided.pdf. Dina Smeltz, et al., “America Engaged,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 2, 2018, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/public ation/america-engaged?utm_source=wapo&utm_campaign=rpt&utm_ medium=partner&utm_term=ccs2018-america-engaged&utm_content= text. Ibid. Dina Smeltz, et al., “Rejecting Retreat,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 6, 2019, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/public ation/rejecting-retreat.. Cited in Dan Balz, “America’s global standing is at a low point. The pandemic made it worse,” Washington Post, July 25, 2020, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/reckoning-americaworld-standing-low-point/?utm_campaign=wp_todays_worldview&utm_ medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld. James Traub, “The Pandemic Is the World’s Long Overdue Reality Check,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/ 07/01/trump-boris-johnson-bolsonaro-the-pandemic-is-the-worlds-longoverdue-reality-check/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_ campaign=22789&utm_term=Editors%20Picks%20OC&?tpcc=22789.

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18. Peter Pomerantsev, “The Counteroffensive Against Conspiracy Theories Has Begun,” The Atlantic, August 7, 2019, https://www.theatlantic. com/international/archive/2019/08/evolution-protests-conspiracy-the ories-disinformation/595639/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 19. Neil Irwin, “The Trump Trade Strategy Is Coming Into Focus. That Doesn’t Necessarily Mean It Will Work,” New York Times, October 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/upshot/trump-tradestrategy-coming-into-focus.html?emc=edit_th_181007&nl=todaysheadli nes&nlid=43321681007. 20. Cited in “A new kind of cold war,” The Economist, May 16, 2019, p. 14. 21. Cited in Heather Long, “Trump probably has the upper hand in trade war – until September,” Washington Post, June 6, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/business/2019/06/06/trump-probably-has-upperhand-trade-war-until-september/?utm_term=.fd8658aa36c3&wpisrc=nl_ daily202&wpmm=1. 22. Cited in Damian Paletta, Robert Costa, Josh Dawsey, and Philip Rucker, “The month a shadow fell on Trump’s economy,” Washington Post, August 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/ 08/22/trump-economy-month-chaotic-response/?wpisrc=nl_most& wpmm=1. 23. Orville Schell, “The Ugly End of Chimerica,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/03/chimerica-ugly-endcoronavirus-china-us-trade-relations/. 24. Cited in Fareed Zakaria, “America’s excessive reliance on sanctions will come back to haunt it,” Washington Post, August 27, 2020, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/americas-excess ive-reliance-on-sanctions-will-come-back-to-haunt-it/2020/08/27/e73 a9004-e89c-11ea-970a-64c73a1c2392_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_ week_in_ideas&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_ ideas. 25. “Global supply chains,” Special Report, The Economist, July 13, 2019, p. 3. 26. Ibid, pp.4-7. 27. “A new kind of cold war,” p. 4. 28. Cited in Peter S. Goodman, “Global Trade Is Deteriorating Fast, Sapping the World’s Economy,” New York Times, October 1, 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/2019/10/01/business/wto-global-trade.html?nl=todays headlines&emc=edit_th_191002?campaign_id=2&instance_id=12641& segment_id=17504&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea& regi_id=43321681002. 29. “Slowbalisation,” The Economist, January 26, 2019, p. 9. 30. “The global list,” The Economist, January 26, 2019, p. 20. 31. “Making it in America,” The Economist, February 9, 2019, p. 53.

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32. Alan Beattie, “Britain’s annual Brexit capitulation draws nigh,” Financial Times, December 17, 2020. 33. “Slowbalisation,” The Economist, January 26, 2019, p. 9. 34. “The global list,” p. 20. 35. Ibid, p. 21. 36. Bradley Jones, “Americans are generally positive about free trade agreements, more critical of tariff increases,” Pew Research Center, May 10, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/10/americansare-generally-positive-about-free-trade-agreements-more-critical-of-tariffincreases/?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 37. Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, “Record Number of Americans Endorse Benefits of Trade,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 27, 2018, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/record-num ber-americans-endorse-benefits-trade?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 38. “American Consumers Expect to Bear Costs of China Tariffs,” Monmouth University Polling Institute, May 28, 2019, https://www.monmouth. edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_052819/. 39. Bello, “The benefits of equidistance,” The Economist, July 27, 2019, p. 30. 40. Cited in Shasta Darlington, “E.U. and Four Latin American Nations Reach a Trade Deal,” New York Times, June 28, 2019, https://www.nyt imes.com/2019/06/28/world/americas/eu-four-latin-american-nationstrade-deal.html. 41. “Counter-flow,” The Economist, July 6, 2019, p. 10. The agreement was endangered by a spat between Germany and Norway, on the one hand, and Brazil regarding President Jair Bolsonaro’s unwillingness to prove funding to protect Brazil’s rainforest. 42. “Weapons of mass disruption,” The Economist, June 8, 2019, p. 13. 43. Pankaj Mishra, “The Religion of Whiteness Becomes a Suicide Cult,” New York Times, August 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 08/30/opinion/race-politics-whiteness.html?emc=edit_th_180831&nl= todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680831. 44. Cited in Felicia Sonmez, “George W. Bush: ‘May we never forget that immigration is a blessing and strength’,” Washington Post, March 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/george-w-bushmay-we-never-forget-that-immigration-is-a-blessing-and-a-strength/ 2019/03/18/9b5aaf6a-49b1-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html? utm_term=.774d8bf270c7&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 45. Ganan Ganesh, “Donald Trump lacks appeal in a low-immigration world,” Financial Times, October 14, 2020, https://app.ft.com/content/07d 9509c-e284-44e8-b397-38428f9a9030. 46. Anonymous, “I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration,” New York Times, September 5, 2018. “Anonymous” turned out

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47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52. 53. 54.

55.

56. 57.

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to be Miles Taylor, a lifelong Republican and a former top official at the Department of Homeland Security. Cited in Aaron Blake, “One GOP senator’s extraordinarily dim assessment of the Trump administration,” Washington Post, October 4, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/04/senbob-corkers-extraordinarily-dim-portrayal-of-the-trump-administration/? utm_term=.395d06809704. Cited in Griff Witte and Isaac Stanley-Becker, “’A morning of alarm’: Mattis departure sends shock waves abroad,” Washington Post, December 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/12/21/mat tis-departure-sends-shock-waves-abroad-allies-question-us-approach-glo bal-crises/?utm_term=.2263bcf1a02d&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. “Read Jim Mattis’s Letter to Trump: Full Text,” December 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/letterjim-mattis-trump.html. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “Biden Faces Early Test With Immigrations and Homeland Security After Trump,” New York Times, November 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/us/politics/bidenimmigration-homeland-security.html., Stephen Sestanovich, “The Brilliant Incoherence of Trump’s Foreign Policy,” The Atlantic, May 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/mag azine/archive/2017/05/the-brilliant-incoherence-of-trumps-foreign-pol icy/521430/. Luce, The Retreat of Western Liberalism, p. 194. Anonymous, “I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration.” Philippe Legrain, “The Coronavirus Is Killing Globalization as We Know It,” Foreign Policy, March 12, 2020, https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/03/12/coronavirus-killing-globalization-nationalism-protec tionism-trump/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_cam paign=20224&utm_term=Editor#39;s%20Picks%20OC&?tpcc=20224. “Down but not out? Globalisation and the threat of Covid-19,” A report by The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020, https://pages.eiu.com/ rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Impact%20of%20Covid-19%20on%20FDI% 20and%20Globalisation%20V2.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTWpabE5tSmtaV 0kxTUdNeiIsInQiOiI2RDRHN0psd0pidEtTcStxUkI0NWJqa21sODN oSnhUS1ZpOHRaVkNmZFpnYW43UFVaM3dIUk1nK3QrbG9VWUc 4cVNuVVkwV2M3RlhGOUg3d3g0am9UamtPbW41S1wvT3RIK2Y 4cGNWbGMzRzNtb1NadmprSVh1QkQ3c3lWRzNWbVMifQ%3D%3D, p. 4. Friedman, “The United Kingdom Has Gone Mad.” Italics in original. Luce, The Retreat of Western Liberalism, p. 102.

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58. Cited in Philip Bump, “Nikki Haley says the U.S. is now respected.’ Is it?” Washington Post, October 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/politics/2018/10/09/nikki-haley-says-us-is-now-respected-is-it/? noredirect=on&utm_term=.b73d86673b36. 59. Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, Janell Fetterole and Shannon Schumacher, “Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 8, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/01/08/trump-ratings-rem ain-low-around-globe-while-views-of-u-s-stay-mostly-favorable/. See also Adam Taylor, “Global confidence in Trump lower than for China’s Xi, poll shows,” Washington Post, October 1, 2018, https://www.was hingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/01/global-confidence-trump-lowerthan-chinas-xi-poll-shows/?utm_term=.90cbcdb29dber 68&wpisrc = nl_todayworld&wpmm = 1, and “U.S. Image Slides As Trump Rated Lower Than Putin, Xi In Global Poll,” RFE/RL, October 2, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-image-slides-trump-rated-lower-than-putinxi-global-poll-pew-research/29520545.html. 60. Adam Taylor, “Global views of U.S. plunge to new lows amid pandemic, poll finds,” Washington Post, September 15, 2920, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/world/2020/09/15/global-views-united-states-trumpcoronavirus-pew-poll/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium= email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most. 61. Cited in Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, “Rift Between Trump and Europe Is Now Open and Angry,” New York Times, February 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/world/eur ope/trump-international-relations-munich.html. 62. Kori Schake, Jim Mattis, Jim Ellis, and Joe Felter, “Defense in Depth,” Foreign Affairs, November 23, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/2020-11-23/defense-depth?utm_campaign=wp_ the_daily_202&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_ daily202. 63. Cited in Matt Viser, “After long, bitter delay, Biden transition kicks into gear,” Washington Post, November 24, 2020, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/politics/biden-transition-trump/2020/11/24/26b8e4ba2e7a-11eb-bae0-50bb17126614_story.html. 64. Emily Tamkin, “More than 8 in10 Americans support NATO, study finds,” Washington Post, April 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/2019/04/03/more-than-americans-support-nato-studyfinds/?utm_term=.a9d92ca859e7&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1. 65. Smeltz, et al., “America Engaged.” 66. James Stavridis, “Why NATO Is Essential for World Peace, According to Its Former Commander,” Time. April 4, 2019, https://time.com/556 4171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/.

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67. Josep Borrell, “How to Kick-Start a New Trans-Atlantic Era,” Foreign Policy, December 10, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/10/ how-to-kick-start-a-new-trans-atlantic-era/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_ medium=email&utm_campaign=28306&utm_term=Editors%20Picks% 20OC&?tpcc=28306. 68. Smeltz, et al., “America Engaged,” 69. Scott Clement and Dan Balz, “Poll: AmeriTrumpcans worry U.S. is losing allies, support for global engagement rises,” Washington Pose, October 2, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-americans-worryus-is-losing-allies-support-for-global-engagement-rises/2018/10/01/e87 b3f22-c571-11e8-b2b5-79270f9cce17_story.html?utm_term=.f91a27edc 2d4&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1. 70. Jonathan Monten, et al., “Americans Want to Engage the World,” Foreign Affairs, November 3, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/uni ted-states/2020-11-03/americans-want-engage-world. 71. Cited in Bill Gertz, “Trump’s national security adviser lays out stinging critique of threat posed by China,” The Washington Times, June 24, 2020, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/24/rob ert-obrien-lays-out-stinging-critique-of-threat/. 72. Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, “Why Populists Want a Multipolar World,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2020/04/25/populists-multipolar-world-russia-china/?utm_source=Pos tUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=21202&utm_term=Editors% 20Picks%20OC&. 73. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, “End minority rule,” New York Times, October 23, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/ opinion/sunday/disenfranchisement-democracy-minority-rule.html?utm_ campaign=wp_todays_worldview&utm_medium=email&utm_source=new sletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld. 74. Colbert I. King, “Fourteen days that will test our democracy,” Washington Post, January 1, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fou rteen-days-that-will-test-our-democracy/2020/12/31/7a59d6d6-4b9611eb-a9f4-0e668b9772ba_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_post_most& utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&cartaurl=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F2e0ce33% 2F5ff0a45e9d2fda0efb9c5b3f%2F596b51d8ae7e8a44e7d58086%2F17% 2F66%2F5ff0a45e9d2fda0efb9c5b3f. 75. Max Fisher, “After a Rocky 2018, Populism Is Down but Far From Out in the West,” New York Times, January 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/01/05/world/europe/populism-voters-global.html?emc= edit_th_190106&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321680106. 76. Cited in Katrin Bennhold, “’Sadness’ and Disbelief From a World Missing American Leadership,” New York Times, April 23, 2020, https://www.

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79.

80. 81. 82.

83.

84.

85.

86. 87.

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nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/europe/coronavirus-american-except ionalism.html?smid=em-share. Haass, A World in Disarray, p.11. Hillary Clinton, “Hillary’s Farewell Speech: Read the Transcript,” Daily Beast, updated July 12, 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/hillarys-far ewell-speech-read-the-transcript. Sebastian Buckup, “Shaping global architecture in an era of fortresses and walls,” Quartz, January 21, 2019, https://qz.com/1527582/shapingglobal-architecture-in-an-era-of-fortresses-and-walls/. Richard Haass, “World Order 2.0,” Foreign Affairs 96:1 (January/February 2017), pp. 7, 9. Buckup, “Shaping global architecture in an era of fortresses and walls.” Fareed Zacharia, “We have a bleak view of modern life. But the world is making real progress,” Washington Post, January 31, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-have-a-bleak-view-of-modern-life-butthe-world-is-making-real-progress/2019/01/31/6ee30432-25a8-11e9ad53-824486280311_story.html?utm_term=.5824923b311b&wpisrc=nl_ ideas&wpmm=1. Anne Applebaum, “Non-Americans, be warned: There will be no return to normal after Trump,” Washington Post, August 2, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/non-americans-be-war ned-there-will-be-no-return-to-normal-after-trump/2019/08/02/a3b 83784-b551-11e9-8f6c-7828e68cb15f_story.html?utm_term=.b49385 0180dd&wpisrc=nl_ideas&wpmm=1. Cited in James Hohmann. “Election pits Trump versus the experts,” Washington Post, November 3, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/2020/11/03/daily-202-election-pits-trump-vs-experts/. Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Continues Interfering in Election to Try to Help Trump, Intelligence Says,” New York Times, August 8, 2020, https:// www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/us/politics/russia-china-trump-bidenelection-interference.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20200808&ins tance_id=21107&nl=todaysheadlines®i_id=4332168&segment_id= 35593&user_id=318a8b2e197d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea. Cited in Draper, “Unwanted Truths Inside Trump’s Battles With U.S. Intelligence Agencies.” Thomas Friedman, “Time for G.O.P. to Threaten to Fire Trump,” New York Times, December 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/ 24/opinion/impeach-fire-president-trump.html?emc=edit_th_181225& nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=43321681225. Italics in original. Cited in Mark Landler, “Biden Victory Brings Sighs of Relief Overseas, New York Times, updated November 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/11/07/world/americas/biden-international-reaction.html? campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20201108&instance_id=23920&nl=todays

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headlines®i_id=4332168&segment_id=43950&user_id=318a8b2e1 97d8de30abd1bb02c4382ea. 89. James Traub, “Joe Biden Is Actually Listening,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/14/joe-biden-diplom acy-skepticism-actually-listening/. Italics added.

Questions Multiple Choice 1. Richard Haass concluded that globalization had created which of the following among sovereign states? a. Animosity b.Deep interdependence c. Independence d. Unstructured chaos 2. How did a globalized world impact the illiberal states such as China and Russia that were eager to join the WTO? a. Ravaged their economy b. Increased unemployment c. Stagnated their economy d. Benefitted them 3. Which of the following is a Chinese initiative that depends on extending infrastructure, trade, and even tourism that reduce impediments to the movement of goods and people? a. Belt and Road b. Free Trade c. NAFTA d. Trade Surpluses Initiative 4. Generally, illiberal societies have _______ a stake in curbing climate changes as liberal societies and have _______ the Paris accords as well as the multilateral Iran nuclear deal and efforts to denuclearize North Korea? a. Less of, opposed b. More of, supported c. As much of, supported

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d. Less of, supported 5. Donald Trump is which of the following? a. Realist b. Liberalist c. Constructionist d. None of the above 6. John Bolton claimed he persuaded Trump not to leave which organization? a. United Nations b. North Atlantic Treaty Organization c. World Trade Organization d. World Health Organization 7. France and Germany undertook an initiative “to create a network of countries ready to support multilateralism and cooperate, including to fight inequality, tackle climate change and address the consequences of new technologies” called what? a. Europe Alone b. Bilateralism Union c. Alliance for Multilateralism d. League for Trade 8. The pandemic, of course, had political implications for populism. Which of these is not one of three of the four largest democracies run by illiberal populists that rank one, two, and three in deaths from the coronavirus.? a. German b. United States c. Brazil d. U.K. 9. The growing economic interdependence between America and China began to unravel after China joined which institutional core of economic globalization? a. WHO b. NATO c. WTO

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d. None of the above 10. The demand for economic efficiency has made the global economy more what? a. Fragile b. Flexible c. Rigid d. Inefficient 11. U.S. manufacturing is undergoing a revival, especially among firms using advanced techniques of what other types of firms? a. Large firms b. Inflexible firms c. Agile and smaller d. Large and porous 12. Although populism has spread across the European Union, the EU concluded the which major free trade agreement with Canada that came into force in 2017? a. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) b. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) c. Europe Canada Trade Agreement (ECTA) d. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 13. Which of the following has slowed partly in consequence to violations by major states, including Trump’s America, of freetrade norms and U.S.-Chinese geopolitical rivalry in high-tech industries? a. Political Globalization b. Internet usage c. Spread of Nationalist-populism d. Economic Globalization 14. The socio-cultural dimension of globalization is declining owing to which of the following? a. Racism b. Xenophobia c. Social Media

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d. Both a and b 15. In Europe, only in what country did a bare majority of 51 percent (largely right-wingers) have confidence in Trump? a. Poland b. Italy c. Germany d. Austria 16. To avoid their depending on a single great power, populists seek a which of the following? a. Unipolar World b. Bipolar World c. Multipolar World d. None of the Above 17. A future U.S. administration might seek to restore elements of the liberal order but would find it difficult to do, especially given the popularity of nationalist-populism in which U.S. Party? a. Green Party b. Libertarian Party c. Republican Party d. Democratic Party 18. President Trump tweeted falsely that which American institution was impeding vaccines and treatment research and blaming everyone but himself for America’s dolorous performance? a. Federal Bureau for Invetigations b. Food and Drug Administration c. Department of Homeland Security d. Department of the Interior 19. After it had become clear that President Trump had tried to force Ukraine to smear former Vice President Joe Biden to aid his reelection in 2020, which of the following happened? a. President Trump promised not to run for reelection b. President Trump was removed from office c. President Trump resigned from office d. The U.S. house impeached President Trump

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20. In his reelection campaign, Trump shifted his divisive hatred from immigrants to which of the following which he called responsible for “American carnage.” a. White supremacist b. Antiracist protesters and liberals c. Working Class d. Republicans True or False 1. True or False? The several dimensions of globalization are all linked, and therefore must move in the same direction. False, though linked, the several dimensions of globalization need not move in the same direction 2. True or False? Nationalist-populism itself has been globalized, and the technologies that foster globalization also foster nationalistpopulism. True 3. True or False? The coronavirus dramatically decreased the demand for some goods at the same time supply remained unimpacted. False, it dramatically increased the demand for some goods at the same time as it damaged supply. 4. True or False? Globalization has increased the size of informal economies in developing countries that rely on distribution chains and reduced tax receipts and regulatory enforcement. True 5. True or False? Polls suggest that Americans have lost faith in multilateral institutions and agreements. False, polls suggest the opposite. For example, a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs said most Americans prefer engagement and shared leadership in world affairs.

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6. True or False? The WTO prediction for growth in trade of merchandise in 2019 was the highest since 2009 at the height of the Great Recession. False, it was the lowest. 7. True or False? Banks were less willing to finance trade owing to the pain of the Great Recession in 2008; the rate of return from multinational investment plummeted; and local firms were increasingly capable of competing with transnational corporations.True or False? Banks were less willing to finance trade owing to the pain of the Great Recession in 2008; the rate of return from multinational investment plummeted; and local firms were increasingly capable of competing with transnational corporations. True 8. True or False? In May 2018, a Pew poll found that 56 percent of respondents thought “free trade” a good thing for the U.S. True 9. True or False? Beijing has allowed foreign investors to acquire a greater share in local firms, and foreign investment in China’s stock and bond markets has fallen. False, foreign investment has soared. 10. True or False? In his resignation letter, now former Secretary of Defense James Mattis made clear his concern that Trump did not fully recognize the danger posed by Russia and China and the president’s opposition to the liberal global order. True 11. True or False? A major danger to globalization was the spread of the invisible global coronavirus. True 12. True or False? Also, a 2020 Pew poll revealed that globally Trump, unlike his predecessor, was more popular than other leaders of major powers – Germany’s Angela Merkel, France’s Emmanuel Macron, and even China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

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False, unlike his predecessor he was more unpopular 13. True or False? Despite Trump’s repeated criticisms of allies for not paying their “fair share,” one poll found that 83 percent of Americans supported NATO, including large majorities of both Republicans and Democrats. True 14. True or False? National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien called Washington’s miscalculation of China’s political trajectory the “greatest failure of American foreign policy since the 1930s.” True 15. True or False? Populist politicians who opposed immigration, were wary about multinationalism, and favored economic protectionism fell in popularity places like Italy, Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere. False, they remained popular 16. True or False? Great Britain, too, had nationalist-populists, especially among those who support Brexit. True 17. True or False? As the 2020 U.S. presidential election neared, America’s intelligence community concluded that Russia would not be inferring in the U.S. presidential election. False, they concluded that Russia sought to aid Trump and defeat Joe Biden by smearing Biden and spreading misinformation using bots and social media to reach American voters 18. True or False? China, though less of a threat, appeared to meddle against President Trump in the lead up to the 2020 presidential election. True 19. True or False? Two-thirds of Americans opposed maintaining or increasing U.S. commitments to NATO and providing U.S. troops to defend allies such as South Korea and Japan. False, two-thirds supported it

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20. True or False? Supply chains of transnational corporations, a feature of economic globalization, were eroding, and global trade declined after 2017. True Short Answer What were the political crises and resulting political instability in America and Great Britain a reflection of? They reflected the moribund condition of the leading advocates of the liberal order and perhaps a prelude to the demise of that order? What did James Traub claim populist leaders deny COVID-19 and similarly climate change? First, because acknowledging a force beyond their control might break the spell of omniscience in which they have bound their followers; and second, because deference to science and logic undermines the emotional sources of their appeal. Give an example of a counter-reaction to populist-authoritarianism? The election of Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul and a liberal foe of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, the defeat of Greece’s left-wing populists, the vibrancy of Taiwan’s democracy was encouraging. In eastern Europe, the electoral victory of a foe of Viktor Orban ˙ as mayor of Budapest, and, in Poland, the Law and Justice (PIS) party’s loss of a majority in the country’s upper house of parliament suggested that populism may have begun to ebb. In addition, the massive demonstrations in Hong Kong in support of democracy and opposition to Chinese interference in the city, and mass prodemocracy protests in Moscow, all in mid-2019, may be harbingers of a reaction to authoritarianism and populism. Why and how have global supply chains changed? Supply chains changed owing to technology and rivalry in supply-chain security, the growing role of services instead

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of manufacturing, and political factors such as the SinoAmerican geopolitical rivalry and Brexit. Supply chains were also becoming more regional than global, for example, Southeast Asia. Provide a case in which the impact of Trump’s violent and inflammatory rhetoric was revealed. It was revealed after the arrest of a passionate pro-Trump supporter who had sent bombs to Trump’s political foes in 2018, his refusal to criticize the Confederate flag and divisive advocacy of violence to end protests against racial inequality in 2020, and the repeated use of Trump’s language by violent white supremacists. How did the coronavirus impact the state of globalization? It disrupted global supply chains, reduced foreign direct investment, and impeded the movement of people. Focusing on the economic dimension of globalization, The Economist concluded that the pandemic caused a decline in globalization but viewed this as temporary and likely to lead to positive changes that may make “existing systems work better” like “diversifying supply chains away from a single country and instead throughout a region. Why is future of the liberal global order is darker than the future of globalization? The world no longer has a benevolent U.S. hegemon. The world has become increasingly multipolar, and hegemonic war with China and/or Russia is a possibility. Neither of America’s rivals would defend the liberal order. However, both would support an illiberal global order and some of the elements of globalization, and it is difficult to imagine a peaceful resumption of U.S. hegemony. In what ways has President Trump showed a willingness to break the rules regarding the U.S. election?

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Suggesting that the 2020 U.S. election be delayed, admitting that he sought to limit the U.S. Postal Service to reduce writein ballots, and refusing to say that he would accept the outcome of the election, along with his lies in general. Fareed Zacharia takes a long view of globalization, and, despite growing inequality, pointed out what? He pointed out how a globalized and liberal world continued to make progress. “Even in the West, it is easy to take for granted the astounding progress. We live longer, the air and water are cleaner, crime has plunged, and information and communication are virtually free. Why did Russia meddle to get Trump elected? Russian leaders probably assess that chances to improve relations with the U.S. will diminish under a different U.S. president. Essay Questions 1. How has social media like Facebook and Twitter changed the way information is spread and its impact? 2. What implication has the coronavirus pandemic had for globalization and populism? 3. How and why has the growing economic interdependence between the U.S. and China begun to unravel? 4. Will the global liberal order remain strong in the near future? 5. Will support nationalist-populism continue to increase globally?

Index

A Abbas, Mahmoud, 161, 296 Abe, Shinzo, 319 Abhazia, 120 Abraham Accords, 296 Abrams, Elliot, 65 Absolute decline, 93 Acheson, Dean, 476 Advanced Persistent Threat 10, 110 Affirmative Globals, 52 Affirmative Locals, 52 Afghanistan, 115, 117, 154, 420, 422 in a “good” war, 118 wars in, 90 Africa, 370, 422 Africans, 10 African Union, 366 Age of entropy, 91 Age of order, 91 Age of the elected despot, 60 Aging populations, 416 Agnew, John, x, 6, 47 Agreement in principle, 374 Agreements, 4

Agricultural exports, 387 Agricultural Midwest, 382 Agricultural trade, 382 Airbus, 67 Alaska, 327 al-Assad, Bashar, 65, 118, 119, 418 Al-Assad regime (Syria), 294 Alawite Muslims, 418 Alba, 284 Al-Bagdadi, Abu Bakr, 118 Alibaba, 96 Alien cultures, 420 Ali Khamenei, 122 Allegations of genocide, 291 Allen, John R., 69 Alliance for American Manufacturing, 162 All-India National Register of Citizens, 292 Allison, Graham, 30, 93 Al-Qaddafi, Muammar, 118 Al-Qaeda, 118, 119 Alternative for Germany (AfD), 236, 421, 422

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Ferguson, Populism and Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72033-9

497

498

INDEX

Aluminum imports, tariffs on, 385 Amal, 294 Amazon, 51, 364 America, 416 Chinese exports to, 98 Chinese investment in, 386 defense authorization bill, 147 Defense Department, 106 Domestic Economic Consequences, 384 “first island chain”, 108 Indo-Pacific Command, 105 intelligence community, 150 Midwest “rust belt”, 104 national interests, 479 National Security Council, 99 Pacific Command, 106 relations between Israel, 119 “rust belt”, 190 trade deficit with China, 98 “unwelcoming”, 411. See also United States (U.S.) ‘America First’ agenda, 473 “America first” trade policy, 364 America’s election Mueller’s investigation of Russian meddling in, 189 America’s International Trade Commission, 377 America’s Justice Department, 283 America first, 65 American carnage, 477 American century, 94 American Chamber of Commerce (Beijing), 368 American Civil Liberties Union, 50, 429 American consumers, 370 American diplomacy, 28 American era passing of, 92 American exceptionalism, 64

American hegemon, 17 American Party, 408 American revolution, 17 American Soybean Association, 386, 387 Anarchic world, 94 Annex settlements, 295 Annual Conservative conference, 199 Annual patent applications, 97 Anti-American, 281 Anti-dumping rules, 377 Anti-elitist “Jacksonians”, 49 Antiestablishment politicians, 54 Antifa, 50 Anti-globalization sentiments, 21, 56 Anti-immigration sentiment, 408 Anti-populists, 237 Anti-populist sentiment, 258 Anti-Sandinista Contras, 284 Anti-Semitic, 62 Anti-Semitism, 193, 198, 242 Antitrust actions, 466 Appeals Court, 410 Apple, 112, 365, 385, 386, 415 Applebaum, Anne, 28, 68, 191, 201, 202, 477 Arab-Israeli hostility, 417 Arab Spring, 6, 119, 295 Arab world export democracy to, 420 Araud, Gérard, 154 Arctic Council, 326 Arctic Ocean, 100 Ardern, Jacinda, 475 Argentina, 20, 277, 380, 467 Argentine labor confederation, 278 Armenia, 246, 251 Armenian-Azeri conflict, 120 Arms races, 92 Arms sales, 105 Arpaio, Joe, 147 Arreaza, Jorge, 282

INDEX

Arron Banks, 191 Article 50, of the EU treaty, 195 Article 5 of the NATO treaty, 251, 321 Article 7 of the EU Treaty, 244 Artificial intelligence (AI), 8, 365 ASEAN, 12 Ash, Timothy Garton, 143, 476 Asia, x, 117, 288 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 479 Asian Development Bank, 101 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 13, 99, 101 Assange, Julian, 63, 189, 284 Association Agreement, 252 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 325 Asylum-seekers, 410–413, 418, 423–426, 430, 432, 434 Athens, 93 port of, 99 Atlanta, 327 Australia, vi, 12, 102, 106, 409, 411, 475 Australian dollar, 19 Austria, 190, 234, 420, 422, 425 Authoritarian, vi Authoritarianism, vii, x, 22, 59, 123, 474 spread of, v Authoritarian leaders, 59, 144, 318 Authoritarian populism, x, 143, 233 Authoritarian populists, 474 Automation, 8, 66 Avian influenza, 3 Aviation Industry Corporation, 384 Axis of Adults, 164 Aymara ethnicity, 281 Ayodhya, 292

499

B Babis, Andrej, 240 Backstop provision, 192 Baer, Daniel, 64 Bagehot, 190 Bahrain, 161, 296 Balance of power, 94 Baldwin, James, 468 Balkans, 425 Baltimore, 58 Balz, Dan, 473 Banaji, Shakuntala, 293 Bangladesh, 104, 291, 386 Bank of America, 195 Bannon, Stephen K., 24, 95, 153, 156, 165, 232, 243, 287 Barnier, Michel, 195 Barr, William P., 165, 283, 435 Barry, Ellen, 460 Batista, Fulgencio, 280 Bavaria, 421 Bayanihan Act (Republic Act No. 11469), 290 “Beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, 325 Beinart, Peter, 366 Belarus, 166, 251 Belgium, 319, 423 Belief in decline, 94 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 13, 98 Benelux countries, 232 Benghazi, 118 Bergsten, C. Fred, 96 Beschloss, Michael, 148 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 291, 292 Biden, Joe, vi, 10, 99, 122, 148, 161, 206, 246, 322, 334, 341, 380, 431, 440, 470, 472–474, 478, 479 administration, 475 Big Pharma, 378 Bilateral deals vs. multilateral deals, 67

500

INDEX

Bilateralism, 10, 341 Bilateral strategy, 315 Bilateral trade deal, 316 Bildt, Carl, 329 Bilton, Nick, 149 Bin Laden, Osama, 190 death of, 118 Bin Salman, Mohammed, 145, 294, 330 Birrell, Ian, 200 Birth rates, 410 Birth tourism, 409 Black Death, 16 Blackmon, Douglas A., 51 Black people, 468 Black September terrorists, 198 Blacks Lives Matter, 475 Blair, Dennis, 111 Blair, Tony, 53, 66, 70 Blinken, Anthony, 155 Bloomberg, Michael, 327 Blue-collar workers, 54, 470 Blumental, Dan, 113 BMW, 386 Boeing, 67 Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), 280 Bolivarianism, 280, 284 Bolivarianism Elsewhere, 283 Bolivarian Revolution, 280 Bolívar, Simón, 280 Bolivia, 280, 282 Bolsonaro’s Bannon, 287 Bolsonaro, Flávio, 287 Bolsonaro, Jair, x, 54, 277, 285–287, 463, 478 Bolton, John R., 145, 154, 160, 163, 164, 318, 338 Booth, William, 191 Border and Protections Agents, 434 Border checkpoints, 411 Border Patrol Tactical Unit, 414

Border walls, 148, 468 Borrell, Josep, 473 Bots, 6 “Boundary-eroding” trends and events, 5 “Boundary-strengthening” trends and events, 5 Brazil, 17, 20, 277, 380, 411, 426, 467, 475 Superior Electoral Court, 285 Supreme Court, 285 Brennan, John, 335 Bretton Woods institutions, 18 Brexit, x, 13, 212, 241, 315, 380, 460, 465, 467, 475 debate, 187 Leavers’ arguments for, 196 political divisions, 190 political turmoil and, 197 Brexiteers, 10, 189, 190 criticisms of the EU, 196 Brexit means Brexit, 197 Brexit Party, 188 Brexit referendum, 189, 196 Britain, 366 Britain’s Tories, 53 British democracy, 211 British hegemony, 17 British Parliament, 460 British politics, 192 British pound sterling, 19 British waters fishing in, 210 Broadband, 471 Brookings Institution, 333 Brooks, Arthur C., 56 Brooks, David, 256 Brose, Christian, 105 Browder, Bill, 159 Brown, Jerry, 327 Brussels, 423 Buckup, Sebastian, 476, 477

INDEX

Budapest, 463 Buddhist, 59, 289 majority, 291 Bulgaria, 120 Bulgarians, 425 Bullshitter, 149 Bump, Philip, 411 Buoy Barrier System, 436 Burden-sharing, 322 Bureaucratic harassment, 367 Burleigh, 113 Burleigh, Michael, 27, 50, 113 Burns, William J., 117, 156 Buruma, Ian, 55 Bush, George W., 27, 49, 116, 117, 468 administration, 114 administration’s unilateralism, 90 Buzan, Barry, 94

C Cable television, 6 California, 327, 416, 427, 429 Cambodia, 104 Cameron, David, 187, 191 Cámpora, Héctor José, 279 Canada, 8, 255, 376, 377, 384, 410–412, 467, 471 Meng Wanzhou, arrest of, 366 Canadian dairy industry, 377 Canadian dollar, 19 Capabilities, 94, 95 Capital controls, 103 Capital flows, 56 Capital-intensive industries, 380 Capital investment, 57 Capital markets, 103 Caracas, 282 Carbon emissions, 326 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 286 Career Ministers, 156

501

Carlson, Tucker, 148 Carnegie Endowment, 105 Carney, Jay, 110 Carousel retaliation, 382 Carvalho, Olavo de, 287 Casino capitalism, 57 Castro, Fidel, 280 Catholic Church, 278 Catholic nationalists, 192 Catholics, 408 Cato Institute, 370 Caucasian migrants, 408 CDU-CSU alliance, 237 Cellphones, 385 Center for a New American Security, 232, 378 Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 152 Central America caravans from, 413 Central American migrants, 413 Central Asia, 100 Central European University, 241, 242 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 48, 145, 149, 152–154, 158, 336 Centre for European Reform, 332 Chain migration, 409 Chain of command, 154 Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 154 Channel Tunnel, 197 Chaotic decision-making style, 376 Charlottesville, Virginia, 63, 159 march in, 51 Chávez, Hugh, 280–283 Cheap capital, 367 Cheney, Dick, 146, 319 Chequers, 199, 200 Chernyshev, Boris, 159 Chicago, 58 Chimerica, 103, 375

502

INDEX

China, vi, 4, 66, 67, 105, 117, 122, 283, 288, 289, 316, 380, 385, 410, 416, 460, 469, 478 as world’s largest foreign investor, 102 consumerism in, 363 economic rise, 96 first aircraft carrier, 108 growing middle class, 369 INF missiles, 121 intellectual property, theft of, 365 military Equipment Development Department, 368 military rise, 104 rise of, x, 16 rising, 95, 476 rural, 98 silk road, 16 state subsidies, 367 submarine technology, 108 ten-dash-line claims, 109 trade war, reaction to, 368 trade war with, 109, 162, 364, 365 transfer technology to, 374 U.S. exports to, 98 “wolf warrior” behavior, 113 China Development Bank, 99 China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC), 102 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 101 Chinese government subsidies for state enterprises, 375 subsidies to home industries, 371 Chinese hackers, 110 Chinese investment, 99 Chinese-manufactured infrastructure, 366 Chinese Ministry of State Security, 110 Chinese minorities, 59 Chinese renminbi, 19

Chinese spying and undermine national security, 366 Chinese state banks, 367 Chinese students overseas, 98 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 236, 257, 421 Christian Europe, 420, 425 Christian refugees, 407 Christian Social Union (CSU), 421, 422 Christie, Chris, 29 Chua, Amy, 408, 412 Churchill, Winston, 188, 460 Church World Service, 412 Citgo Petroleum Corp, 283 Citizenship, 409, 419 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), 292 Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 411, 439 Civility, 470 Civil War, 60 Clapper, James, 111, 159, 335 Clash of civilizations, 407 Clean energy, 326 Clement, Scott, 473 Climate change, 147, 326, 459, 476 Clinton, Bill, 91, 116, 339, 364 administration, 336 Clinton, Hillary, 24, 63, 66, 158, 476 Coats, Dan, 61, 153, 157, 159 Coats, Daniel, 153, 335, 336 Coca-Cola, 385 Cohen, Eliot A., 25, 49, 150 Cohen, Michael, 156 Cohn, Gary, 375 Cold War, v, 120 in Norway, 323 liberal order, creating, 30 Colgan, Jeff D., 53 Collective goods, 55 Collective security, 4

INDEX

Colmenares Gutiérrez, Leopoldo E., 281 Colombia, 426 Comey, James, 152 Comment Crew, 110 Commercial aircraft, 97 Commercial espionage-for-profit theft, 111 Commercial interest rates, 100 Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, 111 “Common sense”, usage of, 47 Common thread, of all movements, 47 Communism, v Communist rule, 97 Communists, 280 Communitarian socialism, 281 Comparative advantage, 363 Compounding complexity, 91 Comprehensive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP), 325 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 467 Computer microchips, 97 Concert of Europe, 71 Confucius Institutes, 98 Congress, 67, 152, 322, 324, 376, 377, 479 Congress of Vienna, 71 Connelly, Tony, 202 ConocoPhilips, 281 Conservative Party, 48, 188, 193, 197, 200 Conservatives, 197, 199 Conspiracy theories, 148 Constantinople, 16 Constitution, vi, 144, 154, 335, 429 preserve, protect, and defend, 149 Constitutional crisis, 204 Constitutional democracy, 475

503

Constitutional restraints, 60 Conte, Giuseppe, 238, 422 Continental Europe, x Convention Against Torture, 431 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 19 Cooley, Alexander, 473 Corbyn, Jeremy, 193, 194, 197, 198, 207 Corker, Bob, 469 Coronabonds, 258 Coronavirus, 148, 371, 375, 415, 438, 465, 470 “recovery fund”, 258 Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 8 Coronavirus epidemic, 290 Corporate cross-border investment, 389 Corporate executives compensation for, 57 Corporate health, 104 Corporatism, 278 Correa, Rafael, 280, 284 Cosmopolitan globalization, 5 Cosmopolitism, 52 “Cost Plus 50” idea, 319 Costa Rica, 426 Council, 334 Council for International Business, 371 Countervailing duties, 377 Covax, 318 COVID-19, 151, 152, 155, 463 Creator of the Ten Commandments, 144 Credible fear, 413 Creeping extraterritoriality, 329 Crimea annexation of, 93, 120, 251 Crime of aggression, 20 Crimson Contagion, 152

504

INDEX

Critical infrastructure, 465 Critical testers, 59 Criticism of alliances, 146 Croatia, 422 Cross-border personal contacts, 407 Crusius, Patrick, 68 Cuba, 280, 282, 283 Cultural dilution, 424 Cultural diversity, 61 Cultural entity, 407 Cultural genocide, 289 Cultural liberalism, 474 Cultural proximity, 407 Cultural purity, 407 Culture, 59 Cummings, Elijah E., 433 Currency manipulation, 103, 362 Currency manipulator, 373 Customs partnership, 201 Customs union, 191, 192, 197, 198, 201 Cyber-capabilities, 110 Cyber countermeasures, 112 Cyber-espionage, 6, 110, 112, 367, 370, 375, 465 Cyber-revolution, 6 Cyberspace, 459 Cyber-technologies, 5 Cyber working group, 112 Cyprus, 99, 247 Czech Republic, 99, 120, 239, 240, 424

D Daalder, Ivo H., 28, 29, 123, 315, 369 da Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula, 284 Data exchanges, 389 Davidson, Philip, 109 Davis, David, 199 Debt-trap diplomacy, 100

Decentered globalism, 94 Declaration of Independence, 71 Declining unions, 57 Deepfakes, 6 Deep state, 60, 155, 157, 211 Defense budgets, 320 Defense expenditures, 319 Defense spending, 104, 320 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), 410 Dell, 385 Demagoguery, 278, 408, 412 Demagogues, 28, 60 Democracy, v, vii, 5, 17, 30, 59, 92, 461, 475 majoritarian view of, 60 nationalist-populism’s threat, 59 promotion, 122 threats to, 24, 59 threat to, 156 Democratic deficit, 60 Democratic norms, 92 Democratic Party protectionists and labor unions, 12 Democratic reformism, 290 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 197, 200 Democratic values, 23 Democrats, 378, 408, 469, 472, 479 Demographic change, 408 Demographic factors, 416 Demographic transformation, 412 Demolition man, 146 Demonstrators, 143 Denaturalization, 468 Deng Xiaoping, 95–97 Denmark, 424 Denuclearization, 339, 340, 460 Department of Defense, 105 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 147, 152, 416

INDEX

Department of Homeland Security, 50, 68 Department of Justice, 48 Deportations, 468 moratorium on, 470 Detained refugees, 409 Dialectical perspective, 3, 4 Diamond, Larry, 23 Different currencies, 362 Digitalization, 19, 361 Digital Silk Road, 100 Digital technology, 389 Digitization, 471 Dignity deficit, 56 Di Maio, Luigi, 238 Diplomacy, 65, 146 Diplomatic and security dialogue, 368 Director of Homeland Security (DHS), 419 Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 153, 154 Direct payments, 387 Dirty War, 279 Distribution chains, 460 Distribution of power, 95 Doha Amendment, 4 Doha Round, 11, 324 Dollar to “float”, 18 Domestic consumption, 97 Dominican Republic, 334 Donbas, 120 Donohue, Thomas, 380 Doria, João, 288 Dozier, Kimberly, 164 Drezner, Daniel, 64 Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 65 Drone strikes, 118 Drug prices, 148 Dublin, 195 Dublin Convention (1990), 421 Duda, Andrzej, 240 Due process, 429

505

Duhalde, Eduardo, 279 Duke, David, 63 Dumping, 18, 67 Dutch, 420 Dutch Trump, 235 Duterte, Rodrigo, 145, 166, 290 Duterte, Rodrigo (Philippines), 59

E East and Southeast Asia, 362 East Asia, 115 Eastern Europe, 120 Eastern Partnership program, 252 Eastern Ukraine elections meddling in, 13 East India Company, 341 EB-5 visa, 438 EBay, 415 Economic “G-2”, 96 Economic dimension, 465 Economic dimension, of globalization, 11 Economic efficiency, 465 Economic equality, 361 Economic globalization, 8, 57, 341, 362, 387, 388, 470, 479 decline in, 470 Economic growth, 98 Economic independence, 279 Economic inequality, 144 Economic interdependence, 30, 92, 465 Economic liberalism, 474 Economic migrants, 410 Economic narcissism, 464 Economic nationalism, 58, 66, 465 Economic networks, 55 Economic roots, of populism, 361 Economies of scale, 362 Economist, The, 197, 465 Ecuador, 100, 280, 282

506

INDEX

Eduardo, Duhalde, 288 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 19 Egalitarian philosophy, 48 Egypt, 119, 145, 161, 294, 296 1807 Insurrection Act, 409 Elections, 408 Electoral outcomes, 412 Electoral votes, 58 Elites, vii, ix Ellsberg, Daniel, 63 El Paso, 69 El Salvador, 431 El-Sisi, Abdel Fatah, 145 E-mail, 389 Empire, managing, 28 Enderlein, Henrik, 476 English nationalism, 13 Enhanced Community Quarantine, 290 En Marche! (Onward!), 235 Environmental migration, 440 Environmental protection, 478 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 326 Environmental stress, 410 Epistemic communities, 60 Erasmus exchange program, 210 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 150, 166, 240, 246, 418, 424, 463, 478 Esper, Mark, 155 Espionage of military technologies, 107 Estonia, 120, 319, 462 Ethics and Public Policy Center, 426 Ethnic and religious strife, 92 Ethnic exclusionism, 92 Ethnicity, v EU association agreement, 251 EU-British compromise agreement, 209 EU euro, 18

EU’s freedoms free movement of goods, services, capital, and people, 201 EU Parliament, 188 EU quota, of refugees, 69 Eurasia Group, 200 Eurasian Economic Union, 251 EU regulations, 189, 198, 201 Eurodeterrent, 322 Europe, 117, 380 Muslim migration to, 420 populist opposition to immigration in, 14 trade wars with, 162 European Alliance for People and Nations, 244 European Central Bank, 57, 239, 248, 249, 332 European Coal and Steel Community, 232 European Commission, 195, 249, 258, 381, 467 European Council, 231 European Council on Foreign Relations, 232 European Court of Justice, 189, 201, 424 European elections meddling in, 13 European Enlightenment, 17 European External Action Service, 332 European intervention initiative, 254 European missile defense, 121 European Parliament, 244, 382 2019 elections to, 257 elections to, 194 European Research Group (ERG), 200 European Union (EU), x, 114, 390, 467 budget oversight, 249

INDEX

Permanent Structured Cooperation, 254 trade deal with, 286 West-East fracture, 239 Europe of nations, 244 Euroskeptics, 188, 193, 231, 238, 257 Eurozone, 14, 114, 233, 238 EU-U.S. trade frictions, 258 Evangelical Christians, 144 Executive order, 419, 470, 478 Executive time, 150 Experts, 48 Export-oriented firms, 362 Extended deterrence, 94 ExxonMobil corporation, 157

F Facebook, 6, 48, 51, 415, 422, 459 Failed ruling class, 55 Fake news, 61, 62, 148 Fake News Media, 335 False and misleading claims, 148 Family separation, 431 Farage, Nigel, 188, 189, 243 Farm bankruptcies, 387 Farmers, 379 Farron, Tim, 194 Fascism, v, x, 278 “Fast track” authority, 12 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 48, 152, 189 Federalization, 121 Federal Reserve Bank, 48, 366, 372 Ferguson, Niall, 103 Fernández, Alberto, 279 Fertility rates, 417 Fidesz, 241 Fillmore, Millard, 408 Financial crisis, 21 Financial flows, 389

507

First impeachment, 24 Fisher, Max, 69, 163, 189, 475 5G mobile phone communications, 97 5G networks, 366 5G wireless transmissions, 471 5+1 group, 315 Five-Star, 248 Five-Star Movement (M5S), 238 Five-year plan, 279 Florida, 416 Flows of direct investment (FDI), 466 Floyd, George, 143, 148, 409, 463 Flynn, Michael, 29, 156, 158, 419 Foa, Marcello, 63 Foa, Roberto Stefan, 21 Focus Active, 386 Foer, Franklin, 242 Fontaine, Richard, 378 Food and Drug Administration, 476 Forced technology transfers, 371 Ford, 386, 389 Ford, Douglas, 59 Ford F-150, 376 Foreign bonds and equities, 389 Foreign-born residents, 411 Foreign direct investment (FDI), 389, 470 Foreign investors, 374 Foreign Service, 156 Fortune Global 500 list, 104 Foxconn, 362 Fox News, 7, 148, 388 Fragile states, 92, 93 Fragmegration, 3 Fragmentation, 9 Framework Convention for Climate Change, 4 France, 232, 258, 316, 420, 423, 471, 475 France’s National Front (renamed National Rally), 235 Frankfurt, Harry, 149

508

INDEX

Franzi, Alessandro, 238 Freedland, Jonathan, 23 Freedom House, 48, 241 Freedom of navigation operations, 109 Freedom Party (Austria), 243 Free market capitalism, 5, 461 Free markets, 371 Free media, 475 Free trade, vii, 13, 17, 363, 387, 466 French goods, tariffs on, 383 Frenchness, 420 French revolution, 17 Frexit, 196 Frey, William H., 412 Friedberg, Aaron, 369 Friedman, Thomas, 166, 211, 234, 297, 335, 471, 477 Frozen conflicts, 13, 120 Fukuyama, Francis, xi, 61

G Gabriel, Sigmar, 254 Gaddis, John Lewis, 28, 89 Galli, Mark, 144 Games of chicken, 109 Gantz, Benny, 295, 296 Gates, Rick, 156 Gauke, David, 205 Gauland, Alexander, 236 Gaza, 117, 417 Geisler, Sybille, 243 Gender, v General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 11, 18, 324 General Assembly, 19 Generalized System of Preferences, 364 General Motors, 381, 384, 386, 389 Generation Identity, 237 Genetic genocide, 107, 289

Geneva Conventions, 19 Genoa, 99 Genocide, 20, 414 Gentrification, 56 Geographical exception, 411 Geopolitical challenges multiple and simultaneous, 116 Geopolitical conflict, v Geopolitical interests, 92 Geopolitics, x, 121–123, 477 Georgia, 120, 416 German Democratic Republic, 237 German Marshall Fund, 463 Germany, v, 17, 60, 120, 232, 236, 239, 253, 258, 366, 381, 411, 420, 421, 423, 425, 471, 475 Council on Foreign Relations, 239 “transit centers”, 425 Gilpin, Robert, 93 Giuliani, Rudy, 165, 474 Gladstone, William, 203 Glasser, Susan, 231 Global civil society, 90 Global economy, 5, 19, 460 Global financial system, 18 Global governance, 10, 90 Global investment, 460 Globalization, v, ix, 3, 4, 389, 459, 465, 467, 476 cosmopolitan, 5 danger to, 470 earlier conclusions regarding, 8 economic, 8, 57, 466, 468 economic dimension of, x, 11, 196 political, 4, 468 political dimension of, x, 11, 196 political, slowing, 212 socio-cultural, 468 socio-cultural dimension of, x, 14, 196, 212 Globalization: The Return of Borders to a Borderless World?, ix

INDEX

Global liberal order, v, x Global Pact on Migration, 147 Global pandemic, 459 Global participation, 463 Global production chains, 58 Global South, The, x Global trade, 460, 466 Global warming, 90, 326, 440 Golan Heights, 295 Gold standard, 18 Good Friday Agreement, 192, 206 Goods deficit, 365 Google, 51, 385, 414, 415 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 121 Gordon, Philip, 26, 66 Gove, Michael, 209, 211 Government, vi Government bureaucracies, 60 Grand strategy, 91 Great Britain, x, 48, 475 Great Depression, v, 325, 363, 364, 366 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 96 Great Recession, 8, 21, 114, 212, 248, 389, 465, 466 “Great Replacement” theory, 68 Greece, 99, 247, 258, 421–425 bankruptcy of, 14 Greek-owned ships, 334 Green cards, 416, 437, 438, 440 Greenhouse gas emissions, 327 Greenhouse gases, 326 Green Party (Austria), 243 Greens, 188, 189, 257 Grenell, Richard, 329 Grexit, 196 Gross capital flows, 466 Gross domestic product (GDP), 96, 466 Gross national product (GNP), 96 Group of 20 (G-20) summit, 236

509

Group of 7 (G-7), 99 Growth Acceleration Program, 285 Growth rates, 97 G-7 (Group of Seven), 315 G-20 2019 summit meeting, 371 G-20 conference in Buenos Aires (2018), 370 Guaidó, Juan Gerardo, 282 Guam, 106 Guantánamo Bay, 428 Guardian, The, 61 Guatemala, 416, 427, 429, 431 Guerrilla warfare, 283 Gujarat, 291 Gulen, Fethullah, 246 Gulf of Mexico, 102 Gun rights, 7 Guterres, António, 419

H Haass, Richard N., x, 15, 117, 122, 153, 388, 459, 476, 477 Habeck, Robert, 237 Hacking, 6 Haddad, Fernando, 285 Hadley, Stephen, 70 “Haircut” on loans, 20 Haitians, 147, 407 Haley, Nikki, 321, 471 Hall, Peter, 190 Hammes, T.X., 8 Hammond, Philip, 205 Hampson, Fen, 255 Han Chinese, 289 Hannity, Sean, 148 Hard border, 192, 194, 208 Hard exit, 198, 199 Hard power, 95 Hard-right pugilism, 470 Harley-Davidson, 386, 389 Harmony Center, 233

510

INDEX

Hatch, Orrin, 365 Hate crimes, 51 Hate-mongering, 412 Hayden, Michael, 149, 335 Head & Shoulders, 150 Hebdo, Charlie, 423 Hegemon, 70, 71, 316 Hegemonic hubris, 31 Hegemonic rivalry, 366 Hegemonic stability, 93 Hegemonic-stability theory, 92 Hegemonic wars, 93 Hegemony, x, 92, 114 Heinz, 384 Heisbourg, François, 123 Helsinki, 158–160, 335 Helsinki summit, 337 Hemon, Aleksander, 433 Henniges, 384 Hermitage Capital Management, 159 Hezbollah, 118, 294 Hidalgo, Anne, 478 Hiftar, Khalifa, 145 “High wage” factory, 377 High-intensity, 105 Highly-skilled workers, 415 High-tech export industries, 363 High-tech industries, 416 High-tech professions, 410 High-tech start-ups, 365 Hijabs/headscarves, 420 Hindu extremists, 291 Hindu nationalist, 291 Hispanic immigrants, 147 Hitler, Adolf, 60, 91 Hohmann, James, 460 Hokenos, Paul, 237 Hollande, François, 235 Holocaust, 23, 69 Holocaust Remembrance Day, 63 Homan, Thomas D., 414 Homeland Security, 410

Home-schooling, 420 Honda, 195 Honda Odyssey, 386 Honduran Supreme Court, 284 Honduras, 284, 429, 431 H-1B visa, 415, 439 Hong Kong, 103, 107, 375 demonstrations in, 110 Horror stories, 413 House Armed Services Committee, 322 House Freedom Caucus, 165 House of Representatives, 469 House Oversight Committee, 433 Houston, 427 Hoyer, Steny, 338 H-2A visa, 416 Huawei, 102, 365, 366, 370 Hu Jintao, 108 Hukou (required household registration), 98 Humanity crimes against, 20 Human rights, v, vii, 5, 92, 113, 413, 475 Human smugglers, 410 Human traffickers, 410 Hungarians, 425 Hungary, x, 17, 61, 99, 120, 190, 234, 239, 244, 416, 417, 420, 424, 425, 475 Huntington’s nationalists, 52 Huntington, Samuel, 51, 407, 427 Hunt, Jeremy, 199 Huntsman, Jon, 111 Hussein, Saddam, 24 Hutchison, Kay Bailey, 320 Hybrid war, 121 Hyperglobalist path, 55 I Ibrahim, Saadedine, 294

INDEX

Identitarians, 68 Identity, 59 politics, 50, 408 Identity theft, 6 Ideology, 52 Idlib, 418 Iglesias, Pablo, 284 Ikenberry, G. John, 25, 90, 92 Illegal aliens, 410 Illiberal democracy, 60, 241 Illiberal powers, 70 Illiberal states, 460 Illiberal values, 10 Imagined community, 53 Imamoglu, Ekrem, 463 Immigrants, 54, 389, 413, 415, 417, 427 barriers to, 58 dislike of, 468 raised fears about, 189 skilled, 415 Immigration, 7, 390, 413, 416, 417, 419, 469, 473, 475 policies, 408 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 414, 470 Impeachment, 148, 157 Independent Group, 193 India, 9, 17, 283, 288, 289, 291, 364, 415, 475 Indian Ocean, 100, 101 Indigenous peoples, 286 Indispensable nation, 91 Indonesia, 59, 386 Inequality, 361, 388 Inflation cycles of, 93 Informal economies, 460 Information-centric regional military operations, 105 Information flows, 407

511

Information Technology Agreement (ITA-II), 12 Information up and down, 154 Informatization, 105 Infrastructure funding, 58 Ingelhart, Ronald, 438 Inglehart, Ronald, 59 Instagram, 6, 415 Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), 332 Integrated Network Electronic Warfare cyber-strategy of, 110 Integration, 3 Intel, 385 Intellectual property, 371, 374, 375 Intelligence agency, 152, 158 Intelligence community, 148, 341 Interdependence, 55 Interest rates, 57 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 106, 121 Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 412 Internal Market Bill, 206 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 19, 294, 328 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 18 International Court of Justice, 19, 333 International Criminal Court (ICC), 19, 143, 318 International Development Association, 18 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 198 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 27 International institutions, 92, 472 International Labor Organization (ILO), 19

512

INDEX

International lending, 389 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 9, 18, 248, 341 International organizations, 30, 315 International regimes, 93, 146, 315 International students, 415 International Trade Organization (ITO), 18 Internet, 385, 471 Intra-regional trade, 466 Investment Migration Council, 438 Iowa’s Pork Producers Association, 387 iPads, 362 iPhones, 362 Iran, 66, 116, 117, 119, 122, 123, 153, 154, 418 1979 revolution, 333 Arab minority, 294 nuclear agreement with, 120 nuclear ambitions, 117 nuclear deal, 164, 478 Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, 330 Iranian hardliners, 328 Iranian nuclear talks, 114 Iran Nuclear Agreement, 327 Iran nuclear deal, 25 Iraq, 24, 115–119, 418, 422 2003 intervention in, 119 army, collapse of, 115 “bad” war in, 118 invasion of, 92 keeping troops in, 150 Shia militias in, 119 wars in, 90 Iraq syndrome, 115 Ireland, 195 Irish backstop, 194 Irish migrants, 408 Irish Republic, 192, 194–197 Irish Taoiseach, 195

Irwin, Douglas, 365, 380, 381 Irwin, Neil, 464 Ischinge, Wolfgang, 253 Islam, 419 Islamic migration, 420 Islamic minorities, 289 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 154 Islamic State (IS), 69, 150 Islamic terrorism, 251, 418 Islamist separatism, 420 Islamophobia, 242, 291, 417–420, 425 Isolationism, 408 Israel, 17, 117, 295, 471, 478 Arab minority, 295 Jerusalem as capital, 295 Supreme Court, 295 Israeli Olympic team, 198 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 161, 295 Israeli settlements, 161, 295, 417 Istanbul, 330, 463 Italian, 408 Italy, v, vi, x, 8, 190, 232, 258, 421–423, 475 “Italy first” policies, 239

J Jackson, Andrew, 50 Jae-in, Moon, 337, 338 Jai Shri Ram, 292 Jamaat, Tablighi, 293 Jammu, 292 Japan, v, 12, 17, 94, 102, 106, 112, 115, 316, 380, 381, 416 Japanese, 108 Japanese yen, 19 Jewish worshipers, 62 Jews, 62 Johnson, Boris, 188, 190, 198–200, 204, 205, 475, 477

INDEX

Johnson, Lyndon, 56 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 4, 250, 327, 328, 333 Joint ventures, 380 Jordan, 296, 418 Journalists an “enemy of the people”, 62 Judiciary(ies), 53, 60 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 195, 201, 382, 383, 426, 467 Junta of National Reconstruction, 283 Jurecic, Quinta, 149 Justicialist Party, 279

K Kaczynski, ´ Jarosław, 54, 240 Kagan, Robert, x, 115, 117, 237, 323 Kaiser, Karl, 472 Kaliningrad, 252 Kant, Immanuel, 30 Kashmir, 292 Kassam, Raheem, 243 Katainen, Jyrki, 381 Kazakhs, 289 Kazakhstan, 17, 251 Kellner, Peter, 194 Kelly, John F., 29, 164, 165, 419, 469 Kennan, George F., 121 Kennedy, John, 460 Kent access permit, 209 Kenya, 63 Keohane, Robert O., 53, 93 Kerch, Crimea shooting in a school, 10 Kerry, John, 112, 119 Kettle, Martin, 195 Khamenei, Ali, 328 Khan, Sadiq Aman, 200 Khashoggi, Jamal, 145, 160, 330 Kim Jong-un, vi, 64, 122, 253, 478 King, Stephen, x, 16

513

Kirchner, Cristina, 279 Kirchner, Néstor, 279 Kissinger, Henry, 95 “Know Nothing” movement, 408 KOF index, 361 Korea Demilitarized Zone, 160 denuclearize, 153 Kosovars, 414 Kotin, Stephen, 92 Kotkin, Stephen, 123 Kramp-Karrenbauer, Annegret, 257 Krasner, Stephen D., 11, 55 Krastev, Ivan, 240, 423 Kristol, Irving, 62 Krugman, Paul, 234, 389 Kudlow, Larry, 162, 372 Kurdish, 123 Kurdish-occupied Syria, 150 Kurdish terrorists, 150 Kurds, 150, 418 Kurz, Sebastian, 243, 421, 424 Kushner, Jared, 145, 156, 158, 164, 295, 330, 417 Kyenge, Cecile, 238 Kyoto Protocol, 4 Kyrgyzstan, 251

L Labour MPs, 198 Labour Party, 48, 70, 188, 193, 197–199 Ladakh, 115 Landfill (“island building”), 108 Landler, Mark, 460 Languages diversity, 407 Laschet, Armin, 257 Latin America, x, 412, 416 refugees in, 426 Latin American “dependency” theorists, 20

514

INDEX

Latin Americans, 416 Latino immigrants, 407 Latvia, 120, 233, 462 Lauder, Ronald S., 161 Law and Justice, 234 Law-enforcement agency, 152 Law enforcement authorities, 69 Lawson, George, 94 Lazarus, Emma, 437 LCD screens, 362 League of Nations, 17 Leave Means Leave, 188 Leavers, 58, 190, 196, 197 Lebanon, 63, 418 Left-leaning supporters, 53 Legal migration of Muslims and Latinos, 69 Legislatures, 53 Legitimacy, 459 Legrain, Phillippe, 470 Le Maire, Bruno, 332 Leo Varadkar, 195 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 235 Le Pen, Marine, 196, 235, 244 Leslie, Chris, 193 Less developed country (LDC), 67, 410 Level playing field, 209 Levin, Brian, 63 Levitsky, Steven, 54, 474 Lew, Jacob, 110 Liberal democracies, 23, 408 Liberal Democrats, 188, 189, 197 Liberal economic system, 361 Liberal global order, 479 Liberal hegemony, 31 Liberal norms, 10 Liberal order, 474 Liberals, 55 Liberal Sardines, 258 Liberal universalism, 30 Liberal values, 16

Liberal world order, 323 Libertarianism, x Libya, 24, 118, 338, 339, 421 Libyan, 145 Libyan Coastguard, 425 Lighthizer, Robert E., 160, 163, 363, 371, 380 Li Keqiang, 364 Limbaugh, Rush, 148 Lindsay, James M., 28, 29, 123 Lipner, Shalom, 297 Lissner, Rebecca Friedman, 30 Lithuania, 120, 462 Liu He, 371 Localization, 3, 4 Lofven, Stefan, 322 London, 423 Long peace, The, 89 López Obrador, Andrés Manuel, 277, 430 Los Angeles, 327, 427 Losers, 65 Low-paying jobs, 416 Low-skilled workers, 412 Loyalty lists, 152 Luce, Edward, 54, 71, 148, 471 Lukashenko, Alexander, 166 Lula, 284 Lund, Susan, 389 Lysol, 152

M Maas, Heiko, 26 Macedonia, 321, 422, 425 Macho populists, 55 Macmillan, Harold, 460 Macron, Emmanuel, 99, 165, 232, 235, 249, 250, 257, 316, 320, 322, 420, 471, 478 “Made in China 2025”, 365 Maduro, Nicolás, 282, 283, 426

INDEX

Maelstrom, Cecilia, 382 MAGA agenda, 390 MAGA slogan, 408 Magna Carta, 71 Magnitsky Act, 159, 387 Magnitsky, Sergei L., 159 Maguire, Joseph, 157 Mainstream political parties, 48 Maiquetia airport, 282 “Make America Great Again”, 27 “Make America Great Again” slogan, 62, 66, 147, 363 Malacca dilemma, 108 Malaysia, 59, 100 Maldives, 475 Manafort, Paul, 156, 158 Mandarin, 98 Mandatory resettlement quotas, 426 Mandetta, Luiz Henrique, 287 Mandiant, 110 Manjoo, Farhad, 414 Manufacturing decline in, 66 Manus Island, 409 Mao Zedong, 96, 106, 372 Marine Corps, 429 Maritime Silk Road, 99 Market capitalism, 93 Market exchange rates, 97 Marshall Fund, 472 Marshall Plan, 231, 232 Martel, William, 91 Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 282, 283 Mattis, James N., 29, 108, 150, 156, 164, 469, 472 Max Boot, 335 Mayo Clinic, 9 May, Theresa, 191–194, 197, 200, 201, 204, 460, 463, 477 Mazaar, Michael, 30 McAleenan, Kevin, 414, 428

515

McCabe, Andrew, 48, 148, 152 McCain, John, 22, 70, 89 McCarty, Nolan, 57 McConnell, Mitch, 123, 150, 151 McCormick & Co, 384 McDonnell, John, 193 McFaul, Michael, 159 McGahn, Don, 165 McGuire, James W., 278 McGurk, Brett, 69 McMaster, H.R., 164, 334 McTague, Tom, 212 Meadows, Mark, 165 Mead, Walter Russell, 49, 50 Mearsheimer, John, 94 Media, 60, 61 Members of Parliament (MPs), 197 Memorandum of Cooperation, 430 Menem, Carlos Saúl, 279, 287 Merchandise trade, 365 Mercosur, 382 Merkel, Angela, 14, 231, 253, 257, 259, 421, 422, 471, 478 Mexican border wall on, vi, 478 Mexican tomato imports, 378 Mexico, 20, 376, 380, 382, 386, 416, 427, 430 bilateral negotiations with, 376 buiding of border, 58 migrants from, 409 Michigan, 104, 384–386 Microsoft, 51, 415 Mid-Continent Nail Company, 379 ‘Middle democracy’ trap, 293 Middle democracy, 293 Middle East, x, 6, 114, 117, 122, 294, 417 Middle-income trap, 367 Migrant children, 414 Migrant Protection Protocols, 427 Migrant recipients, 423

516

INDEX

Migrants, 411, 416, 420 categories of, 410 in agriculture, 416 Migration, 8 flows, 407 Militarism, v Military dimension, 10 Military sovereignty, 323 Miller-Idriss, Cynthia, 68 Miller, Stephen, 412, 413, 433, 439 Minister Counselors, 156 Minneapolis, 463 Minority(ies), 58 groups, 56 Mishra, Pankaj, 211, 468 Misogyny, 7 Mitra, Subrata K., 293 Mnuchin, Steven, 66, 101, 162, 163, 368, 370 Mobile devices, 471 Mobil, Exxon, 281 Modernity, 59 Modi, Narendra, vii, x, 54, 166, 291–293 Mogherini, Federica, 240, 331, 332 Moïsi, Dominique, 476 Molenbeek, 423 Montenegro, 20, 99, 321 Montoneros, 279 Moore, James, 190 Morales, Evo, 280, 281 Morales, Jimmy, 431 Morocco, 296 Moros, 290 Moro, Sergio, 288 Morsi, Mohamed, 295 Moscow anti-regime protests in, 463 Mother of All Messes, The, 193 Motyl, Alexander, 121 Mounk, Yasha, 21, 206, 243 MS-13 gang, 28

Mubarak, Hosni, 119 Mueller III, Robert S., 152, 158, 159 report of, 7 Mueller investigation, 24 Mueller, John, 115 Mulroney, Brian, 375 Multiculturalism, 407, 412 Multilateral agreements, 325 Multilateral consultation, 459 Multilateral institutions, 4 Multilateral institutions and agreements opposition to, 58 Multilateralism, 26, 164, 316, 341, 461, 462, 472 dislike of, 146 Multilateral trade agreements, 469, 479 Multilateral trading system, 380 Multinational agreements, 478 Multinational companies, 469 Multinational corporations, 389 Multinational corporations and banks, 19 Multinational institutions, 5 Multinationalism, 475 Multipolarity, 90, 92 Multiracial society, 438 Mulvaney, Mick, 165 Munich, 198 Murphy, Chris (Senator), 26 Musgrave, Paul, 383 Muslim Bengalis, 292 Muslim Brotherhood, 119, 295 Muslim-majority countries, 419 Muslim migrants, 417 Muslim Rohingyas, 291 Muslims, 10, 54 Muslim terrorists, 425 Muslim Uighurs, 107, 289 Muslim visitors, ban on, 148 Mussolini, Benito, 91

INDEX

fascism, 278 MVM Inc., 439 Myanmar, 59, 102, 288, 289, 291

N Nagorno-Karabakh, 246 Napoleon, 71 Narcissist, vi Narcissistic personality disorder, 9 Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 294 Nathaniel Banks, 408 National Bureau of Asian Research, 101 National Counterterrorism Center, 157 National Guard units, 427 National Health Service, 190 National homogeneity/heterogeneity, 407 National Indian Foundation, 286 National Intelligence Estimate, 477 National interests, vi, 4, 94 Nationalism, x, 4, 5, 52, 60, 122, 280, 407 Nationalist exclusionism, 92 Nationalist-populism, v, x, 66, 68, 238, 277, 278, 459, 461 Nationalist-populists, v, 362 Nationality, 410 National Judiciary Office, 242 National Retail Federation, 373 National security, 363, 364, 366, 381, 414 National Security Adviser, 419 National Security Agency (NSA), 102, 149 National Security Council, 153, 413, 478 National Security Strategy, 116 National self-determination, 17 Native American Party, 408

517

Nativism, 407, 427 Nativists, 418 Nauru, 409 Navalny, Alexei, 166 Navarro, Peter, 163, 318, 363, 364, 371, 381 Nazis, 62 Nazism, v Negotiations, 198 Neller, Robert, 429 Neo-conservative, 114 Neo-mercantilism, 103 Neo-Nazis, 51, 63, 159 Neo-Nazi violence, 236 Nepal, 100 Netanyahu, Binyamin, x, 54, 119, 161, 295, 296 Netherlands, 319 Newkirk, Vann R., 57 New Mexico, 427 New START treaty, 122 New York, 58, 327, 414, 427, 476, 478 New York Times , 63 New Zealand, 12, 69, 106, 325, 380, 475 fifty Muslims massacred in, 51 New Zealand-initiated effort, 51 Nexen, 102 Nexit, 196 Nexon, Daniel, 473 Niblett, Robin, 23 Nicaragua, 283, 426 Nielsen, Kirstjen, 408, 414, 430, 432 Nigeria, 410, 419 Nigerians, 147 1934 Long March, 372 1951 Refugee Convention, 410 1967 Six-Day War, 417 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, 106 1974 Trade Act sections 201 and 301 of, 67

518

INDEX

1980 Refugee Act, 412 9/11, 7, 114 Nissan, 195 Nixon, Richard, 106 Nixon shock, 18 “No deal”, 200 parliamentary defeat of, 194 Nobel Peace Prize, 116 No deal, 199 “Noncore” jobs, outsourcing, 66 Nongovernmental groups (NGOs), 90 Non-Han ethnicities, 289 Nonliberal order-building projects rival, rise of, 92 Nonpolarity, 91 Nonproliferation Treaty, 327 Non-refoulement, 411 Non-tariff barriers, 369, 371, 372 Nord Stream pipeline, 253, 255, 320 North Africa, 421, 425 migrant centers in, 421 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 66, 162, 375, 466, 473 tariff dispute settlement system, 377 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 19 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 20, 120, 198, 232, 315, 341, 460, 461, 471, 472, 475, 478 America withdraw from, 322 Article 5 of, 20 biggest threat to, 323 collective budget, 319 enlargement of, 91 July 2018 summit, 320, 321 May 2017 summit, 320 U.S. commitments to, 472 U.S. involvement in, 462 North Carolina, 416

Northern Ireland, 187, 192, 194, 195, 197, 200, 205, 208, 210 Northern League, 238, 248 North Korea, vi, 24, 66, 91, 113, 115, 116, 154, 160, 337, 369 bilateralism with, 316 denuclearization, 316 easing sanctions on, 370 horrendous human rights record, 64 nuclear weapons, acquisition of, 93 North Macedonia, 20 North Vietnam, 95 Norway, 69, 191, 408 Nostalgia, 425 Nuclear modernization programs, 95 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 294 Nuclear proliferation, 94 Nuclear weapons, 95 Nucor, 384 Nye, Joseph, 26, 94, 114

O Obama administration, 112 Obama, Barack, 10, 27, 111, 114, 116, 117, 410, 412 administration, 478 belief in U.S. decline, 122 Obamacare, 58 Obamagate, 148 O’Brien, Robert C., 154, 473 Obsolete industries, 363 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria, 147 Office of Personnel Management, 165 Offshore balancing strategy of, 31 Offshore destination, 104 Ohio, 104 Oil price of, 13

INDEX

Oman, 105 Omar, Ilhan, 147 “One-China” policy, 109 One China, one Taiwan, 106 Online extremism, 51 Online purchases, 389 On-shoring, 8 Ontario, 59 Open financial services, 374 Open markets, 23 Open Skies treaty, 121 Orbán, Viktor, vii, 10, 54, 240–242, 244, 259, 416, 417, 424, 425, 438, 463, 475, 478 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 287 Organization of American States (OAS), 19 Orinoco Belt, 281 Orlando, 327 Ortega, Daniel, 283, 426 Orwellian-sounding System of National Cooperation, 61 Osaka G-20 summit (2019), 61, 62 Oslo Accords, 295 Ottoman Turkish occupation, 425 Outsourced (subcontracted), 104 Outsourcing, 8, 363 Overpopulation, 410 Overt favoritism, 367 Owens, Candace, 60 Oxfam, 21

P Pacific Silk Road, 100 Pakistan, 17, 101, 113, 118, 292, 327 Palestine Liberation Organization, 295 Palestinian refugees, 417 Palestinians, 417, 418

519

refugee status of, 417 Pandemic, 152 Papadopoulos, George, 156 Papua New Guinea, 409 Paracel Islands, 108 Paraguay, 467 Paris Périphérique, 423 terrorist attacks in, 423 Paris Accord, 4 Paris climate accord, 25, 325, 462, 478 Paris climate agreement, 250 Parker, Kathleen, 63 Parliament, 191, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200 Partial ceasefire, 374 Partial power, 113 Patrick, Stewart, 212 Patriotism, 49 Paulson, John, 67 “Peace to Prosperity” plan, 296 Peer-reviewed research articles, 97 Peloponnesian War, 93 Pelosi, Nancy, 147, 149, 436 Pence, Mike, 29, 319, 461 Pension obligations, 104 Pentagon, 150, 370 Pentagon Papers, 63 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 104 Information Engineering University (Zhengzhou), 111 People’s Party (Austria), 243 People, The, ix Permanent Court of Arbitration, 109 Peronism, 277, 278 Peronistas, 278 Peronists, 277 Perón, Juan, 277, 278 Persecution, 411 fear of, 410, 411, 429 victims of, 414

520

INDEX

Persian Gulf, 331 Peru, 282, 411, 426 Petrobras, 285 PetroCaribe, 282 “Phase 1” of an agreement, 374, 387 “Phase 2” of an agreement, 375 Philippine drug offenders, 290 Philippines, 106, 108, 288–290, 475 Piketty, Thomas, 57 Pilling, David, 96 Pillsbury, Michael, 109 Pink tide, 284 Piraeus, 99 Pittsburgh, 62 Pittsburgh synagogue massacre at, 50 shooting, 68 “Pivot” to Asia, 115 PLO, 119 Poe, Edgar Allan, 164 Points of entry, 411 Poland, x, 17, 99, 120, 190, 239, 244, 424, 463, 471, 475 Poles, 425 Police brutality, 143 Polish, 408 Political appointees, 156 Political correctness, 53 Political dimension, of globalization, 11 Political globalization, 4, 189, 388, 470, 472, 478 U.S. support for, 462 Political instability, 460 Political Islam, 420 Political liberalism, 474 Political sovereignty, 279 Political tribalism, 412 Political vandalism, 205 Politicization, 24 Politics of paranoia, 60 Pomersantsev, Peter, 463

Pompeo, Mike, 101, 151, 164, 282, 316 Poole, Keith T., 57 Poonam, Snigda, 292 Poor white males, 57 Populism, ix, 61, 463 Populist authoritarianism, 50 Populist leaders, 463 Porter, Henry, 423 Ports of entry, 411, 429 Portugal, 99 austerity imposed in, 14 Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 428 Post-Cold War World, x Postwar trading norms, 388 Poujade, Pierre, 235 Power factors, 94 Presidential Records Act, 336 Press, 53 Pressley, Ayanna, 147 Prince Mohammad, 160 Principals Committee, 153, 154 Pritchett, Lant, 97 Private firms, 371 Private investment, 97 Pro-Brexit organization, 188 Pro-Brexit voters, 190 Production chains, 362, 370, 385 Professional economists and technocrats, 58 Pro-globalist liberal elites, 52 Prompt Asylum Claim Review, 435 Pro-Russian populist party, 233 Protectionism, 58, 362, 388, 408 economic costs of, 362 Protectionist societies, 362 Protestant, 192 Prudence of leaders, 94 Psychological genocide, 107 Purchasing power parity (PPP), 96, 98 Purchasing power per capita, 96 Putinism, 61

INDEX

Putin, Vladimir, vi, 10, 232, 253, 256, 282, 471, 478 Q Qatar, 161 Qualcomm, 369 Quantum computing, 365 Queen Elizbeth II, 205 Queiroz, Fabrício, 287 R Race, v, 410 Racial biases, 412 Racial diversity, 407 Racial violence, 468 Racism, 7, 425, 468 Rackete, Carola, 423 Rakhine State (Myanmar), 291 Rapp-Hooper, Mira, 30 Rare-earth, 370, 372 company, 370 metals, 370 Rasmussen, Lokke, 203 Ratcliffe, John, 157 Reagan, Ronald, 121, 146, 460 administration, 284 Reagan-Thatcher governments, 20 Realism, 64 Realists, 94 Realist thought, 94 Realpolitik world, 93 Real-time data, 465 Recession, 93 Rees-Mogg, Jacob, 200, 201 Reeves, Carlton, 60 Referenda, 278 Referendum, 60, 187 Refugee asylum, 258 Refugee Convention, 411 Refugees, 147, 410–412, 414, 418, 422

521

influx of, 425 Regimes, 93 Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 325 Regional arrangements, 466 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 12 Relative decline, 93 Relative gains and losses, 64 Religion, v, 407, 410 Religious diversity, 407 Religious pluralism, 420 Religious schools, 420 Re-localization, 8 Reluctant sheriff, 117 “Remain in Mexico” program, 427, 428, 430 Remainers, 58, 190 Renationalization, 8 Renminbi, 103, 372 as reserve or hard currency, 103 Repeat referendum, 191 Reproductive health, 143 Republican convention, 148 Republican Party, 48, 364, 408, 476 Republicans, 53, 68, 123, 408, 468, 472, 479 Republican senators, 119 Republic of Ireland, 192, 200, 210 “Reserve” currencies, 18 Residence by investment, 438 Resident foreign population, 407 Resistant Globals, 52, 53 Resistant Locals, 52 Retaliatory tariffs, 362 Returns on education, 57 Reunification, 107 Revisionist states, 71 Rhodes, Ben, 53 Rice, Susan, 409 Right to due process, 435 Right-wing extremists, 474

522

INDEX

Right-wing populists, 54 Riley, Russell, 374 Rising powers, 94 Risky investments bundling and sale of, 57 Robinson, Peter, 371 Robotics, 8, 97 Rodrik, Dani, 55, 212 Rogue regimes, 26 Rogue states, 91 Roman Empire, The, 89 Romania, 120 Romanians, 425 Roosevelt, Franklin D., v, 460 Rosenau, James N., 3 “local worlds”, 52 Rosenthal, Howard, 57 Rosneft, 283 Ross, Wilbur, 364 Röttgen, Norbert, 469 Rouhani, Hassan, 328, 333 Rousseff, Dilma, 285 Royal United Services Institute, 151 Rudd, Amber, 205 Rudd, Kevin, 10, 112, 369 Rule of law, vi, vii, 48 Rules-based order, 25 Runciman, David, 59 Rural support, 54 Russia, 5, 117, 120, 122, 123, 251, 416, 418, 460, 469, 473, 474, 477, 478 resurgence of, x sanctions against, 14 seizure of Crimea, 89 Russian aggression, 93 Russian aggression, in Ukraine, 251 Russian- and Iranian-supported army, 259 Russian meddling, in American politics, 7 Russian military pressure, 151

Russian peacekeepers, 247 Ryukyu Islands, 108

S Saá, Adolfo Rodríguez, 279 Sadat, Anwar, 294 “Safe-third country” policy, 430, 431 Saharan tribes, 421 Sahel region, 425 Salman, Mohammed bin, 26 Salt Lake City, 327 Salvadoran rebels, 284 Salvini, Matteo, vii, 54, 232, 238, 243, 248, 422–424, 475 Samsung, 67 Sanctions, 468 Sanctuary cities, 413, 414 Sanders, Sarah Huckabee, 432 Sandistas, 283 San Francisco, 58, 413 São Paulo, 288 Sardesai, Rajdeep, 293 Sasse, Ben, 363 Saudi Arabia, 13, 105, 145, 161, 294 rivalry with Iran, 146 U.S. arms sales to, 26, 146 Saudi wealth, 26 Schake, Kori, 31 Schell, Orville, 464 Schengen Agreement, 233 Schengen zone, 258, 425, 440 Schularick, Moritz, 103 Schuman, Michael, 367 Schumer, Chuck, 339 Science contempt for, 146 Science and experts, 47 Science and technological superpower, 97 Science evidence, 326 Scientific evidence, 147, 325, 326

INDEX

Scientific research funding of, 147 Scobell, Andrew, 104 Scotland, 187, 195, 206, 208 Scottish National Party (SNP), 197 Sea of Japan, 93, 108 Second impeachment, 409 Second referendum, 193, 199 Sectarian exclusionism, 92 Sectarianism, 5 Secularism, 5, 420 Security agency, 152 Security clearance, 335 Security Council, 19, 333 Resolution 2231, 334 Seehofer, Horst, 422 Self-interested “elites”, 53 Self-sufficiency, 67 Semiconductors, 362 Senate Finance Committee, 365 Senate Intelligence Committee, 153, 158 Senkaku Islands, 95 Separation of powers, in government, 60 Serbia, 14, 422 Serwer, Adam, 51 Sessions, Jeff, 432 Sestanovich, Stephen, 470 Shambaugh, David, 113 Shanahan, Patrick, 105, 319, 429 Shanghai server farm in, 366 Shanghai Group, 110 Shanghai Unit 61398, 110, 111 Shared leadership, 462 Sharia law, 420 “Shia” bombs and/or missiles, 294 Shia militia, 154 Shia Muslims, 155, 294 Shias in Bahrain, 294 Shifting alliances, 95

523

Shinawatra, Thaksin (Thailand), 59 Shin, Michael, x, 6, 47 Shithole countries, 147, 407 Shuanhui International, 102 Sicily, 242, 422 Siemens, 67 Significant reduction exceptions (SREs), 328 Sikh turbans, 420 Silicon Valley, 415 Silk Road Economic Belt, 99 Silk Road Fund, 99 Silk Road on Ice, 100 Simon Wiesenthal Center, 7 Singapore, 291, 382 Single market, 191, 192, 197, 199, 201, 209, 258 Sino-American economic interdependence, 364, 387 Sino-American geopolitical rivalry, 465 Sino-American relations, 465 Sino-American trade war, 162, 316 negotiations to end, 371 Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 119 Sittwe, 291 Skyping, 389 Slobodian, Quinn, 16 Sloterdijk, Peter, vi Slovakia, 120, 190, 239 Slovenia, 120 Slowbalisation, 465 Smartphones, 6 Smithfield, 103 Smithfield Foods, 102 Snowden, Edward, 111 Soames, Nicholas, 205 Social Democrats, 233, 236, 257 Socialist Party (France), 235 Socialism, x Social justice, 279 Social media, 5, 459

524

INDEX

Social networks, 55 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), 332 Socio-cultural dimension, of globalization, 14 Socio-cultural globalization, 68, 407, 438, 440, 470, 479 Socio-cultural homogeneity, 409 Soft Brexit, 199, 200 prime minister’s proposal for, 201 Soft deal, 198 Soft power, 95, 113, 147, 414, 415, 463 Solá, Felipe, 279 Soleimani, Qasem, 154, 155, 330 Somalia, 92, 118 Somoza, Anastasio, 283 Soros, George, 50, 241–243, 259, 426 South and Japan Seas, 113 South Carolina, 69, 381 South China Sea, 95, 108, 163, 370 U-shaped “nine-dash-line” map of, 108 South China Sea islands, 107 Southeast Asia, 58, 465 South Korea, 12, 65, 102, 106, 115, 316, 462, 475 National Assembly, 337 nuclear weapons, acquiring, 316 South Ossetia, 120 South Sudan, 102 Sovereign obligations, 459 Sovereignty, 476 Soviet Jews, 414 Soviet Union, v Spain, 258, 425 austerity imposed in, 14 Special Forces, 118 Special Investigation Team, 292 Specialized Globals, 52

Sperling, Gene, 464 Sri Lanka, 101 Stability Mechanism, 249 Stalin, Joseph, 91 Stanley, Jason, 244 State Administration for Foreign Exchange, 102 State autonomy, 9 State capacity, 9 State capitalism, 96, 371 State capitalist, 97 State-controlled economy, 280 State Department, 25, 152, 153, 156, 157, 409, 430 State-owned and highly subsidized industries, 367 State sovereignty, 92 Statue of Liberty, 437 Stavridis, James, 472 Stealth drone, 107 Steger, 61 Steger, Manfred, x, 14 Stephens, Michael, 151 Stoltenberg, Jens, 319, 323 Stone Panda, 110 Stone, Roger, 156 “Stop Soros” bill, 426 Strache, Heinz-Christian, 243 Strait of Hormuz, 331 Strange, Susan, 57 Strategic dialogue, 323 Strategic Support Force, 105 “Structural changes” in Chinese activities, 370 Structural Funds, 240 Structural transformation, 373 Sturgeon, Nicola, 206 Sudan, 296 Suicide rates, 57 Sullivan, Jake, 71 Sulzberger, A.G., 63 Summers, Lawrence, 16, 97

INDEX

“Sunni” bombs and missiles, 294 Supply chains, 8, 19, 362, 385, 389, 460, 464, 465, 470 Supreme Court, 205, 410, 411, 419, 428, 431, 436, 437, 474 decision banning segregation, 60 Supreme Electoral Court, 281 Surrendering technology, 367 Suu Kyi, Aung San, 291 Sweden, 420, 471 Sweden Democrats, 233 Swedish nativism, 7 Swiss franc, 19 Switzerland, 191 Syria, 100, 116, 118, 119, 123, 150, 418, 422 chemical weapons in, 471 intervention in, 93 poison gas against civilians, 65 Turkey’s intervention in, 259 Syrian civil war, 418 Syrian refugees, 418

T Taiwan, 106, 108, 113, 115, 316, 370 Taiwanese computer chips, 362 Taiwan Relations Act, 106 Taiwan Strait, 95, 107 Take back control, 189 Taliban, 118 Tariffs, 10 on imports, 364 Tarrant, Brenton, 51, 68 Tatmadaw, 291 Tax cuts, 365 Tax reduction, 58 Technocrats, 48 Technological change, v Technological rivalry, 365 Technology transfer, 370

525

Tempel, Sylke, 65 Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 409, 411 Tennessee, 382 Terminal dues, 318 Terrible probability, 468 Territorial “caliphate”, 118 Territorial Globals, 52 Terrorism, 10, 92, 419, 420, 424 suspects, torturing, 143 Terrorists, 419, 425 THAAD anti-ballistic missile system, 66 Thailand, 475 Thatcher, Margaret, 460 Theocrats, 122 3D Printing, 8 Thomas-Greenfield, Linda, 472 Thornberry, Mac, 322 Thucydides trap, 93, 95 Tibet, 113 Tibetans, 289 Tillerson, Rex, 29, 157, 158, 160, 469 Tlaib, Rashida, 147 Today’s populism, 47 Trade, 8 Trade deficits, 341, 363, 479 Trade Expansion Act Section 232 of 1962, 363 Trade multilateralism, 473 Trade Partnership Worldwide, 372 Trade surplus, 363, 389 Trade war, 58, 365, 465, 466, 468 Transactional advantages, 26 Transactional basis, 26 Transactional policies, 157 Transactional strategy, 315 Transactional view, 55 Trans-Atlantic friendship, 478 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 12

526

INDEX

Transdniestria, 120 Transnational corporations, 465 Transnational corporations and banks, 362 Transnational customers, 389 Transnational groups, 470 Transnational investment, 11, 389 Transnational management, 389 Transnational networks, 19 Transnational nongovernmental organizations, 315 Transnational organizations, 315 Transnational politics, 461 Transnational production, 389 Transnational production and sales, 362 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 12, 316, 325, 466, 479 Traub, James, 463, 479 Tribalism, 408, 412 Tribal loyalties, 50 Trieste, 99 Trinidad, 426 Trojan horses, 418, 425 Troubles, The, 192 Trudeau, Justin, 253, 255, 377, 384, 478 Truman, Harry S., v, 476, 479 Trumbull, Malcolm, 409 Trump Doctrine, 383 Trump, Donald, v–vii, x, xi, 24, 68, 69, 122, 190–192, 200, 232, 438, 460, 463, 468, 475 a “nationalist,” declared himself, 49 administration, 362, 412, 413 administration to list of threats to EU, 26 America’s trade deficit, view of, 65 American base, 369 and Chaos in Government, 151 and immigration, 408, 409 “base”, 27

bilateralism, preference for, 361 Britain’s Trump, 207 decision-making style, 65 democratic support for USMCA, 378 globalization, rejection of, 49 hispanic asylum-seekers, comments about, 427 July 2018 Helsinki summit, 253 MAGA slogan, 471 mainstream media, assailment of, 48 opponents, 144 properties in Florida and New York, 416 Putin, loyalty to, 323 Russia’s support in presidential election, 49 state visit to the UK (2019), 200 “the swamp”, 50 Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, 153 Trump of the Tropics, 285 Trump-Putin summit, 336 Trusted Traveler Program, 413 Tsai Ing-wen, 109 Tu-160 Russian strategic bombers, 282 Tunis, 198 Turkey, 17, 123, 246, 364, 411, 418, 421, 423, 424 incursion into Syria, 424 Turkmenistan, 102 Turks, 190 Tusk, Donald, 26, 70, 194, 195, 199, 231, 232 “Tweet storm”, 149 Tweets, 152, 408 2008 Beijing Olympics, 96 2016 Brexit referendum, 58 2017 EU summit, 233 2017 G-20 summit, 388 2019 G-7 summit in Biarritz, 373

INDEX

2019 National Intelligence Strategy, 61, 439 2019 NATO summit, 383 2020 Pew poll, 471 2020 presidential election, 24 Twitter, 6, 27, 48, 51, 415 Two-state solution, 117, 478 Tyson, Laura, 389

U UAE-Israeli agreement, 296 Uighurs, 388 UK-EU post-Brexit relations, 461 UK Independence Party (UKIP), 188, 191 Ukraine, vi, 14, 93, 114, 120, 158, 477 imposing sanctions on Russia over, 116 Ukraine crisis, 251 Ultraviolet lights, 152 Undocumented aliens, 414, 416 Undocumented migrants, 5, 410, 413 Unemployment, 363 “Unfair” trade, 363 UN General Assembly, 64 UN Human Rights Committee, 475 Unilateralism, 472 Unionist community, 192 Unipolar moment, 90 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 105, 161 United Fighting Championship (U.F.C), 413 United Kingdom (UK) nationalist-populism in, 188 negotiations between EU and, 196 United Nations (UN), 19, 316, 462 Charter, 11, 19 General Assembly in 2018, speech to, 48

527

System, 19 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 417, 475 United Officer’s Group, 277 United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), 377, 473 United States Fair and Reciprocal Trade Act, 324 United States (U.S.), 9, 282 2016 presidential election, 9 decline, perceptions of, 15 elections, meddling in, 13 foreign policy, successful, 71 influx of Latinos into, 10 intelligence agencies, 29 intelligence community, 49 judiciary, 60 populist opposition to immigration in, 14 relative decline, 15 Republicans, 53 trade deficit, 66 war games against China, 105. See also America United Steel Workers, 379 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 11, 19, 410 Universal Postal Union, 19, 318 UNOCOL, 102 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 410 U.N. Security Council, 143, 333 Uranium enrichment, 330, 334 Urban support, 54 Urban voters vs.rural voters, 58 Uruguay, 467 Uruguay Round (1986–1994), 324 U.S. Aluminum Association, 379 U.S. border migrant flow of Latinos to, 378 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 380 U.S.-China trade war, 362

528

INDEX

U.S. consumers and farmers, 372 U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 370 U.S. dollar, 18 U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, 417 U.S. farmers, 67, 387 U.S. firms imposing tariffs, 67 U.S. foreign debt, 369 U.S. goods, boycott of, 372 U.S. government securities Chinese purchases of, 103 U.S. hegemony, v declining, 90 U.S. intelligence community, 366 U.S.-Iranian Treaty of Amity (1955), 333 U.S. Iran sanctions, 329 U.S-North Korea relationship, 153 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 111 U.S. Postal Service, 474 U.S.-Russian relations “reset” in, 120 U.S. Senate, 4 USSR, 28, 62 U.S. Steel, 384 U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, 255 U.S. tax code, regressive, 57 U.S. trade deficit with Mexico, 67 U.S. treasury securities, 372 U.S. troops in Germany, reduction of, 322

V Validation, 59 Values, 64, 65 Venezuela, 20, 277, 280, 334, 426, 475 Venezuela’s National Assembly, 282

Venezuelan refugees, 426 Venezuela, Petròleos de, 283 Venture-capital firm, 415 Video streaming, 389 Vietnam, 104, 106, 108, 382, 386 Vietnamese, 414 Vietnamese “hearts and minds”, 95 Vietnam War, 63, 95 Virus, The, 425 Visegrad, 239 Vitiello, Ronald D., 414 Voight, Russ, 434 Volkswagen, 384 von der Leyen, Ursula, 209, 258 Vote Leave group, 190 Voter fraud, 62 Vulnerability, 464

W Walesa, Lech, 54 Wallace, George, 60 Wallander, Celeste A., 323 Walmart, 364 Walt, Stephen, 31, 156, 166 War crimes, 20 Warmbier, Otto, 64 War on multilateralism, 315 War on Poverty, 56 War on Terror, 114, 118 Warsaw, 330 Washington, 416 Washington Consensus, 20 Weber, Manfred, 242 Wehner, Peter, 57, 163, 426 Welfare programs, 57 West Bank, 295, 417 Western Pacific, 105, 106 Western Sahara, 296 WhatsApp, 415 Whigs, 408 White evangelicals, 66, 438

INDEX

White genocide, 57 White nationalism, 62 Whiteness, 468 White supporters, 468 White supremacism, 51, 69 White supremacists, 50, 63, 68, 159, 286, 408, 427, 468, 474 mentality, 51 WikiLeaks, 63, 189, 284 Wilders, Geert, 196, 235 Will, George, 59, 163, 188 Wilson, Woodrow, 17 Window of strategic opportunity, 105 Winnebago, 385 Wolf, Chad, 428 Wolfenden, Katherine J., 279 Wolf, Martin, 47, 60, 96, 152 Workers’ Party (Brazil), 284, 285 Working-class communities, 53 World’s “lungs”, 286 World Bank, 11, 18, 341 World Economic Forum, 364 World Health Organization (WHO), 19, 315, 316, 475, 478 World markets, 477 World Trade Center, 419 World Trade Organization (WTO), 5, 18, 316, 324, 341, 362, 367, 369, 374, 380, 382, 460, 464, 465, 478 dispute resolution system, 11 dispute-settlement system, 364 rules-based trading system, 369 treaty, 363 World War I, 17, 71 World War II, v, 16, 17, 71 effect of, 94 Wray, Christopher, 51, 159, 477 Wright, Thomas, 461

529

Wuhan virus, 151 X Xenophobia, 7, 390, 407, 408, 468 Xi Jinping, 27, 95, 122, 289, 316, 364, 477, 478 Xinjiang, 113 Y Yahoo, 415 Yanukovich, Viktor, 252 Yellow people, 468 Yeltsin, Boris, 91, 120 Yemen, 100, 118, 161 YouTube, 6 Z Zacharia, Fareed, 477 Zaidi-Shia Houthi movement (Yemen), 294 Zakaria, Fareed, 90, 188, 464 Zaretsky, Robert, 420 Zelaya, Manuel, 284 Zeman, Milos, 425 Zero non-tariff barriers, 382 Zero subsidies, 382 Zero-sum perception, 467 Zero-sum relationships, 4 Zero-sum views, 25 Zero tariffs, 382 “Zero tolerance” policy, 432, 433 Zhengfei, Ren, 366 Ziblatt, Daniel, 54, 474 Zimbabwe, 100 Zimmerman, James, 368 Zombie government, 193 ZTE electronics maker, 162